China in India’s Neighbourhood: Shifting Regional Narratives 9781032501499, 9781032756158, 9781003474821

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Contributors
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1 Introduction
Part I Transcendental boundaries in neighbourhoods
Chapter 2 China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood
Chapter 3 Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood:: Eastern Himalayas, disgruntled geographies, and “Chinese goods”
Chapter 4 Dance of the dragons: Bhutan–China relationship
Part II Connectivity and conundrum in the South Asian neighbourbood
Chapter 5 Comrades in arms? Decoding China’s Taliban gamble
Chapter 6 Connectivity, capital, and culture: China in Pakistan
Chapter 7 China in Bangladesh: The evolving relationship
Part III Evolving dynamics and networks in the neighbourhood
Chapter 8 The manifold aspects of Chinese presence in Iran
Chapter 9 Prospects of continuity and change of China’s role in Central Asia: Case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Chapter 10 The ethnic dynamics in Myanmar-China strategic interests: Implications for the region
Part IV Negotiating narratives of maritime neighbourhoods
Chapter 11 Security narratives of China’s impingement in the Indian Ocean theatre
Chapter 12 India-China rivalry in Sri Lanka: A nexus of historical narratives and political economy
Chapter 13 The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar
Part V Extended Neighbourhood
Chapter 14 The collapse of China’s cooperation with Central and East Europe
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

CHINA IN INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD This book explores the scope and extent of the growing Chinese influence in India’s neighbourhood and its impact on India as well as on Asian power politics. Through theoretical narratives and detailed case studies, it examines Chinese bilateral relationships in the Indian neighbourhood and looks at the extent and significance of Chinese influence through the lens of strategic, economic and infrastructural arrangements and Chinese interventions in South, Southeast, and Central Asia. The book takes into account regional voices and domestic political compulsions in understanding what they make of the Chinese narrative and examines how and whether the narrative has changed in recent years through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an instrument of Chinese public diplomacy. The volume also discusses how domestic narratives and compulsions in the Indian neighbourhood remain significant and how these, in turn, would impact the trajectory of Chinese public diplomacy. Intertwined through all these themes is a focus on the extent to which these could become potential flashpoints for India. This book will be a useful resource for academics and researchers working on Asian geopolitics and geo-economics, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese politics, international relations of Asia, Asian dynamics and Asian studies. Anita Sengupta is an area studies specialist engaged in the study of the Eurasian region. Her areas of interest include issues of identity politics, migration, gender, borders, critical geopolitics and logistics. She is a regular commentator on debates on Asian affairs. She has been Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, and Director, Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata.She is currently Director, Asia in Global Affairs, Kolkata. Priya Singh is Associate Director at Asia in Global Affairs, Kolkata (AGA). Priya has a PhD from the University of Calcutta. Her thesis, Jewish and Democratic: Ethnicity, Gender and the Israeli State, mapped the intersectionality of ethnicity, gender and marginality situated in a receding democratic space from a South Asian perspective. Priya is a political scientist whose research encompasses issues pertaining to nationalism/ post-nationalism, identity, state formation, ethnicity, gender,migration and marginalisation in the West and South Asian context.

CHINA IN INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD Shifting Regional Narratives

Edited by Anita Sengupta and Priya Singh

Designed cover image: Getty images First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Anita Sengupta and Priya Singh; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Anita Sengupta and Priya Singh to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-50149-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-75615-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-47482-1 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821 Typeset in Sabon byDeanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

CONTENTS

List of Figures vii List of Tables viii List of Contributors ix Acknowledgements xv 1 Introduction Anita Sengupta

1

PART I Transcendental boundaries in neighbourhoods 27

2 China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood Samir Kumar Das 3 Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood: Eastern Himalayas, disgruntled geographies, and “Chinese goods” Anup Shekhar Chakraborty 4 Dance of the dragons: Bhutan–China relationship Jigme Yeshe Lama

29

42 63

PART II Connectivity and conundrum in the South Asian neighbourbood 81

5 Comrades in arms? Decoding China’s Taliban gamble Raghav Sharma

83



vi Contents

6 Connectivity, capital, and culture: China in Pakistan Priya Singh

103

7 China in Bangladesh: The evolving relationship Sriparna Pathak

121

PART III Evolving dynamics and networks in the neighbourhood137

8 The manifold aspects of Chinese presence in Iran Bahram Amirahmadian 9 Prospects of continuity and change of China’s role in Central Asia: Case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Yunus Emre Gurbuz, Mehmet Yahya Çiçekli, Maksat Ajykan Uulu 10 The ethnic dynamics in Myanmar-China strategic interests: Implications for the region Soma Ghosal

139

156

172

PART IV Negotiating narratives of maritime neighbourhoods189

11 Security narratives of China’s impingement in the Indian Ocean theatre Anindya Jyoti Majumdar

191

12 India-China rivalry in Sri Lanka: A nexus of historical narratives and political economy Shiran Illanperuma and Sumanasiri Liyanage

206

13 The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar San San Khine

221

PART V Extended neighbourhood239

14 The collapse of China’s cooperation with Central and East Europe Emilian Kavalski

241

Conclusion259 Priya Singh Index267

LIST OF FIGURES

12.1 GDP per capita (1978–2021) 212 12.2 Manufacturing valued added (% of GDP) (2009–2021) 213 12.3 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) (1978–2021) 214 12.4 High-tech exports (% of manufactured exports) (2009–2021) 214 12.5 External Balance (% of GDP) (1978–2021) 215 12.6 Outward FDI (% of GDP) (1978–2021) 215



LIST OF TABLES

  7.1 Some Key Events and Agreements Between Bangladesh and China (2016–2022) 13.1  Myanmar’s Regular Trade with China (2010–2019) (USD in Millions) 13.2 Myanmar’s Border Trade with China (2011–2019) (USD in Millions) 13.3 Chinese Investment in Myanmar (2010-2019) (USD in Millions) 14.1  Number of Reports on China (2010–2018) 14.2 Perceptions of China (2010–2018)



123 229 229 229 245 246

CONTRIBUTORS

Bahram Amirahmadian earned his PhD in Political Geography from Tehran University, Tehran, Iran. Born in 1950 in Tehran, he is a member of the scientific board of the ECO College of Insurance, affiliated with Allameh Tabataba’i University, and Guest Professor at Faculty of World Studies, Tehran University. He is author of several scientific papers, published in quarterlies, and conference proceedings in Persian, English, Turkish, and Russian languages. He also published 35 titles of books in Persian language about social-economic, political, and cultural issues on Central Asia, Caucasus, and Russia. Dr Amirahmadian has participated in almost 145 conferences, seminars, and symposiums, and has lectured at national and international levels, of which 60 were in other countries. He has travelled all around the Eurasian countries, including Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, as well as India, Afghanistan, China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Turkey, Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, Mexico, and Kenya. He is a member of Specialist Experts Groups of Geographical Names in the National Cartographic Organisation of Iran under the UN-related group. At present, he teaches regional studies at the university and has supervised 90 AM and doctorate theses. He has 27 years of experience in teaching and research in the above-mentioned fields. Also, he is active in writing notes and conducting interviews with mass media. Anup Shekhar Chakraborty is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at North-Eastern Hill University (NEHU) Shillong, Meghalaya. He was previously faculty at the Department of Political Science & Political Studies, Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata, West Bengal. He is also, a member of Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (MCRG), Kolkata. He has over 17 years of teaching and research experience. Dr. 

x Contributors

Chakraborty’s publications have discussed margins, marginality, hybridity and subjectivity among the peripheral tribes and migrants, ethnic cocooning, nexus of patriarchy and critical engagement in manufacturing of spaces, mustering empowerment. His latest co-edited books include “Queer and the Vernacular Languages in India: Studies in Contemporary Texts and Culture” (with Kaustav Chakraborty (2023). Routledge); and “Death and Dying in Northeast India: Indigeneity and Afterlife” (with Parjanya Sen (2023). Routledge). He serves as one of the Guest Editors of the Special Issue on “LGBTQ+ People in Situations of Forced Displacement” (Oxford Journal of Refugee Studies. Oxford: UK); and the Special Issue on “Politics and the People in India: Modern and Historical Perspectives” (Humanities and Social Science Communications. Springer Nature: UK). Mehmet Yahya Çiçekli is a legislation expert at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He was a visiting scholar at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University Central Asian Research Centre (ORASAM) as preparation for this study. He is interested in Asian studies, primarily post-Soviet states, with a special focus on the Turkic states. He writes on political agendas, international relations, and administrative topics. In addition to his mother tongue, Turkish, he is fluent in English and Kyrgyz, while having some command of other languages. He has made many official business trips to Turkic states. He usually attends parliamentary delegations for international events. He has bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Public Administration and Political Science, and is currently working on his PhD thesis at the Department of Public Administration and Political Science of Ankara HBV University. Samir Kumar Das is Professor of Political Science at the University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India. Previously Vice-Chancellor of the University of North Bengal, and a Postdoctoral Fellow (2005) of Social Science Research Council (South Asia Program), he is presently the Coordinator of the University Grants Commission-Departmental Research Support (UGCDRS) Programme (Phases II & III) on “Democratic Governance.” He served as Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Calcutta, Adjunct Professor of Government at Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Visiting Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi and at Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, among many of his recent assignments. He specialises in and writes on issues of ethnicity, identity, security, migration, rights, and justice, and is on the advisory and editorial boards of many national and international journals. Some of his publications include: Making of Goddess Durga in Bengal: Art, Heritage and the Public (ed. 2021), Migrations, Identities and Democratic Practices in India (2018), Governing India’s Northeast: Essays on Insurgency, Development and the Culture of Peace (Springer 2013), Conflict and Peace in India’s Northeast: The Role of Civil Society (East West Center, 2006), among others.

Contributors xi

Soma Ghosal is Assistant Professor of Political Science at SRSVM, Kamarpukur, Hooghly (West Bengal). Her doctoral work is on the border tribes of northeastern India and Myanmar. She was earlier a project fellow with the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata. Her research interests include the socio-political aspects of narcotics in Manipur. She has authored “The Politics of Narcotics in India’s Northeast” (2002). Yunus Emre Gürbüz is Professor of History and International Relations at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek. He was born in Istanbul, and went to the Austrian High School (in German). He studied International Relations and graduated from the Department of Sociology at the Middle East Technical University (in English). While working as a research assistant at the Centre for Black Sea and Central Asian Studies (METU), he received his master’s degree in History in 2003 and his PhD in 2007. Since 2010, he has been a member of the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, where he has taken many administrative positions, such as Chairperson of the Central Asian Research Centre (ORASAM), Vice-Dean of Faculty of Letters, Coordinator of International Relations Office, and he became General Coordinator of the Turkic Council Turkic Universities Union (TURKUNIB). His research focuses on the history and politics in Central Asia with a special focus on national identity formation. He studied, delivered lectures, and conducted field research in Turkic countries, the US, and in many Eurasian countries, including Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Russia, India, and China. He is fluent in Turkish, English, German, and Kyrgyz, in addition to Russian, Dutch, and some Turkic languages as working languages. Shiran Illanperuma is a journalist and development economist. As a journalist, he has covered issues including politics, business, and culture. As an independent columnist, he writes on heterodox economics and geopolitics, including China’s role in an emerging multipolar world order. As a development economist, his areas of research include industrialisation and industrial policy. He holds a BA in Media and Communication from the University of Sydney and is currently reading for an MSc in Economic Policy at SOAS University of London. Emilian Kavalski is the NAWA Chair Professor of Complex Systems at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland and the book series editor for Routledge’s “Rethinking Asia and International Relations” series. His work explores the interconnections between the simultaneous decentring of international relations by post-Western perspectives and non-anthropocentric approaches. Emilian is the author of four books, including The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (Routledge 2018), and he is the editor of eleven volumes, such as World Politics at the Edge of Chaos (State University of New York Press, 2016).

xii Contributors

San San Khine is Professor at the Department of International Relations and Political Science, University of Yangon, Myanmar. She has achieved Bachelor of Arts (Honours) International Relations in 1993, Master of Arts (IR) with Credit in 2000, Master of Research (IR) in 2001, PhD (IR) in 2007, Diploma in Tourism Studies and Management in 2006, and Postgrad Diploma in Global English in 2010 from University of Yangon, Myanmar. She conducts lectures on theories of International Relations, political thoughts and theories, Central Asia, and regional development in Asia. Her research focuses on peace and security: non-traditional security issues in International Relations. Her publications are: “A Study on China’s Strategies towards Southeast Asia,” Yangon University Research Journal Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, “Myanmar-Thai Cooperation in Migrant Workers Issue,” Journal of Myanmar Academy of Arts and Science, Vol. XII, No. 9, June 2014, “Myanmar’s Cooperation in BIMST-EC,” Journal of the Asian Research Centre, Vol.1, No. 1, Asian Research Centre, University of Yangon, 2015, “Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Project in the Context of MyanmarChina Relations,” Universities Research Journal Vol. 9, August 2017, and “South Korea’s ODA Policy Towards Myanmar,” LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Mauritius, June 2019, (eBook) ISBN978- 620-0-22520-7, The New Southern Policy: ASEAN-ROK Economic Relations, edited by Edy Prasetyono, Evi Fitriani, and Hariyadi Wirawan Shofwan Al Banna C. ASEAN Insights: Vol. 3. Indonesia: ASEAN Study Centre, December 2020., ISSN 2356-3249 9 772356 324000, and “Myanmar’s Response to NonTraditional Security Issue: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” Yangon University Research Journal, Vol. 10, No.1, June 2022. Her ongoing publication is “Development Assistance of the Republic of Korea to Myanmar,” Journal of Myanmar Academy of Arts and Science. At present, she has been conducting a research project funded by the Asia Research Centre with the title of “Myanmar’s Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)” since 2011. Jigme Yeshe Lama is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Calcutta. He completed his PhD from the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interest lies in China-Tibet ties, the study of religion and politics in the Himalayas, and Tibetan democracy in exile. He has published several chapters in edited volumes, journals, and edited a volume titled Changes on the Roof of the World – Reflections on Tibet, published in 2016 by Pentagon Press, New Delhi. Sumanasiri Liyanage is Co-cordinator of the Marx School. He is a retired teacher in political economy at the University of Peradeniya and a fellow of the Solomon Asch Centre for Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania. He is a columnist in Sinhala and English. His writings include: Intervention

Contributors xiii

in the Devolution Debate and One Step at a Time: Reflections of the peace process in Sri Lanka (Colombo: SSA). He is a co-editor of A Glimmer of Hope and Perspectives on India-Sri Lanka Relations (Colombo: Sapi). Anindya Jyoti Majumdar earned his PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has been a research consultant with the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, and at present is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. Former Dean of the Faculty of Arts and former Director of the School of International Relations and Strategic Studies at Jadavpur University, Dr. Majumdar was also a visiting professor at the Richard Walker Institute of International and Area Studies of University of South Carolina, USA, as a FulbrightNehru Academic and Professional Excellence Fellow. He has attended a number of national and international academic schedules at home and abroad and contributed research papers to journals and compendiums. He has also authored and edited and coedited books on foreign policy, security issues, forced migration, and international relations – his areas of interest. His recent publications include two coedited books: Conflicting Identities: Travails of Regionalism in Asia (Manohar) and Peace and Conflict Studies: Perspectives from South Asia (Routledge). Sriparna Pathak is Associate Professor and the founding Director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) of O.P. Jindal Global University, (JGU) Haryana, India. She is also the Associate Dean for Admissions at JSIA, JGU. She teaches courses on Chinese foreign policy as well as theories of international relations. She has recently published a book titled Drifts and Dynamics: Russia’s Ukraine War and Northeast Asia. Her previous work experience covers universities like Gauhati University and Don Bosco University; the Ministry of External Affairs, where she worked as a consultant for the Policy Planning and Research division, working on China’s domestic and foreign policies; think tanks like Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi and Kolkata, South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels, where she is a Research Fellow, and the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research in New Delhi, where she worked as a researcher. Awarded a doctorate degree from the Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 2015, Dr Pathak is fluent in English, Mandarin, and Indian languages like Hindi, Bengali, and Assamese. She has been a recipient of the joint fellowship awarded by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, India and the China Scholarship Council, Government of the People’s Republic of China, and she spent two years in China, actively researching various aspects of China’s domestic economy. Her areas of interest are China’s domestic economy, trade and economic relations between India and China, and China’s foreign

xiv Contributors

policy and economic linkages with the world. She is currently working on a project on China’s influence operations in India. She has been a resource person for various media organisations, colleges, Universities, and think tanks within India and abroad. Anita Sengupta is an area studies specialist engaged in the study of the Eurasian region. Her areas of interest include issues of identity politics, migration, gender, borders, critical geopolitics and logistics. She is a regular commentator on debates on Asian affairs. She has been Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, and Director, Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata.She is currently Director, Asia in Global Affairs, Kolkata. Raghav Sharma is an Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India. He is the author of “Nation, Ethnicity and the Conflict in Afghanistan: Political Islam and the Rise of Ethno-Politics (1992-1996)”. Prior to this, he worked in the humanitarian sector in Afghanistan and taught under the Good Governance Afghanistan Program at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. He occasionally writes media commentaries on Afghanistan and has also published in peer-reviewed journals. Priya Singh is Associate Director at Asia in Global Affairs, Kolkata (AGA). Priya has a PhD from the University of Calcutta. Her thesis, Jewish and Democratic: Ethnicity, Gender and the Israeli State, mapped the intersectionality of ethnicity, gender and marginality situated in a receding democratic space from a South Asian perspective. Priya is a political scientist whose research encompasses issues pertaining to nationalism/post-nationalism, identity, state formation, ethnicity, gender, migration and marginalisation in the West and South Asian context. Maksat Ajykan Uulu graduated from Talas State University, Faculty of History in 1998–2004. From 2004–2007, he studied at the Graduate Department of Isenali Arabayev University, and worked as a lecturer at the Social Development Institute. From 2008–2016, he was the Chairman of the Trade Union of the Social Development and Entrepreneurship Institute. From 2010–2013, he worked as a lecturer at the Faculty of History of the Kyrgyz State Pedagogical University. He completed his PhD in history in 2014. He served as the vice rector at the Social Development and Entrepreneurship Institute from 2014–2016. Since 2016, he has been working as a researcher at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University Central Asian Research Centre (ORASAM), where he works on examining, publishing, and translating daily news. He is fluent in Kyrgyz, Turkish, and Russian.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The volume began with a two-day deliberation on the scope and extent of Chinese penetration in India’s neighbourhood, in Kolkata, organized by Asia in Global Affairs, Kolkata, India. Asia in Global Affairs is an independent forum for research which aims at conducting research and discussions on wide-ranging global issues with an interdisciplinary and transnational approach. The deliberations were held in collaboration with the Department of History and Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Calcutta University. The deliberations were organized with the active involvement and participation of staff and students of Loreto College, Kolkata. These discussions formed the basis of the volume that involved all the participants. The editors wish to thank all the collaborating Institutions particularly Loreto College and its Principal Sr. Christine Coutinho for their support. They also acknowledge the financial support given by the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, which allowed scholars from outside Kolkata to participate. The editors are particularly grateful to all those who contributed to the volume despite their busy schedules and multiple engagements. The editors thank the anonymous reviewers whose comments enriched the volume and the editors at Routledge who made the publication possible.



1 INTRODUCTION Anita Sengupta

A neighbourhood is defined as the area that surrounds someone’s home or the people who live in this area. While neighbourhood remains a prominent point of analysis in contemporary studies, particularly urban studies, its delimitation remains unclear, and in any case there are always questions about whether it really matters in a globalised world. With the broadening of neighbourhoods to regional and global scales, further complexities are introduced. Here, strategic neighbourhoods multiply and contract, often encompassing diverse areas across multiple geographic spaces. Neighbourhoods are complicated by cultural landscapes that transcend boundaries and are constrained by political relationships that are ever changing. In certain senses, for an understanding of geopolitical neighbourhoods, mathematical definitions of the neighbourhood of a point, as a set of points where one can move some amount in any direction away from a point without leaving the set, seems more appropriate if the set itself is accepted as dynamic. Whether valuable or problematic, neighbourhoods remain a reality conceptually and in actual terms and it is assumed that prioritising and synergising relationships in the neighbourhood assumes significance and provides mutual benefit. In India’s case, the neighbourhood is complicated by problematic and competitive relations that have their roots in a fractured history and a group of intermediate states that are compelled to choose between alternatives. India now acknowledges primacy in the neighbourhood as critical for credibility in the global arena, which is reflected in her “Neighbourhood First” policy. This is, however, constrained by China’s enhanced global stature and its growing presence in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood across South, Southeast, and Central Asia. This can be gauged through policies DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-1

2  Anita Sengupta

adopted by Beijing towards countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Central Asian republics, all of which, barring Bhutan, have also joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A combination of infrastructural financing and trade is being put in place by China to create new realms of influence across regions, which includes providing aid and investments at competitive interest rates. The surging requirement for humanitarian assistance, in the wake of the global pandemic and the concomitant isolationist stance of the United States and Europe, as well as the emergence of nongovernmental soft power in its ranks, has significantly abetted China in rewriting its narrative and strengthening its influence in various countries through foreign aid. Packaged as “gifts” reflecting the Chinese nation’s tradition of internationalism and its ideal of universal harmony, and projected in terms of South-South cooperation, these have been accompanied by a narrative and an evolving set of practices that stress a parity of relationships that beguiles reality and aims at creating influence. Recent developments in India’s neighbourhood, like the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, created further possibilities for China, allowing a combination of political and economic interests to come into play. China’s key interest in Afghanistan is access and Afghanistan offers China the opportunity to access not just Iran and Pakistan, but also the Middle East and Africa. However, there has been a certain level of caution in the level of Chinese engagement, given its experiences with pursuing investment opportunities in infrastructure in areas of endemic violence. The winding up of the American presence in Afghanistan and the subsequent American focus on contiguous Central Asian states has also posed questions for the Chinese in Central Asia, as there are substantial Chinese investments in rail and road connectivity, energy connectivity, trade promotion, and industrial development and people-to-people projects. China’s attempts to create new realms of influence through infrastructure finance, the creation of multilateral development funds and banks like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and markets have played a complex role in determining the contours of the relationship between the Central Asian states and China. A similar combination of partnerships in banking, telecommunications, ports, railways, and other projects in Iran is moving towards creating a Chinese foothold in the country. All of these are in addition to China’s growing influence in South and Southeast Asia and are potential flashpoints for India in her neighbourhood. There has, however, always remained a note of caution about these ‘infrastructural alliances,’ with the recognition that dependence on the Chinese comes at a price. Like in other parts of the world, with greater involvement of the Chinese, debt has been mounting, leading to failure of debt servicing. This has become a major problem in many Asian countries like Sri Lanka

Introduction 3

and Nepal, where the level of Chinese control over the lion’s share of the economy has been increasing. There has also been rising anger and discontent among local populations against Chinese economic ventures or infrastructure development, which are not being perceived as beneficial for local economies. Even in Pakistan, Chinese penetration of the economy without any noticeable benefits to the local population has elicited a negative reaction, leading to the closure of consular services in the Chinese Embassy at Islamabad in February 2023. Finally, Chinese border incursions have been occurring even in countries like Nepal and Bhutan, which have led to local protests putting the pro-China lobbies in the government in a spot. Despite this, Chinese influence has strengthened over the subcontinent and beyond in an unprecedented manner and scale. During the last round of border stand-off between India and China, India’s immediate neighbours not only did not take sides, but some, such as Nepal and Pakistan, have even taken steps that have been far from friendly. The dragon’s footsteps have never been more entrenched in India’s neighbourhood, and it warrants being studied in greater detail for that reason alone, since it would influence India’s own position in the neighbourhood. This volume deliberates on the scope and extent of Chinese penetration in India’s neighbourhood through theoretical narratives and detailed case studies that examine Chinese bilateral relationships in the Indian neighbourhood and the extent and significance of Chinese influence through the lens of strategic, economic, and infrastructural arrangements and Chinese interventions in South, Southeast, and Central Asia. The focus is not on the Chinese narrative, but on what India’s neighbourhood makes of that narrative and therefore the extent to which it affects the Indian position within the extended neighbourhood. It is also about the extent and significance of these narratives in terms of the wider storylines of the changing global order, for instance, considering China’s focus on integrating an economically interconnected South Asia and the extent to which asymmetric power relations have affected this remaking, particularly in terms of the pandemic years. There is also a focus on how and whether the narrative has changed in recent years through debates on the changing nature of the BRI as an instrument of Chinese public diplomacy. In essence, it is about how regional narratives and domestic political debates centred around Chinese presence would have an impact on the larger Asian power politics and on India in particular. The volume combines historic narratives of an extended neighbourhood and interlinked social and economic relations with an understanding of how diplomacy and politics transformed these narratives to reflect policy prescriptions. Individual articles focus on comprehensive Chinese partnerships in the neighbourhood, reflecting a range of common, conflicting, and parallel interests and declared common policies on significant international

4  Anita Sengupta

and regional issues. The volume illustrates how the reimagining of these relationships that the Belt and Road Initiative envisages and the significance of transit capacity and trade in this equation is balanced with a carefully calibrated soft power policy and alternative financial institutions. However, the focus is also on how domestic narratives and compulsions in the Indian neighbourhood remain significant and how these in turn would impact the trajectory of Chinese public diplomacy. Intertwined through all of these themes is a focus on the extent to which these could become potential flashpoints for India. The volume begins with an understanding that neighbourhoods have a dynamic of their own that defines great power politics and then moves on to examine this in terms of various neighbourhoods. It concludes with a final chapter that provides an interesting comparison of the evolving nature of Chinese relationship in the immediate neighbourhood of the Asian regions in Central Europe, where a similar pattern of domestic political compulsions drives the narratives and nature of bilateral relationships. It examines these themes in their entirety across a neighbourhood that spreads from the south and southeast of Asia to the north and northwest of India. Much of the contemporary literature is focused on engagements in particular Asian regions, whereas a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese policy – and therefore its impact on Asian power politics in general and India in particular (given the reality of India’s pivotal geographic position) – would require a focus on both the continental and the maritime regions in the Indian neighbourhood. The volume selects certain states from each of the regions as representative examples. While individual chapters bring into focus social, cultural, political, and economic narratives that come into play in the understanding of China’s relations with India’s neighbourhood, this introductory chapter looks into the complexities of India’s relationship with China in her neighbourhood and how that in turn impacts Asian geopolitics. Given the fact that the Indian neighbourhood extends across both the continental and maritime spheres, this introduction begins with an understanding of this interactive dyad that constrains Asian geopolitics. Asian neighbourhoods as interactive dyads

Luis Simon notes that Asian geopolitics must be visualised as an ‘interactive dyad’ and argues that the Indo-Pacific axis cannot be isolated from the continental dynamics as well as from other maritime regions beyond the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Simon 2013). Asia is today considered an interconnected geopolitical whole. This is evident from the fact that continental Asian powers like China are linking development in the interior of the continent

Introduction 5

with the projection of maritime security. How the withdrawal of American troops from continental Asia would impact its largely maritime influence in the region remains to be seen, but Simon argues that this would lead to greater geopolitical volatility. In terms of the Indian position, this would mean connecting the Eurasian hinterland to the Indian Ocean by creating maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and overland connectivity between the Indian Ocean and its hinterland. The maritime space is not well connected to the interior of the continent, with the consequence of domination by extraregional powers to the exclusion of regional Eurasian land powers. As American withdrawal makes the possibility of increasing Chinese influence over continental Asia a distinct possibility, the necessity of increasing strategic depth in the Indian Ocean is becoming important for India. There is a variance between the official Chinese and Indian visions. The Chinese policy is based on the narrative that China is developing national projects, which it hopes will collectively deliver the aim of overland and maritime connectivity for China. India, on the other hand, professed the aim of regional development both in the Eurasian and the Bay of Bengal/Indo-Pacific regions that will connect the landlocked regions with maritime regions and lead to a better sense of community and connectivity that also existed historically. For India, this geopolitical framework is known as SAGAR, which stands for Security and Growth for All in the Region. In this connection, it is necessary to take note of Indian alternatives in the background of the many popularly named “New Silk Road” initiatives, which refer to a variety of visions for formalising transit flows across Asia. Among them are the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative, the American “New Silk Roads,” and the Russian-led efforts to reconnect through the Eurasian Economic Community. Financial institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), set up with 57 Asian, European, South American, and African states, including China and India, have been supporting these logistical developments. AIIB supports China’s logistic vision of the BRI, with the aim to bring South Asian economies closer to China, Central Asia, and West Asia. The various New Silk Road initiatives also provide opportunities for exploring the multifaceted impact of transstate corridors of human, resource, and ideational transit, and are contingent on the assumed acquiescence of the participating states to varied modes of overland transit in the interest of collective gain (Sengupta 2019). Within the framework of the New Silk Roads, there were a number of strategies. The New Silk Road strategies were planned by the United States and the European Union in view of the opportunities for overland connection between China, India, the Middle East, Europe, and Russia, which would result in revenue formation for the Central Asian states and particularly sustainable development of Afghanistan after US withdrawal (US Dept. of State

6  Anita Sengupta

2016).1 From the US perspective, a South Asia-Central Asia transit corridor was foreshadowed by the Northern and Southern Distribution Networks for the provision of supplies for Afghanistan’s military operations and included a number of infrastructural projects to facilitate the transport of resources (Samaddar and Sengupta 2019). While the Chinese alternative vector of trade and transit has been in place ever since the independence of the Central Asian states, it was expressed in terms of a consolidated “Silk Road” during President Xi’s multistate tour of the states (Sengupta 2016). The explicit use of the term was predicted by many years of intense economic engagement, where trade grew from $527 million in 1992 to $40 billion in 2012 (Diener 2015). As Samaddar and Sengupta (2019) argue, as this trade required infrastructural development, it also offered a vector of mobility. Rail lines, roads, airports, and pipelines were part of this infrastructural initiative. The Kazakhstan-China pipeline, which is China’s first direct import pipeline and the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, was one of its most significant efforts. One Belt One Road (OBOR) or BRI has a transcontinental (Silk Road Economic Belt) and maritime (Maritime Silk Route) component. Much of the transcontinental route falls within areas of traditional Russian influence and regions where Russia is bidding to refashion a common economic zone in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Sengupta 2017). Global logistic visions that encompass entire continents and beyond are one part of the present-day logistics story; the other part of logistics are the significant geopolitical and geo-economic challenges to connectivity in areas where these infrastructural projects operate. The Indian neighbourhood is no exception. India would have to negotiate its own logistical space against the backdrop of these complexities, both in terms of the emergence of transcontinental logistics spaces and numerous “Silk Road” strategies supported by a number of states (Sengupta 2019). Here, India has been faced with constant negotiation between its spaces to the east and southeast and its alternative connects in the west and northwest based on its “pivotal” geographical position, which allows access to both its east and west on the one hand, and to maritime and continental routes on the other (Sengupta 2019). Within this context, one needs to examine India’s ability to connect with broader and sometimes competing logistics visions, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, for instance, that provides an alternative north-south connect to the International NorthSouth Transport Corridor that India supports. Given the global reality of a China centred trade network overlapping with a Russian-led economic community engulfing both Asian overland and maritime routes on the one hand, and the emerging rules and regulations that would govern global

Introduction 7

trade on the other, either the development of a logistic alternative or connecting with the existing frameworks would be an essential enabler for India’s agenda of connecting with the regions to the northwest and southeast (Sengupta 2019). And here, an understanding of the Chinese agenda for both the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (the overland connect) and the port of Hambantota is significant. Part of the BRI, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was one of President Xi’s flagship projects. CPEC was projected as symbolic of the long-term cooperation between the two states. It began in 2015 with an initial investment of $46 billion which was subsequently increased to $62 billion in two years. Though beset with problematic issues, including the economic disparity between China and Pakistan and security issues and opposition in Pakistan, it has not been discontinued. Also, CPEC, which aims to connect Xinjiang with the Pakistani port of Gwadar, passes through difficult earthquake-prone regions, partly through territory that is disputed. Added to this is the lack of infrastructure and finance for infrastructure in Pakistan, which creates uncertainty about Pakistan’s ability to return the loans and complete dependence on Chinese investment. Gwadar is located in Baluchistan, opposite Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. About 70 kilometres to the west is the Iranian border, where the port of Chabahar is being developed by India. Gwadar is also situated at a distance from Pakistan’s principal industrial centres and was until recently a fishing village in an enclave that Pakistan bought from Oman in 1958. Given its situation, linking the port to China would mean crossing the entire length of Pakistan, including the Karakoram Range in the north, which is extremely difficult terrain for building a pipeline. Added to this is the fact that the pipeline is highly susceptible to terror attacks from the Baluch nationalists who are opposed to the corridor. Ensuring security would mean the deployment of high numbers of security personnel. The port would also have to be dredged in order to accommodate oil tankers and its handling capacity would have to be increased. All of these factors bring into focus the necessity of an analysis of China’s intense interest in the project. Here, most analysts point to geopolitical reasons. David Brewster, for instance, argues that the establishment of the overland corridor to the Indian Ocean would radically transform the Indian Ocean region by opening it up to Chinese influence. He notes that this opening could create unprecedented geopolitical consequences for the region where India is now increasingly attempting to play a more dominant role. Also, it remains to be seen whether this corridor would provide better access to the interior parts of China (Brewster 2017). Here, the general argument tends towards the fact that the proposed pipeline and transportation corridor is more a symbol of cooperation than a fully achievable goal. Jeremy Garlick argues that the aim

8  Anita Sengupta

of Chinese engagement with Pakistan through the CPEC is an attempt at balancing its regional rival, India, based on a long-term strategic assessment of physical geography, which he terms as geopositional balancing. Garlick goes on to argue: This concept is based on traditional Chinese notions of geographical space, and is developed, as Henry Kissinger points out, from the tactics of encirclement in the Chinese game of weiqi (called go in Japan). Geopositional balancing is a system of putting dozen ‘marker’ stones in key geographical positions for potential future use and as hedge against possible conflicts. The aim is for China to strengthen its long term long term geopolitical position vis-à-vis rivals (in this case India) without great risk and despite appearances to the contrary, excessive financial expense. (Garlick 2018) Another motivation for the CPEC was to build an alternative to the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca and the South China Seas. The Strait of Malacca is identified as a stretch of water that can be blockaded, thus preventing vital supplies from reaching China. This is significant, as around 89% of China’s oil and gas supplies come through the strait. In economic terms also, there is some claim that the overland route is cheaper and shorter. Also, Gwadar is situated on the Persian Gulf next to Iran and this, along with the recent 25-year China-Iran deal, would signify that China is keen to transport at least part of its oil and gas through this pipeline. However, as Garlick argues, it is geopositional balancing that seems to be the most important reason for the Chinese involvement in the port. According to Garlick, geopositional balancing seeks to establish “physical footholds in selected countries, with a view to establishing a stronger long term geo strategic position with regard to a regionally more powerful rival, in this case India.” Its aim is to maintain a non-military position at selected sites such as commercial ports. However, not all studies reflect the negative aspects of the Corridor. While pointing to some of the difficulties that the Corridor would encounter (which includes the opposition to the Corridor in Baluchistan and resultant security threats; terrorism from insurgent groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang; challenges from other powers interested in the region; geographical conditions like high altitude and poor weather), Riaz Ahmad et al. argue that CPEC is a comprehensive development agreement. It not only establishes “economic and strategic connectivity between China and Pakistan but has the potential to involve other sub-regions of Asia that could play a key role in improving the area’s strategic and economic environment” (Ahmad 2020). They go on to argue that CPEC will pave the way for the integration of remote markets in the South Asian regions and also create the possibility of financial investments in addition to creating better people-to-people

Introduction 9

contacts and relations between the two states (Ahmad 2020). Similarly, Massarrat Abid and Ayesha Ashfaq argue that the Corridor is a “game changer project” that will function as a “primary gateway for trade between China and Africa and the Middle East” and be beneficial for Pakistan (Abid and Ashfaq 2015). In their article“Betting Big on CPEC,” Xiangming Chen et al. note that, given the economic potential and social impact of the project, the government in Pakistan would remain committed to the project despite leadership changes (Joseph and Tariq 2018). Similarly, the port of Hambantota is now part of the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) proposed by Chinese president Xi Jinping in October 2013 during a speech to the Indonesian Parliament. This Maritime Silk Road passes through the cities of Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Beihai, Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Colombo, Kolkata, Nairobi, Athens, and Venice. Its maritime space includes the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea. In Indian strategic thinking, the Maritime Route has been identified as a repackaging of the “string of pearls” strategy. This position is a reflection of the position taken by C. Raja Mohan in his Samudra Manthan: SinoIndian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Here, he argues that the land competition between China and India will spill out to the ocean and the Indo-Pacific is becoming a new geographical space for this contest (Mohan 2012). It has deepened maritime competition between India and China, as India is apprehensive about greater Chinese engagement in its neighbourhood. China, on the other hand, is impeded by the absence of naval bases, which restricts its capacity to provide security in the Indian Ocean region as well as to protect its energy routes (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008). China’s promotion of two corridors (continental and MSR) as part of its evolving regional geostrategy and the fact that India lies on both the Maritime Silk Route and the Southern Silk Route poses opportunities and challenges for India. Samaddar and Sengupta (2019) argue that a refusal by India and the MSR’s acceptance by ASEAN and a majority of South Asian states would leave India as an outlier and send a clear signal of India being opposed to China. India’s own declared intent to attract massive Chinese investment capital in several industrial parks across the country has perhaps further complicated the issue. Such contradictions suggest that India would look closely at the evolution of the MSR proposal, as it needs to be an essential part of an emerging new geo-economic trend in Asia’s political economy. According to analysts, India has the option of simultaneously conceptualising other strategic options with Japan and ASEAN to present alternative regional initiatives and looking for collaboration with organisations like the SCO. It is further argued that if through the MSR important neighbours like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka drift into the Chinese orbit, it would signify a grave setback to India’s traditional conception of the subcontinent as a

10  Anita Sengupta

privileged sphere. This would in effect mean that nearly every Indian neighbour in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littoral would have strong economic ties with mainland China, making it difficult for these smaller states to resist internalising Chinese norms for Asian security (Samaddar and Sengupta 2019). In view of this new “geography of logistics,” analysts like Deborah Cowen have argued that security will be reimagined in the context of production and trade. No longer lodged in a conflict between territorial borders and global flows, national security is increasingly a project of securing supranational systems. The maritime border has been a crucial site for experimentation and a spate of new policy is blurring “inside” and “outside” national space, reconfiguring border security and reorganizing citizenship and labour rights. (Cowen 2010) This also implies a reimagination of Asian neighbourhoods, which the next section will focus on. Reimagining Asian neighbourhoods

Conceptually, advancing maritime connectivity in the Indo-Pacific and extending it further to East Africa and on to the Mediterranean is in accordance with India‘s own broader maritime economic vision. However, according to the prevalent narrative, MSR should be understood as part of a rising China’s attempt to “reorder Asia”. Analysts note that China is attempting to create trade and economic relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries through trade, port, and continental land bridges to counteract the United States’ influence and to draw the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littorals within its sphere of influence. This line of thinking underlines Chinese proposals to develop the Kunming Railway to connect China–Singapore and other countries in Southeast Asia, as well as the recently commissioned oil and gas pipelines and proposed railway line connecting the Rakhine coast of Myanmar with Kunming. The MSR proposal complements infrastructural initiatives and allows landlocked southwest China’s access to markets in Southeast Asia. Some analysts also perceive that the MSR is part of a Chinese reassurance stance to “diffuse the tension” on China’s maritime periphery after a period of uncertainty over Chinese maritime behaviour. It is moreover viewed as a policy to complicate the US’s rebalancing strategy by “softening” ASEAN elites‘ renewed interest in reaching out to the US, Japan, and, perhaps, even India (Singh 2014).

Introduction 11

The Maritime Silk Route envisages a system of linked ports, infrastructural projects, and special economic zones in Southeast Asia and the northern Indian Ocean. As David Brewster argues, while much of the discussion is focused on ports, infrastructure, and manufacturing facilities, probably of greater significance is the development of new production and distribution chains across the region, with China at its centre. He goes on to argue that, if implemented, it could bind countries of the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean closer to the Chinese economy (Brewster 2014). Several states in the Bay of Bengal region, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, have expressed their desire to be part of the Maritime Silk Route and in principle agreed to Chinese investments in ports and infrastructure. Brewster argues that, while the Chinese position has been that these investments are purely economic, it is clear that this economic involvement with the Bay of Bengal littoral states and control over port facilities would have a strategic impact. However, he goes on to note that these relationships have not been without their problems. Despite a close defence and strategic relationship, Myanmar has never allowed China to develop a military presence in the country, Bangladesh has opted for international investors for the Sonadia and other ports, and fears of “debt trap diplomacy” have become significant in Sri Lankan nationalist narrative, with demands for the return of control of the Hambantota port. The port of Hambantota was intended to transform a small fishing village into a major shipping hub with Chinese financing. However, Sri Lanka could not pay back the loans and, in what was seen as a debt-for-equity swap in 2017, control over the port was handed over to China through a 99-year lease. Chinese official news agencies marked this as “another milestone on the path of Belt and Road” (Hilman 2018). However, it has been argued that the port lease was not actually a classic debt-for-equity swap, as there was no cancellation of the five loans that Sri Lanka took from Exim Bank of China to construct the port. 70 percent stake of the port was leased to strengthen the country’s foreign reserves and pay off short-term debt payments. Umesh Moramudali argues that there was no cancellation of debt and no change of ownership. On the other hand, the leasing of the port reflects a far deeper economic issue stemming from reduction of trade and budget deficit (Moramudali 2020). However, this purely commercial explanation is not supported by all analysts. Maria Abi Habib, in an article called “How China got Sri Lanka to cough up a port,” notes that from the very beginning Sri Lankan officials said that “intelligence and strategic possibilities of the port’s location was part of the negotiations. She writes, Initially moderate terms for lending on the port project became more onerous as Sri Lankan officials asked to renegotiate the timeline and add more financing. And as Sri Lankan officials became desperate to get

12  Anita Sengupta

the debt off their books in recent years, the Chinese demands cantered on handing over equity in the port rather than allowing any easing of terms. (Abi Habib 2018) This, along with the fact that the port is struggling to attract ships that prefer to dock at the nearby Colombo port, brings into question the viability of a new port at Hambantota. In fact, Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean has been interpreted both as a reflection of expanding trade interest and also as a means to increase its regional influence. Zack Cooper, for instance, argues that Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean during peacetime may resemble those of other great powers, with protection of trade routes being the main objective. However, he notes that Chinese shipping routes will be particularly vulnerable, as the sea lines of communication from the Middle East to China cannot be protected without substantial naval presence. In times of conflict, Cooper argues they are likely to create vulnerabilities as they pass close to Indian facilities at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the US facilities at Diego Garcia, and Australian facilities at Cocos and the Christmas Islands (Cooper 2018). From India’s maritime and naval perspective, with the full evolution of the MSR, additional access points and facilities would have to be developed straddling the proposed Chinese MSR (Scott 2013). The decision to accelerate India’s collaboration in the construction of Chabahar Port on Iran’s Makran coast by the Modi government could also have been partially driven by this quest to seek top-notch transit points in the Indian Ocean Rim. Moreover, in order to ensure greater durability and sustainability for its own power projection and expeditionary roles, India will need to invest more in longhaul vessels. Since the late 1990s, China has been pushing for a land corridor – termed the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). The BCIM will initially provide road connectivity between India’s northeast and China’s Kunming province, and later, rail connectivity. Despite an established track-2 BCIM dialogue, Delhi was lukewarm about the proposal. In view of India’s restive northeast and complex relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar, Delhi was reticent because of two factors: the fear of Chinese economic domination in border regions and India’s security concerns about its sensitive northeast. Moreover, an eventual fruition of the BCIM corridor would imply not only improved trade and connectivity, but could also open the door for China to upgrade infrastructure in port facilities in Bangladesh and Myanmar, key hubs in a potential MSR. It is in this connection that India’s effort to develop the Iranian port of Chabahar assumes significance. The port reflects Indian ambitions as a driver of infrastructure development and improved regional connectivity, particularly with Afghanistan (Pant 2018). The Chabahar port has been designed

Introduction 13

to serve as an essential node to a multimodal transportation network for the movement of goods and passengers between Iran, Afghanistan, and India. During the final phase of its development, the port would be able to handle about 20 million tonnes of trade annually. Chabahar was imagined as an alternative north-south corridor linking India by sea to Afghanistan. It is therefore important to India both as a first step towards projecting itself as a regional infrastructure developer but also as a means to develop closer relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. A trilateral transit agreement was signed with Iran and Afghanistan in May 2016 that allows passage of Indian exports through Iran to Afghanistan. Part of the International North South Corridor (between India, Iran, and Russia), the port is vital for India and Iran to reduce dependence on the Suez Canal. Chabahar is also situated on the South Asia Corridor, which links Southeast Asia to Europe. Alleviating the bottleneck that Pakistan poses in terms of India’s connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia has been identified as a significant alternative to Chinese efforts to redraw regional boundaries through the BRI (Pant 2018). China is trying to link with the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and the Bay of Bengal; it is also promoting the cause of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor and financing major projects in other littorals like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India, in contrast, having grasped the changed geopolitical situation in relation to the security architecture of the Bay, has begun to engage and pay attention to the problems and apprehensions of the littorals. Along with its role as the major security provider in the region by regular patrols through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), it has also embraced a strategy of developing a sense of community among the littorals along the Bay region. Participation is being encouraged through forums such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and Exercise MILAN (biennial naval exercise) that have ensured participation of the navies of the littorals. Another initiative is the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), for greater awareness to respond to any maritime challenge, particularly due to the existence of important Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Bay region. With the ever-increasing strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal region, there is a growing desire among the littorals that India should consolidate its relationships across the expanse. At the same time, India should realise and acknowledge increased Chinese presence as a given fact and accommodate this while continuing to mould a Bay of Bengal community. With the recognition that the Bay is a strategic space with a shared history and ”regional“ institutions, the necessity of creation of boundaries and a model of governance has been brought into focus. On the other hand, the recognition of the Bay of Bengal as a ”region” also reconceptualises South and Southeast Asia as distinct spaces traditionally divided by a line running through the middle of the Bay. Both underline the recognition that an

14  Anita Sengupta

inter-oceanic model of governance can only work in tandem with “regional” associations and organisations already in place (Das and Sengupta 2023). This means that an oceanic regional system centred around the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific can only be viable as part of an integrated Eurasian security and economic system. As Das and Sengupta contend, it is probably this recognition that led to the idea of a Maritime Silk Route connecting to a continental system of transport in the Chinese imagining of the BRI. As Francis A. Kornegay Jr argues, this is the result of globalisation encompassing both land and sea and the necessity of “imagining a continental-maritime nexus or interface as an intellectually improvisational tool for unpacking the complexities of regional and global dynamics” (Kornegay 2015). He goes on to note: The maritime domain comprising the global commons via sea lanes of communications forms the connectivity of intercourse linking onshore regional and continental venues of resource access and exploitation with infrastructures of coastal and inland transport links essential for reaching overseas markets and vice versa. These realities inevitably inform national geo-economic strategy, subject to conflicting interpretations regarding great power and naval intentions as indicative in the ambivalence of Sino-Indian relations—their BRICS membership notwithstanding—in and around the Indian Ocean. (Kornegay 2015) Traditionally, the region and its littoral states in Southeast Asia have been subject to competing US-China interests (Stromseth 2017). In order to deal with the US and China, the states themselves have adopted different strategies (Stromseth 2017). While Chinese influence in the states of Laos, Cambodia, and even Myanmar is undeniable, it remains a fact that even here they have faced pushback, which has resulted from domestic social pressure and led to the cancellation of Chinese-financed infrastructure projects like the Mekong Dam project. On the other hand, Thailand, a traditional US Cold War ally, now has numerous arms deals with China, while still conducting military exercises with US-armed forces. However, the delay in the implementation of BRI projects in Thailand means that there is dissatisfaction there as well. Philippines, caught in a dispute over the South China Sea, traditionally had stronger ties with the US. However, President Duterte has indicated that he would want closer economic ties with China. Other Southeast Asian states like Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia are likewise trying to find independent positions between the two super powers. Despite close economic ties with China, they are moving towards diplomatic and military cooperation with regional states. The Southeast Asian states are attempting to manage their interests by balancing them individually and as a region. Here, ASEAN plays a significant role.

Introduction 15

The border of the Indo-Pacific region, as defined by the US, corresponds with the Maritime Silk Road in what is seen as an effort to control the peripheries of Eurasia by the US. Denisov argues that the Chinese strategy for the Indo-Pacific can therefore be termed as “containing the containment” (Denisov 2021). China has proposed a new alternative by advocating the BRI as the model for a community of shared interests that provides benefits to the states of the region. China also does not use the term IndoPacific in its strategic discourse and does not include itself within the region as defined by the US. Chinese scholars like Song Wei stress trade and economic ties for the creation of a single region with a single strategic economic goal (Denisov 2021, 78). Wei argues that this creation of a single economic region would also necessitate the resolution of problems of regional governance and that the Chinese alternative promotes a strong regional system that would be inclusive. Continuing in the same vein of opposition to the development of blocs in the Indo-Pacific region, Zhao Huasheng argues that China is opposed to what he defines as a “soft system.” Soft systems, like blocs, compete with each other but not in open hostility. Since China sees itself as being outside of the process being developed, Huasheng argues it is against the idea of the development of any bloc (Denisov 2021, 80). Indian strategic thinking identifies the Maritime Silk Route as a repackaging of the “string of pearls” strategy, as stated earlier. While the string of pearls theory has gained credence in strategic thinking, analysts like David Brewster argue that China faces disadvantages in the Indian Ocean region, with few dependable security relationships. So, while China may look at prospects of an expanded strategic presence, it will involve itself only in response to specific threats (Brewster 2014). Brewster focuses on Chinese vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean, based on the necessity to protect the Sea Lanes of Communication through chokepoints like the Malacca Strait for energy supply, to argue that China is following a “places not bases” strategy to allow for flexibility. 2 This could have an effect on the regional balance of power if China was certain about the availability of facilities in case of a crisis. However, Brewster argues that this remains to be seen, as China itself has argued that the ports are for commercial purposes only. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated the Indian position during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. He claimed that this was based on the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the importance of oceans to security and commerce, and India’s role within the broader region. Prime Minister Modi clarified that for India this was neither a strategy nor an exclusive club. Rather, it was a “natural region” ranging “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas” and argued that it should be “free, open, and inclusive,” grounded in “rules and norms…based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few;” an area

16  Anita Sengupta

distinguished by respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and over-flight. He went on to stress that it was not in conflict with ASEAN unity and centrality (MEA 2018). What was implicit in this discourse was the pronouncement of the Indo-Pacific as a strategy to balance China’s influence over the oceans. On the other hand, the downplaying of the concept of a “rules and norms based” Indo-Pacific by the Chinese is a clear indication that the openness of the policy is in contradiction to the Chinese policy in stretches like the South China Sea. A rapid multiplication of the number of strategic dialogues, intelligence sharing mechanisms, military exercises, and defence compacts involving large and medium powers in the Indo-Pacific, including India, have come up in response. There have been attempts to deepen cooperation in various fields with the littoral states, promote the creation of maritime norms and rules, and encourage a balance of power in the region. However, there is also an ongoing attempt at constructive dialogue through various organisations like BRICS and SCO. Darshana M. Baruah argues that the Indo-Pacific provides India the opportunity to leverage partnerships to address the new security and strategic environment. It also offers India an opportunity to create partnerships with smaller littoral and island states like the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles in the Indo-Pacific. However, she argues that the Indian Ocean region and South Asia remain the priority region for India (Baruah 2020). Small nations and island states in particular presented a challenge, because until recently very little had been done to renew partnerships with them. Though they have been long-term Indian partners, the increasing Chinese interest created challenges for them in their attempt to avoid taking sides in an increasingly competitive atmosphere. The Indian response, in terms of the creation of a new MEA division on the Indian Ocean Region, signified a transition to a greater focus on the islands against the background of a transformed neighbourhood. Indo-Pacific collaborations also focused on infrastructure development and connecting Asia and Africa through the Indian Ocean as part of a joint Japanese collaboration. It resulted in the Asia Africa Growth Corridor in response to the BRI. There have been other attempts to increase collaboration and credibility through initiatives like the International Solar Alliance with France and the creation of a coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure 2019. There are also a number of annual exchanges like the Maritime Security Dialogue, where key regional issues are discussed. The Indian position also included Russia as an Indo-Pacific power, due to its long Pacific coast. This inclusion is based on a long relationship in defence. There is also recognition of the Russian role in the Middle East and post-American withdrawal from Afghanistan as being significant. However, to date, the Russian position on the Indo-Pacific has been aligned with that

Introduction 17

of the Chinese, though Russia is more positive towards regional formats as a reflection of the new form of globalisation. Given the complex and fluid nature of contemporary international politics, the Indian response has been defined by “strategic autonomy” which has included a “regrouping of interests and partners, attempts to negotiate with competing partners and an attempt to manage uncertainties effectively” (Denisov 2021, 76). Rajesh Rajagopalan argues that India’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific has become a “sub-set” for its policy towards China, though there is no official recognition of the same. In fact, India’s policies of partnership towards the United States and Japan, particularly with respect to the Indo-Pacific, are reflective of this stance. On the other hand, there are certain aspects of collaboration evident with China as well, further complicating the mix of policies (Rajagopalan 2020). He goes on to argue that this is true of most of China’s other neighbours as well, and in theoretical literature on this there is very little consensus on how to define this behaviour. While many characterise it as “hedging,” Rajagopalan terms it as “evasive balancing,” which he defines as “an effort to engage in balancing while trying to reassure the target” (Rajagopalan 2020, 76). This has been attempted through repeated policy statements that stress the inclusive nature of Indo-Pacific policies, through engagement in bilateral and multilateral organisations, and through seeking dialogue in difficult periods of the relationship. Rajagopalan argues that, while not explicitly stated, India wants to prevent Chinese hegemony in the region, something that was evident from Prime Minister Modi’s reference to the principle of equality of all nations and the call for a common rulesbased order during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018. Contradictory assurances to China left much to be desired. In addition, India also has serious problems with regard to her capacity to build infrastructure to reconnect with Southeast Asia. Rajagopalan argues that India’s policies towards Southeast Asia have transited through a perception of spirituality to a wider Asian culture, through disengagement during the cold war years, and eventually to a relationship that was based both on emulation of economic success as well as security and humanitarian assistance. The geographic scope of the area of interest has expanded to include the entire Indo-Pacific with greater interest in the ASEAN. There has also been a change in the objectives of the engagement with political, strategic, and cultural dimensions being added on to economic ones based on trade and connectivity. This, according to him, is also reflected in the extended definition of the Indo-Pacific, revealing Indian concerns in the Indian Ocean as also the South China Sea and the Pacific. The Indian framing of its Indo-Pacific policy is also inclusive and reflects its concern for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, on which India depends for trade and transit. Another significant aspect of India’s Indo-Pacific policy is the emerging relationship with the United States with its significant security components

18  Anita Sengupta

and India’s relationship with American allies, Japan and Australia. Similarly, India has sought to build its relations with Southeast Asian states, which was the initial objective of the Look East policy. In recent times, the prolonged lockdown and its aftermath and the June 2020 border conflict seem to have hardened India’s position against China, resulting in the banning of Chinese apps on the grounds of security, limiting foreign direct investment, and focusing on a more forceful military strategy and rhetoric. This also resulted in greater outreach to Indo-Pacific partners like Australia. In October 2020, India and the US signed four foundational defence agreements required by Washington for defence integration. Kumar and Ghosh argue that, while there is an aspiration commensurate with India’s growing strategic engagement in the region, the realisation of the stated objectives remains debatable, given the realities on the ground. A common strategic framework embracing both oceans is yet to be developed and the capabilities to implement them are yet to be cultivated (Kumar and Ghosh 2022). While there are issues of common concern like environmental degradation, human trafficking, natural disasters due to climate change, and piracy that concern all the states in the region, there remains the reality of contradictory policies and changing regional equations that make any attempt at developing a regional maritime system of governance challenging. For India, influence and capability in the Pacific part of the Indo-Pacific is restricted by US and Chinese traditional influence. There is today a focus on the Indian Ocean as a whole. This marks a change from the years of Cold War politics, where the focus was on the chokepoints and localised spaces of strategic interest. This has meant the challenge of developing a strategic system for the entire zone. This is complicated by the fact of pre-existing complexities, but also by a range of new issues that have become significant due to the concerns of the multiple littorals. Issues of freedom of navigation particularly along chokepoints, the increasing naval completion among regional and extraregional powers, and the geopolitical flux in general have created numerous challenges in the various subregions of the ocean. In the western Indian Ocean as well as the southern and eastern Indian Ocean, the problem is one of enforcement capability, with unrestrained illegal activities including illegal fishing. There is also a growing competition for the opening of naval bases and continuing militarisation of the Red Sea. The Persian Gulf region faces the overflow of the multiple conflicts in the Middle East and the increasing modernisation of the Pakistan navy. The Indian Ocean island countries are being increasingly faced with Chinese influence and the growing numbers of BRI projects. In the Bay of Bengal region, traditionally, Indian naval capability had been a strong presence. There is today increasing naval capability of the other littorals. While Chinese naval presence is limited, there is significant shipping activity and an interest in ports along the coast.

Introduction 19

There have been recent news reports about India building a new naval facility at Agalega, an island off the southeastern coast of Africa, which will be used by the Indian Navy for patrols and surveillance (Bashfield 2021). It is significant that the Chinese have a military base at Djibouti, some 2500 miles away. The facilities are situated in the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean, which is a region of strategic interest to both. The Ministry of External Affairs has argued that this is part of the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) policy, which aims to increase maritime cooperation between countries in the region. The outpost will support the Indian fleet of Boeing P-81 maritime surveillance aircraft, which can be used for submarine strikes, intelligence, and surveillance. Their peacetime utility is derived from their sophisticated sensors and radars that can be used for routine missions. But the P8s require refuelling facilities and staging points and it is here that ports like Agalega come in useful. India’s focus on the island states is significant, given their strategic location, their traditional relations with India, and the increasing Chinese interest in the region. Island states of the Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, the Maldives, and Madagascar) have common infrastructure needs, particularly in terms of naval capacity. While they have benefitted from regional powers, they harbour questions about the misuse of their territory and also about the effects of the presence of these powers on their own domestic and foreign policy. India has traditionally offered assistance to these states, both in terms of human resources and equipment. For instance, the Mauritius Coast Guard is led by a deputed Indian Navy officer and India has gifted and serviced their patrol boats. Similarly, India provides the Maldives with hydrographic and surveillance services. In Seychelles, India conducts hydrographic work in the Special Economic Zone. In addition to capacity building, India has also offered assistance in disaster management, like during the tsunami in 2004 or during floods. While at present China’s assistance to these states is negligible, they are likely to increase, with China showing an interest in particular in ports, like the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota. Japan has also shown an interest in them, with coast guard and military cooperation with Sri Lanka and the building of a “safe island” in the Maldives with breakwater protection (Samaranayake 2014). Articles in this volume

The articles in the volume are written against this background, while reflecting and focusing on narratives from within India’s extended neighbourhood. The volume begins with a set of three articles that reflect on the notion of neighbourhoods in South Asia to emphasise a fluidity that transcends the logic of nation-states as entities with strictly defined boundaries and the subsequent impact of this fluidity on foreign policy. Neighbourhood ties in

20  Anita Sengupta

South Asia have forever been shape-shifting, and the notions of friendship in the neighbourhood oscillate from angst to animosity. It begins with Samir Kumar Das’s article on “China, India and the aporia of neighbourhood,” where he recounts ethnographic studies to reflect on what he refers to as the “rules of neighbourhood” in South Asia, which have a dynamism of their own. He argues that facets of this neighbourhood impinge on foreign policy, creating divergent forms that cannot be reduced to a great game framework. Similar notions of “muddled” friendships in South Asian neighbourhoods are the subject of Anup Shekhar Chakraborty’s article “Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood: Eastern Himalayas, disgruntled geographies, and ‘Chinese goods.’” Chakraborty focuses on what these complex neighbourhoods mean and imply to the actors in a highly tangled geopolitical/ geocultural/geo-economic space in the course of his understanding of bootlegging engagements that complicate the spectre of China in the Himalayan nations of Nepal and Bhutan. Traditional ‘encounters,’ ‘dialogues,’ and ‘interactions’ in intermediate spaces that have now been transformed into buffers between China and India are the subject of Jigme Yeshe Lama’s article “Dance of the dragons: Bhutan-China relationship,” where he underlines multiple dynamics that influence the present relationship. The second set of articles look to India’s immediate South Asian neighbourhood and its continental connects, where Chinese economic penetration has created substantial inroads with geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural implications. Raghav Sharma, in his article “Comrades in arms? Decoding China’s Taliban gamble,” points to advantages for China as Beijing looks for a more active role in determining the trajectory of developments in Afghanistan in the wake of competing interest of global powers. The paper argues that the key areas of strategic and economic interest that underpin Beijing’s interest, however, will be negatively impacted by the lack of political process and exclusionary character of the Taliban, which in turn would result in an economic freefall. Despite the shared colonial legacy, the newly created states of South Asia adopted very different trajectories of state building, often entangled with nation building. India and Pakistan, though created simultaneously, offer contrasting narratives of political, social, and economic progression in the process of decolonisation. While engaging in rhetorical as well as actual battles, the two states forged opposing alliances. The resilient and increasingly deepening Sino-Pak alliance, in contrast to the rising Sino-India disputes, is a case-in-point, with significant ramifications for the South Asian neighbourhood. Priya Singh, in her article “Connectivity, capital, and culture: China in Pakistan,” deconstructs the changing dynamics of the multifaceted China-Pakistan relationship and its impact on the neighbourhood. The last article in this section is Sriparna Pathak’s article “China in Bangladesh: The evolving relationship.” Pathak argues that the economic and military component of the relationship between China and

Introduction 21

Bangladesh shows how much the relationship has evolved. From once being opposed to the creation of Bangladesh, China has now become one of the major investors and trade partners for Dhaka. She plots the evolution of the relationship, where the two lie in terms of the completion of the BRI projects, and tries to understand whether the relationship could pose a challenge to Indian interests within South Asia. A third set of articles examines evolving networks and dynamics in the neighbourhood. Bahram Amirahmadian, in his article “The manifold aspects of Chinese presence in Iran,” focuses on a relation based on material interests, though he notes that in recent times the benefits of the economic relations has been in favour of China. Chinese import of cheap Iranian crude and the flooding of Iranian markets with goods which at one time wer produced within Iran has impacted Iranian small industries negatively. As with Iran, long-term strategic interests remain in doubt and the future is fraught with multiple possibilities. Yunus Emre Gurbuz, Mehmet Yahya Çicrkli, and Maksat Ajkan Uulu, in their article, “Prospects of continuity and change of China’s role in Central Asia: Case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” examine the projections of change and continuity in the relationship between China and the Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the BRI. They contend that the BRI would not result in any significant increase in Chinese economic presence or investment in the region and underline global, regional, and domestic reasons for the same. They argue that China will become a significant factor in the region only in the longterm with implementation of carefully planned soft power policies. The last article focuses on Myanmar and how this relationship is impacted by ethnic dynamics across modern state borders. Soma Ghosal in her article “The ethnic dynamics in Myanmar-China strategic interests: Implications for the region” examines China’s intentions at furthering its strategic interests in Myanmar through the rhetoric of paukphaw. The author contends that shared boundaries constitute an intrinsic part of the Chinese policy as most of its strategic projects are in ethnically contentious regions. China attempts to manipulate ethnic minorities, especially in resource-rich and strategically important zones of contact and assume control over ethnic minority groups in conflict zones of border states as a key component in furthering Chinese national interests. Ghosal argues that Sino-Myanmar relations have gradually evolved on the premise of managing ethnic minority groups to protect investments in the state. A fourth set of articles looks at India’s maritime neighbourhood and begins with Anindya Jyoti Majumdar’s article on “Security narratives of China’s impingement in the Indian Ocean theatre,” which explores dominant narratives pertaining to the security scenario in the Indian Ocean region and seeks to find the relationships between the narratives and policy. Majumdar argues that these narratives need to be considered in the view of wider storylines

22  Anita Sengupta

about the changing global order that both presuppose a narrative of contest between the league of democracies and an axis of authoritarian states and also attempt to divide the world into two major blocs. Such sweeping generalisations are further complicated by narrower but unique narratives of “Chindia Syndrome” or “Frenemy Syndrome,” indicating fluctuations in relations between India and China. Contentions in the maritime neighbourhood are best exemplified by the Sino-Indian rivalry in Sri Lanka. Shiran Illanperuma and Sumanasiri Liyanage, in their article “India-China rivalry in Sri Lanka: A nexus of historical narratives and political economy,” look into the evolution of Sri Lanka’s ties with both India and China through foundational myths and national chronicles like the Mahavamsa, which trace Sinhalese bloodline and the Buddhist religion to India, while also warning of the existential threat of expansionary South Indian empires. They explain that Sri Lanka’s own economic deficiencies have led to China, rather than India, emerging as the primary sponsor of Sri Lanka’s economic development in recent decades. Economics and redefined regional dynamics is the theme of San Khine’s article, “The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar,” where she focuses on Chinese economic strategy in Myanmar and ways in which Myanmar can effectively balance these strategies through development of its own material and human resources, institutional reforms, and a comprehensive policy for development. She explores ways and means for Myanmar to manage the implications of Chinese influence and seeks to respond to questions about the economic policies and objectives of China and consider the possible ways for Myanmar to manage these impacts. The final article by Emilian Kavalski, on “The collapse of China’s cooperation with Central and East Europe” provides an interesting comparison of the evolving nature of Chinese relationship in the immediate extended neighbourhood of the Asian regions in Central Europe, where a similar pattern of domestic political compulsions drives the narratives and nature of bilateral relationships. Kavalski argues that the days when China’s cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was viewed as a boon for Beijing’s outreach in Europe are long gone. CEE attitudes towards China began to cool in the wake of the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. This trend appeared to be further reinforced by developments during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, Beijing’s ambiguous reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided a real bifurcation point, splitting the CEE states between those ideationally committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and those looking for illiberal alternatives. China has been set up by both camps to justify their strategic choices. In this respect, the study suggests that it is the contextual localisation of China in domestic political debates – rather than what China necessarily does in the individual CEE states or globally – that informs CEE perceptions of China.

Introduction 23

Conclusions

According to Constantino Xavier and Nitika Nayar, in the last 20 years India has opened or reopened 13 new consulates in neighbouring countries (Xavier and Nayar 2021). Most of these consulates are not situated in capital cities but in peripheral towns, often on the borderlands, and they are reflective of India’s subnational engagement with neighbours, including provincial administrations, minorities, and other economic actors. Xavier and Nayar argue that, since 2001, India has opened twice as many new missions in the region as in the last 50 years. They note that the ten new consulates include Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan, Birgunj in Nepal, Phuetsholing in Bhutan, Jaffna and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Sittwe in Myanmar. Two new missions were opened in Bangladesh in Sylhet and Khulna. Another consulate has been approved for Addu in the southern Maldives. In Myanmar, India reopened a consulate that had been closed since 1979. These missions complement the embassies located in capital cities and are engaged in economic diplomacy, political outreach, technical assistance, and development cooperation (Xavier and Nayar 2021). Among the roles that these consulates play, the most significant is that of economic diplomacy and supporting sub-regional connectivity. Support for cross-border movement of people and goods and for Indian companies that provide support for infrastructural activities are some of the other functions that these consulates perform. Consulates like the one in Birgunj in southern Nepal, situated near the border check post, support Indian companies that are building infrastructure for the Nepal government. It also assists transit trade, allowing smooth commercial relations. Consulates and missions on the Bangladesh and Myanmar borders assist in India’s connection with Southeast Asia. The new consulate at Sittwe is located near the transit hub of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the mission in Mandalay oversees the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway that will eventually connect Manipur to Bangkok (Xavier and Nayar 2021). Similarly, the development dimensions of India’s foreign policy depend on these peripheral missions, which assist with ground implementation, engagement with local communities, and also liaison with local authorities. In Afghanistan, India’s consulates help implement development activities that were meant for areas beyond Kabul. They also help towards community outreach, and India’s mission in Sri Lanka, for instance, helps to connect with the Tamil community through cultural diplomacy. India’s growing diplomatic outreach reflects the significance of the neighbourhood to India today. As the peripheries in most states become central to bridging the states of the region, the significance of these missions in engaging with diverse groups assumes significance. And it is here that the next phase of the Indian connection to her neighbourhood needs to be situated.

24  Anita Sengupta

Notes 1 The US Department of State in the section “Diplomacy in Action” underlines four key areas of support: (a) regional energy markets, which include support for CASA –regional electricity grids and support for energy transmission lines, hydropower plants, and 1,000 megawatts to Pakistan’s power grid; (b) trade and transport: 3,000 kilometres of roads built or rehabilitated in Afghanistan, support for Kazakh and Afghan accession to WTO, and technical assistance to the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and Cross Border Transport Agreement between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan; (c) customs and border operations: increasing trade, reducing the cost of crossing regional borders, and streamlining customs procedures at seven Afghan border crossing points; (d) business and people-to-people: funding of university studies for Afghan students in Central Asia, sponsoring Central Asia-Afghanistan Women’s Economic Symposium and South Asia Women’s Entrepreneurship Symposium, and organised trade delegations. For details, see: “U.S. Support for the New Silk Road,” U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2017, https://2009​-2017​.state​.gov​/p​/sca ​/ci ​/af ​/newsilkroad ​/index​.htm, accessed 9 August 2016. 2 “Places, not bases” refers to the American post-Cold War strategy of seeking to avoid the political and economic costs associated with maintaining bases in favour of more flexible arrangements that allowed them military access in times of crisis.

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Introduction 25

Brewster, D. 2017. “Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean.” Geopolitics 20(2): 269–291. Chaudhury, A.B.R., P. Basu, S. Banerjee, and S. Bose. 2018. India’s Maritime Connectivity: Importance of the Bay of Bengal. Kolkata: Observer Research Foundation. https://www​.orfonline​.org ​/research ​/indias​-maritime​- connectivity​ -importance​-of​-the​-bay​-of​-bengal/. Chen, X., S.K. Joseph, and H. Tariq. 2018. “Betting Big on CPEC.” Trinity College Digital Repository, Trinity College. https//: digitalrepository​.trincoll​.edu​/fac​pub. Cooper, Z. 2018. “Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean.” CSIS, April 2: 27–28. Cowen, D. 2010. “A Geography of Logistics: Market Authority and the Security of Supply Chains.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100(3): 600–620. Das, S., and A. Sengupta, eds. 2023. Continuity, Connectivity and Access: The Importance of the Bay of Bengal Region in Indian Foreign Policy. Abingdon: Routledge. Denisov, I., O. Paramonov, E. Arapova, and I. Safranchuk. 2021. “Russia, China and the Concept of Indo Pacific.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(1): 78. Diener, A. 2015. “Parsing Mobilities in Central Eurasia: Border Management and New Silk Roads.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56(4): 387. Funaiole, M., and J. Hillman. 2018. “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers and Challenges.” CSIS, April 2: 1–25. Garlick, J. 2018. “Deconstructing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pipe Dreams Versus Geopolitical Realities.” Journal of Contemporary China 27(112): 521. Green, M.J. 2018. “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region.” CSIS, April 2: 1–3. Hillman, J. 2018, March. “Game of Loans, How China Bought Hambantota.” CSIS Briefs 2. www​.csis​.org. Holmes, J.R., and T. Yoshihara. 2008. “China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31(3): 367–394. Jaisankar, D. 2018. “India and the Indo-Pacific Balance at Shangri-La.” The Hindustan Times, June 5. Kornegay Jr, F.A. 2015. “Editorial.” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 11(2): 148. Kousar, S., M. Zafar, A. Rehman, and N. Nasir. 2018. “China –Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Gateway to Sustainable Economic Development.” International Journal of Social Economics 45(6): 909–924. DOI: 10.1108/IJSE-02-2017-0059. Kumar, Y., and P. Ghosh. 2020. “The Indo in the Indo-Pacific: An Indian View.” Naval War College Review 73(2). https://digital​- commons​.usnwc​.edu​ /nwc​- review​/ vol73​/ iss2​/ 7/​?utm​_ source​= digital​- commons​.usnwc​.edu​%2Fnwc​ -review ​ % 2Fvol73​ % 2Fiss2​ % 2F7​ & utm ​ _ medium ​ = PDF ​ & utm ​ _ campaign​ =PDFCoverPages. Accessed 24 January 2022. Ministry of External Affairs. 2018, June 1. Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue. https://www​.mea​.gov​.in ​/Speeches​- Statements​.htm​?dtl​ /29943​/ Prime​+Ministers​+Keynote​+Address​+at​+Shangri​+La​+Dialogue​+June​+01​ +2018#:~​:text​=I​%20am​%20here​%20to​%20say​,pursue​%20this​%20than​%20in​ %20Singapore. Moramudali, U. 2020, January 1. “The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/01​/the​-hambantota​

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-port​-deal​-myths​-and​-realities/#:~​:te​​x t​=At​​%20th​​e​%20t​​ime​%2​​0of​%2​​0 ente​​ring,​​ was​%2​​0hand​​ed​%20​​over%​​20to%​​20Chi​​na. Nataraj, G. 2015. “Why India Should Join China’s MSR.” ORF Commentaries. https://www​ . orfonline ​ . org ​ / research ​ / why​ - india​ - should ​ - join ​ - chinas ​ - msr/. Accessed 13 January 2020. Pant, H.V. 2018. “India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port.” CSIS, April 2: 18. Raja Mohan, C. 2012. Samudra Manthan, Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment. Rajagopalan, R. 2020. “Evasive Balancing: India’s Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy.” International Affairs 96(1): 75–93. Samaddar, R., and A. Sengupta, eds. 2019. Global Governance and India’s North East. Abingdon: Routledge. Samaranayake, N. 2014. “Island States in a Region of Great Powers.” In Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region, edited by David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, 61–70. Stimson Center. Scott, D. 2013. “India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean—Securing the Waves.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36(4): 484–511. Sengupta, A. 2016. “Logistical Spaces IV: Connectivity as the New Asian Paradigm.” Policies and Practices 79 http://www​.mcrg​.ac​.in ​/ PP79​.pdf. Sengupta, A. 2017. “Regional Strategies and Global Image in an Era of Branding.” In Symbols and Images of the State in Eurasia, Springer Briefs in Political Science. Singapore: Springer91-109. Sengupta, A. 2019. “Connectivity as Influence. India´s Policy in Central Asia in the Era of the ‘New Silk Road’.” Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal 49 : 209-220. Simon, L. 2013. “Reaching Beyond the Indo-Pacific.” Comparative Strategy 32(4): 331–353. Singh, Z.D. 2014, October–December. “Indian Perceptions of China’s Maritime Silk Road Idea.” Journal of Defence Studies 8(4): 133–148. http://idsa​.in​/jds​/8​_4​ _2014​_ Ind​ianP​erce​ptio​nsof​Chin​asMa​riti​meSi​lkRoad​.html. Stromseth, J. 2017. “Great Power Rivalry, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy.” Special Issue. Asian Security 13(3). Stromseth, J., ed. 2021. Rivalry and Response: Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Weimer, N.D. 2013. “Sino Indian Power Preponderance in Maritime Asia: A (Re) Source of Conflict in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.” Global Change, Peace and Security 25(1): 5–26. Xavier, C., and N. Nayar. 2021, August 31. “India’s New Consulates and Subnational Diplomacy in South Asia.” South Asian Voices. https://southasianvoices​.org ​/ indias​-new​- consulates​-and​-subnational​-diplomacy​-in​-south​-asia/.

