Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract Australian edition [12 ed.] 9780409354867, 9780409354874, 9780409354881

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Cheshire and Fifoot

Law of Contract Twelfth Australian Edition

Australian Editions First edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1966 Second edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1969 Third edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1974 Fourth edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, assisted by N C Seddon, 1981 Fifth edition — J G Starke QC, N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1988 Sixth edition — J G Starke QC, N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1992 Seventh edition — N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1997 Eighth edition — N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 2002 Ninth edition – N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 2008 Tenth edition – N C Seddon, R A Bigwood and M P Ellinghaus, 2012 Eleventh edition – N C Seddon and R A Bigwood, 2017

Cheshire and Fifoot

Law of Contract Twelfth Australian Edition N C Seddon LLB (Hons) (Melb), B Phil (Oxon), PhD (ANU) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory Counsel, Ashurst Honorary Professor, ANU College of Law, Australian National University

R A Bigwood LLB (Hons) (Auckland), PhD (ANU), LLD (Auckland) Sir Gerard Brennan Chair in Law, Academic Dean and Head of School, TC Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New Zealand and the Australian Capital Territory

LexisNexis Australia 2023

LexisNexis AUSTRALIA LexisNexis 475–495 Victoria Avenue, Chatswood NSW 2067 On the internet at: www.lexisnexis.com.au ARGENTINA LexisNexis Argentina, Buenos Aires AUSTRIA LexisNexis Verlag ARD Orac GmbH & Co KG, Vienna BRAZIL LexisNexis Latin America, Sao Paulo CANADA LexisNexis Canada, Markham, Ontario CHILE LexisNexis Chile, Santiago CHINA LexisNexis China, Beijing, Shanghai CZECH REPUBLIC Nakladatelství Orac sro, Prague FRANCE LexisNexis SA, Paris GERMANY LexisNexis Germany, Frankfurt HONG KONG LexisNexis Hong Kong, Hong Kong HUNGARY HVG-Orac, Budapest INDIA LexisNexis, New Delhi ITALY Dott A Giuffrè Editore SpA, Milan JAPAN LexisNexis Japan KK, Tokyo KOREA LexisNexis, Seoul MALAYSIA LexisNexis Malaysia Sdn Bhd, Petaling Jaya, Selangor NEW ZEALAND LexisNexis, Wellington POLAND Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, Warsaw SINGAPORE LexisNexis, Singapore SOUTH AFRICA LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban SWITZERLAND Staempfli Verlag AG, Berne TAIWAN LexisNexis, Taiwan UNITED KINGDOM LexisNexis UK, London, Edinburgh USA LexisNexis Group, New York, New York LexisNexis, Miamisburg, Ohio

ISBN:

9780409354867 (hbk). 9780409354874 (pbk). 9780409354881 (ebk).

© 2023 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis. First edition 1966; Second edition 1969; Third edition 1974; Fourth edition 1981; Fifth edition 1988; Sixth edition 1992; Seventh edition 1997; Eighth edition 2002; Ninth edition 2008 (reprinted 2012); Tenth edition 2012 (reprinted 2014 and 2015); Eleventh edition 2017 (reprinted 2018). This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Optima and Sabon. Printed in Australia. Visit LexisNexis at www.lexisnexis.com.au

Contents Prefacevii Casesix Statutesclix

PART I  Overview of the Law of Contract Chapter 1  Overview of Contract Law 3 Introduction 3 Elements of Liability for Breach of Contract 5 Unconscionability 6 Formation of Contracts 10 Breach 24 Construction of Contracts 25 Excuses 34 Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 34 Mistake 38 Duress and Undue Influence 39 Unconscionable Dealing and Unconscionable Conduct 39 Informality 39 Incapacity 40 Illegality and Public Policy 41 Termination of Contracts 43 Remedies 50 Specific Performance and Injunction 55 Unconscionability and Remedies 56

PART II  Contract Formation Chapter 2  Estoppel The Importance of Estoppel The Overarching Estoppel Theory The Impact of Estoppel in the Law of Contract

59 59 68 90

Chapter 3  Agreement — Offer and Acceptance 98 Introduction 98 Offer and Acceptance 99 Offer 114 Acceptance 123 170 Termination of Offer v



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Chapter 4 Consideration Function and Definition Consideration Must Move from the Promisee What Does and Does Not Constitute a Good Consideration in Law

183 183 187 190

Chapter 5  Intention to Create Legal Relations 230 Introduction 230 Domestic and Social Agreements 234 Agreements within Clubs, Unincorporated Associations and Political Parties 241 Commercial Agreements 244 Government Transactions 269 Chapter 6  Uncertainty 274 Introduction 274 Types of Uncertainty 276 Chapter 7  Privity of Contract The Privity Rule The Effect of the Rule Exceptions to the Privity Rule Circumventions of the Privity Rule

301 301 308 321 339

Chapter 8  Assignment of Contractual Rights and Liabilities The Voluntary Assignment of Contractual Rights The Voluntary Assignment of Contractual Obligations The Involuntary Assignment of Contractual Rights and Liabilities

365 366 410 418

PART III  Breach and Construction Chapter 9 Breach

423

Chapter 10  Construction of Contracts 429 General 429 Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence 431 Actual Terms — Incorporation 462 Actual Terms — Interpretation 474 Implied Terms 490 Terms Limiting Liability 540

vi

Contents



PART IV  Excuses Chapter 11  Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 559 Introduction and Overview 559 Rescission for Actionable Misrepresentation under the General Law 563 Damages 608 Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 627 Chapter 12 Mistake 734 Introduction 734 Common Mistake 740 Mutual and Unilateral Mistake 770 Chapter 13 Duress

802

Chapter 14  Undue Influence Establishing Undue Influence The Yerkey v Jones Principle

823 824 844

Chapter 15  Unconscionable Conduct 856 Introduction 856 Unconscionable Dealing in Equity 858 Statutory Unconscionability 883 Chapter 16 Formalities History and Policy of the Statute of Frauds The Statute of Frauds: Section 4 Sale of Goods

921 921 927 984

Chapter 17 Incapacity 991 Minors 992 Persons Mentally Disabled and Drunkards 1023 Married Women 1027 Corporations 1030 Unincorporated Associations 1034 The Crown 1035 Chapter 18  Illegal Contracts 1037 General 1037 Contracts Illegal by Legislation 1040 Contracts Against Public Policy 1049 Effect of Illegality 1080

vii



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PART V  Termination Chapter 19  Termination by Frustration 1097 Basic Principles 1097 Application 1105 Limits of the Doctrine 1109 Effect of Frustration 1114 Chapter 20  Termination for Non-fulfilment of Contingent Condition 1121 Operation of Contingent Conditions 1121 Non-fulfilment of Contingent Conditions 1126 Regulation of Termination 1128 Restrictions on Termination 1132 Effect of Termination 1141 Chapter 21  Termination for Breach 1143 Overview 1143 Contractual Rights to Terminate for Breach 1143 Right to Terminate for Breach Conferred by Law 1148 Regulation of Termination 1174 Effect of Termination for Breach 1204 Chapter 22  Variation and Termination by Consent 1207 Variation and Termination 1207 Variation 1208 Termination by Consent 1213 Termination at Will 1218

PART VI  Remedies Chapter 23 Damages 1223 Overview 1223 Expectation Loss 1227 Recognised Losses 1235 Effect of Termination 1247 Valuation 1250 Causation 1263 Remoteness 1269 Mitigation 1274 Agreed Damages 1277 Chapter 24  Equitable Remedies Specific Performance

1289 1289 viii

Contents



Specific Restitution of Chattels 1314 Injunction 1316 Declaration 1328 Equitable Damages under Lord Cairns’ Act 1329 Chapter 25  Limitation of Actions The Operation of the Legislation

1335 1335

Chapter 26  Restitution and Debt 1351 Restitution for Unjust Enrichment 1351 Debt 1368

PART VII  History and Theory Chapter 27  Historical Introduction to the Law of Contract Australian Contract Law A Brief History of the Law of Contract

1377 1377 1380

Chapter 28  A Guide to Contract Theory 1397 Introduction 1397 The Classical Period 1400 Economic Analysis of Contract Rules 1408 Relational Theory 1419 Critical Legal Theory 1425 Promissory Theory 1429 Feminism 1431 Unconscionability 1433 Index1439

ix

Preface Given its bulk, some would say this is a book one cannot pick up. As with every new edition, the authors have reviewed the entire text and have been mindful to reduce material where possible, principally in culling old cases. There have been no spectacular developments in contract law since the publication of the 11th edition. The High Court has confirmed in Pipikos v Trayens, after many years of mild uncertainty, that the strict test for the doctrine of part performance in Statute of Frauds cases is the correct test. The High Court has also confirmed in Price v Spoor the long-established principle that the operation of limitation periods is in the control of the parties, even to the extent of excluding a period entirely. Arguably, though, the law relating to undue influence has changed in the wake of Thorne v Kennedy, where the High Court appears to have refashioned that law in such a manner that, were the current tests to be applied to the facts of Johnson v Buttress, that case could not be decided in the way it was by the majority of the High Court in 1936. On the topic of limitation periods (see Chapter 25), the centrally important notion of accrual has divided a five-judge New  South  Wales Court of Appeal in Globe Church Incorporated v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd on the question of when a right of action accrues in respect of indemnity insurance. Is it when the insured event occurs or when the insurance company fails to meet the claim? Three judges opted for the former. A similar trap can be set by loan contracts where, counter-intuitively, accrual occurs on the making of the loan unless the contract provides otherwise. The same court has clarified in Wollongong Coal Ltd v Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd that the doctrine of privity is a preclusionary principle and cannot be used as a sword. In multi-party contracts the existence of privity between the various parties does not mean that each has rights against each other party. The correct approach is determined by what the contract provides. The treatment of electronic transactions continues to attract extensive commentary, noted in Chapter  3. The anthropomorphising of contracts (can a machine have intention? Is it a legal entity?) is suggested but has not been well received. Some legislative responses to COVID-19 are noted, the most important of which are changes to the Corporations Act enabling the use of electronic documents, including deeds, by companies. The response at state level has been patchy, with some states and territories remaining unresponsive to the pleas of practitioners to enable electronic deeds. A muted controversy continues as to whether estoppel can in effect operate as a cause of action outside proprietary estoppel cases. The prevailing view is that it can, which accords with the decision of the High Court in the Waltons case. Misleading conduct cases continue apace, adding to the very extensive tapestry of case law on the 23 words of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law. A handful of single-judge cases consider whether it is possible to exclude the operation of the section (see 11.150), with three outliers saying that it is possible, despite extensive authority to the contrary. This possibility is vigorously advocated by two learned xi



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

commentators. Such a development would be momentous and would need to be made by the High Court. The idea of market-based causation has taken root in misleading conduct cases. A person may suffer loss caused by misleading conduct that did not lead the claimant into error. A simple example is where customers of the claimant are misled and cease to buy the claimant’s products. Financial markets provide more complicated instances of this indirect causation. The High  Court and the Full Federal Court have continued in their attempts to throw light on the meaning of and approach to statutory unconscionability under s  21 of the Australian Consumer Law and its equivalents. There has been a retreat from the earlier apparent insistence on proof of conduct representing ‘a high level of moral obloquy’. Clarification around the relationship between statutory unconscionability and unconscionability in equity is also emergent in the field. In Mann v  Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd, the High  Court examined the intersection between contract and restitution, recognising the right of an innocent party who has lawfully terminated a contract by accepting the other party’s repudiation to elect between suing for damages for breach of contract or for restitution in respect of services rendered under the uncompleted contract (or uncompleted divisible stage of the contract). Differences in the reasoning in the various judgments, however, suggest that the relationship between contract and restitution may continue to be affected by uncertainty into the future. It is worth noting developments in the United Kingdom that have not taken root in Australia. They are: • • • • • • •

The discarding of Solle v Butcher in mistake cases; Wrothan Park damages (disgorgement damages); Damages payable for third-party loss (discussed 7.7); Disallowing an informal contract variation where there is a no-oralvariation clause; Not allowing estoppel to prevail over a failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds (see 16.67); Recognition of a standalone category of lawful-act (economic) duress; and Contractual estoppel where a clause (for example, that a party has not relied on information provided by the other party) cannot be denied.

As this book went to press the Queensland government revealed a Property Law Bill 2022. References to the relevant clauses of this Bill are included in our commentary. Nick Seddon Rick Bigwood October 2022

xii

Table of Cases References are to paragraph numbers 075 883 626 Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd (FCA, Cooper J, 17 July 1998, unreported) .… 21.10 400 George Street (Qld) Pty Ltd v BG International Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 302; [2010] QCA 245 .… 5.24 1144 Nepean Highway Pty Ltd v Abnote Australasia Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 551; (2009) 26 VR 59; [2009] VSCA 308 .… 24.13 21st Century Promotions Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp [2001] SASC 299 .… 21.19 A A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532; (1984) 156 CLR 542 .… 18.14, 18.15, 18.16, 18.30, 18.31, 18.32, 18.40, 18.41 A & A Property Developers Pty Ltd v MCCA Asset Management Ltd [2017] VSCA 365 .… 10.12 A & M Green Investments Pty Ltd v Progressive Pod Properties Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 502 .… 26.8 A Goninan & Co Ltd v Direct Engineering Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASCA 112 .… 10.32 A H McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506 .… 11.53 A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd v New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 385 .… 7.25 A Roberts & Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555 .… 12.53 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay 4 [1974] 3 All ER 616 .… 15.8 Aademy of Health and Fitness Pty Ltd v Power [1973] VR 254 .… 11.69 Aalborg CSP A/S v Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd [2017] SASCFC 158 .… 11.149 Aardwolf Industries LLC v Tayeh [2020] NSWCA 301 .… 11.111 AB v CD [2015] 1 WLR 771; [2014] EWCA Civ 229 .… 24.4 Abadeen Group Pty Ltd v Bluestone Property Services Pty Ltd; Brown v Hodgkinson [2009] NSWCA 386 .… 5.19 ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665 .… 26.7

ABB Power Generation Ltd v Chapple [2001] WASCA 412 .… 26.8 Abbott v Lance (1860) Legge 1283 .… 3.28, 3.45, 3.71, 27.1 — v Wolsey [1895] 2 QB 97 .… 16.84 Abdurahman v Field (1987) 8 NSWLR 158; (1987) 8 NSWLR 159 .… 18.43, 18.47 Abela v Lawnside Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-430 .… 21.32 Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Cheng [1960] AC 115 .… 20.8 Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181 .… 3.27, 5.19, 26.7 — v Sydney Catchment Authority [2004] NSWCA 270 .… 11.122 — v — [2005] NSWSC 662 .… 11.150 — v — (No 3) (2006) 67 NSWLR 341; [2006] NSWCA 282 .… 11.127, 11.146 Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45 .… 21.27 Abjornson v Urban Newspapers Ltd [1989] WAR 191 .… 16.21 ABL Custodian Services Pty Ltd v Smith [2010] VSC 548 .… 8.7 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; 309 ALR 445; [2014] FCAFC 65 .… 11.83, 11.114, 11.121, 11.124, 11.132 Aboody v Ryan [2012] NSWCA 395 .… 15.1, 15.3, 15.9, 15.10 Abram v AV Jennings Ltd [2002] SASC 417 .… 10.13, 20.15 Abram Steamship Co v Westville Shipping Co [1923] AC 773; [1923] All ER Rep 645 .… 11.45, 11.48 Abundant Earth Pty Ltd v R & C Products Pty Ltd (1984) 59 ALR 211 .… 11.150 AC Toepfer International Gmbh v Nidera Handelscompagnie BV (NSWCA, 16 October 1990) .… 21.18 Academy of Health and Fitness Pty Ltd v Power [1973] VR 254 .… 10.21, 11.46, 11.57, 11.69, 11.71 ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491; [2003] FCA 850 .… 15.16, 18.7 — v ACN 117 372 915 Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 368 .… 15.16, 15.22 — v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) FCA 17 .… 15.1, 15.16 — v Baxter Health Care Pty Ltd (2007) 232 CLR 1; 237 ALR 512; [2007] HCA 38 .… 17.74, 18.7 — v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1 .… 11.110

xiii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract — v — (2002) 117 FCR 301; 189 ALR 76; [2002] FCA 62; [2002] FCAFC 4 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.13 — v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253; 178 ALR 304; [2000] FCA 1365 .… 15.16 — v Smart Corporation Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 347 .… 15.20 — v South East Melbourne Cleaning Ltd (in liq) (formerly known as Coverall Cleaning Concepts South East Melbourne Pty Ltd) (No 2) (2015) ATPR 42-492; [2015] FCA 257 .… 15.16 — v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; 304 ALR 186; [2013] HCA 54 .… 11.104, 11.105, 11.113, 11.118 — v Unique International College Pty Ltd (Imposition of Penalty) [2019] FCA 1773 .… 15.16 — v Universal Sports Challenge Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1276 .… 11.110, 11.117 — v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 .… 3.7, 11.114, 11.122, 11.153 Accordent Pty Ltd and Portellos v Bresimark Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 196; (2008) 101 SASR 286 .… 8.6, 7.27 Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470; 114 ALR 355 .… 7.1, 10.21, 10.24, 11.118, 11.124, 11.146 Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 .… 2.5 Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55 .… 2.29 Ackers v Austcorp International Ltd [2009] FCA 432 .… 11.110 Aclaw Pty Ltd v Fullston [2000] SASC 440 .… 21.12, 21.19 ACMNET Pty Ltd v Ai Tel Pty Ltd [2007] SASC 96 .… 24.21 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) SASC 204 .… 7.35 ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 .… 2.16, 2.17 ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd v Vercorp Pty Ltd; Vercorp Pty Ltd v ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 189 .… 7.28, 24.4 Acohs Pty Ltd v RA Bashford Consulting Pty Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 528 .… 10.50, 10.52

— v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375 .… 11.115 — v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 491; 169 ALR 324; [2000] FCA 2; [2000] FCA 1376 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.13, 15.16 — v — (2003) 214 CLR 51; (2003) 197 ALR 153; [2003] HCA 18 .… 10.46, 13.11, 15.6, 15.8, 15.13, 21.37 — v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 1204 .… 15.22 — v CLA Trading Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 377 .… 15.22 — v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2018] FCA 703 .… 15.13 — v Geowash Pty Ltd (No 3) (2019) 368 ALR 441; [2019] FCA 72 .… 10.43, 10.44 — v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 302 .… 11.110 — v Harrison (No 2) [2017] FCA 182 .… 15.17 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 819 .… 11.117 — v Keshow [2005] FCA 558 .… 15.16 — v Leelee Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1121 .… 6.15, 15.13 — v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 .… 15.16 — v Lux Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 926 .… 15.16, 17.53 — v Medibank Private Ltd [2018] FCAFC 235 .… 15.16 — v Oceana Commercial Pty Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 316; [2004] FCAFC 174 .… 15.15, 15.16 — v Origin Energy Electricity Ltd [2015] FCA .… 15.16 — v Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [2021] FCA 956 .… 15.16 — v Productivity Partners Pty Ltd (trading as Captain Cook College) (No 3) [2021] FCA 737 .… 15.16 — v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1062 .… 11.117 — v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 388 ALR 577; [2021] FCAFC 40 .… 15.16 — v Radio Rentals Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 292; [2005] FCA 1133 .… 15.13, 15.15, 15.16 — v Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 1294 .… 5.20 — v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1725 .… 15.8 xiv

Table of Cases



Adelaide Development Co Pty Ltd v Pohlner (1933) 49 CLR 25 .… 18.7, 18.19, 18.40 Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-901 .… 11.117 Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 10 SASR 203 .… 18.34 Adenan v Buise [1984] WAR 61 .… 14.5 Adicho v Dankeith Homes Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 316 .… 10.6, 22.4 Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158; [1954] 3 All ER 21 .… 7.37 Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera (1973) 130 CLR 353 .… 10.16 Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 .… 6.6 — v Leahy (1961) 105 CLR 6 .… 5.28 Administrative and Clerical Officers Association v Commonwealth (1979) 26 ALR 497; 53 ALJR 588 .… 5.26 Adrenaline Pty Ltd v Bathurst Regional Council (2015) 322 ALR 180; [2015] NSWCA 123 .… 26.5 Advance Fitness Corp Pty Ltd v Bondi Diggers Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd [1999] NSWSC 264 .… 10.43, 10.45 Advance (NSW) Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd v Matthews (1989) 166 CLR 606 .… 7.10 Advanced Hair Studio Pty Ltd v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 615 .… 11.111 Advanced National Services Pty Ltd v Daintree Contractors Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 270 .… 26.9, 26.13 Adventure World Travel Pty Ltd v Newsom [2014] NSWCA 174 .… 10.46 AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 .… 24.22 Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-operative Society Ltd v Lee (2000) 102 FCR 125 .… 18.35, 18.36 Aerospace Publishing Ltd v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 3 .… 23.11 AFC Holdings Pty Ltd v Shiprock Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 28,199; [2010] NSWSC 985 .… 10.30 African Minerals Ltd v Pan Palladium Ltd [2003] NSWSC 268 .… 3.11, 5.21 A-G v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1913) 18 CLR 30 .… 18.37 — v Barker Bros Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 495 .… 6.9 — v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; [2000] 4 All ER 385; [2000] 3 WLR 625 .… 11.146, 23.2, 24.31

Acorn Consolidated Pty Ltd v Hawkeslade Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 322 .… 10.12, 10.34 Acron Pacific Ltd v Offshore Oil NL (1985) 157 CLR 514 .… 23.45 ACT Gaming and Liquor Authority v Andonaros (1991) 103 FLR 450 .… 18.6, 18.11, 18.12, 18.21, 18.32, 18.43, 18.45, 23.39 Actall Pty Ltd v Pacific Bay Development Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 190 .… 20.18, 21.34, 21.35 ACTEW Corporation Ltd v Pangallo (2002) 127 FCR 1; [2002] FCAFC 325 .… 5.26 Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering IN.GL. EN SpA [2003] 2 AC 541; [2003] 2 All ER 615; [2003] 2 WLR 1060; [2003] UKHL 17 .… 16.67 Active Leisure (Sports) Pty Ltd v Sportsman’s Australia Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 301 .… 24.22 Actron Investments Queensland Pty Ltd v DEQ Consulting Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 147 .… 11.110 Adam v Newbigging (1888) 13 App Cas 308 .… 11.44 — v Shiavon [1985] Qd R 1 .… 25.12 Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250 .… 27.21 — v — (1818) 2 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250 .… 3.58, 3.59, 3.60 — v Quasar Management Services Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 223 .… 21.19, 23.2 Adamson v Hayes (1973) 130 CLR 276 .… 8.21, 16.21, 16.25 — v — (1974) 48 ALJ 322 .… 16.21 — v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 319 .… 18.35, 18.36, 18.37 — v — (1993) 15 Syd LR 92 .… 18.35 — v West Perth Football Club (1979) 27 ALR 475 .… 18.36 — v Williams [2001] QCA 38 .… 10.41, 26.1, 26.6, 26.7 Adani Abbot Point Terminal Pty Ltd v Lake Vermont Resources Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 26 .… 15.15 Adaz Nominees Pty Ltd v Castleway Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 201 .… 10.16, 10.30, 10.41, 10.42 Adcon v Icon [2020] VSC 165 .… 24.23 Adelaide City Corp v Altmann (1987) 46 SASR 186 .… 10.32 — v Jennings Industries Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 455 .… 10.32 — v — (1985) 156 CLR 274 .… 10.55 xv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Codner [1973] 1 NZLR 545 .… 2.7 — v Ray (1874) 9 Ch App 397 .… 11.63 AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464; [2002] NSWSC 170 .… 18.16, 18.32, 24.19 A-G (Botswana) v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASCA 73 .… 21.22 A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114 .… 2.6, 2.14, 5.24, 5.25 A-G (NSW) v Mutual Home Loans Fund of Australia Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 162 .… 3.20 — v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 .… 24.1 — v Peters (1924) 34 CLR 146 .… 11.37 — v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; [2005] NSWCA 261 .… 15.1, 15.16 A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1; 295 ALR 197; [2013] HCA 3 .… 3.52 A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 353 .… 18.21 Agaiby v Darlington Commodities Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-535 .… 11.112, 11.122, 11.150 AGC v Ross [1983] 2 VR 319 .… 21.18 AGC (Advances) Ltd v FCT (1975) 132 CLR 175 .… 8.16, 8.28 — v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454 .… 3.22, 3.24 AGC Ltd v McClelland [1993] ASC 58,378 .… 14.17 Agius v Sage [1999] VSC 100 .… 2.26, 5.19, 6.6, 16.67, 24.7, 24.14 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood [2003] 10 VR 596; (2003) 183 FLR 242; [2003] VSC 453 .… 16.80 — v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173 .… 6.11 Agmon Investments Pty Ltd v Inglis [2006] NSWSC 932 .… 6.11 Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2006] NSWSC 202 .… 10.43, 19.2, 20.16 — v — [2010] NSWSC 635 .… 15.26, 15.27 — v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 .… 2.29, 4.2, 4.32, 4.35, 4.36, 6.18, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 10.33, 10.62, 10.66, 21.29, 21.31, 22.4 Agricultural Societies Council of NSW v Christie [2016] NSWCA 331 .… 5.10 Agripay Pty Ltd v Byrne [2011] QCA 85 .… 14.19, 14.20 xvi

Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd t/as Spring Air v Hatfield (2003) 7 VR 63; 174 FLR 395; [2003] VSCA 6 .… 25.12 AH McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506 .… 11.46 Ah Sam v Mortimer [2021] NSWCA 327 .… 15.8, 15.10 Ahern v Power [1953] QWN 22 .… 4.19 Ahmed Angullia bin Hadjee Mohamed Salleh Angullia v Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd [1938] AC 624; [1938] 3 All ER 106 .… 8.55 AHR Constructions Pty Ltd v Maloney (1994) 1 Qd R 461 .… 23.41 Aidinis v Hotchin [1971] SASR 446 .… 21.24 Ailakis v Olivero [2014] WASCA 127 .… 5.18 — v — (No 2) [2014] WASCA 127 .… 4.30, 21.29, 21.30, 23.25 Ailsa Craig Fishing v Malvern Fishing [1983] 1 WLR 964; 1 All ER 101 .… 10.62 Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 309 .… 3.17, 5.1, 5.19, 5.24, 6.8, 6.11, 10.9, 12.64, 22.9 Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (2005) 223 CLR 283; 218 ALR 700; [2005] HCA 39 .… 21.24, 25.12 Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 .… 2.2, 2.13, 2.16, 2.28, 7.2 Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 116 .… 3.27, 4.30, 4.35, 5.19, 5.29 Aitkin Transport Pty Ltd v Voysey [1990] 1 Qd R 510 .… 7.2 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236, 237; [1999] NSWSC 996 .… 6.15, 6.16, 10.43, 10.44, 10.47, 10.48, 24.13 Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556 .… 2.15, 2.17 Akins v National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 .… 14.18 Akot Pty Ltd v Rathmines Investments Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 302 .… 10.13 Akron Securities v Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353; 143 ALR 457 .… 11.129, 11.146, 11.147 Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477 .… 3.34 Al Achrafi v Topic [2016] NSWSC 1807 .… 10.32, 20.16

Table of Cases Al Jadeed TV v United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd (2011) 283 ALR 206 .… 21.23 Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; 137 NTR 1; [2000] NTCA 15 .… 4.14, 10.53 Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 224 .… 26.9 Alan Davis Group v Rivkin Financial Services [2005] NSWSC 369 .… 21.18 Alanbert Pty Ltd v Bulevi Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 261 .… 13.6, 19.5, 19.8, 19.12 Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216 .… 10.21, 11.3, 11.44, 11.45, 11.53, 11.60, 11.69, 11.85, 11.104, 11.113, 11.147, 13.11 Albert House Ltd v Brisbane CC (1965) 118 CLR 145 .… 10.6 Albion Insurance Co Ltd v GIO (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 .… 11.145 Albury v Gulror Pty Ltd (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-018 .… 15.29 Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.34 Aldersea v Public Transport Corporation (2001) 3 VR 499; (2001) 183 ALR 545; [2001] VSC 169 .… 11.146, 21.34, 22.12, 23.19 Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd [1945] KB 189; [1945] 1 All ER 244 .… 10.77 Alderson v Maddison (1880) LR 5 Ex D 293 .… 16.54 — v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 435 .… 11.108, 14.17, 14.20 ALDI Foods Pty Ltd as General Partner of ALDI Stores (A Limited Partnership) v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2020] FCAFC 231 .… 11.111 Aldridge v Johnson (1857) 7 E & B 885; 119 ER 1476 .… 16.79 — v Miller (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 520 .… 21.19 Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd v Armidale City Council (1994) 51 FCR 378 .… 25.1 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil GB Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 944 .… 13.7, 13.11 Alex Kay Pty Ltd v General Motors Acceptance Corp [1963] VR 458 .… 10.74 Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 .… 23.5, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38, 23.39, 23.40 — v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2001] NSWCA 240 .… 10.64, 10.76, 10.77



— v — (2003) 216 CLR 109; (2004) 204 ALR 417; [2004] HCA 7 .… 11.145 — v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 .… 18.21 — v Standard Telephones & Cables Plc [1990] ICR 291 .… 24.27 — v Stocks & Holdings (Sales) Pty Ltd [1975] VR 843 .… 3.61 Alexiadis v Zirpiadis (2013) 302 ALR 148; [2013] SASCFC 64 .… 18.46, 26.1 Alexus Pty Ltd v Pont Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1171 .… 21.19 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518; [2000] 4 All ER 97; [2000] 3 WLR 946 .… 7.7, 7.30, 23.2, 23.19 ALH Group Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2012) 245 CLR 338; 286 ALR 1; [2012] HCA 6 .… 8.1, 8.46, 8.47, 22.5 Alinta 2000 Ltd v Petkov [2012] WASCA 258 .… 25.12 Allan Rowlands Holdings Pty Ltd v Gaye (No 1) Pty Ltd (1992) 107 FLR 313 .… 18.3, 18.4, 18.7, 18.9, 18.39, 18.47 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; [1886–90] All ER Rep 90 .… 14.2, 14.5, 14.8, 14.10, 14.11, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15 — v Walker [1896] 2 Ch 369 .… 12.23 Allcars Pty Ltd v Tweedle [1937] VLR 35 .… 6.5 Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 .… 3.10, 3.11, 10.12 — v Richardson (1879) 13 Ch D 524 .… 11.63 — v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685 .… 16.73, 16.75 Allen & Sons v Kirk [1927] St R Qd 85 .… 16.29 Allens Group Ltd v Arena Meetings Conventions & Exhibitions Pty Ltd (1997) 8 BPR 15,623 .… 3.11, 5.19, 6.12 Alleyn v Thurecht [1983] 2 Qd R 706 .… 21.29 Allhours Enterprises Pty Ltd v Global Food Services Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 459 .… 8.7, 8.47, 11.147 Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd v Hinton (1964) 1 DCR (NSW) 5 .… 17.5 Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464 .… 3.27, 3.44 Alliance Petroleum Australia NL v Australian Gas Light Co (1985) 39 SASR 84 .… 21.19 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121 .… 2.10, 2.24, 2.31, 21.29, 21.31 xvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568; 215 ALR 385; [2005] HCA 26 .… 11.127 — v Haddad [2015] NSWCA 186 .… 11.115 — v Oakley (1987) 45 SASR 148; (1987) 48 SASR 337 .… 10.6, 10.9 Allied Mills Ltd v Gwydir Valley Oilseeds Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 26 .… 19.17, 19.23 Allison v Hewitt (1974) 3 DCR (NSW) 193 .… 23.19 Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 57 .… 21.12, 21.26, 21.37 Allpike Honda Pty Ltd v Marbellup Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 5 ATPR 40-385 .… 11.115 Allstate Enterprises v LV Beaconsfield Gold NL [1999] NSWSC 832 .… 10.12 Allstate Prospecting Pty Ltd v Posgold Mines Ltd (1995, unreported) .… 18.35 Alma Hill Constructions Pty Ltd v Onal [2007] VSC 86 .… 8.18 Al-Maha Pty Ltd v Coplin [2017] NSWCA 318 .… 15.31 Almond Investors Ltd v Kualitree Nursery Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 198 .… 21.26 Aloha Shangri-La Atlas Cruises Pty Ltd v Gaven [1970] Qd R 438 .… 7.25, 18.37 Alonso v SRS Investments (WA) Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 168 .… 5.1, 16.40, 16.45 Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Co Ltd [2008] WASCA 119 .… 2.3 Alstom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2012] SASC 49 .… 10.7, 10.41, 10.43, 10.52, 10.77, 22.4, 22.6 — v — (No 8) [2012] SASC 117 .… 10.14 Altmann v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (1986) 43 SASR 353 .… 18.30 Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 VR 386 .… 23.15, 23.27, 23.28 AMA Group Ltd v ASSK Investments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 45 .… 10.30, 20.7 Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2001] NSWSC 324 .… 10.2 — v Ridgeway [2005] NSWCA 417 .… 25.11 Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson (1998) 81 FCR 149 .… 18.11, 18.40, 18.41, 18.47 Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd [1976] 3 All ER 509 .… 12.1

— v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 .… 2.3, 2.6, 2.28 — (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 577 .… 2.29 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Television Corp Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 648 .… 10.32, 22.12 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 100 ALR 267 (Beaumont J); (1990) 22 FCR 527; 92 ALR 601; 92 ALR 603 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.21, 23.25, 21.33 Ambassador Refrigeration Pty Ltd v Trocadero Building and Investment Co Pty Ltd [1968] 1 NSWR 75 .… 18.43, 18.47 Amber Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Polona Pty Ltd (1982) 2 NSWLR 470 .… 20.8, 20.13, 20.16 Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker [2010] VSC 59 .… 7.28 Amco Enterprises Pty Ltd v Wade [1968] Qd R 445 .… 16.25 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2021] VSCA .… 10.30 Amcor Ltd t/as Australian Paper Manufacturers v Watson [2000] NSWCA 21 .… 15.28 American Express International Inc v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 10 VR 145; [2004] VSCA 193 .… 8.50 AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 564 .… 23.45 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 70; (1986) 162 CLR 170; (1986) 162 CLR 171 .… 23.23, 23.45 Amey v Fifer (1971) 1 NSWLR 685 .… 17.73 Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 288 .… 18.35, 18.37 — v — (No 2) (1975) 133 CLR 331 .… 18.4 Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199 .… 4.6, 4.22 — v Citibank Ltd [1996] QCA 129 .… 4.38 AMP General Insurance Ltd v Kull [2005] NSWCA 442 .… 10.33 AMP Services Ltd v Manning [2006] FCA 256 .… 21.24 AMP Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [1990] VR 646 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.48 — v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 .… 10.16 — v Specialist Funding Consultants Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 .… 11.147, 11.149 Ampol Petroleum Ltd v Mutton (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 1 .… 24.20

xviii

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— v — [1996] LMCLQ 337 .… 26.8 Anglican Development Fund Diocese of Bathurst v Palmer [2015] NSWSC 1856 .… 5.10, 5.17, 17.73 Anglo-Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 .… 18.31 Angus Developments Pty Ltd v Kim [2017] NSWSC 584 .… 10.31 Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549 .… 10.33, 20.1, 21.11, 21.18, 21.19, 21.21, 21.22 Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 .… 8.4, 8.8, 8.18, 8.34, 8.39 Ansett Australia Ltd v Diners Club Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 102 .… 10.13, 10.15, 26.5 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (1990) 95 ALR 211 .… 13.12 — v — (No 2) [1991] 2 VR 636 .… 5.26 — v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54 .… 5.28, 10.32, 10.48, 10.55, 10.59, 18.9, 18.30 Anthoness v Melbourne Malting and Brewing Co (1888) 14 VLR 916 .… 16.17 Antonovic v Volker (1986) 7 NSWLR 151 .… 15.1, 15.28, 15.31 Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith [2003] 2 NZLR 23 .… 4.35 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2004] QCA 6 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd (1982) 57 ALJR 35; (1982) 57 ALJR 352 .… 20.4, 21.17 — v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 478 .… 25.3 — v Frost Holdings Pty Ltd [1989] VR 695 .… 6.2, 6.3, 6.8 — v Manasseh [2016] WASCA 41 .… 22.2, 22.5 — v Pan Foods Co Importers and Distributors Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 29 .… 11.124 — v Petrik [1996] 2 VR 638 .… 11.39 — v Widin (1990) 2 FCR 21; (1990) 26 FCR 21; 102 ALR 289 .… 16.35, 16.65, 16.67 — v Wrenport Pty Ltd [1996] ANZ ConvR 102; [1995] QCA 140 .… 20.20, 26.4 ANZ Executors & Trustee Co Ltd v Qintex Australia Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 360 .…  17.69, 18.21, 24.7 — v Humes Ltd [1990] VR 615 .… 24.4 Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) (2013) 45 WAR 379; 307 ALR 376; [2013] WASCA 213 .… 7.41

Amsprop Trading Ltd v Harris Distribution Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1025 .… 7.25 Anaconda v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 .… 10.3 Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 .… 2.16, 2.30, 10.6, 10.43 — v — [2005] HCA Trans 151 .… 10.3 — v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 101; [2000] WASCA 27 .… 5.19, 6.6, 10.41 Anaconda Operations Pty Ltd v Fluor Daniel Pty Ltd [1999] VSCA 214 .… 24.23 Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; [2004] HCA 28 .… 10.12, 10.13, 10.31, 10.33, 10.40 Anderson v G H Michell and Sons Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 543 .… 18.34 — v Glass (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152 .… 4.19 — Anderson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2018] VSCA 22 .… 15.16 Andoy Pty Ltd v S & M Cannon Pty Ltd (1990) 17 IPR 533 .… 24.24 Andre & Cie SA v Ets Michel Blanc & Fils [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 166 .… 11.96 — v — [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 .… 11.13 Andrew Knox Holdings Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd .… 21.28, 21.29 Andrew Shelton & Co Pty Ltd v Alpha Healthcare Ltd [2002] VSC 248 .… 26.8 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205; 290 ALR 595; [2012] HCA 30 .… 23.45, 24.23 — v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229 .… 3.9 — v Parker [1973] Qd R 93 .… 18.27, 18.47 Androvitsaneas v Members First Broker Network Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 212 .… 10.43, 21.38 Anfrank Nominees Pty Ltd v Connell (1989) ACSR 365 .… 12.30 Angas Securities Ltd v Small Business Consortium Lloyds Consortium No 9056 [2016] NSWCA 182 .… 10.12 — v Valcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 190 .… 11.129, 11.146 Ange v First East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 638; [2011] VSCA 335 .… 10.27, 15.1, 19.21 Angel v Hope 1927] St R Qd 221 .… 16.18 — v Jay [1911] 1 KB 666; [1908–10] All ER Rep 470 .… 11.61, 11.62, 11.63 Angelopoulos v Sabatino (1995) 65 SASR 1; [1995] 65 SASR 17 .… 26.6, 26.8 xix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Ardlethan Options Ltd v Easdown (1915) 20 CLR 285 .… 23.42 Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65 .… 2.15, 4.19, 5.7 Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112; 12 ATPR 41-015 .… 11.84, 11.111, 11.122 Argyll Park Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd v Glen Pacific Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 1 .… 4.17 Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581 .… 24.16, 24.17 Arktos Pty Ltd v Idyllic Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 119 .… 11.110 Arlett v Kinsella (1870) 1 AJR 2 .… 16.62 Arlone Pty Ltd v Teller Properties Pty Ltd (FCA, Lockhart J, 7 February 1995 .… 23.23 Armada Balnaves Pte Ltd v Woodside Energy Julimar Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 69 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 21.20, 21.29 — v — (No 2) [2020] WASC 14 .… 21.29 Armaghdown Motors Ltd v Gray Motors Ltd [1963] NZLR 5 .… 12.56 Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Strange 505 [1722] EWHC KB J94; 93 ER 664 .… 11.82 Arms v Houghton (2006) 151 FCR 438; [2006] FCAFC 46 .… 11.110 Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 KB 822; [1916–17] All ER Rep 1117 .… 11.63 — v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232 .… 11.79 Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (No 9) [2016] NSWSC 1005 .… 21.26 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 .… 10.12, 10.30 Arnot v Hill-Douglas [2006] NSWSC 429 .… 10.3, 10.7 Arnott’s Ltd v Bourke (1998) 41 IPR 172 .… 18.37, 18.38 Aroney v Christianus (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 118 .… 17.17, 17.29 Aronis v Hallett Brick Industries Ltd [1999] SASC 92 .… 9.8 Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2002] FCA 1450 .… 15.2, 15.8, 15.15 Arshad Developments Pty Ltd v Wardle [2002] QSC 089 .… 10.35 Artcraft Pty Ltd v Chandler [2003] QSC 102 .… 18.37 ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512 .… 23.6, 24.30, 24.31

APD Parcel Delivery Pty Ltd v Baumann [2002] SASC 350 .… 11.97 Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49 .… 2.29, 3.27 APF Properties Pty Ltd v Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1561 .… 11.129 APIR Systems Ltd v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 45 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147 Apollo Shower Screen Pty Ltd v Building & Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1995) 1 NSWLR 561 .… 20.16 Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2016] VSCA 280 .… 10.12, 10.30, 22.3 Appleby v Pursell [1973] NSWLR 879 .… 10.14 Applegate v Moss [1971] 1 QB 406 .… 25.6 Application by Klumper, Re [2003] NSWSC 854 .… 17.48 Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 319 .… 21.24 APT Finance Pty Ltd v Bajada [2008] WASCA 73 .… 8.12, 8.18 Aquagenics Pty Ltd v Break O’Day Council [2010] TASFC 3 .… 11.141, 11.143 Aquatec-Maxcon Pty Ltd v Barwon Region Water Authority (No 3) [2006] VSC 270 .… 11.139 Arab Bank v Barclays Bank [1954] AC 495 .… 25.3 Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328 .… 23.45 Aravco Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 419 .… 4.16 Arbest Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1996) ATPR 41481 .… 11.112, 11.113, 11.114, 11.115, 11.118, 15.27 Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v S Spanglett Ltd [1961] 1 QB 374 .… 18.43 Archer v Archer [2000] NSWCA 314 .… 14.7, 15.7 — v Cutler [1980] 1 NZLR 386 .… 15.5, 17.53 — v Hudson (1844) 7 Beav 551; 49 ER 1180 .… 14.7 Archibald v Powlett [2017] VSCA 259; (2017) 53 VR 645 .… 23.19 Ardee Pty Ltd v Collex Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 836 .… 19.5, 19.7, 19.8, 19.15, 19.21, 19.24

xx

Table of Cases



Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 .… 10.28, 10.31, 10.55, 10.56, 10.61 — v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321 .… 3.67, 5.23 — v — (No 2) (1986) 45 SASR 57 .… 3.67, 23.13, 23.32 Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255 .… 12.15, 12.21 Associated Midland Corp Ltd v Bank of NSW (1984) 51 ALR 641 .… 3.21 Associated Newspapers Ltd v Bancks (1951) 83 CLR 322 .… 10.52, 21.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.15, 21.16, 21.18 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 155; 197 CLR 1 .… 10.53, 11.88, 23.8, 23.30, 23.39, 24.31, 28.7 — v Reynolds (1731) 2 Stra 915; 93 ER 939 .… 13.4 Astor Electronics Pty Ltd v Japan Electron Optis Laboratory Co Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 419 .… 24.13 Astra Resources Plc v Full Exposure Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1061 .… 11.111 Astrazeneca Pty Ltd v GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 22 .… 11.115, 11.122 Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corporation [2011] EWHC 1574 .… 10.73 ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460 .… 11.103, 11.124 Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 .… 3.6, 5.1, 5.17 Athens-MacDonald Travel Service Pty Ltd v Kazis [1970] SASR 264 .… 23.19 Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 481 .… 11.146, 23.24 Atlantic Civil Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corp (1992) 39 NSWLR 468 .… 18.34 Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641; [1989] QB 833 .… 13.7, 13.9 Atlas Steels (Aust) Pty Ltd v Atlas Steels Ltd (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 157 .… 24.12, 24.26 Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 144 CLR 203 .… 23.18, 23.32, 27.1 Atlee v Backhouse (1838) 3 M & W 633; 150 ER 1298 .… 13.4 Attia v Caird Seven Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 271 .… 21.29, 24.1, 24.10

Ashdown v Kirk [1999] 2 Qd R 1 .… 20.8, 21.23, 21.38, 23.45 Ashfind Pty Ltd v McDonald (1990) ANZ ConvR 108 .… 11.40, 11.41 Ashgrove Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 53 FCR 452 .… 16.29 Ashington Holdings Pty Ltd v Wipema Services Pty Ltd [1998] NSW ConvR 56, 694 .… 5.20 — v — [1999] NSWCA 456 .… 24.32 — v — (2000) NSW ConvR 55-928 .… 10.3, 19.24, 22.9 Ashton v Pratt [2012] NSWSC 3 .… 18.27 — v — (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 .… 2.5, 2.9, 2.15, 4.24, 5.1, 6.5, 18.3, 18.27 — v — (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 3 .… 18.3 Ashton Mining Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 590 .… 22.10 Ashvill Investments Ltd v Elmer Contractors Ltd [1989] QB 488 .… 11.60 Ashworth v Royal National Theatre [2014] 4 ALL ER 238; [2014] EWHC 1176 .… 24.12 Asia Pacific International Pty Ltd v Dalrymple [2000] 2 Qd R 229; [1999] QSC 204 .… 15.4, 15.7, 15.8, 15.11 — v Peel Valley Mushrooms Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 168 .… 21.19 — v Forestry Tasmania (No 2) [1998] TASSC 50 .… 10.47, 19.2, 22.12 — v Yau’s Entertainment Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 254 .… 21.24, 21.34 — v — [2003] FCA 720 .… 21.27, 23.16 ASIC v Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 540 .… 10.56 — v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2020] FCA 716 .… 15.20 — v Kobelt (2019) 267 CLR 1; [2019] HCA 18; (2019) 13(1) J Eq 81 .… 15.9, 15.13, 15.16 — v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 132; [2005] FCAFC 226 .… 15.16 Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 35 .… 18.14 Aslan v Stepanoski [2022] NSWCA 24 .… 21.12 Asmar v Albanese [2022] VSCA 19 .… 5.1, 5.10 Aspden v Seddon (1874) LR 10 Ch App 394 .… 10.30 — v — (No 2) (1876) 1 Ex D 496 .… 8.53 Asset Insure Pty Ltd v New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) (2006) 225 CLR 331 .… 10.54 xxi



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Attica Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei GMBH [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 .… 21.10, 26.9 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; [2000] 4 All ER 385; [2000] 3 WLR 625; [2000] UKHL 45 .… 24.1 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988; [2009] UKPC 10 .… 10.18, 10.55 — v — [2016] AC 742; [2015] UKSC 72 .… 10.40 Attorney General of the Virgin Islands v Global Water Associates Ltd [2020] UKPC 18 .… 23.39 Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; 331 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 16 .… 11.112 Attwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl & Fin 232; 7 ER 684; [1835–42] All ER Rep 258 .… 11.37, 11.53 Auburn Council v Austin Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] NSWSC 130 .… 21.24 Auburn Shopping Village Pty Ltd v Nelmeer Hoteliers Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 114 .… 3.68, 21.35 Aurel Forras Pty Ltd v Graham Karp Developments Pty Ltd [1975] VR 202 .… 19.22 Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd (2019) 1 QR 392; [2019] QSC 163 .… 10.43 Auss Metals Pty Ltd v Express Mobile Services Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 745 .… 7.3 Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 406 .… 7.43 Aussie Home Loans v X Inc Services (2005) NSWSC 285 .… 18.37 Aussie Invest Corp Pty Ltd v Pulcesia Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 362 .… 9.5, 20.18, 21.19, 21.35 Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd [1998] 1 Qd R 1 .… 23.24 Austin v Sheldon [1974] 2 NSWLR 661 .… 19.16 — v United Dominions Corp Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 612 .… 23.45 Austino Wentworthville Pty Ltd v Metroland Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 59 .… 8.25 Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1996) ATPR 41-454 .… 11.145 Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 .… 1.15, 2.5, 2.8, 2.16, 2.20, 15.8

Austra Tanks Pty Ltd v Running [1982] 2 NSWLR 840 .… 6.8, 18.38 Austrak Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 103 .… 24.23 Austral Masonry (NSW) Pty Ltd v Cementech Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 72 .… 20.20, 21.38 Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524 .… 2.31, 21.26, 21.28, 21.32 Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 696 .… 21.23 Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 467 .… 12.33, 12.35 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Compagnie D’Assurances Maritimes Aeriennes et Terrestres [1996] 1 VR 561 .… 10.13 — v Frenmast Pty Ltd (2013) 282 FLR 351; [2013] NSWCA 459 .… 3.15, 17.70 — v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149; [2005] NSWCA 344 .… 4.28, 13.2, 13.5, 13.7, 14.4, 15.8 — v Larcos (1987) 13 NSWLR 286 .… 25.12 — v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 106 ALR 115 .… 11.145 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 164 CLR 662 .… 26.1, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5 Australia Bank Ltd v Stokes (1985) 3 NSWLR 174 .… 15.27 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd .… 23.45 Australia China Business Bureau Pty Ltd v MCP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 934 .… 6.15, 10.47 Australia City Properties Management Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 65111 [2021] NSWCA 162 .… 21.26 Australia Estates Pty Ltd v Cairns CC [2005] QCA 328 .… 12.3, 12.25 Australia Hotel Co Ltd v Moore (1899) 20 LR (NSW) Eq 155 .… 12.35 Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 .… 15.5 — v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.52 Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Kazi [2004] QCA 147 .… 18.11 Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council [2022] HCA 5 .… 7.9, 24.28 — v The Nuance Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 133 .… 6.11, 18.34 xxii

Table of Cases Australian Airline Flight Engineers Association v Ansett Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1299 .… 10.41 Australian Airships v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 232 .… 10.73 Australian Aviation Underwriting Pty Ltd v Henry (1988) 12 NSWLR 121 .… 10.41 Australian Beauty Trade Suppliers Ltd v Conference & Exhibition Organisers Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 474 .… 11.106, 11.107 Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1963] AC 74 .… 22.12 Australian Breeders Cooperative Society Ltd v Griffith Morgan Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488 .… 18.11, 18.12, 18.41, 18.43, 18.46, 18.49 — v Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488 .… 11.124 Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.35 — v — (1997) 129 CLR .… 10.34 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1988) 166 CLR 454 .… 18.9 — v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 .… 21.35, 28.31 — v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 .… 3.11 Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 157 .… 13.6 Australian Capital Territory v Munday [2000] FCA 653 .… 18.3, 18.35 Australian Casualty Co Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 .… 10.34 Australian Coarse Grains Pool Pty Ltd v Barley Marketing Board [1989] 1 Qd R 499 .… 10.41 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 657; [2003] FCAFC 149 .… 5.11 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 819 .… 11.117 — v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 992 .… 11.117 — v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 378; [2012] FCAFC 56 .… 24.28 — v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 .… 3.47, 3.56 — v Woolworths Ltd [2019] FCA 1039 .… 11.117



Australian Consolidated Investments Ltd v England (1995) 13 ACLC 296 .… 11.115 Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 .… 2.16, 2.18, 2.20, 10.3, 10.7, 10.43, 10.45 Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 .… 2.2, 2.5, 2.11, 5.19 Australian European Finance Corp Ltd v Sheahan (1993) 60 SASR 187 .… 5.17 Australian Express Pty Ltd v Pejovic [1963] NSWR 954 .… 12.70 Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2011] NSWSC 267 .… 26.1 — v — (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 .… 2.3, 2.15, 12.56, 26.1, 26.3, 26.5 Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546 .… 5.10 Australian Fruit and Produce Co Ltd v Terry Pty Ltd (1934) 29 TAS LR 102 .… 23.13 Australian Gasfields Ltd v Kvaerner Process Systems Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 320 .… 24.23 Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL [2009] WASCA 98 .… 23.2, 23.6, 23.24, 23.35 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 .… 6.5 — v McClelland (1993) ASC 56-230; (1993) ATPR 41-254 .… 15.28, 15.29 Australian Gypsum Ltd v Hume Steel Ltd (1930) 45 CLR 54 .… 12.32, 12.35 Australian Hardwoods Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways [1961] 1 All ER 737; [1961] ALR 757 .… 24.2, 24.9, 24.10 — v Hudson Investment Group Ltd [2007] NSWCA 104 .… 24.6, 24.16 Australian Horizons (Vic) Pty Ltd v Ryan Land Co Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 463 .… 21.28, 21.29, 22.2, 22.5 Australian Hotels Association (NSW) v TAB Ltd [2006] NSWSC 293 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44 Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387 .… 23.18 Australian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Frugalis Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 201; [1990] 2 Qd R 203 .… 5.26, 10.56, 10.58, 10.61, 20.1 Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR

xxiii



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501; [2009] FCA 1220 .… 2.18, 10.5, 10.8, 12.31 Australian Mortgage v Baclon [2001] NSWSC 774 .… 21.19, 21.27 Australian Mutual Provident Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 417 .… 10.48, 10.60 — v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 .… 6.6 — v Gregory (1908) 5 CLR 615 .… 8.18 Australian National Airlines Commission v Robinson [1977] VR 87 .… 23.2 Australian National Hotels Pty Ltd v Jager (2000) 9 Tas R 153 .… 10.24, 10.39, 22.12 Australian National Nominees Pty Ltd v GPC No 11 Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 773 .… 10.21, 10.24 Australian Pipeline Ltd v Hastings Funds Management Ltd [2014] NSWCA 398 .… 10.13 Australian Postal Corporation v Oliver [2006] VSC 318 .… 10.6 Australian Provincial Assurance Association v ET Taylor & Co Ltd [1947] NZLR 793 .… 10.5 — v Rogers (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 202 .… 16.46, 22.4 Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Grice [1998] NSWSC 399 .… 10.61 — v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177 .… 10.53 Australian Real Estate Investment Co Ltd v Gillis [1935] SASR 148 .… 18.47 Australian Rugby League Ltd v Cross (1997) 39 IPR 111 .… 10.41 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 173 ALR 702; Aust Contract Rep 90-115 .… 8.53, 11.118 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 409 .… 25.12 — v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 177 ALR 329 .… 15.25 — v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364; 274 ALR 731; [2011] FCAFC 19 .… 5.19, 6.8 — v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2008] FCA 1071 .… 28.17 — v Narain [2008] FCAFC 120; (2008) 169 FCR 211 .… 11.110 Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 .… 2.14, 2.16

Australian Smelting Co v British Broken Hill Pty Ltd (1896) 22 VLR 190 .… 23.39 Australian Steel and Mining Corp Pty Ltd v Corben [1974] 2 NSWLR 202 .… 11.39, 11.40, 11.122 Australian Wheat Board v Ison [1967] 2 NSWR 643 .… 18.45 — v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 233 .… 23.37 Australian Widows’ Fund Life Assurance Society Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of A’asia Ltd (1912) 14 CLR 141 .… 12.20 Australian Winch & Haulage Co Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd [2002] FCA 1181 .… 10.55 Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 (HC); [1954] HCA 20; (1955) 93 CLR 546 (PC) .… 1.16, 1.31, 3.45, 5.28, 5.28, 10.9, 10.31, 26.5, 28.7 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 .… 6.15, 8.52, 9.7, 10.42, 10.47, 10.48, 10.51, 10.52, 24.25 Austress-Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 399 .… 18.37 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286 .… 10.44, 10.46, 15.16, 21.14, 21.21, 21.34, 21.37 Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 .… 10.41, 21.10, 21.38, 23.42, 26.9, 26.14 Auzcare Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 581; [2015] NSWCA 412 .… 4.28, 23.45 Avel Pty Ltd v FCT [2004] FCAFC 70 .… 10.39 Avellino v All Australia Netball Association Ltd (2004) 87 SASR 504; [2004] SASC 56 .… 7.33, 18.36 Avenhouse v Council of the Shire of Hornsby (1998) 44 NSWLR 1 .… 23.19 Aventus Cranbourne Thompsons Road Pty Ltd v Home Consortium Leasehold Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 199 .… 10.30 Avenue (WA) Pty Ltd v Prazaline Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 173 .… 24.10 Aviation Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Byrt [2009] QSC 387 .… 8.9 Aviet v Smith and Searies Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 274 .… 3.47 Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281 .… 12.69, 14.16, 14.20 Avtex Airservices Pty Ltd v Bartsch (1992) 107 ALR 539 .… 21.28, 22.7, 22.10, 22.12

xxiv

Table of Cases Avzur Hotels Pty Ltd v Ivanhoe Entertainment Pty Ltd (2009) 257 ALR 498; [2009] FCA 701 .… 7.28 Awad v Twin Creeks Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 200 .… 11.147 Awap SGT Investment Ltd v CN Holdings Ltd [2020] WASCA 74 .… 26.4 Awaroa Holdings Ltd v Commercial Securities & Finance Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 19 .… 11.10, 11.19, 11.30, 11.79 AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133; [2011] CLC 312 .… 10.7 Axelsen v O’Brien (1949) 80 CLR 219 .… 6.2, 6.11, 24.8, 24.11, 24.16 Axxess Australia Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications (Aust) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 64 .… 24.21 Ayliff v Archdale (1660) Cro Eliz 920; 78 ER 1142 .… 17.5 Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 319 .… 7.41, 21.14 B B v McM (1987) 8 SR (WA) 36 .… 18.44 B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Brian A Cheeseman & Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 25 NSWLR 227 .… 10.4, 10.8, 10.12 B & H Constructions Pty Ltd v Campbell (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1234; 63 NSWR 333 .… 16.84 B & R Stevens Transport Pty Ltd v Burkitt [2016] NSWCA 259 .… 10.6, 10.20 B & S Contracts & Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd (1984) ICR 419 .… 13.9 B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147 .… 3.11, 3.17 Babsari Pty Ltd v Wong [2000] 2 Qd R 576 .… 5.19, 12.44, 12.47 Babstock Pty Ltd v Laurel Star Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 63 .… 21.12 Baburin v Baburin [1990] 2 Qd R 101 .… 14.10, 14.14, 15.8, 15.11 Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd v Joseph Nathan & Co Ltd (in liq) (1919) 26 CLR 410 .… 10.4, 10.12, 12.30, 18.35, 18.37 Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 VR 1 .… 24.23 Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243 .… 15.8 Bacon v Purcell (1916) 22 CLR 307 .… 10.12, 22.6



