This book examines China's naval and airpower strategic direction towards the Indian Ocean region. It discusses Chi
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English Pages 273 Year 2025
Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Centre for Air Power Studies
Table of Contents
Tables and Figures
Abbreviations
Introduction
Chapter 1: China’s Grand Military Strategy
Chapter 2: China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice
Chapter 3: China’s Air and Naval Capabilities
Chapter 4: China and the Indian Ocean
Chapter 5: PLAN’s Basing Strategy in the IOR: The ‘String of Pearls’
Chapter 6: China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR
Chapter 7: PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping
Chapter 8: A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean
Chapter 9: Conclusion
Index
China’s Air Power and Maritime
Strategies Towards the
Indian Ocean Region
This book examines China’s naval and airpower strategic direction towards the Indian Ocean region. It analyses China’s military modernization program along with naval and airpower capabilities including expeditionary nature. It analyses China’s attempt to gain a strategic dominance in the IOR by means of investments and trade with the littoral countries, military-diplomatic relationship with friendly countries, permanent presence of naval systems in the Indian Ocean and delivering ‘public goods’ throughout the region. A comparative analysis of People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) expeditionary capabilities and Indian Air Force’s (IAF) deterrence mechanisms is also included. Joshy M Paul worked as a Research Fellow at the Centre for Airpower Studies (CAPS), New Delhi, focusing on East Asia, Airpower and Indo-Pacific. He has eighteen years of research-cum-academic experience on Asian Security, East Asian Affairs, Airpower Dynamics and Maritime Security of the Indo-Pacific. Before joining CAPS, he worked as Assistant Professor at the Department of International Studies, Christ University, Bangalore, and also with a premier naval think tank, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. He has been an RSIS-MacArthur Associate Visiting Fellow (Singapore) in 2010, NIDS Visiting Research Fellow ( Japan) in 2011, and Salzburg Global Seminar Fellow in 2009, 2015 & 2022.
China’s Air Power and Maritime
Strategies Towards the
Indian Ocean Region
JOSHY M. PAUL
Air Marshal Anil
Centre for Air Power Studies New Delhi
Introduction by
Chopra PVSM AVSM VM VSM (Retd)
in association with
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi
First published 2025
by Routledge
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© 2025 Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
The right of Joshy M. Paul to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 9781032969732 (hbk)
ISBN: 9781032969756 (pbk)
ISBN: 9781003591542 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003591542
Typeset in A Caslon Pro
by KW Publishers, Delhi
CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES VISION
To be an independent centre of excellence on national security contributing informed and considered research and analyses on relevant issues. MISSION
To encourage independent and informed research and analyses on issues of relevance to national security and to create a pool of domain experts to provide considered inputs to decision-makers. Also, to foster informed public debate and opinion on relevant issues and to engage with other think-tanks and stakeholders within India and abroad to provide an Indian perspective.
Contents
Tables and Figures
ix
Abbreviations
xi
Introduction
xv
1.
China’s Grand Military Strategy
2.
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice
35
3.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities
65
4.
China and the Indian Ocean
105
5.
PLAN’s Basing Strategy in the IOR: The ‘String of Pearls’
129
6.
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR
151
7.
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping
182
8.
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the
Indian Ocean
203
9.
Conclusion
236
Index
1
251
Tables and Figures
Tables
2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 8.1
Major Russian Weapons Delivered to China 1987–2016 New Classes of PLAN Destroyers Since the 1990s New Class of Frigates Since the1990s PLAN Port Visits, 1985-97 Major Approved BRI Investments in Pakistan Major Approved BRI Investments in Sri Lanka Major Approved BRI Investments in Bangladesh Major Approved BRI Investments in Myanmar Major Approved BRI Investments in East Africa Certain Types of Chinese and US Ships Since 2005 The Southern Theatre Command Inventory by 2022
Figures
1.1 Map of First and Second Island Chains 2.1 Chinese Arms Purchases from the Soviet Union/Russia (1950-2002) Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 3.1 PLA’s Combat Aircraft: Selected Inventories 2016-22 3.2 Total Number of Ships of the US and Chinese Navies during 2000-20 3.3 The US Navy Plan for 355 Ships by 2034 3.4 Breakdown of PLA Navy Surface Fleet in 2021 5.1 Topographical Map of China’s ‘String of Pearls’
54 77 80 111 163 164 164 165 168 189 217
17 47 73 89 91 92 132
x • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
6.1 China’s Belt and Road Initiative 6.2 China’s MSR Ports in the Indo-Pacific 7.1 Annual Number of Destroyers and Frigates Commissioned
into the PLAN 8.1 PLA’s Major Aviation Units 8.2 China Theatre Commands 8.3 Coverage of China’s Bombers and Missiles from
Mischief Reef, SCS 8.4 Combat Radius of J-17 Thunder of 1,700 km from
Dara Sakor Air Base and Mischief Reef 8.5 Air Cover with Su-30 MKI from Thanjavur 8.6 Radii of Action of Su-30 MKI from ANC 8.7 Island Airfields of Friendly Foreign Countries
155
170
191
206
207
209
215
221
222
225
Abbreviations
AAA AAI AAM A2/AD AAW ADA ADIZ AEW AIIB AIP ALBM ALCM ANC ASBM ASCM ASW AWACS BIMSTEC BMD BRI BVRAAM CAIG
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Airport Authority of India Air-to-Air Missiles Anti-Access Area Denial Anti-Air War Air Domain Awareness Air Defence Identification Zone Airborne Early Warning Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Air-Independent Propulsion Air-Launched Ballistic Missile Air-Launched Cruise Missile Andaman and Nicobar Command Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Anti-Submarine Warfare Airborne Warning and Control System Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Ballistic Missile Defence Belt and Road Initiative Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group
xii • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
C3I C4ISR
CATBAR CCCC CCP CICT CMC CMEC CONUS CPEC CPTPP CRS CSC CSG CTF DIFTZ ECS EEZ EMALS EXIM Bank FCS FRA FYP GLD HADR IAC IAF IOR IRBM
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Catapult Assisted Take-off But Arrested Recovery China Communications Construction Company Chinese Communist Party Colombo International Container Terminal Central Military Commission China-Myanmar Economic Corridor Continental United States China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Congressional Service Report Colombo Security Conclave Carrier Strike Group Combined Task Force Djibouti International Free Trade Zone East China Sea Exclusive Economic Zone Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System Export-Import Bank Fire Control Systems Flight Refueller Aircraft Five-Year Plan General Logistics Department Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Indigenous Aircraft Carrier Indian Air Force Indian Ocean Region Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
Abbreviations • xiii
JSDFs KMT LACM MDA MGP MIRV MOOTW MPA MRAF MRBM MSR NAM NDRC NDU NDIO NEO OECD PDI PGM PLA PLAAF PLAN PLANAF PRC R&D RCEP SAC SAGAR SAM SCS SDI SHADE
Japanese Self-Defence Forces Kuomintang Land Attack Cruise Missile Maritime Domain Awareness Maritime Great Power Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle Military Operations Other Than War Maritime Patrol Aircraft Military Region Air Force Medium Range Ballistic Missile Maritime Silk Route Non-Aligned Movement National Development and Reform Commission National Defence University National Defence Industries Office Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Pacific Deterrence Initiative Precision-Guided Munition People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force People’s Liberation Army Navy PLA Naval Air Force People’s Republic of China Research and Development Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Shenyang Aircraft Corporation Security and Growth for All in the Region Surface-to-Air Missile South China Sea Strategic Defence Initiative Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
xiv • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
SLBM SLOCs SOA SRAAM SRBM SSBN SSN STC STOBAR TCAF TPP UAV UCAV USAF USINDOPACOM VLS WCT WTC
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Sea Lines of Communication State Oceanic Administration Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile Short Range Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine Attack Nuclear Submarine Southern Theatre Command Short Takeoff But Arrested Recovery Theatre Command Air Force Trans-Pacific Partnership Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle United States Air Force US Indo-Pacific Command Vertical Launch Systems West Container Terminal Western Theatre Command
Introduction
China has seen the fastest growth of aerospace and naval assets in the last two decades. It has made large investments in defence Research and Development (R&D), and created industries for all genres of technologies and platforms. This was possible because the Chinese economy grew at over 10 percent for nearly two decades, and funds could be spared. It was also because the authoritarian leadership had chosen to become a global power, and that required higher investments in aerospace and maritime assets. China’s aircraft industry has two fifth generation fighter programmes. Nearly 150 stealth J-20s have been build. The F-35 look-alike J-35 development has been accelerated. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has nearly 1,700 fighters, of which nearly 1,000 are fourth generation plus. These include the Sukhoi Su-27UBK, Su-30MKK, Su-35S, Chengdu J-10, and Shenyang J-11 and J-16. China already has nearly 175 H-6 bomber variants which are nuclear capable and some can carry six long-range cruise missiles. The indigenous H-20 strategic stealth bomber is getting ready for its maiden flight. It has three types of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, including the Ilyushin Il-76 based KJ-200, Shaanxi Y-8 based KJ 200, and Y-9 based KJ-500. The numbers are still small for the continental sized country. It has electronic warfare variants of the H-6 and some transport aircraft. The 66-ton payload indigenous heavy transport aircraft Y-20 has been inducted in large numbers, with nearly 60 flying. The Flight Refueller Aircraft (FRA) variant and an AEW&C are evolving. China builds its own Z-9 and Z-20 utility helicopters, and Z-10 attack helicopters. It also
xvi • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
has a strong Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry. China has some of the longest range air-to-air missiles, and significant Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) manufacturing capability. Its ballistic missile and cruise missile programmes are now supplemented by the hypersonic missile programme. Similarly, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is supported by a huge ship-building industry. The PLAN today has more ships than the US Navy in numbers, albeit they are much less in tonnage.The PLAN has two combat-ready aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong. The third, the Fujian, is under system fitment. The next, Type 004 is planned to be larger and also have nuclear propulsion, and construction reportedly began in 2017. China plans to have six by 2035, and this seems highly achievable. Chinese aircraft carriers have yet to sail into the eastern Pacific or Indian Ocean. The PLAN’s active ships number nearly 425 and, in addition, there are around 230 auxiliary ships. Significant among these are the aircraft carriers, three landing helicopter docks, eight amphibious transport docks, 36 landing ship tanks, eight ballistic missile submarines, 12 nuclear attack submarines, 58 attack submarines, as well as many destroyers, frigates, etc. China has been making aggressive forays into the South and East China Seas and crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait regularly. China is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean in terms of acquiring and leasing ports for political, economic, and strategic reasons.The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is important for China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative as it accounts for the transfer of nearly 80 per cent of China’s energy imports. China is directly or indirectly involved in nearly 17 ports in the IOR. The most important of these are the deep-water ports and terminals at Gwadar in Pakistan, and Lamu in Kenya; 13 of the 17 are being built by Chinese companies. In some others, China has made financial investments. A Chinese company owns the Doraleh multi-purpose port in Djibouti. The PLA’s first overseas military support base in Djibouti oversees the Horn of Africa, is operated by the PLAN, and supports its blue water capabilities. China has leased the Gwadar port, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and some others. It has invested nearly $300 million in a terminal at the Khalifa port near Abu Dhabi. The Chittagong and Payra ports in Bangladesh have been built by a Chinese company. Even Karachi’s deep-water terminal has
Introduction • xvii
been built by a Chinese company. Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Djibouti have substantial Chinese debts. Over 27 per cent of Pakistan’s total external debt is owed to China. China also has a secret naval base in Ream, Cambodia. The PLAN’s sensor laden reconnaissance and intelligence gathering listening post ships, active warships, and submarines ply through the Indian Ocean and also some make port calls. The navies of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar are mostly equipped with Chinese vessels, equipment and platforms. Some of them exercise with the PLAN. All this increases the interoperability and presence of the PLAN in the IOR. Till the Chinese aircraft carriers start sailing into the IOR, the PLAAF will be able to overfly Myanmar and reach the Indian island territories in the Bay of Bengal. Conscious of increased Chinese air and maritime presence in the IOR, India has strengthened its maritime presence through the Indian Navy and Air Force in and around the Indian peninsula, and its island territories. India has also arranged access to certain ports and air bases of its like-minded democratic friends. Geographically, India is well positioned to dominate the northern Indian Ocean, the only ocean named after a country. India should endeavour to achieve Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capability between the Malacca Strait in the east, and the Gulf Hormuz and Gulf of Aden in the west. This book, titled China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region, is written by a senior scholar who has been researching on both maritime and air aspects in the Indo-Pacific. The subject being geostrategically important for India, the book is most timely. It should make a good read for both scholars and the uninitiated about the air and maritime aspects of the Indian Ocean region.
1.
China’s Grand Military Strategy
China is emerging as a 21st century great power. Its navy is the largest in the world in terms of the number of ships, and its air force is the third largest in the world. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is enhancing its capabilities to match those of the United States, quantitatively and qualitatively. Indeed, all great powers in the history of the world were either maritime powers or had strong navies to protect their trade interests as well as landmass. Importantly, air coverage for the navy to operate freely in distant waters is a major concern for military decision-makers. The US has a large number airfields in different parts of the world, and can also use the air assets of its allies and friendly countries. On the other hand, during the Cold War, the former Soviet Union had critically lacked military assets in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and beyond the north Atlantic. China, essentially a continental power, is expanding its economic interests through the oceanic shores across the globe under the new programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and pursues naval expansionism as its path to emerge as a 21st century great power. Naturally, its expansion of economic interests will invariably demand security protection for its assets. In 2015, China announced its “far seas protection” strategy with the intention of expanding its military presence in the Indian Ocean.1 In this regard, the Chinese Navy—the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN/PLA Navy)—and the PLAAF are going to play vital roles in China’s expanded economic and security interests. Besides, both the PLAAF and the PLAN may undertake expeditionary operations to make the “Maritime Great Power” (MGP) 2 concept of
2 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
President Xi Jinping a reality. In this MGP strategy, China will likely seek a ‘consolidation’ of the near seas—Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea—and expansion towards the Indian Ocean with the intention of gaining ‘strategic control’ of the water body In this expansionism, the PLAN is likely to play the primary role while the PLAAF will provide air coverage as well as carry out independent expeditionary operations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). However, many observers believe that the rules based world order that came into being after the end of World War II, may not be the same once China has marginalised the US and established its will in the maritime domain. China is looking at controlling the seas in the East Asian region, once controlled by imperial Japan before its defeat by the US in World War II, and since then, the US has dominated the water body, which is now up for grabs by China. China has filled the vacuum left by the former Soviet Union in East Asia and is challenging the US supremacy in the western Pacific, while expanding its influence in the IOR, in its attempt to emerge as a 21st century maritime great power. Geography is the most basic and enduring influence upon a country’s strategic choices.3 It contributes both as a limitation and as an opportunity. National strategic culture is very much the product of geographical conditioning. Many countries have a plainly maritime or continentalist orientation in their strategic worldviews. An island nation or one that has a large swath of water on its boundary, focusses on the maritime domain for its existence. It thrives through maritime trade and militarily controls the area it believes necessary to protect for its economic dominance. Major great powers like Great Britain, America, and imperial Japan emerged through their oceanic activity and built powerful navies to protect their trade interests. As a result, they were able to protect their shores from invaders. And China, today, seeks to emerge as a continental-cum-maritime power, an unparalleled great power, dominating both the Eurasian landmass and the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre. After Beijing was captured by the Red Army and on the verge of officially founding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders recognised the importance
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 3
of developing aerial and maritime capabilities within the PLA. Mao stated in September 1949 at the first plenary of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), “We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy”.4 Mao listed the PLAAF ahead of the PLAN, however, today, the PLAN is listed prior to the PLAAF in the protocol order. In Mao’s ‘People’s War’ concept, both the air force and navy were considered as extended arms of the PLA ground force as he believed that China could defeat an enemy decisively if the war occurred in the interior part of China in which China would mobilise the masses along with the full strength of the army. The subordinate role of the PLAN and PLAAF to the PLA Army continued until the 2000s, and the commanders of both Services were inducted into the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest decision-making body, headed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), only in 2004. They are now considered as ‘Strategic Services’ within the PLA and have their own headquarters and separate branch under the newly formed Theatre Commands. The early missions and roles of the PLAAF can be understood from the statements and writings of Mao and the PLAAF’s first three commanders, that it had to “support the ground forces in unification (Taiwan, Hainan, Yijiangshan and Jinmen) work, conduct air defense, and build up its capability aligned with the broader PLA ground force-dominated force building process”5. Operational matters were decided at the top level of the PLA, and all PLAAF commanders were selected from previous ground force officers and political commissars who had served during the civil war, through 1985.6 The PLAAF leadership enshrined “air force construction on the foundation of the ground forces” as the PLAAF’s guiding principle.7 The PLAAF was not able to meet the leadership’s requirements of providing direct air support for the ground forces during the Korean War, and this deficiency continued for a few more decades despite the call for modernising the air force.8 M. Taylor Fravel notes that the PLA’s overall strategic outlook was focussed on the defeat of a superior enemy, thus, “the PLAAF recognized early on that it lacked the operational experience and advanced aircraft to match those of a sophisticated adversary—a challenge it confronted during the Korean War”.9
4 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
China’s Air Power Strategy The Korean War, battles over Taiwan’s offshore islands, and the Vietnam conflict shaped the evolution of the PLAAF’s employment of concepts, and the tempo of air and space power growth. The PLAAF had been actively involved in the PLA’s two major campaigns—Yijiangshan and Jinmen—against Taiwan’s islands in the 1950s, which also helped to shape the Chinese Air Force’s employment concepts . During the Korean War, however, the PLAAF was supposed to provide aerial protection for the ground forces, but it could not carry out this primary task because of various technical limitations against the superior US forces. 10 This forced the PLAAF to change its missions and focus more on securing the borders and territorial integrity as well as providing air protection for major cities. The Yijiangshan Island campaign of 1954-55 was a combined air, ground, and naval operation in which the PLAAF was able to achieve air superiority by conducting attacks on Taiwanese resupply ships, decoy and reconnaissance missions, and providing direct air support for landing operations.11 Similarly, the Jinmen campaign of 1958, the first Chinese military conflict to truly involve air combat, was in many ways a guideline for the PLAAF’s future air combat operations as it was an important shaper of the PLAAF’s strategy and employment concepts because the air operational principles were directly controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC).12 During the Jinmen operations, the PLAAF overwhelmingly attacked enemy artillery and firepower positions as well as command and communication centres.13 According to Zhang Xiaoming, the CMC defined the PLAAF’s role in joint operations based on the experiences from various campaigns as: “(1) using overwhelming force to achieve protection of forces and destruction of enemy forces; (2) subservience of military battles to political battles by a strict adherence to CMC operational policy; and (3) study and application of the PLAAF experiences and tactics drawn from the Korean War”.14 China did not use its air force during the 1962 border conflict with India and the 1979 Vietnam War to avoid the involvement of the US in the former case and that of the Soviet Union in the latter conflict.15 Until the 2000s, the PLAAF remained a defensive force, deploying half of its aircraft to protect
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 5
home bases and major cities, as the short range of its aircraft deprived it of the ability to undertake international missions, including under the United Nations. Importantly, the PLAAF suffered greatly during the post-Cultural Revolution era because of the political stalemate between Chairman Mao and Defence Minister Lin Biao, who orchestrated a failed coup and was marginalised till Mao’s death but was reinstated in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. Deng rehabilitated around 6,000 senior military officials who became his eyes and ears during his defence modernisation period.16 By 1981, Deng attained complete control over the defence forces and called on the PLAAF to “strictly enforce order and prohibition” and also implemented the second and third three-year plans for training and combat readiness.17 With active support from Deng for modernisation, the PLAAF Headquarters urged the aviation industry to gear up for high production and performance. Deng gave high priority to the air force in his defence modernisation era, and as CMC chairman, he brought in his perspective on air power to official CMC dogma. Deng viewed that “pursuance of air superiority is crucial to Chinese military power and winning future wars”.18 However, the actual modernisation of the PLAAF started only in the 2000s due to the lack of homegrown technology and systems and its continued reliance on Soviet technology and hardware, while the navy got early attention due to its Commander Liu Huaqing’s proximity to Deng. In the 1990s, the PLAAF’s employment concepts for future wars were reoriented according to the “active defense strategy” adopted by the CMC in the 1980s. Accordingly, the PLAAF’s warfare strategy was formulated in three phases: “strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-attack.”19 In the active defence strategy, the PLAAF’s role was defined into two categories—defensive campaigns and attack campaigns—either of which could be one of two types: independent air force campaigns, and air force campaigns as part of a joint campaign.20 It also adopted two principles in its warfare strategy: ‘light front, heavy rear’ and the ‘deploying in three rings’ concept. The ‘light front, heavy rear’ principle stemmed from Mao’s ‘people’s war’ concept in which the inner core (both territory and political leadership) had to be heavily fortified and in the PLAAF’s concept it comprised “airfields, national political and
6 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
economic centers, heavy troop concentrations, important military facilities, and transportation systems,”21 Under this strategy, most fighter aircraft, and almost all Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAMs) were concentrated around China’s large cities—most of which are at least 200 km from China’s borders. Because the aircraft and SAMs were deployed to protect the hinterland, China’s frontiers were ‘lightly’ defended. The principle of ‘deploying in three rings’ involves organising a small quantity of interceptors, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and SAMs “as a combined air defense force into ‘three dimensional, in-depth, overlapping’ firepower rings.”22 It says, “Each weapon system would be assigned a specific air space to defend—high, medium or low. In-depth rings means assigning each weapon system for a specific distance from the target to defend— distant, medium or close. Overlapping rings means organizing each weapon system into left, middle or right firepower rings facing the most likely avenue of approach”.23 However, the Gulf War of 1991 forced the PLAAF to reformulate its doctrine and strategy in accordance with the PLA’s ‘local war under high-technology conditions’. The 1991 Gulf War was a watershed moment in the history of China’s air power concept. The demonstration of air power by the United States against Iraq shattered the confidence of the Chinese elites with the existing platforms and doctrinal concepts.24 They highlighted that in future wars, modern technology and advanced weapons would be on display and determine the outcome of the war. Accordingly, the PLA strategists relied on the West’s writings on high-technology warfare and concluded that “in order to move towards a combined forces posture, the PLAAF must add more offensive forces”.25 In accordance with this thinking, the PLAAF decided to restructure its combat inventory with a mix of modern fighters, bombers (bomber fighter), helicopters and transport planes, while allowing a large number of obsolete aircraft to be retired. The PLAAF’s inventory comprised a great number of fighter aircraft but after the Gulf War, it started increasing the numbers of reconnaissance planes, electronic counter-measures aircraft, early warning aircraft, air refuelling aircraft, and transport planes.26
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 7
The PLAAF’s missions and objectives were redefined in the 1990s from the people’s war’ concept to convert it to a 21st century air force in which the ‘deterrence’ strategy gained more importance. Until then, the PLAAF’s equipment has been aging and backward, limited in power, and not equal to that of many small and medium-size countries’air forces.27 Thus, the PLAAF sought to enhance its deterrence and offensive air power capabilities with improved bombers and modern fighter aircraft and aimed to increase its strategic reach. Also, the PLAAF was used to exert diplomatic influence over the territorial claims in the South China Sea against the other claimants by conducting airborne reconnaissance, using these islands or sea areas as bomber shelters.28 Similarly, the ‘fist’ unit formed in the late 1980s as a rapid action force, gained traction within the PLAAF in the 1990s. The role of a ‘fist’ unit is to end the war quickly and be part of a strategic counter attack. It was decided that China would conduct future wars as part of its ‘active defence strategy’ comprising three facets: strategic defence, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-attack. Accordingly, one fighter aviation division would be formed in each battle area. Each division would have three fighter regiments dispersed along the main attack routes, plus one ground attack regiment, one bomber regiment, one Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, one electronic counter-measures aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft special troops.29 However, to deploy rapid action units in the battlefield, the PLAAF needed air dominance in the theatre which required airborne command and control platforms as well as sufficient numbers of in-flight tankers to refuel fighters while they loiter, which China critically lacked until the 2000s, including trained pilots.30 By 1996, the PLAAF and PLAN aviation consisted of approximately 4,424 combat aircraft, including 24 Su-27s but the remaining were based on the 1950s and 1960s technologies, and 1,075 bombers.31 China was keen to induct the Soviet Union’s latest fourth generation fighter, Su-27; an agreement was signed in 1990 and China received three fighters before the Soviet disintegration in 1991, and also got the licence to assemble these in China. By the 2000s, the PLAAF emerged as a ‘strategic air force’ with an independent doctrine and operational concept, deviating from the CMC’s supervision. In 1987, the PLAAF had first proposed creating its own strategy
8 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
with the goal of making “coordinating offensive and defensive operations” as the strategic component of the PLA’s “active defense strategy”, on the lines of the PLAN’s strategy of “offshore active defense” announced in 1985.32 It was reported that the ground force-centric organisation of the PLA and the army were opposed to giving the PLAAF its own strategy and argued that this would let the PLAAF become a strategic Service in its own right.33 After the 1995 Taiwan fiasco, many PLAAF strategists argued for the “offensive air defense” concept, making the PLAAF an aerospace force.34 In the 2000s, the PLAAF theoreticians, especially Dong Wenxian, a member of the PLAAF’s Military Theory Studies Expert Group, wrote extensively on the ‘strategic air force’ concept and Chinese air and space power, deriving the air power concept from Deng’s 1979 article which stated that “it would be impossible to win such a conflict without command of the air”.35 In 2004, the CMC officially approved the PLAAF’s independent strategy titled ‘Integrated Air and Space Operations, Being Prepared for Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations’, which made the PLAAF a ‘strategic Service’ capable of obtaining political objectives from the top leadership in concert with the rest of the PLA forces or separately.36 The ninth PLAAF Commander, Qiao Qingchen, along with the commanders of the PLA Navy and PLA Second Artillery Force (Rocket Force), were elevated as CMC members. Official military documents started highlighting the PLAAF’s roles and missions elaborately and the 2004 Defence White Paper described the PLAAF’s mission objectives as “the air force has gradually shifted from territorial air defence to one of both offensive and defensive operations,” and also “safeguarding China’s air space security and maintaining a stable air defence posture nationwide.”37 The White Paper also highlighted the development of new fighters, air defence, and anti-missile weapons and the need “to improve the capabilities in operations like air strikes, air defence, information countermeasures, early warning and reconnaissance, strategic mobility, and integrated support.”38 The 2006 Defence White Paper emphasised the importance of increasing “its [PLAAF’s] capabilities in the areas of air strike, air and missile defense, early warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projection.”39 The White Papers and other PLA doctrinal literature reveal that the PLAAF’s air defence mission is now conceived of
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 9
as a nationwide responsibility that incorporates both offensive and defensive actions. Gradually, the PLAAF has emerged as a modern fighting force with expeditionary capabilities to conduct offensive operations up to the second island chain areas. In the New Historic Mission laid out by President Hu Jintao at the 17th Party Congress in November 2007, the PLAAF’s ‘strategic air force’ position was reiterated as “to build a modernized ‘Strategic Air Force’ that will be compatible with the international stature of our country and capable of carrying out the historical mission of our armed forces.”40 As a strategic air force, the PLAAF has to participate in joint operations as well as independent strategic actions in support of the PLA’s military operations as per the national objectives.The PLAAF has also started inducting ‘integrated air and space capabilities’ for joint operations both in the near seas areas and the far seas. According to Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping, integrated air and space operations are “operations in which aviation and space forces are the main operational components. It includes other operational forces related to integrated air and space operations and is represented by joint operations in the air and space battlefield.”41 China’s military aerospace capabilities, according to Scott Harold, are: “manned and unmanned fixed- and rotarywing aviation, ballistic and cruise missiles, and satellites and space-based assets—capabilities that the PLA operates across four Services plus the Strategic Support Force.”42 China conducted the first ever in the world AntiSatellite (ASAT) missile test in 2007: a weather satellite—the FY-1C—at an altitude of 865 km was destroyed by a ballistic missile on October 11.43 Since the PLAAF has now become an independent and strategic air force, its missions and roles have been redefined as “to move beyond its focus on air defense of Chinese territory by placing greater emphasis on conventional deterrence missions and offensive operations.”44 In order to maintain the ‘offensive-defensive’ operational requirements of the PLAAF as well as to emerge as a modern air force, it has to enhance “the speed, mobility, and firepower of modern air platforms that ‘dictate the offensive power which is the essence of the air force’”,45 wrote Li Chuanxun, a PLAAF theorist in the Strategic Air Force magazine, published by the PLAAF’s official publisher, Lantian (Blue Sky) Press. In a broader concept of the deterrence
10 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
strategy which includes nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare capabilities, Chinese strategists argue that “conventional military power is an increasingly important component of strategic deterrence, both because of improvements in conventional military capabilities and because conventional forces can be employed more readily than nuclear weapons”,46 They believe that conventional capabilities play a key role in strengthening China’s deterrence posture, because “long-range offensive air power has strong destructive power”. It can play a vital role in deterring the potential enemy. China replaced thousands of antiquated fighter jets from the 1950s and 1960s with advanced jects in the last decade. For instance, in 1999, the ratio of third and fourth generation fighters was 3,348 and 52, while in 2019, it became 852 and 837.47 Even though the PLAAF puts its emphasis on both offence and defence, the focus is on offence, with expeditionary propensity as the country’s interests have been growing globally. Former PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang (from 2007 to 2012) had claimed that “by 2020, the Chinese Air Force would establish a defense/offense balance through its reorganization and with a modern inventory”.48 Indeed, in terms of combat effectiveness, building an offensive air force is faster and cheaper than building a defensive one. Moreover, given China’s vulnerabilities in terms of combat experience and quality of the systems, an offensive force has greater deterrence power in a regional contest. The PLAAF’s expeditionary stature was officially propounded by the Chinese president during his visit to the PLAAF Headquarters in April 2014 where he called on the need to “accelerate the construction of a powerful people’s air force” and instructed air force generals “to improve air force structure, build up new combat capacity, and make a rapid transition to a balanced air power for both defense and offense.”49 He emphasised the jointness of forces, not only in the air and space domain but “to defend China’s maritime interests and strengthen its over-water capabilities.”50 China’s ambition of extending its military influence beyond the East Asian periphery was mentioned in the 2013 edition of Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative military document that stated the need for “shifting the strategic defense from coastal periphery to the external forward edge”, and “building overseas strategic strong points that depend
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 11
on the homeland, radiate into the surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans.”51 It also called for the PLA Air Force to have an ‘effective combat radius’ (platform plus missile range) of 3,000 km from China’s borders, effectively providing aerial coverage up to the second island chain.52 Like Liu Huaqing, who closely worked with Den Xiaoping in China’s naval modernisation, former PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang, who became the PLAAF commander in 2007, then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2012, and a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo in 2013, emerged as a top leader next to Xi Jinping, and has supervised the PLA’s restructuring as well as the PLAAF’s modernisation.53 By incorporating the “far seas protections strategy” in the 2015 Defence White Paper,54 the scope of the PLAAF’s operational strategy expanded from the East Asian theatre to the far seas area, allied with the PLAN’s wider operational requirements, particularly, the Indian Ocean. While the PLAN has been given the task of performing the “primary role” in expeditionary operations out at sea, and the PLAAF is considered an “essential” force in making offensive defensive campaigns successful.55 In any offensive actions that the PLAN has to embark on in the Indian Ocean, which is the backyard of the Indian Navy and also the operational area of the US Navy’s IndoPacific Command (USINDOPACOM), the PLAAF has to provide air coverage and necessarily requires expeditionary capabilities. Undoubtedly, offensive and long-range capabilities are necessary for the PLAAF’s expeditionary operations in the oceanic direction for air control, air strike, and air defence. The PLAAF has gradually acquired these capabilities in alliance with the PLAN’s two navy missions. In the PLA’s offensive and expeditionary operations, the PLAAF will have to undertake a key role in joint amphibious landings, coastal blockade, joint firepower strike, island defence, airborne, and nuclear counter-strike campaigns. The PLAAF’s expeditionary role will be focussing on the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, both independently and in support of the PLAN. The PLAAF’s expeditionary operations in the Pacific, crossing the first island chain, were demonstrated for the first ever time in 2015 when an H-6K bomber conducted a reconnaissance mission in the western Pacific,
12 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
transiting through the Miyako Strait that connects the Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa.56 A year later, the PLAAF bomber circumnavigated Taiwan by passing through both the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel in the same mission and has significantly increased the number of circumnavigation missions since then.57 Although the Southern Theatre Command’s operational area is defined as the South China Sea, it can be extended into the Indian Ocean from air bases in the artificial islands in the South China Sea and also from Dara Sakor air base in Cambodia where China has built a massive 3,400-metre (m) airstrip, which would be able to accommodate all types fighter aircraft and bombers of the PLAAF.58 Also, China can provide aerial coverage from the Western Theatre Command to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea with one-time refuelling while using the air space of Myanmar and Pakistan, its close strategic partners. China has already established direct land connectivity to the Indian Ocean though Myanmar and Pakistan under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China can also use Pakistani airfields such as Gwadar and Karachi, on the southern flank of Pakistan, during a crisis with India.
China’s Maritime Strategy
Arguments about China’s maritime power can be discussed in two ways: is China following a Mahanian concept of ‘command of the ocean’, or simply following a continentalist mentality with expanded maritime activity? American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan has conceptualised maritime power as combining domestic prosperity and naval power which requires robust domestic industrial production, overseas markets, forward bases and large merchant and military shipping.59 The Mahanian concept helped spur the US expansion into Asia in the late19th century and it became a great power by the beginning of the 20th century. Mahan propounded the theory of “command of the ocean” that underpinned the “overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great commons, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores.”60 He further argued that foreign commerce was necessary to ensure America’s economic vitality, and overseas bases, and large battle fleets were required
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 13
to defend the flow of trade. Powerful battle fleets, implied Mahan, should be used to crush the navies of rival maritime nations and wrest control of strategic waterways, thus, assuring the dominant power access to the sea lanes and the commerce they conveyed. According to him, command of the sea was inextricably bound with commercial, geographic, and military considerations. Commerce, and, thus, national prosperity, hinged on sea power, as embodied in commercial and naval shipping, and control of critical geographic nodes. According to Mahan, building a powerful navy is not to conquer territory or acquire colonies but to protect trade and maintain peace. He declared, “Commerce thrives by peace and suffers by war … it follows that peace is the superior interest” of great sea-faring nations.61 For him, the navy was simply the logical outgrowth of peaceful maritime commerce. Forward bases were necessary to permit warships to operate ‘forward’, strategically placed along the Sea Lines of Communication (SLoCs). Naval power, economic health, and geographic expansion fused under the rubric of ‘sea power’. Continental powers such as France, imperial Germany and the former Soviet Union, however, focussed on coastal defence in their strategic thinking. France and imperial Germany had a colonial strategy and the role of the navy was not just to protect the land but to harass the rival’s commerce; in the case of the Soviet Union, priority was given to industrialisation during the inter-war period, so resource allocation for ship-building was constrained, and the army was allocated most of what was left.62 The naval focus, accordingly, switched to coastal defence, using an integrated system of minefields, coastal artillery, submarines and motor torpedo boats, In fact, the navy worked under the direction of the Soviet Communist Party, with a light and inexpensive naval defensive-deterrent force centred on submarines, and only a small number of large ships to support the Soviet Army.63 Under the Marxist-Leninist terminology, the central tenets of what became known as the Soviet Young School were that the navy existed to guard the army’s seaward flank, and focussed on ‘small war’, that smaller craft and submarines could be manufactured quickly and losses could, therefore, be readily replaced, and, subsequently, submarines replaced battleships as the main striking arm of the fleet.64 Under Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, who was
14 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985, a drastic change occurred and he converted the Soviet Navy into a world class naval power capable of disrupting the US’ might in the north Atlantic. As a continental power, China followed the Soviet strategy for almost two decades, and then shifted its attention towards being a sea power by the 1980s. There were three reasons behind China’s shift in its attention to the sea: history, geopolitics and economics. Although geopolitics and economic necessity were the primary drivers of this shift, it was also a long felt dream of the Chinese people and leaders to overcome the ‘century of humiliation’ and become a maritime power. Historically, ever since the maritime civilisation swept China in the 19th century, the Chinese people expected China to become a maritime power once again.65 The Opium Wars brought maritime security high on China’s agenda as a national strategic objective. Through various conflicts (such as the Sino-French War and Sino-Japanese War) with other maritime powers, the Qing dynasty’s naval capacity had been devastated, which made the Chinese people understand that maritime power went beyond simple naval construction; rather, it required a well-planned strategy. Communist China’s main security concern in the early decades was the presence of the US military in East Asia, particularly in South Korea, in the post Korean War period and US support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan . This security situation forced China to believe that an amphibious operation against it could occur as part of the US’ containment of Communism strategy. Highlighting the importance of a strong navy to thwart an amphibious attack against China, Mao declared in 1953 that “in order to resist an imperialist invasion from the sea, we must build a strong navy”. However, instead of building a strong navy to thwart an invasion of the land from the sea, China focussed much on stationing a large number of short range missiles along the coast. The reason was that protecting the motherland dominated China’s security thinking rather than becoming a maritime power. This was emphatically described by the then Vice Premier Zhang Chunqiao in 1972, “We are continentalists. Now guided missiles are well developed. Installed on shore, they can hit any target, and there is no need to build a big navy.”66 Since the stationing of US troops in South Korea and the Taiwan Strait was included within the “defensive perimeter”
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 15
line of the US67, a US invasion from the sea, indeed, seemed to be on the horizon. To thwart the US invasion, Mao continued his civil war strategy of ‘luring the enemy deep’ to protect the motherland from imperialist forces. Mao did not focus on prevention of an invasion through a forward defence strategy; rather, defeating the enemy decisively in the hinterland gained prominence in China’s strategic thought. This strategy continued until the 1980s even against the Soviet threat that was more severe during the late 1960s and 1970s. When the Soviet threat disintegrated in the 1980s, China started focussing on the maritime domain as a defensive strategy as well as to enhance its expanding role on the global stage. Broadly speaking, China’s naval strategy can be divided into three categories, along with a certain time period. The first one is the ‘near coast defence’ strategy for the period up to the 1980s; the second is the ‘offshore active defence’ from the late 1980s/early 1990s; and the ‘far seas operation’ from the late 2000s. When the Soviet threat emerged in the late 1960s, the navy’s traditional concept of coastal defence against a Soviet naval assault from the sea remained unchanged. The Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet was powerful enough to even challenge the US supremacy in the region. Mao visualised that along with the Soviet land invasion of China from the north, it could do the same from the sea, so disrupting the advancement of the Soviet fleet was the task set out for navy. Accordingly, three main missions were to be carried out by the navy against the Soviets: (1) preserving combat capability and preventing early engagement with the Soviet Pacific Fleet in lingering sea battles, in order to endure a protracted war; (2) dividing the PLAN into small groups, utilising fast track craft and emphasising manoeuvrability of ‘fast attack, fast retreat’in order to destroy the Soviet naval force piecemeal; and (3) reliance on onshore and harbour mine-laying, landbased artillery, missiles, and naval air force in order to interdict the Soviet sea lines of communication and prevent a Soviet amphibious invasion.68 The Chinese Navy, during this time, focussed on frigates, submarine chasers, minesweepers, guided-missile fast attack craft, torpedo boats, patrol boats, diesel-electric submarines, and shore-based tactical bombers.69 When the Soviet threat dissipated in the late 1980s as a result of the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations, China’s attention shifted to the maritime domain from
16 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the continental concept. The navy’s mission and objectives were redefend from coastal defence to near seas defence, also known as the offshore active defence strategy.
Offshore Active Defence Strategy
China introduced the ‘near seas defence’, also known as ‘active offshore defence’ strategy, focussing on coastal defence during the 1980s. Deng had not only launched economic reforms in China but also started reforms in the PLA along with the modernisation effort to make it a more flexible and agile force. The navy had already become an independent force and its role had increased subsequently—the PLAN was now considered a ‘strategic Service’. Under Deng’s watch, Admiral Liu Huaqing, who was the PLAN’s commander from 1982 to 1987 and later became the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, conceptualised a new strategy known as “active offshore defence”, which exemplified “defend actively, operate in the near seas”.70 Liu had also come up with ‘island chain’ strategy—first and second island chains—to both protect the Chinese waters and to expand the navy’s role as an ocean-going navy; and a third island chain for future operational requirements. With the ‘offshore defence’ as well as the island chain strategy, Liu asserted that the “Chinese Navy should exert effective control of the seas within the first island chain”.71 Liu further stated, “Offshore should not be interpreted as ‘coastal’ as we used to know it. ‘Offshore’ is a concept relative to the ‘high seas’. It means the vast sea waters within the second island chain”72 (see Fig 1.1). Although there is no clear-cut geographical mapping of the active offshore defence area, a consensus among the political and military leaders arrived at ‘four large sea areas’ (i.e. the Bohai, Yellow, East China and South China Sea), plus the continental shelf out to the ‘first island chain’ as the PLAN’s ‘offshore’ area.73 Liu also set out a large vision for China’s naval strategy to convert it into a maritime power with a stipulated timeframe. As per Liu’s island chain strategy, China would be able to expand its influence gradually into the far seas areas in three stages. In the first stage, from 2000 to 2010, China was to establish control of waters within the first island chain that links Okinawa
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 17
prefecture, Taiwan and the Philippines. In the second stage, from 2010 to 2020, China would seek to establish control of waters within the second island chain that links the Ogasawara Island chain, Guam and Indonesia. In the final stage, from 2020 until 2040, China would be able to exercise its naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, using aircraft carriers as a key component of its military force.74 Fig 1.1: Map of First and Second Island Chains
Source: https://twitter.com/DFI_Sancho/status/1257279299821993984/photo/1. Accessed on August 26, 2022.
The active offshore defence strategy has a direct resonance with the island chain concept. In active defence, Liu propounded two levels of defence: resolute defence and extended strategic depth.75 Resolute defence means the core area that China needs to protect from the enemy such as the
18 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
fast growing coastal belt and, for that, the engagement with the enemy in a war must be far away from the core area. So it is imperative for China to create a defence line where its forces prevent the enemy from approaching the core area. This defence line area is known as strategic depth in which China could deploy its forces or launch offensive operations against the enemy. Extended strategic depth means that to protect its core area from the enemy, the actual war operation must take place far from it: China has extended its defence forward into the open ocean in the western Pacific. And China would launch offensive operations to prevent the enemy from approaching its resolute defence area. In this regard, the active defence strategy emphasised resolute defence of key areas such as coastal cities, which now shifted from the defence front line to the strategic rear, and acquisition of offensive capability to intercept and destroy enemy forces at sea, or deter them from reaching close to the first island chain. This change in strategy converted the PLAN into a more offensive force than before. Theoretically, the PLAN’s offshore active defence is ‘defensive’ but it would be required to carry out offensive missions in order to guarantee the fulfillment of strategic objectives set by the Chinese national defence authority.76 This suggests that PLAN modernisation has been aimed to acquire offensive capabilities but with a defensive strategic orientation. In a similar fashion, China’s first priority during the 1980s was to protect the coastal area; then, the Taiwan Strait, as well as the South China Sea region, became the core area during the 1990s and the 2000s; after 2020, China is looking for extending the forward defence perimeter up to the third island chain; and by 2050, it will be able to become a major naval power with sea denial capability across the western and southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean region. A major aspect in the offshore active defence strategy is that a ‘forward defence posture’ has been brought into China’s security strategy and the second and third island chains have progressively become the forward defence lines of China.
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Strategy
In January 1993, China released new strategic guidelines known as the ‘National Military Strategy Guidelines for the New Era’ to provide the
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 19
overall principles and guidance to plan and manage the development of the PLA. The new guidelines emphasised ‘active defence’ as the core strategy of the PLA and served as “the highest level of strategic guidance for all PLA military operations during war and preparation for war during peace time”.77 Given the nature of historical changes in conflicts, the guidelines introduced a new concept: “winning local wars under modern especially high technology conditions” which highlighted how to wage wars with limited aims that would be characterised by new ways of fighting.78 It was a major shift from the earlier strategy of how to counter an invasion of Chinese territory and a protracted war. This situation has been aptly described in the official document Science of Military Strategy published by the Chinese National Defence University (NDU) in 2001 that explains how China views local war under the new historical conditions: Generally,the possibility of a large-scale ground invasion by an adversary is
minimum. However, the danger of being the target of high-technological
warfare, such as air-naval, air-space, and space-cyber wars, is intensifying. The threat from the east is more severe than that from the west, the threat
from the sea is more severe than that from the ground; the threat from space and cyber networks is gradually becoming true. The probability of
conducting military operations to protect rights and limited overseas war operations is ever increasing. The most severe war threat is a large-scale strategic sudden attack launched by a strong adversary, which aims at
destroying our war potential to force us to surrender. The most probable
war threat is a limited military conflict from the sea. The war we need to prepare for, particularly given the background of nuclear deterrence, is a large-scale, and highly intensive local war from the sea.79
Since ‘winning war in high technology conditions’ is the guiding principle of China, its warfare strategy has focussed on how to prevent a superior force intervening in a crisis; or if such a force were to intervene against China, then the cost must be heavy for the superior adversary. With this objective, China started focussing on acquiring capabilities that could help thwart an intervention by a superior force in its mission objectives:
20 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the Taiwan Strait and the disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas. China’s major strategic missions are to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, restore lost and disputed maritime territories, protect China’s maritime resources, secure its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in times of war, deter and defend against foreign aggression from the sea, and conduct strategic nuclear deterrence.80 Although resolving the Taiwan problem has been the priority for China’s naval modernisation, acquiring power projection and sea denial capabilities have also been dominant in Chinese strategic thinking. However, to project power beyond the near seas, China had to overcome its twin challenges: one, the natural physical barrier of islands and narrow straits that lies in the eastern periphery of continental Asia which includes Japan and its extended small islands to the south, virtually blocking China’s entry into the Pacific. Similarly, the South China Sea is a virtual lake circumscribed by islands of sovereign states, narrow straits and the Kra Isthmus. As a result China’s entry to the open ocean, especially during a war, faces insurmountable challenges. The second is the military preponderance of the US, supported by alliances, in surrounding China which include with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand and Singapore. US aircraft carrier groups create a potent challenge not only for China’s security, including in a Taiwan contingency, but also restrict China’s ocean-going activity. To overcome these challenges China focussed on acquiring power projection capabilities in a short period and concentrated on what Xue Xinglin termed “obtaining command of the information, command of the air and command of the sea … and to maintain them throughout the process of the war”.81 In this regard, China focussed on developing capabilities to achieve Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) which is not just to deter the US from approaching into the Taiwan Strait in the context of a forceful annexation of Taiwan but to deny US manoeuvrability in the entire western Pacific region. A2/AD is an attempt to deny an adversary freedom of movement on the battlefield. Anti-access refers to “the ability to prevent an opposing force from entering an area of operations”.82 Under the anti-access strategy, China can slow down deployment of opposing forces into a theatre,
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 21
preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theatre, or causing them to operate from a distance farther from the locus of the conflict than they would normally prefer.83 Thus, China’s priority is to deter the US forces from approaching the first island chain area and also keep the war theatre away from its coastal area and beyond the first island chain in case a war broke out. It also includes attacking the enemy’s Forward Operations Bases (FOBs), air bases and port facilities to complicate the opposing forces’ logistic arrangements or reinforcement plans. In order to achieve this, China has arranged a multi-layered system which includes: for operation out to 3,300 km from the Chinese mainland, the PLA will use CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) launched from Chinese H-6 bombers to attack US forward operating bases and support infrastructure in the western Pacific.84 For operations out to 2,000 km, the PLA will use roadmobile CSS-5 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) and CSS-5 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in addition to DH-10 LACMs and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) launched by FB-7 and H-6 aircraft. For operations out to 600km, the PLA will use CSS-6 and CSS-7 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Chinese HG-9 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and Russian PMU-2 SAMs for air and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).85 China’s anti-ship cruise missiles are also fielded by warships and submarines that patrol the waters along the country’s coastline. The objective of area denial, on the other hand, is not prevention, but disruption to compel the desired behaviour by “imposing severe costs on the enemy’s freedom of action once it has gained access”.86 Chinese integrated air defences, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, marine bombers, missiles and torpedo carrying submarines, and fast patrol boats are designed to inflict a prohibitively high cost on any country operating within the first island chain near the Chinese mainland.87 Specifically, the PLAN will use a surface fleet of Type-022 class air warfare destroyers, Type 054A class guided missile frigates and Type-022 class fast-attack missile patrol boats. These assets will be supported by thousands of sea mines, and a fleet of conventional submarines, including the Russian Kilo class.88 Besides, the A2/AD strategy has also been strengthened by the development of the
22 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
DF 21D and DF 26D land-based ASBMs. They are ‘carrier killer’ missiles because of their ability to hit a moving object. The Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) are the most potent weapon of US power projection in the Pacific theatre. The DF 26D is also known as the ‘Guam killer’ because the US base of Guam comes within its range and US carriers can now be targeted around the second island chain also.89
Hu Jintao’s Maritime Cooperation Strategy
When Hu Jintao assumed power in 2002, he sought to enlarge the scope of the PLA Navy from a regional navy to a powerful one with a global footing. Hu promulgated his idea of a “new historic mission” for the PLA at an enlarged meeting of the CMC in December 2004.90 President Hu Jintao listed four historical missions for the PLA: the traditional responsibility of ensuring the military’s loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security, to include preventing Taiwanese separatism; the new responsibilities of safeguarding expanding national interests, including maritime security and non-traditional security problems; and helping to ensure world peace and promoting common development.91 Under the new mission, the navy was directed to actively carry out non-military operations such as disaster relief across the globe as well as defending China’s interests in the maritime domain. The navy was also being described in the new historic mission as a strategic Service by 2008.92 Since then, China has sent its ships, both surface combatants and nuclear submarines, to the Indian Ocean, and conducted anti-piracy operations independently. The enhanced operational requirements for the navy have also been incorporated in the official documents. Along with traditional security orientation, the 2006 White Paper emphasised the importance of securing transportation channels which are the lifelines of China’s energy security.93 China is now a leading consumer of energy, and imports from the Middle East pass through the narrow strait lines, including the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits in Southeast Asia. This security threat, known as the “Malacca Dilemma”, was highlighted by Hu in 2003, that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling the strait,
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 23
and calling for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.94 Moving beyond China’s maritime interests from the near seas waters, Hu proposed the “harmonious seas” concept, emphasising the importance of strengthening international maritime cooperation.95 In 2008, China sent three of its naval ships to participate in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden; this was the first time that the Chinese Navy sailed beyond the coastal waters.96 In 2009, China made an unsuccessful attempt to grab the chairmanship of Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), a multilateral mechanism that coordinates various countries’ anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and meets quarterly in Bahrain. 97 Since then, China has attended all the meetings of the SHADE. In 2010, China sent a hospital ship known as Peace Ark to the Gulf of Aden under the title of ‘Harmonious Mission 2010’ to provide medical support to the Gulf of Aden Task Force.98 En route, it visited and provided medical treatment to the local people of Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya, the Seychelles and Bangladesh.99 The same ship sailed to the Atlantic in 2011 and visited Cuba, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the first Chinese voyage to the Caribbean.100 The navy now has to play not just the role of a war-fighting force but to enhance China’s diplomatic profile. It set the stage for far seas operations in a benign manner which somewhat countered the ‘China threat’ perceptions against its ‘peaceful’ rise theory. Along with the harmonious approach towards the far seas regions, China became more assertive in the disputed territorial waters during this period. The PLAN began more active engagement in the disputed regions, including the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and East China Sea.101 China showed its determination to use its military in disputes with the regional countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, during the 2009/10 period. For instance, China warned Vietnam when it detained Chinese fishermen said to be illegally fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese state run media, in June and July 2011, warned, “If Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence to destroy invading Vietnamese battleships … no one should underestimate China’s resolve to protect every inch of its territory”.102 The ten-week Scarborough Shoal
24 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
stand-off between the Chinese and Philippines Navies, which ended in June 15, 2012, after the Philippines’ withdrawal from the disputed area, showed China’s firmness in using its military to support its assertive position in the disputed claims.103 Upping its assertiveness in the South China Sea, China established Sansha, a prefecture-level city under Hainan province in July 2012, and a military garrison under the Guangzhou Military Region (MR) responsible for national defence mobilisation and pertinent military operations.104 China also increased its assertive activities in the disputed Senkaku/Diouyu Islands in the East China Sea. Even though Chinese President Hu and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda met in May 2008 and agreed to work together for mutual benefits, two Chinese government vessels made a sudden intrusion into Japan’s territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands in December of the same year and sailed inside the Japanese territorial sea for nine hours.105 A series of confrontational activities with the neighbouring countries and the navy’s determined gestures in military stand-offs with them manifested ‘assertiveness’ and became the salient feature of China’s new maritime strategy. There are two perspectives about China’s new maritime assertive strategy: one is the structural viewpoint and the other is the embrace of nationalism by the top leadership of the Communist Party. The structural argument claims that it is a response to the nationalist fervour and activities by other countries which include Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, the Philippines’ application for international arbitration and Vietnam’s “illegal intervention” in the China-claimed EEZ in the South China Sea, considered as “provocative actions” that might threaten China’s so-called “core interests”.106 As a result, it is imperative for the Chinese state to protect its national interests and ward off such threats. The second view is based on domestic legitimacy rooted in the nationalist impulse. For the Communist Party, the legitimacy of the regime is paramount in its survival and occasionally it instigates nationalist sentiments in its security policy. The East and South China Seas water body is an unaccomplished dream—China’s historical ‘humiliation’ emanated from these waters. As a result, expanding its power from the continental to the maritime domain is a natural progression of any rising power like China. Importantly, the legitimacy of the regime is
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 25
also connected to protecting its interests and showing its resoluteness in such disputes. President Hu had argued for maritime great power status for China which is part of the legitimisation of the regime and conveys to the populace that China has now overcome the humiliation stigma. In his address to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, he stated that China should “enhance its capacity to exploit the marine resources, develop the marine economy, and protect the maritime ecological environment, resolutely safeguard the country’s maritime rights and interests, as well as build the country into a ‘maritime power’”.107
Xi Jinping and ‘Maritime Great Power’ Strategy
When Xi Jinping inherited the presidentship from his predecessor Hu, in 2012, he continued the maritime power concept in a more aggressive way. Xi’s aggressive maritime activity under his presidentship was an extension of a series of meetings at the highest level that took place preceding his accession.108 The nationalist sentiment thrived in China as a result of three decades of double digit economic growth, so loss of territory or failing to retrieve it, is deeply associated with weak leadership and ‘national backwardness’ in the Chinese political system. The mounting nationalist interests and security problems posed new challenges to the CCP’s political missions and legitimacy.The demand for actions corresponding to China’s great power status increased within the CCP. As a result, President Xi Jinping announced on July 30, 2013, when the members of the CCP Politburo met for a collective study session on the topic of transforming China into a maritime power, that building maritime power was an integral part of China’s socialist undertaking because the importance of the sea had become more apparent with respect to developing the national economy, furthering opening up and reform, protecting national sovereignty, improving ecosystems, and competing in international politics.109 Xi further stated, “We need to do more to take an interest in the sea, understand the sea, and strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power”110 Subsequent maritime initiatives such as the Maritime Silk Route (MSR) concept, part of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), strengthening cooperation with littoral countries of
26 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and constructing a direct access route to the Indian Ocean are important pillars of the maritime great power strategy. Xi continued China’s assertive practices in a more aggressive way, from declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea to constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea, and setting up China’s first naval base beyond the Chinese waters, at Djibouti, in 2017. Indeed, the navy is the mainstay of a maritime power and there has been a realisation among the top echelons of the Party as well as the CMC that a powerful navy is required for building China into a maritime great power.111 According to the Chinese Defence White Paper of 2015, the role of the PLAN in the pursuit of maritime great power status is not only to “safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests”, a concept which generally includes, but is not limited to, defending China’s sovereign rights in its territorial waters and EEZ and ensuring freedom of navigation for Chinese vessels on the high seas, but also to “safeguard the security of China’s overseas interest”—a new mission for the navy along with its far seas operational concept commensurate with China’s increasing foothold under the BRI in the maritime littorals of faraway regions.112 With the 2015 White Paper, China’s “far seas protection” strategy came into being as the 21st century naval strategy of the PLA. Fundamentally, the role of the PLAN is described as “to provide strategic support for building (China) itself into a maritime power”.113 As a result, the goal and operational theatre have been expanded in line with the strategic requirement from “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection”.114 In order to achieve this, the White Paper suggests that “the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea,comprehensive defense and comprehensive support”.115 By interpreting the ‘open seas protection’ mission, different analysts and senior officials in the navy have given varied actionable objectives which include: strengthen daily combat readiness work and always maintain a high degree of readiness; closely observe, actively be on guard, and prepare at any time to respond to military conflict; maintain a strong navy, not
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 27
only to contain wars and win wars but also to effectively protect national development interests and maritime rights and interests, including the security of its maritime economy; and prepare for maritime combat and focus on being able to fight and win wars—specifically, “maritime local wars under informatized conditions”.116 These interpretations show that a strong navy with a blue-water capability is identified as fundamental to maritime power to protect China’s maritime rights and interests. One important dynamic in the maritime power projection scenario is the PLAN’s role in China’s assertiveness in disputed territory and frequent deployment for far seas missions, especially in the Indian Ocean. From 2008 onwards, China has continuously sent its naval ships on anti-piracy missions, not just surface combatants but has also deployed nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean waters. In August 2017, China deployed at least fourteen naval ships in the Indian Ocean.117 China uses anti-piracy operations as a legitimate cause for its permanent presence in the Indian Ocean to prevent India getting a dominant position in its own backyard.
