China’s Achilles’ Heel: The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents [1st ed.] 978-981-13-8424-0;978-981-13-8425-7

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xi
Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 1-35
The Road to the Belt and the Road (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 37-75
The BRI and Its Different Manifestations (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 77-112
India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 113-138
The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business with India (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 139-163
India as Jealous Foe and the BRI (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 165-194
Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 195-234
Conclusion: The Way to War (Srikanth Thaliyakkattil)....Pages 235-248
Back Matter ....Pages 249-257

Citation preview

China’s Achilles’ Heel The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents

Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

China’s Achilles’ Heel

Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

China’s Achilles’ Heel The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents

Srikanth Thaliyakkattil Independent Scholar Kerala, India

ISBN 978-981-13-8424-0    ISBN 978-981-13-8425-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface and Acknowledgments

This book is the product of a sustained curiosity emerged out of reading, listening, and in certain ways experiencing what is called One Belt One Road initiative by China or in the current form Belt and Road initiative (BRI) (the Chinese name of the BRI (一带一路) never changed—pointing to the difficulty of translating and communicating Chinese concepts through English—It is also the case with many other languages). BRI was announced during my final years as a doctoral candidate in the School of International Studies, Peking University. The announcement was followed by a “blitzkrieg” of BRI campaigns. It filled every sphere of the social life of Chinese, especially in media and academia. It was also the twilight period of the “China dream” campaign, which didn’t go well and was fading away. Me and many of my colleagues thought it will also go in the way of “China dream”. My colleagues in Peking University were also proud that the previous dean of our School Wang Jisi was rumoured to be the one who proposed the BRI idea, but it remains as a rumour. Unlike the “China dream” campaign BRI campaign was massive, encompassing several government departments, several think tanks and university research departments, some of them opened just in the name of BRI or its component Silk Road. The special character of the BRI campaign was that it was internal and external, for other campaigns like “China dream” the external focus was limited. In the Chinese academic circles, academicians are also concerned with material rewards, it was not the question what is BRI? Which concerned them, but that it came with lots of material rewards was the most important attraction. For Chinese young scholars academic papers with BRI in the title got accepted and published quickly, v

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a­ cademicians and media analysts still are in a race to pounding out books on BRI, and carriers are made out of BRI. Hundreds of PhD thesis and Master’s thesis was written about Belt and Road initiative. The trick was that attach the BRI to the title of the thesis or frame the thesis in such a way to include the BRI label, the advantage was that the academic output or media output with BRI label got instant visibility and acceptability. In its initial phase several foreign scholars, businessmen, media analysts from the developed world and developing world self-recruited themselves and went on to the pilgrimage of China as publicists of BRI in search of the “benefit” of the BRI. But outside China there was an ever-growing number of critics of the BRI and currently they form, arguably, the largest group. It fed into the ever-growing literature of BRI. It was the label and narrative of the BRI that was important. After leaving Beijing, spending my time in India and Singapore gave me very different and varied perspectives of the BRI. Outside China, the BRI discussions both in media and academia, concentrated on the projects which China labelled as BRI, its merits and demerits. Take out the label of BRI it ended up as a benefit/ risk analysis of certain projects. It was in want of a deeper understanding I started this research, and which ended up as a monograph. How much of what I understood that I can communicate through this monograph is in doubt, but within the timeframe and available resources, the only consolation is that I tried my best. I found out that BRI also had a huge disadvantage. BRI was and is the largest external campaign conducted by China. It was relatively easy for China to brand BRI as a benevolent one inside China because of the almost absolute control of Government over media and academia. However, outside China the label of BRI was interpreted by the countries which have powerful and influential English media and academia. For instance, one such country, India was successful in framing BRI as a threat, with concerns emerging out of BRI labelled projects adversely affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Western media and academia also interpreted the Chinese label of BRI as a threat and exploitative. China’s first large-scale attempt to build a benevolent narrative of its engagements with the world is a failure and in it India played a pivotal part. The failure of the BRI narrative and currently turning it into a hegemonic and non-­ benevolent narrative outside China will have internal and external repercussions. Through BRI, China also signalled to regional powers like India and the only reigning superpower United States that China wants to be a dominant power in the global and regional politics. The rollback of

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Chinese ambitions is started earnestly by an Indo-Pacific strategy with India and US as its core. BRI is turning out to be one of the greatest blow to China in its global engagement, will China emerge from it is a question only time can answer. Though sometimes history misguides, History can also sometimes serve as the guide to the future, for Chinese Communist Party took several devastating blows in its history, it survived the Chinese civil war, Sino-Soviet split, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square, and it may probably survive the BRI debacle and wait for another chance for the glory of becoming the superpower. I am grateful to the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), the National University of Singapore for providing space and resources for this research. I thank all my ex-colleagues, especially Sojin, Jivanta, Chulanee, Amitt, Dipinder and Deeparghya for their support and encouragement. Without the kind support and work environment provided by the ISAS administration, it will be impossible to come up with this book. I would like to thank the Chairman of the institute Ambassador Gopinath Pillai, the Director of the institute Professor Raja Mohan, Professor Subrata Mitra, Johnson Davasagayam, Hernaikh Singh, Sitara, Peggy, Sally, Shilin, and Sheila for their support and cooperation during the time I spend in ISAS. However, all the opinions expressed in this book are mine and I take full responsibility for any mistakes sneaked into this volume. Kerala, India

Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

Contents

1 Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage  1 2 The Road to the Belt and the Road 37 3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77 4 India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View113 5 The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business with India139 6 India as Jealous Foe and the BRI165 7 Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific195 8 Conclusion: The Way to War235 Index249

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2

Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % China led major new financial institutions—Country voting share in % Table 1.3 Nepal—Top 5 bilateral donors (2016–2017) Table 3.1 List of regional/national linking initiatives or development plans for BRI “alignment”

7 8 19 96

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage

On April 27 and 28, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in the Chinese province of Wuhan to reset the floundering relationship between their respective countries. The content of the two-day meeting was replete with positivity. During the summit, Modi said that “both India and China are ancient civilisations and important neighbours of each other. We [China and India] must strengthen dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, live in peace and build a friendship that lasts from generation to generation.”1 The praise and emphasis on similarities were also reciprocated by Xi Jinping, according to whom “Both China and India are countries with a splendid history and culture, and the two countries share many similarities in culture. China and India should conduct more extensive and deeper exchanges, jointly commit to the rejuvenation of Eastern civilisation, advocate respect for the diversity of civilisations and promote the harmonious coexistence of different civilisations.”2 The post-Wuhan summit statements of India and China show the divergences between the thinking of the two countries about important issues that impact the relations between them. According to India’s post-­ summit statement, “Prime Minister Modi and President Xi recognised the common threat posed by terrorism and reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They committed themselves to cooperate on counterterrorism.”3 However, in China’s post-summit statement, terrorism was © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1

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mentioned only as part of a general statement on global challenges: “We will work together to address global challenges such as epidemic diseases, natural disasters, climate change, and terrorism and will provide innovative and sustainable solutions.”4 This divergence can be viewed in light of China’s repeated blockage of India’s attempts at the United Nations to list Masood Azhar, the chief of Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-eMohammed (JeM), as a global terrorist.5 Both statements addressed the India-China border issue. The Chinese statement was a reiteration that border issues should be solved peacefully and that it was important to maintain peace in the border areas. However, the Indian statement was more specific; it stated that “the two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in all areas of the India-China border region in the larger interest of the overall development of bilateral relations.”6 Indian concerns that the border issue would negatively impact the overall relationship between India and China were not reflected in the Chinese statement. India views the boundary settlement between itself and China as a prerequisite for a healthy overall relationship, but China tends to separate the border dispute from other aspects of the India-China relationship. Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on supporting “the multilateral trading system” and opposing “protectionism” is missing from the Indian statement.7 From the Chinese perspective, the main aim of the Wuhan summit was to show that India is on the side of China in resisting the imminent retaliatory trade measures of the United States (which eventually materialised) against China due to its alleged unfair trade practices. Following the meeting between Modi and Xi, the Chinese media selectively reported Indian opinions, highlighting that India opposed United States-initiated trade protectionism while ignoring the fact that India had also initiated tariffs to protect its industries from unfair trade practices by China.8 The Chinese media also tried to depict a combined Chinese-Indian front against the West, as well as blaming the Western media for exaggerating the differences between India and China.9 In another major divergence, China’s post-summit statement repeatedly emphasised the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. This reference was missing from India’s post-summit statement.10 The reason was that since the 1962 war, Indians have never taken Chinese reiterations of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” for granted. For Indian strategic experts, the fact that “China never took the doctrine of peaceful coexistence seriously was, however, never in doubt.”11

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Ultimately, the Wuhan summit was just a showpiece event achieving nothing but a series of photo opportunities for both leaders. The core issue in the background was China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy. Discussions of the BRI were conspicuously absent from the Wuhan summit. The BRI has put into motion a set of strategies and counter-­strategies that have increased the threat perceptions and militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region. Summits such as that in Wuhan or any other so-­called confidence building meetings are held against the backdrop of the aggravated mistrust in the region that the BRI strategy has created. The BRI has marked a turning point in the geopolitics of Asia. As argued in the following chapters, it is an attempt by China to establish its narrative dominance over Asia, thus establishing itself as the predominant power in the Asian region and the world. Becoming the dominant power in Asia serves many purposes for the Communist Party-led system of China. It will ensure its survival as a unique political system, it will increase the internal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it will substantially increase the power of the CCP to shape its geopolitical environment. India’s objections and resistance to the BRI have become its most vulnerable point, and the resulting discourse has securitised the BRI.  Indian resistance has helped to transform what was purported by China to be an economic and cultural initiative into a regional security threat, as reflected in the Chinese discourse on the Indian attitude towards the BRI. Several questions raised in the Indian parliament related to the BRI reflect India’s concern over the implications of the BRI. The Indian worries are mainly concentrated on the question of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The official Indian position states that the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is being projected as a flagship project of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, which has been in illegal occupation of Pakistan since 1947. [The Indian] government has conveyed to the Chinese side, including at the highest level, its concerns about China’s activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and asked them to cease these activities. [The Indian] government has also strongly conveyed its position at multilateral and international fora where issues related to OBOR / CPEC have been raised, citing its concerns over the violation of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by this project. [The Indian] government has clearly articulated its firm belief that connectivity initiatives

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must be based on universally recognised international norms, good ­governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.12

The then-Minister of State In the Ministry Of External Affairs, M.J.  Akbar, further states that “the inclusion of the so-called CPEC, which passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir under illegal occupation of Pakistan, as a flagship project of OBOR reflects a lack of appreciation of India’s concerns regarding the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”13 China has ignored India’s concerns, and CPEC remains the most contentious issue in the BRI strategy. It was not the only Indian concern that led to the Indian rejection of the BRI; there are also other factors, such as the long-running border dispute, the enormous trade deficit, the sale of Chinese weapons to India’s South Asian neighbouring countries, and, most importantly, China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan. Indian objections and the resulting events have had an unfavourable impact on China’s BRI strategy. Given the objectives and the wide-­ranging issues expected to be solved by the BRI, the impact of the Indian objections has proven detrimental. The BRI is an ambitious strategy that China wanted to use as a tool to carve a space out for itself in global geopolitics. One of the vital purposes of the BRI was to decrease China’s legitimacy deficit. Two examples of this deficit are, first, the Boao forum for Asia, which is considered one of the biggest events organised by a rising China to disseminate its ideas and engage with the Asian region and the world. However, major Western leaders or Asian leaders rarely attend the Boao forum for Asia. The usual figures are Pakistani ministers and some leaders from small countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The second, more interesting example is the Confucius Peace Prize. Although, at present, it is claimed to be awarded by a private organisation, it was initially set up in 2010 by an association affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Culture as a response to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Neither then nor now has it been taken seriously by the world, by the winners or even by the Chinese themselves.14 The BRI is also the product of the Chinese realisation that it should have control over its own narrative, the power to monopolise, both internally and externally, the answer to the questions such as “what is China?” and “what is China doing?” is vital for the survival of China’s

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current political system. It also requires China to be the leading power in the world. For Chinese party elites, the example of the Soviet Union was telling. The Soviet Union was powerful and relatively prosperous. Nevertheless, it collapsed because of the influence of the Western narrative of democracy and “free speech.” China wants to be the leading superpower in the world so that it will be less influenced by existing systems and institutions, which are dominated by the West. The BRI is an attempt to set norms and rules of the international system that are conducive to the future development of China. Through the BRI and its accompanying institutions, China wishes to create global institutions with different rules and norms, thus gradually creating a different or parallel financial and trading system that is dominated by China.

Attempt at a New Form of Global Governance Currently, the United States, the European Union, and Japan control the global financial institutions. With its rise as one of the world’s largest economic powers, China is demanding a greater voice in these institutions. The 2008 financial crisis triggered the strengthening of China’s demands for a more significant say in global financial institutions. Increasing global economic integration led the financial crisis, originating within one national jurisdiction spreading to other countries, making it a source of global crisis. By the end of the nineteenth century, “the transatlantic cable had been laid, and as a result, Britain, France, Holland, Germany, and the USA had interlinked financial markets, which moved in parallel, especially at times of crises.”15 At the end of the twentieth century, the Asian crisis of the summer of 1997 quickly spread to other Asian countries and even threatened Latin American countries such as Brazil. The more a national economy is integrated into the global economy, the more it will be affected by a global financial crisis. According to Meghnad Desai, “a small number of interest rate cuts by the [US] Federal Reserve calmed the markets and resolved the [1997–1998] crisis.”16 The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis also once more solidified the position of the United States of America as both the preeminent and the pivotal economic power of the world. The 2008 financial crisis ­happened in a different global environment. The crisis, which started in the United States, quickly spread all over the world. China learned from the 2008 financial crisis that its economy is deeply integrated into the United States-led global economic system and that it has very less choice

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but to adapt to the cyclical crises that are bound to happen in the “capitalist” United States economy. Apart from its low level of representation in financial institutions relative to its economic size, China is also currently facing a backlash from Western economies, leading to restrictions on technology transfers from Western economies to China and restrictions on Chinese investments in high-tech Western companies. China is also facing what Gabriel Palma cited as a cause for the economic stagnation and crisis in the Thai economy and the Malaysian economy during the 1997 crisis. That is, China is reaching a point in its process of industrialisation where the further upgrading of its exports to higher value-added products (and, in particular, to breaking away from a “sub-contracting” type of industrialisation) is becoming increasingly difficult.17 A combination of factors, including the 2008 financial crisis, led to the rise of the Chinese discourse on global governance. The disarray in Europe because of the refugee crisis, the continuing relative economic stagnation of Europe, the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and, above all, the increasing cleavages between the Trump administration and major European nations such as Germany and France have led to the Chinese belief in an emerging power vacuum. China’s perception of a power vacuum in international politics is articulated by the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua. According to Xinhua, “the rising populist ideology in Europe, along with Trump’s election in the United States, has posed potential challenges to economic globalisation, trade liberalisation and global governance as a whole.”18 The term “global governance” has become one of the most frequently used terms in Chinese political discourse since the 2008 economic crisis. The 2008 economic crisis was an eye-opener for China; it showed that without having a hold on the levers of global or regional economic governance, China would be on the receiving end of the economic fluctuations in other parts of the world, especially the United States.19

Xi’ Jinping’s Thoughts on Global Governance Chinese President Xi Jinping himself has frequently referred to China’s need to participate in global governance more actively. According to Xi Jinping, “no matter how the reform of the global governance system may unfold, we should always take an active and constructive part in the process.”20

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He has also given reasons for China’s focus on and push for global governance reform. In Xi Jinping’s words, “as the international balance of power has shifted and global challenges are increasing, global governance system reform has emerged as a ‘trend of [the] times.’”21 Xi Jinping further reiterated that “China will work with people of all countries to push the world order and global governance system towards a more just and reasonable direction.”22 However, China’s desire to push for global governance reform came with a stark warning from Xi Jinping: “…China will never give up our lawful rights. Chinese people do not believe fallacy and nor are we afraid of evil forces. Chinese people do not make trouble, but we are not cowards when involved in trouble.”23 The key term in Xi Jinping’s thoughts on global governance is the mention of the shift in “international power.” Chinese leaders believe that international power has already shifted and is in their favour. For Xi Jinping, pushing for global financial reforms to rectify the “unjust and improper arrangements in the global governance system” has become an important foreign policy issue. China is trying to reform the global financial order in two ways: by increasing its share in global financial institutions and by building new financial institutions in which it has a majority stake (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Regarding the new financial institutions, China is focused on the AIIB rather than the NDB because all BRICS countries have equal shares in the NDB. The usual Chinese rhetoric of a win-win situation has accompanied China’s aspirations for global governance reform; China has assured the global audience that governance with Chinese characteristics would treat Table 1.1  Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % Countries US Japan China

IMF 16.52 6.15 6.09

IBRD (World Bank) 15.98 6.89 4.45

ADB 15.6 15.6 6.4 (B.S)

Source: “IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,” IMF, November 21, 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (accessed November 23, 2018); “The World Bank,” September 30, 2018, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/795101541106471736/ IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf (accessed November 23, 2018); “Asian Development Bank,” December 31, 2017, https://www.adb.org/site/investors/credit-fundamentals/shareholders (accessed November 23, 2018)

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Table 1.2  China led major new financial institutions—Country voting share in % Countries China Russia India Brazil South Africa

AIIB 26.5872 6.0146 7.6352

New Development Bank (NDB) (BRICS Bank) 20 20 20 20 20

Source: “Members and Prospective Members of the Bank,” AIIB, October 8, 2018, https://www.aiib. org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html (accessed November 23, 2018)

every country, whether rich or poor, small or large, equally. The BRI is designated as an umbrella concept for global governance reform. Nevertheless, China faces intractable obstacles on its way to creating its own space in the global system. Although China has adapted to the world, the world has yet to acclimatise to China. The behaviour of the Chinese state is judged according to the yardsticks previously set by the Western powers after the Second World War. Considering that China is now a Westernised state, in which, except for the political system, most things Western have been adopted, it will be hard for China to Sinicise itself and almost impossible to Sinicise the world. The best that China can hope for is that with economic interdependency, fewer countries will perceive it as an anomaly in world politics. Nevertheless, with the increasing tensions between China and regional powers, on the one hand, and Western powers, on the other hand, the “economic interdependency theory” of stability is already discredited. Until China, if ever, becomes the dominant power in the world, China faces the difficult task of maintaining belief in the current political system. It has to struggle with the infiltration of other belief systems, such as those of Christian missionary groups. As has always been the case, China is searching for new weapons for the battle of ideas. It is evident from history that ideas count more than armies. Marquis Astolphe de Custine wrote in 1839 that “…customs have no power over thought. Armies cannot exterminate it. Ramparts cannot stop it. Ideas are in the air, they are everywhere, and ideas change the world…,”24 and this holds true for any society, including Chinese society. With the slowing down of China’s economic growth and the general anti-globalisation trend worldwide, China’s task looks difficult. Until it becomes a peer power of the United States, it has to maintain the Chinese population’s belief in the current

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system. As part of these efforts, the Chinese government has conducted campaigns that have tried to relate the current system to happiness and the realisation of the dream of a prosperous life, the same dream that the Soviets wanted to realise—happiness on earth. Regarding the struggling Soviet system, Soviet writer Vladimir Voinovich wrote in 1982 that “the system cannot survive without ideology, and ideology requires belief.”25 Similarly, China is also in a constant struggle to maintain its population’s belief in the country’s current political system. In pursuit of a new ideology that appeals to the current modern society of China, the CCP developed a belief system that synthesises Chinese traditions and Sinicised Marxist ideology. Thus far, the CCP has found that defending its own system in China is a losing battle and that, without defending itself outside China, it cannot achieve the goal of becoming a great power. Becoming a great global power requires a global narrative, requiring a narrative such as the BRI, which has labelled Chinese projects, both internally and externally, as part of a grand narrative of China-centric globalisation and the road to superpower status. However, under the BRI framework, China’s relations with the South Asian region are themselves an example of the obstacles that China faces in implementing this strategy.

The Power of Narrative Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe argue that a narrative is essentially a story. “Yet narrative also refers to the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality.”26 Human beings construct political realities through narratives, and these narratives, in turn, influence our political perceptions and identities. They also reflect one’s self-­ perception and worldview. Research on political discourse conducted by political scientists shows that political discourse relies heavily on narrative patterns because human beings rely on narrative as a way of understanding the world and attributing meaning to it. According to Shaul R. Shenhav, “The dominant role of narratives in political discourse is also based on the centrality of narrative in the formulation and maintenance of worldviews.”27 The BRI forms such a narrative by China to create new realities and worldviews of China. Chinese leaders have called for “good stories about China” to be spread all over the world, both literally and figuratively. Xi Jinping has called for Chinese journalists to tell “China’s stories well and spread China’s voice.”

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Although they are banned in China, China’s Publicity Department (Propaganda Department) uses Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to spread stories about China to the outside world. To tell stories about China, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, operates approximately 180 overseas bureaus, reaching over 200 countries and regions.28 Thus far, the impact on the global audience seems to be minimal. Obtaining the acceptance of the outside world for Chinese stories is considered to be an important factor in boosting the cultural confidence of the Chinese population and the legitimacy of the CCP-led political system of China. “Storytelling” is one of the core concerns of the CCP. For instance, on May 23, 2017, Chinese political advisors met to discuss how to build the country’s cultural confidence and to tell Chinese stories well. Yu Zhengsheng, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top advisory body, chaired the meeting, and according to the members of the CPPCC National Committee, stories about China are the best means of building the country’s cultural confidence and telling others about its traditions, ideas and values.29 Telling “good Chinese stories” is considered to be the responsibility of all Chinese people. Liu Qibao, head of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee, has asked experts and celebrities from sectors including the economy, science, literature, the arts and sports to actively engage in international exchanges and present to the world the real China “through good story telling.”30 The BRI was conceived as storytelling on a global scale, encompassing roads, bridges, railways, ports, religion, culture and many more areas. In the post-liberation history of China, the CCP has created many narratives for internal and external consumption to construct political realities and to give meaning and essence to the existing political realities. The BRI is distinct and extraordinary in the sense that the objectives it seeks to achieve are both domestic and global. A globalised China requires such an objective. It is also exceptional in the sense that China has had the resources to propagate the story of the BRI to a global audience, and it has had enough ground realities all over the globe to create such a narrative. The BRI narrative provides a modern Chinese worldview, and it projects what it wants the world to believe about China. However, the Chinese narrative of the BRI has created a discourse, and the discourse has created realities that are different from what China intended with the creation of the BRI. India’s rejection of the BRI plays a critical role in the discourse created thus far.

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South Asia and the BRI: Pawns and Pivots Under the BRI framework, Chinese involvement in South Asian countries has been marred by crisis and suspicion within the respective South Asian countries and by the strengthening of the Indian threat perception. For instance, China’s relationship with Pakistan is considered an “all-weather friendship.” Nevertheless, with the deepening involvement of Chinese companies and Chinese workers in Pakistan, strains in China’s relationship with Pakistan are beginning to appear. For instance, in the first week of April 2018, the picture of a Chinese engineer standing on top of a Pakistani police mobile van and the violent conflict between Chinese workers involved in CPEC construction projects and Pakistani law enforcement officers raised strong reactions from Pakistani media and the Pakistani public.31 The concerns with and critique of this Chinese behaviour by Pakistanis were far greater and stronger than the indifference of Pakistani politicians to it. Responding to the incident, Professor Ejaz Hussain, the head of the Social Sciences Department at Iqra University, Islamabad, reasoned that “being blinded by sheer arrogance and a sense of superiority, the Chinese may one day scuffle with the army too, which also provides Chinese nationals with security. Lastly, if the CPEC is not negotiated rationally and managed intelligently, and if Pakistan continues to enhance its dependency on Chinese weapons, capital, technology and workforce, the testable notions of the colonisation of Pakistan will get sufficient data in the years to come.”32 An editorial in Pakistan’s Daily Times condemned the subservient nature of Pakistan’s relationship with China. It stated, “The entire incident ought to come as a belated wake-up call for Islamabad. For the [Chinese] engineers reportedly retaliated by cutting power supplies to the police camp located within the main compound. Nevertheless, as if that were not enough, they also effectively went on strike; leaving heavy machinery and vehicles abandoned at various points. This suggests a risky future whereby all the power is more or less concentrated in the hands of a visiting workforce. Nevertheless, the Pakistani government shares some of the blame. For it might have wanted to fully decolonise its mind following its last encounter with [the] Empire before this time actively courting a new master. Colonisation is not for the faint-hearted. Moreover, this is something that Pakistan should have learned better than most.”33 The economic benefits from Chinese investments in infrastructure d ­ evelopment in Pakistan during the initial stages of the CPEC appeared evident and

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v­ isible. This was also the case with Chinese infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka, and Pakistani scholars and media are all too aware of the consequences of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka. Pakistani media refer to the outcomes of Chinese-funded infrastructure and other projects in Sri Lanka to stress Pakistan’s need for caution. For instance, in 2007, the EXIM Bank of China began funding Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. The port was completed at a cost of US$ 1.3 billion. In its initial phase of operations, the port was basically abandoned. Sri Lanka then failed to repay the debt to China incurred by the construction of this port, and in December 2017, it officially handed the management of the port to a Chinese company on a 99-year lease. Pakistani media also point out that most of the major Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka are basically abandoned and that Sri Lanka faces a debt crisis because of the debt servicing issues related to these projects.34 Pakistani media and experts warn that if Pakistan is not cautious, Chinese-funded large-scale infrastructure and other projects in the country may face a fate similar to those in Sri Lanka. They argue that Pakistan’s current interest in the CPEC is the result of the country’s weak economy. However, if these large-scale projects are not self-sustaining, they will do more harm than good to Pakistan’s economy. Nevertheless, the reality is that Pakistan will face an uphill battle in ensuring the self-sustainability of Chinese-funded large-scale projects, given its slow gross domestic product growth and deteriorating internal security situation.35 Eventually, in practice, Pakistan had to cede the control and operation of Gwadar Port to China. In November 2017, the Pakistani minister for shipping and ports, Mir Hasil Bizenjo, revealed that China would obtain a 91% share in the revenue of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and that a Chinese port holding company will operate the port over the next 40 years. In reality, Pakistan was relinquishing the port to China.36 China is also aware of the risks involved in operating in politically volatile countries such as Pakistan. For instance, the Chinese consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, was attacked by Baloch separatists from Balochistan province to express their discontent regarding Chinese projects in their region. A separatist group, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), claimed responsibility for the attack. According to the spokesman of the BLA, “We [Balochi people] have been seeing the Chinese as an oppressor, along with Pakistani forces.” With the increasing visibility of Chinese nationals in Pakistan, it is expected that Chinese nationals will become the targets of internal political and separatist factions in Pakistan.37

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Sri Lankan experts also share Pakistan’s concerns that the BRI will negatively impact the sovereignty of their country. They point out that a significant portion of investment and funding in BRI-tied projects in Sri Lanka comes from Chinese public entities, and Sri Lanka’s inability to repay in a timely manner and the resulting debt burden can lead to weaker negotiating strength and a loss of sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s worries have taken material form in China’s takeover of the troubled Hambantota Port. Whether Hambantota will remain the only case of a loss of sovereignty arising from high debt-to-equity swap agreements or whether more such arrangements will follow is the worrying question confronting Sri Lankan authorities.38 The debt burden of Sri Lanka and Pakistan is not different from China’s financial and economic engagement with other developing world countries. For instance, at the end of 2016, China accounted for 21% of the combined external debt stock of low- and middle-income countries.39 Additionally, India’s concerns related to China’s pursuit of naval base facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan are not new. Chinese control of Hambantota Port and Gwadar Port only confirmed India’s fears and the fears of the United States, that China will use its new-found economic leverage to acquire strategic control in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. It can be argued that the debt burden of these countries is mainly due to the mismanagement of their own economy by their own respective governments for various periods. Furthermore, the majority of Sri Lanka’s debt burden is not even with China. “According to the 2017 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the country’s total external debt was $ 51.824 billion, among which Chinese loans constituted about 10.6% or $ 5.5 billion. Also, according to Sri Lanka’s Finance Ministry Annual Report 2017, market borrowings mainly of sovereign bonds accounted for 39% of the country’s external debt. Loans owed to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were 14%, Japan 12%, the World Bank 11%, China 10%, and India 3%.”40 However, China’s use of debt as strategic leverage has been more significant; China used its debt leverage with Sri Lanka to acquire a strategic port. China’s action meant a geopolitical threat to India and the interests of the United States in the region. For China, in addition to Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Nepal is one of the most strategically located South Asian countries. Due to its location, Nepal has an indirect and direct impact on China’s internal and external security. Since the announcement of the BRI, as with Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the label of BRI was attached to China’s engagements with Nepal.

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Chinese engagement using the BRI framework in Nepal has also exacerbated the security concerns and worries in the region. Although Chinese engagement with Nepal has attracted less media attention than the port infrastructure in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, because of its proximity to strategic regions of Tibet and the long borders it share with both India and China, Nepal is one of the pivotal states in which the power struggle between China, on the one hand, and India and the West, on the other hand, will play out. Thus, it is worthwhile to take a detailed look into Chinese engagement with Nepal and its position in relation to India and the West. The Tibetan autonomous region is adjacent to the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Tibet also shares borders with South Asian countries such as India, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan. In the BRI of China, Tibet has a significant role in connecting Chinese interior provinces with South Asian countries. With the progress of Chinese connectivity initiatives, Tibet can also act as a province linking it to South Asia, Central Asia, and Europe. Among its international borders, Tibet’s borders with Nepal are its most important border from the perspective of Tibet’s international trade and internal security.41 Indicating Tibet’s close linkages with Nepal, Tibet’s foreign trade fell for two consecutive years following the Nepal earthquake in 2015.42 The opening of the China-Nepal highway in 1965 allowed the Zhangmu port of entry on the Nepal-China border to carry nearly 90% of Tibet’s foreign trade until China’s reform and opening up. Because the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, the Zhangmu port of entry is temporarily closed, and the trade through this port of entry has yet to be normalised. Although trade between Nepal and Tibet has been adversely affected, Nepal is still the largest trading partner of Tibet. For instance, in the first 11  months of 2017, the total value of Tibet’s trade with Nepal was 2.15 billion yuan, a decrease of 23.9%. Nepal still accounts for 39.1% of the total foreign trade value of Tibet, a decline of 20.3%.43 Since the announcement of the BRI, China and Nepal have been taking initiatives to increase the economic integration between Nepal and the Tibet region. For instance, on May 9, 2017, Chinese Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan and Nepalese Vice Premier and Minister of Finance Krishna Bahadur Mahara officially signed the MOU on constructing the China-Nepal Cross-border Economic Cooperation ­ Zone.44 Trade and tourism between Nepal and China will be boosted once the Rasuwagadhi-Kerung (Geelong Port) border crossing is upgraded

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into an international border point. Following the closure of the Zhangmu border point, Geelong Port is the only operating trade point between the two countries. The upgrading of this border point into international status will also help in boosting tourism because Nepali tourist companies can sell combined tour packages of Tibet and Nepal to international tourists.45 China is undertaking road and railway linking projects with Nepal. Although there is road connectivity between Nepal and China, the railway connectivity is still in the planning stages. China is not only constructing physical infrastructure, it is also focused on data linking with Nepal and the South Asian region. On January 12, 2018, the Nepal-China cross-­ border optical fibre link came into commercial operation. Two state-­ owned telecommunication companies from Nepal and China—Nepal Telecom and China Telecom—established the linkage, providing Nepal with an alternative route for receiving Internet services through China from major Internet hubs, including Hong Kong. According to the chief representative of China Telecom, Wang Yonglin, the Nepal-China cross-­ border optical fibre link “…is the shortest route for Nepal to get Internet service,” adding that the route could also act as a gateway for Nepal to reach Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the United States.46 With an estimated total investment of 1.54 billion US dollars, China is also building a cloud storage centre in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, to service investment and trade between Chinese companies and their counterparts in South Asia. It is expected to start operation by the end of 2018. According to Wang Jun, the chief engineer of Ningsuan Technologies, the investor and operator of the centre, “the center will mainly process data for Chinese companies engaged in investment and trade in Nepal, India and other South Asian countries, where big data service fees are high.”47 China is linking Nepal with the Tibet region to convert it into a bridge that will facilitate establishing and servicing industries in adjunct South Asian regions. It will contribute to the economic development and urbanisation of the Tibet region and increase the population settlement in the vast regions of thinly populated Tibet. For China, the objective of the connectivity initiatives in Nepal is not Nepal in itself; the target of Chinese connectivity initiatives is to connect the Indian market through Nepal. This Chinese objective is not hidden, and Chinese officials have clearly articulated it in many forums and meetings between Chinese leaders and Nepali leaders. For instance, in September 2017, at a level meeting between joint press conference after a bilateral delegation-­

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Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister stated China’s intention to make Nepal a bridge and link between the two emerging economies of China and India. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “China looks forward to gradually creating the conditions to explore and construct the China-­Nepal-­India economic corridor, and jointly promote the Himalayan region to a new high ground for Asian development.”48 In the context of India’s suspicions and worries about the BRI, the Chinese aspirations to open an economic corridor between Nepal and India will also add to Indian fears of encirclement. The profitability of linking Nepal through difficult land routes via the Tibet region will also come under scrutiny. Considering the high transportation costs expected to incur by the Tibet-­Nepal transportation corridors, the IndiaNepal economic corridor, proposed as a linking corridor of the ChinaNepal transportation corridor, will also be viewed as another strategic infrastructure that will “benefit” China. Tibet’s security has always been the most important interest of China in Nepal. From a security perspective, China wants to remove any support for the Tibetan government in exile; China also wants to restrict and prevent the flow of Tibetan refugees to Nepal. With the increase in Chinese economic engagements with Nepal, successive governments in Nepal are more sensitive to the Chinese government’s aspirations. This can be gauged from Nepal government’s official reiteration that Nepal will not allow any powers to use its territory against China.49 China has been successful in restricting Tibetan migration to Nepal. The influx of Tibetan refugees has been severely restricted, with the once average of 2000 immigrants a year dropping to a low figure of 200 since the 2008 Uprising in Tibet. The Nepali government has refused to give refugee status to Tibetans, but the government of Nepal and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1989 agreed to allow Tibetan refugees to cross over to India. With the increase in the Chinese influence on Nepal, Nepal is currently sidestepping this agreement and often detaining Tibetan refugees and sending them back to China.50 Nevertheless, China is still concerned about Western support for the Tibetan cause and the Western role in Nepal supporting Tibetan refugees. As an example of Western pressure on Nepal to support Tibetan refugees, Chinese media reports refer to the United States House Appropriations Committee Chairman Frank Wolf’s warning to the Nepali government. According to Frank Wolf, “If the Nepalese government insists not to issue

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visas to exiled Tibetans and its record of treating them does not improve, US aid to Nepal will be cut off.” In addition to the pressure from the US government, many NGOs from the US and Europe have also played a role in supporting Tibetan refugees in Nepal.51 To prevent what China perceives as “anti-Chinese activities” by Tibetans in Nepal, China’s security establishment is expanding its influence on Nepal. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China is gradually establishing a strong relationship with Nepali security forces. For instance, in April 2017, the Nepalese army and PLA held a first-ever joint military training in Kathmandu, seeking to exchange skills and knowledge on disaster management and counter-­ terrorism.52 China also financed and built the Nepal Armed Police Force Academy, and the Nepali Armed Police force plays an important role in managing Tibetan refugees in Nepal.53 In addition to China’s engagement with Nepal’s armed forces, the Chinese government is also giving Nepali government officials training in the Chinese language to increase the interoperability between China’s government and Nepal’s government. Although there is the future promise of connectivity and trade between Nepal and China, the connectivity between the two countries is currently still far from developed. Indian imports enter through 22 border points between Nepal and India. In contrast, there are only two official border points with China. The Chinese connectivity initiatives with Nepal are all in their nascent stages; arguably, it will take many more years for China to match the Indian level of connectivity with Nepal. Although there is an image of comradery between the Chinese government and the Nepali government, it is not all smooth sailing for Chinese companies in Nepal and the collaborative projects between the government of Nepal and Chinese companies. For instance, in May–June 2018, there were reports that Nepal was scrapping its deal with a Chinese company to build the West Seti Hydropower project and that the Nepali government was planning to build it with its own resources. Presenting the federal budget on May 29, 2018, Nepal’s Finance Minister Yubaraj Khatiwada said the construction work on West Seti would be commenced by mobilising internal resources. However, this report was later denied by both the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson and Investment Board Nepal (IBN). The contradictory statements between Nepal’s ministries and the Chinese government show the confusion and the difficulties in negotiation between the Nepali government and Chinese companies. The project, located in far-western Nepal, has been languishing in uncertainty

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since the Chinese company said it would not go ahead with the scheme if the power purchase rate were not increased. The lingering negotiations between the Chinese company and the Nepali government are ongoing. Many of the Chinese projects involved are commercial projects, which are largely excluded from geopolitical thinking and based on hard-nosed profit motives. However, the Chinese government labels many of these independent commercial projects as part of the BRI.54 In relation to Nepal, as of the end of 2018, BRI has proven to be more propaganda than substance. Many projects are stamped by Chinese officials as BRI-related projects, even though they are not related to any connectivity initiatives or are not even funded by China. For instance, the Upper Tamakoshi hydroelectric project, located east of Kathmandu, is being built using Nepal’s domestic financial resources. The majority stakeholders in the project are Nepal’s government agencies.55 It is considered a project of Nepal’s national pride. The construction contract has been given to the Powerchina Company; however, Chinese government officials also label this project as a BRI project. For instance, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yu Hong, pointed out that the Upper Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project is the largest in Nepal and is of great significance for the participation of Chinese enterprises in the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.56 The connectivity projects between Nepal and China are also not feasible within a short period of time. In particular, it is not cost-effective for Nepal to access Chinese ports through highways; for Nepal, the nearest Chinese port, the Port of Tianjin, is almost 3500 kilometres away from Kathmandu, and other Chinese ports such as Guangzhou and Shanghai are even further away, approximately 4500 km from Nepal. The current nearest Chinese railhead from Nepal is Shigatse in Tibet, which is 540 km from Nepal. China is expanding its railway line from Shigatse to Kyirong, which is close to the Rasuwagadhi border point of Nepal. The Chinese railway projects connecting Nepal are expected to be completed by 2020. The railway will be more cost-effective than highways in connecting the Chinese mainland with Nepal. However, Nepal’s access to Chinese ports will still be costly.57 China is also increasingly involved in providing aid and disaster relief in Nepal. A Chinese NGO, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), “has carried out over a dozen projects in sectors such as disaster relief, food, water and sanitation, disinfection treatment and health care in 14 districts of Nepal. It has invested about 12  million yuan (1.9  million US dollars) to extend support to over 250,000 Nepali people….”58

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Table 1.3  Nepal—Top 5 bilateral donors (2016–2017) USAID United Kingdom Japan India China

$134.05 million $128.31 million $77.65 million $59.25 million $41.24 million

Source: “Foreign aid disbursement up 27 percent,” The Kathmandu Post, January 1, 2018, http:// kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-01-01/foreign-aid-disbursement-up-27-percent.html, accessed June 2, 2018

However, from the perspective of aid as a factor in Nepal’s economic development, China’s role is still secondary. China is very successful in projecting the aid that it has provided to Nepal through effective public relations campaigns, magnifying the impact of Chinese aid. However, in reality, China is only the fifth largest bilateral source of foreign aid. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan still dominate the donor scene in Nepal (Table 1.3). The Chinese attempt to build a benevolent narrative in Nepal under the BRI initiative has found only mixed success, although China’s connectivity initiatives in Nepal have yet to be realised. Nepal is wary of the debt burden as a result of large-scale infrastructure financed by China. Another major South Asian country, Bangladesh, is also cautious about falling into the BRI debt trap.59 China will remain a major economic partner of South Asian countries. Thus far, normal economic relations have not been the cause of India’s worries. In this regard, China also has very close economic relations with India. The Chinese intentions reflected in the strategic investments and colonial pattern of relations with the small and middle powers of the South Asian region have been the most critical factor leading to the determined actions of India, the United States and other powers to check Chinese strategic expansion in South Asia.

Not a Marshall Plan In the initial years of the BRI, China was successful in creating a discourse relating the BRI to the Marshall Plan. By way of denying that the BRI is not a Marshall Plan, China has argued that it is not a top-down plan where China is investing in reconstructing developing countries; rather, it is an initiative in which China and other participating countries are equal

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­ artners. According to the Xinhua news agency, the BRI “…is not a new p version of the Marshall Plan, which gave aid only to American allies. The Belt and Road Initiative, in contrast, is open to all. The vagueness of the initiative’s geographical boundaries also helps. No bars are set, and countries do not need to negotiate their ways into the initiative.”60 However, China’s investment pattern shows that BRI-related and BRI-­ unrelated Chinese investments are directed towards developed countries. The United States, Europe and other countries in the developed world attract most Chinese investments. Europe and North America (excluding Mexico) received 52.1% (US$ 544.5 billion) of China’s total global FDI outflows from 2005 to 2017. The US is the largest destination for Chinese FDI in the world, attracting US$ 171.04 billion or 16.4% of China’s outbound FDI since 2005. Australia is the second largest destination of Chinese FDI, attracting US$ 90.95 billion from 2005 to 2017 during the same period. The U.K. has become the third largest destination of Chinese FDI, attracting US$ 72.39  billion. The top low- or middle-income or developing country that has attracted the most Chinese FDI during the same period is Indonesia, attracting US$ 13.33 billion.61 However, five years after the announcement of the BRI, in 2018, China is facing a backlash over its strategic investments in both the developed and developing worlds. Countries are cautious in allowing Chinese investment in industries and businesses that are critical for national security.62 According to China’s “Made in China 2025” strategy, every commercial technology in China should be made available to the PLA. This means that every technology that Chinese firms acquire in foreign countries will have the potential to be used by the PLA, and indirect technology transfer from foreign countries to China will eventually help strengthen the PLA.63 China has increasingly invested in high-tech industries in the United States. “According to data from Public Citizen, a liberal advocacy group and think tank, 56% of Chinese investments in the United States in 2017 were in industries that Beijing defines as ‘strategic,’ such as aviation, biotechnology, and new-energy vehicles—up from 25% in 2016.”64 As a result of worries over Chinese strategic acquisitions of American technology industries, the US Treasury Department began a pilot programme using new powers under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act. The law expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the main United States government body able to block foreign acquisitions of domestic businesses, resulting in strict

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scrutiny of Chinese investments in the United States technology sector.65 Not only the United States but also other developed countries are following the lead of the United States in blocking China’s “technology” and strategy bids. For instance, citing reasons of national security, Australia also blocked the Chinese technology company Huawei from participating in the roll out of the fifth-generation mobile network in Australia.66 Not only developed countries, because of their technology-related national security concerns, are restricting numerous Chinese investments. Developing countries are also scaling down Chinese investments because of their “debt trap” worries. For instance, Myanmar scaled back the China-­ funded Kyauk Pyu Port project in Rakhine state because of concerns over excessive dependency on China.67 The debt trap worries are widespread among India’s neighbouring countries. Nepali and Bangladeshi experts and media advise caution in accepting enormous loans from China for infrastructure development. The most frequently cited examples for the cautious approach to accepting Chinese loans are the cases of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. China-financed projects were at the centre of the months-­long internal political crisis in 2017–2018 in the Maldives, which is also facing a looming debt crisis due to Chinese loans tied to infrastructure construction in the Maldives.68 The debt trap worries show a deep, widespread mistrust in Chinese ways and the intentions behind its BRI investment. The BRI narrative has played a crucial role in increasing this mistrust in and caution with regard to Chinese investments all over the world.

BRI: The Label and the Road The Chinese engagement in South Asian countries in the periphery of India has a far more strategic component than the economic. From the instances of Chinese engagement in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal described above, it is evident that the BRI, as an economic label, camouflages China’s strategic intentions. The security impact of China’s intentions is far reaching for India and US interests in the region. In the Chinese economic engagement with the world, the South Asian region plays only a minor part. Nevertheless, for China, the strategic significance of this region overshadows that of any other region. The South Asian region is the first region in which China needs to establish its dominance as the first step in achieving its aspirations of becoming a global

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superpower. South Asia is also the place where China faces enormous challenges because the region consists of India, its only rival with a matching civilisational and historical narrative and influence. India’s role and aspirations in South Asia make it an insuperable barrier for the Chinese objective of building a China-centric Asian narrative. China has used the BRI label in its attempts to build this China-centric Asian narrative. Physical infrastructure forms just one part of the BRI. Physical infrastructure is endowed with a new meaning because of the BRI narrative, and the ports, roads, and debt burdens in turn give the BRI hands, legs and a body to create a narrative of Chinese benevolence as a strategic camouflage to achieve China’s internal and external strategic objectives. Considering the depth and extent of the potential impact of the BRI, India’s rejection of it has had far-reaching consequences. Chinese analysts, scholars, and media have analysed India’s rejection and the reasons behind it. The Chinese analysis reveals the stereotypes and frameworks used to analyse the behaviour of the Indian state. The study of the Chinese analysis shows how China has framed India’s rejection of the BRI and reveals patterns and clues of the future direction of the Asian geopolitics. It also shows that from the Chinese perspective, India is not meant to oppose Chinese initiatives and projects, regardless of whether these projects benefit or hurt Indian interests. This work provides an extensive analysis of the Chinese political thinking behind the proposal of BRI and the Chinese critique of India’s rejection of the BRI and demonstrates that it is the most vulnerable part of the BRI and that the consequences of the Indian rejection of the BRI have also led to the resurrection of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy.

Notes 1. “Xi Jinping tong Yindu zong li Modi zai Wu han ju xing fei zheng shi hui wu” [Xi jinping held an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan.], Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 28, 2018, http://www. gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/28/content_5286667.htm (accessed May 3, 2018). 2. “Xi Jinping hui jian Yindu zongli Modi” [Xi Meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi], Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 27, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2018-04/27/content_5286462.htm (accessed May 3, 2018).

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3. “India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 28, 2018, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases. htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan (accessed on May 5, 2018). 4. “Zhong Yin ling dao ren fei zheng shi hui wu da cheng guang fan gong shi (quan wen)” [The informal meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders reached broad consensus.], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 28, 2018, http://www. gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/28/content_5286684.htm (accessed May 3, 2018). 5. “China Defends Terrorist Masood Azhar, Justifies UN Veto of India’s Move,” NDTV, September 29, 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/indianews/china-defends-terrorist-masood-azhar-justifies-its-veto-of-indiasmove-at-united-nations-1924157 (accessed October 6, 2018). 6. “India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 28, 2018, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases. htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan (accessed October 6, 2018). 7. “Zhong Yin ling dao ren fei zheng shi hui wu da cheng guang fan gong shi (quan wen)” [The informal meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders reached broad consensus]. 8. Mary Lovely, “Narendra Modi’s rise in import tariffs will hurt India’s economy,” Financial Times, 20 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/ content/25900f14-1564-11e8-9c33-02f893d608c2 (accessed May 3, 2018). 9. “mao yi da bang yin fa Zhong nu ge guo zheng mouduo bian he zuo Mei guo dang xin pei le fu ren you zhebing” [The trade club has provoked a lot of anger among all the countries in the fight for multilateral cooperation: US worry that it had “thrown the helve after the hatchet”], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], May 1, 2018. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-05/01/content_5287173.htm (accessed May 7, 2018). 10. Ibid. 11. K. Subrahmanyam, “Befriending the Dragon: An Objective Approach to Sino-Indian Ties,” The Times of India, July 5, 2004, p. 12. 12. Gen. (Dr) V. K. Singh (Retd) (The Minister Of State In The Ministry Of External Affairs, India), “Chinese Intervention In Pok,” Ministry Of External Affairs, Government Of India, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No.712, December 20, 2017, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/13/AU712.pdf (accessed January 2, 2018). 13. M.J.  Akbar, “Belt and Road Initiative of China,” Government Of India, Ministry Of External Affairs, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No-2735,

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Answered On August 10, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult. aspx (accessed January 3, 2018); By the end of December 2017, seven questions had been asked in the Indian parliament’s lower house about the CPEC and its impact on India. As of April 5, 2018, twelve questions have been asked in the Indian parliament’s upper house about the CPEC. The similarity of these questions and answers lies in the fact that most of them concern the CPEC’s impact on the security of India. 14. The cultural association that awarded the Confucius Peace Prize was affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Culture. However, following widespread criticism, in September 2011, the association was ordered to scrap the award, and it was announced that the ministry had decided to shut down the association. According to one Chinese critic of the Confucius Peace Prize, Ma Liming, “the Confucius Peace Prize has soured. It represents an outdated and naive worldview, carrying some kind of populism. Such a thing is hurting our country. I think that such a farce needs to be ended”; Lien Chan, the former chairman of the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the first recipient of the prize, had never heard about the prize or accepted it. See Huang Jingjing, “War over peace,” Global Times, November 3, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/950348.shtml (accessed February 3, 2018). 15. Meghnad Desai, “Financial crises and global governance,” in Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said ed., Global Governance and Financial Crises (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 7. 16. Ibid. 17. Gabriel Palma, “Mexico, Korea and Brazil: three paths to financial crises,” in Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said ed., Global Governance and Financial Crises (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 139. 18. Zhu Junqing and He Jing, “Yearender: Multiple crises-ridden West faces uncertainties,” Xinhua General News Service, December 27, 2016, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/27/c_135936164.htm (accessed December 23, 2017). 19. “China’s Xi injects vitality into G20 mechanism,” China Daily, September 2, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016hangzhoug20/ 2016-09/02/content_26683178.htm (accessed December 23, 2017). 20. “China’s Xi injects vitality into G20 mechanism,” China Daily, September 2, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016hangzhoug20/ 2016-09/02/content_26683178.htm (accessed December 23, 2017). 21. “Xi calls for reforms on global governance,” China Daily, September 29, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-09/29/content_ 26931697.htm (accessed December 26, 2017). 22. “Xi: China to contribute wisdom to global governance,” People’s Daily, July 01, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0701/c90785-9080390. html (accessed December 26, 2017).

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23. “Xi opposes monopolization of global governance,” Xinhua General News Service, July 1, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/01/ c_135482043.htm (accessed December 23, 2017). 24. Rupert Cornwell, “1989: The Year of Revolution (1),” The Independent, December 28, 1989, p. 13. 25. Robert B. Cullen, “The Cautious Bully,” Newsweek, November 22, 1982, p. 48. 26. Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative In Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science, No.1 (1998), pp. 315–317. 27. Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2006), pp. 245–246. 28. “Chinese journalists encouraged to tell stories to world,” Xinhua General News Service, November 9, 2017. 29. “Political advisors discuss building cultural confidence,” Xinhua General News Service, May 23, 2017. 30. “CPC publicity chief calls for telling China stories well,” Xinhua General News Service, April 8, 2016. 31. Sajjad Akbar Shah, “Chinese workers thrash policemen in Khanewal,” Dawn, April 4, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1399531 (accessed April 7, 2018). 32. Ejaz Hussain, “Pakistan: a Chinese colony?,” Daily Times, April 8, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/225183/pakistan-a-chinese-colony/ (accessed April 9, 2018). 33. Editorial, “China needs more than biryani”, Daily Times, April 6, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/224340/china-needs-more-than-biryani/ (accessed April 8, 2018). 34. Farrukh Saleem, “Sri Lanka for sale?”, The News, June 4, 2017, https:// www.thenews.com.pk/print/208448-Sri-Lanka-for-sale (accessed April 9, 2018). 35. Kamal Monnoo, “CPEC: Should Pakistan be worried?”, Pakistan Today, November 8, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/08/ cpec-should-pakistan-be-worried/ (accessed April 9, 2018). 36. Iftikhar A.  Khan, “China to get 91pc Gwadar income, minister tells Senate,” Dawn, November 25, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/ news/1372695 (accessed January 6, 2018); F.M.  Shakil, “Bad terms: Pakistan’s raw deal with China over Gwadar port,” Asia Times, November 29, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/bad-terms-pakistans-rawdeal-china-gwadar-port/ (accessed January 6, 2018). 37. “Karachi attack: China consulate attack leaves four dead,” BBC, November 23, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46313136 (accessed November 23, 2018). 38. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): A sustainable partnership for Sri Lanka?,” Daily Financial Times, November 14, 2018, http://www.island.

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lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_ title=194476 (accessed December 3, 2018); Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-srilanka-port.html (accessed August 8, 2018); Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Debtbook Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Leveraging of its Newfound Economic Influence and the Consequences for U.S.  Foreign Policy,” Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, May 14, 2018, pp. 9–10. 39. International Debt Statistics 2018, Washington: World Bank Group, p. 5. 40. Shen Shiwei, underwater myth of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port deal, Daily Financial Times, August 10, 2018, http://www.ft.lk/opinion/ Underwater-myth-of-Sri-Lanka-s-Hambantota-Port-deal/14-660586 (accessed October 9, 2018). 41. Wu Jianying, “Xi Zang Jin ZhuaYi dai Yi luji yu ying lai dui wai mao yi xin fa zhan” [Tibet is seizing the “One Belt And One Road” opportunity to usher in the new development of foreign trade], Tibet.cn, January 12, 2018, http://www.tibet.cn/cn/news/yc/201801/t20180112_5347074.html (accessed March 3, 2018). 42. “Tibet’s foreign trade rebounds in 2017,” Xinhua General News Service, February 4, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/04/ c_136948758.htm (accessed June 3, 2018). 43. “2017 nian qian 11 ge yue Xi Zang dui wai mao yi jin chu kou zong zhi 55. 03 yi yuan” [The total value of Tibet’s foreign trade in the first 11 months of 2017 is 5.503 billion yuan], January 8, 2018, Lasa Customs district, People’s Republic of China, http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/ portal182/tab63445/info876425.htm (accessed June 4, 2018). 44. “Chinese Ministry of Commerce Signs the MOU on Constructing ChinaNepal Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zone with the Ministry of Industry of Nepal,” Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, May 17, 2017, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201705/20170502577336.shtml (accessed June 4, 2018). 45. “Upgraded China-Nepal border point to boost trade, tourism: Nepali traders,” Xinhua General News Service, September 2, 2017, http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/02/c_136577630.htm (accessed June 4, 2018). 46. “Nepal-China cross-border optical fiber link starts operation,” Xinhua General News Service, January 12, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2018-01/12/c_136891112.htm (accessed June 3, 2018). 47. “Big data center to service companies in Tibet,” Xinhua General News Service, March 27, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201703/27/c_136161791.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

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48. Sangeet Sangroula, “Nepal, China to expedite cross-border railway,” Myrepublica, September 8, 2017, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork. com/news/27151/ (accessed June 2, 2018). 49. Ma Jing, “ni bo er zheng fu yao yuan zai la sa chong shen: jue bu rong xu ren he shi lili yong nib bo er ling tu” [Senior members of the Nepalese government reiterated in Lhasa that no force should be allowed to use Nepalese territory], Tibet.cn, September 30, 2015, http://www.tibet.cn/ news/focus/1443573682853.shtml (accessed June 2, 2018). 50. “Nepal to ban March 10 Tibetan uprising day events,” Myrepublica, March 9, 2018, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/37684/ (accessed June 2, 2018). 51. “ni bo er nan cheng liu wang zang ren ‘bi nan suo’” [Nepal is hardly a haven for exiled Tibetans], Huan qiu shi bao [Global Times], March 15, 2013, http://world.huanqiu.com/depth_report/2013-03/3735051_2. html (accessed June 2, 2018). 52. Santosh Ghimire, “Nepal, China witness significant achievements in ­bilateral ties in 2017,” Xinhuanet.com, December 31, 2017, http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136864458.htm (accessed June 2, 2018). 53. “Nepal Armed Police Force Academy built under Chinese aid to address security challenges,” Xinhua General News Service, March 19, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/19/c_137050775.htm (accessed June 2, 2018). 54. Bibek Subedi, “IBN refutes govt claim on West Seti Project, Says there has been no decision to scrap pact signed with China Three Gorges on 750MW undertaking,” Kathmandupost, June 7, 2018, https://kathmandupost. ekantipur.com/news/2018-06-07/ibn-refutes-govt-claim-on-west-setiproject.html (accessed June 7, 2018); “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 6, 2018,” Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1566463.shtml (accessed June 7, 2018). 55. Rudra Pangeni, “Project cost to reach about Rs 50 billion,” myRepublica, March 18, 2018, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/ 38221/?categoryId%3D81 (accessed June 2, 2018). 56. “Prime Minister Oli visits under-construction hydropower project,” PowerChina, April 13, 2018, http://en.powerchina.cn/2018-04/13/ content_36185165.htm (accessed June 2, 2018). 57. Pushpa Raj Acharya, “Transit Transport Agreement should be utilised to enhance economic engagement between Nepal and China,” Himalayan Times, March 28, 2016, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/transit-transport-agreement-utilised-enhance-economic-engagement-nepalchina/ (accessed June 2, 2018).

