China, Russia, And Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics [1st Edition, 3rd Impression] 0198719515, 9780198719519

Table of contents :
1: Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, and World Order2: Energy and the Economic Foundations of the Sino-Russian Relationship3: The Sino-Russian Military-Security Relationship: Emerging Trends and Challenges4: Russia, China and Contemporary International Conflicts: Ukraine and Syria5: Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges: Colour Revolutions, Cyber/Information Security, Terrorism and Violent ExtremismConclusion: The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: Implications for Contemporary World Order and Geopolitics

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross 2018 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2018 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2017947625 ISBN 978–0–19–871951–9 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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Paul Bolt dedicates this book to Betty Jo and his children, especially Abby, whose enthusiasm for the book was inspirational Sharyl Cross dedicates this book in memory of US Senate Majority Leader Joe T. Robinson and in honor of the legacy of the Robinson family of Lonoke Arkansas—to their dear son and nephew, her father, Jerry Cross—with gratitude for those sacred and enduring values that he carries on in all spheres—commitment, loyalty, integrity, faith, and love

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Preface and Acknowledgments

China and Russia, as the world’s two leading authoritarian nations, will undoubtedly be critical for managing the most pressing traditional and nontraditional security challenges facing humanity, and can be expected to exert significant influence in shaping the future development of the twenty-first century geopolitical security order. China and Russia challenge United States hegemony and the Western liberal order by seeking a multipolar global power configuration more suited to their interests. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin enjoy a close association, and both are strong nationalistic leaders determined to command respect on the world stage. Russia still maintains nuclear parity with the United States, and China rivals the United States as the world’s leading global economic power. China and Russia exercise considerable influence as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and share a coincidence of positions on several significant international issues in direct contradiction to the preferences and interests of Western democratic nations. Beijing and Moscow understand that the Sino–Russian partnership holds the potential to challenge the United States and its allies on global and regional issues. At the same time, both countries place high priority on relationships with Western democratic nations, but they insist that collaboration be based on “mutual respect” and “equality.” The motivation for undertaking this project on the Sino–Russian relationship comes from the fact that, first of all, we recognize the importance of these two major global powers, nations possessing rich historical and cultural traditions, for future peace and security in the twenty-first century international community. As American scholars, we believe that the US academic and policy communities have been so consumed over the past decade with issues in the Middle East and countering terrorism that we have neglected to devote sufficient attention to assessing the strategic significance, challenges, and opportunities presented by the evolving Sino–Russian relationship. We hope that this book, combining our respective expertise on China and Russia, fills a critical gap in the existing literature by offering a study that will hold significant relevance for both academics and policy practitioners interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the factors influencing the dynamic developments in the Sino–Russian strategic partnership.

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese–Russian bilateral relationship, grounded in a historical perspective, and discusses the implications of the burgeoning “strategic partnership” between these two major powers for world order and global geopolitics. The study concentrates particular attention on evaluating the importance of Russia’s “pivot” toward China and Asia in response to the consequences of the crisis in Ukraine. The chapters compare the national worldviews, priorities, and strategic visions for the leaderships of both China and Russia, examining several aspects of the relationship in detail. The energy trade is the most important component of economic ties, although both sides desire to broaden trade and investments. In the military realm, Russia sells advanced arms to China, and the two countries engage in regular joint exercises. Diplomatically, these two Eurasian powers take similar approaches to conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and also cooperate on non-traditional security issues, including preventing “colored revolutions”, cyber management, and terrorism. The analysis suggests major themes regarding the evolving Sino–Russian relationship. Russia and China have common interests that cement their partnership, including security, protecting authoritarian institutions, and reshaping aspects of the global order. They are key players not only influencing regional issues, but also international norms and institutions. The comprehensive Sino–Russian partnership presents a potential counterbalance to the United States and democratic nations in shaping the contemporary and emerging geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, the West is still an important partner for China and Russia and both countries seek better relations with the United States and its democratic allies, but on terms of equitable partnership. The Sino–Russian bilateral partnership has gained considerable momentum, particularly since 2014 as Moscow turned to Beijing in an attempt to offset tensions with the West in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine. However, the two countries still have some frictions in their relationship, and not all interests overlap. Therefore, China and Russia describe their relationship as a comprehensive “strategic partnership,” but they are not “allies.” In terms of our approach, the book combines the expertise of one author concentrating research and teaching on China and Chinese foreign policy and the other specializing in Russian security and foreign policy. We would not have been able to offer the depth and scope of analysis provided in this book without the regional expertise that each co-author brought to the project. In addition, we placed the highest priority on actively engaging in discussions with our colleagues in China and Russia over the past several years to gain deeper understanding of their varying perspectives and priorities with respect to Chinese and Russian international behavior. We have made every effort to incorporate interviews and statements from discussions with leading experts viii

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in China and Russia and to consult and document a wide range of original primary Chinese and Russian sources in developing our assessments and analysis presented in this book. This project reflects not only our daily immersion in the American and European international relations academic and defense communities, but also our efforts to maintain routine collaboration and engagement with our colleagues in both China and Russia, who possess substantial subject area expertise on politics and foreign policy and international security. This book represents the culmination of collaborative research on the Sino– Russian relationship spanning the past decade. We initiated our work on the Chinese–Russian partnership in 2004 while serving together on the faculty of the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, and have continued to collaborate in hosting professional gatherings with our Chinese and Russian colleagues on contemporary international security and foreign policy issues, traveling frequently to China and Russia to conduct research, lecture, and contribute to major conferences, and co-authoring publications from which this book is a product. Although they are not directly funding this book, we would like to acknowledge the importance of prior valuable support for our research on Chinese and Russian foreign policy and the Sino–Russian relationship provided by the US Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies, Minerva Research Initiative, Marshall Center Director’s Sponsored Research Program, and Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The authors thank the Kozmetsky Center of St. Edward’s University for funding research for this project in Russia during Fall 2015, and hosting a conference session led by the authors in February 2016 to bring together leading experts from both China and Russia to discuss the Sino–Russian relationship and implications for global politics and security. These sessions provided excellent opportunities for holding working meetings with colleagues from both nations to explore in depth the issues discussed in this book. We would also like to acknowledge institutions in China and Taiwan and Russia for hosting and supporting conference gatherings and research visits over the past two decades that were important for this project work, including Fudan University, the School of International Studies at Peking University, National Chengchi University, Shanghai International Studies University, China Foreign Affairs University, China Institute of International Studies, Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Moscow State University, Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg State University, School of International Relations, Institute of World Economy and International ix

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Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian International Affairs Council, and US Embassies in Beijing and Moscow. We also acknowledge and appreciate the efforts of our colleagues in Europe, Eurasia, and Asia for hosting regional conference gatherings that provided further opportunities for us to discuss our research and exchange perspectives on Chinese and Russian foreign policy with colleagues from China and Russia, including Strategy International and ELIAMEP (Greece), Atlantic Council in Montenegro and Croatia, Belgrade Security Forum, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, International Political Science Association, New Policy Forum/Gorbachev Foundation, Foreign Affairs Association Germany, SPECTRUM Center for Strategic Analysis (Armenia), I. I. Mechnikov University in Odessa, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, and Kazakhstan National University. China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics will be of interest for academic experts on Chinese and Russian foreign and security policy, and for those involved in broader study of international relations, geopolitics, and security studies. The rich original primary source material contained in this book should be useful for research scholars, but we would like to emphasize that every effort was made to present the material throughout the chapters so as to be clear, straightforward, and easily accessible for the wider non-expert student and public audience. In our judgment, the stakes could not be greater for the United States and its allies in productively managing relationships with these two critical global powers, and we certainly hope that the research and analysis featured in the chapters will provide insight on foundations of the Sino–Russian evolving partnership that will serve as a valuable resource for the United States and international policy communities. A project such as this requires contributions and support from numerous colleagues, friends, and our families. We would like to thank Alexei Voskressenski, Alexander Lukin, Artyom Lukin, Viktor Sumsky, Alexander Gabuev, Victor Kremenyuk, Tatyana Shakleina, Pavel Palazchenko, Mikhail Margelov, Raymond Truong, Scott Urbom, Wang Ning, Zhao Huasheng, Su Changhe, Jennifer Davis-Paguada, Nina Diaz, Cam Torrens, Gao Fei, Su Xiaohui, Wang Dong, Wu Hongwei, Arthur Ding, Shen Dingli, Wei Bai-Ku, Tsai Ming-Yen, Jim Smith, and Patrick Besha for contributing to our understanding of Sino–Russian relations. Cheryl Kearney, Joe Foster, Teresa Daniels, Fran Pilch, Paul Carrese, Damon Coletta, David Sacko, John Riley, Christine Cross, Steve Balich, and Brenda Vallance provided encouragement throughout the project. We thank those who have discussed ideas with us at various stages of our work on Sino– Russian relations or who commented on the manuscript, including Ruth Melkonian-Hoover, Evan McKinney, Doyle Baker, Wang Wenfeng, Suisheng Zhao, Matt Rojansky, Igor Zevelev, John Reppert, Despina Afentouli, Greg Gleason, Deborah Palmieri, Elizabeth Prodromou, Craig Nation, Scott Roenicke, x

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Julian Lindley-French, Isabelle Facon, Igor Okunev, Sergei Oznobishchev, Vadim Kozylin, Nadia Arbatova, Oleg Demidov, and Timur Makhmutov. Of course, any errors that remain in this work are the responsibility of the authors. Our students and seminar participants at the United States Air Force Academy, Marshall Center, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and St. Edward’s University have contributed to our work on China and Russia by engaging in many discussions with us and asking excellent questions as we have reviewed the literature and researched these issues. Our work has no doubt benefited from these interactions and interventions, and we will always be deeply grateful to those we have had the privilege to work with in our courses and seminars. We wish to express our gratitude for the support provided by Dominic Byatt and Olivia Wells at Oxford University Press. A transatlantic residential relocation in 2013 combined with the unanticipated developments over the crisis in Ukraine resulted in multiple extensions of our deadlines for completion of the book, and we surely appreciate the abundant patience and flexibility on the part of Dominic, Olivia, and their colleagues at Oxford in adjusting to our schedule. We thank David Mowry of the Kozmetsky Center for providing valuable editorial support. We thank each other for encouragement and sustaining commitment to a project that has required a tremendous dedication of time, concentration, and hard work. Most of all we want to thank our families, whose love and support throughout the extended periods of research and writing really did make this possible. Sharyl Cross, Austin and Paul Bolt, Colorado Springs, 2016 Disclaimer: The ideas expressed in this book are those of the authors, and are not a reflection of the views of the institutions where we are presently or have been employed or affiliated.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations About the Authors

xv xix

1. Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, and World Order

1

2. Energy and the Economic Foundations of the Sino–Russian Relationship

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3. The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship: Emerging Trends and Challenges

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4. Russia, China, and Contemporary International Conflicts: Ukraine and Syria

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5. Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges: Color Revolutions, Cyber and Information Security, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism

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Conclusion: The Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership: Implications for Contemporary World Order and Geopolitics Index

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List of Abbreviations

AIIB

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

APEC

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APR

Asia-Pacific region

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASAT

Anti-satellite

ASCM

Anti-ship cruise missile

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BMD

Ballistic missile defense

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CAC

Cybersecurity Administration of China

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CICIR

China Institute of Contemporary International Relations

CIIS

China Institute of International Studies

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CMC

Central Military Commission

CNOOC

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

CNPC

China National Petroleum Corporation

CPSU

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSAC

Cyber Security Association of China

CSTO

Collective Security Treaty Organization

CT

Counterterrorism

CTC

Counter-Terrorism Committee

CTED

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

CVE

Countering violent extremism

EAG

Eurasian group on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism

EEU

Eurasian Economic Union

ESPO

East Siberian–Pacific Ocean pipeline

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List of Abbreviations ETIM

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

EU

European Union

FATF

Financial Action Task Force

FSB

Federal Security Service

GLONASS

Global Navigation Satellite System

ICANN

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

ICT

Information and communication technology

IMU

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INEW

Integrated network electronic warfare

INF

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

IS

Islamic State

ISSG

International Syria Support Group

LNG

Liquid natural gas

MOFCOM

Ministry of Commerce

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATCG

National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group

NDB

New Development Bank

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

NEA

National Energy Administration

NGO

Non-governmental organization

NOC

National oil company

NRC

NATO-Russia Council

OBOR

One Belt, One Road

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PAP

People’s Armed Police

PARNAS

People’s Freedom Party

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF

People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC

People’s Republic of China

PYD

Democratic Union Party

RATS

Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure

RFE

Russian Far East

RMB

Renminbi

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List of Abbreviations SAM

Surface-to-air missile

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SPR

Strategic petroleum reserve

SSF

Strategic Support Force

THAAD

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

TIP

Turkistan Islamic Party

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council resolutions

YPG

People’s Protection Units

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About the Authors

Paul J. Bolt Dr Paul Bolt is a Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, where he has taught since 1997. Dr Bolt served previously as Head of the Department of Political Science at the US Air Force Academy. He received his BA from Hope College and his MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has taught at Zhejiang University and Baicheng Normal College in the People’s Republic of China, as well as the University of Illinois. In 2009–10 he served as a Fulbright scholar at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Dr Bolt teaches courses in Asian Politics, Defense Policy, American Government, American Grand Strategy, and Comparative Politics. He is the author of China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia (Praeger Publishers, 2000), and has published on Asia and security issues in the Journal of Contemporary China, Issues and Studies, Asian Affairs, Asian Security, China: An International Journal, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and various edited volumes. He has also co-edited The United States, Russia and China: Confronting Global Terrorism and Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Praeger Security International Series, 2008), China’s Nuclear Future (Lynne Rienner, 2006), and American Defense Policy, 8th edition (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Sharyl N. Cross Dr Sharyl Cross is Director of the Kozmetsky Center at St. Edward’s University in Austin and Global Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC. Dr Cross was Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in GarmischPartenkirchen Germany (2005–13) where she served as Director of Academics for both the Program in Advanced Security Studies and the Senior Executive Seminar. Prior to the Marshall Center, Dr Cross had been appointed Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy teaching courses on Russian foreign policy, US–Russian relations, and global security. She was a resident Senior Fulbright Scholar in Moscow in 1999, serving on the faculty of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO) and as visiting research scholar at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences. She earned a PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and was a resident fellowship scholar and consultant at the RAND Corporation, completing programs in Russian area and policy studies. Dr Cross has published extensively on Russian foreign and security policy in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Asian Security, Journal of Strategic Security, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,

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About the Authors Nationalities Papers, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (Russian Academy of Sciences), and in several other journals and edited volumes. Her books include Shaping South East Europe’s Security Community: Trust, Partnership, and Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, New Security Challenges Series, 2013), The United States, Russia, and China: Confronting Global Terrorism and Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Praeger Security International Series, 2008), Global Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives (Macmillan, 1999), and The New Chapter in United States-Russian Relations: Opportunities and Challenges (Praeger, 1994).

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1 Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, and World Order

The year 2016 marked the twentieth anniversary of the strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the fifteenth anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. Over the past two decades, political relations between China and Russia have become increasingly dynamic and close, with common views on most major world issues, frequent summits, significant Russian arms sales to China, and joint military exercises. China’s leader Xi Jinping made his first foreign visit to Moscow in 2013, and he and President Putin have established a close personal bond.1 However, the events of 2014 catalyzed even deeper relations between these two Eurasian giants. Western attempts to influence the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, the Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, followed by Western sanctions against Russia and the deployment of NATO military forces further east, broke what was left of the trust between Russia and the West. As a result, Russia pivoted more sharply to the east, and especially toward China. Although China did not endorse Russia’s actions in Ukraine, it believed that Russia had been pushed into a corner as a result of Western instigation of the uprising that led to the ouster of the government in Kiev in 2014. At the same time, relations between the United States and China were deteriorating, due largely to intensified Chinese efforts to advance its maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea at the expense of American allies, raising fears in the United States that China would interfere with freedom of navigation in vital sea lines of communication. The closeness of Russia and China to each other and their distance from other Western powers was illustrated in 2015 by festivities in Moscow in May, and then in Beijing in September, celebrating the anniversary of the end of World War II. While Xi went to Moscow and Putin traveled to Beijing, President Obama and other Western leaders held commemorations elsewhere. Since the events of early 2014, China and Russia have signed new agreements on building gas pipelines (although the pipelines have not been built yet) and

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increased their joint military exercises, with naval drills taking place in the South China Sea in 2016. The two partners have cooperated diplomatically on Syria, and Russia and China have worked together on non-traditional security issues such as cyberspace, terrorism, and preventing “colored revolutions”, unified by a shared vision that stable authoritarian government is legitimate. Since 2014, Russia and China have also intensified efforts to enhance economic cooperation, and have begun working on integrating China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). They characterize their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination. This is not to suggest that China and Russia have overcome all differences in their outlooks and policies. While China has asserted its maritime interests, it is relatively cautious in its foreign policy in order to preserve a stable environment for economic growth. Russia has been more willing to violate traditional rules, norms, and expectations and defy US preferences if it believes it is in its interests to do so. There are significant structural differences in the Russian and Chinese economies that impede closer bilateral economic cooperation, and these barriers will continue to present significant challenges even with strong political will to overcome them. China does not want to become overly entangled in Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, and Moscow strives to maintain good relations with Hanoi in spite of Vietnam’s dispute with China in the South China Sea. Thus, China and Russia have a useful partnership with strong momentum that shapes international politics. China and Russia seek to alter aspects of the liberal world order which they had no hand in creating, although China in particular has benefited from this order. What remains an open question is how the power disparity between the two countries will play out over the coming years. China treats Russia with respect. Nevertheless, the fact remains that China is outpacing Russia in economic growth and military spending. Leading Russian experts on China, Alexander Gabuev and Alexei Voskressenski, note that Russians have recently suggested the reference to “elder sister” for Russia in the Sino–Russian relationship, or a woman of senior status, that more powerful China should respect or even protect.2 While Russian elites are determined to establish Russia as an independent pillar in the world and insist that Russia will not serve as a junior partner to any country, the long-term power differential is a fact that Russia must deal with. The academic and policy debates on Sino–Russian ties cover two major issues. The first is the question of how close and stable the relationship of these two countries really is. In other words, what is the best way to characterize this relationship? Answers in the literature have ranged from cynical cooperation on a limited range of issues to an alliance that threatens the West. The second (and related) debate is how the Sino–Russian relationship will shape the liberal international order. How do Beijing and Moscow view the current order, and 2

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how might their partnership alter aspects of this order? Within these broader questions lie more specific issue areas where China and Russia both cooperate and compete. These include economic and energy ties, security and arms sales, regional conflicts, and approaches toward non-traditional security concerns. In addressing these topics, this book has four major themes. First, Russia and China have common interests that cement their partnership. One such interest is maintenance of external and internal security. A secure joint border is vital for both states, as well as cooperation against terrorism and internal threats. While China and Russia have different forms of government, they share a goal of legitimizing and protecting authoritarian institutions. Moreover, both countries are strengthening state institutions at the expense of civil society and private business. An additional common interest is dissatisfaction with elements of the existing liberal world order. While the West holds rules for resolving disputes to be central to the order, China and Russia perceive injustices that are difficult to remedy under the existing rules. A second theme is that Russia and China are key players in shaping the international order. Western triumphalism after the end of the Cold War is past, and Russia and China will be influential in all major world issues, affecting the balance of power, norms of both domestic and international conduct, and global institutions. Russia and China can be a counterbalance to the United States and the West, but the cooperation of these two giants will also be critical in successfully managing a host of transnational security challenges in the global environment. A third theme is that the West is still an important partner for China and Russia in the economic and political realms. Russia and China are not directly opposing the West as in the Cold War, and desire a cooperative relationship with the West, but one in which the West makes greater accommodation of their interests. The final theme is that Russia and China are partners but not allies. While the pace of cooperation between the two states is quickening, there are limits to the amount of support each will give the other, as well as elements of distrust that, although perhaps not often publicly discussed, are rooted in history and the fear of ongoing changes in relative power.

World Order Since the end of the Cold War and the unexpected collapse of the bipolar world order, scholars and policymakers have attempted to understand the contours of an emerging order. As early as 1989, Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist now at Stanford University, predicted the end of history, a world where liberal democracy reigned supreme without serious ideological 3

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challengers. In 1991, US President George H. W. Bush proclaimed a “new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.” However, Fukuyama’s onetime mentor Samuel Huntington foresaw a very different structure, a clash of civilizations where frequent wars would be fought along civilizational fault lines.3 By the mid-1990s, many observers noted a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States, although debate revolved around how long unipolarity would last.4 For instance, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described the United States as a “hyperpower,” meaning “a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories,” and thus a state whose unilateral tendencies, in his view, needed to be balanced.5 This matters because major powers seek to advance their view of world order. Henry Kissinger states that the American view of order sees democratic principles as universal, necessary to legitimize governments. Seeing itself as unique and having a mission, the American view is rooted in Wilsonianism. Kissinger claims, “Whenever America has been tested by crisis or conflict . . . it has returned in one way or another to Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a world order that secures peace through democracy, open diplomacy, and the cultivation of shared rules and standards.” Unfortunately, according to Kissinger, this Wilsonian impulse takes neither history nor geopolitics into account.6 Liberal Wilsonian values continue to affect the American worldview. As described by the 2015 National Security Strategy, the American vision consists of “a rules-based international order that works best through empowered citizens, responsible states, and effective regional and international organizations.”7 It self-consciously strives to promote American values abroad, defining democracy, human rights, and the equality of minority groups around the world as fundamental American interests.8 While critics point to numerous instances of the US applying rules to others but not itself, the Wilsonian principles themselves are not universally accepted. Today the unipolar moment has passed: US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan; Russian activism in Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere; the emergence of the BRICS (a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa); the power of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates; and significant weaknesses in Western financial structures illustrated by the 2008 financial crisis, continuing instability in the Eurozone, and Brexit have all posed challenges to the liberal world order.9 Kissinger states: “Our age is insistently, at times almost desperately, in pursuit of a concept of world order,” noting that order consists of both legitimacy, or rules that are widely considered just, and power relationships between states.10 He makes it clear that, regrettably, nuclear proliferation, cyber technology, and the pressures brought on political leaders by digital media make the framing of a global order more difficult. 4

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Views of world order are inevitably tied to one’s theoretical perspective. Realists see order as the prevailing power distribution among states. Because the world is anarchic, “order” always has a conflictual element. Liberals emphasize the importance of international institutions in shaping world order. They also focus on the domestic characteristics of states, particularly the extent to which states embrace values such as democracy and human rights. Constructivists note that conceptions of order evolve in line with state identities, conceptions of interest, and norms. The English School views international order as “a pattern or arrangement that sustains the primary goals of a society of states. It must involve limits on behaviour, the management of conflict, and the accommodation of change without undermining the common goals and values of society.”11 States too have differing views of world order. China and Russia have demonstrated dissatisfaction with elements of the current liberal order. Both countries publicly call for a multipolar world where the interests of all major powers are taken into account. As early as 1997, the two sides submitted a document to the United Nations entitled a “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order.”12 Both countries insist that major international issues be worked out in the United Nations Security Council, where they have a veto. Russia and China advocate for stronger state sovereignty, where human rights are not issues of international concern. Russia and China both reject the notion that democracy is necessary for government legitimacy. Russia insists on a sphere of influence in the former Soviet states, while China wants the United States to stop intervening in its maritime territorial disputes. The way that China and Russia will shape the world order, and the influence each will have, is still unfolding. China has greater resources than Russia, although Moscow is more inclined to boldly challenge the status quo. This book will explore Sino–Russian ties, with an emphasis on how this relationship will affect the features and rules of world order in terms of both power distribution and what constitutes legitimate rules, norms, or expectations of behavior. The current chapter will look at the legacy of the history of Chinese– Russian relations, noting major historical events and their effect on world order, as well as providing an overview of how China and Russia view the international rules of the game.13

The Legacy of History in Chinese–Russian Relations Russia’s first experience with an Asian empire was invasion from Genghis Khan’s grandson Batu Khan and his general Subutai from 1223–40. The Mongol forces crushed Russian military opposition and burned fourteen 5

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cities, including Moscow and Kiev. As a result, Russia lay under Mongol subjugation for more than two hundred years. (The Mongols also ruled China under the Yuan Dynasty.) Mongol rule left a legacy of both despotism and positive administrative reforms.14 It also contributed to an abiding Russian sense of insecurity and fear of invasion. Russian dealings with the Qing Dynasty began in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 established a border between Russia and the Qing that recognized the Amur basin and the current Russian maritime province as Chinese territory. It also established licensed border trade between the two empires. However, even more significantly from a world order perspective, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was China’s first treaty with a European state. The agreement resembled treaties between Western states, and the two sides negotiated as sovereign equals. Thus, in this pact the Qing and its powerful emperor Kangxi recognized the czar as a sovereign outside the traditional Chinese tribute system. Harvard historian Odd Arne Westad notes, “Of all the European states, China’s first regular foreign relations were with Russia. Indeed, it can be argued that China’s first foreign relations—in anything approaching the Western sense—with any country were with that other expanding empire moving into East Asia from the north.”15 In 1715, the Qing permitted a Russian Orthodox mission in Beijing to serve the spiritual needs of Russians. This mission essentially served as an embassy, the only one in Beijing for more than one hundred years.16 The Kiakhta Treaty of 1727 enabled two hundred Russian merchants to go to Beijing every third year, in addition to permitting border trade. By the end of the 1700s, 10 percent of Russia’s trade was conducted with China. As Westad argues, “While the Qing, at home, tried to pass its relations with the Russians off as tribute, it was clearly very different from the exchanges China had with any other country.”17 By the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia was becoming a threat to China. Russia continued to expand eastward along the Amur, and Russian officials had territorial designs on China. While the Qing Empire fought for survival during the Taiping Rebellion and was concurrently engaged in the Second Opium War against the French and British, Russia made territorial demands. The Treaty of Aigun (1858) gave Russia 185,000 square miles of territory along the northern bank of the Amur. In return, Russia promised to mediate the Second Opium War, a promise it did not keep. In the Treaty of Peking (1860), Russia gained an additional 130,000 square miles from China along the coastline. These treaties were achieved in part through Russian local officials exceeding their instructions, although Moscow was also attempting to make up for losses in Crimea.18 Russia further sought territory along the western border. The Treaty of Tarbagatai in 1864 gave Russia 350,000 square miles from Xinjiang, and 6

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during the 1860s Russia encouraged Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in order to enhance its influence there. Russian troops occupied the Ili Valley in 1871, but the Qing regained control of Xinjiang by 1878 and thwarted further Russian efforts to acquire territory there. The empire made Xinjiang a province and tried to better incorporate it into the rest of China. In all this the Qing came to see Russia as more dangerous than other European states due to its efforts to permanently take Chinese territory.19 Later on, Mao would demand that Russia return to China the territories gained through the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century.20 In the late nineteenth century, the Qing began allowing Han Chinese to settle in Manchuria, the traditional Manchu homeland, in order to solidify Qing control over the region. Some of the new settlers moved to the north side of the Amur River, causing fear in Russia that it would lose control of this territory. As a result, Russians began expelling Chinese from the north bank in 1886. Moreover, Japan had designs on the area as well. Alarmed over Siberian security and possessing expansionist ambitions of its own, Russia began building the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1891, with plans to traverse Manchuria. The Qing gave Russia a concession for the Manchurian section of the railroad as part of a secret Russian–Chinese alliance against Japan in 1896. Russia again intervened in Manchuria in 1898 by leasing the Liaodong Peninsula, including Lüshun and Dalian. This provided Russia with warm-water harbor facilities to defend its railroad.21 Russia further threatened Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion when it occupied the three northeastern provinces with approximately 100,000 troops. Moscow resisted withdrawing its forces after the uprising ended, leading to a strong reaction from China, Japan, and the other foreign powers involved in China. Russia hoped to make Manchuria its exclusive sphere of influence. However, Moscow’s dreams were shattered by the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–5. Russia’s defeat forced it to recognize a Japanese sphere of influence in Korea and turn over Lüshun, Dalian, and the Southern Manchurian Railroad to Japan, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island.22 Less than five years later, however, Russia made gains in Mongolia. In 1911, when the Qing was falling to Republican forces, Mongolian separatist leaders declared independence from China. Russian support for Mongolia led to political leverage and commercial privileges there. The 1915 Tripartite Treaty between the Republic of China, Russia, and Mongolia affirmed the new status quo. While legally China maintained suzerainty over Mongolia, it was forced to grant the Mongolians autonomy, a major diplomatic victory for Russia. After the Bolsheviks moved into Mongolia in 1921, Mongolia again declared independence with the clear understanding that this was to be guarded by the Soviet Union. Thus, in important ways Soviet policy was consistent with czarist policy.23 7

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The period from 1937–45 was especially complex, with constantly shifting ties between the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At stake were world order-altering questions of who would rule China and maintain dominant influence in Asia. China and the Soviet Union agreed to the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty in August 1937, creating an alliance against Japan. This pact was abrogated when the Soviet Union aligned with Germany in 1939, leading to an improvement in ties between Moscow and Tokyo. In 1941, while China was fighting for its life, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality agreement, a major setback for then head of state Chiang Kai-shek. Both sides adhered to neutrality almost until the end of the war. However, after tortuous negotiations over Xinjiang, Manchuria, and the CCP, the Soviet Union and Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945. At the same time, the Moscow-directed Comintern worked to control the CCP and manipulate the conflict between the CCP and Kuomintang (KMT) to foster Soviet interests. During this period, Moscow’s goals included using China to enhance Soviet security vis-à-vis Japan, Germany, and the West; controlling Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria; and managing the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek sought to defeat Japan, maintain Chinese territorial integrity in light of Soviet designs, demonstrate his nationalist credentials to his own population, defeat the CCP, and use the Soviets to strengthen his government. Mao similarly strove to demonstrate CCP nationalism, use the Soviets to strengthen the CCP while simultaneously ridding the party of Soviet influence through various internal struggles, and drive the KMT out of power.24 While in theory ideology created a bond between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CCP, in practice the three-way struggle was based largely on realist considerations of power and interest. After the victory of the CCP in the Chinese revolution, China was eager to learn from the Soviet Union. In 1949, Mao said that the Soviet Communist Party “is our best teacher and we must learn from it.” Mao announced that China would “lean to one side,” and on February 14, 1950, after hard bargaining, Mao and Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Subsequently, the Soviets sent 10,000 advisors to China. However, before too long the relationship began to sour. By 1956, Mao, referring to the Soviets and Eastern Europeans, said, “We mustn’t copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. Naturally, we mustn’t pick up their shortcomings and weak points . . . Some of our people were not clear about this and even picked up their weaknesses.”25 Subsequently, the relationship deteriorated further, to the point that war seemed likely by 1969. Early after the CCP victory, China attempted to adapt major elements of the Soviet economic model, believing it was suitable for China. Soviet experts 8

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taught Chinese cadres how to produce five-year economic plans, and China’s first plan relied heavily on Soviet loans and other assistance. In May 1953, the two countries signed the Agreement on Assistance by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Allied Governments to the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the Purpose of Developing China’s National Economy, which provided assistance for 141 major projects. But by 1953 the Soviet Union, which was at a different stage of economic development from China, began adjusting its own economic model. This was seen as revisionist in Beijing, and was one factor leading to later clashes between China and the Soviet Union.26 China also learned from the Soviet military in ways that still resonate today. University of Macau political scientist You Ji notes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) made huge advances within five years of its victory in 1949 as it acquired Soviet weaponry, including 800,000 guns, 11,000 artillery pieces, and 5,000 aircraft. The PLA also learned from the Soviets how to transform a guerrilla army into a conventional force by studying centralized regulations, rank structure, training regimens, and command arrangements. In addition, the Soviets helped China develop its defense industries. Nevertheless, PLA and Soviet ways often clashed. The Soviet military was a conventional force that had helped defeat Adolf Hitler. The PLA was primarily a guerrilla force with very different traditions and viewpoints on how to fight. In particular, PLA political commissars disliked the Soviet model because it emphasized professionalism over ideology. PLA officers had major internal debates on whether they had gone too far in adopting the Soviet model, and careers were ended for those on the losing side.27 These arguments, of course, reflected broader debates in Chinese politics on red versus expert and self-reliance versus integration. By the late 1950s, less than ten years after the victory of Mao’s CCP, the Sino–Soviet relationship was in trouble. The seeds of dissension had been sown early. During the CCP’s wars against the KMT and Japan, Stalin and Mao often had conflicting viewpoints and Mao regularly ignored Stalin’s instructions.28 When Mao was in Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and Mutual Assistance from December 1949 to February 1950, Stalin treated him poorly. Stalin was suspicious of Mao, and left Mao sitting in a dacha for weeks with nothing to do in order to humiliate him. While the treaty they eventually negotiated provided economic benefits for China, secret protocols gave the Soviet Union special rights in Xinjiang and Northeast China that were a reminder of China’s past unequal treaties.29 Moreover, the Korean War deepened mutual suspicion between China and the Soviet Union as each country tried to manipulate the other and China paid a high price in lives and treasure defending North Korea. Relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated further after Stalin died in 1953 and Khrushchev became the Soviet leader. From an ideological 9

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perspective, Mao believed that Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, which began in 1956, was an assault on him. Further, Mao thought that he should now become the leader of the world revolutionary movement rather than Khrushchev, a position completely unacceptable to the Soviets. Moreover, Mao and Khrushchev personally clashed, and strategic differences between Moscow and Beijing were very real. In 1957, when the Soviet Union advocated peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao called for a struggle against imperialism and asserted that the “east wind” was now prevailing over the “west wind.” In the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Mao challenged the Soviet Union and dragged it reluctantly into a confrontation it had sought to avoid, further alienating Moscow.30 This was exemplified by the Soviet withdrawal of aid to help China develop a nuclear weapon. The downward spiral in relations continued when China launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Despite the recommendations of Soviet experts, the CCP undertook mass collectivization and industrialization through means that Moscow considered absurd. As a result, in 1960 the Soviet Union withdrew its specialists and their blueprints from China, embittering the Chinese for years to come. The Soviet declaration of neutrality in the Sino–Indian War of 1962, and subsequent economic and military aid to India, revealed the depths of the split. In 1963, China demanded that the Soviets recognize the nineteenthcentury border treaties as unjust, and throughout the 1960s both sides built up military forces along their common border. Mao proclaimed in 1964 that a counterrevolution had occurred in the Soviet Union and capitalism had been restored there, a damning ideological claim. In international relations, the two states continued to compete for leadership of the third world and the communist movement. Support for Vietnam, in particular, caused tension. Circumstances deteriorated with the onset of the Cultural Revolution when in 1967 Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing. By 1969, there were armed clashes along the border and the two sides were preparing for war.31 Although war fears later eased, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union remained tense in the 1970s. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was a direct challenge to Vietnam’s Soviet patron, but Moscow did not respond by supporting Vietnam in any meaningful way. China believed that Vietnam sought hegemony in Southeast Asia and was unwilling to see this realized. Ties slowly improved in the 1980s, especially as both states moved away from strict ideological positions. Relations were finally normalized with Mikhail Gorbachev’s trip to Beijing in 1989 after enough progress had been made on the three issues that were particularly important to China: the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet forces along the Chinese border, and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.32 Ironically, as China sought to learn from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, it also later sought to assess lessons from the Gorbachev era. Before the collapse 10

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of the Soviet Union, Chinese scholars looked at Soviet reforms to determine how these policies might be applicable to China.33 More important, however, were the debates that occurred within the CCP after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders were shocked by this event. They desperately wanted to know the primary factors that led to the collapse, and how to avoid such a disaster in China. David Shambaugh, a leading scholar of Chinese politics at George Washington University, notes that thirteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Enhancing the Party’s Ruling Capacity was adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Congress of the CCP, summarizing lessons from the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. An eight-volume DVD set entitled “Consider Danger in Times of Peace: Historical Lessons from the Fall of the CPSU” was made in 2006, and all party organs were required to view it. In general, Chinese analysts saw systematic problems in the CPSU in four categories: economic, political and coercive, social and cultural, and international.34 A. Greer Meisels of the Wilson Center identifies three dominant schools of thought in China regarding lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union: Some conservatives and leftists hold Gorbachev responsible; liberals and reformers point to the system for an incorrect execution of the socialist model; while other conservatives and leftists blame the West, the source of bourgeois liberalization and peaceful evolution.35 Xi Jinping has argued that the CPSU collapsed because “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist” the attacks against it, and as a result he has led China in a much more centralized and ideological direction.36 Boris Yeltsin visited China shortly after becoming the Russian president in 1992, and the leadership of Russia and China classified their relationship as a “strategic partnership” in 1996 after progress on demarcating the border. However, early in the Yeltsin period, the leadership of the Russian Federation looked primarily to the United States and Europe, and Russia’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, spoke of developing a “strategic partnership and alliance based on common values” with the United States.37 Russia’s first Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, issued in 1993, referred to Western countries as the “dynamic factor in the progress of world civilization in the foreseeable future.”38 However, the expectations of the early 1990s were not met, due in part to NATO expansion and the NATO air war over Kosovo, resulting in a more sobering assessment of Russia’s relationship with the West. Already by 1994, Boris Yeltsin warned of a “Cold Peace” falling over Europe, asserting that “plans for expanding NATO” would “create new divisions” and “sow seeds of distrust.”39 These tensions with the West led Russia to look increasingly to the East in order to create a more balanced foreign policy. Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996–8) and Prime Minister (1998–9), advocated 11

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shifting foreign policy to prioritize Russia’s interests in Asia and the Middle East. In doing so he argued for the formation of a Russia–India–China strategic bloc as a counterweight to the United States. Alexander Yakovlev, senior research scholar at the Institute of the Far East in the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote in 1997 that Russia, China, and perhaps India “can act as inspirers and organizers of a new anti-hegemonic, anti-Western international front.”40 In 2002, the Russian, Indian, and Chinese prime ministers met informally in New York, and since 2007 have met at least annually, releasing a joint communiqué in a sign of “RIC” cooperation. However, differing national priorities and the Sino–Indian border dispute have prevented further institutionalization of this trilateral relationship.41 Since Vladimir Putin’s first election as president in 2000, there have been tensions and geostrategic conflicts in Russia’s relationship with the West. A high point was achieved after unexpectedly strong Russian support for the US-led War on Terror after the attacks of September 11. Low points include the US invasion of Iraq, colored revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Russia’s war with Georgia. The Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine in 2014, followed by Western sanctions, pushed Russia further toward China, although the Russian “pivot” to the East had preceded the deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West in 2014.

China, Russia, and the Liberal International World Order China struggled to adapt to the Westphalian world order in the nineteenth century as the Qing Empire declined. Beginning with the First Opium War (1839–42), the major world powers forced China to adjust to the rules of international (Western) diplomacy in which all states were theoretically equal, diplomats resided in foreign capitals, and imperialism was a mark of great powers. Thus, the Qing not only grappled with states that wanted territorial concessions in China, but also with the necessity to reconceptualize a hierarchical worldview that pictured China as culturally and politically superior to other civilizations. After the CCP victory in 1949, Mao strived to fundamentally change the domestic and world order. Inspired by an ideology that predicted a proletarian revolution would sweep aside existing political and economic structures around the globe, China saw itself as a champion of the Third World. While Chinese foreign policy under Mao could be pragmatic, it was also sometimes ideologically driven, particularly during the Cultural Revolution when Red Guards tried to take over the Foreign Ministry. After Mao died and China began its reform period in the late 1970s, China achieved rapid economic growth, along with commensurate political influence. Never had so many 12

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people experienced such rapid change over so short a time. This growth was enabled by the contemporary international order, an order in which China had little to no say in creating. How much does China now want to change the existing order?42 One area of debate is how to define China’s traditional view of world order, and what perceptions of the traditional order mean for China’s preferences today. The “Chinese World Order” is a phrase first used by John King Fairbank, the renowned Harvard historian.43 More recently, writers have referred to the Chinese system as tianxia, meaning “all under heaven.” The traditional Chinese world order refers to a hierarchical Asian system with the Chinese emperor at the pinnacle due to China’s cultural superiority. Other states paid tribute to China in recognition of their subservience, and in return were given valuable gifts by the emperor. Enthusiasts of the Chinese world order claim that it was benevolent and a better model than the Westphalian system, with all states benefiting. For example, David Kang of the University of Southern California states “East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West.”44 Others disagree, noting that there was frequent warfare in imperial China, the empire was maintained by force, or the tributary system did not define all of China’s foreign relations. For example, Georgia Tech professor Fei-Ling Wang argues that there was a great deal of diversity in world order across the different Chinese dynasties, and Chinese today debate their preferred world order. June Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami claims, “Supporters of the revival of tianxia as a model for today’s world are essentially misrepresenting the past to talk about the present, distorting it in order to advance an equally distorted political agenda.”45 One supporter of using tianxia as a framework in the contemporary order is Zhao Tingyang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhao argues that we live in a global society that requires global governance, not just nationstate governance. Tianxia is a world theory that entails a benevolent empire ruling the globe. While tianxia is a Chinese concept of order, Zhao holds that any nation could rule under this model.46 Although Chinese leaders have not embraced tianxia publicly because its hierarchical nature would suggest that China is striving to replace the United States as the world’s leading power, they have emphasized Confucian themes such as harmony while striving not to appear to abandon Marxism in the process. While imperial China defined the Asian order and Mao publicly advocated a radical transformation of the world order, Deng Xiaoping adopted a more modest position. Deng’s primary goal was to build China’s economy while maintaining the power of the CCP. Such a strategy required a peaceful international environment and a concentration of China’s resources on economic development. As a result, Deng laid down the principle of “hide your strength, 13

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bide your time, never take the lead,” understanding that eventually China would become more powerful and able to exercise greater influence. However, Deng’s dictum left open the question of when China would be strong enough to change its approach. While the strategy was designed to minimize anxiety over the implications of China’s rise for the international community, concerns were inevitable.47 There have been a variety of official pronouncements designed to reassure the world about China’s rise and offer clues to China’s vision of world order. For example, the Information Office of the State Council published a White Paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development in 2011.48 This document asserts that China “takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world peace and promoting common development and prosperity for all countries.” China’s development is scientific, independent, open, peaceful, cooperative, and serves the interests of not only China, but also the world. In seeking peaceful development, Chinese foreign policy endeavors to “promote democracy in international relations.” China endorses the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and rejects alliances in order to promote “new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.” The White Paper asserts that this model of peaceful development is consistent with China’s history and culture,49 although it seems to fit better with a Westphalian rather than a hierarchical order. Similarly, China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, tries to make the point that China’s military will only be used in a defensive capacity. In uncompromising language, the document asserts: It is China’s unshakable national commitment and strategic choice to take the road of peaceful development. China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. China opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion. China advocates a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security.

According to this viewpoint, China’s rise contributes to a peaceful international order.50 Official documents as well as scholars emphasize further aspects of Chinese diplomacy that have world order implications. Xi Jinping has proposed that relations with the United States and other major powers, including Russia, be based on “A New Type of Great Power Relations,” an item on the agenda at the summit with President Obama at Sunnylands in 2013. The essence of this model 14

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is defined as “1) neither a confrontation nor a conflict; 2) mutual respect; and 3) win-win cooperation.” This proposal can be seen as a response to the US call for China to become a responsible stakeholder. China does not want to just join an order in which it had no say in creating, but seeks to shape that order.51 The call for A New Type of Great Power Relations can also be seen as an effort to urge the United States to respect China’s core interests in order to avoid a war caused by a power transition. However, from the perspective of the United States, both China’s core interests and A New Type of Great Power Relations are too vaguely defined and would undermine American alliances. Russia, on the other hand, has been more accepting of this concept.52 One Chinese scholar close to the security community noted that while the current order greatly favors the United States, which had a large hand in creating it, China has benefited from it too. However, the world order needs to be changed where it is not just. China will therefore strive to alter certain aspects of the order, such as IMF voting rights, terms of trade in the economic order, and rules governing intellectual property rights. While China will not try to overturn the order or US leadership, it does need to assert itself to better protect its rightful interests.53 Liselotte Odgaard of the Royal Danish Defence College describes China’s version of international order as “coexistence.” This vision of order embodies often-proclaimed concepts such as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference, mutual nonaggression, and peaceful coexistence. However, there are inconsistencies between China’s stated doctrines and its actions, including contradictions between China’s desire for a peaceful rise and other goals that must be accomplished through hard power. For example, China seemingly desires regional primacy and raises tensions in regional disputes while calling for a peaceful environment and swearing off hegemony. China seeks a stable international and economic environment, while aiming to undermine the United States in important ways. China wants soft power at the same time as the CCP cracks down on perceived political opponents and encourages Chinese nationalism. Odgaard believes this is because the strategy of coexistence is not principled, but rather a means to achieve great power status.54 Xi Jinping’s unique stamp on Chinese ideology and foreign policy has been the concept of the “Chinese Dream,” summarized as “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Thus, the dream links the CCP and contemporary communist rhetoric with the glories and contributions of China’s past. While it officially encapsulates previous elements of Chinese foreign policy doctrine, such as a peaceful environment, peaceful development, and win-win cooperation between states, there is more of a nationalistic edge to the dream. The concept is also linked to two upcoming centenaries: the 2021 anniversary of the establishment of the CCP, and the 2049 anniversary of the founding of the 15

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PRC. Xi has set a goal of creating a “moderately well-off society” before 2021, and a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious” by 2049. Xi asserts that the Chinese Dream links individuals to the state. He emphasizes the central role of the CCP in achieving the dream, the necessity of hard work across generations, the importance of innovation to achieving the dream, and even the participation in the dream of ethnic Chinese living abroad.55 Xi has also suggested that China’s experience has lessons for the rest of the world. In a speech celebrating the 95th anniversary of the CCP, Xi declared CCP “members and the people of China are fully confident about adding the China solution to mankind’s search for better social systems.”56 There are critics of Xi Jinping’s conception of the China Dream. For example, William Callahan, professor at the London School of Economics, documents many different dreams in China. Looking at twenty perspectives on China’s future from officials, dissidents, and public intellectuals, Callahan asserts that there are a variety of influential views about China’s future, not just the official line.57 Notre Dame’s Victoria Hui argues that Xi’s China Dream assumes a 5,000 year history of a powerful and peaceful China that is in fact a myth. China was often divided, emperors sought military expansion, and people were exploited. Instead of looking to the past, China needs to look to the future.58 Xi has also expressed dissatisfaction with the current security architecture in Asia. The existing structure is dominated by the US hub-and-spokes system, with the US maintaining key bilateral alliances in the region. This is supplemented by ASEAN-led multilateral organizations that serve mainly as a venue for meetings. Speaking at the Conference on Interaction and Confidencebuilding Measures in Asia in May 2014, Xi proposed that its members, not the United States, play a bigger role in maintaining Asian security. According to Xi, Asian countries should provide for Asian security. A month later Xi reiterated his point, indirectly criticizing the United States for seeking to dominate Asia.59 This new proposed security structure, while unlikely to materialize anytime soon, points to Chinese dissatisfaction with the current regional order. China has undertaken several initiatives with implications for world order and international institutions that indicate China is no longer hiding its strength or biding its time. The first is leadership in founding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established an organization known as the Shanghai Five. Uzbekistan joined in 2001, and the group became the SCO. The SCO has contributed to regional security (including military exercises), economic cooperation, and cultural exchanges. While Russia has wanted the SCO to play a larger political role, China has pushed it to focus on economics. The 16

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SCO is not a formal military alliance with a binding defense commitment (Article V) based on shared values like NATO, but the organization has provided a forum for Russia, China, and Central Asian states to discuss and coordinate approaches on security and economic issues of shared concern. The SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan as members in 2016, but Russian efforts to bring Iran into the organization have so far been blocked.60 Second, China has played a key role in the BRICS. The BRICS is an avenue for China to practice international leadership in a low-threat environment. China uses its BRICS membership to enhance both its identity as a representative of developing countries in bringing about a more just world and its position as a rising power. At a summit in July 2014, the BRICS leaders announced they were establishing the New Development Bank (NDB) with a $50 billion initial capitalization, as well as a $100 billion currency reserve fund that members could draw on if they suffered from balance of payments difficulties. The bank was launched one year later, headquartered in Shanghai. Bank president Kundapur Vaman Kamath stated: “Our objective is not to challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the system in our own way.”61 Nevertheless, the BRICS countries were clearly unhappy with what they see as their subservient role in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and view current international institutions as inadequate to deal with global challenges. While weaknesses in the West revealed by the 2008 financial crisis gave impetus to the BRICS, and Chinese writers argue against the proposition that the BRICS will fade in importance, by 2015 the BRICS economies themselves had slowed considerably and the future influence of the BRICS as an organization was less certain.62 The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another Beijing initiative with world order implications. First proposed by Beijing in 2013, the multilateral bank is designed to fund infrastructure projects in Asia. The United States initially opposed the new institution, arguing that it would lower lending standards and undermine the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. In addition, the United States feared that the new bank would give China added political leverage in the region. However, Beijing responded that there is a need for greater financing of projects in Asia. Moreover, China makes a strong case that it is not given power commensurate with its economic influence in the World Bank, IMF, or Asian Development Bank (although China’s voting share in the IMF finally increased from 3.8 percent to 6 percent in 2016, a long overdue change). The Asian Development Bank, for example, has always been led by a Japanese national. In the end, the United States could not prevent many of its allies from becoming members of the new bank. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and South Korea all signed on to become founding members, although Japan declined.63 In June 2016, the bank announced its first four loans, which financed road 17

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improvements in Tajikistan and Pakistan, electric power in Bangladesh, and improved living conditions in Indonesia. Three of the projects are being co-financed with the ADB, World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.64 Surprisingly, Russia was one of the last states to sign on as a founding member of the AIIB. Some Russian bureaucrats feared that Russia lacked the resources to fund the bank. Perhaps Russian officials also worried that the AIIB will compete with the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Reportedly Putin himself was required to make the decision to join the AIIB, overcoming resistance in the bureaucracy.65 Another major Chinese initiative with potential to shape world order is an ambitious plan to alter the vast swathe of Eurasia’s landscape called One Belt, One Road. While China has already invested heavily around the world, strategically expanding its global presence, the goal of OBOR is to economically integrate Eurasia, a region with more than 60 percent of the world population, under Chinese leadership. Xi Jinping first proposed the plan in 2013, and in March 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Commerce publicly released an action plan. OBOR has two components: the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. The general outline of the plan involves Chinese-funded infrastructure development throughout Eurasia, lower tariffs in the region, streamlined customs procedures, greater financial integration based on the renminbi (RMB) currency, and stronger diplomatic coordination. More than 900 projects worth $890 billion are planned, and Beijing has promised large sums of money to the initiative. This includes $50 billion to the AIIB, $10 billion to the NDB, $40 billion to a New Silk Road Fund, and additional credits promised from the Bank of China. Most investments in OBOR are expected to come from Chinese development banks, including the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank. Foreign investors such as Singapore’s state-owned trade development board are also partnering in projects. Implementation of the plan could stretch out to 35 years.66 Chinese officials claim the initiative demonstrates that China is a benevolent power that does not threaten its neighbors. OBOR is portrayed as a winwin economic development for all who participate, but it is also a strategy designed to enhance China’s economic power and global role. It can be seen as a tangible manifestation of China moving from being what President Obama once called a “free rider” to a leader that provides public goods.67 Thus, there is an economic and a strategic rationale for OBOR. Investment in Eurasian infrastructure projects enhances China’s energy security, improves prospects for the long-term growth of China’s economy, fosters regional development in areas of China that have struggled economically, and potentially can create 18

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closer links between China and Europe. Economic growth in Central Asia is expected to promote political stability in the region and increase China’s influence. China has also demonstrated that as the United States pivots east, it has options to the west.68 Although OBOR has the highest-level political support and Xi Jinping’s political credibility is tied to the project, Chinese scholars have pointed out potential pitfalls. One concern is that China may rush into projects without proper consultations with host governments, damaging China’s relations with regional actors. Moreover, analysts are worried about political risk in the region, including violence or terrorism that could threaten projects, too much state involvement at the expense of private firms, misallocation of resources, too many Chinese provinces attempting to tap into the money China has allocated, and what OBOR might mean for China’s much vaunted non-interference policy. Further, scholars warn that some regional players, such as India and Vietnam, have reservations.69 Indeed, India has strongly objected to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, a key component of OBOR, because it crosses through a section of Indian-claimed Kashmir. The $46 billion Corridor, which consists of energy pipelines, roads, and railways connecting China with the port of Gwadar, also illustrates security risks in OBOR projects. From 2014 to September 2016, militants killed 44 and wounded more than 100 who were working on the project.70 Nevertheless, earlier unease about Russian reactions may have been misplaced. While Russia still has concerns about managing potential competition from China, it has also become more willing to find ways to cooperate (or even make compromises) with China so that it too can benefit from OBOR. OBOR also illustrates contradictions between the Chinese government’s political goals and Chinese investors seeking profits. It is a grand vision that can potentially reshape Eurasia. However, investing in OBOR countries, many of which have poor credit ratings and political instability, is commercially risky. Thus, in 2016 only 8.5 percent of Chinese outward direct investment went to OBOR countries. At the end of the year China’s policy banks, the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank, reported that 15 percent of their total overseas lending was OBOR-related. Hence, to date China has actually spent approximately $50 billion on OBOR projects, a sizable sum but less than the hype might suggest.71 Another area where China’s views on world order differ from the West is in the cyber arena. Certainly China and the United States want to strengthen cyber security to prevent crime. Both states also hope to secure their governments and corporations from cyber attack. Nonetheless, China takes a broader view of Internet threats. Chinese writers talk about “cyber sovereignty” or cyber “virtual territory” and the risks that the Internet poses to China’s social and political system. In 2015, China’s legislature passed a security law 19

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declaring that China’s sovereignty includes cyberspace. Moreover, the Chinese government is concerned that the Internet is dominated by Westerndesigned protocols and hardware. In order to mitigate what it sees as cyber threats, the Chinese government takes a much more active role in regulating the Internet and censoring content than Western states, leading to a system where what is available on the Internet varies across countries. China seeks norms and rules established by the United Nations that would legitimize restrictions on the Internet. The Wall Street Journal comments that “China’s determination to promote an alternative to the borderless Internet embraced by Americans marks yet another way the country is challenging a US-led world order under President Xi.”72 China has further sought to reshape the Asian order by employing more aggressive means of asserting its territorial claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In the East China Sea, Japan and China claim the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. While Japan administratively controls the islands, Beijing is seeking to force Tokyo to recognize that sovereignty is disputed. In the South China Sea, China has overlapping claims with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. China’s assertive strategy is demonstrated by the 2013 establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that overlaps territory claimed by Japan and South Korea, by increased military patrols, and the creation of islands in the South China Sea. China also refused to participate in a case brought against it by the Philippines at a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal in The Hague, and has not accepted the tribunal’s verdict that rejects much of China’s territorial claim.73 While China is trying to alter the world order through institutions such as the SCO, BRICS, and the AIIB; initiatives such as OBOR; moves to regulate the cyber order; and more aggressive steps to change the Asian order in the South China Sea and East China Sea, it is ironically most satisfied with the United Nations, in spite of the fact that the UN was created without input from the PRC. There are several reasons why China prefers the institutional design of the UN. First, the UN is by definition a multilateral organization where states have legal equality. Moreover, the Security Council acts as a concert system. It recognizes China as a great power, while the General Assembly enables China to identify with developing countries. There are also common norms and preferences shared by China and the UN in regard to peacekeeping. As a result, of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China is the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations.74 The initiatives on the part of Beijing suggest two questions. The first is whether China’s actions so far already challenge the global order. The second question is what order China ultimately wants for the future, and what this goal means for world politics. Ellen Frost of the East-West Center suggests that 20

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China’s actions already challenge the world order. China’s use of force for regional claims; institutional frameworks such as the NDB, the AIIB, the SCO, and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement; OBOR; Xi’s call for a “New Asian security architecture”; and the Russian-led Eurasian Union are all challenges. Frost says, “ ‘Rival regionalisms’—new or re-energized regional groupings initiated or heavily supported by China and Russia—are on the rise. Their goals include providing alternatives to US-led institutions, thereby avoiding Western-backed conditionality and reducing US influence. As a result, a slow crisis both of regional and global order and of institutional legitimacy is emerging.”75 However, Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that Chinese want to reform, not overthrow, the existing liberal international order. The goals of reform are to strengthen justice, better protect the interests of developing countries, enhance the principle of sovereignty, and promote open economic systems.76 In terms of China’s ultimate interests, analysts are divided on the direction China will take in the future. However, few would disagree with Eric Li, founder and managing director of Chengwei Capital, who states quite simply “China has its own long-term strategic objective: to reclaim a pre-eminent position in Asia.”77 As early as 1997, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski saw China as striving for regional dominance and then major global influence. Brzezinski noted that China’s central objective is “to dilute American regional power to the point that a diminished America will come to need a regionally dominant China as its ally and eventually even a globally powerful China as its partner.”78 For Martin Jacques, senior fellow at Cambridge University and author of the provocative and controversial When China Rules the World, China will rise to immense power and shape world order more than the United States ever did. Due to its identity as a “civilization-state,” its unique form of governance, and its rapid economic growth, in the not-too-distant future China will be the most influential power in history. Jacques predicts world order will be hierarchical, with Beijing as the world capital. Asia will return to the tributary system, the international financial system will be dominated by the RMB, and Chinese culture will be a major source of soft power.79 However, Johns Hopkins professor of Political Economy Ho-fung Hung and long-time China analyst Jonathan Fenby both see various weaknesses within China that will prevent Chinese dominance, including an unsustainable growth model and a rigid political system.80 Another school of thought sees China’s rise as dangerous and conflictual. For example, University of Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer views the rise of China through the lens of offensive realism. If China’s economic growth continues, Mearsheimer foresees China attempting to dominate Asia and projecting its power outside the region as well. The United States, along with most of China’s neighbors, will resist China’s efforts, resulting in a serious risk 21

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of war.81 Similarly, military strategist Edward Luttwak asserts that China’s efforts to grow economically, militarily, and in global influence are already generating pushback. Because China is unlikely to change its policies to better accommodate its neighbors, resistance to China from the United States and regional powers will increase and China will be left with reduced relative power.82 Fei-Ling Wang sees an aggressive China that attempts to dominate Asia and challenge American power wherever possible to alter the world order in a manner that is supportive of preserving Chinese autocracy, while former US Department of Defense official Michael Pillsbury asserts that China has a long-term strategy to overtake the United States and become the world’s superpower.83 A third school of thought suggests that within China itself there is debate and uncertainty on how China should shape the future. For example, China’s peaceful-rise narrative contrasts sharply with the triumphalist narrative of retired PLA colonel Liu Mingfu’s The China Dream and former naval officer Song Xiaojun’s China is Unhappy.84 In two different volumes, William Callahan looks at a variety of views within China on world order issues.85 David Shambaugh and Ren Xiao classify seven schools of thought on China’s identity, foreign policy, and world order questions, and the University of Southern California’s Daniel Lynch identifies various views on Chinese politics and economics as well.86 In a recent Chatham House paper, Tim Summers makes the case that “China’s global personality is complex and dynamic. It is currently in a period of flux, driven by debates within China that are magnified by a global context that is also characterized by a period of shifts in traditional economic balance and political power.”87 Renmin University’s Shi Yinhong agrees, noting that China’s “complicated foreign policy” sends contradictory messages of assertiveness and accommodation.88 Russia’s view of world order has both similarities to and differences from the Chinese view. The primary factor uniting China and Russia’s visions of world order is belief that the United States has been the dominant factor in shaping the order for too long, and their own countries’ legitimate interests have not been given adequate consideration. While Russia initially had been interested in deeper integration with Europe and Western institutions during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms and for the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin and much of Russia’s foreign policy community have become convinced that they must establish an alternative independent pillar or pole of influence reflecting Russia’s unique history and traditions with the capacity to challenge the United States and Western allies. Russia sees the fundamental objectives and values of the United States and the liberal international order as posing potential serious threats to Russia’s state security, national interests, and sphere of influence. China’s tremendous economic growth was made possible in the existing 22

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liberal world order, and therefore Beijing has generally been more inclined to work with the rules of the existing world order, supporting a gradual revision that would not lead to serious disruption or unpredictable circumstances. China and Russia also share important similarities in rejecting Western attempts to impose universal values in shaping the world order. Moscow and Beijing have found common ground in opposing the series of American-led interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, and in expressing resistance to the export of colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere which they see as destabilizing these societies and leaving chaos and disruption rather than enhanced quality of life for citizens. Although the influence, accomplishments, freedom, and prosperity associated with the United States and other Western nations based on democratic political systems and free market economies holds appeal for much of the world’s population, both China and Russia have developed unique identities based on longstanding traditions and cultures which in many ways represent sharp contrasts with the West. Martin Jacques suggests that the Western “nation-state” cannot aptly describe China since China perceives itself as a “civilization-state” with a history measured in terms of thousands of years (rather than hundreds of years as for the United States and other Western democracies) featuring Confucian values, primacy of family, and more.89 As one illustration, Jacques argues that while the tendency in the West is to constrain the state, legitimized by adhering to democratic practice, China has an all-pervasive “patriarch state” deriving its legitimacy as the protector and guardian of Chinese civilization.90 The richly distinct experiences of both China and Russia suggest that Western assumptions and frames of references regarding domestic and international order may not be adequate for understanding and predicting the future direction or preferences of these two major players. Following a period of identity crisis spanning much of the first and second decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire, President Putin and Russian society have fully embraced a strong sense of nationalism with a priority assigned to protecting Russia’s civilizational identity. This is accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the state’s relationship to the Orthodox Church and conservative values—values that differ sharply from what Russians perceive as Western decadence and rejection of Christian morals. The Orthodox Church has been closely affiliated with both Putin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Putin specifically references the importance of a “state-civilization” experience in the development of the country based on the “Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church,” and at the same time he is careful to acknowledge the importance of Russia’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural “historical consciousness,” and the importance of all faiths that have been “an integral part of Russia’s identity”—Christianity, Islam, 23

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Buddhism, Judaism, and others.91 The dismantling of the Soviet communist empire legitimized on the basis of Marxist–Leninist ideology brought a resurgence of religious influence in post-communist societies in Russia and Eurasia and resistance to Western secularism and perceived moral decline. China remains a communist regime and Xi Jinping is attempting to reinvent commitment to communist ideals, but Beijing’s leadership also supports a return to and sense of reverence for age-old Chinese Confucian teachings that are gaining greater appeal among a population no longer so gripped by Marxist– Leninist ideology. Xi Jinping and the CCP enforce the nation’s identity of what it means to be Chinese by encouraging selected Confucian teachings and traditional values while clamping down on Western influence in universities, media, and popular culture. Although Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, also gaining increasing strength in Eurasia during the decades since the collapse of the USSR, are quite different from Confucianism, each provides means for reinforcing a contemporary national identity and consciousness established in the past and quite distinct from Western influence. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping emphasize these traditional sources of Russian and Chinese cultural, moral, and spiritual heritage, rejecting any notion of supremacy coming from the West in terms of defining values for a moral, just, and desirable domestic and international world order. The leaderships of both societies question the suitability of Western models and prescriptions for development, governance, and moral standards. For example, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argues that a “second wave of globalization” brought the “dispersal of economic might,” “political influence,” and “the emergence of new and large centers of power, primarily in the Asia-Pacific Region” where “China’s rapid upsurge is the clearest example” yielding new development models that depart from the “monotony of existence with the uniform, Western frame of reference.”92 As a result, Lavrov contends that “there has been a relative reduction in the influence of the socalled ‘historical West’ that was used to seeing itself as the master of the human race’s destinies for almost five centuries.”93 China and Russia are firmly united in the common call for “non-interference” on the part of the United States and its allies seeking to promote Western democratic models and value systems throughout the world. Concerns are frequently expressed among the foreign policy communities of both China and Russia that the United States seeks to “contain” the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia. Russia’s President Putin directly addressed the perceived continuation of George F. Kennan’s strategy for “containment” of Soviet power during the era of the Cold War in his December 2014 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly: “The policy of containment was not invented yesterday. It has been carried out against our country for many years, always, for decades, if not centuries. In short, whenever someone thinks that 24

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Russia has become too strong or independent, these tools are quickly put into use.”94 Sergei Lavrov also argues that a legacy of perceived threat and thwarting Russia’s influence on the part of the West has been “evident for several centuries,” with Lavrov stating “While the rapidly developing Moscow state naturally played an increasing role in European affairs, the European countries had apprehensions about the nascent giant in the East and tried to isolate it whenever possible and prevent it from taking part in Europe’s most important affairs.”95 Xi Jinping’s broaching of the concept of a “new type of great power relations” as a means of establishing a relationship of parity and equality in the US–China bilateral relationship might have fueled further suspicions regarding US intentions in the face of the evident unwillingness on the part of the American leadership to embrace the description Xi desired for China’s relationship with the United States. Prior references to mutual preference for building “strategic partnership” expressed by both US and Russian presidents during the first two decades following the collapse of the Soviet empire have been purged from bilateral discussions since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, and the United States and NATO redeployed forces in Europe as a means of safeguarding against further Russian ambitions among neighboring countries. Concerns about American intentions directed at countering the regional and global influence of China and Russia constitute major drivers in the international behavior of the two countries and strengthen their collective resolve in seeking alternatives to what they consider to be a US-led Western-rules-based liberal order. There are significant differences between China and Russia in terms of the psychology of loss and power trajectories. China sees its “century of humiliation” as having ended in 1949. After a period of revolutionary struggle under Mao, China is now on a path to recover past greatness and gradually reshape the world order. Russia’s humiliation is much more recent, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the perception of American triumphalism and the ending of the Cold War on terms disproportionately unfavorable to Russia. While Russia has regained some of its swagger under President Putin, Russia’s economy remains heavily reliant on the export of hydrocarbons, placing greater limitation on Moscow’s capacity to exert influence in shaping world order in comparison with China, particularly in the economic sphere. The success of China’s economic model and capacity for providing financial support to promote global economic development without expectations being attached for compliance with democratic norms presents an attractive opportunity to many nations and an effective means for expanding China’s global influence and reach. Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” project offers an ambitious initiative promoting economic growth and development backed by massive Chinese investment without the prerequisites for domestic reform 25

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typically associated with Western assistance. Russia can offer arms exports and energy resources, but lags far behind China in possessing the substantial economic largesse for financing major development projects throughout the world. As leading Sinologist of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow Alexander Lukin notes, “Rising China will be a much bigger challenge to the Western ideology of global dominance than Russia which still remains quite weak.”96 Ivan Timofeev of the Russian International Affairs Council suggests Russia “does not even have a project to propose to other countries.”97 Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and editor of Russia in Global Affairs, argues that Russia has not “made up its mind about its image and future place” in “an utterly unpredictable world,” and that it “has no real resources—financial or intellectual—to launch its own big project.”98 In another significant report published by the Valdai Group in 2015, Timofeev and Lukyanov join with other experts of Russia’s foreign policy community to suggest that a “Moscow–Beijing axis” coupling China’s economic might with Russia’s military capability might create a basis for managing questions of world order and influence on the basis of compromise.99 Nonetheless, Moscow, like Beijing, seeks to establish its rightful role in a global order that no longer places the United States and other Western powers in a position of overwhelming influence in decisively determining international rules and outcomes. Russia’s long history of periodic invasions has understandably shaped its view of world order. Russia has suffered from a sense of insecurity due to its demographics and underdeveloped economy, with a belief that the country is surrounded by enemies. Russia’s governments have attempted to compensate for this perceived vulnerability with imperial expansion to protect against outside threats, autocratic rule at home, and a realist worldview that envisions international relations primarily as a struggle for power, coupled with statedirected development to try to catch up with rivals. From the period of the nineteenth century, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” were proclaimed as the pillars of the Russian empire. A strong state has been linked to development, national security, and Russian civilization.100 Western leaders should expect that Moscow will want to maintain a geographic buffer to prevent any intrusions that might once again threaten the territory or even existence of the Russian state. Thus, given Russia’s history of invasion and occupation, the involvement of NATO and the EU in border areas of the Russian Federation, including Georgia and Ukraine, should be expected to heighten Russian anxieties, insecurities, and the determination to counter perceived intrusions. A central element of Russia’s view of world order is the insistence that it be afforded recognition as a great power. As Dmitri Trenin observes, Russia “refuses to accept the rank of a middle power with merely a regional role. It 26

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sees itself as a global actor, playing in the big leagues.”101 Russia’s imperial history and its Cold War struggle with the United States contribute to the belief that Russia is destined to play a critical role in the world. The early postSoviet period left Russian elites with a strong desire to restore Russia’s prestige in the world, reflected in Putin’s quote that the fall of the Soviet Union was the twentieth century’s “greatest geopolitical catastrophe.”102 Russian national identity is largely based on a perpetual “great power” image with a unique “special destiny” and a “messianic,” “spiritual,” or “universal” mandate for the role of Russia in world society. The Russian Orthodox political philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev captures this unique perspective in suggesting that the people of Tsardom believed that Russians had a “messianic consciousness” historically reflected in the belief in Moscow as the “Third Rome,” and that Russia would be the “vehicle of true Christianity” in Orthodoxy. Berdyaev links this sense of consciousness to “the transcendent majesty of the Russian state,” “importance attached to the Russian Tsar,” and the “alluring temptation of imperialism.”103 Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2000, determined to restore Russia’s prestige and power following what was perceived as a period in which Russia had sold out its interests and suffered a serious loss of global stature and influence, perhaps visibly embodied in the frequently stumbling and embarrassing behavior of Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Vladimir Putin retains his popularity in Russian society in large part because of his willingness to stand firm in safeguarding Russia’s interests, reinforcing Russia’s great power identity as a distinct leader of a civilization with features and values defined as separate from the West. Russia’s contemporary major power status is based on the fact that it is the largest country on earth, with a vast border straddling the Eurasian heartland, and that the nation remains one of the two leading world nuclear powers, possessing vast hydrocarbon reserves, natural resources, and significant military force projection capability. Russia continues to possess capacity disproportionate to its neighbors, and is clearly willing to intervene in its own immediate neighborhood as well to project power beyond the Eurasian region where it sees its interests threatened, as in Syria. Together with China—a nation with a population exceeding 1.3 billion and an economy rapidly advancing to match and perhaps surpass the United States—the two countries influence major international decisions. They exercise their power in imposing veto authority in the United Nations and in many other areas, using their diverse resources to challenge the interests and rules preferred by the architects of the Western liberal order. While many in Russia hoped after the fall of the Soviet Union that Russia would deepen ties with the West in a bilateral partnership of equality or on a co-partnership basis with the United States, Russian elites eventually came to believe that the United States and the Euro-Atlantic security and economic 27

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communities would never accept Russia as an equal. In Moscow, the actions of the United States during the first two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the conclusion that Western triumphalism at the end of the Cold War and the significant bilateral power differential left Russia in a position of significantly diminished status and influence. The expectations of Soviet reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin that the Soviet Union or Russia might share a co-equal partnership did not materialize. Moscow officials often stressed in discussions in Brussels that they would never accept a “junior partner” status in the Western security alliance, and remained dissatisfied with the lack of veto authority afforded to them in the consultative bodies established to manage the post-Cold War NATO–Russia relationship, in the NATO Permanent Joint Council or NATO–Russia Council. Moscow witnessed what it perceived as the US-dominated NATO alliance that had been established to counter the Soviet enemy gradually expanding closer to Russia’s border, incorporating former Warsaw Pact members to encircle Russia and threaten vital security interests. From the Russian perspective, conflicts and strains in post-Cold War relations between the United States and Russia are largely due to the United States ignoring Russia’s fundamental interests.104 Russians also tend to believe that the United States gives greater status to China than to Russia. However, although Russia needs to see itself as a great power, and sometimes plays the part, as in Syria, it is still limited by its military and especially economic instruments for projecting power and influence.105 Similar to China, Russia also advocates for a multipolar or polycentric world order of shared influence among major powers. By definition, in a unipolar world order with a hegemonic power, Russia is not given equal great power status. A multipolar world is one where major powers form a condominium in which the interests of all great powers are taken into consideration. Thus, consistent with the view from Beijing, the United Nations is the central venue for resolving international issues from Russia’s perspective, at least in theory.106 In Russia’s case, a multipolar world is particularly important because it requires inputs from abroad for its economic development. Russia does not want to be in a position where one power or alliance might prevent Moscow from decisively influencing regional or global interests or deny it access to important resources, a problem illustrated by the current strains in Russia’s relationships with Western nations and sanctions imposed in response to Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine.107 A multipolar order is also important to protect Russia’s internal institutions. While the Russian Constitution provides a framework of democratic governance, Russia has strong authoritarian elements. Like Beijing, Moscow seeks a multipolar world that respects state sovereignty, and the manner in which states treat their citizens is not on the international agenda. It has often been 28

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suggested that Russia’s vast size and diverse population requires strong authoritarian leadership to counter potential tendencies toward dissolution. In the economic realm, Russia has established a free market economy, but still with significant state influence throughout various sectors of the economy. Georgetown University’s Angela Stent describes Russia’s model as a type of “crony capitalism,” a mixture of business and politics where informal links determine the success or failure of Russian businesses.108 University of Virginia political scientist Allen Lynch suggests that the harsh Russian climate, the tremendous size of the country, and the lack of water transportation mean that Russia will never be able to operate under free market conditions because costs will perpetually be high.109 Given Russia’s size and natural and human resources, Russia’s economy should be able to advance beyond ranking behind the economies of much smaller nations with more limited natural resources, such as Italy or France. Whether Russia develops a more democratic system of governance, its own variant of democracy, or a more functional and prosperous free market economy over the next decades remains uncertain, but Russia’s traditions and unique circumstances would surely reinforce Moscow’s preference for an international order tolerant of models of strong or authoritarian states and pluralistic economic organization. A multipolar world further means UN-centered and state-centered governance of the Internet. Although the Internet is not as heavily controlled by the state in Russia as it is in China, the Russian government’s views on the prerogatives of the state in Internet governance and control of web content are closer to China than to the governments of the West. Russia’s leadership recognizes the cyber/information arenas as potential sources of security vulnerability, and stands with Beijing in challenging Western nations with the firm conviction that the state rather than private enterprise should have the authority for managing the cyber sphere within its borders and that any attempt to intrude in the cyber/information space of a nation-state represents a threat to undermine sovereignty. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Another element of the Russian view of world order is the conviction that it rightfully has a sphere of influence in Eurasia, particularly among the former Soviet states, due to the history of the Soviet Union and Russian empire, Russia’s security requirements, and Russia’s role as a great power. Russia does not treat post-Soviet states as truly sovereign in that the Kremlin leadership believes it has the right to set conditions on their policy choices. In 2008, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested that “There are regions in which Russia has ‘privileged interests.’ ”110 In other words, the Kremlin leadership assumes that they are entitled to ensure that these states do not take actions that harm Russian interests. Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and positioning of troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian forces in 29

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Moldova’s breakaway republic of Transnistria, and, most recently, the annexation of Crimea and continued support for separatists in eastern Ukraine suggest a contradiction in that while Russia professes to champion sovereignty and non-intervention as standards for the world order, these guidelines somehow do not apply to Moscow’s own behavior in its immediate neighborhood. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014 shocked Europe and the United States, who considered the Kremlin’s actions as constituting a fundamental repudiation of established rules and norms of the liberal world order. Moscow has also engaged in attempting to influence the information space, challenging narratives of the Euro-Atlantic community through media, Internet, and public discourse among nations of the former Soviet empire in Eurasia, the Baltics, East-Central Europe, and the Balkans. Russia also attempts to use its cultural values as soft power to strengthen identification with and attract other Eurasian states. For example, Alexander Lukin argues that Eurasians, not just Russians, value religion and reject the liberal secularism, permissiveness, moral relativism, and arrogance associated with the West.111 Lukin argues that much of the populations of Russia and Central Asia have been influenced by religious faith (Orthodoxy, Islam, and others), rejecting the perceived “western permissiveness” of accepting practices “prohibited by divine authority” such as gay marriage, sexual deviance, euthanasia, obsessive materialism, and other sins.112 In a speech to the Valdai Forum in September 2013, President Putin states: Another serious challenge to Russia’s identity is linked to events taking place in the world . . . Here there are both foreign policy and moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious, and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.113

Moscow takes keen interest in Russian speakers residing outside the borders of the Russian Federation. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept refers to “protecting” Russians living outside of Russia’s borders.114 The breakup of the Soviet Union left a Russian diaspora scattered throughout the newly independent states, Russians who were now minorities in countries eager to build their own identities and embrace local languages. Subsequently, the terms “compatriots abroad,” “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World), and “Novorossiya” became quite prevalent in nationalist discourse, demonstrating a disconnect between Russia’s actual borders and the way many Russians think about the Russian nation. Kremlin policy toward its “compatriots” was initially less threatening, particularly until the concepts of “Russkiy Mir” and “Novorossiya” were invoked to justify intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.115 30

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Russia’s interest in economic integration between Russia and former Soviet states is illustrated by the Eurasian Economic Union. Vladimir Putin described the EEU as modeled after the European Union, proposing to unite its members through free trade and endeavors to coordinate financial systems, industrial policies, agricultural policies, labor markets, and transportation systems. Writing in Izvestia in October 2011, announcing his intention to return to the presidency in Russia, Putin described his vision for promoting the EEU project, stating that it could be expected to “create a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.”116 It is designed to bring economic integration to former Soviet states, followed by tighter political integration, and might obviously be expected to enhance Russia’s leadership in the region as the disproportionately more powerful country among the other potential Eurasian member states. The Union, built on the foundations of the Eurasian Customs Union, was established on January 1, 2015. Its members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. While prior to 2014 Russia had hoped that Ukraine would join in order to give greater clout to the organization, conflict between Moscow and Kiev has thwarted this possibility. So far the EEU has struggled to meet expectations. It has not yet produced stronger growth for its members, and the devaluation of the Russian ruble has led to economic difficulties for the other members of the EEU. Belarus and Russia have had trade disputes, and sanctions on Russia have hurt Kazakhstan as well. Kazakhstan signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in December 2015. Moreover, the non-Russian members worry about losing sovereignty if they are too closely linked to Russia, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.117 However, in 2015, following the onset of the Ukraine conflict, Russia and China moved to align the EEU and China’s Silk Road initiative, which has heightened expectations for future success of the EEU in so far as Moscow and Beijing can successfully manage areas of shared interests as well as competition throughout the Eurasian region in the decades ahead. Like China, Russia has been an enthusiastic supporter of the BRICS. Hosting the first formal summit (minus South Africa) in Yekaterinburg in 2009, Russia sees the BRICS as part of its “multi-vector” strategy to give Russia global influence. Cooperation with the other BRICS members, it is hoped, can enhance and diversify the Russian economy, as well as provide Russia with a forum in which to coordinate policies with non-Western powers. Moreover, Moscow uses the BRICS to push for restructuring of world political and economic relations to give Russia and its BRICS partners a greater voice in world affairs and a more significant role in making decisions in global institutions such as the IMF.118 Russia shares with China the desire to reform governance 31

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of the Western-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and discussions in Moscow on the global economy often revolve around seeking alternatives to the Western currency system. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is Russia’s most important security partnership. The CSTO was formed in 2003 as the successor to the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS as a multifunctional security organization. Its members include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The CSTO has four types of collective forces: regional groupings, peacekeepers, rapid deployment forces for Central Asia, and collective prompt reaction forces. In addition, CSTO members engage in practical cooperation in preventing illegal migration, enhancing information security, and countering drug trafficking.119 Russia prefers to work through the CSTO on security issues in Central Asia, rather than the SCO, because it is the preeminent member of the organization. While there is some evidence of competition between Russia and China in the SCO, especially in the period before 2014, Russia’s foreign policy community sees the SCO as holding significant potential for eventually serving as a competitor to the influence of the major security and economic institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. The Kremlin has demonstrated a preference for managing relationships with nations in Europe on a bilateral basis, rather than working through the major security and economic institutions NATO and the EU where they do not hold significant influence or veto authority. Moscow’s leadership has favored the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), mandating veto authority to the Russian Federation, as the preferred existing collective security consultative structure for maintaining security and stability in Europe. In 2008, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had introduced a European Security Treaty proposal designed to open dialogue with other European nations on establishing an alternative security system that would replace the existing architecture. Broaching the proposal made Russia’s dissatisfaction with its place in the post-Cold War European security arena even more obvious. During the decade of the 1990s and in the early period of Putin’s presidency, Russia was moving toward forging deeper integration with the major European security and economic structures. Moscow established special consultative partnership relationships with NATO and the European Union, and arguably much was accomplished, especially in terms of strengthening practical security and economic collaboration. Military-to-military consultation and exchanges and cooperation were established between former Cold War enemies, and Russia conducted routine exercises with NATO partner nations in countering terrorism, cyber attacks, piracy, managing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and many other areas of shared security interest. Russia’s partnership with the European Union had also facilitated greater collaboration between 32

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Russia’s private sector and European nations. Russia became a member of the intergovernmental forum of the world’s leading industrialized democratic nations as the G-7 became the G-8 with Russia’s admission. However, as a consequence of the Ukrainian intervention in 2014, Russia’s membership in the G-8 was terminated, and collaboration with NATO and the EU was suspended, with the United States joining EU nations in imposing sanctions on Russia’s economy. As a result, Moscow’s involvement in seeking to develop or bolster international security and economic structures that might represent alternatives to the leading institutions of the Euro-Atlantic system takes on greater urgency. Western scholars and pundits frequently pose the question, “What does Russia want?” There is a high degree of clarity and consensus among Russia’s foreign policy community about what they don’t want. Fyodor Lukyanov, for example, captures the prevailing assessment of Russia’s foreign policy officials and experts, suggesting that although Mikhail Gorbachev “thought that a new world order would emerge through the integration of East and West on a completely equal basis,” instead the “disintegration of the Soviet Union put an end to the idea of equality and of joint construction of a European and global order.”120 Lukyanov continues, observing that the “new Russia, which at birth was thrust into the throes of existential crisis, was no longer viewed by the West (and indeed by the East) as a potential co-creator of a new world order . . . The ‘end of history’ construct triumphed. The Western model carried the day. Russia was essentially told to find its place in the US-centric system.”121 The Gorbachev era had not only opened the domestic polity for sweeping reform with the introduction of glasnost and perestroika, but Gorbachev’s new thinking on the international front, placing emphasis on the interconnected world and shared global human values and interests, never found a receptive audience among the Western foreign policy communities to reciprocate in revising modes of conducting statecraft or altering the established practices for conducting world politics. In the previously mentioned 2015 Valdai report co-authored by several leading experts on Russian foreign policy, including Lukyanov, “Liberalism” is coupled together with “Communism” and the “Caliphate” as “dogmatic ideologies” or “global experiments” of a “destructive nature.”122 The report concludes that we are currently at a “Hobbesian” moment in world politics or a “game without rules” when there is no agreement among “leading centres of world power” as to what is allowed and what is prohibited.123 While the details of the preferred world future order are not clear, this group of leading scholars of the Valdai Discussion Club emphasizes the need to take into account the diversity that non-Western nations bring to the world stage. They seem to believe that we are moving toward a West/non-West bipolar world order in which the “aspiration of the rich West to preserve and 33

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strengthen its leading position in the international system is bound to stimulate others to aspire to a similar position,” and they conclude by invoking reference to the great Russian author Leo Tolstoy, who “believed that global history” is the “history of all the people who participate in its events,” suggesting that developments in technology, communications, and other areas mean that “everyone” will have “an impact on the historical process” of shaping the world order.124 Igor Zevelev suggests that the “big ideas” in contemporary Russian discourse have “deep roots in the centuries-old debates over Russian identity,” reinforcing the conviction that “exceptionalism” defines Russia’s place in the world.125 As Zevelev states: [A]fter the end of the Cold War and as a consequence of the failure to get included into European and transatlantic security architecture, Moscow began to look for a place in the international system by relying on domestic discourses and “big ideas” emanating from within the country, as well as through reinterpreting Russian history in isolation from world processes.126

Zevelev warns that Moscow is forming policy as a “function of its own existential search for an identity,” leaving the nation vulnerable to “missing important opportunities” and “overlooking grave threats,” potentially adversely effecting Russia’s policy responses with respect to the United States and nations of Europe and Eurasia.127 Although Russia is attempting to strengthen its links with Eurasia and the former Soviet states, its struggle with identity has long bedeviled it. Russia’s huge landmass connecting East and West leaves the nation with an unresolved question of identity. Expressing his views on debates regarding Russia’s identity, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov refers to “Russia’s special role in European and global history” and a vision of “Russia that is essentially a branch of European civilization,” while at the same time asserting that the “Russian people possessed a cultural matrix of their own and an original type of spirituality never merged with the West.”128 Scholars of Russian foreign policy frequently trace the foundations of contemporary thinking on Russia’s identity and international behavior to the historic traditions established by the Slavophiles of the early nineteenth century and later by the original Eurasian intellectuals of the 1920s–1930s. While Westernizers emphasized the importance of Russia as a part of Europe and the common features of Russia (including Christianity) with Western civilization, both Slavophiles and Eurasianists defined the foundations of Russia’s identity as separate and distinct from the West. For Slavophiles, Russia was the leader of the Orthodox Slavic civilization, with the mission of protecting and maintaining unity among the Slavic populations of Russia and Europe. As Berdyaev explains: “The Slavophiles believed in a special type of 34

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culture springing out of the spiritual soil of Orthodoxy; Peter’s reform and Europeanizing of the Petrine period were a betrayal of Russia.”129 Berdyaev identifies a common view among the leading Slavophile thinkers in the belief that “Russia ought not to tread the way of the West and that the Slavonic Russian world was the world of the future.”130 Leading contributors developing Slavophile thinking during the 1840s and 1850s included Aleksey Khomyakov, Ivan Kireyevsky, Konstantin Aksakov, and Yuri Samarin, with further philosophical ideas elaborated decades later in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by prominent figures including not only Nikolay Berdyaev, but also Vladimir Solovyov and Sergey Bulgakov, among others. Eurasianism, or variants of the Eurasian perspectives, looked toward Asia to define Russia’s unique identity to include not only Slavic Orthodox heritage, but also Turkic-Muslim elements. Alexander Lukin explains that those adhering to the Eurasianist schools tend to establish Russia’s affinity with Asia as rooted in a shared preference for authoritarian governance, rejection of excessive dominance of market principles over the state prevalent in Western societies, and significant influence of religious values among the traditional faiths of Russia and the Eurasian region.131 Contemporary or more extreme neo-Eurasianist thought is perhaps most popularly represented in the writings of geopolitical theorist Alexander Dugin, who subscribes to a vision of worldcivilization conflict with Russia occupying the Eurasian zone, where it should expect to be challenged by other civilizational zones while it moves to reconstitute the Soviet Union and expand further beyond the post-Soviet space. Variants of Eurasianist thinking were found in the policy world with the prescriptions offered by Yevgeny Primakov, Russia’s influential diplomat and statesman affiliated with the Oriental Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences and Russia’s Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999, who was instrumental in initiating the beginning of Russia’s turn away from the West and toward Eurasia, particularly corresponding with the US/NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia.132 Clearly, Russia has been influenced by the Mongols and Siberian native cultures that were absorbed into the Russian and Soviet empires. However, Russia has also had a sense of ambivalence regarding the east, mixing colonial attitudes of superiority and fear with fascination and interest.133 Europe has traditionally had a stronger pull on Russia, and Russia has long been a part of the European political order, sharing significant elements of cultural affinity (Christianity, for example). San Francisco State University Professor Andrei P. Tsygankov maintains that the “argument that Russia is a part of Europe is centuries-old” and that “all Russia’s leaders identified with European ideas,” but that “Russians disagreed on whether western Europe could serve as a role model or whether Russia itself should become the leader of European civilization.”134 Peter the Great built St. Petersburg on Russia’s western border so that 35

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Russian elites could more closely interact with Europe. Nevertheless, in Russia’s eyes the West has never fully accepted Russia as part of Europe. The fact that Russia’s place with respect to major European security institutions (NATO, the EU, and others) failed to meet Moscow’s expectations following the collapse of the Soviet Union fueled this sense of marginalization and anxiety vis-à-vis the West and contributed to further accelerating the drive toward balancing Russia’s geopolitical and economic advantage by turning toward China and Asia. Both Russian and Western scholars have defined similar variants of thought within Russia corresponding with differing versions of world order. Andrew Kuchins of CSIS and Igor Zevelev identify three such schools. Liberals support collective security, globalization, and international organizations, calling for integration into Europe. Influential in the early Yeltsin Administration, especially associated with former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the impact of liberals has faded as Russia’s assessment of geopolitical interests and behavior became increasingly at odds with the preferences of the United States and other Western nations. Great power balancers are the second school, described by Kuchins and Zevelev as “realists” and adhere to a set of assumptions about the nature of international politics quite similar to the realist school of thought dominating Western academic theory of world politics. They advocate an independent foreign policy for a Russia that balances other great powers. They also stress the concept of Russian civilization and the importance of Russia’s unique identity and culture separate from the West. Finally, nationalists are neo-imperialists, many of whom want to restore the old borders of the Soviet Union and dominate the Near Abroad, while ethno-nationalists embrace what is ethnically and culturally Russian rather than advocating empirebuilding.135 Jeffrey Mankoff of CSIS divides Russian approaches in a similar fashion. He identifies Atlanticism that looks to Europe and the United States, Eurasianism that sees Russian identity in Eurasia, centralism that sees Russia as playing an independent role between Asia and the West, and Russian nationalism that is anti-immigrant and advocates for the interests of ethnic Russians.136 Finally, Igor Okunev of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIGMO) also describes the increasingly less influential liberal school arguing for Russia’s shared traditions and associations with Europe, concerned that such ties could be indefinitely jeopardized over the conflict in Ukraine; those of the right calling for turning to China and Asia because trust with the West could not be restored following actions over Ukraine; and finally a central and most influential position favored by Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party committed to continuing to balance a necessary pivot toward China and Asia while still recognizing the importance of remaining open to cultivating 36

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advantageous ties for Russia with the United States and European democracies, but only on a basis of equality.137 Putin has consistently emphasized that, geographically and politically, Russia belongs to both Europe and Asia. In 2000 he stated: Russia has always felt itself to be a Eurasian country. We have never forgotten that the main part of the Russian territory is in Asia. Frankly, we have not always made good use of that advantage. I think the time has come for us, together with the Asia-Pacific countries, to move on from words to actions and to build up economic, political and other ties. Russia today has every opportunity for this.138

However, in 2003 Putin affirmed: “Russia both geographically and mentally considers herself a part of Greater Europe . . . We believe that at the base of European identity is, first and foremost, culture and Russia without a shadow of a doubt belongs to this part of European culture.”139 Like the broader debates on Russia’s European and Eurasian identity, there have been different schools of thought and conflicting views regarding China. Those placing a high premium on Russia’s relationships with Europe and the United States fear that links with China might strengthen Russian authoritarian tendencies or that a pivot toward China will not be sufficient to compensate for the deterioration in Russia’s relationship with Western democracies, leaving Russia exploited by a stronger China. China’s blend of authoritarian government and high economic growth appeals to some of Russia’s conservative and anti-Western segments of the elite and society. In fact, from the perspective of many Russians, authoritarian China’s dramatic economic success represents a significant contrast with Russia’s model, particularly with the severe economic dislocations associated with the period of greatest openness and freedom in Russia’s society of the early 1990s. Racist perspectives emphasizing the threat of penetration, particularly of Russia’s Far East by the so-called “Yellow Peril,” might be more muted in public discussion since the onset of conflict with the West over Ukraine, but still remain operative in the thinking among some Russians regarding China. The mainstream center, including Putin’s party, calls for continued balancing of Russia’s ties in Europe and China in so far as either benefits Russia’s strategic and economic interests, but leaning significantly more toward strengthening ties with China in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict.140 Alexander Lukin offers additional insight into the configuration of Russian domestic forces on policy toward China and Asia. Lukin suggests that those among Russia’s elite with business interests and property in Europe resisted Russia’s “pivot” to Asia and feared that Russia could become a “satellite” and “natural resource provider” to a more powerful China. Conversely, others contended that the shift toward China was “unavoidable” in order for Russia to establish an “independent course.”141 Lukin claims that the pivot to Asia 37

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represents “an attempt to achieve a balanced foreign policy and to give relations with Asia no less significance than those with Europe so that Russia can create its own independent center of world politics.”142 Lukin contends that the discussion of the pivot to Asia far preceded the intervention in Ukraine, and was largely recognized as necessary due to the shift in global economic power toward China and Asia.143 He believes that Russia’s leadership understood prior to the ascendance of Vladimir Putin that economic development of Siberia and the Far East and Russia’s overall international development would require pivoting to China and Asia.144 Those in Russia strongly opposed to Putin’s confrontation with the West or objecting to a dramatic shift toward China and away from the West constitute the extremes of the current political spectrum, including marginalized Western liberals (Yabloko and others) currently with no representation in Parliament. Mikhail Kasyanov, former prime minister and leader of one of Russia’s major opposition parties, the People’s Freedom Party (or PARNAS), suggests that Putin is “destroying the country” by destabilizing Europe’s security environment and suggests that China would not provide “loans” or “capital” to Russia.145 Kasyanov speaks in terms of Chinese “infiltration” of the Far East and Siberia stemming from corruption, and he appears to find no credibility in the idea that there are no alternatives to Russia developing its energy ties with China to offset lost opportunities in European markets.146 There are variations with respect to China among the four parties represented in Russia’s Parliament. The Communist Party, still headed by Gennady Zyuganov, tends to view the Chinese model as increasingly capitalist and therefore having greater affinity with models adhering more closely to pure socialist experience. Radical nationalist and fiercely anti-immigrant Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the nationalistic Liberal Democratic Party, which derives most support from Russia’s rural and lower income strata of society, has called for expelling all Chinese migrants from the Far East. Sergei Mironov, head of the left-of-center party Just Russia, traveled to Beijing in October 2014 to meet with China’s top legislative official Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, resulting in commitment by both legislative leaders to expand party-to-party ties and parliamentary exchanges. Putin’s overwhelmingly dominant United Russia, representing the mainstream conservative center in contemporary Russian politics, supports the pivot toward China.147 Despite discussions and variance among Russia’s political parties, opposition groups, academics, pundits, and members of private and civic society, Vladimir Putin and the government maintain an official line between the marginalized extremes among Russia’s elite and society who seek to manage ongoing relationships with the United States and Western democracies even in the period of heightened tensions following the onset of turmoil in Ukraine, while at the same time reaching out 38

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with greater urgency to deepen ties with China and Asia.148 Alexei Voskressenski, professor and dean at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and Artyom Lukin, professor at Russia’s Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, leading experts on China and Asia, echo the prevailing view among Russia’s foreign policy community in leaving open the possibility that a shift in policy on the part of the West, such as lifting economic sanctions, could alter the political balance in Russia and result in some adjustments in policy, but that the shift toward China and Asia seems to be “irreversible” at this point.149 Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin turned abruptly to embrace the West, declaring Russia’s commitment to democratization and developing a free market economy, Mankoff argues that already during Yeltsin’s presidency “the bulk of the Russian elite came to recognize that integration with the West and its institutions was neither possible nor desirable, at least in the short-tomedium term.”150 Following the US/NATO intervention in Bosnia and the air war in Kosovo in 1999, Russia’s official foreign policy concept and military doctrine were revised dramatically to take account of the perceived threat represented by NATO’s out-of-area intervention, which was viewed as destabilizing the international system. Russia’s most recent Military Doctrine continues to identify NATO expansion and strategy as presenting a serious threat to the security of the Russian Federation. Particularly as tensions have escalated with the United States and Europe, Russia’s foreign policy establishment, academics, media, and society increasingly reference the West as the “other.” Andrei Tsygankov and Igor Zevelev suggest that Russia has a long tradition of defining its identity in comparison with the “other,” particularly the West. Tsygankov, writing in 2008, identified a self/other dialectic operative in defining Russia’s perceptions of Europe and Asia and perceptions of self or identity and foreign policy.151 Zevelev maintains that for more than a century and a half, Russia’s elite “tended to define Russia in opposition to Europe,” serving as the basis of what Zevelev describes as a “preoccupation with the West as the Other” in defining contemporary foreign policy and geopolitical interests.152 Western policies toward Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union—perceived as excluding Russia from a proper place in the European security community on terms deemed acceptable for Russia’s size, influence, and traditional major role—only contributed to the growing prominence of this view. In contrast, for Zevelev, Moscow’s relationships with China and Asia are based exclusively on calculations regarding foreign policy and economic interests, rather than being tied to perceptions of “self” as opposed to the “other,” as in the case of Russia’s relationship with the West.153 Russia’s elite and foreign policy community have become increasingly disillusioned with Western policy and models of development, tending toward 39

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strengthening support for the authoritarian state and establishing independence from the Euro-Atlantic nations. The prevailing view in Moscow rejects what is perceived as desire on the part of the United States and its Western allies to impose its model of development (frequently by force) throughout the world, and there is a determination among the Kremlin leadership to establish Russia’s relationships with the United States and the West on equal terms, ensuring Russia’s influence in determining the features and contours of the European and global world order. China’s leadership shares this perspective with the Kremlin, deeming US and European allied efforts to impose Western liberal ideas and regime change a violation of sovereignty resulting more often than not in chaos, destruction, and despair rather than cultivating thriving democracies that enhance the quality of life and security for citizens. A strong sense of nationalism, based on a self-image as a great power and determination to establish an independent role commensurate with Russia’s rightful place in the world, is viewed as the foundation for Russia to exert influence in challenging the West in shaping the contemporary world order. At the same time, Russia has significant ties with the West, and Russia’s relationships with Western nations remain critical for achieving Putin’s economic modernization and development plans. Again, even during a period of such strained relations with Western democracies, leading voices of Russia’s foreign and defense community spoke out about Russia’s cultural affinity with Europe and the importance of these relationships for Russia’s interests. For instance, retired Lt. Gen. Evgeny Buzhinsky, serving as head of the PIR Centre, a highly regarded think tank on contemporary security issues, stated in an interview in 2015: “It is my strong belief that though we occupy part of Asia and part of Europe, Russia is a European country—in our way of thinking and everything. We are much closer to the US and Europe than to China, India, and Korea.”154 Similarly, leading expert of the USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor A. Kremenyuk emphasized the importance of Russia’s relationships with the United States and Europe and that the pivot to China and Asia would not be sufficient to offset declining interest and engagement with the West.155 The leaderships in Beijing and Moscow recognize, and frequently openly acknowledge in official statements and documents, the importance of maintaining constructive relationships with the United States and other Western nations for ensuring global stability, addressing common security challenges and threats, and realizing plans for economic growth and modernization that will benefit their societies. Beijing clearly appreciates the critical importance of China’s economic interdependence with the United States and the contributions of the liberal international order to supporting China’s rise. Following the imposition of European sanctions on Russia, Putin’s statements and Russia’s official national security documents underscore the continued value 40

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of working with the United States and European democracies and remaining open to engaging with the major Western security and economic structures. At the same time, due to the fact that Russia was not successfully integrated on equal terms in the existing Western security and economic structures, and has not experienced the same economic benefits of participation in the Western liberal order, Moscow tends to display less patience in pushing for revision of the existing liberal world order. The Kremlin leadership holds the view that the United States is no longer able to sustain a unipolar hegemonic world order aiming to further shape nations of the world on the basis of Western values, and both Beijing and Moscow share the long-term assessment that the future world order will inevitably have to move toward more closely reflecting the interests and preferences of the diversity of values and traditions represented in the evolving fabric of the twenty-first century world society. Clearly, Beijing favors a gradual transition and reform of the existing world order that might be managed cooperatively, rather than an abrupt revolutionary upheaval of the existing liberal international order creating anarchy or involving direct confrontation with the United States and its Western allies. The Kremlin seeks a more multipolar or polycentric order in which Russia plays a major role, and Putin may be less risk averse than Beijing in his willingness to boldly challenge the United States and its Western allies with respect to the rules of the existing order, though sharing the preference that transformation could be achieved without major conflict with the United States and other Western nations.

