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Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces [1 ed.]
 9780826301956, 0826301959

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CHILEAN POLITICS 1920-1931 The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces

BY

FREDERICK M. NUNN

Albuquerque UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO PRESS

© 197° the University of New Mexico Press. All rights reserved. Manufactured in the United States of America by the University of New Mexico Printing Plant, Albu­ querque. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 70-129808. Designed by Bruce Gentry First Edition

FOR T. D. A N D T. M.

160498

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Initial research for this study was carried out during 1962 in Santiago, Chile, and in Washington, D.C. Through the generosity of the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation I was able to study and travel throughout Chile. While there I made extensive use of primary and secondary source materials in the Biblioteca Nacional, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, and Biblioteca del Estado Mayor del Ejercito de Chile. In Washington I conducted research in the National Archives and in the Library of Congress. I am also grateful to the Faculty Committee on Research and Publica­ tion of Portland State University and to the American Philosophical Soci­ ety for grants which made possible a return trip to Chile in 1969 and facilitated completion of this work. To list the names of all those who gave me aid and advice during early research and writing on this subject is impossible, but several names must be mentioned. Professor Edwin Lieuwen of the University of New Mex­ ico supervised my doctoral work and made invaluable suggestions. Profes­ sor Troy Floyd and the late Professor Miguel Jomn of the same institution also guided me in my graduate studies. The late E. Taylor Parks of the Department of State was most helpful when I was in Washington. I also owe a large debt of gratitude to Gonzalo Mendoza Aylwin, Direc­ tor of the Biblioteca del Estado Mayor who gave advice and encourage­ ment willingly and frequently. Professor Eugenio Pereira Salas of the University of Chile allowed me to ransack his private library, a veritable mother lode of primary source material. Colonel Gaspar Lueje Gardeweg of the Section de Publicaciones of the Estado Mayor General and Lieu­ tenant Colonel (ret.) Edmundo Gonzalez Salinas, Chief of the Section de Historia of the Estado Mayor General, answered many of my questions on the history and politics of the Chilean army. Without the love, numerous suggestions, and hours of typing of my wife Diana, this study would never have been possible. She and my daughter Marianna were most patient and understanding through the various stages of its preparation.

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The final manuscript was prepared by Ann Rostentreter, a former stu­ dent and assistant who, like all others involved, listened patiently to my frequent discourses on politics and the armed forces of Chile. While many have contributed to this work, I am solely responsible for errors in it. Frederick M. Nunn Portland, Oregon

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CONTENTS

Introduction

1

PartOne: The Politics of Change, 1920-1924 1. Origins of the Honorable Mission 9 2. Year of the Lion 19 3. White Anarchy 28

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Part Two: The Military and the Politics of Change, 1924-1927 45 4. The Mission Begins 47 5. Military Rule 67 6. The Mission Continues 88 Part Three: Politics on the Military’s Terms, 1927-1931 7. The Purge 117 8. The Institutionalized Mission 134 9. The Mission Ends 160

115

Appendixes A. The Manifestos of September 10 and 11,1924 177 B. Proclamation to the Armed Forces of Chile, January 19,1925 180 C. Declaration of the Minister of War, February 9,1927 182

Notes

185

Selective Bibliographical Note Index

ix

213

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'‘Chile is destined ... to enjoy the blessings that How from the just and gentle laws of a republic.” Simon Bolivar, 1815

“The evils of misgovernment extended themselves, leaving nothing uncorrupted except those institu­ tions under laws, regulations and leadership separ­ ate from the rest of the public administration.” Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza, 1929 “The intervention of the armed forces in political questions is like the intervention of firemen in fires; it is justified when a disaster occurs, and, at times, is worse than the disaster itself.” Carlos Saez Morales, 1941