Badat v DTZ Australia (WA) Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 83 .… 20.13, 21.31 Badenach v Calvert (2016) 257 CLR 440; [2016] HCA 18 .… 23.16 Badman v Drake [2008] NSWSC 1366 .… 14.5 Bagnall v White (1906) 4 CLR 89 .… 16.53 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; 78 ALR 1; [1988] HCA 16 .… 7.31, 7.45, 7.47, 7.48, 8.47, 8.53, 16.72, 24.2, 24.10 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v Sztrochlic [2015] NSWSC 885 .… 3.40 Baig v Baig [1970] VR 833 .… 7.7 Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd [1964] VR 436 .… 4.17, 6.7 Bailey v Cassaniti (1991) 5 BPR 11,683 .… 24.7 — v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 125 ALR 228 .… 23.8 — v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399; 132 ALR 1 .… 3.8, 7.22 — v Sweeting (1861) 9 CB (NS) 843 .… 16.37 Bain v Fothergill (1874) LR 7 HL 158 .… 23.6 — v — (1991) 4 JCL 230; (1991) 65 ALJ 285 .… 23.6 Bainbrigge v Browne (1881) 18 Ch D 188 .… 14.15 Baird v BCE Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 374 .… 11.64, 12.21, 12.30 — v Magripilis (1925) 37 CLR 321 .… 24.10 Bak v Glenleigh Homes Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 10 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.41, 23.42, 23.44 Bakarich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2007] NSWCA 169 .… 15.26 Baker v Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd (recs apptd) (in liq) [2011] VSCA 334 .… 7.28 — v Corp of City of Salisbury (1982) 2 IR 168 .… 24.27 — v Gough [1963] NSWR 1345 .… 24.12, 24.27 — v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145 .… 19.15 — v Liberal Party (SA Div) (1997) 68 SASR 366 .… 5.10 — v McLaughlin [1967] NZLR 405 .… 24.7, 24.8 — v Sheridan [2005] NSWCA 408 .… 8.7 — v Taylor (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 500 .… 3.29 Baker Perkins Ltd v Thompson [1960] NSWR 488 .… 10.28 xxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bakewell v Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd [2019] NSWCA 199 .… 8.7 — v Deputy FCT (SA) (1937) 58 CLR 743 .… 8.9, 8.38 Balagiannis v Balagiannis [2022] NSWCA 18 .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.29 Balanced Securities Ltd v Dumayne Property Group Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 61 .… 22.5 Baldwin v Everingham [1993] 1 Qd R 10 .… 5.10 — v Icon Energy Ltd [2015] QSC 12; [2016] 1 Qd R 397 .… 6.15, 10.41, 10.47 Balesfire Pty Ltd t/as Gutter Shop v Adams [2006] NSWCA 112 .… 10.56, 10.58 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 .… 5.4 — v Hollandia Ravensthorpe NL (1978) 18 SASR 240 .… 11.7, 11.14, 11.53 Ball v Hesketh (1697) Comb 381; 90 ER 541 .… 4.21 Ballantine v Harold (1893) 19 VLR 465 .… 16.45, 16.86 Ballantyne v Phillott (1961) 105 CLR 379 .… 4.26, 10.21 — v Raphael (1889) 15 VLR 538 .… 11.16 Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 .… 3.68 — v — (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193 .… 3.68, 3.72, 21.19 Ballett v Mingay [1943] KB 281; [1943] 1 All ER 143 .… 17.40 Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379; affirmed in [1910] AC 295 .… 10.28, 10.72 Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd [2006] Lloyd’s Rep 629 .… 23.11 Balog v Crestani (1975) 132 CLR 289 .… 10.12, 21.19 Baloglow v Konstanidis [2001] NSWCA 451 .… 10.36, 16.21, 21.36 Baltic Shipping Co (The Mikhail Lermontov) v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 .… 3.21, 4.28, 10.64, 10.70, 10.71, 15.28, 15.28, 15.31, 23.19 — v — (1993) 176 CLR 344 .… 10.64, 23.5, 23.9, 23.18, 23.19, 23.39, 26.1, 26.2, 26.4, 26.5, 26.13 — v — (1994) 18 UQLJ 112 .… 23.19 — v Merchant ‘Mikhail Lermontov’ (1995) 36 NSWLR 361 .… 15.28, 15.30, 15.31 Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192 .… 10.43, 10.46, 21.33, 21.34, 21.35 Bamford v Pozenel [2001] SASC 132 .… 20.16 Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626 .… 11.80

Bandelle Pty Ltd v Sydney Capitol Hotels Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 303 .… 25.5 Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capell and Co [1919] AC 435 .… 19.23 Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3 .… 2.7, 2.30 Bank of America Australia Ltd v Ceda Jon International Pty Ltd (1988) 17 NSWLR 290 .… 11.103, 18.10 Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540 .… 10.4 — v Reynell (1892) 10 NZLR 257 .… 12.68 Bank of Baroda v Shah [1988] 3 All ER 24 .… 14.16 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1989] 2 WLR 759 .… 14.10 — v — [1990] 1 QB 923 .… 14.20 — v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 .… 4.28 Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120 .… 14.6, 14.9, 14.17 Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42 .… 14.15 Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 .… 10.13 — v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 27 NSWLR 91; 107 ALR 333 .… 11.147, 11.149 Bank of NSW v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42; 65 CLR 43 .… 12.66, 12.68, 12.70, 14.11 Bank of Queensland Ltd v Chartis Australia Insurance Ltd [2013] QCA 183 .… 10.35, 10.74 Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller [1925] VLR 642 .… 14.6, 14.9, 14.17, 15.12 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Abdul [2012] VSC 222 .… 14.16, 14.18 Banking Corp v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 143 ALR 35 .… 4.30 Banking Group Ltd v McGee [1994] ASC 56-278 .… 14.19 — v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 265; 106 ALR 115 .… 11.145 Bankrupt Estate of Piccolo v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] FCA 386 .… 22.2, 22.5 Banks v Williams (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 220 .… 23.11, 23.13, 23.22 Bankstown CC v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 660; 221 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 46 .… 24.20 Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502 .… 5.17, 6.6, 10.3, 10.25, 10.32 Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 191 .… 11.82, 11.83, 11.146, 23.11

xxvi

Table of Cases — v — [1996] 3 WLR 87 .… 11.85 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665 .… 11.95 Bantick v Boss Properties Pty Ltd [2001] ANZ ConvR 471; (2000) V ConvR 54629 .… 21.18 Barac v Farnell (1994) 53 FCR 193 .… 18.20, 18.21, 18.27 Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120 .… 3.67, 3.68 Barbados Trust Company Ltd v Bank of Zambia [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495; [2007] EWCA Civ 148 .… 8.8 Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 .… 24.30, 24.31 Barbaro v Millington [2007] ACTCA 1 .… 14.20 Barber v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 475 .… 26.9 — v Rowe [1948] 2 All ER 1050 .… 16.39 Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451 .… 24.23 Barclays Bank Plc v Coleman .… 14.9 — v Kennedy [1989] 1 Fam LR 356 .… 14.17, 14.20 — v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 .… 14.17 Barilla v James (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 457 .… 16.67 Barker v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2005) 91 SASR 167; [2005] SASC 81 .… 25.13, 25.14 — v Midstyle Nominees Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 75 .… 18.7 Barking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 221 .… 11.49 Barlow v Neville Jeffress Advertising Pty Ltd (1995) 17 ATPR 41-376 .… 18.37 Bar-Mordecai v Hillston [2004] NSWCA 65 .… 14.6, 14.13 Barnard v Australian Soccer Federation (1988) 81 ALR 51 .… 18.35, 18.36 Barnes v Addy [1874] 9 Ch App 244 .… 15.9 — v Alderton [2008] NSWSC 107 .… 16.68 — v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (2015) 316 ALR 408; [2014] FCAFC 152 .… 10.7, 10.55, 10.58, 11.115, 23.16, 23.39 Barnes, Re [1983] 1 VR 605 .… 17.55 Barnett v Ira L & AC Berk Pty Ltd (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 268 .… 4.17, 10.62, 10.75 Barns v Barns (2003) 214 CLR 169; 196 ALR 65; [2003] HCA 9 .… 5.8



Baron Corporation Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 69567 [2013] NSWCA 238 .… 7.26 Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149 .… 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 Barraclough v Hellyer (1964) 81 WN (NSW) 245 .… 21.10 Barrak Corporation Pty Ltd v Jaswil Properties Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 32 .… 21.19, 21.26, 21.35 Barrett, Re; Ex parte Young v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 508 .… 23.12 Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 .… 3.11, 5.19 Barro Group Pty Ltd v Fraser [1985] VR 577 .… 22.12 Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170 .… 7.2, 7.3, 7.10 Barrow v Barrow (1854) 18 Beav 529; 52 ER 208 .… 12.30 — v Chappell & Co [1976] RPC 355 .… 24.12 Barry v Davies [2000] 1 WLR 1962 .… 3.24 — v — (2001) 17 JCL 69 .… 3.24 — v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197 .… 12.70 Bartercard Ltd v Myallhurst Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 445 .… 23.45 Bartier v Kounza Investments Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 390 .… 21.27 Bartier Perry Pty Ltd v Paltos [2021] NSWCA 158 .… 11.112 Bartles v GE Custodians Ltd [2010] NZCA 174 .… 15.31 Bartlett v Arbuckle [2004] WASC 169 .… 20.4 Bartley v Myers (2002) 83 SASR 183; [2002] SASC 24 .… 11.124 Barto v GPR Management Services Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 339 .… 11.111 Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598; [1976] AC 104 .… 13.2, 13.3, 13.10 — v — [1976] AC 104 .… 11.39 Bartonvale Management Services Pty Ltd v International Linen Services Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 254 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.17 Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1534 .… 21.38 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 161 ALR 399; [1999] HCA 9 .… 11.107 Bassano v Toft [2014] EWHC 377 .… 10.69 Bastard v McCallum [1924] VLR 9 .… 16.35, 16.86

xxvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bateman Project Engineering Pty Ltd v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 69; 155 FLR 354; [2000] NTSC 34 .… 11.151 — v Resolute Ltd (2000) 23 WAR 493; [2000] WASC 284 .… 18.34, 24.23 Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 .… 11.116, 11.128, 11.150 Bates v Western (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,320 .… 24.18 Batey v Gifford (1997) 42 NSWLR 710 .… 23.6 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 .… 11.64, 11.122 Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85 .… 10.4, 10.12, 10.16, 10.40, 10.55 Batiste v Lenin [2002] NSWCA 316 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.21, 21.36 Batt v Onslow (1892) 13 LR (NSW) Eq 79 .… 3.43 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Kayah Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 14 BCL 277 .… 5.15, 18.34 Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v G R Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622 .… 5.24 Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97 .… 23.1 Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1985] 2 NSWLR 406 .… 16.72 — v — (1987) 164 CLR 137 .… 16.73, 16.75, 16.76 Bava Holdings Pty Ltd v Pando Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,295 .… 3.46 Bawdes v Amhurst (1715) Prec Ch 402; 24 ER 180 .… 16.58 Baxter v British Airways (1988) 82 ALR 298 .… 11.146 Baxton v Kara [1982] 1 NSWLR 604 .… 25.14 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Natural Gas Corp Energy Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 173 .… 8.40 Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd v Farbenfabriken Bayer AG (1965) 120 CLR 285 .… 18.31 Bayley v Wesfarmers Transport Ltd [2000] WASCA 399 .… 10.13 Bayside Council v V Corp Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 120 .… 10.30, 10.40, 10.56 Bayview Gardens Pty Ltd v The Shire of Mulgrave [1989] 1 Qd R 1 .… 13.7, 13.9

BB Australia Pty Ltd v Karioi Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 347 .… 18.37 BBB Construction Pty Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 225 .… 15.15 BBK Development Corp Pty Ltd v Luedi [2004] NSWSC 622 .… 20.15, 21.29 BDW Trading Ltd v J M Rowe (Investments) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 548 .… 10.55 Beach v Trims Investments Ltd [1960] SASR 5 .… 23.39 Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411 .… 11.114, 21.29 Beagle Holdings Pty Ltd v Equus Financial Services Ltd [2000] WASC 27 .… 10.41 Beale v Huggins [1918] SALR 15 .… 23.13 Beard v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 .… 18.33 Beardmore v T D Burgess Co 226 A (2d) 329 (1967) .… 11.83 Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 .… 16.25 — v — (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 .… 3.71, 4.2, 4.4, 4.12, 4.13, 5.2, 10.41, 16.68, 10.72, 19.3, 21.35, 23.26 — v Moore Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (1959) 104 CLR 107 .… 10.62, 10.72, 23.26 Beattie v Lord Ebury (1872) LR 7 Ch App 777 .… 11.13, 11.14 — v Szabo [1962] VR 401 .… 12.46 Beatty v Brash’s Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 .… 8.7 Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v GilbertAsh NI Ltd [1999] 1 AC 266 .… 10.30 Beaumont Investments Pty Ltd v Cyril Golding Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 593 .… 5.23 Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55459 .… 3.69 Beck v Montana Constructions Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 229; (1963) 5 FLR 298 .… 10.52 Becker Group Ltd v Motion Picture Co of Australia Ltd [2004] FCA 630 .… 21.12, 21.17, 21.18, 21.23, 21.24, 23.39 Beefeater Sales International Pty Ltd v MIS Funding No 1 Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 217 .… 10.74 Beer v Bowden (Note) [1981] 1 WLR 522 .… 6.8, 6.9 Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd (2012) 39 VR 1 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.45, 10.48, 10.49, 13.5, 13.6 Begbie v State Bank of New South Wales (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-038 .… 14.17

xxviii

Table of Cases Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480 .… 3.11 Behan v Reef Coast Investments No 2 Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 320 .… 21.26 Beil v Pacific View (Qld) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 43 .… 21.27 — v — [2006] QSC 199 .… 23.45 Belflora Pty Ltd v Vinflora Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 178 .… 18.37 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161; [1931] All ER Rep 1 .… 12.2, 12.15, 12.18, 12.21, 12.23, 12.25, 12.26, 12.44, 12.51, 27.24 — v Scott (1922) 30 CLR 387 .… 21.12 Bell Bros Pty Ltd and Stewart v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 .… 3.68, 7.28, 12.66, 12.70 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp [2001] WASC 317 .… 10.12 — v — (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 .… 4.17, 11.108 Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613 .… 9.6, 23.27 Bellmere Park Pty Ltd v Benson [2007] QCA 102 .… 6.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.13 Beltech Corp Ltd v Wyborn (1988) 92 FLR 283 .… 24.20 Belvino Investments No 2 Pty Ltd v Australian Vintage Ltd [2014] NSWSC 978 .… 24.13 Bembridge v GKR Karate Australia Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 15 .… 10.5, 10.9 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Karamihos [2014] NSWCA 17 .… 15.28, 15.29 Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd v Karavas (1991) 23 NSWLR 256 .… 15.27, 15.28 — v Multiplex Construction Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 510 .… 3.67, 16.22, 17.69 — v Sharker (1993) 32 NSWLR 161 .… 23.26, 23.42, 23.45 Benlist Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-043 .… 11.116, 11.150 Bennell v Westlawn Finance Ltd [2010] FCA 658 .… 8.34 Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408 .… 23.16, 23.35 Benson v Rational Entertainment Enterprises Ltd [2018] NSWCA 111 .… 7.1, 7.3 Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd v Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 69 .… 10.41, 21.27 Berk v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 459 .… 14.11



Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364; [2006] HCA 32 .… 18.6 Berridge v Public Trustee (1914) 33 NZLR 865 .… 11.55 Berry v CCL Secure Pty Ltd (2020) 94 ALJR 715; 381 ALR 427; [2020] HCA 27 .… 11.82, 11.127 — v Hodsdon [1988] 1 Qd R 361 .… 2.16, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 361 .… 21.29 — v Wong [2000] NSWSC 1002 .… 18.4, 18.37, 22.5 Bert v Red 5 Ltd [2016] QSC 302 .… 23.35 Besier v Foster (1952) 94 CLR 526 .… 10.60 Best v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1989] VR 608 .… 22.5 Best Price Real Estate Pty Ltd v Equity 2 Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 99 .… 10.43 Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 30 .… 14.14 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; [1967] 2 All ER 1179; [1967] 2 All ER 1197 .… 4.8, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.25, 7.46, 23.2, 24.4, 24.5, 24.6, 24.11 Better Sprinkler Systems v Koussidis [1998] SASC 6892 .… 8.49 Bettison v Insurance Corp of British Columbia (1988) 22 BCLR (2d) 130 .… 5.11 Betts v Whittinglowe (1945) 71 CLR 637 .… 23.34 Bev Pak Australia Pty Ltd v Caines Packaging Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 397 .… 23.12 Bevanere Pty Ltd v Lubidineuse (1985) 59 ALR 334 .… 11.106, 11.111 Bevillestea Pty Ltd v Sovereign Motor Inns Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 279 .… 10.73 BGC Australia Pty Ltd v Fremantle Port Authority [2003] WASCA 250 .… 18.23, 18.30, 18.32 BGC Construction Pty Ltd v Minister for Works [2009] WASC 398 .… 3.39 BGC Residential Pty Ltd v Fairwater Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 268 .… 23.19, 23.35 BH Australia Constructions Pty Ltd v Kapeller [2019] NSWSC 1086 .… 10.16 Bhasin v Hrynew [2014] SCC 71; [2014] 3 SCR 495 .… 10.43 BHPB Freight Pty Ltd v Cosco Oceania Chartering Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1087 .… 11.129, 11.134 Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 154 ALR 534 .… 11.145

xxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bibby Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Sharma [2014] NSWCA 37 .… 21.24 Bicknell v Bell (1897) 3 ALR 162 .… 16.35 Bidjara Aboriginal Housing & Land Co Ltd v Bidjara Motor Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] QCA 196 .… 7.17 Big Kahuna Holdings Pty Ltd v Kitar [2012] NSWSC 615 .… 15.26, 15.29 Bigg v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 11 .… 5.8 Bilborough v Holmes (1876) 5 Ch D 255 .… 8.49 Bill Acceptance Corp Ltd v GWA Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 242; 78 FLR 171 .… 11.118, 11.122 Bingham v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 402 .… 24.19, 24.21, 24.22 — v Bingham (1748) 1 Ves Sen 126; 27 ER 934; 28 ER 462 .… 12.14 Bingo Holdings Pty Ltd v GC Group Company Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 184 .… 11.136 Biodiesel Producers Ltd (ACN 099 165 876) v Stewart [2007] FCA 722 .… 23.45 Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 .… 4.17, 4.18, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7, 10.42, 10.43 Birch v Birch [2020] QCA 31 .… 14.2 Bird v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1957] VR 619 .… 7.45 Birdanco Nominees Pty Ltd v Money (2012) 36 VR 341; [2012] VSCA 64 .… 18.35, 18.37, 23.45 Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1313 .… 11.149 Birkmyr v Darnell (1704) 1 Salk 27; 91 ER 27 .… 16.13 Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd (2014) 47 WAR 552; [2014] WASCA 180 .… 10.16 Birmingham v Renfrew (1936) 57 CLR 666 .… 5.8, 7.1, 7.47, 7.48, 16.24 Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268 .… 2.4, 2.5 Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447 .… 21.38 Birtwistle v Hann (1878) 4 VLR (L) 153 .… 18.37 Biscayne Partners Pty Ltd v Valance Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 874 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.48, 23.2 Bishop v Taylor (1968) 118 CLR 518; [1968] Qd R 281 .… 21.26, 24.10, 24.12

Bishopsgate Insurance Australia Ltd v Commonwealth Engineering (NSW) Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 429 .… 12.35 Bisognin v Hera Project Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 75 .… 10.12, 10.52, 12.52 — v — [2018] VSCA 93 .… 21.12 Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177; [1926] All ER Rep 343 .… 11.15 Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 9; 232 FLR 1; [2006] NSWCA 238 .… 11.147, 15.13 Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; [2007] HCA 31 .… 21.36 Blackbox Control Pty Ltd v Terravision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219 .… 10.30 Blackburn v YV Properties Pty Ltd [1980] VR 290 .… 18.45 Blacker v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] FCA 254 .… 11.85, 11.147 Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 958 .… 22.12 Blackley v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1972] NZLR 1038 .… 11.35, 11.36 Blackley Investments Pty Ltd v Burnie CC (No 2) [2011] TASFC 6 .… 12.52 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 .… 3.39 Blacktown CC v Fitzgerald (1990) NSW ConvR 55-544 .… 21.35 Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254 .… 2.9, 6.8 Blazey v Polletti (1990) ANZ ConvR 168 .… 16.21 Bleakley v Higgins [2006] NTSC 89 .… 10.56 Blennerhassett’s Institute of Accountancy Pty Ltd v Gairns (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 89 .… 17.7 Bligh v Martin [1968] 1 All ER 1157 .… 12.14 Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362 .… 15.7 — v — (1956) 99 CLR 362 .… 12.66, 14.10, 15.1, 15.5, 15.7, 17.56, 24.8 Bloomer v Spittle (1872) LR 13 Eq 427 .… 12.54 Blue v Ashley [2017] EWHC 1928 .… 5.11 Blue Moon Grill Pty Ltd v Yorkey’s Knob Boating Club Inc [2006] QCA 253 .… 4.24 Bluebottle UK Ltd v DCT (2006) NSWSC 706 .… 8.31 — v — (2007) 232 CLR 598; 240 ALR 597; [2007] HCA 54 .… 8.28

xxx

Table of Cases Bluehive Pty Ltd v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1307 .… 23.14 Blundstone v Johnson [2010] QCA 148 .… 25.1 BMW Australia Finance Ltd v Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 117 .… 11.115 BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45 .… 14.1 Board v Weekes (1898) 19 LR (NSW) Eq 200 .… 17.62 Bob Guiness Ltd v Salomonsen [1948] 2 KB 42 .… 4.23 Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 .… 28.21 Bodapati v Westpac Banking Corp [2015] QCA 7 .… 15.8 Body Bronze International Pty Ltd v Fehcorp Pty Ltd (2011) 34 VR 536; [2011] VSCA 196 .… 15.16 Bodycorp Repairers Pty Ltd v AAMI [2015] VSCA 73 .… 18.37 Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269; [2009] HCA 44 .… 10.33, 15.2, 28.31 Bohemians Club v Acting FCT (1918) 24 CLR 334 .… 17.68 Bohn v Miller Bros Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 354 .… 16.68 Bojczuk v Gregorcewicz [1961] SASR 128 .… 17.5 Bolton v Madden (1873) LR 9 QB 55 .… 4.3 Bon McArthur Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Caruana [2013] NSWCA 101 .… 3.15 Boncristiano v Lohmann [1998] 4 VR 82 .… 23.19 Bond v Hongkong Bank of Australia Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 286 .… 22.2 — v Larobi Pty Ltd (1992) 6 WAR 489 .… 18.34 — v Rees Corporate Advisory Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 13 .… 21.38 Bond Corp Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215 .… 11.112 Bonda v Wagenmaker (1960) 77 WN (NSW) .… 22.12 Bondi Beach Astra Retirement Village Pty Ltd v Gora (2013) 82 NSWLR 665; [2011] NSWCA 396 .… 18.35 Bondlake Pty Ltd v The Owners — Strata Plan No 60285 [2005] NSWCA 35 .… 18.13, 18.15, 26.11 Bonham v Brophy (1880) 6 VLR (1) 64 .… 10.5



Bonhote v Henderson [1895] 1 Ch 742 .… 12.35 Boni v Kingsoak Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 174 .… 21.36 Bonic v Fieldair (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636 .… 23.17 Bonney v Hartmann [1924] St R Qd 232 .… 19.17 Bonython v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 589 .… 9.8 Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 600; 43 ALR 68 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.9, 6.11, 10.48, 20.4, 24.16 Boomer v Muir 24 P (2d) 570 (1933) .… 26.7 Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421 .… 8.11 Boothbey v Sowden (1812) 3 Camp 175; 170 ER 1346 .… 4.40 Boral Formwork & Scaffolding Pty Ltd v Action Makers Ltd [2003] NSWSC 713 .… 15.8, 15.13, 15.15, 15.16, 24.23 Boral Ltd v Foley & Bear Pty Ltd trading as J&R Industries [2016] NSWCA 373 .… 7.2 Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd v Donnelly [1988] 1 Qd R 506 .… 10.12 Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWCA 94 .… 3.30, 10.40 Borg v Borg (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 92 .… 16.53 — v Howlett (No 2) (1996) 8 BPR 15,535 .… 12.7, 12.47, 12.48, 12.50, 12.55, 24.17 Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp (Australia) Ltd v Diprose (1988) ANZ ConvR 57 .… 15.28 Borough of Tamworth v Sanders (1904) 2 CLR 214 .… 10.12, 10.60 Borrelli v Ting [2010] UKPG 21; [2010] Bus LR 1718 .… 13.6 Borrows v Ellison (1871) LR 6 Exch 128 .… 25.7 Borzi Smythe Pty Ltd v Campbell Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 233 .… 11.121, 11.122, 11.150 Bos v Helsham (1866) LR 2 Ex 72 .… 11.63 Bosaid v Andry [1963] VR 465 .… 11.30, 11.51, 11.52, 12.36, 16.45, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32 Bosca Land Pty Ltd v Wruck [1982] Qd R 111 .… 21.19 Boscaini Investments Pty Ltd v Petrides (1982) 103 LSJS 250; ASC 55-222 .… 11.20, 11.98

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Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 20 .… 23.32, 23.42, 24.12, 24.27 Boston v Boston (1904) 1 KB 124 .… 16.22 Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1352 .… 8.7 Bot v Ristevski [1981] VR 120 .… 21.38 Botany Fork & Crane Hire Pty Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 473 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.73 Boucaut Bay Co Ltd (in liq) v Commonwealth (1927) 40 CLR 98 .… 23.45 Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) 5 BPR 11,477; (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-004 .… 2.15, 3.24, 12.55, 16.42 Boulevarde Developments Pty Ltd v Toorumba Pty Ltd (1984) 15 ATR 1197; [1984] 2 Qd R 371 .… 18.24, 18.28 Boulton v Jones (1857) 2 H & N 564; 157 ER 232; 27 LJ (Ex) 117 .… 8.52, 12.58 Bourseguin v Stannard Bros Holdings Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 231 .… 12.52 Bovaird v Frost [2009] NSWSC 337 .… 5.7 Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 .… 8.27 Bowen v Alsanto Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 39 .… 20.13, 21.31 — v Blair [1933] VLR 398 .… 10.53 Bowen Central Coal Pty Ltd v Aquila Coal Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 334 .… 24.22 Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings (2008) 166 FCR 494; [2008] FCAFR 38 .… 23.27 Bower v Bantam Investments Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 349 .… 24.25 Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agents [1996] CLC 451 .… 3.9 Bowes v Chaleyer (1923) 32 CLR 159 .… 9.5, 21.10, 21.12, 21.13, 21.17, 21.19, 21.21, 21.31, 23.21 Bowesco Pty Ltd v Zohar [2007] FCAFC 1 .… 10.16 Bowler v Hilda Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 95 .… 11.117 — v — (in liq) (2001) 183 ALR 81 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.35 Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] 1 KB 65 .… 18.45 Bowman v Durham Holdings Pty Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8 .… 3.61, 3.69, 10.32 Box v FCT (1952) 86 CLR 387 .… 18.37 Boyana Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 37 .… 11.110, 11.121

Boyd v Holmes (1878) 4 VLR (E) 161 .… 3.44 — v Ryan (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 163 .… 17.18, 17.34 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow and South Western Railway Co [1915] SC (HL) 20 .… 11.57 Boydell v Drummond (1809) 11 East 142; 103 ER 958 .… 16.44 Boyle v Basan (1886) 8 ALT 82 .… 16.41 Boyns v Lackey (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 395 .… 24.8, 24.29, 24.30, 25.14 BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 520 .… 10.12 — v — [2004] FCAFC 163 .… 10.35, 26.4 BP Chemicals ANZ Pty Ltd v Manildra Starches Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1046 .… 22.12 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Hastings Shire Council (1977) 16 ALR 363 .… 5.28 — v Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20; 16 ALR 363; 180 CLR 266 (PC) .… 1.71, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61, 19.13, 22.8 Bradbury v Morgan (1862) 1 H & C 249; 158 ER 877 .… 3.73, 8.55 Bradford v Zahra [1977] Qd R 24 .… 6.18 Bradford House Pty Ltd v Leroy Fashion Group Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 305; 68 FLR 1 .… 10.61, 11.114 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 .… 11.22, 11.78 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 .… 5.29 — v Voltex Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1230 .… 10.32 Bradley Egg Farm Ltd v Clifford [1943] 2 All ER 378 .… 5.10, 17.73 Bradshaw v Gilberts (Australasian) Agency (Vic) Pty Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 209 .… 18.7, 18.39, 18.40, 18.47 — v Hair Transplant Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 1 .… 25.12 — v Henderson [2010] QCA 8 .… 16.22 Bradto Pty Ltd v Victoria; Tymbook Pty Ltd v Victoria (2006) 15 VR 65; [2006] VSCA 89 .… 24.19, 24.22 Brady Contracting Pty Ltd v Kellyville Christmas Tree Farm Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 22 .… 26.3 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661; [2015] UKSC 17 .… 10.48 Braham v ACN 101 482 580 Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 108 .… 11.116

xxxii

Table of Cases — v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 .… 3.68, 18.4, 18.7, 18.20 Braidotti v Queensland City Properties Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 1 .… 21.12 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.29, 3.44, 5.19, 10.12, 10.16, 10.31, 10.40, 10.61, 22.3, 22.8, 26.1, 28.6, 28.23 Brand v Chris Building Co Pty Ltd [1957] VR 625 .… 16.68 Brandsma & Crockett Pty Ltd v Heindal Pty Ltd (2002) 26 WAR 323; [2002] WASCA 96 .… 25.12 Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1924] 1 KB 575 .… 7.24 Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 .… 2.18, 3.6, 5.19, 10.3, 10.5, 10.7 Braunbeck v Mercantile Land & Investment Co Ltd (1887) 9 LR (NSW) 9 .… 16.45 Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68; [2005] FCAFC 256 .… 3.4, 11.111 Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 1; [2002] FCA 243 .… 11.114 — v — (2003) 130 FCR 317; 200 ALR 607; [2003] FCAFC 153 .… 11.114 Braystock Pty Ltd v Garland [2004] NSWSC 874 .… 10.12 Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311 .… 24.30 Breen v Williams (1996) 168 CLR 71; 138 ALR 259 .… 10.18, 10.29, 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.59 Bremer HandelsgesellschaftmbH v VandenAvenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 .… 2.5 Brendon Pty Ltd v Russell (1994) 11 WAR 280 .… 6.8, 18.37, 18.38 Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 .… 26.6, 26.8 Bressan v Squires [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 .… 3.60, 3.61 Bret v J S (1600) Cro Eliz 756; 78 ER 987 .… 4.12 Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 311 .… 4.22 Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449 .… 18.33 — v — (No 2) [1967] VR 803 .… 6.17 Brewarrina Shire Council v Beckhaus Civil Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 248 .… 23.27, 26.4



Brice v Chambers [2014] QCA 310 .… 6.6, 6.8 Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 .… 10.53 Brickles v Snell [1916] AC 599 .… 21.36 Bridge Stock Brokers Ltd v Bridge (1984) 4 FCR 460 .… 11.121 Bridge UK Com Ltd (t/a Bridge Communications) v Abbey Pynford Plc [2007] EWHC 728 (TCC) .… 23.11 Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Australia) Ltd v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415 .… 6.2, 16.35, 24.1, 24.8 Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58; 97 ER 22 .… 14.15 Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 .… 14.4, 15.7, 15.8, 15.9 — v — (1999) 14 JCL 265 .… 15.8, 15.9 Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 415; 51 ALJR 743 .… 3.10, 3.30 Brien v Dwyer [1976] 2 NSWLR 420; (1978) 141 CLR 378 .… 3.10, 20.4, 21.18, 21.19, 21.24, 21.29, 21.35 Brierley (RA) Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 .… 3.29 Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333 .… 11.79 Brightman v Lamson Paragon Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 331 .… 18.37 Brighton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2011] NSWCA 152 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.58, 15.26, 15.27 Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737 .… 2.17, 2.30 Brimaud v Boston Securities Entertainment Pty Ltd [1998] 1392 FCA (9 October 1998) .… 23.25, 23.26, 23.42 — v — [1998] FCA 1104 .… 10.41, 23.2 Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 .… 3.3, 3.26, 3.47 Brirek Industries Pty Ltd v McKenzie Group Consulting (Vic) Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 165 .… 25.5, 25.12 Brisbane CC v Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 143 .… 19.3, 19.5, 19.8, 19.11, 19.13, 19.16 Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Collins (1995) 31 IPR 488 .… 18.37 Bristow v Moffat-Virtue (Qld) Pty Ltd [1962] Qd R 377. .… 11.9 Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 .… 16.58, 16.59 British & American Telegraph Co v Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 .… 3.60, 3.61, 38.4

xxxiii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

British Bank for Foreign Trade v Novinex Ltd [1949] 1 KB 623 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.9 British Car Auctions Ltd v Wright [1972] 1 WLR 1519 .… 3.21 British Columbia Saw Mills Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499 .… 27.24 British Crane Hire Corp Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] 1 QB 303 .… 10.29 British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd [1943] VLR 163 .… 4.10, 4.17, 10.62 British Imex Industries Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1958] 1 QB 542; [1958] 1 All ER 264 .… 7.50 British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556; [1949] 1 All ER 208 .… 7.5, 7.13 British Movietonews Ltd v London & District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166 .… 19.13 British Road Services Ltd v Arthur V Crutchley & Co Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811 .… 3.32 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefonia 02 UK Ltd [2014] UKSC 42 .… 10.43 British Traders’ Insurance Co Ltd v Monson (1964) 111 CLR 86 .… 19.25 British Waggon Co v Lea and Co (1880) 5 QBD 149; [1874-80] All ER Rep 1135 .… 8.51, 8.52 Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd v Minister Assisting the Minister for Natural Resources (2004) 221 CLR 178; 204 ALR 46; [2004] HCA 4 .… 8.8 Broadlands International Finance Ltd v Sly (1987) ANZ ConvR 328 .… 15.28 Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405; [2000] WASCA 192 .… 11.108 Brodie v Cardiff Corp [1919] AC 337 .… 6.11 Brodyn Pty Ltd t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421; [2004] NSWCA 394 .… 16.55 Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666 .… 3.27, 3.32, 3.44 Broken Hill CC v Tiziani (1997) 93 LGERA 113 .… 23.19 Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v HapagLloyd Aktiengesellschaft [1980] 2 NSWLR 572 .… 7.9, 7.37, 24.20, 24.24 Bromell v Robertson (1886) 12 VLR 560 .… 16.22 Brooker v Pridham (1986) 41 SASR 380; (1986) 41 SASR 428 .… 25.2, 25.3, 25.8 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185;

313 ALR 408; [2014] HCA 36 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26 Brooks v Burns Philp Trustee Co (1969) 121 CLR 432 .… 6.17, 10.64, 18.4, 18.16, 18.34, 18.40, 18.41, 23.44 — v Wyatt (1994) 99 NTR 12 .… 24.29, 24.30 Brooks Robinson Pty Ltd v Rothfield [1951] VLR 405 .… 16.80 Brooks Towers Corp v Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203 .… 3.27, 3.44 Brooks, Re (1903) 21 WN (NSW) 4 .… 17.54 Broons, Re [1989] 2 Qd R 315 .… 3.15 Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16 .… 10.44 Brophy v NIAA Corp Ltd (1995) ATPR 41399 .… 11.115 Brosnan v Katke (2015) 236 FCR 567; [2015] FCA 203 .… 11.114 — v — [2016] FCAFC 1 .… 11.122 Brott v Grey (2000) 181 ALR 617 .… 26.12 — v Maher (No 2) [2004] VSCA 220 .… 13.7 Broughton v B & B Group Investments Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 227 .… 23.25 Brown v Fox (1897) 18 LR (NSW) Eq 8 .… 12.23 — v Gould [1972] Ch 53 .… 3.67, 6.3, 6.9, 6.10 — v Heffer (1967) 116 CLR 344 .… 20.12, 24.16 — v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1980) 35 ALR 79 .… 11.118, 11.122, 11.146 — v — (1981) 53 FLR 340 .… 11.104 — v Ogle [2006] QSC 74 .… 10.35, 10.36, 20.5, 20.6 — v R (1986) 160 CLR 171 .… 18.34 — v Raphael [1958] Ch 636; [1958] 2 All ER 79 .… 11.13, 11.16 — v Robertson (1890) 16 VLR 786 .… 16.23 — v Sheen & Richmond Car Sales [1950] 1 All ER 1102 .… 3.9 — v Smitt (1924) 34 CLR 160 .… 11.49, 11.53, 11.55 — v Southport Motors Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40-306; 43 ALR 183 .… 11.113 — v Willington [2001] ACTSC 100 .… 23.14 Brown and Davis v Galbraith [1972] 1 WLR 997 .… 3.9 Brown Boveri (Australia) Pty Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 94 FLR 425 .… 10.27

xxxiv

Table of Cases Brown Falconer Group Pty Ltd v South Parklands Hockey & Tennis Centre Inc [2005] SASC 75 .… 23.27 Brownbill v Kenworth Truck Sales (NSW) Pty Ltd (1981) 59 FLR 56 .… 18.22 — v — (1982) 59 FLR 56; ATPR 40-269 .… 10.6, 18.3, 18.44 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925 .… 11.63 Brownon Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 .… 8.7 Bruce v AWB Ltd [2000] FCA 594 .… 10.4, 10.5, 21.12, 21.18 — v Tyley (1916) 21 CLR 277 .… 8.6, 8.8, 8.52, 9.7, 12.58 — v Warwick (1815) 6 Taunt 118; 128 ER 978 .… 17.34 Brunker v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1937) 57 CLR 555 .… 14.5 Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1999] NSWCA 199; (1999) 46 NSWLR 538 .… 11.17 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 128 ALR 163 .… 7.1, 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.42, 10.53, 25.5 Bryant (Landlord) v Arsanis David (Tenant) [1996] NSWRT 192 .… 17.43, 17.46 Bryson v Bryant (1992) 29 NSWLR 188 .… 16.72, 16.73, 16.75 BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Renta-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589 .… 3.46, 3.69 Buccoliero v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2011] SWCA 371 .… 15.31 Buchanan v Byrnes (1906) 3 CLR 704 .… 21.14, 22.9, 22.10, 23.22 Buckenara v Hawthorn Football Club Ltd [1988] VR 39 .… 18.36, 18.37, 24.25 Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477 .… 3.74 Buckle & Sons Pty Ltd v McAllister (1986) 4 NSWLR 426 .… 18.37 Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353 .… 7.33, 18.35, 18.36, 18.37, 18.40 Buckman v Rose (1980) 1 BPR 97,059 .… 24.1, 24.10 Bucknell v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 155 .… 25.8 Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All ER 1145 .… 5.9 Buckworth v Gladio Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 54 .… 21.17, 23.39 Budget Stationery Supplies Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1996) 7 BPR 14,891 .… 10.3, 10.7, 10.33



Budmore Pty Ltd v Johnson (1993) 6 BPR 13,574 .… 2.13 Buhrer v Tweedie [1973] 1 NZLR 517 .… 5.23 Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 .… 17.74 Bulk Chartering & Consultants Australia Pty Ltd v T&T Metal Trading Pty Ltd (The Krasnogrosk) (1993) 31 NSWLR 18 .… 18.34 Bullabidgee Pty Ltd v McCleary [2011] NSWCA 259 .… 11.127, 11.146, 11.147 Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822 .… 24.25 Bullhead Pty Ltd v Brickmakers Place Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] VSCA 316 .… 2.16 Bulloch v Glasson (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 91 .… 10.6, 10.23 Bullock v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1955] Ch 317 .… 14.7 Bundanoon Sandstone Pty Ltd v Cenric Group Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 87 .… 21.34, 22.4 Bunge Corp New York v Tradax Export SA Panama [1981] 1 WLR 711 .… 21.22 Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] 3 All ER 1082; [2015] UKSC 43 .… 23.25 Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.34, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48, 10.50, 10.51, 10.52, 12.51, 21.18, 21.19, 21.24, 21.26, 21.33, 21.34, 23.2, 23.14, 23.15, 23.25, 23.29 Burges v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 504 .… 24.8, 24.9, 24.10 Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383 .… 16.35 Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp .… 11.151 Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 161 .… 11.145 — v — (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612; [2002] HCA 17 .… 11.145 — v State Bank of New South Wales (1994) 37 NSWLR 53; (1994) 37 NSWLR 55 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.35, 14.13, 14.17, 14.20 — v — (1995) 37 NSWLR 53 .… 14.20 Burke and Riversdale Road Pty Ltd v Gemini Investments Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 33 .… 21.24

xxxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Burke Estates Pty Ltd v PJ Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [1991] 1 VR 610 .… 21.35 Burke (Raymond) Motors Ltd v Mersey Docks and Harbour Co [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 155 .… 7.38 Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54 .… 7.46 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 .… 8.25 Burmic Pty Ltd v Goldview Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 479 .… 18.9, 18.21, 18.22, 19.1, 19.24 Burnard v Haggis (1863) 14 CBNS 45; 143 ER 360 .… 17.39, 17.40 Burness v Hill [2019] VSCA 94 …. 10.13 Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304; 353 ALR 386; [2018] HCA 15 .… 11.151 — v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653 .… 23.6, 23.39, 23.40, 23.41, 23.43, 23.44 Burns Philp Hardware Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd (1986) 8 NSWLR 621 .… 7.31 — v — (1987) 8 NSWLR 642 .… 10.12 Burns Philp Trust Co Pty Ltd v Kwikasair Freightlines Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 801 .… 24.21 Burroughes v Abbott [1921] 1 Ch 86 .… 12.40 — v — [1922] 1 Ch 86 .… 12.39 Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816 .… 18.14 — v Winter (1929) Tas LR 45 .… 12.50 Burwood Project Management Pty Ltd v Polar Technologies International Pty Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 97, 801; [1999] NSWSC 1203 .… 8.6, 8.8 Busch v Stevens [1963] 1 QB 1; [1962] 1 All ER 412 .… 25.8 Buseska v Sergio (1990) 102 FLR 157 .… 12.48, 12.50, 12.52, 22.8, 22.11 Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186 .… 4.20, 4.22 — v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 NSWLR 390 .… 12.30 Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 741 .… 8.40, 8.42 Businessworld Computers Pty Ltd v Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 ALR 499 .… 24.21, 24.22, 24.24 Bustfree Pty Ltd v Llewellyn [2013] QCA 103 .… 13.6, 13.9, 13.11

Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60 .… 3.26, 10.70, 11.113, 11.115, 11.118, 11.121, 11.122, 11.147 — v Stapely (1685) 1 Vern 363; 23 ER 524 .… 16.56 Butler v Countrywide Finance Ltd (1992) 5 PRNZ 447 .… 12.31 — v — [1993] 3 NZLR 623 .… 24.1, 24.13, 24.17, 28.17 — v Craine [1986] VR 274 .… 16.74 — v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 .… 4.24, 4.25, 12.18, 23.2 Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England Ltd) [1979] 1 WLR 401 .… 3.6, 3.32 Butt v Long (1953) 88 CLR 476 .… 10.15, 10.40, 10.57, 18.35, 18.37 — v M’Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 .… 1.68, 10.41, 20.16 Butts v O’Dwyer (1952) 87 CLR 267 .… 10.39, 10.41, 18.7, 24.1, 24.16 Buxton v Bellin (1877) 3 VLR (E) 243 .… 16.37 — v Rust (1872) LR 7 Ex 279 .… 16.37 Byers v Dorotea Pty Ltd (1986) 69 ALR 715 .… 11.42, 11.73, 11.119, 11.147, 11.150 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410; 131 ALR 422 .… 5.26, 10.18, 10.39, 10.45, 10.50, 10.51, 10.52, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57 — v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735 .… 7.45, 7.47 — v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432 .… 3.60, 3.65 Byrne & Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 .… 24.12 Byrnes v Groote Eylandt Mining Co Pty Ltd (1990) 93 ALR 131 .… 25.11 — v Jokona Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 41 .… 21.14, 21.21 — v Kendle (2011) 279 ALR 212; [2011] HCA 26 .… 10.1, 10.12, 10.31 Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158 .… 2.6, 2.13 Bysouth v Shire of Blackburn and Mitcham (No 2) [1928] VLR 562 .… 8.8 Bytan Pty Ltd v BB Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 41 VR 46; [2012] VSCA 233 .… 10.43, 10.46 C C & S Constructions Pty Ltd v Dawson (1991) ATPR 41-088 .… 6.6

xxxvi

Table of Cases C B Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.46 C Convenience Stores Pty Ltd v Wayville Plaza Retirement Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 229; [2012] SASC 14 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.41 C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos [1969] 1 AC 350; [1969] 1 AC 380 .… 23.39 C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWSC 242 .… 7.8 C H Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 960 .… 24.13 C J Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22 .… 3.9 C M I Clothesmakers Inc v A S K Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447 .… 3.44 C Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 16.63 CA & CA Ballan Pty Ltd v Oliver Hume (Australia) Pty Ltd (2017) 55 VR 62; [2017] VSCA 11 .… 12.30, 18.40 Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (2015) 328 ALR 396; [2015] FCAFC 94 .… 11.83, 11.124, 11.127 Cable (1956) Ltd v Caratti [1971] WAR 86 .… 16.45 — v Hutcherson Bros Pty Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 143 .… 10.12, 10.14 Caboche & Bond v Ramsay (1993) 119 ALR 215 .… 18.35 Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 .… 26.13 — v State Authorities Superannuation Board (1993) 47 IR 254 .… 19.18 Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd v Peters [2006] NSWSC 717 .… 18.37 Caddick v Skidmore (1857) 2 De G & J 52; 44 ER 907 .… 16.22 Cade Pty Ltd v Thomson Simmons [1998] SASC 6912 .… 23.14, 23.25 Cadman v Horner (1810) 18 Ves Jun 10; 34 ER 221 .… 11.44 Cadoks Pty Ltd v Wallace Westley & Vigar Pty Ltd [2000] 2 VR 457; [2000] 2 VR 569 .… 10.53, 23.8, 23.14, 23.26, 23.28, 23.38, 23.39 Cadorange Pty Ltd (in liq) v Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 26 .… 26.8 Caird v Moss (1886) 33 Ch D 22 .… 12.37 Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1 .… 8.8, 8.53 Calgary v Northern Construction Co Division of Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc [1986] 2 WWR 426 .… 3.39



Calkins and Burke Ltd v Empire Stevedoring Co Ltd (1976) 4 WWR 337 .… 7.38 Callaghan v Merivale CBD Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 985 .… 10.35 — v O’Neill [2002] NSWSC 877 .… 6.6 — v O’Sullivan [1925] VLR 664 .… 18.32, 18.47 Callisher v Bischoffsheim (1870) LR 5 QB 449 .… 4.25, 4.26 Calmao Pty Ltd v Stradbroke Waters Cooperative Society Ltd (1989) 21 FCR 28 .… 11.147 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Alderton and Knox [1964-5] NSWR 456 .… 6.17 — v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 11 ALR 227 .… 23.35, 23.38 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616; [2009] NSWCA 258 .… 7.41 Calvert v Stollznow (1982) 1 NSWLR 175 .… 4.14 Cam & Bear Pty Ltd v McGoldrick [2018] NSWCA 110 .… 11.136 Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Ramsay (1960) 104 CLR 247 .… 26.4 Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Hutcheson (1985) 9 ACLR 545 .… 23.37 Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; [2007] QCA 136 .… 11.150 Camenzuli v Morrison [2022] NSWCA 51 .… 5.1, 5.10 Cameron v Campbell & Worthington Ltd [1930] SASR 402 .… 23.26 — v Hillier [1941] St R Qd 298 .… 10.74 — v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 .… 5.1, 5.10 — v Murdoch [1983] WAR 321 .… 16.70 — v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 147 .… 15.1 — v UBS AG (2000) 2 VR 108 .… 23.45 Cameron & Co v Slutzkin Pty Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81 .… 10.12, 10.13 Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 .… 11.122 — v — (2009) 238 CLR 304; 257 ALR 610; [2009] HCA 25 .… 10.41, 11.105, 11.113, 11.116, 11.118, 11.119, 11.122, 11.124, 11.150 — v Kitchen & Sons Ltd (1910) 12 CLR 515 .… 26.1 — v Ridgely (1887) 13 VLR 701 .… 17.39, 17.42, 17.43 — v University of Adelaide [2006] SASC 92 .… 10.24 Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 229 ALR 58; [2006] HCA 41 .… 8.7, 18.33

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Camping Warehouse Australia Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Ltd [2014] VSC 357 .… 11.127 Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; 169 ALR 677; [2000] HCA 12 .… 11.122 Canada Steamship Lines v The King [1952] AC 192 .… 10.77 Canberra Advance Bank Ltd v Benny (1992) 115 ALR 207 .… 10.48, 21.28, 21.33, 21.35 Canberra Pools Pty Ltd v MMI General Insurance Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 296; 174 ALR 755; [2000] FCA 751 .… 6.8, 18.3, 18.8, 18.9 Canning v Temby (1905) 3 CLR 419 .… 9.2, 10.36, 21.19, 24.10 Canon Australia Pty Ltd v Patton (2007) 244 ALR 759; [2007] NSWCA 246 .… 15.16 Cansdell v O’Donnell (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 596 .… 12.68 Cant v Miller (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 505 .… 24.26 Cant Contracting Pty Ltd v Casella [2007] 2 Qd R 13; [2006] QCA 538 .… 16.55 Canty v PaperlinX Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 309 .… 15.31 Cao v Baccello Pty Ltd as trustee for The Mondello Family Trust [2020] WASCA 82 .… 10.33 Capital Aircraft Services Pty Ltd v Brolin [2006] ACTSC 80 .… 18.35, 18.37 — v — [2007] ACTA 8 .… 10.56, 18.37 Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham [1975] 1 NZLR 576 .… 11.88 Caporn v Dixon (1904) 6 WALR 71 .… 16.59 Cappello v Hammond & Simonds NSW Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 57 .… 23.26 Caprice Property Holdings Pty Ltd v McLeay [2015] 1 Qd R 206; [2013] QCA 125 .… 21.19, 21.30 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525; [1963] 2 All ER 547 .… 11.48 Caraher v Lloyd (1905) 2 CLR 480 .… 8.28 Carbon Black Lab Pty Ltd v Launer [2015] VSCA 126 .… 21.19 Cardwell Shire Council v Calabrese (1975) 49 ALJR 164 .… 23.13, 23.20, 23.34 Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165 .… 2.16, 2.18, 12.30, 12.35, 12.43

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1892] 2 QB 484; [1893] 1 QB 256; [1891–94] All ER Rep 127 .… 3.16, 3.19, 3.28, 3.42, 3.45, 5.11, 5.12, 27.21, 27.22 Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd v EZ Industries Ltd [1988] VR 349 .… 6.5, 10.34 Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co v Bragg [1911] 1 KB 489; [1908–10] All ER Rep 977 .… 12.68 Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Elliott [1960] VR 320 .… 12.68, 12.70 — v Tooth & Co Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 543; 7 IPR 581 .… 7.31, 18.7 Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487 .… 17.73 Carmax v Haydon & Co Pty Ltd [2000] ACTSC 29 .… 21.29 Carmichael v Colonial Sugar Co Ltd (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 233 .… 19.18 — v National Power Plc [1999] 1 WLR 2042 .… 10.5 Carminco Gold & Resources Ltd v Findlay & Co Stockbrokers (Underwriters) Pty Ltd (2007) 243 ALR 472; [2007] FCAFC 194 .… 7.2 Carnham, Harris & Elton Ltd v Alfred W Ellis (Transport) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 940 .… 8.52 Carnival plc v Karpik (The Ruby Princess) [2022] FCAFC 149 …. 10.28, 10.60, 10.71, 15.22 Carpentaria Investments Pty Ltd v Airs and Arnold [1972] Qd R 436 .… 10.39, 20.8, 20.16, 24.1 Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR 39 .… 21.19, 23.6, 23.22, 23.38, 23.39 Carpenters Estates Ltd v Davies [1940] Ch 160; [1940] 1 All ER 13 .… 24.14 Carpet Fashion Pty Ltd v Forma Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 460 .… 11.118 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan [2014] 1 NZLR 792; [2014] NZSC 75 .… 18.41 — v Gilsenan [1946] QSR 44 .… 13.7 — v JA Berriman Pty Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 327 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.20, 21.21, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 23.7, 23.11, 23.13 — v JS Berriman Pty Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 327 .… 21.12, 21.14 — v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (1994) 63 FCR 358 .… 22.12 Carrapetta v Rado [2012] NSWCA 202 .… 21.19 Carrington v Roots (1837) 2 M & W 248; 150 ER 748 .… 16.48

xxxviii

Table of Cases Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd v Patrick Operations Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 745 .… 7.24, 7.38 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 .… 11.24 — v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 .… 3.30, 3.46, 3.68, 3.74, 8.6, 8.55, 24.8, 25.14 — v Mehmet [2021] NSWCA 286 .… 21.12 — v Silber [1892] 2 Ch 278 .… 17.22 — v Smith (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 290 .… 16.48, 16.66 Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052 .… 4.17, 4.22, 4.23, 25.8 Casey’s Patents, Re; Stewart v Casey [1892] 1 Ch 104 .… 4.22 Cash Orders (Amalgamated) Ltd v Haynes (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 157 .… 18.37 Casha v Georgiev [2000] VSC 248 .… 21.29, 21.32 Casinos Austria International (Christmas Island) Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 387 .… 21.12 Cassegrain v Cassegrain [2016] NSWCA 71 .… 11.135 Cassidy v Engwirda [1968] Qd R 159 .… 21.18 — v Saatchi & Saatchi Australia Pty Ltd (2004) 134 FCR 585; [2004] FCAFC 34 .… 11.110 Casson v Mirror Motors Pty Ltd (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 762 .… 20.2 Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Fekala Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 133 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.22, 23.26, 23.39, 23.41 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468 .… 10.50, 10.52 — v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 .… 24.21 Castlepines (IBM) Pty Ltd v Residential Housing Corp Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 232 .… 10.35 Cathedral Place Pty Ltd v Hyatt of Australia Ltd [2003] VSC 385 .… 10.42 Cathels v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1959) 79 WN (NSW) 271; [1959] 62 SR (NSW) 455 .… 7.5, 7.6 — v — [1962] SR (NSW) 455 .… 7.6 Caton v Caton (1867) LR 2 HL 127 .… 16.40 Cator v Croydon Canal Co (1841) 4 Y & C Ex 593 .… 8.27 Cattanach v Melchior (1984) 156 CLR 532; (2003) 215 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 38 .… 18.15, 18.16, 18.35