Contemporary Sino–Russian Relations: An Overview The contemporary period of Sino–Russian relations began in 1996 when China and Russia announced a strategic cooperative partnership, subsequently grounded in the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation signed in 2001. Both countries ratified an action plan to implement the treaty in 2008. The nature of the relationship was raised in 2011 to a “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership,” and has been characterized by numerous leadership summits, institutions established for high-level communications, and frequent agreements for further cooperation. The relationship became even closer in 2012, the year in which Vladimir Putin resumed the Russian presidency and Xi Jinping took over the reins of the CCP in China (becoming president in 2013). The two men have reportedly developed a close personal bond. Again, Western sanctions against Russia in 2014 marked a dramatic acceleration in Russia’s turn toward China. This was starkly symbolized when Moscow celebrated the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in May 2015. Xi Jinping stood beside Vladimir Putin 41

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while Western leaders stayed away. In September of the same year, Putin went to Beijing to participate in China’s celebrations. Nevertheless, at the local levels in Russia there is still often distrust of China that manifests itself in ways that are contrary to the direction the Kremlin has set. For example, in 2015 a Russian prosecutor charged the Confucius Institute located in Blagoveshchensk with illegally hiring Chinese nationals and evading taxes, with the charges likely driven by the concerns of locals that China was exercising undue influence in the region. In 2010 the Confucius Institute in Yakutsk was closed due to FSB accusations.156 China considers Confucius Institutes its most important tool for teaching Chinese language and culture, and thus spreading Chinese soft power, so their closure is significant. Over the years, various observers have attempted to characterize the relationship in a phrase. In 2008 Bobo Lo, former Australian diplomat and Chatham House researcher, famously described the relationship as an “axis of convenience,” a relationship that cooperates on some issues but is secondary for both countries, ambiguous, and without true strategic cooperation. In 2015 Lo called the Sino–Russian relationship a “partnership of convenience,” with no common strategic vision and little trust. In 2013, Andrew Kuchins referred to the relationship as an “axis of necessity,” with the most important aspect of the relationship being border stability. However, taking account of dramatic changes following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing imposition of Western sanctions on Russia, in 2015 Dimitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, made reference to the relationship as an “entente” moving toward a “quasi-alliance and quasi-integration.” Fu Ying, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, calls it a “stable strategic partnership.”157 Although there are differences in characterizing Sino–Russian ties, the essential point is that the relationship has gained momentum since 2014 and Russia and China are cooperating on a wide variety of issues. The deepening of ties can be seen by comparing Dmitri Trenin’s assessment of the relationship in 2012 and 2015.158 Trenin asserted in 2012 that while China and Russia had good relations and wanted to cooperate in balancing the United States, neither Beijing nor Moscow had the strategic vision to create a stronger, more beneficial partnership. Both Russia and China feared that the other would become closer to the West, leaving the third party in the cold. Moreover, the relationship between Russian and Chinese leaders was business-like but not warm. By 2015, Trenin saw a radically different strategic context. The events of 2014 made it impossible for Russia to avoid turning toward China. There is a close personal relationship between Xi and Putin, with Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center describing them as “soul mates.”159 Putin is popular in China as well, and is seen as being tough on the West. While there are still some problems in the relationship, these are 42

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downplayed by both governments. In fact, Trenin foresaw a future defined by a “Greater Asia” that stretches from Shanghai to St. Petersburg. While China has long sought closer links with Russia, it is not as dependent on Russia as Russia is on it. Moreover, Beijing wants to maintain good working relations with the United States and Europe to reach its long-term development goals. Therefore, within Chinese academic circles, there has been some debate on how far China should be willing to move toward Russia. Russian expert Zhao Huasheng wrote in July 2013 that due to Russia’s turn to the east and pressure on China from the United States and Japan, some in China suggested that an alliance with Russia was advisable. Zhao argued against an alliance due to lack of trust in the relationship, Russian fears of China, and the ways in which an alliance could increase tensions.160 In 2014, there was an academic debate in China regarding relations with Russia, prompted by Russia’s troubles with the West. General Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché to Moscow, argued for a quasi-alliance—a more proactive partnership with Russia, but one that does not entail obligations or cause reactions from the West. Feng Yujun of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations called for pragmatic cooperation with Russia, but with recognition that China did not need a Russian shield for its own defense, and China could not save Russia from its problems with the West. Others criticized Russia for being too adventurous in Crimea, and for selling Kilo-class submarines to Vietnam.161 In sum, Chinese analysts understand very clearly that in looking east Putin is serving Russia’s interests, and each country will cooperate only to the extent that it is in its own interests to do so. There are a wide variety of areas where Russian and Chinese interests coincide. Subsequent chapters will examine many of these issues in greater detail. Perhaps the most important area of common interest is border security. In 2008, Feng Yujun wrote, “In the next 5–10 years, China’s Russian policy objective is to further consolidate mutual trust and to expand bilateral security cooperation so as to safeguard the long-term peace and security of China’s northern border region.”162 This objective of safeguarding the border has been achieved. Border clashes had almost led to war in the late 1960s, and by the 1980s a secure border was a primary objective for both sides. The border is not insignificant, covering 3,605 kilometers in the east and 40 kilometers in the west.163 In 2008 China and Russia signed an agreement on the demarcation of the last remaining disputed territory, and the border region has been demilitarized. Since Chinese propaganda during the Maoist era emphasized the vast territories lost by the Qing to Russia, settling border lines and managing border crossings have helped assure Russia that China will not make irredentist claims.164 China and Russia have also seen security cooperation in the realms of arms sales and military exercises. In spite of China’s rising power and growing PLA 43

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capabilities, Russia has viewed cooperation with China as more conducive to its security than a confrontational approach. China has been engaged in a long-term buildup of advanced weapons since the 1990s. With the United States and Europe maintaining an arms embargo against China since 1989, Russia has been China’s most important supplier of weapons that it cannot produce at home. Russia has sold China fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, submarines, destroyers, helicopters, transport aircraft, antiship missiles, torpedoes, radars, and jet engines.165 Russia and China have conducted joint military exercises as well, some under the auspices of the SCO and some bilaterally. Russia and China seek greater security and autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. By 2015, both countries were feeling pressure from the United States. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, stimulating Western sanctions and a stronger NATO military presence close to Russian borders, and the United States pivot to Asia, accompanied by patrols in the South China Sea; pressure on China over cyber attacks; and the successful negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (subsequently rejected by Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump) only serve to strengthen impulses toward a Russia–China bond and a common call for a more multipolar world order.166 Institutionally, a more multipolar world would entail a central role for the United Nations Security Council, further elevating Russia’s and China’s status and giving them greater influence in regional issues such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya.167 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that cooperation between China and Russia on international issues enhances stability and shapes a new world order.168 A more multipolar world would also ease the Western emphasis on human rights, democracy, and minority self-determination. Thus, it would better protect classic notions of sovereignty. Russia and China believe that human rights are primarily an internal issue. This position leaves them greater autonomy to suppress internal dissent. For example, both Moscow and Beijing have enacted policies to strictly limit the freedom of NGOs, especially those having or suspected of having foreign connections.169 Moreover, both countries seek maximum latitude to deal with regions that desire greater autonomy or independence, without outside interference. Moscow wants to be able to counter domestic unrest in the Caucasus without censure from external actors, while Beijing is determined to suppress dissent in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as eventually regain effective sovereignty over Taiwan. Again, Sino–Russian cooperation is fostered by commonalities in Chinese and Russian identity.170 China and Russia see themselves as defenders of state sovereignty, with a shared identity as authoritarian systems standing against Western hegemony and ultra-individualism. They have in common an identity as a bulwark against international disorder. While from their perspective 44

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the West fostered chaos while seeking to impose liberal ideals in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, and elsewhere, China and Russia cooperate to prevent colored revolutions and keep the Internet from being used to undermine governments.171 The shared Sino–Russian identity is illustrated by efforts to link the EEU and OBOR and Putin’s close personal relationship with Xi. Moreover, both Russia and China use nationalism to solidify regime legitimacy. So far, this nationalism has led to stronger ties because it is focused against the West or governments supported by the West. However, nationalism is an unpredictable force, and in the future Russian and Chinese nationalism could be redirected against each other, particularly given the possibilities for continued competition in Eurasia. In the economic realm, China and Russia want to develop stronger trade and investment ties. However, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the record here has so far been disappointing. Even in the energy realm, where Russia is a major exporter and China a growing importer, the record is mixed. While pipeline oil flows from Russia to China after years of negotiations, Russian gas exports have been problematic due to political and economic factors. Although cultural ties between Russia and China have not driven the relationship, public opinion is relatively warm but divergent. In 2015, 79 percent of Russians surveyed by the Pew Research Center had a favorable view of China, while 51 percent of Chinese viewed Russia favorably. The gap is notable. However, of the 39 countries surveyed, Chinese gave Russia its third-highest rating, behind only Vietnam (75 percent) and Ghana (56 percent).172 In terms of student exchanges, in 2014 approximately 25,000 Chinese students were in Russian universities and colleges, while 15,000 Russians were studying in China. Russia and China set a goal of raising the total number of exchanges to 100,000 students by 2020. In 2014, China became the largest source of foreign tourists to Russia, replacing Germany.173 Even given the burgeoning partnership between Russia and China, the existing relationship still holds some sources of tension. The first is a legacy of mistrust that is the fruit of the tumultuous Russian–Chinese historical relationship. Both Russians and Chinese have felt this. Prior to 2014, Chinese analysts also expressed apprehension that Russia would turn toward the West as it did in the early 1990s, leaving China isolated. Russians continue to be concerned about the potential of a US–China “duopoly,” where Russia is left isolated in a disadvantageous place in the strategic triangle. Chinese economic success compared to slow Russian growth since 2008 also contributes to Russian fears.174 While Russia’s most important Asian relationship is with China, Russia also seeks to strengthen ties with other Asia-Pacific states.175 At the APEC summit in Singapore in 2009, President Medvedev announced a pivot to Asia. In 2010 45

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Russia became a member of the East Asian Summit, and in 2012 it hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vladivostok after making extensive investments in the city. Article 75 of the 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation states: Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is becoming increasingly important since Russia is an integral part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone, toward which the center of world economy and politics is gradually shifting. Russia is interested in participating actively in APR integration processes, using the possibilities offered by the APR to implement programs meant to boost Siberian and Far Eastern economy, creating a transparent and equitable security architecture in the APR and cooperation on a collective basis.176

There are several reasons for Russia to invest in relations with East Asia. To enhance economic growth, Russia needs to more deeply integrate with the region. More specifically, the Russian Far East, a vast, underdeveloped region, requires major foreign investments to spur development. Russia also strives to be a regional power with strategic options. Moreover, after 2014, Russian conflict with the West and the loss of trust on the part of both sides forced Russia to look to the east. There are challenges in this “pivot.” For example, Victor Larin of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Far Eastern Federal University sees historical and cultural barriers in turning eastward. He asserts: “East Asia can hardly serve as a target for Russia’s ‘eastward turn’. Asian states . . . view it entirely as a foreign, and often destructive, force. This is also true of China.” Instead, he recommends that Russia orient policy toward the North Pacific.177 Others believe that Russia should lift its gaze beyond China to enhance ties with ASEAN, South Korea, and Japan.178 The difficulty of a more robust Asia policy is seen in Russia’s relations with Japan. During the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods, relations between Japan and Russia were normalized. In November 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi visited Russia and signed the Moscow Declaration with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The Moscow Declaration referred to a Russian–Japanese “creative partnership,” with both sides pledging to attempt to achieve a peace treaty requiring a settlement of the dispute over the four southernmost Kuril Islands, or Northern Territories, by 2000. However, the promise of closer Russian–Japanese relations has never been fulfilled. The territorial dispute has proven impossible to settle so far, and thus a formal peace agreement ending World War II has not yet been achieved. Moreover, Japan’s continued role as a close US ally and anchor of the liberal world order in Asia has proven problematic.179 There have been occasional signs of warmer Japanese–Russian relations, and current Japanese Prime Minister Abe has made improving relations with 46

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Russia a priority. In fact, as of 2016, Abe had met Putin fourteen times in an effort to balance Russia’s ties with China. Tellingly, Abe traveled to Sochi and met Putin during the Winter Olympics in 2014 when major Western leaders did not, and Russia has remained neutral on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which China has found annoying.180 However, Japan joined sanctions against Russia after its annexation of Crimea, and Abe visited Kiev in 2015. Russia responded with military maneuvers, new infrastructure, and military modernization on the Kuril Islands, and Prime Minister Medvedev visited the islands. Nevertheless, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida went to Moscow in September 2015, demonstrating that Moscow and Tokyo both seek to improve relations despite pressure from China and the United States.181 Further progress was made at a meeting between Putin and Abe in Vladivostok in September 2016 at the Eastern Economic Forum, in which both sides agreed to further negotiations on the island dispute and specific economic cooperation projects, and Putin visited Japan later in December.182 Japan also plays an important economic role in the Russian Far East (RFE), serving as a vital trade partner. Again to China’s displeasure, Russia has continued to maintain strong ties with Vietnam. In 2012, Russia and Vietnam upgraded their strategic partnership, formed in 2001, to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Russia has sold Vietnam its best weapons, including six Kilo-class submarines (the fourth being delivered in June 2015) and the land attack variant of the Klub missile which can hit Chinese coastal cities. Gazprom has also signed deals to explore for gas in the South China Sea, although Russia says nothing on the sovereignty disputes in those waters. Also on the economic front, in 2015 the EEU and Vietnam signed a free trade agreement, which will aid Russia in developing economic ties with ASEAN.183 Russia has sought to improve relations with both North and South Korea, and has proposed infrastructure projects that would link the two countries. In March 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that 2015 would be a “Year of Friendship” with North Korea. With regard to Taiwan, Russia has modest economic and cultural links. While overtures were made to Taiwan during the Yeltsin Administration, Russia now generally maintains China’s diplomatic line. Because China would use Russian-made weapons in any military conflict with Taiwan and seek Russian political support, Russia risks being pulled into a potential conflict in which it has little interest.184 In Central Asia, China and Russia have tended to cooperate and compete in an atmosphere of restrained rivalry. Both states share common interests in the region, including the stability of Central Asian regimes and the prevention of US-inspired colored revolutions. Russia and China have established common ground in pledging to eliminate the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism from the area. China, in particular, wants stability and 47

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economic development in Central Asia to contribute to peace and growth in its northwestern province of Xinjiang, and Xinjiang itself as a subnational actor has worked to expand ties with Central Asia.185 Russia and China are members of the SCO, and use the organization to communicate on policies toward the region and enhance security. However, there are sources of tension here as well. As part of the former Soviet Union, Russia sees the Central Asian states as within its sphere of influence and has military forces based in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Beijing’s policy of developing the western part of China, beginning in 2000, has led to extensive infrastructure development and growth in China’s interior, giving China much greater access to Central Asia.186 China’s investments in Central Asia and trade with the region are growing rapidly, in contrast to Russia. For example, while remittances from Tajik workers in Russia are vital to Tajikistan’s economy, by 2016 China’s trade with Tajikistan almost equaled that of Russia. China has also made significant investments in the country. China has been more enthusiastic than Russia in using the SCO to promote economic development, and the two have disagreed over China’s proposal to create a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank. However, since 2015 there has been discussion of using the SCO to coordinate economic and development plans between the OBOR and EEU.187 For now, Russia provides Central Asian security, while China is the primarily player in fostering economic development. Nevertheless, as its investments grow in Central Asia, China may feel compelled to play an increasing role in security as well. For example, in March 2016, the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, General Fang Fenghui, announced during a visit to Afghanistan that China sought an anti-terror alliance with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Russia viewed this as an unwelcome development, particularly since Tajikistan is a close ally and member of the CSTO. In August the four states agreed to establish a “four-country mechanism” for joint training and sharing intelligence.188 Increasing Chinese investments in the region have undoubtedly led to stronger political and security interests, and the suicide bomber attack on the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan in August 2016 only heightens China’s interest in the region’s security. Thus, for Russia, Chinese activities in Central Asia are a challenge to its interests. China’s OBOR means that its investments and influence in Central Asia will only increase. While Russian leaders initially feared that OBOR would directly compete with Russia’s vision of an EEU encompassing all or most of the CIS, Moscow now hopes that OBOR can be negotiated to benefit Russia as well.189 While Russia and China have agreed to coordinate their respective plans, implementation will not be easy, as illustrated by a past case. China has been advocating for a 268 kilometer China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway since 1997. The gauge of this railroad would meet China and EU standards, 48

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but not the Russian standard, and Moscow was concerned that it would compete with the Trans-Siberian railway. After heavy Russian lobbying, Kyrgyzstan rejected China’s proposal in 2013, and the CSTO has suggested an alternative line.190 Another area of competition is Mongolia. Mongolia is committed to maintaining a careful balance between China and Russia to retain its independence and room for maneuver, as well as keep good working relations with the United States, the EU, Japan, and Korea. China and Russia have indirect economic competition in attempting to exploit Mongolia’s resources. More than 80 percent of Mongolia’s exports go to China, although Russia has tried to leverage its partial ownership of the trans-Mongolian Railroad to increase its economic stake in the country. China has been frustrated in efforts to secure ownership of resources as Mongolia attempts to prevent itself from falling too closely into Beijing’s orbit. In 2016, Mongolia was considering declaring a policy of neutrality.191 A disappointment in the Sino–Russian relationship has been unbalanced trade, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Sino–Russian trade is more important to Russia than China. Moscow is concerned that terms of trade are disadvantageous to Russia, with Russia primarily exporting raw materials and natural resources to China and importing manufactured goods.192 Large Chinese investments that Russians hoped would compensate for Western sanctions after 2014 have been slow to materialize, although some significant deals have been finalized and there are shared intentions on both sides to further expand mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Russians also have concerns regarding the safety of the RFE, a vast region with only six million Russian inhabitants. The RFE is underdeveloped and underpopulated, and some in Russia believe China will take advantage of this.193 Artyom Lukin, professor at Russia’s Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, and Rens Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute state: “Russia’s Far East (RFE), like much of eastern Asia, is at risk of becoming a de facto appendage of a powerful and assertive Chinese state.” Moscow has instituted a variety of policies to spur development in the RFE and attract international investments. For example, a 2016 law provides free land for Russians in the RFE. However, so far Russia has not successfully developed the region, and state capacity to do so is weak. Moreover, low energy prices from 2015 hinder efforts to stimulate the region’s economy. In the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, China has productively leased thousands of acres of land for agricultural production, but some locals see that as a threat. Moreover, due to the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century, in which the Qing Dynasty was pressured to cede parts of the RFE to Russia, some fear Chinese irredentism. Thus, while Russia needs Chinese investments to develop the RFE and improve the region’s standard of living, Russia also has a strong interest in Japanese and Korean participation in the region as well.194 49

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Another impediment to closer relations is the lack of experts in both countries that understand the other. During the 1950s, Russia trained China watchers while China sent many promising future leaders to Moscow to study. However, as the two countries came to focus elsewhere, senior subject area specialists retired and newer personnel were not trained. Interviews in both China and Russia confirm a shortage of expertise that would help build closer relationships in business and politics, although there is a commitment, particularly on the part of Russians, to develop this expertise now. Especially important for the long-term prospects of the relationship is the shadow of the future. A highly regarded Chinese scholar noted that the Sino– Russian partnership can only be healthy if neither side is dependent on the other.195 However, while China’s economic growth has slowed in recent years, Russia’s economy has contracted due to sanctions, lower energy prices, and failure to bring about substantial diversification in the economy. Current trends suggest that the military and economic gap between Russia and China will continue to grow in the future. Russian leaders and analysts have repeatedly claimed, however, that Russia will not be a junior partner to China. For example, leading Russian expert on China, Alexei Voskressenski, asserts that the Russian political elite will not settle for less than equality in its relationship with China.196 While Russia’s complaint with the West is that it is not treated equally, the fact remains that there is a power imbalance between Russia and China that may grow. Linked to this are concerns that China looks down on Russia, in spite of the efforts of the Chinese government to treat Russia with respect. As Dmitri Trenin baldly asserted in 2012, “Initial Chinese amazement at the pace and direction of the changes in post-Soviet Russia eventually turned into contempt. While this feeling is almost never made explicit, the Chinese have quietly written off Russia as a country that is in an absolute and relative decline.”197 Xing Guangcheng, Director of the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies at CASS, notes in an article that is generally sympathetic to Russia that “factors at both home and abroad will delay and limit any rise of Russia in line with the strategic goals set out by the Putin regime. Indeed, it must be noted that at present Russia is declining at a very fast speed, and it will be a long process with lots of difficulties for it to rise again.”198 The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 provided an important test of Sino–Russian relations, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. China did not welcome the Ukraine conflict. Before the crisis, China had good relations with both Russia and Ukraine. In particular, China and Ukraine had declared that they had a relationship of “strategic partnership” and Ukraine sold military hardware to China and transferred needed technology. Beijing also had agricultural interests in Ukraine and sees Ukraine as a potential geographic bridge to Europe that could be important for realizing 50

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objectives of the OBOR project. The Russian annexation of Crimea further set another example of outside forces supporting a breakaway region, a precedent that Beijing fears could generate support for an independent Taiwan. Thus, Beijing did not endorse Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Beijing stayed neutral in the conflict. China faulted the United States and its European allies for destabilizing Ukraine, and Western involvement in Ukraine’s internal struggles led to sympathy from China for Russia’s position in this situation. China therefore abstained from the UN Security Council Resolution condemning Russia, and Xi Jinping called for a political end to the crisis. Importantly, for the sake of the partnership China did not publicly criticize Russia.199 Alienation of Russia from the West following annexation of Crimea and ongoing support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine only gives China more leverage over Russia regarding OBOR, energy access, weapons sales, and other issues.200 Some Chinese express admiration for Putin’s decisiveness in the face of Western pressure, and the tactical success of the Russian military in Crimea.201 Thus, while Beijing has gained some advantages as a result of Russia’s actions, Beijing did not seek or endorse the crisis. There has been debate in China over how far to support Russia. As mentioned earlier, some feel the time is right for an informal alliance. Others suggest that Russia looks well beyond China to a variety of countries to secure its interests. Moreover, intervening to assist Russia can detract from China’s own domestic development. There is recognition that China can actually do little to aid Russia’s economy.202 There is also clear understanding in Beijing that the Russian–Chinese relationship is limited. Both sides look to multiple economic partners, and neither side will sacrifice its interests for the other.203 Some analysts have asserted that Russia’s shift from Europe to China is against its interests. For example, Lilia Shevtsova, of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, has argued that China’s historical grievances against Russia, the fragile basis of economic ties between the two countries, the asymmetry of a declining Russia and rising China, and competition in Central Asia are all disadvantageous for Russia. Moreover, Russia’s forceful actions in taking Crimea and China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea create the type of environment where China can justify taking back the territory it lost from the RFE. The logic here is that, contrary to the expectations of the liberal international order, military power can be employed to seize territory using only historical principles as justification. Princeton University professor Gilbert Rozman similarly believes that Russia has not given careful strategic analysis to its relationship with China or the Chinese–US–Russian triangle. Rozman asserts: Russia is enamored of such concepts as the strategic triangle, multipolarity, energy superpower, and the Eurasian civilizational pole. All serve to give it a false sense of

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For a state that has historically seen itself as needing to position itself in the long term between East and West, Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. The following chapters will explore specific aspects of this relationship in greater detail. Chapter 2 examines economic ties. Trade and investment levels are relatively low, and both governments are making efforts to increase these exchanges. Gas pipelines have been agreed to but not yet built. The major bright spot in economic ties is oil sales from Russia to China, which are steadily increasing, and OBOR may more closely link the two economies. Chapter 3 looks at the military and security relationship. Both states benefit from a secure border. In addition, Russia has been the major arms supplier to China, and the two sides have engaged in increasingly complex naval exercises. At the same time, both countries continue to take precautions with respect to the other. Chapter 4 explores Russian and Chinese approaches to significant contemporary regional conflicts, namely Ukraine and Syria. While there is a high degree of compatibility in the positions and perspectives of Beijing and Moscow on these regional conflicts, there are differing levels of interests and responses in both cases. Chapter 5 examines non-traditional security issues, including colored revolutions, cyberspace, and terrorism, demonstrating an increasing convergence of views on the part of Russia and China on these areas. Finally, conclusions are offered summarizing the importance of the findings for the Sino–Russian partnership, world order, and geopolitics.

Notes 1. See Cary Huang, “Russian President Vladimir Putin Tops China’s Guest List for G20 Summit,” South China Morning Post, August 14, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/ china/diplomacy-defence/article/2002840/russian-president-vladimir-putin-topschinas-guest-list. 2. See Alexander Gabuev, “Future Approaches to China,” in Russian Futures: Horizon 2025, European Institute for Security Studies Report, 52, no. 26, March 2016; and interview by author with Alexei Voskressenski, Moscow, October 6, 2015. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest (Summer 1989), 3–18; “State of the Union; Transcript of President’s State of the Union Message to Nation,” New York Times, January 30, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/ 30/us/state-union-transcript-president-s-state-union-message-nation.html; and Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22–49.

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Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order 4. See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (America and the World 1990/1991), 23–33, http://users.metu.edu.tr/ utuba/Krauthammer.pdf; and Thomas S. Mowle and David H. Sacko, The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 5. “To Paris, US Looks Like a ‘Hyperpower,’ ” New York Times, February 5, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/news/05iht-france.t_0.html. 6. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 268–9; more broadly, see chapter 7 therein. 7. White House, National Security Strategy, February 2015, 1, https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 8. White House, National Security Strategy, 19–22. 9. However, for the argument that the United States is still the hegemonic power in Asia, see Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Tim Summers, “China’s Global Personality,” Chatham House, June 2014. 10. Kissinger, World Order, 2. 11. Goh, Struggle for Order, 7. There is a vast literature linking ideology and world order. See, for example, Joseph E. Nye, Jr. and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 9th edn. (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 337; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 12. The document can be found at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/ plenary/a52-153.htm. 13. For a comparative study of Russian and Chinese economic, political, and foreign policies, see Christer Pursiainen, ed., At the Crossroads of Post-Communist Modernisation: Russia and China in Comparative Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 14. Lowell Dittmer, “Political and Cultural Roots of Sino-Russian Partnership,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 16–17. 15. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 33; see also 10–11. A more detailed discussion of the treaty is found in Mark Mancall, China and Russia: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 141–62. 16. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 35. 17. Westad, Restless Empire, 34. 18. S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 28–9, 49–106; see also R. K. I. Quested, The Expansion of Russia in East Asia 1857–1860 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968). 19. Paine, Imperial Rivals, 110–73. 20. Kissinger, On China, 100. 21. Paine, Imperial Rivals, 178–208. 22. Paine, Imperial Rivals, 209–68.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 23. Westad, Restless Empire, 146–8; and Paine, Imperial Rivals, 272–342. 24. For a detailed study of this time period, see John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 25. Thomas P. Bernstein, “Introduction: The Complexities of Learning from the Soviet Union,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 1–2. 26. For a positive view of the Soviet economic model’s contributions to China, see Kong Hanbing, “The Transplantation and Entrenchment of the Soviet Economic Model in China,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 153–66. 27. See You Ji, “The Soviet Model and the Breakdown of the Military Alliance,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 131–49. 28. Kissinger, On China, 114. 29. For details of Mao’s time in Moscow, see Alexander Pantsov with Steve Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 366–73; see also Kissinger, On China, 113–18; and Michael L. Levine, The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 79–82. 30. For details on the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, see Kissinger, On China, 172–80. 31. For details on the causes of the Sino–Soviet split, see Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Sino-Soviet Relations during the Mao Years, 1949–1969,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 34–48; and Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs and International Relations (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2013), 117–47. 32. For a comprehensive view of Sino–Soviet/Russian relations from 1969 through the Yeltsin period, see Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). 33. Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Concurrent Debate about the Gorbachev Era,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 449–76. 34. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), chapter 4. 35. A. Greer Meisels, “Lessons Learned in China from the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” China Studies Center Policy Paper 3, January 2013. 36. Suisheng Zhao, “Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016), 84. 37. Cited in Sharyl Cross and Marina A. Oborotova, eds., The New Chapter in United StatesRussian Relations: Opportunities and Challenges (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 5. 38. Cross and Oborotova, New Chapter, 5. 39. Boris Yeltsin, remarks at the CSCE Summit, Budapest, December 5, 1994, cited in Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary Record of United States Foreign Policy 5, no. 4–5 (1995), 11. 40. Alexander Yakovlev, “Confidential Partnership Aimed at Strategic Interaction,” Far Eastern Affairs 112, no. 2 (1997), 45, cited in Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image

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41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50. 51.

of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” Brookings Working Paper, 2001, https://www.brookings.edu/research/russias-image-of-china-and-russian-chineserelations/. For a Chinese perspective on RIC, see Chen Dongxiao and Feng Shuai, “The RussiaIndia-China Trio in the Changing International System,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 2, no. 4 (2016), 431–47. For a detailed analysis of this question, see David Scott, “The Chinese Century?”: The Challenge to Global Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See, for example, John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), 66. Fei-Ling Wang, “From Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of World Order,” in America, China, and the Struggle for World Order, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 43–68; June Teufel Dreyer, “The ‘Tianxia Trope’: Will China Change the International System?,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 96 (2015), 17, http://dx. doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1030951. For details of the debate on the historical Chinese world order, see Suisheng Zhao, “Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of China,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 96 (2015): 961–82, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1030913. Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept ‘All-Under-Heaven (Tianxia),’ ” in China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy, ed. William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011), 21–36; see also William A. Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 52–8. On China’s strategy under Deng, see David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 27–36. The English version of this document can be found at http://www.gov.cn/english/ official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm. For an application of the concept of China’s “New Diplomacy,” see Gao Fei, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China’s New Diplomacy,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, July 2010. The English version of this document can be found at http://www.china.org.cn/ government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm. For an analysis of this model, see Ren Xiao, “Modeling a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’: A Chinese Viewpoint,” Asan Forum, October 14, 2013, http://www. theasanforum.org/modeling-a-new-type-of-great-power-relations-a-chinese-view point/. See also Yang Jiechi, “Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New Conditions,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 16, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1066869. shtml; and Christopher K. Johnson et al., “Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014, 19–21.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 52. For a Chinese perspective on how this concept applies to Russia, see Sun Changhong, “Zhong E guanxi fazhan yu xin xing daguo lianxi” (“The Development of Chinese-Russian Relations and a New Type of Great Power Relations”), in 2013 Ou Ya fazhan yanjiu (2013 Eurasian Development Research), ed. Li Fenglin (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 2013), 1–8. 53. Interview by author, Beijing, November 2015. 54. Liselotte Odgaard, “Between Integration and Coexistence: US-Chinese Strategies of International Order,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2013), 15–39; for contradictions in China’s stated doctrines and policies, see Barry Buzan, “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2014), 14–21. 55. For Xi’s speeches on the Chinese Dream, see Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 37–70; see also Yang Jiechi, “Innovations”; and Christopher K. Johnson, “Decoding,” 18–19. 56. Zhou Bajun, “SAR’s Big Role in the ‘China Solution,’ ” China Daily Asia, July 13, 2016, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/opinion/2016-07/13/content_15461916. html. 57. Callahan, China Dreams. 58. Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “The China Dream: Revival of What Historical Greatness?,” in China Dreams: China’s New Leadership and Future Impacts, ed. Chih-Shian Liou and Arthur S. Ding (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 3–32. 59. “China’s Xi Calls for Asia Security Framework at Summit,” Bloomberg, May 21, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-21/china-s-xi-calls-forasia-security-framework-at-summit; Henry Sanderson, “China’s Xi Urges Asian Security Framework to Counter US,” Bloomberg, June 28, 2014, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-28/china-s-xi-urges-asian-securityframework-to-counter-u-s-; and Shannon Tiezzi, “At CICA, Xi Calls for New Regional Security Architecture,” Diplomat, May 22, 2014, http://thediplomat. com/2014/05/at-cica-xi-calls-for-new-regional-security-architecture/. 60. Alexander Lukin, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Looking for a New Role,” Russia in Global Affairs, July 10, 2015, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/ShanghaiCooperation-Organization-Looking-for-a-New-Role-17576; and “China-led Bloc Keeps Iran at Arm’s Length Despite Russian Backing,” Reuters, June 23, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-sco-idUSKCN0Z9213. 61. “Brics Countries Launch New Development Bank in Shanghai,” BBC, July 21, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/33605230. 62. For China’s perspective on the BRICS, see Zhao Kejin, “Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe zhongde jinzhuan guojia hezuo” (“Cooperation with BRICS in China’s International Strategy”), in Guoji guancha (International Review) 2014, no. 3, 44–58; and Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “China’s Approach to BRICS,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (2014), 357–75. 63. See Jane Perlez, “US Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank,” New York Times, October 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-planfor-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0; and the AIIB website at http://www.aiibank.org.

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Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order 64. Jane Perlez, “China-led Development Bank Starts with $509 Million in Loans for 4 Projects,” New York Times, June 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/ world/asia/china-led-development-bank-starts-with-509-million-in-loans-for-4-pro jects.html. 65. Yu Bin, “All Still Quiet in the East,” Comparative Connections 17, no. 1 (May 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/1501qchina_russia.pdf. 66. For details, see James Kynge, “How the Silk Road Plans Will Be Financed,” Financial Times, May 9, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/e83ced94-0bd8-11e6-9456444ab5211a2f; Christopher K. Johnson, “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative,” CSIS, March 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinping %E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative; François Godement and Agatha Kratz, eds., “ ‘One Belt, One Road’: China’s Great Leap Outward,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2015; and Jacob Stokes, “China’s Road Rules,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-04-19/chinas-road-rules. 67. In this regard, see Zheng Wang, “China’s Alternative Diplomacy,” Diplomat, January 30, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-alternative-diplomacy/. 68. See Shi Ze and Yang Chengxi, “China’s Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Energy and Resources Cooperation Along the ‘One Belt and One Road,’ ” China Institute of International Studies Report, no. 5, May 2015, http://images.china.cn/gyw/CIIS% 20Report%20no.5%20full%20text.pdf; and Qiao Liang, “One Belt, One Road,” Heartland: Eurasian Review of Politics, July 17, 2015, http://temi.repubblica. it/limes-heartland/one-belt-one-road/2070?refresh_ce. 69. For the concerns of Chinese scholars, see Godement and Kratz, “One Belt, One Road”; Shi Yinhong, “China Must Tread Lightly with its ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” South China Morning Post, August 18, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/ comment/insight-opinion/article/1850515/china-must-tread-lightly-its-one-beltone-road-initiative; and Lisa Murray, “Speed Bumps in China’s New Silk Road,” Australian Financial Review, September 29, 2016, http://www.afr.com/news/world/ asia/speed-bumps-in-chinas-new-silk-road-20160928-grqxe8. 70. Syed Raza Hassan, “Attacks Have Killed 44 Pakistanis Working on China Corridor since 2014,” Reuters, September 8, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistanchina-idUSKCN11E1EP. 71. Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Lowy Institute, March 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-roadinitiative; David Dollar, “Yes, China Is Investing Globally—But not so Much in its Belt and Road Initiative,” Brookings Institution, May 8, 2017, https://www. brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/08/yes-china-is-investing-globallybut-not-so-much-in-its-belt-and-road-initiative/; and Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order,” New York Times, May 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/chinarailway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html?_r=0. 72. James T. Areddy, “China Aims to Rewrite Rules of Global Web,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2015, A1, A10, quote on A10; see also Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 42 (Fall 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS_092013Carnegie.pdf.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 73. See International Crisis Group, “Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions,” July 24, 2014, http://old.crisisgroup.org/_/media/Files/asia/northeast-asia/258-old-scores-and-grudges-evolving-sino-japanese-tensions.pdf; and Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” Brookings, August 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/research/files/papers/2014/08/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthalmcdevitt/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf. 74. Rosemary Foot, “ ‘Doing Some Things’ in the Xi Jinping Era: The United Nations as China’s Venue of Choice,” International Affairs 90, no. 5 (2015), 1085–100. 75. Ellen L. Frost, “Rival Regionalisms and Regional Order: A Slow Crisis of Legitimacy,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report no. 48, December 2014, quote on 3. 76. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Global Governance since 2008–9: Not Much New,” China Leadership Monitor no. 49 (Winter 2016), http://www.hoover. org/sites/default/files/clm49ms.pdf. 77. Eric X. Li, “China and the World,” Survival 57, no. 2 (April–May 2015), 237. 78. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 172 (emphasis in original). 79. Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). See especially chapter 11. 80. Ho-fung Hung, The China Boom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); and Jonathan Fenby, Will China Dominate the 21st Century? (Malden, MA: Polity, 2014). 81. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” National Interest, April 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204. (This is also the new concluding chapter of Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics). 82. Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2012). 83. Fei-Ling Wang, “China Faces the United States: A Strategy of Four Rs,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Aug 28–Sept 1, 2013; Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015). 84. Kissinger, On China, 503–13. Song’s book was written with co-authors. 85. William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, eds., China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011); and Callahan, China Dreams. 86. David Shambaugh and Ren Xiao, “China: The Conflicted Rising Power,” in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, ed. Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 36–72; and Daniel C. Lynch, China’s Futures (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). 87. Summers, “China’s Global Personality.” 88. Shi Yinhong, “China’s Complicated Foreign Policy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_com plicated_foreign_policy311562.

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Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order 89. See Jacques, When China Rules the World; and Guang Xia, “China as a ‘CivilizationState’: A Historical and Comparative Interpretation,” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 140, 2014. 90. See summary of Martin Jacques’s lecture held at the University of California, Los Angeles, in Kathleen Micham, “US Needs to Deepen its Understanding China Scholar Urges,” UCLA Today, December 1, 2009. 91. See Vladimir Putin’s speech at the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, in “It is Impossible to Move Forward without Spiritual, Cultural and National Self-determination-Putin,” RT-Russia Today, September 20, 2013; and Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, transcript, September 19, 2013, Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243. 92. See Sergei Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,” Russia in Global Affairs, March 3, 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/2124391. 93. See Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy.” 94. See Vladimir Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly, December 4, 2014, Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173. 95. See Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy.” 96. Alexander Lukin, Pivot to Asia: Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century (New Delhi: United Services Institute, 2017), 21, based on Alexander Lukin, “Russia in a Post-Bipolar World,” Survival 58, no. 1 (February 2016), 100. 97. Ivan Timofeev, “Why Russia Wants a Change to the Contemporary World Order,” Russia Direct, October 30, 2014, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/why-russiawants-change-contemporary-world-order. 98. Fyodor Lukyanov, “The Lost Twenty-Five Years: Why No New World has been Built since the End of the Cold War,” Global Brief: World Affairs in the 21st Century, February 19, 2016, http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2016/02/19/the-lost-twenty-fiveyears/. 99. See Fyodor Lukyanov, Oleg Barabanov, Timofey Bordachev, Andrey Sushentsov, Dmitry Suslov, and Ivan Timofeev, “War and Peace in the 21st Century, International Stability and Balance of the New Type,” Valdai Discussion Club Report, 2015, 12. 100. For discussions of the impact of history on the Russian worldview, see Kissinger, World Order, 52–8; Stephen J. Blank, “The Sacred Monster: Russia as a Foreign Policy Actor,” in Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2012), 25–194; and Allen C. Lynch, How Russia is Not Ruled (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7–10. 101. Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 210. 102. “Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR,” BBC News, April 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co. uk/1/hi/4480745.stm. 103. See Nikolai Berdyaev, The Russian Idea (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1947; Hudson, New York: Lindisfarne Press, 1992), first translated from the Russian by R. M. French, 26–7.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 104. For Russia’s desire to be a great power, see Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2012). On US–Russian relations, see Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: USRussian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 105. Pavel K. Baev, “Defying that Sinking Feeling: Russia Seeks to Uphold its Role in the Multistructural International System in Flux,” in Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2012), 1–24. 106. See the 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Articles 4, 15, 29–30, http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D. 107. See Timofeev, “Why Russia.” 108. Stent, Limits, 180–1. 109. Lynch, How Russia is Not Ruled, 195–234. 110. Mette Skak, “Russia’s New ‘Monroe Doctrine,’ ” in Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 147; see also Blank, “Sacred Monster,” 75–96; and Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 8. 111. See Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 60–1; Alexander Lukin, “What the Kremlin Is Thinking: Putin’s Vision for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2014); and Alexander Lukin, interview with author, Moscow, October 6, 2015. 112. See Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 60–1; Lukin, “What the Kremlin is Thinking”; and Lukin, interview with author, Moscow, October 6, 2015. 113. See Vladimir Putin, speech at the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, September 19, 2013. 114. The latest manifestation of this is Article 39 of the 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. 115. Igor Zevelev, “The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy,” CSIS, August 22, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy. 116. See Vladimir Putin, “New Integration Project for Eurasia, Future Being Born Today,” Izvestia, October 4, 2011, http://iz.ru/news/502761; “Does Putin’s Return to the Kremlin Breathe New Life Into Eurasian Union Project?,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, March 6, 2012; and Irina Filatova, “Putin Bats for Eurasian Union,” Moscow Times, October 5, 2011. 117. For details on the EEU, see Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), 188–93; Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 75–87; and Reid Standish, “Putin’s Eurasian Dream is Over Before it Began,” Foreign Policy, January 6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/putins-eurasian-dream-is-over-before-itbegan/. 118. Cynthia Roberts, “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider,” Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010), 38–73. 119. Yulia Nikitina, “The Collective Security Treaty Organization through the Looking Glass,” Problems of Post-Communism 59, no. 3 (May/June 2012), 41–52. 120. Lukyanov, “Lost Twenty-Five Years.”

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Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

133. 134.

135.

136. 137. 138.

139. 140.

141. 142. 143. 144.

Lukyanov, “Lost Twenty-Five Years.” Lukyanov et al., “War and Peace in the 21st Century,” 2. Lukyanov et al., “War and Peace in the 21st Century,” 2. Lukyanov et al., “War and Peace in the 21st Century,” 12. Igor Zevelev, “Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy,” A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2016. Zevelev, “Russian National Identity,” 16. Zevelev, “Russian National Identity,” 16. Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Berdyaev, “Russian Idea,” 57. Berdyaev, “Russian Idea,” 63. Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 18, 60–1, 166–7; and Lukin, “What the Kremlin Is Thinking.” For a treatment of the Eurasianist version of Russian nationalism, see Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016). In this regard, see Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (New York: Picador, 2002), 355–429. Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from the Russian Civilizational Debates,” International Studies Review 10, no. 1 (December 2008), 766. Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor Zevelev, “Russia’s Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy,” in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, ed. Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 184–98. Articles 76–82 of the December 2015 Russian National Security Strategy stress the importance of Russian spiritual and cultural values, in line with nationalist thinking. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 62–77. Igor Okunev, interview with author, Moscow, October 5, 2015. “Article by Russian President Vladimir Putin, ‘Russia: New Eastern Perspectives,’ ” Kremlin, November 9, 2000, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/ 21132. Vladimir Putin, statement in Britain in 2003, quoted in Maria Lipman, “What Russia Thinks of Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2016. Interviews by author, Moscow, October 2015. See also Marlène Laruelle, “Moscow’s China Dilemma,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 85–7; and Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 178–81, 184–5. Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 34–5, 37–9; see also Alexander Lukin, “Russia, China and Emerging Greater Eurasia,” Asan Forum, August 18, 2015. Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 7. Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 4–5; and Lukin, “Russia, China and Emerging Greater Eurasia.” Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 5–6; Lukin, “Russia, China and Emerging Greater Eurasia”; and Lukin, interview with author, Moscow, October 5, 2015.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 145. Mikhail Kasyanov quoted in Denis Sinyakov, “Charting Russia’s Political Future,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2015. 146. See Sinyakov, “Charting Russia’s Political Future.” 147. See “China Pledges Closer Exchanges with A Just Russia Party,” Xinhua, October 30, 2014. 148. Author’s interviews in Moscow, October 2105; and see, for example, Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 158. Lukin indicates that Putin “maneuvers” between “extremes” among Russia’s elite so as “not to fully sever ties with the West,” and at the same time to pursue “integration in the post-Soviet space and cooperation with Asia.” 149. Alexei Voskressenski and Artyom Lukin, interview with author, Austin, February 9, 2016. 150. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 5. 151. Tsygankov, “Self and Other.” 152. Zevelev, “Russian National Identity,” 8. 153. Zevelev, “Russian National Identity,” 4. 154. Bridget Kendall, “How Does Russia View the West?” BBC News, August 10, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33821589. 155. Viktor A. Kremenyuk, interview with author, Sveti Stefan Montenegro, June 5, 2015. 156. Dragoş Tîrnoveanu, “Russia, China, and the Far East Question,” Diplomat, January 20, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/russia-china-and-the-far-east-question/. 157. Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience (London: Chatham House, 2008); Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Chatham House: London, 2015); Andrew Kuchins, “Russia’s China Challenge in a Changing Era: An American Perspective,” Asan Forum, November 22, 2013, http://www.theasanforum.org/russias-chinachallenge-in-a-changing-asia-an-american-perspective/; Dmitri Trenin, “From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Trenin_To_Asia_ WEB_2015Eng.pdf; and Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2016), 96. 158. Dmitri Trenin, “True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other,” Centre for European Reform, February 2012; Trenin, “From Greater Europe.” 159. Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016, 4–5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf. 160. “Country Report: China,” Asan Forum, October 4, 2013, www.theasanforum. org/country-report-china-2/. 161. These points of view are described in Yu Bin, “Russia’s Pride and China’s Power,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 3 (January 2015), http://csis.org/files/publica tion/1403qchina_russia.pdf. For a perspective that many of the arguments against a Russian–Chinese alliance are myths, see Alexander Korolev, “The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China: Myths and Reality,” Asan Forum, May 4, 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/the-strategic-alignment-between-russiaand-china-myths-and-reality/. 162. Feng Yujun, “Prospects for Sino-Russian Relations and China’s National Interests in the Next Decade,” Contemporary International Relations (July/August 2008), 26.

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Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order 163. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook—China, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. This is, of course, much shorter in the northwest than in Soviet days. 164. Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs, 151–2. 165. For a complete list, see SIPRI arms transfer data at https://sipri.org/databases/ armstransfers. 166. Interview by author, Beijing, May 2013. 167. Regarding Libya, China felt betrayed by NATO’s attack, believing that the UN mandate was exceeded by NATO’s use of force. Interview by author, Beijing, 2013. 168. “Russia, China Help Stabilize Global Situation: Lavrov,” People’s Daily Online, February 28, 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0228/c90883-8854868.html. 169. See Julia Famularo, “The China-Russia NGO Crackdown,” Diplomat, February 23, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-china-russia-ngo-crackdown/. 170. For an argument that state identity is more important than interests in assessing international relations, see Gilbert Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (Washington DC, and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2014). 171. See “People’s Daily Criticizes US as ‘Source of Turmoil,’ ” Xinhua, September 18, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/18/c_135695211.htm. 172. “Russia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World,” Pew Research Center, August 5, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/08/05/russia-putin-held-in-lowregard-around-the-world/. 173. Anna Dolgov, “Russia and China Boost Student Exchange Programs,” Moscow Times, October 13, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russianand-china-boost-student-exchange-programs/509353.html; and Anastasia Bazenkova, “Russia Lures Chinese Tourists as West Turns Away,” Moscow Times, June 9, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-lures-chinesetourists-as-west-turns-away/523360.html. 174. See, for example, Ji Zhiye, “China-Russia Bond,” Contemporary International Relations (January/February 2007), 13; Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo (China Institute of International Studies), Guoji xingshi he Zhongguo waijiao lanpishu 2007/2008 (International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs 2007/ 2008) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2008), 199; Nebojsa Bjelakovic and Christina M. Yeung, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: Views from Beijing and Moscow,” Defence R&D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, September 2008; Trenin, “From Greater Europe,” 12–16; and Kuchins, “Russia’s China Challenge.” 175. Interview by author with Victor Sumskiy, October 6, 2015. For a Chinese perspective on Russia’s eastward turn and its historical antecedents, see Wang Ning, “Eluosi ‘dongjin’ yu xin xing dangdai guoji guanxide goujian” (“The Russian ‘Eastward Strategy’ and the Construction of the Contemporary New Type of International Relations”), Guoji guancha (International Review) 2014, no. 1, 110–22. 176. The Concept can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ report/2013/2013-foreign-policy-concept.htm.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 177. Victor Larin, “Staying on Track,” Russia in Global Affairs, September 22, 2015, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Staying-On-Track-17703. For the failure of Russia’s eastern policy, see also Lo, Russia, 132–64. 178. Interviews by author, Moscow, October 2015. 179. R. Craig Nation, “Russia in East Asia: Aspirations and Limitations,” in Russia’s Prospects in Asia, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2010), 44–9; and Yakov Zinberg, “The Moscow Declaration, the Year 2000, and Russo-Japanese Deadlock over the ‘Four Islands’ Dispute,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Winter 1998–1999), 86–95, https://www. dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=138. 180. See Valerie Niquet, “Sino-Russian Relations,” Asan Forum, July 25, 2014, http:// www.theasanforum.org/tag/balance-of-power/. 181. See Artyom Lukin, “Russia’s Eastward Drive-Pivoting to Asia . . . Or to China?,” Russian Analytical Digest no. 169, June 30, 2015, 2–5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/192109/Russian_Analytical_Digest_170.pdf; Angela Stent, “Russia, China, and the West after Crimea,” Transatlantic Academy Paper Series, May 2016, 13–14, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Stent_ RussiaChina_May16_web_0.pdf; and the National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2016 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2016), 223–6. 182. “In Fresh Isle Talks, Abe and Putin Agree to Japan Summit, Economic Deal in December,” Japan Times, September 2, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2016/09/02/national/politics-diplomacy/putin-sees-opening-japan-world-war-iiera-island-dispute/#.V8zz9pgrLIV. 183. See Stephen Blank, “Russo-Chinese Relations in Strategic Perspective,” Asan Forum, April 11, 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/russo-chinese-relations-instrategic-perspective/; Greg Torode, “Vietnam Buys Submarine-Launched Land Attack Missiles to Deter China,” Reuters, April 30, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/ article/2015/04/30/uk-vietnam-military-idUKKBN0NL0B220150430; and Lukin, “Russia’s Eastward Drive,” 4. 184. On Russia and Taiwan, see Shelly Rigger, “The Taiwan Issue and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: The View from Beijing,” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 312–32; and Jeanne L. Wilson, “China, Russia, and the Taiwan Issue: The View from Moscow,” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 293–311. 185. For Xinjiang’s role in China’s Central Asia policy, see Li Mingjiang, “From LookWest to Act-West: Xinjiang’s Role in China-Central Asian Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (July 2016), 515–28. 186. In this regard see Luis Simón, “Reaching beyond the Indo-Pacific,” Comparative Strategy 32, no. 4 (2013), 338–40. 187. Jamie Coomarasamy, “China’s Westward Pivot: What It Means for Central Asia and Russia,” Mediterranean Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2014), 48–60; June Teufel Dreyer, “China and Russia: A Limited Liability Partnership,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 13, 2015, http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/02/china-andrussia-a-limited-liability-partnership/; Zhao Huasheng and Sergey Luzyanin,

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188.

189. 190.

191.

192. 193. 194.

195. 196.

“Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2016 Model,” Russian International Affairs Council, July 7, 2016, 36–8, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/ rossiysko-kitayskiy-dialog-model-2016/; and Paul Goble, “China Quietly Displacing Both Russia and US from Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 140, August 2, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid% 5D=27&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45704#.V98RDvArLIU. See Gabuev, “Friends,” 25–9; Joshua Kucera, “China Proposes New Central Asian Military Alliance,” Eurasianet.org, March 21, 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/77896; Yu Bin, “H-Bomb Plus THAAD Equals Sino-Russian Alliance,” Comparative Connections 18, no. 1 (May 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ s3fs-public/publication/1601qchina_russia_0.pdf; and “China Joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in Security Alliance,” Reuters, August 4, 2016, http://in.reu ters.com/article/china-security-idINKCN10F1FN. For a Chinese commentator who expected Russian resistance to One Belt, One Road, see Godement and Kratz, “ ‘One Belt, One Road.’ ” See Gilbert Rozman, “The Intersection of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ and China’s ‘March to the West,’ ” Russian Analytical Digest no. 169, June 30, 2015, 6–8, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192109/Russian_Analytical_Digest_170.pdf; and Yu Bin, “Putin’s Glory and Xi’s Dreams,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 3 (January 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/1303qchina_russia.pdf. Robert E. Bedeski, “Asiatica: Sino-Russian Heartland and the Mongolian State,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 214–37; Sergey Radchenko, “Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia,” Asan Forum, November 22, 2013, http://www.theasanforum. org/sino-russian-competition-in-mongolia/; and Anthony Rinna, “Mongolian Neutrality and its Significance for Russian Security,” Russia Direct, May 3, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/mongolian-neutrality-and-its-significancerussian-security. See Trenin, “True Partners?,” 33–42. Paul Lirette, “Russia’s Far East Strategy: Fact or Fiction,” Russia Direct 4, no. 9 (2016), 8. Artyom Lukin and Rens Lee, “The Russian Far East and the Future of Asian Security,” Orbis 59, no. 2 (Spring 2015), 167–80, quote on 167; and Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 292–323. See also Timofey Bordachev, ed., “Toward the Great Ocean 4: Turn to the East,” Valdai Discussion Club Report, 2016, 17–22, http://valdaiclub.com/files/11431/; Andrew Higgins, “Russia’s Acres, if not its Locals, Beckon Chinese Farmers,” New York Times, August 1, 2016, http:// www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/world/asia/russia-china-farmers.html?_r=0; and Michael Khodarkovsky, “So Much Land, Too Few Russians,” New York Times, September 17, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/opinion/so-muchland-too-few-russians.html. Interview by author, Shanghai, May 2009. Interview by author, Moscow, October 2015.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 197. Trenin, “True Partners?,” 16. 198. Xing Guangcheng, “The Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s Choices in 2015,” Russian Analytical Digest no. 168, June 11, 2015, 7, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/ pdfs/Russian_Analytical_Digest_169.pdf; see also Yan Yaping, “Three Contradictions in Russia’s Approach to Ascendance,” Contemporary International Relations (July/August 2009), 59–69. 199. On China’s view of the crisis, see Yu Bin, “ ‘Western Civil War’ Déjà Vu?,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 1 (May 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/ 1401qchina_russia_0.pdf; Märta Carlsson, Susanne Oxenstierna, and Mikael Weissmann, “China and Russia—A Study on Cooperation, Competition, and Distrust,” FOI (Swedish Defense Research Agency), June 2015, 75–8, http:// www.foi.se/Documents/foir4087.pdf; for an analysis of how the crisis affected Russia–NATO relations, see Sharyl Cross, “NATO-Russia Security Challenges in the Aftermath of Ukraine Conflict: Managing Black Sea Security and Beyond,” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15, no. 2 (2015). 200. Dmitri Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry,” Carnegie Moscow Center, July 2014; and Xing Guangcheng, “The Ukraine Crisis,” 6–7. 201. See the remarks of Senior Colonel Fang Bing summarized in Lyle J. Goldstein, “What Does China Really Think about the Ukraine Crisis?,” National Interest, September 4, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-china-reallythink-about-the-ukraine-crisis-11196. 202. For a fuller explanation of these arguments, see Dreyer, “China and Russia.” 203. Interviews by author, Beijing, June 2013. 204. Lilia Shevtsova, “Bad Romance,” American Interest, July 15, 2015, http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2015/07/15/bad-romance; and Rozman, “The Intersection,” 7.

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2 Energy and the Economic Foundations of the Sino–Russian Relationship

In order to deepen their strategic partnership, the Chinese and Russian governments have worked to develop stronger economic linkages. Increasing oil sales from Russia to China is one area of success. Nevertheless, the level of overall trade has not yet met expectations. Years of increasing trade lost momentum with Russia’s economic downturn beginning in 2015. In the energy field, in 2016 Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest crude oil provider, but in spite of more than two decades of negotiations, natural gas pipelines connecting Russia and China were not yet completed at the end of 2016. Cross-border investment is low too, although there may be new momentum as Russia seeks Chinese investments to compensate for Western sanctions and Moscow shows greater openness to Chinese investments in what were once sensitive sectors. While economic links were hampered by political forces in the past, now obstacles consist largely of existing supply chains, geographic trading patterns, the drop in the value of the ruble, and the make-up of the two countries’ economies. Russia and China are working to build stronger economic ties to complement their partnership, but both sides have bargained hard to seek maximum economic gain, slowing the process of tighter integration. Russia and China have hoped that economic cooperation could lead to changes in the global order, but in a way that would reform it rather than overthrow it. For instance, the BRICS were conceived of as a powerful economic grouping that could shape the contours of the world economic system. Russia believed that energy sales to China could give it leverage with Europe on energy prices, and a turn to China after 2014 would provide Russia relief from Western sanctions over Ukraine. Analysts believed that networks of oil and gas pipelines linking Russia and China would have strategic political consequences. While stronger overall economic ties have yet to come to fruition, initiatives such as linking China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) with the

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) have the potential to shape the world economic order.

The Chinese and Russian Economies Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, in 1978 China began a long process of economic reforms. China has moved from a command economy to one that relies more heavily on markets, although state-owned enterprises still dominate priority sectors of the economy such as energy. China’s rapid economic growth rates in the reform era have been the envy of the world. From 1978 until 2015, China’s economy grew more than tenfold. It became the largest economy in the world in 2014, measured on a purchasing power parity basis, but with per capita income still lower than the world average. China is the world’s largest exporter, third-largest importer, and first in value of foreign exchange holdings.1 Fueled by foreign investment, exports, and a huge domestic market, China has enjoyed consistent rapid growth. However, in the 2012–14 timeframe, annual growth rates slipped below 8 percent. Growth fell further, to 6.9 percent in 2015 and 6.7 percent in 2016.2 China’s government is struggling to shift from a model heavily reliant on exported manufactured goods and high levels of debt-financed domestic investment to one driven by consumer spending. Challenges to the economy include increasing corporate debt, environmental degradation, corruption, high levels of inequality, and an aging population that has led to a smaller workforce and rising wages. Rapid drawdowns in foreign exchange reserves and sharp drops in the Shanghai stock exchange in 2015 and 2016 led to questions regarding the future trajectory of China’s economy and the ability of the government to manage the challenges to sustained economic growth. Nevertheless, China’s powerful economy still has tremendous potential and continues to give Beijing increasing influence in the world. Russia’s economy too has moved from a centrally planned system under the Soviet Union to one that is more market-oriented.3 However, Russia’s economy is still heavily tied to the state due to the nature of the political system and the oversized role played by the energy sector, and its economy is less dynamic than China’s. The economy suffered major declines in GNP after the fall of the Soviet Union. According to the World Bank, from 1991 to 1999 the economy shrank every year, including a drop of 14.5 percent in 1992. A recovery began in 1999, when the economy grew 6.4 percent, and ten-year growth from that point averaged 6.9 percent, due largely to Russia’s rich resource base. However, the economy took a big hit in 2009 because of the global recession, with GNP falling by 7.8 percent. Growth has not returned to previous levels. In 2013 and 2014, the economy grew at rates of just 1.3 percent 68

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Energy and the Sino–Russian Relationship

and 0.7 percent respectively, while because of the plunge in energy prices, Western economic sanctions, and the drop in the ruble, the economy contracted by 3.7 percent in 2015.4 In 2016 the economy shrank by an estimated 0.2 percent.5 Russia has the 7th-largest GDP in the world based on purchasing power parity, but is 73rd in GDP/capita. It is 20th in the world in terms of exports, and 25th in imports. Its foreign exchange reserves are 8th largest in the world.6 Russia’s economy is burdened by the country’s geography and harsh climate. Because of Russia’s size, cold temperatures, and the necessity of using expensive land transportation as opposed to river or sea transportation, costs of production in Russia are high.7 Moreover, Russia’s economy is dependent on energy exports. According to World Trade Organization September 2015 data, fuels and mining products made up 70.3 percent of Russian exports, compared to 20.8 percent for manufactured goods. (By comparison, 94.0 percent of Chinese exports are manufactured goods.)8 Largely because of the factors mentioned above, the cost of producing oil in Russia is high, and Russian oil fields are situated far from ports. Moreover, in 2012 the Russian state taxed oil at $70/barrel, leaving very few funds for reinvestment in the industry.9 As the price of oil dropped below $30/barrel in early 2016 and only rose to a little over $40/barrel by the middle of the year, the Russian economy suffered. China’s GDP overtook Russia’s in 1993 and is now more than eight times larger. However, often lost in the hype is the fact that Russia still has a higher per capita GDP. The World Bank calculates China’s GDP/capita in 2015 in current US$ at US$8,069, while Russia’s was US$9,329. There is an even bigger gap using PPP estimates.10 Moreover, the Chinese and Russian regions on either side of the eastern border, the Chinese northeast (Dongbei) and the Russian Far East (RFE), lag behind in development and are areas of concern for their national governments. There have been various plans to more closely integrate Dongbei and the RFE. The Greater Tumen Initiative, initiated in 1995 and including Russia, China, Mongolia, and South Korea, has not been successful. The Program of Cooperation between the Northeast of the People’s Republic of China and the Far East and Eastern Siberia of the Russian Federation (2009–18), initiated by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2009, also withered. Currently, projects designed to integrate Dongbei with the RFE are incorporated in the new Silk Road Economic Belt. Russians hope that under this framework Chinese firms will invest in the RFE. It remains to be seen whether this new initiative will be more successful than previous efforts.11 However, there are some signs of hope. For instance, Russia has relaxed limits on Chinese investments in Russian energy firms, and Chinese companies have signed several new agreements to invest in commercial projects in the RFE. 69

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Trade and Investment China and Russia share a 4,133 kilometer border in the east and a 46 kilometer border in the west. One might expect robust trade relations between such politically friendly states. However, various geographic factors limit trade. The border is far from Russia’s manufacturing industries and major cities. Moreover, the RFE, more than a third of the Russian landmass, has a population of only about 6 million, and its primary economic activity is resource extraction. The transportation links between Russia and China are not well developed, and government policies restricted economic ties in the past.12 Even today there is no free trade agreement between Moscow and Beijing, and it is unlikely that one will be negotiated soon.13 Moscow started looking at Asia, and particularly China, as a source of economic growth in the late 2000s, but became much more serious after the West imposed sanctions in 2014.14 When Chinese and Russian leaders meet they frequently announce new economic projects, reflecting the fact that economic ties between the two states are largely government-initiated as opposed to market-driven. For example, in October 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang traveled to Moscow and signed thirty-eight agreements with Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on cooperation in banking, aerospace, railways, and infrastructure. Russia and China also agreed to currency swaps worth US$24 billion that would enable Russia to tap into the yuan. In May 2015, Presidents Putin and Xi presided over the signing of thirty-two bilateral agreements. In June 2016, Xi and Putin oversaw the signing of more than thirty agreements, most of which had an economic component.15 However, these agreements do not always translate into action or are slow to work out. For example, after twenty years of negotiations, China and Russia agreed to build a bridge across the Heilong/Amur River that crosses into Russia at Nizhneleninskoye, the only year-round link connecting the two countries over a 2,000 mile section of border. Construction began in 2009, and China built thirteen pillars. However, as of July 2016 Russia had not begun building the three pillars on its side of the river. Explanations for the Russian delay range from local elites’ fears of China to difficulty in selecting a construction company among politically connected bidders. As another example, in January 2015 the Beijing city government announced that China would build a 7,000 kilometer high-speed railway connecting Beijing and Moscow, at a cost of $242 billion. However, by September it appeared that work would not begin due to disputes over who would actually pay for the project. A rail-link between Moscow and Kazan, a little over 10 percent of the original plan, is now moving forward.16 Oil and gas initiatives will be discussed later in the chapter. Thus, even in 2016, after many years of the two states attempting to enhance economic ties, Xia Yishan of the China Institute of International 70

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Energy and the Sino–Russian Relationship

Studies said, “Political cooperation between the two countries is good, but economic and trade cooperation is less than satisfactory.”17 Russian experts on China acknowledge that building robust economic ties with China will present significant challenges, and they suggest that any economic proposals coming from the Russian side will have to offer quite attractive terms and opportunities. They point to Russia’s more limited experience in business partnerships with China in comparison with greater familiarity in collaborating with the European private sector, but view turning east as imperative because of a lack of trust with the West as a consequence of developments over Ukraine.18 In 2014, trade between Russia and China was worth between $88 billion and $95 billion, depending on whether Chinese (the higher number) or Russian figures are used.19 Trade in 2007 was just over $48 billion, so in a seven-year period total trade between the two states almost doubled. However, the overall trade relationship is more significant to Russia than China. In 2015 China was Russia’s largest trade partner, while Russia was only China’s 16th largest, down from ninth in 2014. In 2014, China exported $53.7 billion’s worth of goods to Russia. This accounted for 2.3 percent of China’s total exports, putting Russia in tenth place in China’s export markets. In that same year, China imported $41.6 billion’s worth of goods from Russia. This accounted for 2.1 percent of China’s total imports, putting Russia as the eleventh-largest source of Chinese imports. The percentage of China’s exports to and imports from Russia in 2014 were the same as in 2007. In 2014, Russian data showed exports of $37.4 billion to China. This accounted for 7.5 percent of Russian exports, making China Russia’s secondlargest export market after the Netherlands (which took almost $68 billion of Russian exports but is largely a transshipment point for Russian exports to Europe). Russia’s imports from China reached almost $51 billion, making China its top source of imports. In fact, 17.8 percent of Russian imports came from China. Over time, China has become a more important trade partner for Russia. This is illustrated by 2007 data, in which Russian exports to China accounted for only 4.5 percent of total exports, while imports accounted for 12.2 percent of the total. Because of Western sanctions on Russia, President Putin had high hopes that a “pivot” to China would demonstrate that Russia had reliable partners elsewhere. However, data from 2015 showed a drop in the value of Sino– Russian trade of over 25 percent in the context of a sharp overall downturn in Russian trade, with Sino–Russian trade falling far short of China and Russia’s publicly stated goal of $100 billion. The fall in energy prices and the ruble contributed to this downturn in trade value. Thus, a reduction in trade value does not necessarily indicate a drop in trade volumes. However, due to a 71

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

shrinking Russian economy, Russians found it increasingly difficult to import products from China. Moreover, China’s economic growth has slowed as well. In 2016, trade rose by 2–4 percent, with Russia running a deficit with China of between $5.4 and $10.1 billion. China’s exports to Russia equaled 1.8 percent of China’s total exports, while its imports from Russia comprised 2.0 percent of China’s total imports. The trade relationship was again more significant for Russia. Its exports to China made up 9.8 percent of total Russian exports, second only to the Netherlands, while 20.9 percent of Russian imports came from China. China was Russia’s largest source of imports, almost doubling the value of imported goods from number two, Germany. Investment ties between Russia and China have so far been modest but show greater potential. Although investment data is unreliable for regions of Russia,20 since 2014 there has been an increase in agreements for Chinesefunded projects in Russia as Moscow seeks new sources of foreign capital to compensate for Western sanctions and has loosened restrictions on Chinese investments.21 In 2012, total Chinese foreign direct investment in Russia was less than 2 percent of total foreign investment. The main sectors of investment were mineral development, forestry, energy, textiles, household appliances, telecommunications, and construction. Chinese investments have been concentrated in Moscow and Primorsky Krai, or the Maritime Territory, which has the largest economy in the RFE.22 Thus, new Chinese investment projects are proceeding from a low base. As Russia was subjected to Western economic sanctions in 2014 and saw its economy decline, Chinese experts publicly debated whether to increase China’s level of investments there. Li Jianmin and Wen Yi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences came to opposite conclusions on whether or not China should help Russia out of its economic crisis. Li believed it was right to assist Russia and good for China. Wen, however, believed that Russia’s problems were too deep-seated and there was nothing China could do to substantially aid the country.23 In that year, President Xi reportedly instructed the State Council and industrial managers that Chinese firms should seek new investments in Russia but not exploit the situation or invest in projects that would not be profitable. However, Chinese companies were struggling with the anticorruption investigations that made firms cautious, as well as a slowdown in China’s own economy, making it more difficult to invest abroad.24 The two countries made plans in May of 2014 to establish a Russian– Chinese commission for investment cooperation at the deputy prime minister level. At that time foreign investment in Russia was plummeting, dropping from $53 billion in 2013 to $29 billion in 2014 and under $10 billion in 2015.25 But in 2014, the year of the Crimean crisis, Chinese investment in Russia rose by 250 percent. Chinese companies proved to be the five largest investors in Russia, and Chinese automakers, an important sector doing 72

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business in Russia, notably announced investment plans. Chinese firms have invested in Cherkessk, Ulyanovsk, and the Tula region.26 However, in the first half of 2015, Chinese investments dropped 25 percent, in spite of an increase in overall Chinese foreign direct investment in the world. The total of cumulative Chinese investments was reported at $8.7 billion, with a 2016 analysis by Zhao Huasheng and Sergei Luzyanin describing investments and finance between Russia and China as “virtually at the initial development stage.”27 Because most investment deals take place between large state-owned corporations, negotiations over projects take years. Chinese investors know that with Western sanctions they have greater leverage and push for favorable terms. Nevertheless, there were still significant Chinese energy, mining, and data-processing investments in Russia in 2015, all previously sensitive sectors for the Russian government, and Moscow has removed barriers to investments, including double taxation.28 Recent activity includes an April 2016 agreement that would move some of China’s industrial plants to Russia, but this is still largely aspirational and has caused environmental concerns in the RFE.29 Russia awarded a China-led consortium a contract to build a high-speed rail line between Moscow and Kazan, a distance of 770 kilometers, and China agreed to finance the project with loans of $6.2 billion. Putin highlighted this project before his visit to Beijing in 2016.30 During the June 2016 summit, Putin announced that 58 economic projects worth approximately $50 billion were being negotiated.31 One of these projects is an effort to develop a long-distance aircraft that could compete against Boeing and Airbus. According to the Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Aleksandr Galushka in July 2016, regional development initiatives have attracted $17.1 billion to the Far East, with China contributing $2.4 billion of that amount.32 In the financial arena, China has become Russia’s largest lender. Loans in 2014 equaled $11.6 billion, up from $7.5 billion in 2013. However, since 2014, Chinese commercial banks have been reluctant to lend to Russia for fear of violating sanctions. They also lack knowledge on Russia, and find investing in the West more attractive.33 As a result, most loans to Russia have come from the Silk Road Fund and development banks that lend money based on political criteria, including the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. The terms they offer are less favorable than those of commercial banks.34 Another area of attempted cooperation with world order implications is the establishment of currency swaps. Both China and Russia want to reduce their dependence on the dollar. China has slowly moved to make the yuan more widely convertible, as demonstrated by the IMF decision in November 2015 to make the yuan a currency in its Special Drawing Rights basket, although Chinese restrictions on capital outflows in 2016 brought into question 73

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Beijing’s policy direction.35 Russia wants the ruble used more broadly for trade in former Soviet states. In November 2010, the ruble began trading against the yuan in Shanghai. The next month, Moscow’s Micex exchange began trading the yuan. In October 2014, the Russian and Chinese central banks announced a three-year currency swap between the ruble and yuan worth more than $24 billion in an effort to encourage use of the yuan and ruble in Chinese–Russian trade. In December 2014, China and Russia announced that they would allow the trading of derivatives that would bet on the yuan–ruble exchange rate. In July 2015, the two sides again agreed to increase trade in yuan and rubles. However, so far trade in local currencies has advanced slowly. The three-year currency swap announced in October 2014 was never activated. In May 2015, President Putin announced that trade in national currencies made up 7 percent of bilateral trade.36 By June 2016 it was reported that the share of settlements in yuan was up to 9 percent, while rubles were at 3 percent.37 Although there are indicators of accelerating growth in the Sino–Russian economic relationship, still both sides have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of progress.38 There is a general feeling that a true strategic partnership should have a stronger economic component to better keep the two sides from drifting apart. As a result, Xi’s first visit to Russia in March 2013 focused largely on economic issues. The (2013–16) Guidelines for the Implementation of the Treaty of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on GoodNeighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation called for an increase of trade to $100 billion by 2015 and $200 billion by 2020, as well as increases in mutual investment, greater use of the yuan and ruble in economic interactions, and stronger cooperation across a range of industries.39 Russia complains that the trade relationship is unequal. It sells primarily energy and raw materials to China, while importing manufactured goods. Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy notes that “the persistence of the export/raw-materials model of development” is one of the “main strategic threats to national security.”40 The biggest category of Russian exports to China is mineral fuels, oil, and oil products. Wood and wood products, followed by non-ferrous metals, come in next at 9 percent each. The largest category of Russian imports from China is machines and equipment at 37 percent, followed by chemicals at 10 percent, textiles at 6 percent, footwear at 6 percent, and knitted wear at 5 percent.41 An Oxford Institute for Energy Studies paper asserts that in 2014 energy resources made up 74 percent of Russian exports to China, dropping to 67 percent in 2015 as a result of the fall in oil prices.42 Putin himself made a political issue of unbalanced trade as far back as 2006, hoping to increase the number of processed goods exported to China. One step Russia has taken is to put export restrictions on the sale of unprocessed timber to China. The hope was that Russian companies would establish processing plants in Russia and then export the finished lumber to 74

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China. In reality, Chinese firms built many of the subsequent processing operations. Russia also reversed a policy that allowed Russians to buy small amounts of goods in China duty-free, thus reducing small-scale border trade.43 As Vassily Kashin of the Russian Academy of Sciences baldly states, “The current model of bilateral trade has no future either for Moscow or for Beijing when looking long term,” nor does it address the goals of the strategic partnership. The trade relationship is dominated by energy, and most economic interaction occurs between large, state-run companies in a politicized fashion. Even Chinese exports to Russia are often consumer goods with Western brand names, such as iPhones. Kashin calls on the two governments to establish a goal of industrial integration, utilizing the expertise of China’s militaryindustrial firms in non-military industries.44 Other Russian analysts are more optimistic about future economic ties. According to leading Sino–Russian expert Alexander Lukin, a certain “inertia” characterized Russia’s relationship with the West prior to the conflict in Ukraine, most obviously in the areas of trade and economics. Many in Russia’s business community that had more familiarity with and experience in Europe initially resisted the pivot to Asia, but Lukin reflects a widely held view among Russia’s mainstream elite and foreign policy community that the pivot toward China is now “irreversible” and Russia’s government and business economic entities are strengthening capacity (in terms of language, and understanding Chinese culture and business practices) to work with China and Asia more broadly.45 Chinese observers note various factors that have inhibited trade. Zhou Nianli and Huang Ning explain that China has greater integration in global production chains than Russia. They also point to policies on the part of the Russian government that inhibit trade, such as refusal to sell some weapons systems, restricting energy sales for strategic reasons, and protecting domestic industries. Qiu Huafei complains that Sino–Russian trade is largely focused on the needs of border communities and therefore misses opportunities to trade in advanced technological goods. Lack of rule of law also inhibits economic ties. Qiu notes that trade is stymied by contract violations, the absence of arbitration mechanisms for resolving disputes, poor treatment of Chinese business personnel in Russia, the existence of a “China threat” mentality in Russia, and unsettled Russian debts.46 In a 2016 article, Zhao Huasheng frankly states that Russia and China “have not begun any economic integration. This issue is largely due to Russia. Russia’s economy is weaker than China’s and it believes that integrating with China economically would be detrimental to it.”47 Sun Kai and Wang Chenguang hope for greater economic cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, but, due to Russian sensitivities, do not expect major breakthroughs that would enable a partnership to exploit resources.48 Complicating matters, there is a debate in Russia about Chinese economic penetration of the RFE. The RFE would benefit economically from Chinese 75

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trade, investment, capital, and labor, and younger Russian elites in particular are more open to Chinese participation in the region’s economy.49 However, from Russia’s perspective, there are also risks. Some fear the RFE will come to be dominated by China. Because of Russia’s economic slowdown and focus on Ukraine, the prospects for the region look bleak. Lilia Shevtsova warns that approximately 80 percent of land in the Jewish Autonomous Region, part of the RFE, is controlled by Chinese firms, while almost two million hectares on the Chinese–Russian border have been given to China to cut timber.50 Official Russian trade data show Far East exports of $18.6 billion and imports of $5.8 billion in 2016. Exports are spread evenly across the Northeast Asian powers, with 21 percent going to China, 26 percent to Korea, and 26 percent to Japan. China leads in supplying 39 percent of imports, with South Korea at 11 percent and Japan at 7 percent. However, trade relationships vary within the RFE. For example, more than 95 percent of the trade of the Jewish Autonomous Region is conducted with China, while 50 percent of Primorsky Krai’s exports go to China and 57 percent of imports come from there. In Kamchatka Krai the highest percentage of exports and imports are with South Korea, while the largest percentage of Sakhalin’s exports flows to Japan, at 46 percent. Countries outside of Northeast Asia trade with the RFE as well. Half of the exports of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) go to Belgium, while over half of its imports come from the United States.51 Thus, China by no means dominates the RFE economy. Clearly in 2015, at the Amur River border separating the Russian town of Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese town of Heihe, business was not thriving. A ferry is required to cross the river, and Chinese and Russians are not allowed in the same boat, although a bridge is planned for the future. Taxes by both sides raise the price of some traded goods by up to 30 percent. In addition, economic conditions in Russia have reduced the opportunities for business.52 In 2016, Russia began implementing a policy that offers free land to Russian citizens in parts of the RFE, managed by the Ministry for the Development of the Far East, in order to increase the population of the area. The Kremlin has heavily publicized the program. However, bureaucratic hurdles and the unwillingness of most Russians to move to an undeveloped area make the success of the program questionable.53 President Xi Jinping’s 2013 OBOR proposal creates both economic opportunities and potential rivalries for Russia and China. One plausible interpretation is that, before 2013, China had hoped the SCO would engage in more active economic cooperation, including common policies on energy, trade enhancement, and perhaps a free trade area. However, China could not move the SCO in this direction, in part due to Russian resistance. As a result, China proposed OBOR.54 76

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Russia was initially wary of OBOR. Increased Chinese investments in Central Asia reduce Russian economic and political influence in an area that it sees as being within its sphere of influence. Moreover, some in Russia saw OBOR as directly competing with the Moscow-favored EEU. It is true that there are competitive elements between the plans. However, they also have different institutional make-ups. The EEU is formally organized and exclusive, seeking to integrate its members’ economies. OBOR is primarily about developing transportation infrastructure throughout Eurasia. Moreover, China has resources to develop Eurasian states that Russia lacks. Therefore, after Chinese lobbying by a CCP Politburo member, Russia agreed to a joint statement issued on May 8, 2015, in which the two sides committed to coordinate and integrate the EEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. The SCO is touted as an institution that might assist in this integration.55 Russia took this step as a way to attract Chinese financing for economic development projects. Putin has praised the integration process, and OBOR may be a vehicle for Russia to further develop its infrastructure, especially in Siberia and the RFE.56 If OBOR proceeds as promised, it has the potential to increase prosperity for Russia and Eurasia. Achieving effective integration of OBOR and the EEU will be challenging, both politically and economically. It will require coordination both within the EEU and between the EEU and China, and stronger institutional capacity than exists now. On the one hand, the May 2015 announcement is aspirational but sends an important political message. Central Asia has not turned into a battleground between Russia and China, and the SCO has helped manage Russian and Chinese interests in the region. OBOR may provide opportunities for Russian contractors, as well as stronger legitimacy for the EEU if it benefits from OBOR projects. On the other hand, Russia’s concerns about growing Chinese influence in Central Asia have not gone away, and it fears that the Silk Road Economic Belt can undermine Russia’s desire for greater traffic on the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways. Moreover, China has already committed to funding numerous projects throughout Central Asia and is dealing with its own slowing economy, raising questions about how much financing is available for further projects.57 While some OBOR projects may better integrate Russia with China and its neighbors, other projects are likely to bypass Russia. One example of an OBOR transportation project linking Russia, China, and Kazakhstan is the Western Europe–Western China Expressway that will connect Lianyungang, a Chinese port on the Yellow Sea, with St. Petersburg. The almost 8,500 kilometer road is heavily funded by the World Bank and other development banks. Chinese exports to Europe will move considerably faster than via the current sea route, benefiting landlocked Kazakhstan. Construction on the highway began in 2008. While its original completion date was scheduled for 2014, it will now take until at least 2020, due in part to land 77

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disputes, corruption, and Russian delays in completing its part of the highway.58 Nevertheless, when completed it will have a major economic impact. Tourism is also a factor with desirable economic consequences. China sends more tourists to Russia than any other country—over a million a year—with the average tourist spending approximately $2,000. Russian tourists rank third in China. Currently, tour groups from Russia and China can travel visa-free, while discussions are underway for visa-free travel for individuals.59

Chinese and Russian Energy Sectors: The Quest for Energy Security Energy ties between Russia and China, primarily the sale of Russian oil, are the most important form of economic exchange between the two countries. Both need energy security: secure markets for Russia, and secure supply for China. Thus, there is a political and strategic aspect to energy sales, especially when multi-billion dollar pipelines are built to deliver oil or gas and new energy fields require heavy investments. Because of political hurdles and pricing disputes, the development of multi-faceted energy ties has been complicated and slower than many expected. While Russian oil sales to China are increasing, as of the end of 2016 natural gas pipelines have not been completed, in spite of years of negotiations and numerous agreements. Chinese investments in Russian oil and gas fields have been modest, although Russia has relaxed restrictions since 2014. The energy relationship between Russia and China currently takes place in an environment of abundant worldwide energy supplies and slowing growth in demand. The shale revolution in the United States has led to significant increases in oil and gas production. In 2014, the United States became the world’s largest oil producer, overtaking Saudi Arabia, as well as the world’s largest combined gas and oil producer, surpassing Russia.60 The lifting of sanctions on Iran has also increased its capacity to export oil. At the same time, increases in worldwide energy demand have slowed. While the ten-year average increase in global primary energy consumption is 1.9 percent, in 2014 growth was 1.1 percent, while growth in 2015 was only 1.0 percent. In 2015, 97 percent of growth came from emerging economies. For the fifteenth year in a row, China was responsible for the largest increase in energy demand, although its growth in consumption also slowed to 1.5 percent. (China became the world’s largest net oil importer in 2013.) Moreover, renewables continued to take up a large percentage of the increase in energy consumption.61 As a result of increased supply and slowed demand, the price of energy fell sharply in 2015. Brent crude, an international oil benchmark, fell by 78

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47 percent. Crude prices dropped from $112/barrel in June 2014 to less than $30/barrel in January 2016, before recovering to $54/barrel at the end of 2016. For the longer term, the 2015 Paris Agreement demonstrates the global commitment to slow the effects of climate change. China, which has long resisted limits to its sovereignty that might result in lower economic growth, faces strong domestic and international pressure to better protect its environment. The government has responded with a commitment to improve China’s air quality, leading to a reduction in coal consumption, emphasis on renewable energy sources, and expected stronger demand for natural gas in the long term. The natural gas market has also changed in two ways. First, the cost of natural gas has dropped substantially. In East Asia, prices fell by 35 percent in early 2016. Second, natural gas prices, which once differed widely across regions, have converged. For example, in 2014 natural gas cost $20 per million British thermal units (Btu) in South Korea, $10 in the United Kingdom, and $5 in the United States. In 2016, prices had dropped below $5 in East Asia, the UK, and the US. The transportability of liquid natural gas (LNG) has made the market more competitive, similar to the oil market. This has been particularly important for East Asia, which had lacked an integrated market and transparent trading hubs.62 While demand increases in the future will likely raise prices again, Asia will continue to benefit from a more globalized gas market. This environment of slowing energy demand and increased supply benefits China, an energy importer, while damaging Russian economic interests. Moreover, relatively low oil and gas prices, combined with China’s slower growth, make large new Chinese expenditures on Russian energy projects less economically viable. Nevertheless, Western sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea have begun to lead Russia to policy changes that could eventually strengthen China’s position in the Russian energy sector.