PART I

Transcendental boundaries in neighbourhoods



2 CHINA, INDIA, AND THE APORIA OF NEIGHBOURHOOD Samir Kumar Das

The shift in emphasis from a “Look East” to an “Act East” policy not only marks a sense of urgency that characterises the latter, but proposes to expand the ambit of the policy beyond the countries of Southeast Asia, to countries of East Asia. Insofar as the ambit is expanded, China figures prominently as one of our key neighbours. This has resulted in a renewed concern for rediscovering our historical ties with the country. This paper aims at deriving the implications of these ties for India’s foreign policy. Does China merely stand at our doorstep, waiting to be included in our newly redefined neighbourhood, or has it already become part of us through multiple genres of engagement? The first section of the paper dwells on the question of how these ties have penetrated into the heart of our body politic and thus deepened our anxieties. The duality of China’s role as a geopolitical neighbour and a neighbour with long historical ties forces us to rethink the very concept of neighbourhood at a more general level. The second section reflects on the co-presence of two registers of neigbourhood and how it makes each other perpetually incomplete. While each impinges on the other, their interpenetrating nature produces an intermediate space which cannot be reduced to either of them. Are there some rules on the basis of which this intermediate space is organised? Drawing from our earlier ethnographic works, the third section outlines three such rules and their implications for both the geopolitical and historical registers. From outside in

I am reminded of the expedition upstream along the river Brahmaputra led by George Dunbar in the early-1910s. Dunbar was a British military DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-3

30  Samir Kumar Das

officer-cum-ethnographer who was given the task of figuring out where exactly India came to an end and Tibet began and vice versa, and thus ensuring the security of the tribes living on the Indian side of the “frontier” against “the Chinese invaders”: “…there have been times during the past twenty years when Chinese troops, invading Tibet and pressing down upon the tribes beyond the North-East Frontier have given cause for anxiety” (Dunbar 1932/1984, viii). Dunbar himself describes the expedition as “an exploration in an otherwise unknown land” offering him “the good fortune of getting to know intimately an intensely interesting primitive people” (Dunbar 1932/1984, ix). Interestingly, the twin task of mapping and securing the “frontiers,” according to Dunbar and the colonial rulers of his time, qualified as “knowledge” and, may we add, “anthropological knowledge” (Ghosh 1991). As the expedition team was sailing upstream and passing through what is called the Abor1 country, it came across artefacts which, they had thought, had their association with the Tibetans. They were in a dilemma, for they were not very sure if the presence of these artefacts meant that Tibet had already begun and they had exceeded the administrative brief. But they decided to keep sailing along the river and could increasingly discover the traces of Tibetan artefacts, but again they were not very sure exactly where they would draw the line between what was known at that point in time as the “Eastern Frontier” of British India on the one hand and Tibet/China on the other. 2 They were not sure, because they could also discover distinctively Indian imprints amongst the frontier tribes. As they crossed the Abor country and entered Pemako, Dunbar could make out the “confused state” of the situation: The whole political state of this part of the world is most confused. Half the Tangam Abors3 may be said to be theoretically under the indefinite political control of the Political Officer, Sadiya. The remainder of the Tangams live in the country about the great gorges, where the Monbas, Pobas and Khambas hunt the wandering herds of the takins. Pemako, wedged between the Tangam, Abor settlements appears to be connected with Po-Me. Po-Me is a feudatory of Lhasa, with a semi-independent ruler and was invaded in 1911, by the Chinese, who destroyed its capital Showa. By 1913, the Chinese forces had retired, but before they left they seemed to have sent a detachment into the northern part of Pemako. In 1913, the people of Pe-me and Pe-mako were still very nervous about the Chinese, and this possibly induced Dopo [Dunbar’s contact] to ask me quite seriously if I would stay in the country and not go down with the others, so as to keep anything unpleasant from happening to them. He casually explained that we had only been shown prong guns. But that they had some modern rifles. He went on to make it quite clear that I would be provided with everything a man could possibly want. For one

China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood 31

ridiculous moment I saw myself training a Pomeko Territorial Force. I hardly liked to ask Dopo if this was entirely his own idea. But there was I, a Government servant, with every sort of responsibility and claim upon me elsewhere. Four days later I left Yortong, and turned my face towards India and the ordinary routine of everyday life (Dunbar 1932/1984) And it all happened one fine morning when the expedition team, albeit suddenly, decided that they should not move farther because there might be the danger of unknowingly hitting Tibet and thus taking on the “ferocious” Monbas, Pobas, and Khambas of Tibet. The story tells us how difficult it was to draw a thin line of border on an otherwise continuous cultural landscape. While the “anxiety” caused by the frequent raids of Chinese raiders made it imperative on the part of the colonial rulers to draw the border in neat and precise terms, the haunting “confusion” forced the team not only to abandon the expedition, but to settle in the process for a perpetually arbitrary border. About a hundred years later, what Dunbar called “anxiety” has only become more acute. Besides, if Dunbar and the colonial rulers discovered the source of “anxiety” in a remote frontier and fewer frontier tribes, there is reason to believe that the source has moved from outside in and struck at the body of the nation. On 29 January 2014, a 20-year-old boy named Nido Tania from Arunachal Pradesh was hacked to death in broad daylight in New Delhi’s Lajpat Nagar market, reportedly because he had a haircut that made him look “Chinese” – and not Indian (Pant 2020). Nido’s father was a sitting legislator from Arunachal Pradesh and we came to know that Chinese-style haircuts have become fashionable in towns and cities of the northeast and Darjeeling in West Bengal – so much so, that many local barbers actually watch Chinese movies in order to develop some knowledge about the state-of-the-art hairstyles in mainland China. Why should one remember these apparently unconnected stories occurring in the gap of a hundred years? Because there is a thread of similarity. Both the expedition team and the killers of Nido Tania were haunted by the similar anxiety of continuity and were driven by the perception that China must not be part of us. But, the thread of similarity ends there. There is a difference too. The expedition team was trying to figure out where China began on the fringes of the “Eastern Frontier” and where India came to an end. In the second instance, China has struck right at the heart of our capital. In other words, the question now is not so much to determine where exactly the border is drawn, but to cleanse the interior of the body of the impurities caused by the symbolic presence of China. Dunbar’s brief of stopping China at the border continues to elude us. The danger has only grown much bigger, and now the task is to preserve the purity of the body,

32  Samir Kumar Das

cleansing it of impurities, and the Chinese hairstyle is only one aspect. The outside no longer remains outside, as Dunbar had thought, but has become part of the inside.4 We are thus confronted with a paradox that is underlined in the three papers presented at a recently held seminar. 5 On the one hand, there is what Mayongam calls “the glorious history” f close trade and economic relations, cultural and technological exchanges with trade, ideas, and innovations travelling across the societies. On the other hand, these relations were “closed down” (Mayongam 2022), “came under closure” (Thonginlal 2022) thanks to the emergence of distinctive nation-states and the rapid securitisation in the frontier areas (Lama 2022). The three papers, however, provide two diametrically opposed answers to the paradox: on the one hand, it is argued that closer trade and economic relations, cultural, and technological exchanges cannot be sustained in the era of nation-states with the heavy securitisation accompanying them, particularly in recent years: “…for India and China opening the border for greater regional economic integration is not likely to happen in the coming years” (Mayongam 2022). Festivals, such as manau practised in common by the Jinpos of Yunnan in China, Singphos of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam in India, and Kachins of Myanmar – believed to be ethnic cognates to each other – have lost their “broad and secular character” that once characterised them when they could remain as one cohesive community, and have subsequently yielded to appropriations by the respective nations – the “atheists” in China, buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh/Assam, and christians in Burma/Myanmar (Thonginlal 2022) – understandably with varying degrees of success. On the other hand, a section of scholars points out how, notwithstanding the disruptions in the cultural continuities in the wake of the emergence of nation-states, the “remnants” persist, drawing their sustenance from the present. Nimmi Kurian’s work on India-China Borderlands (2014), for instance, proposes to view the border not as a dividing line, but as a “zone” marked by continuities (“a bustling network of social and cultural flows,” as she terms them) and peopled by active, living communities. She makes a plea for factoring them in, while “rethinking” our foreign policy towards China: “It stands to reason that the local communities need to be active partners in this rethinking process…” (Kurian 2014). Her plea is based on the presupposition that a nation’s foreign policy could be “effective” only if the voices of these borderland communities are heard and taken into account. Unlike what the run-of-the-mill commentators would have us believe, these communities are, for her, not the mere objects of appropriation by the concerned nation-states, but are living subjects having their active role in the formulation of India’s China policy.

China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood 33

Neighbourhood’s two registers

Why did I begin with these two stories of continuity and discontinuity? Precisely because neighbourhood plays between these two registers of continuity and discontinuity and therefore is irreducibly complex. We cannot reduce one register to the other. Unfortunately, mainstream scholars of International Relations continue to subscribe to the post-Westphalian world order of nation-states and are dismissive of the social and cultural landscape of neighbourhood continuities. They seem to take the concept of neighbourhood loosely, if at all. According to them, neighbourhood stands for a group of contiguous or nearby nation-states that have come together simply by a sheer geographical accident, each with its distinct national interest, although each of them may be endowed with differential ability to pursue such interest. Viewed in this light, neighbourhood does not bear any special significance – other than the geopolitical compulsions of proximity and contiguity. Neighbouring countries, first and foremost, are nation-states with their separate geopolitical interests. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, one of our former prime ministers, once said, “We can change our friends, but not our neighbours.” The underlying message was clear – we have no other way but to put up with the two “enemies” sitting on our borders and masquerading as neighbours. Neighbourhood, in this understanding, is a function of power politics in two complementary senses of the term. On the one hand, neighbourhood is made to serve as the site of contest between two or more rivalling countries – India and China, in our case. If India is to bail Sri Lanka out of the current economic collapse the latter has been facing, it is to be seen not as an innocent move, but as an attempt at weaning Sri Lanka away from China’s clutches. Neighbourhood is basically understood as the venue where two powers are involved in a kind of regional cold war. The same is true of Myanmar. While China is bent upon finding connectivity to the waterways through Myanmar’s port and grabbing her hydrocarbon resources, India faces the challenge of thwarting China’s moves in areas dangerously closer to her already vulnerable northeastern borders. On the other hand, as India is all set to project herself as a global power and refuses to remain tied to her immediate neighbours, the neighbours are believed to be suffering from what I described as “small power syndrome” (Das 1998). The more India aspires to become a global power, the more her neighbours feel apprehensive and fearful and indulge in what Shyam Saran once called “counterbalancing” her, by pitting her against such powerful neighbours like China and/or Pakistan – only adding to India’s consternation. It is a vicious cycle – if you are powerful, then your smaller neighbours become apprehensive, so they want to play you off against the other(s), and this play only drags you into a spiralling conflict – much against your global interest. Ironically, India’s neighbourhood relationship seems to be a victim

34  Samir Kumar Das

of her great power aspirations. The challenge India faces in the immediate neighbourhood is not to shift away and disengage, but to effectively engage in a way that helps address and heal the small power syndrome of her neighbours. There is a chance that India’s neighbourhood policy might be overridden by her great power ambitions. Neighbourhood, according to this view, is only an extension of the great power game. The other register of neighbourhood has to do with the challenge of making neighbours with the geographically contiguous or nearby countries that are not otherwise neighbourly towards us, by bringing the neighbourhood continuities to bear on the concerned nation-states. The term is used to refer to the web of social, cultural, and economic continuities that spill across the borders and blunt the rough edges of the geopolitical interests of the concerned nation-states. But the paradox is that the invocation of these continuities does not easily feed into the respective foreign policies of the countries in question. There is bound to be a part of this neighbourhood that does not dissolve into the foreign policies of the nation-states for reasons best known to us. Because the two registers are autonomous and do not necessarily converge with each other, neither of them could independently explain the neighbourhood dynamics underlying the region. While a nation-state seeks to mould the complex web of social, cultural, and economic relations in tune with what it considers its national interest, it can do so only incompletely, as much as the web of relations can exercise its influence only incompletely on the shaping of a country’s national interest. For example, there is a difference of accent between the papers by Mayongam and Thonginlal: Mayongam, for instance, maintains that, given a congenial environment, the nation-states may eventually come to realise and appreciate the value of continuities: “The cross border interaction needs an environment where the nation-state shared the same political values, interest, and security. But amongst great powers with regional hegemon ambition barely work together in an environment of shared interest and values” (Mayongam 2022). In contrast, Thonginlal feels that there is still a space left for the concerned people to play a role in persuading the nation-states to come to realise and appreciate the historical continuities. As he observes: “[D]espite all the challenges, relations are built through people-to-people contact and cultural and economic ties, which can shape strained relations” (Thonginlal 2022). As Kurian too argued, the interest of a nation-state is “effectively” served only if the voices of the local communities are heard by their nation-states. Our journey in this paper begins with the premise of incompleteness. The intermediate space

The mutual incompleteness of the two registers allows the interactions between them to mend and inflect, modify, and transform, and thus

China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood 35

co-constitute each other. These interactions are by no means reducible to either of the two registers mentioned above and therefore help create an intermediate space that is not fully controlled or monopolised by either of them. One may say that it is the intermediate space that, borrowing from Derrida, turns neighbourhood into an aporia: since each register working in isolation is incomplete precisely because of the presence of the other, it tells us only a finite truth. But a sovereign nation-state can acknowledge its finitude only at its own peril. The nation-state is the only sovereign body that can thrive in a post-Westphalian world – the presence of which is recognised by the other fellow nation-states. A world of nation-states is literally left without an outside that does not consist of the nation-states. In simple terms, while a nation-state is necessarily incomplete, thanks to the mending and inflections, modifications, and transformations by the rivalling neighbourhood register of continuities, all nation-states tend to defend their presence beyond the truth – that is to say, the finite truth of nation-state with its geopolitical interests – that is constantly called upon to contend and come to terms with that of neighbourhood continuities. If this is a defect, Derrida considers it as “a general defect,” for a nation-state cannot but “cross the border” of what we described as the finite truth of nation-states until it can transform this finite truth into a generality. It cannot but strive to bring the continuities to a complete stop or at least under its control. The pursuit, impossible though it is, can never be abandoned as long as it looks upon itself as a nation-state and a nation-state worth its name. As Derrida puts it, a “certain border crossing is not impossible as soon as truth is confined” to the otherwise finite world of nation-states (Derrida 1993). Sometimes, the process is turned on its head and the persistence of neighbourhood ties across international borders is made into a case for their recognition by the respective nation-states involved in the neighbourhood. Their persistence adds legitimacy to the right to free and unfettered travel across the borders. After the military operation in Bhutan launched with the objective of flushing out the ULFA6 rebels taking shelter in that country was over in 2002, many of them who survived the operation escaped to China. It was around that time that the then-chairman of ULFA reportedly wrote a letter to the Chinese envoy of New Delhi asking for a “safe passage” and “temporary shelter” for the cadres in China on the ground that, in a composite and culturally continuous region such as this, the ULFA cadres had what they thought was the “natural right“ to migrate across the countries. The Chinese envoy of course rejected the offer immediately. The oscillating responses

India’s official response to the neighbourhood paradox has oscillated between the two extremes – one of which is what I describe as unrequited

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hospitality. Even if we come to know, more often than not at great cost, that our neighbours may be ungrateful to us, we continue to remain neighbourly towards them and show them courtesy as long as we can. The theoretical cue of my argument emanates from one of Derrida’s oft-quoted distinctions between ”invitation“ and “visitation” (Derrida 2000). As one, he argued, invites someone whom one knows from the past, one is by all means ready to welcome the guest. But “visitation” is different – it implies that someone may not know which visit is unwelcome. One does not want the visitor to come to one’s home, but still he comes and imposes himself on the host. Much in the same way, General Pervez Musharraf – the former President of Pakistan – came to Agra on a State7 visit in July 2001. If one reads, for instance, Dulat’s account (Dulat 2015), one comes to know that everyone in the Indian and Pakistani establishments had had the premonition that the visit was going to be abortive well before the visit. Mr. A.S. Dulat was then the chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) – India’s external intelligence agency. But still, all the elaborately laid-out diplomatic rituals of being neighbourly were performed until the end. This also reminds me of the visit of Zhou Enlai – the former President of China – in 1950, when he was greeted with the banners saying, “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers to each other). The campaign that was initiated by then-Prime Minister Nehru with great enthusiasm is described by Mayank Singh as “India’s Alice-in-Wonderland policy towards China” and was followed by the “unexpected” war with China in 1962 (Singh 2015). The official accounts leave us with the feeling that the trust we repose on our neighbours is never reciprocated by neighbourliness, which our innocent and neighbourly moves would have demanded. Our neighbours have always knifed us in the back. All this only shows that India is an incomplete nation-state. The “Gujral doctrine” articulates it eloquently. The doctrine makes it imperative that we keep being neighbourly towards our neighbours because we are left with no other way. Maybe, there are temporary hiccups and roadblocks on the way, but then we need to keep trying and a “big power” like India should not mind, as it has the greater ability to absorb the breach of trust than the enemy committing it. The doctrine leaves out of consideration the question of whether there is any trade-off between putting up with a non-neighbourly neighbour on the one hand and losing out on our national interest on the other. The second response is diametrically opposite of the first. The realists would argue that the fact we are neighbours is a sheer geographical accident and there is no reason why we should trust or be hospitable towards our hostile neighbours. The less we realise it the more we will feel betrayed. We should treat them like any other nation in the world, regardless of their proximity and cultural continuity. If there is anything

China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood 37

called neighbourliness in international relations, they maintain, it is only the outcome of a contingent convergence of national interests among the concerned nation-states. Dynamics of neighbourhood

The paper reflects on the dynamic interplay between the two registers. What is called “the China factor” in India’s foreign policy is only an outcome of this dynamic interplay between these two registers in what we call an intermediate space. Much of the rest of our discussion seeks to find out if what we call the dynamic interplay is also subject to certain rules and if the intermediate space is organised on the basis of these rules.8 These rules, needless to say, are not to be confused as “iron laws.” It might be difficult, if not impossible, to discover in them any “causal link authoritatively by excluding contingency” (Durkheim 1982). These are rules in the sense that they – contrary to what the scientific study of foreign policy would have us believe – have the effect of making a nation’s foreign policy perpetually contingent and provisional. While much of the existing literature on the subject points out why the foreign policy elite would do well to come to terms with the rules, we propose to refocus our attention on how the state finds it difficult to appropriate and subsume neighbourhood in the way it wants within the bounds of power politics. Nor can it discard and abandon the exercise by virtue of being a nation-state. This takes us to the heart of the aporia. First, people-to-people neighbourly ties with their wide-ranging ramifications for history, geography, culture, and economy of the region give unto them a certain rule of momentum. The sustenance of these ties over the years and centuries continues to survive even after a border is drawn and enforced by both sides. The momentum does not imply a simple continuation of the old and archaic ethnic, economic, and cultural ties, and much of the discussion in this regard is unfortunately caught in a time warp. It is important to find out what exactly makes the ties survive across time and why only some of them survive and many others die. Some of these ties have the potential to rearticulate and reassemble them under newer conditions of globalisation, with the effect that they acquire new and hitherto unscripted forms and names. The recent shift in the Naga rebel discourse may serve as a case in point. With the reorganisation of international borders in the region, the community was strewn across a variety of States – India, Myanmar, and China. Even within India, Nagas are distributed across a number of states and administrative units like Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur. The insurgents’ demand for “integration of Naga-inhabited areas” is raised side by side with the demand for independence and the formation of a sovereign Naga state. Integration is one of the thorniest issues that has kept the

38  Samir Kumar Das

Government of India, the neighbouring states and the insurgent leaders apart for more than two decades. Does Naga rebel discourse show any change in this regard? A document signed by Isak Chishi Swu – one of the top leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (I-M) – came out in 2003 with the title “Generation to Generation: Stories of Origin and Migration of the Nagas,” and this is a text which retells the story of the multiple points of origin of the Nagas located in Myanmar, Thailand, and China, and he actually emphasised the necessity of suturing together all these accounts of their histories and ancestries and appreciating their multicentred genealogy.9 The discovery of the multicentred genealogy has its implications for the demand for integration of Naga-inhabited areas. The more the multicentricity is recognised, the more it is bound to soften the demand for independence. In other words, the discovery is bound to blunt the sharp edges of this demand thanks to the forces and processes of globalisation. It is no longer the same, old Naga rebel discourse that is reproducing itself; but there has been a value addition to it and the value being added to it is that the Nagas seem to have recognised the multicentred nature of their origin. The second rule is the one of seepage. Way back in the late-1990s, in the course of conducting my doctoral research, I met the chief in a remote village of Arunachal Pradesh, very close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) located not too far from Tawang. The chief proudly declared that they used to pay annual tribute to a tribal chief from Tibet/China. I was quite surprised. He clarified that on occasion they would go in order to visit him to pay the tribute. Most of the time, the chief would send his representatives to collect it from him. The amount of tribute is not much, but its symbolic value was undeniable. It could be a chicken or even a kilogram of chili. But then it marks the symbolic hegemony of the Tibetan chief over the villages that are located on the Indian side and that hegemony seeps through the international boundary. The practice, he could remember, has been observed for generations. Practices such as this refuse to remain bound by the territorial confines of a nation-state. Finally, there is the rule of hybridity. Foreign policies, as a section of scholars argues, is to be formulated in a rational manner that lets a nationstate achieve its interests and objectives in a maximal way. Little do they understand that foreign policies are also filtered through and mediated by the historical register of social, cultural, and economic continuities and are likely to produce their unintended consequences. Once a country’s foreign policy refracts through the prism of neighbourhood, it acquires grotesque features. We are interested in knowing how these refractions force us to revisit the foreign policy. I met Bhim Bahadur Tamang in Nathu La in 2018. Nathu La is part of the old Silk Route that connects Sikkim with Tibet/China. Bhim was an employee of Indian Post. His task was to carry the bag of mail remit from

China, India, and the aporia of neighbourhood 39

the Indian side and reach the Nathu La border every Thursday and pass it on to his Chinese counterpart across the border and receive another from his Chinese counterpart. According to him, he had been doing this for the past 21 years, until he retired in 2018. In fact, his father was in the same job and was doing the same before he took over. When the two armies were standing eyeball to eyeball on the border, was he not afraid of passing into an “enemy territory?” I came to know from him that he would quietly pass the Indian side at 8:30 a.m. and enter the Chinese side. Not a word is exchanged because, “I speak Hindi or Nepali, my Chinese friend speaks Chinese.” But interestingly, during the conversation, he referred to his Chinese counterpart on the other side as “a friend.” This is a “silent friendship” that grows without any exchange of words. This arrangement of exchanging bags of mail remits is very much official. Back in 1992, the government of India reached an understanding with the Chinese government that this mail would be exchanged. Otherwise, it would be a long detour through the two capitals of Beijing and New Delhi and all this would take long time. I describe it as a strange – albeit official – intermediate institution that is situated between a closely guarded territorial state on the one hand and the free travel of the social, economic, and cultural ties across countries. The two states with their battle-ready armed forces look the other way as the silent friendship develops while the mail remits are exchanged. China, as we have seen, is no longer waiting at the border, but strikes at the very heart of our body politic, thus exponentially exacerbating our concerns and anxieties. Nido Tania embodied these concerns and anxieties and became a victim of them. We often feel the necessity of cleansing us of the neighbour that, instead of remaining an outside neighbour, threatens to become part of us. The historically existent social, economic, and cultural continuities must not be so intense as to undermine the difference between us and our neighbours. Secondly, China’s dual role as a geopolitical and historical neighbour of India only draws our attention to neighbourhood’s two registers seldom converging with each other. The interplay of the two registers only helps us understand why neither of them works in isolation. The interplay, in simple terms, not only makes each of them incomplete, but carves out an intermediate space which makes the neighbourhood outcomes often unrecognisably distinct. Thirdly, we concluded with an inquiry into the rules of neighbourhood viewed as a dynamic enterprise, with the hope that these rules will enable us to understand the unrecognisably distinct outcomes of neighbourhood. Acknowledgements

The paper is a revised version of the valedictory address that was delivered to the national seminar on “China in India’s Neighbourhood: Shifting Regional

40  Samir Kumar Das

Dynamics and the Future of Asian Power Politics,” organised by Asia in Global Affairs (AGA), Loreto College (Kolkata), Institute of Foreign Policy Studies (University of Calcutta), and Indian Council of World Affairs (New Delhi) on 7 May 2022. I am thankful to Ayanika Das – an intern with AGA – for her brilliant transcription of the address. The paper also draws on my discussion in the Thematic Panel I on “Northeast India and Trans-Himalayan Connections: Culture and Trade” in the 15th All India Conference on China Studies (AICCS) organised by the Institute of Chinese Studies in cooperation with Gauhati University, Indian Institute of Technology (Guwahati), and sponsored by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi, on 17 November 2022. I thank Anita Sengupta and Priya Singh, Patricia Uberoi, and Akhil Ranjan Dutta for their support and constant encouragement. Lapses, if any, are entirely mine. Notes 1 Abors have been designated by Dunbar as “intensely primitive” and “neckless cannibals” (Dunbar 1932: ix). 2 Because the nomenclature of “the Northeast,” by all accounts, came about only in 1947 with the partition of India and reorganisation of the international borders around the present geography of the region. 3 An Abor subgroup. 4 I borrow the argument from Mary Douglas’ book (2002). 5 The paradox has been amply demonstrated in the three papers presented recently by Mayongam (2022), Mathew (2022), and Lama (2022) to the Thematic Panel I on “Northeast India and Trans-Himalayan Connections: Culture and Trade” in the 15th All India Conference on China Studies (AICCS) organised by the Institute of Chinese Studies (New Delhi) in cooperation with Gauhati University, Indian Institute of Technology (Guwahati, Assam), sponsored by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi on 17 November 2022. I had the opportunity of commenting on the papers. 6 The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), born in 1979, is the largest insurgent group operating in Assam. One of its factions, viz. Independence, led by Paresh Barua, its self-styled commander-in-chief, is still committed to the goal of creating “a sovereign, socialist Assam.” 7 We use the term “State” with “S” in upper case to refer to the Indian State, while the term “state” with “s” in lowercase I reserved to refer to any constituent state of the Indian union. 8 I had the occasion of reflecting on some of these rules in Das (2020:53-76). 9 For details, see Das (2016).

References Das, S. K. 1998. ‘National Security and Ethnic Conflicts in India: A View from the Northeast’, in Arun K. Banerji (ed.), Security Issues in South Asia: Domestic and External Sources. Calcutta: Minerva, pp. 102–118. Das, S. K. 2016. ‘India’s Northeast and the Cultural Historiography of Difference’, NEISP Occasional Paper Series. New Delhi: North East India Studies Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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Das, S. K. 2020. ‘Framing South Asia as a Neighbourhood’, in Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury & Vikash Kumar (eds.), Understanding Transition in South Asia: Economy, Politics and Society (Essays in Honour of Partha S. Ghosh). Gurugram: AF Press, pp. 53–76. Derrida, J. 1993. Aporias. Trans. Tomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Derrida, J. 2000. Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond. Trans. Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Douglas, M. 2003. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge. Dulat, A. S. with Sinha, A. 2015. Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years. New Delhi: HarperCollins. Dunbar, G. 1932/1984. Frontiers. New Delhi: Omsons. Durkheim, E. 1982. The Rules of Sociological Method. Edited with an Introduction by Steven Lukes. New York: The Free Press. Ghosh, A. 1991. ‘The Stricture of Structure, or the Appropriation of Anthropological Theory’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 14(1, Winter): 55–77. Kurian, N. 2014. India-China Borderlands: Conversations Beyond the Centre. New Delhi: Sage. Lama, J. Y. 2022. ‘Dis(Connections), Residues and Tibetan Buddhism in the Eastern Himalayas’ (mimeo). Muinao, M. 2022. ‘Re-inventing the North-East India: Trans-Himalaya Trading Route in the Height of Indo-China Relations: Challenges and Prospects’ (mimeo). Pant, M. 2020. ‘That Mongoloid Face: Nido Tania’s Death and Six Years Later’, https://www​.eastmojo​.com​/news​/ 2020​/ 01​/30​/that​-mongoloid​-face​-nido​-tanias​ -death​-and​- 6​-years​-later/ accessed on 4 January 2023. Singh, M. 2015. ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai is History and Poor One at That’, The Times of India, 15 March, https://timesofindia​.indiatimes​.com ​/ blogs​/voices​/ hindi​- chini​-bhai​-bhai​-is​-history​-and​-a​-poor​- one​-at​-that/​?source​= app​&frmapp​ =yes accessed on 4 January 2023. Thonginlal, M. 2022. ‘Cultural and Trade Route Linkage Between China-MyanmarIndia: A Study of Frontier/Cross-Border Tribe Jingpo-Kachin-Singpho’ (mimeo).

3 BOOTLEGGING IN SOUTH ASIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD: Eastern Himalayas, disgruntled geographies, and “Chinese goods” Anup Shekhar Chakraborty

The shifting ideas of the neighbourhood and friendships: Eastern Himalayas

South Asia’s inherited territorial geographies are contested and perplexing. Power shifts and inclinations among South Asian nations are constantly shifting. Providing assistance, Indian remedies to domestic issues in smaller nations were not problematic. In the 1980s and 1990s, Nepal expected India to interfere when Bhutan’s cultural nationalism led to the expulsion of Nepali-speaking Lhotsampas. Nepal accused India of not interfering in its neighbour’s affairs (Chakraborty 2021a). Nepal recently claimed sovereignty, visibility, and participation in neighbourhood politics, including the revival of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a winding but uninterrupted route to the seas for landlocked BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) countries. Nepal claimed the desired centrality in the geopolitical space between South Asia and the Trans-Himalayas (Chakraborty 2020). India must address the lack of trust in its immediate neighbourhood and prioritise pragmatic friendship. India should allow its smaller South Asian neighbours to pursue new alliances. Growing inequality, unemployment, migration, political consciousness, and assertiveness all pose challenges to India’s “grants and loans” development models. Bhutan’s economic disillusionment and over-reliance on India have polarised public opinion in that country. Democratic voices have advocated for recalibrating historical ties with India as well as new geopolitical interpretations. Bhutan’s “right to seek new friends” and protect its national interests, including diversifying its foreign policy, is the focus of political discussions and debates. Dissatisfied DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-4

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Bhutanese have piqued China’s interest in the country. China as the “Lung Dragon” (lit., “aggressive dragon”) has persuaded a segment of the Bhutanese population with promises of a better future and soft power. Friendship has been recalibrated, customised, and made conditional, with or without benefits. In South Asia, “neighbourhood ties” have always taken various forms, ranging from angst to hostility (Chakraborty 2021b). Territorial incisions and skirmishes loom large in Ladakh, Uttarakhand, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh, and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Bhutan engaged India while avoiding China’s expansionism. Bhutan avoided economic talks with its northern neighbour in favour of those with its southern neighbour. India’s relations with its neighbours have changed as the “Norbu Dragon” (lit., “peaceful jewelled dragon”) country of Bhutan undergoes change and new democracies emerge. China wishes to re-establish and realign Himalayan trade and cultural ties. Bhutan-China ties are strained. In 1988, the PLA occupied Bhutan and built roads. The West ignored China’s territorial expansion, while India backed the “Norbu Dragon.” Chinese territorial expansionism is viewed as aggressive in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. China invaded Doklam in 2017 in order to undermine regional stability and India’s trust. Bhutan’s vulnerability in the face of China was exposed in Doklam. China appears to be interested in Bhutan. Proponents of the “right to look” for new allies should be wary of China’s “debt diplomacy,” as well as what Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and a few African nations have experienced. Before embarking on a new “dance,” Bhutan should consider the feasibility of its “bromance” with its southern neighbour (Chakraborty 2021a). However, the region’s friendships’ recalibrations and customisations have little effect on the movement and flow of materialities across and through the borders and passes. Smuggling, particularly bootlegging, is still prevalent in the region. Smuggling, illegal sales, and the transportation of illegal goods are all examples of “bootlegging.” The original definition of the term referred to the illegal smuggling and sale of alcoholic beverages. When alcohol was illegal in the US, many smugglers brought it in from neighbouring countries such as Canada and the Bahamas. In a specific historical context, the term “bootleg” came to refer to an unlicensed audio or video recording that was distributed without the artist’s permission. These recordings are often made live during performances. This type of illegal activity contributes to the development of a black market that operates in opposition to the generally accepted norms of a legal society. However, because the goods in question are relatively cheaper and desired by a significant portion of the population, the question of whether they should be legalised is being debated (as was alcohol at the end of the Prohibition era). In today’s context, “bootlegging” refers to the illegal activity in which bootleggers participate and

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profit. Bootlegging has become a popular term for the illegal activity that some people pursue as a career or aspiration. The Indo-Myanmar border with the Indian state of Northeastern India is porous. The Mizoram district of Champhai, in particular, is teeming with commercial activity. Moreh in Manipur and Zokawthar in the Champhai District are both bustling Indo-Myanmar trade hubs. Trade-related crossborder movement existed prior to the 1988 Myanmar political crisis, but the magnitude of the influx has grown over time as a result of Myanmar’s socio-political crisis. The vast majority of Mizoram’s Chin population can never imagine returning to Myanmar. Those Chins who used to be involved in trade but were captured during the 1988 crisis are afraid to return to Myanmar. To avoid police harassment and fines at border checkpoints, Chin traders travel primarily through the jungle between Myanmar and Mizoram. Crossing borders without valid permits (for business or otherwise) is illegal, but it occurs frequently, due to lax border personnel who see “fines” incurred by such movements as a cheap source of income. When people cross a border more than once, they frequently change their identities at the border checkpoint. This is done to avoid being caught exceeding the permitted time limit, which is typically one month, but renewable for a fee. Disgruntled geographies and the Lung Dragon’s shadow’s flip side

The Eastern Himalayan borderlands from Northeast India to Chin state and the Sagaing region in Myanmar are what I call “disgruntled geographies,” because of the interplay between the region’s natural (heavily forested, mountainous, riverine, resource-rich) and anthropogenic (linguistically and religiously diverse, fragmented along sectarian lines, sparsely populated) characteristics. Furthermore, the region has seen the mushrooming of armed insurgent groups displaying insatiable rage as a result of the region’s paucity or limited nature of connectivity, minuscule industrial growth, and lack of employment opportunities. The discussion attempts to decode how the multiple patriarchies and their agencies selectively churn newer maps of ethnic connectivity and cultural ties through “regulated insularity” and “control,” with the ever-changing geopolitical moorings of “disgruntled geographies.” The discussion thus connects assemblages of material cultures and social imaginaries that operate covertly in the borderlands of Northeast India, and how they sway from radical to analytical negotiations of their experience of colonialism, modernity, and the global market economy, and thus find their way into a slippery world of their own choosing (Chakraborty in Sengupta and Singh [ed.] 2022). Ethnic insecurities have become institutionalised, and “rentier capitalism” and the enclosure of territories have become the new norm (Buchanan in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock [eds.] 1980: 3–15; Tullock in Buchanan,

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Tollison, and Tullock [eds.] 1980: 16–38). Alongside this, the region has witnessed an increase in the engagement of competing or contending patriarchies in the making of claims. In a paradoxical turn of events, the sizeable ethnic communities have been eagerly anticipating the opening of the borders and the erasure of “colonial lines” that have been crisscrossed around the region and have separated specific tribes in the area from cousins across the Chin Hills and Southeast Asia. Mizoram’s Young Men’s Association (YMA) just recently (in 2018) sent a letter to the governments at the centre and the federal units, requesting that they expedite the opening of the borders, increase the connectivity across the region through the Act East Policy, to bridge the people-to-people contact, and bring the Zo hnahthlak on the Indian side of the borders and those in the Chin Hills of Myanmar closer together. The region of North Bengal, which serves as the gateway to the Northeast via the “Siliguri-Coochbehar corridor,” has not been incorporated into the region, despite the fact that it is geopolitically closer to the Northeast. However, the desire to be included within the region remains strong (as evident from the social imaginaries) among communities therein. This is an important point to note. For instance, in 2007, the West Delhi Police published a book with the title Security Tips for Northeast Students/Visitors in Delhi (Dholabahi 2007; The Times of India, Jul 16, 2007). This book claimed “to help the people from the region to overcome the handicap of their ‘foreign’ features,” which resulted in a great deal of anger among the students and the people of Darjeeling. It is in the light of this observation that I include Darjeeling and North Bengal as part of the Northeast, region even though they are not technically located there (Chakraborty and Chakraborty 2016 in Banerjee et al. [eds]). The hills and the plains make up the two distinct sections of the Darjeeling district. In comparison, the plains are home to the cities and towns of Siliguri, Matigara, Phansidewa, Bagdogra, and Naxalbari. The hills include Darjeeling, Kurseong, Mirik, and Kalimpong. The foothills of the Darjeeling range that are included in the Siliguri subdivision are collectively referred to as the Terai. The district is bounded on the north by Sikkim, on the south by the Kishanganj district of Bihar state, on the east by Kalimpong (now a separate district), and on the west by Nepal. The length of the Darjeeling district, from north to south, is 29 kilometres, and the width, from east to west, is 26 kilometres. The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), which is a semi-autonomous administrative body under the control of the state government of West Bengal, is in charge of the administration of the entire hilly region of the district. In 2011, it was the second-least populous district in West Bengal, behind only Dakshin Dinajpur. On 14 February 2017, the area that is now known as Kalimpong became its own separate district.

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A method for studying bootlegging: “Seeing like a bootlegger”

How could bootleggers be studied? How could information about bootleggers be gathered? How exactly does the method or procedure work? The intimidating nature of the study as well as the vast geospatial expanse of the research, which includes the diversities encountered at multiple points of engagement, whether it be that of ethnic composition, linguistic differences, or the cacophony of the bazaars and the intermediaries. All of this, combined with the difficulties of traversing the various topographies of the regions, led to the idea of a long-term study. The research evolved over the course of a decade, and the changes that occurred in the covert movement of materials in tandem with the advancements in technology made it more essential that a study with a long duration be carried out. The research was carried out between 2008 and 2022 using snowball sampling to contact individuals in multiple locations for in-depth, in-person interviews and longer conversations that were spaced out to accommodate the schedules of both the interviewer and the interviewee. The researcher could build rapport with the subjects over time and glean nuggets of information through casual conversation. This study was carried out as a multidecade endeavour because of the breadth and depth of the problems that needed to be solved; and, as is customary in migration studies, it revealed trends in migration and movement of materialities within the country, as well as to neighbouring countries and further afield, such as the Southeast Asian region. This research has shed light on the intricate webbed nature of migrations, mobility, and the flow of materialities across the Eastern Himalayas. This research both challenges and confirms many commonly held beliefs about the reasons behind people’s migrations from rural to urban and urban to metropolitan areas. By reexamining the social imaginaries of the region, the study adds another layer of complexity to the idea of mobility itself, which in this context refers to the movement of materialities across time and space. In addition to this, the study makes use of its ethnographic data in order to suggest potential future research directions and analytical implications pertaining to bootlegging and the flow of goods. The respondents’ intricate involvement in illegal activities necessitated the development of an additional significant strategy that I call “seeing like a bootlegger.” In keeping with their activities, the strategy included concealing their identities as well as the geospatial operational sites from which they conducted their activities. As a result, the respondents’ names and other identifying information have been changed, and the exact location where the survey was conducted has been obscured. In order to provide support for the assertions and observations made by the investigation, both primary and secondary sources, including articles from newspapers, were consulted.

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Typical economic theories of regulation view government officials and regulators through the lens of intermediaries between competing interest groups (Kahn 1988). The concept of “bootleggers and Baptists” originates from the subfield of regulatory economics, which aims to foresee which interest groups will succeed in obtaining rules favourable to them . The theory posits that competing groups are better off working together under a common rule than they are working separately.1 Baptists play an active role in the administration of the laws they help pass (a law against Sunday alcohol sales without significant public support would likely be ignored, or be evaded through bribery of enforcement officers). Therefore, “bootleggers and Baptists” is more than just a scholarly reiteration of the widespread political charge that undisclosed for-profit interests are using front organisations representing the public interest to advance their own agendas of deceit. Politicians and administrators are viewed as middlemen by the mainstream economic theory of regulation. “Bootleggers and Baptists” is a subfield of regulatory economics that attempts to predict which interest groups will be successful in obtaining rules favourable to them. It contends that coalitions of opposing interests that can reach an agreement on a common rule will outperform one-sided groups. Baptists do more than just advocate for legislation; they also help monitor and enforce it. For instance, a law against Sunday alcohol sales without significant public support would likely be ignored, or be evaded through bribery of enforcement officers. The neoliberal market and the freedom it affords are hidden from view in the “throw-away culture” of convenience, the “tragedy of the commons” propelling herd consumerism, and commodity fetishism. The market’s primary motivation is making money, not protecting the environment (long- or short-term). In a post-global world, the neoliberal economy is solely motivated by profit, regardless of the impact on society or the environment. The term “Chinese goods” refers to the finest example of “use and throw” products, also known as goods that have a short shelf life and are, for the most part, not repairable. At the very least, Chinese products have been around since the Song Dynasty, when the emperor mandated that his court wear be improvised and his hat and clothing system underwent rapid stylistic shifts after only a few years of use (Hanfu Forum & Community, 10 Oct 2020). Chinese goods are colloquially known by different names. In Nepal and parts of Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Kalimpong, these Chinese products are known as “Khasa ko maal” (lit., “product from Khasa”). Khasa is a Chinese-controlled transit hub in Tibet. The commodity is portrayed in popular culture as something of low quality, possibly fake, quickly outdated, and sold at a low price. In Mizoram and adjoining areas, these foreign items from China and the Far East are categorised as “Khawchhak chuak” or “Khawthlang chuak.” Terms based on cardinal directions reveal a boundary-aware subculture among Zo/Mizo peoples. Products from the Near East,

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the South, and the Far East are referred to as “Khawchhak chuak,” “Chhim lam chuak,” and “Khawthlang chuak,” respectively. The term “Khawchhak chuak” refers to Myanmar; “Chhim lam chuak,” to Thailand and Malaysia; and “Khawthlang chuak” to Bangladesh, Japan, and Korea. In Manipur, these items are called “Moreh gi pot” (lit., “Moreh product”), named after the transit town of Moreh, through which these materials enter the region. Bootlegging in the Himalayan neighbourhood and around: ‘Khasa ko maal’ in circulation

The ‘trans-Himalayan trade and trade routes’ (von Furer-Haimendorf 1975, 1988; Saxer 2013) between Nepal and China that go through Tibet have come under increased Chinese control (Kathmandu Post, 24 Oct 2022). The flow of transportation and materials coming from Lasha and Khasa has slowed down in Hilsa, Nagcha, Ko Rala, Gorkha Larka, Rasuwagadhi, Zhangmu-Kodari (Tatopani), 2 Lamabagar, Kimathanka, and Olangchung Gola. In the aftermath of the Tibetan uprising in 2008, all of these commercial hubs were eventually shut down, with the exception of Tatopani and Lamabagar. Since the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, transit towns have come under China’s control (MOFA Nepal). According to Murton (2021), “China trade includes the cross-border transportation of goods from Mainland China as well as the clandestine export of Chinese products to third countries.” This is in addition to the illegal movement of materials from China to Nepal known colloquially as “Khasa ko maal” (lit., “goods from Khasa”). The “Khasa ko maal” flows through the open borders in multiple directions and through a multiverse of interconnected highways throughout the region. The popular plains route connects India and Nepal via Kakarvitta, Bihar-more to Siliguri, and the Duars. The other route is from Ilam (Nepal) to Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Sikkim via the Pashupati-Mirik channel.3 Though these China products are sourced from many other cities in China, they are labelled as “Khasa ko maal.”4 Tibetan, Nepali, Bihari, Marwari, and Bengali traders and small businessmen are among the traders and bootleggers involved in North Bengal corridor. The reverse goods that flow from the Eastern Himalayas includes forest products, wildlife, banned pharmaceuticals from India, and the consignments channelled through the Northeast of India. The reverseflow experiences demonstrate deep imbalances, as seen in the case of forest products such as the rudraksha seeds to China (Hindu Press International, 28 May 2022). Residents of the Chinese border town of Khasa, which was devastated by an earthquake, have been relocated to Xigatse, which is about 200 kilometres northwest of Khasa. The 25 April 2015 earthquake in Nepal had an impact on Khasa as well, and residents were forced to relocate as soon as

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possible after the quake. The earthquake struck Nepal’s central and eastern regions. Some Nepali families who resided in the border region were relocated to Xigatse, while the remainder returned to Nepal. Recent reports indicate that the Chinese government is eager to rebuild Khasa and relocate mainland residents there. China intends to redevelop Nepal through investments in logistics that will enhance trade, transportation, and connectivity. This is a component of China’s overall strategy in Nepal (MOFA Nepal). The reverse-flow of goods from Nepal and the Eastern Himalayas demonstrates deep imbalances in trade between Nepal and China, caused by the absence of support from the Nepali government and the dominance of the Chinese market (Hindu Press International, 28 May 2022). The trade of rudraksha (dried seeds of the Elaeocarpus ganitrus tree) from the Himalayan foothills to China demonstrates this. Hindus revere these seeds known as rudraksha (lit., “Lord Shiva’s tears”) in Sanskrit. Rudraksha beads have a special significance for Buddhists. This is because they are frequently depicted on the Buddha and other sacred figures in the area wearing them. In the past, Nepalese merchants sold the vast majority of the seeds to Hindus in India; however, this practice has recently begun to shift. Since 2014, Nepalese farmers and merchants have benefitted financially from China’s demand for seeds known as bodhichitta rudraksha (Buddhists prayer beads). These seeds sold in China’s markets are a microcosm of the dynamics of the overall trade that takes place between the two countries, where Nepal is an exporter. Overall, China has a significant advantage over India in terms of the trade balance vis-à-vis Nepal. Between the middle of July 2021 and the middle of April 2022, Nepal imported a total of NPR (Nepali Rupee) 211 billion (US$1.7 billion) from China, as reported by the country’s Department of Customs. In contrast, the total value of Nepal’s exports to China during this time period was NPR 622 million (US$5 million) (The Third Pole, 26 May 2022). The majority of Nepal’s goods that are exported to China include hand-drawn paintings, carpets, medicinal plants, and sculptures. In the fiscal year 2020–21, Nepal exported a total of 280,874 kilogrammes of rudraksha seeds, which placed the country in tenth place among export categories (The Third Pole, 26 May 2022). China still makes money off the unofficial side of international trade. Nearly every respondent contacted for this study admitted to being involved in bootlegging activity in Nepal mentioned that they purchased items in large quantities from industrial and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) towns in China. China is a major manufacturer for international brands; the defective or flawed products that are produced there and packaged as “factory seconds” are then dumped to South Asia, where they are purchased in bulk by traders and middlemen who continue the cycle of bootlegging in the Eastern Himalayas.5 They mentioned that their local Chinese contacts in China are located in cities such as Dongguan, Guangzhou, and Shijiazhuang.

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Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Mirik (West Bengal), and Gangtok (Sikkim) in India are flooded with Chinese goods, including counterfeit. The availability of low-cost products that can be easily discounted by small shopkeepers makes it difficult for products manufactured in India or branded items with high prices to compete for customer loyalty.6 Respondents who were contacted in the border trade zone of Pashupati (Indo-Nepal) en route to Mirik mentioned that drugs, gems, and gold were brought across the border in inventive ways. Consignments would be concealed in tin containers that were carrying ghee (clarified butter) or gundruk (indigenous unsalted dry-fermented vegetables; popular among the Nepali people) before being wrapped in polythene packets, which would then be sealed in plastic. Along the India-Nepal border, herdsmen transport water buffalo, goats, and other livestock, while occasionally partaking in bootlegging and hiding shipments among the herds.7 Because there was no border control, the movement of goods was unobstructed and uncomplicated.8 Ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine [MDMA]), amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), banned pharmaceuticals such as Phensedyl, and forest-based products are all transported throughout Bhutan using similar bootlegging strategies.9 Many contraband items entering Bhutan are concealed in the tyres, spare tyres, toolboxes, or luggage of travellers.10 Siliguri, Bagdogra, and the KakarvittaIndia-Nepal borders serve as hubs for drivers, handymen, and bootleggers to coordinate their activities and communicate with one another. While both sexes partake in bootlegging, women tend to have more success at it.11 Bootlegging in disgruntled geographies: Traces of the Lung Dragon

This section provides a microanalysis of the complex bootlegging activities that occur as a result of China’s innocuous soft presence in South Asia’s neighbourhood. This analysis is presented from the perspectives of several academic disciplines. The term “Asian transnational organised crime” refers to a variety of criminal groups and organisations, including “secret societies, tongs, triads, gangs, drug cartels, criminal networks, and so on,” as well as “multiple goods and services that constitute criminal markets,” such as “drug production and trafficking,” “human smuggling and trafficking,” “money laundering and debt collection,” “vehicle crime and smuggling,” and triad monopolies. The latter category consists of “multiple nations and national components,” as well as “the control by various societies of private bus routes, fish markets, street markets, wholesale markets, second-hand clothes markets, entertainment centres, parking services, sales of counterfeit VCDs, prostitution, illegal gambling, and extortion and the violence that is associated with these crimes,” and “multiple markets and wholesale markets” (Finckenauer and Chin 2007). Chinese authorities are concerned

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about drug bootlegging in the region, and they suspect that local and foreign-based drug syndicates are importing heroin from the neighbouring Golden Triangle and distributing it throughout China (Mu, Sun, and Amon 2022). As criminal organisations become well-armed and violent, Chinese authorities are concerned about violent acts committed by mobsters against rival gang members, ordinary citizens, business owners, and government officials (Mu, Sun, and Amon 2022). The region’s criminal nexus spans the meandering international borders. According to bootleggers contacted from Chin (Myanmar) and Mizoram (India) for this study, the majority of these crime groups are Chinese and operate from Tahan (Myanmar). The nexus serves as a protective umbrella known locally as baohusan.12 The nexus controls wholesale trade, labour recruitments and human trafficking/smuggling, parallel tax regimes in and out of the regions stretching from the South China Sea to Tibet and Nepal via northeast India.13 The flow of materialities and trafficked persons flow in the opposite direction as well, in the Asian Mediterranean routes to continental Europe and thereon to the US. Chinese officials take a muddled stance on human smuggling/trafficking in the region, despite the fact that tens of thousands of Chinese men and women are smuggled out of China every year and the arrival of large numbers of undocumented Chinese labourers or sex workers is a major concern in the region (Smith 1997; Kwong 1997; Emerton 2001; Brazil 2004). The problem is either brushed under the rug as something normal or a regular issue in organised crime, or denied entirely as not being a Chinese problem because the majority of “snakeheads” (human smugglers) are ChineseAmericans (Chin 1999). Both of these approaches are problematic for a number of reasons. One explanation is that it leads to willful ignorance of the problem and a stubborn refusal to acknowledge that one’s own actions contribute to or even cause the region’s problems. Recreational drugs and prescription drugs

The phrase “Golden Triangle” is frequently used in reference to drug smuggling across north-east India. This region roughly corresponds to Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, and is known as one of the oldest and most notorious routes for the supply of narcotics to Europe and other parts of the world. This notorious region is also well-known for being the most important producer of opium in Southeast Asian countries. The Golden Triangle region of Burma is responsible for the production of heroin, which is then exported to the rest of the world through either Thailand or China. There is a market for heroin in China, which is experiencing rapid growth, and there are also markets for heroin in Australia and the majority of the countries in Southeast Asia. Methamphetamine, which is also produced in the Burmese portion of the Golden Triangle, is primarily sold in Thailand, which serves as its

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primary market. Methamphetamine is smuggled into Thailand illegally across the Burma-Thailand border, as well as through Laos and Cambodia, or both of these countries. The vast majority of amphetamine that is produced can be found in China; however, it is illegally imported into other Asian nations including Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and others. The states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh all have borders with Myanmar. The Indo-Myanmar border, which is approximately 1,643 kilometres long, acts as a point of transit for contraband goods travelling into the northeastern part of the country. As a result of the trafficking of drugs into India from Myanmar, various agents in Dimapur, Imphal, Moreh, Churachandpur, Champhai, Vairegnte, Tlabung, Khawzawl, Silchar, Sonai, Shillong, Guwahati, and Siliguri are given consignments worth crores of rupees to distribute throughout their webbed network of active and sleeper suppliers. These are then subdivided further and distributed to various dealers throughout the states of Northeast India and North Bengal via the Silliguri corridor, after which they are taken to the metropolitan areas. When it comes to micro-operations, the difficulties that law enforcement agencies face in their mission to bring down drug cartels are significant. In addition, in order to deceive those who are responsible for law enforcement and security, bootleggers use unconventional methods of transportation. These methods include, among other things, motor vehicle engines, bumpers, and tyres. When communicating with their counterparts located in the disgruntled geographies, these suppliers hide behind aliases and various other fictitious names as an additional layer of protection. These people try to avoid being caught by using a number of different SIM cards, each of which is only used once before being thrown away. They do not use smartphones or GPS because they want to avoid detection and stay away from the radar of security and surveillance.14 Yaba15 tablets, or crazy tablets or mad tablets, are bright-coloured tablets that are a popular stimulant concoction including methamphetamine and caffeine, bootlegged in and through the region. The majority of Myanmar’s yaba production laboratories are concentrated in the bordering Chinese state of Shan (The Business Standard, 20 Jul 2022). The vast majority of methamphetamine imported into Thailand comes from Myanmar/Burma. Since the establishment of the Burmese military junta in 1962, Myanmar has become an important source of methamphetamine (Dhaka Tribune, 25 Aug 2022). Yaba is a pill that is sold to truck drivers and factory workers. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), which governs Myanmar’s Wa state, is a rebel group that signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) in 1989. The UWSA and Myanmar’s ruling junta agreed to stop supplying drugs in 1989 in exchange for Myanmar’s assistance in fighting rival ethnic armies (The Business Standard, 20 Jul 2022). However, through the 1990s, clandestine drug production continued in Myanmar’s mushroom

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laboratories, which crisscross the country (The Daily Star, 11 May 2018). Indications point to the establishment of laboratories in other parts of the country, including the troubled state of Rakhine and the Sagaing Division, which is also home to the production of a product with a name that sounds very similar to “World is Yours” (The Daily Star, 11 May 2018). According to shipments seized over the years, the synthetic drug is transported from Myanmar to Bangladesh via two routes active in India’s Northeast. Yaba is one among the long list of illegal goods bootlegged from India’s northeastern region to Bangladesh. The most common route is through Mizoram, beginning in Champhai and continuing to various locations along the India-Bangladesh border. Champhai SEZ has excellent connections to a number of Myanmar cities, including Tiddim and Mandalay. Narcotics are transported across borders to Bangladesh and then through riverine channels to North 24 Paraganas, Kolkata, and South 24 Paraganas in West Bengal.16 Respondents mentioned that the alternative route passes through Manipur, which is directly adjacent to Myanmar’s Sagaing Division. The Myanmar corridor for the allegedly Chinese-invested drugs and commodities is a lived reality of the borderland ecology’s political economy. These drug suppliers and agents have earned the moniker “Yaba Godfathers.”17 These godfathers, also known as Jao pho, are predominantly people of Chinese descent who are based in the various provinces of Myanmar and the countries that surround it. They have business interests in both legitimate and illegal endeavours. In addition to this, they have networks of associates and followers, maintain close relationships with influential bureaucrats, police officers, and military figures, hold positions of authority within the local administration, and play an important part in democratic and institutional processes such as elections.18 Despite all efforts, not all of Myanmar’s major arteries have been blocked. In Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar coastal district, which is home to tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees, there are still several operational routes. The Rohingyas engage in bootlegging of yaba (Pulitzer Center 2018). A few Assam Rifles personnel stationed at border posts stated that drug consignments such as the yaba are transported along routes used for the transportation of other illegal goods. Multiple times, it has been discovered that the same gangs are responsible for the smuggling of a wide range of commodities.19 The same networks that import gold and heroin from Myanmar are also used to import yaba and World is Yours. The pattern that has emerged in the supply chain thus far suggests the involvement of a large number of gangs, each of which plays a distinct and well-defined role in illegal bootlegging. The shipments are collected by a variety of trafficking organisations near the border between India and Myanmar. These shipments are then delivered to remote locations by a chain of agents who have no idea where the item originated. When older routes are discovered and declared illegal, the search for alternative routes for bootlegging begins immediately. Because

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of the low incomes and poor living conditions of those who live along the India-Bangladesh border, people willing to engage in illegal trade abound (Pulitzer Center 2018). Phensedyl cough syrup is banned in India, but it is manufactured illegally in laboratories across the northeastern states. Many of these labs have been shut down, and sting operations have been conducted to identify the key criminals involved in their operations. The respondents contacted for this study reported that even though these laboratories are shuttered, they continue to produce illegal pharmaceuticals for regional and international distribution. According to the respondents, the line between legitimate and illicit pharmaceuticals in Mizoram has blurred, because the same person who works as a medical representative for a pharmaceutical company based in a major Indian city also runs a local medicine manufacturing unit, out of which they produce counterfeit versions of legal medicines and, on occasion, even banned pharmaceuticals. Prohibited medications and recreational drugs are being smuggled in from all around the region and beyond. Mizoram’s medical representatives and pharmacists, working in tandem with the drug traffickers, extract maximum profit from the state's current prohibitionist framework.20 Every year, many people die as a result of Phensedyl overdose. Phensedyl is popular among drug addicts and substance abusers in Bangladesh, providing opportunities for traffickers to merchandise the prohibited cough syrup. Phensedyl is extremely toxic and results in fatal complications such as brain swelling and blindness. After 2010, clandestine laboratories in north Bengal and the northeast began producing ecstasy (MDMA), ATS, dextropropoxyphene, injectable buprenorphine, diazepam, and nitrazepam, as well as licit opiate pharmaceuticals. 21 Until the year 2000, these drugs circulating in the northeast and major cities across India, came from Myanmar, China, and Southeast Asia. On several occasions, authorities on the Indian border near border SEZs and economic contact zones seized trucks transporting large quantities of the items. Ex-servicemen interviewed stated that, prior to 2000, these substances were typically peddled and bootlegged by Chinese/ Burmese women and men and passed through chains of agents and suppliers. During the Christmas season, these substances were sometimes circulated in traditional bamboo baskets used to transport piglets from Myanmar to Mizoram. The raw materials and chemicals were smuggled to Myanmar, where Chinese experts would make the drugs. The finished product would then return to India via the same route and be distributed. 22 Wildlife and the exotic

A webbed network of local contacts and smugglers in Southeast Asian wet markets assists in the operation of bootlegging in disgruntled geographies. This enables the bootlegging operations to be carried out successfully. These

Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood 55

are the kinds of people who take advantage of India’s northeast in order to smuggle endangered animals into the northeastern part of India (Sentinel Assam, 17 Oct 2022). There have been multiple instances in which the forest departments of the various states located in the region have been successful in rescuing wild animals that are on the verge of extinction. In each of these instances, the forest animals were saved from certain extinction. This suggests that there is a potential risk to not only the species, but also the environment. Because of the topography of the area, as well as the presence of forests, it is abundantly clear that smuggling activities can be carried out by smugglers in this region. The reason for this is the presence of forests. The illegal trade of wildlife is the fourth-largest international crime after the trafficking of drugs, humans, and counterfeit goods, and the killing of endangered species poses a threat to the continued existence of those species (IJCAR; Shankar 2022). These animals have included everything from gibbons to kangaroos to exotic birds, and they have been discovered in ecosystems that stretch from South America all the way to Australia and Southeast Asia (The Diplomat, 22 Jun 2022; The Times of India; Down to Earth). Smugglers of endangered species remove animals from their natural habitats in Asia and sell them as pets or livestock at a profit of several million dollars annually (North East India Broadcast, 22 Aug 2022). When the smugglers are caught by the authorities, they bribe their way to freedom and then immediately return to poaching. The illegal trade in wild animals, also known as “wildlife smuggling,” places entire animal species in danger of extinction while simultaneously providing cover for the poachers who commit the crime. According to Sawma, a former driver who was involved in bootlegging activity, “these consignments were for the pet trade, as well as private zoos and farms in India’s blossoming metropoles.”23 Southeast Asian wet market contacts and smugglers smuggle wildlife into and through the region (Sentinel Assam, 17 Oct 2022). Gibbons, kangaroos, and exotic birds are smuggled through Eastern Himalayan borderlands (The Diplomat, 22 Jun 2022; Down to Earth, 14 April 2022; North East India Broadcast, 22 Aug 2022). When caught, smugglers bribe their way out and return to poaching. The illegal trade in wild animals, known as “wildlife smuggling,” threatens animal species and provides cover for poachers. Most exotic animals enter Mizoram from Myanmar (Northeast Now News, 15 Apr 2022). As Chin Burmese merchants in Champhai (Mizoram) put it, “wildlife was smuggled out of India through Burma’s forests from the 1970s to the 1990s.” Ethnic insurgent groups poached and smuggled one-horned rhinoceros, golden langurs, tigers, elephants, and other forest-based products to supply China’s pharmaceutical industry. Today, the same routes and territorial passages have been rerouted and relabelled as multimodal highways in accordance with the Act East Policy. The same routes and jungle passages that once

56  Anup Shekhar Chakraborty

smuggled wildlife and forest produce from India to China and Southeast Asia now bring in exotic species for India’s growing exotic pet market.24 Gold, semiprecious gems, betelnut/arecanut, and human hair

The Talbung resident Tlani mentioned the bootlegging method that was common in the 1980s in the region. “Ethnic Chakma and Bru women would collect gold from intermediaries (dalals), which they would then break down into nuggets. Women bootleggers would ingest gold nuggets and cross guarded and unguarded borders to get to Chittagong (Bangladesh) or Tripura to Akhaura via Bairabi and Phuldungsei in Western Mizoram, where the gold consignments needed to be delivered. They would spend a few days there, consuming bananas and other laxatives to facilitate their expulsion through faeces.”25 Recent trends in gold smuggling in the region reflect technological innovations, ranging from the use of condoms26 to bootleg gold in paste form to the use of drones to airdrop consignments. 27 In addition to seeking safety in Mizoram, Chin people from Tahan (Chin Hill), Myanmar frequently cross the state’s border to do business and commerce. They return to their homes on the Myanmar side of the border after trading their goods. Mizo people trade with Myanmar in a similar way. Betelnut/arecanut, cotton yarns, milk powder, sugar, malt-based health drinks, tinned condensed milk, and butter are just some of the many products that are smuggled into Myanmar. 28 There are both legal and illegal versions of these items floating around. Despite numerous opportunities, very few people were apprehended in Mizoram for possessing illegal goods. It was also discovered that families from Myanmar who cross the border to trade smuggled goods – contraband items – rely on Mizoram families. Bootlegged goods are those that have been imported or exported illegally from one country to another. They were also able to avoid being checked by border patrol agents on numerous occasions, due to the porous and unfenced border. 29 Some concluding observations

Activities that had been considered “illegal” and part of the transnational criminal networks have realigned, recalibrated, and re-established their global presence by veering between the legal and the illegal, formal and the informal as a result of post-global improved connectivity and rapid technological development. Historically, states have been prepared to deal with the threats posed by non-state actors (Edwards and Gill 2006). For a while, authorities lacked a strategy for dealing with the novel dangers posed by transnational criminal organisations. There was a time when efforts to reduce the threat posed by non-state actors were seen as successful

Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood 57

deterrents, such as expanding military capabilities, enhancing border patrol, and intensifying military intelligence (Srikanth 2016). The post-global experience has compelled states to shift their strategies away from the traditional “seeing like the state” and toward “seeing and acting like the non-state” to “seeing like a bootlegger.” The conventional goods that were transported along the Indo-Myanmar route between the 1960s and 1990s were gold and semiprecious stones. Through the northeastern region, gold and semiprecious stones (such as jade, rubies, emeralds, and sapphires) were bootlegged from Myanmar to markets in Kolkata, Delhi, and Mumbai. These “blood gold and gems” originated in Burma/Myanmar under a junta regime where ethnic communities and people who had been trafficked were forced to work in order to extract these natural resources.30 During the 1960s to 1990s, blood gold and gems were exported from Burma/Myanmar via the Indo-Burmese route. By the end of 1991, Myanmar produced 20–30% of the world’s gold and close to 50% of its rubies (Esterman 2022). Changes in the mode of bootlegging in the region are intriguing to observe. Women of the Chakma and Bru ethnic groups developed a unique technique in the 1970s and 1980s of purchasing gold from middlemen (dalals) and then smelting it into nuggets. The use of condoms to smuggle gold paste and drones to airdrop shipments are examples of changes in the modes and techniques of bootlegging. These are examples of how technology has influenced the region’s current patterns of material movement. Bootlegging of betelnut/arecanut, cotton yarns, milk powder, sugar, malt-based health beverages, canned condensed milk, and butter is common among the Chin people of Tahan (Chin Hill), Myanmar and the Mizo people. These can be purchased legally or illegally. Despite numerous opportunities, few people in Mizoram were apprehended in possession of illegal substances. Many Myanmar people use Mizoram families for unlawful trading. Bootleggers continue to take advantage of the country’s porous borders to smuggle in illegal goods despite the best efforts of border patrol agents. Bringing the tangled web of issues to the fore, the discussions covered in this chapter enables us to consider the multiverse of China’s presence in the area bounded by the Eastern Himalayas and India’s northeast. Innocuous soft power wielded by China reaches and maintains its grip on communities in these disgruntled geographies. China has left an indelible mark, either as the driving force behind these new cultural idoms or as agents/intermediaries arranging the flow of alien cultural materialities, as evidenced by the flow of materialities and the emergent culture manufacturing that flows among ethnic or non-ethnic communities. The discussion offers a nuanced comprehension of the regional bootlegging web, including the wave of movement of bodies and circulation of materialities across the borderlands and the various transit routes that change form over time and space.

58  Anup Shekhar Chakraborty

Notes 1 The regulatory economist Bruce Yandle proposed the term “bootleggers and Baptists” to describe the two types of people who tend to support regulations: those who want the regulation’s stated purpose, and those who stand to gain financially by undermining it. 2 The Zhangmu-Kodari border (also known colloquially as Tatopani in Nepal and Kasa or Dram in Tibet) was the first and, up until the 2015 earthquakes, largest border crossing between China and Nepal. Opened in the 1960s with the construction of the Arniko Highway and the China-Nepal Friendship Bridge, this post has traditionally handled more than 80% of direct transnational trade between China and Nepal (however, a greater overall quantity of goods continues to come from China to Nepal via sea routes to Kolkata). Transferring an array of household, commercial, and industrial goods destined for Kathmandu, on a normal day, dozens of Chinese trucks offload cargo in Zhangmu, a critical step in an international exchange that is 90% import and only 10% export for Nepal. 3 Personal Interviews: Krishna; Ram; Balram; Khansahab; Pyare. (Businessman selling Chinese goods). Bagdo​gra/S​iligu​ri/Da​rjeel​ing/K​urseo​ng/Ga​ngtok​. 15 March 2014. 4 Personal Interviews: Krishna; Ram; Balram; Khansahab; Pyare. Ibid. 5 Personal Interviews: Krishna; Ram; Balram; Khansahab; Pyare. Op. cit. 6 Personal Interviews: Krishna; Ram; Balram; Khansahab; Pyare. Op. cit. 7 Rupen Tamang. Personal Interview. Thamel, Kathmandu, Nepal. 26 July 2019; Bhim Thatel. Personal Interview. Thamel, Kathmandu: Nepal. 29 July 2019; Tenzing Bhutia. Personal Interview. Kalimpong: West Bengal. 11 November 2012; Rajen Biswakarma. Personal Interview. Lalitpur: Nepal. 27 July 2019. 8 Dhondup Bhutia. Personal Interview. West Bengal Police. Darjeeling: West Bengal. 5 March 2021; Shedup Tamang. Personal Interview. West Bengal Police. Darjeeling: West Bengal. 5 March 2021; Rajiv Khambu. Personal Interview. Mirik: West Bengal. 8 November 2013. 9 Zigmi. Personal Interview. Royal Bhutan Police, Thimpu: Bhutan. 28 March 2018. 10 Sherub. Personal Interview. Royal Bhutan Police, Punakha: Bhutan. 30 March 2018. 11 Diki. Personal Interview. Businesswoman, Thimpu: Bhutan. 29 March 2018; Chimi. Personal Interview. Businesswoman, Thimpu: Bhutan. 29 March 2018; Chomu. Personal Interview. Businesswoman, Punakha: Bhutan. 30 March 2018; Tenzin. Personal Interview. Businessman, Punakha: Bhutan. 30 March 2018. 12 Pakunga. Personal Interview. Aizawl: Mizoram. 10 January 2008; Ruata. Personal Interview. Aizawl: Mizoram. 10 January 2008. 13 Kawla. Personal Interview. Shillong, Meghalaya. 24 February 2020; Roberta. Personal Interview. Shillong, Meghalaya. 24 February 2020; Thari. Personal Interview. Shillong: Meghalaya. 20 February 2020; Sawma. Personal Interview. Shillong: Meghalaya. 14 February 2020. 14 Tahair Alam. Personal Interview. Guwahati: Assam. 11 February 2020; Deka. Personal Interview. Guwahati: Assam. 11 February 2020. 15 It was invented in 1918 by a Japanese chemist named Akira Ogata, and its origins can be traced back to Japan. 16 Personal Interviews: Tahair Alam; Deka. Op. cit.; Sawma. Personal Interview. Shillong: Meghalaya. 14 February 2020. 17 Kawla. Personal Interview. Op. cit. 18 Personal Interviews: Roberta; Thari. Op. cit. 19 Personal Interviews: Kawla; Roberta; Thari; Sawma. Op. cit.

Bootlegging in South Asia’s neighbourhood 59

20 Personal Interviews: Tahair Alam; Deka; Roberta. Op. cit.; Tetea. Personal Interview. Guwahati: Assam. 12 February 2020; Prem. Personal Interview. Guwahati: Assam. 12 February 2020 21 Roberta. Personal Interview. Op. cit. 22 Personal Interviews: Tahair Alam; Deka; Tetea; Prem. Op. cit. 23 Sawma. Personal Interview. Op. cit. 24 Pari. Personal Interview. Champhai: Mizoram. 24 January 2008; Zela. Personal Interview. Champhai: Mizoram. 24 January 2008; Ngura. Personal Interview. Champhai: Mizoram. 24 January 2008. 25 Tlani. Personal Interview. Tlabung: Mizoram. 11 January 2010. 26 Rema. Telephone Interview. Aizawl: Mizoram. 3 March 2022. 27 Nguri. Telephone Interview. Aizawl: Mizoram. 3 March 2022. 28 Zela. Personal Interview. Champhai, Mizoram. 26 January 2008; Ngura. Personal Interview. Champhai, Mizoram. 25 January 2008. 29 Personal Interviews: Zela; Ngura. Op​.ci​t . 30 Personal Interviews: Pari; Zela; Ngura. Op​.cit​.

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‘Wildlife Trade in Northeast India With Special Reference to Herpetofauna and Some Measures of Control to Check the Trade.’ NE India Broadcast, 22 Aug 2022, www​.neindiabroadcast​.com​/2022​/08​/22​/wildlife​-trade​-in​-northeast​ -india​-with​-special​-reference​-to​-herpetofauna​-and​-some​-measures​- of​- control​-to​ -check​-the​-trade. ‘Wildlife Trafficking for Trade in North East India: A Case Study.’ International Journal of Current Advanced Research (IJCAR). www​.journalijcar​.org​/issues​ /wildlife​-trafficking​-trade​-north​- east​-india​- case​-study. Accessed 24 Oct 2022. ‘Yaba: The Red Pills and the Rohingya.’ Pulitzer Center, 5 Jul 2018, www​ .pulitzercenter​.org ​/stories​/yaba​-red​-pills​-and​-rohingya. Buchanan, J. M. 1980. ‘Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking.’ (pp. 3–15) in James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.). Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A & M University. Chakraborty, A. S., and Chakraborty, S. R. 2016. ‘Ambiguous Identities: Statelessness of Gorkhas in North-East India.’ (pp. 207–245) in Paula Banerjee, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, and Atig Ghosh (eds.). The State of Being Stateless: An Account of South Asia. New Delhi: Orient Black Swan Pvt. Ltd. Chakraborty, A. S. 2020. ‘Nepal-India Virtual Neighbourhood “Halla Gulla”.’ Multidimensions Magazine, 19 Jul 2020, https://mul​tidi​mens​ionm​agazine​.com​ /2020​/07​/19​/nepal​-india​-virtual​-neighbourhood​-halla​-gulla/ Accessed 15 May 2021. Chakraborty, A. S. 2021a. ‘Dance of the Dragons and the Bromance: Friendships in the Neighbourhood.’ Multidimensions Magazine, 4 Jan, 2021. https://mul​tidi​ mens​ionm​agazine​.com ​/dance​- of​-the​- dragons​-and​-the​-bromance​-friendships​-in​ -the​-neighbourhood/ Accessed 15 May 2021. Chakraborty, A. S. 2021b. ‘Olipath, Centrality and Trust Issues: India-Nepal Muddled Neighbourhood Friendship.’ Multidimensions Magazine, 26 Sept 2021, https://mul​tidi​mens​ionm​agazine​.com ​/olipath​- centrality​-and​-trust​-issues​ -india​-nepal​-muddled​-neighbourhood​-friendship/ Accessed 15 May 2021. Chakraborty, A. S. 2022. ‘Muddled Friendships and Disgruntled Geographies: Lung Dragon in the Neighbourhood.’ (pp. 139–153) in Anita Sengupta, and Priya Singh (eds.). Asia Matters 2: China in India’s Neighbourhood. Kolkata: Asia in Global Affairs, https://www​.asiainglobalaffairs​.in​/wp​- content​/uploads​/2022​/08​ /Asia​-Matters​-2​-final​.pdf. Dholabahi, N. 2007. ‘Police Booklet for the Northeast Students Betrays Prejudices: Delhi “Profiles” to Protect.’ The Telegraph, 10 Jul. Edwards, A., and Gill, P. 2006. ‘Transnational Organised Crime.’ Perspectives on Global Security, https://doi​.org ​/10​.1604​/9780415403399. Esterman, I. 2022. ‘Analysis: Myanmar’s Gemstone Riches Bring Poverty and Environmental Destruction.’ Mongabay Environmental News, 25 Apr. https:// news ​ . mongabay​. com ​ / 2022 ​ / 04 ​ /analysis ​ - myanmars ​ - gemstone ​ - riches ​ - bring​ -poverty​-and​- environmental​-destruction/. Finckenauer, J. O., and Ko-Lin, C. 2007. Asian Transnational Organized Crime, https://doi​.org ​/10​.1604​/9781600214608. Gelbard, R. 1998. ‘Burma: The Booming Drug Trade.’ in Robert Rotberg (ed.). Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Kahn, A. E. 1988. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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Lin Mu, N. S., and Joseph, J. A. 2022. ‘No Exit: China’s State Surveillance over People Who Use Drugs.’ Health and Human Rights Journal, Jun 24(1), https:// www​. hhrjournal​.org ​/ 2022 ​/ 06 ​/no ​- exit​- chinas ​- state ​- surveillance ​- over ​- people​ -who​-use​-drugs/. Lintner, B. 2003. Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Murton, G. 2021. ‘A Himalayan Border Trilogy: The Political Economies of Transport Infrastructure and Disaster Relief Between China and Nepal.’ 3 Jun 2021. escholarship​.org ​/uc ​/item ​/01t8​w749. Saxer, Martin. 2013. ‘Between China and Nepal: Trans-Himalayan Trade and the Second Life of Development in Upper Humla.’ Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, 8(Sept), 31–52. Shankar, P. 2022. ‘Why Is India a Major Hub for Wildlife Trafficking?’ MongabayIndia, 8 Jun, www​.india​.mongabay​.com ​/2022 ​/06​/explainer​-why​-is​-india​-a​ -major​-hub​-for​-wildlife​-trafficking. Smith, P.J. (ed.). 1997. Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. Smith, A., and Bruce, Y. 2014. Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Srikanth, H. 2016. ‘Combating Transnational Crimes in the Era of Globalization: Strategies for India and the ASEAN.’ International Studies, 53(2), 91–104. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0020881717728157. Accessed 24 Oct 2022. Tullock, G. 1980. ‘Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game.’ (pp. 16–38) in James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.). Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A & M University. von Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph. 1975. Himalayan Traders: Life in Highland Nepal. London: J. Murray.