Causer v Browne [1952] VLR 1 .… 3.21, 10.62, 10.66, 10.70 Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20; [1952] HCA 26 .… 1.38, 3.29, 3.30, 6.3, 6.8, 10.36 Cavasinni v Cavasinni [2001] NSWSC 223 .… 5.7, 22.9, 26.9 Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67; [2016] 2 All ER 519; [2016] AC 1172 .… 23.45 Caves Beachside Cuisine Pty Ltd v Boydah Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1273 .… 6.15, 10.47 CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.6, 8.16 CCH Australia Ltd v Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd, Re [1992] FCA 90 .… 11.64 CCPP Australian Airships Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 232 .… 10.31, 10.62, 11.115, 11.122, 23.9 CE Heath Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Grey (1993) 32 NSWLR 25 .… 7.2, 7.10, 11.26 Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 .… 2.5, 2.29, 22.9, 22.10, 23.45 Cedenko Foods Ltd v State Insurance Ltd [1996] 3 NZLR 205 .… 12.31 Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2005] NSWSC 222 .… 7.3 Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 213 .… 4.32, 22.3 Celthene Pty Ld v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606 .… 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38 Cenric Group v TWT Property Group [2018] NSWSC 1570 .… 22.4 Centennial Coal Company Ltd v Xstrata Coal Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 788 .… 6.8 Central Coast Council v Norcross Pictorial Calendars Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 75 .… 7.7, 10.33, 10.74 Central Commodities Services Pty Ltd v Hertzog (1989) NSW ConvR 55-467; ASC 55-706 .… 15.27, 15.31 Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.49 — v — (2003) 31 UWALR 243 .… 10.44 Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 .… 2.4, 2.17 Central Pacific (Campus) Pty Ltd v Staged Developments Australia Pty Ltd [1998] V ConvR 54-575 .… 6.6, 21.19

xxxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Champtaloup v Thomas [1975] 2 NSWLR 38 .… 20.7, 20.18 — v — [1976] 2 NSWLR 264 (CA) .… 11.50, 20.18, 21.29, 21.35 Chan v Cresdon Pty Ltd (1989) 168 CLR 242 .… 10.33, 24.4 — v Tan [2020] NSWCA 344 .… 6.5 Chan Cuong Su t/as Ausviet Travel v Direct Flights International Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41,677 .… 11.110 Chand v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] NSWCA 181 .… 23.25, 23.41 Chandos Developments Pty Ltd v Mulkearns [2008] NSWCA 62 .… 21.26, 24.9 Chaney v Maclow [1929] 1 Ch 461 .… 16.42 Chanrich Properties Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2001] NSWSC 229 .… 2.2 Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessy Building Pty Ltd (2020) 6 QR 38; [2020] QCA 219 .… 16.55, 18.49 Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 .… 23.14 — v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71; [1965] 3 All ER 764 .… 17.13, 17.21, 17.47 Chaplin & Co Ltd v Brammal [1908] 1 KB 233 .… 14.17 Chapman v Taylor [2004] NSWCA 456 .… 19.2, 19.5, 19.9, 19.18 Chapmans Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 402 .… 10.32 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 .… 10.53, 23.1, 23.14, 23.18, 23.28, 23.34, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38 Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701 .… 4.12, 4.13 Chaproniere v Lambert [1917] 2 Ch 356 .… 16.60 Charge Card Services Ltd, Re [1989] Ch 497; [1988] 3 All ER 702 .… 3.51 Charide Nominees Pty Ltd v Matour Nominees Pty Ltd [1987] WAR 137 .… 10.12, 18.37 Charles Lodge Pty Ltd v Menahem [1966] VR 161 .… 20.8, 20.13 Charlick v Foley Bros Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 249 .… 16.7, 16.67 Charmar Electrical Pty Ltd v Minda Incorporated (1990) 55 SASR 112 .… 10.35 Charmelyn Enterprises Pty Ltd v Klonis (1981) 2 BPR 9527 .… 6.9 Charnock v Liverpool Corp [1968] 1 WLR 1498 .… 3.9

Central Trust Co v Rafuse (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481 .… 7.41 Centrepoint Custodians Pty Ltd v Lidgerwood Investments Pty Ltd [1990] VR 411 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.32 Centurion Industries Ltd v Industrial Progress Corp Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 117 .… 23.13 Century 21 Canada Ltd Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc [2011] BCSC 1196 .… 3.7 Century 21 (South Pacific) Pty Ltd v Century 21 Real Estate Corp (1996) 136 ALR 687 .… 8.1 CF & SP Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd .… 10.7, 10.41 CFA Group v Mars Trading [2001] NSWSC 112 .… 21.26, 23.26, 23.41, 23.45 CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2001) 185 ALR 555; [2001] FCA 57 .… 15.8 CG Mal Pty Ltd v Sanyo Office Machines Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 445 .… 10.3, 10.7 CGM Investments Pty Ltd v Chelliah [2003] FCA 79; (2003) 19 JCL 280 .… 22.9 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 1; 237 ALR 420; [2007] HCA 36 .… 2.14, 10.45 — v One.Tel Ltd (in liq) (2010) 242 CLR 174; 268 ALR 439; [2010] HCA 26 .… 8.23 CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Garcia [2007] NSWCA 193 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 23.2 CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 960; [1972] 1 WLR 307 .… 24.2, 24.12 CH Real Estate Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd; Boyana Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 37 .… 11.110, 11.121 Chadwick v Manning [1896] AC 231 .… 2.3 — v Ritchie (1983) ASC 55-229 .… 11.95 Challenge Bank Ltd v Pandya (1993) 60 SASR 330 .… 14.17, 14.20, 15.9 — v VL Cooper & Associates Pty Ltd [1995] IVR 220 .… 23.43 Chamber Colliery Co Ltd v Twyerould [1915] 1 Ch 268n .… 8.53 Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502 .… 12.52 — v — (1991) 28 FCR 21; 98 ALR 617 .… 12.52 Chambers v Odgers (1977) 1 BPR 9467 .… 3.68

xl

Table of Cases



ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 167 .… 10.12, 10.56 Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1999] TASSC 40 .… 10.42, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56 Christiani & Nielsen Pty Ltd v Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd (1993) 2 Tas R 122 .… 7.13 Christiansen v Klepac [2001] NSWSC 385 .… 20.15, 21.29 Christie v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 60 IR 17 .… 5.26 — v — (1996) 138 ALR 19 .… 5.26 Christison v Warren [1903] St R Qd 186 .… 12.53 Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 4) (1995) 16 WAR 277 .… 23.22 Christopoulos v Krishna [2017] VSC 154 .… 18.3, 18.22, 18.46 Churchill v Connolly [2004] NSWCA 212 .… 23.6 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 .… 3.51, 3.55, 12.52 — v — [2005] 1 SLR 502 .… 12.25 Ciaglia v Ciaglia (2010) 269 ALR 175; [2010] NSWSC 341 .… 16.21, 16.62, 16.65, 16.72 Ciavarella v Balmer (1983) 48 ALR 407; 57 ALJR 632; 152 CLR 438; (1983) 153 CLR 438; [1983] 2 NSWLR 439 .… 21.9, 21.19, 21.29, 21.30, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 — v Polimeni [2008] NSWSC 234 .… 16.60, 16.70 CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200; [1993] 3 WLR 802 .… 14.10, 14.17, 14.19, 15.7 CIBC Wood Gundy Australia Ltd v ICL Australia Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 135 .… 10.14, 10.18, 10.31, 22.12 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-232 .… 22.9, 22.10 — v — [1997] HCA 2 .… 22.10 Cielo v MG Kailis Gulf Fisheries Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 189 .… 12.48, 12.50, 12.52 CIT Credit Pty Ltd v Keable [2006] NSWCA 130 .… 15.26 Citibank Savings Ltd v Nicholson .… 14.17, 14.20 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Hendry (1985) 4 NSWLR 1 .… 23.23

Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101 .… 10.12 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 .… 10.30 Charters v Seitz (1989) NSW ConvR 55-464 .… 12.70 Chater v Beckett (1797) 7 Term Rep 201; 101 ER 931 .… 16.5 Chattis Nominees Pty Ltd v Norman Ross Homeworks Pty Ltd (Receiver Appointed) (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 338 .… 10.29 Cheers v Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 1 .… 18.47 Chemeq Ltd v Shepherd Investments International Ltd [2007] WASCA 117 .… 10.12, 10.13 Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548; [2017] NSWCA 295 .… 10.12, 10.13, 10.16, 10.32, 10.33 Chethams v Remington & Co [1999] 3 VR 258 .… 25.8 Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 11 ATPR 40-971 .… 11.104, 11.112 Chichester v Cobb (1866) 14 LT 433 .… 4.34 Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v ALH Group Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 32 .… 8.47 — v Boss Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 270 .… 2.2 — v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1017 .… 10.6 Chilcott v KBRV Resort Operations Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 633 .… 10.67 Child v Commonwealth Development Bank [2000] NSWCA 256 .… 12.70, 15.29 China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v PS Chellaram Co Ltd (1990) 28 NSWLR 354 .… 10.27, 10.64, 10.67, 10.70 China Shipping (Australia) Agency Co Pty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1556 .… 11.151 Chinadotcom corporation v Morrow [2001] NSWCA 82 .… 6.16 Chinatex (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bindaree Beef Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 126 .… 19.19, 21.27 Chinnock v Sainsbury (1860) 30 LJ (Ch) 409 .… 24.12 Chint Australasia Pty Ltd v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 635 .… 2.18 Chocolate Factory Apartments v Westpoint Finance [2005] NSWSC 784 .… 10.52, 10.53, 10.59, 23.27

xli



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Clarence City Council v Commonwealth [2020] FCAFC 134 .… 7.9, 24.28 Clarence Property Corporation Ltd v Sentinel Robina Office Pty Ltd [2019] 1 Qd R 144 .… 10.44 Clark v Clark (1882) 8 VLR (E) 303 .… 25.6 — v Commonwealth [1994] 2 VR 333 .… 25.1 — v Gallop Reserve Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 146 .… 10.31 — v Local Government Training Authority SA Inc [2001] SASC 273 .… 19.4 — v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313 .… 7.28, 16.35 — v Macourt (2013) 253 CLR 1; [2013] HCA 56 .… 23.6, 23.25, 23.26, 23.41, 23.42 — v Malpas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401; 45 ER 1238 .… 15.7 — v Refeld (1980) 25 SASR 246 .… 20.9, 20.13 — v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752 .… 5.1 Clark Equipment Australia Ltd v Covcat Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ALR 367 .… 11.150 Clarke v Cobley (1789) 2 Cox Eq Cas 173; 30 ER 80 .… 17.42 — v Dickson (1858) EB & E 148; 120 ER 463 .… 11.53 — v Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 .… 3.8 — v Tyler (1949) 78 CLR 646 .… 16.22, 16.31, 16.33 Clarke & Co Pty Ltd v Owen [1915] VLR 23 .… 22.5 Clarkson Williams Partners Pty Ltd v Vaughan [2016] ACTCA 1 .… 11.115 Clasic International Pty Ltd v Lagos (2002) 60 NSWLR 241; [2002] NSWSC 1155 .… 12.8, 12.25, 12.27 Classified Pre-Mixed Concrete Pty Ltd v Oil Tool Sales Pty Ltd [1966] Qd R 388 .… 24.16 Claude Neon Ltd v Hardie [1970] Qd R 93 .… 19.4, 19.8, 19.16, 19.17, 19.19 Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410; 178 ALR 193; [2001] HCA 9 .… 3.14 Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Oil International Ltd, the Alaskan Trader (No 2) [1984] 1 All ER 129 .… 21.10, 26.9 Clearihan v Turbitt [1999] ACTSC 88 .… 10.64, 10.71 Clearihan t/a Braddon Auto Mart v Gerald Turbitt [1999] ACTSC 88 .… 11.72, 11.73

— v O’Brien (1996) 40 NSWLR 398 .… 15.28, 15.31 City & Industrial Demolitions v Shanahan (2001) Aust Contract Rep 90-122; [2000] NSWSC 1197 .… 10.40, 21.12, 22.2, 22.5 City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] 1 Ch 129 .… 12.43 City Bank of Sydney v McLaughlin (1909) 9 CLR 615 .… 17.29, 17.42 City Life Assurance Co Ltd, Re [1926] Ch 191 .… 8.18 City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Southern Aerial Super Service Pty Ltd (1961) 106 CLR 477 .… 9.9 City of Belmont v Link Interiors Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 1013 .… 18.4, 18.29, 20.4, 20.13, 20.15 City of Box Hill v EW Tauschke Pty Ltd [1974] VR 39 .… 3.34 City of Camberwell v Camberwell Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 163 .… 10.48, 18.30, 21.13 City of Subiaco v Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 146; [2001] WASCA 140 .… 18.30, 19.5, 19.15, 19.24, 19.25 City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 372 .… 21.34 City West Water Pty Ltd v Simon Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 248 .… 24.17 Civil & Civic Pty Ltd v Pioneer Concrete (NT) Pty Ltd (1991) 103 FLR 196 .… 22.5 Civil and Allied Technical Constructions Pty Ltd v A1 Quality Concrete Tanks Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 157 .… 18.16, 18.24 Civil Service Co-Operative Society of Victoria Ltd v Blyth (1913) 17 CLR 601 .… 11.49 Civoken Pty Ltd v Madden Grove Developments Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 283 .… 21.24 CJ Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22 .… 3.9, 10.21, 10.25 CL Seward & Co Pty Ltd v Thompson (1992) 17 MVR 70 .… 7.2 Clairs Keeley (A Firm) v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139; [2003] WASCA 299 .… 8.7, 18.16, 18.33 — v — (2004) 29 WAR 479; [2004] WASCA 277 .… 8.7 — v — [2005] WASCA 86 .… 8.7 Clancy v Salienta Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 248 .… 21.35, 26.4, 26.6 Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220 .… 3.52, 16.35

xlii

Table of Cases Cleary v Australian Co-operative Foods (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 991 .… 11.102 — v Ayles (1903) 6 WALR 38 .… 17.60 Clegg v Wilson (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 109 .… 18.25, 18.32, 18.47 Clegg Parkinson & Co v Earby Gas Co [1896] 1 QB 592 .… 5.29 Clements v London and North Western Railway Co [1894] 2 QB 482; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1461 .… 17.13, 17.16 Clifford v Turrell (1841) 1 Y & CC 138; 62 ER 826 .… 24.11 — v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 135 .… 11.115 Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records [1975] 1 All ER 237 .… 15.8 Clifton v Coffey (1924) 34 CLR 434 .… 21.18 — v Palumbo [1944] 2 All ER 497 .… 3.17 Climit Pty Ltd v Captech Group Ltd [2003] NSWSC 491 .… 19.1, 19.5 Clohesy v Maher (1880) 6 VLR (L) 357 .… 16.40 Clohesy v Maher (1880) 6 VLR (L) 357 .… 16.41 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483 .… 7.31 Clough v London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Exch 26 .… 11.47, 11.49 — v Rowe (1888) 14 VLR 70 .… 10.20 Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [2007] FCA 881 .… 15.15, 21.35 — v — [2008] FCAFC 136 .… 24.23 CLP Holding Co Ltd v Singh and Kaur [2014] EWCA Civ 1103 .… 10.32 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 .… 23.45 Clyne v Bar Association of NSW (1960) 104 CLR 186 .… 18.33 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 .… 8.40 CMF Projects Pty Ltd v Riggall [2016] 1 Qd R 187; [2014] QCA 318 .… 16.55 CMG, Re [1970] Ch 574 .… 14.6 CMI Clothesmakers Inc v ASK Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447 .… 3.27 Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 14 NSWLR 1; 24 NSWLR 1 .… 6.15, 10.47 Coast Corp Pacific Pty Ltd v Stockland Development Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 305 .… 10.7



Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Melevende [1965] VR 433 (FCSC) .… 11.49, 11.50, 11.51, 11.52, 21.29 Coastalstyle Pty Ltd v The Proprietors ‘Surf Regency’ Building Units Plan No 4246 (1995) 1 Qd R 132 .… 11.107 Coates v Wilson (1840) 5 Esp 152; 170 ER 769 .… 17.5 Cobbold v Barrett [2006] WASC 252 .… 21.32, 21.35 Cochrane v Willis (1865) 1 Ch App 58 .… 12.14, 12.23 Codelfa and Bank of New Zealand with Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 597 .… 10.13 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 .… 1.58, 1.66, 3.11, 6.6, 10.1, 10.4, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.15, 10.16, 10.31, 10.32, 10.35, 10.40, 10.50, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61, 12.1, 12.42, 12.64, 19.1, 19.5, 19.12, 19.13, 19.21, 19.22, 21.23, 21.38 Coffin v Botany Fork & Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 83 .… 23.27 Coggin v Telstar Finance Company (Q) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 191 .… 15.16 Coghlan v Pyoanee Pty Ltd [2003] 2 Qd R 636; [2003] QCA 146 .… 22.3, 22.5, 24.10 — v SH Lock (1985) 4 NSWLR 158 .… 10.3 — v SH Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 .… 4.22 Cohen v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 57 .… 11.118 — v Cohen (1923) 33 CLR 174 .… 10.9 — v — (1929) 42 CLR 91 .… 5.4, 18.3, 25.8, 25.13 — v iSoft Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1071 .… 4.35 — v Nessdale Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 118 .… 16.65 — v Roche [1927] 1 KB 160 .… 24.18 — v Wilson Dowd [2000] TASSC 174; [2001] ANZ ConvR 285 .… 10.53, 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 Cohen & Co v Ockerby & Co Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 288 .… 10.30, 10.32, 21.13, 23.2 Colbron v St Bees Island Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 303 .… 18.10 Coldunell Ltd v Gallon [1986] 1 All ER 429 .… 14.16, 14.17 Cole v Willington Dairy Farmers’ Co-op Association [1917] NZLR 372 .… 8.6 xliii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Coleman v Bone (1996) 9 BPR 16,235 .… 5.7 — v Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-960 .… 11.112 — v Holecek 542 F (2d) 532 .… 12.52 — v Liberal Party of Australia, New South Wales Division (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 736 .… 5.10 — v Seaborne Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 60 .… 26.2, 26.8 Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Ltd [2008] FCA 1915 .… 3.42, 11.115, 11.118, 24.1, 28.17 Colin CM Moore Pty Ltd v Sivathasan [2022] NSWSC 532 .… 10.30 Colin R Price & Associates Pty Ltd v Four Oaks Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 764 .… 15.16 — v — [2017] FCAFC 75 .… 15.16 Collier v Electrum Acceptance Pty Ltd (1986) 66 ALR 613; 69 ALR 355 .… 11.115, 11.124, 11.147 — v Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd (1989) ASC 55-716 .… 15.27, 15.28, 15.31 — v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329 .… 2.19, 4.39 Colliers Jardine (NSW) Pty Ltd v Balog Investments Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-140; [1996] ANZ ConvR 527 .… 3.67, 10.52, 10.56, 10.60, 11.115 — v — (FCA, Beazley J, 16 December 1994, unreported) .… 19.12, 19.22 Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510 .… 2.6, 16.21, 16.41, 16.47, 16.58, 16.67, 21.35 Collings v ACCC (1998) 152 ALR 510 .… 11.146 Collings Construction Co Pty Ltd v ACCC (1998) 43 NSWLR 131; 152 ALR 510 .… 11.146 Collins v Godefroy (1831) 1 B & Ad 950; 109 ER 1040 .… 4.30 — v May (2000) Aust Contract Rep 90-109 .… 15.9 Collins Hill Group Pty Ltd v Trollope Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 205 .… 10.16 Collum v Opie (2000) 76 SASR 588; [2000] SASC 107 .… 25.14 Colman v Golder [1957] VR 196 .… 16.64 Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 .… 3.38, 3.45 Colonial Insurance Co of NZ v Adelaide Martin Insurance Co (1886) 12 App Cas 128 .… 9.5

Colyear v Mulgrave (1836) 2 Keen 81; 48 ER 559 .… 7.5, 7.32 Colyer v Clay (1843) 7 Beav 188; 49 ER 1036 .… 12.23 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45; 238 ALR 457; [2006] FCAFC 192 .… 11.60, 11.152 Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.15, 4.10 Combulk Pty Ltd v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 214 .… 11.108 Comcare v Martinez (No 2) (2013) 212 FCR 272; [2013] FCA 439 .… 10.32 Comcopy Pty Ltd v Chadwick [1999] VSC 31 .… 18.37 Cominos v Rekes (1979) 2 BPR 9619 .… 24.7 Command Energy Pty Ltd v Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust [2003] VSC 261 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.20, 21.21 Commercial & General Corporation Pty Ltd v Manassen Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] SASCFC 40 .… 2.5, 10.30, 20.8 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 46 ALR 402; [1983] HCA 14 .… 2.13, 5.17, 11.56, 12.71, 14.10, 14.16, 14.20, 15.1, 15.2, 28.31 — v GH Dean & Co Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 204 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.8 — v Younis [1979] 1 NSWLR 444 .… 26.3, 26.5 Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Patrick Intermarine Acceptances Ltd (in liq) (1978) 19 ALR 563; 52 ALJR 404 (PC) .… 8.5 — v Pollard [1983] 1 NSWLR 74; (1983) ASC 55-244 .… 15.26, 15.27 — v R H Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 337 .… 11.30, 11.31, 11.42, 11.78, 11.79, 11.80 Commercial Base Pty Ltd v Watson [2013] VSC 334 .… 15.3 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Hazelwood-Smith (2000) 11 ANZ Ins Cas 61-469 .… 10.33 Commission Car Sales (Hastings) Ltd v Saul [1957] NZLR 144 .… 16.79 Commissioner for Railways v Dangar (1943) 15 LGR 101 (NSWSC) .… 23.39 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Quinn (1946) 72 CLR 345 .… 10.20, 10.62, 10.77 Commissioner of Police v Barbaro [2001] NSWCA 57 .… 10.35 xliv

Table of Cases



— v Hooper (1992) 2 Aust Contract Reporter 90-010; (1992) 2 CCH Contract Reporter 90–010 .… 3.67, 18.30 — v John White & Sons (NT) Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 172 .… 3.24, 16.45 — v Ken [1919] SALR 201 .… 26.3 — v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309 .… 10.41 — v Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 167; (1995) 130 ALR 193 .… 18.4, 21.28 — v Silverton Ltd (1997) 130 ACTR 1 .… 23.32 — v Spotless Catering Services Ltd [2000] WASCA 302 .… 20.1, 20.4, 20.9 — v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; 95 ALR 321 .… 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2.13, 2.16, 2.19, 2.24, 2.29, 4.27, 5.28, 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 15.1, 16.67, 18.34, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 25.1, 25.14 — v Western Australia (1999) 196 CLR 392 .… 10.33 Commonwealth Bank v Finding [1998] QSC 68 .… 11.115 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Baltica General Insurance Co Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 579 .… 7.10, 11.26 — v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169; [2014] HCA 32 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.52, 10.55 — v Carotino (2011) 111 SASR 573; [2011] SASCFC 110 .… 5.17 — v Cohen (1988) ASC 55-681 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.19 — v Finding [2001] 1 Qd R 168 (CA) .… 11.115 — v Foxman Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 .… 11.120 — v Kojic [2016] FCAFC 186 .… 11.108, 15.16 — v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84 .… 11.112, 11.115, 11.122 — v Mileoak Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 12 .… 23.45 — v Spira [2002] NSWC 905 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.49 — v TLI Management Pty Ltd [1990] VR 510 .… 5.17, 10.25 Commonwealth Financial Planning Ltd v Couper [2013] NSWCA 444 .… 11.115 Commonwealth Homes and Investment Co Ltd v MacKellar (1939) 63 CLR 351 .… 11.46, 21.24 Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 .… 21.12, 23.5, 23.10, 23.14

Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Carlenka Pty Ltd (1995) 41 NSWLR 329 .… 12.30 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694; [1964] 3 All ER 692; [1964] 3 WLR 963 .… 8.21 Commissioner of State Revenue v Politis [2004] VSC 126 .… 7.28 Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51 .… 26.3, 26.5 Commissioner of Taxation v American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122 .… 3.51, 8.50 — v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150 .… 8.9 — v Hadidi (1994) 51 FCR 453 .… 22.11 — v Racing Queensland Board [2019] FCAFC 224 .… 3.8 — v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342 .… 23.45 — v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 .… 2.29, 4.2, 4.32, 4.35, 20.4, 20.12, 22.3, 22.5 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520 .… 10.41 Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 .… 3.68 Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) v Phillips (1936) 55 CLR 144 .… 23.32 Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies (in liq) [2018] AC 275; [2017] UKSC 29 .… 26.1 Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 .… 10.43, 10.48, 10.52, 21.12, 21.19, 21.21, 21.33, 21.35, 23.5, 23.6, 23.7, 23.9, 23.11, 23.12, 23.13, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.28, 23.39, 26.4 — v Antonio Giorgio Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 244 .… 3.69 — v Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926) 39 CLR 1 .… 17.69 — v Burns [1972] ALR 154 .… 26.3 — v Citra Construction Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 235 .… 11.88 — v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333 .… 2.9 — v Cornwell (2007) 229 CLR 519; 234 ALR 148; [2007] HCA 16 .… 23.5, 25.5, 25.6 — v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567 .… 3.27, 4.32, 4.35, 22.3, 22.4

xlv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v Hollins [1956] VLR 169 .… 16.59, 16.64, 24.10 Commonwealth Portland Cement Co Ltd v Weber, Lohmann & Co Ltd (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 516 .… 23.39 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Reno Auto Sales Pty Ltd [1967] VR 790 .… 26.5 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Sydney Wide Stores Pty Ltd (1981) 55 ALJR 574 .… 23.37 Community Development Pty Ltd v Engwirda Construction Co (1969) 120 CLR 455 .… 10.62 Compagnie de Commerce et Commission SARL v Parkinson Stove Co [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 487 .… 3.46 Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 .… 8.7, 8.31 Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 .… 11.110, 11.115 Compass Building Society v Cervara Fifty-Seven Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 48 .… 18.10 Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v HowardSmith (1936) 54 CLR 614 .… 8.16, 8.17, 8.18 Computer World (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Internet Centre of Excellence 2000 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 91; [2006] FCA 752 .… 10.5, 10.6 Computershare Ltd v Perpetual Registrars Ltd [2000] VSC 233 .… 6.16 Con Kallergis Pty Ltd v Calshonie Pty Ltd (1998) 14 BCL 201 .… 10.47 Conagra International Fertiliser Co v Lief Investments Pty Ltd (1997) 141 FLR 124 .… 10.27 Concept Television Productions Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1988) 12 IPR 129 .… 26.8 Concrete Constructions Group v Litevale Pty Ltd (2002) 170 FLR 290; [2002] NSWSC 670 .… 11.118 Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594 .… 11.106, 11.111 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55 .… 10.39, 10.41, 10.50, 10.52 Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64 .… 4.32, 10.50, 21.24, 22.2, 22.5, 24.1

Condogianis v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 341; [1921] AC 125 .… 10.74 Conlon v Biggs [1943] SASR 103) .… 21.19 Conn Martusevicius (1991) 14 Fam LR 751 .… 16.75 Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 673 .… 6.15 Connolly v Beechworth Shire (1876) 2 VLR (E) 1 .… 17.71 Connor v Spence (1878) 4 VLR (L) 243 .… 19.4, 19.17, 19.21 — v Stainton (1924) 27 WAR 72 .… 9.5, 26.6, 26.13 — v Tasmanian Permanent Executors & Trustee Assn Ltd (1933) 28 Tas LR 9 .… 16.11, 16.15 Conroy v Lowndes [1958] Qd R 375 .… 24.32 Consolidated Credit Network Pty Ltd v Sonenco Apartments Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1000 .… 24.4, 24.14 Consolidated Development Pty Ltd v Holt (1986) 6 NSWLR 607 .… 3.73 Consolidated Neon (Phillips System) Pty Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 152 .… 19.4 Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Naylor (1963) 55 CLR 423 .… 8.34 Consolo Ltd v Bennett (2012) 207 FCR 127; [2012] FCAFC 120 .… 11.110 Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226; 64 ALR 481 .… 2.3, 12.2, 10.3, 10.39, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.61, 12.8 Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 .… 10.16, 10.30 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services [2018] FCA 417 .… 5.26 Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717 .… 2.5, 2.9, 24.1 Consulere Ltd v Trikon Corp Pty Ltd (1990) 10 BCL 424 .… 24.26 Consulting Services Pty Ltd v Rieson (2006) 225 CLR 516; [2006] HCA 31 .… 18.41 Container Handlers Pty Ltd v Insurance Commission of WA [2001] WASCA 304 .… 10.73 Continental C & G Rubber Co Pty Ltd, Re (1919) 27 CLR 194 .… 18.2 xlvi

Table of Cases Contra Fernandez v Glev Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1859 .… 11.110 Contra Salmon v Enares (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 202 .… 16.66 Conway-Cook v Town of Kwinana [2001] WASCA 250 .… 23.42 Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 50 ALR 363 .… 5.19, 5.28 — v — (1983) 50 ALR 363 .… 3.11, 16.45 Cook v Bank of New South Wales (1982) 2 BPR 9580 .… 11.9, 15.31 — v — (1986) 162 CLR 376 .… 27.1 — v Lister (1863) 13 CBNS 543; 143 ER 215 .… 4.40, 4.41 — v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 548 .… 11.151 — v Ravji [1967] NZLR 289 .… 24.6 Cook Islands Shipping Co Ltd v Colson Builders Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 422 .… 4.32 Cooke v Head [1972] 2 All ER 38 .… 16.73 — v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785 .… 3.58, 3.65 Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v SFS 007298633 Pty Ltd .… 16.55 Coolibah Pastoral Co v Commonwealth (1967) 11 FLR 173 .… 12.36, 12.40 Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 .… 14.5, 14.6 Coomber, Re [1911] 1 Ch 723 .… 14.5, 14.6 Coombs v Bahama Palm Trading Pty Ltd (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-002 .… 15.27 — v Wilkes [1891] 3 .… 16.35 Coomera Resort Pty Ltd v Kolback Securities Ltd [1998] QSC 20 .… 19.12, 20.9 Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 .… 16.57, 16.58, 16.60, 16.61, 16.65, 16.66 Cooper v Australian Electric Co (1922) Ltd (1922) 25 WALR 66 .… 26.13 — v Commonwealth Bank; Marshall v Commonwealth Bank [1998] SASC 6585 .… 17.51 — v Gardiner (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 67 .… 23.39 — v Harman (1866) LR 3 Eq 98 .… 8.55 — v Joel (1859) 1 De G F & J 240; 45 ER 350 .… 11.44 — v Municipality of Brisbane (1900) 10 QLJ 120 .… 25.8 — v Parker (1855) 15 CB 822; 139 ER 650 .… 4.39



— v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149; [1861–73] All ER Rep 2109 .… 12.23, 12.25 — v Ungar (1958) 100 CLR 510 .… 20.1 Cooper & Sons v Neilson & Maxwell Ltd [1919] VLR 66 .… 19.17, 19.20 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1991) 147 CLR 297 .… 10.35 Co-operative Bulk Handling Pty Ltd v Jennings Industries Ltd (1996) 17 WAR 257 .… 7.3 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 286; [1998] AC 1 .… 24.1, 24.12, 24.13 Copper Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hill & Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 .… 22.4 Cooper’s Trusts, Re (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 234 .… 17.63 Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1997) 67 SASR 525; [1997] SASC 5995 .… 11.82, 11.85, 11.97, 23.8 Coppleson v FCT (1981) 52 FLR 95 .… 5.11 Coras v Webb [1942] St R Qd 66 .… 17.18 Corbidge v Bakery Fun Factory Fun Shop Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 40-493 .… 11.127, 11.146 Corcoran v O’Rourke (1888) 14 VLR 889 .… 16.35 Cordon v Lesdor [2010] NSWSC 1073 .… 23.27 Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184 .… 10.43, 23.27, 26.13 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 .… 8.39, 24.1 Corio Guarantee Corporation v McCallum [1956] VLR 755 .… 26.13 Cork v Baker (1717) 1 Stra 34; 93 ER 367 .… 16.20 Cork and Bandon Railway Co v Cazenove (1847) 10 QB 935; 116 ER 355 .… 17.19 Corkin v Taylor [1963] Qd R 534 .… 22.6 Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M & W 358; 151 ER 450 .… 11.79 Cornish & Co v Kanematsu (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 83 .… 19.4, 19.17, 19.19, 19.23 Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 247 .… 21.29 Corp Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; 266 ALR 462; [2010] HCA 19 .… 16.72 Corpe v Overton (1833) 10 Bing 252; 131 ER 901 .… 17.23

xlvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Corpers (No 664) Pty Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd [1989] ANZ ConvR 548; (1989) ASC 55-714; 20 ATR 1084; NSW ConvR 55-475 .… 24.30, 24.5 Corporate Express Australia Ltd v SwiftMcNair [1998] NSWSC 593 .… 18.38 Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 .… 10.32 Corradini v Lovrinov Crafter Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 125; [2000] SASC 224 .… 18.10, 18.12, 18.19, 18.20, 18.43, 18.49 — v O’Brien Lovrinov Crafter Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 125; [2000] SASC 224 .… 18.9 Correa v Whittingham (2013) 278 FLR 310; [2013] NSWCA 263 .… 17.70 Corrections Corp of Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2000) 104 FCR 448; [2000] FCA 1280 .… 11.109 Corser v Commonwealth General Assurance Corp Ltd [1963] NSWR 225 .… 6.11 Cortis Exhaust Systems Pty Ltd v Kitten Software Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1189; (2001) ATPR 41-837 .… 11.146, 15.13, 18.38 Cory v Gertcken (1816) 2 Madd 40; 56 ER 250 .… 17.42 Coset No 15 Pty Ltd v Blagojevic [2003] NSWSC 418 .… 12.36, 12.38 Cosgrove v Horsfall (1946) 62 TLR 140 .… 4.14, 7.37 Coshott v Fewings Joinery Pty Ltd (NSWCA, 15 July 1996) .… 23.19 Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2014) 45 VR 771; [2014] VSCA 353 .… 2.5, 6.5 Cossill v Strangman [1963] NSWR 1695 .… 8.16, 8.17, 8.19, 8.29, 8.34 Costa Vraca Pty Ltd v Berrigan Weed & Pest Control Pty Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 714 .… 11.115 Cottee v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 469 .… 4.14 Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 .… 4.26, 4.27 Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554 .… 10.28 Couldery v Bartrum (1881) 19 Ch D 394 .… 4.40 Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] HCA 385 .… 1.40, 3.13, 4.40, 4.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.7, 7.8, 7.12, 7.25, 8.9, 8.17, 23.2, 24.1, 24.2, 24.4, 24.6, 24.17, 28.17 Coulthart v Clementson (1879) 5 QBD 42; [1874–80] All ER Rep 865 .… 3.73 Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 372

.… 10.16, 10.41, 10.42, 10.46, 10.48, 10.56, 21.12, 21.26 — v Goldspar Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 568 .… 11.110 — v Woodward [2000] NSWCA 201 .… 26.7 Council of the Shire of Noosa v JE Farr Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 060 .… 10.62, 10.67 Council of the Shire of Sutherland v James (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 273 .… 18.4 County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 .… 6.2, 6.6, 10.12, 10.16 Courtenay Polymers Pty Ltd v Deang [2005] VSC 318 .… 18.35, 18.37 Courtney v Powell [2012] NSWSC 460 .… 14.5, 14.12, 15.8 Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297 .… 6.8, 6.15 Cousin v Grant (1991) 103 FLR 236 .… 7.3, 7.27 Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Ltd [2006] QSC 307 .… 10.43, 10.44 — v — [2007] QCA 192 .… 7.18 Coutts & Co v Browne-Lecky [1947] KB 104; [1946] 2 All ER 207 .… 17.36, 17.50 Couturier v Hastie (1852) 8 Exch 40; 155 ER 1250 .… 12.12, 12.16, 16.17 Cover v McLaughlin (1897) 18 LR (NSW) 107 .… 21.20 Cowan v O’Connor (1888) 20 QBD 640 .… 3.60 Coward v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1963] 1 QB 259 .… 5.9 Cowen v Pigott [1989] 1 Qd R 41 .… 14.6 Cowern v Nield [1911–13] All ER Rep 425; [1912] 2 KB 419 .… 17.16 Cox v Esanda Finance [2000] NSWSC 502 .… 13.5, 13.7 — v Troy (1822) 5 B & Ald 474; 106 ER 1264 .… 28.3 Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst [1990] 2 NZLR 15 .… 11.118 Coxhead v Mullis (1878) 3 CPD 439 .… 17.27, 17.28 Coyne v Commercial Equity Corp Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 109 .… 23.19 C&P Syndicate Pty Ltd v Reddy [2013] NSWSC 643 .… 3.49 CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] WASCA 123 .… 24.23 CPG01 Pty Ltd v Kourinos [2010] WASC 92 .… 7.28

xlviii

Table of Cases Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 .… 2.7, 2.9, 16.68, 16.69 Craddock Bros Ltd v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136; [1923] All ER Rep 394 .… 12.30 Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 .… 2.13, 2.28, 21.29, 21.31 Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant [2014] 2 All ER 279; [2014] UKSC 9 .… 11.38 Crane v Hegeman- Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662 .… 12.35, 12.40 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (1934) 55 LQR 54 .… 16.54 Crawford v Parish (1991) 105 FLR 361; [1991] ACTSC 87 .… 11.95, 11.97, 11.99 Crawford Fitting Co v Sydney Valve & Fittings Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 438 .… 10.15, 22.12 Creak v James Moore and Sons Pty Ltd (1912) 15 CLR 426 .… 12.56 Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 82 .… 2.16, 11.118, 18.4, 18.37 Creamoata Ltd v Rice Equalization Association Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 286 .… 7.45, 7.47, 18.35, 18.37, 22.4, 22.7 Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 .… 13.1, 13.6, 13.7, 13.10 Cresswell v Cresswell [2017] VSCA 272 .… 2.9 — v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255 .… 15.8 Crichton v Morris (1884) 10 VLR (E) 338 .… 16.35 Crick v Murray (1882) 3 LR (NSW) L 20 .… 17.18 Cripps v G & M Dawson Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 81 .… 23.39 Crisp v ANZ Bank Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-294 .… 11.115 Criss v Alexander (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 587 .… 23.41 Crocodile Marketing v Griffith Vintners (1992) 28 NSWLR 539 .… 11.110 Croft v Lumley (1858) 6 HL Cas 672 .… 21.29 Crombie v Crombie [1903] SALR 147 .… 16.65 Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ Conv R 307 .… 2.17, 2.29, 10.3 Crompton v Wheat (1983) 71 FLR 346 .… 16.70 Crook v Corporation of Seaford (1870) LR 10 .… 16.67



Crothers v Hire Finance Ltd (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 469 .… 21.15 Crouch v Hawes (1974) 9 SASR 391 .… 20.16 — v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1907] VLR 80 .… 8.5 Crow v Rogers (1724) 1 Stra 592; 93 ER 719 .… 7.4 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] NSWCA 41 .… 15.8, 15.31 Crowe Horwath (Aust) Pty Ltd v Loone [2017] VSC 163; [2017] VSCA 181 .… 21.38 Crowley v Worley Ltd [2022] FCAFC 33 .… 11.108 Crown Insurance Services Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] VSCA 218 .… 23.14, 23.16 Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 .… 2.5, 2.6, 3.67, 4.18, 6.5, 10.6 Crown Resorts Ltd v Zantran Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 1 .… 18.32 Crowther v Commr of Stamp Duties [1963] NSWR 858 .… 26.1 Crump v Sharah [1999] NSWSC 884 .… 23.19 CRW Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1972) AR (NSW) 17 .… 11.122 Crystal Auburn Pty Ltd v IL Wollerman Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 735 .… 11.147 CSG Ltd v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 335 .… 8.47 Csomore v Public Service Board of NSW (1986) 10 NSWLR 587 .… 26.13 CSR Ltd v Adecco (Australia) Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 121 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.33, 10.34 — v Amaca Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 .… 25.14 — v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 .… 24.20 — v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-034 .… 2.21, 7.45, 7.46 CSS Investments Pty Ltd v Lopiron Pty Ltd (1987) 6 FCR 15; 76 ALR 463 .… 10.41, 21.35, 21.36, 24.4, 24.9 CT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 .… 18.37 CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714 .… 13.5, 13.7 Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 656 .… 3.39

xlix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Cullan v Pearse (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 200 .… 16.28 Cullen v Thomson (1862) 6 LT 870 .… 11.40 — v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1 .… 23.18, 23.32, 27.1 Culligan v Aco Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 290 .… 11.150 Cumber v Wane (1721) 1 Stra 426; 93 ER 613; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 436 .… 4.37 Cumins v DCT (Cth) [2007] WASCA 30 .… 26.1 Cumming v Ince (1847) 11 QB 112; 116 ER 418 .… 13.3 Cumming & Co Ltd v Hasell (1920) 28 CLR 508 .… 6.5 Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 .… 8.7 — v Lewis (1993) 113 ALR 285 .… 11.117 Cummins Generator Technologies Germany GmbH v Johnson Controls Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 326 ALR 556; [2015] NSWCA 264 .… 11.82, 11.128 Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1149 .… 12.28, 12.59, 12.60, 27.24, 28.3 Cunningham v National Australia Bank Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 495 .… 11.121 Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513 .… 23.35 Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 .… 4.3 Curro v Beyond Productions Pty Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 337 .… 10.52, 18.37, 24.24, 24.25 Curtin University of Technology v Woods Baget Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 449 .… 11.143 Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805 .… 11.9, 11.62, 11.122 Curwen v Yan Yean Land Co Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 745 .… 11.19 Cushman & Wakefield (NSW) Pty Ltd v Farrell [2017] NSWCA 24 .… 10.30 Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Dallas Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 92 .… 10.6 — v Gray [1991] 1 VR 540 .… 6.6 Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 Term Rep 320; 101 ER 573; [1775–1802] All ER Rep 159 .… 27.12 Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189 .… 10.6, 11.34, 11.40

Cypjayne Pty Ltd v Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR .… 6.8 Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos [1966] 2 QB 695 .… 24.1, 28.17 — v — [1969] 1 AC 380 .… 23.39 D D & C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837 .… 2.16, 2.17, 4.37, 4.38 D & G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority [2015] EWHC 226 .… 10.43 D & S Group of Companies Pty Ltd v O’Connor Investments Pty Ltd [1997] SASC 6436 .… 7.4 D G Australia Pty Ltd v Alexander [2003] SASC 176 .… 26.6 Da Yun Xu v Fang Lin [2005] NSWSC 569 .… 14.5, 15.8 Daher v Doulaveras [2008] NSWSC 583 .… 15.8 Dai v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89; (2000) 171 ALR 348 .… 15.16 Dainford Ltd v Juana Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 396 .… 21.30, 23.2 — v Smith (1985) 155 CLR 342 .… 21.12 Dairy Vale Foods v Manfield [1998] SASC 6992 .… 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.55 Dale v Copping (1601) 1 Bulst 39; 80 ER 743 .… 17.5 — v Hamilton .… 16.23 Dalecoast Pty Ltd v Guardian International Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 199 .… 23.2 — v — [2003] WASCA 142 .… 11.110, 11.146, 11.147 Daley, Re; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 390 .… 8.7 Dalgety & Co Ltd v AMP Society (1908) VLR 481 .… 11.22, 11.38 Dalgety Australia Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 NSWLR 324 .… 3.40 Dalgety Wine Estates Pty Ltd v Rizzon (1979) 26 ALR 355; 53 ALJR 647; (1979) 141 CLR 552 .… 24.20, 24.24, 24.25 Dalle-Molle v Manos (2004) 88 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 102 .… 17.53 Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gold Resources Australia Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 587 .… 10.56, 10.57 Dalton v Ellis; Estate of Bristow (2005) 65 NSWLR 134; [2005] NSWSC 1252 .… 5.8, 7.25 Dalton v Lawson Hill Estate Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 169 .… 11.110, 11.121, 11.122, 11.128, 11.150 l

Table of Cases



David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 468 .… 6.17, 7.28, 8.6 — v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 110 .… 23.18 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1; 93 ALR 271 .… 11.112, 11.115, 18.48 — v — (1992) 175 CLR 353 .… 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 12.39, 12.40, 18.6, 18.48, 26.1, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5 David T Boyd & Co v Louis Louca [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 209 .… 6.5 Davids Distribution (Vic) Pty Ltd v Dance [1999] VSC 258 .… 22.12 Davidson v Atlas Assurance Co Ltd [1932] NZLR 1163 .… 12.8 Davies v Apted [2013] SASCFC 92 .… 3.15, 7.2 — v Benyon-Harris (1931) 47 TLR 424 .… 17.18 — v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 .… 8.52 — v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359 .… 8.6 — v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 258; (1938) 12 ALJ 260 .… 3.29 Davinski Nominees Pty Ltd v I & A Bowler Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 220 .… 23.32 Davis v CGU Insurance Ltd [2009] SASC 220 .… 2.3 — v Commissioner for Main Roads (1968) 117 CLR 529 .… 10.62 — v Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd (NSWSC, Rolfe J, 20 April 1994, unreported) .… 18.43 — v Pearce Parking Station Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 642 .… 10.53, 10.60, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.76, 10.77 Davis & Co (Wines) Ltd v Afa-Minerva (EMI) Ltd [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 27 .… 11.97 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 .… 19.5 Davys v Buswell [1913] 2 KB 47 .… 16.18 Daw v Flinton Pty Ltd (1998) 85 IR 1 .… 21.12 Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260; [1904-7] All ER Rep 913 .… 8.7 Day v O’Leary (1992) 57 SASR 206 .… 23.27, 23.39 Day Ford Pty Ltd v Sciacca [1990] 2 Qd R 209 .… 18.4, 18.6 Dayeian v Davidson (2010) 76 NSWLR 512; [2010] NSWCA 42 .… 4.17

Daly v Egan (1886) 12 VLR 81 .… 9.8, 9.9 Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 371 .… 14.10 Dan v Barclays Australia Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 437; 57 ALJR 442 .… 22.5, 22.6 Danaris Pty Ltd v J and M United Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 220 .… 11.86 Danbol Pty Ltd v Swiss Re International SE [2020] VSCA 274 .… 6.8 D’Angibau, Re (1880) 15 Ch D 228; [187480] All ER Rep 1184 .… 7.32 Daniel v Sinclair (1881) 6 AC 181 .… 12.8 Daniel Efrat Consulting Services Pty Ltd, Re (1999) 162 ALR 429 .… 18.33 Daniels v Sabemo (SA) Pty Ltd (1986) 43 SASR 55 .… 22.6 — v Trefusis [1914] 1 .… 16.41 Darin Nominees Pty Ltd v Franklin’s Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 209 .… 10.35 Dark v Boock [1991] 1 NZLR 496 .… 15.9 Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 QB 65; [1995] 1 WLR 68 .… 7.7, 8.7 Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500; [1986] HCA 82 .… 1.75, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77, 27.1 Darmanin v Cowan [2010] NSWSC 1118 .… 5.7 Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1216 .… 11.132 Darter Pty Ltd v Malloy (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-017 .… 3.11 — v — [1993] 2 Qd R 615 .… 10.16, 16.64, 24.4, 24.10 Darzi Group Pty Ltd v Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 .… 3.11, 5.20, 5.24 Dataflow Computer Services Pty Ltd v Goodman (1999) 168 ALR 169 .… 11.107, 11.111 Dataforce Pty Ltd v Brambles Holdings [1988] VR 771 .… 24.26 Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231; [1978] 2 All ER .… 3.71, 16.22, 16.38, 16.61 Davey v Challenger Managed Investments [2003] NSWCA 172 .… 15.8 David by her Tutor the Protective Commissioner v David (1993) 30 NSWLR 417 .… 17.55 David Deane & Associates Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 270 .… 3.68, 20.3

li



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Debenham v Sawbridge [1901] 2 Ch 98 .… 12.14 Dedert Corporation v United Dalby Bio-Refinery Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 368 .… 24.23 Deeks v Little Moreton Trading Pty Ltd (1995) 14 WAR 58 .… 10.20 Deemcope Pty Ltd v Cantown Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 44 .… 10.48, 13.7 Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98 .… 8.7 DeJohn v TV Corp Int’l (2003) 245 F Supp 2d 913 .… 3.7 Del Borrello v Friedman and Lurie (a firm) [2001] WASCA 348 .… 10.12 Del Casale v Artedomus (Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 73 IPR 326; [2007] NSWCA 172 .… 24.1, 24.25 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 .… 2.9, 2.15, 5.4, 5.8, 16.70 Delaney v Delaney [2022] VSCA 48 .… 5.24, 24.16 — v T P Smith Ltd [1946] KB 393; [1946] 2 .… 16.48 Delbridge v Low [1990] 2 Qd R 317 .… 21.18 Delco Australia Pty Ltd v Equipment Enterprises Inc t/a Kukla Trenchers (2000) 100 FCR 385; [2000] FCA 821 .… 11.114 Delicacy Co Ltd v Patricia’s Chocolates & Candies Pty Ltd (1947) 77 CLR 57 .… 18.37 Dell v Beasley [1959] NZLR 89 .… 12.55, 24.30 Dellys v Elderslie Finance Corp Ltd [2002] WASCA 161 .… 10.52 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 281; [2003] FCA 1413 .… 8.7, 18.32 — v JP Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd [2007] FCAFC 52; (2007) 158 FCR 417 .… 8.7, 18.33 Delta Pty Ltd v Mechanical and Construction Insurance Pty Ltd [2019] QCA 62 .… 25.4 Dem Compagnie Pty Ltd v Telxon Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 66 .… 21.24 Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31; 110 ALR 608 .… 6.15, 11.32, 11.43, 11.84, 11.104, 11.113, 11.115, 11.121, 11.125, 11.147, 11.150 Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 561 .… 11.39, 11.78, 11.83, 14.13 Dempster v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 124 .… 22.8, 22.12

DCT v Advanced Communications Technologies (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 487 .… 16.67, 23.45 — v Chamberlain (1990) 26 FCR 221; 93 ALR 729 .… 12.17, 12.50, 12.51, 12.52 — v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1993) 117 ALR 61 .… 8.7 DCT Projects Pty Ltd v Champion Homes Sales Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 117 .… 21.12 De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 645 .… 11.127 — v — [2012] FCAFC 28 .… 11.110, 11.129 De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 .… 25.14 De Cesare v Deluxe Motors Pty Ltd (1996) 67 SASR 28 .… 23.27 De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430; [1886–90] All ER Rep 414 .… 17.13, 17.14 De Garis v Dalgety & Co Ltd [1915] SALR 102 .… 17.7, 17.25 De Garis & Rowe’s Lease, Re [1924] VLR 38 .… 18.2 De Jong v Carpenter (1982) 2 BPR 9524 .… 3.33 De La Bere v Pearson [1908] 1 KB 280 .… 4.14 De Leuil v Jeremy (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 137 .… 16.45 de L’Isle v Knight [2021] NSWSC 809 .… 10.32 De Mattos v Gibson (1858) 4 De G & J 276; 45 ER 108; [1843-60] All ER Rep 803 .… 7.31 De More Constructions Pty Ltd v Garpace Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 132; [2001] NSWCA 350 .… 16.55 De Nier v Beicht [1982] VR 331 .… 25.1 De Paola v City of New York 394 NYS (2d) 525 .… 12.52 Deacon v Transport Regulation Board [1958] VR 458 .… 13.7 Dean v Gibson (1958) 4 LGRA 214; [1958] VR 563 .… 11.62, 11.64 Deane v City Bank of Sydney (1904) 2 CLR 198 .… 10.5 — v — (1918) 25 CLR 215 .… 25.8 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; 38 ER 475; [1824-34] All ER Rep 28 .… 8.18 — v Hall, Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weinenkauf GmbH and Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150 .… 8.18 lii

Table of Cases



Dewhirst v Budget Rent-a-Car Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 1 .… 11.119 — v Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 .… 16.69, 24.7 DHBC Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 98 .… 6.11 DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 .… 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.15, 2.20 Di Biase v Rezek [1970] 1 NSWR 661 .… 7.28 — v — [1971] 1 NSWLR 735 .… 16.22, 16.35, 16.45 Di Giovanni v Dark Horse Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] WASCA 188 .… 8.49 Diagnostic X-Ray Services Pty Ltd v Jewell Food Stores Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 632; [2001] VSC 9 .… 24.13, 24.21 Diakogiannis v Johnson (1989) NSW ConvR 55-472 .… 3.46 Dial-An-Angel v Penchtime Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 180 .… 18.37 Dialog Pty Ltd v Addease Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 600 .… 24.21 Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd v Instagram Inc [2020] FCA 1846 .… 3.7, 3.26 Diamanti v Martelli [1923] NZLR 663 .… 11.80 Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd [1979] QB 333 .… 11.80 — v British Columbia Thoroughbred Breeders’ Society and Boyd (1965) 52 DLR (2d) 146 .… 12.19 Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd v Newham (1993) 117 FLR 164 .… 18.12 Dib Group Pty Ltd v Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 601; [2011] NSWCA 300 .… 11.117, 11.142 Dibble v Aldan Nominees Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-693. .… 11.123 Dick v United States (1949) 82 Fed Supp 326 .… 3.62 Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623; [1965] 2 All ER 65 .… 10.23, 10.24 Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463 .… 3.59, 3.66, 3.67, 3.73 Dickson v Gallagher (1985) 7 ATPR 40-550 .… 11.107 Dickson Property Management Services Pty Ltd v Centro Property Management (Vic) Pty Ltd (2000) 180 ALR 485 .… 10.43, 21.33, 21.34, 21.37, 22.12, 24.19

Demtear Pty Ltd v Abelian Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 103 .… 6.11 Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500; [2003] QCA 376 .… 8.6 Denkewitz v Hodgson [1998] QSC 261 .… 23.19 Dennant v Skinner and Collom [1948] 2 KB 164; [1948] 2 All ER 29 .… 12.60 Denne v Light (1857) 8 De GM & G 774; 44 ER 588 .… 24.7 Dennis Pethybridge v Stedikas Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 154 .… 7.2 Dennison v Ace Shohin (Aust) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 ATPR 40-793 .… 11.110, 11.112, 11.145 Dent v Bennett (1839) 4 My & Cr 269; 41 ER 105 .… 14.5 Dental Corporation Pty Ltd v Lee [2016] NSWSC 1859 .… 18.37 Denton v Great Northern Railway Co (1856) 5 E & B 860; 119 ER 701 .… 3.4 — v Ryde Municipal Council (1953) 19 LGR 152 and 159 .… 18.8 Derbyshire Building Co Pty Ltd v Becker (1962) 107 CLR 633 .… 23.38 Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318 .… 2.16 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1 .… 11.63, 11.76, 11.78 Despot v Registrar General of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 5 .… 21.29, 24.1, 24.13, 24.32 Deta Nominees Pty Ltd v Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VR 167 .… 16.84 — v Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VR 167 .… 16.80, 24.1 Deutsch v Deutsch [2012] VSC 227 .… 19.23 Devaugh Pty Ltd v Lamac Developments Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 280 .… 10.27, 10.31, 10.32, 10.40 Devaux v Steinkeller (1839) 6 Bing (NC) 84; 133 ER 33 .… 11.80 Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Perl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225 .… 8.6, 8.8, 10.50 Development Underwriting (Qld) Pty Ltd v Weaber [1971] Qd R 182 .… 12.35 Device Pty Ltd v Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority .… 20.8 Devpro (a firm) v Seamark [2007] QCA 241 .… 6.11 Dewar v Mintoft [1912] 2 KB 373 .… 16.37 liii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract DKB Investments Pty Ltd v Belcote Pty Ltd (1991) 79 NTR 38 .… 10.6 — v — (No 2) (1993) 113 FLR 290 .… 10.6 DKLR Holdings Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431 .… 8.21 Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234 .… 25.6 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 .… 18.34 Dobson v Dobson (1879) 13 SALR 137 .… 15.2 Dockpride Pty Ltd v Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211 .… 3.39 Dockside Holdings Pty Ltd v Rakio Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 374; [2001] SASC 78 .… 10.35, 12.36 Dodds v Premier Sports Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 948 .… 10.18 Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 Est Gaz 1115 .… 16.70 Doepel & Associates Architects Pty Ltd v Hodgkinson [2008] WASCA 262 .… 11.117, 11.146 Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2015) 47 VR 302; [2015] VSCA 351 .… 4.28, 10.2, 13.1, 13.5 Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709 .… 24.23 Dold v Murphy [2020] NZCA 313 .… 13.6, 13.7 Domazet v Jure Investments Pty Ltd [2016] ACTSC 33 .… 12.30 Domb v Isoz [1980] Ch 548 .… 3.57 Dome Resources NL v Silver [2008] NSWCA 322 .… 4.35, 7.8 Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd v Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 471 .… 11.122 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [1998] 2 All ER 608; affirmed [1999] 2 All ER 218 .… 8.5, 8.8 Donaldson v Bexton [2007] 1 Qd R 525; [2006] QCA 559 .… 20.8, 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 — v Freeson (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 113 .… 11.36, 11.37 — v — (1934) 51 CLR 598 .… 18.25, 18.45 Donau Pty Ltd v ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 185 .… 10.36, 21.19 Donellan v Read (1832) 3 B & Ad 899 .… 16.32 Doney v Palmview Sawmill Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 62 .… 11.110, 11.118 Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749 .… 3.34

Dietrich v Dare (1980) 30 ALR 407; 54 ALJR 388 .… 5.19 Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd v Brand [2004] NSWCA 58 .… 11.117, 11.127 Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Downs [1972] 2 NSWLR 49 .… 11.88 Dillon v Bepuri Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-436 .… 21.26, 21.36 — v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 92 ALR 331 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Nash [1950] VLR 293 .… 16.57, 16.66, 24.30 Dillwyn v Llewellyn (1862) 4 De G F & J 517; 45 ER 1285 .… 2.7, 16.68, 16.69, 16.70 Dimmock v Hallett (1866) 2 Ch App 21 .… 11.11 Dimond v Moore (1931) 45 CLR 159 .… 21.12 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Evia Luck) [1992] 2 AC 152 .… 13.10 Dinan v Harper [1922] VLR 49 .… 16.35 Dingjan, Re; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 69 ALJR 284 .… 21.38 Dinyarrack Investments Pty Ltd v Amoco Australia Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 214 .… 11.115 Diplock, Re; Diplock v Wintle [1948] Ch 465; [1948] 2 All ER 318 .… 25.6 Direct Acceptance Finance Ltd v Cumberland Furnishing Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1504 .… 21.21 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc [2002] 1 AC 481 .… 15.22 Director of Consumer Affairs v Scully (2013) 303 ALR 168; [2013] VSCA 292 .… 15.16 Director of Posts and Telegraphs v Abbott (1974) 2 ALR 625 .… 5.29, 18.30, 19.22 Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co (1974) 130 CLR 1 .… 6.5 Ditcham v Worrall (1880) 5 CPD 410; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1324 .… 17.28 Diversified Mineral Resources NL v CRA Exploration Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-381 .… 11.115 Dixon v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1998) 90 FCR 390 .… 7.22 Dixon, Re [1994] 1 Qd R 7 .… 24.5 DJ Hill & Co Pty Ltd v Walter H Wright Pty Ltd [1971] VR 749 .… 10.20, 10.69, 10.71, 10.72 liv