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58. Shristi Kafle, “Chinese organization extends support to Nepal’s education to mark third quake anniversary,” Xinhuanet.com, April 26, 2018, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/26/c_137139130.htm (accessed June 2, 2018). 59. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Chinese loans may put Bangladesh in debt trap,” June 17, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/chinese-loans-may-put-bangladesh-in-debt-trap/articleshow/59185012.cms (accessed February 3, 2018). 60. (BRF) Essential guide to understanding Belt and Road Initiative, Xinhua General News Service, May 13, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2017-05/13/c_136279142.htm (accessed November 3, 2018). 61. China Power Team, “Does China dominate global investment?” China Power, September 26, 2016. Updated July 19, 2018, https://chinapower. csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/ (accessed November 29, 2018). 62. Jodi Xu Klein, “It’s not just the US: around the world, doors are shutting on Chinese investment,” South China Morning Post, September 13, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2163974/ its-not-just-us-around-world-doors-are-shutting-chinese (accessed October 6, 2018). 63. Humza Jilani and Amy Cheng, “Chinese Investment in the U.S.  Tanks Amid Major Policy Crackdowns,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2018, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/06/chinese-investment-in-the-u-s-tanksamid-major-policy-crackdowns-trade-war-tariffs-china-trump/ (accessed September 9, 2018). 64. Alan Rappeport, “In New Slap at China, U.S.  Expands Power to Block Foreign Investments,” New York Times, October 10, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/10/10/business/us-china-investment-cfius.html (accessed November 3, 2018). 65. Ibid. 66. Nick Whigham, “Huawei banned from Australian 5G network,” News. com.au, August 23, 2018, https://www.news.com.au/technology/gadgets/mobile-phones/huawei-banned-from-australian-5g-network/newsstory/d1d6ec001747ba51e7c5c8738021f7ee (accessed September 9, 2018). 67. “Myanmar scales back China-funded Kyauk Pyu port project in Rakhine state due to debt concerns,” South China Morning Post, August 2, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2158015/ myanmar-scales-back-china-funded-kyauk-pyu-port-project (accessed September 6, 2018). 68. Umesh K Bhattarai, “The BRI anxiety,” My Republica, September 17, 2018, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/the-bri-anxiety/? categoryId=opinion (accessed November 8, 2018); Gyan P Neupane,

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“Avoiding debt trap,” My Republica, June 20, 2018, https://myrepublica. nagariknetwork.com/news/avoiding-debt-trap/ (accessed November 9, 2018); Brahma Chellaney, “Imperial China,” My Republica, December 24, 2017, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/imperial-china/ (accessed November 9, 2018); “Investment inefficiency can lead to ‘debt trap’,” Himalayan Times, July 25, 2018, https://thehimalayantimes. com/business/investment-inefficiency-can-lead-to-debt-trap/ (accessed November 8, 2018); Inam Ahmed, “Debt trap?,” The Daily Star, September 4, 2018, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/frontpage/ debt-trap-1628839 (accessed October 6, 2018); “Chinese loans or debttrap,” July 25, 2017, http://www.bangladeshlivenews.com/home/article-details/9320/column/Chinese+loans+or+debt-+trap/ (accessed September 6, 2018); “Gathering economic clouds,” The Financial Express (Bangladesh), October 23, 2018, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/ views/opinions/gathering-economic-clouds-1540221117 (accessed November 6, 2018). The debt trap concerns of China are not limited to the Indian Ocean region but are gradually spreading to other continents such as Africa, where China invested heavily; see Alito L Malinao, “Countries waking up to risks attached to China loans,” The Nation, October 24, 2018, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30357044 (accessed November 6, 2018); Rizal Ramli, “Creases On the Silk,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), October 31, 2018, p. 15; Alasdair Pal, “Maldives’ Chinese debt and political risk could lead to trouble in paradise,” Reuters, September 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-election-debt-idUSKCN1LY1QR (accessed October 9, 2018); Shashank Bengali, “How an island nation’s new leaders are trying to unravel a web of secret deals with China,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-maldives-china20181106-story.html (accessed November 9, 2018).

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Rappeport, Alan. 2018. In New Slap at China, U.S.  Expands Power to Block Foreign Investments. New York Times. October 10. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/10/10/business/us-china-investment-cfius.html. Accessed November 3, 2018. Saleem, Farrukh. 2017. Sri Lanka for sale? The News. June 4. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/208448-Sri-Lanka-for-sale. Accessed April 9, 2018. Sangroula, Sangeet. 2017. Nepal, China to expedite cross-border railway. Myrepublica. September 8. http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/ news/27151/. Accessed June 2, 2018. Shakil, F.M. 2017. Bad terms: Pakistan’s raw deal with China over Gwadar port. Asia Times. November 29. http://www.atimes.com/article/bad-terms-pakistans-raw-deal-china-gwadar-port/. Accessed January 6, 2018. Shenhav, Shaul R. 2006. Political Narratives and Political Reality. International Political Science Review. Vol. 27, No. 3 (July): 245–262. Shiwei, Shen. 2018. Underwater myth of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port deal. Daily Financial Times. August 10. http://www.ft.lk/opinion/Underwater-mythof-Sri-Lanka-s-Hambantota-Port-deal/14-660586. Accessed October 9, 2018. Singh, V.  K. 2017. Chinese Intervention In Pok. Ministry Of External Affairs, Government of India, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No.712. December 20. http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/13/AU712.pdf. Accessed January 2, 2018. Subedi, Bibek. 2018. IBN refutes govt claim on West Seti Project, Says there has been no decision to scrap pact signed with China Three Gorges on 750MW undertaking. Kathmandupost. June 7. https://kathmandupost.ekantipur. com/news/2018-06-07/ibn-refutes-govt-claim-on-west-seti-project.html. Accessed June 7, 2018. Subrahmanyam, K. 2004. Befriending the Dragon: An Objective Approach to Sino-Indian Ties. The Times of India. (July 5): 12. Tibet’s foreign trade rebounds in 2017. 2018. Xinhua General News Service. February 4. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/04/c_136948758. htm. Accessed June 3, 2018. Upgraded China-Nepal border point to boost trade, tourism: Nepali traders. 2017. Xinhua General News Service. September 2. http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2017-09/02/c_136577630.htm. Accessed June 4, 2018. Whigham, Nick. 2018. Huawei banned from Australian 5G network. News.com. au. August 23. https://www.news.com.au/technology/gadgets/mobilephones/huawei-banned-from-australian-5g-network/news-story/d1d6ec001 747ba51e7c5c8738021f7ee. Accessed September 9, 2018. Xi calls for reforms on global governance. 2016. China Daily. September 29. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-09/29/content_26931697. htm. Accessed December 26, 2017.

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Xi Jinping hui jian Yindu zongli Modi [Xi Meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi]. 2018. Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC]. April 27. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/27/ content_5286462.htm. Accessed May 3, 2018. Xi Jinping tong Yindu zong li Modi zai Wu han ju xing fei zheng shi hui wu [Xi jinping held an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan]. 2018. Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC]. April 28. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/28/ content_5286667.htm. Accessed May 3, 2018. Xi opposes monopolization of global governance. 2016. Xinhua General News Service. July 1. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/01/ c_135482043.htm. Accessed December 23, 2017. Xi: China to contribute wisdom to global governance. 2016. People’s Daily. July 01. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0701/c90785-9080390.html. Accessed December 26, 2017. Zhong Yin ling dao ren fei zheng shi hui wu da cheng guang fan gong shi (quan wen) [The informal meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders reached broad consensus]. 2018. Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC]. April 28. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/ 2018-04/28/content_5286684.htm. Accessed May 3, 2018.

CHAPTER 2

The Road to the Belt and the Road

This chapter argues that the BRI is part of a larger narrative to regain and reinforce the legitimacy of the CCP. The BRI is part of a narrative rather than a concrete plan or project. It is an extension and by-product of a “legitimacy” discourse that has external and internal political applications for the CCP. The CCP heavily relies on the revival of China’s traditional culture and imagined golden past to create a modern narrative of China, and the Silk Road narrative forms part of this narrative, providing a benign narrative for China’s engagement with the world. It is also part of the CCP’s pursuit of non-Western legitimacy for Chinese modernity.1 However, why should China need a new narrative to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime, and why, since the presidency of Xi Jinping, is there a renewed vigour to build and sustain a new narrative? The answer is that the new narrative is the result of the CCP’s pursuit of an ideology, a theory and a framework for legitimising its rule since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The CCP was concerned with the ideological vacuum created following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The CCP feared that the ideological vacuum, compounded with the prospect of an economic slowdown, would result in “ideological infiltration” from the West, threatening its rule. Since becoming president of China, Xi Jinping has been concerned with the ideological aspects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to reports.2

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China’s Fear: The Hegemony of Western Discourse In the post-liberation history of China, the most earth-shaking moment for the CCP was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For the West and most of the world, it disproved and delegitimised the communist system and ideology. In this context, China faced the difficult task of explaining the legitimacy of its regime, which was based on Marxist ideology. Chinese scholars concluded that the Western powers, through their ideological infiltration and their advocacy of a “peaceful evolution” of the Soviet system, broke up the Soviet Union without firing a single shot. CCP ideologues called for Chinese communist cadres to conduct a thorough study of the reasons for the Soviet Union’s collapse and learn from the episode. According to them, “the so-called pluralism and democratisation promoted by the Soviet communist party, represented by Gorbachev, is the essence of deconstructing Marxism’s dominant position in the ideological field.” Therefore, the CPC should strengthen the power of its discourse to ward off any Western ideological infiltration.3 According to Chinese political theorists, “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a historical tragedy; this is an undeniable fact. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union is not equal to the failure of socialism, nor can it change the historical development of socialism replacing capitalism.”4 This confidence in the inevitability of socialism is far from the ground realities of contemporary China. CCP theorists feared that the infiltration of Western ideologies would influence the perception of Chinese elites and commoners, which, in turn, would threaten the survival of the existing regime. The theoreticians of the CCP also asked Chinese citizens to be vigilant with regard to the various infiltrations of hostile Western forces in the Chinese ideological field and to continuously strengthen the vigour of anti-infiltration efforts against Western ideologies and protect the ideology of the Chinese nation. However, it was not clear to the Chinese populace what the contemporary ideology of the Chinese nation actually is. The lesson learned from the disintegration of the Soviet Union was that the most critical factor in the continuing survival of the CCP is the question of who holds the power of discourse. According to Professor Zhang Wei, the director of the “China model” research centre, “If a country does not have its own discourse, it cannot rise. If a country does not have its own discourse, even doing the right thing can be interpreted as wrong by others. Without one’s own discourse, facing international pressures, it will be difficult to defend the core interests of China and it will not be possible

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to effectively respond to domestic and international challenges. If China does not have its own discourse, Western discourse can easily fool Chinese people.”5 Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed the importance of building an external discourse system to explain “China’s story” to the world.6 On February 19, 2016, while attending a CCP news and public opinion work discussion meeting, Xi called for an increase in China’s international “discourse power”. The document approved by the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, “The CPC Central Committee’s Decision on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of Several Major Issues,” points to the importance of building a discourse system for propagating China’s story outside China. The document states that China “…should energetically carry out foreign cultural exchanges, strengthen the capacity for international communication and the construction of the external discourse system, and promote Chinese culture to the world.”7 Currently, in the contest for global power of discourse with the US, CCP scholars contend that as a developing country, the Chinese government, at all levels, is stepping up its efforts to focus on the livelihood of people, and there is decreasing space for the West to criticise China. Ultimately, however, regardless of whether China is doing well or poorly, it is up to Chinese citizens to judge; the West cannot dictate the decision. Nevertheless, in a globalised world, Chinese citizens can be easily influenced by Western discourse. As a defensive measure, China has banned many Western news and media sources in China to prevent Western ideological infiltration. Chinese scholars explain why China should step up its efforts to acquire more power of discourse, pointing to the fact that “the United States still holds the dominant power of discourse. This does not mean that all that the United States is doing is right, but why do few nations, groups or celebrities condemn it? It is a question worth thinking about. Therefore, it is important and necessary for our party and national leaders to establish the power of discourse of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”8 For the CCP, socialism with Chinese characteristics means combining Marxist theory with the ground realities of China. However, party ideologues’ assertion to follow Marxist theory itself does not reflect the ground realities of China. Just like their Western counterparts, Chinese businesses, both government-owned and private, are driven by profit. The economic system of contemporary China can be termed state-led or state-supervised and controlled capitalism. The contradictions of advocating Marxism and following capitalism have destroyed

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the legitimacy of Marxism as a viable theory for explaining China to the outside world and to the people of China. Therefore, CCP theorists contradict themselves when they advocate adapting to the ground realities of China and formulating policies according to the actual conditions on the ground and, at the same time, continue to defend the Marxist theoretical framework. This contradiction in the advocacy of an outmoded theory invites historical nihilism, which China is trying to prevent. Current Chinese ground realities and party policies follow Deng Xiaoping’s idea of first allowing some people and some parts of China to become rich and then inducing them to help and bring the other parts of China on the path to wealth and prosperity.9 Xi Jinping’s idea of the BRI follows the same logic, linking the prosperous eastern regions to the comparatively underdeveloped western regions of China. The idea of becoming rich is ingrained in the psyche of the Chinese population, replacing the earlier Marxist and Maoist ideology. In other words, Chinese nationalism, in combination with the ‘get rich’ narrative, informs contemporary Chinese thinking. Nevertheless, combining the ‘get rich’ narrative and ‘nationalism’ has not produced any ideology or theory with which China can describe itself to the outside world. China fears that this “theoretical” deficiency will eventually lead to a Western ideological infiltration of the Chinese population, with the West achieving what it did in the Soviet Union and disintegrating the Chinese communist system without firing a single shot. This fear and vulnerability was manifested in the CCP’s reaction to the commencement speech by a Chinese student at the University of Maryland, which created a controversy. Shuping Yang criticised the lack of freedom of speech in China and the pollution in Chinese cities. Criticising the lack of freedom in China, she said, “I would soon feel another kind of fresh air for which I will be forever grateful. The fresh air of free speech. Democracy and free speech should not be taken for granted. Democracy and freedom are the fresh air that is worth fighting for.”10 This is precisely what China feared—Chinese students repeating the Western discourse on China. However, the backlash she faced from mainland Chinese citizens and Chinese student organisations in the United States also indicated that although China was increasingly successful in defending its own discourse inside and outside China, it is also highly vulnerable and sensitive to the influence of Western discourse. More alarmingly for the CCP, the University of Maryland incident also demonstrated the increasing influence of Western discourse on the younger Chinese generation.

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The survival of China’s current CCP regime depends on how China will build a counter-narrative to the dominant Western narrative or a theory to explain China’s development, vision, and worldview. The vulnerability of China as a result of “discourse deficiency” has also been emphasised by Professor Li Daokui, who states that if China fails to build a theory to explain its economic development, then the time at which China will suffer because of this weakness is not far away. According to him, “successful economic development practices must be interpreted and guided by a set of theories that match them; otherwise, they will be viewed as biased.”11 He points to the perception of China’s economic development created in the outside world. According to him, the world is not accustomed to Chinese development; they think China is cheating, stealing and taking advantage of Westerners. To explain China’s development story, China needs a theory.12 To date, CCP theoreticians have failed to develop a convincing theoretical foundation for China’s post-reform and opening-up economic transformation. The current emphasis of Xi Jinping’s new era of socialist development with Chinese characteristics points to the objectives that China wants to achieve in the short term, such as decreasing the contradictions developing from uneven economic development, modernising the military by 2035, and becoming a responsible global great power. However, none of this is a theory; rather, these are a collection of future targets to achieve.13 Trying to ward off the Western discourse on China’s economic development and political system, Xi Jinping rejects the judgemental Western analysis of China’s socialist path. According to him, “whether socialism with Chinese characteristics is a good thing or not depends on the judgement of the Chinese people, not on the subjective assumptions of those who wear coloured glasses.”14 He has also repeatedly emphasised that China should go on the offensive in building an international narrative of China rather than remaining defensive.

Preparing for the “Narrative” Offensive Chinese experts refer to Samuel P. Huntington’s view that the main threat to the stability of a traditional society comes not from the invasion of foreign armies but “from the invasion of foreign ideas, press, and discourse, moving faster and deeper than armies and tanks.” China’s military strength is second only to that of the US, and it has powerful nuclear and

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c­onventional deterrence capabilities. Because of these factors, Chinese experts are not particularly worried about a military invasion, similar to colonial times, by Western powers. Nevertheless, times have changed, and with the times, warfare has also changed. According to Professor Dai Xu, “the shape of future war is already plausible. It looks as if the contours of nuclear and conventional war are still there, but what is happening on the ground is warfare that uses information and ideas. It is a war that seems familiar but somehow ambiguous. The Chinese saw the demise of the Soviet Union and the destabilisation of Middle Eastern countries as victims of Western information warfare. Still, it is worrying for the CCP that some Chinese refuse to believe that China could face the same kind of war.” For the CCP, Western countries are using the same successful tools of information warfare against China, and China should take countermeasures before it is too late.15 For Chinese scholars, the experience of Libya was a lesson in information warfare. According to the United Nation’s Human Development Index ranking in 2010, Libya was ranked 53rd in the world and first in Africa (in comparison, China’s HDI ranking in 2014 was 91st). Libya was a prosperous and wealthy country under Moammar Gadhafi.16 However, Western propaganda was successful in depicting Libya as a failed state and Gadhafi as a tyrannical ruler, and it was able to convince many Libyans to revolt against him. The late Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi said during the civil war that if his regime falls, Libya will be broken. Three years after his death in 2011, that message has come true. Three years after the war, Libya, a North African country, had failed to achieve a smooth political transition following Western political structures; rather, it had fallen into a quagmire of separatist violence and terror, facing the growing danger of fragmentation.17 China has also learned other lessons from the Libyan experience; for example, the friendship between the West and non-­Western countries is an illusion. For instance, Libyan leader Gadhafi became friends with the West before the West supported the rebels in the Libyan civil war, leading to Gadhafi’s assassination. If a country wants to resist Western invasion, it has to have a nuclear deterrent.18 However, a nuclear deterrent can deter only a physical invasion, not informational or ideological infiltration. In search of a model to deter the Western narrative, Chinese scholars have taken inspiration from the tough policies of Russian president Putin. For instance, how Russia dealt with the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions. Faced with Western sanctions and information warfare, Putin continued with his tough policies and expanded his international diplomacy.

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Putin also strengthened Russia’s relations with China.19 China has also taken inspiration from the Russian success in its information warfare with the United States and other Western countries. Chinese scholars point out that Russia and China face a similar information warfare threat from the West; however, Russia is more efficient in resisting it and countering it. For instance, the Chinese refer to the Russia Today (RT) TV channel and its success in influencing the global audience.20 These incidents have convinced the CCP that China’s warfare with the West is an ongoing battle and that China will have to take a proactive role in disseminating its side of the story. India and many other countries that follow a democratic system of government do not need to defend their system’s legitimacy by comparing it with other systems because the system provides a legitimate way to replace the ruling powers through the democratic process. However, the Chinese political system created by the CCP faces a unique dilemma: the system is successful in promoting economic development, and the CCP has based its legitimacy on this success. Nevertheless, economic development will certainly slow down with the increase in the size of the economy, and the CCP must defend itself through other sources of legitimacy. As a result, China’s political system is always playing defence and must consistently guard against what it considers to be outside interferences intended to subvert China’s “unique” system of government. As part of this defence, CCP disseminates a large amount of information and news about the flaws of the Western democratic system to convince Chinese audiences that Western political systems are undesirable. Experts from the CCP endeavour to delegitimise the Western democratic system through an offensive discourse; thus, increasingly the legitimacy of the Chinese system is an ongoing task. The critical issue that makes this undertaking by CCP experts more difficult is that in China, the lines between the government and the political system are blurred. In a democratic system, the government is only part of the system, not the system itself. The fear of subversion by Western democratic ideas is ever present in China. From time to time, the CCP has used many tools to defend its system, with the BRI being the most recent tool. The modernisation and opening up of China have introduced Western values and ideas to China’s masses, thus increasing the threat perception of the CCP. This fear is palpable in the efforts by CCP scholars to defend the contemporary Chinese system. According to Jiang Yingchun, “in contemporary China, some people blindly believe in the Western democratic system, regard Western

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democracy as a universal value, and use Western democracy to negate socialist democracy. Western democracy has been abstracted as the supreme value and governance form evolved out of different historical stages and nations. The theory and practice of Western democracy have inherent contradictions that cannot be overcome. In contemporary China, some people ignore the inherent contradictions and defects of the Western democratic system and advocate replacing socialist democracy with Western democracy. This kind of advocacy will harm China.” Jiang Yingchun points to Xi Jinping’s thoughts about adopting Western democracy; according to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, “if, regardless of national conditions, we copy someone’s system, it will be like trying to draw a tiger and ending up drawing not even a dog. Not only will such copying be unable to solve any practical problems, but, because of the lack of acclimatisation (to national conditions), it will also result in serious consequences. We (CCP) are pressing ahead with reform in order to better promote the development of the party and the people’s cause, and not to cater to the applause of some people. We should not slavishly apply Western theories and views to ourselves.”21 One of the examples of a “failed” democracy that China often refers to in order to defend its own system is Indian democracy. Chinese scholars enumerate many Indian failures. For instance, they point to India’s failure to alleviate its large-scale abject poverty; its population explosion, which strains its resources; its flawed legal system, which has millions of pending cases; its slow economic development; and its religious and ethnic divisions and conflict. Chinese intellectuals also challenge the wisdom behind the argument that in the long run, democracy will prevail. They point out that “Some intellectual elites, while acknowledging that India is lagging behind China in the past, argue that the comparison should be made over a longer period and that democracy is, in the long run, more conducive to efficiency and economic development.” They refute this argument by referring to the meaning behind the term “long-term”. Alluding to India’s lack of development and failure to alleviate its abject poverty, Chinese critics wonder whether “…sixty years is not a long run”, and they question the efficiency of democracy, asking whether Chinese people need to wait 100 years for democracy to attain development. They argue that Chinese people want an efficient system that works for development. Chinese people tolerated the Republican government for only 37 years and abandoned the Soviet model after 30 years. For Chinese people, the efficiency of the system matters more than the mode of the system. Chinese scholar Xiao

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Jianjun argues that sixty years of practice have proved beyond doubt that the root cause of India’s problems is democracy itself, which not only has failed to solve India’s problems but also is the cause of India’s problems.22 Chinese scholars argue that Indian conditions such as the extreme disparity between rich and poor make the Indian democratic system lopsided; it will never represent the real interests of the ordinary people of India, and it will be a tool for the rich and privileged to wield power over others. In contrast, the Chinese system is oriented towards economic development as its objective and is useful for achieving this target. If China adopts the Western democratic system as India did, then China’s masses will have to suffer just like India’s masses.23 The Chinese government has always emphasised the stability of society as the core value and the basis for economic and social development. Stressing the importance of stability, CCP scholars have argued that “without stability, people cannot work and live in peace and contentment; without stability, there will be no social development and prosperity; and without stability, there will be no lasting peace and stability of the country.”24 They also argue that, for ordinary Chinese people, whether the central government wields too much authority is less important than whether the central government can maintain order and stability.25 Referring to the protests and demonstrations that are a common phenomenon in most democracies, Chinese experts try to portray Western society and the democratic political system as being in crisis. For instance, Chinese Marxist scholars portray events such as Brexit and Trump’s election as the president of the United States as precursors to the inevitable chaos of the Western capitalist system and as being part of a consistent trend towards the decline of the Western capitalist system. They argue that in sharp contrast to the chaos of the West, China’s economic and social development is sustained and healthy.26 Through official Chinese media, Chinese scholars propagate that the Western democratic system is in crisis but that the West will not abandon democracy as an ideological tool to infiltrate other political systems such as that of China. Chinese scholars argue that due to the rise of China, the Chinese political system poses a great challenge to Western democracy and that the rise of China will certainly greatly improve the confidence of Chinese people in their institutions. Chinese scholars have also sounded warnings about Western attempts to destroy China through flattery and exaggeration. Western media exaggerate China’s economic influence and power, and thus, they want China to increasingly handle global responsibilities, which will

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lead to the overexpansion of Chinese power and, in turn, reinforce the Western discourse of the “China threat theory.”27 Chinese Marxist scholars argue that the current general perception of Western institutions, such as the Western democratic political system, free speech, and law-based society, as the root cause of the West’s success and economic prosperity is flawed. They point out that the developing countries that adopted these institutions have mostly failed in developing their economy and building a stable society. They argue that the Western political system and Western institutions were born of colonial plunder and extortion; thus, it is only after the West became rich that it has managed to sustain such institutions. So, after China becomes a developed nation, will China adopt a Western system? The answer of Chinese scholars is “no.” They believe that Western consumer society will negatively impact the resource allocation of the world; only a “socialist” China can efficiently allocate resources and thus sustain a welfare-oriented development of the world.28 However, Chinese arguments that China is not following the Western consumerist pattern of development are also flawed because China’s rapid economic development has created the largest consumerist society in the world, with shopping festivals having become a national phenomenon in China to such an extent that they rival those in the United States in volume and value. The Chinese government advocates vigilance towards Western propaganda concerning “free speech”, especially the advocacy of a free internet, and towards allowing Western social media platforms to have unrestricted access to China’s market. The government argues that the Western advocacy of a free internet in China, without censorship and restrictions, is a tool to subvert the Chinese system. Chinese critics point out that “Western countries never have relaxed control over their own social media.” This so-called internet freedom is just a political scheme exported to other countries. For instance, Chinese critics refer to the example of Google in China. On January 14, 2010, some Chinese netizens spontaneously went to the Google office building in Beijing and placed white flowers in front of it because the renowned American internet company, which is deeply opposed to the censorship and hacking attacks by the Chinese government, was considering leaving China. These Chinese netizens thought that Google was a company that would never do any harm to China, and Google always talked about striving for a more open and free internet. At that time, however, Google had been involved in PRISM (PRISM is a code name for a programme under which the United States National

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Security Agency (NSA) collects internet communications from various US internet companies) for nearly a year, helping the US government monitor internet users around the world, including in China, which was not publicly known until many years later. Thus, Chinese critics argue that Chinese netizens should guard against Western propaganda concerning a “free internet.”29 Chinese critics identify Western information infiltration and ideological invasion as a threat to the Chinese political system, and they urge caution. However, Chinese scholars find themselves in a defensive position and as having a dearth of tools to mitigate the threat of Western ideas and information. As part of their defence against Western ideological infiltration, Chinese experts try to use Marxism, which has been discarded as a viable ideological tool by China’s masses, to defend the Chinese political system. Ironically, although China argues that Marxism in China is Sinicised, Marxism is a Western theory, and it is often used in China’s official pronouncements as one of the core ideologies of the current political system. However, the most important and widely used tool for establishing and reinforcing the legitimacy of the CCP today is Chinese tradition and culture; Marxism also plays a role as an appendage-like tool that still appeals to some leftist factions.

The Christian Threat Another significant ideological threat that China has faced is the Christian “threat.” The perceived ideological threat from the expansion of Christianity in China has been closely related to the Western threat, especially because a large number of Christian groups have strong relations with Western evangelical groups. China considers colonial culture to be one of the main characteristics of Western culture. Chinese thinkers argue that concepts such as civilisation, barbarism, race, progress, and racism are all the products of the expansionist era of capitalism, and they consider European Christian Protestant culture to be the root of Western colonial culture. Taking the success of Europe’s material civilisation as the commercial premise and applying scientific disciplines such as biology and anthropology as the explanation for human progress, colonial culture became the spiritual means of colonial expansion in the process of the formation and development of modern European colonial expansion. According to Chinese experts, two main ideas originated from the cultural roots of Christianity. One is the idea of “God’s chosen people,” and the

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other is the Christian missionary tradition, which became the core of Western colonial expansion. The West’s advocacy of democracy to other nations reflects a colonial culture based on these principles.30 During the colonial period, unequal treaties and the military power of the colonial great powers protected Christian proselytising in modern China. There have been numerous examples of missionaries meddling in local politics in China. It is also true that there have been conflicts in which the abuse of privilege by missionaries and parishioners has provoked resentment. The legacy of Christianity as a tool of Western imperialism and colonialism is ingrained in the political thinking of China.31 The CCP views non-state sanctioned Christian groups as a threat to the social order and as modern tools of Western neo-colonisation and imperialism.32 The propagation of the Christian faith without the permission of the state is considered illegal in China. According to Yan Kefei and Li Xuhui, historically, the Western powers used the church’s teachings to indoctrinate and spread the faith in China and equated Western culture with foreign culture to occupy China and try to change Chinese culture. They argue that for a long period of time, Chinese people were ignorant about the use of Christianity by the United States as a means of cultural infiltration and ideological invasion. In contemporary China, Chinese people view many Christian groups as tools of Western or American cultural imperialism.33 Chinese scholars refer to the impact of Christian missionary activity in the Xinjiang region during the Republican period as one historical example of cultural invasion. The “cultural invasion” led by Christian missionaries tried to change the culture of the region and subvert the existing social system and cultural norms. According to Chinese scholars, missionary activity greatly hindered social progress in the region and adversely affected cultural and ethnic harmony in the region. Currently, Christian groups are considered the “fifth column” of the West in China, aggressively expanding and seeking to erase whatever remnants of communist thought and Maoist thought remain, and win over the next generation of Chinese people. The Chinese government’s view of Christian groups as a threat is reflected in the CCP’s consistent crack down on them.

The Re-Sinification of China One strategy for taking hold of the narrative is the continuing effort to re-Sinicise China; this is a multifaceted strategy encompassing education and culture.

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The sense of urgency with regard to rolling back the Westernisation of China has strengthened since Xi Jinping took power. After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, one official Chinese newspaper enthusiastically reported that the progress of Westernisation, which has lasted for nearly 30 years, influencing Chinese society and the study of the social sciences and the humanities in China, has been halted. The report further stated that “as people observe and feel, in recent years, the entire spirit of China, the cultural climate and the academic climate, are indeed undergoing profound changes, the context of Chinese society is being reconstructed, and the whole of China itself is moving in the direction of more indigenisation.”34 Xi Jinping has encouraged the inclusion of classical poetry and prose in Chinese textbooks and criticised de-Sinification. He considers the study of classical poetry and prose to be an integral part of building the cultural confidence of China.35 According to Xi Jinping, “classical Chinese poetry and literature have been integrated into the blood of the Chinese nation. It has become our genes. All the things that we are talking about right now are recorded in childhood. Chinese children attending Chinese language classes should learn ancient Chinese poetry and literary classics, thus advancing the excellent traditional culture of the Chinese nation.”36 Xi Jinping advocates the learning of ancient Chinese classics and poetry in Chinese schools to instil pride with respect to ancient Chinese culture in the minds of China’s young generation. Xi Jinping thinks that de-­ Sinification by way of rejecting ancient traditional Chinese culture is sad and that it removes from Chinese people the gene that makes them distinct from other cultures and ethnicities. Xi Jinping has further advocated that the cultivation and promotion of socialist core values must be based on the exceptional traditional culture of China because strong core values must have solid roots. On many occasions, Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised learning about China’s traditional culture and warned about the consequences of rejecting it. According to him, “abandoning traditions will lead to the loss of one’s own roots. It is like cutting off one’s spiritual lifeblood. The extensive and profound traditional culture of China serves as a foundation for a firm foothold in the middle of the surge of global culture. Chinese culture has a long history; it is the accumulation of the deepest spiritual pursuits of the Chinese nation, and it represents the unique spiritual identity of the Chinese nation. It provides rich nourishment for the development and growth of the Chinese nation. Chinese traditional virtue is the essence of

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Chinese culture and contains rich ideological and moral resources. Do not forget the past because it is only through the past that we can then open up the future. Be adept at one’s own heritage because it is only through this heritage that we can then be more creative.”37 Xi Jinping has also emphasised not blindly following the past but adapting the past to the present conditions. He states, “regarding our [Chinese] history and culture, especially the values and morals inherited from our ancestors, we should make the past serve the present, get rid of the stale and welcome the fresh. We should differentiate and purify, then inherit and strive to use all the spiritual wealth created by the Chinese nation to educate and cultivate people.”38 Additionally, Xi Jinping has emphasised Chinese culture as a source for China’s current political system. According to him, “the unique cultural tradition, unique historical destiny, and unique basic national conditions predestine that we must follow the development path suitable to our own characteristics.” Xi Jinping has also called on the Chinese population to “make China’s exceptional traditional culture the important source of the core socialist values.” Xi Jinping has also emphasised the necessity of opening up to the world and of learning from the world. According to him, Chinese people “…should not only understand the history and culture of China but also open our eyes to the world, understand the history and culture of different ethnic groups in the world, discard the dregs and extract the essence from them so as to take inspiration from them and use them for our own purposes.” The CCP argues that the current political system of China is based on values derived from traditional Chinese culture. Exhorting Chinese citizens to follow the right path, the path of the CCP, and to take pride in China’s traditional culture, Xi Jinping has pointed out that “the Chinese nation is a nation of extraordinary creativity. We have created the great Chinese civilisation. We can also continue to expand and follow a development path that is suitable to Chinese national conditions. Chinese people of all ethnic groups must strengthen their confidence in theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, their confidence in the Chinese path, and their confidence in the Chinese system and be determined to forge ahead along the correct Chinese path.”39 From the above passages, it is evident that Xi Jinping and the CCP are concerned with the Westernisation of China and want to create a narrative based on Chinese culture. Xi Jinping’s strong and repeated emphasis on the importance of learning Chinese culture reflects China’s concern over the Westernised nature

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of contemporary Chinese society. One of the main concerns reflecting Westernisation and threatening the CCP’s hold over the thought process of the Chinese population is the intrusion of international curriculums into China’s educational system. Many middle-class Chinese families train their children in international curriculums and enrol them in international schools to make their applications to foreign educational institutions easier. Many CCP scholars think that these actions will lead to the de-­ Sinification of Chinese children and will facilitate ideological infiltration by the West.40 The search for an ideology or narrative tool to legitimise the CCP’s rule has been extensive; one such attempt has been to legitimise Marxist theory according to the changed circumstances of China. The process of legitimising Marxist theory to explain the contemporary realities of China has involved establishing that the Marxist base of the CCP is Sinicised. The propaganda with regard to how Marxism in China is Sinicised has produced several PhD theses by Chinese students as well as thousands of research articles by Chinese scholars.41 On December 13, 1939, Mao Zedong first mentioned the Sinification of Marxist theory, after which the debate over the Sinification of Marxist theory gradually faded away, resurfacing only at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, thus signalling the need of the CCP to reinforce its ideological and theoretical base. The main idea of this debate was to substantiate and justify that China applied a foreign ideology (Marxism) to the practical necessities of the Chinese situation. The debate supported and unleashed by the CCP tried to instil in the Chinese population the belief that the Marxist theory followed by the Chinese Communist Party is relevant to the contemporary conditions of China and is a legitimate theory.42 Some party scholars have even tried to link Marxism with China’s traditional culture and believe that Chinese Marxism can derive its ideological source from traditional Chinese culture. According to them, Confucianism does not necessarily need to replace Marxism; both can coexist and prevent the advancement of Western culture in China.43 Xi Jinping’s emphasis has been to develop among Chinese citizens pride in Chinese culture and to make traditional Chinese culture the de facto source of legitimacy for the ruling CCP and for China as a nation, At the same time, the CCP has been maintaining the argument that its Marxist ideology is Sinicised. The BRI is a by-product of the larger Chinese search for a narrative to explain contemporary China to its people and to the outside world.

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Marxist theory, though still propagated within party circles, is not used to explain China to either its internal or external audiences. Chinese leadership currently propagates traditional culture as the source of the core value of what it calls socialism with Chinese characteristics. These measures are part of a broader effort to find traditions and history to explain the current political actions of China, its contemporary regime and political system, and they reflect a yearning for a theory to explain China. Chinese leadership is concerned about the Westernisation of the Chinese population if there is no effort to explain China through its own narrative.

Searching for the Dream Another attempt by the CCP to have a Chinese national narrative that resists Western narrative hegemony has been the creation of the discourse of the “Chinese dream.” The Chinese dream closely resembles the popular conception of the “American dream.” It is meant to be equivalent to the American dream and to be a message that the Chinese population finds easily understandable. One of the main purposes of propagating the Chinese dream among the Chinese population has been to have narrative parity with the United States. For instance, the following comparison by a CCP scholar between the American dream and the Chinese dream reveals much about the Chinese pursuit of narrative parity with the United States. According to Zhu Jidong, “before, there was a British dream, a Russian dream, and a Japanese dream, but today, world attention is drawn only to the ‘American dream’ and the ‘Chinese dream.’ Unlike the American dream, which highlights individuality and enriching oneself, the Chinese dream emphasises that the state plays an important role in an individual’s destiny. The “American dream” emphasises the pursuit of a strong unipolar world, where the “Chinese dream” not only belongs to China but also belongs to the world, that is, China seeks consensus with other countries on global issues. The “American dream” is becoming ephemeral; the Chinese dream will open bright prospects for exploring the diversified development of human civilisation.”44 However, Xi Jinping’s explanation of how to realise the “Chinese dream” does not correlate with the party scholar’s description of it as a dream that “belongs to the world.” According to Xi Jinping, “to realise the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is to make the country rich and powerful, national rejuvenation, the happiness of the people.”45

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Very closely related to the Chinese dream, there has also been a nationwide campaign to spread happiness and build happy cities. A happy Chinese citizen is considered part of the Chinese dream. As with any individual trying to attain happiness, China’s happiness campaign has also ended up as a mirage. The reason is that the main idea behind it was to spread happiness by projecting positivity and only positive news, which, to the Chinese population, looks more like propaganda than anything that spreads happiness. Nevertheless, the campaign has stimulated some exciting studies. Using data from “Sina Weibo,” the most popular social media platform in China, researchers at Tsinghua University studied the happiness levels of Chinese citizens, producing impressive results and new directions for the Chinese government to pursue its happiness campaign. According to this study, the happiest cities in China were Hangzhou (Zhejiang province), Chuzhou (Anhui province), Yuxi (Yunnan province), Yingtan (Jiangxi province), and Yangzhou (Jiangsu province). Interestingly, large metropoles such as Beijing and Shanghai were not the happiest cities in China. The researchers also found that the relationship between happiness and economic wellbeing is not linear. In poorer regions, happiness rose rapidly with economic development. However, the turning point is a per capita income of US$ 3000, above which the level of happiness will not rise as quickly as the economy develops. Additionally, in the happiness campaign, the main target of comparison and reference point have been the “American dream”, further indicating that China has a long way to go to free itself from the influence of the United States.46

The BRI Narrative as a Double-Edged Sword Post-structuralist philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari have highlighted the importance of narrative as a basic structure for human knowledge and action and as a means of constructing one’s sense of self.47 China’s effort to create a new narrative is part of its attempt to reimagine itself and to resist the narrative dominance of the West, which China considers detrimental to its survival. Building a BRI narrative is as significant as building the physical linkages between the countries. The narrative gives the physical entities meaning. The BRI narrative also gives meaning to China’s relations with other countries. Although the BRI narrative is mainly an economic one, other aspects of relations such as cultural relations and historical relations are also included in this narrative, and compared to the BRI’s emphasis on

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China’s economic and cultural relations with other countries, considerably less emphasis is given to defence and security relations. Initially, the BRI was a name given to China’s plan to integrate its relatively underdeveloped periphery provinces, such as Xinjiang and Yunnan, with the bordering national economies of Asia and Eurasia. However, since the announcement of the BRI, the name has gradually been used to describe Chinese economic engagements, historical relations and cultural relations in most parts of the world, including China’s engagements with distant regions such as Latin America. If we erase the “BRI” label from China’s economic engagements with its neighbouring countries and other parts of the world, then the projects initiated in the name of the BRI may seem to be profit-driven and geostrategically driven initiatives. If there is no BRI label for these Chinese projects, then every Chinese-led or Chinese-involved infrastructure project and every other economic engagement will be judged according to its merits and demerits. In the initial years in which the BRI was propagated, inviting companies from the United States to join in the initiative, Xi Jinping himself emphasised the flexible nature of the BRI label. According to him, We will take strong measures to promote the coordinated development of the domestic regions, coordinated rural-urban development. We will accelerate the development of less developed areas, we will accelerate the construction of “One Belt And One Road” in order to build a platform for the expansion of the foreign cooperation of various provinces. For example, Xinjiang is the core area of the Silk Road economic belt, and Yunnan is the bridgehead of “One Belt and One Road” to the southwest. “One Belt and One Road” welcome the active participation of all countries, including the United States, and these measures will create opportunities for China-US local cooperation.48

The fact that the BRI gives all Chinese projects a common narrative is both an advantage and a disadvantage of the BRI concept. The BRI is an abbreviation indicating two Silk Roads, one maritime and the other ­land-­based. The Silk Road narrative forms an integral part of this narrative, and what makes it distinct is that it is mostly a trade and culture narrative rather than a militaristic narrative (although there are some exceptions, such as the Chinese expedition to Sri Lanka under Admiral Zheng He and the capture of one of the Sri Lankan kings as a hostage). The BRI can help in building a Chinese narrative that can assist in the

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country’s rise to becoming a global superpower. The BRI smooths the narrative of Chinese economic engagement with the world; it may also help in camouflaging the security issues it has with its neighbouring countries and the rise of the Chinese military. However, building a narrative can also be a double-­edged sword. The most dominant global media are in English, which is also the language of the global elite. Although China is trying to create a narrative, global English media and academia can interpret the BRI as a dangerous plan or project by China to dominate Asia and even the world. This may result in producing an effect that is the opposite of what was intended by China, that is, building a benign narrative of the rise of China. If a counter-narrative against the BRI is created and the benevolent narrative of the BRI is rejected, then all Chinese projects with the BRI label will come under suspicion, and the BRI will come to be perceived as a tool for Chinese hegemony or neo-colonialism. China is aware of this pitfall and has decided to pursue a discourse offensive to pre-empt the aggression of the Western narrative. The Chinese discourse offensive is explicitly directed against the West, but the battleground covers almost all regions of the world and the internal affairs of China. The reasons for going on the offensive are mixed. One reason is the frustration on the part of China over the fact that even with the country’s economic success, the West does not acknowledge the CCP-­ led regime of China as a legitimate regime. The second reason is the confidence that China is now powerful enough to challenge the hegemony of Western discourse and that the West is in disarray because of its slow economic growth, its migration issues, and the right-wing nationalism on the rise. This attitude of the CCP is amply demonstrated by a CCP ideologue in the following. The conditions now exist that allow us to challenge the hegemony of Western discourse with our own independent systems of discourse. For many years, there has been an ongoing refrain that China’s political reform is failing. No matter how things have changed, no matter what successes have been achieved, China can never meet the demanding standards of the US.  This is a typical example of Western discourse hegemony, to which some of us are willing to enslave ourselves. China is China, and why should China need to turn into the United States? This is something that will never happen. China’s chosen path, its theories, its system will be welcomed by and win the support of its people if they can bring about the great revival of the Chinese nation.49

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Historical Legitimacy CCP theoreticians relate the BRI to the ancient Silk Road, and the Silk Road narrative provides the BRI with historical legitimacy. According to them, the land-based Silk Road was opened by Zhang Qian during the Western Han dynasty, and the maritime Silk Road was also opened by the Western Han dynasty; during this time, the Chinese fleet arrived in both India and Sri Lanka. The BRI is not a new attempt by China to legitimise its opening up to the world using the legacy of the ancient Silk Road. The Silk Road helped China present itself as a Civilisational nation to the outside world, even though it was inconsistent with and contrary to the revolutionary teachings of Mao and Marxism. A divisive communist ideology is not an excellent tool for making friends. However, this ideology was the core of the identity of post-liberation China; China had to find a new identity to project itself to the outside world and to pursue friendly relations with foreign powers holding various ideologies and cultures. The most obvious tool for China to relate to various foreign powers was the Silk Road concept, which encapsulated the identity of China as a global, traditional and prosperous trading nation. The Silk Road concept acted as a symbol of China’s global relations. In the post-reform and opening-up period of China, the Silk Road concept was used for diplomatic, commercial and cultural objectives. The Silk Road served as an important tool for re-emphasising traditional China and its relations with the West as well as other Asian countries. The talk of global revolution and the struggle against imperialism and capitalism was gradually replaced by narratives of the shared common civilisational linkages and commercial linkages China had with Asia and the West. The Silk Road also helped to rebrand China as a civilisational power rather than as a revolutionary power. The Silk Road was given prominence in internal and external propaganda to show that the Communist Party-led ­government of China is the inheritor of Chinese civilisation rather than a destroyer of it. China’s aspirations to be recognised as a civilisational power were manifested in the launching of the historical dance-drama “Friendship on the Silk Road” in 1979. This dance drama tells the story of a muralist of the Dunhuang caves and his daughter who save a Persian merchant from being swallowed up by howling winds and sand waves in the Gobi Desert. According to the official Chinese story about the origins of this dance-­ drama, in late 1977, members of the Gansu song and dance troupe

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­ repared for the production of “Friendship on the Silk Road” with a yearp long trip westward along the Silk Road. They visited the Thousand Buddha Grottoes of the Dunhuang caves several times, studied the dance movements depicted on the murals in the grottoes as well as costumes and architecture from various periods, and read relevant historical documents. The Chinese government claims that the troupe created the plot of the dance-drama based on historical scenes and stories about the friendship between the people of China and foreign countries dating back more than 1000 years.50 After China’s reform and opening-up, one of the most prominent countries with which China established close relations was the Persian monarchy. At that time, Iran was one of the closest allies of the West and one of the most powerful countries in the Middle East; thus, China viewed it as a door to both the Middle East and the West. During high-profile visits between Iran and China, Chinese leaders often emphasised the role played by the Silk Road in connecting both the Chinese empire and the Iranian empire. In 1977, China allowed an Iranian scholar, Professor Moghaddam, to visit Xinjiang to study the historical ties between the cultures of the peoples of China and Iran, especially the vestiges of the Silk Road.51 In 1978, CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng visited Iran and presented the Shahanshah of Iran an antique yellow-glazed pottery camel adorned with silk that was unearthed in Loyang province, symbolising the Silk Road and the heritage that connected both Iran and China.52 In 1979, foreign diplomats in China attended a ballet performance, “Silk Road Episode,” and other embassy officials in China and several Chinese ministers also joined foreign diplomats to watch the ballet. This event was a signal to foreign nations that China wanted to revive the “Silk Road” heritage of international commerce and cultural exchanges.53 Many world leaders who visited China in the 1980s also attended the “Silk Road Episode” ballet. For instance, between 1980 and 1981, during this two-year period, world leaders who attended the ballet included General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, the president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, the chairman of the military committee for national salvation and the head of state and government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, New Zealand Prime Minister Robert D.  Muldoon, General Prem Tinsulanonda, the prime minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Verdet, President Julius

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K. Nyerere of Tanzania, Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin, and General d’Armee Gnassingbe Eyadema, the president of Togo. Because of the international isolation during the Cultural Revolution and the image of China as a militant and violent state that it created, China needed a cultural symbol like the Silk Road to create an image of China as worldly, benign and pro-trade that would support the policy of reform and opening-up.54 China also revived its maritime history and the hero of its maritime history, Zheng He (1371–1435), the world-renowned navigator of the Ming dynasty. In 1979, a park in memory of Zheng He was constructed in the town of Kunyang, Jinning county, Yunnan province, the birthplace of Zheng He. According to official Chinese reportage, Zheng He commanded a fleet between the1405 and 1433 and visited thirty nine Asian and African countries on seven voyages, greatly contributing to the friendship and trade relations between China and those areas. Zheng He is believed to have opened up the Chinese maritime Silk Road.55 In 1982, a drama entitled “Zheng He Sails the Western Oceans,” recounting the travels of Zheng He, was produced and performed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy Drama Troupe. Zheng He is considered an inspiration for the PLA Navy, but more importantly, he has been projected as a pioneer who opened up China’s trade with other nations as well as knowledge exchanges between China and several other countries. According to Zhu Zuyi, the playwright behind the drama, “Zheng He carried out a peaceful mission and opened a ‘Silk Road’ in the sea lanes, and we regard him as part of the tradition of our navy.” The idea of a Silk Road in the sea lanes was initiated in China’s post-reform period; like the Silk Road over land, the Silk Road through the sea gave legitimacy to both the reform and opening-up and to international trade.56 China has conducted many studies about the Silk Road; archaeological excavations have been carried out in areas through which the ancient Silk Road passed. China has also been open to collaboration with other countries, such as Japan, to conduct studies about the history and culture of the Silk Road. As part of the coordination of its efforts to study the Silk Road and its various aspects, the Chinese Dunhuang Turpan society has been established in Lanzhou, in northwest China’s Gansu province, to promote the study of Dunhuang and Turpan, two ancient cultural treasure houses on the ancient Silk Road. Professor Ji Xianlin, the vice-president of Beijing University, was elected president of the society. A 1983 national symposium on the study of Dunhuang was held simultaneously with the society’s

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inaugural meeting. Among the more than 200 participants were specialists and scholars in the fields of philosophy, history, archaeology, ethnology, religion, language, literature, the fine arts, music and dance from all over the country.57 Regarding commercial aspects, China has showcased Gansu and Xinjiang, emphasising the role of these two provinces roles in connecting China with the world and attracting foreign tourists to visit these provinces. The soft infrastructure of the Silk Road, in terms of spreading awareness of it, conducting historical and cultural research about it, identifying and branding its regions and routes as Silk Roads and, above all, using it as a diplomatic tool, was laid long before its contemporary revival by the Chinese government under Xi Jinping. However, the major differences are its new name, “Belt and Road,” and the rise of China as a global economic power. The Chinese government’s plan to revive the Silk Road as a tool to conceptualise and communicate China’s rise and its economic relations with other countries is a strategy with strong historical and cultural roots. However, the single label of the BRI given to the combined land-­ based and maritime Silk Roads remains confusing and lacks any historical basis.

The Colourful Road The Chinese Silk Road narrative attempts to recreate the imagined golden era of China during the Tang Dynasty. Comparing the BRI with China’s historical golden era, Xi Jinping has said that “the land-based Silk Road and maritime Silk Road served as a great channel that economically and culturally connected Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, East Africa, and Europe. The One Belt One Road project is an inheritor and up-grade of the ancient Silk Road.”58 Official Chinese media sometimes give the BRI very colourful descriptions; for example, “One Belt and One Road are like a magical bond that makes the exchanges between China and the rest of the world colourful.” Xi Jinping has also added to this colourful rhetoric, saying that “the construction of One Belt and One Road shows our desire for exchange between civilisations and will continue to serve as the messenger of communication between civilisations, promoting mutual learning among civilisations, and making human civilisation more colourful and colourful.”59 Slightly more than three years after the announcement of the BRI, more than 100 countries and international organisations have supported

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and responded positively, and over 40 countries and international organisations have signed cooperation agreements with China. According to Xi Jinping, “the One Belt and One Road initiative come from China, but it benefits the world.”60 These descriptions and pronouncements also point to the fact that from the initial focus areas of Eurasia and Southeast Asia, the BRI has now become a label for China’s relations with all other countries worldwide.

Hope for Victory? Chinese people fear that the negative public opinion prevalent in the world with regard to China’s many global commercial and industrial activities will be detrimental to China’s relations with the world. For instance, Chinese experts argue that China’s increasing interactions with Middle Eastern countries, such as China’s role in oil exploration in the Middle East region and technical cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, are negatively portrayed in Western media as “resource imperialism.”61 Some Chinese experts argue that the BRI is a strategy that fulfils China’s obligation as a great power. However, this aspiration faces the hurdle of Western anti-Chinese discourse. Chinese scholars argue that China should strengthen its propaganda power to neutralise the negative propaganda by the Western powers, especially Western media propaganda that labels Chinese engagement in Africa as China’s “new colonialism.” Chinese scholars advocate that Chinese propaganda should be distinct from the propaganda by the Western media and should be presented with diluted political and ideological colours. For example, concerning Africa, Chinese propaganda should be focused on economic development and people’s livelihood. They argue for a Chinese model of broadcasting based on economic development and the “realities of China” and the realities of “developing Africa.” In critiquing Western media propaganda, Chinese scholars have alluded to the dominance of judgemental discourses in Western media about many African countries that do not follow the Western model of democracy. Chinese scholars advocate that China should not follow Western broadcasting standards, for example, criticising African regimes based on Western assumptions of human rights and the lack of free speech. However, China faces an uphill battle in creating alternative propaganda that is distinct from Western nations and, at the same time, that is attractive to developing world countries, especially countries in Africa.

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Chinese scholars point out that because of the outcomes of historical Western colonialism, most of the African population is familiar with Western culture and Western institutions and values. This situation forms a large obstacle preventing Africans from accepting Chinese broadcasting and propaganda. The West has had a well-established media and broadcasting presence in most of the world. The colonial territories in Asia and Africa are heavily affected by the media and culture of their former colonial masters. Considering the uneasy and sometimes hostile relations between China and Western nations, China believes that Western media are creating a discourse that negatively affects the Chinese image in most of the developing world. How to resist it is an important and longstanding question for China. Under the BRI programme, Chinese scholars call for the building of a new discourse and propaganda structure for developing world countries. They assert that this structure will be essential for the success of the BRI.62 One may ask, what is the problem with the current Chinese broadcasting and propaganda targeting foreign countries? The answer is “quite a lot.” Chinese scholars criticise official Chinese methods and ways of propaganda. They consider the Chinese way of broadcasting and presenting Chinese policies to foreign audiences to be marred by outdated thinking and a limited understanding of foreign audiences and changes in global values. They refer to Chinese broadcasters’ habit of direct translation from Chinese to English, as a result of which the Western public misunderstands China’s intentions. For instance, China’s use of words such as “strategic corridor” and “bridgehead” in explaining the BRI to foreign audiences resonates more closely with a military vocabulary than a civilian or economic vocabulary. Naturally, the BRI intends to bring many benefit to China, but the Chinese media’s habit of giving less or no emphasis to this factor gives the wrong impression of China’s intentions to the outside world. It also gives room for Western media to speculate about China’s intentions and to attribute China’s ulterior motives to them. Chinese scholars advocate that China should emphasise Chinese interests and benefits when explaining the BRI to the outside world. Chinese scholars also criticise the Chinese media’s tendency to overstate achievements and to rarely admit failures or mistakes. This habit of projecting a perfect and infallible China to the outside world will also easily arouse the vigilance and fear of countries along the One Belt and One Road. This kind of non-­ objective broadcasting by China will only result in counterproductive outcomes.63

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It is true that China is strong; however, strength is a relative concept, and emphasising it will elicit various psychological reactions from neighbouring countries. Chinese experts argue that if, in their foreign broadcasting, Chinese media in their foreign broadcasting, repeatedly emphasise China’s rapid rise in political, economic and military power, the image of a seemingly unblemished superpower, doing so will only create a stronger sense of crisis and rebellious spirit among the countries along the BRI, and they will resist cooperation with China. Because of these reasons, Chinese experts call for objective broadcasting by the Chinese media for foreign audiences.64 Chinese scholars point out that for most foreigners, China is still a distant and mysterious country. China’s foreign media broadcasting has low recognition and acceptability in foreign countries. Chinese media are not up to international standards; there is no convergence between what Chinese media broadcast and the needs of foreign audiences. Chinese media also lack the professionalism of Western media in reporting international events.65 One example of how Western media influence the perception of the world against China is the increasing influence of Western media on the Pakistani perception of China. Pakistan is a country that has a highly favourable opinion about China. However, studies show that this favourable opinion is also changing because of the influence of Western media. According to one study conducted by Chinese experts about the Pakistani news media’s reporting on China, Pakistani news media are highly influenced by Western media in their reporting about China. Pakistani media source a large amount of China-related news from Western media. The study also finds that Pakistani media use the concepts, frameworks, vocabulary and agenda of Western media, emphasising democracy, free speech, and Western notions of human rights. Due to this use of Western notions and frameworks, Pakistani media view China from a Western perspective. Additionally, the study points out that many Pakistani newspapers are starting to have tie-ups with Western media companies, thus increasing the Western influence on Pakistani media.66 Chinese experts advocate Chinese media should adopt the professionalism and methods of Western media but not their content and values in their foreign broadcasting. To date, Chinese media have a long way to go to challenge the monopoly of Western media in creating the global discourse.

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The Unexpected Hurdle During the building of the BRI narrative, India’s non-participation in and rejection of the BRI have become a stumbling block for the Chinese narrative. Although major Chinese investments for linking the Chinese mainland with Asia do not involve India, India’s rejection or nonparticipation has led to the creation of both a counter-narrative and a refuting narrative against the BRI. India’s refuting narrative against the BRI has also attracted and is increasingly unifying the negative narratives of the BRI, such as the counter-narrative of the United States and Japan’s counter-narrative of the BRI. While India cannot match China’s technical skills or economic power in building infrastructure linking its neighbouring countries, India has managed to build a refuting narrative against the BRI, becoming one of the most challenging hurdles for the BRI.  The effectiveness of India’s nonparticipation in BRI is evident from the strong Chinese reaction and extensive debate on India’s attitude towards the BRI. Explorations into the Chinese debate on India’s attitudes and actions with regard to the BRI reveal how vulnerable China is in narrative creation and how others create meanings about Chinese activities.

Notes 1. Shaoying Zhang and Derek McGhee, China’s Ethical Revolution and Regaining Legitimacy Reforming the Communist Party through Its Public Servants (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 12. 2. Carry Huang, “Paranoia from Soviet Union collapse haunts China’s Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, November 18, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1359350/paranoiasoviet-union-collapse-haunts-chinas-communist-party-22-years (accessed November 12, 2017). 3. Lin Yanhu and Feng Yanli, “Dui Sulian Jieti Jiaoxun de zai renshi” [Rethinking the lessons from Soviet Union’s Disintegration], Qiushi [Qiushi], September 8, 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/ 2016-09/08/c_1119530393.htm (accessed March 9, 2018). 4. Ibid. 5. Wen Jian, “Ba wo guoji huayu quanyou xiao chuan bo zhong guoshang yin” [To grasp the international discourse power and effectively spread the Chinese voice – An analysis of the Xi Jinping’s ideas and Thinking on the External Propaganda Work], Xinhua wang [Xinhua net], April 6, 2016. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/06/c_1118542256.htm (accessed March 9, 2018).

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6. “China story” means the generally stories about China’s economic success story. 7. Ibid. 8. Li Shenming, “Hua yu quan bang zhu xi fang long duan shi jie” [Did the power of discourse helped the West to monopolise the world?], Qiushi [Qiushi Journal], December 9, 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/ politics/2014-12/09/c_1113573063.htm (accessed March 9, 2018). 9. “Deng Xiaoping: rang yi bu fen ren xian fu qi lai” [Deng Xiaoping: let some people get rich first], Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen [News of the Communist Party of China], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/34136/ 2569304.html (accessed March 8, 2018). 10. Ken Shepherd, “UMD grad apologizes for offending her native China in pro-free-speech commencement address,” Washington Times, May 24, 2017. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/24/yangshuping-univ-of-maryland-graduate-apologizes-/ (accessed March 9, 2018). 11. Li Daokui, “Jiejian ying mei ri ba zhong guoli lun jiang tou che” [Make thorough Chinese theory by Borrowing from the experiences of England, US and Japan], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], February 26, 2018, http:// www.bjd.com.cn/sy/llzk/201802/26/t20180226_11080938.html (accessed March 8, 2018). 12. Ibid. 13. Han zhenfeng, “Xi Jinping xin shi dai zhong guo te se she hui si xiang de nei zai luo ji” [The internal logic of Xi jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics], Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen wang [CPCnews Net], December 9, 2017, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1219/ c40531-29715166.html (accessed March 9, 2018). 14. She Shuanghao, “tui dong Xi Jinping xin shi dai zhong guo te se she hui si xiang shen ru ren xin” [Promoting Xi jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics deep into people’s hearts], Lilun Zhong guo [China Theory], March 11, 2018, http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/theory/2018-03/11/content_50697824.htm (accessed March 11, 2018). 15. Dai Xu, “Zhongguo zui da de weixie” [China’s biggest threats], Hongge hui wang [Red Song Association Net], April 30, 2014, http://www. szhgh.com/Article/opinion/xuezhe/2014-04-29/50680.html (accessed December 9, 2017). 16. Mahmood Mamdani, “Libya after the NATO invasion,” Al Jazeera, April 10, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/04/ 201148174154213745.html (accessed December 26, 2017). 17. “Libiya “sui pian hua”, Xifang nan ci qi jiu” [The West is to blame for Libya’s fragmentation], Jie fang Junbao [Liberation Army Daily], October 25, 2014, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-10-25/0319807416.html (accessed December 8, 2017).