The Russian Energy Sector Russia possesses abundant energy resources, which is both a blessing and a curse. Oil and gas provide substantial revenue to the Russian economy and state, yet Russia is overly dependent on this sector. Thus, Russia’s economy rises and falls with the price of energy. Russia also lacks the capital, technology, and management skills to efficiently exploit its oil and natural gas resources on its own, and therefore depends on international corporations for expertise and financing. Russia’s energy sector is tightly linked to the state and is influenced by impulses within the Russian Federation to use the energy card as a means for enhancing great power status. As a result, state goals can clash with market imperatives.63 79

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Various features of the Russian energy sector are important for a clearer understanding of Sino–Russian energy relations. First is the heavy reliance of the Russian state and Russian economy on oil and gas. Oil and gas made up 63.5 percent of Russian exports and 17.3 percent of GDP in 2010. In 2015 the numbers were similar. It was reported that 50–70 percent of Russian government revenue came from the energy sector, while natural resources contributed 19 percent of Russian GDP. It is estimated that a 10 percent decline in oil prices shaves 1 percent off Russian GNP. As various countries have discovered, energy exports can have a detrimental effect on other sectors of the economy. Russian oil and gas exports have raised the value of the ruble higher than it would otherwise be, making Russian industrial exports more expensive.64 Although Russia has been focusing on Asia to increase its energy exports, Europe is still its primary market for gas and oil. A 2015 report noted that Europe absorbs 80 percent of Russian crude exports and 75 percent of natural gas exports. Only 8 percent of Russian energy exports go to China.65 This is reflected in the geography of Russian gas and oil fields, which have been concentrated in West Siberia. East Siberia and the RFE have major potential, but suffer from being remote from Russia’s original energy infrastructure. In East Siberia the reserves-to-resources ratio is only 5 percent, indicating both huge potential but also lack of development of known energy fields. Established oil fields in East Siberia and the RFE are estimated to hold 10 billion barrels of oil, while it is projected that the region holds a total of 70–160 billion barrels.66 In the east the main oil production areas are the Irkutsk region, the Sakha Republic, and the Krasnoyarsk region. The most important natural gas sources are Kovyktinskoye (or Kovykta) gas, Sakhalin offshore gas, and Sakha Republic gas.67 For political and economic reasons, the Russian state and Russian energy firms seek to increase energy exports to Asia. In January 2014, the Russian Ministry of Energy released the Draft Russian Energy Strategy to 2035, predicting that, by 2035, 23 percent of total energy exports would be sold in the Asia-Pacific region. The strategy calls for Russia to increase the percentage of its gas exports going to Asia from 6 percent to 31 percent by 2035. The goal for crude was 32 percent. However, this would necessitate massive capital expenditures: $460 billion in 2011–15, rising to $793 billion in 2031–35.68 Western sanctions on Russia, which include restricting access to financial markets for designated state-owned firms and a prohibition of exports to Russia of certain oil exploration and production equipment, make the goal of developing the east more difficult.69 Another feature of the Russian energy industry that has affected ties with China is the dominant role of the state. More than a decade ago, Putin succeeded in putting oil and natural gas under central control, a key part of

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Putin’s broader effort to strengthen the Russian state.70 The great turning point came when Russian authorities arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003 and dismantled his oil company, Yukos. Khodorkovsky had challenged the Kremlin by planning a pipeline to China that the Kremlin believed would make Russia too dependent on China. Khodorkovsky further used his wealth to obtain influence in the Duma to keep oil taxes low. The Kremlin believed that Khodorkovsky planned to sell a majority stake in Yukos to ExxonMobil, an affront to Russian nationalism that would make it difficult for the state to control Russia’s oil resources. By 2007, four years after Khodorkovsky’s arrest, the percentage of oil produced by private firms in Russia dropped from 90 percent to 45 percent, and by the end of the decade the state was taking more than 90 percent of oil company profits in taxes.71 Majority state-owned Rosneft obtained the key assets of Yukos. Rosneft is the predominant majority state-owned firm in the Russian oil industry, with Gazprom Neft and Slavneft also key players. Together, stateowned firms today produce approximately 50 percent of Russian oil, while another state-owned firm, Transneft, controls the pipeline industry. Stateowned Gazprom is dominant in the gas sector, producing almost 75 percent of Russian natural gas.72 It also has a monopoly on the export of Russian natural gas, with one exception. In a sign of political struggle among Russian companies, a 2013 law gave additional firms the right to export LNG, especially benefiting Novatek and Rosneft. Nevertheless, in 2016 there were reports that Russia planned to sell shares of its champion energy firms, including Rosneft and Transneft, to reduce budget deficits. In fact, in October of 2016 the Russian government announced that it had sold Bashneft, a state-controlled oil company. However, the purchaser was state-controlled Rosneft.73 Later in the year the Russian government announced it would sell almost 20 percent of Rosneft to a Swiss firm and the sovereign wealth fund of Qatar. In sum, energy security for Russia means growing markets and consistent or increasing energy prices. It also means the ability to extract additional energy resources. From Putin’s perspective, energy security further requires state control over the energy sector. Due to Europe’s flat demand, the quest for cleaner energy sources, and efforts to reduce dependency on Russia, Moscow has turned east to seek new markets. However, developing the necessary infrastructure in East Siberia and the RFE is expensive, and sanctions still in place at the end of 2016 limit the use of Western financing and expertise. Moreover, the low price of energy and reduced demand has led to serious Russian budget shortfalls that have caused the government to sell shares in state-controlled energy companies. Russia therefore lacks energy security and needs new sales to China.

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The Chinese Energy Sector China also seeks energy security, but for China this means reliable, consistent energy supply at affordable prices. Secure supply is paramount because China is the world’s largest consumer and importer of oil.74 Before the reform era began, China was self-sufficient in energy. However, rapid industrialization led China to become increasingly dependent on imports, leading to changes in policy that encouraged China’s energy companies to invest abroad. While the current abundant-supply, low-price environment has been damaging to Russia, it has given China’s energy firms greater bargaining power in negotiating with Russia. Moreover, the government of China is seeking to wean the country off coal, China’s primary energy source, to reduce air pollution. In accordance with Chinese development policy, three state-owned corporations have monopolized the energy sector to an even greater extent than stateowned firms in Russia, controlling 95 percent of China’s oil and gas output and 70 percent of refining capacity. These three firms hold ministerial status and are listed in the top ten global oil companies. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), created in 1982, controls offshore resources. Onshore oil and gas is dominated by the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), formed in 1983, and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), created in 1988. CNPC’s listed arm is PetroChina, and the company is particularly dominant in natural gas, producing 77 percent of China’s output. The power and nuclear sectors are also controlled by state-owned firms.75 The International Energy Agency lists twenty-four Chinese government institutions that have a hand in regulating energy issues, creating a complicated bureaucracy that has been frequently reshuffled.76 The major player is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the state planning agency. The NDRC regulates the price of natural gas and oil products and is the main body for planning, policymaking, and regulating the energy industry. As a result, NDRC policies have a major impact on the profitability of energy firms. The National Energy Administration (NEA) operates under the NDRC. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) oversees energy imports and the domestic oil market, while the Ministry of Land and Resources has responsibility over exploration. Other ministries involved in the industry include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the State Oceanic Administration, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. In order to better coordinate policy among the bureaucracy and energy industry, the Energy Leading Group was established under Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005, as well as a State Council Energy Office. In 2010, a National Energy Commission headed by the premier was created. However, the big three energy companies have been able to resist the establishment of a unified Energy Ministry that could more effectively control their activities.77 82

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There is a complex relationship between China’s state-owned energy firms, or national oil companies (NOCs), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Those associated with the oil industry have long had major influence in the CCP.78 For example, former prime minister Zhu Rongji, former vice president Zeng Qinghong, and former security chief Zhou Yongkang all held positions in the oil industry. As a result, the NOCs have had ready access to party leaders. They also have technical knowledge that the government itself lacks, and are skilled at lobbying. In turn, the CCP has tools to assert control over the industry. Most importantly, the Organization Department nominates the chairs of the NOCs, and promotions of top executives are controlled by the CCP. The Party and state also influence energy company behavior through the regulatory authority of the NDRC, price controls and tax rates, and leverage over bank credits.79 The structure of ownership and bureaucratic oversight of China’s NOCs lead to questions about what drives the companies’ strategy and behavior. Are they arms of the state seeking national goals such as energy security, or do they seek profit and autonomy first? Zhao Hongtu—an analyst with the Ministry of State Security think tank, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)—asserts that China’s energy firms are motivated by profit more than anything else. These companies are quite independent and may even have conflicting interests with the Chinese government.80 Nevertheless, the NOCs cannot wander too far from CCP preferences. In 2011, the CCP reshuffled executives at the NOCs and discouraged the practice of allowing one executive to hold multiple positions due to concerns that the companies were too autonomous. After Xi Jinping took power in November 2012, scrutiny of the NOCs intensified. Xi initiated a concerted anticorruption campaign, with the coal and oil industries selected as special targets. In March 2015, Liao Yongyuan, the vice chairman of CNPC, was investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, then expelled from the Party and prosecuted for bribery. Zhou Yongkang was expelled from the Party and convicted of corruption in 2015. He had spent more than thirty years in the oil industry and served as party secretary of CNPC before eventually being promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Xi apparently had several motives for targeting the energy sector. First, officials at the NOCs were engaged in pervasive corruption, including nepotism and transferring state assets to private companies. Second, Zhou Yongkang, a powerful political rival, was viewed as a threat to Xi. Targeting the energy industry undermined Zhou’s power base. Third, shaking up the industry better enabled China to implement reforms to the energy sector, including opening the industry to private investors. However, the campaign against the energy companies negatively affected Sino–Russian energy cooperation. Experienced managers were taken away without warning, and decision-makers 83

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became very cautious in an effort to avoid attracting attention. For two years, there were almost no mergers and acquisitions.81 China’s energy industry faces three domestic challenges in providing energy security. First, coal must be replaced by other sources of energy. Coal fuels approximately 70 percent of Chinese energy use. As a result, China accounts for almost half of the world’s coal consumption. While coal is abundant in China, it is also a major source of pollution, producing 90 percent of China’s SO2 emissions and 70 percent of CO2 emissions. Therefore, the government’s 2014-2020 Energy Development Strategy Action Plan lays out a goal to sharply reduce the burning of coal. The government plans to cap consumption by 2020. To do this, it has forced some coal producers and small industrial plants to close, and has raised tax rates to discourage the use of coal. Demonstrating the policy’s initial success as well as slowed industrial growth, in 2014 and 2015 coal consumption fell in China. China plans to replace coal with gas and renewables, raising the share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption from 9.8 percent in 2013 to 15 percent by 2020, and raising the share of natural gas to at least 10 percent.82 The second challenge is that, over the course of the reform period, China’s energy demands have skyrocketed. China consumed 6 percent of total global energy in 1980; by 2016 this had risen to 23 percent.83 Chinese energy consumption grew at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in 1980–2000, leaping to 9.9 percent a year in 2000–5. As a result, from 2000–10 China’s energy demand doubled.84 However, due to slowed economic growth and a shift toward services, increases in energy consumption have been smaller in recent years, dropping to 1.5 percent in 2015.85 The exception is gas. In 2015, natural gas consumption rose by 4.7 percent. In the first half of 2016, China’s natural gas use rose by 9.8 percent, spurred by government policies to promote natural gas. In response, PetroChina has set a goal of raising its level of gas production to half of its total energy output by 2020.86 Industry has consumed a disproportionate share of China’s energy, but with changes to China’s development model, the proportion of energy used by consumers will increase.87 China’s third challenge is that domestic production of oil and gas cannot keep up with demand. China’s most important oil field is still Daqing in Dongbei, producing 19 percent of China’s crude in 2014. China also extracts oil from the Shengli field near the Bohai Bay, Changqing in the north central Ordos Basin, and Xinjiang. Twenty percent of China’s domestic oil comes from offshore sources. Nevertheless, China’s most productive oil fields are mature. Investments in production have dropped, and in 2016 domestic oil production fell sharply. China’s main gas production bases are the Tarim Basin, the Ordos Basin, the Sichuan Basin, and offshore locations. While gas output has increased steadily since 2000, more than tripling from 2003 to 2013 and rising by 4.8 percent in 2015, consumption has grown even faster.88 84

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In an effort to spur greater production at home, the Chinese government is opening bidding on oil and gas blocks to private firms. As a result of the above factors, China’s energy imports have grown dramatically. China became a net oil importer in 1993 and net gas importer in 2007. In 2015, China produced 215 million tons of oil but consumed 560 million tons, requiring it to import more than 60 percent of its oil. In that same year, China produced 138 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas but consumed 197 billion cubic meters. Thus, China was required to import 30 percent of its gas through Central Asian pipelines and seaborne LNG.89 China has set a goal of limiting oil import dependency to 61 percent. However, it is difficult to see how this will be met. The International Energy Agency projects that in 2030 China’s oil-dependency ratio will be 80 percent.90 In facing its need to enhance energy security, China has developed a broad strategy that links development goals, commercial interests, diplomacy, and sea power with energy requirements.91 This strategy is designed to deal with China’s challenges in enhancing its energy security. For example, Chinese energy diplomacy requires negotiations with leaders in violent and unstable parts of the world, such as South Sudan. Once China has made energy investments abroad, it will be more difficult to maintain its longstanding policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. China, like other oil importers, also lacks control over prices in a complex and welldeveloped global market, a system in which oil is available for countries that can pay the market price, but prices constantly adjust in accordance with supply and demand.92 Øystein Tunsjø defines China’s approach to energy security as “hedging.” It combines market approaches to acquiring energy, linked to NOCs’ quest for profits, with strategic approaches determined by the state.93 In its quest for energy security, Beijing is taking steps to ensure continued supplies of crude oil and natural gas. These include multiplying supply sources, diversifying the means of energy delivery, investing in upstream energy assets abroad, enhancing military capabilities to protect sea lanes, and building a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in case of supply disruptions. Russia has an important place in nearly all of these strategies. In order to enhance energy security and reduce the vulnerability of supply disruptions from any region or country, China imports oil from a range of sources. In 2015, China’s top suppliers were Saudi Arabia (15.9 percent), Russia (13.3 percent), Angola (12.2 percent), Oman (10.1 percent), Iraq (10.1 percent), and Iran (8.4 percent). Eight additional countries provided over 1 percent of Chinese oil. Russia’s share of China’s oil market rose from 9.1 percent in 2013.94 In 2016, Russia became China’s largest oil supplier as its crude exports increased by 24 percent. Saudi Arabia, Angola, Oman, Iraq, and Iran were the next-largest suppliers.95 Thus, Russia plays a key role in 85

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diversifying China’s energy sources. Nevertheless, approximately half of China’s crude oil still is supplied by countries in the Middle East, with China importing more than 3 million bbl/d (barrels per day) from the region. It is forecast that by 2035 China’s imports from the Middle East will double.96 China imported 59.8 bcm of gas in 2015. Of this total, 33.6 bcm (56 percent) came via pipeline, primarily from Turkmenistan, while 26.2 bcm (44 percent) was LNG. LNG is imported from several countries, including a small amount from Russia, with Australia being the largest provider. CNOOC has been at the forefront of China’s increasing LNG imports, and new LNG terminals are being built throughout China.97 From an energy security perspective, LNG provides flexibility in that it is exported by seventeen countries, although almost one-third of the total supply comes from Qatar.98 In the first eleven months of 2016, China’s total gas imports increased by almost 22 percent, while China’s LNG imports rose by 33 percent in 2016.99 China seeks to diversify not only supply, but also the means of delivering energy. Practically speaking, this means that China has sought pipelines to deliver natural gas and oil to supplement seaborne energy shipments. Pipelines have certain disadvantages. They are expensive to build and maintain, and prices are tied to long-term contracts. They are also potentially vulnerable to sabotage and, if breached, will create environmental damage. However, they also hedge against threats to seaborne trade, especially disruption of tanker trade during wartime. China is linked to several countries by pipeline. A pipeline connecting China and Kazakhstan carries Kazakh and Russian oil. A pipeline connecting China and Myanmar allows Middle Eastern oil to be offloaded in Myanmar and then sent overland to China, allowing tankers to bypass the Straits of Malacca. There is also a pipeline bringing natural gas from Myanmar to China. Three parallel natural gas pipelines link China with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. A spur from the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline brings Russian crude oil to China.100 A third strategy of China is to encourage its NOCs to invest abroad in oil and gas fields. China’s first overseas project was in 1991, when CNPC invested in an oil sand development project in Canada. Subsequent CNPC deals involved production-sharing in Thailand, oil recovery in Peru, oil exploration in Papua New Guinea, and involvement in Sudan in 1995. CNOOC obtained a share in an Indonesian block in the Straits of Malacca in 1993. However, the NOCs took only small steps until 1997, when it became evident that China would become a major oil importer. In 1997, CNPC made large-scale investments in Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, and Iraq. In 2004, Chinese policy banks began financing overseas investments and the Chinese government started ramping up diplomatic support for overseas ventures, including high-level bilateral visits.101 However, China 86

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was handicapped by coming late into an environment where other international oil companies had operated for years, taking up the most productive fields. This led China to make investments in politically unstable environments that other companies avoided. By the end of 2013, Chinese oil production overseas equaled half of China’s domestic production, and China had production entitlements in forty-two countries. Half of these were in the Middle East and North Africa. However, China’s more recent forays have been concentrated in members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Such investments provide access to not only gas and oil, but also technology, as Chinese NOCs partner with foreign companies.102 In 2016, Boston University researchers estimated that, from 2000 to 2015, Chinese companies had invested $258 billion in energy green field investments and mergers and acquisitions—3.54 percent of total world investments. (This includes not only oil and gas, but also electric power and renewables.) However, $211 billion of this came in 2008–15, demonstrating a significantly increased pace of investment. Chinese companies showed a strong preference for mergers and acquisitions over green field investments.103 Nevertheless, as detailed in the next section, China has been frustrated in its efforts to invest in the Russian oil and gas sector, but new opportunities may be developing. China’s energy investments in Central Asia merit special attention because they have affected Russian interests. China’s first Central Asian investment was in Kazakhstan. In 1997 CNPC outbid Texaco, Amoco, and Russia’s Yujnimost to take a 60 percent share in the Aktyubinskmunaigaz Production Association, which included production licenses for oil fields with recoverable reserves of one billion barrels of oil. The offer included an upfront payment of $320 million to Kazakhstan’s government, and in 2003 it acquired further stakes. CNPC bought PetroKazakhstan for $4.18 billion in 2005, beating out the Russian firm Lukoil, and in 2009 it took over MangistauMunaiGaz (MMG). China’s first international pipeline also was built to deliver Kazakh oil to Xinjiang in a joint venture between Kazakhstan’s state-owned KazMunaiGaz (KMG) and CNPC. The first phase of the 2,798 kilometer China–Kazakhstan pipeline was completed in 2005, and oil began to flow in 2006. CNPC paid 85 percent of pipeline construction costs with the support of state loans, but each side had an equal share in the partnership.104 China’s primary natural gas investments in Central Asia have been in Turkmenistan, which has the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves. In August 2007, CNPC acquired a production-sharing agreement for developing the right bank of the Amu Darya River. It also gained a service contract for the South Yolotan gas field. The China Development Bank subsequently loaned 87

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more than $8 billion for gas field development in Turkmenistan to ensure supplies. To transport gas from Turkmenistan, as well as other Central Asian states, pipelines have been constructed. A framework agreement was signed in 2006 between China and Turkmenistan for building the 30 bcm per year (bcm/y) Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline that would transit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Construction began in 2008, and the first phase of the 1,830 kilometer pipeline, which starts at the Turkmen–Uzbek border city Gedaim and ends in Xinjiang’s Horgos, became operational in 2009. This was the first Central Asian gas route to bypass Russia. Now there are three parallel lines, with a combined capacity of 55 bcm/y, with a fourth scheduled to be built through Tajikistan but still uncertain.105 In 2015, China imported 27.7 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan, almost half of China’s total gas imports, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan contributed small amounts too. Chinese energy deals in Central Asia ended Russia’s monopoly position there. Paik notes, “The development of crude oil pipelines between the two countries [China and Kazakhstan] was a painful blow to Russia, as it has led to a collapse of its monopoly position as the sole transit country and buyer of central Asian energy resources.”106 Similarly, the gas pipeline between China and Turkmenistan gave both countries greater leverage in bargaining with Gazprom. Ziegler and Menon argue that China and Russia have adopted neomercantilist energy policies in Central Asia as they compete for Central Asian energy resources.107 The fourth strategy for enhancing energy security is protecting the sea routes over which oil and LNG are shipped. Asian states have been worried about what they see as threats to sea lines of communication, and thus have displayed growing resource nationalism by expanding their naval forces, flagging oil tankers, and investing in more comprehensive surveillance.108 China is no exception. Chinese analysts fear that because 80 percent of China’s oil imports sail through the narrow Straits of Malacca, US naval forces, and the forces of US allies, have the potential to block oil shipments.109 As a result, the Chinese military is investing in naval and air capabilities to protect Chinese shipping and sea lines of communication. Russia plays a small role in this. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese–Russian naval exercises are increasing in number and complexity. The final strategy of China is building up an SPR in case of disruptions to the oil market. Discussions on creating an SPR began in China in the mid-1990s, but it wasn’t until the Iraq War that it became a priority. Establishing a reserve entailed years of negotiations between the government and NOCs over who would bear the costs of building storage capacity and purchasing the oil. By the middle of 2016, China was reported to be close to filling its reserve after taking advantage of low crude prices and using approximately 15 percent of its total imports for the SPR.110 88

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Oil and Gas in the Sino–Russian Relationship Energy investments and sales are natural areas of cooperation between China and Russia. The two countries have proclaimed a strategic partnership, Russia’s primary exports are oil and natural gas, and China imports energy resources. As early as 2000, a Chinese analyst argued that a post-Cold War environment of reduced tensions in Northeast Asia, Russia’s surplus of energy and China’s increasing demand (including the need for cleaner gas), Russia’s dependence on energy for revenue to help it overcome economic and social crises, and China’s quest for energy security were all factors promoting the development of energy cooperation between Russia and China. Many years later, these same arguments were still being made.111 However, the quest for stronger energy ties has taken a winding road, and the 2000 analysis was overly optimistic. A pipeline delivering oil to China was not operational until 2011, and gas pipelines between Russia and China have been contracted but not built. On the bright side, in recent years Russian oil sales to China have rapidly increased and are by far the most significant energy export. Russia has also sold China coal, electricity, liquefied natural gas, and nuclear reactors for China’s Tianwan Power Station. In 2016, President Putin said that “energy of course remains the locomotor of business relations” between China and Russia.112 During the 1990s, the Chinese and Russian governments began to establish the institutional basis for closer energy ties. The two countries signed the Agreement on Energy Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in April 1996, the first intergovernmental agreement between Russia and China on the energy sector. Various bodies were created to explore cooperation, and regular meetings of prime ministers were established. Later, the Sino–Russian Energy Negotiation Mechanism was established (2008), better institutionalizing energy cooperation. While the 1990s brought agreement on feasibility studies for developing oil and gas pipelines, little else occurred. Russia’s energy industry was concentrated in western Siberia and European Russia, and the potential of energy reserves in eastern Siberia and the RFE was still uncertain. Privately owned Yukos was one of the first Russian companies to sell oil to China. Yukos signed a deal to provide Sinopec with oil via rail in 1999. In the early 2000s, CNPC began negotiations with Yukos to build a pipeline from Angarsk in Russia to Daqing. In anticipation of a deal, CNPC increased refining capacity, refurbished pipelines, and built new storage capacity in Dongbei to accommodate the expected flow of oil. It also agreed to finance half of the construction costs. In 2003, Yukos and CNPC signed a $1.1 billion, three-year deal for further oil shipments by rail, as well as a contract for supplying oil via the planned pipeline. However, in a display of competition between Russian 89

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firms, Transneft put forth a competing proposal, reportedly endorsed by President Putin, for a pipeline running from Angarsk to Nakhodka on the Russian Pacific coast. The pipeline would be longer and more expensive, but would enable Russia to sell oil to any interested customer, including China. Japan endorsed this plan, adding to the project’s attractiveness but also creating a rivalry between China and Japan over Russian oil.113 After a period of confusion in which Russian officials gave conflicting statements on which route would be chosen, China became frustrated and looked to Kazakhstan for oil. The arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky after a long power struggle with the Kremlin and Moscow’s dismantling of Yukos in 2003 ended the first viable pipeline plan. Forced to change its Russia strategy, CNPC made an upfront payment of $6 billion to Rosneft to finance the Yukos assets it had purchased in a bankruptcy auction in exchange for additional oil deliveries by rail. This was the first in a series of loans or prepayments that China would provide to the Russian energy industry. After more delays on the Russian side over the pipeline route, on December 31, 2004, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed a directive that gave approval for the ESPO pipeline system, terminating on the Pacific coast. Rosneft would develop the oil fields feeding the pipeline, while Transneft was responsible for the pipeline itself. Transneft began construction in 2006, but there were delays and routing changes dues to environmental concerns around Lake Baikal. Ben Judah claims the ESPO pipeline was further plagued by $4 billion in construction fraud.114 The process of pipeline construction and the question of how China would be connected were characterized by political maneuvering between Russian oil companies themselves and between the oil companies and the government, making it difficult for CNPC to engage in effective negotiations.115 The 2008 world financial crisis created further problems for the pipeline, causing oil prices to plummet and leaving Rosneft and Transneft short of funds. This provided an opportunity for China. CNPC and the China Development Bank signed an agreement with Rosneft and Transneft in 2009, providing a $15 billion loan to Rosneft and a $10 billion loan to Transneft. The Russian companies in turn guaranteed crude oil supplies to China of 300 million tons over 30 years and a spur in the ESPO pipeline that would deliver oil to China, and, later that same year, Transneft began construction on the section running to the Chinese border. In December 2009, Russia completed the 4,857 kilometer ESPO pipeline to Russia’s Pacific port of Kozmino at a reported cost of $14 billion for the pipeline and port facilities. In January 2011, the spur to China became operational, with CNPC building the pipeline on Chinese soil to bring oil from the border to Daqing. The price of oil was based on spot markets.116 90

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Russia’s completion of the ESPO pipeline and spur to China was a major advance for the Russian state and oil industry. Russia was no longer solely dependent upon Europe as a market for its energy. Russia and China had longterm oil contracts, and any country could purchase oil at Kozmino. Somewhat surprisingly, a significant price dispute quickly arose between China and Russia. Due to a disagreement over terms of the contract related to pipeline fees, CNPC reduced its oil payments to Russia. By March, the Russians had charged CNPC with underpaying for oil by $100 million and threatened to take the case to court in London. There were also disagreements over the volume of oil shipped to China via the pipeline. China wanted more oil shipped through the spur, but Russia could get higher prices at Kozmino and preferred sending oil there. The price dispute was settled with a compromise in 2012, but it required hard bargaining by both sides.117 Since the pipeline was completed, the oil trade between Russia and China has expanded. From 2011 to 2013, Rosneft had export deals with China worth 300,000 bbl/d. This rose to more than 500,000 bpd in 2014–16 after a 10-year deal between Rosneft and Sinopec, and will jump to over 700,000 bbl/d in 2017–23. The ESPO pipeline spur to China provides up to 300,000 bbl/d of oil to China. Russia projects that it will double the capacity of the link by 2018, as well as increase overall ESPO capacity by 2020. In 2016, CNPC began work on a second pipeline from the Russian border to Daqing, paralleling the first, which is expected to be operational in 2018. Russia also sends oil to China by tanker via Kozmino Bay and Sakhalin, and even uses a swap deal with Kazakhstan to provide oil to China using the China–Kazakhstan pipeline.118 China was Russia’s largest importer of crude oil in 2015, while Russia was China’s second-largest supplier of oil, becoming the largest in 2016. Not only have the Chinese NOCs purchased Russian oil, as part of reforms to the oil sector, but Beijing has allowed smaller, independent “teapot” refineries to import Russian oil, and these refineries drove increased imports of Russian oil in 2016.119 Negotiations over natural gas pipelines have been more difficult than those for oil pipelines. In spite of numerous agreements and interest on both sides, gas pipelines connecting China and Russia have not been completed as of 2016. China and Russia signed the first memorandum of understanding (MOU) on a natural gas pipeline in 1994. From 2000 to 2005, there were discussions of a pipeline from the Kovykta gas field in the Irkutsk Oblast that would supply China and South Korea. However, the project never got off the ground, largely due to energy politics within Russia related to Gazprom’s efforts to control natural gas. Gazprom indicated in 2005 that it hoped to build two pipelines to China and supply gas by 2010. In 2006, ExxonMobil and its partner Rosneft agreed to a deal with CNPC that would export gas to China via pipeline from the Sakhalin-1 field, but that was blocked by Gazprom. In the March 2006 Putin-Hu summit, Gazprom and 91

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CNPC signed a memorandum on natural gas supplies and the construction of two pipelines. Gas deliveries were expected to begin in 2011. This agreement failed too, and a summit between Prime Minister Putin and Premier Wen in 2009 was unable to settle the matter. Gazprom announced in 2010 that it had reached a deal on gas delivery with CNPC, with deliveries to begin in 2015. However, again the two sides failed to reach an agreement on price. Why was it so difficult for Russia and China to come to a binding agreement on natural gas pipelines? Five issues presented obstacles. First, price was fundamental. Gazprom wanted to charge CNPC oil-linked rates similar to those paid by European customers. CNPC argued that Chinese consumers could not afford this price, especially in light of the added costs imposed by long pipeline routes. The gas rate ultimately required a political solution, and the two governments were unable to come to agreement. Second, CNPC reportedly wanted to purchase an equity interest in Russian gas fields, but Gazprom rejected this, seeking a loan instead. Third, China and Russia had different preferences over pipeline routes. China’s priority was an eastern route that would bring gas from eastern Siberia to Dongbei, closer to China’s high-demand regions. Russia preferred a route from western Siberia, which already had a well-developed gas infrastructure. In a 2013 summit, Russia finally agreed to prioritize the eastern route. Fourth, Russia’s natural gas strategy in the east was conflicted, with competing interests striving for dominance. Finally, the construction of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, which began delivering gas to China in 2009, reduced China’s urgency for a deal with Russia.120 After the Ukraine crisis brought relations between Russia and the West to a new low, a breakthrough deal on gas between China and Russia seemingly occurred in 2014. On May 21, a legally binding contract between PetroChina and Gazprom was signed in the presence of Presidents Putin and Xi to build the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. This was a $400 billion deal that would deliver 38 bcm/y of natural gas from eastern Siberia to Dongbei over 30 years, with border points at Blagoveshchensk in Russia and Heihe in China. Gazprom estimated the costs of constructing the pipeline and developing the Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye gas fields, which will supply the pipeline, at $55 billion. CNPC is expected to pay $22 billion for pipelines and infrastructure. At a ceremony attended by President Putin and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, illustrating the high level of political support for this project, Gazprom began building the Power of Siberia pipeline on September 1, 2014. At the time the contract was signed, the two sides expected that gas deliveries would begin in 2018. Details on price were not announced, although LNG competition and pressure from the Ukraine crisis made it likely that Russia compromised. China has so far not made upfront payments or major loans to assist in pipeline development, as it did for the 92

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oil pipeline, although in March 2016 the Bank of China and Gazprom agreed on a five-year, €2 billion loan.121 Six months after the Power of Siberia Agreement, in a surprise development Russia and China signed a nonbinding MOU on another project that would deliver 30 bcm/y of western Siberian, or Altai gas, to China for 30 years. This is the western route that Russia had long favored. The next step would be for the two sides to complete negotiations leading to a legally binding contract. If the Altai pipeline is built, the Zapolyarnoye and Yuzhno-Russkoye fields will supply it.122 Why were these deals reached in 2014? The Ukraine crisis proved to be a political catalyst as Russian relations with Europe froze. Gazprom needed diversification beyond Europe, and China would provide an expanding new market. If both pipelines are built, their capacity would be 68 bcm/y, compared to the 158.6 bcm of Gazprom’s total gas exports to Europe in 2015.123 For its part, China is seeking to raise the use of gas as a percentage of total energy consumed, and wants further diversity of energy sources and delivery methods. The Chinese government also believes that the eastern route will bring greater economic development to Dongbei, an area that has lagged behind the rest of the country.124 Nevertheless, 2015 brought new developments that significantly affected pipeline prospects. First, natural gas prices dropped precipitously. The price of LNG deliveries to Japan dropped from $16.33 per million Btu in 2014 to $10.31 in 2015, and by December 2015 natural gas prices in the United States had dropped to their lowest levels since 1999.125 Low gas prices make it uneconomical to build expensive pipelines with heavy upfront costs, and sparked discussions within Russia on the economic viability of new pipelines. Industrial growth in China also slowed. In February 2015, CNPC revised its forecast for Chinese gas demand in 2020 from 400 bcm to only 310 bcm, and later forecasts projected even lower demand. Due to slowing economic growth and increasing LNG shipments, the Chinese gas market was actually oversupplied in 2015.126 China’s economic slowing is also making it more difficult to afford transforming industrial energy use from coal to gas. On the Russian side, the drop in Gazprom’s production in 2015, as well as Western sanctions, limit Gazprom’s ability to finance new projects. Natural gas pipeline construction has been affected by these factors. No contract has yet been signed on the Altai, or Power of Siberia 2, pipeline, and Russian media reports that it has been “delayed indefinitely.” While the eastern Power of Siberia pipeline, China’s first choice, may still go forward, China so far has not made financing construction easier. There may be disagreements between the two sides on pricing, equity stakes, or the use of Chinese contractors, and there are conflicting reports on when the project might be completed.127 Thus, low energy prices and slowed economic growth 93

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in both China and Russia have raised doubts about the current economic viability of natural gas pipelines. In sum, Chinese–Russian energy projects, before 2014, were slowed by internal Russian politics, disputes over pricing and the relative distribution of gains from energy cooperation, and geopolitical concerns. Chinese officials, focused on economic growth, were frustrated at both the working and the leadership levels.128 In 2006, in a rare display of impatience, Zhang Guobao, vice director of the NDRC, complained of “Russian opinion changing like the weather forecaster, one day saying they have reached an agreement, the next saying there is no agreement at all.”129 In analyzing the reasons for the challenges to making faster progress, Chinese scholars Hao Yubiao and Tian Chunsheng suggested four factors: the fear in Russia that China would become a threat, concerns that Russia was becoming a resource vassal, the growing economic gap between Russia and China, and differences in values.130 The first three of these are tied to the growing relative power difference between the two sides. China also believed that at different times Russia was playing it off against Japan and Europe in order to get the best possible deals. Shi Ze, Director of the Center for International Energy Strategy at the China Institute of International Relations, provided recommendations on improving the energy relationship in 2015. He advocated more vigorous efforts to reach consensus between the two sides, as well as stronger coordination on policies toward Central Asia, upstream and downstream investments, and pricing issues. He also called for the implementation of existing agreements, the development of a strategic plan for energy cooperation, and improved working mechanisms.131 Before 2014, Russia was reluctant to see China make substantial investments in upstream energy assets. As early as 2002, CNPC bid for a controlling share of Slavneft, but the Russian Duma passed a bill forbidding it. In 2002–3, CNPC was unable to purchase a controlling interest in Stimul, a small oil company. Chinese NOCs thereafter came to realize that Gazprom and Rosneft were the major players that they would have to work with. In 2006, Sinopec, in a minority capacity with Rosneft, purchased the oil firm Udmurtneft. Rosneft and CNPC also created two joint ventures. Vostok Energy operates in Russia, while the Chinese–Russian Eastern Petrochemical Company refines oil and operates gas stations in China.132 However, none of these deals were large-scale. In 2013, Chinese equity investments in Russian oil and gas fields delivered only 2.5 percent of China’s overseas production.133 The events of 2014 have brought some degree of change to the energy relationship. Writing in 2016, Tao Wang, Assistant Director of the Yicai Research Institute, states that since the ESPO oil deal with Russia in 2009, “China’s energy cooperation with Russia seemed to always leave a bitter taste—until 2014.”134 The year 2014 did not erase all mistrust between the two sides. Michal Meidan noted in 2016: 94

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Energy and the Sino–Russian Relationship Despite deeper and more frequent engagement between Russian and Chinese leaders, mistrust between the two sides still lingers. Russian companies do not want to be beholden solely to their Chinese consumers while Chinese investors are wary that their activities in Russia will preclude them from other markets in the US and Europe, which they increasingly see as less risky and more appealing.135

Even Western sanctions on Russia have not been all positive from China’s perspective, as without Western investments, know-how, and financing it is more difficult for Russia to produce oil and gas in eastern Siberia for the Chinese market. However, what it did change in 2014 was that Russia was largely cut off from Western energy investments and cooperation. Thus, it turned to China, loosening restrictions on Chinese upstream investments. This was exemplified by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich stating in February 2015 that Russia had overcome a “psychological barrier” and may allow Chinese investors more than 50 percent stakes in oil and gas fields.136 Already in the previous November, CNPC agreed to a 10 percent equity stake in Rosneft’s Vankor oil field. However, the Vankor deal was not completed, and an Indian firm, ONGC, is now purchasing a stake in the firm, demonstrating that Russia has more than just the China option. In 2014, CNPC purchased a 20 percent stake in Novatek’s $27 billion Yamal LNG project, and in September 2015 China’s state-run Silk Road Fund announced it would take a 9.9 percent stake in the project as well. Yamal, above the Arctic Circle, has potential reserves of more than 900 billion cubic meters of gas, and Chinese investments in Russian LNG put pressure on Gazprom in selling pipeline gas to China. In 2016, China National Chemical Corporation negotiated a 40 percent stake in a petrochemical complex planned by Rosneft, VNHK, in the Far East. Other projects are in the planning stages, but not solidified.137 Thus, the tide may be turning for equity investments. However, no deals in which China obtained a majority stake have been sealed, and it is unclear if further agreements will occur in a period of low energy prices. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies analysts note three reasons for the lack of further progress. First, Chinese companies are driving a hard bargain on asset prices due to perceived Russian weaknesses. China is not supporting Russia on the basis of friendship. Second, the crackdown on corruption in China has led energy executives to be cautious. Third, Western sanctions on Russia have led China to be hesitant, as Chinese companies do not want their deals with the West to suffer.138 In addition to disagreements over asset prices, there may still be some political opposition in Russia to Chinese investments as well. Russia has responded by inviting new players, such as India, to invest in energy assets. Do Sino–Russian energy ties contribute to a strategic relationship between China and Russia that binds their political interests more closely together? 95

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The answer, at least for now, appears to be no, although further Chinese upstream investments in Russian oil and gas could change this. Many analysts argue that China’s energy policies toward Russia are part of a broader strategy to ensure diversity in energy suppliers, so Russia will not gain a disproportionate share of the Chinese market.139 However, Keun-Wook Paik suggests that two key issues will determine if Sino–Russian energy cooperation will move to the strategic level: whether the Altai gas pipeline goes through, and whether CNPC purchases a 19.5 percent equity stake in Rosneft.140 The Altai pipeline is likely dead, and even the eastern Power of Siberia pipeline is delayed. Moreover, Russia did not sell Rosneft stakes to a Chinese firm. However, regardless of the equity issue, Oxford analysts Henderson and Mitrova suggest that since 2014, “China is now the dominant force in this cooperation.”141 In conclusion, Sino–Russian economic ties have not yet brought fundamental changes to the world order. Trade relations between the two neighbors are relatively modest, hampered by Russia’s European orientation, the lack of competitive broad-based Russian exports, and the limited knowledge each side’s business community has of the other. Chinese investments in Russia are growing, but from a small base, and the structural factors that impede closer ties will take time to overcome. Most economic interactions between Russia and China occur between state-owned firms. Russia’s oil sales to China are robust and growing, but oil dominates Russian exports at the expense of other products. President Putin and other Russian leaders had hoped that the “pivot” to China would demonstrate to the West that Russia had other partners, but China is pragmatic and has not rushed in as Russia’s savior. Nevertheless, both governments are committed to deepening economic ties, and there is potential for more robust trade and investment. In particular, since 2014 Moscow has shown increasing resolve to create stronger economic linkages with China in order to reduce its economic dependence on the West and hence its vulnerability to sanctions. The longer sanctions against Russia last, the more willing Russia may be to be to compromise with China on terms for energy cooperation that will strengthen the role of Chinese companies in the Russian energy sector at the expense of European and American firms. Moscow and Beijing also aspire to broader changes in the international economic order. Their support for BRICS shows a commitment to giving developing countries a stronger voice in global economic policies. Their efforts to enhance the use of the ruble and yuan for trade settlements demonstrate a shared commitment to undermining the role of the dollar as the dominant international currency. Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow hope that OBOR will not only more closely enmesh their own two economies, but also integrate Eurasia in a way that drives future prosperity and fundamentally shifts the locus of the world economy to the east. Thus, the future dynamics of the Sino–Russian economic relationship deserve careful observation. 96

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Notes 1. CIA, “China,” World Factbook, updated July 11, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 2. World Bank, “GDP Growth,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. KD.ZG; and “China’s Economy Grows 6.7% in 2016,” BBC, January 20, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38686568. 3. For a comparison of the fundamental reforms to the Russian and Chinese socioeconomic models, see Markku Kivinen and Li Chunling, “The Free-Market State or the Welfare State,” in At the Crossroads of Post-Communist Modernisation: Russia and China in Comparative Perspective, ed. Christer Pursiainen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 47–113. 4. World Bank, “GDP Growth.” For an analysis of how sanctions have affected economic ties between Russia and the EU, see Anastasia Nevskaya, “Russia-EU Economic Relations: Assessing Two Years of Sanctions,” Russia Direct, June 16, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russia-eu-economic-relations-assessingtwo-years-sanctions. 5. World Bank, “Russia Monthly Economic Developments,” February 2017, 2, http:// pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/869191487348237935/Feb2017-Russia-Monthly-EconomicDevelopments-final.pdf. 6. CIA, “Russia,” World Factbook, updated January 12, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. 7. Allen C. Lynch, How Russia Is Not Ruled (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220–34. 8. World Trade Organization, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPF Home.aspx?Language=E. 9. Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “Russia and Energy Markets,” in New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the US Military, ed. John R. Deni (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), 22–3. 10. World Bank statistics, “GDP per Capita” and “GDP per capita, PPP,” http://data. worldbank.org/indicator. 11. Gaye Christoffersen, “The Russian Far East and Heilongjiang in China’s Silk Road Economic Belt,” China Policy Institute, April 25, 2016, https://cpianalysis.org/ 2016/04/25/the-russian-far-east-and-heilongjiang-in-chinas-silk-road-economicbelt/. 12. For ways in which geography influences economic ties, see Richard Lotspeich, “Economic Integration of China and Russia in the Post-Soviet Era,” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 84–8; and Richard Lotspeich, “Perspectives on the Economic Relations Between China and Russia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 1 (2006), 52–4. 13. Jeffrey Schubert and Dmitry Savkin, “Dubious Economic Partnership,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 2, no. 4 (2016): 529–47. 14. Artyom Lukin, “Russia’s Eastward Drive—Pivoting to Asia . . . Or to China?” Russian Analytical Digest no. 169, June 30, 2015, 2–5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/ 192109/Russian_Analytical_Digest_170.pdf.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 15. See Fred Weir, “China Cashes In on Russia’s Shrinking Economic Options,” Christian Science Monitor, October 14, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/ 2014/1014/China-cashes-in-on-Russia-s-shrinking-economic-options-video; Andrew Roth, “China and Russia Sign Cooperation Pacts,” New York Times, May 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/world/europe/russia-and-china-signcooperation-pacts.html?_r=0; and Cao Siqi, “China, Russia to Strengthen Global Stability,” Global Times, June 27, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/990624. shtml. 16. Andrew Higgins, “An Unfinished Bridge, and Partnership, Between Russia and China,” New York Times, July 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/ world/asia/unfinished-bridge-russia-china-amur-river.html?_r=0; Yu Bin, “All Still Quiet in the East,” Comparative Connections 17, no. 1 (May 2015), http://csis.org/ files/publication/1501qchina_russia.pdf; Michael S. Arnold, “China, Russia Plan $242 Billion Beijing-Moscow Rail Link,” Bloomberg, January 22, 2015, http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-22/china-russia-plan-242-billion-raillink-from-beijing-to-moscow; and Jane Perlez and Neil MacFarquhar, “Friendship Between Putin and Xi Becomes Strained as Economies Falter,” New York Times, September 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/asia/friendshipbetween-putin-and-xi-becomes-strained-as-economies-falter.html?action=click& pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT. nav=top-news. 17. Cao Siqi, “China, Russia to Strengthen.” 18. Interviews by author with Victor V. Sumsky and Alexander Gabuev, Moscow, October 2015. 19. All trade data come from http://comtrade.un.org/data/. 20. In this regard, see O. V. Kuznetsova, “The Role of Foreign Capital in the Economies of Regions of Russia,” Studies on Russian Economic Development 27, no. 3 (2016), 276–85. 21. See Alexander Gabuev, “Future Approaches to China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 7, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/ 07/future-approaches-to-china-pub-63389. 22. Maria Alwksandrova, “Zhongguo dui E touzi: xianzhuang, qushi ji fazhan fangxiang” (“Chinese Investment in Russia: Status, Trends, and Development Direction”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) 2014, no. 2, 11–20; and Kuznetsova, “Role of Foreign Capital,” 279. 23. Yu Bin, “Russia’s Pride and China’s Power,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 3 (January 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/1403qchina_russia.pdf. 24. Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016, 10, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf. 25. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Russian Federation,” World Investment Report 2016, http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2016/ wir16_fs_ru_en.pdf. 26. Veronika Bondareva, “The Sino-Russian Cooperation in Economy: A View from Russia,” European Union Foreign Affairs Journal, no. 3 (2016), 184. 27. Courtney Fingar, “FDI to Russia Slumps but Chinese Investors Step In as Others Pull Back,” Financial Times, May 6, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/99ff3bc8-

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28. 29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

f338-11e4-8141-00144feab7de.html#axzz3xW0GTSVA; Gregory Shtraks, “A Cold Summer for China and Russia?,” Diplomat, September 1, 2015, http://thediplomat. com/2015/09/a-cold-summer-for-china-and-russia/; Ivana Kottasova, “China Plays Hard to Get with Russia,” CNN, September 2, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/ 09/02/news/economy/china-russia-trade/; Zhao Huasheng and Sergey Luzyanin, “Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2016 Model,” Russian International Affairs Council, July 7, 2016, 18, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/rossiysko-kitayskiydialog-model-2016/; and Anna Dolgov, “Chinese Investments in Russia Fell 25% in the First Half of This Year,” Moscow Times, July 22, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes. com/business/article/chinese-investment-in-russia-fell-25-in-the-first-half-of-thisyear/525983.html. See Alexander Lukin, Pivot to Asia: Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century (New Delhi: United Services Institute, 2017), 45–8. Vadim Shtepa, “Moscow Invites Chinese Factories to Move to the Russian Far East,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 83, April 28, 2016, http://www.jamestown. org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45368&cHash=90cddf28d 5e63317ae6ef6e19e386219#.V5vjtrgrLIU; and Alexander Gabuev, “Should Russia Be Afraid of Chinese Plans in the Far East?,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 7, 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/06/07/should-russia-be-afraid-of-chineseplans-in-far-east/j1gj. “Putin Considers Russia-China Interaction Important Factor of Global Stability,” TASS, June 23, 2016, http://tass.ru/en/politics/884100; and Chun Han Wong and Nathan Hodge, “Troubled Russia Tries to Exploit Links to China,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-russia-tries-toexploit-links-to-china-1466714732. “ ‘Friends Forever’: Xi Talks up China’s Ties with Russia during Putin Trade Trip,” Guardian, June 26, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/ 26/friends-forever-xi-talks-up-chinas-ties-with-russia-during-putin-trade-trip. “China Invests $2.4bn in Russian Far East,” Russia Today-RT, July 5, 2016, https://www.rt.com/business/349524-china-russian-region-investments. Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” 17–20. James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova, “Energy Relations between Russia and China: Playing Chess with the Dragon,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper WPM 67, August 2016, 16. For sources on the globalization of the RMB, see Eswar Prasad, Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Paola Subacchi, The People’s Money: How China is Building a Global Currency (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” 21. “Energy Ties Highlighted as China, Russia Ink Array of Deals,” BRICS Post, June 26, 2016, http://thebricspost.com/energy-ties-highlighted-as-china-russia-ink-array-ofdeals/#.WCeR__krLIU. For example, Zhou and Huang contrast robust political relations with lagging economic ties. See Zhou Nianli and Huang Ning, “Zhong E zhengzhi yu jingji guanxi fazhande feiduichen xianxiang fenxi ji yingdui” (“On the Asymmetry of

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39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48.

49. 50.

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52.

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54. 55.

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Political and Economic Relations between China and Russia and the Countermeasures”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) 2014, no. 2, 67–78. Yu Bin, “Pivot to Eurasia and Africa: Xi’s Style,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 1 (May 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/1301qchina_russia.pdf. Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015, article 56. Vassily Kashin, “Industrial Cooperation: Path to Confluence of Russian and Chinese Economies,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 18, 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Industrial-cooperation-path-to-confluence-of-russian-and-chineseeconomies-18111. Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 2. Interviews by author, Beijing, June 2009; Zhou and Huang, “Zhong E,” 72. Kashin, “Industrial Cooperation.” Alexander Lukin, interview by author, Moscow, October 6, 2015; Lukin, Pivot to Asia, 6, 156–9; and Alexander Lukin, “Russia, China and the Emerging Greater Eurasia,” Asan Forum, August 18, 2015. Zhou and Huang, “Zhong E,” 71–3; and Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs and International Relations (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2013), 152–9. Zhao Huasheng, “Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in the Far East and Central Asia since 2012,” Eurasian Border Review 6, no. 1 (2016), 112. Sun Kai and Wang Chenguang, “Guojia liyi shijiao xia de Zhong E Beiji hezuo” (“Analysis of Sino-Russia Arctic Cooperation in the Perspective of National Interests”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) no. 6, 2014, 26–34. However, Western sanctions may now create opportunities for Chinese companies. Interview by author, Austin, February 9, 2016. Artyom Lukin and Rens Lee, “The Russian Far East and the Future of Asian Security,” Orbis 59, no. 2 (Spring 2015), 167–80, quote on 167; and Lilia Shevtsova, “Bad Romance,” American Interest, July 15, 2015, http://www.the-american-interest. com/2015/07/15/bad-romance. Statistics calculated from data provided by the Russian Far Eastern Customs Administration at http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=21181:-2016-&catid=304:-2016-&Itemid=316; see also Alexander Korolev, “The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China: Myths and Reality,” Asan Forum, May 4, 2015, http://www.theasanforum.org/the-strategic-alignmentbetween-russia-and-china-myths-and-reality/. Michael Schuman, “Thaw in China-Russian Relations Hasn’t Trickled Down,” New York Times, December 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/business/ international/thaw-in-china-russia-relations-hasnt-trickled-down.html; and “Packing Up the Suitcase Trade,” Economist, August 15, 2015, http://www.economist.com/ news/china/21661033-hard-times-border-these-days-packing-up-suitcase-trade. Andrew Higgins, “Russia Looks to Populate Its Far East. Wimps Need Not Apply,” New York Times, July 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/eu rope/russia-looks-to-populate-its-far-east-wimps-need-not-apply.html?_r=0. Interview by author, Taipei, May 2015. See Zhao Huasheng, “Qian ping Zhong E Mei san da zhanlüe zai Zhong Yade gongchu” (“An Analysis on the Coexistence of the Three Strategies of China,

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56. 57.

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59. 60. 61. 62.

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Russia, and the US in Central Asia”), Guoji guancha (International Review) no. 1, 2014, 96–109; Artyom Lukin, “Russia’s Eastward Drive,” 3; and Zhao and Luzyanin, “Russian–Chinese Dialogue,” 36–8. See Timofey Bordachev, ed., “Toward the Great Ocean 4: Turn to the East,” Valdai Discussion Club Report, 2016, 23–34, http://valdaiclub.com/files/11431. Alexander Gabuev, “Russia’s Uneasy Economic Alliance with China Just Got Less Easy,” Russia Direct, November 12, 2014, http://www.russia-direct.org/apec2014-russias-uneasy-economic-alliance-china-just-got-less-easy; Simon Denyer, “In Central Asia, Chinese Inroads in Russia’s Back Yard,” Washington Post, December 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-advanceinto-central-asia-ruffles-russian-feathers/2015/12/27/cfedeb22-61ff-11e5-8475781cc9851652_story.html; Shtraks, “A Cold Summer”; and Mathieu Duchâtel et al., “Eurasian Integration: Caught Between Russia and China,” European Council on Foreign Affairs, June 7, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_eurasian. Wade Shephard, “The Western Europe–Western China Expressway to Connect the Yellow Sea with the Baltic,” Forbes, July 10, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ wadeshepard/2016/07/10/the-western-europe-western-china-expressway-to-connectthe-yellow-sea-with-the-baltic/#6ff55fa06c95. Zhao and Luzyanin, “Russian–Chinese Dialogue,” 43–4. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, June 2015, 1, bp.com/statisticalreview. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, June 2016, 2–3, bp.com/statisticalreview. Gregory Meyer, Neil Hume, and David Sheppard, “Gas Price Tumble Comes as Markets are Increasingly Interlinked,” Financial Times, March 10, 2016, https:// www.ft.com/content/3bc0116c-e681-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39; and Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 40–2. Key sources on the Russian energy industry are Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations”; Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2012); Andreas Goldthau, “The Russian Energy Outlook,” in Too Much Energy? Asia at 2030, American Enterprise Institute, February 2015, 51–9; and Sabonis-Helf, “Russia and Energy Markets.” Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 21–2; Goldthau, “Russian Energy Outlook,” 51–2; Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” 11; and Sergei Guriev, “Russia’s Constrained Economy,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2016), 19. Goldthau, “Russian Energy Outlook,” 54; and Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 4. Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 20–1. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 69–70, 101–36. Rosemary Griffin, “Russian Draft Energy Strategy Sees 23% of Exports to Asia-Pacific by 2035,” S&P Global Platts, January 24, 2014, http://www.platts.ru/latest-news/ natural-gas/moscow/russian-draft-energy-strategy-sees-23-of-exports-26649363. Edward Christie, “Sanctions after Crimea: Have they Worked?” NATO Review, 2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-theyworked/EN/index.htm.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 70. See Leon Aron, “The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas,” American Enterprise Institute, May 29, 2013, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-political-economyof-russian-oil-and-gas. 71. For details on Yukos, see Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 59–80. 72. Goldthau, “Russian Energy Outlook,” 52. 73. Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev was later charged with accepting a $2 million bribe to facilitate the deal. 74. Michal Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry: Past Trends and Future Prospects,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper WPM 66, May 2016, 3. 75. Derek M. Scissors, “The Chinese Energy Outlook,” in Too Much Energy? Asia at 2030, American Enterprise Institute, February 2015, 32; and US Energy Information Administration, “China: International Energy Data and Analysis,” https:// www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN, last updated May 14, 2015. For a brief history of these three firms, see Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry.” 76. Julia Xuantong Zhu, “China’s Engagement in Global Energy Governance,” International Energy Agency, 2016, 16, 62–3, http://www.iea.org/publications/ freepublications/publication/PartnerCountrySeries_ ChinasEngagementinGlobalEnergyGovernance_Englishversion.pdf. 77. Details of China’s energy bureaucracy can be found in Jean A. Garrison, China and the Energy Equation in Asia (Boulder, CO: FirstForumPress, 2009), chapter 2; Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 145–52; US Energy Information Administration, “China”; and Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry.” 78. See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), chapter 5. 79. See Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 32–8; and Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 38–47. 80. Zhao Hongtu, “The Myth of China’s Overseas Energy Investment,” East Asia Forum, March 4, 2015, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/04/the-myth-ofchinas-overseas-energy-investment/. 81. Matt Sheehan, “China Targets Big Oil in Wars on Corruption, Pollution,” World Post, March 17, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/17/chinacorruption-oil-coal-pollution-crackdown_n_6882690.html; and Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 46–50. 82. Damien Ma, “Rebalancing China’s Energy Strategy,” Paulson Papers on Energy and Environment, January 2015, 4–24, http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/04/PPEE_Rebalancing-Chinas-Energy-Strategy_Ma_English.pdf; “China Unveils Energy Strategy, Targets for 2020,” Xinhua, November 19, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/19/c_133801014.htm; Edward Wong, “Statistics from China Say Coal Consumption Continues to Drop,” New York Times, March 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/ asia/china-coal-consumption-down.html?_r=0; and US Energy Information Administration, “China.”

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Energy and the Sino–Russian Relationship 83. Michal Meidan, “China’s Burgeoning Demand and its Quest for Resources,” in New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the US Military, ed. John R. Deni (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), 186–7; and Zhu, “China’s Engagement,” 7. 84. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 142–4. 85. BP Statistical Review 2016, 2. 86. Aibing Guo, “China’s Biggest Oil Company Aims for 50% Natural Gas by 2020,” Bloomberg, August 25, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201608-25/china-s-biggest-oil-company-wants-to-be-50-natural-gas-by-2020. 87. Ma, “Rebalancing China’s Energy Strategy,” 5. 88. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation; US Energy Information Administration, “China”; Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 53–4; BP Statistical Review 2016, 22; Xin Li, “Natural Gas in China: A Regional Analysis,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper NG 103, November 2015, 6; and US Energy Information Administration, “More Chinese Crude Oil Imports Coming from Non-OPEC Countries, Today in Energy, April 14, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/to dayinenergy/detail.php?id=30792. 89. US Energy Information Administration, “China”; and BP Statistical Review 2016, 10–1, 22–3. 90. Meidan, “China’s Burgeoning Demand,” 186, 194. 91. Interview by author, Taipei, June 2015. 92. Damien Ma and William Adams, In Line Behind a Billion People: How Scarcity Will Define China’s Ascent in the Next Decade (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2014), 39–41. 93. Tunsjø, Security and Profit. 94. Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” 14; and “Russia Pips Saudi Arabia in Race to Grab China Oil Market Share,” Bloomberg, June 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2015-06-23/russia-pips-saudi-arabia-in-race-to-grab-china-oilmarket-share. 95. “Russia Wrests Crown of Top China Oil Supplier from Saudi Arabia,” Bloomberg News, January 23, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0123/russia-wrests-crown-of-top-china-oil-supplier-from-saudi-arabia; and Daniel Workman, “Crude Oil Imports by Country,” World’s Top Exports, http://www. worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-country/. 96. “The Great Well of China,” Economist, June 20, 2015, http://www.economist. com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21654655-oil-bringing-china-and-arab-worldcloser-economically-politics-will. 97. Keun-Wook Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper WPM 59, April 2015, 24, 30–1; and BP Statistical Review 2016, 28. 98. International Gas Union, “2016 World LNG Report,” 6, www.igu.org/download/ file/fid/2123. 99. “China’s Swapping Energy Independence for Cleaner Air,” Bloomberg News, January 10, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-10/smogchoked-china-swapping-energy-independence-for-cleaner-air; and “China’s 2016

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LNG Imports Rise 33 pct YoY,” LNG World News, January 23, 2017, http://www. lngworldnews.com/chinas-2016-lng-imports-rise-33-pct-yoy/. Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 150–96; Dan Blumenthal, “China, the United States, and the Geopolitics of Energy,” in Too Much Energy? Asia at 2030, American Enterprise Institute, February 2015, 69–71; and US Energy Information Administration, “China.” See Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 19–21, 22–25, 41–4. Julie Jiang and Chen Ding, “Update on Overseas Investments by China’s National Oil Companies,” International Energy Agency, 2014, https://www.iea.org/pub lications/freepublications/publication/PartnerCountrySeriesUpdateonOverseas InvestmentsbyChinasNationalOilCompanies.pdf. Bo Kong and Kevin B. Gallagher, “The Globalization of Chinese Energy Companies: The Role of State Finance,” Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative, June 2016, 3–4, https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2016/06/Glo balization.Final_.pdf. Other useful sources on China’s overseas investments include Garrison, China and the Energy Equation, 32–5; Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 75–109; US Energy Information Administration, “China”; and Meidan, “China’s Burgeoning Demand,” 194–5. Garrison, China and the Energy Equation, chapter 3; Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 286–98; Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 24; and Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 153–8. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 298–314; Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 158–60; Jacopo Dettoni, “Turkmenistan Faces Competition from Russia as China’s Largest Supplier,” Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2015, http://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Turkmenistan-faces-competitionfrom-Russia-as-China-s-largest-supplier; and CNPC, “Flow of Natural Gas from Central Asia,” http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/ FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia2.shtml. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 297. Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon, “Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2014), 7–41. See Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Energy Nationalism Goes to Sea in Asia,” in Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region, National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report no. 31, September 2011, 15–28; and Pierre Noël, “Asia’s Energy Supply and Maritime Security,” Survival 56, no. 3 (June—July 2014), 201–16. Tu Debin, Ma Liya, Fan Bei, and Hui Caixing, “Zhongguo hai shang tongdao anquan ji baozhang silu yanjiu” (“Research on China’s Maritime Transportation Security and Thoughts on its Protection”), Shijie dili yanjiu (World Regional Studies) 24, no. 2 (June 2015), 1–10. For a lengthy discussion of protecting seaborne petroleum that downplays the threat and Chinese response, see Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 110–49. Meidan, “The Structure of China’s Oil Industry,” 40–1; and “Oil Bulls Beware Because China’s Almost Done Amassing Crude,” Bloomberg, June 30, 2016,

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121.

122.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-30/oil-bulls-beware-becausechina-s-almost-done-amassing-crude. Xia Yishan, “China-Russia Energy Cooperation: Impetuses, Prospects and Impacts,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, May 2000; and Hao Yubiao and Tian Chunsheng, “Zhong E nengyuan hezuo: jinzhan, dongyin ji yingxiang,” (“Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation: Development, Motivation, and Effect”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) no. 5, 2014, 71–82. “Energy Ties Highlighted.” See Shoichi Itoh, “Sino-Japanese Competition over Russian Oil,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 158–78; and Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 24–5. Judah, Fragile Empire, 219. A Russian source claims that Rosneft and Gazprom were ordered by the government to work with China. Interview by author, Moscow, October 2015. For details on the many twists and turns leading up to the construction of the ESPO pipeline and spur to China, see Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 317–50; and Gaye Christoffersen, “Multiple Levels of Sino-Russian Energy Relations,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 140–4. Christoffersen, “Multiple Levels,” 149–52; “Russia-China Oil Price Dispute Valued at $100M,” Moscow Times, March 28, 2011, http://www.themoscowtimes. com/business/article/russia-china-oil-price-dispute-valued-at-100m/433814.html; “Russia, China Resolve Oil Pricing Dispute—Paper,” Reuters, February 28, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/28/russia-china-oil-idUSL5E8 DS01V20120228. Zhang Yu and Lyu Chang, “China-Russia Oil Pipeline Fuels Trade,” China Daily Asia, August 19, 2016, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2016-08/19/con tent_15481937.html; US Energy Information Administration, “China”; Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation,” 4–10; and Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 28, 32. Tao Wang, “China-Russia Energy Ties Won’t Short-Out,” East Asia Forum, September 30, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/30/china-russia-energyties-wont-short-out/; and “Russia Wrests Crown.” For details on gas pipeline negotiations, see Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 350–67; Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 52–6; and Yu Bin, “Navigating through the Ukraine Storm,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 2 (Sept 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qchina_russia.pdf. Jack Farchy, “Gazprom Secures €2bn Loan from Bank of China,” Financial Times, March 3, 2016, https://next.ft.com/content/ac5b1ee4-e159-11e5-92176ae3733a2cd1. Details of the agreements are found in Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation”; Yu Bin, “Navigating through the Ukraine Storm”; Richard Weitz,

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123. 124.

125.

126.

127.

128. 129. 130. 131.

132. 133. 134. 135.

136.

137.

106

“The Russia-China Gas Deal: Implications and Ramifications,” World Affairs (September/October 2014), 80–6. Gazprom Export, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/. See Harry W. S. Lee, “Ailing Northeast Struggles to Keep Young Talent,” Caixin, February 6, 2016, http://english.caixin.com/2016-02-06/100907755.html; and Lucy Hornby, “China Ploughs Cash into Struggling North-East,” Financial Times, May 10, 2016, https://next.ft.com/content/21a1784c-1698-11e6-b197a4af20d5575e. BP Statistical Review 2016, 27; and Nicole Friedman, “Natural-Gas Prices Fall to Lowest Level since 1999,” Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2015, http://www.wsj. com/articles/natural-gas-prices-continue-slump-1450193642. Elena Mazneva, “China Gas Demand Forecast Cut by CNPC Researcher Amid Slowdown,” Bloomberg, September 30, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015-09-30/china-gas-demand-forecast-cut-by-cnpc-researcheramid-slowdown; and Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 50–2. Interviews by author, Austin, February 9, 2016. See also Alessandria Masi, “China’s Economic Woes Jeopardize Putin’s Pipeline, Energy Trade between Russia, China,” International Business Times, August 27, 2015, http://www.ibtimes. com/chinas-economic-woes-jeopardize-putins-pipeline-energy-trade-betweenrussia-china-2070346; Ben McPherson, “Gazprom: What’s Wrong with Russia’s Energy Giant?” Russia Direct, August 11, 2015, http://www.russia-direct.org/ana lysis/gazprom-whats-wrong-russias-energy-giant; and Alexander Gabuev, “SinoRussian Trade after a Year of Sanctions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 11, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/11/sinorussian-trade-after-year-of-sanctions/ihte. Interview by author, Beijing, June 2013. Quoted in Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 371. Hao and Tian, “Zhong E,” 76–9. For a Japanese perspective, see Itoh, “SinoJapanese Competition,” 165–7. Shi Ze, “Building a Strong China-Russia Energy Strategic Partnership,” China International Studies (September–October 2015), 81–99, http://www.ciis.org.cn/ english/2015-12/02/content_8422032.htm. Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, 367–76. Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 38. For a list of all acquisitions in oil and gas, see 39 and 59 therein. Tao Wang, “China-Russia Energy Ties.” Michal Meidan, “A Changing Outlook for Chinese Energy Security,” Danish Institute for International Studies Policy Brief, February 2016, http://pure.diis. dk/ws/files/421457/PB_China_Energy_Security_WEB.pdf. “Cash-Strapped Russia Eyes Giving China Control of Major Oil Fields,” Moscow Times, February 27, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/cashstrapped-russia-eyes-giving-china-control-of-major-oil-fields/516658.html. Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation,” 4–10; Shi Ze, “Building a Strong”; “Russia Turning to China for Long-Term Funding,” Oil and Gas 360, September 29, 2015, http://www.oilandgas360.com/russia-turning-to-china-for-long-term-funding/;

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138. 139.

140. 141.

“‘Friends Forever’: Xi Talks Up China’s Ties with Russia during Putin Trade Trip”; “Win-win Cooperation Lifts China-Russia Energy Partnership to New High,” People’s Daily, May 28, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0528/c90000-9064784.html; and Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 39, 59. Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 41–2. See, for example, Tunsjø, Security and Profit; Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 9; and Amy Myers Jaffe, Kenneth B. Medlock III, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “China’s Energy Hedging Strategy: Less than Meets the Eye for Russian Gas Pipelines,” National Bureau of Asian Research Energy Security Program, February 2015, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=530. Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation,” 2–3. Henderson and Mitrova, “Energy Relations,” 74.

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3 The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship Emerging Trends and Challenges

Russia and China use their relationship as leverage in countering military threats as well as broader security challenges. Moscow sees the West as a threat due to the expansion of NATO, sanctions over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, increased NATO force deployments to Eastern Europe after 2014, and Western efforts to promote a rules-based liberal order. Russia also faces terrorism and sees danger emanating from conflicts in the Middle East, particularly Syria. China faces US support for its Asian neighbors as they contest China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Taiwan also looms in the background. The Korean Peninsula could erupt into war in a way that would fundamentally damage both Russian and Chinese interests. Moreover, China and Russia guard against internal unrest. (For China’s and Russia’s response to “colored revolutions”, see Chapter 5.) China reportedly spends more on internal security than it does on its military.1 With gradually slowing economic growth, periodic labor unrest, conflict in Xinjiang and Tibet, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign, and dissatisfaction generated by Xi’s efforts to strengthen the party at the expense of society, there are sources of internal dissent, including a Maoist political movement that critiques Chinese politics from the left. Russia’s leaders face potential unrest as well due to Russia’s ailing economy, corruption, and the danger of terrorism. In this environment, both sides need a secure Sino–Russian border. However, military and security cooperation extend beyond the border. Since the 1990s, Russia has been a vital source of arms for China, and these weapons have altered the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. In more recent years, the extent and depth of cooperation in joint military exercises between Russia and China have increased, and the two sides have seemingly stepped

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up coordination on international security issues. In fact, some analysts believe that pressure from the United States on Russia and China is pushing the two toward an alliance. Nevertheless, long-term trends and realist calculations temper the partnership. Russia cannot keep pace with China’s growing military power. Moscow attempts to maintain its security through close political ties with Beijing, but military planners are always concerned with capabilities because intentions can change. Some Russians view long-term security vis-à-vis China as problematic, and it is questionable how effectively Russia can protect the Russian Far East (RFE). Russia has engaged in major military exercises that simulate defense against attacks on the region, and the Russian government proclaims the right to use nuclear weapons to defend its territory against conventional attack. Thus, military cooperation between Russia and China, while increasing, has limits.

The Military and Security Environment Confronting Russia and China China has 22,457 kilometers of land borders with 14 states, and maritime boundaries with 8 states. Security is therefore a complicated and multi-faceted endeavor for China. In its “new security concept,” which first appeared in the late 1990s and still influences Chinese rhetoric today, Beijing emphasizes partnership, decisions based on consensus, and peaceful coexistence.2 Reflecting this, China’s 2015 Military Strategy asserts: China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace.

Later, while describing a policy of “active defense,” the document states that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”3 In terms of the international environment, China’s 2015 Military Strategy does not give a consistent picture. On the one hand, it proclaims that China faces a “generally favorable external environment” in which it enjoys growing power and influence. On the other hand, the document states that “China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.” Challenges laid out in the document include the US rebalance to Asia; new Japanese security policies; threats in the South China Sea; danger on the Korean Peninsula; terrorism, separatism, and

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extremism; reunification with Taiwan; conflict in Xinjiang; anti-China forces that encourage a colored revolution; and new military technologies that threaten China. This situation, according to the strategy, calls for an expansion of air and naval forces.4 Columbia University’s Andrew Nathan and Rand Corporation’s Andrew Scobell assert that China sees the world as a dangerous place. Beijing faces threats in four concentric circles: China’s own territory, adjacent countries (some of whom are allied with the United States), six regional systems, and the broader world. In addition, China faces major demographic and economic challenges. In order to address these threats and improve its position in the world, China has four strategic goals. The first is to preserve its territorial integrity and internal stability, as well as regain Taiwan. The second is to increase its influence in Asia while preventing any other state from dominating the region. Third, China strives for an international environment in which it can sustain rapid economic growth. Fourth, Beijing seeks to participate in constructing or revising the global order.5 For Russia, too, the world has many dangers. Russia has 22,408 kilometers of land boundaries bordering 14 countries. Russia sees instability near its long borders, ranging from tensions with NATO, war in the Middle East, fighting in Afghanistan, and a territorial dispute with Japan. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO has disregarded Russian interests in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Russia views the West as a destabilizing force because it maintains exclusive institutions such as NATO and the EU, as well as encouraging regime change through colored revolutions. Moreover, Russia recognizes that its own domestic weaknesses, such as an underdeveloped economy and ineffective government administration, limit its ability to effectively deal with threats. Moscow’s response includes a plan to have 70 percent modern military equipment by 2020, as well as regular exercises by police forces and the military aimed at maintaining internal stability in the event of crisis.6 The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, similar to China’s Military Strategy, notes a welcome redistribution of power in the world. However, it also points out various dangers, including NATO, interference in Russia’s internal affairs, instability in bordering states, and subversive operations against Russia. The document calls for strengthened cooperation with the BRICS countries to enhance Russian security, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Similar themes are found in the Russian National Security Strategy for 2016. Moreover, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation is very explicit about the willingness of Russia to use nuclear weapons. Article 27 states:

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The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.7

The Russian military was crippled after the fall of the Soviet Union due to unprecedented budget cuts and lack of attention during a period of political and economic instability. Although Russia defeated Georgia in a brief war in 2008, the conflict revealed shortcomings in the Russian armed forces. As a result, the government initiated major reforms beginning in 2008, including modernization of military platforms, movement away from a mass conscription-based military toward a more professional force, organizational reforms, and more realistic exercises. These changes have reinvigorated the Russian military and made it a more capable force, although further progress is still required. Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and the Woodrow Wilson Center, refers to the Russian military as “a force in transition.”8 In terms of manpower, in April 2015 the number of professional, so-called “contract-service” personnel exceeded the number of one-year conscripts for the first time after increases in pay and other incentives. However, the military is still working to build a competent non-commissioned officer cadre, and some fear that plans to move away from a mass army have been stalled. In terms of hardware, Russia has embarked on a modernization program and plans to spend $700 billion between 2011 and 2020, with a second phase to follow. The goal of the first phase is to bring the proportion of modern equipment in the military inventory up to 70 percent, although what this actually means is undefined. This modernization program has had both successes and delays. The May 2015 Victory Parade in Moscow proudly displayed new T-14 battle tanks, heavy infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, and other modernized equipment for land forces. The Navy has completed construction of three Borey-class SSBNs, with four more currently being built and another scheduled for construction. In September 2016, the Ministry of Defense ordered six new Varshavyanka-class attack subs for the Pacific Fleet. While other vessels are delayed, and France canceled the sale of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia, the Navy is becoming a green water force with smaller but capable platforms. With about 40 new missiles per year, the strategic rocket forces continue to be upgraded. Aircraft modernization is proceeding as well, with new Su-30SM, Su-35, and Su-40 aircraft, other upgraded fighters, modernized air-to-ground cruise missiles, and new helicopters. As of the end of 2014, Russia had 1,060 tactical combat aircraft. Out of this total, 749 were legacy aircraft, 211 were upgraded, and 100 were new.9 In

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terms of organizational change, on August 1, 2015, the Air Force, army aviation, and Aerospace Defense Forces were reorganized into the new Aerospace Forces. Russia’s Aerospace Force is the world’s second largest, and Russian military aircraft have resumed far-ranging patrols as Putin seeks to reassert Russia’s role as a global military player. Russia continues to be a nuclear power rivaling the United States. Moreover, the Russian armed forces have increased their mobility, demonstrated via large-scale exercises across the country. Further, the Russian military has top-notch cyber capabilities. The Ministry of Defense has established a cyber command whose responsibilities entail offensive cyber operations, including malware and propaganda. There is also a special military branch for computer network operations, and Russian cyber actors have demonstrated the ability to remotely access industrial control systems in the United States. The 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community listed Russia as the top cyber threat to the United States. Moreover, a variety of Russian nonstate actors, including nationalist activists and criminal organizations, engage in cyber attacks that align with Russian state goals. The level of coordination between state security organs and these actors is usually unknown.10 Unlike China’s, Russia’s military has been tested in recent combat in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. In Crimea, Russian forces were able to professionally achieve their objectives without a serious fight. In Syria, Russia has demonstrated the ability to maintain high intensity air operations coordinated with special forces. The Russian military is performing better than many Western analysts had expected. A variety of new platforms were also used in Syria. Keir Giles of Chatham House argues: [b]y comparison with the force that went into action in Georgia in 2008, the troops used in Crimea and against the Ukrainian mainland were demonstrably more effective, flexible, adaptable and scalable for achieving Russia’s foreign policy aims. The depth and scale of change in the Russian military over the past seven years are impossible to overstate.11

The concept of “hybrid war” is gaining traction among Russia’s defense community. In 2013, the Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, wrote an article after observing the Arab Spring, in which he noted fundamental changes in the rules of war. In this new order, non-military means of reaching political goals, including information operations and cyber attacks by state or non-state actors, have become increasingly important. The implication is that success in conflict now requires a coordinated mix of asymmetric tactics, information, political actions, irregular forces, and conventional forces. Russia successfully used a diverse set of tools in taking Crimea from Ukraine. In fact, both Russia and China have effectively used measures short of war in geopolitical contests against the United States. 112

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However, “hybrid war,” or the use of multiple means of power to achieve an objective, is not a new doctrine for Russians or the West, nor does it neatly summarize Russian military thinking. Moreover, the conditions that made it successful in Ukraine are different from conditions in other parts of the world where Russia may be tempted to intervene with military force.12 The Russian military still struggles to overcome weaknesses. For example, the arms industry is inefficient and needs reform.13 Obtaining adequate numbers of personnel is a long-term challenge. More immediate are budget problems. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 2015 Russia was ninth in the world in percentage of GNP spent on the military, coming in at 5.4 percent according to the broad NATO definition of military expenditures. With low oil prices, Western sanctions, and a struggling economy, Russia may not be able to sustain this level. Moreover, economic sanctions and the end of defense cooperation with Ukraine have cut off Russia from engines it uses for various ships and aircraft, as well as important electronic components.14 Nevertheless, despite earlier reports to the contrary, Russia increased its military spending in 2016 and had the third largest military budget after the United States and China. Turning to China, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization over the past twenty-five years has been impressive. When Deng Xiaoping began China’s reform process in the late 1970s, modernizing the PLA took lower priority than modernizing the economy. However, after the PLA fought its way to Tiananmen Square in 1989, PLA budgets increased significantly. In spite of still having an army of 1.6 million soldiers, over time the PLA has reduced its numbers but increased its technical sophistication and capabilities, transforming itself in response to the revolution in military affairs. It has also had consistent double-digit annual increases in its budget until 2016, when growth slowed to under 8 percent, with the Navy, Air Force, missile/nuclear forces, and space being priorities. While the Chinese military has made notable progress, it has not been seriously tested in combat since its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.15 PLA modernization has been accompanied in recent years by more aggressive political rhetoric. For example, in a 2015 article in the magazine of the Communist Party Central Committee, PLA vice chief of staff and president of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies Sun Jianguo quotes Xi Jinping as saying: China’s adherence to the path of peaceful development in absolutely no way means that it will give up its legitimate rights and interests or sacrifice its core national interests. No country should entertain the fantasy that China will allow its sovereignty, security, and development interests to be infringed. Should China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity be challenged, we will mount a head-on struggle and fight for every last inch.16

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Face-offs with foreign militaries around islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea that are claimed by China have increased with this rhetoric. Chinese military modernization is oriented toward winning “local wars under informationized conditions”—limited wars outside China’s borders where the rapid and accurate use of information is the key to victory. Under this doctrine, the modernization of the ground forces is not a top priority. However, the PLA Rocket Force is upgrading all classes of ballistic missiles. This includes deploying China’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is introducing a variety of new aircraft as its mission expands from defending China’s own airspace to conducting offensive operations in contested airspace at greater ranges. Fighters being developed include the Chengdu J-20, the Shenyang J-31/FC-31, and the Chengdu J10B. China is developing new air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons and an intermediate-range bomber, and the Y-20 heavy strategic transport aircraft came into service in 2016. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has an aircraft carrier program, and is introducing new destroyers, frigates, and corvettes into the fleet. Submarines are in production as well. Like the Air Force, the Navy’s mission has moved beyond that of border defense.17 Moreover, supporting the Navy is a large naval militia force consisting of “militarized fishermen”—what China military expert Richard Bitzinger calls China’s “little blue men.”18 Like Russia and the United States, China has developed cyber forces, in line with fighting under “informationized conditions.” In the event of war, the PLA would conduct early attacks on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets in order to blind enemy commanders. In support of this strategy, China has developed a doctrine of integrated network electronic warfare (INEW) that combines electronic warfare with computer network operations, although a new concept of “information confrontation” has emerged that better integrates aspects of information warfare with other military measures. Similar to Russia, China also utilizes reserve units, militias, and patriotic hackers for cyber operations. This connects cyber operations to the doctrine of People’s War. Cyber spying, as opposed to cyber operations in wartime, became a major issue of contention between China and the United States during the Obama Administration.19 The PLA is also undergoing profound organizational reforms. The seven Military Regions have been eliminated and replaced by five new joint Theater Command headquarters. There is a new Army headquarters, the Second Artillery Force was raised to the same level as a service and renamed the PLA Rocket Force, and a new Strategic Support Force (SSF) was created. It is believed that the SSF will now be responsible for cyber activities and the information domain. The Central Military Commission (CMC), the organ through which 114

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the party controls the military, has been restructured with fifteen departments. There seem to be multiple purposes for the reforms. The first is to strengthen Party control of the military through the CMC, chaired by Xi Jinping, and reduce corruption. A further goal is to enhance the ability of the PLA services to operate jointly in expeditionary operations. It is likely that in its reorganization efforts, the PLA learned from Russia’s reforms. Moreover, in 2015 President Xi announced reductions of 300,000 personnel as China tries to decrease manpower costs to further invest in modernization.20 The PLA still has weaknesses to overcome in its modernization efforts. For example, the reorganization process will take years to complete as army generals strive to maintain their status amid bureaucratic infighting. China’s domestic defense industry has made great strides, but still has limitations. For example, China struggles to develop high performance turbo-fan engines and relies on imports from Russia. The “new normal” of reduced economic growth will inevitably slow the rate of PLA budget increases, as witnessed in 2016. Moreover, military writings in China itself discuss the “two big gaps”: the gap between the PLA’s missions and capabilities, and the gap between the PLA and the militaries of other world powers. Internal writings also identify gaps in the expertise of the officer corps. For example, China must produce a system to develop officers capable of commanding joint operations, a difficult task.21 Directly comparing the Chinese and Russian militaries, China’s defense budget in 2015 was $145.8 billion, while Russia’s stood at $65.6 billion. (The US military budget was $597.5 billion). Chinese military personnel numbered over 2.3 million, while Russian personnel were under 800,000. China outnumbered Russia in main battle tanks, artillery, naval vessels, and tactical aircraft. Russia, however, held a strong nuclear advantage over China, with approximately 7,500 warheads (1,780 deployed) versus 260 for China. Russia outnumbers China in ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines, as well as armored infantry fighting vehicles and transport aircraft.22 Russia still holds a qualitative edge over China in many weapons systems, although this is shrinking.