Table of Cases



Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2000) 182 ALR 481 .… 10.14, 10.16, 10.31, 10.32, 10.54 Dowdle v Inverell Shire Council (1998) 9 BPR 97,800 .… 3.11 Dowell v Custombuilt Homes Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 171 .… 26.8 Dowling v Rae (1927) 39 CLR 363; Perpetual Executors and Trustees Assn of Australia Ltd v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.46, 22.4, 22.6 Downer EDI Ltd v Gillies (2012) 229 IR 314; [2012] NSWCA 333 .… 21.24 Downey v Carlson Hotels Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 199 .… 11.108, 11.110 — v Crawford [2004] FCA 1264 .… 26.9 Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257 .… 12.36 Downward Bricklaying Pty Ltd v Goulburn-Murray Rural Water Authority [2003] VSC 171 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.48 Dowsett v Reid (1912) 15 CLR 695 .… 12.8, 14.12, 15.11, 24.1, 24.7, 24.8, 24.30 Doyle v Jacobs (1872) 11 SCR (NSW) 77 .… 23.39 — v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 .… 11.85 — v White City Stadium [1935] 1 KB 110; [1934] All ER Rep 252 .… 17.16 DPN Solutions Pty Ltd v Tridant Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 511 .… 10.49 DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 .… 4.12, 4.35 Dr Angel-Honnibal v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 263 .… 18.37 Drake Personnel Ltd v Beddison [1979] VR 13 .… 18.37 Drennan v Star Paving Co (1958) 333 P 2d 757 .… 2.23, 3.64, 3.67, 5.23 Dresna Pty Ltd v Linknarf Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] FCA 540 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.56, 21.34 Drever v Drever [1936] Arg L R 446 .… 18.23, 18.28 Dreverman v Doherty (1870) 1 VR (E) 4 .… 16.64, 16.65 Driat Pty Ltd v Thomas [2012] NSWSC 71 .… 15.27 Drinkwater v Caddyrack Pty Ltd (NSWSC, 25 September 1997 .… 21.27 Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1954] 1 QB 250 .… 7.25 Driveforce Pty Ltd v Gunns Ltd (No 3) [2010] TASSC 33 .… 10.43 Drozd v Vaskas [1960] SASR 88 .… 11.50, 11.53

Donis v Donis (2007) 19 VR 577; [2007] VSCA 89 .… 2.9, 16.70 Donnelly v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2014] NSWCA 145 .… 15.8, 15.12 — v McIntyre [1999] FCA 450 .… 22.9 Donohoe v Schroeder (1916) 22 CLR 362 .… 18.31 Donovan v TIC Realty Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 90 .… 6.6 Donut King Australia Pty Ltd v Wayne Gardner Racing Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 275 .… 21.12, 21.18 Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 .… 11.117, 11.134, 23.31 Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91 .… 11.42 Dorrough v Bank of Melbourne Ltd (1995) ATPR .… 11.145 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 214 ALR 92; [2005] HCA 12 .… 11.112 Dotter v Evans [1969] VR 41 .… 24.1 Doubikin Holdings Pty Ltd v Grail Pty Ltd (1989) 5 WAR 563 .… 21.12, 21.24, 21.32 Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 .… 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11, 2.14, 16.69, 16.70, 24.1 Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142 .… 24.1, 24.4, 24.6, 24.11, 24.16, 24.17 Douglas v Cicirello [2006] WASCA 226 .… 21.16, 21.18, 21.19, 21.20, 21.23 — v Hill [1909] SASR 28 .… 16.22, 16.59, 16.66 Douglas, Re; Ex parte Starkey (1987) 75 ALR 97 .… 4.22 Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 89 .… 26.4 Douglass Automated Laboratories & Allied Services Pty Ltd v Sonic Technology Australia Ltd (1994) ATPR (Digest) 46129 .… 18.38 Doust v Hubbard [1964] Tas SR 260 .… 24.7 Dover v Lewkovitz [2013] NSWCA 452 .… 8.7 Dover Beach Pty Ltd v Geftine Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 442; [2008] VSCA 248 .… 16.55, 18.9, 18.10, 18.46 Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd v Bottrill Research Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 557 .… 21.18, 21.21, 21.24 Dovuro v Wilkins (2000) 105 FCR 476 .… 7.41 lv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Dunmore (Countess) v Alexander (1830) 9 Sh (Ct of Sess) 190 .… 3.62 Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114 .… 4.12, 4.18, 4.30 Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 179 .… 6.11 Duralla Pty Ltd v Plant (1984) 54 ALR 29 .… 11.40, 11.103, 11.147 Durant v Greiner (1990) 21 NSWLR 119 .… 11.112 Durban Roodeport Deep Ltd v Mostert [2004] WASC 9 .… 18.32 — v Newshore Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 231 .… 23.24, 26.9 Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765; [1895-9] All ER Rep 1683 .… 8.24 Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839 .… 2.7, 2.17 Durkin v Pioneer Permanent Building Society Ltd (ACN 087 652 042) [2003] FCA 419 .… 21.24 Durrell v Evans (1862) H & C 174; 158 ER 848 .… 16.40 Dusik v Newton (1985) 62 BCLR 1 .… 13.12, 15.8, 15.11 Duxbury v Pierce [2010] FCA 203 .… 11.138 Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410 .… 23.37 Dventures Pty Ltd v Wily [2001] NSWSC 641 .… 4.23 Dwyer v Craft Printing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 405 .… 11.115 — v O’Mullen (1887) 13 VLR 933 .… 12.70 Dyck v Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc (1981) 5 WWR 97 .… 7.38 Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundry Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 332 .… 21.12 Dyke v McLeish Estates Ltd (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 74 .… 23.1 Dymocks v Capral [2010] NSWSC 195 .… 11.140 Dymocks Holdings Pty Ltd v Top Ryde Booksellers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 795 .… 23.14 Dynamic Hearing Pty Ltd v Polaris Communications Pty Ltd (2010) 273 ALR 696; [2010] FCAFC 135 .… 11.120 Dysart Timbers Ltd v Nielsen [2009] 3 NZLR 160; [2009] NZSC 43 .… 5.23, 10.55

Druiff v Lord Parker (1868) LR 5 Eq 131 .… 12.36 Drummoyne District Rugby Club Inc v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-039 .… 2.21, 7.1, 7.31 DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] Build LR 530 .… 13.7 DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423 .… 10.13, 21.9, 21.12, 21.17, 21.18, 21.19, 21.21, 21.26, 22.9, 26.4 DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88 .… 2.25 Du Buisson Perrine v Chan (2016) 49 WAR 432; [2016] WASCA 18 .… 21.19, 21.38, 26.4 Dual Homes Pty Ltd v Moores Legal Pty Ltd (2016) 306 FLR 277; [2016] VSC 86 .… 11.112, 23.32 Dubois v Ong [2004] QCA 185 .… 14.19 Dudgeon v Chie (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 450 .… 16.37, 24.19 Duff v Blinco [2007] 1 Qd R 407; [2006] QCA 497 .… 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd v Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 7 .… 10.33, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 23.23, 23.45 Duggan v Barnes [1923] VLR 27 .… 6.5 Duke v Royalstar Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 273 .… 24.8, 25.14 Duke of Bedford v British Museum Trustees (1822) 2 My & K 552; 39 ER 1055; [1814–23] All ER Rep 669 .… 24.7 Duke of Somerset v Cookson (1735) 3 P Wms 390; 24 ER 1114 .… 24.17 Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 180 .… 23.14 Duncan v Dixon (1890) 44 Ch D 211 .… 17.27 Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101 .… 3.46 Duncombe v Porter (1953) 90 CLR 295 .… 10.62, 10.74 Dunlop v Lambert (1839) 6 Cl & F 600; 7 ER 824 .… 7.7, 7.30 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 .… 23.45 — v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847; [1914–15] All ER Rep 333 .… 4.6, 7.1, 7.4, 7.12

lvi

Table of Cases E



Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93 .… 3.10 Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544; [2017] HCA 12 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 Ecroyd v Davis (1872) 3 VR (L) 228 .… 16.42 Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 273 .… 18.6 Eden Construction Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [2007] FCA 689 .… 22.12 Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166 .… 10.54 Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] VSC 502 .… 10.6, 10.43, 20.15 Edgar v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (1992) ATPR (Digest) 46-096 .… 11.115 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459; [1881–5] All ER Rep 856 .… 11.14, 11.39 Edmondson v Warringah Council (1999) 105 LGERA 37 .… 3.39 Edward Keller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Hennelly (1987, unreported) .… 18.24 Edward Street Properties Pty Ltd v Collins [1977] Qd R 399 .… 24.30 Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460 .… 7.3 — v Carter [1893] AC 360; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1259 .… 17.21, 17.22 — v Edwards (1918) 24 CLR 312 .… 10.13 — v — [1965] VR 486 .… 24.8 — v Newland & Co: E Burchett Ltd (third party) [1950] 2 KB 534; [1950] 1 All ER 1072 .… 8.52 — v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 494 .… 5.17, 5.18 Edwin Davey Pty Ltd v Boulos Holdings Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 65 .… 21.19, 21.30 Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517; [2007] EWCA Civ 547 .… 19.5 Effem Foods Pty Ltd trading as Uncle Ben’s of Australia v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599 .… 11.115 Effie Holdings Properties Pty Ltd v 3A International Pty Ltd [1984] NSW ConvR 55-174 .… 18.22, 18.25, 18.28 Egan v Caveny [1921] VLR 37 .… 6.5, 6.6 — v Ross (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 382 .… 16.35 — v — (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 382 .… 12.56, 12.57, 12.68, 12.69, 24.16

E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 310; 99 ALR 601 .… 11.111 E Brown Pty Ltd v Florence [1967] SASR 214 .… 8.52 E R Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 .… 16.69, 16.71 E T Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84 .… 4.40 E W Blanch Pty Ltd v Cooper [2004] NSWSC 631 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.58 EagleBurgmann Australia Pty Ltd v Ross Grant Leadbeater [2012] NSWSC 573 .… 18.37 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 .… 15.1 Earl of Lucan, Re; Hardinge v Cobden (1890) 45 Ch D 470 .… 8.38 Earle v Peale (1712) 10 Mod 67; 88 ER 628 .… 17.5 Earney v Australian Property Investment Strategic Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 621 .… 21.12 Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.12, 21.19, 21.20 Earth Pty Ltd v Quoin Technology Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 89 SASR 337 [2004] SASC 257 .… 18.39 Earthworks & Quarries Ltd v Eastment & Sons [1966] VR 24 .… 26.6 Easling v Mahoney Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (2001) 78 SASR 489 .… 21.12, 23.42 Eastgate Properties Pty Ltd v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 196 .… 20.4 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413; [1963] 1 All ER 137 .… 7.33 Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson (2005) 223 ALR 123; [2005] WASCA 144 .… 4.26 Easts Van Villages Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act (2001) Aust Contract Rep 90-132; [2001] NSWSC 559 .… 10.43, 11.109 Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 11 A & E 438; 113 ER 482; [1835–42] All ER Rep 133 .… 4.3, 16.11, 27.13, 27.14, 27.21 Easyfind (NSW) Pty Ltd v Paterson (1987) 11 NSWLR 98 .… 12.52 eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd (2006) 170 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 1768 .… 3.22, 3.51, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.70, 11.116 lvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Egel v Drogemuller [1936] SASR 407 .… 4.17, 6.7 Eggleston v Marley Engineers Pty Ltd [1979] 21 SASR 51 .… 10.20, 10.71, 10.72 Egmont v Smith [1877] 6 Ch D 469 .… 7.29 Eicholz v Bannister (1864) 17 CB NS 708; 144 ER 384 .… 27.26 Eimco Corp v Tutt Bryant Ltd [1970] 2 NSWR 249 .… 10.74, 10.75 El Ali v Tritton [2019] NSWCA 111 .… 23.25, 23.39 Elan Trading Corp Pty Ltd v Clarence Street Freeholds [2001] VSC 339 .… 24.17 Elcos Australia Pty Ltd v James Hardie Building Services & Technologies Ltd [1999] QSC 27 .… 20.4, 21.19, 21.21 Elder Dempster & Co v Paterson, Zochinos & Co [1924] AC 522; [1924] All ER Rep 135 .… 7.37, 7.40 Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd v McBride [1976] 2 NSWLR 631 .… 10.74, 10.75 Elders Lensworth Finance Ltd v Australian Central Pacific Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 364 .… 12.41 Elders Ltd v Incitec Pivot Ltd [2006] SASC 99 .… 10.45, 20.7, 21.24 Elders Rural Finance Ltd v Smith (1996) 41 NSWLR 296 .… 15.28, 15.29 Elder’s Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Commonwealth Homes & Investment Co Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 603 .… 11.49, 11.51, 11.59, 21.13, 21.29 — v EG Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193 .… 11.116 Electric Acceptance Pty Ltd v Doug Thorley Caravans (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] VR 799 .… 18.19, 18.20, 18.21, 18.40, 18.41, 18.43 Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; 306 ALR 25; [2014] HCA 7 .… 4.17, 6.50, 6.8, 10.12, 10.52 Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] WASCA 36 .… 13.1, 13.3, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 13.12, 14.4 Electronic Industries Ltd v David Jones Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 288 .… 10.41, 10.48, 22.2, 22.6 — v Harrisons & Crosfield (ANZ) Ltd (1965) 82 (WN) NSW 499 .… 20.8 — v — [1966] 2 NSWR 336 .… 11.46 Elesanar Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland [2007] QCA 208 .… 10.13

Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-329 .… 3.11 Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 35 NSWLR 709 .… 4.18, 6.10, 6.16 Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 .… 3.46, 3.60, 3.61 Elkateb v Lawindi (1997) 42 NSWLR 396 .… 16.55, 26.6 Elkerton and Willcocks in their capacity as Administrators of South Head & District Synagogue (Sydney) (in liq) v Milecki [2018] NSWCA 141 .… 5.7 Elkhoury v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 114 ALR 541 .… 21.38 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [2002] NSWCA 413 .… 11.56, 14.16, 14.20, 15.8, 15.26, 15.31 Ella v Wenham [1971] QWN 31 .… 24.30 Ellington v Heinrich Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 475 .… 4.17, 10.31 Elliott v Reading [1999] WASCA 11 .… 10.56, 10.58, 10.60, 20.1, 21.12, 23.22, 23.25, 23.35 Ellis v Barker (1871) 7 Ch App 104 .… 14.6 — v Ellis (1689) Comb 482; 90 ER 05 .… 17.5 — v Joseph Ellis & Co [1905] 1 KB 324 .… 3.14 — v Kerr [1910] 1 Ch 529 .… 3.14 — v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399; [1918–19] All ER Rep 1132 .… 8.7 Ellison v Lutre Pty Ltd (1999) 88 FCR 116 .… 11.50, 11.147 — v Vukicevic (1986) 7 NSWLR 104 .… 15.27, 15.29, 15.31, 16.25 Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374 .… 7.27 Ellul v Oakes (1972) 3 SASR 377 .… 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24 Ellul and Ellul v Oakes [1972] 3 SASR 377 .… 11.83, 11.146 El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 .… 4.24 Elmore v Pirrie (1887) 57 LT 333 .… 24.5 Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 271 .… 11.146, 11.147 Elsmore Resources Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 856 .… 15.27, 15.28 Elton v Cavill (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 289 .… 18.35 Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264 .… 2.29, 18.3, 18.10, 18.20, 18.43, 18.47, 18.49, 22.3, 22.6 Elzamtar v Bangladesh Islamic Centre of NSW Inc [2020] NSWSC 1161 .… 16.67

lviii

Table of Cases



Enzed Technology Pty Ltd v Benge (1989) 1 WAR 164 .… 22.9 Equitable Life Assurance of the US v Bogie (1905) 3 CLR 878 .… 20.15 Equiticorp Finance Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 32 NSWLR 50 .… 13.3, 13.7 Equititrust Ltd v Franks (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128 .… 2.15 Equus Investment Services Pty Ltd v Bernard Curran McHugh Ltd .… 21.29 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Belperio [2006] VSC 14 .… 16.67, 18.4, 18.6 — v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55; (2004) 218 CLR 701 .… 2.19, 3.4, 5.11, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.9, 10.20, 10.26, 12.30, 21.29, 21.32 — v — [2006] QCA 194; [2006] QCA 414 .… 2.18, 10.3, 11.122 — v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498; 286 ALR 12; [2012] HCA 7 .… 8.7, 11.103, 11.150, 18.9, 18.33, 18.46, 18.47, 18.48, 26.1 — v Jimenez [2001] SASC 165 .… 10.35 — v Kamisha Corp Ltd (1999) ATPR 41697 .… 11.150 ER Henry Wherrett & Benjamin (a firm) v Catta Pty Ltd [2004] TASSC 148 .… 25.12 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2011) 274 ALR 705; [2011] FCAFC 11 .… 11.121 Erica Vale Australia Pty Ltd v Thompson & Morgan (Ipswich) Ltd (1994) 29 IPR 589 .… 23.23 Ericksson v Whalley [1971] 1 NSWLR 397 .… 21.33 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 .… 11.53 Erley Pty Ltd v Gunzburg Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] ANZ ConvR 522; [1998] WASCA 75 .… 20.2 Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; 187 ALR 92; [2002] HCA 8 .… 5.1, 5.1, 5.7, 5.11, 5.17 Ernest Beck & Co v K Szymanowski & Co [1924] AC 43 .… 10.74 Eroc Pty Ltd v Amalg Resources NL [2003] QSC 74 .… 12.53 Errichetti Nominees Pty Ltd v Paterson Group Architects Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 77 .… 12.25 Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; [1952] 1 All ER 149 .… 3.71

Emanuele v Chamber of Commerce & Industry (SA) Inc (1994) ATPR (Dig) 46121 .… 11.147 EMCL Pty Ltd v ESANDA Finance Corp Ltd [1999] FCA 978 .… 20.1, 20.9, 21.18, 21.23 Emery v Spencer [1995] 1 Qd R 247 .… 21.24, 21.29 Emhill Pty Ltd v Bonsoc Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSCA 108 .… 11.56, 11.57, 21.26 Eminence Property Developments Ltd v Heaney [2010] EWCA Civ 1168 .… 21.12 Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 .… 3.1, 3.6, 3.27, 3.32, 3.44, 10.27, 10.61 Emu Brewery Mezzanine Ltd (in liq) v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] WASCA 105 .… 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24 Emu Gravel and Road Metal Co v Gibson (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 204 .… 23.39 Encino Plaza Pty Ltd v Wilson International Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 326 .… 3.11 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591 .… 5.10 Energex Ltd v Alstom Australia Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 504; [2005] FCAFC 215 .… 3.36, 11.115, 11.147 Energy Brix Australia Corp Pty Ltd v National Logistics Coordinators (Morwell) Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 113 .… 22.4 Energy World Corporation Ltd v Maurice Hayes and Associates Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 34 .… 10.35, 22.12 Engineering Pty Ltd v Chilco Enterprises Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 291 .… 21.37 England v Davidson (1840) 11 Ad & El 856; 113 ER 640 .… 4.31 English v Gibbs (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 455 .… 17.35 — v Plath [2003] QSC 222 .… 21.18, 21.24, 21.29, 22.9, 23.14 English Scottish Mercantile Investment Co Ltd v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700 .… 11.76 Ennis Paint Australia Holding Pty Ltd v Lei [2015] NSWSC 1933 .… 23.14 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327; [1955] 2 All ER 493 .… 3.26, 3.47 Environmental Systems Pty Ltd v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 358; 227 FLR 1; [2008] VSCA 26 .… 10.77, 11.118, 11.146, 11.147, 11.150, 23.39 Enzed Holdings Pty Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 450 .… 11.110 lix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Evalena Pty Ltd v Rising Sun Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 622 .… 26.9 Evans v Benson & Co [1961] WAR 13 .… 11.50, 11.51, 11.53 — v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 .… 2.5, 2.16 — v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2012) 289 ALR 237; [2012] FCAFC 81 .… 5.1, 5.7 Evans & Associates v Citibank Ltd [2003] NSWSC 204 .… 10.12 Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 .… 3.39, 3.67, 10.47 Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola [1973] 1 WLR 349 .… 24.4 Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (2009) 255 ALR 171; [2009] NSWCA 67 .… 24.5 Evening Standard Co Ltd v Henderson [1987] ICR 588 .… 24.25 Eves v Eves [1975] 3 All ER 768 .… 16.73 Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 381 .… 2.9, 24.1, 24.16 Excel Quarries Pty Ltd v Payne [1996] QCA 17 .… 20.6, 20.13 Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Scully (1998) 160 ALR 138 .… 17.72 Executor, Trustee & Agency Co of SA Ltd v Thompson (1919) 27 CLR 162 .… 25.8 Eximenco Handels AG v Partrederiet Oro Chief and Levantes Maritime Corp [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 .… 24.18 Expectation Pty Ltd v Pinnacle VRB Ltd [2001] WASC 144 .… 10.47 — v — [2002] WASCA 160 .… 20.16 — v — [2004] WASCA 261 .… 6.15 Express Airways v Port Augusta Air Services [1980] Qd R 543 .… 3.26 Exterior Home Improvements Pty Ltd v Stanger [1999] NSWSC 222 .… 23.27 Ezishop Net Ltd (in liq) v Veremu Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 156 .… 10.7, 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.13, 19.22

Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 188 CLR 241 .… 11.41, 11.88 — v Plessnig (1989) 166 CLR 131 .… 23.45 — v Tong (1997) 41 NSWLR 482 .… 15.28, 15.29 Esanda Ltd v Burgess [1984] 2 NSWLR 139 .… 5.11, 10.9 ESG Epping Pty Ltd v Love [2019] VSC 250 .… 21.23 Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175 .… 2.3, 7.46, 10.3, 12.8 Esplin v Murray [1998] NSWSC 338 .… 23.38 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 69 ALJR 404 .… 10.29, 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.56 — v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1; [1976] 1 All ER 117 .… 3.20, 5.13 — v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 26 .… 18.35 — v Mardon [1976] 1 QB 801 .… 11.15, 11.88, 11.89 Estate of Late Sir Donald Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (2010) 107 SASR 1; [2010] SASC 71 .… 25.7 Estate of Nitopi, Re (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 748 .… 15.10 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279 .… 8.6 ET Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84 .… 18.16, 18.21 Ethnic Earth Pty Ltd v Quoin Technology Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2006] SASC 7 .… 18.48 Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 .… 10.7, 20.1, 20.8 Ettridge v Vermin Board of the District of Murat Bay [1928] SASR 124 .… 21.38 Eunson v Beaulieu United Ltd [1999] FCA 1164 .… 23.19 Euphoric Pty Ltd v Ryledar Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 2 .… 12.35, 21.38 Eureka Operations Pty Ltd v Viva Energy Australia Ltd [2016] VSCA 95 .… 10.12 European Asian of Australia Ltd v Kurland (1985) 8 NSWLR 192 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.19, 15.8 European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 264 ALR 1; (2010) 240 CLR 432; [2010] HCA 6 .… 23.6, 23.39

F F & B Trading Co Pty Ltd v Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 209 .… 20.13 F & G Sykes (Wessex) Ltd v Fine Fare Ltd [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53 .… 6.6, 6.8 F & H Entertainments Ltd v Leisure Enterprises Ltd (1976) 120 Sol Jo 331; 240 EG 445 .… 11.93, 11.96 Fabcot Pty Ltd v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council [2010] NSWSC 726 .… 6.14 lx

Table of Cases



Farmers’ Executors Co-operative & Trustees Ltd v Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399 .… 14.4, 14.9 Farmers’ Mercantile Union and Chaff Mills Ltd v Coade (1921) 30 CLR 113 .… 3.6 Farnham v Orrell (1989) NSW ConvR 55443 .… 5.24, 15.27 Farrant v Leburn [1970] WAR 179 .… 21.38 Farrell v Bussell [1960] NSWR 398 .… 16.35, 24.8, 24.16 Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4 CP 744; [1861-73] All ER Rep 846 .… 8.55 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Edgar (1993) 114 ALR 1 .… 18.16, 18.19, 18.40 Fast Fix Loans Pty Ltd v Samardzic [2011] NSWCA 260 .… 15.26, 15.31 Faulks v Cameron (2004) 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61 .… 3.52 Fawcett v Smethurst (1914) 84 LJ (KB) 473 .… 17.40 — v Star Car Sales Ltd [1959] NZLR 952; [1960] NZLR 406 .… 12.60 Fawke v Holloway [1986] VR 411 .… 11.112 Fayad v B & G Properties Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 129 .… 10.30, 10.35 Fazari As Executrix of the Estate of Domenico Antonio Cosentino (Dec) v Cosentino [2010] WASC 40 .… 5.8 Fazio v Fazio [2012] WASCA 72 .… 22.9 FCT v Everett (1979) 143 CLR 440 .… 8.31 — v — (1980) 143 CLR 440 .… 8.3, 8.4, 8.9, 8.26, 8.28, 8.36 — v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500; 154 ALR 1; [1998] HCA 33 .… 4.24 — v Reliance Carpet Corp Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342 .… 21.9 — v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105 .… 23.32 — v Westgarth (1950) 81 CLR 396 .… 11.16 Federal Airports Corporation v Makucha Developments Pty Ltd (1993) 115 ALR 679 .… 21.35, 21.36 Federated Coal and Shipping Co v R [1922] 2 KB 42 .… 7.31 Federation Properties Pty Ltd v Tzioras [2001] VSC 125 .… 16.67 Fehlberg v Stanton [1960] ALR 299 .… 19.16, 23.20, 26.4 Feletti v Kontoulas [2000] NSWCA 59 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.37 Fell v NSW Oil and Shale Co (1889) 10 LR (NSW) Eq 255 .… 24.17, 24.30

— v — [2011] NSWCA 167 .… 11.115, 11.127 Fablo Pty Ltd v Bloore [1983] 1 Qd R 107 .… 16.54, 16.55 Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner [2022] FCAFC 9 .… 11.114 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (1997) 41 NSWLR 559 .… 11.45, 11.60 — v Parras (2002) 55 NSWLR 498; [2002] NSWCA 334 .… 3.46 — v RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 479 .… 11.122 FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Securities Ltd (1990) 3 ACSR 279 .… 10.14 — v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 343 .… 6.6, 10.16 Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346; 321 ALR 404; [2015] FCAFC 37 .… 3.6, 11.110 Fairway Trading Pty Ltd v Project Blue Moon Pty Ltd [1999] ACTSC 99 .… 19.15, 19.25 Falcone v Mentyn [2003] TASSC 79 .… 11.149 Falconer v Wilson [1973] 2 NSWLR 131 .… 21.19 Falko v James McEwan & Co Pty Ltd [1977] VR 447 .… 23.19, 23.43 Famestock Pty Ltd v The Body Corporate for No 9 Port Douglas Road [2013] QCA 354 .… 10.41, 10.42 Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos (1994) 115 FLR 443 .… 15.8 Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 .… 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.33, 21.34 Faraday v Rappaport [2007] NSWSC 34 .… 26.12 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22 .… 26.1 Faram v Kerr (1877) 3 VLR (L) 146 .… 10.28 Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732 .… 23.19 — v — (2006) 22 JCL 118 .… 23.19 Farmer v Honan and Dunne (1919) 26 CLR 183 .… 6.6, 10.16 Farmers’ Co-operative Executors & Trustees Ltd v Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399 .… 13.3, 14.10, 25.13

lxi



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Financings Ltd v Stimson [1962] 1 WLR 1184; [1962] 2 All ER 386 .… 5.23 Finch v Sayers [1976] 2 NSWLR 540 .… 19.18 Fincke v US (1982) 675 F 2d 289 .… 3.6 Findex Group Ltd v McKay [2020] FCAFC 182 .… 10.30, 18.35, 18.38 Findlay & Co Stockbrokers (Underwriters) Pty Ltd v Carminco Gold & Resources Ltd [2007] FCA 573 .… 26.4 Finesky Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport for Western Australia [2001] WASC 87 .… 20.4, 20.12 Finishing Services Pty Ltd v Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 177 .… 11.124 Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127 .… 23.12, 23.14, 23.19, 23.24 Finlayson v Carr [1978] 1 NSWLR 657 .… 5.10 — v Finlayson [2002] FCA 898 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.25 Finucane v New South Wales Egg Corp (1988) 80 ALR 486 .… 11.111 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951; [2007] UKHL 40 .… 11.60 Fiorelli Properties Pty Ltd v Professional Fencemakers Pty Ltd (2011) 34 VR 257; [2011] VSC 661 .… 21.36 Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Powell [1966] VR 513 .… 18.14 Firewatch Australia Pty Ltd v Country Fire Authority (1999) 93 FCR 520 .… 11.111 Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2015] 1 NZLR 432; [2014] NZSC 147 .… 10.12 Firmin v Gray & Co Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 160 .… 18.41 First City Corp v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710 .… 8.7 First Mortgage Managed Investments Pty Ltd v Pittman [2014] NSWCA 110 .… 11.56, 15.11, 15.12, 15.28, 15.29 — v — (No 3) [2014] NSWCA 361 .… 15.29 First National Reinsurance Co v Greenfield [1921] 2 KB 260; [1920] All ER Rep 777 .… 11.48, 11.49 Firstmac Fiduciary Services Pty Ltd v HSBC Bank of Australia Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1122 .… 11.150 Firth v Halloran (1926) 38 CLR 261 .… 19.13, 19.15, 19.25 Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 .… 3.20

Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2010] VSC 110 .… 10.43 Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CBNS 869; 142 ER 1037 .… 3.44, 16.50 Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 .… 18.34 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 .… 11.110, 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 Fenech v Sterling (1983) 51 ALR 205 .… 11.147 Fenn v Paul (1932) SR (NSW) 315 .… 13.5 Fensom v Cootamundra Racecourse Reserve Trust [2000] NSWSC 1072 .… 26.6, 26.8 Fenwick v Macdonald, Fraser & Co (1904) 6 F (Ct of Sess) 850 .… 3.24 Ferdinand Nemeth v Prynew Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1296 .… 11.136 Ferdinando, Re; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 42 FCR 243 .… 2.12, 15.9 Ferguson v Hullock [1955] VLR 202 .… 16.58 Ferguson, Re (1969) 14 FLR 311 .… 18.47 Ferraro v Smith (1991) NSW ConvR 55-581 .… 6.8 Ferris v Plaister (1994) 34 NSWLR 474 .… 10.31, 11.60 Fewstone Pty Ltd v Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 082 .… 21.18 Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235 .… 8.5 — v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285 .… 5.20 — v Shoalhaven Transport Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 96 .… 11.16 Field, Re [1968] 1 NSWR 210 .… 18.26 Fig Tree Developments Ltd v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd [2009] FCA 390 .… 21.24, 21.29 Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473 .… 3.70, 8.49, 22.5, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.28, 23.29 Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251 .… 3.11 Filmana Pty Ltd v Tynan [2013] QCA 256 .… 10.74 Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670 .… 24.22 Finagrain AS Geneva v P Kraus Hamburg [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 508 .… 2.5 Financial Integrity Group Ltd v Scott Farmer & Bravium Pty Ltd [2009] ACTSC 143 .… 24.29

lxii

Table of Cases — v Bennett (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 399 .… 24.8 — v Degnan [2022] NSWCA 202 …. 10.32 Fisher & Co v Apollinaris Co (1875) 10 Ch App 297 .… 13.6 Fishlock v The Campaign Palace Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 531 .… 21.12 Fitch v Snedaker (1886) 38 NY 248 .… 3.40 — v Sutton (1804) 5 East 230; 102 ER 1058 .… 4.40 Fitzgerald v Dressler (1859) 7 CB (NS) 374; 141 ER 861 .… 16.18 — v FJ Leonhardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215 .… 10.41, 18.4, 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.14, 18.16, 18.18, 18.19, 18.20, 18.22, 18.23, 18.24, 18.40, 18.43, 18.46 — v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420; [1956] HCA 53 .… 1.38, 6.17, 10.27, 10.35, 22.7, 22.9, 24.8, 24.10, 25.13, 25.14 — v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268 .… 23.35 Fitzpatrick v Michel (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 285 .… 11.16 Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] FCA 1628 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.32 FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 .… 2.5 FJ Richards Pty Ltd v Mills Pty Ltd 1995) 1 Qd R 1 .… 16.55 Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Polly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500 .… 23.19 Fleeton v Fitzgerald [1998] NSWSC 696 .… 23.38 Fleming Bros (Monaro Agencies) Pty Ltd v Smith (1983) ATPR 40–389 .… 18.38 Flemington Properties Pty Ltd v Raine & Horne Commercial Pty Ltd (1997) 148 ALR 271 .… 11.83 Fletcher v Berriman [2001] NSWSC 457 .… 23.19 — v Manton (1940) 64 CLR 37 .… 19.25 — v Minister for the Environment (1999) 73 SASR 474; [1999] SASC 223 .… 3.29 — v St George Bank Ltd [2010] WASC 75 .… 25.12 Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1983] 3 VR 812 .… 10.30, 24.23 Flett v Deniliquin Publishing Co Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 383 .… 26.6 Flight v Bolland (1828) 4 Russ 298; 38 ER 817; [1824–34] All ER Rep 372 .… 17.34 — v Reed (1863) 1 H & C 703; 158 ER 1067 .… 27.14



Flight Centre Ltd v Louw (2010–11) 78 NSWLR 656; [2011] NSWSC 132 .… 23.19 Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109 .… 2.5, 16.70 Flint v Brandon (1803) 8 Ves 159; 32 ER 314 .… 24.4 Flourentzou v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90083 .… 14.17 Flower v London and North Western Railway Co [1894] 2 QB 65; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1459 .… 17.13 — v Sadler (1882) 10 QBD 572 .… 13.5 FMG Pilbara Pty Ltd v Cox (2009) 175 FCR 141; 255 ALR 229; [2009] FCAFC 49 .… 6.15 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605; [1881–5] All ER Rep 106 .… 4.38 Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 KB 1 .… 6.3, 6.6, 6.8 Folley v Marafioti (No 2) (1972) 9 SASR 9 .… 24.1 Fong v Cilli (1968) 11 FLR 495 .… 3.73 Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385; 88 ALR 413 .… 2.6, 2.31, 4.4, 9.2, 9.10, 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 21.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.23, 21.24, 21.26, 21.27, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 23.2, 23.9, 23.21, 23.34, 24.10, 26.2, 26.4 Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 .… 2.2, 2.11, 3.8, 3.71, 10.31, 11.107, 11.111 — v NSW Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242 .… 18.37 Forbes Engineering (Asia) PTE Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 .… 4.22 Ford v Bartley (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 281 .… 18.3 — v Comber (1890) 16 VLR 540 .… 16.23 — v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455 .… 3.46, 3.70 — v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 42; [2009] NSWCA 186 .… 15.26, 15.27, 15.31, 18.46, 26.3 — v Young (1882) 8 VLR (E) 93 .… 16.35 Ford by his Tutor Watkinson v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 42; 257 ALR 658; [2009] NSWCA 186 .… 12.64, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70, 17.53 Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 1 WLR 339; [1969] 2 All ER 481 .… 5.26 Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd v Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd (2003) 134

lxiii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

FCR 522; [2003] FCAFC 313 .… 10.42, 10.57, 10.59, 11.127, 13.7, 15.2, 18.10, 18.19, 18.20 Forestry Commission of NSW v Stefanetto (1976) 133 CLR 507 .… 23.45 Forklift Engineering Australia Pty Ltd v Powerlift (Nissan) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 443 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 21.21, 21.33, 21.34 Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 291 ALR 399; [2012] HCA 39 .… 11.76, 11.116 Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 291 ALR 399; [2012] HCA 39 .… 6.8 Foster v Genowlan Shale Co (1895) 16 LR (NSW) Eq 59 .… 7.46 — v Hall [2012] NSWCA 122 .… 6.8, 10.52 — v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704; [1861–73] All ER Rep 1913 .… 12.67 — v Wheeler (1887) 36 Ch D 695 .… 28.3 Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 83 .… 18.33 Fothergill v Rowland (1873) LR 17 Eq 132 .… 24.26 Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438 .… 23.43 Fox Entertainment Precinct Pty Ltd v Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust [2004] NSWSC 214 .… 12.50, 12.53 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 433 .… 3.11, 22.2, 22.5 FPM Constructions v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340 .… 21.24 Fragomeni v Fogliani (1968) 42 ALJR 263 .… 12.55, 24.7, 24.8 Fragoulis v Mountzouris (1973) 6 SASR 456 .… 20.8 Francis v Francis [1952] VLR 321 .… 16.61, 16.63 — v Lyon (1907) 4 CLR 1023 .… 23.26 — v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 343 .… 18.7, 18.39 — v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [2002] FCA 1306 .… 10.43, 21.10, 23.44, 26.9 Francis May Pty Ltd v Tikitere Pty Ltd (NSWSC, Miles J, 2 April 1982, unreported) .… 23.44, 26.9 Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160; 131 FLR 422 .… 11.114, 11.150, 11.153

Franckombe v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 21.18 Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459 .… 11.111, 11.115 Frank Davies Pty Ltd v Container Haulage Group Pty Ltd (1989) 98 FLR 289 .… 10.74 Frankcombe v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 26.4 Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 76; 264 ALR 14; [2009] NSWCA 40 .… 6.5, 6.6 Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2007] NSWSC 242 .… 10.3 — v — (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 406; [2009] NSWCA 407 .… 2.18, 3.11, 10.3, 10.7, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 12.7, 12.27, 12.30, 12.32, 12.34, 12.35, 12.36, 12.41 Franknelly Nominees Pty Ltd v Abrugiato [2013] WASCA 285 .… 12.33 Frankome v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 21.26 Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 127 ALR 543 .… 11.115, 11.122 — v Vic Railways Commissioners (1909) 8 CLR 54 .… 11.1 Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd v Can-Dive Services Ltd [1999] 3 SCR 108 .… 7.40 Fredensen v Rothschild [1941] 1 All ER 430 .… 12.37 Frederick E Rose (London) Ltd v William H Pim Jnr & Co Ltd [1953] 2 QB 450; [1953] 2 All ER 739 .… 12.19, 12.20, 12.30, 12.33 Freedom v AHR Constructions Pty Ltd [1987] 1 Qd R 59 .… 18.22, 18.28, 26.4 Freedom Homes Pty Ltd v Botros [2000] 2 Qd R 377; [1999] QCA 150 .… 16.55, 18.10, 18.12, 21.12, 21.24 Freemantles Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett [1999] VSC 129 .… 23.43 Freshmark Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 390 .… 21.28, 21.31 Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2001) 111 FCR 322; [2001] FCA 907 .… 7.43 Friedeberg-Seeley v Klass (1957) 101 Sol Jo 275 .… 13.3 Friedlander v Bank of Australasia (1909) 8 CLR 85 .… 21.17, 21.18 Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129; [2009] HCA 21; (2009) 255 ALR 601 .… 26.1

lxiv

Table of Cases



Gaffney v Ryan [1995] 1 Qd R 19 .… 18.10 Gagner Pty Ltd t/a Indochine Cafe v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd (2009) 262 ALR 691; [2009] NSWCA 413 .… 23.25 Gair v Smith [1964] 814 .… 21.24 Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243 .… 18.44 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.29, 21.30 Galaxidis v CBFC Leasing [2005] NSWCA 347 .… 3.21 — v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 .… 2.5, 16.70 Galaxy Media Pty Ltd, Re (2001) 167 FLR 149; [2001] NSWSC 917 .… 6.5, 6.6 Gall v Mitchell (1924) 35 CLR 222 .… 24.7, 24.8 Gallagher v Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 159 .… 22.12 — v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 .… 8.53 Gallic Pty Ltd v Cynayne Pty Ltd (1986) 83 FLR 31 .… 23.23 Gallie v Lee [1969] 2 Ch 17 .… 12.63, 12.67, 12.68, 12.70 Gallo v Gallo [1967] VR 190 .… 12.46 Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531 .… 12.12 Gander v Murray (1907) 5 CLR 575 .… 24.7 Gandy v Gandy (1885) 30 Ch D 57 .… 7.44, 7.45, 7.46 Gange v Sullivan (1966) 116 CLR 418 .… 5.25, 20.6, 20.8, 20.13, 22.9 Garbett v Midland Brick Company Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 36 .… 10.52 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395; 155 ALR 614; [1998] HCA 48 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.20, 28.29 Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd (1988) 82 ALR 415; 10 ATPR 40-884 .… 11.121 Garden City Transport v National Manufactured Product No 2 Ltd (1995) 65 SASR 109 .… 10.72, 10.73 Garden State Packers v Lancken [2000] NSWSC 139 .… 23.14 Gardiner v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 235 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.33, 10.62, 10.66, 19.2 — v Grigg (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 524 .… 10.23 — v Orchard (1910) 10 CLR 722 .… 20.7, 20.18

Frith v Gold Coast Mineral Springs Pty Ltd (1983) 47 ALR 547; 65 FLR 213 .… 11.128, 11.146 Fry v Daly [1988] VR 19 .… 11.25 — v Smellie [1912] 3 KB 282 .… 12.56 Fry, Re; Chase National Executors and Trustees Corp v Fry [1946] Ch 312; [1946] 2 All ER 106 .… 8.38 Fu Tian Fortune Pty Ltd v Park Cho Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 282 .… 7.29, 8.47, 8.49, 22.5 Fubilan Catering Services Ltd v Compass Group (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1205 .… 11.117 Fuji Xerox Finance Ltd v CSG Ltd [2012] NSWSC 890 .… 10.12 Fulham Partners LLC v National Australia Bank Ltd [2013] NSWCA 296 .… 8.8 Fuller v Albert (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 183 .… 24.1 Fuller’s Theatres Ltd v Musgrove (1923) 31 CLR 524 .… 12.44, 21.21, 24.7, 24.9 Fullerton Nominees Pty Ltd v Darmagio [2000] WASCA 4 .… 18.21, 18.25, 18.41, 18.47 Fully Profit (Asia) Ltd v Secretary for Justice [2013] HKCFA 40; (2013) 6 HKC 374 .… 10.12 Fulton Hogan Constructions Pty Ltd v Grenadier Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 358 .… 23.32 Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 .… 3.24, 10.6, 11.117, 11.118, 16.21, 16.42, 24.1 Futuris Corp Ltd v ERG Ltd [2001] FCA 1126 .… 10.34 Futuris Industrial Products Pty Ltd v Arrow Industries Pty Ltd (FC, Wilcox J, 22 June 1993, unreported) .… 10.61 Fysh v Page (1956) 96 CLR 233 .… 14.14 G G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 407 .… 24.23 G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 .… 5.19, 5.24 — v — (1987) NSW ConvR 55-324 .… 3.11 G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v H C & J G Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 5.2, 6.5 — v — (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721 .… 11.150 GA Nominees Pty Ltd v Barden Motors Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-519 .… 11.114 lxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Gardner v Commissioner of Probate Duties [1967] WAR 106 .… 8.38 — v Coutts & Co [1967] 3 All ER 1064 .… 7.28 — v Smith [2001] WASCA 116 .… 26.6, 26.7, 26.13 Gardner Corp Pty Ltd v Zedbears Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 13 .… 11.129 Garms v Birnzwejg [1990] 2 Qd R 336 .… 18.7 Garnaut v Rowse (1941) 43 WALR 29 .… 11.9 Garnock v Black [2006] NSWCA 140 .… 21.36 Garrard v Frankel (1862) 30 Beav 445; 54 ER 961 .… 12.54 Garraway Metals Pty Ltd v Comalco Aluminium Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 118 .… 23.17, 23.39 Garrett v L’Estrange (1911) 13 CLR 430 .… 16.64 Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 903 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 15.16, 21.34, 21.37, 22.12 Gary Sydney Green v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1164 .… 11.115 Gasiunas v Meinhold [1965] ALR 121 .… 24.16 Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 149 .… 5.17, 7.3, 11.118 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1 .… 10.2, 10.6, 10.7, 10.21, 10.24, 11.146, 23.6, 23.7, 23.8, 23.9, 23.14, 23.22 — v — (1982) 68 FLR 74; 43 ALR 313 .… 11.146 Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd SA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357 .… 21.10 Gavalas v Singh [2001] 3 VR 404 .… 23.14 GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 .… 2.29, 3.8, 3.27, 22.6 GBAR (Australia) Pty Lyd v Brown [2016] QSC 234 .… 18.37 GC Dickson & Yourston (Builders) Pty Ltd v Hattam [1935] VLR 168 .… 18.3 GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 .… 3.11, 22.9 GE Capital Asset Services & Trading Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v Rocks Excavations & Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 99 .… 24.17 GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003)

128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50; (2003) 201 ALR 55 .… 2.29, 10.3, 10.7, 10.16, 10.27, 10.32, 10.33, 10.43, 10.49, 10.51, 10.55, 11.109, 20.20, 21.12, 21.24, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31, 21.38, 22.3, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 22.12, 23.11, 23.13, 26.6, 26.7, 26.13, 28.21 Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd v Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA .… 10.32 Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 14,551; Aust Contract Rep 90-059 .… 3.11, 3.27, 5.24, 6.6 Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v Gibbs, Bright & Co (1970) 122 CLR 504 .… 27.1 Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36 .… 2.20, 3.11, 16.60 GEJ & MA Geldard Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 2) [2011] QSC 33 .… 11.136 Gelling v Crespin (1917) 23 CLR 443 .… 19.13, 19.16 Gem Meat Production Pty Ltd (in liq); Re, Ex parte Lindquist [1960] WAR 105 .… 4.19 General Credits Ltd v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162 .… 12.50 — v Wenham (1989) 18 NSWLR 570 .… 25.8 General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v RACQ Insurance Ltd (2003) 12 ANZ Ins Cas 61-574; [2003] QSC 080 .… 7.10 Gentry Brothers Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-460 .… 11.84, 11.145 Geo Thompson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Vittadello [1978] VR 199; (1977) 33 FLR 465 .… 8.3, 8.28 George v Cluning (1979) 28 ALR 57 .… 9.8, 10.32 — v Greater Adelaide Land Development Co Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 91 .… 18.4, 18.7, 18.40, 18.47, 20.4 — v Roach (1942) 67 CLR 253 .… 6.11, 20.4 — v Webb [2011] NSWSC 1608 .… 11.135 George 218 Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 182 .… 10.3, 10.32 George Hudson Holdings Ltd v Rudder (1973) 128 CLR 387 .… 3.46 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock [1983] 2 AC 803 .… 10.62

lxvi

Table of Cases — v — [1983] QB 284 .… 28.17 George T Collings (Aust) Pty Ltd v HF Stevenson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41104 .… 10.26, 10.64, 15.8 Georges France Photography Pty Ltd v M & T Zimmermann Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 220 .… 21.24 Georgeson v Geach (1877) 3 VLR (L) 144 .… 16.25 Georgoulis v Mandelinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 .… 3.60 Gerace v Auzhair Supplies Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 435; 310 ALR 85; [2014] NSWCA 181 .… 25.13, 25.14 Geraghty v Minter (1979) 142 CLR 177 .… 18.35, 18.37 Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1992) 11 WAR 40 .… 21.26, 23.23 Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187 .… 8.6 Gerrard v Slamar [2004] WASCA 253 .… 10.53, 23.13, 23.24 Gerraty v McGavin (1914) 18 CLR 152 .… 18.2, 18.40, 19.15 Getreide-Import-GesellschaftmbH v Contimar SA Compania Industrial Comercial y Maritima [1953] 1 WLR 207 .… 3.60 GetUp Ltd v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 189 FCR 165; 268 ALR 797; [2010] FCA 869 .… 3.53 Giacci v Giacci Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 233 .… 25.8 Giancaspro v SHRM (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] SASC 340 .… 19.18 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 81 ALR 92 .… 11.112 Giasoumi v Hutton [1977] VR 294 .… 16.37, 16.38 Gibb v Sell [1922] VLR 561 .… 16.31 Gibbons v Pozzan [2007] SASC 99 .… 23.45 — v Proctor (1891) 64 LT 594 .… 3.40 — v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423 .… 17.53, 17.55 Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 277 .… 10.16 Gibson v Manchester CC [1978] 1 WLR 520 .… 3.6 Gibson Motor Sport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes [2005] FCA 749 .… 10.56 — v Robert James Forbes [2005] FCA 749 .… 22.3, 22.12 Gilbert v Healey Investments Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 650 .… 20.8



Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 122 .… 3.46, 3.69 Gilbert Stokes & Kerr Pty Ltd v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 435 .… 7.37, 7.40 Gilchrist v ATS Amusements Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 558 .… 11.118 Gilchrist Watt & Sanderson Pty Ltd v York Products Pty Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 825 .… 7.42 Giles v Rooney (1996) 23 MVR 510 .… 17.53 — v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 .… 18.33 Giliberto v Kenny (1983) 48 ALR 620; 57 ALJR 283 .… 10.12, 10.27, 20.4 Gillespie v Commonwealth (1991) 104 ACTR 1 .… 23.39 — v Whiteoak [1989] 1 Qd R 284 .… 24.13, 24.21 Gillespie Brothers & Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] QB 400 .… 10.64 Gilligan’s Backpackers Hotel & Resort Pty Ltd v Mad Dogs Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 304 .… 21.12, 21.26, 23.2 Ginger Development Enterprises Pty Ltd v Crown Development Developments Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 295 .… 10.32 Gino D’Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v Powis [1987] 2 Qd R 40 .… 16.55 GIO General Ltd v Allen [2002] NSWCA 333 .… 3.64 Gipps v Gipps [1978] 1 NSWLR 454 .… 11.35 Gippsreal Ltd v Registrar of Titles & Kurek Investments Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 157; [2007] VSCA 279 .… 4.17 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; [1971] AC 905 .… 16.73, 16.74 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 .… 2.6, 2.9, 16.69, 16.70, 16.72 Given v Pryor (1979) 39 FLR 437 .… 11.119 Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 .… 1.24, 3.11, 3.27, 3.28 GL Nederland (Asia) Pty Ltd v Expertise Events Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 62 .… 10.73, 10.74, 10.77 Gladstone v Ball (1862) 1 W & W (E) 277 .… 16.40 Gladstone Ports Corporation Ltd v Murphy Operator Pty Ltd (2020) 6 QR 497; [2020] QCA 250 .… 18.16, 18.33

lxvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council [1925] AC 270; [1924] All ER Rep 579 .… 4.31 Glasscock v Balls (1889) 24 QBD 13 .… 7.23 Glavanics v Brunninghausen (1996) 14 ACLC 345 .… 11.88 Glebe Island Terminals Pty Ltd v Continental Seagram Pty Ltd (1993) 40 NSWLR 206 .… 10.66, 10.73, 10.76 Gleeson v Gleeson [2002] NSWSC 418 .… 26.12 Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 .… 8.7 Glen King Marine & Trading Services v Owners of the Ship ‘Armada Ternak’ (FCA, Spender J, 16 June 1998, unreported) .… 19.23, 23.24, 23.26 Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd v Aurizon Network Pty Ltd (2020) 5 QR 392 .… 10.43 Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (No 2) (2000) 79 SASR 185 .… 10.75, 10.77, 18.21, 23.13, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.25, 23.27, 23.29 — v — (No 3) (2001) 79 SASR 288 .… 23.25 Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 323 .… 7.3, 7.9 Global Network v Legion Telecall [1999] NSWSC 1090 .… 22.3, 22.6, 22.9 Global Network Services Pty Ltd v Legion Telecall Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 279 .… 10.35, 23.15 Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82; 55 ALR 25 .… 11.113, 11.116 Globe Church Incorporated v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2019] NSWCA 27 .… 25.4 Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396 .… 22.4 Glorie v WA Chip and Pulp Co Pty Ltd (1981) 55 FLR 310 .… 11.112 Glover v Roche [2003] ACTSC 19 .… 18.23 GMA Garnet v Barton International Inc [2010] FCAFC 38 .… 10.13 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414; 320 ALR 489; [2015] HCA 23 .… 18.9, 18.10 Gobblers Inc Pty Ltd v Stevens (1993) 6 BPR 13,591 .… 2.13 GoConnect Ltd v Sino Strategic International Ltd (in liq) [2016] VSCA 315 .… 4.17, 6.7

Goddard v O’Brien (1882) 9 QBD 37 .… 4.37 Goddard, Ex parte; Falvey, Re (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 289 .… 17.68, 17.73 Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 629 .… 5.24, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.11, 10.27 Godfrey Constructions Pty Ltd v Kanangra Park Pty Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 529 .… 20.7, 20.18, 23.6 Godfrey Spowers (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 84; [2008] VSCA 208 .… 11.139 Goggin v Majet [2016] 2 Qd R 401 .… 21.12 Goile, Re; Ex parte Steelbuild Agencies Ltd [1963] NZLR 666 .… 2.16 Gokora Pty Ltd v Montgomery Jordan and Stevenson Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-722 .… 11.110 Gold Coast Oil Co Pty Ltd v Lee Properties Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 416 .… 21.20 Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v Kovan Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2006) 225 ALR 57; [2005] FCA 1521 .… 3.11, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56 Goldburg v Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711 .… 6.6, 23.11, 23.22, 23.41 Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 224 .… 16.21 Golden Sands Pty Ltd v Excel Quarries Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 276 .… 11.115 Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] 3 AC 363; [2007] UKHL 12 .… 23.25 Golden West Refining Corp Ltd v Daly Laboratories Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-378 .… 11.115 Goldmaster Homes Pty Ltd v Johnson [2004] NSWCA 144 .… 3.67 Goldsbro v Walker [1993] 1 NZLR 394 .… 11.121 Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Black (1926) 29 WALR 37 .… 18.32 — v Carter (1914) 19 CLR 429 .… 12.12 — v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 .… 3.64, 3.68, 3.71, 12.4, 12.8, 12.45, 12.55, 12.70, 24.7, 24.8, 24.30, 28.17 Goldsmith v Rodger [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249 Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2001] NSWCA 246 .… 6.11

lxviii

Table of Cases Goldsworthy v Brickell (1987) Ch 378 .… 14.6, 14.10 Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18 .… 18.14, 18.45 Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435 .… 2.4 — v Karenlee Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 153 CLR 455 .… 22.6 Golski v Kirk (1987) 72 ALR 443 .… 25.12 Gonzalez v Agoda Co Pte Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1133 .… 3.7 Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) .… 23.14 Good Living Company Pty Ltd as trustee for the Warren Duncan Trust No 3 v Kingsmede Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 33 .… 15.16 Goode v Harrison (1821) 5 B & Ald 147; 106 ER 1147 .… 17.17, 17.20 Goodfellow v Life Assurance Co of Australia Ltd [1920] VLR 296 .… 10.12 Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550 .… 3.26 Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704 .… 3.32, 10.31, 10.54, 10.77 Goodridge v Macquarie Bank Ltd [2010] FCA 67; [2010] FCA 76 .… 15.13, 23.43 Goodwin v Francis (1870) LR 5 CP 295 .… 16.37 — v Goodwin (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 503 .… 7.46 — v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1968) 117 CLR 173 .… 15.5 — v Robarts (1876) 1 App Cas 476 .… 8.44 — v Vietnam Veterans Motor Cycle Club Australia NSW Chapter Inc (2008) 72 NSWLR 224; [2008] NSWSC 154 .… 5.10 Goodwin’s of Newtown Pty Ltd v Gurry [1959] SASR 295 .… 3.20 Google Inc v ACCC (2013) 249 CLR 435; 294 ALR 404; [2013] HCA 1 .… 11.113, 11.121 Gooley v NSW Rural Assistance Authority 2020] NSWCA 156 .… 15.31 Gorczynski v W & FT Osmo Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 62; 241 FLR 242; [2010] NSWCA 163 .… 7.22 Gordon v Australian & New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 512 .… 20.18 — v Gordon (1821) 3 Swan 400; 36 ER 910 .… 11.28 — v MacGregor (1909) 8 CLR 316 .… 10.5, 16.36



