China and the Indo-Pacific: Maneuvers and Manifestations 9811975205, 9789811975202

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgements
Praise for China and the Indo-Pacific
Contents
Editors and Contributors
About the Editors
Contributors
Abbreviations
List of Tables
1 China’s Engagement and the Indo-Pacific
Introduction
The China-Led Transition of Asia–Pacific
China’s Engagement by Other Stakeholders
In This Volume…
References
2 Decoding ‘Sovereign Strategic Networks’ in the Indo-Pacific: Contesting China’s ‘Ascendant-Rise’
Introduction
Strategic Competition: Cooperative Vistas to Convergent Axes?
The Economic Prosperity Network: A ‘Non-China’ Economic Security Compact
Challenging Predatory Strategic-Capacitation: The Blue Dot Network
Democratizing Commoditized Economy: Supply Chains Resilience Initiative
Sanctity of ‘Data-Tech’: ‘G7’, ‘D10’ or ‘T10’?
‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’: Mainstreaming Sustainable Development
Conclusion
References
3 US–China Strategic Competition: Through the Matrix of Complex Interdependence
Introduction
Asymmetries and Interdependence
US Presence in the Indo-Pacific
Shifting Complex Interdependence Axis
Dissecting Its Theoretical Underpinning
Concluding Remarks
References
4 Sino-Japanese Relations: Drivers and Obstacles in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
Introduction
China’s ‘New Era’ Under Xi Jinping
The Precarious Seikei Bunri Formula
Critical Junctures in Sino-Japanese Relations
Characteristics and Approaches of the FOIP
China Factor in Japan’s FOIP Vision
Conclusion
References
5 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Motivations, Opportunities, and Challenges
Introduction
One Construct, Multiple Interpretations
Indonesia’s Contribution to the AOIP
The Geopolitics of the AOIP
China and ASEAN Centrality
ASEAN Unity and Its China Challenge
Conclusion
References
6 China in EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Introduction
Why EU Needs to Join the Indo-Pacific?
Untangling EU’s China Vision
EU vs. Its Member States
Complexities of the EU–China Relationship
Can Indo-Pacific Solve China–EU Problems?
China in the Making of the Indo-Pacific
EU’s “Middle-Ground” Approach
Tailpiece: What About Post-Brexit UK?
Conclusion
References
7 Evolving Indo-Pacific Multilateralism: China Factor in Australia’s Perspectives
Australia as a Middle Power
Multilateralism in Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy
China Factor in Australia’s Multilateralism
Multilateralism in Middle Powers’ Defence Strategies
Multilateralism and Middle Powers’ Economic Strategies
China and the Evolving Regional Architecture
Conclusion
References
8 The Community of Shared Futures: China’s Counter to Indo-Pacific Narratives
Introduction
Constructed and Contested Ideas in-the-Making
Ideas of Indo-Pacific: Contestations and Convergences
China’s Asia–Pacific Policy
Factors and Forces Guiding China’s CSF
CSF and Changing of the Normative Dynamics
Motivations For China’s CSF
From Harmonious World to CSF
From Defensive to Proactive
Intellectual Origins of CSF
CSF in China’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific
Chinese Critique of the Indo-Pacific
Conclusion
References
9 China’s Regional Engagement and Quad: Mapping Conceptual Dynamics
Introduction
Mapping the Conceptual Dynamics
Maritime Silk Road vis-à-vis the Quad
Mapping China’s Supply Chain Networks
China’s Expanding Maritime Footprint
China’s Vaccine Diplomacy
Conclusion
References
10 China’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands
Introduction
China’s Engagement with Pacific Islands
Competition Between China and Taiwan
China and Solomon Islands
Conclusion
References
11 China’s Maneuvers in South Asia
Introduction
South Asia: A Region of Significance for China
SAARC—Limited Relevance and Outreach
China’s All-Pervasive Engagement in South Asia
China’s Influence: A Bilateral Perspective
India and China: Unresolved Borders
China: Afghanistan and Pakistan as Special Friends
Bhutan and Nepal: Small Nations Between Two Large Neighbors
Bangladesh and China: A Strengthening Relationship
Sino-Sri Lanka Relations: An Impacted Island
Maldives and China: Influence in the Indian Ocean
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE SERIES IN ASIA AND PACIFIC STUDIES

China and the Indo-Pacific Maneuvers and Manifestations Edited by Swaran Singh · Reena Marwah

Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies

Honorary Editor May Tan-Mullins, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo, China

Series Editor Filippo Gilardi, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo, China

Editorial Board Melissa Shani Brown, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany Adam Knee, LASALLE College of the Arts, Singapore, Singapore Gianluigi Negro, University of Siena, Siena, Italy Andrea Stˇrelcová, MPIWG, Berlin, Germany

The Asia and Pacific regions, with a population of nearly three billion people, are of critical importance to global observers, academics, and citizenry due to their rising influence in the global political economy as well as traditional and nontraditional security issues. Any changes to the domestic and regional political, social, economic, and environmental systems will inevitably have great impacts on global security and governance structures. At the same time, Asia and the Pacific have also emerged as a globally influential, trend-setting force in a range of cultural arenas. The remit of this book series is broadly defined, in terms of topics and academic disciplines. We invite research monographs on a wide range of topics focused on Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the series is also interested in manuscripts pertaining to pedagogies and research methods, for both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Published by Palgrave Macmillan, in collaboration with the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies, UNNC. NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!

Swaran Singh · Reena Marwah Editors

China and the Indo-Pacific Maneuvers and Manifestations

Editors Swaran Singh Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

Reena Marwah Jesus and Mary College University of Delhi New Delhi, India

ISSN 2662-7922 ISSN 2662-7930 (electronic) Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies ISBN 978-981-19-7520-2 ISBN 978-981-19-7521-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Zoonar GmbH/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

This volume seeks to present both sides of the discourse on Indo-Pacific geopolitics: the mainstream one—the genesis of which is credited to Japan but is lately led by the United States and its friends—and also the other led one by China and only mutely joined together by several recipients of its largely one-sided trade and investments. Over the years, US-led narratives in the name of Free and Open Indo-Pacific have seen China heralding its own vision of a shared destiny of humankind and, at least indirectly, the Chinese have also begun to engage with the Indo-Pacific geopolitics. China, however, remains committed to using the term AsiaPacific thereby emphasising the continental perspectives of the region. Both these narratives of the US and China remain located in this region’s larger drift from the post-World War II geo-strategic US-led security architecture of hub-and-spokes to post-Cold War geo-economic realignments making China the largest economic partner for most littoral nations. No doubt US has also sought to reinforce its economic leadership—from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to Trans-Pacific Partnership to Indo-Pacific Economic Forum—and China has also made inroads in the regional security architecture by building of port facilities— from Djibouti to Hambantota, Gwadar, to Solomon Islands—yet the US remains the leader in security management while China has emerged as the locomotive of regional economic growth and epi-centre for regional production and supply chains.

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PREFACE

The intriguing question that this volume seeks to explore is how China, the main trigger for this combined growth and change—and therefore trigger for novel imaginations of this confluence of Pacific and Indian Ocean—has largely remained an outlier in US-led mainstream IndoPacific geopolitical discourses? This is where contributors of this volume have sought to deconstruct various conceptual and operative outlines of both US-led and Chinese narratives to elucidate their overlaps as also their distinctive core and its drivers. Do these new outlines emanate from the larger drift from the geo-strategic and geo-economic churning and transformations set in motion by this unprecedented economic rise of China? Do they also adequately reflect how under President Xi Jinping this economic prowess has been used by China in cultivating and expanding its political influence which is today guiding and goading the evolving future trajectories of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics? The economic and the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific, meanwhile, appears bifurcating—led respectively by China and the United States—often witnessing eruptions on issues relating to trade, technology and Taiwan—which have become all the more complicated by the longdrawn coronavirus pandemic followed by the Ukraine crisis which have further sharpened US-China contestations. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the epi-centre of global powers competition has clearly shifted to the Indo-Pacific region igniting a new competition between China as the new rising power and an established power ie. the United States; and, where the US-led global order finds itself challenged by a move towards Pax-Sinica. It is evident that ‘China centricity’ of global production and supply chains, reinforced through its state-driven project-based infrastructurebinge is fast diminishing the erstwhile clout of the US. China’s leaders have consistently made clear their desire to have their political and economic models respected. It has been a consistent feature of Chinese foreign policy to push for deference to its ‘core interests’. The multiple strands of the Belt and Road Initiative have seen a host of counteracting responses including its Indo-Pacific narratives and the Quad initiatives among others; the most recent one being the trilateral grouping of Australia, the U.K., and the US, viz. the AUKUS. This is where dissecting their underlying visions and conceptual constructs become critical to understand their evolving mutual policies and perceptions as also their global implications.

PREFACE

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It is in this complex backdrop, that this book seeks to examine the evolving contours and dimensions of Western imaginations of China as also China’s own response to various Western multilateral initiatives. Contributors specifically explicate China’s Indo-Pacific strategies in the context of the strategies of United States, Japan, ASEAN, European Union, Australia and India. In the second part they specifically explore Chinese expositions. Together they seek to reveal how China’s mediumterm strategy envisages a non-hostile external environment in order to focus on its core interests; how by reducing dependence of littoral nations of the Indo-Pacific region on the United States it seeks to increase their engagement with China. China’s expanding economic outreach and influence across the Indo-Pacific littorals has likewise provided a new boost to US-led expositions and initiatives which are often seen as being China-driven thereby inviting intermittent responses from Beijing and this action-reaction has become increasingly palpable. It calls for a serious debate to scrutinise China’s vision as also its increasing centrality and influence in the moulding and unfolding of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. New Delhi, India

Swaran Singh Reena Marwah

Acknowledgements

This volume titled, China and the Indo-Pacific: Maneuvers and Manifestations is an outcome of the two-days International Conference held in April 2021. Authors’ papers after their Abstracts were selected had to go through multiple stages of rigorous selection and editing process, before these were presented within the sub-themes of Conceptualisation of Multilateralism, Major Powers engagement, China in the Indo-Pacific, Issues and future trends. Discussants were provided papers in advance and authors received their oral and written responses The authors were then required to substantively revise their papers as chapters based on the comments received from the discussants during the conference as also comments received from Editors. At the outset, Editors take this opportunity to thank each of the conference session chairpersons and discussants, whose valuable inputs helped to enrich the contributions of the authors. We are particularly grateful to Dr. E. Sridharan, Prof. Munim Barai, Prof. Nirmal Jindal, Prof. B.R. Deepak, Prof. Sophana Srichampa, Prof. Lailufar Yasmin, Prof. Lakhwinder Singh and Prof. Sukhpal Singh for chairing various sessions. Our thanks are also due to the large number of scholars who participated in this two-day conference and engaged the presenters with pointed questions. Conference participants are also acknowledged for their candid sharing of views. This volume also acknowledges the perseverance of several authors whose papers were revised a few times and all of them have contributed to

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

enriching the book. This volume comprising 11 chapters would not have been possible without the kind cooperation of the production and editorial team of Palgrave Macmillan. Each one deserves our sincere thanks and appreciation. All research interns of our Association of Asia Scholars, led by Dr. Silky Kaur were continuously engaged in ensuring the success of the conference and deserve our appreciation. Finally, we are grateful to our families for being our constant strength in enabling us to complete this seminal work. Prof. Swaran Singh Prof. Reena Marwah

Praise for China and the Indo-Pacific

“This ground-breaking compendium by a group of scholars - both established and emerging - presents a critical deconstructing of both the conceptual as also operative elements of what appears to be two distinct narratives; mainstream one led by the United States and a gradually emerging counter from China’s leaders. Seen from Indian perspectives it presents useful analysis for India’s policy makers to fathom the ever evolving trajectories likely to shape the contours of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics in the coming years.” —Harsh V Pant, Professor of International Relations, King’s College London “At a time of accelerating competition in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an extremely timely and important contribution. This book brings together a great and diverse group of excellent scholars to analyze the rapidly evolving Indo-pacific strategies of all key players in the region and beyond, with fascinating individual insights. Edited by two renowned editors, this is a must-read volume to make sense of current geopolitical dynamics.” —Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia, Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research

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PRAISE FOR CHINA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC

“A brilliant blending of opposing yet determined interrogations complicates the simultaneity of China’s reluctant engagement with narratives of Indo-Pacific geopolitics aimed at a joint alert to its rise and corresponding practices of mutual moulding that not only reconfigures major actors but also entangles China.” —Chih-yu Shih, Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University “A timely volume with an Excellent Set of Contributions perfectly assembled by the Editors. Useful reading material for libraries, researchers and policy practitioners to understand the current and future Chinese strategies in Indo-Pacific. The volume presents a balanced and fine overview of Indo-Pacific, highlighting bilateral and mini-lateral politics.” —Jagannath Panda, Head, Stockholm Centre for South Asian & Indo-Pacific Affairs, ISDP, Sweden & Director, Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YACPS), Japan “The United States, some European and Asian countries have issued strategic documents on the Indo-Pacific, and scholars and politicians from various countries are paying close attention to China’s response. This monograph, edited by Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Reena Marwah, brings together the assessment of China’s status and role in the IndoPacific framework by important scholars in the field of international relations, highlighting the concerns and perceptions of relevant countries on China. Chinese scholars will be able to gain a better understanding of the views of the outside world through this book.” —Prof. Su Hao, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing

Contents

1

China’s Engagement and the Indo-Pacific Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah

2

Decoding ‘Sovereign Strategic Networks’ in the Indo-Pacific: Contesting China’s ‘Ascendant-Rise’ Dattesh D. Parulekar

3

4

5

6

1

21

US–China Strategic Competition: Through the Matrix of Complex Interdependence Rubina Waseem

41

Sino-Japanese Relations: Drivers and Obstacles in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision Stephen R. Nagy

55

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Motivations, Opportunities, and Challenges Don McLain Gill

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China in EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Claudia Astarita

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CONTENTS

7

Evolving Indo-Pacific Multilateralism: China Factor in Australia’s Perspectives Artyom A. Garin

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The Community of Shared Futures: China’s Counter to Indo-Pacific Narratives Devendra Kumar Bishnoi

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China’s Regional Engagement and Quad: Mapping Conceptual Dynamics Mrittika Guha Sarkar

171

8

9

10

China’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Madhura Bane

195

11

China’s Maneuvers in South Asia Reena Marwah and Abhishek Verma

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Index

241

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia (Vancouver) and Professor and former Chairman of the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute (Calgary), Director India, The Millennium Project’s South Asia Foresight Network (Washington DC), Member, Governing Body, Society of Indian Ocean Studies (New Delhi) and president of the Association of Asia Scholars (New Delhi). Prof Singh has been formerly visiting professor/scholar at Australian National University (Canberra), Science Po (Bordeaux, France) University of Peace (Costa Rica), Peking, Fudan and Xiamen Universities, and Shanghai Institute of International Studies and

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EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Center for Asian Studies (Hong Kong University) in China, Asian Center (University of the Philippines), and Chuo, Hiroshima and Kyoto Universities (in Japan), as also Guest Faculty at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden). He was Academic Consultant (2003–2007) at Center de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi), Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (New Delhi). Prof. Singh has published in the Journal of International Affairs (Columbia University), Security Challenges (Australian National University), Journal of Indian Ocean Region (Perth, Australia), Issues & Studies (Taiwan National University), African Security (Institute of Security Studies), BISS Journal (Dhaka), and several Chinese and Indian journals. Prof Singh co-edited Multilateralism in the Indo Pacific—Conceptual and Operational Challenges (Routledge, 2022), Revisiting Gandhi: Legacies for Global Peace and National Integration (World Scientific, Singapore, 2021) Corridors of Engagement (2020), Colonial Legacies And Contemporary Studies Of China And Chineseness: Unlearning Binaries (2020), BCIM Economic Corridor: Chinese and Indian Perspectives (2017), Transforming South Asia: Imperatives for Action (2013); India and the GCC Countries, Iran and Iraq: Emerging Security Perspectives (2013), On China By India: From Civilization to State (2012), Emerging China: Prospects for Partnership in Asia (2012), Asia’s Multilateralism (in Chinese 2012); Edited China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives (2007) Co-authored Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy (2007) and authored Nuclear

EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

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Command & Control in Southern Asia: China, India, Pakistan (2010), China-India Economic Engagement: Building Mutual Confidence (2005), China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies (2003). Prof. Singh has supervised 32 Ph.D.s and 50+ M.Phil. degrees at JNU and sits on Selection Committees for faculty recruitment and on the Editorial Board of various reputed journals. He regularly writes for Indian and foreign media, lectures at various prestigious institutions in India and abroad, and regularly appears on radio and television discussions. Twitter: @SwaranSinghJNU. Prof. Reena Marwah (M.Phil., Delhi University; Ph.D., India, International Business) is Professor at Jesus and Mary College, Delhi University. She was an ICSSR Senior Fellow, MHRD, Govt. of India, affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi from June 2017 to May 2019, during which her study was on Reimagining India– Thailand Relations. She has also been on deputation as Senior Academic Consultant, ICSSR, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Govt. of India for three years (2012– 2015) and continued, on behalf of ICSSR to coordinate/lead the India-Europe Research Platform (EqUIP), comprising 10 research councils of Europe till July 2017. She is the recipient of several prestigious fellowships including the McNamara fellowship of the World Bank, 1999–2000 and the Asia fellowship of the Asian Scholarship Foundation 2002–2003, during which she undertook research in Thailand and Nepal. She is also a Senior Fellow of the Institute of National

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Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL). She has been a Consultant for the World Bank and UN Women. She is the founding editor of Millennial Asia, a triannual journal on Asian Studies of the Association of Asia Scholars, published by Sage Publishers. During her teaching and research experience, she has worked closely with several think tanks, international donors, embassies, ministries of the Government of India and research councils in Asia. Among her research interests are international relations issues of China, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand and India, and development issues of South and South East Asia. In addition to several chapters and articles published in books/journals, she is author/co-author/co-editor of 16 books and monographs including Contemporary India: Economy, Society and Polity (Pinnacle 2009, 2011), co-edited volumes including Economic and Environmental Sustainability of the Asian Region (Routledge 2010), Emerging China: Prospects for partnership in Asia (Routledge 2011), On China by India: From a Civilization to a Nation State (Cambria Press, USA); Transforming South Asia: Imperatives for Action, (Knowledge World, India) 2014; The Global Rise of Asian Transformation, (Palgrave Macmillan) 2014. Her latest co-edited books are: China Studies in South and Southeast Asia: ProChina, Objectivism, and Balance, (2018) (World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore). Revisiting Gandhi: Legacies for Global Peace and National Integration (World Scientific, Singapore, 2021, Multilateralism in the Indo Pacific—Conceptual and Operational Challenges (Routledge, 2022).

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Her most recent authored books are Reimagining India Thailand Relations: A multilateral and bilateral perspective, by World Scientific Publishers, Singapore, published in March 2020; China’s Economic Footprint in South and Southeast Asia: A futuristic perspective, published in 2021, by World Scientific Publishers, Singapore and India-Vietnam Relations: Development Dynamics and Strategic Alignment, (2022) published by Springer Nature.

Contributors Claudia Astarita is a lecturer at Sciences Po Paris and International Relations Analyst for China and the Indo-Pacific at Indigo Publication (Paris). She obtained her Ph.D. in Asian Studies from Hong Kong University in early 2010. Her main research interests include China’s political and economic development, Chinese and Indian Foreign policies, East Asian regionalism and regional economic integration, Asian Civil Society, and the role of media and memory (both official and unofficial) in reshaping historical narratives in Asia. Madhura Bane (Ph.D.) Former Coordinator of Post-graduate Centre, Department of Political Science, Sir Parashurambhau College (Autonomous), Pune. Former Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Ramnarain Ruia Autonomous College, Matunga. My academic interests are in International Relations, India’s Foreign Policy, Political theory and Indian Polity. My chapter on Climate Change Challenges: A Study of Island States in the Indo-Pacific is a part of the forthcoming volume with Routledge titled Multilateralism in the Indo Pacific: Conceptual and Operational Challenges edited by Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah. Devendra Kumar Bishnoi has submitted his Ph.D. thesis titled Domestic Politics and International Order: a Constructivist Analysis of Chinese Discourses on Territorial Sovereignty for evaluation in the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, Telangana

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(India). His research focuses on the intersections between domestic politics and China’s approaches to the international order with particular focus on the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its efforts to remould ideology in the post-Mao period. Earlier, he has earned his master’s in Political Science from the University of Hyderabad, and Chinese language training from the English and Foreign Language University, Hyderabad, and Tsinghua University, Beijing. His current research focuses on maps circulated in education textbooks, popular books, and media among other media since the 1940s and their significance in understanding Chinese imaginations of its place in the territorial sovereignty-based international order. Artyom A. Garin is Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS. He is interested in multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Australia–China relations. His research interests also include defence and aid policies of Australia, as well as politics and history of the Pacific Island Countries. Don McLain Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst and author who specialises in Indo-Pacific affairs and India-Southeast Asian relations. He has over 100 publications to his credit, and he has written in the form of books, book chapters, peer-reviewed international journal articles, and analytical commentaries for major international affairs publishers such as The Diplomat, Asia Times, The National Interest, SCMP, ORF, and RUSI, among others. Don is also regularly interviewed by international news tv channels on his views regarding various issues on international security and geopolitics. Stephen R. Nagy received his Ph.D. in International Relations/Studies from Waseda University in 2008. His main affiliation is as a senior associate professor at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI); a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA); a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute (MLI); and a senior fellow with the East Asia Security Centre (EASC). He also serves as the Director of Policy Studies for the Yokosuka Council of Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS) spearheading their Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue series. He is currently working on middle power approaches to great power competition in the IndoPacific. His latest publications include among others, Nagy, S. R. 2022.

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‘Economic Headwinds and a Chance of Slower Growth: What the forecast holds for the Belt Road Initiative’, MacDonald Laurier Institute.; Nagy, S. R. 2021. “Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as seen through the Interplay of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP)’. China Report: 1–15. Dattesh D. Parulekar (Ph.D.), is Assistant Professor at the School of International and Area Studies (SIAS), Goa University. His realms of specialisation are India’s Foreign Policy, Strategic Maritime Issues in the Indo-Pacific, African Affairs, India-Europe Cooperation w r.t the Nordics, and Latin American Political Economy. Mrittika Guha Sarkar is an SIS Dean’s Awardee and Graduate Assistant at the School of International Studies (SIS), The American University, Washington, DC, USA. She is further associated with the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia as an Editorial Assistant. She has previously been associated with the Chinese Language Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan, as a Language Scholar, and the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi as a Research Scholar in Chinese studies. Her area of focus mainly encompasses China’s foreign policy and strategic affairs. She has also researched India–China relations, as well as the geostrategic affairs of the Indo-Pacific region, East Asia’s geopolitics and security affairs, focusing on the regional developments of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Abhishek Verma is a Ph.D. scholar at Diplomacy and Disarmament (DAD) division, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has several publications to his credit including a monograph titled ‘China’s Growing Stature and Inherent Conflict: Tracing Chinese Strategic Thoughts and its Contemporary Behaviour’. He completed his graduation from Hansraj College, Delhi University and M.A. in Politics (Specialisation in International Studies) from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Rubina Waseem (Ph.D.) is Assistant Professor of the Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Islamabad and a former Research Scholar at the George Washington University, Washington, DC. She has written number of research papers and participated in many national and international conferences to share her research work. She

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earned her Ph.D. in Strategic Studies and also holds M.Phil. and M.Sc. degree in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid-I-Azam University.

Abbreviations

AAGC ACFTA ADB ADMM AEC AFTA AIIB AOIP APEC APT ARF ASEAN AUKUS BBIN BCIM BDN BIMSTEC BRF BRI CAFTA CBMs CCP CECA CENTO CLMV

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor ASEAN–China Free Trade Area Asian Development Bank ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting ASEAN Economic Community ASEAN Free Trade Area Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of South East Asian Nations Australia UK US Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Blue Dot Network Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation Belt and Road Forum Belt and Road Initiative China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Confidence-Building Measures Chinese Communist Party Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement Central Treaty Organisation Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar Vietnam xxiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

CMEC CORPATs COTRI CPEC CPICEDC CPTPP CSIS DSTO EAS EU FDI FOIP FTA GAME GCI GDP HDI IMF IPOI LAWs MANPADS MDA MEA MoU MRIA MSR OBOR OSOWOG PIC’s PLA PNG PQI PRC QSD RCEP ReCAAP RIMPAC RSCI SAARC SCO SEATO

China Myanmar Economic Corridor Coordinated Patrols China Outbound Tourism Research Institute China Pakistan Economic Corridor China-Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership Centre for Strategic and International Studies Defence Science and Technology Organisation East Asia Summit European Union Foreign Direct Investment Free and Open Indo Pacific Free Trade Agreement Guidelines for Air Military Encounters Global Competitiveness Index Gross Domestic Product Human Development Index International Monetary Fund Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Lethal Autonomous Weapon systems Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Market Development Assistance Ministry of External Affairs Memorandum of Understanding Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport Maritime Silk Road One Belt One Road One-Sun-One-World-One-Grid Pacific Islands Countries People’s Liberation Army Papua New Guinea Partnership for Quality Infrastructure People’s Republic of China Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Rim of the Asia Pacific Resilient Supply Chain Initiative South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Shanghai Cooperation Organization South East Asia Treaty Organisation

ABBREVIATIONS

SIDS SREB TAC TPP UNCLOS WB WW2

Small Island Developing States Silk Road Economic Belt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Trans-Pacific Partnership United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas World Bank World War Two

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

7.1 10.1 10.2 10.3

Table 10.4 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 11.3 Table 11.4

Australian Defence White Papers (1976–2016) China’s exports to the select PIC’s Donors: a comparative assessment China’s Aid in USD million (spent) on Pacific Islands in 2009 and 2019 Taiwan’s Aid in USD million (spent) on Pacific Islands in 2009 and 2019 South Asian countries: GDP, Debt, HDI, 2022 Chinese debt as a percentage of total debt of South Asian countries Chinese projects in Pakistan and Nepal Chinese projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives

124 199 201 205 206 223 224 228 231

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CHAPTER 1

China’s Engagement and the Indo-Pacific Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah

Introduction The year 2021 closed with China finally officially taking its first step towards accepting, engaging, and endorsing the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ that it had been fighting shy; choosing instead to stay on with the older ‘Asia–Pacific’ terminology of yesteryears. The occasion was the special virtual summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue relations where President Xi Jinping’s speech read: ‘We seek high-quality Belt and Road cooperation with ASEAN and cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (emphasis added) (Xi 2021: 5). The Joint Statement that

S. Singh Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] R. Marwah (B) Jesus and Mary College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_1

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followed appeared a bit cautious clarifying China’s limited endorsement: ‘Reaffirming the principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), while recognising that it is ASEAN’s independent initiative, being open and inclusive, is intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process, and is not aimed at creating any new mechanism or replacing existing ones’ (MoFA 2021). At the follow-up press briefing, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson was even more restrained reiterating China’s long-held position saying: ‘China always supports ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture, and supports ASEAN playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs’ (Verma 2022). However, on being asked a specific question MoFA spokesperson acknowledged India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific, placing on record that ‘China has noted India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative’ (ibid.). While staying on with the ‘Asia–Pacific’ terminology, China has since evolved a larger vision for the region that is outlined in its building of a shared community of humankind which blends almost seamlessly with ASEAN’s community building initiatives. Indeed, like most stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics, China remains committed to the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’ and Beijing seems now finally ready to open its innings of directly engaging with these Indo-Pacific geopolitical narratives. The pace and direction of this engagement, of course, will remain hostage to China’s overall equations with the United States and its imaginations of the Indo-Pacific strategy that Beijing views as aimed at China’s containment and thereby reinforces US predominance. The US-China trade and technology wars of recent years provide the most apt evidence of such a prognosis. As recent as in July 2021, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi had described the US Indo-Pacific strategy as a come-back of Cold War mentality warning that ‘Revisiting the old dream of Cold War hegemony cannot win the future, let alone “rebuild a better world”’ (Xinhua 2021). Likewise in 2018, Wang Yi had first demolished US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as ‘Sea foam’ that will dissipate but then by 2020 called it an Asian NATO and condemned US Indo-Pacific strategy being aimed at reviving ‘Cold War mentality and to stir up confrontation amongst different groups and blocks and to stoke geopolitical competition’ (Hu and Meng 2020: 145; Rej 2020). It is pertinent to begin by asking what has triggered this change of heart in Beijing? What have been the drivers and direction of China engagement with the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) or of its growing recognition of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)?

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What are the likely trajectories of China’s engagement with the new Indo-Pacific alignments? It is in this complex and evolving backdrop of blurring contours of their mutual containment and engagement— or congagement—that this volume seeks to explore both China’s own forward movement from its extensive economic partnerships with the Indo-Pacific littoral to engaging with emerging Indo-Pacific political and strategic narratives as also the engagement of China by various stakeholders in this evolving Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Either way, it has become increasingly impossible to ignore China’s presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region which calls for a serious examination of its vision and engagements with this region.

The China-Led Transition of Asia–Pacific At the very outset, China’s extraordinary economic rise since the early 1990s has unleashed China multifaceted external engagements thereby unfolding novel visions about its past glory as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the yore. This has also fired desires to reclaim its due place in the world leading to solidifying of its resolve to raise its global power profile. Successive Chinese leaders have since aspired to transform China into a world power with fuguo qiang hing (economic prosperity, strong military) and from early 2000s they have felt confident of having realised these twin objectives (Mitter 2020: 219; Li 2013: 57). Beijing summer Olympics of 2008 under President Hu Jintao are generally cited as marking that inflection point in China’s coming out from Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide your strengths, bide your time’ axiom creating grounds for President Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ and China’s emergence as a full-spectrum regional power (Grix et al. 2019: 69; Heydarian 2014). Especially, since the coming of President Xi Jinping to power, China has undergone a radical shift in signalling its willingness to shape the regional and even global order (Wu 2018: 996–997). Especially, the last two years of pandemic coinciding with president Xi’s drive towards his third term as Party General Secretary and President have begun unfolding a more assertive China, especially in its immediate region. President Xi’s focus on consolidating his own and Party’s centrality through anti-graft campaigns during his first term in office followed by his focus on innovation and through his unique benchmarks like the Centennial Goals, China Dream, Belt and Road Initiatives juxtaposed with China’s military modernisation and an increasingly assertive ‘wolf warrior’

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diplomacy have sent aftershocks across China’s periphery and amongst its peer competitors (Mladenov 2021: 62, 122, 344, 462). Indeed, starting from the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, China emerged as a great friend and economic partner of the Association of South East Asian Nations that was originally created in 1960s to contain Communist China spreading its ideology to other countries of the Asia–Pacific (Yahuda 2004: 295, 333). And then, the global economic slowdown from 2008 was to see Beijing engender closer partnerships even with major US allies like Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea making the United States aware of its changing equations in global politics (Yang and Seng 2010: 34). Finally, since 2020, the Coronavirus pandemic has only accelerated the process of a relative rise of China catching up with the United States in various indices of influence: for the year 2021, China was the only one among major economies to show positive growth of 2.6 per cent thus further closing the gap as the second largest economy in the world (Day and Xuanmin 2022; Hale and Yu 2022). This economic rise of China has gradually unfolded China’s political and strategic vision and its overtones resulting in China and the United States frequently contesting for influence among various small and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific. This is what has since triggered efforts by both sides to unfold their respective novel conceptualisations for building a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific and these reflect strong divergences with serious implications for regional security, stability and prosperity. While the United States, starting from President Barrack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia has heralded narratives of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics, China has since President Hu Jintao promoted the vision of building a China-led harmonious world. This has been further fine-tuned under President Xi Jinping into building a community of shared future of humankind at the conceptual level and his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to operationalise that novel vision and perspective. China’s BRI engagement reaching out to over 130 countries has not just enabled its recent forays around the world to support the fight against the coronavirus pandemic but saw it simultaneously supporting (read leading) the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which promises to align the economic alignments of 15 nations of the Indo-Pacific accounting for over 30 per cent of global GDP. It is important to underline how India, feeling sidelined by China, had distanced itself from RCEP negotiations at the very last minute.

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The RCEP comprises 15 countries, including the ten ASEAN nations as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Langhammer, former vice president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, asserted that the benefits of RCEP would be uneven and it would be most advantageous for China (Martin 2021). Over the past decade China has also been taking measures to internationalise the Renminbi (RMB), with the objective that over the long run, the currencies of its trading partners become pegged to the RMB. The fact that China is the largest trading partner of over 120 countries, there is an endeavour to ensure that the RMB is established as an important reserve currency of the foreign central markets (Marwah and Ramanayake 2021: 25). Xi Jinping’s visualisation of the ‘China Dream’ through BRI is without a parallel in history; encompassing increasingly numbers of smaller nations in its enfold. This penchant for expanding its influence is supported by China emerging as the world’s most powerful supplier of manufactured good and physical infrastructure (Marwah and Ramanayake 2021: 8). In contrast, Trump’s ‘America First’ policy was seen in the United States abandoning its world leadership including Trans-Pacific Partnership thereby conceding space for China which increasingly dominates multilateral trade arrangements in Asia. In the realm of security as well, the post-2017 revitalised Quad 2.0, a grouping of four democracies, has since seen its agenda traversing less on elements like security cooperation and naval exercises and much more on sectors like vaccine diplomacy, climate change, critical technology, cyberspace, capacity building and so on. The United States and its allies have since taken refuge in framing and promoting a normative agenda including transparency in decisionmaking, quality regulations, standards and rule-based international system as the basis of their cooperation with all the relevant stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region through non-military measures (Marwah and Yasmin 2021: 11). Evidently, as a rising power, China is not without its own normative formulations and conceptual push-backs to US-led Indo-Pacific narratives. These have indeed gradually gained traction and are strongly backed by China’s economic partnership across these littoral nations of the IndoPacific. To begin with, ASEAN’s unwillingness or inability to stand up against China’s virtual annexation of the South China Sea provides its most apt example where both China’s artificial island building and grey zone operations have gone uncontested by all other claimant nations of

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the ASEAN (Singh and Yamamoto 2016: 2). The Indian Ocean is another strategic maritime space that has witnessed China’s increasing footprint with implications (Singh 2011: 245). Under President Xi Jinping, China has demonstrated great agility in undertaking various tactical initiatives to overcome what President Hu Jintao had called China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’ (Mohan 2012: 119–121). If anything, China’s expanding trade and investments across the Pacific and Indian Oceans littoral have transformed Malacca Straits from a choke point into a bridge-triggering imagination of the confluence of these two maritime regions into Indo-Pacific paradigm (Borah 2022: 131). It is interesting to see how China, an integrator, has so far remained an outlier in the US-led Indo-Pacific narratives. This of course has been the result of both US attempts to visualise Indo-Pacific strategies to contain and counter China’s rise as well as a result of Beijing’s own consciousness of not encouraging this visualisation and expose itself in its sensitive maritime region, the South China Sea; not at least until it has consolidated its complete control on this region. Does this indirect but growing interest and engagement of China with the Indo-Pacific reflect its consolidation of South China Sea and its equations with ASEAN and other US allies in its periphery? What could be the measurable benchmarks to establish China’s equation with the Indo-Pacific to facilitate serious explorations into its likely nature, pace and future trajectories. The February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, that describes China as one that ‘seeks to become the world’s most influential power’ calls for ‘collective effort’ to ‘not to change the PRC but’ seek ‘to manage competition with the PRC’ thereby ‘building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States (The White House 2022: 5). This sounds like a climb down from the 2019 US Indo-Pacific Strategy of President Donald Trump that talked of China’s continued ‘economic and military ascendence’ that ‘seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term’ had recommended to ‘enhance our posture and presence… to ensure that the rule of law—not coercion and force—dictates the future of the Indo-Pacific’ (The Department of Defence 2019: 8). Can this be seen as a shift guided by the pandemic experience along with propitious exit from Afghanistan leading to US failure to stand up to Russia in Ukraine? Or is this a consequence of increasing recognition of China’s incremental expanding footprint across the region where China’s trade and investments had received a boost from its relatively better economic performance during the pandemic?

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That would be one way of explaining President Xi’s engaging ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ as the first mechanism to explore China’s direct engagement with various US-led Indo-Pacific narratives.

China’s Engagement by Other Stakeholders China’s relentless drive of economic diplomacy—especially its so-called cheque book diplomacy that has become noticeable under its Belt and Road Initiative since 2013—have revealed China’s fast-paced trade and investment-driven engagement by various stakeholders of the IndoPacific. Surely, China has been welcomed and facilitated by all these recipient nations big and small alike. To begin with, China’s role in the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s had transformed the equations between Beijing and ASEAN leadership. Ever since, a whole range of littoral nations of the larger Indo-Pacific littoral has seen China emerge as their largest trading partner and fastest-growing investor. This two-way economic engagement has also brought to light a diverse range of multihued perspectives about China’s aims, ambitions and ambiguities that underline its approaches to multilateralism, wrapped in unique one-sided bilateral trade and investments around the Indo-Pacific as also with most other extra-territorial stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific. While the smaller economies among these justify their engagement as part of exploring to benefit from China’s unprecedented economic rise, major powers have done the same but from the perspective of restraining and socialising Beijing into the preexisting norms and codes of inter-state behaviour. But without this cooperation of its partners across the Indo-Pacific, China could not emerge as a force to reckon with. To begin with the ASEAN—which was originally promoted by the United States to contain the spread of communism in the Asia–Pacific region and today stands universally recognised for its ‘centrality’ to all of the Indo-Pacific narratives—has China as its largest trading partner since 2019 (Fung 2022). Likewise, China has come to be the largest investor in ASEAN, and fourth largest investor when experts count Hong Kong as a separate investor that again stands at second position after the United States (Fung 2022). Likewise, in the year 2019, ASEAN also overtook the European Union to become China’s largest trading partner and this happened ten years after China had surpassed both the United States and European Union to become ASEAN’s largest trading partner. Likewise, with its continuing political tensions around the Senkaku islands, Japan’s

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exports to China for 2021 reached $206 billion compared to China’s exports to Japan being $165 billion and the year 2020 saw Japan invest $3.4 billion in China compared to China investing $0.5billion in Japan (MoFA 2022). This, was when Japanese defence minister, Nobuo Kishi, claimed China violating Japan’s airspace 722 times for last year—which, he said, were 260 more than the year before (Feng 2022). Similarly, even in the face of rather acrimonious relations for last several years, Australia’s exports to China between 2016—when the two had signed their Free Trade Agreement—and 2021 have moved up from $60 billion to $135 billion making China a destination for Canberra’s 31% of total exports and taking their two-way trade to $184 billion (DFAT 2022). The same is true with India which has seen enduring border tensions since early 2020 and yet their bilateral trade, (in spite of India’s banning of 272 China-linked mobile application), rose by 41 per cent to reach USD 125.7 billion for 2021 (Singh 2022). Nevertheless, it is also true that the last several years of acrimonious China–Australia ties are believed to have pushed the latter into closer economic engagement with India including their signing a long-awaited trade pact (Ramesh 2022). The most important has been the continuing story of US-China trade and technology wars since the early years of Donald Trump administration and yet Chinese media reported their trade rising by 28.7 per cent to reach $755.6 billion for 2021 (Global Times 2022). The same is the case with European Union that indeed crossed China’s trade with the United States to reach $777 billion for 2021 (Free Press 2022). Chinese interest in the Pacific is growing and this is evident with the signing of a security pact with the Solomon Islands in April 2022. This has resulted in the contest for influence on the island nations becoming even more sharp. The success of the pact was followed by an eight-country tour of the region by China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, in May 2022, seeking other security agreements. Except for a few minor deals, the island nations resisted going the way of the Solomom Islands, resisting any overture to be enveloped within the big powers’ geopolitical contest (The Economist 2022). It is this continuing intertwining of China’s $6 trillion plus world trade along with its $1 trillion plus promised investments under BRI that have since begun to facilitate China’s political and strategic engagement with all the major stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific narratives. This has also seen China’s own vision becoming focused on the Indo-Pacific narratives thereby beginning to influence latter’s tone and tenor as well. It

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is in this backdrop that this volume seeks to address these dichotomies as also variations in China’s own evolving engagement with the Indo-Pacific littoral and its narratives. To streamline a holistic response to this broader evolving challenge the contributors of this volume held multiple interactions before this final product arrived with our readers; a brief outline of which follows as part of an introduction to this volume.

In This Volume… The book, in addition to this introductory chapter, comprises of ten fulllength chapters that have undergone multiple revisions and discussions to complement each other. This also flows from a broader conceptual analysis of elucidating threadbare visions and engagement of the two most powerful actors in the Indo-Pacific namely the United States and China followed by examining already outlined visions of all major stakeholders in Indo-Pacific narratives. It is then followed by examining China’s own vision for what kind of world it aims to work for and how has that vision been viewed, understood and engaged by other stakeholders of the IndoPacific region. Dattesh Paulekar in the chapter titled, Decoding ‘Sovereign Strategic Networks’ in the Indo-Pacific: Contesting China’s ‘Ascendant-Rise’, endeavours to decode the tenor and trajectory of such emergent networks in shaping congagement frameworks vis a vis China, through alternative rather than confrontational narratives of normativity and performance outcomes, competing for mercantilist, connectivity, and commons governance sweepstakes, through higher-ordering praxis in sustainable, tangible outcomes. The Indo-Pacific, as articulated by Dattesh Paulekar, is a geo-strategically spatial concept marked as much by the shifting centre of gravity, away from the Euro-Atlantic swathe to the continental expanse and maritime continuum straddling Asia, as by the incontrovertibility of the buccaneering and robust rise of China whose performance quotient is anchored, in quintessentially predatory and unmistakably pioneering dimensions of national power projection. The author substantiates his argument that the Indo-Pacific is as much riven by the preponderance of searing Sino-US global competition as by the substantive rise of a slew of middle powers navigating through novel processes of multilateralism, systemic multi-polarity, and trajectories of nifty and nuanced multi-alignment rather than ironclad old hub-n-spokes centricity. Increasingly, productive partnerships take precedence over

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perpetuation and resurrection of ‘zero-sum’ alliances of reductionism. Preservation of liberalized commerce, sustainable integrity over multivectored connectivity, and pluralized harness of the global commons in beneficent equity, not predatory hegemony, remains ardent impulses and idioms for strategic stability. However, these enjoinments also underscore the stratagems of power-play militating across the Indo-Pacific, seemingly inundated by the overbearing presence of rising China, but, whose burgeoned footprint is equally a function of the irresistible opportunities, that portend, for sovereign peers in interchange with it. Communities reposed of sovereigns, have conventionally been constructed, coalesced around warding-off common threats, melding affinities of common identity, or partake of value systems. Notwithstanding, the strategic churn of complex interdependence that pervades equations and engagement across the Indo-Pacific, is leading sovereign actors to seek new hues of strategic networks, rooted in institutionalised-cooperation-sans-theinstitutionalism, a high transactional incidence of play-it-by-ear engagement, pitching for supple minilaterals and efficacious plurilaterals, in flexible aggregation and disaggregation, from overarching cordon-sanitaire bulwarks. Rubina Waseem’s chapter titled, US-China Strategic Competition: Through the matrix of Complex Interdependence, asserts that the Indo-Pacific region has been a great testing ground for analysing the politico-economic and geo-strategic dynamics of the great powers’ competition. Since the early 1990s, China and the United States have had constant sporadic contestations about their control over the Western Pacific. The end of the Cold War has seen the Indo-Pacific gradually emerge as the epicentre of their strategic pursuits. Attempting to elucidate underpinning theoretical debates of this competition, this chapter revolves around various evolving push and pull factors undergirding the dynamics of this region where all global as well as regional powers have remained trapped in their ever-expanding complex interdependence. The fact that the Indo-Pacific has also gained spotlight due to its increasing economic significance has increased the US-China competition and consequently drastically altered its geo-strategic and security dynamics as well. This chapter contends that in spite of their expanding complex economic interdependence, it is the clash of geopolitical interests of the two ‘great powers’ that has driven this perpetual politico-economic insecurity across this region. While the United States has sought to persistently defend mechanisms that explain and legitimise its sole ‘superpower’ status, China

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being a revisionist state, has striven hard to evolve an alternate ‘balance of power’ that the United States sees as a challenge to its global dominance. The United States therefore, has been reviving its time-tested hub-andspokes security architecture and cultivating new friends where India has come to be its new strategic partner for countering a rising China. The chapter shows how, in the short term, a clash between the United States and China is less likely, as quintessential China will continue to avoid directly confronting the US pre-eminence unless its defined ‘redlines’ or core interests are threatened. The two sides therefore will continue with their off-again-on-again interactions to manage their trust deficit and to carve out a sustainable future for themselves. Stephen R. Nagy’s chapter explores Sino-Japanese relations through the prism of FOIP. Key lines of enquiry include: (1) How have SinoJapanese relations affected the design and implementation of FOIP; (2) How does FOIP reflect Japan’s long-standing hedging approach to China; and (3) Does FOIP represent a critical juncture in the Seikei Bunri formula for bilateral relations? His research suggests that FOIP remains both an inclusive and exclusive framework to shape the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order in-line with the post-WW 2 international order. It leaves windows of opportunity to deepen Sino-Japanese relations while contributing to robust, multilateral institution building to anchor the United States in the region and constrain China’s efforts to reshape the region with Chinese characteristics. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has so assiduously evolved itself at the very centre or in the driver’s seat in Asia–Pacific affairs. It has done so by building multiple institutional mechanisms to discuss economic, political and security issues engaging all major and middle power stakeholders to what is now called the Indo-Pacific. Don McLain Gill, in his chapter titled, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Motivations, Opportunities, and Challenges, reminds us that this period has also witnessed ASEAN’s piecemeal drift from the United States to China. In fact, China’s unprecedented economic rise has accelerated these ongoing drifts in not just regional but the global distribution of power. Beijing’s increased assertion and expansion throughout the Indo-Pacific region is seen as a direct challenge to the pre-eminence of the United States that sees itself as the status-quo Pacific power. This has resulted in a series of strategies to check China’s growing power projection capabilities. Indeed, the very establishment of the Indo-Pacific concept—that conjoins

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the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean—and the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Framework between the US, Japan, India and Australia seeks to preserve and safeguard the current US-led international rulesbased order. It is amid this power competition that ASEAN has become increasingly wary of being side-tracked from its normative influence and centrality. This is where, ASEAN, through the initiative of Indonesia, has crafted this ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific that seeks to maintain ASEAN role and relevance in the Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Flowing from its quintessential salience of not disrupting major powers core interests, the AOIP banks heavily on the need to adhere to existing regional mechanisms, the promotion of inclusivity to ensure ASEAN centrality. Though the AOIP is a step in the right direction for ASEAN, the challenges concerning the unity and coherence of its member states may outstrip the potential to maximise from such an initiative. The author asserts that to utilise the AOIP to its full potential, ASEAN member states must alleviate the deepening internal fault lines and lagging external connectivity. Claudia Astarita envisions the European Union as becoming a key partner of the Indo-Pacific. By emphasising its commitment to act as a global player in what the EU High Representative Josep Borrell has defined ‘the region of the future’, the EU has begun to lay the foundations for a completely new strategic orientation. Her chapter titled, China in EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, underlines that this choice is not only the direct consequence of selected European countries growing economic interdependence within the region, but is also linked to the need to contribute to the creation of a new multilateral structure potentially able to contain China and, at the same time, to scale down the intense geopolitical competition that is exacerbating the confrontation between China and the United States. Justifying the EU activism in the Indo-Pacific, however, is not an easy task. First, because the European Union does not have a stable geographic presence in the region. Second, because it is not clear whether the EU wants to play a role in the area as a region or whether it will choose to rely on specific member states, such as France and Germany, to represent European interest in the Indo-Pacific. Both options are problematic: the first one might encounter a huge coordination deficit, the second one might be seen as too personalistic. Representation, the author asserts, is not the only challenge the EU has to face in shaping its Indo-Pacific strategy: by defining its position, the EU will have to clarify whether it is ready to embrace a multilateral inclusive framework in which it will maintain an independent position, or

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whether it prefers to align with the United States, which would run the risk of further deteriorating its own relationship with China. Australia occupies an exceptional geo-strategic position in the IndoPacific region; a large political, economic and defence potential, as well as the possession of the South Pacific as its immediate sphere of influence. Artyom A. Garin, in his chapter titled, Evolving Indo-Pacific Multilateralism: China Factor in Australia’s Perspectives, argues that Australia’s foreign policy vector increasingly depends on the degree of development of the Sino-U.S. confrontation. As is well known, the United States has been Australia’s main strategic and ideological partner, while China has come to be its main trade destination. While the competition between the two great powers (China and the U.S.) has increased, this has made regional environment in the Indo-Pacific multifaceted and complex creating new challenges or opportunities for Canberra. In order to reduce its geo-strategic risks, Australia has increasingly turned to multilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region engaging ASEAN, India, and Japan. This requires the ability to quickly respond to changes in the balance of power between the United States and China. To understand its likely trajectories, this chapter first dwells on the evolution of multilateralism in Australia’s defence and foreign policy documents and how it engages with the rise of the China factor in its commitment to multilateral cooperation to gauge Australia’s Fifth Continent’s approaches to mitigate the escalating trend of the anarchic situation in the region. The chapter deals with the definition of Australia as a middle power and its commitment to multilateral foreign policy. It further elucidates the features and tendencies of multilateralism in Australia’s defence and foreign policy vision and builds the connection between multilateralism and the middle powers’ foreign policy strategies. The author also examines selective and balanced frames of multilateralism in the context of rapidly transforming regional alignments in the Indo-Pacific, even as it contends how future trends on Australia’s foreign policy at the present still remain largely hostages to the degree of the Sino-U.S. confrontation. Devendra Kumar Bishnoi, in his chapter titled, The Community of Shared Futures: China’s Counter to Indo-Pacific Narratives, underlines that the idea of the Indo-Pacific Region has involved several competing and contradictory narratives of regional order-shaping and being shaped by the overall geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of major stakeholders’ competition and cooperation. This chapter attempts to examine the idea of China’s Community of Shared Future (CSF) as a

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counter conception of the regional order presented in Western narratives on Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Prima facie, having evolved from China’s Asia–Pacific Policy from the late 1980s, the idea of CSF emerged as a major alternative from China’s imagination of regional order in 2010. The roots of CSF though are also traced to China’s neighbourhood policy in the early 2000s followed by China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiatives from 2013. These have emerged as major components of this CSF counter-narrative that are already undercutting Western discourses on Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Led by the United States and its friends and allies, FOIP has been advanced as an extension of the liberal international order. Such a conception of Indo-Pacific is portrayed as aimed at creating an open and inclusive regional order. But while there are divergences within FOIP narratives, one of the drivers behind the idea has been their shared concerns about the rise of China and the need to counter its rising influence in the region. While China has remained the main trigger for the FOIP narratives yet existing debates have paid less attention to China’s own conception of Asia–Pacific regional order. By dwelling on Chinese IR writings and official discourses to chart the evolution of CSF, this chapter seeks to provide a critical assessment of the Chinese alternative approach of community building to evaluate its efficacy as counter-narrative and what it means for the evolving Asia–Pacific/Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The Quadrilateral Security Framework (Quad)—comprising of likeminded democracies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India— has firmly endorsed the concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) that keeps them together. It is their preferred normative strategies committing them to ensuring the stability and sustenance of the rules-based liberal order in the Indo-Pacific that resonate their shared values as the core of the Quad framework, avers Mrittika Guha Sarkar in her chapter titled, China’s Regional Engagement and Quad: Mapping Conceptual Dynamics. However, the values mentioned above imbibe greater significance in face of Xi Jinping’s principal slogan of ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind’ (CSFM), which also resonates similar sentiments while projecting Beijing as an earnest builder of global peace, development and a defender of the international order to ensure a just, secure, and prosperous world. President Xi’s new outlines mark China’s strategic shift from Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide-and-bide’ dictum to a global activist one, underpinning China’s nationalist geo-economic and geostrategic motives, reflected in its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) as also its supply chain networks, naval assertiveness, and ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy

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in the region. Lately, there have been growing concerns regarding China’s unilateralism through its diplomatic, political, and economic endeavours; that is, along with the underpinning opaqueness in its commercially questionable infrastructural projects in the Indo-Pacific. This has made Quad nations increasingly conscious of China’s activities that are seen as posing threats to their understanding of basic freedoms, security and stability of this region through its assertive diplomacy and aggressive military posturing. In this backdrop, this chapter examines the conceptual undercurrents between China’s regional engagement vis-à-vis the Quad’s tryst with the Indo-Pacific to analyse their evolution and likely trajectories. While doing so, the chapter argues that the Quad may not be in position to easily marginalise China’s expanding footprint in the Indo-Pacific yet it has the potential to become a balancer to Xi’s CSFM vision that reflects the critical strategic underpinnings of China’s expanding economic and strategic access and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The diplomatic relations between rising China and Pacific Islands Countries (PIC’s) goes back to 1970’s and recent decades have witnessed a gradual increase in China’s trade and investment with these PIC’s. As a result, China today gives tough competition to region’s major partner nations. Australia has been especially anxious about China’s increasing trade and developmental assistance under BRI which has seen PIC’s constructing schools, hospitals, bridges, roads and stadiums with China’s investments. In addition to China’s competition to major partner nations of this region, China’s engagement with PIC has also been guided by its efforts to undercut PIC’s diplomatic support for Taiwan. Lately, China is also suspected of using its economic power to accomplish military interests as well. In this context, the chapter by Madhura Bane seeks to explore the discourse on China’s engagement in the Pacific islands region. It also elucidates how the ‘Taiwan factor’ has influenced China’s perspectives on this region. It also illustrates China’s use of economic diplomacy to achieve security interests where it examines Solomon Islands security agreement with China as a case study to extrapolate possible future trends. China’s maneuvering in South Asia has been critiqued in the last chapter of the volume by Reena Marwah and Abhishek Verma. With the rise in China’s standing and stature across the globe in general and the Asia–Pacific region in particular, its influence is increasing rapidly not only in the economic sphere but also in the cultural, societal and security spaces. Their chapter provides a synoptic view of China’s presence within the smaller countries of South Asia. It also underlines the issues between

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India and China in the context of their respective spheres of influence within the subcontinent. To conclude, the 2021 centenary celebrations of the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, was not lost on the rest of the world. This was the first of the two centennial goals, along with other benchmarks, that President Xi has outlined in projecting China’s future trajectories and how China would like to shape itself as also its peripheral regions and the world. Going by the dramatic transition of China in the last fifty years that witnessed unprecedented unleashing of China’s productive forces that have brought China to the centre stage of emerging narratives including those of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics. As this volume shows in its multi-mentored and extensive analysis, the visibility of China’s system-shaping capabilities and their gradual engagement by other stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific have begun to unfold the process of China’s reluctant and piecemeal, yet decisive engagement with the Indo-Pacific narratives and engagement of China by these other stakeholders. This volume in that sense aspires to initiate pioneering efforts in exploring their overlapping and complimenting elements and how this process of blending two divergent visions is likely to shape the future of the IndoPacific region and its geopolitics in the coming times. China’s continued straddling across the globe with its deep pockets and reverberating of its grandiose pursuits surely calls for experts starting to reminisce, reflect and revisit various possibilities of China’s ambitious enterprise with implications for the future of entire humankind but especially what it implies for the future of China’s immediate periphery.