Russian and Chinese Military and Security Cooperation The Border Military and security cooperation has been a major driver of Sino–Russian relations. In 2008, Feng Yujun, Director of the Institute of Russian Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, discussed the top priority in Chinese–Russian relations, writing, “In the next 5-10 years, China’s Russian policy objective is to further consolidate mutual trust and to expand bilateral security cooperation so as to safeguard the long-term peace 115

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and security of China’s northern border regions.”23 In a 2016 article, Zhao Huasheng, Professor and Director of the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies at Fudan University, reiterated, “In Sino-Russian relations, there is no issue more far-reaching than that of borders, and there is no issue that is more pivotal to the future development of this relationship.”24 The emphasis on the significance of security, especially border security, is particularly important in light of the sometimes contentious history between Russia and China. In the nineteenth century, China was forced to turn over 665,000 square miles of territory to Russia on both the eastern and western borders in the Treaty of Aigun (1858), the Treaty of Peking (1860), and the Treaty of Tarbagatai (1864).25 However, these treaties did not unambiguously delineate the border. As a result, the boundary question created political problems in Sino–Soviet relations as early as 1957 when Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai brought up the issue in Moscow, and tensions increased throughout the 1960s as the Sino–Soviet split deepened.26 Armed clashes broke out on the border in 1968. The most serious, initiated by Chinese forces, occurred on Zhenbao/Damanskii Island on March 2, 1969, followed by further fighting on March 15. The Soviets retaliated with an attack on a Chinese patrol in the northwestern Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. The scale of these confrontations led the Chinese government to fear that all-out war with the Soviet Union was likely. In order to prepare for this eventuality, China’s leadership left Beijing, government archives were relocated to a safer location, and the PLA moved to its highest stage of readiness as units were moved to forward positions.27 While the two countries avoided war, the Soviets maintained major deployments along the Chinese border, and reductions in these forces later became one of Beijing’s preconditions for improved relations. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, he moved to normalize ties with China and cut the costs incurred by the stationing of more than 600,000 troops close to their border. Thus, in his landmark July 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev proposed troop reductions. Perhaps more importantly, he also compromised on the Soviet Union’s eastern border claims. While the Soviets had earlier claimed that where a river made up the border, the border ran on the Chinese bank, Gorbachev shifted the Soviet position to accept the thalweg principle that the border ran through the main channel of navigation. In September of that year, the two sides agreed to resume negotiations. Talks began in 1987 on the eastern sector of the boundary, although China insisted that any agreement encompass both the eastern and western sectors. However, after the military crackdown on demonstrators in 1989 left China internationally isolated, Beijing compromised with the Soviet Union and agreed to sign separate deals on the eastern and western sectors, as well as sign an eastern agreement without settling the still-disputed Heixiazi Island at 116

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the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers and Abagaitu Shoal in the Argun River. The two sides signed a boundary agreement covering the eastern sector in May 1991. A Chinese–Russian Joint Demarcation Committee was created in 1992, and work was completed in 1997. In 1994, China and Russia inked an agreement on the shortened western border sector, and by 1997 demarcation was completed in that area as well. Russia and China signed the Sino–Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in July 2001, establishing that neither China nor Russia has “territorial claim on the other” (Article 6), and “the contracting parties will neither resort to the use of force or the threat of force nor take economic and other means to bring pressure to bear against the other” (Article 2).28 Finally, in 2004, President Putin and President Jiang agreed to divide Heixiazi Island and the Abagaitu Shoal equally.29 In addition to solving the boundary issues, China and Russia (or the Soviet Union) signed three confidence-building agreements that effectively demilitarize a 100 kilometer zone on either side of the border. The first is the 1990 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Mutual Reduction of Military Forces and Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Area of the Soviet– China Border. The second, signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is the 1996 Shanghai Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area. The third, signed by the same countries in 1997, is the Agreement on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in Border Areas. As a result of these agreements, armed forces within 100 kilometers of the Russian–Chinese border can be deployed for defensive purposes only. Military forces and equipment within the zone are limited and subject to verification measures, and exercises in the zone are restricted and require prior notification.30 Today the Sino–Russian border, which extends 3,605 kilometers in the east and 40 kilometers in the west,31 is demilitarized and peaceful. The final demarcation document was signed in July 2008. Any tensions that still exist on a day-to-day basis concern smuggling, illegal immigration, and customs procedures rather than militarized disputes. Both countries value this peaceful border as they deal with issues elsewhere. Nevertheless, some Russians fear that because China still views the nineteenth-century treaties which ceded Chinese territory to Russia to be unequal and unjust, the border issue is not ultimately settled. Several Russian security experts have expressed fears of renewed future border conflicts in spite of official Chinese declarations that the border is settled.32

Arms Sales Arms sales from Russia to China are another element of the military relationship. Qiu Huafei, professor and deputy dean at the School of Political Science 117

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and International Relations at Shanghai’s Tongji University, called arms sales the “cornerstone” of Russia’s and China’s bilateral relationship.33 Military sales are important in that they display the quality of the political ties between the two countries.34 Arms sales reflect broader international forces operating on China and Russia as well. For example, after using military force to suppress demonstrators in 1989, China had no choice but to rely on Russia for weapons purchases due to the arms embargo placed on China by Western powers. That embargo has never been lifted, in spite of heavy Chinese lobbying in Europe. Thus, for every year (except two: 1998 and 2012) from 1995 to 2014, at least 66 percent of China’s total arms imports came from Russia.35 Moreover, the quality of arms that Russia has sold to China has increased since the Ukraine crisis. Yu-Shan Wu of National Taiwan University asserts that arms sales are driven by the fact that both countries are now “shunned by the West.”36 The majority of arms deals between Moscow and Beijing have involved the sales of Russian weapons to China. However, Russia has also licensed China to produce weapons too. Arms licensed for production include the Su-27S/Flanker-B fighter, guided shells, anti-tank missiles, air and sea search radar, and naval guns. Overall, arms deals have tended to consist of air and naval assets, as well as missiles.37 In the naval realm, China acquired twelve Kilo-class submarines from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, and is now seeking Petersburg/Lada-class diesel-electric submarines, or perhaps the upcoming fifth-generation diesel-electric Kalina attack submarine. China also acquired four Sovremenny-class destroyers, delivered between 1999 and 2006. In addition, Russia has sold various antiship cruise missiles (ASCM) to China. For example, eight Kilo-class submarines have the Russian-made SS-N-27 ASCM, and the Sovremenny-class destroyers have the Russian-produced SS-N-22/Sunburn supersonic ASCM. Russia has also sold China torpedoes, fire control radar, sea search radar, and additional antiship missiles. Naval guns were delivered through 2015. In the air realm, China’s fourth-generation fighters include the Russianbuilt Su-27/Su-30 and J-11A, some of which were produced in China with Russian kits. In 2015, Moscow and Beijing reportedly reached an agreement for China to purchase twenty-four of the more advanced Su-35 Flanker aircraft. China’s strategic airlift relies on ten used IL-76 transport aircraft that it purchased from Russia. China has acquired several types of helicopters from Russia, including fifty-two Mi-171 medium-lift helicopters. It is currently pursuing joint design and production of a heavy lift helicopter. While China has moved into greater production of its own aircraft, it still relies on Russia for engines, purchasing at least 130 AL-31F turbo-fan jet engines in recent years. Electronic components for weapon systems also continue to be important in recent sales. 118

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Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems are another area of military sales from Russia to China. Russia has sold China a variety of air defense systems, including the SA-10 and SA-20 SAMs, and is currently selling the S-400 Triumf SAM system. The SA-20 is said to be able to engage ballistic missiles, and with the right interceptor the S-400 can counter medium-range ballistic missiles. China also purchased Russian-made antiradiation missiles during the 1990s and has developed the YJ-91 anti-radiation missile based on the Russian Kh-31P. Total weapon sales from Russia to China have been substantial. According to SIPRI data, in 1992–2015 Russia exported to China $32.654 billion’s worth of arms in constant 1990 dollars. The Russian share of China’s total arms imports equaled nearly 80 percent.38 However, Russia’s arms sales to China have gone through phases, based on China’s needs and the willingness of Moscow to sell various weapon systems. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to develop a self-sufficient indigenous defense industry. Russian weapons have filled in the gaps where China has been unable to develop adequate platforms and weapons. Russia’s motivation in selling weapons has been profit and the maintenance of defense industries during hard times after the fall of the Soviet Union. It also sees weapon sales as cementing its political relationship with China. According to SIPRI, arms sales peaked in 2005 at $3.1 billion (at constant 1990 prices), and have been below $1 billion annually since 2010. However, beginning in late 2010, Vasily Kashin, a research fellow at Moscow’s Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, notes there has been somewhat of a recovery in arms sales, with aircraft engines, parts, and subsystems playing an important role in the trade.39 In fact, in November 2016, Russian Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu said that military-technical contracts had reached about $3 billion annually, a figure near the high point of Russian military sales to China.40 Moreover, as will be discussed, the most recent sales of Su-35s and S-400s are particularly significant. Arms sales were facilitated by an institutional structure established by Moscow and Beijing. On November 24, 1992, the two sides signed an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation, followed by A Memorandum on Principles of Military-Technical Cooperation the next month. A bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation usually meets annually, co-chaired by the two defense ministers.41 Both China and Russia have benefited from arms sales. China has obtained critical weapons systems from Russia after being largely shut out of the Western arms market, and it has acquired technology and upgraded its defense industries. In fact, the rapid development of China’s defense industries has been noteworthy.42 For both Moscow and Beijing, arms sales have solidified the strategic partnership. This means that, for Russia, China will not be a threat 119

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in the short to medium term, in spite of its growing economic and military power, because of the close strategic ties generated in part by military sales. Furthermore, arms sales in the 1990s were necessary for the survival of Russia’s defense industry after domestic procurement had dried up, and arms sales have subsequently continued to provide significant revenue to Russian firms. This income has been used to conduct research and development. For example, the sale of Su-27s to China paid for the development of the Su-35, while sales of Kilo-class submarines financed the development of the Lada.43 However, arms sales have also faced limitations and obstacles. The Russians believe that China has cloned its military technology and then competed against Russia on the international arms market. One observer in Beijing stated that the Russians assume that whatever weapons they sell will be reverse engineered.44 Kashin stated in 2013 that “Russian and Chinese military-technical cooperation is characterized by a fundamental lack of trust, with China regarding any dependence on arms imports as a weakness, and Russia considering China a potentially dangerous competitor in the international arms market.”45 For example, Russians claim that Chinese engineers extensively copied from the Su-27 to produce China’s own J-11B fighter plane. In 2011, the Russian government commissioned a report entitled “The Strategies and Tactics of Chinese Exporters of Arms and Military Equipment” to better understand the issue of Chinese competition in the international market, and the head of the MiG and Sukhoi design bureau sent a letter to Rosoboronexport asking that it not sell RD-93 engines to China. These engines were used in the JF-17 fighter, which competed against Russian jets in the international arms market.46 Russia canceled sales of the Su-33 to China in 2009 due to fears of Chinese copying. China has also reportedly undermined Russian arms sales based on technology it copied and used in anti-tank rockets, howitzer ammunition, and other weapons, although recently the Russians have come to believe that some weapons that were once thought to have been reverse engineered were actually designed in the 1990s by Russian engineers contracted by Chinese firms.47 Competition over arms exports is illustrated by Chinese arms manufacturer Norinco criticizing the Russian T-14 Armata tank on messaging service WeChat, in an effort to promote its own tank for international sales, after one of the Russian tanks stopped working during rehearsals in Red Square for the 70th anniversary celebration of the conclusion of World War II.48 With arms exports increasing by 143 percent in 2010–14, China has become the world’s third-largest arms exporter. While its share of total exports is still far below that of the United States and Russia, some Russians fear that their country is becoming less competitive on the international market, especially compared to China.49 120

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There are other factors that have caused friction. China has sometimes complained about the quality of Russian weapons, spare parts, and service, and Moscow has not always been willing to sell the weapons that Beijing has requested.50 Furthermore, Russia has to consider whether selling weapons to China threatens its own security. In border clashes in the 1960s, China used Soviet-made weapons. As the PLA becomes a more effective fighting force, Russians have to ask how willing they are to further enhance the PLA’s combat power.51 Opposition politicians Boris Nemtsov (murdered in 2015) and Vladimir Milov have called Putin’s policies toward China, including arms sales, “capitulationist.”52 While these viewpoints have been muted, the underlying facts have remained. Russia also has to consider the consequences for Asia of the increased potency of the PLA, as well as the growing militarization of Asia as a whole.53 From China’s perspective, Russia sells weapons to Asian countries that are potential rivals to China. These are not the actions expected of a close strategic ally. For example, in recent years Russia has sold India numerous weapons, including the S-400 SAM system, hundreds of jet engines, anti-ship missiles, a variety of helicopters, tanks, Su-30MK fighters, frigates, tanks, and even an aircraft carrier. Moscow has been willing to sell its best equipment to New Delhi because of a history of close ties going back to Soviet days and the fact that India poses no strategic threat to Russia. More galling to Beijing, Moscow has sold highly advanced weapons to Vietnam, with whom China has territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Vietnam has purchased six Gephard frigates (four for delivery in 2017), thirty-six Su-30MK fighters, six Kilo-class submarines, and perhaps most striking, Klub anti-ship missiles for the Kiloclass submarines and the land attack variant that puts southern Chinese cities at risk. Moscow is further negotiating to reopen a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.54 In spite of the tensions, the most recent Russian arms sales to China demonstrate that Moscow is willing to sell China some of its best equipment. One example is the agreement to sell China twenty-four Su-35s, an approximately $2 billion deal, with delivery expected between 2016 and 2018. China wants these planes, in part, because it still has not developed jet engines that it can be confident in.55 Talks had been held since 2008, but Russia had been reluctant to sell the Su-35, its best multi-role fighter, because of fears over reverse engineering. It is reported that originally China only wanted to purchase four of the aircraft while Russia wanted to sell forty-eight, and the two countries have signed legal documents to protect Russia’s intellectual property.56 The first aircraft were scheduled for delivery in December 2016. The sale of the S-400 SAM system is also noteworthy. Tim Heath, an analyst at RAND, calls the system “the most dangerous operationally deployed modern long-range SAM in the world.”57 China has become the first country to purchase this system from Russia, buying six batteries for approximately $3 121

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billion. Negotiations for the system reportedly began in the early 2010s, well before the Ukraine crisis. The S-400 has an effective range of up to 400 kilometers, thus potentially reaching Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands depending on how the system is deployed, and gives China a potent new weapon that can effectively destroy both aircraft and cruise missiles.58 Together, sales of the Su-35 and S-400 significantly improve Chinese military capabilities and mark deepening defense ties between Russia and China.

Joint Exercises Another area of military cooperation is joint exercises. Exercises did not begin until the 2000s, later than arms sales. Over time they have become more sophisticated, signaling to the world the depth of the Russian–Chinese partnership and the growing trust between the two countries’ militaries. There are primarily two types of exercises: land/air (sometimes with a naval component) under the auspices of the SCO, and bilateral naval/air exercises. The first land exercise between China and Russia, officially labeled as anti-terrorist, occurred under the SCO framework in August 2003. Named Coalition-2003, the exercise involved approximately 1,300 troops from five SCO countries, including Russia and China, and took place in Kazakhstan’s Ucharal and China’s Ili. Subsequent SCO exercises went under the “Peace Mission” label. There were eight “Peace Mission” drills in 2005–16. The first bilateral naval exercises between China and Russia took place in 2012 and have occurred every year since. The three SCO military exercises that involved only Russia and China are Peace Mission 2005, 2009, and 2013. Peace Mission 2005 took place from August 18 to August 25, beginning in Vladivostok and moving to China’s Shandong Peninsula. The exercise involved 10,000 troops, as well as aircraft and warships. Although officially Peace Mission 2005 was designed to fight terrorists, the scale and amphibious landings made it appear more like a simulation of an invasion of Taiwan. Another possible interpretation is that the drills prepared Russia and China for an operation in North Korea. Tongji University professor Qiu Huafei was quite explicit about the purpose, stating: The objectives of the joint exercises had little to do with combating terrorism; instead, they were aimed at conventional warfare . . . The actual objective of the maneuvers was likely to display to the Western world that Russia and China consider themselves to be in control of the Asia-Pacific region and that outside powers will be denied the right to interfere in their sphere of influence.59

Operations in Peace Mission 2009 took place in July in the Taonan training base in northeastern China, although opening ceremonies were held in Russia’s Khabarovsk. About 2,600 troops participated, far fewer than in 2005, along with armor, aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and other systems. Peace 122

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Mission 2013 took place in the Urals and involved some 1,500 troops, although the exercises simulated larger numbers of personnel. Regional military commands instead of national authorities planned the maneuvers. Chinese troops traveled 4,000 kilometers to the exercises, testing China’s logistic capabilities, and Chinese and Russian forces worked together for almost three weeks.60 Peace Mission exercises in 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 included China, Russia, and other SCO states. Officially they were designed to prepare for domestic disturbances, Islamist insurgencies, or other terrorist activities in a variety of settings. The exercises used thousands of troops, tanks, artillery, planes, helicopters, and other weapons, which indicated the exercises were about more than small-scale terror attacks. However, some observers suggested that these exercises were not very sophisticated. There was little true cooperation, and activities mainly involved moving people and equipment around in scripted settings. One analyst mentioned that communication over cell phones was considered a success.61 However, the exercises have improved over time. There was no exercise in 2015, and Peace Mission 2016 was held in Kyrgyzstan with approximately 2,000 troops as well as aircraft from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia, and Tajikistan. In addition, there have been further exercises between just Russia and China, focused on counterterrorism, including Country-Gate Sharp Sword in 2009, Tian Shan-2 in 2011, and Border Defense Cooperation 2014.62 Police have also practiced together, as in Lijian (Sharp Sword)-2014, a hostage rescue exercise in Manzhouli, China.63 In May of 2016, TASS reported that Russia and China would conduct computer-assisted missile defense drills, a noteworthy enhancement of defense cooperation.64 Moving to the water, the 2012 naval exercises, called Naval Interaction 2012 or Maritime Cooperation 2012, the first official bilateral naval exercises between Russia and China, took place from April 22 to April 27 in the Yellow Sea near China’s Qingdao. Seven surface ships from Russia, sixteen surface ships from China, two Chinese submarines, as well as aircraft, helicopters, and special operations units took part. The exercises engaged in anti-submarine warfare, rescuing a hijacked ship, air defense, and involved live-fire exercises against surface targets. While the exercises had communication problems and operational limitations, their scale and the evidence of new strategic trust were important.65 The 2013 naval drills, called Naval Interaction 2013 by the Russians and Joint Sea 2013 by the Chinese, were more sophisticated than those of the previous year and practiced coordinating combat operations. The exercises were held for a week in July in Peter the Great Gulf, off the Sea of Japan. The geographic location close to Japan may have been intended to send a political message. Eighteen surface ships, including seven from the PLA, participated, as well as a Russian submarine, eight aircraft, and special operations units. The 123

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PLA ships were some of China’s best. A variety of naval operations were practiced, including live fire at surface and air targets, and depth charges for anti-submarine warfare. Notably, after the exercises five of the seven Chinese vessels for the first time passed through the narrow Soya Strait between Japan’s Hokkaido and Russia’s Sakhalin, unnerving the Japanese and perhaps even the Russians.66 There were two sets of naval exercises in 2014. The largest was in May, consisting of twelve or fourteen surface ships (sources vary), two submarines, and various aircraft and marine units, with China making the biggest contribution of forces. Presidents Xi and Putin attended the opening of the event. All three Chinese fleets contributed to the drills, held in the politically sensitive East China Sea, which practiced sea lane protection and a host of other missions, including simulated ship-to-ship combat. Both Russians and Chinese commanded and the level of difficulty was higher than in previous years.67 In an earlier exercise in January, a Russian nuclear-powered missile cruiser and Chinese frigate exercised in the Mediterranean, the first time the Chinese had done so.68 In 2015, there were two major maritime exercises. In May, nine Russian and Chinese ships exercised for ten days in the Mediterranean, enhancing interoperability and helping build teamwork between Chinese and Russian sailors. However, more importantly, the location sent a strong political message that Russia is not alone in facing NATO. Furthermore, just as the United States can operate in Asian waters, China can operate in European waters. Moreover, the Chinese Navy demonstrated its ability to exercise far from home.69 In August, “Joint Sea 2015 II” took place in Peter the Great Bay near Vladivostok. The exercise was the largest yet, with the Russians contributing 16 surface ships, 2 submarines, 12 aircraft, and 9 amphibious vehicles, and the Chinese contributing 6 vessels, 6 helicopters, 5 aircraft, and 500 marines. In addition to the usual naval operations, the exercise also included joint beach landings. One Indian analyst suggested that the level of coordination was comparable to that of the US Navy with partners in the APR, signaling a challenge to US domination of the Asian maritime order.70 Joint Sea 2016 was held over eight days in September in the South China Sea. The context of the exercise was significant in that it was held after the decision against China by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal in The Hague. Although the scheduled exercise area was planned to be far from disputed islands, the timing and South China Sea location of the exercises signaled Russian support for China, and the events reportedly included an “island seizing exercise.” Nevertheless, Russia contributed only 3 older warships, including 2 destroyers and an amphibious vessel, and 2 support vessels to the exercise, along with 90 marines and 2 helicopters. The PLA utilized 10 naval vessels, 11 fixed wing aircraft, 8 helicopters, and 160 124

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marines. The small Russian contingent may indicate Russian sensitivities due to its relationship with Vietnam, and points to Russia’s delicate balance in maintaining strong ties with both China and Vietnam.71 Exercises between China and Russia have served three broad purposes. The first is commercial. In the early maneuvers, Russia demonstrated the use of military equipment that it hoped to sell to China. The second purpose is military. China desired to learn operational and tactical skills from Russia, although both sides have improved their performance and learned firsthand of the strengths and weaknesses of the other. Joint exercises also build mutual confidence and a degree of interoperability between the Chinese and Russian militaries. The growing complexity and geographic range of exercises demonstrate trust and suggest continued exercises in the future. The third purpose is political. Naval exercises show that Beijing and Moscow can work together to protect their common interests in the APR, demonstrating a reaction to Washington’s rebalancing. SCO exercises exhibit a commitment to maintain stability in Central Asia. In short, in a world where NATO–Russian tensions run high and US/Japan–China tensions are never far from the surface, Chinese– Russian military exercises are designed to prove that neither country is isolated.72 However, exercises should not be overemphasized. They are a normal part of statecraft, and major militaries regularly exercise with other forces.73 From a political perspective, Sino–Russian military cooperation in Central Asia through the SCO has demonstrated success. While some have expected Russian–Chinese conflict over Central Asia, exercises have demonstrated a willingness on the part of both Russia and China to jointly manage security issues. This has taken political will on both sides to prevent Central Asia from becoming a battleground.74 Beijing and Moscow see SCO security cooperation as necessary in an area with separatist groups, drugs, and extremists threatening energy flows and political stability. Beijing and Moscow also fear USinspired colored revolutions. Scholarly views of the effectiveness of the SCO vary. For instance, Alexander Lukin, of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and Director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), asserts that while the SCO needs fundamental change in order to stay relevant, its greatest success has been in regional security and combating terrorism.75 Other Russians call for the SCO to play a more active role in Central Asian security. For example, Mikhail Titarenko and Vladimir Petrovsky of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences assert: “Despite its huge potential, the SCO’s practical achievements leave much to be desired.” They call for the SCO to do more to stabilize Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They also see the need for closer cooperation between the SCO, EEU, and CSTO, as well as stronger SCO steps to stabilize Afghanistan.76 Indeed, the US has also sought for Russia and 125

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China to do more to help bring peace to Afghanistan.77 Beijing, on the other hand, has hoped the SCO would play a greater economic role in the region. Some in China have called for further measures to strengthen maritime security cooperation with Russia. Such analysts see a militaristic Japan and aggressive United States threatening Russia and China. Even India is seen by some as a threat. In particular, Chinese sea lanes, and especially energy imports, are vulnerable to the United States and its allies in the Straits of Malacca and other strategic chokepoints. Cooperation with Russia is one way to defend against these threats and maintain a balance of power in the maritime realm.78 There have also been other forms of security-related exercises or exchanges. For example, there are regular strategic consultations between the Russian and Chinese general staff headquarters and defense ministers, and Chinese and Russian officers study in each other’s command and staff colleges.

Regional Issues From a strategic perspective, China and Russia have expressed dissatisfaction with the current security institutions in the Asia-Pacific. In a 2010 joint statement on deepening their strategic partnership and in a security cooperation framework proposed at the 2013 East Asia summit, China and Russia declared that the current regional security mechanisms were insufficient. Claiming security to be indivisible, Moscow and Beijing see the system of US bilateral alliances in Asia as problematic in that it promotes some states’ security at the expense of others. Furthermore, none of the existing ASEANcentered multilateral security mechanisms are adequate. Therefore, in the Chinese and Russian perspective, a new architecture is needed that is nonhierarchical, comprehensive, and does not exclude any states.79 In 2015, China continued to seek further Russian cooperation in Asia-Pacific affairs. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that “China is willing to strengthen the strategic coordination with Russia on Asia-Pacific affairs to promote a common, cooperative, comprehensive and sustainable Asian security concept and jointly safeguard regional peace, stability and development.”80 However, Russia’s interests in the APR are complicated by the rising military power of China.81 Moreover, Beijing’s long-term goal for the region is to maximize its own influence and economic growth while managing the rivalry between Russia and the United States in Asia.82 Two areas that reflect the closeness but also the complexity of Sino–Russian ties in the Asia-Pacific are North Korea and the South China Sea. Russia and China call for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and both states strongly condemned the fourth North Korean nuclear test on January 6, 2016. Nuclear proliferation in Asia is not in the interest of either country. 126

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Nevertheless, China and Russia also assert that the US and South Korean reactions to the nuclear test have been overblown. More specifically, the United States and South Korea agreed in July 2016 to deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a missile defense shield, in South Korea. Russia and China strongly oppose this. In addition to it provoking North Korea, both countries feel threatened by THAAD because its X-Band radar would be able to penetrate into their territories. Moreover, they fear deepened ties between the United States, South Korea, and Japan if US missile defense systems in South Korea and Japan are integrated. However, the 2016 North Korean nuclear test also reveals some divisions, or at least lack of coordination, between Moscow and Beijing. China and Russia did not begin to coordinate policies until a month after the event. Moreover, China and the US negotiated a sanctions package against North Korea that seriously undermined Russian banks doing business in North Korea and other Russian economic interests. Additionally, the sanctions hamper the ability of North Korea to pay for Russian investments. Russia was reportedly surprised at how strongly China acted in response to the nuclear test after its negotiations with the United States.83 The South China Sea also demonstrates cooperation and differences between Russia and China. As of mid-2016, the South China Sea was the greatest source of friction between the United States and China. Based on the concept of “historic rights,” Beijing claims almost all of these waters through an ill-defined nine-dash line. This puts China in conflict with competing claims by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. To strengthen its assertions, China has reclaimed more than 3,200 acres of land off features in the Spratly Islands, while also building runways, ports, and structures. The United States has responded by conducting “freedom of navigation operations” close to land features that Beijing claims.84 The United States has also increased diplomacy in the region, as evidenced by President Obama’s visit to Vietnam in May 2016 and the lifting of the lethal arms embargo on Vietnam. The Philippines has responded to China’s claims by challenging them before an UNCLOS tribunal. China refused to officially defend its claims in these proceedings, asserting that the court lacks jurisdiction. However, as the court approached its decision in July 2016, Beijing went on a diplomatic offensive to gather support for its stance. Russia defended Beijing, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov contending in April 2016 that the dispute should be settled by the claimants and not internationalized. Russia has been joined in this position by Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and other states.85 Nevertheless, Russia’s overall position on the South China Sea, in spite of Chinese lobbying, does not give unqualified support to Beijing. In May, Russia held a summit with ASEAN leaders in Sochi. In the ensuing declaration, Russia took a position on the South China Sea that was to the liking of Southeast 127

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Asian countries. For instance, the declaration states that Russia and ASEAN resolve to “ensure maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce; promote self-restraint, non-use of force or the threat to use force and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.” It also called on all parties to support the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Russia further reached commercial and technical agreements with ASEAN states, including building nuclear power plants and railroads, which undermined Chinese commercial goals for the region.86 Perhaps more surprising, after The Hague tribunal ruled in July 2016 that China was violating UNCLOS with its nine-dash line claim and various forms of conduct in the South China Sea, is that Russia did not give China unqualified diplomatic support. Moscow refrained from making a formal statement on the ruling. Instead, in answering a question by a Chinese journalist at a press conference, a spokeswoman from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported UNCLOS and said that Russia does not take sides in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.87 Moreover, on the third day of 2017, Russia sent two ships to the Philippines for a goodwill visit. Thus, while Russia provides limited support to China in the South China Sea, it still tries to maintain close relations with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states. How Russia would react to an armed conflict in the South China Sea is unknown, but deepening political and military ties between Beijing and Moscow and the escalation of tensions with the West following the Crimean conflict might lead Moscow to be more willing to offer some degree of support to China, perhaps as a means to further distract or divert the United States.

Space Another area of cooperation between China and Russia with military implications is space. Human use of space is commonly broken down into civil space (exploration and science), commercial space (largely communications), and military space. While the United States is the world’s leading spacefaring nation, Russia and China are major space powers as well. In fact, space technology developed quickly due to the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. China came to space later, but has made rapid progress in all three realms.88 There is a debate among scholars and policymakers on the extent to which space will be militarized. Clearly space has important military purposes now, particularly in communications, imaging, early warning, signals intelligence, and global positioning (including targeting). Several countries also have weapons or technologies that can be used against space assets, including antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, satellite jamming capabilities, laser blinding 128

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technology, and the capability to use satellites to interfere with other countries’ satellites. Within this context, there are various views on if and how conflict in space can be managed. These include struggles by states or coalitions for space dominance, limited global engagement to manage space competition, and new global institutions that would enforce cooperative behavior in space.89 Because the United States currently has an advantage in space and relies heavily on this realm in its warfighting, many American analysts fear the United States is vulnerable, particularly to asymmetric attacks on its space assets by Russia and China, and therefore needs to develop a limited war strategy for space deterrence and defense.90 Moreover, most space technology is dual-use, enabling it to be used for civilian or military purposes. It is within this context that Russia and China cooperate on legal and technical aspects of space. In 2008, Russia and China proposed a Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, with a second draft presented in 2014.91 As its name suggests, the treaty would ban space weapons. However, the United States and others rejected this treaty, objecting that it does not ban ground-, air-, or sea-based ASAT systems, does not address the issue of space debris, and does not provide provisions to verify if there are weapons in space. In response, EU states proposed a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities that calls on states to voluntarily agree to avoid interfering with spacecraft, mitigate debris creation, contribute to a database of objects in space, and participate in biannual discussions on space issues. While China, Russia, and India initially opposed the code and the United States was noncommittal, in recent years it has gained support.92 Technical cooperation on space platforms has also been a marker of Sino– Russian relations. In the early 1990s, China bought human spaceflight technology from Roscosmos, the Russian federal space agency. China also obtained technology at that time from Britain and Germany. Moreover, in 1996 Russia gave intensive training to two Chinese astronauts.93 In 1997, Moscow and Beijing created a space cooperation subcommittee under the prime ministers’ dialogue mechanism. Subsequently, China opened a space program office in Russia, while Russia opened an equivalent office in China. Cooperation reportedly takes place in a wide variety of fields today, although details are sketchy.94 For example, in 2014 the two sides agreed on new forms of cooperation in their satellite navigation systems: China’s Beidou and Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). One aspect of this cooperation is for each country to build monitoring stations in the other, improving the coverage of satellites. In February 2015, the Russian–Chinese Interstate Committee for Space Navigation held its first meeting to work out details.95 In October 2015, Chinese investment fund Cybernaut agreed to invest $70 million with 129

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the Russian firm Dauria Aerospace to develop ten imaging satellites with an accuracy of 0.7 meters per pixel. Reportedly the satellites will be used to monitor developments along the new Silk Road. Further areas of possible cooperation include Chinese purchase or joint production of rocket engines and plans to build a joint lunar station. However, surprisingly, in April 2016 Russia announced that it would not begin selling rocket engines to China, as had been expected, due to China not being a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime.96

Alliance? When looking at the various forms of military and security cooperation, some analysts believe that US policies have pushed China and Russia closer together. For example, Lee and Lukin assert that Russia sees the West as a bigger threat than China because the West tries to alter Russian identity and has interfered in Russia’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, NATO expansion threatens Russia, and the United States has not shown Russia the great power respect that Russia believes it deserves. From a Chinese perspective, Ma and Li argue that the US pivot to Asia threatens both China and Russia. The United States has provoked Japan, the Philippines, and other states to challenge China as well. These actions push Russia and China closer together to defend their interests.97 Especially after Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, Russia saw China as one of its few real partners. This points to the security dilemma: While the US believes it is acting defensively against both Russian aggression in Ukraine and Chinese provocations in the East China Sea and South China Sea, China and Russia claim they are being threatened by the United States. US missile defenses drive the two sides closer too. Beijing began a concerted diplomatic campaign against US BMD systems in 1999, arguing that BMD would threaten China’s own deterrent and undermine global nuclear stability. China has also developed BMD countermeasures designed to ensure that its missiles can strike the United States in spite of BMD, and has begun its own research on BMD.98 Moscow too has long opposed US BMD systems. The most recent set of tensions occurred when NATO opened a missile defense system based in Romania in May 2016, asserting that it was designed to protect against Iran and not Russia. Russia rejected this explanation, charging that the system is a violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a threat to Russian security. Moscow fears that the Romanian site could be used to fire US cruise missiles, and Putin has threated to abrogate the INF Treaty as a result.99 As previously discussed, both Beijing and Moscow strongly oppose the deployment of an American THAAD system to South 130

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Korea, and it is reported that Russia and China may be working together on BMD systems.100 An alternative perspective is that China and Russia are drawn together by their internal political systems. Although both Putin and Xi are personally popular, it is not clear how much legitimacy their broader regimes have with the Russian and Chinese populations. This is exacerbated by slower (or negative) economic growth. As a result, the Chinese and Russian leaderships fear domestic insecurity, leading to more aggressive, nationalist foreign policies to maintain legitimacy. As they strive against aspects of the international order and support nondemocratic regimes, they are drawn closer together.101 This, of course, entails costs for both countries. Russia, in particular, is in a strategically difficult position. Due to its frozen relations with the West, it must partner with China in a manner that reduces Russian bargaining power. While Russia still has some room to maneuver, China is in a stronger position. Russian analyst Alexander Gabuev sums this up: “An asymmetrical Russian-Chinese interdependence is emerging. China is reaping the lion’s share of the benefits and Russia acting like the needier, more pliable partner.”102 This leads to the question of whether Russia and China are approaching an alliance. China’s policy since 1982 has been to avoid alliances. While it does have an official pact with North Korea based on the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that requires Beijing to support North Korea if it is attacked, Chinese–North Korean relations are chilly.103 China also has a close relationship with Pakistan, what Jonah Blank calls an “Almost Alliance.”104 However, China’s doctrine of A New Type of Great Power Relations rejects alliances. Russia’s primary security alliance is the CSTO, which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to Article 25 of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Federation shall regard an armed attack against a CSTO member state as an aggression against all CSTO member states and shall take measures in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty.” Russia has troops stationed in Armenia, the separatist Transnistria region of Moldova, Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Crimea, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO, to which both Russia and China belong, is not a military alliance.105 The official policy of China and Russia is that they are not in an alliance. Instead, they have close, beneficial relations, a “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership” or a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.” In June 2015, Vladimir Putin stated: “We are not creating a military alliance with China. We are not creating a bloc-based approach, we are trying to create a global approach.”106 Article 93 of Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy states that Russia “is developing relations of all-embracing 131

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partnership and strategic cooperation with the Chinese People’s Republic, regarding them as a key factor of the maintenance of global and regional stability.” Scholars give varied descriptions of the relationship. Yu-Shan Wu believes that due to the structure of the international system, namely the West isolating both states, Russia and China have a “quasi-alliance.” Alexander Lukin calls the relationship a “strategic partnership” that is “close to a military alliance.” John Garver of the Georgia Institute of Technology calls the relationship “A Far Eastern Rapallo,” a reference to a treaty signed between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1922. Garver’s rationale rests on the 2001 treaty which, according to Garver, “came very close to being a military alliance in the event of a US-PRC clash over Taiwan” because Russia promised neutrality in a Taiwan conflict, but would still provide China with material assistance.107 Garver’s historical analogy suggests the relationship may not last in the long term. Some in Russia, particularly those in the nationalist camp, have advocated a more formal alliance with China.108 A few Chinese analysts think similarly. Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, in 2015 called for China to revise its policy of rejecting alliances. Yan asserts that allies would assist Beijing in its efforts at rejuvenation in return for security. Moreover, China needs allies to balance the United States. He suggests that likely initial allies could be Cambodia, Laos, and the six members of the SCO, which of course includes Russia.109 In spite of many observers seeking signs of an alliance, such a relationship does not exist currently. The Chinese and Russian leaders have not sought a formal alliance, which would reduce their freedom of maneuver and potentially draw them into conflicts in which they have only limited or competing interests. The different foreign policy styles, with China pragmatic and focused on economic growth while Russia seeks to assert its great power status, would make an alliance difficult.110 Moreover, each country sees advantage in being a potential swing state between the other and the United States. However, it might confer benefits to Russia and China if others perceive them as having an alliance.111 The question remains as to whether China is a threat to Russia, which of course has bearing on the alliance issue. As Russian analysts Anna Kireeva from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and Petr Topychkanov from the Carnegie Moscow Center note, “For years, Russia has watched with increasing concern the appearance of new territorial disputes in East Asia, the growing confidence of China in asserting its military influence in the region, and the signs of an emerging Asia-Pacific military buildup.”112 The issue of whether China is a threat to Russia was expressed more openly before the Ukraine crisis in 2014, after which many Russian elites came to 132

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believe that the West was a comparatively larger threat. Nevertheless, the potential of a China threat has not gone away, although China vociferously denies that it poses any danger to Russia. From Moscow’s perspective there are a variety of factors to consider. First, the close relationship between China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s did not end well. Arguably, that was due to ideology, an issue that does not separate the two sides now. However, the legacy of that time still plays a cautionary role in the thinking of both sides. For instance, Titarenko and Petrovsky warn: The sad experience of the Soviet-Chinese relations of the 1960s and 1970s highlights the need for respect for each other’s interests and each other’s choice, the non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual confidence, openness, and tolerance. But even following these principles by no means precludes various kinds of unexpected aggravations. This means that both sides need to follow the fundamental rule of taking a correct attitude to potential disagreements between them on current problems and having friendly tolerance for differences in each other’s mentality and civilizational set of values.113

Another factor that Russia faces is the rapidly expanding power of the PLA. Without specifically mentioning any threat to Russia, Vassily Kashin, senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, states: It would be safe to say that China is taking long-term, systematic and very costly efforts to make the PLA ready for active combat operations in remote regions of the world. These will not be limited actions carried out by several warships and special forces units but operations that will involve large forces, including the landing of troops in countries located thousands of kilometers from China. These are preparations for the use of forces numbering thousands of men in any area of the world.114

With most of Russia’s forces concentrated in Europe and the PLA outspending Russia’s military, the RFE would be most vulnerable if political relations between China and Russia were to sour. Before Beijing’s reorganization of military regions in 2016, the Shenyang Military Region, covering China’s three northeastern provinces, hosted the 16th, 39th, and 40th group armies.115 Dmitri Trenin notes that in 2006, during a Chinese military exercise in this region, PLA troops moved 1,000 kilometers, similar to what one would see in an invasion of Russia. Exercises in 2009, code-named Stride 2009, demonstrated Chinese ability to conduct long-range land operations against Russia. While such exercises do not demonstrate intent, and militaries routinely prepare for a wide variety of scenarios, Stride 2009 caused Russian observers to take notice.116 Much more recently, in January 2016 more than 2,000 Chinese marines and a Chinese Navy special operations regiment 133

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exercised in extremely cold weather in the Gobi desert. While this may not have been designed with Russia in mind, it demonstrated to Russians that China could move forces long distances to fight in winter conditions.117 In 2000, Putin expressed concern about the RFE, warning regional leaders that lack of development could lead to the region being taken over by China, Japan, or Korea, and in 2013 he stated that the development of the RFE and Siberia must be Russia’s “national priority for the entire 21st century.”118 Since 2014, Russian officials have not publicly acknowledged a Chinese threat to the RFE. However, the fundamentals have not changed. The Chinese economy is outstripping Russia’s, the PLA is improving, and the RFE is separated by vast distances from European Russia. Hugh White, an Australian analyst, suggests that “unless Moscow is willing and able to spend enough to build massive land forces in its Far East, its strategic position in Asia is likely to become increasingly tenuous.” He further asserts that Russia is not likely to become a great power in East Asia again, “and in the longer term its hold on the Russian Far East may prove untenable.”119 Lee and Lukin similarly see Chinese annexation of the RFE as a possible scenario, based on economic penetration of the region, and call for the United States to ease sanctions on Russia that affect the RFE and to encourage greater integration of the RFE economy into the broader APR by urging US allies to invest in the region.120 In dealing with a rising neighbor, Russia has taken specific steps to protect its security if the current comprehensive strategic partnership were to crumble. Mankoff reports, “The Russian Defense Ministry quietly considers China a potential adversary (fear of China is an unspoken subtext to much of the military’s declaratory fixation on conventional, state-based threats such as NATO),” in spite of arms sales.121 In 2009, the Russia military press began discussing the potential Chinese threat, and military planners focused more on China. However, due to the political relationship, China is never publicly acknowledged as a threat, especially with Russia’s greater dependence on China since 2014.122 Over the past decade, Russia has taken steps to enhance its military capabilities in the east. In the mid-2000s, Russia deployed two brigades to the border on the Irkutsk–Chita axis to counter five PLA armies on the Chinese side of the border. It was reported in 2010 that Lieutenant-General Vladimir Valentinovich Chirkin, the commander of the Siberian Military District, stated: “we are obligated to keep troops there because on the other side of the border are five Chinese armies and we cannot ignore that operational direction.” Chirkin also noted that “despite the friendly relations with China our army command understands that friendship is possible only with strong countries, that is whose (sic) who can quiet a friend down with a conventional or nuclear club.”123 This illustrates the military mindset that capabilities matter more than intentions. In 2011, a Chinese writer complained that Russian military 134

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officers were beginning to see China as a threat, and had therefore put two regiments of Su-27SM fighters as well as T-90 tanks into the Siberian Military District.124 In fact, before 2014 Russia made upgrading the military in the east a priority, and reportedly the region was the first to get new weapons. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has focused on enhancing command and control in the region, and increased the capability of units outside the RFE to rapidly deploy to the region, as demonstrated in the Vostok 2014 military exercises.125 In October 2016 the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that a new longrange heavy bomber division would be stationed in the Far East.126 In April 2015, commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear said that Russian activity in the Pacific “has returned to . . . nearly a Cold War level of activity.”127 The Russian military plans to deploy Bal and Bastion antiship missile systems to the southern Kurils. Russia further intends to deploy S-400 systems to the Kamchatka Peninsula. It also continues to expand its Pacific fleet, with new additions including Borei-class nuclear-powered ballisticmissile submarines. This overall buildup is designed to protect both Russia’s Asia-Pacific and its Arctic interests.128 Russia sees a need to better defend its eastern region, and enhancements in the east are part of the wider emphasis on modernizing the military that began in 2008. The buildup is a response to growing Chinese power, the United States rebalancing to Asia, increased tensions with the United States, as well as the broader militarization of Asia. The Russian military, like any force, prepares for long-term contingencies. Of course China also looks at its neighbor’s military developments with an eye on its own security as well. China has produced new mobile missiles with MIRVs in response to US and Russian developments in missile defenses, ISR, and precision strike capabilities. The University of Macau’s You Ji asserts that “Russia’s resumption of developing star wars weapons systems in 2013 further stimulated PLA strategists to contemplate realistic employment of aerospace power against its major opponents,” and China is possibly developing a network of sensors that would help it track American and Russian submarines.129 Russia has further engaged in military exercises to practice defending the RFE and demonstrate its capability to protect its eastern territory. Thus, for example, in 2010 Russia launched the Vostok 2010 exercises. These maneuvers were designed to test Russia’s New Look military strategy by quickly mobilizing recently formed brigades and aircraft from European Russia to defeat a military force threatening the RFE. It was the largest exercise since the fall of the Soviet Union, involving 20,000 personnel and 2,500 pieces of equipment. The 30 participating ships from the North Sea Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, and Pacific Fleet engaged in anti-submarine warfare, laying minefields, and amphibious assault. Troops and tanks repelled invasion and engaged in combined-arms maneuvers. The exercises had various purposes, including 135

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demonstrating the progress of the New Look strategy and the successful adoption of network-centric warfare to Russian critics of ongoing military reform. However, undoubtedly it also sent a signal to China that Russia could defend the RFE, a message that Chinese analysts clearly understood.130 In 2013, Russia conducted even larger exercises. Held between the Joint Sea 2013 exercises and Peace Mission 2013 exercises with China, this so-called snap inspection involved 160,000 troops, 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles, 130 aircraft, and 70 naval vessels in the Eastern Military District. The exercises clearly seemed designed to send a message to China.131 In 2014, Russia engaged in Vostok 2014. Involving more than 100,000 personnel, 1,500 tanks, 120 aircraft (including a variety of fighters, helicopters, and strategic bombers), and 70 ships, the exercises (which were preceded by a snap inspection) took place on Sakhalin, the Kamchatka Peninsula, the southern part of the Primorsky Territory, and Chukotka. Notably, the exercises mixed conventional and nuclear weapons. Like Vostok 2010, the maneuvers involved moving troops great distances, in this case over 6,000 kilometers from the Western Military District. While elements of the exercises may have simulated defense against American and Japanese attack, the nature and location of the exercises demonstrate that the Russian military leadership still sees it as being prudent to defend against China, even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.132 One sobering question revolves around the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons to defend the RFE. Article 2 of the 2001 Treaty of GoodNeighborliness and Friendly Cooperation states that “The contracting parties reaffirm their commitment that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other nor target strategic nuclear missiles against each other.” However, Article 16 of the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation states “Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor of preventing an outbreak of nuclear military conflicts involving the use of conventional arms (large-scale war or regional war).” Russian analysts note that this is implicitly directed at China.133 Article 27 of the Military Doctrine further states: The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy. (emphasis added)

This can apply to both NATO in the West and China in the East.134 In December 2013, Putin said, “Our military doctrine and advanced weapons, weapons that are being and will be deployed, will unconditionally allow us to ensure the security of the Russian state.” Kireeva and Topychkanov interpret this as nuclear deterrence against threats arising from the Asia-Pacific.135 136

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Russian military weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that for many years Russia relied on nuclear weapons for its defense of its Asian territory. Russian conventional forces there were quite weak compared to Chinese forces.136 Russia has improved its forces in the east, and one question the exercises described were designed to answer is how dependent Russia must remain on nuclear weapons for defense of its eastern territory. Russian defense specialist Roger McDermott notes that Vostok 2010 “enabled the top brass to more clearly determine how long Russian conventional forces might hold out in a conflict with the PLA, before using tactical nuclear weapons. Calibrated into this delicate equation was the likelihood that this time factor might be exponentially increased by possessing asymmetric network-centric capabilities.” Vostok 2014 also tested Russian nuclear capabilities in the Far East, suggesting that the exercises were designed with China in mind.137 Regardless of what the exercises revealed, nuclear weapons will continue to play some role in the defense of the east. More broadly, the overall nuclear relationship between China and Russia is complex. Neither Russia nor China officially recognizes that a mutual deterrent relationship exists between them. Because of the strategic partnership, Beijing and Moscow do not discuss nuclear deterrence. Moreover, there are areas of disagreement between Russia and China on nuclear issues. China wants Russia (and the United States) to commit to a blanket no first use policy, which they have refused to do. Russia (and the United States) want China to declare the number and types of nuclear weapons it possesses, which China has refused to do. Some Russian analysts believe that China’s nuclear weapons are underestimated, and Chinese secrecy is employed not to cover the weakness of China’s nuclear forces, but their strength. Furthermore, some Russians question whether China really intends to adhere to its no first use policy.138 China’s unwillingness to disclose the size of its force is one factor that has inhibited additional strategic arms reductions by the United States and Russia, although the political situation now also makes that impossible.139 China’s suspected improvements in nuclear capability create challenges for Russian defense. Arbatov and Dvorkin, leading experts on Russia’s nuclear security issues, state: “The increasing Chinese capability of launching a nuclear strike on European Russian territory would diminish Russia’s advantage in intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons, which continue to compensate for China’s superiority in conventional forces close to the area of Russian Siberia and the Far East.”140 Moreover, Russia is bound by the INF Treaty, which prevents the United States and Russia from having land-based cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia’s dilemma is that China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan do have intermediate-range missiles. The United States has accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty with the deployment of a new cruise missile, although 137

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Russia denies it.141 Thus, the issue of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Sino– Russian relationship is important, but is rarely brought out into the open. As we have seen, Russia has had a variety of responses to potential military threats from China, including strengthening its military, conducting exercises, and calculating the role of nuclear weapons in defending Asian Russia. However, Russia’s primary defense has been to move closer to China politically and strengthen the strategic partnership. Russia calculates that China’s military buildup is mainly designed for maritime use, focusing on the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan. In other words, China’s strategic advance looks to the south, not the north. Moreover, Russia and China have enough common interests in creating a multipolar world that China is, at present, not a threat to Russia.142 Nevertheless, realist views of politics look at state capabilities rather than intentions. Russians have a realist view of world politics, and know they cannot be complacent toward China. The Chinese response to the above notion is that China poses no threat to Russia, eloquently stated by Zhao Huasheng. According to Zhao’s analysis, Russia has found it difficult to adapt to its changed power position relative to China. Whereas China’s economy was once one-third the size of the Soviet economy, now it is four times larger than Russia’s. As a result, some Russians see China as a threat. Zhao notes various interpretations of the China threat, including immigration, economic dominance of Russia, Chinese expansion into Siberia and the RFE, a strategic threat through surpassing military power, and the threat to eclipse Russian influence in Central Asia and the former Soviet states. Zhao asserts that none of these threats are accurate. Relevant to this chapter, Zhao asserts that China will not seek to regain lost territory, and China is still behind Russia in military capability. China respects Russia and holds both states as equal, and there are numerous opportunities for cooperation and a wide variety of common interests. However, Russia needs to adapt to the new reality of China and drop its suspicions.143 In conclusion, Russia and China both face internal and external security challenges. Externally, both feel pressed by the United States and its allies. Russia sees NATO as a threat, while China sees the United States as mobilizing Asian states to contain it and deny China its legitimate island territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Both seek to form a multipolar world where their interests are better taken into account. China and Russia have cooperated in the security and military realm in a variety of ways. After decades of hostility, the two states have settled their boundary issues and implemented confidence-building measures that reduce the military footprint within 100 kilometers of the border and require notification of military exercises in the same area. Russia has sold a large quantity of arms to China. Although Moscow has complained about reverse engineering and the

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theft of technology, arms sales have profited Russia by providing billions of dollars to its weapons manufacturers, particularly at a time when state military procurement had dried up. China has gained from a better equipped and more capable PLA. Similarly, China and Russia have engaged in technical cooperation related to space, as well as promoting a treaty that bans weapons in outer space. China and Russia have further benefited from joint military exercises. Peace Mission exercises, conducted under the auspices of the SCO, either have been bilateral or have included additional SCO member states. The Chinese and Russian navies have engaged in bilateral exercises in the Pacific and Mediterranean, showing increasing sophistication over time. They have enabled both sides to improve their operational skills, sharpened the ability of the Russian military and PLA to cooperate, and sent a political message that neither Russia nor China stands alone. The two countries demonstrate increasing levels of defense cooperation, and there is momentum in the Sino–Russian security relationship. Nevertheless, because of history as well as the realities of an anarchic world order in which states can never be completely assured of their security, some Russian analysts have expressed concern that China may become a threat to Russia. China’s economy has long surpassed Russia’s in size, and, in spite of a slowdown, continues to have strong potential. Spending on the PLA exceeds what the Russian military spends. Although the border issues have been legally settled, some Russians fear that the nineteenth-century “unequal treaties” that granted large swaths of the RFE to Russia will someday be repudiated by China. Thus, Russian forces have been strengthened in the eastern part of the state as one component of a broader rebuilding of the Russian military since 2008, and Russian exercises have demonstrated capabilities for defending Russia’s eastern territories. Moscow also has deployed nuclear weapons that might be used in a conflict in the east. Concerns about China as a security threat have been muffled since 2014, although they have certainly not gone away. Thus, Russia and China’s cooperative strategic partnership includes not only political and economic cooperation, but also military cooperation. The partnership does not rise to the level of a security community or even an alliance. However, it has been strengthened by Russia’s dispute with the West over Ukraine and China’s conflict with the United States and its allies over sea claims, and is important for the security of both countries. Chinese and Russian military cooperation serves as a counterbalance to American military power, and the evolution of future ties will depend in part on the amount of pressure that China and Russia feel from the United States.

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Notes 1. “China to Boost Security Spending as Xi Fights Dissent, Terror,” Bloomberg News, March 4, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/china-toboost-security-spending-as-xi-fights-dissent-terrorism. 2. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept, July 31, 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665174/2612_665212/2614_ 665216/t15319.shtml. 3. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433. htm. 4. China’s Military Strategy. 5. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), chapter 1. 6. See Andrew Monaghan, “Russia’s World: Facing a Century of Instability,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2016, https://www.academia. edu/24314293/Russias_world_Facing_a_century_of_instability. 7. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014, http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 8. Alexander Golts and Michael Kofman, “Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, and Threat,” Center on Global Interests, June 2016, http://globalinterests.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Russias-Military-Center-on-Global-Interests-2016.pdf. 9. For details on Russia’s military modernization, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2016 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 25, 163–73, 189–202; Golts and Kofman, “Russia’s Military”; and Richard Tomkins, “Russia Orders New Submarines for Pacific Fleet,” UPI, September 8, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2016/ 09/08/Russia-orders-new-submarines-for-Pacific-fleet/6861473349545/. 10. James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, February 16, 2015, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Clap per_02-26-15.pdf; see also Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, no. 1 (2014), 101–30; and Sergei A. Medvedev, “Offense-Defense Theory Analysis of Russian Cyber Capability,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, March 2015, http:// calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45225/15Mar_Medvedev_Sergei.pdf?. 11. Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New Tools’ for Confronting the West,” Chatham House Research Paper, March 2016, 13, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf. 12. See “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” Military Review (January–February 2016), 23–9, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/ MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf; Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’ ” Kennan Cable no. 7, April 2015, https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY% 20KOFMAN.pdf; Giles, “Russia’s ‘New Tools,’ ” 4–11; and Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, “Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-

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14.

15.

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17. 18.

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22.

23. 24.

Order War,” RAND Corporation, 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_ reports/RR1003.html. Roger McDermott, “Shoigu Builds Mythical Russian Army,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 101, May 24, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45462&cHash=4300e27afcc76eae6b7e07c838986c13#. V7UrwZgrLIU. IISS, Military Balance, 19; Golts and Kofman, “Russia’s Military,” 7; and “Russia Will Cut Defense Budget by 5 Percent in 2016, RIA Reports,” Reuters, March 6, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defense-budget-idUSKCN0W80TL. For PLA modernization, see You Ji, China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016); Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley with Michael Wang, Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield and CSIS, 2015); Ian E. Rinehart, “The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 24, 2016; and Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” China Quarterly 216 (December 2013), 805–30. Sun Jianguo, “Adhering to a Distinctly Chinese Approach to National Security,” Qiushi 7, no. 3, issue 24 (July–September 2015), http://english.qstheory.cn/201508/19/c_1116183183.htm. IISS, Military Balance, 221–7, 240–9. Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Militarization of the South China Sea: Building a Strategic Strait?,” Asia Times, June 21, 2016, http://www.atimes.com/chinasmilitarization-of-the-south-china-sea-building-a-strategic-strait/. See Paul J. Bolt and Benjamin Shearn, “Cyberpower and Cross-Strait Security,” in Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of Power, ed. Monique Chu and Scott Kastner (London: Routledge, 2015), 158–82; and Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016). See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,” Strategic Forum, April 2016, http://inss.ndu.edu/ Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-294.pdf; and Yevgen Sautin, “The Influence of Russian Military Reform on PLA Reorganization,” China Brief 16, no. 6, March 28, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews% 5Btt_news%5D=45236#.V3pvB7grLIU. See Dennis J. Blasko, “The New PLA Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments of PLA Capabilities,” China Brief 16, no. 10, June 21, 2016, http://www.jamestown. org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45511&no_cache=1#.V3qgGrgrLIV. IISS, Military Balance, 19, 22–3; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 460. Subsequent pages give detailed information on each country’s nuclear forces. Feng Yujun, “Prospects for Sino-Russian Relations and China’s National Interests in the Next Decade,” Contemporary International Relations (July/August 2008), 26. Zhao Huasheng, “Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in the Far East and Central Asia since 2012,” Eurasian Border Review 6, no. 1 (2016), 104–5.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 25. S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 28–9. 26. Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 27–9. 27. See Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (August 2000): 21–52; and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001), 985–97. 28. The document is at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_ 665393/t15771.shtml. 29. For details on the border negotiations, see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 137–44; and Yu-Shan Wu, “Russia and Chinese Security,” In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Security, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Maochun Yu (London: Routledge, 2015), 93–4. 30. For details on these agreements, see Dmitri Trofimov, “Arms Control in Central Asia,” in Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 3, July 2003, 45–56, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP03.pdf; and Wishnick, Mending Fences, 128–32. 31. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook—China, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 32. Rensselaer Lee and Artyom Lukin, Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 128–9. 33. Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs and International Relations (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2013), 162. 34. Interview by author, Beijing, May 2009. 35. Cordesman and Colley, Chinese Strategy, 183. 36. Yu-Shan Wu, “Russia and Chinese Security,” 97. 37. Data on arms sales comes from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database (http://www.sipri. org/databases/armstransfers), generated on 26 February 2016, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,” April 2016, http://www. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power %20Report.pdf. 38. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. 39. Vasily Kashin, “Military-Technical Cooperation between Russia and China: Current State and Prospects,” in The Chinese Defense Economy Takes Off, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (San Diego: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2013), 66–7. 40. “The Russian Defense Minister Notes Major Progress in Implementing Contracts in Military-Technical Cooperation Between Russia and China,” Russian Ministry of Defense, November 11, 2016, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm? id=12104572%40egNews. 41. Kashin, “Military-Technical Cooperation,” 64.

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The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship 42. Jing-dong Yuan, “Sino-Russian Defense Ties: The View from Beijing,” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 203–4; for the development of China’s defense industries, see Tai Ming Cheung, ed., The Chinese Defense Economy Takes Off (San Diego: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2013). 43. Yu-Shan Wu, “Russia and Chinese Security,” 97. For an argument that defense cooperation with China has been beneficial for Russia, see Paul Schwartz, “Evolution of Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation since the Cold War,” Asan Forum, June 13, 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/evolution-of-sino-russiandefense-cooperation-since-the-cold-war/. 44. Interview by author, Beijing, June 2013. 45. Kashin, “Military-Technical Cooperation,” 63. 46. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Jeremy Page, “China Clones, Sells Russian Jet Fighters,” Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052748704679204575646472655698844. 47. Stephen Blank, “Recent Trends in Russo-Chinese Military Relations,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 120–2; and Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016, 23, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_ FINAL.pdf. 48. Shai Oster, “China Battle Tank Maker Trash Talks Russian Rival Online,” Bloomberg Business, June 8, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0608/china-battle-tank-maker-trash-talks-russian-rival-online. 49. See Austin Ramzy, “China Becomes World’s Third-Largest Arms Exporter,” New York Times, March 16, 2015, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/ 16/china-becomes-worlds-third-largest-arms-exporter/?_r=0; and Samuel Bendett, “Is Russia Losing Competitiveness on Arms Markets?,” RealClearWorld, April 2, 2015, http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2015/04/is_russia_losing_competitive ness_on_arms_markets_111092.html. 50. Jing-dong Yuan, “Sino-Russian Defense Ties,” 204, 217–19. 51. See Richard Weitz, “China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2008, 24–35; and Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), 137–42. 52. Schwartz, “Evolution of Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation”; and Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 70. 53. See David Tweed, “China Tensions Fuel Acceleration in Military Spending in Asia,” Bloomberg Business, February 21, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/art icles/2016-02-22/china-tensions-fuel-acceleration-in-military-spending-in-asia.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 54. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database generated May 19, 2016; and Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia Seeks to Reopen Military Bases in Vietnam and Cuba,” New York Times, October 8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/world/europe/russia-seeks-toreopen-military-bases-in-vietnam-and-cuba.html?_r=0. 55. See Jesse Sloman and Lauren Dickey, “Why China’s Air Force Needs Russia’s Su-35,” Diplomat, June 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-chinasair-force-needs-the-su-35/. 56. See Yu Bin, “Tales of Different ‘Pivots,’ ” Comparative Connections 14, no. 3 (January 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/1203qchina_russia.pdf; Yu Bin, “Into the Syrian Storm: Between Alliance and Alignment,” Comparative Connections 17, no. 3 (January 2016), http://csis.org/files/publication/1503qchina_russia.pdf; and Vassily Kashin, “Why is China Buying Russian Fighter Jets?,” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 9, 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/02/09/why-ischina-buying-russian-fighter-jets-su-35/itod. 57. Timothy R. Heath, “How China’s New Russian Air Defense System Could Change Asia,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/ 01/how-chinas-new-russian-air-defense-system-could-change-asia/. 58. For further details, see J. Michael Cole, “Alarm over China’s S-400 Acquisition is Premature,” Diplomat, April 22, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/alarmover-chinas-s-400-acquisition-is-premature/; and Vassily Kashin, “Selling S-400s to China: A New Front in the Cold War?” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 27, 2015, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=59908. 59. Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs, 161. For details of the exercise, see Richard Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,” US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2015, 5–7. 60. See Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian,” 8–11 and 21–3; and Yu Bin, “Summer Heat and Sino-Russian Strategizing,” CSIS Comparative Connections 15, no. 2 (September 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/1302qchina_russia.pdf. 61. Interviews by author, Beijing, May 2009 and June 2013; and the 2015 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 407. 62. Each year, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, published by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, lists international military exercises that China has participated in. 63. Yu Bin, “Russia’s Pride and China’s Power,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 3 (January 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/1403qchina_russia.pdf. 64. “China and Russia to Hold Joint Military Drills,” Moscow Times, May 3, 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/china-and-russia-to-hold-jointmilitary-drills/567825.html. 65. Details of this exercise can be found in Yu Bin, “Succession, Syria . . . and the Search for Putin’s Soul,” Comparative Connections 14, no. 1 (May 2012); and Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian,” 15–18. 66. See Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian,” 20–1; Yu Bin, “Summer Heat”; and Stephen Blank, “The Context of Russo-Chinese Military Relations,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 5 (2013), 247–9.

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The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship 67. Yu Bin, “Navigating through the Ukraine Storm,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 2 (Sept 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qchina_russia.pdf; and Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian,” 23–8. 68. Yu Bin, “ ‘Western Civil War’ Déjà Vu?,” CSIS Comparative Connections 16, no. 1 (May 2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/1401qchina_russia_0.pdf. 69. Jane Perlez, “Chinese and Russian Navies to Hold Joint Drills in Mediterranean,” New York Times, April 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/world/chineseand-russian-navies-to-hold-joint-drills-in-mediterranean.html?_r=0; and Jim Holmes, “Why Are Chinese and Russian Ships Prowling the Mediterranean?,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-russia-navy-joint-sea2015-asia-pivot-blowback/. 70. Abhijit Singh, “China-Russia Naval Ties and the Balance of Maritime Power in Asia,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, August 27, 2015, http://www.idsa. in/idsacomments/China-RussiaNavalTiesandtheBalanceofMaritimePowerinAsia_ asingh_270815. 71. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Send Anti-Submarine Warfare Destroyers to South China Sea,” Diplomat, August 31, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/russiato-send-anti-submarine-warfare-destroyers-to-south-china-sea/; Sam LaGrone, “China, Russia Kick Off Joint South China Sea Naval Exercise; Includes ‘Island Seizing’ Drill,” US Naval Institute News, September 12, 2016, https://news. usni.org/2016/09/12/china-russia-start-joint-south-china-sea-naval-exerciseincludes-island-seizing-drill; and Euan Graham, “Russia Over a South China Sea Barrel,” Interpreter, September 12, 2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/ 2016/09/12/Russia-over-a-South-China-Sea-barrel.aspx. 72. Interview by author, Taipei, May 2015; and Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian,” 32–52. 73. See Ryan W. French and Peter Dombrowski, “Cooling the Controversy over Sino-Russian Naval Exercises,” War on the Rocks, September 20, 2016, http:// warontherocks.com/2016/09/cooling-the-controversy-over-sino-russian-naval-exercises/. 74. Interview by author, Austin, February 9, 2016. 75. Alexander Lukin, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Looking for a New Role,” Russia in Global Affairs, July 10, 2015, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/ShanghaiCooperation-Organization-Looking-for-a-New-Role-17576. 76. M. Titarenko and V. Petrovsky, “Russia, China and the New World Order,” International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2015), 25. 77. Interview by author, Beijing, 2013. 78. See Ma Ping and Li Jingyu, “Guanyu Zhong E liang guo jiaqiang haiyang hezuo de zhanlüe tuijin gouxiang” (“Strategic Promotion Vision of Strengthening the SinoRussian Ocean Cooperation”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) no. 5, (2014), 60–70; and Tu Debin, Ma Liya, Fan Bei, and Hui Caixing, “Zhongguo hai shang tongdao anquan ji baozhang silu yanjiu” (“Research on China’s Maritime Transportation Security and Thoughts on Its Protection”), Shijie dili yanjiu (World Regional Studies) 24, no. 2 (June 2015), 1–10, https://gaodawei.wordpress.com/ 2015/08/24/chinese-scholars-discuss-chinese-maritime-security-vulnerabilitiesand-how-china-might-reduce-them/.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 79. See Liu Qingcai and Zhao Xuan, “Zhong E tuidong jianli Yatai ditu anquan yu hezuo jiagou de zhanlüe sikao” (“Strategic Thought about Sino-Russian Promotion of the Establishment of Asia-Pacific Regional Security and Cooperation Architecture”), Dongbei Ya luntan (Northeast Asia Forum) no. 3, (2014), 32–41; V. Petrovsky, “Russia, China and New International Security Architecture in AsiaPacific,” International Affairs 59, no. 2 (2013), 42–53; and International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, “The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific,” 2016, https://www. iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2016-a3c2/march-1194/the-us-and-russia-in-theasia-pacific-39ff. 80. Shannon Tiezzi, “China Seeks Joint Pacific Security Vision with Russia,” Diplomat, August 6, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/china-seeks-joint-pacificsecurity-vision-with-russia/. 81. In this regard, see Anna Kireeva and Petr Topychkanov, “The Asia-Pacific Military Buildup: Russia’s Response,” Russia Direct Monthly Memo no. 13, August 2014, 3–8. 82. For the perspective of the president of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations on US, Russian, and Chinese interactions in the Asia-Pacific, see Yang Jiemian, “Zhong Mei E de Yatai zhanlüe hudong: Dongyin, tedian he lilun jiangou” (“The Asia-Pacific Strategic Interaction of China, the United States and Russia: Motivation, Features, and Theoretical Construction”), Guoji guancha (International Review) no. 4 (2014), 1–11. 83. Georgy Toloraya, “Russia’s North Korea Conundrum,” Diplomat, March 17, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/russias-north-korea-conundrum/; and Yu Bin, “H-Bomb Plus THAAD Equals Sino-Russian Alliance?,” Comparative Connections 18, no. 1, May 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/ 1601qchina_russia.pdf. 84. For the US Department of Defense perspective on land reclamation and Chinese activities in the Spratly Islands, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report,” 2016, 7–11, 13–20, 31, 45, 51. 85. See Zhen Liu, “Beijing Seeks Moscow’s Support over South China Sea Court Battle with Philippines,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2016, http://www.scmp. com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1937227/beijing-seeks-moscowssupport-over-south-china-sea; and Ben Bland, “China Builds Ties as Well as Airstrips in South China Sea,” Financial Times, May 2, 2016, http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/bd57f528-0e27-11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515.html#axzz49tu6imnb. 86. See Miles Maochun Yu, “Russia’s Pacific Pivot: The Moscow-Beijing Shadow Boxing Continues,” Asia Times, May 27, 2016, http://atimes.com/2016/05/russias-pacificpivot-the-moscow-beijing-shadow-boxing-continues/; and Sok Khemara, “Russia Weighs Into South China Sea Dispute with ASEAN Accord,” VOA Cambodia, May 19, 2016, http://www.voacambodia.com/a/russia-weighs-into-south-china-seadispute-with-asean-accord/3335804.html. 87. Anton Tsvetov, “Did Russia Just Ask China to ‘Buzz Off ’ on the South China Sea?,” Diplomat, July 16, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/did-russia-justask-china-to-buzz-off-on-the-south-china-sea/.

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The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship 88. For an excellent overview of space that covers science, politics, and the human uses of space, see James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 89. See Moltz, Crowded Orbits, 178–89. 90. See, for example, Elbridge Colby, “From Sanctuary to Battlefield,” Center for a New American Security, January 2016, http://www.cnas.org/from-sanctuary-tobattlefield. For a different perspective that relies on international norms, entanglement, retaliation, and denial to deter attacks against US space assets, see Roger G. Harrison, Deron R. Jackson, and Collins G. Shackelford, “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defense 3, no. 1 (Summer 2009), 1–30. 91. The Council on Foreign Relations has published the 2008 treaty at http://www. cfr.org/space/treaty-prevention-placement-weapons-outer-space-threat-use-forceagainst-outer-space-objects-ppwt/p26678. 92. Moltz, Crowded Orbits, 157–63; and Lee Billings, “War in Space May Be Closer than Ever,” Scientific American, August 10, 2015, http://www.scientificamerican. com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/. 93. Moltz, Crowded Orbits, 77; and “China Flags Secret Russian Space Pact,” Space Daily, November 25, 1999, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-99t.html. 94. 2015 Report to Congress, 290. 95. 2015 Report to Congress, 290; and Yu Bin, “All Still Quiet in the East,” Comparative Connections 17, no. 1 (May 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/1501qchina_ russia.pdf. 96. Victoria Zavyalova, “$70 Mln Russian-Chinese Satellite Project Will Monitor Life in Major Cities,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, October 13, 2015, http://rbth.com/ science_and_tech/2015/10/13/70_mln_russian-chinese_satellite_project_will_ monitor_life_i_50027.html; Eric Rosenberg, “Russian Rocket Engines and China’s ICBM Force,” The Hill, March 7, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ homeland-security/271820-russian-rocket-engines-and-chinas-icbm-force; “Russia to Launch Large-Scale Space Projects with China,” Space Daily, July 5, 2015, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_to_Launch_Large_Scale_Space_Pro jects_With_China_999.html; and Yu Bin, “H-Bomb Plus THAAD.” 97. Lee and Lukin, Russia’s Far East, 103–6; and Ma Ping and Li Jingyu, “Guanyu Zhong,” 60–3. 98. See Bruce W. MacDonald and Charles D. Ferguson, “Understanding the Dragon Shield,” Federation of American Scientists Special Report, September 2015, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DragonShieldreport_FINAL.pdf. 99. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Calls New US Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat,’ ” New York Times, May 12, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/ world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html?_r=0. 100. “China Mulls Ramping Up its Missile Defense with Russia,” Space Daily, August 4, 2016, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Mulls_Ramping_Up_Its_Missile_ Defense_With_Russia_999.html. 101. Robert D. Kaplan, “Eurasia’s Coming Anarchy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2016), 33–41.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 102. Alexander Gabuev, “Russia’s ‘China Dreams’ Are Less of a Fantasy than You Think,” War on the Rocks, June 28, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/ 06/russias-china-dreams-are-less-of-a-fantasy-than-you-think/. 103. See Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” CFR Backgrounder, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097. 104. Jonah Blank, “Thank You for Being a Friend,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-15/thank-you-beingfriend. 105. See Tugsbilguun Tumurkhuleg, “Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Represent an Example of a Military Alliance?,” in Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia?, ed. Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström (London: Routledge, 2012), 179–98. 106. Emma Graham-Harrison et al. “China and Russia: The World’s New Superpower Axis?,” Guardian, July 7, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/ 07/china-russia-superpower-axis. 107. Yu-Shan Wu, “Russia and Chinese Security,” 90–1; interview by author with Alexander Lukin, Moscow, October 2015; and John W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 540–8, quote on 548. 108. Interviews by author, Austin, February 9, 2016; and Titarenko and Petrovsky, “Russia, China,” 26–7. 109. Yan Xuetong, “China-US Competition for Strategic Partners,” China-US Focus, October 29, 2015, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinau-s-competition-for-strategic-partners/. 110. In this regard, see Alexander Gabuev, “Future Approaches to China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 7, 2016, http://carnegieendowment. org/2016/04/07/future-approaches-to-china-pub-63389. 111. See International Institute, “US and Russia,” 11. 112. Kireeva and Topychkanov, “The Asia-Pacific Military Buildup,” 2. 113. Titarenko and Petrovsky, “Russia, China,” 27. 114. Vassily Kashin, “China’s Power Projection Potential,” Russia in Global Affairs, March 30, 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Chinas-Power-ProjectionPotential-18073. 115. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report,” 2016, 35. 116. Dmitri Trenin, “True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other,” Centre for European Reform, February 2012, 41; see also Jacob W. Kipp, “Asian Drivers of Russia’s Nuclear Force Posture,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 51–3. 117. See Kashin, “China’s Power Projection Potential”; and Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Marines Conduct First Military Exercises in the Gobi Desert,” Diplomat, January 27, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-marines-conduct-firstmilitary-exercises-in-the-gobi-desert/. 118. Blank, “Recent Trends,” 109; and Andrew Higgins, “Russia Looks to Populate Its Far East. Wimps Need Not Apply,” New York Times, July 15, 2016, http://www.

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119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

125. 126.

127. 128.

129.

130.

131. 132.

nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/europe/russia-looks-to-populate-its-far-eastwimps-need-not-apply.html?_r=0. Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2012), 91. Lee and Lukin, Russia’s Far East, 248–55. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2012), 180. Blank, “Recent Trends,” 108–9, 115–17. Kipp, “Asian Drivers,” 53. Zhao Mingwen, “Deepened Strategic Partnership of Coordination between China and Russia,” China Institute of International Studies, August 12, 2011, http:// www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/12/content_4404233.htm. Blank, “Recent Trends,” 110–13; and Blank, “Context of Russo-Chinese Military Relations,” 245–6. Bruce Jones, “Russia to Set Up Pacific Heavy Bomber Division to Patrol Seas near Japan, Hawaii, and Guam,” HIS Jane’s 360, October 11, 2016, http://www.janes. com/article/64531/russia-to-set-up-pacific-heavy-bomber-division-to-patrol-seasnear-japan-hawaii-and-guam. Tiezzi, “China Seeks.” Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Military Plans Buildup from West to Pacific,” Associated Press, May 25, 2016; and Rebecca M. Miller, “Russia’s Massive Military Buildup in Asia,” National Interest, April 21, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/ blog/the-buzz/russias-massive-military-buildup-asia-12691. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report,” 2016, 57; You Ji, China’s Military Transformation, 171–2; and Catherine Wong, “ ‘Underwater Great Wall’: Chinese Firm Proposes Building Network of Submarine Detectors to Boost Nation’s Defence,” South China Morning Post, May 19, 2016, http://www.scmp. com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1947212/underwater-great-wallchinese-firm-proposes-building. Roger McDermott, “ ‘Virtual’ Defense of the Russian Far East: Vostok 2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 129, July 6, 2010, http://www.jamestown. org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e& tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=McDermott&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D= 6&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36580&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash= ad9c11c502a43fc0564a58417b1156d2#.V7Z4J5grLIU; Jacob W. Kipp, “Vostok 2010 and the Very Curious Hypothetical Opponent,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 133, July 12, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news% 5D=36610&no_cache=1#.V7Z4cZgrLIU; and Zhao Mingwen, “Deepened Strategic Partnership.” Yu Bin, “Summer Heat.” Roger McDermott, “Vostok 2014 and Russia’s Hypothetical Enemies (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 167 (September 23, 2014), http://www.jamestown. org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42859&cHash=bb0e681 11832039d5c8997b2355b2942#.V7Z4yJgrLIU; and Roger McDermott, “Vostok 2014 and Russian’s Hypothetical Enemies (Part Two),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 11,

149

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133.

134. 135. 136. 137.

138. 139. 140. 141.

142. 143.

150

no. 172 (September 20, 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/sin gle/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42893&cHash=319df43c23ffb4201c1ea084b8d cb4b3#.V7Z5FpgrLIU. Kireeva and Topychkanov, “Asia-Pacific Military Buildup,” 9–10; and Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Great Strategic Triangle,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2013, 12, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/strategic_triangle.pdf. See Kipp, “Asian Drivers,” 54–5. Kireeva and Topychkanov, “Asia-Pacific Military Buildup,” 13. Kipp, “Asian Drivers,” 72–5. Roger McDermott, “Reflections on Vostok 2010: Selling an Image,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 134, July 13, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews% 5Btt_news%5D=36614&no_cache=1#.V7Z5eJgrLIU; and McDermott, “Vostok 2014 and Russia’s Hypothetical Enemies (Part One).” Arbatov and Dvorkin, “Great Strategic Triangle.” Frank G. Klotz and Oliver Bloom, “China’s Nuclear Weapons and the Prospects for Multilateral Arms Control,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2013), 3–9. Arbatov and Dvorkin, “Great Strategic Triangle,” 18. See Amy F. Woolf, “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf; and Blank, “Context of Russo-Chinese Military Relations,” 245. See Trenin, “True Partners?,” 10. Zhao Huasheng, “Does China’s Rise Pose a Threat to Russia?,” China Institute of International Studies, April 26, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-04/ 26/content_5908664_2.htm.

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4 Russia, China, and Contemporary International Conflicts Ukraine and Syria

Introduction: Intentions, Capabilities, Global Presence, and Engagement Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin and the elevation of Xi Jinping to party and state leadership has ushered in an era when both Russia and China are assuming increasingly significant and assertive presences in their immediate regional neighboring areas and on the broader world stage. Both Putin and Xi, sharing a close personal affinity and representing the two most powerful authoritarian regimes in the world, have been described as strong nationalistic leaders determined to command respect and to enhance the status of their nations as they pursue their respective global diplomatic, security, and economic agendas. As Robert Daly and Matthew Rojansky of the Wilson Center observe, “They benefit not only from their images as strongmen, but from championing such principles as opposition to U.S. hegemony, and building such institutions as the BRICS Bank that offer alternatives to Western institutions.”1 Over the past few years, both Putin and Xi have managed to further consolidate their control in both societies and to exert significant presence and engagement throughout the world. Russia has directly confronted Western nations as a decisive influence in instigating, sustaining, or contributing to seeking resolution of regional conflicts. China’s engagement throughout the world has increased, particularly in terms of exercising economic influence, but also in the diplomatic sphere and challenging the United States and other nations in Asia. The burgeoning Sino–Russian strategic partnership holds the potential to challenge the existing liberal world order, significantly shaping the contemporary and future geopolitical environment.

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The foreign policy communities in both Russia and China believe that a range of factors pertaining to capabilities, historical identity and traditions, aspirations, and values have converged to support the shared intention to reclaim “major power” or “great power” status in the contemporary global community. Both nations consider themselves to represent unique civilizations with deep traditions that have suffered as a result of past interventions and occupations from the West. The desire to restore Russia’s “great power” status or to avoid being relegated to a position of weakness as in the 1990s has been a major priority for Russia’s foreign policy community. Presidential statements and official foreign policy documents have called to “reassert” a “strong” and “self-confident” Russia.2 Russia’s national identity is largely based on a perpetual “great power” image and a “special destiny” in the world unique to Russia’s Orthodox heritage and traditional cultural experience. Under the heading “National Interests and Strategic National Priorities,” Russia’s new National Security Strategy for 2016 includes the objective of “consolidating the Russian Federation’s status as a leading world power.”3 Similarly, the Chinese leadership speaks of assuming the role of a “responsible major power.” Beijing’s new National Security Strategy notes that China will “proactively participate in regional and global governance” and “promote the common prosperity of all nations.”4 China’s foreign policy slogans include aspects of universal appeal, such as the “harmonious world,” “justice and interests,” or “China Dream,” placing emphasis on promoting global peace and a more just international system. Speaking in Germany in 2014, Xi Jinping emphasized the potential contributions of the “Chinese civilization,” with a “history of over 5,000 years,” to peace in the world.5 As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2013: We will be fully and more actively engaged in international affairs and work closely with other countries to meet complex global challenges and tackle difficult issues facing mankind. We will voice China’s views, offer China’s wisdom, propose China’s solutions, play China’s due role, and provide more public goods to the international community.6

China aims to regain the stature that was lost after what the Chinese perceive as the “century of humiliation” beginning with the Opium Wars of 1840s when their society was dominated by external powers. As Wang Yizhou of the School of International Studies at Peking University notes: “China, one of the world’s oldest civilizations, has been a backward semi-colonized country suffering from external aggression in the recent past, now with a chance to ‘revive its influence and reassert its pride.’ For the common Chinese people, the ‘middle kingdom’ once again has become a respected country.”7 152

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Russia is a global nuclear power rivaling the United States, possessing vast natural resources, and standing among the world’s leading energy powers. Though Russia’s economy ranks among the top ten in terms of GDP and PPP, Russia’s capacity for international economic influence is much diminished in comparison with that of China and the United States. China is an emerging economic giant, approaching the United States as the leading global economy, with the world’s largest population and second-highest military expenditure. Russia is the world’s largest nation in term of geographic size, and together with China the two continental landmass nations straddle the critical Eurasian “heartland.” Securing the support of Russia and China is essential for managing regional conflicts and traditional and non-traditional security threats. Russia and China exert considerable influence in the United Nations as permanent members of the Security Council, and the two nations enjoy participation in the world’s leading multilateral international global and regional organizations (BRICS, SCO, G-20, APEC, and others), providing significant capacity for promoting respective agendas and coordinating initiatives among nations. China and Russia have tended to closely align on recent issues in the United Nations, typically utilizing their influence as members of the UN Security Council in promoting and exercising veto authority to advance common objectives. Russian and Chinese diplomatic influence has become more prevalent not only in neighboring regional issues, but also globally in Sudan, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and postwar mediation in Afghanistan, Syria, and other areas. The cooperation of both Russia and China continues to be critical for managing key security challenges in the Middle East and Asia, such as reaching an agreement on Iran’s nuclear development or containing threats posed by the despotic regime of Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Russia and China have sought to develop relationships and widen their influence with major powers, emerging powers, and developing nations. Both countries tend to display a sense of entitlement in relationships with regional neighbors. Russia’s leadership characterizes former Soviet republics on their borders as a zone of “privileged interests.”8 Xi Jinping has focused on strengthening China’s role in Asia, and he has emphasized that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.”9 Russia has directly confronted the United States and other Western powers over Georgia in 2008 and more recently in Ukraine, and Xi Jinping has increasingly asserted China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Growing global economic influence and reach is the single most important factor establishing China as a leading world power. The leadership in Beijing has placed the highest priority on fueling economic growth in a stable international environment which has contributed to China’s enhanced capacity to 153

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exert influence in the world. Chinese private enterprises are operating beyond Asia and throughout the world, maintaining a burgeoning array of investments extending to Africa, Europe, and, more recently, the Middle East and Latin America. China has been a major competitor with the West in promoting financial projects without the development requirements attached that are typically imposed in order to secure Western investment and financial support. Beijing’s “Integrated Destiny” “win-win” relationship with Africa places emphasis on prospects for China’s economic “rejuvenation” to bring reciprocal benefits for modernization and development on the continent of Africa.10 In 2011, China initiated “16+1” to include new and aspiring member nations of the European Union and former communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe in a cooperative initiative designed to increase Chinese investment in Europe. Chinese investment in the Middle East has grown more than tenfold over the past decade, concentrated in the energy sector, infrastructure development, and consumer goods sales. China is in fact Iran’s largest trading partner, and a major source of investment and aid in Iraq and Afghanistan. China’s “Silk Road” economic and maritime initiatives, collectively known as One Belt, One Road, envisions developing a vast infrastructure network using Chinese capital that will connect China to Western Europe via the Eurasian heartland, and which is likely to dramatically impact trade, population, and security networks in the world community. While Russia and China are involved throughout the world, there are still some limitations to their capacities to shape developments in the global community. Russia carries the legacy of being a major superpower during the bipolar era of the Cold War when Moscow was engaged in an intensive and extensive competition with its major ideological rival, the United States. As a consequence of Russia’s prior experience as one of two global superpowers, some have suggested that the Kremlin will tend to “punch above its weight” in attempting to decisively influence outcomes on global issues and regional conflicts. Although the Russian Federation no longer possesses the relative global power capacity of the Soviet era, over the past decade both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin have been willing to challenge the United States and Western powers, thereby influencing major developments in their immediate region and beyond. Conversely, China has been described as a “risk averse” or “cautious” power that once tended to restrict its activity in the world to pursuing its economic interests. While it has broader ambitions, there are still limits on China’s power-projection capacity. David Shambaugh has described China as the “partial power” in today’s world, which is “not shaping the world” or “nowhere near being in the league of the United States.”11 Shambaugh suggests that “China’s emergence on the world stage is accelerating dramatically in pace and scope,” but that it does not have a “footprint” that is “particularly deep” and tends to focus on “limited areas” 154

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and is “guided by narrow national interests.”12 Wang Yizhou concludes that “China is presently only a great power in the economics and trade realm, while it is still dealing with constraints in other spheres, facing major challenges to its rise.”13 Evan S. Medeiros concludes that Chinese policymakers “clearly have objectives in mind, but they are groping their way forward with newfound power, influence, responsibilities, expectations and constraints.”14 Although Russia and China are leading powers integrated in the contemporary Westphalian international system of nation states, both nations are dissatisfied with a system of rules, norms, and security and economic architectures that they consider to have been established by Western nations and not of their making. In the first two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was developing deeper associations with the Western security institutions and communities through collaboration with the G-8, EU, and NATO. At the same time, Moscow expressed dissatisfaction with the contemporary security arrangement in Europe when former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a new European security treaty in 2008, suggesting an alternative arrangement that would not put Russia at a disadvantage.15 Today the Kremlin leadership aims to establish the Russian Federation as an independent pillar in the global area, separate from the West, exerting influence on the world order. Beijing’s leadership also has reservations about the liberal world order, but China’s rise has largely been fueled by deepening integration in the existing global economic and security system and especially by forging economic ties with the United States. Although Beijing has generally conformed with the rules and norms of the Western international system that it considers were largely determined after 1945 without its involvement, China appears to desire a gradual revision of the existing world order as a consequence of its rising capacity relative to other powers. One of the most important factors binding Russia and China is the rejection of overwhelming US influence in the contemporary international community, preferring instead a “multipolar” or “polycentric” configuration of power more suited to their interests.16 The Kremlin has emphasized that critical decisions in the international sphere must be made on a “collective” basis, rather than by a “unipolar” decision-making authority.17 There is a general consensus among the leadership in both Moscow and Beijing that the international system is undergoing a major transition, with the power of the United States being reduced relative to other emerging actors, and therefore creating more opportunity for their influence in world affairs. They understand that the Sino–Russian partnership holds the potential to serve as a counterbalance to the United States on specific global and regional issue areas. Russia and China also share the desire to bring about transformation of the world financial system and challenge the pre-eminence of Western financial institutions. The establishment of alternate sources of funding to traditional 155

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Western sources, such as the Chinese-founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), represents proactive initiatives aimed at exerting greater control over the global financial community. The launching of Putin’s initiative creating the “Customs Union” and “Eurasian Economic Union” and Xi Jinping’s “Silk Road” and “Maritime Silk Road” reflect the desire of both leaders to transform the Eurasian economic space in the coming years to serve as a base for expanding financial and infrastructure ties through the region, linking the Eurasian economic network with Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Managing bilateral Russia–United States and China–United States relationships has involved complex considerations as both Moscow and Beijing also have a vast array of critical interests with the United States and other Western democratic nations. During the first period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin supported the establishment of a “partnership” relationship with the United States.18 Putin recognizes the importance of Russia’s security and economic ties with the United States and Western nations in realizing Russia’s domestic and international objectives. With major cities in European Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg), and cultural, economic, and security ties to Europe, in many ways there was a preference for Russia to forge closer ties to the West. At the same time, Moscow’s leadership considered NATO enlargement as a way for the United States and the West to encircle Russia, and Russia strongly objected to the United States and Western nations challenging Russia’s influence in Eurasia and to US and allied military interventions in Kosovo and in the Middle East and North Africa. The United States’ “pivot” or “re-balancing” to Asia generated heightened concern among Beijing’s leadership that Washington sought to “contain” China. The Chinese leadership is uncertain about the commitment of the United States to continue to support China’s rise and wary about US challenges to China’s interests on its periphery or with respect to priorities such as the future of Taiwan. At the same time, the priority that Beijing assigns to the relationship with the United States was reflected in Xi Jinping’s historic initiative to establish a “new type of major power relations” between China and the United States. Writing on contemporary Chinese foreign policy priorities, Da Wei and Sun Chenghao of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations concluded: “Beijing believes that America can play a role helping China achieve its ‘Chinese Dream’ of modernization, if the bilateral relationship remains constructive. It can also hinder or even undermine China’s rise, should relations deteriorate. For these reasons, the U.S. remains a critical country for China.”19 The Sino–Russian relationship has been strengthened by championing the concept of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of the sovereign nations as they have united in opposition to Western efforts (particularly the United 156

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States) to promote democratization and regime change. For China, “nonviolation” and “sovereignty” have been sacrosanct foundations in foreign policy, and these concepts have tended to be interpreted strictly since the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” was introduced in 1947. The unifying foundations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) rest in “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of states” and “inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, [and] non-interference in internal affairs.”20 Unlike NATO, which was formed on the basis of shared democratic values among nations, the SCO makes no claims to influence the internal affairs of member nations or to promote political change on the world stage. Russia has been more inconsistent than China in strictly adhering to a policy of non-interference, particularly on the border of former Soviet republics or “near abroad” in Georgia and Ukraine. For China, there will be growing pressure to take sides and engage in complex regional conflict settings as the nation continues to rise on the world stage, presenting challenges for balancing the commitment to non-interference. China has been keen to pursue economic opportunities as it has risen globally, rather than issues of governance, as the United States. The Chinese leadership has refrained from interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and they do not want other nations intervening in their domestic issues. Moscow and Beijing are quite concerned about the potential proliferation of “colored revolutions” or the threat of a contagion of destabilizing forces unleashed by the societal uprising of the Arab Spring, and strongly oppose the use of US and Western national instruments of power or non-government organizations meddling in the domestic politics of other nations. Russia and China are large multi-ethnic nations vulnerable to popular mobilizations within their borders, or even secessionist regional impulses. Maintaining a “strong state” insulated from outside interference serves as a means for securing control in both countries. Both nations consider Western efforts toward promoting normative values of democracy and human rights as potentially destabilizing for their regimes. The leaderships of both Russia and China recognize the power and influence of the Internet and social media as tools that can be used to incite revolution, as in the Arab Spring. Moscow’s development of “hybrid warfare” concepts introduced in the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine signals the recognition of the potential power of networks and social media as instruments of statecraft. Many in Russia’s foreign policy community believe the United States seeks regime change in the Russian Federation, and the introduction of the “foreign agent” law that resulted in terminating the involvement of several Western non-government organizations in Russia indicates the level of suspicion regarding US intentions. Though there have been limits to the soft power influence of Russia and China on the world stage, both countries are traditional societies seeking ways 157

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to better promote cultural and national values and visions as alternatives to Western traditions for the twenty-first century world order. China’s unprecedented economic rise was especially significant in generating heightened interest among nations seeking alternatives to Western developmental models. Vladimir Putin has introduced concepts such as the “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World), championing traditional Russian values and culture, as representing a contrast to Western values. China emphasized its status as a “developing nation” for decades, downplaying global ambitions, but more recently concepts such as pursuit of the “Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation” are consistent with China’s appeal as a rising major global power. China’s foreign policy slogans such as “harmonious cooperation” convey the desire to project the image of a nation seeking to champion peace and positive ties among nations. China’s OBOR is associated with a “Silk Road Spirit” proclaiming to promote common ideals of humanity injecting “a new positive energy into world peace and development” that “is a great undertaking that will benefit people around the world.”21 State-financed and statemanaged media sources of Russia and China, such as Russia Today-RT and CCTV, providing worldwide outreach in multiple languages, offer points of view that can represent dramatic contrasts with Western perspectives, promoting the agendas of both nations in the global media market. Russia and China have settled many of their differences over the past few decades, and Russia has increasingly “pivoted” toward Asia and especially China, but there are also areas of the world where the potential for clashes of Sino–Russian interests remains. For example, both nations have significant historical, economic, and strategic interests in Central Asia. Alexander Lukin, Head of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the National Research University of Higher Economics in Moscow and Director for the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), observes that China is not perceived as a “threat” to the Kremlin in Central Asia, but as a “challenge,” which is a natural consequence of China being the stronger neighbor in the region.22 Russia has a longstanding network of relationships among nations of Central Asia inherited from the Soviet era, and it has been concerned about the growing Chinese presence in the region over the last decade. Russians still see Central Asia as part of their so-called “near abroad” or “zone of privileged interests.” Future challenges from China beyond the commercial sphere might easily be deemed as jeopardizing Russia’s influence and result in Moscow’s resistance. Whether the ambitions of the Russian-led “Eurasian Union” and China’s “Silk Road” initiatives can be managed so that both Russia and China can collaborate in a way that is mutually advantageous remains to be seen. Russia’s confrontation with the United States and rupture with Europe following the conflict with Ukraine have brought the Sino–Russian 158

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relationship much closer, though the fact that Russia and China remain “partners” and not “allies” suggests that both countries will continue to maintain room for maneuver in coordinating actions on the world stage. China plays a wide field, enjoying “partnership” relationships with a broad range of nations, including Russia, but also major Western democratic “partners”—the United States, United Kingdom, and others. Thus, in advancing their respective interests in regional conflict situations, each case can be different based on the range of variables determining the response from either Russia or China. While Moscow and Beijing have tended to be mutually supportive in advancing global regional objectives and challenging the United States and its Western allies, the potential still exists for both nations to pursue different policies and responses, varying in significant or lesser degrees, or even potential clashes. This chapter will concentrate on examining Russian and Chinese responses to the two major contemporary regional conflicts in Eurasia and the Middle East that are reshaping the international security environment and involving wide regional and global participation: Ukraine (2014–present) and Syria (2011–present). In both conflicts, the policies and responses of Russia and China reflect a high degree of mutual support, challenging the capacity of the United States and other Western democratic nations to manage developments in accordance with their established norms, values, and preferences.