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18. Ye Hailin, “Libiya “zhan zheng” de jiao xun” [Lessons from Libyan war], Dang Zheng lun tan [Party & Government Forum], No. 10 (2011), p. 37. 19. Zuo Fengrong, “Xifang zhicai xia dee luo si” [Russia under Western Sanctions], cpcnews.cn, February 2, 2015, http://theory.people.com. cn/n/2015/0202/c40531-26490412.html (accessed November 6, 2017). 20. Wu Xu, “RT: E luo si “xin wen xin xi zhan” zhong de xin wang pai” [RT: Russia’s new ace in news and information warfare], Duiwai chuanbo [International Communications], No. 7 (2014), pp. 23–25. 21. Jiang yingchun, “dang dai xifang xuezhe dui xifang minzhu de fansi” [Reflections on western democracy by contemporary western scholars], QsTheory, May 6, 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/201605/06/c_1118818159.htm (accessed December 9, 2017). 22. Xiao Jianjun, “Minzhu heyi zhong jiang huimie Yindu” [How democracy will eventually destroy India?], Tianya [Frontiers], No. 3 (2009), pp. 203–204. 23. Lai lixing, “cong Yindu minzhu xuanzhu zhidu kan Zhongguo jingji” [A view of Chinese economy  – From India’s democratic electoral system], Xiandai Jingji Xinxi [Modern Economic Information], No. 19 (2009), p. 29. 24. Zheng Ruifeng, “wen ding shi ying dao li” [Stability is also a strong ­ rinciple], QsTheory, October 9, 2017, http://www.qstheory.cn/ p defense/2017-10/09/c_1121773482.htm (accessed December 19, 2017). 25. Sun Jin, “Zhongguo fazhan xuyao yingdui de Xifang guannian yingxiang” [China’s development need to cope with the impact of Western ideas], Dang dais hi jie yu shehui zhuyi [Contemporary World & Socialism], No. 6 (2006), p. 89. 26. Tian Pengying, “‘Xifang luan xiang’ de zhidu genyuan” [The Institutional Root cause of Western Chaos], QsTheory, December 1, 2016, http:// www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/bkjx/2016-12/01/c_1120032431.htm (accessed December 9, 2017). 27. Tian Gaiwei, “Xifang minzhu shuaibai de wuda yuanyin – jinqi guo nei wai meiti dui xifang minzhu de fansi” [Five reasons for the decline of Western democracy: the recent reflection on Western democracy by domestic and foreign media], QsTheory, August 7, 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/ dukan/hqwg/2014-08/07/c_1111982588.htm (accessed December 8, 2017). 28. Yu Guohui, “Xifang de “fada” shi baoli lueduo de chanwu” [The “developed” West is the product of violent plunder], Zhongguo shehui kexue bao [China Social Science Daily], October 17, 2014, http://www.cssn.cn/ bk/bkpd_qklm/bkpd_bkwz/201410/t20141031_1385136.shtml (accessed December 8, 2017).

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29. Xiao Li, “Xifang huayu xianjing yu xifang wangluo ziyou” [Western discourse trap and Western internet freedom], QsTheory, April 30, 2015, http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/bkjx/2015-04/30/c_1115140179. htm (accessed December 9, 2017). 30. Wang Hua, “shi jie jindaishi beijing xia de zhimin wenhua wenti” [Colonial culture in the context of modern world history], Qinghua daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)], No. 5 (2008), p. 151. 31. Li Shizhou, “diguo zhuyi lieqiang zai hua bao jiao quan de yange” [The evolution of the imperialist powers’ right to protect missions in China], Shandong daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)], No. 2 (1990), pp.  95–102; Lian Lizhi and Wang Shouzhong, “diguozhuyi liyong jidujiao (xinjiao) dui jindai Shandong de qinlue” [Imperialist invasion of modern Shandong using protestant Christianity], Qilu xue [Qilu Journal], No. 2 (1980), pp. 34–40. 32. Zeng Tianxiong and Fan Daming, “Zhongguo jindai shishang de jidujiao yu diguo zhuyi –yi Zhang Yijing wei kaocha zhongxin” [Christianity and imperialism in modern Chinese history: An analysis of Zhang Yijing’s works], Zhexue Yanjiu [Philosophical Researches], No. 1 (2016), p. 112. 33. Yan kefei and Li xuhu, “cong changli jiaohui jiaoyu tan Meiguo wenhua diguo zhuyi” [Research on American Cultural Imperialism  – From the Missionary Education in Changli], Hubei hanshou daxue xuebao [Journal of Hubei Correspondence University], No. 18 (2017), p. 168. 34. “ba Zhong guo “Zhong guo hua” ren wen she hui ke xue de zhuan xing zhi lu” [Make China “Chinese”  – Transformative path of the Social Science and Humanities], Zhong hua du shu bao [The Chinese Reading], September 21, 2016, http://epaper.gmw.cn/zhdsb/html/2016-09/21/ nw.D110000zhdsb_20160921_1-05.htm (accessed November 2, 2017). 35. Mu sen, “jing ti cheng shi jian she Zhong de ‘qu Zhong guo hua’” [Beware of de-Sinicization in City construction], Guang ming ri bao [Guangming Daily], October 11, 2014, http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/ html/2014-10/11/nw.D110000gmrb_20141011_1-09.htm?div=-1 (accessed November 5, 2017). 36. Fan Yugang, “Zhong guo chuan tong wenhua shi shi xian san ge zi xin de jichu” [Chinese traditional culture is the basis for achieving “three self-­ confidence”], Guangming wang [Guangming Net], September 26, 2014, http://theory.gmw.cn/2014-09/26/content_13377848.htm (accessed December 2, 2017). 37. Ibid. 38. Han Xing, “she hui zhu yi he xin jia zhi guan zhi gen yu Zhong hua wen hua wo tu” [Socialist core values are rooted in the fertile soil of Chinese

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culture], Guangming wang [Guanming Net], September 25, 2014, http://theory.gmw.cn/2014-09/25/content_13363026.htm (accessed December 2, 2017). 39. Xu Ping, “you xiu chuan tong wen hua shi Zhong hua minzu weida fuxing de jian qiang ji shi” [Exceptional traditional culture is the strong cornerstone of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation], Guangming wang [Guangming Daily], September 22, 2014, http://theory.gmw.cn/201409/22/content_13318562.htm (accessed December 1, 2017). 40. “bu neng fang ren “guo ji ban” qu Zhong guo hua” [The International Curriculum in Schools should not be allowed to de-Sinicize], Ren min wang [People.com.cn], February 6, 2013, http://edu.people.com.cn/n/ 2013/0206/c1053-20445433.html (accessed November 2, 2017). 41. Shang Zhihua, Liu Xiaohua and Lu Jianfeng, “2015 nian guo nei ma ke si zhu yi Zhong guo hua yan jiu shu ping” [A review on the research on the Sinicization of Marxism in China  – 2015], Guihai luncong [Guihai Tribune], No. 4 (2016), pp. 18–23. 42. Liu Feng, “du xiu wang shi jiao xia de ma ke si zhu yi Zhong guo hua ji ben wen ti yan jiu shu ping” [A review of the basic issues of Marxism in China from the perspective of Du Xiu Website], Guihai luncong [Guihai Tribune], No. 2 (2012), pp. 33–37. 43. Chen Xianda, “ma ke si zhu yi he Zhong guo chuan tong wen hua” [Marxism and traditional Chinese culture], Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily], July 3, 2015, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0703/ c40531-27247511.html (accessed November 28, 2017). 44. Zhu Jidong, ““Zhong guo meng” he “Mei guo meng” de cha yi zai na li?” [What’s the difference between the Chinese dream and the American dream?], Dang jian [Party Building], No. 2 (2013), p. 28. 45. Leng Rong, “Shen me shi Zhong guo meng. zen yang li jie Zhong guo meng” [What is Chinese dream and how to understand it], Renmin wang [People.com.cn], April 26, 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/ 0426/c40531-21285625-3.html (accessed December 2, 2017). 46. Peng Kaiping, ““Xingfu Zhongguo” da shuju yanjiu, xinli jishu yu yingyong” [“Happy China” big data research], Xinli jishu yu yingyong [Psychology:Techniques and Applications], No. 8 (2014), p.  4; David Blair, “Applying the science of happiness,” China Daily, December 5, 2017, https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/psyen/2355/2017/201 70515131041079566059/20170515131041079566059_.html (accessed January 3, 2018). 47. Heide Baumann, Stories of women at the top: narratives and counter narratives of women’s (non-) representation in executive leadership, Palgrave Communications, Vol. 3, March 7, 2017, https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms20179 (accessed December 1, 2017).

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and One Road” international cooperation summit], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], May 14, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/201705/14/c_1120970718.htm (accessed December 6, 2017). 60. Ibid. 61. He Zhouli, “‘yi dai yi lu’ jian she xia Zhong guo qu yu neng yuan he zuo lu jing tan xi” [An Analysis of China’s regional energy cooperation path under the construction of “one belt one road” initiative], Gaige yu zhanlue [Reformation & Strategy], Vol. 33, No. 12 (2017), p. 98. 62. Wu Juanran, “‘yi dai yi lu’ zhan lue xia Zhong guo dui fei zhou chuan bo ce lue yanjiu” [Study on China’s communication strategy in Africa under One Belt and One Road strategy], Dong nan chuanbo [Southeast Communication], No. 12 (2015), pp. 57–60. 63. Liang Haiming, ““yid ai yi lu” hai wai chuan bo ying bi mian de ji da wu qu” [Should be avoided big mistakes of propagating “one belt one road” overseas], Zhong guo ji zhe [Chinese Journalist], No. 10 (2015), p. 33. 64. Ibid., 34. 65. Yang Ke, ““yid ai yi lu” bei jing xia dui wai chuan bo zheng ce jie xi” [Analysis of foreign communication policy in the context of One Belt and One Road], Zhongguo baoye [China Newspaper Industry], No. 1 (2017), p. 12. 66. Cao ran, ““yi dai yi lu” shi yu xia Zhong guo xing xiang mei ti jian gou ce lue fen xi – yi ba ji si tan zhu liu ying yu bao kan she hua bao dao wei lie” [An analysis of media’s strategy of constructing China’s image in the context of One Belt And One Road – A case study of Pakistan’s mainstream English newspaper’s construction of China’s image], SuZhou keji daxue xuebao [Journal of Suzhou University of Science and Technology], Vol. 35, No. 1 (2018), pp. 103–105.

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Ruifeng, Zheng. 2017. Wen ding shi ying dao li [Stability is also a strong principle]. QsTheory. October 9. http://www.qstheory.cn/defense/2017-10/09/c_ 1121773482.htm. Accessed December 19, 2017. Sen, Mu. 2014. jing ti cheng shi jian she Zhong de “qu Zhong guo hua” [Beware of de-Sinicization in City construction]. Guang ming ri bao [Guangming Daily]. October 11. http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2014-10/11/ nw.D110000gmrb_20141011_1-09.htm?div=-1. Accessed November 5, 2017. Shenming, Li. 2014. Hua yu quan bang zhu xi fang long duan shi jie [Did the power of discourse helped the West to monopolise the world?]. Qiushi [Qiushi Journal]. December 9. http://www.qstheory.cn/politics/2014-12/09/c_ 1113573063.htm. Accessed March 9, 2018. Shepherd, Ken. 2017. UMD grad apologizes for offending her native China in pro-free-speech commencement address. Washington Times. May 24. https:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/24/yang-shuping-univ-ofmaryland-graduate-apologizes-/. Accessed March 9, 2018. Shizhou, Li. 1990. Diguo zhuyi lieqiang zai hua bao jiao quan de yange [The evolution of the imperialist powers’ right to protect missions in China]. Shandong daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)] 2 (April–June): 95–102. Shuanghao, She. 2018. Tui dong Xi Jinping xin shi dai zhong guo te se she hui si xiang shen ru ren xin [Promoting Xi jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics deep into people’s hearts]. Lilun Zhong guo [China Theory]. March 11. http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/theory/2018-03/11/ content_50697824.htm. Accessed March 11, 2018. Singapore Prime Minister attends Chinese dance drama. 1980. Xinhua General News Service. November 12. Swedish prime minister attends theatrical performance. 1981. Xinhua General News Service. April 9. Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda attends Chinese dance drama. 1980. Xinhua General News Service. October 29. Tianxiong, Zeng and Fan Daming. 2016. Zhongguo jindai shishang de jidujiao yu diguo zhuyi – yi Zhang Yijing wei kaocha zhongxin [Christianity and imperialism in modern Chinese history: An analysis of Zhang Yijing’s works]. Zhexue Yanjiu [Philosophical Researches] 1 (January): 107–112. Togolese President Eyadema attends soiree in Beijing. 1981. Xinhua General News Service. September 28. Xi Jinping pu zhan “yid ai yi lu” hong wei lan tu [Xi Jinping unveils grand blueprint of One Belt and One Road], Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net]. 2017. May 12. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-05/12/c_129603105.htm. Accessed December 3, 2017. Xi Jinping zai Zhong Mei sheng zhou zhang lun tan shang de jiang hua, Xi ya tu [Xi’s remarks at the China-US provincial governor’s forum, Seattle]. 2015.

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Xinhua Wang [XinhuaNet]. September 24. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2015-09/23/c_1116653149.htm. Accessed December 2, 2017. Xi Jinping. 2017. zai “yi dai yi lu” guo ji he zuo gao feng lun tan huan ying hui shang de zhu jiu ci [Welcome speech during the banquet at the “One Belt and One Road” international cooperation summit]. Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net]. May 14. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-05/14/c_1120970718. htm. Accessed December 6, 2017. Xianda, Chen. 2015. ma ke si zhu yi he Zhong guo chuan tong wen hua [Marxism and traditional Chinese culture]. Guangming Ribao [Guangming Daily]. July 3. http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0703/c40531-27247511.html. Accessed November 28, 2017. Xing, Han. 2014. she hui zhu yi he xin jia zhi guan zhi gen yu Zhong hua wen hua wo tu [Socialist core values are rooted in the fertile soil of Chinese culture]. Guangming wang [Guanming Net]. September 25. http://theory.gmw. cn/2014-09/25/content_13363026.htm. Accessed December 2, 2017. Xu, Dai. 2014a. Zhongguo zui da de weixie [China’s biggest threats]. Hongge hui wang [Red Song Association Net]. April 30. http://www.szhgh.com/Article/ opinion/xuezhe/2014-04-29/50680.html. Accessed December 9, 2017. Xu, Wu. 2014b. RT: E luo si “xin wen xinxi zhan” zhong de xin wang pai [RT: Russia’s new ace in news and information warfare]. Duiwai chuanbo [International Communications] 7 (July): 23–25. Yanhu, Lin and Feng Yanli. 2016. Dui Sulian Jieti Jiaoxun de zai renshi [Rethinking the lessons from Soviet Union’s Disintegration]. Qiushi [Qiushi]. September 8. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2016-09/08/c_1119530393.htm. Accessed March 9, 2018. Yingchun, Jiang. 2016. Dang dai xifang xuezhe dui xifang minzhu de fansi [Reflections on western democracy by contemporary western scholars], QsTheory. May 6. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2016-05/06/c_ 1118818159.htm. Accessed December 9, 2017. Yugang, Fan. 2014. Zhong guo chuan tong wenhua shi shi xian san ge zi xin de jichu [Chinese traditional culture is the basis for achieving “three self-­confidence”]. Guangming wang [Guangming Net]. September 26. http://theory.gmw. cn/2014-09/26/content_13377848.htm. Accessed December 2, 2017. Yun, Zhang and Zhang Fuxin. 2017. cong minzu xinli yu wenhua tiaoshi kan Minguo shiqi jidujiao zai xinjiang de fazhan [The Spread and Development of Christianity in Xinjiang During the Period of the Republic of China from the Perspectives of National Psychology and Cultural Adjustment]. Zhong bei daxue xuebao (shehuikexue ban) [Journal of North University of China (Social Science Edition)] Vol. 33, No. 2 (March–April): 8–12. Zhang, Shaoying and Derek McGhee. 2017. China’s Ethical Revolution and Regaining Legitimacy Reforming the Communist Party through Its Public Servants. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Zhenfeng, Han. 2017. Xi Jinping xin shi dai zhong guo te se she hui si xiang de nei zai luo ji [The internal logic of Xi jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics]. Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen wang [CPCnews Net]. December 9. http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1219/c4053129715166.html. Accessed March 9, 2018. Zhihua, Shang, Liu Xiaohua and Lu Jianfeng. 2016. 2015 nian guo nei ma ke si zhu yi Zhong guo hua yan jiu shu ping [A review on the research on the Sinicization of Marxism in China – 2015]. Guihai luncong [Guihai Tribune] Vol. 32, No. 4 (July–August):18–23. Zhouli, He. 2017. yi dai yi lu” jian she xia Zhong guo qu yu neng yuan he zuo lu jing tan xi [An Analysis of China’s regional energy cooperation path under the construction of “one belt one road” initiative]. Gaige yu zhanlue [Reformation & Strategy] Vol. 33, No. 12 (December): 94–96, 111.

CHAPTER 3

The BRI and Its Different Manifestations

The explanations about what the BRI is and the various discourses concerning and usages of the BRI concept provide us with the nature and application of this concept. Thus, when applied to specific regions such as South Asia, it also performs different functions, such as explaining China’s economic engagement in the South Asian region. China explicates this engagement through a Silk Road framework that gives historical legitimacy and cultural legitimacy to its economic engagement with South Asia. Emphasising the cultural factor in its engagement with other countries provides China with a benign discourse.

What Is One Belt One Road? There is no clear answer to this question; BRI is widely used in many contexts and is attached to many issues. However, the following is an explanation of what the BRI is by Liu Hongyang, the Chinese ambassador to East Timor. One Belt One Road is short for the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road; in 2013, these two components were proposed by President Xi Jinping of China in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively. The core of this initiative is to align China with the development strategies and policies of various countries, and it seeks to deepen practical cooperation, promote coordinated and interconnected development, and achieve common prosperity. The One Belt One Road initiative © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_3

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has a profound historical inheritance and a realistic foundation. It conforms to the common development of all countries and peoples of the world and has a vision of building a community of shared future for humankind.1 Liu Hongyang further divides the answer into three parts: (1) One Belt One Road is the way to connect history and reality; that is, the exchange of ideas and goods is carried out through the ancient Silk Road, while the new Silk Road proposes to recreate that spirit of the Silk Road. (2) One Belt One Road is the way to connect East and West, referring to connectivity initiatives such as the Eurasian land bridge rail project. (3) One Belt One Road is the path to friendship between different countries and civilisations. The third point mainly constitutes the diplomatic rhetoric of China, which refers to how One Belt One Road will ultimately join all religions and cultures of the world together in a peaceful global community.2 According to Chinese experts, the specific targets of the new Silk Road projects are mainly economic. The BRI will help in building new economic hubs in the border regions of China; it will help to create a stable political, economic and secure environment in China’s neighbourhood. The BRI will increase the quality of regional cooperation through logistics and public transport connectivity and build a quality “soft infrastructure.” Additionally, one of the most important targets of the BRI is to solve China’s manufacturing overcapacity issues by exporting excess manufacturing capacity to other parts of the world. Chinese experts also believe that the opening up of the periphery regions of China will give a new impetus and further momentum to the economic growth of the country’s already prosperous eastern regions.3

Visions and Actions The official document issued by the Chinese government, titled the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” explains the BRI as follows: the Initiative is an ambitious economic vision of the opening-up of and cooperation among the countries along the Belt and Road. Countries should work in concert and move towards the objectives of mutual benefit and common security. To be specific, they need to improve the region’s infrastructure, and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea

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and air passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level; further enhance trade and investment facilitation, establish a network of free trade areas that meet high standards, maintain closer economic ties, and deepen political trust; enhance cultural exchanges; encourage different civilisations to learn from each other and flourish together; and promote mutual understanding, peace and friendship among people of all countries.4

Many aspects of this vision, such as political trust and the mutual understanding between civilisations, seeming to be tasks that have been ongoing for centuries, and how China will achieve this vision is not given. Ironically, many of China’s neighbours have strong political mistrust regarding China’s intentions and territorial disputes with China, which are escalating over time. Many of the connectivity projects are also fuelling political suspicion and discontent between countries and between China and many other countries; this is the case of the CPEC and India’s objections to it. The five key goals of the BRI are to promote policy coordination, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and interpersonal bonds. In essence, the BRI seemingly includes everything except defence. This comprehensiveness makes the initiative an all-encompassing project covering almost all areas of relations between China and other countries. However, the connectivity projects are the core of the BRI, and Europe is the main focus of these projects. The initiative’s land routes will connect China with Europe through Central Asia, Russia, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. One part of these routes is the CPEC, connecting the western part of China with the Indian Ocean. The initiative’s transboundary connectivity projects will require diplomatic efforts, long-term financing, political stability, a skilled workforce, and security infrastructure. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the BRI has to mobilise all departments of governance and diplomacy to assist in its implementation. This important task may not be conducive to the small countries in China’s neighbourhood. Consequently, China will be wielding a disproportionate amount of authority in regard to project implementation with these countries. However, one of the most crucial aspects of the BRI is the framing of the BRI and the propaganda associated with it. The BRI is propagated as an example of China’s largesse to other countries, even though most of it is commercial or even strategic, built to serve China’s short-term and long-term economic and strategic interests. If the BRI only concerns infrastructure building and financing, then why should a country accept or

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officially join the BRI? After all, without joining the BRI, any country, according to its national interest, can cooperate with China to build infrastructure. The BRI seems to create a Chinese narrative of a modern tributary system, whereby typical commercial projects between countries are given a narrative in which China is helping other countries. If a state acknowledges that it is joining the BRI, a Chinese initiative, then China frames the BRI as help, with the joining state benefiting from it. The benefit narrative is constructed by quoting foreigners who acknowledge the benefits expected from the BRI.

The Benefit Narrative The BRI is depicted as a new effort to push Chinese enterprises to “go out,” internationalise and expand into global markets. In contrast to the depiction of the BRI to foreign audiences as a public good that benefits foreign countries, within China, it is mainly depicted as assisting the development of Chinese enterprises. In the initial period of the BRI, one Chinese business media outlet assessed which Chinese companies would benefit from the BRI; the company that most benefited was China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. (CCCC). According to a company report of December 10, 2014, as a result of the BRI, the company’s stock rose 4.87% to a record high. The report states that “as the largest international engineering contractor in China, the company will fully benefit from China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy, with strong growth of overseas business and stable growth of infrastructure. It is estimated that the proportion of overseas revenue and profit is expected to increase to 40% in the next three years, and it will become the state-owned enterprise with the highest proportion of overseas business and the highest degree of internationalisation.”5 The CCCC is involved in major projects such as the Gwadar deep-water port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port, and the Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka, as well as many other infrastructure projects labelled BRI projects.6 The CCCC was established in October 2006, and 63.8% of the CCCC is owned by the China Communications Construction Group (Limited) (CCCG), which is a state-owned enterprise that, in turn, is wholly owned by the State Council of China and supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.7 The state ownership of the CCCG and, subsequently, the economic viability of overseas infrastructure projects have led surrounding countries such as India to grow suspicious

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with regard to the objectives of the projects. Five years after the announcement of the BRI, in 2018, a study published by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that out of all contractors participating in Chinese-funded projects in 34 countries, 89% were Chinese companies, 7.6% local companies, and 3.4% foreign companies.8 Hence, the BRI is certainly benefiting Chinese companies and advancing Chinese interests, but this is not the case for countries that accepted the infrastructure projects, such as Sri Lanka. Many of infrastructure projects have subsequently come under scrutiny, been cancelled or become white elephants, with home governments incurring enormous liabilities and becoming debt-ridden, owing billions of dollars in debt to China. Such situations can be viewed as a regular business transaction where expectations of profitability have gone wrong. Chinese firms finance and construct the infrastructure, and the recipient country fails to pay up; then, according to the contract signed, China may or may not have leverage and control over the government of the country in question.9 However, the most crucial issue is how China’s activities in the name of BRI is viewed by the neighbouring major powers, especially countries such as India that have strategic stakes in the Indian Ocean region, where most of the big-ticket Chinese projects are concentrated. The words “benefit” and “mutual benefit” have been used repeatedly to emphasise that the BRI is mainly an economic strategy that will benefit foreign countries, and a benefit narrative has been built by using the utterances of foreigners with regard to these benefits. For instance, Joseph Nye has been quoted as saying that the BRI “…can be a global public good builder if China uses its finances to create an infrastructure which everybody can benefit.”10 Additionally, the vice chancellor of Makerere University, Prof Barnabas Nawangwe, has been quoted as saying, “We [Ugandans] believe that Uganda should benefit from the One Belt and One Road initiative because it will connect us better to the people of China.”11 Attending the second “1+6” Roundtable on September 12, 2017, in Beijing, Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank (WB), said that Belt and Road investments “can bring substantial development benefits to participating countries through improved infrastructure, greater trade, and higher cross-border investment.”12 The Xinhua news agency has also quoted several foreign “experts” supporting the Chinese narrative of benefits from the BRI. For instance, acknowledging the benefits of the BRI, one Nepali expert has said, “Nepal’s efforts to enhance

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connectivity and cooperation with China in recent years have been reaping benefits for the Himalayan country in various areas of the economy including tourism and aviation,”13 and Polish experts have said that Poland, particularly its central city, Lodz, will benefit from the BRI.14 The narrative of “mutual benefit” and “benefit to others” is ubiquitous in China’s BRI propaganda with regard to foreign countries, but this propaganda rarely discusses the risks, especially risks such as Russia’s sensitivity to the BRI. Addressing the risks faced by Chinese businesses because of the political instability or lack of government transparency in foreign countries such as those in Central Asia has been considered politically incorrect by state-owned Chinese media outlets. In Contrast, Chinese academics, businesspeople and other specialists have been concerned about the risks posed by such a strong government-led push of Chinese investment in foreign countries and by intruding in the natural power spheres of many regional powers, especially the superpower, the United States. Nevertheless, the most extensive discussions of the political risks faced by the BRI have taken place in Chinese academia and nonmainstream media outlets, and many of these discussions have produced a frank assessment of the potential and ongoing risks faced by the BRI.

Benefits Come with Risks More than the “benefits” and, in fact, more than the gains brought by the BRI, Chinese people have been concerned about the risks associated with a concentrated effort by the Chinese government to internationalise Chinese enterprises and businesses in the name of the BRI. By the time the BRI was announced, Chinese enterprises had already internationalised and were doing business across the globe. However, the BRI has drawn greater attention to the risks that may accompany the internationalisation of Chinese enterprises. The BRI has also inadvertently put more focus on the operations of Chinese companies both inside and outside China. Chinese lawyers have advised Chinese enterprises not to follow the same operational methods they are following inside China because doing so may create problems for Chinese enterprises in foreign countries. One concern is that Chinese businesses might seek to influence local administrators or leaders of foreign countries in the process of starting a business. Chinese legal experts are advising Chinese companies to become familiar with the industry and business operations in foreign countries and to familiarise themselves with the relevant laws and regulations concerning

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setting up and running an enterprises or business in a given country; doing so will prevent many risks and help to mitigate any misunderstandings about Chinese enterprises in foreign countries.15 Another risk envisaged by Chinese scholars is the rise of protectionism. Especially after the international financial crisis in 2008, the global economic recovery has been relatively weak, and protectionism has been on the rise in some developed Western countries, with a clear trend against globalisation. It is thought that Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States have strengthened this trend. Given this trend, how globalisation will develop is a major question facing the progress of China’s trade and development. There is a clamour against globalisation mainly because global growth is flagging, the global governance system is lagging, and global development is imbalanced. The BRI is depicted as a solution to these issues and as a plan to build a new kind of tolerant and balanced globalisation, reflecting China’s judgement about the current state of globalisation. The BRI is considered China’s effort to re-globalise the world, with China as its centre. Chinese scholars point out that because of historical reasons such as the legacy of colonialism, ethnic issues, religious differences, and many other factors, several countries along the BRI route are politically sensitive, which may cause frequent disruptions in these countries, and Chinese investments may face difficulties in establishing themselves in these countries.16 For developed countries, the BRI will undermine their dominant position; thus, they will be impediments to China’s new type of globalisation. Chinese scholars reason that as a result of globalisation, there will be a division of labour between countries, and many inexpensive and low-­ tech labour-intensive industries will shift to developing countries that are lagging in terms of technological development. The BRI may create jobs for these countries; simultaneously, however, it will increase the benefits for countries that possess high technology and capital, it will increase the power differences between these countries, and in the case of China and developing countries, this may increase the suspicions towards China. It has also been pointed out that the vast income disparities and the internal social contradictions in some countries involved in the BRI may easily result in an increase or escalation of international trade frictions and aggravate the geopolitical risks facing the BRI.17 Chinese scholars have delineated most of the possible risks faced by the BRI. For instance, the different political systems in various countries are depicted as a risk. The different political systems in different countries will

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produce discrepancies in perceptions, and the variations in the degree of political stability under different political systems are also considered a risk faced by the BRI. Chinese scholar Hu Jian believes that it is easy to have cooperative relations with states that have high political transparency. For instance, he points to China’s difficulties with Central Asian countries ruled by former Soviet elites; these countries are low in transparency, highly susceptible to political instability, and rife with separatism, extremism, and terrorism.18 The generational change in political leadership is also considered a political risk because a different generation will have a different set of values. Additionally, government performance and the legal environment are indicators of risk. Chinese scholars point out that the world’s three largest credit rating agencies are all Western and that China should start its own credit rating agency to avoid bias from the Western agencies. More importantly, from a Chinese perspective, the status or degree of friendly relations with China, especially in the core region of the BRI, makes it easier for Chinese enterprises to advance the project. For example, in Pakistan, the cooperation between China and this country is very smooth, including the cooperation on nuclear energy, railway construction, and the Beidou satellite navigation system. In contrast, despite being China’s neighbour, because of the border issue and many other issues in India-China relations, the progress of Chinese enterprises in India has been less smooth, and above all, India’s attitude towards the BRI is negative.19 Another mode of risk envisaged by Chinese experts is the conflict between the different strategies of China and the BRI countries. As a result of different economic strategies, the host countries of Chinese investment may promote their own industries and give preferential treatment to indigenous industries and businesses. The differences in economic strategies will also contribute to difficulties in establishing Chinese businesses in foreign countries. The host countries of Chinese investment may use domestic law or other means to interfere in the business activities of Chinese enterprises. European countries are considered to be less risky for BRI investment because of their developed market, legal system and other infrastructure conducive to business. However, some regions in the BRI scheme, such as Central Asia and Africa, have underdeveloped markets and closed markets, making it more difficult for Chinese enterprises to enter into investment projects, thus increasing investment risks.20 Risks are also likely to arise from improper corporate decisions by Chinese enterprises due to a lack of familiarity with foreign social and

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environmental laws and cultures. Chinese experts view this kind of risk as being a result of a lack of information about local norms, cultures, and laws. In some countries, the lack of environmental awareness by Chinese enterprises may reduce investment effectiveness, and the risk of overseas investment is increased. Chinese experts believe that competition from other state-supported business activities is increasing daily; in some markets, such competition can squeeze out Chinese investment and increase political risk.21 From a geopolitical risk perspective, the BRI region contains sensitive areas of great power geopolitics and is prone to conflict. Because the United States has competing strategies and does not want to become involved in Chinese initiatives such as AIIB and because the United States views the BRI through a zero-sum lens, the United States may become a hurdle for the progress of the BRI. China may also face a default risk of debtor countries and investment project bubble risks.22 Democratic elections and changes in government are also considered a political risk, and a change in government can lead to a change in attitude towards China. There is also the risk that an outside influence, such as the influence of the United States, will lead to a change in attitude of BRI host governments.23 According to Chinese experts, the BRI faces maritime challenges from the United States and challenges on land from Russia; they refer to foreign media reports that the United States tried to prevent some major countries from joining the AIIB. The United States will encourage its allies and other countries to oppose or undermine the BRI if the United States deems BRI likely to pose a significant challenge to the existing international system, which is dominated by the United States. The BRI will also pose a challenge to Russian dominance in the Central Asian region and other Eurasian regions. The BRI may not be compatible with Russian-­ Eurasian economic integration plans, and the BRI may divide the loyalties of the countries of the Eurasian region between Russia and China. India, on the other hand, is worried that the BRI will leave the country boxed in by China; in particular, India is worried that its security environment both on land and at sea will be worsened. Japan, an ally of the United States, will not sit idly by and watch the BRI become a success; it will also take measures to obstruct its progress. Chinese experts also point to the possibility that China will become entangled in conflicts arising as a result of climate change and conflicts over resources, impacting the progress of the BRI. As an example of a political crisis adversely affecting BRI projects, they point to the change in the governing party alliance in Sri Lanka in 2013 and the

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talk about the revaluation of the Colombo city port project.24 For Chinese experts, although the intention of the BRI to achieve mutual benefit, cooperation, and development is obvious, some countries still express strategic concerns. These countries believe that the BRI is a vehicle for China’s strategic expansion; although some countries verbally support the BRI, in participating, they are cautious and even adopt balancing strategies.25 Resource-based enterprises face higher political risk due to the geopolitical characteristics of natural resources such as oil and gas. The struggle and competition for control over these resources will risk an increase in conflict and war. The competition to secure oil resources has always been considered one of the main factors in inducing conflict because price is closely related to the macroeconomic development of the country in question. Fluctuations in oil prices have had an enormous impact on governments’ macroeconomic policies and development of the national economy. Chinese experts argue that because of the competition to secure oil and other natural resources, Chinese enterprises have faced many setbacks in securing and developing overseas resources. Political risk is regarded as the most important limiting factor for Chinese enterprises to undertake foreign direct investment. How Chinese enterprises handle political risk will increase or reduce the loss incurred by political risk. Economic risks such as tax issues, inflation, currency exchange fluctuations, and a host of other issues can also impact the prospects of Chinese investments in BRI countries.26 Some countries along the BRI line are highly dependent on foreign capital and face currency depreciation, exchange rate fluctuation and credit crunch pressures; thus, the risk of capital flight is greater. These unstable economic conditions will adversely impact Chinese investment.27 Chinese foreign investment risk analysts advocate that Chinese businesses must also adapt to local cultures. They argue that if they do not understand the local religious culture, Chinese enterprises will be likely to face difficulties regarding trademark design and product sales, and their investment will fail. As an example of “cultural risk”, Chinese experts point out that “山羊” “Goat” brand products translated the word from Chinese as “Goat”; however, this word is a slang term for a lothario in English-speaking countries, leading to poor product sales abroad.28 Closely related to cultural sensitivity risks, Chinese experts advocate that enterprises should improve their awareness of environmental protection and fulfil their social responsibility with regard to environmental protection. Chinese businesses are urged to establish the concept of e­ nvironmental protection, respect the religious beliefs and customs of host countries, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers.29

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Chinese experts have analysed all conceivable risk factors that the BRI is likely to face, and they believe that the path of the BRI is filled with all kinds of difficulties. This is nothing new; the risk analysis performed was mainly an investment risk analysis for Chinese enterprises in the name of the BRI. Compared to a normal business risk analysis, the main difference was that, now, Chinese businesses would be viewed through the lens of the Chinese government’s BRI strategy. As predicted by Chinese risk analysts, the BRI has invited a concentrated balancing and push-back effort from regional powers and global powers. Ultimately, the BRI has led most regions to have enhanced threat perceptions of China.

Propaganda and Alignment Among all the Chinese governmental departments mobilised for the BRI, the missing link is the PLA; it is rarely mentioned in BRI rhetoric or propaganda. However, the increase in Chinese global interests and the need to protect Chinese trade, industry, and finance in other parts of the world will eventually set the Chinese military into action. With the increase in Chinese capability, China will be able to maintain military posts in foreign countries to protect its interests. Chinese scholars and military officials who advocate PLA deployment overseas view the BRI as a China-initiated or China-centric globalisation of the world.30 The BRI is depicted as being without any geographical limitation, and it is open to all countries. According to Xi Jinping, “the Belt and Road Initiative is rooted in the ancient Silk Road. It focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but is also open to all other countries. All countries, from either Asia, Europe, Africa or the Americas, can be international cooperation partners of the Belt and Road Initiative. The pursuit of this initiative is based on extensive consultation and its benefits will be shared by us all.”31 This vagueness and inclusiveness make the BRI an excellent instrument for propaganda. One of the unique departments of the modern Chinese government is its propaganda department (or, in its current English name, the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China).32 Among the modern state systems of major countries, the propaganda department makes China distinctive in that the propaganda department is openly called upon to propagate the “correct” ideas and line of the government. Chinese media and social science academic departments are also heavily influenced by the propaganda department of the party. The BRI has also stimulated discussions on how to propagate the BRI.

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According to the head of the Hainan radio and television station Kong De Ming, a Communist Party secretary, when propagating the BRI, Chinese media should focus on eight issues. (1) It is important to guard against simple, blunt, stereotyped propaganda. (2) Attention should be paid to the prevention of egocentric propaganda: his advice is that the BRI should not be depicted as a Chinese strategy but as a global strategy, and he points to Xi Jinping’s statement that “it is not a solo by the Chinese family but a chorus by the countries along the line.” (3) Attention should be paid to prevent propaganda that looks lively on the surface but has limited effectiveness. (4) His advice is for planned propaganda rather than low-level, ad hoc and knee-jerk propaganda. (5) Attention should be paid to the lack of in-depth evaluation; propaganda that includes excessive interpretation and inference will spread differences and contradictions. (6) Attention should be paid to preventing differences between internal research and external publicity: here, the idea is not to have conflicting ideas but to adhere to a unified view and to avoid the emergence of multiple voices in public communication, which will increase the doubts of the international community with regard to the BRI strategy, resulting in new public opinion disputes. (7) Attention should be paid to preventing new media [social media] from interfering with the mainstream (CCP-­ controlled) media and influencing public opinion. This point refers to popular internet discourse and warns that such discourse should not be allowed to hijack the BRI discourse. In particular, historical analogies, references and comparisons of the BRI with other historical projects should be prevented; one such comparison involves the BRI and the Marshall Plan. Other biases include the notion that the BRI will re-establish China’s central position in the world, and it important to eliminate erroneous ideas, for example, the BRI is the great political leap forward or is economic colonialism. (8) Finally, attention should be paid to preventing external interference and influence that may create a state of confusion in the propaganda effort: here, the point is that because of the increasing global attention to the BRI, there will be an “assault” by a growing amount of outside news and views about the BRI, which can influence Chinese propaganda. He exhorts Chinese propaganda efforts to communicate, engage, guide, influence, and address the concerns arising from outside. Nevertheless, at the same time, he urges Chinese ­propaganda to “maintain strategic composure, unswervingly push China’s propaganda strategy, grasp the propaganda focus, control the propaganda rhythm, and not be confused by the interference and influence of external public opinion.”33

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According to Cheng Guo, China should conduct targeted propaganda according to its relationship with the country in question; for instance, regarding Russia, China should strengthen its explanation to target Russia’s concerns over being excluded because of the BRI; China should carry out explanatory work, strengthen its relationship with Russian academia, media, and political elites and continue to communicate and strive for consensus. Concerning India, China should emphasise that both countries are important developing countries and emerging economic powers, members of the BRICS group of nations and important neighbouring countries. China should explain their common interests in regional economic integration and their mutual interests as two large-scale consumers of energy and resources, and it should accept India’s special position in the South Asian region.34 One of the most common policy phrases used in the process of promoting the BRI is 对接 (dui jie), which can be translated as coordination, alignment, docking, or linking (up). For consistency in usage, in this book, it is translated as alignment. The concept of alignment is consistently used in relation to the BRI’s relationship with all countries and organisations; this is also true for South Asian countries. However, what is meant by “alignment” with the BRI is rarely explained. Professor Cheng Dawei is one of the few scholars who has tried to explain the meaning of “alignment” in the BRI context. According to Cheng Dawei, “aligning” means the search for a concurrence point; it is not a policy “safety valve.” Cheng Dawei further explains that “safety valve” is a term in global slang used in trade governance to refer to protectionist measures. The WTO is an organisation that pursues global free trade. However, market opening may hurt domestic industry; thus, there is a need for a safety valve that allows countries to use protective measures once domestic industry is hurt. In this sense, “alignment” is not a safety valve. “A safety valve is used as an emergency measure when there are negative effects. BRI “alignment” is alignment at the starting point, and finding the concurrence point in advance is a positive action.”35 In other words, “alignment” roughly means a search for complementarity between China and the BRI country in question. Commonly used forms of alignment related to the BRI are the alignment of regional or national development strategies, the alignment of free trade areas; alignment with international organisations; and the alignment of specific infrastructural, industrial or commercial projects. The alignment discourse spans a vast area dealing with China’s internal and external

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alignment with the BRI. Under the BRI, various forms of alignments are proposed. To understand what it means, an examination of the BRI-­ related alignment discourse is warranted. One instance of the alignment discourse analyses how to align the minority ethnic areas in China’s border areas with the countries of the BRI, referring to the advantages of the common culture, ethnicity, language and religion shared between the Chinese territories and the neighbouring countries. In this regard, one example is the proposal to align Mongolia with China’s province of Inner Mongolia. This discourse also refers to the imperative of this strategy because of the development gap between the minority areas in the western and southern provinces of China, such as Yunnan, and the comparatively richer coastal areas of China. Chinese scholars argue that the development of the ethnic minority regions will help to secure the border areas of China, which are largely inhabited by ethnic minorities.36 Chinese scholars have even stretched the alignment argument to include the sports industry. Like many other BRI-related alignment narratives, the “sports industry alignment” argument is also vague and non-specific. It deals with general areas of sports industry development such as the development of sports infrastructure, the use of multinational organisations, and the use of China’s free trade zones and economic zones to link up with the global market. If we remove the term “BRI” from the argument, then the argument seems to be a study dealing with the internationalisation of Chinese sports goods.37 From the perspective of China’s internal development, Chinese experts argue that Shanghai has to align with the BRI to transform itself as a global financial centre. They call upon Shanghai to seize the historic opportunity of RMB (Chinese currency) internationalisation, utilise the spillover effects from the BRICS bank (New Development Bank) and the free trade zone pilot project in Shanghai, attract global financial businesses to Shanghai and convert Shanghai into a global financial hub.38 The importance of think tanks is also emphasised to increase policy communication and alignment. Think tanks are called for to build a theoretical and discourse framework for the BRI, increase the consensus between nations, build confidence, and assist in increasing the quality of decision making.39 The various applications of the term “alignment” show its usefulness for the BRI as a connecting word. By using this word, one can give any industry, enterprise, or province a role in the new narrative of the BRI and thus become part of a perceived grand project.

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All Countries Should Align with the BRI Chinese scholars also argue that because of the weak global economic recovery and growth, many countries are creating their own development strategies, and they are also searching for a convergence point with the development strategies of other countries. The focus of China’s diplomacy is to follow this realistic trend and to promote the alignment of the BRI strategy with the development strategies of the countries along the routes.40 Chinese scholars differentiate the countries with which China wishes to align the BRI as large countries, middle (medium-sized) and small countries. According to Chinese scholars, many small countries on the BRI route are eager to align their development initiatives with the BRI. One example is Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road” initiative, which is actively aligned with the BRI, especially because both strategies emphasise infrastructural development linking international trade routes.41 However, in terms of alignment, one of the less frequently mentioned plans is the New Silk Road strategy of the United States, which is a strategy proposed by the United States in 2011 to integrate Afghanistan with regional trade networks and to increase the interlinkages with regional economies. Because of geopolitical factors and a lack of funds, it is still in its infancy. According to Chinese specialists, the BRI did not omit the New Silk Road strategy of the United States; under the framework of a “new model of great power relationship” between China and the United States, China can jointly participate with the United States in regional governance and global governance.42 Chinese experts argue that the BRI will assist Chinese diplomacy in attaining its major objectives. However, one of China’s major diplomatic objectives is to be recognised as a peer superpower by the United States. However, China’s BRI-related alignment discourse rarely mentions aligning with the United States as one of its objectives. Although the “New Silk Road initiative” led by the United States was mentioned as a possible alignment target, this is mainly because China has a specific strategy for its relations with the United States. China views itself as a peer country the United States and frames their relationship under a “new model of great power relations.” This new model implies that China and the United States may eventually share global governance responsibilities; however, this is not a plan that has been accepted or even encouraged by the United States. The alignment discourse also shows the hierarchical worldview of China. At the top, there are the US and China. The second group includes

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large regional powers such as Russia, India, and the EU, while the third group is composed of middle and small powers. The strategic linking of the BRI with the economic development initiatives and strategies of other countries forms one of the critical parts of the BRI. This linking of development strategies forms an impression of cooperation and thus helps dilute the conflicting or dominating features of the BRI. In itself, the linking imply any substantial change in China’s relationship with the target countries being linked. The BRI is not a specific linking programme; it is a conceptualisation of the strategies of a pair of countries as a cooperative framework. The core components of the economic relationship envisioned by the BRI, such as increasing opportunities for Chinese companies in the target country, increasing trade opportunities for Chinese businesses, shifting the excess industrial capacity of China to the target country, and building strategic resources such as port infrastructure, will all be the same, but the name will link China’s BRI strategy with the strategy of the host country. The concept of linking with the development strategies of other countries can be difficult because of the differences in the objectives of the respective strategies. One of the prominent countries with which China is exploring the alignment of the BRI is Indonesia; China seeks to align its 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative with Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” strategy. Indonesia’s strategy calls for maritime infrastructure development and the improvement of its naval power. The infrastructure part of Indonesia’s maritime strategy is intended to “Provide priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity by constructing sea highways along the shore of Java, establishing deep seaports and logistical networks as well as developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism.”43 Infrastructure development is the proposed focus of the BRI, and the infrastructure building and connectivity initiatives correspond well with the economic part of Indonesia’s maritime initiative. However, the defence part of Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” states that “Indonesia has an obligation to develop its maritime defence forces. This is necessary not only to maintain maritime sovereignty and wealth but also as a form of our [Indonesia’s] responsibility to maintain the safety of shipping and maritime security.”44 The emphasis of Indonesia’s maritime initiative on maritime sovereignty conflicts with China’s sovereignty claims.45 The alignment of the two strategies is not possible because the nature of the two initiatives is

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different: China’s initiative addresses only economic issues, but the Indonesian initiative addresses the comprehensive development and security of Indonesia, and the security aspect entails contradictions with Chinese foreign policy. Officially, China overlooks this contradiction and emphasises the alignment aspect. Xi Jinping himself, who emphasises Indonesia’s importance in the BRI and the alignment aspect of it, has stated that “I proposed the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road for the first time when I delivered a speech in Indonesia in October 2013. The alignment of the proposal with Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum has enriched bilateral ties.”46 During the initial years of the BRI, the Chinese scholars were also concerned with the lack of a security emphasis in the BRI. The idea that security concerns should also be part of the BRI has been pointed out by Feng Weijiang (director of the International Political and Economic Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). He proposes that in addition to becoming a development belt and a growth belt, the BRI should become a belt for peace and security. He further argues that “to this end, China should also support the discussion on how to realise common security and other issues under the BRI framework, and strive to give a solution that is rich in BRI characteristics.”47 Regarding the BRI, security concerns refer to the threat to Chinese interests overseas. Chinese scholars have argued that the internationalisation of China would lead to the expansion of the threats faced by Chinese citizens and Chinese enterprises. As a solution, it has been suggested that since the BRI cuts across national boundaries in the form of connectivity initiatives, the countries involved should come together to form a collective security system. According to Zhao Ke-Jin, without a good security environment, BRI projects will not be successful or sustainable.48 At the end of 2017, China also began to create military bases overseas, opening its first military base in Djibouti. The most important reason cited by the Chinese media for building the military base in Djibouti was also the BRI.  According to Chinese media, Djibouti is a crucial node of the maritime Silk Road route connecting Asian and European markets; it is a necessary conduit, the gateway to Europe and Africa. The establishment of a base here is more conducive to the development of the BRI and plays a role in safeguarding Chinese merchandise.49 On various occasions, Xi Jinping has reiterated China’s desire to align the BRI with the development or connectivity strategies of other countries. This emphasis has become so repetitive that it has become new

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Chinese diplomatic jargon when dealing with other countries. For instance, on aligning with Russian strategy, Xi Jinping stated that there is a “need to align the Silk Road Economic Belt with the construction of Russia’s trans-­ Eurasian railway, promote economic and trade exchanges between the two countries, as well as the development and opening up of adjacent areas of two countries, then share Eurasian corridor and the great Eurasian market.”50 The following are some of the noteworthy statements on alignment with other countries. Kyrgyzstan: “Kyrgyzstan is an important part of the Silk Road Economic Belt. It is important to align China-Kyrgyzstan bilateral cooperation with the initiative and promote regional connectivity as well as trade and investment facilitation.”51 Arab countries: “In order to expand employment opportunities in Arab countries, promote industrialisation, and to promote economic development, China is willing to align itself with the development of Arab countries.”52 Mongolia: “China has carried out reform, opening-up, and modernisation, it will radiate and stimulate the neighbouring countries, including Mongolia. The development strategy of China and Mongolia can be effectively aligned, promote common development and achieve common prosperity.”53 South Asia: “China is the largest neighbour of South Asia. A peaceful, developing and prosperous South Asia is in line with China’s interests. China is ready to align its development strategies with South Asian countries to achieve mutually beneficial development and common prosperity.”54 India: “China is called the ‘workshop of the world’ and India is called the ‘office of the world,’ and the two sides should strengthen cooperation to realise complementary advantages. We need to promote alignment between China’s ‘opening to the west’ and India’s ‘look east’ policy, create the most competitive production base in the world, most attractive consumer market, most attractive growth engine, we also need to expand cooperation in investment and finance to realise the all-round development of pragmatic bilateral cooperation.”55 Asian countries: “We need to achieve a coordinated development of Asian countries; Asian countries attach great importance to connectivity, and many countries have their own infrastructure plans. Now, we need to align various national strategies and plans, identify priority areas and projects, concentrate resources and jointly advance.”56

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Turkey: “China is ready to align the One Belt and One Road initiative with Turkey’s development strategy and achieve cooperation, mutual development, as well as common prosperity.”57 Germany: “Germany is an important member of the European Union. We hope that Germany will promote practical cooperation between the EU and China in all areas. Promote the European investment plan to align with China’s One Belt and One Road initiative, continue to play an active and leading role in the four major partnership relation between China and Europe.” (here, hour major partnership means partnerships for peace, for growth, for reform, and for civilisation).58 Vietnam: “Both sides should consolidate the steady growth momentum of bilateral trade, speed up the docking of the “Belt and Road” with the construction of “Two Corridors and One Economic Circle,” promote cooperation in key areas such as infrastructure construction, production capacity, and cross-border economic cooperation zones and focus on major projects.”59 Croatia: “Both countries should explore the docking of developmental strategies, actively participate in China-Central and Eastern Europe cooperation, work hard to tap the potential for cooperation between the two sides in the fields of energy, transportation, industrial park, finance, communication, and agriculture so as to better facilitate bilateral relations.”60 Australia: “Promote alignment of “One Belt One Road” and Australia’s “Developing Northern Australia” plan.”61 The countries and regions with which China wants to align the BRI are exhaustive. The main difference with these initiatives and the BRI is that the BRI does not have a regional focus; that is, the initiative is amorphous. China identifies the regional and national economic plans with which China can align its BRI, which means that by becoming involved in other initiatives, the BRI can gain legitimacy in the regions in question and build a positive narrative of China (Table 3.1).

Buddhism’s Alignment with the BRI In two sessions in Fujian province, a member of the standing committee of the provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference and the vice president and secretary general of the Buddhism association, Shi Benxing, expressed his great enthusiasm for the BRI.  He pointed out that “In the ancient Silk Road, Buddhism played an important role; today, Buddhism should and must be actively involved in the One Belt

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Table 3.1  List of regional/national linking initiatives or development plans for BRI “alignment”62 Countries

Plans

Poland ASEAN Australia Egypt Kenya

Amber Road Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity Northern Australia’s development plan The New Suez Canal Project Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) “Two Corridors and One Ring”/North-South Economic Corridor Grassland Road “Bright Road” Initiative Global Maritime Fulcrum Eurasian economic union Project Mausam Eurasia Initiative “Juncker Plan” or the “EU Infrastructure Investment Plan” Asian Infrastructure Investment Plan New Silk Road Initiative

Vietnam Mongolia Kazakhstan Indonesia Russia India South Korea European Union Japan United States of America

One Road strategy.”63 Chinese scholars have also pointed out Xi Jinping’s emphasis on Buddhism with Chinese characteristics as one of the core components of Chinese culture. According to Xi Jinping, “Buddhism originated in ancient India. After it was introduced into China, the religion went through an extended period of integrated development with the indigenous Confucianism and Taoism and finally became Buddhism with Chinese characteristics, thus making a deep impact on the religious beliefs, philosophy, literature, art, etiquette, and customs of the Chinese people. Xuanzang (Hiuen Tsang), the Tang (dynasty) monk who endured untold sufferings as he went on a pilgrimage to the West for Buddhist scriptures, gave full expression to the determination and fortitude of the Chinese people to learn from other cultures. I am sure that you have all heard about the Chinese classic Journey to the West, which was written on the basis of his stories. The Chinese people have enriched Buddhism in the light of Chinese culture and developed some special Buddhist thoughts. Moreover, they also helped Buddhism spread from China to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia and beyond.”64 Buddhist activities are also included as both a part of and an effect of the building of the BRI. For instance, on November 26, 2017, the “2017

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Nanhai Buddhist Shenzhen Roundtable”, with the theme “building a community of common destiny and moving towards a New Era in the South China Sea,” was held in Shenzhen. Eminent monks from 10 countries, including China, Mongolia, the US and Canada, attended the meeting. The meeting decided to build the “South China Sea (Nanhai) Silk Road Fund,” to establish the “South China Sea (Nanhai) Cultural Research Institute,” and to build a permanent institutionalised mechanism of the “South China Sea (Nanhai) Buddhism Shenzhen Roundtable.”65 China emphasises the historic role of Buddhism in its relationship with most Asian and Central Asian countries, and this trend is followed up in reference to aligning the BRI with the countries in question. Attending a China-Central Asian political party dialogue, Farkhad Kuanganov, the secretary of the “Nur Otan” Democratic People’s Party, the ruling political party in Kazakhstan, emphasised Central Asia’s role as the core actor of the Silk Road, saying, “Monks in Central Asia have translated Buddhist classics into Chinese. This is a prime example of the communication between Central Asia and China on the ancient Silk Road. The sparks of China’s civilisation and our (Kazakhstan’s) country’s thought arose from [because] the communication caused by the Silk Road. It is hard to imagine how human civilisation would have developed without the Silk Road connecting us.”66 The role of religion, especially Buddhism, in the BRI comes under the fifth goal of the initiative to increase the bonds between the citizens of China and the citizens of BRI countries. The role of Buddhism is also linked with the alignment rhetoric, where the purpose of the emphasis on Buddhism is to increase the alignment between the hearts and minds of Chinese Buddhists and the people of other countries who share a similar belief system and religious outlook. Chinese Buddhist leaders are increasingly playing the role of cultural diplomacy and participating in the global discourse on peacebuilding. In this regard, one activity initiated by Buddhist leaders was the keynote speech on the theme of “building a sustainable and peaceful society” given by the president of the Buddhist Association of China, Master Xue Cheng, when he attended an international peace conference on September 26, 2017, at UNESCO headquarters. This was the first time that the Chinese Buddhist association had participated in activities at UNESCO headquarters and proposed the peace initiatives of the Chinese Buddhist Association.67 The spread of Buddhism in Asia is closely associated with the ancient Silk Road, and during ancient times, China was more of a recipient of

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cultural influences from other parts of the world through the Silk Road. Under the BRI framework, China seeks to spread its culture and use it as a tool of influence. It is termed as focusing on the “going out” of the Chinese culture, resonating with the “going out” campaign of Chinese industries and businesses. The implied objective is to increase the internationalisation and globalisation of Chinese culture. The former vice foreign minister and Chinese coordinator of G20 summit affairs, He Yafei, elaborated on the importance of strengthening cultural exchanges and cooperation between countries along the BRI. According to him, “Strengthening China’s foreign cultural exchanges is the key to the success of the One Belt One Road initiative. By the end of 2016, China had signed 318 inter-governmental cultural exchange and cooperation agreements, implementation plans and agreements on the mutual establishment of cultural centres with countries along the One Belt One Road initiative, as well as eleven Chinese cultural centres that have been set up in countries along the One Belt One Road.” He Yafei also believes that the positive significance of enhancing the cultural exchanges of countries along the One Belt One Road includes the beneficial use of the positive energy of Chinese religions. His views are supported by the religious leaders of China, especially China’s Buddhist leaders.68 The secretary general of the Center for China and Globalization, Miao Lu, has pointed out that two-thirds of global corporate takeovers are unsuccessful and that these two-thirds of these failures are due to cultural conflicts stemming from a lack of integration between cultures and civilisations. According to her, “in order to realise the One Belt One Road vision, it is important to integrate culture and civilisational aspects into the OBOR agenda and to increase people-to-people communication.” She referred to the Buddhist temples built by ethnic Chinese belonging to Han Buddhism in Chiang Mai, Thailand; these temples integrate the local style of Buddhist temples, constituting an example of the propagation and integration of Chinese culture with the local culture.69 China is also building its internal Buddhist infrastructure to integrate and revive the Buddhist cultural heritage of Asia. The idea also aligns with linking the Buddhist culture of other neighbouring Asian countries. Most of these are countries with large Buddhist populations or historic Buddhist connections with China. As part of this effort, China opened the Nanhai Buddhist Academy in Sanya, Hainan province. The academy’s first cohort of 227 students arrived at the school’s opening ceremony on September 23, 2017, and the academy is envisaged as a centre for academic learning

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and the practice of different branches of Buddhism and as a cultural and religious exchange centre between China and Southeast Asian nations. It was built under the official approval of the state administration for religious affairs, and the Hainan Buddhist association conducts four-year undergraduate classes. According to the official website of the academy, the academy will serve China’s “One Belt One Road” strategy and will help in building Hainan as an international tourism island.70

Linking with International Organisations The BRI is also linked to international objectives such as the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Aligning the BRI with the UN 2030 Agenda is considered to be supportive in promoting the establishment of a new global partnership for equitable and balanced development. Chinese experts argue that the philosophies of the BRI and the UN 2030 Agenda are the same, the objectives are also identical, and the alignment of both programmes will help in building trust between the countries along the BRI. It will also increase the international attractiveness of the BRI and improve the quality and the level of South-South cooperation.71 One Chinese scholar argues that by integrating China’s unilateral initiative and a global initiative with wider participation, China can win more say in the development of new international development governance systems and global governance rules, as well as an increase in China’s international standing and influence. By combining China’s unilateral initiative with global initiatives, China can expand its diplomatic resources. By providing public goods, China can also enhance its international image. It can also help China to transform its global status. The alignment with global organisations and initiatives is recognised as a tool for both legitimising China’s unilateral initiative and making it a multilateral initiative.72

Notes 1. Liu Hongyang, “Hand-in-Hand we can win- The expectation of the people of Timor-Leste is the focus of cooperation between China and Timor-­ Leste,” Voice of East Timor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 6, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676428/12 06x2_676448/t1490501.shtml (accessed December 23, 2017). 2. Ibid.