References Borah, Rupakjyoti. (2022), The Strategic Relations Between India, the United States and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, (Singapore: World Scientific). Day, Chu and Li Xuanmin. (2022), “China’s GDP Grows 8.1% in 2021, Fastest in 10 Years, Spurring Confidence Despite Challenges Ahead”, Global Times, January 17 (accessed on 15 February 2022), https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202201/1246200.shtml DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government). (2022), Trade and Investments at a Glance 2021, (accessed on 18 April 2022), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade-and-investment/ trade-and-investment-glance-2021 Feng, John. (2022), “Japan Feels Heat of China’s Intensifying Military Manoeuvres”, Newsweek, 17 April, https://www.newsweek.com/japan-taiwan-chinamilitary-aircraft-airspace-defense-1698490

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Free Press. (2022), FPJ Web Desk, “China-European Union Summit: Ukraine, Trade at the Top of Agenda”, The Free Press Journal, (accessed on 8 April 2022), https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/china-european-unionsummit-ukraine-trade-at-top-of-agenda Fung, Doris. (2022), “The Growing China-ASEAN Economic Ties” HKTDC Research Analysis, 7 January, https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/OTU xMzk0NDE0 Global Times. (2022), “China-US Trade Grows 12.2% to Reach $185 Billion in First Three Months”, Global Times, (accessed on 18 April 2022), https:// www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1259207.shtml Grix, Jonathan et al. (2019), Entering the Global Arena: Emerging States, Soft Power Strategies and Sports Mega-Events, (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 69–82. Hale, Thomas and Sun Yu. (2022), “China’s GDP growth slows as Covid restrictions and property woes hit demand”, Financial Times, January 17, (accessed on 15 February 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/5b0e09fb-1e02-4537a44b-7b33cd43ba48 Heydarian, Richard Javad. (2014), “Hide your strength, bide your time”, Opinion, Al Jazeera web, 21 November, (accessed on 6 January 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/21/hideyour-strength-bide-your-time Hu, Weixing and Weizhang Meng. (2020), “The US Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Response”, China Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 143–176. Li, Mingjiang. (2013), “China and Japan: Hot Economics, Cold Politics?” in Purnendra Jain and Lam Peng Er (eds.), Japan’s Strategic Challenges in a Changing Regional Environment, (Singapore: World Scientific), pp. 51–72. Martin, Nik. (2021), “RCEP: Asia Readies World’s Largest Trade Deal.” NewsClick, 31 December 2021, https://www.newsclick.in/RCEP-asia-rea dies-world-largest-trade-deal#:~:text=RCEP%20will%20cover%20about%203 0,population%2C%20some%202.2%20billion%20people Marwah, R., and Yasmin, L. (2021, May–August), Japan’s Quad: More than a Mechanism for Dialogue, Society for Indian Ocean Studies, 141–153. Marwah, Reena and Sanika Sulochani Ramanayake. (2021). China’s Economic Footprint in South and Southeast Asia: A Futuristic Perspective—Case Studies of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand, (Singapore: World Scientific). Mitter, Rana, (2020) China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism, (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University). Mladenov, Nicolai S. (2021), China’s Rise to Power in the Global Order: Grand Strategic Implications, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan). MoFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2021), “Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive

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Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development”, 22 November 2021 (accessed on 5 January 2022), https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211122_10451478.html MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), (2022), “Japan-China Relations”, February 24, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/data.html Mohan, Raja C. (2012), Samundra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the IndoPacific, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Ramesh, Akhil. (2022), “India and Australia’s Wining Deal on Trade Will Boost Quad”, Nikkei Asia, April 18, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-andAustralia-s-winning-deal-on-trade-will-boost-the-Quad Rej, Abhijnan. (2020), “China and the Quad: From Sea Foam to Indo-Pacific NATO”, The Diplomat, October 15 (accessed 6 January 2022), https://the diplomat.com/2020/10/china-and-the-quad-from-sea-foam-to-asian-nato/ Rose, G. (1998, October). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51(1), 144–172. Singh, Karunjit. (2022), “Amit Bilateral Chill, India-China Trade Marks Record Surge in 2021”, The Indian Express, 26 January (accessed on 18 April 2022), https://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/amid-bilateralchill-india-china-trade-marks-record-surge-in-2021-7741805/ Singh, Swaran and Lilian Yamamoto. (2016), “Spectre of China’s Artificial Islands”, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 30. No. 3 (July–Sept), http://www. indiandefencereview.com/news/spectre-of-chinas-artificial-islands/ Singh, Swaran. (2011), “China’s Forays into the Indian Ocean: Strategic Implications for India”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 7, No. 2 (October), pp. 235–248, https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2011.637427 The Department of Defence. (2019), Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, (June 1) https://media.def ense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEF ENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF The Economist. (2022), (accessed on June 21, 2022), https://www.economist. com/china/2022/06/02/chinas-interest-in-the-pacific-islands-is-growing The White House. (2022), Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, (Washington), (accessed on 28 February 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf, p. 5. Verma, K. J. M. (2021), “China for the First Time Acknowledges IndoPacific Initiative”, The Week, 23 November (accessed on 5 January 2022), https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2021/11/23/ fgn41-china-india-indo-pacific.html Wu, Xinbo. (2018), “China in Search of a Liberal Partnership International Order”, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5, (September), pp. 995–1018.

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Xi, Jinping. (2021), “For a Shared Future of Our Common Home”, 22 November (accessed on 5 January 2022), https://news.cgtn.com/news/ files/For-a-Shared-Future-and-Our-Common-Home.pdf, p. 5. Xinhua. (2021), “Indo-Pacific Strategy” is Come-Back of Cold War Mentality, Retrogression of History: FM”, 3 July (accessed on 6 January 2022), http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-07/03/c_1310041520.htm Yahuda, Michael. (2004), The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (second and revised edition), (New York: RoutledgeCurzon). Yang, Mu and Lim Tin Seng. (2010), “Recession Averted? China’s Domestic Response to the Global Financial Crisis”, in Zheng Yongnian and Sarah Y. Tong (eds.), China and the Global Economic Crisis, (Singapore: World Scientific).

CHAPTER 2

Decoding ‘Sovereign Strategic Networks’ in the Indo-Pacific: Contesting China’s ‘Ascendant-Rise’ Dattesh D. Parulekar

Introduction The regional security landscape of the Indo-Pacific expanse can veritably be described, as capricious and kinetic. Securitization of the hitherto formerly Asia-Pacific that conflated as Asia, back in the Cold War era, underpinned and conditioned by the military security-driven hub-andspokes alliances, underwritten by the US, was considered apt to contend with the strategic challenge posed by an ideologically concentrated but maritime peripheral great power, as in the Soviet Union. In contrast, the humungous rise of China was neither the emergence of an archetypal ideologically dogmatic power, nor the ascendance of an entity that is

D. D. Parulekar (B) School of International and Area Studies (SIAS), Goa University, Goa, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_2

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marginal to the maritime dynamics of the Asia-Pacific, segueing into the current conceptualized construct of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ arc. Beijing’s gambit in the Indo-Pacific, in pursuance of rendering the Asian century as one of ‘Chinese centricity’, and the Indo-Pacific as the proverbial ‘Chinese lake’, is sought to be leveraged through the whole-of-regime endeavoured and omni-sphered impinge of eclectic instruments of national power, viz., the whip-hand on trade interchange, buccaneering prowess at multimodal infrastructural build, financial largesse, and the albeit of recent vintage burgeoning technological wherewithal, proffering conveniences while also beholding instrumentality of subversion (Tellis et al., 2019). Its mainstreamed quest for command and control over connectivity pathways conjoining hinterland geographies to maritime frontages, and development of an array of dual-use port facilities and installations, as vital nodes for material sway along arterial sea lanes of the thoroughfare and over maritime trade corridors, notwithstanding, it’s the objectification of spatial depths of the ocean-floor for dominant control of critical lines of communication, a singular corral of rare earth elements and wider blue economy harness, that presents itself as a preponderant hybridized challenge—eminently predatory and perverse, but emblematically precocious and trenchantly prolific in the same vein. Hence, in the unbridled template and inexorable current context of Beijing’s statist-capacitive capitalism, weighing heavy through its abject project-based co-option of hitherto nondescript sovereign spaces, masquerading as pragmatic principles of tangible cooperation, has thrown down the gauntlet to the collating democratic community of the Indo-Pacific to rival its performance with higher-order principles, but also a tangible matrix of offering, in pursuance of securitization of societal prosperity. Rising to this statist sovereign challenge, in an enveloping environment of globalization induced interdependencies, is convolute and formidable. Amidst the angularities of sovereign strategic calculus, it renders the development of a single overarching trans-regional countervailing bulwark as untenable, and vulnerable to being breached by the hiving subversive stratagem of the target-state, which uses the discrepant and discordant notes amongst entities arrayed against it, to drive a convenient wedge among its adversaries (Scott, 2018). Chinese leveraging of its cat’s paw targets like Cambodia, to break up consensus and soften-up cohesion within ASEAN, as also the mop-up mould of ties with smaller South Asian neighbours and miniature South Pacific island nations, to

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keep New Delhi and Canberra off-kilter in their respective near-abroad, not to mention the cultivation of broadsheet engagement with Seoul and Tokyo, through brandishing of the carrot of high-value technology-trade that seeks to dilute and erode the once cornerstone character of the US’s immutable alliances, is eminent and receiving traction (Jung et al., 2020).

Strategic Competition: Cooperative Vistas to Convergent Axes? The emergent strategic scenario is harbinger enough of what is expected to unfold in a post-pandemic strategic setting for the Indo-Pacific. Three significant dimensions to strategic multilateralism portend to become the mainstays of cooperation and/or competitiveness across the Indo-Pacific expanse, viz., commercial security translating as equilibrium and resilience in commoditized supply chains; considerations of techsovereignty and cooperation surrounding interactions of technological ecosystems; and considerations for sustainable development embodied in beneficent demeanour across global commons. Needless to state, each of these dimensions of power accretion, coagulation, and attendant projection, is visible in fault-lines of counterpoises of a ‘Pax Sinica’ ordering, and the juxtaposition of an ‘Indo-Pacific’ community weltanschauung, consequently procreating existential stresses and strains on sovereign strategic disposition. The strategic canvass of the Indo-Pacific has been sparked into politico-diplomatic skittishness, especially since the unfolding of the pandemic. These seek to forge a slew of strategic collectives of variegated formats, steeped in power diffusion through soft-hedging, short of overt antagonism. The dint of the democratic diamond clique— the ‘Quad’, as the lynchpin at the core of such newer formulations, is reflection enough of the desire of the Indo-Pacific region and its interlocutors from the outside, to explore the construct of issue-premised and principles-predicated ‘strategic networks’ (collectivization) to tame the Chinese ingress, through an ostensible action-dispersion framework. The logic and rationale for ‘strategic networks’ becoming the order of the day, as opposed to formally constructed, highly institutionalized, and inflexibly regimented frameworks, is not hard to fathom. In the modernday world, where statecraft in the external realm is about yin and yang operating concurrently in an environ of nuance and shades of grey, countries seldom embrace categorical cut-and-thrust positions, particularly on specific issues that are bones of contention. Strategic networks constitute

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flexible but focused mechanisms, gravitating minilateral and/or multilateral cooperation, coalesced around specific issue(s) and principle(s), to advance the strategic agenda, without binding the sovereign constituents into inextricably wedded stances. The fact that such networks obviate the need for institutionalization through ironclad structures, means, they proffer latitude for participating countries to exercise sovereign autonomy of strategic choices, which though may seem contradictory or paradoxical, do not compromise or vitiate the network’s issue at hand. The threshold for striking consensus within strategic networks is relatively modest, yet, the operative vent of such networks, if pursued to their logical conclusion, hold out the promise and prospect of efficaciousness over large over-toned architectures, that end up as posturing talk-shops.

The Economic Prosperity Network: A ‘Non-China’ Economic Security Compact The unfolding pandemic, since its genesis, has as much been characterized as an incandescent economic crisis, as it has been touted, as an unprecedentedly ensnaring public health exigency. The commercial and mercantilist stone-dead stall, in regional and global logistics and production processes, has exerted a cascading effect, smearing and smothering virtually every value-accretion and value-unlocking industrious sphere of entrepreneurial human endeavour. Amidst the sobering reality, of how an innocuous-seeming pathogen-strain could wreck such dislocating virulence, and in the wake of the rumoured whiff, of it either having possibly been human-induced or beholding the potential for such prospective knavish proliferation, Washington, feeling singed by perceived Chinese recalcitrance, and pining for comeuppance, has popped the thought of an Economic Prosperity Network (EPN), to its phalanx of cornerstone sovereign-partners, across the Indo-Pacific. In what was a remote diplomatic interface, convened in late March 2020, the US sought to proposition this idea over con-call, as a trust fuelled strategic initiative for Economic Security, corralling hatchet allies and core strategic partners, into fostering collegial brainstorming and deliberation, around trading arrangements, healthcare cooperation, infrastructure-build and transmission of development aid. However, the dint of its expeditions fade, from any kind of politico-diplomatic common usage and parlance in discourse, an upshot of shorn diplomatic legwork, consequently rendering it a oneoff dilettante exercise, is an indictment of the misplaced impatience and

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unreasonable condescension and hubris, with which it was brandished by the Trump administration. The template, which also had coordinated tax incentives and re-shoring subsidies, for entities migrating and transitioning away from China-based production, constituted a desirable and much-vaunted architecture for sustainable development; yet, it stood undercut, due to the apparent downside of the initiative’s noncalibrated hue of escalation-in-juxtaposition, with a strategically ascendant and robustly entrenched China, that has inhabited mind-space as an economic change-agent entity. There is great value and much virtue, in peddling, propagating, and endeavouring to consummate the project of an Economic Prosperity Network (EPN), as a doctrinal and operational narrative and project-based game-changer, for the pecuniary, industrial, infrastructural, and technological disparate theatre-subsets, within the Indo-Pacific. However, the tenability of any such prescriptive dispositional and projectsconsummation pitch remains rudimentarily contingent, upon the inherent attractiveness and exuding credence of its propositioning, measured on attributes of cognitive conception, flexible institutional-designing, and curated processes, of purposefulness not polemics. Although the Trump administration’s cataclysmically set-up virtual interaction, blindsided its participants, there was a definite initial buy-in from Washington’s security and trade allies and partners, in so far as the strategic agenda flagged and girdled dimensions of sustainable trade and investment compact, comprehensively resilient infrastructure collaboration, mutually beneficent healthcare cooperation, ardently consensual and transparent development diplomacy, and the ilk. All of this could be perceived, construed and projected, as positive and constructive provisioning of public goods for wider socio-economic benefaction, and by no means singularly primed, with intentions for reflexive anti-China ring-fencing. However, as US fetish with an abrupt ripping-up of the existing edifice of China-centric production and transportation logistics structures, and abrasive impetuosity with fomenting an across-the-board relocation of commercial entities out of China became evident, it constituted a self-inflicted curveball that threw a wrench in the otherwise hallowed initiative (Pamuk and Shalal, 2020). Participating sovereign protagonists’ enthusiasm waned, in light of their enlightened assessments of equities portending imperil, vide fallaciously self-wrought pyrrhic costs or subjected to hobbyhorse punitive missives from Beijing. Plus, Washington’s own progressively eroding integrity, further assailed the

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circumstances of the Economic Prosperity Network, courtesy of the Trump White House’s abiding strong-arm tactics on refashioning bilateral trading arrangements, and stoking disingenuous discourse over being short-changed in inveterately extended security commitments with archallies Japan and South Korea, besides, picking petty-duels with Canberra, and seeking to bully New Delhi into concessions over trade, by turning the spigot on its high-skills IT workforce (Walters, 2020). The enduring Trump narrative for the overwhelming measure of his Presidency, of a carping and whining United States, in self-deprecation mode, and beating a retreat from global integration compacts and forums, flew in the face of this newly minted Washington, that wanted to spearhead and chaperone the foundations of a new framework for a broadsheet sustainable development, through pluralized sovereign action, if not outright multilateralism, impugning Beijing and its burgeoning sweepstakes in the Indo-Pacific. However, there was also some cause for optimism, albeit cautious, since this came close on the heels of Trump’s own spearheading herald of the seminal Blue Dot Network (BDN), an ostensible qualitative standards certification regime of physical infrastructure. In November 2019, the invitation to New Delhi to join the fold was extended, during President Trump’s momentous India tour in February 2020, together with announcements that, the US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) would unveil an office in India, and plunge $350 million towards health infrastructure, renewable energy, food security, and allied initiatives (Ray, 2020). Although President Biden has not pronounced himself unequivocally on any of these Trump-era forays, given his proclivities thus far to hold the steady line on Trump’s proscriptions, including sustaining the heat on China, the trajectory for American consistency over promoting the EPN should fructify. After all, the logic and moorings undergirding the EPN are sound, if conceptualized and consolidated, as a progressive construct of pragmatic and tangible cooperation, premised on showcasing itself as a strongly competitive but reliably ‘higher-order’ alternative, to Beijing’s unmistakably eye-popping but subcutaneously running predatory form of strategic capacitation (Hoang and Nguyen, 2020). If the EPN is projected as a benign but dynamic and vibrant initiative, in contrasted-addition to the Chinese projection of its state-capacitated model of economic prosperity, it shall portray itself as a cohesive formulation, enjoying consequent sovereign multi-stakeholder traction, through a congruent blend of the transactional with the twinning, an attribute that the Middle Kingdom has

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patented by soft-targeting Indo-Pacific littoral in general, but the EPN participating sovereign-principals in particular. It behooves mention and consideration, as to the viability of a sequel initiative that followed the first of US interactions with suitors in the Indo-Pacific. In April 2020, Secretary Pompeo engaged counterparts of Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Vietnam, and New Zealand, along with those out-of-sphere nations of Israel and Brazil, in what was billed as a ‘Quad-Plus’ conversation. Although the immediate agenda for the diplomatic confabulation, was to haul-China-over-the-coals for its prevarication and non-transparency, at the then impending WHO plenary, it set-off strategic chatter, as to whether this marked the incipience of an anti-China axis (Rajagopalan, 2020). The largely amorphous ‘Quad-Plus’ setting has not evolved into any form of a structured dialogue, although, much is conjectured, about how the Biden administration could leverage this diplomatic gambit, at a time when European capitals such as Paris, Berlin, London, and even Amsterdam, have unveiled their respective Indo-Pacific strategic outlooks, with the trend going as transcendentally afar, as Canada (Esteban and Armanini, 2021). Should the Quad-Plus fructify in its current nebulously hewed avatar or even as a devolved globally permeating ‘Quad++’, it would still fructify, only in curated realms of cooperation where individual countries’ respective strengths could be collectivized, and not as a wide-ranging bulwark against China. Also, its potential recruits, whether geographical mainstays within the Indo-Pacific or extra-regional outliers have been squeamish about purveying signals, that may construe as scything Chinese hegemonic ascent (Chinoy, 2020). The Quad’s vaccine compact is a lode-star whose trail could blaze, as an initiative that fosters human security, through productive sovereigns partnership of research and development ecosystem meeting financial transmission, fusing with production wherewithal and last-mile logistics connect.

Challenging Predatory Strategic-Capacitation: The Blue Dot Network Strategic Capacitation, through the labyrinthine build of multi-modal infrastructure, has emerged as a potent axis of major power geo-strategic competition, interplaying geopolitics and geo-economics. And if there is one arena where the power differential, between the global hegemon, the United States, and its most formidable and preeminent peer-rival

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China, has attenuated, is in the domain of multi-dimensional infrastructural construction (Kuo, 2020). Beijing’s state-driven project based infrastructure-binge, fording across the Indo-Pacific, mainstreaming hitherto hidebound geographical subsets (Central Asia), and unlocking value in other nondescript theatres (Mekong Corridor Region), has obtained it the standout profile of a transcontinental infrastructural developer of growing pedigree (Hansbrough, 2020). The pan-Asian sprawl of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), most notably the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) strand of it, has left democratic powers, either astounded or more so scrambling for counteracting responses, mechanisms of which have either been anodyne or incoherent, in their militating conceptualization. With Japan’s credentialed Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) enterprise and its devolution into the Expanded PQI version, remaining patchy, and the India-Japan co-broached infrastructure initiative of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), turning out crassly underwhelming to date, much has been left to the recently unveiled ‘Blue Dot Network’ (BDN). Floated by Washington, it was launched through the trilateral collaborative auspices of the US’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and trade (DFAT) of Australia, respectively, at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum, on the margins of the 35th ASEAN Summit, in Bangkok, November 2019 (McCawley, 2019). Drawing exotic christening as being the ‘Michelin Guide’ peckingorder of infrastructure projects, the quintessentially ‘excellence-validation’ exercise, presents itself as a qualitative benchmark for certifying infrastructure projects, ostensibly steeped in the G20 adopted Principles for Quality Infrastructure Development (PQID), as also drawing on the elements enshrined in the Equator Principles, delineated by the OPIC, the precursor development bank to the US’s newly minted International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). Being underscored as the most credible alternative to the Chinese BRI and its opaque and predatory dimensions, the BDN, is a multi-stakeholder initiative convening governments, businesses, and civil society, to exude sound capacity building for sustainable development. It is premised on attributes of economic and financial viability, ecologically harmony and sustainability, democratizing recipient-country consent, and sentience to local beneficiary consciousness (Geraci et al., 2020). There is no gainsaying the dint of humungous infrastructure demand and the cavernous funding gap that exists on this

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score (globally, approximately 94 trillion USD is required to satiate infrastructure aspirations by 2040, with Asia estimated to suck out 26 trillion of it, until 2030) or for that matter the fact that China, with its one trillion dollars of pledged financing, has swooped-in on leadership in this regard. However, there ought to be a method even in madness, and the collectively concurred-in methodology of the BDN is to impart standardssetting, parameters-enunciation, and attributes-delineation, to prospective projects and suitors. Such an urbane and refined alternative paradigm of national, sub-regional, and trans-regional infrastructure development is premised, upon promising upholding of sovereign financial stability and consummation of societal prosperity (Rajah, 2020). While the normativity of the initiative is suitably addressed, the performance quotient also has to speak. And here, the embryonic BDN initiative, is still very much work-in-progress. With India being actively courted to join the clique, the BDN framework which is being decried in some quarters as archetypal talk-shop over normativity and principles that shall eventually pale in comparison to the BRI’s tangible build track-record, possibly fails to factor-in the cogent intellectual and operative challenge that this metric indexing enterprise, purports to accomplish. Each of the resident Indo-Pacific nations are pursuing their respective infrastructure forays in the extant, whether bilaterally or regionally; be it Japan’s drive across ASEAN, most notably the Mekong Region countries; Australia’s proactive indulgence across dotting sovereigns punctuating the South Pacific; and India’s piloting of its outreach across South and Southeast Asia, the maritime Indian Ocean Region, and beyond. A fully developed and maturing BDN initiative, on the dial, would enable segueing and threading together of such individual country infrastructure enterprises, to productively collectivize heavy-lifting on such projects, through mutual accessibility to centralized pools of technical expertise, financial streams, and human resource capacity building ecosystems, within the multi-stakeholder frame of public-private partnership, primed to execute robust and enduring outcomes (Goodman et al., 2020).

Democratizing Commoditized Economy: Supply Chains Resilience Initiative It is almost clichéd now to allude to how the pandemic has exposed the world and the Asian continent’s untenable dependence on China-based regional and global supply value chains. However, despite much song

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and dance about how the far-reaching implications of this over-reliant spectre would mean an evacuation of companies out of China, there has been nothing remotely suggestive of a hollowing-out from China, which continues to hold the whip-hand on pedigreed credentials, benchmarked to cost-competitiveness, technological injection, and the cavernous size of its market and consumerist purchasing power. What one has witnessed is the natural logic of diversifying one’s holdings through curated relocation by certain companies, of units superfluous to requirements, in what has been christened to be the ‘China+1’ strategy. However, the disruptions to commoditized supply chains have spooked sovereign governments into deliberating on feasible measures, to impart resilience and sustainability to the geographically dispersed value-added character of twenty-first-century production logistics processes. Yet, the allure of remaining deeply engaged with and invested in China remains enticing, as exemplified in the earnestness of the non-China constituents of the RCEP, being keen to ink the agreement at the annual China-ASEAN Summit of 2021. With the enthusiasm of Vietnam—which has quite mastered the optimization of free trade agreements to spur its economy in recent years, and whose relative cost-competitiveness in manufacturing is a result of close to sixty per cent of FDI emanating from China—has been the prime mover in ensuring that the RCEP does not continue to languish. This is in stark contrast to India, whose self-imposed exclusion has left it to be a 15member RCEP, and whose structural infirmities in manufacturing and tax structure and land and labour regimes, make it a misfit in such bandwagoning (Suzuki, 2021). Among the multitudes of strategic rebalances being niftily practised on the Indo-Pacific firmament, is the purposive redress of situational imbalance of supply chain facilities, including endorsing the idea of a ‘China-Plus’ dispersal strategy, rather than any kind of a ‘Sans-China’ local stratagem. Bilateral efforts at diversification, such as Prime Minister Abe’s $2.2 billion subvention scheme that constituted a prod-and-nudge commitment to suitor Japanese companies, to underwrite their relocation out of China, and even possibly migration to India, was met with tepid exploration, with a reported eighty-seven entities evincing interest, but devoid of any big-ticket departures. Prime Minister Modi for his part, availed the spectre of the border conflagration with China, to enshrine New Delhi’s ‘Atmanirbharta’ (Self-Reliance) drive, which has seen some green-shoots in terms of New Delhi’s pertinacious move to winnow its active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) dependence (an untenable reliance to the

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tune of seventy per cent on China), through the unveiling of the marquee performance linked incentives (PLI) scheme, that appears to have captivated some interest (Panda, 2020). However, as Sino-Indian bilateral trade data for 2020 would have it, despite much caterwauling of attenuating dependence on Chinese component supplies to critical sectors such as electricity and telecommunications, sourced Chinese imports in these precise sectors, either remained flat or showed a small uptick. Recognizing the limitations of individualized responses, to mitigate externally contingent economic uncertainties, has brought the triumvirate of Japan, India, and Australia, into an intriguing bond, of similarities and dissimilarities. Drawing on political direction from the executive echelons, the Trade Ministers of these countries have forged this initiative over a virtual conversation, delivering strategic guidance to technical officials to work on the nitty-gritties of sewing up a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). Although in its nascence, the description of the measure as intended to imbue resilience and not work for an outright supplant of supply chains from current geographical coordinates is an appreciation of the circumscribed utility of this collectivization as much as a plausible appraisal of the key objective, underpinning this banding together. Japan presents a higher-order confluence of exquisite technology and deep pockets, with increasingly embedding stakes for its specialized high-tech sectors, in a cavernous Chinese market and in the harness of its innovating ecosystem. Australia, another high-value economic space, thrives on its profile as a repository for a spectrum of strategic commodities and enjoys a sophisticated texture of economic activity, where India pales in comparison to either. Yet, India brings humungous scale and attractive opportunities in its gapingly deficient capacitive sectors, and is a sub-three trillion dollar economy primed for at least a three-fold augment, over the ensuing decade and half (Heydon, 2020). This said, none of the trinity constituents are exponents of costeffective manufacture. This leaves them wedded and addicted to Chinese production fare, akin to the industrialized European titan economies of Germany and France. Although protagonists have already rolled out their expectations of the sectors (automotive, electric, telecom, electronic, pharmaceuticals, etc.), in which supply chain insulation is to be sought, there is nothing tangible for now. It behooves mention that fault-lines exist on the horizon, most notably the New Delhi-Canberra grapple with concluding a free trade deal since 2014, the former’s concerns with less than satisfactory returns from its Comprehensive Economic

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Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Tokyo, and the lingering belief within both Japan and Australia, that India is more often than not the problem in multilateral trading regimes. This view saw them both join the formalized RCEP framework, even as India bailed out. Now one hears that, the Japanese mooted SCRI is threatening to be undercut, by India’s reluctance to accede to Japan’s proposal for incorporating the ASEAN countries into the mix, albeit on well-founded trepidations of surreptitious Chinese influence being exercised, by proxy-subterfuge. The conspicuous absence of the United States in SCRI is not lost on anyone. This indeed is even speculated in terms of the Indo-Pacific resident powers wanting to moot an indigenous enterprise instead of being always led as handmaidens to Washington which can be misread by Beijing. Moreover, it must also be averred that, the hemming-in or for that matter helming by Washington, of such a capacitation-preservation and autonomy-spurring initiative, would bring its higher-order demands of sophisticated environmental and labour standards, high threshold safeguards for intellectual property rights, and peer intricate expectations, to assail Indian practices. Nevertheless, the dichotomy of travails and lure of engagement with China has not detracted from the paramount objective of resetting supply-chains to the extent possible, which has brought the triad of Japan, India, and Australia to initiate albeit preliminary conversations and to even explore the mechanism of the trilateral ‘Track 1.5’, convening private sector and academia into the mix. The strategy of Australia-India-Japan trilateral with its avowed clarion call for other common-cause sovereigns to join-in, chimes well with the overarching theme of the ‘Economic Prosperity Network’ (EPN). If the ‘SCRI’ turns out at the heart of the Indo-Pacific’s ‘EPN’ framework, it can mount a strong narrative contest against China and its state-led commercial development. But since it neither proposes a gang-up against Beijing nor envisions any kind of punitive steps seeking retrace of Beijing from the region. Therefore, if anything, it calls for greater national self-reliance which ought to be the paramount goal for autonomous and robust national development of region’s vibrant emerging economies.

Sanctity of ‘Data-Tech’: ‘G7’, ‘D10’ or ‘T10’? The most iconic fault-line to emerge as an upshot of the pandemic experience is the razor’s edge competition over technology and its attendant dimensions. The whiff of competition indeed was very much in the air,

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predating COVID-19, as the heavyweight likes of ZTE and Huawei have often been suspected to be sharp power instruments of Chinese national power, primed for surveillance, subversion, and subterfuge. While it is curious to comprehend as to what element of Chinese tech-specific behaviour during the pandemic has led these firms to transition from ‘entities of concern’ to be ‘entities of existential concern’ in the eyes of the democratic world, it’s not hard to decipher, that the grouse isn’t so much about what’s transpiring in the current, as about what could befall down-the-road, if these firms continue to have a free-run penetrating democratic society. This way they could become integral to global technological ecosystems, besides, preying on sensitive data pools, through the playbook of industrial espionage, surveillance, and engineered tech disruptions. While Washington has approached this apparent vulnerability, with a blitzkrieg of actions, that at one level smacked of cynical opportunity of a President seeking re-election and needing to vilify Beijing in the eyes of his people by scapegoating it to cover his own ham-handed tracks at tending to COVID-19, India has approached it in a principled but calibrated manner of targeted surgical strikes, without the fanfare associated with such punitive measures. Moving quietly but assuredly, the Modi government was at the vanguard of boldly shuttering close to one hundred twenty Chinese tech-social apps and their known doppelgangers, yet opting to simply nudge its public sector telecom operator BSNL and private telecom players, to eschew Huawei and solicit alternative partners in Japan, South Korea, and Finland, whilst still holding out on any big-ticket announcement of proscribing Huawei per se. While few countries have moved swiftly to announce a ban on Huawei, they have chosen to go the staggered phase-out route to transition (UK and France to ease Huawei equipment out by 2027/2028), even as Europe’s largest economy and the one most in hock with China, viz., Germany, still hedging its bets on the issue. In Asia, major economies like Japan and South Korea have been noncommittal, sentient in the fact that they have larger stakes with China especially in their high-tech-economy space of the internet of things, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and the ilk (Rasser et al., 2020). All this embodies the cutting-edge duality of China and its critical mass within the global technological ecosystem, which construes as a predatory force on the one hand, but, whose catapult up the sweepstakes of pioneering technological advent and innovation, underpinning industrial

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growth and impinging on the societal quality of life, is unmistakable, and too alluring to pass over, in the changing contours of global political economy, despite the vulnerability quotient at hand. The ASEAN economies most notably Singapore and Malaysia are others priming themselves for affording a greater role for Chinese fin-tech firms in their socio-economic realm, even as US investors are continuing to bet big on Chinese technology and procreating firms, despite their compulsive foreclosure from the NYSE and precluding access to US markets. Hence, the horses for courses of action, undertaken by sovereign interlocutors, amidst a broad permeating sentiment of cautiousness favouring the circumscribing or thwarting of Chinese tech participation within critical national communication infrastructure, shows up the complexity therein. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s urging for a democratic D10 grouping of technology exponents (creators and consumers) in response to then President Trump’s suggestion of an expanded G7 into a G10 with similar emphasis, has not ventured far on the technology issue beyond the perfunctory hand-wringing over 5G decoupling. This is partly due to inherent concerns that such methodologies explicitly barring China from the landscape, would spur the move to a fundamental rip-up of the internet, resulting in an unsustainable, mutually exclusive, decoupled tech configuration (Brattberg and Judah, 2020). While the protagonists would duel it out, none would be insulated from the singeing ambers of such a cannibalized battle, for command and control of technological products, platforms, and processes.

‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’: Mainstreaming Sustainable Development Notwithstanding the fact that Asia, as a continent of sovereign constellations and peoples, is the cynosure of global attention, due to the multitude of advantages it beholds, in the form of resource endowments, demographic composition and profile, investible surpluses and technological skills, etc., is still marked by pronounced infrastructural deficiencies. Across its continental and maritime expanse, several specific geographical coordinates and community societal locales, all of which have contributed to disparate and differentiated levels of pan-continental development, continue to face significant levels of poverty and underdevelopment. Coupled with energy-intensive industrial processes, their subsistence societal existence has further compounded matters, exerting an exacting cost

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on inclusivity in pan-Asian growth-development phenomenon. China has sought to exploit this facet by emblazoning its credentials across wide swathes of Asian territory. By presenting itself as the Good Samaritan procreator of community projects, China has engaged them in projects from transportation to urbanization to innovations for societal happiness and beneficence. This narrative has quite failed to be assailed for the right reasons, due to the dearth of credible alternatives emergent on the Asian horizon, benchmarked on higher-order principles of such projects. An important innovation is underway though. India under Prime Minister Modi has been at the vanguard of underlining the imperative for twinning the ever-pressing issue of energy security and energy independence for emerging economies and lesser developed and low-income countries alike, together with addressing the metastasizing scourge of climate change and global warming. Hence, it was no turn up for the books to witness India team up with renewables energy pioneer France in co-launching the International Solar Alliance (ISA) on the sidelines of CoP-21 that enshrined the Global Climate Accord in Paris in 2015 (Jain and Sareen, 2021). Subsequently metamorphosed into a Treaty-based international organization, with its headquarters in a Member-State, India (a first of its kind in itself), its avowed goal is to mobilize a trillion dollars in renewables-driven financing for solar energy spawn and deployment of 1000 GW by 2030. Operationally, the ISA envisages convening all sovereign habitations within the twin Tropics, as members, ostensibly since these countries are awash with sunshine, and can contribute to harnessing solar energy through capacitation, research and development, procreation of solar applications technologies, and building economies of scale. Given the fact that this initiative was India’s brainchild, but pursued through an unmistakable multilateral process, Prime Minister Modi availed the opportunity to address the 2nd Global RE-Invest conclave of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the inaugural assembly of the ISA in October 2018, where he pitched the ambitious vision of a One-Sun-One-World-One-Grid (OSOWOG) project, underpinned by the temporal understanding that, the Sun Never Sets on the World— hence can be leveraged to procreate unfettered solar-power, in real time, round the clock. The audacious enterprise, which envisions a labyrinthine interconnection of globally strewn solar energy grids, conjoining continents through transmissions by undersea HDVC cables, is widely billed as a competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), although such

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comparisons may yet be far-fetched, given the magnitude of capital and allied funding that would be entailed, and the potential for procrastinating timeline in its consummation, given the pluralized tenor of the exercise. With India at the fulcrum, the ISA solar spectrum envisions two broad zones of operation, viz., the Mekong corridor continuum of countries i.e., Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Lao, Cambodia, etc., and the Far West, basically encompassing sun-kissed West Asia and the African continent. The project which at its most expansive, proposes an outreach to one hundred forty nations, across three phases of staggered implementation, with Phase I (2020–2025) to cover the interconnection of the Middle East, South Asia, and South East Asia; Phase II (2025–2030) to weave solar and other renewable energy resources rich regions into a mix; and Phase III (2030–2035) to accomplish global interconnection of the power transmission grid under the OSOWOG vision (Asher and Soni, 2020). Clearly, this incredible conceptualization and intrepid implementation of the initiative would mount ideational and operational challenges especially, if viewed as an outright competition to Beijing and its singular narrative in this regard. Also, India’s credentials to propose and run with the idea is strongly legitimized by its inveterate convictions to enhance solar power capacitation and instrumentalization at home which is seen in the remarkable success of the ‘Saubhagya’ scheme, enabling electricity access to the deepest underprivileged and deprived sections of Indian society. The commissioning of Asia’s largest solar-power generating facility, in Rewa (Madhya Pradesh) and the Kochi International Airport, which operates almost wholly on solar power utilization, evince India’s credentials. With over a hundred signatories to the ISA which serves as the nodal entity for the OSOWOG project, the truly democratic and multilateral hue of the enterprise is incontrovertibly established. The project, across its various intended phases and stages of staggered execution, is in large measure aimed at bringing cheap and effective solar power to less developed and low-income countries, where the cost of conventional energy, the fossil-fuels based per capita energy consumption, and the pernicious cascading effects on the environment and climate change are aggravating and existential. The ISA’s desire to foster a renewables-user revolution constitutes a hallowed, higher-ordering initiative, inducing sustainable development, aligned with SDGs 2030 (Zaki, 2020). This grandiose project is often touted as India and the democratic Indo-Pacific community’s answer to Chinese soft-power clientalism. Its behooves mention that

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China, which is the world’s biggest solar panels producer and destination for predominant Indian sourcing of solar and electricity grid equipment, has been non-committal on its decision on the ISA, thus far. While there is no gainsaying that, the project would be a tall order for India to pull off at any level, yet, given the multiple benefits set to accrue, from gravitating investments in an interconnected transnational grid on a trans-regional even transcontinental scale that would intermediate skills, technology, and financial resources drawn from various participant countries, towards meeting a critical component within the global SDGs for 2030, cannot but be underscored. The initiative stands capable of helping countries propel themselves out of the vicious cyclical mire of poverty through developmental models propitious to mitigating the existential challenges of water, sanitation, food, and allied socio-economic aggravations. Besides, given that the focus of the initiative is predominantly Indian Ocean centric straddling Africa to South East Asia, it should chime with East Asian entities such as Japan and South Korea, who are keen on an enhanced presence on the other end of the Malacca. Even European powers like France, Germany, and the UK have also been keen to wade back into the Indo-Pacific and its transpiring. With their substantive footprint in Africa they could become viable partner-stakeholders, in materializing this initiative, marking a potentially credible alternative competitor, to the Chinese model (Bello, 2021).

Conclusion China is poised to progressively make the most substantive stab for veritable comprehensive national power in human history. Beijing’s deployment of ‘whole-of-regime’ instrumentality, which flows from the Party-State’s avowed objective of manipulating the narrative of an ‘Asian Century’ consensus of principled action anchored in democratic pluralism, into a core and tributary molded Chinese century of unrivalled operational-centrality and ordering-centricity, portends ominous vestiges for the Indo-Pacific and pan-Asian stability and prosperity. A pushback is imperative and inevitable, however, the form and terms upon which such counterpoise can be crafted and developed, remains inchoate and open-ended. China’s surging quest for wherewithal, across military, industrial and technological dimensions is appraised as predatory, but its deep hew within a global framework of dependencies and interdependencies, implies that, despite being the prudent course of action,

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unvarnished decoupling and rip-up extrication, though desirable, isn’t quite doable, either by individual sovereign protagonists or vide an expansively bulwarking coalition of states. The clique of major and middle powers, whether geographically, geopolitically, or territorially resident across the Indo-Pacific, that signify the progressive and liberal democratic world, are organizing themselves into potentially functional mini-lateral frameworks and mechanisms, with a view to counterpoising the Chinese disseminated model of national economies development, regional and sub-regional emancipation and societal upward mobility. The US mooted Blue Dot Network (BDN) which hems Japan and Australia and solicits India into the mix, the US broach of an Economic Prosperity Network (EPN) within a Quad-Plus setting, the Japan-India-Australia stake-out on a Supply Chains Resilience Initiative (SCRI), India’s pitch for a One Sun One World Grid (OSOWOG), integral to its introducing shingle of the global treatise of International Solar Alliance(ISA), the green-shoots of a Critical Technologies Initiative through the auspices of a prospective G7-Plus, as also a slew of trifectas, are anecdotal evidence of the strategic re-architecture of processes for global commons preservation, to promote objectives of the sanctity and autonomy of commercial, technological and hard and soft wired capacitation, the key to the realization of a tenable free and open Indo-Pacific order.