— v Murphy (1867) 4 WW & A’B (E) 120 .… 16.20 Gordon & Gotch Australia Pty Ltd v Horwitz Publications Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 257 .… 10.40 Gore v Montague Mining Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1214 .… 23.16, 23.35 — v Van der Lann [1967] 2 QB 31 .… 4.14 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 .… 26.4 Gough & Gilmour Holdings Pty Ltd v Caterpillar of Australia Ltd (No 11) [2002] NSWIR Comm 354 .… 28.21 Gough Bay Holdings Pty Ltd v TyrwhittDrake [1976] VR 195 .… 20.13 Gould v Gould [1969] 3 WLR 490; [1969] 3 All ER 728 .… 5.2 — v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 58 ALJR 560 .… 11.9, 11.32, 11.37, 11.39, 11.40, 11.41, 11.83, 11.85, 11.86, 11.122, 11.124 — v — (1985) 157 CLR 215 .… 23.8, 23.37 Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 .… 2.29, 10.41, 23.6 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Atkinson-Leighton Joint Venture (1981) 146 CLR 206 .… 10.55 — v K A Reed Services Pty Ltd [1988] VR 829 .… 8.53 Government of Japan v Global Air Leasing Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 221 .… 18.21, 18.23, 18.24, 18.25, 21.29, 26.4 Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 .… 4.15 Govorko v Vicelic (1971) 2 BPR 9477 .… 16.24 Gowan v Hardy (unreported, 1991) .… 15.28 Gozzard v McKell (1931) 32 SR (NSW) 39 .… 18.3 GP Transport (SA) Pty Ltd v Cavill Power Products Pty Ltd [2009] SADC 77 .… 25.12 GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 23; 191 ALR 342; [2001] FCA 1761 .… 15.13 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) ANZ ConvR 367 .… 6.9, 6.11 — v — (No 4) (1990) 9 BPR 17,461 .… 12.35 GPT RE Ltd v Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1964 .… 20.3, 20.4

lxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Great City Pty Ltd v Kemayan Management Services (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 44; [1999] WASC 70 .… 16.55, 18.49 Great Fingall Consolidated Ltd v Sheehan (1905) 3 CLR 177 .… 18.9, 18.34 Great Northern Developments Pty Ltd v Lane [2021] NSWCA 150 .… 10.32, 26.3, 26.4 Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 .… 3.38, 3.45 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2003] QB 679; [2002] 4 All ER 689; [2002] 3 WLR 1617 .… 12.3, 12.21, 12.25 Great Union Pty Ltd v Sportsgirl Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 299 .… 10.30 Greco v Bendigo Machinery Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-521 .… 11.121, 11.146 Greek Macedonian Club Ltd v Pan Macedonian Greek Brotherhood NSW Ltd [2007] NSWSC 92 .… 16.69 Green v AMP Life Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Ins Cas 90-124; [2005] NSWSC 370 .… 7.3 — v CGU Insurance Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 612; [2005] NSWSC 254 .… 7.2 — v Ford (1985) 7 ATPR 40-603 .… 11.107 — v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343 .… 16.74, 16.75 — v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226; [1959] 2 All ER 525 .… 7.5, 7.44, 7.45 — v Sommerville (1979) 141 CLR 594 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.24, 21.29, 24.9, 24.10 Green Growth No 2 Ltd v Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust [2019] 1 NZLR 161; [2018] NZSC 75 .… 10.30 Greentown Bellambi Pty Ltd v Wong [2017] NSWSC 872 .… 14.18, 15.10 Greenwood v Greenwood (1863) 2 De G J & Sm 28; 46 ER 285 .… 11.28 Greetings Oxford Koala Hotel Pty Ltd v Oxford Square Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 33 .… 24.13, 24.14, 24.21 Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Pty Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328 .… 11.124, 11.147, 15.13, 15.18 Gregory v Beecraft (1998) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-401 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.32 — v MAB Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 1 .… 5.23, 5.25, 6.6, 10.41, 20.3, 20.4, 20.16 — v Philip Morris Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 79 .… 5.26 — v — (1988) 80 ALR 455 .… 5.20, 24.12, 24.13, 24.28

GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 .… 20.9, 21.19 GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 .… 5.24 GR Securities with Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181 .… 5.24 Grace v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [1998] QSC 27 .… 2.18, 10.3 Graham v Freer (1980) 35 SASR 424 .… 11.67 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2000) 102 FCR 307 .… 7.30 Graham Evans Pty Ltd v Stencraft Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1670 .… 5.24 Graham H Roberts Pty Ltd v Maurbeth Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 93 .… 24.14, 24.19, 24.25 Grainger v Vindin (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 32 .… 3.29 — v Williams [2009] WASCA 60 .… 11.122 Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 .… 3.19 Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Ltd [1992] 2 WLR 867 .… 11.98 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 .… 16.73, 16.74 — v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112; 91 CLR 123 .… 4.24, 4.28, 10.2, 10.13, 10.32, 10.62 Grantwell Pty Ltd v Franks (1993) 61 SASR 390 .… 11.116 Gray v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1914) 19 CLR 356 (HC); (1919) 26 CLR 249 .… 16.22 — v Ellis [1925] St R Qd 209 .… 16.48 — v Lang (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 7 .… 22.5, 22.6 — v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 .… 23.2 — v Pastorelli [1987] WAR 174 .… 18.25, 18.28 — v Pearson (1877) 3 VLR (L) 81 .… 4.41, 16.13 — v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; 276 ALR 267; [2011] FCAFC 40 .… 11.146 Graziano v Graziano [2010] SASCFC 76 .… 6.8, 6.11 Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306 .… 16.69 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1998) 196 CLR 161 .… 10.27 lxx

Table of Cases — v Rangitikei District Council [1995] 2 NZLR 208 .… 3.39 Gregory and Parker v Williams (1817) 3 Mer 582; 36 ER 224 .… 7.46, 7.47, 7.48 Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131 .… 3.69 Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 .… 8.17, 8.23, 8.34 — v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1; [1959] 3 All ER 603; [1959] 3 WLR 759 .… 8.21 Grieve v Enge [2006] QCA 213; [2006] QSC 37 .… 10.41, 10.60, 20.16, 21.26, 21.27, 24.1, 24.4 Griffith v Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434 .… 12.1 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; 213 ALR 724; [2005] HCA 7 .… 5.1 Griffiths v Knight [1960] SR (NSW) 353 .… 4.10, 4.27 Griggs v Noris Group of Companies [2006] SASC 23 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.60 Grime v Bartholomew [1972] 2 NSWLR 827 .… 6.18, 16.45 Grist v Bailey [1967] Ch 532; [1966] 2 All ER 875 .… 11.13, 12.8, 12.18, 12.25, 12.27, 12.29, 12.54 Grizonic v Suttor [2011] NSWSC 471 .… 16.35 Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd v APN DF2 Project 2 Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 190 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.59 Grogan v ‘The Astor’ Ltd (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 409 .… 11.64 Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] Ch 445; [1969] 3 All ER 1476 .… 11.31 Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1995) 129 ALR 372 .… 23.32 Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v Modern Touch Marble & Granite Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 290 .… 21.27 Grubb v Toomey (2003) 12 Tas R 205; [2003] TASSC 131 .… 10.41, 24.1 Grummitt v Natalisio [1968] VR 156; 42 ALJ 118 .… 16.21, 16.37, 16.41, 16.61 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641; [1937] HCA 58 .… 2.3, 2.15, 2.16, 10.3, 11.9, 12.37, 21.31, 21.32 GSA Group Pty Ltd v Siebe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573 .… 10.42, 10.43 Guan v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 99 .… 23.45



Guardian Assurance Co Ltd v Condogianis (1919) 26 CLR 231 .… 11.24 Guest v Watson (1891) 17 VLR 497 .… 16.58 Guilford Municipality v Traylen (1908) 10 WALR 32 .… 17.71 Gulf Air Company GSC v Fattouh (2008) 251 ALR 183; [2008] NSWCA 225 .… 3.4 Gull v Saunders (1913) 17 CLR 82 .… 23.39 Gullett v Gardner (1948) 22 ALJ 151 .… 10.15 Gumland v Duffy [2006] NSWSC 10 .… 21.24 Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 237; 244 ALR 1; [2008] HCA 10 .… 8.6, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 23.23 Gummon v Barter (1899) 1 WALR 58 .… 16.59 Gunn v Meiners [2022] WASCA 95 .… 14.2, 14.5, 15.9 Gunston v Lawley (2008) 20 VR 33; [2008] VSC 97 .… 11.139 Gurdag v B S Stillwell Ford Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 526 .… 11.146 Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 .… 10.9 Gurney v Gurney (No 2) [1967] NZLR 922 .… 24.1, 24.7, 24.9, 24.10 Gurr & Gurr v Forbes (1996) 80 ATPR 41491 .… 11.121 Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 735 (NZSC) .… 15.9 Gustavson v Haviland [1919] 1 Ch 38 .… 8.31 Gustin v Taajamba Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-433 .… 21.19 Guthrie v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-463 .… 15.8 Gutnick v Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd [2016] VSCA 5 .… 11.45, 11.54 GW Sinclair & Co Pty Ltd v Cocks [2001] VSCA 47 .… 10.53, 23.6, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.43 Gwam Investments Pty Ltd v Outback Health Screenings Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 37 .… 10.55, 23.43 H H & H Security Pty Ltd v Toliopoulos (FCA, Madgwick J, 18 August 1997, unreported) .… 19.18 lxxi



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H Lundbeck A/S v Sandoz Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 4 .… 10.1, 10.12, 10.32, 10.40, 10.55 H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 .… 23.39 H W Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 .… 11.122 Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 .… 18.33 Haas Timber and Trading Co Pty Ltd v Wade (1954) 94 CLR 593 .… 11.35 Hacker v Australian Property and Finance Co Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 376 .… 21.12 Haddin v Le Feuvre [1969] 2 NSWR 32 .… 18.43 Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [1999] FCA 1798 .… 10.59 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145; [1843–60] All ER Rep 461 .… 1.138, 23.39, 27.24 Hadoplane Pty Ltd v Edward Rushton Pty Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 156 .… 23.13 Hagerty v Hills Central Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 200 .… 3.46 Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60 .… 23.2 Halfpenny v Ballet (1699) 2 Vern 373; 23 ER 836 .… 16.58 Halkidis v Bugeia [1974] 1 NSWLR 423 .… 21.19 Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206 .… 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 6.11, 18.35, 27.19 — v Loder (1885) 7 NSWLR (Eq) 44 .… 17.18, 17.21 — v Queensland Truck Centre Pty Ltd [1970] Qd R 231 .… 10.77 — v Sawkins [2000] NSWSC 441 .… 10.26 — v Wells [1962] Tas SR 122 .… 12.3, 12.56, 17.37 Haller v Ayre [2005] 2 Qd R 410; [2005] QCA 224 .… 25.3, 25.8, 26.12 Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 637 .… 18.33 Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 224 ALR 79; [2006] HCA 3 .… 8.21, 16.21, 21.36 Halpern v Halpern (No 2) [2008] QB 195; [2007] EWCA Civ 291 .… 13.11 Halstead, Re; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 31 FCR 337 .… 14.13 Hamblin v Marjoram (1878) 12 SALR 62 .… 16.61

Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371; 98 ER 1136 .… 8.55 Hambly-Clark v Forsaith [1953] SASR 270 .… 16.35, 16.45 Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256 .… 4.18 Hamilton v Chapman [1902] QWN 86 .… 22.5 — v Kaljo (1989) 17 NSWLR 381 .… 25.6, 25.13 — v Lethbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236 .… 8.6, 17.13, 17.15, 17.47 — v Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineering Co [1894] 3 Ch 589 .… 17.23 — v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121; 82 ALR 626 .… 11.110 Hammer and Barrow v Coca-Cola [1962] NZLR 723 .… 21.15 Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 .… 2.5 Hampstead Meats Pty Ltd v Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109 .… 3.26, 3.47 Hampton v BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 285 .… 15.13 Hanau v Ehrlich [1912] AC 39; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1294 .… 16.31 Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 .… 3.68, 4.12 Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2012) 45 WAR 29; 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 .… 2.17, 10.12 — v — (2013) 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 .… 22.9 Handbury v Nolan (1977) 13 ALR 339 .… 10.14, 10.28, 10.62, 10.74 Handley v Gunner [2008] NSWCA 113 .… 10.36 Hanna v OAMPS Insurance Brokers Ltd [2010] NSWCA 267 .… 18.37 — v Raoul [2018] NSWCA 201 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.10, 15.26, 15.31, 17.53 Hannah Louis Group Pty Ltd v Maxum Taxi Trucks Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 291 .… 10.55 Hanneybel v Uniflex (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 349 .… 10.41 Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Sayseng [2005] NSWCA 214 .… 7.3 Hansen v Marco Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1948] VLR 198 .… 22.11 — v Northern Land Council [1999] NTSC 69 .… 10.5, 23.42 Harbottle Brown & Co Pty Ltd v Halstead (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) NSW 432 .… 18.34

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Table of Cases Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Co Ltd [1993] QB 701 .… 11.60 Harburg India Rubber Comb Co v Martin [1902] 1 KB 778 .… 16.18 Hardchrome Engineering Pty Ltd v Kambrook Distributing Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 359 .… 10.28, 10.56, 10.58, 10.71, 23.34, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38, 23.39 Hardesty & Hanover International LLC v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 44 .… 6.10 Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442 .… 8.38 Hardingham v RP Data Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 148 .… 10.18, 10.55 Hardman v Booth (1863) 1 H & C 803; 158 ER 1107; [1861–73] All ER Rep 1847 .… 12.56 Hardware Services Pty Ltd v Primac Association Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 393 .… 23.22 Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1966] 1 All ER 309 .… 10.72 Hardy & Co v Hillerns and Fowler [1923] 2 KB 490; [1923] All ER Rep 275 .… 16.83 Hardy Wine Co Ltd v Tasman Liquor Traders Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] SASC 168 .… 10.35, 10.56 Harlou Pty Ltd, Re [1950] VLR 449 .… 6.8, 6.11 Harlow v Mitchell [1970] QWN 27 .… 16.51, 16.65 Harold R Finger & Co Pty Ltd v Karellas Investments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 123 .… 5.24, 6.15, 21.12, 23.42 Harpur v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1996] QCA 483 .… 5.24 Harrigan v Brown [1967] 1 NSWR 342 .… 18.37, 24.26 Harrington v Browne (1917) 23 CLR 287 .… 21.19 — v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 .… 5.20 Harris v Burrell and Family Pty Ltd [2010] SASCFC 12 .… 7.3 — v Carruthers (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 100 .… 23.43 — v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; 197 ALR 626; [2003] NSWCA 10 .… 23.2, 24.31, 27.1 — v Gollings (1891) 17 VLR 686 .… 12.47 — v Harris [2021] VSCA 138 .… 2.9 — v Jenkins (1922) 31 CLR 341; [1922] SASR 59 .… 3.29, 14.12



— v Nickerson (1873) LR 8 QB 286 .… 3.23 — v Pepperell (1867) LR 5 Eq 1 .… 12.54 — v Smith [2008] NSWSC 545 .… 12.36, 12.37 — v Sydney Glass & Tile Co (1904) 2 CLR 227 .… 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 18.6 — v Western Australian Exim Corp (1994) 129 ALR 387 .… 25.12 Harrison v Battye [1974] 3 All ER 830 .… 3.33 — v Cage (1698) 1 Ld Ray 386; 91 ER 1156 .… 16.20 — v Conto (1953) 55 WALR 58 .… 16.32, 16.40 — v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170 .… 2.9 — v National Bank of Australasia (1928) 23 Tas LR 1 .… 15.5, 15.7 Harrison and Jones Ltd v Bunten and Lancaster Ltd [1953] 1 QB 646; [1953] 1 All ER 903 .… 12.19 Harriton v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461 .… 7.3 Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231 .… 2.16 — v Fidelity Nominees Pty Ltd [1985] 41 SASR 458 .… 7.28, 8.47 Harry Goudias Pty Ltd v Akakios [2007] SASC 81 .… 18.3, 18.20 Hart v Alexander (1837) 2 M & W 484; 150 ER 848 .… 8.49 — v Jacobs (1981) 57 FLR 18 .… 10.61 — v JGC Accounting & Financial Services Pty Ltd (2015) 47 WAR 582; [2015] WASCA 22 .… 11.131, 11.132, 11.136, 11.139, 11.140 — v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 417 .… 10.7, 10.16, 10.40 — v Mossensons [2000] WASC 295 .… 23.17 — v O’Connor [1985] 1 AC 1000 .… 15.1, 17.53 Hartigan v International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc [2002] NSWSC 810 .… 14.5, 14.8, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15, 15.11 Hartley v Ponsonby (1857) 7 El & Bl 872; 119 ER 1471 .… 4.33 Hartley Poynton Ltd v Ali [2005] VSCA 53 .… 23.33 Hartleys Ltd v Martin [2002] VSC 301 .… 18.37 Hartog v Colin and Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 .… 12.48, 12.52 Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller [2020] FCAFC 229 .… 11.125, 11.147

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Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd (CI) [1986] AC 207; (1985) 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276 .… 3.1, 3.11, 3.24, 3.25, 3.28, 3.35, 3.39 Harvey v Edwards Dunlop & Co Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 302 .… 16.19, 16.45 — v Facey [1893] AC 552 .… 3.17 — v Harvey (1970) 120 CLR 529 .… 10.61 — v MacDonald [1927] St R Qd 50 .… 16.84 Hasham v Zenab [1960] AC 316 .… 24.5 Haskew v Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1919) 27 CLR 231 .… 14.11 Hatcher v White (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 285 .… 18.25, 18.44, 18.47 Hatt v Magro [2007] WASCA 124 .… 11.118 Hauff v Miller [2013] QCA 048 .… 5.25, 6.6 Hausman v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (2009) 29 VR 213; [2009] VSCA 288 .… 11.150 Havenbar Pty Ltd v Butterfield (1974) 133 CLR 449 .… 20.8, 21.30 Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 273; [2009] FCA 242 .… 23.2, 23.34 Havyn Pty Ltd v Webster [2005] NSWCA 182 .… 11.111, 11.129, 11.146, 11.150, 20.18, 21.35 Hawcroft v Hawcroft General Trading Co Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 555 .… 12.25 Hawcroft General Trading Co Pty Ltd v Hawcroft [2017] NSWCA 91 .… 8.9, 22.4 Hawes v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1167 .… 20.18 — v — (1999) NSWSC 1167 .… 20.16 Hawke v Edwards (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 21 .… 10.5, 10.9 Hawker v Vickers [1991] 1 NZLR 399 .… 20.13 Hawker de Havilland Ltd v Fernandes (1996) ATPR 41-479 .… 18.38 Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 298 .… 13.4, 13.8, 13.9 Hawker Siddeley Building Supplies Pty Ltd v Hanson [1965] WAR 115; [1966] ALR 26 .… 8.25 Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1 Cowp 289; 98 ER 1091 .… 16.9, 27.13 Hawkesbury Bakery Pty Ltd v Moses [1965] NSWR 1241; [1965] NSWR 1242 .… 18.37

Hawkesbury Nominees Pty Ltd v Battik Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 185 .… 23.11, 23.12, 23.13, 23.44 Hawkins v Clayton (1986) 5 NSWLR 109 .… 25.5 — v — (1988) 164 CLR 539; [1988] HCA 15 .… 10.18, 10.29, 10.40, 10.50, 10.53, 10.55, 11.88, 11.147, 25.5 — v — (1992) 5 JCL 127 .… 10.53 — v Clayton t/a Clayton Utz & Co (1986) NSWLR 109 .… 3.34 — v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 .… 5.26 — v Pender Bros Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 135 .… 10.52 — v Price [1947] .… 16.35, 16.37 Hawthorn Football Club Ltd v Harding [1988] VR 49 .… 6.9, 24.25 Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd v Victorian Securities Corporation Ltd (2010) 241 FLR 335; [2010] VSCA 247, .… 11.129 Haydon v Jackson (1988) 10 ATPR 40-845 .… 11.107 — v McLeod (1901) 27 VLR 395 .… 16.37 Hayle Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Technology Group Ltd [2000] FCA 1242 .… 23.16 Haynes v Hirst (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 480 .… 21.29 — v Sutherland (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) NSW 428 .… 18.8 — v Top Slice Deli Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Dig) 46-147 .… 11.124 Hayward v Darling Downs Aircraft Services Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 153 .… 25.12 — v Planet Projects Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1105 .… 3.33, 10.26 — v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48 .… 11.78 Haywood v Roadknight [1927] VLR 512 .… 11.29, 14.11, 14.15, 15.2, 15.11 Hazard Systems Pty Ltd v Car-Tech Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWCA 314 .… 8.7 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London BC [1992] 2 AC 1 .… 17.69 HCK China Investments Ltd v Solar Honest Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 680 .… 4.10 HDI Global Specialty SE v Wonkana No 3 Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 296 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.35, 10.74, 12.30 Head v Diggon (1828) 3 Man & Ry (KB) 97 .… 3.65 — v Kelk (1961) 63 SR (NSW) 340 .… 9.7, 16.48, 16.52

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Table of Cases — v — [1962] NSWR 1363; (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340 .… 4.17, 6.7 Healy v The Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Incorporated [2005] WASCA 219 .… 5.10, 21.27 Hearle v Greenbank (1749) 3 Atk 695; 26 ER 1200 .… 17.21 Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 .… 6.10, 6.16 Heathwood v Murgon Shire Council [1941] St R Qd 275 .… 26.4 Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT (1965–6) 115 CLR 512; 40 ALJR 280 .… 23.32 HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp (1999) ATPR 46-196; [1999] FCA 822 .… 15.8, 23.21 Heckenberg v Delaforce [2000] NSWCA 137 .… 26.4 Hector v Lyons (1988) 58 P & CR 156 .… 12.30, 12.60 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575 .… 11.41, 11.73, 11.87, 12.17 Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 .… 2.3, 10.3 Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30; [1911–13] All ER Rep 83 .… 27.22 Heimann v Commonwealth (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 691 .… 10.13, 10.56, 10.61 Heine Bros (Aust) Pty Ltd v Forrest [1963] VR 383 .… 18.37, 24.25 Helco Pty Ltd v O’Haire (1991) ATPR 41099 .… 11.116 Helicopter Sales (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1 .… 10.65 Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235 .… 3.34, 5.24, 6.8 Helps v Clayton (1864) 17 CBNS 553; 144 ER 222 .… 17.5 Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire CC [1978] 3 All ER 262 .… 8.8 Hely v Stirling [1982] VR 246 .… 6.9 Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (1995) 140 ALR 391 .… 11.145 — v — (No 2) (1996) 62 FCR 221; 140 ALR 596 .… 18.9 — v Curtis [2008] WASC 283 .… 4.32 — v Hopkins (1988) ANZ ConvR 229 .… 3.57 Henderson’s Caveat, Re [1998] 1 Qd R 632 .… 20.12 Henderson (A Protected Party, by her litigation friend, The Official Solicitor) v Dorset Healthcare University NHS



Foundation Trust [2021] AC 563; [2020] UKSC 43 .… 18.46 Henderson, Re (1916) 12 Tas LR 40 .… 17.37, 17.40 Henderson’s Automotive Technologies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Flaton Management Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 539; [2011] VSCA 167 .… 26.1, 26.8 Hendriks v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 .… 2.14 Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1276 .… 8.8 Henfree v Bromley (1805) 6 East 309 .… 12.64 Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 39 FCR 546; 79 ALR 83 .… 11.17, 11.36, 11.53, 11.110, 11.113, 11.114, 11.115, 11.121, 11.123, 11.124, 11.129, 11.147, 11.150 Hennessey v Architectus Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1390 .… 12.33 — v Craigmyle & Co Ltd [1986] ICR 461 .… 13.9 Hennessey Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 24 .… 10.12 Henry v Sydney MC (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 264 .… 17.71 Henry Dean & Sons (Sydney) Ltd v P O’Day Pty Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 330 .… 21.26 Henry Kendall & Sons (a firm) v William Lillico & Sons [1969] AC 31 .… 10.29 Hensley v Reschke (1918) 18 CLR 452 .… 23.2 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; [1891–4] All ER Rep 908 .… 3.47, 3.65 Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37; [2001] HCA 52 .… 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.147, 23.5, 23.30, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 Hepburn v A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd [1966] AC 451; [1966] 1 All ER 418 .… 7.43 — v McDonnell (1918) 25 CLR 199 .… 25.8 Heppingstone v Stewart (1910) 12 CLR 126 .… 16.37, 16.40 Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301 .… 3.9 Heron v Port Huon Fruitgrowers’ Cooperative Association Ltd (1922) 30 CLR 315 .… 18.35, 18.37 Herrick v Leonard and Dingley Ltd [1975] 2 NZLR 506 .… 7.38, 7.42

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Herring v Templeman [1973] 3 All ER 569 .… 5.1 Herro Trading Pty Ltd v Kang [2001] NSWCA 309 .… 22.2 Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 .… 16.80, 24.14 — v Casella [2006] WASC 254 .… 10.35 — v Debus [2004] NSWCA 54 .… 21.19, 21.35 — v Henderson [2006] WASCA 233 .… 25.12, 25.13 Hexiva Pty Ltd v Lederer [2006] NSWSC 1129 .… 10.52, 21.10, 21.31, 23.44, 26.9 Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2001) Aust Tort Rep 81-588 .… 11.110 Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 .… 11.60 Heys v Gold Ribbon Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2000] TASSC 17 .… 4.17 HG & R Nominees Pty Ltd v Fava [1997] 2 VR 368 .… 14.17, 14.20 Hibberson v George (1989) 12 Fam LR 725 .… 16.75 Hibiscus Shoppingtown Pty Ltd v Woolworths (Qld) Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 106 .… 10.3 Hickey v Australian Wire Rope Works Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 455 .… 7.17 Hickinbotham Developments Pty Ltd v Woods (2005) 92 SASR 52 .… 3.39 Hickman v Turn and Wave Ltd [2013] 1 NZLR 741; [2012] NZSC 72 .… 18.41 Hide & Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 310 .… 6.6, 10.30, 10.32, 10.35 Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 .… 11.60, 11.152 Higgins v Scott (1831) 2 B & Ad 413; 109 ER 1196 .… 25.11 Higgs v Assam Tea Co (1869) LR 4 Ex Ch 387 .… 8.44 Highfern Pty Ltd v Sibbles [1987] 2 Qd R 667 .… 21.30 Highlands Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109 .… 11.72 Highmist Pty Ltd v Tricare Ltd [2005] QCA 357 .… 9.2, 9.5, 10.35, 20.1, 20.6, 21.12, 21.24, 21.26, 21.29, 21.30, 22.9 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp (2003) 202 ALR 610; 188 FLR 153; [2003] NSWSC 1083 .… 7.3, 7.22

HIH Claims Support Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 72; 280 ALR 1; [2011] HCA 31 .… 11.145 HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq), Re [2016] NSWSC 482 .… 11.110, 11.127 Hilad v SCI [1999] NSWSC 486 .… 10.35 Hilary Ignatius Lantry v Tomule Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 81 .… 20.11 Hill v CA Parsons & Co Ltd [1972] Ch 305 .… 24.27 — v Canberra Centre Holdings Ltd (1995) 122 FLR 434 .… 21.12, 21.29 — v Forteng Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 105 .… 4.35 — v Gateway 2000 Inc (1997) 105 F 3d 1147 .… 3.7 — v Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231 .… 3.69 — v Rose [1990] VR 129 .… 11.29, 15.11 — v Sawkins [2000] NSWSC 44 .… 10.27 — v Sidney [1991] 2 Qd R 547 .… 10.34, 10.48, 21.19, 21.26 — v Terry [1993] 2 Qd R 640 .… 20.12, 20.18, 21.35 — v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 .… 7.41, 11.88, 23.8 — v Willis (1880) 6 VLR (L) 193 .… 16.41 Hill & Plummer v Pinchin Johnson & Co Ltd [1957] NZLR 758 .… 24.26 Hillam v Iacullo (2015) 90 NSWLR 422; [2015] NSWCA 196 .… 8.47, 8.49, 10.5, 21.38, 22.5 Hilliard, Re; Ex parte Tinkler [1907] VLR 375 .… 8.5 Hillas v Arcos [1932] All ER 494 .… 6.6, 6.8 Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 503; [1932] All ER 494 .… 6.3, 6.6, 10.32 Hillboi Nominees Pty Ltd v Evenwood Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 66 .… 10.12, 10.13 Hillcrown Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2011] QCA 129 .… 19.5 Hillier v Hewett [2001] SASC 225 .… 23.32 Hillman v Ferro Con (SA) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] SAIRC 22 .… 18.14 Hills v Croll (1845) 1 De G M & G 627; 42 ER 698 .… 24.11 Hills Industries Ltd v Australian Financial Services & Leasing Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 147; [2012] NSWCA 380 .… 12.56 Himbleton Pty Ltd v Kumagai (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 NSWLR 44 .… 3.68, 6.11, 10.41, 10.42, 10.60, 10.61 Hines v Birkbeck College [1986] Ch 524; [1985] 3 All ER 156 .… 5.1

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Table of Cases Hinkley v De Vries (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1049 .… 3.61 Hirachand Punamchand v Temple (1863) 13 CBNS 543; 143 ER 215 .… 4.41 — v — [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597 .… 4.40 Hirsch v Zinc Corp Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 34 .… 18.2, 19.13, 19.15, 19.20, 19.22 Hirst v West Riding Union Banking Co Ltd [1901] 2 KB 560 .… 11.80 Hiser v Hardex Cooperative Ltd (in liq) .… 10.26 Hitchcock v Giddings (1817) 4 Price 135; 146 ER 418; [1814–23] All ER Rep 781 .… 12.13 HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd v Psycadian Ltd [2005] WASC 234 .… 26.10, 26.12 Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168 .… 23.24 Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd (1977) 1 NSWLR 88 .… 23.11, 23.27 — v Swan (1920) 28 CLR 258 .… 21.12, 21.30 Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council .… 7.9, 24.28 Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 .… 23.17 Hobbs v Petersham Transport Co Pty Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 222 .… 10.53 Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd v Zupps Southside Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 319 .… 11.136 Hobhouse v Macarthur-Onslow [2022] NSWCA 158 …. 10.60 Hocking Stuart (Hawthorn) Pty Ltd v Vernea [2005] VSCA 129 .… 23.25, 23.26 Hodder & Tolley Ltd v Cornes [1923] NZLR 876 .… 8.8 Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70 .… 13.7 Hodgins v Duke Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 74 .… 2.29, 21.13, 22.6 Hodgson v Johnson (1858) EB & E 685; 120 ER 666 .… 16.47 Hodgson & Hodgson v Morella Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1975) 13 SASR 51 .… 10.14 Hoffman, Re; Ex parte Worrall v Schilling (1989) 85 ALR 145 .… 11.50, 21.29 Hogan v Howard Finance Ltd (1987) ASC 55-594 .… 15.28 — v Regional Centres Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 699; 81 WN (NSW) 59 .… 10.56 — v Tumut Shire Council (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 284 .… 24.26 Hohn v Mailler [2003] NSWCA 122 .… 10.35 Hohol v Hohol [1981] VR 221 .… 16.76



Holdcroft v Market Garden Produce Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 381 .… 18.3, 18.22, 18.28, 18.47 Holder v Holder [1968] Ch 353; [1968] 1 All ER 665 .… 11.53 Holidaywise Koala Pty Ltd v Queenslodge Pty Ltd [1977] VR 164 .… 18.22, 18.23, 18.24, 18.43 Holland v Goltrans Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 18 .… 19.16, 21.13 — v London Society of Compositors (1924) 40 TLR 440 .… 7.4 — v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409 .… 21.12, 21.18, 21.23, 21.29, 21.30, 21.38, 23.20 Hollander v Atkinson (1885) 6 LR (NSW) .… 16.61 Holloway v Witham (1990) 21 NSWLR 70 .… 11.118 Holman v Deol [1979] 1 NSWLR 640 .… 11.112 Holman Constructions Ltd v Delta Timber Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 1081 .… 3.67 Holmes v Blogg (1818) 8 Taunt 508; 129 ER 481 .… 17.23 — v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692 .… 11.34, 11.35, 11.83, 11.95, 23.6, 23.8 — v Walton [1961] WAR 96 .… 15.2 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; 11 ER 999 .… 8.28 Holt v Biroka Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 629 .… 11.118, 11.146 — v Bunney [2020] SASCFC 89 .… 3.6 — v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] KB 1; [1942] 1 All ER 404 .… 8.34 Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 WLR 155; [1974] 1 All ER 161 .… 3.61 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2004] 1 AC 715; [2003] 2 All ER 785 .… 7.38 Homeguard Products (NZ) Ltd v Kiwi Packaging Ltd [1981] NZLR 322 .… 4.39 Homestake Australia Ltd v Metana Minerals NL (1991) 11 WAR 435 .… 10.14 Homestake Gold of Australia v Peninsula Gold Pty Ltd (1996) 131 FLR 447 .… 17.4, 17.19, 17.45 Homfray Carpets Australia Pty Ltd and Hycraft Carpets Pty Ltd, Re (1996) 14 ACLC 555 .… 5.26, 10.16 Honeychurch Management Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2005] TASSC 13 .… 10.53, 10.56, 11.115 Honeyman v Nhill Hospital [1994] 1 VR 138 .… 5.26

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Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank v Lo Lee Shi [1928] AC 181 .… 12.64 Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Larobi Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 593 .… 18.34 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 .… 21.22, 27.1 Honner v Ashton (1979) 1 BPR 9478 .… 21.12, 21.21 — v — [1980] ANZ ConvR 343 .… 21.14, 21.19 Hoogerdyk v Condon (1990) 22 NSWLR 173 .… 23.24 Hooker Town Developments Pty Ltd v Jilba Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 320 .… 12.35, 12.41 Hookway v Racing Victoria Ltd [2005] VSCA 310 .… 4.26, 26.1, 26.5 Hooper v Oates [2014] Ch 287; [2013] EWCA Civ 91 .… 23.26 Hooper and Grass’ Contract, Re [1949] VLR 269 .… 13.7 Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 194 .… 4.18, 6.16, 18.34 Hop and Malt Exchange and Warehouse Co, Re; Ex parte Briggs (1866) LR 1 Eq .… 11.49 Hopcroft & Edwards v Edmunds [2013] SASCFC 38 .… 3.27 Hope v RCA Photophone of Australia Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 348 .… 10.5, 10.7, 10.12 Horace Holman Group Ltd v Sherwood International Group Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 83 .… 23.11 Horlock v Beal [1916] AC 486 .… 19.21 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247 .… 11.85 Horne v Barber (1920) 27 CLR 494 .… 18.29 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 216 .… 11.106, 11.121 Hortico (Aust) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545 .… 16.15, 21.35, 24.23 Horton v Horton (No 2) [1961] 1 QB 215; [1960] 3 All ER 649 .… 4.27 — v Jones (1935) 53 CLR 475 .… 5.8, 16.24, 16.47 Horton Geoscience Consultants Pty Ltd v Energy Minerals Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 169 .… 10.12, 10.31

Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] 1 VR 643; [1998] VSCA 51 .… 17.1, 17.18, 17.31, 17.34, 17.38, 17.52 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.5, 10.6, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 10.25, 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61 Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2001] FCA 1040; (2001) 110 FCR 157; ATPR 41-831; Aust Contract Rep 90-133 .… 8.53, 10.28, 10.70, 18.35, 23.2, 24.1, 28.17 Hotcopper Australia Ltd v SAAB [2002] WASCA 190 .… 26.9 Hotmail Corp v Van$ Money Pie Inc 47 USPQ 2d 1020, 1025 (ND Cal 1998) .… 3.26 Houghton v Arms (2006) 225 CLR 553; 231 ALR 534; [2006] HCA 59 .… 11.108, 11.110, 11.111, 11.114, 11.140, 11.142 Houlahan v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 259 .… 12.47 Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 .… 11.59 Hounslow London BC v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 233 .… 21.10, 26.9 Hourigan v Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 619 .… 25.14 House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown CC (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 .… 10.32 Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 .… 3.47, 3.60 Housing Guarantee Fund Ltd v Dore [2003] VSCA 126 .… 10.75 — v Yusef [1991] 2 VR 17 .… 8.6 Howard v Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 253 CLR 83; 309 ALR 1; [2014] HCA 21 .… 8.7 Howard E Perry & Co v British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 .… 24.17 Howard F Hudson Pty Ltd v Ronayne (1972) 126 CLR 449 .… 18.35, 20.1, 20.8 Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd [1965] 2 QB 574 .… 11.98 — v — [1978] QB 574 .… 11.73 Howard Smith & Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68 .… 3.11, 3.46, 10.16 Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301 .… 23.14, 23.24

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Table of Cases Howes v Miller [1970] VR 522 .… 3.28 — v O’Neill (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 167 .… 24.26 Howie v NSW Lawn Tennis Ground Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 132 .… 7.31, 10.62 Howtrac Rentals Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors (NZ) Ltd [2000] VSC 415 .… 10.16, 10.42, 10.43, 10.54, 26.1 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 810 .… 21.26 Hoyle, Re [1893] 1 Ch 4 .… 16.37 Hoylevans Pty Ltd v Weir [2000] WASC 144 .… 2.21, 7.1, 10.3, 10.6, 18.37, 22.2, 22.5 Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1978) 52 ALJ 372 .… 2.18, 2.30, 10.6 — v Spencer (1989) 2 JCL 181 .… 10.6 — v — (1919) 27 CLR 133 .… 2.30, 3.9, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.30, 11.122, 12.43 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (2013) 306 ALR 53; [2013] NSWCA 479 .… 11.147, 11.149, 11.150, 25.11 — v Hartnett [2016] NSWCA 342 .… 10.30, 10.32 HR Westlake v White (1984) 3 ANZ Ins Cas 60–616 .… 18.41 HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640; 211 ALR 79; [2004] HCA 54 .… 11.83, 11.118, 11.146, 11.147, 23.25, 23.26, 23.39 Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Son Ltd [1895] 2 Ch 273 .… 12.24, 12.28, 12.29, 12.50, 12.52 Hudson v Gray (1927) 39 CLR 473 .… 15.2 — v Jope (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 351 .… 12.29 Hudson Crushed Metals Pty Ltd v Henry [1985] 1 Qd R 202 .… 21.14, 21.18 Hudson Investment Group Ltd v Australian Hardboards Ltd [2005] NSWSC 716 .… 22.9 Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 .… 11.112 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.17 — v Molloy [2005] VSC 240 .… 26.6, 26.8 — v NLS Pty Ltd [1966] WAR 100 (affirmed (1966) 120 CLR 583) .… 21.14 — v Pump House Hotel Co [1902] 2 KB 190; [1900-3] All ER Rep 480 .… 8.23, 8.24 — v Schofield [1975] 1 NSWLR 8 .… 24.8 — v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 .… 3.28



— v St Barbara Mines Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 160 .… 10.55, 11.83 — v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) 69 ALR 660 .… 18.36, 18.37 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1 .… 3.39, 5.14, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 10.51, 10.52, 10.58, 11.20, 11.21, 11.115, 11.118 Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (1993) 31 NSWLR 91 .… 10.48, 21.33 Hughes, Re (1850) 1 Legge 659 .… 17.62 Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves 273; 33 ER 526; [1803–13] All ER Rep 1 .… 14.5, 14.8 Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 .… 8.27, 24.11 Hume Steel Ltd v The Attorney General for Victoria (1927) 39 CLR 455 .… 10.27 Humphries v The Proprietors ‘Surfers Palms North’ Group Titles Plan 1955 (1993) 179 CLR 597 .… 17.69 — v — (1994) 121 ALR 1 .… 18.41 Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125 .… 11.54, 11.85, 23.2, 23.5, 23.9, 23.17, 23.25, 23.39 Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd v Burger King Corporation [1999] NSWSC 1029 .… 23.2 Hunnerup v Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Co (Australia) Ltd (1974) 7 SASR 215 .… 23.37 Hunt v Bate (1568) 3 Dyer 272a; 73 ER 605 .… 4.20, 27.11 Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 296 ALR 3; [2013] HCA 10 .… 11.131, 11.136 Hunter v Hunter [1936] AC 222 .… 3.67 Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507 .… 11.114 Hunter Valley Skydiving Centre Pty Ltd v Central Coast Aero Club Ltd [2008] NSWSC 539 .… 10.44 Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2018] WASCA 90 .… 4.22 Hunyor v Tilelli (1997) 8 BPR 14,269; (1997) 8 BPR 15,629 .… 20.16 Huppert v Stock Options of Australia Pty Ltd (1965) 112 CLR 414 .… 23.1, 23.21, 23.42

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Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 1497; [1999] FCA 1728 .… 10.62, 15.4, 15.13 — v — (2000) ATPR 41-741 .… 15.1, 15.16 Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 294 .… 18.9, 18.11, 18.12, 18.41, 18.46, 18.49 Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson [2007] 1 WLR 2351 .… 11.39 Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 .… 3.6 Hussain v Haynoum Developments Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 420 .… 10.55 — v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2006] FCA 1263 .… 18.49 Hussey v Bauer [2011] QCA 91 .… 5.8 — v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.73 Hutchence v South Sea Bubble Co Pty Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 330 .… 11.150 Hutchens v Deauville Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367; [1986] HCA 85 .… 8.6 — v — (2011) 27 JCL 65 .… 8.6 Hutchinson v Equititour Pty Ltd (2011) 2 Qd R 99; [2010] QCA 104 .… 11.147, 25.5 — v Payne [1975] VR 175; [1975] VR 242 .… 20.8, 20.13, 24.16 — v Scott (1905) 3 CLR 359 .… 18.4, 18.21, 18.23 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s LR 620 .… 13.6, 13.9, 13.10 HW Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 .… 11.122 HWG Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairlie Court Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 519 .… 12.21, 12.25, 12.30 Hyatt Australia Ltd v LTCB Australia Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 260 .… 7.18 Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334; 49 ER 132 .… 3.29 Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 313 .… 10.27, 23.13, 23.25, 23.27 — v McGrath Sales Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 223 .… 11.41, 11.121, 11.129 Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 .… 6.8, 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Hyleing v Hastings (1699) 1 LdRaym 389; 91 ER 1157 .… 4.21

Hylton v Hylton (1754) 2 Ves Sen 547; 28 ER 349 .… 14.6 Hyundai Heavy Industries v Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129 .… 26.12 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Dartbrook Coal (Sales) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1324 .… 19.2 HZD Pty Ltd v McInnes [2007] QSC 213 .… 3.22 I I & L Securities Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2000) 179 ALR 89; [2000] QCA 383 .… 11.147 — v — (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 41 .… 11.39, 11.99, 11.122, 11.123, 11.124, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.147 I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002) .… 3.7, 3.26 IAC (Leasing) Ltd v Humphrey (1972) 126 CLR 131 .… 23.45 Iannello v Sharpe [2007] NSWCA 61 .… 23.45 Iannotti v Corsaro (1984) 36 SASR 127 .… 18.20, 18.22, 18.28 Ibberson v Neck (1886) 2 TLR 427 .… 4.39 IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 466 .… 11.60 — v Queensland [2015] QSC 342 .… 10.2, 10.62 IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335 .… 6.8 IceTV v Ross [2007] NSWSC 635 .… 18.37 ICT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 .… 18.37, 18.38 Icta Investments Pty Ltd Trading as Jolly Roger v GE Commercial Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 290 .… 3.45 Idameneo (No 9) Pty Ltd v Bandevski (1989) NSW ConvR 55-460 .… 15.28, 15.31 Idameneo (No 123) v Robalino [2009] NSWSC 969 .… 21.22 Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Angel-Honnibal [2002] NSWSC 1214 .… 26.4 Idameneo Pty Ltd v Ticco Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 329 .… 18.37, 21.26, 21.27 Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2005] WASC 51 .… 10.35 — v — [2006] WASCA 215 .… 26.1, 26.4 lxxx

Table of Cases IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd v Classified Transport Pty Ltd (2011) 111 SASR 155; [2011] SASCFC 123 .… 11.118, 11.122, 11.147 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 .… 10.41 Iezzi Constructions Pty Ltd v Watkins Pacific (Qld) Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 350 .… 26.7 IF Asia Pacific v Galbally (2003) 59 IPR 43 .… 18.37 IGA Distribution Pty Ltd v King & Taylor Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 440 .… 23.6 Igloo Homes Pty Ltd v Sammut Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 280 .… 12.53 IIR Pty Ltd v Buchman (1989) ATPR 40-955 .… 18.37 Ikin v Cox Bros (Aust) Ltd (1930) 25 Tas LR 1 .… 6.5 — v The Danish Club ‘Dannebrog’ Inc [2001] VSCA 123 .… 10.60 Illawong Village Pty Ltd v State Bank of NSW Ltd [2005] NSWCA 382 .… 22.5 Imac Security Services Pty Ltd v Tyco Australia Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 592 .… 24.21, 24.24 Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1992) 182 CLR 26 .… 20.15 — v — (1993) 182 CLR 26 .… 11.45, 11.47, 21.9, 21.29, 21.30 Imperial Brothers Pty Ltd v Ronim Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 172 .… 21.19 — v — [1999] 2 Qd R 172 .… 21.19 Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case, Re (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 .… 3.60 Imperial Loan Co v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599 .… 17.53 Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 .… 14.5, 14.11 Independent Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Noble Lowndes Superannuation Consultants Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 525 .… 10.55, 26.8 Indico Holdings Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 41 NSWLR 281 .… 11.73 Indus Realty Pty Ltd v Phillipson [2002] VSC 129 .… 10.16 Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v IngersollRand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.27, 18.37, 18.38 Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 495; [2011] FCA 183 .… 10.24, 18.37



— v — (2012) 207 FCR 298; [2012] FCAFC 165 .… 18.37 — v — (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 7 .… 10.24, 18.37 ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Leagrove Pty Ltd; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Stafford [2011] QCA 131 .… 3.14 Ingham v ACN 000 333 844 Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWCA 63 .… 10.33 Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Hannigan [2020] NSWCA 82 .… 10.30 Ingot Capital Investments v Macquarie Capital Markets (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; 252 ALR 659; [2008] NSWCA 206 .… 11.121, 11.127 — v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets (No 6) [2007] NSWSC 124 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.49 Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31; [1960] 3 All ER 332 .… 12.60, 12.63 Inlon Pty Ltd v Celli SpA [2017] NSWSC 569 .… 24.20 Inman v Stamp (1815) 1 Stark 12; 171 ER 386 .… 16.22 Inn Leisure Industries Pty Ltd v DF McCloy Pty Ltd (1991) 28 FCR 151 .… 11.116 — v — (No 1) (1991) 28 FCR 151 .… 11.116 Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 .… 2.4, 2.29, 4.32, 22.6 Insight Oceania Pty Ltd v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 710 .… 10.43 Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd [2013] FCAFC 62 .… 8.7 Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young [2010] NSWCA 137; (2010–11) 78 NSWLR 641 .… 23.19 — v — (2011) 243 CLR 149; [2011] HCA 16 .… 10.73, 23.19 Instyle Contract Textiles Pty Ltd v Good Environmental Choice Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 38 .… 24.20, 24.21 Insurance Commission of Western Australia v Container Handlers Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 89; [2004] HCA 24 .… 10.73 — v Woodings [2017] WASC 122 .… 10.41 Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 406 .… 23.45 Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd

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(1988) 5 BPR 11,110 .… 3.4, 3.6, 21.14, 22.3, 22.5 Intercontinental Packers Pty Ltd v Harvey [1969] Qd R 159 .… 13.9 Interlink Australia Pty Ltd v Lowe [2015] QCA 211 .… 5.19, 10.56 International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 2 .… 12.52, 12.53, 12.54, 12.55, 24.4, 24.7, 24.12 International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151 .… 10.12 International Alpaca Management Pty Ltd v Ensor (1995) 133 ALR 561 .… 10.13 International College Pty Ltd v ACCC (2018) 266 FCR 631; [2018] FCAFC 155 .… 15.16 International Drilling Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd [1986] Ch 513 .… 8.8 International Finance Ltd v Sly (1987) ANZ ConvR 328 .… 15.31 International Harvester Co v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644 .… 10.27 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 .… 8.6, 8.17, 8.23, 8.34, 21.14 International Palace Pty Ltd v Novaheat Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 75 .… 20.13 International Petroleum Investment Company v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea [2015] NSWCA 363 .… 6.5 International Terminal Operators Ltd v Miida Electronics Inc (1986) 28 DLR (4th) 641 .… 7.38 Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Homes Loans Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 310 .… 23.45 Interstate Express Parcel Co Pty Ltd v TimeLife International (Nederlands) BV (1977) 138 CLR 534 .… 10.61 Interstate Investment Co Ltd v Mobbs (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 572 .… 8.23, 8.24 Intertransport International Private Ltd v Donaldson [2005] VSCA 303 .… 26.1, 26.4 Investec Bank v Naude [2014] NSWSC 165 .… 15.13 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896; [1997] UKHL 28 .… 3.46, 10.12, 10.31, 10.35 Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 .… 16.69

IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech (1998) 156 ALR 470 .… 11.150 IOOF Building Society Pty Ltd v Foxeden Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 138 .… 23.14 IP Homes Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v Swan (2011) 110 SASR 157 .… 21.23 Ipex ITG Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 480 .… 3.39 Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 .… 4.17, 4.22, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8 Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd v APS Satellite Pty Ltd (2018) 356 ALR 440; [2018] NSWCA 15 .… 15.16 IPT Systems Ltd v Quadrant Management Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 216 .… 20.9 Iraf Pty Ltd v Graham [1982] 1 NSWR 419 .… 18.38 Ireland v Leigh [1982] Qd R 145 .… 21.26 — v WG Riverview Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 307 .… 11.150 Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186 .… 3.9 Isaac v Dargan Financial Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 343; [2018] NSWCA 163 .… 18.35, 18.37 Isabella Shipowner SA v Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (The Aquafaith) [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 461 .… 21.10 Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211 .… 16.35 Isotomic Pty Ltd v Adelaide International Raceway Pty Ltd [2007] SASC 111 .… 10.16, 21.24 ispONE Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2013] FCA 823 .… 15.16 Israel v Foreshore Properties Pty Ltd (1980) 54 ALJR 421 .… 10.56 Issa v Berisha [1981] 1 NSWLR 261 .… 12.30, 12.36, 12.41 Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427 .… 11.122 Ivanof v Phillip M Levy Pty Ltd [1971] VR 167 .… 11.45, 11.47, 11.48, 11.55, 11.79, 11.83, 11.84, 11.85 IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205 .… 3.65 J J & C Reid Pty Ltd v Abau Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-416 .… 21.21, 28.31 J & H West Nominees Pty Ltd v Twenty Four Outdoor Australia Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 337 .… 6.2

lxxxii

Table of Cases J&S Chan Pty Ltd v McKenzie [1994] ANZ ConvR 610 .… 21.10 J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 539 .… 13.4, 26.3 J B & B L Nominees Pty Ltd v McCormack [1982] WAR 258 .… 16.86 J B Rogers Ltd v Harry Lesnie Ltd (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 427 .… 6.8, 16.35, 16.86 J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 118 .… 20.15, 21.28, 21.29, 21.31 — v — [2001] TASSC 29 .… 20.1 J C Reid Pty Ltd v Abau Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-416 .… 21.11 J C Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 10.41, 16.22, 16.58, 16.59, 16.63, 16.66 J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1078 .… 10.28 J Kitchen & Sons Pty Ltd v Stewart’s Cash and Carry Stores (1942) 66 CLR 116 .… 22.12 J P Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 3 .… 10.33 J S Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 .… 16.81 J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 2 All ER 121; 1 WLR 461 .… 10.72 J, Re [1909] 1 Ch 574; [1908–10] All ER Rep 1311 .… 17.8 Jabbcorp (NSW) Pty Ltd v Strathfield Golf Club [2020] NSWSC 1317 .… 10.12 Jackson v Crosby (1979) 21 SASR 280 .… 16.70 — v — (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; 21 SASR 281 .… 16.70 — v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438 .… 18.12, 18.44 — v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468; [1975] 3 All ER 92 .… 7.7 Jackson McDonald Services Pty Ltd v Woh Hup (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 77 .… 7.7 Jackson Nominees Pty Ltd v Hanson Building Product Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 126 .… 10.39, 10.41, 10.42, 10.56 Jacobs v Bills [1967] NZLR 249 .… 24.7, 24.8 Jacoby v Whitmore (1883) 49 LT 335; 32 WR 18 .… 8.6 JAD International Pty Ltd v International Trucks Australia Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 378 .… 11.45, 11.50, 11.51, 11.53, 11.54, 11.55, 11.64, 11.146, 11.147



Jaddcal Pty Ltd v Minson (No 3) [2011] WASC 362 .… 7.16 Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219; [2004] TASSC 126 .… 5.18 Jaeger v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2018] NSWCA 116 .… 8.9, 8.23, 8.31 Jafari v 23 Developments Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 201 .… 22.3, 22.9 Jakeman v Cook (1878–9) 4 Ex D 26 .… 4.23 James v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347 .… 11.118, 11.147, 11.151, 14.6 — v Heim Gallery (London) Ltd [1980] Est Gaz Dig 184 .… 2.5 — v Thomas H Kent & Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 551 .… 16.54 James Adam Pty Ltd v Fobeza Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 311 .… 10.35, 12.30 James Jones & Sons Ltd v Earl of Tankerville [1909] 2 Ch 440; [1908–10] All LR Rep 1231 .… 24.17, 24.18 James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583 .… 10.16 James Talcott Ltd v John Lewis & Co Ltd and North American Dress Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 592 .… 8.19 Jamieson v Renwick (1891) 17 VLR 124 .… 4.18, 4.30 Jams 2 Pty Ltd v Stubbings [2020] VSCA 200 .… 15.9, 15.31 — v — (No 4) [2019] VSC 4; [2019] VSC 482 .… 15.11 Jandon Constructions v Lyons [1999] WASCA 310 .… 23.27 Janos v Chama Motors Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 238 .… 21.23, 23.25 Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 526; 109 ALR 638 .… 11.124, 11.127 Jaques v Lloyd D George & Partners Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 625; [1968] 2 All ER 187 .… 11.46 Jardin v Metcash Ltd (2011) 285 ALR 677; [2011] NSWCA 409 .… 18.37 Jarrett v Hunter (1886) 34 .… 16.35 Jarvis v Pitt Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 506 .… 3.37, 3.38, 5.23 Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd v Trina Solar Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1453 .… 11.60 JB (Northbridge) Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] NSWCA 249 .… 3.69, 8.8 JBS Southern Australia Pty Ltd v Westcity Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 476 .… 10.30, 10.31, 10.32

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JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 .… 18.49 JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 24.1, 24.2, 24.11, 24.12, 24.13, 24.24, 24.26, 24.30 Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 .… 2.4, 2.10, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 4.39, 22.6 Jebeli v Modir and Golyaei [2005] NSWCA 184 .… 11.85 Jeffrey v Anderson [1914] QSR 66 .… 16.22 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75 .… 8.7 Jekos Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Horticultural Finance Pty Ltd (1994) 2 Qd R 515 .… 11.147 Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 709; 74 ALJ 287 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Rundall (1799) 8 Term Rep 335; 101 ER 1419 .… 17.39, 17.40 — v Zihali-Kiss (1972) 2 SASR 493 .… 11.19 Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld) (1953) 90 CLR 113 .… 14.5, 14.6, 15.9 Jeppesons Road Pty Ltd v Di Domenico [2005] QCA 39 .… 21.17, 21.19, 21.26, 21.35 Jervis v Howle & Talke Colliery Co Ltd [1937] 1 Ch 87 .… 12.39, 12.40 Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1 .… 13.5 Jessica Holdings Pty Ltd v Anglican Property Diocese of Sydney (1992) 27 NSWLR 140 .… 20.12 Jessop v McInteer [2003] QCA 170 .… 10.5 Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Petres Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 722 .… 11.106 Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd [2011] EWHC 1529 .… 6.8 Jewelsnloo Pty Ltd v Sengos [2016] NSWCA 309 .… 11.150 Jezer Construction Group Pty Ltd v Lilischkies [2005] 1 Qd R 125; [2004] QSC 270 .… 6.11 Jillinda Pty Ltd v McCourt [1983] NSW ConvR 55-145 .… 21.19 Jingalong Pty Ltd v Todd [2015] NSWCA 7 .… 4.24, 22.11 Jireh International Pty Ltd t/as Gloria Jeans Coffee v Western Exports Services Inc

[2011] NSWCA 137 .… 10.30, 10.35, 11.122 JJ Savage & Sons Pty Ltd v Blakney (1970) 119 CLR 435 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.23, 10.25, 11.2 JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Companies Ltd (No 2) [2020] WASCA 112 .… 10.30 JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v Matos [2016] QCA 355 .… 3.46 JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou [1994] 1 VR 237 .… 11.146, 23.24 JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 .… 11.122 Jobbins v Capel Court Corp Ltd (1989) 91 ALR 314 .… 11.147 Jobern Pty Ltd v BreakFree Resorts (Victoria) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1066 .… 6.15, 10.43, 10.44, 10.47, 10.48 Jobst v Becke [2001] NSWSC 277 .… 10.42 Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 KB 863 .… 11.25 John v Coles [1931] SASR 254 .… 26.1 John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd .… 16.72 John Burrows Ltd v Subsurface Surveys Ltd (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 354 .… 2.5 John Cooke and Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1922) 31 CLR 394 .… 5.28 John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (NSWCA, 18 December 1996, unreported) .… 10.26, 10.53, 10.62, 10.64, 10.53, 10.62, 10.64, 10.69, 10.73, 10.74 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1977] 2 NSWLR 400 .… 5.29, 24.14 John Fairfax Ltd v Postal Commission (1977) 30 FLR 444 .… 5.29 John G Glass Real Estate Pty Ltd v Karawi Constructions Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR (Dig) 41-249 .… 11.121 John Holland Pty Ltd v Miami Gold (WA) Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 141 .… 26.2 John McGrath Motors (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Applebee (1964) 110 CLR 656; 37 ALJR 363 .… 11.10, 11.76 John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc (2004) 88 SASR 334; [2004] SASC 128 .… 3.67, 8.8, 10.32, 18.35 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; 172 ALR 625; [2000] HCA .… 11.150

lxxxiv

Table of Cases John S Chappel Pty Ltd v DK Pett Pty Ltd (1971) 1 SASR 188 .… 18.9 Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 .… 7.52 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 .… 23.25, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32 — v American Home Assurance Company (1998) 192 CLR 266 .… 10.31, 10.33, 10.73 — v Bones [1970] 1 NSWR 28 .… 3.68 — v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 184 .… 10.16 — v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 .… 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.11, 14.12 — v Mackinnon [2021] NSWCA 152 .… 11.17, 11.18, 11.76, 11.110, 11.115, 11.138 — v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 .… 23.5, 23.6, 23.25 — v Smith [2010] NSWCA 306 .… 15.1, 15.8 Johnson Matthey and Co Ltd v Constantine Terminals Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 215 .… 7.42 Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 .… 2.18, 2.19, 10.3, 10.7, 10.56 Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 477 .… 11.115 — v — (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572 .… 11.115, 11.151 — v — (No 2) (2000) 97 FCR 175 .… 7.41 Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra (1948) 72 CLR 544 .… 17.71 Johnston v Arnaboldi [1990] 2 Qd R 138 .… 12.53 — v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73 .… 3.24 — v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 .… 6.6 — v Filaria Pty Ltd [2005] ACTCA 16 .… 11.98 Johnstone v Commerce Consolidated Pty Ltd [1976] VR 463; [1976] VR 724 (FC) .… 12.33, 12.35, 12.53 — v Knight [2006] QCA 322 .… 10.13 Jones v Acfold Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 512 .… 11.122 — v Aircrafts Pty Ltd [1949] St R Qd 196 .… 10.26, 10.69 — v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137; [2000] HCA 56 .… 7.16, 7.17, 7.25, 10.53, 23.18 — v Bouffier (1911) 12 CLR 579 .… 18.33 — v Bright (1829) 5 Bing 533; 130 ER 1167 .… 27.26 — v Clifford (1876) 3 Ch D 779 .… 12.23