Conclusion
China is emerging as both an aerospace power and a maritime power capable of enhancing its power and prestige across the Indo-Pacific region. From the 1990s, China has made concerted efforts to modernise its defence forces, especially the surface, underwater, air power and spacebased systems so as to neutralise the threats to China. Initially, China bought systems from the Soviet Union but lately, it has developed its own. Initially, an arm of the ground-based wing of the PLA, the PLAAF has leapfrogged to a modern air force with all kinds of systems and equipment which include fourth and fifth generation fighters and bombers as well as hypersonic weapons, and advanced missiles to thwart the enemy beyond the second island chain. Its naval strategy has turned out to be a maritime power strategy, fulfilling the long cherished dream of Mao and Deng. It has been a gradual progression of the Chinese maritime power concept by negating any negative connotations. President Hu Jintao adopted soft power diplomacy, winning friends and making China’s rise an acceptable phenomenon on the global stage. Later, he launched an assertive strategy
28 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
and China started establishing its control over disputed areas. President Xi continued the assertive proposition but in a more vigorous way. Under his watch, China is expected to fulfill the ‘far seas’ operations and ‘open seas protection’ in an effective and successful way by 2035. Of late, the Western powers have started acknowledging China’s military prowess which is now capable of overcoming the US challenges in the western Pacific. China has had a focussed military modernisation in a steady manner to acquire capabilities for defensive as well as offensive purposes under the active defence strategy. The expansion of the area for resolute defence that was initially the coastal belt and then expanded up to the first island chain, is also based on the capability that China has acquired over a period of time. When it developed the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) DF-26D, China expanded the strategic depth from the first island chain to the second island chain, and now the first island chain is part of the resolute defence strategy. Similarly, as China completes its six aircraft carriers, including the nuclear powered one, the IOR will come within the strategic depth strategy. This will truly enhance China’s ambition of being a maritime power with a blue water naval capability. Once China has completed its military modernisation by around 2030, it may not hesitate to take a confrontationist approach with the regional countries to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region.
Notes 1. 2.
3. 4.
China’s Military Strategy 2015, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 2015, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/ WhitePapers/index.htm. Accessed on June 12, 2021. Even though Jintao first enunciated the MGP concept in his work report at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, Xi Jinping gave it a new direction and it became a major national policy priority. Mia Li and Amy Qin, “Strong Military Called Centerpiece of ‘Chinese Dream’,” International Herald Tribune, December 15–16, 2012, p. 4. Colin S. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1991, pp. 311-329. Yan Hui, “Mao Zedong and People’s Air Force Construction” CPC News, November 11, 2019. Quoted in Kenneth W. Allen and Cristina L. Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021), p. 74.
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 29 5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
Ibid. Kenneth W. Allen, “The Organizational Structure of the PLAAF,” in Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders, The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington D.C., National Defence University Press, 2012), pp. 95-132. Ibid. Hui, n. 4. M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Military Strategy Since 1949: Active Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 98. Ibid. Zhang Xiaoming, “Air Combat for the People’s Republic: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949–1969,” in Mark A. Ryan, David Michael Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 270-299. Roger Cliff, et. al., Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2011). Ibid. Xiaoming, n. 11, p. 284. Cliff, et. al., n. 12, p. 39. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a Modern Air Force”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 64-94. Ibid., p. 71. Ibid. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (RAND Corporation, 1993), p. 111. Cliff, et. al., n. 12, p. 41. Allen, et. al., n. 19, p. 114. Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., pp. 115–116. Lewis and Litai, n. 16. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 83. Allen et. al., n. 19. Ibid. Ibid. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). The Military Balance, 1996 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies). Kenneth Allen, “Overview of the PLA Air Force’s Kongtian Yiti Strategy”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2019-12-19%20Overview%20of%20the%20 PLA%20Air%20Force’s%20Kongtian%20Yiti%20Strategy.pdf. Accessed on July 15, 2023.
30 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 33. Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force’”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2016, pp. 4-28. 34. Allen and Garafola, n. 4. 35. Chase and Garafola, n. 33. 36. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016 A Comparative Analysis”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) December 2016, p. 345, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ publication/161208_Chinese_Strategy_Military_Modernization_2016.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2023. 37. China’s National Defense in 2004, State Council Information Office, December 27, 2004, www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Dec/116032. htm. Accessed on July 5, 2023. 38. Ibid. 39. China’s National Defense in 2006, State Council Information Office, December 29, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white 40. Allen, n. 32. 41. Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping, Integrated Air and Space Operations Studies (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2006), p. 2, quoted in Allen, n. 32, p. 9. 42. Scott W. Harold, Defeat, Not Merely Compete (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2018), p. 7. 43 Brian Weeden, “2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet”, Secure World Foundation, November 23, 2010, https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_ fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf. Accessed on July 25, 2023. 44. Murray Scot Tanner, “The Missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force,” in Hallion, et. al., eds., n. 6, pp. 133-148. 45. Chase and Garafola, n. 33, p. 11. 46. Ibid., p. 13. 47. Niall McCarthy, “Chinese Military: Then and Now China’s Military Modernization”, Statista, August 28, 2019, https://www.statista.com/chart/19162/ share-of-modern-and-older-equipment-in-the-chinese-military/?kw=&crmta g=adwords&gclid=Cj0KCQjw8NilBhDOARIsAHzpbLABl9LSky17WAqo_ QAuQKta2xTd1tdTw4LaYl_7mhxsKTpoO7CKhToaAo1OEALw_wcB. Accessed on July 13, 2023. 48. Li Xiaobing, “The Dragon’s Wing: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Strategy”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, August 1, 2022, https://www.airuniversity. af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation army-air-forces-strategy/. Accessed on July 26, 2023. 49. Ibid. 50. Mark Cozad and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, People’s Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance in China’s Changing Security Environment (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand. org/pubs/research_reports/RR2057.html. Accessed on July 22, 2023. 51. Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 2013), p. 253.
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 31 52. Ibid., p. 224. 53. Xiaobing, n. 48. 54. China’s Military Strategy 2015, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/ WhitePapers/index.htm. Accessed on December 30, 2022. 55. Ian Burns, McCaslin, and Andrew S. Erickson, Selling a Maritime Air Force: The PLAAF’s Campaign for a Bigger Maritime Role (Montgomery: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 2019), p. 17. 56. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2018, May 2018, p. 118, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF. Accessed on January 15, 2023. 57. Ibid. 58. Drake Long, “Cambodia, China, and the Dara Sakor Problem”, The Diplomat, October 21, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/cambodia-china-and-the dara-sakor-problem/. Accessed on January 15, 2023. 59. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover, 1987). 60. Ibid., p. 138. 61. Ibid., p. 42. 62. Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara, “Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2015, pp. 12-39. 63. Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988). 64. Murphy and Yoshihara, n. 62. 65. Hailong Ju, China’s Maritime Power and Strategy: History, National Security and Geopolitics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015). 66. Quoted in Thomas G Mahnken, “China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2011, p. 316. 67. When China fell to Communism in 1949, the then US Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson drew a defence line along the Aleutians to Japan that then goes to the Philippine through the Ryukyu Islands in order to avoid a domino effect of the Communist expansion, and to protect Japan and the Philippines as “model states”. Later, this defence perimeter was extended to the Taiwan Strait during the Korean stalemate. 68. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1994, pp. 7-32. 69. Kamlesh Agnihotri, Strategic Direction of the Chinese Navy: Capability and Intent Assessment (Bloomsbury: New Delhi, 2015). 70. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’”, Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, pp. 144-169.
32 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 71. Admiral Liu’s remark is quoted in Ali Hongreen, An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy: Advancing Toward the Blue-Water Challenge (Hong Kong: October 1988), cited in Huang, n. 68, p. 18. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 75. Stacy A. Pedrozo, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and its Regional Impact”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 27, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact. Accessed on August 20, 2020, p. 36; Huang, n. 68. 76. Ibid., p. 20. 77. “People’s Liberation Navy—Doctrine”, Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity. org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine.htm. Accessed on August 30, 2020. 78. M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Military Strategy Since 1949: Active Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 182. 79. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) (English translation), p. 100. 80. Li, n. 70. 81. Xue Xinglin, Campaign Theory Studies Guidebook (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2002), p. 227, cited in Yves-Heng Lim, “The Driving Forces behind China’s Naval Modernization”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2011, pp. 105-120. 82. “The China Syndrome”, The Economist, June 9, 2012, p. 36. 83. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Anti-Access-Area Denial (A2/AD) Capabilities: Is American Rebalancing Enough?” in William H. Natter III, ed., American Strategy and Purpose: Reflections on Foreign Policy and National Security in an Era of Change (Kittery, ME: Jason Brooks, 2001). 84. Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2011”, Washington DC: Department of Defence, p. 31, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf. Accessed on September 20, 2020. 85. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for US Navy Capabilities (Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2012), p. 4. 86. Mastro, n. 83. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid; Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2012”, Washington DC: Department of Defence, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2012_CMPR_Final. pdf. Accessed on August 29, 2020. 89. TNI Staff, “Meet the DF-26 Missile: China’s Prized Anti-Carrier Weapon”, The National Interest, October 3, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-df 26-missile-chinas-prized-anti-carrier-weapon-85261. Accessed on September 13, 2020.
China’s Grand Military Strategy • 33 90. Fravel, n. 78, p. 228. 91. James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 27, Hoover Institution, January 9, 2009, https:// www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM27JM.pdf. Accessed on August 25, 2020. 92. Bernard D. Cole, “The History of the Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2004, pp. 43-62. 93. Ministry of National Defence, “China’s National Defense in 2006”, http://eng.mod. gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2006.htm. Accessed on September 6, 2020. 94. Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma”’, China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 8, http://jamestown. org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/. Accessed on September 6, 2020. 95. Kejin Zhao and Hao Zhang, “Projecting Political Power: China’s Changing Maritime Strategy”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2020, pp. 229-261. 96. Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Dragon Boats: Assessing China’s Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden”, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010, pp. 213-230. 97. Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, “China and the International Antipiracy Effort”, The Diplomat, November 1, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china and-the-international-antipiracy-effort/. Accessed on September 6, 2020. 98. Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, “China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions”, China Strategic Perspective 3, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington DC, 2010, https://ndupress. ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. 99. Quan Li, “Navy Hospital Ship Sets Sail for Medical Task”, China Daily, September 01, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/slides/2010-09/01/content_11241842.htm. Accessed on September 10, 2020. 100. Howard J Dooley, “The Great Leap Outward: China’s Maritime Renaissance”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2012, pp. 53-76. 101. Zhao and Zhang, n. 95. 102. Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 81, 2013, pp. 446-459. 103. Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef ”, The National Interest, November 21, 2013, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the lessons-scarborough-reef-9442. Accessed on September 20, 2020. 104. Zhao and Zhang, n. 95. 105. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response”, Tokyo, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html. Accessed on September 22, 2020. 106. Zhao and Zhang, n. 95.
34 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 107. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress”, November 27, 2012, http:// www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm. Accessed on August 20, 2020. 108. Feng Zhang, “China’s Long March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 2009-2016,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2019, pp. 757-787. 109. Zhao and Zhang, n. 95. 110. Ryan D. Martinson, “Jinglue Haiyang: The Naval Implications of Xi Jinping’s New Strategic Concept”, China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, https://jamestown. org/program/jinglue-haiyang-the-naval-implications-of-xi-jinpings-new-strategic concept/. Accessed on September 18, 2020. 111. Luo Jing, “Maritime Power, an Inevitable Choice in Implementing the Chinese Dream,” PLA Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), March 9, 2013, cited in Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream”, Centre for Naval Analysis, Virginia, June 2016, p. 23. 112. China’s Military Strategy, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2016-07/13/ content_4768294.htm. Accessed on September 20, 2020. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. Mark A. Ryan, David Michael Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 270-299. 117. “Odd That China Has Submarines in Indian Ocean for Anti-Piracy Ops: Navy Chief,” Hindustan Times, December 1, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/odd-that-china-has-submarines-in-indian-ocean-for-anti-piracy-ops navy-chief/story-eUwmKlcyYOWIGrZckvyoHJ.html. Accessed on September 25, 2020.
2.
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice
Every country focusses on military modernisation also when it is growing economically. However, for some, this process is faster and more aggressive when they face an immediate threat or have a global ambition. China, the new emerging great power in the 21st century, has given high priority to the modernisation of its defence forces. China’s defence modernisation is part of the four modernisations drive along with that of agriculture, industry and science and technology that Deng Xiaoping undertook when he assumed the highest office in the late 1970s. A major objective of the modernisation drive has been to place China in the league of major powers in the international system. The defence modernisation was focussed initially to thwart an invasion by an external power and lately to project China as attaining great power status. The defence modernisation was also aimed at enhancing the domestic legitimacy of the Communist Party—which has been the vanguard of the state—and the welfare of the people. Protecting the sovereignty of the nation and regaining its old glory by becoming a military power, thus, became a high priority for the top leadership of the Communist Party. Throughout history, modern China faced threats from a superior enemy—especially from among the European powers—so victory over a superior power became the hallmark of Chinese strategic thinking. A fundamental aspect of Chinese defence modernisation is that it has been more theory-driven than situation-driven.1 According to
36 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Chinese thinking, theory provides a sound basis for facing the challenges of situational demands. A theory-based situational challenge is a classical Marxist approach to problem solving. Since China had faced security threats from technologically superior powers, theory would help in formulating an optimal strategy to cope with such threats. This, in turn, may lead to a more efficient use of scarce resources for preparing the defence forces to meet the challenges. Also, arming the still technologically backward forces with advanced theory may quicken the formation of combat effectiveness once advanced arms are available. Initially, the defence planners believed that modern arms would be available once the budgetary allocation increased as the country grew economically. For China, a technologically advanced military that lags in theory, it may mean a higher cost in war, as the French and British militaries discovered during the early phases of World War II.2 Winning a war is indispensable for the PLA and technological inferiority can be compensated for by winning a war based on conceptual innovation and a sound war doctrine. So, from Mao’s period, doctrinal aspects have attained the highest priority in Chinese strategic thinking and the doctrine has been modified before formulating a new strategy or a particular policy to respond to a new security situation. Preventing a threat is the currency of the balance of power. The theory of realism argues that when a country faces an external security threat, it focusses on internal balancing through the process of modernisation of its armed forces and equips them with sophisticated weapons to prevent the threat. Balance of power theory explains that to prevent the emerging threat, states balance either by building up their own military capabilities (internal balancing), by forming alliances with others (external balancing), or by combining these two forms of balancing.3 Internal balancing is the enhancement of a state’s power in response to a potential threat. Through internal balancing, states may obtain countervailing capabilities and thereby attempt to balance the rising threat. Kenneth Waltz maintains that threatened states increase their power appropriately to ensure their security, albeit not absolutely.4 China has faced security threats, both domestically and externally, right from its inception after the prolonged civil war. The Korean War and the subsequent presence of the American military stationed
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 37
in East Asia comprised a major security concern during the 1950s. After that was the friction in the relationship with the former Soviet Union, followed by the border stalemate in the late 1960s wherein the threat of a major Soviet invasion loomed large over China. Again, after the end of the Cold War, China alleged that the continuation of the forward deployment of US forces, a corollary of the Cold War mechanism, was targeted to prevent China’s rise. China claims that it lost 3 million sq km of maritime territory during the period of the ‘century of humiliation’; regaining the lost territory is, therefore, considered as being of paramount importance to the Communist Party. However, its quantitative and qualitative military preparedness has not been sufficient to achieve this objective. Some of the countries with which China has territorial disputes are allies of the US, therefore, preventing US intervention in a crisis over China’s (supposed) legitimate claim of territory would be possible only by gaining local military superiority over the US in the theatre. Since China does not have any military ally to form a regional balancing mechanism against the US, internal balancing has been the only possible way to counter the threat. Defence modernisation was first introduced by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1973 when China made an inquiry about the British Harrier Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) ground attack aircraft and resumed the halted negotiations for the transfer of the British Spey turbofan aircraft engine technology as part of the process of gradual force improvement based upon self-reliance.5 Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping assumed a prominent role in the military modernisation process. When Deng got complete authority over the CCP, he resuscitated the defence modernisation and dispatched numerous delegations to Europe and Japan to study foreign military technology.6 In August 1977, under Deng’s direction, the PLA announced a new doctrine of “People’s War Under Modern Conditions” replacing the old Maoist doctrine of “People’s War” or “Total War”.7 The new doctrine emphasised modernisation of the defence forces by acquiring modern equipment and technology. Though, in the early stages, money was a major stumbling block, the defence planners were convinced that as the economy grew, money would not be a problem in the future for fulfilling the modernisation objectives.
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The international situation also influenced China’s defence modernisation programme. The lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, where new technologies were used to gain air superiority or deny air superiority to the enemy, the new inventions in defence technology in the United States such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or the ‘Star Wars’ programme, and also China’s poor performance in the 1979 Vietnam fiasco, led to the need for a new look in China’s war preparedness.8 Accordingly, in July 1985, the Central Military Commission, together with the State Council and Central Committee, issued a new plan titled Plan for Reforms, Streamlining, and Reorganisation of the Military System. The goal of the reforms was to develop a force with streamlined administration, more flexible command, and greater combat power by reducing the number of personnel, eliminating the level of the bureaucracy, downgrading units, and closing some installations.9 When the downsizing was completed in 1987, over a million soldiers—roughly 25 percent of the force—had been cut. Moreover, China gave significant importance to a qualitative change in its armed forces across the spectrum to meet the new and emerging challenges. By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet threat had dissipated as a result of normalisation of relations between the two countries and a new concept of warfare emerged. With China’s security environment becoming stable, it was assessed that the new conflict would occur at the local level for a limited period, especially over disputed territory in the southern border of China. Accordingly, China shifted its attention from the north to the southern border, especially the South China Sea. Similarly, the booming coastal region had now become the engine of Chinese economic growth; and protecting these regions also became one of the important aspects of China’s defence strategy. Though the end of the Cold War changed the global security perspective, it demonstrated new challenges for China’s security. Most of the security mechanisms built by the US to counter the Soviet threat still remained in the Asia-Pacific region. China felt that the continued deployment of US forces in Asia, despite the Soviet threat having vanished, was against a resurgent China.10 For the Chinese, continued maintenance of US troops in South Korea and Japan was evidence of an emerging containment strategy against
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 39
China. Similarly, China perceives that the Japanese ‘normalisation’ and the modernisation of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces ( JSDFs) under the US umbrella are aimed to constrain the space needed for China’s revival. All these necessitated an internal balancing strategy of force modernisation— especially for the PLAN. In its growth trajectory, China has had unfinished existential objectives such as the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, settling territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and converting China into a maritime power by the middle of the 21st century.To achieve these objectives China wanted to achieve local superiority over the US’ military preponderance in the western Pacific. In this respect, China’s military modernisation has been focussed on building strong armed forces, including the air force and navy by gaining control over China’s near seas region (particularly the South China Sea) for enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime EEZ; for defending China’s commercial SLOCs, particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; for displacing US influence in the western Pacific; for resolving the Taiwan problem militarily, if need be—all these being aimed at asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power.
Drivers of China’s Defence Modernisation
Although Chinese naval modernisation was initiated as early as 1975, when the PLAN’s “ocean-going proposals” were endorsed by Mao Zedong,11 it got strategic priority only in the 1980s when China shifted its attention to the south. In the initial period of defence modernisation, the navy was not given importance in the overall national security objectives and had to play a supporting role for the PLA. Its main objective was preserving combat capability and preventing early engagement with the Soviet Pacific Fleet in decisive sea battles in order to endure a protracted war.12 Lately, when China’s attention shifted from the land to the sea and the navy became a strategic Service, the ocean was being considered a theatre for projecting power of modern China. The major driving forces behind China’s defence modernisation are doctrinal changes, changes in
40 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the technology of war, and the regional security environment, and the ambition for maritime power projection.
Doctrinal Changes
Doctrinal reform has been one of the most important elements of the PLA’s modernisation drive over the last five decades. Military doctrine is a body of published principles concerning the forces and the nature of war.13 In all militaries, doctrine consists of the basic principles that guide military commanders and their staff in planning and executing the application of military force to achieve specific military objectives. As succinctly described in the US Army’s principal field training manual (FM-100-5), “Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects on the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates intellectual and technological developments in future times.”14 Military doctrine must also be distinguished from military strategy, which in Western usage is usually concerned with linking those military objectives to a set of desired politicalstrategic goals. In the Chinese context, military doctrine is determined at the highest level of the political and military leadership, and provides both the political vision of the nature of war and the military guidance for the armed forces to follow.15 Accordingly, the military doctrine has been modified to meet changes in the strategic and political environments. In Maoist China, ‘People’s War’ was the doctrine of the PLA. Under Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation programmes, doctrine was adjusted to new conditions such as ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’, ‘Local War Under Historical Conditions’, and ‘Local War Under Modern High Technology Conditions’. Along with the doctrinal changes, the naval strategy has also been modified from ‘active offshore defence’ of the 1980s to ‘open seas protection’ in the 21st century. The Maoist ‘People’s War’ focussed on protracted war utilising the vast landmass and masses by first, “luring the enemy in deep” and then striking, adopting guerrilla warfare to defeat the enemy decisively. It was believed that this was the way victory could be achieved over a technologically superior enemy. Mao had mastered this in the long civil wars and continued it as a war strategy against the threat of a Soviet invasion. It emphasised strategic
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 41
defence, where the initial surprise attack by an opponent is countered by using a combination of offensive and defensive operations to blunt the force of the attack. Positional warfare was the key at this stage where the PLA would use ‘strategic retreat’ to realign the forces for a counter-attack. The second stage was a strategic counter-attack, where offensive operations were to be used to counter-attack when the enemy’s offensive had been stalled. The third and final stage was a strategic offensive once the enemy had been weakened and conditions created for a decisive battle to end the war. It included the elements of forward defence, positional warfare, and combined arms operations, and the entire operational tactics were for countering an invasion. However, when the economic reforms started in the late 1970s, Deng realised that early strategic retreat to the inland would severely jeopardise protection of the newly emerged economic growth centres in the coastal areas. Under Mao’s ‘People’s War’, the coastal areas would be exposed to the enemy, and once they were lost, it would affect China’s war preparations and would lead to defeat. Therefore, defeating the adversary close to the border before it could capture any territory became the priority in China’s security calculations. In this regard, under Deng’s initiative, a new slogan of ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’ was developed after Mao’s death. It put the old Maoist doctrine into new strategic and technological environments. This brought in the need for modernising the military doctrine in order to direct military preparedness and achieve the fighting capabilities necessary for future wars. The new doctrinal concept aimed to upgrade the quality of the PLA’s personnel and equipment, increase the efficiency of organisational and command structures, and improve force projection and combat capabilities.16 To achieve all these goals, the new military doctrine focussed on improvement of the PLA’s Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) and logistic systems, combined arms training, and a rapid response task force.17 Accordingly, by the 1980s, China’s doctrinal concepts and military strategy had been revamped to suit the changing security environment. China adopted new strategic guidelines based on global security perceptions, China’s military capability and preparedness, and the nature of war that had taken place in different parts of the world. After a series of meetings and
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reviews at the top political leadership level and China’s Central Military Commission, it was concluded that a large-scale invasion of China by an external power was highly unlikely. It was observed that the PLA lacked any credible means of launching offensive strikes beyond the border, and also preempting a Soviet attack was difficult.18 At the same time, the guidelines argued that a general war was highly unlikely because of the financial cost of the war, and that China’s most likely threats would come from small and medium-sized local conflicts, not general or total wars. 19 Following the strategic guidelines, the military planners and strategic thinkers came up with a new ‘local war’ concept, which, in the subsequent periods, has become the central tenet of the military doctrine of the PLA. Since then, China has focussed on the technological advancement of its defence forces to gain superiority in a local war theatre. Chinese analysts argued that a local war would be geographically limited and shorter in duration, although some wars like the Iran-Iraq War dragged on for several years.20 During major wars, the combatants employed massive firepower— particularly air power—and short-range missiles. While, in a local war, though the role of the army could not be discarded entirely, it was no longer the key to victory as it had been during the World Wars. All weapons in the disputants’ inventories were fair game for use, including chemical and tactical nuclear weapons, and successful armies practised C3I. The objective was that without attaining supremacy in terms of both capability and being a flexible force, China could not defeat the enemy in a limited local war. With the changes in the nature of war and more sophisticated weaponry emerging with the major powers worldwide, China modified the local war doctrine to ‘Local War Under Modern High-Tech Conditions’ in the 1990s; it later became ‘Under Conditions of Informatization’, which is now the guiding principle of the Chinese military strategy. The 1991 Gulf War and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis apparently convinced the PLA planners that a mediumsized local war could take place involving a large-scale sea crossing and amphibious landing operations, counter-offensive operations in the border regions, repelling local foreign invasions, and, above all preventing the US forces deployed in the western Pacific from interfering in China’s efforts for the unification of Taiwan.21
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 43
The local war theory has brought in a new concept into the lexicon of China’s military strategy which includes “active defense”, “strategic frontier”, “strategic deterrence”, “victory through elite groups”, “gaining initiative by striking first”, “victory over inferiority through superiority”, and “fighting a quick battle to force a quick resolution”.22 The concepts are important in real-time situations with specific objectives to support particular types of systems and missions. For instance, “active defense” is a strategy of offensively defending the “core area” which includes China’s shorelines and territorial waters, while the “strategic frontier” is a geographical perimeter line preventing the enemy from approaching the “core area”. Similarly, technological advancement is the key component in all aspects of the new strategy. According to Chinese calculations, a local war will likely take place in the maritime domain, and, as a result, the navy and air force received increased attention in the modernisation drive. Indeed, concepts like “active defense” and “strategic frontiers” are exclusively connected with the maritime domain which is relevant in the 21st century security strategy of China. For instance, the 2015 Defence White Paper states that “active defense is the guiding principle of China’s defense strategy in a new era”.23 From the 1990s onwards, China has focussed on a concerted military modernisation drive to make the “active defense” and “strategic frontiers” strategy successful, and, lately, with a blue-water navy and an expeditionary air force.
Changes in Technology of War
Technology has changed modern warfare; it has increased the lethality of war but reduced the duration and casualties. Technological modernisation of defence forces is a continuing process that countries have undertaken to achieve victory in a war. Technological modernisation is also the preparation for war that generally takes place during peace-time. How technology can change the theory of war can be seen in the change in China’s war theory from ‘victory through inferiority over superiority’ to ‘victory through superiority over inferiority’. In the Maoist ‘luring the enemy in deep’ concept, China would be able to overcome the adversary’s technological superiority by utilising China’s comparative advantages of landmass, manpower, and time. However, in the local war scenario, China’s
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victory could be guaranteed only through technological superiority in a local theatre over the enemy. The Chinese leadership realised that without technological advancement, superiority in the local theatre was difficult to achieve. Since the local war theatre could be the maritime domain of the western Pacific which includes the three seas—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—China launched naval modernisation in the late 1990s and air force modernisation in the 2000s. As a result, the first two decades of the present century have witnessed billions of dollars being spent for R&D in the defence sector to convert China into a modern maritime power in the 21st century. The quest for technological modernisation of the defence forces emanated from the Chinese assessment of small wars such as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the Falklands War between Argentina and Britain that demonstrated the ability of the technologically superior power to finish the war quickly before international responses mounted against it. The military leadership realised that modern, limited wars, emphasising speed, mobility, lethality, and C3I technologies can change the course of the war in one’s favour. Given the nature of war and victory for the technologically advanced states, the PLA demanded increased budgetary allocation for modernisation, especially to create ‘fists’ and rapid response units or ‘special forces’ in every Military Region (MR), which must be well trained and equipped to fit the local situations and the capability of a potential adversary.24 It was also recognised that, except for the USSR, and possibly India, the most likely source of conflict around China’s periphery would not involve countries whose military forces had the capability to conduct high-technology warfare in the same capacity as the Western powers.25 The 1989 Tiananmen tragedy put a roadblock to China’s effort in acquiring Western equipment and technology and emphasised the need to promote indigenous R&D. It was understood that weapons and technology are the decisive elements of modern warfare.26 More precisely, the 1991 Gulf War became the reference point for the PLA’s modernisation programme. The Gulf War was a hightech war, in which the latest weaponry was used against an inferior state by a superpower, and which highlighted the need for a defence industrial complex in China. The Gulf War proved to be decisive in China’s technological
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 45
preparedness to ensure victory in short and limited wars. The Gulf War demonstrated the awesomeness of American military prowess that inspired the PLA to model its modernisation on that of the Pentagon.27 Since then, China focussed its attention on Russia for technological cooperation and started giving attention to strengthening the indigenous capability to equip the Chinese defence forces as modern and flexible forces in the 21st century. Deng turned to the West for the defence moderinisation of the PLA in the 1980s, and the US and its allies provided military equipment and technology to China. China was keen to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union after the border clash between the two as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, while the West was looking to counter the Soviet influence in Asia and due to that the relationship between Washington and China became normal. China held extensive discussions with the Western arms suppliers, with the most notable results being two agreements: one with Israeli defence contractors, for a modern tank firepower system (guns, ammunition, and fire control); and, second, with the United States, to construct an artillery munitions factory and an avionics upgrade for China’s F-8 fighter plane to make it an all-weather weapon platform.28 Other agreements signed with the US were to purchase Sikorsky helicopters, Raytheon 12 E 1167 sonars, Mark 46 Mod 2 torpedoes, and five LM 2500 gas turbines for the Chinese destroyers; Britain supplied shipborne radio systems, degaussing equipment, and the technology to build high-speed catamarans; France supplied the Crotale surface-to-air missiles, artillery shell loading equipment, and concluded a co-production agreement for the Dauphin helicopter.29 Besides, China signed contracts for military equipment with other countries of the West such as Germany, and Sweden, and was interested in purchasing armoured vehicles and military equipment from Brazil.30 Initially, the US was not keen to sell arms to China, with President Jimmy Carter saying that “it would be a quantum leap to go to arms sales”, but later, it decided to sell non-lethal weapons, while lethal military equipment was to be approved on a case-by-case basis.31 In fact, the early 1980s comprised a period of bonhomie in US-China military relations and the US removed China from the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) Category Y (for the Warsaw Pact), and included it in Category
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P, “making China eligible for a wider variety of exports, particularly in such sensitive areas as transport aircraft, long-distance communications equipment, and military-type helicopters.”32 However, the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident shattered China’s hopes for modernising its defence forces with Western technology and equipment, as the West imposed sanctions on China for its military actions against its own citizens.33 China then turned to Russia for modern equipment and also focussed on home-based research and development, including reverse engineering practices, to develop advanced systems. With a steadily modernising military industrial base, China’s import of arms reduced significantly by 2005, with a more home-based inventory being inducted into service since then.34 In its indigenisation process, China relied on the import of military equipment for reverse-engineering and dual-use technologies to supplement its technology shortfalls. It sought to acquire targeted foreign technologies including “engines for aircraft, tanks, and naval vessels; solid state electronics and microprocessors, guidance and control systems; enabling technologies such as cutting-edge precision machine tools; advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment; and computer-assisted design, manufacturing, and engineering.”35 China mostly relied on Russia and Ukraine in the reverse engineering process, particularly for airframes. According to a 2016 US Department of Defence report on China’s military, China seeks some high-tech components and major end items from
abroad that it has difficulty in producing domestically—particularly from
Russia and Ukraine. China has purchased advanced Russian defense equipment such as the SA-X-21b (S-400) SAM system, and is pursuing
the Su-35 fighter aircraft as well as a new joint-design and production program for a heavy-lift helicopter and diesel-electric submarines based on the Russian PETERSBURG/LADA-class. China purchased ten
used IL-76 transport aircraft from Russia, three IL-78 aircraft refitted for aerial refueling from Ukraine, an additional 52 Mi-171 multi-role
medium-lift helicopters, and at least 130 AL-31F turbofan jet engines. China is partnering with Russia to purchase electronic components as well as creating joint production facilities located within Russia. China
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 47
also has signed significant purchase contracts with Ukraine in recent years, including contracts for assault hovercraft and aircraft engines.”36
Since 1996, Russia has sold to China Su-27 fighter aircraft and agreed to their licensed production as well as numbers of Su-30 multi-role fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with Sunburn antiship missiles, and Kilo-class Project 636 diesel submarines, apart from a variety of other weapon systems and missiles.37 However, China’s imports from Russia reduced drastically from 2000 to 2015, which indicates that indigenous production contributed substantially to the modern inventory of the PLAAF (Fig 2.1). Many of China’s most modern weapon systems, especially in aircraft, are Russian imports or copies, such as the Su-27, Su-30, and J-11.38 While some other indigenous weapon systems such as helicopters, radar, and engine technologies are either imported, or produced under licence from Russia and Europe. By concerted efforts, China is now a leading exporter of arms, accounting for 5.2 per cent of total global arms exports in 2018–22, ranking at fourth position among the major exporters of arms in the world.39 Fig 2.1: Chinese Arms Purchases from the Soviet Union/Russia (1950-2002) Trend Indicator Values (TIVs)*
* TIV is a unique pricing system developed by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) to measure conventional arms sales.
Source: CSIS, China Power Project, SIPRI, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/. Accessed on August 20, 2023.
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China launched a military modernisation drive in the 1990s as part of its new military doctrine of ‘local war under high-technology conditions’ in which technology became the main source of winning wars. General Liu Huaqing, China’s most senior officer and the military official responsible for overseeing the technological improvements of China’s armed forces, highlighted the need for the technological modernisation of the PLA. He stated in 1993 that the PLA “fails to meet the needs of modern warfare and this is the principal problem with army-building.”40 This problem would be met, he stated, by the “vigorous” importation of foreign technology and accelerating the modernisation of weapons and equipment through improvements in China’s own defence industries and R&D.41 As a result, a higher budgetary allocation for defence was earmarked and high priority was placed on mastering electronic warfare (particularly air and naval); improving missile and aircraft guidance systems; developing PrecisionGuided Munitions (PGMs); building satellites, early warning and command systems, and advanced communication relay stations; laser technology; artificial intelligence; mastering in-flight refuelling; and developing an anti ballistic missile system.42 Of course, China’s persistent search abroad for military technology and hardware has been a bone of contention in that China has been accused of stealing Western technology. Despite its opaque intellectual property rights protection system, China’s vigorous efforts at force modernisation and steady higher budgetary allocations for defence were visible in every budget for the next three decades.
Regional Security Environment
The regional security environment that emerged after the end of the Cold War was another reason for China’s defence modernisation. With rapprochement with the Soviet Union and relatively stabilised land borders in the north and west, China felt no major security threat from external sources. No regional country that was capable of challenging China, whether in terms of technological capability or the sheer size of the military, emerged in the vicinity. For Chinese analysts, Russia was no longer a primary threat for China, Japan was unlikely to become a threat in the foreseeable future, and it was the US that was continuously depicted
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 49
as the number one source of threat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).43 This threat perception emerged due to American policies and actions toward China over Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and human rights, which were all seen as aimed at the eventual demise of Communism in China. Besides, Chinese defence planners and security analysts questioned the rationale of the forward deployment of US forces in the region even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and they suspected that this was aimed against a resurgent China.44 In their view, the Pentagon was trying to project China as a principal threat to replace the Soviet Union to justify the continued high levels of defence expenditure. For them, the US still maintained its Cold War era military alliances in East Asia, and its defence cooperation with Taiwan was a stumbling block in the unification dream. Since the US was superior, in terms of both technology and manpower, China was in no way able to cope with the US threat. Since the US has been a global superpower, while China’s technology and military capacity were still inferior, China could not challenge the US openly. The 1995 Taiwan fiasco proved that China had no match for the military preponderance of the US in East Asia. In this situation, Beijing felt that the only way it could counter the threat from the US was to gain local superiority. Hence, China’s technological modernisation was targeted at achieving local superiority in the “war zone campaign”,45 a major type of local war that may enhance local and temporary PLA superiority over the powerful enemy. Incidentally, China’s ‘active defence’ strategy itself is to prevent US amphibious operations from the sea, as the theatre of future conflict would in all likelihood be the maritime domain in the east and south of China. Therefore, the air force and navy received high priority in China’s defence modernisation in the subsequent decades.
Power Projection Ambition
Ever since the establishment of the PRC, Communist leaders have harboured the notion that the new China should emerge as a great power one day. However, its economic capacity and technical capability were not conducive to preparing China for such a project. When the Soviet threat dissipated and the economic reforms allowed China to earmark money
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for modernisation of its defence forces, it gradually started focussing on projecting its power, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. China has been surrounded by strong land powers such as India and Russia, so a continental expansion was impossible, while the ocean has been dominated by US naval power. However, the US is a distant naval power while China could emerge as a regional power by marginalising the US power at sea by means of strengthening its naval capability. This was evident in the naval expansion in three stages with Admiral Liu Huaqing’s island chains strategy by which China would be able to expand its influence gradually into the “far seas”.46 Similarly, to provide air coverage for the PLAN ships, China initiated air force modernisation with a view to acquire expeditionary capabilities for its power projection ambition. The sea power strategy has a unique role in China’s development strategy in matters of countering the pressures and challenges that China faces. A powerful navy is required for securing its maritime trade as well as protecting its extra-territorial interests. Protecting the SLOCs has been necessary for the smooth progress of the economic reforms. The booming economic belt in the south and east coastal area—which became the engine of China’s economic growth—was heavily dependent on seaborne trade. The protection of trade and overseas assets is integral to projecting the maritime power of a nation. A Chinese naval officer spelled out as early as in the 1990s that “the international law of the sea today stipulates thus: the black land is yours, the blue water is everyone’s, and the brown water is yours and everyone’s. The enlightenment from historical experience today is: if you cannot occupy yours, it is someone else’s.”47 In this respect, it was necessary for China to build a strong and modern navy commensurate with China’s international status which could also safeguard its maritime sovereignty, rights, and interests. Importantly, domestic stability and the continuity of the Communist Party’s hold on power rest on whether China can protect its maritime rights and its status as a powerful and prosperous nation. At the same time, Deng was well aware of the repercussions of China’s defence modernisation programme that would have unleashed an arms race across the region. It was feared that other countries would see China as harbouring hegemonic intentions. To mitigate such suspicions and
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 51
concerns, Deng proclaimed his ‘24-character strategy’ in the early 1990s which claimed that China needed to “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”48 China needed peaceful regional and global environments, at least for the initial 20 years of the 21st century, conducive to its rise to regional preeminence and global influence.49 In short, China’s defence modernisation can be seen in two phases: a slow and gradual process from the 1980s to 2010; and a fast and forceful modernisation since 2010; and the PLAAF has been a major beneficiary of the latter one. The first phase was under the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping with his dictum of ‘keeping a low profile’ , while the second phase has been as part of President Xi’s ‘striving for achievement’ strategy. By the late 2000s, the Chinese leadership understood that the international security environment being relatively peaceful provided a strategic opportunity for China to enhance its strategic profile. This realisation came out of the 2008 global financial crisis and the successful conduct of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, along with China becoming the second largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan, in 2008.50 When Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he quietly began establishing himself as a strong military leader, with high profile visits to the headquarters of the PLAN, PLAAF, Second Artillery Force (later PLA Rocket Force) during his first 100 days in office.51 The PLAAF was rejuvenated under Xi in its effort to emerge as a strategic air force, capable of conducting expeditionary operations in the far seas region, and also “closing the gap with the USA across a spectrum of capabilities”.52
China’s Air Force Modernisation
The PLAAF was a late entrant in China’s defence modernisation process, and is still an air force in transition. China’s recent advancements in hightechnology have been translated into developing most modern fighter aircraft to become a superior air power in East Asia. Ever since the PLAAF became a ‘strategic force’ in the 2000s, it has fully embraced a shift from a singular focus on air defence with interceptor fighter aircraft of the Cold War era to a multi-mission force, capable of carrying out Air Defence (AD), strike transport, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
52 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
(ISR), and most recently, electronic warfare missions. 53 Undoubtedly, the modernisation of the PLAAF has increased its ability to not only conduct both defensive and offensive missions but to accomplish ‘joint war-fighting tasks’, in association with the PLA’s ‘active defence’ strategy in the near seas and ‘far seas protection’ strategy in the Indian Ocean area. The 2014 edition of the US Department of Defence (DoD) report stated, “The PLAAF is pursuing modernization on a scale unprecedented in its history and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities.”54 The pace of modernisation and the war-fighting capacity that the PLAAF has achieved in the last decade was assessed by the US DoD in its 2022 report, “The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to the West. This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant US military advantage vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain.”55 When Deng launched the defence modernisation, the navy received a higher priority than the air force because of the geographical importance of the active defence strategy to defend the near seas. The modernisation attempt of the PLAAF in the early period was thwarted by the rigid industrial policies and political turmoil that characterised the Chinese economy in the 1960s and 1970s. However, economically and technologically, it was a daunting task to replace the PLAAF’s force structure which primarily comprised obsolete interceptor aircraft based on the 1950s and 1960s technology of Soviet origin. At the same time, the leadership realised the importance of modernising the air force which is necessary in the ‘active defence strategy’ as more jointness of forces is required to win wars. The Central Military Commission (CMC), then in the 1980s, observed that “air power, especially when utilizing precision-guided munitions, would be decisive in future conflicts”.56 The PLAAF’s major inventory during this period comprised a large number of second- and third-generation interceptor aircraft which lacked Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) capability, advanced radar, and specialised Electronic Warfare (EW ) support aircraft. 57 It also critically lacked long-range precision strike capability and other systems for air dominance, needed for both defensive and offensive operations. Even though China started its air force modernisation in the 1980s, it got accelerated only in the 1990s. Its force structure, equipment
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 53
composition, and training had to be reoriented to suit the local war concept. In support of the active defence strategy, the PLAAF had to obtain a long-range precision strike capability, which included advanced radars, land attack cruise missiles, EW capability, and Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C3ISR) [later Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR)]. In fact, the 1991 Gulf War, in which the US demonstrated overwhelming air dominance in the conflict that made the war short and decisive in its favour, was a shock for the Chinese leadership, despite its confidence about having a large ground force and its reliance on nuclear weapons.58 This brought home the need for necessary changes in the PLA’s war-fighting, and China’s National Defence University recommended, inter alia, to “give priority to conventional arms over nuclear weapons; introduce high-technology, including advanced guidance systems, pinpoint accuracy bombing, weapons of mass destruction, and stealth aircraft; and build a rapid-response force”.59 Eventually, in the 1990s, the PLAAF and Aviation Ministry laid out ambitious plans to modernise the air force and embarked on a concerted attempt to develop or acquire modern equipment to be able to carry out the prescribed missions in a border conflict after the year 2000.60 In the PLAAF’s modernisation drive, the first attempt was to acquire the then latest fighter aircraft from foreign sources. When Chinese Premier Li Peng and Deputy Chief of Staff General Xu Xin visited Moscow in April 1990, despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they got an assurance from the new Russian leaders on the possibility of arms sales and technology transfers.61 In December 1990, the former Soviet Union agreed to deliver 24 Su-27 Flanker fighter aircraft, then the most advanced fourth generation aircraft, and allowed its licensed production in China, and the first batch of three aircraft was delivered in 1991, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 62 China then purchased US$ 5-6 billion worth of Russian weaponry in 1993, which included 26 Su-27 Flanker fighter aircraft, 4 Ilyushin transport aircraft, 18 SA-300 anti-aircraft systems and 100 missiles.63 The export oriented Su-27 Flanker programme was entirely funded by China, and the aircraft had the longest range, greatest versatility,
54 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
and was overall considered the most sophisticated aircraft of that era.64 Russia delivered the remaining planes by 1995 despite the suspicion that China would copy the technology, without permission or paying royalty.65 In 1994, China ordered additional Su-27 fighters, T-72 battle tanks, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and in-flight refuelling tankers from Russia.66 Further, in 1996, China and Russia signed a $2 billion contract to co-produce the Su-27 Flanker fighter aircraft in China.67 From 1991-2006, China had the largest number of Russian weapons, including fighter aircraft and helicopters, after which China’s indigenous production leapfrogged with the Russian engine (Table 2.1).68 If fact, China had no option to strengthen its air force other than relying on Russia because of the Tiananmen fiasco as the West had stopped selling arms to China. Years
Table 2.1: Major Russian Weapons Delivered to China 1987–2016
2012-16 2007-11
2002-2006 1997-2001 1992-96 1987-91
Combat aircraft
Helicopters
11
106
79
55
4
145 45 3
Warships
62 72
8
30
2
24
4
Long-range SAM systems
Aircraft engines
16
202
4 4
424 70 4
SAM= Surface-to-Air Missile.
Notes: Number of items delivered in selected weapon categories.
Source: Siemon T. Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales”,
SIPRI, July 5, 2017, https://sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales. Accessed on August 25, 2023.
According to the IISS Military Balance for 1994-95, China had around 4,000 fighter aircraft (for both the air force and naval aviation), of which 26 Su-27 aircraft were acquired from Russia in 1992, and virtually every aircraft in the Chinese inventory was of the 1950s and 1960s technology.69 This forced the PLAAF to augment a steady and fast modernisation of its air force to meet the challenges of the 21st century. However, apart from the rigid industrial policy, the lack of funds to purchase aircraft and associated systems (e.g. command and control, reconnaissance and communication),
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 55
even on a small scale, hindered the modernisation effort. Similarly, China’s aviation industry was ill-equipped to adopt the modernisation process, and the lack of adequate funding and technological upgradation made the domestic aviation industry an underperforming one. A major debate, centred around the capability of the PLAAF in the 1990s, was about its ‘deterrent capability’. Some argued that the PLAAF’s equipment was backward, limited in power, and not equal to that of many other small and medium-sized countries and that its deterrent capability was not real.70 While another group argued that the PLAAF had already demonstrated its deterrent capability and that several measures to enhance its future deterrent capability had already been taken. By the 1990s, the PLAAF adopted air defence which included deterrence, and defensive, and offensive actions as its core principles. The PLAAF leadership now focussed on building an air force for the 21st century capable of deterring, and if necessary, conducting a defensive counter-attack against enemy installations.71 This resulted in the PLAAF focussing on air defence with a rapid-reaction strategy and it started inducting bombers, fourth generation fighter aircraft, and airborne and electronic warfare aircraft. Air power is a technology-driven form of military power, and modernisation requires a sophisticated industrial base and a substantial amount of capital infusion. China was able to earmark a substantial amount of capital for air force modernisation only in the 2000s when its economy started progressing by leaps and bounds. From 1991 onwards, China’s defence expenditure from its annual budget had a double digit increase in every year for almost two decades, which helped it to earmark a substantial amount of money for the air force modernisation. From the 2000s, the military leadership set certain benchmarks on acquisitions comparable to Western systems and introduced more synergy between various institutions and end users on domestic R&D, and also implemented competitive mechanisms in the acquisition process.72 In its modernisation drive, the PLAAF first replaced its obsolete jets with modern aircraft, both absolutely and relatively. There has been a substantial decrease in the category of fighter-interceptors—between 1995 and 2015, over 3,000 fighter-interceptors were removed from the PLAAF’s inventory,
56 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
dropping from 80 to 50 per cent, while fighter ground attack aircraft had a robust growth, and increased by more than 2.5 times, during the same period.73 Similarly, from 2000 onwards, the number of transport and training aircraft also increased progressively in the PLAAF inventory. China has also focussed on inducting fourth generation aircraft, both Russian origin and indigenously developed aircraft. The major Russian-made aircraft in China’s inventory are the Su-27UBK Flanker, Su-35 Flanker M, Su-30MKK Flanker G, and Su-30MK2 Flanker G (naval).74 China’s first indigenously developed fourth generation aircraft is the Chengdu J-10, manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. Having first flown on March 23 1998, the J-10 is the first fighter aircraft fully developed indigenously in China, which entered service in 2004. Both the J-8 and J-10 are reverse engineered aircraft or cut-and-paste designs from Russian aircraft; the J-11 is a copy of the Su-27.75 China then developed a carrierborne fighter aircraft, the J-15 Flanker; fourth generation ground attack fighter, the J-16, and its Pakistani version, the J-17; fifth generation stealth fighter aircraft, the J-20; the fifth generation stealth bomber aircraft, the J-31 and its carrier version, the J-35 are under development.
China’s Naval Modernisation
China’s naval modernisation has been targeted to achieve specific missions as part of the national grand strategy. In general, China’s naval modernisation efforts encompass a wide array of platforms and weapon acquisition programmes, including Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft carriers, Unmanned Vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR systems. The modernisation efforts also include improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. The Chinese Navy is tasked with national defence “goals and tasks” of “safeguarding national sovereignty”, which include national economic development; defence of the homeland, to include “the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters, and air space, safeguard its maritime rights and interests; to oppose and contain the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence’, and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”76
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 57
Besides, the missions and objectives of China’s naval modernisation are aimed to achieve a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near seas region, particularly the East China and South China Seas; for enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime EEZ; for defending China’s commercial SLOCs, particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; for displacing US influence in the western Pacific; and for asserting China’s status as the leading regional power, and in the league of great powers.77 Specific operational missions and strategies have been carved out for the PLAN according to the doctrinal changes. In the initial period, the navy’s mission was ‘coastal defence’, then defined as ‘offshore defence’, and from the second decade of the 21st century onwards, it was ‘open seas protection’. The need for a strong navy was outlined by Mao when he emphasised that expertise in amphibious warfare, seaborne logistics and maritime air power were required to conquer Taiwan. However, his plan to organise a strong navy was aborted because of the Korean War and thereafter limited by domestic political events, especially the disastrous Great Leap Forward. Later, naval development was severely impacted during the 1960s by the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent continental mindset. It was only at the end of the 1970s, after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the post-Mao power struggle, that the PLAN was in a position to ‘take off ’. Until the mid-1980s, the PLAN’s primary strategic concept was one of ‘coastal defence’ or to play a supportive role to the army in China’s ‘luring the enemy into deep’ strategy. This strategy focussed the PLAN on defending China’s coast from the Soviet Pacific Fleet. By the late 1980s, the then PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing laid out a new strategy known as ‘offshore defence’ in pursuance of new missions of the Chinese Navy.78 The main objective of the ‘offshore defence’ strategy was to build for China a powerful regional navy. It called for naval capabilities suited to China’s specific regional maritime interests. In essence, the strategy emphasised a defence perimeter for the navy to be extended from the coastal waters out to between 200 and 400 nautical miles (nm), and even further, in defence of the territorial claims in the South China Sea. Eventually, the mission areas of offshore defence were defined as the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South
58 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
China Sea, the areas around the Spratly Islands and Taiwan, and the areas inside and outside the Okinawa Island chain as well as the northern part of the Pacific Ocean.79 This includes the areas outside the ‘first island chain’ as well as the more traditional coastal waters. The PRC’s industrial base for building a modern naval force was inadequate in the early decades. As a result, China had relied heavily on the former Soviet Union for its naval requirements. During this period, the Chinese Navy focussed on frigates, submarine chasers, minesweepers, guided-missile fast attack craft, torpedo boats, patrol boats, diesel-electric submarines and shore-based tactical bombers.80 Initially, torpedo boats were imported from the Soviet Union or constructed in Chinese shipyards using Soviet designs and parts. In the 1960s, the local industry began to deliver other types of ships, also of Soviet origin. The PLAN fielded a large number of small craft and submarines, particularly the Type 021 Huangfeng guided-missile boats and the Type 033 Romeo class submarines. China’s first generation diesel-electric submarines were the Russian built Romeo class and indigenously built Ming class (Type 35) submarines, based on the Soviet Romeo design. The first nuclear powered Han class (Type 091) attack submarine (SSN) was commissioned in 1974, and its first ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN), of the Xia class (Type 092), was commissioned in 1983 and entered service in 1987. Subsequently, China built the more advanced Jin class SSBNs which are now operationally in service. To strengthen its naval fleet, in 1994, the PLAN ordered, four Russian Kilo class diesel submarines, and four Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia. Of particular note, the Sovremenny class ships are outfitted with the 3M-80E Moskit [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) designation: SS-N-22 Sunburn] ramjet-powered, supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), which has a range of 120 km; later-model Sunburns have a 200 km range. Some of the systems that China bought were to gain the technology and production capability needed to become more independent of foreign sources of supply.81 Richard Bitzinger argues that China actually started its naval modernisation programme in the year 1997, and he gives multiple reasons for this. For him, this was the year when Chinese defence spending began its remarkable run of double-digit real annual growth.82 Besides, the central
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 59
government forced the PLA to divest itself of the bulk of its commercial activities so as to concentrate on its primary functions—defence, compellence, and, if necessary, war-fighting. This was also around the time when the PLA officially adopted the strategic concept of fighting ‘limited local wars under high technology conditions/conditions of informatization’ or the addition of computers and information sharing networks to military platforms,83 which still drive current operational and hardware requirements for military modernisation. From the beginning of the new century, the PRC has increasingly turned to its own indigenous defence industry to provide the PLA with modern weaponry—in some cases, through reverse engineering or by outright theft from foreign suppliers. China’s 2006 Defence White Paper outlined a three-step development strategy with short-term and medium-to-long-term plans for the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces: the first step was to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second was to make major progress around 2020, and the third was to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationised armed forces and being capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century.84
Conclusion
China’s air and naval modernisation effort, which forms part of a broader Chinese defence modernisation programme, has almost finished. Today, China has the largest navy in the world, while its air force is catching up with the US Air Force, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. Compared with other countries, China does not release a navy forcelevel goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels. The 2006-20 Medium and Long-Term Defence and Science Technology Plan which sought to address the reform and development of the defence innovation ecosystem has come to an end, and China has almost fulfilled its objectives in modernising its navy and air force which are now capable of establishing the Chinese will at least in the near seas. Chinese military authorities have been pushing to achieve
60 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the target of defence and related programmes in every Five-Year Plan (FYP) without any delay, and the 13th FYP (2016-20) has provided added momentum in the modernisation programme. At the annual meeting of the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2019, President Xi noted that this was “a crucial year for implementing the development and construction of our military’s 13th FYP to achieve the 2020 targets for national defence and army building.”85 Importantly, the year 2020 was also crucial in the Chinese strategic thinking as it was the period wherein China was to complete sea control within the second island chain, as propounded by Liu Huaqing in the 1980s, and the 100th year of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. Now President Xi is seeking to place China as an ‘unparalleled’ great power, a maritime great power, by 2049, with a large, modern and winning naval force. The PLAAF is now becoming an expeditionary force capable of conducting air operations in the western Pacific and providing aerial coverage for the PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean waters.
Notes 1.
2. 3.
4. 5.
6. 7. 8. 9.
Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999). Ibid. Christopher Layne, “The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony”, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (California: Stanford University Press, 2004). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1979). Sydney H. James and G. Lawrence Lamborn, “China’s Military Strategic Requirements” in China Under the Four Modernizations Part 1, Selected Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, NinetySeventh Congress, Second Session, August 1982, https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ed235107. Accessed on November 2, 2020. Ibid. M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Military Strategy Since 1949: Active Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019). Ibid., p. 163. Ibid., p. 175.