References Asher, M., and Soni, A. (2020). “One Sun-One World-One Grid: India’s Transformative Initiative for Sustainable Development”. Research and Information Systems (RIS) Brief. http://ris.org.in/sites/default/files/OSOWOG%20M yindmakers-converted.pdf Bello, L.D. (2021, March). “India’s Plans for Solar Domination”. The Energy Monitor. https://energymonitor.ai/technology/renewables/indias-plans-forglobal-solar-domination Brattberg, E., and Judah, B. (2020). “Forget the G-7, Build the D-10”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracytrump-europe/ Chinoy, S. (2020, October 22). “The Rise of the QUAD: The Quad Needs a Definitive Blueprint to Have Meaningful Impact”. https://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/columns/quad-countries-china-navy-malabar-exerciseladakh-australia-6825430/

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Esteban, M., and Armanini, U. (2021, March). “European Indo-Pacific Strategies: Convergent Thinking and Shared Limitations”. http://www.realinsti tutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CON TEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-pacific/ari30-2021-esteban-arm anini-european-indo-pacific-strategies-convergent-thinking-and-shared-limita tions Geraci, M., Cooper, A., and Li, M. (2020, July). “Blue Dots and Red Roads: Friction and Potential for Limited Cooperation between Chinese and US International Development Models”. Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS). https://chinaus-icas.org/research/blue-dots-and-red-roads/ Goodman, M., Runde, D., and Hillman, J. (2020). “Connecting the Blue Dots”. CSIS Commentary. https://www.csis.org/analysis/connecting-blue-dots Hansbrough, J. (2020). “From the Blue Dot Network to the Blue Dot Marketplace: A Way to Cooperate in Strategic Competition”. Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). https://apcss.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/09/11-Hansborough-25thA.pdf Heydon, K. (2020, September 21). “Domestic Policies Key to Supply Chain Resilience Initiative”. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/ 2020/09/21/domestic-policies-key-to-the-supply-chain-resilience-initiative/ Hoang, V.L.T., and Nguyen, H. (2020, August 21). “From Hub to Network: A Transformation of US Policy in the Indo-Pacific”. https://thediplomat. com/2020/08/from-hub-to-network-a-transformation-of-u-s-policy-in-theindo-pacific/ Jain, A., and Sareen, J. (2021, February). “Renewable Energy Expansion through Inter-Continental Grid Will be a Shot in the Arm for Climate Action”. https://www.forbesindia.com/blog/author/amit-jain-and-jagjeet-sareen/ Jung, S.C., Lee, J., and Lee, J.Y. (2020, May). “The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle Powers’ Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region”. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 30, Issue 127, pp. 53–68. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10670564.2020.1766909 Kuo, M.A. (2020, April 7). “Blue Dot Network: The Belt and Road Alternative”. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/blue-dot-networkthe-belt-and-road-alternative/ McCawley, P. (2019). “Connecting the Dots on the Blue Dot Network”. The Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/connec ting-dots-blue-dot-network Pamuk, H., and Shalal, A. (2020, May 4). “Trump Administration Pushing to Rip Global Supply Chains from China: Officials”. Reuters. https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-china/trump-administration-pus hing-to-rip-global-supply-chains-from-china-officials-idUKKBN22G0BZ

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Panda, J. (2020, September). “What Will an Indo-Pacific Supply Chain Mean for China?”. RUSI Newsbrief , Vol. 40, Issue 8. https://idsa.in/system/files/ news/rusi-scri-china.pdf Rajagopalan, R. (2020, May 7). “Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement”. ORF Commentary. https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-a-quad-plus-arr angement-65674/ Rajah, R. (2020, April). “Mobilizing the Indo-Pacific Infrastructural Response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South East Asia”. Foreign Policy Brief . Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/mobilizing-the-indo-pac ific-infrastructure-response-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-in-southeastasia/ Rasser, M., Arcesati, R., Oya S., Riikonen, A., and Bochert, M. (2020). “Common Code: An Alliance Framework for Democratic Technology Policy”. Centre for New American Security (CNAS), https://www.cnas.org/publicati ons/reports/common-code Ray, A. (2020, June 5). “US Development Bank to Invest $350 Million in India”. Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/sto cks/news/us-development-bank-to-invest-350m-in-india/articleshow/762 25431.cms Scott, D. (2018, August). “The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power-Shifts”. Rising Powers Quarterly, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 19–43. https:// risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/the-indo-pacific-in-us-strategy-respon ding-to-power-shifts/ Suzuki, H. (2021, February). “Building Resilient Supply Chains: The Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region”. CSIS Report. https://www.csis.org/analysis/bui lding-resilient-global-supply-chains-geopolitics-indo-pacific-region Tellis, A., Szalwinski A., and Wills M. (2019). “Strategic Asia 2020: US-China Strategic Competition for Global Domination”. The National Bureau of Asian Research. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/SA_20_Tellis.pdf Walters, R. (2020). “China: Trump Administration Needs to Align its Trade Policies with its Priorities”. The Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Center, Issue Brief No. 5096. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/IB5 096.pdf Weinhardt, C., and Brink, T.T. (2020). “Varieties of Contestations: China’s Rise and the Liberal Trade Order”. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 27, pp. 258–280. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1699145 Zaki, K. (2020, June 14). “Geopolitical Contours of India’s ‘OneSun, One-World, One-Grid’ Project”. Strategic Foresight for Asia (STRAFASIA). https://strafasia.com/forum/topic/geopolitical-contours-ofindias-one-sun-one-world-one-grid-project/

CHAPTER 3

US–China Strategic Competition: Through the Matrix of Complex Interdependence Rubina Waseem

Introduction The Indo-Pacific Region has come to be an arena of evolving new equations among the major as well as the rising middle powers. This vast maritime region has also witnessed expanding interface among both regional and extra-regional powers. The main contestations comprise not only China, India, Japan and Australia but also the US and European

The views expressed are those of the author and not to be taken to represent the views of NDU. R. Waseem (B) Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_3

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nations like France, Germany and United Kingdom. With expanding global commerce, some of the most critical maritime routes criss-cross these Indian and Pacific Oceans waters where increased volumes of freights have been accompanied by expanding threats of piracy further igniting their strategic competition, especially so between the US and China. China’s emergence as the world’s largest trading nation and its expanding investments under its Belt and Road Initiative have increased its dependence on the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in these waters where it has faced formidable the US naval presence as also Indian navy’s expansionist programs that increasingly define the emerging contours of the emerging “Great Power” confrontation in this region. China’s unprecedented economic preponderance has accentuated ensuing rivalries polarising this region in terms of great powers’ incompatible agendas that indicate prospects of Great Powers operating in this increasingly competitive environment at least in the near future. These have also encouraged the extra-regional powers to get involved in the Indo-Pacific dynamics igniting a complex of geopolitical imaginations. This chapter, however, specifically explores the emerging contours of this US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific from the vantage point of theoretical discourses on their complex interdependence. To begin with, the discourses on the trade viz-a-viz conflict equations between the US and China have been interpreted using both the broad theoretical approaches i.e. liberalism and realism. The liberals argue that commerce and trade promotes shared interests while the realists assert that due to uneven divides and security deficits among both the influential states, vulnerabilities have been continuously aggravating their competing strategies (Mansfield and Pollins, 2003; Rosecrance, 1986; Barbieri, 2002). In modern trade systems, it is not easy to manipulate established international mechanisms that seek to regulate complex and amorphous supply chains that excessively impact each other. Thomas Wright puts it like this: To say that the world’s economies are interdependent does not adequately, or even remotely, express the true nature of today’s global economic activity. Vulnerabilities exist everywhere, the most serious being those obscured by the very complexity of the system…The demise of the meaning of the ‘made in’ label means we can no longer gauge with any accuracy where the incidence of a specific trade sanction will fall or where failures in the global supply chain may manifest themselves. (Wright, 2013)

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Therefore, the need is never felt on either side to reduce trade and commerce between the US and China through tools of isolationism. This is partly so because, as the world’s first and second largest economies, isolating either side cannot be imagined without setting in motion a general disentanglement of the global trading system that each of them relies upon to thrive. Indeed, it can even be said that trade provides limited leverage for either country against the other. If anything, it offers each country serious stakes in the success of the other. Consequently, the avenues of multilateralism in the geo-economics and geopolitics of the dynamic Indo-Pacific present one of the signs of growing cooperation between the Indo-Pacific states. The role of allies of both the US and China in their growing rivalries therefore is not guided exclusively by their national interests but also by the temper and tenor of regional multilateral equations. This serves as a model for the kinds of competition that have shaped multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region. It is in this backdrop of US–China competition that this chapter examines the shift of axis between the Indo-Pacific states and their existing asymmetries with the prism of the Complex Interdependence matrix.

Asymmetries and Interdependence History shows that economic interdependence has never stopped nations from going to war. The economics of the United Kingdom and Germany before World War I had become so densely intertwined that it ended up harming itself. To cite Graham Allison, “Many [had] hoped that this entangling web of trade and investments would prevent war. But their hopes were misplaced when war did break out, the economic consequences for Berlin and London were extraordinary” (Allison, 2017: 210). Likewise, the contemporary economic intertwining of the US and China that makes them so interdependent might also cause an analogue of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This one may also end up likewise and be labelled as Mutually Assured Economic Destruction (MAED) (Allison, 2017: 210) despite the US being the largest market for Chinese exports and China being the largest creditor of the US. Joseph Nye notes that China’s economic policymakers did not sell China’s growing stock of US Treasuries in retaliation to US’ sale of weapons to Taiwan, despite pressure from senior military officers, because that could have brought economic consequences for China as well (Nye,

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2010). Although the US military commanders have warned of the imminent threat of China to take control of Taiwan, some experts are of the view that there are least chances that China will directly attack Taiwan in the near future. According to Bonnie Glaser, director of the Washingtonbased China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “While we shouldn’t ignore the risk of a Chinese attack, I believe an attack in the near term is unlikely. It remains a potential action of last resort if the Chinese feel that they have exhausted all their options” (Welle, 2021). The debate regarding any major clash in the Indo-Pacific looming large with China’s consistent militarisation around Taiwan is generally believed to be less likely to come true in the near future. Nevertheless, as Keohane and Nye recognise that complex interdependence may vary in various arenas and degrees, moreover they consider it more contingent and less categorical view of outcomes of the US–China competition in comparison with different liberal as well as realist perspectives. Their discussion debates around a “combination of competitive and cooperative outcomes beyond the possibility of violent conflict in a growing range of policy sectors. At the same time, their focus on international or systemic processes understates the role of domestic politics and their concept of interdependence does not adequately account for the wider dynamics of international relations” (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 25). China, for instance, remains concerned about the US continuing security leadership and political influence in the Indo-Pacific littoral including its indirect control on Taiwan. Likewise, the US too is not comfortable with China’s policy towards North Korea and Pakistan, especially in the context of CPEC (Pakistan China Economic Corridor), keeping in mind its impact on the Gwadar port (Khan et al., 2017: 6). As Chinese partnership with Pakistan has also raised reservations in India which is a strategic partner of the US and China considers this strategic partnership working against its interests in the region. China’s surge in the global economic order, European Union’s expanding interest in the Indo-Pacific politics, and the influential role of India viz-a-viz strategic interest of Australia in the region, including the growing influences of multiple centres depicts the existing competitive environment under the umbrella of the predominant global powers in both economic as well as a military domain (Buraga, 2016). Nevertheless, bringing new connectivity initiatives and managing this complicated security and development architecture across Indo-Pacific is no more an option but a strategic necessity.

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European nations including European Union has shown increasing interest in engaging Indo-Pacific littoral (Fact Sheet: EU IP Strategy, 2021a). These extra-regional actors could play a vital role in addressing several ignored areas, including non-traditional security cooperation and good governance, in the changing security matrix of the Indo-Pacific region. Europe’s traditional neutral approach towards conflicts among Asian powers, involving economic leverage and healthy relations with almost all regional and extra-regional powers involved could provide vital advance towards stability in the competitive environment of the Indo-Pacific (Pejsova, 2018: 3). For this reason, China has also expanded its economic engagement with multiple European nations including Germany, France and UK. It has also developed closer links with many countries in the Indo-Pacific littoral as also extended its presence and reach across the Indo-Pacific region. China has invested huge amounts of sums in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. China’s presence in South Asia, specifically in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh has been associated with the notion of a String of Pearls (SOP). This seems to have created negative perceptions regarding China’s intentions. But it is also believed that China’s core motives that drive its strategy in the IndoPacific are more towards economic and commercial advantages rather than military. Nevertheless, several Western analysts remain suspicious of the future use of the Gwadar port of Pakistan (which was built with the help of China) (Kaplan, 2009). It is commonly believed that China is constructing huge maritime stations to observe ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz. Moreover, it is making close links with many African and some island countries, including Djibouti.

US Presence in the Indo-Pacific The US remains committed to establishing a Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) to secure Washington’s interests as also those of its allies. According to a US State Department report on its Indo-Pacific strategy issued in November 2019: The U.S. Department of Commerce is at the forefront of U.S. efforts to build business ties in the region. The Department’s Access Asia outreach program, which connects American firms with commercial opportunities in Indo-Pacific markets, has engaged more than 1,000 U.S. companies since

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2018. The Department’s largest annual domestic conference, Discover Global Markets, further strengthened Indo-Pacific business connections. Trade Winds, the largest U.S. trade mission of 2019, brought 100 U.S. companies to India and Bangladesh. Trade Winds will return to the IndoPacific in 2020, stopping in Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand. (Report, 2019)

It is however commonplace that the US considers alliance formation as the most important pillar of its strategy to address its evolving strategic competition with China. Hence, bringing its local and European allies and partners into the Indo-Pacific politics reflects the US’ evolving grand strategic outlook for redressing its China challenge. In response, the Chinese, have been building strategic assets. China seeks to balance against the US attempts to expand its influence in the region, and even to resist its influence in the Indo-Pacific littoral. Beijing intends to portray the US as strategically less relevant and interventionist power with respect to China’s conflicts with regional states like Japan, Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. The new US Administration is not likely to change the US Indo-Pacific strategy of Trump administration which aims to contain China’s rise with the help of regional allies such as Australia, Japan and India. The evolving four-nation framework in the form of Quad may eventually transform into a military alliance with India emerging as the biggest beneficiary from the growing US–China competition. On the other hand, it may be considered that the US was always influential in this region; its new-found interests in expanding its maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific is nothing but its response to China’s expanding footprint. The reinforcement of the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, however, seems to run in parallel with the Chinese resurgence in the region. The US has maintained an alliance system in Asia since the end of World War II by taking Japan as its protectorate and guaranteeing its security (Allison, 2017). This was followed by its commitment to the security of South Korea and hence broadening its alliances to include Pakistan, Philippines, and Australia so as to ensure its naval presence in the region. Such security alliances did not go beyond securing its allies but have now shifted to restraining ever-rising power of China that continues to challenge the interests of the US and its friends and allies like that of Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Brookings, 2016). Similarly, the nuclear threat

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from North Korea and threats to the US-led security architecture reinforces the motivational factors behind the strategic alliance between the US and South Korea. South Korea and Japan together host nearly 80,000 thousand US troops on their territories which bolsters American influence and deters external threats for the allies (Hass and Rapp-Hooper, 2019). But equations have also been changing to the US discomfiture. The Philippines provides one most apt example. The US has had a relatively stable partnership with successive Filipino leaders and they shared fears about the growing Chinese influence in the region. But Rodrigo Duterte’s regime had clearly more than drifted in favour of China. China, which has always criticised the US’ growing influence and alliance system in the region, continues to develop such partnerships with others including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives to build its robust regional security cooperation arrangements. The Chinese efforts are not accidental but reflect its systematic strategic planning to build a China-centric regional security order that encourages regional states to accommodate Beijing’s interests and limit the US influence (Rolland, 2020). Such efforts are not new and can be traced to the end of the Cold War when Beijing opened up to the regional states in Southeast Asia. Though China faces difficulty in building such partnerships, it has achieved some success following the 2000s, as is evident by its defence cooperation agreements with Malaysia in 2005 or from its 2003 joint patrols with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tokin, that mark a major shift from their past relationship with China (Rolland, 2020).

Shifting Complex Interdependence Axis Among scholars of liberalism, economic interdependence is believed to be a major instrument in reducing and resolving conflicts. This is done by three basic mechanisms: firstly the opportunity costs, secondly the role of international institutions and thirdly, the domestic interests of the parties to the conflict. Richard Rosecrance explains that the higher benefits of trade win over the increasing costs of the war and hence reduces the chances of conflict by deterring states (Rosecrance, 1986). Secondly, the state’s integration into the international financial market also plays a vital role in reducing conflicts (Gartzke, 2007). Those theorists who believe that economic interdependence could lead to peace as well as new conflicts take into account the role of international institutions in promoting sustainable free trade to mitigate chances of conflict (Keohane,

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1984). These institutions offer a platform for negotiations, monitoring of trade activities and channels for information sharing, enabling information exchanges among varying international players, even among conflicting states, regulating the decisions which helps in avoiding miscalculated resolve on part of states and hence, in reducing conflicts among states (Kahler, 2012). These scholars believe that such economic interdependence and role of international institutions yield vital and powerful interests realised by state and society, which makes them avoid conflict in favour of protecting those larger gains that they have acquired through trade and interdependence (Simmons, 2003: 31–43). As regards the Indo-Pacific, the ASEAN has been at the centre stage of regional multilateralism that today guides its new evolving networking. This was traditionally conceptualised in the 1960s to contain the spread of communism but has come to increasingly engage and endorse ever expanding leverages and influence of Beijing. There are a number of factors that necessitate the South East Asian countries to have partnerships with China including joint security agreements because of piracy threats and crimes from the Golden Triangle. Likewise, China’s growing tilt towards joining the regional and international institutional frameworks, reflect its efforts to reshape the existing security architecture to the satisfaction of the regional countries of Indo-Pacific (Parameswaran, 2019). The continued relative decline of the US means that it no longer has sufficient power and wealth to provide for all “public goods”, including security for the people on this planet, and has adopted the strategy of expanding its network of new partners, like India, to maintain its domination over the globe without directly threatening the interests of others, like China and Russia. Australia also has certain ambitions and compulsions guiding its outlook and engagements in the region. These include its need for access to energy, secure sea lanes for smooth trade and finally its need to align with American interest in the evolving dynamics of the IndoPacific region. Australia maintains robust trade ties with Japan, South Korea, China, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia besides with the US and EU states. It is believed that Australia being one of the close US allies would not hesitate to toe its line with the US in case of a confrontation with China. Australia is also seen as part of an emerging strategic consensus that consists of the US, India, Japan and Australia that seeks to check growing Chinese influence and its Belt and Road Initiative

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(BRI). Australia has a powerful naval force which takes part in international multilateral efforts to provide security to SLOCs. In this regard, Australia’s North-West coast, which is considered the “engine room” of its economy, remains vulnerable to piracy, trafficking and other security threats. And marking its increasing sense of seeking self-help, the Australian navy, therefore, has established sufficient naval installations to ensure the safety of its coast and the associated SLOCs. But, from its very beginning in 2007, Australia has remained an integral part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) initiative which lay dormant for a decade till it was revived in 2017. It is often viewed as its joint security platform with the US, Japan and India to counter the growing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, open about calling QUAD “an important forum for Australia and the region”, indicated to revive it to counter China’s might. However, the country also displays some confusion about its engagement with China. Australia shares more trade exchanges with China than its fellow QUAD partners and has acknowledged the fact that the nature of its relations with China is different than those of the US, India and Japan. The Australian Prime Minister during his official visit to the US in September 2019 acknowledged that “the first thing to do is to acknowledge that Australia and the US come at this forum from a different perspective…. from Australia’s point of view, the engagement with China has been enormously beneficial” which the Australian government wishes to continue in the same tone (Laurenceson, 2020). Australia’s engagement with China reflects how the US and China have had varying influences on the regional states where the US holds much more diplomatic as well as military influence, as compared to China having more economic interdependence and influence. Likewise, most of the Southeast Asian states have also increasingly preferred economic developments over their security concerns; these states are more worried about the economic influence of China rather than its military. China can use these leverages and their influence for various goals, including to marginalise the traditional influence of the US military. China prefers to apply tools like economic incentives or coercive capacity like turning its debt-into-equity. Nonetheless, these regional states prefer not having to choose between both the US and China due to their shared dependence on both sides.

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Dissecting Its Theoretical Underpinning Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have explained how they are not suggesting that “complex interdependence faithfully reflects political realities of the world” (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 20). More willingly, they stress that “complex interdependence can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type” (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 19). They discuss that although, in most of the situations, realism provides an accurate picture, interdependence can provide an improved portrait of reality (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s concept of “interdependence” brings power to dominate and the more powerful states have the ability to make weaker states more vulnerable states and pay the costs. In Indo-Pacific multilateral equations as well as the developing states, due to their economic interests, have developed alliances yet the greater powers have the ability to exploit their vulnerabilities to extend their strategic objectives. At the same time, Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye contend that the impact of power is contingent upon the process of political bargaining between countries and thus Indo-Pacific states have been engaged to gain from their shared interests. According to Jacobs and Perlez: “the base’s construction is a milestone marking Beijing’s expanding global ambitions—with potential implications for America’s longstanding military dominance…It’s a huge strategic development” (Jacobs and Perlez, 2017). It is also often opined that from China’s perspective, all of these projects have a commercial objective rather than military expansion of China. However, there are sceptics and one cannot rule out the military dimension of these developments because China would like to rise peacefully as it has occasionally expressed but still, it must have a strategy if it is compelled to retreat by its strategic competition with the US where it would like to retain the option to respond decisively. The generous flood of investments by China as part of its Maritime Silk Road to multiple countries which has generally been seen as satisfactory for them while some even seem overwhelmed with relationship with China in terms of their resultant economic prosperity prospects has been possible given enormous investment deficit across all the Indo-Pacific states that need investments and economic development. Ideal type, complex interdependence posits that economic interdependence increases the probability of peace. This is because, apart from a growing range of issues whose solution is not feasible by the use of force, the interdependence increases costs even for the great and dominating

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powers who may have carried relative advantage in a given conflict. For example, Joseph Nye explains how China’s economic policymakers have refrained from selling China’s stocks of US treasuries to punish the US for selling weapons to Taiwan because that could bring economic costs on China as well (Nye, 2010: 143–153). However, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s work also suggest a matrix of cooperation and competition beyond a possible direct conflict. Meanwhile, the role of domestic affairs also remains understated in their thesis. Keeping in mind the systemic level procedures (Nye, 2010), their complex interdependence paradigm does not sufficiently interpret the global rivalries. With a view to maintaining its current status at the global level, the US would need to continue to adopt the combination of various strategies to simultaneously contain as also to engage China which may include options like power projection, coercive diplomacy and the threat of use of military might. The theory of complex interdependence therefore shows limitations in explaining the trend and trajectories of the US-China strategic competition as it cannot explain all its loose strands. Nevertheless, it remains perhaps the most suitable and closest theoretical framework for any assessment of the US–China strategic competition and especially to draw any further extrapolations about its impact on the nature of evolving multilateralism across the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, this framework may also be useful in exploring various subsets of this larger paradigm like how is India–China competition likely to shape. What could be its implications for the South Asian sub-region as well as extra-regional actor’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific? Answers to all these questions also remain essential imperatives to assess the future of this rather dynamic region and in each of these explorations “complex interdependence” thesis can provide a useful lens enriching the debate on Indo-Pacific multilateralism.

Concluding Remarks To conclude, therefore, the Indo-Pacific, which has come to be the epicentre of international affairs and brings together all great economic powers, most of the world’s nuclear powers as also most of the middle powers, involving more than one-third of the world’s population, has been a hotbed of recasting inter-state equations in the larger regional geopolitics. The study contends that in face of geo-economics emerging as the driving force of rapid changes in the evolving new order for the Indo-Pacific, Complex Interdependence theory must aptly help in

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explaining the novel genres of evolving multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. This theoretical prism also helps in understanding the reality of the shifting matrix of interdependence in the Indo-Pacific region that undergirds regional political discourses and how effectively the emerging new order may contribute towards sustaining the US leadership as a global power. The study concludes that rather than withdrawing from the region the US seems all set to try to evolve newer leverages and partnerships to survive as a world leader (by consent) instead of being the superpower (by coercion) which is a twentieth-century expression. In ensuring this, Washington has already adopted a multi-track approach in dealing with Beijing. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy (issued in 2017 and its new version on 3rd March 2021) (Fact Sheet, 2021b) clearly indicates it being pivoted to ensuring FOIP. A deeper reading of it reflects an intent of adopting both “containment” as well as “engagement” of China to sustain its leadership. The US is more likely to continue to engage China politically and economically which would allow the US to expand its soft power premised on its hard power military superiority. To sum up, the world order spinning around the pivot of geoeconomics has unleashed newer competitions among the major global powers for ensuring the security of their trade transport and of energy resources while this sustainable development remains the goal of major players thus unleashing competition that, premised on the axis of sustainability, has to be regulated. In this context, the Indo-Pacific has assumed special significance given its growth dynamics. This has accentuated the ongoing tension and strategic competition between the world’s leading powers—the US and China. The US’ bonhomie with new partners like India and its experiments with new frames like the Quad to redress their shared China challenge (Anti-China “QUAD Alliance”, 2020) have ignited Chinese responses to improvise its commerce driven strategies to further strengthen its ties with regional powers, such as Russia, Pakistan, and build cordial relations with other countries by re-enforcing its strategy generally known by the name of String of Pearls (Dixon, 2014). This has made Indo-Pacific equations increasingly vulnerable and complex making the complex interdependence far more relevant to decode the strategic competition between the US and China, especially across the Indo-Pacific rim.

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References “Alliance and Partnerships: US Commitments in the Asia-Pacific,” (2016) Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/alliances-partnerships-u-scommitments-in-the-asia-pacific/. “Anti-China ‘QUAD Alliance’ between US, India, Australia and Japan could soon be a Reality,” (2020) The Eurasian Times, https://eurasiantimes.com/ anti-china-quad-alliance-between-us-india-australia-japan-could-soon-be-a-rea lity/. Allison, Graham. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 210. Barbieri, Katherine. (2002) The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Buraga, Manoj Babu. (2016) “India, China and the EU in a Multipolar World Order: A Perception,” European Academic Research 9, no. 6: 1–2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324586285_India_ China_and_the_EU_in_a_Multipolar_World_Order_A_Perception. Dixon, Jonathan. (2014) “From ‘Pearls’ to ‘Arrows’: Rethinking the ‘String of Pearls’ Theory of Chinas Naval Ambitions,” Comparative Strategy 33, no. 4: 389–400, https://doi.org/10.1080/%2001495933.2014.941730. Fact Sheet. (2021a) “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, EU IP Strategy,” https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-indo-pacific_fact sheet_2021a-04_v.5.pdf. Fact Sheet. (2021b) “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” https://ustda.gov/wp-content/upl oads/2021b-Indo-Pacific-Strategy-Fact-Sheet.pdf. Gartzke, Erik. (2007) “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1: 166–191. Hass, Ryan, Mira Rapp-Hooper. (2019) “Responsible Competition and the future of US-China Relations,” Brookings, February 6, https://www.bro okings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/06/responsible-competitionand-the-future-of-u-s-china-relations/ Jacobs, Andrew, Jane Perlez. (2017) “U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base,” The New York Times. Kahler, Miles. (2012) “Regional Institutions and East Asian Security,” in The Nexus of Economics and International Relations in East Asia Security, eds. Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 72. Kaplan, Robert D. (2009) “Center Stage for the 21st Century,” Foreign Affairs Magazine, April 15, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/200903-01/center-stage-21st-century. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little Brown, 25. Laurenceson, James. (2020) “China’s Trade Confound Australia’s Indo-Pacific Shift,” East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/05/ china-trade-questions-confound-australias-indo-pacific-shift/. Majeed Khan, Minhas, Ahmad Rashid Malik, Saira Ijaz, Ume Farwa (eds.) (2017) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor A Game Changer, Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 6. Mansfield, Edward, Brian Pollins. (2003) “Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction,” in Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, eds. Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1–30. Nye, Joseph S. (2010) “American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4: 143–153. Parameswaran, Prashant. (2019) “Managing the Rise of China’s Security Partnerships in the South East Asia,” Brookings, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ publication/managing-the-rise-chinas-security-partnerships-southeast-asia. Pejsova, Eva. (2018) “The Indo-Pacific: A Passage to Europe,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March. Report. (2019) “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision,” Department of State, United States of America, November 4, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-andOpen-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf. Rolland, Nadege. (2020) “An Emerging China-Centric Order: China’s Vision for a New World Order in Practice”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 3– 4, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr87_aug2 020.pdf Rosecrance, Richard. (1986) The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Free Press. Simmons, Beth. (2003) “Pax Mercatoria and the Theory of the State,” in New Perspectives on Economic Exchange and Armed Conflict, eds. Brian Pollins and Edward Mansfield, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 31–43. Welle, Deutsche. (2021) “Can China Impose Military Force Against Taiwan?” Taiwan News, March 25, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/416 0570. Wright, Thomas. (2013) “Sifting through Interdependence,” The Washington Quarterly, 36, no. 4: 7–23.

CHAPTER 4

Sino-Japanese Relations: Drivers and Obstacles in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision Stephen R. Nagy

Introduction Sino-Japanese ties have been mutually beneficial but fraught with problems in much of the post-World War II period. Since the normalisation of bilateral relations in the early 1970s, both have avoided sensitive historical issues as well as issues related to compensation for Japan’s wartime behaviour to push forward the bilateral relations. The traditional format in which relations evolved was under the so-called Seikei bunri (政経分離) formula in which there was a clear separation of politics and economics (Hatakeyama 2021: 1–18). This formula allowed Japan and China to significantly increase their economic intercourse in the 1980s and 90s so

S. R. Nagy (B) International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_4

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much so that the 1980s is called the Golden Era in Sino-Japanese relations (Campbell 2018: 465–466). With the collapse of the Cold War, Japan and China have returned back to old grievances plus regional challenges that now inform their bilateral relations (Frost 2008: 8–9). Disputes over territories in the East China Sea (ECS), mutual criticisms about history, and the rationale for continued dependence on the US–Japan alliance have become irritants in the relationship. The US–Japan alliance has been especially problematic for China since the larger threat posed by the Soviet Union is no longer a threat to China. For Chinese strategic thinkers, the US–Japan alliance represents a forward US presence that can be critical in a new strategy to contain China’s rise (Yang 2010: 92–98). Worse still, the US-Japanese strategic alliance is seen as a counter-revolutionary threat to the regime itself, a regime that has had concerns about a ‘The Plot against China’ since its inception (Khan 2018; Doshi 2021; Jisi 2021). In terms of this US factor in Japan–China equations, the 1970s, had seen relations between China and Japan continue to evolve and struggle at the same time. Especially, following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Japan had joined Western nations in sanctions as also in their informal embargo against the Chinese. But Japan was also the first country to re-engage China and try and socialise it into the international system (Matsuda 2012: 365–391). China appreciated that initiative and as a result had allowed the Japanese to send peacekeepers to the Golan Heights (Hook et al. 2011). For many, bilateral relations had reached a peak with the emperor visiting China in 1992 and expressing empathy for Japan’s wartime past (Sanger 1992). However, all was not well as this superficial tone demonstrated. In 1994, on eve of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty being extended indefinitely, China began testing nuclear devices which was followed by tensions in the Taiwan straits in 1996 (Takashi and Jain 2000: 235; Porch 1999: 15048). This made Tokyo anxious about China’s potential as a security challenge, especially in terms of access to sea lines of communication so critical for Japan’s imports of energy as also its exports via the Indo-Pacific to Europe, North America, and the world (Nagy 2021c). As a result of these growing concerns about China’s growth trajectories, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was to articulate the so-called ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ vision, framing the idea of the Indo-Pacific during his August 2007 speech to the Indian parliament

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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). In this vision, Abe was to highlight the connection both culturally and historically between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and the importance of linking these two regions through economic integration, institution building, building shared norms and creating a platform for cooperation in the terrestrial and maritime domains. It is against this backdrop, especially in face of China’s economic power being used by Beijing in cultivating political influence around its periphery, that this chapter examines Japan’s separation of politics and economics and the role of China factor in Japan’s vision and engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

China’s ‘New Era’ Under Xi Jinping Most visible have been the debates on China’s assertive policies since Xi Jinping’s ascension to the position of Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 and then as President of China from March 2013. This period since has witnessed Xi’s ‘New Era’ of the concentration of power that has complicated the traditional Sino-Japanese formula for pragmatic, forward-looking relationship. To balance the benefits from strong bilateral economic relations with China and growing concerns about its assertive behaviour in its periphery are seen as main driver in Japan’s conceptualisation and engagement with the emerging discourses on the Indo-Pacific region that has seen Japan craft the so-called free and open Indo Pacific (FOIP) vision. It is this consciousness of assertive China that remains overcast on emerging Japanese imaginations of the Indo-Pacific region. Looking at the Sino-Japanese relations through the prism of FOIP is explored in this chapter through three lines of enquiry. They include: (i) How has Sino-Japanese relations affected the design and implementation of FOIP?; (ii) How does the FOIP reflect Japan’s long-standing hedging approach to China?; and (iii) Does FOIP represents a critical inflection point in the ‘seikei bunrei’ (separate politics and economics) formula for Japan’s bilateral relations with China? The findings of this chapter suggest that FOIP remains both an inclusive and exclusive framework to shape the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order in-line with the post-World War II international order. It, therefore, leaves windows of opportunity open to strengthen Sino-Japanese relations while also contributing to the robust, multilateral institution building to anchor the US leadership in the region meant partly to constrain China’s efforts to reshape

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the region with Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, it suggests that FOIP also remains both an inclusive and exclusive framework to shape the Indo-Pacific narratives as also the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order. This chapter is organised into five parts. Part one examines the concept of ‘seikei bunri’ (separate politics and economics) and how this has come to be the formula for bilateral relations between China and Japan since the normalization in 1972. Part two highlights the critical junctures in Sino-Japanese relations in terms of Japan, rethinking how it should engage with China. Part three looks at the emergence of Japan’s FOIP vision to explore its main components, main factors and how and why it remains both an inclusive and exclusive vision to inculcate Japan into the Indo-Pacific region’s institutions, economy, norms, as well as maritime governance. Part four finally, looks at both the drivers and obstacles in terms of the Indo-Pacific vision through the lens of Sino-Japanese relations. The last part of this chapter will focus on the areas of potential cooperation under the FOIP vision as well as continued challenges moving forward. And, the last part of this chapter ends by focusing the limits of a securitised Japanese FOIP vision.

The Precarious Seikei Bunri Formula The ‘seikei bunri’ formula is an expression established since the late mid80s to describe how the Japanese and the Chinese are able to put forward cooperation between their economies and their governments through a focus on economic relations while eschewing the more sensitive political aspects of their relationship (Dreyer 2014: 326–341). Since their normalisation of bilateral relations in 1972, Japan has engaged with China through intergovernmental projects and multi-sectoral cooperation. This intergovernmental cooperation has provided a foundation for the expansion of Japan’s overseas development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) into China to help build Chinese infrastructure and help its economy develop (Takamine 2012; Wu 2008; Lin 2005). This was not an entirely altruistic gesture from Japan. While this was seen by many Japanese as a form of war reparations, others have viewed it as a critical part of keeping the Japanese economic engine growing during its high-growth period (Stallings and Eun 2016). The decades of 1970s, and 1980s, have seen the cost of domestic manufacturing become increasingly unsustainable. China represented source of unlimited cheap labour

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and resources, and therefore in many ways, a perfect match in terms of comparative advantages for the two states. With this ‘seikei bunri’ equation being beneficial to both sides, the Chinese government welcomed ODA and FDI from the Japanese government and Japanese business community went into China to help develop its manufacturing base and what is today seen as the global production network centred around China. On the Japanese side, manufacturing in China allowed Japan to continue to be a manufacturing powerhouse and to leverage the cheap labour, inter-regional labour supplies as well as resources in China to dominate the global manufacturing community. This relationship continued unimpeded from the late 1970s into the late 1990s and early 2000s with a few hiccups along the way. However, in the 1980s while Deng Xiaoping was attempting to consolidate his power within the Chinese political system the ‘seikei bunrei’ formula had begun to face some questions. As Yamaguchi (2021) writes, there was increasing recognition in China that Deng Xiaoping had to take a more nationalist approach in terms of dealing with Japan and Japanese investment into the country (Yamaguchi 2021). This nationalist approach stemmed from the growing resentment of Chinese over the large trade deficit that was emerging in the so-called Golden Age of their bilateral relations (Yu 2015; Li 2016). This shift in China’s thinking about Japan was, in some ways, as much about their domestic politics, as it was a realisation that Japan was becoming an economic superpower within the region that could potentially dominate the region economically, in a way that it couldn’t dominate the region militarily during its imperial past.

Critical Junctures in Sino-Japanese Relations Aside from trade friction testing the validity of their ‘seikei bunri’ framework for stable Sino-Japan’s relations, there have been numerous critical junctures in the relationship that initially were a cause for reflection in Tokyo but have introduced major divergences in their bilateral relations. These critical junctures include but are not exclusive to: (i) the 1994 nuclear tests; (ii) the 1996 Taiwan strait crisis; (iii) the 2010 fisherman incident; (iv) the 2012 aftermath of the nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Tai islands; (v) the building and militarising of an artificial island in the South China Sea (SCS) from 2013; (vi) the eschewing of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 decision again Chinese claims in the SCS; (vii) the adoption of the National Security Law in Hong Kong

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on June 30, 2020; and (viii) increasingly bellicose rhetoric and behaviour towards Taiwan beginning in 2020. Prima facie, a deeper dive into each of these inflection points is not really essential to highlight their overall impact on how these incidents have contributed to Japan’s changing views on the formation of FOIP. Put together, these 8 incidents have transformed Japan’s view about the nature and trajectory of China’s peaceful rise which has been the trigger for the rise of most nations’ views around this evolving IndoPacific paradigm (Takahara 2009). While some see China’s peaceful rise through the lens of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, others have focused on China’s efforts to modernise its military but also join a plethora of multilateral organisations to ‘confront the U.S. and facilitate the rise of China’ (Aoyama 2016: 130; Masui 2014: 1–44). Still others have shifted their focus towards what they understand as China’s pursuit of regional hegemony (Wang and Seiichir¯o 2021: 26–33; Sat¯o 2021: 12– 15). Consensus is towards seeing China as a revisionist state aimed at resetting the regional order into one dominated by China. To illustrate, the 1994 nuclear tests was a slight against Japan’s three non-nuclear principles of not manufacturing, possessing, or introducing nuclear weapons (Ogawa 2003). In face of Japan’s efforts to promote denuclearisation of the region and the world, they saw China’s announcement to test and modernise and expand its nuclear arsenal as revisionist and counter to regional trends (Zhuˇanjiˇao 2021). Likewise, this period also saw China’s increased belligerence towards Taiwan and talk about not eschewing the use of military force (China Daily 2021). China pressing for re-unification of Taiwan along Beijing’s terms was to further deepen Tokyo’s prognosis about China’s evolving regional hegemony. Tokyo’s anxieties include whether or not a Taiwan contingency can be avoided as hawks are in the ascendency in Beijing’s security establishment and a likely conflict to have devastating regional and economic consequences (CAN Insider 2021). Key questions raised in security circles in Tokyo were focused on China’s long-term commitment to peace and stability in the region as it steps up patrols and training exercises in its newly created Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) (Reuters 2021). Likewise, China’s engagement with building and militarising of artificial islands in the SCS and ramping up of its grey zone and grey operations of the Chinese coast guard in the East and South China Seas (The Maritime Executive 2021). Examples included the use of water cannons by Chinese Coast Guard

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vessels in the exclusive economic zones of the Philippines (Puri and Greg 2021). It was bound to increase the danger of conflict by using police assets in the territorial wars of another country in the region. The so-called grey-zone operations using merchant vessels have been testing the strategic patience of countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. But, as these countries refrain from responding in kind to the threatening behaviour of Chinese vessels, it has incrementally eroded their sovereignty claims in the SCS (Nagy 2021a, b, c, d). The same is true in the ECS as China continues to challenge Japan’s claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands with regular incursions of merchant vessels entering Japan’s contiguous zone or intruding at will into the territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). Two other actions by Beijing were to seriously undermine Japan’s confidence in China’s re-emergence: the eschewing of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) 2016 decision against Chinese claims in the SCS and the adoption of the National Security Law in Hong Kong on June 30, 2020. In the case of the rejection of the PCA decision against China’s claims in the SCS, it raises serious questions as to China’s acceptance of the international legal order and agreements like UNCLOS that China has signed (Kurashige 2021: 111–120; Hayashi 2021: 655– 701). In the case of the adoption of the National Security Law (HKSAR1 2021) in Hong Kong on June 30, 2020 and the subsequent erosion of freedom of press (Reporters without Borders 2021), rule of law (Human Rights Watch 2021) and the activity of civil society (ibid.) has eroded the guarantees of the 1984 Sino-British Declaration (Nagy 2021a, b, c, d), which states the ‘rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’” (HKSAR1 2021). These were concrete examples of China’s abrogation of international agreements, namely the 1984 Sino-British Declaration and UNCLOS. Tokyo’s concerns about China’s re-emergence were further magnified by comments by prominent Chinese scholars such as Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong saying that: China will work hard to shape an ideological environment conducive to its rise and counter Western values. For example, the United States defines democracy and freedom from the perspective of electoral politics and personal expression, while China defines democracy and freedom from

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the perspective of social security and economic development. Washington should accept these differences of opinion instead of trying to impose its own views on others. (Yan 2021)

As Japan is a direct benefactor of the current international order that is largely buttressed by the US leadership, China’s rejection of international law and coercive behaviour towards neighbours have individually and collectively served as critical junctures in Japan’s thinking about China’s developmental trajectory and the need to develop a foreign policy that allows Japan to continue to accommodate and benefit from China’s economic re-emergence but also make Japan more resilient to China’s revisionist behaviour (Nagy 2020a: 1–18; 2021d: 7–21). This has taken the form of Japan’s FOIP vision. For example, to cite Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University’s Yoshimatsu (2020) who has analysed Japan’s foreign policy in the context of the Indo-Pacific debates he divides the evolution of FOIP posture into four sub-categories: (i) proactive security engagement in the region; (ii) theoretical categorisations on the Abe administration’s foreign policy; (iii) the domestic policy-making in relation to the Abe administration’s foreign policy; and (iv) efforts to understand the underlying assumptions behind Japan’s Indo-Pacific foreign policies (Yoshimatsu 2020: 8–11). Others such as Hatakeyama (2019), Asplund (2018), and Nagy (2021a, b, c, d) have argued that the inflection point for the FOIP have seen Japan being compelled to prioritize the advocacy of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region over an explicit campaign in favour of democracy and human rights promotion (Hatakeyama 2019: 466–481; Asplund 2018: 117–134; Navy 2021: 7–21). Keio University’s Hosoya Yuichi goes even further to argue that Japan’s FOIP has already evolved into FOIP 2.0, a framework that is meant to downplay security components and highlight development and trade components to elicit broader stakeholder buy-in (Hosoya 2019: 18–28). In this sense, FOIP is also seen both as a reactive and proactive policy of Japan; one that focuses on the conception of Japan as a ‘reactive’ state as also Japan as a ‘proactive’ stabilizer for this region (Calder 1988: 517–541; Liff 2020: 39–78).

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Characteristics and Approaches of the FOIP Japan’s FOIP vision has continued to evolve in the context of SinoJapanese relations and also in the context of the triangular dynamics between the US, China and Japan. What explains Japan’s continued focus on buttressing rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific to guide by its aim to ensure that any revised regional order remains aligned with its strategic interests in the region. To do this, Japan has focused on four key areas: (i) a selective accommodation of China’s rise; (ii) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politico-economy and rules-making process; (iii) tightening the Japan–US alliance and cementing the US into the region; and (iv) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships with other stakeholders. In these, Japan’s selective accommodation of China’s rise has been consistent with Japan’s overall approach to China’s rise in general. Both, for example, are partners of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In the case of the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) though China (and Taiwan) have not been yet accepted as partners. Japan has not only been propagating ideas of both China and Taiwan joining the CPTPP but has also been pursuant of a trilateral FTA between Japan, China and South Korea. China’s economic rise has seen Japan broaden its economic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region by signing EPAs and Infrastructure and Connectivity agreements with several interested nations and groupings including the European Union. Such agreements are meant to anchor Japan into multilateral agreements that open markets and foster collaborations, trade and investments across the Indo-Pacific region but importantly also anchor the EU into the Indo-Pacific region as an important stakeholder, burden sharer, and a grouping known for propagating respect for norms and institutions. While trade infrastructure and connectivity cooperation remain the core component of Japan’s FOIP vision, increasingly this reorientation can be seen in its initiatives like the building of resilient supply chains in the form of the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) to reduce this region’s growing dependence on China-centric manufacturing and supply chains. Such FOIP 2.0 can be seen in Japan’s RSCI like initiatives within the Quad framework, and infrastructure and connectivity cooperation with China in third countries.

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This simultaneous selective inclusive and exclusive approach of Japan to the FOIP shares a common theme: a rules-based approach to international relations with a focus on development and trade. Japan clearly sees its future through the lens of a Japan well integrated into the Indo-Pacific politico-economy that is characterised by deep economic integration, shared understandings of rules and norms, and a shared commitment to institution building that is rules-based, transparent and mutually beneficial. And as the digital economy becomes more widespread throughout the Indo-Pacific region, Japan seems to visualise its FOIP through the lens of technology and the digital economy. One tool in that approach has been the Data Free flow with Trust (DFFT) and the development of alternatives to 5G as pillars of the FOIP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs1 2019). The DFFT was adopted to deal with the emerging privacy challenges that have surfaced with rapidly developing digital eco-systems and China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ national development strategy to leapfrog Chinese high-tech industry into a leading position. Key concerns focus on data privacy, a tangential reaction to China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty through data localisation laws and the National Intelligence Law that ‘strengthened the legal basis for China’s security activities and requiring Chinese and foreign citizens, enterprises, and organizations to cooperate with them’ (Tanner 2017). To accomplish this twin task, Japan had begun to offer tax incentives to incentivise network service providers to invest in secure 5G infrastructure and mitigate supply-chain risk (Matsubara 2020). Overseas as well, and especially in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan used the DFFT initiative to facilitate the synthesising of domestic and international legal frameworks through the use and reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Koga 2020: 137–148). Both pursuits aimed to wed the FOIP’s principles of ‘free’ and ‘open’ to the digital realm as well. Likewise, trade, the digital economy, and development through the provision of infrastructure and connectivity demonstrate how Japan views a well-developed, integrated region as a guarantor of more strategic autonomy at the sub-regional level (Southeast Asia and South Asia) on decisions related to their subregions but also stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region. This of course can not be devoid of geopolitical conditions and would require more cohesive and concrete collaborations in actions and statements with regard to China’s behaviour in the South China Sea as also in other areas in where Japan shares its overlapping interests. Therefore, in spite of propagation of norms and respect for rule of law, security remains a component of

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Japan’s FOIP vision, especially so when it comes to its dependence on ensuring safety and free access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Being critically dependent on SLOCs for its trade and importation of energy resources, Japan remains invested in bolstering its Japan–US strategic alliance where again Japan has focused on expanding numbers and quality of strategic partnerships in the region (Nagy 2018: 112–129). This has seen Japan also evolve various new defense partnerships and minilateral arrangements such as the Quad. Japan however is not looking for any more alliances other than its Japan–US alliance. These other strategic and defence partnerships remain more about cooperation in shared areas of interest such as maritime domain awareness, re-enforcing UNCLOS, anti-piracy and preventing illegal fishing and so on. Japan has also been active in helping various regional stakeholders in building human capital, inter-operability trainings and the provision of using coast guard vessels to bolster local capabilities.

China Factor in Japan’s FOIP Vision Critics of Japan’s FOIP vision have often conflated it with an anti-China containment strategy (Paiken 2020; Jeff 2020). For them, it was an extension of the former Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy that formulated its assessment that China was trying to replace US in the IndoPacific (The White House 2018). Others see the free and open aspect of FOIP to be hypocritical as Japan actively courts non-democratic states to support its FOIP vision such as the recent Japan-Vietnam summit (Ghosh 2020). These interpretations perhaps have seriously misread FOIP’s strategic imperatives. First, conceptualising FOIP as an anti-China containment strategy substantially overlooks the deep and mutually beneficial Sino-Japanese economic ties so assiduously built since the late 1970s. To illustrate, in 2020, a year in which China’s unfavourable ratings reached record lows inside Japan (The Genron NPO 2021), it still saw a rise in Japanese exports to China of an equivalent of US$141.6 billion (22.1% of total Japanese exports). If we include the $44.4 billion (6.9%) of Japan exports to Taiwan and the $32 billion (5%) of exports to Hong Kong, exports to greater China represent at least $218 billion or 33.1% of Japan’s total exports, a number that is nearly twice that of the increase in Japan’s exports to the US which was $118.8 billion (18.5%). As the following factors explain, economic decoupling is simply neither possible nor desirable:

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• First and foremost, Japan’s economic engagement with China has moved from trade and investments into partnerships in China’s infrastructure building and connectivity in third countries. Of course, Japan continues to stress on the principles of transparency and fair procurement, as also on economic viability that includes financing projects through repayable debt, and ensuring that these are environmentally friendly and sustainable (Cabinet 2017). • Second, ‘free’ and ‘open’ of Japan’s FOIP is not a reference limited to democracy or freedom of press advocacy; they also refer to trading regimes, sea lines of communication, and the digital economy being rules-based, transparent and having provisions to be arbitrated by international law and or multilateral agreements. Japan, however, has also had a long track record of working with partners regardless of their political system or based on their commitments to democracy or human rights track record. Japan–Iran, Japan–Vietnam and Japan–China energy and economic cooperation are cases in point. Japan’s participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement alongside China further illustrates its reticence to sever its economic ties with its largest trading partner. • Third, Japan’s expanded defense procurement continues to be incremental both in terms of its budgets but also capabilities. Janes Defence Budgets forecasts an increase to 49.6 $ billion US in 2022 a figure slightly larger than 1% of Japan’s GDP (Janes 2021). Compared to China which spent $209.16 billion in 2021 (1.34% of GDP) Japan’s spending increase remains modest and focused on the acquisition of cyberspace and electromagnetic and over the horizon radar capabilities as well as satellites to enhance space and maritime domain awareness (CSIS 2021). Beyond these capabilities, the 2022 defence budget also aims to secure funding for the deployment of around 570 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and to deploy surface-to-air and anti-ship missile batteries on Ishigaki Island (Ministry of Defense 2020). In contrast, China remains committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal and testing hypersonic delivery systems, Tokyo is still wrangling over constitutional reform and whether it should increase defense spending to 2% of GDP (Financial Times 2021; Mainichi Shimbun 2021). If Japan’s FOIP were to be a containment strategy, one would expect Japan to build a substantial increase in deterrence capabilities including submarine

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acquisitions, lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWs), and the acquisition of mid to long-range missile systems that would be able to target threats in the region. Instead, Tokyo’s FOIP continues to be grounded in economic partnerships and, if anything, multifaceted. Key features continue to include trade promotion, development, the expansion of infrastructure and connectivity and investment in resilient supply chains. Together with these core features Japan also continues to propagate inculcating rules-based predictability into critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through adherence to international law. For Tokyo, the focus on SLOCs, trade promotion, development, the expansion of infrastructure and connectivity and investment in resilient supply chains is tangentially related to Japan’s economic security. A disruption in SLOCs through a regional conflict, incident or Taiwan contingency would cut off Japan’s economy from the critical SLOCs that act as arteries for the import and export of goods and energy resources.

Conclusion China factor in Japan’s FOIP remains, therefore, clearly overcast in its policies of trade promotion, development, the expansion of infrastructure and connectivity and investment in resilient supply chains is about enmeshing Japan into the Indo-Pacific’s economy, its burgeoning institutions, and its rules-making processes. In face of China’s unprecedented economic rise, Tokyo wants to lock itself into the region’s political economy to ensure it helps the region evolve in a form favourable to Japanese interests. This means that Japan’s FOIP believes much more in building strategic partnerships, multilateral cooperation and agreements and socio-economic tools rather than military tools that US prefers to see as the primary means to achieve strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. The Japan–EU Economic Partnership, Japan–EU Infrastructure and Connectivity agreement and the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) which include Japan, India and Australia are all illustrative examples of Tokyo’s efforts to enmesh itself in a series of multilateral agreements that anchor Japan into the national interest of other regions and countries and to anchor those countries and regions into the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s multilateral approach in its FOIP vision indeed goes beyond to even eschew strategic partnerships, defense agreements and the very centrality of the Japan–US alliance. Japan continues to deepen its strategic relationship with the US while moving forwards for a defense treaty with

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Australia.1 Discussions are also on their way towards Japan–UK Reciprocal Access Agreement, 2+2 Ministerial security talk, between Japan and France and on May 3, 2021 Japan and Canada announced their ‘Shared Japan-Canada Priorities Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.2 The latter announcement stresses cooperation in six key areas including: (i) The Rule of Law; (ii) Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief; (iii) Health Security and Responding to COVID-19; (iv) Energy Security; (v) Free Trade Promotion and Trade Agreement Implementation; and (vi) Environment and Climate Change, an agenda that speaks of China’s influence in Japan’s comprehensive approach to achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. It also illustrates the limits of a securitised Japanese FOIP Vision.