Conflict in Ukraine, “Game Changer” for Regional and Global Security: Russia, China, Interests, and Responses The crisis in Ukraine that began in 2014 plunged the European security environment into a new era of tension and uncertainty and shifted the geopolitical equation of Eurasia. While the Russian Federation had been on a path of developing closer integration with Europe and the West during the first two decades following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the response of Western nations to Moscow’s intervention in the conflict in Ukraine led Russia to turn increasingly toward China to attempt to offset Western sanctions and the strains in relationships with the United States and European nations. Russia’s neighbor Ukraine had emerged as an independent nation following the collapse of the Soviet empire, divided between those still carrying a national consciousness identifying with the Ukrainian language and historical narrative and allegiance toward Europe and those of the predominantly Russian-speaking populations of the East who prefer to more closely align with a Russian-led cultural and geostrategic world. These tensions have heightened in recent years as Russia became more assertive in attempting to 159

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maintain an entitled place among bordering nations and Ukrainian society became further divided on whether to proceed with forging closer ties to the European Union and NATO or to the Russian Federation. Tensions between NATO and Russia have reached an unprecedented height since the period of the Cold War as a result of the recent conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The struggle in Ukraine over developing closer ties with the European Union or the Customs Union brought the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, opening a power vacuum for the pro-Western Euromaidan movement to move to the forefront of Ukrainian politics. The involvement of external powers Russia, the United States, and its European allies taking sides in the conflict has led to an implosion of the nation, dividing Ukraine in an East–West civil war.

Russia’s Annexation of Crimea, Challenging the Contemporary International Security Order, Besieged Ukraine The relationship between Russia and the United States and Europe deteriorated to the lowest level since the decades of the Cold War as a result of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Leaders throughout the West described Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as “undermining the entire system of rules and norms” in the international community, stating that Russia’s blatant disregard for established borders created a “dangerous precedent” that threatened to destabilize the entire system in place to maintain security in Europe in the contemporary era. German Chancellor Angela Merkel described Putin’s policy in Ukraine as placing “the whole of the European peaceful order into question.”23 Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was prompted in February 2014 in response to the ouster of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich had resisted signing an Association Agreement with the European Union, triggering the uprising led by the pro-Western Euromaidan movement seeking Ukraine’s deepening integration with the European Union and Western community. Ethnic Russians responded to developments in Kiev by calling for closer ties to Russia and autonomy or independence for Crimea. On March 11, 2014, the Crimean Parliament approved a declaration establishing the independence of Crimea, including the city of Sevastopol, home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The government in Kiev condemned the referendum held in Crimea on March 16, 2014, in which 97 percent of voters supported the return of Crimea to Russia, as a violation of Ukrainian law and international rules. Though denying that Moscow was offering military support, reports suggest that unidentified military personnel and assistance from Russia was rendered to support Crimea’s independence and the separatist forces challenging Kiev. The United Nations General Assembly responded with a resolution declaring 160

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the incorporation of Crimea into Russia as illegal. Moscow has continued to provide lethal assistance to separatists in the eastern Donbass region of Ukraine in the self-declared People’s Republic of Donetsk and People’s Republic of Luhansk. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine prompted reassessments throughout Western nations regarding the Kremlin’s intentions, resulting in officials of the American defense institutions issuing statements to identify Russia as posing among the greatest security threats for the United States.24 Concerns have been raised among leading experts in the United States, Europe, and Russia, suggesting that we may have returned to a new Cold War—or even “Hot War,” where the rules of the game and risks are even higher in an environment of greater uncertainty and mutual misunderstanding of intentions. In accordance with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, Kiev had given up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for commitments that Ukraine’s territorial integrity would be ensured. The parties—including the United States, Russia, and others—agreed that Ukraine’s borders would be respected and to abstain from employing the threat of force against Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent intervention in support of separatist forces in eastern Ukraine violated the Budapest Memorandum. The United States and European nations view Moscow’s undeclared “hybrid war” and support of combatants in eastern Ukraine as clear violations of the integrity of a sovereign nation and prior agreements with Russia for maintaining protection of Ukraine’s established borders. The Ukrainian conflict also makes quite obvious the serious differences of viewpoints and assumptions about international politics that divide Europe and Russia. Europe’s condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a breach of international law and a threat to the security of the international order contrasts sharply with Moscow’s description of Crimea’s referendum as a reflection of the will of the people, claiming that Kosovo’s independence constituted more of a violation of international law.25 Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, responded by comparing the two cases: “If they are now telling us to hold a proper referendum in Crimea, they, too, had to hold a proper referendum in Kosovo. They didn’t do that.”26 Among factors justifying Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin cited that 1) it fulfilled the wishes of the Crimean people; and 2) that justice, on the basis of deep historical and cultural ties, demanded the reunification of Crimea.27 Russia described the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich as an “anti-constitutional” coup, while the United States and Western nations described Yanukovich as managing a corrupt and oppressive pro-Kremlin regime with little regard for the constitution and democratic practice. Russian officials and media emphasize the role of the fascist fringe in the anti-Yanukovich opposition, and neglect to 161

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acknowledge that the core focus of the Euromaidan movement was to support the ouster of the corrupt Viktor Yanukovich because he stood as an impediment to Ukraine’s deeper productive integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. The United States and European Union and other Western allies and partners imposed economic sanctions on the Russian Federation in July 2014, justified as a response to Russia’s “illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilization” of Ukraine.28 The sanctions target Russia’s financial, energy, and arms industries as well as imposing asset freezes and travel bans on specific individuals and enterprises. Moscow responded by implementing reciprocal sanctions banning imports of food commodities from the United States and Europe, entailing costs especially for Europe’s investors and markets. Russia had also been a full member of the G-8, but was expelled in March 2014 as a consequence of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine. The shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 passenger plane in July 2014 galvanized further unity in Europe for supporting the sanctions regime on Russia. In December 2015, given unabated hostilities and ceasefire violations in Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine’s Donbass region and the government in Kiev, the EU extended sanctions against Russia through mid-2016. The combination of economic sanctions and sharp decreases in prices on the world oil market resulted in contraction of the Russian economy by 4 percent in 2015, with projections for further growth reduction in 2016. President Putin’s popularity consistently remains high, exceeding 80 percent or indicating that more than 70 percent of the population would vote for Putin again in 2018, though there is evidence of labor unrest and other indicators that Russia’s economic downturn has started to impose hardship and somewhat diminished confidence in government authorities across segments of the population.29 At the Wales Summit in September 2014, the twenty-eight members of the NATO Alliance issued a statement to “condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine.”30 President Barack Obama created a Rapid Reaction Force to “serve as a signal to Russia to avoid any future potential aggression similar to the ongoing fighting in Ukraine.”31 In June 2014, the US Congress authorized President Obama to advance the European Reassurance Initiative, providing for additional US troop rotations and presence across Europe, but especially on the territory of newer NATO allies.32 Multinational exercises among NATO allies and plans for military training were accelerated for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine to enhance capacity to work alongside NATO forces as well as to provide for their own defense. Defense Secretary Ash Carter explained the need to strengthen US deterrent capability in dealing with Russia: “We do not seek to make Russia an enemy . . . But make no mistake. The United States will defend our interests, and our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords us all.”33 162

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The Obama Administration resisted pressures in the US Congress to provide lethal arms to Ukraine, believing that this would only result in escalation of the conflict. However, NATO’s intention to strengthen capacity on its Eastern flank continued with the announcement in 2016 that US Department of Defense funding for the European Reassurance Initiative would increase fourfold to further bolster defense in response to Russia.34 NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg also affirmed that “newly assertive” Russia had “destabilized” European security, offering the firm reminder that Article V binds the Alliance to the commitment that a threat to any NATO member “will be met by force from across the whole alliance, including North America.”35 At the same time, outrage among European nations over Moscow’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty notwithstanding, statements among NATO allies have emphasized that they still “continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value.”36 In February 2016, NATO’s Secretary General emphasized: “I do not want a new Cold War, and that is why we will strive for a more constructive dialogue and relationship with Russia.”37 Russia’s new National Security Strategy for 2016 affirmed again that NATO’s advance toward Russia represents a threat to national security, but still indicated that cooperation with the United States and NATO would be possible in areas of common interest.38 In September 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) brokered the first diplomatic agreement to halt the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine with the signing of the Minsk Protocol. Representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic, and the Luhansk People’s Republic signed the agreement to implement an immediate ceasefire, but the first Minsk Protocol failed to bring a halt to the fighting in Donbass. On February 11, 2015, the Minsk II ceasefire agreement was negotiated among German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, and Russian and Ukrainian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroschenko, with the oversight of the OSCE, in an effort to revive the first Minsk ceasefire agreement and establish a basis for lasting political settlement of the conflict. The agreement set forth terms for securing peace, including calling for an immediate ceasefire and removal of heavy weapons from the line of contact in Eastern Ukraine.39 Minsk II also specified terms for political settlement, including the releasing of prisoners, holding local elections and establishing special status for Donbass, constitutional reform to provide decentralized status for Donbass, and full restoration of Ukraine’s border with Russia. These leaders of the “Normandy 4” recognized that all would rest with the implementation of the agreement in Ukraine, especially in the conflict-ridden regions of the eastern areas of the country. Russian leadership 163

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and media initially touted the agreement as a successful initiative on the part of the Russian leader with his German, French, and Ukrainian counterparts in the absence of a US presence. In this respect, Putin established significant stakes in successful implementation of the agreement, but repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement on the part of both the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian forces, and failure on the part of Kiev’s besieged government to comply with implementation of the terms of Minsk II, have prevented the cessation of the conflict. No one could have anticipated that the European security environment would have deteriorated so rapidly over developments in Ukraine, but in many respects Russia’s clashes with the West over Ukraine might have been predicted. The Russian leadership has consistently opposed NATO’s enlargement and closer integration of neighboring nations, particularly Ukraine and Georgia, with Western institutions and structures. Alleged Western involvement in Ukraine and Georgia during the colored revolutions had also fueled suspicions that the United States and Western allies had a part in orchestrating regime change among Russia’s bordering former Soviet republics. The Moscow foreign policy community had strongly opposed NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, leading to a complete reorientation of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine to identify NATO’s expansion and “out of area” interventions as threatening Russia’s interests.40 Conflicts with Russia over Georgia’s future and integration with NATO and the West led Moscow to unleash military intervention and occupation in 2008, resulting in Russia re-establishing control of Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow’s resurgent strength, due in large part to developments in the energy sector over the decade following the Kosovo war, corresponded with strengthened resolve in resisting what was perceived as continued Western encroachment in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. For the Kremlin leadership, Georgia and Ukraine would represent red lines for blocking perceived Western expansion and intrusions of the major institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community, especially NATO and the EU, on Russia’s immediate border. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine represented a direct challenge to the established rules and norms of the international and European security communities, with the expectation in Moscow that this system must change in ways that better accommodate Russia’s interests. Reflecting on the significance of the Ukrainian clash, Sergei Karaganov, one of Russia’s leading academics, with close ties to the Kremlin’s inner foreign policy circles, states: “It is obvious that Russia is firmly determined to change the rules of the game that have been dictated to it for the past twenty five years.”41 Karaganov continues: “in demanding a change in the rules of the game,” Russia “actually speaks for the entire non-West.”42 Karaganov makes 164

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clear the perception from Moscow: “The West systematically pressed ahead with expanding its zone of influence and control militarily, economically, and politically (the expansion of NATO and the EU). Russia’s interests and objections were ignored. In fact, Russia was treated as a defeated nation, yet Russians do not consider themselves losers.”43 The United States, European nations, and Russia had not been able to reach agreement on forming a post-Cold War security architecture that would satisfy Moscow’s expectations for status and influence consistent with Russia’s traditional role in Europe. Dmitry Medvedev’s European Security Treaty proposal advanced in 2008 was an attempt to open dialogue on options, but never accomplished more than some preliminary review in Western nations. Rather, as indicated, Moscow came to believe that it would be in a position of continually sacrificing Russia’s interests with the West and that existing security structures in Europe were not suited to advancing Moscow’s interests. Alexei Arbatov, Director of the International Security Center at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, captures the dissatisfaction with the current system and Moscow’s expectation that the Ukrainian crisis might portend for bringing about a permanent readjustment of the existing security order: If Russia and the West reach a compromise on the future of Ukraine, acceptable to both Kiev and the southeast of the country, it will take some time before cooperation resumes, but gradually the confrontation will be overcome and the formation of a polycentric world will begin. It can serve as the basis for a new, more balanced and stable world order, albeit much more complex and volatile.44

Russia’s policy officials and academics frequently refer to the “existential” significance of Ukraine for Russia. Ukraine, the second-largest nation in Europe, has rich agricultural land and significant hydrocarbons and mineral resources. The nation holds Europe’s third-largest shale gas fields, and Ukraine had been a main transit route for Russian natural gas provided to Europe. Ukraine’s location between Europe and Eurasia on the Black Sea significantly enhances the geostrategic significance of the nation. Russia’s bilateral ties with Ukraine were more extensive than with any other post-Soviet neighboring nation. Many families in Russia and Ukraine are mixed, sharing common similarities in culture and religion, and labor migration between Russia and Ukraine had been quite significant. An estimated 70 percent of Ukraine’s armaments exports went to Russia prior to 2014, with Ukraine supplying critical components and support for equipping Russia’s military. In 2013, Russia was Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for 25 percent of Ukraine’s total trade. Russia’s imports from Ukraine amounted to $15.8 billion in 2013. As of 2013, Ukraine was importing some 50 percent of its natural gas from Russia, and Ukraine’s debt to Russia stood at $3 billion. 165

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Given the cultural-religious heritage of Kievan Rus, Ukraine has been viewed historically as a part of Russia. Russia’s former Permanent Representative to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, explained Moscow’s objection to Ukraine’s membership in NATO, stating that Ukraine was in fact “the Mother of Russia,” and that separation from Ukraine could never be accepted.45 Speaking at the first anniversary of the annexation of Crimea in 2015, Vladimir Putin referred to Russians and Ukrainians as “one people.”46 Vladimir Putin periodically made reference to the concept of “Novorossiya” as a basis for Moscow to carve out an alternative pillar to Western influence in the international community. In describing Russia’s interests in Ukraine, Putin made the following point in 2014: I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya back in the tsarist days—Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa—were not part of Ukraine back then . . . The center of the territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost those territories for various reasons, but the people remained.47

In contemporary Russian society and media, Putin and his colleagues contrast Russia’s cultural values with the decadence of the West. Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2016 offers repeated references to the revival and importance of “traditional Russian spiritual moral values” in advancing Russia’s security and meeting national security objectives.48 Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have explicitly suggested that Russia’s foreign policy should be guided by religious values, and they see Russia as a guardian of conservative religious values at a time of escalating decadence in the West. The concept of “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) was invoked to refer to Russian citizens and the Russian diaspora based on the Russian Orthodox faith, common historical memory, and values. In his 2013 speech to the Valdai Forum, Putin offered the observation that citizens of “many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations,” and that Russia “has the natural right” to defend the “values embedded in Christianity and other world religions.”49 Russia’s policy in Ukraine was thus depicted as important for securing national interests and reflecting the (Christian) moral obligation to assist those in need. It also provided a point of reference for depicting a civilizational clash between traditional Russian cultural and religious values and nihilistic materialism and lack of commitment to moral heritage in the West.50 Furthermore, Russia’s leadership explicitly cited religious history and Russia’s civilizational development among justifications for Russia’s action in Crimea. In his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in 2014, Vladimir Putin explicitly identified Crimea “as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and centralized Russian state.” Putin stated:

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Russia, China, Contemporary International Conflicts It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chernsonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized before bringing Christianity to Rus . . . All of this allows us to say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple of the Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism.51

Beyond the fact that Russia’s energy, economic, military, historical, and cultural ties with Ukraine were significant, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was clearly prompted by the desire to safeguard key strategic interests. Crimea had been part of Russia from the time of the establishment of the naval base under Catherine the Great in 1783 until Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.52 Sevastopol provides Russia with ice-free port access year round, and the means to project maritime and other military and commercial assets into the Balkans, Mediterranean, and the Middle East. The lease accord Russia signed on the Black Sea port with Ukraine in 1997 was set to expire in 2017, but Ukraine’s former President Viktor Yanukovich had offered extension of the lease to 2042. There have been periodic disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the past several years regarding terms of implementation of the prior agreement. With the ouster of Yanukovich, Moscow’s determination to draw a line with respect to Ukraine is first of all an interest in maintaining control of the Black Sea fleet and port. Vladimir Putin and many in the Moscow foreign policy community and society have had difficulty coming to terms with the loss of empire resulting from the dismantling of the Soviet Union. As Igor A. Zevelev has observed, the United Kingdom “possessed” a distant empire, but the Soviet Union “was” an empire where no borders divided Russia from its neighbors.53 At the same time, Putin’s widely cited statement of 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century should not imply that his intention was to reconstitute the empire. While not seeking to reconquer Ukraine or other nations of the former Soviet Union, Moscow does want to make sure that regimes are instituted and sustained in these societies that will present no harm to Russia’s interests. Moscow has not been able to deal with Georgia or Ukraine (or other neighbors) as genuinely sovereign nations deserving status of complete autonomy from Russian influence and control. Moscow’s Foreign Policy Concept issued in July 2008 established the pretext for Russia’s intrusion in post-Soviet neighboring nations by including a reference to “protecting” Russians living outside its borders, a provision signaling a prelude for intervention in Georgia and later Ukraine.54 In commenting on the Ukrainian conflict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affirmed this commitment, noting that “an attack on Russian citizens”

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is “an attack on the Russian Federation,” perhaps suggesting that Moscow’s intervention following Ukraine, in the Baltics (particularly in Estonia or Latvia, which have significant Russian populations) or elsewhere, could not be ruled out.55 The protection of the rights of ethnic Russians (17 percent of Ukraine’s population) residing in Ukraine and the Russian majority comprising 58 percent of the population in Crimea has been a major source of strain between Kiev and Moscow. In response to the escalation of tensions with the West, the buildup of forces on its European border, and extended rotations of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, Russia has stepped up military exercises and conducted military flights over the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Reported encounters of NATO military warships and Russian aircraft or Russian incursions into Western airspace have also generated alarm. In March 2015, Vladimir Putin disclosed that he was prepared to place Russia’s nuclear forces on alert to ensure the annexation of Crimea.56 Since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, Russian aircraft have repeatedly violated European airspace, at times causing close encounters with commercial flights.57 The elevated state of tension and unpredictable behavior only heightens the likelihood of misperception, miscalculation, or accidents which could escalate and result in serious clashes between Russia and the United States and NATO, with unintended consequences for all parties.

China’s Assessment and Response China and Ukraine moved to forge a “strategic partnership” relationship in 2011. The Chinese leadership recognizes Ukraine’s potential for providing a vital transit hub to Europe supporting China’s OBOR project that would promote economic integration from Eurasia to Europe. Ukraine’s natural resources and agricultural land make it an important potential supplier of food and other commodities for China’s population. Even prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China had been cultivating economic engagement with Ukraine in the areas of agriculture, housing construction, aeronautics, and information technology. China’s Foreign Ministry affirmed in 2014 that China desired “friendly cooperation” with Ukraine and that Beijing would play a “constructive role” in providing international financial support for Ukraine.58 In 2015, China supported Ukraine’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in spite of Moscow’s opposition.59 Responding to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea presented certain challenges to the Chinese leadership. On the one hand, Russia’s actions in Ukraine could be viewed as objectionable considering China’s insistence on maintaining the inviolable nature of national sovereignty or non-interference in the internal affairs of nations affirmed in the 168

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guiding Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. At the same time, the Chinese leadership has consistently tended to view the colored revolutions as stemming from destructive US imperialist meddling in the internal affairs of nations. The Chinese leadership maintained that the situation in Ukraine could not be viewed in “black and white terms” precisely because they suggested that the entire destabilization of Ukraine was prompted by the intervention of NATO and the European Union in Ukraine, initially in the Orange Revolution of 2004–5 and then in the Euromaidan ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. Commenting on China’s perspective on the conflict in Ukraine, Fu Ying of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress noted that “Chinese diplomats and leaders are also mindful of what led to the crisis, including the series of Westernsupported ‘color revolutions’ in the post-Soviet states and the pressure on Russia that resulted from NATO’s eastward expansion.”60 The Chinese leadership maintained that the primary source of the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine stemmed from a clash over the future of Ukraine’s orientation to either West or East. Ming Jinwei, writing in the state-run news source Xinhua, offered a harsh assessment: “The West’s strategy for installing a so-called democratic and pro-Western Ukrainian government did not get anywhere at all. On the contrary, they have created a mess that they do not have the capacity or wisdom to clean.”61 The Chinese foreign policy community also emphasized the importance of the unique ties between Russia and Ukraine. Professor Gao Fei of Chinese Foreign Affairs University noted that while China and Ukraine are “strategic partners,” Russia and Crimea are “cultural brothers” and that the war in Ukraine might be compared to a conflict in a family.62 In March 2014, commentary published in Xinhua concluded: Based on the fact that Russia and Ukraine have deep cultural, historical and economic connections, it is time for Western powers to abandon their Cold War thinking, stop trying to exclude Russia from the political crisis they failed to mediate, and respect Russia’s unique role in mapping out the future of Ukraine. 63

China refrained from condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the UN Security Council and abstained on the Crimean claim of independence, but at that same time the Chinese leadership did not condone Moscow’s intervention. The Chinese leadership sought to create a balance in refraining from openly clashing with the United States and the West over Ukraine, but also to avoid criticizing Russia’s actions. China’s President Xi Jinping affirmed: “We support the constructive efforts the international community has made to deescalate the situation and are open to any concepts which serve to calm the situation and to bring about a political solution.”64 He stated further that “The Chinese side always respects the principles of international relations and 169

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non-interference in the internal business of other states,” and “All parties involved should work for a political and diplomatic solution to the conflict.”65 Further, reports suggest that Xi Jinping emphasized in conversations with both Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin that the situation in Ukraine was “highly complex” and “sensitive,” and that all sides should “exercise selfrestraint to prevent the situation from worsening.”66 China’s Ambassador to Belgium, Qu Xing, called for the West “to abandon its zero-sum mentality” with respect to the conflict in Ukraine and to “take the real security concerns of Russia into consideration.”67 Since the onset of conflict in Ukraine in 2014, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not wavered in issuing statements that Ukraine’s “independence,” “sovereignty,” and “territorial integrity” should be respected.”68 The Chinese leadership understood the benefit of Russia being forced to turn toward increased reliance on China to offset Moscow’s seriously damaged relationship with the United States and Europe following the Ukrainian intervention. Interviews with Chinese scholars suggest that some Chinese officials actually admired Putin’s resolve in standing firm with the United States and Europe in advancing Russia’s interests. At the same time, the Chinese leadership were careful not to allow their response to the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s stepped-up drive to forge stronger ties with China to result in negative consequences for the Sino–US relationship, which remains of critical importance for China’s interests. The Chinese leadership recognized that the growing tensions between Russia and the West driving Moscow toward Beijing would work to their advantage as it provided greater leverage in China’s relationship with the United States and reduced the likelihood that Putin might side with the United States or the West in the future in countering China’s rise or its ambitions in Asia and beyond. Interviews with Chinese scholars suggest that there were concerns that Moscow invoking the rights of self-determination in Crimea could create damaging legal precedents that might threaten China’s own domestic stability in Tibet and in the predominantly Muslim northwest Xinjiang region. Also, Russia’s sense of entitlement in its so-called “near abroad” might have implications for future intrusions of Russia into the domestic political situations in neighboring nations of Central Asia. However, on balance, the potential benefits for China in establishing a closer relationship with Russia or distracting the United States in Ukraine (or other areas) would tend to offset the risks for Beijing. Recognizing Kiev’s potential for advancing China’s interests, Beijing offered investment and trade opportunities in order to help keep Ukraine’s economy afloat in the aftermath of the disruption and devastation resulting from the war with Russia. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, reports indicate that China has increased agricultural trade with Ukraine by 56 percent and 170

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China has become the largest consumer of food exports from Ukraine.69 The Wall Street Journal reported that China’s corn imports from Ukraine increased eight fold in the first half of 2015.70 Chinese investors are interested in supporting manufacturing projects in Ukraine for export to Europe or nations of the European Union. In early 2015, the National Development Bank of China and the Ukrainian authorities signed an agreement to employ Chinese technology to convert plants functioning on Russian natural gas to coal as a part of the overall measures undertaken by the government in Kiev to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies.71 It was reported in 2015 that China planned to begin assembly of its Hongdu L-15 light attack aircraft at a facility in Odessa Ukraine.72 In January 2016, the first cargo departing from Illichivsk port near Odessa Ukraine crossed through the Black and Caspian Seas to Baku; it was bound for China via a new train/ferry route linking Ukraine to China, bypassing Russia through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.73 The route was launched in response in part to Moscow’s ban on Ukrainian goods transiting through Russia, and also supports China’s OBOR vision in establishing feasible transportation routes for promoting economic ties through Eurasia and linking China to markets throughout Eurasia and Europe. In September 2016, Ukraine’s Antonov Company and the Aerospace Industry Corporation of China agreed to reconvene production of the AN-225 Mriya, the world’s largest plane.74 Russia’s “pivot” toward China and Asia actually preceded the conflict in Ukraine, but it has accelerated since the deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West and the imposition of US and EU sanctions on the Russian Federation.75 Russia’s President Putin acknowledged Beijing’s support in his speech on Crimea in Russia’s Parliament in March 2014, emphasizing that “We are grateful to the people of China, whose leadership sees the situation in Crimea in all its historical and political integrity.”76 Following the unleashing of war in Ukraine, President Putin signed a number of new agreements for deepening Sino–Russian bilateral cooperation during his May 20–21, 2014, visit to China. The warming of the Sino–Russian relationship was on full display when China’s President Xi Jinping was guest of honor at the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Ukraine joined the United States and nations of Western Europe in not attending the historic celebrations, though they had been present in the past, along with the United States and other Western nations’ military participation, at the traditional Red Square military parade. In turn, President Putin attended a similar event hosted in Beijing in the summer of 2015, commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, Moscow’s leadership had some concern about committing resources to Chinese growth and development in ways that could strengthen China’s capacity to challenge Russia’s interests. However, 171

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following the reprisals from the West over the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian leadership was prepared to develop a deeper and more comprehensive relationship with China. While the Russian leadership and elite had been wary of China’s presence and development in Central Asia and the Far East, following the outbreak of conflict over Crimea’s future and status Moscow moved to lift restrictions on Chinese investment and promoted deepening economic cooperation in both regions. When Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the “Silk Road” economic project in Astana in 2013, Moscow was initially reluctant to embrace the initiative, still concerned about potential implications of China’s burgeoning presence and ambitions in Central Asia. More recently, in the aftermath of conflict in Ukraine, Putin and Xi have agreed to coordinate their signature economic projects in Central Asia, Russia’s Eurasia Economic Union, and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. Putin described the growing collaboration: “The integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies a common economic space on the continent.”77 Russia’s foreign policy community echoes this sentiment, suggesting that Russia and China could work in tandem to support development in Eurasia. As Timofei Bordachev, Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and Head of the Eurasian Program at the Valdai International Discussion Club, notes: the EEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and China-led Silk Road Economic Belt are not competitors because they are about completely different things. Eurasian integration is necessary so that member states can jointly regulate their economic activity. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a transport and logistics project aimed at developing the region on the basis of Chinese investment. The two projects do not propose alternative models of development or management.78

China stands to benefit significantly as a result of the new trade opportunities and the potential for collaboration in the energy sectors and other areas offered by the Silk Road project. Beijing’s geopolitical influence is likely to be further augmented by stimulating growth throughout the entire Eurasian region, strengthening China’s presence and reach in Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. A major consequence of the crisis in Ukraine is the shift in the power balance in Central Asia, lifting impediments and enabling China to gain further ground as a leading Eurasian power. It is not unquestionable that future regime transformation in Central Asia could evoke similar intervention from Moscow, which would result in potentially jeopardizing China’s interests or requiring difficult choices for China with even greater consequences than in the case of Ukraine. Russia might stand to make gains as a result of massive 172

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Chinese investment fueling economic development and growth in Eurasia, but whether the two giants can manage their interests in Eurasia as partners, rather than traditional competitors, remains uncertain. Finally, several analysts have suggested that if any nation benefited from the serious escalation of tensions between Russia and the United States and its Western allies over Ukraine, it was China. Among the three major powers— the United States, China, and Russia—Beijing is in an even stronger position to advance its interests vis-à-vis the United States and Russia throughout the world. As Xing Guangcheng, Director of the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, concludes: For China, the Ukraine crisis and the resulting problems in the relationship between Russia and the United States is a strategic opportunity. On the one hand, it has served to distract the USA from its new focus on China. While, on the other hand, it has forced Russia to move closer to the East and to China, which will help China in its aim of constructing a more conducive international environment for its interests.79

Whereas the policies of Russia, the United States, and the European Union toward Ukraine have largely been determined by political considerations, China assumed a pragmatic approach in supporting Russia and yet leaning toward neutrality in balancing competing interests in the West, thereby enabling Beijing to advance its regional and global interests in reacting to the difficult East–West battle over Ukraine.

Kiev’s Besieged Leadership, Deadlock on Minsk II, Perpetual Frozen Conflict? Today the conflict in Ukraine dividing the nation between East and West remains at deadlock. Crimea has not been returned to Ukraine, and Russia continues to render assistance to separatist forces fighting in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. Michael Kofman makes the point that the increased Russian military ground force presence and upgrades of the Black Sea Fleet in the period since the annexation of Crimea make it “a bastion to rival Kaliningrad, able to effectively deny access in the air and sea domain, while additional units are still expected in 2017.”80 United Nations estimates in 2016 indicated that the death toll had reached 9,500 in Ukraine since the outbreak of conflict in 2014, and there are still daily reports of serious human rights abuses, including killings, torture, and illegal detention, and the lives of the population have been disrupted with many displaced from their communities and lacking access to health care and social services.81 Ukraine’s GDP declined from 5.2 percent growth in 2011 by –6.8 percent in 2014 and –12.0 percent in 2015.82 Disruption in trade flows with Russia and production in the 173

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industrial oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk has severely impacted Ukraine’s overall economic performance. Ukraine faces tremendous challenges ahead as the nation suffers endemic problems, lacking viable and legitimate institutions and capacity for effective governance. Excessive state control, corruption, and pervasive cronyism have continued to influence the political and economic systems in Ukraine, and there has been little visible marked progress in addressing these issues since independence. In 2015, Transparency International ranked Ukraine 130th of 167 nations in its corruption perception index.83 Even prior to the devastation resulting from the current implosion of the country, Ukraine suffered budget deficits, hyper-inflation, and a standard of living below that of several nations in Europe and Eurasia. Long-term investment (in terms of decades) in political, security, and economic capacity-building will be required to develop the institutional structures and traditions necessary for Ukraine’s growth. The failures of the leadership in Kiev to manage the daunting challenges of Ukraine’s recovery has led to a crisis in confidence among the public in both the President and the Western-oriented government. A December 2015 poll indicated that Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko had only a 17 percent public approval rating, with poll estimates dropping below 10 percent in 2016, and Poroshenko is even less popular than former President Viktor Yanukovich was at the time of his ouster from office.84 In February 2016, marking the second anniversary of the Euromaidan uprising, the political crisis culminated with Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Poroshenko was ultimately successful in replacing Yatsenyuk with his ally, Rada Chairman and Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Groysman, though Groysman also faces a host of difficulties in ensuring that Ukraine’s government can meet its existing obligations. Ukraine’s Minister of Economy and Trade, Aivaras Abromavicius, and his entire team were forced to resign in early 2016 amid political infighting and accusations that they had not been able to manage the economy and contain corruption. Failure to implement necessary economic reforms and rein in corruption had resulted in hesitance and delay in deliveries of the International Monetary Fund bailout slated for Ukraine.85 Domestic dissatisfaction with the performance of the government in Kiev on the part of original supporters of the Euromaidan movement across the political spectrum, including the Radical Right Forces and others, has led to periodic speculation about a possible “Maidan III” uprising. In late December 2015, the fragile Minsk II agreement negotiated by the leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia was extended into 2016 since several of the terms of the agreement remain unfulfilled. While the ceasefire between the Kiev government forces and pro-Russian separatists brought some progress in stabilizing the line of contact between the two sides, still 174

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there are periodic surges of violence between the pro-Kremlin separatists and Ukrainian forces, and the warring sides continue to exchange machine gun and mortar fire daily. Reports indicate that Russia continues to provide arms, ammunition, fuel, and fighters in Eastern Ukraine. On the political front, the leadership of the People’s Republic of Donetsk and People’s Republic of Luhansk have stated that they will not accept the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty in accordance with the terms of Minsk II, and elections have been repeatedly postponed in both these oblasts. The government in Kiev has encountered resistance to instituting the constitutional changes that include de-centralization and special status for Donbass to meet the terms of Minsk II, and the Ukrainian government has not moved to re-establish economic ties and social services in the Donbass region. There has also been a lack of willingness on the part of Ukraine’s authorities to comply with the requirement to pardon and grant amnesty to those engaged in the conflict. Ukrainian officials report that Russia has failed to meet the Minsk II provisions stipulating the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces and military equipment from Ukraine, full access of the OSCE to Donbass, release of all illegally detained prisoners, and restoration of Ukraine’s control of the border. Disputes over proper sequencing for compliance with the terms of Minsk II will continue to impede progress. There is growing pressure among some European nations and segments of the business sectors to lift the sanctions on Russia, but in July 2016 the European Union again extended sanctions on Russia’s economy through January 31, 2017, because of failure to comply with terms of implementation of the Minsk agreement. If Moscow would assume the initiative to take further bold steps toward compliance with the security requirements of Minsk II, paving the way for lifting sanctions, the United States and EU could exert additional influence on the government in Kiev to proceed with the most politically unpopular, controversial requirement of Minsk II to grant decentralized status for Donbass. Unless the political situation in Kiev is stabilized and sufficient support is generated by all parties to proceed with compliance with Minsk II, there will be no end to the conflict in Ukraine. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine reached a critical point again in August 2016, when Vladimir Putin accused the government in Kiev of attempting to orchestrate terrorism in Crimea. Russia’s account maintained that a Russian FSB security service employee and soldier were killed attempting to thwart the border incursions by Ukrainians intending to carry out acts of terrorism. Ukraine’s officials denied the accusations and suggested that Putin was seeking a pretext to escalate conflict. The situation corresponded with an increase in Russian military activity in Crimea, and reports that Russia’s Ministry of Defense would hold exercises in the area to repel potential terrorist attacks. In the midst of the escalating tensions, Russia deployed advanced S-400 surface-to-air missiles to the Crimean Peninsula.86 Ukrainian 175

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President Petro Poroshenko responded by placing Ukraine’s army on combat alert on the Crimean border and at the line of contact in Eastern Ukraine. Putin accused the government in Ukraine of “playing a dangerous game,” and warned of “counter-measures” against Ukraine.87 A closed-door session of the UN Security Council was convened at the request of Ukrainian officials to discuss the escalating tensions. Leading expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrei Kortunov, suggested that for Putin “It’s about sanctions,” or “increasing pressure on Western participants of the Minsk peace process” to prompt Ukraine’s Western allies “to exert influence on Kiev to get it to fulfill its side of the bargain.”88 Others suggested that Putin was trying to raise the stakes in negotiations on the implementation of Minsk that had been planned in conjunction with the G20 summit in September 2016.89 Volodymyr Fesenko, a leading political analyst in Ukraine, suggested that Putin wanted to “scare the West with the prospect of full-scale conflict in Ukraine.”90 There is no doubt that Western sanctions have caused difficulties for Russian society, but the increasing Russian military presence in Crimea and ramping up of tensions between Moscow and Kiev is risky and could easily escalate to confrontation. With all sides assigning blame for failure to comply with the terms of the Minsk II agreement, it is difficult to envision how there could be progress beyond the current impasse in proceeding with full implementation of the agreement. Restoration of the Donbass region will require significant investment and reconstruction, economic aid, and humanitarian support. Russia has been Ukraine’s largest trading partner, but trade between Russia and Ukraine dropped sharply following the onset of conflict in 2014–15, and in January 2016 the Russian Federation imposed an embargo on Ukraine, with Kiev placing bans on importing a range of Russia’s goods. The Kiev government is in no position to render such assistance, and neither the United States, European nations, or even Russia are likely to be willing to take on this burden. While China can be a source of some economic support and investment for Ukraine, Beijing will not be willing to incur either the economic or the geopolitical costs that would be entailed in assuming the burden of supporting the massive economic recovery project that will be required in Ukraine. For Russia, fueling continued endless shelling and low intensity turmoil in Donbass is one way to further destabilize Kiev without escalating Moscow’s engagement or potential further consequences from the West. At the same time, it is certainly in Russia’s interest that Western economic sanctions are lifted. European nations have also suffered losses as a result of the sanctions, and therefore there are economic pressures coming from these societies favoring the lifting of sanctions on Russia. The United States and Europe will be reluctant to support any additional investment in Ukraine until there is 176

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significant progress in implementing economic reform and eliminating corruption. While both Kiev and Moscow benefit from expressing the intention to continue to move forward on implementation of Minsk II, without new momentum it appears that the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists could continue unabated in Donbass for years to come. In February 2016, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, compared the current security environment with the period of the Cuban Missile Crisis, reminding the audience of President John F. Kennedy’s words that “foreign policy can kill us” and expressing concern regarding consequences of falling into a new “Cold War.”91 Reflecting on Medvedev’s remarks, Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE, warned that “We are losing the tools and the kind of logic that we had during the cold war”; he continued: “It is more unpredictable than the cold war.”92 He characterized the Ukraine conflict as a “symptom of deeper disease” related to the evolution of the European security architecture, with a “narrative” that Russia interpreted as “not necessarily friendly.”93 NATO’s military buildup in Eastern Europe bordering Russia, combined with Russia’s escalating military presence and exercises in the Black Sea and in areas bordering Europe, has heightened the potential for dangerous encounters or outright confrontation. Even prior to Russia’s destabilizing intervention, Ukrainian society was divided on NATO membership, and the nation had not made sufficient progress in political or defense transformation to make the country a qualified candidate for NATO membership in the immediate future. All should realize that Ukraine is not a viable candidate for NATO membership at this time, though this remains a popular perception of still great concern among Moscow’s foreign policy community. The population of Ukraine must determine whether differences among various groups can be reconciled and minority relationships can be protected in some type of federal structure once again uniting the eastern and western areas of the country. Absent reconciliation within the country and wellorchestrated sustained provisions of support from the outside, Ukraine is likely to remain deadlocked in a prolonged “frozen conflict,” leaving the beleaguered nation in a state of uncertainty with scant hope for progress. There is little doubt that the Crimean Peninsula will remain a part of the Russian Federation, and at this point peace and recovery seems a long way from reality in Donbass. The Chinese leadership continues to repeat the point that all sides should comply with the Minsk II agreement in finding a settlement that “protects Ukraine’s sovereignty.” As Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, states: “We hope that all respective parties will take the necessary steps and effective measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements and manage to advance in the process of the political settlement 177

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that will allow settling the crisis in Ukraine in a comprehensive way.”94 Whether peace can be achieved and Ukrainian society returned to a state of normalcy is unclear, but there is no doubt that major consequences of the war in Ukraine have been the escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, driving Russia closer to China and serving China’s aims to emerge as a leading power in Eurasia.

Syria’s Civil War Crisis: Russia, China, Interests, and Responses Syria descended into civil war in 2011 during the Arab Spring protests that swept the Middle East and North Africa region. Syrian society had been polarized along ethnic and religious lines, and the repressive response of the regime of Bashar al-Assad to public protests in 2011 led to an exacerbation of domestic upheaval and a widening international conflict. The situation has become a security and humanitarian tragedy, displacing more than 50 percent of the Syrian population and resulting in some 400,000 casualties according to UN estimates of 2016, with other sources suggesting a higher death toll of at least 470,000.95 The war has brought a massive influx of migrants into Europe, placing enormous pressures on the continent for managing the crisis and the reactionary backlash, with significant consequences for domestic politics among European societies across the continent. The Levant (including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Northwest Iraq) has historically been a theater of major power clashes. The region had been under Ottoman rule prior to World War I, and Tsar Nicholas I challenged the territorial control of the Ottoman Empire, which he described in 1853 as “the sick man of Europe.” The Levant geographical landmass, torn by ethnic and religious differences, provided fertile ground for internal conflicts attracting the involvement of multiple international actors. Syria remains engulfed in a complex five-year proxy war ravaged by competing interests among several regional and global actors, and many factions within Syria engaged in a zero-sum existential struggle. The conflict in Syria, as in Ukraine, involving Russia, China, the United States, and other regional and global powers, has also become a central battleground for asserting power and influence and testing resolve among leading powers in the contemporary international environment.

Russia’s Interests and Military Intervention in Syria Moscow had cautioned the United States against invading Iraq to bring down Saddam Hussein, and Vladimir Putin and many in Russia’s foreign policy community blame the United States and Western intervention for the current 178

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instability raging in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia’s National Security Strategy cites the “practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking interstate instability and conflicts” as a threat that is “becoming increasingly widespread.”96 As Valentina Matviyenko, Chair of Russia’s upper house Federation Council noted in 2015: “The West blew up the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, and sowed chaos, bloodshed and humanitarian catastrophe,” and Sergey Naryshkin while serving as Speaker of Russia’s State Duma attributed the European refugee crisis to US and NATO intervention in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.97 A major conclusion offered at the 5th Meeting of Russia’s Valdai Middle East dialogue held in 2016 noted that the “actions of some states seeking goals related to changing authoritarian regimes (in which they mistakenly saw the root of all problems) led to weaker state institutions in Syria, where the power void was filled with terrorism.”98 Following the toppling of regimes in the contagion of the Arab Spring, Russia was concerned that such movements might find similar inspiration in surrounding nations in the Middle East and North Africa or in the Caucasus or Central Asia regions, or even in the Russian Federation. Moscow had anticipated that the downfall of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad would leave a power vacuum, as in Iraq and Libya, that would be occupied by Islamist-inspired terrorist forces or by those who would jeopardize Russia’s longstanding interests in Syria. Moscow’s foreign policy community has been quite adamant in stating that they intended to avoid a “Libya-like fiasco” in Syria. Fearing further destabilization of circumstances in Syria and the region, both Moscow and Beijing had placed a priority on maintaining the existing sovereign government in Damascus. Alternatively, the priorities for the Obama Administration included securing political transition in Syria to oust the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, countering the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh and the al Qaeda-affiliated al Nusra Front, and at the same time avoiding direct US military engagement or becoming consumed in a costly protracted military quagmire, as in Iraq or Afghanistan. The United States and its European allies blamed Assad’s repression for provoking the civil war, faulting the Syrian leader for committing serious human rights violations against his own population. For Western nations, deposing Assad would be a necessary step to establishing peace in Syria. Initially, the United States limited its engagement to providing humanitarian aid and non-lethal support to opposition groups. By 2012, the Obama Administration was providing assistance to the Free Syrian Army and other opposition forces committed to ousting the Assad regime, and in 2014 the US undertook airstrikes to respond to IS advances. While Russia’s military deployment aimed to counter terrorism in Syria, Moscow’s definition of terrorists included not only IS or Daesh and the al Qaeda-affiliated al Nusra, but overwhelmingly the anti-Assad forces 179

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encompassing those aligned with the West. Beijing also tended to perceive all forces seeking to undermine the existing Syrian government as terrorist elements. The prevailing view among Russia’s foreign policy community was that the US strategy aimed at fighting IS and Assad at the same time would fail. Conversely, Moscow’s strategy would focus on working with the Syrian Army and sectarian militias to counter those threatening the existing Syrian state, including IS and all other forces opposing the Assad regime. Britain, France, and other European powers also became engaged, primarily to counter IS or Daesh. The Sunni–Shia religious and geopolitical struggle has intensified over the conflict in Syria, with Saudi Arabia seeking the downfall of Assad, and Iran supporting the Shiite regime of Assad and the minority Alawite community in Syria. Turkey also claimed to be fighting IS, but Ankara’s priority has been to oust Assad and to counter Kurdish influence in Northern Syria. Both the United States and Russia, in contrast, were coordinating their engagement with the support of the Syrian Kurdish population. Over time, the non-jihadi-affiliated moderate Western opposition and militant force committed to bringing down the Assad regime became fragmented and weak, with combatants eventually turning to fight one another or to join IS or al Nusra. The United States’ support for the opposition to Assad and efforts to find a diplomatic solution failed to bring about any resolution of the Syrian war. The uncompromising focus of the United States and other Western powers in toppling the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad made it challenging to work with Moscow in seeking resolution of the Syrian conflict. Syria has been a longstanding ally for Russia since the Soviet era, and provided a major arms sales market for Russian military equipment. Even prior to Russia’s military engagement in the Syrian civil war in September 2015, Moscow had been the largest arms supplier for the Assad regime. Moscow’s naval facility in the Syrian port city of Tartus was established in 1971, and Russia’s armed forces have used the airbase at Kheimim in Syria’s coastal city of Latakia since 2015 in executing the military campaign. Syria’s deep water port at Tartus and the port of Latakia provide Russia’s military with warm-water ports and access in the Mediterranean Sea. Russia has an airbase at Palmyra in Syria, and Moscow’s air campaign was critical for the Assad regime in recapturing Palmyra after the city had been seized by IS. Syrian–Russian cultural ties were also close, with extensive investments, educational exchanges, and tourist networks. Estimates indicate that Russia’s investments in Syria totaled close to $20 billion prior to the start of the war, concentrated in the areas of energy, infrastructure, and tourism.99 Beyond Russia’s desire to preserve its influence in Syria and maintain its military presence and economic ties, the Syrian war provided the opportunity for Moscow to reassert influence in the Middle East as a major power and to counter the Obama Administration’s claim that Russia was restricted to 180

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assuming the role only as a “regional power.” According to Sergey Oznobishchev, Head of the Division of Military Analysis and Director of the Institute of Strategic Assessment at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow’s engagements in both Ukraine and Syria were overwhelmingly motivated by the desire to establish a relationship based on equal terms with the United States, a consideration even more important than countering terrorism in Syria.100 Russia’s global power-projection capacity is still modest compared to the United States, but Russia remains among the few powers in the world capable of deploying a military force to Syria. Moscow’s engagement in the Syrian conflict presented an opportunity to regain strategic influence and geopolitical advantage in a critical region where the Soviet Union had previously enjoyed longstanding relationships and influence. The Middle East had served as a major arena for the US–Soviet rivalry during the decades of the Cold War, with Moscow holding considerable influence in the region and in a number of client states among Arab nations. With the collapse of the USSR and Russia’s diminished global capacity, Moscow had lost considerable standing and influence in the region. The instability ensuing from the Arab Spring uprisings beginning in 2011 fueled anxiety in Moscow about such “chaos” threatening Russia’s interests in the Middle East, with potential spill-over threatening stability in Central Asia or even the Russian Federation. From the perspective of Russia’s leadership, the pro-Western Maidan revolution in Kiev and the mass movements of the Arab Spring are similar in representing threats to sovereignty and the state, only heightening concerns that Russia’s regime could also be the target of similar efforts instigated from outside the country. The Kremlin was also concerned that Russia’s retreat from the Middle East had created more room for the United States and its allies to engage in promoting democratization and regime change, deemed as fueling extremism and violence and leaving failed states, thereby jeopardizing Russia’s regional interests. Russia’s exertion of considerable influence in the course of Syria’s civil war would also correspond with Putin’s stepping up diplomatic and economic involvement throughout the Middle East region, further leveraging Russia’s partnership with Tehran, deepening engagement as a broker in the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, and strengthening relationships with major powers in the region on a non-ideological basis of shared pragmatic interests, including traditional US allies, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the geostrategic and diplomatic importance of the region, the broader Middle East also provides actual and potential important markets for Russia’s arms sales and lucrative trade and investment opportunities in oil, gas, and other areas. In justifying Russia’s military intervention in Syria in fall 2015, President Putin argued that he would rather confront IS/Daesh in Syria than fight them in Central Asia, Caucasus, or Russia. Islamic State leader Abu Muhammad 181

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al-Adnani had declared the establishment of a caliphate in the heavily Muslim region of the North Caucasus in Russia in 2015, representing the first territorial claim made in Russia by a terrorist group.101 Moscow was concerned about IS forces fighting in Syria returning to carry out terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation. Several thousand citizens of the former Soviet republics, including Chechens and Russian volunteers from the North Caucasus regions, are fighting in support of IS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The terrorist attacks of November 2015 in Paris provided Moscow with further justification for the Syrian military campaign, and an opportunity to try again to build common ground with Western powers in combating a common enemy. Many in the West were skeptical about Russia’s claims that the military campaign in Syria was directed toward countering IS, arguing that the preponderance of Russia’s attacks were directed at Assad’s opposition, rather than concentrating on countering IS strongholds as the United States and other Western European nations were doing. However, given the series of terrorist attacks in Russia carried out by jihadist militants in Beslan in 2004 and several others, and the fact that IS had established links in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Moscow would have at least a secondary concern in countering the growth of IS in Syria and beyond. Those affiliated with IS in the Caucasus are likely to seek to demonstrate their unity and significance in a powerful worldwide organization by responding to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s appeal to all jihadi fighters to carry out attacks. Even though Putin did not concentrate Russia’s military assault on IS, forces linked to IS are likely to return to Russia and its neighbors to threaten terrorist attacks for the sake of the secessionist struggle in Russia and the broader global jihadi caliphate. Moscow’s escalating engagement in the war in Syria would contribute to deflecting Western attention from the conflict in Ukraine. As the former NATO Ambassador of the Obama Administration Ivo Daalder stated, “In some ways, Syria became a distraction for us because it led us to work with Russia to try to address the Syrian crisis and to ignore what’s happening in Ukraine.”102 The timing of the launching of Russia’s military campaign in Syria in September 2015 corresponded with a marked slowing in shelling in Donbass, suggesting that Putin hoped that demonstrating Russia’s importance in combating terrorism in Syria might help to distract the United States and other Western powers from ongoing differences over Ukraine. Moscow recognized that the IS terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and again in Brussels in February 2016 brought greater focus in the United States and Europe on the threat from IS and the importance of engaging with Russia to counter the terrorist challenge. Prior to the launching of Russia’s military campaign in Syria, Moscow had been playing a leading diplomatic role in the Syrian crisis. Bashar al-Assad’s regime had been widely condemned for targeting his population with 182

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chemical weapons and other human rights abuses. Moscow’s influence was decisive in forging an agreement implemented in 2014 to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, thereby preventing a US military strike against the Assad regime. Russia, together with China, exercised veto power in the UN Security Council against resolutions promoted by the United States with other Western countries and Arab nations, in order to prevent possible sanctions against Syria and the ouster of the Assad regime. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin described the series of UNSCR veto actions as necessary to prevent the Security Council from engaging in “regime change.”103 Moscow’s diplomatic involvement also included encouraging efforts at national reconciliation, brokering talks between the opposition and the Assad government, and hosting representatives of the Free Syrian Army in Moscow. In October 2015, the first round of the Syrian peace talks were held in Vienna, with the participation of Russia, China, the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and others. Russia played a key role in the Geneva meetings in 2014 and 2015, but no agreement was reached on Syria’s future, primarily over deadlock on the future of Assad. In November 2015, Russia proposed an eight-step plan for settling the Syrian conflict, including establishing an eighteen-month transitional period, creating a united delegation of opposition groups, identifying terrorist factions, coordinating international military strikes on IS, and holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.104 Western diplomats believed that the plan gave too much control to the Syrian government in organizing the transition. The proposal failed to gain traction because it left open the possibility that Assad could remain in power or be re-elected. The United States, European nations, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia continued to maintain that Assad’s exit would be a pre-condition to peace talks. It is important to note that while Moscow enjoyed a close association with Bashar al-Assad that had served Russia’s interests, there have been consistent and repeated signals from the Kremlin leadership that the Syrian leader was not “indispensable.” For example, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev implied that perceptions that Moscow was committed to Assad were not valid, claiming that the priority for Russia is “not fighting for specific leaders” but “defending our national interests” and “we don’t want IS to head Syria.”105 According to former Finnish President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari, Western nations failed to seize an opportunity for Assad to step down at an early stage in the conflict.106 According to Ahtisaari, Russia’s Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, had suggested a three-point plan in 2012 that would include provision for Assad to cede power following the initiation of peace talks. However, Ahtisaari maintains that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France believed at the time that the collapse 183

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of the Assad regime was imminent and so they chose to ignore Churkin’s suggestion. Perhaps Western nations might have found the proposal more convincing if it had been delivered with the confirmed backing of Russia’s President, but it does suggest that there might have been more space for pursuing additional options regarding Assad’s future prior to the intensification of the conflict. The unexpected and dramatic engagement of Russia’s military in the Syrian conflict in September 2015 complicated strategic options for the US-led coalition and would decisively impact the balance of forces within the Syrian quagmire. Moscow had been supplying military assistance to the Assad regime prior to 2015, including jets, drones, Iskander SAMs, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, and Russia also offered military-technical advisors to Damascus. On September 29, 2015, Russia’s armed forces initiated a full-scale military campaign in Syria, launching airstrikes against militant groups positioned against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This marked the first deployment of Russia’s armed forces beyond the bordering areas of the previous Soviet Union, and the largest engagement of Russia’s air force since the war in Afghanistan. Russia’s military involvement in the war in September 2015 would provide a means for breaking the deadlock, and Moscow would become indispensable to securing a solution for the conflict. The air campaign included employing Russia’s MIG 31, SU-24, and SU-25 squadrons in Syria, as well as T-22 long-range bombers striking rebel targets, including forces supported by the US military.107 Russia’s armed forces utilized the naval station at Tartus and the air base near Latakia for executing the air campaign. Moscow indicated that Russia’s Spetsnaz elite forces participated in the ground assault to recapture Palmyra from IS, and there were reports that Spetsnaz forces assisted in combating opposition groups in Aleppo and Latakia.108 Moscow continued to insist that Russia was targeting IS and terrorist groups, and Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported to Putin in March 2016 that Russia’s intervention had led to the death of 2,000 rebels and destroyed 200 oil production facilities supplying the terrorist opposition.109 However, US Pentagon sources and other reports consistently indicated that the overwhelming focus of Russia’s airstrikes was directed toward anti-Assad and non-IS rebels, including those who had been supported by US coalition-led training and weapons. Despite differences regarding the targeting of rebel combatants and terrorists in Syria, Moscow and Washington did reach an agreement on exchange of information about air operations, resulting in the signing of a memorandum on air safety over Syria in October 2015.110 Moscow has pushed for greater military-to-military cooperation with the United States in Syria, perhaps to ease strains in the relationship with Washington, but again the consequences of the Ukrainian war would still limit Russia’s ability to engage the United States and its allies in military-to-military collaboration in Syria. 184

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Russia’s air campaign featured a vigorous pace, involving some seventy sorties each day. As a result, the Syrian Army was able to gain considerable ground, and the balance of forces within Syria shifted dramatically in Assad’s favor. As expert on the Russian military Michael Kofman observed: “At the outset of the Russian air campaign, U.S. officials called it a predetermined failure. Here their foresight proved as faulty as many other a time when predicting the course of events in the Middle East.”111 Kofman continues: “the question we should ask is whether or not Russian use of force in Syria is achieving their desired political ends. The answer is yes. The United States made a mistake by waving off this intervention as a doomed adventure.”112 There were repeated charges from Western nations that Moscow had engaged in indiscriminate bombing in the Syrian campaign, often from high altitudes with unguided bombs wreaking havoc on the civilian population and generating additional refugee flows. Air warfare expert of the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment in Washington DC, Ben Lambeth, said of Russia’s air assault in Syria: “They are following a clear strategy, and, in my opinion, are succeeding at it mightily,” though it was carried out “most sloppily and in total indifference to the collateral damage to infrastructure and killing of innocents.”113 Moscow officials denied charges that they were deliberately attempting to provoke further mass refugee waves from Syria or conducting bombing campaigns that were more destructive than similar military operations carried out by Western nations.114 Russia’s intervention in Syria directly conflicted with NATO member Turkey’s objectives, entailing considerable risk and adverse consequences for both nations. Ankara had been focused on replacing Bashar al-Assad and his minority Alawite regime with a Sunni-majority government. The overriding interest for Turkey was to thwart territorial gains on the part of the Kurdish population in Northern Syria, while both Russia (and the United States) relied on the Syrian Kurds as partners in achieving strategic objectives. Ankara maintained that the Kurds of Northern Syria are aligned with the autonomy-seeking PKK, responsible for carrying out an insurgency in Turkey for more than three decades. Even though the Kurds in Syria have made several significant advances in supporting the struggle against IS, Ankara had been targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG; the armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD and military ally of the PKK) inside Syria’s borders. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan allowed the United States as a NATO ally to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey for operations against IS, but Turkey’s missile attacks were directed almost exclusively against the Syrian Kurds. Senior Turkish officials openly stated that the Kurds pose a greater threat to Turkish national interests than IS, and Ankara has objected to US assistance to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Erdoğan has stated 185

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that there is no difference between the YPG and IS, contending that both are “terrorist” forces. Both the United States and Russia have worked with the Kurdish Democratic Union and the People’s Protection Units to provide the most effective fighting force against IS, and the YPG ground forces also supported Russia’s air campaign staged against the anti-Assad al Nusra Front, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, and its allies, who were reported to have received support from Ankara. Moscow came close to military conflict with NATO in November 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 military aircraft engaged in the Syrian conflict, followed by the killing of one of the Russian pilots. Ankara maintained that the Russian military aircraft had strayed into its airspace and ignored repeated warnings, but Moscow insisted that the aircraft never left Syrian territory. Subsequent disclosures suggest that Turkey undertook this highly provocative action without prior consent from NATO allies. Putin warned of “serious consequences,” and Moscow responded by deploying S400 SAMs.115 Vladimir Putin characterized the downing of the Russian fighter aircraft as a “stab in the back” by “committed accomplices of the terrorists,” and Russia initially responded by imposing a series of economic sanctions on Turkey.116 The incident raised serious questions about whether Moscow’s clashes with a NATO ally could lead to invoking Article V or a collective response of the Alliance against Russia. In fact, even though evidence suggests that other NATO members objected to potentially being implicated by Erdoğan’s risky action, the incident might have escalated to a Russia–NATO confrontation had Moscow not responded with restraint.117 Prior to the incident, Putin had referred to Turkey as a “strategic partner,” and the two countries had extensive bilateral ties in energy, trade, and tourism. Russia and Turkey share a certain affinity as a result of being marginalized to some extent from the European security and economic communities and in resisting elements of the Western liberal order. Prompted largely by mutual economic interests and the desire to preserve a significant bilateral relationship, Erdoğan issued an apology to Putin over the death of the Russian pilot, and then traveled to St. Petersburg in August 2016 to meet with Putin. The two countries moved swiftly to restore energy and economic ties, but the differing perspectives and interests on the part of Moscow and Ankara on Syria will have to be managed and remain a source of potential conflict.

China’s Assessment and Response The Middle East has not traditionally held the same importance for China as for Russia, the United States, and Europe. China is geographically distant from Syria, and the mass exodus of refugees from war-ravaged Syria has not 186

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impacted China in the way this crisis has influenced circumstances in Europe. China’s engagement in the Middle East advances Xi Jinping’s vision of playing a more assertive role on the global stage and establishing credibility as a major world power, but China has refrained from incurring the level of risk or cost that other major powers have been willing to stake in the region. Like Moscow, Beijing also seeks to balance the predominance of US influence in the Middle East, and China’s leadership has been averse to intervention or violating the sovereignty of nations. In spite of pressure from other international actors for China to assume greater responsibility in attempting to manage the Syrian crisis, Beijing has been reluctant to be drawn into a situation in Syria that could drain resources and damage interests in the wider Middle East region. Consistent with China’s rise on the world stage, Beijing has become more assertive in the Middle East in recent years, especially in developing economic ties, but also participating in regional diplomatic efforts. In January 2016, Xi Jinping made his first state visit since assuming office to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. China’s President placed emphasis on promoting the regional OBOR initiative in the Middle East, seeking collaboration in energy, infrastructure development, and technology. Gulf oil and gas imports have become essential for China’s economy over the past two decades, with 50 percent of its oil imports coming from the Middle East. China has growing economic interests and ties with both the Shia (Iran) and Sunni (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) nations. Beijing has been concerned that Sunni–Shia conflict within Syria could further engulf the region in war, potentially disrupting China’s trade and oil supplies. Ongoing war and terror attacks in the region can place China’s major investments and plans for the OBOR economic growth initiative at risk. Beijing’s focus has been to contain or resolve conflict in the Middle East in order to secure China’s economic interests and to avoid any further destabilization of security circumstances in Syria or throughout the region. China–Syria bilateral ties have been much more limited than Russia’s relationship with Syria or the regime of Bashar al-Assad. China has provided military hardware to Syria, but total China–Syria trade registered only $1.2 billion in 2012, representing a 50 percent decrease from 2011 totals.118 China’s National Petroleum Company did partner with Syria’s main oil-producing consortium, but operations were halted as a result of escalation of the war. In responding to the crisis in Syria, Beijing’s commitment to noninterference and respect for sovereignty contributed to its support for Russia’s position that Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad should remain in power. From Beijing’s perspective, US attempts at nation-building and regime change in the Middle East, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, were “misadventures” that had only jeopardized stability in these nations.119 Chinese experts tend to 187

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emphasize that the conflict in Syria and the surrounding region reflects a struggle within Islam that can only be intensified by intervention on the part of external powers. Beijing would undoubtedly have preferred that Moscow utilize instruments other than military force in Syria, but the fact that Russia’s engagement in Syria was carried out in response to requests by the legitimate incumbent government made it more justified from Beijing’s view. The destabilizing impact of the Arab Spring, and especially the lessons derived from the consequences of the collapse of the regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, contributed significantly to influencing China’s assessment and responses to the Syrian civil war. China came to regret the decision to abstain and not to veto the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 allowing for a no-fly zone over Libya. For Beijing, the Western-led intervention in Libya became a UN-sanctioned attempt at regime change, and the Chinese leadership was careful to avoid the same mistake again, prompting them to resist any sanctions against Syria. Professor Pan Guang, Director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies, emphasized that avoiding a “second Libya” was a primary concern for China in assessing options for Syria.120 Pan Guang noted that the ouster of Qaddafi has led to the proliferation of weapons in the hands of mujahideen and others, intensifying existing destabilizing trends in the region, and Pan Guang said he believes that even a “weak Assad” would be preferable to unseating the regime, as in Libya.121 Beijing’s interest in the Syrian conflict also stems from the fact that there are greater numbers of Uighurs from Xinjiang in the western region of China transiting through Central Asia to fight in the Syrian civil war. China’s interest in Afghanistan was also significantly tied to concerns about Uighur separatist groups participating in the conflict and potentially returning to Xinjiang to pose a destabilizing security threat. Reports range from “hundreds” to “thousands” of Uighurs in Syria, primarily concentrated in the northern Idlib Province belonging to the al Nusra Front allied to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a successor of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).122 The TIP has been playing an increasingly important combatant role in Syria, and has publicized its capabilities and contributions supporting the al Nusra Front and other jihadist forces on the Syrian battlefield in the struggle to oust Assad.123 China has worked to control Islamist separatists in Xinjiang and does not want them to find another source of material and ideological support. Islamic State in Syria has included China as a target, and the leadership of IS has spoken of the desire to increase their presence in China. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadhi has threatened China over treatment of the Muslim Uighur minority.124 Beijing’s interests converge with Moscow’s in placing a priority on countering terrorism, extremism, and separatism. When the United States began conducting airstrikes against IS in Syria, one of China’s main concerns was 188

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that the Obama Administration had not received approval from the Assad government to employ military force in Syria. However, again, because Russia entered the war at Assad’s request, Moscow’s military engagement was less objectionable for Beijing. As China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, noted in late 2015: We have always supported the efforts of various countries, including Russia, to ensure international security. As for Russia’s strikes against terrorist organizations in Syria, we have also expressed our support previously and noted that Russia carried out the fight against terrorist organizations in Syria at the invitation of the government of this country.125

Following the terrorist attacks in France in November 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping joined other major world leaders in offering condolences to French President Hollande and vowing to join the worldwide effort against IS.126 In December 2015, China implemented a new counterterrorism law to allow the People’s Liberation Army to engage in overseas activities. China had started construction of its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2014, and since January 2014 elite forces from China had been training for desert operations in “unfamiliar territory.” Some observers had suggested that China would enter the Syrian military campaign with Russia in fall 2015, and particularly following the terrorist attacks in France. Speculation was also fueled by the Russian and Chinese navies engaging in their first small-scale joint exercises in the Mediterranean in 2015. A Chinese official source indicated that Beijing had dispatched military advisors to Syria with the approval of the Assad government prior to mid-2016 to train regime forces in the use of weapons that had been purchased from China.127 Consistent with China’s status as a major global player, Beijing has been more engaged in diplomatic processes in the Middle East in recent years. Xi has offered his support for major peace initiatives in the region, including supporting the establishment of the Palestinian state. From the start of the Syrian civil war, China’s engagement in Syria has been primarily at the diplomatic level, and Beijing has underscored the point that political negotiation between the competing parties is essential for resolution of the crisis. China joined Russia in vetoing the series of UNSCR resolutions on Syria directed toward prosecuting the abuses of the Assad regime, leaving Beijing a target of international criticism as being responsible for failing to counter genocide in Syria. China consistently contended that “political resolution” would be the “only realistic way to solve the Syrian issue.” In the first phase of the Syrian conflict, China criticized the United States’ threat to strike the Assad regime for chemical weapons use, and then offered enthusiastic support for the plan to destroy Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons, committing a ship to assist in escorting the mission.128 189

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Beijing seeks to fuel the perception of assuming the role of a responsible global player in the Syrian conflict by advancing a number of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolution of the conflict. In 2012, China issued a fourpoint plan for settlement of the Syrian conflict, but this first proposal lacked significant details, including specifying what role Assad would play in any political transition.129 In preparation for the Geneva II talks in 2014, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi advanced a five-point proposal in the UN, to include: 1) The issue of Syria must be resolved through political means; 2) Syria’s future must be decided by its own people; 3) An inclusive political transition must be promoted; 4) National reconciliation and unity must be achieved in Syria; and 5) The international community should provide humanitarian assistance to Syria and its neighbors.130 In fall 2015, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Li Baodong broached a four-point proposal for political resolution of the war in Syria during talks held in Vienna, including that: 1) China urges all sides in Syria to embrace an immediate ceasefire with a commitment to fight terrorism; 2) Syria’s warring sides, under the auspices of the UN, should have comprehensive, inclusive, and equal dialogue to make arrangements for political transition; 3) The UN should play the role of the main channel of mediation in the Syrian crisis; and 4) A process of reconstruction should commence among warring sides in Syria making clear the peace dividends that will result once the war ends.131 China’s diplomatic initiatives in the Syrian crisis have also included meeting with representatives of the Assad government and the Syrian opposition in Beijing. For example, on December 24, 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al Moualem in Beijing, and shortly after met with Khaled Khoja, President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary Opposition Forces.132 In March 2016, China appointed career diplomat and former Chinese Ambassador to Iran Xie Xiaoyan as its first special envoy for the Syria crisis.133 The Chinese government suggested that the appointment of the special envoy would contribute “to better proactively put forward China’s wisdom” toward a settlement.134 Beijing has offered humanitarian support to Syria, and pledged to assist in postwar reconstruction. China’s participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon suggests that it is not out of the question that it could contribute to such a force in the future in Syria.

Russia’s Continued Military Engagement, Collapse of the US–Russia Brokered Peace Settlement, Beijing Signals Deepening Involvement On March 14, 2016, Russia’s President surprised the international community by declaring that he was “withdrawing” Russia’s military force from Syria, claiming that the objectives for the military intervention had largely been 190

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accomplished. Putin stated: “I believe that the task put before the defense ministry and Russian armed forces has, on the whole, been fulfilled” and that Syrian armed forces with the assistance of Russia’s military “have been able to achieve a fundamental turnaround in the fight against international terrorism.”135 Putin made the announcement on the same day that the UN-brokered peace talks resumed in Geneva, noting further that: “With the participation of the Russian troops and Russian military grouping, the Syrian troops and Syrian patriotic forces, we were able to radically change the situation in fighting international terrorism and take initiative in nearly all areas to create the conditions for the start of the peace process.”136 In announcing the drawdown of Russia’s armed forces, Putin also made clear that Russia would maintain its Mediterranean naval facility in the port of Tartus and its airbase in the Syrian province of Latakia.137 The Interfax news agency reported that approximately 1,000 troops would remain in Syria, many of whom were military advisors.138 Reports indicated that a portion of Russia’s fighter strike force would remain, and that the entire strike force could be returned to Syria within 48 hours. Moscow signaled that its air defense forces would not be removed from Syria, including S-400 anti-aircraft systems.139 Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, described the Kremlin’s strategy, noting that “Moscow is initiating a peace process and following the path of the United States in Afghanistan by leaving its strongholds and their means of defense.”140 Clearly, Moscow’s military withdrawal would be partial, maintaining sufficient military presence to safeguard its interests in Syria and to be positioned with the flexibility to escalate military engagement as deemed necessary. The announced “withdrawal” did generate considerable discussion among the Russian foreign policy community and media evaluating the success of the Syrian military campaign. War correspondent Alexander Kots, writing in Komsomolskaya Pravda, offered the following assessment of Moscow’s contribution: In case anyone has forgotten, the Assad regime was hardly functioning in autumn 2015, and the jihadists were moving toward Damascus. Today Assad’s representatives sit at the table with the enemies’ commanders and try to negotiate. More than forty different groups joined the ceasefire. Is it possible not to thank Russian military and diplomats? No one had been able to accomplish this in over five years of the conflict in Syria. And Moscow managed this in 5 months!141

Quoted in an article on the announced military withdrawal from Syria in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Lt. Gen. Yuriy Netkachev noted that “A number of factors have influenced the decision to pull back our aviation group from Syria . . . The main one is that the Syrian crisis cannot be settled with combat means, so the 191

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peace process that has started in Syria is a logical development.”142 Maksim Suchkov of the Russian Council for International Affairs, did caution, however: It is pointless to deny, though, that one of Russia’s objectives in Syria that was declared from the very beginning was not achieved. Serious damage has been inflicted on the IS group, but it is still capable of causing trouble for the Syrian government and posing a threat in the region and abroad.143

It should be noted that while Moscow did claim to be in Syria to fight terrorism, defeating IS was never established as an objective for the military campaign, perhaps because the Kremlin recognized that such a goal might not be attainable. Russia’s defense establishment took note of the improved performance over the previous weaknesses evident in the military deployment during the Russo–Georgian war of 2008. For example, Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and Member of the Public Council under the Russian Defense Ministry, offered the following observation, typical of assessments reached by Russia’s defense community: Russia’s air operation in Syria is the most spectacular military-political event of our time . . . Russia’s capability to maintain a very high sortie rate for a long period of time and the absence of combat and operational losses (except for the SU-24M frontline bomber shot down by the Turkish Air Force) came as, perhaps, the biggest surprise to observers, especially abroad. This indicates that the Russian air group’s combat activities in Syria have been excellently organized at all levels and that the Russian Aerospace Forces meet modern requirements . . . The situation is in stark contrast to Russia’s actions in the five-day conflict with Georgia in August 2008. Although confronted by a weak enemy, Russian aviation lost seven combat aircraft in four days (including a Tu-22 M3 long-range bomber) and another four aircraft were seriously damaged . . . During the seven years that have passed since then, the Russian Air Force (renamed the Aerospace Forces on August 1, 2015) have progressed rapidly in all areas.144

Putin’s military intervention in Syria presented a perfect opportunity to showcase improvements in Russia’s armed forces and continued capacity for projecting power throughout the world, but there were also considerations that might have prompted Putin to consider drawing down Russia’s military presence in Syria. While the Russians had relied on airpower in executing the Syrian campaign, avoiding a commitment of ground combat units as in the past in Afghanistan, Putin was also concerned not to become embroiled in an endless military engagement that could significantly drain resources. The impact of Western economic sanctions over Ukraine and fluctuations in world oil prices placed strains on Russia’s economy. Perhaps even more significant, the timing of Russia’s announced withdrawal might pressure Assad to 192

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be more inclined to cooperate in the renewal of the peace process effort. Russia’s display of military force left no doubt regarding Moscow’s importance in resolving the Syrian conflict, and the situation offered Russia a possibility to potentially re-engage with the United States and its allies in the aftermath of the serious derailing of its relationships with Western countries as a consequence of the Ukraine intervention. Sergei Strokan, foreign affairs columnist for Kommersant, offered the point that “Putin has a bigger agenda, which does not involve endless fighting against jihadists in the deserts of eastern Syria . . . He wants to restore relations with the West on Russia’s terms, end sanctions, and put Russia back in the center of world affairs.”145 With the United States facing a fractured opposition in Syria that had made little progress, Russia’s significant military engagement brought further pressure on the United States to retreat from the initial insistence that “Assad must go” and perhaps be more willing to compromise in working with Russia to broker a diplomatic solution. In December 2015, Russia and the United States, together with China and other members of the Security Council, unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution 2254, offering a road map for a peace process in Syria that included implementation of a ceasefire and established the initial steps for political transition.146 The UN Peace Conference for Syria had resumed in Geneva in January 2016, and the ceasefire was announced on February 22, 2016. Russia and the United States were to become co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), with the stated aim of “seeking to advance a peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis with full support of the United Nations” and to “establish the conditions for a successful Syrian-led political transition process.”147 The peace proposal applied only to the “rebel groups” that were prepared to stop hostilities and engage in talks, and did not involve the recognized terrorist organizations such as IS/Daesh and al Nusra. This arrangement included maintaining an around-the-clock Coordination Center to be managed by the United States and Russia to ensure compliance. On February 23, 2016, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Major General Igor Konashenkov said the center’s main objective would be “to assist the reconciliation process between the Syrian opposition and government, with the exception of ISIS or other terrorist organizations.”148 The United States and its European allies were no longer insisting that Assad must go as an immediate first priority; rather, Western nations would concede that Assad could remain in power for an undefined political transition period. Moscow was not ruling out that Assad’s exit could never be considered, but that leadership change would not be possible until the territory of Syria was secured under the existing state structure. Therefore, Russia and the United States were prepared to cooperate toward brokering a peace settlement and Syrian-led political transition that may or may not include Bashar al-Assad 193

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continuing in the leading position in Syria’s future. In the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities in early 2016, US Department of Defense sources suggested that Russia’s airstrikes had shifted, registering a significant uptick in targeting IS.149 Fu Ying, chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, offered the following assessment of the Russia–United States relationship in Syria in December 2015: Although Washington has called for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, it shares Russia’s goal of taking on Islamic State . . . So, on the one hand, the United States has criticized the Russian intervention, but on the other hand, it has expressed willingness to work with Russia on counterterrorism. The Russian move, then, was not exactly what the United States wanted to see but was not an entirely bad thing for U.S. interests, either. From China’s perspective, Russia and the United States share an interest in confronting the brutal terrorists of ISIS . . . But it is difficult to know how far U.S.-Russian cooperation on Syria can go without a common understanding about what will lead to peace and order.150

Clearly, Russia, the United States, and China could find common ground in seeking to prevent the Syrian nation from collapsing into a terrorist-held stronghold, but resistance on the part of Russia’s ally Bashar al-Assad and lack of agreement on priorities for the United States and Russia would prove decisive. In referencing the plan to cease hostilities in Syria, US Secretary of State John Kerry in fact did acknowledge that “[without] Russia’s cooperation I’m not sure we would have been able to have achieved the agreement.”151 Returning to the Syrian peace process and establishing the ISSG facilitated the resumption of communication between Russia’s President Putin and US President Obama after a period of suspended contact over the Ukrainian crisis. The two presidents communicated by phone on December 22, 2015, regarding the situation in Syria and other critical issues, and they spoke again on February 22, 2016, to discuss the terms for managing the Syrian crisis. Russia also hoped to utilize the need for greater military coordination with the United States, necessary for implementing the ceasefire as a means to better military-to-military consultation which had broken down as a consequence of sharp differences over circumstances in Ukraine. US Secretary of State John Kerry played a lead role in the ceasefire talks and expressed hope that the US–Russia agreement might succeed. Accounts indicate that John Kerry was opposed within the Obama Administration by US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan, all of whom were skeptical from the outset about whether the agreement would hold.152 Ash Carter described the agreement as a “ruse.”153 Carter and Dunford pressed the White House to agree to a “Plan B” that would include 194

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stepping up arms supplies to Syrian rebels and tightening sanctions in the event that Russia undermined the ceasefire agreement. John Kerry conceded that the agreement represented a “test” on whether “Moscow can be trusted” and that “Plan B thinking needs to occur” if Russia failed to abide by the agreement.154 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov responded to rumors about a “Plan B” under consideration in the Obama Administration, suggesting that “We’re perplexed by our Western partners . . . mentioning some kind of ‘Plan B.’ Nothing is known on that one, we are considering no alternate plans.”155 For Moscow, reaching the agreement on Syria presented an opportunity to impress upon the global community that Russia is an equal partner with the United States. Vladimir Putin demonstrated the seriousness of the Kremlin’s intentions by supporting the effort and acknowledging the importance of Russia and the United States in the process. Representatives of Russia’s foreign policy community reacted quite favorably to the proposed central role for Russian–American collaborative leadership in Syria. Writing in Rossiskya Gazeta, Fyodor Lukyanov states: It is a matter not just of the content of the joint statement, but also of its tone. Moscow and Washington are jointly acting as the initiators and guarantors of a most important international process that is of concern to most of mankind. Against the background of the relations that have taken shape between the two countries over the last couple of years, the example of such a constructive approach is unprecedented.156

Nikolay Surkov of the Oriental Studies Department at Moscow State Institute of International Relations MGIMO concluded: “The joint statement is a milestone in the development of Russia-U.S. relations because it shows that the two sides are capable of constructive cooperation regardless of their differences.”157 Leading expert in Moscow on US–Russian relations, Victor A. Kremenyuk, offered the following observation: Alongside the search for a peace settlement of the Syrian conflict a code of new relations between Russia and the United States should be devised . . . We are large countries, but we are not the only ones in the world. The widest dialogue should be promoted for the sake of trust toward each other to ensure nobody in the United States, Europe or the Middle East should feel any doubts about the implementation of the settlement plan for Syria. Then nothing like PLAN B will ever loom on the horizon.158

Alexei Arbatov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations suggested that “the stakes for Moscow and Washington in the Syrian settlement are so high that there is no way to back off . . . Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama already cannot say: ‘Excuse us, this didn’t work,’ and back away. This is unacceptable for them.”159 195

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Following the announcement of the ceasefire of February 27, 2016, serious obstacles remained, threatening to undermine the entire peace process. The Assad government negotiators maintained that his presidency was nonnegotiable, and the Syrian armed forces continued shelling rebel-controlled areas in Aleppo. In April, the main armed opposition walked out of the peace talks. On May 1, 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry appealed again to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for assistance in containing violence in Syria. Russia and the United States attempted to develop a detailed map with “safe zones” where opposition groups covered under the truce agreement could be sheltered from Assad’s continued attacks, and agreed to work to reach “shared understanding” on the territories held by IS and the al Qaedalinked al Nusra Front. Tensions peaked in July–August 2016 over militants of IS shooting down a Syrian Mi25 helicopter carrying Russian crew members, and the downing of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in Syria’s Idlib province, killing Russian crew members and officers on board.160 Unfortunately, fulfilling the plethora of predictions waged by the pessimists, while US Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterpart Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov had made repeated attempts to sustain the peace initiative, the US–Russia effort would result in another diplomatic failure during fall 2016. After observing the early weeks of the ceasefire, Russia had joined Assad’s forces to continue strike missions in Syria, bolstered by Russian attack helicopters supporting a major offensive against opposition strongholds in contested areas. The Russian and Syrian air assault included employing bunker buster and cluster munition bombs in the rebel-held areas of Aleppo, resulting in high levels of civilian casualties and generating wide criticism among the international community. The top UN human rights official Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein referred to the heavy civilian casualties and abuses following the bombing siege in eastern Aleppo as “simply not tragedies” but “crimes of historic proportions,” and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described the situation in Aleppo as a “slaughterhouse.”161 As US and Russian diplomats were on the verge of resuming the ceasefire, the entire effort collapsed again, almost at the same time as the US coalition mistakenly carried out an airstrike against Syrian troops in the eastern province of Deir al-Zour intended to target IS, and a clearly marked humanitarian aid convoy carrying support en route to Aleppo was bombed, with allegations that either the Russian or Syrian armed forces were responsible for the attack.162 What started as a major US–Russian-led diplomatic effort earlier in the year had deteriorated into mutual accusations of blame and escalating threats. The United States issued an ultimatum to Moscow on September 28, 2016, warning that US–Russian engagement on Syria would be suspended unless Russia ended the assault of the rebel-held eastern Aleppo in support of Damascus. 196

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John Kirby, US State Department spokesman, said that the “United States is suspending its participation in bilateral channels with Russia that were established to sustain the cessation of hostilities,” and, further, that this was “not a decision that was taken lightly,” but that the Obama Administration still preferred a diplomatic solution.163 The Obama Administration came under increasing pressure to employ harsh measures to counter the Russian and Syrian air assault in eastern Aleppo. The US State Department signaled that non-diplomatic options were being considered to respond to the largescale casualties resulting from the Russian and Syria aerial bombardment of Aleppo. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Moscow was forced to resume attacks on rebel-held positions after the ceasefire collapsed, blaming the United States for failing to distinguish among moderate anti-Assad and extremist opposition forces, al Qaeda-linked al Nusra, and others.164 Lavrov stated: “About the situation in Aleppo . . . the entire problem derives from the fact that the United States and the coalition led by the United States cannot and refuses, basically, to separate the opposition from Nusra and the terrorist groups who joined Nusra.”165 Representatives of the Russian military repeatedly complained that the US-supported rebels were violating the ceasefire in Syria. Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, justified Moscow’s intervention as necessary to stop the advance of the Nusra Front that had taken eastern Aleppo “hostage,” affirming that “We’re trying to make sure black flags won’t fly over Damascus.”166 Because al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the al Nusra Front, had always sought the ouster of Assad, for Russia al Nusra remained an unambiguous first-order target. However, unlike IS in Syria, which touted a global agenda openly declaring the intention to carry out terrorist attacks in the West, al Nusra restricted its stated objectives to focus exclusively within Syria to oust Assad and establish an Islamic regime. For the United States, IS was the most significant threat, while distinguishing the loyalists of al Nusra frequently embedded with the moderate opposition forces presented obstacles in synchronizing US and Russian strategies and targets. The problem was further complicated in July 2016, as al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate al Nusra announced that they had parted amicably with al Qaeda and would change their name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Conquest of Levant), which was evidently a purely tactical rebranding largely instigated to reduce the likelihood of being successfully targeted by the United States and Russia.167 The collapse of the US–Russian effort in Syria led to speculation among Moscow’s foreign policy community that the Obama Administration would move to “Plan B,” which could involve airstrikes to prevent Assad from taking Aleppo, providing increasingly lethal military support to Assad’s opposition 197

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directly or via Turkey or the Gulf states, or imposing an additional package of economic sanctions on Russia. An article published in Izvestia on October 5, 2016, featured interviews with officials and experts from Russia’s foreign policy community discussing possible countermeasures for Moscow in responding to the withdrawal of the United States from talks on Syria and resort to the so-called “Plan B.”168 The article included interviews with Frants Klintsevich, first deputy chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security, and other high-ranking representatives of Russia’s defense community, indicating that Russia’s Ministry of Defense prepared a “comprehensive plan” to counter possible US actions following the suspension of US–Russian collaboration in Syria to include substantially increasing military support for the Syrian armed forces and other measures within Syrian territory and beyond its borders.169 Spokeswoman for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, warned that US intervention against the Syrian Army “will lead to terrible, tectonic consequences not only on the territory of this country but also in the region as a whole.”170 Russian Defense Ministry Spokesman Major General Igor Konashenkov issued the warning that Russia’s air defense and anti-missile systems were prepared to shoot down “any unidentified flying object” if airstrikes targeted Syrian government positions.171 While the United States and Russia did share certain objectives, the priorities of the two countries were still sufficiently at odds as to undermine the intention to maintain the ceasefire and move toward settlement. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was unwilling to support the US–Russia brokered ceasefire that was to establish the conditions for an immediate or eventual political settlement and likely leadership transition. Moscow certainly recognized the opportunity that cooperation with the United States in Syria could offer in contributing to restoring the relationship with the United States after Ukraine, but at the same time Putin did not want to lose the advantage in influencing Syria’s transition in a way that would safeguard Russia’s interests. Writing in Vedomosti in October 2016, Leonid Isayev of the National Research University School of Higher Economics describes the challenge for the Kremlin in attempting to “sit on two chairs at once” or to accomplish “two mutually exclusive tasks”:172 If Moscow wishes to take advantage of the Syrian conflict as a first step en route to normalization of relations with the West, its sole option is a political settlement of the situation. Which, in turn, should take Russia to a fundamentally different plane: moderator of the Syrian conflict equidistant both from the regime and from the moderate opposition. But in this case, Moscow would be absolutely unnecessary for the Syrian regime and would be jeopardizing all our agreements on a Russian presence in Syria.173

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The fact that significant differences remained between Washington and Moscow on the future of the Assad regime and the potential legitimacy of alternative opposition forces left Moscow with the option of proceeding to exert its military advantage to assist Assad in regaining contested areas, further weakening the adversaries of the Damascus government. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had called for imposing a partial no-fly zone in Syria, and the perception in Moscow was that she would be more inclined to employ coercive measures and lethal force than the Obama Administration, perhaps prompting the Kremlin to proceed to assist Assad in consolidating his hold on territory, leaving fewer options as the new US Administration assumes office in 2017. A successful Russia–Syria air campaign to take back Aleppo would limit military options for Assad’s opponents and might place the Kremlin and the existing regime in Damascus in a stronger position at a point that the diplomatic process might resume in 2017. The collapse of the attempt on the part of the United States and Russia to take the initiative in jointly leading a brokered ceasefire and political transition in Syria does not mean the two countries will never be successful in Syria, or elsewhere, in the future. However, the serious lack of trust in both Washington and Moscow, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine, will continue to present significant barriers for effective cooperation in regional conflict situations. Circumstances were further complicated over the course of 2016 as NATO activated the missile defense shield system in Romania and deployed additional battalions in Eastern Europe to counter perceptions of an escalating Russian threat, generating further mutual mistrust and suspicions regarding intentions. The opportunity presented by the Syrian case to restore some confidence in the US–Russian bilateral relationship by working together to bring an end to a conflict that has taken a devastating toll in terms of staggering loss of life and displacement was not realized due to differing interests and priorities complicated by the enormously complex circumstances in the Syrian security environment undermining whatever positive intentions existed in Moscow or Washington. China’s involvement in the Syrian crisis moved to a new level in August 2016 as Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation of China’s PLA, traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian Defense Minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij. Following the visit in August 2016, Chinese military officials announced that they would provide personnel training and humanitarian aid in support of Bashar al-Assad’s government.174 Guan was quoted by Xinhua as stating “China and Syria’s militaries have a traditionally friendly relationship, and China’s military is willing to keep strengthening exchanges and cooperation with Syria’s military.”175 During this visit, China’s RADM Guan Youfei also consulted with Lt. Gen. Sergei Chvarkov, who headed the Russian naval base at Latakia. The military/diplomatic

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initiative might have been prompted by Beijing’s desire to ensure that China’s position and interests with respect to Syria and the region would be protected in any future political arrangement that might result from the US–Russian-led attempt to broker a settlement. An article published in Global Times (an affiliate of the CCP’s People’s Daily) and carried in China’s military news source, reporting on the significance of RADM Guan Youfei’s visit and the resulting agreements with the Assad regime, suggested that the “time is right for the Chinese military to contribute more to ending the Syrian crisis.”176 Among the explanations offered, the article quotes Zhao Weiming, a professor of Middle East Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, noting he told the Global Times that because “the US has been interfering militarily in China’s backyard in the South China Sea, this could be pushback from the Chinese military into an area, the Middle East, that is usually considered a US sphere of influence.”177 Tensions between China and its neighbors and the United States certainly heightened in 2016 as Beijing asserted pressure to advance its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, and therefore suggesting some type of regional sphere of influence quid pro quo might be relevant. However, the same Global Times article also hinted at Beijing’s continued caution, quoting former Chinese Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming: “China’s deeper engagement with the Syrian government does not necessarily mean it will start any military intervention in Syria,” and quoting the Ambassador’s statement that “Intervention from outside can only enlarge the crisis, so China will maintain the relationship with the government and encourage negotiations between different parties.”178 Even if the United States, Russia, and China could reconcile their differences toward reaching a settlement in Syria, there are multiple additional external actors with stakes in Syria that can be unpredictable and difficult to manage. Russia, China, and Shiite Iran have consistently supported the Assad regime, but Moscow’s relationship with Tehran is not an alliance and the Kremlin cannot be assured of being able to influence Iran’s responses to potential escalation of engagement on the part of Sunni Arab nations or in other circumstances in Syria in the future. Although Turkey is a member of the NATO alliance, Ankara’s interest in thwarting Kurdish gains is likely to present obstacles to securing any settlement and continue to potentially place Turkey at odds with the United States and other European allies in reaching a settlement. Tremendous uncertainty remains with respect to Syria’s future. Different areas within Syria are still under the control of the government, various rebel groups, the Kurdish YPG militia, and IS. All stakeholders, particularly those in Syria, will have to find a common platform and terms to come together around a permanent constitutional arrangement. Several critical dimensions of a political transition remain unclear, and there is no indication of a path 200

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beyond the deadlock concerning Assad’s future or discussion of the conditions for an eventual exit. A long-term international strategy for countering IS and other jihadi groups in Syria has yet to be defined. Any agreement will have to provide for the safety of Syria’s minority Alawite community. Brian Jenkins, expert on terrorism at the RAND Corporation, suggests that an “interim solution” might be a “local accommodation that reduces violence and leaves in place some sort of Sunni entity government by a rebel coalition.”179 Jenkins poses the question of whether this might include the successor of the Nusra Front, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which he believes might be easier to envision now that the tie with al Qaeda has been severed. However, even if Russia and China agreed to accept a transition of Assad from power, neither will concede to an arrangement that would place an entity that has been affiliated with al Qaeda and the Turkistan Islamic Movement (TIP) at the political foundation for Syria’s future. Shiite Tehran would most assuredly be an even greater obstacle to such an arrangement. Given the sharp religious and ethnic polarization within the country even before the outbreak of conflict in 2011 exacerbated by conflicting objectives among external powers, partition might represent the only long-term viable settlement for Syria. One possibility might be complete dissolution of the Syrian state in a post-Yugoslav model, a federated system like Bosnia, or a weaker federated model as in Iraq.180 There have been suggestions to establish a Sunni-protected area or to create major zones roughly along lines of the concentrations of Syria’s ethno-religious sectarian groups, with the northern or northeastern regions belonging to Kurds; grouping Damascus and southern regions to accommodate Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others in the east; leaving the center of the country under moderate Sunni leadership; and finally to either include in a fourth zone or eradicate the IS and al Nusra Front terrorist groups.181 Vadim Kozylin of the Russian Center for Policy Studies (PRI) in Moscow notes that while “Syrian Kurds never publically declared their intention to strive for a separate statehood, the situation might evolve along the same route as in Iraqi Kurdistan,”182 a development that would undoubtedly be deemed unacceptable to Ankara. Grigory Kosach, professor at Russian State University for Humanities and expert on politics in the Arab world, similarly suggests that “Moscow might count on preserving its influence with the authorities, who would control two large territories: one stretching from Damascus to Aleppo all along the Mediterranean coast, and the other encompassing the northern region largely inhabited by the Kurds.”183 Like the United States and China, Moscow would prefer that Syria remain a unified nation, but Russia’s overriding interest will be to ensure that any transitional federation or division of the country will include a regime that is favorable to Moscow’s interests, and providing continued access to the strategically important regions of the Mediterranean coast. 201

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All indicators suggest that the situation in Syria is likely to remain intractable for a prolonged period. The danger of external actors involved in the Syrian war further fueling wider regional Sunni–Shia sectarian conflict with Russia, and to a lesser extent China continuing to render military and diplomatic support to the existing Shiite regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus backed by Tehran, juxtaposed against calls by Sunni-majority nations, especially Saudi Arabia, for Assad’s departure, with the support of the United States and its European allies, remains a significant threat. Many of the war refugees will choose not to return to Syria, draining the nation of the human talent needed to rebuild, and thousands of others who fled the war to Jordan, Turkey, and Europe will require substantial repatriation assistance. Even in the bestcase scenario, Russia, the United States, China, and other nations will have to manage the demands for massive long-term reconstruction support and humanitarian assistance needed in Syria.