x

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations have been an ingredient of politics as long as governments have existed and military organizations have been sup­ ported by the state. Whether a nation’s government is controlled by civilians or under the influence of men in uniform, the interrelationship of its civil and military authorities is a vital one. Particularly in a time of national crisis is this so. In modern history, viable civilian governments have attempted to restrict their armed forces to the traditional role of national defense. At certain times, however, the civil-military relationship inverts; military men do govern and are the masters while civilians are governed and are the servants. Emerging, underdeveloped, or developing nations in which crisis may be endemic, society transitional, and democratic traditions weak are par­ ticularly fertile ground for such inversion. Indeed, some of the original emerging nations of the non-western world, such as Turkey in the 1920s and Japan after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, owed their emergence to the military as much as to any other factor. The manifest fragility of democratic institutions, or the inability of democratic processes to cope with immediate problems and provide order and tranquility, almost com­ pels the professional military organization to step in, at times eagerly and with no apparent purpose, sometimes reluctantly but determined to solve the problems of the fatherland. In Latin America the relationship between civilians and the military is an intriguing one. Men on horseback have played a political role since independence times when Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin, to­ gether with their lieutenants Antonio Jose de Sucre and Bernardo O’Hig­ gins, liberated most of Spanish South America, and Agustin de Iturbide founded his short-lived Empire of Mexico. The great liberators completed their roles by 1830, and in some countries were replaced by lesser libera­ tors. During the nineteenth century all the Latin American nations were at one time or another governed by military men. The Republic of Chile was governed by generals from the initial out­ break of the independence movement in 1810 until 1851. Even after 1831, when the army was at last expelled from politics, Generals Joaquin Prieto

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Chilean Politics, 1920-1931 and Manuel Bulnes eaeh served two five-year terms in the presidency. With the exception of minor revolts in 1851 and 1859, however, the army did not menace civilian rule in Chile during the rest of the century. Even when Chile was torn by a civil war in 1891, military power did not dom­ inate but served merely as the agent of civilian factions contending for political control. Chile was fortunate by Latin American standards in that civilian con­ trol of politics became a firm tradition. But during the first quarter of the twentieth century this tradition crumbled and Chile’s armed forces be­ came involved in politics. The main implication of this study is that political instability aided in the rise of a politically motivated military organization—a military organization that was the most highly profes­ sionalized in Latin America and that faulted politics, politicians, and parliamentarism for all the ills of the fatherland and its armed forces. Professional army officers served as chief spokesmen for this attitude. Late in the southern hemisphere winter of 1924 the Chilean army in­ tervened in the conduct of government and politics for the first time in nearly a century. The military movement of September 5, 1924 which caused President Arturo Alessandri Palma to resign his office and leave the country was not preconceived or carefully plotted. It began as a non­ violent, spontaneous protest, first by junior, then by middle-grade army officers of the Santiago garrison against serious political, social, and eco­ nomic conditions of the post-World War I decade, and the failure of the government to ameliorate them. Almost to a man the officers involved were reformers; only a handful were radicals. Theirs was a movement in the national interest, they said, but professional self-interest also mo­ tivated them. Their secondary motive was the frustration caused by the sad condition of the army, and anger at the involvement of the service in congressional elections held the previous March. The protesting lieu­ tenants and captains and their allies, the majors and colonels, readily acquiesced when the army high command professed sympathy for their actions. The high command was equally alarmed about the state of Chilean politics but for reasons quite different from those of the sub­ alterns. Once the generals and (with the incorporation of naval leaders) the admirals assumed leadership of the September movement, it took on a different tinge—one of reaction. Whereas the originators of the protest were progressive in their political and social ideas and nationalistic in their economic thinking, their commanders wanted to turn back the clock to the days before the 1920 election of Arturo Alessandri. Alessandri and his politics, discussed in Part I of this work, were the

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INTRODUCTION

axis on which Chilean politics rotated in the early and mid-i92os. Like most junior and middle-grade officers Alessandri saw the need for reform in Chile, but his reform proposals had been held up since 1920 by a hostile parliament. During those four years Chilean politics were stagnat­ ing in a parliamentary torpor; social conditions, particularly in the mining and urban industrial areas, were critical, and Chile’s economic stability was nearly shattered by the loss of nitrate markets, inflation, and the government’s inability to finance its operations. The army officers orig­ inally involved in the September movement were critical of Alessandri s methods, but they believed his programs necessary for national progress. They also believed that before social and economic difficulties could be overcome, political problems needed solution, and that Chile’s political problems overshadowed everything else. They blamed the failure to enact needed reform measures on the Congress, not the President. They di­ rected their criticism and later their efforts toward the summit of power, the national government. Their conservative superiors, however, blamed Alessandri for the anarchic condition of politics. The movement of Sep­ tember 5, 1924 saw the army superficially united in protest but internally divided as to the fundamental target of protest. The rise to power of the politically oriented military faction led by reform-minded officers is dis­ cussed in Part II. Almost before the month was over, junior and middle-grade officers realized what they had set in motion on September 5: Alessandri had relinquished the presidency and a high command junta had replaced him; Congress, after acting rapidly on a number of reform measures, was closed by the junta, which in turn began to pave the way for new presidential elections. Members of the junta paid no heed to suggestions for further re­ form (specifically, constitutional reform) made by the original protes­ tants. And as long as the tight military discipline of the Chilean army was maintained, there was no need for them to do so. But by the end of 1924 military discipline itself was in danger. Discipline was destroyed on January 23, 1925. At that point the Honorable Mission—the army’s mission to set right Chilean politics and to assure governmental responsibility and action in the social and eco­ nomic fields—became a crusade. In September 1924 the reform-minded officers had been duped, but by January they were resolute and adamant in their demands. By this time they also had a single leader, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibanez del Campo. The junta of government was overthrown on January 23, 1925 for the express purpose of recalling Alessandri, reforming the constitution to give the chief executive more autonomy and authority, and guaranteeing