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3. “Shenme Shi sichou Zhilu jingji dai?” [What is ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’?], The State Council Information office, People’s Republic of China, July 24, 2014, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31215/Document/ 1376552/1376552.htm (accessed 22 January 2018). 4. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and Century Maritime Silk Road,” March 2015, First Edition 2015, 21st-­ Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 28, 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov. cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html (accessed November 2, 2017). 5. Zan Liyong, ““yi dai yi lu” shei chang qi shou yi?” [“One Belt And One Road” who benefit in the long run], Ying cai [Talents Magazine], No. 3 (2015), p. 86. 6. See CCCC Website for detailed information about these projects, CCCCltd.com, http://en.ccccltd.cn/ (accessed February 26, 2018). 7. Moody’s Investors service, “Announcement: Moody’s: China Communications Construction’s strong 2017 results support its credit profile,” Moodys, April 3, 2018, https://www.moodys.com/research/ Moodys-China-Communications-Constructions-strong-2017-resultssupport-its-credit%2D%2DPR_381674 (accessed May 26, 2018). 8. Jonathan E. Hillman, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 25, 2018, https:// www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later-0 (accessed March 23, 2018); Janne Suokas, “Chinese state enterprises undertake over 3,100 Belt and Road projects,” October 31, 2018, gb Times, https://gbtimes.com/chinese-state-enterprises-undertake-over3100-belt-and-road-projects (accessed November 1, 2018). 9. “Tightening up China’s Belt and Road Initiative; Beijing’s lending could fuel a debt crisis in the developing world,” Financial Times (London, England), September 11, 2018, p. 8; Jamil Anderlini, Henny Sender and Farhan Bokhari, “Islamabad seeks new terms on Beijing deals; Belt and Road Initiative; Pakistan official says Chinese companies have ‘undue advantage’,” Financial Times (London, England), September 10, 2018, p. 4; Peter Janssen, “Will Bri Project Derail Laos Economy?,” The Banker, September 1, 2018, p. 74. 10. “Interview: Better understanding between U.S., China benefits both, says U.S. scholar,” Xinhua General News Service, November 1, 2017, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/01/c_136720345.htm (accessed January 3, 2018). 11. “Belt and Road initiative to bring dev’t in Africa: ambassador,” Xinhua General News Service, February 26, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2018-02/27/c_137001825.htm (accessed March 3, 2018).

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12. “Western banks rush to gain deals on China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua General News Service, February 28, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2018-02/28/c_137005861.htm (accessed March 3, 2018). 13. “(B&R Forum) Nepal reaping benefit from enhanced connectivity with China,” Xinhua General News Service, May 13, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/13/c_136279349.htm (accessed March 3, 2018). 14. “Spotlight: Belt & Road initiative promotes China-CEEC cooperation,” Xinhua General News Service, March 28, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2016-03/29/c_135231320.htm (accessed February 28, 2018). 15. Zhu Shuying, ““yid ai yi lu” xia de falu fengxian fangkong” [Legal risk prevention and control under “One Belt And One Road”], Shigong Qiyeguanli [Construction Enterprise Management], No. 3 (2017), p. 41. 16. Sun Qixiang, Suo Lingyan and Zhengwei, ““yid ai yi lu” yu xin xing quan qiu hua: feng xian ji ying dui” [“The Belt and Road” and New Type of Globalization: Risks and Solutions], Zhong Gong Zhong Yang dang xiao xue bao [Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC], No. 6 (2017), p. 102. 17. Ibid., p. 103. 18. Hu Jian, ““yid ai yi lu” chang yi: jie duan xing cheng guo feng xian he qian jing” [The Belt and Road Initiatives: Periodical Achievements, Risks and Prospect], Yunmeng xuekan [Journal of Yunmeng], No. 5 (2017), p. 15. 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. Li Junfeng and Wang Pengwu, “‘yi dai yi lu’ jingwai touzi feng xian fang fan ji zhi” [Mechanism to Prevent the “The Belt and Road” Foreign Investment Risk], Gaige yu Zhanlue [Reformation & Strategy], No. 11, 2017, p. 172. 21. Ibid., 173. 22. Chen xuerui, ““yi dai yi lu” dingwei, fengxian ji shunli tuijin lujing tanxi” [Analysis of One Belt And One Road Oriantation, risk and probing for a path of smooth progress], Qiuzhi daokan [Journal of Seeking Knowledge Guide], No. 10 (2016), p. 26. 23. Cong PeiYing, ““yi dai yi lu” dui wai yuan zhu zheng zhi feng xian fenxi” [Foreign Aid Political Risk analysis], Guoji Yuanzhu [International AID], No. 5 (2015), p. 40. 24. Xiao Xinmei, ““yi dai yi lu” jianshe de fengxian yu fangfan” [Risk and Risk prevention in the construction of BRI], Shanxi Caijing daxue xuebao [Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University], Vol. 37, No. S2 (2015), pp. 7–8. 25. Ma Yun, ““yi dai yi lu” tiao zhan, feng xian yu yingdui” [BRI: Challenges, Risks and Responses], Jingji yanjiu cankao [Review of Economic Research], No. 37 (2015), p. 45.

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26. Xiang Dongjing, ““yid ai yi lu” zhan lue xia Zhongguo qiye mianlin de fengxian yu duice” [Risks faced by Chinese enterprises under One Belt And One Road strategy and its countermeasures], shidai jinrong [Times Finance], No. 1 (2017), p. 166. 27. Yan Yan, Zhang Yingjie and Zhang Tingting, ““yid ai yi lu” yanxian zhuquan fengxian” [Sovereign Risk along the BRI], Zhongguo Jinrong [China Finance], No. 13 (2015), pp. 55–56. 28. Ye Huajing, ““yid ai yi lu” zhanlue mianlin de fengxian tiaozhan ji duice” [The “Belt and Road” strategic risk challenge and countermeasure], Mudan jiang jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Mudanjiang College of Education], No. 3 (2017), p. 68. 29. Ibid., p. 52. 30. Qiao Liang, “wo jun shao jiang: yi dai yi lu zhan lue yao qiu Zhong guo lu jun bi xu fei qi lai” [Major general: the One Belt And One Road strategy requires the Chinese army “to fly”], Sina.com, May 7, 2015, http://mil. news.sina.com.cn/2015-05-07/1708830002.html (accessed December 3, 2017). 31. “(BRF) Full text of President Xi’s speech at opening of Belt and Road forum (6),” Xinhua General News Service, May 14, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282990.htm (accessed December 7, 2017). 32. Although the English translation or name of the department was changed to “Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China,” the functions of the department, propaganda, remain the same. 33. Kong Deming, ““yi dai yi lu” xuan chuan zhong de ba xiang zhuyi” [Eight points for consideration in the propaganda of One Belt And One Road], Chuan mei [Media], No. 11 (2015), pp. 28–29. 34. Cheng Guo, “dang qian guo ji yu lun xing shi xia de “yi dai yi lu” jian she xuan chuan” [One Belt And One Road construction propaganda under the current international public opinion scenario], Xinwen yanjiu dao kan [Journal of News Research], No. 11 (2015), p. 262. 35. Cheng, Dawei, “ruhe lijie “yi dai yi lu” chang yi zhong de “dui jie” ce lue” [How to understand the “alignment” strategy in the One Belt And One Road initiative], Renmin luntan [People’s Tribune], No. 17 (2017), pp. 84–86. 36. Sachurina, “min zu di qu dui jie “yi dai yi lu” yanxian guojia fazhan zhan lue yanjiu” [Study on the strategy of “aligning” ethnic regions with national development strategies of countries along the One Belt And One Road] Guangxi minzu yanjiu [Guangxi Ethnic Studies], No. 6 (2016), pp. 136–143. 37. Jiang Tongren and Zhang Lin, “yi dai yi lu” yu zhong guo ti yu chan ye dui jie fa zhan lu jing yan jiu” [On Ways of aligning of China’s Sports

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Industry with the Policy of “One Belt One Road”], Xian tiyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Xian Physical Education University], Vol. 34, No. 2 (2017), pp. 129–139. 38. Zhao Sujun, Zhang Xiangjian and Tu Yongqian, “Shanghai guoji jinrong zhong xin dui jie “yi dai yi lu” de tu po kou ji cuo shi” [The Breakthrough and Measures to align Shanghai International Financial Center with “One Belt One Road”], Kexue Fazhan [Scientific Development], No. 103 (2017), pp. 78–85. 39. Yang Liangmin, “Jiaqiang zhengce goutong he zhan lue duijie” [The role of think tanks in strengthening policy communication and strategic alignment cannot be overlooked], Zhong guo fazhan guancha [China Development Observation], No. 9–10 (2017), p. 58. 40. Wang Zhimin, ““yi dai yi lu” zhanlue yu zhongguo waijiao zouxiang” [“One Belt One Road” Strategy and Way Forward for Chinese Diplomacy], Zhongguo Pudong ganbu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong], Vol. 10, No. 1 (2016), p. 78. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 80. 43. Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world,” The Jakarta Post, November 13, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html (accessed November 4, 2017). 44. Ibid. 45. Tom Allard and Bernadette Christina Munthe, “Asserting sovereignty, Indonesia renames part of South China Sea,” Reuters, July 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-map/assertingsovereignty-indonesia-renames-part-of-south-china-sea-idUSKBN19Z0YQ (accessed November 4, 2017); Saifulbahri Ismail, China demands Indonesia rescind decision to rename part of South China Sea, ChannelNewsAsia, September 2, 2017, https://www.channelnewsasia. com/news/asiapacific/china-demands-indonesia-rescind-decision-torename-part-of-south-9179992 (accessed November 4, 2017). 46. “China, Indonesia agree to step up Belt and Road cooperation,” China Daily, May 16, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201705/16/content_29381985.htm (accessed November 3, 2017). 47. Feng WeiJiang, ““yi dai yi lu” de Zhanlue dui jie” [Strategic Alignment of “One Belt One Road”], Dangdai Jinrong Jia [Modern Bankers], No. 9 (2016), p. 111. 48. Zhao kejin, ““yi dai yi lu” ying qiang hua an quan wei ji” [One Belt And One Road should be based on enhanced security], China.com.cn, June 16, 2015, http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_83_131683.html (accessed October 19, 2017).

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49. “Zhong guo shou ge hai wai jun shi ji di – Jibuti” [China’s first overseas military base  – Djibouti], Sohu.com, July 13, 2017, https://www.sohu. com/a/156676104_99946707 (accessed October 19, 2017). 50. Liu Hua, Hu Hao and Wu Yu, “Xi Jinping: Ba Zhong e quan mian zhan lue xie zuo huo ban guan xi tui xiang geng gao shui ping” [Xi Jinping: push China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership coordination to a higher level], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, May 20, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov. cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6482.htm (accessed October 21, 2017). 51. Liu Hua and Xiu Xiaoqing, “Xi Jinping: Ba Zhong Ji you guan Shuang bian he zuo tong gai chang yi dui jie” [Align China- Kyrgyzstan bilateral cooperation with the [BRI] initiative], Yidaiyilugov.cn, May 18, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6479.htm (accessed October 21, 2017). 52. “hong yang si lu jingshen shen hua zhong a he zuo” [Carry Forward Silk Road Spirit and deepen China-Arab cooperation], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, June 5, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6575.htm, (accessed October 22, 2017). 53. “Shou wang xiangzhu, gong chuang zhong meng guanxi fazhan xin shi dai” [With mutual help create together a new era for the development of China-Mongolia relations], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, August 22, 2014, https:// www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6616.htm (accessed October 21, 2017). 54. “goujian Zhong Ba mingy un gong tong ti kai pi he zuo gong ying xin zheng cheng” [Building a community of Shared future between China and Pakistan opens up a new journey of win-win cooperation], Xinhuanet.com, April 21, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-04/21/c_ 1115044392.htm (accessed October 9, 2017). 55. “Xi Jinping: yi “yi dai yi lu” wei Shuang yi tong nanya guojia yidao shixian teng fei” [Xi jinping: with One Belt And One Road as its wings, China has taken off together with south Asian countries], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, September 18, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6633. htm (accessed October 24, 2017). 56. “liantong yinling fazhan huoban ju jiao he zuo” [Linking together of development partners will lead development partners to focus on cooperation], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, November 8, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov. cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6703.htm (accessed October 21, 2017). 57. Liu Hua, “Xi Jinping: Zhong fang yuan jiang “yi dai yi lu” chang yi tong tu fang fazhan zhanlue dui jie” [Xi Jinping: China is ready to align the One Belt And One Road initiative with Turkey’s development strategy], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, July 29, 2015, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/ xgcdt/6887.htm (accessed November 17, 2017).

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58. Tan Jingjing, “Xi Jinping hui jian de guo she min dang zhu xi, fu zong li Jiabulier” [Xi Jinping met with Gabriel, Vice chancellor of the Social Democratic Party Of Germany], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, July 15, 2015, https:// www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6882.htm (accessed November 18, 2017). 59. “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Tran Dại Quang of Vietnam,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the people’s republic of China, November 13, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1510705. shtml (accessed November 17, 2017). 60. Liu Hua, “Xi Jinping tong ke luo di ya zong tong Jitaluoweiqi hui tan” [Xi jinping met with Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic], Yidaiyilu. gov.cn, October 10, 2014, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/ 6946.htm (accessed October 19, 2017). 61. Li Jianmin, “Xi Jinping hui jian ao da li ya zong li Te en bu er” [Xi jinping met with Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, November 16, 2015, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/7019. htm (accessed October 16, 2017). 62. Data from China’s official BRI website, yidaiyilu.gov.cn, September 29, 2016, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?site_id=CMSydylgw&cat_ id=10011&cur_page=1 (accessed November 17, 2017). 63. Rong, Zhangrong. “rang Fo jiao wen hua rong ru “yi dai yi lu” zhan lue – ben xing fa shi fang tan lu” [Let Buddhist culture be integrated into “One Belt And One Road” strategy – Records of Interview with Master Benxing], Haixiatongxun [StraitsCommunication], No. 4 (2015), p. 36. 64. “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At UNESCO Headquarters,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the people’s republic of China, March 28, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml (accessed October 17, 2017). 65. “Zhuan jia: san da dong neng xu tui “yi dai yi lu” gao wei yun xiang” [Expert: Three kinetic energies continue to push One Belt And One Road on a high trajectory], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, December 29, 2017, https://www. yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/gnzjgd/41624.htm (accessed January 2, 2018). 66. Zhang Feiye and Sun Xiaoting, “Zhong guo- Zhong Ya zheng dang lun tan: wei “yi dai yi lu” gong xian zheng dang de li liang” [China – Central Asia political party Forum: Party Strength contribute to the “One Belt And One Road”], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, December 3, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/38193.htm. (accessed December 17, 2017). 67. “Zhuan jia: “yi dai yi lu” jian she chu xian jing pen shi he zuo dui jie xiao ying” [Expert: One Belt One Road construction is experiencing an effect of skyrocketing cooperative alignments], Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, November 13, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/gnzjgd/34464.htm (accessed December 6, 2017).

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68. Zhao Yejiao and Zhang Bin, “ju jiao wen hua “zou chu qu” “yi dai yi lu” yu Zhong hua wen hua luntan juxing” [conducted by One Belt One Road and Chinese culture forum Focusing on culture “going out”], Yidaiyilu. gov.cn, September 10, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/ 27526.htm (accessed October 19, 2017). 69. Ibid. 70. “Xue Yuan jian jie” [Brief Introduction of the College], Nan Hai Buddhism Academy, November 12, 2017, http://www.nhfxy.net/?article/type/69/ 1.html (accessed November 25, 2017). 71. Cao Jiahan, ““yi dai yi lu” chang yi yu 2030 nian ke chi xu fa zhan yi cheng de dui jie” [On Aligning BRI with the 2030 Sustainable development agenda], Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review], p. 3 (2016), p. 37. 72. Ibid., p. 53.

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Shou wang xiangzhu, gong chuang zhong meng guanxi fazhan xin shi dai [With mutual help create together a new era for the development of China-Mongolia relations]. 2014. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. August 22. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ xwzx/xgcdt/6616.htm. Accessed October 21, 2017. Shuying, Zhu. 2017. “yid ai yi lu” xia de falu fengxian fangkong [Legal risk prevention and control under “One Belt And One Road”]. Shigong Qiyeguanli [Construction Enterprise Management] No. 3 (March): 41–43. Speech by H.E.  Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At UNESCO Headquarters. 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the people’s republic of China. March 28. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml. Accessed October 17, 2017. Spotlight: Belt & Road initiative promotes China-CEEC cooperation. 2016. Xinhua General News Service. March 28. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2016-03/29/c_135231320.htm. Accessed February 28, 2018. Sujun, Zhao, Zhang Xiangjian and Tu Yongqian. 2017. Shanghai guoji jinrong zhong xin dui jie “yi dai yi lu” de tu po kou ji cuo shi [The Breakthrough and Measures to align Shanghai International Financial Center with“One Belt One Road”]. Kexue Fazhan [Scientific Development] No. 103 (June): 78–85. Suokas, Janne. 2018. Chinese state enterprises undertake over 3,100 Belt and Road projects. gb Times, October 31. https://gbtimes.com/chinese-state-enterprises-undertake-over-3100-belt-and-road-projects. Accessed November 1, 2018. Tightening up China’s Belt and Road Initiative; Beijing’s lending could fuel a debt crisis in the developing world. 2018. Financial Times (London, England). (September 11): 8. Tongren, Jiang and Zhang Lin. 2017. “yi dai yi lu” yu zhong guo ti yu chan ye dui jie fa zhan lu jing yan jiu [On Ways of aligning of China’s Sports Industry with the Policy of “One Belt One Road”]. Xian tiyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Xian Physical Education University] Vol. 34, No. 2 (March): 129–139. Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-­Century Maritime Silk Road. 2015. Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization. March 28. http:// en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. Accessed November 2, 2017. WeiJiang, Feng. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” de Zhanlue dui jie [Strategic Alignment of “One Belt One Road”]. Dangdai Jinrong Jia [Modern Bankers] No. 9 (September): 109–111. Western banks rush to gain deals on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 2018. Xinhua General News Service. February 28. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2018-02/28/c_137005861.htm. Accessed March 3, 2018.

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Witular, Rendi A. 2014. Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world. The Jakarta Post. November 13. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/ jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html. Accessed November 4, 2017. Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Tran Dại Quang of Vietnam. 2017. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the people’s republic of China. November 13. http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1510705.shtml.  Accessed November 17, 2017. Xi Jinping: yi “yi dai yi lu” wei Shuang yi tong nanya guojia yidao shixian teng fei [Xi jinping: with One Belt And One Road as its wings, China has taken off together with south Asian countries]. 2014. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. September 18. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdt/6633.htm. Accessed October 24, 2017. Xinmei, Xiao. 2015. “yi dai yi lu” jianshe de fengxian yu fangfan [Risk and Risk prevention in the construction of BRI]. Shanxi Caijing daxue xuebao [Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University]. Vol. 37, No. S2 (November): 7–8. Xue Yuan jian jie [Brief Introduction of the College]. 2017. Nan Hai Buddhism Academy. November 12. http://www.nhfxy.net/?article/type/69/1.html. Accessed November 25, 2017. Xuerui, Chen. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” dingwei, fengxian ji shunli tuijin lujing tanxi [Analysis of One Belt And One Road Oriantation, risk and probing for a path of smooth progress]. Qiuzhi daokan [Journal of Seeking Knowledge Guide] No. 10 (April): 25–26. Yan, Yan, Zhang Yingjie and Zhang Tingting. 2015. “yid ai yi lu” yanxian zhuquan fengxian [Sovereign Risk along the BRI]. Zhongguo Jinrong [China Finance] No. 13 (July), pp. 55–56. Yejiao, Zhao and Zhang Bin. 2017. ju jiao wen hua “zou chu qu” “yi dai yi lu” yu Zhong hua wen hua luntan juxing [conducted by One Belt One Road and Chinese culture forum Focusing on culture “going out”]. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. September 10. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/27526.htm. Accessed October 19, 2017. Yun, Ma. 2015. “yi dai yi lu” tiao zhan, feng xian yu yingdui” [BRI: Challenges, Risks and Responses]. Jingji yanjiu cankao [Review of Economic Research] No. 37 (July): 45–52. Zhangrong, Rong. 2015. rang Fo jiao wen hua rong ru “yi dai yi lu” zhan lue – ben xing fa shi fang tan lu [Let Buddhist culture be integrated into “One Belt And One Road” strategy  – Records of Interview with Master Benxing]. Haixiatongxun [Straits Communication] No. 4 (April): 36–38. Zhimin, Wang. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” zhanlue yu zhongguo waijiao zouxiang [“One Belt One Road” Strategy and Way Forward for Chinese Diplomacy]. Zhongguo Pudong ganbu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong] Vol. 10, No. 1 (January):76–82.

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Zhong guo shou ge hai wai junshi jidi-Jibuti [China’s first overseas military base  – Djibouti]. 2017. Sohu.com. July 13. https://www.sohu.com/a/ 156676104_99946707. Accessed October 19, 2017. Zhuan jia: “yi dai yi lu” jian she chu xian jing pen shi he zuo dui jie xiao ying [Expert: One Belt One Road construction is experiencing an effect of skyrocketing cooperative alignments]. 2017. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. November 13. https:// www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/gnzjgd/34464.htm. Accessed December 6, 2017. Zhuan jia: san da dong neng xu tui “yi dai yi lu” gao wei yun xiang [Expert: Three kinetic energies continue to push One Belt And One Road on a high trajectory]. 2017. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. December 29. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ ghsl/gnzjgd/41624.htm. Accessed January 2, 2018.

CHAPTER 4

India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View

Chinese officials often reiterate that the BRI is purely an economic initiative envisioned to increase the prosperity of China and of participating countries through regional linkage initiatives, and they brush off any reference to the geostrategic intentions behind it. Chinese diplomats have also repeated this dismissiveness to India. For instance, mollifying Indian fears of China’s geostrategic intentions and arguably keeping in mind India’s criticism that the BRI is not an initiative based on consultation with other countries, the then-Chinese ambassador to India Le Yucheng (2014–2016) reiterated China’s official position that “the ‘Belt and Road’ initiatives will observe the principles of discussing, building and sharing together, through policy coordination, road connectivity, unimpeded trade, monetary circulation, and mutual understanding. These initiatives have been put forward to promote economic cooperation, and are not driven by geopolitics, or an attempt to seek spheres of influence.”1 However, Chinese officials often contradict their own official pronouncements about the BRI. Contradictions are apparent, especially when dealing with a vague concept such as the BRI. For instance, when explaining the BRI to Indians, China tries to depict the BRI concept as a shared initiative implemented with the consultation of other countries. However, the BRI is also depicted as a gift or a public good offered by China to the world. For instance, Chinese ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui described the BRI as “…a major public product China has offered to the world. It is a strategic initiative aimed at promoting globalisation and economic integration.”2 © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_4

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Unlike official pronouncements, which are more akin to marketing the BRI concept to the world as a benevolent, beneficial win-win situation for the world, the discourses that have emerged in reaction to the Indian attitude towards the BRI in Chinese media, scholarly and official discourses can be divided into three types. The first stream of this discourse tries to construct India as an increasingly cooperative nation that China will eventually win to the BRI. The second accepts the fact that India is unlikely to join the BRI and seeks a cooperative partnership with India by aligning the BRI with India’s own domestic and regional linkage concepts and plans such as the Mausam, Sagarmala, and Spice Route initiatives. The third stream and the most dominant part of the discourse, the critique of the Indian attitude towards the BRI, seeks the reasons for India’s non-­ participation and reaches several answers, many of which reinforce the existing frameworks with which Chinese scholars analyse India.

The Good BRI for India The Chinese media propagate the BRI as a peace initiative. The spirit of the Silk Road is portrayed as benign, one that includes “peace and cooperation, openness and tolerance, learning from each other, mutual benefit and win-win.”3 This statement is a typical Chinese depiction of its international initiatives, portraying them as a win-win situation. China’s portrayal of its initiatives as benevolent is not particularly different from the depiction of any other major country’s foreign policy initiatives. With China, the only differences are the intensity, the range and the hegemony of the state over media, as a result of which non-official media, as well as academia, all echo the official version of the Chinese depiction of the BRI.  Nevertheless, scholarly analysis and some media analysis tend to widen the area of debate within the limited framework of analysis provided to Chinese academia and media. The Chinese debate and analysis of India and the BRI have broadened because India has yet to join the initiative and opposes many aspects of it. Consequently, China tries to argue that even if it is delayed in doing so, India may eventually join; at the same time, it criticises India for not joining, widening the space for discourse on the issue of Indian’s non-­ participation in the BRI. These discourses reinforce some of the existing Chinese images of India and create new images. It can be argued that the Chinese tendency to reinforce the old discourses concerning India is also a normal state of affairs in any country’s discourse concerning another

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country; it builds on the pre-existing discourse and reinforces it, negates it or creates a new divergent discourse. The Chinese narrative about the Indian attitude towards the BRI cannot be separated from China’s larger discourse concerning India. One stream of the Chinese narrative on India’s attitude towards participation in the BRI can be described as advocacy directed towards India. China advocates that the BRI will be helpful to India and will support India’s economic development and that it will also assist in creating a stable neighbourhood for India. The contribution to the stability of the region has been emphasised several times as a public good that the project will provide. For instance, Chinese scholars pointed out that in December 2014, in the second meeting of the joint working group of the Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor held in Bangladesh, all four countries committed to accelerating the building of the BCIM Economic Corridor to maintain regional peace and stability and to promote economic development. However, the condition of stability is proposed as both a cause and an effect related to the CPEC; for instance, in the case of Pakistan, China considers stability as a prerequisite for the success of the CPEC, and the success of the CPEC will increase the stability of Pakistan.4 China argues that based on India’s objective of attracting foreign investment, the BRI will also be an attractive project for India to consider. Chinese scholars propose that China can transfer its less competitive low-­ end manufacturing to India. According to them, India and China can cooperate on production capacity. China is a manufacturing superpower, and India is far behind in its manufacturing capacity. In this respect, China and India can find complementarity. According to this argument, China encourages the transfer of production capacity to India, which, China argues, is a natural process in global economic history. Cooperation on international production capacity is a mutually beneficial form of cooperation between countries to promote investment, development, improvement, and the transfer and application of expertise and skills. It will also benefit Chinese enterprises by opening new markets, ensuring price competitiveness and upgrading the industrial structure.5 Chinese experts point out that India is currently pursuing a Make in India initiative and encouraging FDI in India. In this respect, there exists complementarity between India and China with regard to cooperation on transferring manufacturing capacity. Cooperation on international ­production capacity is closely linked to international industry transfer, and industry transfer is closely linked to international investment. Factors such

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as disparities in economic development, differences in developmental strategies, disparities in the developmental level, and variations in the industrial structure have led to many production capacity transfers and industry transfers. In global economic history, many Western and Asian developed countries have served as the source of production capacity transfer and the target of production capacity transfer. Starting in the 1980s, China undertook and accepted global production capacity. As a result, its economy followed a trajectory of fast growth. India also began to attract outside investment in the 1990s and began to develop quickly. Chinese experts argue that given the current anaemic investment in India by China, a cooperation on production capacity between the two countries will increase the economic cooperation between them.6

Locating India in the BRI When emphasising the importance of India to the BRI initiative, one of the areas that China has emphasised is the location of India. According to China, India’s location is at the intersection of the maritime Silk Road and the land-based Silk Road, and India was part of the historical Chinese Silk Road. Le Yucheng has also emphasised India’s importance to the BRI by emphasising India’s location. According to him, “India enjoys a unique geographical location. It was a significant country along the ancient Silk Roads and spice route and is situated at the crossing point of the contemporary ‘Belt and Road.’ India is China’s natural and significant partner in promoting the ‘Belt and Road’ initiatives.”7 In the initial stages of the conceptualisation of the BRI, the relevance of India was unclear; however, in the later stages of its implementation (here, implementation just means the continuation of some projects and the initiation of some new projects in the South Asian region), India has arguably become a crucial factor. During Li Keqiang’s visit to Pakistan in May 2013, China and Pakistan agreed to “link China’s strategy to develop its western region with Pakistan’s domestic economic development, with a view to translating their political partnership into results of pragmatic economic cooperation.”8 This proposal was later evolved into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). During his visit to India on May 20, 2013, Li Keqiang also “called for establishing an economic corridor among China, India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh to push for closer links between the two major markets.”9 This was not a new proposal; it was only a change in name from the BCIM Forum to the BCIM Economic Corridor because the intention

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of both was the same. The BCIM Forum had been conducting regular conferences for more than a decade before Li Keqiang’s call to establish the BCIM Economic Corridor in 2013. The first BCIM Forum was held in Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan province, in 1999 and was known as the Kunming Initiative; the 4th took place in Yangon, Myanmar, in 2003, the 7th in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2007, and the eighth in Myanmar’s new capital, Nay Pyi Taw, in 2009.10 However, during Li Keqiang’s visit to the South Asian region in May 2013, China had not yet proposed the Silk Road concept or the BRI concept. Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed building a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian countries on September 7, 2013, during his speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, only three months after Li Keqiang’s visit to the South Asian region.11 Even the blanket term, BRI, was applied to these regional linkage projects only after some time. The impact of giving the BRI name to these projects and depicting the BRI as the pet project of Chinese President Xi Jinping was that there was a renewed emphasis and focus on these projects. In building the Silk Road, the emphasis falls on building regional linkages. For this purpose, ancient and modern linkages between India and China are emphasised by Chinese media. One of the most important of these regional linkage projects concerning India is the K2K cooperative mechanism, linking the city of Kolkata, India, with the city of Kunming, China, the capitals of India’s West Bengal state and China’s Yunnan province, respectively. The increase in the linkages between the two provincial capitals, such as direct flights from Kolkata to Kunming, is considered a significant initiative for linking the two regions of India and China. Kolkata is the nearest major city to the Chinese province of Yunnan, and it has close cultural linkages with China. As in the case of the BCIM Economic Corridor, the K2K initiative is also not a new initiative. The first K2K forum was conducted in Kolkata in 2003. The primary intention of this forum was to increase trust between the citizens, scholars, and industrialists of Yunnan and Kolkata. The forum also explored initiatives regarding the connectivity between the two provinces, such as direct flights and road connectivity between the two provincial capitals.12 One of the noteworthy changes since the announcement of the BRI is the increase in the scope of the K2K forum, with the Indian side of the forum expanding to include the Indian states of Assam, Bihar, and Manipur.13 Although regular forums and exchanges are conducted between Kunming and Kolkata to increase trust between Indian and

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Chinese citizens, the contemporary conditions of the most visible linkage of Kolkata with China, its Chinatown, remain an unpleasant linkage. According to Chinese media, India has an estimated current population of 5000 individuals of Chinese origin, of whom 3000 live in Kolkata, 1000 in Mumbai and approximately 500 in Delhi. The history of Chinese people in India, especially in Kolkata, is not a great one. During and after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, they experienced mass detention and harassment by Indian authorities.14 Kolkata’s Chinatown is also regarded as one of the most impoverished Chinatowns in the world, and the poor conditions there under which Chinese people live are reported in Chinese media. However, their lives are not particularly distinct from those of a large part of the Kolkata population, who also live in similar conditions. Overall, the attempts to emphasise the old linkages are not always positive because of the negative images and perceptions created in Chinese minds because of the images of poverty and underdevelopment in Kolkata.15 Closer interactions can sometimes result in the creation of positive images, but in the case of Kolkata, they may result in the creation of more negative images of India in China. In regard to creating images, the official and unofficial media in China diverge. Official Chinese media propagate a positive image of Chinese initiatives and their linkages with Kolkata as part of the Silk Road initiative. Nevertheless, at the same time, the unofficial media project an image of Kolkata that is based more on real experience, primarily through the narratives of Chinese travellers visiting the city and the depiction of the Chinese population in Kolkata and the poor conditions in which they lives.16 In addition to Kolkata’s Chinatown, one incident that received full Chinese media attention and extensive coverage in global media is the story of the Chinese soldier who became lost in India after the 1962 war and returned to his hometown in China in 2017. In China, he received an emotional welcome, and the two aspects that both Chinese and global media highlighted were how, for decades, he remained in India because he lacked the proper documentation to go to China and the life of poverty that he and his family endured in India.17

Commonalities Make Linkages China has emphasised the historical and other commonalities between India and China to create the impression that the BRI is not an initiative imposed from above but a cooperative project and that the objectives are noble and will benefit countries such as India. The general commonalities

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between India and China that China has emphasised are that during the colonial period, both were controlled by colonial powers to different degrees, both are currently regaining their influence in the international community and both are participating in and moulding the international system as emerging powers. Continuing with this positive tone, China emphasises that India and China will reach consensus and a achieve a model of “coexisting with competition and cooperation.” This alludes to the current disposition of India-China relations in which there is competition and, at the same time, cooperation between India and China and this is the normal state of affairs between the two countries. From an optimistic perspective, one Chinese scholar thinks that India will adopt a step-by-­ step approach to joining the BRI.18 Based on this “step-by-step approach” that India will take, the main factor that restricts Indian participation is the lack of effective communication of the policy by China. Effective policy communication is the most crucial factor in confidence building and in advancing cooperation between the two countries. China assesses that the BRI policy has not been effectively communicated to India, resulting in misunderstanding on the part of India.19

Soft and Not So Soft Power of the BRI Chinese media and scholars have tried to give a new meaning and new narratives to projects to incorporate them into the larger BRI narrative. One such attempt is the framing of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an institution that supports the BRI.  Chinese scholars argue that the transformation of the AIIB into a supporting institution of the BRI indirectly made India a supporter of the BRI. According to the deputy director of the South Asian Research Centre at Fudan University, Professor Zhang Jiadong, “in fact, India’s accession to the AIIB has meant that India in part joined the BRI.”20 In contrast to the fact that India is currently the AIIB’s largest borrower, in the initial years, there was much scepticism by Chinese over whether the newly formed AIIB should lend to India. Referring to the example of the Delhi-Agra Expressway, which was not used extensively in 2015 because of the toll fare issue, Zhang Jiadong said that investors are finding it difficult to recover money invested in large-scale infrastructure programmes in India. He also questioned the viability of some of India’s plans, such as the Delhi-Chennai bullet train programme. According to him, most Indian rail passengers are short-haul

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passengers, and the Delhi-Chennai route will face customer shortages; additionally, another issue will be the affordability of bullet train tickets for Indian passengers, implying that long-haul bullet train tickets will be costly for Indian passengers.21 According to Chinese scholars, India joined the AIIB because of its enormous demand for infrastructure development. Joining the AIIB shows that India is inclined towards cooperation. Chinese scholars believe that the paramount governing philosophy of the Modi government is “development first.” Therefore, for economic reasons, India can join the BRI. Chinese scholars who view the issue of Indian participation in the BRI through a positive lens believe that China has the ability to persuade India to understand the economic intentions and dividends of the BRI. Communicating the BRI’s economic benefits to India should be the practical basis of active policy communication between India and China. Thus, the prospects of policy communication are predictable; we (Chinese) only need to be patient.22 When the news broke that India had become the AIIB’s largest borrower, some Chinese news reports asked whether China suffered and India benefited from the AIIB. In the popular Chinese perception, the AIIB is a Chinese initiative attached to the BRI, and India seems to be taking advantage of the AIIB without joining the BRI. Refuting this perception, the director of the Indian research centre at Xihua Normal University, Xing-Chun Long, stated that the AIIB is undoubtedly a multilateral institution and China is one of the founding members of the AIIB with a large shareholding. India’s stake in the AIIB is not as large as China’s, but it is also a large shareholder. From the perspective of the original intention behind founding the BRI or its business model, its fundamental role is to promote investment and financing activities related to international infrastructure construction projects. Considering the size of India and its needs for infrastructural development, the fact that India has become the largest beneficiary of the AIIB is not surprising.23 Because the founding of the AIIB coincided with the initial period of the BRI, it was widely perceived that both are linked together. India’s joining the AIIB was considered a precursor action ahead of joining the BRI. According to Xing-Chun Long, this is mainly a Chinese perception, and he points out that “from the Chinese point of view, the AIIB is linked with the BRI, but from the perspective of international law, they are two different things.” Xing-Chun Long says that the fact that India joined the AIIB and has become its largest borrower does not mean that it will be further associated with the BRI, nor can it be judged as India’s attitude

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towards the BRI.24 Given Modi’s priority of developing India’s infrastructure and given that the priority field of the BRI is also infrastructure development, the spillover effect of this will be the development of trade cooperations, exchanges of people and goods, an increase in trust between the countries, and a deepening of regional cooperation. China predicts that regardless of the current state of low-level financial cooperation between India and China, in the long run, financial cooperation between the two countries will be significant. This is also the general trend. The establishment and operation of the AIIB, BRICS bank, and Silk Road fund have all provided an excellent platform for economic cooperation between both countries under a multilateral framework. BRI will increase the cooperation between the financial institutions of the two countries and increase the financial circulation and trade between them. It will increase the size of the market for settlement in local currency and the loan market and greatly reduce the economic risks for both countries. China predicts that India and China will have the capability to lead and push for multilateral financial cooperation.25

Cultural Linkages of the BRI The BRI is mainly projected as an economic project. However, to soften the economic rhetoric of the BRI, Chinese media and scholars have tried to propagate the BRI as a project for universal good. From the perspective of people’s identity, the BRI wants to build a bridge between different cultures, ethnicities, and religions. Concerning India, Chinese scholars point to increasing cultural interactions as a basis of India’s closeness to China. In 2014, China and India launched a China-India cultural exchange programme; in 2015, India conducted a “India tourism year” in China, and in 2016, China conducted a “China tourism year” in India. Both countries have established a framework for facilitating interactions between India’s and China’s museums and other cultural institutions. India and China have also established ministerial-level consultations between the cultural ministries of the two countries. India and China are also ­increasing their translations of classical and modern literature, and there are also increasing interactions between media, educational institutions, and other sectors. Referring to the increasing cultural interactions between India and China, Chinese scholars and media have tried to depict a positive image and suggest that the relations between the citizens of both countries are growing warmer.26

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In the BRI discourse related to India, the ancient Silk Road to India is emphasised to give legitimacy to the discourse of the BRI and India. Chinese scholars point out that the southern Silk Road of ancient times passed through Southwest China to India. The southern Silk Road is also the most ancient international route originating from the Chinese mainland, with the southern Silk Road to India opening two centuries before the northern Silk Road. Through this Silk Road, India started to learn about China and started to enter Chinese consciousness. There were many other Silk Road routes, such as that through Tibet, another that starts in Sichuan, passes through Yunnan and Myanmar, and ends in India, and the sea route. The importance of these routes changed over time. However, these routes acted as the link between the Indian and Chinese civilisations.27 The scope of cultural interaction under the heading of the BRI has been expanded to strengthen the exchange of ecological culture. According to Chinese scholars, the beliefs and ethics of ecological protection formed by the three traditional Indian religions of Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism still play an important role and have value in the protection of the ecological environment. Chinese scholars refer to the Xi Jinping’s comment that “There are striking similarities between Chinese “tai chi” and Indian “yoga,” as well as the Chinese traditional Chinese medicine and the “Ayurveda” in India, the people of both countries have followed a similar philosophy of life for thousands of years.”28 Chinese scholars argue that religious, ecological, and cultural exchanges between India and China can promote bilateral cooperation in the field of ecological civilisation construction. Chinese scholars link this goal with the Chinese Communist Party’s decision to construct an ecological civilisation.29 Chinese scholars advocate an increase in the trade of cultural products to soften the image of China among the Indian population. They even argue that strengthening the cultural interactions between India and China can soften India’s attitude towards the South China Sea issue. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development classifies cultural products as follows: art crafts, audio visuals; design, new media, performing arts, publishing, and visual arts; advertising, market research and ­public opinion polling; architectural, engineering, and other technical services; research and development; personal, cultural and recreational services; and royalty and license tax. Chinese scholars point out that between 2006 and 2015, the total import and export volume of cultural products between China and India increased from US$281.28  million to US$2.6 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 28.42%. However,

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in the US$2.6 billion in total trade in 2015, US$1.7 billion consisted of Chinese “design” exports to India, and “design” products are not products that increase cultural interactions or understanding, such as books, movies or other kinds of performing arts. One fact that proves that exports are being framed under the BRI heading is that during the ten-years period from 2006 to 2015, only approximately two years come under the BRI period. Alternatively, in other words, without the BRI heading, trade happened and improved.30 Under the BRI, China is also concerned over the perceived lack of awareness about Chinese culture in the outside world. Under the BRI heading, the Chinese government has also tried to increase the awareness of Chinese culture in the world. Chinese people think that Indians are least aware of Chinese culture. According to one study conducted by Chinese scholars, only 7% of Indians think that the Spring Festival or Chinese New Year is a symbol of Chinese culture, and only 5% like the Spring Festival; the most recognised symbol of Chinese culture in India is the “Great Wall” (73%) and the “Yin Yang” symbol (17%).31 Trying to frame a major portion of the economic and cultural relations between India and China within the conceptual framework of the BRI, Chinese rhetoric tries to give a large part of China’s relations with India the BRI label.

Border Issues and the BRI Framing the China-India disputes over the border in terms of “complicated perceptions,” Chinese media emphasise that because of political, economic, security and diplomatic factors, Indians have complicated perceptions of China; however, complication does not necessarily mean rejection. From the perspective of policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, and trade interactions, both India and China have shared interests and an operational path to follow. Chinese media and scholars repeat the official propaganda that Chinese “diplomacy’s practice of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness and, with its inclusiveness, openness and win-win cooperation should strive to seek common Indian and Chinese interests and gradually build trust and remove India’s strategic doubts to ultimately win over India to the BRI.”32 However, the core of India’s “strategic doubts” is the sovereignty issue or border issue between India and China, which is the basis of the mistrust between India and China. Specifically with respect to the BRI, India’s main objection is

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that the BRI undermines Indian sovereignty by building projects through disputed territories between India and Pakistan. Since the announcement of the BRI, the border dispute between India and China has only worsened; thus, there is considerable scepticism with regard to China’s positive view of Chinese diplomacy’s ability to smooth India’s worries. The impact of the border issue on the BRI is acknowledged by scholars who are sceptical with regard to India’s joining the BRI.  According to them, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 had a large impact on India-China relations. They point out that the India-China border issue has yet to be resolved and that talks are dragging. The border war between China and India caused by the border issue has destroyed the harmonious situation between the two countries. Chinese scholars argue that since the 1962 war, hostility and wariness towards China have become a fundamental position in India’s high-level decision-making. This Indian hostility is reflected in India’s attitude towards the Dalai Lama and the emergence of tactical duplicity on India’s part. Because of India’s rigidity with regard to border issue and its “insincere” attitude towards the Dalai Lama question, India has never given a positive response to or support for China’s One Belt One Road initiative.33 According to Professor Xiao Xian, the most significant problem between India and China is the lack of mutual trust. There are two reasons for this mutual mistrust: one is the border issue, and the other is the lack of understanding between the two nations. He regards China’s understanding of India as minimal. He points out that in 2012, the number of Indian students who came to study in China was 11,000, but the number of Chinese students studying in India was only 1200, which is incomparable to the number of Chinese students studying in the United States and Europe but even markedly less than the number of Chinese students studying in other neighbouring countries of China. For instance, in 2012, the number of Chinese students studying in Japan was 110,000; in South Korea, it was 54,000; in Russia, 24,000; and in Vietnam, 3000. Compared to other countries, the number of Chinese tourist arrivals in India is also very low. Before 1949, there were 50,000 to 60,000 individuals of Chinese origin in the Indian population; now, this number is down to 5000. Some Chinese people do not understand India and look down on India. When referring to India, many Chinese people think that it is impoverished and backward, dirty and disorderly, bad and messy, and weak, disunited and lazy; additionally, they regard the country’s economic development as lagging decades behind that of China. From their perspective, China should

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concentrate on its relations with equal powers, such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Russia. In other words, there is no need to give much attention to India. However, some Chinese people tend to think of India as a rival or as an enemy of China, and they compare India with China with regard to everything. In a way, this is good because they still acknowledge India, but such knowledge is both superficial and dangerous. Xiao Xian also argues that because India is a neighbouring country that is weaker than China, India is wary of China’s rise, and once boundary frictions or economic disputes occur, it is easy for extreme nationalistic rhetoric in India to be instigated.34 According to Chinese scholars, the India-China border issue has always been highly sensitive, and it affects both countries’ sovereignty and their perception of history, national sentiments, decision makers, parliament, military, media, and mass psychology. India and China have established some trust-building measures, but the trust between the two countries is still not enough. The border areas are not always peaceful. In March 2017, the UN Security Council supported a Chinese project passing through Pakistanadministered Kashmir. This marked the first time that China’s BRI has been incorporated into a UN resolution. India was deeply concerned with this UN resolution and believed that such a move would undermine its territorial claims.35 Chinese scholars further argue that India resists and objects to BRI projects such as the CPEC because India worries about the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue and about China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean region. To show its dissatisfaction with China, India has made trouble for China in regard to the country’s core issues and major interests such as the Dalai Lama, Taiwan, and anti-terrorism.36 Like many other Chinese scholars, Liu Hongliang is also confused about the nature of the BRI. According to him, the BRI is a strategy (officially, it is an initiative) that has been proposed because of economic factors, strategic factors and Chinese concerns about the United States. In contrast to Liu Hongliang, the official Chinese government narrative tries to omit the geopolitical discourse from the BRI narrative. According to Liu Hongliang, at the government level, India has responded cautiously to the complex impact of the strategy.37 Some Chinese scholars believe that India’s competitive behaviour in the Indian Ocean region after the announcement of China’s 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative will significantly impact China’s energy security. This stream of discourse shows that India has become a concern for the BRI and that the border dispute between India and China is becoming a core factor in the BRI discourse.

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Don’t Harbour Wild Ambitions According to Chinese specialists, Indians believe that the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road has been proposed to secure regional control. India’s great power ambitions and demands to follow an independent foreign policy have led India to develop its own way of countering this Silk Road, resulting in India’s proposal of the “Project Mausam,” the “Spice Route” and many other plans.38 India’s Project Mausam, which was launched by the Indian government at the 30th Session of the World Heritage Committee held in Doha, Qatar, in June 2014 has received wide coverage and analysis from Chinese media and academia. According to Indian official documents, “Project ‘Mausam’ is an initiative of the Ministry of Culture to be implemented by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) as the nodal agency, with research support from the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA) and the National Museum as associate bodies. This project aims to explore the multi-faceted Indian Ocean ‘world’—collating archaeological and historical research in order to document the diversity of cultural, commercial and religious interactions in the Indian Ocean—extending from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asian archipelago. It also aims to promote research on themes related to the study of Maritime Routes through international scientific seminars and meetings and by adopting a multidisciplinary approach.”39 The proposed aim of Project Mausam is to establish cross-cultural linkages and to revive historic maritime cultural and economic ties with 39 Indian Ocean countries. “These 39 countries include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritius, Singapore, Thailand, Yemen, South Africa, Philippines, and Pakistan among others.”40 One of the objectives of this project was for Project Mausam to obtain a ­“trans-­national nomination as World Heritage.” However, India’s application to obtain UNESCO transnational heritage status for the project hit a roadblock due to Chinese objections; China is countering India’s proposal on the pretext that it will affect China’s own proposal to revive the maritime Silk Road.41 China’s attempts to block the Indian effort to obtain global recognition for Project Mausam was also reported in Chinese media. Chinese media pointed out that the Indian project was conceived as a challenge to China’s maritime Silk Road project and that it also shows India’s “wild strategic ambition.” In other words, with regard to which country made the first move to block the other country’s project, India made the initial

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move to block China’s project. According to Chinese media, after China proposed the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, India did not explicitly support the BRI for more than half a year, and after this period, the so-called Project Mausam was released. In July 2016, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences issued a blue book on the Indian Ocean region titled “Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2016).” According to this report, which focuses on India, in recent years, changes in China’s geopolitical influence have brought “psychological discomfort” to India. India’s Act East policy and China’s strategy of opening up of its western regions collided with each other. The same is also true with regard to the BRI and Project Mausam; these strategic initiatives of China and India have also collided with each other, leading to an intensification of the strategic rivalry in the region between India and China. According to this report, “India not only regards the rise of China as the biggest threat to the rise of India but also deems China’s cooperation with South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim countries as a great challenge to India’s influence there. Especially, the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” has been interpreted by India as the strategic initiative to contain India.”42 Chinese media advice that India should not resist the BRI; instead, India should turn China’s economic strength to India’s advantage. That is, India should turn over a new leaf in its relationship with China and adopt an open attitude towards China.43 Qian Feng, the executive director of the South Asian Studies Association of China, has also pointed out factors such as the time difference between the announcement of the Chinese initiative and the Indian initiative, the geopolitical competition between India and China, the overlap between China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative and India’s Project Mausam. According to him, Indian elites generally view Project Mausam as a countermeasure against the BRI by the ­government of Indian Prime Minister Modi; Project Mausam is an attempt to dilute the appeal of China’s Belt and Road initiative to regional countries and to take back the power of discourse from China. Based on these reasons, the Chinese scholar argues that, although not said explicitly, the above factors reveal the Modi government’s duplicitous policy towards China.44 Another project that is viewed as a competitor of China’s One Belt One Road initiative is the Spice Route announced by India. In India’s official pronouncements related to this project, it is depicted as “an important initiative of the State Government of Kerala, supported by the Government

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of India, in an ongoing effort to revive the two millennia-old Spice Route. Besides re-establishing Kerala’s maritime trade relations with 31 countries associated with the ancient spice route, the project seeks to rekindle interest among modern travellers in this ancient maritime route, which was responsible for bringing travellers across the world in ancient times to India.”45 In the Spice Route, the emphasis is on tourism and the heritage revival of historical routes, not on economics. However, Chinese media depict the Spice Route as being a project that is similar to the BRI. According to one prominent newspaper network, the Reference News Network (参考消 息网), “India’s plan, similar to that of mainland China, is to promote trade and economic ties between India and the 31 countries and regions through historically close trade links.”46 Chinese scholars believe that India’s many other projects in the future can link up with Project Mausam, with one such linkage project being the Sagarmala project. The Indian government promotes the Sagarmala project as a project to harness India’s 7500-km-­ long coastline, its 14,500 km of potentially navigable waterways and its strategic location on key international maritime trade routes, and the project aims to promote port-led development in India. The official documents of the project also refer to comparative advantage that China has over India. In reference to the distance between the port and industrial centres, documents state that “While the cost differential between India and China is not significant on a per tonne-km basis, China still has a lower container exporting cost than the cost in India due to lower lead distances. The presence of major manufacturing and industrial zones in coastal regions in China, which were developed as part of the port-led policy of the government, is the main reason for these lower lead distances.”47 Although, on the surface, India’s Project Mausam has no economic character when it is linked up to other projects, China believes that it will eventually obtain an economic character and become a comprehensive maritime initiative. China views it as an Indian answer to the Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative. Some Chinese analysts depict it as a hedge against the Maritime Silk Road. Currently, however, according to official Indian documents, the amount that India is willing to spend on Project Mausam, over two years, i.e., 2015–2016 and 2016–2017, was Rs. 150,244,502/- (US$ 2,355,833).48 Thus, from the perspective of spending itself, one can discern that the Indian intention is mainly to conceptualise the Indian-influenced or shared heritage space in the Indian Ocean

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region and to obtain global recognition from UNESCO that the Indian Ocean space belongs to India’s heritage. This strategy can also be observed based on the fact that India cannot compete with China in building large-­ scale maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region because of India’s lack of expertise and economic resources. India’s emphasis on culture, history, and heritage fits well with its close historical and cultural linkages with most of the major Indian Ocean states; Project Mausam is also a low-­ cost option to hedge against the Chinese Maritime Silk Road project. Additionally, Project Mausam will provide a narrative to compete with the Chinese Maritime Silk Road narrative. If India manages to obtain UNESCO recognition, then it will install an Indian narrative as the official narrative of the Indian Ocean region. When India has resources in the future to compete with China, it will already have a framework of connectivity in place. However, if China successfully completes its port-building projects in the Indian Ocean region, then Chinese-constructed realities will be far more pronounced, and China will be able to describe them as realizations of the BRI. While Indian conceptual frameworks may not be convincing without ground realities such as large-scale port infrastructure and while India may lose credibility as a balancer of China in the region, China can also lose credibility as a benign power because of how others interpret these projects. For China, the risk is that if a project designated as a BRI project turns out badly or fails, it will cast China’s other projects in a negative light. Chinese scholars consider the Modi government’s Project Mausam to be the primary strategy in response to China’s BRI, and it is chosen as the leading Indian project to compete against the BRI. Other maritime linkage projects announced by the Indian government are considered to be initiatives that assist this project.

Notes 1. Le Yucheng, Interview by Srinivasan Ramani, “Building ties for the 21st century,” The Hindu, April 01, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/building-ties-for-the-21st-centur y/article7054501.ece (accessed February 6, 2018). 2. Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Luo Zhaohui at the United Service Institute of India, “In My Eyes: India, Indians and India-China Relations,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, May 8, 2017, New Delhi, http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy_news/t1459430. htm (accessed February 7, 2018).

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3. Ma Yilu, ““yi dai yi lu” shaengfa yilu xiang nan xin silu” [One Belt One Road develops a new way of thinking towards south], Renmin ribao haiwai ban [People’s Daily Overseas Edition], December 8, 2015, http:// paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-12/08/content_1639217. htm (accessed January 6, 2018). 4. Lan Jianxue, ““yi dai yi lu” chang yi zai nan ya jin zhan tiao zhan ji fang xian” [One Belt One Road Initiative in South Asia: Progress, Challenges and Direction], China Institute of International Studies, July 3, 2017, http://www.ciis.org.cn/chinese/2017-07/03/content_9551000.htm (accessed December 16, 2017). 5. Chen LiJun and Yang Kai, ““yi dai yi lu” bei jing xia de Zhong Yin chan neng he zuo” [Production capacity cooperation between China and India in the context of One Belt And One Road], Xueshu Tansuo [Academic Exploration], No. 10 (2016), p. 36. 6. Ibid. 7. Le Yucheng, Interview by Srinivasan Ramani. 8. Zhang Lingling, Liu Hua and Jia Hanlong, “Li’s visit opens new chapter in China-Pakistan relations,” CNTV, May 24, 2013, http://english.cntv. cn/20130524/101856.shtml (accessed December 12, 2017). 9. “Chinese premier calls for substantial progress in China-India cooperation,” CRI, May 20, 2013. http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/05/20/ 2561s765935.htm (accessed December 16, 2017). 10. BCIM economic cooperation forum opens in Myanmar. Xinhua General News Service, July 23, 2009. 11. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s republic of China, September 7, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml (accessed December 2, 2017). 12. “di er jie K2K guo ji yan tao hui” [The Second K2K International Seminar], Yunnan Jingji nianjian 2005 [Yunnan Economic Year Book 2005], Xian Zhuang shuju [Thread-Binding Books Publishing House], September, 2005, pp. 221–222. 13. Yang Gongchuan, Li Hongfeng, Luo Rongchan and Zu Gongbing, “K2K he zuo ji zhi da jian he zuo xin ping tai” [K2K cooperation mechanism builds a new platform for cooperation], Yunnan Ribao [Yunnan Daily], December 2, 2014. 14. Zou Song, “ji zhe zou fang yin zui da hua ren she qu: Yindu wei he liu bu zhu hua ren xin” [Journalists visit the largest China Town in India: why can’t India retain Chinese hearts?], oversea.huanqiu.com, July 13, 2015, http://oversea.huanqiu.com/article/2015-07/6985218.html (accessed December 12, 2017); “ZhongYin na chang zhan zheng zhi hou yin du

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jing ran jian le zuo ‘hua ren ji zhong ying’” [After that China-India War India actually Built a “Chinese Concentration Camp”], China.com, July 12, 2017, http://military.china.com/history4/62/20170712/30959911_ all.html#page_2 (accessed December 15, 2017). 15. “jia er ge da- kai shiti yan yin du de zang luan cha” [Kolkata – Began to experience India’s dirty mess], www.mafengwo.cn, April 8, 2012, http:// www.mafengwo.cn/i/855148.html (accessed December 17, 2017). 16. “Quan shi jie zui zang luan cha de hua ren ju ji di: dang di hua ren fei chang pin qiong xian zai hen xiang hui Zhing guo” [The world’s dirtiest Chinese gathering place: the local Chinese are very poor and want to go back to China], eastday.com, October 7, 2017, http://mini.eastday. com/a/171007235953921.html (accessed December 15, 2017); “Bei kun yin du de zhong guo lao bing po qie xiang hui guo zai yin hua ren zhi you 5000 ren wei he Zhong guo ren bu xiang liu zai yindu?” [Chinese soldier trapped in India eager to return to China, India have only 5000 Chinese people. Why don’t Chinese want to stay in India?], HBTV.com.cn, February 7, 2017, http://news.hbtv.com.cn/p/502288.html (accessed January 2, 2018). 17. “Chinese man trapped in India goes home after 50 years,” BBC, February 11, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-38928217 (accessed December 7, 2017); “The Chinese man trapped in India for half a century,” BBC, January 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-38715056 (accessed December 7, 2017). 18. Mo li, ““yid ai yi lu”: Yindu “jian jin shi” can yu he zuo huo ke qi” [One Belt One Road: India gradually or soon participate and cooperate], Jinrong shibao [Financial Times], July 23, 2016. 19. Ibid. 20. Fan Shiyun, “Yindu ren ren wei Yindu zhi shi “yi dai yi lu” de guo ke” [India believes that India is only a passer-by country of the One Belt One Road], 163.com, April 3, 2015, http://news.163.com/15/0403/09/ AM92BOO900014SEH.html (accessed December 2, 2017). 21. Ibid. 22. Mo li, ““yid ai yi lu”: Yindu “jian jin shi” can yu he zuo huo ke qi” [One Belt One Road: India gradually or soon participate and cooperate]. 23. Jia Yuanxi, “ya tou hang “zui da shou yi guo” shi yindu, Zhong guo chi kui le ma?” [The biggest beneficiary of the AIIB is India: Did China suffered losses from it], Cankao xiaoxi wang [Reference news network], March 22, 2018, http://column.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2018/0322/2259300_2.shtml (accessed April 6, 2018). 24. Ibid. 25. Mo li, ““yid ai yi lu”: Yindu “jian jin shi” can yu he zuo huo ke qi” [One Belt One Road: India gradually or soon participate and cooperate].