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 61 10. David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, 1994, pp. 3-25. 11. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1994. 12. Ibid., p. 11. 13. Ching-pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 3. 14. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, June 1993. Quoted from David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 57. 15. Paul H. B. Godwin, “Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 1978-1987”, China Quarterly, Vol. 112, December 1987, pp. 572-590. 16. Huang, n. 11. 17. Ibid 18. Fravel, n. 7, p. 142. 19. M. Taylor Fravel, “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Edition of Zhanluexue”, in James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Beijing: Chinese People Liberation Army, 2002), pp. 79-99. 20. Ibid. 21. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010). 22. Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985 95: A Chinese Perspective”, The China Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition, July 1996, pp. 443-463. 23. Ministry of National Defence, “Chapter III: Strategic Guideline of Active Defence”, China’s Military Strategy 2015, People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 2015. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586711.htm. Accessed on November 20, 2020. 24. Godwin, n. 15. 25. JianWenxian, et. al., “Tentative Discussion of the Special Principles of a Future Chinese Limited War,” Guofangdaxuexuebao, No. 11, November 1, 1987, in JPRS CHI, 12. Quoted in Godwin, n. 15, p. 470. 26. Shambaugh, n. 10. 27. Allen S Whiting, “The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions”, The China Quarterly, No. 146 (Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition) 1996, pp. 596-615. 28. June Teufel Dreyer, “Deng Xiaoping And Modernization Of the Chinese Military”, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, Winter 1988, pp. 215-231. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.
62 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 31. Kevin Pollpeter, U.S. China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), p. 9, https://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG143.pdf. Accessed on August 15, 2023. 32. Ibid. 33. Taifa Yu, “The Conduct of Post-Tiananmen U.S. China Policy: Domestic Constraints, Systemic Change, and Value Incompatibility,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1993), pp. 229-247. 34. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016 A Comparative”, CSIS, December 2016, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ s3fs-public/publication/161208_Chinese_Strategy_Military_Modernization_2016. pdf. Accessed on August 11, 2023. 35. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016”, April 2016, p. 81, https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf. Accessed on August 5, 2023. 36. Ibid., p. 81. 37. Catherine A. Theohary, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014”, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, p. 9, https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44320.pdf. Accessed on August 18, 2023. 38. Cordesman, n. 34. 39. SIPRI, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022”, March 23, 2023, https:// www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/2303_at_fact_sheet_2022_v2.pdf. Accessed on August 25, 2023. 40. Liu Huaqing, “Unswervingly March Along the Road of Building a Modem Army with Chinese Characteristics,” Jiefangjunbao, August 6, 1993, in FBIS-CHI, August 18. Quoted in Godwin, n. 15, p. 472. 41. Ibid. 42. Shambaugh, n. 10, p. 18. 43. Whiting, n. 27. 44. Shambaugh, n. 10. 45. Li, n. 22. 46. Hailong Ju, China’s Maritime Power and Strategy: History, National Security and Geopolitics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015). 47. Quoted from Whiting, n. 27, p. 600. 48. Globalsecurity, “Deng Xiaoping’s “24-Character Strategy”, https://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm. Accessed on December 2, 2020. 49. Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008”, Washington, DC, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/ china/dod-2008.pdf. Accessed on December 5, 2020. 50. Feng Zhang, “China’s Long March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 2009–2016’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 33. No. 5, 2020, pp. 757-787.
China’s Military Modernisation: Theory and Practice • 63 51. Cordesman, n. 34. 52. Air Marshal Anil Chopra, China, the Rising Aerospace Power: Implications for India (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2020), p. 10. 53. Cordesman, n. 34. 54. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2014”, April 2014, p. 9, https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/ files/article/attachments/Military%20and%20Security%20Developments%20 Involving%20the%20PROC%202014.pdf. Accessed on August 23, 2023. 55. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2022”, November 2022, p. 59, https://media.defense. gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF CHINA.PDF. Accessed on August 27, 2023. 56. Cordesman, n. 34, p. 345. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation), MR-580-AF, 1995, p. 33. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR580.html. Accessed on August 29, 2023. 60. Ibid. 61. Tai Ming Cheung, “Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s,” in Richard H. Yang, ed., China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/93 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 61-77. 62. “Final Gift From the Soviets: How China Received Three of the USSR’s Top Fighters Weeks Before the Superpower Collapsed”, Military Watch Magazine, August 14, 2022, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/final-gift-from-the soviets-how-china-received-three-of-the-ussr-s-top-fighters-weeks-before-the superpower-collapsed 63. Shambaugh, n. 10. 64. Ming-yen Tsai, American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2001, pp. 1-5. 65. Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, “Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s”, SIPRI Research Report No. 15, SIPRI, Stockholm, 1999, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/RR/SIPRIRR15.pdf 66. Globalsecurity, “Kilo Class”, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ kilo.htm. Accessed on December 15, 2020. 67 Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Allen, et. al., n. 59. 71. Ibid. 72. Tai Ming Cheung, “Innovation in China’s Defense Research, Development, and Acquisition System”, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2011, https:// escholarship.org/uc/item/43v5v0nt. Accessed on August 21, 2023.
64 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.
78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.
Cordesman, n. 34, p. 360. Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). Chopra, n. 52. “China’s National Defense in 2010”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, March 31, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/government/ whitepaper/node_7114675.htm. Accessed on December 6, 2020. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, CRS Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on December 6, 2020. Huang, n. 11. Office of Naval Intelligence of the US Navy, “The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics”, August 2009, https://fas.org/irp/ agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf. Accessed on December 10, 2020. Kamlesh Agnihotri, Strategic Direction of the Chinese Navy: Capability and Intent Assessment (Bloomsbury: New Delhi, 2015). Shambaugh, n. 10. Richard Bitzinger, “Modernising China’s Military, 1997-2012”, China Perspective, No. 4, Vol. 88, 2011, pp. 7-15. Ibid. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 29, 2006, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ doctrine/wp2006.html. Accessed on December 14, 2020. Military Balance 2020 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2020), p. 238.
3.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities
China is expanding the profile of the PLAAF and Naval Aviation into the Indian Ocean, with air coverage from ground-launched aircraft, either from the Chinese bases under the Southern Theatre Command or from the sources of friendly countries like Pakistan and Cambodia, and aircraft carriers. China has already completed the construction of a 3,500-m airstrip at the Dara Sakor airfield near the Ream naval base in Cambodia and can use its all-weather friend Pakistan’s airfields for Indian Ocean operations. Even though it has built several airports in various Indian Ocean littoral countries under the strategic initiative of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the PLAAF may not use them for logistical as well as strategic reasons. Maintaining an airfield in the IOR could be a huge economic burden for China. Also, it could be an easy target for India, as reinforcement will be a huge problem for China to counter the Indian threat. In this regard, the PLAAF’s expeditionary capabilities and Naval Aviation will be used for the Indian Ocean military operations by China.
PLAAF’s Capabilities: An Assessment
Since its inception in 1949, the PLAAF has undergone massive technological transformations, with a focus on acquiring critical technologies through various means, including assistance from foreign countries, and espionage, to emerge as a modern air force at par with the Western forces. China heavily relied on the former Soviet Union for technology and equipment in the early periods; it attempted to source technology from the West during the 1980s, then resorted to reverseengineering for creating a home-made production line, and has made
66 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
‘hybrid’ (copied Western technology and home-made weapon system) fifth generation fighter aircraft in the present century. It has also improved the range of its bombers with an extended strike capability of its missiles and now can target the US base of Guam and beyond. The PLAAF relied heavily on the Soviet Union for its inventory in the first decade, and by the mid-1960s, it started licensed production in China with the Soviet technology. China established the Chinese Aeronautical Establishment, an umbrella organisation for Chinese aerospace research centres and institutes, and test facilities, in 1960. In 1961, the National Defence Industries Office (NDIO) was established by the State Council and the CMC to coordinate military industrial production. After the Korean War, Mao propounded the setting up of dual-use military industrial complexes to focus on civilian economic development and reduce military expenditures from 30 to 20 per cent of the state budget, which would eventually contribute to both economic development and improved defence output.1 By the mid 1960s, China had set up six military industrial complexes, aviation being one among them, including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), a conglomerate of over 100 subsidiaries including the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation, Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation, and Hongdu Aviation Industry Group.2
Fighter Aircraft Programme
In the early 1960s, Soviet engineers shared plans of the MiG-21 fighter jet with China, which helped Beijing to develop its first fighter aircraft, the J-7, a copy of the MiG-21, by the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation, and it had its first flight in 1966.3 The J-7 is China’s first supersonic fighter jet and continued as the mainstay of the PLAAF and Naval Aviation for many years. China produced approximately 2,400 J-7 aircraft, and ended production in 2013, but around 200 aircraft are still in service in the PLAAF inventory.4 Besides China, the Bangladesh, North Korea, and Pakistan Air Forces operate the Chinese made J-7 fighters. This aircraft was planned to be retired by 2023, as part of the PLAAF modernisation to create an advanced Air Force by 2030.5 A major advantage of the J-7’s production is that China was able to build the trainer aircraft JL-9 on the
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 67
same platform, and many variants of advanced aircraft including the J-17 Thunder aircraft. Based on the J-7 platform, Shenyang Aircraft/Aerospace Corporation, a subsidiary of AVIC, produced two series of the J-8 ( J-8 Finback A and J-8 Finback B/J-8II) multi-role aircraft in the 1980s. Since the Soviet Union stopped providing technical assistance due to the border stalemate that started in the late 1960s, it took almost 10 years for China to develop the J-8 indigenously, while the design and materials were still of the Soviet origin. Externally, the J-8 followed Soviet’s new Sukhoi Su-15’s external design, while much of the internal technology was a copy of the MiG-21.6 In fact, the 1980s was a crucial period for China’s aerospace industry, when China focussed on developing indigenous fighter jets equipped with advanced avionics and air-to-air missiles.The CMC pushed for international cooperation on defence projects, which included China’s cooperation with France on helicopter production, and the $550-million ‘Peace Pearl’ programme with the United States. The objective of the ‘Peace Pearl’ programme was to equip about 50-55 J-8II aircraft with improved avionics and weapons by the US company Northrop Grumman, in partnership with the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation of China, which would make the J-8II a high-altitude, high-speed fighter aircraft.7 However, the programme got cancelled after the initial stages of collaboration due to the Tiananmen Square imbroglio in 1989, and China produced a total of 60 J-8II aircraft with improved avionics and BVR combat air-to-air missiles, without the US assistance.8 The new J-8 has an improved onboard computer system, new cockpit design and redesigned ejection escape system and oxygen supply system, and improved electronic warfare systems.The J-8II aircraft is close to its eventual retirement, as announced by a PLAAF pilot from the Northern Theatre Command Air Force in April 2023.9 Currently the PLAAF operates one brigade of the J-8II.10 China’s most successful and first indigenous fighter jet, the J-10 (Vigorous Dragon), developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), is a combination of the Israeli Aircraft Industries’ Lavi fighter aircraft’s design (which itself is similar to, and derived technology from, the USAF’s F-16 aircraft) and Russian engine and weapons.11 The design process
68 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
of the J-10 started in 1988 and the prototype was completed in June 1997. The first flight of the single seat J-10 took place in 1998, and a two-seater variant J-10S fighter trainer made its first flight in 2003. The J-10 is a multirole fourth generation fighter aircraft which entered service in 2005. The J-10 has beyond visual range air combat and surface attack capabilities and can carry various missiles, such as the PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles for aerial combat, and air-to-ground munitions, including precision-guided bombs and anti-ship cruise missiles, for ground attack missions.12 The CAIG has developed three more variants of the J-10: the J10A Firebird, J10B Firebird, and J10-C Firebird, each one with advancements in avionics, radar systems, and weapons integration. The J10-C is an export variant and the Pakistan Air Force is currently the sole customer. China started negotiations with Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for the sale of the aircraft, amid the weapons embargo on Russia after the Ukraine crisis.13 The PLAAF currently operates 5 brigades (90) with the J-10A/S Firebird, one brigade (24) with the J-10B/S Firebird, and 6 brigades with the J-10C/S Firebird, while the PLAN Aviation operates one brigade with the J-10A/S Firebird.14 After having failed to acquire Western technology and equipment for the PLAAF’s modernisation, China turned to Russia for various types of weapons in the early 1990s, and since then, Russia has become the major source of fighter aircraft, including aircraft engines and avionics for China’s indigenous production. During the 1990s, China bought an estimated $6.75 billion worth of weapons and equipment from Russia, which included 26 Su-27 interceptors, 4 Ilyushin transport aircraft, 18 SA-300 anti-aircraft systems, and 100 missiles.15 Originally, China contracted for 72 Su-27 Flanker aircraft in 1990, and the first batch of 26 fighters was delivered in 1992, while negotiations for the second batch started in 1994 and were concluded two years later, leading to the delivery of 48 fighters in 1996 which included 34 one-seat Su-27 Flanker SK, 12 two-seat Su-27 Flanker UB, and two trainers.16 The renegotiated contract also contained Chinese co-production of 200 Su-27 fighters worth $2.2 billion at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) over a 10-15 year period. The contract specified that “the first fifty aircraft would be assembled from kits from Russia before the transfer of production technology begins. Even by the end of
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 69
the production period, the SAC will build only 70 per cent of the plane, the remainder coming from the Sukhoi factory at Komsomolsk”.17 The first two co-produced Su-27 Flanker fighters were assembled at the SCA facility with the assistance of over a hundred Russian engineers and the flights were tested in December 1998 (designated the J-11 by the Chinese).18 There were reports that by the end of the 2000s, the PLAAF grounded all Russianmade Su 27 Flankers, because of the problems faced during the induction of the aircraft into the PLAAF inventory, while 40 fighters were converted into training aircraft.19 The PLAAF currently operates 168 China-made Su-27 or J-11A/B fighters.20 In December 1999, China also signed a contract with Russia for 38 Su-30MKK Flanker G at the cost of $1.8 billion, which later increased to 73 fighters because of its high performance compared with the Russian made Su-27s.21 The Su-30MKK Flanker is a custom-made aircraft for China by the Sukhoi Design Bureau of Moscow based on the Russian version of the Su-30M (the Su-30MKI is the Indian version of the Su-30M). The range of the Su-30MKK is 3,000km, which can be extended to 5,200km with in-flight refuelling, and the duration of the combat mission can be increased from 6 hours to 10 hours.22 The Su-30MKK has the all air-combat capability of the Su-27 but also has all-weather ground attack capability as well. It is a twin-seat multi-purpose fighter, optimal for longrange air combat roles, that was originally designed to challenge the US’ F-15. The Su-30MKK Flanker also has more advanced digital avionics and radar than the Su-27 and can carry a dozen Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) and air-to-ground missiles, as well as 6,000 kg of precision-guided ‘smart’ bombs.23 It is a fourth generation ‘plus’ fighter aircraft and its delivery was completed in 2004. China also ordered 24 Su-30MK2 naval fighters, of which more details are discussed in the Naval Aviation section below. China has currently deployed one brigade of Su-30MKK fighters at the Nanning Base of the Southern Theatre Command, which looks after the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean waters.24 In 2015, Russia and China signed a contract worth $2 billion for 24 Su-35, Russia’s most advanced fighter aircraft, ending Russia’s longstanding policy of withholding sales of its most advanced weapon systems
70 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
to China because of Moscow’s fear of losing critical technology to China.25 Besides, China purchased two sets of S-400 missile defence batteries from Russia worth $3 billion in 2014 to enhance its defensive mechanism against a superior enemy. In 2019, both countries signed another contract for 120 helicopters, which included: 68 Mi-171 helicopters (including the upgraded Mi-171E), 18 Mi-171Sh (military transport) helicopters, 14 Mi 171 helicopters with a VK-2500 engine, and 21 Ansat helicopters.26 These agreements suggest that China has not become self-sufficient in advanced military equipment and still relies on Russia for both offensive and defensive weapons and systems. China’s dependence on Russia for high technology aerial items has been irrevocable. One such item comprises engines for aircraft and helicopters which need a highly skilled and experience workforce which China is lacking. Its indigenous aerial systems are powered by Russian engines, including the first fifth generation fighter J-20. Russia delivered nearly 4,000 engines for Chinese helicopters and other military aircraft between 1992 and 2019.27 Currently, 40 percent of China’s Air Force fleet is powered by Russian engines.28 With experience gained from making fighter aircraft through licensedmanufacturing of the Russian made Su-27 ( J-11), China has built another fourth generation fighter aircraft, the J-16, indigenously which is one of the major ground attacking platforms of the PLAAF. Unveiled for the first time in 2012 by the SAC, the aircraft entered service in 2013. The SAC built the J-16 based on the J-11BS (a twin-seat combat capable trainer version of the J-11) and the Russian-supplied Su-30MKK fighter and is broadly similar in terms of capabilities to the American F-15E.29 The J-16 Flanker has increased operational range, improved avionics, and multi-role capability; it can be used for aerial combat and can strike various ground targets as well as ships from long distances. It is powered by two Chinese Shenyang WS-10A turbofan engines and can fly at a top speed of Mach 2, with a range of 1,900 miles. It is equipped with 12 external hand points which support the PL-9 and PL-12 series of AAMs, standard anti-radiation (anti-radar) missiles, anti-ship weaponry, rocket pods, conventional drop bombs, and precisionguided ordnance.30 Its onboard Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) suite
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 71
helps in missile and radar tracking/engagement of incoming threats so as to respond quickly and thwart the threats through onboard chaff and flare dispensers. The J-16 is an advanced fighter aircraft and China currently operates 6 brigades (108) with the J-16 Flanker.31 China also has developed another fighter aircraft, the J-17, a lightweight aircraft developed based on the third generation MiG-21,and the programme started in the 1980s in the name of ‘FC-1’, that stands for “Fighter China-1”.32 Pakistan joined the developmental process in 1999, originally to develop and produce the Chengdu ‘FC-1/Super-7’ in Pakistan to replace its Air Force’s aging A-5C, F-7P/PG, Mirage III, and Mirage V, but China forced Pakistan to join the FC-1 programme. Later, both countries agreed to bear the cost at a 50:50 ratio and Pakistan offered to accommodate a minimum of 200 aircraft. The plane’s name was changed to ‘Joint Fighter-17’ in 2003, with the ‘-17’ denoting that, in the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF’s) vision, it was the successor to the US-made F-16 for Pakistan. The PAF is the major user of the J-17 aircraft. It is the only Chinese origin aircraft for export, and in July 2023, Iraq signed an agreement to purchase 12 aircraft for $664 million.33 Earlier, Nigeria bought three JF-17 Thunder aircraft from Pakistan in 2021,34 while around 17 J-17 Thunder aircraft were delivered to Myanmar by Pakistan during 2019-21 but had to be grounded due to malfunctioning.35 Countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt had evinced interest in purchasing the aircraft, but later abandoned it due to unknown reasons.36 China’s fifth generation fighter aircraft is the J-20 (Mighty Dragon), developed by the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation, which entered service in 2017. It is a single-seater twin engine aircraft and is considered a rival to the US Air Force’s (USAF’s) fifth generation aircraft F-22 Raptor and Russia’s Su-57 (previously known as the PAK-FA). China started the developmental process in the 2000s, reportedly assisted by the Russian MiG aviation company, and it made its first flight in 2011.37 The company made at least five prototypes by 2015 and the first batch of operational J-20 stealth fighters was delivered to the Chinese Air Force in 2016. The J-20 is powered by the Russian AL-31FN engines while in a video that appeared in June 2023, a J-20 is flying with China’s home-made WS-15 engines.38 China’s Shenyang Liming Aircraft Engine Company developed the WS-10 engines for the
72 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
J-11 fighter aircraft in the 2000s, and it has different variants, while the WS 10G was expected to be used in the J-20.39 With home-made engines, China can ramp up the production with minimum cost, for the PLAAF plans to acquire 500 J-20 stealth jets by 2035-38.40 China has reportedly stolen the stealth technology of the F-22 Raptor as the J-20’s stealth body shaping is similar to that of the F-22.41 Domestic aircraft engines will allow China to augment the mass production of the J-20 fighters, helping it to achieve air superiority in East Asia over its rivals. The J-20 is an aerial combat aircraft with a range of 1,100 nm and can reach a speed of Mach 2.25, and a service ceiling of 66,000ft, while the F-22 has the same speed as the J-20, Mach 2.25, with a smaller combat range of 460 nm and a smaller service ceiling of 65,000ft.42 The US’ fifth generation muti-role aircraft, the F-35, has a maximum speed of 1.6 Mach, a combat range of 669 nm, and a service ceiling of 55,000ft. In this respect, the J-20 is both faster and has a longer range than the F-35, while later models of the J-20 have supercruise—an ability to fly at a high speed without afterburners. Its stealth attributes are inferior to those of the F-35. While compared with the F-22 and F-35, both have a high level of agility, but the J-20’s agility which includes sensor range, onboard data processing, and weapons targeting precision is still under suspicion because, unlike the US systems, J-20 technology is not being developed incrementally. The US stopped production of the F-22 Raptor in 2011 because of the high cost; the aircraft is exclusively for the USAF to prevent technology adaptation by other countries, while the F-35 is being used by the USAF and most of its military partners. The J-20 carries six onboard missiles, four BVR PL-15 medium-to long-range air-to-air missiles, and two PL-10 short-to-intermediate-range missiles; the PL-15 is for long-range precision strike, while the PL-10 could prove useful in a dogfight. China keeps on upgrading the J-20 aircraft from its earlier versions which could be used for information warfare with a tactical electronic jammer and enhanced early warning equipment.43 It can also “become the commanding aircraft of a swarm of drones”, according to Chinese military magazine Ordnance Industry Science Technology.44 The PLAAF currently focusses on three designs of multi-role fighter/ ground-attack combat aircraft: the Chengdu J-10C Firebird, Shenyang
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 73
J-16 Flanker and the ‘low-observable’ Chengdu J-20, and their production is increasing (Fig 3.1). The PLAAF has now fielded over 600 aircraft of these three types in at least 19 frontline combat brigades and is looking toward further expansion.45 According to the Military Balance, “Within the last three years, annual production rates of both the J-16 and J-20 have likely doubled, and in early 2023, at least 150 aircraft were in PLAAF service, and if production of the J-20 continues at its current rate, by the end of 2023, this inventory will likely have overtaken that of the United States Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.”46 Fig 3.1: PLA’s Combat Aircraft: Selected Inventories 2016-22
Source: Douglas Barrie, et. al., “China’s Air Force Modernisation: Gaining Pace”, Military Balance blog, February 21, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/military-balance/ 2023/02/chinas-air-force-modernisation-gaining-pace/. Accessed on March 12, 2023.
Bombers
According to the PLAAF, bombers are described in the following terms. Bombers are a type of military aircraft used for attacking enemy surface targets with air-to-surface weapons. Besides dropping bombs, bombers can also drop various torpedoes and nuclear bombs or launch air-to
ground missiles. They have strong penetration capabilities with a large
payload for a long-range mission. Bombers are the main type of aircraft for air strikes. They can be divided into strategic bombers and tactical
74 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
bombers, depending on their mission; heavy bombers (10 tons and over), medium bombers (5-10 tons), and light bombers (3-5 tons) based on their payload; or short-range bombers (less than 3,000 km), medium-
range bombers (3,000-8,000 km), and long-range bombers (8,000 km over) based on their range.47
The PLAAF operates three series of H-6 bombers (H-6M; H-6H; and H-6K) with a total of 196 bombers, and a brigade H-6N will be formed in the near future.48 China is also developing a stealth bomber, the H-20, a rival to the US’ most advanced strategic bomber, the B-21 Rider, with an expected range of 8,500km.49 Bombers are mostly deployed under the Central, Eastern, and Southern Theatre Commands which will enhance the range of the PLAAF’s strike capability on the vast oceanic flank. Bombers are crucial in the PLAAF’s expeditionary operations far beyond the East Asian theatre into Guam and the Indian Ocean waters. China’s H-6 series bombers are the licensed-built versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16s and remain the primary bomber aircraft of the PLAAF. The H-6 can carry 9,000 kg of payload, including various air-to-surface, and air-to-ship missiles or free-fall bombs, and has nuclear attack capability. The H-6H bomber, which appeared in the 1990s, is a cruise missile carrier. It carries two land attack cruise missiles but has no internal bomb bay or defensive armament.50 The H-6M can carry up to four cruise missiles but has no internal bomb bay or defensive armament. The H-6K is a recent upgrade, fitted with Russian engines, which made its first flight in 2007 and entered service in 2009.51 It has new avionics and a reinforced structure, and is considered to be a strategic bomber. It is capable of launching precisionguided munitions, such as Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), at longer ranges and at stand-off distances. The H-6K is subsonic, with an operational range of approximately 3,000 km.When armed with the CJ-20 LACMs, however, the bomber’s range increases to 4,500 km, and the upgraded version might be air-refuellable but is not considered nuclear-capable.52 The H-6N is the latest version with in-flight refuelling capability and a much longer operational range than the H-6K. It was first publicly revealed in 2019.53 As per media reports, it can
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 75
carry an Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM) CH-AS-X-13, an airlaunched variant of the DF-21 medium-range Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM).54 China has an aerial refuelling tanker, the H-6U, necessary for conducting long-range precision strikes in the Indian Ocean or to attack targets beyond Guam.
Naval Capabilities
As China’s naval strategy is ‘offensive defence’ based on theoretical formulations, it focusses on near seas ‘active defence’ as its core defence strategy, while extending strategic depth is its offensive/expansionist strategy.55 Near seas ‘active defence’ aims to “reunify Taiwan with the mainland, restore lost and disputed maritime territories, protect China’s maritime resources, secure major SLOCs in times of war, deter and defend against foreign aggression from the sea, and achieve strategic nuclear deterrence”.56 Its defence strategy has been premised on a layered defence line extending from the coastal belt to the near seas and the far seas; strategic depth is a progressive expansion of China’s ‘sea control/sea denial’ ability from the near seas to the far seas, and as and when each layer of the defence line becomes matured, it is considered as strategic depth, which is also considered as a forward defence line.57 Accordingly, China’s naval capabilities are targeted to achieve these twin objectives: defending the near seas, and expanding the strategic depth to the Indian Ocean. Since America is viewed as the major enemy of China and the Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) are the most potent weapon of American power,58 China’s layered defence includes anti-ship missiles, localised submarine forces, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft, making incursions within the strike range of a CSG is possibly unfeasible.59 To expand the strategic depth, aircraft carriers, strategic submarines, and large destroyers are to ensure projection of Chinese power on a global scale. In short, China’s naval modernisation, as well as its capabilities, are aimed at winning in the ‘active offshore defence’ strategy by negating the manoeuvrability of the CSG within the first island chain and establishing Chinese sea control in the near seas. In the Chinese strategic parlance, numbers matter as a winning formula in a war. Mao’s ‘total war’ was to mobilise the populace against
76 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the enemy so that a technologically superior enemy could be defeated by the numerically large Chinese Army. In the naval strategy also, China’s initial focus was on the sheer number of ships and tonnage which would be able to deter the advancement of superior forces from approaching the Chinese coasts. In the post-Cold War scenario, it has become preventing the US Navy from approaching the Taiwan Strait as well as the near seas and establishing Chinese dominance. So the naval modernisation has given considerable attention to platform ships and attack submarines to defend the near seas waters and deter US manoeuvrability in the area. Since the 1990s, China has been modernising its naval fleets by replacing older and technologically obsolete or obsolescent submarines, surface ships, and aircraft with foreign-made and indigenously produced units that are technologically much more modern and capable. The far seas protection strategy announced in 2015 necessitated China to build large destroyers and aircraft carriers to have a two-ocean navy—the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Accordingly, China’s overall defence budget grew by roughly 55 per cent since 2015, and funding for the PLAN increased by roughly 82 per cent.60 Today, the PLAN is the largest navy, with around 320 warships, and is expected to grow to 400 ships in the next two years.61 China continues to increase its new inventory of large destroyers, guidedmissile cruisers, submarines, and now aircraft carriers.
Surface Fleets
China’s surface fleets are the largest in the world and it has been continuing its modernisation programme from the large numbers of low-capability, single-mission platforms of the 1990s and 2000s to a modern force of highly capable, multi-mission systems.62 It has replaced older systems and introduced new and advanced platform ships into the Service. Since China’s primary aim is to deter the US’ advancement to its shores at faraway locations, its earlier focus was on increasing the numbers of destroyers, frigates, amphibious vessels, and fast attack missile craft with indigenous technology.63 In 2009, the PLAN force structure consisted of approximately 26 destroyers, 48 frigates, more than 80 missile-armed patrol craft, 58 amphibious ships, 40 mine warfare ships,
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 77
50 major auxiliaries, and over 250 minor auxiliaries and service/support craft.64 In 2021, it increased to 80 principal surface combatants, which include aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and frigates, 179 corvettes, and patrol and missile boats, 132 amphibious ships, and 154 major and minor auxiliaries (Table 3.1).65 Table 3.1: New Classes of PLAN Destroyers Since the1990s
Class Name Type
Active in Service
Displacement (tonnes)
Commenced in Service
Luhu
052
2
4,674
1994, 1996
Luhai
051B
1
6,100
1999
052C
6
7,000
2005
Hangzhou
Luyang I
Luyang II Luzhou
Luyang III Renhai
Project 956E (Sovremenny class) 052B
051C
052D 055
4
2 2
Active 20, Planned 25 Active 5, Planned 8
6,600 standard, 8,480 full load 6,500 7,100
7,500 13,000
1999-2006
2004 2006, 2007 2014 2020
Source: Compiled from various sources.
China has commissioned seven new classes of destroyers since the beginning of the naval modernisation in the early 1990s. The first modern destroyer was the Type 052 Luhu class, launched in the1980s, with technical support from the US and the European Union. Beijing was able to commission only two ships due to the sanctions imposed by the West after the Tiananmen incident. However, this was believed to have served as the basis for the advanced Luyang class designs. In the 1990s, China turned to Russia for advanced naval systems and purchased twelve Russian Kilo class conventional submarines and four Sovremenny class destroyers66 China has also launched its own R&D programme to build modern naval systems by itself, and since then, all types of naval systems are being built indigenously in China. China ordered two Sovremenny class destroyers in 1996 which entered service in 1999 and 2001, and ordered an additional two in 2002, which entered service in 2005 and 2006. The ships are
78 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
equipped with the highly capable SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCMs, while the ships that were ordered in 2002 had ASCMs and wide-area air defence systems.67 Every new class of ship in China is advanced and at par with the equivalent US naval ship. For instance, the Luyang I is stealthier, equipped with the Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83 ASCM.68 However, the Luyang II has a phased-array radar that is outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar used in the US-made Aegis combat system.69 China’s latest series of destroyers, the Type 052Ds, and Type 055s, represent advancements in technology in the PLAN’s destroyer programme. Launched in 2019, the Type 052D Luyang III (Kunming class series) is one of the latest generations of guided-missile destroyers (DDG) of the Chinese Navy, which entered naval service in 2021.70 The newest version of the Type 052D, Zhanjiang, commissioned in March 2022, is equivalent to the US’ Arleigh-Burke class destroyers.71 The first Type 052D naval ship entered service in 2014, outfitted with an Aegis-type air defence radar and fire-control system, forming a critical part of the PLAN’s goal of expanding operations into the distant seas, including aircraft carriers. In August 2020, China launched the 25th Type 052D destroyer and many are still being equipped or are in the sea trial phase.72 The new Type 052Ds have improved radars and sensors, and are mounted with “a multi-purpose vertical launch system for firing CJ-10 LACMs, HHQ-9 series long-range SAMs, HQ 16 and DK-10A medium-range SAMs, YJ-18/YJ-83 anti-ship missiles, as well as CY-5 series anti-submarine missiles.”73 The Type 052D guided missile destroyers are likely to serve as the primary combatant surface ships for the “active near seas defence” and the PLAN’s blue water naval operations.74 China has also built the larger Type 055 (Renhai class) guided missile destroyer, with a full load displacement of about 13,000 tonnes, currently the largest surface combatant being built in the world.75 In comparison, the US Navy’s Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruiser, with a displacement of 9,800 tonnes, and the Royal Navy’s Type 45 at 8,500 tonnes are the other largest destroyers.76 The first Renhai class destroyer was commissioned in January 2020, and four have already entered service: the Nanchang (101) in
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 79
late 2020, Lhasa (102) in March 2021, Dalian (105) in April 2021, Anshan (103) in November 2021; and two ships, Anshan and Wuxi, were launched in 2022 and are under sea trials.77 The Type 055 Renhai is regarded as second only in power to the US Navy’s Zumwalt class stealth cruiser and a total of eight ships in the first batch were planned to be inducted by 2024.78 The Renhai class ships will be the principle ‘bodyguard’ for CSGs once fully operational for mission purposes.79 Both Type 052D and Type 055 vessels are equipped with the indigenous YJ-83 or YJ-62 ASCM and the HN-2 LACM (a variant of the Russian Kh-55 missile). The Type-052C also carries several Chinese built HHQ-9 SAMs, housed in the Vertical Launch System (VLS). Frigates are the mainstay in China’s surface combat force and since the early 1990s, China has built four new classes of frigates. Like the destroyers, under the naval modernisation process, China’s technological improvements have occurred in the new generation frigates over earlier generation ships, including improved Anti-Air War (AAW ) capabilities, and have larger displacement.80 Its oldest Jianghu class (Type 053) frigates were of the Soviet era but improvements were made progressively in every new ship which included AAW capabilities, electronics based sensors, Fire Control Systems (FCS), and modern weapon systems, enabling effective war-fighting capabilities and sea-worthiness.81 The programme has since matured in stages through progressive improvements in design, armament, and technology enabled sensor and battle control packages. The latest Jiangkai II class guided missile frigates possess more stealth features than China’s Jiangwei II-class frigates and are armed with the most modern fire control systems and weapons.82 “Some sources note that the Type 054 Jiangkai I frigate resembles the French Lafayette class guided missile frigate because of the minimalist design of the Type 054’s superstructure. The design of the new frigate also offers greater options for outfitting the vessel with various weapon suites.”83 China has a large fleet of missile boats, originally bought from the former Soviet Union, then made in China with Soviet assistance, and since the mid-1960s, China has independently built the Houkou class, Huangfen class and Houbei class missile boats.84 Table 3.2 summarises the four new classes of frigates.
80 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region Table 3.2: New Class of Frigates Since the1990s
Class Name
Type
Jianghu-II
Type 053 H1
Jiangwei I Jiangkai I
Jianghu V
Jiangwei II Jiangkai II
Active in Service Displacement (tonnes)
Commenced in Service
6
1993-1996
10
2000
053G H2G
4
2,393 full load 1991-1994
054
2
3,963
053 H1G
053H3 054A
10 30 (till 2019)
200
1998-2002
2,393
1998-2005
3,963
2007-2008
2005
Sources: Compiled from various sources.
Submarines
The naval modernisation has made the PLAN submarine force more agile and modern, replacing the aging older generations with Kilo class nonnuclear-powered attack submarines (SS) and a new generation of nuclear powered attack (SSN) and strategic (SSBN) submarines. The Kilo class is a Soviet-made submarine that China purchased in a total of 12—four ordered in the 1990s and another eight in 2002—with delivery completed in 2006. Besides the Kilo class, China operates three more conventional submarines: the Ming (035), Song (039), and Yuan (041) classes. The Ming class is the oldest inventory in the current PLAN submarine force, after decommissioning of China’s first ever submarine, the Romeo class, built with Soviet technical assistance. The Ming class submarine is an improved version of the Romeo class, with an “improved diesel-electric engine, improved hull design with less hydrodynamic resistance, better underwater speed, and a more capable sonar.”85 The first Ming class boat entered service in 1971, and from 1987 till 2002, one submarine was built per year with three progressive design modifications.86 China launched its 20th ship in 200287 and currently, 14 are in service in the Chinese Navy.88 The weapon package of the Ming class includes only torpedoes. The Song class is the first submarine developed through China’s indigenous R&D programme, taken from the experience of the Ming and Kilo classes of boats.89 The first Song class boat was commissioned in 1999, and the second and third boats were commissioned in 2001 with substantial modifications.90 Initially, they reportedly experienced
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technical problems, resulting in design changes that were incorporated into subsequent (Type 039G) boats built in the second phase of the 2002 06 period. The Song class submarine is more advanced than that of the Ming class, with “a hydrodynamically sleek (teardrop) profile, possesses new cylindrical environmental sensors, and relies on German engines for propulsion.”91 “Most significantly, the Song is much quieter because it is fitted with an asymmetrical seven-blade skew propeller, and uses anechoic rubber dampening tiles on the hull and shock absorbency for the engine to reduce its acoustic signature. The Song may also be able to launch cruise missiles when submerged, another design advance for China’s conventional submarines.”92 China currently operates 12 Song class boats and has almost stopped further construction of such boats. China’s latest class of conventional submarines is the Yuan (Type 041) class: the first boat was launched in 2004, commissioned in 2006, and the second entered service in 2009. The appearance of the Yuan was reportedly a surprise to Western observers because of its similarity with the Kilo class as well as with Russia’s most recent SS design, known as the Lada or Amur class.93 The boat is shorter and broader than the Song class, however, it acquired some of the design features of the Song which include the fin (i.e., the sail) and stern. The boat is of the double-hull construction model, and is fitted with a seven-bladed propeller. It is fitted with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and is covered with anechoic tiles to increase acoustic stealth.94 China currently operates 4 Type 039 A and 14 Type-039B boats.95 It also has a Qing or Golf (Type 032) class non-nuclear-powered ballistic (strategic) submarine for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) trials based at the North Sea Fleet. China’s nuclear submarine force consists of SSN submarines and a small number of SSBN submarines. China has two classes of SSNs, the Han and the Shang, and two classes of SSBNs, the Jin and the Xia. The Han is the oldest nuclear submarine that China built, and was developed under Mao’s instruction as a priority in China’s security strategy, and also comprised the first ever indigenous naval development programme. This was due to Russia’s refusal to provide nuclear propulsion technology needed for nuclear submarines to China. In October 1959, when Soviet President
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Nikita Khrushchev turned down the Chinese request for technical assistance to build a nuclear submarine, Mao indignantly said, “We will have to build nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years.”96 China’s top leadership then decided to go ahead in building a nuclear submarine by itself; it cleared the nuclear submarine project in 1958 and decided to go with Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs), which were in use in the American and Soviet submarines at that time.97 China conceptualised its nuclear submarine project four years after the first American nuclear submarine Nautilus entered service in 1954, indicating Mao’s determination to have top-line defence systems for China. Chinese researchers decided to build a loop type PWR using low enriched uranium, with refined zirconium alloy cladding control rods, instead of silver-indium-cadmium rods.98 China, however, still followed the Russian model of submarine building with a double hull configuration for better combat survivability, and the fabrication of both the outer and inner hulls was completed in December 1970 at the Bohai shipyard. By mid-1971, the nuclear power plant was installed onboard the first submarine hull, the nuclear fuel rods were loaded in June 1971, and the reactor was brought to initial criticality. After four phases of tests and trials from 1972 to 1974, the first Han class nuclear attack submarine (Type 091) was commissioned in 1974. However, the submarine faced problems in its reactor and propulsion systems, and was, therefore, not fully operational until the early 1980s. China commissioned its second submarine in 1977, and both boats underwent a mid-life refit wherein French Electronic Support Measure (ESM) equipment was inducted, replacing the original Soviet ESM system. The boats were rather noisy, even by the standards of the time in which they were built. They were taken off from active service in 2003 and 2007 respectively, and the first submarine was decommissioned in 2013. China produced three more Han class submarines, which also have undergone extensive refits. The boats carry a mix of straight-running and homing torpedoes, as well as the C-801 YingJi (Eagle Strike) anti-ship missiles; even though the missiles are also noisy, they can strike at shipping lanes far beyond China’s coastal waters. When China was developing its first nuclear attack submarine (HanType 091) from scratch, it commenced work on transforming its SSN design into that of an SSBN, with the code name of 092, later, Xia class submarine.
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It had two distinct phases: the first involving the design of the submarine, and the second, the development of a submarine-based ballistic missile launch system. China then developed a short range Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), the Julang ( JL-I) for the Xia class submarine. The first land launch of the missile was conducted on April 30, 1982, and a sea launch from a Project 629A (Golf ) class submarine on October 12, 1982. China had adopted the SSN design as the basis for constructing the 092 SSBN design, but it had to overcome the question of accommodating the vertical missile launch tube and the associated ejection system for its SSBN. Eventually, China launched the first Xia class SSBN in 1981 and commissioned it in 1983. The second Xia class was launched in 1982 but was reportedly lost in 1985 in an accident.99 The JL-I missile was inducted into the first Xia class boat in 1986 and the JL-1 ballistic missile was successfully launched from the Xia on September 27, 1988.100 In China’s SSBN inventory, the Jin (Type 094) is the second generation of boat or ‘boomer’, launched in 2004, and commissioned in 2007. The Jin boat’s development began in the early 1980s as a successor to the Xia, but actual construction began in 1999. The Jin was believed to be the derivative of the Russian Delta class SSBN, with a lesser radiated noise level compared to its predecessor, but the absence of active Soviet/Russian support during the hull design phase had constrained the Chinese designers and led to delay in the beginning of the construction.101 China launched two more boats, in 2004 and 2006, which were commissioned in 2009 and 2012 respectively. During four years through 2022, China commissioned three more boats, one each in 2018, 2020, and 2021, of which two were the upgraded Type 094A SSBNs.102 The Type 094A can carry up to 12 Julang-2 ( JL-2) SLBMs, each of which is believed to carry a single nuclear warhead and possess a range of between 7,200 and 9,000 km. If launched from waters near China, the JL-2 can target Russia and India, as well as Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska.103 Due to its reach and ability to carry nuclear weapons, the JL-2 has enhanced China’s deterrence capability and prestige as a major power that can strike its powerful enemy from its territory. China is reportedly working on its next generation of SSBNs, the Type 096, which is expected to be armed with the JL-3 SLBM.104 Though the JL-3 SLBM
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is yet to become operational, it is estimated to have a range exceeding 9,000 km and to potentially carry multiple warheads on Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).105 Some sources have indicated that the range of the JL-3 is more than 10,000 km, but less than the 12,000 km (7,500-mile) range of the American Trident II and Russian Bulava SLBMs, but it will have a wide range of targets in the Continental United States (CONUS).106 The US Department of Defence estimates that, by 2030, China could field up to eight SSBNs of the Type 094 and Type 096 operating concurrently.107 The Shang (Type 093) is the second generation SSN that China launched in 2002. The boat is equipped with YJ-12 ASCMs and is powered by two 150 Mega Watt (MW ) pressurised water reactors, compared with one reactor in the Han class submarines. In 2015, China launched an improved version of the Shang, 7,000-tonne Type 093A, the most advanced attack submarine in the Chinese arsenal, of the same size as the Royal Navy’s Astute class or equivalent to the US Navy’s Los Angeles class Flight I and the more advanced Flight III variants in terms of stealth.108 The Type 093As is also believed to be outfitted with the Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells for firing the YJ-18 ASCM and anti-ship variants of the CJ-10 cruise missile.109 The new boat is less noisy as the large size may provide more space for noise reducing features, and it has a modern feature of acoustic stealth.110 China has been constantly upgrading its nuclear submarine forces to enhance its deterrent capability as well as to match the US Navy. It has already developed a hypersonic vehicle, and while the US is planning to install its first hypersonic system in the Zumwalt class destroyers, China too may equip its nuclear submarines with hypersonic vehicles.111 China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: SLBMs, ASCMs, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines (Table 3.3). Wakehoming torpedoes can be very difficult for surface ships to decoy. Each Jin class SSBN is expected to be armed with the 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed SLBMs. Each JL-2 is equipped with a single nuclear warhead and, possibly, penetration aids. The JL-2, which is a modified version of China’s first InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the DF-31, is thought to have a range
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of approximately 7,200 km.112 The weapon systems of the SSNs include torpedoes and cruise missiles. Since 2006, eight nuclear submarines have reached initial operational capability, for an average of one every 15 months. Diesel-electric submarines are produced at two shipyards and typically undergo approximately one year of outfitting and sea trials before becoming operational.113 The number of nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs) may grow in the coming years to ensure the ‘far seas protection’ strategy in which SSBNs are going to be crucial in China’s counter-attack strategy, but still, the force structure will likely continue to consist mostly of SSs because ‘active near seas defence’ is the central tenet of China’s naval and security strategy.114 Currently, the PLAN possesses three nuclear capable ballistic missiles in its inventory, the Jl-1, JL-2, and JL-3, while the Pentagon’s 2020 report to Congress has indicated that “China will likely build new Shang class Type 093B guided-missile nuclear attack submarine with nuclear tipped Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs)”.115 According to the US Naval Intelligence report, China’s submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats—4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs—in 2020; to 76 boats—8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs—in 2030.116
Aircraft Carriers
China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (Type 001), a refurbished exSoviet aircraft carrier named Varyag that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998, entered service in 2012. The second carrier, the Shandong, modelled after the Liaoning and a fully indigenous one, was commissioned in 2019. The Shandong was commissioned after initial sea trials started in 2017; however, an April 2021, press report suggested that it would soon be heading for “combat ready trials on the high seas”.117 In April 2022, China’s Global Times reported that after two years of “active” service, the carrier was undergoing the “first scheduled maintenance and refurbishment that is expected to enhance the flattop’s usability” at Dalian shipyard in northeast China,118 suggesting that it is still not ready for operational deployment. The displacement of the Liaoning is 60,000 to 66,000 tonnes, and it can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed wing airplanes and helicopters, including 24 J-15 fighters.119 The displacement of the
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Shandong is estimated at 66,000 to 70,000 tonnes, with a wing of 44 aircraft that includes 36 J-15 fighters.120 Both the Liaoning and Shandong launch fixed-wing aircraft using a ‘ski ramp’ at the ship’s bow. The third carrier, the Type 003 Fujian, a larger super-carrier with more 80,000 tonnes of displacement, was launched in June 2022.121 It is roughly comparable to the US Navy’s Ford class, and is using the EMALS (Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System) in its deck for smooth launching of aircraft.122 All the three carriers are non-nuclear powered, and there were reports that China was mulling to build a fourth, a nuclear powered one, but had reportedly put it on hold before the COVID pandemic due to financial and technical constraints.123 However, in 2021, reports suggested that China had reactivated the nuclear carrier programme to build the Type 003 design, which would be ready for launch by 2025.124 Having an aircraft carrier has been an ambitious project that the Chinese leadership has harboured for a long time, for national prestige as well as to project its power beyond the East Asian waters. In the 1980s, the Chinese military leadership advocated the importance of an aircraft carrier to turn the PLAN from a coastal navy into a blue water navy in a phased manner from 2000 through 2050.125 The aircraft carrier has been considered as indispensable in the final stage of Admiral Liu’s island chains strategy to establish Chinese dominance between the areas of the second and third island chains, which include the Pacific and Indian Oceans, during the 2020 to 2050 period.126 Admiral Liu had famously said in 1987, “Without an aircraft carrier, I will die with my eyelids open; the Chinese Navy needs to build an aircraft carrier,” using a saying that refers to dying with an unfulfilled wish because China lacked the technology and financial position to own an aircraft carrier.127 Similarly, later, senior officials from the PLA had also advocated the necessity of an aircraft carrier for far seas operations highlighting “an aircraft carrier as the core of a far seas navy.”128 When Jiang Zemin became the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party from 1989 to 2002, he believed that acquiring an aircraft carrier was the responsibility of the Chinese nation and directed the PLA to “place the construction of the Naval Air Force in an important strategic position.”129
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China’s ambition to build an aircraft carrier was indeed constrained by the lack of infrastructure and technology. It had to seek foreign collaboration for technical assistance as well to create a homegrown ecosystem needed to build more carriers in the future. However, the defence technology ban imposed by the West against China following the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 closed the door for Beijing for any collaboration with the Western countries. At the same time, the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the geostrategic situation in the nieghbouring regions and China quickly developed friendships with the Central Asian Republics and resolved the territorial disputes with them.This left the territorial disputes in the maritime domain and the protection of the SLOCs remained as the major concern for China, and prompted the Chinese leadership to acquire an aircraft carrier as soon as possible. Interestingly, instead of the state entities taking the initiative, China allowed commercial entities to acquire the knowhow about aircraft carriers from abroad, and in the mid-1990s, Chinese entities reportedly approached a Spanish shipbuilder who was constructing one for the Royal Thai Navy.130 By the late 1990s, Chinese commercial entities bought three Soviet era aircraft carriers, the Minsk and Varyag (both in 1998) and Kiev (in May 2000) for commercial and tourism purposes.131 The Varyag, originally launched in 1988 for the Soviet Navy, was lying incomplete in a Ukrainian yard, and was bought by the Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement Agency, and towed to China three years later. The company was allegedly a shell company of the Chinese state because it had several retired PLAN officers on its board of directors. Though the company claimed that the carrier would be converted into a floating casino based in Macau, it was finally docked at Dalian, a Chinese shipyard in the northern part of China. China’s decision to build an aircraft carrier by itself was reportedly taken by the highest body on military matters, the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004 or 2005, which coincided with the new CMC Chairman Hu Jintao’s announcement of revised military strategic guidelines for the PLA in December 2004.132 In his ‘New Historic Mission’ strategic guidelines for the PLA, President Hu portrayed two major tasks for the PLA: protecting China’s “national interests”; and safeguarding “world peace”.133 Hu promoted greater contributions by the Chinese defence forces with a broad spectrum
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of activities, including patrolling of the SLOCs and contributing to international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.134 Apart from projecting power at the global level, an aircraft carrier became a necessity to develop goodwill with foreign countries faced with natural calamities. For instance, when the tsunami wreaked havoc in Southeast Asia in December 2004, China was handicapped in delivering aid rapidly to the region, a task completed by the aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups deployed to Indonesia by the US Navy.135 Eventually, China launched its first aircraft carrier in 2009, using a Short-Takeoff-But Arrested-Recovery (STOBAR) design. Currently, the Liaoning is the only fully operational aircraft carrier in the PLAN’s inventory, and is conducting live-wire exercises in the East and South China Seas.136
Assessment of PLAN’s Power Projection Scenario
The Chinese Navy is the largest in the world in terms of the total number of ships, surpassing the US in 2017 (Fig 3.2). China’s naval ships construction spree started along with its ‘going out’ strategy in the previous decade. It had 216 ships in 2005 that increased to 348 in 2021, according to the latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.137 The new inventory in the navy has sped up since Xi came to power. For instance, between 2014 and 2018, China launched more submarines, warships, amphibious vessels, and auxiliaries than the number of ships currently serving in the individual navies of Germany, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom.138 China commissioned 18 ships into its armoury in 2016 alone and another 14 were inducted in 2017, while the US Navy commissioned only 5 and 8 ships respectively during the same period.139 Between 2017 and 2019, China reportedly built more vessels than India, Japan, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom combined.140 In 2021, China commissioned at least 28 new ships,141 approximately 170,000 tonnes worth, to the PLAN.142 “By 2030, it is estimated that the PLAN will consist of some 550 ships: 450 surface ships and ninety-nine submarines.”143 Certain Chinese scholars argue that “China should consider deploying two ocean going fleets, centered around aircraft carriers [sic] the Pacific Fleet and the Indian Ocean Fleet.”144
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 89 Fig 3.2: Total Number of Ships of the US and Chinese Navies during 2000-20
Source: Brad Lendon, “China has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now, What’s Beijing Going to Do With it?” CNN, March 6, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/05/china/ china-world-biggest-navy-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html. Accessed on March 30, 2022.
There has been a major transformation during this period from a regional and technologically inadequate navy to one that is global, upgraded, and capable of multiple missions far from China’s ports. China’s current destroyers are technologically at par with those of the US Navy, and the only area in which China is lagging behind the US is the aircraft carrier.145 The latest series of nuclear armed submarines have the capabilities to contribute to the PLAN’s missions of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), nuclear deterrence, and power projection capabilities. China has increased its nuclear submarine building facilities and the new ones can produce one SSN a year and one SSBN every two years—meaning that there will be eight more SSNs and about four more SSBNs by 2030.146 Destroyers and submarines have received constant upgradation:, for example, the Type 052D was designed to match the US Navy’s Arleigh-Burke class destroyers: the first ship, the Luyang III was short of it in terms of speed—the Arleigh Burke can cover 4,400 nm at a speed of 20 knots, while the Luyang III has a range of 4,000 nm at 15 knots147—but carries similar kinds of weapon systems as the former. For instance, its HHQ-10/FL-30000N 24-round SAM launcher is similar in appearance to the US Navy’s Mk49 rolling airframe missile launcher; the helicopter hangar and landing deck for a
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single Z-9 helicopter used for anti-submarine warfare are the licensedbuilt versions of the Eurocopter AS-365 helicopter used by the US Coast Guard under the HH-65 Dolphin designation.148 Moreover, with the Type 052D Zhanjiang, China has overcome the technological deficiency and the Zhanjiang is being described as ‘a new-generation destroyer’ by the foreign media and at par with the US Navy’s Arleigh-Burke class destroyers.149 This may have influenced the US decision to go in for the ‘generation change’ DDG(X) destroyers to maintain its technological edge over the immediate adversary by a gap of 20 years. The US’ new DDG (X) will be the most sophisticated ship on the surface in the coming decades, and it is not known whether China will attempt to develop a new class of ships to match it. With the naval modernisation efforts, the PLAN has become a formidable navy in the western Pacific, challenging the US Navy within the second island chain. Admiral Philip S. Davidson, former commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, during his Senate hearing in March 2018, stated, “There is no guarantee that the United States would win a future conflict with China”.150 The Chinese Navy may be the largest in the world, but is inferior to the US Navy in offensive weapons and displacements. In 2014, the total tonnage of the US naval ships was 3,415,893, while China’s was 708, 886.151 In 2021, the US capacity increased by barely one million, to 4.5 million tonnes, which is still more than twice that of China’s fleet’s displacement.152 In 2022, the US had 11 aircraft carriers and China had 2; the US had 24 large cruisers of more than 10,000 tonnage while China had only 2; the US had 68 destroyers, and had China 36; while China had more frigates and corvettes than the US at a ratio of 46:21 frigates, and 52:0 corvettes.153 According to the Pentagon, by 2035, the US Navy will have 355 ships with 117 large and 52 small surface combatant ships, apart from 10 aircraft carriers (Fig 3.3). On the other hand, even as the Chinese Navy is the largest in the world in terms of numbers and total tonnage, its naval contingent largely comprises small craft and fast patrol boats. The Chinese Navy in 2030 will likely consist of 8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, 55SSs, 65 aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, and
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135 frigates, and corvettes.154 During the 2005-15 period China’s induction into the navy largely comprised small craft and fast patrol boats, while in the last six years, China has commissioned more corvettes, frigates, and destroyers (Fig 3.4). Fig 3.3: The US Navy Plan for 355 Ships by 2034
Source: Lara Seligman, “Navy Prepares to Slash Funding for New Warships”, Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/10/navy-prepares-cut-funding new-warships-20-percent-budget/. Accessed on April 24, 2022.
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Fig 3.4: Breakdown of PLA Navy Surface Fleet in 2021
Source: China power, “How is China Modernizing its Navy?” CSIS, https://chinapower. csis.org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on April 10, 2022.