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Nagy, Stephen R. “Accommodation Versus Alliance: Japan’s Prospective Grand Strategy in the Sino-US Competition.” Nagy, SR (2020a): 1–18. Nagy, Stephen R. “Japan-Australia Defense Treaty: US Allies Adapting to New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.” The Geopolitical Monitor. November 24, 2020b. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/japan-australia-defense-treatyus-allies-adapt-to-new-geopolitics-of-the-indo-pacific/. (Accessed November 16, 2021). Nagy, Stephen R. “China-ASEAN Ties: Are They Stronger and Healthier?” The Japan Times. December 8, 2021a. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ opinion/2021/12/08/commentary/world-commentary/china-asean-relati ons/. (Accessed December 10, 2021). Nagy, Stephen R. “Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as Seen Through the Interplay of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP).” China Report 57, no. 1 (February 2021b): 7–21. Nagy, Stephen R. “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Puzzle: Abe’s “Uncontroversial Taiwan Statement.” 9Dashline. December 8, 2021c. https://www.9dashline. com/article/taiwan-in-japans-security-puzzle-abes-uncontroversial-taiwan-sta tement-nbsp. (Accessed December 8, 2021). Nagy, Stephen R. “Why Does Canada Need an Indo-Pacific Strategy as Part of Its Foreign Policy?” In Commentary in The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. August 11, 2021d. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/ 2726941/why-does-canada-need-an-indo-pacific-strategy-as-part-of-its-for eign-policy/. (Accessed November 30, 2021). Office of the Secretary of Defence. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China a Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,” p. 30. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/ 2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF?source=GovDelivery. (Accessed November 25, 2021). Ogawa, Shinichi. “A Nuclear Japan Revisited.” The National Institute for Defense Studies News 64 (2003). Paiken, Zachary. “Canada’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Future? Not so Fast.” Global Brief . December 4, 2020. https://globalbrief.ca/2020/12/canadas-indo-pacific-fut ure-not-so-fast/. (Accessed December 21, 2020). Pope, Chris G. “Depoliticization and the Changing Boundaries of Governance in Japan.” Critical Policy Studies (2021): 1–18. Porch, Douglas. “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy.” Naval War College Review 52, no. 3 (1999): 15–48. Puri, Samir, and Austin Greg. “What the Whitsun Reef Incident Tells Us About China’s Future Operations at Sea.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). April 9, 2021. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/ 04/whitsun-reef-incident-china. (Accessed December 7, 2021).

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CHAPTER 5

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Motivations, Opportunities, and Challenges Don McLain Gill

Introduction Formed in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has managed to position itself at the centre of Asian affairs since the end of the Cold War. Being a normative power, ASEAN has crafted particular guidelines for intra and extra-regional engagements. This was materialised through the promotion of the “ASEAN Way”, which gives emphasis to norms such as non-interference in domestic affairs, decision-making by consensus, respect for sovereignty, and the maintenance of ASEAN centrality as the vehicle for regional affairs (Haacke 2003: 7; Jones 2010: 480). However, the unprecedented rise of China has accelerated the inevitable drift in the global distribution of power. The once illuminating

D. M. Gill (B) Philippine-Middle East Studies Association (PMESA), Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_5

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unilateral “moment” of the United States (US) is now dimming down in China’s favour. Moreover, China’s rise has occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union, creating a power vacuum that Beijing has allegedly sought to fill at the discomfiture of status quo powers. This has made several states witness China’s rise with a parallel degree of assertion and expansion, which threatens the stability of the established global rulesbased order. Meanwhile, as China continues to grow in the economic and military realms, it has inevitably challenged the influence of the US, its allies, and its like-minded partners, at least in the Eastern Hemisphere. This geopolitical shift has since forced the US along with its allies and partners to put forward the concept of the Indo-Pacific that aims to maintain the peace and stability of the rules-based order from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Arrangements such as the Quad—between the US, India, Japan, and Australia—have been bolstered the desire to enforce these rules throughout the region. However, it must be noted that the concept behind the Indo-Pacific remains subject to varying interpretations, which in turn has led to varying degrees of action among its major stakeholders. In the face of ASEAN’s growing engagement with China, while also continuing with its traditional proximity with the US, the Southeast Asian bloc seeks to utilise its perennial balancing act. This chapter seeks to explain why ASEAN has chosen to take such a stance. As for its AOIP, two crucial elements have catalysed its foundation namely, geography and the maintenance of normative power and centrality. The first section seeks to flesh out the concept of the Indo-Pacific from its prevalent interpretations. The second section explores the AOIP as a brainchild of Indonesia’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. The third section serves as a critical point of discussion to navigate the geographical and geopolitical importance of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific and highlight certain constraints in relation to the overarching US–China power competition. The fourth section aims to underscore the normative power dynamics of ASEAN and how this affects its decision-making within the broader Indo-Pacific against the backdrop of ASEAN centrality. The final section, however, exposes certain pitfalls that may hinder the implementation of the AOIP thereby pushing ASEAN centrality under question.

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One Construct, Multiple Interpretations The ASEAN construct of the Indo-Pacific region serves perhaps as the most interesting case in understanding how the Indo-Pacific is collectively interpreted by a regional bloc. The adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) of 2019 seeks to provide an authentic and collective view on ASEAN’s conception towards this region by crafting a blueprint that combines the Southeast Asian bloc’s engagements in both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean regions. Positioned at the geographic heart of the Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN endeavours to incorporate a functional and collaborative strategy in the region with an emphasis on practical and sustainable goals involving multi-dimensional connectivity, inclusive interstate engagements, and maritime and economic cooperation. To steer clear of China’s contention with the US that dominates most Indo-Pacific narratives, the AOIP, for example, makes no mention of any of the major powers, be it China or the US, Russia, India, or Japan. The AOIP avoids utilising a strategically confrontational tone that can be misconstrued as having any military connotation. Accordingly, it seeks to both preserve and utilise the continuing significance of ASEAN “centrality” at a time when the competitive grab for influence between Quad members and China in the region seems to re-write their agenda. ASEAN’s interpretation of the Indo-Pacific, therefore, stems from its history, its experience, and its fears in terms of being marginalised in the evolving new security architectures of this region. Critics of the AOIP often highlight how ASEAN has sought to walk a fine line between the two competing and dominant states of the system—the US and China— whereas several other major states have incorporated the Indo-Pacific as their means to check Beijing’s assertive rise around its periphery (Daniel 2021). Nevertheless, ASEAN must contend with the fact that the Indo-Pacific narratives have arguably taken-up centre stage in the discourse of international politics and strategic affairs. While the Indo-Pacific may be a novel terminology, its geographical dimensions, which encompass the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, are not new. Manjeet Pardesi explains that major powers in the post-1800 era have also strategically understood the geographic space as a collective region (Pardesi 2019: 2). However, looking at it from the prism of multiple constructs, the Indo-Pacific geopolitical framework gained significant momentum during the Trump

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administration’s adoption of an Indo-Pacific Strategy and renaming of the Pacific Command into the Indo-Pacific Command (Gyngell 2018). Indeed, from the time of President Obama, successive US presidents have demonstrated a renewed interest in this region that is illustrated in the US vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on the established rules-based order founded on liberal democratic values, institutions, and international law. Going beyond the US, other major powers of the region have continued with their slightly varying interpretations regarding the Indo-Pacific though most of them continue to work with the US framework. The closest ally and partner of the US and ASEAN in the region— Japan—has displayed a long-drawn interest to project the notion of an “open and free” Indo-Pacific region. In 2007, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had identified this space as the “seas of prosperity”, defined by rule of law, freedom from coercion, and a thriving market economy (Przystup 2020). Reflecting on Abe’s spirit of the “confluence of two seas”, Japan’s Indo-Pacific formulation coincides with the US vision; however, Tokyo’s view puts more weight on the promotion of infrastructure projects and trade beyond East Asia and into the Middle East and Africa (Das 2019). The primary objective is shared prosperity, which greatly banks on connectivity and infrastructure projects, in addition to maintaining peace and stability (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). Accordingly, ASEAN has all the reasons to synergise with this prosperity-driven vision. ASEAN’s tiger economies of 1990s were once the beneficiaries of the “flying Geese” model of Japanese Official Development Assistance and have continued to be its strong economic partners. India—the world’s largest democracy that shares the world’s longest disputed boundary with China and has been experiencing repeated violent face-offs with the latter—has also been demonstrating a proactive role in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, which was articulated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his speech at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, represents an amalgamation of key India-led regional initiatives such as the Act East and Neighbourhood First policies, as well as multilateral arrangements like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (Mohan 2021: 274–276). While New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific engagements, along with its proactive role in the Quad, is often viewed using a China-driven lens, it is important to highlight that India seeks to promote an Indo-Pacific

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region defined by multipolarity, coupled with principles of inclusiveness, openness, freedom, and respect for rule of law and agreed-upon norms (MEA 2018). The emphasis on these very principles forms the crux of its expanding partnerships in the region (Baruah 2020). Being seen as a major power and security provider in the region, India remains committed towards upholding the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific (Indian Navy 2015). Furthermore, India’s expanding multi-dimensional partnerships with states across the region in the form of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arrangements further illustrate the nature of its role. Finally, regarding China’s perception towards the Indo-Pacific, China perceives the rise of the Indo-Pacific construct as a provocative policy aimed at constraining its power maximisation and projection across the region (Gokhale 2020). However, it must be noted that China has been a pivotal pillar in the evolution of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical frame, whether one likes it or not. More specifically, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has especially accelerated this expanding China footprint in the region. To begin with, BRI was presented in two clear formats: the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) for Eurasia and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)” for China’s maritime connect with Pacific and Indian Oceans all the way to the Mediterranean. The combined BRI consists of multiple economic Corridors, mega-infrastructure, and connectivity projects spanning from East Asia to Europe. Moreover, China has been consolidating its economic clout most effectively on littoral states of the Indo-Pacific rim. Its activities, especially economic engagement, have inevitably strengthened imaginations of this link between these two maritime spaces, which further mobilised the US, along with its allies and partners, to balance China’s unprecedented economic rise and its expanding geopolitical footprint. Accordingly, China’s initial reservations on engaging with such Indo-Pacific narratives become quite foreseeable. It is amid these sharpening major powers’ contention that ASEAN presents an interesting case especially with its perception of its “centrality” in its Indo-Pacific construct. Also, unlike the major powers, ASEAN’s vision presents a collective perspective of the ten Southeast Asian states that range from small to middle powers. To its credit, ASEAN has eventually come to embrace the Indo-Pacific terminology, which has been vividly reflected through the announcement of the AOIP. Therefore, it is therefore important to highlight that the overarching framework of the AOIP draws significantly from Indonesia’s vision of serving as a maritime

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fulcrum. Interestingly, the importance attributed by the AOIP on key values like inclusivity and sensitivity strongly reflects Jakarta’s perception and understanding of the Indo-Pacific (Chongkittavorn 2020; Acharya 2019; Sukma 2019).

Indonesia’s Contribution to the AOIP To recall, China’s Maritime Silk Road project was first announced by President Xi Jinping in Jakarta on 2 October 2013. Given the notable presence of overseas Chinese in this country, Indonesia has been sharing a complex relationship with China, yet Xi Jinping’s China has managed to cultivate favourable business deals with the world’s largest archipelagic country. Indeed, President Joko Widodo’s rise to power from March 2014 was seen as “linked to China’s or ethnic Chinese support partly because he is not from the the established political elite” that carried the baggage of difficult relations of 1960s (Negara and Suryadinata 2019: 82). As in several other cases, the AOIP is believed to largely tap on Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s vision of positioning Indonesia as the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) (Tiola 2019). Introduced by Widodo in 2014, the GMF concept is grounded in his vision of Indonesia’s maritime role and identity. At the ninth East Asia Summit, Widodo profoundly outlined five important pillars that serve as the foundation of the GMF, particularly: maritime culture, economy, security, connectivity, and diplomacy (Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs 2017). In 2017, these pillars were incorporated into a comprehensive Indian Ocean Policy, which gave significant attention to issues of maritime security and development, marine and human resources development, and ocean governance (ibid.). The buzz surrounding the Indo-Pacific served as a catalyst to strengthen Indonesia’s role in shaping regional affairs. At the 13th EAS in 2018, Widodo highlighted that the Indian and Pacific Oceans form a “single geo-strategic theatre” (Cabinet Secretary of Indonesia 2018a). Subsequently, at the 33rd ASEAN Summit in 2018, Widodo reiterated the need for ASEAN and Indonesia to develop and promote an Indo-Pacific based on inclusivity, international law, and ASEAN centrality (Cabinet Secretary of Indonesia 2018b). As other ASEAN members were reluctant to completely accept the emerging Indo-Pacific construct, Indonesia was given the opportunity to orient and shape ASEAN’s

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strategic calculus towards incorporating the emerging geopolitical reality (Anwar 2020: 126). As early as 2017, Indonesia was making conceptual progress vis-àvis the Indo-Pacific with the launching of its Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. Since this development, Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi had one by one invited ASEAN member states to endorse Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept (Weatherbee 2019: 1). In 2018, both Widodo and Modi agreed on a “Shared Vision of India-Indonesia maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, whose statement saw the term “Indo-Pacific” being mentioned several times (Scott 2019: 206). Furthermore, the Shared Vision encompassed several crucial points towards envisioning an Indo-Pacific that is rules-based, free, open, peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive (Indian Ministry of External Affairs 2018). In 2019, Indonesia’s journey to socialise its Indo-Pacific vision evolved when it hosted senior-level discussion on Indo-Pacific cooperation with 18 EAS member states, including China, India, and the US (Septiari 2019). The Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept, according to Vice President Jusuf Kalla, does not intend to replace existing regional frameworks, but rather to supplement them with a more-emphasised focus on transparency, inclusivity, international law, and mutually-beneficial cooperation (Agastia 2020: 300). Indonesia’s vision for the Indo-Pacific largely banks on integration and strays away from any attempt to incorporate isolation. Accordingly, ASEAN will be expected to link the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, while establishing itself as the pivot or “fulcrum” for norm-setting. This means that while engaging with all major powers of the region, ASEAN must maintain its role as the main vehicle. Eventually, after a series of comprehensive and exhaustive discussions within ASEAN and with its extra-regional partners, Indonesia’s vision was finally embraced by ASEAN member at 34th ASEAN Summit in June 2019, leading to the establishment of the AOIP (Anwar 2020: 126). Though it is seen as a collective endeavour towards the shifting landscape of global politics, Indonesia’s role in creating the AOIP has been incredibly pivotal.

The Geopolitics of the AOIP ASEAN is a strategically located group at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, which means that the regional bloc inevitably possesses great significance and complications at the same time. Southeast Asia is a critical hotspot when it comes to the intensifying power competition between China and

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the US. There are three reasons why: First, Southeast Asia, as part of the greater East Asian region, is where China’s locus of power lies. It is therefore predictable for the East Asian giant China to continue its power projections through assertive means to safeguard its strategic interests in its own immediate geographical periphery. Second, in line with the first point, the South China Sea dispute has taken centre stage in the region’s geopolitics. China continues to maintain its expansive claims over the maritime space, which overlaps with the claims of several ASEAN states. Third, and perhaps the most crucial, as the US and China remain locked in an intense power competition for influence in the region, majority of the US’s treaty allies in the Eastern Hemisphere are located in China’s immediate periphery. This is where China’s growing economic and military influence has created a relatively high degree of dependence among the states of this region. This entails a high strategic risk if the situation exacerbates between the US and China. Given this compounding geopolitical landscape, ASEAN must walk a troublesome strategic tightrope. The AOIP therefore incorporates ASEAN’s inability to effectively muster the needed capacity to remain unaffected by the brewing power competition. Accordingly, AOIP elaborates on the role of inclusivity among all major powers, which demonstrates its position as a consensus-builder in the region. The AOIP avoids the usage of the term “free” Indo-Pacific, which Beijing perceives to be a terminology that has negative implications. However, appearing soft on China while seeking strike a balance with Washington, the AOIP also contains references to the freedom of navigation and the rulesbased order, which serve as a major cornerstone in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. This sensitivity towards inclusivity does not necessarily dilute the significance of the ASEAN or its AOIP. Observers from the West, however, dismiss the AOIP’s significance since it does not seek to target or check China’s growing assertion or compel it to abide by various compliance measures. Despite China’s acts of unilateralism and coercion in the South China Sea, ASEAN has made attempts to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, for scholars like Amitabh Acharya (2019), such statements show a lack of understanding regarding how ASEAN works and will continue to work. As he says (2019):

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ASEAN’s main roles in regional security have been in norm-setting and confidence-building, rather than in exercising hard power or conflictresolution. What’s disappointing is not the document, but the gap between how the West sees ASEAN and how ASEAN sees itself. ASEAN is bound to disappoint those who would like to see it act like a great power in a classical concert of powers. This is not what ASEAN is nor what it will ever be. (ibid.)

China and ASEAN Centrality ASEAN constantly endeavours to maintain its principle of ASEAN centrality in this expanded Indo-Pacific region. Conceptually, this “centrality” draws upon scholars of Social Network Analysis (SNA); among them, Anne Marie Slaughter (1997), for instance, provides a key understanding of the importance of centrality in international affairs. According to her, in a highly networked and inter-connected world, the ability to forge connections determines power; hence, maintaining centrality illustrates significant influence, given the capacity to promote and spearhead connections (Slaughter 1997: 99–112). Utilising this conceptual framework, Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony illustrates the importance of ASEAN as a major node attempting to get connected in a system defined by the density of networks (Caballero-Anthony 2014: 581). Therefore, ASEAN’s goal to position itself in within this highly intertwined system points to its willingness in maintaining its relevance as a driving force in the region’s architecture (Johnston 1999: 290–294). Indeed, since the Cold War from 1960s, ASEAN had been steadfast in harnessing its centrality amid major powers in the Asian theatre. Since the 1990s, ASEAN proactively initiated several forums that served as a practical platform for major powers and regional states to engage in. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN+3, and the East Asia Summit (EAS). ASEAN’s motivations for inviting key powers into these platforms can be understood as a way to maintain its relevance among the powerful states in the region and to avoid being politically marginalised amid the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region (Koga 2013). Arguing that trust-based engagements are a focal element in political network dynamics, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008) noted that ASEAN’s ability to convince extra-regional powers to abide by specific norms, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), is a strong indication of its normative power. Moreover, ASEAN’s ability to set the

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agenda and bring major powers of the continent to the table signals a significant degree of centrality, legitimacy, and trust on its part. As China’s rise continues to disrupt post-World War II regional order, ASEAN has sought to ensure that it remains a candidate by consensus in a situation where no major power is comfortable with other major powers taking the lead in any institution, especially in the realm of security. However, in a likely scenario where more competition, mistrust, and discord among major powers will continue to plague the volatile security architecture of the region, ASEAN’s position will remain important and controversial vis-à-vis the future of great power politics. ASEAN has also learnt its lessons from the past. From Washington’s failure to provide an early and effective assistance to ASEAN economies after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s to its post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and its current involvement in the unfolding conflict in Ukraine—which has led to Washington’s preoccupation towards the Middle East and Europe respectively—China has used this as an opportunity to increase its strategic clout in the region. China’s unprecedented economic rise has allowed it to increase its influence in the greater East and Southeast Asian region and beyond. With China’s growing material capacity in the economic and military domain, the Obama administration decided to protect US pre-eminence through a “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific region. The successive US presidents have maintained that the US has always been a Pacific power and that it has no intentions of forfeiting its role. This has led to an intensified power competition between the US and China impacting the entire Eastern Hemisphere. After the hyperbole of President Donald Trump, the Biden administration has also continued to pursue a competitive policy against China (albeit in subtle terms) in what is now termed as the IndoPacific region. In addition, at the forefront of US Indo-Pacific strategy has been formation of the Quadrilateral security arrangement with India, Japan, and Australia, which, at least to the US, is seen as a counterweight to China’s assertive rise in the region. All this has only added a new layer of complexities surrounding the role of ASEAN centrality and its relevance within evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. This recognition of China’s preponderance in this shifting geopolitical landscape, coupled with the increasing increased mistrust among major powers, has motivated ASEAN into crafting the AOIP to reinforce its role and relevance. The AOIP is thus primarily aimed at envisioning ASEAN’s centrality in these evolving geopolitics among major powers. As

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mentioned earlier, ASEAN’s role as the pioneering architect of regional institutions in Asia has provided it with an important degree of legitimacy and importance in regional affairs. However, the fear of losing this agenda-setting influence to major powers like China, the US, India, or Japan has created worries within ASEAN vis-à-vis the fast-paced changes occurring within the regional security architecture. As a result, by crafting an AOIP that banks on the principle of centrality, ASEAN will be able to strategically position itself within regional institutions. However, it must be noted that the AOIP has also exposed ASEAN to criticism for remaining relatively soft on China and its actions.

ASEAN Unity and Its China Challenge The AOIP presents an important step in addressing both geopolitical and normative concerns of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific. However, it is important not to overlook the context in which this document was produced. This should reveal something about the region not only from within but also highlight its emerging external linkages that have compounded its internal fault lines among its member states. The ongoing power competition coupled by the havoc brought by the Covid-19 pandemic have significantly exposed the lack of internal cohesion on this ASEAN centrality paradigm which can marginalise ASEAN at a time when the distribution of power is being recast in this region. This is where the ASEAN Way promises to provide it with the necessary leverage to underscore its unique identity and guide its member states to ensure their internal unity and cohesion by engaging one another and collectively engaging with other states beyond the sub-region. However, this has not been a smooth run so far. Among the principles of the ASEAN Way, respect for sovereignty and non-interference have often been seen to be the bedrock pillars. However, issues revolving around the compliance and interpretation of these norms have considerably strained ASEAN unity over the years. Given China’s enormous economic clout, in addition to its contestations in the South China Sea, it seems inevitable that Beijing will continue to maintain a large sway on the dynamics of the internal unity of ASEAN. This East Asian giant stands tall as the most materially-powerful immediate geographical neighbour of all ASEAN members—including those who do not have any territorial or maritime contestations with it—being a top trade partner of nearly all ASEAN member states. Moreover, the high

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level of asymmetric interdependence between China and ASEAN member states allows the former to hold a significant degree of leverage over the decision-making capacity of the regional bloc and its individual members. President Rodrigo Duterte’s response to the July 2016 verdict of International Court of Arbitration, revoking China’s historical 9-dash line claims to the South China Sea, provides one apt example of such leverages China enjoys over its Southeast Asian neighbours (Heydarian 2018: 50; Kipgen 2020). It must also be reminded that ASEAN’s adherence to consensusbased decision-making ensures that even one member’s disagreement is enough to withhold its initiatives. On the other hand, China’s one-party system has used the absence of opposition at home to cultivate its political and economic clout on smaller ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Laos, Brunei. This provides China with a great strategic advantage over the US as well as an assurance of achieving favourable outcomes from the Southeast Asian bloc. China’s rise and influence has indeed triggered greater extra-regional interference, and this has since come to be a major thorn in sustaining a robust degree of ASEAN unity. As early as 2012, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting had failed, for the first time in ASEAN’s then 45 years of existence, to issue a joint communiqué. This failure occurred due to their disagreements over various references to the South China Sea. A report highlighted that Cambodian officials considered to reject any references made to the Scarborough Shoal and the exclusive economic zones (EEZ), after sharing drafts of the statement with Chinese interlocutors (Bower 2012). Interestingly, both the Chinese president and defence minister visited Cambodia a few months before to express their fulfilment and support for Cambodia’s sensitivity towards topics on the South China Sea (Sutter and Huang 2012: 4). A similar situation happened at the 2016 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting where, in the wake of the International Court of Arbitration verdict revoking China’s claims to the South China Sea, ASEAN again failed to reach a consensus on the issue surrounding the South China Sea due to Cambodia’s efforts (Willemyns 2016). This led to more praises from China, which coincided with the approval of loans estimated to be worth $500 million (Baliga 2016). Moreover, in 2017, the Philippines, as ASEAN Chair, received accolades from Beijing as it excluded any reference of China’s military and land reclamation activities (‘China Welcomes’ 2017). This clearly demonstrated how China’s success in cultivating deep

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relations with states like Cambodia and the Philippines had allowed it to influence and intervene in ASEAN’s internal affairs. Realising the growing power asymmetry in East and Southeast Asian, former President Donald Trump issued his strategy for the Indo-Pacific and renamed his Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command, leading him to heighten his discontent vis-a-vis China’s rise. President Trump’s presidency (2017–2021) witnessed the deepening and broadening of the US—China power competition in the form of trade wars and military might. His strategic vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) served to call out China’s coercive and unilateral actions in the South China Sea and beyond. However, despite this, China continued to maintain the upper hand in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. While the US still holds considerable sway in East Asia, especially through enhancing security cooperation with its strategic treaty allies, it has not been able to capitalise on ties that are strong enough with any state in Southeast Asia to the extent that China has done. ASEAN and its principle of ASEAN centrality has meanwhile come under distress with the increase in great power rivalry between the US and China. With this current predicament unfolding, the whole purpose of the AOIP—in outlining ASEAN centrality through its normative and consensus-driven narratives—may stand diluted if ASEAN’s condition continues to deteriorate from within. ASEAN as a unit can only effectively manoeuvre if its members stand in unison and speak in one voice. However, varying interests within the Southeast Asian bloc, encouraged by China in the face of the intensifying power competition, have continued to create deep fault lines among its member states to ASEAN’s own peril and potential inefficacy in ensuring ASEAN centrality.

Conclusion The global geopolitical landscape surrounding the regions connected by the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean has witnessed an incredible change given its rising economic growth rates and the brewing power competition between the US and China. This region, termed as the IndoPacific, is now at the forefront of major power engagements, making it all the more complex for local stakeholders like ASEAN, leading them to reinvent their role and relevance. ASEAN’s AOIP underlines that endeavour. Even though the particular geographic space of Indo-Pacific is not novel, the conceptualisation of it in the twenty-first century has

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been subject to several interpretations among major and middle-power stakeholders of this region. While ASEAN had so assiduously built its centrality in the region, the bloc has become especially wary of the rapid geopolitical changes that may result in losing its normative influence. Hence, the need to adapt to such underlying changes will be crucial for ASEAN. The AOIP—often understood as Indonesia’s brainchild—remains grounded in ASEAN values and principles and seeks to reengage extra-regional powers’ narratives in the Indo-Pacific on its own terms. Located so critically at the very heart of this dynamic Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN intends to enhance its influence without giving up on its traditional role as the main vehicle for regional engagements. Inclusivity, sensitivity, and most importantly, centrality are three highly crucial elements that ASEAN seeks to reassert in this AOIP. However, despite the enunciation of the AOIP, there remains a significant degree of challenges that can dwarf ASEAN’s potential. ASEAN’s proximity with China has been disrupting both its level of internal unity within and its centrality in regional affairs. This has impacted ASEAN’s ability to speak with one voice and muster enough strategic leverage in moulding the Indo-Pacific narratives. China’s increasing influence among several ASEAN member states has clouded the bloc’s collective opportunity to harness the influential moral posturing of the ASEAN Way without hurting any of the major powers’ core interests. Moreover, the disaster brought by the Covid-19 pandemic and the exacerbating US-China power competition has further locked ASEAN in a strategic tug-of-war, further shrinking its ability to manoeuvre and balance. This can potentially destabilise the whole region with ASEAN members showcasing divergent priorities, interest and challenges. Unless ASEAN manages to muster enough internal cohesion and external connectivity, it may soon find itself engulfed within the evolving power dynamics of the major power-driven Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The AOIP is definitely a step in the right direction. However, without one voice and the critical awareness to identify its challenges, the AOIP will remain nothing more than a wish-list of an increasingly fragmented and marginalised ASEAN.

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CHAPTER 6

China in EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Claudia Astarita

Introduction The European Union aims at becoming a key partner of the Indo-Pacific region. By emphasising its commitment to act as a global player in what the EU High Representative Josep Borrell has defined “the region of the future”, the EU has begun to lay the foundations for a completely new strategic orientation, and the details for a new “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” have been released in September 2021. This choice has been the direct consequence of selected European countries growing economic interdependence within the region, especially China, and this is also linked to their need to shape a multilateral structure that may potentially contain China’s unrestricted assertive behaviour. At the same

C. Astarita (B) Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_6

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time, this could also help them scale down increasingly intense geopolitical competition that has been exacerbating the confrontation between China and the United States. As part of these endeavours, April 19, 2021 saw the Council of the European Union approve its first document on the European “IndoPacific strategy” that formally asked the European Commission to prepare a final draft before September 2021. In spite of the ongoing pandemic, by the end of May 2021, the EU High Representative organised an official visit to Indonesia to formally relaunch the EU “strategic partnership with ASEAN”. During this visit, ASEAN was portrayed as “the hearth of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy”, and the latter the new “centre of gravity of the world” (Borrell 2021a). Josep Borrell described the visit as a key gathering that “opened a new chapter in our relations with ASEAN”, confirming the EU commitment in the Indo-Pacific region, adding that “our shared agenda includes key areas such as connectivity, sustainability, health, defence and security, and multilateralism” (Borrell 2021a). By emphasising EU’s commitment to act as a global player in this new region, the EU has since begun to lay the foundations for a completely new strategic orientation, and the choices that the EU makes will also illustrate to what extent Brussels wants to rely on strategic independence to interact with both China and the United States in the near future. The document released in September 2021 has been even more clear in precising the EU attitude towards the Indo-Pacific, that will remain open, cooperative, and respectful of the existing set of international rules, as well as on the areas the EU wants to engage in deepening cooperation: Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; Green transition; Ocean governance; Digital governance and partnerships; Connectivity; Security and defence; Human security. Despite openly recognising that geopolitical pressures in the Indo-Pacific have contributed to boost regional tensions and military build-up; with democratic principles and human rights being under threat because of a series of authoritative actions endorsed by authoritarian regimes in the region, the document has confirmed that dialogue, not confrontation, will be the key to consolidate stability. Interestingly, while recognising implications on China with regard to these worrying dynamics, the document has emphasised that both a regional and a bilateral approach will be taken to encourage dialogue and confidence building between European countries and China (Lin 2021).

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The EU has often been accused of being either too dependent on the United States or far too ambiguous on China, regularly swinging from a strong anti-China posture on human rights to a more accommodating one on economic cooperation (Anthony et al. 2021). The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is one of the recent examples of this ambiguity: proposed in 2013 as an investment deal between China and the EU, in late May 2021, just before Borrell’s mission to Indonesia, the EU Parliament decided to stop the ratification process of the EU–China investment deal due to the sanctions that Beijing previously imposed on five EU MPs. However, Beijing’s sanctions have also been a consequence of the EU Parliament actions against what it calls China’s “crimes against humanity” (Chipman Koty 2021). The war in Ukraine has unfortunately put even further pressure on Europe for the redefinition of its relationship with China. France and Germany have been trying to relaunch the bilateral dialogue. Although it remains premature to talk about a rapprochement, some positive developments in terms of bilateral visits and trade agreements, and in particular the most recent one between Chinese air companies and Airbus to buy 292 Airbus aircraft for a total investment of $37 billion (Nolan 2022) could create positive spill-over effects on EU-China bilateral relations, such as the relaunch of CAI negotiations, which has also been recognised as mutually beneficial in the “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” document of September 2021. It is in this backdrop that this chapter aims to examine the EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region at three different levels. First, it outlines various tangible economic and strategic opportunities linked to this new geopolitical imagination and its likely multilateral structure, by illustrating specific European countries’ Indo-Pacific postures, and in particular those held by major nations like France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Second, the chapter will examine EU’s ever-expanding engagement with China and its impact on its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Third, the analysis will continue with an assessment on the European Indo-Pacific strategy and its commitment to push for its emergence as a third pole in the China–US confrontation, a pole that, by remaining multilateral, norms and issue-driven and inclusive, aims at avoiding the further deterioration of Sino-American relations. The concluding section will then examine EU’s balancing act between a rising China and the US to explore into its efficacy and relevance regarding the emerging Indo-Pacific narratives and initiatives.

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Why EU Needs to Join the Indo-Pacific? The EU High Representative Josep Borrell could have not been more explicit in clarifying how the European Union sees the Indo-Pacific Region. In a seminal paper published by the French Groupe d’études géopolitiques in June 2021, Josep Borrell himself outlined, for the first time, his doctrine for the Indo-Pacific region. The EU High representative recognised that “as a concept, the Indo-Pacific is much en vogue these days” (Borrell 2021b), highlighting his intention to create the foundations to let the EU play a key role in the region. This commentary by Josep Borrell was published in multiple European languages just after his Indonesia mission in May 2021 and naturally attracted attention for a number of reasons. First of all, anticipating the policy paper that was expected to be released by September 2021, it reflected and clarified EU’s future orientation. Second, it seemed to offer a chance to the European countries that have already developed their own Indo-Pacific strategy to re-align to the EU one. Third, it clarified the omnipresent “China dimension” of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, by moving from an explicitly anti-China attitude (that was further confirmed in May 2021, when the European Parliament abruptly interrupted the ratification process of the EU–China Agreement on Investment), to a subtler invitation to keep the Indo-Pacific “inclusive” to a People’s Republic of China willing to “cooperate”. Before analysing these nuances of the European “Council conclusions on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” issued in April 2021, these most recent remarks made by the EU High Representative Josep Borrell as well as the ones of the “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” released in September 2021, it is imperative to understand why the Indo-Pacific debate has been launched in Europe at all. The key point that is missing in the discussion is why Europe has decided to be more active in this region, pushing its 27 country members to agree on a common position in the evolving Indo-Pacific debate. This mandate explores into the genealogy of this debate and its political, economic, and strategic nature and implications. Prima facie, the reason for this has been outlined in the first point of the Council document, stating that the EU should boost its presence in the region, to contribute to its “stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development” (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 1). Beyond that, after recognising valuable relations with various nations in

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the region, the Council also emphasises the need to “reinforce its role as a cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific”, bringing added-value to all these partnerships (ibid.: 2). In other words, EU’s existing partnerships with countries more actively and directly involved in the Indo-Pacific have created ground for pushing Brussels to strengthening its cooperation with the same nations in other regions as well. This approach, as the chapter will further explicate, is also at the core of the EU understanding of the Indo-Pacific region as an inclusive and multilateral environment (Islam 2021). The second reason justifying European interest in the Indo-Pacific is certainly related to the fact that three EU member nations and United Kingdom have already embraced an Indo-Pacific agenda, which is formally supported by specific Indo-Pacific strategies. These EU member countries include France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Although this chapter will subsequently debate both benefits and complications related to this double “national-regional” approach to the Indo-Pacific, it goes without saying that if the EU wants to avoid its interests from being perceived as inconsistent and represented at multiple levels, it become a prerequisite to push EU member states to align on the same strategy instead of working at variance from each other. That being said, the second part of this section will show that, from the perspective of Brussels, any such attempt at coordinating a common position of all EU nations on the Indo-Pacific is neither easy nor a feasible task (Duchâtel 2020). Third, the Council conclusions have explicitly recognised that contemporary competition in the region is threatening its current equilibrium, an this evolution might soon become a threat to EU local interests (General Secretariat of the Council 2021). There seems only one way to interpret this statement: being the Indo-Pacific, a region where the People’s Republic of China has an ever-expanding presence thanks to the dense network of cooperative agreements signed within and outside the One Belt One Road framework, it becomes pertinent for EU to clarify its position in the area as early as it can. In this regard, there are at least three main points that have been clearly instated in the document published in April 2021 and confirmed in the strategy outlined in September 2021: (1) Geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific: In defining the geographical expanse of the Indo-Pacific, “[T]he Council agrees that the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, encompasses the geographic area from the east coast of Africa to the

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Pacific Island States” (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 3). This remains at variance with definitions in vogue propounded by the United States, China, India and others and needs to be explicated for its premises. (2) European vision and engagement strategy: In outlining EU’s vision this document describes EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy as “pragmatic, flexible and multi-faceted”, suggesting that Bruxelles should deepen its Indo-Pacific cooperation with EU countries that have already made their Indo-Pacific posture explicit (ibid.: 3). It is interesting to note that this point could technically raise some ambiguities vis-à-vis the attitude EU aims to adopt towards China, considering the difficult partnership that currently characterises equations between Brussels and Beijing, as well as the fact that the People’s Republic of China has not announced its own Indo-Pacific strategy, remaining reluctant to embrace this doctrine. (3) EU objectives in the Indo-Pacific: Outlining EU’s fundamental objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, it states that “The EU strategy will provide a new impetus by working with our partners in the Indo-Pacific region”, aiming at relaunching a shared political, economic, and defence agenda, as well as “advancing our collaboration in the field of research, innovation and digitalization” (ibid.: 4–10). If the enhancement of norm- and value-based multilateral cooperation represent the backbone of the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, then what is important to highlight is that the EU vision has remained consistent in identifying the engagement with ASEAN and the ASEAN-led regional architecture as the core of the promotion of “effective rulesbased multilateralism” in the Indo-Pacific (ibid.: 4). Josep Borrell’s June 2021 statement puts ASEAN at the core of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy (Borrell 2021b). Likewise, another key element of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy remains its “global dimension” that showcases EU’s interest to focus on global challenges requiring multilateral cooperation. Important among these remains the protection and promotion of human rights, with a special emphasis on the essential role played by the civil society in building inclusive and prosperous communities; the development of climate, biodiversity, and decarbonisation strategies; the emphasis given

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to challenges related to climate change, ocean governance, and the health sector. Such attitude was further underlined in the EU High Representative’s discourse, arguing that, “concretely, [the EU] will advance joint work to boost, trade and investment, economic openness and a sustainable approach to connectivity” revolving on mutual collaboration. Global challenges such as climate change and security cooperation have also been identified as pivotal in defining EU Indo-Pacific strategy (Borrell 2021b).

Untangling EU’s China Vision There is one striking difference between EU’s April 2021 statement and the June 2021 declaration that highlights EU’s critical approach to People’s Republic of China as well as the “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” released in September 2021. Nuances of the anti-China posture of European orientation have been emerging in at least five points of the Council conclusions. On page 7, the document clearly states that the EU will craft “forward-looking growth-enhancement strategies for a resilient and sustainable rebound of our economies”, emphasising thereby that by diversifying supply chains the EU will be able to strengthen its economic resilience and moderate its current strategic dependencies on raw materials (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 7). This idea of supply chains restructuring and the one of reducing strategic dependence on critical raw materials certainly carries an implicit reference to the key role China is playing in global supply chains and in the allocation of strategic raw materials (Xia 2020). On the same page 7, another ambiguous note refers to the EU’s intention to further deepen regional trade and investment agreements, especially those with Australia, Indonesia, and New Zealand, following the model of those signed with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 7). As far as China is concerned, the document timidly mentions that some “further steps” need to be taken to advance the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China (CAI), a negotiation that would be abruptly stopped a few weeks before the release of this document, anticipating a generalised scepticism on the most recent evolution of the EU–China relationship (Hu 2021). This April 2021 EU Council document has also been read as taking a confrontational approach to China in two other ways: on pages 9 and 10, after confirming EU intention to strengthen collaboration with other countries as well as relevant organisations in both security and defence

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fields to respond to contemporary international security challenges, the paper reasserted Member States’ acknowledgement of the importance of an autonomous EU naval presence in the Indo-Pacific (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 8–9). The document also precised the EU intention to “promote digital governance through more ambitious global standards and regulatory approaches, including on artificial intelligence […] and to promote security and resilience of critical infrastructure, including security of supply chain of 5G networks” (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 10). This emphasis is attributed to the recognition of the importance of an accessible and secure cyberspace, where rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms will have to be guaranteed and protected, for future prosperity, growth, security of contemporary societies (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 10), a remark that has been identified as an explicit warning to prevent China from going solo in the redefinition of global cyber governance. It is interesting to notice that this implicit anti-China posture of EU came at the same time as was explicit and less confrontative in Josep Borrell’s June 2021 statement, and that a more conciliatory tone was also adopted for the subsequent “Strategy for Cooperation in the IndoPacific” released in September 2021. Was this noteworthy change of narrative the consequence of a broader re-orientation of the EU Strategy on the Indo-Pacific? Was it a consequence of a more pragmatic assessment of the consequences of endorsing US’ explicit anti-China posture? Josep Borrell considered the Indo-Pacific as “the region of the future” though, on several earlier occasions, he has also emphasised his concerns about the fact that the current equilibrium is severely threatened by regional rising challenges (Borrell 2021b). While EU already assumes that regional economic growth can only be grounded on stable and shared rules, transparency and shared security, as a group it continued to be committed to the preservation of an open and rule-based order (Borrell 2021b). This is where Josep Borrell’s statement becomes instructive as it identifies China as one of the key actors negatively impacting on Indo-Pacific stability. After reminding that “maritime and land disputes, internal crises and conflicts, and the US-China geopolitical competition” are intensifying in the region, the EU High Representative also raised the alert on the risks the region encounters and the risk to see political and geopolitical challenges negatively impacting regional economic development and cooperation (Borrell 2021b).

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However, when talking about “concrete actions”, the EU seems to suddenly become less confrontational and more inclusive (Hua 2021). In Josep Borrell’s words: “…concretely, we will advance joint work to boost, trade and investment, economic openness and a sustainable approach to connectivity. We will promote multilateral cooperation, working on global challenges, …and we will deepen our security engagement, seeking to make that cooperation as concrete as possible” (Borrell 2021b). At the same time, while referring to the inclusiveness of the EU approach, the reference to China was direct and explicit, arguing that the IndoPacific has not been conceived to create rival blocks (Borrell 2021b). Both these references, however, underlined ASEAN centrality and the relevance given to the commitment to democratic rights and fundamental freedoms contribute to offsetting the idea that cooperation with People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific will be either easy or straightforward (Mohan 2020b). The third section of this chapter analyses what these aforementioned remarks imply for the EU–China strategy and for their bilateral relations, as the contradiction between the urge for an “open and inclusive” IndoPacific, especially as far as China is concerned, and the emphasis on the commitment to advance democratic rights and fundamental freedoms assume that the majority of countries in the region support this vision (Borrell 2021a). Despite these apparent contradictions in EU’s vision document as also statements by Josep Borrell, it remains important to highlight that, more than ten years after Japan started circulating the very first version of the Indo-Pacific concept, the publication of these documents represents a milestone for the EU’s foreign policy: this strategy is clearly the result “of a long internal debate, reflecting the differences of strategic priorities of its members, Brussels’ evolving perception of regional security challenges and—to an extent—the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor” (Pejsova 2021). How EU engages China in the Indo-Pacific remains incumbent upon how cohesive EU is as a foreign policy actor.

EU vs. Its Member States In the words of the EU High Representative, Brussels aimed at creating an Indo-Pacific (reference to the September 2021 document), with a pragmatic vision, ASEAN centred, open to both China and the United States, but at the same time committed to preserve democratic rights

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and fundamental freedoms. Much earlier than the EU started discussing about its eventual involvement in the Indo-Pacific, three European countries already published their own vision about the Indo-Pacific region. These countries were France, Germany and the Netherlands. Briefly summarising their perspective on the region becomes important for two reasons. First, this helps in evaluating whether they have played any role in influencing the EU original orientation vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific (Louis 2020). Second, this helps in understanding as to what extent the activism of single member states should be considered as an advantage or a burden for the implementation of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy? At the very outset it is important to underline how the respective starting points for France, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding their positioning on the Indo-Pacific were significantly at variance from each other. France is the only country that is able to claim an active geographical presence in the area, thanks to the many territories the country is still controlling in the region, such as Mayotte, Scattered Island, La Réunion, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Wallis & Futuna and the French Polynesia (Wacker 2021b). Since the launching of its Indo-Pacific narrative, France has been using this presence to justify an escalation of operativity in the region (Wacker 2021b). As outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy document issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 20191 this intention is to be accomplished by: (a) strengthening the strategic partnership with China; (b) relaunching existing and new partnerships in the region, namely with Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea); (c) clarifying the EU’s positioning in the Indo-Pacific; (d) strengthening the role of the EU within existing regional organisations; and (e) contributing to a common and comprehensive response to Islamist terrorism, the facilitation of common goods, and environmental protection (Lechervy 2019). In short, France considers the Indo-Pacific region as a theatre for multilateral engagements where it can “strengthen and “balance” its strategic partnership with China—a statement that confirms its intention to use the new regional arrangement as an inclusive platform where cooperation with Beijing will be not only possible but is to be encouraged (Morcos 2021). Also, by committing to promote public goods, France 1 This document was not the first official statement on the Indo-Pacific published by France. The French Ministry of Defence had drafted two earlier documents: the first in 2018, that was further updated in May 2019, and the second one in later half of 2019.

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has confirmed the pragmatic and issue-based nature of the Indo-Pacific narratives, as it has also emphasised on more than one occasion its aspiration to act as a mediating power in the region (Fisher 2020). Mention of public goods and pragmatism also echoes narratives from China which has used its Belt and Road Initiative to build its ever-expanding influence in the region. Indeed, France has also lately become a major beneficiary of China’s investments that only reinforces its being the only European, (other than Italy), nation to be in tune with Beijing becoming part of Indo-Pacific narratives and arrangements. Differently from France—and mainly because they cannot count on a similar geographic or historical presence in the region—Germany and the Netherlands’ visions on the Indo-Pacific region have been grounded on their respective interests as major trading nations: keep existing sea lanes open and contribute to the maintenance of a rules-based order. Berlin had published its “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific” in September 2020, while the Netherlands issued a much simpler assessment on the region in November 2020. Differently from the French ones, both documents should not be understood as “contributions and building blocks to lead to an EU position on the Indo-Pacific” (Wacker 2021b), with the IndoPacific seen as an area where European countries can find precious allies to dilute the escalating tension linked to Sino-US competition (Mohan 2020a). This version seems far closer to EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy that as well hinges itself in moderating this US–China competition. In terms of their concrete initiatives to promote in the region, both Germany and the Netherlands have emphasised the need to coordinate with the European Union to (a) reinforcing regional multilateral cooperation; (b) protecting the environment from climate change-related dynamics; (c) relaunching peace, security and stability; (d) reinforcing human rights and the rule of law; (e) supporting free trade; (f) reinforcing rules-based networking and internal digital transformation; and (g) stimulating shared culture, education and science (The German Federal Government 2020). The policy fields of intervention identified by the Netherlands remains slightly at variance though closer to what EU has subscribed to. The Netherlands instead aims at (a) the safeguarding of the international legal order; (b) the protection of democracy and human rights; (c) the enhancement of sustainable trade, security, stability, and maritime security; and (d) a broader commitment in the areas of climate change, global healthcare and poverty reduction (Government of the Netherlands 2020).

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There are of course areas where French Indo-Pacific strategy does overlap with that of Germany and the Netherlands. Despite differentiation in terms of their commitment, capacity projection, and coordination ambitions, it is important not to overlook to what extent these three European nations are committed not only to strengthen their position in the Indo-Pacific, but also the one of the EU, with a common goal of preserving rules-based order (Odgaard 2019). What is noticeable is that all three reflect a general agreement on the importance of not excluding China. This convergence among these three important European nations have provided the common basis for discussions at the EU level. For example, the positions of France, Germany, and the Netherlands have been more ambiguous when it comes to ASEAN’s role and centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. While no nation denies the usefulness of strengthening the relationship with ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific context, the centrality of ASEAN that has been emphasised by the European Union is not so much shared by its member states, and this potentially could become an element of animosity among them that could potentially challenge the multilateral nature of any emerging new regime in the Indo-Pacific region. At the current stage of the EU’s debates on the Indo-Pacific, it is worth mentioning that France, Germany, and the Netherlands had circulated a joint “non-paper” towards the end of 2020 (Wacker 2021a). These three countries had also actively solicited the participation of other EU nations to join their preliminary discussions, raising the interest of countries like Portugal, Poland, Italy, and Sweden. These exchanges have identified four areas of intervention as EU main priorities. These areas are trade, connectivity, maritime security and global issues such as climate change and biodiversity. France has created the format of convening a ‘Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ during its semester of Presidency of the Council of the European Union, highlighting that translating Europe’s desire for increased commitment into action has been one of the main priorities of France. The first forum was organised in February 2022 in Paris, and the Czech Republic EU Presidency has further nurtured this new tradition by organising the Prague Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific on June 13–14, 2022 with the aim of further discussing the implementation of the EU Strategy for the region. This rapid endorsement of the Indo-Pacific narrative by other European countries therefore perhaps presents a renovated consensus guided by their imagined advantages in supporting pragmatic multilateralism in a context of progressive

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regionalisation and of keeping the Indo-Pacific framework as an inclusive platform, especially as far as China is concerned.