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26. Yang Siling, “Yindu ru he kan dai “yi dai yi lu” xia de Zhong Yin guan xi” [How does India view the relationship between China and India under One Belt And One Road?], Zhongguo shehui kexue wang [Chinese Social Sciences Net], May 28, 2015, http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/201505/ t20150528_2013295.shtml (accessed December 5, 2017). 27. Yang si ling, Ren jia, and Wang Qinghua, “Gou jian xin nan fang si chou zhi lu can yu “yi dai yi lu” jian she” [Building of the new south silk road to participate in One Belt And One Road construction], Yunnan shehui kexue [Social Sciences in Yunnan], No. 3 (2014), pp. 1–2. 28. Yin Lun, ““yid ai yi lu” zhan lue bei jing xia yindu yu Zhong guo de zong jiao sheng tai wen hua jiao liu” [Religious ecological culture exchange among China and India in the context of “One Belt One Road” Strategy], Yuan shengtai minzu wenhua xuekan [Journal of Original Ecological National Culture], Vol. 9, issue 1 (2017), pp. 108–109. 29. Ibid. 30. Qin Shujuan and Gu Yongfen, ““yid ai yi lu” zhan lue xia de Zhong Yin wen hua mao yi he zuo wen ti yan jiu” [Cultural Trade Cooperation between China and India under the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative], Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shanghai Normal University (Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition), No. 5 (2017), pp. 120–122. 31. Zhang Yuanyuan, ““yid ai yi lu” bei jing xia Zhong guo chaun tong jie ri de kua wen hua chuan bo fen xi  – yi Zhong guo chun jie zai yindu de chuan bo wei li” [Analysis of the trans-culture propagation of traditional Chinese festivals in the context of One Belt And One Road: An example of the propagation of Chinese New Year in India], Xinwen Yanjiu daokan [Journal of News Research], No. 3 (2017), p. 253. 32. Mo Li, ““yi dai yi lu”: Yindu Jianjin canyu hezuo huo keqi” [“One Belt And One Road”: India’s gradual engagement can be expected], Zhong guo Jinrong Xinwen [China Financial News], July 23, 2016, http://www. financialnews.com.cn/gj/hqcj/201607/t20160723_100902.html (accessed February 8, 2018); China’s diplomatic jargon applied to India is not unique, see Wang Yi, “2014 in Review: A Successful Year for China’s Diplomacy,” China International Studies, January–February 2015, http:// www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-05/27/content_7937512.html (accessed February 8, 2018); Han Fangming, “Xi Jinping’s diplomatic thought guides China’s interactions with its neighbors,” Beijing Review, March 8, 2018, No. 10, http://www.bjreview.com/Current_Issue/Editor_ Choice/201803/t20180305_800119897.html (accessed February 8, 2018). 33. Guan Hui, ““yi dai yi lu” jian she bei jing xia Zhong Yin guan xi fa zhan xin ji yu de si kao” [reflecting on new opportunities for the progress of the

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China-India relations under the background of the construction of “One Belt and One Road”], Guangxi shehui kexue [Guangxi Social Sciences], No. 12 (2016), p. 150. 34. Xiao Xian, “Zhong Yin zhi jian ying jin kuai xiao chu jiao liu chi zi” [China and India should eliminate the “communication deficit” as soon as possible], Shijie zhishi [World Affairs], No. 4 (2015), pp. 56–57. 35. Meng qinglong, “Zhong Yin bian jie wen ti de qian shi jin sheng yu Zhong guo de he ping fa zhan” [Past and Present of the China-India boundary issue and peaceful development of China], Sichuan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition)] No. 4 (2017), p. 111. 36. Ibid., p. 116. 37. Liu Hongliang, “luelun Zhong Yin bian jie wen ti de xian zhuang ji qi ying xiang” [A brief account on the current situation and the impact of the boundary issue between China and India.], Xinan shiyou daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Southwest Petroleum University (Social Sciences Edition)], Vol. 18, No. 2 (2016), p. 58. 38. Guan Hui, ““yi dai yi lu” jian she bei jing xia Zhong Yin guan xi fa zhan xin ji yu de si kao” [reflecting on new opportunities for the progress of the China-India relations under the background of the construction of “One Belt and One Road”], p. 151. 39. “Project Mausam,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Culture, April 25, 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=141133 (accessed January 30, 2018). 40. “Government to establish cross cultural linkages with 39 Indian Ocean Countries under Project Mausam,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 9, 2015, http://www.indiaculture.nic.in/sites/default/ files/events/Project%20Mausam.pdf (accessed January 2, 2018). 41. Ritu Sharma, “Project Mausam hits a Chinese wall,” New Indian Express, January 8, 2017, http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/2017/jan/08/project-mausam-hits-a-chinese-wall-1557291.html (accessed December 17, 2017). 42. Cuiping Zhu, “Geopolitical Considerations and the Modi Administration’s Development Strategy,” in Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.), Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2016) Modi’s India, Singapore: Springer 2017, p. 35. 43. “Yin mei: ji feng ji hua shen zao Zhong guo zu nao zhuan jia: Yindu you zhan lue ye xin” [Indian media: world cultural heritage application for Mausam Plan is blocked by China; Expert: India holds Strategic Wild ambitions], www.guancha.cn, January 10, 2017, http://www.guancha. cn/Neighbors/2017_01_10_388614.shtml (accessed December 3, 2018).

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44. Ibid. 45. Bhaswati Mukherjee, “International recognition of India’s world heritage  – New, exciting projects on anvil”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 10, 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?23601/International+recognition+of+Indias+world+heritage ++New+exciting+projects+on+anvil (accessed November 24, 2017). 46. “Modi tui Yindu ban “Yi dai Yi lu” yu yu Zhong guo zheng duo dui si li lan ka ying xiang li” [Modi is pushing the Indian version of One Belt And One Road to compete with China for influence in Sri Lanka.], Cankao xiaoxi wang [Reference News network] May 25, 2017, http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20170525/2039080.shtml (accessed January 2, 2018). 47. Sagar Mala project-Back Ground, Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, December 27, 2017, http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/ background (accessed January 2, 2018). 48. “Project Mausam of M/O Culture,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Culture, April 25, 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=141133 (accessed January 2, 2018).

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Government to establish cross cultural linkages with 39 Indian Ocean Countries under Project Mausam. 2015. Press Information Bureau, Government Of India. March 9. http://www.indiaculture.nic.in/sites/default/files/events/ Project%20Mausam.pdf. Accessed January 2, 2018. Hongliang, Liu. 2016. luelun Zhong Yin bian jie wen ti de xian zhuang ji qi yingxiang [A brief account on the current situation and the impact of the boundary issue between China and India.]. Xinan shiyou daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Southwest Petroleum University (Social Sciences Edition)] Vol. 18, No. 2 (March): 54–59. Hui, Guan. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” jian she bei jing xia Zhong Yin guan xi fa zhan xin ji yu de si kao [Reflecting on new opportunities for the progress of the China-­ India relations under the background of the construction of “One Belt and One Road”]. Guangxi shehui kexue [Guangxi Social Sciences] No. 12 (December): 149–152. jia er ge da – kai shiti yan yin du de zang luan cha [Kolkata – Began to experience India’s dirty mess]. 2012. www.mafengwo.cn. April 8. http://www.mafengwo. cn/i/855148.html. Accessed December 17, 2017. Jianxue, Lan. 2017. “yi dai yi lu” chang yi zai nan ya jin zhan tiao zhan ji fang xian” [One Belt One Road Initiative in South Asia: Progress, Challenges and Direction]. China Institute of International Studies. July 3. http://www.ciis. org.cn/chinese/2017-07/03/content_9551000.htm. Accessed December 16, 2017. Li, Mo. 2016. “yid ai yi lu”: Yindu “jian jin shi” can yu he zuo huo ke qi [One Belt One Road: India gradually or soon participate and cooperate]. Jinrong shibao [Financial Times]. July 23. Lijun, Chen and Yang Kai. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” bei jing xia de Zhong Yin chan neng he zuo [Production capacity cooperation between China and India in the context of One Belt And One Road]. Xueshu Tansuo [Academic Exploration] No. 10 (October): 36–43. Lingling, Zhang, Liu Hua and Jia Hanlong. 2013. Li’s visit opens new chapter in China-Pakistan relations. CNTV, May 24. http://english.cntv.cn/20130524/ 101856.shtml. Accessed December 12, 2017. Lun, Yin. 2017. “yid ai yi lu” zhan lue bei jing xia yindu yu Zhong guo de zong jiao sheng tai wen hua jiao liu [Religious ecological culture exchange among China and India in the context of “One Belt One Road” Strategy]. Yuan shengtai minzu wenhua xuekan [Journal of Original Ecological National Culture] Vol. 9, issue 1 (January–March): 106–110. Modi tui Yindu ban “Yi dai Yi lu” yu yu Zhong guo zheng duo dui si li lan ka ying xiang li [Modi is pushing the Indian version of One Belt And One Road to compete with China for influence in Sri Lanka]. 2017. Cankao xiaoxi wang [Reference News network] May 25. http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/ 20170525/2039080.shtml. Accessed January 2, 2018.

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Mukherjee, Bhaswati. 2014. International recognition of India’s world heritage – New, exciting projects on anvil. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. July 10, 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?23601/ International+recognition+of+Indias+world+heritage++New+exciting+project s+on+anvil. Accessed November 24, 2017. President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries. 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s republic of China. September 7. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml. Accessed December 2, 2017. Project Mausam of M/O Culture. 2016. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Culture. April 25. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease. aspx?relid=141133. Accessed January 2, 2018. Project Mausam. 2016. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Culture. April 25. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=141133. Accessed January 30, 2018. Qinglong, Meng. 2017. Zhong Yin bian jie wen ti de qianshi jin sheng yu Zhongguo de heping fazhan [Past and Present of the China-India boundary issue and peaceful development of China]. Sichuan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition)] No. 4 (July–August): 108–117. Quan shi jie zui zang luan cha de hua ren ju ji di: dang di hua ren fei chang pin qiong xian zai hen xiang hui Zhing guo [The world’s dirtiest Chinese gathering place: the local Chinese are very poor and want to go back to China]. 2017. Eastday.com, October 7. http://mini.eastday.com/a/171007235953921. html . Accessed December 15, 2017. Sagar Mala project-Back Ground. 2017. Ministry of Shipping, Government of India. December 27. http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/background. Accessed January 2, 2018. Sharma, Ritu. 2017. Project Mausam hits a Chinese wall. New Indian Express. January 8. http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/2017/jan/08/project-mausam-hits-a-chinese-wall-1557291.html. Accessed December 17, 2017. Shiyun, Fan. 2015. Yindu ren ren wei Yindu zhi shi “yi dai yi lu” de guo ke [India believes that India is only a passer-by country of the One Belt One Road]. 163. com, April 3. http://news.163.com/15/0403/09/AM92BOO900014SEH. html. Accessed December 2, 2017. Shujuan, Qin and Gu Yongfen. 2017. “yid ai yi lu” zhan lue xia de Zhong Yin wen hua mao yi he zuo wen ti yan jiu” [Cultural Trade Cooperation between China and India under the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative]. Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shanghai Normal University (Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)] Vol. 46, No. 5 (September): 120–122.

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Siling, Yang, Ren Jia, and Wang Qinghua. 2014. Gou jian xin nan fang si chou zhi lu can yu “yi dai yi lu” jian she [Building of the new south silk road to participate in One Belt And One Road construction]. Yunnan shehui kexue [Social Sciences in Yunnan]. No. 3 (May–June): 1–6. Siling, Yang. 2015. Yindu ru he kan dai “yi dai yi lu” xia de Zhong Yin guan xi [How does India view the relationship between China and India under One Belt And One Road?]. Zhongguo shehui kexue wang [Chinese Social Sciences Net]. May 28. http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/201505/t20150528_2013295. shtml. Accessed December 5, 2017. Song, Zou. 2015. ji zhe zou fang yin zui da hua ren she qu: Yindu wei he liu bu zhu hua ren xin [Journalists visit the largest China Town in India: why can’t India retain Chinese hearts?]. Oversea.huanqiu.com. July 13. http://oversea. huanqiu.com/article/2015-07/6985218.html. Accessed December 12, 2017. The Chinese man trapped in India for half a century. 2017. BBC. January 31. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-38715056. Accessed December 7, 2017. Xian, Xiao. 2015. Zhong Yin zhi jian ying jin kuai xiao chu jiaoliu chizi [China and India should eliminate the “communication deficit” as soon as possible]. Shijie zhishi [World Affairs] No. 4 (February): 56–57. Yilu, Ma. 2015. “yi dai yi lu” shaengfa yilu xiang nan xin silu” [One Belt One Road develops a new way of thinking towards south], Renmin ribao haiwai ban [People’s Daily Overseas Edition]. December 8. http://paper.people.com.cn/ rmrbhwb/html/2015-12/08/content_1639217.htm. Accessed January 6, 2018. Yin mei: ji feng ji hua shen zao Zhong guo zu nao zhuan jia: Yindu you zhan lue ye xin [Indian media: world cultural heritage application for Mausam Plan is blocked by China; Expert: India holds Strategic Wild ambitions]. 2017. www. guancha.cn. January 10. http://www.guancha.cn/Neighbors/2017_01_10_ 388614.shtml. Accessed December 3, 2018. Yuanxi, Jia. 2018. Ya tou hang “zui da shou yi guo” shi yindu, Zhong guo chi kui le ma? [The biggest beneficiary of the AIIB is India: Did China suffered losses from it]. Cankao xiaoxi wang [Reference news network]. March 22. http://column.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2018/0322/2259300_2.shtml. Accessed April 6, 2018. Yuanyuan, Zhang. 2017. “yid ai yi lu” bei jing xia Zhong guo chaun tong jie ri de kua wen hua chuan bo fen xi – yi Zhong guo chun jie zai yindu de chuan bo wei li [Analysis of the trans-culture propagation of traditional Chinese festivals in the context of One Belt And One Road: An example of the propagation of Chinese New Year in India] Xinwen Yanjiu daokan [Journal of News Research] Vol. 8, No. 3 (February): 253–254.

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Yucheng, Le. 2015. Interview by Srinivasan Raman. Building ties for the 21st century. The Hindu, April 01. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ building-ties-for-the-21st-century/article7054501.ece. Accessed February 6, 2018. Zhaohui, Luo. 2017. In My Eyes: India, Indians and India-China Relations. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India. May 8. New Delhi. http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy_news/t1459430. htm. Accessed February 7, 2018. ZhongYin na chang zhan zheng zhi hou yin du jing ran jian le zuo “hua ren ji zhong ying [After that China-India War India actually Built a “Chinese Concentration Camp”]. 2017. China.com. July 12. http://military.china.com/ history4/62/20170712/30959911_all.html#page_2. Accessed December 15, 2017. Zhu, Cuiping. 2016. Geopolitical Considerations and the Modi Administration’s Development Strategy. In Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.). Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2016) Modi’s India. Singapore: Springer.

CHAPTER 5

The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business with India

Although India was invited to join the BRI, because of India’s reluctance to join the initiative, China has sought to include India’s participation in ways other than joining. After the initial criticisms of India’s “wild strategic ambition” in announcing the Project Mausam and what China perceived as India’s intention to counter and hedge against the Chinese Maritime Silk Road project, the Chinese narrative shifted to the possibility of linking the BRI with India’s Project Mausam. The idea of a strategy linkage was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping himself. During Modi’s visit to China in 2015, Xi Jinping depicted the BRI as a tool to reorder the existing international order. Xi called on the two countries to look at their ties from a long-term perspective, strengthen coordination on global and regional affairs, and ‘steer’ the international order to develop in a fairer direction. This emphasis on navigating the international order in a just direction was perceived as appealing to India because of India’s limited say in global institutions. Xi Jinping also issued a call to find areas of common interest and to practise a model of cooperation with mutual benefits. He said, “the two countries should seek common ground in their respective development strategies to jointly promote the region’s economic integration and contribute to global ­economic growth.”1 Xi Jinping also called for side-lining differences so that they will not negatively affect cooperation. The linkage proposal is not a unique proposal made to India; it has also been made to almost all

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major countries, including the United States. Later events have proven that Xi Jinping’s proposal had a limited effect on Indian thinking. Nevertheless, among Chinese experts, it generated a narrative of exploring the linkage options with India. In a way, China’s call to integrate the Indian initiatives with the BRI makes India acknowledge the BRI and is tantamount to “joining the BRI.” If India accepted the Chinese offer to integrate its initiatives with China’s initiatives, the result would be an acknowledgement that the BRI is a benevolent initiative. It would also result in downgrading India’s initiatives and making them an appendage of the BRI in the Indian Ocean region; thus, India’s initiatives would lose their independent and unique value for India. Without saying that India is integrated with the BRI, India can collaborate with China on other connectivity initiatives. Therefore, the Chinese plan to link Project Mausam and the BRI is tantamount to asking India to join the BRI indirectly. The then-Chinese ambassador to India, Le Yichang (2014–2016), expanded and elaborated on official Chinese thinking on strategic alignment with India. The key points he emphasised were that both countries are developing fast and that linking with each other’s economic development plans will enhance the development opportunities for both countries. According to him, “in the next five to ten years, China and India will both be in key development periods, and the era gives us the historic opportunity to realise the prosperity of our respective countries. China has entered the decisive stage of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. China’s development will bring more opportunities to neighbouring countries, including India.” For Le Yichang, linking with each other’s economic development strategies will help in realising the common mission of economic rejuvenation. Emphasising the linkage of strategies and trying to mollify Indian concerns Ambassador Le Yucheng said, “China attaches importance to India’s views and suggestions on the BRI and would like to further strengthen policy communication with India. We [Chinese] are looking forward to linking the ‘One Belt and One Road initiative’ with India’s ‘Spice Route’ and ‘Project Mausam.’”2 He further emphasised that as the important factor for a conducive atmosphere for strategy linkage, both countries should be “free from zero-sum thinking, adhere to the principle of mutual respect and mutual trust, and seek common ground based on differences.”3 However, performing all these tasks is problematic because of the strategic mistrust prevailing between India and China.

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Chinese scholars think that there is a significant complementary and mutually beneficial space for interlinking the BRI and the Mausam initiative. An Indian-Chinese strategy linkage can deepen cooperation between China and other countries in South Asia. Strategic cooperation between China and India is also conducive to enhancing the level of economic integration in South Asia. China and India’s positive search for a strategic interlinkage between India’s and China’s strategies can also become a reference point for China in adopting a similar approach with other regional major powers that have their own regional or global connectivity strategies. A successful linkage of China’s BRI with India’s Mausam programme will also have a positive global effect and promote the new type of cooperation between China and India. Through the interlinking of these strategies, China anticipates the future growth potential of India. According to Chen Wenling, the chief economist and deputy executive director of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE), China’s BRI and India’s Project Mausam should be connected effectively. India has latecomer advantages (in its opening up and integration with the global economy), India’s demographic dividend is being released, and India has an enormous market space, especially for infrastructure investment. Chen Wenling thinks that “India is a country that we (China) should focus on.”4 In Chen Wenling’s view, China and India are the most populous countries in the world; both economies are enormous; both are in the high growth stage of economic development. After the rapid growth of its economy for a certain period of time, the size of China’s economy will be large, and the economic growth rate will slow down. From this perspective, as a potential market for Chinese companies, India should not be ignored. Although India’s infrastructure is currently abysmal and its roadways are rough and very backward, it is also true that China was in the same state during the 1960s and 1970s. In a short span of 30 years, India can become today’s China.5 From this assessment, Chen Wenling implies that India has enormous growth potential for the next few decades and that India’s growth will offer many opportunities for Chinese enterprises and companies. Thus, the question is how to link the BRI with Project Mausam. According to a blue book on the Indian Ocean region titled “The development report of the Indian Ocean region (2016)” published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the development strategies of China and India can gradually be connected from the short-, mediumand long-term perspectives, starting from plans and projects that are easy

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to connect and then gradually progressing to difficult plans and projects. First, easier issues should be dealt with; then, progress should be made towards solving difficult issues, thus building connectivity between the two strategies. In the short term, China and India can link their strategies by actively carrying out specific economic projects under comparative advantage. For instance, India is facing severe funding shortfalls in its infrastructure building, especially in railway modernisation and port infrastructure development; this is also the main reason why India actively joined the AIIB and became its second-largest shareholder. China has financial resources as well as technological capabilities and experience in infrastructure development; thus, in the infrastructure development area, both countries have opportunities for project-based linkage.6 In the medium term, China and India can advance the linkage of China’s Maritime Silk Road project with India’s Sagarmala project. Sagarmala is a port-oriented development that will eventually support India’s Make in India project. India’s port-oriented development model has commonalities with China’s proposed Maritime Silk Road initiative, and it is expected to form the largest common denominator of cooperation between India and China.7 In the long run, China and India can explore connecting China’s One Belt and One Road and Project Mausam. Chinese scholars think that because of India’s policy of strategic autonomy, India may not join the BRI but may connect its Project Mausam with China’s BRI. As long as they promote cultural exchanges, strengthen communication and build consensus, in the long run, there is hope that through cultural linkages between the two countries, meeting the objective of forming a strategy linkage between the connectivity strategies of both countries can be accelerated.8 According to Chinese scholars, a strategy linkage of India’s and China’s plans will give India the impression that it is on “equal footing” with China in terms of strategic cooperation. However, with the positive evaluation of the future prospects of the Indian economy and the many opportunities for strategy linkage with India, Chinese specialists also warn that India should be very clear “that regardless of the support and participation of the Indian Government in the ‘Belt and Road’, or regardless of whether Indian initiatives such as the port-oriented ‘SagarMala’ plan are consistent with the ‘Maritime Silk Road’, China will promote the BRI. India’s hesitant or uncooperative action will only lead to more loss of opportunities to gain profit.”9 Thus, Chinese scholars are

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trying to put the onus to join the BRI on India, and they are suggesting that not joining or linking with the BRI will be India’s loss, not China’s.

Cultural and Conceptual Fusion Some Chinese scholars think that the issue blocking linkage is the negative mindset built around the framing of the BRI concept. There should be conceptual linkages between India and China to overcome the negative mindset built around the BRI. According to Chen Fei, in strategic pursuits, there is no irreconcilable structural contradiction between China and India, and there is a broad space for a mutual linkage of the development strategies of the both countries. Seeking a common point of cooperation by which both countries can link their respective strategies, Chen Fei proposes a three-step approach to strategic alignment. The first step is connecting the concepts of both countries; however, many scholars in both China and India believe that Project Mausam and the BRI constitute a pair of competing concepts. According to Chen Fei, both China and India should prevent the conflict of concepts because of the misinterpretation of each other’s concepts. Regarding concepts such as the Silk Road Economic Belt, the 21st-­ Century Maritime Silk Road, Project Mausam, and the Spice Route, such initiatives or plans are not structurally and intrinsically antagonistic and can achieve conceptual alignment and conceptual integration. Although these concepts are cultural phenomena and spatial phenomena with fixed routes, under modernity, they are more abstract cultural symbols. These cultural symbols inherited and carry forward by China and India entail “peace, friendship, communication, and prosperity,” and these symbols will help the two sides find a meeting point in the spirit of Asian and Oriental culture. He suggests that China should take care of Indian sensitivities; India seeks China’s respect, and it wishes for the countries in the region to respect India’s plans at the same level as they respect China’s plans.10 Some scholars consider the Chinese Buddhist belief in Guanyin Bodhisattva to be one such symbol of the synthesis and alignment of Indian and Chinese culture.11 The fusion of cultures is considered to be an essential factor in creating a positive perception on the ground with regard to Chinese investment and Chinese projects.12 The second step is called the functional alignment of strategies of India and China; it pertains to India’s infrastructural deficit and how Chinese companies can play a role in overcoming this deficit. Chen Fei points out that the search for a­ lignment

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between the BRI and India’s manufacturing policy needs to break the existing thinking pattern and that it should be guided by market rationality and avoid unnecessary prejudice. As an example of unnecessary bias that China should avoid, Chen Fei points to the public opinion in China that “China’s sunset industry is the hope of India.” This refers to the rising wages and decreasing profitability of these industries in China and the need for the development of manufacturing industries in India, which complement each other. However, according to Chen Fei, Chinese comments about the shifting of Chinese sunset industries to India have sparked a backlash in India. The tone of Chinese public opinion gives the impression that through the BRI, China is shifting its unwanted and polluting industries to other countries. Chen Fei advocates avoiding this perception; China should strictly abide by the laws and regulations of the BRI target country and avoid local backlashes. As the third step, Chen Fei, like many other Chinese scholars, calls for an alignment of the cultures of the two countries. Cultural alignment is considered an essential step because of the negative perceptions prevailing in India with regard to China.13 According to the annual report on the development of “The Belt and Road Construction” (2016), the prospect of India’s participation in the One Belt and One Road initiative is still optimistic, and India’s gradual participation and cooperation can be expected. (1) Good policy communication is the most crucial way to promote cooperation between China and India. This report also emphasises policy communication to dispel doubts and build trust. In the long run, both countries can find a convergence of interests, have good policy communication, and realise strategic alignment (linkage). India has always stressed the transparency of the BRI. The work of explaining and interpreting policy can be performed using the government communication mechanism under the BRI framework. China’s ability to make India appreciate the economic implications and growth dividends of the One Belt And One Road initiative is a realistic basis for policy communication between the two countries. Under such circumstances, the prospect of policy communication is predictable but requires more time and patience. (2) Infrastructure connectivity is a priority area for One Belt And One Road construction, and India’s Modi administration has made improving India’s infrastructure a priority.

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Infrastructure interconnectivity is a priority of the BRI, and it has the most spillover effects on many other fields. Trade cooperation, the interaction of people, information and merchandise flows, trust between nations, and the deepening of regional cooperation can all benefit from infrastructure connectivity. Infrastructure used to be a significant bottleneck in India’s economic development. Now, India can break through this bottleneck with the help of One Belt And One Road. (3) Modi has been improving India’s investment climate, the foreign investment policy has been relaxed, and positive signals with regard to Chinese investment have been sent. In the future, the situation of capital that enters each country’s market will gradually improve. This, in turn, will lead to the healthy development of economic and trade exchanges between the two countries, and some of the difficulties facing the realisation of the Free Trade Agreement between India and China will hopefully be resolved. If the Indian-Chinese FTA becomes a reality, then it will be an important part of the BRI—Vision and Action’s high-standard free trade area network, and significant breakthroughs in Chinese-Indian trade and economic relations will be made. (4) At present, the level of financial cooperation between China and India is still very low, but in the long run, financial cooperation between the two countries is of great significance and is the general trend. Financing is the guarantee of trade development and mutual investment, which, in turn, will lead to the financing of trade development and investment. The establishment and operation of the BRICS development bank, the Silk Road fund, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank provide a good platform for financial cooperation between China and India. These institutions will encourage financial cooperation between the two countries in a multilateral framework. They will promote cooperation between the financial institutions of the two countries, promote the flow of funds and trade, promote the size of the local currency settlement and loan business, and enhance the ability of the two countries to withstand global financial risks. (5) The BRI seeks to build a multicultural society by interlinking the common people of the countries in the countries participating in the BRI, and it seeks to build a bridge between different religions and races. The bonding between people is one of the core concepts of the BRI; it also provides a new opportunity for the people of India to renew their understanding of China. Cultural and educational exchanges are vital for the bonding between people. Therefore, cultural and educational

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c­ ooperations between the two countries are highly valued by the Chinese government. Regarding these five aspects, China and India have converging interests and operational paths to achieve these interests.14 Chinese debates and discourses on Chinese-Indian economic cooperation frequently hit speed bumps and hurdles, often in the form of military stand-offs on the China-India border, China’s support for Pakistan and a host of other issues, and the alignment discourse is no exception. However, the alignment discourse is still alive and vigorous; it survived one of the most significant speed bumps, Doklam, the most protracted military stand-off between India and China (June–August 2017). Chinese efforts to link the BRI with India are continuing; for instance, on January 16, 2018, trade delegations from Jiangsu, Shandong, and Yunnan visited Kolkata and participated in a conference on industrial linkage.15 Chinese officials continue to reiterate the Chinese intention to link the BRI with India’s regional connectivity initiatives and other economic development strategies. These statements are often accompanied by the rhetoric of building mutual trust between the two countries and adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.16 In India, the Chinese rhetoric of building trust is viewed with suspicion because Indians perceive that little action corresponds with Chinese rhetoric or that there are few initiatives to build mutual trust. The factors that maintain and contribute to this mutual mistrust, such as the border dispute and China’s strategic relationship with Pakistan, persist, with occasional flare-ups. According to Chinese strategic expert Hu Shisheng, without the necessary strategic understanding and communication, the more China and India rise, the more intense the geopolitical conflicts between the two countries in their common adjoining areas will be, and the more difficult it will be for the two countries to stabilise their relations. In this respect, Hu Shisheng refers to the example of Modi’s opposition to the BRI. According to him, India believes that the BRI is not only an economic development initiative of China but also a geopolitical expansion strategy of China to translate economic advantages into political and security advantages. In India’s view, the BRI has largely made the difficulties of the past that used to destabilise the relationship between the two countries—a new normal.17 Apart from the BCIM, which is generally perceived as a major BRI linkage plan, China is also emphasising linking the Tibetan region with South Asian countries. This emphasis can be viewed in light of the

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­ ifficulties faced by the BCIM. The BCIM has been plagued by hurdles d such as ethnic strife in Myanmar, the Rohingya issue and the contradictions between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and several border issues and regional issues. The Tibetan region and its border with South Asian countries are relatively peaceful; most importantly, China has more control over the initiatives. Chinese government experts have codified and structured China’s plan to integrate India into the BRI.  However, the dominance of the linkage discussion was short-lived. The more elaborate and extensive debate was dominated by a group of Chinese scholars and experts who are convinced that India will not join or link with China’s BRI, and they initiated a wide-­ranging analysis of the reasons behind India’s decision not to join the BRI. Chinese experts refer to various economic reasons for India’s nonparticipation in the BRI. Some Chinese experts also point to the difficulties faced by Chinese investors in India as an indicator and the basis for the current Indian attitude towards China’s BRI.

Economic Reasons for India’s Nonparticipation According to Zhao Gancheng, the Indian attitude towards the BRI is driven by the protectionist mindset of India’s Modi government. Although India is focusing on economic development, it also has clear intentions with regard to defending its interests, including protecting India’s ­industries and jobs from competition. India is wary of collaborating with more competitive people such as Chinese. For Indians, it is not uncommon to view the BRI as a tool for Chinese economic expansion. Zhao Gancheng further points to the differences between India’s central government and its state governments and the prospective implications for the implementation of the BRI. He points to internal economic decisionmaking issues in India as a significant impediment to India’s collaboration with China in the BRI.  According to him, in India, local governments have a more significant say in many aspects of the implementation of FDI projects. Thus, the consent of the local government is a crucial factor deciding the success of India’s foreign economic cooperation. In many areas of international cooperation, because of their different interests compared to those of the federal government, India’s state governments are reluctant to implement the federal government’s proposals and laws, and they even manufacture all kinds of barriers to stop cooperation with

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foreign governments. These issues can negatively influence the BRI in India.18 Chinese scholars also consider the limited power of the Indian central government to be an impediment to India’s internal economic reforms. They observe that when the ruling parties of various Indian states differ from the ruling party of the central government, the conflicts of interests of the parties obstruct the reform measures of the Indian central government, as a result of which the reform measures introduced by the central government often encounter local resistance.19 Another fundamental issue acknowledged by Chinese scholars is the differences in perception. For China, the BRI strategy is more of an economic approach to increasing regional investment flows and investment cooperation. However, many countries in the South Asian region are more concerned with national sovereignty and economic security. India is also concerned with sovereignty issues when it deals with the BRI issue. Chinese scholars also warn that India may not be a good candidate for BRI investment. They are also concerned about the perceived lack of investment protection for foreign investment in India. According to Chinese scholars, developed countries have more robust investment protection policies for investors. However, in developing countries, the government has more control over investment. According to Chinese scholars, India is a federal capitalist state; legislative, judicial and administrative powers are divided; political transitions are accompanied by political turmoil; the Indian system also has frequent policy changes; India’s political environment is one of the critical factors restricting its investment environment. Chinese experts point out that investment in India is risky; thus, with regard to investing in India, Chinese companies need local and regional investment protection mechanisms in place.20 Chinese scholars also try to depict India as a bully in its economic relations with China. India is exploiting China’s status as a nonmarket economy and imposes many restrictive measures on China’s trade with it. Chinese scholars refer to the very high amount of trade remedy investigations against China carried out by India. They term them unidimensional trade remedy investigations, which are more akin to a situation in which India “attacks” and China “defends.” Chinese experts argue that China’s foreign anti-dumping investigations are far lower than the anti-dumping investigations that it has endured. They point out that China is the target of most of India’s anti-dumping investigations; between 1995 and 2011, China endured a total of 772 anti-dumping investigations, and with 135

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investigations, India is the country that conducted the most anti-dumping investigations against China.21 Not many outside China may believe this Chinese allegation because the Indian economy and the Chinese economy are structurally different and India does not have many competitive products that will threaten the market of Chinese products within China. Thus, the question of whether China is restraining itself from carrying out anti-­ dumping measures against Indian products does not arise. China acknowledges that the Indian economy provides many prospective opportunities. However, India’s and China’s economic policies and plans collide with each other. China believes that an increased pace of liberalisation of the Indian government under Prime Minister Modi will bring many opportunities to participate in Indian infrastructural development. For instance, China is promoting its railway technology and equipment, renewable energy technology, electric vehicles, and many other industries and businesses. This is part of the “Made in China 2025” strategy for realising the Chinese government’s vision to become a great power in high-technology manufacturing. Similarly, under Modi, India has promoted the “Make in India” policy to make India a globally competitive manufacturing destination and to increase India’s exports. Chinese scholars point out that both Modi’s Make in India strategy and Xi Jinping’s Made in China 2025 strategy are fundamentally competitive, and when both leaders start to strengthen their own strategies, there will be more frictions in the trade relations between the two countries.22 Chinese experts contend that dumping investigations are one of the most significant expressions of these trade frictions. Other manifestations include the investigations of China’s trade protectionist measures or unfair trade practice measures and the accusation that China is giving an unfair advantage to its industries by giving them various kinds of subsidies. Investigations of trade protection and unfair trade practices that directly target China as well as anti-subsidy investigations form important tools for targeting China’s trade. Chinese economic experts believe that in the near future, the frequency with which India uses anti-dumping measures against China will increase substantially. They also believe that the BRI will face a considerable challenge in the face of India’s usage of all kinds of remedial trade measures. They also fear that Indian actions will set an example for other countries to follow and use these measures against China to exert pressure on China and gain unfair advantages. Additionally,

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Chinese experts argue that apart from traditional trade barriers, in the future, issues such as environmental protection, quality protection, ­standardisation, and technical trade barriers will all become central points in the trade friction between India and China. In the scenario of evolving global trade, trade remedial measures are gaining more legitimacy and becoming more flexible. Anti-dumping, anti-­ subsidy and protectionist measures are all legitimate tools allowed by the WTO. India is one of the founding members of the WTO, and within the framework of the WTO, it can carry out protectionist trade measures. China also points out that India has internal laws that protect its industry from unfair competition, for instance, the tariff act of 1975.23 Additionally, China argues that in India, the levy of anti-dumping duties is flexible; the duty levied is not more than five years, and not so competent authorities can determine the dumping margin. Anti-dumping duties are the weapon most frequently used by Indians against Chinese products, which points to the legal imperfections of the anti-dumping measures. WTO anti-­dumping measures do not have strict enforcement standards; they give the administering party discretionary power and implementation power because anti-­ tax measures show great variability, making it highly convenient to impose anti-dumping duties. From the perspective of India’s anti-dumping laws, India does not prioritize WTO regulation over Indian law. Moreover, from the perspective of arbitration, India also does not identify the existence of dumping and damage. Instead, it observes whether imports are too fast and domestic industries are seeking protection; the identification of dumping is done such that it reverses the cause-effect relationship of the dumping (which means that it is the effect that determines the cause). Chinese scholars make the accusation that India’s administration and implementation of anti-dumping measures run counter to the original intentions of these measures. Chinese experts lament that China is the largest victim of remedial trade measures. India, which does not accept China as a market economy when judging the normal value of Chinese goods, adopts the values of a surrogate country. Moreover, there is no objective judgement regarding the selection of a surrogate country. Regarding the arbitrary nature of the selection of products as the target for dumping duties, there is suspicion that there exists a selection bias. Additionally, Chinese export industries have become innocent victims, and they are in an unfavourable position when responding to anti-­dumping

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measures. Chinese experts are concerned that India will use China’s nonmarket economy status to put restrictions on Chinese imports.24 ­ Chinese scholars have been diligently searching for the reasons for the Indian r­ ejection of the BRI, and one of the reasons they find is related to India’s economic nationalism. According to them, the evolution of India’s internal politics, India’s long struggle against colonialism and the moment of national independence have given rise to strong nationalist sentiments, and these sentiments have evolved into an economic nationalism. Indian nationalism has two unique characteristics: the profound and lasting influence of Hinduism and the continued evolution of the nationalisation policy since India’s independence. Since India won its independence, the country’s political system and religion have had very close relations. Initially, this proximity had to do with gaining independence; at that time, India adopted “Swaraj” nationalism, and the important goal was gaining independence. Between 1950 and 1970, in developing India’s industries, Nehru adopted self-reliance and restricted external capital. Thus, this constituted a nationalism bound up with the closed economy, but it led to slow economic growth.25 Li Xiao believes that the BJP, the current ruling party of India, follows its own version of economic nationalism. The BJP wants India to realise industrialisation and economic modernisation in its own way, with India not relying too much on outside capital and technology and adopting FDI from outside selectively, mainly foreign capital from high tech fields, not low-level FDI, Additionally, the slogan “computer chips and no chips” resonates BJP’s intention to invite FDI in high tech fields. Compared to Nehru’s closed economy, the BJP’s economic ideology constitutes more of an “open economy nationalism.” However, China has also pointed out that over the course of India’s long history, the country has suffered repeated invasions from foreign powers, and the memories of the long period of colonisation by the British are unforgettable. On the one hand, economic nationalism has become an effective weapon in India’s external engagement, competition, and internal politics; on the other hand, it has become a method to reflect national dignity and honour. Li Xiao points out that in 1980, there was a “do not drink Coca-Cola” movement in India, encouraging the use of national goods and rejecting imported goods. Chinese scholars believe that when analysing Chinese-Indian relations and the BRI, the factor of India’s economic nationalism should not be overlooked.26

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Investment by Chinese Companies and Setbacks in India China is compelled by the potential of India’s economic development. According to Chinese scholars, because India is a vast country with an enormous population, its market capacity is immense, and its potential for development is also large. Additionally, regarding the economic structure and development model, there are many complementarities with China. The opportunities for Chinese companies to invest in India are enormous. Since 1991, the pace of India’s economic development has been fast, the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis on India was minimal, and the potential for development is tremendous. Although India’s per capita GDP is not even half that of China’s, its development model is very different from China’s. China mainly relies on government spending and exports. However, 60% of India’s growth stems from its internal consumption. India still has a rural population of 800 million villagers; for this reason, the demand for middle- and low-end products is very high. Although India’s software industry and high-tech industry are growing rapidly, other segments in India’s manufacturing base, especially the industrial hardware manufacturing base, are fragile. Infrastructure development needs outside investment. India is in the midst of a transition to a new growth cycle; manufacturing will become the most critical driver of growth. From the perspective of the development of the manufacturing potential, India ranks second only to China.27 By 2035, the Indian population will be 1.5  billion, the working-age population will be 65% of the population, and India will become the largest human resource pool in the world. These are the foundations on which Chinese investment is attracted towards India. Moreover, in the BRI, there is ample space for cooperation and collaboration for both India and China. On one end, signalling a cooperative intent from the Indian side, the BCIM has received the approval of the Indian government. India is also actively participating in the BRICS bank and the AIIB, which is the most central funding agency for the BRI. Chinese scholars believe that India has a vital place in China’s geopolitics, especially in  China’s geoeconomic strategy. Currently, China is in a developing stage, and most of China’s exports and imports pass through the Indian Ocean region. Thus, the question is how to enhance the economic interactions between the two countries and, in particular, how to increase Chinese investment in India to increase their interdependency and thus create stakeholders and reduce

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the risk of uncertainty. This matter not only concerns China’s future development and prosperity; answering this question will also enhance the peaceful rise of these two Asian countries. It will also promote the steady development of the South Asian region—the positive economic analysis about prospects of Indian economy by Chinese experts points to the role of a peaceful relationship with India as a significant factor for the peaceful rise of China. Although there are enormous business opportunities for Chinese companies in India, China is finding it difficult to build a positive economic relationship with India. Chinese scholars point out that the growth in Chinese investment in India is small and erratic because comparing the overall economic aggregates and geographical advantages of the two countries, Chinese FDI directed towards India is still comparatively small.28 In the outside investment made by Chinese industry, India’s position is very low; thus, the question of why Chinese companies are facing a dilemma in their FDI in India warrants analysis. Like the foreign investment of many other multinational companies, the difficulties in investing in India faced by Chinese companies are varied and complex. In summary, Chinese companies are facing an Indian dilemma for three reasons: the restrictions of the Indian government, the constraints in India’s investment environment, and the brand deficiency of Chinese products. Chinese scholars consider that Indian government restrictions are the most critical factor restricting Chinese companies from investing in India. They point to the example of Huawei. Huawei’s journey in India has had many ups and downs. In 1999, Huawei started investing in software development in India; in 2001, Huawei officially established an R&D centre in India. In the initial years, Huawei was considered a Chinese success story. By 2006, after only a few years of operation in India, Huawei had sales of US$ 300 million, and Huawei’s research centre in Bangalore employed 1100 people, 95% of whom were Indians.29 Since this initial honeymoon, Huawei has faced tough times in the Indian market. In 2008, India’s Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL) announced a 9.3 million GSM line expansion plan with a contract value at tender estimated at US$ 6 billion. In 2009, along with the Swedish telecom equipment manufacturer Ericsson, Chinese telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei was selected as a supplier for the GSM project. Huawei was to provide equipment to India’s western and southern areas. However, India’s Home Affairs Ministry objected to the BSNL decision to award the contract to Huawei. Indian authorities believed that Huawei

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and the Chinese defence establishment had close relations and said that only if a high-level committee set up by India’s Home Affairs Ministry agrees could BSNL place orders with Huawei. Eventually, Indian authorities concluded that using equipment supplied by Huawei may pose a security risk, and Huawei lost the project.30 On April 29, 2010, Indian media reported that the Indian government would ban the import of telecom equipment from the Chinese manufacturers ZTE and Huawei on the grounds that their equipment failed the relevant security checks. China noticed that equipment from Huawei’s rivals, such as the Ericsson and Nokia Siemens networks, passed the security checks. As a result of this setback in the global market, ZTE’s share price in the Chinese stock market plunged 8%. The Indian decision to block Chinese telecom equipment companies significantly affected the growth and revenue of these companies. For Huawei, India was one of the largest markets; in 2008, the Indian market constituted 11% of Huawei’s total turnover. Because of the ban, Huawei lost 6.5% of its contract sales. Chinese media and experts termed India’s restrictions an “Indian crisis” and concluded that Chinese companies need patience and indigenisation to become more competitive in the Indian market.31 The Chinese government considers the restrictions on Chinese companies to be unjustified, but it realises that it must negotiate its way past India’s restrictive measures and grow. Huawei has come a long way since the “India crisis”, and it is no longer dependent on the Indian market; currently, in Huawei’s US$92.549 billion in total revenue, India’s share is only US$1.2 billion; however, Huawei regards India as a future growth market.32 Chinese sceptics of the BRI’s investment push into India refer to the Huawei experience and warn that India is a hostile environment for Chinese investment. Chinese experts argue that India has placed restrictions on Chinese investment not only because of national security reasons but also because of competitive reasons. For instance, the textile industry is an industry that China is transferring to its neighbouring countries in the BRI framework. From 2005 to 2010, India needed US$ 9.2 billion invested in the textile industry. This investment was needed if it wanted to catch up with China. However, India very clearly expressed that it did not want investment from China in the textile sector. India’s textile minister openly pointed out that China is India’s greatest competitor and that if India accepted Chinese investment, it would significantly influence India’s policy-making regarding the textile industry. There are two ways in which Chinese ­

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i­ndustries enter the Indian market: through automatic approval and through ­government approval. Most industries use automatic approval, and a small number of industries have to go through government approval. This includes industries that require industrial licensing. Mostly foreign capital is used to buy the stocks of existing Indian companies; in this way, these industries invest in India. Automatic approval may look easy, but for Chinese industries, it is also a challenging route. A very small group of Chinese industries can enter through automatic approval because of the abovementioned reasons, such as economic nationalism, China threat theory, the China-India boundary dispute, and the need to hedge against the BRI.  India is wary of Chinese investment; thus, during the registration period, citing the reason of national security, India diverts Chinese companies to government approval. However, few Chinese companies receive government approval.33 In addition to the abovementioned investment hurdles, Chinese experts refer to restrictions such as India’s incomplete infrastructural facilities, and its complex regulatory system make the environment even more unfavourable for investment, which further restricts the development of Chinese investment in India. From the perspective of infrastructural development, compared to China, India’s infrastructure is backward. India’s railways were mostly built during the period of British colonial rule; India does not have high-speed railways, and most of the railway network is a remnant of the British colonial period. The rail infrastructure has yet to be updated or transformed. Regarding highways, India is backward, and the quality of its highways is poor. The power generation capacity of India is also backward, and it is disposed of as frequent large-scale blackouts. For instance, on July 30, 2012, India saw one of the most massive power failures, reportedly affecting 600 million people of North and Northeast India. Industries in India lost millions of dollars because of power failures and erratic power supply. India is known for its prowess in the software industry. Nevertheless, it is hard for many Indians to receive internet services, compared to China, India’s internet users are pitifully smaller. In reality, India’s backward infrastructure not only affected investment by Chinese and other foreign companies but also negatively affected investment by Indian companies.34 Another issue that concerns Chinese businesses is the “Red Tape.” India’s complicated tax system gave Chinese investors hard times. India’s law system is highly complex; it is divided between the central government, state government and local districts. India’s long and complex

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administrative review process also greatly restricts Chinese investment. Though through administrative reforms India’s cumbersome government approval process is currently bit relaxed, its approval process is still relatively lengthy. It is worth noting that FDI regulations and access are formulated and implemented by the federal government. However, approval for construction planning, land use, and environmental protection should be obtained by state governments and other local governing bodies. (This is called “regulatory approvals”). According to the Chinese scholar, a typical power project investment in India requires 43 federal approvals and 57 state approvals. The state governments complicated the approval process many times and serves as the bottleneck for the FDI.  The federal government-­approved FDI Project’s realisation rate is very small, between 2000 and 2001, and it is only 45%. In the middle of all, there is also a severe issue of governmental corruption. Chinese investment risk analysis of India was mainly concerned with India’s “corruption culture.” According to Chinese observers, “corruption is rampant in India, rent-seeking is rife, and bribery has become a way of life for Indians.” They point to one of the reports published by the Indian government, which states that every Indian urban household by average pays a yearly bribe of 4400 Indian Rupees and rural household 2900 rupees, respectively. They also note that parts of India are less secure, especially in the northeast and east, with high crime rates. Chinese argue that the low social status of women in India, the frequent occurrence of sexual assault and rape in public places, and the government’s poor handling of a series of incidents all constitute potential political risks for foreign investment in India. The Chinese also refer to other risk factors such as sectarian conflicts arising out of religious differences and, above all, the threat of terrorism. In the 2014 global terrorism index ranking released by the Sydney-based international think tank the Institute for Economics and Peace, India ranks sixth out of 162 countries in the world, behind Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria. The political risk of the border dispute and the impact of the 1962 war is still active, Indian governments, including the Modi government many times reiterated that solving border dispute is a prerequisite for smooth relations between India and China.35 At last India’s labour laws and regulations also highly restrict FDI, India’s labour laws are perceived as the most complicated and strict in the world. Because of India’s democratic political system and competitive political parties, no party can afford to look over the interests of the labours, so they constructed one of the most rigid labour laws in the world.

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India is the founding member of the international labour organisation, and it follows the rules and regulations of the international labour organisations, such as the rights of the labour to organise, 1947 Industrial dispute law, and 1948s minimum wages law, and if a company relieves the labour after the probationary period, it has to compensate the labour a lot. Moreover, if the Industry has more than 100 employees, it needs to have government approval to fire an employee, these restrictions make India’s labour costs very high, and the business face difficulties in this matter, this is also one of the most critical factors that restrict the FDI to India.36 As early as 2002, the Indian government imposed restrictions on foreign direct investment from specific neighbouring countries, including China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, on national security grounds. India also added China to the list of countries from which foreign direct investment poses a security risk. During that time, investment from China will not be approved through the automatic approval process, and foreign investment from China used to subject to more complex review procedures and strict auditing standards. In 2008, India also proposed exclusive security zones to restrict and prevent Chinese investment in sensitive border regions.37 Although most of these restrictions are removed and China is no longer in the list of sensitive countries, India’s mistrust in Chinese investment has only strengthened over the years, and through indirect measures, India continue to place many restrictions on Chinese investment.

The Potential and Pitfalls of the Indian Market for China The contradictory Chinese perception, in which India is criticised for not joining the BRI and, at the same time, mention is made to the hurdles obstructing robust economic cooperation with India, is more or less consistent in China’s BRI discourse about India. In China, one group acknowledges the potential of the Indian market and advocates close economic cooperation with India, while another group warns Chinese investors of the investment risk arising out of India’s internal political contradictions, corruption, terrorism, and a host of other negative factors. The BRI itself notwithstanding, the fact emerging from the discourse is that regardless of whether India joins the BRI, China cannot ignore the Indian market, and Chinese companies will invest in India and do business in India regardless of the many hurdles involved because not doing so will

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only hurt the business interests of Chinese companies. However, another glaring fact emerging from the discourse is the mistrust and negative perception that exist among Chinese thinkers about India and the Indian government. This mindset has the potential to increase misunderstanding between India and China and to ultimately disrupt Indian-Chinese economic cooperation and India-China relations at large.

Notes 1. “Chinese president meets Indian PM,” Xinhua net, May 14, 2015, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/14/c_134239652.htm (accessed December 4, 2018). 2. “Zhong Yin tong zou “yid ai yi lu” “jiao xiang yue” [China and India can together play BRI symphony], Ambassador Le Yucheng’s speech at the One Belt And One Road seminar at Jawaharlal Nehru university (Delhi), Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, April 7, 2015, http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/chn/sgxw/t1252684.htm (accessed December 5, 2017). 3. Ibid. 4. Yang hong, ““Yi dai Yi lu” he Yindu “ji feng ji hua” ying you xiao dui jie” [One Belt and One Road and the India’s Mausam plan should be effectively connected], Zhongguo Jingji daobao [China Economic Herald], August 6, 2016, B03. 5. Ibid. 6. Cuiping Zhu, “Geopolitical Considerations and the Modi Administration’s Development Strategy,” in Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.), Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2016) Modi’s India, Singapore: Springer 2017, pp. 33–34. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., pp. 31–32. 10. Chen Fei, ““Yi dai Yi Lu” yu Yindu jifeng jihua de zhanlue duijie yanjiu” [A study on the strategic linking of BRI with India’s Mausam strategy], Guoji zhanwang [Global Review], No. 6 (2015), p. 22. 11. Li lian, “Zhongguo minjian de guanyin xinyang shi Zhong Yin wenhua jiaorong de jieguo” [Chinese folk belief in Guanyin is the result of the fusion of Chinese and Indian cultures], Ifeng.com, June 19, 2016, http:// fo.ifeng.com/a/20160619/41625348_0.shtml (accessed December 7, 2018).

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12. Wang guan, “Zhong qi dui wai touzi ji shen quan qiu di liu wei zhuanjia: shixian zhiliang fazhan shi weilai touzi guanjian” [China’s Outward Foreign Investment Ranked sixth in the world – Expert: Achieving high quality development is the key to future investment], Yidaiyilu.com.cn, December 4, 2017, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/38318. htm (accessed January 3, 2018). 13. Chen Fei, p. 25. 14. “Yindu canyu “yi dai yi lu” hezuo qianjing leguan” [Optimistic about India’s participation in One Belt And One Road], in “yi dai yi lu” lan pi shu: “yi dai yi lu” jianshe fazhan baogao (2016) [One Belt And One Road blue book: One Belt One Road construction and development report (2016)], Ren Min wang [People’s Network], July 15, 2016, http://world. people.com.cn/n1/2016/0715/c190970-28558208.html (accessed December 12, 2017). 15. “zhu jia er ge da zongling guanju ban Zhong Yin qiye dui jiehui” [The consulate-general in Kolkata holds a dialogue between Chinese and Indian enterprises], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 18, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/ gzhd_673042/t1526602.shtml (accessed February 2, 2018). 16. Hu Zhiyong, “Zhong Yin guanxi jiexia lai zenme zou” [What’s next for India-China relations], Haiwai Wang [haiwainet], September 26, 2017, http://opinion.haiwainet.cn/n/2017/0926/c353596-31133834.html (accessed October 6, 2017). 17. Hu Shisheng, “Zhong Yin jiexialai daodi gai ruhe xiangchu” [How Will China and India get along], Huan qiu shi bao [Global Times], January 18, 2018, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/hqpl/2018-01/11532441.html (accessed January 26, 2018). 18. Zhao gancheng, “yi dai yi lu zhanlue de nanya fangxiang yu Yindu de xuanze” [BRI’s South Asian direction and India’s choice], Dangdai shijie [Contemporary World], No. 6 (2015), pp. 19–22. 19. Zhuo Xian, “gai ge jing sai: lai zi Yindu de qishi” [Reform Race: Lessons from India], September 21, 2017, Cai Xin [CaiXin], http://opinion. caixin.com/2017-09-21/101148180.html (accessed October 3, 2017). 20. Guo Shufang, ““yid ai yi lu” quyuxing touzi falu yanjiu – cong Yindu shuo qi” [Analysis of One Belt And One Road regional investment laws  – Beginning from India] Juece luntan – jiyu gong gong guanli xueshi jiao de juece yantao hui lunwen ji [Decision making Forum: proceedings of Workshop on decision making based on the perspective of public management], October 29 (2015), p. 216. 21. Zhang Min, ““yi dai yi lu” zhan lue xia Zhong guo yu yin du mao yi ge ju zhi bian hua yu mao yi mo ca zhi ying dui” [Changing trade pattern and

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trade frictions between China and India under “One Belt And One Road” strategy], Lilun jianshe [Theory Research], No. 2 (2016), p. 33. 22. Ibid., p. 34. 23. Ibid., p. 35. 24. Ibid., p. 36. 25. Li Xiao, ““yid ai yi lu” zhanlue shishi zhong de “Yindu kunju”’ – Zhongguo qiye touzi Yindu de kunjing yu duice” [“Indian dilemma” in the implementation of “One Belt And One Road” strategy – The plight and countermeasures of Chinese enterprises investing in India], Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review], No. 5 (2015), p. 24. 26. Ibid., p. 25. 27. Ibid., p. 27. 28. Ibid., p. 28. 29. Lan Yan, “Hua Wei yan jiu Yindu cheng gong jing yan” [Huawei study successful experiences in India], Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China, June 25, 2006, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/chn/ssygd/ IT/t259829.htm (accessed February 3, 2018). 30. “Ai li xin Hua wei hou xuan Yindu 60 yi mei yuan” [Ericsson and Huawei is selected for a $6 billion deal in India], Tongxin qiye guanli [C-Enterprise Management], No. 6 (2009), p. 85. 31. Ji Yongqing, “Hua wei, Zhong xing zao yu Yindu wei ji” [Huawei and ZTE suffers from India crisis], IT jingli shijie [CEOCIO China], No. 10 (2010), pp. 20–21. 32. Danish Khan, “Huawei’s India revenue may dip, not to make in India,” Economic Times, June 15, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes. com/tech/hardware/huawei-expects-india-revenues-to-double/articleshow/61937111.cms (accessed April 3, 2018); “Huawei’s 2017 Annual Report: Solid Performance and Lasting Value for Customers,” Huawei.com, March 30, 2018, https://www.huawei.com/en/pressevents/news/2018/3/Huawei-2017-Annual-Report (accessed April 3, 2018). 33. Li Xiao, p. 34. 34. Li Xiao, p. 35. 35. Liu Shiqiang, ““yi dai yi lu” tou zi zheng zhi feng xian yan jiu zhi Yindu” [One Belt And One Road Investment: A Political Risk analysis of India], Zhongguo wang [China.com.cn], June 24, 2015, http://opinion.china. com.cn/opinion_31_132231.html (accessed August 23, 2017). 36. Li Xiao, p. 36. 37. Zhou Chunying, “lun Zhong guo dui wai tou zi shou xian – yi Yindu wei li” [On restrictions faced by China in outward FDI – Example of India], Xiandai shangmao gongye [Modern Business Trade Industry], No. 14 (2011), p. 86.