Conclusions
China has been modernising its Air Force and Navy for the past two decades, and wants to become the largest military power in the world by the middle of the century. The PLAAF is the third largest air force in the world, however, its modernisation is not incremental and not fully home grown. Its modern inventory comprises imported aircraft from Russia and its home-made inventories comprise largely licensed-produced equipment of Russian origin. It has developed fifth generation fighter aircraft, allegedly copied version of US systems and Russian engines. Over a period of time, it has mastered reverse engineering, produced advanced equipment and indulged in espionage to acquire Western technology. For instance, the technology for the fifth generation fighter aircraft J-20 has not been incrementally developed by the Chinese researchers from the third to the fourth to the fifth as in the case of the United States, it is a mini form of the USAF’s F-22 Raptor. Even though the PLAAF has
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fifth generation fighter aircraft, the US systems are far superior in terms of technology and weaponry, so in an air-to-air battle between the J-20 and F-22, it is still doubtful whether China can overpower the US in East Asia. Similarly, whether China can attack US air bases in South Korea and Japan is also questionable because each US base is heavily protected with anti-aircraft weaponry. Only recently, the PLAAF has acquired expeditionary capabilities to target the Indian Ocean from the Chinese soil or from the friendly countries of Southeast Asia, However, it still has to go a long way to achieve air dominance in the Indian Ocean theatre. So far, China has no military base in the Indian Ocean area, only a few airfields that it has constructed as part of the BRI in the region. To protect a military base in the Indian Ocean during a war is a huge challenge for the PLAAF, let alone targeting enemy bases or systems from such PLAAF bases. In this regard, the PLAAF will be able to use long-range bombers from China controlled air bases under the Southern Theatre Command to strike targets in the Indian Ocean. An important aspect of China’s two decades of naval modernisation is that it has progressively bridged the technological gap with the US Navy in certain categories of platforms. The naval modernisation has transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and agile force, capable of conducting a growing number of operations in more distant waters, including the broader waters of the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters around Europe. In the early part of the present century, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organisation, and readiness for modern warfare, however, with the focussed attention on military modernisation under the CCP, China has been able to “strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations to strengthen and transform China.”155 The 2020 report of the US Department of Defence suggests that the objective of the PRC is to “develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or, in some cases, superior to—the US military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat.”156 China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas, especially in warships, other than aircraft carriers, air defence, and missiles, and its destroyers are at par with the US naval ships in the same category. For instance, the Type 055 (Renhai
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class) is China’s answer to the US Navy’s Aegis cruisers, the most advanced platform ships to defend US carriers.157 Overall, the US is superior to China on financial and offensive platforms: the US defence budget for 2021 was $705 billion, while China’s was $209 billion; the US has 11 aircraft carriers, all nuclear powered, but divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. On the other hand, China’s entire force projection is targeted at the western Pacific, so geographically it is advantageous for China. Even though every branch of China’s armed forces lags behind the United States in firepower and experience, China has made significant gains in asymmetrical weaponry to blunt America’s advantages. In a strategic theatre, numbers sometimes do matter, and China is reducing the technological gap with the US. China does not need a military that can defeat the US outright but merely one that can make an intervention in the region too costly for Washington to contemplate. The DF-26D missiles would keep US carrier strike groups away from the first island chain area, and give enough time for China to launch a counter-attack. Besides, China’s recent innovations in artificial intelligence, robotics, 6G technology, and semiconductors would help it leapfrog in military technology to establish its supremacy in the western Pacific by 2050.
Notes 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Wei-chin Lee, “China’s Defense Industry Invades: The Private Sector, SAIS Review, 1989-2003, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1995, pp. 177-205. Deba R. Mohanty, “Defence Industry Conversion in China”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXII, No. 12, 1999, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_99mod01.html. Accessed on June 10, 2023. Peter Wood and Robert Stewart, “China’s Aviation Industry: Lumbering Forward”, CASI Monograph, China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), 2020, https:// apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082739.pdf. Accessed on June 16, 2022. Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2023). Liu Xuanzun, “China expected to retire legacy J-7 fighter jets from combat service in 2023”, Global Times, January 29, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202301/1284429.shtml. Accessed on June 11, 2023. “Shenyang (AVIC) J-8 / J-8 II (Finback)”, Military Factory, August 7, 2022, https:// www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=212. Accessed on October 12, 2022. Ibid.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 95 8
9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
22. 23. 24. 25.
Thomas Newdick, “Remembering the Time Grumman Helped Craft a Modern Fighter for China”, The Drive, April 29, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war zone/40396/the-u-s-once-helped-china-develop-a-modern-jet-fighter. Accessed on March 16, 2022 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s J-8 fighter jet can still make a difference despite nearing retirement: pilot”, Global Times, April 2, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202304/1288430.shtml. Accessed on April 30, 2022 n. 4. “J-10 ( Jian 10) Vigorous Dragon Multi-role Tactical Fighter”, Airforce Technology, October 13 2020, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/j-10/. Accessed on June 16, 2022. “The Chengdu J-10: China’s Advanced Fighter Jet”, Defence Bridge, May 21, 2023, https://www.defensebridge.com/article/the-chengdu-j-10-chinas-advanced fighter-jet.html. Accessed on May 19, 2023. Sakshi Tiwari, “China’s J-10C Fighters Headed To Egypt, VTOL Drone, HQ-17 SHORAD To Saudi As Beijing Tries ‘Gobbling’ US Market”, Eurasian Times, May 26, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinas-j-10c-fighters-headed-to-egypt vtol-drone-hq-17/. Accessed on May 16, 2023. n. 4. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Ibid. Ibid., p. 262. Ibid. “J-11 [Su-27 FLANKER] Su-27UBK / Su-30MKK/ Su-30MK2”, Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-11.htm. Accessed on March 29, 2022. n. 4, p. 242. “Su-30MKK: Designing an Elite Fighter to Protect Chinese Coasts and the Beginning of Chinese Maritime A2AD”, Military Watch Magazine, September 10, 2-19, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/su-30mkk-designing-an-elite fighter-to-protect-chinese-coasts-and-the-beginning-of-chinese-maritime-a2ad. Accessed on December 16, 2022. “Sukhoi Su-30: Multi-role Fighter”, Military Technology, https://www.militarytoday. com/aircraft/su_30.htm#:~:text=It%20is%20worth%20noting%20that,4%2D5%20 hour%20combat%20mission. Accessed on June 16, 2022. Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016 A Comparative Analysis [Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2016]. n. 4, p. 242. Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Russia, China sign contract worth over $2 bln for Su-35 fighter jets”, November 19, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-china
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26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.
34.
35.
36.
37. 38.
39.
jets/update-1-russia-china-sign-contract-worth-over-2-bln-for-su-35-fighter-jets idUSL8N13E0QM20151119. Accessed on July 16, 2022. “Russia to Sell 121 Helicopters to China amidst India’s Standoff with China”, Indian Defence News, October 29, 2020, https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/10/russia to-sell-121-helicopters-to-china.html. Accessed on June 16, 2022. Abraham Mahshie, “Dependence on Russian Aircraft Engines Could Prompt China to ‘Fix Their … Problem’”, Air & Space Forces Magazine, May 19, 2022, https://www. airandspaceforces.com/china-air-force-may-take-a-hit-due-to-dependence-on russian-aircraft-engines/. Accessed on August 10, 2022. Ibid “Shenyang J-16: Multi-role Fighter”, Military Today, https://www.militarytoday. com/aircraft/j16.htm. Accessed on June 10, 2022. “Shenyang (AVIC) J-16 (Red Eagle)”, Military Factory, May 10, 2021, https://www. militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=1157. Accessed on May 16, 2022. n. 4. Group Captain D.K. Pandey, “The (Un)reliable JF-17”, SP’s Aviation, Issue: 1, 2023, https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=3248&h=The-UnReliable-JF-17. Accessed on Jun 16, 2022. Smruti Deshpande, “Iraq ‘to buy Pakistan-China co-produced JF-17 fighter jets in $664-mn deal’”, The Print, July 14, 2023, https://theprint.in/defence/iraq-to-buy pakistan-china-co-produced-jf-17-fighter-jets-in-664-mn-deal/1668435/. Accessed on Jun 16, 2022. Sana Jamal,“Nigeria buys 3 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan”, Gulf News, May 22, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/photos/news/photos-uae-vaccinates-86-million children-against-polio-in-pakistan-in-seven-years-1.1613904783426?slide=5. Accessed on June 16, 2022. ANI, “Myanmar angry with Pakistan over ‘unfit’ fighter jets supplied by Islamabad: Report”, The Economic Times, September 04, 2023, https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/defence/myanmar-angry-with-pakistan-over-unfit-fighter jets-supplied-by-islamabad-report/articleshow/103335997.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on September 10, 2023. Ankit Panda, “Revealed: Why Sri Lanka Backed Off the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder”, The Diplomat, January 11, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/ revealed-why-sri-lanka-backed-off-the-sino-pakistani-jf-17-thunder/. Accessed on August 16, 2022. “Chengdu J-20: Stealthy air superiority fighter”, Military Today, https://www. militarytoday.com/aircraft/j20.htm. Accessed on June 16, 2022. Liu Xuanzun, “China’s J-20 stealth fighter flies with new engines: reports”, Global Times, July 3, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202307/1293620. shtml#:~:text=The%20first%20J%2D20s%20were,with%20this%20type%20of%20 engines. Accessed on July 26, 2023. Phillip C. Saunders, and Joshua K. Wiseman, “Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies”, Chinese Strategic Perspectives (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2011, https://ndupress.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 97
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48. 49. 50. 51. 52.
53. 54.
ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-4.pdf. Accessed on June 16, 2022. Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “China Plans 500 J-20 Stealth Jets By 2035-38, Should India Consider Su-75 Checkmate Till AMCA Arrives”, Eurasia Times, August 6, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-plans-500-j-20-stealth-jets-by-2035 38-should-iaf-consider/. Accessed on August 30, 2023. “J-20 Design”, Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ j-20-design.htm. Accessed on June 16, 2023. “J-20 vs F-22 vs F-35: How does China’s fifth-generation warplane compare to the West’s?” Force Net, November 21, 2022, https://www.forces.net/china/j20-vs f22-vs-f35-how-does-chinas-fifth-generation-warplane-compare-wests. Accessed on December 26, 2022. Kristin Huang, “Could China’s twin-seat stealth fighter become a weapon in information warfare?”, South China Morning Post, November 1, 2022, https://www. scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3197877/could-chinas-twin-seat-stealth fighter-become-weapon-information-warfare. Accessed on December 20, 2022. Ibid. Douglas Barrie, et. al., “China’s air force modernisation: gaining pace”, Military Balance blog, February 21, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/military balance/2023/02/chinas-air-force-modernisation-gaining-pace/. Accessed on April 3, 2023. Ibid. Lu Xiaoping, ed., The PLA Air Force (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2012), pp. 86-87, cited in Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force: Bomber Force Organization”, May 2, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/ documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2022-05-02%20PLAAF%20Bomber%20 Organization.pdf. Accessed on November 16, 2022. n. 4. Kris Osborn,” Can China’s New Stealth H-20 Bomber Threaten the US or Rival the B-21?”, Warrior Maven, March 9, 2023, https://warriormaven.com/china/-china stealth-h20-bomber-us-b21. Accessed on July 16, 2022. “H-6: Medium-range bomber”, Military Today, https://www.militarytoday.com/ aircraft/h6.htm. Accessed on December 12, 2022. Ibid. Derek Grossman, et. al., China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights Drivers and Implications (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/ dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2567/RAND_RR2567.pdf. Accessed on June 16, 2022. David Axe, “China’s H-6N Bomber Just Got A Lot Deadlier”, National Interest, February 1, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-h-6n-bomber just-got-lot-deadlier-199555. Accessed on July 15, 2022. Roland Oliphant, “How a publishing error may have revealed China’s secret super missile”, The Telegraph, November 19, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
98 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
55.
56. 57.
58. 59. 60. 61.
62.
63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.
news/2019/11/19/accidental-espionage-publishing-error-may-have-revealed chinas/. Accessed on June 18, 2022. Joshy M. Paul, “China’s Active Defence Strategy: A Maritime Perspective”, Air Power Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2019, pp. 49-76; see also, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 2006, http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006(2).html. Accessed on May 4, 2022. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’”, Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, pp. 144-169. Alexander C. Huang, “The PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999: From Coastal Defense to Distant Operations”, in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. Mcdevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (New York: Routledge, 2003). David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 13, 1994, pp. 3-25. Daniel E. Ward, “Going to War with China? Dust off Corbett”, Proceedings, US Naval Institute, January 2020, pp. 56-60. David Lague, “China’s Vast Fleet Is Tipping the Balance against U.S. in the Pacific,” Reuters, April 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china army-navy/. Accessed on June 28, 2022. Brad Lendon, “Expert’s warning to US Navy on China: Bigger fleet almost always wins”, CNN, January 17, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/16/asia/china navy-fleet-size-history-victory-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. Accessed on June 18, 2023. Ronald O’Rourke, “PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft”, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2011), pp. 141-174. Kamlesh Agnihotri, Strategic Direction of the Chinese Navy: Capability and Intent Assessment (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2015). Office of Naval Intelligence, People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (US Navy, 2011), https://irp.fas.org/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf. Accessed on April 4, 2022. Military Balance 2021 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2021), pp. 251-253. Agnihotri, n. 63. O’Rourke, n. 62. Department of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007”, Washington D.C., https://nuke.fas.org/guide/ china/dod-2007.pdf. Accessed on March 25, 2022. Accessed on April 4, 2022. O’Rourke, n. 62.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 99 70. Xavier Vavasseur, “Shipyard in China Launched the 25th Type 052D and 8th Type 055 Destroyers For PLAN”, Naval News, August 30, 2020, https:// www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/08/shipyard-in-china-launched the-25th-type-052d-and-8th-type-055-destroyers-for-plan/. Accessed on April 4, 2022. 71. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy Reveals Commissioning of Two New Type 052D Destroyers”, Global Times, March 9, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202203/1254469.shtml. Accessed on March 25, 2022. 72. Ibid. 73. “Luyang-III Class/ Type 052D Destroyers”, Naval Technology, April 19, 2017, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/luyang-052d-destroyers/. Accessed on March 20, 2022. 74. “How is China Modernizing its Navy?”, CSIS China Power, https://chinapower.csis. org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on December 16, 2021. 75. Naval News Staff, “PLAN In Motion: Chinese Navy’s Massive Ship Commissionings in 2021”, Naval News, January 6, 2022, https://www.navalnews. com/naval-news/2022/01/plan-in-motion-chinese-navys-massive-ship commissionings-in-2021/. Assessed on April 3, 2022. 76. n. 74. 77. Liu Zhen, “China’s Navy Puts 2 More Advanced Type 055 Destroyers into Service in Push for Blue-Water Fleet”, South China Morning Post, April 22, 2022, https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3175233/chinas-navy-puts-2-more advanced-type-055-destroyers-service. Accessed on April 30, 2022. 78. “Type 055 Class Destroyers”, Naval Technology, September 11, 2020, https://www. naval-technology.com/projects/type-055-class-destroyers/ accessed on April 3, 2022. 79. Liu Zhen, “China Quietly Put into Service 2 More ‘Bodyguards’ for its Aircraft Carriers”, Business Insider, April 22, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/ chinese-navy-commissions-more-type-055-destroyers-into-ser vice-2022 4?IR=T#:~:text=New%20Chinese%20Type%20055%20destroyers,carriers%20 and%20large%20amphibious%20ships. Accessed on April 28, 2022. 80. O’Rourke, n. 62. 81. Agnihotri, n. 63. 82. Ibid. 83. Evan S. Medeiros, et. al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 147. 84. Agnihotri, n. 63. 85. “Romeo-Class Submarine”, Military-history, https://military-history.fandom. com/wiki/Romeo-class_submarine. Accessed on April 10, 2022. 86. Agnihotri, n. 63. 87. O’Rourke, n. 62. 88. n. 4. 89. O’Rourke, n. 62. 90. Agnihotri, n. 63.
100 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.
O’Rourke, n. 62, p. 147. Ibid. Ibid. Agnihotri, n. 63. n. 4. Shibdas Burman, “Review: China’s Seapower”, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1995, pp. 77-79; for details, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 97. Agnihotri, n. 63. 98. Ibid. 99. Shibdas Burman, “China’s Nuclear Weapons Programme”, World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995, pp. 42-52. 100. CCTV.com, “China’s Submarine-Launched ICBM Chief: Studied V-2 Missiles in the UK”, June 9, 2013, http://military.cntv.cn/2013/06/09/ ARTI1370742007703220_2.shtml. Accessed on April 10, 2022. 101. Agnihotri, n. 63. 102. Peter Suciu, “China Now Has Six Type 094A Jin-Class Nuclear Powered Missile Submarines,” National Interest, May 6, 2020, https://nationalinterest. org/blog/buzz/china-now-has-six-type-094a-jin-class-nuclear-powered-missile submarines-151186. Accessed on April 20, 2022. 103. Matthew P. Funaiole and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, “A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines”, CSIS Commentary, August 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/ analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines. Accessed on April 26, 2022. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. Michael Peck, “JL-3: China’s Third Generation Nuclear Missile Sub Is a Killer”, The National Interest, March 18, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/jl 3-chinas-third-generation-nuclear-missile-sub-killer-180433. Accessed on April 22, 2022. 107. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021: Annual Report to Congress”, United States of America, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/ 1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on April 30, 2022. 108. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Image May Confirm Advanced Anti-Ship Capability of China’s Type 093 Submarine”, The Diplomat, June 20, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/06/image-may-confirm-advanced-anti-ship-capability-of-chinas-type 093-submarine/. Accessed on April 20, 2022. 109. Ibid. 110. H I Sutton, “The Chinese Navy’s Most Powerful Attack Submarine: The Type 093A”, Naval News, November 15, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval news/2020/11/the-chinese-navys-most-powerful-attack-submarine-the-type 093a/. Accessed on April 24, 2022.
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 101 111. Agence France-Presse, “China Launched the Second Missile During July Hypersonic Test, Reports say”, The Guardian, November 23, 2021, https://www. theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/23/china-launched-second-missile-during-july hypersonic-test-reports-say. Accessed on April 2, 2022. 112. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2021”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 77, No. 6, 2021, pp. 318-336. 113. O’Rourke, no. 62. 114. CRS Report 2022, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on April 30, 2022. 115. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress”, United States of America, 2020, p. 45, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/ 1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on May 10, 2022. 116. n. 65. 117. Minnie Chan, “China’s Shandong Aircraft Carrier Ready for High Seas Test, Insider Says,” South China Morning Post, April 8, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/military/article/3128830/chinas-shandong-aircraft-carrier-ready-high seas-test-insider. Accessed on April 19, 2022. 118. Liu Xuanzun,” China’s Home-Built Aircraft Carrier Shandong Starts 1st Maintenance, Refurbishment: Media Reports”, Global Times, April 24, 2022, https:// www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1260185.shtml. Accessed on May 12, 2022. 119. n. 65. 120. For details, see Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,” Global Times, August 13, 2019, http://eng.chinamil. com.cn/view/2019-08/13/content_9588884.htm; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,” South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3022973/ chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-pack-more-jet-power-liaoning. Accessed on April 17, 2022. 121. AFP, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier in Major Military Milestone”, The Hindu, June 17, 2022. Accessed on November 17, 2022. 122. H I Sutton, “China’s Massive New Aircraft Carrier Is As Big As It Can Be”, Naval News, October 27, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/ chinas-massive-new-aircraft-carrier-is-as-big-as-it-can-be/. Accessed on May 16, 2022. 123. “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship are Put on Hold”, The South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019, https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3039653/chinese-navy-set-build fourth-aircraft-carrier-plans-more. Accessed on April 27, 2022.
102 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 124. Minnie Chan, “Chinese Military: Fourth Aircraft Carrier Likely to Be Nuclear Powered, Sources Say,” South China Morning Post, March 13, 2021, https://www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125224/chinese-military-fourth-aircraft carrier-likely-be-nuclear; Also see EurAsian Times Desk, “China Aims To Deploy First-Ever ‘Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier’ By 2025-Reports,” EurAsian Times, March 13, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/china-aims-to-deploy-first-ever nuclear-powered-aircraft-carrier-by-2025-reports/. Accessed on May 20, 2022. 125. Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon and Cortez A. Cooper III, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2015, pp. 64-79. 126. Stacy A. Pedrozo, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and its Regional Impact”, Statement before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, United States House of Representatives First Session, 112th Congress, January 27, 2011, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/02/China_Testimony.pdf. Accessed on May 20, 2022. 127. Edward Wong, “Liu Huaqing Dies at 94; Oversaw Modernization of China’s Navy”, The New York Times, January 16, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/world/ asia/18liu.html. Accessed on April 10, 2022. 128. Zhang Shiping, “Zhongguo Haiquan” [China’s Sea Power] (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 2009), p. 2, quoted in Scobell, et al, n. 125, p. 67. 129. Commander Jake Wilson, “China’s Domestic Aircraft Carrier Program: Modernization and Challenges”, Wild Blue Yonder (Air University, November 12, 2021), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/ Article/2842336/chinas-domestic-aircraft-carrier-program-modernization-and challenges/#_edn3. Accessed on April 10, 2022; for more details, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006). 130. Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2004, pp. 77-93. 131. Scobell, et. al., n. 125, p. 70. 132. Ibid. 133. Daniel M. Hartnett, “The “New Historic Missions”: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy”, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Report of the Strategic Studies Institute (Newport: US Army War College, 2014), pp. 31-80. 134. Andrew Scobell and Gregory Stevenson, “The PLA (Re-)Discovers Nontraditional Security,” in Lyle J. Goldstein ed., Not Congruent but Quite Complementary: U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Nontraditional Security, China Maritime Study 9 (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2012), pp. 41-50. 135. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, pp. 125-141. 136. Jesse Johnson, “Aircraft from Chinese Carrier Conducted 100-Plus Landings and Takeoffs in Waters near Okinawan Islands”, The Japan Times, May 10, 2022,
China’s Air and Naval Capabilities • 103 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/10/national/china-aircraft-carrier okinawa-japan/. Accessed on April 26, 2022. 137. Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, March 8, 2022, p. 7, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on April 10, 2022. 138. CSIS China Power, “How is China Modernizing its Navy?”, https://chinapower.csis. org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on November 25, 2021. 139. Ibid. 140. CRS Report 2019, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on April 23, 2022. 141. Ibid. 142. ANI, “A Powerful Chinese Navy Ready to Flex its Muscles”, Economic Times, January 4, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/a-powerful chinese-navy-is-ready-to-flex-its-muscles/articleshow/88661655.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on April 16, 2022. 143. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony” Naval War College Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2019, pp. 11-45. 144. Christopher Colley, “A Future Chinese Indian Ocean Fleet?” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2021, at https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean fleet/. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 145. Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up”, National Defense, September 3, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up. Accessed on November 30, 2021. 146. Nick Danby, “China’s Navy Looms Larger”, Harvard Political Review, October 5, 2019, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/prcnavy/. Accessed on December 31, 2021. 147. Minnie Chan, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers as it Continues Drive to Strengthen Naval Force”, The South China Morning Post, May 14, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3010060/china launches-two-new-type-052d-destroyers-it-continues-drive?module=perpetual_ scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3010060. Accessed on March 30, 2022. 148. Eric Wertheim, “China’s Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyers is a Potent Adversary”, Proceedings, US Naval Institute, January 2020, p. 92. 149. Liu Zhen “Chinese Navy Sails New Destroyers in the South China Sea Amid Military Shipbuilding Spree”, The South China Morning Post, June 15, 2021, https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3137400/chinese-navy-sails-new destroyers-south-china-sea-amid-military. Accessed on March 30, 2022. 150. Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific”, The New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
104 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html. Accessed on March 31, 2022. 151. “Largest Navies in the World 2022”, World Population Review, https:// worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/largest-navies-in-the-world. Accessed on April 30, 2022. 152. David Axe, “Yes, the Chinese Navy Has More Ships Than the U.S. Navy. But It’s Got Far Fewer Missiles”, Forbes, November 10, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ davidaxe/2021/11/10/yes-the-chinese-navy-has-more-ships-than-the-us-navy-but-its got-far-fewer-missiles/?sh=1c46ab9461b6. Accessed on April 13, 2022. 153. CSIS China Power, “How is China Modernizing its Navy?”, https://chinapower.csis. org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on November 25, 2021. 154. CRS Report 2022, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2022, p. 9, https://crsreports.congress. gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153. Accessed on April 26, 2022. 155. Asley Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific”, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 2017, https:// carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/25/protecting-american-primacy-in-indo-pacific pub-68754. Accessed on June 3, 2022. 156. Department of Defence, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress”, Government of the United States, 2020, p. vi, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/ 1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on June 3, 2022. 157. H I Sutton, “Bigger Than A U.S. Navy AEGIS Cruiser: China Is Building More Type-055s”, Naval News, January 12, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval news/2022/01/bigger-than-a-u-s-navy-aegis-cruiser-china-is-building-more-type 055s/. Accessed on April 29, 2022.
4.
China and the Indian Ocean
China’s forays into the IOR can be traced back to the Mao era’s search for solidarity with the Afro-Asian countries and its efforts to assume moral leadership of them. Mao looked for a ‘collective struggle’ against the imperialist and capitalist forces, i.e., the US and the West, and found the Afro-Asian countries, which had been under colonial subjugation for centuries, as the natural choice as China’s close allies. Most of the countries from around the IOR had just become independent states after World War II, and their memories of colonialism and imperialism were still vivid; and they sought close cooperation among themselves during the initial period of their independence. As China had shown great resilience against the combined Western forces in the Korean War, it projected itself as a champion of the fight against the new imperialism of the West. China utilised the Bandung Summit of 1955 to make friends with the AfroAsian countries and carefully projected itself as a natural ally, friend, leader, and even protector of third world nations.1 The Chinese effort was to unite the developing countries under its moral leadership, through which it could emerge as a new global leader. The two superpowers, after having established their strong presence in the Atlantic and Pacific, were also vying for more allies from the newly decolonised countries in the IOR, while China was attempting to create a “united front” against the Western imperialist forces as part of its “Three World Theory”.2 However, the 1962 War fiasco severely dented China’s high moral image as a champion for the cause of the third world countries because the self-styled leader of the developing world attacked another leading developing country over
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a piece of disputed land. Most of these countries were also involved in territorial disputes because the boundaries were created by the colonial masters, and, in some cases, unilaterally drawn, without the approval of the national leaders. In the post-1962 period, however, China focussed on the African continent in a bid to clear doubts about its intentions and to project itself as an alternative to the two superpowers. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai went on an African safari from December 1963 to February 1964, visiting 12 African capitals and explained the Chinese position on imperialism, colonialism, racism, expansionism, safeguarding world peace, strengthening unity among the Asian and African countries, and opposition to big power politics on global issues.3 The Chinese objective was to undermine the efforts of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) and to organise a second Bandung Conference at Algiers, as a rival to the scheduled (second) meeting of the NAM at Cairo in 1964. However, the Algiers meeting had to be called off due to the coup in Algeria which removed the Ben Bella government, and also because of the growing split in Soviet-China relations. China viewed India as its rival for leadership among the third world countries and wanted to project itself as the champion of the cause of developing countries, particularly the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean. China’s focussed attention on the Indian Ocean came to the fore in the late 1960s when Britain decided to withdraw from the region east of Suez in 1968, following the handing over of Diego Garcia to the US one year earlier. China opined that this had created “a new situation in the Indian Ocean and both superpowers were trying to fill the vacuum commensurate with their naval strategies and capabilities”.4 Subsequently, China became a votary of freeing the Indian Ocean from the power rivalry, and wholeheartedly supported the demand for the “declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace” resolution passed at the Lusaka Conference of the NAM held in 1970, which also called upon the superpowers to “dismantle their bases and withdraw their naval fleets and infrastructure from the Indian Ocean region”.5 When the issue of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace came up before the UN General Assembly in its 26th session, the Chinese representative Chen Yi supported the Sri Lanka sponsored resolution ‘in
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principle’ and emphasised “the urgent desire of many Afro-Asian countries to safeguard their national independence and oppose the superpowers’ contention for hegemony and division of spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean”.6 He further maintained that China “will never be a superpower that carries out aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying of other countries, neither today nor in the future”, and called upon the US, USSR, Britain, and India to undertake similar obligations.7 China’s objective was to enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean region and to keep both the US and the Soviet Union away from the Indian Ocean waters. China continued its pursuit of the leadership role of the third world countries, as part of Mao’s anti-imperialist struggle against the two super powers. In his “three world”8 theory, Mao had envisioned making China a great power at par with the first world, and assuming a leadership role of the “third world”—the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Fundamentally, it was a political strategy without a military component because for Mao, military expansion was the strategy of the imperial and hegemonic powers. For the expansionist proposition, a strong military, backed by steady economic growth is necessary which China critically lacked during Mao’s period. The Cultural Revolution and internal political disturbances stymied the critical technological and economic support required for naval expansionism, however, the idea of Chinese expansionism beyond the adjacent waters had been deeply ingrained in the Chinese thinking. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced China to turn to the West for technological assistance for defence modernisation, one of the four components of Deng’s ‘Four Modernisations’ principle, which was necessary for making China an advanced military power. This resulted in neglect of the much publicised relations with the third world countries by forming a united front against the West.9 When China reformulated its defence strategy in the mid-1980s, the Indian Ocean was again caught up in the Chinese strategic thinking and received higher priority for naval expeditions. Moreover, the downfall of Saigon and the US’ withdrawal of naval bases from Southeast Asia created favourable conditions for China to play a more active role in the power politics in the maritime domain. The US’ retrenchment in East Asia and China’s emergence as a major economic
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cum-military power in the region heralded a new period in the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean where China wanted to play an active role commensurate with its economic status.
China’s Indian Ocean Naval Strategy
Today, the Indian Ocean has become the critical artery of China’s energy lifelines, as more than 80 per cent of its oil and gas passes through the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa. China is also dependent on the East-West trade route connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic through the Indian Ocean, one of the busiest trade routes in the world, which carries Chinese industrial products to Europe. Any threat to this critical trade link, either by the dominance of a rival power or instability and lawlessness in the region would critically affect the economic growth of China which would also affect the Communist Party’s legitimacy to administer the state. Since China’s immediate security concern is associated with the near seas, its Indian Ocean strategy is to keep the ocean as free as possible; however, its major concern is about Indian dominance, in association with a superpower, of the Indian Ocean water body. To protect its interests, Beijing is trying to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and seeks logistical support from the regional countries through bases and assets across the water body, in times of both peace and crisis. China’s Indian Ocean strategy is fundamentally different from its near seas (East and South China Seas) strategy, as it doesn’t face any direct threat from the Indian Ocean. The Southeast Asian archipelago that divides the two oceans, the Pacific and Indian, works both as a protective barrier and vulnerability for China. Unlike the near seas, the Indian Ocean belongs to the far seas area and the distance allows adequate time for China to prepare against a threat from the Indian Ocean. Its major concerns are, firstly, the Southeast Asian archipelago that restricts direct access to it. Even though China has tried to get overland connectivity to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Myanmar, that would not help it to overcome the vulnerabilities, such as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. As a result, it requires access rights to ports in the littoral countries so as to
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build friendly relationships with them. Secondly, the rise of India as a predominant naval power in the IOR is considered as a major threat to Chinese interests in the IOR. Since China is a rising power, it sees India as its potential peer competitor in the IOR. As Mearsheimer argues, China as a state rising to great power status in East Asia,10 considers India as a potential rival in its great power ambition. The threat is accentuated by India’s geographic advantage in South Asia. India could extend the border skirmishes taking place in the Himalayas into the Indian Ocean by disrupting the Chinese SLOCs passing through the waters. Thirdly, the US Navy might take advantage of China’s vulnerability in the Indian Ocean to exert leverage in the conflict in the western Pacific. The US could do it alone or in concert with India to disrupt China’s dependence on the sea route for its economic survival. China’s Indian Ocean concern is viewed as the PLA’s 1.5 war doctrine, associated with India that may take advantage of China’s conflict with the US in the western Pacific. Firstly, India could conduct a simultaneous attack on the land border against China, with seizure of the disputed territory; secondly, as war broke out in East Asia, the Indian Navy may be called on to disrupt China’s SLOCs in the Indian Ocean in order to strengthen India’s position in the SinoIndian border dispute and also to help US operations in the Pacific.11 So China’s strategy towards the Indian Ocean is a combination of its threat perception and expansionism, i.e., making strategies to overcome the threat by neutralising India’s dominant position in the IOR and balancing the US’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific by emerging as a major naval power in the IOR. China’s Indian Ocean strategy can be seen in five stages: politicodiplomatic, search for domain awareness, energy security, harmonious world (cooperative) strategy, and maritime great power with the ‘far seas protection’ strategy. Its naval strategy towards the Indian Ocean began from the 1980s when China’s economic interests started expanding as part of its reform process. It is also associated with the increasing nature of its capabilities and changes in its military doctrine; as with all great powers, China has expanded its influence from the coastal area to the far seas in different periods, without upsetting the status quo.
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Search for Maritime Domain Awareness
Even though China was focussing on coastal security in the formative years of its naval strategy, it set the expansionist agenda towards the wider Asia, including the maritime domain. When the Chinese economy started growing by the 1980s, it focussed on building a strong navy to protect its booming coastal regions and safeguard its external trade. For a long time, the Chinese Navy’s focus was on the coastal waters as it did not have the capabilities or experience to operate in distant waters. One of the weak areas that the PLAN confronted was ‘Maritime Domain Awareness’ (MDA) beyond its coastal waters. MDA is a critical area while operating in distant waters as it facilitates oceanic surveillance, which is the key to effective SLOCs defence that the US Navy has mastered across the globe.To acquire MDA away from the coastal waters, China started sending naval contingents beyond the East Asian waters since the mid-1980s. China’s first overseas naval expedition was to the Indian Ocean in November 1985 (Table 4.1), under the direction of PLAN Commander Liu Huaqing. The expedition had the backing of the political leadership and the task force was commanded by the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet Commander Nie Kuiju, in order to get domain awareness of the seas and cultivate friendships with the littoral countries.12 The task force reportedly faced considerable difficulty in replenishment activity at sea due to the incessant weather conditions and was able to perform its mission only in a fair weather environment.13 Since then, the PLAN has sent task forces across the globe almost every year which has helped to enhance its visibility and reach in distant waters. In 1997, a PLAN naval contingent, with two destroyers, visited Mexico, Peru, and Chile, and in 1998, Chinese naval ships visited Australia and New Zealand.14 In 2001, PLAN vessels conducted a range of visits around the globe, sailing to some 23 countries in Asia, America, Africa, Europe, and Oceania.15 During the period between May and September 2002, the Chinese Navy conducted an around-the-world cruise with a guided missile destroyer and a support ship, calling at ports in a dozen countries, including the United States, Russia, Portugal, and Brazil.16 It had not only showcased China’s new capabilities to the world but was aimed to
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conduct naval diplomacy with farther countries, indicating truly global Chinese ambitions. Table 4.1: PLAN Port Visits, 1985-97
Dates
Countries Visited
Ships
March 1989
United States (Hawaii)
Zhenghe training ship
October 1993
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India,
Zhenghe training ship
August 1995
Russia (Vladivostok)
Jiangwei frigate Huaibei 541
July 1996
North Korea
July 1996
Russia (Vladivostok)
November 1985
March 1990 May 1994
August 1995
February 1997
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
Thailand
Russia (Vladivostok)
Indonesia
United States (Hawaii, San Diego), Mexico, Peru, Chile
Luda destroyer Hefei 132 and replenishment ship Fencing 615 Zhenghe training ship Dajiang sub tender, Changxingdao 121, Luda-II destroyer Zhuhai 166, and Jiangwei frigate Huainan 540 Luda-II destroyer Zhuhai 166, Jiangwei frigate Huainan 540, and one replenishment ship Luhu destroyer Harbin 112 and Luda destroyer Xining 108 Luhu destroyer Harbin 112
Luhu destroyer Harbin 112, Luda-II destroyer Zhuhai 166, replenishment ship Nancang 953
Source: Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, “China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions”, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3, Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2010), p. 12.
China formulated an ambitious expansionist naval strategy in the mid 1980s under Liu, who enjoyed great support from the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Liu propounded the ‘three island chains’ expansionist strategy based on technological capability, geographical boundary, and a timeframe. According to Liu, China should establish its control within the first island
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chain by 2010, the second island chain by 2020, and, in the final stage, by 2035-40, China should to be able to exercise its naval power decisively in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.17 The island chain strategy emphasised a long-term expansionist plan step by step, from coastal defence to the third island chain through the intermediary lines over a period of more than half a century. In this expansionism, China viewed the area between the first island and third island chains as “buffer zones”,18 an area that no one could occupy until China became powerful enough to exercise its sea denial strategy in this area. As early as 1982, General Liu had expounded the expansionist intention and stated that “China had to make its navy capable of venturing beyond the Malacca Strait.”19 Thus, China’s expansionism towards the third island chain—the Indian Ocean—was set in the 1980s and was formally launched when it joined the anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean in 2008. Further, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, commander of the PLAN during the Jian Zemin era, noted that China’s 21st century navy had to be developed in the following fashion: first, an offshore defence strategy; second, a strong navy with science and technology; third, more advanced weapon systems; and fourth, well-trained personnel and more qualified people.20 This indicated that along with the economic reforms that were to provide the economic base for the naval modernisation, the Chinese leaders aspired to achieve blue water naval capability and expansion of Chinese maritime power well into the far seas, including the Pacific and Indian Oceans.They gave considerable, if not equal, importance, to the Indian Ocean, along with the security of the Taiwan Strait. As China’s technology and capability improved, China extended the forward defence from the coastal area to the area up to the third island chain, which President Xi Jingping formulated as the ‘far seas protection’ strategy.
Energy Security and SLOCs Protection
When China became a net importer of oil in 1993, energy security became one of the important aspects of its foreign policy calculations. Broadly speaking, energy security means “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy”.21 Energy security was accorded higher priority in China’s
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security strategy because an uninterrupted source and supply of energy was essential to continue the economic growth and became a major factor in the comprehensive national power capability. In 1993, China’s oil production and consumption were approximately equal at 3 million barrels per day (mb/d); in 2008, production increased slightly, reaching just 3.7mb/d, while consumption doubled during the same period.22 This increased demand for energy necessitated the Chinese elites to formulate a security-oriented strategy for an uninterrupted source and supply of energy. China understood that control of natural resources as well as security of the transport routes were critical to its long-term energy security, so it started investing in energy-related assets overseas, including the purchase of equity of oil. Some of the Chinese investments went to the Middle East and African countries, such as Iran, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and Libya. As part of the former Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongi’s ‘‘going out strategy’’,23 Chinese oil companies invested in lucrative oil and gas fields in various parts of the world that helped to increase Chinese political clout in those regions, which had been left behind by Japanese, European and American companies in their thirst for hydrocarbon resources.24 Though not deliberately, this became the continuation of Mao’s strategy of uniting the third world countries which were not part of the East-West rivalry. Not only control of the source of energy supply but protection of the transport route also became an important factor in the energy security strategy of China. China is heavily dependent on international waters—the global commons—for its energy supply, as almost 80 per cent of China’s oil imports passes through the Strait of Malacca. Besides, as Chinese external trade grew by leaps and bounds following the economic reform and coastaloriented economic growth strategy, the economy became heavily dependent on the maritime trade routes, especially with the European markets. The contribution of exports to China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth varied from 1.3 to 5.5 percentage points for the period between 2000 and 2008.25 However, the global commons have been safeguarded by the forces of the US and its allies that were considered to be inimical to Chinese interests, particularly in times of war in the western Pacific. China believed that as a growing power, it could not depend on other countries for safeguarding its
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vital interests such as energy security, and the protection of trade routes as it would become vulnerable during a crisis. This concern was raised by former Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2003, known as the “Malacca Dilemma”, as he declared that “certain major powers were bent on controlling the strait”, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.26 In order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy, and to prevent the disruption in the Indian Ocean bound trade routes, which also pass through the narrow Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, China’s strategy has been to deploy its naval forces instead of relying on other navies, including the littoral navies, to protect the Chinese bound SLOCs. For the protection of these SLOCs, senior PLA commanders demanded a strong Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. For instance, in a secret memorandum issued by Zhao Nanqi, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD) of the PLA, in early 1993, he detailed a strategic plan to consolidate control over the Indian Ocean (and the South China Sea) under a new PLA doctrine of “high-sea defense”.27 Earlier, a July 1992 report of the PLA’s GLD had called for “stepped-up naval visits to the Indian Ocean”.28 Importantly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of fleet units of the United States and the USSR from the Philippines and Vietnam respectively helped China to expand its sphere of influence into the Indian Ocean region. Until then, China had been preoccupied with negating the threats emanating from the naval presence of the superpowers in the near seas. The withdrawal of such naval presence had indeed freed China from the shackles of proximate threats, especially from the South China Sea, and allowed it to reorient its strategy to focus on nuetralising the ‘secondary’ threats which could take place in the Indian Ocean. The energy security strategy became one of the convenient reasons for China to expand towards the Indian Ocean while avoiding criticism of its anti-hegemonism and antiimperialism rhetoric. Since the Chinese Navy was still a coastal navy and had no experience nor capabilities to deploy for a longer period in the IOR, China sought to build economic and diplomatic ties with the littoral countries. China identified Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Iran from the Indian Ocean littorals for building strong relationships in order
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to get support to guarantee the security of the SLOCs.29 Also, a strategic alliance with these nations was beneficial to counter US hegemony and monitor the naval activities of India and the US in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Instead of seeking direct military support from these countries for securing the SLOCs, China sought to acquire ‘places and bases’, also famously known as the ‘string of pearls’, on a long term basis. Important Chinese places/pearls along the trade routes were Gwadar port in Pakistan, a container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, a deep water port in Sittwe, and naval bases and electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on Coco Islands in Myanmar, and funding for the construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand.30 Acquiring bases overseas was clearly a demonstration of the expansionist policy by the Chinese Navy in the guise of energy security purposes, and, today, China not only continues to hold most of them, but has expanded to other countries of the region, into the western Indian Ocean and Africa, including a full-fledged naval base at Djibouti in northern Africa. Commentators have argued that China has adopted the Mahanian way of expansionism into the Indian Ocean with bases and assets, along with increasing trade interests and the need to protect sources of energy, including its passage.31 When China actively participated in the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and adjacent waters since 2008, these places became greatly supportive of the Chinese Navy to conduct smooth operations in the Indian Ocean.
Cooperative Framework Strategy
The Hu Jintao administration focussed on a cooperative endeavour to promote Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean. The ‘charm offensive’ strategy that Hu adopted in Southeast Asia, 32 was extended to the Indian Ocean region through economic cooperation, without an outright military expansionist agenda. As part of his ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world’ strategy, Hu’s intention was to get an uninterrupted supply of energy resources needed for China’s economic development, principally from the Middle East, which pass through the critical artery connection from the sources of energy through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to East Asia. Despite his concern about disruption
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in the energy lifelines, expressed in the form of the Malacca Dilemma, Hu’s strategy was to overcome it through harmonious cooperation with the littoral states. Explaining the role of the PLA in promoting Chinese interests at the world level, Hu, in 2004, articulated a ‘historic mission’ for the PLAN, which included China’s “expanding national interests and maintaining world peace”.33 Hu emphasised on cooperative missions for the PLAN to maintain stability inside and outside China which was necessary for its continued economic development.34 The new historic missions put political will behind the new expansionist strategy of the PLAN in distant regions to secure Chinese interests.35 As the modernisation of the navy continued in the 2000s, Hu set the agenda for expanding its role, status, and operational areas into faraway regions. He emphasised on making the PLAN a modernised force whose fleet over the next decade would be structured, equipped, and trained for a diversified mission portfolio supporting China’s expanding economic interests.36 Cooperation of the PLAN with other navies would not only provide familiarisation with the external environment but also convey China’s ‘harmonious’ world concept, that its intentions were not offensive and domineering but cooperative and benign. Hu’s non-confrontationist and cooperative form of naval expansionism was evident in the naval strategy of his period; he emphasised the need for expanding the PLAN’s operations from the near seas to the far seas for the purpose of the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW ) such as peace-keeping, antipiracy, disaster relief, medical support, and counter-terrorism missions.37 Hu termed those missions as from “near seas defense” to “near seas defense, open seas defense [Yuan Hai Fangwei]”38 and also to support the Chinese narrative of being a “responsible stakeholder” at the global level.39 China was criticised for the PLAN’s zero presence in humanitarian assistance in the IOR in the aftermath of the tsunami that wreaked havoc along with the coastal areas in December 2004. Since then, China has tried to build diplomatic relationships with the littoral countries through aid and investments; for instance, China offered US$ 20 million (Yuan 166 million) to Sri Lanka as tsunami relief assistance in April 2005 when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the tsunami affected areas of the island
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nation.40 Later, piracy and armed robbery at sea provided an opportunity for the PLAN to make an increased presence in the IOR. When piracy emerged as a major concern in the Malacca Strait, China offered its assistance by sending naval ships to patrol in and around the strait, but the regional (littoral) countries decided not to invite external powers and formed their own mechanism, known as MALSINDO, launched in 2004 by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, which later Thailand also joined, to manage the security of the Malacca Strait.41 By holding a strong position in the Strait of Malacca, the main entrance to East Asia from the Indian Ocean, China could not only protect its seaborne trade and oil supply passing through the area but could also effectively deter the US Navy by deploying rapid reaction forces in the strait when a crisis occurred.42 Also, the deployment of the PLAN in the Malacca Strait provided a bird’s eye view on the developments in the Indian Ocean, particularly the activities of the Indian Navy in the Andaman Sea. China officially started deploying naval ships in the Indian Ocean in 2008 as part of the anti-piracy operations in the western Indian Ocean. The 2006 Defence White Paper had highlighted the need for the PLAN to have an increased role in China’s international cooperation.43 Although the PLAN mission was to provide support for anti-piracy operations in the IOR, the White Paper suggested extending the maritime ‘strategic frontier’ from the near seas to the far seas—it stated that the navy has been tasked for “gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defence operations”.44 China officially claimed that the naval deployment was a cooperative exercise along with other international groupings such as the United States-established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), NATO’s Operation Allied Protector, and the European Union-organised Operation Atlanta, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, which encouraged member states to take a more active role in fighting pirates off the coast of Somalia.45 However, China did not join the other mechanisms and, instead, it conducted its antipiracy operations independently, a major departure from its behaviour in the United Nations peace-keeping operations, and focussed on ‘area control’ escort activities in a specific geographical area of 550-600 nm between 100 nm of Yemen’s Socotra Island and 75 nm southwest of Aden harbour. 46
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The primary mission of the operations was ensuring the safety of Chinese ships and crews transiting through the pirate infested region, but it was a demonstration of Chinese naval power as a responsible stakeholder vis-à-vis piracy.47 Military commanders boasted about the Chinese deployments in the Indian Ocean as a show of strength: for instance, on the day the Chinese mission was launched, Wu Shengli, commander of the PLAN, announced, “It’s the first time we go abroad to protect our strategic interests armed with military force.”48 Though piracy had faded away by 2012 as a result of the increased naval deployment of various navies, China continued its deployment vigorously. According to the statistics of Operation Atlanta, piracy had been almost completely eradicated by 2012: while 176 attacks were recorded in 2011, there were only 35 in 2012, and after that, only two unsuccessful piracy activities, one in 2017 and another one in 2019, occurred.49 On the other hand, the PLAN has made almost continuous deployments of two to three vessels in the Gulf of Aden.50 China used the anti-piracy operations to gain far seas experience and enhance its power projection capability, and deployed advanced naval ships and nuclear submarines. Though nuclear submarines are unsuited for such operations, the Chinese officials referred to them as being for “combat readiness patrol,” or “blue-water training,” in the Indian Ocean.51 In 2019, China deployed its latest guided missile destroyer, the Xi’an, missile frigate Anyang and a comprehensive supply ship, Gaoyanghu, in the Indian Ocean.52 In February 2018, a naval contingent was deployed off Maldives and sailed around the eastern Indian Ocean for almost a week, allegedly to influence the outcome of domestic unrest in the Maldives.53 According to a Xinhua report, over a ten-year period of antipiracy operations since 2008, China sent out 26,000 officers and soldiers in 31 escort fleets, escorted 6,595 ships, and successfully rescued or aided more than 60 Chinese and foreign ships.54 The PLAN has been involved in joint naval exercises with the navies of many countries which include the South Korean Navy, Russian Navy, South African Navy, Ukraine Navy, Pakistan Navy, and others.55 It conducted a solo drill in the eastern Indian Ocean in 2014 which was part of a 23-day deployment of a Surface Action Group (SAG) spanning the South China
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Sea, eastern Indian Ocean, and the Philippine Sea to improve operational proficiencies for anti-submarine warfare, air defence, electronic warfare, and expeditionary logistics, and to enhance its ability to conduct integrated and multi-disciplinary operations in the Indo-Pacific.56 China sought to build soft power diplomacy through port calls along the littoral countries and provided medical assistance to the citizens of the host country. In 2010, the PLAN deployed its hospital ship, Peace Ark, on an 88-day humanitarian aid trip covering Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh.57 It completed many Mission Harmony tours in different parts of the world, including the Atlantic, Indian and south Pacific Oceans, and conducted a number of joint disaster relief drills and joint military medical exercises, demonstrating the achievements of China’s naval transformation as well as its ‘goodwill’ diplomacy.58 China deployed naval ships for various humanitarian assistance efforts such as the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011; rescue of the civilian workers from Yemen in 2015; and Chinese search operations following the disappearance of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH 370 in the southern Indian Ocean in which 217 Chinese nationals were lost in March 2014.59 The cooperative endeavour of the PLAN has indeed contributed to some success in making friendly relationships with the littoral countries and provided China the benefit of being considered the largest littoral power in the Indian Ocean—other than India—for support during emergencies.
Maritime Great Power Strategy
When Xi Jinping assumed office as the Chinese president in 2013, after becoming the Party general secretary the previous year, he sought to change certain prevailing foreign policy practices, while introducing new dictums and concepts. He replaced the ‘peaceful development’ theory with the maritime great power concept: even though Jintao had first enunciated this concept in his work report at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, Xi gave it a new direction and it became a major national policy priority. He also changed Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of ‘keeping a low profile’ and introduced ‘striving for achievement’ as the major foreign policy objective, an active foreign policy
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strategy commensurate with China’s economic strength and improved military capability.60 He also gave the mandate to the PLAN of pursuing offensive operations other than MOOTW to protect China’s maritime rights and interests.61 With the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) concept, China firmly established its foothold in the IOR. Under Xi’s stewardship, the Chinese Navy has become the largest navy in the world and will be capable of replacing the US Navy as the predominant naval power in the western Pacific Ocean by 2035. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that President Xi announced in 2013 helped China to expand its foothold in the maritime littorals of Asia and Europe by winning contracts and building infrastructure, thus, ensuring better strategic cooperation with the host countries. Undoubtedly, the more investments China makes in maritime infrastructure such as ports and other areas in the IOR, the greater will be the requirement of its naval presence to protect such assets, thus, making it a strong naval presence in the IOR. The 2015 Defence White Paper categorically stated that “to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests” is one of the major responsibilities of the PLA.62 China set up a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 to provide logistical support for the PLAN deployed in the IOR.63 China claims that it has no plan to make the Djibouti base a real military base as it is against hegemonism and imperialism. In fact, since the 2000s, there has been a debate among Chinese strategists about the necessity to set up logistical supply bases far from China for the missions that the PLAN needs to perform to protect the SLOCs, and also concurrent with China’s globalised economy.64 The need for building a naval base in the Indian Ocean was demonstrated in the writings by a Chinese military officer, Colonel Dai Xu, who claimed that China “needs to develop overseas bases as a logistical extension of the PLAN’s mission to the Gulf of Aden and as a necessity to safeguard [China’s] commercial interests and world peace.”65 He further stated that these would “not require the long-term stationing of large military equipment or large-scale military units …but they should be suitable for comprehensive replenishment.”66 Beijing has recently scaled up the facility at the base to accommodate an aircraft carrier, a minimum of four nuclear-powered attack submarines, and large destroyers.67 China had
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considered various locations for setting up its naval base in the IOR such as Salalah in Oman, Aden in Yemen, Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan, Victoria in the Seychelles, Colombo, Hambantota, and Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, one in the Maldives, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar.68 Djibouti was chosen because of its location as it also the hosts military bases of other countries, so China can negate the criticism of imperialism and hegemonism.69 With the mandate of overseas operations to protect Chinese interests, the PLAN has expanded the number of its deployments in the Indian Ocean and is expected to deploy at least one aircraft carrier, the first Liaoning carrier, when all the three carriers become ready for operations by 2025.70 It may go up to two if China goes with a total of six aircraft carriers by the mid 2030s.71 According to former Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, at any given time, “there are six to eight PLAN warships in the northern Indian Ocean”, which are “permanently present and they have three to four survey vessels or hydrographic vessels”. 72 In 2017, 14 ships were deployed for antipiracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and between 2015 and 2019, China deployed six submarines for the same purpose.73 China’s increased activity in the IOR is explained further in Chapter 7.
PLAAF’s Expeditionary Strategy to the Indian Ocean
With China’s increasing dependence on the Indian Ocean for energy and trade interests, the security of these vital sea lanes is a concern for China. At the same time, dominating the three water bodies—the near seas, the western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean—has been a long-standing goal of China’s top leadership. Since, maritime spaces are interlinked from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, connectivity is not a concern for naval ships, during both war and peace-time. However, extending air power into the Indian Ocean for air dominance as well as to provide security for naval ships, and getting permission for using the air space of a third country is a challenging task for the PLAAF. Without air coverage, naval ships are vulnerable targets in the Indian Ocean waters so the PLAAF’s air power presence in the Indian Ocean is a necessary component in both China’s security calculations and its global power projection ambitions.
122 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
China’s air power expeditionary strategy towards the Indian Ocean is part of the PLA’s ‘far seas protection’ strategy. This strategy is premised on China’s air capabilities extending to the Indian Ocean for aerial dominance in support of the PLAN’s objective of a two-ocean navy.The PLA is required to protect China’s maritime ‘rights and interests’ in the Indian Ocean which include the MSR assets as well limited military assets at Djibouti. In the past decade, China has invested or committed more than $150 billion in the Indian Ocean littoral states.74 Under the MSR, China has built a series of dual-use ports and airfields in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Africa. These fundamentally comprise commercial infrastructure developed with Chinese investments and operated by Chinese companies on foreign soil. These assets are handy for China to be able to use during MOOTW but whether they can be used during war-time is questionable. Allowing the use of their territory by the littoral countries for China’s military operation in an India-China crisis will invite a harsh reaction from India, so they may desist from facilitating Chinese interests during wars. Since the PLAAF was used for limited MOOTW in the Indian Ocean, its future role both in peace-time and in war is uncertain. The PLAAF can use the airfields of its close partners Pakistan and Myanmar only during a war with India, while Sri Lanka and Maldives may not allow use of their soil against India. However, the airfields of both countries come under the normal range of Indian fighter aircraft so the PLAAF has to rely mostly on its shore based air assets under the Southern Theatre Command. It has long range bombers and has developed air launched ballistic missiles which will help it in targeting Indian military assets in the Indian Ocean and the southern peninsula.
Conclusion
As the 2015 Defence White Paper stipulates, among the many strategic tasks that the PLAN has to shoulder, two of its major roles concern the Indian Ocean: to safeguard the security of China’s overseas ‘assets’; and to maintain strategic deterrence and counter-attack.75 With the BRI investments of around $1 trillion in the Indian Ocean littoral states, the Chinese Navy will become a legitimate stakeholder in the security of this
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region. With the BRI investments in ports and allied infrastructure in the continental area spanning from Singapore to South Africa, and the many island states in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy will get easy access to these ports during peace-time, and some could be used for military purposes when China faces a crisis. China has strategically invested in countries that are both friendly to it to as well as inimical to its rivals. For instance, Pakistan and Myanmar will work as the best hedge against India, while Bandar Abbas in Iran and the port of Aden in Yemen could be used if a US-China war breaks out in the western Pacific. Similarly, as China continues its naval presence in the Indian Ocean throughout the year for the protection of MSR assets, PLAN ships could be called upon by the littoral countries when they face security challenges, especially for humanitarian assistance, though, generally, the Indian Navy has been called for such assistance in the IOR. This shows that one of the major objectives of China’s naval expansionism is to neutralise the Indian Navy’s ‘net security provider’ position in the IOR. The PLA Navy will also work as a deterrent force in the Indian Ocean to prevent an adverse impact when a crisis breaks out in the western Pacific. China’s counter-attack strategy in the western Pacific is to inflict damage on the enemy forces if they try encroaching in Chinese territorial waters or preventing Chinese ships in the Chinese ‘controlled’ waters—the South and East China Seas. China may adopt the same strategy against other states that may disrupt the Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean or rivals getting assistance from the Indian Ocean littoral countries. It will be difficult for China to sustain a strategy of dominating the Indian Ocean but it will keep deploying nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in the region for deterrence and counter-attack purposes. Even though the Indian Ocean gets the secondary preference for China in its naval strategy, its larger objective is that no rival power is allowed to dominate the Indian Ocean while it must get unfettered access across the water body.