4 DANCE OF THE DRAGONS Bhutan–China relationship Jigme Yeshe Lama

The title of this chapter roughly borrows from the title of a novel written by the author George R.R. Martin. He is renowned for his work The Game of Thrones (GoT), which was turned into a popular television show. The novel A Dance with Dragons is a part of the larger series that deals with rival houses competing for power in the fictional land of Westeros. Interestingly, many of these houses have different creatures, such as dragons, lions, wolves, etc., as their sigils. A few are powerful houses with rich resources, while many are middle- or smaller powers, which are in alliance with or subservience to the larger houses. The narrative of GoT is similar to the real-world interactions of states. As an example of fiction mirroring reality, A Dance with Dragons is replete with competition and cooperation among kingdoms. This interaction is based largely on power, with kingdoms using a web of diplomatic, strategic, and security practices to converse with each other. It can be somewhat stated that these actors enter into a well-rehearsed and choreographed dance. Here, importance should be given to the word “choreographed,” as the dialogues among states in the 21st century follows a fixed choreography. The dance among nation-states is dictated through the language of foreign policy, which, according to Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, is a technical, rational process that is influenced by numerous factors. It involves the interplay of a wide variety of basic determinants, political institutions, organisational pulls and pressures of a bureaucratic/political nature, and the personality of the decision-makers (Bandyopadhyaya 2003, 2). He further equates the interaction among states with a system that converts certain information inputs into policy outputs. Like a machine, there is a “decisional” unit that functions according to its own behavioural laws, and its output is foreign policy. A “feedback loop” connects the inputs and DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-5

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the outputs, for the inputs – both exogenous and endogenous – are affected by the output, insofar as foreign policy in turn influences the various factors that go into its making (Bandyopadhyaya 2003, 2). The feedback is more complex and continuous, and is a major characteristic of decision-making in foreign policy, as there is perpetual interaction between the demands and supports generated by the political institutions and the governmental machinery of decision-making, and between different branches and levels of this machinery, both horizontally and vertically (Bandyopadhyaya 2003, 3). Thus, the foreign policy of modern states is a well-choreographed dance, whose main objective is furthering national interest. Foreign policy as a dance has been alluded to in David Malone’s book Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy. In a similar vein, this chapter investigates the dance between the Dragon Kingdom (Bhutan) and the Red Dragon (China). The association of the mythical dragon with both countries is interesting and needs further analysis. Historically, China has been depicted as a dragon, a narrative well-established in media and academic discourses. Moreover, the rise of China’s power has fuelled the association of the Middle Kingdom with a powerful dragon. While the dragon plays an important role in Chinese culture, the Chinese do not necessarily associate the mythical beast with their country. On the other hand, a country that is strongly associated with the dragon is the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. The Bhutanese self-association with a dragon is deep, as the indigenous name for Bhutan is “Druk-yul,” meaning “land of the Thunder Dragon.” A white dragon adorns the Bhutanese national flag and the mythical creature also finds prominence in their national anthem. The predominant school of Tibetan Buddhism in Bhutan is the Drukpa Kagyu, a branch of the larger Kagyu school that started in Tibet during the 11th century AD. The Drukpa Kagyu’s founder was Tsangpa Gyare, who named his new order after seeing nine dragons rise up in the sky. The leading state monk body of Bhutan, or the zhungdratshang, follows the Drukpa Kagyu school of Buddhism, which is led by the Je Khenpo. Even the state of Bhutan was founded by Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, a reincarnate lama belonging to the Drukpa Kagyu school, who originally hailed from Tibet. Thus, the “druk,” or dragon, plays an important role in Bhutan. Historical encounters between the two dragons

Both dragons started sharing borders from the 1950s, but it did not lead to the establishment of official diplomatic relations. It was after the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950–51 that the Red Dragon became next-door neighbours with the Himalayan dragon. Before this, Bhutan shared borders with Tibet. In fact, both countries had extensive socio-political and religious connections. The Bhutanese script Dzongkha is derived from Tibetan,

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which in turn has its roots in the Devanagari script. A brief elaboration of the Tibet-Bhutan connections is significant, as it reverberates in the modern dance of the two dragons. As mentioned earlier, Bhutan was unified in the 1620s by Zhabdrung Nawang Namgyal. In 1616, a young religious hierarch of the Drukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism sought refuge among his followers in western Bhutan after political opponents in Tibet challenged his reincarnate status. The king of Tsang, who ruled central Tibet from Shigatse, supported the Zhabdrung’s opponent and launched a war in the southlands against him and his followers, but was defeated (Ardussi 2018, 111). In 1625, the Zhabdrung proclaimed the formation of a new state based on the “cho-si” principle, which meant an amalgamation between religion and politics. He appointed a regent in charge of civil affairs and an informal group of advisors. For the next 26 years, he consolidated his position in this new state, Bhutan, holding off repeated threats and actual invasions from Tibet, including several launched by the Fifth Dalai Lama (Ardussi 2018, 111). The interaction between the Buddhist states was marked with armed conflict, with the Bhutanese emerging victorious in most of them. However, conflict was not the only language of conversation between both countries, as they interacted through Buddhism. On the other hand, as understood through the example of the Zhabdrung, violence, and in many cases war, did stem from religious disagreements. However, the Buddhist connections are seen to predate the establishment of the state of Bhutan by Zhabdrung Nawang Namgyal. These connections were patronised by the local elites, but also were equally diffused. The Buddhist connections will receive more attention towards the end of the chapter, as it is seen to develop into a factor that affects Sino-Bhutanese relationship. Unlike the choreographed foreign relations between nation-states, the premodern Buddhist connections were somewhat free-flowing. Instead, Buddhist linkages between Bhutan, Tibet, and the larger Inner Asian world was diverse and plural. These multiple connections can be compared to numerous dances taking place, which came to an end with the arrival of the Western colonial powers. They imported the Western ideology of statehood and the forms of interaction that came to its colonies. These norms were based on the principle ideas of the Westphalian state, which gives importance to a unified, indivisible sovereign state with centralised political authority (Behera 2008, 29). On the other hand, polities such as Tibet, Bhutan, etc. were managed within the framework of a layered sovereignty. Political authority and control tended to be dispersed and distributed between various layers of authority: vassal states, regional kingdoms, monasteries, and empires, as distinct from the centralised political unity of the modern sovereign state (Behera 2008, 26). This was radically transformed under colonial rule, which ruptured the old, indigenous, and creative mechanisms of

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compromise and collaboration between various identities and the political authority (Behera 2008, 26). The ideology of the Western nation-state is seen to have permeated in the “interactions” between and among states. First, a word about “encounters” or “meetings”/“interactions”/“dialo gue” between and among states. Globalisation and technological revolution has accelerated the “interactions” between and among states, bringing states into proximity to each other. This interaction is seen to be mediated through certain fixed norms. It can be said that the encounters between states is conducted through the language of diplomacy. Since ancient times, diplomacy has existed between and among states; for instance, Emperor Ashoka (third century BC) of the Mauryan dynasty used Buddhist diplomacy to conduct foreign relations. In the 21st century, diplomacy is seen as a scientific mode of conducting foreign relations. Through diplomatic establishments and ambassadors, states have institutionalised their interactions, making them formal and rational. Interestingly, the language of modern-day diplomacy has been framed by the West and followed by the rest. Similar to the institutions of the nation-state and creation of state borders, even modern diplomatic parlance was imposed by the West on its colonies. This discursive imposition has led to the birth of numerous problems in the non-West. An example of this is seen in the Sino-Tibetan problem. Since the 1950s, Tibet has been occupied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, Chinese sovereignty over Tibet is challenged by Tibetans and their supporters, transforming Sino-Tibetan ties into one of conflict and contestation. According to Parshotam Mehra, the Tibetan issue could have been resolved if the oriental system of diplomacy had been maintained (Mehra 2012, x). Western colonial discourse has shaped the relationship between China and Bhutan. In the late-18th and 19th centuries, European powers, especially the British, had a hegemonic presence in Asia. They colonised large areas of the Indian subcontinent, leading to an import of British categories in the region. A significant area where Western categories of the nation-state was imposed was in geopolitics. Asian geopolitics underwent a paradigm transformation with the entry of the Western colonial categories, which is seen in the ideas of the buffer state and suzerainty. After establishing their authority in India, the British set out to secure the borders of their colony. In respect to this, they saw the Himalayan states (Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet) as buffers between India and China and also Russia. The sovereignties enjoyed by the traditional polities in the Himalayas were not comprehended by the British colonial power; instead they were defined through Western categories. This is best understood through the category of suzerainty, which was used by the British to explain Tibet’s relationship with China. Entailing the idea of loose control over Tibet, the British saw the Chinese having suzerainty over Tibet. The traditional cho-yon or priest-patron relationship between China and Tibet was dubbed as an exercise of suzerainty by the Chinese over Tibetans.

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Interestingly, many non-Western states adopted these categories that were also present in Bhutan-China ties. The direct encounter between the two dragons occurred through the language of the West. Prior to this, encounters between both countries were mediated mostly through Tibet. The imperial Chinese documents have records of Bhutanese lamas. In the 1700s, Qing China’s power in Tibet increased. For them, Bhutan was not important and their imperial edicts term the Bhutanese as “tribals” (Ardussi 1977, 457). Still, the Manchus understood that events in Bhutan could destabilise affairs in Tibet. During the 1730s, the Tibetan ruler Pholane had interfered in Bhutanese affairs. As Tibet then was under Manchu influence, it affected Bhutan (Ardussi 1977, 457). Ardussi writes how from the late-18th century, the perceived or imagined menace from British India and China loomed far larger in Bhutanese monastic circles than from Tibet (Ardussi 1977, 476). Chinese goods used to arrive in Bhutan through Tibetan traders. During the Sino-Gurkha war of 1792–1793, the Chinese commander had requested the Bhutanese to assist him in his war against Nepal. Despite Bhutan’s refusal and the commander’s protestation, no action was taken against Bhutan (Mathou 2004, 392). The entry of the British changed this, witnessed in the 1890s, when the Qing dynasty claimed suzerainty over Bhutan. The Chinese official stationed in Lhasa, known as the Amban proposed to the Chinese emperor to appoint the Tongsa ponlop as the chieftain and the Paro ponlop as the vice-chieftain of Bhutan, which was approved by the Manchu emperor. However, the Bhutanese did not take this seriously as well, as no Chinese officials were stationed in Bhutan (Phuntsho 2016, 525). The Chinese emperor had sent a seal and hat with an imitation coral button that signified an official in second rank to Bhutan, which the Bhutanese received out of politeness, but these items were locked away and were never used. The Qing policy towards Bhutan should be seen as a part of the Great Game; a series of geopolitical wranglings that involved British India, China, and Tsarist Russia. The Great Game strengthened nation-statism in the region, with the imperial powers scrambling to expand their sovereignty in the Asian highlands. In 1907, the Amban went beyond the symbolic suzerainty when he wrote to the Bhutanese leaders that “the Bhutanese are subjects of the Emperor of China, who is the lord of heaven.” He also sent the Chinese official stationed in Chumbi Valley to Paro with 20 soldiers “to inspect climate, crops, etc.” The Bhutanese reception was lukewarm and the officer met the Paro ponlop and the Thimpu dzongpon, but the meeting was of no consequence to Bhutan. The Amban also wished Chinese currency to be accepted in Bhutan, but this too was met with a cold response (ibid., 526). Until 1911, the Chinese claimed suzerainty over Bhutan. Peking termed Bhutan to be a vassal state that was paying annual tributes to China. The Chinese had even sent a letter to Bhutan warning that Chinese troops would be posted in Bhutan and they should not be resisted (ibid., 527).

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The Middle Kingdom’s claims to Bhutan stemmed from Tibetan claims. There are several cultural, social, and religious similarities between Bhutanese and Tibetans, who have had many interactions for a long time (Mathou 2004, 389). During the eighth century, when Tibet was a military power, they had invaded Bhutan, withdrawing only in the ninth century. Even after that, Tibetan lamas kept pouring into Bhutan (ibid.). As mentioned earlier, Bhutan was unified by a Tibetan lama who was a refugee forced out from Tibet. Zhabdrung Nawang Namgyal, abbot of Ralung Monastery in Tibet, arrived in Bhutan in 1616 after been expelled from Tibet by the Tsangpa rulers and the Lhasa government headed by the Fifth Dalai Lama (ibid.). After solidifying his position in Bhutan, the Zhabdrung thwarted numerous invasions from Tibet. However, in 1731, the Tibetan ruler Pholane took Bhutan’s internal turmoil as an opportunity to impose suzerainty on Bhutan. Although Tibet occasionally claimed a legitimate right to interfere in local politics, there is no evidence of Tibet ever having practically implemented its rule in Bhutan (ibid., 390). Tibet’s rulers certainly considered Bhutan as a vassal, and occasionally, Bhutan even pretended to accept that situation in order to play down British influence. In 1946, for instance, the King of Bhutan wrote to the viceroy and Governor General of India that Bhutan had “acknowledged Tibetan sovereignty” up to 1860. Thierry Mathou writes how Bhutan gave an annual payment to Tibet, and a Bhutanese representative was posted in Lhasa up to 1959 as part of a tributary system (ibid., 390). The Qing and the Nationalists stressed the idea that Bhutan was a vassal of China. This assumption was based on the Tibetan ruler Pholane’s alleged suzerainty on Bhutan that was supposed to have passed on to Tibet’s Chinese overlords (ibid., 391). There are records of Chinese intervention in Bhutan in 1830, 1876, 1885, 1889, and 1905. Direct contacts between the two countries were also recorded under the Guomindang regime in 1940, 1943, and 1947 (ibid., 392). It should be noted that successive Chinese regimes have misinterpreted Bhutan’s relations with Tibet. Their comprehension of Tibet-Bhutan ties is understood through Western concepts, whereby the gifts sent by the Bhutanese ruling elite to the Dalai Lama was understood as tributes, which in the Himalayan Buddhist world was nothing but a display of respect and deference towards the Dalai Lama. Such acts, however, can be understood in a different manner. For instance, the Himalayan polities seem to be endowed with what Susanne Rudolph calls the ritual sovereignties. Under this, the Himalayas had the presence of self-regulating groups, which had certain links to a centre through giving tributes or through a weakly specified ritual sovereignty. This in turn was derived through Buddhist values in which a number of Himalayan polities not only saw Lhasa as their cultural centre but also emulated certain practices followed by the ruling elites in the Tibetan capital. Ritual sovereignty is designated through cultural activities,

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symbols, and processes that in the absence of instrumental mechanisms nevertheless creates a domain, a realm (Rudolph 1987, 740). The Himalayan and the larger Inner Asian world accepted the ritual sovereignties exercised by Tibet. While this idea is not comprehensible to the sovereignty of the modern nation-state, ritual sovereignties are seen to be active in the Himalayas. A way of understanding this is through the “connected histories” present between Bhutan and Tibet. While a bulk of the connections between the two were religious and cultural in nature, there was also a pedagogical connection with the Bhutanese king sending several young Bhutanese northward to Tibet to undertake advanced Buddhist studies. The Bhutanese pupils studied in Drepung monastery, one among the three great monastic universities of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism. A batch of students were sent to the Srisimha college at Dzogchen in Kham (Phuntsho 2016, 530). Moreover, there was the presence of Bhutanese and Ladakhi enclaves in Tibet, entirely surrounded by the territory of the Dalai Lama, which gave revenue to Bhutan for some 300 years (Bray 1997, 89). In the 20th century, Bhutan claimed sovereignty over these enclaves. By contrast, the Lhasa government acknowledged that Ladakh/Kashmir and Bhutan held certain rights, but it nevertheless tried to exercise its own authority as though the enclaves were no more than foreign-owned estates in Tibetan territory (ibid.). Still, Bhutanese officers governed these enclaves, collected taxes, and administered justice (Stobdan 2019, 204). Such a political setup is considered ambiguous and incomprehensible for the modern nation-state. However, as John Bray mentions, in the premodern period political linkages in the Himalaya consisted of a web of interrelationships with many ambiguities (ibid.). In the case of the Bhutanese enclaves, the origin was religious but, as it is with the Himalayas, the boundaries between the religious and the political is seen to be overlapping. The Thunder Dragon meets the Red Dragon

The multiple sovereignties or so-called “ambiguities” in the Himalayas came to an end with the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and its subsequent takeover of Tibet. After this, both China and Bhutan started sharing borders which historically were between Tibet and Bhutan. Encounters between the dragons took place through the language of the modern, as the post-colonial PRC adopted the model of nation-statism, which is a project of modernity. As a virulent nation-state, the PRC embarked on a project of nation-state building, leading to the forceful incorporation of Tibet in China. Tibet and the Himalayas were peripheries for the Chinese state that had to be securitised. The post-colonial nation-states saw the Himalayas through a singular notion of strategy/security, which steamrolled the existing multiple realities in the region. For instance, the earlier borders between Tibet and Bhutan

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were open and frequently crisscrossed by traders and nomadic communities. This notion is strengthened from the example of the Doklam plateau present at the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. In 2017, the region was the site of a military standoff between India and China. Doklam, or Drok-lam in Tibetan, literally means the “nomad’s path,” which is now an epitome of strategy/security for the nation-state. The borders are now closed and inaccessible. As stated earlier, Western imperial categories are accepted by all, which is also seen in the context of Bhutan’s international relations. In 1907, the Treaty of Punakha was signed between Bhutan and British India, giving the latter an advisory position in framing Bhutan’s foreign policy. One sees a follow-up to this in the 1949 treaty between Bhutan and India, which allowed India to guide Bhutan in its external affairs (Phuntsho 2016, 573). The entry of the nation-state in South Asia in the form of post-colonial India and China led to countries like Bhutan picking a side, which for Thimpu was India. China was fully aware of the Bhutan-India treaty of 1949 and was keen to treat Bhutan as an independent state (Mathou, 393). In 1953, Chinese gifts were sent to the Druk Gyalpo (King of Bhutan). In 1955, Chinese officers in Lhasa even decided to issue visas directly to Bhutanese citizens. However, Bhutan remained cautious, if not suspicious, as far as Chinese intentions were concerned. In 1958, there were some rumours about the discovery, in the Tawang district in Northeast India, of a reincarnation of the Zhabdrung Nawang Namgyal, a potential challenger to the Bhutanese monarchy. Some unsubstantiated reports even mentioned that this reincarnation was brought to Tibet, where Bhutanese opposed to the King tried to win support from China against the Bhutanese monarchy (ibid.). Throughout the 1950s, Beijing’s legitimacy in Tibet was challenged by the Tibetans, who led armed rebellions that culminated in the Lhasa uprising of 1959. After the brutal crushing of the Tibetan uprising by China and the subsequent exile of the 14th Dalai Lama, the borders between China and Bhutan were closed, bringing an end to the historical exchanges with Tibet (Phuntsho 2016, 573). Eventually, both countries started having problems regarding the location of the borders. This uncertainty was seen when, at the end of 1960, Chinese border guards made small scale incursions into Bhutanese territory and also a map that was published in July 1958 in the China Pictorial magazine denoted large tracts of Bhutanese territory – the entire Trashigang area in the east and a substantial portion of territory in the northeast – as belonging to China (Mathou, 394). These events increased the proximity between Bhutan and India, with the Himalayan kingdom signing a number of agreements regarding defence and infrastructural build-up with New Delhi. The consolidation of nationstatism in the region further led to an erasing of older ties between Bhutan and Tibet. The Dragon Kingdom withdrew its representative in Lhasa and its officer in Western Tibet. It decided a total ban on trade with Tibet.

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According to Thierry Mathou, the halting of trade with Tibet had a decisive influence on the Bhutanese economy, which had long depended upon the Tibetan market, and was forced to adjust to the global shifting of trade structures that followed the opening of the road to India in 1963. It meant closing all the traditional outlets for the country’s surplus rice and depriving weavers around the Bumthang area with Tibetan wool (Mathou, 394). Furthermore, the earlier pluralist discourses that formed the basis of the encounters between the polities were now replaced by a singular discourse entailing borders and territories. Between the Red Dragon and the Thunder Dragon, border disputes have emerged as the dominant discourse. Both countries have disputes in the western sector of Bhutan, which entails the strategic Doklam trijunction. There are claims and counterclaims over the Jakarlung and Pasamlung Valleys in northern Bhutan and in recent times, Beijing has staked claims over Bhutan’s eastern Sakteng region (Yang 2021). In 1997, China had offered a so-called “package deal,” under which it would give up claims on areas in central Bhutan in exchange for territory in the western part, including Doklam (Chaudhury 2021). Border talks between the two dragons

Border talks between both countries started in 1984, and they signed the Guiding Principles on the Settlement of Boundary Issues in 1988 and the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the border areas in 1998 (Yang 2021). The Chinese approach on border talks with Bhutan has been quite similar to the one it had taken earlier with Nepal, and to the one once proposed to India on the Sino-Indian boundary, with preference for a “package deal” rather than a sector-by-sector settlement (Mathou, 402). Under this, Beijing would concede its northern claims, with an area of 495 square kilometres, in exchange for Bhutan agreeing to China’s western claims, including 89 square kilometres of Doklam (Joshi 2021). The package deal proposed by PRC reveals how encounters between modern states are dictated in terms of the language of security/strategy. China wanted the western territories of Bhutan, as it would enlarge the narrow and strategic Chumbi valley and control over Doklam would give Beijing a military advantage over India. The Chinese access to the Zompelri ridge in Doklam plateau would give them a commanding view of India’s strategic Siliguri corridor (ibid.). Doklam/Drok-lam, or the nomad‘s path, was for ages traversed by traders, nomads, and pilgrims. The plateau was gifted by the 13th Dalai Lama to Raja Urgen Dorjee, the Prime Minister of Bhutan in the early 1900s, for his unfettered services to the Tibetan hierarch. Tsering Shakya mentions how the Chumbi Valley and Doklam were spaces of multiple transactions – economic, cultural, and religious – before the advent of the nation-state. Interestingly, both countries do not have direct diplomatic

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relations and liaise via their embassies in Delhi (Yang 2021). Still, negotiations between both countries continued, and in 2021, both countries signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to accelerate the protracted boundary talks ongoing for over three decades (Patranobis 2021). The MoU was formulated during the tenth expert group meeting in Kunming in April 2021 and the discussion entailed, setting up a framework first, confirming the specific disputes with an exchange of maps and a resolution stage (Yang 2021). In a statement released after the signing of the MoU, it is termed as promoting the process of establishing diplomatic ties between both countries. Beijing has hailed the MoU as bringing mutual benefits and a win-win for both countries. More importantly, The Global Times, which is the official tabloid of the PRC, saw the agreement as a victory over Indian hegemony and the victory of bilateral diplomacy in the region. India is seen as a bully and the MoU has thwarted India’s strategy of isolating China in South Asia (Patranobis 2021). Beijing sees the MoU as a way of reducing India’s influence over Bhutan, which can now independently manage the borders (ibid.). On the other hand, the MoU will not cover the India-China-Bhutan trijunction in Doklam, as in 2012 it was agreed with China that any trijunction will only be resolved in consultation with all three countries (Chaudhury 2021). It would restress the 1988 and 1998 agreements between both countries. According to a 2021 Bloomberg article, through the MoU, Bhutan is termed to have offered China the prospect of eventual full diplomatic relations in return for demarcating the northern border, allowing sidestepping the issue of Doklam while stopping Chinese encroachments in other areas (Sen and Chaudhary 2021). The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese state hailed, the signing of the MoU as historic, as it breaks the current deadlock between both countries and lays the foundation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Bhutan. The report mentions how the relationship between the two was negatively influenced by India and that New Delhi might set blockades for both countries when the negotiations enter the crucial period. The MoU was signed by the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Wu Jianghao and the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Lyonpo Tandi Dorji. It is seen as a milestone, as the agreement signifies the starting of bilateral ties between both countries (Cao et al. 2021). According to Wang Se, an Assistant Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, “India has always been the reason for the delay in negotiations on the boundary issues between China and Bhutan. After previous rounds of talks, the two sides have reached a consensus on some issues, but India believes these would undermine its interest, especially about the western sector in the Bhutan-China border, which India thinks could pose a threat to the Siliguri corridor” (ibid.). Thus, China perceives the Indian pressure on Bhutan as being responsible for the difficulty faced by Bhutan and China

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in border negotiations. The Global Times report further elaborates how the details of the negotiations are not available, but that India will interfere when the roadmap is implemented to make concrete protocols. It states how there may be changes in the negotiations between both countries due to India’s possible interference. The Chinese have tried to portray Bhutan signing the MoU as Bhutan’s willingness to get rid of India’s interference, to gain more independence over diplomacy for Bhutan’s own national interests (ibid.). Beijing definitely sees the MoU with Thimpu as the first step of weaning the Thunder Dragon away from India. The Chinese dragon wooing the Thunder Dragon was seen in the three-day visit (10–13 October 2022) by Sun Weidong, China’s ambassador in India, to Bhutan, where he met King Jigme Khesar Wangchuk, Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, and Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji. The objective of the visit was to maintain friendly exchange, improve relations, expand a win-win cooperation, promote China-Bhutan border talks, and move ahead with the three-step roadmap. Bhutan remains the last state that has not latched to Beijing’s BRI and thus prevents China from becoming an Asian power (Shivamurthy 2022). The rise of China is seen as providing an option to Bhutan, which is considered to be under the influence of India (Cao et al. 2021). This is also reflected in a section of the Bhutanese population affirming the need to look north towards China. Some sections even perceive India as a hurdle in Bhutan’s border negotiations with China. Bhutan’s refusal of China’s “package deal,” and India’s alleged involvement in the 2013 elections, have often been cited to substantiate this view. The Doklam issue is a case in point. As tensions increased, some Bhutanese criticised both India and China on social media called out the Bhutanese government for its over-reliance on India. There are those who see India’s economic embrace as “suffocating.” With increasing reliance on social media, young people are becoming more vocal and critical of Bhutan’s foreign policy and India’s role (Shivamurthy 2022). The people-to-people contact between China and Bhutan is seen in the form of tourism, with Bhutan being a preferred destination for weddings of Chinese celebrities. In 2008, the actors Tony Leung and Carina Lau married in Bhutan. The wedding drew more than a hundred guests, most of whom hailed from China (China​.org​​.cn 2008). Chinese tourists in Bhutan have vastly increased since 2008 – through2015, there have been 10,000. These tourists generate revenue by spending lavishly, around US$250 on their visas alone, while their counterparts from India barely spend US$15 per day. This has made Bhutan’s need to have economic and diplomatic relations with China more urgent. By 2010, China had begun exporting farming and telecommunications equipment to Bhutan. In 2012, a company owned by the Bhutanese PM’s son-in-law won a tender to buy Chinese-made buses to sell in Bhutan. This indicates a growing relationship between lobby groups, political parties, and business elites in Bhutan with China (Shivamurthy 2022).

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The 2021 MoU between Bhutan and China is seen as being beneficial for China’s proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the development of China’s border regions (ibid.). A significant aspect of China’s interest in resolving the border dispute with Bhutan and also starting diplomatic relationship with Thimpu is security. Beijing’s claims over Tawang in India’s Arunachal Pradesh can be strengthened if China maintains a good relationship with Bhutan. In 2020, the Chinese dragon made new claims over Sakteng in eastern Bhutan, adjoining Tawang, which can be understood as a part of this strategy. As mentioned earlier, China’s encroachment in the Doklam plateau can also be understood in terms of Beijing attempting to secure its borders in the Himalayas. Regarding encroachments, the 2017 Doklam standoff between India and China took place in the aftermath of Chinese construction activities in the Doklam plateau. According to Robert Barnett, since 2015, the Chinese have constructed a network of roads, buildings, and military outposts in a sacred valley in Bhutan. In 2020, the communist party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Wu Yingjie, inaugurated a new village in the south of the TAR, which, however, was in Bhutan. Wu and a retinue of officials, police, and journalists had crossed an international border. They were in a 232-square-mile area claimed by China since the early 1980s, but internationally understood as part of Lhuntse district in northern Bhutan (Barnett 2021). The village is a part of a major drive by Chinese President Xi Jinping since 2017 to fortify the Tibetan borderlands. Barnett mentions how China doesn’t need the land it is settling in Bhutan: its aim is to force the Bhutanese government to cede territory that China wants elsewhere in Bhutan, to give Beijing a military advantage in its struggle with New Delhi. Gyalaphug is now one of three new villages (two already occupied, one under construction), 66 miles of new roads, a small hydropower station, two Communist Party administrative centres, a communications base, a disaster relief warehouse, five military or police outposts, and what is believed to be a major signals tower, a satellite receiving station, a military base, and up to six security sites and outposts that China has constructed in what it says are parts of Lhodrak in the TAR, but which in fact are in the far north of Bhutan (ibid.). Beijing’s strategy along the borders with Bhutan is a reflection of its policy in the South China Sea. In 2020, China established a village two kilometres within Bhutan's territory, very close to Doklam (Som 2020). The Pangda village has been built by the Chinese government in subtropical forest just inside the southwestern border of Bhutan (Barnett 2021). On the other hand, the work in the northern border with Bhutan is more advanced in its development and involves the settlement of entire districts, not just a single village. A significant point raised by Barnett is that the area with Chinese construction is of exceptional importance to Bhutan and its people (ibid.). A EurAsian Times report has mentioned how maybe Bhutan and

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China have agreed to a deal and chosen to keep it under wraps (EurAsian Times Desk 2020). Another important aspect of the interaction between the two dragons deals with Tibetan Buddhism. Red Dragon, Tibetan Buddhism, and the Thunder Dragon

While this paper deals with present Sino-Bhutanese ties, which are modern nation-states, it gives importance to the premodern multiple sovereignties, realities that were experienced in the Himalayan spaces where the two nation-states now interact. Among the plethora of discourses present in the region that formed an ideology of domination was Tibetan Buddhism. Bhutan was a theocratic state under the Shabdrungs, with the Drukpa Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism exercising authority over the population. On the other hand, until the Chinese takeover of Tibet, it was a theocracy under the Dalai Lamas, a line of reincarnated monks belonging to the Geluk school (Yellow Hat). It needs to be understood that authority and sovereignty in both countries were exercised through diffused and plural ways and their interaction was dictated through the language of Tibetan Buddhism, which was marked by both conflict and cooperation. The Drukpa hierarch had an antagonistic relationship with the Dalai Lama’s predominantly-Geluk government. Both countries fought several wars on religious lines, mainly with the Tibetans invading Bhutan and the latter successfully defending themselves. However, conflict was not the only theme between the Drukpa Kagyu and the Gelukpas of Tibet, as seen through the relationship between the Panchen Lama and the Bhutanese ruling elite. The sixth Panchen Lama was instrumental in brokering the Anglo-Bhutan peace treaty in the aftermath of the first Anglo-Bhutan war (1772–1774). The Bhutanese ruling elite had approached the Geluk hierarch to broker peace between Bhutan and the East India Company after the latter aided the raja of Cooch Behar against Bhutan. Through this, the British aimed at increasing the prospect of commercial relations with Tibet through Bhutan (Booth and Chophel 2021). Amazingly, it led to Hastings and the East India Company offering land on the banks of the Hooghly near Calcutta to the Panchen Lama for the construction of a temple that would serve as a de facto foreign office for Tibetans. At present, this site is referred to as Bhot Bagan. Going back to the Buddhist linkages between Tibet and Bhutan, a number of Tibetan ascetics and Buddhist masters travelled to Bhutan, which included the famous Thangtong Gyalpo, also known as Chakzampa (builder of iron bridges). He preached in Bhutan and also constructed a number of iron bridges in the country. Another famous Buddhist personality hailing from Tibet who visited Bhutan was the divine madman Drukpa Kunlek, who made phallic worship popular in the Himalayan kingdom.

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The semi-mythical figure of Guru Padmasambava, the Indian tantric saint, who supposedly hailed from the Swat Valley, present-day modern Pakistan, was responsible for bringing Buddhism to Tibet. He traversed the Himalayas, creating “hidden valleys,” or “beyuls,” and taming the local spirits, converting them into guardians of the Buddhist faith. He was very active in Bhutan in the eighth century AD and laid the foundation of Buddhism in the country. The famous Paro Taktsang, or ‘tiger’s nest,’ is a powerful site associated with Guru Dorje Drolo, a wrathful emanation of Padmasambava. The Indian guru and his activities in the Himalayas can be an example of the fluidity present in ritual sovereignties, with Vajrayana Buddhism here becoming an essential example of a source of sovereignties. Guru Rinpoche, as he is popularly known among the various communities in the Himalayas, adopted numerous forms or has been portrayed as manifesting multiple identities, many of which might mirror local ideas and beliefs. He is popular among the Bhutanese and is propagated by the dominant Drukpa Kagyu, as well as the Nyingmapa school in Bhutan. It should be noted that the Gelukpa school to which the Dalai Lamas have belonged to does not have a strong presence in Bhutan. Prior to the advent of the modern nation-state and the emergence of fixed borders, Bhutanese pilgrims used to visit numerous sacred sites in Tibet and Bhutanese monks used to study in monasteries inside Tibet. Pilgrims from Tibet also visited the multiple sacred sites in Bhutan prior to the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Even the Monpas from neighbouring Tawang frequent Bhutan for religious purposes. A popular pilgrimage spot visited by them is the Gomphu Kora in eastern Bhutan. This site, which is close to the border with India, is associated with Guru Padmasambava. Here, locals as well as the pilgrims from Tawang and Dirang districts of present-day Arunachal Pradesh, participate in the Kora, or the circumambulation of the sacred spot (Schrempf 2018, 329). The pilgrimage to Gomphu Kora is a case of how pre-nation-state connections are very much active in the Himalayas. The language of Bhutan known as Dzongkha bears strong resemblance with Tibetan and they share the same script. With the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the subsequent escape of the Dalai Lama along with tens of thousands of Tibetans in 1959, the erstwhile traditional Tibetan state came to an end. Along with the Dalai Lama, his family, officials, and common refugees, came hundreds of Buddhist reincarnates, many of whom settled in the Himalayas, including in Bhutan. They established monasteries and dharma centres with numerous local followers. Thus, the end of the traditional Tibetan state led to a dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism in the South Asian Himalayas, strengthening the traditional ties between Tibet and the Himalayan spaces. Some degree of friction and resistance to the entry of these Buddhist hierarchs from Tibet has been seen, but nonetheless “interactions” between them and the local communities have remained. For instance, the current Dalai Lama has never visited Bhutan, but still has a strong following among the Bhutanese. In 2017, when he gave

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religious teachings in Tawang, a region bordering eastern Bhutan, around 3,000 people from Bhutan, many of whom had trekked for two days, had come to hear his sermons (Loiwal 2017). Thus, the Dalai Lama, along with other Tibetan reincarnates, enjoy varying degrees of traditional legitimacy among the Himalayan communities, including Bhutan. Incidentally, the modern communist Chinese state has also employed the legitimacy enjoyed by Tibetan Buddhism to interact with the Himalayan dragon. China is seen as “welcoming Bhutanese friends to China to make pilgrimages or to visit relatives and friends” (Mathou 408). Beijing in 2001 had invited the Dorje Lopen, the second-highest lama of the Drukpa Kagyu school to visit the sacred Wutai Shan and Emei Shan (ibid.). The people-to-people contact between the two countries can also be understood as an interaction between the two dragons, which, according to Chinese field investigators of the Global Times, is seen with herdsmen and farmers on both sides of the borders interacting and enjoying a peaceful and stable living environment (Cao et al. 2022). However, reports have indicated that Bhutanese grazers settled in the northern borders were intimidated by their Chinese counterparts (Shivamurthy 2022). Chinese aid and investments form a significant aspect of their foreign policy. With Bhutan, the first major Chinese investment came in the religious sector. This was in the form of a 169-foot Buddha statue in Thimpu, which was installed to commemorate the 60th birthday of the former king. It was financed by Aerosun Corporation, a major equipment manufacturing company based in Nanjing, PRC (Banerjee 2017). The Red Dragon’s “Buddhist” overtures to the Thunder Dragon can be analysed as a part of its preparation for the reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama. With the Dalai Lama reaching an advanced age, his future rebirth has emerged as a zone of contention between the atheist Chinese state and the Tibetans. Since 2007, the Chinese have initiated an “institutional” process to handle the reincarnation of Tibetan lamas. The interest of the Chinese nation-state in an arcane practice like reincarnation reveals the presence of ritual sovereignties in the form of these reincarnates in Tibet and the larger Himalayan world. A number of Tibetan reincarnates inside Tibet have been co-opted by the Chinese state, who will provide legitimacy to Beijing in the process of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. Thus, on similar lines, China’s Buddhist overtures towards Bhutan can be seen as a way to secure support from a Mahayana Buddhist country for its choice of the Dalai Lama in the near future. Interestingly, this notion has gained some mileage from statements made by the present 14th Dalai Lama. The exiled Tibetan spiritual leader in 2007 had mentioned that one mode of selecting his successor can be through referendum among the Tibetan Buddhist communities from the Himalayas to Mongolia, making the position of Bhutan unique and important (Ramesh and Watts 2007).

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Conclusion

In conclusion, the dance between the two dragons is seen through the language of the West. Modern Western notions of state, sovereignty, security, and territory are dominant discourses between China and Bhutan. Modernday geopolitics favours the nation-state and is imbued with realist perceptions of the world. Large states with immense military and non-military resources hold an advantage and monopolise global politics. This is highlighted by Nitisha Kaul in her article, “Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a Small State in International Relations.” She elaborates how, as a small state, Bhutan does not receive much attention in International Relations (IR). It is focused through the interests and perspectives of the more-prominent, larger powers like China and India, which is a result of big-power geopolitics inherited from an imperial era that sees such small states in rivalrous terms, merely as arenas of contest and influence. Also, Kaul writes how it is due to an epistemic violence on small states like Bhutan, whereby the scholarship on IR of Bhutan is produced by larger powers, in this case India (Kaul 2021, 2). Furthermore, as Nitisha Kaul writes, modern geopolitics and the emanating competition between China and India has led to the creation of an “in-betweenness” of Bhutan. Under such circumstances, Bhutan’s agency in IR is understood simply as a country in between the two superpowers. Such a portrayal is one mode of understanding the dynamics of China-Bhutan encounters that has become the dominant discourse in foreign policy studies. On the other hand, this chapter feebly attempts to overcome this and analyse the encounters between the two countries in terms of a post-colonial understanding. Through this, several “hidden” categories, falling under the rubric of ritual, traditional sovereignties, are accepted and the influences are seen in the encounters between the Red Dragon and the Thunder Dragon. References Ardussi, John A. 1977. Bhutan before the British - A historical study. PhD Dissertation. Australian National University. Ardussi, J. 2018. State building in the himalayas. In Timothy Brook, Michael Van Walt Van Praag and Miek Boltjes (Eds.), Sacred Mandates – Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan (pp. 107–113). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bandyopadhyaya, J. 2003. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy – Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities. New Delhi: Allied Publishers. Banerjee, R. 2017, August. Dangerous liaison. The Week. https://www​.theweek​.in​/ theweek ​/cover​/dangerous​-liaison​.html Barnett, R. 2021, May. China is building entire villages in another country’s territory. Foreign Policy. 4 July, 2022. https://foreignpolicy​.com ​/2021​/05​/07​/ china​-bhutan​-border​-villages​-security​-forces/

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Behera, N.C. 2008. International Relations in South Asia – Search for Alternative Paradigm. New Delhi: Sage. Booth, J. and D. Chophel. 2021. Love, hate and tragedy: A three-part history of Bhutan-Cooch relations. Kuensel. 21 May 2022. https://www​.google​.com ​/ search​?q​=booth​+and​+ chophel​+bhutan​+ coochbehar​&oq​=booth​+and​+ chophel​ +bhutan​+ cooch​& aqs​= chrome​.1​. 69i57j33i160l2 ​. 26112j0j4​& sourceid​= chrome​ &ie​=UTF-8 Cao, S. Liu Xin and Bai Yunyi. 2021. MoU on China-Bhutan boundary talks ‘break deadlock caused by India, paves way for diplomatic ties’. Global Times. 15 October 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/202110​/1236425​.shtml Chaudhury, D.R. 2021. Bhutan-China border talks deal not to involve Trijunction with India. The Economic Times. 4 July, 2022. https://economictimes​.indiatimes​ .com ​/news​/defence ​/trijunction​-not​-in​-boundary​-pact​-bhutan​-signed​-with​- china ​/ articleshow​/87047037​.cms​?from​=mdr Joshi, M. 2021. The China-Bhutan border deal should worry India. ORFonline​.or​g. 4 July 2022, https://www​.orfonline​.org ​/research ​/the​- china​-bhutan​-border​-deal​ -should​-worry​-india/ Kaul, N. (2021). Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a small state in international relations. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific: 1–41. Kinga, S. Centre for Bhutan studies. https://fid4sa​-repository​.ub​.uni​-heidelberg​.de​ /2625/ Loiwal, M. 2017, April. Dalai Lama in Tawang: The other mission of Tibetan spiritual leader in Arunachal. India Today. 22 June 2022. https://www​.indiatoday​.in​/ india ​/arunachal​-pradesh ​/story​/dalai​-lama​-tawang​-tibetan​-plantation​-arunachal​ -pradesh​-970530​-2017​- 04​-10 Mathou, T. 2004. Bhutan-China relations: Towards a new step in Himalayan politics in the spider and the piglet: Proceedings of the first seminar on Bhutan studies. In K. Ura and P. Mehra (Eds.), Tibet – Writings on History and Politics 2012. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 388-411. Patranobis, S. 2021, October. China hails MoU with Bhutan, blames India for souring ties with Thimphu. The Hindustan Times. 30 June 2022. https://www​ .hindustantimes​.com ​/ world​- news ​/china​-hails​-mou​-with​-bhutan​-blames​-india​ -for​-souring​-ties​-with​-thimphu​-101634382546284​.html Phuntsho, K. 2016. The History of Bhutan. New Delhi: Random House. Ramesh. R. and J. Watts. 2007. Dalai Lama challenges China - with a referendum on reincarnation. The Guardian. 25 June 2022. https://www​.theguardian​.com ​/ world​/2007​/nov​/28​/china​.religion Rudolph, S.H. 1987. Presidential address: State formation in Asia – Prolegomenon to a comparative study. The Journal of Asian Studies, 46(4): 731–746. Schrempf, M. 2018. From popular pilgrimage festival to state monastic performance – the politics of cultural production at Gomphu Kora, East Bhutan. In Ute Luig (Ed.), Approaching the Sacred Pilgrimage in Historical and Intercultural Perspective Berlin Studies of the Ancient World (Vol. 49). Berlin: Topoi. Sen, R.S. and Chaudhury, A. 2021. Bhutan struggles to defend territory in IndiaChina border spat. Bloomberg. 30 June 2022. https://www​.bloomberg​.com ​/ news​/articles​/ 2021​-12​- 08​/ bhutan​- struggles​-to​- defend​-territory​-in​-india​- china​ -border​-spat

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Shivamurthy, A.D. 2022. The changing contours of Bhutan’s foreign policy and its implications for China and India. ORF Occassional Papers. 1 June 2022. https:// www​.orfonline​.org​/research​/the​- changing​- contours​- of​-bhutans​-foreign​-policy​ -and​-the​-implications​-for​- china​-and​-india/#​_ edn3 Shivamurthy, A.D. 2022. Bhutan’s border conundrum: Nowhere near the finish line. Orfonline. 10 November 2022. https://www​.orfonline​.org​/expert​-speak​/ bhutans​-border​- conundrum/#:~​:te​​x t​=La ​​ndloc​​ked​%2​​0betw​​een​%2​​0Indi​​a​%20a​​ nd​%20​​China​​,albe​​it​%20​​witho​​ut​%20​​any​%2​​0dipl​​omati​​c​%20r​​elati​​ons Som, V. 2020, November. China sets up village within Bhutan, 9 Km from Doklam face-off site. Ndtv. 21 June 2022. https://www​.ndtv​.com​/world​-news​/china​-sets​ -up​-village​-within​-bhutan​-9​-km​-from​-doklam​-face​-off​-site​-2327563 Stobdan, P. 2019. The Great Game in the Buddhist Himalayas: India and China’s Quest for Strategic Dominance. New York: Vintage Books. Yang, J. 2021, November. Bhutan-China border negotiations in context. The Diplomat. 24 June 2022. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​/11​/ bhutan​- china​-border​ -negotiations​-in​- context/

PART II

Connectivity and conundrum in the South Asian neighbourbood



5 COMRADES IN ARMS? DECODING CHINA’S TALIBAN GAMBLE Raghav Sharma

The major changes in Afghanistan once again show that democracy imposed and transplanted by others will not last or be firm. I learned from news today that one of the people who died after falling from the landing gear of a US plane was 19-year-old Afghan national team football player Zaki Anwari. This is heart-breaking…Zaki Anwari's fallen, American myth down. More and more people are awakening. (Chunying 2021) Caustic remarks by Hua Chunying, Spokesperson of China’s foreign ministry in the wake of the chaotic and humiliating US military retreat from Afghanistan, were preceded by a collapse of the US-backed government in Kabul two weeks prior. Developments in Afghanistan became symptomatic for some in Beijing of the irreversible decline of US hegemony on the world stage. This sentiment echoed most loudly in nationalist quarters of China, wherein it was argued that in the 1970s, post-“Saigon moment,” the US retained its global “hegemony” by drawing on the support of China as a “strategic force” in dealing with the Soviet Union. However, today it regards “Beijing as its top rival,” a view not shared by many countries (Tengjun 2021). Two decades after the US swiftly toppled the Taliban, it scrambled to wind down its military and diplomatic mission in Kabul in light of the Taliban’s blitzkrieg across the country. Beijing, in contrast, remained among the few capitals that chose to retain its diplomatic presence in Kabul. These developments were reflective of the ideological and geopolitical road traversed by the Zhongnanhai, which barely three decades ago cast the group in the mould of a militant hardline Islamist movement. DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-7

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As the withdrawal of US-led NATO alliance loomed over the horizon, the Zhongnanhai sought to gingerly recalibrate its position in a post-American Afghanistan, courting not just the Islamic Republic but also overtly engaging with the Taliban, who described China as our most important partner…It is ready to invest and rebuild our country..​.ri​ch copper mines in the country, which, thanks to the Chinese, can be put back into operation and modernised. In addition, China is our pass to markets all over the world. (Zabiullah Mujahid 2021) While the Taliban’s interim government was widely critiqued for its lack of inclusivity, Beijing in contrast issued a swift endorsement of it by describing it as a “necessary step” to end “anarchy.” It sweetened its outreach to the Taliban by offering it a modest US$31 million aid package, followed a high level visit by Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Kabul in March 2022 (Basu 2022;Press Trust of India 2021). China was unusually quick to position itself as a first responder in the devastating earthquake which struck the Paktika province of southeastern Afghanistan in June 2022, offering US$7.5 million in emergency humanitarian assistance (Global Times 2022). Beijing has also sought to shore up economic and political support to the Taliban by supporting an extension of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan,” granting “zero tariff treatment to 98 percent of the tariff lines of the Afghan products exported to China” and calling on “the United States and other Western countries to remove unreasonable sanctions on Afghanistan, and earnestly fulfil its primary responsibility for the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2022). This chapter will engage with what explains Kabul’s rapid ascent in in Beijing’s strategic calculus. It will be argued that China’s bonhomie with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is primarily underpinned by key interests in the areas of security and economics. To this end, Beijing has a rich history of covertly courting the Taliban in the 1990s to draw on. However, its overt embrace of “Taliban 2.0” is new and is characterised by reconfigured context, one that is coloured by a perceived decline of US hegemony, China’s willingness to play a more assertive role, a greater appetite for risks as Beijing seeks to secure its core security and economic interests, and a congruence of interests with key regional players. The Taliban’s embrace of Beijing on the other hand is anchored in its desire to broaden its diplomatic options as it hankers for international legitimacy and its hopes of Beijing providing their regime with much-needed economic succour. Although brutal realpolitik drives China’s Taliban gamble, the road ahead is fraught with challenges, as the Taliban wavers in delivering on

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security commitments and inherent contradictions characterise the relationship which have the potential derail China’s Taliban bandwagon. China-Afghanistan relations in historical perspective1

The forging of bilateral relations between China and Afghanistan in the contemporary period can be dated to the year 1944, when the nationalist government of China inked a Treaty of Amity with Afghanistan. Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Kabul swiftly bestowed recognition on it in 1950. However, concerns over US military and economic assistance to Kabul led Beijing to withhold reciprocation. By January 1955, the Eisenhower administration’s decision to spurn Afghanistan in favour of forging military links with Pakistan strained relations between Washington and Kabul, creating room for diplomatic manoeuvre and paving the way for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Soon thereafter, in January 1957, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Kabul, followed by Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan’s visit to Beijing in October 1957 (Emadi 1993, 108). But, despite being geographically proximate, Afghanistan remained far removed from Beijing’s strategic and foreign policy calculus. The rhetoric of common colonial experience notwithstanding, relations lacked depth and substance. The only notable milestones in this period were the signing of a nonaggression pact in 1960 and the opening of boundary negotiations in December 1962 over the Wakhan corridor2 that culminated in the inking of a draft border treaty agreement on 1 August 1963. Under the terms of the treaty arrangement China renounced its claims to the Wakhan and by March 1965 the demarcation process was completed . This was significant, as it came in the wake of a growing Sino-Soviet rift and a deepening Soviet footprint in Afghanistan. Chinese concerns regarding growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan were amplified following a coup by Daud Khan in 1973 against his cousin, King Zahir Shah, that led to the establishment of a Republican regime. What troubled Beijing was the backing Daud received from the pro-Soviet Hizb-i-Demokratik-i-Parcham-i-Afghanistan, also known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA [Parcham]). Daud was the principal architect of the policy of Pushtunistan that had strained Afghanistan’s relations with China’s main ally Pakistan.3 Moscow supported Kabul’s claims on Pushtunistan and the two inched closer on military cooperation (Emadi 1993, 111). However, it was the bloody Saur (April) coup by the proSoviet PDPA (Khalq faction) in April 1978 against Daud, followed by the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, that catapulted Afghanistan up Beijing’s strategic calculus. A large Soviet military presence on its borders deeply unsettled the Chinese leadership, which on 31 December 1979 unequivocally conveyed to

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the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing that “Afghanistan is China's neighbour... a​nd therefore…the Soviet armed invasion of that country poses a threat to China's security. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese People." Beijing’s fears were accentuated in light of the uneasy hold it exercised over its western border province of Xinjiang (Segal 1981, p. 1165).4 A palpable sense of unease with a massive Soviet military presence on its borders and the growing entente with Washington – a development in which Islamabad had played a key role between 1969 and 1971 – Beijing began to closely coordinate its Afghan policy with Washington, Islamabad, and Riyadh. It covertly aided the mujahideen in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Beijing is estimated to have contributed about US$100 million to the anti-Soviet jihad, this figure stands in stark comparison to the US$44 million extended by way loans to the Afghan government until 1972 and the measly US$4 million pledged in immediate humanitarian assistance in 2001. Significantly, Beijing not only tolerated participation of Uyghurs from Xinjiang in the Afghan jihad to dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan, but the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) helped train mujahideen fighters in Xinjiang. In fact, in 1985 the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal government claimed that China had imparted training to more then 30,000 “counterrevolutionaries” in 120 camps situated in Pakistan and three camps, namely Azgar, Gogirfen, and Maryand, in Xinjiang (Emadi 1993, 115). Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and subsequent collapse of both the USSR and the PDPA government in Kabul in April 1992, the most pressing threat for Beijing faded, as did its interest in its Western neighbour. However, the Zhonghnanhai confronted the ugly reality of a blowback in its western peripheral province of Xinjiang. The Afghan sojourn provided Uyghurs connections with a wider network of radicalised militants that would eventually be cultivated by the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP) leadership to find safe sanctuary in Afghanistan and subsequently in Pakistan. Thus, it came as little surprise that close on the heels of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989 – which contributed to the rising crescendo of political Islam in the region – on 5 April 1990, Baren became the stage for the first major protests since 1949 against Chinese rule over Xinjiang. While the Chinese state stamped out the protests, the events at Baren had a domino effect, sparking violent protests against the policies of the Chinese state (Sharma, Afghanistan: Discerning China's Westward March 2019, 5). As the Taliban rolled into Kabul in September 1996, Beijing shuttered its embassy and ceased formal diplomatic contact. However, covert overtures to the Taliban were initiated with the help of Rawalpindi. By the year 2000, China’s first tentative outreach to the Taliban was initiated when it organised a visit to Afghanistan from the Ministry of Security-affiliated think tank the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations.

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Close on the heels of this visit came the inking of contracts that awarded two Chinese telecom companies, Huawei and ZTE, the franchise to install 12,000 and 5,000 landlines in Kandahar and Kabul, respectively. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also forged an agreement with the Taliban to train and maintain the Taliban’s forces and equipment. Beijing’s flirtation with the Taliban reached a crescendo following China’s ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin’s December 2000 meeting with Mullah Omar in Kandahar. Succinctly articulating the nature of China’s engagement with the Taliban up until 2001, the former spokesperson for Mullah Omar and former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil opines: “We did not have diplomatic relations with the Chinese. What we had were business and trade relations…The meeting [with Mullah Omar] took place… China had a problem with the Taliban, especially with regard to the Uyghur Muslims.” (Interview, Muttawakil 2011). This outreach lasted barely over a year, with the Taliban being toppled by October 2001 in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 (Sharma, Afghanistan: Discerning China's Westward March 2019, 7–8).5 China once again confronted the spectre of large-scale foreign military presence in its western neighbourhood. However, in contrast to its strong condemnation of the Soviet assault on Afghanistan and disapproval of NATO mission in Kosovo in 1999, Beijing cautiously positioned its support to the US-led “war on terror.” The Zhongnanhai grasped that the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks had galvanised support for US-led “war on terror” and explicit opposition to it at this juncture would sully China’s image. It also saw in these events an opportunity to legitimise its attempts to muzzle dissent among ethnic minorities in restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet by bringing it under ambit of terrorism (BBC News 2001). This is explicitly borne out in the statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhu Bangzao: The United States asks for China’s support and assistance in the fight against terrorism. China, in the same token, has reason to ask the United States to give its understanding and support in China’s fight against national splittism and terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2001) Subsequently, the US would go on to designate the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP) as a terrorist organisation and China would launch a vicious crackdown against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, condemning millions to modern-day concentration camps (Nebehay 2018; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2021; Petersen 2021).6

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China, Afghanistan, and the Taliban in the shadow of the US

Following the establishment of a US-backed interim government led by Hamid Karzai, Beijing moved swiftly to re-establish diplomatic relations with Kabul in December 2001, pledging a paltry US$150 million in immediate humanitarian assistance. In 2002, the two sides inked the “Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations.” However, in the early years of US intervention, Beijing largely sought to steer clear of a political role. It largely confined itself to testing waters in the economic and commercial arena, wining a US$3.5 billion bid for one of the largest copper reserves in the world at Mes Aynak, as well as oil and gas blocks in Sar–i–Pul and Faryab provinces (NASDAQ 2011; Sharma, China's Afghanistan Policy: Slow Recalibration 2010, 203–205). While most of China’s commercial forays in the country faltered, with not an ounce of copper being mined and oil production coming to halt within a year of production kicking off, its political stature grew gingerly, as it carefully recalibrated engagement with its western neighbour (Tolo News 2013; Reuters 2021). Several developments coalesced to set the stage for setting in motion a process of strategic realignment between Kabul and its Western allies, allowing Beijing room for manoeuvre. By 2008, Hamid Karzai’s relationship with his Western partners began to fray over the mounting civilian casualties in the countryside, which made him “confront” the US military “very, very strongly…I told them that they were behaving like an invasion…they should stop…they better leave.” Karzai’s allies in the West were livid and accused his administration of being corrupt and inept. The relationship would continue to unravel following his deeply flawed re-election to the Arg in 2009, for which Karzai would blame Washington, arguing that the principal fraud was committed by the US, they spoilt the elections, they wanted me to be in no position to resist them. They said the election was fraudulent and must go to the second round even before the results were declared…they wanted me silent and I won’t stay silent. (Karzai 2021; Ruttig 2018) Notably, soon after inauguration of his second term, Karzai chose Beijing for his second overseas visit in March 2010, signalling a determination to whittle down dependence on the West. However, cooperation remained largely confined to the commercial sphere. In 2012, for the first time in half a century, Beijing dispatched its first senior official, Zhou Yongkang, Minister for Security and member of the powerful politburo of the CCP to Kabul. Agreements were inked to “train, fund and equip the Afghan police.” This was followed by the appointment of Sun Yuxi as China’s first special representative to Afghanistan, indicating a growing concern that NATO

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withdrawal is likely to leave China’s troubled Western periphery exposed to hotbed of radical militancy and narco-trafficking. In February 2012, Beijing hosted the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue, where some security issues and trilateral cooperation were discussed. Then, in June 2012, as China was holding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Beijing, President Hu Jintao signed a bilateral "strategic partnership" agreement with President Karzai. By 2014, in an indication of both its growing weight and willingness to play a more political role in Afghanistan, China became a part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) framework along with the US, to guide the peace process in Afghanistan. Notably, its support of the QCG framework was predicated on securing its “core interests” of “sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” which entailed denying space to the ETIP. Thus, expectedly, the first round of QCG dialogue was pre-empted by the arrest and deportation of 12 Uyghurs from Kabul and Kunar provinces (Sharma, Afghanistan: Discerning China's Westward March 2019, 9–10; RFE/RL 2010). Sino-Afghan engagement would acquire heightened momentum under President Ashraf Ghani, who within a month of his contentious election to the Arg in 2014, chose China for his first overseas visit. Daoud Sultanzoy, advisor to Ghani, astutely remarked: “China was invited to play the pivotal role that it can because China has a lot at stake for its own stability. Also, China has a tremendous amount of clout when it comes to Pakistan.” Ghani’s new policy gambit of attempting to harness Beijing’s political clout marked a paradigm shift in the quest to achieve elusive peace. (Sharma, Afghanistan: Discerning China's Westward March 2019, 2). Ghani’s ascent to the political centre stage came close on the heels of the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China in 2013, which dovetailed with his administration‘s push for enhancing regional trade and connectivity. Beijing’s growing heft in Afghan affairs was amplified further with its simultaneous cultivation of the Taliban, which described Beijing as its “most trusted partner,” and by 2015, China was hosting the Taliban for secret talks with the Afghan government brokered by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, ironically in Urumqi (Teizzi 2015). Beijing’s concerted efforts to cultivate ties with groups like the Taliban are underpinned by a desire to deny safe sanctuary to ETIP and secure its investments in the BRI, of which the ambitious China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a major component, to which India has voiced steadfast opposition. Cultivating ties with the Taliban would carry the added advantage of blunting India’s influence in Kabul and help facilitate Beijing’s BRI as it strives to secure unfettered access to markets in West Asia (Adlakha 2022). Thus, Pakistan serves as a primary trope through which developments in Afghanistan and the region at large are contextualised and engaged with. The view from Beijing was laid thread-bare by Chinese scholars in Oslo in 2018, who argued that “stability

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in Afghanistan and Pakistan is regarded by China as a crucial issue for the future.” But it is seen more as a regional problem than an Afghan one. “How does China rate Afghanistan as a problem?” one of the scholars asked, rhetorically. “We first are concerned about an overspill from Afghanistan to Pakistan, then about one from Afghanistan to Central Asia, and only then about Afghanistan itself… If the Afghan government collapsed, this would be a problem; but if the Pakistani government collapsed, this would be a catastrophe.” Thus, the Zhongnanhai’s domestic and pan-regional security concerns underpin its deepening engagement in Afghanistan, underscoring both its growing heft and also its appetite for risks associated with such a role. This reality was powerfully underscored when, in October 2016, reports surfaced of Chinese patrols being spotted in the Wakhan corridor. Pictures captured by a German mountaineering expedition showed Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles used by the Chinese military being part of the patrol. Notably, there existed no known agreement for joint border patrols or war games between Kabul and Beijing. China is believed to be inserting itself militarily into the strategically located Wakhan corridor via 1,000 square kilometres of land ceded to it by Tajikistan in the Pamir mountains in 2011, a deal which brought the curtains down on a 130-year-old border dispute. Critics argue that China is trying to buy the Pamirs by debt-trapping Dushanbe. Notably, in 2017 Tajikistan formally joined the BRI and an estimated 350 Chinese companies operate in the country. As of this year, Beijing owns over half of Tajikistan's external debt that amounts to around 35.9% of the country’s GDP (The Hindu 2011; BBC News 2011; Shih 2019). By the time the Taliban seized power in August 2021, Beijing was well poised to entrench itself further, setting up an elaborate military base near an old Soviet outpost at Shaymak, Tajikistan. Located barely 12–15 kilometres from the Wakhan corridor, the base is said to host troops from both the PLA as well as the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) – the latter tasked with internal security. Chinese troops are said to have replaced the Tajiks for border patrols in the area. In a recent trip along the Tajik-Afghan border by The Washington Post, its reporter confirmed the presence of a Chinese military compound in Tajikistan where he personally encountered a group of uniformed Chinese troops – notably bearing the collar insignia of a unit from Xinjiang – shopping in a Tajik town, the nearest market to their base. These reports are corroborated by expert analysis of satellite imagery of this region, which shows a large Chinese military outpost, its second on foreign soil after Djibouti, with plans for its future expansion. Spread over seven hectares, it is believed to be able to host anything from a battalion to a brigade of troops with support elements (Standish, From A Secret Base in Tajikistan, China's War On Terror Adjusts To A New Reality 2021; Shih 2019; Bhat 2019).

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By the time the Trump administration inked the Doha agreement with the Taliban in February 2020, bypassing and thereby undermining the Afghan government, China had positioned itself for a post-American Afghanistan. Whilst continually emphasising the need for an “orderly and responsible” withdrawal and “a negotiated political settlement,” it continued to court the Taliban vigorously, consistently calling on the group to “fulfil its counterterrorism commitments” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2021; The Economic Times 2020). Thus, while Beijing welcomed the prospect of a US withdrawal from its neighbourhood, it did not mask its anxieties of what a post-American Afghanistan would hold. A post-American Afghanistan

The hasty withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan actually marks the failure of U.S policy towards Afghanistan…the Afghan Taliban is an important military and political force in Afghanistan and is expected to play an important role in the country's peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction process… We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist organizations including the ETIM and resolutely and effectively combat them. (Yi 2021) As the Taliban were on the offensive across Afghanistan on 28 July 2022, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi played host to a Taliban delegation led by Mullah Baradar in the city of Tianjin, barely two weeks prior to the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He not only minced no words in taking a swipe at the US as it stared at one its most significant strategic defeats of the 21st century, but notably referred to the Taliban as a major player even before it formally seized power. The Zhongnanhai had already begun positioning itself publicly, as Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape was poised for cataclysmic transformation. In doing so, China also categorically laid out its red lines, making its engagement and support contingent on receptivity to Chinese concerns, especially on the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) What followed since has been a persistent attempt to repackage the Taliban’s image from a group that symbolised an extremist, militant Islam to one that was equated by some of China’s leading academics to “the People’s Liberation Army during the war of liberation” which has “been demonized by the Americans” (Yiwei 2021). Similarly, Yue Xiaoyong, Beijing’s serving special envoy to Afghanistan, in an interview given in Islamabad, not only painted the Taliban as “sons of the soil” who “are like other Afghans…they are very friendly, they like to exchange ideas with me, to talk to other people, they listen to other people’s ideas,” but notably went on to heap praise on his country’s strategic ally Pakistan for having “played a very important role in

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the Afghan issue…they contributed a lot to peace, reconciliation” (Xiaoyong 2021). His praise of both Pakistan in the face of evidence to the contrary and the Taliban, whose worldview sits uneasily with Beijing’s domestic policies towards Muslims in Xinjiang, is telling of both the naked realpolitik driving the relationship and also the inherent contradictions that underpin it. In its bid to rehabilitate the Taliban, Beijing has found a strong congruence of interests with Rawalpindi, Tehran, and Moscow. This, coupled with the weakening of the tanzeems which, with the support of Tehran, Moscow, and New Delhi, had mounted opposition to the Taliban in the 1990s, has made the task at hand easier for Beijing. China has been at the forefront of conversations to engage with and rehabilitate the Taliban, extending a US$31 million “emergency aid” package in September 2021 while castigating US economic sanctions on Afghanistan (BBC News 2021). The Zhongnanhai has made a concerted push to cement ties with the Taliban, with reports emerging in October 2021 of Beijing dispatching troops to the Bagram airbase to train special forces of the notorious Haqqani terror syndicate (Sulaiman 2022; Faddis 2022), a claim supported, among others, by the former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh. A small contingent of foreign troops have taken some of the inner sections of the Bagram airbase. I don't want to speculate on who they are and what functions they perform. It won't remain dark for long though. They train the Haqqani militias, which is confirmed by multiple sources. (Saleh 2022). Close on the heels of this purported development came the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who landed in Kabul in March 2022, barely 24 hours after the Taliban was castigated for closing the doors of higher education on Afghan girls. Notably, China is among the handful of countries to have accredited Taliban diplomats in Beijing whilst withholding de jure recognition (Rassa 2022; Greenfield 2022).7 The Zhongnanhai’s decisive lurch towards the Taliban is anchored not merely in the need to deny space to Uyghur militants,8 but also in the belief that it will serve as a bulwark against a common enemy, i.e. “the Islamic State…we should encourage the Taliban to defeat the Islamic State.” The Islamic State (IS), which has acquired a foothold in Afghanistan since 2014, has ratcheted up its rhetoric against China, by peppering its propaganda not just with references to Uyghurs but seeks to cast its net over the country’s wider Muslim population by arguing that “Muslim rights are forcibly seized,” and releasing a map which showed Xinjiang as part of its envisioned Caliphate (Ruttig 2018; Keck 2014). Key regional capitals from Tehran to Moscow have found a strong congruence of interests with Beijing on deploying the Taliban as an effective bulwark to counter the physical and the ideological threat posed by the IS. Tehran has

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gone a step further by linking the threat posed by the IS not just to the realm of security but also China’s grand geo-economic strategy predicated on its ambitious BRI, arguing about the threat posed by extremism to the BRI, a national security issue for China and for Iran (Sharafedin 2015). The growing shadow of ISIS in Afghanistan is a source of concern for both Beijing and Tehran, which has been calling on Beijing to be “more active in the fight against the Islamic State” (Sharafedin 2015). However worryingly for Beijing in the wake of the US pullout, the IS has denounced the Taliban as “insufficiently hardline” and it has registered a significant increase in its activity in Afghanistan. Puncturing the Taliban’s claim of providing security, the group carried out 365 terrorist attacks that resulted in 2,210 casualties in 2021. Since the Taliban’s seizure of power, the IS has expanded its presence across all provinces according to the UN and stepped up its attacks through 2022. In February 2022, the IS castigated the Taliban for forging close ties with Beijing which it accused of “eradicating Uyghur Muslims” in Xinjiang (United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 2021; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2022; Goldbaum 2022; Gupta, ISIS-K blasts Taliban for supporting China on Uyghur repression 2022). This, coupled with Afghanistan’s catastrophic economic meltdown, the absence of an inclusive political process, and institutional breakdown will exacerbate the challenges at hand for China’s Taliban allies in their quest for “stability.” Far from nudging the Taliban to address these challenges, the Zhongnanhai are reportedly shoring up efforts to cast the group in its image by helping it tighten its hold on information flows through the supply of equipment to set up new TV and radio stations and the supply of sophisticated surveillance systems of the kinds used in Xinjiang to snuff out dissent (Sheikh 2022). Moreover, China remains undeterred in securing the interests of its ally Pakistan in the region by not only giving a helping hand to the Afghan Taliban, but also by its willingness to take calculated risks by shielding “strategic assets” of Rawalpindi, such as Maluana Masood Azhar, founder of a designated terror organisation, the Jaish–e–Mohammad. Beijing repeatedly put his designation as a terrorist on hold at the United Nations Security Council, relenting after intense pressure from the US. China’s intransigence on the issue has persisted. Consider, for instance, the fact that in October 2022 it put on hold a joint proposal by the US and India to the UNSC, designating Hafiz Talah Saeed, son-in-law of Hafiz Saeed, who heads the Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Shahid Mahmood as global terrorists (Press Trust of India 2022). Thus, at a regional level, China’s approach to Afghanistan is likely to amplify differences with India, which is increasingly branded as “pro-US” and a country prejudiced “against the Afghan Taliban, and its competition with Pakistan in the Afghan issue combined restrict the role India can

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play…The country puts too much emphasis on its own interest and neglects Afghanistan's actual demands in the peace process” (Jianxue 2018; Chinoy 2019). New Delhi has been keeping a close watch on Beijing’s manoeuvres in its northwestern neighbourhood, assiduously critiquing its role: The United Nations responds to terrorism by sanctioning its perpetrators. Those who politicize the UNSC 1267 Sanctions regime, sometimes to the extent of defending proclaimed terrorists, do so at their own peril. Believe me, they advance neither their own interests nor indeed their reputation (Jaishankar 2022). While Beijing has found common cause with Russia and Iran for now, the longevity of this congruence of interests remains to be seen, particularly in light of the Taliban’s onslaught on Iran’s ideological constituency in Afghanistan. In fact, developments on the ground demonstrate that thus far, despite the camaraderie between the Taliban and the Zhongnanhai, there are limits to the latter’s ability to secure its core interests. Noteworthy in this context are two facts. First, despite the Taliban’s public pronouncements of there being no foreign militants on Afghan soil, the Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri was taken down in a US drone strike in the heart of Kabul in July 2022. This has cast a shadow on credibility of Taliban’s commitments, exemplified by the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan Tomas Niklasson’s stinging statement: Last week in Tashkent we heard the Taliban trying to convince countries and organisations committed to supporting the Afghan people that they had full control over Afghan territory. They repeated their commitment that Afghanistan would not become a safe haven for terrorists. The killing of Mr Al-Zawahiri by the US in central Kabul reinforces previous doubts about such claims. Were the Taliban unaware, unable or unwilling to take action against the AQ leader? (Niklasson 2022) More specifically for Beijing, it came barely 72 hours after the Taliban’s foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, who, while batting for the lifting of sanctions, urged the Taliban to build a broad-based and inclusive government and exercise moderate and prudent governance, maintain domestic stability and realize national harmony, take resolute measures to crack down on all terrorist forces, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and actively respond to the concerns of the international community and gain more understanding and recognition (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2022).

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Although the Taliban appear to have restrained the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) by relocating its fighters away from “Badakshan to provinces further from the Chinese border as part of the Taliban’s efforts both to protect and restrain the group,”concerns yet persist in light of Zawahiri’s killing; reports of the TIP leader, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, publicly celebrating Eid al-Fitr in Afghanistan in May 2022; and that “some Uyghurs may have joined the ISIL-K” (Roggio 2022; United Nations Security Council 2022). Thus, there is an inherent contradiction between the Taliban hosting transnational terror syndicates that seek to bring down the international system and its desire to seek recognition from that very system. Secondly, the hollowness of the Taliban’s rhetoric of having severed links with terror groups appears to have dampened Beijing’s appetite to an extent and may explain why, despite several high-profile visits, “there has not even been a penny of investment by China…many of their companies came, met… conducted research and then left and vanished which is frustrating.” Even existing Chinese projects such as the Mes Aynak copper mine and oil blocks in the north have failed to restart, more than a year into the Taliban’s rule. Thus, Beijing appears not to be fully convinced by Taliban pledges to adhere to the red lines laid out by them (Bloomberg 2022). Conclusion

In the wake of US pullout from Afghanistan, China has ramped up its rhetoric on the inevitable decline of US hegemony on the world stage. It appears willing to step up for a larger political role, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, in a bid to secure its core interests that predominantly revolve around security. However, this will come at a price for China, which had thus far relied on the presence of US troops for stability in its troubled western periphery. It could potentially render China increasingly vulnerable to attacks on its interests in third countries, as recent targeting of Chinese workers in Pakistan has demonstrated. Driven by brutal realpolitik, both the Taliban and China have crossed the Rubicon, and in doing so they have both entered unchartered territory. While the Zhongnanhai has harped on the threat posed by religious extremism, it has ironically embraced those very forces that promote violent extremism as comrades-in-arms. The Taliban, while drawing close to Beijing in a bid to diversify their basket of diplomatic options and galvanise their quest to secure international legitimacy, will find the alliance with China hard to sell ideologically, considering its policies in Xinjiang. Moreover, the Taliban, like in most other instances, has unsurprisingly failed to deliver on commitments to prevent the use of Afghan soil by foreign terror networks and it has in fact been working to assimilate these groups into its military structure in Northern Afghanistan, as is seen in

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the case of the Al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Ansarullah commander, Mahdi Arsalon, a Tajik national, who has been given charge of five districts in Badakshan province . This, coupled with Afghanistan’s economic freefall, absence of a political process, the exclusionary character of the Taliban’s ruling structure, and the schisms within the Taliban ranks, will create space for groups like the IS to find fertile breeding ground. The IS has been swift to tap into this in its propaganda rhetoric, framing the Taliban as a “treacherous, deviant” Pushtun ethno-nationalist movement that seeks “political and international recognition for its own thirsty needs,” and referred to China, Russia, and Iran as “the biggest enemies of Islam” (Gupta, ISIS-K blasts Taliban for supporting China on Uyghur repression 2022; Weber 2021; Pannier 2022; Sajid 2021; Trofimov 2021). In fact, the resurgence of the IS in Afghanistan will puncture the image of the Taliban as a force capable of providing security and stability – two goals cherished by China. Notes 1 Some parts of this section were originally published in.The Wakhan corridor is a strategically located, narrow strip of territory– 10 kms​.wi​de at its narrowest point and 60 kms. at its broadest– wedged between China,Tajikistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The territory became part of the Afghan state following the Anglo–British negotiations of 1891 which were propelled by British fears of Tsarist Russia undertaking exploratory missions to the Wakhan. Sensing a threat to its imperial possessions and keen to preempt the possibility of geographical contiguity between the two empires London engaged in intense negotiations with St. Petersburg. The two sides forcibly gifted the Wakhan to Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, his protests notwithstanding. This would thus come to constitute a short 76 km. border between China and Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, p.424). 2 The Wakhan corridor is a strategically located, narrow strip of territory – 10 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and 60 kilometres at its broadest – wedged between China, Tajikistan, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The territory became part of the Afghan state following the Anglo-British negotiations of 1891, which were propelled by British fears of Tsarist Russia undertaking exploratory missions to the Wakhan. Sensing a threat to its imperial possessions and keen to preempt the possibility of geographical contiguity between the two empires, London engaged in intense negotiations with Saint Petersburg. The two sides forcibly gifted the Wakhan to Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, his protests notwithstanding. This would thus come to constitute a short 76 kilometre border between China and Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, 424). 3 In response to Daud’s support to Pushtun irredentism and Baloch rebels, Pakistan began courting Islamists such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani in Afghanistan. In 1975, 5,000 Islamists staged a series of failed uprisings in Panjshir, Herat, Laghman, and Badakhshan against Daud’s government. The Afghan government claimed that the rebels had been supplied with Chinese arms (Emadi 1993; Sharma 2020, 107). 4 Xinjiang, which literally means “New Territories,” became part of the Qing state as late as 1750 and by the 19th century it came to serve as a strategic frontier

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against Tsarist Russia. However, following the dissolution of the Qing dynasty, China entered a period of political fragmentation, with territories being controlled by warlords or the Japanese. Xinjiang was ruled by a local warlord, who in the 1920s sought and received Soviet support. Over the course of the 1930s, the Afghans supported an Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in Xinjiang that sought to spurn both Soviet and Chinese control before the Communist Party of China established control over the region in 1949–50. The Muslim majority province has since witnessed a crackdown on local language, culture, and religion, with persecution as well as attempts at internal colonialism with the a state-sponsored influx of Han Chinese (Segal 1981, 1159; Davis 2008, 16–17). 5 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the spotlight was cast on China’s covert engagement with the Taliban on 15 September 2001, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued vigorous denials of what it described as “baseless” and “groundless” reports. However, three days later, the Ministry’s spokesperson Zhu Bangzao went on to acknowledge links with the Taliban in a convoluted fashion, stating, “At the request of the Taliban, China had some contacts with it at the working level. China explained to the Taliban our principled position. Some other countries have also done likewise. We wish to stress that we have no official relations of any form with the Taliban. This is very clear and should not be misinterpreted.” 6 Beijing appears to have exerted pressure on the UN human rights body, which has dragged its feet over making public its fact-finding report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang. This has cast a dark shadow over the OCHR and led 192 international organisations to address an open letter to the UN human rights commissioner, imploring her office to release the report. 7 In this respect, China finds itself in the company of Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, all of whom have accredited Taliban diplomats. 8 The true scope of a threat posed by Uyghur militants from Afghanistan to China is disputed. A 2021 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) report – which relies on intelligence inputs of member states – pegs the number of Uyghur militants at several hundred, concentrated in Badakhshan, Kabul, Nuristan, and Faryab provinces. However, given the virtually sanitised nature of the Sino-Afghan border, it appears unlikely that they would pose a direct threat. Some experts have cast doubt on their ability to coordinate and mount attacks in China. With the Taliban in charge, the country’s 2,000-odd Uyghurs have expressed greater vulnerability, given China’s history of pursuing Uyghurs in Central Asia.