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Bibliography Ai li xin Hua wei hou xuan Yindu 60 yi mei yuan [Ericsson and Huawei is selected for a $6  billion deal in India]. 2009. Tongxin qiye guanli [C-Enterprise Management] No. 6 (June): 85. Chinese president meets Indian PM. 2015. Xinhuanet.com. May 14. http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/14/c_134239652.htm. Accessed December 4, 2018. Chunying, Zhou. 2011. lun Zhong guo dui wai tou zi shou xian – yi Yindu wei li [On restrictions faced by China in outward FDI – Example of India]. Xiandai shangmao gongye [Modern Business Trade Industry] No. 14 (July): 86–87. Fei, Chen. 2015. “Yi dai Yi Lu” yu Yindu jifeng jihua de zhanlue duijie yanjiu [A study on the strategic linking of BRI with India’s Mausam strategy]. Guoji zhanwang [Global Review] No. 6 (November–December): 15–32. Gancheng, Zhao. 2015. “yi dai yi lu” zhanlue de nanya fangxiang yu Yindu de xuanze [BRI’s South Asian direction and India’s choice]. Dangdai shijie [Contemporary World], No. 6 (June): 19–22. Guan, Wang. 2017. Zhong qi dui wai touzi ji shen quan qiu di liu wei zhuanjia: shixian zhiliang fazhan shi weilai touzi guanjian [China’s Outward Foreign Investment Ranked sixth in the world – Expert: Achieving high quality development is the key to future investment]. Yidaiyilu.gov.cn. December 4. https:// www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/38318.htm. Accessed January 3, 2018. Hong, Yang. 2016. “Yi dai Yi lu” he Yindu “ji feng ji hua” ying you xiao dui jie [One Belt and One Road and the India’s Mausam plan should be effectively connected]. Zhongguo Jingji daobao [China Economic Herald] August 6, 2016, B03. Huawei’s 2017 Annual Report: Solid Performance and Lasting Value for Customers. 2018. Huawei.com. March 30. https://www.huawei.com/en/press-events/ news/2018/3/Huawei-2017-Annual-Report. Accessed April 3, 2018. Khan, Danish. 2018. Huawei’s India revenue may dip, not to make in India. Economic Times. June 15. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/hardware/huawei-expects-india-revenues-to-double/articleshow/61937111.cms. Accessed April 3, 2018. Lian, Li. 2016. Zhongguo minjian de guanyin xinyang shi Zhong Yin wenhua jiaorong de jieguo [Chinese folk belief in Guanyin is the result of the fusion of Chinese and Indian cultures]. Ifeng.com. June 19. http://fo.ifeng. com/a/20160619/41625348_0.shtml. Accessed December 7, 2018. Min, Zhang. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” zhan lue xia Zhong guo yu Yindu maoyi geju zhi bian hua yu mao yi mo ca zhi yingdui [Changing trade pattern and trade frictions between China and India under “One Belt And One Road” strategy]. Lilun jianshe [Theory Research] No. 2 (March–April): 32–37.

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Shiqiang, Liu. 2015. “yi dai yi lu” tou zi zheng zhi feng xian yan jiu zhi Yindu [One Belt And One Road Investment: A Political Risk analysis of India]. China. com.cn. June 24. http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_31_132231.html. Accessed August 23, 2017. Shisheng, Hu. 2018. Zhong Yin jiexialai daodi gai ruhe xiangchu [How Will China and India get along]. Huan qiu shi bao [Global Times], January 18. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/hqpl/2018-01/11532441.html. Accessed January 26, 2018. Shufang, Guo. 2015. “yid ai yi lu” quyuxing touzi falu yanjiu – cong Yindu shuo qi” [Analysis of One Belt And One Road regional investment laws – Beginning from India]. Juece luntan – jiyu gong gong guanli xueshi jiao de juece yantao hui lunwen ji [Decision making Forum: proceedings of Workshop on decision making based on the perspective of public management] (October 29): 216, 219. Xian, Zhuo. 2017. Gai ge jing sai: lai zi Yindu de qishi [Reform Race: Lessons from India]. Cai Xin [CaiXin]. September 21. http://opinion.caixin. com/2017-09-21/101148180.html. Accessed October 3, 2017. Xiao, Li. 2015. “yid ai yi lu” zhanlue shishi zhong de “Yindu kunju”’ – Zhongguo qiye touzi Yindu de kunjing yu duice [“Indian dilemma” in the implementation of “One Belt And One Road” strategy – The plight and countermeasures of Chinese enterprises investing in India]. Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review] No. 5 (September–October): 19–42. Yan, Lan. 2006. Hua Wei yan jiu Yindu cheng gong jing yan [Huawei study successful experiences in India]. Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China. June 25. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/chn/ssygd/IT/t259829.htm. Accessed February 3, 2018. Yindu canyu “yi dai yi lu” hezuo qianjing leguan [Optimistic about India’s participation in One Belt And One Road]. In “yi dai yi lu” lan pi shu: “yi dai yi lu” jianshe fazhan baogao (2016) [One Belt And One Road blue book: One Belt One Road construction and development report (2016)]. 2016. People.com.cn. July 15. http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0715/c190970-28558208. html. Accessed December 12, 2017. Yongqing, Ji. 2010. Hua wei, Zhong xing zao yu Yindu wei ji [Huawei and ZTE suffers from India crisis]. IT jingli shijie [CEOCIO China] No. 10 (May): 20–21. Zhiyong, Hu. 2017. Zhong Yin guanxi jiexia lai zenme zou [What’s next for IndiaChina relations]. Haiwainet.cn. September 26. http://opinion.haiwainet. cn/n/2017/0926/c353596-31133834.html. Accessed October 6, 2017. Zhong Yin tong zou “yid ai yi lu” “jiao xiang yue [China and India can together play BRI symphony]. 2015. Ambassador Le Yucheng’s speech at the One Belt And One Road seminar at Jawaharlal Nehru university (Delhi), Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. April 7. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cein/ chn/sgxw/t1252684.htm. Accessed December 5, 2017.

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zhu jia er ge da zongling guanju ban Zhong Yin qiye dui jiehui [The consulate-­ general in Kolkata holds a dialogue between Chinese and Indian enterprises]. 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. January 18. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/gzhd_673042/t1526602. shtml. Accessed February 2, 2018. Zhu, Cuiping. 2016. Geopolitical Considerations and the Modi Administration’s Development Strategy. In Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.). Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2016) Modi’s India. Singapore: Springer.

CHAPTER 6

India as Jealous Foe and the BRI

Chinese critics of India’s rejection of the BRI search for the reasons for this rejection. Some discard the very idea that India is an important country for the success of the BRI. However, even those who suggest the irrelevance of India with regard to the BRI cannot reject the relevance of India in terms of setting obstacles with regard to the BRI. Chinese criticisms of Indian objections to the BRI centre on India’s perceived ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean region and to maintain its hegemony in the South Asian region as well as its perennial dream of becoming a great power. The Chinese analysis of the competitive projects proposed by India conclude that India views the BRI proposal as a struggle over narrative in the Indian Ocean region and Asian region as a whole.

The Adversary in the Indian Ocean Region Chinese experts attribute the threat posed by the BRI to India’s “hegemony” in South Asia and India’s aspirations to control the Indian Ocean region as the main reasons for India’s objections to the BRI. According to Chinese experts, India worries that through economic corridors such as the BCIM, China’s opening of a land route to the Indian Ocean will pose a threat to its hegemony in South Asia.1 Refuting the arguments for linking Chinese plans with Indian plans, Chinese critics argue that Project Mausam, initiated by India, is an India-centric initiative. Because the main purpose of Project Mausam is to build up India-centric trade and cultural © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_6

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routes, there is no space for China to join, especially because India considers China an outsider of the Indian Ocean region.2 Chinese experts further explain that from a geoeconomic perspective, the objective of Project Mausam is to create trade and economic linkages dominated by India and to increase the cultural influence of India, which will also help India to increase its economic and cultural influence in the South Asian region. Chinese scholars argue that the identical strategies of India and China will not lead to connectivity; they will only lead to competitive behaviour. In contrast, Pakistan is actively joining China’s initiative because the two countries have a complementary relationship. Therefore, it is not identical plans but complementarity that matters.3 China’s BRI has gained much traction in the South Asian region and the Indian Ocean region, and India fears that this will dilute its regional influence. For Indians, China’s BRI-­ related diplomacy and activities in the South Asian region have already threatened its dominant position in this region, raising geopolitical concerns for India.4 According to the argument of Chinese critics, India views Chinese actions through a “threat” framework. They point out that, in 2013, when the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative was announced, many Indian strategists raised doubts about the initiative, believing that it was just giving a brand name to China’s “string of pearls” strategy. Indian strategic thinkers are certain that China wants to build its own international institutions, which China itself dominates, instead of being a responsible stakeholder in the current American-led international system. China considers that the anxiety of Indian media, Indian scholars and the Indian government over the docking of a Chinese submarine in Sri Lankan Port in 2014 and the exaggeration of Chinese Navy’s movements in the Indian Ocean region have created an atmosphere of suspicion between India and China.5 Chinese experts lament that when Indian scholars view China’s maritime connectivity initiatives, they have an attitude similar to that of the Indian foreign ministry. Chinese scholars refer to India’s fear that the Chinese military will follow Chinese trade, as happened during the European colonial period, in which European armies followed European trade. Chinese experts point out that, for Indians, it is unclear what China means by the “Maritime Silk Road”, what the intentions are behind it, what the difference is between the Maritime Silk Road strategy and normal seaborne trade, e.g., will the strategy substitute or complement seaborne trade. Based on the Maritime Silk Road project, China will be

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making large investments to build ports and other maritime infrastructure in the participating countries; thus, to protect these investments, will the Chinese military also enter into the Indian ocean region?6 Chinese critics acknowledge India’s sensitivity to the Indian Ocean. They believe that India is worried about the security situation in the Indian Ocean because it is the foundation of India’s survival and development. In recent history, India’s decline has been closely related to threats from the maritime powers. The decline of the Mughal Empire and India’s transformation into a British colony happened because India could not face the challenge of the Western maritime powers. Painful historical memories have made India extremely sensitive to security in the Indian Ocean, and these memories lead India to misinterpret or exaggerate threats from the sea. Since independence, India has treated the Indian Ocean as its “backyard.” From the perspective of India’s current strategic environment, India cannot expand by land, except towards the Southeast Asian region. India faces limitations in its expansion due to land borders. The Indian Ocean is the place through which India can project its strategic influence, and former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh projected the Indian Ocean as India’s strategic circle. Nevertheless, Chinese critics argue that the Indian Ocean is also essential for China’s overseas trade; China’s trade with Africa, Europe and the Middle East mostly passes through the Indian Ocean. In view of re-supply and fleet protection, it is necessary for China to have cooperation with Indian Ocean countries. Because of the influence of the concept of exclusivity, India views this need for cooperation as an action that threatens India’s national security, and it has tried to obstruct China from constructing ports in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh.7 From the Chinese perspective, those things that China perceives as Indian aspirations to dominate the Indian Ocean are inimical to Chinese interests and the implementation of the BRI. China argues that Indians view the Indian Ocean as an Indian lake, a sphere of influence that India must dominate, and India fears encroachment from other powers in the Indian Ocean. However, the routes to the Persian Gulf and Africa through the Straits of Malacca are the core of China’s 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. China import 80% of its oil through this route; thus, for China, the Indian Ocean is the top priority, and China cannot steer clear of it.8 Emphasising Chinese advantages over India, Chinese scholars point out that apart from India, almost all of the countries in the Indian Ocean region have supported China’s BRI. This situation has made India more afraid of the BRI. India fears that with this one stroke (BRI), China will

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exponentially increase its influence in the Indian Ocean region and South Asian region and that it will negatively impact India’s status as a great regional power and diminish its influence. Precisely for this reason, targeting China’s BRI, India has also proposed its own initiatives. Through these initiatives, India wishes to expand its influence, presence, culture, strategy and psychology in the Indian ocean region to remind people why the ocean is called the Indian Ocean.9

The Limitation of India’s Initiatives Chinese critics argue that, to compete with China’s BRI and to revitalise its influence in the Indian Ocean region, the Indian government has proposed many initiatives similar to the BRI, such as Project Mausam, the Spice Route, Sagarmala, and the Cotton Route. However, from the perspective of the political realities and economic prospects of the Indian Ocean region, these Indian initiatives have several limitations.10 Chinese scholars argue that India is committed to building, both culturally and economically, an India-centric Indian Ocean region. Thus far, there is a large difference between India’s imagination and reality. Since the Western mercantile colonial era, the Indian Ocean has no longer been India’s ocean, and colonial maritime powers such as Spain, the Netherlands, and the U.K., at various points in time, have occupied a dominant position in the Indian Ocean region. Since the end of World War II, the United States has occupied the dominant position in the Indian Ocean region. Chinese scholars argue that with the development of globalisation, no land or sea area on earth can be the exclusive region of a major power.11 The Indian Ocean is an open sea; all the great powers are free to enter or exit it or to use it in other ways. Countries such as China, the United States, Japan, and Australia will all play an important role in the Indian Ocean. From a cultural perspective, although India is committed to restoring India’s cultural influence in the Indian Ocean region, the role of the Indian Ocean region in improving the Indian economy is limited.12 Chinese critics argue by pointing to India’s trade figures, which show that Western nations and East Asian nations occupy the largest share of India’s trade, not countries belonging to the Indian Ocean Rim such as South Asian countries and East African countries. Referring to these facts, Chinese critics argue that the future of India’s connectivity is with East Asia and Europe, not with countries of the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, India’s plan should focus on opening up Asia’s interior rather

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than on connecting the Indian Ocean region.13 Chinese critics also argue that, in reality, India does not have the capability to control the Indian Ocean; nonetheless, it has always entertained ambitions regarding the Indian Ocean, and it views China as a newcomer intruding into its territory. Chinese scholars often quote K.M. Panikkar to show Indian aspirations and thinking about the importance of the Indian Ocean to India. K.M. Panikkar argued that whoever controls the Indian Ocean will control India, and for this reason, India should build up a strong navy. Chinese critics believe that K.M. Panikkar embedded India’s exclusivist mentality in the early years of India’s independence.14 Precisely due to this kind of understanding of the Indian Ocean region, India is on guard and cautious about China’s trade and economic relations with countries in South Asia.15

India’s Great Power Complex Chinese experts believe that for a long period of time, India’s dream of being a great power has created a strong China complex. China has become a reference point for India’s great power ambitions and both the competitor and the target that India must overtake. Indians consider China to be the most critical factor that will impact India’s rise. Because of these factors, Indian society’s attitude towards China has always been complicated and complex.16 Chinese scholars have always “accused” and attributed many of India’s “anti-China” actions to India’s “great power dreams.” They argue that India views China’s rise as a great obstacle to India’s path to becoming a great power, and Indian leadership has always been obsessed with its great power dream. To substantiate this argument, Chinese scholars and experts often cite Nehru’s observation, made before India’s independence, about India’s future role in the world, quoted in Nehru’s work “The Discovery of India”. The original quote reads “India, constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not count at all. No middle position attracted me. Nor did I think any intermediate position feasible.”17 In this quote, there is no explicit reference to Nehru’s aspiration for India to become a great power. Rather, he refers to the potential of India, considering that its size (the pre-Independence imagination of India refers to an undivided India, which constitutes the current independent nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and population will play an important part in the world. However, in Chinese, Nehru’s comment that India will “count for a great deal” is translated as

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da guo—大国, meaning great power or major power. Nehru’s quote is used to denote “great power” and repeatedly used to show India’s great power ambitions. The conceptual difference between a “great power”, “major power”, and a nation that “counts for a great deal” varies widely. Currently, the United States is unarguably considered to be a great power; in many respects, especially in economic respects, China is also considered a great power. Countries such as Russia, Brazil and India are considered major powers but not great powers, and many countries are considered to “count for a great deal” in international affairs, such as Germany, England, and Saudi Arabia. Thus, conceptual labelling matters very much in making the image of a country. The distorted and skewed translation of Nehru’s quote is represented as a fact in Chinese works and is ingrained in Chinese elite and popular thinking. Chinese analysis heavily uses this image of India as a country that is obsessed with becoming a great power, which mostly leads to distorted analysis. This is also the case with the Chinese critique of India’s attitude towards the BRI. Apart from the Chinese belief about the current Indian “obsession” with becoming a great power, Chinese experts also argue that Nehru had high self-esteem and strong national pride derived from the great historical memories and cultural traditions of India. Nehru dreamed of constructing a large Indian federation stretching across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, even to central Asia.18 Chinese analysts have tried to paint Nehru as expansionist and to attribute Nehru’s thinking to the current Indian attitudes towards the BRI. One group of Chinese critics considers the Indian perception of China’s BRI to be complex and contradictory. Chinese critics view the main aim of India’s Project Mausam, Cotton Road and other initiatives as an attempt to create a distinctive power of discourse in the area of interconnectivity. They suggest to India that the economic size of the countries in the Indian Ocean region is small and that they cannot absorb India’s expanding economy and absolutely will not become a place where India can realise its dream of becoming a great power. If India wants to realise its trade and economic potential and realise its ambition to become a great power, India should go beyond the Indian Ocean and establish connectivity with Northeast Asia and Europe. The BRI is suitable for India’s development needs; the BRI has broad inclusiveness, and it will have a substantial impact on trade between Asia and Europe. Moreover, it will prompt a strategy linkage between India and China.19 According to the suggestions of Chinese critics, India can achieve its great power dream by joining the BRI.

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Establishing the Power of Discourse Chinese analysts also attribute Indian aspirations for strategic autonomy derived from India’s great power complex as one of the primary sources of India’s insecurity regarding the BRI. India thinks that by land and sea, the BRI will encircle India. According to Chinese analysts, India is actively promoting alternative strategies to the BRI because in many ways, the BRI touches on India’s cultural self-esteem and great power complex. India’s brilliant ancient civilisation has spurred its desire to regain its great power status, and because of the colonial humiliation suffered in its recent history, India is particularly sensitive to its great power status. To regain the status of an impressive great power, India has placed particular emphasis on an independent foreign policy. Through the ancient Silk Road, India’s Buddhism influenced and spread to China and Southeast Asia. The Spice Route and Cotton Route occupy an important position in India’s interactions with the outside world and Asian-European trade. India fears that it will lose the power of discourse with regard to the Indian Ocean region because of the BRI. This fear has prompted India to launch its own connectivity projects to hold on to its monopoly over the interpretation of its culture and history.20 India’s great power ambition leads India to compete with other great powers and to seek recognition as a great power. It is such a powerful feeling that for India, joining the BRI is impossible. Some Chinese critical analyses put both India’s and China’s aspirations into a global context and arrive at a more balanced and sober conclusion. According to this argument, historically, both India and China had golden periods, and both countries want to recreate these days of glory. Because of their colonial experiences and other forms of foreign domination, both countries are determined to achieve great power status. Because of changes in geopolitics and the jagged path of Chinese-Indian relations, these countries, which have shared ambitions, have started to hold a grudge against each other; both want to realise their own dreams, but at the same time, they also stand guard against each other. Nevertheless, the current international political economy and its institutions are dominated by Western nations. India and China started from passive engagement and then turned to active engagement in these institutions; currently, both countries want to rectify this situation. However, in this process, the international status of both countries is uncertain. Chinese experts have analysed the complicated status of India and China in the world and realised that

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although China is hailed as an economic powerhouse and is considered a rising great power, it is not a great power in the real sense. China still has issues related to poverty and income inequality. Although it is a manufacturing powerhouse, from the perspective of high technology manufacturing, it is still at the bottom of the pyramid. In comparison, India’s status as a great power is also far-fetched. Chinese critics point out that India has 350 million citizens who live below the poverty line; thus, with such a large portion of India’s population living in abject poverty, Chinese critics wonder how anyone can call India a great power. However, Chinese critics believe that India and China will not accept the mediocrity of their status as large developing countries; they will strive for great power status. Therefore, to become a regional superpower and a global superpower, it will be hard to avoid the geopolitical manoeuvrings between the two. Thus, for Chinese critics, India’s rejection of the BRI is more a structural issue of global power politics and has to do with the differences and similarities in the self-perceptions of both India and China.21 China views India’s perceived interference in the internal politics of neighbouring South Asian countries as a reflection of India’s great power complex.22 Chinese critics also believe that some segments in India view the BRI as a challenge posed by China as a rising great power to the United States, the existing great power. By proposing new initiatives, India is keeping an equidistant approach to both existing and aspiring great powers, and at the same time, it is emphasising its status as an aspiring great power.23

The Way to the Great Power Destination China views India’s post-Independence great power aspirations as a history of consistent failures. For instance, the first setback to India’s great power status was the India-Pakistan partition, and its initial aspirations to become a great power were met with ashes because of its defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India’s prestige also saw a disastrous decline because it allied itself with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, the most crucial factor that has kept India far from realising its great power dream is that India’s great power aspirations have always lacked economic backing. In the initial decades of India’s independence, the slow pace of economic development was called the “Hindu rate of growth.” With the acceleration of economic growth during the 1990s, India’s great power dream seems to be revived, and this is reflected in India’s rejection of the BRI.

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India was sanctioned for its 1998 nuclear tests by the United States, Japan and many other Western powers. However, with the rise of China, the attitude of the United States and Japan has changed dramatically; now, both countries support India’s aspirations to become a great power.24 The United States has even promised to help India become a great power. To date, Chinese experts have noted that many Indian foreign policy interests are at odds with American interests, such as the policy on Iran. Chinese critics have also argued that regardless of US pronouncements about making India a great power, no country in history has ever helped another country become a great power.25

Perceiving China as a Rival India’s negative attitude towards the BRI has also been attributed to India’s jealousy of China’s achievements. Again, Chinese scholars quote Nehru to prove that India’s competitive behaviour in regard to China started very early. Chinese critics refer to Nehru’s comparison of Chinese vitality and Indian vitality to prove this point: “…the vitality of the Chinese people astonishes me. I cannot imagine a people endowed with such bed-­ rock strength going under (war with Japan). Something of that vitality which I saw in China I have sensed at times in the Indian people also. Not always, and anyway it is difficult for me to take an objective view. Perhaps my wishes distort my thinking.”26 India’s jealousy of China’s economic success is a frequent theme in Chinese internet and news media. According to Chinese experts, what keeps India awake at night is the economic achievements of China. They point out that when China was liberated and a new China was created in 1949, its economy was not much different from that of India. However, by the time India embarked on its economic reforms in 1990, the Chinese economy was already far ahead of India’s. Determined to rise, India views China as a reference point for its economic development. Chinese critics of India point to the pronouncements of Indian leaders to prove India’s complicated emotions and views with respect to China. For instance, when talking about the issue of India attracting FDI, India’s former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, said that although it may be difficult to achieve the current levels of FDI that China is attracting, because of this, we (India) should not belittle ourselves and give up striving for these kinds of results. On January 16, 2005, he again said that in the energy sector, India should overtake China.

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Moreover, Manmohan Singh said that in the field of energy security, although China already has plans and is far ahead of India, India should not be satisfied with the current situation. In November 2008, Pranab Mukherjee, the then-foreign minister of India, claimed that China was developing outer space capabilities and in geopolitics, resources and raw materials, challenging the rise of India. In November 2009, the Indian prime minister, according to Chinese critics, “showing overconfidence,” again mentioned China and compared India with China. He said that even though China is ahead of India in economic development, India is superior to China in human rights protection, laws and regulation, cultural diversity, and respect for ethnic diversity and religious diversity. In 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also mentioned that foreigners believe that India is going to take the iconic path of China’s economic rise. In September 2014, before going to visit United States, Modi declared that India has the opportunity to rise, keep pace with China, and become a great power. Nevertheless, when asked to compare India with China, he said that India does not need to become like any other country and that India will follow its own path.27 Chinese scholars consider that India’s constant comparisons with China have resulted in the development of jealousy of Chinese achievements.28 The reason is that the constant comparisons have led to the development of an awareness, in terms of economic development, of how far behind India is, an awareness of the fact that it will not be able to catch up with China in a short period of time and that its chances of catching up are very low, all of which results in negative emotions towards China. Chinese scholars also accuse Indian bureaucrats of contradicting themselves when they refer to China. In their speeches, Indian bureaucrats say that China and India do not have a competitive relationship. In reality, however, they praise and flaunt India’s highlights and say that there is no need to compare India with China while, at the same time, consistently comparing India with China. Therefore, Chinese critics argue that it would be fairy-­ tale thinking for China to believe that a jealous India will join the BRI. India holds a grudge against China due to its good relations with Pakistan. India believes that the developing relations between China and Pakistan are targeted at India, and India complains that China is not sensitive to its security concerns. India has also intervened by introducing many security and political factors in the Gwadar port project in Pakistan. Chinese-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation is also viewed with suspicion by India. Chinese experts argue that India views China’s cooperation with

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South Asian countries as Chinese interference in India’s backyard. In 1983, then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced her Indira Doctrine, that is, India’s Monroe Doctrine, and proposed to maintain India’s role as a supervisor of South Asia. She said, based on the premise of a request by a concerned country, India may interfere in the internal politics of that country. India will not allow outside great powers to interfere in the South Asian region; if there is any political crisis in South Asian countries, they should first approach India. South Asia is the core of this doctrine, which not only asks outside powers to stay out of the South Asian region but also advises South Asian countries to ask for India’s help when faced with crises. Chinese scholars argue that in recent years, India has changed its ways of using only sticks; that is, compared to the past, India is more willing to use economic incentives and diplomacy with regard to its South Asian neighbours, but it has not changed its view of South Asia as its backyard.29 Chinese scholars believe that since independence, India has pursued dominance in South Asia in a bigoted manner, and for some Indian elites, India is the centre of South Asia.30 Because of this thinking, India takes a negative attitude towards any external great power having a close relationship with other South Asian countries. The BRI will undoubtedly strengthen the relations between China and other South Asian countries. The close relations of China and other South Asian countries are bound to have an impact on Indian dominance in South Asia; they will dilute India’s influence in the South Asian region, which India does not want to see. For instance, China and Nepal had a consultation to extend the Lhasa railway to Nepal, and India became worried about this, believing that the Lhasa-­ Nepal railway will increase the ability of China to rapidly deploy military forces to the India-China border area. India is also worried about the CPEC and Gwadar port, which are viewed as tools for strategic siege of India. Chinese experts argue that China has always clarified that it has no intentions to carry out a strategic encirclement of India. Nonetheless, India’s domestic thinking is unable to relinquish this concern, and India remains fearful even with regard to normal economic relations between China and other South Asian countries. Because of this fear over military security, India does not want China to carry out large-scale infrastructure projects in other South Asian countries.31 Chinese experts believe that since the BJP replaced the Congress party as the ruling party in 2014, India’s national strategy has become clearer. According to the new Indian strategy, as the first step, the BJP-led Indian

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government will strive to have the central position in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region; as the second step, India will strive to have the central position in Asia, and the ultimate goal is to seek global centrality. Therefore, in every step of India’s pursuit of its great power aspiration, China is a competitor. In this competitive national strategy context, China’s BRI project will confront India’s core national interests, and it is bound to arouse a high degree of vigilance and resistance from India.32

The American Conspiracy Chinese critics argue that India has been instigated by support from the United States to challenge China’s initiatives. They contend that although, in the future, India may play a more important role in the international system, it is currently only a swing state used by the United States. Because of the scenario of the gradual decline of the American power, the US is relying on emerging regional powers to prop up its great power status in the world. Countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey want to increase their status in the current international political system but do not seek to subvert or challenge it. Furthermore, in the near future, they are not going to stand up against the United States-led international system or propose a new system to challenge the United States-led system. The position of these countries is flexible, and they have substantial influence in their regions. With a low cost, the United States can win them over to positions close to its national interests in the respective regions. For the United States, in the South Asian region, India is such a “swing state”; it is just a useful pawn. Chinese critics even believe that in the future, India can become a challenger to American power; currently, however, it is far from being a great power. For other regional countries, such as Southeast Asian countries and Gulf countries, India’s role is only that of an external balancer. China considers that Modi has received an enthusiastic welcome in the United States during his visits only because of India’s role as a balancer in the region, not because India is a great power.33 It was only in the twenty-first century that India became the natural partner of Japan and the United States. During the twentieth century, India was not an important factor in the strategic thinking of these two countries, but in the twenty-first century, the United States offered its help to make India a great power, and Japan increased its aid to India, with India becoming the largest recipient country of Japanese aid. India needs the aid, capital and technology of the United States and Japan. At the

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same time, though not officially accepted or declared, based on India’s actions, China assesses that India is playing a role as a security partner of Japan and the United States. These two countries have changed their attitude to use India to contain or balance China. Although all three countries say that their cooperation is not targeting any other country, when the scholars of the three countries meet, the issue of China always comes up. Chinese experts also refer to the conceptual inclusion of India in the Asia-Pacific region by the United States. The Asia-Pacific concept does not have India; the new Indo-Pacific concept gives India a role in the Pacific and pushes its dream of becoming a global power. This concept is also actively encouraged by the United States and Japan. The United States is actively promoting the Indo-Pacific concept, which is meant to diminish China’s influence in Asia and, at the same time, increase India’s influence.34 India is also signalling to the United States and Japan that they will collectively contain China, joining the two countries in multilateral naval exercises; this is also an example of tooling bilateral and multilateral relations.35

Strategic Mistrust and Vague Plans Another important factor that has influenced India’s rejection of the BRI and implementation of countermeasures against it is the lack of political trust. According to Chinese scholars, India has never completely supported any of the connectivity initiatives with China; for instance, India has never supported the BCIM. The reason is that India’s Act East policy and China’s BRI are competitive. Other factors, such as the China-India boundary issue, the cooperation between India and Japan, and the close relations between India and Vietnam, have also caused frequent frictions between China and India.36 Chinese critics argue that India is deliberately using a tactic of strategic vagueness, for example, not clearly articulating its position on the connectivity plans with China.37 Regardless of Indian programmes such as the Spice Route or Project Mausam, India has not clearly articulated its strategy. All of its plans are very vague, and Chinese scholars interpret India’s vagueness with regard to its plans as a deliberate strategy. If India has a clear strategy, it will invite specific countermeasures from potential competitors. Chinese scholars also doubt that India has the capability and resources to carry forward India’s planned strategies. The argument that strong cultural interactions will eventually create trust and create an atmosphere to link the BRI and Project Mausam has

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also been repudiated by Chinese sceptics of the Indian-Chinese strategy linkage proposal. According to the counter-argument of Chinese sceptics, “the effect of cultural interactions will take a long time to impact bilateral relations between India and China. It is evident that the 1962 war has had far more impact on Indian thinking than the hundreds of years of cultural relations between India and China.” Chinese scholars refer to the depiction of the BRI by Indian media and strategic experts as a plot by the Chinese navy to encircle India. They also point out that India has indicated that if early progress or results were obtained with regard to the border issue, India would consider joining the BRI initiative. According to Chinese scholars, this Indian proposition is unacceptable to China. Chinese scholars try to differentiate between the BRI and other issues, especially contentious issues such as the border issue between India and China.38 After analysing how the BRI is depicted in the most circulated English-­ language newspaper in India, the Times of India, Chinese critics have concluded that when reporting about the BRI, the Times of India uses vague language and reflects the negative attitude of the Indian government towards the BRI.  It maliciously interprets the BRI as a means of trade cooperation for China to expand its influence. Chinese critics warn that the use of negative language by the Indian press is a potential threat to the progress of the BRI.39 For Chinese critics, India is not a high priority for China with regard to the BRI, and India will only ever view the BRI as a threat. In the BRI, China’s highest priority is to connect China with Europe. The three high priority lines of the BRI are the China-Kazakhstan-­ Russia high-speed railway, the China-Lao-Thailand high-speed rail network and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; none of these networks have any direct impact on or economic benefit for India. For India, the CPEC and other Chinese infrastructure built closer to India’s borders are considered a competitive or even a threatening act, not a cooperative act. Thus, from the Indian perspective, the BRI creates a threat from both sea and land.40 The Chinese scholars also suggest that the connectivity initiatives linking the BRI and India, such as the BCIM connectivity initiative, may not be viewed favourably in India. The BCIM is expected to bring d ­ evelopment to India’s north-eastern territories. However, India is also worried that if the BCIM is realised, then the economic benefit will disproportionately favour China and that the advanced infrastructure in the region will also be advantageous for China to easily deploy its forces near India’s

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north-eastern territories. India also fears that an increase in economic development in the north-eastern region may strengthen the separatist forces in north-eastern India. Additionally, Chinese scholars point out the frequent Indian hype and “threat” discourse about Chinese projects in the South Asian region, supporting this argument. Theoretically, the “Himalayan Economic Belt” (surrounding the China-Nepal-India railway or highway) or the BCIM (surrounding Stilwell Road) forms the most likely project facilitating the strategy linkage between the two countries. However, news about the extension of railways from Chinese Tibet to Nepal is viewed with alarm and as a threat in India.41 All the plans that India has initiated, such as Project Mausam, the Spice Route, and the Cotton Route, are vague plans that reflect India’s intentions. However, there is an enormous mismatch between India’s objectives and its capabilities. In implementing its plans, India cannot compete with China; China has the determination and capabilities to implement the 21st-Century Silk Road; in comparison, the Indian plans exist only in theory.42 Nonetheless, Chinese scholars believe that India’s strategic vagueness suits its strategy because many regional countries consider India to be a balancer of China. The strategic vagueness strengthens India’s position as a balancer of China in the Asian region. India is considered a swing state in the region; this status of the swing state attracts other powers, such as Japan and the United States, who have a common interest with India to balance China. This aspect, according to Chinese scholars, also limits India’s participation in BRI. For instance, if India joined BRI, it will lose its attractiveness towards other regional powers.43 Chinese scholars believe that the Indian strategy is to maintain a distance with China and from time to time provoke China. Consequently, it can keep its role as a balancer of China and draw opportunistic benefits from this situation. However, because of the inherent defects in Project Mausam, the plan will end up having only a symbolic meaning or will gradually recede to the background.44 Chinese scholars and media contend that Indian efforts such as Project Mausam do not have any potential to compete with Chinese projects; India does not have the resources to compete. India’s own infrastructure needs investment from outside such as China. For India, it is almost impossible to spend large sums of money to build ports, roads and airports in foreign countries. Project Mausam can become a bargaining tool for India.45 India’s other initiative, “Make in India,” is also viewed as part of India’s effort to dilute the BRI narrative.46

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One Chinese viewpoint explains all of India’s attitudes towards the BRI as a comprehensive strategy. It states that all Indian concerns raised in the BRI context are pre-existing; however, there is a complex background behind the origin and evolution of these issues. These issues also impact China’s national interests; China cannot change its diplomatic positions to facilitate India’s joining the BRI. Chinese experts believe that India also knows this point very well. Therefore, these issues are raised as a way to seek a pretext to avoid joining the BRI, and India is using these issues to put pressure on China. Even Indians who want India to join the BRI want to do so according to specific interests and for specific reasons; for instance, using this platform, India advance its interests in the region and use China’s influence on Pakistan to change its behaviour.47

Structural Issues Considering the international power structure and the evolving balance of power, Chinese scholars argue that as long as the balance of power favours China, India’s focus on China will be far greater than China’s focus on India.48 India’s focus on Indian-Chinese political and security relations is far greater than its focus on India-China economic relations. They also refer to the limited interactions between India and China as one of the factors increasing the mistrust between India and China. For most Chinese people, India is a strange country, its position as one of China’s neighbouring countries notwithstanding. For most Chinese people, India is just a different civilisation bordering China.49 The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the defeat of India delivered a blow to India’s honour. For Indians, it left a memory of shame. The mutual mistrust between India and China and the mutual hostility have become a complicated legacy inherited from the war. The feeling of resentment against China caused by this memory has led India to consider China a long-term enemy or competitor; this context of memory transforms even a small boundary incident into a sensitive issue in Indian-Chinese relations.50 Chinese scholars also believe that India may use its victim mentality from the 1962 war as a tool for propaganda against China. Chinese critics of India have accused the country of using victim mentality propaganda and of failing to view the border issue rationally and objectively, and they argue that India may use victim mentality propaganda again to gain strategic advantages.51 Chinese scholars reiterate the Chinese line that India’s belief in the British territorial line and India’s forward policy led to

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the war in 1962. Chinese scholars point out that India has used this victim mentality as a tool when it conducted its nuclear tests in 1998 to justify these tests. It cannot be ruled out that India will again use this victim mentality as a tool to challenge the BRI.52 In a sense, India hopes that China can be flexible in its disputes with India in return for its support of the BRI. In September 2014, when Xi Jinping visited India, Modi very clearly signalled that improved relations between India and China hinges upon an early resolution of the border dispute between India and China. Again, in May 2015, when Modi visited China, he pointed out that the boundary question hinders the realisation of the full potential of cooperation between India and China. In both of Modi’s statements, it is implicit that India wants an earlier resolution of the India-China boundary dispute and that only then will India consider joining the BRI.

American Media Domination Chinese critics believe that one of the most critical factors impacting and continuing to impact India’s views about China in general and about the BRI in particular is Western media’s influence on Indian media. They argue that American international media have a substantial influence on how developing countries report international news, and in this age of globalisation, the geographical limitations of the global media are waning. American media outlets influence the ownership, structure and content of global broadcasting, resulting in a state of media imperialism. In the twenty-first century, powerful American media build media and broadcasting that support its political structure and discourse power, luring and shaping global public opinion. By producing popular movies and current affairs programmes, America is shaping and reshaping the self-perception of humanity and the global population. By creating local media channels in several countries, American media and local media compete over the thinking and consciousness of the population of different countries. Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter provide a space for political mobilisation, promote intercultural interaction and guarantee American “language hegemony” on international media, as well as promoting American “cultural exports”.53 Although in the Western conception of democracy, the media act as a fourth estate, the arguments and opinions of American media are also subjected to manipulation by the American government. American

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­ iplomacy and American media have a strong association, and Chinese d experts point out that during the Iraq War, American media rarely questioned the then-President George W. Bush’s exaggerated threat perceptions and allegations against Iraq. In reality, selectivity in American media is a common phenomenon, and a selective rendering of international stories dominates American media. American media’s reporting on underdeveloped countries is always focused on disruptive events, and there is no balanced reporting, greatly misleading the masses with regard to these areas and countries. One example is America’s selective reporting of mass killings in Africa. Considering India’s open media market policy and Indian English-­ language media’s influence on Indian elites, the American influence easily became entrenched in the media of India and the thinking of India’s elites. Because India’s social media market is free and the regulatory environment is lax, Facebook and Twitter monopolise the social media market. These kinds of global media platforms have already influenced the way in which conversation and discourse in India are conducted, and they have strong political implications. Chinese experts point to Narendra Modi’s successful election campaign in 2014, and his successful and efficient use of social media was considered an important factor in his victory. Chinese experts attribute the colonial legacy of British India as another significant factor still influencing the thought process of Indian elites. They argue that, in India, modern journalism originated from the British colonial era, and it is intricately linked with Western traditional culture. The dissemination of information is dependent on language, and language is the carrier of culture; India’s English-language media naturally identify with Western media. Because politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, and the people who influence diplomacy all speak English, India’s English-language media have a significant influence on public opinion and foreign policy decision making.54 Chinese experts also argue that British colonialism fundamentally changed Indian culture. After British colonial rule, India’s religious civilisation gradually transformed from having a transcendent nature to a worldly nature, and the pursuit of the liberation of the soul became the pursuit of secular personal freedom; cultural attitudes towards religious toleration progressively narrowed.55 In addition to this scenario, the international strategies of the powers along the BRI route have tensions and overlaps, and the framework under which these countries’ media report the news and their media discourse can be biased against China and can easily be influenced by Western media.

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India’s aspiration to become a great power, its Look East policy, the internal political pressures on the ruling government to show that it is nationalist, and a host of other factors influence Indian media to report the BRI in a negative light. However, according to the opinion of Chinese experts, Chinese nationalist speech and behaviour are also giving ammunition to the bordering countries of the BRI to attack China and are creating an unfavourable public opinion against China in these countries. In addition, American media are serving as a tool to encourage Sino-Indian disputes. When American media report about China and India, they tend to show India as a great power that is equal in strength to China. The title and content of reports are written in such a way to show that India is better in the competition and comparison with China. Chinese experts on India also argue that the Doklam boundary stand-off between India and China (June–August 2017) was a product of consistent and relentless efforts by the United States to create a wedge between India and China.56 Chinese critics also refer to a survey conducted by Australia’s Lowy Institute in 2013 to show that the favourability of China among the ordinary Indian population is just above that of Pakistan. Although public opinion is not a significant factor in India’s foreign policy decision making, it will still limit India’s foreign policy choices. Most domestic research on China in India is conducted using Western English sources and some English versions of Chinese newspapers, enhancing Indian prejudices against and stereotypes of China. Chinese critics argue that Indian public opinion view the BRI as a new Chinese tributary system, and it is viewed as a tool for establishing a new hegemony. It is natural that media reporting and reality are not aligned, especially in relation to complex diplomatic issues. Chinese authors condemn Indian media, noting that without knowing the reality of the India-China border issue, Indian media cannot separate falsehood from truth and that sometimes, Indian media even rely on rumour to create something out of nothing and use eye-catching titles to add colour and exaggerate the issue. Although, in reality, China-India relations are improving, in the media, it is always under friction. Part of Indian media’s high-decibel reporting of China and even their false reports is negatively impacting India-China relations. Chinese experts argue that with regard to media, the source of news is often the symbol of its objectivity; in the case of the domestic media in a country, the rate of adoption of foreign media as a source of news may reflect its quality. Based on this premise, according to a study conducted by Chinese experts on the source of reporting of India’s most

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circulated English-language newspaper, the Times of India, about China in 2011, more than half of the reporting came from foreign sources. Furthermore, these media sources are almost all from the famous news agencies and newspapers of America, England, and France. Not a single report is from China’s Xinhua news agency or from stories in the China Daily. When Chinese media emerge as the source of information in Indian media, they are prefixed as state-run or “official sources”. Chinese experts believe that this usage of prefixes casts the news in a negative light and mitigates its authenticity. Chinese critics of India argues that before its economic liberalisation in 1991, India was closed to the world. With the opening up of the Indian economy, American consumerism seeped in, and the American lifestyle, American brands, and American individualism have all entered India; even the American accent has entered India. Indians also widely appreciate American philosophy and values. According to a PEW survey, most modern Indians support free capitalism, globalisation, MNCs and the deployment of troops to Iraq during the Second Gulf War. Based on this phenomenon, an article in the New York Times published on March 9, 2012, asked “how India is becoming another America” to reflect the influence of the United States on Indian thinking. Chinese scholars argue that although there is no linear relationship between American media and Indian policymaking, American media still have a major influence on the thinking of Indian elites and create an atmosphere that facilitates the adoption of anti-Chinese policies. Although American media dominate the information and knowledge of other countries, they do not have any responsibility towards the people of those countries.57

India Is Not Reciprocal Chinese critics also believe Indian behaviour towards China has changed and is now a form of pragmaticism but with an unfair attitude towards China. Between the 1962 war and the end of the Cold War, India maintained a vigilant attitude towards China and bilaterally and multilaterally maintained a distance from China. However, since 2000, India has been highly vigilant towards China, but at the same time, it has been bilaterally and multilaterally engaging with China. China believes that starting with the period of Modi government, India’s turn to pragmatism has been very evident. India is willing to actively participate with China for economic benefits, and India cannot

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afford, like it did before, to maintain a distance with China. However, this turn to pragmatism also exposes a kind of one-sidedness in the matter of fairness in the relationship between India and China. Chinese experts point out that China invited India to Join the BRICS, AIIB, and SCO platforms. However, India never has invited China to attend any multilateral forums, such as the SAARC, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), or the Indian Ocean Rim Association. China’s olive branch of cooperation is pushed away by India.58 Chinese scholars warn the Chinese government to beware of the Indian strategy of talking a lot but doing nothing, thus dragging out Chinese initiatives of economic cooperation. The Indian-Chinese free trade zones are one example of this “delaying strategy.” More than ten years have elapsed since the proposal was submitted, and studies have been conducted, but nothing concrete has happened. This is also the case with the BCIM. China accuses India of never proposing any substantive plans for cooperation; in the four country meetings of the BCIM, India has always emphasised joint research and exploration, not the development part of cooperation.59 Chinese critics believe that when dealing with China, India’s attitude tends to become one of weakness or an underdog. The best expression of this is the demand for reciprocity. Whenever there is anything that India has to do for China, India also asks for reciprocity from China and tries to find a point of correspondence even if it is far-fetched, for instance, India’s linking up of India’s presence in the South China Sea and China’s presence in the Indian Ocean.60 Once again, India is unsatisfied with the fact that the CPEC passes through disputed territories of Kashmir between India and China. Although for a long period of time China expressed an objective and principled attitude towards the Kashmir issue, India asks for the route of the CPEC to be revised. Chinese critics argue that in India’s demand for the revision of the CPEC, two points of weakness emerge: first, India is casting itself as a victim and inflating this victim status to propagate China threat theory and to seek strategic interests from it. This is the Indian attitude as well as India’s habitual action. The second ­concerns India’s attitude when it is faced with a stronger power than itself; when this happens, it feels weaker, and it feels a lack of security, which leads India to emphasise the uncertainty in India-China relations and to attach importance to short-term and immediate benefits. The first layer, the victim mentality, is the “tradition” that has arisen out of the history of

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the two countries; the second, the demand for reciprocity, is the “instinct” that arises out of the power asymmetries between the two countries. To demonstrate India’s weak and strong attitude, Chinese scholars have pointed out India’s resolution of boundary issue with Bangladesh. According to Chinese experts, without much difficulty, India solved its boundary dispute with Bangladesh, and the land handed over to Bangladesh is more than that it received from Bangladesh in return; this resolution was widely accepted and supported by Indian public opinion. Chinese scholars speculate that this will not be the case when India negotiates with China on the boundary issue, and Indian public opinion and reaction will be different. When faced with Bangladesh, India perceives itself as a strong country; thus, the difference in behaviour. India’s weak state of mind in the face of China leads India to be vigilant when it encounters China’s BRI. For China, it is evident that India’s way of making deals consists of the use of a high-cost mode of behaviour and demands for immediate returns. The Indian mode of deal-making also reflects India’s lack of a sense of security when dealing with China.61

Duality in Strategic Culture Chinese experts argue that the moral or spiritual aspect of diplomacy is a crucial factor in Indian diplomacy. From this perspective, India is not satisfied with the Chinese model of diplomacy in the South Asian region, and India even accuses China of buying friendship using money. In India’s strategic culture, morality has more weight than realism. The principle of morality in diplomacy can be traced back to Emperor Asoka. The morality factor in contemporary Indian strategic culture is also evolving; in the creation and implementation of Indian strategic culture, the target and means of achieving that target should be just and rightful. Chinese experts argue that during the period of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, the influence of the morality factor was very evident. They argue that under this background, India wildly criticises China’s economic diplomacy. The complex attitude towards China causes it, and it also stems from a misunderstanding of Chinese methods. However, there is no denying that India’s “moral supremacy principle causes such criticism,” and we can find the source of it in India’s strategic culture. India believes that the BRI carries the label of China’s vision of the regional and global strategic architecture and that it is an important embodiment of China’s quest to be a great power. The BRI also reflects India’s complex mentality towards China’s

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pursuit of great power status. Apart from the mistrust created by the 1962 war, the qualitative difference between Indian and Chinese culture has also contributed to this lack of communication and even resulted in creating misunderstanding between the two countries. For instance, China’s cultural characteristic of an implicit and introverted way of expressing things is taken with suspicion by India, which believes that there is some hidden agenda under the warm and friendly words of China.62 Chinese scholar Ye Hailin believes that India’s regional foreign policy contains sound and colour. Nevertheless, its foreign policy with respect to Africa and Southeast Asia contains more sound and less colour, which means that India’s verbal assurances are not backed by actions. Modi’s activities in Southeast Asia or Africa are interpreted by Indian media as balancing China’s BRI and by many Chinese media as India’s intentions to align with the BRI. Ultimately, however, these activities have been all talk and little action on India’s part. Nevertheless, in contrast, India’s policy in South Asia can be said to contain both “voice” and “colour”. This highlights India’s dominance in the region and does not lead to balancing acts by other large powers in the region or beyond. Whether India’s actions in the South Asian region and their consequences are beneficial to India is debatable. Undoubtedly, however, India’s actions in the region and their consequences are what India has hoped for, that is, restricting the BRI. India has great freedom and flexibility in the South Asian region, and it can impose its will on other South Asian countries and thus realise its objectives.63

Indian Motives and Their Impacts on South Asia Ye Hailing believes that India is not particularly interested in integrating the South Asian region or the Indian Ocean region because India’s economic development is not dependent on doing so. India’s economic development is mainly dependent on the United States and the E.U.  However, India is also careful to avoid open confrontation with China. India’s tactics are more focused on limiting and restricting China’s participation in the region. India is not motivated by creating economic integration in the Indian Ocean region but by obstructing China from doing so. Ye Hailing thinks that India’s policy regarding the small countries in the region emphasises deterrence rather than tenderness. India’s policy in the region swings between obligating and bullying, but it is more centred on bullying. In places where India’s influence is strong, India is more willing to use more powerful methods to manifest its hegemony.64

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Chinese critics also believe that India has attempted to intervene in the internal politics of Sri Lanka and Nepal to obstruct the development of China’s relations with the two countries and warn that if India believes that China will backtrack because of this obstruction, then India lacks an understanding of China’s political institutions and culture. Chinese critics also argue that India does not have the capacity to fill the vacuum created by China’s capital freeze; as a result, India’s balancing strategy of the BRI lacks any long-term impact. For instance, in 2015, India successfully blocked China’s Colombo port city development project; however, this was not a success of India’s strategy.65 The port city setback and Sri Lanka’s internal political contradictions are closely related, and after alienating China by blocking Chinese initiatives in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka quickly ran into economic trouble. India failed to help Sri Lanka in its economic troubles, and after a short period of time, Sri Lanka repaired its relations with China; thus, India’s victory was short-lived. In contrast, India’s sanctions against Nepal strengthened the willpower of Nepal to join China’s connectivity projects by linking Nepal’s interior territories with China. The result of India’s unofficial sanctions against Nepal and interference in Nepal’s internal politics was that Nepal enhanced its relations with China. From a Chinese perspective, China is helping Nepal to achieve economic autonomy. For India, it is difficult to say whether this is a good thing. However, China is reluctant to seek India’s understanding of specific projects and plans to promote cooperation between China and other countries in South Asia.66 China’s criticism of India’s objections to the BRI vacillates between advocating cooperation and arguing about India’s irrelevance for the BRI. However, the extensive analyses of the Indian attitude towards the BRI and the multiple and varied views of Indian criticism of the BRI itself point to China’s concerns about India. It also establish India as a critical player in the success or failure of China’s BRI.

Notes 1. Liu Zhen, Liu Yingtian, Cheng Binxiu and Ceng Fengwei, ““yi dai yi lu” bei jing xia Meng Zhong Yin Mian jingji zoulang jianshe jinzhan, wenti yu duice yanjiu” [In the context of One Belt And One Road, A study on the problems facing the development of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor and its countermeasures], Bianjie yu haiyang yanjiu [Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies], No. 6 (2017), p. 50.

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2. Feng Chuanlu, ““yi dai yi lu” yu “ji feng ji hua” zhanlue duijie: youxiao zhengce xuanxiangyi huo weimingti” [The strategic linking between“One Belt And One Road”and“Mausam plan”: Effective policy options or false proposition], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 2 (2016), p. 50. 3. Ibid., p. 46. 4. Ibid., p. 55. 5. Ibid., p. 57. 6. Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, ““yi dai yi lu”changyi de zhanlue duijie wenti: yi Zhongguo yu Yindu de hezuo weili” [Strategic linking issues of “One Belt And One Road” Initiative: China-India cooperation as an example], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 4 (2015), p. 75. 7. Gan Junxian, ““yi dai yi lu”: long xiang du xing yi huo gong wu?” [The Belt and Road Initiative: Dragon and Elephant going alone or dancing together?], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], No. 4 (2015), p. 104. 8. Li Xiao, ““yid ai yi lu” zhanlue shishi zhongde “Yindu kunju”-Zhong guo qi ye tou zi yindu de kun jing yu dui ce” [“Indian dilemma” in the implementation of “One Belt And One Road” strategy- the dilemma and countermeasures of Chinese enterprises investing in India], Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review], No. 5 (2015), p. 25. 9. Yang Siling, “Yindu ruhe kandai yi dai yi lu xia de Zhong Yin guanxi” [How does India view China-India relations in the context of “One Belt And One Road”], Xueshu qianyan [Frontiers], No. 5 (2015), p. 42. 10. Gan Junxian, p. 105. 11. Some readers may consider this as a contradiction to the China’s stance in South China Sea, however, China long before claimed South China Sea and have capabilities to control as well as dominate it. This is different from Indian Ocean, India never claimed a substantial portion of Indian Ocean as its territory, or even claimed Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean. Nevertheless, the view exists among Indian elites that India should strive for a dominant position in the Indian Ocean region and it is vital for India’s security. 12. Gan Junxian, p. 106. 13. Ibid., p. 107. 14. K.M.  Panikkar, India and The Indian Ocean (London: George Allen & Unwin ltd, 1951), pp. 1–2, 82–84; in this work K.M. Panikkar argue that whoever control Indian Ocean will control India, and for this reason India should build up a strong Navy. 15. Yang Siling, p. 41. 16. Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, p. 74. 17. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 56. 18. Li Xiao, p. 26.

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19. Gan Junxian, p. 96. 20. Ibid., p. 101. 21. Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, “yi dai yi lu: Yindu de jue se ban yan ji tiao zhan” [One Belt And One Road: India’s role play and challenge], Dongnanya nanya yanjiu [Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies], No. 3 (2015), p. 2. 22. Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 5. 23. Mao Yue, “cong Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de renzhi yu fanying kan Yindu waijiao siwei moshi” [Analysing India’s diplomatic thinking model from India’s perception and reaction to “One Belt And One Road”], Guoji luntan [International Forum], No. 1 (2017), p. 36. 24. Yang Siling, p. 38. 25. Ibid., p. 39. 26. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 56. 27. Yang Siling, p. 40. 28. Huang yongming (guan Lin) and WenYong, “Zhong Yin jiujie de shenceng wu jie” [India and China entangled in a deep misunderstanding], Rencai ziyuan kaifa [Exploration of Talent resources], No. 23 (2014), p. 93. 29. Yang Siling, p. 41. 30. Gan Junxian, p. 102. 31. Ibid., p. 104. 32. Li Xiao, p. 25. 33. Mao Yue, p. 37. 34. Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 4. 35. Ibid., p. 5. 36. Liu Zhen, Liu Yingtian, Cheng Binxiu and Ceng Fengwei, p. 57. 37. Feng Chuanlu, p. 44. 38. Ibid., p. 51. 39. Shang Xuenan, “Jiwuxing shijiao xia yingyu xinwen yupian de pipingxing huayu fenxi- yi “Yindu shibao” dui “yi dai yi lu” de baodao weili” [from the perspective of transitivity an analysis of the critical discourse in the English news texts], Henan gongcheng xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Henan University of Engineering (Social Science Edition)], No. 4 (2017), pp. 65–69. 40. Feng Chuanlu, p. 55. 41. Ibid., p. 56. 42. Zeng Xiangyu and Du Hong, “Yindu haishang hezuo xin changyi de neihan, yingxiang yu duice” [Emerging Maritime Cooperation Initiatives from India: Its Essence and Implication], Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 3 (2016), p. 23.

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43. Feng Chuanlu, pp. 58–60. 44. Ibid., p. 64. 45. Long Xingchun, “ba wo hao Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de zhenshi yitu” [Grasp India’s true intentions for “One Belt And One Road”], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], July 15, 2015, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2015-07/7003501.html (accessed November 12, 2017). 46. Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, p. 75. 47. Mao Yue, p. 35. 48. Li Xiao, p. 20. 49. Ibid., p. 22. 50. Ibid., p. 23. 51. Psychology of “victim mentality” plays an important part in China’s international relations. The memories of China as a victim of colonial aggression is kept fresh and institutionalized by the CCP through various campaigns. “victim mentality” influence Chinese state behaviour in its relations with Western powers and Japan. China use it as a tool for internal mobilization and also to exert pressure on West and Japan; See Liu Rupeng, “guan yu Zhong guo jueqi guanjian qi su zao daguo xintai de sikao” [Thoughts for Shaping Great Power Mentality During the Crucial Period of China’s Rise], Shengli Youtian [Journal of the Party School of Shengli Oilfield], Vol. 28, No. 1 (2015), pp. 53–56; Qian Hao, “Long wenhua, daguo xintai, Zhong Mei guanxi- dui Zhongguo “shou hai zhe xin li” de li shi yu li lun kao shi” [Dragon culture, great power mentality, Sino-US relations- Critical analysis on the history and theory of “victim psychology” in China], Guoji guancha [International Survey], No. 2 (2004), pp. 25–30. In analysing Indian state behaviour China believes that India also hold a victim mentality and its state behaviour is influenced by it when dealing with China. However unlike China, in India’s internal politics or external politics “victim mentality” is rarely a factor. For instance, India’s modern relations with England is rarely informed by “victim mentality” from the colonial aggression. 52. Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 5. 53. Zhao Ruiqi, ““san ge yulun chang” yu dui Yin chuanbo zhanlue – “yi dai yi lu” xia de Zhongguo guoji huayu quan jiangou” [The construction of China’s international discourse power under One Belt And One Road: “Three public opinion field” and communication strategy towards India], Qilu xuekan [Qilu Journal], No. 1 (2016), p. 74. 54. Zhao Ruiqi, p. 126. 55. Liu Li, “Cong wenhua jiaodu kan yingguo zhimin tongzhi hou Yindu wenming de yihua [The alienation of Indian civilization after the British colonial rule- from a cultural perspective], Renmin luntan [People’s Tribune], No. 3 (2014), p. 249.