— v Dumbrell [1981] VR 199 .… 11.20, 11.21, 11.38 — v Edwards (1994) 3 Tas R 350 .… 23.41 — v Jones [1977] 2 All ER 231 .… 16.70 — v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 .… 13.5 — v Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd (1995) 142 ALR 561 .… 11.145 — v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328; [1969] 2 All ER 616 .… 4.34, 5.1, 5.7 — v Pease (1909) 10 SR (NSW) 64 .… 24.30 — v Persal & Co [2000] QCA 386 .… 10.53, 10.56 — v Peters [1948] VLR 331 .… 16.65 — v Schiffman (1971) 124 CLR 303 .… 23.24 — v Vernon’s Pools Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 626 .… 5.14 — v Waite (1839) 5 Bing NC 341; 132 ER 1136 .… 4.34 Jong v Advanced Dental Services Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 318 .… 3.70 Jonstan Pty Ltd v Nicholson (2003) 58 NSWLR 223; 184 FLR 247; [2003] NSWSC 500 .… 11.145 Jonval Builders Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2020] NSWCA 233 .… 11.125, 11.146, 11.147, 15.16 Jordan v Walker (1885) 11 VLR 346 .… 10.9 Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868 .… 2.3 Joscelin v Shelton (1557) 3 Leon 4, Benloe 57, and Moo KB 51; 74 ER 503 .… 27.10 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 .… 12.33, 12.35 Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942] AC 154 .… 19.13, 19.23 — v — [1948] AC 154 .… 19.23 Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan (2012) 38 VR 241; [2012] VSCA 113 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.52 Jovista Pty Ltd v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 130 NTR 1 .… 16.29 JPA Finance Pty Ltd v Gordon Nominees Pty Ltd (2019) 58 VR 393 .… 21.36 JQAT Pty Ltd v Storm [1987] 2 Qd R 162 .… 6.8, 18.38 JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 329 ALR 625; [2016] FCAFC 20 .… 10.16, 10.32, 22.9 JR Stevens Holdings Pty Ltd v Von Begensey (1992) NSW ConvR 55-623 .… 8.47

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JS McMillan Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 419 .… 11.109, 11.111, 11.124, 11.125, 11.147 JS Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 .… 3.29 Julong Pty Ltd v Fenn [2002] QCA 479; [2002] QCA 529 .… 10.56, 26.9 Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162; [2016] VSCA 334 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Justelle Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin (No 3) [2009] WASC 264 .… 21.26 JV Property Syndicate Pty Ltd v Croakybill Ltd [2005] QCA 479 .… 3.28, 8.8 JWH Group Pty Ltd v Kimpura Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 39 .… 7.3 K K & K Real Estate Pty Ltd v Adellos Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 302 .… 21.26 K & S Freighters Pty Ltd v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1325 .… 10.43, 21.34, 22.12 KA & C Smith Pty Ltd v Ward (1998) 45 NSWLR 702 .… 18.37, 18.38 Kabbara v Australian National Sports Club Incorporated [2020] NSWSC 497 .… 10.40, 10.50 Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-950 .… 6.7, 11.115, 11.124 Kadner v Brune Holdings Pty Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 498 .… 11.50 Kai Ling (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rosengreen [2019] NSWCA 3 .… 8.47 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2009] VSC 559 .… 15.8 — v — [2012] VSCA 95 .… 15.8 — v — (2013) 250 CLR 392; 298 ALR 35; [2013] HCA 25 .… 14.1, 15.8, 15.9, 15.16, 17.53 Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737; [2002] NSWCA 383 .… 11.127 Kalnenas v Kovacevich [1961] WAR 188 .… 16.40, 16.61 Kamil Export (Aust) Pty Ltd v NPL (Australia) Pty Ltd [1996] 1 VR 538 .… 10.75, 10.77 Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Instruments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 .… 2.5 Kane Constructions v Sopov [2005] VSC 237 .… 21.12 Kapamadjian v Assandra Developments Pty Ltd (1994) 6 BPR 13,373 .… 21.29

Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 313 .… 15.27, 21.11, 21.17, 21.23, 23.23, 23.41, 23.43 — v — (2001) 15 APLB 81 .… 23.23 Karaggianis v Malltown Pty Ltd (1979) 21 SASR 381 .… 24.21 Karaguleski v Vasil Bros & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 267 .… 3.68, 7.28 Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709 .… 4.28, 10.2 Karasaridis v Kastoria Fur Products (1984) 37 SASR 345 .… 25.12 Karedis Enterprises Pty Ltd v Antoniou (1995) 59 FCR 35; 137 ALR 544 .… 11.147 Kargotich v Mustica [1973] WAR 167 .… 23.26, 23.42 Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 .… 3.26, 3.52 Katz v Jones [1967] NZLR 861 .… 24.4 Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591 .… 13.3, 13.4 — v McGillicuddy (1914) 19 CLR 1 .… 21.38 — v Michael (1892) 18 VLR 375 .… 16.62 Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79 .… 3.9, 11.146 — v Tasmania [2000] TASSC 45 .… 21.12 Kavia Holdings Pty Ltd v Suntrack Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 716 .… 3.49, 16.35 Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd v Laing O’Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd (2017) 96 NSWLR 329; [2017] NSWCA 291 .… 24.23 Kay v Playup Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 33 .… 21.36 Kay Group Holdings Pty Ltd v K & K Plastics Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 500 .… 11.150 Kay’s Leasing Corp Pty Ltd v Fletcher [1964–65] NSWR 25 .… 18.31 Kay’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1939] Ch 329; [1939] 1 All ER 245 .… 7.32 Kayserian Nominees (No 1) Pty Ltd v J R Garner Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 803 .… 20.13, 20.18, 21.35 Kayteal Pty Ltd v Dignan [2011] NSWSC 197 .… 11.140 Kaze Constructions Pty Ltd v Housing Indemnity Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 12 ATPR 41-017 .… 11.104, 11.146 KD Morris & Sons Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (1980) 54 ALJR 424 .… 22.2

lxxxvi

Table of Cases Kearney v Crepaldi [2006] NSWC 23 .… 18.37 Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107 .… 10.30 Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 100 .… 10.13, 21.12 Keen Mar Corp Pty Ltd v Labrador Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1988) ATPR 40853 .… 11.147 — v — (1989) 11 ATPR .… 11.150 Keith S Hall (Distributors) Pty Ltd v Smith [1955] QWN 6 .… 9.5, 21.24 Keith Woods v Rodney Mario de Gabriele [2007] VSC 177 .… 11.134 Kekewich v Manning (1851) 1 De G M & G 176; 42 ER 519 .… 8.20 Kell v Harris (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 473 .… 6.6, 17.18, 17.34 Kell & Rigby Pty Ltd v Flurrie Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 906 .… 16.67 Kellas-Sharpe v Psal Ltd [2013] 2 Qd R 233; [2013] QCA 371 .… 23.45 Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 55 .… 11.110 Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd v Australian Aerospace Ltd [2007] VSC 200 .… 22.12, 24.19, 24.22 Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1 .… 2.5 Kelly v Alford [1988] 1 Qd R 404 .… 10.48, 10.53 — v Bega Valley CC (NSWCA, 13 September 1982, unreported) .… 17.46 — v C A Bell Commodities Corp Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 248 .… 10.43 — v Caledonian Coal Co (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 1 .… 3.38 — v Desnoe [1985] 2 Qd R 477 .… 21.26 — v Mina [2014] NSWCA 9 .… 4.12, 5.14, 5.19 Kelrit Investments Pty Ltd v Transform Composites Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 662 .… 16.21 Kemp v Baerselman [1906] 2 KB 604 .… 8.6 Kendall v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 341 .… 5.29 Kendell v Carnegie (2006) 68 NSWLR 193; [2006] NSWCA 302 .… 12.52 Kendells (NSW) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sweeney [2005] QSC 064 .… 10.41, 10.43 Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677; 143 ER 268 .… 4.22 — v Hill [1999] SASC 440 .… 21.23

— v Lee (1817) 3 Mer 441; 36 ER 170; [1814–23] All ER Rep 181 .… 28.6 — v Panama etc Royal Mail Co (1867) LR 2 QB 580; [1861–73] All ER Rep 2094 .… 11.44, 11.63 — v Thomassen [1929] 1 Ch 426; [1928] All ER Rep 525 .… 3.46 — v Vercoe (1960) 105 CLR 521; (1960) 34 ALJR 310 .… 18.28, 20.3, 20.9, 20.16, 21.12, 24.15 Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd, Re [1973] VR 161 .… 8.7 Kenny v Brierty [1982] VR 339 .… 10.6 — v Fenton [1971] NZLR 1 .… 11.52, 11.56 — v Sholl (1905) 7 WALR 197 .… 12.35 Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (No 2) Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 163 ALR 611; [1999] HCA 25 .… 7.41, 11.82, 11.83, 11.88, 11.118, 11.128, 11.146, 23.35, 23.36, 23.38, 23.39 Kent v Brown (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 124 .… 12.36 Kern Consulting Group Pty Ltd v Opus Capital Ltd (2014) 2 Qd R 379; [2014] QCA 111 .… 7.2, 7.35 Kerr v West Australian Trustee Executor & Agency Co Ltd (1937) 39 WALR 34 .… 14.7, 14.14 Kerridge v Simmonds (1906) 4 CLR 19; (1906) 4 CLR 253 .… 13.5, 18.20, 18.32 Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144 .… 11.145 Ketchell v Master Education Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 161 .… 18.7 Kewley v Ball [1913] VLR 412 .… 16.52 Kham & Nates Shoes No 2 Inc v First Bank of Whiting (1990) 908 F 2d 1351 .… 10.45 Khan v Khan (2004) 62 NSWLR 229; [2004] NSWSC 1189 .… 14.8, 14.15 Khatijabai v Zenab [1960] AC 316 .… 24.4 Khattar v Hills Shoppingtown Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 363 .… 10.30 Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd [2010] VSCA 355 .… 11.141 Kheng v Secola [2001] WASCA 3 .… 20.2, 20.8 Khoury v GIO of NSW (1984) 165 CLR 622; 54 ALR 639; 58 ALJR 502 .… 11.50 — v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1984) 54 ALR 639 .… 10.55, 10.58, 21.29

lxxxvii





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Khouri (2006) 66 NSWLR 241; [2006] NSWCA 184 .… 16.21, 16.60, 16.63, 16.65 — v Sidhu (No 2) [2010] FCA 1320 .… 11.129 Kilkerrin Investments Pty Ltd v Yiu Ying Mei Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 88 .… 10.12, 10.13 Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [2019] WASCA 156 .… 8.5 Kinch v Walcott [1929] AC 482 .… 12.52 King v Adams [2016] NSWSC 1798 .… 10.55 — v Cornell (1932) 50 WN (NSW) 50 .… 16.22 — v Coupland [1981] Qd R 21 .… 25.7 — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 184 ALR 98; [2001] FCA 308 .… 11.110 — v Grimwood (1891) 17 VLR 253 .… 16.58, 16.65 — v Ivanhoe Gold Corp Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 617 .… 6.5 — v Poggioli (1923) 32 CLR 222 .… 21.26, 24.10, 24.30 — v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1896] AC 250 .… 8.31 — v Yurisich [2005] FCA 1277 .… 11.112 King Mortgages Pty Ltd v Satchithanantham [2006] NSWSC 1303 .… 14.19, 15.28, 15.31 King, Re; Ex parte Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association (1858) 3 De G & J 63; 44 ER 1192 .… 17.42 Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell [1986] 1 WLR 119; [1986] 1 All ER 423 .… 14.17, 14.20 King’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett & Co Ltd (1897) 14 TLR 98 .… 12.59 Kingstream Steel Ltd v Stemcor UK Ltd [2001] WASCA 138 .… 22.2, 22.5 Kingswood Estate Co Ltd v Anderson [1963] 2 QB 169 .… 16.58 Kinivan v Maoudis (1988) ANZ ConvR 320 .… 6.11 Kintella Pty Ltd v Scotte [1999] ACTSC 100 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.41, 23.42 Kintominas v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475 .… 2.26, 16.69 Kirkby v Turner [2009] NSWCA 131 .… 6.15 Kirkham v Marter (1819) 2 B & Ald 613; 106 ER 490 .… 16.10 Kirwin v Pearson (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 162 .… 10.9

Kitching v Phillips (2011) 278 ALR 551; [2011] WASCA 19 .… 10.18 Kiwi Brands Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 160 ALR 1 .… 4.32 Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281; 131 ALR 363; [1995] HCA 4 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147, 23.8 KKL Investments Pty Ltd v Daikyo (North Queensland) Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 25 .… 21.14, 21.23 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corp Bhd [1988] 1 All ER 714; [1989] 1 All ER 785 .… 5.17 Klocek v Gateway, Inc (2000) 104 F Supp 2d 1332 .… 3.7 Klown Production Pty Ltd and Australian Trade Commission, Re (1992) 26 ALD 763 .… 3.37 Knezevic v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2013] NSWCA 199 .… 15.28 Knight v Mayart Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 36 .… 10.33 Knogo Corp v Halligan (1984) ATPR 40460 .… 18.38 Knowles v Fuller (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 243 .… 18.3 Knox v Gye (1872) LR 5 HL 656 .… 25.13 Koala Pty Ltd v Queenslodge Pty Ltd [1977] VR 164 .… 18.21 Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 845; [2005] HCA 15 .… 10.55, 10.60 Koellner v Breese (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 457 .… 16.54 Koenigsblatt v Sweet [1923] 2 .… 16.40 Koh v Pateman [2005] WASC 172 .… 22.5, 22.10 Koikas v Green Park Construction Pty Ltd [1970] VR 142 .… 20.8, 20.13 Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 (PC) .… 2.2, 16.67 Kolavo v Pitsikas [2003] NSWCA 59 .… 10.53, 10.56 Kollman v Watts [1963] VLR 396 .… 23.39 Kompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115; [2007] HCA 61 .… 27.1 Kone Elevators Pty Ltd v Canberra Southern Cross Club Ltd [1998] ACTSC 113 .… 10.2, 10.13, 22.12 — v McNay (No 1) (1997) ATPR 41-563 .… 18.38 Konstas v Southern Cross Pumps and Irrigation Pty Ltd (1996) 217 ALR 310 .… 8.53

lxxxviii

Table of Cases Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 5 .… 10.35 Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115; [2007] HCA 61 .… 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 21.22 Koops Martin Financial Services Pty Ltd v Reeves [2006] NSWSC 449 .… 18.37, 18.38 Korda v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 62; 317 ALR 225; [2015] HCA 6 .… 7.45, 7.46 Kostopoulos v GE Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 311 .… 2.5, 20.18, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 21.36 Kosciuszko Thredbo Pty Ltd v ThredboNet Marketing Pty Ltd (2014) 223 FCR 517; 311 ALR 656; [2014] FCAFC 87 .… 18.35 Kotulski v Attard [1981] 1 NSWLR 115 .… 25.7 Koutsonicolis v Principe (1987) 48 SASR 328 .… 23.43 Koutsopoulos v Pintusen (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 122 .… 21.29 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd (2008) 77 NSWLR 205; 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343 .… 11.112, 11.115, 15.28, 15.31 Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2018] SASCFC 44 .… 7.46, 7.47 — v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370; [2007] FCA 1069 .… 11.111 Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119 .… 23.19 Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563; 130 ALR 1; [1995] HCA 68 .… 11.10, 11.19, 11.32, 11.40, 11.45, 11.64, 11.76, 15.16 Kramer v Duggan (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 385; 72 WN (NSW) 255 .… 11.55, 11.64 — v McMahon [1970] 1 NSWR 194 .… 10.21, 11.45, 11.53, 11.69 Kranz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2003) 8 VR 310; [2003] VSCA 92 .… 14.18, 14.20, 15.18 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 .… 12.1, 19.19 Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.27 Krishell Pty Ltd v Nilant [2006] WASCA 223 .… 8.7 Kronenberg v Bridge (No 2) [2015] TASFC 9 .… 11.85



Kudeweh v T & J Kelleher Builders Pty Ltd [1990] VR 701 .… 3.61 Kudos Catering (UK) Ltd v Manchester Central Convention Complex Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 38 .… 10.73 Kullack v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-861 .… 11.112 Kumar Motors (Bankstown) Pty Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2016] NSWSC 1874 .… 20.20, 21.38 Kuper & Kuper v Keywest Constructions Pty Ltd [1990] 3 WAR 419 .… 10.41 Ku-ring-gai Council v Chan [2017] NSWCA 226 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.42 Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society, Re (No 12) Ltd (1978) 36 FLR 134 .… 11.111 Kurnell Developments Pty Ltd v Orica Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 163 .… 10.47 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 3 All ER 209 .… 11.127 Kuzmanovski v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (2010) 270 ALR 65; [2010] FCA 876 .… 7.38, 8.16 Kweifio-Okai v RMIT University [1999] FCA 1686 .… 21.18 KWS Capital Pty Ltd v Love [2015] WASCA 237 .… 10.16 Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 63 .… 15.8 Kylsilver Pty Ltd v One Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWC 226 .… 26.4 Kymbo Pty Ltd v Paxton Management Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 792 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.11, 24.7 Kyrwood v Drinkwater [2000] NSWCA 126 .… 10.32, 10.35, 10.41, 19.23, 21.12, 21.14, 21.19, 21.26, 21.27, 21.35 L L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 .… 10.16 L Shaddock & Assocs Pty Ltd v Parramatta CC (1981) 150 CLR 225 .… 11.41, 12.17 La Rosa v Nudrill Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA .… 10.72 La Rosa, Re; Ex parte Norgard v Rodpat Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 83; 104 ALR 237 .… 11.145, 11.154 La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 .… 11.146

lxxxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380 .… 14.7, 14.11, 14.15 Land & Homes (WA) Ltd v Hendry (1930) 33 WALR 89 .… 11.34 — v Roe (1936) 39 WALR 27 .… 17.36, 17.41 Land Rover Group Ltd v UPF (UK) Ltd (in administrative receivership) [2003] 2 BCLC 222 .… 24.21 Landall Construction and Development Co Pty Ltd v Bogaers [1980] WAR 33 .… 18.4 Landbank Tinana Pty Ltd v McKay [2006] .… 21.35 Lander v Trigger [1999] NSWSC 1253 .… 15.27 Landers v Schmidt [1983] 1 Qd R 188 .… 21.12, 21.24 Landpower Australia Pty Ltd v Penske Power Systems Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 161 .… 11.131, 11.133, 11.136 Lane v Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 45 .… 24.12 Lane Cove Council v Michael Davies Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 727 .… 11.150 Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 .… 3.29, 12.58 — v Le Boursicot (1993) 5 BPR 11,782 .… 25.13 Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Peluso [2006] 1 Qd R 42; [2005] QSC 112 .… 24.31 Langdon v Reuss (1883) 4 LR (NSW) Eq 28 .… 15.2 Lantry v Tomule Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 81 .… 20.1, 20.9, 21.26 Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365 .… 4.28 Larking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 221 .… 21.30, 21.31, 25.2 Larratt v Bankers and Traders Insurance Co Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 215 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.38 Lasermax Engineering Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia Ltd) [2005] NSWCA 66 .… 10.31, 10.32 Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 2 NSWLR 923 .… 16.56 Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Knight [1969] 2 NSWR 79 .… 3.45 Latella v L J Hooker Ltd (1985) ANZ ConvR 141 .… 11.104, 11.111, 11.124 Laurelmont Pty Ltd v Stockdale & Leggo (Queensland) Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 212 .… 10.39, 10.42, 10.43, 10.56

Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich [2013] NSWSC 97 .… 2.5 Lacey v Hayden [2000] NSWCA 182 .… 21.26 Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA 130 .… 23.45 Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 748 .… 10.32, 26.1, 26.3 Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWCA 169 .… 2.30, 10.6 Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 .… 3.27 Laing v Fidgeon (1815) 6 Taunt 108; 128 ER 974 .… 27.26 Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487 .… 12.60 Lake Koala Pty Ltd v Walker [1991] 2 Qd R 49 .… 11.111, 11.116, 11.117 Lake Macquarie Municipal Council v Bortolus Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 46 LGRA 292 .… 3.11 Lakomy v Accounting TEK Property Investment Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 1152 .… 10.26 Lakshmijit s/o Bhai Suchit v Faiz Mohammed Khan Sherani [1974] AC 605 .… 25.3 Lalor v Winfield [1925] VLR 306 .… 16.35 Lam v Ausintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd (1988) ASC 55-693 .… 15.28 — v — (1990) 97 FLR 458 .… 11.115 Lamare v Dixon (1873) LR 6 HL 414 .… 11.44 Lamb v Johnson (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 65 .… 11.10 — v Vice (1840) 6 M & W 467; 151 ER 495 .… 7.47 Lambert v Lewis (1982) AC 225 .… 23.38 Lamond v Calcraft (1945) 53 SR (NSW) 103 .… 24.24 Lamotte v Lamotte (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 99 .… 14.7 Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615) Hob 105; 80 ER 255 .… 4.20, 4.22 Lampropolous v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193 .… 15.10, 17.53 Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 3) [2014] WASC 162 .… 26.1, 26.8 Lamshed v Lamshed (1963) 109 CLR 440 .… 24.8 Lamson Paragon Ltd v Spicers (Australia) Ltd [1953] SASR 297 .… 10.62, 10.74, 23.11, 23.13, 23.39 xc

Table of Cases



Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd v DHK Retailers Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 81 .… 23.23 Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co 2016 SCC 37 .… 10.12 Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VSCA 262 .… 7.2, 10.16 Ledingham v Bermejo Estancia Co Ltd [1947] 1 All ER 749 .… 4.17, 6.7 Lee v Ah Gee [1920] VLR 278 .… 12.46, 12.66, 12.71, 15.9 — v Chai [2013] QSC 136 .… 14.5, 15.9 — v Gaskell (1876) LR 1 QBD 700 .… 16.25 — v Griffin (1861) .… 16.80 — v Simmons (1999) ANZ ConvR 372 .… 8.6 Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571 .… 2.21, 7.1, 11.114, 11.115, 11.124, 16.55, 18.49 Leeda Projects Pty Ltd v Zeng (2020) 61 VR 384; [2020] VSCA 192 .… 23.13 Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851 .… 24.31 Leeman v Stocks [1951] 1 .… 16.41, 16.42 Lees v Fleming [1980] Qd R 162 .… 16.23, 18.12, 18.43 Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Stores (1957) 86 NW 2d 689 .… 3.19 Left Bank Investments Pty Ltd v Ngunya Jarjum Aboriginal Corporation [2020] NSWCA 144 .… 3.15 Legal and General Life of Australia Ltd v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314 .… 5.1, 6.11 Legal Services Commissioner v Baker [2006] QCA 145 .… 26.6 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1; [1983] HCA 11 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.14, 2.16, 2.17, 10.3, 15.13, 21.24, 21.32, 21.35, 21.36, 23.45, 24.9 Leibler v Air New Zealand [1999] 1 VR 1 .… 12.53 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1985] QB 350 .… 7.42 Leighton v Parton [1976] 1 NZLR 165 .… 12.52 Leipner v McLean (1909) 8 CLR 306 .… 16.36 Leitch v Reynolds [2005] NSWCA 259 .… 23.19 Lempriere v Large (1879) 12 Ch D 675 .… 17.42

Laurence v Lexcourt Holdings Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1128 .… 11.13, 12.8, 12.25, 12.29 Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623 .… 10.36, 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.19, 21.20, 21.21, 21.35 Lauvan Pty Ltd v Bega (2018) 330 FLR 1; [2018] NSWSC 154 .… 15.28 Laver v Fielder (1862) 32 Beav 1; 55 ER 1 .… 16.20 Lavery v Pursell (1888) 39 Ch D 508; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1583 .… 16.25, 16.66, 24.5, 24.30 Lavin v Toppi (2015) 254 CLR 459; 316 ALR 366; [2015] HCA 4 .… 11.145 Law v Harragin (1917) 33 TLR 381 .… 12.12 — v Jones [1974] .… 16.38 Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138 .… 7.31 Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan Investment Survey Pty Ltd [1973] VR 293 .… 8.14, 8.18, 8.34 Lawley v Terrace Designs Pty Ltd (Domestic Building) [2006] VCAT 1363 .… 11.142 Lawrence v Ciantar [2020] NSWCA 89 .… 10.16 — v Fordham [1922] VLR 705 .… 16.45 Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563 .… 2.3, 2.28, 12.58 Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 .… 3.68, 3.73, 6.17, 8.55, 10.27 Laythoarp v Bryant (1836) 2 Bing (NC) 735 .… 16.48 LCA Marrickville Pty Ltd v Swiss Re International SE [2022] FCAFC 17 .… 10.30, 10.33 LCR Group v Bell [2016] QSC 130 .… 18.37 Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pty Ltd v Iliadis [1998] 4 VR 661; [1998] VSC 104 .… 5.13, 10.26, 10.62, 10.66, 10.69, 10.75 Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 244 .… 3.47 Leadenhall Australia Ltd v Peptech Ltd [2001] NSWCA 272 .… 11.82 Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa [2007] NSWSC 228 .… 26.8 Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 KB 86; [1950] 1 All ER 693 .… 11.49, 11.62, 11.67, 11.71, 12.18, 12.19 Leason Pty Ltd v Princes Farm Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 381 .… 10.26, 11.62, 11.63, 11.64, 11.65, 11.67 Lecky v Walter (1914) 1 IR 378 .… 11.63 xci



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Lemura v Coppola [1960] Qd R 308 .… 26.13 Lend Lease Custodian Pty Ltd v DCT [2006] FCA 1790 .… 21.36 Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 .… 17.13 Lennon v Scarlett & Co (1921) 29 CLR 499 .… 3.11, 21.12, 21.23 Leonard v Booth (1954) 91 CLR 452 .… 18.5, 18.45 Lepcanfin Pty Ltd v Lepfin Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 155 .… 10.30 Leroux v Brown (1852) 12 CB 801; 138 ER 1119 .… 16.48, 17.26 Les Affréteurs Reunis Société Anonyme v Walford [1919] AC 801 .… 7.43 Leslie Leithead Pty Ltd v Barber (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 172 .… 11.31 L’Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 .… 10.26, 12.64 — v — [1973] CLJ 104 .… 10.26 — v L’Estrange (1850) 13 Beav 281; 51 ER 08 .… 8.12 Levene v Brougham (1909) 25 TLR 265 .… 17.39 Leveraged Equities Ltd v Goodridge (2011) 191 FCR 71; 274 ALR 655; [2011] FCAFC 3 .… 8.5, 8.6, 8.34, 8.47 Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] QB 69 .… 10.64 Levy v Indooroopilly Golf Club [1990] 1 Qd R 316 .… 18.6 Lew Footwear Holdings Pty Ltd v Madden International Ltd [2014] VSC 320 .… 3.61, 11.145 Lewandowski v Mead Carney-BCA Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 640 .… 6.7 Lewes Nominees Pty Ltd v Strang (1983) 57 ALJR 823; 49 ALR 328 .… 3.61, 9.8 Lewis v Alleyne (1888) 4 TLR 560 .… 17.29 — v Averay [1971] 3 All ER 907; [1971] 3 WLR 603 .… 12.62, 12.63 — v Clay (1897) 67 LJ (QB) 224; [1895–9] All ER Rep 1738 .… 12.67 — v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528 .… 12.50, 12.52 — v Cook (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191 .… 2.24, 4.36 Lewis Construction (Engineering) Pty Ltd v Southern Electric Authority of Queensland (1976) 50 ALJR 769; 11 ALR 305 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.34, 10.40, 10.56, 10.60, 12.30, 12.32 Lewis Construction Co Pty Ltd v Tichauer SA [1966] VR 341 .… 3.60

Lexane Pty Ltd v Highfern Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 446 .… 21.36 Lezabar Pty Ltd v Hogan (1989) NSW ConvR 55-468 .… 3.11 Lezam Pty Ltd v Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 535; 107 ALR 291 .… 11.122, 11.145, 11.150 LG Thorne & Co Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A’asia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81 .… 10.4, 10.5 L’Huillier v Victoria [1996] 2 VR 465 .… 18.30, 23.15 Li v Liu [2022] NSWCA 67 .… 11.103, 18.46 — v So [2021] VSCA 32 .… 18.40 Liangis Investments Pty Ltd v Daplyn Pty Ltd (1994) ANZ Conv R 638; 117 FLR 28 .… 2.30, 10.6 Liberty Investments Pty Ltd v Sakatik Pty Ltd (NSWCA, Mahoney ACJ, 30 August 1996) .… 19.8, 19.17, 19.25 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch trading as Liberty Specialty Markets v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 126 .… 12.30 Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 Term Rep 63; 100 ER 35 .… 12.56, 12.62 Lido-Savoy Pty Ltd v Paredes [1872] VR 267 .… 18.37 Liebe v Molloy (1906) 4 CLR 221 .… 22.4, 26.8 Lieberman v Morris (1944) 69 CLR 69 .… 18.15, 18.16, 18.34 Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 94 .… 10.43, 23.7 Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 .… 6.17, 10.5, 10.9, 10.12, 10.31, 12.47, 12.64 Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431 .… 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38, 10.75 Lifoon Pty Ltd v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 .… 2.14, 16.37 Lighting by Design (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cannington Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 35 WAR 520; [2008] WASCA 23 .… 16.60, 16.64 Ligon Sixty-Three Pty Ltd v Clarkekann [2015] QSC 153 .… 8.8 Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339 .… 4.6, 4.10 Lim v Hong [2021] SGCA 43 .… 22.4 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 .… 7.7, 7.30, 8.1, 8.8

xcii

Table of Cases Linderstam v Barnett (1915) 19 CLR 528 .… 14.11 Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Lindsay v Cundy (1876) 1 QBD 348 .… 12.59 — v Smith [2002] 1 Qd R 610; [2001] QCA 229 .… 2.24 Lindsay-Owen v Associated Dairies Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1095 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.15, 19.22 — v Winton Partners Funds Management Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 78 .… 10.30, 10.35 Linfield Linen Pty Ltd v Nejain (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 280 .… 24.11 Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates and Co Ltd [2004] NSWSC 943 .… 10.18 Ling v Commonwealth (1994) 51 FCR 88; 123 ALR 65 .… 8.11, 10.41, 10.60 Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd v King [1995] 1 VR 574 .… 14.6 Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144; [2005] FCA 1812 .… 10.12 Lion White Lead Ltd v Rogers (1918) 25 CLR 533 .… 12.44 Lionsgate Australia Pty Ltd v Macquarie Private Portfolio Management Ltd [2007] NSWSC 371 .… 24.1, 24.4 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] AC 548 .… 26.5 Lipman v Lipman (1989) 13 Fam LR 1 .… 16.73, 16.75 Liristis v Wallville [2001] NSWSC 428 .… 21.12, 21.18, 21.23, 21.28, 21.35, 22.9 Liristis Holdings Pty Ltd v Q-Corp Marine Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 418 .… 24.21 Lisciandro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 69 FCR 180; 139 ALR 689 .… 10.35, 14.20, 15.7, 15.9 Lismore CC v Stewart (1989) 18 NSWLR 718 .… 5.28 Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 1 All ER 125 .… 11.140 Lithgow State Mine Railway Ltd v City of Greater Lithgow Mining Museum Inc (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1468 .… 4.12, 24.1, 24.19 Little v Law Institute of Victoria [1990] VR 257 .… 13.12 — v Trotman (1885) 6 ALT 252 .… 3.66



Littlefield v Shee (1831) 2 B & Ad 811; 109 ER 1343 .… 27.13 Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 .… 18.35 Liu v Adamson [2003] NSWSC 74 .… 14.17, 14.20 — v Chan [2020] QCA 25 .… 5.20 Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley & Ford [1927] VLR 523 .… 8.16 Liverpool Borough Bank; Duranty’s Case, Re (1858) 26 Beav 268; 53 ER 901 .… 11.44 Liverpool Holdings Ltd v Gordon Lynton Car Sales Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 103 .… 21.12, 21.18 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603; 157 ER 978. .… 8.47 Livingston v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) (1960) 107 CLR 411 .… 8.4 LJ Hooker Ltd v W J Adams Estates Pty Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 52 .… 3.71, 10.61 Llewellyn v Brown & Milton Pty Ltd (1961) 80 WN (NSW) 336 .… 16.54 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 .… 11.79 — v Lloyd [1964] WAR 219 .… 16.35 Lloyd Steel Co (Australia) Pty Ltd v Jade Shipping SA (1985) 1 NSWLR 212 .… 25.1, 25.12 Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1337 .… 7.7, 7.46, 7.47 Lloyd’s Bank Ltd, Re [1931] 1 Ch 289 .… 14.6 Lloyd’s Ships Holdings Pty Ltd v Davros Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 505 .… 6.8, 18.38 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11, 15.6 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886; [2003] NSWCA 74 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.6, 6.17, 10.4, 10.12, 19.23, 20.6, 23.24 Load v Green (1846) 15 M & W 216; 153 ER 828 .… 8.40 Loan Investment Corporation of Australasia v Bonner [1970] NZLR 724 .… 24.4, 24.5 Lobb v Vasey Housing Auxiliary (War Widows Guild) [1963] VR 239 .… 19.18, 19.22 Lockhart v Osman [1981] VR 57 .… 10.28, 10.65, 10.75 Loftus v Roberts (1902) 18 TLR 532 .… 4.17 Logan Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways [1960] Qd R 191 .… 5.28

xciii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Lohar Corporation Pty Ltd v Dibut Pty Ltd (1976) 1 BPR 9177 .… 21.26 Lombard Australia Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 45 .… 7.10 Lombardo v Development Underwriting (WA) Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 188 .… 18.4 — v Morgan [1957] VR 153 .… 20.16 Lombok Pty Ltd v Supetina Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 226 .… 22.9 Lomsargis v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] QSC 199 .… 23.2 London City Corp v Goree (1676) Lev 174; 3 Keb 677; 1 Vent 298; 83 ER 488 .… 27.19 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642; [1914-15] All ER Rep 1008 .… 7.31 London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne and Nagel International Ltd (1990) 70 DLR; [1992] 3 SCR 299; [1993] 1 WWR 1; (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261 .… 7.40, 7.41 London General Omnibus Ltd v Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72 .… 11.24 Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 .… 8.12 Long v Lloyd [1958] 1 WLR 753 .… 11.49, 11.67 — v Millar (1879) LR 4 CPD 450 .… 16.45 Longden v Kenalda Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 128 .… 23.6, 23.16, 23.24, 23.39 Longpocket Investments Pty Ltd v Hoadley (1985) NSW ConvR 55-244; 3 BPR 9606 .… 3.33 Longstaff v Keogh (1877) 3 VLR (Eq) 175 .… 11.38 Lonsdale v Whittaker (1915) 17 WALR 111 .… 16.35, 16.66 Lopes v Taranto [2018] VSCA 288 .… 10.12 Lopwell Pty Ltd v Clarke [2009] NSWCA 165 .… 14.3, 14.5, 15.1, 15.8, 15.9, 15.12 Lord v Trippe (1977) 14 ALR 129 .… 7.28, 7.29 Lord Buddha Pty Ltd (in liq) v Harpur (2013) 41 VR 159; [2013] VSCA 101 .… 11.122 Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108; [1925] All ER Rep 87 .… 7.47, 7.31 Lords v Von Thomann (No 2) (2014) 47 WAR 473; [2014] WASC 320 .… 23.26 Lott v Collins (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 104 .… 16.35

Loughridge v Lavery [1969] VR 912 .… 21.12, 21.28, 21.29 Louinder v Leis (1982) 56 ALJR 433; 149 CLR 509 .… 9.2, 10.36, 21.9, 21.19, 21.20, 21.35 Loumbos v Ward [2016] NSWSC 885 .… 15.8 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; (1994) 19 MULR 701 .… 14.5, 15.8, 15.9, 15.10 Love v Simmons [2016] WASCA 176 .… 21.26 Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 66 .… 24.22 Lovell and Christmas v Beauchamp [1894] AC 607; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1184 .… 17.20 Lowe v Evans [1989] 1 Qd R 295 .… 21.19 Lowe Pty Ltd v Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 180 .… 25.6 Lowick Rose LLP (in liq) v Swynson Ltd [2018] AC 313; [2017] UKSC 32 .… 26.1 Lowther v Kim [2003] 1 NZLR 327 .… 16.21 — v Lowther (1806) 13 Ves 95; 33 ER 230 .… 24.17 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360 .… 8.3 Lloyd v Tedesco (2002) 25 WAR 360; [2002] WASCA 63 .… 16.73 LSKF Holdings Pty Ltd v Shield Lifestone Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 129 .… 4.12 LT King Pty Ltd v Besser (2002) 172 FLR 140; [2002] VSC 354 .… 11.112 Lu v Lim (1993) 30 NSWLR 332 .… 18.37 Lucas v Public Transport Corp Victoria [2000] 1 VR 156; [2000] VSCA 35 .… 3.27 Lucas & Tait (Investments) Pty Ltd v Victoria Securities Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 268 .… 24.8 Lucas Drilling Pty Ltd v Armour Energy Ltd [2013] QCA 111 .… 24.23 Lucas Stuart Pty Ltd v Hemmes Hermitage Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 283 .… 24.23 Luce Optical v Budget Specs (Franchising) [2005] FCA 1486 .… 10.43 Luck v Ilka [1951] St R Qd 281 .… 16.35 Lucy v Commonwealth (1923) 33 CLR 229 .… 23.22 Ludlow Corp v Charlton (1840) 6 M & W 815; 151 ER 642 .… 17.70, 17.71 Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520 .… 12.4, 12.20, 12.27, 12.29, 12.54

xciv

Table of Cases Lukey v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 298 .… 11.145 Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; [2008] HCA 27 .… 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.8, 28.31 Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De G M & G 604; 42 ER 687 .… 24.25 Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286 .… 9.5, 21.12, 21.18, 23.1, 23.20 Luong v Du [2013] VSC 723 .… 12.68 Lutre Pty Ltd v Ellison (1997) 151 ALR 626 .… 18.3, 21.29 Luu v Sovereign Developments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 40 .… 23.45 Luu Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society Ltd (1999) 75 SASR 345 .… 23.19 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108; [1941] 1 All ER 33 .… 3.71 Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo [2011] NSWCA 303 .… 10.5, 10.16 Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] AC 653 .… 13.2 — v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428 .… 2.10, 2.14 Lyon v Home (1868) LR 6 Eq 655 .… 14.8 Lyons v Hughes (1875) 1 VLR (L) 1 .… 16.80 Lyth v Ault and Wood (1852) 7 Exch 669; 155 ER 117 .… 8.47 M M K & J A Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39 .… 10.3 M R Hornibrook (Pty) Ltd v Eric Newham (Wallerawang) Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 523 .… 12.33 MA & J Tripodi Pty Ltd v Swan Hill Chemicals Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 46 .… 23.16 Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 .… 4.2, 4.32 MA Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp (1999) 93 Wn App 819 .… 3.7 MAAG Developments Pty Ltd v Oxanda Childcare Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 289 .… 10.35, 12.30 Macarthur v Georgamlis (No 1) (1989) NSW ConvR 55-501 .… 3.68 Macaulay v Greater Paramount Theatres Ltd (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 64 .… 24.11 MacBain v Mailer (1886) 12 VLR 354 .… 11.15 MacCormac v Bradford [1927] SASR 152 .… 16.35

MacCormick v Nowland (1988) 10 ATPR 40-852 .… 11.110 Macdonald v Tully (1880) 5 QSCR 192 .… 23.39 MacDonald v Australian Wool Innovation Ltd [2005] FCA 105 .… 5.24, 6.6, 6.8, 23.15 — v Robbins (1954) 90 CLR 515 .… 7.29 — v Shinko Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 152 .… 10.7, 11.42, 12.31, 12.34 — v Yakiti Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 114 .… 15.10, 15.16 Macdonald Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd v Nikolas [2007] NSWSC 552 .… 23.45 Mace v Rutland House Textiles Ltd [2000] TLR 6 .… 12.38 MacFarlane v John Martin (1977) 1 ATPR 40-034 .… 11.119 Machirus Properties Ltd v Power Sports World (1987) Ltd (unreported, NZ High Crt, 26 May 1998) .… 2.16 MacIntosh v Bebarfalds Ltd (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 371 .… 24.20 Mack v Elvy (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 313 .… 25.5 Mackay v Brice (1979) 53 ALJR 603 .… 21.35 — v Dick (1881) App Cas 251 .… 10.41 — v Wilson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 315 .… 16.22 Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41 .… 3.49, 3.56, 16.35 Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590; [1966] 3 All ER 847 .… 11.22, 11.45, 11.60 Mackenzie v Albany Finance Ltd [2003] WASC 100; [2004] WASCA 301 .… 26.4, 26.9, 26.12 — v Rees (1941) 65 CLR 1 .… 21.13 — v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] AC 468 .… 11.13, 11.63 MacKinlay v Derry Dew Pty Ltd (2014) 46 WAR 247; [2014] WASCA 24 .… 6.17, 18.41, 23.35 Mackintosh v Baldock [2000] TASSC 6 .… 23.17 — v Johnson (2013) 37 VR 301; [2013] VSCA 10 .… 15.8, 15.9 Mackman v Stengold (1991) ATPR 41-105 .… 11.116, 11.121 Macks v Blacklaw & Shadforth Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 15 ACLC 341; 22 ACSR 641 .… 7.5 MacMillan v Mumby [2006] NSWCA 74 .… 3.15, 7.2, 12.56, 26.3 xcv





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Macquarie Bank Ltd v Meinhardt (NSW) Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1320 .… 11.136 — v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 .… 15.16 Macquarie Generation v CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040 .… 3.39, 3.65 — v Peabody Resources [2000] NSWCA 361 .… 11.20, 11.32, 11.33, 11.38, 11.40 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District (2020) 19 BPR 40,463; [2020] NSWCA 161 .… 10.44, 10.49 — v Sydney South West Area Health Service (2010) 15 BPR 28,563; [2010] NSWCA 268 .… 10.44, 21.26, 23.2 Macqueen v Frackelton (1909) 8 CLR 673 .… 5.10, 18.34 MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 .… 3.4, 3.21, 3.26, 3.28, 4.10, 4.17, 10.71, 22.12 MacVean v Woolcott (1889) 11 ALT 74 .… 11.19 Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305 .… 24.29, 24.30, 24.31 Madders v Walker (1995) 2 Qd R 386 .… 18.10, 18.12 Maddestra v Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 303 .… 10.13, 10.35 Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467; (2018) 265 CLR 522; [2018] HCA 39 .… 16.48, 16.54, 16.58, 16.59, 16.60 Magann v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta [2020] NSWCA 167 .… 15.31 Magee v Pennine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 QB 507; [1969] 2 All ER 891 .… 4.28, 12.26 Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 152 .… 10.31, 10.35, 18.35, 18.37 Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 9; (1997) 142 ALR 198 .… 8.7, 18.33 Magic Mountain Developments Pty Ltd v Laureate Australia Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 570 .… 20.8 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 231 ALR 277; [2006] HCA 51 .… 5.4, 11.75, 11.78, 11.82 — v National Australia Bank [2001] NSWCA 221 .… 10.16 Magman International Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 104 ALR 575 .… 11.147

Magnacrete Ltd v Douglas-Hill (1988) 48 SASR 565 .… 13.7, 24.7 Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 395 .… 3.46, 4.24 Magripilis v Baird [1924] St R Qd 303 .… 4.19 Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449; (1997) 188 CLR 449; [1997] HCA 23 .… 11.29, 11.45, 11.53, 14.13, 15.11 Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 12 .… 13.5, 13.7, 14.4, 15.8 — v Millennium Markets Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 174 .… 13.7 Mahommed v Unicomb [2017] NSWCA 65 .… 8.7 Mahoney v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522 .… 23.35 — v Lindsay (1980) 33 ALR 601 .… 9.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 21.26, 21.27 — v Purnell [1996] 3 All ER 61 .… 14.13, 14.15 Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727 .… 16.52, 16.64 Main Roads Property Group Pty Ltd v Pelligra and Sons Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 5 .… 11.139 Maine v Lyons (1913) 15 CLR 671 .… 18.2, 19.15 Mainieri v Cirillo (2014) 47 VR 127; [2014] VSCA 227 .… 16.72 Mainland Holdings Ltd v Szady [2002] NSWSC 699 .… 23.2 Mainline Investments Pty Ltd v Davlon Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 392 .… 16.22 Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 89 NSWLR 633; (2014) 310 ALR 113; [2014] NSWCA 184 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.35 Maio v City of Sterling (No 2) [2016] WASCA 45 .… 7.16 Maitland v Irving (1846) 15 Sim 437; 60 ER 688 .… 14.15 Maitland Holdings Pty Ltd v NTZ Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 710 .… 10.6 Maitland Main Collieries Pty Ltd v Xstrata Mt Owen Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1235 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.48, 10.49 Majeau Carrying Co Pty Ltd v Coastal Rutile Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 48 .… 10.54 Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225 .… 8.3, 12.36, 12.53 Majik Markets Pty Ltd v S & M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd (No 1) (1987) 10 NSWLR 49 .… 21.23, 21.29

xcvi

Table of Cases Major v Bretherton (1928) 41 CLR 62 .… 10.6 Major Engineering Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2011] VSCA 226 .… 10.77 — v Timelink Pacific Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 228 .… 10.61 Makings Custodian Pty Ltd v Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 33 .… 11.83, 11.121, 11.136 Mal Owen Consulting Pty Ltd v Ashcroft (2018) 97 NSWLR 1163; [2018] NSWCA 135 .… 23.16 Malabar RSL Sub-Branch Club Pty Ltd v RSL Custodians Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1016 .… 23.5 Malago Pty Ltd v AW Ellis Engineering Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 227 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.11 Malas v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; [1958] 1 All ER 262 .… 7.10, 7.50 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 .… 23.14, 23.15 Malhotra v Choudhury [1980] Ch 52; [1979] 1 All ER 186 .… 24.31 Malik v Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (in liq) [1998] AC 20 .… 10.52 Mallesons Stephen Jaques v Trenorth Ltd [1999] 1 VR 727 .… 23.35, 23.38 Mallett v Mallett (1984) 156 CLR 605 .… 16.75 Malliaris v Public Real Estate Bureau (1984) 112 LSJS 88 .… 20.13 Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66 .… 10.13 Malmsbury Confluence Gold-Mining Co Ltd v Tucker (1877) 3 VLR (L) 213 .… 16.25 Malozzi v Carapelli [1975) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 229 .… 6.8 Management Services Australia Pty Ltd v PM Works Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 107 .… 10.32 Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 .… 3.46, 372 Manco Ltd v Atlantic Forest Products Ltd (1971) 24 DLR (3d) 194 .… 3.44 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1992) 60 SASR 120 .… 23.45 Mander Forklift Pty Ltd v Dairy Farmers Co-operative (1990) ATPR (Digest) 46–061; BC9002635 .… 11.118 Mander Pty Ltd v Clements (2005) 30 WAR 46; [2005] WASCA 67 .… 12.30, 12.33



Manderson v Wright (No 2) [2018] VSC 162 .… 24.31 Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Mio Art Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 148 .… 8.25, 8.34 Mangrove Mountain Quarries Pty Ltd v Barlow [2007] NSWSC 492 .… 21.34 Mann v Capital Territory Health Commission (1982) 56 ALJR 261; 148 CLR 97 .… 23.19, 23.24, 23.34 — v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (2019) 267 CLR 560; 373 ALR 1; [2019] HCA 32 .… 6.1, 21.9, 21.38, 23.22, 26.1, 26.2, 26.6, 26.7, 28.17 Mann Judd v Papers Sales Australia (WA) Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 268 .… 23.40, 23.43, 23.44 Manna v Manna [2008] ACTSC 10 .… 12.25 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 945; [1997] AC 749 .… 3.46, 6.6, 10.35, 21.19 Mannix Electrical Pty Ltd v Belport Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 115 .… 25.12 Manock v South Australia (1979) 83 LSJS 64 .… 18.30 Manson v Thacker (1878) 7 Ch D 620 .… 11.63 Mantovani v Carapelli SpA [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375 .… 18.34 Manuel v Pasminco Cockle Creek Smelter Pty Ltd (1998) 83 IR 135 .… 5.26 Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd v Withers (1988) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-853 .… 10.12 Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 148 .… 21.15 Maralinga Pty Ltd v Major Enterprises Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 101; (1973) 128 CLR 336 .… 12.30, 12.34, 12.35, 12.53, 24.8 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 171 CLR 507 .… 11.82, 11.127, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38 Marchesi v Apostolou [2007] FCA 986 .… 21.36 Marco Productions Ltd v Pagola [1945] KB 111; [1945] 1 All ER 155 .… 24.25 Marcus Clarke (Vic) Ltd v Brown (1928) 40 CLR 540 .… 10.34, 10.40 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia (The Laconia) [1977] AC 8 .… 24.18 Marek v Australian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 .… 3.11

xcvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v CGA Fire & Accident Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 2 BCL 401 .… 18.34 Mareva Building Consultants v Zevon [2013] ACTCA 28 .… 22.9 Marginson v Ian Potter & Co (1976) 136 CLR 161 .… 16.7, 16.18 Margush v Maddeford (2014) 121 SASR 199; [2014] SASCFC 129 .… 20.2, 20.8, 21.19 Marinchek v Cabport Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 334 .… 4.28 Marist Brothers Community Inc v Shire of Harvey (1994) 14 WAR 69; [1995] ANZ ConvR 270 .… 3.6, 16.21 Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] AC 524 .… 19.23 Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority [1999] FCA 899 .… 13.7 Mark Sensing (Aust) Pty Ltd v Flammea [2003] VSCA .… 8.6 Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2013] QCA 379 .… 11.112 Market Terminal Pty Ltd v Dominion Insurance Co of Australia [1982] 1 NSWLR 105 .… 12.37 Markham v Bernales (1906) 8 WAR 208 .… 26.13 Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington CC [1985] 2 NZLR 520 .… 3.39, 3.24 Marks v CCH Australia [1999] 3 VR 513 .… 7.3, 7.43 — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; (1998) 196 CLR 494; 158 ALR 333; [1998] HCA 69 .… 10.2, 10.27, 11.104, 11.125, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147, 23.6, 23.8, 23.16 — v Hunt Bros (Sydney) Pty Ltd [1958] SR (NSW) 381 .… 10.6, 10.7 — v Jolly (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 351 .… 18.25, 18.47 — v Lilley [1959] 2 All ER 647 .… 24.5 Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742; [2015] UKSC 72 .… 10.40, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57 Marlow v Pitfield (1719) 1 P Wms 558; 24 ER 516 .… 17.5 Marmax Investments Pty Ltd v RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd (2015) 327 ALR 45; [2015] FCAFC 127 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44 Marminta Pty Ltd v French [2003] QCA 541 .… 22.9 Marquette v Walsh (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 298 .… 18.37

Marquis of Townshend v Stangroom (1801) 6 Ves 328; 31 ER 1076 .… 12.35 Marshall v Broadhurst (1831) 1 Cr & J 402; 148 ER 1480 .… 8.55 — v Colonial Bank of Australasia Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 632 .… 10.41 — v Glanvill [1917] 2 KB 87 .… 19.18 — v Green (1875) 1 CPD 35; [1874–80] All ER Rep 2198 .… 16.27 — v Marshall (1999) 1 Qd R 173 .… 18.39, 18.47, 18.48 Marshall, Re [1920] 1 Ch 284 .… 17.55 Martech International Pty Ltd v Energy World Corp Ltd [2006] FCA 1004; [2007] FCAFC 35; (2007) 248 ALR 353 .… 22.5, 22.7, 4.33 Martin v Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 222 .… 6.17 — v Gale (1876) 4 Ch D 428 .… 17.16 — v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297 .… 18.23, 18.28 — v Swan Aerated Water Co Ltd (1913) 15 WALR 112 .… 16.83 — v Tasmania Development and Resources (1999) 163 ALR 79 .… 11.111, 11.151 Marton v Evenwood Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 66 .… 10.26 Martyn v Glennan [1979] 2 NSWLR 234 .… 16.38 Marxen v Smith [1990] 3 NZLR 585 .… 6.11 Maskell v Horner [1915] 3 KB 106 .… 13.4, 13.6, 13.9 Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108 .… 13.4, 13.7, 13.9 — v Stevens (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 70 .… 16.48 Masonic Homes Ltd v Oppedisano & Platinum Property Retirement Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 196 .… 21.29 Massey v Johnson (1847) 1 Exch 241; 154 ER 102 .… 16.22 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320; 100 ER 1042 .… 8.10, 8.12 Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ketchell (2008) 236 CLR 101 .… 18.8, 18.10 Masters v Belpate Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 169 .… 20.16 — v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 .… 5.19, 5.24, 5.25, 6.8, 20.2 Masters Dairy Ltd v Nagy (1998) 156 ALR 262 .… 11.146 Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty Ltd v North East Solutions Pty Ltd [2017]

xcviii

Table of Cases VSCA 88 .… 10.12, 10.18, 10.44, 10.47, 23.16 Masters in Building Training Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 499 .… 10.45 Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234 .… 10.5, 10.12 Mastronardo v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2018] NSWCA 136 .… 15.16 Materials Fabrication Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 405 .… 18.34 Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) ATPR 41-192 .… 11.110 Mathew v Bobbins, The Times, 21 .… 14.6 Mathews v Mathews (1941) SASR 250 .… 22.9 Mathieson v Booth [2000] VSC 385 .… 10.41 — v Sunshine Wrappings Pty Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.21, 21.24 Matthes v Carter (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 357 .… 16.54 Matthew Short & Associates Pty Ltd v Riviera Marine (International) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 281 .… 7.42, 10.73 Matthews v Cool or Cosy Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 114 .… 26.14 — v Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777 .… 11.50 Mavaddat v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 94 .… 14.5, 14.10, 14.18, 14.19, 15.11 Mawson v Blane (1854) 10 Exch 206; 156 ER 417 .… 17.28 Maxcon Constructions Pty Ltd v Vadasz (No 2) [2017] SASCFC 2 .… 18.9, 18.14 Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559 .… 3.6, 3.32 Maxsujur Pty Ltd v Asimus [1980] 2 NSWLR 96 .… 21.19 May v Brahmbhatt [2013] NSWCA 309 .… 15.27 — v Gibson (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 79 .… 16.31, 16.51, 16.59 May & Butcher v R [1934] 2 KB 17n .… 6.6, 6.8 Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co (1953) 89 CLR 507 .… 10.5, 10.6, 10.60 Maye v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 14 .… 10.33