Implications of Russian and Chinese Involvement in Ukraine and Syria for Regional Conflicts, Geopolitics, and World Order The behavior of Russia and China in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria has been mutually supportive, presenting challenges to the United States and its Western allies. Russia’s engagement has certainly been more consequential in both cases, but the influence exerted by China has not been insignificant. Both nations have responded in these situations to challenge major tenets of the liberal international order and to reinforce their preference for transition from the immediate post-Cold War unipolar arrangement to an increasingly multipolar world order. Russia’s clash with the West over Ukraine served to intensify the urgency for Moscow to pivot toward China, and the circumstances surrounding the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria have contributed to enhancing the Sino–Russian bond and the countries’ collective resolve to offset US and Western democratic predominance in the global community. Putin’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea and the commitment to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria are indicative of Moscow’s determination to pursue its foreign policy and strategic interests even at considerable cost and risk. Moscow’s behavior in both situations served Putin’s interests in reasserting and regaining Russia’s influence not only in its immediate neighborhood, but also on the wider global stage in the Middle East and beyond. The stakes for Beijing in the wars in Ukraine and Syria were not as critical as for Moscow, but China’s response was also consistent with its interests and there was no reluctance to hedge against US policy and preferences in both Ukraine and Syria. Russia and China have still been open to compromise and cooperation with the United States in both Ukraine and 202

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Syria, but the Sino–Russian partnership limits the capacity of the United States and Western nations to decisively manage outcomes in such regional conflict situations. With the aim of establishing the right to protect its perceived interests in the immediate neighborhood, Moscow’s behavior in Ukraine challenged the existing international legal system and disrupted the entire European security order. The display of Russia’s military capacity in Syria reinforced the perception that Moscow is capable of effectively projecting force beyond its bordering regions and that Russia is still a nation of considerable influence in the contemporary global community. Russia’s emboldened assertiveness has heightened fears among its neighbors, prompting them to collectively appeal to the United States and NATO for additional assurances of protection to bolster their military defense capacities. Similarly, China might be expected to clash with the United States and its allies over territorial claims in its immediate neighborhood. For example, while the South China Sea has not yet witnessed the outbreak of conflict on the scale of the wars in Ukraine and Syria, the region is fraught with territorial disputes and high tension involving significant interests for China. Although China has certainly been more reluctant to confront the West in bordering areas than Russia, Beijing has been increasingly more assertive in challenging the rules and norms underpinning the international system based on Western values and legal precedents in the South China Sea. Beijing’s weaker neighbors are apprehensive about potential clashes with China in Asia, and have sought reassurances and military support from the United States for enhanced security guarantees in countering China’s territorial ambitions. Although Moscow’s interests do not entirely correspond with China’s priorities and ambitions in the South China Sea, and both Russia and China would want to avoid the risks and costs of being drawn into the conflicts of the other nation, still Moscow’s movement closer to Beijing following the crisis in Ukraine and the support it has garnered from the Chinese leadership on its positions in both the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria might make Russia less reluctant in this current period of heightened tensions with the West to consider undertaking measures to support China in conflict situations in the South China Sea. Moscow might be expected to be even more inclined to support China in territorial disputes over the South China Sea or elsewhere in Asia if the circumstances offered potential gains for Russia in diverting the United States and its allies from regions of higher priority interest for the Kremlin, in Europe or Eurasia. The behavior of Russia and China in Ukraine and Syria suggests that both countries oppose Western initiatives that promote regime change in the interest of fostering democratic governance and protection of human rights on the world stage. Moscow’s involvement in Ukraine was justified as a response to Western attempts to undermine the pro-Russian government of 203

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Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovich. Although Beijing’s leadership was not entirely comfortable with Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine, they viewed Putin’s action as representing a response to a situation provoked by Western strategy aimed to destabilize an existing sovereign government. In both Ukraine and Syria, Moscow and Beijing exercised influence in the United Nations, holding that non-interference and respecting state sovereignty should take precedence over US and allied concerns with promoting regime change toward cultivating democratic governance. The cases of Ukraine and Syria have demonstrated the capacity for Russia and China to serve as a counterbalancing influence to the United States and its allies in challenging the fundamental values of the liberal world order. There is considerable compatibility in the interests and priorities of both nations in seeking to limit US hegemony in the global system and resist the efforts of the United States and other democratic Western powers to influence domestic political developments, thus advancing a vision of an international system that would legitimize authoritarian sovereignty over concerns with values of the liberal world order, including promoting democracy and human rights. Periodic surges in tensions over the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria could lead to a serious escalation of military confrontation between Russia and the United States and its allies if caution is not exercised, potentially involving China or leaving Beijing in a position to have to make difficult choices. Russia’s resurgence and China’s rise on the world stage suggest that these two powers are likely to significantly shape developments in the emerging international security arena, often cooperating to counter the United States and other Western democratic nations in decisively influencing regional conflict situations.

Notes 1. Robert Daly and Matthew Rojansky, “Engage China and Russia with Issues, Not Scolding,” Wilson Briefs, May 2015. 2. See Review of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 27, 2007. 3. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, December 31, 2015. 4. See Sharon Tiezzi, “China’s National Strategy,” The Diplomat, January 24, 2015, and “China Adopts National Security Strategy Guideline,” China.org.cn, January 23, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-01/23/content_34640926.htm. 5. Speech Delivered by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, to the Korber Foundation, Berlin, March 28, 2014, https://www.koerberstiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/koerber-globalleaders-dialogue/pdf/2014/Speech_Xi_english.pdf.

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Russia, China, Contemporary International Conflicts 6. “China at a New Starting Point,” Statement by H.D. Mr Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at the General Debate of the 68th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, New York, 27 September 2013. 7. See Wang Yizhou, “China’s New Foreign Policy: Transformations and Challenges Reflected in Changing Discourse,” Asan Forum, March 21, 2014, http://www. theasanforum.org/chinas-new-foreign-policy-transformations-and-challengesreflected-in-changing-discourse/. 8. See Dmitry Medvedev’s first references to the “zone of privileged interests” in “Russia Announces Spheres of Influence,” Financial Times, August 31, 2008, and “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC, September 1, 2008. 9. “New Asian Security Concept for the New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Shanghai Expo Center, May 21, 2014, published online by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. 10. See Wang Yizhou, “China’s New Foreign Policy.” 11. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 310. 12. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 9. 13. See Wang Yizhou, “China’s New Foreign Policy.” 14. Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), xxi. 15. Dmitry Medvedev, The Draft of the European Security Treaty, Office of the President of the Russian Federation, November 29, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presi dent/news/6152. 16. See Vladimir Putin’s Speech to the 70th Session of UN General Assembly, September 28, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385; Vladimir Putin, Speech at Military Parade on Red Square in Moscow to Mark the 70th Anniversary of Victory in the 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War, May 9, 2015, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/transcripts/49438; Vladimir Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference, February 10, 2007; Xi Jinping Speech at 70th UN General Assembly, September 28, 2015, http://www.c-span.org/video/?328385-3/chinese-presidentxi-jinping-address-un-general-assembly; and Tyler Roney, “With Obama MIA, China Touts Multipolar World,” The Diplomat, October 9, 2013. 17. See Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy and Vladimir Putin’s speech to the 70th Session of UN General Assembly. 18. See Sharyl Cross, “Advancing a Strategy for Constructive Security Engagement: ‘Resetting’ the US/NATO Approach Toward Russia,” in American Foreign Policy Regional Perspectives, ed. Richard M. Lloyd (Newport: Naval War College, 2009), 206–7. 19. Da Wei and Sun Chenghao, “China’s Changing Foreign Policy Priorities,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, no. 28 (Spring–Summer 2015), http://www. securityaffairs.org/issues/number-28/chinas-changing-foreign-policy-priorities.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 20. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter, St. Petersburg Russia, June 7, 2002. 21. See “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road,” Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html; and “Media Leaders Roundtable: Building the Silk Road Consensus, Creating a New Future of Media Cooperation BFA Annual Conference,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, March 26, 2015, http://english.boaoforum.org/ sums/18981.jhtml. 22. Author’s interview with Alexander Lukin, Moscow, October 6, 2015. 23. “Angela Merkel Warns Russia Could Seek to Destabilize ‘Whole of the European Order,’ ” Telegraph, November 17, 2014. 24. See “Defense Secretary Ash Carter: ISIS and Russia Are Our Greatest Threats,” National Review, August 28, 2015; “Russia Is Top US National Security Threat: Gen. Dunford,” Reuters, July 9, 2015; and “Carter Outlines Security Challenges, Warns Against Sequestration,” DOD News, US Department of Defense, March 17, 2016. For a prior article on Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and NATO’s reaction to Russian annexation of Crimea, see Sharyl Cross, “NATO-Russia Security Challenges in the Aftermath of Ukraine Conflict: Managing Black Sea Security and Beyond,” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15, no. 2 (2015). 25. See “The Foreign Policy Dimension of the Ukrainian Crisis,” in “The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia,” Russian International Affairs Council, Working Paper, no. 24, (2015), 25. 26. Vitaly Churkin, Interview, Kommersant, February 19, 2016, reproduced at the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, http://www. mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/ 2104524. 27. Vladimir Putin address to State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society members in the Kremlin, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 28. “How Far Do EU-US Sanctions on Russia Go?” BBC, September 15, 2014, and “EU Sanctions Against Russia over Ukraine Crisis,” European Union Newsroom, March 18, 2016. 29. “Poll: 70% Support 4th Term for Putin,” Reuters, March 3, 2016; “Putin’s Popularity: The Envy of Other Politicians,” US News and World Report, September 8, 2016; and “Russians Losing Trust in Government and Putin—Poll,” Moscow Times, October 13, 2016. 30. Wales Summit, Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, NATO Press Release, September 5, 2014. 31. “Obama: New NATO Force a Signal to Russia,” VOANews, September 5, 2014. 32. European Reassurance Initiative, Operation Atlantic Resolve, US European Command, Communication and Engagement Directorate, US Department of Defense, June 26, 2014.

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Russia, China, Contemporary International Conflicts 33. “Defense Secretary Ash Carter says Russia, China potentially threaten global order,” Military Times, November 8, 2015, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/ military/pentagon/2015/11/08/defense-secretary-ash-carter-says-russia-chinapotentially-threaten-global-order/75412284. 34. See Fact Sheet: The FYI2017 European Reassurance Initiative Budget Request, White House, February 2, 2016. 35. “Top NATO Official: Assertive Russia Threatens European Security,” Defense News, February 24, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/02/24/topnato-official-assertive-russia-threatens-european-security/80866760. 36. Wales Summit Declaration, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/ documents/sede/dv/sede240914walessummit_/sede240914walessummit_en.pdf. 37. “Top NATO Official.” 38. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy. 39. See “Ukraine and the Minsk II Agreement: On a Frozen Path to Peace?”, European Parliament Briefing, European Parliament Research Service, January 2016, and “Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points,” BBC, February 12, 2015. 40. See Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (June 1993); Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (June 2000); Russia’s Military Doctrine (2000), Rossiskaya Gazeta, January 18, 2000; and Cross, “Advancing a Strategy,” 206–7. 41. Sergei Karaganov, “Europe and Russia: Preventing a New Cold War,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2, 2014. 42. Karaganov, “Europe and Russia.” 43. Karaganov, “Europe and Russia.” 44. Alexei Arbatov, “Collapse of the World Order: The Emergence of a Polycentric World and Its Challenges,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3, (2014). 45. Ambassador Dmitri Rogozin, Remarks in Brussels, Belgium, at a conference session hosted by the East-West Center, November 25, 2008. 46. “Vladimir Putin Praises Russian Patriotism and Claims: Ukrainians and Russians are One,” Telegraph, March 18, 2015. 47. “ ‘Novorossiya,’ the Latest Historical Concept to Worry About in Ukraine,” Washington Post, April 18, 2014. 48. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy. 49. “Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Transcript of the Speech,” Valdai Discussion Club, September 20, 2013; “It Is Impossible to Move Forward without Spiritual, Cultural and National Selfdetermination—Putin,” Russia Today-RT, September 20, 2013; and see Boyd D. Cathey, “Putin’s Christian Faith Is Central to His Politics,” Russian Insider, January 5, 2013; Alicija Curanovic, The Guardians of Traditional Values, Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status, Transatlantic Academy, no. 1, 2014–2015 Paper Series, 2015. 50. See “Vladimir Putin Meets with Members”; Cathey, “Putin’s Christian Faith”; and Curanovic, The Guardians of Traditional Values. 51. Vladimir Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, December 4, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 52. See Mark Kramer, “Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?,” Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, no. 47, 2014, http://www.wil soncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago. 53. Igor A. Zevelev, lecture at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies via videoconference from Washington DC, March 11, 2008. 54. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 15, 2008. 55. “Ukraine Crisis: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Warns Moscow ‘Will Respond’ if Interests Attacked,” Independent, April 23, 2014. 56. “Russia Was Ready to Put Nuclear Forces on Alert Over Crimea, Putin Says,” CNN, March 16, 2015; and “Putin Says Russia Was Ready for Nuclear Confrontation Over Crimea,” Reuters, March 15, 2015. 57. “Russian Bombers Disrupt Commercial Flights in Ireland’s Airspace,” Moscow Times, March 4, 2015; and James T. Quinlivan, “Yes, Russia’s Military Is Getting More Aggressive,” RAND Blog, December 30, 2014, http://www.rand.org/blog/ 2014/12/yes-russias-military-is-getting-more-aggressive.html. 58. “China Says to Play ‘Constructive Role’ on Aid for Ukraine,” Reuters, March 27, 2014; and “China Makes Proposals on Ukraine Crisis,” Xinhua, March 16, 2014. 59. See Colum Lynch, “At the UN, Beijing Begins to Shift Away from Putin,” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2015; and “Ukraine to Sit Alongside Russian UN Security Council,” Moscow Times, October 15, 2015. 60. Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia,” People’s Daily Online, December 18, 2015, http:// en.people.cn/n/2015/1218/c90000-8992446.html; reprinted as “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close, but Not Allies,” Foreign Affairs, January/ February 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/howchina-sees-russia. 61. Ming Jinwei, “Commentary: The West’s Fiasco in Ukraine,” Xinhua, March 7, 2014, http://en.people.cn/90777/8558083.html. 62. Gao Fei, author’s interview, February 9, 2016. 63. Lu Yu, “Commentary: West Should Work With, Not Against, Russia in Handling Ukraine Crisis,” Xinhua, March 3, 2014, http://en.people.cn/90777/8552726.html. 64. See “China Takes No Sides on the Ukraine Crisis, Xi Tells Europe,” Reuters, March 28, 2014. 65. See “China Takes No Sides.” 66. See Yu Sui, “China’s Stance on the Ukraine Issue and Role It Can Play,” China-US Focus, April 2, 2015. 67. Cited from a report in Xinhua; see “Ukraine Crisis: Top Chinese Diplomat Backs Putin and Says West Should ‘Abandon Zero-sum Mentality’,” Independent, February 27, 2015; and “China Just Sided with Russia Over the Ukraine Conflict,” Global Research, March 3, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-just-sided-with-russiaover-the-ukraine-conflict/5434334. 68. See, for example, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 11, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_ 665401/t1206855.shtml; and “The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and China Held Negotiations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, April 27, 2016,

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69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84.

85.

86.

http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/46955-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairsof-ukraine-and-china-held-negotiations. “China Becomes Largest Consumer of Ukrainian Food,” USA Today, September 25, 2015; “Ukraine Set to Become Top Corn Exporter to China in First Half,” Financial Times, July 6, 2015; and Samuel Ramani, “Hey, Putin, Have You Seen How Much China Is Investing in Ukraine?,” Washington Post, July 24, 2015. “China’s Corn Strategy Turns Bear Market on Its Ear,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2015. Gregorio Baggiani, “China-Ukraine Relations After Crimea,” China Brief, 15, no. 15, July 31, 2015. John C. K. Daly, “China to Build Hongdu Light Attack Aircraft in Ukraine Next Year,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12, no. 224, December 15, 2015. “First Cargo on New ‘Silk Road’ from Ukraine to China Crosses Azerbaijan,” USA Today, January 24, 2016. See “China and Ukraine Are Going to Build the Largest Plane in the World,” Business Insider, September 1, 2016. Alexei Voskressenski, Dean at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO) and leading China expert in Moscow, emphasized this point in a meeting with the author, Moscow, October 6, 2015. Vladimir Putin address to State Duma deputies. See “Russia, China Agree to Integrate Eurasian Union, Silk Road, Sign Deals,” Russia Today-RT, May 8, 2015. Timofei Bordachev, “Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: The View from Moscow,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2015. Xing Guangcheng, “The Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s Choices in 2015,” Russian Analytical Digest, no. 168, June 11, 2015, 7. See “Amid Tensions, Russia Deploys Advanced Surface-to-air Missiles System to Crimea,” Washington Post, August 12, 2016. “Ukraine Conflict Has Left More than 9,000 Dead, Says UN,” Guardian, December 9, 2015; “Two Years after the War Broke Out in Ukraine, the Death Toll Continues to Mount,” Telegraph, May 3, 2016; and “Civilian Casualties in Eastern Ukraine Highest since 2015,” CNN, August 5, 2016. World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/Ukraine. Corruption by Country, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/ country/#UKR. “Ukrainians Disillusioned with Leadership,” Gallup Inc., December 23, 2015; Kenneth Rapoza, “Corruption Is Killing Ukraine’s Economy,” Forbes, October 14, 2016; “Five Times Less Likely Ukrainians Would Vote Today for Poroshenko—Poll,” Khvylya, June 20, 2016; and Fred Weir, “For Ukraine’s Poroshenko, a Growing Crisis Hits a Critical Juncture,” Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 2016. See “IMF Clears $1 Billion Ukraine Loan Tranche After Year Delay,” Bloomberg, September 14, 2016; and “IMF Board Approves $1 Billion Loan Disbursement to Ukraine,” Reuters, September 15, 2016. “Amid Tensions, Russia Deploys Advanced Surface-to-air Missiles System to Crimea.”

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 87. See “Russia Announces War Games after Accusing Ukraine of Terrorist Plot,” Reuters, August 11, 2016; and “Kiev Has Turned to Terrorism,” Russia Today-RT, August 10, 2016. 88. Interview with Andrei Kortunov, “Putin Hints at War in Ukraine But May Be Seeking Diplomatic Edge,” Reuters, August 16, 2016. 89. See “Russia Announces War Games after Accusing Ukraine of Terrorist Plot”; and see quote by Alex Kokcharev, analyst for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, “Putin’s Saber-Rattling Spooks Ukraine and the Baltics,” Newsweek, August 31, 2016. 90. See “Russia Announces War Games after Accusing Ukraine of Terrorist Plot.” 91. Dmitry Medvedev speech at the 52nd Munich Security Conference, Official Website of the Russian Government, February 13, 2016, http://government.ru/en/news/21784/. 92. “OSCE Chief Warns against Erosion of NATO-Russia Ties,” Financial Times, February 16, 2016. 93. “OSCE Chief Warns.” 94. “China Defends Russia, Criticizes Economic Sanctions Related to Ukraine Crisis During G-7 Summit,” International Business Times, June 8, 2015, http://www. ibtimes.com/china-defends-russia-criticizes-economic-sanctions-related-ukrainecrisis-during-g-7-1956478. 95. UN special envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura reported in April 2016 that an estimated 400,000 had been killed in the Syrian conflict. See “Syrian Peace Talks Limp on to Next Week with Opposition Absent,” New York Times, April 22, 2016. For other sources indicating higher estimates, see “Syria War: Why Is There Fighting in Syria?” BBC, March 15, 2016; “Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000 Group Finds,” New York Times, February 11, 2016; and “The Syrian War’s Death Toll Is Absolutely Staggering. But No One Can Agree on Number,” Washington Post, March 15, 2016. 96. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy. 97. See “Russian Parliament Gives Blessing to Security Overhaul after Plane Bombing,” Reuters, November 20, 2015, and “Naryshkin Criticizes U.S., NATO Allies for Causing Refugee Crisis,” Xinhua, September 17, 2015. 98. See Andrei Skriba and Dmitry Novikov, “The Middle East: Main Trends,” summary of the 5th Meeting of the Valdai Middle East dialogue entitled “The Middle East: From Violence to Security,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 19, 2016. 99. “What’s at Stake for Russia in Syria,” CNBC World, September 3, 2013; “Billions of Dollars of Russian Business Suffers Along with Syria,” Moscow Times, September 2, 2011; and Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Many Interests in Syria,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2013. 100. Sergey Oznobishchev, interview by author, Moscow, October 7, 2015. 101. “Islamic State Spreads Tentacles to Russia as Chechnya Militants Pledge Allegiance to Leader Bagdhadi,” Telegraph, June 24, 2015. 102. Ivo Daadler quoted in Michael Crowley, “Obama’s Ukraine Policy in Shambles,” Politico, February 29, 2016. 103. See “Russian Vetoes Are Putting UN Security Council’s Legitimacy at Risk, Says US,” Guardian, September 23, 2015. 104. “Syria Conflict: Russia ‘Peace Plan’ Revealed ahead of Key Summit,” BBC, November 11, 2015; and “Russian Proposal on Syria Fails to Gain Traction,” Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2015.

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Russia, China, Contemporary International Conflicts 105. “Dmitry Medvedev: Defending ‘National Interests’ in Syria, not Assad,” Business Standard, October 17, 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/inter national/dmitry-medvedev-defending-national-interests-in-syria-not-assad115101700496_1.html. 106. Martti Ahtisaari, quoted in “West ‘Ignored Russia Offer in 2012 to Have Syria’s Assad Step Aside,’ ” Guardian, September 15, 2015. 107. See Gustav Gressel, “Lessons from Russia’s Military Campaign in Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commen tary_lessons_from_russias_intervention_in_syria5085. 108. “Russian Special Forces Active in Syria, Give Recon and Targeting for Warplanes, General Confirms,” Russia Today-RT, March 24, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/ 337023-russian-special-forces-syria; and “How Russia’s Special Forces Are Shaping the Fight in Syria,” Washington Post, March 29, 2016. 109. See Transcript of the Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu, March 14, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51511; “Russian Troops Leave Syria, Why Now and What’s Next?,” Pravda.ru, March 15, 2016; “Vladimir Putin Orders Russian Forces to Begin Withdrawal from Syria,” Guardian, March 15, 2016; “Syria Withdrawal: Which of Russia’s Forces Are Being Pulled Out?,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, March 15, 2016; and “Russia Has Changed Course of the Civil War in Syria, Say Analysts,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, March 15, 2016. 110. “US, Russia Sign Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria,” US Air Force press release, DOD News, October 21, 2015; and “Russia Presses Air Blitz in Syria to Dictate Peace Terms,” Associated Press, February 16, 2016. 111. Michael Kofman, “Putin’s Quagmire and Other Fairy Tales About Syria,” Newsweek, February 21, 2016. 112. Kofman, “Putin’s Quagmire.” 113. Benjamin Lambeth, quoted in “With Campaign in Syria, Russia Tested Hardware, Prowess,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2016. 114. “Russia’s Rogozin Slams NATO Statements on ‘Non-Precision’ Syria Bombings,” Moscow Times, March 2, 2016. 115. See “Turkey Downs Russian warplane near Syria border, Putin Warns of ‘Serious Consequences,’ ” Reuters, November 24, 2015. 116. See “Russia-Turkey Relations Are Slipping into Chaos,” Russia Direct, December 11, 2015; and “Is Vladimir Putin Right to Label Turkey ‘Accomplices of Terrorists,’?” Guardian, November 24, 2015. 117. See “Putin vs. Erdogan: NATO Concerned over Possible Russia-Turkey Hostilities,” Der Spiegel, February 19, 2016. 118. See International Monetary Fund; and Shannon Tiezzi, “China at Geneva II: Beijing’s Interests in Syria,” The Diplomat, January 22, 2014. 119. See Andi Zhou, “Can China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Save the US in Afghanistan?,” The Diplomat, March 11, 2016. 120. Pan Guang, “China’s Role in the Changing Middle East,” lecture delivered at The Middle East Institute, Washington DC, May 26, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/event s/chinas-role-changing-middle-east; Pan Guang,“China’s Role in the Middle East,” lecture delivered at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,

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121. 122.

123. 124.

125. 126.

127.

128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

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January 25, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2qAUDfTn5E; and Pan Guang, quoted in Christina Lin, “Why China supports Assad: Asian jihad hits Syria,” Transatlantic Academy, October 14, 2013. Pan Guang, “China’s Role in the Middle East.” Michael Clark, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Turkish Connection,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2016; and David Volodzko, “China’s New Headache: Uyghur Militants in Syria,” The Diplomat, March 8, 2016. See Michael Clarke and Raffaello Pantucci, “China Is Supporting Syria’s Regime. What Changed?,” The National Interest, September 17, 2016. See Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Middle East Policy: The ISIS Factor,” Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, XXIII, no. 1 (Spring 2016); Jacob Zenn, “China Claims Uyghurs Trained in Syria,” Asia Times online, July 15, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/China/CHIN-01-150713.html; and Volodzko, “China’s New Headache.” See “China Supports Russia’s Actions in Syria—Foreign Ministry,” TASS, December 4, 2015. See “Paris Attacks: The Violence, Its Victims and How the Investigation Unfolded,” New York Times, November 13, 2015; “China to LAUNCH WAR on ISIS? President Xi Vows to BATTLE Jihadis after Paris Attacks,” Daily Express UK, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/619513/ISIS-Islamic-State-ChinaPresident-Xi-Jinping-Li-Keqiang-Paris-attacks; “China to Step Up Counterterrorism Measures After Paris Attacks, Calls for International Support Against Xinjiang Separatists,” International Business Times, November 16, 2015, http://www.ibtimes. com/china-step-counterterrorism-measures-after-paris-attacks-calls-internationalsupport-2185525; and “Paris Attacks: China’s President Xi Jinping Says He’s Willing to Join France in Combatting Terrorism,” Straits Times, November 14, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/paris-attacks-chinas-president-xi-jinpingsays-hes-willing-to-join-france-in-combating. See reference in the Global Times, an affiliate of the People’s Daily official news source of the Chinese Communist Party: “China to Boost Syria Support,” Global Times, August 19, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1001150.shtml, and also published at China Military online, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2016-08/19/content_7215049.htm. Also, see “China Steps Up ‘Military Cooperation’ with Assad as Top Admiral Visits Damascus,” Telegraph, August 18, 2016. Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Navy Role in Syrian Chemical Weapons Disposal,” The Diplomat, December 20, 2013. See “China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the Civil War in Syria,” New York Times, November 1, 2012. See “China Raises Five Principles for Political Settlement of Syrian Issue,” Xinhua, January 1, 2014, and Tiezzi, “China at Geneva II.” See “China Brought Four-Point Proposal to Syria Talks,” Executive Intelligence Review, Press Release, October 31, 2015. “Syria Ready to Take Part in Geneva Peace Talks: Minister,” Reuters, December 24, 2015; and “Head of Syrian Opposition SNC to Visit China This Week,” Reuters, January 4, 2016.

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Russia, China, Contemporary International Conflicts 133. See “China Appoints First Special Envoy for Syria Crisis,” Reuters, March 29, 2016. 134. Quoting China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei in “China Appoints First Special Envoy for Syrian Crisis.” 135. Transcript of Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu, and “Putin Says Russians to Start Withdrawing from Syria, as Peace Talks Resume,” Reuters, March 14, 2016. 136. Transcript of Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu. 137. “Putin Orders Start of Russian Military Withdrawal from Syria, Says ‘Objectives Achieved,’ ” Russia Today-RT, March 14, 2016. 138. See “Russia Flies Out Almost Half Syria Strike Force,” Reuters, March 16, 2016. 139. “Russia Keeps S-400 Air Defense Systems in Syria—Kremlin,” TASS, March 15, 2016; and “Russian S-400 Systems May Stay in Syria for a While—Federation Council,” INTERFAX, March 15, 2016. 140. Fyodor Lukyanov, quoted in “Syria Withdrawal: Which of Russia’s Forces Are Being Pulled Out?,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, March 15, 2016. 141. Alexander Kots, “Russia Is Returning from Syria with the Shield or on the Shield?,” Komsomoskaya Pravda, March 15, 2016, http://www.kp.ru/daily/26503. 1/3372927/. 142. Lt. Gen. Yuriy Netkachev, quoted in Vladimir Mukhin, “Aircraft Fly Away, Peacemakers and Advisors Stay,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 16, 2016. 143. Maksim Suchkov, quoted in an article by Sergey Strokan and Ivan Safranov, “Russia Starts Withdrawing from Syria,” Kommersant, March 16, 2016. 144. Ruslan Pukhov, “A Proving Ground of the Future,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2, (2016). 145. Sergei Strokan, quoted in “What Did Russia’s Brief Intervention in Syria Accomplish?,” Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 2016. 146. “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks,” Security Council Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, December 18, 2015. 147. See Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, US Department of State, Washington DC, February 22, 2016. 148. See “Syria Truce Center Launched at Khmeimim Airbase, Russia Hands Over Hotline Contact to US,” Russia Today-RT, February 23, 2016. 149. Col. Steven Warren, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman, Teleconference from Baghdad, Department of Defense Press Briefing, April 20, 2016, https:// www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/739157/depart ment-of-defense-press-briefing-by-col-warren-via-teleconference-from-bagh/. 150. Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia.” 151. See “Kerry Touts Russia’s Support for Syria Truce,” CNN, February 23, 2016; for Russian sources on Kerry’s acknowledgment of Russia’s contributions, see “John Kerry Admits Russia Saves Tens of Thousands of Lives in Syria,” Pravda.ru, May 11, 2016, and Yekaterina Zigrovskaya, “Syrian Ceasefire to be Coordinated from Russia’s Khmeimim Base,” Gazeta.ru, in Russia Beyond the Headlines, February 25, 2016. 152. See “Pentagon, CIA Chiefs Don’t Think Russia Will Abide by the Syria Cease-Fire,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2016.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 153. “Pentagon, CIA Chiefs.” 154. “Pentagon, CIA Chiefs”; “Kerry Warns of ‘Plan B’ in Syria if Cease-fire Fails,” USA Today, February 23, 2016; and “Russia Role Vital to Syrian Truce, but US Has ‘Plan B’—Kerry,” Russia Today-RT, February 24, 2016. 155. “No Plan B for Syrian Settlement,” Russia Today-RT, February 25, 2016. 156. Fyodor Lukyanov, Rossiskaya Gazeta, February 23, 2016. 157. Nikolay Surkov, “Is Syria on the Path to Peace or on the Verge of a New War?,” Russia Direct, February 24, 2016. 158. Victor A. Kremenyuk, “Russia-US Truce Plan Promises No Push-Button Solutions,” TASS, February 24, 2016. 159. Alexei Arbatov quoted in Tamara Zamyatina, “Inter-Syrian Talks as Follow-up of Syria Truce Meet Russian, US Interests,” TASS, February 29, 2016. 160. “Russian Military Helicopter Shot Down in Syria, Killing All 5 Aboard,” New York Times, August 1, 2016. 161. See “Airstrikes on Aleppo Are War Crimes, UN Human Rights Chief Says,” Huffington Post, October 21, 2016; and Ban Ki-moon, quoted in Laura Rozen, “US Threatens to Halt Talks with Russia on Syria,” Al Monitor, September 30, 2016. 162. “US Admits Airstrike in Syria, Meant to Hit ISIS, Killed Syrian Troops,” New York Times, September 17, 2016; and “UN Suspends Aid Convoys in Syria after Deadly Attack on Relief Shipment,” Washington Post, September 20, 2016. 163. See “US Suspends Syria Ceasefire Talks with Russia, Blames Moscow,” Reuters, October 3, 2016; “US Election Cycle Offers Kremlin a Window of Opportunity in Syria,” New York Times, October 5, 2016; and Rozen, “US Threatens to Halt Talks with Russia on Syria.” 164. “Sticking with Assad: Russia Has a Risky Syria Policy,” Deutsche Welle, October 1, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/sticking-with-assad-russia-has-a-risky-syria-policy/ a-35940846. 165. Sergei Lavrov, quoted in “Syria, Russia Ignore Warnings on Aleppo Bombings as Assault Continues,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 2, 2016. 166. Vitaly Churkin, quoted in “Tension with Russia Rises as U.S. Halts Syria Negotiations,” New York Times, October 3, 2016. 167. See “Attempt at US-Russian Cooperation in Syria Suffers Major Setbacks,” Reuters, July 29, 2016. 168. “Experts View Russia’s Steps in Case of US Plan B in Syria,” Izvestia, October 5, 2016. 169. “Experts View Russia’s Steps in Case of US Plan B in Syria.” 170. Maria Zakharova, quoted in “Russia Warns of ‘Terrible’ Consequences if US Attacks Syrian Government Forces,” Associated Press, October 1, 2016. 171. Nikolai Litovnik, “Russia: We Will Shoot Down US Jets in Syria that Threaten our Servicemen,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, October 10, 2016. 172. Leonid Isayev, “Russia Loses Influence over Damascus,” Vedomosti, October 18, 2016. 173. Isayev, “Russia Loses Influence over Damascus.” 174. See “China Says Seeks Closer Military Ties with Syria,” Reuters, August 16, 2016; “China Aligns with Russia in Syria, Creating a Headache for the US,” Fiscal Times, August 18, 2016; Samuel Ramani, “China’s Syria Agenda,” The Diplomat, September 22, 2016; and “China Boosts Syria Support,” China Military Times

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175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180.

181.

182.

183.

(source: Global Times), http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/chinamilitary-news/2016-08/19/content_7215049.htm. See “China Says Seeks Closer Military Ties with Syria.” See “China Boosts Syria Support.” Zhao Weiming, quoted in “China Boosts Syria Support.” Hua Liming, quoted in “China Boosts Syria Support.” Brian Michael Jenkins, “What’s in the Name? The Rebranding of the Nusra Front,” RAND Blog, August 14, 2016. Former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe Admiral James Stavridis suggests these possibilities for Syria’s future. See James Stavridis, “It’s Time to Seriously Consider Partitioning Syria,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016. See Stavridis, “It’s Time to Seriously Consider Partitioning Syria,” and James Dobbins, Phillip Gordon, and Jeffrey Martini, “A Peace Plan for Syria,” RAND, 2015. Vadim Kozylin, interview with author, Moscow, October 7, 2015, and quoted in “Moscow Is Winding Down its Presence in Syria. Why? Why Now?,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, March 15, 2016. Grigory Kosach, quoted in “Moscow Is Winding Down its Presence in Syria. Why? Why Now?”

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5 Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges Color Revolutions, Cyber and Information Security, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism

The most recent official national security and military strategy documents for Russia and China reflect recognition on the part of both nations that the global security environment is quite dangerous, presenting “complicated” and “unprecedented” challenges and involving a range of existing and emerging threats from both state and non-state, and traditional and nontraditional security areas. Both nations continue to devote considerable attention to security concerns on their borders and in immediate neighboring regions. However, the national security and military strategies of the two countries suggest that officials in both Moscow and Beijing see their respective nations assuming greater responsibility in global security. Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2016 explicitly states that: “There has been an increase in the Russian Federation’s role in resolving the most important international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability.”1 China’s Military Strategy of 2015 notes that “national security issues facing China encompass far more subjects, extend over a greater range, and cover a longer time span that at any time in the country’s history.”2 Russia and China have defined a sweeping list of potential challenges, ranging from their internal inter-ethnic relations to borders, space, and the depth of the sea. There is an appreciation on the part of the leaderships in both Russia and China of the reality that “holistic” or “all encompassing” solutions implemented in cooperation with other nations of the world community have and will be necessary to address non-traditional challenges that transcend borders. For both Moscow and Beijing, security of the state is paramount, and officials recognize a direct linkage between threats that are composed of the interplay between internal domestic and external foreign international

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sources. National security is directly tied to regime stability and security for Moscow and Beijing, and officials assign the highest priority to addressing threats at home or abroad that are perceived as posing existential challenges to the state. This chapter focuses on three emerging, non-traditional security challenges that are identified as critical concerns or “main threats” for both Russia and China: “colored revolutions”, cyber and information security, and terrorism and violent extremism. There is a high degree of coincidence between Russian and Chinese perspectives and responses concerning these non-traditional security challenges, and both countries see the issues as representing areas where internal and external forces might intersect in ways that can be detrimental for state and, concomitantly, national security. For Russia and China, these issues are closely related to a host of other emerging nontraditional challenges destabilizing and threatening the international community, such as displacement and migration, drug and weapons trafficking, piracy, crime, disease, and poverty. Examining the three issue areas demonstrates that Moscow and Beijing can in some respects find common ground with Western democratic nations in addressing emerging transnational threats and challenges, but also makes quite clear that significant differences exist in terms of interests, perceptions, and responses. The convergence of perspectives and approaches of Moscow and Beijing with respect to methods of governance and values and for addressing critical contemporary security challenges suggests the increasing potential of these two authoritarian giants for challenging the distribution of power, legitimacy, and international rules of the existing world order.

Color Revolutions The term color revolutions described a series of peaceful uprisings that toppled post-communist authoritarian regimes among former Soviet republics (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005), and has subsequently been used to refer to popular uprisings leading to regime change in the Middle East and elsewhere. Moscow and Beijing share almost indistinguishable views on the potential domestic and international security threats posed by colored revolutions, and both nations view these revolutionary movements as being orchestrated by the United States and its Western democratic partners to advance geopolitical ambitions. Russia’s National Security Strategy explicitly cites “foreign sponsored regime change” among “main threats to public and national security,” and identifies: the activities of radical public associations and groups using nationalist and religious extremist ideology, foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, and

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics financial and economic structures, and also individuals, focused on destroying the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the domestic political and social situation—including through inciting “color revolutions”—and destroying traditional Russian religious and moral values.3

Russia’s Military Doctrine, approved in December 2014, lists among internal military threats “subversive information activities against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defense of the Motherland.”4 China’s Military Strategy of 2015 states that “anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country. Consequently, China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability.”5 Assessments offered by the Russian and Chinese leaderships and academic and media coverage offer similar judgments regarding the sources and consequences of color revolutions. Officials and analysts in Russia and China recognize the domestic drivers that can trigger such unrest in society, including poverty and income inequality, but the primary source of the colored revolutions is assigned to external sources. The United States and Western nations see these uprisings or revolutions as representing legitimate aspirations of those seeking to overturn corrupt, entrenched authoritarian regimes with the hope of transitioning toward democratic governance, while assessments in Russia and China hold that such domestic upheaval is deliberately instigated and exploited by the United States and other Western powers, destabilizing societies and undermining national state sovereignty in order to strike geopolitical gains. Concerns were heightened among both the Russian and Chinese leaderships as the colored revolutions initially swept across the post-Soviet space with the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Assessments offered in both Russia and China contend that these revolutionary uprisings provided opportunities for the United States to increase influence in the postSoviet space and to establish regimes that would be subservient to Washington. Andrei P. Tsygankov describes Russia’s increasing concern with the colored revolutions as “reactive,” resulting from “Moscow’s fears of Western encroachment in its sphere of influence” and seeking to insulate Russia’s identity and culture from Western influence.6 Initially, during this first series of colored revolutions in 2003–5, Russian and Chinese leaders tended to characterize the United States and other Western nations as demonstrating a preference for employing a lower-cost soft-power strategy to incite regime transformation which would not require significant investment in resources or hard power commitments. The West was seen as relying on non-government organizations, media, and the Internet to influence the populations and elections in 218

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these target societies. It was not until the Iraq War, and especially the Arab Spring and Euromaidan revolutions in Ukraine, that Russian and Chinese assessments concluded that the United States and its allies were prepared to resort to the use of hard power or military intervention in pursuit of regime transformation. Vladimir Putin adhered to the concept of “sovereign democracy” over a period of several years as a viable approach, suited to the realities of Russia’s culture and traditions, for responding to pressures for democratization from the West. Putin’s associate Vladislav Surkov introduced the concept in 2006, noting that colored revolutions along with international terrorism and lack of economic competitiveness presented threats to Russia’s sovereignty. The concept of “sovereign democracy” featured a centralized political system that rejects pluralist conceptions of democracy requiring division of society into competing factions. The system of “sovereign democracy” or “managed democracy” would tolerate representation and expression of some competing interests and ideologies while protecting the state against illegitimate forms of interference.7 Russia’s leadership was more tolerant in permitting an open Internet and access to Western publications during the first Putin term and Medvedev period, but measures have been continually introduced more recently to tighten state control of the media and to restrict the activity of non-governmental organizations in Russia. Protecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs has consistently been a critical concern for the Chinese Communist Party. China’s leadership had long recognized that the United States and Western nations were critical of the method of political governance and the human rights record in China and would prefer either gradual reform or dismantling of the socialist system and Marxist ideology toward adopting a more liberal, open, and democratic model. China has been much more restrictive than Russia in terms of regulating the Internet and access of its society to Western media. The wave of colored revolutions in the post-Soviet space in 2003–5, particularly the Tulip Revolution that toppled the authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan, bordering China’s turbulent ethnic Uighur-populated Xinjiang Autonomous Region, triggered even greater concern in Beijing regarding the potential destabilizing impact of domestic turmoil and unrest. Chinese leaders reacted to the series of regime transformations in the postSoviet space by placing further restrictions on civil society and imposing additional surveillance controls on NGOs operating in China. Shi Zhongyuan, head of the General Administration of Press and Publication in China, justified the tightening of restrictions on civil society and media, offering the point that “When I think of the ‘colored revolutions’ I feel afraid.”8 In an article published in the CCP’s People’s Daily in April 2005, the series of colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were attributed to “impure” 219

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motives on the part of the Bush Administration, with claims that the United States “instigate[d]” color revolutions in Central Asia in execution of a “geopolitical strategy” aimed to “surround Russia” and “prevent it from regaining past successes.”9 The article offered the further observation that the “chaotic” situations in the Middle East and Central Asia demonstrate that “US democracy promotion” has “opened a Pandora’s box bringing a new round of national conflicts.”10 In May 2005, inspired by the revolutionary upheaval in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, demonstrators stormed a police station, a prison, and government buildings and protested in the streets of Andijan Uzbekistan, calling for the resignation of autocratic president Islam Karimov. Karimov’s brutal response—ordering his troops to fire on the protesters and killing hundreds in order to suppress the movement—provided evidence to observers in Russia and China that regimes maintaining tight control and prepared to employ force were better equipped to respond effectively to societal pressures resulting from the colored revolutions.11 Following the uprisings in Andijan in 2005, Karimov moved swiftly to force NGOs to curtail operations in Uzbekistan, eliminate the independent press, and close a US air base that Uzbekistan had been hosting in the Karshi-Khanabad region on the Afghan border. Karimov attributed the 2005 uprising to instigation by an affiliate of the Islamist extremist group Hizb ut-tahrir, and continued to maintain zero-tolerance for Islamist militancy and dissident opposition, rejecting charges of human rights abuses from the West. Considerations regarding regional threats to political stability and comparing effectiveness of regime responses prompted other nations of Central Asia to tighten restrictions on NGOs, and media, thwarting reform, and imposing crackdowns on opposition. Reports indicate that Russia’s President Putin warned then Chinese President and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao of the threat posed by foreign-supported NGOs at the annual meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana in July 2005. China’s People’s Daily reported that China and Russia joined other SCO nations in issuing a statement in Astana emphasizing that “people of each country have the right to choose their own road of development” and that the “West’s attempt to expand their influences has failed to enable the Central Asian countries to get united, but instead has caused division among them.”12 The article further noted that the SCO nations would assume responsibility for containing the “real threats to the stability” of Central Asia, including “Afghan narcotics,” “religious extremism,” and “political turbulence,” and that a timeline should be set for the removal of US military bases from the region.13 Concerns were heightened in Russia regarding threats to regime stability as a result of public protests taking place over Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011–12, the Arab Spring contagion, and the outbreak of 220

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conflict in Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s elections in 2011–12 triggered large public protests that Vladimir Putin and his associates readily attributed to Western instigation following then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other officials of the Obama Administration openly expressing support for the efforts of the protesters. Reflecting on external involvement in Russia’s elections, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev offered the following perspective: [E]lections in every country are primarily a domestic event, and it is voters who have the last word. However, one tries to interfere and influence this process from outside. For example, through various non-government organizations and funds. One even tries to directly influence public opinion from abroad, and various modern technologies, in particular social networks that have already been tested in a number of other states are used. Our people have experienced many challenges and see danger in attempts to manipulate public opinion, shatter the constitutional basis of the state, including in line with the “color revolutions” scenario.14

Vladimir Putin and his colleagues associated efforts to promote democratic regime transformation in the Middle East with displays of domestic opposition in Russia during the elections. Russia’s elites frequently compare the “chaotic” period in Russian society of the “so-called democratic era” of the 1990s which brought social and economic disorder with more recent attempts of US and Western involvement in regime change. The immediate destabilizing consequences for societies in the Middle East and North Africa following the Arab Spring revolutions further intensified concerns in Russia and China that Western “meddling” would lead to undesirable end-states. Analysts and media in both Russia and China tended to conclude that responses to turmoil in Libya and Syria made clear that the United States and its allies and partners were prepared to move beyond soft power to employ military force if necessary to support agents within these societies prepared to “impose Western inspired democracy.” However, for both Russia and China, US strategy had resulted only in complete collapse of the state, perpetual domestic turmoil and conflict, and, ultimately, the loss of sovereign integrity of the nation. In conjunction with Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s trip to the Middle East in January 2016, a Xinhua staff editorial by Deng Yushan and Zhu Dongyang offered the following assessment: [The] waves of turbulence and upheaval that swept West Asia and North Africa over recent years—lauded in the West as various Color Revolutions or the Arab Spring—serve as a sobering reminder. More than five years after the selfimmolation of a young Tunisian vendor triggered the chain reaction, Western intervention has brought the region nothing but a toxic mixture of social disturbances, international conflicts, unprecedented refugee flows, bloody sectarian clashes and rampant terrorism.15

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The authors contend further that “The tragedy—more like an ‘Arab Winter’ than spring—stems from the West’s attempt to manipulate local grassroots grievances for the purposes of exporting its own ideology and institutions and toppling the governments it loathes.”16 Chinese media and scholarly sources also frequently suggest that democratic elections and colored revolutions actually undermine US and Western strategic ambitions by delivering electoral outcomes favoring Islamist regimes that counter Western interests or destabilize the state structure, leading to heightened risk of terrorism. Russia’s Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, has devoted considerable attention to the colored revolutions in his analysis of Russia’s contemporary military challenges. In an article published in February 2013, Gerasimov notes: The experience of military conflicts—including those connected with the so-called color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East—confirms that a perfectly striving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.17

Gerasimov offered the observation that “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”18 A British defense analyst and expert on Russia, Keir Giles, contends that Russia’s armed forces have learned from US-led Western interventions, and have incorporated the experiences into Russia’s approaches. Giles states: Russia learns from the West and sometimes appears to be mimicking it, but then adapts the lessons to its own specific circumstances. The West, in the Russian view, fosters and facilitates regime change, for example, in Georgia, the Middle East and North Africa. Russia perceives Western techniques and approaches; studies and reports on them; and then applies them in Ukraine.19

Clearly, Russia’s armed forces have analyzed recent conflicts, deriving lessons applied in subsequent situations not only from Western interventions, but from the experience of Russia’s armed forces in Chechnya, Georgia, and elsewhere. General Valery Gerasimov emphasizes the urgent need to invest additional resources in military research in order to develop capacity to respond to the most complex security threats facing Russia and the world. Gerasimov makes the point that “We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves.”20 Russia is likely to be relying increasingly on variants of “non-linear” warfare, including the “integrated use of military force and political, informational, and other non-military means” potentially orchestrated by the armed forces and 222

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special forces together with relevant ministries and irregular private units which can be tailored or modified to suit specific circumstances as the preferred instrument of influencing the post-Soviet space, and potentially beyond.21 In May 2014, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine, Russia’s Ministry of Defense focused on the negative impact of colored revolutions for international security in its annual Moscow Conference on International Security. The discussion made clear that Russia’s leadership believes the United States and its partners seek to impose Western values on nations throughout the world and that Russia was among the targets of this strategy. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made the following point during the Moscow session: Attempts to impose homemade recipes for internal changes on other nations, without taking into account their own traditions and national characteristics, to engage in the “export of democracy,” have a destructive impact on international relations and result in an increase in the number of hot spots on the world map.22

Lavrov argued further that “Regime change operations in sovereign states, various ‘color revolutions’ provoked by external forces, cause apparent damage to international stability.”23 Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, contended that the West had engaged in a new type of warfare in Serbia, Libya, and Syria involving initially rendering support to protesters, and then deploying military force to unseat national governments if the domestic uprising activity failed to accomplish the aim of regime transformation.24 General Valery Gerasimov suggested that a form of “hybrid warfare” imposed in an era of globalization, weakening borders, and information instruments was being employed by powers to threaten Russia’s security in the form of colored revolutions, and that Russia must “catch up” in developing responses to counter this threat.25 For Gerasimov and his colleagues, lessons derived from a series of cases suggested that military force was an integral element in traditional interventions targeting the state, but that low-cost, non-military, political, economic, humanitarian, and information instruments to fuel colored revolutions might also be used to target the state. Conference speakers included senior government and military officials from Russia, China, Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, India, Kyrgyzstan, and others. Russia’s strategy for countering attempts to promote regime change appears to include building relationships with other nations (including China) concerned about threats to state stability and security throughout the world. In November 2014, Vladimir Putin spoke directly about the threat posed by colored revolutions in a meeting with Russia’s National Security Council, stating: [I]n the modern world extremism is often used as a geopolitical instrument to rearrange spheres of influence. We see the tragic consequences of the wave of

223

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Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov followed Putin’s warning, stating that “public figures in Western countries say there is a need to impose sanctions [in Russia] that will destroy the economy and cause public protests . . . the West is making it clear it does not want Russia to change policy but wants to secure regime change.”27 During an expanded session of the Interior Ministry in February 2015, Putin again stated that “We see attempts to use so-called ‘color revolution technology,’ ranging from organizing unlawful public protests to open propaganda of hatred and enmity on social networks . . . The aim is obvious—to provoke civil conflict and strike a blow at our country’s constitutional foundations, and ultimately even at our sovereignty.”28 Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Anatoly Antonov, made reference to the “epidemic of colored revolutions” in the Middle East and Europe in his address to the annual Asia Security Summit “Shangri-La Dialogue” held on May 30, 2015, in Singapore.29 Antonov included Macedonia among cases listed, though turmoil in Skopije in 2015 stemmed from Islamist extremists and the domestic unrest jeopardizing stability in this nation which openly aspired toward NATO and EU membership had also been a source of concern in the United States and Europe. Antonov took the opportunity to emphasize the threat posed by domestic turmoil in Asia and the US strategy of containment: No one can feel absolutely safe, entertaining the fact that “color revolutions” have not come to the Asia-Pacific. The thing is, it may happen at any moment once the Western elites feel unhappy about the policy of a state and make a decision on the introduction of “democratic” values. We recall the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong. Who is next? . . . In this context, we are concerned about US policy in the Asia-Pacific given that it becomes more and more focused on systematic “containment” of Russia and China.30

In June 2015, Interfax reported that Russia’s Ministry of Defense would initiate a major research project involving input from multiple agencies and experts on the topic of colored revolutions. Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu commenting on the project stated: It has been said that the army should sit on the sidelines and not get involved in the political process . . . On the contrary, we believe we do need to be involved . . . We don’t have any right, nor do we want to repeat events of 1991 to 1993 when the government collapsed . . . We need to understand how to prevent it.31

A report published in Kommersant in March 2015 noted that research was underway in Russia’s defense community directed toward recommending 224

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measures that could effectively respond to “destabilization of a domestic political situation” and to counter “romanticized” images of revolution in the country.32 As a part of the effort to build partnership capacity to counter colored revolutions, elite airborne forces and special forces from Russia, Belarus, and Serbia involving 700 personnel participated in the “Slavyanskoe Bratsvo” (Slavic Brotherhood) military exercises held in the Southern Military District in Novorossiysk Russia in September 2–5, 2015.33 Russia’s military leadership maintained that the exercises were necessary because “color revolutions” are a “form of armed struggle” that must be countered with both lethal and nonlethal measures; the joint training was also deemed significant for gaining multinational experience in combining lethal and non-lethal instruments to manage public protests, riots, and acts of terrorism.34 Robert McDermott suggests that involving Serbia or widening the exercise to include participation outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) might indicate that Russia seeks to gain political support in the event that future action is needed to respond to this type of threat.35 The exercise, promoted by Russia’s military as the “first of its kind,” was reported to have simulated responses to anti-government protests, escalating into street riots followed by terrorist attacks. While Putin frequently includes discussion of the colored revolutions in his speeches and public statements, China’s President Xi Jinping avoids specific reference to colored revolutions and instead reaffirms China’s commitment to non-interference and respect for sovereignty when commenting on external intervention in circumstances of domestic vulnerability or instability. At his speech to the 95th Congress of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping noted that “China is against placing a forceful will on other people, or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.”36 Chinese media and analysts have devoted considerable coverage to the threat posed by colored revolutions. In June 2015, the CCP’s People’s Daily featured several articles devoted to analyzing the sources and national security threats posed by colored revolutions and lessons that China can derive from the experience of uprisings threatening other states. Zhang Zhizhou, professor of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, offering one of the featured articles in the series, stated that the colored revolutions were an “aftershock” of the collapse of the Soviet Union and that “blind” introduction of “Western social reforms” had resulted in “chaos.”37 He further contended that nations should explore their “own path and model,” rather than attempting to follow the “superstition of Western institutions.”38 A staff editorial published in October 2015 in Xinhua attributed blame for the Middle East refugee crisis to the Western intervention: “Waving the flags of democracy and freedom, advocating non-violent protests and demonstrations, the West, 225

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particularly the United States, pushed forward the Color Revolution by immensely pressuring ruling regimes and ultimately collapsing them, creating a power vacuum afterward and leading to further political unrest and social disorder.”39 The staff editor, Chen Yue, continued: Only seeking to secure their own safety and interests, Western powers have meddled in regional affairs, incited turmoil and waged wars, bringing chaos to the area and forcing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes . . . The Western countries have no other choice but to accept the “side effect” of the Color Revolution they once supported, as they should be held collectively accountable for the Middle East refugee crisis today.40

CCTV featured a report in October 2015 by Wu Sike, China’s former special envoy to the Middle East, suggesting the US military occupation of Iraq in 2003 “disrupted political conditions in the country,” unleashing “unabated unrest” and resulting in “refugees fleeing Arab countries.”41 Wu Sike continued: “After turmoil erupted again in late 2010, European countries, led by the United States, were promoting so-called color revolutions that ignited regime change in Libya and other countries through military means . . . Islamist terrorists exploited the situation . . . Humanitarian catastrophes are growing day-by-day.”42 Suspicions regarding Western designs in provoking domestic tensions seem to shape perceptions and pervade Russian and Chinese assessments of contemporary regional security flashpoints. In July 2015, protests that took place in Armenia prompted by the desire to reduce prices for electricity in households generated reactions from the Russian leadership warning against Western attempts to provoke domestic upheaval. In response to the protests in Armenia, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated: You know how the “color revolutions,” and the Maidan in Ukraine started . . . The current developments in Armenia—there is also a temptation among many to use them to whip up anti-government sentiment although the root of these events is purely economic . . . It seems useful for someone to go further and develop these processes in a political way.43

Lavrov added that Western nations were paying greater attention to the role of young people in shaping national agendas, obviously based on reference to developments in the Middle East and in the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine and elsewhere. Mass protests erupting in Hong Kong in September 2014 as a reaction to what was perceived as Beijing’s reneging on an agreement to permit genuinely open elections or “true universal suffrage” in Hong Kong prompted charges from Beijing of Western instigation. Hong Kong has been governed under a “one country, two systems” framework since 1997, wherein Beijing is 226

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responsible for defense and foreign relations, and Hong Kong maintains a degree of self-governance.44 The so-called “Umbrella Revolution,” initially staged by an indigenous movement involving large mass protests that continued for more than two months September–December 2014, was prompted by Beijing’s attempt to vet candidates that would be permitted to run for the chief executive post. In the end, the movement failed to elicit compromise from Beijing on selection of the chief executive, though resistance to Beijing’s intervention in local affairs has not subsided.45 The CCP accused the United States and Western nations of attempting to stoke a colored revolution in Hong Kong in an effort that would undermine the Chinese political system. Chinese media sources claimed that Western media coined the term “Umbrella Revolution” to refer to domestic protests in Hong Kong. An article published in the CCP’s China Daily identifies Western influence as a factor in the Hong Kong protests, seeking to prompt a “ ‘color revolution’ that would ignite in Hong Kong” but “spreads to the mainland.”46 The article states: “Color revolutions usually have fancy names—‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, ‘Orange’ in Ukraine and ‘Tulip’ in Kyrgyzstan. More recently, there was the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in the Middle East and the ‘Sunflower Movement’ in Taiwan. But in reality, these movements were poison laced with honey.”47 The author suggests that the movement in Hong Kong shared with the colored revolutions a “wanton disregard for the rule of law” which had “greatly affected social stability” and “taken a heavy toll on businesses.” Another editorial published in the CCP’s People’s Daily discussing the background to the Hong Kong protests claimed that “the US government, nongovernmental organizations and media will be associated with US involvement in the ‘Color Revolutions’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere” and that the “US may enjoy the sweet taste of interfering in other countries’ internal affairs, but on the issue of Hong Kong it stands little chance of overcoming the determination of the Chinese government to maintain stability and prosperity.”48 Support offered by the Washington DC-based non-profit National Endowment for Democracy was cited as evidence of external instigation of the protests, but protesters participating in the Hong Kong uprising deny receiving assistance from the United States or other Western nations in organizing the demonstrations. In September 2016, six new young legislators favoring greater autonomy were elected to Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, reflecting the intensified desire to challenge the manner in which Beijing has imposed control over Hong Kong, and suggesting that political pressures for greater independence have by no means subsided.49 In responding to the wave of colored revolutions, both Russia and China moved to incrementally impose stringent restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organizations. In July 2012, after taking office for a third 227

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term, President Putin signed a “foreign agents” law. Building on the previous NGO law implemented in 2006 and subsequent amendments, the “foreign agents” law would impose additional surveillance measures on NGOs operating in Russia. The law implemented in 2012 requires that organizations receiving foreign funding must register as “foreign agents” even if the organization is not involved in political activity. The NGOs defined as “foreign agents” would be required to produce financial reports and were subject to unscheduled audits and law-enforcement monitoring and searches. The difficulties presented to externally funded NGOs would result in closures and voluntary decisions to terminate offices in Russia. In March 2015, Putin referred to NGOs as a “threat to national security.”50 Putin stated: “Western special services continue their attempts at using public, non-governmental and politicized organizations to pursue their own objectives, primarily to discredit the authorities and destabilize the internal situation in Russia. They are already planning their actions for the upcoming election campaigns of 2016–18.”51 In 2016, Beijing implemented the first law on regulating NGOs, targeting those “foreign agencies” attempting to “de-stabilize” “non-aligned sovereign and autonomous China” by exerting influence through the media, universities, and other sources.52 Beijing’s officials and media sources frequently characterize NGOs as “Trojan horses” planted by Western nations to influence society or gather intelligence. Prior to implementation of the new legal restrictions, China’s officials issued a statement regarding NGOs in 2015, warning that these organizations should not attempt to take any actions that threaten national security or that would be contrary to “China’s social morality.”53 On July 1, 2015, China passed a sweeping National Security Law authorizing “all measures necessary” to “protect China from hostile elements.” The new legal restrictions require NGOs to have an official Chinese sponsor and to register with the Ministry of Security, which has authority to scrutinize all activities related to the organization’s mission, operations, and finances. Amid criticism from Western nations regarding the new restrictions, Guo Shengkun, China’s Minister of Public Security, stated that “China highly appreciated the contributions made by overseas non-governmental organizations, and will further support their friendly activities in China.”54 The Chinese government recognizes the longstanding contributions of foreign-sponsored NGOs, but these measures are designed to ensure that only those NGOs that operate exclusively in accordance with the strict terms set forth by the government and party and that present no threat to domestic security will be tolerated in the country. Russia’s population is generally reluctant to take part in public protests, and any effort on the part of Western nations to discredit or undermine Putin would more than likely only serve to strengthen the Russian president’s hold 228

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on society. Putin’s high popularity, further centralization of state control, and limiting of the space for political competition and dissent also make it difficult to challenge the existing regime. Recent official meetings of the Communist Party of China consistently include calls to improve one-party Marxist rule, but not to introduce radical change. In his speech at the 95th anniversary of China’s Communist Party, Xi Jinping credited the CCP with “ushering the nation onto the global stage as a major player” and “lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty,” and expressed a firm intention that China would continue to adhere to Marxist ideological orthodoxy.55 Xi Jinping suggests a model of “consultative democracy” to permit communication with the masses while maintaining the CCP’s firm control of the system, enforcing the rule of law, and countering corruption. The leaderships in both Russia and China have reinforced messaging suggesting that Westernstyle democracies are not suited to the unique circumstances and traditions in their nations. Domestic standards of living and social and economic conditions in both nations could be a source of future unrest, but there is no evidence that in the shorter term European sanctions imposed on Russia will lead to revolutionary upheaval or that the Chinese system is likely to be overturned in response to demands for improved social living conditions. Still, both countries harbor concerns that Western subversive attempts to exploit internal situations could threaten regime legitimacy. Neither Russia nor China appears to be vulnerable to “Egyptian,” “Tunisian,” or “Libyan” models of revolution or attempts to engineer regime change on the part of Western powers. However, given the recent waves of uprisings resulting in the ousting of authoritarian regimes, the leaderships of both these nations place the highest priority on countering domestic threats to the state, national sovereignty, and perceived Western strategic ambition toward advancing regime transformational democratization throughout the world. While the West sees democratization as necessary to legitimize governments, Russia and China fear the potential chaos and threats to regime stability that can ensue from unleashing popular participation or tolerating open competition and dissent. Western nations seek to promote democratic institutions and governance as a means toward long-term stability and expanding allies and cooperative partners, whereas Russia and China point to revolutionary transformation as yielding adverse disruption, regime instability, and human suffering. Clearly, Moscow and Beijing pose a direct challenge to the liberal international order by placing a higher priority on security of the state over freedom of the individual. The tensions between Western democratic nations and preferences on the part of Russia and China for insulating state security by means of authoritarian models of governance restricting political participation define a major geopolitical divide on the contemporary and emerging global security environment. 229

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Cyber and Information Security Estimates indicate that the total number of Internet users has reached three billion worldwide. The worldwide cyber network has become a ubiquitous feature of life in the twenty-first century, creating a level of global interconnectedness unimaginable only a few years ago. Cyber technology, the Internet, and social media have rapidly come to pervade nearly all aspects of human experience. Digital networks are essential to the functioning of governments, economies, and social experience. Cyberspace creates another sphere for both cooperation and competition among nations. Along with the tremendous opportunities offered by the growth of the worldwide network, the cyber arena represents a major non-traditional security issue area in contemporary international politics. Nations have faced difficult challenges in attempting to proactively keep pace with responding to the complex array of security challenges accompanying the rapid growth of the cyber sphere. To the extent that nations are integrated and reliant on digital interconnectedness, they become exposed to another dimension of threats in the cyber realm. The growth of the Internet creates a unique set of challenges for nation states as it transcends borders and has largely developed without regulation. Existing domestic and international laws are simply not sufficient to keep pace with the unanticipated worldwide proliferation of the Internet. The element of anonymity adds to the difficulty of maintaining accountability for behavior and activity in cyberspace. The number of annual significant hacker data breaches has reached a staggering figure. Terrorists and criminals have exploited the Internet to recruit and inculcate followers and to conduct devastating attacks and crimes. The global community is plagued by electronic identity theft, and societies are concerned about the continual emergence of new types of cyber threats to public safety, such as disrupting medical devices or automobile hacking. All countries have become targets for the weaponizing of cyber assets or the conduct of cyber espionage for striking advantages in state-to-state conflicts. Even as cyber technology creates prosperity and cultural enhancement, unfortunately the proliferation of malicious content, trolling, botnet attacks, and many other threats is a part of the cyber experience for all nations. Experts are concerned that additional devastating incidents could occur, jeopardizing power grids and nuclear power plants or disrupting other critical infrastructure. Russia’s National Security Strategy specifically identifies threats posed by the global information struggle: “The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries’ aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international 230

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situation.”56 Member of Russia’s senior security leadership Nikolai Patrushev characterizes the security challenge as follows: “At the threshold of the 21st century the primary threats to international peace and security have ‘shifted’ to the information sphere . . . in modern conditions effectively providing national and international security and stability is impossible without strengthening security in the information sphere.”57 China’s Military Strategy describes cyberspace as a “new dimension of national security” and “international strategic competition,” and states that China confronts “grave security threats to its cyber infrastructure.”58 The People’s Liberation Army recognizes that “the internet has become the main battlefront for the struggle in the ideological arena.”59

Russia–China Bilateral and Multilateral Collaboration in Cyber/Information Security In May 2015, Russia and China concluded a bilateral treaty for broad-ranging cooperation in “information security.” The agreement reflected a consensus in Russian and Chinese views regarding major threats to global information security and represented a commitment to further expand collaboration in addressing these challenges. The agreement has been widely described as a “nonaggression pact” for cyberspace in which both countries pledged to avoid using “computer attacks” against each other.60 The two countries agreed to exchange technology to secure information infrastructure and to enhance coordination among law enforcement agencies and technical experts in promoting cyber/Internet security. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping committed to holding a series of consultative exchanges to accelerate Russia–China collaboration in cyber and information security and established a series of benchmarks to measure progress. The 2015 agreement corresponds with Russia’s intention to deepen cooperation with China and Asia in the aftermath of Western sanctions following the intervention in Ukraine, but it also builds on a series of prior bilateral agreements and initiatives over the past decade reflecting the shared interests and approaches of the two nations for global cyber and information security. Leading specialist on cyber security of the Russian Center for Policy Research (PIR) research center in Moscow, Oleg Demidov, described the agreement as “an important step in terms of pivoting to the East” that would establish a “precedent” for “cooperation” among “two global cyber security powers.”61 Russia and China aspire to exert decisive influence in establishing norms for the international community in cyberspace, and the approaches of the two countries toward cyber and information security differ in significant respects with Western nations. In addition to the common concerns shared with the United States and Europe, such as protection against cyber intrusions, theft, 231

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and security of critical infrastructure, Russia and China have defined security in the information/cyber sphere in broader terms. Like prior Russia–China initiatives in cyberspace, the 2015 bilateral agreement refers to countering information threats to the “societal-political and social-economic systems, and spiritual, moral and cultural environment of states.”62 The two countries agreed to counter technology that could “destabilize the internal political and socio-economic atmosphere” of their nations or “disturb public order” or “interfere with the internal affairs of the state.” Russia has no equivalent of China’s “Golden Shield Project,” more popularly known as the “Great Firewall of China,” functioning as a domestic intra-net restricting material and blocking vast sections of the foreign Internet from China’s population, but both countries have been more willing than Western nations to employ varying levels of censorship and surveillance in order to manage content in the cyber/ Internet arenas. Corresponding with the establishment of the Internet or the intra-net, China introduced the concept of “internet sovereignty” in official documents and speeches, contending that nation states should have the authority to govern and manage the functioning of the Internet within their territory. United States and European nations tend to favor a free and open Internet to allow unrestricted expression, and the influence of the first amendment has made the United States even more reluctant to restrict online expression than some of its European allies. The United States and other Western nations use the term “cybersecurity,” defined as protecting computer networks and promoting the free flow of information, whereas Russia and China have tended to prefer “information security,” encompassing a broader concept to include managing Internet and social media content. Russia and China have also worked collaboratively over the past several years to attempt to exercise decisive influence in establishing the terms for governance of the Internet. The United States and other Western nations want to maintain the original multi-stakeholder system that established the protocols for managing the Internet, involving participation of an array of private and civic organizations to include government representation, while both Russia and China have adamantly contended that the Internet should be managed by the United Nations and that national governments should control the cyber and information space and Internet within their territory. China issued a White Paper in 2010 to address information security issues, calling for the “establishment of an authoritative and just international Internet administration organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide scale.”63 Moscow and Beijing have joined forces to introduce proposals in major international organizations to establish global laws and norms for governing cyberspace.64 In 2006, Russia and China signed a first agreement on cyber and information security together with the nations of the SCO, calling for securing 232

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the role of the state in governing the information space, and promoting the “establishment of a multilateral, transparent and democratic international Internet management system.” Nations of the SCO identified dissemination of “information harmful to social and political, and economic systems, as well as spiritual, moral, and cultural spheres” as being among the main threats for “ensuring international information security.”65 During the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, Russia, together with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, introduced a proposal entitled “International Code of Conduct for International Security,” offering a twelve-point statement based on the “need to prevent the potential use of information and communication technologies for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security” and “adversely affecting the integrity of infrastructure within States.”66 The document also called for respecting “internet sovereignty” and curbing “the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism, or extremism that undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment.”67 Analysts suggested that the Russian-led proposal did offer several important areas where common ground could be established with Western nations, including protection of critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, enhancing cyber capacity among nations of the world, cooperation in monitoring violent security threats, and more. However, Western officials also cautioned that adopting the proposed “Code of Conduct” could lead to censorship of international communication for any reason or filtering communication that governments find objectionable.68 Russian and Chinese officials have often expressed concerns regarding “ideological domination” of the cyber sphere, and complain that the United States maintains a competitive or even “hegemonic” controlling position in the Internet, with a disproportionate share of DNS servers and leading internet companies. Although Russia and China have benefited from the existing multi-stakeholder system of Internet governance, both Moscow and Beijing share the position that the current Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) establishes a dominant influence for the United States and other Western nations in the management of the Internet, and have repeatedly called for shifting oversight of the Internet from the nongovernment ICANN to United Nations regulation. Developing a unified international approach to cyber and Internet security has been fraught with difficulties as a result of the differences among nations in constitutional and legal traditions, and varying political, social, and cultural expectations regarding the restrictions of freedom of expression and communication. Russian and Chinese officials have frequently expressed complaints about the lack of established international agreements for governing the global cyber, information, Internet, and social media arenas. For 233

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example, a report issued by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the think tank of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, compares international and Chinese perspectives on cyber security.69 Among several international perspectives on cyber security, the report cites Eneken Tikk’s widely circulated Ten Rules of Cyber Security, published while she was at the NATO Cooperative Defense Center for Excellence, focusing on issues such as data protection pertaining to balancing information exchange and individuals’ rights to privacy, cooperation between public and private institutions and national governments and international organizations, self-defense concerning legal justification for a kinetic military response to cyber attacks, and others.70 The CIIS report juxtaposes Tikk’s and other Western writings with thinking in China, referencing, for example, the five principles proposed by Chinese Ambassador Wang Qun in his speech on the diplomatic aspects of international security in the information age delivered at the 66th session of the UN General Assembly.71 Ambassador Wang Qun’s succinct summary of China’s major concerns concentrated on the importance of national sovereignty in governing information and cyberspace, maintaining the balance between freedom and security in information flow, and he cautioned that cyber technology should not provide a means for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.72 The CIIS report concludes that Chinese and other international proposals on cyber and information security are different in terms of content and emphasis, representing a reflection of the interests and aims of each nation. The growth of the cyber sphere and Internet, accompanied by increasing accessibility and sophistication of methods for jeopardizing the security of network systems, has contributed to greater urgency among all nations of the world to seek additional technical, legal, and educational means to protect security. The prominent role of the Internet/social media in the destabilizing Arab Spring uprisings, the frequency of terrorist attacks motivated by violent extremism, the alleged Western interference in Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011–12, and suspicions regarding Western intentions in exporting revolutionary change and espionage have contributed to strengthening resolve among the leadership in both Moscow and Beijing to secure and further expand government control of the cyber sphere. Both nations assign the highest priority to ensuring non-interference from outside powers in their domestic cyberspace. Analysts also point to the impact of the disclosures of former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden in 2013, which prompted Russia and China to seek additional means for limiting foreign threats to domestic cyber and information systems. Figures indicate the rapidly expanding participation of the populations of Russia and China with the Internet. Estimates indicate that Russia registered more than 87 million Internet users in 2015, and an estimated 91 million in 234

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2016.73 China ranks first in the world in terms of numbers of Internet users, with 669 million “netcitizens” in 2015 and 700 million in 2016.74 This figure slightly exceeds 50 percent of China’s vast population, whereas Russian penetration or percentage of the population as registered Internet users has reached approximately 70 percent. China has placed significant attention on closing the digital divide within the country and the global community, and Xi Jinping claims that by 2020 all villages in China will have broadband coverage.75 China’s .cn ranks behind only the .com domain as the second largest in the world, and Russia’s .ru ranks among the top ten largest domains in the world. Social media and social networking have also grown exponentially in Russia, with more than 72 million social network users in 2016. Social networking and blogging communities popular in Russia include Vkontakte, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, LinkedIn, My Space, Google, Twitter, Ushahidi, and more. China is one of the most restricted countries in the world in terms of Internet access, with censorship laws prohibiting participation in social media sources dominating the West and much of the world, but they have created thriving alternate local internal social platforms and networks (Weibo, a Twitter equivalent in China; Renren and PengYou sites that are similar to Facebook) and China’s “netcitizens” actually spend more time on social networking sites than do Western Internet users.76

Russia: Cyber/Information Security Challenges and Responses In 2011, in his annual address to the Duma, President Putin made the point that he opposed placing limitations on the Internet, stating that there would be no “snip-snapping” [referencing a popular Soviet era anecdote about the Cheka secret police] or censorship of the Internet.77 While serving as Russia’s President, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had also called for preserving freedom from restriction on the Internet. In 2011, Medvedev made the point that “Russia will not support initiatives that put in doubt freedom in the Internet, freedom which is based on the requirements for morality and law.”78 He stated further that: “Blocking the Internet, cutting off global communication lines . . . all this leads nowhere.”79 While the state controls most of the television and news media in Russia, citizens in contemporary Russian society have been able to rely on the Internet as a source of information and communication throughout the world with few restrictions. However, as the subsequent discussion illustrates, official attitudes are shifting, and there are concerns within Russian society about the potential for increasing government regulation and monitoring of the Internet/social media which could lead to further restricting expression throughout the entire Runet and limit full access to information. 235

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Russia’s Information Security Doctrine of 2000, originally conceived prior to the development of social media, has served as the basis for Russia’s domestic strategy for managing cyber security for more than a decade.80 The document describes the objectives and priorities of Russia’s information security policy. Russia’s official definition of information security included “the state of protection of national interests in the information sphere defined by the totality of balanced interests of the individual, society, and the state.” Spheres of information security are broadly described to include economics, domestic policy, foreign policy, science and technology, spiritual life, information and telecommunication systems, defense, law enforcement, and emergency situations. Information security expert Mikhail Yakushev notes that Russia’s approach to Internet governance has taken two forms, one that includes technical management issues such as procedures for domain name registration and rules for allocation of IP numbers, and a broader approach encompassing humanitarian, economic, and political dimensions to prevent the Internet from being used for harmful purposes.81 In conjunction with the passing of the “foreign agents” law in 2012, an additional law was passed blocking websites featuring content that “could threaten children’s lives, health, and development.”82 Major Internet providers in Russia, Yandex, Google Russia, the Russian branch of Wikipedia, and others immediately protested the new law, claiming that it was passed in order to censor the Internet. Since the laws came into effect in November 2012, the Mass Media Inspection Service has been permitted to block sites with objectionable content, including those promoting child pornography, suicide, or substance abuse, without the need for a court decision. A federal agency, Roskomnadzor, was established to monitor Internet and media activities. The system functions as a robot, with the task of vigilantly monitoring online sources for objectionable material. The agency scans the Internet and other media sources and issues warnings to Internet providers in the event that written or visual material posted online is deemed extremist or harmful. Timothy L. Thomas, a leading US Army analyst on cyber security, notes that “Russia’s leaders appear to believe there is a real cognitive war underway in the ether and media for the hearts and minds of citizens at home and abroad.”83 The Russian government has responded by utilizing official websites and social media as well as enlisting the support of pro-regime groups in society (Nashi and others) to support the positions of the Kremlin and counter critics in online platforms. Thomas and others have documented the increasingly important role that control of information is assuming in Russia’s strategic military thinking. Consistent with the evolving thinking of General Valery Gerasimov and his associates, analysts have pointed to the use of concepts such as “psychosphere” or “reflexive control” in Russia’s defense community, reinforcing what has become a generally held belief 236

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that contemporary and future wars will be won in the mind rather than on the physical battlefield.84 In 2014, Russia’s government issued a first draft Cyber Security Concept, formed by the Russian Federation Council, Duma, Ministry of Communication, and the Government Office, encouraging public discussion of the proposal.85 The document was posted on the Federation Council’s website and other Internet sites, emphasizing the importance of seeking input from the largest possible group of stakeholders representing business and civic society. The draft acknowledges the critical importance of the Internet and cyberspace to Russia’s economic development and modernization, but also notes that the “purposeful” and “systematic” development of state policy of information and communication technology (ICT) governance is critical for “building an effective and socially responsible state in the XXI century.” The document suggests that the term “cybersecurity” can be used to facilitate Russia’s collaboration in managing the cyber sphere and Internet since so many nations use the cyber reference rather than information security, but that information aspects of security are encompassed within the cyber definition. The strategy focuses on combating information terrorism and cyber crime, and defending against foreign exploitation of the cyber sphere for strategic gain. The draft document also calls for focusing on threats to critical infrastructure, especially the water supply, heating, traffic lights, and nuclear and hydroelectric plants. Russia’s President, legislative bodies, Federal Security Service, Federal Protection Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Defense all participate in the development and management of the responsibilities for cyber and information security in the Russian Federation. Andrei Krutskikh serves as Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in Information Security. In 2012, Andrei Lipov was appointed as Chief of the Presidential Directorate for the Application of Information Technology and the Development of E-Democracy. The Directorate’s main objectives are to support state policies of the Russian Federation in the application of information technology and development of e-democracy, to advise the President of the Russian Federation on the use of information technology, and to participate in the implementation of direction provided by the President. In 2013, Russia established a cyber unit within the Russian armed forces with the mission of defending the nation and armed forces against critical infrastructure and computer attacks.86 Russia has an officially recognized government computer security incident response team, GOV-CERT, with public and private capacity to manage cyber system security issues such as denial of service attacks, data compromise, unauthorized access, malicious software, breaches of information security, phishing, fraud, and other threats.87 While Russia’s leadership had initially been more willing to allow freedom on the Internet, Russian society has witnessed a progression of the imposition 237

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of government regulation in the cyber/information spheres. Putin responded to a question in 2014 about Russia’s largest search engine Yandex storing its data on servers outside the country, stating that the Internet was a “CIA project” and “is still developing as such.”88 In January 2015, an official spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Communication said that there are plans to use the Chinese model to establish a cyber threat response center to collect and store information and to educate the public on Internet use.89 Legislation was introduced in 2015 in the Russian Duma to tighten controls on monitoring DNS and IP addresses, to control foreign communication channels, and to require operators to use only exchange points registered with the state. The Russian government has introduced additional measures to ensure that the personal data of citizen Internet users is stored on Russian soil. In 2015, a personal data localization law was effected, requiring foreign companies operating in Russia to process and store the data that they collect about Russian citizens and residents on the territory of the Russian Federation. This legislation evidently aimed to pressure sites such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, which have enabled networking exchange for antigovernment groups in Russia, to open local offices and to provide user information. So far, these foreign-based companies have generally resisted compliance. Additional restrictions included imposing a requirement that bloggers register if they have more than 3,000 followers, with provisions that would lead to arrest in the event that “offensive” information is posted or retweeted. In February 2016, Russian media reported that the Duma was considering additional legal provisions requiring Internet companies to validate the authenticity of facts before posting material. In early 2016, inspired by an initiative in China to require companies to register Internet domain names in the country, a working group was formed in Russia to establish a “white list” of domain names to be approved or distributed by the government. An article published in Kommersat-Vlast in April 2016 by Alexander Bastrykin, Director of Russia’s Investigative Committee, the nation’s top law enforcement officer, called for adopting to “a reasonable extent” Beijing’s experience in censoring the Internet.90 Bastrykin stated: In the past decade, Russia and a number of other countries have lived in so-called hybrid war unleashed by the United States and its allies. It is time to put an effective shield against this information war. We need a strict, adequate and matching response. This is particularly relevant in the context of the upcoming elections and the possible risks of activation of forces destabilizing the political situation.