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56. Wang Tao, “rang Yindu tong gaosu nin Zhong Yin duizhi beihou de jingtian mimi” [Let the Indian Expert tell you the terrible secret behind the standoff between China and India], Cha Wang [Observer Net], August 10, 2017, http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201708/37756.html (accessed January 2, 2018). 57. Zhao Ruiqi, p. 76. 58. Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 3. 59. Ibid., p. 6. 60. Contrary to Chinese assertions that India unnecessarily moved into South China Sea “issue”, for India freedom of navigation and unimpeded trade through South China Sea is pivotal for its economic security. For instance, over 55% of India’s trade passes through South China Sea. See The Indian Minister Of State In The Ministry Of External Affairs Gen. (Dr) V.K. Singh’s answer to Lok Sabha Question No: 2869, August 3, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15. aspx?qref=38654&lsno=16 (accessed January 3, 2018). 61. Mao Yue, p. 38. 62. Ibid., p. 39. 63. Ye Hailin, “Yindu nanya zheng ce ji dui Zhongguo tuijin “yi dai yi lu” de yingxiang” [India’s South Asia Policy and its impact on the Chinese efforts to advance “One Belt One Road”], Yindu Yang jingji ti yan jiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review], No. 2 (2016), p. 4. 64. Ye Hailin, p. 11. 65. Ibid., p. 12. 66. Ibid., pp. 13–15.

Bibliography Chuanlu, Feng. 2016. “yi dai yi lu” yu “ji feng ji hua” zhanlue duijie: youxiao zhengce xuanxiangyi huo weimingti [The strategic linking between“One Belt And One Road”and“Mausam plan”: Effective policy options or false proposition], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies] No. 2 (April–June): 44–66. Hailin, Ye. 2016. Yindu nanya zheng ce ji dui Zhongguo tuijin “yi dai yi lu” de yingxiang [India’s South Asia Policy and its impact on the Chinese efforts to advance “One Belt One Road”]. Yindu Yang jingjiti yanjiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review] No. 2 (March–April): 4–15. Junxian, Gan. 2015. “yi dai yi lu”: long xiang du xing yi huo gong wu? [The Belt and Road Initiative: Dragon and Elephant going alone or dancing together?]. Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], No. 4 (July–August): 96–113. Li, Liu. 2014. Cong wenhua jiaodu kan yingguo zhimin tongzhi hou Yindu wenming de yihua [The alienation of Indian civilization after the British colonial rule – From a cultural perspective]. Renmin luntan [People’s Tribune] No. 3 (February): 247–249.

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Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. The Discovery of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Panikkar, K.M. 1951. India and The Indian Ocean. London: George Allen & Unwin ltd. Ruiqi, Zhao. 2016. “san ge yulun chang” yu dui Yin chuanbo zhanlue – “yi dai yi lu” xia de Zhongguo guoji huayu quan jiangou [The construction of China’s international discourse power under One Belt And One Road: “Three public opinion field” and communication strategy towards India]. Qilu xuekan [Qilu Journal] No. 1 (January–February): 74–79. Shuisheng, Chen and Xi Guigui. 2015. “yi dai yi lu”changyi de zhanlue duijie wenti: yi Zhongguo yu Yindu de hezuo weili [Strategic linking issues of “One Belt And One Road” Initiative: China-India cooperation as an example]. Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies] No. 4 (October–December): 72–80. Siling, Yang and Gao Huiping. 2015. “yi dai yi lu: Yindu de jue se ban yan ji tiao zhan [One Belt And One Road: India’s role play and challenge]. Dongnanya nanya yanjiu [Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies] No. 3 (September): 1–7. Siling, Yang. 2015. Yindu ruhe kandai yi dai yi lu xia de Zhong Yin guanxi [How does India view China-India relations in the context of “One Belt And One Road”]. Xueshu qianyan [Frontiers] No. 5 (May): 37–50. Tao, Wang. 2017. Rang Yindu tong gaosu nin Zhong Yin duizhi beihou de jingtian mimi [Let the Indian Expert tell you the terrible secret behind the standoff between China and India]. Cha Wang [Observer Net]. August 10. http:// www.cwzg.cn/politics/201708/37756.html. Accessed January 2, 2018. Xiangyu, Zeng and Du Hong. 2016. Yindu hai shang hezuo xin changyi de neihan, yingxiang yu duice [Emerging Maritime Cooperation Initiatives from India: Its Essence and Implication]. Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly] No. 3 (July–September): 17–25. Xiao, Li. 2015. “yid ai yi lu” zhanlue shishi zhongde “Yindu kunju”-Zhong guo qi ye tou zi yindu de kunjing yu duice [“Indian dilemma” in the implementation of “One Belt And One Road” strategy – The dilemma and countermeasures of Chinese enterprises investing in India]. Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review] No. 5 (September–October): 19–42. Xingchun, Long. 2015. ba wo hao Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de zhenshi yitu [Grasp India’s true intentions for “One Belt And One Road”]. Huanqiu shibao [Global Times]. July 15. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/201507/7003501.html. Accessed November 12, 2017. Xuenan, Shang. 2017. Jiwuxing shijiao xia yingyu xinwen yupian de pipingxing huayu fenxi – yi “Yindu shibao” dui “yi dai yi lu” de baodao weili [from the perspective of transitivity an analysis of the critical discourse in the English news texts]. Henan gongcheng xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Henan University of Engineering (Social Science Edition)] Vol. 32, No. 4 (December): 65–69. Yongming (guan Lin), Huang and WenYong. 2014. Zhong Yin jiujie de shenceng wu jie [India and China entangled in a deep misunderstanding]. Rencai ziyuan kaifa [Exploration of Talent resources] No. 12 (June): 92–93.

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Yue, Mao. 2017. cong Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de renzhi yu fanying kan Yindu waijiao siwei moshi [Analysing India’s diplomatic thinking model from India’s perception and reaction to “One Belt And One Road”]. Guoji luntan [International Forum] Vol. 19, No. 1 (January): 34–41. Zhen, Liu, Liu Yingtian, Cheng Binxiu and Ceng Fengwei. 2017. “yi dai yi lu” bei jing xia Meng Zhong Yin Mian jingji zoulang jianshe jinzhan, wenti yu duice yanjiu [In the context of One Belt And One Road, A study on the problems facing the development of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor and its countermeasures]. Bianjie yu haiyang yanjiu [Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies] Vol. 2, No. 6 (November): 49–61.

CHAPTER 7

Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific

The Indian opposition to, rejection of and critique of the BRI would not have been particularly effective if the United States did not back it. The hardening of the United States’ threat perception of China was essential for the effectiveness of India’s opposition to the BRI.  The muscle and legitimacy of India’s challenge to the BRI came from changing American threat perceptions. The full-scale support of the United States for India has subsequently been termed the “Indo-Pacific” strategy; at least, that is how the Chinese saw it. The timing of India’s opposition was instrumental in obtaining support from the United States. In the initial years of the BRI, it was uncertain whether India would join the initiative. India’s opposition became clearer only by the time of the BRI Forum held in Beijing on May 14–15, 2017. Even the United States sent a delegation to the BRI Forum, but the Western ambivalence towards the BRI was evident. For instance, only one member of the G7, Italy, sent its prime minister to attend the forum. India’s opposition was more pronounced and clearer because India did not send a delegation at all; rather, it boycotted the forum and expressed its official opposition.

Coming Together of India-U.S. Threat Perceptions When the BRI was announced, the American press was filled with alarmist and, what China might call, negative reporting on the Chinese infrastructure or aid initiatives all over the globe. One New York Times headline © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_7

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asked the question “Is China the World’s New Colonial Power?,” detailing Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Africa.1 Others in the United States viewed the BRI as Xi Jinping “… promoting global leadership in China’s own image.” In contrast to the United States President Trump’s “America First” mantra, the BRI plan was regarded as a Chinese attempt to create a China-centric globalisation.2 Americans viewed the BRI as a tipping point of the Chinese challenge to the American-led international system. China’s intention to establish institutions with global reach was interpreted as a challenge to the global dominance of the United States. When in October 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping described his vision for a new multinational, multibillion-dollar bank to finance roads, railways and power grids across Asia, which was later realised as the AIIB, he triggered an alarm in the United States. For the United States, by creating the AIIB, “China is taking direct aim at the current development regime, the Bretton Woods system established under the leadership of the United States after World War II to help stabilise currencies and promote growth.” According to American media reports, “the United States worries that China will use the bank to set the global economic agenda on its own terms, forgoing the environmental protections, human rights, anti-corruption measures and other governance standards long promoted by its Western counterparts.”3 Jennifer Harris, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, described the AIIB as being part of China’s broader geopolitical strategy “to undermine the United States’ alliance system in Asia.”4 Prominent American media have viewed Chinese initiatives through the lens of historic American initiatives. For instance, the BRI is viewed as China’s own version of the Marshall Plan, a blueprint for land and maritime dominance.5 Elites in the United States have concluded that “as China rises and becomes increasingly powerful, it will want to dominate the Asia Pacific region. Xi’s vision of ‘One Belt, One Road’ lays out a strategy for China, as a continental power, to consolidate a sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific area, allowing Beijing to take the initiative in defining regional policy.”6 The United States has viewed India as a willing partner in balancing China’s rise, actively taking an interest in counterbalancing China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s role has been prominently mentioned in the advocacy of American experts on how to respond to the challenge of China. Michael Pillsbury, a senior fellow and director of the Hudson Institute’s Center For Chinese Strategy, identifies India as a partner for developing

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comprehensive responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.7 India has emerged as a vocal critic and opponent of the BRI, and American news media have prominently reported Indian unhappiness. In particular, the news media of the United States have widely reported the news of India’s boycott of the BRI Forum and the statement by India’s finance and defence minister, Arun Jaitley, that India has “serious reservations about” the BRI because of sovereignty issues.8 The BRI Forum in May 2017 was closely followed by one of the longest border military stand-offs between India and China, the Doklam stand-off. Although this stand-off, which lasted over a month, did not result in any armed incidents, it increased India’s threat perceptions. The vitriolic and jingoistic media and verbal exchanges between India and China during the stand-off featured prominently in American media. For instance, the American press referred to exchanges constituting a “war” of words. That is, “Chinese officials said India should learn ‘historic lessons’ from its defeat in the 1962 war. Indian Defense Minister Arun Jaitley shot back by saying that ‘India in 2017 is different from India in 1962,’ in reference to its perceived improved military strength.” The rhetorical exchanges between Indian and Chinese officials confirmed that the memories of the 1962 war are still intact in both India and China. More importantly, they also signalled to the United States that the time is ripe for more substantial engagement with India in the Indian Ocean region.9 One of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visits to the United States coincided with the Doklam stand-off. During that visit, “U.S.  President Trump called India a ‘true friend’ and said relations between the two countries have ‘never been stronger … never been better’.”10 The United States viewed Modi as a leader willing and capable of “standing up to China.” The US media pointed out events that demonstrated this “fact.” For instance, in April 2017, “a top Indian official accompanied the Dalai Lama to the border of Tibet, shrugging off China’s public insistence that the journey should be cancelled.” Most importantly, there was India’s boycott of the BRI Forum.11 Before Mr. Modi’s visit in June 2017, the United States administration approved the sale of 22 “Guardian” surveillance drones to India; these drones can purportedly be used to eavesdrop on Chinese naval movements in the Indian Ocean.12 Modi’s visit was closely followed by one of the largest naval exercises involving the United States, India and Japan, the 21st edition of Malabar exercise on July 9–17, 2017. The primary objective of the exercise was to enhance maritime cooperation and interoperability among the participating

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navies. The exercise gave an impression of a deepening of the maritime collaboration between India, the United States and Japan and a deepening of the balancing efforts by Japan, the United States and India with regard to the increasing Chinese power in the Indian Ocean region.13 The announcement of the BRI was followed by a series of events that led to the hardening of the threat perceptions of India and the United States. Here, the culmination was a staunch belief among United States ruling elites that India is an indispensable country for protecting American interests in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2017, after analysing the BRI, Jonathan Stivers, the commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, concluded that “Chinese President Xi Jinping is expanding China’s presence on the world stage through both coercion and a charm offensive, thereby creating pockets of influence, leverage and control from the East and South China Seas to Africa and to Europe.” In addition, “China is marshalling the full resources of its state and private sector in an attempt to shape the Asia-Pacific region in a way that places China at the centre of economic and security activity in the region.” According to his recommendation on how to deal with the BRI, India should become a central component of America’s Asia-Pacific strategy. He pointed out that India shares American democratic values and has overlapping strategic interests, particularly concerns over China’s policies in the Asia-Pacific region. He commented that the Trump administration is on the right track with the terminology of the “Indo-Pacific” region and the revival of the quadrilateral dialogue with the democratic partners Japan, Australia and India.14 The new terminology of the “Indo-Pacific” region marked a turning point in the American relation with India. It was also considered an American answer to the BRI, conceptually bringing India into the Pacific, to hedge against rising and assertive China. Before his trip to East Asia and Southeast Asia, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and Trump himself began to frequently use a new strategic framework for Asia: a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This framework emphasises the United States’ democratic allies and partners, an increased role for India and an alternative to a China-led Asia.15 The idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” originating with Japan, which had been urging the United States to bond with three other maritime democracies—Japan, Australia, and India—to contain a rising China, became the new American policy for Asia.16

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Indo-Pacific Background At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific concept was frequently used to refer to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean together, and even at that time, the role of India frequently entered the foreground. One of the oldest references to the Indo-Pacific concept by a United States government official was by William J.  Burns, referring to the United States-Thailand military cooperation during the 2004 tsunami. He mentioned the joint American-Thai relief and rescue efforts in the Indo-Pacific basin, which specifically meant the area surrounding Indonesia that connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean.17 The origins of the conceptualisation of the region as the Indo-Pacific in United States government circles can be attributed to then-United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. In 2010, the United States started to shift the forward presence of its military towards Asia and the Pacific reflecting economic changes and shifts in the balance of power. The United States enhanced its military cooperation with Singapore, New Zealand and Australia; more importantly, according to one of Hillary Clinton’s speeches, the United States was working with the Indian navy in the Pacific because the United States understood how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce.18 In Hillary Clinton’s Foreign Policy article “America’s Pacific Century”, which has been widely credited as an announcement of the American pivot to Asia, the reference to the Indo-Pacific partnership had to do with expanding the American alliance with Australia into the Indian Ocean. It was only in later years that India superseded Australia’s position as the most important partner of the United States in maintaining its dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.19 Hillary Clinton also promoted an Indo-Pacific economic corridor linking the rapidly expanding economies of South and Southeast Asia as a new connectivity initiative that would promote new investment and trade opportunities, create jobs, promote peace and strengthen regional stability.20 Interestingly, the United States’ Indo-Pacific economic corridor closely resembled the BRI. It was meant to connect South and Southeast Asia, especially India, with Southeast Asian markets and was one of the core purposes of the United States pivot to Asia. On February 26, 2013, elaborating the United States’ rebalancing to Asia and the purpose of the Indo-Pacific economic corridor, then-United States Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Joseph Yun said,

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“Creating an Indo-Pacific Economic corridor between South Asia and Southeast Asia will require significant investment in physical infrastructure throughout the region: road, rail, sea, and air connectivity between these two regions must be developed. While financing will necessarily come primarily from countries in the region and international financial institutions, United States’ companies are well-positioned to participate in connectivity projects and stand to benefit from some of the increased commercial opportunities that will result. Additionally, we [U.S.] have encouraged the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to identify gaps in the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor that could be filled by public-private investment.”21 It is also worth noting that the announcement of the BRI closely followed the announcement of the Indo-Pacific economic corridor of the United States. The greatest difference was China’s speed in propagating it domestically and internationally and the great speed with which infrastructure projects were conceived and implemented. The Indo-Pacific strategy initiated a wide-ranging discussion in China about how to deal with the Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Chinese Perceptions During the initial phase of the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept as a strategic idea in 2013, it was viewed as an appendage of the Obama administration’s rebalancing to Asia strategy. The Indo-Pacific concept drew the attraction of Chinese experts in the initial phase itself. They viewed it as a reflection of the evolving geoeconomics and geopolitics of the Asian region centred on the rise of China and India. One group of Chinese experts referred to it as a balancing behaviour by a small group of countries creating maritime security institutions targeting China. Chinese experts noted that it was mainly the efforts of India, Australia, Japan and the United States, grouping under the umbrella of the American strategic rebalancing to Asia to hedge against uncertainties stemming from China’s rise in the region.

Rebalancing Was the Name Chinese scholars trace America’s rebalancing and the Indo-Pacific strategy to long-term thinking by American strategists in the 1980s. To substantiate this point, they refer to a report by the “Commission on Integrated

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Long-Term Strategy” submitted to the Pentagon in 1988; this commission was set up by the Pentagon to assess the probable changes in the global security situation in the next two decades. According to this report, China, Japan or some other Asian country will emerge as a major military power in the next two decades, and it will adversely impact the national security of the US.  The Soviet Union and many other countries will acquire high-tech weapons, eroding the quality edge of US weapons. For the US to maintain its advantage, it should develop “smart weapons” (sensor-integrated weapons technology) and precision-guided weapons, control space, and develop stealth technology.22 Within two decades after the publication of the above-mentioned report, the Soviet Union collapsed, and as predicted by the report, one Asian country, China, emerged as a challenger of the United States. The Indo-Pacific strategy is the latest part of America’s long-term containment strategy with regard to its new competitor, China. China attributes the United States’ renewed strategic focus on Asia and the rise of the Indo-Pacific concept to the rise of both China and India. Chinese experts point out that as a result of the economic rise of China and India, one-third of the world’s bulk cargo and approximately two-­ thirds of world oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean, which makes the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean the most strategic in the world. China views the first phase of the Indo-Pacific strategy or the American rebalancing to Asia as an American containment strategy with respect to China. According to Chinese analysts, because of the fast pace of the rise of China, America fears that China will soon replace the United States as the global superpower. However, because of the substantial increase in Chinese power, the United States cannot pressure China as it did before; thus, it has decided to enlist other regional powers to contain China, which is the core idea of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Wu Zhaoli believes that there are three changes indicating the rise of China that Western scholars have noticed. The first is the growth of the economy, which in the second quarter of 2010 overtook Japan’s economy to become the second-largest economy, second only to the economy of the United States. The second is the increasing military capability of China. The third change is China’s willingness and behaviour with regard to safeguarding its national interests, which are reflected in China’s clearly defining the category of national core interests and China’s determination to defend those core interests. Wu Zhaoli argues that China’s neighbouring countries and some Western countries have not adapted to China’s

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development and changes. Some Western strategists even assess that the international order of Asia as a whole is rapidly moving towards a China-­ centric unipolar era. China’s political, economic, diplomatic and military moves since 2010 seem to have reinforced the West’s assessment of an increasingly assertive China. Wu Zhaoli considers that the geostrategic emphasis of the Indo-Pacific is creating strategic doubts with regard to China among regional powers.23 From the Chinese perspective, one way in which the Indo-Pacific strategy is useful for the United States is that it puts China in a broader framework. Unlike geographical concepts such as East Asia, the Western Pacific, and the Asia Pacific, the Indo-Pacific includes a large number of countries and many regional large powers. The United States thinks that putting China in a broader framework will help dilute the influence of Chinese power. However, in 2013, China came to understand US intentions in the Indo-Pacific strategy as a hedge against China. China also thought that because of the vagueness of the concept, it could use this concept to establish itself as an Indian Ocean power. A nonexclusive Indo-Pacific concept provided China with a free ride to become an Indian Ocean power that even the US and India would have to accept. Nevertheless, the Indo-­ Pacific strategy turned out to be an exclusive concept that did not include China.24 For many Chinese scholars, the American rebalancing to Asia strategy and the Indo-Pacific concept illustrate that the United States is now more convinced that China is its enemy and that it is bound to bring more obstacles and risks to the China-America relationship. According to Chinese experts, “there are always people in the United States calling for more controls on China. They want to use many channels to achieve this, such as the US-led alliance system, regional security mechanisms and so on. Until China has truly completed its rise, the US will always act to contain it and create America’s own real ‘Pacific Century’.”25 However, in the initial phase of the rebalancing strategy, which included the Indo-Pacific strategy, some Chinese scholars viewed it as a soft balancing strategy. They argued that, given the complexity and interdependency between China and the United States, the United States wants to take advantage of the contradictions and conflicts between China and its neighbouring countries, and through the Indo-Pacific strategy, it seeks to regulate China’s rise. However, the United States is unwilling to engage in military conflict or war with China, but it strives for a delicate strategic balance in the region with China.26

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Chinese experts argue that the core of the Indo-Pacific system is the alliance system composed of India, Australia and Japan. Because of India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean region and its great potential as a hedge against rising China, India has become a key force for the successful transformation of the Asia-Pacific alliance system into the Indo-Pacific alliance system. The Indo-Pacific strategy is also a strategy for continuing the hegemony of the United States. The United States created its Asia-Pacific alliance system to contain Soviet hegemony in the East Asian region. With the rise of China, China has become the target of this system. After the Cold War, the United States found that it does not have a strong and stable ally in the Indian Ocean region to protect trade routes and strategic choke points in the region; to remedy this deficiency, the United States built an alliance composed of India, Australia, and Japan into an Indo-­ Pacific strategy to balance China. At the same time, the United States has maintained its role as an offshore balancer.27 According to Chinese view, the main reason behind the American proposal of the Indo-Pacific policy, bringing it to the forefront and giving it a specific shape involving Japan, India and Australia is because the rebalancing strategy of the United States lagged behind China’s economic development. Chinese scholars argue that China has successfully counterbalanced the United States’ rebalancing strategy. Through China’s good neighbourhood strategy, the South China Sea issue has been significantly alleviated, Chinese-Philippine relations have been warming, and economic ties with ASEAN member states have been closer. When the rebalancing strategy does not seem to be working, the United States is eager to find a new strategy.28 Therefore, the United States has to expand the game and make new conditions to balance China’s rise.

Competing Narratives: The BRI vs the Indo-Pacific China views the BRI and the Indo-Pacific as competing strategies. In response to China’s rapid rise, the Obama administration proposed and implemented the rebalancing to Asia-Pacific strategy. Initially, the United States proposed the Indo-Pacific concept mainly to attract South Asian countries such as India to have a more large-scale rebalancing strategy in Asia. Later, the major component of the initial American rebalancing strategy, the Indo-Pacific strategy, became the core strategy of the United States in Asia. One of the objectives of proposing the BRI in 2013 was also to hedge against the American rebalancing strategy.29 In the initial analysis,

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many Chinese experts concluded that the relationship of America’s rebalancing strategy and China’s BRI strategy is not a relationship of containment and anti-containment. Although the strategic goals of the two countries are competitive or even antagonistic, they also have broad space for cooperation because of the economic interlinkages and the large spheres of potential economic cooperation.30 However, with the operationalisation of the Indo-Pacific concept, reflected in the joint military exercises between Japan, Australia, India and the United States, Chinas has become more convinced of the containment nature of the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific strategy also serves as a counter-narrative to the BRI. The nature of the Indo-Pacific is similar to the most critical component of the BRI, the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative. The Indo-Pacific strategy has created a discourse involving the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as a narrative competing against the BRI. China has assessed that the Indo-Pacific strategy will create a negative security environment for the BRI. For example, Chinese experts point to the depiction of China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative by American and Japanese officials and media as a so-called Silk Road strategy of naval containment of India by China. Chinese experts believe that the demonisation of the BRI in the Indian Ocean region, constituting a new version of China threat theory, has, to some extent, led to India’s strategic response to the BRI, exacerbating China’s security dilemma in the Indian Ocean region.31 Chinese experts have also pointed out that initially, India was the only major country along the Silk Road initiative that criticised and protested against the BRI.32

Chinese View: American Pivot to India In 2013, Chinese experts noticed that the United States was looking to improve its ties with India to build a long-term strategic partnership and to support India in playing larger economic and security roles in the Indian Ocean region.33 China considered the Indo-Pacific strategy to be an effort by the United States to bring India within the larger Asian framework and to indirectly acknowledge India as a great power.34 Chinese scholars believe that the United States wants to integrate India as a quasi-ally into its Asian alliance system. They point to the support and help that the United States has provided to India to obtain an India-­ specific Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver in 2008, the fact that

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India had not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) notwithstanding. Thus, acknowledging India as a nuclear power was an early signal of the American intention to use India to balance China in the Asian region. In addition, the United States increased arms sales to India, especially the sale of C-130J transport aircraft, the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and the C-17S strategic transport aircraft, increasing India’s maritime surveillance and troop mobility capability. The United States also substantially increased its military cooperation with India through numerous joint exercises and exchanges between the militaries of the two countries. The United States also encouraged other nations, such as Japan and European countries, to increase their strategic relationship with India. This will facilitate enhancing the Indian as well as the Japanese and European capabilities to contain China.35 According to Chinese experts, by promoting the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States has exerted a negative impact on India-China relations. In seeking to make India a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region, the United States is increasing the Indian mistrust and threat perception of China.36 In 2015, when Obama visited India, the United States encouraged India to take on greater responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region, as reflected in the first joint statement with India on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. On June 6, 2016, Modi embarked on his fourth visit to the United States, promising to assume greater responsibilities, which for China, once again demonstrated India’s determination and willingness to engage in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific affairs.37

The India-United States Convergence For Chinese scholars and experts, the Indo-Pacific concept brought together India and the United States, and with this concept, Chinese started to view India and the United States in combination and to consider that although there are many areas of differing national interests between India and the United States, the convergence of interests is gradually growing stronger. Both India and the United States believe that China is a factor of instability in the Indian Ocean region. Although India and the United States also know that China will not accept the interference and mediation of outside powers in disputes between China and other regional powers, Chinese experts believe that interference in regional disputes such as the South China Sea issue is one of the aims of the Indo-­ Pacific strategic concept.38

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Chinese experts have also noticed that under the Indo-Pacific framework, the United States-India defence cooperation has increased substantially in quantity and quality. On June 4, 2015, during his visit to India, United States Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter signed a new defence cooperation agreement with India. According to this agreement, the United States will help India in constructing aircraft carriers and cooperate with India in manufacturing fighter jet engines. According to Chinese defence expert Wang Tao, since Modi became India’s Prime Minister, there has been a new momentum and vitality in American-Indian defence relations, and it will have far-reaching consequences for the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape.39 In the context of the weakening American dominance in the region, America has elevated the concept of the Indo-Pacific to a strategic concept, giving India a more prominent position in the region and helping India increase its influence. Wang Tao also argues that the Indo-Pacific is mainly a maritime concept and reflects the competition between large maritime powers. Chinese scholars have also noticed that India is the only non-United States ally with which the US conducts the largest number of military exercises, with more than 50 exercises and exchanges being conducted annually between the Indian and American defence establishments. With the development of American-Indian defence relations, the United States has gradually relaxed restrictions on the export of sensitive military technology to India and accelerated the pace of military-technical cooperation between the two countries.40 Under the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States strives to establish an Asian balance of power that favours the strategic interests of the United States by relying on the emerging economic and military power of India. China views India-United States defence cooperation as the core of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and by incorporating India into the American strategic structure, the United States is seeking to maintain its dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.41 China also refers to the United States military industrial complex as having a stake in the United States-India defence relations. Modi’s government has actively promoted the reform of the military industry as an important component of Indian manufacturing, and the United States highly expects the enormous business opportunities generated by the reform. The major driver of the India-United States defence relation is India’s threat perception of China.42 One of the naval exercises that has received special attention from China is the Malabar naval exercise. As of the end of 2018, the Malabar

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naval exercise had been conducted 22 times. China considers it to be the major platform for the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Chinese view was further strengthened when the 22nd edition of the Malabar exercise on June 7, 2018, was conducted off the coast of Guam, the major United States naval base in the Western Pacific. From the Chinese perspective, the strengthening of the Malabar exercise correlates with the increase in the threat perception of India, the United States, and Japan. In 2015, Japan became a member of the Malabar naval exercise, indicating an increase in its threat perceptions of China.43

The Japanese Help The close relation between Japan and India is also viewed through the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chinese experts see a pattern of institutionalising of Japan-India interactions. Chinese experts point to instances such as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attendance at India’s Republic Day parade as its chief guest in 2014, India-Japan strategic dialogue, and India-Japan joint naval exercises to show the growing closeness of India-Japan relations. Chinese experts believe that India-­Japan defence cooperation may eventually institutionalise and will inevitably have a significant impact on the geostrategic environment of China.44 The United States also encourages India-Japan strategic relations, One of the indicators of Japan’s desire to make India a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific region is that since 2005, India has been the largest recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA). Again, Chinese experts believe that India’s great power ambition and desire to be a hegemon of the South Asian region are important factors driving India to seek close relations with Japan. From the perspective of Chinese scholars, Australia’s joining the Japan and India security structure also poses challenges to China’s maritime security.45 On August 22, 2007, during a speech delivered in the Indian parliament, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that Japan’s new focus is on linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, making it a sea of freedom and prosperity. Like the United States, Japan has also wanted to build a “big Asia” by linking with India and later invited the United States and Australia to join. Although Shinzo Abe did not mention China, it was evident to Chinese scholars that this speech was directed against China and that it was meant to dilute Chinese power. Japan’s Indo-Pacific

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s­trategy, which began from the “arc of freedom and prosperity” concept proposed by Shinzo Abe in 2007, Japan’s advocacy of value-based diplomacy, and Shinzo Abe’s efforts to create an alliance of democratic states are all viewed by China as a containment strategy by Japan.46 For Chinese analysts, India and Japan do not have any old scars as China has from Japan, nor do they have any other significant disputes. This will guarantee the long-term continuity and deepening of the defence cooperation between Japan and India. From the national development strategy perspective, India and Japan share many common development goals. The public opinions of the political elites and the common people are friendly to each other, which provides a great helping hand for bilateral defence relations.47 For Chinese experts, the cooperation between India and Japan reinforces the capabilities of each country. Japan has the capital and technical capabilities to enhance India’s effectiveness in balancing China. At the same time, India provides a market for Japanese capital and technology; most importantly, India will balance Chinese power in Asia and will drain Chinese resources and diplomatic energy in responding to the challenge of India.

India’s Great Power Ambition Reloaded Chinese scholars believe that the United States is clever in proposing the Indo-Pacific idea because it knows that India follows a non-alignment policy. The Indo-Pacific makes India part of American strategy without aligning with it.48 However, China views India’s great power aspirations (yet again quoting Nehru’s views from The Discovery of India mentioned in the previous chapters) as the main motivation for India’s joining the Indo-Pacific strategy.49 The Indo-Pacific strategy will help India break out of the Indian Ocean region and enter the Pacific with the help of the United States and Japan. More importantly, for Chinese experts, the Indo-Pacific will make India part of the South China Sea issue, and they believe that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, India has strengthened its strategy and tactics ­ eneralised to enter the South China Sea. India uses oversimplified and g concepts such as the Indo-Pacific to express its South China Sea strategy. Chinese experts believe that Indian perceptions have changed since the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept. For instance, to make itself part of the South China Sea issue, in a joint statement issued by China and India after Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, both countries

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mentioned concrete efforts “to safeguard international navigation safety and freedom of navigation.” For China, this can be interpreted as referring to the Indian Ocean; for India, it can be interpreted as being about the South China Sea. Chinese experts have also pointed out that in 2013, when the Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid visited the Philippines, the joint statement signed with the Philippines used the term “West Philippine Sea” to refer to the disputed waters of the South China Sea.50 Chinese experts believe that India’s entry into the South China Sea through the Indo-Pacific concept reinforces the Indian strategy of becoming a great power. They also view the upgrading of the military facilities in the Andaman Nicobar Islands and the frequent visits of Indian naval vessels to Southeast Asian countries and Russia in terms of India’s strategy of gradually establishing itself as a Pacific power and becoming part of the South China Sea issue. In July 2012, the INS Baaz naval air station in Campbell Bay in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands became the southernmost naval air station of the Indian navy. This naval air station gives India a strategic advantage over the Bay of Bengal and a strategic advantage in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regions because of its closeness to the Straits of Malacca. For China, India is following a strategy of deliberate vagueness by using the Indo-Pacific concept. Although the South China Sea is not India’s core interest, it is entering the South China Sea issue by using the Indo-Pacific concept to put pressure on China.51 Chinese scholars argue that it was easy for the United States to enrol India in the Indo-Pacific strategy mainly because it is more in line with India’s great power mentality and creates a reasonable excuse for India’s naval force to gradually enter the Pacific Ocean. The transformation of the strategic pattern caused by the entry of India into the Pacific has made the international relations in the Asia-Pacific region more complex and more intense, especially the rising tension in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Moreover, it brings more uncertainties to the already complicated and strained strategic issues in China-Indian relations. Because the United States is providing implicit support for India’s great power ­mentality, India will be even more reluctant to have a conciliatory view of China’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region.52 From the Chinese perspective, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept has enabled India and the Indian Ocean to be included in a strategic vocabulary concerning the stability of the world, catering to the great power dream long pursued by India and promoting India’s natural sense of geographical superiority in the Indian Ocean region.53 Given that

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the jagged development of the strategic relations between India and China has negatively affected China’s normal functions in the Indian Ocean region, the Indo-Pacific concept will aggravate India’s threat perceptions of China and negatively impact China’s interests in the Indian Ocean region. Chinese experts also believe that the fundamental factor influencing the development of China-India relations is India’s suspicion and misjudgement of China’s strategy. China has never regarded India as a competitor, while India has always regarded China as a threat to its development. As a result of this strategic dilemma, India has failed to view China’s development in a correct, objective and rational manner, thus causing instability in China-India relations. This imbalance could threaten China’s influence in Asia.54 Chinese experts fear that the Indo-Pacific strategy will bring India into the global strategic considerations of the United States; it will further stimulate the Indian desire to become a world power. The strengthening of the strategic partnership between India and the United States, whether from the perspective of geopolitics or the perspective of economic geography, will greatly weaken the progress of China-India bilateral relations, and it will substantially increase the uncertainty factor in China-India relations, which will be unfavourable for both India and China. China also believes that, at the global level, the strengthening of the United States-­India strategic partnership will make establishing a just and reasonable international political order more complicated and difficult. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific strategic plan, with India as its core, that the United States is trying to shape is becoming one of the greatest obstacles to the implementation of China’s BRI strategy. Using the Indo-Pacific strategy, India is trying to lift its own status, gain more attraction and self-respect, and intensify its competitive behaviour with regard to China.55 China makes the accusation that the United States is inciting India against China by dangling great power status before India through the Indo-Pacific strategy. According to Chinese experts, the main reason behind India’s vigilance against China is India’s pursuit of great power status. For a long period of time, the fear of being surrounded by China has been an inherent security logic that India cannot avoid when evaluating its security environment. This security logic is reflected in the maritime dimension, as India misunderstands China’s legitimate strategic demands for expanding its commercial interests and maintaining its maritime transportation routes. That is, India no longer views China’s presence in the Indian Ocean region

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as a natural extension of the latter’s interests in its national development process, and India believes that China’s ultimate aim is to limit India’s influence in the South Asian region using the so-called “string of pearls” strategy, a term invented and propagated by the United States. To some extent, the “string of pearls” strategy has become synonymous with India’s maritime threat perceptions, and this thinking has impacted India’s maritime strategy.56

Indian Great Power Dreams as a Hurdle The glue that holds India-United States relations together is the motive of balancing China. From the perspective and background of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy, American foreign policy priorities in South Asia have shifted in the direction of India. However, substantive strategic coordination between the two countries remains far away. Chinese scholars believe that the differences in strategic expectations between the United States and India may also be the most formidable obstacle to cooperation between the two countries. The United States wants India to play a direct role as a counterweight to China, but India is reluctant to play the role of a pawn and wants the United States to view it as an equal partner. The direct impact of the strategic doubt is that the United States is uncertain with regard to the success of its India policy. Chinese scholar Mao Keji envisages scenarios that will lead to fissures between India and the United States. For instance, if the United States cedes too much to India, India may not gratefully reciprocate but, instead, adopt a great power posture that takes it all, resulting in the humiliation of the United States. On the other hand, if the United States does not make concessions to India, it will be difficult for India to take the initiative because of the gap in national power, in which case, the alleged strategic collaboration between the United States and India would end up being a rhetorical exercise. In the past, this tension has existed between the United States and India, but between the penny-pinching Mr. Trump and the ­tough-­talking Mr. Modi, differences in strategic expectations are less likely to be resolved.57 However, Chinese scholars themselves believe that the differences in strategic expectations and strategic trust between the United States and India are not irreconcilable. Moreover, over time, Chinese assumptions of strategic doubt between India and the United States have proven to be misplaced. Ren Yuanzhe believes that under Modi, there has been a substantial change in India’s strategic thinking and methods, and India is

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aggressively pushing for great power status. Ren Yuanzhe also accuses India of intruding into Chinese territory, leading to the Doklam stand-off as an example of Modi’s aggressive stance. The Indo-Pacific strategy is supporting and instigating India’s aggressiveness. Ren Yuanzhe also suggests that Modi should adopt a cooperative attitude towards China to realise India’s great power dreams.58 In contrast to the mainstream Chinese perception of the Indo-Pacific strategy as having been created and led by the United States, some Chinese scholars argue that the Indo-Pacific strategy is India’s strategic plan and is based on India’s offensive realist strategy. Elaborating on this Chinese attribution of India’s holding an offensive realist mentality, Chinese scholar Yang Siling argues that the main reason for the lack of progress in the India-China relation is mainly because China follows wishful thinking in its relations and its policy-making with regard to India, and the result is the opposite of that pursued. For instance, China advocates cooperation and believes that India will also follow this path. However, India believes that China’s advocacy of cooperation has ulterior motives. India believes that China’s real motive is to weaken, contain, and encircle India to prevent the realisation of India’s great power dream. Indeed, in this context, the effect of cooperation is significantly compromised. China’s failure to understand India’s diplomatic strategy from a theoretical perspective leads to the emergence of self-inflicted cooperation. Although China can influence some Indians to cooperate with it, it will be difficult for China to fundamentally change India’s strategic antagonism towards China.59 Yang Siling makes the accusation that India’s ambitions for power and territorial expansion were on display even before it broke from Britain, and to show India’s alleged expansionist tendencies, he follows many other Chinese scholars in referring to Nehru’s words from the Discovery of India: “The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as a nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in south-east Asia and right up to the Middle East.”60 Therefore, according to Yang Siling, even before India’s independence, the country has ready an Indo-Pacific concept that was based on the offensive realism of territorial expansion. India’s post-independence behaviour could interpret Nehru’s offensive realism. According to Yang Siling, it was on this basis that Nehru skilfully employed the strategy of

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capitalising on offensive realism to serve its territorial gains from China. The Chinese scholar repeats China’s official accusation that during the 1962 Sino-­Indian War, India invaded China, and India was following British imperialist policies.61 For a group of Chinese scholars, India’s role is evident in the Indo-­ Pacific strategy; the group views Indo-Pacific strategy as an containment strategy of China. These scholars also argue that without China’s support, India’s desire to increase its power through the international system would be difficult to achieve. Yang Siling warns that China should be aware of and vigilant towards India’s offensive realism strategy. There will be a crucial time in the process of the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy in which, whether accidental or planned, India may repeat the 1960s and, finding China isolated, India may take advantage of the international situation and attack China. It is doubtful that India will take this step, but China should take precautions.62 Chinese experts argue that the progress of the BRI in the South Asian region has contributed to India’s deepening threat perception and its active participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy. According to Liu Yanfeng, with the progress of the BRI in South Asia, India’s biased strategic perception is deepening. “India believes that China will influence the balance of power in South Asia, so it is constantly antagonising China and even disrupting its economic corridor program. India’s strategic suspicion of China undoubtedly increases strategic miscalculation in South Asia, which is not conducive to peace and stability in the region.”63 Chinese strategic experts think that there is a mindset in India that with the Indo-Pacific strategy, the world is embracing and anticipating India’s rise, giving India an excellent opportunity to gain benefits from every side.64 Chinese scholars consider Modi’s visits to South Pacific island states to be India’s attempt to take advantage of the Indo-Pacific strategy, and these visits are also attributed to the unquenchable thirst of Indian leadership and the desire of ordinary people in India to be recognised as a great power.65 In May 2016, Modi visited Mongolia and became the first Indian prime minister to visit the country; the visit marked the push of India’s Act East policy towards a broader range of areas. During his trip, Modi signed 14 cooperative agreements with Mongolia. For Chinese scholars, this clearly shows India’s intention to be recognised as an East Asian power; they especially noticed Modi’s remark that India is Mongolia’s third neighbour and that Mongolia is an integral part of India’s Act East policy.66 Mainstream Chinese experts, as well as the scholarly framework of analysis,

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attribute India’s great power aspirations as the primary motive behind its active participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

Trump and the Indo-Pacific China considers the Obama administration’s effort to rebalance to Asia to be a failure. However, it laid the groundwork for the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration. In the initial stages of the Trump administration, Chinese experts became perplexed by the mixed signals about its Indo-Pacific strategy. In the initial assessment, they viewed India’s perceived expectations that Trump would adopt a tough attitude towards China on a number of fronts, including security and trade, and would “help India to balance China” were all scuttled. According to the initial Chinese view, Trump’s nature as a businessman led him to follow a conciliatory policy with regard to China on matters of trade, even neglecting India’s sensitivity to the G2 (the group of America and China or the partnership between the United States and China). During his visit to China, Trump talked about how China and the United States together could solve most of the world’s problems. This kind of remark worried India, and it made India realise that the United States has far more cards to play with China than India has and that as a result of rushing to be close to the United States, India may lose the geopolitical game. Chinese scholars point out that although both the United States and India initially said that they would not attend the BRI international cooperation summit in Beijing in May 2017, at the last minute, the United States was perfidious and sent an official delegation to the conference, making India the only major country absent from the summit. China believed that Trump’s America First policy would bring many challenges to Indian-American relations. Trump’s initial focus on the internal affairs of the United States and the “Make in America” campaign contradicted India’s “Make in India” push. Chinese observers and scholars of the United States assumed that Mr. Trump would correct the Obama-era Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy with a greater emphasis on hard power and the America First policy, leading to problems for India-United States relations. However, Trump may not discard the rebalancing to Asia strategy; nevertheless, Trump will readjust it. Chinese experts have also noticed that Trump was dismissive of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy during his presidential campaign, and several of Trump’s comments

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created suspicion about American security commitments among American allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia.67 However, the initial Chinese doubts about the Trump administration’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific strategy cleared quickly. Later, Chinese scholars predicted that Trump would abandon the Asia rebalancing strategy and pivot but only in name. Like the Trump administration, China found that regardless of name, the United States would continue to pursue its policy of balancing and containing China. It was also clear that in the Trump administration’s strategy, India would play an important role.68 Although India-United States relations under Trump may face challenges, the fundamental aspects and objectives of these relations, such as hedging against rising China, will result in a continuation of this relationship. According to the Chinese assessment, Trump believes that international relations are based on realism and the principle of transaction and exchange. He does not fully pursue high moral standards like previous presidents, such as expanding democracy, advocating human rights and championing the free market. These characteristics of Trump will influence the future trend of United States-India relations.69 For Chinese scholars, Trump’s nature as a businessman was evident in the increasing US arms sales to India. Chinese experts concluded that the Trump administration further upgraded the level of strategic cooperation between the United States and India. Because of the inward orientation of the United States, the United States wants India to fill the gap left by its decreasing power in the Indo-Pacific region and to slow the rise of China. India, on the other hand, hopes to carry out strategic coordination with the United States and its allies to curb China’s rapid growth in the Indo-­ Pacific region, increase its bargaining leverage with China on disputed issues, and strengthen its voice in the game of great powers.70 Chinese scholars also warn China not to be deceived by liberal American media when assessing Trump. For instance, during the United States presidential elections, Trump was considered a weak candidate. However, the mainstream media of the United States, which are largely controlled by a leftist liberal section of the United States, could not predict that Trump would be victorious in the presidential election by a wide margin; additionally, their assessment of Trump’s influence in the United States or Trump’s foreign policy cannot be believed.71 Trump just changed the name of “rebalancing to Asia” to the Indo-Pacific strategy, but the strategy is the same, with more focus and action. The Indo-Pacific strategy will make small countries in the region choose between two groups, one led by

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China and the other led by the United States. Thus, it will try to put China in a cage.72 Alluding that most of the countries may choose the group led by the United States. China considers the United States National Security Strategy Report published in 2017 to be a clear articulation of Trump’s determination to contain China and of India’s pivotal role in doing so. In the report, the Asia-Pacific concept is replaced by the Indo-Pacific concept, and thus, the “threat” posted by China to the United States is officially established.73 According to the 2017 United States National Security Strategy Report, “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour.”74 In contrast, it gives full support for the development of Indian power in Indian Ocean region, saying, “We [U.S.] will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.”75 In 2017, the Trump administration officially launched the Indo-Pacific strategic plan, not only replacing the Asia-Pacific region with the Indo-­ Pacific region in official documents but also taking various measures to promote the realisation of its Indo-Pacific strategy. According to Chinese experts, under such circumstances, Indian authorities will continue to adjust their foreign policy and actively cooperate with or even guide the strategic vision of the Indo-Pacific. Doing so will serve the objective of counterbalancing the BRI, and with the alliance of the United States and other countries, India can balance the rise of China and finally realise its dream of rising and becoming a great power.76 The initial Chinese assessment that Trump, as a businessman, would adopt a conciliatory attitude towards China proved wrong. The following Chinese assessment reached the opposite conclusion. According to the ensuing assessment of Trump’s attitude towards the Indo-Pacific, Chinese strategists warn that although many scholars believe the differences in size, influence and uniqueness of the four countries of the Indo-Pacific strategy will limit it, this may not necessarily be true. Trump may view it as a businessman, in which everyone has his or her own unique interests, but in the Indo-Pacific strategy, everyone’s interests converge, and Trump will concentrate on these common interests—that is, containing China. Before, the United States used China to contain the Soviet Union; now, the United States is using the same strategy with regard to China but using India instead.77

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Chinese Strategy: We Can Wait It Out China’s counter-strategy to the Indo-Pacific strategy can be termed an “active waiting it out” strategy. While China will continue to carry out its BRI projects, it will cultivate cooperation with Indo-Pacific powers, exploit their vulnerabilities and increase the contradictions; at the same time, China will increase its military and diplomatic weight in the region to face any eventualities, thus waiting for the contradictions in the group to grow. Referring to the vulnerabilities that may arise in the Indo-Pacific strategy, Chinese experts argue that because the current Indo-Pacific strategy is based on long-term thinking that emerged from American strategists at the end of the Cold War, this thinking of the United States will not allow India to control the Indian Ocean or even the South Asian region. Additionally, it will not allow Europe to marginalise the United States in Europe to a peripheral role and allow Europe to emerge as an independent pole, and it will also not allow China’s rise. However, the United States cannot take on both China and India in Asia at the same time. Therefore, it has adopted a strategy of using India to contain China.78 The United States’ strategy of maintaining its hegemony and predominance in the world will ultimately lead to frictions with other powers such as India. Additionally, Chinese experts contend that the United States will face many obstacles in maintaining the viability of the current IndoPacific strategy because increasing government expenditures will restrict its defence spending and the proliferation of high-tech weapons and technology will limit its edge over other powers.79 Chen Jimin argues that governance issues in the foreign policy administration of Trump will limit the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy. He points out that, as of December 15, 2017, 250 of the Trump administration’s 624 key jobs requiring Senate approval were unfilled, and the senior most official of the US State Department’s Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs is a deputy assistant secretary. From the Chinese perspective, this lack of bureaucratic weight will restrict and limit the American Indo-Pacific strategy.80 One group of Chinese experts advocates a hedging strategy of simultaneous cooperation and balancing. These experts call for the strengthening of China’s strategic coordination with the United States, India, and Australia, and they suggest exploring the establishment of a coordination mechanism that is conducive to the common interests of these four countries. The positive role of the United States in maintaining

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peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region should be respected, and China should actively share the responsibilities in the region with the United States, India, and Australia and jointly negotiate the establishment of a new mechanism for strategic stability in the Indian Ocean region.81 Efforts should be made to promote cooperation between China and the three countries, the United States, India and Australia, to enhance strategic mutual trust, establish an effective dialogue mechanism, and expand cooperation in security areas (especially non-traditional security) and other areas to expand common interests. On the other hand, China should actively increase its strategic space in the Indian Ocean region by cultivating security relationships with Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Gulf States. China should also promote comprehensive cooperation with these countries and help them enhance their economic diversity and capacity so that China can rely on them as partners in the Indian Ocean region.82 Chinese experts advocate increasing the pace of the CPEC to side-line the Indian Ocean security dilemma. China should also adopt a policy of Blue Ocean active defence, which means a substantial increase in China’s naval force to operate in far-off oceans and seas. China should publicly state that in entering the Indian Ocean, the Chinese navy is not competing with the United States for maritime hegemony or competing with India for hegemony but is only protecting China’s legitimate interests and expanding the country’s maritime strategic space. China should strengthen its military presence in the Indian Ocean to protect the current Chinese maritime trade there and the security of relevant overseas interests.83 To isolate India and Japan and prevent them from joining this potential alliance, Chinese scholars advocate enhancing cooperation with India using different multilateral forums such as BRICS.  They also advise Chinese nationalists to refrain from making statements that stir tensions in the border areas. They further suggest that China should advocate that UN reform should focus on increasing the representativeness of developing countries and support India’s withdrawal from the group of four countries, thus driving a wedge in the cooperation between Japan and India. Given the remarks made by Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida that southern Tibet belongs to India, China can consider blurring its position on the Kuril Islands territorial dispute between Japan and Russia. China should strengthen Chinese-Russian cooperation, consolidate an all-around strategic partnership between China and Russia, and take advantage of the special friendly relations between Russia and India to slow down the

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Japanese-Indian security cooperation and contribute to the stability of China’s neighbourhood.84 Chinese scholars also argue that the success of the Indo-Pacific strategy depends on whether India can maintain its social stability and sustainable economic development.85 Without sufficient resources, India will not be able to contribute to the balancing effort. Chinese experts refer to the fissures between India’s large Muslim population and its majority Hindu population as an example of India’s internal difficulties that will make India concentrate its energies on its internal issues.86 Although there is no longer a Cold War between two alliances centred on two conflicting ideologies and Indian policymakers mention non-alignment more as a foreign policy ritual, Chinese scholars frequently refer to it to reassure themselves that India will not have a close relationship with the United States.87 Chinese scholars highlight the differences between India and the United States to comfort themselves with the fact that India’s long-term participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy is not guaranteed. They point out differences between the US and India on issues such as market access, foreign investment in the defence industry, intellectual property rights, and the issuing of United States temporary work visas to Indian IT workers. Chinese scholars argue that in defence cooperation, India will not completely rely on the United States because at present, most of the advanced weapons of the Indian army are made by Russia and it is unrealistic for India to turn to the United States. Because of their cultures, their religions and many other factors, there still exist many fissures between the United States and India. Although India and the United States share a common interest in balancing China, India will not fully partner with the United States attempt to forge a quasi-alliance with India against third parties. Regarding India’s fundamental interests, India only hopes to accelerate its economic development and international status with the help of American power and influence on the premise of ensuring its strategic autonomy.88 Some Chinese scholars tend to advise India to accept the “reality” and argue that India needs more confidence, more toleration and an open mind and that it is necessary to stand on a higher pedestal of strategic thinking to view and analyse China-India relations. India must accept the reality of increasing Chinese power. The rivalry and confrontation between India and China will only result in catastrophic results. Moreover, for its part, China should inform India of its intentions to rise peacefully. Chinese scholars argue that on the basis of India’s acceptance of its secondary

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position in Asia, both India and China can build a cooperative relationship.89 Arguing about the potential of failure of the Indo-Pacific strategy, Chinese experts also point out that Modi’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy, such as his visits to South Pacific Island states, is “more thunder, but little rain,” as the practical effect of Modi’s diplomacy was very low. This is because for the South Pacific Island states, India is not economically attractive and it is not a core country of any economic organisation. From the perspective of utilitarianism and usefulness, for these island states, India is still a distant promise. Even Fiji, which India wants to make the core of its South Pacific policy, is also wary of supporting India. Fiji may fear that lobbying by the Indian-origin population in Fiji for Indian interests will increase the internal fissures in Fiji. Thus, Chinese scholars believe that India’s efforts to find a strategic foothold in the South Pacific as a part of the Indo-Pacific strategy will not succeed.90 Chinese scholars also advocate attracting the United States with economic incentives; if China can succeed in doing so, then the Indo-Pacific strategy will collapse.91 Chinese strategy of “waiting it out” is based on the logic that over time, as a result of the internal contradictions in the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, the Indo-Pacific strategy will be downgraded. The United States may once again be distracted by some global crisis, such as the Syrian Civil War, and be unable to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific strategy. The economic issues in India and the internal contradictions within India, such as religious issues, will lead India to concentrate its attention on internal issues. At the same time, China can use economic benefits to increase the fissures in the Indo-Pacific strategy and to increase its military strength to hedge against a potential military conflict. The Chinese assumption is based on the continued economic development of China; however, unlike the period of Obama’s rebalancing to Asia strategy, China’s economic growth is slowing down. With limited economic tools, China has to rely on other tools such as an aggressive military stance, cooperation and concessions. India’s discontent towards and rejection of the BRI inspired and strengthened the second coming of the United States’ rebalancing to Asia strategy under the name of the Indo-Pacific strategy. With a small group of nations, the Indo-Pacific strategy is more agile. The Indo-Pacific strategy provided a framework, direction, purpose and motivation for increasing security and economic cooperation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia, thus making it a strong competitor of the BRI.

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Interestingly, the Chinese hypothesis that the United States will not allow India to become a great power or that, in the long term, the United States will go against India contradicts the 1988 US document on long-­ term strategy. In this document, China and Japan were mentioned as potential competitors of the United States, not India. The lack of American threat perceptions of India can be explained by the fact that India also follows a Western system of government and its values are more closely related to Western values.

Notes 1. Brook Larmer, “Is China the World’s New Colonial Power?,” The New York Times, May 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/magazine/is-china-the-worlds-new-colonial-power.html (accessed November 8, 2017). 2. Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order,” The New York Times, May 13, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-oneroad-1-trillion-plan.html (accessed November 8, 2017). 3. Jane Perlez, “China Creates a World Bank of its Own, and the U.S. Balks,” The New  York Times, December 5, 2015, https://www.nytimes. com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-creates-an-asian-bankas-the-us-stands-aloof.html (accessed November 12, 2017). 4. Roger Yu, “China chases U.S. in goal to be superpower,” USA Today, March 2, 2017. 5. David Ignatius, “President Trump would hand the world to China,” Washington Post, May 31, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-trump-would-hand-china-the-world/2016/05/31/ e4d1b1f8-2771-11e6-ae4a-3cdd5fe74204_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.d69f04c3c4da (accessed November 9, 2017). 6. “Caucus Brief: Threats From Russia, China Drive 2017 Defense Budget,” States News Service, February 2, 2016. 7. See Dr. Michael Pillsbury’s statement to U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Dr. Michael Pillsbury, “American Leadership in the Asia-Pacific, Part 4: The View from Beijing,” November 14, 2017, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/111417_Pillsbury_Testimony.pdf (accessed December 19, 2017). 8. Joe Mcdonald, Munir Ahmed And Gillian Wong, “‘Silk Road’ plan stirs unease over China’s strategic goals,” Associated Press Financial Wire, May 11, 2017, https://apnews.com/b4667b8165294d88a4d1eff53caafecd

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(accessed November 19, 2017); James Griffiths, “China’s new world order: Xi, Putin and others meet for Belt and Road Forum,” CNN Wire, May 14, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/13/asia/china-beltand-road-forum-xi-putin-erdogan/index.html (accessed November 19, 2017); Rishi Iyengar, “India boycotts China’s global trade jamboree,” CNN Wire, May 15, 2017, https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/15/ news/economy/china-belt-road-india-boycott/index.html (accessed November 19, 2017). Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, “Xi Jinping Positions China at Center of New Economic Order,” The New York Times, May 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/world/asia/xijinping-one-belt-one-road-china.html (accessed November 19, 2017). 9. Gerry Shih and Muneeza Naqvi, “China demands India leave Himalayan plateau in rising spat,” Washington Times, July 5, 2017, https://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/5/tensions-high-in-himalayas-aschina-demands-india-/ (accessed November 21, 2017). 10. James Griffiths, “Trump calls out Pakistan, India as he pledges to ‘fight to win’ in Afghanistan,” CNN Wire, August 22, 2017, https://edition.cnn. com/2017/08/21/politics/trump-afghanistan-pakistan-india/index. html (accessed November 23, 2017). 11. Steven Lee Myers, Ellen Barry and Max Fisher, “How India and China Have Come to the Brink over a Remote Mountain Pass,” The New York Times, July 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/ asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html (accessed November 23, 2017). 12. Mark Landler and Gardiner Harris, “Trump Meets India’s Leader, a Fellow Nationalist Battling China for His Favor,” The New York Times, June 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/donaldtrump-narendra-modi-india.html (accessed November 23, 2017). 13. “Exercise MALABAR 2017 (July 9–17),” Indian Navy, July 2017, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/exercise-malabar-2017 (accessed December 9, 2017). 14. See U.S.  House Of Representatives Documents, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing; “Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy Amid China’s Belt and Road.”; Testimony by Jonathan Stivers, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, (Former Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development), U.S. House of RepresentativesSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (Committee on Foreign Affairs), November 15, 2017, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106635 (accessed December 6, 2017). 15. Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The 5 things we learned from Trump’s Asia trip; There’s no clear strategy on Asia – Or the ‘Indo-Pacific’,” Washington Post,

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November 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/11/15/the-5-things-we-learned-from-trumps-asiatrip/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8a3904d3b869 (accessed November 23, 2017). 16. Mark Landler, “Trump Heads to Asia With an Ambitious Agenda but Little to Offer,” The New York Times, November 3, 2017, p. 7. 17. William J. Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “A Renewed U.S.Thai Alliance for the 21st Century,” State Department Press Release, Speeches: A Renewed U.S.-Thai Alliance for the 21st Century, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, July 16, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/144774.htm (accessed November 23, 2017). 18. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Secretary’s Remarks: America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” State Department Press Release, Honolulu, HI, October 28, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ rm/2010/10/150141.htm (accessed November 26, 2017). 19. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, p. 59. 20. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Delivering on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” Speech delivered in Singapore Management University, November 17, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ rm/2012/11/200664.htm (accessed November 26, 2017). 21. Joseph Yun, “The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1),” Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Public Affairs Documents, Testimony, Statement Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, February 26, 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ rm/2013/02/205208.htm (accessed January 3, 2018). 22. Liao Kai, “Mei jun “Yatai zai pingheng” zhanlue ji qi mianlin de bu queding yinsu” [The U.S military’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and the uncertainties it faces], Junshi Wenzhai [Military Digest], No. 15 (2015), 14. 23. Wu Zhaoli, ““Yintai” de yuanqi yu duoguo zhanlue boyi” [The origins of Indo-Pacific and the multinational strategic games], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], No. 1 (2014), p. 34, 39. 24. Li Zhonglin, ““Yintai” bing bu wan quan shi ge huai dongxi” [Indo-­ pacific is not really a bad thing], Zhongguo jingji zhoukan [China Economic Weekly], No. 20 (2013), p. 21. 25. Tang Yongsheng, Li Li and Fang Ke and Li Hongli, “Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Situation and Its Impact on China,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 5 (September/October 2013), p. 14.