Complexities of the EU–China Relationship Official diplomatic relations between the EU and China were established on 6 May 1975 when China was still in the throes of its historic Cultural Revolution. Since then, many things have changed in the world and especially in China making this relationship as one of the most inconsistent for both these actors (Lincot 2019). Since 1975, for instance, China-EU bilateral dialogue has expanded to cover economic, political and security issues. In 2003, a “comprehensive strategic partnership” was established (Anthony et al. 2021: 11). As a result, the EU has come to be China’s largest trading partner since 2014, and China reciprocated the same in 2020. Brussels seems to have become increasingly aware that its assumptions about dialogue alone promoting EU interests in Asia was based on unrealistic arguments. Indeed, China’s growing “self-confidence as a result of fast economic growth and rapid recovery from the global financial crisis has translated into an ambitious national, regional and global agenda under the leadership of Xi Jinping” (Godement and Wacker 2020). Because of these developments on both sides, China and the EU had moved, from 2003, to build a “strategic partnership” that was by 2019 to make them “economic competitors” and even “systemic rivals”, although the “EU-China—A Strategic Outlook” issued in March 2019 continued to refer to China as its “cooperation and negotiation partner”. China’s unprecedented economic rise has put the European Union in a very delicate situation. After trying to deepen multilateral cooperation with China as well as to equally balance the existing economic relations, the EU ended up imposing higher standards of protections to critical assets, technology and infrastructure (Godement 2021). China, on the other hand, has been successful in building, over time, a massive economic, diplomatic and media presence in Europe, and this presence not only did not get enough attention from the EU, but it is also one of the main reasons behind Brussels inconsistencies vis-à-vis Beijing. Europe as a result has remained divided over how seriously to take the Chinese challenge (Kavalski 2019). Differently from what was happening in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, the leaders of many smaller European nations continue to

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see mainly, if not only, the economic benefits of deeper engagement with Beijing. However, as far as the variance in attitudes of major and minor European powers with China is concerned, ambiguities remain writ large in defining this European stance on China. In 2012, for instance, China 17 + 1 mechanism was welcomed in Central and Eastern Europe (Brînz˘a 2021). Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were supposed to become China’s privileged corridor to Europe, a win–win strategy for everyone, since Beijing promised to substitute Western disappearing partners for investments in local economies, education and cultural activities. Almost 10 years later, same countries had started keeping China at distance, claiming that the 17 + 1 mechanism had transformed into a zombie mechanism, and that China’s involvement in their economies had created an unbearable level of dependence that they needed to offset as soon as possible. With the onset of coronavirus pandemic—that originated in China—and even before, almost all of these Central and East European nations had signed a similar memorandum of understanding with the United States President Donald Trump (Brînz˘a 2020). Meanwhile, major EU players, like France and Germany, while remaining China-sceptics in Europe, have also been the ones pushing for the implementation of the EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Negotiations for the agreement had ended in late December 2020, and on paper the deal was expected to boost bilateral connections, foreign direct investments and trade flows (Godement 2021). In May 2021, the European Commission announced that efforts to ratify the CAI with China had been suspended after China imposed sanctions on several EU members of parliament, some academics and other members of national parliaments. These sanctions, according to Beijing, were only the inevitable consequence of the earlier sanctions that the EU had imposed on four Chinese officials and the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau for their alleged involvement in Xinjiang Province “reeducation camps” (Chipman Koty 2021). This stalemate or U-turn, however, did not prevent German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron to organise, in early July 2021, another trilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping to exchange views on European Union–China relations, where they discussed international trade, climate protection, as well as the status of human rights in Xinjiang (Adghirni and Donahue 2021). Beijing also did not lose the momentum to push Paris and Berlin to join its “Initiative on Partnership for Africa’s

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Development” and assist China in the development of Africa in a “four-party” framework (Moriyasu and Hadano 2021). What is important here is to understand what lies beneath these ambiguities and how the latter might affect the European Union’s Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, especially from a Chinese perspective (Brînz˘a 2021). To answer these questions, it is important to refer to two dynamics. First, the EU has never been united in defining its overall foreign policy, as single members often continue to exercise inordinate control over this institutional prerogative of EU. Also, it is commonplace to identify similar consistencies in a selected group of nations and see them at times coordinating their strategies, but these line-ups can also change as rapidly as they have been created, a dynamic that negatively affects EU’s credibility, regarding its China strategy but also for any other initiative, the Indo-Pacific strategy included. Second, the debate on “strategic autonomy” has gained momentum in Europe, with the EU progressively discussing the advantages of promoting independence, selfreliance and resilience in a wide range of fields—such as defence, trade, digital, economic, and health policy. This debate is not only the consequence of EU manifest vulnerability to external shocks that recent crisis have confirmed, rather it is an equally inevitable reaction to the rising ambiguities related to US interests in Europe and the difficulties of untangling China’s foreign ambitions (Small 2019). To quote Julianne Smith and Torrey Taussig: Europe finds itself caught in the middle of a growing U.S.-Chinese rivalry. It cannot abandon its long-standing ties to the United States… but it also cannot afford to weaken a trade relationship with China worth well over $1 billion a day. Europe is walking a fine line by nominally resisting China’s predatory trade and investment practices but not issuing any meaningful threats. (Smith and Taussig 2019)

However, it is important to note that so far, Brussels ambiguous approach has failed to persuade China to change course or to abide to European requests. Europe has been trying to redefine its attitude with China, considering the impact of its rise and trying to reorient its response strategy to EU rather than American interests and priorities (Smith and Taussig 2019). Striving for autonomy had become EU’s regular refrain during the presidency of Donald Trump and some it has continued even during Biden administration’s re-engagement with Europe. Although it

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would be to the mutual advantage of Europe and the United States to deepen the coordination of their respective China policies, it would also be naïve to imagine that dialogue will push them to agree on all contested points. In this context, the Indo-Pacific region could further push Europe to embrace norms-driven multilateralism in order to counterbalance both China and the United States thereby trying to become strategically more autonomous (Medcalf 2020). But, while it may seem obvious to imagine that a “united and coordinated” EU is needed to make this plan for “strategy autonomy” work, the way in which Europe has been acting continues to make its attitude and real intentions look more suspicious, and the trilateral meeting organised by Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping in early July 2021 to restart EU talks with Beijing makes China’s Communist Party wonder if, in Europe, their interlocutor is the EU or the Franco-German block (Adghirni and Donahue 2021). One thing is certainly sure: the protagonists of the selected European members have not necessarily helped the EU to be perceived as a strategically autonomous region.

Can Indo-Pacific Solve China–EU Problems? At both regional and national levels, the Indo-Pacific debate in Europe seems more and more inclined to present the Indo-Pacific as the only solution to face multiple problems, viz. China–US rivalry, the crisis of Asian regionalism and the weakening of multilateralism, and the ambiguities of European global strategy, especially towards China. European leaders are perfectly aware that regionalism and, as a consequence, balance of power in Asia is going through a moment of profound change (Gaulme 2019). Although it is a matter of fact that China–US antagonism has triggered this disruption, it remains difficult to imagine and contribute to the emergence of a new paradigm that can help EU to consolidate and stabilise a new balance of power capable of enacting a new equilibrium in the region. This chapter endorses the EU’s vision of the Indo-Pacific as the most suitable paradigm not only to address the weaknesses of the Asia–Pacific one—which has eventually lost its momentum to guarantee a stable equilibrium of powers in the Far East, but also to re-emphasise the merit of multilateralism to face global problems in a collaborative and more effective way. To understand the reasons why Europe is so supportive of the IndoPacific formulation it is necessary to go back to the weaknesses of the

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Asia–Pacific paradigm and the challenges that it had faced. Prima facie, the structure of a pan-Asian regionalism has never been able to either integrate or counterbalance an unprecedented rise of China, and its inherent weaknesses lay in that. Recalling a couple of crucial moments in the evolution of Asian regionalism may give further credit to this hypothesis. Among these, the post-Cold War dynamics remain its immediate context which has seen revival of various border disagreements that have become increasingly visible as these have not yet been settled (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Second, 1967 represents a key moment for Asian regionalism, as the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) illustrated the very first attempt at least from Southeast Asian countries to create a regional structure to increase their collective weight to counterbalance China. Over years, ASEAN had gradually become the core of a new wave of regionalism aimed at finding the most effective formula to simultaneously integrate and counterbalance the People’s Republic of China (Acharya 2009). In the 1970s, this debate was a regional one but since 1990s it had become global. However, the two major ideas underpinning Asian regionalism did not change: it remained desirable to integrate China considering the numerous opportunities of profitable cooperation that the country offered, and, at the same time, it remained imperative to prevent China from taking advantage of this cooperation to consolidate a dominant position in the region. The three decades following the creation of ASEAN are usually remembered as the triumph of the “spaghetti bowl” practice. ASEAN+3 (i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea) was created in 1997, as a direct consequence of the Asian financial crisis. In 2005, an even broader version of Asian regionalism emerged with the launching of the East Asian Summit (EAS or ASEAN+6). This new regime de facto forced China to welcome Asian countries that Beijing was not necessarily considering Asian, for geographical, identity, and cultural reasons, but also because of their long-term connection with the United States, such as India, Australia and New Zealand. Asian regionalism “trials” reached their peak in 2011, when the EAS decided to welcome Russia and the United States. In the EU’s vision, this enlargement represented the umpteenth confirmation of the inherent weakness of the Asia–Pacific paradigm in achieving its only goal: integrating and contemporarily counterbalancing China in this region. This phase of “regional experimentation” was followed by a long period of transition and deep uncertainty that lasted from 2012 until 2018 where the Indo-Pacific presented the new formulation. During this

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time, several countries decided to contribute to an emerging debate aimed at identifying a new equilibrium, and Europe was not alone in endorsing the idea that, to be sustainable, the new Asian equilibrium had to be a multipolar one (Medcalf 2020).

China in the Making of the Indo-Pacific During this half a century of experimentation in Asian regionalism, three different dynamics have emerged in the Asian region, and they have all been gradually moving towards the consolidation of a new multipolar Indo-Pacific formulation. The first and most powerful dynamic was China-driven, and corresponds to the launch of One Belt One Road (OBOR), a new project confirming China’s interest in creating a Sinocentric region (Cabestan 2019). This paradigm of Asian regionalism worked pretty well during the decades in which China was determined to introduce itself as a “peaceful” country committed to contribute to regionalism in a multilateral environment (Astarita 2008). However, the original paradigm of Asian regionalism has always presented two major limitations for China: its borders, as the ambitious Sino-centric region that Beijing aims at creating with OBOR go far beyond the frontiers of the Asia–Pacific; and the ASEAN centrality in this model (Astarita and Damiani 2016). The second dynamic is US-driven. In the face of China’s expanding footprint in this region, American commitment in the Asian region has been re-emphasised since 2011 when Barack Obama had introduced his “Pivot to Asia” strategy and started the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. His objective was to strengthen the US presence in Asia– Pacific while at the same time trying to isolate China (Li 2016). Donald Trump changed this strategy to adopt a more confrontationist approach with Beijing. President Trump unleashed a trade war with China that was subsequently transformed into a technological competition that, to some extent, started to be perceived as a new Cold war between Chinese and American values (Samaan 2019). This narrative did not change with the coming of Joe Biden who not only confirmed that China–US competition represents the “greatest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century”, but appears to be even more determined than his predecessors to create a strong anti-China alliance (Patil 2021). Accordingly, it is not surprising to notice that his vision of the Indo-Pacific corresponds to the one of an alliance aimed at isolating China.

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The third dynamic revolves around Asia–Pacific region’s middle powers’ interest in creating a new multipolar framework grounded on the respect for international law and the promotion of collective interests. Countries such as India, Australia, and Japan are now conscious of the existence, in Asia, of various loopholes preventing the development of any form of regionalism (Evans 2004). On the contrary, they also see it as more realistic and profitable to imagine a multipolar Indo-Pacific as a potential successful outcome of an increasingly active process of regionalisation (Medcalf 2019). For Europe, this regionalisation appears the most promising formula to facilitate the emergence of a new equilibrium that can promote issue-based cooperation by proposing concrete solutions to existing problems. This tangible approach has not only further accelerated the process of regionalisation, but allows the Indo-Pacific to remain open to China and the United States, allowing them to integrate into regional initiatives of the Indo-Pacific littoral. This open and conciliatory attitude promises not only to further nurture the conflictual nature of the current China–US relationship, but also create new room for ad hoc cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries. This cooperation may not necessarily transform the Indo-Pacific into a region, but advancing such regionalism can be useful to reduce conflicts, mutual mistrust and contribute to the development of the region (Vayrynen 2003).

EU’s “Middle-Ground” Approach There is one last question that needs to be discussed to understand the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region: to what extent the EU involvement in this process of Indo-Pacific regionalisation can be perceived as a legitimate one. When viewing the Indo-Pacific formulation, it is not so obvious to understand why Europe should play such an active role in it. Also, it is still a matter of debate which Europe we should be talking about: The European Union as a whole? Or France, Germany, and the Netherlands? All together or separately? And also, what would be the role of the post-Brexit United Kingdom? The answer to these questions lies in the narratives in favour of creating an inclusive Indo-Pacific region that allows EU’s “middle ground” approach to make an effective value addition to this region. Such an inclusive Indo-Pacific paradigm promises to accommodate interests of a cohort of countries which do not individually have the capacity to assert themselves as powerful trend setters in this regionalisation like China, US, Japan, India, Australia etc.

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Other than China and the United States, the shared commitment of EU along with India, Australia, and Japan has been in favour and yet not sufficiently enough to guarantee this vision of inclusive multipolarity. This is not necessarily because they do not have leadership ambitions, but rather because without the EU’s concerted engagement with the Indo-Pacific formulation it may not be able to perform one of its crucial functions: the one of remaining an inclusive area that is not intentionally oriented at marginalising either China or the United States. EU has had strong credentials for supporting norm- and value-based narratives and initiatives increasingly at the global level. If Europe does not directly and actively participate in the Indo-Pacific regionalisation process, both the US and China will continue to think that they could pressurise Europe to implement an alternative hedging strategy to the Indo-Pacific. A direct, strong and continuous collaboration between EU, Australia, India, and Japan promises to exclude this option, forcing China and the US to cooperate. At this stage, it may be rather difficult to assess whether, strategically, the involvement of EU could be more effective than the one of single European countries. Although it would be ideal to see the EU acting as a cohesive region, and despite the new “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” released in September 2021 refers to ‘Team Europe’ as the leading actor for the initiative, it remains hard to imagine that even the new EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific will be able to ensure all EU members guaranteeing a shared commitment and enthusiasm. In this context, a preliminary involvement of few powerful EU member states might emerge as the second-best choice, provided that the countries that have so far confirmed their interest in the Indo-Pacific will continue to coordinate their strategies with the larger EU strategy for this region. But even in an ideal scenario of powerful individual nations of Europe conforming and backing EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, there will still remain challenges. This makes EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy work-in-progress at best. And then there are challenges exogenous to EU that also need to be considered. Well-known sinologist, Gurdun Wacker, aptly alludes to some of these that flow from none other than China. To quote her, Despite the fact that all three governments [Germany, France and the Netherlands] have made very clear that they pursue an inclusive approach to the region that also involves China as an important partner on issues such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation, it will be difficult

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to convince Beijing that the Indo-Pacific concept is not –at least in part– directed against China. The three dimensions of the EU’s China policy as outlined in the Strategic Outlook paper –China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival– are also clearly visible in the Indo-Pacific documents, and they will be difficult to balance. (Wacker 2021b)

Tailpiece: What About Post-Brexit UK? Another issue that deserves more attention from EU is how to ensure coordination and cooperation with the post-Brexit United Kingdom’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The UK may not be part of EU yet it remains a major player in the Indo-Pacific formulations as also wishing European policy confabulations. The UK had issued their Indo-Pacific strategy in March 2021, extensively discussed in the “Global Britain in a Competitive Age” document that hinges on its “special relationship” with the United States (Government of the United Kingdom 2021). After recognising the Indo-Pacific as a geographical area that is critical to UK’s economy, security, and global ambition, the British strategy emphasises that the country’s goal will be the one of emerging as “the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific” (Government of the United Kingdom 2021). As far as UK’s relationship with China is concerned, the British documents refers to China in points 7 and 8 in the list of the “significant changes and shifts” that the new British Strategic Framework has endorsed. These two specific points clearly outline how, unlike other major European powers, UK presents a more nuanced approach to either crediting or engaging China as the leading player in the region. As this document says, a deeper engagement will be pursued in the Indo-Pacific aimed at fostering regional prosperity and stability. This approach recognises China, India and Japan as the major powers in a region where South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines are also playing a key role. As far as China is concerned, the document emphasises the need to “invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities” aimed at promoting a better understanding of the country as, as a consequence, contributing to the refining of UK ability to respond to the challenge that the country poses to national and regional security, prosperity and values. (Government of the United Kingdom 2021). Given its newfound freedom from EU, the post-Brexit UK perhaps seeks

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to propound a more open and pragmatic approach compared to the EU and former is bound to have its influence on the latter.

Conclusion Without doubt, China has been and remains one of the most crucial variables impacting EU positioning on the Indo-Pacific region. This has also been the focal point of variance in the Indo-Pacific strategies of EU and major European nations like Germany, France and the Netherlands. To avoid any intra-European ambiguities that could undermine Europe’s fruitful engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, it would be ideal to observe an early evolution of a more concrete format of the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. However, especially regarding to its China actions; the EU has preferred to remain ambiguous, emphasising on the one hand that ‘Team Europe’ will be in charge of endorsing EU Indo-Pacific initiatives, and on the other hand that bilateral relations will continue to impact the EU China strategy. If it is true that more clarity would have provided a more precise guide on the attitude that the EU may pronounce vis-à-vis China and the United States and guided strategies of individual European nations, the “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” document of September 2021 has remained voluntarily ambiguous on the EU positioning visà-vis China and the Unites states. For example, it encourages the EU to maintain a multifaceted engagement with China, avoiding excluding the country from cooperative initiatives aimed at identifying solutions to common challenges. At the same time, the EU will continue to insist on the protection of its essential interests and values, remaining committed not to accept any compromise with China in any of these fields (General Secretariat of the Council 2021: 4). While emphasizing its determination in reinforcing cooperation with other Indo-Pacific actors, it is remarkable to notice that the US is hardly mentioned in any of the European papers that have been published so far. Including both US and China in their discussion could be a good strategy to further emphasise the centrality of multilateralism in their approach to the Indo-Pacific region. The major immediate challenge for any EU vision or strategy concerning the Indo-Pacific will be to evolve the intra-EU consensus especially to mobilise the resources needed to bring it to life with the support of the region as a whole. It will be interesting to watch how far some of the major European powers like Germany, France, UK, the

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Netherlands that have already issued their own Indo-Pacific strategies will guide the evolution of the EU strategy as also how far EU’s vision will be able to streamline visions of these individual nations to ensure conformity in their initiatives. This coordination will be EU’s major challenge. At the same time, investing on the broad and solid network of bilateral relations European countries have with all other stakeholders (that are expected to play a crucial role in this ambitious and advanced experiment of regionalization), might become one of the most effective ways to strengthen the EU’s vision of the Indo-Pacific as a multilateral and inclusive framework. This will then be a sort of contemporary global version of the Concert of Europe that may fine-tune and navigate the Indo-Pacific from becoming vulnerable to US–China contestations.

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CHAPTER 7

Evolving Indo-Pacific Multilateralism: China Factor in Australia’s Perspectives Artyom A. Garin

Australia as a Middle Power The key to understanding Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific lies in its “middle power” mindset. This is because, over the last 70 years, term “middle power” has gained traction in Australia’s geopolitical and foreign policy narratives. Way back in 1945, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt, had participated in a conference in San Francisco with a strong commitment to advance Australia’s interests on a range of foreign policy issues, from disarmament to decolonisation, as well as a more independent middle power position (Ungerer 2007). Till date, the issue of the classification of Australia as a middle power still remains debatable though it has been extensively well-covered in works of scholars like M. Beeson, M. Thompson, B. Gilley, E. Cooper, R. Higgott, J. Robertson, A. Carr, J.

A. A. Garin (B) Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_7

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Manicom and E. O’Neill, as well as received significant mentions in official doctrines by Australia’ leaders, including former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Mark Thompson, for instance, argues how Australia has always sought to “punch above their weight” (Thompson 2005), while Mark Beeson defines “middle power” as a term close to globalisation, which “can obscure as much as it reveals but …can stand as a useful shorthand for a more complex reality” (Beeson 2011). It would be pertinent to ask what have been Australia’s expectations from being a “middle power”? According to the 2000 Defence Policy White Paper, Australia, as a middle power, “can and should do to help to keep our region secure, and support global stability” (Department of Defence 2000). This is where the document contains a reference to multilateralism: “Australia therefore cannot be secure in an insecure region, and as a middle-size power, there is much we can and should do to help to keep our region secure, and support global stability. Working with others we can do a lot more than we can do by ourselves” (ibid.). As in 2012 Prime Minister of Australia and later Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd had stated during his speech at Asia Society New York: “Australia, through the agency of what we call creative middle power diplomacy, is optimistic that we can learn from history and craft a common future for our hemisphere” (Rudd 2012). So, as we can see, the middle power is considered not only in terms of influence and geographical location but also in terms of its propensity to promote multilateral cooperation for the stability of the regional and global architecture. This makes the issue of specific definitions of ‘middle powers’ debatable, though these are generally defined as a group of countries that have the material resources to support a specific level of influence but aren’t able to independently dominate the world stage (Robertson 2017). Taking into account the thesis of E. Cooper, R. Higgott and K. Nossal from the joint work Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, that middle powers are recognisable by their foreign policy behaviour (Jordaan 2003), this chapter specially examines Australia’s defence and trade and economic strategies in the context of emerging multilateral alignments across the Indo-Pacific region. Based on three approaches taken from the works of B. Gilley and A. O’Neil (2014), as well as Andrew Carr (2013)—i.e. positional, systematic and self-identification—it seeks to establish how Australia can be defined as a middle power because of its vast territories, natural resources, location at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans between the two

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great powers, as well as the presence of its own zone of influence in the South Pacific. Moreover, Australia has a fairly strong position in numerous other indicators: 1st place in the world in terms of gold, iron ore, uranium and lead reserves (Geoscience Australia 2020), 13th place in the world in terms of nominal GDP (2017), 12th place in terms of GDP per capita, 13th in terms of military spending in 2018, or fifth largest among countries in Asia and Oceania (SIPRI 2019). This is important to underline as often, middle powers don’t have enough resources to spread their influence on global scale. This impels the middle powers to rely on multilateralism and regional cooperation. As Robert Keohane points out, the middle power is “a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution” (Keohane 1969). Moreover, multilateralism helps to reduce the growing trends of the anarchic environment in their region. It’s obvious that the middle powers are inferior in military power to the great powers, so multilateralism and joining forces with other Indo-Pacific states, including India and Japan, allows Australia to somehow even its odds. For example, since Donald Trump took office as US president in early 2017, Washington had changed the nature of its China policy towards greater confrontation. In 2021, when Joseph Biden came to power in the United States, it became clear that Washington wouldn’t fundamentally change its approach to competing with Beijing in their struggle for leading positions in the Indo-Pacific while stepping up attempts to bring on board as many actors in the region as possible. At the same time, in the year of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Beijing chose to set itself quite high and ambitious goals— dominance in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, the inclusion of Taiwan in the PRC, taking control over the South China Sea, becoming an economic centre of attraction both regionally and globally, and, most importantly, demonstrating the advantages of its political model over the Western one. Thus, the Sino-US confrontation seems ordained to continue and it directly affects both the security and economic situation in the Indo-Pacific, which has since been described in terms of either “arc of instability” or an “arc of ascendance” (Campbell 2016). In view of Australia’s foreign policy dualism of engaging both China and US, as well as its close relationship with Japan and India, multilateralism remains the most attractive way to protect and adapt to the anarchic regional environment that is transforming from the Asia–Pacific era to Indo-Pacifism.

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Especially, the rapid pace of military and economic rise of China plays a key role in the transformation of Canberra’s foreign policy making it one of the main supporters of multilateralism and regional integration of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a dual geo-strategic space of its primary interests.

Multilateralism in Australia’s Defence and Foreign Policy To analyse the place of multilateralism and the China factor in Australia’s regional policies, it is pertinent to trace the evolution and the use of these in Australia’s defence and foreign policy narratives, especially with Defence (1994–2016) and Foreign Policy (2017) White Papers, as well as Defence Strategic Update (2020). As can be seen from Table 7.1, multilateralism has officially entered into Australia’s official documents from 1994, after which it has taken a fairly strong roots in the Australia’s policy discourse. A similar situation can be traced with China: since 1994, the number of references to the PRC in Australian defence documents has increased 3.2 times, which also indicates a gradual increase in Canberra’s concern and consciousness about Beijing’s rising influence in its peripheral region. If in 1976 and 1987 multilateralism wasn’t mentioned in the Defence White Papers, the document of 1994 carried the highest number of mentions of multilateralism. It already contained a number of provisions indicating a greater interest of the Australian authorities in a multilateral way of regional cooperation. Of course, it was a reaction to the US withdrawal from the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Table 7.1 Australian Defence White Papers (1976–2016) Use of words like… Multilateralism India Japan USA PRC (China)

1976

1987

1994

2000

2009

2013

2016

0 2 11 12 10

0 0 3 62 4

24 5 14 60 20

6 11 14 43 13

14 15 18 80 34

16 36 20 86 65

13 21 36 129 64

Source Compiled by the author on the basis of the Department of Defence, the Australian Government (Defence White Papers 1976–2016)

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According to the 1994 Defence White Paper, the United States had important strategic and growing economic interests in the region and maintained strategic commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other allies, including Australia (Defence White Paper 1994). As the authors of the document rightly underlined, the strategic affairs of the region were expected to become increasingly volatile and complex, as well as increasingly determined by the countries of Asia themselves (ibid.). As a result of the transformation of the regional architecture, the strategic affairs of the region would increasingly be determined by the Asian countries themselves, while the United States would remain an important participant in multilateral regional security issues (in the next fifteen years). By comparison, it believed that the PRC would probably become “the most powerful new influence on the strategic affairs of our wider region” (ibid.). At the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Australia policy papers began to note that its security depends not only on its defence capabilities but also on defence cooperation with other countries in the region. This is where it begins to view multilateral cooperation as the way to manage its increasingly complex strategic environment.

China Factor in Australia’s Multilateralism In the initial years of this change, however, the Australian discourse on multilateralism was dominated by Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), ASEAN, the fight against weapons of mass destruction, joint exercises, and support for Japan’s commitment to emerging multilateral approaches to regional security. As time has shown, Tokyo’s aspirations have subsequently transformed into a Free and Open IndoPacific strategy. However, in contrast to their recent tensions during the pandemic years of 2019–2021, Australia had developed a regular dialogue with China and supported its participation in multilateral discussions on security issues. In the 2000 Defence Policy White Paper, multilateralism was further developed. Australia that had traditionally described its alliance with the United States as a “key strategic asset” (Defence White Paper 2000) was not seen outlining how, as a middle power, it had also turned to “close cooperation with its allies, neighbours and regional partners” (ibid.). Australia perhaps already anticipated the emergence of tensions between the major powers of Asia (in the next 20 years), and admitted to the possibility of growing and sustained confrontation between “the major powers in Asia, and even of outright

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conflict” (ibid.). Therefore, it believed that the development of regional multilateral structures would contribute to the stability in the Asia– Pacific region. The Australian government has since been exploring the possibility of building on common perceptions and goals in the region. Till early 2000s, the Indo-Pacific concept was probably a reflection of this in the future. A special place in multilateralism was still given to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as participation in the multilateral dialogue within the framework of this Forum increased Australia’s credibility in the region and allowed it to contribute to the building of a regional security environment (Ibid). It was the 2009 Defence White Paper that presented a new and revolutionary strategic vision of Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s; especially so, with regard to People’s Republic of China. As Kevin Rudd himself later said that the main conclusions of the 2009 Defence White Paper were the need to recognise that the rapid growth of China’s military budget and its increased naval activity in the South China Sea represent a major change in Australia’s broader strategic environment. It should be noted that in 2009, the authors of the Australian defence document had also predicted the growth of the geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean in world politics, including for the defence of Australia, as well as competitive pressure in Southeast Asia from India and China (Defence White Paper 2009). A secret section of the 2009 White Paper even contained scenarios of fighting between Australia and China (Taylor 2012). Kevin Rudd himself took another step towards multilateralism: foreshadowing the implementation of the Indo-Pacific concept in practice, he urged for the establishment of an Asia–Pacific Community designed to strengthen the dialogue of all Asia–Pacific states (including India) in the political, economic and defence areas (Rudd 2008). The Australian Government believed that armed neutrality was the best approach in terms of ensuring the security of the territory and people (Defence White Paper 2009) of the Fifth Continent. Moreover, as an alternative to the previous alliances, the Kevin Rudd government’s plan was to rely on a multilateral security system, with the UN at its pinnacle (ibid.). Australia’s strategic interests were planned to be secured by focusing on military cooperation with like-minded partners against common threats on the assumption that these partners would provide assistance if something threatened the security of the Fifth Continent. For its part, Canberra, where it would be the leading country in the coalition, was ready to provide “logistics support, air and sea lift, and

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strategic communications, that make it possible for smaller nations to take part in operations, and we will need to factor this into our planning for such operations” (ibid.). Besides, the development of defence cooperation would strengthen its credibility as a middle power that actively promotes multilateral security and rules-based world order that increases the likelihood of strategic stability in the Asia–Pacific. It is especially important to note that Australia also supported the development of multilateral technological cooperation within the framework of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). Through the multilateral DSTO mechanisms, Australia preferred to explore potential technological opportunities at a much lower cost to itself, as well as gain access to the technologies and capabilities of other countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. In the first few years, the main areas of DSTO were integrated surveillance and intelligence (ISR), cyber warfare (including computer security), electronic warfare, submarine warfare, and network systems (Defence White Paper 2009). Kevin Rudd’s vision was soon replaced by a different foreign policy view of Julia Gillard, which was reflected in the new 2013 Defence White Paper. According to the document, Canberra committed itself to strategic cooperation with the United States, while the relationship between Washington and Beijing “will more than any other factor determine our [ed. the Australia’s—A.G.] strategic environment in the coming decades” (Defence White Paper 2013). The new defence document also stated that Australia’s strategic landscape was becoming more multifaceted and complex, in part because of the growing influence of China and India. Undoubtedly, the 2013 Defence White Paper went down in the history of Australia’s regional construction in Asia due to the concept of the IndoPacific region—a single interconnected geo-strategic space of the Indian and Pacific Oceans combined. India and the Indian Ocean became an important part of Australia’s vision for the future of the region: “The Indo-Pacific is a logical extension of this concept, and adjusts Australia’s priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends” (ibid.). One of the reasons for the Australian government’s attention to the Indo-Pacific region was Beijing’s growing influence in the region, its military and economic power, which was now embodied in the form of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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According to Australia’s vision, the establishment of multilateral cooperation with India, Japan and the United States may restrain or prevent China’s attempts to recast the regional architecture. With the advent of Malcolm Turnbull in 2015, Australia’s foreign policy and rhetoric towards China probably became more alienated. It was during the Turnbull premiership that the greatest scope of Chinese expansion in the South Pacific occurred, which is why the Australian Prime Minister’s policy became one aimed at directly opposing Beijing against the background of its growing influence in the sub-region. As a result, amid growing tensions with China, the Australian government stressed that it “can better pursue its objectives of growth and prosperity and protect its interests in our region and globally by working with others, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally” (Defence White Paper 2016). A special place in the Defence White Paper was given to cooperation “with countries in South East Asia which have an interest in maritime security in the region” (ibid.)—Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. As a key security partner in the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific, Australia certainly saw India as a rising power in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s Act East Policy from 2014 was seen opening new opportunities for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. This tension with China as defining factor of Australia’s vision of multilateralism in the IndoPacific was to draw greater traction during Scott Morrison period since 2018 when he was elected as the new Prime Minister of Australia. This period indeed was to be identified with an active phase of aggravation of Sino-Australian relations in the areas of economy, regional building and defence. This was to result in Australia’s authorities giving a special impetus to the Indo-Pacific concept with an added emphasis on the development of relations with Japan, India, and the United States within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Scott Morrison’s premiership has been closely linked with the strengthening of Australia’s military power and with Canberra’s influence in the South Pacific, as well as with increased trade tensions with China. On July 1, 2020, prime minister Scott Morrison presented the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2024 Force Structure Plan—defence documents developed to prepare Australia for a post-pandemic world that will be “poorer, more dangerous and more disorderly” (Morrison 2020). After many years of discussions about the regional architecture’s transformation, the Australian government provided its Department of Defence with

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A$575 billion (US$397.4 billion) for the next 10 years for the modernisation of the armed forces and the military-industrial complex (Janes 2020). According to the Australian Prime Minister, the country should be better prepared for the prospect of a “high-intensity conflict” (this combination reads more like ‘war’). In fact, the probability of the Australian authorities expecting a war with the United States, India, Japan, and Indonesia tends to zero, while the increasing of defence funding during the aggravation of bilateral relations with China and rapprochement with the United States confirms the high level of Australia’s fears about the growing influence of Beijing. Second, what is also notable is that the 2020 Defence Strategic Update covers a relatively extensive area: “from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific” (Defence at Glance 2020). At the same time, Australia attaches more importance to Southeast Asia, because it is there some of the most vital Australian trading partners are located, as well as vital logistics arteries. Canberra is concerned that if China gains control over the South China Sea waters, it may restrict access to Australia and its partners to trade routes. Of course, to solve this challenge, Australia’s vision is aimed at developing multilateral processes in the region. When analysing the Australian brand of multilateralism, it is important to consider not only the defence, but also the economic component, which increasingly occupies the leading position in its regional discourse. In this case, it is important to note the thesis from the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which describes the relationship between the growing strategic rivalry between China and the United States and the damage it can do to the multilateral trading system in the region. Given the trade war that broke out between the United States and China during the US presidency of Donald Trump, the assumptions of the Australia’s White Paper turned out to be prophetic in many respects. This explains why the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contains a total of 36 references to multilateralism (Foreign Policy White Paper 2017). Consequently, based on Australia’s 1994–2017 defence and foreign policy documents, the following trends can be identified in Canberra’s evolving perceptions of multilateralism: 1. Seeking a common agenda among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, defining what has led to the establishment of Indo-Pacific concept and its new formation of multilateralism;

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2. Building cooperation with the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific region, in particular with Japan, India and the ASEAN countries; 3. The conviction of China that ranges from it being a regional challenger to a revisionist power that challenges the established regional and global order based on the dominance of the United States; 4. Recognition of India as a key security partner in the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific; the significant role of ASEAN in Southeast Asia; the commitment of Japan to multilateral cooperation and the United States as a key element of regional security in the Indo-Pacific; 5. Participation in multilateral organisations and initiatives to increase Australia’s credibility; 6. Commitment to a rules-based order; 7. Commitment to sharing defence technologies with Indo-Pacific partners; 8. Commitment to multilateral military exercises, especially naval exercises, and working together against non-traditional security threats; 9. The struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and 10. Maintaining the stability in foreign trade and the economic wellbeing of the region on the basis of multilateralism, even in conditions of geo-strategic tension.

Multilateralism in Middle Powers’ Defence Strategies Australia’s approach to multilateralism closely intertwines its economic and defence interests, as well as shifting power in the Indo-Pacific region. In the literature on international relations devoted to this issue, it’s often argued that the emerging instability at the global and regional levels gets characterised by the emergence of new power centres in the region, ones that seek to challenge the established regional or global order, where the hegemon state already dominates. At the present stage, a particularly valuable contribution to the study of the middle powers’ defence strategies was made by Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg, who also highlighted the strategies of hedging and regional balancing (Edström and Westberg

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2020). Their postulates can be observed in the expanding cooperation among Australia, India, and Japan and their support for the concept of the Indo-Pacific in response to the aggravation of Sino-US relations and the growing influence of the China. There are at least three embodiments of the defence strategies that Australia currently follows: First and foremost, in a period of transition, it is the hedging strategy that is usually implemented by the middle powers, when they don’t specifically wish to take sides. In the case of Australia—it has been a case of balancing act between the United States and China. This was most clearly expressed in Canberra’s reluctant position in supporting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in order to avoid any retaliatory measures from Beijing. For example, in 2017, the United States considered Australia as the most likely candidate to conduct joint patrols in the framework of Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea (FONOPs), but Australia did not join that initiative, but only supported the actions of the United States to patrol the South China Sea within the framework of international law. According to then Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, Australia didn’t join FONOPs, as this would only escalate tensions in the South China Sea (Laurenceson 2017). In addition, at the beginning of 2020, Australia refused to support direct accusations against China in the creation of COVID-19 by the United States, but, at the same time, as a middle power, appealed to the international community to initiate an investigation into the origin of the coronavirus infection which of course earned it a wrath of Beijing’s trade tariffs and wolf warriors. Secondly, it is the regional balancing strategy. As the events of 2020early 2021 demonstrated, with the intensification of the rivalry between the two great powers in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia took the side of the United States, which led to ratcheting up of tension in its relations with China. However, in this case, it is important to pay attention to another important detail inherent in the regional balance of power: due to the high level of strategic dependence on the United States and export dependence on China, Australia and other middle powers in the region have resorted to increased cooperation on a multilateral basis and have intensified their association in a new alliance like the Quadrilateral Security Framework or Quad. If earlier meetings of the foreign Ministers of Australia, India and other partners in the Indo-Pacific region were sporadic, then in May 2021 they met for the second time in a month, and personally. In the future, cooperation between the Indo-Pacific countries on a multilateral basis, including within the framework of Quad or Quad

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Plus, can lead to the establishing of more stable coalitions, but so far this initiative doesn’t have proper a degree of stability and a well-built structure which again can be attributed to China’s influence. Thirdly, in order to maximise the benefits and maintain the influence in the subregions, the middle powers often turn to build security in a more limited space. For example, the Fifth Continent traditionally leading the way in the South Pacific. Based on the level of influence, at the present stage, China can be identified as one of Australia’s main competitors in the South Pacific. Over the past two decades, China has made significant progress in building relations with the Pacific Island Countries (PIC). In the period 2017–2018, China has overtaken Australia as the main trading partner for PIC. At the current stage, thousands of Chinese companies operate in the Australia’s “zone of influence” in various industries: from mining to restaurants and grocery stores. The PRC is also a key partner of their regional organisations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). A similar situation is developing in the relations between India and the Indian Ocean island states or Sino-Japanese competition in Southeast Asia. Thus, with the further expansion of China into the South Pacific, the island part of the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia, the middle powers can use the strategy of building a subregional balance, involving partners in the overarching Indo-Pacific multilateral cooperation in their areas of responsibility. As part of the analysis of Australia’s approach to multilateralism, these middle powers’ defence strategies template seems to complement each other well and highlight the aspirations of Australia, as a middle power, that seeks to avoid uncertainty and streamline cooperation (Ratner et al. 2013) even in the face of a transformation of the regional architecture. Such defence strategies have also become increasingly connected to their economic strategies given that economic levers have become a major component of national power as also backbone of defence modernisation and soft power of nations. This is especially true of middle powers like Australia facing the might of an economic powerhouse, China in their immediate region.

Multilateralism and Middle Powers’ Economic Strategies No doubt, most middle powers’ foreign policy studies have remained focused on their defence strategies and the accumulation of military

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power and their trade and economic policies are insufficiently studied. But China emerging primarily as an economic powerhouse has shifted this focus to economic strategies of middle powers. Increasingly, Australia’s credibility has been largely viewed in terms of its economic and trade relations with other powers and countries. From “middle power” perspective, for instance, the following elements have come to be part of the combine the trade and economic strategies of Australia: the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) supporting hedging strategy, the subsidy strategy that is to provide ODA to developing countries, and, as the events of 2020– 2021 have demonstrated, the shift of the strategy of building a regional balance to the diversification of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region to reducing its trade dependence on China. From the perspective of the middle powers, free trade agreements (FTAs) have become the norm to draw economic benefits for all stakeholders. These FTAs aim to solve a wider range of foreign policy issues as well. For example, given the competition between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia has signed the FTA with both these countries and this has not just increased its trade, but also helped it avoid a situation in which it will have to choose between two extremes in order to maintain a balance in its relations with each of these countries (Goh 2005). However, Australia acknowledges that while modern FTAs are based on the rules and disciplines of WTO agreements, they go far beyond tariff cancellation and advance rules in areas and ways that are not possible in the conventional multilateral system. No wonder, Australia aims to participate in newer regional multilateral trade initiatives like Regional Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (RCEP) that aim at diversifying markets. At the moment, Australia is already participating in 15 FTAs (with New Zealand, Singapore, USA, Thailand, Chile, China, ASEAN, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Japan, CPTPP, Hong Kong, Peru, Indonesia, PACER-Plus), which allow it to maintain a more favourable trade environment and play an important role as a mediator as well. However, a particularly important step towards multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region has been the RCEP. Australia joined the RCEP in February 2020 and looks forward to the expansion of sales markets, which will open this format of cooperation to it, as well as help to strengthen the economic relationship among the participating countries. At the same time, Australia plans to use the RCEP not only for economic but also for political purposes. In particular, to improve economic relations with China, as well as to promote India’s entry into this regional FTA.

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It should be noted that with the rapid development of trade relations between Australia and China, there were increasing concerns that the high degree of Australia’s export dependence on China can have an excessive risk. For instance, China could use economic pressure on the Fifth Continent during the political tensions. In 2020, the expectations came true. In response to Australia’s demands for an international investigation into the origins of Coronavirus as well as to the investigations of the Australia’s Anti-Dumping Commission regarding goods from China, Beijing imposed a number of restrictions on imports from Australia of coal, timber, grain, wine, seafood, etc. Such actions by Beijing can lead to quite significant consequences for Canberra, because China accounts for over 39 per cent of Australian exports of goods (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). In 2019 China was the export destination for 100 per cent of Australian nickel ore exports, 95 per cent of timber, 77 per cent of wool, 56 per cent of iron ore, 54 per cent of barley and 21 per cent of coal (Uren 2020). At the same time, China’s share in Australian imports is 27 per cent and includes mainly products of the electrical industry, machine and automotive industry (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). As a result, Australia and its partners in the Indo-Pacific region seek to build a regional balance by diversifying trade on multilateral basis in order to reduce their economic dependence on China. In this context, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) has been particularly noticeable. On April 27, the trade ministers of Australia, India and Japan announced its official launch. SCRI is a response to supply chain disruptions caused by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Enwood 2021). However, based on the composition of the participants, it can be assumed that SCRI is a project of alternative supply chains designed to reduce the economic dependence of the participating countries on China. Indeed, the proponents of the dual space of the Pacific and Indian Oceans proposed a new multilateral platform for the development of regional trade and investment, taking into account their geo-economic interests, which could later become an economic reflection of Quad Plus. At the same time, the SCRI member countries have another important advantage—the economies of Australia, India and Japan are complementary. It’s important to mark that there were no direct mentions about China during the SCRI meetings, but Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson stated that they “have taken note of the situation” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the

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Commonwealth of Australia 2021), and reacted to the SCRI with a great deal of scepticism. It can be asserted that the defence strategies of the middle powers, in case of increased rivalry between the two regional hegemons, are projected not only to become geo-strategic, but also geo-economic, thereby also reorienting the evolving tenor of regional multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region. The FTA’s hedging strategies and supply chain diversification can definitely prove to be useful in terms of greater cohesion in regional markets, which remain vulnerable to the evolving rivalry of China and the United States in this region. Moreover, as the example of the US-China and Australia-China trade wars of 2019 and 2020 have demonstrated, competition between actors is more likely to involve instruments of economic influence than the use of their offensive and defensive military capabilities. Both strategies allow the middle powers to “punch above their weight” and give a chance to establish themselves as one of the key trade hubs in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is important to note that economic tools are not entirely new to the middle powers that have traditionally been generous donors of official development assistance (ODA). Considering, for instance, the strategies of Australia in the economic field, it is worth highlighting Canberra’s so-called subsidy strategy. As is well known, in order to provide ODA on a regional and subregional scale, the middle powers must have sufficient resources to provide ODA (Jordaan 2003), which Australia, Japan and India fully comply with. At the same time, the ODA provision involves not only maintaining a stable humanitarian situation in the region but also measures to attract developing countries to its orbit by providing various types of assistance (mainly grants and concessional loans). In contrast, China’s direct and active involvement in the affairs of the South Pacific makes Australia increasingly concerned about Beijing’s ODA growth; especially its implementation of infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. According to the Lowy Institute, over the past 10 years, China has provided $1.76 billion in ODA to the Pacific Island States, and 66.5 per cent of this amount (US$1.17 billion) constitute loans (Lowy Institute 2021). The growing number of infrastructure projects in Australia’s “zone of influence” and the PIC’s increasing debt to Beijing has provoked Canberra’s fears that China will influence the foreign policy vector of its islands neighbours, as well as purchase ports in Oceania, following the example of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. As a result, Australia has taken steps to compete with

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Beijing, including increasing the ODA funding, establishing an infrastructure financing fund as well as, undoubtedly, counting on the assistance of its partners, who are also interested in containment of the rising influence of China in the South Pacific. The visit of Mike Pompeo, the then United States Secretary of State, to Guam in 2019, had seen him announce the beginning of negotiations on a National Security Agreement with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau, which will help Washington to resist the growing influence of China in the region (Reuters 2019). The ODA to the PIC is also provided by all Quad parties (2010–2020): Japan ($US1.52 billion), the United States (US$1.49 billion), and India (US$60.83 million) in less degree. Moreover, the onset of COVID-19 pandemic has further changed the situation and given the Indo-Pacific middle powers a rare chance to unite around another common agenda. In addition to providing ODA in their areas of responsibility: Australia— South Pacific; India—the island states of Indian Ocean and South Asia; Japan—Southeast Asia, the middle powers of Indo-Pacific region saw Quad Summit of March 2021 launch an initiative to provide 1 billion vaccines worth US$600 million to these littoral countries. The vaccines are expected to be produced in India, funded by Japan and the United States, and Australia will provide logistical support for their distribution in South Pacific and Southeast Asia (Reuters 2021). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the post-pandemic world, the humanitarian ODA provided to developing countries in the field of health and maintaining economic stability may become the main vector of assistance from the Indo-Pacific middle powers, somewhat shifting the implementation of new infrastructure projects, which are focused on the external assistance of China.

China and the Evolving Regional Architecture Undoubtedly, in the post-pandemic era, an important aspect will be the continuing transformation of the regional alignments in the IndoPacific region, resulting in the need to reform regional institutions and architecture. In this case, the rich experience of the middle powers, including Australia, in building multilateral platforms for regional cooperation can be useful. For example, in the 1980s Australia was one of the founders of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),

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India is the leader of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), while Japan initiated the ASEAN+6 Format (CEP), which later became the RCEP. But there’s one important feature: all these initiatives are united by economic cooperation, as well as by multilateralism, which includes most of the countries of the region, especially China (excluding BIMSTEC). This may be out of tune with the escalation of the situation in the Indo-Pacific in 2020– 2021 that showed that the multilateralism of the middle powers is shifting towards an increasing defence and ideological direction. First, in spite of the stated cooperation on healthcare, technology, countering unfair trade practices, and climate change under Quad, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States were seen focusing on streamlining of their defence cooperation mechanisms. Moreover, the initiative to expand the G7 by Australia and the Indo-Pacific middle powers has been making big waves. Back in 2008, Kevin Rudd was to find that it was necessary for Australia to take the lead in addressing the fallout from the global financial crisis and the perceived shortcomings of the G7, advocating for the forum to be expanded to include key G-20 members (Xu 2011). Then there were the initiatives of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and former US President Donald Trump to invite Russia, South Korea, Australia and India to the G7 summit to talk about “the future of China”. London wants to go even deeper and create an alliance of ten democracies in this composition. The idea of D10 echoes the plan of US President Joe Biden to hold a “Summit for Democracy”, which is supposed to develop a strategy to counter corruption and authoritarianism in a number of foreign countries. Each of these initiatives has a clear China-centric orientation, which can cause irreparable damage to SinoAustralian relations. The guest participation of the Indo-Pacific middle powers in the G7 meeting of foreign ministers demonstrates their greater cohesion than before, but they are still trying to balance and avoid a sharp deterioration in relations with China. For example, all three Indo-Pacific powers—Australia, India, Japan—were invited to the G7 of 2021, and they participated in the meetings, but had the status of guests, so they were not officially involved in the final communique. It is also important to take into account that China isn’t only an influential or powerful economic and defence force in the Indo-Pacific, but also a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of a number of several other international organisations. If Australia, India, or Japan, as the middle powers, need to influence the

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outcome of important regional or global issues, they will still have to interact not only with Washington but also with Beijing. As we know, the goal of the middle powers is traditionally the opportunity to be at the same negotiating table with as many leading countries of the world as possible in order to maximise their benefits. But will the blatant building of an anti-Chinese coalition based on the G7 and the organisation’s drift from an element of the global governance system to an ideologised club lead to positive results? (Petrovskiy 2020). Leaving behind the world’s second-largest economy and 18 per cent of the world’s population is clearly a counterproductive measure, which was also mentioned by thenAustralian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam back in the 1970s (Griffiths 2014). Moreover, in the post-pandemic world, the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific will have a long way to build a new approach to Beijing and the region itself in the new geo-strategic realities: it is impossible to fight with the economic crisis, to develop a single consensus on Myanmar or Taliban, to resolve the situation with Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the DPRK without the participation of China. It is important for Australia and other Indo-Pacific middle powers to take into account a realistic analysis of their capabilities, as well as the gradual decrease of the United States’ influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This fact was even mentioned by Joseph Biden himself, when he stressed that during the years of his presidency, China will not become the superpower. It may seem that in this way US President played on the emotional cards with Americans who support the assertive rhetoric of the West towards China, but at the same time, this can be considered a compliment to China because according to forecasts, by 2028–2030 China will become the largest economy, and, probably, the power of the world—just after the presidential term of Biden. This is confirmed by the defence documents of the United States, according to which, due to China’s rise, Washington has been responding by strengthening traditional alliances and creating new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States, thus, indirectly recognises its weakened power and inability to face the challenge of China alone. The United States is interested in the support of its allies and partners in the region in order to successfully contain the growth of China’s influence and strengthen a stable strategic order in the Indo-Pacific region. Probably, at the present stage, the United States needs Australia, India, and Japan perhaps a little more, which means that the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific space have the opportunity to build some of the aspects of cooperation in their own

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interests. Probable, the future cooperation of the Indo-Pacific countries within the Quad framework has already led to the creation of more multilateral economic and defence coalitions, though until 2020, this initiative didn’t have a high degree of stability and system building. Time of closed ideologised formats has passed along with the Cold War (ibid.), so nowadays, nations have ot make ways for a more rational, rather than “selective multilateralism” in Indo-Pacific region as well. Anyway, this author has identified two possible scenarios for the building and development of this evolving multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region: 1. Selective multilateralism. It is built between Australia and the middle powers of Indo-Pacific on the side of the United States in order to compete with China for influence in the region. Such a course of development puts into the roots of this multilateralism a deliberately inbuilt conflicting nature, which, as the Cold War demonstrated, cannot provide a long-term basis for cooperation. At the same time, Australia and the middle powers of the region are increasing the risk of their involvement in a major conflict between the two great powers. Selective multilateralism can provoke China to retaliate, step up its military and economic presence in the region, and find allies to balance the United States’ Indo-Pacific coalition. All this will once again push this region into the state of so-called controlled confrontation and freeze the tense situation in the Indo-Pacific, in which actors would not dare to openly speak out against each other and seek a compromise in the spirit of more or less symmetrical mutual restraint. 2. Balanced multilateralism. This multilateralism is being built on the basis of cooperation between Australia and other Indo-Pacific middle powers in order to strengthen influence in their respective ‘zones of responsibility’—the subregions of the broader Indo-Pacific region. This strategy gives the middle powers an opportunity to gain a stronger position within their zone of influence, strengthen relations with other influential middle powers and credibility, including to become together as a single voice of the larger region, promote its security and economic stability. Reducing dependence on the great powers (the US or China) gives the middle powers here the opportunity to choose a more independent and flexible foreign policy vector based on inclusive, more viable, and diversified regional institutions in a post-pandemic world. Moreover, they will be able to act

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as mediators in easing tensions between Washington and Beijing, rather than to be the parties to the conflict.