Notes 1.
John F. Copper, “China’s Claim to South China Sea Islands”, China Report, Vol. 10, No. 3, May-June 1974, p. 10.
124 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 2. 3
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
9. 10. 11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
Herbert S. Yee, “The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China’s Global Strategy”, International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1983, pp. 239-249. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Premier Zhou Enlai’s Three Tours of Asian and African Countries”, People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18001.shtml. Accessed on April 1, 2021. Gurnam Singh, “China and the Indian Ocean Region”, China Report, Vol. 20, Issue 3, 1984, pp. 15-23. Kamal Kumar, The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing, 2000), p. 75. Singh, n. 4, p. 16. Ibid. In February 1974, Chairman Mao Zedong set forth his strategic thinking of the division of the three worlds. He observed, “In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union belong to the first world. In between, Japan, Europe, and Canada belong to the second world. The third world is very populous. Except for Japan, Asia belongs to the third world. So does the whole of Africa and Latin America”. For details, see, “Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the Three World and the Strategy of Forming an Alliance Against an Opponent”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml. Accessed on April 17, 2021. Herbert S. Yee, “The Three World Theory and post-Mao China’s Global Strategy”, International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1983, pp. 239-249. John J. Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi”, Foreign Policy, JanuaryFebruary, 2005, No. 146, January-February, 2005, pp. 47-48. You Ji, “China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy”, Asia Policy, No. 22, July 2016, pp. 11-19. Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, “China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions”, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2010). Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. Lee Jae-Hyung, “China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2002, pp. 549-568. Christopher Bodeen, “China Ends 1st World Military Cruise,” Associated Press, September 22, 2002, https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/article/China-Ends 1st-World-Military-Cruise-10552582.php. Accessed on April 30, 2021. Stacy A. Pedrozo, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and its Regional Impact”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 27, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact. Accessed on April 15, 2021.
China and the Indian Ocean • 125 18. Yves-Heng Lim, “The Driving Forces Behind China’s Naval Modernization”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2011, pp. 105-120. 19. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 67. 20. Ibid. 21. World Energy Outlook 2007: India and China Insights (Vienna: International Energy Agency, 2008), p. 160. 22. Erica Downs, ‘‘Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China’’, December 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/12china. pdf. Accessed on April 13, 2021. 23. ‘‘Buying Fast into Southeast Asia’’, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 28, 2002, p. 30. 24. Joshy M. Paul, “The Role of Energy Security in China’s Foreign Policy: A Maritime Perspective”, Maritime Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, pp. 49-71. 25. Yves-Heng Lim “China’s Rising Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean: Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means”, Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2020, pp. 396-412. 26. Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma,’” China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 8, https:// jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/. Accessed on April, 18, 2021. 27. Yossef Bodansky, “The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and US”, Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 1995, p. 6. Quoted in Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-39. 28. Philip L. Ritcheson, “Nuclearization in South Asia”, Strategic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1993, p. 39. Quoted in Khurana, Ibid. 29. David Brewster, “Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is There Really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, pp. 133-149. 30. Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2006, https://www.files. ethz.ch/isn/27007/String_Pearls_Meeting.pdf. Accessed on April 21, 2021. 31. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, pp. 367-394. 32. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia”, Current History, Vol. 105, No. 692, 2006, pp. 270-276. 33. James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor, No. 27, Winter, 2009, https://www.hoover.org/research/ chairman-hu-and-plas-new-historic-missions. Accessed on April 12, 2021. 34. Daniel Hartnett, “The PLA’s Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation”, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad, April 2009, https://www.uscc.gov/ sites/default/files/transcripts/3.4.09HearingTranscript.pdf. Accessed on April 10, 2021.
126 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 35. E. Lin-Greenberg, “Dragon Boats: Assessing China’s Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 2010, p. 213. 36. Cortez A. Cooper, “The PLA Navy’s ‘New Historic Missions’ Expanding Capabilities for a Reemergent Maritime Power”, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 11, 2009, RAND, https://www. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf. Accessed on April 21, 2021. 37. Michael S. Chase and Kristen Gunness, “The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: Prioritizing Combat Operations and Developing MOOTW Capabilities”, China Brief, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 5-7, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/ cb_010_08.pdf ?x45672. Accessed on May 1, 2021. 38. Lim, n. 18, pp. 396-412. 39. Jerome Henry, “China’s Military Deployment in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-Piracy and Beyond”, Centre for Asian Studies, Paris, November 2016, p. 10, https://www. ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_ aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf. Accessed on May 3, 2021. 40. “Tsunami Relief: China Helping Hand”, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ tsunami_relief/116623.htm. Accessed on April 28, 2021. 41. Siti Zubaidah Ismail and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, “The Straits of Malacca: Regional Powers vis-à-vis Littoral States in Strategic and Security Issues and Interests”, paper presented in a seminar on “National Resilience: Political Managements And Policies In Malaysia” from July 13 to 15, 2010, at Langkawi, Kedah, Malaysia, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12118559.pdf. Accessed on April 30, 2021. 42. Mokhzani Zubir, “The Strategic Values of the Straits of Malacca”, https:// fdocuments.in/reader/full/the-strategic-value-of-the-strait-of-malacca. Accessed on April 29, 2021. 43. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 2006, Beijing, http://en.people.cn/ whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006(2).html. Accessed on May 4, 2021. 44. Ibid. 45. Silvia Burke, “Explaining China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden”, May 2009, MIT, https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-408 chinese-foreign-policy-fall-2013/assignments/MIT17_408F13_ExplinigChina.pdf. Accessed on April 29, 2021. 46. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “China’s Blue Soft Power: Antipiracy, Engagement, and Image Enhancement”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2015, pp. 71-92. 47. Henry, n. 39. 48. AFP, “Chinese Navy Off on Historic Anti-Piracy Mission”, Space Daily, December 26, 2008, https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinese_navy_off_on_historic_anti piracy_mission_999.html. Accessed on May 6, 2021.
China and the Indian Ocean • 127 49. Shishir Upadhyaya, “Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region: Assessment of India’s Maritime Strategy to be the Regional ‘Net Security Provider’”, PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Wollongong, 2018, https://ro.uow. edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=theses1. Accessed on April 29, 2021; Combined Maritime Force (CMF), “CTF 151: Counter-Piracy,” Combined Maritime Forces, December 2020, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151 counter-piracy/. Accessed on May 6, 2021. 50. David Brewster, “The Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean: Prospects for a Significant Chinese Naval Presence”, in David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, eds., Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region, (Stimson Centre, December 2014), pp. 71-80, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/fileattachments/SEA-CHANGE-WEB.pdf. Accessed on April 26, 2021. 51. Burke, n. 45. 52. “China Deploys New Missile Destroyer, Frigate in Its Anti-Piracy Fleet”, The Economic Times, April 4, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ defence/china-deploys-new-missile-destroyer-frigate-in-its-anti-piracy-fleet/ articleshow/68724333.cms?from=mdr. Accessed on April 10, 2021. 53. Ankit Panda, “What’s a Recent Chinese Naval Deployment to the Eastern Indian Ocean About?”, The Diplomat, February 22, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/ whats-a-recent-chinese-naval-deployment-to-the-eastern-indian-ocean-about/. Accessed on April 26, 2021. 54. Andrew S. Erickson, “The China Anti-Piracy Bookshelf: Statistics & Implications from Ten Years’ Deployment & Counting”, January 2, 2019, https://www. andrewerickson.com/2019/01/the-china-anti-piracy-bookshelf-statistics implications-from-ten-years-deployment-counting/. Accessed on May 12, 2021. 55. Erickson and Strange, n. 46; G Parthasarathy, “China Tightening its Grip on the Indian Ocean”, The Hindu Business Line, February 11, 2020; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Russia and China Team up on the Indian Ocean”, The Interpreter, December 16, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-and-china-team-indian ocean. Accessed on May 3, 2021. 56. Burke, n. 45. 57. Eddie Walsh, “The China Factor”, The Diplomat, June 4, 2011, https://thediplomat. com/2011/06/the-china-factor/. Accessed on May 1, 2021. 58. “Peace Ark Carries a Cargo of Goodwill”, China Daily, December 12, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201912/12/WS5df19918a310cf3e3557d9f9.html. Accessed on April 27, 2021. 59. Upadhyaya, n. 49. 60. Zhou Fangyin, “Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy”. International Affairs 92(4), pp. 869-890. 61. Shou Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 2013), p. 107. 62. Ibid. 63. Charlotte Gao, “China Officially Sets Up Its First Overseas Base in Djibouti”, The Diplomat, July 12, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-officially-sets-up its-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti/. Accessed on April, 1, 2021.
128 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 64. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 125, 2020, pp. 731-747. 65. D. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 1, Winter 2011, p. 63. 66. Ibid. 67. H I Sutton, “Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy is Expanding Overseas Base”, Forbes, May 10, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/05/10/satellite images-show-chinese-navy-is-expanding-overseas-base/?sh=7a0118a68691. Accessed on April 1, 2021. 68. Loro Horta, “China Turns to the Sea: Changes in the People’s Liberation Army Navy Doctrine and Force Structure,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2012, pp. 393-402; Upadhyaya, n. 49; Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, June 18, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/dragon-tracks emerging-chinese-access-points-in-the-indian-ocean-region/. Accessed on May 14, 2021. 69. Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Security Implications and Ways Forward for the European Union”, SIPRI, Solna, Sweden, p. 28, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the-21st-century maritime-silk-road.pdf. Accessed on May 12, 2021. 70. “China’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier Expected to Launch in 2021: Reports”, Global Times, January 17, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213074.shtml. Accessed on May 10, 2021. 71. Christopher Colley, “A Future Chinese Indian Ocean Fleet?” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean-fleet/. Accessed on May 1, 2021. 72. “‘Keeping a Close Eye on Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean,’ says Admiral Lanba”, Hindustan Times, March 13, 2019. 73. Ibid. 74. Amit Bhandari and Chandni Jindal, “Chinese Investments in India’s Neighbourhood”, Gateway House, March 12, 2018, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/ chinese-investments-in-indias-neighbourhood/. Accessed on July 18, 2022. 75. n. 72.
5.
PLAN’s Basing Strategy in the IOR: The ‘String of Pearls’
The PLAN’s first overseas voyage was to the Indian Ocean from November 16, 1985, to January 19, 1986, for domain awareness purposes, under the direction of its Commander Liu Huaqing. The contingent, led by the East Sea Fleet Commander Nie Kuiju, had port calls in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh where the sailors attended lavish banquets and were invited to participate in cultural events.1 The naval ships reportedly faced difficulties in replenishment due to the incessant weather conditions at sea. China successfully carried out supply operations during a Force 8 storm, without any loss or damage.2 The mission was touted as successful by the Chinese media and authorities, however, it highlighted China’s requirement of basing capabilities for sustained operations in overseas destinations. By then, the Indian Ocean had become part of the island chain strategy and later-to-be an area of influence in China’s naval strategy.3 The first area of influence was the near seas, and, as the capabilities improved, it could expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. China lacked the critical infrastructure for naval operations beyond the coastal areas, so it was logical for it to focus only on the first island chain area initially and work on getting basing facilities in friendly countries in far away regions. At the same time, distance was a major hurdle for sustained operations in the Indian Ocean, so Beijing viewed the South Asian countries as being able to provide such basing requirements of the PLAN. Importantly, the countries China chose to anchor its ships in during its 1985-86 deployment were those that were at odds with New Delhi due to its alleged ‘big brother’ attitude. Later, Pakistan and Sri Lanka became two important states for China in its ‘string of pearls’ and Maritime Silk Route
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(MSR) strategy. To overcome the PLAN’s replenishment difficulties in the IOR and also to create a conducive environment in its pursuit of fulfilling the third stage of the island chain strategy, i.e. dominance of the area between the second and third island chains, a la the Indian Ocean, China wanted strong diplomatic relations, secure basing facilities, and deterring the dominance of rival powers in the Indian Ocean region. The Chinese economy came out of the doldrums of Mao’s era as a result of the economic reforms launched by Deng in the late 1970s. International trade began to increase, which necessitated the protection of the trade routes. China’s international trade was largely conducted through the open seas where the rules and norms to conduct international trade had been set by the Western powers. It was the Western powers’ military strength that had ensured the safety of international trade, with not even a nominal role by China in the whole dynamics of international trade, as Beijing was a nascent player in the game of commercial trade. As China started exporting finished foods to the Western market from its coastal free-trade economic zones, promoting international trade, including its safety, became a national security goal of China. China’s external trade grew by leaps and bounds following the economic reforms and coastal-oriented economic growth strategy, so the economy became heavily dependent on the maritime trade route, especially with the European markets. Since its geographical location in the far eastern part of the Euro-Asian continental spectrum and its trade with Europe passed through the maritime domain via the Indian Ocean, deficiency of any sort of assistance that China could provide in a security crisis in the SLOCs was an issue that haunted Beijing. Besides trade, the Indian Ocean became increasingly important in China’s energy security calculations. As the economy began booming, the requirements for natural resources, including energy to fuel economic growth, surged, and its dependence on external sources also increased. In 1985, China was East Asia’s largest petroleum exporter; in 1993, China became a net oil importer; and in 2004, China leapfrogged Japan to become the world’s second largest oil importer.4 In the early periods, China’s requirements for natural resources had been met by the Southeast Asian countries but since the demand grew, it searched for other sources, and the Middle East and the African countries
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became the new destinations for Beijing’s energy hunt.5 In 1995, the AsiaPacific accounted for 41 per cent of China’s oil imports and the Middle East accounted for 46 per cent; in 2003, its dependence on the latter increased to 51 per cent but the former’s share decreased to 15.2 per cent, while the share of Africa increased from 11 per cent to 24.3 per cent during the same period.6 As a result, secure access to foreign oil resources became necessary for both continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China’s domestic stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist regime.7 Due to these SLOCs protection concerns, China sought to build ports and other infrastructure facilities along the South Asian littorals for the requirements of basing and replacement activities for its naval ships—this came to be known as the ‘string of pearls’. The ‘string of pearls’ theory appeared in a study conducted by a US defence contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, titled “Energy Futures in Asia”, in 2004, which explained that China could “establish forward operating bases” on a commercial basis in the IOR to ensure its energy security interests as a counterweight to the influence of India, Indonesia, Australia and the US in the region.8 The Washington Times, in 2005, on the basis of an undisclosed internal report prepared for Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed that “China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives”. As such, China’s strategic hold in various locations far from the Chinese mainland, along the maritime trade route from China to the Middle East, through geopolitical influence or military presence, is known as the ‘string of pearls’. Hainan Island, with upgraded military facilities, is a ‘pearl’; an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago, 300 nm east of Vietnam, is also a ‘pearl.’9 The ‘pearls’ extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf (Fig 5.1).10 However, when China started expanding its naval influence beyond the near seas but found logistical support facilities lacking in distant waters, it searched for ports in friendly countries for replenishment activities, especially in the South Asian waters, which are popularly known as the ‘string
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of pearls’. In these areas, China sought to build strategic relationships with friendly countries and develop a capability to establish a forward presence along the SLOCs. So ports associated with airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernisation form the essence of China’s “string of pearls.”11 Some scholars term the ‘pearls’ as ‘places’, not bases, because bases require a permanent military presence in overseas locations in other countries as well as own territory, like the US base in Okinawa in Japan or Guam in the western Pacific. While there is no official definition for the term ‘places,’ “but empirically the term denotes the access by a country’s military forces to another country’s ports, airports, and other logistics facilities on an ad-hoc basis, without the need for a permanent positioning of forces.”12 Fig 5.1: Topographical Map of China’s ‘String of Pearls’
Source: “China’s String of Pearls Strategy”, Geopolitics, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=8aiwvbGeWNI. Accessed on May 15, 2021.
The ‘string of pearls’ comprised China’s planned four ports projects in the South Asian countries: Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe in Myanmar, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka for getting logistical support for its naval ships operating in the Indian Ocean as well as for direct connectivity from mainland China to the Indian Ocean. In Bangladesh, China had planned a container shipping facility in Chittagong and an oil pipeline for carrying Chinese crude from Chittagong to Yunnan through Myanmar.13 However, it was later abandoned because Bangladesh refused use of its territory for the military purpose of a foreign country, especially one inimical to India.14 The
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Hambantota project was to construct a development zone, which included a container port, a bunker system, and an oil refinery, with Chinese financial assistance. The plan was unveiled in 2007, started operations in 2010 and Sri Lanka received $307 million in assistance from China’s state owned Export-Import Bank, and a Chinese company, China Harbour, became the preferred company to build the project.15 Economically, the project hasn’t become feasible so far as it has attracted few ships: even though it is close to one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world where tens of thousands of ships pass by, the port drew only 34 ships in 2012.16 As the loss piled up, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) received 70 per cent of the stake in 2017 for 99 years of the lease for $1.12 billion.17 Gwadar is a deep sea port in southwest Pakistan near the Strait of Hormuz, constructed with the assistance of China. The project was conceived in 2001 and on March 22, 2002, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Bangguo, laid the foundation of the port project, with three phases, to be completed by 2010.18 It was also planned to build a road-and-rail link from Gwadar to Kashi (in China’s Xinjiang province). In 2013, the Chinese company China Overseas Port Holdings took over the port facility from the previous operator, Port of Singapore Authority.19 Gwadar has become an important Chinese strategic outpost near the Hormuz Strait in the north Arabian Sea. In the background of China-Pakistan strategic cooperation and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connectivity with the Chinese mainland, Gwadar would play an important role in China’s security calculations concerning the Indian Ocean. The Sittwe project was to construct a deep water port and a 1,200 km oil pipeline from Sittwe to Kunming/Rili in China’s Yunan province, at an estimated cost of $2 billion, and construction was likely to begin at the end of 2007.20 It was expected to reduce the sea route distance by 1,820 nm and account for 10 percent of China’s oil flow through the Malacca Strait.21 The port project was later shifted to Kyaukphyu where China is building the deep sea port and a Special Economic Zone (SEZ).22 Kyaukphyu has now become the entry point of China’s direct connectivity to the eastern side of the Indian Ocean under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which includes a gas and oil pipeline, a rail link, an industrial park, and the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu.23 There were rumours that China had planned to set up
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a large Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) station in the Great Coco Islands in Myanmar to monitor Indian and US naval activity in the region, however, on-site inspections by US and Indian officials proved these assertions wrong.24 The string of pearls strategic concept emerged out of China’s perceived vulnerability in the energy trade route passing through the Indian Ocean, popularly known as the Malacca Dilemma, which was amply highlighted by former Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2003, as he declared that “certain major powers were bent on controlling the strait”, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.25 Also, it was China’s long-term ambition to get a strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean and easy access for PLAN ships during both peace-time and in crises.The entire project relied on China’s friendly relationships with the partner countries. Of late, China has extended the ‘pearls/places’ strategy from South Asia to the western Indian Ocean and eastern Africa, under the Maritime Silk Route strategy. Importantly, the choice of locations is not random, but only in countries with which China has strong diplomatic relations or is trying to bring closer to China through aid and investment, at times, weaning them away from their traditional friends. China has close commercial and diplomatic relations with most of these countries, which enable it to use their facilities for its navy’s logistical needs. Even though the PLAN didn’t have large expeditionary capabilities in the 2000s, nor was it doctrinally a far seas protection force, China sought to set the stage for large future naval missions in the Indian Ocean as part of its long-term national strategy. When the PRC formulated the ‘peaceful development’ strategy in the 1990s, it set the national goal of emerging as a ‘semi-great power’ in three stages, to be completed by 2050: in the first stage, from 2000 to 2010, China was expected to double its GDP; in the second stage, ending in 2020, the total GDP was to be doubled again such that GDP on a per capita basis was expected to be approximately $3,000, both of which it fulfilled—it crossed the $3,000 mark in 2008 itself; and in the final stage, from 2020 to 2050, China expects to join the middle rung of advanced nations as a prosperous, democratic, and modernised socialist country.26 This suggests that by the time China becomes a ‘prosperous, democratic, and modernised socialist country’ by 2050, it should have ensured that there was no threat either in the immediate periphery or in faraway regions, and also
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that no country dominates in regions where China has vital interests. Thus, the ‘string of pearls’ is part of the ‘peaceful development’ theory with a slow and steady but non-confrontationist process of stationing Chinese naval ships permanently in the IOR.
National Power and Trade Interests
As countries grow economically, the wealth they have accrued through trade and commerce would be transfered for protecting trade interests as well as for building a strong navy. Acquiring natural resources, searching for new markets, controlling trade routes, enhancing power influence in such regions, and building a powerful navy to protect these aspects are steps that have been taken by major trading states that were maritime powers too. As such, naval strategy and maritime trade go hand-in-hand. A powerful navy with an expansionist propensity is a corollary of trade induced economic growth, which could lead to competition and conflict. When a nation’s prosperity depends on seaborne commerce, and the amount of trade available is limited, then competition follows, and that leads to naval contests to protect trade.27 If the country’s founding fathers had envisioned converting the nation into a great power using all its advantages, then its actions would naturally lead to expansionism.28 Western scholars have argued that China has adopted a Mahanian way of expansionism into the Indian Ocean, with bases and assets, along with increasing trade interests.29 For Mahan, to protect trade and commerce, countries need merchant and naval fleets, and geographic expansion, for which obtaining bases or basing agreements overseas comprised the sine qua non for maritime powers.30 Indeed, maritime trade and energy security became the dominant narrative in China’s external behaviour in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which encapsulated the need to protect the sources of energy, including the passage routes. Holmes and Yoshihara, having analysed the writings of Chinese military thinkers and maritime commentators, have argued that “Chinese naval thinkers have borrowed heavily from Mahan’s writings to express their recommendations on how China ought to cope with maritime matters. This process of foreign adaptation has become particularly visible in recent years, as proponents of Mahanian thought have multiplied and become
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more forceful.”31 They have interpreted the then PLAN Commander Wu Shengli’s proclamation of China as an “oceanic nation” in 2007 with a Mahanian characteristic that “sea power is inseparable from national greatness”.32 Not just Western scholars but Chinese authors too have highlighted the importance of having dominance in the trade routes and the need to protect them. In Sea Power and Prosperity, the first book on sea power openly published as early as 1991 in China, by the Ocean Press, as their first volume of the Ocean Consciousness series, Zhang Wei and Xu Hua examine how maritime trade transformed states into sea powers and their attempts to control trade routes to dominate the maritime trade.33 They say, “States that were successful in maritime trade needed to control sea lines of communication and capture desired markets, while simultaneously blocking other countries from controlling or occupying them.”34 The PLAN’s role has expanded from coastal protection to guarantor of maritime trade, and it also began to consume more of the nation’s wealth. China viewed the navy as a representative of the country’s national power, that could expand China’s power influence along with expansion of trade. The quest for sea power identity emerged in China during the 1990s and early 2000s, and a series of books on sea power was published in Chinese; some were Chinese translations of foreign authors such as Gorshkov’s Sea Power of the State, Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, and Naval Strategy, a collection of Mahan’s essays titled Sea Power Theory, and Lehman’s Command of the Seas, among others.35 The Chinese authors attempted to link China’s naval rise with its history of the Ming dynasty, especially the great maritime voyages of Zeng He to the Indian Ocean, as well as the imperative of having a strong navy for the protection of commerce and trade. The Communist Party-associated People’s Press published Zhang Shiping’s Chinese Sea Power in 1998, with the aim of promoting awareness about the maritime past of China, claiming that China had mastered sea-faring tactics much before the Europeans.36 The book, however, contended that ‘sea power’ meant ‘military’ and ‘comprehensive’ sea power: “Military sea power refers to one party in a war asserting control of a fixed maritime space for a certain period. Comprehensive sea power includes political, economic, and military factors.”37 Wang Shengrong’s Maritime Great Powers and the Struggle for Sea
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Power hails the ‘sea power’ concept of America’s Mahan and the Soviet Union’s Gorshkov as both are the inspiration for their nations’ pursuit of achieving sea power status, albeit differently. With the interest of propagating the ‘sea power’ concept as a major strategic objective, several monographs were published in the 2000s, such as Yang Xinhua’s and Shi Ping’s Chinese Sea Power and Historical Culture, Qin Tian’s and Huo Xiaoyong’s On the History of Chinese Sea Power, Liu Yijian’s Command of the Seas and Naval Strategy, and Lu Rude’s Ocean-State-Sea Power, as well as the PLAN Command Department’s Modern Chinese Navy and Cheng Guangzhong’s On Geopolitics.38 The then PLAN Commander Wu Shengli, in 2007, called on “Chinese citizens to raise their collective consciousness of the seas, bringing about ‘the great revitalisation of the Chinese nation’.”39
Energy Security and the ‘String of Pearls’
Energy security is broadly defined as “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy.”40 It matters because energy is essential to economic growth and human development, so affordability is an important component of its overall growth, especially for developing countries like China. Yet no energy system can be entirely secure in the short term, because disruptions or shortages can arise unexpectedly, whether through sabotage, political intervention, strikes, technical failures, accidents, or natural disasters.41 The prices of raw materials and finished products have been determined by the market forces, however, the paramount responsibility of securing energy supply rests with governments that need to take adequate measures to prevent disruptions in the supply route. As per the BP Statistical Review of World Energy of June 2009, “The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries hold just 7 per cent of global proven surplus oil resources, yet consume around 60 per cent of world supply.”42 The corresponding figures for “the Asia-Pacific region are 3.3 per cent and 30.1 per cent, those for the US 2.4 per cent and 22.5 per cent, for China 1.2 per cent and 9.6 per cent.”43 In other words, major oil and gas consumers happen to be the resource poor advanced countries, whereas the producing countries are mostly located in the developing world, barring India and China, and many of them are affected by chronic political instability or are under authoritarian regimes.
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Since China became a net importer of oil in 1993, energy security has become one of the important aspects of its foreign policy calculations. Energy security is accorded high priority in China’s security strategy because uninterrupted sources and supply of energy are essential for continued economic growth. Energy also became a major factor in the comprehensive national power capability of China. In the 2000s, China’s energy mix was dominated by coal, with 71.5 per cent in 2004, which China wanted to reduce to 52.3 per cent by 2030.44 As a result, other components were expected to rise; the oil share was expected to increase from 22.4 per cent to 28.9 per cent; natural gas from 3.0 per cent to 8.3 per cent; nuclear power from 0.9 per cent to 3.0 per cent; hydro from 2.2 to 2.4 per cent; and, other renewable energy from 0.5 per cent to 5.1 per cent, during the corresponding period.45 For instance, in 1993, China’s oil production and consumption were approximately equal at 3mb/d; in 2008, production increased slightly, reaching just 3.7mb/d, while consumption doubled during this period.46 This increased demand for oil has necessitated the Chinese elites to formulate a security-oriented strategy for an uninterrupted source and supply of oil, which mostly comes from the volatile Middle East. In 2008, crude oil imports from the Middle East comprised 48 per cent of China’s total consumption, up from 46 per cent in 2005; 30 per cent from Africa; 8 per cent from Russia, and 5 per cent from the Asia-Pacific and Oceania.47 Given the increasing demand for energy and the rise in imports, China published a ‘‘White Paper on Energy’’ in 2007, viewing energy security as a comprehensive policy of the state: The sustained growth of energy supply has provided an important
support for the country’s economic growth and social progress, while the
rapid expansion of energy consumption has created a vast scope for the global energy market. As an irreplaceable component of the world energy
market, China plays an increasingly important role in maintaining global energy security.48
As per the White Paper, the basic themes of China’s energy strategy are premised on six components: giving priority to thrift, relying on domestic
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sources, encouraging diverse patterns of development, relying on science and technology, and increasing international cooperation for mutual benefit.49 Theoretically speaking, China’s effort to source energy from abroad is a temporary phenomenon until China becomes self-sufficient in the energy sector through domestic production. However, with the economic growth on a higher trajectory, its consumption increased which resulted in higher import of hydrocarbons. In short, China’s energy security strategy can be seen as securing the source and supply of energy, strengthening diplomatic relations with the regional countries, and expanding China’s global influence. China understood that control of natural resources as well as security of transport routes would be critical to its long-term energy security, so it started investing in energy-related assets overseas, including the purchase of equity of oil. Some of the Chinese investments have gone to the Middle East and African countries, such as Iran, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and Libya. As part of the former Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongi’s ‘‘going out strategy’’,50 Chinese oil companies snapped up lucrative oil and gas fields in various parts of the world that helped to increase Chinese political clout in the regions which were left behind by the Japanese, European and American companies in their thirst for hydrocarbon resources.51 Though not deliberately, this became the continuation of Mao’s strategy of uniting the third world countries, with China as their leader. Not only getting control of the source of energy supply but protection of the transport route also became an important factor in the energy security strategy of China. China is heavily dependent on international waters—the global commons—for its energy supply as almost 80 per cent of China’s oil imports passes through the Strait of Malacca. However, the global commons have been safeguarded by the forces of the US and its allies who were considered inimical to Chinese interests, with attempts to prevent China’s rise. At the same time, China believed that as a growing power, it could not depend on other countries for safeguarding its vital interests in energy security and the protection of trade routes, as it would become vulnerable during a crisis. In order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy, and to prevent the disruption in the Indian Ocean bound trade routes, which also pass through the narrow Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, China’s strategy
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has been to deploy its own naval forces instead of relying on other navies, including the littoral navies, to protect the Chinese-bound SLOCs. However, the Chinese Navy was still a brown water one and had just started venturing into the overseas environment, so it was unthinkable for it to have foreign bases for logistical support in faraway waters. Instead, Beijing sought support from friendly Indian Ocean littoral countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka for basing the facilities of its navy. The port facilities of these countries were inadequate to provide anchoring facilities for foreign vessels, so China provided financial assistance to them to improve the port infrastructure and allied facilities. With this objective, China sought to build economic and diplomatic ties with the littoral countries, which could provide easy access for its naval ships to their ports and facilitate replenishment activities. China identified Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Iran from the Indian Ocean littorals to build strong relationships with in order to get support to guarantee the security of the SLOCs.52 Along with the pearls, there was reportedly a plan to build a submarine base at Marao in the Maldives.53 Investments in infrastructural activities, especially ports which cater to economic activity to improve the home country’s economic growth, would generate strategic leverage for China, improving its strategic relationships with them to counter India’s influence in the IOR. Under the energy security framework, China has sought to expand its influence into the IOR. The ‘string of pearls’ was touted as China’s plan to build a comprehensive network of ports stretching from southern China to Pakistan, getting a firm foothold in the IOR. Even though the protection of trade routes and sources of supply attained importance in China’s energy security strategy, its underlying motivation was to expand its naval influence in the Indian Ocean. One can see the basing strategy as China’s slow and steady step to establish a naval base in the IOR, that culminated in 2015 at Djibouti in northeastern Africa. Initially, China did not seek to build a proper base nor sought military support from these countries for securing the SLOCs Instead, China’s strategy was to get access facilities for its naval ships with investments to improve the facilities to suit to its naval requirements. It was
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part of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ theory that for its comprehensive growth it required unfettered access to the source of energy for its economic growth and to markets for its finished products. A cooperative environment was required for the smooth running of the economy, while any confrontationist policy or action would invite criticism against its ‘peaceful rise’ theory. So, it conspicuously avoided the military orientation of the ‘string of pearls’, while focussing on building diplomatic and defence relationships with the South Asian countries. Undoubtedly, it was a demonstration of the expansionist policy by the Chinese Navy in the guise of energy security purposes and, today, China not only continues to hold most of the bases but has expanded to other parts of the IOR, including the setting up of a full-fledged military base at Djibouti. The basing requirements of the PLAN in the Indian Ocean in its operations to protect trade can be seen as the “command of the sea”54 theory of Mahan. While China was focussing on its ‘active defence’ to defend the first island chain, simultaneously it was searching for opportunities outside the second island chain for strategic gains. A commercial asset under the Chinese strategic control could be utilised in the future when it revealed its expansionism. The energy security strategy was a conduit to avoid criticism of the ‘Chinese imperialism/expansionism’ rhetoric. In fact, all major importing and exporting countries were depending on ‘good order at seas’ to promote trade, with no major disruption in the oil shipments in any of the regional crises. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, the oil tankers and other commercial ships were spared, and it hardly affected the energy trade during the crisis period. However, China remained resolute in getting a naval foothold in the Indian Ocean for its energy security with basing requirements as it claimed that it had no control over the management of the security of the Indian Ocean. It was believed that the string of pearls would help China to monitor the naval activities of India and the US in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.55 When China actively participated in the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and adjacent waters since 2008, these basing places became greatly supportive for the Chinese Navy for the conduct of smooth operations in the Indian Ocean.
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Naval Expansionism
As China turned to the maritime domain, demands for a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean increased from within the PLAN establishment. For instance, a secret memorandum issued by Zhao Nanqi, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD) of the PLA, in early 1993, detailed strategic plans to consolidate control over the Indian Ocean (and the South China Sea) under a new PLA doctrine of “high seas defense”.56 Besides, a July 1992 report of the GLD called for “stepped-up naval visits to the Indian Ocean”.57 The regional security environment was also conducive to an expanded role for the PLAN in the post-Cold War period. The withdrawal of the fleet units of the United States from the Philippines helped China to expand its sphere of influence into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean waters. Until then, China had been fully preoccupied with negating the threats emanating from the naval presence of the superpowers in the near seas. The withdrawal of such naval presence had indeed freed China from the shackles of proximate threats, especially from the South China Sea, and reoriented its strategy on focussing on neutralising the ‘secondary’ threats which could take place in the Indian Ocean. Even though the ‘string of pearls’ is associated with economic and energy security interests, it was part of China’s expanding security interests beyond the Taiwan cause. China gave convenient explanations for its expansionism toward the Indian Ocean to avoid criticism of its anti-hegemonism and anti-imperialism rhetoric. In the 2000s, China started assertiveness in the adjacent seas, while expanding its reach to the distant waters to prevent the interdiction at sea of the supply lines for the energy and raw materials needed for its domestic economy.58 The Chinese economy was growing by leaps and bounds, and the navy was emerging as a modern and expeditionary force capable of going beyond its immediate coastal confines to patrol the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the approaches to the Persian Gulf.The Chinese naval shipbuilding programme increased dramatically from 2000 with the ambition of becoming a ‘blue water’ navy capable of undertaking missions in the far seas. Between 2000 and 2018, the PLAN’s inventory far exceeded the build-up in any other nation’s navy in the post-World War II era.59 By the mid-2000s, China’s ‘active offshore defence’ strategy became matured
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as there was no threat of an invasion by a superior force, nor did any peer competitor from within the region seemingly emerge, which boosted China’s confidence in power projection in distant waters. China had already sought to acquire an aircraft carrier, converted the Soviet-era Varyag of Ukraine into the Liaoning which it commissioned in 2012. Since the late 2000s, China started consolidating its claims in the South China Sea disputes by pursuing a strategy of delaying the resolution of the ongoing disputes and deterring others through diplomatic, administrative and military means.60 While in the region of the far seas, it sought to acquire ports in friendly countries for ‘dual use’ purposes: commercial ports which could be strategically leveraged in a conflict environment. Between 2000 and 2014, China committed $126 billion to the transport and storage sectors, and signed port deals worldwide, helping Chinese companies to get a footprint in distant waters.61 The ‘string of pearls’ helped China to get basing facilities for its naval ships during distant water operation missions in concert with its maritime assertiveness and power projection interests even though the PLAN was still a brown water navy. Today, these ‘pearls/places’ can facilitate the requirements for nuclear and conventional submarines that the PLAN has deployed in the IOR, as has already taken place at Hambantota in Sri Lanka.62 And, the deal to procure submarines from China by Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the deployment of a Chinese submarine flotilla in the Indian Ocean could greatly benefit from a parts commonality with these regional states’ assets.63 At the same time, in the earlier periods, China was not keen to set up overseas bases in the IOR; instead, its strategy was to develop a network of ‘places’ in order to support the forces deployed in the Indian Ocean for various non-military missions of the PLAN. If it wanted to set up a naval base in the IOR, then additional deployment of forces would be required to protect the naval base during a crisis which would, in any case, be difficult for China because its priority has always been in the western Pacific against a superior US Navy. However, China had demonstrated its long-term ambition to play a larger role in the Indian Ocean through its energy security strategy. In its first Defence White Paper, released in 1998, limited naval ambitions of deploying naval forces for the protection of the SLOCs were clearly expressed and promulgated: that China “does not station any troops or set up any military
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bases in any foreign country.”64 President Hu Jintao came up with a more outward reflection of the PLAN’s increasing role beyond the near seas in his speech to the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004 when he officially became the head of the CMC. Hu introduced the idea of a ‘new historic mission’ for the PLA, in which he indicated the need for defending China’s expanding national interests and “safeguarding world peace.”65 As China’s power status increased in East Asia, it became necessary to “integrate with other regions of the world”, and “play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development”. 66 At the same time, President Hu was concerned about external vulnerabilities such as SLOCs protection and the limited role that China could play to overcome such concerns. China’s apprehensiveness about security related developments in the energy routes was identified in the 2006 Defence White Paper, and the 2008 Defence White Paper sharpened China’s public focus on the rising global competition for resources, and expressed the need for the PLAN to have the capabilities to conduct “cooperation in distant waters.”67 In the subsequent Defence White Papers, a stepped up action plan for far seas operations and the need for seeking support from littoral countries for the PLAN’s extended operations were highlighted. The 2010 White Paper highlighted the increased PLAN deployment other than the UN peace keeping missions, especially in the non-traditional security areas such as escort missions and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia.68 Since then, China has participated actively in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) which include counter-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden and a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) during the Libyan crisis in 2011. However, during these operations, the Chinese ships faced considerable logistical difficulties, especially on overseas shore-based supply for fuel, food, fresh water, and substantial repairs, and used the port of Aden in Yemen, the port of Salalah in Oman, the port of Karachi in Pakistan, and the port of Djibouti for logistics.69 Starting with the MOOTW in the Gulf of Aden area, the PLAN has been continuously making its presence felt in the Indian Ocean and is claiming to be a stakeholder in regional security matters.70 With the announcement of the BRI/MSR, China has strengthened
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its port building spree and expanded from South Asia to the western Indian Ocean and the east and northeast African coasts. As Chinese investments increased under the MSR drive, Beijing found a convenient explanation for the permanent deployment of the PLAN to protect the MSR ‘assets’ with its ‘far seas protection’ strategy.71 In this regard, it can be argued that from the 1990s onwards, whether for energy security purposes, SLOCs protection or MOOTW, or for protecting MSR assets, China’s larger objective has been the PLAN’s permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, traditionally an Indian sphere of influence, with a two-ocean navy, and to get a stakeholder position in the management of security affairs concerning the Indian Ocean.
Conclusion
The ‘string of pearls’ strategy was a stealth approach for the PLAN’s expansionist entry into the Indian Ocean in the guise of energy and trade interests. China feared that seeking an open naval base in the Indian Ocean would face strong headwinds from India as well as other global powers about China’s hegemonic agenda. On the other hand, commercial ports in friendly countries could be leveraged for security purposes, especially during a crisis. Access to regional ports by the PLAN ships would reduce frequent calls to home ports for replenishment and servicing and avoid dependence on regional navies in emergencies. Similarly, a foreign naval base would go against China’s ‘peaceful development’ theory as Beijing was looking for its global ambition with a non-confrontationist approach. China wanted to constrain the Indian Navy’s free manoeuvrability in the Indian Ocean because it would give China parity in the naval competition in Asia.
Notes 1.
2. 3.
Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, “China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions”, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2010). Ibid. Gurnam Singh, “China and the Indian Ocean Region”, China Report, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1984, pp. 15-23.
146 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 4.
5. 6. 7. 8.
9. 10. 11. 12.
13. 14.
15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006), https://www.files. ethz.ch/isn/27007/String_Pearls_Meeting.pdf. Accessed on May 18, 2021. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09 01/chinas-global-hunt-energy. Accessed on May 22, 2021. Ibid.; Erica Downs, ‘‘Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China’’, December 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/12china.pdf. Accessed on May 20, 2021. Zweig and Jianhai, n. 5. Booz Allen Hamilton, “Energy Futures in Asia”, Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Department of Defence, United States of America, 2007, https://www.esd. whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/15-F-0953_ DOC_07_Energy_Futures_In_Asia.pdf. Accessed on May 12, 2021. Pehrson, n. 4, pp. 5-6. Ibid. Ibid. Virginia Marantidou, “Revisiting China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy: Places ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ and their Security Implications”, Issues & Insights, Vol. 14, No. 7, June 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182061/140624_issuesinsights_ vol14no7.pdf. Accessed on June 15, 2021. Accessed on May 21, 2021. Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-39. Indrani Bagchi, “Dhaka Cancels Port to be Built by China, India Eyes Another”, The Times of India, February 8, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dhaka cancels-port-to-be-built-by-china-india-eyes-another/articleshow/50894554.cms. Accessed on July 12, 2021. Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port”, The New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri lanka-port.html. Accessed on June 12, 2021. Ibid. Umesh Moramudali, “The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities”, The Diplomat, January 1, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port deal-myths-and-realities/. Accessed on June 15, 2021. Tarique Niazi, “Gwadar: China’s Naval Outpost on The Indian Ocean”, China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2005, https://jamestown.org/program/gwadar-chinas-naval-outpost on-the-indian-ocean/. Accessed on August 12, 2021. Declan Walsh, “Chinese Company Will Run Strategic Pakistani Port”, The New York Times, January 31, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/ chinese-firm-will-run-strategic-pakistani-port-at-gwadar.html. Accessed on July 20, 2021.
PLAN’s Basing Strategy in the IOR: The ‘String of Pearls’ • 147 20. Khurana, n. 13. 21. Ibid. 22. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Myanmar Junta Expedites Work on China Funded Kyaukphyu Port”, The Economic Times, August 9, 2021, https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/myanmar-junta-expedites-work on-china-funded-kyaukphyu-port/articleshow/85167272.cms. Accessed on May 30, 2021. 23. Yuichi Nitta “Myanmar Cuts Cost of China-Funded Port Project by 80%”, Nikkei Asia, September 28, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and Road/Myanmar-cuts-cost-of-China-funded-port-project-by-80. Accessed on May 27, 2021. 24. Marantidou, n. 12. 25. Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma,’” China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 8, 2006, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/. Accessed on July 16, 2021. 26. Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, pp. 23-24. 27. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to the US Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 17. 28. Gerald Segal, “China and the Great Power Triangle”, The China Quarterly, No. 83, September, 1980, pp. 490-509. 29. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2008); James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, pp. 367-394; Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, “Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?” World Affairs Vol. 174, No. 6, 2012, pp. 85-92; Andrew Latham, “Mahan, Corbett, and China’s Maritime Grand Strategy”, The Diplomat, August 24, 2020, https://thediplomat. com/2020/08/mahan-corbett-and-chinas-maritime-grand-strategy/. Accessed on June 30, 2021. 30. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover, 1987). 31. Holmes and Yoshihara, n. 29, p. 27. 32. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “A Chinese Turn to Mahan?”, China Brief 9, No. 13, 2009, June 24, https://jamestown.org/program/a-chinese-turn-to-mahan/. Accessed on May 12, 2021. 33. Zhang Wei and Shazeda Ahmed, “A General Review of the History of China’s Sea-Power Theory Development,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2015, pp. 80-93. 34. Quoted in Ibid., p. 82. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid.
148 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 37. Ibid., p. 83. 38. Ibid. 39. Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Army,” Qiushi 14, July 16, 2007, quoted in Holmes and Yoshihara, No. 31. 40. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007: India and China Insights (Vienna: International Energy Agency, 2008) p. 160. 41. Ibid., p. 161. 42. British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009 (London: British Petroleum, 2009), p. 6. 43. Ibid. 44. Li Zhodong, ‘‘China’s Long-term Energy Outlook and the Implications for Global Governance’’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, p. 17. 45. Ibid. 46. Erica Downs, ‘‘Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China’’, December 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/12china. pdf. Accessed on May 12, 2021. 47. Joshy M. Paul, “The Role of Energy Security in China’s Foreign Policy: A Maritime Perspective,” Maritime Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 49-71. 48. State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on Energy: China’s Energy Condition and Policy’’, Government of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, December 2007, p. 2, http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm. Accessed on January 28, 2022. 49. Ibid. 50. ‘‘Buying Fast into Southeast Asia’’, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 28, 2002, p. 30. 51. Paul, n. 47. 52. David Brewster, ‘Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is There Really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?’ Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, pp. 133-149. 53. Daniel Kostecka. “Hambantota, Chittagong, and the Maldives—Unlikely Pearls for the Chinese Navy”, China Brief, Vol. 10, No. 23, 2010, https://jamestown. org/program/hambantota-chittagong-and-the-maldives-unlikely-pearls-for-the chinese-navy/. Accessed on June 12, 2021. 54. According to Mahan, ‘command of the seas’ meant, “that the overbearing power of the sea which drives the enemy flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and fro from the enemy’s shores”. Ibid., p. 138. 55. Joshy M. Paul, “China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR”, in KK Nohwar, ed., Asian Defence Review (New Delhi: Centre for Air Power Studies, 2020), pp. 119-138.
PLAN’s Basing Strategy in the IOR: The ‘String of Pearls’ • 149 56. Yossef Bodansky, “The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and US”, Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 1995, p. 6. Quoted in Khurana, n. 13, p. 2. 57. Philip L. Ritcheson, “Nuclearization in South Asia”, Strategic Review, 21(4), Fall 1993, p. 39. Quoted in Khurana, n. 13, p. 3. 58. Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 81, 2013, pp. 446-459. 59. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2019, pp. 10-55. 60. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2011, pp. 292-319. 61. Fanell, n. 59. 62. Sachin Parashar, “Sri Lanka Snubs India, Opens Port to Chinese Submarine Again”, The Times of India, November 2, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sri lanka-snubs-india-opens-port-to-chinese-submarine-again/articleshow/45008757. cms. Accessed on June 12, 2021. 63. Press Trust of India, “Pakistan to Acquire 4 Chinese Frigates, 8 Submarines in Modernisation Push for Navy”, India Today, February 6, 2021, https://www. indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-to-acquire-4-chinese-frigates-8-submarines in-modernisation-push-for-navy-1766465-2021-02-06. Accessed on July 19, 2021. 64. Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Evolving Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean Region: An Indian Perspective,” in David Brewster, ed., India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 113. 65. Daniel M. Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military Legacy,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), pp. 31-80. 66. M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Military Strategy Since 1949: Active Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 228. 67. Joshua T. White, “China’s Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence, and Military Advantage”, Brookings, June 2020, p. 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_chinas_indian_ocean_ambitions_white-1. pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2021. 68. “China’s National Defense in 2010”, Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, March 2011, Beijing, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ publications/2017-04/11/content_4778206_3.htm. Accessed on May 29, 2021. 69. Marantidou, n. 12. 70. Abhijit Singh, A ‘PLA-N’ for Chinese Maritime Bases in the Indian Ocean, PacNet #7, January 26, 2015, https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-7-a-pla-n for-chinese-maritime-bases-in-the-indian-ocean. Accessed on July 13, 2021.
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71. Jennifer Rice and Erik Robb, “The Origins of ‘Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection’”, China Maritime Report No. 13, February 2021, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/ uploads/2021/02/CMSI_China-Maritime-Report_13_Near-Seas-Defense-Far Seas-Protection-Origins_Rice-Robb_202102.pdf. Accessed on July 14, 2021.
6.
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR
The last decade saw a sporadic rise in Chinese investments in the Indian Ocean littoral area, including South Asia, Southeast Asia and Eastern Africa. China has invested or committed more than $150 billion in countries of the IOR and is the largest overseas investor in the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.1 The investments have come under China’s new initiative in the 21st century, the Maritime Silk Route, popularly known as the MSR, announced in 2013, which is a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI includes the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), linking China to Central and South Asia, and onward to Western Europe, while the MSR is a maritime route connecting China’s southeastern shore to the Mediterranean through the Indian Ocean. The SREB connects with the MSR through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), both having a large port facility in the Indian Ocean, i.e. Gwadar in Pakistan and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. The MSR also covers various forms of infrastructural development assistance to Bangladesh, including the development of the port city of Chittagong and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka; and $12 billion Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans for various infrastructure projects and infrastructural assistance to the Maldives. Chinese commercial presence in East Africa is mainly in the infrastructural sector, spanning oil and gas, railways, ports and the like. As a new great power in the 21st century, Beijing has sought to expand its power and influence beyond the East Asian theatre. China started to
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make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean from the 1990s with its military modernisation, initially in the form of energy security also known as the ‘string of pearls’ strategy, and then with the MSR strategy. In the 2015 Defence White Paper, China committed to protect its overseas assets, and the navy was deployed in the Indian Ocean for these purposes. As an East Asian country, China’s investments and its intentions to protect these assets have generated considerable speculation about its ulterior motives for so many investments in otherwise poor and developing countries. This chapter seeks to analyse the intentions and motives, and the strategic implications of China’s MSR investments in the IOR. To date, around 138 countries—accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population—have signed onto the BRI projects or indicated an interest in doing so.2 According to Refinitiv data, as of March 31, 2020, China was estimated to have invested approximately US$4 trillion in a total of 3,164 projects that span across transportation, power and water, real estate, oil and gas, manufacturing, mining and communication.3 Of these, $3.3 trillion worth of projects or 83 per cent in value terms, are active, with another $593 billion in completed projects. The remaining are either on hold ($64.3 billion), delayed ($14.8 billion) or cancelled.4 “They come under the following regions—Sub-Saharan Africa (38), Europe and Central Asia (34), East Asia and Pacific (25), Latin America and Caribbean (18), Middle East and North Africa (17), and South Asia (6).”5 To fulfil the BRI projects, Beijing has backed $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt, $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road, $50 billion for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and $40 billion for the Silk Road Fund.6 The COVID pandemic had constrained various economic activities across the globe due to the lockdowns and other restrictions on movement of goods and services, but it did not affect the new Chinese BRI investments; instead, they increased substantially. In the first quarter of 2020, China had undertaken 184 projects valued at $137.43 billion in various sectors.7 The purpose of the BRI has been to elevate China as an undisputed leader in the 21st century. According to the BRI ‘Vision and Action’ plan document, released by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission in March 2015, China “envisages cooperation among member countries
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in policy coordination; facilitates connectivity (including infrastructure such as rail, roads, shipping, aviation, and pipelines); unimpeded trade through investment and trade facilitation, removal of trade barriers, and customs cooperation; financial integration (including establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and deepening financial cooperation); and people-to-people bonds (such as cultural and academic exchanges).”8 Indeed, these networks “would knit together economic activity across a geographic region extending from Southeast Asia through Central Asia to Africa and Europe.”9 Beijing’s focus is China’s Eurasian integration, a homogeneous geographical region from the east coast of China to Central Europe, under the Chinese leadership, different from the divided Eurasia during the Cold War.10 The Eurasian zone covers 65 countries with two Silk Routes: the Land Silk Route and 21st Security Maritime Silk Route; five major landbased economic corridors: China-Pakistan, China-Mongolia-Russia, ChinaCentral Asia-Western Asia-Turkey, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor. Among these, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the largest, worth $65 billion11 (see Fig 6.1). The MSR passes through the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, connecting to the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea. With the BRI, China will improve its geostrategic presence in both maritime and continental spheres, which could make it a great Eurasian power with a strong maritime foothold by the middle of the 21st century.
The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Grand Strategy Initiative
The BRI is a grand strategy to address China’s geopolitical concerns as well as a viable strategic and economic alternative to the current USled international order.12 Predominantly, there are two views about the rationale behind the formulation of the BRI; these are the commercial/ development and security view (Chinese view), and geopolitical view (the US and others). The Chinese view contends that the BRI is a new type of globalisation led by China. Although China has been the largest beneficiary of the existing globalisation led by the US, after the 2008 financial crisis, new rules and standards were necessary to advance
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globalisation with a more “humane approach”.13 For the Chinese, the BRI is ‘Chinese led globalisation’ with Chinese rules and standards, as Chinese enterprises go abroad. Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out in 2014, “China must not be a bystander and follower, but a participant and trendsetter, making more Chinese voices heard and injecting more Chinese elements in the institution of international rules and safeguarding as well as expanding China’s development interests.”14 Chinese globalisation is different from Western-dominated globalisation; the main feature of the latter has been the global divide between the rich and poor or contradiction between the South and North, while the BRI brings “common prosperity” for all.15 According to Tian Wenlin, the BRI is “neither a new Marshall Plan nor a new Monroe Doctrine, rather it is a plan that calls for the active participation of more countries and its aim is to benefit people from all countries.”16 At the 2015 annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia, President Xi stated, “The BRI insists on the principle of joint discussion, co-construction and sharing, which is open and inclusive rather than closed; it is not a solo project of China but a chorus with all the countries along the ‘Belt and Road’. It aims to promote geoeconomic integration, which is hoped will heal the ‘fragmentation of Eurasia’.”17 The BRI is in accordance with President Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream’ of great national rejuvenation based on “a community of common destiny” and “win-win cooperation”, contrary to the existing world order, by seeking “expansion, hegemony, or sphere of influence.”18 China seeks to create a new world order based on Chinese norms such as Chinese socialism rather than capitalism and profit making, and cooperation and harmony rather than hegemony and the arms race.19 Large and medium Chinese state-owned enterprises are the driving force behind the BRI and are investing in various projects, which include infrastructure, textiles, home appliances, steel, building materials chemical industry, automobile, machinery, mineral processing, and so on, in as many as 138 countries that have joined the BRI. With Chinese funds such as the Silk Road Fund and Maritime Silk Road Fund, and the Chinese-initiated multilateral institution, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), China aims to promote “economic integration
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of the countries involved in a market economy for which China has set the agenda and established the framework.”20 Fig 6.1: China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Source: Tenggara, “Belt and Road Initiative: What’s in it for Indonesia”, Tenggara Strategics Briefing Paper, August 18, 2018, https://tenggara.id/insights/Belt-and-Road-Initiative Whats-in-it-for-Indonesia. Accessed on November 13, 2022.