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6 CONNECTIVITY, CAPITAL, AND CULTURE China in Pakistan Priya Singh

Notwithstanding a shared colonial legacy, the newly created states in South Asia have traversed along substantively different paths in terms of state building, nationhood, and developmental programmes. The commonality among them lies in the fact that each state is contending with the challenge of economic development with a view to addressing myriad socio-economic problems. However, the approach adopted by each South Asian state towards achieving development has been different, dependent as they have been on their unique identities and circumstances. Moreover, due to deep-rooted discords and unfavourable geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics, productive and coherent regional collaboration has failed to materialise. Perhaps the biggest casualty of the inter-state and intra-state conflicts in South Asia has been connectivity or the lack of it. Pakistan, situated powerfully as it is in the geopolitical sense has sought to capitalise the same by entering into compacts with external great powers, the impact of which has almost always spilled over into its domestic political arena and socio-economic fabric. Pakistan has enjoyed a particularly steady alliance with China, a cooperation which has gained momentum in recent times. With China asserting itself in the global scenario, the penetration into Pakistan has been remarkable. As an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative, the relationship between the two states has gone beyond the rhetorical to the substantive with geopolitical, geo-economic and geocultural dimensions and implications thereof. This chapter begins with a reading of the process of decolonisation in South Asia, the nature of state building and regionalism or the lack of it in the expanse, providing opportunity spaces for China’s entry into the region as a major investor and actor. This is followed by an analysis of China’s association with South Asia, culminating in the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-8

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that constitutes the backdrop to the deconstruction of its critical partnership in the region with its “all-weather” ally, Pakistan. The subsequent section briefly traces the resilient and intensifying China-Pakistan story. This is followed by a brief explication of the critical site of China’s penetrative gaze in South Asia, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The paper concludes with a reading of the Belt and Road diplomacy, in particular the CPEC diplomacy via the lens of connectivity, capital and culture; in other words, it offers an analysis of the Pakistan-China dynamics through the prism of the intersectionality of politics with economics and culture with its ramifications for the region at large. Decolonisation, state building, and regionalism in South Asia

The process of decolonisation was initiated in South Asia, which later spread to other parts of Asia and Africa. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka became independent states, while adopting the Western notion of liberal democracy. Europe began to rebuild itself in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as fortify itself against communism; South Asia, at this juncture, was left to sustain itself. With the intensification of the Cold War, South Asia too got entangled in the politics of bipolarity, despite the professed nonalignment. However, as the initial euphoria died down, Pakistan went from a functioning democracy to military rule, Sri Lanka found itself mired in ethnic and communal politics, while India, though a democracy, was contending with economic instability, a rapidly rising population, famine, and multiple conflicts with its neighbours, namely China and Pakistan. India too underwent a brief phase of authoritarian rule in 1975. The violent politics of ethnicity, language, race, and religion culminated in a spate of high-profile assassinations in the 1980s and 1990s, wherein domestic and regional politics became intertwined with ramifications for the neighbourhood. In the economic sense, the states of South Asia lagged behind the Asian economies of South Korea and Taiwan for multiple reasons, such as corruption, protectionism, and deficient initiative (Misra 1998). It is said that nation building began in South Asia with the end of British colonialism. However, this contention is not applicable in the context of Pakistan, which became a nation at the “defining moment of partition” in 1947 (Jalal 1995). The general perception was that Islam as the state religion and the basis of creation of the nation would serve as the binding force (Ahmed 1985), and it was felt that “everything was expected to flow from the triumph of the faith” (Naipaul 1998). Pakistan, which in the past has been branded as a homogeneous religious population, is faced with domestic political hostilities and sectarian violence akin to multi-religious, multicultural, and multilingual societies as well as secular democratic states, which act as a major impediment to the process of nation building. In other

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words, “ethnic heterogeneity and cultural pluralism were viewed as threats to the whole country and rhetorical emphasis was placed on religious commonality” (Malik 1997, 168). Ifthikar Malik (1997) identifies the dangers posed by ethnic factors in the process of nation building in Pakistan. He identifies “territoriality, provincialisation, cultural configuration, linguistic foundation and historicity” to put forth the argument of ethnic identity at odds with the nation-state. According to critics, the process of nation building from state building in Pakistan has been disrupted by the military regime, the authoritarian governments, religious fundamentalism, the migrant Mohajirs from India and the landed aristocracy, as well as ethnic groups who have all sought to fight for their own political space. Ethnic and cultural diversity within Pakistan has often been ignored by scholarship in the past. Despite modernisation, urbanisation, education, and global communication, Pakistan continues to be confronted by economic instability, civil violence, foreign policy misadventures, and the ignominy of being often labelled as a terrorist state or a failed state. The external variable of perpetual enmity and rivalry with India does enthuse the nationalist spirit and often acts as an instrument in the process of nation building (Misra 1998). Stanley J. Tambiah, while interpreting the character of collective violence in South Asia, seeks to explicate the same from the lens of the ethnonationalist dimension. He contends that there cannot be a single unified claim to nationhood in South Asian states, while claiming that South Asia is focused on ethnic diversity and the politics associated with it (Tambiah 1996). The Balkanisation (disintegration) of South Asian states has been an oft-mentioned phrase, yet the state continues to occupy a hegemonic space, despite the inherent multiple faultlines. Sumantra Bose (2004), in his analysis of decolonisation and state building in South Asia, has observed that the ethnically, linguistically, and religiously varied states of the subcontinent necessitate a comprehensive and sustainable explication of the term “nation.” This in turn includes diverse, yet interconnected, impediments. During the initial stage of statehood, prudent decisions are imperative with respect to state policies on religious and linguistic matters. Decentralisation and dissemination of power within a facilitating institutional structure ought to be formulated and strengthened, instead of the accumulation of political power within specific social and political groups. Political and social elites in post-colonial states perceived their objective as nation building and not state building. Offshoots of nationalist movements, they perceived the independent state as merely the “territorial and institutional” embodiment of the prerogatives, the individuality, and the fate of a nation. South Asia was a reflection of the same. However, nation building inescapably arouses complicated queries regarding the explication and constituent traits of the nation. In the ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse societies of South Asia, “nation

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building” was an inherently loaded notion with the precarious capability to instigate differences and stir up violence. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz, in the context of the newly emerging states of Asia and Africa in the process of decolonisation, remarked in 1963, “Though it can be moderated, this tension between primordial sentiments and civil politics probably cannot be entirely dissolved. The power of the ‘givens’ of place, tongue, blood, looks, and way-of-life to shape an individual‘s notion of who, at bottom, he is and with whom, indissolubly, he belongs is rooted in the non-rational foundations of personality” (Geertz 1963, 128). The hazardous nature of nation building in South Asia therefore consisted of choices of critical significance on vital issues of public policy such as the dynamics between religion and the state, the language to be selected as the lingua franca of the state and issue of a centralised or decentralised system of governance. Thus, the destiny of state-building projects in South Asia would be reliant on pragmatic, prudent choices taken with respect to these subjects. “National integration,” usually with a unitary bias, was the preferred collective philosophy of the nationbuilding elites in the South Asian states. The hazards with such an ideology was that it could appropriate a unitary explication and an autocratic, oppressive character. Generally, though not always, it assumed the nature of a type of majoritarianism that prioritises the individuality and entitlements of a “majority” group within the populace (Bose 2004). South Asia in a regional sense is predominantly perceived in institutional terms via the lens of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was formed in 1985, comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Scholars suggest that there are five essential features constituting a region, “shared history and culture, political semblance, economic cooperation based on complementarity, power balance, and strategic congruence,” and by that logic South Asia fails to qualify as one (Ghosh 2022). History, in contemporary times, is far from being shared, particularly in the context of India and Pakistan, with contrasting narratives being espoused. Political divisions between majority groups and minority groups based on religion and ethnicity, negligible economic cooperation, and a glaring power imbalance in favour of India characterise the region. A region focused on India and a distressed space, in addition to majoritarian domestic politics, add to the affliction. The region’s fixation with security and a narrative guided by external factors in coordination with Pakistan, be it the US in the past and China in the present, has been one of the major impediments to constructive regionalism, including, significantly, regional connectivity. South Asia embodies a region as well as a civilisation (the Indus civilisation). A counter-narrative from within the region harping on the space not merely as a civilisational one but as a plausible cultural space could be a constructive step in the direction of functional regionalism (Ghosh 2022).

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China and South Asia

China’s association with South Asia goes back to time immemorial. The exchanges between the two ancient civilisations consisted of cultural and religious interactions, commerce, pilgrims, travellers, as well as scholars. Contemporary South Asia is an amalgam of religion, politics, language, and culture, and it is also host to two nuclear-weapon nations, India and Pakistan. With the changing power dynamics in global politics, South Asia has been converted into a hub of power politics, primarily due to its geographic and strategic significance. Besides, regional competition, feeble regional institutions, for instance, a non-functioning SAARC, have negatively impacted the region’s capacity to contend with external hold (Ranjan 2021). At the same time, South Asia is home to 24.89% (UN estimates 2019)1 of the world’s population, and the forecast for its economic growth was 6.6% in 2022 (World Bank estimates 2022). 2 Nevertheless, it has only 1.3% of global income and houses 60% of the poor. The inter-state actuality of contemporary South Asia is closely connected with the Chinese presence in the region. China shares borders with multiple South Asian states, such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. It is the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and the second-largest otherwise. South Asia, on the other hand, is one of the most impoverished regions globally. As such, Chinese financial assistance is of significance to the states of South Asia. India, being the dominant regional power, considers South Asia to be its sphere of influence. Consequently, Sino-Indian misgivings are systemic. At the same time, the gap between the economies of the two states has increased substantively in China’s favour. Ananth Krishnan in India’s China Challenge: A Journey Through China’s Rise and What it Means for India (2020) observes that “India sees China as an equal… the Chinese strategic thinkers…see it as somewhat insulting that [Indians]…dare to think of themselves as being on par with a five-timeslarger economy and a country that spends at least four times more on its military. For many Chinese strategists, it is the reluctance to acknowledge this power differential that is at the heart of the multiple problems confronting the relationship” (Krishnan 2020, 158). China’s nearness to South Asia and its increasing prowess made it tempting for the states of the region to ally with her, and use her to neutralise India’s hegemonic presence in the region, be it Bangladesh, Nepal, or Sri Lanka, a reality which compelled the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar to point out the dangers of allying with China. He remarked at the 58th Munich Security Conference (MSC) in February 2022, in the presence of the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen, “We’ve seen countries, including in our region, being saddled with large debts, we’ve seen projects which are commercially unsustainable, airports where aircraft

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doesn’t come, harbours where the ship doesn’t come. I think people would be justified to ask themselves about what they are getting into” (cited from Ghosh 2022). In the South Asian context, the rivalry between India and China has come to the forefront, with the former not inclined to be a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the consequence being an uneasy existence for the smaller players within the region. Still more, the invasion and availability of cheap Chinese products and labour that accompany the Chinese infrastructural expansion constitute another area of concern for many Asian nations. There is trepidation regarding the displacement of the local population with the influx of Chinese labour and anxieties regarding the misuse of labour laws. Along with the apprehensions regarding Chinese competitiveness are the accompanying fears of the creation of a neocolonial variant. whereby the Chinese are viewed as going after raw materials in the guise of building and developing infrastructure. The deepest concern is with regard to Chinese involvement in regional and local politics. In other words, there is a dearth of conviction between China and the regional and fringe powers (Singh 2019, 44). 3 There is no official Chinese pronouncement regarding the geographic dimensions of China’s neighbourhood (Kumar 2019). It has been unofficially regarded to be the land and maritime spaces bordering on China. According to Yuan Pen, China’s neighbourhood can be explicated by way of three rings, wherein the inside ring comprises states that have land borders with China, the middle ring comprises maritime states that stretch from the inside ring and incorporate regions in the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean, including parts of Central Asia and Russia that have no border with China. The outer ring stretches to Africa, Europe, and America (Swaine 2014). The sub-regions have been more clearly explicated by the likes of Qi Hai. They are situated in regions which are adjacent or share borders, such as: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, and the South Pacific. According to Yan Xuetong, the more apt phrase is “periphery,” which is described as East Asia, Russia, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia ( Thomas 2015; Kumar 2019). The Monroe Doctrine served as a reminder to China that it is imperative to emphasise neighbouring states because they are crucial for its rise. Zhang Yunling observed that, “China suffered if neighbouring areas are unstable and China benefitted if those are stable and friendly” (Zhang 2008). Previously, a section of the scholarship in China held South Asia third in criticality after Northeast and Southeast Asia in China’s Asia policy (Malik 2001). According to this viewpoint, China’s equation with states/regions like Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa was premised on economic factors, whereas its equation with South Asia has been conventional, centred around military and political factors (Ye 2008). South

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Asia was considered to be vital for Chinese interests from the security lens. However, in a departure from the past, South Asia is beginning to enjoy a central strategic space in Chinese foreign and neighbourhood policy. Hu Jintao, then the Chinese Premier, remarked in 2016 that China foresees peace between India and Pakistan, political and economic stability, and overall development in the region (Hu 2006). Li Keqiang, during his visit to India and Pakistan in 2013, identified Pakistan as a chief strategic ally in South Asia (Li 2013). Besides, under Xi Jinping, China began to give priority to neighbourhood dialogue, connecting it with the People’s Republic of China‘s (PRC’s) “two centenary goals” and the Chinese vision. China needs to develop relations with neighbouring countries in an allaround manner, consolidate friendly relations with neighbouring countries, and deepen the mutually beneficial cooperation with neighbouring countries. China needs to protect and make the best use of the strategic opportunities to safeguard China’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. China needs to develop closer ties with neighbouring countries, with more friendly political relations, stronger economic bonds, deeper security cooperation, and closer people-to-people contacts (Xi 2013). Xi in 2013, further observed

China and neighbouring countries should maintain the good-neighbourly friendship and help each other. China and neighbouring countries should treat each other as equals and value friendship. China and neighbouring countries should meet and visit each other more frequently. China and neighbouring countries should do more things that win and warm people’s heart. China needs to make neighbouring countries more friendly, stay closer to China, more recognising and more supportive and increase China’s affinity, magnetism and influence China needs to treat neighbouring countries with sincerity so as to win more friends and partners. (Xi 2013) Along the same lines, both Xi at the 19th Party Congress and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 2022 Symposium on the International Situation remarked that China “will stay committed to the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness and the policy of forging friendship and partnership in our  neighborhood, and deepen friendship, mutual trust and convergence of interests with our neighbors” (Xi 2017; Peng 2023). The BRI in particular, under President XI Jinping, reiterates the changed perspective and has been termed as the “rediscovery of the strategic status of South Asia” (cited in Kumar 2019). In Xi’s words, “we should make joint

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efforts with relevant countries to accelerate infrastructure connectivity, to build the Silk Road economic belt and Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century” (Xi 2013). According to Xi, China’s neighbourhood policy was based upon “principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness in conducting neighbourhood diplomacy, promote friendship and partnership with our neighbours, foster an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood environment, and boost win-win cooperation and connectivity with our neighbours” (Xi 2013). In other words, China’s interactions with South Asia have increased considerably. The BRI and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), particularly, have connected China with the region, transforming the current economic, political, social, and strategic regional perspective. From the Chinese perspective, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Indian ascendancy, nuclearisation of the region, the India-Pakistan discord, and global attempts at anti-terrorism have prompted global and Chinese curiosity towards the region. South Asia is slowly but surely assuming a critical place in China’s diplomacy. An indicator of the significance South Asia holds in Chinese foreign policy is the constant visits by high-ranking Chinese leaders to the region, personifying China’s transmuting South Asia policy(Ranjan 2022). This interpretation is justifiable in the backdrop of the emergence of Pakistan as a nascent state in search of security in a hostile neighbourhood. A good relationship with China in the given scenario soon became a rational choice for Pakistan’s political and security elite. Notwithstanding the fact that maintaining a perpetually friendly relationship with China has been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy, strengthening this relationship into a structured partnership has indeed been a gradual process. In the international relations discourse, the relationship between countries is a complex interaction of pragmatic national interests. These national interests are multifaceted and could take an alternate course according to changing regional and international scenarios. However, in Pakistan’s foreign policy architecture, congenial bond with China has seen an upward trajectory, which has been endorsed and carried along by the successive governments in Pakistan. China in Pakistan

The Sino-Pak dynamics are generally viewed from the lens of national interest, situated within the regional security framework along with economic prerequisites (Liu 2020). Pakistan and China predominantly hold shared strategic and economic interests and have a commonality of perspectives regarding the regional geostrategic ambience. In the Chinese perception, Pakistan is considered a critical regional ally, providing a connect with the strategic maritime outlet to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, which

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accounts for 20% of the global oil trade. The partnership is viewed as a safeguard against India’s regional dominance. The Chinese narrative harps on the objective of establishing sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan to promote regional connectivity and control militancy and radicalism in the Xinjiang province of China. Besides, China has repeatedly proclaimed its goal of peace in South Asia, along with a Pakistan-India economic collaboration to ensure greater economic connectivity (Hartpence 2011). The portion of South Asia that constitutes contemporary Pakistan has historical linkages with its neighbours going back around 4,000 years. The conventional Silk Route that links Pakistan with China and her northwestern regions such as Afghanistan and the Turkic belt has a profound cultural and geographical connection (Malik 2008). Prior to the construction of the current Karakoram Highway (KKH) (Sial 2014) and other means of communication, the Silk Route consisted of myriad passages and corridors linked the Upper Indus Basin to the Tarim Basin in eastern Central Asia, facilitating transregional trade and transporting common people in the expanse (Neelis 2017). The ancient corridor that connects the Karakorum Highway to China, and the subway in the north towards Kabul linking Hindukush, is actually the “Crossroad to Asia” referred to in ancient narratives of travellers who traversed these corridors. These ancient corridors acted as cradles for contemporary corridors that connect the region in a wider socio-political terrain in the present setting. As the contemporary nation-state system evolved, the then-informal, spontaneous dynamics were transmuted into formal relationships. Emerging geographical actualities in the subcontinent created the state of Pakistan on 14 August 1947 in western South Asia. The People’s Republic of China came into being on 1 October 1949. Pakistan was the first Muslim state to recognise China and the Communist regime under Mao Zedong. Formal diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China were initiated on 21 May 1951 (Pande 2011). The evolving geopolitical facts in South Asia and East Asia were a precursor to close ties between the two states. In the decade of the 1950s, the Cold War was a reality in international relations, yet it could not make a dent in the bilateral equations between China and Pakistan, even though Pakistan was a part of the SEATO and CENTO, which were essentially anti-communist. China, despite being a communist state, had a chequered equation with the other significant communist state, the Soviet Union, in the midst of the Cold War. Against this backdrop, China’s alliance with the West did not hamper its relationship with Pakistan. In the subsequent years, both states went on to further deepen their ties. The next decade (1960s) further intensified the Sino-Pak dynamics. As a consequence of multiple agreements, the relationship between the two states assumed a multifaceted character in the political and economic realm. The diversification of relations between China and Pakistan was accompanied

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by the realisation and actualisation of a mutually agreed settlement of geographical boundaries. The Xinjiang province in China shares a border with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, and in December 1962, Pakistan and China arrived at an agreement with respect to the settlement of the site and positioning of this boundary. It is contended that Pakistan helped China in putting an end to its global quarantine. China responded to this gesture with the arrival of President Zhou Enlai in Pakistan in February 1964, followed by another visit in September 1965, indicative of the increased Chinese commitment during the seething traction between Pakistan and India with respect to Kashmir. On 17 September 1965, the Chinese Foreign Ministry offered complete support to Pakistan against what was termed as uninhibited belligerence from India. Immediately after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan. He proclaimed that his country and its people were obliged to acknowledge, appreciate, and support Pakistan’s “national independence, sovereignty, and national integrity” (Pande 2011). The next couple of decades (1980s and 1990s) witnessed an enhanced Pakistan-China cooperation in the spheres of economics, commerce, technology, and defence, along with enhanced Chinese support in Pakistan’s nuclear plan that continues to mould the bilateral equations in a “Strategic Partnership.” The Gwadar Port was opened on 20 March 2007 by the Minister of Communication Li Shenglin and China’s financial stakes in critical infrastructure undertakings with the objective of advancing the One Belt One Road (OBOR) via Pakistan, linking China with West Asia and Africa, were forerunners to the unravelling proportions of the Pakistan-China relations, which was to follow. China’s Belt and Road Initiative highlights the criticality of Pakistan as it joined forces with Pakistan in its crucial undertaking, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The commencement of the CPEC ushered in a more penetrative relationship and greater reliance of both states on each other, facilitating a complementary network (Javed 2016). The Chinese presence in Pakistan in the form of CPEC may be interpreted from a geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural lens. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

As Mathew McCartney (McCartney 2021) puts it, the CPEC is a financial investment on a gigantic scale that has been pledged to Pakistan. China has given an assurance to provide most of the financing to Pakistan in advance, but there is a lack of clarity regarding the residual amount, and the conditions on which the financing would be settled. The financial investment has been predominantly allocated to the following sectors: energy, transport infrastructure, and the creation of distinct economic zones (SEZs) to

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encourage manufacturing and production. Approximately 3,000 kilometres (1,800 miles) of roads and rail from Kashgar in China to Gwadar in southern Pakistan has been specifically envisaged for the project. At the outset, CPEC was estimated as a $46 billion project, with 71% ($32 billion) to be allocated for energy, eight percent for rail, 13% for road connections, and four percent for the Gwadar port (Boyce 2017, 12). In 2017, the amount was estimated at $62 billion. However, these figures do not give an accurate picture with respect to the exactitude of the CPEC. According to Shafqat and Shahid, it is difficult to identify and explicate the myriad constituents of the CPEC, as it is a complicated task due to the difficulty in procuring information, which is spread across multiple sources and there are alterations frequently (2018, 24). Shafqat and Shahid further opine that there are intersecting and vague inventories, project records are inconsistent and often overhauled, and running projects are frequently represented as CPEC projects (Shafqat and Shahid 2018, 25; McCartney 2021). The government of Pakistan has represented CPEC in a puzzling manner, in the geographical sense. The long-term plan regarding CPEC explicates the “spatial geography” as “one belt, three axes and several passages with a core zone and adjoining radiation zones” (GOP (2017, 4). The central sector connotes the belt and comprises Kashgar, Tunshuq, and Atush city, as well as the Akto county in the Kizilsu Kyrghiz prefecture in Xinjiang in China, and correspondingly from Pakistan, Islamabad, sections of Punjab, Sindh, KPK, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan (McCartney 2021). Multiple node cities are a part of the central zone. Peshawar and Lahore, Quetta and Sukkur, and Karachi and Gwadar constituted three axes with horizontal connections. The concept of expanse is intertwined with resources. Such resources would encompass extraction of minerals such as gold, diamonds, and marbles in northern and northwestern Pakistan, unsheathing of textiles in Punjab and Sindh as well as cement and domestic electronics, and in the southern sector, incorporating the coastal belt from Gwadar to Karachi, encompass petrochemicals, harbour industry, as well as iron and steel (Shafqat and Shahid 2018). CPEC includes plans that are more clearly represented. CPEC includes short-term, medium-term and long-term projects, which are expected to be concluded by 2020, 2025, and 2030, respectively. It also comprises projects labelled as “early harvest” projects, expected to be concluded within a few years of its inception in 2015. A plethora of predominantly energy projects initiated by 2018 were substantive in nature. The list of projects completed before schedule included: 1) the 2,660 megawatt supercritical coal-fired power station at Port Qasim in Karachi, developed approximately 37 kilometres southeast of Karachi, at an estimated cost of US$2.085 billion. The plant is operated by Port Qasim Energy Holding, jointly owned by China’s Power Construction Corporation (51%) and Al-Mirqab Group (49%). 2) The

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2,660 megawatt Sahiwal coal power plant, located at Qadirabad, 18 kilometres northeast of Sahiwal city and 160 kilometres southwest of Lahore. The project is estimated at US$1.8 billion and sponsored by the consortium of Huaneng Shandong Power Generation Company Ltd and Shandong Ruyi Group. Sahiwal Power Plant is equipped with two 660 megawatt supercritical coal-fired steam generators. 3) The Karot hydropower station, the concretecore rock-fill gravity large dam with a planned installed capacity of 720 megawatts. The project is sponsored by a Chinese state-owned company, China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG). It is the first investment project of the Silk Road Fund. The CPEC can be read in terms of sector, as well. Not a single section of the economy within Pakistan has not been incorporated into CPEC. The CPEC incorporates teach-in projects in the field of agriculture, in which Chinese firms are expected to initiate farm systems that employ modern irrigation, technology, and livestock and, as such, familiarise and educate Pakistani farmers with the same. In addition to the teach-in projects, Chinese financing in agriculture is supposed to include the complete supply chain of agriculture, beginning from seeds, fertilisers, harvesting, storage, and transportation. Firms from China would be accorded incentives to put money into the emerging SEZs comprising telecommunications, mining, and minerals and goods, such as electronics for domestic use and mobiles. At the core of infrastructural activity within CPEC are roads and railways, considered crucial for the transportation system, but the assurance of multiple CPEC offshoots can be perceived in more comprehensive terms. In the pipeline are fibre-optic networks, internet connectivity, and cultural connects, for instance, encouraging the screening of Chinese television programs to acquaint the public with Chinese society and lifestyle. Varied projects such as Baltistan University, the China-Pakistan Joint Research Centre in Earth Sciences and the institution of collaborative research among medical establishments in China and Pakistan. Peshawar is host to a safe city project, which is designed to observe and scrutinise urban spaces employing radars and scanners which are combustible. The plan is estimated to include more cities (Shafqat and Shahid 2018, 34–37; McCartney 2021). However, the much-talked-about CPEC project, an integral component of the BRI, has been subject to a considerable degree of analysis within Pakistan, whilst it has been a matter of considerable consternation within India. Even as the official narrative exalts it to the point of reverence, as the prized pivot of the colossal project, with the potential of being the harbinger of the “defining moment” for Pakistan in the region, particularly with regard to India, in contrast, there exists a significant cluster of critics who continue to consistently articulate concerns pertaining to feasibility, transparency, and sovereignty. The official retort to the expressions of dissent is best summarised in the statement of Nadeem Javaid, Chief Economist, Planning Commission of Pakistan: “CPEC enjoys the support and backing

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of all political parties and segments of the establishment and that its popularity among the public will grow when gains start touching their lives.”4 The Chinese refer to it as “a corridor of prosperity, long-lasting peace and inclusive development.” Economics, development, and prosperity emerge as the catchphrases of the official narrative both in China and Pakistan. The thrust of the economic corridor according to the master plan, which was revealed in the Pakistani daily Dawn, appears to be on “agriculture, large surveillance system for cities and visa-free entry for Chinese nationals.” The purported use of vast agricultural expanses as “demonstration projects” by Chinese enterprises; an exhaustive network of “monitoring and surveillance” across cities, thoroughfares, and marketplaces; the construction of a “national-fibre-optic backbone for internet traffic;” as well as “terrestrial distribution of broadcast TV,” with the intent of collaborating with the Chinese media in the “dissemination of Chinese culture,” has evoked a sense of disquiet among sections within Pakistan regarding the extensive nature of the Chinese penetration, both economic and societal. It has harboured misgivings about the supposed plan for the “redevelopment of Pakistan,” with Senator Tahir Mashhadi, Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Planning and Development, terming the initiative as “another East India Company in the offing.” While this could be dismissed as “fear-mongering rhetoric,” there does seem to be an element of genuine concern regarding the possibility of an “undermining of Pakistan’s sovereignty” considering the intensive penetration that it entails, which, in turn, is a prerequisite, keeping in mind the scale of the project. There is scepticism among both economists and political analysts in Pakistan who advise a degree of caution. It was claimed that CPEC would comprehensively transform Pakistan’s economy: creating and modernising existing infrastructure that would facilitate connectivity and enhance productivity, providing domestic jobs, hydropower, and a rise in GDP. The bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan has continued to intensify in recent times, and if the CPEC initiative does become a reality, despite scepticism concerning its rationale and practicality, the manifold serious challenges and flaws inherent in the scheme and the various forms of resistance that it faces and is likely to face in the foreseeable future within Pakistan and the greater neighbourhood, it could, indeed, at least in conjecture, help Pakistan contend with some of its key “developmental issues.” Though in recent times, beset by multiple concerns and obstacles, it is being labelled as a case of a “game over” rather than a “game changer” (Husain 2017in Singh 2019, 44-46).5 Conclusion

China’s Belt and Road Initiative personifies the intertwining of connectivity (geopolitics), capital (geo-economics), and culture (geoculture). Connectivity

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may be explained as a “state or a capacity of being connected” (Kohlenberg & Godehardt 2021). While connectivity is not a new phenomenon, the evolution of connectivity as a blueprint with geopolitical repercussions holds novelty. The Belt and Road Initiative epitomises new-age politics, with wide ranging global aspirations and a focus on multifaceted connects. Two distinguishing characteristics in this respect include: a) the multifaceted “spatialisation” of Chinese foreign policy within the BRI structure. This, in turn, has facilitated a network of spatial arrangements such as “economic corridors, physical and digital ecosystems, transportation hubs, and other linkages,” as well as multiple layers of technologies, such as “5G mobile networks, digital payment systems, global energy interconnections, and satellites” that could frame the international system in a dissimilar, Chinese-oriented system. In this context, it has been observed that if the BRI fulfils its objectives in its entirety, it would radically transmute the cartography of global experiences. b) Both the government of China and multiple other Chinese players are converting these sites of connectivity into a “strategic matter of geopolitics.” In other words, China’s politics of connectivity has provided a new spatial, geopolitical connotation to connectivity (Kohlenberg & Godehardt 2021). The BRI has been explicated as a geo-economic initiative that envisages geo-economic “connectivity” along the land-based “belt” or the “maritime road,” affecting around two-thirds of the global populace. In other words, China is constructing new, or enhancing the “infrastructures of transport, technological, cultural and economic connectivity” (Forough 2019). In addition to infrastructure, the BRI focuses on trade and commerce, technology transfer, industrial hubs, financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, strategic partnerships, and free-trade initiatives. Cowen and Smith (2009) argue that “geoeconomic social forms are gradually supplanting this geopolitical social” and that “geoeconomics is nonetheless crucial to the spatial reconfiguration of contemporary political geography.” The geo-economic involvement of China via the BRI is gradually reframing the “geopolitical social,” which was the hegemonic global social order from the Second World War. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) may be cited as an instance of China’s involvement in Pakistan, which aims at a “geoeconomic reterritorialisation” of Pakistan, which may occur in two ways: internal and regional. Internally, concentrating on Pakistan’s geographical expanse and economy, China seeks to invigorate Pakistan’s economy and incorporate Pakistan, with its considerable economic potential and considerably young populace, within China’s economic zone. In addition, China is transferring its “surplus capacity” in the infrastructure sector to an infrastructurally deficient Pakistan (Forough 2019). The BRI has also been described as a Chinese dream, vision or concept that China and other nations have discursively embraced, to allude to the New

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Silk Roads (NSR). The discursive NSR encourages civilisational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, soft power resources (such as the Confucius Institutes), educational exchanges, and tourism. By means of the NSR, China is going past the end-of-history hypothesis, reinforcing history and reterritorialising spaces. As Winter (2019) has argued, the Belt and Road Initiative can be read from the perspective of heritage diplomacy, wherein international and national interests are intertwined. China’s recent emphasis on economic enlargement has altered its diplomatic game-plan in global politics, including varied forms of soft power, to establish and enhance its international status. It has been contended that China, in its efforts to bring back the Silk Road narrative, has a strategic objective to “win friends and build loyalties, and to legitimise expansionist ambitions to public audiences, both at home and abroad” (Winter 2019). In other words, it is an attempt by China at recasting the past to widen its importance in international politics, while shaping its foreign policy goals concealed in the vocabulary of “peaceful connectivity and harmonious dialogue.” Thus, China’s Silk Road diplomacy can be interpreted via the notion of geoculture, which can be explicated as a strategic use of geopolitical prowess, and in this effort, the discerning mobilisation of culture and history are employed to encourage cultural collaboration and people-to-people contacts in the global arena ( 2019, 2020a, 2020b and 2021). As China and the global community of nations enter the second decade of the Belt and Road Initiative, the COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly remoulded connectivity, particularly people-to-people exchanges. Therefore, another Silk Road – the Health Silk Road – is now in focus. Though the notion of a Health Silk Road was in existence prior to COVID19,6 the pandemic is expected to provide the requisite push to convert it into an actuality. Conventional Chinese medicine and wellness-centric projects rooted in history and culture could be the focus of the Health Silk Road project. The prioritisation and incorporation of public health in the BRI fold and the implications of the Chinese reaction to the pandemic on its expansionist motives are areas to look out for in future analysis. Notes 1 Population of Southern Asia (2023) - Worldometer. Population of Southern Asia (2023) - Worldometer (worldometers .in fo) 2 South Asia Economic Focus. The World Bank, IBRD.IDA SPRING 2022 .South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2022 | Reshaping Norms: A New Way Forward (worldbank​.o​rg)

3 The paragraph has been published in the author’s chapter “Cartographies of connectivity in Asia and the Indian response”, in Samaddar, R., and Sengupta, A. (eds) Global Governance and India’s North-East: Logistics, Infrastructure and Society. London and New York: Routledge, 44. 4 Subohi, A. 2017. “ Looking at CPEC costs admist hypes”. Dwan, (April 13, 2017), Looking at CPEC costs amid hype - Pakistan - DAWN.COM

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5 The paragraph has been published in the author’s chapter “Cartographies of connectivity in Asia and the Indian response”, in Samaddar, R., and Sengupta, A. (eds) Global Governance and India’s North-East: Logistics, Infrastructure and Society. London and New York: Routledge, 44–46. 6 Ngeow C.B. Channel NewsAsia; 2020. Commentary: What’s behind China’s controversial Health Silk Road efforts​.https:/​/www​.channelnewsasia​.com ​/news​/commentary​/china​ -health​-silk​-road​-what​-is​-it​-push​-influence​- covid19​​- coronav​-12782968

References Ahmed, I. 1985. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan. London: Almquist and Wiksell. Baru, S. 2012. “Geo-economics and strategy”, Survival, 54/3: 47–58. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2012.690978 Blackwill, R.D. and Harris, J. 2016. War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. Harvard: Belknep Press. Bose, S. 2004. “Decolonization and state building in South Asia”, Journal of International Affairs, 58/1 (Fall): 95–113. https://www​.jstor​.org​/stable​/24357937 Accessed January 24, 2023. Boyce, T. 2017. “The China–Pakistan economic corridor: Trade security and regional implications”, Sandia Report. Cowen, D. and Smith, N. 2009. “After geopolitics? From the geopolitical social to geoeconomics”, Antipode, 41/1: 22–48. Forough, M. 2019. ”Intervention with Chinese characteristics: The belt and road initiative reconfiguring (Afro-)Eurasian geo-economics”, Conflict, Security & Development, 19/3: 275–281. DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2019.1608023 Geertz, C. 1963. “The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states”, in Geertz, C. (ed) Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. New York: The Free Press, 105–57. Ghosh, P.S. 2022. “South Asia: A region in search of regionalism”, Frontline, April 20, 2022. https://frontline​.thehindu​.com ​/cover​-story​/south​-asia​-a​-region​-in​ -search​-of​-regionalism​-india​-pakistan​- china​/article38476916​.ece Government of Pakistan. 2017. “Long term plan for China-Pakistan economic corridor 2017–2030”, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Islamabad. Hartpence, M. 2011. “The economic dimension of Sino–Pakistani relations: An overview”, Journal of Contemporary China, 20/71: 581–599. Hu, J. 2006. “Hand in hand to expand cooperation for a better future”, Speech at the Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi. http://www​.gov​.cn​/ ldhd​/2006- 11/23/content​ _450971​.h​tml Hussain, k. 2017. “Exclusive: CPEC master plan revealed”, Dawn, June 21, 2017. www​.dawn​.com/ news/1333101. Accessed August 30, 2017. Jaeger, B.C. and Brites, P.V.P. 2020. “Geoeconomics in the light of international political economy: A theoretical discussion”, Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 40/1: 22-36. Jalal, A. 1995. Democracy and Authority in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Javed, U. 2016. “Assessing CPEC: Potential threats and prospects”, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, 53/2: 1–16.

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Kohlenberg, P.J. and Godehardt, N. (eds.). 2021. The Multidimensionality of Regions in World Politics. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Krishnan, A. 2020. India’s China Challenge: A Journey Through China’s Rise and What It Means for India. New Delhi: Harper Collins. Kumar, S. 2019. “China’s South Asia policy in the ‘new era’”, India Quarterly, 75/2: 137-154. Li, K. 2013. “Making new progress in growing China–Pakistan all-weather friendship”, Islamabad: Senate of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. https://www​ .fmprc​.gov​.cn​/mfa​_ eng​/wjdt​_ 665385​/zyjh​_ 665391​/t1043526​.shtml Liu, A.H. and Ahmed, R.A. 2020. “The changing dynamics and new developments of China–Pakistan relations”, India Quarterly, 76/1: 73–88. Malik, I.H. 1997. State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity. London: Palgrave Macmillan Press. Malik, J.M. 2001. “South Asia in China’s foreign relations”, Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 13/1: 73–90. Malik, I.H. 2008. The History of Pakistan. Islamabad: Greenwood Publishing Group. McCartney, M. 2021. Dragon from the Mountains: The CPEC from Kashgar to Gwadar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Misra, A. 1998. “Review: On South Asian states and the state of the nations in South Asia”, Third World Quarterly, 19/5 (December): 963–969. Naipaul, V.S. 1998. Beyond Belief. New York: Little, Brown. Neelis, J. 2017. Early Buddhist Transmission and Trade Networks: Mobility and Exchange Within and Beyond the Northwestern Borderlands of South Asia. Netherlands: Brill. Nurse, K. 2012.“Diasporic spaces: Migration, hybridity and the geocultural turn”, in Anheier, H. and Isar, Y.R. (eds) Cultural Expression, Creativity, and Innovation. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 78–85. Pande, A. 2011. Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India. London: Routledge. Peng, N. 2023. “Will China-ASEAN relations take a turn for the better postpandemic?” The Diplomat.Will China-ASEAN Relations Take a Turn for the Better Post-Pandemic? – The Diplomat. Ranjan, R. 2022. “China and South Asia in the twenty-first century”, in Ranjan, R. and Changgang, G. (eds.) China and South Asia: Changing Regional Dynamics, Development and Power Play. London and New York: Routledge, 1–14. Shafqat, S. and Shahid, S. 2018. China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Demands, Dividends and Directions. Lahore: Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian College. Sial, S. 2014. “The China–Pakistan economic corridor: An assessment of potential threats and constraints”, Conflict and Peace Studies, 6/2: 24. Singh, P. 2019. “Cartographies of connectivity in Asia and the Indian response”, in Samaddar, R. and Sengupta, A. (eds) Global Governance and India’s NorthEast: Logistics, Infrastructure and Society. London and New York: Routledge: 29-61. Swaine, M.D. 2014. “Chinese views and commentary on periphery diplomacy”, China Leadership Monitor, 44/1: 1–43. Tambiah, S.J. 1996. Levelling Crowds: Ethno-Nationalist Conficts and Collective Violence in South Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Thomas, N. 2015. “Is China’s periphery becoming the core of its international relations”, The Diplomat, 29. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2015​/01​/is​- chinas​ -periphery​-becoming​-the​- core​-of​-its​-international​-relations/ Wallerstein, I. 1992. Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Westermeier, M.G.C. 2022. “Infrastructural geopolitics”, International Studies Quarterly, 66/3 (September). DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqac033 Winter, T. 2019. Geocultural Power: China’s Quest to Revive the Silk Roads for the Twenty-First Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Winter, T. 2020a. “Geocultural power: China’s belt and road initiative”, Geopolitics, 26/5: 1376–1399. DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1718656 Winter, T. 2020b. “Silk road diplomacy: Geopolitics and histories of connectivity”, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 26/1: 1–15. DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2020.1765164 Winter, T. 2021. “The geocultural heritage of the silk roads”, International Journal of Heritage Studies, 27/7: 700–719. DOI: 10.1080/13527258.2020.1852296 Xi, J. 2013. “Speech at the forum on neighboring diplomatic work” [习 近 平 在 周 边 外 交 工 作 座 谈 会 上 发 表 重 要 讲 话], Xinhua. http:// www​.xinhuanet​.com/​/politics​/2013​-10​/25​/c​_117878897​.htm Xi, J. 2014. “In joint pursuit of a dream of national renewal”, Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At the Indian Council of World Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn​ /mfa​_ eng​/ topics​_ 665678​/zjp​c xsh​z zcy​g ysl​s hds​s chy​b dtj​k stm​e dfs​l lky​djxgsfw​/ t1194300​.shtml Xi, J. 2017. “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. http://www​.xinhuanet​.com ​/english​/download​/ Xi​_ Jinping’s​_ rep​​ort​_ a​​t​ _19t​​h ​_CPC ​​_ Nati​​onal_​​Con​gr​​ess​.p​​df Ye, H. 2008. “China and South Asian relations in a new perspective”, in Y. Zhang (Ed.) Beijing: Social Academic Press. Making New Partnership: A Rising China and Its Neighbours, 217–336. Zhang, Y., Xi-de, J. and Yu, Z. 2008. “China and its neighbours: Relations in a new context”, in Yang, Y Y. (ed.) Making new partnership: A rising China and its Neighbours. Beijing: Social Academic Press, 1–15.

7 CHINA IN BANGLADESH The evolving relationship Sriparna Pathak

Even though the 21st century is often called the Asian Century, bolstered by expectations of cooperation between India and China, two of the most populated countries in the world with relatively faster growth rates, the fact is that the relationship is extremely complex. Cooperation often gets marred by conflict, as seen in the case of Chinese violations of Indian sovereignty, be it in Galwan since 2020 or in the case of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running through disputed territory. Bilateral relations get more complicated as China continues expanding its sphere of influence in South Asia, which has often been seen as efforts to surround India with military and geopolitical implications. India’s relations with South Asian countries are the result of years of shared history, culture, and values. Difficult relationships, such as the one between India and Pakistan, for example, are also a by-product of shared histories, values, and cultures, as have been the cases of more amicable relationships in South Asia, as is seen in the case of the India-Bangladesh relationship. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has even gone to the extent of calling the India-Bangladesh relationship an excellent bilateral relationship that goes “far beyond a strategic partnership” (MEA 2021).1 However, as China increases its forays into South Asia, worried commentaries have often emerged from India which border on concerns regarding its traditional partner following the same path as Nepal and Sri Lanka, which have been hedging towards Beijing. The net foreign direct investment (FDI) which Bangladesh received from China in 2019 stood at US$1.159 billion, which made Dhaka among the largest recipients of Chinese FDI in South Asia (Samsani 2021).2 The energy sector has been a big attraction for Chinese investors, and Dhaka’s coal-based power plants have received significant attention from Beijing. At least 12 dual-fuel power plants are in the planning stage. In addition to this, Beijing DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-9

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has also been investing significantly in the green energy sector. Dhaka has also set up a joint venture with a Chinese company worth US$400 million to build energy projects of a total of 500 megawatts by 2023 (Samsani 2021).3 In this context, it becomes pertinent to look at some of the key agreements signed between Bangladesh and China in the last five years. Bangladesh-China relations have progressed steadily since they signed the defence cooperation agreement in 2002. The agreement actually makes China the only country with a broad defence cooperation agreement with Bangladesh. China also accounted for 74% of Bangladesh’s arms imports between 2010 and 2019 (Samsani 2021).4 While defence remains an important facet of the relationship, economic ties have been increasing drastically, as seen in Table 7.1. Chinese companies bought three natural gas fields in Bangladesh in 2017, which account for about 50% of the total gas output. Keeping in mind Chinese plans to carry oil from Chittagong to storage plants in mainland China, Beijing is also partially financing the building of a 220-kilometre pipeline in Bangladesh.5 In 2018, a consortium comprising the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) signed an agreement with Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and acquired a 25% stake to become Bangladesh’s strategic investor. The bidding process had also involved Indian, US, and Turkish exchanges.6 During Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Beijing in 2019, the two sides agreed that defence cooperation is an integral aspect of the Bangladesh-China relationship and that the two sides would enhance exchanges at different levels between the armed forces of the two countries. This is to be in addition to the deepening of cooperation in the defence industry and trade, training, equipment, and technology, mutual visits of navy ships, and the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,7 In 2021, Bangladesh signed an agreement with China to locally produce China’s Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine, and Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming stated that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) will be a successful model for cooperation between China and South Asian countries.8 In 2022, during Wang Yi’s visit to Dhaka, in addition to agreements in the realm of economy, cultural, and educational ties, Bangladesh also sought cooperation from China to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.9 China has in the past used its influence in Myanmar to broker a November 2017 agreement to repatriate about 700,000 Rohingyas who fled persecution in Myanmar.10 During the visit, Wang told Hasina that China considers Bangladesh a “strategic development partner” and that Beijing would continue to support Dhaka.11 It is pertinent to mention here that the garment industry in Bangladesh, which brings in about 80% of foreign currency from exports, is heavily dependent on China for raw materials.12 In 2022, following Chinese ire surrounding US congresswoman Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Bangladesh’s foreign ministry also reiterated its commitment to the One China principle.

2020

2019

2018

2017

Xi Jinping visits Bangladesh – a first for a Chinese President in 30 years. Bangladesh and China enhance their relationship to a strategic partnership. Bangladesh and China signed 27 memorandas of understanding (MoUs), valued at US$24 billion. Bangladeshi and Chinese companies entered 13 joint ventures (JVs), valued at US$13.6 billion. The two sides sign a framework agreement for the construction of a 220-kilometre pipeline to carry oil from tankers in the Bay of Bengal to storage plants on the mainland. 2 Chinese companies bought three natural gas fields in Bangladesh, which account for more than half of the total gas output of Bangladesh from Chevron. 1 A Chinese consortium comprising the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) signed an agreement with Bangladesh’s Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) to acquire 25% stake in the country’s premier bourse and became its strategic investor. 1 Sheikh Hasina visits Beijing and holds talks with counterpart Li Keqiang. 2 Nine agreements were signed covering different sectors, ranging from aid for the Rohingyas and economic and technical cooperation, investment, power, culture, and tourism. 1 Two agreements on financial close for a China-funded mega-road infrastructure project in Bangladesh’s capital were signed in Dhaka. The First Dhaka Elevated Expressway Company, Ltd (FDEE), owned by China Shandong International Economic & Technical Cooperation Group Ltd (CSI), Sinohydro Cooperation, and Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited (ITD), is implementing the Dhaka Elevated Expressway Project.

2016

(Continued)

1 China increased the number of products Bangladesh could export tariff-free to China, from 60% to 97% of their tariff line.

1 2 3 4 1

Event/Agreement Signed

Year

TABLE 7.1 Some Key Events and Agreements Between Bangladesh and China (2016–2022)

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1 Bangladesh begins discussing a free trade agreement (FTA) with China to boost exports to the Chinese market. 2 An MoU was signed between China’s Sinopharm Group, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and Incepta Vaccine Ltd to locally produce China’s Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine. 1 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Dhaka. 2 Bangladesh and China signed four agreements during the visit to enhance cooperation on cultural issues, disaster management, and educational programs. 3 China agreed to enhance the duty-free access by one percent additional goods from Bangladesh, taking the total of dutyfree items exported to China to 98%. 4 Information and Communication Technology Division and China Railway International Group representatives signed a contract to implement the Establishing Digital Connectivity project.

2021

Source(s): Various news articles

2022

Event/Agreement Signed

(Continued)

Year

TABLE 7.1

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Bangladesh also urged all concerned parties to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any actions which can aggravate tensions and undermine peace and stability in the region and beyond.13 As evident from just these few developments since 2016, China’s position on Bangladesh has evolved a lot since 1971, from that of hostility to a reluctant embrace to a strategic partnership. The current relationship is a queer mix of pragmatism, strategic ambiguity, and political accommodation. While the events outlined in the previous sections show the closeness in the ties between the two, the relationship even in the recent past has had its ups and downs. An example of this is from 2022, when Bangladesh snubbed China, compelling Wang Yi to change his dates of visit to Dhaka in August. Beijing, without consulting Dhaka, had unilaterally announced the dates of Wang’s visit. The dates had to be rescheduled by Beijing after the snub, after consultations with Dhaka (Chaudhury 2022). Even as Wang’s visit was underway, Bangladesh’s finance minister Mustafa Kamal warned that countries should “think twice” before agreeing to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and blamed China for not carrying out a rigorous study before forwarding the ambitious project that has plunged some countries into a debt crisis (Parkin 2022; Roy 2022). In the context of the BRI, it is pertinent to mention here that Bangladesh has joined the initiative. However, Bangladesh has also terminated a lot of BRI projects, keeping its own national interests in mind. The following section discusses Bangladesh and the BRI. Bangladesh and the Belt and Road Initiative

Bangladesh joined the BRI in 2016, and since 2016, as seen in Table 7.1, ties between Bangladesh and China have grown exponentially. Xi’s visit to Dhaka in 2016, a first in 30 years, was significant, as a flurry of agreements were signed and, as stated by the then-Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Zhang Zuo, the visit resulted in the beginning of a strategic period of cooperation, leading to a new chapter in the BRI. The biggest projects under the ambit of the BRI in Bangladesh include the Padma Rail Link, the Bangabandhu tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, and the Dasherkandi sewage treatment plant. The Padma Bridge alone, as stated by China’s state-controlled Global Times, is expected to boost Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) by more than one per cent when the work is completed (Hasan 2021). Bangladesh is the second-largest recipient of loans from China under the BRI in South Asia, the largest recipient being Pakistan. While China invested US$60 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it also stepped up its investments in Bangladesh, totalling US$10 billion. The Bangladesh Working Group on External Debts lists 64 BRI projects in Bangladesh, which have various dates of completion.14

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The first toll road project of Bangladesh was signed in 2016, and the Bangladeshi government signed a contract with a China-Bangladesh consortium to upgrade the 48 kilometre-long Dhaka Bypass Road to a dual carriageway.15 The toll road is one of the many transportation projects in which China has been investing in Bangladesh, and in the ten-year period of 2009–2019, Beijing invested an estimated US$9,750 million in various transportation projects in Bangladesh.16 Also, a Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) is being developed in the Anwara upazila of the Chittagong district in Bangladesh, in which state-run China Harbour Engineering Company holds a 70% share. The CEIZ is the first specialised government-to-government (G2G) economic zone, and will accommodate about 200 industrial units including textile, pharmaceuticals, electronic garments, chemical, shipbuilding, agro-based industries, and information technology.17 Bangladesh’s Look East Policy seeks to open up new avenues of cooperation with China and Southeast Asia, and the BRI seems to fit in well with Dhaka’s infrastructural needs. The Look East Policy was adopted in 2001 after the Khaleda Zia-led Bangladesh National Party was elected, and Zia had stated, “the doors are open to us in the west, east, south and north but we are focusing on the east because it is good for us.”18 What spurred Dhaka to come up with the policy was a lack of progress in trade deals within the ambit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and a perceived domination by India in bilateral trade with Bangladesh (Rahman 2003). While Bangladesh’s infrastructural needs can be fulfilled by BRI investments and projects, a pertinent question that remains is why is China so keen in investing in Bangladesh, so much so that it is the second-largest recipient of Chinese planned disbursements in South Asia after Pakistan? China’s rationale for BRI investments in Bangladesh

The global financial crisis of 2008 meant that China’s prime export destinations in the US and the EU no longer had sufficient capacity to absorb Chinese exports. This became a contributing factor to oversupply in key sectors of the economy, including steel, cement, and iron ore. In 2009, 21 out of the 24 subsectors of China’s manufacturing industry faced the problem of oversupply (Pathak n.d). In 2009, Zhu Hongren of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology said China faces many difficulties in maintaining a stable industrial growth and he cited falling exports and shrinking external demands and severe oversupply in key sectors due to inadequate demands.19 In 2015, in sectors such as iron and steel, glass, cement, aluminium, solar panels, and power generation equipment, the overcapacity rate crossed 30% of the threshold at which overproduction may trigger loan defaults forcompanies that have borrowed and then watched their profits fall. 20

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All of these problems combined have led to lower growth rates and what Xi Jinping termed as the “new normal” in 2014. For China to regain the double-digit growth rates of the past, it became essential to ease out the oversupply, either through domestic consumption or through exports to other destinations. The solution to the problem was found in China’s own history, in its own historical Silk Route. Adapting the historical trade route to its current needs and circumstances, China came up with a policy which was initially called “One Belt One Road” and is now known as the BRI. Announced in 2013, the BRI aims to strengthen the PRC’s connectivity with the world, covering an expansive geographic scope, and it also aims at creating infrastructural as well as economic and cultural ties. The initiative currently extends to 65 countries, comprising around 4.4 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of US$23 trillion. 21 Economic benefits for China include an expansion of China’s export markets, promotion of the Yuan as an international currency, and the reduction of tariffs on Chinese exports. The BRI will also help China boost growth in its lower-income western provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang, which will be connected to Central Asia by building overland trade routes to connect their economies. These have been even explicitly acknowledged in China’s official policy communiqués. An example is 推 动 共 建 丝 绸 之 路 经 济 带 和21 世 纪 海 上 丝 绸 之 路 的 愿 景 与 行 动(Tuidong gongjian sichou zhilu jingjidai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhilu de yuanjing yu xingdong, or “The Vision and Action to Promote the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”), published by the National Development and Reform Commission, in 2015. China has a large reserve of savings that have not been fruitfully invested, particularly because of the slowdown in growth. Investing in large-scale infrastructure projects overseas enables China to export its excess savings along with its overcapacity in steel and iron ore. The country’s largest stateowned enterprises (SOEs) are in the steel, iron ore, and cement sectors – all of which have been plagued by oversupply. The BRI presents these SOEs with a golden opportunity to export their surplus capacity abroad, along with the possibility of earning revenue. An example is China National Building Material Group, China’s biggest cement maker. According to Song Zhiping, its chairman, the Group can capitalise on a surge in business opportunities from the BRI, as projects spur an infrastructure boom in the region. He states, “If you want to get rich, build a road first. If you want to build a road, you need cement.” How the Chinese economy will benefit by establishing global connectivity networks over and above returns on its investments can be understood from the example of Bangladesh. China’s primary interest in Bangladesh is its market. Bangladesh is a good outsourcing destination for its manufacturing

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industries because of the cheap labour Bangladesh offers. Again, ports in Bangladesh are an important motivation for China because they offer a lucrative alternative route to reduce its dependence on the Straits of Malacca for the supply of its energy. Given Bangladesh’s geographical proximity to China’s Yunnan Province, its ports can be easily accessed for the supply of energy resources. As stated previously, Bangladesh formally joined the BRI in 2016. Construction work on China-backed Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel Project is currently underway. After completion, the tunnel will connect the port city of Chittagong to the far side of the Karnaphuli River, the site of a new Chinese economic zone. The tunnel will reduce the travel time between Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar, one of the Bangladesh’s tourist destinations, and will ease the heavy congestion on the existing two bridges across the river, while also connecting up with the Korean Export Processing Zone and Shah Amanat International Airport. It will also feed into two other projects that are currently under way – the Asian Highway and the DhakaChittagong-Cox’s Bazar Highway. With conditions of a new normal operating for the Chinese economy, which sees slower growth rates in the country with problems of oversupply ailing the economy, along with rising labour costs, fallouts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the prolonged US-China trade war, it is pertinent for Chinese labour industries, such as the garments industries, for example, to relocate. China will seek to relocate to places with cheap labour. Bangladesh becomes the perfect candidate in this context. Bangladesh is the world’s second-largest garments producer and exporter after China, and labour costs are still cheap. Given this, the creation of the Chinese SEZ in Anwara is understandable. The Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel will make the selling of end products easier as it will ease connectivity between Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar. It will also connect to the Korean Export Processing Zone, making the processing of garments easier, and then finally connect to the Amanat International Airport, which will facilitate the export of finished products. Therefore, economically, BRI investments in Bangladesh make perfect sense for China, while for Bangladesh, the BRI is an opportunity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition to this, Bangladesh will serve as an important bridge for China to access markets in South and Southeast Asia. While the economic complementarities between Bangladesh and China become the perfect explanation for why Dhaka has emerged as a country of interest for China’s BRI, it also becomes pertinent to assess the benefits BRI projects have actually brought to Bangladesh. As stated earlier, the increasing bonhomie between Bangladesh and China has frequently led to concerns over whether Bangladesh is falling into China’s influence, it is pertinent

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to objectively understand whether Bangladesh has been able to shield its national interests or is rapidly on the path to a debt trap, as has happened in Sri Lanka. The following section analyses the projects that have been scrapped by Bangladesh and the rationale behind them to assess how much of an economic influence China actually wields over Bangladesh. Scrapped BRI projects and the question of Chinese economic influence

In the years since Xi Jinping’s visit to Dhaka in 2016, the two sides have only implemented some of the 27 projects agreed upon. Dhaka has scrapped and swapped BRI projects which Dhaka sees as being incapable of yielding substantial benefits to the Bangladeshi economy. A lot of MoUs have also expired (Pitman 2022). Bangladesh scrapped the Dhaka-Sylhet highway worth US$1.6 billion in 2018 after blacklisting the contractor, China Harbour and Engineering Company (CHEC), after it tried to bribe officials.22 Bangladesh further blacklisted the company from participating in any future ventures. CHEC had tried to bribe the newly appointed director of the Bangladesh Highway Transport and Bridges Department for the purpose of diverting project funds. 23 Interestingly, the CHEC has undertaken the Gwadar port project in Pakistan and the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka (Shengwei 2018). Bangladesh also scrapped another project in 2020 – the US$430 millionworth 350-megawatt coal-fired thermal plant in Gazaria. It was after reports emerged that Bangladesh would make US$19 million a month as capacity payments for the 1,320-megawatt coal-fired thermal plant in Payra, which is a project marred by a deadly brawl between Chinese and Bangladeshi workers in 2019. 24 As per reports from the local police, violence erupted at the site after a Bangladeshi worker fell from the terrace and rumours flew that a Chinese worker had pushed him and even tried to cover up the death (Chowdhury 2019). In any case, by 2019, China expended only US$981 million of the promised US$24 billion (Ejaz 2022). Loans were apparently delayed by negotiations, the limited capacity of the Exim Bank of China and lobbying by Chinese firms (Byron and Chakma 2019). Even in the highly touted Payra project, there have been multiple delays and, as stated by the Bangladesh Power Development Board Chairman, “the Payra power plant is going to be a burden and would only increase the government’s power subsidy” (Nicholas 2020). As such, only one-third of the 27 projects agreed upon in 2016 have been completed or are ongoing; half of the remaining projects are under consideration while the other half remain suspended (Ejaz 2022). Bangladesh also did not allow Chinese investment in its deep-sea ports, which could be used in the future for Chinese naval presence, and cancelled the Sonadia deep-sea project. The project, conceived in 2006, was

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to be located in the Bay of Bengal and was to be a part of the BRI. India has always been wary of Chinese presence on the Bay of Bengal due to security concerns. In January 2012, Bangladesh’s cabinet approved the draft to set up the deep-sea port to facilitate Bangladesh’s growing international trade (Byron 2020). The existing seaports in Chittagong and Mongla have low water levels in the Karnaphuli and Passur channels, as a result of which another port in Sonadia seemed feasible. In 2020, Bangladesh announced the scrapping of the Sonadia deep-sea projects due to environmental concerns. Interestingly, Bangladesh is building a deep-sea port in Matarbari, adjacent to Sonadia, as part of a public-private partnership with Japan. 25 The port is set to be functional in 2025. The establishment of digital connectivity was another arena which was much touted in 2016. Beijing was interested in building a Digital Silk Road, which is a part of the BRI, and Dhaka was interested in establishing a Digital Bangladesh. However, it was only in 201826 that the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved the project for direct procurement, fast-tracking, and the tender process (Rehman 2021). China Railway International won the bid and signed an agreement with the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Division for the project in 2018 – two years after the initial MoU. Dhaka approved the agreement in November 2019, while Beijing approved of it in March 2020 (Rehman 2021). However, since 2020, there have been negotiations for two years over cutting the project’s budget, as Dhaka needed to secure the financing of the project from Beijing. 27 In 2022, four Chinese state-owned firms expressed keenness to build a metro rail network along with a “smart city” in Chittagong with their own funds. In return the SOEs demanded a share of profits from the “smart city” after selling off the plots. 28 The proposal mentions that a company from Bangladesh will be a partner of the projects. However, what the proposal does not mention is how the reclaimed land will be shared, how proceeds will be divided, or the exact and full names of the Chinese companies involved (Hasan, Shubhra, and Adhikary 2022). Allowing control of the territory of a country by another country is eerily reminiscent of the fiasco that has already unfolded in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. Thus, the BRI has not had a smooth journey so far in Bangladesh and projects have been marred by delays, strategic and environmental concerns, lobbying by Chinese firms, among a long list of others. Beyond the economic realm, even in the sphere of defence ties, which traditionally have been the realm on which Bangladesh Dhaka relations have been hinged, several problems have emerged. Dhaka has acquired a sizeable amount of military hardware from Beijing, which includes submarines, guns, frigates, and fighter aircraft. However, many of the arms acquired from Beijing have developed snags and examples include the Type-053HR frigates and the K-8W aircraft, 29

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Conclusion

China’s BRI and Bangladesh’s Act East policy align well, and this is one of the reasons for the increasing bonhomie between the two sides. Several commentators in and beyond Bangladesh have often discussed the possibilities of Bangladesh falling into China’s debt trap the way Sri Lanka did. In fact, Bangladesh’s finance minister Mustafa Kamal also has been critical of the BRI and has stated that China should take the blame for debts due to the BRI project. Given that Bangladesh has requested funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to the financial pressures it faces due to escalating international fuel prices, worries regarding further debts from China’s BRI are natural. In recent months, Bangladesh’s currency has plunged against the US dollar and the government has been forced to undertake strict austerity measures. As per reports, Bangladesh has requested from the IMF US$4.5 billion in aid (Roy 2022). However, what is also pertinent to point out in the context of the question of how deep Chinese economic influence in Bangladesh is, is that Dhaka has rejected projects that it does not see as economically sustainable or against its national interests. Bangladesh understands realpolitik and has been tweaking its foreign policies in accordance with its own national interests. While economic ties between Bangladesh and China have been on the rise, it is pertinent to note here that the US remains the largest export destination for Bangladesh, accounting for 14.5% of total exports. Germany remains the top export destination for Bangladesh’s garment trade, taking US$6.2 billion-worth of items in 2021; Germany is Bangladesh’s second largest market overall, accounting for 14.2% of total exports (Roy 2022). With regards to India, as per trade statistics from 2022, Bangladesh imports products worth US$16 billion from China and worth US$14 billion from India; while Bangladesh’s export to China amounts to US$1 billion and to US$2 billion to India. This is despite the fact that China in 2020 granted duty-free access to its market for 97% of Bangladeshi products (Anwar 2022)! China definitely has been trying to make a mark in Bangladesh and this is visible from the educational partnerships, strategic messaging, and scholarships given to entities and individuals from Bangladesh in an attempt to showcase how the BRI is well-functioning and should not be viewed with suspicion. Several Confucius Institutes have opened in Bangladesh in quick succession. In Bangladesh, journalists have been awarded one-year, allexpenses-paid fellowships to Chinese institutions, and multiple newspapers have worked with the Chinese embassy to coordinate roundtables on the benefits of the BRI for the country (Rahman 2003). Some of the journalists involved have even been hired by Chinese state-owned media. The Chinese embassy regularly takes out full-page advertisements in local dailies, and embassy officials, including the ambassador, have visited newsrooms and

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participated in moderated discussions with the staff to build positive relationships that can yield positive coverage (Pal 2021). In China’s relations with South Asian countries, the economic element is increasingly intertwined with political, governmental, and people-to-people aspects of these relationships. However, in Bangladeshi geopolitics, India has long been at the centre due to historical and cultural links as well as geographic proximity. Also, the US, as evident from trade statistics, is still an important economic and political consideration in Bangladeshi foreign policy. While the Chinese footprints in South Asia is a worrying trend, Bangladesh is not on the same path as Sri Lanka and has its own geopolitical considerations at the centre of its foreign policies. Notes 1 Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. “India-Bangladesh relations.” March 2021, https://mea​.gov​.in ​/ Portal ​/ ForeignRelation ​/ India ​_ Bangladesh ​_ MAR2021​ .pdf. 2 Sumanth Samsani. “China-Bangladesh Strategic Linkages.” Observer Research Foundation, May 11, 2021, https://www​.orfonline​.org ​/expert​-speak​/china​ -bangladesh​-strategic​-linkages/. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Xinhua News Agency. “China company to build 220-km oil pipeline in Bangladesh.” December 8, 2016, http://en​.people​.cn ​/n3​/2016​/1208​/c90000​ -9152499​.html. 6 Xinhua News Agency. “Chinese consortium signs deal to acquire 25 pct stake in Bangladesh's premier bourse.” May 14, 2018, http://www​.xinhuanet​.com ​/english​/2018​- 05​/14​/c​_137178673​.htm. 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. July 6, 2019, https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn​/mfa​_ eng​/wjdt​_ 665385​/2649​_ 665393​/201907​/ t20190707​_ 679575​.html. 8 Embassy of China in Dhaka. “Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming Takes Exclusive Interview with the Prothom Alo .”Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 12, 2022, https://www​.fmprc​.gov​ .cn​/mfa​_ eng​/ wjb​_ 663304​/zwjg​_ 665342​/zwbd​_ 665378​/ 202212​/ t20221213​ _10989931​.html. 9 TRT World. “Bangladesh seeks China's help for Rohingya repatriation.” August 7, 2022, https://www​.trtworld​.com ​/asia​/ bangladesh​-seeks​- china​-s​-help​-for​-rohingya​-repatriation​-59537#:~​:text​=Bangladesh​%20has​%20sought​%20cooperation​%20from​,in​%20the​%20South​%20Asian​%20nations. 10 International Centre for Transnational Justice. “Bangladesh Asks China for Help in Repatriating Rohingya Refugees.” September 8, 2022, https://www​.ictj​ .org ​/ latest​-news​/ bangladesh​-asks​- china​-help​-repatriating​-rohingya​-refugees. 11 The Arunachal Times. “Bangladesh seeks China help to repatriate Rohingya refugees.”, August 8, 2022, https://arunachaltimes​.in ​/index​.php​/2022​/08​/08​/ bangladesh​-seeks​- china​-help​-to​-repatriate​-rohingya​-refugees/. 12 The Associated Press. “Bangladesh seeks China help to repatriate Rohingya refugees.” Asahi Shinbum, August 8, 2022, https://www​.asahi​.com​/ajw​/articles​ /14689976.

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13 The Daily Star. “Bangladesh committed to “One China” principle: Foreign Ministry.” August 4, 2022, https://www​.thedailystar​.net ​/news​/asia ​/news​/ bangladesh​- committed​-one​- china​-principle​-foreign​-ministry​-3087731. 14 Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt. “List of BRI projects.” November 2020, https://bwged​.blogspot​.com ​/2020​/11​/ list​-of​-projects​-under​-bri​-in​-bangladesh​.html. 15 Center for Policy Dialogue. “How can Bangladesh benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative? – Fahmida Khatun and Syed Yusuf Saadat.” November 19, 2020, https://cpd​.org​.bd ​/ how​- can​-bangladesh​-benefit​-from​-the​-belt​-and​-road​ -initiative/. 16 Ibid. 17 BRI Watch. “Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ).” March 11, 2022, https://briwatch​.info​/chinese​- economic​-and​-industrial​-zone​- ceiz/ 18 South China Morning Post. “Tension with Delhi spurs Bangladesh's look-east policy.” January 10, 2023, http://www​.scmp​.com ​/article ​/403004​/tension​-delhi​ -spurs​-bangladeshs​-look​- east​-policy 19 Reuters. “China ministry says rising costs pose risk to industry .” October 28, 2010, https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/china​- economy​-output​-idU​SBJB​0 039​ 8220​101028. 20 Sriparna Pathak. “China and the Global Financial Crisis”, M. Phil dissertation, submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University. 21 PWC, “Understanding infrastructure opportunities in ASEAN .”, Report, 2019, https://www​.pwc​.com​/sg​/en​/publications​/assets​/cpi​-mas​-1​-infrastructure​-opporuntities​-in​-asean​-201709​.pdf. 22 Northeast Now. Bangladesh cancels road construction project of Dhaka-Sylhet highway by a Chinese company on corruption charges.” January 28, 2018, https://nenow​.in​/neighbour​/ bangladesh​- cancels​-road​- construction​-project​- of​ -dhaka​-sylhet​-highway​-by​-a​- chinese​- company​-on​- corruption​- charges​.html. 23 Ibid. 24 Anwar, A. 2022. “China-Bangladesh relations: A three way balance between China, India and the US.” MERICS, August 8, 2022, Byron, R.K. 2020. “Plans for a deep seaport at Sonadia nixed.” The Daily Star, September 1, 2020, https://www​.thedailystar​.net ​/ business​/news​/plans​- deep​- seaport​- sonadia​-nixed​ -1953857. Byron, R.K. and Chakma, J. 2019. “China Funded Projects: Red tape holds back progress.” The Daily Star, 19 October 2019, https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/frontpage​/news​/china​-funded​-projects​-red​-tape​-holds​-back- progress-1815790. Chaudhury, D.R. 2022. “Bangladesh snub compels China foreign minister Wang Yi to change visit dates.” The Economic Times, 31 July 2022, https://economictimes​.indiatimes​.com ​/ news​/international​/worldnews/ ​bangl​adesh​-snub​- comp​els-c​hina-​forei​gn-mi​ niste​r-wan​g-yi-​to-ch​ange-​visit​dates​/arti​clesh​ow/93​​25511​​4​.cms​​?utm_​​sourc​​e​ =con​​tento​​fi nte​​rest​&​;utm​_ medium​=text​&​;ut​m​_ campaign​= cppst. Chowdhury, K.R. 2019. “Bangladeshis at Power Plant Where 2 Workers Died Placed on Leave.” Benar News, June 25, 2019, https://www​.benarnews​.org ​/english ​/news​/ bengali ​/ bangladesh​- china​-payra- 06252019174349​.htm​l. Ejaz, R. 2022. “Chinese loan commitments: Only 14pc released .” Prothom Alo, December 20, 2022, https://en​.prothomalo​.com​/ bangladesh​/nqr2orm3ov. Hasan, P. 2021. “BRI provides benefits for Bangladesh .” China Daily, October 11, 2021, https://global​.chinadaily​.com​.cn​/a​/202110​/11​/ WS6​163e​762a​310c​ dd39​bc6e219​.html.

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Hasan, R., Shubhra, T. and Adhikary, P. 2022. “Chinese proposal for CTG: Metro rail in return for stake in ‘smart city’.” The Daily Star, February 23, 2022, https://www​.thedailystar​.net ​/news ​/ bangladesh ​/transport ​/news ​/chinese​-proposalctg​-metro​-rail​-return​-stake​-smart​- city​-2968136. Nicholas, S. 2020. “Shelving of huge BRI coal plant highlights overcapacity risk in Pakistan and Bangladesh.” China Dialogue, May 1, 2020, https://chinadialogue​.net​/en​/energy​/11988​-shelving​-of​-huge​-bri​- coal​-plant- highl​ights​-over​capac​ity-r​isk-i​n-pak​istan​-and-​bangl​ adesh​/. Parkin, B. 2022. “Bangladesh’s finance minister warns on Belt and Road loans from China .” The Financial Times, August 9, 2022, https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/65632129​-dd75​- 4f23​-b9c4​ -9c0496840a54. Pal, D. 2021.“China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2021, https://carnegieendowment​.org ​/2021​/10​/13​/china​-s- influ​ence-​in-so​uth-a​sia-v​ulner​abili​ties-​and-r​esili​ ence-​in-fo​ur-co​untri​es-pu​b-855​52. Pathak, S. “China and the Global Financial Crisis”, M. Phil dissertation, submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University. Pitman, A. 2022. “What one BRI project shows us about China’s investment in Bangladesh.” The Dhaka Tribune, June 27, 2022, https://www.dhakatribune.com/ longform/2022/06/27/what-one-bri-project-shows-us- about-chinas-investment-inbangladesh Pitman, A. 2022. “What one BRI project shows us about China’s investment in Bangladesh.” The Dhaka Tribune, June 27, 2022, https://www​.dhakatribune​.com ​/ longform ​/ 2022 ​/ 06​/ 27​/ what​- one​-bri​-project​- shows​-us​- about​- chinas​ -investment​-in​-bangladesh Pitman, A, 2020.“China’s Stake in Bangladesh Is Overplayed.” The Diplomat, August 8, 2020, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/08​/chinas​-stake​-in​-bangladesh​ -is​-overplayed/. Rahman, S.A. 2021. “The BRI in Bangladesh: ‘Win-Win’ or a ‘Debt Trap’?.” The Diplomat, November 9, 2021, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​/11​/the​-bri​-in​ -bangladesh​-win​-win​-or​-a​-debt​-trap/. Rahman, W. 2003. “Bangladesh looks east.” BBC News, January 2, 2003, http://news​.bbc​.co​.uk​/2​/ hi​/south​_ asia​/2621947​.stm. Rehman, M.M. 2021.“Tk 58.83b digital connectivity project passes China evaluation.” The Financial Express, November 5, 2021, https://www​.thefinancialexpress​.com​.bd ​/trade​/tk​ -5883b​-digital​- connectivity- proje​ct-pa​sses-​china​- eval​uatio​n-163​60850​78. Roy, R. “Bangladesh minister slams China BRI loans amid foreign minister Wang visit.” WION, August 10, 2022, https://www​.wionews​.com ​/south​-asia ​/ bangladesh​-minister​-slams​-chinas​-bri​-loans​-amid​-foreign​-minister​-wangs​-visit​-505497 Shengwei, X. 2018. “China’s Connectivity Projects with Pakistan and Sri Lanka: A Review of the CPEC Projects and Hambantota Port .” Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, December 2018, https://lkyspp​.nus​.edu​.sg ​/docs​/default​-source​/cag ​/ xushengwei--​- china's​- con​​necti​​vity-​​with-​​pakis​​tan​-a​​nd​-sr​​i​-lan​​ka​_19​​dec20​​18​.pd​​f​ ?s​f v​​rsn​=b​​89973​​0a_4 The Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, “Speech by H.E. Zhang Zuo, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, at China-Bangladesh relations: Prognosis for the Future Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 12, 2018, https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn ​/eng ​/wjb​_ 663304​/zwjg ​_ 665342​/zwbd ​_ 665378​ /201812​/t20181212 ​_ 624788​.html.