Conclusion Based on the study of the evolving centrality of multilateralism in Australia’s foreign policy, the evolution of this concept in Australia’s defence and foreign policy documents, this chapter identifies the growing significance of the China factor that explains Australia’s continued commitment to this multilateralism, as well as Canberra’s approaches to using it for mitigating the escalating trend of the anarchic environment in this region. There is no doubt that Australia’s foreign policy vector at the present stage largely depends on the developments in the Sino-US confrontation. If the United States is the main strategic ally for Australia, then China is considered as the most probable threat to the Fifth Continent and the Pacific Island States. This is taking place in the context that Canberra’s focus on China’s military modernisation, the rise of its economic influence, as well as the loss of Washington’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. This makes the regional environment far more multifaceted and complex, requiring Australia to be flexible and responsive to changes in the emerging balance of power. Given the increasing visibility of the United States’ inability to confront China alone, Australia has been trying to reduce its own geo-strategic risks by engaging other middle powers and by turning to multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the Cold War, which ended three decades ago, still continues to have a profound impact on the consciousness and structure of the international political system and it isn’t possible to overcome its legacy even now (Bordachyov 2021). Part of Australia therefore still continues to struggle with the rise of China in the form of a potential anti-Chinese alliance (selective multilateralism), which can lead to even more serious consequences for Canberra. Given the prophecies of China’s political, economic, and defence prospects as a future regional and probably global hegemon, Beijing is clearly expected to emerge victorious in such a competition. As some representatives of Australia’s academic community continue to point out, in modern conditions, Canberra needs to evolve a far more pragmatic orientation for its foreign policy. The solution to this situation for them lies in a balanced multilateralism aimed at strengthening the influence of the Indo-Pacific middle powers in their “zones of responsibility”; closer coordination

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between Australia, India, and Japan; reducing their dependence on the great powers, as well as a more independent and flexible foreign policy course.

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Lijian, Zhao. (2021). “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks 2021/04/28”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Commonwealth of Australia, accessed: 15.05.2021, http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/ sghdxwfb_1/t1872342.htm. Lowy Institute. (2021). Pacific Aid Map, accessed: 15.05.2021, https://pacificai dmap.lowyinstitute.org/. Morrison, Scott. (2020). “Launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update”, Prime Minister of Australia, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/ address-launch-2020-defence-strategic-update. Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2019). Accessed: 15.04.2021, https:// oec.world/en/profile/country/aus. Petrovskiy, Vladimir. (2020). “D10: ot instituta global’nogo upravleniya k antikitajskomu al’yansu?” (In Russian), International Affairs, accessed 18.05.2021, https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/29650. Ratner, Ely, Cronin Patrick, Fontaine Richard, Hosford Zachary. (2013). “The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties”, Center for a New American Security, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://s3.amazon aws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_AsiaPowerWeb.pdf?mtime=201 60906080503. Reuters. (2019). “U.S. Seeks to Renew Pacific Islands Security Pact to Foil China,” accessed: 15.05.2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-micron esia-usa-pompeo/u-s-seeks-to-renew-pacific-islands-security-pact-to-foilchina-idUSKCN1UV0UV. Reuters. (2021). “US, India, Australia, Japan Agree to Send One Billion Vaccines Across Asia by End-2022”, accessed: 15.05.2021, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-asia-vaccines-idUSKBN2B42F4. Robertson, Jeffrey. (2017). “Middle-Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme”, Australian Journal of International Affairs. 71:4, PP. 355–370. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1293608. Rudd, Kevin. (2008). “It’s Time to Build an Asia Pacific Community”, Address to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, Sydney, Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, accessed: 15.04.2021, https:// pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-15947. Rudd, Kevin. (2012). “Complete Text of Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd’s Speech at Asia Society New York”, Asia Society, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://asiasociety.org/complete-text-australian-foreign-ministerkevin-rudds-speech-asia-society-new-york. Taylor, Adam. (2012). “The Australian Government Made a Secret Plan for War with China in 2009”, Business Insider, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://www.bus inessinsider.com/australia-china-kevin-rudd-2009-2012-6. Thompson, Mark. (2005). “Strategic Insights 18—Punching Above Our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),

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accessed: 15.04.2021, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/strategic-insights-18punching-above-our-weight-australia-middle-power. Tian, Nan, et al. (2019). “Trends in World Military Expenditure”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/fs_1904_milex_2018_0.pdf. Ungerer, Carl. (2007). “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of Politics & History. 53, PP. 538–551, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00473.x. Uren, David. (2020). “Australia’s Asymmetrical Trade with China Offers Little Room to Move”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), accessed: 15.04.2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-asymmetri cal-trade-with-china-offers-little-room-to-move/. World Ranking for Australia’s Mineral Resources (EDR) and Production. (2020). Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, accessed: 15.04.2021, https:// www.ga.gov.au/digital-publication/aimr2020/world-rankings. Xu, Yi-Chong. (2011). “Australian Participation in the G20”, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, accessed: 15.04.2021, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_ file?uuid=7d07301c-afe1-4d2b-6763-c47aead30f59&groupId=252038.

CHAPTER 8

The Community of Shared Futures: China’s Counter to Indo-Pacific Narratives Devendra Kumar Bishnoi

Introduction Indo-Pacific region has become a terrain of hardcore competing strategic, economic, and security interests of major powers on the one hand and on the other, witnessed an equally powerful contesting normative narratives on regional order to be.1 These narratives conflict and also coalesce multiple conceptions of the region as a community, “rules-based order”, and norm-driven alignments among the like-minded countries. While material national interests of each actor remain the main axis in evolving 1 The chapter uses the term Indo-Pacific though in Chinese narratives till recently continued to use it is Asia–Pacific to outline China’s policies and in highlighting all important dimensions of the spatial and normative construction of the regional order in the Chinese foreign policy.

D. K. Bishnoi (B) Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_8

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of dynamics of their regional politics of the Indo-Pacific, their norms and paradigms in these narratives of constructing a new regional order can potentially be far more overpowering as they seek to both goad and guide those hardcore competing alignments to shape the future of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. In these narratives again, there are essentially two competing outlines: the “liberal regional order” (LRO) proposing for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) advanced by the United States and then the “Community of Shared Future” (CSF)2 by the People’s Republic of China. To say it at the very outset, unlike the CSF that represents the united vision of the Chinese Communist Party, the US-led FOIP has had multiple versions propagated by a number of countries including Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN, European Union, UK, France, Germany, Canada and so on. So unlike CSF, the FOIP has had serious divergence among its proponents who also seem rather externally driven by their shared concerns with regards to China’s rapid and unprecedented rise. Also, while both narratives remain grounded in values of ensuring open and fair regional order, they are seen as if juxtaposed against each other as alternatives. The US-led FOIP narrative claims to represent the liberal world order and portrays China as an outlier and even as a threat to it because it is not a democracy and hence does not fit into the vision until and unless it subscribes to these western democratic processes, institutions and values. This is implicit in frequent references to the US partnerships as “alliance of democracies” and rules-based order. Also, an implicit message in these narratives is that authoritarian China cannot uphold a rules-based international order (Scott 2018: 31). This clearly makes it is an exclusive order though not all proponents of FOIP agree with such a proposition. India’s positions on the Indo-Pacific, for example, have subtly differed from those of the West and India has laid down an accommodative vision of regional order wherein the binaries of democracy-authoritarianism are played down (Ministry of External Affairs 2018a).

2 There are two terms used in Chinese discourses viz 人类 命运 共同体 renlei mingyun gongtongti and 人类 利益 共同体 renlei liyi gongtongti translated as Community of Shared Future/destiny and Community of Shared Interests respectively. The former is frequently used in official discourses and hence, the chapter prefers to use the translation the Community of Shared Future (CSF).

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The idea of CSF, on the other hand, presents one voice and sans exclusivity and does not present itself as an alternative, opposed to the liberal order or as a counter to such exclusive propositions, by projecting its inclusive vision of regional order that theoretically includes everyone (Xi 2019). This chapter, however, argues that the idea of CSF nevertheless remains a counter to the LRO at least in two ways: One, that it counters China threat theory by explicating China’s “peaceful development” narrative. And two, it is not just “defensive” as it is often presented to be. Rather, it is an equally proactive narrative that in fact is not confined to the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, the centrality of the neighbourhood from the beginning of these Chinese narratives indicate the significance that China has attached to its unstated Asia–Pacific policies. And while FOIP has been examined in other chapters in great detail, this chapter seeks to elucidate China’s CSF as its counter to the US-led FOIP narratives. This Chapter is organised in the following five sections. The first section provides a critical overview of the multiple meanings and contexts of the concept in Chinese official discourses. Then the second section builds upon these existing arguments on a region in the larger international relations dynamics thereby locating its significance for the normative narratives of the CSF and FOIP in the context of the IndoPacific. The third section critically evaluates China’s Asia–Pacific strategy concerning the evolving Indo-Pacific constructs in order to locate the use of the CSF belong Chinese narratives. The fourth section then extends the discussion from the previous section and critically examines why the CSF is a counter-narrative and assesses its acceptability and efficacy. The final section summarises the main conclusions and arguments of this chapter.

Constructed and Contested Ideas in-the-Making In international relations, in critical theories parlance, “region” is conceptualised in terms of a construct reflecting its underlying geopolitical and geo-economic interests of states (Godehardt 2014: 47; Acharya 2012: 189). While there are extensive published works on what constitutes region and regionalism in IR, the chapter focuses on one particular aspect of the region, that is, ‘the historicity and making of regions’ and it does so by focusing specifically on Chinese narrative of the CSF. It locates its analysis on Karoline Vinay-Postle’s argument that region or regional order is an exercise of polity building. As he points out, “most of the regionalist IR literature deals with regulations of regional politics rather

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than with the polity-building of the region” where the focus in the mainstream debates of IR very often remains more “around the region than about it” (Postel-Vinay 2007: 556; Postel-Vinay 2020). By focusing on the region as a polity-building process, it is possible to delineate specific features of the regional order distinguishing them from mere “regulatory” aspects of the region. In other words, it helps explain how ideas and norms shape the conceptions of a regional order. It is true that ideas and norms are not the only factors shaping regional order but these ideas and norms shape how states conceptualise a region as well as help them articulate already existing policies that serve their material interests. Constructivism, for instance, believes that ideas and norms matter as constitutive elements of the process of articulation and institutionalisation of regional orders. It is specially so with the case of East Asia (broadly defined around and including South East Asia) which has seen such regional processes due to distinctive ideas, norms and a priori cognitive givens (Amitav 2017: 817). But there are problems with such arguments not because they emphasise far too much on the role of ideas and cultural identity, but because they do not recognise the diversity of norms and ideas, and the role of power in building their hierarchical order. This is especially true in the wake of regional and extra-regional power competition between major powers becoming a potential factor to influence how states imagine regional orders as well as how material interests of each actor impinge upon their choices. Additionally, they do not take the interactions between power and norms seriously (Acharya 2012: 184). The implication of these interactions is that norms and ideas are also constructive and hence they do matter in shaping conceptions of region and normative articulations. Yet, they cannot be ignored because every state does legitimise its policies and visions of regional order in normative and ideational terms. Hence, the liberal regional order (LRO) is sought to be legitimised and articulated in terms of liberal values of openness and fairness while the CSF as a vision of regional community is sought to be legitimised in win–win cooperation, shared interests, “public goods” creation and so on. While not denying the efficacy of both ideas and material interests, this chapter argues that the idea of CSF represents and works in consonance with China’s material (i.e. security and economic) interests. It both allows it to make sense of the region as it wants it to be as well as allows it to counter the FOIP narratives and allay fears of smaller countries about its unprecedented economic rise and its consequent security implications for

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the Indo-Pacific region. Here, the sequence of idea-material interests or material interests-ideas gets complicated as also complementary to each other. For example, a range of security and economic policy interests can be articulated normatively using this concept of CSF. Economic development and access to markets is the most pressing interest of China and hence, arguing for win–win cooperation and inclusive rules allows CSF to play the game safe with large number of developing and least developed nations. China’s economic rise, on the other hand, does allow smaller counties to benefit and hence makes it difficult for them to easily shun these economic opportunities. Additionally, material power is necessary to implement a state’s vision of regional order and in case of China, as some scholars have effectively argued, the geo-economic power has helped it rewrite rules and norms around its periphery (Norris 2016: 45). And it is argued that China also requires to legitimise its proposed changes in the regional order through norms which explains its emerging discourses of CSF that becomes an essential prerequisite, especially so in face of US-led FOIP narratives.

Ideas of Indo-Pacific: Contestations and Convergences The concept of FOIP has been projected as an extension of the international liberal order and hence, as a singular concept. However, each stakeholder in this debate has had their idea of the Indo-Pacific reflecting diverse interests, ideas, and strategies of each one of these. Even their imagined geographies of the FOIP have varied quite widely. As several scholars have argued, it remains a contested concept (Chacko 2014: 433). Yet, there are critical areas of convergence especially in the broader framework of it as an open and rule-based order as also in its perceived threat of rising China leading to overlapping of the different material and ideational conceptions of the regional order. Besides, the Indo-Pacific is also presented in FOIP as an evolving concept with a multitude of policies pursued by each actor. These convergences and divergences are often explained in terms of democratic ethos of participating countries posting them at variance with authoritarian and monolithic narratives of Beijing. Also, in the FOIP narratives, none of the actors have presented a defined policy though most of them have presented their formal policy outlines on engaging the Indo-pacific. All of them see it as a dynamic and evolving regional order in the making. Also, it means that each actor has

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had policies that can be defined as part of their Indo-pacific strategy but also aligned to their overarching vision of the FOIP. For example, India’s Look East Policy was enunciated in the early 1990s when the region was beginning to take off economically. Yet its Indo-Pacific strategy is still defined by immediate security concerns especially emanating from China in its neighbourhood (Rajagopalan 2020: 80). Similarly, South Korea’s South Policy, Taiwan’s new emphasis on South-Bound policies, Japan’s FONOP, etc. all have major convergences yet they are also subtly different from each other making it difficult to think of them as one or in terms of this being a clear situation of China versus rest of these countries (Scott 2019: 29). In the last decade, of course, these trends towards convergences of interests have stepped up with the US announcing first “Rebalance to Asia” in 2010 and later issuing its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017 (The White House 2017). Meanwhile, it has also stepped up diplomatic activities in the region with Quadrilateral Security Framework being one of the most hyperactive (Smith 2021a). Yet it still cannot be argued to have a well-defined Indo-pacific strategy for all its friends and allies. The divergences have arisen out of both ideational and material factors. There are two instances that especially manifest such divergences. One, is the June 2018 speech by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. While emphasising on ASEAN centrality and rule-based, fair and open regional order similar to the LRO, his emphasis on the inclusiveness of regional players differed from the narrative in the US official statements (Ministry of External Affairs 2018b). India has since advocated inclusion of both Russia and China into Indo-Pacific deliberations and since included this as an item in the ChinaIndia Annual Maritime Dialogue (Ministry of External Affairs 2018c; Basu 2020). Another example is that of the “dilemma” of smaller states and middle powers in the region having to choose between the US or China (Wilkins and Kim 2020: 7). India again continues to struggle for balancing its equations between the US and China. Recent China-India tensions have indeed seen India drifting closer to US-led initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region (Smith 2021a, b). This as well reflects tensions within their Indo-Pacific narratives that are increasingly being pushed forward by major powers strategic competition. Nevertheless, what unites all these US-led visions is the perceived threat from the rise of China and a recognition of the need for a coordinated response.

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None of the actors indeed have one fixed and given idea of regional order in Indo-Pacific region. The United States’ conception of IndoPacific—as it is articulated in its 2017 Indo-Pacific Strategy and other policy discourses—seeks to recall its centrality of the region going back to the post-World War II period (The White House 2017: 3; Green 2017: 3). Global power shifts from Euro-Atlantic to Asia–Pacific over last two decades have effected these US policy rebalances since early 2000s. Similarly, other states have also responded to these evolving dynamics of geopolitics and geo-economics in the region. China’s conceptions of Asia–Pacific have also evolved with its unprecedented rise over this time and its economic and security interests expanded since 1980s. As a result, China has also had multiple versions of its policy for Asia–Pacific region and it also consists of multiple policies at bilateral and multilateral levels. Collectively, these reflect the evolving nature of the conception of regional order in their policies and narratives. Hence, it is equally important to take into account the processes and politics of this interface in their parallel two sets of narratives on region-making. As always, apart from their material interests and leverages, norms have played a central role in legitimising and articulating policies by each of the actors.

China’s Asia–Pacific Policy This section has two objectives. Firstly, it examines the meanings and contexts of the concept of CSF in terms of region as a community. Secondly, it locates the significance of this concept in China’s conception of the Asia–Pacific region as articulated in foreign policy narratives primarily from the perspective of this being evolved as a counter to the idea of FOIP. To begin with, China’s Asia–Pacific policies had evolved as its economic and military power rose steadily and even miraculously during the last four decades. But China, that had stayed largely inward looking, did not have a view on the Asia–Pacific regional order until the late 1990s. It had memories of doctrinal aspirations to shape regional order but did not quite articulate such an aspiration in clear terms reflecting lack of “regional policy” so to speak (Christoffersen 1996: 1067). Some Chinese scholars even believed that China did not even need a grand strategy towards the Asia–Pacific region (Hu 1995: 132). This situation was to change with China’s opening up and reforms that substantially integrated it with the Asia–Pacific economies and created

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conditions for it to evolve a “regional view” in making its policy articulations. China’s regional view of course differed from the US-led conceptions of the regional order, even in fighting shy of calling it IndoPacific region. Additionally, as a rising power in the region, China’s view was deeply grounded in its security, economic and geopolitical interests. What is noticeable is that China’s evolving policies towards the region have been proactive in nature rather than reactive. This is significant when it comes to normative articulations of its regional policy is the focus of examination in this chapter. The idea of Indo-pacific as a region has itself evolved parallel to the economic rise of China. Indeed, the increasing pace of economic growth in this entire region has catapulted the region as the new power centre in the global geo-economic trends. The narratives of the CSF in Chinese discourses have therefore emerged primarily from this shift from geo-strategy to geo-economics and from Euro-Atlantic to Asia– Pacific that have created its own new challenges that China faces especially in the immediate neighbourhood (Feng 2020: 10). For the United States and its friends and allies, this rise of China and its material leverages and especially its actions in the South China sea have created fear among its smaller neighbours. Continuing cross-straits tension with Taiwan Relations Act of the US creating possibilities of outside interference by the US and other powers have always loomed large in Chinese thinking (Yan 2015). Besides, the overall increasing strategic competition between the US and China—seen in their recent trade and technology wars—have made these narrative contestations all the more salient to the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Given China’s experiences during the Western containment policies of the cold war years trust building in the neighbourhood had presented a challenge to Beijing. Accordingly, China since the early 2000s has worked hard to assuage the fear among the smaller countries in South-East Asia through the “peaceful development narratives and the good neighbourly policy” (Bijian 2005; Chung 2009). The immediate neighbourhood of China, therefore, has found a prominent place in the evolution of its idea of the CSF although its scope remains global (Li and Yuwen 2016). It is in this sense that the centrality of the neighbourhood makes the CSF closely tied to its Asia–Pacific policy. This has, of course, also evolved in view of its perceived challenges that it faces in its immediate neighbourhood and the way China’s rise has accentuated a certain sense of fear among these small countries that also explains Beijing’s attempt to make its narrative of

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Community of Shared Interests (liyi gongtongti) central to China’s Asia– Pacific strategy. This is also a counter to the narrative of US-led liberal regional order (LRO) articulated by the US and its allies and other friends in the Indo-Pacific region. Second, China’s views of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US have also evolved in the form of a variety of arguments extended by Chinese scholars and officials on how to respond to their security challenges, achieve economic interests and project influence as a regional power in the Asia–Pacific. All of these remain woven around a consensus that LRO driven Indo-Pacific narratives represent a containment strategy against China (Ma 2020; Huang 2018; Hu and Meng 2020). At the same time, China’s Asia–Pacific strategy cannot be said to have been influenced by the US policy alone. Rather it has a longer genealogy going back to China’s proactive conceptualisations since early 1990s. A variety of factors had shaped its policies towards the region. To understand CSF, therefore, it becomes pertinent to briefly contextualise its discourses by examining various factors that have guided and goaded it.

Factors and Forces Guiding China’s CSF First and foremost, China’s conception of the regional order in Asia– Pacific have been closely co-related to its unprecedented rise as an economic power from the later half of 1980s and especially since early 1990s. Economic relationships have therefore been the mainstay of China’s Asia–Pacific policy articulations at the regional level. Within this, China’s policies with regards to specific issues like the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and its increasing military capabilities have created uncertainty and fear among smaller countries. China has pursued its visions on these issues both at bilateral and multilateral levels aimed at securing its security and economic interests. Apart from bilateral relationships with countries in the region, it has increasingly pursued its engagement with multilateralism both in security and trade sectors to secure a peaceful environment in its periphery which has been a vital prerequisite to its economic development and security. This has seen China at the very forefront to create multilateral fora like the APEC, ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum, and various trade agreements including the RCEP concluded in 2020. It is interesting to note that even in China’s narratives, there has been widespread scepticism on whether this multilateral approach can yield

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desired results (Sun 2010). There have been arguments that China may not be seriously interested in strong multilateral institutions, and how its preference for bilateral has been a hindrance to multilateralisation (Beeson 2015: 5). Nevertheless, these multilateral fora have been an important pillar of China’s approach to the Asia–Pacific region especially in its immediate neighbourhood if not in terms of its larger institutional balancing against US-led alliance networks in the larger Indo-Pacific region where it must prevent something from happening against its core interests (Beeson 2019: 246). While these policies present an inclusive and cooperative China, its approach to multilateralism reveals that it intends to create a Sino-centric regional order by excluding major players like the US. For example, China has created multilateral institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) where the United States has not joined as member. Some of China’s initiatives do exhibit an inclusive character as well like the AIIB in terms of its governance mechanisms and norms that allows it to become an effective regional organisation (Kumar 2021: 2). Another driver has been China’s economic engagement with the littoral nations. The economic dimensions of China’s engagement strategy have been aimed at turning economic supply chains, finance, and trade China-centric creating interdependence and even path dependency for several smaller neighbours. While the security and military dimensions of China’s strategy gets more attention, this China-centric trade and economic supply chains have provided the stronger basis for creating a Sino-centric regional order. The Belt and Road Initiatives, trade agreements at bilateral and multilateral levels, the RCEP for example, provide leverage in making economic order anchored in Chinese interests. This has made region’s rise undergirded by China’s rise creating mutual stakes. Although the centrality of economic dimensions of China’s relationships emerged out of its emphasis on China’s domestic economic development drive since the late 1980s, the security and military aspects of its regional strategy that followed cannot be disentangled either. It is reflected, for example, in the way deeper economic relations with smaller countries have created conditions for the latter to choose military and security alliances. Even countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and others, which fear Chinese military and security policies the most, cannot easily ignore China economically. China’s economic partnerships, therefore, give it leverage over smaller countries in terms of wooing or even coercing them to wean them away from the US-led initiatives and narratives.

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China’s neighbourhood policy has been aimed at integrating smaller countries with the Chinese economy. Lately, its security policies have also become centred on creating a safe zone in its neighbourhood given rising China perceives serious security threats not only from outside powers but also from larger ethnic groups like the Uyghurs and Tibetans on the western side, and the issue of South China Sea and Taiwan in the east (Zhou 2014: 29). While on its coast in the East and South, it has adopted the so-called “sea denial policy” to create a secured neighbourhood, in the west it has settled borders with Central Asian countries and Russia in lieu of guarantee for sovereignty questions in Xinjiang (Godehardt 2014: 134). The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was aimed at ensuring security in Xinjiang and Central Asia (ibid.: 130). In other words, the centrality of security concerns in the neighbourhood has been the first step determining China’s approach towards building a Sino-centric regional order in the Asia–Pacific. China’s economic and security dimensions cannot be disentangled as its recent actions have made it increasingly clear its use economic relationships as a tool for pursuing geopolitical interests (Kurlantzick 2008: 7; Norris 2016: 45). The dispute over economic relations between Australia and China provides a recent example of China’s coercive economic diplomacy. Apart from countries in South-East Asia, its economic relations with Island countries in the South-Pacific have also deepened in recent decades. One of the explicit outcomes of this has been the change of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Besides, these island states provide significant geo-strategic locations the major powers like the US and China vying for regional preeminence. China’s inroads into these small island countries has prompted concerns in the US and among its friends and allies which have announced plans for infrastructure projects and economic aid to these countries in the South-Pacific (Zhou 2021: 245). This has contributed to China’s increasing profile in the region economically boosting its strategy of regional order. It is in this context that China has been trying to shape or reshape the norms and rules to suit its interests and has pushed forward with new normative ideas as outlined in the CSF. The significance of the CSF in its emerging conception of the regional order lies in its normative articulation of economic, security and geopolitical interests on the one hand and its critiquing of other conceptions of regional order like that of the FOIP on the other.

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CSF and Changing of the Normative Dynamics The CSF as a concept was first used in Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Party Congress with regard to the Taiwan question (China Daily 2007). Later, China released a White Paper titled China’s Peaceful Development that discussed the CSF in good detail, and hereafter it came to be used extensively in references to all aspects of China’s relationship with the outside world (Information Office of the State Council 2011). Nevertheless, it remains an ambiguous concept often used in contrasting situations. The ambiguity comes especially from its fuzzy conceptual and moral boundaries, reflecting perhaps the persistent normative confusion within China’s foreign policy discourses. The concept at the same time remains significant in discursive practices rather than providing moral compass or normative resource for institution building as such; a problem that such ideas from Chinese foreign policy discourse are likely to face for long time. Of course, its normative significance in terms of articulating foreign policy and in contestation of dominant international norms cannot be ignored either. In 2017, the CSF was finally enshrined in the constitution as part of the Xi Jinping Thought and its definition captures its essential elements that have been used in different contexts in official discourses. According to this text: In international affairs, it shall uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, safeguard China’s independence and sovereignty, oppose hegemonism and power politics, defend world peace, promote human progress, work to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and advance the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. (“Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China” 2017)

Motivations For China’s CSF Chinese debates on the CSF give multiple reasons why the idea of CSF is needed and useful for China’s peaceful rise. First, the existing global institutional system and values are highly exclusive and hence an inclusive idea of “global community” is needed that can promote creation of public goods for the common interests of all. Second, the diversity of cultures, civilisations, political systems require a common idea that is inclusive and respects diversity. Third, the existing order and values do not adhere to morality that calls for direction. Fourth, the US-led system

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is beset with cold war mentality with double standards towards the developing world (Yan 2020). And finally, there is a serious lack of ideology that is inclusive and can guide the world by solving common problems like poverty, underdevelopment, environmental degradation (China Center for International Economic Exchanges 2018; Xi 2015; Zhang 2018; Fu Ying 2017). Moreover, while the world was fighting the coronavirus pandemic, China in 2020 claimed to having completely eradicated extreme poverty—a full ten years before the 2030 target year for it in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Xinhua News 2021). From Harmonious World to CSF The discourses of the CSI have more in common with China’s preceding normative concepts like creating a harmonious world and peaceful development projected in the early 2000s which makes it appear like an extension of peaceful development (Bijian 2005; Kawashima 2019). However, what makes it different from those earlier narratives is its scope and centrality within Chinese foreign policy narratives. It is usually referred to as a new approach to global governance. For example, Xi Jinping in his address at Beijing on 26 March 2019 at the closing ceremony of the China-France Global Governance Forum stated that: We must adhere to the global governance concept of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, insist that global affairs are handled by people of all countries through consultation, and actively promote the democratization of global governance rules. We must continue to hold high the banner of multilateralism of the United Nations, give full play to the constructive role of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Group of Twenty, the European Union, and other global and regional multilateral mechanisms to jointly promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. (Xi 2019)

From Defensive to Proactive China’s earlier discourses are also seen as having been largely on the defensive while the idea of CSF is presented as a proactive paradigm. The idea of CSF is projected as a Chinese contribution to the global norm-building rather than just a part of the narrative that China can rise peacefully in compliance with global norms (Guo and Yu 2021: 2).

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Additionally, the peaceful rise discourses have been taking place when China remains concerned primarily with economic needs and economic interactions with the outside world. But increasingly, the CSF is taking place when China is repositioning its security and strategic policies in the region as also beyond it. It is seen by many as a vision that rejects liberal values while emphasising the institutional architecture of the current international system (Xi 2019; Fu 2017). Additionally, China’s CSF also projects a vision of world order as community (Guo and Yu 2021: 1). Although scholars have recently started taking note of the concept and begun to theorise it as an idea of regional or world order in terms of region or world as a community, such a conception has received inspirations primarily from the speeches of Xi Jinping and other high officials that defines their Party line. This makes it also connected to the issue of enhancing Party’s legitimacy both at home as also in its immediate periphery. Before going into the details of how this concept is used in articulating that China-led regional order, it is equally instructive to briefly delve into its possible intellectual origins. Intellectual Origins of CSF The idea of CSF has deeper intellectual and political roots within Chinese domestic politics, International Relations theory and search for alternatives. As such, it is not just a moralist foreign policy concept and soft power tool while these dimensions of the CSF are also a significant part of China’s official narratives. Rather, it is part of the new strategies of China to push forward itself as a norm maker and not just a norm taker as the West would like it to be (Jianwei 2019: 22). In this regard, scholars as well as state have been attempting to push forward this vision in diplomatic statements, and official documents at different levels. As a result, two broad proposals have emerged from China’s mainstream International Relations intellectuals that have shaped the these normative articulations of China’s foreign policy in general although, when it comes to China, the direct links between the intellectual and State guided debates have their own limitations. This process had begun with Chinese scholars attempting to provide an alternative explanation for the rise of China and how it stood apart from Realism driven power centric narratives of war and peace determining the nature of international relations and foreign policies. These views have been grounded in norms, historical experiences, and practices during

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long Chinese history to provide alternative explanations for China’s rise. Yan Xuetong has attempted to explain China’s rise in moral realism terms arguing that morality (of leadership) is an important element of power which is understood in limited material terms by Realist scholars (Yan 2020: 3). But Yan Xuetong has also critiqued economic-centrism in Chinese foreign policy and argued that it should bring in new ideas of a harmonious world and the Community of Shared interests in its mainstream strategies (Yan et al. 2011: 152). The rationale in the normative argument of Chinese scholars is that moral leadership is different from leadership based on the superiority of military and economic power and hence, as a civilisational state, China’s rise is different from the realist perspectives of hegemonic wars between dominant status quo power and the emerging aspirant power. Be that as it may, the point is that norms have been central to Chinese foreign policy in these arguments. Another significant intellectual project has been put forward by Zhao Tingyang in his book All Under Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order first published in Chinese in 2005 as tianxia tixi yu shijie zhidu. The idea that Chinese history and ideas provide a better way of understanding and solving global problems is central to his project (Zhao 2006: 36). Critiques of it apart, the idea is that China should now push forward new norms. It is argued here that new ideas like the CSF are part of the larger normative changes taking place in China’s domestic politics and foreign policy. The idea of the world as a community in the CSF is closely related to the idea of the world as a family pushed forwarded by Zhao Tingyang and others.

CSF in China’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific The question is how does this relatively ambiguous and fuzzy and largely normative concept manifest in Chinese conception of the Indo-Pacific regional order. Yet, as Raoul Bunskoek and Chih-yu Shih have argued the idea of Community of Shared Destiny provides an alternative conception of regional order going beyond western conceptions of regional order, ignoring the idea and hence, its significance in Chinese narratives is not helpful (Bunskoek and Shih 2021: 2). Rather a serious engagement with these narratives is required to fully appreciate the role of ideas in region-making exercises. Norms and ideas have no doubt been at the very centre of various competing visions of the Indo-Pacific regional order. This has been seriously contested by leading scholars in the Realist

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narratives since the early 1990s over whether China can rise peacefully (Mearsheimer 2014). In that sense, these new concepts and ideas had begun to emerge in China’s discourse from the late 1990s primarily in response to these questions about its “peaceful rise” coming under question. But, the discourses of the CSF were to emerge not as reactive but as proactive response and hence, as an alternative rather than simply a defensive response to debunk Western notions. This also made CSF quite like China’s earlier discourses on China’s “peaceful development” and harmonious world. China’s proactive normative CSF idea has also been linked to its preceding narratives in articulating its security interests like its New Security Concept (NSC) since 2014 that uses some of the ideas normally defined as part of the CSF. In this, the idea of region includes the whole of Asia captured in the phrase in Xi Jinping’s speeches emphasising on “Asia for Asians” (Dong and Weizhan 2020: 506–7). Not only this generic scope of region is different from the Western conception of the Indo-Pacific region but it also includes the NSC that is presented as an open, inclusive and win–win idea for the region (Jiang 2014: 3–4). These norms and ideas are part of the CSF. Other scholars have also included inclusiveness, openness and elasticity in China’s NSC and connected it with the idea of CSF (Han 2015: 52). Here, the idea of region in China covers whole of “Asia” with respect to debates on US policies in the region that have preoccupied China’s foreign policy from the very beginning. This again indicates that China’s security, strategic and economic priorities are linked with pan-Asian imaginations and not just maritime focus as has been the case of the Western notions of the Indo-Pacific region. Second, China’s conceptualisation of CSF have also evolved in contrast to the “cold war mentality” of the US which is also seen guiding American Indo-Pacific narratives. On the contrary, to begin with, China’s CSF as a regional community is presented as part of China’s good intentions of seeing regional stability as prerequisite for national security. Shen Dingli, for example, refers to multilateral initiatives and confidence building measures like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) among others as driven by Chinese actions to promote region as a community (Shen 2014: 1). In a way, these ideas were also formulated by Beijing to allay fears of China’s rise in its immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, articulating of these new ideas like CSF and other norms have not only provided it an ideational resource to

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present China’s narratives but also by implication critique the FOIP while pushing forward its own vision of regional order. Also, since every state needs to legitimise their policies and vision, the CSF has likewise been used not only as a critique but a counter to other conceptions of regional order. Third, even the geographical scope of the region as it manifests in Chinese discourses remains largely continental as it puts Asia as the very centerstage of its vison of Asia–Pacific and somehow underplay the “Pacific” part of Asia–Pacific (Dong and Weizhan 2020: 506). Although it is difficult to judge the rationale behind such a formulation with convincing evidence there are couple of general points that can be made to derive some sense of the centrality of Asia in China’s narratives on its larger region. Put most simply, China’s geographical location between the regions like South-East Asia, Central Asia and South Asia make its security policies much more related to continental Asia as a whole rather than focusing on maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific as has been the case of FOIP that argues for a maritime regional order. This at least party explains why China has been a later comer in engaging Indo-Pacific narratives. Some scholars have, in larger debates on Indo-Pacific, refuted the idea that Indo-Pacific is an exclusive maritime region and asserted the intersection between continental and maritime zones as an integrated region, i.e. Asia (Pardesi 2020: 125). Within this continental Asia-centric regional order, there are of course subsets through which China has been pursuing its foreign policy. Here, China’s conception of Asia–Pacific policies intersects with its policies towards Asia’s sub-regions like Central Asia and South Asia. Zhao Huasheng indicates how Indo-Pacific covers Pacific more than Indian ocean region as such and hence, to counter it, China has penetrated into Indian Ocean though it is not as such a part of the continental Asia-centric regional order for China (Zhao 2020). Fourth issue relevant to this continental Asia-centric conception has been debated in terms of China wanting to create a Sino-centric regional order by replacing the US as a post-World War II predominant power in the region. The US has enjoyed predominance in strategic and security alignments and in many other aspects since the World War II. It has had military alliances with multiple regional players like Japan, South Korea, Australia among others and was the largest trading partner of most of these countries until the 2000s. The geopolitics of the region was anchored by the US geopolitical and geo-economic interests in

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the region. But all this had begun to change with the unprecedented economic rise of China from 1990s that also saw collapse of Soviet Union and US drift to the Middle Eastern region. China consequently was to emerge as the largest trading partner of most of the countries in the region replacing the US by early 2000s. However, in terms of military alliances, China continues to fall short of the US preponderance. Since the 1980s, China followed the policy of non-alliance officially and hence, China has no formal military alliance (Liu and Liu 2017: 153). But recently scholars and policymakers have begun to underline the change in China’s policy suitable for the emerging strategic scenario (Yan 2017). Although Chinese official positions and even intellectuals have consistently argued that Sino-US relations are not necessarily bound to lead to fall into the proverbial “Thucydides Trap” (Yan and Haixia 2012: 106), the US official narratives, on the other hand, have been quite explicit about such a possibility and blamed it on China’s actions and policies (Allision 2017). In the end, Chinese policies at a bilateral, regional and multilateral level have been aimed at and goaded by its need for security for ensuring its rapid development. At the same time, China has also evolved into expanding its regional influence in a way that makes regional order anchored in its own core interests even when security remains at the core of China’s regional narratives (Zhang and Tang 2006: 51). Nevertheless, China’s rise as an economic power has stoked fears as well. Especially, China’s ambitious Belt and Road initiative (BRI) has been one of those initiatives that have led to security concerns not just among its neighbours but also major powers like the US. The idea of CSF has been integral to the BRI that is portrayed in terms of win–win formulation as if benefiting everyone. China’s position on geopolitical dimensions of the BRI have been laced with the narrative of China being driven by desire to helping others develop as well. This desire however is not unique to China as it is generally articulated by all powerful actors seeking expanded influence. But it becomes important because many states feel convinced of having benefitted economically from China’s rise. This is where, the CSF as a normative idea begins to shape the dominant discourse in Chinese official positions (Chen and Zhang 2020: 10). This what makes CSF a formidable influence in the evolution of Indo-Pacific narratives.

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Chinese Critique of the Indo-Pacific One of the saliences of the Chinese critique of the concept of Indo-Pacific has been that Beijing has been against the “new cold war” or cold war mentality (State Council Information Office of the PRC 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC 2019). As a result, it has sought to present a conception of the regional order that must be devoid of building any military alliances that had once defined the cold war divide. Herein lies the utility of the normative and moralist ideas like the CSF. At one level, it works as part of China’s discursive practice that seeks to shape the overall normative discourse about the region. In this regard, it becomes part of China’s soft power instrumentality that has been generally defensive and reactive rather than proactive. The previous discourse on “peaceful development” was, for example, aimed mainly at countering “China threat theory” evolved by Western scholars since early 1990s. But this enterprise was clearly devoid of the proactive orientation to push forward new ideas and norms as is seen in case of CSF paradigm. The re-calibrated conceptualisation of the CSF, on the other hand, portrays a normative foundation for the idea of the Indo-Pacific region not in terms of hard-power driven geopolitics but as a community in the making. In presenting itself as an alternative it indirectly undercuts the lure of Western narratives. Especially the way the idea of CSF has been used by China to articulate its diplomatic positions and its centrality in Indo-Pacific narratives suggests that it is aimed at providing an alternative normative understanding of the Indo-Pacific region. Given that China has acquired substantial material capability, it is appropriate to surmise that, backed by BRI, the CSF has substantially reshaped the norms and rules of this region’s narratives. But this has also in turn compelled China to articulate its interests and policies in normative ideas and then to also become their prisoner and comply with all of these. This has also been understood as socialisation of China into the mainstream. Finally, the CSF as it is articulated in the Chinese debates does not have any focus on creating new institutions that has been the pillars of the success of post-World War II LRO that have facilitated the US preeminence in the region. Therefore, this community building approach remains yet to be tested and carries its own strength and challenges. To the least, it portends to be a long-haul enterprise. Besides, China faces an uphill task to materialise its vision of regional order through

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norms and soft power without relying on US “hub-and-spokes” like military alliances. Meanwhile, China’s approach to building an Indo-Pacific regional order also remains subject to multifarious strategic challenges. Most of these again flow from taking US friends and allies along in building a consensus driven regional multilateral order led by Beijing. China’s strength in economic sphere, however, allows it the staying power to initiate and participate in building a China-centric regional order. China-led free trade agreement like the RCEP presents an apt example of such leverages. Hence, China’s ideas like the CSF seems all set to play a critical role not just in terms of grand vision of its normative thinking but to contest “exclusive” initiatives like that of Indo-Pacific that is often couched in terms of the so-called FOIP narrative.

Conclusion To conclude, therefore, it is interesting to see how various stakeholders have presented both the material and normative or ideational dimensions of their respective imaginations about regional order for the Indo-Pacific. This has become far too complex in the context of an accelerated geopolitical shift from Euro-Atlantic to Asia–Pacific or Indo-Pacific. At least two of these sets, led respectively by the US and China, have come to be seen as competing and contesting. What is interesting is how both sets have shown enormous overlap through driven by contrasting motives and leverages and yet these cannot be disentangled from each other. Some of the western scholars like Ian Johnston or Stephen Walt have seen it as Western victory as China can no longer ignore norms evolved largely by Western nations and hence has to follow international norms while trying to redefine and change these norms and the regional order (Johnston 2019; Walt 2021). At their core, however, these contesting conceptions of the regional order of the Indo-Pacific are equally about normative ideas and material interests. Since the Indo-Pacific region has come to be a politically constructed idea, normative ideas like the CSF or LRO or Liberal International Order matter only in the way states conceptualise mechanics of this regional order. And finally, because each proponent of the Indo-Pacific regional framework has to legitimise its material interests and policies normatively the contentious nature of two narratives of the regional order do reveal their underlying contentions over material interests viz military, security and geo-economic interests. In this contested terrain of evolving narratives,

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the CSF construct has come to be for China what has been ‘liberal ideology’ in successive American strategies. But while liberal international order has been in the mainstream and presents a strong institutional vision which cannot be matched by the communitarian approach of China’s CSF, the latter does promise an attractive alternative that has influenced the emerging regional dynamics of geopolitics of region in the IndoPacific. The CSF has indeed begun to influence mutual alignments of varying visions of the FOIP undercutting its preeminence and yet even in most favourable circumstances it has a long way to go to replace time tested LRO vision driven currently by the Western construct of the FOIP.

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CHAPTER 9

China’s Regional Engagement and Quad: Mapping Conceptual Dynamics Mrittika Guha Sarkar

Introduction Perceived as the grouping of like-minded “democracies” converging across the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, the Quad—consisting of the US, Japan, Australia, and India—has firmly endorsed the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). The four countries have carved their niche by emphasising on the rules-based liberal order, resonating shared values as the core of the Quad. These were reiterated in their debut online summit on March 12, 2021, signalling a more concrete agenda, enhanced momentum, and a “vital arena for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” region (Government of India 2021). Particularly from the vantage point of the first-ever “Quad Leaders” Joint Statement, “The Spirit of the Quad”

M. G. Sarkar (B) Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institute of India, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_9

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sought to ensure an Indo-Pacific founded on freedom, openness, inclusivity, health, democratic values and be devoid of coercion. However, the values mentioned above imbibe greater significance in view of Xi Jinping’s principal slogan of “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (CFSM), which also echo a similar sentiment while projecting Beijing as an earnest builder of global peace, development, and a defender of international order to ensure a just, secure, and prosperous world (China Daily 2017). What is noteworthy is that President Xi’s new outline marks China’s strategic shift from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide-and-bide” dictum to a global activist one, underpinning China’s nationalist geo-economic and geostrategic motives, reflected in its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) as also its supply chain networks, military assertiveness and “wolf warrior” diplomacy. China’s Maritime Silk Road has been making considerable inroads in the traditional maritime spheres of influence by expanding its maritime access and outreach. However, this is where Quad has accused Beijing of facilitating unilateralism and opaqueness through its commercially questionable infrastructural projects in the Indo-Pacific, giving rise to debt traps and diverging from the values of “openness” and “equality”. At the same time, the Quad underlined how Chinese activities threaten the region’s freedom and security through its assertive diplomacy and aggressive military posturing, especially in the South China Sea. With this background, the chapter seeks to specifically examine the conceptual undercurrents between China’s regional engagement vis-à-vis the Quad’s tryst with the Indo-Pacific. It explores and analyses its evolution and likely trajectories to assess its impact on Indo-Pacific geopolitics. While doing so, the chapter argues that the Quad, to some extent, has the potential to become a balancer to Xi’s Community of Shared Future for Mankind which, for Quad nations, reflects the critical strategic underpinnings of China’s economic and strategic assertive adventurism in the Indo-Pacific. These have led these Quad countries to call for diversifying away from China-centric global supply chain networks to offset their economic over-dependence on Beijing. These, further, have been challenging the liberal order the Quad has been mutually aiming to defend in the Indo-Pacific.

Mapping the Conceptual Dynamics Despite the fact that both China and the Quad have contributed significantly to the Indo-Pacific area, there is still a large viewpoint gap between

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Beijing and the other Quad members. This has guided their respective policies and activities in the Indo-Pacific. To begin with, although the Indo-Pacific region is key to China’s strategic goals, the country’s official discourse has, more often than not, utilised the term “Asia–Pacific” instead. Nonetheless, China’s strategic community is beginning to discuss how to integrate the idea of the “Indo-Pacific”, although this has not been endorsed by the country’s leadership (Shephard and Miglani 2017; Medcalf 2013). As its economy has grown, China has felt more powerful in the ‘Asia–Pacific,’ leading to a corresponding increase in military spending. China’s ascent as a regional economic power and expansion of its authority as a vital actor in the region are facilitated by the Asia–Pacific concept, which bears all the virtues of Asian economic multilateralism for China. As a result of this conception of Asia–Pacific, China was able to join APEC in 1991 and the WTO in 2001. Further, China became one of the Asia–Pacific region’s most important trading partners, confirming its growing reputation as a global industrial hub. China’s commitment to the Asia–Pacific region has been bolstered by the global economic recession after 2008–2009. These factors have also contributed to China’s status as the region’s economic leader after the country became the first major economy to recover from the worldwide economic shock of the 2008–2009 recession. In particular, China’s expanding position in the APEC helped the “China Miracle”, which has led to the expansion and stability of the Chinese economy and, in turn, brought legitimacy to the Communist Party of China (CPC). All of this has strengthened China’s position as an economic superpower in APEC, the region, and the global arena, along with India’s absence from the forum and the United States’ diminishing significance in it since the postcold War Era. Thus, China has been leading APEC’s plan for an FTA, while the summit approved the Chinese Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Development of the Free Trade Area of Asia–Pacific (FTAAP). Further, China has recently funded the establishment of a “Sub-Fund on APEC Cooperation on Combating Covid-19 and Economic Recovery” to aid the APEC nations in recovering from the disastrous consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (Zhang and Zhang 2021). When viewed in a broader context, the Asia–Pacific structure has been a significant factor in Xi’s Community of Shared Future for Mankind. It has allowed it to take on the role of the guardian of the global system, in line with the Chinese perspective on what must be done to create a fair, secure, and affluent global society.

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The US-led Indo-Pacific construct, in contrast to the Asia–Pacific construct, contains Neo-Realist features and are limited to a security domain for China, both of which are unacceptable to the country. Because it is being directed and supported by the United States, it aims to maintain the status quo of American hegemony by using its great economic and military power to govern and control regional affairs. What’s more, the fact that India, Japan, and Australia have all come out in open support of this just serves to cement the region’s Neo-Realist outlook for China. The September 2021 formation of a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) that commits to support Australia in acquiring nuclearpowered submarines only reinforced this view in Beijing. It is vital to note that the Quad countries appear to be progressively filling the geopolitical void that has been underlying the rising Indo-Pacific construct. Much to China’s discontent, this is the very void that China has desired to fill ever since its economic boom. In this light, the Indo-Pacific poses a risk and contradiction to China’s own regional order vision and, by extension, the regional outlook that it defends and promotes. Thus, China has been steadily sprouting a revisionist attitude towards the Quad and AUKUS, indicating that it aims to change the U.S.dominated status quo (Schweller 2015). In retrospect, China under Xi Jinping appeared to express its discontent with the growing US presence and the US-led order in the region by embracing a “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation” in 2014. As well, it urged the “building of a new model of international relations” by forging various collaborations with all nations and regional organisations. It can be argued that instead of aligning with the United States-led alliance system and partnerships, China’s stated goal with these programs has been to construct a “China-centric” security architecture (State Council, The People’s Republic of China 2017) incorporating and bolstering India’s political, security, and economic upsurge, Japan’s reemerging prominence, and Australia’s burgeoning significance with their progressively firm attitude towards China. In contrast, the Quad framework’s members have been able to advance their own foreign policy, security, and economic goals with the help of the Indo-Pacific construct, therefore, it is clear that the framework’s continued use of this concept is vital. Their goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is to promote their diplomatic, economic, geopolitical, and military interests and maintain the security and stability of the

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rules-based international order supported by the present US-led status quo (Hanada 2019). The Quad, as was restated during the Quad Leadership Summit of 12 March 2021, remains “united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific” (United States of American, Department of State 2017). They work towards an area that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, rooted in democratic ideals, and untamed by coercion. Last but not least, it promises to promote a “free, open rules-based order”, entrenched in international law to strengthen stability and development and resist challenges to the Indo-Pacific and beyond (ibid.).