Geopolitically, the BRI is China’s counter-containment strategy: to counter the American ‘rebalance’ strategy initiated by the Obama administration in the second decade of the 21st century that aimed to contain China’s rise.21 It is argued that the Land Silk Road will counter the US hold over Afghanistan and Central Asia, while the MSR will counter the US’ ‘pivot to Asia’. The pivot was to establish a firm US footing in the western Pacific, which includes the East and South China Seas, that China views as its backyard.22 Instead of direct competition with the US in the western Pacific, China sought to expand its naval influence beyond the adjacent waters and project its power through a ‘network of ports’ in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. In this regard, the MSR can be seen as a ‘pivot west’ towards the Western frontiers against the US’ “rebalance”.23
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Indeed, China wants to establish an alternative order to the prevailing liberal international order established and preserved by the US, and to counter US military hegemony in the Pacific by expanding the theatre from the western Pacific to other areas. Ashley Tellis’ argument that China’s major obstacle in the IOR is a strong Indo-US partnership in the Indian Ocean is true. Tellis states that China’s acquisition of various air, naval and missile capabilities will allow it to project its power beyond the ‘second island chain’ into the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, but it faces a major challenge in a strong Indo-US partnership in the Indian Ocean.24 China seeks to overcome these obstacles by adopting the ‘Mahanian Way,’ by creating assets and bases in the IOR, with which it will be able to pose major challenges to the US and also constrain India’s manoeuvrability in the IOR. Indeed, China is unlikely to achieve naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean any time soon, because the current Chinese priority has been in the near seas, which include the East and South China Seas, for a firm consolidation of China by marginalising the US out of the area. Similarly, China’s current military capabilities do not support the projection of its power beyond the second island chain, despite projecting the PLAN as a blue water navy.25 China will have only four aircraft carriers by the end of this decade; the fifth, a nuclear-powered one, was reportedly shelved well before the COVID pandemic began due to financial and technical constraints.26 Conversely, when the US declared its pivot to Asia, it had planned to deploy 9 out of 14 aircraft carriers in the western Pacific to establish firm US supremacy in the region. Although China has incorporated “far seas protection” in the PLAN’s operational strategy, the objective of the Chinese naval strategy is still to achieve “absolute” security in the near seas and establish “effective deterrence” in the far seas.27 Accordingly, instead of seeking a full-spectrum military dominance in the far seas, which include the Indian Ocean, the MSR would serve China’s interests by enhancing its maritime capabilities with assistance from local partners. The MSR will secure berth facilities for the Chinese Navy along the maritime routes that will enhance its maritime capabilities for “strategic deterrence and maritime counter-attacks.”28 In addition, China faces the ‘distant power dilemma’ in the IOR against India, the regional heavyweight in the IOR, which is that a
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distant superior power cannot be effective against a local power in a regional theatre. Moreover, it would be difficult for China to own a full-fledged naval base in the IOR primarily for two reasons: one is that the littoral countries are wary of leasing their assets to China for military purposes because that would create strain in their relationship with their largest neighbour, India; and, second, a Chinese naval base in the IOR would always be prone to US targeting as the US Navy has two naval installations in the IOR: its Fifth Fleet at Manama and the Cold War era base at Diego Garcia. Even the Djibouti base is not a real naval base, just a logistics hub for the PLAN’s various operations in the region such as anti-piracy and UN-led international peace-keeping operations as well as humanitarian assistance operations conducted by China itself, and is leased for a ten-year period.29 Instead, the Chinese strategy is to strengthen its presence by creating assets in the Indian Ocean littorals and enhancing its military capacity by means of frequent deployment of naval ships in the name of protecting these assets to prove that it is the most powerful and friendly country for the littoral states in the region. In this regard, it can be argued that China’s MSR is an economic statecraft strategy aimed to get a ‘controlling’ stake of the IOR, ownership of economic activity and guarantor of the security of the region. The MSR, especially with regard to the IOR, is more of China’s economic statecraft strategy than a geopolitical narrative. Of course, the economic statecraft will eventually contribute to geopolitical benefit for China, but the latter is not the prime driver of the MSR. China can use its commercial assets for geopolitical advantage when the situation demands. As stated above, a Chinese hard military base in the littorals of the IOR may be prone to be ‘quarantined’ by rival navies such as India’s, the US’ or fully fledged NATO forces. On the other hand, the ports and other allied infrastructure that China has set up in the littorals of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are strategic ‘real estates’ that can be used for political and strategic objectives in times of crisis.30 They are commercial assets in critical locations, set up on a long-term basis, which could yield geostrategic benefits as and when a war broke out in East Asia. Chinese naval ships will be able to get
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logistics support in times of need such as a crisis over the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the purposes of the assets are to constrain the Indian Navy’s manoeuvrability in its home waters and also to keep other hostile maritime powers at bay. The MSR is a new kind of alliance and partnership to enhance Chinese power and prestige on the political, economic and diplomatic levels in the IOR area. China’s interest in the Indian Ocean is not just to protect its trade routes and energy supplies but to become a major source of economic activity and security guarantor in the IOR, consistent with its maritime great power status. The Chinese capital will accelerate local industrialisation and economic advancement for the regional countries, through engaging in bilateral infrastructure projects, trade and investment cooperation, and tapping into China’s huge domestic markets.31 The billions of dollars of Chinese investments in the littoral countries will increase their exports, and Chinese shipping companies would carry such products through the Indian Ocean to the outside world. This means that China would be the financier, producer, carrier of goods, and major market for these countries. In the case of any crisis to this economic activity in the waters of the Indian Ocean, China would be the natural choice as a guarantor of the trade. This will enhance China’s naval presence as a ‘legitimate stakeholder’ of the security of the Indian Ocean region. Taking ownership of the economic activity in and around the Indian Ocean would help China move from being an East Asian power to a trans-Oceanic power in the Indo-Pacific. In its counter-containment strategy, China will be able to create an alternative economic region west of China under Chinese leadership to counter the American economic dominance in the Pacific.32 The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was the economic component of the ‘rebalancing’ strategy of the US, along with the military ‘pivot’, while the whole BRI is China’s ‘marching west’, creating an economic zone bringing the continental and maritime space as a single entity. To be sure, the MSR is an economic statecraft strategy to enhance China’s strategic presence in the IOR.33 The MSR assets are not just commercial ones but strategic ones set up in critical locations for strategic objectives when the situation warrants. The ports and allied infrastructure being developed in the critical
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locations are strategic ‘real estates’ built on a long-term basis, which could accrue geostrategic benefits for China.34 As per the Royal United Services Institute study, it is difficult to ascertain the economic logic or commercial viability behind the port projects that China has set up along the MSR.35 These new MSR ports will have to compete with either the existing ports or with other MSR ports to make each port commercially viable; for instance, the Melaka Gateway project in the Malacca Strait will have to compete with other Malaysian MSR ports such as Kuantan as well as Singapore, which is currently the world’s busiest trans-shipment hub. Similarly, the MSR ports are not emerging as big trans-shipment hubs, like Hambantota in Sri Lanka. However, the Melaka Gateway will become crucial as and when the Kra Canal project in Thailand becomes operational as that would create a new shipping lane between the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Similarly, the MSR assets are mostly in the developing countries that were being marginalised during the US-led globalisation era but now stand to benefit from the Chinese investment, so the objective can be ascertained as strengthening the political relationship between China and the recipient countries. With large economic influence, China can manipulate the foreign policies of these countries at various multilateral fora, including at the United Nations. China has a history of mastering economic statecraft for strategic gains: Beijing has used this tactic three times earlier. It has undertaken punitive usage of economic statecraft against Japan, the Philippines and Australia. In 2010, when the Japanese Coast Guard took custody of the captain of a fishing boat for territorial violation near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China suspended the export of rare earth oxides, salts and metals to Japan, which forced the Shinzo Abe government to release the captain forthwith.36 Rare earth metals are key natural resources for the Japanese high-tech industries, and denying access to such material would hamper the export potential of the Japanese industry. China used its market dominance for the Philippines’ agricultural products during the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012 against Manila.37 Chinese customs officials delayed the inspection of fruit coming into China from the Philippines at Manila airport, causing the fruit to perish, and the loss of millions of dollars for the Philippines’ agro-business.38
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Additionally, China cut the number of tourists visiting the country as a punitive measure against Manila for standing up against Chinese demands in the Shoal incident. China used economic statecraft tactics against Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic to its advantage. Australia supported the US in its anti-China campaign against Beijing’s mishandling of the pandemic. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison had called for an independent enquiry into the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic from its source in Wuhan, China. In a bid to prevent other countries following Australia, China imposed a series of trade restrictions on Canberra, which included on Australian iron ore, beef, lobster, timber and lamb, and warned of stopping of Australian coal exports to China.39 In May 2020, Beijing slapped an 80 percent ‘anti-dumping’ tariff on Australian barley, a move that was expected to cost Australia 500 million Australian dollars (USD 350 million) a year.40 Despite their deep economic engagement, China turned against Canberra when a strategic choice had to be made; China is Australia’s largest trading partner—more than 60 per cent of China’s iron ore imports come from Australia; China is dependent on Australian milk and cheese, wine and meat, while Chinese tourists and students are a major source of income for Australia. This shows that China could also use its strategic ‘real estate’ assets along the MSR for its strategic advantage, no matter how dearly it affects the poor nation.
MSR Investments in the Indian Ocean Region
The MSR is indeed China’s grand strategy, part of its ambitious maritime great power vision. Grand strategy means “a combination of politicaldiplomatic, economic, and military means that a state embraces to ensure its vital interests and pursue its goals—at minimum, its survival—in a potentially dangerous world.”41 It contains the nation’s broad strategic objectives, action plans, policy guidelines and priority areas.42 It is consistent with the political decision-makers’ policy preferences and choices on a rational framework, made over an extended period. It is generally an authoritative statement by the highest authority of the state, and
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 161
governmental agencies would be identified to implement it. Accordingly, the MSR was an articulated statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, and four agencies have been identified to supervise it, which include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce.43 As stated above, the MSR is the maritime component of the BRI, which complements China’s vision of emerging as a maritime great power by the middle of the 21st century. Former President Hu Jintao first enunciated the maritime great power concept; he had declared China’s ambition to become a “strong maritime power” at the 18th National Congress of the CPC in November 2012.44 This was further articulated by President Xi Jinping as “maritime true power” in 2013, with four thrust areas: “firstly, establishing new high-profile organisations dealing with maritime policy and strategy; secondly, upgrading naval capabilities to counter the US pivot to Asia and back up its civil maritime law enforcement; thirdly, reframing E/SCS [East and South China Seas] issues away from prevailing international law and toward China’s rights as derived from historical precedence; and, fourthly, demonstrating China’s ostensible goodwill through participation in international forums and multilateral exercises in the region.”45 The Chinese maritime great power ambition was repeated in China’s Defence White Paper in 2013, and again in 2015.46 Consistent with China’s extended maritime activity, the PLAN adopted the “open seas protection” strategy in 2015,47 a shift from the near seas to “active defense”, with the aim of safeguarding the assets that China would set up along the MSR. China’s vision of becoming a maritime great power is not just about being an East Asian maritime power, restoring the Middle Kingdom of the 14th century, and regaining the maritime territories lost during the colonial subjugation, but, rather, to have a global footprint stretching between China, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic. While announcing the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept, President Xi proposed the modalities of how this extended great power status could
162 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
be achieved, i.e. through the construction of a “series of ports, logistical stations, storage facilities and free-trade zones with local partners”.48 The local partners—laggards during the past half-century of global growth—are expected to ‘catch up’ with other booming states by the so-called ‘gracious’ Chinese investments. This will, in turn, make them reliable partners of China for protecting Chinese interests across the regions, as opposed to the US military alliance system established across East Asia. China has made it through the build-operate-and-transfer method on a fixed lease period. For instance, the lease period of Hambantota (Sri Lanka) is for 99 years, Gwadar (Pakistan) for 40 years and Obock (Djibouti) for 10 years; however, all are extendable. Chinese investments are not restricted to ports but have focussed on building connectivity between ports and the interior through roads, railways, power grids, and other communication systems. As Nadège Rolland, the Washington-based senior fellow for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, notes, “Economic clout is diplomacy by other means,” and, “It’s not for today. It’s for mid-21st century China.”49 In the Indian Ocean, many of the Chinese investments are a continuation of the previous one—the ‘string of pearls.’ However, the ‘string of pearls’ comprised ‘dual-use’ assets—commercial ports, that could also be used by the PLAN. The MSR projects are comprehensive in nature, helping the country to overcome its infrastructure bottlenecks. China has identified Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar in the northern Indian Ocean; Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique in the western Indian Ocean; the Seychelles and Madagascar in the central-south Indian Ocean; and the island states of Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the middle of the ocean. Of the committed $150 billion investments in the Indian Ocean littoral states, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka attract the maximum.50 Major projects being undertaken by China in these countries are the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ($62 billion) and Gwadar-port-cum-allied infrastructure in Pakistan (Table 6.1); in Sri Lanka, in the form of Hambantota port and $6.8 billion worth of infrastructure projects (Table 6.2); for Bangladesh, $1.03 billion
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 163
worth of investment by 2018, and another $7 billion committed for 27 infrastructure projects (Table 6.3); in Myanmar, $9 billion for the ChinaMyanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and $1.3 billion for Kyaukphyu port (Table 6.4). In most cases, Chinese companies are undertaking these projects with concessionary loans of 80-100 per cent from the consortium of Chinese state-owned banks. Table 6.1: Major Approved BRI Investments in Pakistan Nature of the Investment
Gwadar Port Project
Amount Worth
US$ 1.62 billion
Undertaker
New Gwadar International Airport
US$ 246 million in the form of Chinese grant
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Eastbay Expressway Project
US$ 92 million as 0% loan China Communication Construction Company
Physical Projects in Gwadar city
US$ 786 million
To Be Decided (TBD)
Karakoram Highway Project
US$ 1.3 billion in the form of concessionary loans- Phase I US$ 930 million- phase II
Pakistan National Highway Authority
Sukkur-Multan Motorway
US$ 2.89 billion
China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC)
Pakistan Railway Mainline 1 Karachi-Peshawar
US$ 7 billion
Pakistan Railways
Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG Terminal & Pipeline Project
US$ 2.3 billion in Chinese China Petroleum Pipeline loan Bureau
Karot Hydro-Power Station
US$ 1.42 billion
Lahore-Matiari Current Transmission line
US$ 1.5 billion
Compiled by the author from various sources.
China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC)
China Three Gorges South Asia Investments Ltd (CTGSAIL) China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company
164 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region Table 6.2: Major Approved BRI Investments in Sri Lanka Nature of the Investment
Southern Expressway
Amount
US$ 1.54 billion
Undertaker
Outer Circular Highway Project
US$ 494 million
Metallurgy Corporation of China Ltd.
Hambantota International Airport Project
US$ 190 million
CCCC (China Communications Construction Company Ltd.)
Colombo Katunayake Expressway
US$ 248 million
Hambantota Port Development Project
US$ 1.33 billion
CICT Colombo Terminal
US$ 500 million
China Merchant Port Holdings
Colombo Port City
US$ 1.3 billion
CHEC
Norocholai Power Station
Lotus Tower
US$ 1.3 billion
US$ 88 million
SMEC (Australia)
CHEC (China Harbour Engineering Company) CHEC
China Machinery Engineering Corporation
China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) and Aerospace Long-March International Trade Co. Ltd Source: G.Wignaraja, D. Panditaratne, P. Kannangara, and D. Hundlani, Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka (Chatham House, March 24, 2020), https://www.chathamhouse. org/publication/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka. Accessed on May 20, 2021. Table 6.3: Major Approved BRI Investments in Bangladesh Nature of the Investment Amount
Undertaker
1,320 MW Payra Coal Power Plant
US$ 1.6 billion
North-West Power Generation Company Bangladesh Limited (NWPGCL) and China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CMC)
25% Stake in Dhaka Stock Exchange
US$ 119 million
Consortium of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
27 Infrastructure Development Programmes (proposed in 2016)
Approx US$ 50 billion planned US$ 31 billion committed US$ 24 billion (loan programmes)
Various companies
Padma Rail-link Project
US$ 3.14 billion
Compiled by the author from various sources.
Bangladesh Railway
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 165 Table 6.4: Major Approved BRI Investments in Myanmar
Nature of Investment
Amount
Undertaker
Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port
US$ 1.3 billion (initially was US$ 7.3 billion)
CITIC group
Muse-Mandalay Railway Project
US$ 8.9 billion (Lwin, 2019)
China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG) (formerly the China Railway Group Ltd.) and Myanmar Railways
Letpadaung Copper Mine
US$ 1 billion
Wanbao Mining Ltd.
Myitsone Hydropower Dam (frozen since 2011)
New Yangon City Project (proposed in January 2020) Grant by the Chinese to improve living standards of Kachin refugees displaced during the civil war.
US$ 3.6 billion
TBD
Reserved for a CCCC later date by both (China Communications parties Construction Company)
US$ 144 million (Lo, 2019)
Myanmar Government
Compiled by the author from various sources.
During his visit to the Maldives in 2014, Chinese President Xi announced the construction of a 2-km ‘Friendship Bridge’ for US$210 million that was to connect Male’s eastern edge to the western corner of the island of Hulhule, which became operational in August 2019.51 During Xi’s visit, China and Maldives signed nine agreements, which included building a new runway for the airport and construction of a port in the atoll of Laamu.52 The Chinese Construction Group received the contract to expand the Velana International Airport in 2014, displacing India’s GMR, which had earlier held the contract.53 The EXIM Bank of China provided an initial loan of US$373 million for the development of the airport in December 2016.54 Looking for a firm MSR foothold in the Maldives, an undisclosed Chinese company in 2016 received a 50-year lease to construct a port at Feydhoo Finolhu Island for merely $4 million.55 Along with Hambantota, Kyaukphyu and Gwadar, Feydhoo Finolhu is also touted as one of the important port ‘assets’ in the Indian Ocean by China. China has built a series of ports in the eastern littorals of the Indian Ocean, from Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Kra Isthmus in Thailand, and
166 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Melaka Gateway in Malaysia. Earlier, China was keen to get a hold of the Chittagong port under the ‘string of pearls’ strategy, and lately, a deepsea port at Sonadia Island in Bangladesh, but the Dhaka government shelved the MSR project, as it does not want to irritate India by allowing Bangladesh territory to be used for Beijing’s containment strategy. China has now focussed on the western littorals of the Indian Ocean, and Chinese President Xi has made three visits to the Indian Ocean littoral states: Tanzania in 2013, Zimbabwe and South Africa in 2015, and South Africa and Mauritius in 2018. China is Africa’s largest trade partner, while Africa is China’s major source of natural resources and raw materials. With the active participation in the MSR, Africa has become the second largest overseas market for development project contracts from China and the fourth biggest investment market.56 Many commentators have argued that the MSR is part of China’s ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy and that the investments China has made will lead to huge debts for the recipient country as it attaches the provision of sovereign guarantee with its investments. Moreover, in return, China will exert its influence in that country for strategic gains because the country is unable to repay the amount to China. Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, especially the Hambantota port project, is a classic case of China’s ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy because of the lack of returns from the Chinese investments and the economic burden that Sri Lanka has to bear.57 In Hambantota, around 85 per cent ($307 million) of the first phase of the cost was funded by a loan from the EXIM Bank of China, and a further concessional loan of $278 million was later provided to finance a rail track to the port by China. When the debt piled up and the Sri Lankan government was unable to pay back to China, the Chinese state-owned China Merchants Group took over the project on a 99-year lease in exchange for a debt write-off worth $1.1 billion.58 China is also constructing an industrial city in the Colombo port area, bypassing the domestic regulations, for which the new Mahinda Rajapaksa government has extended its full support.59 However, studies about MSR investments in other countries, especially in Africa, suggest that Sri Lanka is a unique case as this model has not been extended to other countries.60 The share of Chinese debt in the overall
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 167
debt of the host countries from Africa is much less compared to their debts to other external borrowers. Similarly, in Africa, China has not engaged in predatory behaviour towards the borrowing countries, using debts to facilitate takeovers of strategic assets and natural resources, or to promote military expansion.61 Although most of the MSR ports may well become an economic liability for China as well as the recipient countries, they also provide political leverage for authoritarian leaders at home.62 On the other hand, China has used the debt trap practice only in Sri Lanka and, to some extent, in the Maldives, for two reasons. First, China aims to isolate India in South Asia by weaning away its smaller regional neighbours from it with such investments. For example, China has convened meetings of the foreign ministers of the South Asian countries for pandemic-induced economic assistance, and, so far, four rounds of meetings have been concluded, in which India, Bhutan and the Maldives have not participated.63 Second, the port projects in the littoral area have been a strategic asset for China because they offer Beijing “a front-row seat to spy on rival navies”, such as the Indian, American and Australian naval operations in the Indian Ocean.64 With the MSR, China is trying to strengthen its relationships with the Indian Ocean littoral countries, such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives in a bid to counter India in the IOR. However, except for Pakistan and Myanmar, the other countries try to balance their relationships between India and China for economic gains.65 Chinese investment activities in East Africa are mainly in the infrastructural sector, spanning oil and gas, railways, ports and the like (Table 6.6). Major countries that have been China’s focus in East Africa in its MSR strategy are Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania.66 Lamu in Kenya and Doraleh in Djibouti are the two hub ports in East Africa in the MSR connectivity. They are multi-purpose ports connected by rail and road with other countries of the region. China also has a naval base at Obock in Djibouti. “Kenya is neither resource rich, nor is it a high trading partner to Beijing, but its location along the East African coast of the Indian Ocean holds its importance in China’s MSR strategy.”67 China has also constructed several small ports in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique.
168 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region Table 6.5: Major Approved BRI Investments in East Africa Nature of the Investment
Amount
Undertaker
Port of Lamu and related infrastructure
US$ 27 billion
Expansion of Port Mombasa
Deal of US$ 193 million
China Communication Construction Co.
Pipeline from Kenya to Sudan
US$ 4 billion
Construction of Bagamoyo Port, Tanzania (currently suspended)
US$ 10 billion
NA
Upgradation of Tanzania and Zambia Railway Line
US$ 1.2 million loan
TBD
Gas Pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es Salam
US$ 1.2 billion
China Petroleum and Technology Development Company
Doraleh Multipurpose Port, and Free Trade Zone
Port -US$ 590 million & Free Trade ZoneUS$ 3.5 billion
China Merchants Port Holdings
US$ 4 billion
China Railway Group and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC)
US$ 24 billion
Various companies
Standard Gauge Railway operation linking Nairobi and Mombasa
Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway Line (759 km)
Lamu Port-South Sudan Ethiopia-Transport (Lapsset) Project
China Road and Bridge US$ 3 billion loan for phase 1 Corporation (CRBC) US$ 1.5 billion for phase 2
China Communication Construction Co. TBD (To Be Decided)
Compiled by the author from various sources.
Since Africa had been left out in the previous globalisation era, China claims that it has brought the African continent into the new globalisation, as the main driver of East African regional economic development.68 Through the Lamu and Doraleh ports, exports from other countries which include oil and gas, and industrial products from the Chinese investment zones will travel to China and other world markets. In Kenya, China is upgrading the Mombasa port, building a new ultra-modern port in Lamu, building a new standard gauge railway line linking Mombasa port, the capital Nairobi
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 169
and the landlocked neighbouring countries. The railway and pipeline are envisaged to export oil and gas from neighbouring countries, such as South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi.The 2,700-km railway line is expected to cost US$ 25 billion, the pipeline from Kenya to South Sudan is at US$ 4 billion, while Lamu port and the associated infrastructure investment will be at US$ 27 billion when completed.69 Such large investments will help a major surge in the economies of these countries. Uganda and South Sudan can export their oil and gas without major hindrance, as they are landlocked states. Besides, China is planning to establish an east-west corridor by revitalising the old Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TanZam or TaZaRa), built with the help of the Chinese in the 1970s and still perceived as a symbol of Sino-African friendship. It will be connected with Lobito port of Angola on the west coast through the existing Angola-Congo railway line.70 Similarly, the multi-purpose Doraleh port, completed in 2017 at the cost of $590 million, is a major trans-shipment port as well as a hub of the MSR ports in the Indian Ocean. China is constructing a Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ) in 4,800 hectares for $3.5 billion, adjacent to the port, and it is planned to link the port by road and rail to inland logistics centres close to Chinese industrial parks in highland Ethiopia.71 Once completed, the DIFTZ will be the largest free trade zone in the continent, and an integral part of the MSR in terms of the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean and up to the Mediterranean Sea.72 This is one of the busiest trade routes in the world, with major countries having their military facilities in and around the region. China’s first overseas naval base was also set up in Djibouti in 2015. China claims that the Obock naval base, which became operational in 2017, is not a real military base, but a “logistical support facility” for the PLAN, “mainly used to provide rest and rehabilitation for the Chinese troops taking part in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters of Somalia, UN peace-keeping and humanitarian rescue.”73 Notwithstanding the Chinese claims, however, the base hosts around 2,000 military personnel, not only of the navy but also the army, and particularly the special forces, and plays a key role in the “securitization” of the MSR in “the far seas”.74 Satellite imagery shows that the Djibouti naval base is a large military fortress where China
170 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
has stationed “armoured vehicles such as ZBD-09 infantry fighting vehicles and ZTL-11 assault gun vehicles, armed with an array of automatic cannons, anti-tank missiles, and large caliber guns.”75 Fig 6.2: China’s MSR Ports in the Indo-Pacific
Source: Marine Corp University, “The Maritime Silk Road”, December 6, 2022, https:// maerospace.com/the-maritime-silk-road/. Accessed on May 23, 2021.
Earlier, reports and speculation were rife that China was planning to establish its overseas naval base in the Seychelles or Gwadar, Pakistan, or on the eastern coast of Africa (Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Lamu or Mombasa in Kenya.76 There were also unconfirmed reports of China being involved in negotiations with the Namibian government for using Namibia’s port for refuelling and material supply, warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and naval ashore rest, and replenishment and weapon maintenance.77 Two reasons have contributed to the selection of Djibouti as the final destination: one, China preferred to set up its base away from Western eyes and military bases—the US facilities of Diego Garcia and Manama would pose a serious challenge to the privacy of PLA activities in the Indian Ocean; two, Djibouti hosts the militaries of the USA, Japan, Germany, France and
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 171
Italy, while Saudi Arabia is building a base there, and Turkey is considering building one. In this respect, China can avoid accusations of “imperialism” and “hegemonism”, the framework that China has been consistently using against the US in Asia.78 The facility in Djibouti is a strategic boost for China as it provides protection for the SLOCs, helps in anti-piracy operations, enhances China’s role in international peace-keeping and can help monitor the movement of other navies.
China’s BRI Air Assets in the IOR
Along with dual-use ports and naval logistic facilities in the Indian Ocean littoral areas, China has built commercial (dual-use) airfields close to the ports as part of its BRI strategy. Indeed, the BRI investments are strategic enablers for the PLA in support of specific overseas missions in the IOR. Even though the BRI assets in the IOR are to facilitate naval operations, the air assets are force multipliers for the PLA’s strategic dominance in the region. Due to the sheer size of the Indian Ocean, it is essential to have a network of local airfields for the staging of, and support for, the PLAAF to conduct sorties over the water body. Since China doesn’t have a military base in the IOR nor has expeditionary operational experience, the PLAAF has to rely on the air infrastructure such as airfields, communication facilities, and commercial satellites for situational awareness that will be provided by the host country during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. When China starts permanently deploying an aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean, it can use MSR ports for anchoring purposes. With the permission of the host country, ports and airfields could be used for joint operations by the PLA for a hard power demonstration during a crisis. Also, China has resorted to military diplomacy with the regional countries which includes ramping up arms sales, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and educational and training programmes. China’s historical military cooperation with Pakistan will help it make its air power presence felt in the northwestern Indian Ocean. Besides, in recent times, China has been strengthening its defence cooperation with the African countries, where Russia had been a major arms supplier but could not continue its hold due to the Ukraine crisis.
172 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Major BRI infrastructure that could facilitate the PLAAF are port cum-airport investments at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan, and the limited operational facilities at Djibouti. Besides, China has built or committed to build nine commercial airports across Africa, apart from taking over of Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport due to the country defaulting on its loan repayments.79 With the Chinese financial assistance of $290 million in two tranches—$190 and $100—for the first and second phases from the Exim Bank of China, Sri Lanka built the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA), with a 3,500-m-long run way near the Hambantota port. Due to lack commercial activity, the airport faced trouble and the Sri Lankan government chose to form a joint venture with India’s Airport Authority of India (AAI) to operate the airport with a majority 70: 30 share in favour of AAI , only to cancel the proposal after two years of protracted negotiations. 80 Since China controls the Hambantota port and PLAN ships anchor at the berths for replenishment and repair, an airport near the anchoring facility would help the PLA in joint operations, especially as it has planned to acquire 5-6 aircraft carriers with one permanently in the Indian Ocean. The multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) facilitates a series of ports and two airports, an international airport in Gwadar, 26 km northeast of the existing airport in Gwadar city on the southwestern Arabian Sea coast of Balochistan region. The New Gwadar International Airport (NGIA) which was fully funded by the Chinese government with a $230 million of investment, has a runway of 3,658 m, to be able to operate the ATR 72, Airbus (A-300), Boeing (B-737), and Boeing (B-747) for domestic as well international routes.81 Launched in 2019, the airport was ready for inauguration in the last quarter of 2023. Touted as a beacon of infrastructure development and economic growth, it stands as a monumental leap forward in Pakistan’s aviation infrastructure sector, as it is the second largest airport in Pakistan, but the economic viability remains unaddressed. Currently, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) operates just the Karachi-Gwadar route through the airport, utilising a 72-seat ATR aircraft thrice a week, with an average load capacity of 74 per cent. 82 In 2022, the Gwadar International Airport handled a mere 16,343 passengers,
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 173
a far cry from the peak figure of 33,960 passengers recorded in 2018.83 It is going to be another dead asset like the Hambantota port, however, given the Pak-China nexus, it is a long-term infrastructure investment for the PLA operations in the Indian Ocean, especially for the PLAAF. The BRI assets in Africa that could be used for the PLAAF’s MOOTW as well as during a security crisis are various commercial airports that have been built with Chinese financial assistance. China has been focussing on airport and allied infrastructure investments in Africa worth between US$ 27 and 38 billion in countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zambia.84 China has reportedly spent one-third of all airport investment of $38 billion in Africa,85 Major airport investments are: • Luanda (Angola) - $3.8 billion • Maputo - $615 million • Zambia airport projects - $360 million • Addis Ababa international airport - $345 million • Mauritius - $260 million • Sierra Leone - $190 million • Mauritania - $136 million86 This excludes Chinese bank loans for a new airport in Ethiopia for US$ 3 billion, in Sudan for US$ 1.4 billion, and many other investments too small to be counted. The PLAAF has used the African territory only once in its history, for evacuation from Libya in 2011, China did not use the PLAAF assets even for United Nations-led humanitarian relief operations anywhere in the world due to lack of oversees operational experiences, and crew fatigue experienced during the Libyan operations. However, this may change in the future as the PLAAF is getting international exposure though air exercises with foreign countries in overseas territories which include the annual Shaheen Excercise with the Pakistan Air Force (alternatively in China and Pakistan), one in Turkey, and also with Thailand. The international experience the PLAAF could accrue from these experiences would come in handy to use the African assets during times of both peace and war.
174 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Conclusion
With the outflow of Chinese capital across the continents that helped to establish China as an engine of regional development, it will be able to win diplomatic allies and make strategic inroads into the developing world. The MSR is a new kind of alliance towards partnerships that are built to enhance Chinese power and prestige in political, economic and diplomatic terms. The direct connectivity through Pakistan and Myanmar into the Indian Ocean, one from the north of China and the other from southern China, will help Beijing reduce its dependence on the narrow Malacca Strait, where rival navies could choke Chinese supply lines in times of crisis. With various strategic assets that China has set up in the islands and littoral states, China is going to be vital in the economic activity as well as the security dynamics of the IOR. In fact, Chinese maritime power will be a combination of wider economic presence, strong political connections with the littoral countries, and enhanced military capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, China is wary of being criticised for Xi’s ‘striving for achievement’ strategy—a major shift from Deng’s ‘keeping a low profile’— in a more assertive manner, which China has already demonstrated in the South China Sea. Permanent military assets in the IOR would resuscitate the motives of Chinese military expansionism, supported by the PLAN’s ‘far seas protection’ strategy, into the region. However, without adequate logistical support facilities, the Chinese Navy would face significant challenges in the IOR. Hence, it seeks reliable access to facilities in key points around the region to sustain its military operations in the IOR. It would be difficult for Chinese naval ships to come back to the Chinese facilities in East Asia for fuel and resupply. At the same time, as a growing power, it cannot depend on other countries for safeguarding its vital interests such as energy security, protection of MSR assets and monitoring of the ‘counter-actions’ by rival powers. To this end, China has leased ports in strategic locations in the Indian Ocean, including Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Feydhoo Finolhu in the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan and Obock in Djibouti, as well as Melaka Gateway in Malaysia. This is contrary to the US-style permanent facilities in the
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 175
western Pacific. Zack Cooper of the Washington-based Centre for Security and International Studies (CSIS) posits, “China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad.” 87 These assets would help China “to refuel or resupply naval vessels and in terms of anti-piracy operations and familiarization with other regional militaries in peace-time, while it will provide many opportunities in terms of protecting trade routes, bases, and ships during war-time.”88 China’s interests in the Indian Ocean are not just to protect its trade routes and energy supplies but to become a major source of economic activity, consistent with its maritime great power status. Its billions of dollars investments in the littoral countries will increase their exports, and Chinese shipping companies are going to carry such products through the Indian Ocean to the outside world. This means that China will be the financier, producer, carrier of goods and a major market for these countries. This will help China to take ownership of the economic activity in and around the Indian Ocean in keeping with its strategy of emerging as a ‘true maritime power’ in the Indo-Pacific.To protect its assets in the IOR, China may have its own maritime ‘pivot’ strategy—dividing its naval assets between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, like the US’ aborted ‘rebalancing’ strategy that aimed to divide its naval assets between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with a 60:40 ratio. China might permanently keep one aircraft carrier and six to eight surface ships, with occasional deployments of submarines in the Indian Ocean. It could also use the dual-use airports for air operations in the Indian Ocean. The China-Pakistan nexus would help the PLAAF to exert its dominance in the western Indian Ocean area, and if it has free access to airfields in East Africa, then Beijing will have greater sway on air power matters in the western Indian Ocean. This will help it enhance its counter attack capability and could dwarf India’s ‘net security provider’ status in the IOR. With the land connectivity through Pakistan and Myanmar, and enhanced naval capability in the Indian Ocean waters, China will be able to encircle India in South Asia. To counter the Chinese hegemony in the Indian Ocean, India needs to strengthen its own naval capability and build strong friendships with the littoral countries.
176 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Notes 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
Amit Bhandari, “China in Bangladesh: Remaking the Financial Rules,” Gateway House, February 27, 2018, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/china-bangladesh remaking-financial-rules/. Accessed on May 10, 2021. Andrew Chatzky and James Mcbride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed on May 30, 2021. Refinitiv, “BRI Connect: An Initiative in Numbers” (3rd ed.), February 2020, https:// agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/belt-and-road-initiative-in-numbers issue-3.pdf. Accessed on January 12, 2021. Ibid. Romi Jain, “Pitfalls or Windfalls in China’s Belt and Road Economic Outreach?” Asian Survey, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2020, pp. 685-709. Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 123, 2020, pp. 319-35. Refinitiv, “BRI Connect: An Initiative in Numbers (4th ed.): The Impact of Pandemics on Infrastructure Projects,” https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/ marketing/en_us/documents/gated/reports/belt-and-road-issue-4-impact-of pandemtic-on-infrastructure-projects.pdf. Accessed on May 20, 2021. National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, “Vision and Action to Promote the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” March 28, 2015, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ newsrelease_8232/201503/t20150330_1193900.html. Accessed on May 18, 2021. Avery Goldstein, “China’s Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2020, pp. 164-201. Tian Wenlin, “The ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: A Chinese Concept for Global Development,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, pp. 1-20. Christian Dargnat, “China’s Shifting Geoeconomic Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2016, pp. 63-76. Zhang Yingli, “China’s National Security Strategy,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-12. Jiang Yong, “Theoretical Thinking on the Belt and Road Initiative,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2018, pp. 26-39. Wenlin, n. 10, p. 4. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid. Laura-Anca Parepa, “The Belt and Road Initiative as Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, p. 6. DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1848370 Yingli, n. 12.
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 177
20. Dargnat, n. 11, p. 71. 21. Michael Clarke, “Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’?” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 123, 2020, pp. 336-53. 22. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/Americas-pacific-century/. Accessed on May 30, 2021. 23. Clarke, n. 21. 24. Ashley Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 2017, https:// carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/25/protecting-american-primacy-in-indo-pacific pub-68754. Accessed on May 25, 2021. 25. Congressional Research Service Report, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” March 9, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on March 15, 2021. 26. “Chinese Navy set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a more Advanced Ship are Put on Hold”, The South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019, https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3039653/chinese-navy-set-build fourth-aircraft-carrier-plans-more. Accessed on February 8, 2021. 27. Alan Burns, “The Role of the PLA Navy in China’s Goal of Becoming a Maritime Power,” in Michael McDevitt, ed., Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream (Centre for Naval Analysis, June 2016), p. 28, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/ pdf/irm-2016-u-013646.pdf. Accessed on May 30, 2021. 28. China’s Military Strategy, 2015, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2016-07/13/ content_4768294.htm. Accessed on February 10, 2021. 29. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 125, 2020, pp. 731-47. 30. Veerle Nouwens, “China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Implications for the UK,” RUSI Occasional Paper, February 2019. Royal United Services Institute, London, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190214_nouwens_maritime_silk_ road_web.pdf. Accessed on May 10, 2021. 31. Hong Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 26, No. 105, 2017, pp. 353-68. 32. Clinton, n. 22. 33. Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Security Implications and Ways Forward for the European Union,” October 2019, SIPRI, Solna, Sweden, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the-21st century-maritime-silk-road.pdf. Accessed on May 8, 2021. 34. Ibid., p. 4.
178 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 35. Ibid. 36. Edmund J. Burke, Timothy R. Heath, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Logan Ma, Lyle J. Morris, and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Military Activities in the East China Sea Implications for Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force,” (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/ RR2574/RAND_RR2574.pdf. Accessed on June 18, 2021. 37. Chien-peng Chung and Thomas J. Voon, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Political-Economic Calculations of Southeast Asian States”, Asian Survey, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2017, pp. 416-49. 38. “The China-Philippine Banana War,” Asia Sentinel, June 7, 2012, https:// www.asiasentinel.com/p/the-china-philippine-banana-war. Accessed on June 8, 2021. 39. “Australia Called for a COVID-19 Probe: China Responded with a Trade War,” ABC News, January 3, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-03/heres-what happened-between-china-and-australia-in-2020/13019242. Accessed on June 16, 2021. 40. Minxin Pei, “China’s Economic Bullying will Never Work,” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-economic-bullying-will-never work. Accessed on June 16, 2021. 41. Goldstein, n. 9, p. 166. 42. Christian Ploberger, “One Belt, One Road—China’s New Grand Strategy”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-17. 43. Nouwens, n. 30. 44. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” November 27, 2012, http:// www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm. Accessed on January 27, 2021. 45. Sukjoon Yoon, “Xi Jinping’s ‘True Maritime Power’ and ESCS Issues,” Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2014, pp. 887-89. 46. n. 28. 47. Ibid. 48. David Brewster, “Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is there Really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, pp. 133-49. 49. “China’s Empire of Money is Reshaping Global Trade”, Bloomberg News, August 2, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-01/china-s-empire-of money-is-reshaping-lives-across-new-silk-road. Accessed on May 29, 2021. 50. Amit Bhandari and Chandini Jindal, “Chinese Investments in India’s Neighbourhood,” Gateway House, March 12, 2018, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/ chinese-investments-in-indias-neighbourhood/. Accessed on June 8, 2021. 51. “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge Refreshes Maldivian Life,” Global Times, September 4, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1163627.shtml. Accessed on June 6, 2021.
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 179 52. Anurag Viswanath, “Reviving the Silk Route via One Belt, One Road,” Financial Express, February 29, 2016, https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/reviving-the silk-route-via-one-belt-one-road/217271/. Accessed on June 8, 2021. 53. “Chinese Investment in the Maldives: Appraising the String of Pearls,” CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, September 4, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/chinese investment-in-the-maldives-appraising-the-string-of-pearls/. Accessed on June 10, 2021. 54. Fathmath Shaahunaaz, “Maldives Pledges Full Support for China’s New Silk Road,” November 22, 2016, https://edition.mv/mihaaru/1593. Accessed on June 8, 2021. 55. n. 53. 56. Muhammad Sabil Farooq, Yuan Tongkai, Zhu Jiangang, and Nazia Feroze. “Kenya and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Implications for China-Africa Relations,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2018, pp. 401-18. 57. Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Creditor Imperialism,” Project Syndicate, December 20, 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12?barrier=accesspaylog. Accessed on May 12, 2021. 58. Darren J. Lim and Rohan Mukherjee, “What Money Can’t Buy: The Security Externalities of Chinese Economic Statecraft in Post-War Sri Lanka,” Asian Security, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 73-92. 59. “Sri Lanka Opposition, Civil Society Mount Legal Challenge to ChineseBacked Port City Bill,” The Hindu, April 15, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/ news/international/challenges-to-china-backed-colombo-port-project-land-in-sc/ article34329231.ece. Accessed on May 20, 2021. 60. Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ Is a Myth,” The Atlantic, February 6, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/. Accessed on March 8, 202; Ajit Singh, “The Myth of ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’ and Realities of Chinese Development Finance,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2021, pp. 239-53; Pádraig Carmody, “Dependence not Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” Area Development and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2020, pp. 23-31. 61. Ajit Singh, “The Myth of ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’ and Realities of Chinese Development Finance,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2021, pp. 239-53. 62. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Southeast Asia”, LSE IDEAS, London, October 2018, https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/ LSE-IDEAS-China-SEA-BRI.pdf. Accessed on June 18, 2021. 63. “Bangladesh to Join China-led Initiative on COVID-19 Cooperation Among South Asian Nations,” The Indian Express, April 26, 2021. 64. Jane Perlez, “US Casts Wary Eye on Australian Port Leased by Chinese,” New York Times, March 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/21/world/australia/ china-darwin-port-landbridge.html. Accessed on March 5, 2021.
180 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 65. Darren J Lim and Rohan Mukherjee, “Hedging in South Asia: Balancing Economic and Security Interests Amid Sino-Indian Competition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2019, pp. 493-522. 66. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Colin Flint, “The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” Geopolitics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2017, pp. 223-45. 67. Muhammad Sabil Farooq, Nazia Feroze and Yuan Tong Kai, “An Analysis of China and Africa Relations with Special Focus on ‘One Belt and One Road’,” India Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2019, pp. 366-79. 68. Diego Pautasso, “The Role of Africa in the New Maritime Silk Road,” Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2016, pp. 118-30. 69. Farooq, et. al., n. 67. 70. Julia Breuer, “Two Belts, One Road? The Role of Africa in China’s Belt & Road Initiative,” Blickwechsel, July 2017, https://www.eu-china.net/uploads/tx_news/ Blickwechsel_OBOR-Afrika_Maerz2018.pdf. Accessed on June 8, 2021. 71. David Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 122, 2020, pp. 191-206. 72. Ibid. 73. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 125, 2020, pp. 731-47. 74. Ibid. 75. H I Sutton, “The Chinese Navy’s Unusually Heavily Defended Fortress Near The Indian Ocean,” Forbes, May 15, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ hisutton/2020/05/15/chinas-new-fortress-near-the-middle-east-and-indian ocean/?sh=1e290dbf4066. Accessed on May 23, 2021. 76. Cabestan, n. 73. 77. Nouwens, n. 30, p. 28. 78. Ghiasy, et. al., n. 33. 79. Nick Cummins, “China’s Influence In African Aviation”, Eways Aviation, March 5, 2021, https://www.eways-aviation.com/blog/chinas-influence-in-african-aviation. Accessed on June 14, 2022. 80. “Sri Lanka suspends joint venture at ‘the world’s emptiest airport’”, CAPA Centre for Aviation, July 24, 2020, https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/sri lanka-suspends-joint-venture-at-the-worlds-emptiest-airport-531746 81. Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, “New Gwadar International Airport, Government of Pakistan, https://cpec.gov.pk/project details/33 82. Ibtasaam Sajid, “How New Gwadar International Airport Will Transform Pakistan’s Aviation Landscape?”, September 17, 2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hownew-gwadar-international-airport-transform-pakistans-sajid/ 83. Ibid. 84. Cummins, n. 79.
China’s MSR Asset Accumulations in the IOR • 181 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Zack Cooper, “Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean,” CSIS Briefs, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/security implications-chinas-military-presence-indian-ocean. Accessed on January 8, 2021. 88. Ibid.
7.
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping
Under President Xi Jinping, China is gradually emerging as a ‘Maritime Great Power’ (MGP)1 in the 21st century. It is building a two-ocean navy—a Pacific Ocean fleet and an Indian Ocean fleet. Since China is an East Asian power and the proximate threats that it could face are in the East Asian theatre, the Pacific fleet acquires primary importance in China’s naval strategy. Even though the Indian Ocean is the secondary preference for China, the ocean is becoming a lynchpin for China’s new global naval reach. China’s 2015 Defence White Paper declares ‘open seas protection’ as a new naval strategy of the PLAN, which primarily deals with the IOR. With massive investments under the BRI across the IOR, China’s Indian Ocean strategy can be seen as its effort to protect its economic interests, and also project its power across maritime Asia. China has recently been deploying its submarines, along with platform ships, through the Indian Ocean; however, the aircraft carrier is going to be the mainstay of China’s Indian Ocean fleet. Indeed, without projecting Chinese naval power across the Indian Ocean, Xi Jinping’s ‘maritime great power’ status would remain a dream only. China’s Indian Ocean strategy is fundamentally different from its near seas (East and South China Seas) strategy because it doesn’t face any direct threat from the Indian Ocean. The Southeast Asian archipelago divides the
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 183
two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian, and works as a protective barrier as well as a vulnerability for China. Unlike the near seas, the Indian Ocean belongs to the far seas area and the distance allows adequate time for China to prepare against a threat from here. Its major concerns are, firstly, the Southeast Asian archipelago restricts direct access to the Indian Ocean. Though China has tried to get overland connectivity to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Myanmar, that would not help it to overcome vulnerabilities such as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. As a result, getting access rights to ports in the littoral countries has been the only option for China, so it seeks to build friendly relationships with them. Secondly, the rise of India as a predominant naval power in the IOR is considered as a major threat to Chinese interests in the IOR. As Mearsheimer argues, China, as a state rising to great power status in East Asia, will ensure that no state in Asia can threaten it2, so it considers India as a potential rival in its great power ambition. The threat is accentuated by India’s advantages over China in a conflict over a land border dispute that India could extend into the Indian Ocean where it has a geographic advantage over China; and that India could disrupt the Chinese SLOCs passing through the Indian Ocean. Thirdly, the US Navy might take advantage of China’s vulnerability in the Indian Ocean to exert leverage in conflicts within the Pacific. The US could do it alone or in concert with India to disrupt China’s dependence on the sea route for its economic survival. So China’s strategy towards the Indian Ocean is a combination of its threat perception and expansionism, i.e., making strategies to overcome the threat by neutralising India’s dominant position in the IOR and balancing the US’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis China in the Indian Ocean, and to project its power beyond the East Asian theatre. Today, the Indian Ocean has become the critical artery of China’s energy lifelines, as more than 80 per cent of oil and gas passes through the Indian Ocean to China from the Middle East and Africa. China is also dependent on the East-West trade route connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean through the Indian Ocean, one of the busiest trade routes in the world which carries Chinese industrial products to Europe. Any threat to this critical trade link, either by the dominance of rival powers or instability and lawlessness in the region would critically affect the economic growth
184 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
of China which would impact the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy to administer the state. To secure its energy and trade interests, China had earlier adopted a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, or, as some scholars called it, ‘places not bases’ strategy.3 This was to ensure Chinese presence in the region and to convey the message that China keeps an eye on the developments in the Indian Ocean. China’s concern was about the US naval bases in the Indian Ocean and that India’s naval prowess could hurt its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. China’s strategy has been to maintain the Indian Ocean region as free as possible, however, its major concern is an Indian dominance, in association with a superpower, of the Indian Ocean waters. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, Beijing has been trying to expand its naval presence into the Indian Ocean and seeks to emerge as a formidable naval power there. According to the US Congressional Research Service report of March 2021, with more than 25 years of naval modernisation, the Chinese Navy has been transformed into a much more modern and capable force, a formidable military force, within China’s near seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more distant waters, including the broader waters of the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters around Europe. 4 Besides, China has become the largest navy in the world in terms of the number of battleships, with 360 by the end of 2020, compared with 297 of the US Navy, and is projected to have 400 battleships by 2025, and 425 by 2030, while the US will still have less than 300 ships during this period.5 The U.S. Department of Defence’s 2020 annual report suggests that the PLA’s objective is to become a ‘world-class’ military by 2049—a goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017.6
Xi Jinping and China’s Naval Strategy
Although the MGP is associated with the Xi administration, it was first enunciated by Hu Jintao in his work report at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 in which he declared China’s ambition to become a “strong maritime power”.7 It was indeed a response to the demand by many military leaders and strategic analysts who had argued for long for an active foreign policy commensurate with
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 185
China’s economic strength as well as improved military capability.8 This was heightened after 2008 when China successfully conducted the Beijing Olympics, and also became the second largest economy in the world in 2010 in terms of GDP, surpassing Japan and behind only the US.9 However, Hu was reluctant to endorse such demands as he feared that it would have a destabilising impact on China’s “peaceful development”.10 Throughout the 2000s, the PLA Navy sought to expand its wings far into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, including island-building proposals, but failed to get approval from the top on the grounds that the time had not yet come.11 However, that moment came in 2013, when the PLAN, making a new pitch after a leadership transition, was given the green light by the new President Xi.12 When Xi Jinping came to office in 2013, he modified Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “keeping a low profile” foreign policy with the aim of “striving for achievement” at the Central Conference on Periphery Diplomacy held in the same year.13 Further, he undertook reforms in the organisation of the PLA and urged it to “sharpen its combat readiness to fight and win the next war”, and focussed on converting China into a maritime great power.14 The 2012 Chinese Defence White Paper emphasised the importance of the maritime domain in Chinese strategic thinking and pointed out that the most likely scenario of conflict would occur at sea.15 As such, the maritime domain became the new strategic theatre, which was indicated by Xi in his address to the study session of the Political Bureau of the CPP’s Central Committee in July 2013, “We need to do more to take interest in the sea, understand the sea, and strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power”.16 Xi’s MGP strategy is more assertive and comprehensive, with the intention of converting China into an ‘unparalleled’ great power by 2050. For him, the true maritime power concept “is being used to embolden China’s economic philosophy and, in conjunction with other national-security goals, to project a vision of future national greatness”.17 During his speech to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi outlined the requirements for the PLA to become a mechanised force by 2020, a fully modernised force by 2035, and a world-class force by 2050.18 He pointed out that “building
186 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
maritime power was an integral part of China’s socialist undertaking because the importance of the sea had become more apparent with respect to developing the national economy, improving ecosystems, and competing for international politics”.19 In his ‘China Dream’ of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Xi emphasised making China a moderately prosperous nation and a true maritime power with a strong navy when it celebrates the centenary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021, and a fully developed nation (an unparalleled great power) by about 2050, around the time of Communist China’s 100th anniversary (2049).20 China’s expansionist naval strategy has involved both offensive and defensive actions in the far seas. Its offensive nature was explained in the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, that future guidance to China’s Navy will “elevate offense from the campaign and tactical levels to the strategic level.”21 It further says that China “cannot wait for the enemy to attack,” but rather should engage in “strategic attack activities.”22 Indeed, the ‘open seas protection’ strategy is the last stage of the PLAN’s gradual expansion from a coastal navy into a blue water navy capable of undertaking missions in faraway regions. Like many global maritime powers of the erstwhile period, China has modernised its naval force commensurate with its economic progress. The 2015 White Paper underlines its commitment to “develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests.” The PLAN was tasked to “safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power”.23
Indian Ocean in the MGP Naval Strategy
The 21st century Maritime Silk Road that President Xi announced in 2013 helped China in expanding its foothold in the maritime littorals of Asia and Europe by winning contracts and building infrastructures. This was to ensure better strategic cooperation with the littoral countrie, making China a legitimate stakeholder in the security affairs of the IOR. Undoubtedly, the more Chinese investments there are in the areas
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 187
of maritime infrastructure such as ports, rail-road connectivity, and industrial parks along the littorals, the greater will be the requirement of the Chinese naval presence to protect such assets, thus, making it a strong naval presence in the IOR. As a result, safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests has become one of the major responsibilities of the PLAN.24 Though the objective of the new strategy is to protect China’s SLOCs and MSR investments associated with the Indian Ocean region, this will invariably project its power across the region. With the ‘open seas protection’ strategy, China has expanded its ‘strategic frontier’ from the near seas to the far seas where China would be willing to commit military forces in pursuit of goals that it defines to be in its national interest.25 Since the area of operation of the ‘open seas protection’ strategy is the Indian Ocean, Beijing would bring in more naval power into the region. This might come into conflict with India’s national security interests pertaining to the Indian Ocean which New Delhi considers its strategic backyard. China’s Indian Ocean naval strategy is not only to protect its MSR investments or secure its SLOCs but, more importantly, to project its power across maritime Asia. Ever since it turned to the maritime domain as a result of dissipating threats from the former Soviet Union, it had set its eyes on the Indian Ocean as part of its expansionist propensity. China’s first overseas naval expedition was to the Indian Ocean in November 1985, under the direction of the then PLAN Commander Liu Huaqing and had the backing of the political leadership.26 Throughout its naval modernisation period, China considered the Indian Ocean water as a ‘buffer zone’—an area that should not be controlled by any other power until China becomes stronger to expand its influence.27 Now China is in the pursuit of filling the ‘buffer zone’ and seeks to establish its dominance, diminishing the Indian and US power in the Indian Ocean region. Even though its current capacities are not enough for full spectrum dominance of the Indian Ocean, as and when the western Pacific becomes normal and a conflict free zone, China will surely divert its resources for an Indian Ocean dominance. With the mandate of overseas operations to protect Chinese interests, the PLAN has increased its naval deployment in the far seas which include
188 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the northern Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean, for which some PLA sources use the term “two oceans region”.28 This is in line with the third stage of naval expansion of Liu Huaqing’s time-honoured island chain strategy, which emphasised that by 2020, China’s naval capability should be able to project its power between the areas of the second and third island chains.29 To project its power across the maritime domain covering the deep western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, which has also become part of the third island chain, China necessarily requires at least three aircraft carriers. China has planned to acquire a minimum of three aircraft carriers by 2025, so that it can deploy at least one, the first Liaoning carrier, into the Indian Ocean.30 If it gets six carriers, as some reports suggest, then it might deploy two aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean, making it a formidable military power in the region.31
Naval Capabilities
For sustained far seas operations, the PLAN must have capabilities against other major sea powers in all levels of ships. The PLAN has had an unprecedented naval expansion since the 2000s “that far exceeds the build-up in any other navy in the post-World War II era”.32 It had 216 ships in 2005 that increased to 333 in 2020; it built 117 new ships in a 15-year period (Table 7.1).According to the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), China is on the cusp of marginalising the US’ predominant naval position in the Indo-Pacific region.33 The ONI study shows that given the increasing PRC shipbuilding capacity and capabilities, it is likely that by 2030, the PLAN surface force could approach 450 hulls and 99 submarines. The Chinese naval inventory includes advanced destroyers and attack submarines in large numbers, due to the PLAN’s primary mission of ‘active offshore defence’ in the near seas. In the naval modernisation drive, launched in the late 1990s, China has not just replaced older ships with new ones but with more technologically advanced and larger ships than the previous ones, and also installed modern weapon systems.34 Destroyers are the PLAN’s frontline surface combatant strike groups, and China has commissioned six new classes of destroyers since the 2000s. Major inventories are the Type
Year of DOD report
SSB
SSN
Table 7.1: Certain Types of Chinese and US Ships Since 2005
SS
CV
CG
DD
FF
FFL
PC
LST/ LPD
LSM
Total PLAN ship types shown to right
CCG
U.S. total
U.S. vs. PLAN ship types shown
2005
1
6
51
0
0
21
43
0
51
20
23
216
n/a
292
+75
2007
1
5
53
0
0
25
47
0
41
25
25
222
n/a
281
+59
n/a
282
+20
2006 2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 2014 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
1 1
2
2
2
2
3 3 4
4
4
4
4
4
5 5
6
6
5
5
5 5 5
5
5
5
6
6
50 54
54
54
49
48
49 51 53
57
54
57
50
46
0 0
0
0
0
0
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
2
0 0
0
0
0
0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
1
25 29
27
25
26
26 23 24
21 23
21
28
33
32
45 45
48
49
53
53 52 49 52
52
56
51
54
49
0 0
0
0
0
0 0 8
15
23
23
28
42
49
45 45
70 85
86
86 85 85
86
86
88
86
86
86
25 26
27
27
27
28 29 29
29
30
34
33
37
37
25 28
28 28
28
23 26 28
28
22
21
23
22
21
221 233
262
276
276
271 273 283
294
303
317
306
335
333
n/a n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a n/a n/a
n/a
n/a
185
240
248
255
281
279 285
+61
+46
+9
288
+12
287
+14
284 285
289
271
275
279
286 296
+13 +2 -5
-32
-42
-27
-49
-37
2021 6 9 56 2 1 32 48 51 86 57 348 223 296 -52 2021: change since +5 +3 +5 +2 +1 +11 +5 +51 +35 +14 +132 n/a +5 -127 2005 Source: “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, March 8, 2022, p. 7, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on March 25, 2022.