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Chilean Politics, 1920-1931 that national politics should become responsible and responsive. It was also designed to effect change at the summit—the national government— where great decisions were made in the field of social and economic reform. Ibanez, the leader of the January coup, assumed the position of War Minister and guarantor of military discipline. He also assumed the mantle of eminence grise during the period of constitutional reform in 1925 and during the succeeding truncated administration of Emiliano Figueroa Larrain, 1925-27. During the 1925-27 interlude the primary Chilean political issues were those between the military and the civilians. It was the political conduct of Colonel Ibanez that caused Alessandri to forsake the presidency a second time in October 1925 and that led Figueroa to resign in April 1927In this latter period Ibanez became the indispensable man. From his office in the Ministry of War he held the army in check. Before Congress he defied reactionary elements who opposed the new constitution or who yearned for an impossible return to the illusory pre-1920 “politics without problems.” And finally, as Interior Minister, he exercised executive power himself. Congressional recalcitrance and obstinaey, despite the new con­ stitution, were responsible for the failure of the Figueroa Administration to provide palliatives or solutions for Chile’s problems, but it was Ibanez’ presence that caused the administration to fall. As chronicled in Part III, the Honorable Mission became a purge in early 1927, a purge directed by Ibanez and a small clique of military and civilian advisers with the avowed purpose of cleansing the Chilean polit­ ical system. Actually, military involvment in politics was reduced when Ibanez beeame a political figure and then President of Chile. He became the agent of military involvement and the military, along with a large number of reform-minded civilians, supported him. The Ibanez presidency, 1927-31, is not examined here institution by institution or reform by reform. It is chronicled to show how a military man leading a reform movement, transcending military bounds, dealt with politics, politicians, and political groups. This emphasis on political issues is explicit through the 1920-31 years in all treatments and from all viewpoints. Political action was looked upon as the way to achieve de­ sired goals. What civilians had failed to do through traditional demo­ cratic processes during the 1920-24 and 1925-27 periods, Ibanez and his clique set about doing in the only ways they knew: through authori­ tarianism and firm administration, by demanding obedience and disci­ pline, and through governmental reorganization and administrative effi­ ciency. Civilian support for the Ibanistas was widespread. The Ibanez re-

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INTRODUCTION

gime makes an excellent case study of (a) the military man as chief executive; (b) the degree to which the term “dictatorship” can be applied to such a regime; and (c) the methods used to accomplish goals by leaders who are at least partially disillusioned with constitutional processes but who cannot bring themselves to cast aside all of a nation s organic laws and traditions. The Honorable Mission culminated in July 19 31 when Ibanez was him­ self overthrown. His overthrow in the midst of the Great Depression did not signal an end to military involvement in politics, however. For the next eighteen months would-be saviors con casco y casaca tried their hand at conspiracy and coup. The outcome of this year and a half of near anarchy was a reaction by civilian elements that returned political leader­ ship to the man who had lost it in 1924 an 123, 135, 140, 148, 162, 163, 164, 169, 170 Santiago garrison, 2, 40, 44, 47, 48, 52, 56, 79, 83, 85, 90, 99, 111, 128, 174 Santiago Province, 90, 106 Schmidt, Luis, 155 Schroeders, Edgardo von, 169 Schroeders, Adm. Juan, 100, 104, 123 Schweitzer, Daniel, 124 Searle, Adm. Alfredo, 123 Seeckt, Col. Gen. Hans von, 17, 112 Shea, Joseph, U.S. Ambassador, 22 Silva Cruz, Carlos, 26 Silva Somarriva, Jorge, 109 Simon, Raul, 158 Socialist Republic of Chile, 171, 173 Socialists, 33, 136, 170, 171, 172 Sotiedad del Ejercito de Regeneration, 11 Soffia, Adm. Manuel, 57, 58, 74, 81 Soublette, Adm. Guillermo, 51, 123 Soviet constitution of 1918, 15 Soza, Capt. Andras, 79 Spain, 18, 167 Stevenson, John Reese, 16 Stimson, Henry L., U.S. Secretary of State, 158 Sucre, Antonio Jose de, 1 Swett Otaegui, Adm. Arturo, 119, 123