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25 Indo-Pacific Defence Forum. “Bangladesh partners with Japan on deep-sea port, dropping PRC-funded proposal.” November 7, 2020, https://ipdefenseforum​ .com ​/ 2020​/11​/ bangladesh​-partners​-with​-japan​- on​- deep​- sea​-port​- dropping​-prc​ -funded​-proposal/. 26 United News of Bangladesh. “Digital connectivity: Deal signed with Chinese company .” October 28, 2018, https://unb​.com​.bd ​/category​/ Bangladesh ​/digital​ -connectivity​-deal​-signed​-with​- chinese​- company​/5251. 27 Dhaka Tribune. “Bangladesh now 35th largest economy in the world.” 6 January 2023, https://www​.dhakatribune​.com ​/ bangladesh ​/2023​/01​/06​/ bangladesh​-now​ -35th​-largest​- economy​-in​-the​-world. 28 The Economic Times. “Is Bangladesh next to fall in China's debt-trap diplomacy?” 6 July 2022, https://economictimes​.indiatimes​.com ​/news​/international​ /world​-news ​/is​-bangladesh​-next​-to ​-fall​-in​- chinas​- debt​-trap ​- diplomacy​/articleshow​/92661488​.cms​?utm ​_ source​= contentofinterest​&utm ​_ medium​=text​&utm​ _campaign​= cppst. 29 ANI. “Is Bangladesh next to fall in China's debt-trap diplomacy?” 4 July 2022, https://www​.aninews​.in ​/news ​/world ​/asia ​/ is​-bangladesh​-next​-to​-fall​-in​- chinas​ -debt​-trap​-dip​loma​cy20​2207​0 4223646/.

References Anwar, A. 2022. “China-Bangladesh relations: A three way balance between China, India and the US.” MERICS, August 8, 2022, https://merics​.org ​/en ​/china​ -bangladesh​-relations​-three​-way​-balance​-between​- china​-india​-and​-us. Byron, R.K. 2020. “Plans for a deep seaport at Sonadia nixed.” The Daily Star, September 1, 2020, https://www​.thedailystar​.net ​/ business​/news​/plans​-deep​ -seaport​-sonadia​-nixed​-1953857. Byron, R.K. and Chakma, J. 2019. “China funded projects: Red tape holds back progress.” The Daily Star, October 19, 2019, https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/ frontpage​/news​/china​-funded​-projects​-red​-tape​-holds​-back​-progress​-1815790. Chaudhury, D.R. 2022. “Bangladesh snub compels China foreign minister Wang Yi to change visit dates.” The Economic Times, July 31, 2022, https:// economictimes ​ . indiatimes ​ . com ​ / news ​ / international ​ / world​ - news ​ / bangladesh​ -snub​- compels​- china​-foreign​-minister​-wang​-yi​-to​- change​-visit​-dates​/articleshow​ /93255114​.cms​?utm ​_ source​= contentofinterest​& amp​;utm ​_ medium​=text​& amp​ ;utm ​_ campaign​= cppst. Chowdhury, K.R. 2019. “Bangladeshis at power plant where 2 workers died placed on leave.” Benar News, June 25, 2019, https://www​.benarnews​.org ​/english ​/news​ /bengali ​/ bangladesh​- china​-payra​- 06252019174349​.html. Ejaz, R. 2022. “Chinese loan commitments: Only 14pc released.” Prothom Alo, December 20, 2022, https://en​.prothomalo​.com​/ bangladesh​/nqr2orm3ov. Hasan, P. 2021. “BRI provides benefits for Bangladesh.” China Daily, October 11, 2021, https://global​.chinadaily​.com​.cn​/a​/202110​/11​/ WS6​163e​762a​310c​dd39​ bc6e219​.html. Hasan, R., Shubhra, T. and Adhikary, P. 2022. “Chinese proposal for CTG: Metro rail in return for stake in ‘smart city’.” The Daily Star, February 23, 2022, https:// www​.thedailystar​. net ​/news ​/ bangladesh ​/ transport ​/news ​/chinese ​- proposalctg​ -metro​-rail​-return​-stake​-smart​- city​-2968136. Nicholas, S. 2020. “Shelving of huge BRI coal plant highlights overcapacity risk in Pakistan and Bangladesh.” China Dialogue, May 1, 2020, https://chinadialogue​

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.net ​/en ​/energy​/11988 ​- shelving​- of​-huge ​-bri​- coal​-plant​-highlights​- overcapacity​ -risk​-in​-pakistan​-and​-bangladesh/. Parkin, B. 2022. “Bangladesh’s finance minister warns on Belt and Road loans from China.” The Financial Times, August 9, 2022, https://www​.ft​.com​/content​ /65632129​-dd75​- 4f23 ​-b9c4 ​-9c0496840a54. Pal, D. 2021. “China’s influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and resilience in four countries.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2021, https://carnegieendowment​.org ​/ 2021​/ 10​/ 13​/china​- s​- influence​- in​- south​- asia​ -vulnerabilities​-and​-resilience​-in​-four​- countries​-pub​-85552. Pathak, S. “China and the global financial crisis.” M. Phil dissertation, submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University. Pitman, A. 2022. “What one BRI project shows us about China’s investment in Bangladesh.” The Dhaka Tribune, June 27, 2022, https://www​.dhakatribune​ .com ​/ longform ​/ 2022 ​/ 06​/ 27​/ what​- one​-bri​-project​- shows​-us​- a​​ b out-​​ china​​ s​-inv​​ estme​​nt​-in​​-bang​​lades​​h. Pitman, A. 2022. “What one BRI project shows us about China’s investment in Bangladesh.” The Dhaka Tribune, June 27, 2022, https://www​.dhakatribune​ .com ​ / longform ​ / 2022 ​ / 06 ​ / 27​ / what ​ - one ​ - bri ​ - project ​ - shows ​ - us ​ - about ​ - chinas​ -investment​-in​-bangladesh. Pitman, A. 2020.“China’s stake in Bangladesh is overplayed.” The Diplomat, August 8, 2020,https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/08​/chinas​-stake​-in​-bangladesh​-is​ -overplayed/. Rahman, S.A. 2021. “The BRI in Bangladesh: ‘Win-win’ or a ‘debt trap’?.” The Diplomat, November 9,2021, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​/11​/the​-bri​-in​ -bangladesh​-win​-win​-or​-a​-debt​-trap/. Rahman, W. 2003. “Bangladesh looks east.” BBC News, January 2, 2003, http:// news​.bbc​.co​.uk ​/2​/ hi ​/south​_ asia ​/2621947​.stm. Rehman, M.M. 2021.“Tk 58.83b digital connectivity project passes China evaluation.” The Financial Express, November 5, 2021, https://www​ .thefinancialexpress​.com​.bd​/trade​/tk​-5883b​- digital​- connectivity​-project​-passeschina​- evaluation​-1636085078. Roy, R. 2022. “Bangladesh minister slams China BRI loans amid foreign minister Wang visit.” WION, August 10, 2022, https://www​.wionews​.com​/south​-asia​/ bangladesh​-minister​- slams​- chinas​-bri​-loans​-amid​-foreign​-minister​-wangs​-visit​ -505497. Shengwei, X. 2018. “China’s connectivity projects with Pakistan and Sri Lanka: A review of the CPEC projects and Hambantota port.” Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, December 2018, https://lkyspp​.nus​.edu​.sg ​/docs​/default​-source​/cag ​/ xushengwei-- ​- china's​- con​​necti​​vity-​​with-​​pakis​​tan​-a​​nd​-sr​​i​-lan​​ka​_19dec2018​.pdf​ ?sf​vrsn​=b899730a​_4. The Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, “Speech by H.E. Zhang Zuo, Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh, at China-Bangladesh relations: Prognosis for the future ministry of foreign affairs of the people’s Republic of China.” December 12, 2018,https://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn ​/eng ​/wjb​_ 663304​/zwjg ​_ 665342 ​/zwbd ​_ 665378​ /201812​/t20181212 ​_ 624788​.html.

PART III

Evolving dynamics and networks in the neighbourhood



8 THE MANIFOLD ASPECTS OF CHINESE PRESENCE IN IRAN Bahram Amirahmadian

The outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran coincided with transformative development in China led by Deng Xiaoping. This transformed relations between the two countries. With the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution, Iran's foreign policy changed and it was on the path to revolutionism with the slogan “Neither Eastern nor Western.” On the other hand, in China in December 1978, at the third session of the 11th Congress of the Communist Party, the country‘s macro strategy changed from revolutionism to expansionism. Symbolically, Iran and China changed their place in international politics. America’s conservative ally Iran became the stronghold of the revolution, and revolutionary China, which once sought to destroy imperialism, made rationality the centrepiece of its foreign policy and entered into strategic partnership with the United States as the leader of the capitalist camp. The simultaneity of these two developments meant that ideology played little role in the relations between the two countries and the link remained mainly through their material interests. During the Islamic Revolution, in some political groups formed during the revolution, Maoist movements were also influenced by the propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party, which, of course, had little weight among the national and Islamic currents that were ultimately eliminated. Iran follows an independent foreign policy. Prior to the Trump presidency, when Iran solved its nuclear deal with international organisations in the framework of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), Iran was hopeful to diversify its foreign policy and improve its relationship with the West, especially the EU. In that case, Iran decided to negotiate with American and European companies to buy passenger aircrafts from Boeing and Airbus, and signed agreements to receive more than 200 aircrafts. Some European DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-11

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countries started to negotiate with Iran to invest in the oil industry and construction and transportation in Iran. China, in the last decade (2010–-2020), was the first trade partner of Iran and it had a significant place among Iran’s trade partners, with a 25% share in the foreign trade of Iran. Especially during economic sanctions by the West against Iran, during which time Iran’s economy was hard hit as it was not able to export its oil, China played a significant role in Iran’s economy. So, China benefitted both from import of cheap-priced oil, and from the export of several goods to the Iranian market that Iranian light industries were producing previously. Because of the Chinese economic structure, in which the production of goods is cheaper than the Iranian one, the import of Chinese goods led to the closure of Iranian light industries and finally had some negative results on the Iranian national economy. In this period, China’s image suffered in Iran, although in the political and international environment, China supported the Iranian side. Background

Iran’s relations with China can be divided into two periods – historical and modern. Both Iran and China were from the Eastern Empires in ancient times and have a history of ancient governance. The two empires, which had established special relationships in each other’s neighbourhoods over the centuries, played a role in each other’s historic Silk Road and mutual cultural influence. After the outbreak of insecurity in the region, and the emergence of the Mongol Empire and the closure of the Silk Road, following geographical exploration and the development of maritime routes, these relations disappeared. It can be said that the relationship between the two countries, with the establishment of the new system based in China, has been around for five decades. On the one hand, Iran was at the forefront of the battle against communism, and on the other hand, in China, decades of civil war finally culminated in the Communist Revolution in 1949, and a new era began in the country. Naturally, Iran did not recognise communist China and, in keeping with the Western world, recognised Taiwan as a representative of the Chinese people. This period, which lasted from the victory of the Chinese Revolution to the early 1970s, can be considered a tense period in the relations between the two countries. During this period, China considered Iran as a “loyal servant of imperialism,” and Iran dubbed China an expansionist and aggressor country. The two countries were on opposite sides of the Cold War, and naturally this period came to an end in the early 1970s. At this juncture, the United States restated its relations with China in the form of “table tennis diplomacy.” Iran’s relations with China were redefined with the visit of Ashraf Pahlavi (sister of the Iranian king) to China in April 1971. This could

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be considered the starting point for a new era in Iran-China relations, which lasted until the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During this period, formal relations between the two countries were established and initial steps were taken to build trust and cooperation (Mohsen 2012). Throughout the 42-year history after the Islamic Revolution, Iran has never experienced durable relations with any of the powers in the international arena other than China. Despite the developments and challenges in the regional and international arenas, neither country has been considered a rival to the other in foreign policy. China, as one of the world’s major powers, has pursued and followed a number of important principles, including respect for the territorial integrity of countries, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful coexistence in the international community. That's why we can dare say that the two countries have enjoyed relatively stable relations over the course of four decades.1 Relations

One of the most important rules governing international relations can be found in this famous sentence: “countries do not have permanent friends and enemies.” Countries have permanent interests, so in relation to China, we can also point to areas of common interests, parallel interests, and even conflicting interests. If so, then the relationship with China as a regional power trying to give global dimensions to its power can be very important to us. 2 Political relations between Iran and China are always subject to various considerations. Economic issues and the type of policies and stances of the two sides on international and regional issues play a very important role in this regard. Accordingly, and influenced by the economic considerations of political relations, the two sides have always enjoyed a favourable level of positions on regional issues such as Syria. Beijing’s veto, along with Moscow, of anti-Syrian resolutions in the Security Council has fulfilled the demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, China’s position on the United States and its conflicts with Iran have been in the middle of two convergent and divergent trends with Iran, which seems to be considerable. However, in evaluating the level of political relations between the two countries, these relations can be considered as desirable and among the expanding relations. In 2016, we witnessed the visit of the Chinese President to Iran with a highranking delegation, and since the inception of the 11th government in Iran, the political relations between the two countries have been unprecedentedly expanding. The visits of high-ranking officials and cross-country political and economic trips have increased dramatically, and in the last years, the presidents of the two countries have met each other and the foreign ministers have met several times. The meetings of officials of the two countries and

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their declared positions on important international and regional issues and China’s promise to support Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Organisation all indicate the importance of high political importance of the two countries’ relations with each other and indicate that bilateral relations in this sector are in favourable levels and degrees. China's power-driven policy

After a period of closed-door policy and disconnection with the West, China experienced a strategic turnaround in the field of foreign policy. Of course, this change itself has been the effect of the necessities and requirements that this country has made on the domestic front. Finally, since the 1970s, Beijing opened its doors to the Western world and began diplomatic political interactions with mainly economic incentives. Since China’s macroeconomic strategy was defined in the form of economic development, and this strategic goal, firstly without a secure regional environment and then without capital and technology, could not be achieved, the country also took a close path with the West and the United States, which continues to this day. In fact, China’s power-based policy in the economic sphere has made it inevitable to adopt a policy of communicating with the West, because it considers the structure and economic capacity of the West to complement to its economic objectives. This is while Iran has experienced a fundamental conflict with the West. As has been observed so far, Beijing has acted in a vibrant way in its policy of conflict between Iran and the West. This means that, while maintaining the level of relations and interactions and exchanges with Iran, it has maintained strategic relations with the West and the United States. Accordingly, one cannot expect that China can be treated as an ally under sensitive circumstances. The Tehran-Beijing relationship has never entered the stage of strategic unity, but that does not mean that a meaningful and effective relationship has not been formed or will not be formed between them. The relationship between the two countries is a strategic relationship and not a strategic alliance. Because the two sides’ attitudes are different from those of Western countries and the United States, this is a challenge to the expansion and deepening of bilateral relations, which, of course could be comprehensive if managed properly.3 Volume and level of strategic military relations

Military and strategic relations between Iran and China expanded after the Islamic Revolution and especially after the beginning of the imposed war. On the one hand, Iran, which has been the target of Iraq’s aggression policy with the support of Western powers and faced arms restrictions, considers China as a source of weapons and war supplies, and on the other hand, China, as a country opposed to regional hegemony by the United States and its allies in various regions, including the Persian Gulf, was in harmony with

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Iran. Therefore, in order to prevent the disintegration of the balance for the benefit of the West and the United States in the region, China helped to equip and arm Iran in part (of course, China is also supplying weapons to Iraq on the basis of its neutrality policy). This approach and procedure continues to this day. A look at the figures published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) clearly implies that in the last two decades Iran has been the recipient of Chinese weapons.4 China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement on 27 March 2021, addressing economic issues amid crippling US sanctions on Iran. The deal was reached on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Iran and hailed as a major step forward that will see China invest US$400–600 billion into the Iranian economy. The deal was originally proposed in 2016, when the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China issued a joint statement on comprehensive strategic cooperation between the two countries and agreed to sign a plan for comprehensive cooperation. After rounds of consultations and negotiations, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi signed the “Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China” (the Agreement) on 27 March 2021.5 Iran-China cooperation in BRI

Cooperation between Iran and China in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), within the framework of transportation sector, has been in the offing since 2018. Ali Larijani, the speaker of parliament, visited China in this regard and studies have been conducted by the Parliamentary Research Centre. In this regard, two points should be considered. First, the initiative has two sections: the “21st Maritime Silk Road” and the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” which has six land corridors. We know that the majority of natural goods and raw materials are transported through waterways and more than 85% of commercial transportation in the world is carried out by sea. Therefore, the capacity of Iranian sea ports can be used. Although we can benefit from transit by being placed in this corridor, in the BRI, among the six land corridors defined, only one of them has the name “China-Central Asia-West Asia” route, i.e. sending goods from China to Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. This corridor is not fully operational at present and we need to pay attention to it in the framework of this long-term cooperation. Subsequent to the military invasion of Ukraine by Russia and sanctions by the West against Russia, China’s main BRI corridor, named the “New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor,” that connects China to Europe via Russia, Belarus, and Poland to Germany, came to operation.

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However, if we want to work with China, we can suggest that in the transportation sector, it is not only the area of transit cooperation of goods that is invested in, but we prefer that China invest in Iran in the framework of assembling industries and allowing semi-finished goods to come to Iran. Then, after finishing the goods using Iranian skilled manpower, cheap energy, investment capacities, and so on, China re-exports completed goods to Europe. In this case, China will benefit in opportunity costs to export goods and Iran will have a share in the Chinese value chain. We do not like to play only a transit corridor to the Chinese BRI. At the same time, we must not become China’s factory. One of the criticisms of China, also seen in the BRI, is China’s use of Chinese manpower in projects carried out by Chinese investment in other countries. In the past transactions between Iran and China, we have seen that the presence of Chinese manpower has been implementing various projects. One of China’s long-term goals is to invest in other countries and import consumer products to China in various industries, especially those that are polluting. So, we need to be smart so that we don’t become a factory, road, or environment for polluting Chinese industries. The 25-year Strategic Cooperation Plan of Iran with China should be done with the participation of the private sector and the government. For this purpose, the public and private sectors should decide on this document together, and it is better that the role of the government is that of supervision, so that we can link to the global value chain that China has created. Looking to the East doesn’t make us heedless of the West. Another notable issue regarding looking to the East is Iran’s temporary membership in the Eurasian Union. In fact, the New Eurasia Land Bridge corridor, which connects China’s railways to Russia and connects China to Germany via Belarus and Poland and is considered a distribution, loading, and unloading centre, is an active corridor, that after the military invasion of Russia in Ukraine has been under Western sanctions. In this regard, Iran can play a crucial role in China for starting the sixth economic corridor in the BRI. Prospects for bilateral relations between Iran and China

Estimating and evaluating the bilateral relations of countries in the foreseeable future requires paying attention to the power resources of the two countries, their ability to stimulate them, as well as the contextualising of the opportunities and challenges mentioned in the report. According to the above, there are necessities on the political and economic calculations of Iran and China, which leads them closer to the continuation of the relationship. In this regard, the mental and administrative history of both sides has a decisive role. This means that the benefits and revenues that Iran and China have gained from bilateral relations in the political and security economic spheres

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have led to their positive approach to each other and therefore encourages the two sides to expand them while preserving these achievements. This approach requires the expansion of bilateral relations at a comprehensive level. In fact, the Iranian and Chinese sides will advance their relations on the basis of political and economic affairs bilaterally and multilaterally (in the form of regional and international institutions). Especially with the rift between China and the West in the area of regional policies such as the Syrian crisis, and given the strategic opening up of the Iran nuclear standoff, the path to deepening Tehran-Beijing relations has been paved. Therefore, according to the evidence, it seems that China is one of the main centres of Iran’s regional policy, and as such, Iran, due to its economic capacities, especially in the field of energy and populous market, as well as its strategically stimulating capability at the international level, will be one of the main objectives of China’s regional policy. The outcome of constructive mutual approaches of the two countries is to draw a promising vision of bilateral relations between Iran and China.6 Today, Iran has closed multipurpose relations with China, including political, economic, cultural, commercial, scientific, academic, and strategic. Both countries, while considering their own national interests and concerns, work together in the above mentioned field and based on mutual respect, friendship, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. These relations have been following their natural course since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on its independent foreign policy, Iran is interested in having good relations with the countries of the region in the framework of regional cooperation. In Iran’s foreign policy, attention to neighbouring countries, is very important. Among the important powers in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (China, India, and Russia), the China Belt and Road Initiative, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, OPEC, and the like are important. Is Iran left behind by the Belt and Road Initiative?

In the Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to bring the countries partnering in the initiative closer together around the so-called ancient Silk Road. Perhaps when one talks about the Silk Road, it brings to the mind roads, caravans, etc., but it should be noted that this type of thinking is related to the past and the land routes. Today, commercial goods are largely shipped by sea because it is not economically viable to transport large volumes of goods by land. Today, commercial goods are largely shipped by sea because it is not economically viable to transport large volumes of goods by land., because it is not economically viable to transport large volumes of goods by land. In the transportation economy, shipments up to 500 kilometres are transported by truck and more by rail. If the volume of the goods is high and its value is

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low, the shipments are shipped. Only some low-volume and expensive goods are carried by plane. These are the conditions of transportation. There are three very important factors that need to be taken into account in increasing transit, which I call “three transit layers.” The first layer is infrastructure – how much infrastructure are we ready for? Checkpoints, ports, fuel supply stations, road signs and driving, physical security of roads and so on, is the first layer. When the trucks or trains carrying goods enter another country without any deformation and without any interference or seizure of those goods, they will pass to the next destination. This is called transit, and it becomes a transit country and this corridor is formed. We have no information about the cost-benefit analysis and about the economic advantage of transit for the country which plays the transit location. In Iran, to play a transit role for China in the BRI, there is no information in this regard, because so far there hasn’t been a scientific and economic survey and the cost-benefit has not been investigated. So, we need to create the conditions in which the necessary infrastructure for this activity is prepared. This means that ports, airports, and checkpoints must be well-organised for these matters. In Iran, to play the transit role, in the framework of BRI, the roads are technically safe and ready. The second layer is process. Customs laws and customs duties, courts related to this matter, international claims and regulations, banking and insurance systems, inspections, customs and tariffs, and clearance procedures and such matters are all necessary for a transportation and transit process. Here, the first layer belongs to the governments, and another part of the second layer is at the disposal of the governments, but the passage of trucks, trains, and goods are in the hands of the private sector. If there is a problem in the first layer and the second layer, or inefficiency and delays occur, the private sector will look for an alternative path. The private sector seeks “ease,” “security,” “speed,” and “profit” in trade and transportation. The absence of any of these four factors makes transit and transportation difficult. In this way, we need to have an inclusive local government at the checkpoints and entrances, to make all the decisions at once, in order to act on the four mentioned factors. If there are several organisations and entities involved in the entry points for transit goods, there will be delays. Are the rules and regulations in the checkpoints for foreign nationals in accordance with international law, goods received and payments made in accordance with the regulations? How is the fuel and the fuel price difference (in Iran’s economic structure), and currency clearance nationally and internationally? Are those who enter the country and want to cross Iranian territory easily able to cross border crossings, or are there deterrent factors, like the inspection of goods and quarantine? Are these steps handled quickly? If there are shortcomings and inefficiencies that affect the flow, speed, security, and benefits of traffic, it is natural that private economic activities will look

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for alternative routes. In the second layer, which is a process layer (namely customs regulations, police, security, courts of justice, laws and regulations, banking and insurance system), similar conditions apply. It should be noted that, while the road is the responsibility of government, goods that do not belong to the government belong to the private properties. If the private sector feels harassed due to the delayed offloading of its ship at the sea port (and should have to pay demurrage), they no longer use this route and choose an alternative route. The third layer that is important is the political space. The political space of any country is very important. It needs to have a single voice in foreign policy and economic diplomacy. If a transit country is unable to act in its foreign policy in a way that makes others feel safe, the owners of the goods that wish to transit the country will not be willing to transfer their goods for fear of confiscation, or the stopping of goods, personal regulations, non-political barriers, restrictions, etc. Therefore, in order for these considerations to promote the country’s position in the region, it needs to pay attention to scientific, technical, economic, and political transit. Transit is not just revenue; transit can enhance the place of the transit country in the world. If a businessman, private economic company, or commodity owner who wants to cross transit country territory faces an unsuitable political climate, or security difficulties, deterrent regulations and laws, and feels that he cannot easily pass through the country, then he will surely choose another path. This is an economic principle. When the political environment is not appropriate, the development of transit and transportation does not take shape. So, in all areas, the transit country needs to have harmony and a single voice. This is the unity of foreign policy, the unified voice. That is, if there is a responsible government, it will create a suitable condition for transit. At present, Iran is standing in favourable situations in terms of physical infrastructure in the region, that is, its communication network is okay, ports and airports and more infrastructure are better than the countries in the region, but how is it that Iran has not been able to use these assets to how best to use? Now our problem is the Belt and Road Initiative. We have even written and published this in our political literature. Of course, I think our perception of this concept is diverse. To provide for its population of 1.4 billion, China needs to import energy and raw materials, technology, and goods that it does not or cannot produce in the national economy and export goods and engineering services and investment. So, global trade, shipping, connections, communication, connectivity, and exchanges are vital for China. Most of the countries that cooperate with China in the Belt and Road Initiative are countries that often have trade and commercial relations, exchanges, and consequently diplomatic relations with China.

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The Belt and Road Initiative, as its name implies, defines six economic corridors (belts) and a 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. China has been pursuing this initiative since 2013. China is linked to Asia-Africa-Europe through this initiative. One of the six corridors linked to Iran covers part of the ancient Silk Road, which is economic corridor number six (ChinaCentral Asia-West Asia). The flow of goods and capital will be through China to Central Asia and from there to Iran and from Iran to Turkey and then to Europe. This economic corridor may become a sub-corridor for the new Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor. The Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor travels from China to Russia, from Russia to Belarus and from Belarus to Poland, and from there to Germany, where it operates as a European hub. This corridor plays a crucial role for China’s foreign trade in the BRI. It supplies Chinese goods and ships with expensive European goods to China. After Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s boycott by the West, this route has been blocked. In this land corridor (rail and road), millions of tons of goods were transported prior to the blockage. Because they boycotted Russia, the corridor on the Belarusian border to Poland is subject to sanctions and has been estranged from operating. Iran is willing to guarantee the passage of Chinese goods from Iran to Europe as an alternative route under different conditions. In order to benefit from the current situation, Iran needs to improve the above-mentioned three layers that I have described so that Iran’s transit infrastructure can be used. Iran has connections with landlocked countries in Central Asia in the northeast and Afghanistan in the east, Azerbaijan and Armenia in the northwest, and established its connections to road and rail transit (Central Asia, Turkey, and some instances with Afghanistan). How much they will benefit from these routes depends on their economic structure, which has been formed over the decades. The railway route, called the “Silk Rail Road,” is available for the rail connection between Iran and China via Central Asia. Several trains have travelled between Iran and China in recent years through this network. But as mentioned above, this does not mean that we can do all our exchanges through the Silk Road railroad. In the Belt and Road Initiative, Iran can make extensive cooperation in parts of this initiative within the framework of the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that was signed with China. But Iran shouldn’t become a transit country for China, because as stated above, it’s not entirely clear to Iran how profitable transit is for the national economy. In fact, Chinese goods for Europe are transiting through Iran’s territory, but Iran wants to have a stake in China’s global value chain. Iran believes that, while China wants to export goods in this direction, it should come and invest here in Iran, bring semi-finished goods, then use energy and very skilled and cheap manpower available here to finish them, and then send the final product to the consumer market from here, so that Iran can have a share in the process.

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China has two fundamental problems in its essence: one is its population problem, the most populous country in the world. Of the world population of 6.7 billion , 1.4 billion (one-fourth) live in China. This large population must be supplied with food and services. At a conference on the same Silk Road, I said China is the most powerful country in the world. They asked, “What’s your reason?” I said, “A state who is able to provide such amount of population by goods and services that there is no shortage, poverty and hunger, it is a powerful state.” China produces enough for food security one is hungry, which means they produce enough crops, and it shows that they have the good management, good governing, and this is a very important indicator of food security. Another problem is foreign trade or imports and exports. This huge population that wants to live in this country needs to be governed in terms of the needs of living in a large economy. Good trade and economic activities and efficient management make it a top global economy. In order for this flow to survive, this large economy needs to import raw materials that are lacking in the national economy. In order to supply raw materials and imported energy, they need to provide national resources and monetary exchanges. So, they should have production for export. Raw materials and energy are imported and manufactured goods or services are exported. So, it has two markets; one is the market for importing raw materials and energy and services, and the other is the export market for goods and services. Therefore, for this process, China has trade, economic, and political relations with many countries and the number of its partners is high. From different regions, these raw materials are imported, from energy to other materials, everything from ore to oil. What relationship does Iran have with China in this process? Iran exports oil and its products and raw materials to China. What does Iran import from China? Consumer goods and industrial products that Iran cannot produce in its economy or has no relative advantage on. If Iran does not import them from China, will this relationship break? Yes. In the event of a Chinese embargo, it will supply the oil it needs from other sources, and Iran has a stake in the quantum of Chinese imports. China is one of the world’s largest oil importers. In exchange for Iran’s exports to China, China imports manufactured goods. How is this product produced? In a closed economic system called the “Communist Party of China,” with a centrally planned system of economy, fixed and stable foreign currency, constant exchange rate, bank interest for working capital of the manufacturing sector and factories at three percent rate. Compare on equal terms China with Iran. Therefore, Iran cannot compete with China’s cheap final consumers goods. Once, the national economy of Iran produced and sometimes exported light electronic and consumer goods. Today, due to the type of Chinese economy, Iran is no longer able to produce them, and China is occupying Iran’s markets, causing factory closures and unemployment crises and the bankruptcy of those

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industries. Unemployed workers have turned to the informal sector with no organisation (this situation can be found in many countries like Iran who are in partnership with China in the BRI). What kind of goods do they sell to itinerant peddlers? The same Chinese goods that have been imported. So, the export of Iranian raw materials and energy to China reduced domestic Iranian production, because many of the light industries that produced these goods and even exported them to neighbouring Asian, and even Eastern European countries, as well as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, could not produce anymore. So, China is looking for markets and raw materials. Given that more than 100 countries are engaged and tied with China in the Belt and Road Initiative, it begs the question: what does a Belt and a Road mean? Of course, Europe does it too. It imports raw materials and energy and exports goods and services. The difference, of course, is that China demands property and legal collateral in exchange for investments in the logistics of the infrastructure of partner countries in the Belt and Road Initiative through real estate and legal collateral payments. If the country receiving the loans fails to comply with the obligations, the invested item will be made available to China for the period specified in order to exploit it with its desired management. This means violating the national sovereignty of the host country, which has failed to pay the prescribed debt on time. One of these is the port in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Since the president was unable to manage the instalments of the loan, the port has been made available to China. China does not do much benevolently for other nations in the Belt and Road scheme. It is natural that China, like any other country, seeks to maximise its national interests. The question is, is Iran included in this initiative or not? It should be said both yes and no. Iran is included in this initiative, China has invested and is seeking to establish a diplomatic consulate in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s biggest sea port in the Persian Gulf. China, with its huge fleet of shipping and sea transport, is active and has close ties with Iran. Iran imports from China and continues exports to China. Even during the period under sanctions, China imported oil from Iran regardless of US sanctions. But what can be placed within the framework of the BRI, based on the regulations and indicators defined in the Statute of the Belt and Road? What is Iran going to do in the BRI? For example, China intended to electrify the Tehran-Mashhad or Tehran-Isfahan railways, which had been initiated as part of the bilateral relations between the two countries, and now China wants to define the same plans under the BRI. But it should be noted that the BRI is more fanfare and propaganda, and on the other hand, it is very vague and the details are not yet entirely clear. They say it has partnerships with 101 countries, but there is no complete and clear list of

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countries and the amount, resources, and investment locations are not available. What are the 101 countries? Some small countries in Asia and Africa are sometimes involved in the initiative, even some in Europe. There are also big countries, but they share more with greater understanding. Several critical articles have been published, many acknowledging that many of these partnerships and relationships form an exploitative state for those countries. On the other hand, China supports Iran in some way. What should Iran do? Iran can’t say it’s good or it is bad. China is the same. When she wants to exercise her own power, she exploits. Does China come to secure Iran’s interests? No. It has been said that the cat does not catch the mouse in the benefit of the landlord. It does it for its own needs. Critical issue on Belt and Road 2023

China’s BRI was always something of a mafia-like enterprise. Beijing would approach poorer countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the periphery of Europe and offer loans for important infrastructure projects – ports, rail links, dams, roads, and the like. State-owned Chinese banks would arrange the financing and Chinese contractors would execute the projects and manage them after they were completed. If the host country failed to pay, the projects would come under Chinese ownership. Either way, Beijing gained influence and considerable leverage over the nations that allowed themselves to become involved. Since Xi first rose to the presidency, China has made over $1 trillion on such loans in some 150 countries, making the country the world’s largest official creditor (Ezrati 2022). Road to nowhere

The lack of discernible economic activity in Gwadar underlines a tough reality: nearly eight years after China announced a breathtaking list of development projects in the city – a new airport, the Gwadar Free Zone, a 300-megawatt coal power plant, and a water desalination plant – none of these have been completed and what investment there has been has done little to create growth or an economy. Instead, stringent security measures strangle the local fishing industry, which once accounted for 70% of the local economy. The same security measures also sharply curtailed lucrative informal trading. Despite these security concerns, however, the city continues to import electricity from its neighbour, which regularly shuts down the supply under different pretexts of maintenance. A 300-megawatt power plant was to be built in Gwadar, but so far, the work has not started. The power shortage is arguably the biggest stumbling block for any meaningful development there.7

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Geopolitical Goals

Many analysts describe the Belt and Road Initiative as a way to simultaneously achieve China’s two geopolitical goals: broad strategic influence in the heart of Eurasia while subtly avoiding direct competition with the United States. Of course, some sources openly portray the Belt and Road Initiative as a response to US pressure, especially to the pressure imposed by the rebalancing of Asian policy under Barack Obama’s administration. Implementation of Belt and Road projects may face difficulties due to internal or regional instability, new security threats, and strategic balance by other major powers. Chinese sources, including Xi Jinping himself, portray the Belt and Road Initiative as a breakthrough within turmoil; in other words, a deteriorating security environment. (Wuthnow 2017) India’s answer to the Belt and Road

India has begun to view China’s commercial initiatives as a means to advance its strategic ambitions in ways that often are not conducive to India’s interests. Former Indian foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted in 2016 that the “interactive dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives – a universal proposition – is on particular display in our continent.”3 He went on to caution against countries using connectivity “as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.”4 The view that connectivity offers a set of tools to influence other countries’ foreign policy choices has become commonplace in analysis about the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI has garnered much attention, positive and negative, since its inception in 2013. It is one of the world’s biggest initiatives for promoting connectivity and providing funds to finance infrastructure development. In South Asia, the BRI underscores the growing Sino-Indian competition in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region (Baruah 2018). Ten years of the Belt and Road

Is the success of the BRI a win for China, or the world? Who then are the winners and losers? Although criticism is censored in China, the support for the BRI is not unanimous or universal. Parts of Chinese society are concerned about its impact on intensifying China-US competition (Cogan and Scott 2022), or wastefulness in the BRI’s investment and infrastructure. But the BRI has benefitted core political groups in China, including local governments investing in globalisation and growth, businesses expanding abroad with state financing, national agencies utilising BRI platforms, and scholarly communities gaining exposure, experience, and expertise in understanding the world.

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Outside China, BRI host countries, to varying extents, have received considerable investment, infrastructure, and loans (Ray and Simmons 2020). Even when projects have defaulted or been put on pause, host countries can learn valuable lessons and gain precious experience in infrastructure development and engagement with Chinese capital. However, the BRI is not a miracle. It cannot transform places not yet on the verge of taking off. Nor can it fully solve China’s challenges domestically and globally. Nevertheless, it has been an integral part of the global political economy over the past ten years and is likely to continue in the future (Ye 2022). Global trail of trouble

When the Belt and Road was first announced, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak welcomed the initiative, and China quickly became the top source of FDI in Malaysia. According to the World Bank, between 2010 and 2016, nearly $36 billion was pumped into Malaysia by Chinese state-owned firms. Multiple big ticket infrastructure projects – including the East Coast Rail Link project and a massive port city called Melaka Gateway – were started, Chinese firms bought up multiple Malaysian ports, and bonafide mega-projects, such as the $100 billion, 250,000-plus person Forest City, were built with Chinese direction and financial backing. Then came the problems. News of the Malaysia Development Berhad and other scandals8 connected with the prime minister came out, as it was discovered that over $7.5 billion of government money had disappeared. Via Belt and Road projects, China had a role in trying to help the embattled prime minister cover evidence of financial irregularities9 by artificially inflating the costs of infrastructure projects so the excess could be available for other uses. This favour came with a catch, however, as Malaysia was to give Chinese companies big stakes in national railway and pipeline projects and permission for the Chinese navy to use two Malaysian ports. This deal didn’t come to pass, but it yet again cast the Belt and Road in a dubious light. There are many other similar examples throughout the Belt and Road projects. Bangladesh shut down a highway project that was supposed to have been built by the China Harbour Engineering Company due to the company reputedly offering a Bangladeshi official a bribe,10 Chinese development funds were reportedly allocated for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ill-fated re-election campaign,11 Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE have been probed for wrongdoing in numerous BRI countries,12 and the US arrested the emissary of China’s CEFC Energy Company for illicit payments to officials in Chad and Uganda.13 A 2017 McKinsey survey found that between 60% and 80% of Chinese companies in Africa admitted to paying bribes,14 and, almost needless to say, in the latest Transparency International Bribe Payers Index, Chinese firms scored second-to-last.

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At this point, it is clear that the BRI does not keep good company. In addition to most Belt and Road countries having poor debt ratings, they also tend not to fare so well in international corruption indexes.15 According to the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix, ten Belt and Road countries were deemed to be among the countries most at risk to bribery. (Shepard 2020).16 Notes 1 Iran and China: The Necessities and Realities of Mutual Cooperation in New Global Confrontations. http://irdiplomacy​.ir​/fa ​/news​/2001428 2 ibid. 3 Comprehensive study of bilateral relations between Iran and China, Deputy of Political-Legal Research, Office: Political Studies. Research Center of The Islamic Consultative Assembly. China-Iran 25 years cooperation agreement. Available at: https://www​. china​ - briefing ​ . com ​ / news ​ / the ​ - china​ - iran ​ -25 ​ -year ​ - cooperation​ -agreement​-what​-is​-it​-and​-should​-regional​-investors​-traders​-pay​-attention/ 4 Comprehensive study of bilateral relations between Iran and China, Deputy of Political-Legal Research, Office: Political Studies. Research Center of The Islamic Consultative Assembly, ibid. 5 china​-briefing​.c​om. 6 Comprehensive study of bilateral relations between Iran and China, Deputy of Political-Legal Research, Office: Political Studies. Research Center of The Islamic Consultative Assembly, ibid. 7 https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/Spotlight ​/ The​-Big​- Story​/ Road​-to​-nowhere​- China​-s​-Belt​ -and​-Road​-Initiative​-at​-tipping​-point 8 Peterson, Hannah Ellis, The Guardian, ‘1MDB scandal explained: a tale of Malaysia's missing billions- Explainer’. July 28th, 2020 https://www​.theguardian​.com ​/world ​/ 2018​/oct ​/ 25​/1mdb​- scandal​- explained​-a​-tale​- of​-malaysias​-missing​-billions 9 Wright, Tom and Hope, Bradley, Wall Street Journal, ‘WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals.’ January 7th, 2019 https://www​.wsj​.com ​/articles​/ how​- china​-flexes​-its​-political​-muscle​-to​ -expand​-power​-overseas​-11546890449 10 AFP ‘Bangladesh blacklists Chinese construction firm, cancels highway deal after bribe claim’. January 18, 2018 https://www​.scmp​.com ​/news​/asia ​/south​-asia ​/article​/2129493​/ bangladesh​-blacklists​-chinese​-construction​-firm​-cancels​-highway 11 Abi-Habib, Maria, New York Times. ‘How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port’ June 25, 2018 https://www​.nytimes​.com ​/2018​/06​/25​/world ​/asia​/china​-sri​ -lanka​-port​.html 12 https://web​.archive​.org​/web​/ 20180918152420​/ https:​/smallbusiness​.house​.gov​/ uploadedfiles​/6​-27​-18​_ keiser​_testimony​.pdf 13 Meservey, Joshua. The Heritage Foundation. ‘Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines Beijing’s Rhetoric About Friendship with the Continent’ August 8, 2019 https://www​.heritage​.org ​/global​-politics​/report ​/chinese​- corruption​-africa​ -undermines​-beijings​-rhetoric​-about​-friendship​-the 14 Mckinsey Report, ‘Dance of the Lions and Dragons’, June 2017 https://www​ .africa​-newsroom​.com ​/files​/download ​/aa9f2979a3dc18e 15 Doig, Will. Foreign Policy Magazine. ‘The Belt and Road Initiative Is a Corruption Bonanza’. January 15, 2019 https://foreignpolicy​.com ​/2019​/01​/15​/ the​-belt​-and​-road​-initiative​-is​-a​- corruption​-bonanza/ 16 https://www​.traceinternational​.org ​/trace​-matrix

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References Amirahmadian, B. 2022. ‘Is Iran Left Behind by the Belt and Road Initiative?’ September 6, 2022. https://www​.khabaronline​.ir​/news​/ India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia’ Baruah, D.M. 2018, August 21. https://carnegieindia​.org ​/2018​/08​/21​/india​-s​ -answer​-to​-belt​-and​-road​-road​-map​-for​-south​-asia​-pub​-77071 Cogan, M.S. and Scott, P. 2022. ‘Imperial Overstretch: Has Xi Jinping’s China Gone Too Far?’ https://nationalinterest​.org​/feature​/imperial​-overstretch​-has​-xi​ -jinping​%E2​%80​%99s​- china​-gone​-too​-far​-202803 Ezrati, M. 2022. ‘China’s Vaunted Belt and Road Initiative Seems to Have Come A-Cropper.’ November 21, 2022, Leadership Strategy,‘Road-to-nowhere’. Mohsen, S. 2012. ‘Determinants of Iran-China Relations.’ Quarterly Journal of Foreign Relations, 4(2, Summer), pp. 179–210. Ray, R. and Simmons, B.A. 2020. ‘Tracking China’s Overseas Development Finance.’ https://www​.bu​. edu​/gdp​/ 2020​/ 12​/ 07​/ tracking​- chinas​- overseas​- development​ -finance/ Shepard, W. 2020. ‘How China’s Belt and Road Became a “Global Trail of Trouble”.’ https://www​.forbes​.com ​/sites ​/ wadeshepard ​/ 2020​/ 01​/ 29​/ how​- chinas​-belt​- and​ -road​-became​-a​-global​-trail​-of​-trouble/ Shipping Facts. https://www​.ics​-shipping​.org​/shipping​-fact Wuthnow, J. 2017. ‘Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications.’ Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (National Defense University), National Defense University Press. Min Ye, 2022. “Ten years of the belt and road: Reflections and recent trends.” https://www​.bu​.edu​/gdp​/ 2022​/ 09​/ 06​/ten​-years​- of​-the​-belt​-and​-road​-reflections​ -and​-recent​-trends/.

9 PROSPECTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF CHINA’S ROLE IN CENTRAL ASIA Case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Yunus Emre Gurbuz, Mehmet Yahya Çiçekli, Maksat Ajykan Uulu

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a growing economic power on the global scale, and, especially in Asia and Africa, China is playing an escalating role with its intensifying economic presence. The incumbent President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, announced as the centrepiece of China’s foreign policy the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (later “One Belt One Road” [OBOR] and recently the “Belt and Road Initiative” [BRI]) in the Kazakhstani capital Astana (now Nur-Sultan) in 2013 (China Daily 2013). Financing new land routes for transporting China’s export goods to the European market was a crucial part of this enthusiastic policy. As a newly risen superpower, China is trying to gain a stronger foothold in Central Asia, which presents the shortest land route from China to Europe. The excess fossil fuel reserves of Central Asia are also appealing and important for China’s huge energy demand. The aim of this study is to evaluate Central Asian perspectives regarding China’s future prospects in Central Asia, with particular reference to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It examines the prospects of change and continuity in the relationship between China and the Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the BRI, and contends that the BRI would not result in any significant increase in Chinese economic presence or investment in the region. It is argued that, although a radical growth of economic presence was expected in Central Asia following Central Asia’s centrality in China’s new foreign policy, there has not been an exponential growth in China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or export-import figures. If the BRI has not brought about an exponential growth, then the reasons that negatively impact the implementation of the BRI need to be estimated, which can be studied through news in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is argued that China will become a significant factor in the region only in the long term, with DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-12

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implementation of carefully planned soft-power policies. In order to determine the reasons for this, the problems and obstacles that China confronts in the region need to be defined. The answer for the future of China’s investments in Central Asia lies in the possibility of solving these problems in the face of recent global, regional, and national events between 2020 and 2022. Global events include: (1) COVID-19: In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had global effects ranging from increasing poverty and inequalities in health security to rising online marketing and online working, etc. (2) The RussiaUkraine conflict: In February 2022, tension between Russia and NATO (or the US and EU) over Ukraine escalated. On 21 February 2022 Russia recognised separatist Ukrainian territories with a Russian majority – the “Donetsk People's Republic” and the “Luhansk People's Republic.” On 24 February 2022, with a “Russian military operation,” a conflict in Ukraine began, which was expected to be short but turned into a war of attrition for Russia. The war brought sanctions against Russia, which is sometimes called the “New Cold War” (Smeltz 2022; Bremmer 2022; Smith 2022). The discussion about a “New Cold War” is not new, but there were different arguments about the “new evil” in global politics, whether it would be China or Russia (Ali 2022). With the conflict in Ukraine, Russia became the main antagonist for the West in the New Cold War. Regional events include: (1) The Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan: In May 2021, the US withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, and in August, the Taliban recaptured most of Afghanistan, including Kabul, re-establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which brought a potential threat of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. (2) Unrest in Kazakhstan and Russia’s intervention: Between 2 and 11 January 2022, Kazakhstan was shaken by widespread popular uprising, which was suppressed with the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) with member countries Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, but led by Russia, which was the first such operation of the CSTO during its 30 years of existence, although assistance had been demanded in the past by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (Pannier 2022). This operation was considered a sign of Russia’s revival as a big player in Central Asia. It predates Russia’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s intervention was criticised by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken as “one lesson of recent history is that once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave” (BBC News 2022). Russia (and the CSTO), however, left Kazakhstan very quickly on 13 January, when Russia’s move triggered fear in Central Asian republics among the rulers and the people. The Russian-led CSTO intervention started as a national incident but turned into an issue of regional anxiety. The Russo-Ukrainian War has changed the situation in Central Asia again by relieving Russian pressure in Central Asia (Kudaibergenova ,and Laruelle 2022: 13–14).

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National events include: (1) Protests, the change of president, and return to the presidential system in Kyrgyzstan: In October 2020, Kyrgyzstan witnessed another wave of protests against unfair parliamentary election. President Jeenbekov had to resign, Sadyr Japarov was elected as the new president and under his direction, the constitution was changed to increase the presidential power and end the parliamentary system of Constitution (2010). The parliamentary system was a unique example for Central Asia and even for most post-Soviet republics. If it was successful, it could raise the popular demand to shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system with division of power in other Central Asian republics as well, but it brought instability, with frequently changing coalition governments unable to solve deeper problems of the country. (2) Constitutional referendum in Kazakhstan on 5 June 2022: During the suppression of the January protests, President Tokayev consolidated his power against former President Nazarbayev. The constitutional referendum held on 5 June 2022 granted more power to the parliament, and it stripped former President Nazarbayev’s power. The main question of this study is how these national, regional, and global events will influence the role of China in Central Asia. Will there be a radical change in implementing the BRI in Central Asia or will there be a continuity unaffected (or less affected) by the changes? Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative was first announced as the “Silk Road Economic Belt” in the Kazakh capital Astana (now Nur-Sultan) on 7 September 2013 (China Daily 2013), which was later renamed the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR), when it was expanded by adding sea routes under “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” and shortened to BRI in 2016 (People’s Daily Online 2016). This initiative presents multiple trade routes, some of which pass through Central Asia, namely the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC) and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC). The BRI is based on the ancient Silk Road – as it was first announced by Xi Jingpin – but covers a wider area, with sea routes of “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and “the Polar Silk Road,” including the east coast of Africa, the whole of Asia, and Europe (China Daily 2013). The initiative is a long-term intercontinental and transcontinental policy and program, which involves investment for infrastructural development and economic integration of countries (BRI Belt and Road Initiative 2022). As mentioned above, it was first publicised in Kazakhstan, which displays the significance of Central Asia for the project. Shortly after, in October 2013, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was pronounced in Indonesia, and on 26 January 2018, the Polar Silk Road was added to the BRI.

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China’s economic presence in Central Asia

China’s economic presence in Central Asian countries can be studied through statistics of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), export and import volume, and, finally, debts in the examples of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. If China’s BRI is effective, there should be an exponential growth in economic figures, because of the centrality of Central Asia in China’s redefined foreign economic policies. China’s FDI began growing in Central Asia around 2005 and hit the one-billion-US-dollar mark in the middle of 2007. Between the beginning of 2007 and the end of 2008, the FDI tripled and climbed up to the two-billion-dollar mark. China’s FDI was almost nonexistent at the beginning of the 21st century, but a decade later, in 2010, it was already above three billion dollars (Umarov 2020). China’s FDI in Central Asia had increased between 2011 and 2019. Compared to the four-billion-US-dollars FDI of 2011, 2019 presents a more than three-fold increase, at 14 billion dollars. While such a ten billion dollar increase is nowhere near trivial, this does not mean a stable growth. 2015 and 2016 show lower FDIs compared to previous years. Also, 2019 is almost equal to the previous year, with a small decrease. Still, the average growth in China’s FDI is above one billion dollars annually. Among the five countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have the most stable FDI from China, while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have the highest increase. Kazakhstan received most of the FDI, receiving at least half the volume of Chinese FDI throughout the years. The only country in the region without a billion-dollar Chinese FDI is Turkmenistan, and it is also the only country not experiencing an increase in Chinese FDI (Lingzhi 2021). Although there has been a growth of China’s FDI in Central Asia, these tables indicate that the initiation of BRI in 2013 did not produce a radical shift in the investments. There are fluctuations in the tables suggesting that the rate of investments depended on relations with singular countries rather than a total plan about Central Asia. From 2011 to 2014, it rose and then declined, depending on the investment in Kazakhstan. From 2015 to 2019, it increased again with new investments mainly in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan, where the new President Mirziyoyev undertook a more open policy for FDI – and to a lesser degree Chinese projects financed in Tajikistan. China’s export to and import from Central Asia between 2011 and 2019

China’s export to Central Asia has risen by one-third, with a more than six-billion-US-dollar increase between 2011 and 2019, and climbed above $25 billion. During the last decade, China’s exports to Central Asia show a somewhat similar pattern to FDI, where Turkmenistan receives the lowest volume of exports, which has decreased over the years, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have the most stable exports from China. The

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only country in Central Asia with a somewhat stable growth in exports from China is Uzbekistan, and the highest proportional increase is also in exports to Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan has the highest volume of exports between 2011 and 2019, amounting to half of all of China’s exports to Central Asia. The value of China’s exports to Kazakhstan was below ten billion dollars in 2011 and shows a one-third increase by 2014, and in 2019, it was still similar to the amount in 2014 (Lingzhi 2021). Since China’s imports from Central Asia are mostly related to energy sources, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are energy importers, are almost nonexistent in China’s import figures. While there was a fluctuation during the period, both in 2011 and 2019, the amount of total value of imports was a little above the US$20-billion mark. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the sources of most of the imports, with a share above 90%, while Uzbekistan’s slice reached ten percent only in 2016. Kazakhstan’s portion – based mainly on petroleum – in the China’s import volume was decreased by more than a half over the years, and Turkmenistan’s share – based on natural gas – almost doubled, so that in 2011, imports from Kazakhstan were three times the amount of Turkmenistan’s, whereas in 2019, the two countries had almost the same value of imports (Lingzhi 2021). China had little trade turnover with Central Asian countries before the 2000s. It reached ten billion US dollars in 2005, with the $20 billion mark reached in 2007 and the $30 billion mark in 2008. Since then, it has never fallen from that threshold, except in 2009. The trade turnover reached the $40 billion mark in 2011 and reached an overall record of $50 billion in 2013. Export and import volumes were somewhat balanced throughout the years, except in 2008 and 2009, where China’s exports were more than double the value of imports. Trade turnover was always in favour of China, except a period of Central Asia’s surplus between 2011 and 2013 (Umarov 2020). China’s economic ties with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

The statistical data about China’s economic position in Central Asia shows that there are some problems in realising BRI’s economic influence in the region. In order to determine the obstacles China confronts, China’s two neighbors and contact points on the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC) and China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), namely Kazakhstan (NELBEC) and Kyrgyzstan (CCWAEC), will be analysed, but first the data on their economic relations should be examined. As stated above, China’s investments and exports to Kyrgyzstan are somewhat stable, while increasing at a small rate, with a lack of imports from Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan is the largest partner of China in the region in terms of trade volume and also China’s investments in the region.

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China has a visible position among Kyrgyzstan’s foreign investors, with a yearly proportion higher than 20% since 2012. The peak year for China’s investment is 2015, with an investment value of $470 million, followed by 2013, with $460 million, followed by 2018 and 2019, with around $340 million. The top years for China’s position among foreign investors are 2013 and 2017, with China’s share reaching 50% (Statista 2022). Offset of China’s economic presence at its focus: Kazakhstan

As stated above, Kazakhstan is the focus of China’s FDI, since Kazakhstan receives most of the FDI from China with a proportion among Central Asian countries that does not fall from at least half the volume of China’s FDI to the region. However, considering the size of foreign investments in Kazakhstan between 1993 and 2018, China ranks fourth, following the Netherlands, USA, and Switzerland (CABAR 2022). In 2021, China was even pushed to the fifth position by the Russian Federation. The Netherlands had the highest amount of investment at seven billion US dollars, and it was followed by the United States ($2.8 billion), Switzerland ($2.6 billion), and the Russian Federation ($1.9 billon). China closely follows Russia, with $1.8 billon. China’s share of FDI in Kazakhstan among these top-five countries is a little bit over ten percent, while it constitutes less than nine percent of total investment among the top ten, and even less among all foreign investors (Kapital 2022). Evaluation of China’s role in Central Asia by economic indicators

Economic indicators show that, while China’s economic presence grows globally, it is nowhere dominant in the region, and the growth rate is similar to previous years before the announcement of the BRI. There is no geometric (exponential) growth for Kyrgyzstan, and not even a stable increase for Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, China invested in infrastructure for pipeline and road construction, and until 2013, they were nearly completed. After the BRI, Kyrgyzstan became part of China’s economic expansion to the West through Central Asia, as in big projects in road construction, but without a significant growth of investment. China has become an economic partner of the region in the 2000s. China’s role in trade volume and foreign investment began rising in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. Fluctuation in trade volume and investment by China indicates a volatile presence. For example, after a peak in trade volume was reached in 2013, there was a 40% decrease in the following three years. Such volatility means that the stability of economic growth of China in the region is not reliable. Over the last fifteen-year period, China’s economic presence grew noticeably, but the BRI has not brought a change to economic trends and there is no dramatic change in growth after the BRI.

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China’s expansion to Central Asian markets grew following the investments in transport, energy, telecommunications infrastructure, and hydropower plants. In Kazakhstan, China invested in big pipeline projects, also roads were constructed connecting China to Kazakhstan. The Kazakh city of Khorgos was already operating as a dry port on the “New Eurasian Land Bridge” before the BRI. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, was not part of China’s infrastructural expansion to the West. After 2013, construction of roads and logistic centres became a priority for China, which are still under construction. It should be mentioned that these projects were supported by the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments as well. In recent years, China shifted its investments in Central Asia from infrastructural projects to manufacturing, diversifying China’s risks and helping it to take deeper roots in the economies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The obstacles preventing China’s expansion to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

China confronts a wide range of obstacles in the region, which most probably prevented China from playing a bigger role in Central Asia, specifically in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, there is a considerable Sinophobia among the people of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. News on protests against China or even attacks on Chinese citizens or businesses is not exceptional (Auyezov et al. 2019). These protests can be classified in two categories: against China’s investments and against policies towards the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Even before the growing Chinese presence and the Uyghur problem, there was strong Sinophobia in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Both people have negative memories with their eastern neighbour, resting on a long past, and they are alert about the possibility of a territorial expansion by China. The big demographic difference with China is also considered as a threat; they are afraid of being swallowed by the Chinese population. The past with China and demographic difference were potential threats for the peoples of both countries, which were stimulated by China’s investments bringing its own labour force from China. Now, growing number of Chinese workers, marriage with local women – although it is rare – and the settlement of some Chinese citizens are issues which are reflected in protests (Eurasinet 2019). These protests have the power to stop China’s investment. In 2019, China and Kazakhstan signed a big project for relocating 55 factories from China to Kazakhstan, which was supported by the Kazakh government in expectation of new jobs. However, it was cancelled as a result of widespread protests (Auyezov et al. 2019). The public anger against Chinese investments in Kyrgyzstan is also similar. According to the Oxus Society in Central Asia’s protest tracker, “603 protest activities occurred in Kyrgyzstan between

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2018 and 2020, with 10 percent focused on anti-Chinese sentiments and China’s mining operations in the nation” (Sheraliev 2021). In Kyrgyzstan, there were also attacks injuring Chinese citizens, which were protested by the ambassador of the PRC in Bishkek (China Daily 2013). Kyrgyz people neither trust the government nor China (Ocaklı et al. 2020). Again, similar to Kazakhstan, they are not reluctant about stopping big projects. Kyrgyz people are afraid of China’s “invasion,” because in 2001, the Kyrgyz state agreed to give a small plot of land to China under pressure. Chinese investors leased the land from the Kyrgyz state for 49 years, which was considered a land grab by the people (Shailoobek kyzy 2021). The second-biggest transportation project – after the Khorgos Gateway in Kazakhstan – connecting China through Central Asia on the Silk Road Economic Belt is the CCWAEC, starting in Kyrgyzstan. The CCWAEC is aimed to connect Kashgar (XUAR, China) with the Kyrgyz city of Osh. It does not only aim to construct an alternative route to the West, but it will also connect China with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Thus, it is vital for connecting China with the heart of Central Asia. The project also includes a free trade zone – similar to the Khorgos Gateway – on the Kyrgyz border of At-Bashy. The free trade zone in At-Bashy was abandoned after protests (Silk Road Briefing 2020). The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railroad was on the shelf for years, and it was even considered by some as a hopeless case (Saparov & Ibraimov 2021), although presidents of all three countries were positive about its construction (Osmonalieva 2021). Finally, on 20 May 2022, the president of Uzbekistan Mirziyoyev announced that construction would start in Autumn 2022 and defined it as “the biggest project in the whole history of independence” (Gazeta,uz 2022). On 20 May 2022, first at a cabinet meeting on the development of railway transport for 2022–2026, the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan Akylbek Japarov mentioned the construction, then Kyrgyz President Japarov declared that construction would start in 2023, “after completion of feasibility study” (Global Times 2022). There are still many problems to be solved, such as the differences of gauge between China and post-Soviet republics and the budget (van Leijen 2022), and also the route is a conflicting issue, as “China and Uzbekistan want a shorter and cheaper transit route to Europe and the Middle East, whereas Kyrgyzstan prefers a longer variant that will connect centers in the north and south of the country and boost its economy” (Saparov Ibraimov 2021). In addition to fear of a land grab, environmental problems and pollution brought by China’s investments is another source of concern (Ekaterina 2018). The Oxus Society in Central Asia reported that “23 anti-Chinese demonstrations out of 42 in the 2018–2020 period were caused by ecological concerns in Kyrgyzstan” (Sheraliev 2021). A Kyrgyz movie was made about pollution by a Chinese mining company, corruption, and protests.

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It was banned by the Kyrgyz state, but the director added it to YouTube for wider viewership (Imanaliyeva 2020). The protests “against China’s increasing influence and economic power” have been intensified with the “mass incarceration of members of indigenous Turkic-speaking communities in China’s Xinjiang region” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service 2021). China’s policies against the Uyghurs in XUAR triggered protests in many countries. China’s policy does not only target Uyghurs, but it is directed against other Muslim peoples, which consists of the diaspora of Kyrgyz and Kazakh peoples in XUAR as well. Consequently, Chinese “reeducation camps” for the Muslims also incarcerate members of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz diaspora in XUAR. Additionally, there is a sizeable diaspora of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A protest organised by the Uyghur diaspora for their relatives in XUAR is supported by the Kazakh and Kyrgyz protesters anxious for their kin in XUAR. The states, on the other hand, are very cautious about maintaining their diplomatic ties with their neighbour, China. They do not criticise China’s policies, and accuse protesters of “inciting ethnic hatred,” and arrest organisers (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service 2019). People’s reserved, cautious, and even anxious attitude is not limited to civil society. Governments of Central Asian countries have priorities of their own, and while consolidating economic relations with China helps these countries with an economic boost, the governments are wary about a dominant China. It is no surprise that Central Asian countries are not enthusiastic about a new superpower entrenching itself in the region. Their concern can be classified as follows: fear of a debt trap, creating jobs for their citizens, industrial capacity building, and diversification of investments. The last three are interconnected. The debt trap is a serious concern for the Kyrgyz Government. Just like many other beneficiary states of the BRI with weaker economies, Kyrgyzstan is already or almost in a debt trap. Half of Kyrgyzstan’s debt is to China, and out of a $4.2 billion debt to external creditors, Kyrgyzstan owes $1.8 billion to the Export-Import Bank of China (2020; Bartlett 2021). Kyrgyzstan is among the most fragile economies in the world with “Djibouti, Laos, Zambia and Kyrgyzstan [which] have debts to China equivalent to at least 20% of their annual GDP” (Wang 2022). Thus, the Kyrgyz state makes a great effort to postpone or restructure debt payments to China. Both President Jeenbekov and Japarov asked China for debt relief during the pandemic (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service 2020), requests which were met and brought a partial relief after the political upheaval of September 2020. However, Kyrgyzstan still suffers under the pressure of repayment “as China refuses to reduce debt” (Altynbayev 2021). Furthermore, as in the case other countries in debt traps, China’s debt relief demands an invitation to new projects. The debt of Kazakhstan to China, on

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the other hand, does not present a threat like it does to Kyrgyzstan, but still it is a concern for the people and was mentioned during anti-China protests (Umarov 2019). China’s loans became less attractive and less prevalent for both countries. Nevertheless, China’s banks also prefer “more conservative lending policies globally for infrastructure projects,” as they face critical problems of repayments (van der Kley & Yau 2021). Another problem for governments of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is that China’s investment in infrastructure does not create jobs but brings labour from China, and increases in Chinese immigrants provokes Sinophobia among the people. Additionally, both governments are in need of decreasing unemployment through China’s investments. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also demand diversification of investment. The shift of China’s investments from infrastructural projects to manufacturing in Central Asia corresponds to host countries’ demands for “industrial capacity building” (Umarov 2019). As a result of these demands, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – together with other Central Asian countries – pushed Chinese firms to localise by employing more local people and to diversify their investments. As it was mentioned in a report by Van der Kley and Yau, large-scale transport projects have been replaced by “industrial projects that seek to make value-added products that can be exported. These projects are increasingly staffed by Central Asians who receive technical training from Chinese firms,” but controversially, increasing the number of local workers by Chinese companies created negative public sentiments towards Chinese people well. Working under Chinese employers enhanced enmity. A common compliant of Kyrgyz workers is that they have to pay bribes to get jobs (Van der Kley and Yau 2021). There are also problems, setbacks, or obstacles on the Chinese side. These issues can be classified as corruption and bribery, avoiding Russian temperament, and their policy in XUAR. Van der Kley and Yau report that “[m] any Chinese firms in Central Asia are employing more locals. Yet the more closely integrated these Chinese firms become with the region’s economies, the more they must deal with, or be co-opted by, localized corruption and political fights” (Van der Kley and Yau 2021). Chinese companies complain about giving bribes to a multitude of local authorities at all levels, which is more overwhelming than pursuing inter-state diplomatic relations. The problem of corruption in the Khorgos Gateway, “the ‘buckle in Beijing’s global Belt and Road transport and infrastructure network,” had to be dealt with by the president of Kazakhstan, Tokaev, when it created a diplomatic problem with China. There is also a significant difference between the volumes of export-import for China and Kazakhstan as reported by the two states. In 2019, China declared the trade volume at $22.3 billion, while, according to Kazakhstan, it was $14.7 billion – a $7.6 billion difference. In 2020, China reported $21.4 billion, and Kazakhstan reported $15.7 billion

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($5.7 billion difference). In 2021 (except December), according to China, trade was $25.2 billion, whereas according to Kazakhstan, it was at $16.6 billion – a$8.6 billion difference. The difference of billions of dollars attested to a smuggling ring in Khorgos (Lillis 2022). Another obstacle, or rather a setback, for China is their concern about avoiding Russia’s influence. Central Asia is considered by Russia as its zone of influence, and China does not want to risk its relations with the supplier of some of its energy sources, its partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and an ally in a possible confrontation with the US. It should be added that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are also able to play the powers – Russia and China – against each other through multi-vector foreign policy. China’s Uyghur policy presents another problem for China in Central Asia; at least it prevents them from pursuing effective soft power policies. This policy can be evaluated as part of China’s long-term calculations on the BRI. China is focused, for now, on pacifying any potential threat of secessionist terror or even resistance to Chinese policies and creating a safe zone in XUAR for a stable flow of goods from China to the West. Concluding Remarks

China’s policies gained a new momentum in Central Asia with the introduction of the “One Belt One Road” initiative (BRI) under Xi Jinping’s presidency after 2013, when he redefined Central Asia as the main land-transit corridor for transferring China’s goods to European markets. Chinese investments in Central Asian markets seems to be in conformity with Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments, as they correspond to their needs of developing transportation and industrial infrastructure. Despite the fact that policymakers in all three countries are supportive of these investments that could lead to flourishing economic relations, economic parameters on investment and trade volume confirm that the growing global presence of China is not the dominant influence in Central Asia, although Central Asia has a crucial position on the Silk Road Economic Belt of the BRI. China could reach neither an exponential nor a steady arithmetic growth in Central Asia and fell beyond expectations, which is the result of a multitude of facts. Firstly, people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan strongly dislike China’s investments and policies, and they frequently protest China’s investments, increasing influence on their countries and China’s Uyghur policy. Additionally, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are able to push harder for more beneficial agreements, thanks to their multi-vector policies. Moreover, Chinese bureaucrats and investors are annoyed by problems they face in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

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The future of China’s relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will be defined by persisting inner factors and changing regional and global power games. Since 2020, significant events are taking place on the national, regional, and global level, which might lead to a redefinition of China’s position in Central Asia, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022), the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the return of Taliban, uprisings and political changes in Kazakhstan (the end of the Nazarbayev era) and Kyrgyzstan (the return to the presidential system), Russia’s intervention in Kazakhstan and revival as a bigger player in Central Asia, Russia’s attempt to gain a stronger position in world politics through its occupation of Ukraine, which is controversially turning it to the “new evil” in global politics. The main question in this study was about how national, regional, global events would influence the role of China in Central Asia. In order to understand the possibilities, the following arguments can be developed:

• There is a strong anti-Chinese sentiment rooted in the past and triggered by China’s expansion, which cannot be overcome in the near future.

• China’s policies towards the Uyghur minority might change in the near • • • •

• •

future, but negative memories will remain, as they have deep historical and social roots, which were reactivated. Debt policies have a very negative impact, and they should be softened, but Chinese banks have already given big amounts of money to be paid back. China is diversifying its investments and creating jobs, but their involvement with the local people and politics deteriorates their negative image even further. There are complaints on the Chinese side about corruption and bribery, which cannot be solved in the short term, as they have become so deeply embedded in the political, economic, social structure in the region. The position of Russia may change in coming years. After Russian intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, it was expected and feared by Central Asian governments and people that Russia would put more pressure on Central Asian governments. However, their invasion or “operation” in Ukraine is turning into a war of attrition. Russia will probably focus more on its integral stability and domestic economic problems after the Ukrainian war. China will respect Russian preoccupation with Central Asia less than before, as Russia – under sanctions – will look for stronger cooperation with China in a “New Cold War.” Central Asian governments will also probably rely more on China in the face of the aggressive Russian policies demonstrated in the Ukrainian War.

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• China will act more boldly in connecting to Central Asia after pacifying the Xinxiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Consequently, China can act more confidently in Central Asia, and its role in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can increase in this decade. However, it needs to be underlined that China will still be slowed down, because:

• Sinophobia is very strong in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. • Chinese entrepreneurs and banks will continue to experience problems with bribery and corruption.

• The government of Kyrgyzstan will continue to demand debt relief, as

they are not in a position to pay debts. Thus, Chinese banks will be giving fewer credits for investments in Kyrgyzstan, which will further deteriorate relations. • Russia can lose some of its might in Central Asia but not all of it. It is also possible that Russia might try to revive its position after the Ukrainian war as a regional power by increasing its pressure in Central Asia. As a result, most probably, China’s influence will grow in Central Asia because of global changes, but not radically, because of regional and national obstacles China will continue to confront in Central Asia. China can become a significant actor in the region only in the long term with the implementation of carefully planned soft power policies. References Ali, S. Mahmud (2022), The US-China-Russia Triangle: An Evolving Historiography. Cham: Springer Verlag. Altynbayev, Kanat (2021), “Kyrgyzstan at risk of losing national assets as China refuses to reduce debt”, Caravansarai, 19.03.2021, https://central​.asia​-news​ .com ​/en ​_GB ​/articles​/cnmi ​_ ca ​/features​/2021​/03​/19​/feature​- 01 (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Auyezov, Olzhas, Mikheyev, Pavel, Vaal, Tamara & Maclean, William (2019), “Dozens protest against Chinese influence in Kazakhstan”, Reuters, 04.09.2019, https://www​ .reuters​.com​/article​/us​-kazakhstan​- china​-protests​/dozens​-protest​-against​- chinese​ -influence​-in​-kazakhstan​-idUSKCN1VP1B0 (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Bartlett, Paul (2021a), “China offers cash-strapped Kyrgyzstan a glimmer of hope on debt”, Nikkei Asia, 03.12.2020, https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/ Politics​/ International​ -relations ​/China​- offers​- cash​- strapped​- Kyrgyzstan​- a​- glimmer​- of​-hope ​- on​- debt (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Bartlett, Paul (2021b), “Fresh off gold mine seizure, Kyrgyzstan president heads for Russia”, Nikkei Asia, 24.05.2021, https://asia​.nikkei​.com ​/ Politics​/ International​ -relations ​/ Fresh​- off​- gold​-mine ​- seizure ​- Kyrgyzstan​-president​-heads​-for​- Russia (last retrieved on 13.06.2022).

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BBC News (2022), “Kazakhstan unrest: Blinken questions Russian troop deployment”, 08.01.2022, https://www​.bbc​.com ​/news​/world​-asia​-59918004 (last retrieved on 09.06.2022). Bremmer, Ian (2022), “The New Cold War could soon heat up”, Foreign Affairs, 05.05.2022, https://www​.foreignaffairs​.com ​/articles​/russia​-fsu ​/2022​- 05​- 05​/new​ -cold​-war​- could​-soon​-heat (last retrieved on 09.06.2022). BRI Belt and Road Initiative (2022), “Belt and road initiative”, https://www​.beltroad​ -initiative​.com​/ belt​-and​-road/ (last retrieved on 10.06.2022). CABAR (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting) (2022), “Infographics: Why China invests in Kazakhstan?” https://cabar​.asia​/en​/infographics​-why​ -china​-invests​-in​-kazakhstan (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). China Daily (2013a), “18  Chinese workers injured in Kyrgyzstan clash”, 01.01.2013, http://www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn​/world​/2013​- 01​/10​/content​_16103803​.htm (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). China Daily (2013b), “President Xi proposes silk road economic belt”, 07.09.2013, https://www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn​/china​/201​3xiv​isit​cent​erasia​/2013​- 09​/07​/content​ _16951811​.htm (last retrieved on 08.06.2022). Eurasinet (2019), “Kyrgyzstan: Another week, another anti-China rally”, 17.01.2019, https://eurasianet​.org ​/ kyrgyzstan​-another​-week​-another​-anti​- china​ -rally (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Gazeta,uz (2022), “Stroitel'stvo zheleznoy dorogi Kitay-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan mogut nachat' osen'yu”, 21.05.2022, https://www​.gazeta​.uz​/ru​/2022​/05​/21​/ railway/ (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Global Times (2022), “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to start construction in 2023: Kyrgyz President tells local media”, 02.06.2022, https://www​.globaltimes​ .cn ​/page​/202206​/1267203​.shtml (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Imanaliyeva, Ayzirek (2020), “Kyrgyzstan: Drama about mining protests banned from cinema screens”, Eurasianet, 28.07.2020, https://eurasianet​.org ​/ kyrgyzstan​ -drama​-about​-mining​-protests​-banned​-from​- cinema​-screens. The movie is on the following YouTube link: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​= 63​_ sxMT2ezM (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Kapital (2022), “V 2021 godu obyem inostrannykh investitsiy v RK prevysil $23 mlrd”, 04.04.2022, https://kapital​.kz​/economic​/104293​/v​-2021​-godu​-ob​ -yem​-inostrannykh​-investitsiy​-v​-rk​-prevysil​-23​-mlrd​.html (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Khiradmand Sheraliev (2021), “Mining Kyrgyzstan: Chinese companies encounter increasing conflict”, The Diplomat, 29.11.2021, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​ /11​/mining​- kyrgyzstan​- chinese​- companies​- encounter​- increasing​- conflict/#:~​ :text​= Beijing​%20accounted​%20for​%20about​%20half​,percent​%20of​%20all​ %20Chinese​%20FDI (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Kudaibergenova, Diana T. & Laruelle, Marlene (2022), “Making sense of the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan: Failing legitimacy, culture of protests, and elite readjustments”, Post-Soviet Affairs. Lillis, Joanna (2022), “Kazakhstan promises to smash smuggling rings on Chinese border”, Eurasianet, 02.02.2022, https://eurasianet​.org ​/ kazakhstan​-promises​ -to​-smash​-smuggling​-rings​-on​- chinese​-border (last retrieved on 13.06.2022).