190 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
052D Luyang III class guided-missile destroyers, the Type 054C Luyang II class guided-missile destroyers, the Type 054A Jiangkai III class guidedmissile frigates, and the Soviet-built Sovremenny class destroyers.35 These vessels are equipped with the indigenous YJ-18 A or YJ-62 ASCMs and the HN-2 land-attack cruise missiles (a variant of the Russian Kh-55 missile). The Type-052C also carries several Chinese built HHQ-9 SAMs, housed in Vertical Launch Systems (VLS).36 In 2017, the Chinese Navy emerged as the world’s largest navy, with more warships and submarines than the United States, however, the American fleet remains superior qualitatively, and is spread much thinner.37 With the incorporation of ‘open seas protection’ in China’s naval strategy, the blue water naval capability progressed by leaps and bounds. The new inventories were aimed at enhancing China’s blue water naval capabilities, and the PLAN has now become more a blue water force than before.38 For instance, China commissioned or launched 44 surface ships through 2016 17, of which 26 are blue water-capable.39 The new inventory of the navy has sped up between 2014 and 2018; China launched more submarines, warships, amphibious vessels, and auxiliaries than the number of ships currently serving in the individual navies of Germany, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom.40 China commissioned 18 ships into its armoury in 2016 alone and another 14 were inducted in 2017 (Fig 7.1). On the other hand, the US Navy had commissioned only 5 and 8 ships respectively during the same period. In 2018, China launched the world’s largest destroyer, the Type 055 class destroyer, with a displacement capacity of over 11,000 tonnes, demonstrating China’s technical capability in building advanced systems and its blue water naval capability.41 The Type 055 class destroyer is expected to perform major command and control functions in far seas operations and will likely serve as the primary escort of China’s aircraft carrier strike groups in blue water operations.42 China has launched five such destroyers which are under various stages of operational requirements. 43 China launched its second aircraft carrier, the indigenously-built Type-001A Shandong, in April 2017, which underwent maiden sea trials the following June, and was commissioned in December 2019.44 The Shandong can operate up to 36 Shenyang J-15 fighters, a Chinese copy of the Sukhoi Su-33, as well as
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 191
several helicopters.45 It uses a ski-ramp to launch aircraft, and participated for the first time in an exercise in the South China Sea in May 2021.46 The first one, the Liaoning, was originally a Soviet cruiser carrier, retrofitted by China and launched in 2012, with which the PLAN has become a true two-carrier navy.47 The third carrier, the Fujian is the largest one, comparable to the Ford class of the US, and Beijing’s long-term carrier plan has generated considerable concern across the region. China had even mulled building a nuclear-powered carrier, but later put the project on hold, due to budgetary and technical constraints.48 With this expected force level, it is believed that China would be able to project its power beyond the second island chain by 2030, and would provide the force required to meet Xi’s goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. Fig 7.1: Annual Number of Destroyers and Frigates Commissioned into the PLAN
Source: “How is China Modernising its Navy”, CSIS China Power, September 1, 2021. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on August 26, 2021.
Warships play an important role in projecting a nation’s power in distant locations simply “because they are there”.49 Ken Booth contends that “warships can have deleterious effects on foreign policies, they can shape or undermine a country’s efforts in unpredictable and uncertain ways.”50 He
192 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
adds, “To the extent that a government perceives itself to be vulnerable in the naval context, or identifies hostile naval intentions and capabilities on the part of the adversaries, warships can be an important factor in defining the threat.”51 Essentially, a navy constitutes a fungible instrument of foreign policy, facilitating the pursuit of a country’s national interests abroad. At the same time, “a key determinant of naval force projection is sustainability, which is related to the concept of geographical reach. It is the ability to maintain naval forces on station under various operational circumstances, including in the presence of the enemy and under demanding operational environmental conditions.”52 To achieve blue water status, navies must have sustained operation requirements in terms of “sufficient size, sea worthiness, range, and endurance to operate at distances from their home base and in the specific operational environments that their missions require”.53 China focusses on sustained naval operations in the Indian Ocean waters and has deployed destroyers, submarines, corvettes, and may spare one aircraft carrier exclusively for the Indian Ocean operations. Beginning with an anti-piracy mission in the IOR, China has continuously deployed its naval ships, platforms as well as submarines, since its first operation in 2008. Even though piracy and armed robbery have decreased as a result of sustained escort operations by various navies, China continues to make its naval presence felt throughout the year in the water body. The task force that China sends to the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy operations will have a minimum of three ships: a guided-missile destroyer, a missile frigate, and a supply vessel, and spend 3-4 months for escort operations in the Indian Ocean.54 Also, China sends a minimum of three task forces to the Indian Ocean region every year since 2009.55 According to former Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, “At any given time, there are six to eight PLAN warships in the northern Indian Ocean”, which are “permanently present and they have three to four survey vessels or hydrographic vessels”.56 In 2017, 14 ships were deployed for anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and between 2015 and 2019, China deployed six submarines for the same purpose.57 China has multiple objectives in its deployment of naval ships to the Indian Ocean: certain deployments are training exercises for the crew in the far seas area, some are for non-traditional security purposes,
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 193
while some are to give political signals to its adversaries. For instance, it dispatched a fleet of two Type 052D destroyers, a 054A frigate, and a 071 dock landing ship to the Indian Ocean in February 2018 as part of the ‘Blue 2018 A’ exercise, which was held amid the political stalemate going on in the Maldives.58 The contingent spent a week in the eastern Indian Ocean and was purportedly aimed at warning against a possible Indian military involvement in the political crisis in Male. China set up a naval base, the first overseas base, in Djibouti, in 2017 to provide logistical support for the PLAN deployed in the Indian Ocean region.59 China claims that it has no plan to keep the Djibouti base as a real military base as it is against hegemonism and imperialism. However, the recently completed infrastructure modernisation at the Obock naval base suggests that it can also be used for military purposes.60 Currently, the Obock base can accommodate an aircraft carrier, a minimum of four nuclear powered attack submarines, and at least two large destroyers.61 In fact, since the 2000s, there has been a debate among Chinese strategists about the necessity to set up logistical supply bases far from China for the missions that the PLAN needs to undertake to protect the SLOCs and also concurrent with China’s globalised economy.62 The need for building a naval base in the Indian Ocean was demonstrated in the writings of military scholars such as Colonel Dai Xu who stated that China “needs to develop overseas bases as a logistical extension of the PLAN mission to the Gulf of Aden and as a necessity to safeguard [China’s] commercial interests and world peace.”63 He further opined that these would “not require the long-term stationing of large military equipment or large-scale military units…but they should be suitable for comprehensive replenishment.”64 China had considered various locations to set up its naval base in the IOR such as Salalah in Oman, Aden in Yemen, Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan, Victoria in Seychelles, Colombo, Hambantota, and Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, in the Maldives, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar.65 Djibouti was chosen because of its location. Djibouti also hosts other country’s military bases so China could negate the criticism of imperialism and hegemonism, and it has the advantage of being situated on the busiest trade route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.66
194 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Challenges for China’s Naval Dominance of the Indian Ocean
China’s military dominance of the Indian Ocean, however, faces structural problems. Firstly, geography plays a critical role in China’s naval strategy and its ambition for dominance of the Indian Ocean. The Southeast Asian archipelago works as a barrier for the Chinese Navy’s open access to the Indian Ocean waters, as it has to cross any of the three narrow straits, the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, where it could be interdicted by rival navies.67 This problem was amply explained by former Chinese President Hu Jintao in his ‘Malacca Dilemma’ concept, as he declared that “certain major powers were bent on controlling the strait”, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.68 However, so far, its vulnerability has not been resolved; rather, it has been aggravated with more powers such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia deploying their naval assets in the region. With the AUKUS pact signed in September 2021 among the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom, Australia is going to be a formidable challenger in the eastern IOR with the to be acquired nuclear-powered attack submarines.69 Secondly, the Indian Ocean will always be a secondary preference in the Chinese naval strategy: its primary preference has been the near seas covering the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. 70 China’s 2015 Defence White Paper stipulates with regard to the Indian Ocean that the PLAN has two major objectives: to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests; and to maintain strategic deterrence and counter-attack.71 Before expanding its naval dominance into the Indian Ocean, it has to first establish its control in the near seas by marginalising the US, which is highly unlikely to happen in the near future. In this respect, China’s strategy would be to ensure that no rival power dominates the Indian Ocean until it achieves full consolidation of the near seas, and, for that, it seeks unfettered access across the Indian Ocean waters. Thirdly, even though the Chinese Navy is the largest in the world, its capability for full spectrum military dominance of the Indian Ocean is doubtful, despite it vying for six aircraft carriers by 2030.72 The requirement for two full-fledged ocean-going fleets, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, centred around aircraft carriers, is unlikely to be fulfilled any time soon73 Its
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 195
strategic force arsenals lack depth in terms of both quantity and quality to project power as a counter-force beyond the second island chain.74 China operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), while most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs).75 Fourthly, since the Indian Ocean is a distant water body for China, it necessarily requires military bases and alliances and partners. Even though China has set up its first overseas base in Djibouti, this is not an actual military base, rather a ‘logistical support facility’ for the PLAN, “mainly used to provide rest and rehabilitation for the Chinese troops taking part in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, UN peace-keeping and humanitarian rescue”.76 It has improved the facilities at the base, however, making it fully operational during a crisis is doubtful due to the US naval presence in the region—the US has two bases in the western Indian Ocean: the Fifth Fleet at Manama and the base at Diego Garcia. Besides, except for Pakistan and Myanmar, no other country is a close partner of China; so it might be difficult to use their resources against India or the US. And, finally, India’s naval prowess is being considered a major challenge for China to establish its military dominance over the Indian Ocean. As a resident naval power, India has a significant geographical advantage over China’s “distant power dilemma”.77 Also, China sees the progressing Indo-US strategic partnership as a major obstacle for its naval expansionism towards the Indian Ocean region.78 As American scholar Ashley Tellis succinctly puts it, China’s acquisitions of various air, naval, and missile capabilities will allow it to project its power beyond the ‘second island chain’ into the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea, but it faces a major challenge in the strong Indo-US partnership in the Indian Ocean.79
Implications for India
Despite such constraints for a Chinese naval dominance of the Indian Ocean, its larger presence in the Indian Ocean is still a concern for New Delhi. India’s concerns about China’s Indian Ocean forays revolve around its expanding blue water naval capabilities, especially submarines, and port
196 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
access across the region. As navies carry foreign policy objectives while making friendly port calls when sailing in distant waters, deployment in the adjacent waters is viewed as a threat for a hostile nation. The regular physical presence of rival navies, that too with submarines, in one’s backyard is, indeed, a challenge to the local power. China has had its submarines sail through the Indian Ocean and pay port calls in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in recent years.80 Deploying submarines in the Indian Ocean in the guise of anti-piracy operations is a concern for India because of their stealthy character. Importantly, the submarines can dock at China owned ports in various locations across the Indian Ocean, as had been seen when a Song class submarine docked at the Hambantota port of Sri Lanka in October 2014.81 Once through into the Indian Ocean, it doesn’t need to return to China for refuel and resupply, making sustained PLAN deployment in the region possible. China’s strategy is to negate India’s geopolitical primacy and the operational influence of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean, rendering India’s ‘net security status’ redundant. Besides, China’s close ties with regional countries such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka could hurt Indian interests in the region. China is also planning to set up a major hub port in Tanzania which could be used for military purposes also. Sustained naval deployment in the water body and easy access at ports for naval ships along the littoral areas would make the Chinese Navy a virtual regional navy. China might adopt the same ‘harassment’ tactics that it is practising in the South China Sea, against India, which would lead to friction between the naval ships of the two countries in the Indian Ocean.
Conclusion
The 2015 Defence White Paper stipulates that the PLAN’s official policy towards the Indian Ocean is to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests; and maintain strategic deterrence and counter-attack.82 However, to protect the BRI investments in the Indian Ocean littoral states, worth around $150 billion, the Chinese Navy will become a legitimate stakeholder in the security of the IOR. With the BRI investments in ports and allied infrastructure in the littoral area spanning from Singapore to
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 197
South Africa, and the many island states in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy will get easy access to these ports during peace-time, and some of the ports could be used for military purposes when China faces a crisis. China has invested strategically in countries that are friendly with it while being inimical to its rivals. For instance, Pakistan and Myanmar will work as the best hedge against India, while Bandar Abbas in Iran and the port of Aden in Yemen could be used if a US-China war were to break out in the western Pacific. Similarly, as China continues its naval presence in the Indian Ocean throughout the year for the protection of MSR assets, the PLAN ships could be called upon by the littoral countries when they face security challenges, especially for humanitarian assistance. Generally, the Indian Navy is called for such assistance in the IOR. This shows that one of the major objectives of China’s naval expansionism is to neutralise the Indian Navy’s ‘net security provider’ position in the IOR. The PLAN will also work as a deterrent force in the Indian Ocean to prevent an adverse impact if a crisis breaks out in the western Pacific. China’s counter-attack strategy in the western Pacific is to inflict unacceptable damage on the force of the enemy if it tries to encroach into Chinese territorial waters or prevent Chinese ships in the Chinese ‘controlled’ waters—the South and East China Seas. China may adopt the same approach against other states if they disrupt Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, or rivals getting assistance from the Indian Ocean littoral countries. It will be difficult for China to sustain a strategy of dominating the Indian Ocean but it will keep deploying nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in the region for deterrence and counter-attack purposes. Its current objective is to ensure that no rival power dominates the Indian Ocean while it gets unfettered access across the water body. However, once its East Asian problem is settled, it would definitely seek dominance of the Indian Ocean.
Notes 1. 2.
In various Chinese documents, the term ‘maritime great power’ and ‘true maritime power’ are used interchangeably but the meaning and context are the same. John J. Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi”, Foreign Policy, No. 146, January-February, 2005, pp. 47-48.
198 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 3. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16.
17.
18.
Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream” (Virginia: Centre for Naval Analysis, June, 2016). Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, March 9, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2021. Ibid. Department of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020”, Government of the United States of America, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/ 1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on July 18, 2021. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress”, November 27, 2012, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/ t992917.htm. Accessed on July 13, 2021. Zhou Fangyin, “Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4, 2016, pp. 869-890. Feng Zhang, “China’s Long March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 2009-2016”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2019, pp. 757-787. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2011, pp. 292-319. Zhang, n. 9. Jane Perlez, “The Prospect of Philippine Thaw Slows China’s Plans in the South China Sea”, The New York Times, September 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/09/25/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea.html. Accessed on August 12, 2021. Ling Wei, “Striving for Achievement in a New Era: China Debates its Global Role,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, 2020, pp. 413-437. You Ji, China’s Military Transformation (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015). Ibid. Ryan D. Martinson, “Jinglue Haiyang: The Naval Implications of Xi Jinping’s New Strategic Concept”, China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, https://jamestown. org/program/jinglue-haiyang-the-naval-implications-of-xi-jinpings-new-strategic concept/. Accessed on July 16, 2021. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Navy: A Turn to Corbett?,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011, pp. 42-46, https://www.usni.org/ magazines/proceedings/2010/december/chinas-navy-turn-corbett. Accessed on June 15, 2021. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China Daily Online, October 18, 2017, https://www. chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212. htm. Accessed on June 15, 2021.
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 199 19. Kejin Zhao and Hao Zhang, “Projecting Political Power: China’s Changing Maritime Strategy”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2019, pp. 229-261. 20. “Structuring the Chinese Dream”, China Daily, January 25, 2014, http:// usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/25/content_17257856.htm. Accessed on July 8, 2021. 21. Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 2013), p. 107. 22. Ibid., p. 216. 23. China’s Military Strategy 2015, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/ WhitePapers/index.htm. Accessed on June 12, 2021. 24. Ibid. 25. David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, 1994, pp. 3-25. 26. Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, “China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions”, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University Press, 2010). 27. Yves-Heng Lim “The Driving Forces Behind China’s Naval Modernization.” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2011, pp. 105-120. 28. Jennifer Rice and Erik Robb, “The Origins of ‘Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection’,” CMSI China Maritime Reports, 13, February 2021, https://digital commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/13. Accessed on September 15, 2021. 29. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1994. 30. “China’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier Expected to Launch in 2021: Reports”, Global Times, January 17, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213074.shtml. Accessed on May 31, 2021. 31. Christopher Colley, “A Future Chinese Indian Ocean Fleet?” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean-fleet/. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 32. James E. Fanell and Scott Cheney-Peters, “Defending Against a Chinese Navy of 500 Ships”, Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ defending-against-a-chinese-navy-of-500-ships-1484848417. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 33. Office of Naval Intelligence (US), “The PLA Navy : New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century”, 2015, https://www.oni.navy.mil/News/China-Publication/. Accessed on August 31, 2021. 34. Richard Bitzinger, “Modernising China’s Military, 1997-2012”, China Perspective, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2011, pp. 7-15.
200 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 35. James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2019, pp. 11-45. 36. Military Balance, IISS, London, 2021, p. 252. 37. Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific” The New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 38. Koh Swee Lean Collin, “China-India Rivalry at Sea: Capability, Trends and Challenges,” Asian Security, Vol, 15, No. 1, 2019, pp. 5-24. 39. Ibid. 40. “How is China Modernizing its Navy?”, CSIS China Power, https://chinapower. csis.org/china-naval-modernization/. Accessed on August 31, 2021. 41. Rick Joe, “All You Need to Know About China’s New Stealth Destroyer”, The Diplomat, June 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/all-you-need-to-know about-chinas-new-stealth-destroyer/. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 42. “China Set to Showcase Game-Changing Warship at Navy Parade”, The Week, April 19, 2019, https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2019/04/19/china-set showcase-game-changer-warship-at-navy-parade.html. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 43. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s Navy Commissions First-of-Class Type 055 Guided Missile Destroyer”, The Diplomat, January 13, 2020, https://thediplomat. com/2020/01/chinas-navy-commissions-first-of-class-type-055-guided-missile destroyer/. Accessed on July 31, 2021. 44. “China’s 1st Indigenous Aircraft Carrier to be Combat-Ready by 2020: Report”, Business Standard, October 27, 2020, https://www.business-standard.com/article/ international/china-s-1st-indigenous-aircraft-carrier-to-be-combat-ready-by-2020 report-120102701577_1.html. Accessed on July 26, 2021. 45. Greg Waldron, “Beijing Commissions its Second Aircraft Carrier”, Flight Global, December 18, 2019, https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/beijing-boosts-its carrier-power-with-shandong-commissioning/135830.article. Accessed on August 31, 2021. 46. “China’s 2nd Aircraft Carrier Group Holds 1st Drill in 2021 in S. China Sea, ‘Training for Combat Preparedness’”, Global Times, May 2, 2021, https://www. globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1222578.shtml. Accessed on August 26, 2021. 47. “Aircraft Carrier Liaoning’s Latest Voyage Lays Down Foundation for Enhanced Night Combat”, Global Times, August 8, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202108/1230896.shtml. Accessed on August 20, 2021. 48. Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship Are Put on Hold,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3039653/chinese-navy set-build-fourth-aircraft-carrier-plans-more. Accessed on August 26, 2021. 49. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 85. 50. Ibid.
PLAN’s Indian Ocean Strategy Under Xi Jinping • 201 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.
61.
62. 63. 64. 65. 66.
67.
68.
Ibid. Collin, n. 38. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. “‘Keeping a Close Eye on Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean,’ says Admiral Lanba”, Hindustan Times, March 13, 2019. Ibid. “China Deploys Warships in Indian Ocean”, The Hindu, February 20, 2018, https:// www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-deploys-warships-in-indian-ocean/ article22808463.ece. Accessed on September 15, 2021. Charlotte Gao, “China Officially Sets Up Its First Overseas Base in Djibouti”, The Diplomat, July 12, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-officially-sets-up its-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti/. Accessed on March 31, 2021. Sam LaGrone, “AFRICOM: Chinese Naval Base in Africa Set to Support Aircraft Carriers”, USNI News, April 20, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/20/ africom-chinese-naval-base-in-africa-set-to-support-aircraft-carriers. Accessed on September 12, 2021. H I Sutton, “Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy is Expanding Overseas Base”, Forbes, May 10, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/05/10/satellite images-show-chinese-navy-is-expanding-overseas-base/?sh=7a0118a68691. Accessed on April 9, 2021. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 125, 2020, pp. 731-747. Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2011, pp. 59-78. Ibid. Loro Horta, “China Turns to the Sea: Changes in the People’s Liberation Army Navy Doctrine and Force Structure”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2012, pp. 393-402. Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Security Implications and Ways Forward for the European Union”, SIPRI, Solna, Sweden, p. 28, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the-21st-century maritime-silk-road.pdf. Accessed on March 31, 2021. David Brewster, “The Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean: Prospects for a Significant Chinese Naval Presence”, in David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, eds., Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region, (Stimson Centre, December 2014), pp. 71-80. Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’”, China Brief, Vol. 6 Issue: 8, https:// jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/. Accessed on September 2, 2021.
202 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 69. Abhijit Singh, “India is not a Bystander in the AUKUS Saga”, The Hindu, September 25, 2021. 70. Zack Cooper and Allen Shearer, “Thinking Clearly about China’s Layered IndoPacific Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 5, 2017, pp. 305-311. 71. China’s Military Strategy 2015, n. 23. 72. Yves-Heng Lim, “China’s Rising Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean: Aligning Ends, Ways and Means”, Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2020, pp. 396-412; David Brewster, India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018). 73. Hu Bo, Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions (London: Routledge, 2020), Chapter: “China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy”. 74. Lim, n. 72; Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, and Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century,” China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2014, https://ndupress. ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf. Accessed on August 31, 2021. 75. Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, March 9, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on March 31, 2021. 76. Cabestan, n. 62. 77. Distant power dilemma means that a distant superior power cannot be effective against a local power in a regional theatre. The US is facing the same problem against China in an East Asian theatre. Similarly, during the Falklands War, Britain had this problem in the initial period of the conflict, but Argentina was not a regional naval power so it was not able to sustain its local power advantage. 78. Joshy M. Paul. “US and India: Emerging Offshore Balancing in Asia,” India Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, pp. 221-242. 79. Ashley Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific”, testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 2017, https:// carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/25/protecting-american-primacy-in-indo-pacific pub-68754. Accessed on March 31, 2021. 80. H I Sutton, “Chinese Navy Submarines Could Become a Reality in Indian Ocean”, Forbes, January 26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/26/ chinese-navy-submarines-could-become-a-reality-in-indian-ocean/?sh= 54c2d1b954a6. Accessed on March 31, 2021. 81. Abhijit Singh, “Deciphering China’s Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region”, IDSA Commentary, July 8, 2015, https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ Decipher ingChinasS ubmar ineDeploy mentsintheIndianOceanRegion_ asingh_080715. Accessed on March 31, 2021. 82. n. 23.
8.
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean
“Air power”, Sir Winston Churchill once stated, “is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even to express in precise terms”. Definitions abound, one of the most succinct being, “The ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events.” The Chinese warfare strategy has been premised on the concept of ‘seize the initiative, dominate the theatre and decisively win the war’. This concept emerged during the civil war period and has become the central tenet of the PLA’s modern warfare strategy. The army played a leading role in seizing the initiative during the continental war strategy but the developments in the 1990s such as 1991 Gulf War and Balkan crisis, where air power was demonstrated as a decisive component in winning the war, have brought changes in the Chinese warfare concept with an increasing role for the air force. In the informationised local war situation that China adopted in the 1990s, the Chinese leadership understood the importance of aerial dominance and gave considerable attention to modernising China’s air force, which had hitherto played a limited role of protecting the aerial theatre of the Chinese territory and has now leapfrogged to become an integral force in both offensive and defensive operations of China’s warfare strategy. Since the 2000s, a great transformation has taken place, from a singular focus on air defence and interceptor fighter aircraft of the Cold War era to a multi-mission force, capable of carrying out air defence, strike transport, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and, most recently,
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Electronic Warfare (EW) missions. The PLAAF has been modernised as an offensive air force for deterrence as well as to conduct long-range preemptive operations in the oceanic direction for air control, air strike, and air defence.1 It has to play a key role in joint amphibious landings, coastal blockade, joint firepower strike, island defence, airborne, and nuclear counter-strike campaigns. The PLAAF is the largest air force in the region and the third largest in the world, with a 2,500-strong tactical-combat aircraft inventory, including 1,800 fighters, comprising fifth generation J-20 stealth fighters, strategic bombers (H-6K, H6N and H20), and multi-mission tactical and attack aircraft.2 What the PLAAF required to act as a ‘strategic air force’ in support of China’s strategic goal was mentioned in the 2008 Defence White Paper, which notes, “To meet the requirements of informationized warfare, the air force is working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.”3 It became imperative for China to build a high-tech ‘strategic air force’, closely linked to a great power’s status that major military powers and strong countries all had pursued ‘first-rate air forces’ with superior weapons and equipment, personnel, and combat capacity. As Ruan Kexiang writes, modern air power “can launch a fierce and sudden attack on the enemy from thousands of kilometers away … quickly destroying the enemy’s operational system, thus, reducing the enemy’s war capability and paving the way for accomplishing the objectives of the war or directly achieving the aims of the war.”4 The PLA strategists, thus, wanted the PLAAF to play a major role in both deterrence and combat operations as air and space power will have a decisive role in future wars.
PLAAF’s Expeditionary Capabilities and the IOR
The PLAAF’s expeditionary stature was officially propounded by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to the PLAAF Headquarters in April 2014 where he dwelt on the need to “accelerate the construction of a powerful people’s air force” and instructed the air force generals “to improve the air
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 205
force structure, build up new combat capacity, and make a rapid transition to a balanced air power for both defense and offense.”5 He also emphasised the jointness of forces, not only in the air and space domains but “to defend China’s maritime interests and strengthen its overwater capabilities”.6 Further, in the opening address of the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in October 2022, President Xi called on it to “establish a strong system of strategic deterrence”, termed as enhancement of aerial capabilities with new systems and weapons to dominate the air for effective deterrence.7 Similarly, the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy highlighted the need for “shifting the strategic defense from the coastal periphery to the external forward edge”, and “building overseas strategic strong points that depend on the homeland, radiate into the surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans”.8 It also called for the PLAAF to have an effective combat radius (platform plus missile range) of 3,000 km from China’s borders, effectively achieving aerial coverage up to the second island chain.9 China’s aerial capability is still focussed on the East Asian theatre to support the ‘active defence strategy’. Its current priorities are defending Taiwan, securing the disputed territories in the East and South China Seas, and preventing the US from crossing the second island chain. When the restructuring within the PLA took place in 2016 with the formation of five Theatre Commands, thereby abandoning the decades-old seven Military Regions, each Theatre Command was tasked with creating operational strategies based on the perception of threats at the borders under the direction of the CMC. China has deployed its air units mostly to the east and southeastern parts of the mainland to defend the overwater air space (Fig 8.1). The Southern Theatre Command is the Maritime Theatre Command because “safeguarding sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea (SCS) has become the most important mission that the Southern Theater shoulders”.10 The South China Sea is strategically more vital compared with the eastern seabed of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea as it is more secure to deploy China’s strategic SSBNs because the average depth of the Yellow Sea is 40 m and that of the East China Sea is 350 m, while the average depth of the South China Sea is 1,200 m. The Theatre Commands are integrated commands of various forces including the ground, naval and air forces, focussing on jointness of
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operations guided by the CMC.11 The PLAAF’s seven former Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs) were also restructured into North, South, East, West and Central Theatre Command Air Forces, and established at least six new air bases. Each Theatre Command Air Force (TCAF) has seven to 10 fighter brigades; each brigade has three to six fighter groups, totalling 30 to 50 aircraft.12 A possible air operation conducted in the IOR would be by the Southern and Western Theatre Commands, crossing the sovereign territory of the Southeast Asian states for the former and the air space of Pakistan and Myanmar for the latter. Fig 8.1: PLA’s Major Aviation Units
Source: Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2021, Government of the United States of America, Washington, November 3, 2021, p. 59, https://media.defense.gov/2021/ nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-cmpr-final.pdf. Accessed on November 10, 2022.
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In the latter part of the previous decade, the PLAAF’s role had been redefined to carry out long-range air power projection, especially in the overwater domain. The 2019 Defence White Paper described the PLAAF’s missions and tasks as transitioning from territorial air defence to “offensive and defensive operations.”13 In 2017, PLAAF Commander Lieutenant General Ding Laihang emphasised the need to build a truly ‘strategic’ air force capable of projecting air power at a long range.14 The Eastern Air Force Theatre Command and Southern Air Force Theatre Command are mainly responsible for conducting overwater campaigns; the former in the East China Sea and the Pacific, and the latter primarily focussing on the South China Sea but with an additional role for the Pacific as well as Indian Oceans (Fig 8.2). Fig 8.2: China’s Theatre Commands
Source: https://bharatshakti.in/impact-of-plas-new-theatre-commands/, Accessed on November 15, 2023.
PLA units located within the Southern Theatre Command include two group armies, a naval fleet, three marine brigades, two air force bases
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(Nanning and Kunming), one bomber division and two rocket force bases.15 The Nanning air base has seven brigades, while Kunming has four brigades, totalling around 250-300 aircraft under the Southern Theatre Command. 16 Since China doesn’t have any overseas bases being used for the PLAAF’s expeditionary operations, fighter aircraft cannot be used for such missions which will be conducted by bombers. China’s 8th Air (Bomber) division is located at Leiyang, Hunan, which has two bomber (H- 6K)regiments, the 12th air regiment at Shaodong, and 24th air regiment at Leiyang, Hunan.17 Each regiment has around 18 bombers, which come to approximately half of China’s H-6K bombers. The H-6K is a subsonic aircraft with a maximum range of roughly 3,000 km and can carry 6 Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), useful for long-range precision strike against targets in the second island chain from home airfields in mainland China. The US Department of Defence observes that the H 6K has been updated from its original version to conduct strikes at the US base of Guam.18 It can extend its range up to 4,500 km with a CJ-20 LACM that has a range of 1,500 km.19 China has also developed a new long range strategic bomber, the H-6N, capable of launching hypersonic as well as ballistic missiles, demonstrated in the PLAAF’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019.20 The H-6N is reportedly a refurbished and advanced version of the Tu-16 Badger bomber, with a range of 3,000 km and has in-flight refuelling capability.21 A video appeared in a Chinese military magazine Modern Ships in late 2019 demonstrating the launch of China’s Air Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM) CH-AS-X-13, an air-launched variant of the DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile, combined with a DZ-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle as its warhead.22 The Pentagon had in 2018 reported that China was developing a nuclear-capable, air-launched ballistic missile, which can be fired from its strategic bombers.23 This suggests that the combination of the 1,700 km range DF-21 or the 1,500 km range CJ 20 cruise missile, plus the approximate operational range of the 1,500 km of the H-6N would give the PLAAF enough firepower to target the US base of Guam, and carrier strike groups outside the second island chain. With refuelling from the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea, the H-6N can target Indian aircraft carriers deployed in the Indian Ocean (Fig 8.3).
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 209 Fig 8.3: Coverage of China’s Bombers and Missiles from Mischief Reef, SCS
Source: Thomas Shugart, “Australia and the Growing Reach of China’s Military”, The Lowy Institute, August 9, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-and growing-reach-china-s-military. Accessed on April 28, 2022.
With an eye on aerial dominance in the Indian Ocean, China has built an airfield and a naval base closer to the Indian Ocean at Cambodia’s Sihanoukville in the Gulf of Thailand. The Washington Post in June 2022 reported that “China is secretly building a naval facility in Cambodia for the exclusive use of its military” on the northern portion of Cambodia’s erstwhile US Ream naval base on the Gulf of Thailand.24 Cambodia and China had secretly signed an agreement in 2019 to enhance the infrastructure, including communication and surveillance systems, radar facilities, and long wharves to enable larger foreign warships to dock, with Chinese funds, reported the Wall Street Journal.25 At the Dara Sakor airfield, China has built a 2-mile long runway, big enough for China’s long-range bombers and military transport planes to operate.26 As per international law, “all acts of hostility in neutral territory, including neutral lands, neutral waters, and neutral airspace, are prohibited,”27 so without the concurrence of the host country, China cannot
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use the foreign territory for a belligerent act. However, given the economic interdependence between China and Southeast Asia—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became the largest trade partner of China in 202228 and Southeast Asia’s economic dependence on China has been increasing in the ‘America first’ era of Washington 29—Beijing could arm-twist the regional states to use their air space for the PLAAF’s military operations in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has already used economic coercion against Japan in 201030 and Australia in 2020,31 and the same could also be applied to the Southeast Asian states to compel them to comply with China’s security demands. Similarly, if China’s ‘all-weather’ friend Pakistan or Myanmar allows use of its territory for the Chinese planes to refuel, the PLAAF’s aircraft will be able to target Indian assets in the Indian Ocean from airfields in western China. In recent times, China has enhanced its airfields close to the Indian border, including the Hotan, Gar Gunsa, Kashghar, Hopping, Dkonka Dzong, Linzhi, and Pangat air bases in the Xinjiang and Tibet region.32 The PLAAF has already deployed Sukhoi-30s and six H-6 bombers with KD-63 cruise missiles at the Kashgar air base in Xinjiang.33 China can also use Pakistani airfields such as Gwadar, Ormara and Karachi, all of which are on the southern coast of Pakistan. The greenfield airport at Gwadar was built with Chinese assistance under the $56 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and is the second largest airfield in Pakistan, with a 3,658-m-long runway, capable of handling Chinese bombers.34 The Ormara port facility contains the Jinnah naval base, and a small airfield, which can be extended for military purposes; modernisation of the Ormara port facility is already underway as part of the CPEC, and a submarine repair block is being built with Chinese technical assistance at Ormara. 35 The 1,700-km-long China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) has a state-of-the-art port facility at Kyaukphyu in the southwestern part of Myanmar. If China builds an airfield at Kyaukphyu, like Gwadar, it can use it for refuelling which would enhance its aerial coverage in the Indian Ocean. China might also build a greenfield airport in the coastal African country on the Indian Ocean side in the future from where it can provide aerial support in the western Indian Ocean during a crisis.
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China’s Naval Aviation in the IOR
The PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) was established as a sub-unit of the PLAN in accordance with the first Three-Year Plan formed as soon as the PLAN was created in April 1949. The PLANAF initially had three divisions and was expected to operate from the dedicated naval airfields, while the hardware was procured from the Soviet Union. However, the Korean War necessitated the creation of a dedicated naval aviation wing for the PLAN, and in September 1952, the PLAN’s Aviation Wing was designated as one of the PLAN’s five operational branches.36 The former Soviet Union continued as the source of aircraft for the PLA Naval Aviation (PLANA) and it inducted the Tu-2 bombers, MiG-17s as the J-5 (licensed production), and Mi-4 helicopters as the Z-5 into the service. Besides, through reverse engineering, the Il-28 transporters and Tu-16 bombers were made into the H-5 and H-6 respectively. As part of the naval modernisation, China sought to enhance the capability of naval aviation, and in 1997, ordered 38 Su-30s naval version, a maritime fighter aircraft comparable to the American McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle; and Russia’s Sukhoi Aviation Corporation delivered the China specific Su-30 MKKs in 2000.37 In 2001, China renegotiated and ordered 38 improved versions of the Su-30 MKKs with upgraded avionics and maritime strike capabilities, known as the Su-30 MKK2, and another 24 were ordered in 2003, all delivered in 2004. This variant also features a new C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) suite as well as a new mission computer.38 Today, China’s naval aviation consists of foreign-made combat aircraft, indigenously-made bombers, carrier-based aircraft J-15, and helicopters. It has developed a carrier version of the fifth generation fighter aircraft, the J-20 as J-35, and is planning to develop Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) to be operated from naval ships. China has already announced its intention to have a two-ocean navy for the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Chinese Navy has become the largest in the world, with approximately 355 ships and submarines, including aircraft carriers.39 To get a blue water naval capability with partial sea denial in the Indian Ocean waters, that too against a resident naval power with 180 odd
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battleships, including aircraft carriers, China would necessarily require aerial coverage to safeguard its ships and carriers in the Indian Ocean. Without sophisticated aerial capability, including anti-submarine and Airborne Early Warning (AEW ) warfare as well as long range precision strike capability, PLAN ships would be highly vulnerable to aerial and underwater attacks. An aircraft carrier is crucial for the PLAN to provide aerial coverage in the Indian Ocean and the carrier programme started with a vision of getting a two-ocean navy and extending its dominance up to the third island chain.40 China has already commissioned two aircraft carriers and the third one was launched in June 2022. As per various reports, China plans to build a fleet of somewhere between four and six carriers by 2030.41 This suggests that at least one aircraft carrier can be present in the Indian Ocean throughout the year; and may be more, if China were to opt for higher numbers, making it a formidable naval power in the IOR. China’s three carriers are conventional diesel powered ships while it plans to build the fourth one as nuclear powered: China is expected to achieve a breakthrough in nuclear-powered technology by 2027.42 However, US analysts believe that the fourth one will also be a conventional carrier because “China’s naval nuclear reactor technology is not advanced enough to support an aircraft carrier”.43 Indeed, having an aircraft carrier had been the dream of former PLAN Commander Liu Huaqing who coined the island chain strategy in the 1980s. The first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was originally a Soviet cruiser carrier that China purchased from Ukraine in the early 1990s and retrofitted it and launched it on September 25, 2012. The Liaoning can carry 36 aircraft: 24 Shenyang J-15 fighters, six Changhe Z-18F Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopters, four Changhe Z-18J airborne early warning helicopters, and Harbin Z-9C rescue helicopters.44 The Liaoning is armed with the Flying Leopard 3000 Naval (FL-3000N) missile system and Type 1030 Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), while ASW is supported by deck-based rocket launchers.45 When the Liaoning carrier neared its completion for commissioning, the prototype carrierborne fighter aircraft, the J-15 (Flying Shark), was indigenously developed by China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC). A successful take-off and landing expedition took place from the deck of
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 213
the Liaoning on November 25, 2012.46 In the post commissioning phase of the Liaoning, comprehensive trials were carried out, including extensive take-off and landing trials by the J-15; aircrew training; carrierborne work exercises for personnel involved in flying operations; and safety, reliability, and sustainability of onboard equipment, on both the aircraft and the ship.47 The Liaoning conducted all its trials in the near seas (the South China Sea and East China Sea) and every successive sailing flying trial increased in content and complexity. It was reported that during the 3-month-long sailing of the ship, ending September 21, 2013, more than 100 sorties were conducted in different ways and methods.48 After one decade of onboard training for aircraft and crew, it has been undergoing combat training in the western Pacific since May 2022.49 The J-15 is a two-engine fourth generation carrierborne aircraft, comparable to the US Navy’s F/A-18C/D Hornet and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, French Rafale M, and the Russian MiG-29K.50 The manufacturing company SAC used the T-10K prototype acquired from Ukraine in 2001, which itself is a derivative of the Russian Su-33 fighter, using the same airframe and aerodynamic configuration as the Su-33, but it is fitted with indigenous engines, weapons, and radar.51 It has a range of 3,500 km and a combat radius of 1,500 km, and can carry approximately 12 tonnes of weapons, including the PL-12 Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVRAAMs); and PL-7, PL-8, PL-9, AIM-9L/M Short-Range Air to-Air Missiles (SRAAMs), YJ-91 anti-radiation missiles, YJ-83K antiship missiles, and KD-88 air-to-surface missile, as well as various bombs, including guided ones.52 China launched its second carrier, the Shandong, an indigenously-built Type-001A, in April 2017, which underwent maiden sea trials the following June, and was commissioned in December 2019.53 The Shandong can carry up to 36 Shenyang J-15 fighters as well as several helicopters.54 Both carriers are Short Take-Off But Assisted Recovery (STOBAR), using a ski-jump ramp for launches. The Shandong participated for the first time in an exercise in the South China Sea in May 2021.55 China’s third carrier, the Fujian, is its first domestically designed and built catapult aircraft carrier.56 The 80,000-tonne ship is equipped with electro-magnetic catapults and arresting devices or
214 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
the Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) similar to the US carrier Gerald Ford.57 Press reports in December 2021 stated that China has developed the second generation J-15 Flanker, an upgraded, catapult capable version or CATBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-off But Arrested Recovery) that could have improved range/payload and will be operated from the new Type 003 carrier equipped with the CATBAR system.58 With a combat radius of 1,500 km, the J-15 Flanker can strike targets up to the middle of the Bay of Bengal from the South China Sea, especially from Cambodia’s Ream naval base where China has secretly conducted renovation work for the exclusive use of its military on the northern portion of the base on the Gulf of Thailand, and with a 2-mile long runway being built by China at the airport of Dara Sakor.59 China’s Southern Theatre Command (STC) is primarily responsible for the Indian Ocean operations. As a maritime command as well as due to its proximity to the Indian Ocean, the STC’s operational area is the South China Sea but it is also responsible for assuring the security of the SLOCs, China’s critical lifeline for energy, passing through the Indian Ocean. In 2017, the chief of the Southern Theatre Command General Wang Jiaocheng was replaced by Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, former commander of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, the first time ever in the history of the PLA that a naval officer was heading the multi-Service forces of one of its regional combatant headquarters.60 Given the strategic significance as well as the vastness of the maritime area to be covered, the STC has been the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike bombers.61 The H-6J bombers took part in the PLA’s coordinated air and naval forces exercise in the East China Sea in June 2022, and three H-6 bombers (two H-6J and one H-6K) flew past the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean, in a demonstration of China’s long rage precision strike capability.62 One H-6J can carry four YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles, while the PLAAF’s H-6K is equipped with electronic counter-measure pods for jamming enemy radars, apart from carrying six Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs).63 Similarly, China’s second carrier, the Shandong that entered service in 2019, was in the Southern Theatre Command.64 Besides, China has equipped various military outposts in the artificial islands in the
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 215
South China Sea with hangars for fighter aircraft and installed advanced antiship and anti-aircraft missile systems, and military jamming equipment.65 In early 2020, the PLA deployed KJ-200 anti-submarine warfare and KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft at the Fiery Cross Reef.66 Apart from artificial islands in the South China Sea, China can extend its aerial coverage into the Indian Ocean from Cambodia’s Ream naval base and Dara Sakor air base at Sihanoukville in the Gulf of Thailand (Fig 8.4). The Washington Post in June 2022 reported that “China is secretly building a naval facility in Cambodia for the exclusive use of its military” on the northern portion of Cambodia’s Ream naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, which both countries denied.67 Cambodia and China had secretly signed an agreement in Fig 8.4: Combat Radius of J-17 Thunder of 1,700 km from
Dara Sakor Air Base and Mischief Reef
Source: Prepared by the author.
216 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
2019 to enhance the infrastructure, including communication and surveillance systems, radar facilities and long wharves to enable larger foreign warships to dock, with Chinese funds, reported the Wall Street Journal.68 Since the Ream base is close to the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, China could monitor the Indian Navy’s activities in the Bay of Bengal as it could get a bird’s eye view over the Kra Isthmus. China has been consistently improving the weapons and other mechanisms in its aircraft carriers to match the latest US carriers. It has developed a carrier-capable variant of its the J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter aircraft, now designated the J-35, an upgraded version of the J-31 that was first flown in 2012, and its first flight reportedly took place in October 2021.69 Since the J-35 is a twin-engine aircraft, it can carry less payload than the US’ carrier version, the F-35C, which is single-engine aircraft, while the J-35 requires more fuel to run two engines, and the range is also slightly lower than that of the F-35C.70 The J-35 can carry four PL-15 medium-range air-to-air missiles in the internal weapons bay and two short-range PL-10 missiles for dogfights on external hard points.71 China is reportedly also developing “a carrier-based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600, that is similar to the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft, and also a stealth drone aircraft”.72 Both the J-35 and KJ-600 are slated to operate from the newly built Type 004 fourth conventional/nuclear aircraft carrier. China’s naval aviation has land-based airplanes which include 24 Russian made Su-30 MKK2 Flankers. The PLANAF comprises 2 regiments with the H-6DU/G/J bombers; 1 brigade with the J-10A/S Firebird, and Su-30MK2 Flanker G; 1 brigade with the J-11B/BS Flanker L; 1 brigade with J-11B/BS Flanker L, and JH-7A Flounder; 1 brigade with J-8F Finback, and JH-7A Flounder; and 1 regiment with the J-15 Flanker.73 The PLANAF has one brigade with ground attack fighter JH-7 Flounder and two regiments of anti submarine warfare with the KQ-200.74 PLANA’s Electronic Intelligence/ Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance/Anti-Submarine Warfare (ELINT/ ISR /ASW ) capability includes one regiment with the Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; and KQ-200. Its airborne early warning and control comprises 3 regiments with the Y-8J; KJ-200, and KJ-500; and one transportation regiment with the Y-7H; Y-8C, and CRJ-200/700.75 It has a total of 426 combat capable
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 217
aircraft, which include 45 bombers (27 H-6G/G mod and 18 H-6J), FTR24 J-8F Finback, FGA-153: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/ BS Flanker L; 34 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G, ATK-120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder, and 16+ KQ-200 ASW76 (Table 8.1). Of the PLAN’s ship-based helicopters, 13 are for ASW, 8 heavy lift, 8 medium lift, and 22 medium lift/ASW. It has 18 multi-purpose helicopters, 11 for search and rescue, and 10 for airborne electronics warfare (Fig 8.4). The PLAAF operates two types of unmanned aerial vehicles: heavy BZK-005 and medium BZK-007. It has long range and short range SAMs for air defence purposes.
S. No.
Table 8.1: The Southern Theatre Command Inventory by 2022 Inventory
Type
1.
H-6K
Bomber
36
3.
J-10A
Fighter aircraft
48
8th Bomber Division, PLAAF 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
10.
JH-7A J-10C J-11A J-16
J-20A Su-35
Su-30MKK H-6U
Bomber
Fighter aircraft Fighter aircraft Fighter aircraft Fighter aircraft Fighter aircraft Fighter aircraft Tanker
Naval Aviation (3rd Naval Aviation Division)
Quantity
24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
1.
KQ-200
ASW
18
3.
H-6DU/G/J
Maritime strike bomber
18
2. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
KJ-500 J-15
J-11B
JH-7A
Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D Shandong
AEW&C
Carrier based fighter aircraft
Maritime strike fighter aircraft Maritime fighter-bomber Helicopters
Aircraft carrier
Source: Military Balance 2023, IISS, London, p. 244.
18 18 36 12 18 1
218 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Challenges and Limitations China faces considerable challenges in extending its air cover onto the Indian Ocean, from geographical disadvantages to doctrinal and capability problems. Firstly, since China doesn’t have foreign air bases in the IOR, it has to depend on home-based aerial assets, while for carriers, it has to cross narrow channels in the Southeast Asian archipelago. For home-based air coverage, geography creates the most obstacles for aircraft to operate freely in the Indian Ocean. Unlike ships which can pass through narrow channels, either between two islands (Sunda and Lombok) or the waters dividing nations like the Malacca Strait that are known as international shipping lines, fighters cannot fly freely through the air space of Southeast Asia, and if they have to transit ‘sovereign air space’, it requires the host country’s consent.77 The Western Theatre Command has a similar problem—aircraft have to cross Pakistan’s or Myanmar’s air space. At the same time, overflights of sovereign territory are subject to tracking and interdiction, which may be counter-productive in operational missions. Besides, the refusal of countries to grant overflight rights can create significant operational problems. In a hostile environment, even friendly countries may not grant permission for the use of their air space. For example, US strike aircraft based in Britain were not allowed to fly over the air space of France and Spain for air strikes on Libya in 1986, and had to fly over international waters, including the Strait of Gibraltar.78 As a result, the search for air power access to the IOR from the home-based assets remains an insurmountable task for the PLA. Secondly, the PLAAF’s operational experience beyond the East Asian theatre has been very limited. The PLAAF lacks real-time combat experience as it has never been involved in aerial combat, not even in the 1962 border conflict with India or the Vietnam War of 1979. It has also not participated in any of the peace-keeping missions, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, or any other limited military tasks under the UN. The UN’s international peace-keeping missions with other countries’ forces in distant regions are considered operational experiences in unfriendly environments. Only once in the PLAAF’s history has it participated in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) which was in 2011 during the Libyan crisis when Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya. However, after the Libyan
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 219
evacuation, the Chinese government conducted a few more Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in the IOR and nearby areas, including during the Ebola crisis in November 2014, and evacuation of Chinese nationals from Iraq in 2014 and Yemen in 2015, but the PLAAF was not used for these missions due to unknown reasons.79 Thirdly, doctrinal principles allow far seas as secondary objectives of the PLA, and, primarily, the PLAAF has to focus on the East Asian theatre. Its modern capabilities, developed as part of the Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, are to ensure that ‘active defence’ works effectively in the East Asian theatre. The PLAAF’s primary objective is to gain real supremacy within the area of the first island chain and also to keep enemy forces away from the second island chain area. In the far seas, the objectives of the armed forces are to protect China’s maritime rights and interests, and counter-attacks, both of which are the responsibility of the navy with nuclear submarines. Fourthly, its overseas Djibouti or any MSR (Maritime Silk Route) asset in the Indian Ocean littoral area is inadequate to facilitate the PLAAF’s requirements. Only in Pakistan has China built a sea port and an airport nearby. All the ports China has built in the Indian Ocean region, including the Djibouti base, can be quarantined by a joint operation by the Indian and US Navies in a real-time crisis. Similarly, all of Pakistan’s ports and airfields are vulnerable to a strong Indian attack; India has 20 air bases on the IndiaPakistan border, and the Indian Navy’s Western Naval Command, based at Bombay, can create a blockade against major Pakistani ports, as was done in the 1971 Indo-Pak War. This is the same case for the PLAAF’s operations from the Western Theatre Command using Pakistan’s or Myanmar’s air space to target India’s assets in the Indian Ocean which can be shot down by the Indian Air Force before the aircraft can reach the actual theatre. Fifthly, it is not proven whether China’s advanced aerial systems are technologically efficient for combat. Even though China claims that its latest aerial systems are at par with similar categories of the US’ advanced systems, in practice, its modern aircraft are either modified Soviet-era systems or copied US systems, so the technological modernisation is not incremental. For instance, the J-20 and J-35 are China’s fifth generation stealth fighter aircraft, but were reportedly developed with stolen technology from the US’
220 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
systems of the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning and B-2 stealth bomber.80 The parts and components used in the Chinese aircraft may not be at par with the US systems, hence, would not have the same agility that the advanced fighter aircraft of the US have. Sixthly, China critically lacks underwater protection for its aircraft carriers with ASW systems. China’s existing ASW strategy is largely dependent on surface ship anti-submarine capabilities; its aviation anti-submarine capability is based on the Z-9C, Ka-28, Helix A, and Z18F helicopters.81 However, surface ships face serious threats from under water, so aviation based anti-submarine capability can protect carriers from the underwater threat. Helicopters have limited range, speed and can carry less ammunition than the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), but China has less than 20 MPAs, and it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.82 Its MPA KQ-200 (Y-8Q), entered service in 2018, but is limited in number and largely doing reconnaissance around Taiwan.83 The US Department of Defence report in 2022 on China’s Military Power observes that “it will still require several years of training and systems integration for the PLAN to develop robust offensive deep water ASW capability”.84 Sixthly, an aircraft carrier is a highly costly weapon worth around $3-5 billion so its loss is a heavy one for the nation. Even though it has an inbuilt defensive mechanism, it is not fully safe against an aerial or underwater attack. Besides, the sinking of an aircraft carrier would indeed be a great strategic shock for the nation. With the supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles, India can target a Chinese aircraft carrier the moment it enters the Indian Ocean water, crossing the narrow straits of the Southeast Asian archipelago from the Thanjavur air base where the Indian Air Force has deployed one squadron of Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft.
Assets and Capabilities of the IAF in the Indian Ocean
As a largest resident power in the Indian Ocean as well as a middle power in the international system, India is likely to play the central role in ensuring a rules based order in the Indian Ocean region. India has a large number of air bases in the peninsular region as well as in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to exert air dominance throughout the Indian Ocean. Major Indian
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 221
Air Force (IAF) bases in the peninsular region are Trivandrum, Sulur and Thanjavur, and there are many commercial airports in the region from where the IAF can conduct significant military air action out at the ocean. The Thanjavur air base hosts one squadron (No. 222) of the IAF’s frontline Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft which has an operational radii of 1,500 km, and that can be increased to over 2,000 km with one aerial refuelling. From Tanjavur air base, the Su-30 MKI fighter can hit targets in the entire eastern and central Indian Ocean (Fig 8.5). Fig 8.5: Air Cover with Su-30 MKI from Thanjavur
Source: Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “Unsinkable aircraft carriers: India’s island territories have great strategic potential which must be realised”, Firstpost, September 23, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news-expert-views-news-analysis-firstpost viewpoint/unsinkable-aircraft-carriers-how-indias-island-territories-are-great-strategic potential-11314321.html?s=08. Accessed on September 25, 2022.
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands host India’s only tri-Services command—the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)—and with a 8,914-ft-long runway, can to operate all kinds of fighter aircraft. Besides, there is one commercial airport in the islands, the Veer Savarkar
222 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
International Airport at Port Blair, and two naval air stations, the INS Baaz and INS Kohassa. The INS Baaz is located near Campbell Bay, on Great Nicobar Island and is the southernmost air station of the Indian armed forces, which overlooks the Strait of Malacca as well as the Six Degree Channel between Great Nicobar and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The territory is just 100 km from Coco Islands of Myanmar, and 150 km north of Aceh in Indonesia and is separated from Thailand by less than 500 km. The coverage from the ANC extends into significant parts of the South China Sea (Fig 8.6).The Indian government has recently decided to extend the runway from 1,100 m (3,500 ft) to 4,400 ft, and there are plans to extend it further to 6,000 ft and even 10,000 ft.85 Once beyond 6,000 ft, aircraft like the Indian Navy’s P8i Poseidon and IAF’s C-130 aircraft will also be able to operate from here. At 10,000 ft it will be possible to operate all fully loaded fighter class aircraft of the IAF. Fig 8.6: Radii of Action of the Su-30 MKI from the ANC
Source: Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “Unsinkable aircraft carriers: India’s island territories have great strategic potential which must be realised”, Firstpost, September 23, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news-expert-views-news-analysis-firstpost viewpoint/unsinkable-aircraft-carriers-how-indias-island-territories-are-great-strategic potential-11314321.html?s=08. Accessed on September 25, 2022.
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 223
Lakshadweep Islands
India can also use the Lakshadweep Islands as a logistical support base for air operations in the Arabian Sea and western IOR. The Lakshadweep archipelago is a group of 36 islands located around 200 to 470 km off India’s Malabar coast. The main island, Agatti, which serves the only airfield of 4,235 ft (1,291m), is about 459 km west of Kochi. Currently, civil flights with smaller turboprop aircraft operate between the island and the mainland; however, there was a plan to extend the airfield up to 1,500 ft with a bridge over the stilt so that larger aircraft like the Airbus A320 or Boeing 737 could be operated. However, this plan was shelved due to environmental problems but could still be expanded to the north in the island by relocating some of the residents. Since the island is close to 500 km away from the mainland, a larger runway in the Agattti Island will better enable air operations to expand the coverage on the Arabian Sea rather than fighter aircraft operating from mainland bases.
Naval Aviation
India has a fairly advanced naval aviation comprising fighters, helicopters, Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft, and UAVs which can provide the entire spectrum of maritime operations from two aircraft carriers, the INS Vikramaditya and IAC Vikrant. India has had a long history of operating aircraft carriers since the decommissioned INS Vikrant, from 1961. The Russian-made INS Vikramaditya can carry 24 MiG29K/Sea Harrier combat aircraft, 10 Kamov 31 radar picket Airborne Early Warning (AEW ) helicopters/ALH-Dhruv helicopters, Kamov 28 naval helicopters, Sea King helicopters, and Chetak helicopters. The indigenously-developed IAC Vikrant can carry 45 MiG-29K/ KUB fighters, acquired from Russia, however, the Indian Navy is looking for either F/A-18 Super Hornets (Block 3) or Rafale-M fighters (naval version of the Rafale 4.5 generation fighter jet that the Indian Air Force operates). Capability-wise, the two aircraft are similar but the Super Hornet has a higher payload capacity at 66,000lb (29,937 kg) than the Rafale’s 54,000lb.86 The MiG-29K has a range of 2,000 km, which can be increased to 3,000 km by aerial refuelling with three underwing
224 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
fuel drop tanks.87 The range of the F/A-18 Super Hornet is 3,330 km, and it can execute sorties against Chinese targets by loitering beyond the range of China’s hypersonic anti-ship missiles, thanks to conformal, shoulder-hugging, drag-reducing fuel tanks capable of carrying 3,500 pounds of fuel. The Indian Navy has plans to enhance the naval aviation, including acquiring a third carrier—the IAC II—of similar size as the IAC I, which is being developed indigenously and the government is considering it positively.88 This suggests that operating from the Andaman Sea, the carrierborne fighters can cover the entire South China Sea, and China’s southeastern coast, including Guangzhou, the headquarters of the Southern Theatre Command. Besides, the Indian Navy operates 109 helicopters of various kinds which include the Helix, Sea King, Dhruv, and Chetak.89 To enhance its anti-submarine operations, the Indian Navy bought 12 P-8I Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from Boeing and also contracted with the Sikorsky Corporation to buy 24 MH-60R helicopters in 2020: the first batch of two helicopters arrived in India in end-July 2022.90
Collaborations with Other Countries
India has strategic partnerships with the Indian Ocean island countries and has signed strategic partnership agreements for using their territory for military purposes. India and Mauritius signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2015 to develop a military base with a full runway and naval staging point at North Agalega,91 It helps India to monitor the activities of the Chinese Navy and can be used for transit and specific operations for the air force. Also, in the island states of Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius, India has installed radar outposts and other surveillance mechanisms.92 Similarly, India can use the island territories of external states such as Coco Keeling Island of Australia, Diego Garcia of the US, and Réunion Islands of France, with which the IAF regularly carries out air exercises and has signed military logistics enabling agreements for the integration of forces during a crisis in the Indian Ocean region (Fig 8.7).