Mayfair Trading Co Pty Ltd v Dreyer (1958) 101 CLR 428 .… 16.55, 18.47 Maynard v Goode (1926) 37 CLR 529 .… 5.21, 6.6, 10.9, 10.16, 20.1, 20.4, 20.5, 20.9, 20.13 — v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia (1994) 11 WAR 1 .… 10.39, 10.50 Mayne Nickless Ltd v Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 108; [2001] FCA 1620 .… 11.146, 11.147 Mayor of Ludlow v Charlton (1840) 6 M & W 815; 151 ER 642 .… 17.71 Maywald v Riedel [1927] SASR 345 .… 16.52 MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 .… 10.12 Mbuzi v Griffith University [2016] FCAFC 10 .… 5.1 McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 187 .… 11.55, 11.85, 11.86 McArdle, Re [1951] Ch 669; [1951] 1 All ER 905 .… 4.19 McArthur v Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd [2001] QCA 317 .… 20.7, 26.11 McBean v Brown (1887) 13 VLR 726 .… 16.64, 16.66 McBride v Sandland (1918) 25 CLR 69 .… 7.1, 16.23, 16.60, 16.64, 16.67 McCann v Ngurli Ltd [1953] SASR 233 .… 15.2 — v Stark (1981) 2 BPR 9375 .… 24.10 — v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (2000) 176 ALR 711; 203 CLR 57 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 McCannell v Mabee MacLaren Motors Ltd (1926) 36 BCR 369 .… 3.8 McCarthy v Australian Rough Riders Association (1988) ATPR 49,017 .… 18.36 — v Cunningham (1877) 3 VLR (L) 59 .… 25.8 — v McIntyre [1999] FCA 784 .… 26.9, 11.124 McCarthy Bros (Milk Vendors) Pty Ltd v The Dairy Farmers’ Co-operative Milk Company Ltd (1945) 45 SR(NSW) 266 .… 18.22 McCartney v Orica Investments Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 337 .… 23.14 McCaughey v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 192 .… 8.4

xcix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 .… 17.46 McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 20; [2014] FCAFC 45 .… 18.37 McI v McI (1987) 10 NSWLR 243 .… 17.4 McIntosh v Dalwood (No 4) (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 415 .… 24.4, 24.5 — v Murphey 52 Haw 29 .… 16.67 — v Sashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 .… 8.27 McIntosh Hamson Hoare Govett v Pinnacle Properties [1995] QCA 156 .… 10.42, 26.6, 26.7 McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd [2010] 1 NZLR 463 .… 13.7, 13.9 — v Swyny (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 436 .… 11.13 McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 .… 14.20 McKain v RW Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1 .… 25.11 McKay v Gillespie (1885) 11 VLR 835 .… 22.5, 22.6 — v Hudson [2001] WASCA 387 .… 23.27 — v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] 1 VR 173; [1998] 4 VR 677 .… 4.10, 4.18, 13.9 McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC; Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC v James [2016] NSWCA 36 .… 3.40 McKellar v Singh [1999] WASC 145 .… 20.1, 20.8 McKendrick & Co Pty Ltd v Fush [2001] VSC 95; [2003] VSCA 88 .… 16.56, 16.61, 16.67 McKenna v McKenna [1984] VR 665 .… 27.1 — v Perecich [1973] WAR 56 .… 18.45 — v Richey [1950] VLR 360 .… 24.30, 24.31 McKenny v Drummond (1926) 29 WALR 6 .… 23.5, 23.9, 23.11, 23.26, 23.42 McKenzie v McDonald [1927] VLR 134 .… 11.29, 11.58, 14.6, 15.2, 15.11 — v Miller [2006] NSWCA 377 .… 11.1, 11.118 McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295 .… 5.10 McLachlan Consultants Pty Ltd v Boswell (1988) 30 IR 417 .… 18.37 McLarnon v McLarnon (1968) 112 Sol Jo 419 .… 13.3 McLaughlin v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 243 .… 12.56, 12.57, 12.63, 17.53

McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1959] SR (NSW) 122 .… 5.23 McCauley v FCT (1944) 69 CLR 235 .… 16.29 McClay v Seeligson (1904) 7 WALR 87 .… 9.5 McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club (2002) 191 ALR 759 .… 5.10 McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v QCLNG Pipeline Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 157 .… 23.2 McCormack v Bowen (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 621 .… 17.63 McCormick v Riverwood International (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 689 .… 11.111 McCourt v Cranston [2012] WASCA 60 .… 10.12 McCrohon v Harith [2010] NSWCA 67 .… 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.25 McCulloch v Fern (2002) 18 JCL 138; [2001] NSWSC 406 .… 14.8, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15 McCutcheon v David Macbrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 .… 10.29, 10.72 McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 .… 4.24, 4.28, 22.10, 22.11 — v BP Australia Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-547 .… 24.21 McDevitt v Kattengall (1879) 5 VLR (L) 89 .… 10.20 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 .… 16.15, 21.9, 21.38, 23.20, 26.4, 26.10, 26.12, 26.14 McDowell v Meader (1891) 13 .… 16.35 McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co Ltd [1935] AC 24 .… 4.8 McEwan v Dick (1985) 9 ACLR 1011 .… 4.6 McFarlane v Daniell (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 337 .… 18.41 McGavin v Gerraty (1911) 32 ALT 151; 17 ALR 85 .… 24.29 McGrath v Sturesteps [2011] NSWCA 315 .… 10.12 McGrath; Re Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230; 246 ALR 514; [2008] FCAFC 2 .… 11.117, 11.118 McGregor v Fraser (1913) 32 NZLR 1325 .… 8.7 McGruther v Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306 .… 7.12 McGuigan Investments Pty Ltd v Dalwood Vineyards Pty Ltd [1970] 1 NSWR 686 .… 18.35, 18.37 c

Table of Cases McRoss Developments Pty Ltd v Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 183 .… 19.16, 23.22 McTier v Haupt [1992] 1 VR 653 .… 20.1, 20.8 McWilliam v McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd (1964) 114 CLR 656 .… 20.3, 20.12, 24.16 McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v Booth Wine Transport (1992) 25 NSWLR 723 .… 11.115 Mealey v Mountains Development Group Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 830 .… 21.17, 21.18, 21.35 Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 .… 3.6 Mecca Brands Pty Ltd v Kingdom Animalia LLC [2021] VSC 761 .… 18.35, 22.12 Media Arts Group Pty Ltd v Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd [2000] WASC 68 .… 21.37 Media World Communications Ltd (Administrator Appointed), Re (2005) 216 ALR 105; [2005] FCA 51 .… 11.59 Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 135 FCR 1; 205 ALR 402; [2003] FCAFC 289 .… 11.110 Medina v Stoughton (1700) 1 Salk 210; 1 Ld Raym 593; 91 ER 1297 .… 27.26 Mediratta v Clark [2019] VSC 685 .… 10.41 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 .… 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 Medsara Pty Ltd v Sande [2005] NSWCA 40 .… 12.53 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151 .… 21.24 Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 .… 2.5, 3.68, 4.17, 5.25, 6.3, 6.6, 6.8, 6.18, 10.30, 18.23, 20.1, 20.4, 20.5, 20.7, 20.8, 20.16, 20.17 Meetfresh Franchising Pty Ltd v Ivanman Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 234 .… 23.12 Mehmet v Benson (1965) 113 CLR 295 .… 21.19, 21.24, 21.31, 24.8, 24.9, 24.10, 24.16, 25.14 Mehta v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) Aust Torts Rep 81-046 .… 11.115 Melbourne Banking Corp v Brougham (1879) 4 App Cas 156 .… 17.71 Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Ltd [2015] VSC 540 .… 11.127 Melbourne Linh Son Buddhist Society Inc v Gippsreal Ltd [2017] VSCA 161 .… 10.12, 23.45

— v Darcy (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 585 .… 17.5, 17.16 — v Freehill (1908) 5 CLR 858 .… 17.54 McLaurin v FCT (1961) 104 CLR 381 .… 23.32 McLean v Cooper (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 186 .… 16.66 McLean Tecnic Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 386 .… 11.127 McLeary v Swift [2012] NSWSC 1403 .… 7.9 McLennan v Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 46 .… 18.9, 18.11 McMahon v Ambrose [1987] VR 817 .… 24.2, 24.10, 24.31 — v National Foods Milk Ltd (2009) 25 VR 251; [2009] VSCA 153 .… 8.49, 10.7, 1835 McManus v Cooke (1887) 35 Ch D 681 .… 16.22 — v Fortescue (1907) 2 KB 1 .… 3.22 McMaster University v Wilchar Construction Ltd (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 9 .… 12.52 McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 1 .… 7.41, 11.109 McMurchy v Employsure Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 201 …. 18.37 McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352 (2018) 92 ALJ 76 .… 2.9, 16.73, 25.13 McNally v Waitzer [1981] 1 NSWLR 294 .… 21.19 McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis [2005] SASC 269 .… 16.37 McNulty v South East Queensland Electricity Board [1992] 2 Qd R 517 .… 15.16 McPhail v Darby (1879) 2 SCR (NSW)(NS) 225 .… 16.46 McPherson v Andrew Lees Ltd [1926] NZLR 523 .… 8.26 — v Moiler (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 535 .… 18.38 McPhillips v Ampol Petroleum (Vic) Pty Ltd (1990) 12 ATPR 41-014 .… 11.104, 11.108, 11.118, 11.147 McQueen v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [2017] QCA 259 .… 25.12 McRae v Bolaro Pty Ltd [2000] VSCA 72 .… 21.12, 21.14 — v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377; [1951] HCA 79 .… 3.42, 10.62, 10.74, 12.12, 12.16, 19.1, 19.13, 19.22, 23.9, 23.11, 23.12, 23.14, 23.24 ci





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v McLaurin & Tait (Developments) Pty Ltd (1976) 133 CLR 671 .… 19.13, 19.22, 19.25, 24.8, 24.10 Mermaids Café & Bar Pty Ltd v Elsafty Enterprises Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 271 .… 5.24 Merrell Associates Ltd v HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd .… 7.3 Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211; [1970] 2 All ER 760 .… 4.14, 5.4 Mersey Steel & Iron Co Ltd v Naylor, Benzon & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434 .… 21.12 Mertel v Rigney (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 122 .… 18.37 Merton Enterprises Pty Ltd v Nelson (1988) 13 NSWLR 454 .… 25.7 Messageries Imperiales Co v Baines (1863) 7 LT 763 .… 7.31 Metal Fabrications (Vic) Pty Ltd v Kelcey [1986] VR 507 .… 23.41, 23.43 Metal Roofing and Cladding Pty Ltd v Amcor Trading Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 472 .… 10.27, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.74, 23.26 Metalcorp Recyclers Pty Ltd v Metal Manufactures Ltd [2003] NSWCA 213 .… 11.115 Metcalf v Permanent Building Society (1993) 10 WAR 145 .… 10.31, 18.7, 18.8 Metcash Ltd v Joao Louis Jardim (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1042 .… 6.15 Metcash Trading Ltd v Hourigan’s IGA Umina Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 683 .… 11.112 Metha v Pereira Fernandes SA [2006] EWHC 813 .… 16.35 MetLife Insurance Ltd v RGA Reinsurance Company of Australia Ltd [2017] NSWCA 56 .… 10.32 Metro Chatswood Pty Ltd v CRI Chatswood Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWCA 49 .… 24.23 Metroplaza Pty Ltd v Girvan Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR 41-241 .… 3.36, 11.115 Metropolitan Gas Co v Federated Gas Employees’ Industrial Union (1925) 35 CLR 449 .… 10.32 Metropolitan Knitting and Hosiery Co Ltd (in liq) v Thomas Burnley & Sons Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 232 .… 16.84, 16.85 Metrotex Pty Ltd v Freight Investments Pty Ltd [1969] VR 9 .… 10.73, 10.76 Metway Leasing Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] QCA 54 .… 16.22, 16.37

Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner (2015) 229 FCR 221; [2015] FCAFC 20 .… 21.24, 21.38 Melic Pty Ltd v Lainson [2005] NSWSC 711 .… 10.12 Melverton v Commonwealth Development Bank (1989) ASC 55-921 .… 14.20, 15.27, 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160 .… 4.17 Mendel v Benjamin (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90-088 .… 3.30 Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 366 .… 3.26, 3.47 Mendelssohn v Normand [1970] 1 QB 177 .… 10.28 Menegazzo v Pricewaterhousecoopers (a Firm) [2016] QSC 94 .… 12.25 Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pty Ltd [1985] AC 511; [1985] 1 All ER 120 .… 24.31 Menhaden Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542 .… 11.111, 11.112 Mentink v Olsen [2020] NSWCA 182 .… 15.10 Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252; [1893] AC 317 .… 10.5 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 2 QB 242 .… 12.68, 12.69 Mercantile Credit Ltd v Spinks [1968] QWN 32 .… 17.5, 17.29, 17.42 Mercantile Credits Ltd v Comblas (1981-2) 40 ALR 75 .… 6.6, 6.17 — v Harry [1969] 2 NSWR 248 .… 6.5 Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 .… 5.20 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Neilson (2004) 28 WAR 206; [2004] WASCA 60 .… 7.3 Mercantile Union Guarantee Corp v Ball [1937] 2 KB 498; [1937] 3 All ER 1 .… 17.16 Meredith Projects v Fletcher Construction [2000] NSWSC 493 .… 2.9, 10.33, 20.1, 25.1, 25.5 Meredith v Anthony [1980] 2 NSWLR 784 .… 6.8 Meridian Financial Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Ltd [2003] FCA 891 .… 24.21 Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 223 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.34, 21.37 cii

Table of Cases



— v Luneburger Franchising Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 248 .… 23.16 — v New Zealand Alford Estate Co (1886) 32 CLD 266; [1886-90] All ER Rep 1726 .… 4.25, 4.26 Millar v Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 243 FCR 302; [2016] FCAFC 94 .… 5.11, 10.9 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357; 270 ALR 204; [2010] HCA 31 .… 11.115 Miller v Gulliver (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 176 .… 16.28, 16.36 — v JLCS Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 74 .… 10.16, 10.55, 21.12, 21.27 — v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; [2011] HCA 9 .… 18.9 — v Sutherland (1990) 14 Fam LR 416 .… 16.75 Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 .… 10.70 Milliner v Milliner (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 471 .… 5.4, 18.26 Milling v Hardie [2014] NSWCA 163 .… 16.69, 16.70 Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd (2015) 295 FLR 301; [2015] VSC 167 .… 23.32 Mills v Barber (1836) 1 M & W 425; 150 ER 500 .… 8.45 — v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 .… 18.35 — v Fowkes (1839) 6 Bing (NC) 455; 132 ER 1174 .… 25.11 — v Ruthol Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 1; [2004] NSWSC 547 .… 24.11, 24.30, 24.31 — v Stokman (1967) 116 CLR 61 .… 16.25 Milne v A-G for Tasmania (1956) 95 CLR 460 .… 5.28 — v Sydney Corp (1912) 14 CLR 54 .… 3.37 Milton v Proctor (1989) NSW ConvR 55450 .… 21.36 Minchillo v Ford [1995] 2 VR 594 .… 10.33 Mincode Pty Ltd v Isa Pty Ltd (1996) 17 WAR 245 .… 12.30, 12.37, 12.38 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) (2015) 329 ALR 1; [2015] FCA 825 .… 2.3, 2.5, 2.16, 10.3, 10.16, 10.43, 10.48, 10.55, 21.12, 21.26, 21.31, 21.36, 22.5 — v — [2016] WASCA 105 .… 24.22 — v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 69 .… 10.32, 10.34

Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 981 .… 11.147 MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150; [2010] SGCA 36 .… 23.39, 23.40 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 313 .… 11.82 Miba Pty Ltd v Nescor Industries Group Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 527 .… 11.121 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd (1999) 75 SASR 1; [1999] SASC 265 .… 11.96, 15.8 Michael v Barnes (1987) NSW ConvR 55-343 .… 3.68 Michelmore v Breen [1920] St R Qd 266 .… 16.32 Mid Density Development Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1992) 39 FCR 579. .… 11.107, 11.111 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 .… 10.43 Midaz Pty Ltd v Benberg Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 66 .… 10.33 Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak (2006) 67 NSWLR 569; [2006] NSWSC 844 .… 8.6, 8.18 Middleton v O’Neill (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 178 .… 18.3 Midland Bank Plc v Perry (1987) 56 P & CR 202 .… 14.17 — v Shephard [1988] 3 All ER 17 .… 14.6, 14.9 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp (a firm) [1979] Ch 384; [1978] 3 All ER 571 .… 25.5 Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd v Welsh [2006] WASC 122 .… 10.18, 22.5 Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446; [1962] 1 All ER 1 .… 7.37, 7.40 Mighell v Gargoura [2009] NSWSC 248 .… 15.26 Mihaljevic v Eiffel Tower Motors Pty Ltd [1973] VR 545 .… 10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 11.2, 11.53, 11.62, 11.76 Mikaelian v CSIRO (1999) 163 ALR 172 .… 3.67, 11.115, 11.124 Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42; [2007] VSCA 112 .… 3.11, 3.17, 3.19 Miles v Amos [2021] NSWCA 210 .… 8.9 — v Genesys Wealth Advisers Ltd [2009] NSWCA 25 .… 18.37 ciii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Misner v Australian Capital Territory (2002) 146 ACTR 1; [2000] ACTSC 87 .… 8.3, 12.30, 12.36 Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 .… 11.11, 11.85, 11.119, 11.146, 11.147 Mistrina Pty Ltd v Australian Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 223 .… 11.127, 11.128 Mitchell v 700 Young Street Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 42 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Leafs Gully Farm Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 92 .… 7.28 — v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 086; [2006] QSC 198; [2011] QCA 98 .… 4.35, 13.7, 14.4 — v Pattern Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 199 .… 20.6, 20.15, 20.18 — v Purnell Motors Pty Ltd [1961] NSWR 165 .… 8.42 — v Royal NSW Canine Council Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 242; [2001] NSWCA 162 .… 5.10 — v Valherie [2005] SASC 350 .… 11.10, 11.11, 11.119 Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd v Vella [2011] NSWCA 390 .… 11.136 Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission [2003] NSWCA 151 .… 10.59 Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd [2011] NSWCA 297 .… 10.35 Mizzi v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 37 .… 7.43 MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39; [2006] NSWSC 810 .… 2.6, 2.3, 10.7, 20.8, 20.15, 20.16, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31, 21.32 MLC Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 1971] AC 793 .… 11.80, 11.88 MLC Ltd v J & W Management Services Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 241 .… 11.124 MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May [2005] VSCA 29 .… 10.31, 23.2, 23.26, 24.4 Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Kosta (1969) 14 FLR 343 .… 3.46 — v McKenzie [1972] VR 315 .… 18.37 — v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 475; 153 ALR 198 .… 2.5, 3.71, 10.21, 23.14, 24.10 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v Development Auckland Ltd [2017] 1 NZLR 48; [2016] NZSC 89 .… 10.55

Minion v Graystone Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 157 .… 21.24 Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 v Halloran [2004] NSWCA 118 .… 3.14 Minister for Consumer Affairs v WW Vallack Real Estate Pty Ltd (1986) ASC 55-478 .… 15.26, 15.29 Minister for Education v Oxwell and Moreschini [1966] WAR 390 .… 18.26 Minister for Education & Training v Canham [2004] NSWSC 274 .… 12.27, 12.37 Minister for Immigration v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 .… 18.4 Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 .… 2.2 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30 .… 10.48 Minister for Industrial Affairs v Civil Tech Pty Ltd (1998) 70 SASR 394 .… 15.8 Minister for Lands (NSW) v King (1916) 22 CLR 193 .… 18.4 Minister for Lands and Forests v McPherson (1991) 22 NSWLR 687 .… 21.36 Minister for Transport v James Point Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 202 .… 21.30, 25.2 Minister for Youth and Community Services v Health and Research Employees’ Association of Australia (1987) 10 NSWLR 543 .… 5.28 Minister of Education v Oxwell [1966] WAR 39 .… 17.15 Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261 .… 19.25 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (Australia) Pty Ltd v Richards [1963] NSWR 1613 .… 18.37 Miotti v Belford [1962] NSWR 324; (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 98 .… 24.12 Mir Bros Trading Co Pty Ltd v Cavasinni Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1873 .… 10.36 Miraki v Griffith [2021] NSWCA 263 .… 26.4 Misiari v AFC Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 231 .… 20.13, 20.16 Misiaris v Saydels Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-474 .… 12.52, 12.53 Miskovic v Stryke Corporation Pty Ltd t/as KSS Security (No 2) (2011) 16 ANZ Ins Cas 61-873; [2010] NSWSC 1495 .… 10.33

civ

Table of Cases



Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1 .… 3.27, 3.29 Moonlighting International Pty Ltd v International Lighting Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 41 .… 24.21 Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2005) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30 .… 25.5 Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195 .… 8.6 — v Darton (1851) 4 De G & Sm 517; 64 ER 938; [1843-60] All ER Rep 814 .… 7.45 — v Lesbian Space Inc .… 18.43 — v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (2020) 268 CLR 326; [2020] HCA 17 .… 23.19 Moore & Co and Landauer & Co, Re [1921] 2 KB 519; [1921] All ER 466 .… 9.5 Moore Road Machinery (NSW) Pty Ltd v Sourry [1960] NSWR 227 .… 27.19 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1983) 156 CLR 414; (1984) 156 CLR 414 .… 10.41, 10.55 Moorhead v Brennan t/as Primavera Press (1991) 20 IPR 161 .… 10.41, 10.56 Moraitis Fresh Packaging (NSW) Pty Ltd v Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 626; [2008] NSWCA 327 .… 3.67, 10.35 Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5 .… 2.3, 2.29, 10.3, 21.28, 22.3, 22.6 Morehead v McIsaacs (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) (L) 295 .… 16.14 Morellini v Adams [2011] WASCA 84 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147 Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474 .… 25.12 — v Russell & Sons [1909] 1 KB 357 .… 16.25 — v Manner [1948] 1 KB 184 .… 19.18 Morgan Equipment Co v UMW Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] NSWCA 193 .… 10.32 Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC 56-095 .… 15.8 Morley v Loughnan [1893] 1 Ch 736 .… 14.14 Moromilov v Dragicevic [2013] ACTSC 91 .… 5.10 Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 2 All ER 725 .… 7.42 — v Hanley (2003) 173 FLR 83; [2003] NSWSC 42 .… 7.3 — v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.72

Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 .… 24.19, 24.21 Modern Weighbridge and Scale Services Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission (1995) 12 BCL 224; BC9503784 .… 8.8 Modifications Pty Ltd v Doyle (1991) NSW ConvR 55-578 .… 6.5 Moffatt Property Development Group Pty Ltd v Hebron Park Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 60 .… 5.24, 16.35 Mogg v Lord Raglan & St Arnaud Gold Mining Co (NL) (1878) 4 VLR (E) 138 .… 16.64 Mohamed v Farah [2004] NSWSC 482 .… 12.52 Mohr v Smith [1914] SALR 92 .… 21.12 Molodyski v Vema Australia Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55–446 .… 16.35 Molotu Pty Ltd v Solar Power Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-490 .… 21.29 Molton v Camroux (1848) 2 Exch 487; 154 ER 584 .… 17.56 Molyneux v Richard [1906] 1 Ch 34 .… 24.14 Monadelphous Engineering Pty Ltd v Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd [2014] QCA 330 .… 24.23 Monaghan County Council v Vaughan [1948] IR 306 .… 12.53 Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94 .… 11.145 Money v Money (No 2) [1966] 1 NSWR 348 .… 18.26, 18.40, 18.45 — v Ven-Lu-Ree Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 129 (PC) .… 6.11 Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 202 CLR 351; 177 ALR 390; [2001] HCA 2 .… 10.55, 10.56, 16.55, 23.37 Monk v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 .… 8.7 Monks v Poynice Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 662 .… 26.6, 26.8 Monroe Schneider Associates (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 397 .… 23.25 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 1056; (2002) 122 FCR 110; [2002] FCAFC 197 .… 11.112, 15.1, 15.16

cv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract MP Investments Nominees Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 43 .… 4.38 Mr Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 .… 11.118 MR Hornibrook (Pty) Ltd v Eric Newham (Wallerawang) Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 523 .… 20.1, 20.13 Mr Whippy Pty Ltd v Oceanwalk Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 8 .… 10.52 MSAS Cargo International Pty Ltd v AgfaGevaert Ltd [2000] VSCA 197 .… 10.18, 10.56, 10.61 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottone Anstalt [2015] 2 All ER (Comm 614) .… 21.10 Mulcahy v Hydro-Electric Commission (1998) 85 FCR 170; (1998) ATPR (Dig) 46-186 .… 11.111, 15.13 Mulherin v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] QSC 205 .… 7.18 Mulholland v Victorian Electoral Commission (2011) 247 FLR 230; [2011] VSC 89 .… 5.10 Mullett v Mason (1866) LR 1 CP 559 .… 11.85 Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 528; 191 ALR 402; [2001] FCA 226 .… 11.146, 11.147, 23.2 Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd v North Lanarkshirt Council [2011] 1 All ER 475 .… 10.32 Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Abgarus Pty Ltd (1992) 33 NSWLR 504 .… 23.45 — v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 61 .… 21.27 — v Suscindy Management Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 484 .… 10.34, 22.9 Multiplex Funds Management Ltd v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 275 .… 18.16 Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 84 ALR 700 .… 11.104, 11.121, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147 Munday and Shreeve v Western Australia [1962] WAR 65 .… 3.38, 5.28 Mundy, Re (1963) 19 ABC 165; [1963] ALR 264 .… 17.5 Municipal Council of Sydney v Australian Metal Co Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 550 .… 19.15 Munro v Morrison [1980] VR 83 .… 18.45 Murdoch v Mudgee Dolomite & Lime Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] NSWCA 12 .… 11.57

Morris, Re (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352 .… 18.34 Morris (dec’d), Re (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352 .… 18.15, 18.16 Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20 .… 24.1, 24.31 Morrison v Grosvenor (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 195 .… 26.13 Morrison-Knudsen International Co Inc v Commonwealth (1972) 46 ALJR 265 .… 11.88 Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 .… 2.13, 2.24, 2.29 Mortimer v Beckett [1920] 1 Ch 571; [1920] All ER Rep 179 .… 24.26 Morton v Baker [1993] FCA 111 .… 11.60 — v Elgin-Stuczynski (2008) 19 VR 294; [2008] VSCA 25 .… 10.16, 10.40 — v Tibbett (1850) 15 QB 428; 117 ER 520 .… 16.84 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 .… 16.15 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 581 .… 27.19 Mostia Constructions Pty Ltd v Cox [1994] 2 Qd R 555 .… 16.55, 18.49 Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65 .… 11.117, 23.1, 23.34, 23.39 Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 Mount Gambier Co-operative Milling Society Ltd v Williams [1921] SASR 185 .… 11.31 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 .… 23.18 Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd, Re (1963) 4 FLR 478; [1963] ALR 346 .… 3.19, 3.45 Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Pty Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 335 .… 8.12, 8.18 Mountstephen v Lakeman (1871) LR 7 QB 196 .… 16.14 Mouritz v Hegedus [1999] WASCA 1061 .… 10.66, 10.69, 10.75, 10.77, 23.18, 23.41 Mowie Fisheries Pty Ltd v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 57 .… 21.31 Moxey v Lawrence (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 378 .… 16.66

cvi

Table of Cases Murdock v Kennedy (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 191 .… 16.53, 16.54 Muriti v Prendergast [2005] NSWSC 281 .… 10.31 Murphy v Benson (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 66 .… 18.34 — v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138; (2004) 216 CLR 388; 204 ALR 26; [2004] HCA 3 .… 11.116, 11.125, 11.146, 11.147, 15.25 — v Simpson [1957] VR 598 .… 5.2, 5.7 — v Victoria (2014) 45 VR 119; 313 ALR 546; 289 FLR 337; [2014] VSCA 238 .… 11.99, 11.109, 11.111 — v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] FCA 1104 .… 11.111 — v Zamonex Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 439 .… 10.48, 11.149, 21.30 Murphy Corporation Ltd v Acumen Design & Development (Qld) Pty Ltd & Derek Graham Hooper (1995) 11 BCL 274 .… 3.34 Murray v Acraman (1875) 9 SALR 69 .… 16.85 — v Flavell (1883) 25 Ch D 89; [1881-5] All ER Rep 267 .… 7.44 Murray Goulburn Cooperative Co Ltd v Cobram Laundry Service Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 57 .… 3.34, 10.12, 10.18, 10.35, 21.12 Murray Irrigation Ltd v Balsdon [2006] NSWCA 253 .… 10.43, 21.10, 23.14, 23.39 Musca v Astle Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251 .… 11.146 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; (1987) 164 CLR 137 .… 16.73, 15.13, 16.72, 16.73, 16.75, 21.35 Musgrave v ACCC [2003] FCAFC 17 .… 11.110 Mushroom Composters Pty Ltd v IS & DE Robertson Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 1 .… 6.2 Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 .… 4.35, 4.38, 23.19 Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (‘The Lakatoi Express’) (1990) 19 NSWLR 285 .… 22.5 Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389 .… 13.3, 13.5, 13.8 Mutual Life and Citizens’ Assurance Co v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 628 .… 27.1 Mutual Life Assurance Society v Langley (1886) 32 Ch D 460 .… 8.18 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016]



3 WLR 1519; [2016] EWCA Civ 553 .… 4.35, 22.4 MWH Australia Pty Ltd v Wynton Stone Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (2010) 31 VR 575; [2010] VSCA 245 .… 10.77, 11.118, 11.127, 11.150 Myers v Transpacific Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-673; ATPR 47,421 .… 11.84, 11.85, 11.147 N NA Retail Solutions Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] FCA 259 .… 24.22 Naaman v Sleiman [2015] NSWCA 259 .… 21.38 NAB Ltd v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] NSWSC 253 .… 18.33 Nadinic v Cheryl Drinkwater as trustee for the Cheryl Drinkwater Trust [2020] NSWCA 2 .… 11.147 — v Drinkwater (2017) 94 NSWLR 518; [2017] NSWCA 114 .… 11.53, 11.56, 11.72, 11.76 Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633; [1966] 1 All ER 689 .… 7.33 Nagy v Masters Dairy Ltd (1997) 150 ALR 273 .… 6.14, 11.111, 11.115 Nangus Pty Ltd v Charles Donovan Pty Ltd [1989] VR 184 .… 23.23, 23.25 Narain v Euroasia (Pacific) Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 290 .… 14.16, 15.9 Narhex Australia Pty Ltd v Sunspot Products Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-036 .… 11.123 Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 50 ALR 417 .… 10.16 Narni Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] VSCA 31 .… 10.55, 10.56, 10.59, 10.60, 10.61, 23.19, 23.24, 23.25 Nash v Hodgson (1855) 6 De GM & G 474 .… 25.11 — v Inman [1908] 2 KB 1; [1908–10] All ER Rep 317 .… 17.5, 17.6, 17.8, 17.10 Nashco Pty Ltd v Yang [2022] NSWCA 137 .… 8.6 Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 269 .… 10.6 National Australia Bank Ltd v Budget Stationery Supplies Pty Ltd (1997) 217 ALR 365; 9 BPR 97804 .… 6.1, 6.5, 10.2, 10.3, 10.7, 10.33, 12.31, 26.3 — v Clowes [2013] NSWCA 179 .… 6.5, 10.35, 12.41 — v Dionys as Trustee for the Angel Family Trust [2016] NSWCA 242 .… 10.66, 10.70

cvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Hall (1993) ASC 56-234; NSW ConvR 55-684 .… 15.5, 15.29 — v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 .… 10.56, 10.58 — v McKay (1995) ATPR 41-409 .… 15.16 — v Meek [2007] WASC 11 .… 15.16 — v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 18 .… 23.35, 23.39 — v Nobile (1988) ATPR 40-856 .… 15.5 National Bank Ltd v Savage [2013] NSWSC 1718 .… 15.9 National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (1982) 9 Syd LR 674 .… 19.25 National Engineering Pty Ltd v Chilco Enterprises Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 291 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 23.2 National Engineering v Chilco [1999] NSWSC 1105 .… 21.37 National Equity Financial Services Pty Ltd v The Home Loans Group Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 310 .… 21.24 National Executors and Trustees Co of Tasmania Ltd v Edwards [1957] Tas SR 182 .… 7.45 National Foods Milk Ltd v McMahon Milk Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 150 .… 23.34 National Insurance Co of New Zealand v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 .… 11.146 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v S H Hallas Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 531 .… 18.3, 18.23, 18.25, 18.28 — v Walsh (1987) 8 NSWLR 585 .… 26.3, 26.5 National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 27 FLR 404; 6 ACTR 1 .… 8.18 National Mutual Property Services v Citibank Savings (1995) 132 ALR 514; [1995] FCA 1628 .… 8.7 National Oil Pty Ltd v Stephenson (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 51 .… 10.4 National Permanent Benefit Building Society, Re (1869) LR 5 Ch App 309 .… 17.5, 17.29 National Phonograph Co of Australia Ltd v Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481 .… 7.12 National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (NRMA) v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2019] FCA 1491 .… 11.111 — v Whitlam [2007] NSWCA 81 .… 10.7, 10.33, 10.58, 10.60

National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australia Ltd v Abercromby & Beatty Pty Ltd [1965] VR 675 .… 21.17 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 AC 686; [1985] 2 WLR 588 .… 2.6, 12.66, 14.5, 14.10, 14.12, 15.6, 15.7 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Vass [2018] NSWCA 259 .… 3.29 Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 .… 3.6, 3.67 Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook [2007] NSWSC 121 .… 26.1, 26.8 Nature Resorts Ltd v First Citizens Bank Ltd [2022] UKPC 10 .… 14.1 Nav Canada v Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc (2008) 290 DLR (4th) 405; 49 CBLJ 256 .… 4.35, 13.6 Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 .… 23.14 NCON Australia Ltd v Spotlight Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] VSC 604 .… 23.24 NEA Pty Ltd v Magenta Mining Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 106; [2007] WASCA70 .… 10.73, 11.118, 11.150 Neal v Ayers (1940) 63 CLR 524 .… 18.3, 18.24, 18.25, 18.44 Neal, Re; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659 .… 2.15 Neale v Ancher Mortlock & Woolley Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 72 .… 21.38 — v Richardson [1938] 1 All ER 753 .… 6.11 Neate v Parfit [2006] WASC 121 .… 20.15 Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd v Phillips (1974) 131 CLR 286 .… 21.19, 21.20, 24.28 Neill v Hewens (1953) 89 CLR 1 .… 16.40 Neilsen v Hempston Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 302 .… 11.86, 11.123 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd [2002] WASC 231 .… 7.3 Nelson v Bellamy [2000] NSWSC 182 .… 11.111, 21.21, 23.22, 23.25, 23.39 — v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 .… 11.103, 18.1, 18.9, 18.10, 18.12, 18.14, 18.20, 18.40, 18.45, 18.46 — v Moorcraft (2014) 318 ALR 621; [2014] WASCA 212 .… 19.5 — v Stocker (1859) 4 De G & J 458; 45 ER 178; [1843–60] All ER Rep 865 .… 17.41 Nemeth v Australian Litigation Funders Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 198 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406 .… 10.5, 10.7, 10.25, 19.7

cviii

Table of Cases



New South Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 178; (2002) 54 NSWLR 503; [2002] NSWSC 178 .… 6.16, 10.41, 10.49, 10.56 New Standard Energy PEL 570 Ltd v Outback Energy Hunter Pty Ltd [2019] SASCFC 132 .… 10.41, 10.42 New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 .… 10.13 New Zealand Licensed Rest Homes Associated Inc v Midland Regional Health Authority (unreported, NZ High Crt, 15 June 1999) .… 6.15, 28.21 New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co v Howes (1891) 4 QLJ 73 .… 11.44, 11.67 New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd [2004] VSCA 163 .… 2.13 New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154 .… 3.4, 3.28, 3.40, 4.7, 4.8, 4.34, 7.38 Newbigging v Adam (1886) 34 Ch D 582; [1886–90] All ER Rep 975 .… 11.53, 11.55 Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 52 CLR 723 .… 20.8, 20.9, 20.15, 21.23, 21.29 Newcastle Diocese Trustees v Ebbeck (1960) 104 CLR 394 .… 18.26 Newcombe v Chapple (1985) 3 BPR 9391 .… 24.4 Newell v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 311 .… 10.30 Newey v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] NSWCA 319 .… 10.12, 12.30, 12.39 Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 .… 8.40 Newham v Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 117 FLR 429 .… 18.6, 18.12 Newitt v Leitch (1997) 6 Tas R 396 .… 18.3, 26.4 Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd (1959) SR (NSW) 130 .… 3.34 Newman v Ivermee (1989) NSW ConvR 55-493 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.8, 12.68, 12.69, 15.31 Newmont Pty Ltd v Laverton Nickel NL (1982) 44 ALR 598 .… 5.25, 20.4, 20.8, 20.16 News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 58 FCR 447; 135 ALR 33; 139 ALR 193 .… 5.10, 7.43, 10.41, 10.43, 11.111, 13.7, 18.42

Nemtsas v Nemtsas [1957] VR 191 .… 12.46, 12.66 Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v City of Penrith (1989) NSW Conv R 55438 .… 2.14 Neptune Hospitality Pty Ltd v Ozmen Entertainment Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 47 .… 10.44, 21.34 Nessmine Pty Ltd v Devuso Pty Ltd (1990) ANZ ConvR 298 .… 3.69 Netaf Pty Ltd v Bikane Pty Ltd (1990) 92 ALR 490 .… 11.146, 11.150 Netglory Pty Ltd v Caratti [2013] WASC 364 .… 25.3 Netline Pty Ltd v QAV Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 131 …. 23.2 Network Ten Pty Ltd v Fulwood (1995) 62 IR 43 .… 24.24 — v TX Australia Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 312 .… 6.11 Neuchatel Asphalte Co Ltd v Barnett [1957] 1 WLR 356 .… 6.5 Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Traspunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2011] 2 Qd R 114; [2010] QCA 119 .… 2.2, 11.149 Neville v Kelly (1862) 12 CBNS 740; 142 ER 1333 .… 3.40 New Dragon Investments Pty Ltd v Morgan and Banks Development Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1139 .… 22.10 New Hart Builders Ltd v Brindley [1975] .… 16.61 New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455 .… 17.74 — v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12 .… 23.14 — v Moss [2000] NSWCA 133 .… 23.15, 23.29 — v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235 .… 23.19 — v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 .… 2.5, 2.13, 3.11, 11.111 — v Stevens (2013) 82 NSWLR 106 .… 23.2 New South Wales Cancer Council v Sarfaty (1992) 28 NSWLR 68 .… 23.14 New South Wales Lotteries Corporation Pty Ltd v Kuzmanovski [2011] FCAFC 106 .… 8.16, 10.27 New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 740 .… 12.30, 12.31, 12.33, 12.39, 12.40 New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd v Council of the Municipality of Glebe (1937) SR (NSW) 288 .… 2.7, 16.68 cix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Nitopi v Nitopi [2022] NSWCA 162 .… 15.9, 15.10 Nitschke v Rossair Pty Ltd (1989) 97 FLR 54 .… 7.3 Nixon v Furphy (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 151 .… 13.7 — v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 453; 165 ALR 515; [1999] FCA 1107 .… 11.146, 11.147 — v Slater and Gordon (2000) 175 ALR 15 .… 11.112 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (2000) 107 FCR 270; 186 ALR 442; [2000] FCA 1558 .… 10.67, 11.108 No Fuss Finance Pty Ltd v Miller [2006] NSWSC 630 .… 15.28 No TasWind Farm Group Inc v HydroElectric Corporation (No 2) [2014] FCA 348 .… 11.111 Nobes v Australian Cricket Board (1991, unreported) .… 18.36 Nobile v National Australia Bank Ltd (1987) 9 ATPR 40-787 .… 11.112 — v Maddison (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 435 .… 18.41 Noble v Public Trustee of Queensland [1994] 1 Qd R 402 .… 18.6 — v Victoria [1999] QCA 110 .… 26.9 Nobleza v Lampl (1986) 85 FLR 147 .… 12.36, 16.67, 24.10 Nock v Maddern [2018] NSWCA 239 .… 2.5 Nocton v Ashburton [1914] AC 932; [1914–15] All ER Rep 45 .… 11.36, 11.88, 14.6, 15.2 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014; [1940] 3 All ER 549 .… 8.6 Nolan v Nolan [2004] VSCA 109 .… 25.13 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 11 ATPR 40-982 .… 15.9 Nonferral (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia (1998) 43 NSWLR 312 .… 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.19, 18.20 Noonan v Martin (1987) 10 NSWLR 402 .… 8.16 Noor Al Houda Islamic College Pty Ltd v Bankstown Airport Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 625; 189 FLR 14; [2005] NSWSC 20 .… 11.115 Noosa Shire Council v Farr [2001] QSC 60 .… 7.38 Noranda Australia Ltd v Lachlan Resources NL (1988) 14 NSWLR 1 .… 10.43

Newton v Gapes (1910) 12 WALR 86 .… 18.33 Newton, Bellamy and Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431 .… 4.27, 25.1 Newton-King v Wilkinson [1976] 2 NZLR 321 .… 16.38 Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560; [1964] 3 All ER 532 .… 11.48 Next Stage Living Moonee Ponds Pty Ltd v Ardmillan Places Nominees Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 89 .… 21.12 Nextra Australia Pty Ltd v Fletcher (2014) 17(6) INTLB 138 .… 11.104 Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 270 .… 21.19 — v Clyde Securities Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 443 .… 10.52 — v Filmlock Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 389 .… 23.26 Nguyen v Luxury Design Homes Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 178 .… 23.6, 26.6 — v Taylor (1992) 27 NSWLR 48 .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.31, 16.21 Nicholas v Thompson [1924] VLR 554 .… 11.40 Nichols v Earth Spirit Home Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 219 .… 16.55 Nicholson and Venn v Smith Marriott (1947) 177 LT 189 .… 12.18 Nicolazzo v Harb [2009] VSCA 79 .… 10.4 Nicolene Ltd v Simmonds [1953] 1 QB 543 .… 6.17 Nicvara Nominees Pty Ltd v Humich Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 243 .… 10.41 Nield v Davidson (1890) 11 LR (NSW) Eq 209 .… 12.55 Niesmann v Collingridge (1921) 29 CLR 177 .… 5.21, 5.24, 6.8, 20.2 Nikolaidis v Satouris (2014) 317 ALR 761; [2014] NSWCA 448 .… 11.112 Nilant v Plexipack Packaging Services Pty Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 428 .… 7.5 Nina’s Bar Bistro Pty Ltd v MBE Corp (Sydney) Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 613 .… 21.12, 21.26 Nine Films and Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2005] FCA 1404 .… 11.116 Nissho Iwai (Australia) Ltd v Oskar [1984] WAR 53 .… 22.11 Nissho Iwai Australia Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1989) 167 CLR 219; [1989] HCA 32 .… 1.75, 10.32, 10.64, 10.73, 10.74, 10.75 Nisyrios v Pavia (1985) ASC 55-409 .… 11.93 cx

Table of Cases



Northumberland and Durham District Banking Co, Re; Ex parte Bigge (1858) 28 LJ (Ch) 50 .… 11.33 Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523 .… 18.11, 18.12, 18.23, 18.47, 24.7, 24.30 — v Relly (1764) 2 Eden 286; 28 ER 908 .… 14.8 Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Icecream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635 .… 23.37 Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 233 .… 3.68, 10.30, 11.112, 11.116 Norwest Beef Industries Ltd v Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Co (1987) 8 NSWLR 568 .… 10.5 Norwich CC v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 .… 7.41, 7.42 Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Price [1934] AC 455; [1934] All ER Rep 352 .… 12.18 Nosic v Zurich Australian Life Insurance Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 67 .… 10.5 Noske v McGinnis (1932) 47 CLR 563 .… 23.6 Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff 246; 66 ER 103; [1843–60] All ER Rep 764 .… 14.8 Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v Thurstan [1903] AC 6 .… 17.18, 17.29 Novamaze Pty Ltd v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1995) 128 ALR 540 .… 18.34 Novawest Contracting Pty Ltd v Taras Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] VSC 205 .… 10.61 NR Pty Ltd v Kearney [2000] ACTSC 92 .… 22.12 NRM Corporation Pty Ltd v ACCC [2016] FCAFC 98 .… 15.1, 15.16, 15.22 NRMA Ltd v Morgan [1999] NSWSC 407 .… 23.8, 23.11, 23.12, 23.35, 23.38, 23.43 NSW Association of Operative Plasterers v Sadler (1918) AR (NSW) 159 .… 13.3 NSW Cancer Council v Sarfaty (1992) 28 NSWLR 68 .… 10.5, 10.15, 10.41, 23.14, 23.32 NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 740 .… 12.41, 12.42 NSW Rifle Association Inc v Commonwealth (2012) 293 ALR 158; 266 FLR 13; [2012] NSWSC 818 .… 10.43 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [2001] FCA 334; (2001) 184 ALR 481 .… 10.7, 10.42, 10.43, 10.45, 10.56

Norco Co-operative Ltd v Parmalat Australia Ltd [2006] QSC 038 .… 10.35 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535 .… 18.37 Norfolk Estates Ltd v Cadiz Corp Pty Ltd (1977) 8 ATR 77 .… 12.33 Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 .… 8.3, 8.4, 8.9, 8.10, 8.12, 8.16, 8.18, 8.20, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.34, 8.35, 8.37, 8.38, 8.39, 8.46 Norman Baker Pty Ltd v Baker (1978) 3 ACLR 856 .… 17.22 Norman, Re; Forest Enterprises Ltd v FEA Plantation Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 97; 280 ALR 470; [2011] FCAFC 99 .… 5.17 Norrie v Senate of the University of Auckland [1984] 1 NZLR 129 .… 5.1 Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 .… 11.88 Nortel Australia Pty Ltd v Portfolio Leasing Australia Ltd (1998) 8 BPR 15,857 .… 3.44 North v Loomes [1919] 1 .… 16.41 — v Marra (1981) 148 CLR 42; [2003] NSWSC 64 .… 10.33, 18.1, 18.19, 18.21, 18.22, 18.40, 18.41, 18.43 North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd (2012) 285 ALR 217; [2012] FCAFC 1; (2010) 269 ALR 262; [2010] FCAFC 60 .… 11.83, 11.117 North East Solution Pty Ltd v Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 1 .… 6.16, 10.47 North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 89; [1979] 3 WLR 419; [1979] QB 705 .… 4.33, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, 13.9, 13.11 North Western Railway Co v M’Michael (l850) 5 Exch 114 .… 17.19 Northcliffe Constructions Pty Ltd v Stein [2000] NSWSC 1216 .… 6.16 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 146 ALR 572; [1997] HCA 39 .… 7.17, 7.18 Northern Territory v Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 20 .… 3.37 Northern Territory of Australia v Skywest Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 2 .… 18.30 Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146; 93 ALR 385 .… 17.70 Northstate Carpet Mills Pty Ltd v B R Industries Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1057 .… 3.45 cxi



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Trevor [2000] WASC 254 .… 8.9 Nudgee Bakery Pty Ltd’s Agreement, Re [1971] Qd R 24 .… 10.54 Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v The Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635.... 10.41, 10.52, 18.35 Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 .… 3.10, 3.61, 3.62 Nunkuwarrin Yunti v AL Seeley Constructions Pty Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 21 .… 16.55, 18.49 Nurisvan Investment Ltd v Anyoption Holdings [2017] VSCA 141 .… 5.24, 7.2, 10.16 Nyhuis v Anton [1980] Qd R 34 .… 20.3 Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin [2017] FCAFC 59 .… 11.111 NZI Capital Corp Ltd v Poignand (1997) ATPR 41-586 .… 11.56 NZI Insurance Australia Ltd v Baryzcka (2003) 85 SASR 497; [2003] SASC 190 .… 6.2, 6.8 O Oak Capital Mortgage Fund Ltd v Dlakic [2019] NSWSC 1538 .… 15.28 Oakacre Ltd v Claire Cleaners (Holdings) Ltd [1982] Ch 197; [1981] 3 All ER 667 .… 24.31 Oakes v Turquand and Harding (1867) LR 2 HL 325; [1861–73] All ER Rep 738 .… 11.59 Obeid v ACCC (2014) 226 FCR 471; 316 ALR 457; [2014] FCAFC 155 .… 11.111 O’Brien v ANZ Bank Ltd (1971) 5 SASR 347 .… 12.66, 15.2, 15.11, 25.14 — v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295 .… 21.19 — v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-028 .… 15.28 — v Melbank Corp Ltd (1991) 7 ACSR 19 .… 18.11, 18.41 — v Smolonogov (1984) 53 ALR 107 .… 11.107, 11.111 O’Callaghan v Lloyd Aviation Pty Ltd [1982] VR 387 .… 25.6 — v Olsen [1948] SASR 123 .… 6.8 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp v Skibs A/S Avanti [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293 .… 11.79, 13.7 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1987) ASC 55-568; (1988) 165 CLR 197 .… 3.4, 3.21, 3.26, 10.26, 10.27, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.70, 10.71, 15.26, 18.34, 22.12

Ockerby & Co Ltd v Watson (1918) 25 CLR 431 .… 19.13, 19.22 O’Connor v Leaw Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 285 .… 16.55, 18.49 — v S P Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248 .… 11.50, 21.29, 21.30 O’Connor’s Bills of Costs, Re [1993] 1 Qd R 423 .… 18.20, 18.49 Octra Nominees Pty Ltd v Chipper [2007] FCAFC 92 .… 3.67 O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 45 ALR 632; 152 CLR 359 .… 23.45 O’Dempsey v Hansen [1939] QWN 22 .… 10.23 O’Donnell v Thor Industries Pty Ltd (1977) 136 CLR 296 .… 10.57 Offer-Hoar v Larkstore Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 2926; [2006] EWCA Civ 1079 .… 8.40 Official Receiver v Cargo Superintendents (London) Ltd and Schebsman [1944] Ch 83; [1943] 2 All ER 768 .… 7.44 — v Feldman [1972] 4 SASR 246 .… 11.50 Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 641 .… 2.16 Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748; 142 ER 1336 .… 3.38, 3.71 Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VR 1041 .… 25.3, 25.8, 26.12 — v Ryan [1976] 2 NSWLR 504 .… 16.60, 16.76 Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.20, 21.29, 21.30, 21.38, 23.20, 23.21, 24.32 O’Halloran Enterprises Pty Ltd v Farr [1979] VR 33 .… 3.68 — v Williamson [1979] VR 33 .… 7.28 O’Keefe v Taylor Estates Co Ltd [1916] QSR 301 .… 11.31, 11.74, 11.84 — v Williams (1910) 11 CLR 171 .… 10.41, 24.19 Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 .… 5.20, 8.8 Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd (1998) 3 VR 380; [1998] 3 VR 485 .… 2.29, 15.1, 15.8, 15.13, 24.23 Olga Investments Pty Ltd v Citipower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 .… 2.29 Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 .… 3.55, 3.57, 3.61

cxii

Table of Cases Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd v Ballard (Kent) Ltd [2000] .… 21.30 — v Davis [1949] 2 KB 727; [1949] 2 All ER 353 .… 4.23 — v Lakeside Property Trust Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1040; [2006] NSWCA 285 .… 21.12, 21.18, 26.6, 26.13 O’Loughlin v O’Loughlin [1958] VR 649 .… 18.34 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365; [1969] HCA 3 .… 1.43, 7.1, 7.45, 8.38, 8.39, 8.46, 8.47, 16.68, 16.71, 21.35, 22.5 Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61 .… 10.18, 10.53, 10.54 Omega Air Inc v CAE Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 802 .… 11.150 O’Neil v Medical Benefits Funds of Australia Ltd (2002) 122 FCR 455; [2002] FCAFC 188 .… 11.117 O’Neill v Geddes [1971] 2 NSWLR 143 .… 22.5 — v O’Connell (1946) 72 CLR 101 .… 18.7, 18.8, 18.9, 18.39 OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 1; [2013] NSWCA 27 .… 10.30, 10.32 — v United KG Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 119 .… 10.56 One.Tel Ltd (in liq) v David Watson [2009] NSWCA 282 .… 8.23 Onley v Catlin Syndicate Ltd as the Underwriting Member of Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 [2018] FCAFC 119 .… 11.42 Onslow Salt Pty Ltd v Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation [2018] FCAFC 118 .… 6.16 Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 .… 3.39 oOh! Media Roadside Pty Ltd (formerly Power Panels Pty Ltd) v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255; [2011] VSCA 116 .… 19.5, 19.7, 19.12 OPR WA Pty Ltd v Marron [2016] WASC 395 .… 15.22 Optimum Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Open Realty Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 110 .… 26.12 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171 .… 26.2, 26.5 — v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] FCA 1798; (2010) 265 ALR 281; [2010] FCAFC 21 .… 10.42, 10.44, 10.45, 24.1



Optus Vision Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd [2004] NSWCA 61 .… 10.12, 10.32 Oraka Pty Ltd v Leda Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) ATPR 41-558; [1998] ANZ Conv R 577 .… 11.150 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 .… 17.18 Oran Park v Fleissig [2002] NSWCA 371 .… 23.24 Orica Investments v McCartney [2010] NSWSC 488 .… 23.14 Orica Investments Pty Ltd v McCartney [2007] NSWSC 645 .… 18.37 Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 .… 3.27, 3.44 Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vic) (2002) 120 FCR 191; [2002] FCA 860 .… 11.111 Orix Australia Corporation Ltd v Moody Kiddell & Partners Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 257 .… 11.121, 11.122 Orlit Pty Ltd v JF&P Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 277 .… 23.11 Ormwave Pty Ltd v Smith [2007] NSWCA 210 .… 3.6, 5.24, 6.2, 10.1 O’Rourke v Hoeven [1974] 1 NSWLR 622 .… 16.61, 16.63, 16.66 Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 .… 25.14 — v R (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 71 .… 3.42 Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1319 .… 15.15, 24.23 Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Road Show Ltd [2007] VSC 1 .… 7.2 Orton v Melman [1981] 1 NSWLR 583 .… 18.37, 18.38 Orwell v Mortoft or The Case of the Sale of Barley (1505) YB 20 Hen 7, fo 8, pl 18; Anon, Keilfo 69 and 77 .… 27.8 Osborn v McDermott [1998] 3 VR 1 .… 4.24 Osborne v Estate of Frederick Osborne and Daisy Osborne [2001] VSCA 228 .… 5.8 — v Landpower Developments Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 117 .… 10.6 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 .… 10.24, 11.2, 12.29 Osland v Foot (No 1) (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 320 .… 16.48 Osorio v Cardona (1984) 15 DLR (4th) 619 .… 5.9 Osric Investments Pty Ltd v Clout [2001] FCA 1402 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.24

cxiii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1402 .… 21.24 Ostabridge Pty Ltd (in liq) v Stafford [2001] NSWSC 131 .… 8.40 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 428; [1985] 3 All ER 351 .… 11.53, 11.57, 15.8 — v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1913] VLR 173 .… 6.5 — v O’Leary [1955] VLR 52 .… 26.13 Otrava Pty Ltd v Mail Boxes Etc (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1066 .… 19.2, 19.5, 19.9, 23.15, 23.29, 23.30 Oudaille v Lawson [1922] NZLR 25 .… 11.13, 11.16 Oughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 206; [1959] 3 All ER 623; [1959] WLR 898 .… 8.21 Ousley v Varsity Life [2005] NSWSC 462 .… 19.23 Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221 .… 3.29 Ovenden v Palyaris Construction Pty Ltd (1975) 11 SASR 65 .… 18.4 — v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45 Overlook Management BV v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 17 .… 10.3 Overmyer Industrial Brokers Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 305 .… 11.103, 16.67 Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 6 .… 16.55, 26.1, 26.3, 26.5 Owen v Homan (1853) 4 HL Cas 997; 10 ER 752 .… 15.9 — v John L Norris Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1312 .… 24.30 Owendale Pty Ltd v Anthony (1966) 40 ALJR 446; (1967) 117 CLR 539 .… 21.13, 21.29 Owerhall v Bolton & Swan Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 91 .… 15.9, 15.10 Owners Corp SP 72357 v Dasco Constructions Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 607; [2010] NSWSC 819 .… 11.134 Owners, Master and Crew of ‘The Cartela’ v The Inverness Shire (1916) 21 CLR 387; 22 ALR 126; [1916] HCA 15 .… 12.12 Owners of Strata Plan 5290 v CGS & Co Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 285; 281 ALR 575; [2011] NSWCA 168 .… 8.6 Owners — Strata Plan 60285 v Bondlake Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1037 .… 18.9

Owners — SP 62930 v Kell & Rigby Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1342 .… 11.150 Owners — Strata Plan 78102 v Owners — Strata Plan 78101 [2010] NSWSC 973 .… 6.11 Ownit Homes Pty Ltd v Batchelor [1983] 2 Qd R 124 .… 21.15, 21.38, 26.13 Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd (2011) 248 FLR 193; [2011] WASCA 76 .… 11.115 Oxborough v North Harbour Builders Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 145 .… 21.30 OXS Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2016] NSWCA 120 .… 11.115 OZ Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [2015] VSCA 346 .… 10.73, 10.74 P P&M Productions Pty Ltd v Elders Leasing Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 264 .… 18.7 P Ward v Civil and Civic [1999] NSWSC 727 .… 5.16, 10.26 Paal Wilson and Co v Partenreederei (The Hannah Blumenthal) (1983) 1 AC 854 .… 19.23 Pacer v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996, unreported) .… 12.26, 12.27 Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 28; [2005] FCA 288; (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40 .… 2.18, 2.29, 8.2, 8.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.40, 8.47, 8.49, 8.51, 10.43, 10.46, 21.12, 21.14, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.34, 21.37 Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.31, 3.11, 3.15 Pacific Film Laboratories v FCT (1970) 44 ALJR 376 .… 16.80 Pacific National (ACT) Ltd v Queensland Rail [2006] FCA 91 .… 15.15 Paciocco v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249; (2015) 236 FCR 199; [2015] FCAFC 50; (2016) 258 CLR 525; 333 ALR 569; [2016] HCA 28 .… 10.44, 15.1, 15.16, 23.45, 24.1, 27.1 Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549 .… 23.32 Page v Cox (1852) 10 Hare 163; 68 ER 882 .… 7.45 Page One Records Ltd v Britton [1968] 1 WLR 157; [1967] 3 All ER 822 .… 24.11, 24.24, 24.26 Paget v Marshall (1885) 28 Ch D 255 .… 12.54

cxiv

Table of Cases Painaway Australia Pty Ltd v JAKL Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 205 .… 2.20, 8.6 Pakenham Upper Fruit Co Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 .… 24.13, 24.26 Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] 3 WLR 727; [2021] UKSC 40 .… 10.43, 13.1, 13.2, 13.5, 13.9, 14.1, 14.4, 14.5, 15.6 Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72 .… 11.149 Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 .… 8.28 Palmer v Bank of New South Wales [1973] 2 NSWLR 244 (CA); (1975) 133 CLR 150 (HC) .… 5.8, 6.5 — v Carey [1926] AC 703 .… 8.19 Paltara Pty Ltd v Dempster (1991) 6 WAR 85 .… 10.41, 10.52, 20.16 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 496 .… 11.60 Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v Ship ‘Comandate’ (No 2) [2006] FCA 1112 .… 10.41 Pan Foods Co Importers & Distributors Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 579; [2000] HCA 20 .… 6.6, 10.32, 10.33, 20.7, 20.9, 21.19, 21.23 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd, Re (2008) 165 FCR 230; 246 ALR 514; [2008] FCAFC 2 .… 11.117 Panel Tech Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pacific Sheet & Coil Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1230 .… 10.73 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 .… 4.22, 4.34, 13.2, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9 Paolucci v Makedyn Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 215 .… 24.1, 24.29 Papale v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd [2017] QSC 72 .… 15.16 Papapetros v Mazza (1989) 7 BCL 60 .… 22.4 Papas v Bianca Investments Pty Ltd (2002) 82 SASR 581; [2002] SASC 190 .… 12.61, 12.62 Papastravou v Gavan [1968] 2 NSWR 286 .… 18.37 Paper Products Pty Ltd v Tomlinson (Rochdale) Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-315; (1994) 122 ALR 279 .… 11.110, 11.114 Pappas v Soulac Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 231 .… 11.119, 11.122 Para Motors Pty Ltd v Cocks (1974) 9 SASR 44 .… 16.32 Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26 .… 19.21