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Lingzhi, Zhang (2021), “Research on import and export trade based on China’s FDI to Central Asian countries”, International Journal of Innovation and Economics Development, 7(1): 7–15. Ocaklı, Beril, Krueger, Tobias & Niewöhner, Jörg (2020), “Shades of conflict in Kyrgyzstan: National actor perceptions and behaviour in mining”, International Journal of the Commons, 14(1): 191–207. Osmonalieva, Baktygul (2022), “President: China – Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan railroad is road of friendship”, 24​.​kg News Portal, 04.02.2022, https://24​.kg ​/ english ​/222921​_ President​_China_ ​_ Kyrgyzstan_-​_Uzbekistan ​_ railroad​_ is ​_ road​ _of​_ friendship/ (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Pannier, Bruce (2022), “How the intervention in Kazakhstan revitalized the Russianled CSTO”, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), https://policycommons​.net​ /artifacts ​/ 2273603​/ how​-the​-intervention​-in​-kazakhstan​-revitalized​-the​-russian​ -led​- csto​/3033430/. 09.06.2022. CID: 20.500.12592/zt19n7 (last retrieved on 09.06.2022). People’s Daily Online (2016), “Chronology of China’s belt and road initiative”, 24.06.2016. http://en​.people​.cn ​/n3​/2016​/0624​/c90883​-9077342​.html (last retrieved on 08.06.2022). People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), “President Xi Jinping delivers important speech and proposes to build a silk road economic belt with Central Asian countries”, 07.09.2013, https://www​.mfa​.gov​.cn​/ce​/cegy/​/eng​ /zgyw​/t1076334​.htm (last retrieved on 10.06.2022). Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service (2019), “Kyrgyzstan charges anti-China protester with inciting ethnic hatred”, 29.01.2019, https://www​ .rferl​.org ​/a ​/ kyrgyzstan​- charges​-anti​- china​-protester​-with​-inciting​- ethnic​-hatred​ /29739781​.html (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service (2020), “Kyrgyzstan asks China for debt relief amid economic strain of pandemic”, 15.04.2020, https:// www​.rferl​.org​/amp​/ kyrgyzstan​-jeenbekov​- china​- debt​-xi​- coronavirus​/30555118​ .html (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty's Kazakh Service (2021), “Anti-China protests staged across Kazakhstan; At least 20 detained”, 27.03.2021, https://www​.rferl​ .org ​/a ​/ kazakhstan​- china​-influence​-protests​/31172596​.html (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Saparov, Jalil & Ibraimov, Bakyt (2021), “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway remains uncertain”, Jalil Saparov, Bakyt Ibraimov, 13.01.2021, https://www​ .thethirdpole​.net ​/en ​/regional​- cooperation ​/china​-kyrgyzstan​-uzbekistan​-railway​ -remains​-uncertain/ (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Shailoobek Kyzy, Aizat (2021), “Is anti-Chinese sentiment in Kyrgyzstan strong enough to freeze a key Belt and Road Initiative project?”, Global Voices, 05.08.2021, https://globalvoices​.org​/2021​/08​/05​/is​-anti​- chinese​-sentiment​-in​ -kyrgyzstan​-strong​- enough​-to​-freeze​-a​-key​-belt​-and​-road​-initiative​-project/ (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Sheraliev, Khiradmand (2021), “Mining Kyrgyzstan: Chinese companies encounter increasing conflict”, The Diplomat, 29.11.2021, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2021​ /11​/mining​- kyrgyzstan​- chinese​- companies​- encounter​- increasing​- conflict/#:~​ :text​= Beijing​%20accounted​%20for​%20about​%20half​,percent​%20of​%20all​ %20Chinese​%20FDI (last retrieved on 12.06.2022).

Prospects of change of China’s role in Central Asia 171

Silk Road Briefing (2020), “Kyrgyzstan cancels China logistics super-hub investment after At-Bashy protests”, 28.02.2020, https://www​.silkroadbriefing​.com ​/news​ /2020​/02 ​/ 28​/ kyrgyzstan​- cancels​- china​-logistics​- super​-hub​-investment​-al​-bashy​ -protests/ (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Smeltz, Dina (2022), “Russians and Americans sense a new Cold War - April 2022”, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 09.06.2022, https://policycommons​.net​ /artifacts​/2431650​/russians​-and​-americans​-sense​-a​-new​- cold​-war​/3453242/ (last retrieved on 09.06.2022). . Smith, James F. (2022), “Are we entering another Cold War? Probably not—But it could be even worse”, Harvard Kennedy School, 08.03.2022, https://www​.hks​ .harvard​.edu ​/faculty​-research ​/policy​-topics​/international​-relations​- security​/are​ -we​- entering​-another​- cold​-war (last retrieved on 09.06.2022). Statista (2022), “Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China into Kyrgyzstan from 2010 to 2020”, https://www​.statista​.com ​/statistics​/1271965​/fdi​-inflow​-from​ -china​-into​-kyrgyzstan/ (last retrieved on 12.06.2022). Ulitina, Ekaterina (2018), ““Dzhunda” prevyshaet dopustimye normy po zagryazneniyu stoch nykh vod”, Vecherniy Bishkek, 18.09.2018, https://www​ .vb​. kg​/doc​/ 373533​_ djynda​_ prevyshaet​_ dopystimye​_ normy​_ po​_ zagriazneniu​ _stochnyh​_vod​.html (last retrieved on 14.06.2022). Umarov, Temur (2019), “What’s behind protests against China in Kazakhstan?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30.10.2019, https://carnegiemoscow​ .org ​/commentary​/80229 (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Umarov, Temur (2020), “China looms large in Central Asia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30.03.2020, https://carnegiemoscow​.org ​/commentary​ /81402 (last retrieved on 10.06.2022). Van der Kley, Dirk & Yau, Niva (2021), “How Central Asians pushed Chinese firms to localize”, Carnegie Endowment, 15.10.2021, https://carnegieendowment​.org​ /2021 ​/10 ​/15​/ how​- central​- asians​-pushed​- chinese ​- firms​- to ​-localize ​-pub ​- 85561 (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Van Leijen, Majorie (2022), “Is the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway route finally happening?”, Rail Freight, 06.06.2022, https://www​.railfreight​.com​ /beltandroad ​/ 2022 ​/ 06​/ 06​/ is​- the​- china​- kyrgyzstan​- uzbekistan​- railway​- route​ -finally​-happening/​?gdpr​=accept (last retrieved on 13.06.2022). Wang, Kai (2022), “China: Is it burdening poor countries with unsustainable debt?”, BBC, 06.01.2022, https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/59585507 (last retrieved on 11.06.2022).

10 THE ETHNIC DYNAMICS IN MYANMARCHINA STRATEGIC INTERESTS Implications for the region Soma Ghosal

The American National Security Strategy document brought out in October 2022 projects China as a “power harbouring the intention and the capacity to reshape the international order in favour of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.” In its approach to the Indo-Pacific region, on the other hand, the paper views the coup in Myanmar as a brutal military coup that has undermined regional stability. Both these views acquire significance in the context of China’s dynamic rise to power and its attempts at redefining the regional order in both Southeast Asia and, more recently, South Asia. China’s consistent strategic inroads into Myanmar is thus an important link in its grand connectivity strategy catapulting it to a sphere of dominance. China, since 1988, when Myanmar faced international isolation and sanctions, had sought to gain leeway with the military governments (the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and subsequently the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in the state by promptly recognising the junta’s legitimacy in state power. However, interestingly, the governments in Myanmar, despite their positional disadvantage in the international diplomatic arena, were reluctant to provide China an uncompromising leverage. Perhaps, they were more eager for a recognition from the West that prompted them to bargain between the West and China. This is a strategy that several scholars have identified as hedging, a foreign policy approach adopted by Southeast Asian states, at seeking maximum advantage from great power competition in the region, especially between the US and China. However, a reticent military junta attempting to continue in power through severe atrocities on its citizens, significantly hampered attempts at gaining acceptability with the Western nations in a sustained manner. As Myanmar increasingly manoeuvred towards China, the latter’s great power ambitions DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-13

The ethnic dynamics in Myanmar-China strategic interests 173

aimed at manipulating ethnic minorities, especially in resource-rich and strategically important zones of contact. China’s diplomacy, today, unambiguously assumes control over ethnic minority groups in conflict zones of border states as a key component in furthering its national interests. SinoMyanmar relations have gradually evolved on this very premise of managing ethnic minority groups, both by overt and covert means. Thus, China's balancing act in the case of Myanmar has been to manage the government of the day as also simultaneously engage with the ethnic groups to protect its investments in the state. Ethnic dynamics between China and Myanmar

The ethnic dynamics between China and Myanmar belong to the classic genre of shared borders and histories that have characterised the several states of South and Southeast Asia. Like India, China and Myanmar have a long border inhabited by ethnic groups having strong cross border kinship ties. It was not without a strategic forethought that the leadership of Burma and China embarked upon a shared relationship of friendship, termed pauk phaw, or fraternal relationship. The premise of such a shared friendship was laid down during U Nu’s visit to China in 1954 and an ensuing joint communiqué of the leaders of the two states. The premise was sought to be further consolidated during the agreement on peaceful coexistence in the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. Pauk phaw, or fraternal friendship, was reiterated once again by Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on an official state visit in 2019, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Myanmar diplomatic relations. China and Myanmar, further, pledged to strengthen communication and high-level exchanges, according to a meeting held between Myanmar’s State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi and Wang Yi.1 Wang had called for a comprehensive push forward to cooperation in areas including economy, trade, people-to-people, and cultural exchanges. This statement perhaps makes explicit China’s strategic overtures in Myanmar. A realpolitik interpretation of pauk phaw could be to deepen the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two states and jointly build a community of shared future, as Wang’s statement emphasised. China was willing to promote the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from concept and plan into substantial implementation and build it into a flagship program of joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) between the two countries. If Wang’s statement is considered a benchmark in China’s foreign policy framework, the ethnic configuration along China’s borders assumes a significant role in its strategic paradigm. A strategic cooperative partnership aimed at joint community benefits certainly envisages a peaceful and cooperative borderline.

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China and Myanmar in the new configuration

As the world witnessed violent repression against pro-democracy protesters in Myanmar by the military junta under the nomenclature of the State Administration Council, since the February coup, there had been severe protests from opposition political leaders, civil rights activists, and ordinary citizens holding placards displaying, “The Military Coup…Made in China.”2 The first anniversary of the February 2021 coup and the extremities of human rights violations that became symbolic of it, had prompted the special rapporteur of the UN, Tom Andrews, to incriminate the ruling military regime in Myanmar as “functioning as a criminal enterprise.” It is important to note that during such an international outrage and condemnation against the ruling configuration in Myanmar, China has steadfastly remained the beleaguered state’s dependable economic partner. In 2020, China’s investments in Myanmar ranged from the power sector to oil, gas, and other mining sectors. The power sector itself made up about 57% of investments, while the other sectors totalled up to about 18%.3 Several experts have termed the BRI infrastructure projects as the country's most significant source of investment and support for economic growth. Prior to Xi's visit to Myanmar in January 2020, one of the significant visits to China in 2019 had been that of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-inChief of Myanmar's armed forces. Min Aung Hlaing promised to help implement the BRI in Myanmar and make it a success. Despite the uncertainties in Myanmar’s domestic politics, it cannot be denied that China considers Myanmar a key player in its strategic planning. Myanmar’s significance for China holds out, as Myanmar is:

• A crucial partner in China’s access to the Bay of Bengal, especially for

its landlocked southwestern provinces, and a vital alternative to China’s connectivity through the Malacca Straits. • A key factor in the development of these regions of China, and reducing the disparity with its coastal areas. • A much-needed natural resource base and energy provider to China. • A vital link in China’s military strategy, providing access to the Indian Ocean. China shares a 2,170-kilometre border with Myanmar that hosts several cross-border tribes. Some of the tribes found on either side of the border are the Lisu, Lahu, Wa, and the Akha, Shan and Kachin tribes, corresponding respectively with the Hani, Dai, and Jingpo tribes on the Chinese side of the border. Han Chinese can be encountered on the Myanmar side, as there is also the Kokang, a Han clan, who had settled in Myanmar in the 17th century. The Kokang are ethnic Han Chinese and speak Mandarin. Shared language and identity facilitate the cross-border exchanges. The Kachins in

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Myanmar and the Jinpos in China are of the same ethnic stock. Similarly, the Wa are found on both sides of the border. In the event where China is concerned with the ethnic resistance spillovers from Myanmar affecting its greater economic interests, Myanmar also has its own concerns of inadvertent Chinese interference with the armed ethnic groups along the border. Myanmar’s friendship with China has not always followed a linear trajectory; there have been several moments of doubts on the closeness of ties, even during the junta regime, given China’s history of active support to the Communist Party of Burma (BCP). Several ethnic armed resistance groups in Burma are said to be the offshoots of the BCP, defying any allegiance to the government at the centre in Burma. However, as the political turmoil in Myanmar isolated it in the international forum, China was astute enough to seize the opportunity to further its economic interests in Myanmar. A closed economy worsened by international sanctions probably found a reprieve and a ready helping hand in its neighbour’s fast-growing economy. China’s strategic interests in Myanmar and the EAOs

Until the mid-1990s, the Kachin and Shan states were active battlegrounds with the Myanmar army. In recent times, the northern region has again seen intense fighting between the military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).4 Myanmar’s northern border is crucial to China’s political economic interests in the state. The key sectors of commercial interest in the region for China are:

• • • • •

Hydropower Fossil fuels Mines and rare earth Plantations Timber

Interestingly, official agreements notwithstanding, each of these sectors require the “active cooperation” of the ethnic organisations controlling the connectivity networks. If one looks up the enclaves of the civil andcorresponding armed organisations of the major ethnic groups on the map, one cannot overlook their overlap with the border economic cooperation zones. The Kachin state, for instance, has about eighteen hydropower or dam projects, the border economic zone, banana plantations, and rare earth. The Shan state also is the site for thirteen hydropower or dam projects, the Tigyit coal mine and power plant, and rubber plantations. The Sagaing state has two hydropower projects, the Monywa Letpadaung Copper mines, Monywa Sabetang and Kyisitaung copper mines, and two mining projects in the Chin state, while the Rakhine state holds the site for four hydropower projects, deep-sea port, and oil and gas pipeline. Among

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these are some of the crucial projects in Xi Jinping’s ambitious BRI. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port is perhaps the most publicised strategic partnership between China and Myanmar in the conflict-ravaged Rakhine state. The port providing China access to the Bay of Bengal and a checkpoint of the pipeline delivering natural oil and gas to China’s Kunming in the Yunnan province has an estimated investment of about $1.3 billion in the first phase. The Muse-Mandalay railway project, spanning about 431 kilometres and connecting Muse with Kyaukphyu, would pass through some of the armed conflict zones in the Shan state. Interestingly, the project is said to be a truncated version of the $20 billion Kyaukphyu Kunming railway project that had to be suspended due to protests from locals. The project had expired in 2014, yet the Muse Mandalay project had reignited suspicions of a revival of the original railway line. The China-Myanmar border economic cooperation zones are to be located in the Kachin and Shan states. The Myitsone dam, located in the Kachin state, with an estimated investment of $3.6 billion, but shelved due to widespread public outcry, still remains a key project for China’s hydroelectric demands. Prior to his visit to Myanmar, President Xi Jinping had expressed his intention behind the visit as obtaining a “result-oriented Belt and Road cooperation” and the need to move from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” of projects. 5 But the implementation has come at a cost. In the case of the Myitsone dam across the Irrawaddy river, there is a direct clash of interests with the Kachin Independence Organisation. Several civil society organisations in the Kachin state have long protested not only against the construction of the dam but also against the rampant banana plantations carried out by China. Though the hydropower project has apparently been scrapped, villagers displaced due to flooding have not been allowed to return to their homes and live in abysmal conditions in the substandard housing provided by China, deprived of their farmlands and sources of livelihood. A similar pattern can be seen in the Arakan state as well, where China is investing in two of its mot strategic projects. In 2019, a media report had reported on the enthusiasm expressed by the Arakan Army regarding the BRI projects in the Rakhine state. The very fact that Sino-Myanmar analysts in China speak of compromises and winwin solutions to challenges faced by several of the key BRI projects is perhaps indicative of the fact that China has not only successfully bargained with the military government but also is confident in negotiating with the ethnic armed groups. Myanmar, had, since a few years after independence, oscillated between one military government after another, interspersed with demands for and attempts at having a democratic government in place. The state has a unique hybrid civil-military power-sharing system in which the Senior General calls the shots. The clash of two power centres complicates decisionmaking. The

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National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) is the apex body controlling the three services and police. The constitution provides for 25% of the seats in the central, state, and regional legislatures reserved for the military. Making a constitutional change, which requires a two-thirds majority in both houses, is very difficult, if not impossible. Internal, defence, and border affairs ministries are reserved for the junta. The military has de facto control of politics, security, economy, wealth, and the Buddhist clergy.6 In these several years of domestic instability, the failure of successive governments to arrive at a permanent solution to the ethnic unrest in the state did not make things any easier. It was in this void of trust that China sought to emerge as the chief negotiator between the government of Myanmar and the ethnic insurgent groups. Though in the initial phases of China’s relationship with Myanmar, the leadership on either side took sincere steps to lead the friendship further, later phases, especially since the military coup in 1962, saw China’s attempts at skilful manoeuvring in its relations with the government in power. The key components of this manoeuvring ranged from a two-pronged or dual track strategy to a rapprochement with attempts at strengthening not only state-to-state relationships but also party-to-party relations. China’s negotiations with the ethnic insurgency movements in Myanmar while attempting to consolidate its economic interests can be said to have been influenced by these factors. When China seeks to protect its interests in Kyaukphyu, it covertly arms the Arakan Army while overtly providing military support to the junta to deal with the Arakan Army. China, it can be recalled, had been a major stakeholder in the October 2015 nationwide reconciliation with the ethnic rebels in the country. Though only eight ethnic groups had signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, with the more powerful groups abstaining from the process,7 this no doubt had a significant impact on China’s credibility as a peace negotiator. China’s economic inroads into Myanmar does follow a certain trajectory of interplay between the government in power and ruling elites and local communities and local institutions, depending upon their respective leverage in power concentric of the day. Since 1 February, China has reiterated its commitment to “support the country in pursuing a development path appropriate to its own national circumstances and Myanmar’s military in playing an appropriate role in and making a positive contribution to the process of transformation and development of the country.” This was somewhat a more restrained reaction to that of “jointly creating a China-Myanmar community with a shared destiny,” with the NLD in power. Min Aung Hlaing had, in turn, extended unconditional support to China by reiterating that Myanmar will remain committed to deepening the MyanmarChina friendship and strengthening of all-round cooperation with China, and will continue to support China’s position on issues related to Taiwan,

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Hong Kong and Xinjiang. China had declined to condemn the coup, while urging all parties in Myanmar to “resolve their differences.”8 For China’s weigh-and-measure policy amongst the different stakeholders, perhaps a military configuration would likely be a more favourable dispensation than the disparate power centres in a more democratic set-up in Myanmar. China has been aggressively following its BRI projects with fewer anticipated interference than before. The Kyaukphyu port project, for instance, spanning a total area of 4,300 acres and promising about 100,000 jobs for locals, is being vigorously pursued without the public consent. The project would likely affect the livelihoods of about 20,000 people, who would lose their farmlands. CITIC, China’s state-owned company, is developing the project in collaboration with the military. China’s attempts to renew the construction of the Myitsone dam, however, involves a shift from strong-armed strategy with the aid of the military to more vigorous public outreach programmes, where leaders of the Kachin Independence Organisation are sought to be educated and convinced regarding the benefits of dam construction with visits to dams in China. Further, donations were made to schools and civic organisations and peace suddenly became a priority (Han, 2017). The timber trade between China and Myanmar presented another classic case of China’s manoeuvring tactics. This is again a sector where definite data is hard to come by. In 2005, Myanmar and Chinese authorities had cut down on the illegal timber trade and imposed strict rules on logging and timber export activities, leading to a sizeable decrease in Myanmar products being imported overland between 2005 and 2008. However, illegal logging and export of timber, notably carried out by small-scale companies through bribery and corruption of local authorities or the bypassing of official check points, continued. These were the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) areas from where trucks loaded with teak logs passed through a purposely built road, bypassing the official Chinese border crossing. Loggers have built an extensive network of roads and bridges to penetrate further into the deep forests of northern Kachin State. Initially, when the ban was implemented in Yunnan in 1998, big companies had started to operate in Myanmar, especially in the Kachin State, with the connivance of the local Tatmadaw units and cease fire groups. Local authorities both in China and Myanmar have been somewhat reluctant to thoroughly implement restrictive measures taken at the central level, especially as alternative sources of income were not available. Such arrangements had enabled China to extract massive quantities of timber, gold, jade, and other resources from Kachin State. Myanmar officials had reported in The Myanmar Times that the largest losses to the state came from timber, gems, and minerals exports. According to a recent media report, Myanmar is emerging as a key source of rare earth minerals for domestic use as well as exports by China to the developed world.

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Illegal earth mining has surged in Myanmar’s Kachin State since the 2021 coup in areas along the border with China, controlled by a militia backed by the Myanmar military. Myanmar is China’s largest source of rare earth minerals, accounting for more than half of its supplies. Exports of rare earth minerals, which are used in smart phones, electric cars, and other high-tech products, have steadily increased. Myanmar exported more than 140,000 tonnes of rare earth deposits, worth more than $1 billion, between May 2017 and October 2021, said an official Chinese statement.9 China’s influence on some of the powerful rebel groups like the United Wa State Army, head of the Northern Alliance, cannot be overlooked. China may pressure EAOs to stop supporting pro-democracy forces and recognise the junta. But this will prove problematic. First, this turns a blind eye to the key driver of the current crisis — decades of military oppression and attacks on the population. The February 2021 coup has displaced more than 600,000 people. Second, the community in the conflict-ridden states have unequivocally rejected military rule, and turning to support the military will ultimately undermine the legitimacy of these armed organisations. Further, China is likely to find that increased support for the junta will simply consolidate anti-China sentiment, thereby putting its hundreds of billions of dollars of strategic investment at greater risk. By propping up an illegitimate regime, China further sets the stage for protracted conflict. Ethnic communities and China

One can identify three major tactics comprising China’s dealings with the ethnic communities in its economic pursuits:

• Strong-armed tactics with the active help of the military government, both at the centre and the local institutions.

• Outreach programmes with the overtures of a peaceful settlement where local communities take an upper hand. • The use of money power in the form of donations seeking to buy out local civil society groups.

One of the key factors influencing China’s strategy as a peace negotiator is to prevent the entry of any Western-funded peace process in its borders. China wants to be the dominant outside partner in any new ceasefire arrangement keeping international monitors and NGOs, especially from the West, outside its southwestern border. China’s strategic interests are coupled with new economic schemes aimed at securely tying Myanmar’s economy to China’s hinterland. China has defended its stance by arguing that it is playing the role of a responsible great power that the West has asked it to assume. China has also simultaneously used money power to engage the rebel groups in peace talks. Peace is a necessity for the smooth and steady border trade, as the 2015

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fighting in the Kokang region demonstrated that declaration of martial law and subsequent closure of many vital border crossings led to a decrease of trade through Muse. China’s trade and investments operate largely through state-owned companies actively pushed by China’s provincial governments. Though mega-projects that are a part of the BRI are openly advocated by the central leadership, several other investment projects, especially those in the mining and timber sector, are operated by local players. The “local players” include members of the local government and local businessmen on the Myanmar side and companies from China’s provinces like Yunnan. There have been repeated allegations of dire working conditions and scant considerations for any environmental impacts of the projects, especially mining projects. There have also been allegations that customary lands were sold without providing adequate compensation to the owners. Such dealings often avoid the knowledge of the central government and serve as lucrative deals between the Chinese companies, local government representatives, and unscrupulous businessmen. An opaque system makes it very difficult to trace the amount and beneficiaries of such rampant dealings. The military coup has only aggravated the situation, as any voice of dissent is brutally stifled. Perhaps, another alarming situation is a systematised breakdown of the local customary institutions that form the backbone of the ethnic regions in Myanmar. The influx of Chinese labour and other workers from outside the region not only change the demographic pattern but also hit out at those very institutions considered the essence of an ethnic community. Though it might be a political strategy of the military government at breaking up ethnic resistances, these are essentially short-term goals and may boomerang on the country’s social and political structure. However, the desire for lucrative deals is overwhelming, where a competing field has emerged between the military government in collaboration with China’s investment companies on the one hand, and ethnic armed organisations on the other. Early reticence notwithstanding, the junta in contemporary times has been eager to court Beijing’s favours. But though the junta is eager to break ground on the several infrastructure projects, it is equally important to recognise the challenges inherent to any form of large-scale infrastructure development in Myanmar, given the intensity of the civil war. While the military faces a complex web of armed ethnic groups in most of the zones of economic cooperation, rival EAOs in many of these regions, especially the northern and southern parts of Shan, are also battling for control and influence, particularly over key logistics corridors and lucrative mines. Though China’s conditionality for cooperation is said to have minimal overt conditions as compared to the West, prioritising its One China political agenda and active support for the BRI on the economic front, it will be interesting to note the strategy China adopts in dealing with the EAOs while maintaining the power balance with the government in Myanmar.

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India and China: Competing powers

China and its ambitious BRI seek to transform the global connectivity concept, while its geopolitical ambitions have been met with scepticism and criticism the world over. The United States has defined China as an aggressive economic power and regional players like India have been extremely wary of China’s attempts to tilt the region’s power balance. The geopolitics of South Asia has traditionally revolved around its borders, contiguous regions, often arbitrarily imposed and contested zones and cross-border ethnic ties. Traditionally, the border areas of South Asia have acquired the characteristics of isolation, limited development and perpetuation of regional inequalities. The Belt and Road Initiative of China has penetrated into these very impermeabilities. The major infrastructure projects in these regions, in the name of development, has envisioned unhindered communication links with the centre, even if they be at the cost of tumultuous environmental and demographic changes without any substantial economic benefit to the common people. Whether China’s strategic mileage has been a catalyst in prompting the increased focus on connectivity by its other big neighbour, India, is, however, questionable. The Look East and, subsequently, Act East policies of India, though, project a comprehensive policy on connectivity, encompassing land transport, maritime, and flight routes to augment commercial interests and achieve greater regional cooperation. The groundwork has started with implementing the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. There have been discussions on a possible extension of India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act East Policy (AEP) had sought to promote the “three C’s” – culture, commerce, and connectivity – through engagement at both bilateral and regional levels.10 The essence of AEP pivots around the ethnic communities on India’s borders, be it Moreh or Zokhawthar. India’s relations with the ethnic tribes of Myanmar is essentially a part of its border policy and has deep-rooted historical ties. Much of the border relationship between the two states is premised on the colonial perspective of the IndiaBurma frontier. Communication and commercial lines apart, the focus had been on the social and cultural mapping of the region by administrative (military) officers. Though the attempt was one of delimiting the territorial limits for administrative purposes, trade routes, and consequent mobility, across the frontiers was benevolently tolerated. The Inner Line conceived by the British was nothing more than an attempt to demarcate the administrative limits of the empire, yet was permeable in nature. The colonial frontiers were aimed at determining the routes of communications both inside and among state territories and were distinguished by their emphasis on cartographical specifications. However, comprehensive social and cultural

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mapping of the various administrative divisions were not left far behind. The census records, for instance, were the early markers of the social fabric in the colonial administrative units. The migratory tribes on the eastern frontier of British India that had once proved to be a major administrative challenge for the colonial administrators acquired the identity of cross-border tribes once India and Burma gained independence. Do ethnic groups matter?

India has had a long cordial relationship with Myanmar, but governments in India have also unequivocally voiced their solidarity for democracy movements in the state. This became very demonstrable during the late-1980s, when the government openly took an anti-SLORC stance and actively supported Aung San Suu Kyi’s pro-democracy movement. This was also a period when India’s northeast policy was acquiring a more dynamic form. The Mizoram Peace Accord was an important step towards bringing the Mizo rebels into the democratic fold. A similar peace agreement was implemented to end the long running Assam agitation. Such democratic measures with respect to the ethnic movements within its borders probably conditioned the Indian leadership’s attitude towards an autocratic government in its neighbourhood. Myanmar’s isolationist policy put its human rights record on the back burner. At one point in time, the junta concentrated only on suppressing ethnic separatist movements and pro-democracy movements in the state. The 1990s saw a complete shift in India’s policy towards Myanmar. In 1991, the Narasimha Rao government inaugurated the “Look East” policy as a launch pad for forging India’s closer ties with the ASEAN. Myanmar was viewed as the gateway to India’s engagement with the region. This was also a period when India opened up its border trade with Myanmar and new agreements were formulated encompassing greater cooperation on border security, the curbing of insurgency activities, and the narcotics trade. During the era of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s first Prime Minister, Vajpayee made several breaks from the past, instituting several autonomous councils in the region, setting up a separate ministry for development of northeastern region and earmarking ten percent of funds from each ministry for the region. In hindsight, some of these policies could have been better thought out, but the fact remains that Vajpayee was successful in signalling that the centre’s approach to the Northeast had changed. It was also a new invigorated relationship with Myanmar. By 2003, bilateral relations reached a new high when the SPDC Vice-Chairman and Army Chief, General Maung Aye, visited India in late-November with a high-level ministerial delegation. Their meetings resulted in the endorsement of cooperative measures covering matters related to border trade, investment, infrastructure, technology transfer, anti-narcotics operations, and security issues, and India offered

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a US$15 million line of credit for sourcing industrial and electrical equipment. Later on in the day, when Pranab Mukherjee became India’s defence minister, India’s approach towards Myanmar openly called for greater military cooperation between India and Myanmar. Myanmar, in turn, sought India’s assistance in upgrading its infrastructure and military facilities to enable it to suppress insurgent camps, both Indian and local, on its borders. India and Myanmar have sought to effectively manage the borders by periodically cracking down on insurgent movements in the region. However, the free movement regime that enables the ethnic tribes on either side of the border to carry out their normal livelihood routine has often proven to be a hindrance in border management practices. Since independence, the Indo-Myanmar border had maintained its permeability. Border trade had significantly improved with closer government-to-government (G2G) ties. India’s Act East policy aims to significantly improve the border trade with and through Myanmar. The concept of developing Zokhawthar as a trading centre in Mizoram aims to further achieve this policy. The ZokhawtharKalemyo road connecting India’s Mizoram with Central Myanmar seeks to bypass the insurgency-prone Sagaing division of Myanmar, as well as the states of Manipur and Nagaland in India, considered political hotbeds.11 The economic compulsions of India, though, have not as yet sought to alienate the border tribes, rather, often adopting a benign benevolence towards cross-border tribe movements and their indulgence in the informal trade sector. Crossing borders and border crossings

The Panglong Agreement signed on 12 February 1947, laid the basis for the relation between ethnic groups and the newly independent government in Burma. The aim of a Unified Burma had, in principle, agreed upon the autonomy of the frontier areas, whose citizens were entitled to such rights and privileges as regarded fundamental in democratic states. It is pertinent to mention that the agreement laid down that the financial assistance to the Kachin Hills and Chin Hills were to be maintained and a framework for financial autonomy was to be developed on the existing model of the Shan state in Burma. Seventy years later, the Union Day celebrations at Panglong were yet to see any tangible results on the ground, the NCA being a far reality. There was a unity amongst these dissenting voices that a solution to the problem was a necessity and it was imperative for the tatmadaw to stop atrocities on ethnic minorities. A young Kayin put it that the tatmadaw had to stop its offensives against ethnic groups with self-confidence. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was on record as having said that taking risks were essential to breaking free from the vicious circle of fear, hatred, and conflict. It is also interesting to note that these statements came at a time when Myanmar was

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looking towards development and the Chin state had acquired significance as one of the gateways propelling the momentum of trade and connectivity between the South and Southeast Asia. The Chin state is reported as one of Burma’s poorest states with a scanty population. The 2014 Census Report places the total population of the Chin state as 478,801 and the sex ratio as 92 males per 100 females. The total population of the Chin state is much below the national average, as well as the total population of other districts. The Sagaing district, for example, where another frontier town, Tamu, is located, has a total population of 5,325,347. The increase in population in the state has been very low. In 1973, the population of the state was 323,295, in 1983, 368,949, and in 2014, 478,801.12 The Chin Hills are very remote, with poor communication lines. Yet, despite the poverty and remoteness of the region, the Chins had been a party to the NCA. The state is a vital link in India’s connectivity to Southeast Asia. The $484 million Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project in India’s Look East Policy (LEP), may be seen as a catalyst in the economic transformation in the state. India has already completed the construction of a sea port and the inland water terminal in Sittwe, Rakhine state. The Sittwe port will be linked to Paletwa in Chin state via the Kaladan river. Paletwa will be further linked by road to Zorinpui, Mizoram, in northeast India. The road is currently still under construction. The economic momentum in the Chin state is under India’s observation. As Saurabh Kumar, Ambassador of India to Myanmar had put it, people were waiting for the Paletwa road to complete so they could supply to the Indian side.13 The new framework of connectivity had infused in the Chins a re-orientation towards development. The “Opportunities and Challenges for Local Business Development in Chin State” report issued by the Gender and Development Institute of Myanmar, had stated that Chin State had opportunities for investment essential for the state’s development. The Chins themselves were optimistic and many natives were not willing to accept the tag of a “poor state.” They were ready to project their state as a favoured investment and tourist destination and several websites sought to promote the same. Infrastructure development had acquired increased focus and the Chins aspired for a better education and a comfortable lifestyle. The lack of basic facilities in the state, poor infrastructure, lack of adequate electricity and employment opportunities had been the major challenges for the Chins. And this was where the contestations arose. The long spell of deprivation and the challenges faced in the form of absence of land rights and rights to natural resources had hit hard the tribal identity, collective survival, and development. The result had been migration – a sustained process – to greener pastures. The constant flow of the Chins back and forth into the neighbouring state of Mizoram in India had not been a welcome process. Though cultural and kinship ties exist, the access to resources became the major points of contestation. The 2014 census of

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Myanmar reported a high number of Chins living abroad, especially from the frontier areas. The Falam district data put Malaysia (8,032 members) as the most-favoured destination, followed by India (2,962 members). This was the recorded data but the daily cross-overs in the frontier zone usually go unreported. It is not just these points of contradiction alone; the connectivity itself has its internal spiralling effects. The multi-modal transport project is another point of contestation. There are underlying fears of displacement as the project progresses. There had been accusations that the local community had been unaware of the rites of passage of the highway. The civil society groups like the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO) and Chinland Natural Resources Watch had been campaigning for a balanced and sustainable development in the state. The February coup has delivered a sudden jolt to all the developmental processes in the state. The intensity of the conflicts had forced thousands to flee their homes and seek refuge in India’s northeast. Beginning in March 2021, refugees started to cross over from Myanmar into India’s northeastern states. Among the first wave were leaders of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), including organisers of anti-coup protests, striking civil servants, military and police defectors, teachers, and student activists. By April, as Myanmar’s military stepped up its attacks on civilians in Chin State and the Sagaing region, the number of people fleeing to India increased. Among them, reportedly, were members of the PDFs. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 22,000 refugees have entered India from Myanmar since February 2021, with an estimated 7,000 crossing into Manipur and Mizoram States in the second half of January 2022 alone. Tens of thousands more are looking to cross, but have been delayed due to COVID-19 lockdowns. The refugee inflows have generated significant tensions between district administrations in Manipur and Mizoram, and the centre. The kinship ties have been a strong factor in the humanitarian responses to the refugees across the border. In this state of turmoil, members of ethnic armed groups, fighting in tandem with the National Unity Government (NUG) and PDFs, have also sought refuge across the border in India’s northeast. Though the government of India seeks to prioritise its relationship with the government in Myanmar, be it the military government, the situation on the ground has increasingly become a challenge to tackle effectively. Also, it is needless to say that India’s connectivity projects have also suffered tremendously from this fallout. Conclusion

The government of India and the power circles in Myanmar had, for a long time, concentrated on one main agenda, tackling the counter-insurgencies at the border. The repeated border agreements had aimed at managing the

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border areas creating a peaceful front. However, this approach has been somewhat limited, given a tacit reluctance on the both sides to put an end to the countless cross-border flows that have created zones of insularity over time. So, one comes across ethnic tribes from across the border in Myanmar seeking better education, job opportunities, and healthcare in India, of course with valid documents. In a lighter vein, it can be said that, before the connectivity networks have ensured free flow of goods and services across the Indo-Myanmar border, they have started to function as channels enabling passage to greener pastures for the less-privileged and persecuted citizenry from across Myanmar. In a region defined by the aggressive diplomacy of China, where investment returns are the sole mantra, often at the cost of human lives and livelihoods, India’s approach may seem somewhat unfocused and skewed. But, it is equally important to remember that such a holistic approach has evolved over the decades and, given the difficult political trajectories across the bordering state and conflicting interests in the northeast, shown a sustainable peace, not only in the northeast but also with Myanmar, that had endured for several years now. There can be little comparison between the approaches of China and India towards Myanmar. The very basic point of difference is that India is a federal democracy where policymakers delicately trapeze the pulls and pressures of myriad points of interest. India, perhaps, could have aggressively sought to promote this federal democratic structure, rather than being reactive to its other big neighbour. It has to realise that the military government in Myanmar, fighting its own people, has little to deliver in both economic and security terms. The legitimisation of the military government by the leadership of China, probably, looks at short-term economic gains. India has long been a more acceptable partner than China, with people-to-people relationships taking the upper hand. India’s trade with Myanmar until 2014 had comprised chiefly of imports in food items like pulses and beans and rice, making up about US$486.85 million in terms of imports, while medical equipment stood at US$40.44 million. The exports from India were majorly from the pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment sectors, and totalled about US$301.42 million US dollars. On the other hand, China's main exports to Myanmar are complete sets of equipment, mechanical and electrical products, textiles, motorcycle accessories, and chemical products, and its imports from Myanmar are logs, sawed timber, agricultural products, and mineral products. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, total imports and exports between the two countries were only US$11 billion in 2004, but have reached nearly US$168 billion in the first 11 months of 2019. China has a total of about 520 existing projects, amounting to a total investment of US$18793.225 million, making it the second-largest foreign investor in Myanmar after Singapore. India, on the other hand, stands way behind, with a total investment of around

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US$631.933 million. These statistics make it amply clear that it is difficult, if not impossible, for India to compete on investment terms with China. But it still has had a diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China for a very long time. A soft-power approach with tangible investments in areas that can actually benefit the people and transform core capacities in administration and infrastructure, rather than exploiting the country’s natural resources to the last limit, is where India stands to gain in the long run. There can be two narratives to this approach. A humanitarian crisis on the Sino-Myanmar border wherein Kachins seek refuge within China in Yunnan, finds ambivalent responses, as hapless refugees are pushed back into uncertain terrain by authorities. There is very little access to data even today, as massive repressive measures are taken in the Kachin state. On the other, there is a steady inflow of refugees from across Chin State into Mizoram, with the Indian media flooded with reports on the humanitarian approach towards them. The government of Mizoram and major civil society organisations like the Young Mizo Association has extended their arms to their hapless brethren. There are, no doubt, serious security issues with illegal flows of arms and drugs across the border, especially in view of the conflict situation. However, despite these unwanted ancillaries, any connectivity project cannot be sustained if there is a lack of definite support from the people on the ground. A visit to Moreh in the recent past, was a revelation, when citizens on either side of the Indo-Myanmar border were interviewed regarding their anticipations on the Trilateral Highway. As the ordinary seller in his shop preferred to look the other way, representatives from the business guild made clear their apprehensions regarding any tangible benefits on the ground. This is where a democracy with a strong people-oriented approach can achieve sustainability and this is where India stands to gain. Notes 1 Myanmar’s State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi (R) meets with visiting Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Nay Pyi Taw 7 December 2019. 2 Reported in Frontier Burma, January 2021. 3 For further insights, refer to The Diplomat, 7 May 2019. 4 “China is Playing Peacemaker in Myanmar, but with an Ulterior Motive,” The Irrawaddy News, 18 April 2017 5 Sam Aung Moon, “As China’s Xi visits Myanmar, ethnic groups rue disrespectful' investment,” Reuters, 17 Jan 2020. 6 Chinese hold on Myanmar a concern for India, Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd), www​.tribuneindia​.com, Dec.14, 2020 7 Monish Tourangbam and Pawan Amin, “China’s Dynamic Grip on Myanmar: Beijing’s influence in Myanmar permeates multiple levels of engagement between the two neighbors.” The Diplomat, 7 May 2019. 8 For further references, see “China Pledges Support for Myanmar’s Junta, ‘No Matter How the Situation Changes,’” The Diplomat, 4 April 2022

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9 Myanmar’s jade and timber trade have been extensively reported by international press like Time, Al Jazeera, and Reuters. 10 See Amitendu Palit, “India’s Act East Policy and Implications for Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2016, pp. 81–92. http://www​.jstor​.com​/stable​ /26466920 accessed on 23 December 2022. 11 The Sagaing district, for example, where another frontier town, Tamu, is located, has a total population of 5,325,347. For further reading, refer to "Frontier towns in the spatial dynamics of trade,capital and conflict From Look East to Act East" by Soma Ghosal and Snehashish Mitra in Ranabir Samaddar and Anita Sengupta ed. Global Governance and India’s Northeast: Logistics, Infrastructure and Society, London, New Delhi, and New York:Routledge, 2019. 12 https://www​.dop​.gov​.mm ​/en ​/state​-region ​/chin 13 The Irrawaddy, Myanmar Plays a Role in New Delhi’s Two Major Foreign Policy Initiatives: Indian Ambassador 13 December 2019.

References Brattberg, E. and Feigenbaum, E.A. 2021. “Preface: China’s Impact on Strategic Regions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”. https:// carnegieendowment​.org, 2021/10/13 Han, E. 2017. “Geopolitics, Ethnic Politics Along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar”. Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS University of London, 2017. https://eprints​.soas​.ac​.uk ​/23597​/1​ /RR​_ Geopolitics​%2C​%20Ethnic​%20Conflicts​%20along​%20the​%20Border​ %2C​%20and​%20Chinese​%20Foreign​%20Policy​%20Changes​%20toward​ %20Myanmar​.pdf The article deals extensively with China’s dealings with the ethnic armed groups like those of the Kokang and Kachins in the Sino Myanmar relationship paradigm. Kudo, T. 2006. “Myanmar's Economic Relations with China: Can China Support the Myanmar Economy?” August 2006, https://www​.researchgate​.net​/publication​ /5141233 Mangshang, Y.B. and South, A. 2019. “China, India and Myitsone: The Power Game to Come”. Frontier, March 1, 2019. “OECD Investment Policy Reviews MYANMAR”. 2020. “Project Development & Facilitation Framework: Opportunities in Trade & Investment for India in CLMV Countries”. EXIM BANK April 2015. Singh, Y. 2007. “India’s Myanmar Policy: A Dilemma Between Realism and Idealism”. IPCS Special Report, 37, March 2007. Than, T.M.M. 2001. “MYANMAR (BURMA) IN 2000 More of the Same?” Asian Survey, 41/1: 148–155. https://www​.jstor​.org​/stable​/10​.1525​/as​. 2001​.41​.1​.148 Yoshikawa, S. 2022. “China’s Policy Towards Myanmar: Yunnan’s Commitment to Sino-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines and Border Economic Cooperation Zone”. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 11/1: 143–161. Zhao, H. 2015. “China And India: Competing For Good Relations With Myanmar”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 22/1: 175–194.

PART IV

Negotiating narratives of maritime neighbourhoods



11 SECURITY NARRATIVES OF CHINA’S IMPINGEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THEATRE Anindya Jyoti Majumdar

The first decades of the 21st century have been turbulent in terms of varied security challenges, and the trend continues. Factors that contribute to instability in international politics include both conventional threats and unconventional ones. While problems of both kinds erupted intermittently, there had been a constant source of common apprehension essentially focusing upon the increasing assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy. As Xi Jinping came to power, replacing Hu Jintao, and consolidated his hold over the party, his vision of “making China great again” as a strong country with world-class forces – in other words, the “Chinese Dream” – became a priority goal for the state. This calls for an expansion of China’s maritime and overseas interests. As a result of growing economic engagements, more Chinese citizens, officials, and enterprises now operate overseas and China’s economy has become dependent on resource inputs and trade (Erikson 2019). Although, as Erickson points out, Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, in its huge scope and scale, “risks modern-day versions of imperial management challenges and overreach,” in his opinion, “competitive coexistence” could be a preferred policy option for others (Erikson, ibid.). Be that as it may, the Chinese vision and the strategies to achieve its goals have forced others to interact in contested spaces and one such crucial contested space is the Indian Ocean region, where another “emerging” power, India, finds Chinese forays to be directly against its security interests and policy priorities. Unresolved land border disputes that have marred India-China relations for decades further acerbate India’s discomfort with the Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean region. States assess evolving conditions and respond to those by formulating policies, strategies, and tactics, and out of these interactions emerge narratives. DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-15

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Appeal of the narratives is perennial and much of the present perception of changing international power politics is based on such narratives. This paper briefly explores the dominant narratives pertaining to the security scenario in the Indian Ocean region and seeks to find the relations between the narratives and policy. It needs to be remembered that the narratives that emerge are debated and contested before some of the lead narratives secure wide acceptance. Formulation of narratives

As mentioned above, geopolitical narratives arise out of state behaviour and the responses of major actors to he ever-changing environment of international relations at particular junctures of history. Apart from the responses of states in the form of policy or strategy, the attempts to understand, explain, interpret, and theorise the consequent patterns of international politics by the scholars in the field, the media, including social media, shape and modify these narratives. A narrative can be defined as a way of establishing interlinkages among events in order to present a unique account of trends that is attractive and easy to understand, often invoking emotional attachment. Lessons from the past teach us that, instead of brutal pursuit of national interests, a tolerant pursuit of interests is more suitable in the contemporary world that takes into account issues of common concerns. Mutual gains, advantages, and benefits help all states to prosper and, towards that end, collective and collaborative actions are often prescribed. Nevertheless, while durable peace, deep and intense cooperation, and rule-based order are immensely desirable, states, by applying national goal-oriented strategies, usually make them highly improbable. As Jaishankar puts it, not idealism but enlightened self-interest is at work now.1 The objectives and application of policies help develop narratives that usually provoke the formulation of counter-narratives. Geopolitical narratives fashioned to justify policies may lead to assertive diplomacy and can at times also be counter-productive, as security-centric competition ensues among the major actors with competitive narratives. Unlike strategies and official doctrines, narratives are often unofficial, presented by think tanks or individuals, who may or may not be working in tandem with the official line. Perception of motives and interpretation of policies thus formulate security narratives often highlighted with a fanciful or catchy phrase inspiring popular imagination. While the policies and the attempts to understand policies shape narratives, the narratives themselves can influence the policies of the states in turn. Foreign and security policies of states are justified within the folds of largely acceptable and dominant narratives and these narratives are often accepted as the trends that shape and guide foreign policy choices. Foreign

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and security policies of states have to consider the time dimension, i.e. over time the political environment changes, necessitating change in responses and the place dimension, i.e. at different points, certain areas become strategically significant or prioritised and become the focus of great power politics. Such shifts require a suitable narrative to support policies. It may be said that Narratives constructed and used by policy-makers in pursuit of national interests lead to imaginative geographies affirming particular political perspectives and legitimizing foreign policy decisions. The interplay of imagined spaces and imposed identities, changing perceptions of emerging geopolitical realities and the continuous attempts to construct and tag new regions suitable to the preferences of the major powers of the day determine the probabilities of conflicts and feasibility of durable peace. (Majumdar and Bose 2021) A narrative can be deliberately created with a specific motive or can itself evolve into one. In the post-Cold War period, a major narrative has been of “Rising China.” In spite of many other challenges that the world faced during the last three decades – ranging from international terrorism and war on terror, climate change, ethnic conflicts and refugee flow, to pandemics and the war in Ukraine, just to name a few – the “Rising China” narrative has always been at centre-stage, as China sought to expand its economic spheres of influence and concomitantly, flexed its military muscles. It reinvigorates the classic Thucydides Trap. As described by Graham Allison in his book Destined for War, a tendency to conflict and war becomes inevitable when an emerging power threatens to dislodge an existing great power as a regional or global hegemon. Instead of rising power Athens, read China, and the dominant power Sparta, read the US at the global level (Allison 2017). However, in an oligo-polar set up (usually described as multipolar), adjustments in power equations become necessary for other major actors – for example, India, Japan, Australia, and the like. Asia is a combination of multiple security complexes and there is hardly any common pattern that may define the Asian security structure. The established geographical regions are East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia, with their own and disparate security issues demanding unique treatment in each case. It is interesting to note that China alone shares its borders with four of the regions and is not very far from the fifth, i.e. West Asia. Asian security issues therefore involve China to a significant extent and a convergence of interests among like-minded nations along the Chinese border remains a possibility. China is at the core of the continental-maritime Asia and is virtually the “heartland” of Asia. Following the traditional geopolitical understanding, the “heartland” eventually battles it

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out with predominantly maritime states at its rims for dominance over world affairs. The “heartland” seeks to expand its influence beyond its borders by having access to oceans and seas – in the contemporary period, one may hint at the Chinese connectivity projects. In this type of narrative, India and Japan stand out to be the frontline states in the rimland to resist Chinese expansion. China can only be a superpower by subduing both India and Japan – the two other worthwhile competitors to China in Asia. Security in South Asia has been India-centric for long, but China’s rise and penetration into the subcontinent has made the security considerations transregional. By the turn of the century, a pet theme of debate was the possibility of China dominating Asia, leaving the US out of the region. To counter this attempt, it was necessary for the US to reinforce its presence in Asia and strengthen its bonds with the existing and new allies. However, there was clearly visible difference between approaches adopted by the Democrats and the Republicans in the US. The former recognised an arrangement with China was an American necessity and therefore, for them, engagement with China was a better option than containment of China. For the Republicans, as Richard Armitage, Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser to President George W. Bush observed in 2000, America’s most important strategic relationship should be with Japan and this needed to be nurtured and restored.2 With time, keeping pace with China’s increasingly assertive attitude, the US tilted in favour of expanding ties with countries in Asia focusing on the values of liberal democracy as common standards. The post-Cold War new world order narratives, therefore, emanating from the West and predominantly from the US scholarship, upheld the liberal democratic values as the hallmark of any such world order narrative and have painted China as the system challenger. As a result, China is viewed as a revisionist state with a nonliberal political system and values, working its way towards an eventual power shift. This presupposes the need for existing actors to step up with renewed commitment to the betterment of the liberal world order and reset the democratic forces in motion. In the evolution of Western narratives, one may appreciate how the dominant narrative began to take shape in the early years of this century that presupposed a contest between a group of democratic countries vs. authoritarian regimes, symbolised especially by China and Russia. A number of scholars used terms like “Concert of Democracies” (Lindsay 2008) or “Federation of Democracies” (John Davenport). The prime minister of the UK, Boris Johnson, advocated the idea of the D-10 (G7 countries plus South Korea, Australia, India) basically as an arrangement against authoritarian powers. The US President Joe Biden convened in December 2021 a summit for democracy attended by over 100 countries. China and Russia were not invited and they charged that this attempt reflected Cold War mentality destined to create ideological confrontation and a rift in the world.

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These narratives included India as an important member of such a League of Democracies. Consequently, India, the Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific became crucial strategic theatres in terms of the time and place dimension of foreign and security policy, providing India with opportunities to derive advantage out of the existing situation. Basically, such geopolitical narratives that create imagined geographical spaces (like the Indo-Pacific) and impose particular identities (like the revisionist China) provide the foundation upon which the policies are formulated. To achieve policy goals, strategies are applied and in turn, various tactics are followed to achieve the goals of strategy. China in the Indian Ocean: Narratives in abundance

The expanse of China’s maritime silk route (as a component of Belt and Road Initiative) and its strategic implications, its search for overseas military bases with Djibouti as one; its interest in protecting supply lines for commercial and military interests to Africa, West Asia, and beyond; movements of submarines; the modernisation of its navy with warships capable of operating in the Indian Ocean – all contribute to much uneasiness in India-China relations (Majumdar 2020). Along with the vision of the leadership – Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” – aspiring to be a dominant power in the world and its assertive “wolf warrior” diplomacy have contributed to the construction of security narratives for the Indian Ocean. Wolf warrior diplomacy, named after two patriotic blockbuster movies, “describes offensives by Chinese diplomat to defend China’s national interests, often in confrontational ways” and is reflected in Chinese combative words and aggressive actions, says Zhiqun Zhu; however, it hurts China’s foreign policy, as it generates pushback(Zhu 2020). Narratives may gradually consolidate into axioms. Long ago, Panikkar wrote, “A true appreciation of India’s historical forces will show beyond doubt that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at its mercy” (Panikkar 1971). However, India’s “maritime awakening” happened much later. As Arun Prakash argues, the phenomenon of globalisation that brought India into the mainstream of the global economy, rampant piracy, the exposure of coastal areas as corridors of terror strikes, and the “spectre” of the growing Chinese Navy played the most crucial roles, along with the international outreach of the Indian Navy to its counterparts (Prakash 2020). As the “maritime awakening” takes place, Panikkar’s warnings acquire greater significance in the contemporary period. China’s penetration into South Asia and greater forays into the Indian Ocean provoked counter-measures and counter-narratives from India. The pattern of Chinese moves became quite apparent over time: China lures vulnerable countries with generous infrastructural loans, but as the recipients

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fail to pay back, China starts using the countries for its geostrategic interests. Such a policy has attracted interesting sobriquets. As China began to issue huge loans towards the countries, initially it was termed “chequebook diplomacy,” highlighting China’s formidable economic strength, which was much softer in tone compared to “debt-trap diplomacy,” when the world witnessed the state of defenceless recipients of Chinese loans reeling under China’s diktats as a consequence. The terms that have been used to describe a particular brand of foreign policy captured the imagination of people and helped develop a particular brand of narrative cutting into China’s image. A line of thinking however maintains that such debts will hardly be repaid and, though they look grand and buy friends, over time they add to the strain of China’s finances (Khan 2018). Still, one cannot deny the fact that in 2022, the Quad countries have resolved to invest $50 billion on infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region, followed by similar initiative launched by G7 countries to mobilise nearly $600 billion by 2027 under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, ostensibly to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. These policies stem from Joe Biden’s 2021 plan of “Build Back Better World” (B3W) – clearly a value-laden term. In the very first decade of the century, an astoundingly popular security narrative that emerged was that of the encirclement of India by China. The supposed plan was branded as the “String of Pearls” strategy and generated much interest among the China watchers. In 2005, a study by Booz Allen Hamilton was published in the Washington Times. China’s quest for a network of naval bases in the Indian Ocean (or a “String of Pearls”) was viewed as “the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernise military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf” (Pehrson 2006). It was soon interpreted as an example of China’s naval ascent concomitant with the Rising China theme, aimed at reducing American influence in vast parts of Asia. It was presumed, as mentioned earlier, that China’s aim of a unipolar Asia required subjugation of India and Japan, two other strong Asian powers. The “String of Pearls” was viewed by the Indian scholarship more as an attempt by China to encircle India and thereby to restrain India’s sphere of activity. This was projected as a threat to the freedom of navigation by extrapolation of Chinese activities in the South China Sea. China’s access to and investments in developing ports like Sittwe and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar in Pakistan had a clear geopolitical semblance to a possible naval encirclement strategy. China, however, maintained that the so-called “String of Pearls” construct was nothing but a distortion of their regular economic engagements. At the same time, the metaphor is used to explain the “need-based” relations between China on

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the one hand and a recipient of Chinese largesse: “pearl requires string and vice versa for a garland” says Manoharan (Manoharan 2022). However, by 2000, India was itself convinced that its legitimate area of interest stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and its naval expansion plan predates the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy of China. In 2004, Indian Maritime Doctrine endorsed this point. The Chinese scheme at best introduced urgency to the already-existing plan and greater need for precaution. In a response from the Indian side, the conception of the “Necklace of Diamonds” made its debut as a non-official incoherent counter-move in 2011. The phrase is credited to India’s former foreign secretary Lalit Mansingh. It was more of an idea than a strategy, but the spirit of the response was perhaps a greater encirclement of China by close cooperation with the navies of the East and Southeast Asian states – not by forming an alliance or acquiring naval bases, but by making arrangements of port access, fuelling facilities, and establishing a regular contact through joint naval exercises deepening defence ties. India has ensured access to the Changi Port in Singapore, Sabang Port in Indonesia, Duqm Port in Oman, Chabahar Port in Iran – but more than encirclement, the focus is on strengthening strategic cooperation and preventive counter-measures. In fact, a crescent from Chabahar in Iran on the west to Okinawa in Japan on the east looks like a geostrategic encirclement. India has concluded important treaties with the US for operational coordination (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA))3 and India has built up naval posts and listening posts in the Maldives, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. Naval exercises like the Milan and the Malabar have become a regular feature. However, here too, the idea of the encirclement of China is not endorsed in the Indian Government’s official documents. The Narendra Modi Administration announced the initiative of Project Mausam in 2014. It is again assumed that Project Mausam’s objective is to counter the increasing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region. However, India has identified 39 countries, including China and Pakistan, to be brought on board the project. Project Mausam plans to re-establish India’s ties with its ancient trade partners in the Indian Ocean Region stretching from East Africa to Southeast Asia. Another idea came in 2015 in addition, of Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) in the Indian Ocean, as advocated by the prime minister. This led to Mission SAGAR of the Indian Navy towards fulfilling the goals of economic and security cooperation. We may say that neither the “String of Pearls” nor the “Necklace of Diamonds” are officially endorsed strategies of China or India. These are constructs based on the activities of the States, concerned with connecting various policies and responses together towards providing an overarching

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explanation of the pattern of relations between two aspiring states with the conviction that eventually confrontation would dominate their relations. The constructs or narratives provide a context that justifies the policies of the states involved as logical and appropriate. And new narratives bolster the main theme of the story. The Far Eastern Naval Command of Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a tri-service strategic command provides an all-encompassing defence not only in case of attacks by any adversary, but to prevent acts of terrorism and piracy and conduct effective monitoring of the region. Here comes the narrative of the “Iron Curtain.” Naval analyst Zhang Ming proclaimed that the islands of India’s Andaman and Nicobar archipelago could be used as a “metal chain” to block Chinese access to the Strait of Malacca. In other words, India is building an “Iron Curtain” in the Indian Ocean (Rai 2009). The phrase itself, though used more in a strategic sense than political, brings back memories of the Cold War, when the division between the West and the Eastern blocs in Europe was amplified by Winston Churchill with the same analogy. Taking recourse to past to explain the present is not a new phenomenon. Holmes and Yoshihara refer to India’s own “Monroe Doctrine” and talk about a “constable policy” of benign dominance, including efforts to “police the nation’s oceanic environs.” Such a policy accompanied by naval build-up could be seen as an effort to contain China and a countervailing build-up would become China’s viable option ( Holmes and Yoshihara 2009). Before these narratives lost steam, the macro-geopolitical zone of IndoPacific was construed as an emerging theatre of contest and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue began. While this dialogue (better known as the Quad) saw its ups and downs, it gradually turned into a platform for the US, Australia, Japan, and India to consolidate cooperation against possible security challenges in the region. Yet again, a Cold War analogy was revived. While the Cold War military alliance led by the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), continues to function and its continued expansion creates international crises (as in Ukraine), the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attacked the US policy and emphasised that the US was seeking to create an “Asian NATO” to suppress Beijing’s rise. He said that the US is staging a “five-four-three-two” posture: where “five” refers to the Five Eyes, “four” refers to the Quad, “three” refers to the AUKUS, and “two” refers to bilateral military alliances.4 However, the Quad as the “Asian NATO” narrative lost its significance as India’s recalcitrant attitude towards a military alliance made it a multifunctional platform. The Quad has acquired a new character – it is a platform for cooperation on three urgent global challenges: the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, and vaccine development as a response, climate change, and future technologies. In fact, the establishment of AUKUS – a trilateral security pact among Australia, UK,

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and US in 2021 to act as a deterrence arrangement against possible Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region – could be construed as an attempt to bring in place a military alliance in view of the uncertainties with the Quad. Nevertheless, the narrative of the “Asian NATO” persists and the assumption is that, if the situation so demands, the Quad could very well turn into a military alliance, with other states joining in. Policy and narratives

While exploring into narratives, one can surmise that, though a lot of assumptions go into the making of a narrative, still, over time, narratives tend to illustrate at least three major characteristics. (1) A narrative is not a policy, but can serve to achieve policy goals. In the contemporary world, a matrix of complex relations among states comes to the fore where clear divisions between the friends and foes are nonexistent. Under the circumstances, states ordinarily have reservations to commit themselves entirely to provocative postures until a challenge is interpreted as an existential threat. If we try to locate the trends in India’s foreign and security policy, in the post-Cold War oligo-polar world, we notice a shift to multi-alignment (more appropriately, multi-engagement), attempts for membership in multilateral institutions; management of strategic partnerships with multiple states in multiple issue areas, and, according to Ian Hall, normative hedging – avoiding commitment to any particular normative agenda – Western or otherwise (Hall 2016). The narratives of “Emerging India” (sometimes as “swing power,” but at the end of the day, a liberal democratic state with a non-provocative security culture) help India to engage and deepen ties with the West without unduly jeopardising relations with Russia. (2) Narratives serve the purpose of and mobilise grand strategy. China will continue to impinge on India’s Himalayan borders and in the Indian Ocean region, because it has its own strategic interest to protect. Counter-measures would also be adopted by India, as it has its own strategic interests to protect. However, the assertive, expansionist “Rising China” narrative, with all its supporting mini-narratives, actually helps India to grow into a major player. It has provided India with the impulse, justification, and the motive to grow into a major power without causing undue concern in the existing power equations. The “Emerging India” narrative becomes largely acceptable, as India projects itself as the largest democracy of the world that is also a system-supporter of a rule-based order with

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non-provocative defence and the image as a net security provider in the region. Thus the China-centric narratives and the India-centric narratives are actually opposing each other and these narratives create a geostrategic environment that compels India and China to fashion foreign and security policies to effectively respond to it. While each of these have important policy components, India does not scrupulously follow the Western world order narratives (those of the “democracies vs. authoritarian regimes variety), but seeks to project – in keeping with its tradition – an idea of Vasudhaiba Kutumbakam, i.e. the world is a family. In effect, that means keeping independent relations with the major actors, faith in diplomacy and negotiation, seeking greater economic opportunities, and possible self-reliance, inter alia, on defence preparedness in the days to come. The grand narrative of Vasudhaiba Kutumbakam thus provides a direction towards which the policy goals are oriented and strategies are applied to reach those goals. (3) Fanciful phrases are indicators of the evolving patterns but may or may not be reflective of reality. At any given point of time, multiple narratives co-exist based on trends in collaboration and/or confrontation. Repetition and recycling of the key symbols and metaphors keep fuelling the narratives. With the world being in continuous flux and the contemporary being in many ways different from the past, a new reality always emerges that is perceived by different actors differently. As perceptions differ, realities too differ. As a result, many realities can simultaneously coexist and multiple narratives are presented. Narratives would compete and the most acceptable and the dominant ones by means of their popularity establishes themselves as the pre-eminent explanations and guiding principles for state behaviour, with particular identities, tags, and templates bestowed upon places and peoples. As this means an admixture of reality with imagination, narratives may or may not reflect reality. This may allow human ingenuity to reshape relations, adopt reasonable policies towards mutual advantage between India and China in general, and in the Indian Ocean in particular, only if suitable narratives could be constructed and by sustained repetition and recycling, could be popularised. Within the grand narrative

As we have mentioned earlier, the existence of narratives does not mean that these are accepted as true reflections of reality. Many of the policies/strategies either evolve as a response to reciprocate the adversary’s initiatives, or as a precautionary move in anticipation of unexpected turn of events. While the efficacy of policies/strategies can be assessed, narratives are based

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on subjective interpretations and can never be tested. However, one cannot deny that the grand narratives exert deep influence on policies/strategies. Maritime relations between India and China could hardly be detached from the general nature of relations between the two countries. It is difficult to insulate one from the other. Particular events – ranging from China’s frequent incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal sectors to its increased frequency of maritime activities in the Indian Ocean theatre – can be interpreted on the basis of how China is perceived in India’s decision-making circles and whether the irritants in relations are the results and reflections of a deeper cause. By the turn of the century, there were references to “Chindia Sydrome” (a term usually credited to Jairam Ramesh, who felt that “there is no reason that India and China should fall victim to those people who see India and China as natural rivals”5), but more frequently the term is used as an informal economic jargon (Fenech 2005) that was viewed as a challenge to the West’s economic interests. Argued Fenech, “whilst textile producers in Europe are losing jobs to China, US software companies are moving jobs to India. The West is truly facing a trade war on two fronts!” (Ibid.). However, the term soon acquired greater meaning that visualised China and India to be close collaborators contributing to the “Asian Century” against a global order and world systems dominated by the West. In fact, during the first few years of this century, scholars debated about the prudence of stoking the differences between the two countries, especially when both stood to gain from the prevailing system. As trade between India and China flourished, it was felt that Indians might be seen more as consumers than enemies by China(Tharoor 2012). Moreover, as during the Cold War, the US intransigence pushed India to Soviet Union, likewise Chinese inflexibility can push India to US and that would be self-defeating from the Chinese perspective. Based on these convictions, trade with China continued, BRICS came into being (the first summit took place in 2009), and, with the intention to elevate trust with other members, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in June 2017. In the same month, however, the India-China border stand-off at Doklam began. Xi Jinping became the Chinese President in 2013. Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India in 2014. Initial bonhomie gradually embittered with frequent Chinese incursions and growing Chinese opposition to Indian interests at different quarters. India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Syed Akbaruddin, used the word “frenemies” to explain the complex relations between the two countries and he hoped the world could learn from it.6 Here, one recognises the differences but expects that the countries would show some degree of maturity, as important and responsible states in the contemporary system. However, mutual distrust widened and the optics of Xi-Modi meetings in Wuhan (2018) and in Mamallapuram near Chennai

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(2019) – called “Wuhan Spirit” and “Chennai Connect” respectively – could not substantially prevent the downward trends in relations. In fact, the narratives of cooperation that were sought to be propagated died a premature death with the Galwan clash of 2020 and, before the forces were withdrawn from the India-China border, another incursion attempt was foiled by the Indian forces in the Yangtse region of Arunachal Pradesh in 2022. Throughout this period, infrastructure development along the border took place on both sides and the possibility of an eventual showdown was never ruled out. In fact, it is said sometimes that China keeps the border disputes alive with frequent incursions so that India remains bogged down with protecting its land areas and pays less attention to the developments in sea zones. The advent and surge of COVID-19 pandemic has badly affected China’s image internationally and further complicated its relations, as China became increasingly assertive and belligerent. In terms of lack of transparency, a futile zero-COVID policy that led to unrest and protests, an apparently ineffectual vaccine that it developed and administered, and the lingering suspicion that the novel coronavirus actually escaped from a Chinese lab – the image of China as a rising global power suffers a setback. The problems China faces at the domestic front – as the economy’s dream run falters – may compel a troubled Chinese leadership to encourage aggressive nationalism that might, in turn, have its military implications. Between 1405 and 1433, the Chinese sea explorer Zheng He made seven long voyages to the Indian Ocean. There were instances of Ming soldiers getting involved in settling local disputes in India.7 Robert Kaplan is of the view that China might consider India as the most realistic strategic adversary and the extensive commemoration in 2005 of the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first exploit into the Indian Ocean indicates it as an area of interest (Kaplan 2009). As mentioned earlier, Asia is composed of multiple security complexes and each security complex is different from the other. However, China’s attempt to make its presence felt in almost all the security complexes has evoked different types of responses, be it the Taiwan issue, the sovereignty question over Senkaku islands in East Asia, the claim over so-called “historic waters” in the South China Sea, or territorial disputes with Southeast Asian states. In South Asia, the China-Pakistan “all-weather friendship” and China’s increased bonhomie with India’s neighbours make India worried. India’s smaller neighbours can benefit from the China- India competition, as both these powers use aid, investment, and infrastructure development to improve relations in order to prevent the recipients from being hostile to their respective interests. As Paul argues, “the managed limited rivalry between China and India has allowed smaller states to play off one against the other and to gain maximum benefits,” but only until the contest intensifies and

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the small states then would have to bandwagon with one or the other (Paul 2019). There is little possibility of a grand coalition formed by the smaller states against one or the other – if Indian dominance seems unpleasant, possibilities of getting into a Chinese debt-trap is equally bad – and the smaller states would be better off with equivalent relations with both. At a given point in time however, the degree of closeness with one or the other may vary; for example, Sri Lanka and Nepal have shown greater intimacy with China in the recent past, while the Maldives and Bangladesh have kept the relations – despite ups and downs – well-balanced. More than on consistent policies, the scale of intimacy however depends on the overtures of particular regimes. Regional or global-level maritime governance with regard to disaster management, climate change, fish stocks, and deep-sea minerals, preservation of natural habitats, and maritime pollution continues to draw the attention of the states in the region; so also the issues of piracy, human smuggling, and drug trafficking. Sporadic developments in cooperation in these fields do not necessarily reduce the impact of the grand narrative of a possible China-India maritime rivalry. The attempt to declare the Indian Ocean as a “Zone of Peace” in 1971 came to a naught in subsequent years and it has completely lost its context now. Within this milieu, China’s impingement in the Indian Ocean theatre needs to be assessed. The narratives are increasingly becoming very negative and sharp in nature, leaving no scope for romanticism. China under Xi has revealed the “dark side” of its prosperity. As a result, no Chinese maritime activity in the Indian Ocean theatre can be viewed in terms of innocuous and harmless ventures, as mere protective measures of China’s commercial interests. Each visit of Chinese submarines, vessels, and research ships to the Indian Ocean seems to have some security implications. Under the circumstances, the principle of the freedom of navigation is sought to be upheld, but beyond that, the idea of India being the net security provider in the region gains foothold. As mentioned before, this narrative paves way for India’s naval expansion and justifies accumulation of greater naval strength maintaining a meaningful network with other major maritime powers, while the smaller States are compelled to embrace the best possible balancing acts. Notes 1 Sunday Times of India (Kolkata), 2 August 2020. 2 US State Department, “Foreign Policy and the 2000 Presidential Election,” US Foreign Policy Agenda, US State Department Electronic Journal, October 2000, 10. 3 LEMOA 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement; COMCASA 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement; BECA 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. 4 The Economic Times, 7 March 2022.

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5 “‘Chindia’ still vibrant idea: Jairam Ramesh,” Economic Times, 27 March 2014, m​.economictimes​.c​om, accessed 28 December 2022. 6 “World can learn from frenemies India, China: Akbaruddin,” India Today, 22 March 2018, indiatoday​.i​n, accessed on 22 December 2022. 7 For elaboration, see Majumdar, Anindya Jyoti, op. cit., no. 8, 18.

References Allison, G. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Melbourne: Scribe Publications. Emiliano, A. 2008. “World Order Re-founded: The Idea of a Concert of Democracies”, The International Spectator, 43/1. DOI: 10.1080/03932720801892555 Erikson, A. 2022. “Make China Great Again: Xi’s Truly Grand Strategy”, Texas National Security Review, War on the Rocks​.com​, October 30, 2019, accessed on July 2, 2022. Hall, I. 2016. “Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy Under Narendra Modi”, The Round Table, May 2016. DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2016.1180760 Holmes, J.R. and Yoshihara, T. 2009. “Strongman, Constable or Free-Rider? India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Indian Naval Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, 28/4 (September): 332–348. Kaplan, R.D. 2015. “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean”, Foreign Affairs (March–April) www​.foreignaffairs​.com ​/articles​/estasia​ /2009​- 03​- 01​/center​-stage​-21st​- century. accessed on October 7, 2015. Lindsay, J.M. 2009. “The Case for a Concert of Democracies, John J. Davenport, For a Federation of Democracies”, Ethics and International Affairs, 23/1. Majumdar, A.J. 2020.“The Indian Ocean as a Theatre of Conflict: Past Patterns, Present Trends”, in Vivek Mishra and Sarvani Gooptu eds., The Regional Great Game in the Indian Ocean and India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy. New Delhi: KW Publishers. Majumdar, A.J. and Bose, S. 2021. “Geopolitics, Conflicts and Peace”, in Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee eds., Peace and Conflict Studies: Perspectives from South Asia . New York, London and New Delhi: Routledge, 83. Manoharan, N. 2022.“Pearl in the String: Sri Lanka-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century”, in Adluri Subramanyam Raju ed., South Asia and China: Engagement in the Twenty-First Century. New York, London and New Delhi: Routledge, 161. Panikkar, K.M. 1971. India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (Indian Reprint), George Allen and Unwin, 84. Paul, T.V. 2019. “When Balance of Power Meets Globalization: China, India and the Small States of South Asia”, Politics, 39/1, 58. Pehrson, C.J. 2006. String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral, July. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Prakash, A. 2020. “The Roots, Rationale and Limits of India’s Maritime Strategy”, in Vivek Mishra and Sarvani Gooptu eds., The Regional Great Game in the Indian Ocean and India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy. New Delhi: KW Publishers, 4–5. Rai, R.B. 2009. “China’s String of Pearls vs India’s Iron Curtain”, Indian Defence Review, 24/4 (October–December) uploaded 2013.

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Tharoor, S. 2012. Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century, Allen Lane: London, 138. Wasif, S.K. 2018. Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 234. Zhu, Z. 2020. “Interpreting China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, May 15.

12 INDIA-CHINA RIVALRY IN SRI LANKA A nexus of historical narratives and political economy Shiran Illanperuma and Sumanasiri Liyanage

The Greater Indian Ocean region stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, will be the centre of global conflicts, because most international business supply will be conducted through this route. Most important of all, it is in this region the interests and influence of India, China and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here the 21st century’s global power dynamics will be revealed… two key players in this region are India and China – India moving east and west while China to the South. Robert Kaplan, in “Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,” 21 November 2010. Sri Lanka has long and deep civilisational ties to both the Indian subcontinent and China, with historical chronicles presenting both positive and negative outcomes of relations with both. These narratives loom large in how post-colonial Sri Lanka balanced its interest vis-à-vis the two Asian giants, with world historic periods such as the Cold War, Sino-Soviet Split, American Unipolar Hegemony, and the emerging multipolarity all shaping how India-China competition for influence plays out in Sri Lanka, and how Sri Lankan’s themselves view their relations with these countries in costbenefit terms. Often neglected in these grand narratives of civilisational ties and post-colonial nationalisms are the practicalities of economic interests, which we argue is a base factor for Sri Lanka in terms of how India-China competition for influence in Sri Lanka has played out.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-16

India-China Rivalry in Sri Lanka 207

The first part of this chapter provides a brief overview of the evolution of Sri Lanka’s ties with both India and China. We explain Sri Lanka’s ambiguous relationship to India, as highlighted in foundational myths and national chronicles like the Mahavamsa, which trace Sinhalese bloodline and the Buddhist religion to India, while also warning of the existential threat of expansionary South Indian empires. We explain also the dynamic post-colonial period, and how national liberation struggles, the Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-Indian war, and Sri Lanka’s civil war all helped shape the Sri Lankan nationalist narrative of the country’s relationship with India and China. The second part of this chapter provides a highlevel comparative view of the economic structures of Sri Lanka, India, and China. This section seeks to explain Sri Lanka’s own economic deficiencies and why China, rather than India has emerged as the primary sponsor of Sri Lanka’s economic development in recent decades. We explain that simple economic interest, beyond just anti-Indian resentment drive Sri Lanka’s post-war relations with China. Section four recounts and analyses developments since 2019, when Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected to power, in what many foreign policy pundits described as a win for Chinese influence. We track the turbulent sequence of events that led to a foreign policy coup in favor of India, and explain the broader geopolitical and economic context. Historic view of India-China competition in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s foundational mythology is inextricably linked to the Indian subcontinent, albeit in an ambiguous manner. The Mahavamsa, a Pali language chronical written in the fifth century BC, traces the origin of the Sinhala people to an exiled Indian Prince Vijaya (Mahanama n.d.). The chronical also narrates the arrival of Buddhism via a mission sent by Mauryan Emperor Ashoka. Therefore, the bloodline of the Sihala Buddhists, as well as their religion, is textually connected to the Indian subcontinent. However, the Mahavamsa also presents the development of a distinct culture and civilisation in Sri Lanka. The Pandukabhaya story signifies how different communities were integrated in the formation of this pluricultural formation. Another important aspect is it had been constantly under the threat of expansionary thalassocratic South Indian empires, such as the Cholas and Pandyas. The narrative of Sinhala King Duttugemunu and his defeat of South Indian usurper Elara comprises a large part of the Mahavamsa. It should be noted however that historic chronicles do not present Sri Lanka as a passive victim of South India expansion, but as an active political agent, often attempting to play rival Kingdoms against each other, and in some cases in launching military expeditions into South India and Burma.