Maritime Silk Road vis-à-vis the Quad There is no doubting that the region is of critical importance to China. Its drive to combat piracy in the early years of the century brought the country closer to the Indian Ocean. However, China being the world’s largest trade nation and greatest importer of energy also reiterates its vested interest in the security and free use of the world’s sea lanes of communication. Notably, the Middle East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean account for up to 80 per cent of China’s oil imports, which travel through the Malacca Straits and other ports in the Indo-Pacific (China Power 2017). Also, over half of the world’s petroleum commerce passes across the Indian Ocean, while ten of the world’s busiest container ports remain located there. Hence, the ‘Malacca dilemma’ has prompted China to pursue naval modernisation and increase its maritime outreach. This requires us to be on the lookout for threats from both state and non-state actors and to be ready to deal with them accordingly. However, this also throws light on China’s perception towards the Quad, where, according to the country, the Quad’s regional participation in relation to the Beijing is intended to curb China’s growing maritime influence. Thus, for China, its vital foreign interests are at risk from the re-emergence of Quad since 2017, along with the Quad members’ pre-existing clout in the region particularly in light of Beijing’s regional vulnerabilities. Thus, China has delineated an elaborate project of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) that connects China’s busy ports to Europe via the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Gulf, and Mediterranean in order to protect China’s trade routes, increase China’s sway in the larger Indo-Pacific region, and extend China’s strategic objectives. As part of this effort, China is improving and expanding access to existing ports like Gwadar and Hambantota and building brand new ones like Xingang and Yantai

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along the way. Further, to realise President Xi Jinping’s concept of national rejuvenation known as the “Chinese Dream”, the MSR vision has also become an integral aspect of China’s overarching strategy. Beijing sees MSR as an integral part of Xi’s CSFM and a fundamental channel for interaction with the wider maritime region, which makes it a useful tool of statecraft in advancing a more robust China (Parepa 2020). China’s geo-economic policy of exerting its dominance in the area through the MSR is aimed at protecting the country’s vital strategic interests and goals. Because of this, China now has a better chance of securing the energy it needs and expanding its influence over the global supply chain, resources, and other essential inputs. However, in order to increase the MSR’s sway over the wider maritime region, it is also working to limit American influence in the IndoPacific at the same time. In order to achieve this goal, China has been trying to forge closer ties with countries around the Indo-Pacific coast. China has initiated a variety of partnerships, negotiations, agreements, loans, assists, and grants. Since a decade, Chinese corporations have been investing over $11 billion in overseas ports, allowing China to gain access to vital maritime centres and further establish its foothold in the area (Watanabe 2020). These facts have cast serious doubt on the MSR’s stated goals, which appear to be motivated less by pure economics than by China’s more far-reaching strategic ambitions. It is feared that China may one day use the ports connected to MSR to project its military strength in the Indo-Pacific region, and this is at the heart of the mounting suspicions surrounding China. Particularly, the ports (Gwadar, Pakistan; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Kyaukpyu, Myanmar; and others in Africa) would aid China in servicing and stationing its military assets, which would strengthen Beijing’s rising strategic objectives and mitigate its vulnerabilities in this region. The MSR has also been accused of engaging in debt-trap diplomacy through exploitative loan tactics (Chellaney 2017). Such claims are based on events like the creation of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, where the government of Sri Lanka decided to continue the construction despite initial feasibility studies showing that doing so would be unprofitable. As the port continued to lose money, the Sri Lankan government was eventually forced to lease the facility and a large parcel of land (15,000 acres) to China for 99 years. There have also been parallel incidents in nations like Djibouti (Green Belt and Road Initiative Center 2020), Maldives, Pakistan, and in some other African nations like Uganda, Congo, Angola,

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Lao PDR where the debt percentage has only increased between 2014 and 2019. However, amidst Covid-19, the repercussions of the accumulating debts have notably been felt as China faced rising numbers of debt relief petitions from BRI countries. Note that China does not have a program for debt reduction similar to the Paris Club, which lays out requirements and procedures for the release of sovereign debt. Nonetheless, Chinese authorities have repeatedly maintained their commitment to the G-20’s pandemic debt suspension measures. The majority of China’s foreign financing comes from preferential loans. The significance of the preferential loans for China was reflected in the statement by the official of the Ministry of Commerce. The official was quoted in the Global Times as saying that these loans were not appropriate for debt relief and are more problematic with regards to any serious debt difficulties. Some countries and groups have advocated for a simple debt cancellation, but this certainly is not going to solve the problem (Song 2020a). In a second article for Global Times, the same official commented on why just granting write-offs would not be in conformity with African countries’ long developmental goals, adding, that China will vigorously advocate the G-20 debt service suspension idea (Song 2020b). The fact that Chinese commercial banks, policy banks, and stateowned enterprises have lent approximately $152 billion to African states in 2019 alone adds weight to the comments made by China’s authorities (Mark 2020). Despite efforts to shed light on the matter, China’s lending policies remain shrouded in mystery, contributing to irrational beliefs about the borrowing country’s financial stability. Put in context with the global pandemic, when economies were already facing major financial setbacks, these facts raise serious questions about the motivations behind Chinese infrastructure investments. For these reasons, China’s lack of a comprehensive debt relief strategy remains hazardous, especially as the price of negotiating debt-restructuring accords rises and their fairness and transparency decrease (Lipsky and Mark 2020). There, the Quad countries have attempted to unite in opposition to China’s debt-trap diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. At the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, in 2018, former US National Security Advisor John R. Bolton had called China’s ventures in Africa as “predatory” and asserted that the BRI retains China’s blueprint to achieve its ultimate objective of world domination (The White House 2018). Australia, like India and Japan, has voiced concern over the BRI’s use of “economic power” for strategic objectives, even though it supports the initiative

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to improve infrastructure and create new possibilities (Government of Australia 2017). In light of the scenario mentioned above, the Quad countries have been taking initiatives to balance China’s unilateral and assertive engagement in the region through its BRI that employs unsustainable, opaque, and unjust policies to enhance China’s economic and strategic footprints in the region. To an extent, the Quad does have the opportunity and the desire to form a collective economic competence to contain the threats to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This has only enhanced since the inception of Covid-19, as many projects amidst the global disruptions and infeasibility remain halted, cancelled or lead to reconsiderations. The Quad countries have repeatedly discussed the need to enhance sustainable infrastructure and connectivity investment in the region. In fact, this was reiterated in the recent Quad Leadership Summit (QLS), where the emphasis was put on “quality infrastructure investment”, signalling towards China’s unsustainable infrastructure projects through the BRI. India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (hereon, SAGAR) program, Japan’s Equal Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), and their collective the Blue Dot Network, and the Pacific Step Up were all established respectively by the Quad countries to improve connectivity in the region. The integrated and multilateral infrastructural investment projects of India, Japan, the United States, and Australia can help advance a free, open, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. These programs are not now seen as big as China’s BRI, but they might be if they succeed.

Mapping China’s Supply Chain Networks For a long time, China has been the nerve centre of global supply chain networks, serving as the world’s primary manufacturing base. It has also worked its way up to a prominent position in technological supply chain networks, where it promotes itself as a pioneering manufacturer of not only traditional but also cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics (RT), space technology (ST), next-generation telecommunications (NGT), big data (BD), e-commerce, and more. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, China has used its central position in global supply chain networks and its strong industrial base to provide assistance to nations with severe outbreaks, such as Japan, the South Korea, and Iran, as well as to nations with fragile health systems in Asia, West Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Medcalf 2020). Indeed,

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China achieved a unique new feat of being the only one among major economies of the world to posit a positive growth during the year of pandemic as well. Meanwhile, the epidemic exposed China’s dubious behaviour in quashing early whistle-blowers and responding not-so-early, both of which were at odds with the country’s promotion of Xi’s CSFM. Because of this, there has been an increased emphasis on diversifying supply chains away from their current focus on China. The members of the Quad have been at the vanguard of a growing international movement to discourage countries from relying too heavily on any one nation. Japan and the other Quad members were the first to urge for a shift away from China as the primary source of goods. To assist Japanese firms in relocating production from China, the government allocated $2.2 billion from its Covid-19 stimulus program for 2020 (Japan Times 2020). The United States has also been under pressure to lessen its reliance on China by either relocating its industrial operations or investing in other nations (Shalal et al. 2020). Businesses in India have emphasised the importance of establishing domestic supply chain activities to de-risk from China, in line with Prime Minister Modi’s call for developing Atmanirbhar Bharat (selfreliant India). To the same end, in light of China’s economic coercive behaviour in reaction to Australia’s call for an independent review into the genesis of the Covid-19 outbreak, there has been a growing need for diversification in Australia’s trade and supply chain networks (Yadav 2021; Khan 2020). As a result, there has been a growing need to reevaluate their nation’s economic reliance on China and find better ways to diversify away from the People’s Republic. In fact, India, Japan, and Australia launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to diversify away from China’s dominance in global supply networks (Karp 2020). CPC, meanwhile, had responded by making it obligatory for the tech companies to share data and enable the government to retain control that further underpins Beijing’s strategic move to promote China’s technologies (Wheeler 2021). This leaves many global economies divided but increasingly determined to move away from Chinese advancement for their national security. An apt instance of this strategy can be China’s 5G promotion through the telecommunication giant Huawei, which was blocked from trials in many countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the US, and possibly even India (Buchholz 2020; Times of India 2021). In response, since last year’s virtual summit, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia have been working to develop a unified stance on

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5G communications technology, increasing their strategic collaboration within the Quad. The Quad members have made significant references to their diversification strategy and narratives surrounding it at their summits, stressing their intentions to begin cooperation on “the critical technologies of the future” to guarantee that innovation is in line with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for example, could begin by focusing on making of critical technologies like semiconductors a crucial future focus involving expansive technologies. As part of the Quad Leaders’ 2022 Tokyo Summit, they signed a new MoU on “5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN” to encourage technical interactions and testbed activity to increase interoperability and telecommunications cybersecurity (The White House 2022). The Quad Investors Network was established so the private sector could be more actively involved in unlocking critical and emerging technological opportunities. This organisation is a loosely affiliated group of investors whose primary goal is to improve the availability of capital for these sectors. Further, each Quad member enjoys a comparative advantage in a particular sub-field of semiconductor supply chain. For instance, the US remains an undoubted global leader in semiconductor design. US companies dominate two keysub-stages upstream—electronic design automation (EDA) and licenced intellectual property—to design processes (Sargent et al. 2020). Japan has a stronghold over manufacturing materials and chemicals necessary for chip manufacturing. Japan dominates in the etching gas market which assists in removing unwanted material from the chip with high precision. Japan, in fact, accounts for approximately 70 per cent of global etching gas demand (Reuters 2019). Besides, it also leads in the silicon wafers market, which assist in building semiconductor ICs (Lapedus 2019). India, on the other hand, has a comparative edge over trained human capital. Undoubtedly, semiconductor manufacturing is a task of immense precision that requires skilled engineers, something where India’s strength lies. To this, many semiconductor firms have lately been building their operations in India, with eight largest semiconductor companies having their design houses in India (Kotasthane 2021). Lastly, while Australia does not have significant presence in any of the abovementioned edges, it does occupy a significant position in the broader electronics supply chain due to the availability of critical materials and advanced mining capabilities. For these reasons, under President Biden, the US has also called for a semiconductor supply chain review by signing an executive order. It has, subsequently, stepped up talks with Taiwan to

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collaborate and invest further in Taiwan’s key chip and tech companies to secure the US’ chip supply chain (Kelly 2021). The Indian government had also started launching a myriad of schemes in April 2020 to bring in investments to create an electronics manufacturing ecosystem (Invest India 2020). Similarly, Japan has considered providing incentives for domestic companies to build advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities (Japan Times 2020). The first in-person Quad summit in Washington DC in September 2021 carried these forward by issuing an exhaustive Joint Statement, launching new formal working groups on infrastructure building and semiconductors and starting 100 Quad Fellowship and so on (The White House 2021a). Showcasing their prioritising the Quad, the leaders also announced the commitment to hold annual summit meetings and ensure more frequent meetings of the working groups and other officials. This grouping, for instance, has increasingly stressed on a new “rare-earth procurement chain” to offset their dependence on rare-earth raw materials in China. It is important to note that China has held as much as 85 per cent of the world’s rare-earth deposit and is home to 2/3 of the worldwide production of rare-earths and minerals like baryte and antimony (Nyabiage 2021). For countries, such as that of the Quad, this emerges as not only an opportunity, but also a warning to seek to diversify away from China to reduce their growing vulnerabilities, before Beijing utilises its position and monopoly in the supply of the strategic resources as a bargaining chip for political gains (Cheng and Li 2021). To this, the Quad nations can collaborate to ameliorate the situation both in the domains of production and consumption. As an important point, Japan continues to be one of the leading users of the largest rare earths, while India is responsible for 6 per cent of the world’s rare-earth deposits (Asia Nikkei 2021). These, coupled with the economic, political and military clashes between the Quad members and China, can contribute to acting as incentives to diversify away from China-centred supply chains.

China’s Expanding Maritime Footprint China’s defence of its national interests has made it necessary for it to increase its naval presence, which now includes the construction of overseas naval facilities as the Indo-Pacific rises to prominence in international affairs. Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the world has seen China proclaim various standards

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for itself, including Xi’s “Chinese Dream” and the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. While most of the world has been debating Xi’s two century-long goals—making China a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021 and a “developed, beautiful, democratic nation” by 2049—China has also defined three specific goals with regards to its military moderation: mechanising the PLA by 2020, completely modernising China’s military forces by 2035, and transforming the PLA into a “world-class power” by 2050 (Zhou 2017). Among these, China’s naval modernisation has been particularly striking, allowing it to expand its maritime access and outreach across the Indo-Pacific. This is being done to create a blue-water navy capable of projecting power even in the far seas and striving to achieve operational synergies as part of joint warfare (McCaslin and Erickson 2019). Moreover, it has been enhancing the PLA’s capacity to “fight and win wars” against sophisticated militaries by easing coordination between the military and the maritime militia, coast guard, and other branches of the Chinese command to advance China’s unconventional operational processes to assert its maritime sovereignty claims and to keep strategic sea lanes of communication secure (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s military has taken on a more aggressive and belligerent stance in the region over the past two decades, particularly in its efforts to discourage Taiwan’s de jure independence and to use “gray zones diplomacy” to gain control and dissuade other countries from intervening by the use of coercion in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS). This was strongly responded to by the Joint Statement of the September 2021 Quad leadership that specifically mentions SCS and ECS as areas of concern to ensure rule of law complied (The White House 2021a). But China has also been building its Maritime Silk Route (MSR) to indirectly strengthen its military presence in the Indo-Pacific which is seen as its push back to the US, as well as to influence its own partners and regional allies (Medcalf 2020). This explains why China holds regular military drills near Taiwan; the exercises serve as a reminder of China’s forceful stance towards Taipei and a warning to the United States about its strategic role in the region (Wong 2016). China has been increasing the PLA’s conventional missile capacity as part of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) in order to restore its primary strategic objective of control over Taiwan by deterring any American military intervention in the region.

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The People’s Liberation Army plans to destroy American bases in China’s neighbourhood, with a particular focus on Guam (Chase 2018). China still poses a threat in the SCS and ECS, even though the attention of the Quad nations has been growing. The People’s Armed Police (PAP), the China Coast Guard (CCG) (now integrated further into the military command structure through its subservience to the PAP), and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) have all supported the PLA, allowing it to play a major role in SCS and ECS. All of the aforementioned branches work together to keep China’s strategic aims within reach without resorting to open military conflict. China’s new coast guard regulation makes this point quite apparent, allowing the CCG to use force against any foreign vessel that enters what Beijing calls China’s “jurisdictional waters” in the SCS and ECS (Bloomberg 2021). This has also been an attempt to expand China’s military presence in the larger Indo-Pacific region that seeks to move beyond limited mandate of shielding China’s sovereignty, national security and maritime rights. China’s increased efforts have been directed towards countering multinational naval drills and other freedom of navigation operations, especially those conducted by the navy of the Quad countries (Sarkar 2020). One cannot dismiss the PLA’s role in China’s growing global footprint through the BRI as a means of protecting China’s sovereignty and vital interests abroad, and that includes the inland regions of the Indo-Pacific littoral as well. The People’s Liberation Army is responsible for protecting China’s investments in strategically critical Pacific Island nations, their ports, and the construction of naval bases in strategically significant places. This calls for close examination of whether or not the BRI is being used by the Chinese military. Also, one needs to pay more attention to China’s investments in ports that could help it become less reliant on foreign energy sources, as well as bases located close to China’s SLOCs (Panda 2021b). In constrast, China’s military involvement in the region, a central theme of the post-2017 Quad 2.0 meetings, has been surrounding around the promotion of freedom of navigation and the FOIP. Notably, U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) have been ongoing in the area (Panda 2020). Further, both India and Japan have reaffirmed the importance of freedom of navigation in the SCS for their own maritime aspirations and economic development at the first 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministrial Meeting between the two nations in 2019 (Press Information Bureau 2019). During this discussion, both nations

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stressed the importance of updating the Code of Conduct to guarantee efficient, thorough, and uniform observance of international law. The role of freedom of navigation in the SCS has also been acknowledged by Australia. Amidst Covid-19, Australia and the US had conducted joint freedom of navigation activities, restating their right to ensure a free and secure Indo-Pacific. However, creation of AUKUS (AustraliaUnited Kingdom-United States) defence arrangement in September 2021 shows greater co-option by Australia in building a naval response to China’s expanding presence across the Indo-Pacific region (Shi 2021). Even though India and Japan haven’t been invited to join Australia’s new Indo-Pacific coalition, the move still has repercussions for China’s relationship with those countries. Australia’s enhanced capabilities are expected to contribute to regional security in the face of China’s assertive and unilateral adventurism. With the “resolve to strengthen diplomatic, security, and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, especially by working with allies, to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century”, this formation emphasises the United States’ dedication to containing security risks from China (The White House 2021c). It also hopes to work together on developing a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, as well as cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and other undersea capabilities, with interoperability, commonality, and mutual advantage in mind. Importantly, they would not only add to the three countries’ strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific area vis-àvis China but would also guarantee a stable balance of power for both India and Japan. In view of escalating maritime threats from Beijing, increased military capabilities of India and Japan’s partners would allow for greater probable maritime collaboration between the two countries (Mohan 2021). No doubt China has vehemently condemned Quad and AUKUS initiatives; yet these have not prevented these four countries from sustaining their efforts to ensure restraint on China and emphasize on the importance of freedom of navigation in the areas China considers “its own”. In fact, the adherence to “the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity” had been a key point of discussion on the Quad Leaders’ Summits (The White House 2021b, 2022). This, in turn, has only demonstrated their acknowledgement of China’s growing unilateral and assertive regional policies and activities. Indeed, China’s expanding maritime access and influence in the region has made Quad countries

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take other significant measures like revamping their 5-Eyes intelligence network that includes Quad members (except India) plus Canada and New Zealand. Further, Malabar officially expanded to a form of Quad naval exercise in 2020, when Australia joined the fray. When it came to countering China’s military and political supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region, the fleets of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States staged their largest naval drills to date in the Indian Ocean in July 2020. This included the deployment of warships, submarines, and planes (Moriyasu and Khan 2020). The enhancement of these naval exercises and greater military partnerships between the four Quad countries can, in turn, pose a challenge to China’s assertive and expansionist presence in the region that defines the force behind China’s altruistic outline of its CSFM. In the end, all this clearly enhances the capabilities of both China as also the Quad with both sides presenting their own versions of ensuring peace and stability in the larger Indo-Pacific region.

China’s Vaccine Diplomacy Amidst the global pandemic, vaccines have become the new tools of reenforcing regional alignments. Providing medical and other assistance to nations has played a crucial part in China’s global diplomacy during pandemic times. China currently supplies vaccinations to 69 countries and exports them commercially to another 28 countries; Xi Jinping has reworked his 2017 Health Silk Road initiative as part of his efforts to reaffirm this CSFM goal (Yanzhong 2021). This has had additional strategic connotations attached to it as China would seek to enhance its influence—which has been under scanner during the Covid-19—by expanding its vaccine diplomacy, as well as strengthen its global economic engagement, helping it to score political points amid the absence of competitive aid from decelerating economies of G7 industrialised nations. Nonetheless many countries have questioned China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ because of doubts about the veracity of its scientific claims and the country’s ability to fulfil its commitments (Marlow et al. 2020). As a part of China’s CSFM, the Quad countries have particularly viewed the China’s vaccine diplomacy through apprehensive and cautious lenses, as some of these countries (especially Australia) experienced a sour taste of China’s rather assertive diplomatic approach (also referred to as ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy) amidst the challenging Covid-19 times (Ankita 2020).

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Thus, in response to the discrepancy between China’s and the Quad countries’ predictions, the members of the Quad have formed a “vaccine alliance” to increase their efforts to create and disseminate vaccines against Covid-19 (Panda 2021a, b). As the September 2021 Quad Leaders’ Summit statement expounded to “strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific”, collaboration on vaccine production has become crucial priority for the Quad’s collaboration in the coming times to enhance the legitimacy and expand the soft influence of the grouping in the region (The White House 2021c). As China rejects these moves as “vaccine nationalism” and a “vaccine divide” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India 2021), there are significant possibilities of the Quad posing a major challenge to Xi’s vaccine diplomacy being deployed under its banner of China’s Health Silk Road. The Quad’s commitment to deliver safe and effective vaccines worth USD 600 million strengthens the aforementioned case (France24 2021). Further, the US has announced its plans to contribute an additional $25 million to support vaccination efforts in India to buttress vaccine supply logistics, training of health workers, addressing misinformation and vaccine hesitancy (US Department of State 2021). The United States has pledged to supply countries in the Indo-Pacific area with COVID-19 booster shots and paediatric doses based on their needs. Further, the Biological E. Ltd. plant in India will utilise its expanded vaccine-manufacturing capability as part of the Quad Vaccine Partnership. The Indian healthcare sector will receive a boost from a joint $100 million facility sponsored by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the EXIM India. In doing so, it will strengthen the global defences against COVID-19 (The White House 2022). The Pandemic, thus, has added one more element to the Quad’s efforts at balancing China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region. This has seen the Quad being inclined to also co-opt the Indo-Pacific strategies of both European Union as well as ASEAN to further strengthen their efforts through parallel normative and empirical initiatives in the IndoPacific region.

Conclusion Though Quad’s counter to CSFM seems unlikely to find an easy success in marginalising China in the Indo-Pacific, it can surely act as a vehicle to

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balance China with its ultimate goal of making the country follow a rulesbased order in the region. Countering China’s MSR, too, would not be as easy as it is often made out to be. To start with, all these four countries continue to have difficulties arriving at a clear consensus approach towards redressing their shared China challenge. Also, a steady relationship with Beijing, particularly considering the economic interdependence, is essential to all these economies. This makes their first-ever joint statement of the Quad in March 2021, and subsequent Summits important and yet largely symbolic of the evolving and increasing synergies between the Quad members—particularly vis-à-vis China—which remained a major drawback of the grouping till now. The Quad Leaders’ Summits have produced hard and detailed results that make it potentially promising. They have, for instance, launched a series of expert “working groups” ranging from a focus on safe and effective vaccine distribution, critical emerging and innovative technologies, and climate change; the formation of these groups reflects a more conclusive and credible working of the grouping, with a greater possibility to play a further significant role in the region. However, the strength of economies backing their respective initiatives shows China gaining advantage by its gross domestic product crossing 100 trillion yuan ($15.5 trillion) during the year of pandemic 2020 that saw most other economies, including that of Quad countries, decelerating and in recession. This is where innovative and normative strategies of Quad can secure an advantage over China. Their increasing focus on joint infrastructural initiatives also promises to contain China’s unilateral and questionable projects under the banner of MSR that have raised concerns on their unsustainability as also their predatory, unfair and opaque nature aimed at creating a China-dominated and controlled regional order. In fact, a glimpse of such a concern was indicated during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the 21st Meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of State on September 17, 2021. It is here, that India sought to direct the focus towards the imperatives of connectivity projects which must be “consultative, transparent and participatory”, along with the emphasis on the requirement for “respect for the territorial integrity of all countries” (Ministry of External Affairs 2021). Thus, even if the Quad may not rival the CFSM and its compositions in the Indo-Pacific, it is here to stay, playing a core role as an entity countervailing China’s unilateral and assertive and assertive adventurism in the Indo-Pacific region.

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CHAPTER 10

China’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Madhura Bane

Introduction Pacific Islands Region consists of “14 independent and freely associated countries plus territories of U.S as well as that of other countries (France, New Zealand) which are mainly divided into 3 sub-regions—Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia” (Meick et al. 2018: 2). These are usually categorized into three main sub-regions and their constituent nations include the following: Melanesia (including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu); Polynesia (including Tevalu, Tonga, Samoa, Cook

M. Bane (B) Ramnarain Ruia Autonomous College, Matunga, Mumbai, India e-mail: [email protected] Present Address: Sir Parashurambhau College (Autonomous), Pune, Maharashtra, India

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_10

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Islands, Niue) and Micronesia (that includes Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Kiribati and Nauru). Remotely located, small islands of the Pacific are also culturally diverse with ample amount of natural resources and rich biodiversity (Runde and Rice 2022: 4). PIC’s are extended across the Sea Lines of Communication between Australia and America and this position lends them added geopolitical weightage. But, given “…their geographic characteristics, these countries are endowed with limited infrastructure connectivity that deters private investments, impacting their performance on economic growth and human development indicators” (ibid.). Hence, they have remained dependent on foreign aid and now they “increasingly face severe climate impacts including sea-level rise, changing temperature and rainfall patterns. These impacts result in changes in food and water security, loss of identity, climate-induced migration and threats to sovereignty” (Mcleod et al. 2019: 1). It is often not noticed that Pacific Islands region has always been an arena for great power contestations. For instance, during the first and second world wars, America and Japan were seen struggling to retain their control over these islands. A former President of America, Franklin. D. Roosevelt during the World War II had stated that, though Pacific islands appear as dots on a map, they are of great importance (Edel 2018: 3). Throughout the Cold War period as well, the United States had continued to dominate this region. More than 70 years later, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her remarks at Post Forum Dialogue at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) was to say: “This is a vast and dynamic region, a key driver of global economic and politics” and that the “U.S. knows that this region is strategically and economically vital and becoming more so” (U.S. Department of State 2012: 1). In recent years, there have been increased attempts by America, Australia and China to exhibit their interests and concerns for the PICs. In order to maintain unimpeded flow of goods across the Pacific islands and in the name of democracy to prevent this region from the emergence or influence of hegemonic tendencies this region has remained crucial for America. The most recent expression of this engagement came during U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to region in February 2022 where he said: “Despite on-going tensions in Ukraine, these visits were designed to demonstrate Washington’s commitment and

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focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The trip to Fiji to meet with Pacific Island leaders was an especially important signal that the United States plans to bolster its presence in the Pacific” (Wyeth 2022: 2). In the same month, Biden administration also issued its Indo-Pacific strategy 2022 in which it reiterated its pro-activeness in the region. Australia has been the other major stakeholder in Pacific Islands region. In Australian Government’s White Paper 2017, Canberra had underlined its “three priorities” toward Pacific Islands (Australian Government 2017: 99). These include “Promoting economic cooperation and greater integration within Pacific and also with the Australian and New Zealand economies, tackling security challenges with a focus on maritime issues and strengthening people to people links, skills and leadership” (Australian Government 2017: 99). And now, China has come to be the new interlocutor with these Pacific Islands. Before the May 2022 visit of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi to the Pacific Islands, China had released a document titled, “Factsheet: Cooperation Between China and Pacific Islands” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022a: 1). It first underlines how “China-PIC relations have entered a new stage of rapid growth” (ibid.). Then it seeks to assure to “build a closer China-Pacific Island Countries community with a shared future” by encouraging diplomatic exchanges and mutual beliefs, broadening collaboration and nourishing track three diplomacy (ibid.: 8).

China’s Engagement with Pacific Islands To begin with, the recent upgradation of the relationship between China and PICs to the level of “Comprehensive strategic partnership” indicates a new chapter of their expanding relationship (ibid.: 2). These far away island nations had remained a point of contention since World War II yet, for long, Communist China was never seen as a major interested party for this region. The key to transformation lies in China’s unprecedented economic rise since early 1990s that coincided with the end of cold war, opening avenues for reordering global equations among major powers, thus, underlining China’s expanding global engagement as also its increased sense of shared commonalities between China and PIC’s. Dr. Wang Xiaolong, China’s ambassador to New Zealand, brings out the vigor in their relationship in the following lines:

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We have a lot in common. We are all pursuing national development and better lives for our people. We share the aspiration for world peace and regional stability. And we hold each other in respect. Linked by traditional sea routes, the peoples of China and PIC’s have maintained continuous exchanges across the vast Pacific over hundreds of years. With cultures alike and hearts connected, we are engaged in practical and mutually beneficial cooperation. (Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022b: 2)

The Pacific island region “has long been perceived as either “an American lake” or Australia’s and to a lesser extent, New Zealand’s traditional area of influence” (Zhang 2015: 44). During the Cold War period America had followed the policy of “Strategic Denial” toward other interested parties aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from exercising its influence in the region (Henderson et al. 2003: 94). It was the split between Soviet Union and China in early 1960s that was to result in the normalization of China’s relations with the United States and its allies in the region. Starting from 1972, Australia and New Zealand were to establish diplomatic relations with China which was to coincide with the process of decolonization in Pacific Islands Region. Jian Yang in his book, The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Game (Yang 2011) aptly elucidates the immediate cause of China’s engagement with PIC’s. For him, “Beijing didn’t seem to have a comprehensive policy to engage with PIC’s until 1974. In that year, Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Fiji and the Soviet Navy paid several ‘conspicuous visits’” to this region (Yang 2011: 9). Since then, Pacific islands occupied an important place in China’s foreign policy factoring its support for anti-imperialism in the region. China soon developed close diplomatic relations with PIC’s like Fiji, Western Samoa and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Initially, this relationship revolved around political, cultural and social visits. For example, visits from leaders of Fiji, PNG, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati to China, or visits of athletic teams of both sides, visit of Chinese soccer team to Fiji, among others (ibid.). Throughout the1980s, China was to gradually upgrade these mutual exchanges. In 1985, Communist party General Secretary Hu Yaobang was to become the first high-level visitor from China to this region stressing that China fully respected their sovereign rights and their

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existing relationships with outside states (Henderson et al. 2003: 100). But during much of the 1980s, China’s perspective toward PIC’s was guided by their paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s principle of ‘Hide our capacities and bide our time’ which of course was gradually to give way to China becoming a proactive player in this region. At the end of the cold war, the United States was to substantially reduce its linkages with the region followed by the exit of former colonial power Britain. Further, Australia and New Zealand shifted their focus toward rising Asia, apparently at cost of their engagement with these Pacific Islands. This was the time when China’s economy was growing rapidly, accompanied by its attempts to convert its economic leverages into political influence. For example, during the Asian Financial crisis, China was among the foremost countries to assist South East Asian countries by not devaluating its currency. Since then, China “has emerged as an increasingly consequential player in the region through active political and diplomatic engagements, significant aid provisions and expanding trade and economic ties” (Zhang 2015: 44). It’s increasing involvement in Pacific islands can be illustrated with the brief insight on its cooperation in the areas which are of great concern for PIC’s namely, economy and climate change. Accordingly, as per China’s own admission, “From 1992 to 2021, total trade volume between China and PICs with diplomatic relations with China grew from USD153 million to USD 5.3 billion” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022a: 3). Table 10.1 provides a quick glance at the statistics of China’s exports to the selected PIC’s. During the meeting of China-Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation (CPICEDC) forum on 6 April 2006, ministers from both the parties had officially acknowledged that, Table 10.1 China’s exports to the select PIC’s Country

Year 1995 (million USD)

Year 2020 (million USD)

Fiji PNG Vanuatu

$15.7 $15.9 $1.73

$321 $922 $72.5

Source For updated versions see https://oec.world/

Annual rate of increase (in percentage) 12.8 17.6 16.1

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CPICEDC has been “beneficial to the win–win cooperation” in enhancing their trade and investments (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Jamaica 2006: 2). In 2006, CPICEDC was established as the highest level platform to facilitate trade between them. During the second CPICEDC in 2013, China stated that, “China and Pacific Island Countries have gained satisfying progress since the first Forum in 2006. Over the past seven years, bilateral trade developed rapidly with an annual growth of 27%. In 2012, the trade volume reached USD 4.5 billion” (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China 2013: 2). At the third CPICEDC in October 2019 Vice-Premier Hu Chunhua had conveyed Xi Jinping’s congratulatory message to Pacific islands region which exhibited China’s readiness to initiate the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Likewise, their two-way investments have also steady expanded. According to initial statistics by the Chinese side, by the end of 2021, China’s direct investment in those PICs, that have had diplomatic relations with China, had crossed $2.72 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022a: 3). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has since emerged as the major locomotive in promoting economic ties between China and PIC’s. To quote China’s President Xi Jinping: “BRI will open up new pathways for Pacific island countries to enhance business ties and connectivity with China” (Set Sail on A new Voyage for Relations between China and Pacific Island Countries 2018: 4). Henry Szadziewski in an article titled “A Search for Coherence the Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands” has noted that, “Given the difficulties in participating in markets in the Asia–Pacific, the BRI makes sense to Pacific Islanders long restricted to trade with Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific states. BRI offers the access to financing mechanisms which are crucial for PIC’s (Szadziewski 2021: 296). Ten PIC’s that have established diplomatic relations with China have all joined China’s BRI. For instance in PNG, BRI “projects included a significant upgrade to the road systems on the mainland, New Britain and New Ireland, the construction of a U.S. $14 billion industrial park in Sandaun province and the improvement of the water supply to Eastern Highways province” (Szadziewski 2021: 296). In February 2022, China and PNG had agreed to create co-ordination between BRI and PNG’s national policies called “Vision 2050, PNG Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030, and connect PNG” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022e: 2). In Fiji, for the construction of

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two bridges—the Stinson Parad Bridge and Vatuwaqa Bridge—Chinese government had provided a grant through BRI. “In Solomon islands as well, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation had been awarded a contract to build the seven China funded facilities for the 2023 Pacific games in Honiara city” (Veramu 2021: 3). Further, China has since occupied a crucial place in the economic policies of several other PIC’s due to its role as a donor. The following Table 10.2 shows the comparative data on Donors (China, U.S.A., Australia) aid spent on selected PIC’s in 2009 and 2019. As Table 10.2 shows, Australia has been the largest donor in Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu but there has been a clear decline in U.S. aid to these countries. Conversely, China‘s aid to Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu has been expanding. Observers have pointed out multiple reasons for PICs’ preference for China as an attractive donor. Though Australia remains ahead of China in providing aid to PIC’s, it is important to understand the unique nature of China’s aid policy. The aid given by America and Australia, for example, comes with stringent terms and conditions. They expect recipient countries to bring about economic and social reforms in their development policies of good governance, civil society rights and human rights. China, on the other hand, does not attach any conditions to its aid and assistance. China’s aid remains focused on infrastructural development involving building roadways, railways, schools, hospitals and Table 10.2 Donors: a comparative assessment

Donor country

China

U.S.A

Australia

Recipient country

Fiji PNG Vanuatu Fiji PNG Vanuatu Fiji PNG Vanuatu

Year 2009 (million USD)

2019 (million USD)

$6.08 $7.67 $1.42 $1.94 $2.76 $22.76 $20.07 $301.85 $40.04

$26.32 $67.64 $28.78 $2.83 $1.36 $2.39 $48.80 $433.40 $51.37

Source For updated information see https://pacificaidmap.lowyinsti tute.org/

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stadiums. China also maintains the principle of non-interference while offering aid. Irrespective of a country’s internal political, economic and social system, China remains ready to assist. It is perhaps most aptly manifest in the case of Fiji where “[A]fter its 2006 coup, the country went through a considerable period of sanctions, diplomatic isolation and aid reduction from many Western countries, especially Australia and New Zealand. Beijing, however, continued to actively engage with the interim government led by the coup leader, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Indeed, Beijing provided a total of $121 million aid to Fiji in 2007, attracting strong criticism from Australia and other Western countries. China’s aid and diplomatic engagement, however, drew praise from Fiji’s military government” (Zhang 2015: 46). Another issue that needs to be underlined is how China’s growing rivalry with the United States has often ignored PIC’s perspectives. For instance, the ongoing security competition between China and America “does not address the most significant security threat to the region— climate change—former leaders of Pacific nations have warned” (Lyons 2022: 3). This is one issue where China has sought to build leverages with PICs. China’s support to Pacific islands to fight against climate change has also been intriguing. In 2015, Trump administration’s decision to quit Paris Agreement had caused PIC’s to fall back for assistance on China. Solomon Islands officials opine that, America’s apathy to fight against climate change was disappointing. They have argued that China may be a major greenhouse gas emitter but it has also helped PIC’s to deal with their climate change challenges. It has been claimed that climate change is one of the factors due to which Solomon Islands and Kiribati have switched their diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China. China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 2011 mentions its commitment to tackle the issue of climate change in this region. In its efforts to bolster renewable energy in PIC’s two Chinese enterprises have established hydropower plants in Fiji and PNG. In Fiji, Hunan Construction Engineering group has built a hydropower plant. In 2018, China Dongfang Electric Corporation got a contract to construct hydropower plant in PNG (Zhang 2020b: 2). Since 2019, China has also launched a capacitybuilding program and “held three South-South cooperation training sessions for PICs under the theme of Tackling Climate Change for Green and Low-carbon Development. China has also provided multiple batches of supplies to PICs to tackle climate change” (Ellis 2022: 11).

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In order to ensure food security to PIC’s, China has established agricultural demonstration farms in Fiji, PNG, Vanuatu, Niue etc. Fiji receives benefits from China’s Juncao (meaning fungi and grass) Technology that was invented in the 1980s by Lin Zhanxi, a professor at China’s Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, who is also the chief scientist for the China-Fiji Juncao Technology Cooperation Project launched in 2014 after the Chinese and Fijian governments signed an agreement to start agricultural cooperation (Global Times 2022: 4). Chinese experts have so far trained 1,704 Fijians, including female farmers, disabled persons and even tour managers who lost their jobs due to COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, they have sent 45 officials of Fiji’s Ministry of Agriculture and technicians to be trained at China’s Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University (Global Times 2022: 5). Scholars project China’s presence in PIC’s to grow in the coming times and raised questions whether China should be countered or accommodated in extant regional arrangements. J. Reilly Henderson and N Peffer assert that, China is not only filling the vacuum created by Western neglect but also embracing the Pacific islands in its pursuit to become a major power in Asia–Pacific. Furthermore, they state that the region may turn into China’s area of influence where it possibly finds new allies and acquire legitimacy (Henderson et al. 2003: 94). Experts believe that “Beijing’s heightened engagement in the region in recent years is largely driven by its interests in the following three areas: (1) promoting its diplomatic and strategic priorities; (2) reducing Taiwan’s international space; and (3) gaining access to raw materials and natural resources” (Meick et al. 2018: 4).

Competition Between China and Taiwan Taiwan has been one of the significant actors in this region which also determines China’s approach toward these PICs. China considers Taiwan as its renegade province and “[F]or decades China has run a concerted and successful diplomatic campaign to isolate and prostrate the Taiwanese nation” (Funnell 2020: 3). There has been constant struggle between China and Taiwan to get diplomatic support from these PIC’s. It can be argued that, China’s policy of engagement with these PIC’s to a great deal has revolved around its competition with Taiwan. “Taiwan is one of the East Asian Tiger economies, with a democratic polity”. However, Taiwan is also “a sort of ‘friend’ you are happy to chat

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with at a dimly lit party, just as long as no one posts photo of the two of you on Facebook” (ibid.). Neither America nor its allies such as U.K., Germany, and Australia have their embassies in Taiwan. China considers Taiwan as an inseparable part of itself. To quote one Chinese diplomat, the “settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interests of Chinese nation” (The Office of Charge d’ Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania, n.d.: 1). He cites from the White Paper titled The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue to say that, No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext. (ibid.: 9)

Currently, Taiwan maintains diplomatic relationship with a total of 14 nation-states in the world. Out of these four are from Pacific Islands Countries. They are Marshal Islands, Republic of Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu. In the year 2019 Taiwan faced a major diplomatic shock when two important PICs—namely Solomon Islands and Kiribati—decided to switch their diplomatic support from Taipei to Beijing. China claims that Taiwan inherently belongs to it because Taiwan’s population is dominated by ethnic Hans and that Taiwan was a part of the Qing Empire. China has repeatedly asserted it’s ‘One China Policy’ which is a “diplomatic acknowledgment that People’s Republic of China is the sole government and Taiwan is a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland” (Salem 2020: 2). The existence of sovereign Taiwan therefore challenges Beijing’s One-China policy. Due to their vulnerability and voting rights in United Nations and other international bodies, these PICs have played a significant role in China-Taiwan competition to gain international diplomatic support. Joseph A. Bosco in his article titled ‘Taiwan and Strategic Security’ elucidates this geo-strategic importance of Taiwan for China saying that “[S]ituated at the edge of the South China Sea’s (SCS) shipping lanes, Taiwan is positioned 100 miles East of China” (Bosco 2015: 2). So other than its emotional and alleged historical connections to Taiwan, China’s

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control over Taiwan would enable it to carry out its operations in SCS and advocate its “territorial and maritime claims more aggressively” (ibid.: 3). It can be argued that China’s core interest of national reunification as well as geo-strategic interests make its ensuring its hold over Taiwan a prerequisite for Beijing. Beijing, accordingly, has tried to wipe out any signs of Taiwanese sovereignty from the international scene. For instance, during any Olympic qualifier Taiwanese players have to be referred as a team belonging to the Chinese Taipei. In May 2018, the website of Philippines Airlines had mentioned Taiwan as Taipei and a part of China. Similarly, the organizers of the Man Booker International Prize have changed the nationality of “Taiwanese nominee Professor Wu Ming Yi from Taiwan to Taiwan China” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018: 4). J.P. Morgan Chase and Company had also made changes on its website’s designation as Taiwan, China. Since the UN permanent seat and veto right was bestowed upon PRC in early 1970s, Taiwan has continued to fight back and also intensified its diplomatic competition with Beijing by providing development aid to various cash-starved countries around the world. This has been done to protect its diplomatic recognition among few countries that still recognize Taiwan (Salem 2020: 1). This has seen both China and Taiwan pouring aid in newly independent PIC’s which has since come to be called as their “chequebook diplomacy” in the south Pacific (Zhang 2015: 51). See two comparative tables—Tables 10.3 and 10.4 on the foreign aid provided to PICs by Beijing and Taipei. Table 10.3 China’s Aid in USD million (spent) on Pacific Islands in 2009 and 2019

Recipient Country

Year 2009

Micronesia, FED. STS PNG Vanuatu Fiji Tonga Samoa Cook Islands

$660 k $7.67 million $1.42 million $6.08 million $18.77 million $27.97 million $1.00 million

2019 (million) $7.00 $67.64 $28.78 $26.32 $9.58 $13.12 $16.95

Source For updated version see https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute. org/

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Table 10.4 Taiwan’s Aid in USD million (spent) on Pacific Islands in 2009 and 2019

Recipient Country

Year 2009 (million)

Solomon Islands Nauru Tuvalu Kiribati Palau Fiji Marshal Islands

$5.02 $4.06 $4.91 $8.28 – – –

2019 $8.59 million $61 k $7.44 million $13.28 million $3.37 million $61 million $8.30 million

Source For updated version see https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute. org/

The total amount of aid spent by China on Pacific islands in 2009 was $63.57 million which increased to $169.59 million in 2019 and the total amount of aid spent by Taiwan on Pacific islands in 2009 was $22.28 million which has seen a growth by $41.10 million in 2019 (Lowy institute Pacific Aid Map). Although the total amount of aid spent from China and Taiwan is rising, China’s amount has grown much faster than Taiwan. This has made PICs “active creators” of China-Taiwan tussle and have continue to benefit from these foreign aid inflows (Salem 2020: 1). Both China and Taiwan have adopted varying policies and perspectives in extending financial aid to PICs. China’s aid can be labeled as part of South-South cooperation and projected as win–win policy where “[T]he Chinese government regards PICs as part of the greater periphery in its diplomacy and the southern extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” (Zhang 2020a: 4). The major part of Chinese aid is yielded for the construction of wide-ranging physical infrastructural building projects that receive concessional loans. Taiwan, on the other hand was once a beneficiary of foreign aid and now projects its aid as its policy to repay to the world community which explains why “Taiwan’s aid has focused on technical assistance in agriculture and health, government scholarships and small to medium-sized infrastructure such as a solar power plant in Nauru” (Zhang 2020a: 5). Second, Taiwan is also unique for being a new born democracy which is especially celebrated by China’s detractors among Western countries. According to London-based Economist’s Democracy Index 2021, Taiwan had ranked 8 in world’s hundred plus democracies (Democracy Index

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2021: The China Challenge 2022: 12). With respect to their equations with mainland China, many people in Taiwan support status quo and “[E]ven fewer express support for the unification of Taiwan with China. An overwhelming majority reject a “one country, two systems” model, a sentiment that has grown as “Beijing cracks down on Hong Kong’s freedoms” (Maizland 2022: 12). For being a democratic country, many of these variations inside Taiwan get reflected in its foreign assistance policies and in its engagement with the PICs. Third, what also makes it interesting is that in spite of their continued global competition, including in their engagement with PICs, the curve of bilateral trade and investments between China and Taiwan have continued to rise. China’s exports to Taiwan, for instance, have risen from $3.1 billion in 1995 to $60.7 billion in 2020. Likewise, Taiwan’s exports to China have gone up from $14.4 billion in 1995 to $104 billion in 2020. At the same time, competition between China and Taiwan in Pacific Island region has also continued to intensify. With the strengthening of trade and an infrastructural investments aid policy with PIC’s, China has made strong foothold in several island nations the region where it had no ties to begin with. Conversely, the number of PIC’s which maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan has diminished and is currently restricted to its engagement with those four PIC’s.

China and Solomon Islands Not only China’s economic and diplomatic grip on PIC’s has alarmed some of their traditional regional partners but has also impacted China’s equations with Taiwan as also with other major powers with stakes in the south Pacific. These major regional stakeholders increasingly have shared suspicions about China’s ability, even inclinations, to use its enormous economic leverages into cultivating political influence and even create a military presence in the region. This is bound to be detrimental for the regional security architecture. The most recent was the confirmation on a security agreement between China and Solomon Islands where experts have argued on how China is suspected of potentially building its military presence in Solomon Islands in the near future (Singh 2022). The impact of China’s presence in Solomon Islands can already be seen in its changing policies. On 16 September 2019, for instance, “the cabinet of Solomon Islands voted to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, ending its 36-years-old official relationship with

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Taiwan” (Li 2020: 2). Few weeks later when Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, visited Beijing he received the package of a range of economic incentives. Among other things, China and Solomon Islands during this visit signed a Memorandum of Understanding that has “secured a promise from China to build a multi-million dollar stadium in the country” (Cavanough 2019: 3). Besides, some Chinese firms were also awarded the right to build infrastructure, roads, bridges, and power infrastructure in order to revive the “Gold Ridge- Solomon Islands’ most lucrative gold mine” (ibid.). As for Taiwan, the switch of the diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing has already created distress for Taiwan and also for other traditional regional partners of the PICs. First shock of this shift had arrived in the form of the agreement permitting Chinese company China Sam Enterprise to take Tulagi Islands for 75 years on lease for developmental purposes. Later, in face of pressure from its regional partners, this deal was declared unlawful by Solomon Islands. Second, the draft of security agreement between China and Solomon Islands that was leaked in March 2022 on a social network had again led to serious concerns being expressed from the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand (Singh 2022). The leaked draft has stated that, on the request of Solomon Islands, China is allowed to send security personnel to the Islands for the sake of keeping social order. It has further mentioned that, with the approval from Solomon Islands, Chinese ships could stop by to restore logistics and transition. In April 2022, the Chinese side was to confirm that China and Solomon Islands have officially signed an “intergovernmental framework agreement on security cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022d: 1). China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin underlined the centrality of Solomon Islands in the security agreement in the following words: The agreement is based on respecting the will and actual need of Solomon Islands. The two sides will conduct cooperation in such areas as maintenance of social order, protection of the safety of people’s lives and property, humanitarian assistance and natural disaster response, in an effort to help Solomon Islands strengthen capacity building in safeguarding its own security. (ibid.: 3)

Similarly, after signing the security agreement with China, Solomon Islands’ leadership has sought to balance their response to assuage

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concerns of their traditional regional partner countries. Prime Minister of Solomon Islands addressed the Parliament in the last week of April 2022. On that occasion, he shared the reference of riots of November 2021 and its impact on social and economic life. Hence, he also underlined how their security agreement with Australia was insufficient “to deal with the hard internal threats” of Solomon Islands (Solomon Star 2022: 3). But at the same time he also clarified that in the context of such disturbances in the country, the government is left with no option but to have a bilateral security agreement with other partners. He has assured that, the security agreement does not allow China to have a military base. Nevertheless, these concerns continue to be raised in the US, Australia and New Zealand and this has only made Beijing all the more assertive. For example, while commenting on Reuters’ statement about the possible discussion on China during forthcoming visit of U.S. senior officials to Solomon Islands Wang Wenbin said: PICs are not the backyard of anyone, still less chess pieces in a geopolitical confrontation. PICs have the actual need to diversify their cooperation with other countries and the right to independently choose their cooperation partners. Deliberately sensationalizing an atmosphere of tension and stoking bloc confrontation will get no support in the region. Attempts to meddle with and obstruct PICs’ cooperation with China will be in vain. (ibid.: 11)

He further added that China is always a builder of peace and a promoter of stability in the South Pacific region. Certain countries, including the US, groundlessly smear China while creating the so-called trilateral security partnership, which has brought nuclear proliferation risks and Cold War mentality to the South Pacific region and posed a severe threat to regional security and stability. The label of “undermining regional security” suits them better than anyone else. (ibid.)

Thus even though, in line with its overall policy in such matters, China has rejected the insinuations about its interest in creating naval or military bases on Solomon Islands or in any other of the PICs, China’s track record still continues to ignite skeptical prognosis. After Djibouti in the Indian Ocean, Solomon Islands in the Pacific are expected to emerge as another critical outpost of China’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

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This is what makes this China-Solomon Islands security agreement part of its China’s geo-strategic inroads that could potentially see it emerge as one more naval base of China to project power in the larger IndoPacific geopolitics. Some experts believe that “A Chinese naval base in the Solomon Islands could be used to interdict military reinforcement for Taiwan. Even an isolated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) facility in the Solomon’s used for intelligence gathering and presence patrols would complicate defense planning for Australia and, to some extent, the United States” (Graham 2022: 3). Kim. P.N. in her article titled, “Does the China-Solomon Islands Security Pact Pretend a more interventionist Beijing” explains this shift in China’s plan of action in dealing with other countries (Kim 2022: 1). Until now it is utilizing trade, investment, culture and tourism to expand its sphere of influence. With this security agreement it has accepted to provide internal security. Kim P.N. claims that, China is intervening in the internal struggle. Skeptics have also argued that, in the name of maintaining social order, China can halt the democratic process by supporting a non-democratic regime in the region. Gordon Nanau’s article titled “Solomon Islands—China Security Deal is about local needs not Geopolitics” conversely shares positive views on the agreement (Nanau 2022: 1). He believes that, Solomon Islands wants extra backing to its police force; thus it signed the agreement with China. Further his question on “whether Chinese style of forceful policing is something that Solomon Islands wish to emulate” need to be examined (Nanau 2022: 2). Thus, with China’s expanding footprint across the PICs such insinuations about China’s increasing presence in the Indo-Pacific have continued to rise highlighting the unique advantages that China’s Indo-Pacific engagements could draw upon in engaging with these PICs.