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26. Cao Xiaoyang, “Meiguo “Yintai” hai shang an quan zhan lue bu shu ji qi ying xiang” [United States of America’s “Indo-Pacific” maritime security strategic deployment and its impact], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 8 (2014), p. 35. 27. Zhang Li, “Meiguo “Yintai” lianmeng zhanlue de kunjing yu Zhongguo de yingdui” [Dilemmas of America’s Indo-Pacific Alliance Strategy and the Countermeasures of China], Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 4 (2016), p. 30. 28. Hu Xin, “Yindu qianshou Mei Ri Ao zhen lianmeng haishi jia lianyin?” [India joins U.S, Japan and Australia: True alliance or fake marriage], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], No. 24 (2017), p. 50. 29. Xue Li, “Meiguo zai pingheng zhanlue yu Zhongguo “yi dai yi lu”” [U.S Rebalancing strategy and China’s BRI], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 5 (2016), p. 64. 30. Ibid., p. 73. 31. Cai Junhuang, CAI Jiafu, “guojia jingji anquan shiyu xia Yindu yang yu Zhongguo “hai si” chang yi” [The Indian Ocean and China’s “Maritime Silk” initiative from the perspective of national economic security], Fujian Xingzheng xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Fujian Administration Institute], No. 6 (2016), p. 83. 32. Ibid., p. 85. 33. Tang Yongsheng, Li Li and Fang Ke and Li Hongli, p. 14. 34. Li Zhonglin, p. 21. 35. Zhao Qinghai, ““Yintai” gai nian ji qi dui Zhongguo de hanyi” [The concept of Indo-Pacific and its implications for China], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 7 (2013), pp. 20–22. 36. Weizong You, “Meiguo zai Yintai diqu de zhanlue tiaozheng jiqi diyuan zhanlue yingxiang” [The strategic adjustment of the United States in the indo-pacific region and its geo-strategic impact], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 10 (2013), pp. 154–155. 37. Lou Yaping and Yu Yunqing, “Yindu “dong xiang xingdong zhengce” fazhan yu Zhongguo de yingdui” [The Progress of India’s Act East Policy and China’s Response], Guoji guanxi yanjiu [Journal of International Relations], No. 4 (2016), p. 135. 38. Xu Juan, “MeiYin Zhanlue yuanjing: “quanqiu yaobai guojia” dingwei ji jiedu” [U.S-India Strategic Prospects: Positioning and Interpreting “Global Swing States”], Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 3 (2015), p. 42. 39. Wang Tao, ““Yintai” diyuan zhengzhi gainian shijiao xia de MeiYin fangwu guanxi” [U.S.-India defence relations from the perspective of the geopolitical concept of Indo-Pacific], Xiandai Junshi [Conmilit], No. 7 (2015), p. 38.

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40. Ibid., p. 40. 41. Ibid., p. 44. 42. Lou Chunhao, “MeiYin fangwu hezuo xin taishi ping gu” [New Trends in US-India Defence Cooperation and its Implications], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], No. 1 (2017), pp. 110–111. 43. Rong Ying, “cong “Ma la ba er” junyan kan daguo Yintai zhanlue hudong xin taishi” [The New Trend of Major Powers’ Indo-Pacific Strategic Interaction: From the Perspective of the “Malabar” Exercise], Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development], No. 5 (2017), pp. 55, 61. 44. Li Jiacheng and Li Ang, “RiYin anbao tixi goujian de dongli kaocha” [An Analysis of the Driving Forces behind the Construction of Japan-India Security System], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], No. 8 (2015), p. 53. 45. Ibid., p. 54. 46. Zhu Qingxiu, “Riben de “Yintai” zhanlue nengfou chenggong?” [Can Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Succeed?], Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], No. 3 (2016), p. 105. 47. Sun Xianpu, ““Yintai” yujing xia de YinRi fangwu hezuo” [India-Japan defence cooperation under the context of the Indo-Pacific], Lilun Shiye [Theoretical Horizon], No. 3 (2017), p. 81. 48. Lou Yaping and Yu Yunqing, p. 129. 49. Ibid., p. 130. 50. Hu Xiaowen, “Cong celuexing jieru dao zhanluexing bushu-Yindu jieru nanhai wenti de xin dongxiang” [Involvement to Strategic Deployment: India’s New Policy Trends towards South China Sea], Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review], No. 2 (2014), p. 95. 51. Ibid., pp. 107–108. 52. Hu Zhiyong, “Meiguo jiji suzao “Yintai” zhanlue geju ji qi diyuan yingxiang” [US Efforts in Shaping Indo-Pacific Strategic Pattern and Its Geographical Impact], Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 1 (2016), p. 3. 53. Xu Juan, ““Yintai” yujing xia de MeiYinRi Haiyang anquan hezuo” [U.S.India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation under the Context of “IndoPacific” construct], Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 2 (2017), p. 99. 54. Hu Zhiyong, “Meiguo jiji suzao “Yintai” zhanlue geju ji qi diyuan yingxiang” [US Efforts in Shaping Indo-Pacific Strategic Pattern and Its Geographical Impact], Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 1 (2016), p. 3. 55. Ibid., p. 8. 56. Ji Cheng and Song Dexing, “Yintai shiyu xia de Zhong, Mei, Yin haishang diyuan boyi-biaoxiang yu shizhi” [The Expressions and Essence of the

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Geopolitical Game between China, U.S. and India from the Perspective of Indo-Pacific Concept], Yatai anquan yu Haiyang yanjiu [Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs], No. 5 (2017), p. 37. 57. Mao keji, “Yintai Zhanlue xia de MeiYin xietiao: Shang nan qude shizhixing jinzhan” [Coordination between U.S and India under the Indo-Pacific strategy: It is still difficult to make substantive progress], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], No. 23 (2017), p. 35. 58. Ren Yuanzhe, “Yindu waijiao linian de yanjin yu Modi zhengfu waijiao biange chutan” [Explorations on the Evolution of India’s Diplomatic Thoughts and Modi Government’s Diplomatic Transformation], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], No. 10 (2017), p. 48. 59. Yang Siling, “Yindu yu Mei Ri haiyang anquan hudong: jingong xing xianshi zhuyi shijiao” [Maritime Security Interaction of India with the United States and Japan: From the Perspective of Offensive Realism], Guoji anquan yanjiu [Journal of International Security Studies], No. 5 (2017), pp. 54–55. 60. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 536. 61. Yang Siling, pp. 57–58. 62. Ibid., p. 78. 63. Liu Yanfeng, “Telangpu shangtai dui YinMei guanxi de tiaozhan yu yingxiang” [The Challenges and Impacts on India-US Relations after Trump Came into power], Guoji guanxi yanjiu [Journal of International Relations], No. 4 (2017), p. 148. 64. Hu Xin, “Yindu qianshou Mei Ri Ao zhen lianmeng haishi jia lianyin?” [India joins U.S, Japan and Australia: True alliance or fake marriage], p. 51. 65. Hu Xin, “xiang dong kan de geng yuan: Yindu quanqiu waijiao zou jin nan tai ping yang” [Looking too far towards East: India’s global diplomacy heads into the south Pacific], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], No. 24 (2014), pp. 34–35. 66. Lou Yaping and Yu Yunqing, “Yindu “dong xiang xingdong zhengce” fazhan yu Zhongguo de yingdui” [The Progress of India’s Act East Policy and China’s Response], p. 134. 67. Liu Yanfeng, “Telangpu shangtai dui YinMei guanxi de tiaozhan yu yingxiang” [The Challenges and Impacts on India-US Relations after Trump Came into power], p. 139. 68. Lin Minwang, “Yindu jiang chong dang Meiguo xin Yazhou zhengce de “zhi zhu”” [India will be the “anchor” of America’s new Asian policy], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], No. 22 (2017), p. 74. 69. Sun Xianpu, “Telangpu shiqi de MeiYin guanxi fazhan quxiang” [Trends in U.S-India relations during the trump era], Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review], No. 5 (2017), p. 29.

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70. Ibid., p. 38. 71. Baiyun Jushi, “Telangpu “yi tui wei jin” de xin zhanlue Meiguo Yintai zhanlue zongshu (shang)” [Trump’s New Strategy of “retreat in order to advance”: A Review of American Indo-Pacific strategy (part 1)], Tanke Zhuangjia cheliang [Tank and armoured vehicle], No. 2 (2018), p. 9. 72. Ibid., pp. 10–11. 73. Xia Liping and Zhong Qi, “Telangpu zhengfu “Yintai zhanlue gouxiang” pingxi” [Analysis of Indo-Pacific Strategy under Trump Administration], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 1 (2018), p. 22. 74. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 25, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. (Accessed January 3, 2018). 75. Ibid., p. 50. 76. Yang Rui and Wang Shida, “Yindu yu “Yintai zhanlue gouxiang”: ding wei, jie ru ji juxian” [India and Indo-Pacific Strategy: Perception, Participation and Limitation], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 1 (2018), p. 46. 77. Baiyun Jushi, “Telangpu “yi tui wei jin” de xin zhanlue Meiguo Yintai zhanlue zongshu (xia)” [Trump’s New Strategy of “retreat in order to advance”: A Review of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy (part 2)], Tanke Zhuangjia cheliang [Tank and armoured vehicle], No. 4 (2018), pp. 23–27. 78. Liao Kai, “Mei jun “Yatai zai pingheng” zhanlue ji qi mianlin de bu queding yinsu” [The U.S military’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and the uncertainties it faces], p. 14. 79. Ibid., p. 16. 80. Chen Jimin, “Telangpu zhengfu “Yintai zhanlue”: zhengce yu xiandu” [The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the Trump Administration: Policy and Limitation], Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development], No. 1 (2018), p. 37. 81. Chen Bangyu and Wei Hong, “MeiAoYin “Yintai” zhanlue gouxiang de yi tong yu Zhongguo de yingdui” [The similarities and differences between the American, Australian and Indian conception of “Indo-Pacific” strategic concept and China’s response], Shehui Zhuyi Yanjiu [Socialism Studies], No. 6 (2015), pp. 147–148. 82. Ibid., pp. 152–153. 83. Cai Junhuang, CAI Jiafu, “guojia jingji anquan shiyu xia Yindu yang yu Zhongguo “hai si” chang yi” [The Indian Ocean and China’s “Maritime Silk” initiative from the perspective of national economic security], p. 88. 84. Li Jiacheng and Li Ang, “RiYin anbao tixi goujian de dongli kaocha” [An Analysis of the Driving Forces behind the Construction of Japan-India Security System], p. 55.

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85. Yu Fangqiong, ““YinTai” yujing xia de Yindu dongxiang waijiao” [India’s Look East Policy under the context of Indo-Pacific], Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review], No. 2 (2016), p. 64. 86. Baiyun Jushi, “Telangpu “yi tui wei jin” de xin zhanlue Meiguo Yintai zhanlue zongshu (shang)” [Trump’s New Strategy of “retreat in order to advance”: A Review of American Indo-Pacific strategy (part 1)], p. 12. 87. Zhang HengBin, “cong diyuan zhanlue kan dongmeng zai Meiguo Yintai gainian zhong de diwei” [From a geostrategic perspective the position of ASEAN in the American Indio-Pacific concept], Nan Fang Lun Kan [The Southern Journal], No. 11 (2015), p. 16; India’s non-alignment foreign policy tradition is frequently cited by Chinese experts to show that it will not have a close relationship with either the US or Japan; see Zhu Qingxiu, “Riben de “Yintai” zhanlue nengfou chenggong?” [Can Japan’s IndoPacific Strategy Succeed?], Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], No. 3 (2016); Hu Xin, “Yindu qianshou Mei Ri Ao zhen lianmeng haishi jia lianyin?” [India joins U.S, Japan and Australia: True alliance or fake marriage], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], No. 24 (2017), p. 51. 88. Zhang Li, “Meiguo “Yintai” lianmeng zhanlue de kunjing yu Zhongguo de yingdui” [Dilemmas of America’s Indo-Pacific Alliance Strategy and the Countermeasures of China], p. 30. 89. Wang Xiaowen, “ZhongYin zai Yinduyang shang de zhanlue chongtu yu hezuo qianzhi  – jiyu ZhongMeiYin “zhanlue sanjiao” geju de shijiao” [The potential of Sino-Indian strategic conflict and cooperation in the Indian Ocean: From the perspective of Sino-U.S-India strategic triangle], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], No. 1 (2017), p. 61. 90. Hu Xin, “xiang dong kan de geng yuan: Yindu quanqiu waijiao zou jin nan tai ping yang” [Looking too far towards East: India’s global diplomacy heads into the south Pacific], pp. 34–35. 91. Yang Siling, “Yindu yu Mei Ri haiyang anquan hudong: jingong xing xianshi zhuyi shijiao” [Maritime Security Interaction of India with the United States and Japan: From the Perspective of Offensive Realism], p. 78.

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Li, Xue. 2016a. Meiguo zai pingheng zhanlue yu Zhongguo “yi dai yi lu” [U.S Rebalancing strategy and China’s BRI]. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] No. 5 (May): 56–73. Li, Zhang. 2016b. Meiguo “Yintai” lianmeng zhanlue de kunjing yu Zhongguo de yingdui [Dilemmas of America’s Indo-Pacific Alliance Strategy and the Countermeasures of China]. Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly] No. 4 (October–December): 28–36. Liping, Xia and Zhong Qi. 2018. Telangpu zhengfu “Yintai zhanlue gouxiang” pingxi [Analysis of Indo-Pacific Strategy under Trump Administration]. Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] No. 1 (January): 22–28. Mcdonald, Joe, Munir Ahmed And Gillian Wong. 2017. ‘Silk Road’ plan stirs unease over China’s strategic goals. Associated Press Financial Wire. May 11. https://apnews.com/b4667b8165294d88a4d1eff53caafecd. Accessed November 19, 2017. Minwang, Lin. 2017. Yindu jiang chong dang Meiguo xin Yazhou zhengce de “zhi zhu” [India will be the “anchor” of America’s new Asian policy]. Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs] No. 22 (November): 74. Myers, Steven Lee, Ellen Barry and Max Fisher. 2017. How India and China Have Come to the Brink over a Remote Mountain Pass. The New York Times, July 26. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-chinaindia-bhutan.html. Accessed November 23, 2017. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. The Discovery of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Perlez, Jane and Keith Bradsher. 2017. Xi Jinping Positions China at Center of New Economic Order. The New York Times, May 14. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/05/14/world/asia/xi-jinping-one-belt-one-road-china.html. Accessed November 19, 2017. Perlez, Jane and Yufan Huang. 2017. Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order. The New  York Times. May 13. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan. html. Accessed November 8, 2017. Perlez, Jane. 2015. China Creates a World Bank of its Own, and the U.S. Balks. The New York Times. December 5. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/ business/international/china-creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof. html. Accessed November 12, 2017. Pillsbury, Michael. 2017. American Leadership in the Asia-Pacific, Part 4: The View from Beijing. November 14. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/111417_Pillsbury_Testimony.pdf. Accessed December 19, 2017. Qinghai, Zhao. 2013. “Yintai” gai nian ji qi dui Zhongguo de hanyi [The concept of Indo-Pacific and its implications for China]. Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] No. 7 (July): 14–22.

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Qingxiu, Zhu. 2016. Riben de “Yintai” zhanlue nengfou chenggong? [Can Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Succeed?]. Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum] No. 3 (May–June): 103–114. Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2017. The 5 things we learned from Trump’s Asia trip; There’s no clear strategy on Asia – Or the ‘Indo-Pacific’. Washington Post, November 15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/15/ the-5-things-we-learned-from-trumps-asia-trip/?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.8a3904d3b869. Accessed November 23, 2017. Rui, Yang and Wang Shida. 2018. Yindu yu “Yintai zhanlue gouxiang”: ding wei, jie ru ji juxian [India and Indo-Pacific Strategy: Perception, Participation and Limitation]. Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] No. 1 (January): 46–52. Shih, Gerry and Muneeza Naqvi. 2017. China demands India leave Himalayan plateau in rising spat. Washington Times, July 5. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/5/tensions-high-in-himalayas-as-china-demandsindia-/. Accessed November 21, 2017. Siling, Yang. 2017. Yindu yu Mei Ri haiyang anquan hudong: jingong xing xianshi zhuyi shijiao [Maritime Security Interaction of India with the United States and Japan: From the Perspective of Offensive Realism]. Guoji anquan yanjiu [Journal of International Security Studies] Vol. 35, No. 5 (September– October): 53–78. Stivers, Jonathan. 2017. Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy Amid China’s Belt and Road. U.S House of Representatives – Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (Committee on Foreign Affairs). November 15. https:// docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106635. Accessed December 6, 2017. Tao, Wang. 2015. “Yintai” diyuan zhengzhi gainian shijiao xia de MeiYin fangwu guanxi [U.S.-India defence relations from the perspective of the geopolitical concept of Indo-Pacific]. Xiandai Junshi [Conmilit] No. 7 (July): 38–44. The White House. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed January 3, 2018. Xianpu, Sun. 2017a. “Yintai” yujing xia de YinRi fangwu hezuo [India-Japan defence cooperation under the context of the Indo-Pacific]. Lilun Shiye [Theoretical Horizon] No. 3 (March): 77–81. Xianpu, Sun. 2017b. Telangpu shiqi de MeiYin guanxi fazhan quxiang [Trends in U.S-India relations during the trump era]. Yinduyang jingjiti yanjiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review] No. 5 (September–October): 25–38. Xiaowen, Hu. 2014. Cong celuexing jieru dao zhanluexing bushu-Yindu jieru nanhai wenti de xin dongxiang [Involvement to Strategic Deployment: India’s New Policy Trends towards South China Sea]. Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review] No. 2 (March–April): 94–108.

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That BRI has been viewed as a “silver bullet” that will resolve many internal and external issues for China. It is meant as an ‘offensive defence’ against the creeping de-Sinicisation of China and the Westernisation of China. The BRI is intended to reinforce confidence in Chinese tradition and China’s ability to shape the world, which, in turn, will strengthen the internal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. It is supposed to re-­ establish China as a leading power of the world and to provide a narrative of China’s own for its internal development and external relations based on one of the most important historical legacies of China, the Silk Road. The BRI has been kept vague as possible with no geographical limitations. On the one hand, it has served as a good strategy. It can explain any project or business that China is undertaking anywhere in the world. On the other hand, there has been a negative aspect: if any BRI projects are depicted as a threat or are tainted by corruption or other scandals, then all Chinese projects all over the world will come under scrutiny and suspicion. The “debt traps” that led to the handover of control of strategic assets such as Hambantota port and Gwadar port to Chinese state-owned companies are examples resulting in exacerbated threat perceptions of the BRI. In the initial stages of the BRI, India’s objections were that China did not consider India’s sovereignty and security concerns in pursuing its connectivity initiatives. Further evidence was obtained from China’s takeover of strategic assets around the Indian Ocean region. India’s objections and © The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_8

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India’s own new narratives helped to  explain the strategic intentions of China hidden in the BRI to other countries in the region and to world powers. Thus, India was instrumental in explaining the BRI better than China itself. The Indian narrative was inadvertently supported by Chinese behaviours such as the opacity of its lending methods and its opening a new Chinese military base in Djibouti. The suspicions existing among world powers and regional powers were strengthened by the Indian narrative. Thus, India has played the spoiler in China’s road to glory, providing a counter-narrative and acting as the pivot point of regional resistance to the Chinese narrative. This has far wider implications for China because the BRI was not conceived just to attach a label to Chinese port and road projects in foreign countries; the BRI has had far deeper implications for the internal stability and survival of China’s current political system.

The Deep Roots The economic growth of China has been accompanied by a massive infusion of foreign capital, technology and Westernisation. The ideal model of what it means to be modern in China was and is following Western ideals, traditions, and customs. This mode of Westernisation has been exemplified by the growth of coffee and Christianity in China. Coffee was considered alien to the tea drinking culture of China, but since the beginning of the twenty-first century, coffee consumption in China has grown dramatically. “A 2015 report by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) shows that China’s coffee consumption increased by 16 per cent year on year from 2004 to 2014, much faster than the world’s average growth of 2 per cent.”1 The US multinational Starbucks Coffee has been the representative of this growth. Starbucks opened its first shop in China in 1999; by 2018, Starbucks had opened 3400 stores in 140 cities in China, and the number of shops in China is second only to the US This represents both an attitude change and a generational change in China. “According to Zhu Danpeng, an analyst of China’s food industry, consumers above the age of 45 still go to tea houses, but younger generations prefer coffee bars, which they feel are more stylish. Coffee shops are more modern and suit urban life. Tea houses seem like something outdated.”2 Coffee epitomises a divide between old and young China and between modern, Westernised China and communist China. However, it is not coffee that has threatened the CCP; it is the explosive growth of Christianity, which has increasingly filled the ideological vacuum left by

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the collapse of the attractiveness of the communist ideology. Christian groups have provided the Chinese masses with a system of value and an ideological system with close linkages with Western systems of value and ideology. Many reports suggest that China is on the way to becoming the largest Christian nation in the world, and the number of members of Christian groups, such as Protestant groups, purportedly outnumbers communist party members.3 The CCP’s strong threat perceptions of the spread of Christianity in China are rooted in historic memories. This threat perception was reflected in a white paper by the Chinese government about religious freedom in China. According to this white paper, Following the Opium War of 1840, China declined to a semi-feudal and semi-­ colonial country. During this process, Western Protestantism and Catholicism were used by colonialism and imperialism as a tool for aggression against China, and some Western missionaries played an inglorious part in this. -They participated in the opium trade and in plotting the Opium War unleashed by Britain against China. In the nineteenth century, Robert Morrison, a British missionary, and Karl Friedrich August Gutz, a German missionary, both working for the East India Company, participated in dumping opium in China. Some missionaries strongly advocated resort to force by Western powers to make the Qing government open its coastal ports, saying that it was only war that could open China to Christianity, and directly participated in the British military activities to invade China. -They participated in the war of 1900 launched by the allied forces of eight powers against China. A number of missionaries, serving as guides, interpreters and information officers, took part in the slaughter of Chinese civilians and the robbing of money and property. According to Mark Twain, the renowned American writer, some of the missionaries imposed on the poor Chinese peasants fines 13 times the amount they were supposed to pay, driving their wives and innocent children to lingering death from starvation, so that they were thus able to use the money gained through such murder to propagate the Gospel.4

With the modernisation of China and Marxist ideology’s lack of attractiveness to China’s young generation, China started to rely on the revival of its traditional culture to fill the ideological vacuum. Chinese leadership, especially Chinese President Xi Jinping himself, became the champion of the revival of traditional Chinese culture, although this was also accompanied by a parallel Marxist rhetoric, which was still appealing to older-­ generation party loyalists. However, the CCP found itself always on

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the defensive, defending its rule and legitimacy inside China and competing with the West to influence Chinese citizens. China found it difficult to build a narrative of its economic success as the success of its system. In the global narrative, it was the Western interpretation, according to which China’s economic success contradicts the continuing survival of the Chinese system or is considered a failure because, with this economic success, China has failed to transform itself into a Western democracy, that took root. With the increasing Chinese engagement with the world, the narrative deficiency of China has become increasingly costly, and China’s economic engagements with many countries are framed as a threat by Western media. The power of the narrative of the democracy is such that the wretched poverty of large sections of the Indian population and the chaotic, unruly and unsanitary cities of India are never projected as a failure of democracy but as a failure of the ruling government. This is also true for the large-­ scale internal violence and displacement in many parts of India. On the other hand, most of the failures of the Chinese government, such as corruption and regional separatism, are projected as the failure of the system, mainly because the government and system are viewed as the same. In the post-opening up era of China, China has used the Silk Road concept mainly as a tool to conceptualise its relations with other countries and to give it a traditional and historical legitimacy. With the economic rise of China and, in particular, with China becoming the world’s leading trading nation, its economic engagement with the world has substantially increased. Similar to the Western narrative of China’s economic success, China’s economic engagement with the world has also been interpreted by the West. For instance, Chinese investment in and economic engagement with Africa have been framed as China’s “colonisation” of Africa. The pressure on China has gradually built not only in distant continents but also near its shores, assisted by the influence of Western narrative. Chinese scholars also advise China to be cautious in glorifying its current economic prosperity because according to many measures, China is still a developing country; its GDP per capita is nowhere near that of developed countries. The US and the West can exaggerate China’s economic development and compel it to take more responsibility in global governance, as a result of which China’s power and resources will be stretched too thin, and the US may start accusing China of seeking global hegemony and thus create a global “China threat” theory. For China, the BRI fulfilled these fears in many ways.

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Since the Cold War, US strategic thinking has been to prevent and contain the rise of any peer competitors. The multifaceted US strategy to contain China has included the rebalancing to Asia strategy by the Obama administration; its initial phase did not have a significant impact. For a brief period, China perceived that it had been successful in reversing US attempts to rally Asian nations to contain China. With global turmoil, such as the Middle East crisis, migration issues and the slow or stagnant economic growth in Europe, China found itself in a position to push its own narrative. China also learned from the Western intervention in Libya that the West will not accept China as a friendly country and a peer country. The West will continue with its information warfare to subvert China’s political system. China has also been emboldened by Russia’s success in reversing the Western information warfare and counterattacking through its own information warfare, especially using TV channels such as Russia Today. China believes that the global geopolitical environment favours a Chinese-led and China-centred globalisation. The main idea behind the BRI was to create a global narrative of China shaped by China. Initially, it was called the Silk Roads; then, the name changed to the unified form One Belt One Road; finally, it has become known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI strategy was a multifaceted strategy to counter the Western narrative with a Chinese emphasis on its Silk Road historical legacy of cultural exchanges and trade. However, naming the Silk Road strategy the BRI made it ambiguous and lessened its traditional and historical legacy. In particular, Chinese officials and scholars have also found that it is difficult to explain what it is. However, based on the analysis of Chinese scholarly works and media reports on BRI, it can be gauged that Chinese people generally view it as a global Chinese investment initiative. Chinese officials and government agencies have propagated the BRI with a “mutual benefit” narrative and as a public good provided by China to the world, especially in the official media, which are mainly for foreign consumption. However, a large part of China’s internal debate about the BRI was occupied by the discourse about the investment risk, accompanied by what Chinese people saw as the Chinese government’s attempt to label China’s global investments. Chinese analysts warned that small countries would become dependent on China’s inexpensive capital, in addition to risks of religious conflict, economic risks such as currency fluctuations and capital flight, the impact of cultural differences on Chinese investments, and, above all, geopolitical risks such as the counterbalancing

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s­trategies of the United States and India. The BRI has attracted sharp attention to Chinese projects all over the world, especially in the Indian Ocean region. Most of the large projects under the BRI heading have been undertaken by China’s state-owned enterprises, and the majority of BRI contracts have gone to China’s state-owned enterprises. These large projects are mostly debt-financed, and the indebtedness of the countries where these Chinese projects have been implemented has given China leverage over these countries, triggering alarm among regional powers such as India.

The Hurdle and Roll Back Here, one may ask whether it was a wise decision to give both the land-­ based Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road the name of “One Belt One Road” and, later, the BRI. The Silk Road concept was more easily communicated without any explanation; it was predominantly an economic and cultural narrative, and it was widely used by the communist party of China since the reform and opening-up of the Chinese economy. The historical Silk Road showcased China as a traditional open society that encouraged the intermingling of cultures and as a tolerant society that adopted a foreign religion such as Buddhism and that was open to exchanges of culture and technology. The Silk Road narrative subsumed under the OBOR and, later, the BRI narrative made the Chinese plans confusing, and they lacked historical legitimacy or the support of a traditional narrative. The BRI may be an attempt by the Xi administration to project itself as unique, as an administration that proposed a distinct initiative and built a unique legacy for itself. Whatever the reason may be, the narrative power of the BRI had to be built afresh, and this was a massive task with insurmountable hurdles. The initial criticism, whether unexpected or expected, of the BRI came from India. India’s criticism of the BRI centred on the sovereignty issue that the Chinese-proposed CPEC passed through the disputed territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The initial Chinese reaction was the warning that if India did not join the BRI, then India would lose out on the benefits of the BRI. In the early phase of the BRI proposal, India’s criticism appeared to be an exception because most countries, including Western countries, welcomed the BRI, though sometimes with caution and reservations. India not only critiqued the BRI but also proposed rival initiatives. India posed a challenge that no other country could efficiently

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make because India has had a matching traditional narrative and historical legacy in Asia. India’s critique stimulated a wide-ranging analysis of Indian behaviour by Chinese scholars and media, showing just how vital India’s endorsement of the BRI was. India’s criticism and objections were extraordinary at the time they were expressed because in the absence of any strong opposition from the US and the West, it seemed like China was going to have a smooth ride with the BRI and ultimately achieve dominance over Asia. However, Indian opposition has become the single greatest hurdle for China to create a China-dominated narrative in Asia. Chinese analyses of India’s rejection ranged from the positive belief that India would eventually join the BRI to the advocacy of an indifferent attitude towards India’s nonparticipation. These analyses were a concentrated reflection of Chinese attitudes towards India. China tried to use other means such as an “aligning” narrative to indirectly make India join the BRI, but it was also unsuccessful. India’s acceptance of the BRI narrative would be tantamount to accepting Chinese narrative dominance over Asia; it would also lead to accepting that there is only one dominant narrative in Asia, the Chinese narrative. The most important aspect of the Chinese discourse about the Indian attitude was the criticism of India. Interestingly, the criticism rarely addressed India’s objections of sovereignty issues directly; rather, it revived and strengthened China’s “age-­ old” criticism of India that India is harbouring an ambition to become a great power or, in terms of Maoist rhetoric, India’s objections and resistance to the BRI reflected India’s “great power chauvinism.” China’s obsession with what it perceives as India’s pursuit of great power status is one of the most enduring aspects of Chinese thinking about Indian state behaviour. The framework of “India’s great power obsession” is repeatedly used to analyse Indian attitudes towards the BRI.  Another enduring and consistent aspect of Chinese thinking is depicting Jawaharlal Nehru as a power-hungry leader whose main pursuit, according to Chinese perceptions, was to make India a great power. China also attributes Nehru’s perceived great power ambitions to current Indian leaders and officialdom and even to the common people of India. India’s “great power dream” is the main framework through which China analyses Indian thinking. Nehru’s words pertaining to the perceived great power ambition, which, according to Chinese perceptions, relate to Nehru’s obsession with making India a great power, are used as propaganda to depict India’s “expansionist mentality.” The great power obsession is also attributed to Nehru’s “attack” on China and the 1962

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war. According to the China’s depiction of the 1962 war in the current scenario, Nehru took advantage of China’s isolation at that time and launched an attack on China. Chinese strategists warn that India can use the current isolation of China to repeat the events of 1962; thus, China should be vigilant. China’s attribution to India of an obsession with attaining great power status itself reflects China’s obsession with becoming such a power, and in this respect, India is viewed as a competitor of China. If China cannot become the only great power in Asia, then becoming a global great power will be a distant dream. Blaming India over its purported ambition to become a great power reflects China’s thinking that India should not be a great power, which will jeopardise the Chinese pursuit of its own great power status.

Indian Attitude and US Support Indian attitudes towards the BRI depict India’s willingness and determination to balance China. India has been the only major country which criticise the BRI, as it infringed upon its sovereignty and territorial integrity. India’s pushback against the BRI has attracted both regional countries and the US to strengthen their balancing efforts, with India as its core. In its physical form, the BRI and the many projects attributed to it have turned out to be strategic projects that have made little economic sense. As a result, nations such as Sri Lanka have had to relinquish part of their sovereignty. Unlike the BRI, the Indian narratives of Project Mausam, the Cotton Route and the Spice Route have no purpose as investment vehicles; rather, they serve as powerful narratives competing against the BRI, and the lack of ‘economic’ sense in the Indian narratives makes them benign narratives. Over time, the trade and investment narrative of the BRI has also slowly eroded. China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti has added to the apprehension that the BRI is not a trade and investment initiative and that it is used as a label to brand Chinese activities in foreign countries as economic initiatives that are beneficial for the concerned foreign country and to justify the building of military bases in other countries. China’s “South China Sea” claims and its forays into the Indian Ocean region have reinforced the threat perceptions of the major countries in the region. The BRI has confirmed and sharpened these threat perceptions. The initial reluctance of the United States to oppose the BRI and its attitude of wait

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and watch made Indian opposition more glaring. India’s opposition to the BRI later turned out to be the core factor triggering the renewed effort of the US rebalancing to Asia or, in its new name, the renewed Indo-Pacific strategy. In the Indo-Pacific strategy, India has become the core balancer, and the US is the main offshore balancer. The Indo-Pacific strategy, with India as its core, is based on the realisation by the US that India is the consistent, willing and determined balancer of China in Asia, even determined to go it alone without the support of the US, as demonstrated by its opposition to the BRI. India’s criticism of the BRI became a rallying point for other countries, such as Japan and Australia. It also emboldened these countries to form a quadrilateral framework of cooperation under the banner of the Indo-Pacific strategy with demonstrated effectiveness, such as the Malabar naval exercise conducted off the shores of Guam. The joint military exercises involving Japan, the US, and India signalled the operationalisation of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy, and they also demonstrated the wide range of support provided by regional powers and the US for India’s engagement in the Pacific region. Additionally, the United States has also increased its assistance to India to increase its maritime capabilities, strengthening India’s efforts to balance China in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.

The Institutionalisation of Memories of the 1962 War The Chinese depict 1962 Sino-Indian War as a misadventure by India, driven by its great power ambition and aggressive realist principles. The 1962 war is frequently mentioned in the Chinese discourse about India’s rejection of the BRI. Coinciding with the BRI, the Chinese government has also institutionalised its 1962 war memories. In 2014, China’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved September 30 as Martyrs’ Day. As defined by the Chinese government, martyrs are “people who sacrificed their lives for national independence and prosperity, as well as the welfare of people in modern times, or after the First Opium War.”5 In the following year, 2015, China carried out remembrance parades and functions to commemorate Chinese martyrs. Chinese martyrs of the 1962 war were also remembered, and functions were held to institutionalise memories of the war. On September 30, 2015, in Tibet, a memorial park opened in the border county of Zayul, where 447 soldiers who died during the Indian-Chinese conflict were buried. In the park, a monument

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commemorating the Sino-Indian War stands 19.62 metres tall, symbolising the year in which China fought India in a border dispute. During the opening ceremony, representatives of veterans and officials unveiled the monument, while soldiers carried coffins to the tombs. According to Feng Shouzheng, a veteran, “The Park carries the spirits of martyrs, which is helpful for raising people’s awareness of national defence.”6 India also paid tributes to its 1962 war martyrs during the 50th anniversary of the war in 2012.7 The institutionalisation of these war memories through anniversary rituals and commemorations also ingrained the threat perceptions and the image of India as a hostile country among China’s elites and masses. Reflecting this attitude, references to the 1962 war have increasingly figured in the Chinese discourse on India’s attitude towards the BRI. Although Chinese scholars rarely address India’s objection that the CPEC violates India’s sovereignty, when it is addressed, Chinese scholars take the position that China has always taken a principled stand on the Kashmir issue. The “principled stand on the Kashmir issue” refers to the Chinese claim that China has never interfered in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In India, this claim is viewed as a contradiction because the CPEC itself, with the construction of a road and other infrastructure through the disputed territory of Kashmir, constitutes Chinese interference in the Kashmir dispute. The institutionalisation of war memories is reflected in the frequent reference to the war in the Chinese discourse about the Indian attitude towards the BRI and in attributing aggressive intentions to India. Chinese scholars and media try to depict India as an aggressive “bully.” However, Chinese scholars also acknowledge that India’s “aggressive” stand is viewed as “standing up” to China, especially by the US.  Some Chinese scholars even attribute the renewed Indo-Pacific strategy as an Indian ploy. The core of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy is the United States-India partnership, and it is viewed as such by China. Both the Chinese and American discourses on India’s objections to the BRI suggest that India’s resistance to the BRI resulted in the Indo-Pacific strategy, with the Indian-American partnership as its core. In contrast to the BRI, the Indo-Pacific narrative is more inclusive and is based on the shared values of the four participating democratic countries: India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. The main declared objectives of the Indo-Pacific strategy are to maintain open seas; the strategy also maintains the traditional security architecture reinforced with Indian participation, securing public goods for global trade.

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Silk Road to War With the securitisation of the BRI and the entrenched threat perceptions of China, there will be combined attempts by the Indo-Pacific powers to rollback China’s power and influence in the Indian Ocean region. Given the potential slowdown of Chinese economic growth, China will find it difficult to consistently maintain a strong presence in the Indian Ocean region. However, even with diminished power, China will remain one of the major powers in the region. Indeed, some Chinese scholars have warned that the West is exaggerating China’s power and influence to make China overextend and overstretch its power, thus depicting it as a threat and an expansionist power; with the Chinese BRI, it seems that Chinese officialdom has not listened to these warnings and has miscalculated its power to create its own narrative. The BRI has sharpened the edges of the geopolitics in the region, it has reinforced the Indo-Pacific strategy, with India as its core, and it has given India, the United States and other powers a clear signal that China is attempting to carve out a space for itself with institutions, rules and norms created or influenced by China, that is, a China-dominated parallel system of global governance. Currently, China is only one of the important powers in South Asia. However, the critical factor is that China is the crucial player against which most other major players are aligned. China’s actions in the South Asian region that have been under the BRI label have proven to be strategic, resulting in a security threat to the regional power—India. This will result in a consistent escalation of threat perceptions and counter-strategies against China in the region by India and Western countries. The US and India are still a dominant and important factor in the stability and prosperity of the South Asian region. The Chinese attempt to create its own narrative and to create a China-centric order in the Asian region is proving to be counterproductive. China’s internal discourse of accusing India of holding great power ambitions and of being jealous of China only shows that China is convinced of its own narrative that India should not resist China’s strategic advances in the region even if it has to compromise its own sovereignty. This Chinese “great power chauvinism” makes its attitudes towards and policies with regard to India more strident. This framework of thinking will not allow China to accept India’s regional power status; China will continue to make strategic moves to erode India’s strategic position in the region, contributing to the escalation of the threat perceptions and the pushback against China’s strategic expansion in the

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region. The Chinese perceptions of India as a spoiler of its superpower aspirations are becoming stronger. This will create more crisis-like situations in the Indo-Pacific region, making it ripe for conflicts and even war. The BRI has also proven to India the futility of courting China and of economic relations and other modes of relations with China to incentivise changes in Chinese state behaviour. China’s dismissiveness towards India’s concerns led to India’s determined response. For India, because of its physical proximity to other South Asian countries, it is relatively easy to conduct long-term balancing without much expense to its resources, and joining with Western countries and the support of the US only enhance India’s position. Ultimately, India has emerged as a better storyteller than China. In general, democracies tell better stories than authoritarian regimes. They can also better adapt and evolve the narratives they create about themselves. There is no need to search for legitimacy because legitimacy is built into the system through the election process, debates, negotiations and, at times, violence. The Chinese system must seek legitimacy through economic development or other means, but the stories that it creates about itself will be challenged by the global discourse, both internally and externally, and the CCP will find it to be an enormous challenge to instil belief in its system internally and a far more insurmountable challenge to instil belief in its ways of economic engagement externally. The BRI narrative will prove to be one of the greatest strategic mistakes made by rising China. The BRI narrative has been met by India’s counter-­ narratives, and India has interpreted the BRI as a Chinese narrative to dominate Asia and to camouflage China’s strategic intentions in many regions of the world, especially the Indian Ocean region. Unlike the BRI, the Indo-Pacific strategy is backed by countries that have powerful resources for global narrative creation. US media dominate global media, and with India and Australia having a large English-speaking population, vibrant English-language media and universities that use English as the medium of instruction, it is easy for Indo-Pacific countries to create a narrative and to spread their version of the story. In contrast, as many Chinese specialists have also argued, the Chinese propaganda system, which only tries to project perfect and infallible China and is impervious to criticism, will always be viewed with suspicion and mistrust, even within China. China’s attempt to create a China-centric Asian narrative and global narrative through the BRI is a failure. Based on the Chinese discourse about India’s objections to and criticisms of the BRI, it is evident that India has played a pivotal role in the failure of the BRI to provide

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a “good story” for China. As some Chinese analysts have concluded, India grasped the core purpose of the BRI, that is, to create a China-centric narrative. India did not attempt to compete with China in investing or building infrastructure. Its cost-effective way of countering the BRI was to create India-centric narratives and to reject and refute the BRI narrative. The Indian success in foiling the BRI narrative was based on India’s realisation that by saying that it would join the BRI, India would be relegated to the status of a secondary power in Asia, a mere “beneficiary” of the Chinese initiative. In other words, the “benefit” of the BRI itself is a framework through which China wants to illustrate its dominant economic relationship with other countries. China’s framework of analysing Indian actions through the lens of India’s pursuit of great power status is leading China to overlook India’s concerns in the region. China’s own pursuit of great power status is influencing its perception of India as a secondary power. Any anomaly in Indian behaviour that is contrary to its perceived secondary power status, such as India’s own regional connectivity initiatives, is viewed by China in terms of India’s “wild ambition”, and India’s security concerns in the South Asian region and Indian Ocean region are viewed as Indian hegemony. China also views India’s partnership with the United States as a containment strategy. Currently, the threat perceptions of China are in a spiralling stage, in correlation with the increasing Indian cooperation with Indo-­ Pacific countries. China’s entrenched perceptions of Indian behaviour may not change within a short period of time; thus, under the current scenario of increasing mutual threat perceptions between India and China, as well as the US determination to contain China’s ambitions to become the dominant power in the Asian region, the Indo-Pacific region is ripe for confrontational power politics.

Notes 1. Cao Qingqing, “China embraces growing coffee culture,” CGTN, December 6, 2017, https://news.cgtn.com/news/33677a4d30637a6333566d54/ share_p.html (accessed January 2, 2018). 2. Cao Qingeing, “China embraces growing coffee culture.” 3. Eleanor Albert, “Christianity in China, Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christianity-china (accessed November 3, 2018); Sarah Zheng, “Christianity’s ‘explosive growth’ in China – And the official pushback,” inkstone, March

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30, 2018, https://www.inkstonenews.com/china/christianity-protestantchurch/article/2133812 (accessed November 3, 2018). 4. “White papers of government of China  – Freedom of Religious Belief in China (October 1997),” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 1996, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/ Freedom/index.htm (accessed September 28, 2018). 5. “3rd Ld-Writethru-China Focus: Martyrs’ Day marked across China,” Xinhua General News Service, September 30, 2015. 6. Ibid. 7. PTI, India pays homage to martyrs of 1962 Sino-India war for first time, India Today, October 20, 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ india-china-war-defence-minister-a.k-antony-indian-air-for ce119190-2012-10-20 (accessed November 8, 2018).

Bibliography 3rd Ld-Writethru-China Focus: Martyrs’ Day marked across China. 2015. Xinhua General News Service. September 30. Albert, Eleanor. 2018. Christianity in China, Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. October 11. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christianitychina. Accessed November 3, 2018. PTI. 2012. India pays homage to martyrs of 1962 Sino-India war for first time. India Today. October 20. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indiachina-war-defence-minister-a.k-antony-indian-air-force-119190-2012-10-20. Accessed November 8, 2018. Qingqing, Cao. 2017. China embraces growing coffee culture. CGTN. December 6. https://news.cgtn.com/news/33677a4d30637a6333566d54/share_p.html. Accessed January 2, 2018. White papers of government of China  – Freedom of Religious Belief in China. 1997. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. October. http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/Freedom/index.htm. Accessed September 28, 2018. Zheng, Sarah. 2018. Christianity’s ‘explosive growth’ in China – And the official pushback. Inkstone. March 30.

Index

A Abe, Shinzo, 207 Academics, 82 Act East, 127, 213 Afghanistan, 91 Aid, 176 AIIB, 85 Aircraft, 205 Akbar, M. J., 4 Alliance, 196 Allies, 198 Allocate, 46 Ambassador, 77 Ambition, 126 America First policy, 214 American dream, 52 American media, 176 Andaman Nicobar Islands, 209 Anti-dumping, 148 Approval, 156 Arab, 94 Archaeological, 58 Army, 17 Asia, 3

Asia Pacific, 196 Assam, 117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 4 Attack, 213 Attitudes, 182 Audiences, 61 Australia, 21, 95 Autonomy, 219 Ayurveda, 122 Azhar, Masood, 2 B Balance, 177 Balancer, 203 Baloch, 12 Balochistan, 12 Bangladesh, 19 Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar (BCIM), 115 Bank, 196 Banned, 39 Barriers, 150

© The Author(s) 2019 S. Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7

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INDEX

Bay of Bengal, 209 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 185 Behaviour, 8 Beidou satellite navigation system, 84 Beijing, 53 Beijing University, 58 Belief, 9 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 3 Beneficiary, 120 Benefit, 16, 81 Bhutan, 14 Big data, 15 Bihar, 117 Blue Ocean, 218 Boao forum for Asia, 4 Border issue, 2, 124 Border points, 17 Boundary, 2, 181 Brand, 153 Brazil, 176 Bretton Woods system, 196 Brexit, 45 Bridge rail project, 78 British, 151, 155 Buddha, 57 Buddhism, 95 Bullet train, 119 Bullying, 187 Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs, 217 Burns, William J., 199 Business, 82, 153 Businessman, 214 C Camouflaging, 55 Campaigns, 9 Campbell Bay, 209

Capability, 201 Capital, 188 Capitalism, 38 Carter, Ashton, 206 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 81 Central Asian, 85 Channels, 181 Chen Fei, 143 Chen Wenling, 141 Cheng Dawei, 89 Cheng Guo, 89 China, 1 China-centric, 9, 22, 87 China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), 80 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 3 China Telecom, 15 China threat theory, 46 Chinese, 11 activities, 63 businesses, 39 characteristics, 39 dream, 52 government, 9 scholars, 39 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 3 Christian, 8, 47 Cities, 40, 53 Civilisations, 1 Classics, 49 Climate change, 2 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 199 Collapse, 37 Colombo, 80 Colonial, 46 Colonisation, 11 Communication, 119 Communist Party, 3 Companies, 80, 155 Compete, 179

 INDEX 

Competition, 127 Concept, 167, 206 Conciliatory, 216 Conflict, 44, 202 Confucianism, 51 Confucius Peace Prize, 4 Connectivity, 14, 129 Consumerism, 184 Contain, 217 Contradictions, 39, 217 Converge, 216 Cooperation, 119 Cooperative, 114 Core values, 49 Counterweight, 211 Country, 62 Credit, 84 Crisis, 45 Critic, 197 Criticise, 39 Croatia, 95 Cultural exchanges, 39 Cultural initiative, 3 Culture, 1 Custine, Marquis Astolphe de, 8 D Dai Xu, 42 Daily Times, 11 Dalai Lama, 125 Dance, 57 Dance-drama, 56 Debt, 12 Decision-making, 147 Defence, 79, 217 Delegitimised, 38 Deleuze and Guattari, 53 Democracy, 5 Democratisation, 38 Demographic, 141 Deng Xiaoping, 40

Dependency, 21 Deployment, 87 Desai, Meghnad, 5 Developing country, 39 Development, 19 Diplomacy, 186 Discontent, 79 Discourse power, 3, 38, 39 The Discovery of India, 169 Disintegration, 38 Disputes, 183 Divisions, 44 Djibouti, 93 Doklam, 146 Dominant, 39 Dominate, 167 Dream, 9 Drones, 197 Dui jie, 89 Dunhuang caves, 56 E East Timor, 77 Economic engagement, 77 Economic initiative, 3 Educational, 51 Efficiency, 44 Elites, 44 Empire, 11, 57 Encircle, 212 Enemy, 202 Engines, 206 English, 55 Environmental protection, 86 Ethnic groups, 50 Eurasian, 85 Europe, 6 Evangelical groups, 47 Expansion, 19, 146 Expansionist, 212 Experts, 116

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INDEX

Extortion, 46 Eyadema, d’Armee Gnassingbe, 58 F Facebook, 182 Falldin, Thorbjorn, 58 FDI, 20 Feng Weijiang, 93 Fibre link, 15 Fifth column, 48 Fiji, 220 Financial, 5 Financing, 79 Five principles of peaceful coexistence, 2 Foreign aid, 19 investment, 20 policy, 7 Foucault, Michel, 53 Framework, 37 Freedom, 207 Free internet, 46, 47 Free speech, 40, 46 Fudan University, 119 Fusion, 143 G G2, 214 G7, 195 Gadhafi, Moammar, 42 Gandhi, Indira, 175 Gansu song, 56 Gas, 86 Geelong Port, 14 Geopolitics, 4 Germany, 95 Global, 2 Global governance, 6 Globalisation, 6

Goat, 86 Gobi Desert, 56 Google, 46 Great global power, 9, 165 Guam, 207 Gulf, 176 Gwadar Port, 12 H Haidalla, Mohamed Khouna Ould, 57 Hainan radio, 88 Hambantota Port, 12 Happiness, 52 Harris, Jennifer, 196 He Yafei, 98 Hedge/hedging, 128, 215 Hegemony, 114 Himalayan, 82 Hinduism, 122 History/historical, 10, 56 Hostility, 124 Hu Jian, 84 Hu Shisheng, 146 Hua Guofeng, 57 Huawei, 21, 153 Human beings, 9 Humanities, 49 Human rights, 174 Humiliation, 171 Hussain, Ejaz, 11 I Ideas, 87 Images, 114 Imperialism, 48 Imports, 151 Impoverished, 118 India, 1 Indian Ocean, 79, 166 Indian Ocean Rim Association, 185

 INDEX 

Indian threat perception, 11 Indira Doctrine, 175 Indonesia, 20, 77 Indo-Pacific, 3 Industry, 82 Information, 42 Infrastructure, 12 Institutions, 5 Integration, 139 Intellectuals, 44 Intentions, 113 Interdependency, 8 International Coffee Organization (ICO), 236 International system, 5 Internet, 155 Invasion, 47 Investment, 81, 115 Iran, 57 Iranian, 57 Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 57 Italy, 195

Kolkata, 117 Kong De Ming, 88 Korea, 96 Kuanganov, Farkhad, 97 Kyauk Pyu Port, 21

J Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), 2 Jaitley, Arun, 197 Japan, 58 Jealousy, 173 Ji Xianlin, 58 Jiang Yingchun, 43, 44 Jiangsu, 146 Jim Yong Kim, 81

L Label, 21 Labour, 157 Laws, 156 Lawyers, 82 Le Yichang, 140 Le Yucheng, 113 Leadership, 196 Lee Kuan Yew, 57 Legal system, 44 Legitimacy, 4 Lhasa, 15 Li Daokui, 41 Li Keqiang, 116 Li Xiao, 151 Li Xuhui, 48 Liberation, 38 Link/linkages, 53, 117, 142 Liu Hongliang, 125 Liu Hongyang, 77 Liu Xiaobo, 4 Liu Yanfeng, 213 Lodz, 82 Lowy Institute, 183 Loyang, 57 Luo Zhaohui, 113

K K2K, 117 Kashmir, 3 Kathmandu, 17 Kazakhstan, 91 Kerala, 127 Kishida, Fumio, 218

M Made in China 2025, 149 Mahara, Krishna Bahadur, 14 Make in America, 214 Make in India, 149 Makerere University, 81 Malabar, 197

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INDEX

Malacca, 167, 209 Maldives, 21 Manipur, 117 Manufacturing, 115 Mao, 56 Mao Keji, 211 Maoist, 40 Maritime Silk Road, 56, 58 Market, 219 Marshall Plan, 19 Marxist, 9 Mattis, Jim, 198 Meaning, 10 Media, 2 Mentality, 209 Miao Lu, 98 Middle East, 42 Militarisation, 3 Military, 41 Missionary, 48 Mistrust, 79 Modi, Narendra, 1 Moghaddam, 57 Mongolia, 90, 213 Monroe Doctrine, 175 Monroe, Kristen Renwick, 9 Mukherjee, Pranab, 174 Muldoon, Robert D., 57 Multilateral trading system, 2 Mumbai, 118 Muslim, 219 Myanmar, 14, 21 N Narrative, 3, 52 National conditions, 50 Nationalism, 151 Naval/navy, 58, 197 Nawangwe, Barnabas, 81 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 151, 169 Neighbourhood, 219

Neo-colonisation, 48 Nepal, 13 Nepal Armed Police Force Academy, 17 Netherlands, 168 Netizens, 46 New Era, 97 Newspapers, 128, 183 New York Times, 184 New Zealand, 57 NGO, 18 Nigeria, 156 1962 war, 2, 118 Nobel Peace Prize, 4 Nonparticipation, 63 North African, 42 Northeast, 155 Nuclear deterrent, 41, 42 Nuclear power, 205 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 204 Nur Otan, 97 Nye, Joseph, 81 Nyerere, Julius K., 57–58 O Objective broadcasting, 62 Offensive, 41, 235 Offensive realist, 212 Oil, 86 One Belt One Road (OBOR), 3 Opportunities, 152 Order, 45 Organisations, 90 P Pacific, 199 Pakistan, 2 Panikkar, K. M., 169 Patterson, Molly, 9 Peace, 2, 79

 INDEX 

Pentagon, 201 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 17 Perceptions, 38, 144 Persian, 57 Perspective, 84 Plunder, 46 Poland, 82 Poor, 118 Poverty, 172 Power, 38, 46 Powerchina Company, 18 Press, 195 Pride, 51, 170 Prime minister, 174 Products, 122 Profit, 80 Project Mausam, 126 Projects, 12 Propaganda, 18, 46 Prosperity, 45 Protectionism, 83 Psychological, 62 Public good, 115 Public opinion, 183 Putin, 42 Q Qian Feng, 127 Quadrilateral, 198 R Racism, 47 The railway, 18 Rakhine, 21 Realism, 215 Rebalancing, 199 Red Tape, 155 Refugees, 16 Regional, 205 Rejuvenation, 52

Religious, 44 Ren Yuanzhe, 211 Republic, 207 Republican period, 48 Re-Sinicise, 48 Resources, 60, 85 Responsible, 41 Rhetorical, 211 Rich, 45, 46 Rivalry, 127 Romanian, 57 Routes, 79, 122 Russia Today (RT), 43 S Sagarmala, 128 Scholars, 22 Secretary, 88 Security threat, 3 Shanghai, 53 Shenhav, Shaul R., 9 Shenzhen, 97 Shi Benxing, 95 Shuping Yang, 40 Silk Road, 37 Silver bullet, 235 Singapore, 126 Singh, Manmohan, 167 Sinicise, 8 Sinification, 49 Skills, 63 Small, 91 Socialism, 38 Socialist democracy, 44 Social media, 46 Social sciences, 49 Software, 152 South Asian, 4, 9, 119 South China Sea, 205 Southeast Asia, 96, 167 South Pacific Island states, 220

255

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INDEX

Sovereignty, 4, 124 Soviet Union, 5, 9 Spain, 168 Speech, and law-based society, 46 Spice, 126 Sri Lanka, 12 Stability, 45 State Council, 80 Stivers, Jonathan, 198 Story, 9 Strategic thinkers, 166 Strategists, 216 Strategy/strategic, 3, 79 String of pearls, 211 Submarine, 166 Subsidies, 149 Subversion, 43 Superiority, 209 Superpower, 5, 172 Survival, 4 Swing state, 176 T Tai chi, 122 Taiwan, 125 Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project, 18 Taoism, 96 Tech/technology, 6, 217 Territorial integrity, 4 Terrorism, 1 Terrorist, 2 Thailand, 57 Theory, 37, 41 Think tanks, 90 Threat, 1 Tibet, 14 Tillerson, Rex, 198 Tinsulanonda, General Prem, 57 Traditional culture, 37 Traditions, 49

Transparency, 84 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 205 Tributary, 80 Trump, Donald, 6 Trust, 124 Turkey, 95, 176 Twitter, 182 U Uganda, 81 Ukraine, 42 Unequal treaties, 48 Unilateral, 99 United Nations (UN), 2, 99 University of Maryland, 40 V Vacuum, 37 Vague, 113 Verdet, Ilie, 57 Victim, 180 Vietnam, 95 Vigilant, 184 Vulnerabilities, 217 W Wang Jun, 15 Wang Tao, 206 Wang Yi, 16 War, 42 Warfare, 42 Weibo, 53 West, 2 West Bengal, 117 Western Han dynasty, 56 Westernisation, 49 Western media, 2 Western narrative, 5

 INDEX 

West Seti Hydropower project, 17 Wild, 126 Win-win situation, 7 World Bank (WB), 81 Worldview, 41 Wu Zhaoli, 201 Wuhan, 1

Yang Siling, 212 Ye Hailin, 187 Yoga, 122 Young generation, 49 Yu Hong, 18 Yubaraj Khatiwada, 17 Yunnan, 14, 54

X Xi Jinping, 1 Xiao Jian, 44–45 Xiao Xian, 125 Xihua Normal University, 120 Xing-Chun Long, 120 Xinhua, 6 Xinjiang, 14, 48, 54 Xuanzang, 96 Xue Cheng, 97

Z Zhang Jiadong, 119 Zhang Qian, 56 Zhang Wei, 38 Zhangmu border point, 15 Zhao Gancheng, 147 Zhao Ke-Jin, 93 Zheng He, 54 Zhong Shan, 14 Zhu Danpeng, 236 Zhu Jidong, 52 Zhu Zuyi, 58 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed, 57 ZTE, 154

Y Yan Kefei, 48

257