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 225
Fig 8.7: Island Airfields of Friendly Foreign Countries
Source: Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “Unsinkable aircraft carriers: India’s island territories have great strategic potential which must be realised”, Firstpost, September 23, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news-expert-views-news-analysis-firstpost viewpoint/unsinkable-aircraft-carriers-how-indias-island-territories-are-great-strategic potential-11314321.html?s=08. Accessed on September 25, 2023.
Conclusions
In recent times, China has been enhancing its aerial capability to dominate the overwater domain in the western Pacific theatre. Chinese war planes frequently intrude into the Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) of Taiwan and Japan, demonstrating China’s assertiveness as well as its proven capabilities to take them on. China’s air force modernisation, with fifth generation fighter aircraft and hypersonic weapons, has led to a competition for aerial dominance in East Asia; Japan is vying for developing a sixth generation fighter aircraft programme in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Italy, 93 while the US is going ahead with the B-21 Raider bomber, the world’s first sixth
226 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
generation jet and a strategic bomber.94 Until China resolves the Taiwan question, it will be preoccupied with the East Asian theatre. But, at the same time, a simultaneous two-ocean navy means the PLAAF has to provide aerial coverage for the PLAN in both the Indian and Pacific Ocean theatres. In recent times, China has started to enhance its aerial capabilities in its western region to prepare for a two-front war against the US and its allies in the western Pacific, while neutralising the Indian threat in the western theatre as well as in the Indian Ocean. China fears that India might launch a simultaneous attack on its western region if a US-China war breaks out over Taiwan. Similarly, it believes that India may attempt to interdict the Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean which will force China to either end the war quickly or surrender, because without the energy coming from the Middle East and Africa, China cannot prolong the war. In this scenario, China would ensure that a simultaneous attack by India would prove too costly for New Delhi. It is now greatly fortifying its Western Theatre Command with a number of new airfields as well as strengthening the existing fields with hangars for strategic bombers that can be used against Indian assets in the Indian Ocean.95 Besides, China could also launch independent air operations against India in the Indian Ocean, following a land skirmish in the Himalayas between the two. China could arm-twist its close partners, Pakistan and Myanmar, or the Southeast Asian states, if the US prevents them from giving their air space for China to use against India. In this situation, China’s Western and Southern Theatre Commands could launch aerial operations against Indian aircraft carriers, platforms ships, command and control stations in the peninsula, and Indian military assets in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. To overcome the bottlenecks for the PLAAF in the Indian Ocean, China may establish a dual use airfield, on the lines of the dual use MSR ports, in the littoral countries, notably in the East African region. The US Department of Defence, in its 2022 report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022, stated that “the PRC is likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection”, other than the Djibouti base, in faraway regions.96 A dual use airport in the African continent
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 227
on the western side of the Indian Ocean and a naval base and an airfield in Dara Sakor from the eastern part would be enough to provide aerial support for the PLAN’s operations in the Indian Ocean. Undoubtedly, Chinese MSR ports along the littorals and dual use airports on both sides of the Indian Ocean would mount a significant challenge to India in its backyard. To counter China’s military expansionism towards the Indian Ocean, India has to develop an A2/AD system centred on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. By strengthening the Andaman and Nicobar Command by modernising airfields and also by installing air defence systems, including powerful long-range radars, and SAMs, India could deter the Chinese aerial threat.97 Similarly, India has to build alliance cohesion with its strategic partners, particularly the US, for Air Domain Awareness (ADA), which would help get early warning communication from various installations that the US has established to monitor China in all the domains—land, sea, and space—to deter incoming missiles as well as bombers and fighter aircraft. Aircraft carriers may not be deployed offensively in the Indian Ocean, at least in this decade, due to a lack of operational experience for the crew as well as induction of offensive systems on board, including air defence systems.98 As of now, the aerial threat from China is likely to come from the home-based airfields under the Southern and Western Theatre Commands as well as the new base in Cambodia. With an A2/AD on the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, and close cooperation with the US which can not only provide early warning information but also mount pressure on the regional countries to constrain them from allowing their air space to be used against India, India can effectively deter the PLA’s aerial operations in the Indian Ocean region.
Notes 1.
2. 3.
Xiaobing Li, “The Dragon’s Wing: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Strategy”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, July-August 2022, pp. 125-136. Military Balance 2021 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2021). Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing, China, January 2009, p. 27, https://programs.fas. org/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf. Accessed on November 15, 2022
228 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 4.
5.
6.
7.
8. 9. 10.
11. 12.
13.
14.
15. 16.
Ruan Kexiang, “Several Theoretical Issues Concerning the Strategic Air Force,” in Zhu Hui, ed., Strategic Air Force, (Beijing: Blue Sky Press 2009), pp. 68-9, cited in Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force’”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2016, p. 13. Liu Zhen, “What is China’s Joint Operations Command Centre and Who’s in Charge?” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/military/article/3200564/what-chinas-joint-operations-command centre-and-whos-charge. Accessed on November 21, 2022. Mark Cozad and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, People’s Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance in China’s Changing Security Environment (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand. org/pubs/research_reports/RR2057.html. Accessed on November 30, 2022. Amber Wang, “Analysts Seize on Xi’s Mention of Strong ‘Strategic Deterrence’ as Sign of China’s Nuclear Build-up”, South China Morning Post, October 18, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196408/analysts-seize xis-mention-strong-strategic-deterrence-sign-chinas-nuclear-build. Accessed on November 15, 2022. Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 2013), p. 253. Ibid., p. 224. “Commander of the Southern Theater Command: Safeguarding Rights and Interests in the South China Sea is the Most Important Mission”, People’s Daily, February 28, 2016, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/mil/2016/02-28/7775861. shtml. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Michael S. Chase and Jeffrey Engstrom, “China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic Take”, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3, 2016, pp. 49-52. Department of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021,” Government of the United States of America, Washington, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense. gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on November 10, 2022. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing, July 24, 2019), https://english.www.gov. cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Department of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021,” Government of the United States of America, Washington, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense. gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF . Accessed on December 6, 2023. Ibid., p. 102. Each of China’s air divisions generally consists of 70-120 fighter aircraft, or 70 to 90 bombers, each brigade reportedly has 24 aircraft and each bomber regiment has 18 bombers.
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 229 17. Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force: Bomber Force Organization”, China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, Montgomery, May 2, 2022, https:// www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3016239/pla-air-force-bomber force-organization/. Accessed on November 26, 2022. 18. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2016, April 2016, p. 31, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20 Military%20Power%20Report.pdf. Accessed on December 10, 2022. 19. Richard Fisher, “China Showcases New Weapon Systems at 3 September Parade,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 8, 2015; cited in Beauchamp-Mustafaga, n. 6, p. 2. 20. Roland Oliphant, “How China’s Military Parade will Showcase a Country Seeking Regional Dominance”, The Telegraph, September 30, 2019, https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2019/09/30/chinas-military-parade-will-showcase-country-seeking regional/. Accessed on December 10, 2022. 21. Mike Yeo, “Video Reveals Chinese H-6N Bomber Carrying Suspected Hypersonic Weapon”, Defence News, October 19, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/ asia-pacific/2020/10/19/video-reveals-chinese-h-6n-bomber-carrying-suspected hypersonic-weapon./ Accessed on September 14, 2022. 22. Roland Oliphant, “How a Publishing Error may have Revealed China’s Secret Super Missile”, The Telegraph, November 19, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2019/11/19/accidental-espionage-publishing-error-may-have-revealed chinas/. Accessed on November 19, 2022. 23. Yeo, n. 21. 24. Ellen Nakashima and Cate Cadell, “China secretly building naval facility in Cambodia, Western officials say”, The Washington Post, June 6, 2022, https://www. washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/06/cambodia-china-navy-base ream/. Accessed on November 15, 2022. 25. Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network”, Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482. Accessed on November 10, 2022. 26. Hannah Beech, “A Jungle Airstrip Stirs Suspicions About China’s Plans for Cambodia”, The New York Times, December 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/12/22/world/asia/cambodia-china-military-bases.html. Accessed on November 19, 2023. 27. “The Law of Neutrality”, in A. R. James C. Duncan, eds., International Law Studies, Vol. 73 (Newport: Naval War College, 1999), p. 370, https://ia601502.us.archive. org/8/items/annotatedsupplem73thom/annotatedsupplem73thom.pdf. Accessed on November 12, 2023. 28. “ASEAN remains China’s No. 1 trade partner from Jan to Apr, accounting for 14.6% of total trade”, Global Times, May 9, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202205/1265133.shtml. Accessed on November 22, 2023.
230 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 29. Danson Cheong and Charissa Yong, “China, US in race for Asean: Who has the edge?” The Strait Times, May 23, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/multimedia/ graphics/2022/05/china-us-influence-asean-southeast-asia/index.html. Accessed on November 11, 2023. 30. Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan”, The New York Times, September 22, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/ global/23rare.html. Accessed on November 11, 2023. 31. “China punishes Australia for promoting an inquiry into covid-19”, The Economist, May 21, 2020, https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/05/21/china-punishes australia-for-promoting-an-inquiry-into-covid-19. Accessed on November 28, 2023. 32. Smriti Chaudhary, “After Spotting J-20 Jets, Nuclear-Capable H-6 Bombers, India Deeply Monitoring Chinese Air Bases”, The Eurasian Times, August 21, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/after-spotting-j-20-jets-nuclear-capable-h-6-bombers india-deeply-monitoring-chinese-air-bases/. Accessed on November 26, 2023. 33. Ibid. 34. “New Gwadar International Airport”, Airport Technology, April 4, 2019, https:// www.airport-technology.com/projects/new-gwadar-international-airport/. Accessed on September 14, 2022. 35. Ranjit B Rai, “China-Pakistan naval axis to contain India’s dominance in IOR”, South Asia Monitor, October 22, 2020, https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/ china-pakistan-naval-axis-contain-indias-dominance-ior. Accessed on September 22, 2022. 36. Kamlesh Agnihotri, Strategic Direction of the Chinese Navy: Capability and Intent Assessment (New Delhi: Bloomsbury 2015). 37. Eurasian Times Desk, “China’s SU-30MK2, J-10A Fighter Jets Conduct Tactical Combat Drills”, The Eurasian Times, March 22, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/ chinas-pla-naval-brigade-conducts-tactical-combat-drills-with-su-30mk2-j-10a fighters/. Accessed on April 24, 2022. Accessed on December 12, 2022. 38. Ibid. 39. n. 14. 40. “Aircraft Carrier Liaoning’s Latest Voyage Lays Down Foundation for Enhanced Night Combat”, Global Times, August 8, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202108/1230896.shtml. Accessed on December 20, 2022. 41. America’s Indo-Pacific Command suggests that China will operate four carriers by 2025. British defence intelligence reckons that it may have as many as five by 2030. The expert consensus is that China plans eventually to build a fleet of somewhere between six and ten. For details, see “China’s Next Aircraft Carrier will be its Biggest”, The Economist, July 1, 2021, https://www.economist.com/china/2021/07/01/chinas next-aircraft-carrier-will-be-its-biggest. Accessed on December 20, 2022. 42. Kristin Huang, “China’s Next Aircraft Carrier: Nuclear-Power Speculation Continues”, South China Morning Post, October 9, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 231
43.
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45. 46. 47. 48. 49.
50. 51. 52. 53.
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news/china/military/article/3195306/chinas-next-aircraft-carrier-nuclear-power speculation. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Minnie Chan, “China’s Aircraft Carrier No 4 will not Catch up with US Navy’s Nuclear-Powered Giants, Analysts Say”, South China Morning Post, June 23, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3182842/chinas aircraft-carrier-no-4-will-not-catch-us-navys-nuclear. Accessed on November 30, 2022. “Chinese Navy Liaoning Aircraft Carrier has Tested its Integrated Combat Capability”, Navy Recognition, May 10, 2020, https://www.navyrecognition.com/ index.php/news/defence-news/2020/may-2020/8347-chinese-navy-liaoning aircraft-carrier-has-tested-its-integrated-combat-capability.html. Accessed on December 20, 2022. “Liaoning (Varyag) Aircraft Carrier, China”, Naval Technology, September 24, 2012, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/varyag-aircraft-carrier-china/. Accessed on December 22, 2022. Agnihotri, n. 36. Ibid. “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Returns to Home Port”, China Military online, September 23, 2013, http://en.people.cn/90786/8407244.html. Accessed on December 24, 2022. Associated Press, “China Aircraft Carrier on Combat Training in Western Pacific”, The Star, May 3, 2022, https://www.thestar.com/news/world/asia/2022/05/03/ china-aircraft-carrier-on-combat-training-in-western-pacific.html. Accessed on December 19, 2022. “Experts’ Comparative Analysis of Performance Between J-15 and US F-18”, People’s Daily Online, September 6, 2013, http://en.people.cn/90786/8392418.html. Accessed January 4, 2023. Rick Joe, “It’s Time to Talk About J-15, China’s First Carrierborne Fighter”, The Diplomat, April 28, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/its-time-to-talk about-j-15-chinas-first-carrierborne-fighter/. Accessed on December 10, 2022. Rick Joe, “China’s J-15 Carrierborne Fighter: Sizing up the Competition”, The Diplomat, May 20, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/chinas-j-15 carrierborne-fighter-sizing-up-the-competition/. Accessed on May 15, 2022. “China’s 1st Indigenous Aircraft Carrier to be Combat-Ready by 2020: Report”, Business Standard, October 27, 2020, https://www.business-standard.com/article/ international/china-s-1st-indigenous-aircraft-carrier-to-be-combat-ready-by-2020 report-120102701577_1.html. Accessed on July 26, 2022. Greg Waldron, “Beijing Commissions its Second Aircraft Carrier”, Flight Global, December 18, 2019, at https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/beijing-boosts-its carrier-power-with-shandong-commissioning/135830.article. Accessed on August 31, 2022. “China’s 2nd Aircraft Carrier Group holds 1st Drill in 2021 in S. China Sea, ‘Training for Combat Preparedness’,” Global Times, May 2, 2021, https://
232 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
56.
57.
58.
59.
60. 61. 62.
63. 64. 65. 66.
67. 68.
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1222578.shtml. Accessed on August 26, 2022. Press Trust of India, “China Launches Most Advanced 3rd Aircraft Carrier, Eyes Extended Range into Indo-Pacific”, The Indian Express, June 17, 2022, https:// indianexpress.com/article/world/china-3rd-aircraft-carrier-indo-pacific/. Accessed on December 30, 2022. Sumeda, “China’s New High-Tech Aircraft Carrier Fujian and its Advanced Catapult System”, The Hindu, June 29, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/ news/international/china-aircraft-carrier-advanced-catapult-system-emals/ article65556194.ece. Accessed on November 17, 2022. Andreas Rupprecht Mainz and Jon Grevatt, “Shenyang Produces First CatapultCapable J-15,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 16, 2021, https://www.janes. com/defence-news/news-detail/shenyang-produces-first-catapult-capable-j-. Accessed on November 10, 2022 15#:~:text=China’s%20Shenyang%20Aircraft%20 Corporation%20(SAC,to%20images%20released%20by%20AVIC; David Axe, “China’s Next Carrier Fighter Is A Lighter, Meaner J-15,” Forbes, December 20, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/12/20/chinas-new-carrier fighter-is-a-lighter-meaner-j-15/?sh=251c41da7e5a. Accessed on November 11, 2022. Ellen Nakashima and Cate Cadell, “China Secretly Building Naval Facility in Cambodia, Western Officials say”, The Washington Post, June 6, 2022, https://www. washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/06/cambodia-china-navy-base ream/. Accessed on December 16, 2022. Nan Li, “The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime Strategy”, China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 8, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/southern-theater command-chinas-maritime-strategy/. Accessed on December 19, 2022. n. 14. Amber Wang, “China’s H-6 Bombers in Show of Air-Navy Coordination Near Southern Japan, Military Experts Say”, South China Morning Post, June 28, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3183271/chinas-h-6-bombers show-air-navy-coordination-near-southern. Accessed on December 10, 2022. PLA operates three prime variants of the H-6 bomber: the H-6K (conventional bomber), the H-6J (maritime strike role), and the H-6N (nuclear missile capable). n. 14. Ibid. H I Sutton, “Chinese Military Surveillance Ship, Aircraft Spotted at Contested South China Sea Reef ”, UNI News, June 10, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/06/10/ chinese-military-surveillance-ship-aircraft-spotted-at-contested-south-china-sea reef. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Nakashima and Cadell, n. 59. Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network”, Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 233
69. 70.
71.
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73. 74. 75. 76. 77.
78.
79.
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81.
raises-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Nick Childs and Douglas Barrie, “Catapulting China’s Carrier Capabilities”, IISS Military Balance Blog, June 10, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military balance/2022/06/catapulting-chinas-carrier-capabilities Parth Satam, “‘Battle of 35s’: US F-35 or China’s J-35 Stealth Aircraft: A Battle of Equals or Comparing Apples with Oranges?” Eurasia Times, December 18, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/american-f-35-vs-chinese-j-35-stealth-aircraft-a-battle of-equals/. Accessed on December 28, 2022. Parth Satam, “Rejected By PLAAF, China ‘Re-Launching’ Its Second Stealth Fighter Jet; Appears Similar To American F-35s”, Eurasia Times, July 25, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/china-re-launching-its-second-stealth-fighter-jet appears-similar-to-f-35s/. Accessed on November 16, 2022. CRS Report 2022, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2022, pp. 22-23, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. Accessed on November 13, 2022. Military Balance 2023 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023), p. 253. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. “Sovereign air space” corresponds to the air space above sovereign territory, including territorial waters. International air space is not under the control of any state. The 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation facilitates overflight of sovereign air space by commercial [but not military] aircraft, although China and Russia are not parties to the convention. Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 95, cited by David Brewster, “The People’s Liberation Army and Operational Access in the Indian Ocean Region: Geographic Constraints and Lessons from the Cold War”, in Roger Cliff, and Roy Kamphausen, Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, July 2022), pp. 67-87. Cristina L. Garafola, and Timothy R. Heath, “The Chinese Air Force’s First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force”, RAND Report, November 10, 2017, p. 24, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2056.html. Accessed on December 10, 2022. Sakshi Tiwari, “Chinese ‘Stealth’ Espionage! How Beijing-Backed Hackers ‘Acquired’ Sensitive US Tech Used In Its F-35 Fighter Jet?” Eurasia Times, February 3, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/chinese-stealth-espionage-us-tech-used-in-its-f 22-f-35-fighter/. Accessed on December 10, 2022. Rick Joe, “Chinese Anti-Submarine Warfare: Aviation Platforms, Strategy, and Doctrine”, The Diplomat, December 16, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/
234 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
82. 83.
84.
85.
86. 87. 88.
89. 90.
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92. 93.
chinese-anti-submarine-warfare-aviation-platforms-strategy-and-doctrine/. Accessed on November 17, 2022. Ibid. Olli Pekka Suorsa, “The Anti-Submarine Warfare Component of China’s Sorties in Taiwan’s ADIZ”, The Diplomat, November 4, 2021, https://thediplomat. com/2021/11/the-anti-submarine-warfare-component-of-chinas-sorties-in taiwans-adiz. Accessed on November 10, 2022. Department of Defence, Annual Report of Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022,” November 29, 2022, p. 53, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022 MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. Accessed on December 30, 2022. Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “Unsinkable aircraft carriers: India’s island territories have great strategic potential which must be realised”, Firstpost, September 23, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news-expert-views-news-analysis-firstpost viewpoint/unsinkable-aircraft-carriers-how-indias-island-territories-are-great strategic-potential-11314321.html?s=08. Accessed on September 25, 2023. “INS Vikrant: A profile of India’s newest aircraft carrier”, Naval Technology, September 2, 2022, https://www.naval-technology.com/features/ins-vikrant-a profile-of-indias-newest-aircraft-carrier/. Accessed on September 22, 2022. “MiG-29K Carrier-Based Multirole Fighter Aircraft”, Naval Technology, November 23, 2011, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/mig-29k-carrier-based multirole-fighter-aircraft/. Accessed on September 22, 2022. Rajat Pandit, “MoD nod for projects worth over Rs. 2 Crore”, The Times of India, December 1, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/defence-ministry approves-capital-acquisition-proposals-worth-rs-223-lakh-crore-for-armed-forces/ articleshow/105641076.cms. Accessed on December 4, 2023. Military Balance 2021 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2021). HT Correspondent, “Indian Navy: Two new MH-60R choppers arrive in India from the US”, Hindustan Times, July 28, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/indian-navy-two-new-mh-60r-choppers-arrive-in-india-from-the us-101659021579698.html. Accessed on September 25, 2022. Ministry of External Affairs, “List of Agreements/MoUs signed between India and Mauritius during the visit of the Prime Minister to Mauritius (March 11, 2015)”, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24900/List_of_AgreementsMoUs_ signed_between_India_and_Mauritius_during_the_visit_of_the_Prime_Minister_ to_Mauritius_March_11_2015. Accessed on September 25, 2022. Chopra, n. 85. Brad Lendon, “Japan, Britain and Italy Plan Sixth-Generation Fighter Jet to Rival World’s Most-Advanced Warplanes”, CNN, December 9, 2022, https://edition.cnn. com/2022/12/09/asia/japan-uk-italy-new-fighter-plane-deal-intl-hnk-ml/index. html. Accessed on December 10, 2022.
A Comparison of the PLAAF’s and IAF’s Assets in the Indian Ocean • 235 94. Majid Alam, “First 6th Gen Jet and Stealth Bomber: US Air Force to Unveil ‘Most Advanced Military Aircraft’ Today | Explained”, News18.com, December 2, 2022, https://www.news18.com/news/world/first-6th-gen-jet-stealth-bomber-us-air force-to-unveil-most-advanced-military-aircraft-today-explained-6518479.html. Accessed on December 14, 2022. 95. Smriti Chaudhary, “After Spotting J-20 Jets, Nuclear-Capable H-6 Bombers, India Deeply Monitoring Chinese Air Bases”, The Eurasian Times, August 21, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/after-spotting-j-20-jets-nuclear-capable-h-6-bombers india-deeply-monitoring-chinese-air-bases/ Accessed on November 10, 2022. 96. Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2022”, Washington DC: Department of Defence, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. Accessed on August 29, 2023. 97. Chopra, n. 85. 98. “What to make of China’s New Aircraft-Carrier”, The Economist, June 23, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/23/what-to-make-of-chinas-new aircraft-carrier. Accessed on September 30, 2022.
9.
Conclusion
…while to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important
oceanic areas, to India, it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in
that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.…The Indian Ocean must, therefore, remain truly Indian.
—K.M. Panikkar1
India is strategically located vis-à-vis both continental Asia as well as
the IO Region…. The seas surrounding India have been a theatre of
superpower rivalry in the past, and continue to be a region of heightened
activity from, and by, extra-regional navies on account of global security concerns.
—Annual Report of Ministry of Defence, 20042
The Indo-Pacific region is going to be the contested zone for dominance in the 21st century. China seeks complete dominance in the western Pacific and deterrence towards the Indian Ocean. It wants to deter India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean, and has been expanding its naval and air force presence in the region even without a real military base in the IOR. The Indian Ocean is integral to China’s ‘core’ security strategy, a part of the PLA’s 1.5 military strategy as well as China’s energy security and MSR assets protection strategy. With its sophisticated anti-access and area denial capability, it has become an unrivalled power within the first island chain which includes the Yellow
Conclusion • 237
Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.3 Until recently, China’s main strategic objective was to secure the area up to the second island chain, and it considered the areas between the second and third island chains as a buffer zone. Now, with the massive MSR investments and the sustained naval deployment to protect these assets, China has been attempting to establish a stakeholder position in the security dynamics of the IOR.This is in consonance with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ project of emerging as a ‘true Maritime Great Power (MGP)’ by the middle of the century when China celebrates the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049.4 With the expeditionary propensity of the PLAAF, China’s air force is looking for aerial coverage for the PLAN’s ships in the Indian Ocean from shore-based assets, while its aircraft carrier is vulnerable to enemy attacks at least for this decade By the middle of the century, China might attempt to ensure that its surrounding seas and the water body that it depends on for energy and trade interests are Chinese waters. In this regard, its actions targeting the Indian Ocean will affect the Indian interests because the Indian Ocean is critical to India’s security calculations. Ever since Xi Jinping took over as Chinese president in 2013, China’s national security strategy has undergone a significant transformation. As You Ji argues, Xi has been “instrumental in changing China’s passivity into an assertive strategy” to promote its power and glory.5 Today, the Chinese Navy is the largest in the world in terms of tonnage, and more ships are on the production line.The PLAAF is strengthening its combat capability up to Guam in the Pacific as well as into the Indian Ocean.The new strategic bombers such as the H6N and H20 bolster the PLAAF’s capability to target long distance assets and locations in the Indian Ocean. Its naval ships’ construction spree started along with China’s ‘going out’ strategy during the Hu Jintao period. It had 216 ships in 2005 that increased to “approximately 355 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, and fleet auxiliaries”, according to the 2022 Congressional Service Report.6 The new inventory of the navy has sped up since Xi came to power. There has been a major transformation during this period, from a regional and technologically inadequate navy to one that is global, upgraded, and capable of multiple missions far away from
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China’s ports and bases. Its current destroyers are technologically at par with those of the US Navy—the only area in which China lags behind the US is the aircraft carrier; all its carriers are conventional ones.7 The latest series of nuclear armed submarines have greater endurance enabled by the AirIndependent Propulsion (AIP) system, a much needed stealth capability for far seas operations.8 China has also increased its nuclear submarine building facilities and the new facility can produce one SSN a year and one SSBN every two years—meaning there will be eight more SSNs and about four more SSBNs by 2030.9 Similarly, as per various reports, China plans to build a fleet of aircraft carriers, somewhere between four and ten, by 2030.10 This suggests that at least one aircraft carrier can be present in the Indian Ocean throughout the year, and may be more if China goes in for higher numbers, making it a formidable military power in the IOR. The PLAN will be a ‘strategic force’ in the Indian Ocean with multifarious activities which include protection of Chinese assets (MSR), search and rescue operations, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, anti-piracy operations, UN peace-keeping operations, and above all, it will facilitate China’s military strategy of “strategic deterrence and maritime counter-attack.”11 The PLAN’s real military role would indeed evolve as and when a crisis emerges either in East Asia over the Taiwan Strait or in the IOR such as prevention of use of the SLOCs by rival powers. Similarly, if a security crisis emerges in a littoral state, Beijing expects the Chinese Navy to be the first foreign force to provide security assistance. Accordingly, only the crisis will reveal what role the Chinese naval ships could afford to play and who will provide the basing facilities for the PLAN in the IOR, especially over a US-confrontation over Taiwan or a Sino-Indian War. Undoubtedly, the Chinese Navy’s larger and permanent presence in the IOR constrains the Indian Navy’s manoeuvrability in its home waters and will also render its ‘net security provider’ status insignificant. The Chinese strategy towards the Indian Ocean is to gain strategic rather than military dominance.12 Strategic dominance has multiple dimensions. Strategic dominance in a particular region means that the dominant power has no rival in the region that could hurt its interests. It ensures a favourable regional order which caters to unfettered military access across the region in
Conclusion • 239
times of both peace and crisis. It aims to get a controlling stake over resources the region trades in, and with other countries. Also, the regional countries’ economic dependence on the dominant power increases because it will be the main source of finance, as a major investor as well as a trade facilitator. Eventually, it contributes to better economic and security cooperation between them and the dominant power. The Chinese strategy is to secure access to ports in strategic locations to gain economic and strategic advantages during peace-time as well as in a conflict. For many reasons, however, China would not be able to perform the kind of military dominance in the IOR that it seeks to establish in the ‘near seas’ and the western Pacific. The near seas are the primary areas of security concern for China, and the defence capabilities that have been developed are to defend them. And its immediate rival is the United States, a power superior to China in all formats. Also, China is far from being a free rider on neighbourhood diplomacy: its territorial disputes with the neighbouring countries in the East and South China Seas can disrupt its far seas ambitions. Besides, the Senkaku/Diayou problem hinders Beijing from seeking fullfledged naval dominance even in the East China Sea. Even if China settles the Taiwan problem in its favour and the US fails to intervene in support of Taiwan, Chinese suzerainty in the western Pacific would not be acceptable for Japan. Tokyo is strengthening its own capabilities, both naval and air power. Japan has decided to spend 2 per cent of the GDP in its 2023 budget and has planned to acquire long-range counter-strike capability to deter China.13 So, diverting naval capabilities from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean for full-spectrum dominance would be a risky matter for China. Of course, the PLAN hopes to become a two-ocean navy, but without a significant shift of its naval assets, the PLAN will face challenges from the Indian, Australian and US Navies in the Indian Ocean. China might attempt to neutralise India’ natural naval and air dominance in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Air Force can cover the area from the Gulf of Aden to the Malacca Strait from the shore-based air stations. This will make Chinese platform ships, including an aircraft carrier, vulnerable in the Indian Ocean waters. The Poseidon-8I (P-8I) surveillance aircraft that India bought from the US has submarine hunting capabilities. The recently
240 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
bought MQ-9B Predator drones also help India in tracking the movements of Chinese submarines. India has monitored and tracked all the PLAN’s submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean the moment they entered the Indian Ocean region through the Malacca Strait.14 Since China doesn’t have any military assets in the Indian Ocean regional countries, it has to rely on the shore-based assets and the aircraft carrier for air operations in the region. Even though the PLAAF has enhanced cooperation with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and can use the Gwadar and Karachi airfields, the IAF can neutralise the Chinese threat from the Western Theatre Command as the IAF operates from 20 air bases in the northern and western regions of India. Similarly, from the Southern Theatre Command, it requires permission from the Southeast Asian countries which might be difficult for China during a war-like situation. Also, India can nuetralise an air-to-air campaign in the Indian Ocean with air operations from the ANC and Thanjavur Commands. At the same time, China’s strategic dominance of the IOR is imperative for it to secure its energy and trade interests, especially during a China-US military confrontation over Taiwan in the western Pacific. Beijing’s major worry is preventing domination of its SLOCs by rival powers during a crisis in East Asia. A US or Indian dominance of the Indian Ocean would severely cripple China’s economic and security interests during a war in East Asia. In this regard, deterring other countries dominance of the Indian Ocean is a major part of China’s ‘open seas protection’ strategy. For that, it has to emerge as a predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean, with no rival power, regional, like India, or extra-regional, like the US and its allies, dominating the ocean and challenging Chinese commercial as well as security interests there.
Implications for India
With a two-ocean navy, including four or five aircraft carriers as well as bombers and long range cruise missiles, China is poised to make its military presence in the Indian Ocean by 2030-35 period. The PLAAF will provide coverage for the navy from the shore-based assets under the Southern Theatre Command and also in cooperation with the Pakistan Air Force
Conclusion • 241
in the northeastern Indian Ocean. After almost two decades of military modernisation, China’s new naval systems are technologically advanced and can match those of the US Navy. Its new generation submarines are more quiet compared with older generation ones and it has acquired submarine detection capabilities by deploying several underwater sensor networks known as the ‘Underwater Great Wall,’ in the South China Sea and other regions around the Chinese coast, putting US nuclear submarines at risk when operating within the first island chain area.15 China frequently sends nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean as part of its ‘deterrence and nuclear counter-attack’ strategy. For gathering maritime domain awareness for the submarine operations, since 2019, China has sent as many as 48 Chinese scientific research vessels to the IOR with the general area of deployment being the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea towards the Persian Gulf. 16 The PLA gives closer attention to the eastern India Ocean, including the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, because of the ANC from where India can target Chinese military assets in the South China Sea. Similarly, the PLAAF can target Indian military assets in the Indian Ocean and in the peninsula from airfields created in the artificial islands in the South China Sea as well as from Dara Sakor in Cambodia. The eastern Indian Ocean is more vulnerable to the PLAAF’s aerial attack against India. Moreover, China has expanded its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean through the BRI. With the MSR, China has built new types of alliances and partnerships aimed at enhancing Chinese power and prestige on the political, economic, and diplomatic levels in the IOR. Consistent with its maritime great power ambition, the MSR will help China in gaining strategic dominance of the Indian Ocean, along with naval dominance in the East Asian waters. The Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean will be a combination of wider economic presence, strong political connections with the littoral countries, and enhanced military capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region. Its interests in the Indian Ocean are not just to protect its trade routes and energy supplies but to become a major source of economic activity, and security guarantor in the IOR. The Chinese capital will accelerate local industrialisation and economic advancement of the regional countries, as China has been engaged in bilateral infrastructure projects, trade, and investment cooperation with them, and can
242 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
also tap its huge domestic market.17 China’s billions of dollars of investments in the littoral countries will increase their exports, and Chinese shipping companies are going to carry such products through the Indian Ocean to the outside world. This means that China is going to be the financier, producer and carrier of goods, as well as a major market for the Indian Ocean littoral countries. In the case of any crisis in this economic activity in the waters of the Indian Ocean, China wants to be the natural choice as a guarantor of the trade. Similarly, the BRI participants from the IOR are mostly low or middle income countries that badly need foreign capital and trade opportunities to sustain their economies. With a large number of investments in these countries, China can manipulate the choice of their foreign policies at various multilateral forums, including at the United Nations.This will enhance China’s naval presence as a ‘legitimate stakeholder’ of the security of the Indian Ocean region. Taking ownership of the economic activity in and around the Indian Ocean would help China move from being an East Asian power to a transOceanic power in the Indo-Pacific. Western scholars have opined that India-China competition is going to take place in the 21st century in the Indian Ocean for dominance in the water body. However, the actual competition between the two will be to win over the smaller island countries because their strategy towards, and relationship with, India and China would determine the strategic outcome in the IOR. Both India and China are providing financial and other assistance to the smaller island countries that are smart enough to receive the benefits from both. The hedging strategy that these smaller countries are pursuing is of great advantage for them as they are able to manage their independence, and not become vassal states of Beijing despite the large amount of BRI money that is being pumped into these countries by China. When they face a crisis in their relationship with China, they turn to India. In October 2021, Sri Lanka awarded the West Container Terminal (WCT) contract in the sprawling Colombo port to India’s Adani group on a Public Private Partnership (PPP) at a cost of $700 million, adjoining the Chinese-operated Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT).18 The new Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu has called for withdrawing Indian defence
Conclusion • 243
personnel stationed in the Maldives under a bilateral agreement signed with the previous Solih government, ostensibly to please China, as Muizzu is considered close to China and withdrawal Indian troops was one of the main items of his agenda during the election campaign in mid-2023.19 Undoubtedly, Beijing is emerging as an additional and, perhaps, an alternate, security provider for the Indian Ocean littoral countries. Chinese naval ships could be the first to be called in a security crisis in the littoral countries as the PLAN ships are widely deployed across the Indian Ocean. At the same time, large Chinese naval deployment for the protection of its BRI ‘assets’ and trade interests would lead to friction with the Indian Navy in the future over ‘the area of operations’ as the PLAN ships may come closer to India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), constraining the Indian Navy’s manoeuvrability in its backyard. China demonstrated its intention to test the Indian Navy’s resolve to counter the PLAN in the Indian Ocean in an incident that occurred in the eastern Indian Ocean in December 2019 when the Chinese research ship, Shiyan-1, was caught operating in the waters around Port Blair until the Indian Navy expelled it.20 It is highly unlikely that China could establish full spectrum military dominance in the Indian Ocean. The distance, strategic priorities, and naval aerial capabilities prevent China having an East Asian model in the IOR. Instead, it would follow the South China Sea style of slow and steady escalatory tactics to prevent India dominating the Indian Ocean. As a distant power, China requires formal naval bases and airfields in allied territories in the Indian Ocean littorals for full spectrum dominance of the water body. China relies on foreign partnerships and cooperation for getting basing facilities, and that too depends on the willingness of the potential host countries to accommodate the PLAN. There is no surety that the regional countries will accommodate the PLAN ships during war time despite China’s favourable influence on them through infrastructure investment, diplomatic and military engagement, and other economic incentives. Indeed, the potential host’s receptivity to China’s naval presence is ultimately beyond Beijing’s control. These countries’ major concern is how would it affect their relationship with the largest neighbour, India.
244 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
China’s current strategy for the IOR is to deny India its ‘net security provider’ status, and establish itself in that role in the IOR. Its naval ships are available throughout the year for security contingencies in and around the water body. As of now, Pakistan and Bangladesh have purchased naval systems which include submarines from China, while more countries are showing interest in buying arms from China.21 Though the acquisition is a pure commercial deal, China may use its financial strength by providing the aid-cum-purchase mechanism to win friends in the region. China provided grants and loans of around $1 billion to Sri Lanka, including arms and ammunition, during the final stages of its fight with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).22 China is providing financial aid to countries like the Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar for various infrastructure projects to strengthen its cooperation with them. It could turn into military aid in the future as these countries face various types non-traditional security threats. Also, the need to protect Chinese assets will legitimise increased PLAN deployment in the Indian Ocean, and also provide security assistance for the regional countries on demand. As it enhances its economic and military presence in the IOR, China would become the provider of ‘public goods’ in and around the IOR. This would ultimately render India’s status as a ‘net security provider’ redundant.
Policy Options for India
As the primary area of interest of the Indian Navy is the Indian Ocean which includes “the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, and their littoral regions”,23 China’s military forays into the Indian Ocean comprise a security threat to India. To deter the Chinese aerial threat in the oceanic flank which is mostly from China’s Southern Theatre Command, New Delhi has to devise an ‘active denial strategy’ with its own A2/AD capabilities in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. An “‘active denial strategy’ requires maintaining a forward military presence but being oriented toward denying an opponent the benefits of military aggression, rather than trying to ensure a decisive defeat”.24 The entry of Chinese naval ships into the Indian Ocean will be from the South China Sea and the aerial threat is also from there, and denying their entry to the Indian
Conclusion • 245
Ocean from the east would be the most appropriate strategy to counter China in the Indian Ocean. According to a study, the average cost of an A2/AD capability is about one-fiftieth of the cost of the power-projection capability that it could neutralise in war.25 In this regard, an ‘active denial strategy’ would be more economically prudent than a naval competition between China and India in the Indian Ocean for dominance. For an ‘active denial strategy’ in the Indian Ocean, there are three levels with which India can neutralise the aerial and naval threats from China before they reach the Indian Ocean: Andamans-based A2/AD Capabilities: Anti-access area-denial capabilities in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean could deter the Chinese aerial as well as naval threats. Strengthening the Andaman and Nicobar Command by modernising airfields and also by installing air defence systems with powerful long-range radars, and SAMs, 26 could counter the aerial threat. The Indian Navy’s 2015 Maritime Doctrine highlights the importance of “integral air assets” and the lack of these would “severely constrain the navy” making it “largely vulnerable in undertaking operations within hostile aerial maritime strike range.”27 The mainstay of air power of the IAF is the Su-30 MKI and its operational radii of action is 1,500 km, which can increase to over 2,000 km, so the Su-30 MKI can cover a significant part of the South China Sea and, thus, can effectively deter China’s aircraft carrier even before to enters the Indian Ocean. Similarly, India has robust anti submarine warfare capabilities with the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft which could detect and neutralise Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean water. Also, the three aircraft carrier plan of the Indian Navy for strengthening the ‘integral air assets’ would bolster its A2/AD capabilities. Besides, the deployment of attack submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean will be a force multiplier in India’s A2/AD capabilities. Bay of Bengal Security Community. India needs to strengthen its security cooperation with the littoral countries of the eastern Indian Ocean. New Delhi can consider creating a security community grouping of countries from both South Asia and Southeast Asia that share the Indian Ocean waterbody which would help negate use of their air space by China against India.
246 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
Air Domain Awareness (ADA) with QUAD Members: Cooperation on ADA with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) members, particularly the US and Japan will help gather intelligence about the PLAAF’s preparations for targeting India. The US has established early warning systems in all the domains—land, sea, and space—to monitor China’s military activities, and early warning information from the US will help deter incoming bombers and fighter aircraft targeting India. Besides, India needs to increase its engagement with the island states through bilateral aid, investment, and security assistance. New Delhi has already provided such assistance in the form of financial aid of $2billion to the Maldives,28 $100 million Line of Credit (LoC) to Mauritius to help in procurement of defence assets,29 and joint investment in Sri Lanka’s petroleum storage facility at Trincomalee30 as well as the container terminal facility at the Colombo port.31 On security matters, India must consider the IOR, not as a sub-region of the Indo-Pacific, but as its backyard and a ‘core area’. Earlier, from 2011 to 2014, the National Security Advisors of India (NSAs), Sri Lanka, and the Maldives met thrice to discuss security matters concerning the ocean; this was abandoned for a while, then resuscitated in November 2020, focussing on the ways and means for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the IOR.32 Following the fifth deputy NSA level meeting in August 2021, the maiden ‘Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) Focussed Operation’ was conducted among the three navies on November 27 and 28, 2021.33 At the deputy NSA level meeting, they identified ‘four pillars’ of cooperation: Marine Safety and Security; Terrorism and Radicalisation; Trafficking and Organised Crime; and Cyber Security.34 Like the QUAD has evolved from an official meeting to the summit level, the trilateral NSA meeting has to grow to the level of state heads so that larger security issues such as China’s naval expansionism can be discussed, which would address India’s concerns while allowing it to leverage strategically. Similarly, India has to promote a cooperative security framework for the western and northwestern Indian Ocean areas where other major powers’ presence is strong. The US has naval bases in Bahrain and Diego Garcia, and France is a resident power, while the UK, Germany, and Russia are seeking
Conclusion • 247
increased presence in the region, and all are pursuing a strategic partnership with India. To strengthen New Delhi’s bond with the West Asian and African countries, New Delhi announced the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in 2015, and Asia-Africa Growth Corridor or AAGC with Japan in 2017 to counter the Chinese BRI, along with the Indian Ocean littoral countries of Africa. This will boost India’s economic presence in the region, while engaging with other major powers will stabilise the security dynamics of the region.
Notes 1. 2.
K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 84. Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2003-2004, Government of India, p. 9, https:// www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155965/India%20%202004.pdf. Accessed on October 10, 2023. 3. Congressional Research Service, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, May 21, 2020, https:// assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6927913/China-Naval-Modernization Implications-for-U-S.pdf. Accessed on October 21, 2021. 4. “Structuring the Chinese Dream”, China Daily, January 25, 2014, http:// usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-01/25/content_17257856.htm. Accessed on November 10, 2021. 5. You Ji, “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China Sea”, RSIS Policy Brief, October 1, 2013, RSIS, NTU, Singapore, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/216-deciphering beijings-maritime/#.XifmUdR97Gg. Accessed on November 30, 2021. 6. Congressional Service Report 2022, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/ RL/RL33153/265. Accessed on December 20, 2023. 7. Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up”, National Defense, September 3, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ articles/2020/3/9/eagle-vs-dragon-how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-stack-up. Accessed on November 30, 2021. 8. NTI Fact Sheet, “China Submarine Capabilities”, July 29, 2015, https://www. nti.org/analysis/articles/china-submarine-capabilities/. Accessed on July 20, 2021. 9. Nick Danby, “China’s Navy Looms Larger”, Harvard Political Review, October 5, 2019, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/prcnavy/. Accessed on December 31, 2021. 10. America’s Indo-Pacific Command suggests that China will operate four carriers by 2025. British defence intelligence reckons that it may have as many as five by 2030.
248 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region
11.
12. 13.
14.
15.
16.
17. 18.
19. 20. 21.
The expert consensus is that China plans eventually to build a fleet of somewhere between six and ten. For details, see “China’s Next Aircraft Carrier will be its Biggest”, The Economist, July 1, 2021, https://www.economist.com/china/2021/07/01/chinas next-aircraft-carrier-will-be-its-biggest. Accessed on December 20, 2021. Ministry of National Defence, “Chapter III: Strategic Guideline of Active Defence”, China’s Military Strategy 2015, People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 2015. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586711. htm. Accessed on November 20, 2023. Joshy M Paul, “China’s Naval Strategy Towards the Indian Ocean Under Xi Jinping”, Air Power Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2021, October-December, pp. 99-120. Ken Jimbo, “Japan’s Future Security Lies in a ‘Denial and Competition’ Strategy”, The Japan Times, January 26, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/ 2023/01/26/commentary/japan-commentary/denial-security-strategy/. Accessed on February 2, 2023. PTI, “Indian Navy monitoring movement of Chinese warships participating in exercise with Pakistan”, The Hindu, November 15, 2023 https://www.thehindu. com/news/international/indian-navy-monitoring-movement-of-chinese-warships participating-in-exercise-with-pakistan/article67535471.ece. Accessed on November 22, 2023. Alastair Gale, “Era of Total U.S. Submarine Dominance Over China Is Ending”, The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/us submarine-dominance-shift-china-8db10a0d?mod=world_lead_pos1. Accessed on November 28, 2023. Shishir Gupta, “Chinese vessel Shi Yan 6 enters Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka sends mixed signals”, Hindustan Times, September 27, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes. com/india-news/chinese-vessel-shi-yan-6-enters-indian-ocean-sri-lanka-sends mixed-signals-101695785112157.html. Accessed on November 12, 2023. Hong Yu, “Motivation Behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 26, No. 105, pp. 353-368. “India Counters China in Sri Lanka with $700 Million Port Deal”, The Mint, October 1, 2021, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-counters-china-in sri-lanka-with-700-million-largest-foreign-investment-port-deal-11633046975815. html. Accessed on January 10, 2022. Associated Press, “Maldives’ New President Officially Requests India Withdraw Military Personnel”, Voice of America, November 18, 2023, https://www.voanews. com/a/7360750.html. Accessed on November 25, 2023. “Chinese Research Vessel Expelled by Indian Warship for Operating near Andaman and Nicobar Islands”, South China Morning Post, December 4, 2019 (scmp.com). Accessed on January 10, 2022. Satoru Nagao, “The Growing Militarization of the Indian Ocean Power Game and Its Significance for Japan”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, July 10, 2018,
Conclusion • 249
22. 23. 24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
29.
30.
31. 32.
https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/nagao-india-powergame.html. Accessed on January 10, 2022. Peter Layton, “How Sri Lanka Won the War”, The Diplomat, April 9, 2015, https:// thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/. Accessed on January 6, 2022. Indian Navy, Indian Maritime Doctrine 2015, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) 2015, p. 65, https://indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2015, pp. 185-199. Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, International Security, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Fall 2017), p. 110; for details about the cost-benefit analysis of A2/AD capabilities and power projection, see David Gompert and Terrence Kelly, “Escalation Cause: How the Pentagon’s New Strategy Could Trigger War with China,” Foreign Policy, August 2, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/03/ escalation-cause/ Air Marshal Anil Chopra, “Unsinkable aircraft carriers: India’s island territories have great strategic potential which must be realised”, Firstpost, September 23, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news-expert-views-news-analysis-firstpost viewpoint/unsinkable-aircraft-carriers-how-indias-island-territories-are-great strategic-potential-11314321.html?s=08 n. 23, pp. 128-129. Nayanima Basu, “Delhi’s Financial Aid to Male Exceeds $2 Billion as the Maldives Returns to ‘India First’”, The Print, August 13, 2020, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/ delhis-financial-aid-to-male-exceeds-2-billion-as-maldives-returns-to-india first/481052/. Accessed on January 8, 2021. “India Offers $100 mn LoC to Mauritius to Help Procurement of Defence Assets”, Business Standard, February 23, 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/ current-affairs/india-offers-100-mn-loc-to-mauritius-to-help-procurement-of defence-assets-121022201251_1.html. Accessed on January 8, 2021. “Sri Lanka, India Ink Deal to Jointly Redevelop Strategic Trincomalee Oil Tanker Complex”, Live Mint, January 6, 2022, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/ sri-lanka-india-ink-deal-to-jointly-redevelop-strategic-trincomalee-oil-tank complex-11641488870616.html. Accessed on January 12, 2021. Ibid. Vishal Tiwari, “4th NSA-level Meeting Held Between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives; Ajit Doval Attends”, Republic World, November 29, 2020, https://www. republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/4th-nsa-level-meeting held-between-india-sri-lanka-and-maldives-ajit-doval-attends.html. Accessed on January 8, 2021.
250 5• China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region 33. Press Information Bureau, “Colombo Security Conclave Focused Operation Between India, the Maldives and Sri Lanka”, November 28, 2021, https://pib.gov. in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1775797. Accessed on January 8, 2021. 34. “India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives to Collaborate on Security”, The Hindu, August 6, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-sri-lanka-maldives-to collaborate-on-security/article35775231.ece. Accessed on January 5, 2021.
Index
aerospace capabilities/power 9, 27
Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ)
26, 225
air force modernisation 51-6, 59
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system
238
air power strategy 4-12
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
Strategy 18-22, 227, 245
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) 56
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) 56
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)
247
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) 152-3
Aviation Industry Corporation of China
(AVIC) 66
balance of power theory 36
Balkan crisis 203
Bandung Summit of 1955 105
Bay of Bengal Security Community 245
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 1, 25, 65,
122-3
air assets in IOR 171-3
grand strategy initiative 153-60
investments in Bangladesh 164
investments in East Africa 168
investments in Indian Ocean 196
investments in Myanmar 165
investments in Pakistan 163
investments in Sri Lanka 164
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)
151-2
Vision and Action plan document
152-3
Central Military Commission (CMC) 3-4,
11, 16, 38, 42, 52, 144
Chengdu Aerospace Corporation 66
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
(CMEC) 133, 151, 210
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) 133, 151, 172, 210
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 3, 22,
37
Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) 3
Cold War 38
Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (C4ISR) 53, 56
core security strategy 236
COVID-19 pandemic 152, 156, 160
Cultural Revolution 57, 107
defence/military modernisation of China
39
focus areas 35
international situation influence 38
main drivers of 39-40
252 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region power projection ambition 49-51
technologically advanced military 36
technological modernisation 43-8
theory-driven 35
Defence White Paper
2004 8
2006 8, 22, 59
2013 161
2015 11, 26, 43, 120, 122, 152, 161,
182, 196
Deng Xiaoping 35, 50, 111
24-character strategy 51
economic reforms 130
Four Modernisations principle 107
modernisation programmes 40
people’s War Under Modern
Conditions 41
East Africa, China’s commercial presence
in 151
East China Sea 2, 44
electronic warfare (EW) 204
energy security 137-41
Eurasian zone, Silk routes in 153
far seas protection strategy 1, 112, 122
Great Leap Forward 57
Gulf War in 1991 42, 44-5, 203
Hongdu Aviation Industry Group 66
Hu Jintao 27-8, 115
maritime cooperation strategy 22-5
maritime great power concept 161
New Historic Mission 9
Indian Air Force (IAF) in Indian Ocean
227, 239-40
advanced naval aviation 223-4
Andaman and Nicobar Command
(ANC) 221-2
assets and capabilities 220-1
Lakshadweep Islands support for air
operations 223
strategic partnerships with Indian
Ocean island countries 224-5
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and China
1-2, 65, 105-7, 130-1, 174-5, 182-3,
238-9
challenges and limitations faced by
China 218-20
challenges and policy options for
India 240-7
cooperative framework strategy
115-19
dominance of China and structural
problems 194-5
energy security and protection of
SLOCs 112-15
expansion of naval presence 142-5
maritime domain awareness 110-12
maritime great power strategy 119-21
national power 135-7
naval strategy 108-9
rise in investments 151
trade interests 135-7
Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) 203
internal balancing 36
international trade connectivity 130
Japanese Self-Defence Forces ( JSDFs) 39
Jian Zemin 112
Korean War 3-4, 14, 36, 66, 105
layered defence 75
Liu Huaqing 60
local war situation 203
Local War Under Modern High-Tech
Conditions doctrine 42-3
Malacca Strait Dilemma 108, 117, 134, 183
Mao Zedong 2, 66
Index • 253 People’s war concept 3, 40-1
total war 75
Maritime Great Power (MGP) 1-2
maritime power strategy 12-16
Maritime Silk Route (MSR) strategy 25,
129-30, 152-3, 157-9
investments in IOR 160-71
Mediterranean Sea 1
Medium and Long-Term Defence and
Science Technology Plan (2006-20)
59
Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW) 116, 120, 144
Morrison, Scott 160
National Defence Industries Office
(NDIO) 66
National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) 161
NATO 117, 157
natural resources demand of China 130-1
naval capabilities 75-6
naval modernisation 56-9
near seas defence (active offshore defence
strategy) 16-18, 57
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 106
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) 117, 157
open seas protection strategy 161
Operation Atlanta 118
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) 240
peaceful development strategy 134, 145
People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) 1-7, 27, 51, 60, 92-3,
237-8
air defence mission 8-9
bombers 73-5
dual use airfield 226
expeditionary operations in Pacific
11-12
expeditionary strategy to Indian
Ocean 10, 121-2, 204-10
fighter aircraft programme 66-73
integrated air and space capabilities
for joint operations 9
mission objectives 8
modernisation of 51-6, 204
modern fighting force 9
naval aviation in IOR 211-17
offensive defence 75
operational strategy 11
reliance on Soviet Union during
mid-1960s 66
strategic air force 204
technological transformations 65
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN/
PLA Navy) 1-3, 11, 26-7, 51, 60, 123,
134, 141, 197, 226, 238
aircraft carriers 85-8
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 89
first overseas voyage 129
maritime domain awareness (MDA)
110
Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW) 116
modernisation of 56-9
naval capabilities 188-93
port visits 111
power projection scenario 88-92
submarine force 80-5
surface fleets 76-80
warships 76
PLA 9, 36
Command, Control,
Communications, and
intelligence (C3I) 41-2
defence moderinisation in 1980s 45
doctrinal reform 40-3
offensive and expeditionary
operations 11
People’s War Under Modern
Conditions doctrine 37
254 • China’s Air Power and Maritime Strategies Towards the Indian Ocean Region places not bases strategy 184
PLA Rocket Force 51
Tiananmen tragedy in 1989 44
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 158
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)
Air Domain Awareness (ADA) with
246-7
United States (US)
defence budgent 94
Navy Plan for 355 Ships by 2034 91
Navy’s Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) 11
number of ships during 2000-20 89
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)
(or Star Wars’ programme) 38
realism (theory of ) 36
regional security environment 48-9
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) 13,
20, 39, 50, 57, 75, 87-8, 109, 112-15,
123, 131
Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) 247
signals intelligence (SIGINT) 134
Silk Road Fund 152
South China Sea 2, 39, 44
Underwater Great Wall in 241
Soviet Union 1-2, 4, 7, 13, 15, 37, 48-9, 53,
58, 114
string of pearls theory 131-3, 137-42, 145,
184
Taiwan 39, 225
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 42
technology role in modern warfare 43-8
territorial disputes of China 37
theory-based situational challenge 36
threatened states 36
Three World Theory 105, 107
warfare strategy of China 203
war zone campaign 49
Wen Jiabao 116-17
World War II 105
Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation 66
Xi Jinping 2, 28, 60, 112, 119, 161
Chinese Dream of great national
rejuvenation 154, 237
Maritime great power (MGP)
strategy 25-7, 182, 186-8, 237
maritime true power 161
naval strategy 184-6
striving for achievement strategy 51,
174
Yellow Sea 2, 44
Zhou Enlai 37, 106