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Sri Lanka’s relations to China are comparably more mercantile in nature. Some of the earliest accounts of Buddhist civilisation in Sri Lanka are by Chinese Buddhist monk Fa-Hsien in the fourth century (Dharmadasa 2010). Latter events include the tumultuous visit of Chinese explorer Admiral Zheng He to Sri Lanka in the 1400s (Wijegunaratne 2021). Historical records state that the South Indian-origin King of Kotte Alakeshvara committed hostilities against Zheng He’s fleet, prompting him to launch a military campaign known as the Ming-Kotte war, which resulted in the deposing of Alakeshvara and the appointment of King Parakramabahu, who is said to have ruled over a period of peace and prosperity over the island. Modern diplomatic relations between Sri Lanka, India, and China are shaped by the ebbs and flows of world historic events, such as national liberation struggles in the Global South, the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, and the emergence of American unipolar hegemony. India loomed large in Sri Lanka’s independence movement. While Sri Lankan nationalists of varying stripes were influenced by the activism of Indian nationalists from Bhagat Sing to Gandhi, the presence of an alien class of South Indian labourers brought to Sri Lanka by the British Raj, as well as the dominance of South Indian merchants in the plantation economy, emerged as thorny issues in the decades leading up to independence (Jayawardena 2004). Thus, while India’s struggle against the British Raj was seen as an inspiration by Sri Lankan nationalists, the presence of Indian ethnic groups and their perceived loyalty to the British (or at least the manner in which such groups were used to divide and rule) evoked bitterness among a section of nationalists who may have recalled the ever-present threat of Indian expansion from chronicles such as the Mahavamsa. Alternatively, some nationalists, such as Buddhist revivalist Anagarika Dharmapala, were aware of and inspired by Chinese nationalists, such as Sun Yat Sen. In the wake of World War Two and the retreat of the British Empire, India became a republic, while Sri Lanka became a dominion. While Nehruvian India expanded its ties with the Soviet Union, the Dominion of Ceylon retained military agreements with the British and was host to British forces. Curiously, post-colonial Sri Lanka’s diplomatic interaction with communist China took place under a decidedly conservative and pro-British government, with the signing of the Rubber-Rice Pact in 1952 (Fernando 2022). While the deal angered Ceylon’s Western allies, who were indirectly fighting the Chinese in Korea, it ensured that then-Ceylon would be supplied with Chinese grain in order to avoid a domestic food crisis, while the Chinese would procure Ceylonese rubber as an input for industrialisation. Thus, Sino-Lankan commercial relations begin well before the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1957. During this era, relations between Nehruvian India and Maoist China appeared promising, while Ceylon stood out as the spoiler. For example, during the Bandung meeting of 1955, Sri Lankan

India-China Rivalry in Sri Lanka 209

Prime Minister John Kotelawala infamously towed a pro-West and anticommunist line, offending Nehru, who sought to improve ties with China and the USSR (Amarasinghe 2020). These positions would shift drastically in the 1960s, as Sri Lanka’s political leaders veered towards becoming increasingly nationalist, removing British military interests and nationalising Western oil companies (Olson 1977). However, just as Sri Lanka joined the anti-Western bloc, cracks emerged in this camp due to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 and the SinoIndian border war of 1962, putting an assertive Ceylon in a precarious position of having to both fend off Western aggression (including Western sanctions in 1961 and an attempted coup d’état by pro-Western military officers in 1962) and balance heated rivalries within the Communist Bloc and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) (a grouping of 120 countries formed during the Cold War to advance the interests of the developing countries without being aligned to any major power bloc). During the first Sino-Indian war for example, Ceylon played a proactive role by calling for a meeting of the NAM in Colombo (Balachandran 2020). The resulting Colombo Conference Proposals were unfortunately not amenable to China, but, nonetheless, hostilities simmered down after the meeting. Chinese aid to Sri Lanka ramped up throughout the 1960s and included cash grants, a textile mill, railroad coaches, tires of the state-owned transport company, and the construction of an international conference hall (CIA 2000). During this time, Sri Lanka and China also signed an agreement for mutual use of each other’s ports. However, declassified US intelligence reports of this period refer to the allegedly slow pace of fulfilling such commitments, perhaps due to China‘s own and numerous domestic challenges. Curiously, this is in stark contrast to recent Chinese assistance, which pundits say is popular because of the rapid speed with which funds were disbursed and projects launched and completed, compared to multilateral alternatives. Other major developments include the SirimavoShastri Pact between Ceylon and India, which sought to resolve the issue of Indian migrant workers in Ceylon by repatriating a portion of them to India (Phandis and Kumar 1975). Contradictions between Sri Lanka, India, and China would come to a head in the 1970s, laying the foundation for how the Sri Lankan side would narrate its perspective sin the decades that followed. In 1971, the Sri Lankan government was caught off-guard by a Maoist-inspired youth insurgency led by a rebel faction of the Peking-wing of the recently split Ceylon Communist Party (Halliday 1971). Premier Zhou Enlai was quick to condemn and distance the Chinese government from this revolt (Chou 1971). Ultimately, Sri Lanka quelled the rebellion with aid from all sides of the Cold War. In the early 1970s, Indian intelligence is reported to have armed and trained Sri Lankan Tamil separatist groups in the neighbouring Indian state of Tamil

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Nadu. This move, regardless of intent, served to intensify and militarise the ethnic situation across the Palk Strait, and once again evoked the ire of Sri Lankan nationalists by reigniting the image of South India as an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty. By 1978, Nixon’s landmark visit to China signalled the completion of the severance of Sino-Soviet relations. Similarly, the election of the J.R. Jayawardene-led UNP government in 1977 also marked a liberal, pro-West turn in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. These events perhaps fed into Soviet-aligned India’s paranoia and its actions in the next decade. As the Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict turned into a full-blown civil war in the 1980s, China emerged as one of the few non-Western suppliers of military hardware, including arms, ammunitions, aircraft (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database n.d.). India’s attempts to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka diplomatically and militarily would mar Indo-Lanka relations even further. The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene in 1987 stipulated that the Sri Lankan side would allow devolution of power along provincial lines as a compromise to separatist demands, while the government would also cease its anti-insurgency operations (Premadas and Samarasinghe 1988). The Indian side was expected to oversee the disarmament of the Tamil separatist group, many of whom had themselves been armed and trained by Indian intelligence. The perceived bigbrotherly treatment of Sri Lanka by India angered Sinhala nationalists, and played some role in the 1987 youth insurrection launched by the JVP. The Indo-Lanka accords and IPKF involvement in Sri Lanka remain a sore point for Sri Lankan nationalists, while China, who was supplying arms to the Sri Lankan military since at least 1987, is seen as a friend who helped the country assert its sovereignty. This is not to say that Indian soft power has not been a failure in Sri Lanka. As the world’s largest democracy, with a federal system and strong constitution, India is seen by many liberal Sri Lankans as a model for a secular democracy. Meanwhile, Indian cultural commodities such as films and music proliferated in Sri Lanka with the opening up of its economy, heavily influencing domestic musical and televisual production. Sri Lanka has also served as a sort of captive market for Indian manufactures, with the likes of Tata and Leyland dominating Sri Lankan roads, and Indian foodstuffs prevalent in local supermarkets. This has had a positive impact on the perception of India by classes involved in trade with India. On the flipside, it has fuelled anti-Indian sentiment by nationalists, who feel that Sri Lanka’s own production base is stunted due to competition from India’s much larger industrial economy. Attempted trade agreements with India, or privatisation of state assets to Indian companies have often been flashpoints for nationalist protest.

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In the wake of the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, the Chinese side had cemented itself as a reliable provider of crucial aid and weapons for decades. China also played a leading role in taking the Sri Lankan side in Geneva and investing in post-war reconstruction. Between 2006 and July 2019, Chinese investment into infrastructure projects amounted to $12.1 million (Wignaraja, et al. 2020). Investments included roads, ports, energy, real estate, and agriculture. It is important to note that China’s outsized role in investment in Sri Lanka was, in some ways, an accident of timing. The end of the Sri Lankan Civil War coincided with the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, which plunged much of the Western world into chaos. India too, which had opened up and liberalised in 1991, was affected. China however, which had developed an economic system distinct from India and the West, stood out as an industrialised economy with an insulated financial system and massive foreign currency reserves. This allowed the Chinese side to respond to the global financial crisis by increasing outbound investment and stabilising the global economy. Economic development of India and China in relation to Sri Lanka

In the aftermath of World War Two and insurgent national liberation movements across the world, Sri Lanka, India, and China shared some similarities in economic structure, but also many differences. All three countries were predominantly agrarian in nature, with a large peasantry. However, Sri Lanka was much smaller in size, and a large portion of its agricultural base had been converted almost exclusively to cash crops, like tea and rubber, under British colonialism. This made Sri Lanka completely dependent on imports for food, and thus vulnerable to deteriorating terms of trade, as experienced in many countries in the Global South in the 1960s. India and China were both vast land masses, but both countries had an embryo of heavy industry, India from modest investments under the British Raj, and China from the industries started by Japanese occupiers in Manchuria. At the onset of independence, India emerged as a liberal democracy, and China as a communist state. However, both countries were heavily inspired by Soviet-style planning and heavy industrialisation. By comparison, Sri Lanka’s immediate post-colonial leadership was much more conservative, focusing on developing agriculture and services. Notably, India and Sri Lanka had in common a bureaucracy inherited by the British Raj, while China had a more or less continuous tradition of its own Confucian bureaucracy, supplemented by Bolshevik institutions imported from the Soviet Union. Despite these differences, all three countries were similarly impoverished. India had a moderately higher GDP per capita of $206.10 in 1978, while Sri Lanka’s was $188.10 and China’s was the lowest at $156.40 (Figure 12.1; World Bank n.d.). Despite opening up around the same time, China’s growth

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$14000 $12000 $10000 $8000 $6000 $4000

China FIGURE 12.1 GDP

Sri Lanka

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$0

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$2000

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per capita (1978-2021)

would outpace Sri Lanka’s, reaching $3832.20 by 2009, while Sri Lanka’s was $2,090.40 and India’s was the lowest, at $1,096.60. Thus, we find that despite starting closer together, the three economies have significantly diverged, with India in particular falling behind significantly. Under the premise that diplomacy is linked to economic strength (due to the being able to offer “carrots,” such as investment, market access, technology transfer, etc.), this divergence helps provide context for China’s diplomatic success in post-war Sri Lanka. Barring the many nationalistic anti-Indian narratives prevalent in Sri Lanka, the simple fact of China’s economic strength and vitality vis-à-vis India gave it an upper hand in the post-war context, despite being a more distant geographic and civilisational partner. The rapid economic growth in China, and the country’s ability to provide investment, including technology and know-how, relative to India, is explained by the economic structure. Since the 1940s, the Chinese government has followed a single-minded focus on industrialisation, be it through Soviet-style central planning, or through the incorporation of a market framework. Therefore, by 2009, manufacturing accounted for 31% of China’s GDP (Figure 12.2; World Bank n.d.). Comparatively, Sri Lanka and India were both unindustrialised, with manufacturing accounting for only 18.1% and 17.1% of GDP, respectively. Further, China’s industrial base in 2009 was far more technologically advanced, with high-technology manufacture comprising 32% of manufactured exports, compared to just one percent and 9.6% respectively for Sri Lanka and India. China’s specialisation in manufacturing and high-technology exports has, in turn, enabled it to build up a trade surplus and robust foreign currency reserves over time. A closer look at the external balance of payments of the Sri Lanka, India, and China

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35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 China

FIGURE 12.2 Manufacturing

Sri Lanka

India

valued added (% of GDP) (2009-2021)

provides a more revealing look at why Sino-Indian competition in Sri Lanka has turned out the way it has (Figure 12.3). In 1978, perhaps as a result of the global oil shock, all three countries had a negative external balance of payments as a percentage of GDP, with Sri Lanka’s being the most severe at –4.8% (World Bank n.d.). In the decades following liberalisation, Sri Lanka has had consistent and serious balance of payments (BOP) deficits, driven largely by a trade deficit and deteriorating terms of trade, due to the country’s dependence on imported food and energy and an underdeveloped industrial base. India too has struggled with a BOP deficit, however to a lesser extent than Sri Lanka. While India is dependent on imported energy, it benefits from domestic grain production and a large home market. While industry is a smaller portion of India’s GDP compared to Sri Lanka, India’s industrial base is more diversified, featuring heavy and light industries, whereas Sri Lanka’s industrial base is almost entirely garment manufacturing and food processing. China’s economic story stands out as a role model among developing countries. The country experienced massive growth in its external balance, which peaked at 8.7% of GDP in 2007, around the time of the Global Finical Crisis and towards the final years of Sri Lanka’s civil war. Meanwhile India’s external deficit experienced a secular decline from 0.7% of GDP in 2003 to 5.5% of GDP, essentially the same as Sri Lanka’s own deficit at this same time. These structural economic differences explain to a larger extent Sri Lanka’s own foreign exchange deficiencies, and why it was China and not India that was able to help plug this gap. Rapid growth of the Chinese economy after economic liberalisation was followed by its engagement with the countries of the Global South. Sri Lanka is not an exception. The last two decades or so has shown a rapid acceleration of Chinese economic engagement in the Indian

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40% 30% 20% 10%

China FIGURE 12.3 Exports

Sri Lanka

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0%

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of goods and services (% of GDP) (1978-2021)

35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 China

FIGURE 12.4 High-tech

Sri Lanka

India

exports (% of manufactured exports) (2009-2021)

Ocean Region (IOR), across a range of sectors such as infrastructure development and extractive industries. These are in addition to their assistance with weapons, strategic assistance in enhancing surveillance apparatus, and military training. According to statistics from the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Sri Lanka, 94% of the Chinese loans and grants have come during the period of 2005–2012. China is in a competition with traditional sources of foreign finance like the World Bank, the ADB, and Japan. China continued to dominate foreign financing in Sri Lanka from individual countries in 2012, accounting for one billion US , while India was placed behind with US$700 million. India’s restrictions in the supply of military hardware at the height of the internal war may be cited as an added factor contributing to Sri Lanka’s conjunctural leanings towards China.

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10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15%

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FIGURE 12.5 External

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-25%

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-20%

India

Balance (% of GDP) (1978-2021)

2.0% 1.5% 1.0%

China FIGURE 12.6 Outward

Sri Lanka

2010

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-0.5%

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India

FDI (% of GDP) (1978-2021)

Pandemic, default, and Sri Lanka’s pivot to India

Since 2009, the Western and Indian media narrative of Sri Lanka posits that Sri Lanka under the political rule the Rajapaksa family has been firmly in the grip of China (Abi-Habib 2018). The China-Sri Lanka relationship in the previous Rajapaksa regime, especially during the last phase of the civil war, and dependence on Chinese development finance for post-war reconstruction, is often cited in support of this view (Cellaney 2017). Hence, it was anticipated that the Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who was elected as the president of Sri Lanka in November 2019, would continue to adopt the same foreign policy strand. In January 2020, mere months after Rajapaksa was elected to power, local media reported that he would be visiting China following

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an official invitation by Beijing (Daily FT 2020). Months later, following high-levels talks between Rajapaksa and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Colombo, a Reuters headline screamed, “Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa draws country closer to China” (Karunatilake 2020). With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, China quickly stepped in with financial and medical aid including vaccines, while India was preoccupied with the raging virus at home (Kuruwita 2020). The passing of the Port City Bill in 2021 seemed to reemphasise Sri Lanka’s alignment with China (Xinhua News Agency 2021). However, things quickly changed in 2021. Indeed, three years after being elected to power, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had yet to visit Beijing following the formal invitation extended by China. Instead, he had made formal visits to both the US and India. Following an abrupt ban of organic fertiliser, Sri Lanka ordered US$6.9 million-worth of organic fertiliser from a Chinese company. In keeping with the commercial agreement, the fertiliser passed a test in Switzerland but failed to pass an additional test conducted by local authorities. The subsequent rejection of the fertiliser led to a brief diplomatic row, as China blacklisted the state-owned People’s Bank for not honouring the deal to pay for the shipment (Ethirajan 2021). Amid this diplomatic row, India stepped in to deliver 100 tons of nanofertiliser to Sri Lanka (Hindustan Times 2021). The shift in geopolitical priorities were also made evident when Sri Lanka decided to withdraw a contract given to a Chinese company to build renewable energy projects in three islands off the coast of the Jaffna Peninsula, and grant this to an Indian company instead (Srinivasan 2022). With Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange crisis worsening in the lead-up to a total default on sovereign debt, India took the lead in providing a credit line with a condition that 75% be used to purchase products from India (Nilar 2022). Indian External Affairs Minster Jaishankar, while on a visit to Sri Lanka, made an unprecedented intervention by visiting a local Indian Oil Corporation fuel station in downtown Colombo to discuss the country’s fuel shortage (The Hindu 2022). He also instructed the Indian High Commission to intervene in a medicine shortage at the Peradeniya Hospital in Kandy (ADA Derana 2022). Jaishankar’s visit to Sri Lanka also saw the country’s approval of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to be built with a US$6 million grant from India (Subramanian 2022). This whirlwind sequence of events, amid some of Sri Lanka’s most dire economic conditions since independence, helped move the balance of power in India’s favour. With much of Sri Lanka’s debt problems unduly pinned on China by mainstream media, India’s economic support with the provision of essential supplies was welcomed with minimal cynicism from even the nationalist camp, which was largely neutralised due to the faltering government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. India’s recent geopolitical gains in Sri Lanka must also be contextualised within the broader geopolitical context, which has

India-China Rivalry in Sri Lanka 217

allowed the country to strategically advance its self-interest. The RussiaUkraine war and ensuing sanctions on Russian oil have been a windfall for Indian companies, who have bought Russian crude at below-market prices and refined them and sold them to the West and other countries, including Sri Lanka (Petro-Logistics 2022). Therefore, India has managed to leverage the global economic space to turn its foreign policy relationship with Russia and the West into an economic gain, which in turn it has recycled into Sri Lanka to win geopolitical gains. Conclusion

Recent events show that Sri Lanka is not, and perhaps never was, irrevocably in China’s orbit. Indeed, in August 2020, less than a year after President Gotabaya Rajapakse came to power, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Secretary Admiral Jayanth Colombage had told local media that Sri Lanka’s had a “India First” policy, and that China was a friend, while India a relative (The Hindu 2020). We have shown that India wins when it is able to provide Sri Lanka with the economic support required to rebalance its dysfunctional economy. However, a precondition for this is India fixing its own economic problems at home. Secondly, recent events reveal that Chins itself remains a tellurocracy, i.e. an inward-looking, land-based civilisation. Notwithstanding its border conflicts with India and the desire to protect its supply lines of industrial inputs, China has little interest in intervention in far-off lands, and sustained geopolitical confrontations of the kind that overstretched and exhausted the Soviet Union and now threaten to exhaust the United States. China’s main political goals remain inward in nature, as the country is forced to grapple with the demands of its own citizenry for a better life, and tackle issues such as a declining population and the need to shore up domestic technological capabilities in the face of protectionism by the West (Yue 2022). It must also be remembered that China has much more pressing concerns in its immediate vicinity, such as the situation in Chinese Taipei and in the South China Sea, which demand more attention than far-off Sri Lanka (Xinhua News Agency 2022). For the Indian side, however, recent wins in Sri Lanka may yet prove short-lived. Any move by India that could be interpreted as taking advantage of Sri Lanka’s default to advance its own economic interests will likely backfire. Sri Lankan civil society, including unions and professional associations, are already raising concerns about the likelihood of Indian companies becoming the prime beneficiaries of an IMF-led privatisation programme (Bandarage 2022). India no doubt desires to keep Sri Lanka in its orbit of influence, perhaps seeing the island as a potential “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for an aggressor, while also being dependent on Sri Lankan ports for trade. However, India‘s

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repeated attempts to secure its influence have often backfired and added to the litany of historical grievances documented by Sinhala nationalists. The fact is that Sri Lanka continues to see itself as a distinct civilisational entity to India, and the country has had a long history of attempting to balance various powers in order to preserve its own sovereignty. In such a context, China, which has its own house in order, in terms of economic prosperity, is a natural ally for Sri Lanka. India’s long-term interest is therefore to “get its own house in order” and present its engagement with Sri Lanka as win-win for mutual economic development and prosperity. Of course, India-Sri Lanka and China-Sri Lanka relations have to be discussed not only as Sri Lanka’s bilateral links between two countries, but also in relation to and in the context of extant geopolitical tension in the Indian Ocean region. Hence, it is imperative to extend the investigation to the presence and functions of the US, Australia, and Japan. Although it is understandable that India’s legitimate security concerns and its locational proximity to Sri Lanka make its eminence in designing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, the imperialist hegemonic interest of the US may not be disregarded. The linking of the Indian Ocean Region to the Indian Pacific region demonstrates that there are many variables that have to be added to the equation in order to unravel Sri Lanka’s bilateral links with China and India. References Abi-Habib, Maria. 2018. How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough up a Port. June 25. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2018​/06​/25​/world​/asia​ /china​-sri​-lanka​-port​.html. ADA Derana. 2022. Jaishankar Offers Help to Address Drug Shortage at Peradeniya Teaching Hospital. March 29. Accessed December 20, 2022. http://www​ .adaderana​.lk ​/news​/81480​/jaishankar​- offers​-help​-to​-address​- drug​- shortage​-at​ -peradeniya​-teaching​-hospital. Amarasinghe, Punsara. 2020. Our Man in Bandung. May 15. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://moderndiplomacy​.eu ​/2020​/05​/15​/our​-man​-in​-bandung​-how​ -sir​-john​-kotelawala​-of​- ceylon​-shocked​-nehrus​-idealism/. Balachandran, P.K. 2020. 1962 Flashback: When a Non-Aligned Team Tried to Help India-China Negotiate Peace. June 27. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.dailynews​.lk ​/ 2020 ​/ 06​/ 27​/features ​/ 221687​/1962 ​- flashback​-when​ -non​-aligned​-team​-tried​-help​-india​- china​-negotiate. Bandarage, Asoka. 2022. IMF Forcing Privatization, Land and Resource Grab on Sri Lanka. December 2. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://asiatimes​.com​ /2022 ​/12 ​/imf​-forcing​-privatization​-land​-and​-resource​-grab​-on​-sri​-lanka/. Cellaney, Brahma. 2017. China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy. January 23. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.project​-syndicate​.org ​/commentary​/china​-one​ -belt​-one​-road​-loans​-debt​-by​-brahma​- chellaney​-2017​- 01. Chou, En-Lai. 1971. “Letter to Sirimavo Bandaranaike.” New Left Review. 1/69, Sept/Oct 1971.

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CIA. 2000. Increased Chinese Communist Aid to Ceylon. January 18. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.cia​.gov​/readingroom ​/document ​/cia​-rdp​79t0​ 1003​a001​900200001​-8. Daily FT. 2020. President to Visit China on 14–15 Jan. January 2. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.ft​.lk ​/ Front​-Page ​/ President​-to​-visit​- China​-on​ -14​-15​-Jan​/44​- 692872. de Silva, K.M. 2017. A History of Sri Lanka. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications. Dharmadasa, K.N.O. 2010. Fa-Hsien in Sri Lanka. September 29. Accessed December 20, 2022. http://www​.srilankaguardian​.org ​/2010​/09​/fa​-hsien​-in​-sri​ -lanka​.html. Ethirajan, Anbarasan. 2021. Ship-Load of “Toxic” Chinese Fertilizer Causes Diplomatic Stink. November 13. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.bbc​ .com ​/news​/world​-asia​-59202309. Fernando, Anura. 2022. Commemorating 70 Years of China-Ceylon Rice-Rubber Pact. January 8. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.ft​.lk ​/columns​/ Commemorating​-70​-years​- of​- China​- Ceylon​- Rice​- Rubber​- Pact​- A​- landmark​ -agreement​-in​-1952​/4 ​-728843. Halliday, Fred. 1971. “The Ceylonese Insurrection.” New Left Review.1/69, Sept/ Oct 1971. Hindustan Times. 2021. India Delivers 100 Tonnes of Nano Fertilizer to Sri Lanka. November 5. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.hindustantimes​ .com​ / india​ - news​ / india​ - delivers​ -100​ - tonnes​ - of​ - nano​ - fertilizer​ - to​ - sri​ - lanka​ -101636079703643​.html. Janardhanan, Arun. 2021. Facing Protests, Lanka Scraps India Port Deal, Offers Another Project. February 3. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://indianexpress​ .com ​/article ​/ india ​/facing​-protests​-lanka​- scraps​-india​-port​- deal​- offers​- another​ -project​-7172161/. Jayawardena, Kumari. 2004. The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon. Colombo: Sanjiva Books. Karunatilake, Waruna. 2020. Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa Draws Country Closer to China After Summit. October 9. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​ .reuters​.com ​/article ​/sri​-lanka​- china​-idINKBN26U20A. Kearney, R.N. 1962. “Ceylon: The Continuing Crisis.” Asian Survey 11.4, 19-27. Kuruwita, Rathindra. 2020. China to the Rescue in Sri Lanka. April 15. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/04​/china​-to​-the​-rescue​-in​-sri​ -lanka/. Mahanama. n.d. The Mahavamsa. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://mahavamsa​ .org/. Nilar, Amani. 2022. Indian Reserve Bank Issues Notification to Operationalize USD 500Mn Credit Line Under Conditions. March 12. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.newsfirst​.lk ​/2022​/03​/12​/indian​-reserve​-bank​-issues​ -notification​-to​-operationalize​-usd​-500mn​- credit​-line​-under​- conditions/. Olson, Richard Stuart. 1977. “Expropriation and International Economic Coercion.” The Journal of Developing Areas 205–226. Petro-Logistics. 2022. The Indian Oil Bridge Between Russia and Its Sanctioners. August 30. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.petro​-logistics​.com​/ blog​/ posts​/the​-indian​-oil​-bridge​-between​-russia​-and​-its​-sanctioners/.

220  Shiran Illanperuma and Sumanasiri Liyanage

Phandis, Urmila, and Lalit Kumar. 1975. “The Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964.” India Quarterly 249–269. Premadas, R.R., and S.W.R.A. de Samarasinghe. 1988. “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord.” Asian Survey 676–690. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. n.d. Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for 1950 to 2021. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.sipri​.org ​/databases. Srinivasan, Meera. 2022. Indian Power Projects Replace Chinese Ventures in Sri Lanka. March 29. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.thehindu​.com ​/ news​/international ​/indian​-power​-project​-replaces​- chinese​-venture​-in​-sri​-lankas​ -northern​-islands​/article65269733​.ece. Subramanian, Nirupama. 2022. Explained: Why India’s Pact with Sri Lanka on a Maritime Rescue Centre Is Significant. April 1. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://indianexpress​.com ​/article​/explained ​/india​- sri​-lanka​-maritime​-rescue​- co​ -ordination​- centre​- explained​-7845535/. The Hindu. 2022. Jaishankar Visits Lanka IOC to Take Stock of Fuel Supply Situation. March 28. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​.thehindu​.com ​/ news​/national​/jaishankar​-visits​-lanka​-ioc​-to​-take​-stock​- of​-fuel​-supply​-situation​ /article65267123​.ece. The Hindu. 2020. Sri Lanka Will Adopt ‘India-First Approach’: Foreign Secretary Jayanath Colombage. August 26. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://www​ .thehindu​. com​/ news​/ international​/sri​- lanka​-will​- adopt​- india​-first​- approach​ -foreign​-secretary​-jayanath​- colombage​/article32447711​.ece. Wignaraja, Ganeshan, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. 2020. Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka. London: Chatham House. Wijegunaratne, Ravindra. 2021. Chinese Admiral Zheng He’s Trilingual Stela in Galle. May 31. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://island​.lk​/chinese​-admiral​ -zheng​-hes​-trilingual​-stela​-in​-galle/. World Bank. n.d. World Development Indicators. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://databank​.worldbank​.org​/source​/world​-development​-indicators. Xinhua News Agency. 2022. Chinese FM Slams Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan. August 11. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://english​.news​.cn ​/20220811​/dc3​7353​ada6​ a4f1​4a76​471e​b29cec62c​/c​.html. Xinhua News Agency. 2021. Sri Lanka’s Parliament Passes Port City Bill on Building Financial Hub. May 21. Accessed December 20, 2022. http://www​ .xinhuanet​.com ​/english ​/asiapacific​/2021​- 05​/21​/c​_139959878​.htm. Yue, Dong. 2022. U.S. Chip Act Another Testament to Washington’s Economic Coercion. August 18. Accessed December 20, 2022. https://english​.news​.cn​ /20220818​/5e4​dbb0​1639​4 46c​2b7a​cfd8​2c29aaa83​/c​.html.

13 THE IMPACTS OF CHINESE ECONOMIC POLICIES ON MYANMAR San San Khine

Economic policy is product of a policy-making process, in which policy players seek to influence the economic developments to achieve social, economic, and political objectives (Zhang 2017). After the formation of the People’s Republic of China, its ultimate national objective has been to become an economic superpower in 2049. Accordingly, the successive Chinese governments applied respective economic policies to fulfil this strategic objective. In studying Chinese economic policies, the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping require to be observed, as they still reflect on the policies under the current President Xi Jinping. Aiming to make China a modern and powerful country by creating a socialist market economy, Deng Xiaoping introduced the Open-Door Policy in 1978 in order to receive the foreign investments in the country. In fact, Chinese leaders want to promote China’s role in the international arena through its economic power. They deepened reforms, further opened up the economy, and encouraged foreign relations to increase Chinese economic role in the international market. It is noted that policies exercised in the past to reach the rapid economic growth of China were successful. Over the past decades, China has enjoyed rapid growth, transforming its economy from poor to middle-income (Zhang 2017). Since the President Xi Jinping came to power in late-2012, he has substantially stepped up his direct leadership on economic decision-making. He continued to implement economic reforms of China that were started under the Deng Xiaoping era. He launched the Chinese Dream/Rejuvenation of China, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the grand strategy for China to expand its economic power. While China is attempting to promote economic cooperation with many countries through the BRI, it is undeniable DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-17

222  San San Khine

that Myanmar is one of the important partners in implementing the BRI. However, there have been challenges in implementing its economic activities: not limited to the BRI, but including trade and investments. Academic literatures observe China-Myanmar economic relations from various perspectives and criticisms. Some literature argues that Myanmar is neither a strategic pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short- and immediate term, but the relationship seems to be based on a mutual need. Some depict Myanmar as a client state of China. Myanmar has long been categorised as bandwagoning with Chinese power for both protection and profit. China also capitalises on this relationship for its own gain. Based on these literatures, this study aims to examine the Chinese economic policies and strategies, and to explore ways and means for Myanmar to manage the implications. In line with these objectives, this study will ask such questions as: What are the economic policies and objectives of China? What are their activities or strategies in Myanmar to fulfil its economic objectives? And how do their activities impact on Myanmar? In addition, this study will consider the possible ways for Myanmar to manage her impacts. Economic policies and strategies of China

After Mao’s death, the economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping brought dramatic changes to China. In late-1978, Deng Xiaoping began an era of market reform and opening up. His policy objective is to make China a modern, powerful socialist country by creating a socialist market economy that is later endorsed in Article Five of the 1982 Chinese Constitution. Deng introduced four modernisations as a sweeping reform of the planning and management systems in industry and agriculture. The modernisation areas include agriculture, light and heavy industry, defence, and science and technology.1 The reform program had four major purposes: instituting a contract responsibility system in agricultural areas; reviving individual businesses in urban areas; decentralising a substantial amount of authority to state enterprises; and reforming the irrational price system. In 1987, Deng advanced the three steps suitable for China's economic development strategy within seventy years. The first step is to double the 1980 gross national product (GNP) and ensure that the people have enough food and clothing. The first objective was attained by the end of the 1980s. The second step is to quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of the 20th century. This was achieved in 1995. The third step is to increase the per capita GNP to the level of the medium-developed countries by the mid-21st century. Then, the people will be well-off and modernisation will be basically realised. 2

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 223

Subsequently, the government established a number of areas for foreign investment, including the special economic zones (SEZs), 3 open coastal cities, the economic and technology development zones, the delta open zones, the peninsula open zones, the open border cities, and the high-tech industry development zones. The establishment of these zones provided the trigger for massive inflows of foreign investment, primarily from companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Baobo and Kobayashi 1999). The government modernised the infrastructure, attracted Chinese entrepreneurs with tax exemptions for doing business with foreign companies, and lured foreign investors with tax holidays and a large bonded zone for duty-free imports of raw materials (Bhardwaj 1992). The changes brought an entrepreneurial boom that resulted in the emergence of huge numbers of entrepreneurs and venture businesses within China. By 1989, nearly 22,000 joint ventures had been launched, and Chrysler and Coca-Cola were among the first American firms to launch joint ventures.4 In addition, agricultural reforms provided the foundation for economic growth. The quiet elimination of the communes, which allowed farmers to lease their land and to sell their products in rural markets, enabled agricultural output to rise rapidly in the early 1980s. Rural households accumulated funds to invest in small-scale industry, and to buy the consumer goods that they produced. Local governments, suddenly able to keep a portion of the taxes that they levied on business (instead of giving it all up to the central government), became interested in investing in, and generally supporting, these new firms. With the political winds changing, people throughout the country started turning their minds away from politics and towards becoming rich (Green 2003). Inflows of foreign capital, technology, and management know-how enabled China to turn its vast labour resources and space to rapid economic growth. The economy stagnated around the time of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. However, in the first half of the 1990s, China boasted high growth rates again. Rapid economic growth was accompanied by a rise in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). In 1998, per capita income was about US$770, 14 times higher than in 1980. Therefore, it can be assumed that Deng’s goals, which were to improve the economic status of the people, had been accomplished (Boabo and Kobayashi 1999). In fact, subsequent Chinese presidents like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping followed Deng’s guiding principles and reforms. The 1993 revision of China’s constitution called for the development of a "socialist market economy," in which the Communist party would retain political power while encouraging a free market economy. President Jiang Zemin switched the focal point of China’s economic growth from southern China to the Shanghai area and the Yangtze River Valley. During 2001–2004,

224  San San Khine

he increased the speed of market-oriented economy, introduced price-control measures. He also declared the doctrine of the “three represents,” that the party must represent capitalists, workers, and peasants. On 11 December 2001, China formally became a member of the World Trade Organisation, representing international recognition of China’s growing economic power. 5 During 2002–2012, with the philosophy of Scientific Outlook on Development, President Hu Jintao pursued comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable development, building a harmonious socialist society. He committed to generate greater economic development in the interior and provide more services to those who do not live in China’s coastal areas.6 China was firmly committed to further economic reform and opening to the outside world. President Hu identified reform of state industries and the establishment of a social safety net as government priorities. Government strategies for achieving these goals included large-scale privatisation of unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and development of a pension system for workers. Hu had also downsized the government bureaucracy. In response to increasing discontent over income disparities, land seizures, and other problems, the government increased spending on education and health in rural areas. Some said Hu Jintao paved the way for the creation of a credible, sustainable Chinese middle class. During the 2000s, with the practice of the Going Out/Going Global Strategy, the government encouraged Chinese abroad. It actively participated in multilateral organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS, and became an important player in the world trade and economic arena. To investors and firms, especially following China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China represented a vast market that has yet to be fully tapped and a low-cost base for export-oriented production. China had become a US$5 trillion industrial colossus, a growing military force, and, navigating out of the global financial crisis, was sealing its position as the world’s fastest rising power.7According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s GDP expanded by an average annual rate of 10.7% during 2003–2011. Its GDP reached 47.2 trillion yuan (US$7.43 trillion) in 2011, up 150% from 2002. The proportion of China’s GDP in the world economy rose from 4.4% in 2002 to about ten percent in 2011. Its GDP per capita rose from US$1,135 in 2002 to $5,432 in 2011.8 It is noted that China was far wealthier and more influential in the world economy. However, it also produced some challenging costs, like heavy pollution, widening income inequality, overcapacity in many industries, an inefficient financial system, rising corporate debt, and numerous imbalances in the economy. Many economists argued that the old economic growth model would not be sustainable. Therefore, new economic reforms are necessary

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 225

to restructure the economic system of China to avoid a stagnant economic growth and living standards, a condition referred to by economists as the “middle-income trap” (MIT) (Morrison 2019). In particular, since the beginning of the growth slowdown of the economy of China in 2011, there has been rising concern that China is confronted with such a trap, although it has experienced rapid growth and reached the status of a middle-income country in a very short period.( Glawe 2017). As China’s economic importance grows globally, China’s economic policymaking has attracted worldwide attention. In November 2012, Xi Jinping took the position of leadership in China’s administration, and continued to implement economic reforms of China that were started under the Deng Xiaoping era. The role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in economic policy has arisen under President Xi Jinping. The party’s authority over economic policymaking and controls over economic governance has been increased. It means President Xi has substantially stepped up his direct leadership on economic decision-making (He 2018). In 2014, President Xi Jinping adopted four comprehensives as the goals for Chinese reforms: (i) comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society, (ii) comprehensively deepen reform, (iii) comprehensively govern the nation according to law, and (iv) comprehensively strictly govern the CCP.9 The policies set under President Xi Jinping to avoid the MIT mainly include marketisation and democratisation.(Song, Zhou, and Hurst 2019). Marketisation focuses on the privatisation of SOEs, reduction of excessive equipment, and financial liberalisation. Democratisation aims to reduce the income gap, secure the environment, and correcting corruption. China’s political leaders and key policymakers understand that continuing marketbased reform helps sustain growth.10 Xi’s vision has been the Chinese Dream, which he proposed immediately following his takeover of the leadership. The Chinese Dream was defined as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, with two centenary goals (Two 100s). The first centenary goal is to make China a moderately prosperous society by 2021, when the CCP has its 100th anniversary. The second is to make China a wealthy nation by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the formation of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, the Chinese Dream aims at moulding it into a strong and richer nation by 2050. Since 2015, China has approached many more countries and different regions intending to expand its sphere. President Xi’s proactive foreign policy focuses on both rich and developed countries and the neighbouring and regional countries (Rahman 2018). Aiming to implement long-term sustainable economic growth, China has set goals for ensuring stability, maintenance of the party legitimacy, anti-corruption in governance, and serving people with the standard of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Song, Zhou, and Hurst 2019).

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Belt and Road Initiative of China

According to China’s Going Out policy, emphasising to promote investments globally, China’s grand strategy like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) takes a vital role to expand its economic power. China’s BRI, also called One Belt One Road (OBOR), was launched in 2013 to boost economic integration and connectivity such as infrastructure, trade, and investment with its neighbours and various trading partners in Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond.(Morrison 2013) Its objectives are (i) to construct a unified large market and make full use of both international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, and (ii) to enhance mutual understanding and trust of member nations, resulting in an innovative pattern of capital inflows, talent pools, and technology databases. In November 2014, Xi announced that China would contribute USD 40 billion to set up a Silk Road Fund to finance Belt and Road projects, and in 2015, it released an action plan on the principles, a framework, and cooperation priorities and mechanisms of the BRI.11 On the other hand, some critics argued that many aspects of the BRI initiative remain unclear, including which and how many countries will participate, how much China will spend to finance the initiative, and what projects will fall under the BRI. For example, the government’s China Belt and Road Portal listed profiles of 70 countries on its website in 2017. However, China’s official media in December 2017 stated that 86 countries and international organisations had signed 100 cooperation agreements with China under the BRI. The Economist reports that China put the figure at four trillion US dollars, and the World Economic Forum estimates that China could ultimately spend eight trillion US dollars on the BRI. In order to contribute the projects of the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2016 with 57 founding member countries. Since its announcement, the BRI is known as Beijing’s strategy to increase trade and investment connectivity starting from China through Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. (Tekdel 2018). In March 2022, the number of countries that have joined the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China is 146 – 43 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 countries are in Europe/ Central Asia (including 18 countries of the EU that are part of the BRI), 25 are in East Asia/ Pacific, 20 in Latin America/ Caribbean, 18 in Middle East/ North Africa, and six in Southeast Asia.( Nedopil 2022). According to the official data, under the BRI framework, China has signed 22 agreements on international road transportation facilitation with 19 countries, 70 bilateral and regional shipping agreements with 66 countries and regions, bilateral inter-governmental air transport agreements with 100 countries, maintaining regular cargo flights with 54 countries. It also signed the regional air transport agreements with the Association of

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 227

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU, and cooperation documents on postal services with 22 countries.12 In 2021, China further deepened economic and trade cooperation with the BRI countries and made new contributions to the high-quality development of the BRI. China’s trade in goods with the BRI countries totalled 11.6 trillion yuan, accounting for 29.7% of China’s total foreign trade. China’s direct investment to the BRI countries totalled 138.45 billion yuan, accounting for 14.8% of the total outbound investment. The direct investment from the BRI countries in China reached US$11.25 billion, exceeding the ten-billion-dollar mark for the first time. Chinese enterprises of the contracted projects in the BRI countries registered 578.57 billion yuan, which accounted for 57.9% of the total contracted overseas projects.13 According to the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s GDP reached 114.4 trillion yuan in 2021, and the rise of the economic aggregate of 13 trillion yuan (US$3 trillion) in a single year was unprecedented in the history of China and the world. According to the world superpowers 2021 (News & World Report. www​.usnews​.com) index, it is estimated that China is considered to be an emerging superpower or a potential superpower. Some argue that China will pass the United States (US) as a global superpower in the coming decades. China’s GDP is the second-highest in the world. It is also the most-populous country, and the second-largest by landmass in the world. Although its defence spending is significantly lower than that of the US, at US$250 billion, it is still the second-highest in the world. Additionally, China makes up for it with its increasing diplomatic pushes, its rise to become one of the largest contributors to the global economy, and its technological advances, especially with artificial intelligence. Chinese activities/strategies in Myanmar

For China, Myanmar is a neighbouring country, sharing 2,204 kilometres of its border. It is always beneficial to have a friendly neighbour, and preferably a dependent one enticed by a web of economic interconnectedness. Myanmar possesses significant deposits of energy and other natural resources, and China needs them to fuel its economic growth. Most importantly, Myanmar is a key country as far as the transit to China of energy and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East is concerned, and also, in the long term, in relation to China’s consumer goods’ export to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In addition, Myanmar locates on the tri-junction of Southeast, South, and East Asia, having direct access to the Indian Ocean. Consequently, Myanmar becomes a land bridge to access to the Indian Ocean, seringthe economic, political, and security interests of China (Malik 2018). In addition, Myanmar is geostrategically important for the development of China’s southwestern provinces, a potential bridge across the MIT.

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While China is attempting to promote economic cooperation with many countries through the BRI, it is undeniable that Myanmar is one of China‘s important partners in implementing the BRI. Indeed, the objectives of the BRI in Myanmar are shaped by China’s “Two-Ocean” Strategy, including the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. According to the China Defence White Paper (2015), China’s economic interests in the framework of the BRI are closely related to its military and wider security interests. China’s BRI includes six economic corridors and Myanmar is involved in two economic corridors, namely the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Hence, China is willing to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with Myanmar under the framework of the BRI, and to accelerate the development of the ChinaMyanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The mixture of economic and political activities led both countries to tighten their relations. Myanmar and China have a long tradition of bilateral economic relations, trade, investment, and development assistance. China is biggest trading partner and the biggest investor in Myanmar. China has been the leading source of Myanmar’s imports, constituting 28% of all Myanmar’s imports of products such as bicycles, sewing machines, cheap textiles, radios, medicines, and refined petrol. The trade volume between Myanmar and China increased from US$5 billion in 2011–2012 to US$11.393 billion in 2018–2019. After signing border trade agreement in 1988, border trade volume increased from US$2.9 billion in 2011–2012 to US$5.9 billion in 2018–2019. In fact, Myanmar ranks as the biggest trade partner for Yunnan Province. It is noted that Myanmar suffered a trade deficit in regular trade (–$7.9 billion), partially due to the nature of export commodities, and a trade surplus in border trade (+$51 million) (Ministry of Commerce and Statistical Year Book). The following tables show the regular trade and border trade between Myanmar and China during 2010–2019. Chinese investment projects in Myanmar increased particularly in the 2000s. Their main incentives in Myanmar have been natural resources (raw materials) and also cheap labour for their business firms. During 2010–2011 and 2018–2019, China invested 373 enterprises with US$19.5 billion. In 2021, China stood at the second-largest investor after Singapore (Directorate of Investment and Company Administration). Chinese investments in Myanmar are mainly focussed on the sectors of hydropower, oil and gas, and mining. Tables 13.1 & 13.2 describes Chinese investment in Myanmar during 2010– 2019, and Table 13.3 displays the Chinese investments in Myanmar. Chinese investments in Myanmar

Myanmar and China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in December 1989, and since then, loans and grants started to flow

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 229 TABLE 13.1 Myanmar’s Regular Trade with China (2010–2019) (USD in Millions)

Year

Export

Import

Total

Balance

2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018 (Mini Budget) 2018–2019 Total

1,203.560 2,214.298 2,238.070 2,913.673 4,692.459 4,596.961 5,055.487 5,699.348 2,904.473 5,063.538 36,581.867

2,168.523 2,786.835 2,719.486 4,119.452 5,019.629 6,395.479 5,749.286 6,086.780 3,115.258 6,330.061 44,490.789

3,372.083 5,001.133 4,957.556 7,033.125 9,712.088 10,992.440 10,804.773 11,786.128 6,019.731 11,393.600 81,072.656

-964.963 -572.537 -481.416 -1,205.779 -327.170 -1,798.518 -693.799 -387.432 -210.785 -1,266.523 -7,908.922

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Statistical Year Book TABLE 13.2 Myanmar’s Border Trade with China (2011–2019) (USD in Millions)

Year

Export

Import

Total

Balance

2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018 (Mini Budget) 2018–2019 Total

1,821.901 1,896.886 2,502.244 4,052.300 4,242.122 4,521.243 4,973.743 2,441.727 4,010.722 30,462.89

1,162.602 1,041.237 1,367.756 1,834.371 1,708.560 1,775.402 1,796.676 877.681 1,898.713 13,463.00

2,984.503 2,938.123 3,870.000 5,886.671 5,950.682 6,296.645 6,770.419 3,319.408 5,909.435 43,925.89

+659.299 +855.649 +1,134.488 +2,217.929 +2,533.562 +2,745.841 +3,177.067 +1,564.046 +2,112.009 +16,999.89

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Statistical Year Book TABLE 13.3 Chinese Investment in Myanmar (2010-2019) (USD in Millions)

Year

No. of Enterprises

Value of Chinese Investment

2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017 2017–2018 2018 (Mini Budget) 2018–2019

3 2 10 15 30 43 38 68 28 136

8,269.232 4,345.728 231.773 56.160 511.415 3,323.853 482.591 1,398.936 302.334 626.242

Source: Directorate of Investment and Company Administration

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from China. From 2014 to 2019, the two countries concluded six grant agreements, and China provided 4.9 billion Yuan for the infrastructure, agriculture, education and health sectors, rehabilitation of war, and natural disaster victims (Myanmar Foreign Economic Relations Department). Moreover, in March 2016, China initiated the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund to provide small and medium cooperation projects in LancangMekong countries with financing. China gave US$2.4 million LMC Special fund in January 2018 and US$7.378 million in January 2019 for Myanmar to assist the projects under the LMC framework.14 Simultaneously, the regional LMC is a part of BRI and it supports the socio-economic development in Myanmar. Therefore, the promotion of LMC is also reflected in the accelerating of the BRI. In accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, Myanmar and China maintained the special relations of “pauk phaw”. In 2011, bilateral relations were elevated to comprehensive strategic partnership and expanded exchanges and cooperation at all levels for strengthening mutual strategic support, deepening pragmatic cooperation, and maintaining border stability (Bolesta 2018). China always stands on the side of Myanmar in front of international arena against the resolutions of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by vetoing as a permanent member. When the Rakhine Muslim minority issue has been described as possible acts of genocide by the United Nations’ Human Rights chief in 2017, it prevented the UN from submitting a resolution to Myanmar addressing records of human rights abuses. Besides, its engagement with Myanmar and Bangladesh has placed China in a position to play a stronger role in Myanmar and the region (Strangio 2020). A few months later, the Myanmar government intentionally created a Steering Committee for implementation of BRI to review Chinese megaprojects (including the suspended Myitsone dam project) and ensure that they serve Myanmar’s interests. Both sides signed an MoU on cooperation within the BRI in May 2017. In March 2018, an MoU was signed to conduct feasibility studies for the construction of the Mandalay-Muse expressway project and the Kyaukphyu-Naypyidaw highway project. On 25 April 2019, the governments signed two MoUs and an agreement letter for deepening cooperation on building CMEC. They signed 33 agreements, MoUs, protocols, and letters of exchange relating to accelerating the development of the Kyaukphyu SEZ, the Border Economic Cooperation Zone along the Kunlong-Chinshwehaw border area, the New Yangon City, applying stateof-art smart city technologies and sustainable urban design concepts, and comprehensive road, rail, and energy transboundary interconnectivity. Moreover, China provides full backing of the State Administration Council (SAC) in April 2022. That engagement ushered in a new phase of economic cooperation, moving ahead with the CMEC.

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 231

SEZs and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) in Myanmar

Furthermore, China also takes a moderating role in Myanmar’s peace process. It encouraged ethnic armed groups (Northern Alliance from the Shan and Kachin states) to participate in a formal peace dialogue, and gave political and financial support to the Myanmar government. A senior Shan analyst observed that China’s priority is “to stabilise the borderlands, and create an enabling environment for a border trade boom to deliver economic growth for their poorest provinces in their northwest, led by Yunnan.” Some critics are worried about using it as a card in its relations with Myanmar. China’s COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy in Myanmar has been a relative successful. It has transferred to Myanmar the technology to produce a Chinese COVID-19 vaccine under the brand name Myancopharm. As a result, it opens the way for newly established Chinese pharmaceutical companies to invest in Myanmar’s generic drugs market, which is still dominated by imports from India. Both sides also agreed to establish renminbi as the official settlement currency for trade with China to reduce the reliance on the USD in trade (Thiha 2022). Implications for Myanmar

Myanmar is the world’s tenth-largest exporter of natural gas. Access to energy sources is both a strategic and economic concern. The exploitation of offshore natural gas fields in Myanmar is important to China, and avoiding the Straits of Malacca is a strategic plus for China (Steinberg 2010). Myanmar’s energy and strategic importance to reach China’s goal is really an essential factor for China. Indeed, China wants a close relationship with Myanmar, with reasons such as to respond to US influence in Southeast Asia, to counterbalance India’s South Asia influence, to create a strategic way out for China, to support the security of its ships in the India Ocean, to make a way for the left-behind regions from western China to recover their economy, to trade Yunnan products to Myanmar, and to getMyanmar products with cheap prices. From the positive point of view, China has been one of Myanmar’s most important neighbours. Chinese trade and investment still have occupied a large part of Myanmar economy. Myanmar has long-term visions for national development, which require infrastructure for transportation, electricity, telecommunication, and industry. To fulfil these infrastructures, capital and technology are essential and could be mostly provided by China. It is necessary for Myanmar to improve its modernisation, stimulated by the strategy of riding on the boom of China, including foreign investment, market awareness, cross-border economic cooperation zone, and trading network and connectivity links. The increasing Myanmar-China economic

232  San San Khine

cooperation is expected to provide more job opportunities and infrastructural development in Myanmar. For instance, some residents of Kyaukphyu are optimistic about the SEZ and deep-sea port, voicing hopes that the investment will create job opportunities for young people in the township. The project’s developers also said the port and industrial park would add ten billion US dollars to Myanmar’s GDP and create 100,000 jobs in the area. Under the framework of the BRI and CMEC, the Muse-Mandalay Railway project and Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone deep-sea port project will contribute to Myanmar’s sustainable development through improving its own national infrastructure, industry, and development planning, and longterm bilateral relations between Myanmar and China as well.15 On the other hand, from the negative perspective, it is found that Chinese firms mostly ignore basic legal, environmental, and labour standards in their rush to secure resources, leaving a trail of corruption, pollution, and exploitation. This intensifies negative sentiments within Myanmar’s society towards Chinese businesses. For instance, the construction of Myitsone dam was suspended by President Thein Sein in 2011, citing social and environmental concerns, presented by the society. Even the BRI’s road infrastructure could have environmental impacts, including risks of natural disasters such as landslides and flooding, water pollution, wildlife mortality, and ecosystem degradation, if they are not properly constructed. Hostility, through dissatisfaction, to China at all levels of society and unresolved ethnic tensions in Myanmar have focussed popular anger on Chinese investments, which are seen as symbols of the continuing power of Myanmar’s military and its crony business partners. In addition, many felt that Chinese companies provide benefits to only a small group of elite officials and do not benefit the local people. Chinese firms bring their own labourers and resources, and don’t use local people, due to lack of skills. The methods and processes applied by Chinese companies show lack of transparency and trust for the local people.16 For instance, the Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep-sea port is backed by Chinese state-owned conglomerate China International Trust Investment Corporation (CITIC) and the Myanmar government. The projects would cover 4,300 acres and include an industrial zone for garments, electronics, construction materials, food, pharmaceuticals, and other goods. Some residents in Kyaukphyu said that the government and project developers pushed their plans ahead without the public’s consent. According to the International Commission of Jurists, the construction threatened the livelihoods and homes of around 20,000 people. Consequently, in the late-2000s, there were widespread objections among residents along the pipeline route over its social and environmental impacts. Left with little chance to negotiate, villagers organised peaceful protests, but the leaders were arrested. Construction went ahead and the pipelines and terminals were finished (Ryack 2020).

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 233

Despite potential opportunities, the BRI projects have been criticised for creating unsustainable debts for the host countries. Some experts pointed to broad pushback against China’s BRI projects from Malaysia and Sri Lanka to Zambia. A report from the Washington-based Centre for Global Development (2018) described that many countries have the potential to fall into the debt trap of China under BRI projects because of large amounts of lending to implement the projects and string-attached aid activities. Myanmar is concerned about a debt trap, particularly in the Kyaukphyu SEZ project, looking at the experience of the Hambantota international port in Sri Lanka. Myanmar can face a potential debt trap because of its weak financial viability, while BRI-related projects will be huge cost investments. In addition, in the border trade area, Myanmar traders are being manipulated by China closing the border gates without prior notice. Ultimately, many are worried that Chinese support or recognition of the military government might interrupt the Myanmar’s democratisation process. Assessment, recommendations, and conclusion

As a justification of the literatures, according to an interview with a Chinese expert, Myanmar is not an economic pivot of China, but the relationship seems to be based on a mutual need. It is undeniable that Myanmar is a client state of China, because Myanmar is depending on China, politically and economically, to some extent, so that China might take advantage of this relationship for its own gain. It is noted that, accounting for a significant share of Myanmar’s international trade and foreign investments, China has been the country of most influence on Myanmar’s development. Due to geographic and other reasons, and as a potential global superpower, China’s weight on Myanmar will continue to be extensive. Myanmar should take advantage of China’s growing economy, high technology, and rising food demands, while trying its best to tackle challenges. As far as recommendations for the long term, Myanmar should enhance both software like human resources, skills, intelligence, etc., and hardware such as technology, infrastructure, and so on. It should further diversify other economic partners and increase economic cooperation, particularly with India. In addition to Myanmar, for India, growing Chinese influence in Myanmar is a cause for worry and the emerging dynamics in the region need to be carefully monitored and balanced with appropriate counter-action. India and China have risen into the two most powerful and influential Asian nations in terms of their economic capabilities and geopolitical standing. Myanmar is a main actor to fulfil China and India’s common goals, such as meeting energy needs, equal development in the country, and influencing the region.

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Myanmar is perceived to be a buffer state between India and China, and India has always been concerned about China’s relative gains in Myanmar. In the context of the Cold War, the two countries rivalled each other fiercely in Myanmar and the region to meet their needs. Political changes in Myanmar were a significant attraction to their multiple interests. Starting in 1988, Myanmar has become a close ally of China, and China has a considerable presence in Myanmar, which has serious implications for India’s security.17 While China is cooling down on its economic and political engagement with Myanmar, in 2011, particularly concerning the Myitsone dam project, India has actively initiated new steps with the Myanmar government through its Act East Policy. There are lots of opportunities regarding the connectivity of India with Southeast Asian nations through northeast India within the framework of the Act East Policy. India’s wish to regenerate the Northeast Region (NER) is matched by China’s desire to develop Yunnan and integrate with Myanmar (Nehru n.d.). At the same time, China’s growing influence in Myanmar, both politically and economically, is of great concern to India. In the 21st century, China and India’s policies toward Myanmar are essentially the same. However, from the perspective of implementation, there is no denying the fact that China has embraced Myanmar quicker than India. The Indian constructive engagement with Myanmar has come after quite a bit of hesitation. In the context of the Bengali crisis, China resisted stronger involvement by the UNSC in addressing the crisis in Myanmar.18 China stands as a shield for Myanmar in the UNSC whenever Myanmar faces a difficult situation. The major difference between India and China’s approach to Myanmar is that India seemingly tries to reconcile all decisions at central level, while China has allowed a certain degree of decentralisation of the decision-making process ( Schmidt 2011). Myanmar can scale down its dependence on China in the economic sector, but China’s diplomatic shield from the international arena is essential for Myanmar. It can be noted that China’s influence on Myanmar is undeniable, as Myanmar has to rely politically and economically on diplomatic support from China. India regards the growing Chinese influence and presence in Myanmar as undermining their strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Concerns and tensions increased in India over China’s extensive military involvement in developing ports, naval, and intelligence facilities and industries. Chinese firms are increasing investment, from manufacturing to dams, alongside legions of Chinese traders moving into Myanmar. Chinese involvement in Myanmar’s military build-up and ports includes upgrading the Sittwe port for both commercial and military purposes. Some critics argued that the upgrading of a naval base in Sittwe is one of the concerns for India, as it is a major seaport located close to the eastern Indian city of Kolkata. It seems that Myanmar’s relations with both China and India are the same but,

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 235

compared to China, India has been rather late in engaging the Myanmar government. Though India is regarded as the rising power both militarily as well as economically, it still remains behind China in terms of capabilities. The challenges in Myanmar-India relations are China’s great regional influence and Myanmar’s growing dependence on China in economy and politics. For Myanmar, in comparison with China, India has more cultural, religious, and democratic opportunities, and good relations with high officials in the past. Despite delays in issues such as fighting against the insurgents in border areas and some ethnic issues, Myanmar needs India to enhance bilateral relations for the counterbalance to China’s influence and for the benefits of investments and technology that can contribute to its economic development. India is planning to construct a India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral route to connect with Southeast Asian countries, and preparations are being made for connecting northeastern India with Mandalay in Myanmar. In addition, efforts are being made to make large investments in port construction, hydropower projects, the Kaladan Multipurpose Transport project, the oil and gas sector, information technology, and cooperation programs on traditional medicine, human resource development sector, etc. The construction of deep-water projects with India and exporting Myanmar’s gas to India will surely support Myanmar’s economic development. Therefore, India needs to increase its presence in Myanmar for the mutual benefit of the two countries, and to reduce its security concerns. The success of India’s Act East Policy and Neighbourhood First Policy largely depends on its relations with Myanmar. Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and Mekong Ganga Cooperation has introduced a regional, sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations and provided significance in the context of India’s Act East policy. Myanmar has generally been supportive of India’s stand in various regional organisations19 and it is crucial for India to become a regional power with economic ambitions in Asia. For Myanmar, closer economic relations with India is an important technique to relieve implications and reduce its overdependence on China to some extent. Moreover, to accelerate institutional reforms, harmonious rules and regulations should be implemented. More forward-looking, comprehensive, and strategic planning need to be conducted in order to make advances in all fronts. Importantly, both sides should work together to reduce hostility and distrust, and increase responsible and mutually beneficial investments in Myanmar. It is essential to ensure that CMEC investments will provide positive economic and social outcomes, become environmentally sustainable, and contribute to the peace-building process in the country, rather than creating further divisions. To sum up, the continuing chaos, a variety of international sanctions, anti-China sentiment, and economic devastation are all making Myanmar

236  San San Khine

destabilise and marginalise. For the short run, the government should find ways to maintain political stability. It needs to cooperate with other countries by assuring to achieve mutual benefits and opportunities. For the long run, Myanmar should strive to increase its national power, effectively applying its tangible and intangible resources, so as not to depend too much on any other country in the future. Notes 1 “Deng Xiaoping’s Leadership and China under Him,” Facts and Details, accessed 13 June 2022, https://factsanddetails​.com​/china​/cat2​/sub7​/item80​.html​#chapter​-9. 2 “The Three-Step Development Strategy,” China Internet Information Centre, accessed 13 June 2022, http://www​.china​.org​.cn ​/english ​/features​/38199​.htm. 3 The heart of Deng's economic reforms was the establishment of SEZs along China's southern coastline, and the first special economic zone was established in Shenzhen in 1980 “Deng Xiaoping Steps up His Economic Reforms: SEZs and His Southern Tour,” Facts and Details, accessed 13 June 2022, https://factsanddetails​.com​/china​/cat2​/sub7​/entry​-5538​.html​#chapter​-2.. 4 “Deng Xiaoping’s Leadership and China under Him.” 5 “China under Jiang Zemin (1990-2003),” Facts and Details, accessed 14 June 2022, https://factsanddetails​.com ​/china ​/cat2 ​/sub7​/item76​.html​#chapter​- 4. 6 “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, 2012, https://www​.mfa​.gov​.cn ​/ ce​/ceus​/eng ​/zt​/18th​_CPC ​_ National​_Congress​_ Eng ​/t992917​.htm. 7 “China under Hu Jintao (2003-2013),” Facts and Details, accessed 14 June 2022, https://factsanddetails​.com ​/china ​/cat2 ​/sub7​/item75​.html​#chapter​-1. 8 “FACTBOX: China’s Economic Development since 2002,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in The Republic of Slovenia, 2012, http://si​.china​ -embassy​.gov​.cn ​/eng ​/zt ​/zt ​/201209​/t20120924​_ 3369630​.htm. 9 “China’s Xi Jinping Unveils New ‘four Comprehensives’ Slogans,” BBC News, 2015, https://www​.bbc​.com ​/news​/world​-asia​- china​-31622571. 10 Zhang, “Understanding China’s Politics, Economic Policy Makers, and Policy Making under Xi Jinping.” 11 “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative - People’s Daily Online,” People’s Daily Online, 2016, http://en​.people​.cn ​/n3​/2016​/0624​/c90883​-9077342​.html. 12 “Belt and Road Sees Steady Progress in Transport Connectivity,” National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) People’s Republic of China, 2021, https://en​.ndrc​.gov​.cn ​/netcoo​/achievements​/202112 ​/t20211231​_1311219​ .html. 13 “China’s Trade Volume of Goods with BRI Countries Reaches Eight-Year High in 2021,” National Development and Reform Commission, 2022, https://en​ .ndrc​.gov​.cn ​/netcoo​/achievements​/202203​/t20220309​_1318867​.html. 14 “China Extends to Myanmar Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund for Second Batch,” Open Development Mekong, accessed 25 December 2022, https://ope​ndev​elop​ment​mekong​.net ​/news​/china​- extends​-to​-myanmar​-lancang​ -mekong​- cooperation​-special​-fund​-for​-second​-batch/. 15 “Selling the Silk Road Spirit,” Transnational Institute, accessed 25 December 2022, https://www​.tni​.org ​/en​/selling​-the​-silk​-road​-spirit. 16 Bolesta, “Myanmar-China Peculiar Relationship: Trade, Investment and the Model of Development.”

The impacts of Chinese economic policies on Myanmar 237

17 “The Two Rivalries That Benefit the Junta in Myanmar | Kashmir Observer,” accessed 25 December 2022, https://kashmirobserver​.net ​/2021​/06​/17​/the​-two​ -rivalries​-that​-benefit​-the​-junta​-in​-myanmar/. 18 USIP Senior Study Group, “China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts,” 2018, https://www​.usip​.org​/publications​/2018​/09​/chinas​-role​-myanmars​-internal​- conflicts. 19 “India - Myanmar Ties: RSTV – Big Picture,” BYJU’s Exam Prep, accessed 25 December 2022, https://byjus​.com ​/free​-ias​-prep​/india​-myanmar​-ties​-rstv​-big​ -picture/.

References Baobo, J. and Kobayashi, J.S.S. 1999. “The ‘Three Reforms’ in China: Progress and Outlook,” Japan Research Institute 45, https://www​.jri​.co​.jp​/english​/periodical​/ rim ​/1999​/ RIM​e199​904t​hree​reforms/. Bhardwaj, R.D. 1992. “China’s Economic Reform: The Role and Significance of SEZs,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3: 332–373, https://www​ .jstor​.org​/stable​/41855617. Bolesta, A. 2018. “Myanmar-China Peculiar Relationship: Trade, Investment and the Model of Development,” Journal of International Studies 11, no. 2: 23–36, https://doi​.org ​/10​.14254​/2071​-8330​. 2018​/11​-2 ​/2. Glawe, W.L.H. 2017. “The People’s Republic of China in the Middle-Income Trap?” ADBI Working Paper (Japan), https://www​.adb​.org​/publications​/prc​-middle​ -income​-trap. Green, S. 2003. “Reforming China’s Economy a Rough Guide” (London), www​.riia​ .org. He, A. 2018. “The Emerging Model of Economic Policy Making under Xi Jinping China’s Political Structure and Decision-Making Process,” CIGI Papers (Canada), https://www​.cigionline​.org ​/static ​/documents​/documents​/CIGI Paper No​. 208​.p​df. Malik, M. 2018. “China and India: Maritime Maneuvers and Geopolitical Shifts in the Indo-Pacific,” Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2: 67–81, https:// risingpowersproject​.com ​/files​/wp​- content ​/uploads​/2018​/10​/vol3​. 2​-malik​.pdf. Morrison, W.M. 2013. “China ’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States.” Morrison, W.M. 2019. “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States”, https://fas​.org ​/sgp​/crs​/row​/ RL33534​.pdf. Nedopil, C. 2022. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” Green Finance & Development Center (Shanghai). Nehru, J. “India’s Approach to Asia,” accessed December 25, 2022, https://www​ .scribd​.com​/document​/337459688​/ India​-s​-Approach​-to​-Asia#. Ryack, G. 2020. “A Hitch in the Belt and Road in Myanmar,” The Diplomat, December 2020, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/12​/a​-hitch​-in​-the​-belt​-and​-road​ -in​-myanmar/. Rahman, M.Z. et al. 2018. “The Rise of China: Dream of Xi Jinping,” Research in Social Sciences 1, no. 2: 53–59, https://doi​.org​/10​. 53935​/2641​-5305​.v1i2​.8.

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Schmidt, J.D. 2011. “India China Rivalry and Competition in Southeast Asia,” Proceedings from International Conference “India in International Relations: European and Indian Perspectives”, 27–29 April, 2011, Delhi, India. Organized by Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi and Centre for Contemporary India Research and Studies, Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, 2011, 1–27. Song, L., Zhou Y., and Hurst, L. eds., 2019. The Chinese Economic Transformation (ANU Press), https://press​-files​.anu​.edu​.au ​/downloads​/press​/n5564​/pdf​/ book​ .pdf. Steinberg, D.I. 2010. BURMA / MYANMAR What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press). Strangio, S. 2020. “China’s Top Diplomat Checks in on Myanmar Projects,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2020​/09​/chinas​-top​-diplomat​- checks​-in​-on​ -myanmar​-projects/. Tekdal, V. 2018. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: At the Crossroads of Challenges and Ambitions,” Pacific Review 31, no. 3 (May 4): 373–390, https://doi​.org​/10​ .1080​/09512748​. 2017​.1391864. Thiha, A. 2022. “Revisiting the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor After the Coup,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat​.com ​/2022​/04​/revisiting​-the​- china​ -myanmar​- economic​- corridor​-after​-the​- coup/. Zhang, D.D. 2017. “Understanding China’s Politics, Economic Policy Makers, and Policy Making under Xi Jinping,” Commonwealth of Australia, www​ .itsanhonour​.gov​.au.

PART V Extended Neighbourhood



14 THE COLLAPSE OF CHINA’S COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPE Emilian Kavalski

In August 2022, the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia announced their withdrawal from China’s cooperation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – better known as the “17+1” because it brought together 17 CEE countries and China. In this way, Estonia and Latvia joined their neighbour Lithuania, which left the format a year earlier – the first CEE country to do so (Lau 2021). In November 2021, the Lithuanian government made its foreign policy stance quite explicit by opening a “Taiwan” (rather than “Taipei”) representative office in the capital Vilnius (Seibt 2021). The three Baltic countries are far from the only CEE states to have second thoughts about their relations with China. Slovakia and Czechia have been quite vocal in their criticism of Beijing’s human rights record. It seems that the favourite hobbyhorse of pundits on China-CEE cooperation is guessing which will be the next country to leave the “16+1” format (Karaskova 2022). As a recent survey indicated there seems to be no shortage of disaffected CEE states (Lucas 2022). Such findings reveal persistent Chinese failing to engender trust in the region after a decade of China-CEE cooperation initiatives. The CEE countries used to be quite upbeat about benefiting from China’s economic largesse. Just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing’s cooperation with the region was touted as a real feather in China’s foreign policy cap. In fact, the evolution of the “17+1” mechanism was viewed as significantly important to warrant the EU’s designation of China as a “systemic rival” (Mayer and Kavalski 2019b). Ensuring that the point was not lost on anyone, the then-EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Johannes Hahn, went as far as decrying the participating CEE states as “Trojan horses” undermining European unity (Kavalski 2019a). China was equally forthright in flaunting the symbolic significance DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-19

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of its cooperation with CEE countries. In January 2020, just as the COVID19 pandemic was in its offing, Beijing made the unexpected announcement that President Xi Jinping will be replacing the Premier Li Keqiang as the host for all future “17+1” summits (Kavalski 2021a). Yet, for a while, it looked like no future summits would be forthcoming: the 2020 summit of the ChinaCEE cooperation was initially postponed because of the pandemic and was then deferred indefinitely. Reinforcing the growing sense of estrangement, only Serbia, Hungary, and Greece (from all 17 CEE states) agreed to take part in the June 2020 high-level Belt and Road International Cooperation video conference (Truchla 2020). Eventually, the summit did take place virtually on 9 February 2021, but the optics of the event were telling: in what could be read as a snub to Mr Xi, only five CEE states (Poland, Czechia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) elevated their representation to the presidential level; in fact, for the first time since the annual summits of the format were launched, six CEE countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia) downgraded their representation to a level lower than that of the prime minister (Turcsanyi 2021). This has led many to question what brought about the collapse of the China-CEE cooperation. To begin with, there is no single reason or development for this development. In fact, while there are multiple contingent factors that have led to the current rift in the “17+1”, most CEE states have been mulling a freeze in their participation for quite some time. In this respect, the pandemic has only accelerated the “social distancing” of CEE countries from China (Brinza 2020b; Kavalski 2020b; Koleva 2017). Most of the misgivings appear to have come to light already during 2019, well before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and have been stirred by the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong against the proposed extradition bill. Drawing on data gathered by the Chinfluence (2020) project, this paper will outline the main trends in the perception of China both in the run up and in the wake of the pandemic. The analysis suggests that policy and popular attitudes towards China reflect its idiosyncratic “localisation” in the CEE region (Kavalski 2020c). As such, China has been used to validate specific domestic positions of different political formations. Thus, perceptions of China (what it is assumed to stand for) have been deployed domestically in the CEE region to justify particular visions of the state and its international identity (Kavalski 2008). Such context is crucial to understanding the split in the CEE countries following the pandemic – those siding with China (mainly Serbia and Hungary) and those suspicious of China (most of the remaining participants in the “17+1” cooperation). The study concludes by suggesting that the unrequited romance of China with the CEE region has important implications both for China’s public diplomacy and the postpandemic trajectories of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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Localising China in Central and Eastern Europe

The 2016 Mandopop hit “Prague Square” ushered in a new affair between the CEE region and China. The lyrics eulogise the beauty of the Czech capital and urge listeners to “cast their hopes on [Prague’s] wishing fountain”. And many Chinese did – especially young couples, who have been flocking to Prague for their wedding photos (Kirschbaum 2019). Not only that, but it also seems that China itself was pinning its hopes for global prominence on starting an affair with the CEE countries. Just a few months before the release of the song, the city of Suzhou hosted the first China-CEE cooperation summit attended by all the regional heads of state and government. Yet, it was quite literally in Prague that the affair began to unravel. In October 2019, the Prague City Council scrapped its sister-city relations with Beijing (Reuters 2019). The dispute was over the inclusion of the “One China” principle in the agreement. The newly elected mayor of Prague had demanded the removal of any political conditionality from the arrangement, so that the Czech capital could enter into sister-city relations with Taipei. Beijing’s refusal forced Prague’s hand. The tensions appear only to escalate, and about a year later, in September 2020, the President of the Czech Senate, Milos Vystrcil, made the emblematic pronouncement, “I am Taiwanese,” on the floor of the Taiwanese parliament (Kavalski 2021b). Echoing the 1963 statement by the US president John F. Kennedy, “Ich bin ein Berliner [I am a Berliner]”, Vystrcil stressed that Taiwan was a beacon of democracy, freedom, and human rights and was being bullied and threatened with occupation by its larger, authoritarian neighbour on the mainland in a way not dissimilar to what the CEE states experienced during the Cold War at the hands of the Soviet Union. Vystrcil’s trip to Taiwan – whether accidental or not – was timed perfectly to coincide with the first European trip since the start of the pandemic by the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. China’s diplomatic visit intended to strengthen relations with the EU in the face of growing Sino-American tensions. Yet, this aim seems to have been undermined when Wang threatened that the president of the Czech Senate will pay “a heavy price” for his Taiwanese trip. The German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, who was standing right next to Wang when he made the threat, immediately condemned the Chinese foreign minister and stated that threats have no place in the bilateral relationship (Karnitschnig 2020). Likewise, the French foreign ministry announced that “any threat to the EU’s member state is unacceptable”. The Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová was also quick to denounce Wang’s statement as a “violation” of the very nature of the EU-China partnership (Prague Morning 2020). And Czechia is far from the only CEE country to have second thoughts about its relations with China.

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It needs to be stated at the outset that China is not merely a newcomer in the CEE region (Kavalski 2019b), but that both Asia and China have been far too distant geographically, historically, and ideationally to have meaningful resonance in the political, cultural, and (until very recently) economic imaginaries of the CEE countries. Furthermore, the lack of palpable experience and contact has not permitted the coalescing of firm stereotypes or particular attitudes towards either Asia or China (Kavalski 2020b; McCullock and Kavalski 2005). Even during the Cold War, most of the CEE states sided with Moscow during the Sino-Soviet split. As a result, during the communist period, these countries had little-to-no contact with Beijing (Cho and Kavalski 2017; Dimitrov 2013; Kavalski 2005; Turcsanyi and Qiaoan 2019). Such mutual disinterest informed the better part of the first two decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the extent that they did, most CEE states began to engage with China on an ad hoc basis and were invariably motivated by an opportunistic “realpolitik” (Kavalski 2002; Zolkos and Kavalski 2008). In this respect, it is China’s attention to the CEE region in 2012 that has very much set the stage for its perception in the context of the current pandemic (Brinza 2019; Kavalski 2011). CEE perceptions of Beijing – both in general and in the context of COVID-19 pandemic – appear to follow a framework of “localising” China (Kavalski 2019b). Localisation, in this setting, refers to the ways in which images and representations of an external other are internalised in the domestic discourse. The focus is on the uses of China for the justification of different positions in domestic political debates (Kavalski 2009b). In this sense, Chinese images are becoming increasingly “local” (and “localised”) as they are being adopted, adapted, and appropriated to fit the domestic political narratives of CEE states. Such localisation appears to be the established pattern of CEE countries’ engagement with the dominant others in their neighbourhood ( Kavalski 2018a). For instance, the division between “Russophobe” and “Russophile” camps reflects a proRussian or anti-Russian stance, depending on which side of the division a specific political formation stands (Stanoeva 2017; Kavalski 2010a; Zolkos and Kavalski 2007). Attitudes towards China reflect a similar template. For instance the cases of the Prague City Council severing ties with Beijing and the Taiwanese trip of the Czech Senate president reflect domestic political rifts rather than specific actions of China. In both cases, representatives of the opposition have opted for “China bashing” in order to score electoral points against the current Czech President, who is accused of cosying up to Beijing. The inference is that bonhomie with China is synonymous with graft and a tilt towards illiberal politics. In this respect, it is not what China does (or intends to do), but how its agency has been localised domestically that frames CEE perceptions of Beijing (Kavalski 2003; Pan and Kavalski 2018).