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do as they please” only undermines the “common good.”91 Some affiliated with Russia’s information security community are skeptical about the likelihood of imposing a Chinese model of Internet censorship which would require major changes to the existing legal system. Others note that the gradual imposition of government control on the Internet could lead to additional restrictions and that Bastrykin’s article was simply intended to gauge public reaction. Escalation of perceived threats to national security, including tensions with the West or terrorist attacks in Russia, and concerns with the public’s access to extremist, corrupt, or incendiary material on the Internet, could lead to further tightening of control of the Internet in Russia. In July 2016, Putin signed into law measures that would further increase the surveillance powers of Russia’s security services, requiring communication providers to store users’ calls, messages, photographs, and videos for extended periods and to provide the security services with access to these materials. In July 2016, another draft of the prior Cyber Concept or “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation” was posted to the website of the Russian Security Council.92 The draft reflects the input of the Security Council and representatives of the scientific, expert, and business communities, and it was posted soliciting further public feedback. The document “calls for increased centralization management as a means for enhancing information security in the Russian Federation.” The main task as specified in the draft Information Security Doctrine remains “to ensure the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the information space.” The objective of the doctrine is explicitly stated in security/military terms to ensure “the stable and smooth functioning of the national information infrastructure . . . in peacetime, during the direct threat of aggression, and in wartime.” It refers to “leading countries” exerting a “negative impact” on Russia in global information security, and the threats posed by terrorist and extremist organizations. The document states that Russia’s economy and industry are dependent on export policies of foreign nations that they “pursue to serve their geopolitical interests,” and that the “absence of any rules to regulate state-to-state relations in cyberspace or any appropriate international legal mechanisms to reflect specific features of information technology, make it harder to forge a system of international information security, as designed to bring about strategic stability and facilitate equal strategic partnership.”

China: Cyber/Information Security Challenges and Responses At the annual global Second World Internet Conference hosted in Wuzhen China in December 2015, President Xi Jinping compared the information revolution to the agricultural and industrial revolutions, suggesting that all had brought “great and profound impact on our lives.” Projecting an 239

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enthusiastic and positive tone, Xi emphasized that the information revolution had “led to new horizons in commerce and governance” and would facilitate “global communication.”93 Clearly, China’s leadership recognizes the benefits of participation in the global cyber sphere, but also has taken measures to ensure that the government and party retain firm control of the cyber/information space and the participation of China’s society in network platforms. Chinese scholars describe access to the Internet as an “indispensable” part of life, and China has become reliant on both e-government and e-commerce for the functioning of society. The term “informatization” refers to information technology modernization used in the Chinese government planning process with wide application in government, military, commerce, and society. Although the Internet has contributed to China’s rise as a major power, as for all societies it also exposes the nation to a range of cyber security vulnerabilities and threats. Beijing’s leadership consistently acknowledges the contribution of the Internet to economic growth, prosperity, and development, but China has imposed a series of measures to further control the cyber and information spheres in society. Several scholars have observed that China’s leadership has tended to prioritize information and content control over defending the country against economic cyber crime and technical network security. Leading expert on China’s cyber security, Jon R. Lindsay, offers the assessment that: “China tends to put more coherent effort into defense against imagined perils of ‘terrorism, separatism, extremism’ than into defense against economic cybercrime and technical exploitation by foreign intelligence services.”94 There is real concern on the part of the government and ruling party that domestic dissent could spin out of control, and they have aimed to ensure that the Internet and social media would not be harnessed as a platform for challenging the CCP. President Xi Jinping has placed a high priority on the importance of China’s development in the cyber/information spheres, and on balancing security and the proliferation of the cyber/information spheres. In April 2014, Xi Jinping offered a widely cited statement to China’s state-run agency Xinhua on “Internet security and Informatization.”95 Xi’s reference to “two wings of a bird and two wheels of an engine” implies the importance of ensuring Internet safety to national security and “informatization” to modernization. Xi also continually calls for ensuring “cyber sovereignty,” underscoring the importance of “each country’s rights to choose its online development path, its network management model, its public Internet policies and equal participation in international cyberspace dominance.”96 Prior to Xi Jinping’s leadership, China had introduced legal provisions and procedures following the permanent establishment of Internet access in the country in 1994. In 2003, the “National Coordinating Small Group for Cyber and Information Security” developed the first Chinese cyber security strategy. 240

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The so-called White Paper or “Document 27” 2010 (Opinions of the Leading Group for Strengthening Information Security Assurance Work) established the basis for the continued development of China’s cyber/information strategy and legislation today.97 The 2010 White Paper clearly reflected the importance assigned to the Internet: Chinese government fully understands the Internet’s irreplaceable role in accelerating the development of the national economy, pushing forward toward scientific and technological advancement, and expediting the informational transformation of social services, and places emphasis on and actively supports Internet development and application. China takes Internet development as a significant opportunity to boost its reform and opening-up policies and modernization drive.98

The document emphasizes that security was a “prerequisite” for the “sound development and effective utilization” of the Internet, and affirms that the Chinese government would play the leading role in administration and legal regulation of the Internet. In July 2012, following the STUXNET attack against Iran’s nuclear assets and continued problems with maintaining security of China’s sites, the State Council issued an update to Document 27 entitled “Opinion of the State Council Concerning Forcefully Moving Informatization Development Forward and Realistically Guaranteeing Information Security,” reinforcing the importance of cyber encryption, security of critical infrastructure, and user privacy protection. Xi Jinping has designated cyber security as a critical priority, and he has taken a direct role in the acceleration of development of governing institutions and regulatory mechanisms in the cyber sphere. In 2014, the party Leading Small Group for Network Security and Informatization (LSG) was founded, with Xi Jinping establishing the dual priorities of “cybersecurity” and “informatization.”99 The LSG is responsible for shaping and implementing information security and legal standards and policies and procedures for the Internet. At this first meeting of the LSG, Xi Jinping also suggested that the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC) provide the subordinate functional office for implementing objectives set forth by the LSG in managing cyber/information security and development. Lu Wei, currently serving as director of the CAC, has become quite influential in the development of China’s domestic and international cyber security initiatives. In March 2016, the CCP’s Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC) was formed, supporting Xi’s intention to enhance cyber governance in China and connecting the major stakeholders involved in society, including the government, the private sector, and industry. CSAC’s mandate focuses on the development of cyber governance in China, encompassing legal, technical, industrial, as well as public information and social stability dimensions.100 241

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The CSAC is chaired by Fang Binxing, who developed the “Great Firewall” Internet censorship system in China. Fang Binxing’s description of the major areas of concentration for the CSAC are summarized based on interviews to include 1) laws and regulations to build the new ICT legal regime; 2) technology support helping to boost the domestic ICT industry; 3) public opinion supervision to help in information control; 4) security and stability of information systems, products, and services; and 5) protecting core Chinese interests under globalization, and promoting globally competitive Chinese IT companies.101 In July 2016, the National People’s Congress released another document in a series of draft texts of the Cybersecurity Law, and the document remained open for further comments until August 2016.102 Both China’s National Security Law 2015 and Cybersecurity Law 2016 designate the state as the authority for maintaining cyber and information security, and both documents provide considerable latitude to the government to implement security measures as necessary to safeguard cyber and information space.103 For example, Article 75 of the National Security Law authorizes state organs and military units to employ “necessary means and methods” to protect national security. It reiterates the commitment to maintaining “cyber sovereignty” and preventing dissemination of information considered “unlawful or harmful.” The document calls for tightening cyber security and making all infrastructure and information networks “secure and controllable.” Chinese officials have responded to concerns from the West regarding the potential impact on communication and foreign investment, stating that the law was necessary to deal with unprecedented and complex threats to national security ranging from cyber crime to terrorism. China’s draft Cybersecurity Law provides national security standards for cyber and information networks and establishes the state as holding responsibility for implementing “key protections” for “information networks.”104 According to Article 1 of the draft, the Cybersecurity Law has a fourfold purpose: ensuring cyberspace sovereignty, social stability, privacy protection, and economic development. Article 23 specifies that for “the needs of national security and criminal investigation, investigating organs may request network operators provide necessary technological support and assistance in accordance with laws and regulations.” Article 33 specifies that the national cyberspace administration will have responsibility for coordinating security with the relevant departments, and have authority to “conduct random inspections testing security risks to critical information and infrastructure.” As in Russia, Article 31 calls for the localization or storage of citizens’ personal information and important data within the mainland territory of the People’s Republic of China. Article 9 makes specific reference to maintaining social order, stating that the network must not be used to “engage in activities 242

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harming national security, propagating terrorism and extremism, inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, dissemination of obscene and sexual information, slandering or defame others, upsetting social order, harming the public interest.” Finally, the People’s Liberation Army 2015 White Paper on military strategy reaffirms that the concept of “informatization” has been among the key foundations for the development of contemporary military strategy and planning. The document states that “the internet has become the main battlefront for the struggle in the ideological arena.”105 As in Russia, for more than a decade, China’s current cyber-strategic thinking has developed on the basis of the previous priority assigned to information dimensions of warfare. The PLA’s “three warfares” introduced in 2003 include 1) public opinion (media) warfare yulun zhan; 2) psychological warfare xinli zhan; and 3) legal warfare falu zhan, all constituting part of the PLA regulations for the conduct of “political work.”106 In 2015, China’s cyber warfare capabilities were further centralized in a new Strategic Support Force that analysts believe should augment the PLA’s capacity to compete in the information domain.107 While Russia still remains largely open in the Internet and social media arenas, censorship and surveillance have characterized the cyber/Internet experience in China from the outset. Xi says he wants to maintain an Internet that is “clear and bright,” urging “tolerance” and “patience” toward “netcitizens” in welcoming online criticism.108 At the same time, restrictions are imposed in Chinese society to counter statements “endangering national unity,” “inciting subversion of the national regime,” or calling for “the overthrow of the socialist system.”109 Like Russia’s, China’s leadership aspires to set the standards and practices for cyber and Internet security in global affairs. The strengthening of China’s institutional and legal oversight in the cyber/information spheres demonstrates that China’s Communist Party is determined to protect national interests and security in confronting a globalized and interconnected world. Xi Jinping’s speech delivered at the Wuzhen conference in December 2015 proposed a “community of shared future” for the development of the cyber/ information arenas, offering the following recommendations: 1) accelerate world network infrastructure construction, promoting connectivity; 2) build an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning, pledging that China would be willing to develop and host the platform; 3) promote innovative development of the international economy and common prosperity, emphasizing that so long as nations abide by China’s legal requirements, foreign investment would always be encouraged; 4) ensure internal security and promote orderly development, stating that all countries share this responsibility and there should be no “unilateralism” or “no one country calls the shots” in the future development of cyber security and in the Internet; 5) build 243

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a multilateral Internet governance system to promote equity and justice.110 Xi concluded by referring to the Internet as a “common home of all humanity,” and said that all nations should contribute to make it a “better, healthier, and safer” place.111

Recent Momentum and Prospects for Russia–China Partnership in Global Cyber/Information Security On April 27, 2016, Russia’s Safe Internet Forum hosted the first China-Russia Information Communication and Technology Development and Cybersecurity Forum in Moscow involving the top Internet officials from both countries, representatives of private industry as well as experts in cyber security and the IT industry.112 Topics included not only technical factors in securing personal data and countering cyber crime and terrorism, but also discussions regarding regulation of Internet content and social issues. One of the major objectives for the forum was to “harness Chinese expertise in internet management to gain further control over Russia’s internet.” The forum produced a “roadmap document” that set forth areas for deepening collaboration, including planning for a major research project that would propose joint steps for improving legislation and concerted international initiatives. Further, in reiterating the concern with maintaining state control of information space and directly challenging the US position regarding cyber governance, the “roadmap” states, “Governments have their own online interests. To hope that we could promote those interests through transnational IT corporations (like the US-based ICANN), ignoring our own domestic capabilities, would be folly. This matter is directly related to national security.” Heading the Chinese delegation, Lu Wei of the LSG and CAC stated in his remarks to the audience: Online freedom is also a great responsibility for each citizen. Complete freedom can bring not only the threat of terrorism, but also threats to the life and freedom of citizens. Our countries are facing a robust campaign of information propaganda. That is why we must give serious attention to checking and filtering incoming information.113

Fang Binxing, director of CSAC and architect of China’s Great Firewall, similarly stated: “One cannot claim the Internet to be a space of absolute freedom where there is no place for national sovereignty. Sovereignty in general, and digital sovereignty in particular, is the inherent right of every nation and its citizens.”114 On the Russian side, Safe Internet League Chairman Konstantin Malofeyev reinforced agreement with his Chinese colleagues on the issue of cyber sovereignty:

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges The Internet was unveiled by ICANN in 1974, 17 years after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, and 13 years after it put the first human in space. Still, even to the Soviet Union it never occurred to try to be the sole nation governing the cosmic space. The Internet is a space, too, a novel, digital space. And yet, the one nation who invented the Internet somehow aspires to govern it, refusing to let other nations partake in its regulation.115

Malofeyev also contended that the United States has impeded efforts by Russia and China to introduce Internet regulations through the UN and other organizations.116 The conference concluded with a commitment to cooperate in providing a “serious impetus to stand against the efforts of some nations to usurp Internet ownership.” In June 2016, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping reaffirmed the Russia–China bilateral commitment to cooperate in “information space,” signing another detailed agreement in conjunction with the Russian president’s visit to Beijing.117 Information space topped the agenda of the issues discussed by the two presidents, and their agreement reflects the shared concern that “information space is currently faced with growing security challenges and severe abuse of information technologies,” and the joint pledge to “explore the possibilities of developing universal rules of responsible behavior in information space.” Among the consensus items listed in the agreement, the two nations first of all agree to “oppose infringements on every country’s sovereignty in information space,” to “jointly promote respect for every country’s cultural traditions and social customs,” and to “resist interference in the information of other countries.” The two leaders again emphasized the importance of preventing the use of modern technologies for “terrorist purposes” and “interference in internal affairs” as well as “destabilizing the internal political and socio-economic situation.” Putin and Xi established that the Minister of Cyberspace Administration of China and the Aide to the President of Russia on Information Technologies Application (the senior designated representatives of each country) would meet periodically to consult on areas of common concern and ensure inter-agency coordination. The United States has officially designated Russia and China as two of its major cyber security adversaries. The United States has sought collaboration with both countries on cyber security issues, but mutual suspicions in the aftermath of cyber attacks in Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, the STUXNET attack on Iran’s nuclear system, assaults on US government private information systems, and the Edward Snowden revelations, combined with political tensions, have made developing cooperation with both Russia and China in this area quite challenging. Nevertheless, in spite of differences in managing the global cyber commons and regulating the Internet and social media, both Russia and China have engaged in periodic discussions

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and have reached agreements with the United States on key aspects of cyber security. In 2013, the United States and Russia concluded a cyber security confidencebuilding agreement under the auspices of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission collaborative initiatives. In March 2016, it was announced that the United States and Russia planned to resume discussion on cyber security cooperation that had been suspended in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis and imposition of Western sanctions on Russia.118 Officials of the White House, State Department, and FBI participated in meetings with the Russians held in Geneva in April 2016, but it was clear that these discussions would not involve a resumption of presidential-level collaboration on cyber security, and only result in agreement to maintain communication in an area critical for the security of both countries. The two countries discussed possibilities for resuming links among CERTs, exchanging notifications on cyber threats using the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and establishing a White House–Kremlin direct communication line that provides secure voice communication between the US Cybersecurity Coordinator and the Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council to manage any future crises that might arise as a result of an ICT security incident. President Obama and President Xi Jinping announced a US-China Cybersecurity Agreement in September 2015 following one of the largest federal government employee data intrusions. The US government alleged that state-sponsored hackers based in China breached the US Office of Personnel Management (OMP), compromising the personal information of millions of former and present government employees.119 The US–China agreement included a pledge to cooperate with requests for providing information pertaining to “malicious cyber activities” taking place within their territories or areas of jurisdiction. The two nations agreed not to conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, extended to cover trade secrets and information from private businesses and commercial sectors. Such US–China collaboration in cyber security, while significant, has tended to focus on protecting economic activity and, to a certain extent, technical aspects of security, whereas China’s cooperation with Russia has been much broader, including concerns with global and national governance of Internet communication structures, securing state control over data, and social issues on the Internet and social media. Failure to advance international cooperation in the rapidly developing cyber sphere heightens the security risks for all societies. The priorities and perspectives of Russia and China on cyber and information security are closer than those of either nation with the United States and other Western democratic nations. Russia, China, the United States, and most other nations can agree on many issues, such as safeguarding the personal information of 246

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citizens and developing effective methods to counter terrorist and criminal exploitation of the cyber sphere, but there are also significant differences in perspectives and methods regarding state versus private control of the Internet, surveillance, and monitoring of the Internet. Although both Russia and China have and can continue to derive considerable benefit to their societies and economies as a result of global information/cyber revolution under the current private ICANN system, the two countries are not likely to be willing to compromise in accepting international protocols for management of the cyber/information sphere under the auspices of the existing private multistakeholder system or to concede to an arrangement that they believe to be characterized by disproportionate US influence. The leaderships of Russia and China recognize that they are well positioned to combine their influence and play a major role challenging the United States and other Western democratic nations in setting the terms for global governance in the cyber arena, an important emerging element of world order. The acceleration of Russia–China bilateral collaboration in cyber security could serve as an example for many other nations, particularly among those with similar values and perspectives to enhance cooperation in this critical security area. Given the shared positions of Russia and China on cyber and information security, bilateral cooperation between the two countries should continue to deepen, and the combined influence of these two powers could figure significantly in the development of rules and norms for governing the cyber/ information spheres in the global arena. Political developments, particularly the relationship of Russia and China with the United States and the West, and further threats of international instability most likely will continue to impact the cyber security strategies of Russia and China. The significant compatibility evident in Russian and Chinese perspectives on cyber and information security cooperation is likely to be among the most significant areas in building the Russia–China strategic partnership in the years ahead.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism Since al Qaeda’s rival Islamic State (IS) declared the establishment of its caliphate in 2014, a number of attacks have been carried out, reaching far beyond the Middle East and North Africa under the black flag of IS in Europe, Asia, and the United States, propelling the issue of countering terrorism and violent extremism to an even greater level of urgency. Recent attacks on European airports and public facilities in Paris (November 2015), Brussels (January 2016), Istanbul (June 2016), Nice (July 2016), and Munich (July 2016), combined with a series of frequent smaller-scale IS-inspired bombing attacks and murders throughout Europe, have dramatically heightened 247

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security concerns and contributed to political backlash throughout European nations against the influx of migrants from the war-torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa. Attacks inspired by IS involving significant numbers of casualties are also a near-monthly occurrence in Asia, with several incidents in Bangladesh, most recently an attack on a cafe in July 2016 leaving twentyeight dead, and in other significant attacks in Indonesia (January 2016), Philippines (April 2016, July 2016), and Malaysia (July 2016). Instances such as the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings perpetrated by brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnayev of ethnic Chechen-Avar origin and inspired by global Salafist and militant groups in the North Caucasus, and the more recent incidents in the United States in San Bernardino and Orlando, are stark reminders of the continued vulnerabilities of the world community to acts of terrorism. Russia, and perhaps to a lesser extent China, stand at the forefront among IS’s targets. Russia’s military engagement in Syria has brought a direct heightening of vulnerability to attacks of terrorism against Russia’s interests at home and abroad. In June 2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared the North Caucasus region on the territory of the Russian Federation as its northern branch, or Wilayat Qawqaz (Caucasus governorate), after accepting formal pledges of allegiance from militants throughout the region.120 On October 31, 2015, IS claimed responsibility for downing a Russian A321 airliner outbound from Cairo en route to St. Petersburg, killing all 224 on board.121 On July 31, 2016, IS issued an appeal via YouTube featuring a masked gunman driving a car through the desert, calling to carry out “jihad” in Russia: “Listen Putin, we will come to Russia and will kill you at your homes. Oh brothers, carry out jihad and kill and fight them.”122 In July 2014, identifying a list of twenty countries that had “seized Muslim rights,” IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called for “jihad” against China, citing oppression of the Uighur minority and pleading to Muslims in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region for their allegiance. IS has issued a map of targeted nations, including plans for incorporating Xinjiang in China under a caliphate by 2020.123 Both countries share concern that combatants in Syria and Iraq hailing from Russia, Central Asia, and the Uighur minority in China could return to perpetrate attacks in the Russian Federation and China. The counterterrorism strategies for both Russia and China have evolved from initially almost exclusively state-sponsored domestic responses toward recognition of the importance of crafting strategies suited to address global dimensions of the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism. Escalating security vulnerability in Eurasia as a consequence of the series of recent wars in the Middle East and concern with developing a favorable environment for protecting the ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative contribute to the interest in Moscow and Beijing for strengthening regional and international 248

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counterterrorism responses. Officials representing both countries have placed a high priority on the escalating threat, calling for forging a united or “universal anti-terror” or global front to address the challenge. China’s President Xi Jinping responded to the attacks in Paris in January 2015, stating: “Terrorism is an enemy of all mankind and a common threat to the entire international community; including both China and France.”124 Addressing French President François Hollande in a televised statement following the truck attack that killed at least eighty-four in Nice in July 2016, President Putin stated: “Dear François, Russia knows about terrorism and threats that it creates for all of us. Our people faced such tragedies more than once and is deeply affected by what happened, sympathizes with the French people and is in solidarity with them”; the Russian President continued: “I would like to emphasize once again that terrorism can be defeated only through joint efforts.”125 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the “the UN’s leading role should be brought into full play to combat terrorism, and a united front in this regard should be formed.”126 Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded that “recent events, including the terror attacks in Paris, make absolutely imperative for all to drop any good reasons, any pre-conditions and to focus on organization of a truly universal anti-terror front.”127 Official security and legal documents issued in both Russia and China specifically cite the threat of terrorism and extremism. Russia’s National Security documents have suggested that “Nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, separatism and violent extremism will grow, including under the banner of religious radicalism,” and “Territories affected by armed conflicts are becoming the basis for the spread of terrorism, interethnic strife, religious enmity, and other manifestations of extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organization calling itself Islamic State and the strengthening of its influence is the result of the policy of double standards to which some states adhere in the sphere of the fight against terrorism.”128 Russia’s Military Doctrine cites among threats: “ethnic and inter-faith tensions” and the “growth of separatism and extremism.”129 Article 28 of China’s National Security Law affirms that “the State opposes all forms of terrorism and extremism, and increases the capacity to prevent and handle terrorist activities.”130 A 2016 report among leading academics of the Russian International Affairs Council (Moscow) held in cooperation with the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University (Shanghai) concluded: The terrorist threat remains a common challenge for Russia and China . . . Here, China acts as Russia’s natural and reliable ally, sharing both its views on the urgency of this problem and specific ways for tackling the terrorist threat. In recent years, China has suffered a rising number of terrorist attacks committed by

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics individual groups of extremists, primarily in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Of particular concern is the link of the terrorist underground with Islamic State (IS), which is reportedly training fighters from China.131

Moscow and Beijing can agree with the United States and other democratic nations in defining IS and its affiliates, and its rivals al Qaeda and al Nusra and their affiliates, as enemies, but difficulties in developing a unified global antiterror front arise in that Russia and China identify a broader range of perceived threats to the state under the terrorist/extremist definitions. Moscow and Beijing tend to include domestic dissent and challenging the state under the terrorist/extremist rubric, and both reject Western assessments suggesting that the lack of democratic channels of political participation and hardline security responses can be root causes of domestic unrest or terrorism. In addition, both Moscow and Beijing attribute the US/Western coalition interventions in the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa as significant contributing factors (if not actual causes) of the heightened worldwide terrorist threat. Further, concerns have been expressed in both Russia and China that simply being perceived as cooperating with the Western coalition against terrorism can carry increased risk. For example, as Ni Lexiong, a military expert at Shanghai’s University of Political Science and Law, observes, “If China grows too close with Europe and the US, then terrorists are more likely to kill the Chinese people they find. But if it doesn’t do anything, it will look weak.”132

Russia–China Recent Bilateral Cooperation in Countering Terrorism Moscow and Beijing share similar understandings of the threats posed by terrorism, extremism, and separatism, and have collaborated to develop mechanisms for countering these threats. The expanding role of Russia and China in the global anti-terrorism effort was reflected in a statement at the Moscow International Security Conference in April 2016 by General Secretary of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russian General Nikolai Bordyuzha: I think there is a need to consider the possibility of consolidation around the Russian Federation and the CSTO countries, consolidation around China and the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which could become a locomotive in the organization of the entire anti-terrorist fight . . . With this approach and, most importantly, the political will of all of the countries, we can resolve this problem of creating a broad coalition, and increasing the effectiveness of counterterrorism within a short period of time.133

The statement was subsequently reported in China’s official press agency Xinhua under the heading “China, Russia could drive anti-terror fight.”134 250

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Expanding cooperation in countering terrorism and extremism is one of the key areas identified for further enhancing the strategic partnership between Russia and China. Moscow reacted quite favorably to the passing of China’s first-ever anti-terror law in December 2015, viewing the new legislation as another opportunity for advancing bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism.135 Putin and Xi met during the UN climate change conference in December 2015, with both leaders acknowledging that the world had undergone “profound” or “tremendous” changes as a result of the escalating worldwide terror threat and pledging to deepen bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism and to promote global anti-terrorism efforts. During Putin’s visit to Beijing in June 2016, both leaders again called for acceleration of bilateral cooperation in countering terrorism. The Chinese Ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, offered an optimistic prediction in an interview with TASS in August 2016 that the visit of President Putin to China in September 2016 to participate in the G-20 summit, and the visit of Premier Li Keqiang for the 21st meeting of the Russian and Chinese Prime Ministers to be held in St. Petersburg in early November 2016, would be accompanied by further progress in developing the “comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership” between the two nations, to include further expansion of “bilateral cooperation in the sphere of fighting against terrorism.”136 Li Hui affirmed: “In the future we (Russia and China) intend to continue strengthening practical anti-terrorist cooperation, fight against international terrorism, defend peace and stability in the region and in the world.”137 The Russian-Chinese Counterterrorism Working Group convenes on a regular basis to implement direction from the leadership of the two nations in expanding bilateral collaboration. In late October 2015, consultations among deputy foreign ministers in charge of cooperation in the fight against international terrorism were held in Beijing. Russia’s Foreign Ministry reported in late 2015 that bilateral cooperation with China in countering terrorism was expanding in the key international venues, including the UN, SCO, BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Eurasian group on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism (EAG). During July 3–14, 2016, large-scale joint anti-terrorist exercises involving the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardiya) and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force were held in Russia’s Moscow and Smolensk regions.138 The Chinese People’s Armed Force Snow Leopard and Falcon commando units and the Russian National Guard’s Vityaz units took part in the exercise “Cooperation 2016,” the third joint exercise held since 2007 between the two nations’ interior security forces.139 The exercises featured joint operations using Mi-8 transport helicopters, armored vehicles, mortars, and other 251

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equipment. The National Guard of Russia was formed in April 2016 by presidential order to consolidate Russia’s internal security forces into one federal body in a bid to better counter terrorism, secure borders, fight organized crime and drug trafficking, and protect public order. China’s People’s Armed Police is a military organization responsible for internal security. Chief of Rosgvardiya’s general staff, Sergey Chenchik, described the exercise as representing a “new stage of cooperation” with China in the “two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership coordination.”140 General Wang Ning, commander of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, commented on the significance of the joint exercises, marking an “important measure in implementing the promotion of comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia advocated by the two heads of state.”141

Russia–China Multilateral Collaboration in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Although both Russia and China had traditionally preferred to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts at the bilateral level, the two countries have become progressively more engaged in promoting multilateral international initiatives and frameworks to counter terrorism. The threat of terrorism for Russia emanating from the North Caucasus and separatist impulses posed by China’s Uighur Muslim population, combined with threats in Eurasia and Central Asia from IS and other terrorist organizations including Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have contributed to reliance on the part of Moscow and Beijing on the SCO as a primary agent for countering terrorism. The SCO, originally instituted in 2001 as a Eurasian regional intergovernmental organization to resolve border disputes, has been united in pledging to jointly combat the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Chinese scholars attribute the importance that Beijing assigns to securing support of the Central Asian nations and Russia in its campaign against the “East Turkestan” movement responsible for perpetrating terrorist attacks in China to be a critical driving force behind the impetus for the establishment of the SCO. The SCO holds routine counterterrorism collaborative meetings, periodically broaches joint proposals on CT in the United Nations and other international bodies, and continually adjusts regional approaches to address the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. In June 2004, the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent Uzbekistan was established for the purpose of coordinating policies and joint responses to the occurrence of terrorist attacks within the nations of the SCO.142 RATS facilitates inter-agency cooperation and intelligence-sharing among SCO member states, and serves to coordinate planning for exercises and organized initiatives to disrupt 252

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terrorist financing and money laundering. In August 2014, the SCO carried out its largest anti-terror exercise to date in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, termed “Peace Mission 2014.”143 In accordance with the “Cooperation Program to Combat Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism in 2013–2015,” the RATS established a cyber expert group in September 2013 to strengthen pragmatic cooperation of SCO states in the fight against online activities related to terrorism, separatism, and extremism. On October 14, 2015, the SCO held its first online counterterrorism exercise, “Xiamen2015,” in the southeastern Chinese coastal city of Xiamen, Fujian Province.144 China’s Ministry of Defense described the purpose of the exercise as improving organizational and technical mechanisms for enhancing cooperation in preventing the use of the Internet for terrorism, separatism, and extremism among SCO member states. According to the leadership of RATS, as a result of the Arab Spring, SCO member states “are paying increasing attention to the internet” and each “SCO member has a specialized internet security unit.”145 Though there have been some differences between Russia and China with respect to expansion of the SCO (Russia being closer to India, and China with stronger ties to Pakistan), with India and Pakistan as members, and Iran, Mongolia, and Afghanistan enjoying observer status with potential membership, the SCO’s capacity for contributing to countering Eurasian regional and even global sources of terrorism and extremism could be enhanced in the future. At the 15th anniversary summit of the SCO held in Tashkent in June 2016, SCO nations agreed to include expanding counterterrorism cooperation among the priorities included in the 2016-2020 Action Plan for the SCO Development Strategy.146 The Astana Times reported that the SCO heads of state agreed at the anniversary that “fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their forms . . . will remain a priority task of cooperation in the organization.”147 Officials in both Russia and China recognize the threat posed by extremism in Central Asia and have placed a priority on developing cooperation with these nations under the aegis of the SCO and other initiatives. The June 28, 2016, attack on Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport by an IS cell reported to include perpetrators from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Chechnya was a reminder of the significance of Central Asia’s ties in the evolving militant extremist network. A leading Russian expert on Central Asia, Andrey Kazantsev, characterizes the security threats to Russia from “radical Islamism in Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries” as aggravated by “fragile” Central Asian states suffering from corruption, crime, Afghan drug trafficking, poverty, and “sultanistic regimes ingrained in the clan system.”148 Kazantsev contends that the “security of Russia’s metropolitan areas (above all, Moscow) largely depends on where Russia and the entire international community will be able to render effective support to Central Asian countries in countering the growing threat 253

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of radical Islamism.”149 While Moscow and Beijing have encouraged Central Asian nations to take tough measures in countering terrorism and extremism, Western experts tend to consider harsh responses combined with lack of representative channels for political participation as potentially having the opposite effect in provoking backlash and further intensification of the regional terrorist threat. The description of the threat posed by terrorism and extremism among SCO nations is quite broad and frequently associated with developments in the information space. For example, in 2008, the SCO described dissemination of “information harmful to social and political, and economic systems, as well as spiritual, moral, and cultural spheres” as among the main threats in the field of “ensuring international information security.”150 Following the Arab Spring, concerns about the role of social media in playing an integral role in the uprisings ousting longstanding authoritarian regimes led nations of the CSTO to call for additional measures to combat extremism.151 The positions of Moscow and Beijing have coincided in assigning a major role to the United Nations in countering terrorism and extremism. In December 2015, Russia’s Foreign Ministry affirmed: Moscow and Beijing together stand for the preservation of the central coordinating role of the United Nations in global anti-terrorism efforts, which should be free from politicization and preconditions, for the creation of a broad anti-terrorist coalition against the Islamic State terrorist organization (outlawed in Russia), for the adoption of comprehensive measures to counteract the phenomenon of foreign terrorist-militants.152

Russia and China have backed the United Nations Counterterrorism Strategy’s four pillars, including addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, building the capacity of states and strengthening the role of United Nations, and ensuring respect for human rights and compliance with the rule of law.153 Russia and China also supported Resolution 2178, which condemned violent extremism in pledging cooperation in preventing the flow of fighters to and from conflict zones. Both nations have supported UN initiatives toward developing a strategy for countering violent extremism, though deliberation on the issue has generated suggestions from the Russian side that a “one-size-fits-all” approach was not effective in preventing violent extremism, and assertions from China that “unified standards” rather than “double standards” and regulation of the media were necessary to counter terrorist groups’ use of social media and Internet. Russia and China support the initiatives of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which implements the policy decisions of the CTC, aimed to address various aspects of the threat from terrorism and extremism, including issues such as transit of 254

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foreign fighters, terrorist use of the Internet, financing, community counterradicalization and rehabilitation, border and regional cooperation, and so on. Differences in perspective among UN members place certain limitations on the capacity to cooperate in countering terrorism. Representing Russia’s Foreign Ministry at a UN conference on countering violent extremism held in Geneva in April 2016, Iliya Rogachev made the point that there is no common definition of the concepts of “extremism” or “violent extremism” in international law or universally adopted practice.154 He also raised objections to citing “authoritarian regimes” or “lack of democratic governance” as major sources of radicalization, noting that “not a single society” is immune to the threat of “radicalization.”155 In a direct challenge to the United States and its allies, he stated: [T]he willingness of a number of states to use radical groups for political purposes, as a tool to interfere in other States’ internal affairs, incite extremist sentiments and indiscriminately pour resources in all kinds of opposition groups in other countries with a view to destabilizing and undermining the activities of State institutions, is the cause that stands out among the others.156

Russia and China have utilized the BRICS platform to advance common positions on terrorism and extremism. BRICS member nations reaffirmed in the 2015 Ufa Declaration their joint condemnation of “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” emphasizing the central importance of the UN, international law, and responsibilities of sovereign nations in countering terrorism and extremism.157 Russia has also initiated and supported the CSTO’s counterterrorist collaboration with UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the CSTO regional security alliance has spearheaded periodic anti-terror exercises together with the SCO and other nations of the international community. Russia takes a leading role in regional OSCE initiatives toward countering terrorism and violent extremism, which have become particularly important in developing collective responses to the recent sequence of terrorist attacks in Europe. Addressing the OSCE-wide Counter Terrorism Conference held in Berlin on May 31, 2016, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oleg Syromolotov, again urged the creation of a “genuinely global coalition” or “united front” to combat international terrorism.158 Syromolotov emphasized the need to employ military force to defeat IS and al Qaeda, but also the importance of cutting off material support for terrorists, countering the ideological appeal of these extremist groups, and preventing their use of the Internet and social media to advance the terrorist agenda. Prior to the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, NATO and Russia had established routine engagement in holding joint exercises and discussions aimed to continually enhance capabilities for 255

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responding to various types of terrorist attacks and countering violent extremism. In 2014, before the imposition of EU sanctions, Russia had also collaborated with the EU on counterterrorism, and Russia and the EU had issued a joint statement on combating terrorism, citing countering radicalization and recruitment of terrorist and foreign fighters as critical areas for further activity. In an interesting development in August 2016, Chief of the General Staff of China’s PLA Fang Fenghui announced that China would proceed with prior plans to establish an anti-terrorism alliance with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan.159 Defense leaders of the participating nations met together in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, a region in China that has suffered repeated acts of violence and terrorism. Xinhua reported that the participating nations recognized the serious threat of terrorism and extremism to regional stability and agreed to establish a “four country mechanism” for intelligence sharing.160 Prior to forming this new “alliance,” Beijing had already established bilateral ties with Afghanistan and Pakistan in CT cooperation, including extensive intelligence sharing and participation in joint exercises and other CT activities. Beijing’s concerns stem from the potential threat of militant extremism and violence along the “Af-Pak” frontier spilling over into the violence-prone Uighur Muslim communities in Xinjiang. On July 31, 2016, China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan met with Afghan army chief Qadam Shah Shaheem and expressed appreciation for Afghanistan’s support in combating the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a militant terrorist group with ties to China’s Muslim Uighur population.161 The official Russian response downplayed concerns about the alliance. In an interview in the newspaper Izvestiya, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov stated: This is about controlling borders and the infiltration of terrorists. This doesn’t mean that China intends to use its armed forces . . . There’s no reason for us to join. We have our own plans in the framework of the CSTO. Moreover, we discuss these issues with China in the framework of the SCO.162

At the same time, Russian analysts have noted that Central Asia has been a Russian zone of influence for the CSTO and that the SCO has assumed the key role in countering terror in the region. For example, in an interview with Izvestiya, Andrey Serenko, of the Russian think tank Center for the Study of Contemporary Afghanistan, states: “Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and the Middle East has resulted in us losing our position in Central Asia. It appears that in this ‘Central Asian NATO’ under the Chinese umbrella, Russia may be the odd one out.”163 China obviously has its own motivations for promoting the establishment of such an alliance. The Chinese leadership has acknowledged Afghanistan’s support in combating ETIM, an Islamic group aiming to establish a separate state in Xinjiang, and Beijing has been 256

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concerned that violence from Afghanistan could prompt additional domestic unrest among the Uighur population. Also, the successful development of Xi’s premier OBOR will largely rest on securing the Eurasian and Middle East regions from acts of terror, crime, and other security threats. Only time will reveal whether this new Chinese initiative in coordinating a parallel “alliance” for security collaboration in Central Asia/Eurasia without Russia’s inclusion becomes a source of contention with Moscow.

Russia’s Terrorist Threat and Domestic Response to Terrorism and Violent Extremism There has been no single terrorist attack in the Russian Federation of the scale of the 9/11 attack in the United States, but the nation has suffered a series of major terrorist incidents resulting in considerable numbers of casualties.164 Incidents involving devastating explosions and attacks on apartment buildings, theaters, government buildings, markets, trains, subways, and airlines have unfortunately become a part of Russia’s experience, and a series of terrorist incidents throughout the Russian Federation during the past decade were directly linked to the protracted counterinsurgency campaigns in Chechnya. The Dubrovka theater hostage incident in 2002, the school hostage incident in Beslan in 2004, the attack at the Domodedovo airport in 2011, and the previously mentioned downing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai from Cairo perhaps captured the most international attention and demonstrate Russia’s vulnerability to the terrorist threat. While the bulk of Russia’s significant Muslim population—who are primarily of Sunni, Hanafist, and Sufi traditions—maintain cooperative relationships with the state and seek to practice their faith in peace, adherents of the antiSufi New Islamic Movement, radical Shahidists, Salafists, and others have operated in Russia with the aim of establishing a “pious Caliphate” or replacing the state with fundamentalist Islamic rule. Russia’s primary terrorist threats tend to emanate from Chechnya and the surrounding regions of the North Caucasus, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachay, where for decades extremist groups have fought to break away from Russia and establish a caliphate or to impose a fundamentalist Islamic state. The resistance to Russia’s rule in the North Caucasus has deep historical roots, and the Chechens have been described as possessing a distinct identity that contributed to the secessionist wars in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1858, Russia had defeated the leader of the Chechen resistance, Imam Shamil, and his followers who were seeking to establish an Islamic state. While some observers consider the influence of Wahhabism and Salafism a more recent phenomenon in the North Caucasus, the writings of Dagestani scholar Yaseen (Makhach) Rasulov and leader of the Sharia Jamaat 257

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group who was killed in 2006 trace the origins to the anti-Russian resistance movements of the eighteenth century. Though not initially prompted by external instigation, the two Chechen wars in 1994 and 1999, combined with a series of conflicts in the South Caucasus and Tajikistan, led to an influx of outside funding for weapons, training, and Salafist, Wahhabist, and other variants of radical jihadist ideological influence permeating the North Caucasus region. International terrorist networks proliferating through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and also al Qaeda had sent forces to train in Chechnya. Al Qaeda’s deputy to Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri, had offered a vision in his book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, published in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks, that would unite the Chechens and Caucasian mujahideen in what he called a “mujahid Islamic belt to the South of Russia,” enlisting sympathetic Muslims in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, and extending to the east in Pakistan, linking with mujahideen movements in Kashmir.165 Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya were justified in terms of maintaining “territorial integrity.” Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, President Putin had repeatedly suggested the linkages between the conflicts in Chechnya and a broader foreign militant extremist network then supported by Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda. Putin was the first world leader to call President George W. Bush following the 9/11 attacks to express sympathy and support. Putin sought to define Russia’s wars in Chechnya as paralleling the US war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and he evidently hoped that the common terrorist challenge might lead to a silencing of Western criticism on the war in Chechnya. Following 9/11, in early 2003, Washington recognized three groups in Chechnya as “terrorist organizations” with “training and money links” to the al Qaeda terrorist network.166 Frequent attacks today that are generated from the epicenter of Russia’s terrorist activity in Dagestan, particularly in the capital Makhachkala and surrounding areas, and in neighboring areas of Stavropol and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, continue to challenge local police and terrorist units. A number of factors account for the vulnerability of the North Caucasus region to terrorism. Ethno-religious identities, socio-economic problems, unemployment, lack of opportunity, dislocations resulting from recent conflict and war, and corruption continue to provide a fertile ground for recruiting followers to militant extremism throughout the region. Denis Sokolov, Senior Research Scholar of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, and an expert on the North Caucasus having conducted field research in the region since 2009, cites rapid processes of urbanization that took place in the region as a key vulnerability: 258

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges This disruption has forced thousands of young men and women from rural mountain villages straight into a twenty-first century that conflicted with their traditional way of life in which little had changed since the Middle Ages. Driven by need from the mountain villages of the Caucasus, many left for the big urban and industrial centers of Russia and elsewhere to become truckers, peddlers, marketers, builders, oilfield workers, gangsters, entrepreneurs, dentists, preachers, and devout jihadists. They formed largely unseen transnational networks of migrants who had abandoned their ancient homelands and ways of life, joining the modern age—and in some cases international centers or movements of jihad— in one fell swoop.167

Putin’s increased consolidation of power in response to the terrorist threat and harsh measures on the part of law enforcement are factors frequently identified as contributing to the spread of militant extremism. Concerns with maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation have generated speculation about a potential contagion effect of the Arab revolutions which might inspire young people who have become disenchanted with traditional Islam in the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan. Islamic State’s establishment of the new Wilayat Qawqaz (Caucasus governorate) in June 2015 incorporated most of the previous al Qaeda-affiliated Caucasus Emirate that had operated in southwestern Russia since 2007, carrying out attacks with the objective of instituting sharia law and waging global jihad. The statement of IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declaring the new Wilayat and the appointment of Abu Mohammad al-Qadan as leader of the group was circulated on Twitter, where supporters of IS in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachay declared allegiance to IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.168 Thus, four areas of six subdivisions that constituted the previous al Qaeda-affiliated regional Caucasus emirate were incorporated under the umbrella of the new IS Qawqaz. With the addition of Wilayat Qawqaz in the heavily Muslim North Caucasus region of Russia, IS now claims provinces in nine nations outside Iraq and Syria. As noted in Chapter 4, estimates vary, suggesting that there are several thousand citizens of the Russian Federation in Syria and Iraq fighting alongside Islamic State, with additional Russian citizens fighting in support of IS’s rival al Nusra.169 The activities of IS in Russia and the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Europe have heightened concerns that sleeper cells may be operative in the North Caucasus and Russia.170 During the period since IS declared the establishment of the Wilayat Qawqaz in 2015, there have been a series of attacks on police stations, border guards, and civilian areas in Derbent in the Republic of Dagestan (December 2015, February 2016, May 2016) and in Makhachkala, capital of Dagestan (March 2016).171 In April 2016, three suicide bombers attacked a local police department near Buyonnovsk in the Stavropol region, which had 259

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been the target of a major terrorist attack in June 1995 when Chechen separatists raided the city, randomly firing on police and civilians, occupying a hospital, and taking hostages, resulting in 143 deaths.172 This attack, reminiscent of the past tragedy, increased concerns regarding the security of the ethnically diverse region of Stavropol, which has absorbed considerable numbers of migrants from Chechnya and Ingushetia and borders several other regions of the North Caucasus where militant jihadist networks are active. So far, although representatives of IS took credit for the downing of the Russian commercial flight originating from Cairo in October 2015 and have issued repeated warnings of imminent attacks in Russia, IS has not yet managed to orchestrate a terrorist attack on major civilian centers within the Russian Federation on the scale of the major incidents carried out in Europe in 2015–16. However, concerns have been heightened in the Russian Federation regarding possible terrorist activity. In July 2016, Imam Makhmud Velitov, affiliated with one of the largest mosques in Moscow on Khachaturyan Street, was arrested on charges of “public justification of terrorism,” as described in the Russian Criminal Code.173 The allegations suggest that Velitov defended a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir outlawed in Russia, and representatives of the Union of Muftis in Russia supported the accusations, suggesting that they were not able to control Velitov.174 In February 2016, Russia’s FSB reported that they had detained seven suspects in Yekaterinburg who had been plotting major terrorist attacks in Moscow and St. Petersburg.175 Speaking at the Carnegie Center in Moscow in 2015, Alexey Grishin, the president of Religion and Society, a Russian information and analytical center, acknowledged the growing influence of IS in Russia.176 Grishin warned that IS was making effective use of the Internet, working in the multiple languages of republics that had once formed the USSR to recruit members, and recommended that Russia invest additional resources in education at all levels to enhance knowledge and expertise on Islam and better prepare and equip Muslim clerics for countering extremist interpretation of their faith.177 Citizens of Central Asian countries and other former Soviet republics that have also joined the militant Islamist struggle in Iraq and Syria further exacerbate the constant threat that these networks can be used to orchestrate terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation. The tragic Beslan school hostage attack in 2004 perpetrated by Chechen militants was a major catalyst for increasing centralization of government decision-making and enhanced powers and accountability for law enforcement and security forces in combating terrorism.178 The failed rescue attempt revealed serious weaknesses in Russia’s counterterrorism capacity at that time, and led President Putin to undertake a series of initiatives to further centralize and enhance Russia’s state capacity to counter terrorism.179 In 2006, a new “Law on Counter-terrorism” came into force in Russia, designating Russia’s 260

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Federal Security Service (FSB) as the lead agency on counter terrorism and expanding powers of the security authorities to act against suspected militants and their supporters.180 The new “Law on Counter-terrorism” established a “National Counter-Terrorism Committee” (NAC) under the leadership of the Federal Security Service (FSB), with the Ministry of Interior (MVD) assuming a subordinate role though still supporting Russia’s counterterrorism capacities. The NAC database has been used to provide information support to countering terrorism in Russia and to international law enforcement agencies. The 2006 law expanded powers to the executive branch over the prior 1998 law in countering terrorism, calling for the use of all relevant “systemic and complex” means to combat terrorism. Following the March 2010 subway bombings in Moscow, President Medvedev ordered that even tighter anti-terror laws be implemented. Articles 73 and 81 of the Criminal Procedure Code were adopted into federal law to enhance the effectiveness of measures to fight terrorism and extremism in April 2011. In November 2013, in advance of the Sochi Olympic games, Russia enacted still further expanded anti-terrorism laws stipulating that the relatives or close associates of terrorists should pay compensation for damages caused by attacks, and also stipulates imposing criminal sentences of up to ten years for those who receive training with the purpose of “carrying out terrorist activity.”181 Russia has employed a broad definition of extremism, banning many activities of groups and publications permitted in the public domain in Western nations.182 Russia’s Federal Law On Combating Extremist Activity (2002) describes extremism as “activities of organizations or physical persons in planning, organizing, and carrying out acts aimed at inciting national, racial, or religious hatred.”183 While this law has been used to combat the dissemination of material that might incite violence, racial hatred, or be pornographic, it has not been without considerable controversy. The law does not require establishing the threat of the use of inciting violence for prosecution. Russia’s anti-extremism law has been used against peaceful religious groups and individuals to characterize their activities as security threats. Non-traditional religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and Scientologists in Russia have been targeted under the law on extremism. Leading expert in Moscow on terrorism Ekaterina Stepanova makes the point that definitions are further complicated by the fact that terrorism and extremism are frequently classified in Russia as anything that can be deemed pro-separatist.184 Since 2007, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation has compiled a list of publications deemed “extremist” and prohibited in the country.185 As of mid-2013, there were more than 1,500 titles banned as “extremist” in Russia, with the bulk of the material coming from Islamic literature.186 Russia adopted a comprehensive Strategy for Countering Extremism Through 2025 in November 2014.187 In a meeting of the Security Council held on 261

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November 20, 2014, convened to discuss and approve the CVE (countering violent extremism) strategy, President Putin called attention to several of the key features of the strategy, including devoting special attention to “interethnic and inter-religious” relations with the intent to “fully support the culture, tradition, and identity” of people living in various communities, working with the younger generation, managing uncontrolled migration, and also taking practical measures to assure the successful integration of migrants.188 He discussed the efforts of extremist organizations in promulgating their ideology to recruit loyalists using the Internet and social media. Putin called for an “allgovernment” response coordinated with the educational system, political parties, and representatives of civic institutions, human rights groups and traditional religions in Russia. He emphasized that there is no single approach that will be effective in all contexts/settings, but that the response must be tailored based on local circumstances present among the diversity of Russia’s regions and cities. Reflecting Russia’s broad definition of extremism, Putin made reference to types of extremism such as “nationalism, religious intolerance and political extremism,” all of which are described as “especially dangerous for society and the state” and which can “provoke mass violations of public order.” Putin was also careful to draw a distinction between “extremism” and “dissent,” stating that “countering extremism has nothing to do with intolerance towards dissenters,” and that “Russia is a free democratic country and its citizens have the right to their opinion, the right to voice it and to be in opposition to the authorities.” In accordance with mandates of the strategy, subsequent legal measures and procedures have been implemented to monitor information space and tighten control on migration. One of the major initiatives following the adoption of the new CVE strategy was the establishment of the new Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs headed by Igor Barinov to facilitate cooperation among Russia’s national and religious communities. The new agency is responsible for developing and carrying out the government’s policy on nationalities, implementing measures to strengthen national unity and ensure inter-ethnic harmony, and monitoring inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The Russian government continues to maintain constructive relations with the mainstream Islamic community in the country and abroad, and has engaged representatives of Russia’s Muslim faith to combat extremism. Over the past several years, the office of the Russian president has held conferences involving the participation of foreign policy officials with Islamic religious clerics and leaders of other faiths in order to consider approaches for combating terrorism and extremism. In July 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed into law a controversial counterterrorism package that includes expanded surveillance provisions, punishment for failure to report a terrorist crime or facilitating extremist activities, and limits on proselytizing and disseminating religious materials 262

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outside of “designated places”; it also includes the new mandates previously mentioned on telecommunications providers for maintaining records of all communications for extended periods and providing access to the material to security authorities.189 Referred to as the “Yarovaya Law,” the legislation was proposed by ultra-conservative United Russia Duma member Irina Yarovaya (and her colleague of the upper-house Federative Council, Viktor Ozerov), who spearheaded the prior “foreign agents” law tightening restrictions on non-profits receiving foreign funding.190 The new law has generated considerable backlash from opposition lawmakers, the business community, and human rights groups, who argue that the measures would impose excessive costs on mobile phone and Internet providers, and that the broad terms of the law could be arbitrarily interpreted.191 Hundreds of critics of the law staged a mass public protest in Moscow in August 2016 voicing objections to the tightening of government control over the Internet.192

China’s Terrorist Threat and Domestic Response to Terrorism and Violent Extremism The majority of China’s terrorist incidents can be traced to China’s northwest Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The geographic location of Xinjiang, bordering several nations including five having predominantly Muslim populations, Afghanistan, Pakistan and nations of Central Asia, makes the region a vulnerable target for the growing regional terrorist network. Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, is one of the first cities along the Silk Road. Xinjiang is ethnically mixed, including Han Chinese (the ethnic majority of the PRC), the Turkic Muslim Uighur community that mostly practice Sunni Islam, and also Mongols, Hui, Manchu, Kazakhs, Tatars, and Tajiks. The Uighur population in Xinjiang has been influenced by a combination of nationalism, pan-Turkism, and Islamism. Many among the Uighur population believe they have been economically marginalized and fear that their traditional cultural, ethnic, and religious identity is threatened by the large influx of Han Chinese in the region. Kahar Barat of Yale University explained the origins of Uighur cultural and religious identity: The Uighurs’ territory was the easternmost edge of the medieval Islamic Empire where religion was loosely organized, isolated, and backward. Missionaries brought Islam to Kashgar in the 10th century. But the Islamization of East Turkestan took more than 500 years . . . Preserving pre-Islamic and indigenous religious beliefs, the Uighur people created a moderate and liberal form of Sunni Islam. Central Asian Naqshbandiyya Sufism held sway for centuries, especially in the Tarim basin.193

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Professor Barat also discussed the impact of Manchurian rule in Xinjiang from 1759 which imposed colonial non-Muslim administration, and then the subjugation of Uighur religious traditions under Mao, in which communists “trumpeted communism and atheism as progressive and Islam as feudal, backward, and superstitious.”194 The desire for independence from centralized control on the part of the Uighur communities was manifested during two brief periods of the Eastern Turkestan Republics in Xinjiang. The first Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in Kashgar in 1933 and later the Soviet-backed East Turkestan Republic with the capital in Yining (Gulja) established in 1944 were shortlived, and China re-established control in the region in 1949. From the period of the founding of the PRC in 1949 until withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, there were few separatist armed attacks in China. The expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan by the mujahideen fueled militant Islamism throughout the Caucasus, Central Asia, and into Xinjiang. The attack in the small town of Baren located southwest of Kashgar in April 1990 resulted in several civilian and police casualties, and marked the beginning of a new phase of terrorist violence aided by the ETIM. Many of the attacks occurring in Xinjiang employ rather simple methods, with little evidence of extensive planning or outside coordination. However, as in the case of Chechnya, unrest in Xinjiang initially began as a result of conflicts over identity and local grievances, but later would become increasingly linked to the global jihadist networks, leaving the country prone to attacks involving greater degrees of sophistication and devastation in the future. ETIM, with ties to IMU, and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) formed in 2006 by militant Uighurs, share the nationalist and Islamist agenda of seeking independence for East Turkestan from China.195 ETIM, TIP, and other Islamist-inspired affiliates have attempted to frame circumstances in Xinjiang as an “occupation” on the part of Beijing, delegitimizing Chinese sovereignty in the region and calling for a referendum on Xinjing’s status. Periodic reports in China and Russia alleged that Osama Bin Laden had pledged funding and support for ETIM, and the TIP has operated alongside al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, al Nusra.196 Al Qaeda’s leaders and affiliates periodically issue statements supporting the TIP and promoting the cause of liberating the “East Turkestan Islamic” state that would incorporate areas in China and Central Asia. A number of explanations are offered for the sources of Uighur unrest, including unrestricted Han migration to the region, government-imposed restrictions on religious practice, pressures promoting Uighur-Han marriage and limiting offspring, poverty and wealth imbalances, limited educational opportunities, poor health conditions, and hazards due to nuclear testing. Spokespersons for the overseas World Uyghur Congress have continually condemned Beijing’s ethnic and economic policies that benefit the Han Chinese 264

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and restrictions on religious practices (praying, fasting, wearing the hijab) as accounting for ethnic tensions and acts of violence carried out by the Uighur community. In turn, Beijing maintains that China faces threats of terrorism seeking to overturn the existing state leadership that are orchestrated by jihadists linked to militant Islamist terrorist networks in bordering Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond. Chinese authorities contend that the Uighur population is vulnerable to proliferation of violent extremist ideology over the Internet, and ETIM does maintain an active anti-Chinese Internet presence calling for independence of East Turkestan. Experts on the Uighur situation note that China’s ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced militant Uighur separatists into volatile neighboring countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Syria), where they are forming alliances that can be tapped for carrying out future attacks. It is important to note that many Uighurs in the region have remained loyal to the state, or at least are not interested in seeking to redress their grievances by committing acts of violence or terrorism. However, a pattern of sustained ethno-cultural conflict between the Uighurs and Han Chinese and periodic violence targeting the Han Chinese emigres and security forces has clearly continued among the indigenous population in Xinjiang for decades. Academic experts and journalists writing on Xinjiang confront difficulties accessing information on alleged terrorist attacks in the region. The available information can be sketchy, and at times contradictory. There are limits on the official information released, and very few independent journalists have been permitted access to the region.197 Since the mid-1990s, China has maintained a “strike hard” campaign and a significant police presence to combat threats of “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” and sporadic attacks in the region.198 In January 2007, it was reported that Chinese police raided a suspected ETIM training camp in Akto County in Xinjiang near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of eighteen terror suspects and the confiscation of weapons and explosives.199 In March 2008, Xinhua reported that a terrorist plot to attack an outbound China Southern Airlines flight from Urumqi had been thwarted by authorities averting “an air crash,” according to chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, Nur Bekri.200 On August 10, 2008, several men with homemade explosives drove taxis into government buildings in the city of Kuqa in Xinjiang, reportedly orchestrated by ETIM.201 In July 2009, ethnic riots broke out in Xinjiang’s capital of Urumqi between Uighurs and Han Chinese, resulting in an estimated 200 casualties, mostly Han Chinese.202 Several subsequent attacks took place in Xinjiang for which the ETIM, TIP, and other Uighur separatists took responsibility, including an August 2010 bombing in Aksu city that killed several civilians assisting local security forces, a July 2011 attack by young Uighur men on a police station in Hotan, a TIP-orchestrated attack on a 265

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restaurant in the city of Kashgar in July 2011 that resulted in eighteen deaths, and an attempted hijacking by six Uighur men of Tianjin Airlines flight GS7554 from Hotan to Urumqi in June 2012.203 In June 2013, at least twenty-seven police, security guards, and rioters were killed when “knife wielding mobs” attacked a police station and government building in Lukqun in the predominantly Uighur-populated area of Turpan.204 In October 2013, another terrorist incident focused national attention on the ethnic tensions in Xinjiang when a Uighur man drove his jeep into a group of pedestrians in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, killing five people.205 In March 2014, in an incident some 2,500 miles from Xinjiang in the capital of Yunnan Province, a group of men and women carrying long-bladed knives attacked people at the train stations in Kunming. Chinese officials blamed Muslim separatists from Xinjiang for the attacks, reported to have killed twenty-nine and injured many more.206 Additional attacks resulting in dozens of fatalities and injuries were waged at the Urumqi train station in April 2014 with knives and explosives, and in May 2014 in a “violent terrorist incident” involving the detonation of explosives from SUVs in a market.207 In July 2014, Xinhua and government sources described a “premeditated terrorist attack” coordinated with ETIM on the police station and government facilities, resulting in fifty-nine casualties among the perpetrators and thirty-seven victims in China’s far northwest region of Xinjing province in Shache County (Yarkand).208 The Uighur local and international community presented an alternate explanation, attributing the attacks to restrictions imposed on religious practices during the holy month of Ramadan. Two days after the attack, Imam Jume Tahir of the six-centuryold Id Kah mosque in Kashgar in Xinjiang was stabbed to death.209 Imam Tahir maintained a high profile as deputy president of the Xinjiang Islamic Association and was also a loyal supporter of the government and party serving previously in the National People’s Congress, and he was openly critical of “hostile forces inside and outside of China” using “religion to carry out penetration, sabotage and secessionist activities in Xinjiang.”210 More recently, a major attack perpetrated by ethnic Uighurs was reported on a coal mine in September 2015 in the county of Baicheng in Xinjiang, with most victims being Han Chinese migrants, as well as five police officers.211 The attackers were apprehended after a 56-day manhunt, and it was reported that the group’s leaders all had Uighur names and were under foreign influence. Western countries have been reluctant to recognize the terrorist threat in China, and there have been claims that Chinese officials have applied the terrorist designation in a broad and inconsistent manner, often with political objectives.212 The lack of transparency in reporting on alleged terrorist incidents has also contributed to the reluctance on the part of the West to 266

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recognize the problem. Following the 9/11 attacks, in 2002 the United States listed ETIM as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.”213 The United States detained twenty-two Uighurs captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan in Guantanamo, but later released the prisoners on lack of sufficient evidence.214 United States’ and UN terrorist designation of ETIM and the US Treasury recognition of now-deceased ETIM leader Abdul Haq as a global terrorist makes clear that China’s terrorist threat is recognized. Elizabeth Economy, expert on China at the Council on Foreign Relations, offers a clear assessment of the situation: “Beijing’s inability or unwillingness to address adequately the well-founded political and economic grievances of the Uighurs does not minimize the actual terror threat that China might face from Uighur separatists, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.”215 Still, China’s officials frequently complain of Western double standards in failing to acknowledge the terror threat that China confronts.216 For example, following the Paris attacks in November 2015, while Chinese officials were offering messages of condolence to France’s President François Hollande and French society, China’s state media also identified a “double standard” in which the West recognized the atrocities committed by IS in France, but failed to sympathize with the risk China faces from terrorism. Pan Guang, Director and Professor at the Shanghai Center for International Studies, describes an expanding cross-border network he calls a “Terrorist Arc” stretching from the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia into South Asia and Southeast Asia.217 Pan Guang traces the origin of the growth of the network to initial support from the Taliban and al Qaeda in the 1990s, noting that organizations of the East Turkestan movement became active in these cliques. Writing in 2006, Pan Guang had observed that there was growing concern in Beijing about the impact of the collaboration of the networks of the “Terrorist Arc” in China and Asia: “Terrorist organizations and activities in Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia are starting to resemble those in the Middle East in terms of intellectual connections, organizational networks, and activities.”218 More recently, the political instability racking the Middle East and daily deadly attacks throughout the areas of the “Terrorist Arc,” including frequent incidents in Asia perpetrated by al Qaeda’s successors and most recently by IS, only confirms the concerns that Pan Guang has expressed. Uighur nationalism and separatism are evolving in a regional context plagued by the expanding militant global jihadist networks and ideology. Professor Philip B. K. Potter of the University of Michigan makes the point that “Where China was once viewed as a patron of liberation movements (including those active in Palestine) and a counterbalance to the United States and Soviet Union, current jihadist propaganda characterizes it as inheriting the designation of ‘head of the snake’ from the United States.”219 267

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The fact that these regions intersect with China’s OBOR and that the success of the project will hinge on ensuring security for economic, infrastructure, and energy interests along the Silk Road only adds to the likelihood that China will become a more significant stakeholder in the global counter-terror front. Moreover, Beijing’s rise on the global stage and growing engagement in primary regions for the global jihad in the Middle East and North Africa are bound to make China a priority target. China has responded to regional threats of violence and terrorism by devoting resources to additional security measures. Following the highly visible attack in Tiananmen Square in October 2013, several new anti-terrorism measures were announced, including tightening surveillance of the population and imposing additional Internet controls. In Xinjiang, the government has increased law enforcement presence, building community networks of informants and at times being accused of harsh responses and violations of human rights, but Beijing’s leadership has also invested in education, economic opportunity, and promoting ethnic harmony, appealing to all communities in Xinjiang to believe in potential progress and enhanced livelihoods through China’s modernization. Academics and journalists that do visit Xinjiang report on the disproportionately heavy security presence, surveillance, checkpoints, and security cameras. Beijing’s authoritarian system, functioning largely free from public oversight and with fewer concerns regarding individual freedoms, is better equipped to impose controls on the activity of citizens and foreigners in the country than most Western democracies or even today’s Russia can do. The downside, however, is that repression and excessively harsh police tactics can fuel further unrest. In a report of May 29, 2014, Xinhua quoted Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Urumqi following the deadly terrorist attack on the market, imploring ethnic groups of the region to demonstrate “mutual understanding, respect, tolerance and appreciation among themselves, and learn and help each other” to be together “like seeds of a pomegranate.”220 Xi suggested further that efforts be made so that “all ethnic groups contribute to the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation, and to share the fruit of China’s development and prosperity.”221 At the same time, Xi urged “decisive action” to “resolutely suppress terrorists’ rampant momentum,” and called for “meticulous” work “on helping religion adapt to socialist society,”222 focusing on “fostering a team of patriotic clergy and boosting the general quality of people in the religious circle so as to ensure that the leadership of religious organizations is firmly in the hands of people who love the country as well as religion.”223 Chairman of the Xinjiang regional government Nur Bekri reported that the budget for countering terrorism in Xinjiang would be doubled for 2014 and issued the statement: “We must constantly strike hard against

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violent extremism, showing no mercy, in accordance with the law, and maintaining a high handed posture.”224 Like Russia’s, China’s anti-terrorism policy has evolved to take on comprehensive features over time, and has broadened from a nearly exclusive domestic focus to encompass global dimensions. After 9/11, under the leadership of former President Hu Jintao, China established a National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) for developing China’s counterterrorism capacity. China’s President Xi Jinping has taken an even more proactive and assertive stance on combating terrorism, vowing in 2014 to cast a wide net “from the earth to the sky” and to promulgate a “strike hard” counterterrorism strategy. Xi Jinping, urging that a “wall of bronze and iron” be built to combat terrorism, was reported in Xinhua as stating: “We must make terrorists become like rats scurrying across a street, with everybody shouting, ‘beat them!’ ”225 In February 2015, China announced the establishment of a national antiterrorism intelligence system that would improve intelligence sharing and surveillance and security for transportation and aviation systems, tighten border controls to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the country, strengthen management of religious affairs in accordance with the law, and impose harsher prison terms for promoting terrorism and extremism. China’s first anti-terror law, instituted in December 2015, significantly enhanced the powers of the state and security organs for countering terrorism.226 The new law raised concerns in Western capitals and criticism by concerned human rights groups suggesting that it could be used to further limit freedoms. Li Shouwei, Deputy Head of the Parliament’s criminal law division under the legislative affairs committee, offered the following in response to critics of the new law: “This rule accords with the actual work needed of fighting terrorism and is basically the same as what other major countries in the world do.”227 The 2015 anti-terror law also represented a bold departure from China’s past tradition of refraining from foreign military involvement, establishing that the PLA, PAP, and employees of the public security organs could be deployed overseas for counterterrorism purposes.228 In November 2015, Beijing announced that it would build a “logistics hub” in the Eastern African nation of Djibouti as China’s first overseas military base.229 The new naval facility will be located in the same city as where the United States maintains its sole permanent base in Africa, at Camp Lemonnier, which is tasked to coordinate regional counterterrorism operations. Djibouti occupies a vital strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean on the Gulf of Aden-Suez trade route. Beijing contends that the security presence in Djibouti is important for safeguarding economic interests and naval sea lanes, supporting anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, and presumably could be utilized to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts.

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Shen Dingli, Professor of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, described the motives behind China’s first initiative to establish an overseas base extending its military reach: The United States has been expanding its business all around the world and sending its military away to protect those interests for 150 years . . . Now, what the United States has done in the past, China will do again . . . If whoever—pirates, ISIS or the U.S.—wants to shut down the passage, we need to be able to reopen it.230

China, like Russia, concentrates considerable attention on countering violent extremism. However, as in the Russian context, those activities defined as “extremist” can be quite broad and create barriers to finding common ground with Western nations. For example, human rights organizations and critics contend that “Chinese counterterrorism policies enable authorities to crack down on Tibetan civil society in an unprecedented manner,” labeling activities of the Dalai Lama as “religious extremism” deemed objectionable or illegal under present state regulations.231 In other respects, China’s CVE response has been quite sophisticated and reflects understanding of the importance of addressing root causes of terrorism. China’s Deputy Minister of Public Security Liu Yuejin, in a ministerial statement at the International Conference on Deradicalisation and Countering Violence Extremism in 2016, stressed the importance of sharing best practices on CVE, explaining that the Chinese government was implementing preventative and rehabilitation programs: “It is important to conduct a proactive approach and the Chinese government has been firmly committed to addressing extremism through comprehensive measures.”232 In addition to enhancing the capacity and technology of law enforcement, he emphasized addressing economic needs, education, and social and religious initiatives to promote harmony. Martin I. Wayne, evaluating China’s counterinsurgency strategy in Xinjiang, has offered the assessment that China’s “bottom-up” approach, concentrated on responsible interaction with Xinjiang society, was much more effective than employing brutal state responses to kill and capture terrorists.233 Wayne contends that the successful aspects of the campaign rested in “leveraging grass roots institutions against the insurgency,” and he concludes that the United States could derive lessons for China’s strategy in Xinjiang in confronting insurgencies around the world.234 Beyond the challenges China faces from Xinjiang, the large rural-to-urban migrations taking place today also create a potential mass contagion that may be prone to acts of violence in the event that expectations regarding economic betterment are not met. Developing viable channels for airing and responding to local grievances in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the nation must form a critical component of community efforts to counter extremism in both authoritarian and democratic national contexts. 270

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The escalation of attacks by IS in the Middle East and Europe has provided additional impetus and justification for China’s expanded counterterrorism initiatives.235 Mei Jianming, Director of the Counterterrorism Research Center at the People’s Public Security University of China, acknowledged this following the IS attack in Paris and another carried out by an affiliate of al Qaeda in Bamako Mali in November 2014. Mei stated: “The government also took the growing influence of Islamic State into consideration after it planned to recruit Muslims from all ethnic groups in China”; he was quoted further in China Daily, stating that “Although Xinjiang is the traditional battleground of the country’s anti-terrorism efforts, other areas must step up their efforts.”236 Dr Runa Zongze, Vice President of the CIIS, included the threat from IS in summarizing the conclusions of the annual Blue Book on International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs published in 2015: [T]he emergence of the Islamic State (IS) group has shocked the world and brought the Middle East to a post-Arab Spring crisis. The IS group, which originated in Syria and Iraq, has risen almost overnight to become the world’s most powerful and influential terrorist organization . . . Due to the brutal means it uses, such as the beheadings of captives and looting, the emergence of the group has broken the established political structure in West Asia and North Africa . . . its extremist ideologies have attracted global extremists and terrorists to join the so-called Holy War and spread the threat of terrorism to the rest of the world.237

Anthropologist Dru Gladney, an expert on Uighurs in Xinjiang, believes that Uighur ties to IS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by promoting global jihad.238 Gladney claims that the primary motivation would be obtaining “militant training to fight China” and possibly “establish a Uighur state,” but “they’re less interested in creating a global caliphate.”239 Nevertheless, given the unresolved grievances among the Uighur community in Xinjiang and the global struggle of IS and its affiliates and potential successors, Beijing can only expect that Uighur nationalism merged with militant jihadism potentially poses an ongoing, if not heightened, threat for China’s security in the future. As noted in Chapter 4, there are significant variations on the exact numbers of Chinese citizens in Syria. Beijing and many Western sources suggest that several hundred to a few thousand Uighur militants are fighting in Syria alongside the TIP which is supporting the al Nusra Front, until mid-2016 an affiliate of al Qaeda and rival of IS in Syria, and reports indicate that a few hundred Uighurs have been recruited to IS in Syria.240 In December 2015, IS produced a nasheed (Islamic chant) in Mandarin Chinese, distributed online, which represented a general outreach to Chinese Muslims, including Huis, Kazakhs, and some Uighurs exhorting Muslims in China to “wake up” and “take up weapons.”241 Spokespersons for IS have supported Uighur calls for secession from China. 271

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The killings and hostage incidents perpetrated by IS against Chinese nationals in Syria have contributed to China’s determination to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. In September 2014, a Chinese citizen fighting with Islamic State in Syria was “arrested, tried and shot dead” by IS militants after he became disillusioned with the group.242 In December 2014, IS militants beheaded two Chinese members after charging them with treason and accusing them of attempted escape.243 In November 2015, IS announced in their English-language magazine Dabiq, under the heading “The Fate of Two Prisoners,” that they had executed a 50-year-old Chinese hostage, Fan Jinghui, together with a Norwegian hostage after offering them for sale.244 Li Wei, leading Chinese government advisor on terrorism at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, noted that the killing of Fan Jinghui “shows that the threat terrorism poses to international society is growing, and China is no exception.”245 Chinese officials cite the instance as further evidence that Beijing hopes will convince Western governments and media that China also faces threats from militant extremism. In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of IS, claimed that China stands with states such as Israel, India, and the United States as an “oppressor” of Muslims.246 As in Russia, Al-Baghdadi issued an appeal in 2014 to all Chinese Muslims to pledge loyalty to him.247 As mentioned previously, IS has effectively declared war on Beijing, targeting portions of western China for incorporation to constitute the eastern flank of the caliphate by 2020, and IS’s leadership has characterized the People’s Republic of China as a terrorist organization, explicitly appealing to China’s Uighurs and other Muslim communities to take up arms in the IS cause. Tension with Turkey adds another important dimension to China’s concerns in Xinjiang. Turkish cultural and religious ties to the Uighurs have been a significant factor historically, and Turkey has been a supporter of Uighur aspirations. Recep Tayyip Erdog ˘an, later to assume the presidency in Turkey in 2014, described the relationship in a public statement in 1995: “Eastern Turkestan is not only the home of the Turkic peoples, but it is also the cradle of Turkic history, civilization, and culture. The martyrs in Eastern Turkestan are our own martyrs.”248 In July 2009, in his capacity as Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdog ˘an described Beijing’s rule in Xinjiang as “genocide” following the response to the Uighur-Han clashes in Urumqi in 2009. 249 Periodic calls for “self-determination” in “Eastern Turkestan” from Ankara seem unjustified from Beijing’s perspective given that Turkey resisted granting autonomy to the Kurds.250 Incidents occur periodically, suggesting that militant extremists from Xinjiang find support particularly among ideological sympathizers or from the significant Uighur diaspora in Turkey, though there is no evidence that the Erdog ˘an government officially supports such activity.251 For example, in November 2014, several Chinese nationals of 272

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ethnic Uighur origin were arrested for purchasing fraudulent Turkish passports.252 In January 2015, Shanghai police arrested ten Turkish nationals for providing false passports to terror suspects from Xinjiang who were attempting to board flights bound for Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.253 Both Russia and China are likely to be targets of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks in the future. Russia’s engagement in the Syrian war and China’s expanding global economic and security presence, combined with the ties of the two countries in volatile regions from Africa, through the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia, create a direct intersection of critical interests and citizens at home and abroad with the militant Islamist trans-regional networks. The future success of the Eurasian Union and Silk Road projects requires a secure environment through Central Asia to Europe, and the interest and investment that Moscow and particularly Beijing share in these projects is only likely to increase the urgency for broader engagement of both countries in regional and broader global CT initiatives in the future. Terrorism is a major factor in shaping the contemporary security order, and the definitions and approaches of Russia and China in addressing this threat are in many respects at odds with Western nations in their conceptions of world order. However, notwithstanding the differences in Russia’s and China’s understanding of terrorism and extremism from that of the United States and Western democratic nations, there are still several ways to engage productively in countering global terrorism and extremism. Preventing devastating terrorist attacks on domestic populations is a common objective that Russia and China share with democratic nations and the broader world community. The potential for large-scale attacks, even ultimately featuring nonstate use of weapons of mass destruction, remains a vital security concern that Russia and China must share with other nations of the world. The threat of international terrorism creates a powerful incentive for working around differences to identify areas where joint efforts can be developed in order to enhance international CT effectiveness. In February 2015, even in the aftermath of tensions over the conflict in Ukraine, the director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov traveled to Washington with a delegation to participate in a summit among nations of the world community, hosted by US President Barack Obama, on countering violent extremism.254 Russia’s record for CT cooperation with the United States and Europe has been more extensive than China’s CT cooperation with Western nations, but there is considerable opportunity for expanding joint collaboration that would strengthen global counterterrorism capacity. Practical areas for CT collaboration should continue to include intelligence sharing, disrupting financing, intercepting weapons smuggling, coordinating border security, developing community engagement and rehabilitation programs, engaging the youth, and contributing to economic growth in vulnerable areas where terrorists have 273

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and could gain a foothold. The OBOR initiative not only holds promise for China’s future development—enhancing economic growth and development along the major Silk Road routes could go a long way toward offsetting the poverty and unrest that has made these regions so receptive to the appeal of militant extremist ideology.

Authoritarian Convergence? State Security and Sovereignty, Geopolitics, and World Order In the interest of protecting state security and stability, the leaderships in Moscow and Beijing are clearly prepared to impose restrictions that limit personal and political freedoms among citizens beyond means that would be acceptable or tolerated in the context of Western democracies. Following the initial “chaos” of the 1990s associated with the most democratic and open period in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, over the past two decades the Kremlin has moved to gradually restore a strong state and tighter control over society, legitimized as necessary to ensure national security. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have been quite proactive in instituting measures directed to counter perceived threats to state and government authority. The Sino–Russian strategic bond is enhanced by shared views regarding threats posed by colored revolutions and Western-orchestrated efforts to encourage regime change toward democratic transformation. Western backing for opposition groups or outright military intervention to topple antidemocratic tyrannical regimes regrettably has in fact left societies continuing to suffer tremendous dislocation and loss, with little success in cultivating thriving democratic regimes and security and dignity for the lives of citizens. Anxieties have been heightened in both Moscow and Beijing regarding potential existential threats to state power stemming from internal domestic and externally linked sources of regime disruption and transformation. The coincidence of Sino–Russian perspectives with respect to managing cyber security and the insistence on preserving national state control in the cyber, Internet, and information spheres within their borders also places these two major authoritarian powers at odds with the United States and Western nations in managing this critical non-traditional security area in ways that can be quite significant. In addition, Russia and China can collaborate with Western nations in several respects in countering terrorism, but they differ from Western democracies in identifying sources and definitions of terrorism and extremism and the extent to which they are prepared to impose restrictions on freedoms among their populations justified as necessary to effectively counter terrorism, as well as more broadly defined sources of separatism and extremism. 274

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Sino–Russian authoritarian convergence corresponding with coincidence of views between Moscow and Beijing concerning Western support for regime change, cyber security, and countering terrorism poses significant challenges for the United States and Western democracies and the values and tenets of the liberal international order. The common position of the Russian and Chinese leadership for managing these contemporary and emerging nontraditional security challenges at both the national and global levels also reinforces and advances Sino–Russian mutual advocacy for a multipolar (rather than US-led unipolar) global power configuration. The burgeoning Sino–Russian strategic partnership positions these two leading authoritarian powers to exert combined influence of considerable consequence in shaping outcomes with respect to regimes fraught by tyranny, domestic turmoil, and instability; future development of the cyber and Internet domain; and tailoring appropriate domestic and global management in countering the worldwide threat of terrorism and extremism. The Sino–Russian determination to protect national sovereignty and to safeguard the vulnerability of the authoritarian state from the confluence of domestic and internationally linked threats heightens the likelihood for continued tensions with the United States and other Western democracies and provides the foundation for major geopolitical clashes in the contemporary world arena. However, both Moscow and Beijing also readily acknowledge that transnational issues such as cyber and Internet security and countering terrorism and extremism must be addressed on a global scale involving extensive collaboration among nations and through leading international organizations. The challenge for Western democracies will be finding common approaches to managing emerging non-traditional security challenges in the face of growing capacity on the part of China and Russia to come together on the basis of authoritarian convergence to exercise influence in determining global outcomes and rules of the world order.

Notes 1. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, December 31, 2015. 2. China’s Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, Xinhua, May 26, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/ china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm. 3. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, December 31, 2015. 4. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014. 5. China’s Military Strategy, 2015. 6. See Andrej Krickovic, “Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma,” Journal of Global Studies, 1, no. 2 (2016), 123; Andrei P. Tysgankov,

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7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 25. Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight”; Gorenburg, “Countering Color Revolutions,” and Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution.’ ” 26. “Vladimir Putin Held an Expanded Security Council Meeting in the Kremlin to Discuss the Draft Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation through 2015,” November 20, 2014, http://en.Kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47045. 27. “Lavrov Accuses West of Seeking ‘Regime Change’ in Russia,” Reuters, November 22, 2014. 28. “Putin Sounds the Alarm over Budding ‘Color Revolutions’ in Russia,” Moscow Times, March 4, 2015. 29. Main points of speech by Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Dr Anatoly Antonov at the 14th Asia Security Summit “The Shangri-La Dialogue,” Singapore, May 30, 2015. 30. Main points of speech by Deputy Minister of Defence. 31. Sergei Shoigu, quoted at the “Army 2015” forum, Interfax, June 19, 2015. 32. Kommersant, March 4, 2015, cited in “Putin Sounds the Alarm.” 33. “Slavic Brotherhood-2015 International Exercise,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/practice/more.htm?id=12054921@egNews; and “Slavic Brotherhood 2015 Begins,” Serbia News, September 2, 2015, http:// inserbia.info/today/2015/09/slavic-brotherhood-2015-begins. 34. Author’s interviews Moscow, October 2015, and see Roger McDermott, “Slavic Brotherhood 2015 Rehearses Anti-Color Revolution Operations,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, 12, no. 160, September 8, 2015. 35. “Slavic Brotherhood 2015 Rehearses Anti-Color Revolution Operations.” 36. “Party Leader Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech,” CCTV, July 1, 2016, http:// english.cctv.com/2016/07/01/VIDEImSpHMqkEeH7EnvR7b5I160701.shtml. 37. “People’s Daily Warns against Colour Revolutions, Blames ‘Spread of Western Ideology,’ ” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/ china/policies-politics/article/1822063/communist-party-paper-sees-red-over-colourrevolutions. 38. Chen Yue, “Commentary: West-backed Color Revolution to Blame for Mideast Refugee Crisis,” Xinhua, October 9, 2015. 39. Chen Yue, “Commentary: West-backed Color Revolution to Blame for Mideast Refugee Crisis.” 40. Chen Yue, “Commentary: West-Backed Color Revolution to Blame for Mideast Refugee Crisis.” 41. Wu Sike, “Democracy, Hypocrisy Sparks Refugee Crisis,” CCTV, October 21, 2015. 42. Wu Sike, “Democracy, Hypocrisy Sparks Refugee Crisis.” 43. “Russia Warns against ‘Colour Revolution’ in Armenia,” Reuters, July 2, 2015. 44. See Jonathan Kaiman, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution—the Guardian Briefing,” Guardian, September 30, 2014. 45. Austin Ramzy and Alan Wong, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution: One Year Later,” New York Times, September 25, 2015. 46. “Hong Kong’s Color Revolution,” China Daily, October 15, 2014, http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-10/15/content_18739914.htm. 47. “Hong Kong’s Color Revolution.”

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 48. “Why Is the US So Keen on ‘Color Revolutions’?,” People’s Daily Online, October 11, 2014, http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1011/c98649-8793283.html. 49. Michael Forsythe and Alan Wong, “Vote in Hong Kong Deepens Thorn in China’s Side,” New York Times, September 5, 2016, and “Q. and A.: Jason Y. Ng on Aftermath of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution,” New York Times, March 24, 2016. 50. “Russia Bans ‘Undesirable’ International Organisations ahead of 2016 Elections,” Guardian, May 19, 2015. 51. Federal Security Service board meeting, March 26, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/49006. 52. “Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations,” New York Times, April 28, 2016. 53. “NGOs in China Fear Clampdown as Xi Jinping Plans New Security Controls,” Guardian, March 30, 2015. 54. “China Eyes Deepened Cooperation with Overseas NGOs,” Xinhua, July 26, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/27/c_134448504.htm. 55. “Party Leader Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech.” 56. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, December 31, 2015. 57. “Interview of the Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev,” Kraznaya Zvezda, June 1, 2012. 58. China’s Military Strategy. 59. See Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Military Declares the Internet an Ideological ‘Battleground,’ ” The Diplomat, May 21, 2015, and “The Chinese Army Just Informed Everyone that the Internet Means War,” Business Insider, May 20, 2015, http:// www.businessinsider.com/chinese-army-declares-internet-war-2015-5. 60. “Russia and China Sign Cooperation Pacts,” New York Times, May 8, 2015, and “China and Russia Support ‘Cyber Sovereignty,’ ” China Digital Times, May 11, 2015, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/05/china-and-russia-agree-to-respectcyber-sovereignty/. 61. Oleg Demidov quoted in “Russia and China Pledge Not to Hack Each Other,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/05/08/russia-chinapledge-to-not-hack-each-other. 62. See Alexandra Kulikova, “China-Russia Cyber Security Pact: Should the US Be Concerned?,” Russia Direct, May 21, 2015. 63. “Full Text: The Internet in China,” People’s Daily online, June 5, 2010. 64. For comparison of differences among nations on issues of global Internet governance, legal norms, and use of cyber for political and military purposes, see Oleg Demidov, “Global Internet Governance and International Security in the Field of ICT use,” PIR Report, Moscow, Geneva, 2015. 65. See Agreement Between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, December 2, 2008. Also see “President Hu Visits 3 Nations, Attends SCO Summit,” Xinhua, August 28, 2012, and “International Experts Positively Assess Results of SCO Summit Ended in Beijing,” Penza News, June 18, 2012. 66. Letter dated September 12, 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to

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67. 68.

69.

70.

71.

72. 73.

74.