Conclusion As the geopolitics of a larger Indo-Pacific gains traction, the focus has lately come to be on the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in the South Pacific Region that provide both new opportunities but also challenges to its old and new partner nations that are seen increasingly competing to fulfill respective foreign policy goals. No doubt, PIC’s are economically vulnerable yet this newfound interest in PICs has helped them in channelizing their existential challenges including climate change at various international forums. The critical question is whether these PICs

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will be able to use these old and new linkages with major powers and facilitate healthy competition in the Indo-Pacific or become vulnerable to U.S.-China contestations. As of now, some of these questions have only very tentative answers though some trends of China’s increasing engagement showing signs of being potentially system shaping can be seen strong enough to demand a scrutiny and response from major traditional partners of the PICs. In his visit to all 10 PICs in early 2022, China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, had presented a multilateral agreement to foster the economic and security cooperation with all the PIC’s. However, due to the inadequate support from among the PIC’s his proposal remains in suspended animation. This indicates the readiness of the PIC’s to mold China’s intent so as to reduce its disruptive impact. But PICs need their traditional partners to withstand Beijing’s pulls and pressures. The most urgent remains their need to redress the negative impacts of climate change and the pandemic where China has shown stronger willingness and support. This also points to China’s growing presence in the region with strong system shaping potential. Will the United States and its regional allies— Australia and New Zealand—be able to balance China’s leverages remains as yet uncertain. Besides, there is the ‘Taiwan factor’ that has been another unique driver of China’s engagement with these PICs as with the larger Indo-Pacific region.

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from https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/the-geostrategic-challenge-andopportunity-of-the-south-pacific/. Ellis, C.D. (2022, May 27). The China Pacific Island Countries Common Development Initiative:Content and Analysis. Silk Road Briefing. (pg. 1–19). Retrieved from https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/05/26/thechina-pacific-island-countries-common-development-initiative-content-ana lysis/. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Jamaica. (2006, April 6). China and the Pacific Island Countries Sign the Action Plan of China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation. (pg. 1–3). Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cejm/eng/xw/t245502.htm. Funnell, A. (2020, February 27). Taiwan Is Standing Up as an Independent Nation but China Won’t Make It Easy. ABC NEWS. (pg. 1– 13). Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-27/taiwan-ind ependent-nation-democracy-in-shadow-of-china/11981540. Global Times. (2022, June 7). China’s Juncao Technology Helps Fijians Improve Livelihood. (pg. 1–9). Retrieved from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/ 202206/1267461.shtml. Graham, E. (2022, May 5). Assessing the Solomon Islands’ New Security Agreement with China. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (pg. 1–9). Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/05/china-solomon-islands. Henderson, J., Reilly, B., & Peffer, N. (2003). Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania. The National Interest, (72), (94–104). Retrieved from https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/ben_reilly/breilly1.pdf. Kim, P.M. (2022, May 6). Does the China-Solomon Islands Security Pact Pretend a More Interventionist Beijing. BROOKINGS. (pg. 1–5). Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/06/doesthe-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-portend-a-more-interventionist-bei jing/. Li, J. (2020, January 3). Solomon Islands: A Pacific Linchpin is pulled. The Diplomat. (pg. 1–7). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/sol omon-islands-a-pacific-linchpin-is-pulled/. Lowy Institute. (n.d.). Pacific Map (short introduction video to dashboard to their data-base on Pacific Islands, accessed on 9 July 2022), https://pacificai dmap.lowyinstitute.org/. Lyons, M. (2022, April 29). Climate Crisis-Not China—Is Biggest Threat to Pacific, Say Former Leaders. The Guardian. (pg. 1– 8). Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/29/cli mate-crisis-not-china-is-biggest-threat-to-pacific-say-former-leaders. Maizland, L. (2022, May 26). Why China-Taiwan Relations are so Tense. Council on Foreign Relations. (pg. 1–16). Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/bac kgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden#chapter-title-0-8.

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Mcleod, E., Adams, M.B., Forster, J., Franco, C., Gaines, G., Gorong, B., James, R., Kulwaum, G.P., Tara, M., & Terk, E. (2019, June 18). Lessons From the Pacific Islands—Adapting to Climate Change by Supporting Social and Ecological Resilience. (pg. 1–5). Retrieved from https://www.frontiersin.org/ articles/10.3389/fmars.2019.00289/full. Meick, E., Ker, M., & Chan, H.M. (2018, June 14). China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States. U.S.– China Economic and Security Review Commission. (pp. 1–34). Retrieved from https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Pacific%20I slands%20Staff%20Report.pdf or https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-eng agement-pacific-islands-implications-united-states. Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China. (2013, November 12). Address of Wang Yang at the 2nd China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum and the Opening Ceremony of 2013 China International Show on Green Innovative Products & Technologies. (pg. 1–8). Retrieved from http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/sig nificantnews/201311/20131100386982.shtml. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2022a). Factsheet: Cooperation Between China and Pacific Islands, op. cit., p. 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2022b, March 11). China: A Development Partner to the Pacific Region (pg. 1–4). Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/ zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202203/t20220311_10650946.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2022c, May 24). Factsheet: Cooperation Between China and Pacific Islands. (pg. 1–9). Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_6 65393/202205/t20220524_10691917.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2022d, April 19). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on April 19, 2022 (pg. 1–6). Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202204/t20220 419_10669768.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China. (2022e, February 5). Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. (pg. 1–4). Retrieved from https://www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202202/t20220205_106 39296.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan). (2018, December 12). Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence. (pg.

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1–13). Retrieved from https://ws.mofa.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS 9VcGxvYWQvT2xkRmlsZS9XZWJBcmNoaXZlLzI0NTkvSW5zdGFuY2Vz IG9mIENoaW5h4oCZcyBJbnRlcmZlcmVuY2Ugd2l0aCBUYWl3YW7igJlzI EludGVybmF0aW9uYWwgUHJlc2VuY2UucGRm&n=SW5zdGFuY2VzIG9 mIENoaW5h4oCZcyBJbnRlcmZlcmVuY2Ugd2l0aCBUYWl3YW7igJlzIElu dGVybmF0aW9uYWwgUHJlc2VuY2UucGRm&icon=.pdf. Nanau, G. (2022, June 11). Solomon Islands–China Security Deal Is about Local Needs Not Geopolitics. EASTASIAFORUM. (pg. 1–3) Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/06/11/solomon-islands-chinasecurity-deal-is-about-local-needs-not-geopolitics/. Runde, D.F., & Rice, B. (2022, May 27). The United States and Allies Should Make a Big Offer to the Pacific Islands. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. (pg. 1–15). Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-sta tes-and-allies-should-make-big-offer-pacific-islands. Salem, S. (2020, June 22). Sino-Taiwan Chequebook Diplomacy in the Pacific. EINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. (pg. 1–5). Retrieved from https://www. e-ir.info/2020/06/22/sino-taiwan-chequebook-diplomacy-in-the-pacific/. Set Sail on A new Voyage for Relations between China and Pacific Island Countries. (2018, November 13). Papua New Guinea Today. (pg. 1–6). Retrieved from https://news.pngfacts.com/2018/11/set-sail-on-new-voyage-for-relati ons.html. Singh, Swaran. (2022). Why China’s South Pacific Outreach Is Causing a Fuss. Asia Times (Hong Kong), (accessed on 9 July 2022), https://asiatimes.com/ 2022/04/why-chinas-south-pacific-outreach-is-causing-a-fuss/. Solomon Star. (2022, May 2). A Stable Solomon Islands, a Stable Pacific. (pg. 1–5). Retrieved from https://www.solomonstarnews.com/a-stable-solomonislands-a-stable-pacific/. Szadziewski, H. (2021). A Search for Coherence the Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands. In G. Smith & T.W. Smith (Eds.), The China Alternative Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands. (pg. 283–317). Australian National University Press. Retrieved from https://press-files.anu.edu.au/dow nloads/press/n7754/pdf/book.pdf. The Diplomat. (pg. 2–6). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/ with-blinkens-visit-to-fiji-the-us-returns-to-the-pacific/. The Office of Charge d’Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania. (n.d.). White Paper-The One–China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. (pg. 1–10). Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/celt/eng/zt/ zgtw/t125229.htm. U.S. Department of State. (2012, August 31). Remarks at the Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue. (pg. 1–4). Retrieved from https://2009-2017. state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/197266.htm.

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Veramu, J. (2021, July 23). Success Stories of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands. People’s Daily Online. (pg. 1–5). Retrieved from http:// en.people.cn/n3/2021/0723/c90000-9876177.html. Wyeth, G. (2022, February 16). With Blinken’s Visit to Fiji, the U.S. Returns to the Pacific. Yang, J. (2011). The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Game. Palgrave Macmillan, U.S., p. 9. Zhang, D. (2020a, January 20). Comparing China’s and Taiwan’s aid to the Pacific. DEVPOLIVYBLOG. (pg. 1–11). Retrieved from https://devpolicy. org/comparing-chinas-and-taiwans-aid-to-the-pacific-2020a0120/. Zhang, D. (2020b). Assessing China’s Climate Change Aid to the Pacific. Department of Pacific Affairs. (pg. 1–2). Retrieved from https://dpa.bellsc hool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2020b-02/ dpa_in_brief_2020b_3_zhang_final.pdf. Zhang, J. (2015). China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region. In R. Azizian & C. Cramer (Eds.), Regionalism, Security and Cooperation in Oceania. (pg. 43–56). Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu. Retrieved from https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Region alism-Security-Cooperation-Oceania.pdf.

CHAPTER 11

China’s Maneuvers in South Asia Reena Marwah and Abhishek Verma

Introduction China’s meteoric rise since 1980s has led scholars and practitioners around the globe to appreciate it as a systemic phenomenon, precisely because it has altered the fundamental characteristic of the international order from “unipolar” (post-cold war) to bipolar (or a multipolar world). In today’s technologically driven, highly interconnected, and hyper-globalized world, military superiority is not “only” an instrument through which international influence can be gauged. Therefore, even after spending less than half of what the United States spends for its defense requirements, China exerts considerable influence, not only in the Asia–Pacific region but also in South America, United States own

R. Marwah (B) Jesus and Mary College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] A. Verma School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9_11

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backyard. It is for this reason, various US documents explicitly consider China as their main strategic rival. Undoubtedly, as Basu stated, ‘China’s success is the outcome of an intelligent and hugely powerful government ’ (Basu 2013: 29). This chapter provides a synoptic view of China’s presence in the region of South Asia. With the rise in China’s standing and stature across the globe in general and the Asia–Pacific region in particular, its influence is increasing rapidly not only in the economic sphere but also in the cultural, societal, and security spaces. According to Shih, Manomaivibool, and Marwah (2019: xii), ‘China represents a real threat and a real opportunity, a component of the self and a constituent of alterity, and a bygone nostalgia and an inspiring future simultaneously.’ Evidently, South Asia, as a region, cannot remain isolated from an ambitious Chinese grandstanding. China’s geographical proximity to South Asia, political will and most importantly, deep economic pockets have often attracted the attention of South Asian states political and economic requirements. Hence, this chapter seeks to contextualize China’s linkages with this region, and given that each country has a differentiated understanding, engagement, and vision of China, there must be an attempt to present the bilateral as well (Marwah and Ramanayake 2021). As China’s economic footprint provides it with its political influence, it is also important to underline that, as Martin Jacques (2009), stated, ’China’s rise has been seen in almost exclusively economic terms failing to grasp the full meaning of China’s rise. Its political and cultural impact will be at least as great.’ This thematic analysis will explore China’s political, economic, and societal influence on South Asia as a region. The dominating states in Southern Asia (a geographic extension of South Asia) are India and China owing to their huge landmass and economic might. As has been explained by Marwah (2020: 25), Asia’s grand failure till date has been a result of the complacency of the East, its tendency to look within, its devotion to past ideals and methods, respect for those in authority, and being suspicious of new ideas. Asia lacked the excitement of Europe. Both China and India were self-satisfied, the former believing that they had nothing to learn from outsiders, whom they considered barbarians. Regions, as is well known, are fundamental to the structure of world politics and may even provide solutions to some global dilemmas (Katzenstein 2002). Hence, a discussion on the role of history and geography in deciphering China’s interest and engagement becomes pertinent.

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China’s engagement with this sub-region of Asia has been explained in two main sections; the first provides South Asia’s standing and importance for China, and the second provides Chinese political, economic, and societal influence in the South Asian region and how this pattern of interaction has impacted the region as a whole. South Asia: A Region of Significance for China South Asia as a region is bound by the common colonial history with nations having an imperial imagination of South Asia (Yasmin 2019: 324). The Cold war ensued amidst the bloody division of Indian subcontinent which led to the independence of India and Pakistan. Kashmir became a bone of contention between India and Pakistan with both claiming stakes over it. Post World-War 2, USA’s policy toward South Asia was mainly driven by the threat of the spread of communism in the region as happened in China. The cold war dynamics necessitated USA to keep developing robust relationships with both non-aligned India and Pakistan. For China, the region was of much greater historical and strategic importance, especially for its international relations and foreign policy. The Tibetan issue and fleeing of His Holiness Dalai lama in 1959, SinoIndia war and breakdown of Panchsheel Agreement have calibrated its engagements in this region. At this stage, it is important to understand the raison d’etre for China to engage countries in South Asia. With its deep economic pockets, China has profoundly influenced the smaller countries in South Asia, checking an aspirational and rising neighbor, India. There are many other factors giving impetus to such trends like the weakness of SAARC, China-Pakistan axis, Chinese involvement in India’s maritime neighborhood, etc. Such trends further create a trust deficit among two Asian giants, viz. China and India. This outcome has been realized even though China’s economic relations with India have consistently grown (Deshpande 2010). The idea driving the twenty-first century is not the traditional view of politics in a zero-sum game but ‘connectivity’ that Khanna (2016: 6) develops in his framework of Connectography, bringing out the compulsions of competitive geographical connectivity. Evidently, China’s strategy for aggressively expanding economic engagement with countries in South Asia is linked to checking India’s rise by exploiting India-Pakistan rivalry, enhancing access to the Indian Ocean, and countering terrorism and religious extremism (Bartholomew

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et al. 2019). Through the two-pronged strategy of exploiting IndiaPakistan rivalry to keep India engaged with its north-western neighbor, and providing economic baits to smaller neighboring countries, China attempts to thwart India’s economic and political stride. Hence, China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy’, i.e., the encirclement of India through port development is not without reason. In South Asia, these comprise Chinese investment in port facilities in strategic locations in the Indian Ocean (including Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives). These could well be used for strategic leverage. The following sections delineate the engagement. However, prior to elucidating the bilateral relations between China and countries in this region, it is important to introduce the institutional grouping of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which a decade after its inception since 1985, has largely become a function of India-Pakistan rivalry. SAARC—Limited Relevance and Outreach As stated earlier, South Asia, as a region, carries both economic and strategic importance for China and it’s great power ambition. By strengthening its relationship with South Asia neighbors, China seeks to dominate Indian Ocean region, generally believed to be the Indian backyard. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional grouping, which traces its inception to the year 1985, is increasingly fading into irrelevancy (Malhotra 2021). China has observer status in SAARC since 2005 and has been seeking full membership for more than a decade. A major impediment to the functioning of SAARC has been the acrimonious relationship between India and Pakistan. It is owing to IndiaPakistan border tensions itself that SAARC as a regional grouping has virtually been defunct since 2016, with the 20th Summit meeting yet to be held. India resorted to re-enforcing and promoting another grouping, viz. Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)1 (does not include Pakistan as a member) and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative (BBIN) to 1 BIMSTEC comprises countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand.

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move ahead with regional issues. A common running theme between the tripartite relationship between India, Pakistan, and China has been that of increasingly worsening India-Pakistan ties, in contrast to a more strengthened relationship between Pakistan and China. The economic and security benefits that Pakistan could have leveraged from SAARC is being readily made available by its “all weather friend” China. In order to counter Indian attempts to resurrect and revitalize SAARC during the pandemic, China hijacked the process by exerting its economic might. In a convened meeting of foreign ministers of South Asian countries except, rather understandably, India, Bhutan, and Maldives, China launched “China-South Asia Emergency Supply reserves” and “Poverty Alleviation and Cooperative Development Centre” during the pandemic (Bipin and Apoorva 2021). These initiatives became all the more important as these were timed to coincide with India’s disastrous experience with the second wave of the pandemic in 2021, when it was unable to export the COVID vaccines to its neighbors. By utilizing these strategic opportunities and constantly prodding Pakistan to stand against India’s interest (be it on multilateral platforms or supporting Pakistan on border skirmishes), China has played a significant role in keeping the SAARC grouping at bay.

China’s All-Pervasive Engagement in South Asia As explained, SAARC as a regional binding force has been of limited importance in the Indian subcontinent. Sighting this vacuum as an opportunity, along with other important social and economic factors as infrastructural deficits as well as economic challenges of small countries of South Asia, China embarked on a multidimensional engagement spree in South Asia. Acting swiftly from the provision of railways to waterways, gas pipelines, and electricity connections, China sought to attack the Indian brand of engagement that has often been criticized as slow in implementation. In order to provide an alternative and to possibly challenge Chinese economic influence, India re-invigorated with reinforced agility the important regional groupings and connectivity projects. The urgency of promoting BIMSTEC and BBIN is the compelling strategic challenge for India posed by China’s muscular geo-economic and geopolitical interventions in South Asia. The subsequent sections explore a thematic analysis of Chinese engagement in South Asia.

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Chinese global political strategy in general and regional engagements in particular is immensely powered by its economic might. Since Deng’s economic reforms in 1979, China’s economy has grown substantively, rendering further credibility to its diplomatic and military maneuvers. China’s membership to the World Trade Orgnaisation (WTO) in 2001, further catapulted China as the manufacturing hub of the world. China’s entry into the WTO was a formal recognition by the international community that the country could no longer remain outside the global economic architecture. It is Chinese “economic clout,” as explained by David Shambaugh, “that the Chinese government seeks to exploit both for economic benefit and to derive influence in many spheres of international relations (Shambaugh 2020).” In the economic domain, Shambaugh further explains that internationalization of renminbi (RMB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), can be understood as a response to the surplus of domestic saving (Shambaugh 2020: 114). The continuing rise of China evidently impacted its neighbors, both in South East Asia and South Asia. As this chapter focuses on China’s maneuvers in South Asia, it is not unknown that most of these nations are deficient in infrastructure, especially in the development of roads, railways, and ports. China was quick to identify these lacunae and leveraged it in their geopolitical ambitions. Given that China prefers to engage bilaterally, it was the frail polities, weak governments, low human development levels, and amenability to manipulation by international donors and multilateral institutions, which facilitated the smooth entry of Chinese aid, investment, and goods. South Asian countries have rising populations, which exert a strain on available resources. Bangladesh has a high population density, with an average of 950 persons per square kilometer. Most countries struggle with high levels of debt, low levels of human development, and low per capita incomes. See Table 11.1. Compared to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries are lagging in the Human Development index. Sri Lanka’s expected years of schooling is 14 years, employment to population ratio (15 years and older) is 50.2%, and per capita Carbon dioxide emissions is 1.0 tons. India has a ranking of 131, Bhutan at 129, Bangladesh at 135, Nepal at 142, Pakistan at 154, Myanmar at 145, and Afghanistan at 170 in the latest HDI. Under China’s much-acclaimed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (initiated in 2013), China Development Bank and Export–Import Bank of China extended loans of 282 billion dollars throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, building roads, dams, ports, and power plants.

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Table 11.1 South Asian countries: GDP, Debt, HDI, 2022 Countries Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Total SAARC

Population

Annual GDP USD (Mn)

GDP per capita USD

HDI

Govt debt (% GDP)

37,172,386 161,356,039 754,394 1,352,617,328 515,696 28,087,871 200,960,000 21,670,000 1,803,133,714

19,630 288,424 2582 2,718,732 5328 29,040 314,588 88,901 3,467,225

516 2503 3000 2277 8994 1223 1537 3682 1923

0.496 0.614 0.612 0.647 0.719 0.579 0.562 0.78

7.8 21.8 135 73.95 66 37.7 84 101 65.94

Source Country Reports, https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/south-asian-associationregi onal-cooperation, accessed on July 14, 2022

Table 11.3 shows some of the important and strategically significant projects in South Asian countries financed (partially/entirely) by China. Further, with Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific becoming new theaters of contestation, China has aggressively sought to increase the economic dependency of the littoral states through Chinese long term but unsustainable loans. A common characteristic of this style of lending (often called ‘debt trap’ diplomacy), is the takeaway of assets of national and strategic importance on lease in lieu of defaulting interest payment or principal amount. The mid-year 2022 economic crises ensuing in Pakistan and Sri Lanka can be, to some extent, attributed to Chinese debt policy (Chaudhury 2021). Pakistan has been the central pillar of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, a 3000 km long route of infrastructure projects connecting China’s Xinjiang and Gwadar port in Western Pakistan province of Baluchistan, has garnered a 62 billion dollar budget outlay of which 80% is being financed by China (TOI 2022). Certain reports have claimed that Pakistan had been granted loans by China Exim Bank not at a “concessional rate” as given to some other partners but at a higher rate (Naviwala 2017). Evidently, the rate of interest for Chinese-funded projects under CPEC is as high as 8% (Chaudhury 2022). In Nepal the situation is worse. After signing an MoU on BRI for 35 projects in 2017 by then “pro-Chinese” Nepalese PM Pushpa Kumar Dahal, these were reduced to 9 projects in 2019 (The Hindu 2022).

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Table 11.2 Chinese debt as a percentage of total debt of South Asian countries

Country

Pakistan Maldives Bangladesh India Afghanistan Sri Lanka Bhutan Nepal

Total external Total China debt debt (bn dollar) (billion dollar) 90.14 1.8 44.20 620 2 51 2.9 12

24.7 1.4 3.00 NA NA 5.5 NA NA

Share in external debt (%) 27.4 78 6.8 NA NA 10 NA NA

Source The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/; accessed July 15, 2022

Bangladesh is trading its opportunities with utmost caution. After joining BRI officially in 2017, both countries have signed almost 27 agreements. As a result, China has granted duty-free access to 97% of Bangladeshi products to its market (Pakistan Today, 2022). Recently, Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dr. AK Abdul Momen rebutted notion of a “Chinese debt trap.” He asserted that “a country needs to take 40 percent of its debt from a particular source to be in the debt trap. As the share of loans from China accounts for about 5 percent of its total debt, hence, the possibility of being in the Chinese debt trap is yet an illusion” (FE Report 2022). Table 11.2 provides details of China’s share in the total external debt of South Asian countries. It can be seen that the share is highest in the case of Maldives, viz. 78%; with that of Pakistan being about 27%. (More Details of the bilateral engagement are provided in the next section.) China’s Influence: A Bilateral Perspective Assisted by deep pockets and conspicuous economic needs of small South Asian countries, China often tends to deal with its partners on individual merits of the state. As discussed in the previous section, there remains a lack of transparency in the viability of economic projects. The state of affairs in the political domain is no different. In the recent Global Freedom Score released by Freedom House, China scored 9 with the

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remark “not free.”2 It has been primarily due to its increased surveillance activities and restriction on freedom of speech, with impunity, especially with the onset of COVID restrictions. The Chinese leadership hence, prefers to engage with authoritarian regimes and influence the latter’s political milieu. Chinese political influence in the South Asian region through bilateral specifics is now discussed.

India and China: Unresolved Borders India and China share civilizational and cultural linkages over several centuries. Sino-Indian trading relations between the seventh and twentieth centuries transformed from Buddhist-dominated exchanges to market-centered commercial transactions, resulting in interactions among communities on both sides, development of urban settlements of migrants as well as a shared resistance to British imperialist designs and hostilities (Marwah 2018: 3–23). However, as both India and China left the colonial legacy behind and embarked on their own success story, new power stature and ambitions brought these two nations into conflict. With India, Chinese political relationship has been fraught with instability and crises. Regular border skirmishes along an undefined 3488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the major cause of this instability. In recent decades, these border incidents have become more frequent, despite the highest level of meetings between the head of states. Apart from Depsang border crisis in 2014 and Doklam crisis in 2017, the Galwan crisis in 2020 saw 20 casualties on Indian side and an undefined number on Chinese side. This was the first time in over 50 years that casualties occurred on IndiaChina border. Two years later, even after more than 15 rounds of military talks, consensus on border crisis seems to be illusive (PTI 2022). Reports released in 2022 have claimed that satellite images show an apparent Chinese village being built on Indian side of Arunachal Pradesh (TNN 2021). Even at the Doklam Plateau, a site of conflict in 2017, Chinese have built a fully inhabitable village, Pangda (in Chinese). The area is squarely within Bhutanese territory along Amo Chu. Experts are of the view that construction along Amo Chu implies that China will get direct line-of-sight to India’s strategic Siliguri corridor (Som 2022).

2 https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.

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India’s political relationship with China is fraught with mistrust, historical memories and major asymmetry in power. Chinese role in Indian politics has been reduced to negligible as compared to their active endorsement of destabilizing activities of the Communist Party of India in 1960s and 1970s. However, there are other important means through which China has gained unprecedented instrumentality in India’s socioeconomic success. As China study centers in India are independent of any Chinese funding, direct political or ideological influence is nearly impossible. However, entrenched economic reliability in key industries like low–high-end electronic markets, pharmaceutical and photovoltaic source products, mobile industry, toy industry among others has ensured sensitivity to China’s core interests, especially until 2020, post which the relations have taken a turn for the worse. The report of border villages being constructed by China in Arunachal Pradesh has only precipitated the distrust. Chinese foreign ministry categorically stated that “we have never recognized the so-called Arunachal Pradesh. China’s development and construction activities within our own territory is normal. This is beyond reproach as it is in our territory (Krishnan 2021).” However, the report seems to be unconfirmed because Arunachal Pradesh CM, Pema Khandu stated that “no Chinese village has been constructed in Arunachal Pradesh and the construction is on Chinese side of the border.” Chinese activities in this regard becomes instrumental during elections because an effective response to China and Chinese assertiveness in the region could become an electoral flank and fodder for the ruling dispensation.

China: Afghanistan and Pakistan as Special Friends China’s interest in its western neighbor, Afghanistan, with whom it shares a 47 miles border, was largely limited to oil and mineral exploration, though not in any substantive manner. However, security concerns were also prioritized by Chinese political establishment owing to close connection between Taliban and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an extremist group of Uyghur militants. Their aim is to create a separate state of “East Turkestan.” In recent times, especially since US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and Taliban at the helm of Afghanistan affairs, China has immensely enhanced its outreach to the newly formed Afghan government. The security vacuum created by, what Jennifer Murtazashvili calls “de-Americanization of security in South Asia,

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has led to an opportunity by other powers in the region to reset security architecture in the region” (Murtazashvili 2022). In run up to the formation of Taliban government in Afghanistan, Chinese enthusiastic involvement in Afghanistan affairs through mutual visits of officials can largely be construed as security-enhancing efforts by China. The implicit rationale for Chinese engagement with regional countries and hosting several regional stability dialogues, has to do with gaining an understanding of Taliban government’s approach toward regional security. ETIM is believed to have strong ties with Taliban. Most of the ETIM fighters who are deployed in Xinjiang region for recruitment and creating instability, have formally been sheltered and trained by Taliban fighters (Small 2015). On the political front, China is currently trying to establish a credible soft power relationship on the graves of the United States’ disastrous and mismanaged occupation and withdrawal. Beijing’s proactive approach, visible in setting up of a bilateral working group with the Taliban on humanitarian assistance and economic rebuilding, could be seen in the context of its security concerns (Yau 2022). Since the cold war days, Pakistan has been the cradle child for both USA and China. As suggested by Prof C Rajamohan, Pakistan played quite smartly throughout the cold war to leverage antagonism between China and Pakistan, facilitated their rapprochement and then again firmly held China’s camp once US interest in the region ended with withdrawal from Afghanistan (Raja Mohan 2021). The cold war bonhomie between the two was reflected in 1963 when Pakistan gifted Shaksgam valley in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to China. In contemporary times again, Pakistan has allowed Chinese to build CPEC that will pass through POK. This increased political influence of the Chinese sometimes comes under severe attack by non-state militant groups operating inside Pakistan. Chinese nationals are often targeted in Pakistan as a marker of protest by militant and disenchanted civilians for their increased intervention in Pakistan’s socio-political space (Reuters 2022a, b). As Pakistan’s economy is experiencing volatility, there are often short notice high-level mutual visits in order to re-structure/re-finance huge loans and interest commitments thereafter (ANI 2022a, b). Table 11.3 provides a glimpse of some of China’s key projects in Pakistan and Nepal. China has indicated that it is willing to extend CPEC to Afghanistan.

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Table 11.3 Chinese projects in Pakistan and Nepal Pakistan (projects)

Financial commitment/status

Nepal (projects)

Financial commitment/status

Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan Free Zone Phase 1

USD 4million (completed) USD 300 million (completed) USD 10 million (Chinese grant) (Completed) NA (not completed)

Trans-Himalayan Railway 400 kV electricity Transmission line Technical university

NA/Not completed Not completed

Roads, Tunnels and Hydroelectricity dams

Not completed

Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute Swad Dam and Shadi Kure Dam Pipeline East Expressway New Gwadar International Airport Pak-China Friendship Hospital

Not completed

USD 179 million (99% complete) USD 230 million Chinese Grant (36% complete) USD 100 million (20% complete)

Sources https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/80-of-cpec-projects-worth-2-billion-run ning-behind-schedule-in-pakistan/articleshow/91419164.cms, accessed on July 22, 2022; https://fro ntline.thehindu.com/dispatches/nepal-what-happened-to-chinas-belt-and-road-projects/article65466 849.ece, accessed on July 22, 2022

A few projects are outlined in Table 11.3. These are in varied stages of completion. The pandemic and China’s own lockdowns since 2020 have slowed the pace of project implementation.

Bhutan and Nepal: Small Nations Between Two Large Neighbors Chinese coercive diplomacy tactics, testified in Doklam, are continuing in Bhutan as well. Latest satellite images have shown that China has constructed six villages at India, China-Bhutan tri-junction (Philip 2022). Reuters has put out new satellite images indicating Chinese construction activities which now entails 6 sites and more than 200 structures on Bhutan- China disputed land (Devjyot and Anand 2022). Bhutan, a landlocked country, has historical relations with India through cultural linkages, peaceful, cooperative relations, as well as cordial people-to-people ties. In comparison, Bhutan and China have yet to

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establish official diplomatic ties. It was only after the Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1951 that Bhutan and China became neighbors. The border issue (Bhutan-China shares a border of 290 miles with two tri-points with India) results in unease and tensions. China’s soft power overtures toward Bhutan have been witnessed in the dispatch of circus artists, acrobats, and footballers to the tiny kingdom state of less than a million people. Beijing has also granted a limited but growing number of scholarships for Bhutanese students to study in China. According to Lintner, the virus crisis has provided China with an opportunity: to create trouble for India along the border, make new offers of cultural exchanges—and perhaps even suggest establishing some kind of more formal diplomatic relations (Lintner 2020). With Nepal, there is an extensive web of institutions to influence Nepal’s internal political dynamics in Chinese favor. Chinese seems to have two objectives while dealing with Nepal. First, to keep the US influence neutralized, and second, to keep communist parties of Nepal in power in order to extract political and economic favors. Senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been in regular touch with the entire power circuit in Kathmandu. In a recent significant event, China compelled Nepal to decide against going ahead with the US government’s State Partnership Program (SPP). In a brazen display of extensive Chinese lobbying, Wang Wenbin, the China’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated “SPP a military and security initiative closely linked to the Indo-Pacific Strategy and against Nepal’s national interest”. It was not surprising when this unsolicited remark did not attract any criticism from Nepali dispensation. Senior CCP leaders meetings with high level officials in Nepali government is also a testament to the fact that China is trying to broker an alliance between Dahal’s CPN-MC and Oli’s CPN-UML. China’s showering of unwavering political weight behind communist parties of Nepal provides a textbook example of state intervention in domestic affairs of another sovereign nation.

Bangladesh and China: A Strengthening Relationship China-Bangladesh relations were that of acrimony by the virtue of China being Pakistan’s all weather ally. Initially China did not recognize Bangladesh and vetoed Bangladesh’s UN Member status in 1974. After establishing diplomatic relations in 1976, China developed close ties

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with Bangladesh Nationalist Party led by Ziaur Rahman who capitalized on anti-India and pro-China political stand. Before Awami League could occupy power, China-Bangladesh relations reached new heights, so much so that 2005 was declared as “Bangladesh China Friendship Year” (Habib 2021). The contemporary relationship between China and Bangladesh is largely anchored on their economic and infrastructural exchanges. Bangladesh is also a major buyer of Chinese weapons. However, as with other regional partners, China has been making attempts to enter the political and strategic domain as well. Like with most of India’s neighbors, the country’s internal political narrative is driven by pro-India and pro-China factions. China is exploring ways to strengthen its political influence on Bangladesh at a time when the relationship between India and Bangladesh is on an upward trajectory. China has sought to squeeze India’s naval brigade by establishing their firm presence in Indian waters of the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. In Bangladesh, China has adopted all-of-a-Society approach wherein it embarked on a societal exchange to acquaint people with Chinese and Confucius way of life. This is anchored by establishing a cultural bridge through Confucius Institutes in Bangladesh Universities, sponsoring various Chinese cultural programs in Dhaka and musical & student exchange programs. Mohshin Habib, a senior journalist based in Dhaka has warned Bangladeshi political elites to remain cautious as Chinese will essentially work for pro-Pakistani Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Present display of bonhomie is just to fast-track their BRI projects (Habib 2021). Chinese influence among political elites of Bangladesh has been increasing. During an interview, Ambassador Harun ur Rashid shared, “There was a 180-degree turn in Bangladesh’s foreign policy after August 1975. The country became friendly with China, U.S., and other Islamic countries ” (Marwah and Singh 2013). Furthermore, during an interview with Ehsanul Haque, he mentioned that “Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China are driven mainly by trade and investment linkages. China is also a major development assistance partner for Bangladesh”. In an aggressive exposition of Chinese wolf warrior diplomacy, China’s ambassador in Dhaka Li Jiming warned Bangladesh against joining USled Quad alliance which he called “anti-Beijing club” and would result in “substantial damage” to bilateral relations (Basu 2021). Table 11.4 provides a glimpse of Chinese projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Projects in Bangladesh are yet to be completed.

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Table 11.4 Chinese projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives Sri Lanka (projects)

Financial commitment/status

Bangladesh (projects)

Financial commitment/status

Port City Colombo

USD 14 billion (not completed)

Padma Bridge Project DhakaChattogram Rail Route

USD 3.7 billion

Hambantota USD 1.4 billion port (completed)

Colombo port Eastern container terminal

NA (not completed)

NA/not completed

Payra Deep 11–15 billion Sea Port (completed) project

Maldives financial commitment/status

Velana International Airport 367 million dollar/completed Sinamale Bridge 210 million dollar/completed

Source https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/projects/

Sino-Sri Lanka Relations: An Impacted Island Chinese and Sri Lankan relations can be seen as the confluence of Buddhism with a strategic imperative. Sri Lanka’s relations with Chinese gained new momentum with the advent of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government in Sri Lanka. Once believed as an epitome of the confluence of strategic aspirations of both the nations under the banner of China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), Hambantota port has now become a text book example of an economically unviable project under BRI, commonly referred to as a “Debt trap.” The port’s economic viability was questioned on several counts as only around ten ships berthed in one entire year. Very soon China acquired the controlling stakes of the strategic port and airport at Hambantota as part of its ambitious maritime silk route strategy and later acquired the port on a 99 year lease on a debt-equity swap in 2017 (AFP 2022). In case of Sri Lanka, as explained by Abeyagoonasekera, wherever there is suppression of liberal democratic values, the Chinese model of governance is well poised to take over (Abeyagoonasekera 2021). With Rajapaksa’s family takeover of almost the entire high-level government machinery and gradual concentration of power over economic, political, and societal institutions, democratic values were sidelined. In the previous Mahinda Rajapaksa regime during 2010–2015, big ticket infrastructural

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projects were awarded to Chinese companies along with negotiations on a free trade agreement. Ever since the days of the Sri Lankan civil war, Rajapksas had been garnering incessant Chinese support including recent support at United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). At the UNHRC in February 2021, China voted in favor of Sri Lanka and against the resolution expressing serious concern over the rights situation in the Island nation. Appreciating Sri Lankan government’s efforts to promote human rights and economic and social development, Wang Wenbin, Chinese foreign Ministry Spokesperson stated “we are against politicizing human rights and applying double standards or using it to interfere in other countries affairs” (PTI 2021). With Rajapaksa’s overt enthusiasm about giving Chinese a space for strategic maneuvering, it became imperative for China to make all possible attempts to retain the leadership at the helm of Sri Lankan affairs. This would help to fast-track Chinese development projects and strategic agenda through BRI projects. During CCP and World Political Future Summit, former Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa praised CCP in the following words:China has successfully eradicated poverty of 900 million people under its open economic policy… I am confident that China will bring back the economic strength that Asia had 500 years ago through this Silk Road. China always believed that improving infrastructure will provide new ways and new strengths for the people. Therefore, we have constantly invited China to help develop the infrastructure of our country. (Abeyagoonasekera 2021)

Presently, in late 2022, Sri Lanka is going through an unprecedented economic crisis which has turned into a political crisis. Scholars like Shivamurthy have blamed Beijing for their support to the populist Rajapaksas, as well as unsustainable borrowings and structural fallacies of the government (Shivamurthy 2022). Unable to manage external debt commitments, in part, owing to the huge COVID-induced economic meltdown, Sri Lankan economic crisis has now turned into a political crisis of a massive scale (Reuters 2022a, b). Large masses of people protested against pervasive inflation and demanded immediate resignation of President Rajapaksha. The crowds stormed the parliamentary premises and President’s house, causing the

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President and other power holders to flee the country. Within one day, President Gotabaya (from Singapore) tendered his resignation and allowed Ranil Wikrmasinghe to be sworn in as President (Srinivasan 2022).

Maldives and China: Influence in the Indian Ocean Like other South Asian neighbors, Maldives domestic political narrative has also been marred with pro-China and pro-India factions. The atolls of Maldives are sought after for their strategic location in the Indian Ocean The two factions, i.e., Abdulla Yameen (pro-China) and Ibrahim Mohamed Solih (pro-India) have been at the helm of affairs in the country’s small democratic experience. With Solih in power, an India-first policy seems to be the mantra, yet China cannot be pushed into irrelevance. This is because of the overtures made by the Yameen government which included signing a free trade agreement, endorsing BRI, and implementing various projects. Maldivian politics, like other countries in South Asia has also been fraught with pro-China and proIndia bipolarity. Abdulla Yameen’s regime (2013–2018) developed close ties with China and distanced itself from it’s traditionally and geographically close neighbor, India. During his tenure, following “China first” policy, Maldives entered into a number of infrastructural projects which remained financially unsustainable. As Solih government in Male consolidated its power, after being sworn in as President in late 2018, India provided USD 1.4 billion in aid to ward off worries over Chinese debt (Ranjan 2022). Several reports have indicated that China is trying to boost “a campaign against the current political establishment with the help of Islamist nationalist political agenda in order to restore Yameen as President of the nation in the 2023 Presidential election (ANI 2022a, b).” The said report, published in Maldives Voice claims that China would follow a multi-pronged approach to attain their objective. This could comprise a realignment of alliances, liberal monetary grants and the tacit support of Pakistan for triggering an Islamic campaign against the ruling party.

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Conclusion The above discussion clearly highlights that Chinese interaction with most South Asian nations has been under the pretext of growing India-China mistrust (Madan 2021). As a result of this mistrust, various regional alliances and counter-alliances to counteract any uncertainty have been played out in abundance. Internal political dynamics in South Asia have been fraught with ideologically apart and alliance-contested political choices. Countries political landscape are often compartmentalized into “anti-India” and “anti-China” political choices. China’s state capacity and influence have been increasing since last two decades. With President Xi at the helm of Chinese affairs, it has, not only started developing and projecting its institutional capacity in every dimension, but also, more than ever, eager to take other nations along with their success story. With huge foreign exchange reserves and political will to invest in large stake & strategic projects, China is well poised to alter region’s political, ideological, and economic calculus. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, and Afghanistan have extended support to the Belt and Road Initiative despite India’s outright and vocal opposition to the initiative (Anwar 2020). However, access to aid, combined with agility in implementation of infrastructural projects by China is evidently welcomed by countries in India’s neighborhood. Due to its institutional capacity, China has extensively engaged with countries in South Asia developing wide-ranging connections, opinions, and interests. On the other hand, institutional capacity in some South Asian countries are often in disarray and have distinctive vulnerabilities. In some, civil societies role in political discourses are often thwarted, while in others, civil societies have a rather minimal impact on excesses of ruling executives. In 2021, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace undertook a project “China’s impact on strategic region” that explored Chinese political and economic influence in the European and South Asia region (Pal 2021). They concluded that Chinese tend to be interested in big infrastructural projects, try to make it inclusive by considering the feedback of the local population and recommendations of the local administration. Then, they sought completion of these projects along the election years, so that they obtain praises from politicians and public alike. With the aim of building a Chinese narrative in the host countries, China sought to use educational institutions, personal connections with

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the leaders or diplomatic heft to often coerce or compel countries to toe their line. However, there is a flip side to the relationship as well. In a bid to extend its influence across societies in the region, China has conveniently poured its over-capacity in cement, glass, steel, and manpower in other countries through BRI projects. These tactics of exporting laborers and raw materials in another country has led to a social churning in partnering countries. Many a time, these result in local scuffles, attacks, or even killings as the local population is denied employment opportunities (Welle 2022). Mehran Marri, Baloch representative to UNHRC alleged in 2017 that “CPEC experience showed that China was not driven by any altruistic motives and are not promoting OBOR to improve the lives of the local people” (ANI 2017). Sri Lankan experience with BRI has not been different. The economic instability created, in part, by Chinese unsustainable loans has led to an unprecedented political and societal breakdown. Similar concerns have been proliferating in Pakistan as well. The country is reeling in a serious economic crisis with 87.7 billion dollars in debt as per Pakistan’s latest Economic survey (2021–2022). Scholars assert that the ongoing economic crisis, which has an inevitable societal and political repercussions, can largely be traced to reckless borrowing enabled by China (Bhandari 2022). As pointed out in the Carnegie report, engagements are being carried out by Chinese through multiple channels, as Deep Pal calls “whole of a society approach” (Pal 2021). They have been donating small infrastructural requirements, community essentials like books, etc. in the areas they are operating. They are also tying up with universities in South Asia, not only for Language training but for proliferating Chinese ideologies and its defining features to gain legitimacy among the society of the BRI participating country. Thus in the ultimate analysis, Chinese engagement with South Asian countries has largely been described from three strategic lensesChinese great power ambition, thwarting Indian regional predominance, and addressing economic vulnerabilities. Chinese great power ambition demands both hard power (military) and soft power (economic, political and societal) influence across the globe, starting with its neighbors. Diplomatic and political dominance backed by strong and entangled economic dependency of the region on China provides it with a sense of accomplishment. Hence, South Asia is another neighboring region in which the “middle kingdom” seeks tributes from. India is the only

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country with wherewithal and a strong extra regional backing to pushback against Chinese excesses. Hence, by securing the legitimate support of its neighbors, China seeks to suffocate India geographically. Lastly, in order to ward off its “Malacca Dilemma” through which 80% of Chinese trade passes, navigating South Asia, both geographically and politically, is an imperative for China. The operationalization of the Gwadar and Hambantota ports has provided important outlets to maritime spaces of significance. More than investment destinations, China needs favorable South Asian regimes for these economic routes to further aid Chinese economic prowess and marginalize India in its own erstwhile sphere of influence.

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Index

A Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ), 60 Arunachal Pradesh, 225, 226 ASEAN-China Dialogue, 1 ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP), 2, 12, 76, 77, 79–82, 84, 85, 87, 88 Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 154 Asian NATO, 2 Asia-Pacific, 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 14, 15, 21, 22, 84, 108–111, 123, 126, 127, 129, 145, 147, 151–155, 161, 164, 173, 174, 203, 218 Association of South East Asian Nations, 4 Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS), 174, 184 B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 28, 29, 35, 42, 48,

79, 103, 127, 135, 154, 162, 163, 177, 178, 183, 200, 201, 222–224, 230–235 Blue Dot Network (BDN), 26, 28, 29, 38, 178 BRICS, 154 C Cheque book diplomacy, 7 China in the Indo-Pacific, 101, 186 China-Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation (CPICEDC), 199, 200 China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 44, 223, 227 China’s Community of Shared Future (CSF), 13, 14, 146–149, 151–153, 155–165 Cold War, 2, 10, 11, 21, 47, 56, 75, 83, 109, 110, 124, 139, 140, 152, 163, 196–199, 219, 227 Communism, 7, 48, 219

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Singh and R. Marwah (eds.), China and the Indo-Pacific, Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7521-9

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INDEX

Communist Party of China (CPC), 16, 123, 173, 179, 181 Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), 95, 99, 106 Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), 63, 133 Comprehensive strategic partnership, 105, 197, 200 “Confluence of Two Seas”, 56, 78 Confrontation, 12, 13, 42, 48, 94, 95, 123, 125, 139, 140 CoP-21, 35 Council of the European Union, 94, 104

D Data Free flow with Trust (DFFT), 64 Doklam Plateau, 225

E East Asian Tiger economies, 203 East Asia Summit (EAS), 80, 81, 83, 109 East China Sea (ECS), 56, 61, 138, 182, 183 Eastern Hemisphere, 76, 82, 84 Economic Prosperity Network (EPN), 24–27, 32, 38 Environment and Climate Change, 36, 68 European Union (EU), 7, 8, 12, 44, 45, 48, 63, 93–109, 111–115, 146, 186

F Fault lines, 12, 85, 87 Fifth Continent, 13, 126, 132, 134, 140

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 125 Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea (FONOPs), 131, 183

G G7, 34, 137, 138, 185 G10, 34 Global Climate Accord, 35 Globalization, 22 Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), 80 Golan Heights, 56 Golden Era, 56 Golden Triangle, 48 Grey-zone operations, 61 Gulf of Tokin, 47

H Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, 68

I Indian Ocean, 6, 12, 37, 57, 77, 79, 81, 87, 126–130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 161, 175, 185, 209, 219, 220, 223, 230, 233 Indo-Pacific Business Forum, 28 Indo-Pacific Command, 78, 87 Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), 2 Infrastructure, 5, 25–29, 34, 63, 64, 66, 67, 78, 79, 100, 105, 135, 136, 155, 177, 178, 181, 222, 223 Institutionalism, 10 Integrated surveillance and intelligence (ISR), 127 International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), 26, 28

INDEX

J Japan-EU Economic Partnership, 67 Jintao, Hu, 3, 4, 6, 156 Joko Widodo, 80

L Line of Actual Control (LAC), 225

M Major powers, 7, 12, 27, 77–79, 81–85, 87, 88, 113, 125, 145, 148, 150, 155, 162, 197, 203, 207, 211 Malacca Straits, 6 Mekong Region, 29 Michelin Guide, 28 Middle power, 4, 9, 11, 13, 38, 41, 51, 79, 88, 111, 121–123, 125, 127, 130–133, 135–140, 150 Morrison, Scott, 49, 128 Multilateralism, 7, 9, 13, 23, 26, 43, 48, 51, 52, 104, 108, 114, 122–126, 128–130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 139, 140, 153, 154, 173 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 43

N National Security Law, 59, 61 North Korea, 44, 47 Nuclear tests, 59, 60

O Obama, Barack, 4, 78, 84, 110 One-Sun-One-World-One-Grid (OSOWOG), 35, 36, 38

243

P Pacific Islands Region, 15, 195–198, 200 Pakistan, 44–47, 52, 176, 219–224, 227, 229, 233–235 pan-Asian, 28, 35, 37, 109, 160 Panchsheel Agreement, 219 Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding, 68 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA), 59, 61 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, 103

Q Quad++, 27 Quad 2.0, 5, 183 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), 2, 15, 27, 46, 49, 52, 65, 76–78, 128, 131, 136, 137, 139, 171–175, 177–187, 230

R Renminbi (RMB), 5, 222 Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University’s Yoshimatsu, 62

S SDGs, 36, 37 Sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 49, 56, 65–67, 183, 196 Security and Growth for All in the Region, 178 Senkaku/Diaoyu Tai islands, 59 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 154, 155, 187 Sino-British Declaration, 61 Social Network Analysis (SNA), 83 South China Sea (SCS), 5, 6, 46, 59–61, 64, 82, 85–87, 123, 126,

244

INDEX

129, 131, 138, 152, 153, 155, 172, 175, 182–184, 204, 205 Sovereign, 10, 22–24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 38, 177, 198, 204, 229 Soviet Union, 21, 56, 76, 124, 162, 198 Spaghetti bowl, 109 String of Pearls (SOP), 45, 52, 220 ‘Summit for Democracy’, 137 Supply chains, 14, 23, 30, 31, 42, 63, 67, 99, 100, 133–135, 154, 172, 176, 178–181 T Taiwan, 15, 43, 44, 51, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 67, 123, 138, 146, 150, 153, 155, 156, 180–182, 202–208 ‘Team Europe’, 112, 114 Theory of complex interdependence, 51 Tibetan, 155, 219 Trump administration, 8, 25, 46, 65, 78, 202

U UNCLOS, 61, 65 Unification of Taiwan, 207 US-China competition, 10, 43, 44, 46, 103 US-led liberal regional order (LRO), 146–148, 150, 153, 163–165

V Vaccine, 5, 27, 136, 185–187, 221

W Western Pacific, 10 World Trade Organization (WTO), 64, 133, 173, 222

X Xinjiang Province, 106

Z ‘zero-sum’, 10, 219