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It needs to be noted at the outset that CEE interest in China is far less significant than that in other external actors – such as the EU, Russia, or the United States (Horesh and Kavalski 2014; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2018; Kavalski 2014). For instance, CEE media accounts of interactions with Brussels, Moscow, or Washington in the first three quarters of any year tend to surpass the overall number of stories about China in the prepandemic decade (Splichal 2019; Kavalski 2018b). This development reflects distinct constructions of proximity in the CEE region, where events in the EU, Russia, or the United States are considered to have immediate bearing – in contrast to events in China (Kavalski 2007). While, generally speaking, this pattern reflects uninterest not just in China, but also in Asia, it also reveals the failure of Chinese public diplomacy to articulate the country’s significance for the CEE region. Before the pandemic: Anticipation and uncertainty As can be expected, tracing the representations of China in the CEE region reveals a gradual growth in the number of publications and information about China as the relationship intensifies. At the same time, the available data demonstrates that for most CEE countries, the peak year of media interest in China occurred well before the start of the pandemic (Kavalski 2013; see Table 14.1). In fact, already in the run up to 2020 for most CEE countries, the number of media accounts of China was decreasing and was well below the average for the period. There are a number of explanations for such a trend. Some have suggested that the decrease in interest reflects the declining novelty factor and the attended expectations-capabilities gap. The lavish promises of large-scale investments generated nearly stratospheric expectations in most CEE countries. However, as the relationship evolved and the Chinese investments failed to materialise, it revealed a capability gap that caused interest in China across the region to diminish (Kavalski 2018c; Kowalski 2019). Not only that, after years of “17+1” summits, both CEE policymakers and pundits realised that it was the photo opportunities rather than meaningful discussion that mattered most to their Chinese counterparts (Kavalski TABLE 14.1 Number of Reports on China (2010–2018)

Country

Number of Publications (Peak Year)

Average per Year

Czechia Hungary Slovakia Poland

347 (2016) 842 (2013) 544 (2015) 351 (2015)

139 490 325 232

Source: Author compilation based on Chinfluence Data (2020)

246  Emilian Kavalski TABLE 14.2 Perceptions of China (2010–2018)

Country

Perceptions of China Positive

Negative

Neutral

Czechia Hungary Slovakia Poland

14% 4.8% 6% 39%

41% 9.4% 26% 3%

45% 85.8% 68% 58%

Source: Author compilation based on Chinfluence Data (2020) 2012b). For instance the frustration of the Czech Prime Minister Babiš about hosting “masses of [Chinese] delegations over and over again,” without any tangible results, received wide coverage (Cho and Kavalski 2018; Kavalski 2006; Kuchynova 2019). Likewise, the Czech President Milos Zeman, one of the most pro-Chinese CEE politicians, pointed to this lack of outcomes as the reason for shunning the next “17+1” summit (Lau 2020). Such statements echoed the sentiments of many participants in the various China-CEE summits who were exasperated that rather than seeking to develop initiatives in the region, the Chinese organisers of these events were using them to advance their careers back home in China (Kavalski 2016; Nordin et al. 2019). This trend mimics the overall pattern of perceptions of China in the prepandemic period (Kavalski 2010b; see Table 14.2). Based on the available data, in all CEE countries, the overwhelming perception tends to be neutral. Such lack of specific value reflects the nature of most accounts, which tend to depict sights and events – such as historical places, natural sites, religious temples, or tourist venues – in China (Cho and Kavalski 2015; Kavalski 2009a). In this respect, their aim is to construct a picture of China, which neither glorifies nor denigrates the country. Yet, the second most common trend in the Visegrad countries is the largely negative attitude towards China (Kavalski 2018d). Media accounts in Czechia and Slovakia demonstrate the strongest negative feelings, while Hungary trails significantly behind (even though the negative representations there are also twice as many as the positive ones). In this respect, Poland is the sole outlier in the region, with a noteworthy majority of reports revealing a positive depiction of China. In all the other CEE countries, positive perceptions of China are significantly lower than the negative and neutral ones. Yet, a pattern that emerges from the available data is the growing negative media depictions of China in the year preceding the coronavirus outbreak. The localisation paradigm presents a convincing explanation of CEE perceptions of China (Walton and Kavalski 2017). Overwhelmingly, local opinion reflects the vacillation and vagaries of the political elites in each of the

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CEE countries. For instance, the overwhelmingly positive response in Polish media reflects the strong desire of representatives of almost all major political parties in the country to attract Chinese investments. Such consensus seems to have facilitated a largely positive account of China in Poland, as the media outlets either associated with or controlled by the major political parties in the country have been pitching favourable stories of Beijing’s relations with Warsaw. In other words, economic opportunism appears to have informed the near-unanimity among the major political parties in Poland. While Poland was far from being the only country in the region to express such sentiments, the consensus on China across the political spectrum distinguished it from the other Visegrad countries. In all the other CEE states, the perceptions of China tend to reflect a division between governing and opposition parties (Kavalski 2017). As a rule, governing parties have tended to be more pragmatic and favour closer economic relations with China, while opposition formations have tended to be negative. As a result, the negative accounts of China in the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak media often reflect dissatisfaction with specific policies of the government rather than the activities of Beijing or Chinese businesses in the country. Yet, as the 2010s progressed, ideology seems to have been playing a more significant role in regional perception of China. Usually, the parties on the left (in particular, the offspring of the former CEE communist parties) have been more positive of Beijing than the political formations in the centre or the right of the political spectrum. At the same time, increasingly – not only in countries such as Slovakia, but also in Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania – norms and values have begun to play a significant role in the division between a Sinophile and Sinophobe stance (Kavalski 2022b). In particular, human rights and democratic accountability have been central to framing perceptions of China. For instance, both during the election campaign and after her inauguration as President of Slovakia, Zuzana Čaputová, a human rights lawyer and activist, has been quite vocal in her condemnation of China’s treatment of minorities and dissidents (Filipova and Stefanov 2021; Pan and Kavalski 2022). In fact, accounts of her taking China to task by demanding explanations directly from high-ranking Chinese officials might have even increased her electoral appeal. In other words, the image of China has been drawn into domestic political debates about what each of the CEE states stand for and what should be their role on the world stage. 2019 to present: The collapse of the 17+1?

The claim here is that 2019 offers a much more appropriate start for explaining the shift in CEE attitudes towards China. The suggestion is that the dynamics, which became prominent in the wake of the pandemic, had

248  Emilian Kavalski

already been set in motion during the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of 1989, the Hong Kong protests triggered memories of the “velvet revolutions” in the CEE countries. At the same time, Hongkongers’ use of tactics developed by CEE dissidents – such as the Lennon Wall and the Baltic Way – resonated in the region (Lum 2019). Across the Baltic states, commemorations of 1989 involved support for the plight of Hongkongers. The negative Chinese reactions to such support received wide coverage in local media. For instance in August 2019, Chinese diplomats in Lithuania attacked a gathering for solidarity with Hong Kong (AP 2019). Ensuing public outrage urged the government to censure the Chinese ambassadorial staff in the country. A month later, a group of selfstyled “Chinese patriots” defaced the original Lennon Wall in Prague with graffiti celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The outcry in the country only intensified anti-Chinese sentiments in the context of Prague’s decision to end sister-city relations with Beijing. In December 2019, a Chinese tourist desecrated Lithuania’s Hill of Crosses pilgrimage site – a symbol of the country’s national independence – by destroying a cross placed there in support of the struggle of the people of Hong Kong (Jirous 2019). The Hong Kong pro-democracy protests have increased the wariness of CEE countries towards China. For some of them, this shift was associated with taking sides in the escalating conflict between the United States and China. Much of this has revolved around the “technological Cold War” between Washington and Beijing (Smith and Fallon 2020). In this respect, Poland, Czechia, Romania, and Estonia have indicated that they will be banning Huawei from the construction of their 5G networks (Nietsche 2020). Yet, the suggestion that these states merely succumbed to a pressure from Washington offers a simplistic explanation of such decisions. For example, in the case of Poland, the motivation was the charge of espionage against the country director for Huawei (who had previously worked as a Chinese diplomat in Poland). In a similar way, Slovak media had been rife with commentaries that the security threats posed by Chinese telecommunication companies are far worse than “accepting a hundred thousand immigrants” (Schutz 2020). For Czechia, the trigger appears to have been a personal spat between the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and the Chinese Ambassador to the country Zhang Jianmin. Babiš called Zhang a “liar” for allegedly making up statements that the prime minister never uttered (Willoughby 2020). For the Baltic states, the perception of a “dragon-bear” alliance between Moscow and Beijing has led them to declare China a threat to their national security (Brinza 2020a; Cudworth et al. 2018). Such threat perceptions evolved in parallel with the “wolf warrior diplomacy” that China unleashed in response to the pro-Hong Kong sentiments in the region. Almost all Chinese embassies in the CEE region established

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both Facebook and Twitter accounts in the second half of 2019. The aim of these accounts was to engage actively in the promotion of the Chinese version of developments in Hong Kong. In several prominent instances, Chinese embassies bought open space to “correct” local accounts. However, this social media activism went into overdrive in the context of the pandemic. Chinese embassies across the region posted actively about the medical “aid” provided to CEE countries and targeted Washington for both spreading disinformation about the situation in China and alleging that the United States was the source of the coronavirus. Yet, the content of this social networking activism was not customised to CEE audiences. Instead, it appeared to be created for consumption in China. As such, the “mask diplomacy” seems to have backfired by confirming criticisms that Beijing “does not get” the CEE countries (Brinza 2020c). Thus, it was in a climate of a growing suspicion (and even hostility in countries such as Czechia, Slovakia, and the Baltic states) towards China that the COVID-19 emerged in Wuhan. The initial reaction of most CEE states was to express some form of sympathy and support for the people of Hubei province. Nearly all CEE states sent aid to China. Yet, in general, the health crisis was deemed sufficiently distant to obviate consistent reporting. This is not surprising and echoes the minimal news coverage in the CEE countries of the 2002 SARS outbreak (Kavalski 2015; Nyiri 2003). Yet, this lack of interest in the novel coronavirus outbreak quickly gave way to hysteria as the first cases of COVID-19 appeared in Europe and in the individual CEE countries. The immediate concern was securing access to much needed personal protective equipment (PPE) and respirators. China quickly emerged as the first port of call for most of the CEE countries. The media was quick to point that it was the good “guanxi” of Sinophile politicians in the region that secured access to medical supplies. At the same time, a division that has begun to appear between the CEE countries before the pandemic – and especially in the context of the 2019 Hong Kong protests – solidified as a result of the pandemic. The governments of countries such as Serbia and Hungary used the pandemic as an opportunity to entrench authoritarian rule under the guise of emergency health measures. For these countries, China provided a muchneeded ideational alternative for framing narratively their independence from European institutions demanding compliance with EU laws and policies. For instance, in Hungary, the first act of the government under the newly acquired pandemic emergency powers was to make secret a deal with China for the construction of a two-billion-euro Budapest to Belgrade rail link (Inotai 2020). The fact that the deal had nothing to do with the health crisis appeared secondary. The Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, on the other hand, used the pandemic to stress that “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper. I have sent a special letter to the only

250  Emilian Kavalski

ones who can help, and that is China” (Kavalski 2021a). As a result, the European Commission singled out Serbia and Hungary in its report criticising China for using the pandemic to peddle disinformation, while Freedom House declared that Serbia and Hungary are no longer democracies thanks to Beijing’s support for authoritarian governance (Scott 2020). It seems that Beijing is also aware of such split among the CEE countries. A Chinese financial report from December 2019 acknowledged that apart from Hungary and Serbia, the other CEE countries are not worth investing in (Zhu 2019). In the other CEE countries, most media accounts quickly turned on China. Initially, CEE media reports focused on the low quality and high price of the Chinese equipment. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, investigative journalists discovered that hundreds of ventilators bought from China were “useless” for the treatment of patients with COVID-19 (Cuckic 2020). At the same time, the media outlets in many CEE countries reported that China has made the sale and delivery of medical supplies conditional on the public expression of praise of China by high-ranking CEE government officials. Such reports also revealed that China demanded gratitude for China’s “aid,” even though goods were purchased in commercial deals. For instance, Czech media blasted as a disgraceful “kowtowing” the welcoming of Chinese medical supplies by the prime minister and other government officials (Seaman 2020, 18). Likewise, Polish media revealed that the country’s president was compelled by Chinese diplomats in Warsaw to place a call to President Xi Jinping in mid-March and personally thank him for the supplies as a precondition for their delivery in April (Kruczkowska 2020). In the context of this negative reporting on China, most CEE media outlets have tended to point to the examples set up by Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan as appropriate models for tackling the pandemic. In fact, in countries such as Poland and Czechia, commentators were emphasising that Taiwan and South Korea were much quicker to send medical supplies than China. Across the CEE region, media reports were blaming the failure of the authorities in Wuhan to act when the first cases emerged and the subsequent coverup by both the provincial and national government for the pandemic (Mladenov 2021). Also, many accounts expressed doubt about the accuracy of Chinese data. Thus, pointing to Taipei’s exceptional record of dealing with the pandemic, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister called on the World Health Organisation to allow Taiwan’s participation as observer at the organisation’s international assembly in May 2020 (LRT 2020). Subsequently, the visit to Taiwan by the president of the Czech senate and the support that it garnered from the Baltic states and Slovakia seem to suggest that some CEE countries are using the pandemic not only to upgrade their relations with Taipei, but also to challenge Beijing. In June 2020, CEE representatives were among a group of European parliamentarians urging Brussels to demand a reciprocal access to Tibet as Chinese citizens get in

The collapse of China’s cooperation with Central and East Europe 251

the EU: “most European governments allow Chinese citizens to travel freely throughout our countries, while China routinely forbids Europeans from visiting Tibet” (Euractiv 2020). Also, the pandemic has prompted a number of CEE countries to seek decoupling from China. For instance in an attempt to strengthen the security and solidarity of the EU, Bulgaria has proposed the development of a “small EU China” by relocating critical Chinese medical production to the CEE countries (Nikolov 2020; Kavalski 2022a). Similar statements were made by Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, and the Baltic states. In May 2020, Romania revealed that it is cancelling a deal with a Chinese company to upgrade a nuclear power plant in the country, which was supposed to be one of the largest Chinese BRI investments in the region (Necsutu 2020). Adding insult to injury, the contract was then given to the United States, which committed eight billion dollars to the project. In this respect, the China-CEE cooperation has become one of the unintended victims of the pandemic, even though it was already in a comatose state before the first cases of COVID-19 emerged. Conclusion: The age of decoupling

This study has demonstrated that most CEE countries were becoming either suspicious or disappointed (or both) with China well before the pandemic (Kavalski 2012a). In fact, it seems that the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong were the real bifurcation point splitting the CEE states between those ideationally committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and those looking for illiberal alternatives. As has been shown, the pandemic has solidified this split, and China has been deployed by both camps to justify their normative choices. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the spring 2022 and Beijing ambiguous position on the conflict has only reinforced this split (Bergsen and Šniukaitė 2022). In fact, many CEE states have grown more hawkish and have started to challenge many of China’s “red lines” (Standish 2022). Thus, it is the contextual localisation of China in domestic political debates – rather than what China necessarily does in the individual CEE states or globally – that informs CEE perceptions of China. The countries with the strongest negative perceptions of China in the region appear to be Czechia, Slovakia, and the Baltic states, while those with the most positive are Serbia, Hungary, and Greece. All the other CEE states are between these two sets of countries, and most of them appear to be moving closer to the negative end of the spectrum. This response is not unique to the CEE region and reflects a general trend in Europe towards pushback against China (Kavalski 2020a). For some CEE states, this move reflects a negative reaction to the crudeness of China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy;” for others, it reflects Chinese failure to meet their investment commitments; and for still others, it is spurred by a normative

252  Emilian Kavalski

commitment to the liberal values in a rule-based international order. What, however, is unique to the CEE region is the willfulness of regional states to cross China’s red lines – especially, when it comes to the issue of Taiwan. Lithuania has become emblematic in this regard. The first foreign policy statement of the newly elected coalition in November 2020 was to declare its commitment to support “those fighting for freedom from Belarus to Taiwan” (Sytas 2020). Its fellow Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia have echoed similar sentiments in their departure from the “17+1,” signalling China’s perceived support for Russia as a threat to their national identity. At the same time, Beijing’s reactions to such challenges demonstrates China’s abandonment of rhetorical veneer of non-interference in other states’ international affairs. Instead, China has begun deploying economic sanctions as a tool for pressuring countries to change their policy positions when they do not agree with Beijing’s stance (Gueorguiev 2021; Rudakowska and Kavalski 2021). In this respect, China is confronted by the realisation that its romance with the CEE countries was never reciprocated. Regardless of the reasons for the growing negative perceptions of China across the CEE region, it seems that the pandemic rendered conspicuous certain serious shortcomings in Beijing’s public diplomacy and its ability to calibrate its message for diverse contexts. As the experience of the CEE region appears to demonstrate, while connectivity used to be touted as a force for good, it is now presented as over-dependence on (if not, hostage to) trade with Beijing. In this respect, China’s presence in the CEE region has become quite divisive and contested. Such trends do not bode well for the future of the BRI. It is likely to become a much leaner project (Tonchev 2020) targeting strategic acquisitions (such as infrastructure hubs, energy, and technology) and rewarding countries that have proven to be true all-weather friends (Kavalski 2020d). The initiative’s “community of shared destiny” will be open only to those that side with China, and, judging by the CEE policy and media statements, not many of the countries in the region appear interested in the “mutual benefit” (互 利, hùlì) that the BRI pledges to bring them. This is a stark reminder that Chinese ambitions are not backed by soft power and regional legitimacy. The bellicose interventions of China’s selfproclaimed “wolf warrior diplomats” have done little to improve the image of the Chinese state. Globally, perceptions of China are trending downward, a challenge for Beijing that has been aggravated by revelations that it actively pressured CEE officials working at the World Bank to fudge its economic ranking (Rappeport 2021). The unravelling of the “17+1” offers another demonstration that Beijing does not possess a very versatile diplomatic toolbox. There’s an important takeaway from all of this: the narrative that the world is facing a new Cold War between China and the West needs a reality check. A Cold War needs two powerful protagonists able to act on the global stage. And, while China may be growing into an economic, military,

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and technological giant, the CEE region appears to demonstrate that the “hegemon in the making” is much more vulnerable and isolated than it likes to pretend (Mayer and Kavalski 2021). Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge that this publication was co-financed by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange within the NAWA Chair programme (PPN/PRO/2020/1/00003/DEC/1) and the Polish National Science Centre grant (ZARZADZENIE NCN 94/2020). References AP, 2019. Vilnius Protests Diplomats Scuffled Pro-Hong Kong Supporters. AP News. 2 September. Available at: Bergsen, P. and Šniukaitė, V., 2022. Central and Eastern Europe Become Hawkish on China. Available at: Brinza, A., 2019. How China Blew Its Chance in Eastern Europe. Foreign Policy. 11 April. Available at: Brinza, A., 2020a. How Russia Helped the United States Fight Huawei in Central and Eastern Europe. War on Rocks National Security for Insiders: By Insiders. 12 March. Available at: Brinza, A., 2020b. Central and Eastern Europe Is Not in Bed With China. The Diplomat. 3 July. Available at: Brinza, A., 2020c. China Doesn’t Understand Europe, and It Shows. The Diplomat. 4 September. Available at: Chinfluence, 2020. Chinese Influence in Central Europe. Available at: Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E., 2015. Governing Uncertainty. Comparative Sociology, 14(3), pp. 429–444. Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E., 2017. Worlding the Study of Normative Power. Uluslararası Ilişkiler, 15(57), pp. 49–65. Cho, Y.C. and Kavalski, E., 2018. European Union in Central Eurasia. Asia Europe Journal, 16(1), pp. 51–63. Cuckic, N., 2020. “Ventilators” Affair in BiH: Fight Against Corruption or Another Political Quarrel? 5 June. Available at: Cudworth, E., Hobden, S. and Kavalski, E., 2018. Posthuman Dialogues in International Relations. London: Routledge.

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Kavalski, E., 2012b. Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate. Kavalski, E., 2013. The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers. Cooperation & Conflict, 48(2), pp. 247–267. Kavalski, E., 2014. The Shadows of Normative Power. Pacific Focus, 29(3), pp. 303–328. Kavalski, E., 2015. World Politics at the Edge of Chaos. Ithaca, NY: State University of New York Press. Kavalski, E., 2016. Relationality and Its Chinese Characteristics. China Quarterly, 226(1), pp. 551–559. Kavalski, E., 2017. Recognizing Normative State Action. Political Studies Review, 15(2), pp. 231–242. Kavalski, E., 2018a. Guanxi of Relational International Theory. Abingdon: Routledge. Kavalski, E., 2018b. Guanxi or What Is the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 18(3), pp. 268–291. Kavalski, E., 2018c. China’s BRI. Asian International Studies Review, 19(2), pp. 13–32. Kavalski, E., 2018d. Guanxi of Relational International Affairs. Chinese Political Science Review, 3(3), pp. 233–251. Kavalski, E., 2019a. 16+1 Is Dead? Long Live the 17+1. The Diplomat. 29 March. Available at: Kavalski, E., 2019b. China in Central and Eastern Europe. Asia Europe Journal, 17(4), pp. 403–419. Kavalski, E., 2020a. How China Lost Central and Eastern Europe. The Conversation. 27 July. Available at: Kavalski, E., 2020b. The Unexpected Consequences of China’s Cooperation With Central and Eastern Europe. International Studies, 57(1), pp. 1–19. Kavalski, E., 2020c. Localizing China’s Silk Roads. In Fulton, J., ed., Regions of the Belt and Road Initiative. London: Routledge, pp. 16–35. Kavalski, E., 2020d. Inside/Outside and Around. Global Society, 34(4), pp. 467–486. Kavalski, E., 2021a. The End of China’s Romance in Central and Eastern Europe. Global Media and China, 6(1), pp. 16–38. Kavalski, E., 2021b. Quo Vadis Cooperation Between China and Eastern Europe in the Era of Covid-19. World Affairs, 184(1), pp. 2–24. Kavalski, E., 2022a. The Memory Bear. New Perspectives, 30(1), pp. 3–18. Kavalski, E., 2022b. The End of China’s Affair with Central and East Europe. In Arase, D and P. Carvalho, eds., The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 133–146. Kirschbaum, E., 2019. Czech Republic Sees a Surge in Visitors From China, Including Many Prenuptial Couples. Los Angeles Times. 3 September. Available at: Koleva, S., 2017. Totalitarian Experience and Knowledge Production. Leiden: Brill. Kowalski, B., 2019. All Quiet on the Eastern Front: Chinese Investments in Central Europe Are Still Marginal. CEIAS—Central European Institute of Asian Studies.

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CONCLUSION Priya Singh

South Asia and the regional ambiguity

“Region” as a concept is particularly debated with very little unanimity among scholars about its exact connotation. While some definitions emphasise upon geographical contiguity, others give credence to the cognitive and ideational aspects. “South Asia” became a part of the regional vocabulary in a formal sense with the establishment of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, prior to which, though contested, “India” or “the Indian subcontinent,” grounded on the notion of “civilisational unity” and “historical continuity,” was the more popular coinage. “South Asia” emerged as the politically amicable, non-partisan term, which was acceptable to the states of the region, in contrast to “the Indian subcontinent,” “Bharat Barsha,” etc., which were intrinsically linked with India. The term “South Asia” has an exogenous origin. The expression “South Asia” was for the first time employed in research centres within US universities in the aftermath of the Second World War, in the 1960s. Around the same time, the phrase was used in the US State Department briefing documents on the region, for example, The Subcontinent of South Asia of 1959. Similarly, in Europe, Heidelberg University established its “South Asia Institute” in 1962, even though it encompassed the states of contemporary South and Southeast Asia, actually, connoting “Southern Asia.” This was in keeping with the then-mainstream narrative in academia, according to which “Southern Asia” encompassed contemporary South and Southeast Asia. At the same time, international organisations, like the UN, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, began to use “South Asia” in their communications and documentations. However, operationally, the region was clubbed together DOI: 10.4324/9781003474821-20

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with Central Asia, part of West Asia or Southeast Asia, akin to what is now described as India’s extended neighbourhood. With respect to policymaking too, the perception of South Asia in a regional sense was virtually nonexistent prior to the late-1970s. In the aftermath of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, policymaking by and large envisaged regionalism and the region as spatially extensive, including the entire Asian continent, espousing the notion of Pan-Asianism. The failure of Pan-Asianism as an ideology and in practice was inevitable as post-colonial realities dawned upon the newly created states. This, in turn, facilitated a shift towards national from regional both in the realm of security and development. Consequently, regionalism and the construction of a region took a sub-regional path, implying spatial constriction and a narrow focus. Though a well-defined region in terms of its physical landscape, South Asia continues to be one of the least-integrated regions of the world, as the notion of South Asia remains deeply contested. Region-building has been marred by contrasting perceptions and dialogues on the region. One of the critical contributing factors to the lack of regional cohesion has been India’s dominant position in the region, be it in the spatial, economic, or military sense. Constructed on class, ethnic, political, and social faultlines, South Asia is beset with inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The internal conflicts within South Asia may be traced to the incomplete processes of state- and nation-building. Unresolved social relations and political stratifications have often incited ethnic and sectarian violence. Questions pertaining to national identity and claims have generated schisms among multiple social clusters. Furthermore, disparity in development and accruing benefits as well as the gap between aspirations and achievements have led to domestic strife in the region. The region‘s porous and common borders have aided the spillover of internal conflicts from one state to another, often culminating in bilateral tensions. South Asian states have occasionally used the domestic strife within a neighbouring state for their own strategic or foreign policy benefits. On the other hand, disputes have also been amicably resolved via changes in policy and cooperation among the conflicting states. The region continues to be at the centre of forced migration and refugee inflows and outflows, profoundly affected by climate change and contending with multiple impediments to regional integration. China in the neighbourhood

In contemporary times, China has a considerable presence both in the Global North and the Global South. Akin to the emerging powers in history, China’s rising economic prowess and interdependence are compelling it

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to preserve and encourage its ever-growing interests abroad via a mixture of conventional and novel approaches and mechanisms. China’s approach and policies abroad mirror, as well as replicate, most of its internal principles and experience, such as the centralised, single-party-centric administrative political and economic structures. The multiple infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are the most explicit and apparent instruments of China’s considerable global presence, signifying its financial prowess via huge investments, development grants and assistance, and rising volume of trade. In addition, there do exist more implicit and concealed facets of China’s influence. Aided by proactive diplomacy, the senior members of the Communist Party of China (CPC), with the help of the official media agency, have sought to use soft power to mould narratives, make interventions in domestic political arenas, and play mediator in bilateral contestations. Though the character and magnitude of the Chinese endeavours and interventions may differ in accordance with the differing political and economic milieu in the host nations, yet China is progressively amenable to active involvement irrespective of the impediments, with the aim of generating opportunity spaces to mould the geopolitical expanse explicitly and proactively. In the South Asian context, there are multiple areas of Chinese engagement, from education to politics to economic cooperation, cultivating an image of Beijing as ally of the smaller nations vis-à-vis Indian hegemony. Partnerships have been initiated with a variety of government and private actors in China and South Asian countries, who establish regular consultation and collaboration processes to enhance their engagement. In such instances, the Chinese government often assumes the role of a facilitator. Multiple methods are employed to engage individual or institutional partners and states, including myriad channels that are often, but not always, established by governments. China may be regarded as a new entrant in South Asia compared to other outside powers such as the United States, and, until recently, was not considered a critical player in the South Asian economies. While there are discernible patterns in the Chinese conduct and action in South Asia that are in line with its functioning in other regions, there are, as well, distinct particularities that require greater attention from researchers and policymakers alike. One of the distinctive characteristics of South Asia has been India’s dominance as a political and financial entity, along with its overwhelming social and cultural ties to the region. This is in studied contrast to Southeast Asia, where the Chinese presence and influence has had to contend with the Indian presence and influence. India’s neighbouring states in South Asia perceive the BRI as providing them with opportunities that India itself has not been able to offer, due to the latter’s deficiency of capacity and its need of financial integration with the rest of South Asia. As a result, China sought

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to weave together a modern financial arrangement in South Asia through the BRI, in which constituent nations entered into critical financial arrangements with China rather than with India. India itself has China as one of its biggest trading partners. Along with the changes within the financial realm, there has been an extensive penetration within the political realm, wherein the smaller South Asian states adopted policies and undertook measures to appease and confirm to the Chinese position/stance. Nepal, for instance, took measures against the Tibetan refugees, as its administering Communist Party of Nepal enjoyed close ties with the CPC. Sri Lanka and the Maldives have each at diverse times been driven by China-leaning leaderships who have made financial choices favouring the CPC. While much of the research on China in South Asia has tended to focus on the impact of economic and security policies, equal consideration should be given to the soft power implications as well. South Asia is dominated by an intense rivalry between two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and is being progressively penetrated by another nuclear giant, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC). From the 1960s, China had begun cultivating a strategic equation with Pakistan. In the recent past, the PRC embarked on an ambitious plan to deepen its presence globally as well as regionally via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategic infrastructural project. South Asia as a region has been witnessing a change in perception and engagement from external powers. For instance, the United States’ dynamics with Pakistan and India have undergone subtle and not-sosubtle changes. There has been visible diversification of engagements with India with a view to counter China. Other global powers, such as Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have been intensifying their presence and exchanges with the region, identifying its human and economic potential as well as geostrategic importance, which may, in the foreseeable future, convert it into a critical theatre of great power rivalry. Thus, on the one hand, South Asia is contending with numerous critical security and developmental issues that demand a concerted regional response, as opposed to individual state responses. On the other hand, it is increasingly assuming the shape of a critical site for global geopolitics and geo-economics, with the smaller states leveraging the same vis-à-vis its dynamics with the perceived regional hegemon, India. China, in particular, with its shared borders with the region and rapidly rising stature as a global player, has grasped the transmuting character of the expanse. It is making its presence felt specifically through the BRI project, highlighting the need for connectivity in the region and the glaring lack of it. It is against this backdrop that this volume provides the readers with myriad facets of China’s increasing presence in the South Asian neighbourhood and beyond.

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About this volume

While throwing light on the dynamics between the individual states of the region and its extended neighbourhood with China, chapters in this volume explicate the concept of neighbourhood and strike a note of caution with the position that “neighbourhood has a dynamic of its own that cannot be reduced to ‘great power game’ otherwise occupying much of the existing literature on the subject.” Premised on ethnographies, with an interdisciplinary approach, they conclude that neighbourhood ties in South Asia are “constantly shape-shifting, and notions of friendship in the neighbourhood range from angst to animosity” in a “highly entangled geopolitical, geocultural, and geo-economic space.” Employing case studies from the northeast of India, bordering China, along with the Himalayan states of Bhutan and Nepal, the chapters provide for a multidisciplinary micro-analysis that enables a more nuanced reading of the complicated exchanges taking place “through China’s innocuous soft presence in South Asia’s neighbourhood” (Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6). In a similar vein, Western notions of state, sovereignty, security, and territory that are viewed from a realist lens to understand international relations have been supplemented by a reading of geopolitics from a post-colonial perspective, wherein ritual and traditional sovereignties are accepted as tools to analyse the encounters between nationstates such as China and Bhutan. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 delve into the geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural implications of the deep Chinese presence in the South Asian neighbourhood. The lack of synchronisation between economic and strategic interests, on the one hand, and political transparency on the other, could nullify the economic gains expected from such bilateral ties, for instance in the case of China’s engagement with Afghanistan under the Taliban. The Indian subcontinent, with its shared colonial legacy but the contrasting nature of state building, is intriguingly poised, as China intensifies its engagement with Pakistan, with which it shares an “all-weather” friendship, as well as Bangladesh, whose creation was opposed by the then Chinese regime. The Belt and Road Initiative diplomacy is making deep inroads in the region with consequences for India’s perceived hegemony in the region. The chapters bring out the distinct and evolving nature of Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Bangladesh relations, with its implications for India in particular. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 analyse the interplay of social and economic factors in a shared terrain, with ramifications for the region. An interesting analysis (Chapter 10) is offered on how ethnically contentious regions across borders, in the case of China and Myanmar, are used to manage minority ethnic groups for strategic and economic objectives. A vital state for connectivity in the neighbourhood, Iran and her equations with China, wherein cheap

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surplus products from China have found an outlet in the Iranian markets to the detriment of local industries, is examined (Chapter 8). Akin to the problems faced by Iran, Chinese penetration in Central Asia, another critically situated region in the context of connectivity, is hampered by inadequate soft power outreach despite the BRI diplomacy, which constitutes the subject matter of a chapter (Chapter 9) in the volume. Chapters 11 and 12 provide a study of India’s maritime neighbourhood. An analysis of the prevailing hegemonic security narratives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is offered with the aim of deciphering the link between narratives and policy. Contesting narratives of democratic and authoritarian states, intersecting with localised narratives affecting the dynamics between states such as China and India, vital players in the IOR, are analysed. The multilayered nexus between Sri Lanka, India, and China is analysed against the backdrop of historical accounts which connect ethnicity and religion between the Sinhalese majority and Buddhism in India, along with the expansionist motives of the empires in South India. On the other hand, economic inadequacies have prompted Sri Lanka to lean towards China, in the process tilting the regional balance of power towards China. Another chapter (Chapter 13) contends with China’s economic strategy in Myanmar, at the same time prescribing ways and means by which Myanmar could adroitly balance China’s strategic presence via a policy of reforms and holistic development. Chapter 14 dwells upon the region beyond the South Asian neighbourhood. In focus is the relationship between China and the Central and Eastern European states (CEE). The gradual erosion of the positive attitude towards Chinese economic presence in the states of the CEE in the aftermath of the 2019 pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong is spelt out in the chapter. The global pandemic gave further impetus to this tendency and, finally, the Chinese lack of clarity in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a split among the CEE states with respect to their stance towards notions of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. China became the instrument used by both groups to validate their stance and strategic decisions. In other words, it is China’s domestic political discourses that shape the attitude of the CEE states towards it, rather than its global or individual position and actions towards the CEE states. The chapters offer diverse perspectives, adopt multidisciplinary approaches, involve micro and macro studies, giving credence to historical narratives and contemporary policies in assessing the Chinese penetration in the South Asian neighbourhood and beyond. The neighbourhood in flux

According to the World Bank's South Asia Update, South Asia is expected to grow by almost six percent by 2024, faster than any other developing region. This growth rate is slower than the pre-pandemic pace of seven

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percent. Debt trends in South Asia have changed significantly since the mid20th century. Sri Lanka and Pakistan are dealing with major economic crises, with the former having endured a full-fledged economic collapse and the latter contending with massive external debts, power shortages, and extreme inflation. Both states are waiting to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF, in the meantime, sanctioned a precautionary loan of US$4.7 billion to Bangladesh in the midst of a critical macroeconomic situation in the state, with high inflation and a volatile Bangladeshi Taka. Myanmar, contending with a post-coup situation, is on the verge of a veritable economic shutdown and a massive increase in unemployment, while Nepal, too, looks at a future with increasing trade deficits and declining foreign exchange reserves. For most countries in the region, the first decades of the post-colonial era were characterised by economic optimism. Investments were made in infrastructure and social development, including health care, education, and water supply, to combat poverty and inequality. Furthermore, borrowing increased, due to the promotion of industrialisation. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused huge health spending, social safety nets and stimulus packages, rising interest rates in developed countries, a global economic slowdown, domestic political instability, and disrupted borrowing patterns, with concomitant implications for the Global South. South Asian states, as a consequence, are grappling with the dilemma of promoting growth while managing rising debt. The precarious economic situation in the region has been compounded by the lingering Ukrainian conflict, with its implications for global energy and food supply chains, which has particularly impacted the low- and middle-income states and vulnerable populations, which were grappling with hunger in the post-pandemic world. The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has the potential of derailing the prospects of a historic peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which was to be a pivotal component of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) framework, in the process undermining what was seen as a major counter to China’s BRI. References Bhoumik, S. 2023. “Ukraine-Russia conflict: Impact on South Asia”, https://www​ .orfonline​.org ​/expert​-speak ​/ukraine​-russia​- conflict​-impact​-on​-south​-asia/ Chakma, B. 2020. South Asian Regionalism :The Limits of Cooperation. Bristol: Bristol University Press. Dhungel, N. 2023. “Debt Dynamics in South Asia”, Kathmandu Post, https:// kathmandupost​.com ​/columns​/2023​/10​/06​/debt​-dynamics​-in​-south​-asia Ganguly, S. and O’Donnell, F. (eds). 2022. The Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia. London and New York: Routledge.

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“International Monetary Fund: Central Government Debt, 2022. https://www​.imf​ .org ​/external​/datamapper​/CG ​_ DEBT​_GDP​@GDD​/SWE “Israel-Hamas War May Pose Hurdles to India-Middle East Europe-Economic Corridor: Report”, https://www​.livemint​.com ​/news​/india​/israelhamas​-war​ -may​ - pose ​ - hurdles ​ - to ​ - india ​ - middle ​ - east​ - europe ​ - economic ​ - corridor ​ - report​ -11697272130316​.html Scobell, A. 2022. “China and South Asia: Beijing Builds Influence”, in Ganguly, S. and O’Donnell, F. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia. London and New York: Routledge, 330–340. The World Bank: South Asia Development Update, October 2023, https://www​ .worldbank​.org​/en​/region​/sar​/publication​/south​-asia​-development​-update Xavier, C. and Jacob, J. (eds). 2022. “How China Engages South Asia: Themes, Partners and Tools”, CSEP Report, https://csep​.org​/reports​/ how​- china​- engages​ -south​-asia​-themes​-partners​-and​-tools/

INDEX

Note: Italicized and bold page numbers refer to figures and tables. Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes. Abdul Momen, A. K. 107–108 Abid, M. 9 Abi Habib, M. 215; “How China got Sri Lanka to cough up a port” 11–12 Abor 30 ADB see Asian Development Bank Addu 23 Adhikary, P. 130 Aerosun Corporation 77 Afghanistan 8, 12, 13, 23; American withdrawal from 2; Chinese patrols in Wakhan corridor 90, 96n2; East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP) 86, 87, 89; Hizb-​i -Dem​okrat​ik-i-​ Parch​am-i-​Afgha​nista​n (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA [Parcham]) 85, 86; ISIS in 93; as member of SAARC 106; military operations 6; People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 90; relationship with China see Afghanistan–China relationship; relationship with India 93–94; Soviet influence in 85; sustainable development 5; Taliban see Taliban Afghanistan–China relationship 83–97; historical perspective of 85–87; “Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations” (2002) 88;

post-American Afghanistan 91–95; “strategic partnership” agreement (2014) 89; US intervention and 88–91 Africa 2, 151, 156, 195; East 10 Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung (1955) 173 Agalega 19 Ahmed, I. 104 AIIB see Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Akbaruddin, S. 201 Akhaura 56 Ali, S. M. 157 Allison, G.: Destined for War 193 Al-Mirqab Group 113 Al-Qaeda 94, 96 Altynbayev, K. 164 Amarasinghe, P. 209 Amirahmadian, B. 21 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 12; Far Eastern Naval Command of 198 Andrews, T. 174 Anwar, A. 131 Armitage, R. 194 Arsalon, M. 96 Arunachal Pradesh 32, 37, 43, 201; bootlegging 52; Yangtse 202 ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

268 Index

Ashfaq, A. 9 Asia 5, 151, 156 Asia Africa Growth Corridor 16 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 214, 259 Asian Highway 128 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 2, 5, 226 Asian neighbourhoods, as interactive dyads 4–19 Asian transnational organised crime 50 Assam 32, 37 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 227, 235 Athens 9 AUKUS 198 Aung San Suu Kyi 173, 183 Australia 18 Aye, M. 182 Azhar, M. M. 93 Badakhshan 97n8 Bagdogra 45 Bahamas: bootlegging 43 Bairabi 56 Baltic Way 248 Baltistan University 114 Baluchistan 7, 8 Bandarage, A. 217 Banerjee, P. 45 Bangladesh 2, 9, 11–13, 21, 48, 203; Act East policy 131; Bangladesh National Party 126; Bangladesh Working Group on External Debts 125; bootlegging 53; Dhaka Bypass Road 126; Dhaka–Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar Highway 128; energy sector 121–122; foreign direct investment (FDI) 121, 128; gross domestic product (GDP) 125; Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel Project 128; Look East Policy 126; as member of SAARC 106; Payra project 129–130; public–private partnership with Japan 130; relationship with China see Bangladesh–China relationship; Rohingya refugees 53, 122 Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) 12, 13, 228 Bangladesh–China relationship 121–132; in BRI 125–126; BRI investments, rationale for 126–129; Chinese economic influence 129– 130; key events and agreements

123–124; scrapped BRI projects 129–130; Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine 122 Bangzao, Z. 97n5 Baobo, J. 223 Bartlett, P. 164 Baruah, D. M. 16, 152 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) 197 Bay of Bengal 11, 13, 14, 18, 130 BCIM-EC see Bangladesh–China– India–Myanmar Economic Corridor BCP see Communist Party of Burma BECA see Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement Beihai 9 Beijing 2, 22, 39, 72, 84, 86, 90–93, 121, 122; outreach 22 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 2–5, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 21, 74, 89, 103–104, 108, 112, 114–117, 125, 191, 221–222, 226–227, 261, 262; Bangladesh–China relationship in 125–130; critical issue on 2023 151; geopolitical goals 152; global trail of trouble 153–154; India’s answer to 152; Iran– China relationship in 143–151; Kazakhstan–China relationship in 158; Kyrgyzstan–China relationship in 158; rationale for 126–129; scrapped projects 129–130; ten years of 152–153 Bergsen, P. 251 Bhardwaj, R. D. 223 Bhat, Col. V. 90 Bhim Bahadur Tamang 38–39 Bhutan 2, 3, 20, 23, 43, 50; cultural nationalism 42; economic disillusionment 42; as member of SAARC 106; over-reliance on India 42; relationship with China see Bhutan–China relationship; right to seek new friends 42 Bhutan–China relationship 63–78; Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility (1998) 71; border talks 71–75; Guiding Principles on the Settlement of Boundary Issues (1988) 71; historical encounters 64–69; package deal 69–71, 73; Tibetan Buddhism 75–77 Biden, J. 194; “Build Back Better World” (B3W) 196

Index 269

BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) 42, 235 Birgunj 23 Bloomberg 95 Boeing P-81 maritime surveillance aircraft 19 Bolesta, A. 230 “bootleggers and Baptists” 47 bootlegging 43–44; in disgruntled geographies 50–56; in Himalayan neighbourhood 48–50; method for studying 46–48 border: Indo-Myanmar 44, 52; Zhangmu–Kodari 48, 58n2 Bose, S. 193 Bosnia 242, 250 Boyce, T. 113 Bray, J. 69 Brewster, D. 7, 11, 15 BRI see Belt and Road Initiative BRICS 14, 16, 201, 224 Brinza, A. 242, 244, 248, 249 B3W see “Build Back Better World” Buchanan, J. M. 44 “Build Back Better World” (B3W) 196 Bulgaria 242 Bumthang 71 Burma: heroin production 51; methamphetamine production 51–52 Byron, R.K. 129, 130 Cambodia 14, 181 Canada: bootlegging 43 Cao, S. 72, 73, 77 capital 103–118 Čaputová, Z. 243, 247 CCWAEC see China–Central Asia– West Asia Economic Corridor CDM see Civil Disobedience Movement CEE see Central and Eastern Europe CEIZ see Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone Cellaney, B. 215 CENTO 111 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 22; relationship with China see China– CEE cooperation Central Asia 1–3, 5, 6, 21, 166–168; China’s economic presence in 159–160 Central Europe 3, 4 Centre for Global Development 233

Chakma, J. 129 Chakraborty, A. S. 20, 45 Chakraborty, S. R. 45 Champhai 52 Chaudhury, D. R. 71, 72, 125 CHEC see China Harbour Engineering Company Chen, X.: “Betting Big on CPEC” 9 chequebook diplomacy 196 China: Belt and Road Initiative see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); debt diplomacy 43; Department of Customs 49; foreign direct investment 156, 159; Foreign Ministry 112; as “Lung Dragon” 43; Maritime Silk Road see Maritime Silk Road (MSR); Ministry of Commerce 186; in Pakistan 110–112; population problem 149; relationship with Afghanistan see Afghanistan–China relationship; Kazakhstan–China relationship; relationship with Bangladesh see Bangladesh–China relationship; relationship with Bhutan see Bhutan–China relationship; relationship with Iran see Iran–China relationship; relationship with Kyrgyzstan see Kyrgyzstan–China relationship; relationship with Malaysia see Malaysia–China relationship; relationship with Myanmar see Myanmar–China relationship; “The Vision and Action to Promote the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” 127 China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral dialogue (2012) 89 China–CEE cooperation 241–253; anticipation of 245–247, 246, 247; collapse of 247–251; localisation 243–247; uncertainty of 245–247 China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) 143, 148, 158, 160, 163 China Defence White Paper (2015) 228 China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) 129, 153 China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor 228 China International Trust Investment Corporation (CITIC) 178, 232 China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railroad 163

270 Index

China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) 173, 228, 231, 232, 235 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 6–9, 84, 89, 104, 110, 112–116, 121, 125 China–Pakistan Joint Research Centre in Earth Sciences 114 China Railway International 130 China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) 114 Chindia Syndrome 22, 201 Chinese Constitution, Article Five 222 Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) 126 “Chinese goods” 47 Chinese impingement 191–203 Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations 86 Chinese Navy 195 Chinfluence project 242 Chin Hills 45, 183 Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO) 185 Chinland Natural Resources Watch 195 Chinoy, S. R. 94 Chittagong 56 Cho, Y. C. 244–246 “cho-si” principle 65 cho-yon/priest–patron relationship 66 Christmas Islands 12 CHRO see Chin Human Rights Organisation Chrysler 223 Chumbi Valley 67, 71 Chunying, H. 83 Churachandpur 52 Churchill, W. 198 Çicrkli, M. Y. 21 CITIC see China International Trust Investment Corporation Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) 185 CMEC see China–Myanmar Economic Corridor Cocos Island 12 Cogan, M. S. 152 Colombo 9, 12 COMCASA see Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement commodity fetishism 47 Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) 197 Communist Party of Burma (BCP) 175

Communist Party of China (CPC) 149, 225, 261 Communist Revolution of 1949 140 connectivity 103–118 Cooper, Z. 12 counterbalancing 33 counter-narratives 106, 192, 195 Cowen, D. 10 CPC see Communist Party of China CPEC see China–Pakistan Economic Corridor CTG see China Three Gorges Corporation Cuckic, N. 250 Cudworth, E. 248 Czechia 242, 249, 250 Dalai Lama 68, 69, 77 Darjeeling 31, 45, 48, 50 Das, S. K. 14, 20, 40n9 Daud Khan, S. M. 85, 96n3 Davenport, J. 194 debt-for-equity swap 11 debt trap diplomacy 11, 196 decolonisation 104–106 Delhi 12, 57 Deng Xiaoping 139, 223; Open-Door Policy 221 Denisov, I. 15 Derrida, J. 35 de Samarasinghe, S. W. R. A. 210 Dhaka 21, 125 Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 122 Dharmadasa, K. N. O. 208 Dholabahi, N. 45 Diego Garcia 12 Dimapur 52 Dimitrov, M. 244 diplomacy 72, 73, 104, 110, 173, 186, 192, 200, 212, 261, 263, 264; chequebook 196; Chinese public 3, 4, 242, 245, 252; COVID-19 vaccine 231; cultural 23, 117; debt trap 11, 43, 196; economic 23, 147; language of 66; mask 249; table tennis 140; “wolf warrior” 195, 248, 251 Disaster Resilient Infrastructure 2019 16 disgruntled geographies 44–45; bootlegging in 50–56 Djibouti 90, 195 Doklam 70–74, 201; plateau 70, 74 domestic and political debates 221–236 Dongguan 49

Index 271

Drukpa Kagyu 64, 76 Drukpa Kunlek 75 DSE see Dhaka Stock Exchange Duars 48 Dulat, A. S. 36 Dunbar, G. 29–32 Duterte, R. 14 Duttugemunu 207 Dzongkha script 64–65 EAOs see ethnic armed organisations East Africa 10 East Asia 29 East China Sea 9 East Coast Rail Link project 153 Eastern Himalayas 42–44, 46 East India Company 75 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 91 economic policies 221–236 economic structure 140, 146, 148, 207, 211, 212, 261 Edwards, A. 56 EEU see Eurasian Economic Union EEZ see Exclusive Economic Zones Eisenhower, D. 85 Ejaz, R. 129 Emadi, H. 86 “Emerging India” narrative 199–200 Emperor Ashoka 66 epistemic violence 78 Erikson, A. 191 Estonia 242 Ethirajan, A. 216 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) 175–180 ethnic dynamics 21, 172–188 ethnic insecurities 44–45 ethnography 20, 29, 46, 263 ETIM see East Turkistan Islamic Movement Euractiv 251 Eurasia 5, 6, 14, 15, 152 Eurasian Economic Community 5 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 6 Europe 2, 5, 13 European Union (EU) 139, 157; “New Silk Road” initiatives 5 evasive balancing 17 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 13 Exim Bank of China 11, 129 exotic species 54–56 expedition 12, 29–31, 90, 207

Faddis, S. 92 Fa-Hsien 208 Fallon, T. 248 Faryab 97n8 Fenech 201 Fernando, A. 208 Filipova, R. 247 Finckenauer, J. O. 50 first Anglo-Bhutan war (1772–1774) 75 foreign policy 19, 20, 23, 29, 32, 34, 37, 38, 42, 63, 64, 70, 73, 77, 78, 85, 105, 110, 116, 117, 131, 132, 139, 141, 142, 145, 147, 152, 156, 166, 172, 173, 191–196, 207, 210, 215, 217, 218, 225, 241, 252, 260 Forough, M. 116 France 262; International Solar Alliance 16 Frenemy Syndrome 22 Fuzhou 9 Galwan clash of 2020 202 Gangtok 50 Garlick, J. 7–8 Gelukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism 76 Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism 69, 75 geoculture 20, 103, 112, 115, 117, 263 geopolitics 4, 66, 78, 115, 116, 132, 181, 262, 263 geopositional balancing 8 geostrategy 9, 110, 196, 197, 200, 227, 262 Germany 262 Ghani, A. 89 Ghosal, S. 21 Ghosh, P. S. 18, 30, 108 Gilgit-Baltistan 112 Gill, P. 56 GNP see gross national product Glawe, W. L. H. 225 Gogirfen 86 Going Out/Going Global Strategy 224, 226 gold 56 Goldbaum, C. 93 Gomphu Kora 76 Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) 45 Gorkha Larka 48 Green, S. 223 gross national product (GNP) 222 GTA see Gorkhaland Territorial Administration

272 Index

Guangzhou 9, 49 Gueorguiev, D. 252 Gujral doctrine 36 Guomindang regime 68 Gupta, S. 93, 96 Gurbuz, Y. E. 21 Guru Dorje Drolo 76 Guru Padmasambava 76 Guwahati 52 Gwadar 7, 8, 112, 151 Gwadar Free Zone 151 Hahn, J. 241 Haikou 9 Hall, I. 199 Hambantota 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 23, 129, 130, 196, 233 Han, E. 178 Hanoi 9 Hartpence, M. 111 Hasan, P. 125, 130 Hasina, S.: visit to Beijing 122 Hastings, W. 75 He, A. 225 He, Z. 202, 208 Health Silk Road 117 hedging 17 Heidelberg University: South Asia Institute 259 Hekmatyar, G. 96n3 Herat 23 herd consumerism 47 heroin 51 Herzegovina 242, 250 Hilsa 48 Himalayan neighbourhood, bootlegging in 48–50 historic ties 206–218 Holmes, J.R. 9 Hong Kong 178 Hong Kong pro-democracy protests (2019) 248–249 Hongren, Z. 126 Horesh, N. 245 Huaneng Shandong Power Generation Company Ltd 114 Huasheng, Z. 15 Huawei 87, 153, 248 Hu Jintao 89, 109, 224 human hair 56 humanitarian assistance 2, 17, 84, 86, 88 Hungary 250 Hurst, L. 225 Hussain, K. 115

Ibraimov, B. 163–164 Ilam 48 Illanperuma, S. 22 Imanaliyeva, A. 164 IMEEC see India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor IMF see International Monetary Fund Imphal 52 India: Act East Policy (AEP) 45, 55, 181, 183, 235; answer to BRI 152; “the China factor” in foreign policy 37; democracy 104; effort to develop Chabahar port 12–13; Eurasian hinterland to Indian Ocean, connecting 5; Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord (1987) 210; Look East Policy (LEP) 182, 184; maritime awakening 195; as member of SAARC 106; Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 19, 121; Navy 195; Neighbourhood First Policy 1, 235; Nepal’s critiques against 42; as “Norbu Dragon” 43; relationship with Afghanistan 93–94; relationship with Myanmar 181–183; Sirimavo–Shastri Pact 209; trilateral transit agreement with Iran and Afghanistan (2016) 13 India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) 265 India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway 181 Indian Ocean 4, 5, 7, 9, 12–14, 17–19, 201; as “Zone of Peace” 203 Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 10, 16, 213–214 Indo-Myanmar border 44, 52 Indonesia: Sabang Port 197 infrastructural alliances 2 infrastructural financing 2 Inotai, E. 249 International Commission of Jurists 232–233 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 131, 265 International North–South Transport Corridor 6 International Solar Alliance 16 investment 221–236 IOR see Indian Ocean Region Iran 2, 8; Chabahar port 12–13, 197; Islamic Revolution 139, 141; Makran coast 12; relationship with China see Iran–China relationship

Index 273

Iran–China relationship 139–154; 25-year Strategic Cooperation Plan of Iran with China 144, 148; background of 140–141; in BRI 143–151; China’s power-driven policy 142–143; “Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China” (2021) 143; political relations 141–142; prospects for 144–145; strategic military relations, volume and level of 142–143; three transit layers 146–147 IS see Islamic State Isfahan 150 ISIS 93 Islamabad 3, 86 Islamic State (IS) 92–93, 96 Jaffna 23 Jaishankar, S. 94, 107, 152, 192 Jaish–e–Mohammad 93 Jakarta 9 Jalal, A. 104 Japan 9, 10, 17–19, 48, 194; public–private partnership with Bangladesh 130 Japarov, A. 163, 164 Japarov, S. 158 Javaid, N. 114–115 Javed, U. 112 Jayawardena, K. 208 Jayawardene, J. R. 210 JCPA see Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jeenbekov, S. 158, 164 Je Khenpo 64 Jiang Zemin 223–224 Jianxue, L. 94 Jiming, L. 122 Jirous, F. 248 John, A. K. 86 Johnson, B. 194 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) 139 Joshi, M. 71 Kabul 23, 90, 97n8 Kachin Hills 183 Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 176, 178 Kachins 32, 187 Kahn, A. E. 47

Kakarvitta 48 Kaladan 184 Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project 23, 181 Kalemyo 183 Kalimpong 45, 48, 50 Kamal, M. 125 Kaplan, R. 202, 206 Karakoram Highway (KKH) 111 Karakoram Range 7 Karaskova, I. 241 Karnaphuli 130 Karnitschnig, M. 243 Karunatilake, W. 216 Karzai, H. 88 Kashgar 113 Kashmir 112 Kaul, N.: “Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a Small State in International Relations” 78 Kavalski, E. 22, 241, 242, 244–247, 249–253 Kazakhstan 6 Kazakhstan–China pipeline 6 Kazakhstan–China relationship 156– 168; in BRI 158; China’s economic presence in 159–161; economic ties 160–161; evaluation using economic indicators 161–162; obstacles preventing 162–166 Khambas 31 Khan, A. A. R. 96n2 Khan, D. 196 Khasa 47, 48 “Khasa ko maal” 47–50 Khawzawl 52 Khine, S. S. 221 Khulna 23 Kimathanka 48 King Jigme Khesar Wangchuk 73 KIO see Kachin Independence Organisation Kishanganj district, Bihar 45 Kissinger, H. 8 KKH see Karakoram Highway (KKH) Kobayashi, J. S. S. 223 Kokang 180 Koleva, S. 242 Ko-Lin, C. 50 Kolkata 9, 53, 57, 234 Ko Rala 48 Korea 48 Kornegay, F. A., Jr. 14 Kotelawala, J. 209

274 Index

Kowalski, B. 245 Kruczkowska, M. 250 Kuala Lumpur 9 Kuchynova, Z. 246 Kudaibergenova, D. T. 157 Kumar, S. 108, 109, 184 Kumar, Y. 18 Kunming 72 Kunming Railway 10 Kurian, N.: India-China Borderlands 32 Kurseong 45 Kuruwita, R. 216 Kyaukphyu 176, 178, 232 Kyrgyzstan–China relationship 156– 168; in BRI 158; China’s economic presence in 159–160; economic ties 160–161; evaluation using economic indicators 161–162; obstacles preventing 162–166 LAC see Line of Actual Control Ladakh 43, 201 Lamabagar 48 Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Special Fund 230 Laos 14, 181 Larijani, A. 143 Laruelle, M. 157 Lasha 48 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 93 Latin America 151 Latvia 242 Lau, C. 73 Lau, S. 241, 246 League of Democracies 195 LEMOA see Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement Lennon Wall, Prague 248 LeT see Lashkar-e-Taiba Leung, T. 73 Leyland 210 Lhasa 70 Lhodrak 74 Li, K. 109 liberal democracy 104, 194, 211 Lindsay, J. M. 194 Line of Actual Control (LAC) 38 Lingzhi, Z. 159, 160 Lithuania 242 Liu, A. H. 110 Liyanage, S. 22 LMC see Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Special Fund

Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) 197 Loiwal, M. 77 Look East policy 18, 29, 126 Lum, A. 248 Lyonpo Tandi Dorji 72 Maas, H. 243 Mahanama 207 Mahmood, S. 93 Majumdar, A. J. 21–22, 191, 193, 195 Malaysia 14, 48 Malaysia–China relationship 153 Malaysia Development Berhad 153 Maldives 11, 16, 19, 23, 203, 262; as member of SAARC 106 Malik, I. H. 111 Malik, J. M. 108 Malik, M. 227 Malone, D.: Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy 64 Mamallapuram 201 Mandalay 53 Manipur 37, 185; bootlegging 48, 52 Manoharan, N. 197 Mansingh, L. 197 Mao Zedong 111 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 13 Maritime Security Dialogue 16 Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 9, 10, 12, 15, 110, 148, 158 Maritime Silk Route 6, 9, 11 Martin, G. R. R.: The Game of Thrones (GoT) 63 Maryand 86 Mashhadi, T. 115, 150 Matarbari 130 Mathou, T. 68, 77 Matigara 45 Mauritius 16; Coast Guard 19 Mayer, M. 241, 253 Mayongam 32, 34, 40n5 Mazar-i-Sharif 23 McCartney, M. 112–114 McCullock, M .R .J. 244 MDA see Maritime Domain Awareness Mediterranean Sea 9 Mehra, P. 66 Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 93 Mekong Dam project 14 Mekong Ganga Cooperation 235

Index 275

Melaka Gateway 153 Middle East 2, 5, 16, 18, 151 middle-income trap (MIT) 225 MILAN (biennial naval exercise) 13 Min Aung Hlaing 174, 177 Ming, Z. 198 Ming-Kotte war 208 Mirik 45, 50 Misra, A. 104, 105 MIT see middle-income trap Mizoram: bootlegging 44, 47, 51–54; Champhai district 44; Chin population 44; Mizoram Peace Accord 182; smuggled goods 56; Young Men’s Association (YMA) 45 Mladenov, N. S. 250 Modi, N. 197, 201; Act East Policy 181; in Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore 15–17 Mohan, C. R. 14 Mohsen, S. 141 Monbas 31 Mongolia 77 Monroe Doctrine 198 Montenegro 242 Moramudali, U. 11 Moreh 48, 52, 181 Morrison, W. M. 225, 226 Moscow 92 MSR see Maritime Silk Road muddled friendships 20 Mukherjee, P. 183 multilateral development funds 2 Mumbai 57 Murton, G. 48 Muse–Mandalay railway project 176 Musharraf, P. 36 Muttaqi, A. K. 94 Muttawakil, W. A. 87 Myanmar 2, 11–14, 23, 32, 33, 48; Act East Policy 234; Arakan Army 176, 177; bootlegging 44, 48, 51, 53, 54; Chinese activities/strategies in 227–229, 229; Chinese economic policies, impact of 221–236; Chinese investments in 230–232; Chin state 184–185; Kaladan Multipurpose Transport 235; Myitsone dam project 234; Nagas in 38; National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) 177; Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 2015 (NCA) 177, 183; “Opportunities and Challenges

for Local Business Development in Chin State” report (Gender and Development Institute of Myanmar) 184; paukphaw rhetoric 21; relationship with China see Myanmar–China relationship; relationship with India 181–183; smuggled goods 56; special economic zones 232; State Administration Council (SAC) 174, 230; State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 172; State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 172; 2014 Census Report 184; United Wa State Army 179 Myanmar–China relationship 21, 172–187; assessment of 233–236; border crossings 183–185; crossing borders 183–185; ethnic communities 179–180; ethnic dynamics 173–175; implications of 231–233; new configuration 174– 175; recommendations for 233–236; strategic interests 175–179 Nagaland 37–38; bootlegging 52 Naga rebel discourse 37–38 Nagcha 48 Naipaul, V. S. 104 Nairobi 9 NAM see Non Aligned Movement narcotics 53 National Bureau of Statistics 224 National Socialist Council of Nagalim 38 National Unity Government (NUG) 185 nation-state 19, 32–38, 63, 65, 69–71, 75–78, 105, 111; Western 66 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Naxalbari 45 Nayar, N. 23 Nebehay, S. 87 Necsutu, N. 251 Nedopil, C. 226 Nehru, J. 36, 234 neighbourhood: aporia of 29–40; definition of 1; dynamics of 37–39; geopolitical 1; Himalayan, bootlegging in 48–50; intermediate space 34–35; “invitation” vs. “visitation” 36; oscillating responses to 35–37; strategic 1; two registers 33–34; see also individual entries

276 Index

NELBEC see New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor neoliberal economy 47 neoliberal market 47 Nepal 2, 3, 20, 23, 43, 121, 203, 263; critiques against India 42; as member of SAARC 106; 2015 earthquake in 48–49, 58n2 New Cold War 157, 167 New Delhi 31, 39, 70, 74 New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC) 143, 144, 148, 158, 160–162 New Silk Roads (NSR) 5, 116–117 Nicholas, S. 129 Nietsche, C. 248 Niklasson, T. 94 Nikolov, K. 251 Nixon, R. 210 Non Aligned Movement (NAM) 209 Nordin, A. 246 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 198 North Bengal 45, 52 NSR see New Silk Roads NUG see National Unity Government Nuristan 97n8 Nyingmapa school 76 Nyiri, P. 249 OBOR see One Belt One Road Ocaklı B. 163 Olangchung Gola 48 Oman 7; Duqm Port 197 Omar, M. 87 One Belt One Road (OBOR) see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Oxus Society 162, 163 Pacific Ocean 4 Pahlavi, A. 140 Pakistan 2, 3, 7, 8, 18, 20; foreign policy 110; geoeconomic reterritorialisation 116; as member of SAARC 106; relationship with China 103–118 Pal, D. 132 Pan, C. 244 Pan-Asianism 260 Pande, A. 111, 112 Panglong Agreement of 1947 183 Panikkar, K.M. 195 Pannier, B. 96, 157 Parkin, B. 125

Paro 67 Paro Taktsang 76 Pashupati 50 Passur 130 Pathak, S. 20–21, 126 Patranobis, S. 72 pauk phaw (fraternal friendship) 173, 230 Paul, T.V. 202–203 Pehrson, C. J. 196 Pelosi, N.: visit to Taiwan 122 Peng, N. 109 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 86, 87, 91 Persian Gulf 8, 18 personal protective equipment (PPE) 249 Petersen, K. 87 Petro-Logistics 217 Phansidewa 45 Philippines 14 Phuetsholing 23 Phuldungsei 56 Phuntsho, K. 70 Pitman, A. 129 PLA see People’s Liberation Army Pobas 31 Polar Silk Road 158 Port Qasim Energy Holding 113 post-colonial relations 69, 70, 78, 105, 206–208, 211, 260, 263, 265 post-2019 developments 206–218 Power Construction Corporation 113 PPE see personal protective equipment Prague City Council 243 Prakash, A. 195 Premadas, R. R. 210 prescription drugs 51–54 Project Mausam 197 QCG see Quadrilateral Coordination Group Qiaoan, R. 244 Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) 89 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 198 Rabbani, B. 96n3 Rahman, M. Z. 225 Rahman, W. 126, 131 Rajagopalan, R. 17 Raja Mohan, C.: Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the IndoPacific 9

Index 277

Rajapaksa, G. 207, 215, 216 Raja Urgen Dorjee 71 Rakhine 10, 53, 175 Ramesh, J. 201 Ramesh. R. 77 Ranjan, R. 110 Rao, N. 182 Rappeport, A. 252 Rasuwagadhi 48 Rawalpindi 86, 92 Ray, R. 153 Razak, N. 153 realpolitik 84, 92, 95, 131, 173, 244 Red Sea 18 regional interests 84, 92, 172–188 regionalism 104–106, 260 regional neighbours 9, 33–34, 110, 111 regulated insularity 44 Rehman, M. M. 130 rentier capitalism 44 “Rising China” narrative 193, 196, 199 ritual sovereignty 68–69 Riyadh 86 Roggio, B. 95 Romania 242 Rudakowska, A. 252 Rudolph, S. 68 Russia 5, 6, 13, 16–17, 262; military invasion of Ukraine 148; Tsarist 67 Ryack, G. 232 SAARC see South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Saeed, H. T. 93 Sagaing 44, 53, 184, 185 SAGAR see Security and Growth for All in the Region Sajid, I. 96 Sakteng 71, 74 Saleh, A. 92 Samaddar, R. 6, 9–10 Samsani, S. 121, 122 Saparov, J. 163 Saran, S. 33 SARS outbreak (2002) 249 Schmidt, J. D. 234 Schutz, P. 248 Scientific Outlook on Development 224 SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Scott, M. 250 Scott, P. 152 Se, W. 72

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) 13, 15 Seaman, J. 250 SEATO 111 Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) 5, 19, 197 security narratives 191–203; in abundance 195–199; formulation of 192–195; policy and 199–200 Security Tips for Northeast Students/Visitors in Delhi (West Delhi Police) 45 ‘seeing like a bootlegger’ 46–48 Segal, G. 86, 97n4 Seibt, S. 241 semiprecious gems 56 Sen, R. S. 72 Sengupta, A. 1, 6, 9–10, 14 Senkaku islands 202 Serbia 242, 250 Seychelles 16; Special Economic Zone 19 SEZs see special economic zones Shafqat, S. 113 Shah, Z. 85 Shahid, S. 113 Shailoobek Kyzy, A. 163 Shan, E. 77 Shan, W. 77 Shandong Ruyi Group 114 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 9, 16, 89, 201, 224 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 122 Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore 15–17 Sharma, R. 20, 88 Shaymak 90 Shengwei, X. 129 Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 122 Sheraliev, K. 163 Shigatse 65 Shih, G. 90 Shijiazhuang 49 Shillong 52 Shivamurthy, A. D. 73, 77 Shubhra, T. 130 Shulin, L. 87 Sial, S. 111 Sikkim 43, 48, 50 Silchar 52 Siliguri 45, 48, 52 Siliguri–Coochbehar corridor 45 Silk Rail Road 148 Silk Road Fund 226 Simon, L. 4–5 Singapore 14; Changi Port 197

278 Index

Singh, M. 36 Singh, P. 103, 108, 115, 259 Singphos 32 Sino–Bhutan relationship 65, 75 Sino-Gurkha war of 1792–1793 67 Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine 122 SIPRI see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Sittwe 23 SLOC see Sea Lines of Communication Slovakia 249 Slovenia 242 small power syndrome 33, 34 Smith, A. 51 Smith, N. S. 248 Šniukaitė, V. 251 SOEs see state-owned enterprises Sonadia 11, 130 Sonai 52 Song, L. 225 South Asia 1–3, 5, 8, 13, 16, 20, 29, 46, 103, 108–109, 173, 180, 202, 261; decolonisation 104–106; neighbourhood ties 43; regional ambiguity in 259–260; regionalism 104–106; state building 104–106 South Asia–Central Asia transit corridor 6 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 42, 106, 107, 126, 259 South China Sea 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 51, 74, 202 Southeast Asia 1–3, 13, 17, 54, 55, 173; littoral states in 14; special economic zones 11 Southern Silk Route 9 South–South cooperation 2 special economic zones (SEZs) 49, 112, 114, 223 Splichal, S. 245 Srikanth, H. 57 Sri Lanka 2, 9, 11–13, 23, 33, 121, 129, 132, 203, 262; civil war 211; Colombo 12; ethnic and communal politics 104; Hambantota 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 23, 129, 130, 196, 233; independence movement 208; India–China rivalry in see Sri Lanka, India–China rivalry in; Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord (1987) 210; as member of SAARC 106; Ministry of Finance and Planning 214; Non

Aligned Movement (NAM) 209; Rubber-Rice Pact of 1952 208; Sirimavo–Shastri Pact 209 Sri Lanka, India–China rivalry in 206– 218; COVID-19 pandemic 215–217; economic development 211–215, 212–215; historic view of 207–211 Srinivasan, M. 216 SSE see Shanghai Stock Exchange Stanly, J. 86 Stanoeva, K. 244 state building 104–106 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 127, 224, 225 Stefanov, R. 247 Steinberg, D. I. 231 Stobdan, P. 69 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 143; Arms Transfers Database 210 Strait of Hormuz 7, 110 Strait of Malacca 8, 15, 128, 196–198 Strangio, S. 230 strategic autonomy 17 strategic interests 172–188 strategies 221–236 “String of Pearls” strategy 9, 15, 196, 197 Subramanian, N. 216 Suez Canal 13 Sulaiman 92 Sultanzoy, D. 89 Sun, Y. 88–89 Swaine, M. D. 108 Swat Valley 76 Swu, I. C. 38 Sylhet 23 Sytas, A. 252 SZSE see Shenzhen Stock Exchange Tahan 56, 57 Taipei 250 Taiwan 140, 177 Tajikistan 90 Talbung 56 Taliban 83–97; Doha agreement (2020) 91; 9/11 attacks 97n5; rise to power in Afghanistan 157; Taliban 2.0 84 Tamu 184 TAR see Tibet Autonomous Region Tata 210 tatmadaw 183 Tawang 38, 70, 74

Index 279

Tehran 92–93, 150 Tehran–Beijing relationship 142, 145 Terai 45 Thailand 14, 48; Nagas in 38 Tharoor, S. 201 Thein Sein 232 Thiha, A. 231 Thimpu dzongpon 67 Thomas, N. 108 Thonginlal, M. 34 Tiananmen Square incident (1989) 223 Tibet 30, 31, 64–67; ritual sovereignty 69 Tibetan Buddhism 64 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 43, 74 Tiddim 53 TIP see Turkistan Islamic Party Tlabung 52 Tollison, R. D. 44, 45 Tonchev, P. 252 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix 154 trade 122, 126–128, 130–132, 221–236 tragedy of the commons 47 Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 153 Trashigang 70 Treaty of Punakha (1907) 70 Tripura 56 Trofimov, Y. 96 Truchla, H. 242 Tsangpa Gyare 64 Tullock, G. 44, 45 Turcsanyi, R. 242, 244 al-Turkistani, A. H. 95 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) 95 Turkmenistan–China pipeline 6 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 8, 143, 144, 148 “Two-Ocean” Strategy 228 Ukraine, Russia’s military invasion of 148 ULFA see United Liberation Front of Assam Ulitina, E. 163 Umarov, T. 159, 160, 165 UNHCR see United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Kingdom 262 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 35, 40n6 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 93

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 185 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 93, 95, 97n8, 230, 234 United States (US) 2, 5, 10, 17, 18, 152, 157; Cold War 14; Department of State 5–6, 24n1, 259; hegemony 83, 84; National Security Strategy 172; “New Silk Road” initiatives 5; rebalancing strategy 10; 9/11 attacks 97n5; war on terror 87; withdrawal 2, 5, 84, 91, 167 United Wa State Army (UWSA) 52 UNSC see United Nations Security Council U Nu: visit to China 173 US see United States Uttarakhand 43 Uulu, M. A. 21 UWSA see United Wa State Army Uyghur policy 166 Uzbekistan 6 Vairegnte 52 Vajpayee, A. B. 33, 182 Vajrayana Buddhism 76 Van der Kley, D. 165 van Leijen, M. 163 Vasudhaiba Kutumbakam 200 Venice 9 Vietnam 14, 181 Walton, D. 246 Wang, K. 164–165 Wang, S. 72 war on terror 87 Washington 86 Watts, J. 77 Weber, L. 96 Wei, S. 15 Weidong, S. 73 West Asia 5, 195 West Bengal 31, 45, 50 Westeros 63 Westphalian state 65 Wignaraja, G. 211 Wijegunaratne, R. 208 wildlife 54–56 Willoughby, I. 248 Winter, T. 117 wolf warrior diplomacy 251 World Bank 153, 211, 214, 252, 259 World Economic Forum 226

280 Index

World Trade Organisation (WTO) 224 WTO see World Trade Organisation Wu, J. 72, 74 Wuhan 201 Wuthnow, J. 152 Xavier, C. 23 Xiaoyong, Y. 91–92 Xigatse 49 Xi Jinping 6, 7, 9, 74, 109–110, 151, 166, 176, 201, 203, 221, 225, 250; “China Dream” 191, 195, 221, 225; on new normal 127; visit to Dhaka 125; visit to Myanmar 174 Xinjiang 7, 8, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96–97n4, 97n6, 111–113, 127, 162, 164, 178 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 162, 163, 165 XUAR see Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Yandle, B. 58n1 Yau, N. 165 Ye, H. 108

Ye, M. 153 Yi, W. 84, 91, 92, 94, 109, 122, 125, 143, 173, 198 Yiwei, W. 91 Yoshihara, T. 9 Yue, D. 217 Yunnan 32 Yuxi, S. 88 Zarif, M. J. 143 al-Zawahiri, A. 94, 95 Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal 64, 65, 68, 70 Zhang, D. D. 221 Zhang, Y. 108 Zhangmu–Kodari border 48, 58n2 Zhou, Y. 88, 225 Zhou Enlai 36, 85, 112, 209 Zhu, Z. 195, 250 Zia, K. 126 Zo hnahthlak 45 Zokhawthar 181, 183 Zolkos, M. 244 Zorinpui 184 ZTE 87, 153