75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80.

the Secretary-General, “International Code of Conduct for Information Security,” United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, September 14, 2011. “International Code of Conduct for Information Security.” For example, Michele Markoff, serving as US State Department Senior Advisor on Cyber Affairs at the time, described the twelve-point proposal as intended “to justify the establishment of sovereign government control over Internet resources and over freedom of expression in order to maintain the security of their state”; see “State Department Official Accuses Russia and China of Seeking Greater Internet Control,” Huffington Post, September 27, 2011. Teng Jianqun and Xu Longdi, Cyber War Preparedness, Cyberspace Arms Control and the United States, CIIS Report, China Institute of International Studies, no. 3, August 2014. Eneken Tikk, “Ten Rules for Cyber Security,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia, Survival, 53, no. 3 (2011), and see Teng Jianqun and Xu Longdi, Cyber War Preparedness, 34. See Teng Jianqun and Xu Longdi, Cyber War Preparedness, 34, and “Work to Build a Peaceful, Secure and Equitable Information and Cyber Space,” H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun, Speech delivered at the First Committee of the 66th UN Session of the GA on Information and Cyberspace Security, October 20, 2011, http://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t869580.shtml. Speech by Ambassador Wang Qun. “Russia Internet Users,” http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/russia; The World Fact Book, Internet Users, Central Intelligence Agency, “Internet Users by Country (2016),” http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/. “China Internet Users,” http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china; The World Fact Book, Internet Users, Central Intelligence Agency, “Internet Users by Country (2016),” http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/; and “China’s Online Users More Than Double entire U.S. Population,” CNN, February 4, 2016. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech at WIC,” CCTV, December 16, 2015, http://english.cntv.cn/2015/12/16/ARTI1450234813337268.shtml. See Melanie Lee, “China’s Nearly 700 Million Internet Users are Hot for Online Finance,” Forbes, January 25, 2016. “Russia’s PM Vladimir Putin Won’t Snip-Snap Russian Internet,” publicity.ru, April 22, 2011, and see “Internet Censorship Faces Obstacles,” Moscow Times, November 14, 2012. “Russia Support Non-restriction of Internet—Medvedev,” statement at the Davos World Economic Forum, RIA Novosti, January 26, 2011. “Medvedev Warns against Internet Shutdown over ‘Extremism,’ ” RIA Novosti, February 22, 2011. Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2000. For additional background and analysis on Russia’s responses on internet/social media and cyber/ information security, see Sharyl Cross, “Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Social Media: Exploring Prospects for US-Russia Cooperation Beyond the ‘Re-Set,’ ” Journal of Strategic Security, 6, no. 4 (2013).

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 81. Mikhail Yakushev,“Internet Governance: Politics and Geopolitics,” Security Index, 16, no. 2 (2010). 82. “Shutting Down Slanderers,” Moscow News, July 16, 2012. 83. Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s 21st Century Information War: Working to Undermine and Destabilize Populations,” Defence Strategic Communications, 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015), 12. 84. See Thomas, “Russia’s 21st Century Information War”; and Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight.” 85. Cybersecurity Strategy Concept of the Russian Federation (Draft), 2014, https://ccdcoe. org/cyber-security-strategy-documents.html. 86. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Tops China as Principal Threat to US,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2015; and see Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27, no. 1 (2014). 87. “Cyberwellness Profile Russian Federation,” United Nations Statistics Division, December 2012, and ITU Statistics, December 2013, http://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Cybersecurity/Documents/Country_Profiles/Russia.pdf. 88. Quoted in Joshua Keating, “Vladimir Putin Wants his Own Internet,” Slate, April 25, 2014. 89. Quoted in Eugene Gerden, “Russia to Establish Cyber-threat Response Center,” SC Magazine, January 20, 2015. 90. Alexander Bastrykin, “Pora postavit dectvennii zaclon informationnoi voene [It Is Time to Put an Effective Barrier to the Information War],” Kommersant-Vlast, April 18, 2016, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2961578; see also “Russia Should Counter Information War in Run-Up to Elections,” Sputnik, April 18, 2016; “Russia’s Top Cop Wants Internet Censorship to Fight US ‘Info War,’ ” Moscow Times, April 18, 2016; and Iliya Arkhipov, “Putin Ally Says Russia Must Abandon ‘False Democracy,’ ” Bloomberg, April 18, 2016. 91. Bastrykin, “Pora postavit dectvennii zaclon informationnoi voene [It Is Time to Put an Effective Barrier to the Information War]”; “Russia Should Counter Information War in Run-Up to Elections”; “Russia’s Top Cop Wants Internet Censorship to Fight US ‘Info War’”; and Arkhipov, “Putin Ally Says Russia Must Abandon ‘False Democracy.’” 92. See “Russian Security Council Drafts New Information Security Doctrine,” Interfax, June 25, 2016, and for reference to prior version see “Draft of Russia’s Cyber Security Strategy to Undergo Public Discussion,” TASS, January 10, 2014. 93. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech at WIC.” 94. “Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context,” in China and Cybersecurity, Espionage, Strategy and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 11. 95. Xi Jinping, “China Must Evolve from a Large Internet Nation to a Powerful Internet Nation,” Xinhua, February 27, 2014. 96. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech at WIC,” and “China Internet: Xi Jinping Calls for ‘Cyber Sovereignty,’ ” BBC News, December 16, 2015. 97. See “China Calls for International Cooperation in Internet Security Protection,” People’s Daily online, June 8, 2010, and “China Issues White Paper on Internet Policy,” People’s Daily online, June 8, 2010.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 98. “Full Text: The Internet in China.” 99. For discussion of China’s institutional structures for cyber security, see China Monitor, Mercator Institute for China Studies, #20, December 9, 2014, and Lindsay, “Introduction,” in China and Cybersecurity. 100. For assessment of the CSAC and institutional and legal structures in China on cyber security, see Samm Sacks and Robert O’Brien, “What to Make of the Newly Established CyberSecurity Association of China,” CSIS, May 25, 2016. 101. See Sacks and O’Brien, “What to Make of the Newly Established CyberSecurity Association of China,” and “China’s first national NPO in cyber security founded,” Xinhua, March 25, 2016. 102. People’s Republic of China Cybersecurity Law (Draft), June 2014, translated in China Law Translate, July 6, 2015; Cybersecurity Law (Second Reading Draft), China Law Translate, July 4, 2016; “Draft Law Strengthens China’s Cybersecurity,” China Daily, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-06/27/content_ 25874919.htm. 103. See “China Adopts New Security Law to Make Networks, Systems ‘Controllable,’ ” Reuters, July 1, 2015; Ankit Panda, “The Truth About China’s New National Security Law,” The Diplomat, July 1, 2015; “China Adopts Sweeping NationalSecurity Law,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2015; and Zunyou Zhou, “China’s Draft Cybersecurity Law,” China Brief, 15, no. 4, December 21, 2015. 104. People’s Republic of China Cybersecurity Law (Draft); Cybersecurity Law (Second Reading Draft); and “Draft Law Strengthens China’s Cybersecurity.” 105. China’s Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/ 26/content_20820628.htm. 106. See Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare,” SSI Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2014, 29–30. 107. “China Military Seeks to Bring Cyber Warfare Units Under One Roof,” Bloomberg News, October 22, 2015. 108. Xi Jinping, quoted in “The Internet Was Supposed to Foster Democracy. China Has Different Ideas,” Washington Post, July 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/asia_pacific/the-internet-was-supposed-to-foster-democracy-chinahas-different-ideas/2016/07/10/42954bbc-1dd9-11e6-b6e0-c53b7ef63b45_story. html. 109. See “China’s Vast Internet Prison,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2016. 110. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech at WIC.” 111. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Keynote Speech at WIC.” 112. See “About the Forum,” The 7th International Safe Internet Forum, conference description, Moscow Russia, April 27, 2016, http://safeinternetforum.ru/en/. 113. “Moscow Safer Internet Forum Adopts Russia-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Roadmap,” The 7th International Safe Internet Forum, conference description, Moscow Russia, April 27, 2016, http://safeinternetforum.ru/en/novosti/moscowsafer-internet-forum-adopts-russia-china-cybersecurity-cooperation-roadmap. html. 114. “Moscow Safer Internet Forum.”

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 115. “Moscow Safer Internet Forum.” 116. “Moscow Safer Internet Forum.” 117. “Joint Statement between the Presidents of China and Russia on Cooperation in Information Space Development,” China Daily, June 26, 2016, http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-06/26/content_25856778.htm. 118. “US and Russia Meet on Cybersecurity,” CNN, April 17, 2016; “Russia and US to Hold Cyber Security Consultations in Geneva,” Interfax, April 18, 2016; “US and Russia to Meet on Cybersecurity,” The Hill, April 18, 2016; “Russia Calls for Routine Cybersecurity Meetings with US,” Sputnik, May 27, 2016; and Eugene Gerden, “Russia and US to Resume Cybersecurity Cooperation,” SC Magazine: For IT Professionals, March 30, 2016. 119. “Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say,” Washington Post, July 9, 2015; and “Chinese Breach of 4 Million Federal Workers,” Washington Post, June 4, 2015. 120. “Islamic State Spreads Tentacles to Russia as Chechnya Militants Pledge Allegiance to Leader Baghdadi,” Telegraph, June 24, 2015. The Russian military reported that they had killed Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in Syria in 2016. 121. “Russia: 7 Alleged ISIS Charged for Plotting Terror in Moscow, St. Petersburg,” CNN, February 17, 2016. 122. “Islamic State Calls on Members to Carry Out Jihad in Russia,” Reuters, July 31, 2016. 123. See David Eshel, “China Targeted by ISIS,” Defense Update, January 2, 2015, http://defense-update.com/20150102_isis_in_xinjiang.html; “China: Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project, http://www.counterextremism. com/countries/china; and “ISIS WARNING: Horrifying Map of Target Countries It Wants to Dominate in Europe by 2020,” Express, September 14, 2015, http://www. express.co.uk/news/uk/597254/ISIS-Map-Europe-Terror-Organisation-AndrewHosken-Caliphate-Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi. 124. “Chinese President Sends Condolences to France over Paris Terror Attack,” Xinhua, January 8, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-01/ 08/c_133906246.htm. 125. “Putin: Terrorism Can Be Defeated Only in Joint Efforts,” TASS, July 15, 2016. 126. “Chinese FM Calls for United Front to Fight Terrorism,” Xinhua, November 16, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/16/c_134819141.htm. 127. Sergei Lavrov quoted in “China and Russia Call for Global Counter-terrorism Front following Paris Attacks,” Hindu International, November 16, 2015. 128. Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, May 12, 2009, and December 31, 2015. 129. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014. 130. See National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed on July 1, 2015, China Law Translate, http://chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en; and see “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 1, 2015. 131. “Russian-Chinese Dialogue: The 2015 Model,” Reports of the Russian International Affairs Council, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow 2016, 9, russiancouncil.ru/en/report25.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 132. Ni Lexiong quoted in “China Says It Faces Extremism, Too,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2015. 133. “Russia, China, CSTO and SCO May Become Locomotive of Counterterrorism— Bordyuzha,” Interfax, April 28, 2016. 134. “China, Russia Could Drive Anti-terror Fight,” Xinhua, April 29, 2016. 135. “Russia, China Ready for Joint Anti-terror Measures—Russian Foreign Ministry,” TASS, December 31, 2015; and “China’s Anti-Terrorism Law to Boost BeijingMoscow Cooperation,” Sputnik International, December 31, 2015. 136. “Ambassador: Putin’s Visit to China to be Milestone in Russia-China Relations,” TASS, August 2, 2016. 137. China’s Ambassador to Russia Li Hui, quoted in “Ambassador: Putin’s Visit to China to be Milestone in Russia-China Relations.” 138. “China, Russia Begin Joint Anti-terror Exercises,” BRICS Post, July 4, 2016, http:// thebricspost.com/china-russia-begin-joint-anti-terror-exercises/#.V92oHOQVCUk. 139. “Chinese Forces Near Moscow: China, Russia Commence Security Drills,” Sputnik, July 3, 2016; Alexander Korablinov,“Russia, China Commence Anti-terrorism Exercises,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, July 4, 2016; “China-Russia Joint Antiterrorism Drill Kicks Off in Moscow,” China Military Online, July 4, 2016; and Wang Qingyun, “Chinese Police Take Up Counter Terrorism Training in Russia,” China Daily, July 7, 2016. 140. “China, Russia Begin Joint Anti-terror Exercises.” 141. “China, Russia Complete ‘Cooperation-2016’ Joint Anti-terrorism Drill,” China Military Online, July 15, 2016. 142. “The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO),” http://ecrats.org/en/; and Richard Weitz, “Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center,” Eurasianet.org, September 25, 2012, http://www. eurasianet.org/node/65960. 143. See “Russian Troops to Respond to Terrorist Threats at SCO Peace Mission Exercise,” Russkiy Mir Foundation Information Service, August 21, 2014. 144. “SCO Hosts First Joint Online Counter Terrorism Exercise in China,” China Military Online, Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China, October 15, 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2015-10/15/content_7130465.htm. 145. See interview by Weitz, “Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Center.” 146. Galiya Ibragimova, “After 15 Years, the SCO Is Ready to Expand,” Russia Direct, June 30, 2016. 147. “SCO Presidents Urge Cooperation in Transit, Infrastructure, Counter-Terrorism,” Astana Times, June 25, 2016. 148. Andrey Kazantsev, “Fragile Central Asia: Secular Statehood Challenged by Radical Islam,” Russia in Global Affairs, February 13, 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Fragile-Central-Asia-17993. 149. Kazantsev, “Fragile Central Asia.” 150. Agreement Between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, December 2, 2008. Also see “President Hu Visits 3 Nations, Attends SCO Summit,” Xinhua, August 28, 2012.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 151. At a CSTO meeting held in Bishkek in 2001, in the midst of the Arab Spring turbulence, Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary General of CSTO, stated that “extremism is manifested in almost all CSTO countries, and we need to fight it, using common efforts”; see “The CSTO Member States Call to Fight Extremism Together,” Institute of Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia, February 16, 2011, and President Nursultan Nazarbayev recommended joint study of the sources of extremism, and suggested regulating extremist material in the internet that could “endanger governments”; see “CSTO Members Should Cooperate in Resistance to Religious Extremism,” Trend, December 20, 2011. 152. “Russia, China Ready for Joint Anti-terror Measures.” 153. See “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Fighters,” Security Council 7272nd Meeting, # SC11580, September 24, 2014; “General Assembly Decides to Take More Time in Considering Secretary General’s Proposed Action Plan for Preventing Violent Extremism,” Seventieth General Assembly 84th and 85th Meetings, General Assembly #GA11760, February 12, 2016; and “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Affirming Importance of Balanced, Integrated Implementation of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” General Assembly 109th & 110th Meetings 2016 Session, #GA11800, July 1, 2016. 154. Statement by Mr I. Rogachev, Director of the Department of New Challenges and Threats of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Head of the Russian Delegation of the ministerial segment of the International Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism, Geneva, April 8, 2016, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www. un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/RussianFederationStatement8April.pdf. 155. Statement by Mr I. Rogachev. 156. Statement by Mr I. Rogachev. 157. VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, Ufa, Russia, July 9, 2015. 158. Statement by Oleg Syromolotov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference, Berlin, 31 May 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/2298240; and see Statement by Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Oleg Syromolotov at the opening of the annual OSCE-wide CounterTerrorism Conference, Vienna, June 30, 2015, http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/ C93F70DC25F0350343257E7400367F60. 159. “China Joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in Security Alliance,” Reuters, August 4, 2016. 160. “ ‘China Joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in Security Alliance’ and Pakistan Welcomes Peace Agreement in Afghanistan,” Xinhua, September 26, 2016. 161. “China Praises Afghanistan for Fight against Chinese Separatist Group,” Reuters, July 31, 2016. 162. Zamir Kabulov quoted in “China Proposes New Central Asian Military Alliance,” Eurasianet.org, March 21, 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77896. 163. “Kitai tecnit Rossiya v Centralnoiy Azii [China Omits Russia from Central Asia],” Izvestiya, March 16, 2016.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 164. For additional background on the terrorist threat and responses in Russia, see Sharyl Cross, “Russia’s Relationship with the United States/NATO in the US-led Global War on Terrorism,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19 (2006), 175–92, and Sharyl Cross, “US/NAT0-Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Toward Building a Comprehensive Strategy,” Connections, 5, no. 4 (2006). 165. See Aymam Al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (London: Al-Sharq al Awsat in Arabic), excerpts translated in English in FBIS Translated Text, Document # GMP200201080000197, December 2, 2001. 166. “US State Dept. Adds Three Chechen Groups to Terrorist List,” PBS Newshour, February 28, 2003. 167. Denis Sokolov, “Russia’s Other Pipeline: Migration and Radicalization in the North Caucasus,” Kennan Cable, Wilson Center, no. 17, August 2016. 168. See “Islamic State Spreads Tentacles to Russia.” 169. See Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Estimates of the Number of Dagestanis Fighting in Syria Range from 600 to 5,000,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (12), no. 222, December 11, 2015; Maria Tsvetkova, “How Russia Allowed Homegrown Radicals to Go and Fight in Syria,” Reuters, May 13, 2016; Damien Sharkov, “Up to 1,700 Russians Fighting For ISIS, Says Head of Secret Service,” Newsweek, February 20, 2015; Alessandria Masi, “How Russian Militants Declared A New Isis ‘State’ in Russia’s North Caucasus,” International Business Times, June 26, 2015; and Sokolov, “Russia’s Other Pipeline.” 170. See Sergey Markedonov, “Why the Terrorist Threat in Russia Just Won’t Go Away,” Russia Direct, April 15, 2016. 171. See Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Police Suffer Losses in Islamic State-Inspired Attack in Southern Dagestan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13, no. 98, May 19, 2016. 172. Markedonov, “Why the Terrorist Threat in Russia Just Won’t Go Away.” 173. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Russian Security Services Target Muslim Cleric,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13, no. 128, July 15, 2016. 174. Vatchagaev, “Russian Security Services Target Muslim Cleric.” 175. “Terrifying Weapons Cache Found at Bomb Faculty 'Where ISIS Jihadis Plotted Russia Attacks,’ ” Daily Express, February 8, 2016, and “Russia Detains 7 Suspected of Planning Terrorist Attacks,” New York Times, February 8, 2016. 176. See Sofia Grebenkina, “How Russia Can Deal with ISIS Extremism within its Own Borders,” Russia Direct, September 23, 2015. 177. See Grebenkina, “How Russia Can Deal with ISIS Extremism within its Own Borders.” 178. See Otto Luchterhandt, “Russia Adopts New Counter-Terrorism Law,” Russian Analytical Digest, #2, 2006. 179. See Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “After Beslan: Changes in Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy,” E-International Relations, October 15, 2012. 180. See Luchterhandt, “Russia Adopts New Counter-Terrorism Law.” 181. “Russia: Putin Signs Tough Antiterrorism Laws ahead of Sochi Olympics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 3, 2013. 182. For additional discussion Russia’s responses in countering extremism, see Cross, “Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Social Media.”

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 183. Russian Federation Federal Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity, adopted by the State Duma 27 June 2002, approved by the Council of the Federation July 10, 2002. 184. Author’s interview with Ekaterina Stepanova, Moscow, June 26, 2012. 185. See Federal List of Extremist Materials, Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, www.minjust.ru. 186. See “Misuse of Anti-Extremism in June 2012,” SOVA Center for Information Analysis, July 10, 2012. 187. See Vladimir Putin Held an Expanded Security Council Meeting in the Kremlin to Discuss the Draft Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation through 2025, Security Council Meeting, The Kremlin, Moscow, November 20, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47045. For additional background on foundation for national perspectives on countering extremism and potential Russian collaboration with Western nations in addressing this violent extremism, see Cross, “US/NAT0-Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism.” 188. Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation through 2025. 189. Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russia Adopts Controversial Counter-terrorism Amendments,” Associated Press, June 24, 2016, and “Russia’s ‘Yarovaya Law’ Imposes Harsh New Restrictions on Religious Groups,” Reuters, August 9, 2016. 190. Vasilyeva, “Russia Adopts Controversial Counter-terrorism Amendments.” 191. See “Federation Council Approves Controversial Anti-Terrorism Laws,” Moscow Times, June 29, 2016, and “Russia Allows Rare Protest Against New Antiterrorism Laws,” New York Times, August 9, 2016. 192. “Russia Allows Rare Protest Against New Antiterrorism Laws.” 193. Statement by Kahar Barat, Lecturer in Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, Yale University, “Practicing Islam in Today’s China: Differing Realities for the Uighurs and the Hui,” Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred and Eighth Congress, Second Session, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, May 17, 2004. 194. Barat, “Practicing Islam in Today’s China.” 195. For additional background on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and ties to other international terrorist groups, see Beina Xu, “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 4, 2014, and Philip B. K. Potter, “Terrorism in China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2013), 71–6. 196. See Xu, “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).” 197. For a recent journalist’s report on circumstances in Xinjiang, see Carrie Gracie, “Xinjiang: Has China’s Crackdown on ‘Terrorism’ Worked?,” BBC News, January 2, 2015. 198. See, for summary background and analysis of recent terrorist incidents in China, Oliver Brauner and Katharina Seibel, “China’s International Counterterrorism Cooperation,” SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament, 2015; and Marc Julienne, Mortiz Rudolf, and Johannes Buckow, “The Terrorist Threat in China,” The Diplomat, May 26, 2015. 199. “Chinese Police Kill 18 in Raid on ‘Terror’ Camp,” Guardian, January 9, 2007. 200. “China Foils Attack on Passenger Plane,” Xinhua, March 9, 2008, and “Attempt to Crash Beijing-bound Plane Foiled,” China Daily, March 10, 2008.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 201. See “New Spasm of Violence in Western China as 11 Die in Wave of Bombings,” New York Times, August 10, 2008. 202. See “Old Suspicions Magnified Mistrust into Ethnic Riots in Urumqi,” Guardian, July 10, 2009, and “China Locks Down Western Province after Ethnic Riots Kill 140,” Guardian, July 6, 2009. 203. See “Bomb Kills Seven in China’s Xinjiang Region,” Guardian, August 19, 2010; “Armed Men Attack Police Station in China’s Xinjiang Province, Killing Officers,” Washington Post, July 18, 2011; “Deadly Violence Strikes Chinese City Racked by Ethnic Tensions,” New York Times, July 31, 2011; “Chinese Plane in Xinjiang Hijack Attempt,” Telegraph, June 29, 2012; and “Chinese Passengers, Crew Thwart Attempted Plane Hijacking,” abcnews, June 29, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/ 2012/06/chinese-passengers-crew-thwart-attempted-plane-hijacking/. 204. See “27 Die in Rioting in Western China,” New York Times, June 26, 2013. 205. “Five Arrested in Tiananmen Square Incident, Deemed Terrorist Attack,” CNN, October 30, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/asia/china— tiananmen—arrests; “Tiananmen Square Crash: Five Held over ‘Terrorist’ Incident,” Guardian, October 30, 2013; and “Xinjiang Steps Up Fight against Religious Extremists in China,” Guardian, January 17, 2014. 206. “At Least 28 Dead, 113 Injured in Kunming Railway Station Violence,” Xinhua, March 2, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/02/ c_126208696.htm, and “China Mass Stabbing: Deadly Knife Attack in Kunming,” BBC News, March 2, 2014. 207. See “Urumqi Attack Kills 31 in China’s Xinjiang Region,” BBC News, May 23, 2014. 208. “37 Civilians Killed, 13 Injured in Xinjiang Terror Attack,” Xinhua, August 3, 2014; “China’s Account of Bloodshed in Far West Is Disputed,” New York Times, July 29, 2014; and “Government Offices Attacked, Dozens Killed in Far-Western China,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2014. 209. See “Chief Imam at Kashgar mosque stabbed to death as violence surges in Xinjiang,” Guardian, July 31, 2014. 210. “Chief imam at Kashgar Mosque Stabbed to Death as Violence Surges in Xinjiang.” 211. See Jun Mai, “Mainland Officials Confirm Xinjiang Terrorist Attack that Reportedly Killed up to 50 People,” South China Morning Post, November 15, 2015. 212. See “US Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist Is Criticized,” New York Times, September 13, 2002. 213. “US Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist Is Criticized.” 214. “US Frees Last of Chinese Uighur Detainees from Guantanamo Bay,” New York Times, December 31, 2013, and “Uighur Men Held for 12 Years Leave Guantanamo Bay for Slovakia,” Guardian, December 31, 2013. 215. Elizabeth Economy, quoted in “Islamic Militant Threat in China Is Real, Not Just Propaganda,” Reuters, March 18, 2015. 216. See “China Angered over US Questioning ‘Anti-terrorism Campaign’ in Muslimmajority Xinjiang,” abcnews, June 3, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/201606-03/china-angered-by-questioning-of-xinjiang-anti-terrorism-campaign/7476798. 217. Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, 4, no. 2 (2006), 22–3.

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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics 218. Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” 22. 219. Philip B. K. Potter quoted in Heather Timmons, “China’s Bloody Train Station Attack Shows How Terrorism Is Spreading Out of Xinjiang,” Quartz, March 3, 2014. 220. “Xi Calls for Xinjiang Ethnic Unity, Tolerance,” Xinhua, May 29, 2014. 221. “Xi Calls for Xinjiang Ethnic Unity, Tolerance.” 222. Xi Jinping, quoted in “The Alarming Rhetoric of China’s War on Terror,” Washington Post, May 30, 2014. 223. “The Alarming Rhetoric of China’s War on Terror.” 224. Also, see “The Alarming Rhetoric of China’s War on Terror.” 225. “President Xi Vows Intense Pressure on Terrorism,” Xinhua, April 27, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-04/27/content_32237203.htm. 226. See “China Adopts First Anti-Terror Law in History,” Sputnik, December 27, 2015; “China Passes Controversial Counter-terrorism Law,” Reuters, December 28, 2015; and Cui Jia, “New Anti-terror Security Guidelines Made Public,” China Daily, December 14, 2015. 227. “China Passes Controversial Counter-terrorism Law,” Reuters, December 28, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228. 228. See “Chinese Army Allowed to Carry Out Anti-Terror Operations Abroad,” Sputnik, December 28, 2015. 229. “China, Djibouti Negotiate over Military Base,” Xinhua, November 27, 2015, and “China Military to Set Up First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa,” Financial Times, March 31, 2016. 230. Shen Dingli, quoted in “China Retools Its Military With a First Overseas Outpost in Djibouti,” New York Times, November 26, 2015. 231. See, for example, Julia Famularo, “Do China’s New Terrorism Laws Go Too Far?” National Interest, July 26, 2016, and “China’s First Counter-terror Law and its Implications for Tibet,” International Campaign for Tibet, January 7, 2016, https://www.savetibet.org/chinas-first-counter-terror-law-and-its-implicationsfor-tibet/. 232. “IDC 2016: China Expresses Willingness fo Work with Other Countries to Combat Extremism,” New Straits Times, January 25, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/ news/2016/01/123919/idc-2016-china-expresses-willingness-work-other-countriescombat-extremism. 233. Martin I. Wayne, “Inside China’s War on Terrorism,” Journal of Contemporary China, 18, no. 59 (2009). 234. Wayne, “Inside China’s War on Terrorism,” 261. 235. See Jacob Zenn, “China Claims Uyghurs Trained in Syria,” Asia Times, July 15, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-01-150713.html. 236. Quoted in Cui Jia, “New Anti-terror Security Guidelines Made Public.” 237. Ruan Zongze, “Introduction,” CIIS Blue Book on International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs, China Institute of International Studies, 2015. 238. See Justine Drennan, “Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?,” Foreign Policy, February 9, 2015.

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Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges 239. Dru Gladney quoted in Drennan, “Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?.” Also, see Dru C. Gladney, “China’s ‘Uyghur Problem’ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” paper prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearings, Washington DC, August 3, 2006. 240. See Michael Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Turkish Connection,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 14, no. 3, February 4, 2016; Bethany AllenEbrahimian, “Report: More than 100 Chinese Muslims Have Joined the Islamic State,” Foreign Policy, July 20, 2016; Oliver Brauner and Daha Park, “Noninterference Limits China’s Role in the Fight against Islamic State,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 27, 2015; “China’s Proxy War in Syria: Revealing the Role of Uighur Fighters,” Al Arabiya, March 2, 2016; Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Middle East Policy: The ISIS Factor,” Middle East Policy Council, 23, no. 1 (2016); David Volodzko, “China’s New Headache: Uyghur Militants in Syria,” The Diplomat, March 8, 2016; Zenn, “China claims Uyghurs trained in Syria,”; Uran Botobekov, “China’s Nightmare: Xinjiang Jihadists Go Global,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2016. 241. “ISIS Extends Recruitment Efforts to China with New Chant,” New York Times, December 8, 2015; “Over 100 Chinese Fighters Have Joined Islamic State in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2016. 242. “Islamic State Executes Three of its Chinese Militants: China Paper,” Reuters, February 5, 2015. 243. “Islamic State Executes Three of its Chinese Militants.” 244. See “ISIS Dabiq Magazine Shows ‘Execution Photos’ of Hostages Ole Johan Grimsgaard and Fan Jinghui,” International Business Times, November 18, 2015, and “Islamic State Says It Killed 2 Captives and Used Bomb to Down Russian Jet,” Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2015. 245. Li Wei, quoted in “China Says It Faces Extremism, Too.” 246. See Michael Clarke, “China’s Instrumentalization of Terrorism,” Open Democracy, August 3, 2016. 247. See Gracie, “Xinjiang: Has China’s Crackdown on ‘Terrorism’ Worked?.” 248. Cited in Botobekov, “China’s Nightmare,” and Michael Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Turkish Connection,” Terrorism Monitor, 14, no. 3, February 4, 2016. 249. “Turkey Attacks China ‘Genocide,’ ” BBC News, July 10, 2009, and see “Erdogan Visits Xinjiang,” The Diplomat, April 14, 2012. 250. See Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Turkish Connection.” 251. See Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria: The Turkish Connection.” 252. See Volodzko, “China’s New Headache: Uyghur Militants in Syria,” and “China Arrests 10 Turkish Nationals on Suspicion of Aiding Terror Suspects,” Guardian, January 14, 2015. 253. See Clarke, “Uyghur Militants in Syria,” and “China Arrests 10 Turkish Nationals on Suspicion of Aiding Terror Suspects.” 254. “UN: Leaders’ Summit to Counter ISIL and Violent Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 29, 2015, and “FSB Director Heads Russia’s Delegation at US Summit on Extremism,” Reuters, February 18, 2015.

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Conclusion The Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership Implications for Contemporary World Order and Geopolitics

The findings of the preceding chapters coalesce around four major themes. The first is that there is a considerable coincidence of interests between Russia and China that enhances their relationship. One such coincidence is the primacy each state places on security, and the belief that external and internal threats are closely linked. This is accompanied by cooperation between China and Russia to buttress their mutual security. At a global level, the two sides again committed to work together to enhance strategic stability at the June 2016 summit.1 Closer to home, a safe mutual border enabling reduced defense expenditures provided initial impetus for the relationship even before the fall of the Soviet Union, while Russian arms sales to China and joint military exercises further strengthen security ties today. Similarly, cooperative operations between internal security forces, both bilaterally and in conjunction with the SCO, are designed to hone skills against terrorists or other groups that may threaten the governments in Moscow or Beijing. This points to establishing the legitimacy of authoritarianism as another major area of shared interest. China and Russia strongly oppose interventions by NGOs or Western governments to promote “colored revolutions” or democratization because of the instabilities they create, and the fear that conflict abroad can catalyze unrest at home. Both nations, above all, are motivated by the desire to safeguard the security of the strong state. Opposition to democratization is further motivated by the desire to protect their own regimes and the interests of the ruling elite from popular movements that might lead to unstable and unpredictable circumstances or “chaos.” Thus, the two states frequently emphasize the centrality of sovereignty, meaning that outside powers should not interfere in a state’s form of government. As Russia, China, and other powers rise relative to the West, the West will have less

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flexibility to promote democracy and humanitarian objectives.2 Authoritarianism also plays a role in the warmth displayed between China and Russia, in that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping enhance ties with their close personal bond. Moreover, because the relationship is determined largely in a topdown manner, linkages tend to be state-oriented and directed. Therefore, political ties are closer than economic linkages, and the economic exchanges that do occur tend to be between state-owned firms or companies associated with the leadership. Another arena of joint interests between China and Russia comprises varying degrees of dissatisfaction with elements of the liberal world order. For the West, the rules of the order are essential. China and Russia want to alter those aspects of the order that they perceive as unjust or contrary to their interests, and the existing rules make these difficult to change. Therefore, Russia has shown a willingness to unapologetically violate the rules of the international order in its annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine. China has disregarded the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea tribunal in The Hague, although the extent of its willingness to go further and perhaps use force is still to be determined. In the same vein, both Russia and China strive to bring about a more multipolar world where their interests are given stronger consideration. Rising populism and political turmoil in the West, including Brexit, contentious disagreements over immigration and cultural identity, and the lingering effects of the Greek crisis, as well as polarization in the United States over both domestic and foreign policies, all provide Russia and China with an advantage in their efforts to reshape the world order. A second theme of this book is that these two major powers, separately but even more so working together, will be critical for shaping the future international order. Their bilateral relationship has significant potential for molding the global foreign policy agenda and meeting non-state threats. China and Russia will serve as a counterbalance to European and American preferences when they choose to do so, but their cooperation with the West will also be critical for addressing increasingly transnational security challenges of the twenty-first century that require concerted, collaborative action. Russia and China are shaping the global balance of power, global rules and legitimacy, world institutions, and economic relationships. Neither Russia nor China has the global reach or influence of the United States. However, their military strength, size, geographic locations, and economic capabilities enable them to jointly alter the balance of power. China and Russia are augmenting the capabilities of their militaries at a rapid pace. Arms sales from Russia to China have significantly raised the quality of PLA weapons systems and the PLA’s combat capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, and joint exercises between the Russian military and the PLA have honed operational skills, particularly at sea. Moreover, naval maneuvers in the 291

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Mediterranean have demonstrated the ability to project power into NATO’s backyard. In Central Asia, Russia and China work together to limit US influence and prevent color revolutions, while China’s OBOR project has the potential to reshape Eurasia economically and further increase China’s political influence. Farther afield in Syria, China and Russia share support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad, although Moscow has taken a much more active role in challenging the West. While both China and Russia oppose North Korea’s efforts to expand its nuclear arsenal, they also share the view that the United States and South Korea have overreacted. They firmly assert that the scheduled deployment of American THAAD missile defenses in South Korea is destabilizing and a threat to their own security. Russia expressed strong opposition to the activation of NATO missile defense assets in Romania in 2016, vowing to undertake measures to counter the threat. Indeed, Russia and China view all US efforts at missile defense as provocative, with Xi and Putin commenting at their June 2016 summit that Western missile defenses “severely infringe upon the strategic security interests” of other states.3 In the realm of rules and legitimacy, Russia violated international norms by annexing Crimea. Due to its perception that the conflict in Ukraine was largely provoked by Western interference, China remained neutral. In the dispute over the South China Sea islands, China has rejected the findings of an international tribunal. Russia agreed with China that the tribunal in The Hague was not the appropriate venue to resolve territorial disputes, and later conducted joint naval exercises with China in the South China Sea. Russia and China have united in strongly resisting international efforts at democratization, regime transformation, or provoking colored revolutions, sharing the position that authoritarian regimes have full international legitimacy.4 China and Russia are working to shape international standards on freedom of expression in cyberspace by urging greater UN control over the Internet and engaging in censorship to privilege state stability over free expression. While Russia, China, and the West struggle against terrorists who use violence to attempt to reshape the international order, China and Russia define terrorism and extremism more broadly to include all who might pose the threat of undermining the existing government. Russia and China have collaborated in challenging Western democratic influence within existing international institutional structures, and have established parallel structures potentially rivaling or providing alternative regional and global bodies. Russia and China advocate for a stronger role for the UN, especially the Security Council, which acts as a concert of powers and gives Russia and China a seat at the table for major decisions on international security. Moscow and Beijing cooperated in establishing the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa, believing that countries outside the West should have a more prominent role in setting the 292

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international agenda. China and Russia jointly established the SCO as a vehicle for cooperation on Central Asian issues, although Russia favors the CSTO since it has more influence there. Presidents of the Russian Federation have consistently expressed opposition to the enlargement of the NATO Alliance, and Moscow has periodically called for the need to develop alternatives to the existing European institutional security configuration. China and Russia also advocate a new Asian security architecture that would supplant US treaty relationships in the region and place more responsibility for Asian security in the hands of Asian states. China created the AIIB to fund development projects, which was initially opposed by the United States as being likely to reduce lending standards and act as a competitor to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. While Russia was originally hesitant, it eventually joined the bank as a founding member. Xi’s ambitious OBOR could ultimately reshape the Eurasian economic landscape. While Russia initially had concerns that OBOR would further increase China’s influence in Central Asia at Russia’s expense, it agreed with China to promote cooperation between the EEU, Putin’s favored integration project, and OBOR. This will potentially provide economic benefits to Russia and other members of the EEU. The Sino–Russian partnership has done least to reshape world order in the economic sphere. Both sides want deeper bilateral economic cooperation. It is true that oil sales from Russia to China are increasing, displacing sales that would otherwise have been made by Middle Eastern states, and oil pipelines connecting the two have enhanced energy security for both countries. However, gas pipelines have been agreed but not completed. While China and Russia endeavor to reduce the role of the dollar in international finance by conducting more trade among themselves using their own currencies, the dollar still dominates Sino–Russian trade due to its stability. The 2016 trade volume did not meet the target set by the governments, and trade is hampered by structural factors. Chinese investment in Russia is increasing as Moscow removes barriers, but it is starting from a low base. There is optimism that OBOR may help stimulate economic ties, but it remains to be seen if existing barriers can be overcome through political will. A third theme is that relationships with Western nations, the United States in particular, remain important for China and Russia. Both seek better relations with the West, but on the basis of “mutual respect” and “equality” and on their own terms. While Russia’s economy has been impacted by Western sanctions, the EU was still Russia’s largest trade partner as of 2016.5 The EU is also China’s largest trading partner.6 The United States is China’s largest state trading partner and second-largest total trade partner after the EU, while in 2016 the United States was Russia’s fifth-largest state partner.7 However, political ties are more important than economic linkages. Russia and China recognize that the major international issues they face, including 293

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territorial disputes, economic growth, establishing greater influence in existing international institutions, and managing a host of common transnational security challenges, all require the active cooperation or at least acquiescence of the United States. Moreover, dealing with the United States grants political prestige and recognition of great power status. For instance, the US–Russia deal on a Syrian ceasefire, even when broken, confirms Russian status as an important player in the Middle East. China and Russia want a cooperative relationship with the United States in order to protect significant interests and advance priority objectives. Although both Russian and Chinese officials and the public find much to criticize with respect to the United States and the West, there are still aspects of Western culture and society that hold a certain appeal for Russian and Chinese citizens. The fourth major theme of this volume is that Russia and China have a burgeoning comprehensive partnership, but they are not allies. A formal alliance would violate China’s commitment to “A New Type of Great Power Relations” and create further conflict with the United States. Moreover, the Chinese–Soviet alliance of the 1950s did not prevent a disintegration of relations that nearly led to war. Nevertheless, particularly since 2014, there has been significant momentum in Chinese–Russian ties. While there are still obstacles in the relationship, it appears the political will exists to compromise on difficult issues, particularly on the part of Russia. This suggests that Beijing and Moscow may be able to achieve a deeper level of cooperation in the future, not even to exclude a full-scale alliance relationship from within the realm of possibilities. The scope and level of future ties will depend, perhaps to a significant extent, on how much political pressure the United States exerts on China and Russia over various issues of disagreement. One danger for both China and Russia in their partnership is that one country might be drawn into the conflicts of the other in a way that is contrary to its interests. Both sides try to avoid this, which is a major reason for the fact that the partnership has not evolved into an alliance. For example, China is unwilling to become entangled in Russia’s face-off with NATO. There would certainly be considerable risks and potential costs involved for Russia in becoming involved in China’s disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan, though this should not be entirely ruled out, particularly in the current circumstances of tension with the West, as a means of distracting and diverting the United States and its allies. Russia might also be vulnerable due to its weapons sales to China, and the ensuing Chinese expectations created by such sales that Russia would provide material support in case of war. China faces a similar danger, in that its partnership with Russia could lead states to identify China with Russian policies that alienate the West. China is more focused on its economy than Russia, and hence more cautious in its foreign policy. Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at China’s 294

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Renmin University, emphasizes that China handles its border disputes differently than Russia and has no desire to confront the West. In fact, Wang asserts, “The West, not Russia, represents the future for most Chinese.”8 Of course, a danger for the United States would be simultaneous conflicts in Asia and Europe involving China and Russia, whether or not China and Russia acted in concert. Such a scenario would spread American resources very thin. This book has identified a complex range of issues that pull China and Russia closer together, and also those factors that generate tension in the bilateral relationship. One critical issue is identity. Both countries see themselves as having a proud history and deep traditions unique to their respective cultures and experiences. As such, they demand recognition, respect, and influence. They also conceive of themselves as defenders of state sovereignty who should not be pressured on internal issues by outside forces. However, China and Russia also have very different cultures. Russia is closer culturally to Europe, and there is little societal integration between China and Russia. In addition, Russia is no longer influenced by ideology (apart from nationalism), while General Secretary Xi is striving to re-emphasize Marxist elements in China. At the same time, Russia’s sense of civilizational identity is defined as separate from the West, and the desire to establish an independent pillar of influence in the world community has only intensified due to strains in relationships with the United States and its democratic allies in Europe, particularly as a consequence of the East–West conflict besieging Ukraine. In spite of the deepening Sino–Russian partnership and collaboration in Eurasia, Central Asia still remains a region of potential competition and tension for Beijing and Moscow. The legacy of the Soviet empire established longstanding relationships among Russia and the nations of Central Asia, and Moscow continues to carry a sense of entitlement in the region. Indeed, Russia has troops stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, China is rapidly building economic influence in Central Asia through investments, trade, and energy cooperation, and has even created a new security arrangement with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan to fight terrorism. So far, Russia and China have avoided overt conflict over competing interests in the region. The SCO has provided a forum for the two sides to negotiate and manage Central Asian issues, and both countries are united in opposing greater American involvement in the region. It is uncertain if Russia and China can maintain their cooperative stance toward Central Asia or if frictions will result in stronger rivalry. With respect to other regional issues, China and Russia reached an understanding on Ukraine, and regarding the South China Sea, Russia has given diplomatic support to China’s position that sovereignty issues should not be determined by an UNCLOS tribunal. It also held naval exercises with China in the South China Sea in September 2016. However, Russia did not give strong 295

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dissent to the court ruling. Moreover, Moscow maintains close ties with Hanoi and has sold Vietnam advanced weapons that can target China. Beyond the immediate regions of Eurasia and Asia, Russia and China have voted together in the UN on several issues and have taken common positions on conflicts in Syria, the wider Middle East, and beyond. While the priorities, interests, and level of engagement on the part of Russia and China may differ in any given regional conflict setting, they have frequently stood together in challenging Western democratic assessments and strategies in responding to these conflict situations. On non-state issues, such as the rules and organization of cyberspace and the battle against terrorism, Russia and China are in broad agreement. While China censors the Internet more heavily than Russia, both states assert that governance of the Internet should be shifted to the UN and that states ultimately have sovereignty over the ideas that cross borders and the right to block information that could potentially undermine their governments. The shared perspectives of China and Russia on defining terrorism and extremism, and the escalating threats from the global jihadist networks, including Islamic State and others, to the interests and security of both nations, are likely to only create additional incentives for deepening cooperation in this area. In the economic field, both governments seek agreements that will bind the Russian and Chinese economies closer together. However, trade has been slower to develop than was hoped, and investments are increasing from a quite small base. Russia has shown greater willingness than in the past to have China invest in upstream energy activities, but negotiations over specific projects have taken time. More robust linkages have been delayed by disagreements over the distribution of gains. For example, before 2014, when natural gas prices were high, Russia and China could not come to agreement on building gas pipelines due to an inability to settle on a fair price for gas. In 2014, when Russia was eager to show it had other partners after the West imposed sanctions, China and Russia did sign a contract for building the Power of Siberia pipeline. Nevertheless, by that time low gas prices made pipeline construction more difficult. Moreover, even with new political will to increase trade and investments, structural impediments will require time to overcome. In the military arena, Russia continues to negotiate the sale of advanced weapons to China. The two countries engage in exercises under the sponsorship of the SCO, as well as bilateral naval exercises and cooperation in space. As a result, there is enhanced trust between the Russian military and the PLA. Nevertheless, militaries look at capabilities as well as intentions. From this perspective, the PLA is larger than the Russian military, outspends the Russian military, and has quickly gained ground in technology and the quality of weapons. Before 2014, there was discussion in Russia of a potential China 296

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threat, amplified by concerns that someday China would repudiate the nineteenth-century unequal treaties that ceded more than 300,000 square miles in the eastern border sector. Moreover, the RFE is underpopulated and underdeveloped. While concerns have not been publicly voiced since 2014, they cannot have disappeared completely. Finally, the long-term power dynamics between the two sides must be taken into account. While China’s economy is gradually slowing and will not return to the higher growth rates of the past, it still outperforms Russia’s economy, which remains too dependent on hydrocarbons. Moreover, Russia’s annexation of Crimea undermined Russia’s strategic flexibility. Russia’s interests are best served if it can balance between China and the West. As of now, the strains in Russia’s relationship with the United States and Europe have jeopardized the geostrategic advantage of the unique position that Moscow holds straddled between the West and East—both in Europe and Asia. Russia’s complaint with the West is that it is not treated with the respect it deserves. It is unclear what can prevent Russia from becoming a junior partner of China, in spite of protests that this will never happen. Carnegie analyst Alexander Gabuev describes “Russia’s growing dependency on China,” and suggests that in the future it is likely that “Russian political and economic elites will become more responsive to Chinese demands.”9 The Sino–Russian relationship creates challenges for the United States and Europe, but at the same time it cannot be denied that friendly ties between China and Russia also hold the potential to contribute to global stability. Fierce ideological disputes and the threat of war between these two giants in the late 1960s and early 1970s constituted a grave threat to world peace. Chinese and Russian development of Russian energy fields enhances energy security for all states in a global market. Russian and Chinese efforts to develop Eurasia may help lift the living standards of millions of people and create a more tightly linked economy from Vladivostok to Lisbon. Nevertheless, it is difficult for the West to adjust to a shifting balance of power, and particularly to what the United States and its democratic allies view as challenges to a rules-based order. The strategic relationship between China, Russia, and the United States forms a complex triangle. Beijing and Moscow are politically closest, while Washington and Moscow are most distant—what Fu Ying, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, describes as a scalene triangle.10 However, the political foundation for the US–China bilateral relationship was not formed on a basis of shared political values, and therefore lacks the same affinity and stability that characterizes US relationships with democratic countries. Washington’s relationship with Beijing is marked by growing strategic distrust, inevitably tied to what is often called “the Thucydides dilemma.” Nevertheless, as Beijing University’s Wang Jisi points out, both 297

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sides have managed their differences so as to avoid tensions escalating to a breaking point. Wang notes the “new normal” is characterized by a mix of cooperation, competition, and a relationship that is increasingly impacted by domestic politics in both countries.11 China also has close economic ties to the United States that cannot be matched by Russia. Washington’s problems with Russia are quite different. Russia’s tensions with the United States stem from perceptions that Washington took full advantage of Russia’s diminished global status in the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet empire, and the continued lack of willingness on the part of the United States to deal with Russia as an equal partner. Washington sees Moscow as turning away from the hopeful path of democratization it embarked on after the Cold War. As in the case of China, the lack of trust in Russia’s relationship with the United States and other Western democratic nations will continue to present a barrier to fostering cooperation even in areas where there are clear shared interests. From a structural perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to avoid having China and Russia move further from Washington. A model similar to Henry A. Kissinger’s so-called “strategic triangle” featuring a three-nation major power focus deftly managing the interests among the United States, China, and Russia to maintain equilibrium and stability might still prove instructive in some respects for developing the optimal approach in the contemporary period. Balancing this tripartite relationship will require sophisticated diplomacy as long as Washington desires to maintain the current liberal order. It is important to recognize, however, that much has changed in China’s relationship with the Kremlin since President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger opened ties with Beijing in 1972 as a means of attempting to counter Soviet influence, and the circumstances among these three powers are quite different today than in the initial period of the 1990s following the collapse of the USSR. Given the acceleration of ties between China and Russia and the strengthening of the Sino–Russian bond particularly since 2014, Washington should not expect to be able to maneuver Moscow and Beijing in ways that would jeopardize the burgeoning strategic partnership between these two authoritarian world powers. Beijing and Moscow have moved increasingly toward authoritarian convergence largely based on common perceptions of threats to state security linked to the international arena, and both countries share similar preferences for world order in placing a primacy on respect for sovereignty and non-interference from the outside. There is too much at stake for China and Russia in the contemporary and evolving geopolitical order, and it would be unrealistic at this juncture to anticipate that Washington could succeed at significantly disrupting the Sino–Russian partnership by attempting to move dramatically closer to either Moscow or Beijing or to place a wedge between these two powers. 298

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Also, because China and Russia are critical for the future security of the global community, Washington would be ill-advised to engage in initiatives that push China and Russia to consistently counterbalance against US preferences. Policies that rhetorically claim to contain China or Russia would be counterproductive to the US vision of world order. Instead, the United States should seek to skillfully balance cooperation and competition with each country in ways that serve its interests. For example, while the United States maintains pressure on Russia over its violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, it must also consider encouraging its Asian allies to invest in the RFE to prevent Chinese economic domination there. Promoting closer ties between Russia and Japan would foster an environment in which Russia depended less on China. Similarly, giving China responsibility in global economic institutions commensurate with its economic heft would ease the sense of injustice felt by China. Increased cooperation against terrorism would be welcomed by both China and Russia. Perhaps a new American administration could boldly propose a security dialogue among the United States, China, and Russia underscoring the importance of constructive cooperation among these three major powers for national and global security and for contributing to responding effectively in addressing the most critical security challenges facing humanity in the twenty-first century.12 The United States might be best served in seeking to manage security and economic collaboration in the major power triangular relationship with China and Russia on a pragmatic basis by identifying shared critical interests, while at the same time making clear where differences exist with respect to national interests and values. In confronting the contemporary global environment, the West encounters two broad types of issues. The first consists of state-to-state challenges, the ensuing balance of power, and conflict over the international order. These are the types of problem that states have always faced. The second, and arguably growing, challenge is the conflict between states and the forces of chaos, or non-state terrorist or criminal networks. For the West, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia bring a return to major power rivalry. It is certainly true that Western interactions with China have enriched the West economically and culturally, and China’s integration into the global economy and subsequent economic growth have lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and connected its citizens with the world. However, with Russian-supplied arms and some degree of diplomatic support, China’s efforts to push its claims within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea and its challenge to Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have raised fears of possible war between the United States and China for the first time in decades.13 The United States, while having no stake in the island claims, sees freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and its alliance with Japan as 299

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vital interests. Within Europe, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, at least tolerated by China, was seen in the West as violating fundamental norms that many Europeans had hoped would never be broken again, at the same time that Russia feels a deep sense of mistrust of the West for infringing on what Russia sees as its sphere of influence and threatening Russian security. With continued Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and little chance of a compromise on Crimea, the path to returning to a normalized state of relations between Russia and the United States and its democratic allies in Europe is likely to be quite difficult. Moreover, it is still uncertain how fundamentally China and Russia hope to change the international order. As Suisheng Zhao argues: [A]lthough China is not a simple rule-taker content to preserve the existing order, it is not yet a revolutionary power discontent with and willing to undermine the existing order. Not only is China far from the position to overtake US power, it has not articulated distinctive values to underwrite the world order.14

The US and China cooperate on a wide variety of issues, but there are important questions about how China will act in those areas where it is dissatisfied. Will China use force to push its territorial claims? How long will it be patient over Taiwan? How would China react to the collapse of North Korea’s regime? Russia’s assertiveness in using military force to redraw boundaries or to allow frozen conflicts in its neighborhood to remain unresolved presents a direct threat to the existing liberal order and the established security norms and agreements. If accusations of Russian intervention in the 2016 US presidential elections are confirmed, this would constitute an unprecedented attempt to undermine the democratic process itself. Although the Russian leadership, particularly since Putin’s second term, has suggested that Western society is plagued by growing decadence and failure to uphold moral values and traditions, Russia currently offers no clearly defined alternative vision to the current order. The West must seek to enforce a rules-based order, accommodate Russia’s and China’s legitimate security interests, and avoid pressuring Russia and China into an alliance that would create a strong counterweight to the United States and perhaps lead to a new Cold War. Equally daunting is dealing with the ideological challenge posed by Russia and China. Elements of Russian and Chinese concerns about regime change and color revolution are legitimate. The West has worthy aspirations in promoting democracy and freedom, but the reality is that these efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere often have led to violence and chaos. At the same time, placing the highest priority on stability when accompanied by repression does not provide for long-term sustainable forms of political participation, rule of law, or justice, and tends to lead to future violence. The West errs in one 300

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direction, while China and Russia err in the other. New forms of cooperation are necessary to deal with the challenges of unstable and unjust regimes. The stability and security of the international community will to a large extent depend on the capacity of Western democratic nations to work with Russia and China in managing the threats posed by non-state actors and shared non-traditional security challenges that transcend borders. In spite of differences over definitions of terrorism and violent extremism, there is room for greater cooperation among China, Russia, and the United States and its democratic allies in preventing further successes by terrorist groups. Moreover, although there are disagreements over Internet governance, all sides have an interest in limiting terrorist recruitment and indoctrination online and preventing terrorists and criminals from utilizing the Internet to organize and orchestrate acts of terrorism, violence, and other illegal activity. Enlisting the cooperation of both China and Russia to work with the United States and its democratic allies will be critical for effectively managing a host of nontraditional security issues such as environmental challenges and problems related to climate change, displacement and migration, and much more. Looking ahead, the world is in a period of dramatic transition. A range of unknowns that may develop in this dynamic security environment can exert significant influence on the future development of the Sino–Russian bilateral relationship and the importance of this strategic partnership in the evolving geopolitical equation. Politics in the West are roiled by domestic political movements unanticipated just a few years ago that reflect a democratic reaction to the inequalities and dislocations wrought by globalization. The European and Asian security environments suffer from territorial disputes, while the Middle East is beset by war. In this context, the Sino–Russian relationship has momentum. However, the future of even this relationship is still uncertain. Armed conflict between NATO and Russia in Europe or shots fired between the US Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy could draw Russia and China closer together. Nationalism that escapes government limits, as well as the perception of unequal gains that arise from the partnership, could drive the two further apart. Russians might fear that China could come to a G-2 type accommodation with the United States that would entail a US–Chinese partnership to manage world affairs and leave Russia marginalized, but it seems more likely that Beijing will aim to carefully manage relationships with both Washington and Moscow without sacrificing shared interests or advantages with either power. A further possibility is that another catastrophic terrorist attack on the scale of September 11 could change priorities everywhere and bring China, Russia, and the West closer together in cooperation. No matter the outcome, the nature of the Chinese–Russian relationship will continue to fundamentally shape world order. 301

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Notes 1. “China, Russia Sign Joint Statement on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability,” Xinhua, June 26, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/26/c_135466187. htm. 2. See Rob de Wijk, Power Politics (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 185–7. 3. Chun Han Wong and Olga Razumovskaya, “Chinese, Russian Presidents Criticize West for Weakening Global ‘Strategic Stability,’ ” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-russian-presidents-criticize-west-for-weakeningglobal-strategic-stability-1466958253. 4. For an argument by a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University that China is not ready to lead in the world because it does not accept democracy and the rule of law, see Liang Xiaojun, “China Is Destined to Lead, but not Ready,” East Asia Forum, September 13, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/13/china-isdestined-to-lead-but-not-ready/. 5. European Commission, “Trade, Countries and Regions, Russia,” http://ec.europa. eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/. 6. European Commission, “Trade, Countries and Regions, China,” http://ec.europa. eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/. 7. Calculated from the UN Comtrade Database, http://comtrade.un.org/data. 8. Wang Yiwei, “Economic Interests Attract China to Russia, Not Edgy Politics,” YaleGlobal Online, February 3, 2015, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/economic-interestsattract-china-russia-not-edgy-policies. 9. Alexander Gabuev, “Future Approaches to China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 7, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/07/futureapproaches-to-china-pub-63389. 10. Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2016), 104–5. 11. Wang Jisi, “China-US Relations Have Entered a ‘New Normal,’ ” China-US Focus, September 19, 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-relationshave-entered-a-new-normal/. 12. For a list of recommendations by Chinese and Russian scholars on how to improve trilateral relations, see Zhao Huasheng and Sergey Luzyanin, “Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2016 Model,” Russian International Affairs Council, July 7, 2016, 47–8, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/rossiysko-kitayskiy-dialogmodel-2016/. 13. See, for example, David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War With China: Thinking the Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016); and Michael Lofman and Andrey Sushentsov, “What Makes a Great Power War Possible,” Valdai Discussion Club Report, April 2016, http:// valdaiclub.com/files/10683/. 14. Suisheng Zhao, “China and the Evolving World Order: A Stakeholder or a Revolutionary Power?,” Asan Forum, June 22, 2016, http://www.theasanforum.org/chinaand-the-evolving-world-order-a-stakeholder-or-a-revolutionary-power/.

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Index

‘9/11’ terrorist attacks 258, 267 Abdul Haq 267 Abe, Shinzo 46–7 Abromavicius, Aivaras 174 al-Adnani, Abu Muhammad 181–2, 248, 259 Afghanistan 48 anti-terrorist alliance with China 256–7 Agreement on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in Border Areas 1997 117 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Mutual Reduction of Military Forces and Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Area of the Soviet–China Border 1990 117 Ahtisaari, Martti 183–4 Aigun, Treaty of (1858) 6 Aksakov, Konstantin 35 Antonov, Anatoly 224 Arab Spring 157, 178, 188, 220–1, 234, 253 Arbatov, Alexei 137, 165, 195 arms sales 117–22 aircraft 118 Chinese, overall 120 defense systems 119 mutual benefits 119–20 naval 118 obstacles/limitations 120–1 Russia to China 118, 119, 121, 296 Russia to other countries 121 Sino–Russian, proportion of both countries’ arms trade 118 ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) 16, 126, 127–8 Asian Development Bank 17 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 17–18, 156, 293 al-Assad, Bashar 178, 179–80, 187, 190, 198, 202 alleged human rights abuses 182–3 international debate on future 183–4, 187, 193–4, 200–1 moves to oust 197–8 authoritarianism 290–1

al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr 182, 188, 248, 272 Ban Ki-moon 196 Bangladesh, terrorist attacks in 248 Barinov, Igor 262 Bastrykin, Alexander 238–9 Batu Khan 5–6 Bekri, Nur 268–9 Berdyaev, Nikolai 27, 34–5 Beslan school hostage attack (Chechnya, 2004) 260 bin Laden, Osama 258, 264 Blank, Jonah 131 Bogdanov, Mikhail 195 Bordachev, Timofei 172 border, Sino–Russian agreements/treaties 6, 117 defensive measures 115–17 demilitarization 117 disputes 6–7, 43, 116 length 70 security concerns 3, 108–9 Bordyuzha, Nikolai, General 250, 284n151 Bortnikov, Alexander 273 Brennan, John 194 BRICS group 4, 17, 31–2, 292–3 counterterrorist initiatives 255 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 21 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances 1994 161 Bulgakov, Sergei 35 Barat, Kahar 263–4 Bush, George H. W. 4 Bush, George W. 220, 258 Buzhinsky, Evgeny, Lt. Gen. 40 Callahan, William 16, 22 Carter, Ash 162, 194–5 Central Asia Russian/Chinese involvement in 47–9, 87–8, 125, 172, 295 terrorism/counterterrorism 253–4, 256–7 Chang Wanquan 256 Chechnya 222 history of resistance to Russian rule 257–8

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Index Chechnya (cont.) Russian military interventions 258 terrorist attacks 257, 260 Chen Yue 225–6 Chiang Kai-shek 8 China antiquity of civilization 23 armed forces see People’s Liberation Army communist regime 24, 229 communist revolution (1949) 8 counterterrorist strategies 248–50, 268–74; international initiatives 256, 269–70; legislation 269 criticisms of foreign policy 20–2 cyber security policy 239–44; international initiatives 231–4, 244–7; legislation 242–3 foreign direct investment 19 international initiatives 16–20, 31–2 Internet access 232, 238, 240–1 Internet use 234–5 People’s Armed Police 252 place in world order vii, 3–5, 12–26, 153–4, 291–3 relations with West viii, 3, 293–4 response to Syrian crisis 186–90, 199–200 security concerns/policy 109–10, 216, 218, 231 (see also cyber security; security/ military cooperation) stance on Ukraine see under Crimea, Russian annexation state security, primacy of 216–17, 229 terrorist attacks on/in 248, 263, 265–6; Western reluctance to acknowledge 266–7 traditionalist outlook 24, 157–8 see also Chinese economy; Chinese energy sector; Communist Party of China; People’s Republic of China; Sino–Russian relationship China Development Bank 18, 19, 73 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 19 China’s Peaceful Development (White Paper) 14 Chinese Dream 15–16, 152 Chinese economy as alternative to Western models 158 compared to Russian 69, 297 downturn 68, 108, 131, 297 growth 2, 12–13, 22–3, 68, 139, 153–4, 157 Chinese energy sector 82–8 anti-corruption campaign 83–4, 108 challenges to 84–5 domestic production 84–5 foreign investments 86–8 imports 85–6 state control 82–3 strategic reserve 88 Chirkin, Vladimir Valentinovich, Lt. Gen. 134

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Churkin, Vitaly 161, 183–4, 197 Clinton, Hillary 221 Coalition-2003 (military exercise) 122 Cold War aftermath 154, 165 ending 3–4 (fears of) renewal 161, 163, 177, 300 space race 128 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 32, 131, 293 counterterrorist measures 250 colored revolutions 23, 217–29, 274, 292 alleged US instigation 217–18, 219–20, 227 Chinese responses 219–20, 221–2, 225–6, 227, 228 defined 217 media attacks on 219–20, 227 Russian/Chinese concerns over 157, 169 Russian responses 222–5, 227–8 see also under Georgia; Kyrgyzstan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan Communist Party of China (CCP) 229, 243 centenary celebrations (planned) 15–16 cyber security 241–2 links with energy sector 83 and national identity 24 Confucius Institutes 42 corruption in Chinese energy sector 83–4 in Ukraine 174 Crimea, Russian annexation (2014) 1, 25, 159–78, 202–3 aftermath 173–8 benefits for China 172–3 Chinese neutrality 2, 51, 168–73, 177–8, 204, 292, 295 declaration of independence preceding 160 economic consequences 31, 33 impact on relations in East 47, 50–1, 158–9, 170, 171–3, 231, 297 impact on relations with West viii, 12, 28, 30, 51, 79, 132–3, 158–9, 160–3, 178, 300 justifications 161–2, 166–8, 203–4 UN declaration of illegality 160–1 violation of international norms 161, 292, 300 currency swaps 70, 73–4 cyber security 19–20, 29, 217, 230–47 agreements with US 245–6 in China 114, 232, 239–44 global concerns 231–2, 246–7 joint Sino–Russian initiatives 231–4, 244–7, 274 national legislation 242–3 in Russia 112, 235–9 see also Internet Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC) 241–2

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Index Da Wei 156 Daalder, Ivo 182 Dagestan, terrorist attacks in 258, 259 Dalai Lama 270 Daly, Robert 151 Demidov, Oleg 231 democracy, models of consultative 229 sovereign 219 Deng Xiaoping 113 economic strategy 13–14, 68 foreign policy 13–14 Deng Yushan 221–2 Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The (White Paper) 14 Djibouti, Chinese naval base 189, 269–70 Donbass (region of Ukraine), conflict in 162, 182 casualties 173 (failed) ceasefire initiatives 163–4, 174–5, 176 Russian support for separatists 161, 173, 176–7 Dongbei (Chinese region), economic development projects 69, 93 Dreyer, June Teufel 13 Dugin, Alexander 35 Dunford, Joseph, General 194–5 Dvorkin, Vladimir 137 Dvorkovich, Arkady 95 Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 256–7, 264, 267 Economy, Elizabeth 267 energy trade viii, 67, 78–96 Agreement on Energy Cooperation (1996) 89 global context 78–9 imbalances 45, 79 proportion of total trade balance 74–5 role in Sino–Russian relationship 89–96 see also Chinese energy sector; gas; oil; pipelines, construction projects; Russian energy sector Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 185–6, 272 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 31, 67–8, 156 difficulty of integration with OBOR 76 Europe, Russian identification with 37, 40, 156 European Union extent of Russian integration 32–3 Export-Import Bank of China 18, 19, 73, 293 extremism, definition/countering 249, 254–5, 261–2, 270, 284n151 Fairbank, John King 13 Fan Jinghui 272 Fang Binxing 241–2, 244 Fang Fenghui, General 48, 256 Fenby, Jonathan 21

Feng Yujun 43 Fesenko, Volodymyr 176 Fishman, Brian 267 former Soviet republics Russian claim to privileged interest 153, 167–8 Russian interventions in 29–30 Russian plans for economic integration 31 Russian troops stationed in 131 see also colored revolutions; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine France, terrorist attacks on 189, 249 al-Freij, Fahd Jassem 199–200 Frost, Ellen 20–1 Fu Ying 42, 169, 194, 297 Fukuyama, Francis 3–4 G-7/G-8 33 expulsion of Russia 162 Gabuev, Alexander 2, 131, 297 Gaidar, Yegor 36 Galushka, Aleksandr 73 Gao Fei 169 Garver, John 132 gas Chinese imports 93–4 Chinese production 84–5 global market 79 price fluctuations 296 Russian production/export 80–1, 93–4 see also pipelines, construction projects Gazprom (energy company) 47, 81, 91–3, 94, 95, 105n115 Genghis Khan 5 Georgia Rose Revolution 218 war with Russia (2008) 12, 29, 111, 112, 164 Western intervention 26, 153 Gerasimov, Valery, General 112, 222–3, 236 Giles, Keir 112, 222 Gladney, Dru 271 Gorbachev, Mikhail 10–11, 22, 28, 33, 116 Great Firewall of China 232, 242 Great Leap Forward (1958) 10 great power(s) relations between 14–15, 131, 156 Russian/Chinese aspirations to status 151–3 Greece, financial crisis 291 Grishin, Alexey 260 Groysman, Volodymyr 174 Guan Youfei, Rear Admiral 199–200 Guo Shengkun 228 Hao Yubiao 94 Heath, Tim 121 Henderson, James 96

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Index history of Sino–Russian relations 5–12 postwar complexities 8 Soviet era 8–11, 116 treaties/territorial disputes 6–7 Hizb ut-Tahrir 252, 260 Hollande, François 163, 189, 249, 267 Hong Kong, protests at Beijing policies 226–7 Hong Lei 177 Hu Jintao 91–2, 220, 269 Hua Chunying 189 Hua Liming 200 Huang Ning 75, 99–100n38 Hui, Victoria 16 Hung, Ho-fung 21 Huntington, Samuel 4 Hussein, Saddam 178 al Hussein, Zeid Ra’ad 196 hybrid war 112–13, 161 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 17 India arms sales to 121 cooperation with China/Russia 12 hostilities with China 10 objections to Chinese policies 19 International Energy Agency 82 International Syria Support Group(ISSG) 193 Internet 19–20, 219 (alleged) US control 233, 238, 244–5 domain name registration 238–9 freedom of access 235–6, 243 international governance 232–3 restrictions on access 232, 236–9, 240–4 scale of use 230, 234–5 see also cyber security Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 233, 244–5, 247 investment, cross-border 72–3, 96 Iraq, US-led invasion (2003) 178–9 IS (Daesh) 179–80, 181–2, 188 scale of operations 247–8 shooting down of aircraft 196, 260 targeting of China/Chinese nationals 248, 271–2 targeting of Russia 248, 259–60 Isayev, Leonid 198 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 252 Jacques, Martin 21, 23 Japan current relationship with Russia 46–7 past hostilities with Russia 7 perceived as security threat 126 territorial claims 299–300 Jenkins, Brian 201 Jewish Autonomous Region (of RFE) 49, 76

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Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New World Order (1997) 5 joint military exercises viii, 1–2, 44, 108–9, 122–6, 133–4, 291–2, 296 counterterrorist 251–2 land-based 122–3 mutual benefits 139 naval 123–5, 295–6 objectives 122, 123, 125 scale 122–3 Kabulov, Zamir 256 Kamath, Kundapur Vaman 17 Kang, David 13 Karaganov, Sergei 164–5 Karimov, Islam 220 Kashin, Vasily 119, 120 Kashin, Vassily 75, 133 Kasyanov, Mikhail 38 Kazakhstan energy investments 87 military exercises in 122 Kazantsev, Andrey 253–4 Kennan, George F. 24 Kennedy, John F. 177 Kerry, John 194–5 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 81 Khoja, Khaled 190 Khomyakov, Aleksey 35 Khrushchev, Nikita 9–10 Kiakhta, Treaty of (1715) 6 Kim Jong-un 153 Kireeva, Anna 132, 136 Kireyevsky, Ivan 35 Kissinger, Henry 4, 298 Kofman, Michael 111, 173, 185 Konashenkov, Igor, Major General 193, 198 Korean peninsula, security threats 108 see also North Korea; South Korea Kortunov, Andrei 176 Kosach, Grigory 201 Kosovo 161, 164 Kots, Alexander 191 Kozylin, Vadim 201 Kozyrev, Andrei 11, 36 Kremenyuk, Viktor A. 40, 195 Krutskikh, Andrei 237 Kuchins, Andrew 36, 42 Kyrgyzstan 48–9, 123 Tulip Revolution (2005) 218, 219–20, 227 Lambeth, Ben 181, 185 Larin, Victor 46 Lavrov, Sergei 24–5, 34, 126, 127,166, 167–8, 196, 197, 223, 224, 226, 249 Lee, Rens 49, 130, 134

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index Li, Eric 21 Li Baodong 190 Li Hui 251 Li Jianmin 72 Li Jingyu 130 Li Keqiang 70, 251 Li Shouwei 269 Li Wei 272 Liao Yongyuan 83 Libya 188 Lindsay, Jon R. 240 Lipov, Andrei 237 Liu Mingfu 22 Liu Yuejin 270 Lo, Bobo 42 loans 73 Locklear, Samuel, Admiral 135 Lu Wei 241, 244 Lukin, Alexander 26, 30, 35, 37–8, 62n148, 75, 125, 132, 158 Lukin, Artyom 39, 49, 130, 134 Lukyanov, Fyodor 26, 33, 191, 195 Luttwak, Edward 22 Lynch, Allen 29 Lynch, Daniel 22 Ma Ping 130 McDermott, Roger 137, 225 Malofeyev, Konstantin 244–5 Manchuria historical disputes over 7 rule of Xinjiang 264 see also Dongbei, economic development projects Mankoff, Jeffrey 36, 39, 134 Mao Zedong 7 foreign policy 12–13 present-day followers 108 relations with Soviet Union 8, 9–10 Markoff, Michele 279n68 Mearsheimer, John 21–2 Medeiros, Evan S. 155 Medvedev, Dmitry 29, 45–6, 70, 154, 155, 165, 177, 219, 235, 261 Mei Jianming 271 Meidan, Michal 94–5 Meisels, A. Greer 11 Menon, Rajan 88 Merkel, Angela 163 MH17 passenger plane 162 Milov, Vladimir 121 Ming Jinwei 169 Minsk/Minsk II ceasefire initiatives 163–4, 174–5, 176 Mistura, Staffan de 210n95 Mitrova, Tatiana 96 Mongol Empire 5–6

Mongolia 7, 49 al-Moualem, Walid 190 Naryshkin, Sergey 179 Nathan, Andrew 10 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 291–2 clashes with Russia over Syria 185–6 condemnation of Russian activities 162–3 cooperation with Russia against terrorism 255–6 interventions in Eastern Europe 26, 39, 164, 292 objections to enlargement 156, 164, 293 relations with Russia 28, 39, 160, 163, 164, 293 Nemtsov, Boris 121 Nerchinsk, Treaty of (1689) 6 Netkachev, Yuriy, Lt. Gen. 191–2 New Development Bank (NDB) 17 New Type of Great Power Relations, A (Chinese doctrine) 14–15, 131, 156 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) perceived threat from 220 restrictive measures against 227–8 Ni Lexiong 250 Nicholas I of Russia 178 Nixon, Richard 298 non-interference, principle of 156–7, 168–9, 187, 219, 225 North Caucasus region establishment of caliphate 181–2 resistance to Russian rule 257–8 vulnerability to terrorism 258–9 North Korea 153, 300 nuclear weaponry/testing 126–7, 292 relations with China 131 Sino–Russian differences over 127 nuclear weapons Chinese capabilities 137–8 North Korean test 126–7 Russian capabilities vii, 27, 112, 115, 136–7, 153 threat of use 109, 110–11, 136–7 al Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) 179, 186, 188, 197, 201, 250, 271 Obama, Barack 14, 18, 127, 162–3, 170, 179, 180–1, 194, 246, 273 Obuchi, Keizo 46 Odgaard, Liselotte 15 oil Chinese production 84 global market 78–9 Russian production/export 69, 78, 96 Okunev, Igor 36

307

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index One Belt, One Road (OBOR) program 2, 18–19, 25–6, 31, 48, 67–8, 76–8, 154, 158, 274, 292, 293 coordination with EEU 156, 172 and Dongbei/RFE 77–8 Russian reservations 77, 172 threat of terrorism to 248–9, 257, 267–8 Opium Wars (1839–42/1856–60) 6, 12, 152 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 88 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 32, 163, 177, 255 Ottoman Empire 178 Ozerov, Viktor 263 Oznobishchev, Sergey 181 Paik, Keun-Wook 96 Pakistan anti-terrorist alliance with China 256 economic cooperation with China 19, 131 Pan Guang 188, 267 Patrushev, Nikolai 221, 231 Peace Mission exercises (2005–16) 122–3, 136, 139, 253 Peking, Treaty of (1860) 6 People’s Freedom Party (PARNAS) 38 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 9, 43–4, 231 cyber capacities 114, 243 modernization 113–14, 121 Navy/Air Force 114 organizational reforms 114–15 spending on 115 weaknesses 115 People’s Republic of China, foundation 15–16 Peter the Great 35–6 Petrovsky, Vladimir 125, 133 Philippines, claims in South China Sea 127 Pillsbury, Michael 22 pipelines, construction projects 1–2, 45, 87–8, 89–91, 296 delays in completion 78, 91–2, 96 negotiations over 67 police, cooperation between forces 123 political theory, schools of 5, 36–7 Poroschenko, Petro 163, 174 Potter, Philip B. K. 267 Primakov, Yevgeny 11–12, 35 Pukhov, Ruslan 192 Putin, Vladimir 18 anti-terrorist statements/measures 249, 251, 258, 259, 262–3 attitudes to West 154 centralist stance 36–7, 62n148 championing of traditional values 30, 158, 166 and colored revolutions 221, 223–4, 227–8 and cyber security 231, 235, 238, 239, 245

308

economic policy/initiatives 31, 40, 70, 71–2, 73, 156 election to Presidency 12, 27, 41 handling of energy sector 80–1, 89, 91–2 meetings with other Far Eastern leaders 47 and Middle Eastern situation 178–9, 181–2, 186, 190–1, 194, 195 on military security 134, 136 nationalist outlook 23–4, 27, 151 opposition to 121 popularity (at home/in China) 42–3, 51, 131, 151, 162, 228–9 relationship with Xi Jinping vii, 1, 41–3, 45, 151 on Russian place in world order 36–7, 38–9 on Sino–Russian relationship 131 and sovereign democracy 219 summits with Chinese leaders 70, 91–2 and Ukraine situation 161, 163–4, 166–7, 171, 202 visits to Beijing 1, 41–2, 171, 251 al-Qadan, Abu Muhammad 259 el-Qaddafi, Muammar 188 al-Qaeda 250, 258, 264 see also al Nusra Front Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) 6–7, 12, 43, 49 Qiu Huafei 75, 117–18, 122 Qu Xing 170 railways, planned construction 48–9, 73, 171 Rasulov, Yaseen (Makhach) 257–8 Ren Xiao 22 Rogachev, Ilya 255 Rogozin, Dmitri 166 Rojansky, Matthew 151 Roscosmos (space agency) 129 Rosneft (energy company) 81, 90, 91, 94, 96, 105n115 Rozman, Gilbert 51–2 Ruan Zongze 271 Russia anti-permissive attitudes 30 counterterrorist strategy 248–50, 257–63; legislation 260–1, 262–3; organizations 261 cyber security policy 235–9, 243; international initiatives 231–4, 244–7 elections (2011–12) 221 extremism, defined/outlawed 249, 261–2 Federal Security Service (FSB) 260–1 history of invasion 26 Information Security Doctrine 236, 239 internal political divisions 36–7, 38–9 international initiatives 31–2 Internet access 235–8

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index Internet use 234–5 interventions in neighboring states 29–30 (see also Crimea, Russian annexation; Syria; Ukraine) Muslim population 257–8 National Guard 251–2 national identity problem 34–5, 36–7, 295 National Security Strategy 131–2, 179, 216, 217–18, 230–1, 249 nationalism 23–4, 29–30, 152 (perceived) spheres of influence 29–30 place in world order vii, 3–5, 22–41, 291–3 protectiveness towards non-resident nationals 30, 167–8 relations with Asian states other than China 45–8 relations with EU/member states 32–3 relations with West viii, 3, 39–41, 293–4 security concerns 110–11 (see also cyber security; security/military cooperation) state security, primacy of 216–17, 229 terrorist attacks on/in 257, 258–60 traditionalist outlook 157–8, 300 see also Russian economy; Russian energy sector; Russian military; Sino–Russian relationship; Soviet Union Russian economy decline 68–9, 108, 131 natural resources 27, 69, 79–80 production costs 69 Russian energy sector 79–81 percentage of GDP/government revenue 80 state control 68, 80–1 Russian Far East (RFE) development projects 69 military defensive exercises 134–6 political/economic tensions 49, 75–6, 134 potential for annexation 134, 297 size/population 70 US investment 299 Russian military 110–13 conventional weaponry 111–12 cyberpower 112 in Far East 134–6 manpower 111 nuclear armory vii, 112, 136–7, 153 spending on 113 weaknesses 113 Russian Revolution (1917) 7 Russo–Japanese War (1904–5) 7 Samarin, Yuri 35 Scobell, Andrew 10 security/military cooperation, Sino– Russian 43–4, 108–9, 115–39, 151 background 109–15

China seen as threat to Russia 121, 132–5, 138, 139, 296–7 and nuclear weaponry 137–8 regional issues 126–8 in space 128–30 tensions 109, 120–1, 127–8, 132–8 see also arms sales; border, Sino–Russian; joint military exercises; nuclear weapons; state security, primacy of Shaheem, Qadam Shah 256 Shambaugh, David 11, 22, 154–5 Shamil, Imam 257 Shanghai Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area 1996 117 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 16–17, 32, 48, 76–7, 122, 125, 139, 220, 293, 296 counterterrorist operation 252–3 and cyber security 232–3 unifying principles 157 Shen Dingli 269–70 Shevtsova, Lilia 51 Shi Yinhong 22 Shi Ze 94 Shi Zhongyuan 219 Shoigu, Sergei, General 119, 184, 223 Silk Road initiative see One Belt, One Road program Sino–Russian relationship vii–ix, 1–3, 41–52, 274–5, 290–301 areas of tension 2, 45–51, 132–3, 295–6, 297 common counterterrorist strategy 249–52; coordination with other countries 252–7 common interests viii, 3, 43, 155, 188–9, 203, 290–1 cultural exchanges 45 and cyber security 231–4, 244–7, 274; signed agreements 231–2, 245 debates on nature 2–3 degree of mutual dependency 43, 50, 51–2, 131, 290 domestic public opinions 45, 50 economic cooperation viii, 2, 45, 67–8 (see also trade, Sino–Russian) and energy trade 89–96 history see history of Sino–Russian relations ideological challenge to West 300–1 impact of Ukraine crisis 171–2 partnership distinguished from alliance viii, 3, 131–2, 158–9, 294–5 and regional/global political stability 153, 297, 301 triangular relationship with US 297–9

309

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index Sino–Russian relationship (cont.) views from within Russia 36–9 see also border, Sino–Russian; energy trade; security/military cooperation; trade, Sino–Russian Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty 1937 8 Sino–Indian War (1962) 10 Slavophile movement 34–5 social media 238, 243 Sokolov, Denis 258–9 Solovyov, Vladimir 35 Song Xiaojun 22 South China Sea China–US rivalry 127 Russian stance 127–8, 295–6 territorial claims/disputes 20, 127, 203, 299–300 South Korea defense agreements with US 126–7 Russian relations with 47 Soviet Union collapse (1989) 10–11, 24, 27–8, 68, 119, 167–8, 298 continuation of Czarist policies 7 as economic/military model 8–9, 10–11 shifting allegiances 8 worsening relations with China 9–10, 116, 132–3 see also former Soviet republics space degree of militarization 128–9 Sino–Russian cooperation 129–30 Stalin, Joseph 8, 9 state security, primacy of 216–17, 229 state sovereignty 290–1 Stent, Angela 29 Stepanova, Ekaterina 261 Stoltenberg, Jens 163 strategic triangle 298 Strokan, Sergei 193 Subutai, General 5–6 Suchkov, Maksim 192 Summers, Tim 22 Sun Chenghao 156 Sun Jianguo 113–14 Sun Kai 75 Surkov, Nikolay 195 Surkov, Vladislav 219 Swaine, Michael 21 Syria viii, 2, 27, 108, 178–202, 203–4, 271–2, 292 casualties 210n95 Chinese involvement in conflict 186–90, 199–200 conflicting interests of intervening powers 179–80, 185–6, 198–9 definition of terrorists 179–80

310

history of relations/trade with Russia 180, 183 peace talks/initiatives 183–4, 190, 193–5, 199–200; obstacles to 196–7 relations/trade with China 187, 189, 190 Russian diplomatic activities 182–3 Russian military intervention 112; announcement of withdrawal 190–3; clashes with other intervening powers 185–6; reasons for 180–2; targets 184–5 Russian–US cooperation 193–5; disintegration 196–7, 198–9; start of civil war 178 uncertainty of future 200–2 Syromolotov, Oleg 255 Tahir, Jume, Imam 266 Taiwan Russian relations with 47 security concerns 108, 132, 300 Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) 10 Tajikistan 48, 233 anti-terrorist alliance with China 256 Targatabul, Treaty of (1864) 6–7 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 126–7, 130–1, 292 terrorism 217, 247–74 attacks on/in Russia 257, 258–60 collective moves to combat 252–7, 273–4, 301; obstacles to 255 designation of terrorists 179–80, 258, 267 role in global security order 273–4 Sino–Russian cooperation against 250–2 Terrorist Arc 267–8 Thomas, Timothy L. 236–7 Tian Chunsheng 94 Tikk, Eneken 234 timber, trade in 74–5 Titarenko, Mikhail 125, 133 Tolstoy, Leo 34 Topychkanov, Petr 132, 136 tourism 78 trade, Sino–Russian 67–8, 70–8 commentaries 75 imbalance 45, 49, 74–5, 79 import/export figures 71–2 obstacles to 70, 75, 96 slow progress of initiatives 70–1 transport projects 73, 76–7 see also currency swaps; energy trade; investment, cross-border; loans Trans-Siberian Railroad 7 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 1945 8 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation 2001 1, 41

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index Trenin, Dmitri 26–7, 42, 50, 133 Tripartite Treaty 1915 (China/Russia/ Mongolia) 7 Trump, Donald 44 Tsarnayev, Dzhokhar/Tamerlan 248 Tsygankov, Andrei P. 35, 39, 218 Turkey intervention in Syria 185–6 relations with Russia 186 shooting down of Russian aircraft 186 support for Uighur separatists 272–3 terrorist attacks 253 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) 264, 271 Turkmenistan, energy projects 87–8 Uighur people 219, 248, 252, 263–7 cultural/religious identity 263–4 involvement in Syrian conflict 188 reasons for unrest 264–5, 271 Turkish diaspora 272–3 Ukraine decline in productivity 173–4 deflection of Western attention from 182 domestic politics 174 Euromaidan movement 123, 160, 161–2, 169, 174 natural resources 165 Orange Revolution (2004–5) 169 political history 159 post-2014 situation 173–8 relations/trade with China 168, 169, 170–1 significance for Russia 165–6, 169 social conditions 174 trade with Russia 165, 176 worsening relations with Russia 175–6 see also Crimea, Russian annexation; Donbass, conflict in UN Security Council vii, 20 Counter-Terrorism Committee 255 proposed seat for Ukraine 168 responses to Syrian conflict 183, 189, 204 significance of Russian/Chinese roles 153, 204 United Nations Chinese attitudes to 20–1 counterterrorist organizations/ strategy 254–5 and Internet 232 see also UN Security Council United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 20 Tribunal, decision against China 123, 128, 291 United States challenges to hegemony vii, viii, 13, 15, 23, 204 common interests with East 156

constructive relationships with Eastern states viii, 40–1, 156, 193–5, 202–3, 298–9 control of Internet 233, 238, 244–5 cyber security concerns 112, 245–6 defense agreements 126–7 focus of foreign policy vii global supremacy 4 intervention in Syria 179, 193–5, 197–8 invasion of Iraq (2003) 178–9 missile defenses 130–1 presidential election (2016) 300 pressure on Sino–Russian relations 44, 109, 126, 130 response to Ukraine situation 161, 162–3 Russian mistrust of 22–3, 27–8 in South China Sea 127, 299–300 triangular relationship with China/ Russia 297–9 view of world order 4 Uzbekistan 233 civil unrest 220 (counter)terrorism in 252–3 Valdai Discussion Club 33–4 Vedrine, Hubert 4 Velitov, Makhmud, Imam 260 Vietnam 2 arms sales to 121, 127, 296 Chinese invasion (1979) 10 Russian relations with 47 Voskressenski, Alexei 2, 39 Wales Summit (2014) 162 Wang, Fei-Ling 13, 22 Wang Tao 94 Wang Chenguang 75 Wang Haiyun, General 43 Wang Jisi 297–8 Wang Qun 234 Wang Yi 126, 152, 190, 249 Wang Yiwei 294–5 Wang Yizhou 152–3, 155 War on Terror 12 Wayne, Martin I. 270 Wen Jiabao 82, 92 Wen Yi 72 Westad, Odd Arne 6 White, Hugh 134 Wilson, Woodrow 4 World Bank 17, 76 world order 3–5, 12–41, 151–3, 291–3 calls for financial reforms 155–6 challenges to 299–301 Chinese/Russian dissatisfaction with 155 Chinese views of 5, 13–15, 22–3, 44, 152 multipolar 28–9, 44, 155, 204, 275 Russian views of 5, 22–7, 28–30, 36–7, 44, 152

311

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/12/2017, SPi

Index world order (cont.) theoretical perspectives 5 US view of 4 World Trade Organization (WTO) 69 World War II, commemoration (2015) 1, 41–2, 171 Wu Yu-Shan 118, 132 Wu Sike 226 Xi Jinping anti-corruption measures 83–4, 108 anti-terrorist statements 249, 251, 268 and colored revolutions 225, 229 criticisms 16 and cyber security 231, 235, 239–40, 241, 243–4, 245, 246 economic projects/objectives 15–16, 18, 19, 25–6, 70, 72, 76–7, 156 on international relations 14–15, 16 and Middle Eastern situation 187, 189 military rhetoric 113 nationalist/traditionalist outlook 24, 151, 153 popularity 131, 151 relationship with Putin vii, 1, 41–3, 45, 151 stance on Ukraine 51, 169–70 visit to Middle East 221–2 visits to Moscow 1, 41–2, 74, 171 Xia Yishan 70–1 Xie Xiaoyan 190 Xing Guangcheng 50, 173 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 188, 219, 248, 263–73 as centre of terrorist activity 256, 263, 264, 265–6 counterterrorist measures 268–9, 270–1

312

cultural/political history 263–4 reasons for unrest 264–5, 271 separatist movements 264 Yabloko (United Democratic Party) 38 Yakovlev, Alexander 12 Yakushev, Mikhail 236 Yan Xuetong 132 Yanukovich, Viktor 160, 161–2, 167, 169, 174, 203–4 Yarovaya, Irina 263 Yatsenyuk, Arseniy 174 Yeltsin, Boris 11, 27, 28, 39, 46, 156 You Ji 9, 135 Zakharova, Maria 198 Zannier, Lamberto 177 Al-Zawahiri, Ayman 258 Zeng Qinghong 83 Zevelev, Igor 34, 36, 39, 167 Zhang Dejiang 38 Zhang Guobao 94 Zhang Zhizhou 225 Zhao, Suisheng 300 Zhao Hongtu 83 Zhao Huasheng 43, 75, 138 Zhao Tingyang 13 Zhao Weiming 200 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 38 Zhou Enlai 116 Zhou Nianli 75, 99–100n38 Zhou Yongkang 83 Zhu Dongyang 221–2 Zhu Rongji 83 Ziegler, Charles E. 88 Zyuganov, Gennady 38