Tacna, 23, 24, 35, 82 Tacna-Arica area, 24, 25, 121, 137, 155 Talca, 104 Talchuano, 13, 33, 141, 150; Naval Base, 57, 62, 85, 101, 131 Talchuano, Concepci6n complex, 169 Tarapaca Nitrate Railway Company, 31 Tarapaca Province, 19, 20, 23, 93 TEA, 51, 52, 55, 63, 64, 65, 68, 75, 78, 90, 137 Tellez, Gen. Indalicio, 170 Temuco, 101, 150 “Thermal Congress,” 156, 157, 158, 169, 171, 172 Tizzoni, Emilio, 90, 141 Tocornal, Ismael, 32, 33, 86 Toledo, Gen. Rafael, 81 Torrealba, Zen6n, 26 Torreblanca, Edecio, 155 Treaty of Ancon, 23 “Tribunal of Conscience,” 90 Troncoso, Capt. German, 141 Trucco Franzani, Manuel, 168, 169 Tucapel Regiment, 100, 104, 105

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INDEX Turkey, i, 18, 167

Ugalde, Pedro Le6n, 140, 141 Una lapida sobre el pasado de Chile, 13738 Unified Liberal Party, 156. See also Dem­ ocratic Liberal Party; Liberal Party Union, La (Valparaiso), 89 Union Civilista, 162, 163 Unionistas, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 62, 65, 77 United States and Chilean affairs, 22, 24, 32, 35, 37, 65-66, 93, 109, 148, 158, 161, 172, 19211 University of Chile, 151, 152, 162, 163, 164 Urcullo, Col. Felix, 60 Uriburu, Gen. Jos6, 141 Urizar, Lt. Silvestre, 59, 62, 73, 77 Urrejola, Gonzalo, 140 Urzua, Judge Felipe, 125 USRACH. See Republican Social Union of Chilean Wage Earners

Valdez, Adm. Salustio, 84-85 Valdivia Regiment, 89, 90 Valenzuela, Capt. Heraclio, 57, 58 Valparaiso, 13, 21, 23, 28, 86, 89, 119, 140, 150, 170, 171; Naval Base, 57, 63, 70, 84-85,101, 169, 175 Valparaiso Province, 33, 90, 106, 151 Valparaiso-Vina del Mar complex, 70, 86, 120 Vasquez, Capt. Armando, 59, 79 Velasco, Julio, 121, 169

Veliz, Rodriguez, Gen. Manuel, 104, 147 Vergara, Lt. Col. Ram6n, 170 Vergara Montero, Gen. Carlos, 59, 89, BS, *7* Vergara Vicuna, Aquiles, 121, 123, 125, 131, 143, 144, 151, 152, 169 Vial Guzman, Gen. (ret.) Juan de Dios, ,5L 52, 139 Viaux, Gen. Ambrosio, 59, 60, 77, 164, 170 Vicuna, Claudio, 87 Vicuna Fuentes, Carlos, 140, 141, 142 Vignola, Gen. Pedro, 174

War Academy, 59, 60, 82, 111, 112 War of the Gran Chaco, 143 War of the Pacific, 10, 23, 81 Ward, Adm. Carlos, 86, 123, 147 Weimar Republic, 18; constitution of 1919, 15 White Guard, 86, 90 Wilson, Adm. Bracy, 123 World War I, 13, 14, 112, 157; recession following, 2, 11, 16, 18, 21, 43, 49, 82, 107, 111, 113, 118, 129

Yanez, Eliodoro, 21, 22, 32, 86, 92, 99, 101, 105, 121, 122, 135, 137

Zanartu Campino, Alberto, 164 Zanartu Prieto, Enrique, 56, 57, 59, 60, 175 Zig-Zag, 69 Zuloaga, Lt. Pedro, 79 Zuniga, Capt. Enrique, 59, 79

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