Paramasivam v Flynn [1998] ACTSC 10; (1998) 90 FCR 489; 160 ALR 203; [1998] FCA 1711 .… 25.13 Paramedical Services Pty Ltd v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [1999] FCA 548 .… 11.109 Parbury Henty & Co Pty Ltd v General Engineering & Agencies Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 336 .… 16.37, 16.86 Parij v Parij (1997) 22 SASR 155 .… 16.75 Park v Allied Mortgage Corp Ltd (1993) ATPR (Digest) 46-105 .… 8.7 — v Brothers (2005) 80 ALJR 317; 222 ALR 421; [2005] HCA 73 .… 10.12, 10.31, 10.41, 10.49, 20.1, 20.16, 21.27, 21.29, 23.14 Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 .… 11.121, 11.122, 11.123 Parker v Barnett (1889) 16 VLR 214 .… 16.35 — v Clark [1960] 1 All ER 93 .… 5.7 — v Judkin [1931] 1 Ch 475 .… 7.47 — v Mortgage Advance Securities Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 275 .… 15.8 — v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 .… 27.1 — v Registrar-General [1976] 1 NSWLR 343 .… 11.50 — v South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 .… 3.21 Parkersinclair Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v ASIA Associates Inc [2000] VSC 362 .… 13.7, 13.11 ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] 3 WLR 1373; [2016] 2 All ER 516 .… 15.20 Parkinson v Lee (1802) 2 East 314; 102 ER 389 .… 27.26 Parland Pty Ltd v Mariposa Pty Ltd (1995) 5 Tas R 121 .… 7.28, 10.52, 22.5 Paroz v Paroz [2010] QCA 362 .… 15.9 Parr v Rural Agents Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 347 .… 18.34 Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 138 .… 10.39, 10.52 Parras Holdings Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 391 .… 13.7, 21.37 Parr’s Banking Co v Yates [1898] 2 QB 460 .… 25.3 Parsons v McBain (2001) 109 FCR 120; 192 ALR 772; [2001] FCA 376 .… 16.71, 16.73

cxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421; [1968] 1 WLR 1204 .… 3.19 Partyka v Wilkie (1982) ASC 55-213 .… 15.31 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; [1979] 2 All ER 945 .… 2.7, 2.9, 16.69, 16.72 Pascoe and Co Ltd v Holden’s Motor Body Builders Ltd [1931] SASR 180 .… 23.13 Pasdonnay Pty Ltd v SDS Corporation Ltd [2005] WASCA 9 .… 20.16 Pasedina (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Khouri (1977) 1 BPR 9460 .… 24.4, 24.8 Pasley v IRC [1958] NZLR 332 .… 16.29 Pasternacki and Solka-Pasternacki v Correy [2000] NSWCA 333 .… 14.20, 15.28 Patel v Ali [1984] Ch 283; [1984] 1 All ER 978 .… 24.8 — v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399; [2016] UKSC 42 .… 18.46 — v University of Bradford Senate [1978] 1 WLR 1488; [1978] 3 All ER 841 .… 5.1 Pateman v Koh [2007] WASCA 85 .… 10.34 Paterson v McNaghten (1905) 2 CLR 615, affirmed in (1907) 6 CLR 257 (PC) .… 20.15 — v Murphy (1853) 11 Hare 988; 69 ER 1198 .… 7.47 Patersons Securities Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2015] WASC 321 .… 10.77 Patience, Ex parte; Makinson v Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96 .… 8.11 Patrick v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 133 .… 11.111 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1; 153 ALR 643; [1998] HCA 30 .… 24.1, 24.12, 24.13 Patrick, Re; Bills v Tatham [1891] 1 Ch 82 .… 8.38 Patterson v Dolman [1908] VLR 354 .… 3.42, 3.60, 16.86 — v Lowe [1955] St R Qd 437 .… 18.43 Patti v Belfiore (1958) 100 CLR 198 .… 10.32 Pattison v Mann (1975) 13 SASR 34 .… 16.65 Paul v Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd [1985] 3 NSWLR 114 .… 16.55 — v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] QCA 252 .… 25.12 Pave Wealth Services Pty Ltd v Danielle Jones as executrix of the estate of the late Michael Frederick Jones [2021] WASCA 7 .… 11.110

Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 182 CLR 221; (1987) 162 CLR 221; 69 ALR 577 .… 7.3, 16.1, 16.53, 16.54, 16.55, 18.46, 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.6, 26.9, 27.19 Pavlovic v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 605; [2015] NSWCA 313 .… 5.19, 10.16 Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502 .… 3.22, 3.58, 3.64 — v McDonald (1908) 6 CLR 208 .… 18.25, 18.45 Paynter v Willems [1983] 2 VR 377 .… 9.8, 9.9 Payzu Ltd v Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581 .… 23.42 PC Developments Pty Ltd v Revell (1991) 22 NSWLR 615 .… 21.35, 23.45 PE Kafka Pty Ltd v The Hermitage Motel Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 94 .… 11.83 Peabody (Wilkie Creek) Pty Ltd v Queensland Bulk Handling Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 202 .… 3.11 Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.6 Peanut Marketing Board v Cuda (1984) 79 FLR 368 .… 13.7, 13.9 Pearce v Brain [1929] 2 KB 310; [1929] All ER Rep 627 .… 17.21, 17.35 — v Brooks (1886) LR 1 Exch 213; [1861] All ER Rep 102 .… 18.27 — v Gardner [1897] 1 QB 688 .… 16.44 — v Kelly (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 88 .… 17.18, 17.23 — v Pearce [1977] 1 NSWLR 170 .… 16.70 Pears v Balzer (1996) 137 ALR 180 .… 11.111 Pearse, Re [1905] VLR 446 .… 4.40 Pearson v Arcadia Stores Guyra Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 571 .… 8.6, 25.14 — v Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd [1931] SASR 320 .… 16.15 — v HRX Holdings Pty Ltd (2012) 205 FCR 187; [2012] FCAFC 111 .… 18.37 — v Seligman (1883) 48 LT 842 .… 11.80 Pearson & Son Ltd v Dublin Corp [1907] AC 351 .… 11.42 Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353 .… 17.73 Peco Arts Inc v Hazlitt Gallery Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1315; [1983] 3 All ER 193 .… 25.6 Peddie v Stein (1988) NSW ConvR 55-379 .… 15.30

cxvi

Table of Cases Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 .… 11.31, 11.78 Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386 .… 2.3 Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd v Environmental Systems Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 194 .… 10.55 Peet v Richmond (2011) 33 VR 465; [2011] VSCA 343 .… 26.6 — v — (No 2) [2009] VSC 585 .… 23.32 Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 .… 5.24, 6.8 Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 .… 2.9, 2.16, 10.3, 24.32 Pejovic v Malinic (1960) SR (NSW) 184 .… 16.62 Pembroke Antiques Pty Ltd v SPA Property and Investments Co Pty Ltd .… 11.30, 11.79 Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd v Lednez Industries (Australia) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 282 .… 8.6 Pendlebury v Colonial Mutual Assurance Society Ltd (1912) 13 CLR 676 .… 11.76 Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 211 .… 11.115 Peninsula Securities, in Quantum Actuarial LLP v Quantum Advisory Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 227 .… 18.35 Peninsula Securities Ltd v Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd [2020] 3 WLR 521 [2020] UKSC 36 .… 18.35 Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625 .… 23.5, 23.6, 23.24, 23.25 Pennicott v Pennicott (1936) 30 Tas LR 111 .… 21.13 Pennsylvania Shipping Co v Compagnie Nationale de Navigation [1936] 2 All ER 1167; (1936) 155 LT 294 .… 11.69 Penrith City Council v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 24 NSWLR 564 .… 25.4 Penrith District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Fittler (NSWSC, 8 February 1996, Santow J, unreported) .… 10.13, 10.57, 10.58, 19.10, 19.13, 19.19, 19.23, 21.13 Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 176 .… 11.118, 16.22, 16.23, 16.56, 16.67 Pepe v Platypus Asset Management Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 603 .… 4.17



Peppers Hotel Management Pty Ltd v Hotel Capital Partners Ltd [2004] NSWCA 114 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 10.34 Percy v Youngman [1941] VLR 275 .… 17.18 Perfection Dairies Pty Ltd v Australian Cooperative Foods Ltd t/as Dairy Farmers [2007] NSWSC 176 .… 10.42, 10.57 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 .… 8.18, 8.27, 8.36 Perkins Maritime International Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank (1991) 105 FLR 216 .… 24.23 Permaform Plastics Ltd v London & Midland General Insurance Co [1995] 8 WWR 201 .… 13.9 Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1992) 10 WAR 109; (1993) 10 WAR 109 .… 10.35, 18.7, 22.2, 22.5, 22.12 Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353; [2010] WASC 10 .… 14.13, 14.15, 14.17, 14.19, 14.20, 15.1, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9, 15.11, 15.16, 15.31 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514 .… 18.3 Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd v Bridgewater [1936] 3 All ER 501 .… 15.2 Permasteelisa Pty Ltd v Four Seas Network Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 98 .… 21.12 Perpetual Custodians Ltd v IOOF Investment Management Ltd (2013) 278 FLR 49; [2013] NSWCA 231 .… 10.32 Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.48 — v Wright (1917) 23 CLR 185 .… 18.25, 18.45 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1960] NSWSR 366; [1961] SR (NSW) 333 .… 8.4 — v Aroney (1944) SR (NSW) 313 .… 18.31 — v Bligh (1940) 41 SR (NSW) 33 .… 10.13 — v CTC Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 58 .… 11.133, 11.135, 11.140, 11.141, 23.31 — v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41 .… 15.8, 15.9, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 — v Michael Wilson Kwok [2011] NSWSC 422 .… 11.127

cxvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Milanex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 367 .… 11.107, 11.129, 11.134, 11.136, 11.139, 11.142 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180 .… 7.41 Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537 .… 5.21, 5.25, 6.17, 10.36, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.8, 20.9, 20.12, 20.13, 20.16, 21.17, 21.19, 21.23, 21.29, 21.35 Perry v Anthony [2016] NSWCA 56 .… 10.12 Pesticcio v Huet [2004] EWCA Civ 372 .… 14.1 Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355 .… 10.26, 12.3, 12.44, 12.66, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70 Peter A Simon Real Estate Pty Ltd v Ghabash [2004] NSWCA 467 .… 10.73 Peter v Compton (1694) Holt (KB) 326; 90 ER 1080 .… 16.30 — v Shipway (1908) 7 CLR 232 .… 8.38 Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235 .… 19.2, 21.10, 21.13, 21.17, 21.26, 21.27, 21.29 Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149 .… 3.11 Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 .… 10.7, 11.150 Peters v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] ASC 56-135 .… 14.16, 15.27 — v General Accident and Life Assurance Co [1937] 4 All ER 628 .… 8.6 — v Tuck (1915) 11 Tas LR 30 .… 17.40 Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville Ltd [1999] FCA 1245; (2001) 181 ALR 337; 185 ALR 152; 205 CLR 126; [2001] HCA 45 .… 10.41, 18.35, 18.37 Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v Champion (1928) 41 CLR 316 .… 6.7, 10.57 — v Patricia’s Chocolates and Candies Pty Ltd (1947) 77 CLR 574 .… 18.37 Peters American Queensland Cooperative Milling Association v Pamag Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 2 .… 18.37 Peters Ice Cream (Vic) Ltd v Todd [1961] VR 485 .… 18.38 Petersville Ltd v Peters (WA) Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-674 .… 18.37 Petrie v Dwyer (1954) 91 CLR 99 .… 21.12, 21.28, 21.29 Petroleum Investment Company v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea [2015] NSWCA 363 .… 6.11

Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777; [1969] 2 All ER 385 .… 5.4 Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 .… 16.73 Petty v Penfold Wines Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 282 .… 11.119 Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd v Probiotec Pharma Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 532 .… 11.138, 23.31 Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health [1965] AC 512 .… 5.29 Phak & Xu [2015] FamCA 939 .… 12.25 Pham v Doan [2005] NSWSC 201 .… 18.7, 18.9 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1952] 2 QB 795; [1952] 2 All ER 456 .… 3.20 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v A-G (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187 .… 13.9 Philegan & Co Pty Ltd v Blacktown Municipal Council (1974) 29 LGRA 231 .… 24.8 Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 .… 11.151 Phillip & Anton Homes Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 10 ATPR 40-838 .… 11.109, 11.150 Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Transport Commission [1975] Tas SR 128 .… 7.42 Phillip M Levy Pty Ltd v Christopoulos [1973] VR 673 .… 18.37 Phillips v Brooks Ltd [1919] 2 KB 243; [1918–19] All ER Rep 246 .… 12.60, 12.61, 12.62, 12.63 — v Butler [1945] .… 16.42 — v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 221 .… 16.46, 16.54, 22.4, 22.6, 26.6, 26.13 — v Hutchinson [1946] VLR 270 .… 14.7 Phillips Fox v Westgold Resources NL [2000] WASCA 85 .… 10.56 Phillips-Higgins v Harper [1954] 1 QB 411; [1954] 2 All ER 51 .… 25.6 Philpott v Wallet (1682) 3 Lev 65; 83 ER 579 .… 16.20 Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council [2010] NSWCA 64 .… 10.31, 10.32 Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 .… 10.73, 24.1 Pianta v National Finance and Trustees Ltd (1964) 38 ALJR 232; (1964) 180 CLR 146 .… 24.1, 24.4

cxviii

Table of Cases Pickering v Thoroughgood (1533) 93 YB Sel Soc 4 .… 27.8 Pickersgill & Harvey v Tsoukalas [2009] SASC 357 .… 5.11 Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2004] VSC 263 .… 11.110 — v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 204; (2005) 214 ALR 392; [2005] HCA 13 .… 4.6, 7.2 Pierce Bell Sales Pty Ltd v Frazer (1973) 130 CLR 575 .… 10.41, 10.46, 20.17, 20.18, 21.9 Pigram v A-G for NSW (1975) 132 CLR 216 .… 10.32, 10.34, 23.45 Pilbara Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Ammon [2020] WASCA 92 .… 10.40, 10.59 Pilmer v The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 180 ALR 249 .… 23.7, 23.11, 23.26, 23.30, 23.35 Pine Rivers, Caboolture & Redcliffe Group Training Scheme Inc v Group Training Association Queensland & Northern Territory Inc [2015] 1 Qd R 542; [2013] QCA 258 .… 5.10 Pink Floyd Music Ltd v EMI Records Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 770; [2010] EWCA Civ 1429 .… 10.35 Pinnel’s Case; Penny v Core (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a; 77 ER 237; [1558-1774] All ER Rep 612 .… 4.4, 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, 4.39 Pinter v Pinter [2016] QSC 314 .… 14.2, 14.13 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Galli [1985] VR 675 .… 18.37 Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 78 .… 11.79, 11.108 Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 883 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.48, 21.24, 21.34 Piper Ellis Pty Ltd v Farmland Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 157 .… 10.27, 10.35, 10.68, 10.69, 10.73 Pipikos v Trayans (2018) 265 CLR 522; [2018] HCA 39 .… 16.58, 16.59, 16.60, 16.64, 16.67 Pirie v Saunders (1961) 104 CLR 149 .… 16.35, 16.37 Pirrotta v Citibank Savings Ltd (1997) 70 SASR 206 .… 14.17, 14.20 Pisano v Dandris [2014] NSWSC 1070 .… 11.111 Pitcher Partners Consulting Pty Ltd v Neville’s Bus Service Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 119 .… 11.82



Pitt v PHH Assets Management Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327 .… 6.14 Pittmore Pty Ltd v Chan .… 6.5 Pizzino v Finance Brokers (WA) Pty Ltd (1982) 56 ALJR 843 .… 10.35 Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 768; [2003] HCA 10; (2003) 196 ALR 257 .… 5.16, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 21.32, 21.34, 23.9, 23.13, 23.24 Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353; [1969] HCA 29 .… 1.34, 4.17, 5.2, 5.28, 6.7, 7.2, 10.30 Planet Kids Ltd v Auckland Council [2014] 1 NZLR 149; [2013] NZSC 147 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.21 Plastyne Products Pty Ltd v Gall Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-376 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.8 Platemaster Pty Ltd v M&T Investments Pty Ltd [1973] VR 93 .… 26.3 Plath v Plath [2020] QCA 43 .… 2.16, 5.11 Player v Isenberg [2002] NSWCA 186 .… 10.58 Players Pty Ltd v Clone Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 118 .… 20.3 Playgoers’ Co-operative Theatres Ltd v Workers Educational Assoc of NSW (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 374 .… 24.19 Plenty v Seventh-Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie [2006] SASC 361 .… 23.19 Plenty & Plenty v Seventh-Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie; Plenty & Plenty v Dickson [2006] SASC 361 .… 5.10 Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235 .… 11.111, 11.112 Plimmer v Wellington Corp (1884) 9 App Cas 699 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.71 Plomley, Re (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 115 .… 17.61 Plumor Pty Ltd v Handley (1996) 41 NSWLR 30 .… 20.16 Plumptre’s Marriage Settlement, Re [1910] 1 Ch 609 .… 7.32 Plytarias v Andrews [1974] 2 NSWLR 382 .… 26.4 PM Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd v Daihatsu Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 798 .… 23.13, 23.29 PMP Print Pty Ltd v Wood [2005] VSC 230 .… 10.24 PNC Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v REW08 Projects Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 27 .… 18.10, 18.28

cxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

PND Civil Group Pty Ltd v Bastow Civil Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 159 .… 23.11 Pobjie Agencies Pty Ltd v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 105 .… 3.6 Poche v Ellingworth [2022] NSWSC 700 .… 21.9 Podrebersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529; [1985] HCA 34 .… 11.129, 11.142 Pohlmann v Harrison (1995) 2 Qd R 59 .… 16.55 Poletti v May [2000] WASC 29 .… 17.53 Polimeni v Villacam Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 86 .… 12.69 Poliwka v Girgis [2021] WASCA 30 .… 11.127 Polleykett v Georgeson (1878) 4 VLR (E) 207 .… 16.58, 16.61 Pollock v Mackenzie (1866) 1 Qd SCR 156 .… 23.11 Pomeroy v Thwaites Witham Pty Ltd (2000) 76 SASR 184; [2000] SASC 44; (2001) 79 SASR 489; [2001] SASC 125 .… 25.7 Pondcil Pty Ltd v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR .… 10.27, 10.28, 10.61, 10.70, 10.72 Pontypridd Union v Drew [1927] 1 KB 214 .… 17.8 Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 58 SASR 184 .… 18.6, 23.17 Poort v Development Underwriting (Victoria) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1977] VR 454 .… 21.23, 21.24 Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 .… 4.10, 4.23, 4.31, 4.35, 5.4, 16.37 Pordage v Cole (1669) 1 Wms Saund 319; 85 ER 449 .… 27.12 Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 231; (1980) 144 CLR 300 .… 1.76, 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.74, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77, 20.3, 21.38, 25.1 Port Line Ltd v Ben Line Steamers Ltd [1958] 2 QB 146; [1958] 1 All ER 787; (1960) 3 Syd LR 295 .… 7.31, 19.13 Port of Brisbane Corp v ANZ Securities [2002] QCA 158 .… 26.5 Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 85 ALJR 182; [2010] HCA 44 .… 18.30

Portal Software v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1179 .… 18.37 Porter v Audio Visual Promotions Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-547 .… 11.122 — v Latec Finance (Qld) Pty Ltd (1964) 111 CLR 177 .… 12.56, 12.61, 26.3, 26.5 — v Sundance Resources Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 493 .… 10.18, 10.40, 10.55, 22.9 POS Media Online Ltd v Queensland Investment Corp [2001] FCA 809 .… 26.8 Poseidon Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1991) 105 ALR 25 .… 10.15, 10.25, 10.41, 10.48, 10.56, 10.58, 11.115 Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350; [1999] WASCA 217 .… 6.6, 10.16 Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch 25 .… 24.13 Potato Producers Cooperative Ltd v Pavone [1962] VR 231 .… 18.3, 18.37 Pottinger v George (1967) 116 CLR 328 .… 9.9, 18.10 Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 .… 11.83, 11.85, 23.8 — v Smith [1993] 2 Qd R 44 .… 18.3 Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211; [2005] FCAFC 131 .… 11.150 Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540 .… 8.7 Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210 .… 7.7 Powell v Brent London BC [1988] ICR 176 .… 24.27 — v Hoyland (1851) 6 Exch 67; 155 ER 456 .… 13.6 — v Jones [1968] SASR 394 .… 6.11 — v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284 .… 3.43 — v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 .… 14.7, 14.11 — v Tasmania [2001] TASSC 114 .… 11.111 — v Whyte [1968] Qd R 255 .… 16.58, 24.10 Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51; [2005] HCATrans 94 .… 2.26, 16.22, 16.47, 16.67 Powercor Australia Ltd v Pacific Power [1999] VSC 110 .… 10.3, 10.12, 10.32, 11.120 Powys v Brown (1924) 25 SR (NSW) 65 .… 23.6 Poyser v Gajic [2006] VSC 380 .… 10.6 PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 432; (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310

cxx

Table of Cases .… 3.11, 3.27, 5.19, 5.24, 20.1, 20.4, 20.13 Pratt v Rush (1879) 5 VLR (L) 421 .… 16.41 Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469 .… 3.39 — v Transit New Zealand (2005) 2 NZLR 433; [2003] UKPC 83 .… 3.39, 10.43 Precision Fabrication Pty Ltd v Roadcon Pty Ltd (1991) 77 NTR 1; 104 FLR 267 .… 23.6 Premier Pizza Distributors Pty Ltd v Baingold Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1218 .… 18.37 Premier Protection Agency (Aust) Pty Ltd v ASIC [2022] NSWSC 374 .… 13.5 Premiership Investments Pty Ltd v White Diamond (1995) 133 ALR 64 .… 8.55 Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732; [2013] NSWCA 252 .… 11.26 Presmist Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 478 .… 10.48 Prestia v Aknar (1996) 40 NSWLR 165 .… 11.111, 11.112 Price Higgins & Fidge v Drysdale [1996] 1 VR 346 .… 23.14, 23.16 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B & Ad 433; 110 ER 518 .… 4.6, 7.1 — v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704 .… 25.12 — v Murray [1970] VR 782 .… 8.6 — v Shalders (1897) 18 ALT 247 .… 16.35 — v Spoor (2021) 270 CLR 450; 391 ALR 532; [2021] HCA 20 .… 18.6, 25.1 — v Strange [1978] Ch 337; [1977] 3 All ER 371 .… 24.11, 24.13, 24.30 Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto (1994) ATPR 41365; V ConvR 54-513 .… 24.4 Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 .… 2.10, 2.15 Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Mfg Co 388 US 395 (1967) .… 11.60 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2014] AC 436 .… 2.3 Principal Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane Broncos Leagues Club Ltd [2014] 2 Qd R 132; [2013] QSC 148; [2018] 2 Qd R 584; [2017] QCA 254 .… 20.8, 23.16 Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 .… 27.20 Prior v Payne (1949) 23 ALJ 298 .… 6.11 Pritchard v DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 196 .… 23.35



— v Merchant’s and Tradesman’s Mutual Life Assurance Society (1858) 3 CBNS 622; 140 ER 885 .… 12.12 — v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527; 72 FCR 203 .… 8.7, 11.125, 11.147, 15.13 Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg (1996) 86 F 3d 1447 .… 3.7, 3.21 Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444; [2012] IRLR 241 .… 18.35 Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v DDI Group Pty Ltd (2017) 95 NSWLR 82 .… 21.27 Proctor v Almansask Distributors Ltd (1985) 37 Alta LR (2d) 164 .… 3.24 — v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166 .… 25.11, 25.12 Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Computer Accounting and Tax Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 261 ALR 179; [2009] WASCA 183 .… 11.83, 11.146 Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651 .… 18.44 Progress & Properties (Strathfield) Pty Ltd v Crumblin (1984) 3 BPR 9496 .… 10.48 Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] EWHC 273; (2012) 2 All ER (Comm) 855 .… 13.5, 13.6 Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 ALR 17; 57 ALR 609 .… 7.27, 10.30, 19.13, 19.25, 21.9, 21.11, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.17, 21.21, 21.22, 21.23, 21.24, 23.20, 23.21, 23.22, 23.23 Project 28 Pty Ltd v Tim Barr Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 240 .… 8.7 Project Blue Moon Pty Ltd v Fairway Trading Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 127; [2000] ANZ ConvR 628 .… 10.50, 10.56, 10.60, 19.15, 19.25, 15.16, 21.37 Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 158; [2012] FCAFC 31 .… 11.116 Prosilis v Double Bay Newspapers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 30 .… 10.26 Prospect Resources Ltd v Molyneux [2015] NSWCA 171 .… 21.31 Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd t/a Strathearn Insurance Brokers [2012] NSWCA 192 .… 11.146, 23.15 Prosperity Group International Pty Ltd v Queensland Communication Company Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1122 .… 8.53

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Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481; 160 ER 196 .… 8.7 Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Steuler Services GmbH & Co KG [2014] VSCA 338 .… 11.82, 11.83 Protector Glass Industries Pty Ltd v Southern Cross Austoglass Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 16 .… 21.24, 22.9 Proton Investments Pty Ltd v Vahekin Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-452 .… 21.29 Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 381 .… 4.23 Provident Capital Ltd v Papa (2013) 84 NSWLR 231; [2013] NSWCA 36 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Printy [2008] NSWCA 131 .… 8.6 Provident Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Hammond [1978] VR 312 .… 8.40, 8.42 Provident Financial Group Plc v Hayward [1989] 3 All ER 298 .… 24.25 Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 .… 10.32 Provost Developments Ltd v Collingwood Towers Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 205 .… 5.25 Prowse v McIntyre [1961] HCA 79; (1961) 111 CLR 264 .… 3.46, 17.2 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v CM Breedon Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 452 .… 12.1 — v Health Minders Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 673 .… 3.46 Pryors Tours Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport [2003] WASCA 129 .… 10.60 P’s Bill of Costs, Re (1983) 8 Fam LR 489 .… 14.5, 14.6 Psaltis v Schultz (1948) 76 CLR 547 .… 10.61, 18.26, 21.12 PSL Industries Ltd v Simplot Australia Pty Ltd [2003] 7 VR 106; (2003) 174 FLR 111; [2003] VSCA 7 .… 11.147, 25.12 PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643 .… 12.64, 12.65, 12.69, 12.70, 17.53, 18.10 — v — (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241 .… 8.21 — v Spuds Surf Chatswood [2013] NSWCA 446 .… 15.16 Pua Hor Ong v Wu You Yang Pty Ltd (2008) 103 SASR 9; [2008] SASC 365 .… 6.5, 6.17 Public Service Credit Union v Campion (1984) 75 FLR 131 .… 13.3, 13.5

Public Service Employees Credit Union Cooperative Ltd v Campion (1984) 75 FLR 131 .… 13.5, 18.32 Public Trustee v Kukula (1990) 14 Fam LR 97 .… 2.2, 2.11, 16.73 — v Taylor [1978] VR 289 .… 11.13, 11.55, 11.85 Public Trustee (WA) v Brumar Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 161 .… 17.53 Pukallus v Cameron (1982) 180 CLR 447 .… 12.30, 12.35 Pullen v Gutteridge Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27 .… 10.53 Pump Distributors Pty Ltd v Athertons (Qld) Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 213 .… 21.24 Pura v Kornmehl [2004] NSWSC 260 .… 5.8 Purcell v Bacon (1914) 19 CLR 241 .… 26.13 Purves v Smith [1944] ALR 269 .… 7.47 Pusey v Pusey (1684) 1 Vern 273; 23 ER 465 .… 24.17 Pyle v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 511 .… 18.37 Pyramid Building Society v Viewbank Garden Estate [1998] VSC 104 .… 10.26 Q Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 .… 2.5, 2.9, 2.10, 2.15, 16.70, 16.72 Qanstruct Pty Ltd v Bongiorno Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 667 .… 11.116, 11.147 Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (1996) 145 ALR 294 .… 15.1 — v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280 .… 5.26 — v Dillingham Corporation Ltd .… 15.8 — v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26 .… 10.2, 18.34 — v Rohrlach [2021] NSWCA 48 .… 10.30 QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 24 VR 326; [2009] VSCA 124 .… 7.3 QBE Insurance Australia Ltd v Vasic [2010] NSWCA 166 .… 10.13 QBE Insurance Ltd v Moltoni Corp Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 148; 155 FLR 379 .… 23.14, 23.16 QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 358; [2010] QSC 479 .… 3.34, 4.22, 11.115, 11.146 QH Tours Ltd v Ship Design and Management (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 371 .… 11.60

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Table of Cases QNI Resources Pty Ltd v North Queensland Pipeline No 1 Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 169 …. 10.43 Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 932 .… 18.33, 18.44 Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Assocs Pty Ltd (1990) 98 ALR 659 .… 11.150 Quadling v Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192 .… 3.30, 3.46, 5.23, 5.25, 20.4 Quadramain Pty Ltd v Sevastopol Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 133 CLR 390 .… 18.35, 18.36 Quality Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Builders (Vic) Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 502 .… 11.146 Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Quanta Systems Ltd [2004] FCA 1182 .… 22.10 Quantock v ACT Health and Community Service [2003] ACTSC 98 .… 23.14 Qube Ports Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [2018] FCAFC 72 .… 5.26 Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALR 243 .… 24.22 Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Pty Ltd v Pamag Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 260 .… 18.35, 18.37 Queensland Ice Supplies Pty Ltd v Anco Australasia Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 72 .… 23.13, 23.24, 23.37, 23.43 Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 .… 2.18, 10.3, 22.6 Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French (2007) 235 CLR 81; 240 ALR 234; [2007] HCA 53 .… 8.6 Queensland Trustees Ltd v Concannon (1910) QSR 162 .… 16.23 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 .… 13.7 Quek v Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11,761 .… 14.8, 14.11, 14.13 Quenerduaine v Cole (1883) 32 WR 185 .… 3.46 QuestCrown Pty Ltd v Insignia Towers (Southport) Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 378 .… 18.7, 18.10 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 184 ALR 260 .… 11.111 Quiggan Bros v Baker [1906] VLR 259 .… 17.5 Quikfund (Australia) Pty Ltd v Airmark Consolidators Pty Ltd (2014) 222 FCR



13; 312 ALR 254; [2014] FCAFC 70 .… 11.102, 15.27 Quin v Mutual Acceptance Co Ltd [1968] NSWR 122 .… 18.41 Quinlivan v ACCC (2004) 160 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 175 .… 11.110, 11.117 Quinn v Burch Bros (Builders) Ltd (1966) 2 QB 370 .… 23.38 — v Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd [1992] 1 VR 540; [1992] 1 VR 567 .… 4.32, 10.29, 22.5 Quinn Villages Pty Ltd v Mulherin [2006] QCA 433 .… 20.8, 20.15, 20.16, 21.32 Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02 .… 3.55, 12.52 R R v A-G for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 .… 13.5 — v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386 .… 18.29 — v Brown (1912) 14 CLR 14 .… 8.11, 26.1 — v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 .… 3.40 — v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia and Richardson-Merrel Pty Ltd; Ex parte Soul Pattinson (Laboratories) Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 113 .… 11.106 — v McNeil (1922) 31 CLR 76 .… 25.13 — v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 .… 27.1 — v Panayiotou [1973] 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 3 All ER 112 .… 13.5 — v Small Claims Tribunal; Ex parte Gibson [1973] Qd R 490 .… 11.112 — v Stanley; Ex parte Redapple Restaurants Pty Ltd (1976) 13 SASR 290 .… 25.7 — v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533 .… 11.107 — v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321 .… 11.11, 11.16 — v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 .… 18.15 R & A Cab Co Pty Ltd v Kotzman [2008] VSCA 68 .… 21.12 — v Rutty [2007] VSC 62 .… 21.19, 22.11 R A Brierley Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 .… 8.6 R D McKinnon Holdings Pty Ltd v Hind [1984] 2 NSWLR 121 .… 24.7, 24.8 R Leslie Ltd v Sheill [1914] 3 KB 607; [1914–15] All ER Rep 511 .… 17.39, 17.40, 17.41, 17.42, 17.50 R M Turton & Co Ltd (in liq) v Kerslake and Partners [2000] 3 NZLR 406 .… 7.41

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R S Howard S Sons Ltd v Brunton (1916) 21 CLR 366 .… 19.15 R+V Versicherung AG v Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Solutions SA [2006] All ER (D) 209 .… 23.11 R W Cameron & Co v L Slutzkin Pty Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81 .… 12.44 R W Jaksch & Associates Pty Ltd v Hawks [2005] VSCA 307 .… 21.24 Raco v Grove Holmes Pty Ltd (1974) 2 BPR 9411 .… 21.19 Radcliffe v Price (1902) 18 TLR 466 .… 14.6 Rademacher v Kassab [2005] SASC 43 .… 4.17, 6.7 Radford v Ferguson (1947) 50 WALR 14 .… 18.47 Radley Investment Co Pty Ltd v Amque Clothing Pty Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-036 .… 11.122 Radosavljevic v Radin [2003] NSWCA 217 .… 23.16 Rae & Partners Pty v Shaw [2020] TASFC 14 .… 2.3 Raestreet Pty Ltd v The Farmers’ Shop Pty Ltd [1998] SASC 6753 .… 21.21 Raffaele v Raffaele [1962] WAR 29 .… 5.7, 16.68, 16.70 Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 725 .… 11.145 Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H & C 906; 159 ER 375 .… 6.6, 10.12, 12.3, 12.7, 12.47 Raftland Pty Ltd as trustee of the Raftland Trust v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516; 246 ALR 406; [2008] HCA .… 5.11 Raguz v Sullivan (2000) 50 NSWLR 236; [2000] NSWCA 240 .… 3.8 Rahme v Benjamin & Khoury Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 211 .… 11.133 RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 511 .… 11.116, 11.124 Rail Corporation New South Wales v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 344 .… 7.41, 8.51 Rain v Fullarton (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 311 .… 14.14, 17.18, 17.21, 17.22 Rainbow v Hawkins & Sons [1904] 2 KB 322 .… 3.24 Rainbow Spray Sales Pty Ltd v Sanders [1964–65] NSWR 422 .… 10.13, 10.73, 21.12, 21.19 Raine and Horne Pty Ltd v Adacol Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 36 .… 18.37

Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 .… 10.12, 10.73 Ramadan v ACN 098 408 176 Pty Ltd [2017] SASC 63 .… 15.9, 15.13, 15.16 — v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129 .… 2.7, 16.68 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239 .… 11.113, 11.115 Ramsey v Vogler [2000] NSWCA 260 .… 11.114 Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Exch 109 .… 3.72 Rana v Hyatt Regency Hotel Ltd [2007] SASC 7 .… 11.93 Randazzo v Goulding [1968] Qd R 433 .… 6.8, 6.9 Randwick CC v Nancor Trading Co Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 108 .… 5.24 Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 150 .… 21.24 Rankin Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v CMC Property Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 156 .… 10.40 Rann v Hughes (1778) 4 Bro Parl Cas 27; 7 Term Rep 350n; 2 ER 18; 101 ER 1014n .… 16.9, 27.13, 27.18 Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 .… 18.37 Ransley v Medical Benefits Fund (1980) ATPR 40-160 .… 11.118 Raphael v Watson [1998] FCA 577 .… 18.20 Raphael Shin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Waterpoint Shepherds Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 743 .… 10.7 Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 255 .… 18.32 Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Bartholomeus (2012) 114 SASR 448; [2013] SASCFC 23 .… 11.111, 20.8 Rasmussen v Rasmussen [1995] 1 VR 613 .… 16.72, 16.73 Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399 .… 3.67 Rava v Logan Wines Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 62 .… 10.34 Rawlings Pty Ltd v Redder than Red Tomato Co Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 367 .… 2.16 Rawlins v Wickham (1858) 3 De G & J 304; 44 ER 1285 .… 11.63 Rawlinson v Ames [1925] Ch 96 .… 16.58

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Table of Cases Rawson v Hobbs (1961) 107 CLR 466 .… 10.21, 10.25, 10.34, 20.20, 21.12, 21.24 Ray Brooks Pty Ltd v NSW Grains Board [2002] NSWSC 1049 .… 10.12 Ray v Davies (1909) 9 CLR 160 .… 10.5 Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1 .… 3.8 Rayment v Tuthill [1890] 16 VLR 854 .… 5.23 Razdan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] NSWCA 126 .… 15.13 RCR O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2016] QCA 214 .… 24.23 RDJ International Pty Ltd v Preformed Line Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 417 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.56 Read v Croydon Corp [1938] 4 All ER 631 .… 5.29 — v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47 .… 23.37 Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Burstone Victoria Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 546 .… 10.41 Ready Construction Pty Ltd v Jenno [1984] 2 Qd R 78 .… 24.8 Real Estate Securities Ltd v Kew Golf Links Estate Pty Ltd [1935] VLR 114 .… 26.4 Realtek Holdings Pty Ltd v Wetamast Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1869 .… 15.16 Realty World Pty Ltd v Rovera Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] ACTSC 30 .… 18.27 Reardon v Morley Ford Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 401 .… 3.20 Reches Pty Ltd v Tadiran Ltd [1999] FCA 952 .… 22.12 Reck v Gilham [1995] 1 Qd R 302 .… 18.37 Recoveries Corporation Group Ltd v American Express Australia Ltd [2016] NSWSC 771 .… 20.20, 21.38 Rectron Australia BV v Lu [2013] VSC 384 .… 12.68 Red Eagle Corp Ltd v Ellis [2010] 2 NZLR 492; [2010] NZSC 20 .… 11.129 Redbridge London BC v Robinson Rentals Ltd (1969) 21 1 Est Gaz 1125 .… 12.48 Redden v Wilks (1994) 14 WAR 69; [1979] WAR 161 .… 16.21 Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Glossop; Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Fairfax Community Newspapers Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1201 .… 5.19



Redevelopments Pty Ltd v Enima Pty Ltd (2010) 174 ACTR 1; [2010] ACTCA 13 .… 12.36 Redglove Projects Pty Ltd v Ngunnawal Local Aboriginal Land Council [2005] NSWSC 892 .… 18.23, 20.4, 20.16, 20.20 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1; [1881–5] All ER Rep 77 .… 11.36, 11.44, 11.63, 11.67 Redken Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd v Docker (2000) Aust Contract Rep 90113 .… 10.53, 23.18, 23.38 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84 .… 7.1, 8.28, 8.27, 8.38, 8.40 Redmond v Devonport Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 176 .… 26.12 Redowood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 32 .… 3.26, 3.46, 28.23 Reed v Buck (1884) 10 VLR (E) 33 .… 15.5 — v Peridis [2005] SASC 136 .… 10.53, 10.56 — v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 .… 2.5, 2.15, 3.69 Reed Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1987) 3 BCL 384 .… 18.34 Reef & Rainforest Travel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (2002) 1 Qd R 683; [2001] QCA 249 .… 3.67, 8.12 Rees v Rees [2016] VSC 452 .… 12.25 Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 .… 3.3, 3.26, 3.32, 3.47 Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64 .… 11.16, 11.63 Reeve v Jennings [1910] 2 KB 522 .… 16.32 Refrigerated Express Lines (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat & Livestock Corp (No 2) (1980) 44 FLR 555 29 ALR 333 .… 10.27 Reg Glass Pty Ltd v Rivers Locking Systems Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 516 .… 23.34, 23.39 Regent v Millett (1976) 133 CLR 679 .… 16.60, 16.63, 16.64 Regional Development Australia Murraylands and Riverland Inc v Smith (2015) 251 IR 317; [2015] SASCFC 160 .… 19.5, 19.11, 19.22 Regional Power Corporation v Pacific Hydro Group Two Pty Ltd (No 2) (2014) 46 WAR 281; [2013] WASC 356 .… 10.77

cxxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Regis Towers Real Estate v The Owners – Strata Plan 56443 [2002] NSWSC 1153 .… 18.9 Regreen Asset Holdings Pty Ltd v Castricum Brothers Australia Ltd [2015] VSCA 286 .… 10.15, 10.16, 10.18, 10.56 Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 .… 20.8 Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 …. 4.24, 4.28, 10.2, 10.13, 10.62 — v McIntyre (1905) 11 ALR 159 .… 8.38 — v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1 .… 10.36 — v Zoanetti [1943] SASR 92 .… 5.2 Reid House Pty Ltd v Beneke (1987) 5 ACLC 451 .… 19.22 Reid Murray Developments (WA) Pty Ltd v Hall [1968] WAR 3 .… 19.15, 20.4 Reilly v Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co [1893] 19 VLR 75 .… 18.33 — v Victoria (1991) 5 VIR 1 .… 24.27 Reinhold v NSW Lotteries Corp (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 187 .… 11.133, 11.142, 23.31 Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 .… 10.32 Rejfek v McElroy (1966) 112 CLR 517 .… 11.76 Relwood Pty Ltd v Manning Homes Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 481 .… 6.8 Rely-a-Bell Burglar and Fire Alarm Co v Eisler [1926] Ch 609; [1926] All ER Rep 707 .… 24.26 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 .… 10.36, 10.39, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 10.48, 10.51, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56, 10.61, 15.1, 20.18, 21.33, 21.34, 21.35, 26.7 Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 151 NTR 1; [2006] NTSC 4 .… 3.28, 19.18 Rennie Golledge Pty Ltd v Ballard (2012) 82 NSWLR 231; [2012] NSWCA 376 .… 11.136 Renold Australia Pty Ltd v Fletcher Insulation (Vic) Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 294 .… 8.2, 8.7 Renowden v Hurley [1951] VLR 13 .… 24.2, 24.16 — v McMullin (1970) 123 CLR 584 .… 25.12 Rentokil Pty Ltd v Lee (1995) 66 SASR 301 .… 18.37, 18.38, 18.41

Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis (2007) 158 FCR 214; 239 ALR 491; [2007] FCAFC 29 .… 2.9, 2.10, 16.70 Rescando Pty Ltd v Brogan [2000] WASC 19 .… 21.11 Retirement Services Australia (RSA) Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd (2012) 37 VR 486; [2012] VSCA 134 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.7, 10.12, 10.31 Reunidas SA v Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 .… 22.9 Reuthlinger v MacDonald [1967] 1 NSWLR 88 .… 18.35 Revelle v PC Developments Pty Ltd (1990) NSW ConvR 55-527 .… 21.36 REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 269 .… 24.7 Reynolds v Atherton (1921) 125 LT 690 .… 3.74 — v Fury (1921) VLR 17 .… 26.12 RHG Mortgage Securities Pty Ltd v Elektra Purchase No 19 Ltd [2009] NSWSC 258 .… 8.3, 10.45, 12.30, 12.36 Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 .… 3.62 Rhodes, Re (1890) 44 Ch D 94; [1886–90] All ER Rep 871 .… 17.54 Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477; 68 ALR 77 .… 11.113, 11.115 Rialto Sports Pty Ltd v Cancer Care Associates Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 146 .... 23.27 Rian Financial Services Pty Ltd v Alfred Investment Project Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-400 .… 21.20 Ribchenkov v Suncorp-Metway Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 650 .… 14.17 Rich v BDO Kendalls [2007] QCA 147 .… 18.37 Richard Pitt & Sons Pty Ltd v Hydro Electric Commission [2000] TASSC 61 .… 22.6 Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 328 .… 18.32 Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse and Storage Co 223 NC 344; 26 SE 2d 897 (US 1934) .… 5.23 — v Otto (1938) QWN 15 .… 14.15 Richardson & Wrench (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Ligon No 174 Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 681 .… 11.110 Riches v Hogben [1986] 1 Qd R 315 .… 5.7, 16.22, 16.23, 16.58, 16.68, 16.70

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Table of Cases Rick Damelian Pty Ltd v Daewoo Automotive Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 92 .… 22.12 Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti (2004) 220 ALR 267; [2004] NSWSC 1041 .… 8.7 Ricochet Pty Ltd v Equity Trustees Executor and Agency Co Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 30 .… 11.124 Riddiford v Warren (1901) 20 NZLR 572 .… 11.68, 11.68 Rieson v SST Consulting Services Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 90; [2005] FCAFC 6 .… 6.17, 18.41 Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482; [1874–80] All ER Rep 592 .… 24.12 Rigg v Lee Loy Seng [1987] WAR 333 .… 21.14, 21.20 Riggall v Thompson [2010] QCA 144 .… 23.45 Riley v Melrose Advertisers (1915) 17 WALR 127 .… 16.35, 16.53 — v Osborne [1986] VR 193 .… 16.60, 16.61, 16.63 Riltang Pty Ltd v L Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 977 .… 10.35 Rinaldi and Patroni Pty Ltd v Precision Mouldings Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 131 .… 10.69, 10.72 Rinehart v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (2019) 267 CLR 514; [2019] HCA 13 .… 10.12 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1297; [2004] FCAFC 206; (2005) 224 CLR 656; 222 ALR 306; [2005] HCA 71 .… 21.24, 23.45 Ringstad v Gollin & Co Pty Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 303 .… 19.2, 19.9, 19.15, 19.20 Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Ltd v Graphite Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 276 .… 7.7, 7.30, 8.7 Riordan J in Simcevski v Dixon (No 2) [2017] VSC 531 .… 23.45 Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v St Vincent’s Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70 .… 3.6, 10.3 Rishmont Pty Ltd v Tweed City Medical Centre Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 372 .… 11.112 Ritter v Keatley Real Estate Pty Ltd (2013) 116 SASR 53; [2013] SASC 46 .… 10.12, 10.16 — v North Side Enterprises Pty Ltd (1975) 6 ALR 125; 132 CLR 301 .… 11.14, 11.16, 11.50, 11.76 Rivat Pty Ltd v B & N Elomar Engineering Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 638 .… 10.12, 10.27, 10.32, 21.23, 21.24



Riverland Inc v Smith [2015] SASCFC 160; (2015) 251 IR 317 .… 23.42 Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul [1975] 1 Ch 133; [1974] 2 All ER 656 .… 12.50, 12.52, 12.53, 12.54 Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193 .… 10.12, 10.17, 10.18, 10.27, 10.31, 10.32, 10.58 Riviera Holdings Pty Ltd v Fingal Glen Pty Ltd (2003) 120 SASR 450; [2013] SASC 77 .… 21.36 Riz v Perpetual Trustee Australia Ltd [2007] ANZ ConvR 615; [2007] NSWSC 1153 .… 15.31 Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 91; 262 FLR 1; 287 ALR 315; [2012] WASCA 50 .… 11.60 RJR Holdings Pty Ltd v Balleroo Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 151 .… 21.19 Roache v Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Co Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1015; 81 WN (NSW) 400 .… 12.56, 12.61 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v CEL Home Video Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 .… 10.56, 21.12, 21.18, 21.19, 21.26 Robb v Hammersmith and Fulham London BC [1991] ICR 514 .… 24.27 Robert v Collier’s Bulk Liquid Transport Pty Ltd [1959] VR 280 .… 23.32 Robert Hastings Hitchcock v Goldspan Investments Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 205 .… 8.55 Roberts v Calvert [1937] St R Qd 12 .… 10.5 — v Gray [1913] 1 KB 520; [1911–13] All ER Rep 870 .… 17.11, 17.12 Robertson v Admans (1922) 31 CLR 250 .… 18.4, 18.11, 18.40 — v Robertson (1930) QWN 41 .… 13.3 — v Wilson (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 503 .… 19.25 — v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 095 803 286) [2007] VSCA 29 .… 4.22 Robertson Street Properties Pty Ltd v RPM Promotions Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 389 .… 11.110 Robin Pty Ltd v Canberra International Airport Pty Ltd (1999) 179 ALR 449 .… 11.112 Robinson v 470 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 84 .… 11.136 — v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1990) ASC 55-979 .… 14.20, 15.30, 15.31 — v Balmain New Ferry Co [1910] AC 295 .… 10.72

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— v Cook (1815) 128 ER 1064 .… 9.5 — v Craven (1994) 63 SASR 267 .… 25.11 — v Gollan [2012] NSWSC 51 .… 11.111 — v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579; [1935] All ER Rep 935 .… 16.80 — v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 .… 23.6 — v M’Ewan (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 65 .… 3.42 — v Podosky [1905] St R Qd 118 .… 8.24, 8.47 — v South Australia [1928] SASR 42 .… 8.27 Robinson, Re; McLaren v Public Trustee [1911] 1 Ch 502; [1911–13] All ER 296 .… 25.13 Robson and Sharpe v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303; 109 ER 1156 .… 8.52 Rocca v Ryde Municipal Council [1962] NSWR 600 .… 18.30 Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 43 ALR 659 .… 27.1 Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24; [2019] AC 119 .… 4.32, 4.35, 22.4 Rock Solid Surfaces Pty Ltd v Biesse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 42 .… 3.56, 11.114 Rocla Pty Ltd v Plastream Pipe Technologies Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 80 .… 7.3 Rod Ferguson Motor Co v Vasiliauskas (1985) 3 SR (WA) 15 .… 23.26 Rod Investments (Vic) Pty Ltd v Abeyratne [2009] VSC 278 .… 11.132 Rodgers v Moonta Town Corp (1981) 55 ALJR 710 .… 16.68 Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 175; 54 ER 68 .… 24.5 — v Resi-Statewide Corp Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 219; 101 ALR 377 .… 17.18 Rojain Pty Ltd v Ambrose McMahon [1986] VR 449 .… 24.4 Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill [2005] NSWCA 252 .… 23.38 Rolleston Coal Holdings Pty Ltd v ICRA Rolleston Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 352 .… 10.3, 21.19 Roman Catholic Trusts Corp v Van Driel Ltd [2001] VSC 310 .… 3.15, 7.7 Romanos v Pentagold Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 217 CLR 367; 201 ALR 399; [2003] HCA 58 .… 21.19, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 Romberg v Gilbert (1901) 11 QLJ 96 .… 9.5 Ronald v Lalor (1872) 3 VR (E) 98 .… 16.40

Rondo Building Services Pty Ltd v Casaron Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 78 .… 26.9 Ronim Pty Ltd, Re [1999] 2 Qd R 172 .… 10.56 Ronnoc Finance v Spectrum Network Systems Ltd (1997) 45 NSWLR 624 .… 23.22, 23.25, 24.32 Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 Ch 480 .… 3.19 — v Rooke (1610) Cro Jac 245; 1 Rolle 391; Moo KB 854; 79 ER 210 .… 27.19 Root v Bradley [1960] NZLR 756 .… 11.62 Rosas v Toca (2018) BCCA 191 .… 4.35 Roscorla v Thomas (1842) 3 QB 234; 114 ER 496 .… 4.19 Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20 .… 5.10 — v Sakkara Properties Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 304 .… 15.6 Rose and Frank Co v Crompton & Bros Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 (CA); [1925] AC 445 (HL) .… 5.4, 5.14 Rosemac Pty Ltd’s Caveat, Re [1994] 1 Qd R 137 .… 18.3, 18.6 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 178 ALR 577 .… 23.14, 23.36 Rosenhain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1922) 31 CLR 46 .… 10.54 Ross v Allis-Chalmers Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 561 .… 10.21, 10.25 — v IceTV [2010] NSWCA 272 .… 18.37, 18.38, 19.4 — v Meggitt Overseas Ltd (No 3) (1999) 18 NSWCCR 366 .… 23.32 — v Ratcliff (1988) 91 FLR 66 .… 18.12 Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 72; [2011] QCA 49 .… 3.68 Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2008] 1 All ER 1004 .… 11.39 Rosser v Austral Wine and Spirit Co Pty Ltd [1980] VR 313 .… 16.35 — v Marine Ministerial Holding Corp [1999] NSWCA 72 .… 22.12, 23.13, 23.24, 23.29 Rossiter v Miller (1878) 3 App Cas 1124 .… 5.24, 6.8, 16.35 Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G [1991] 2 NZLR 323 .… 4.18, 5.28, 24.28 Roude v Helwani [2020] NSWCA 310 .… 26.6 Rouen v Ryan [2001] NSWCA 230 .… 18.38 Roufos v Brewster (1971) 2 SASR 218 .… 5.7

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Table of Cases Rouleston Clarke Pty Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (2000) 11 ANZ Ins Cas 61-465 .… 10.33 Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 .… 18.33, 18.44 Rowe v Oades (1905) 3 CLR 73 .… 10.5, 10.60 Rowley, Holmes & Co v Barber [1977] 1 WLR 371 .… 3.14 Rowthorn v Queensland Newspapers Ltd [1962] QWN 111 .… 18.3 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2000) 22 Syd LR 636; (2001) 208 CLR 516; [2001] HCA 68 .… 10.39, 10.55, 10.61, 18.33, 26.1, 26.2, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5, 27.1 Roxburghe v Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520 .… 8.43 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 .… 14.1, 14.5, 14.9, 14.10, 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20 — v O’Donnell [2014] CSIH 84 .… 11.20 Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney CC (2002) 240 CLR 45; [2002] HCA 5 .… 6.9, 6.10, 10.4, 10.12, 10.13, 10.16, 10.41, 10.43, 10.55, 26.3, 26.5 Royal Exchange Assurance v Cook [1965] Ch 902; [1964] 3 All ER 898 .… 7.32 — v Hope [1928] Ch 179; [1927] All ER Rep 67 .… 7.44 Royal International (WA) v William Thomas John Valli [1998] WAIR Comm 55 .… 10.61 Royal Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Ltd v Mihailoff [2002] SASC 32 .… 10.56 Royal Victorian Aero Club v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 236 .… 10.32 Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297 .… 11.96, 11.97 RP Data Ltd v Queensland [2007] FCA 1639 .… 11.109 RS Howard & Sons Ltd v Brunton (1916) 21 CLR 366 .… 18.2 RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2003) NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 .… 11.109 Rudd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 366; 54 WN (NSW) 117 .… 6.8 Rudder v George Hudson Holdings Ltd (1972) 1 NSWLR 529 .… 24.4 Rudi’s Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jay (1987) 10 NSWLR 568 .… 20.8



Rufa Pty Ltd v Cross [1981] Qd R 365 .… 8.53 Rufo v Hosking [2004] NSWCA 391 .… 23.14 Rumbleows Ltd v AMK (1980) 19 BLR 25 .… 7.42 Rumney v Croaker [1905] QSR 177 .… 22.4 Rumpe v Camrol Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 40522 .… 11.122 Rural and Agricultural Management Ltd v West Merchant Bank Ltd (1995) 14 ACLC 11 .… 8.53 Rural Bank of NSW v Hobby [1967] 1 NSWR 210 .… 12.66, 12.69 Rush v WA Amateur Football League (Inc) (2007) 35 WAR 101; [2007] WASCA 190 .… 5.10 Rushcutters Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Dragon Asset Investment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 866 .… 21.38, 23.45, 26.4 Rushton (SA) Pty Ltd v Holzberger [2003] QCA 106 .… 3.46 Russell v Lee 1 Lev 86; 83 ER 310 .… 17.5 — v Slater (1912) QSR 237 .… 16.40 — v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2007] NSWSC 104 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.52, 21.34 Russo v Resource Developments International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 838 .… 19.17, 19.22, 21.19 Ruthol Pty Ltd v Tricon (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 443 .… 23.42 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996) 1 AC 344 .… 7.7, 23.19 RWE Npower Renewables Ltd v FN Bentley Ltd [2013] EWHC 978 .… 10.32 Ryan v Hopkinson (1990) 14 Fam LR 151 .… 16.75 — v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 .… 24.1, 24.13 — v Rouen [2000] NSWSC 468 .… 18.4, 18.37, 23.45 — v Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of Australia [1996] 2 VR 235 .… 5.26, 6.6, 10.16 Ryanair Ltd v SR Technics Ireland Ltd [2007] EWHC 3089 (QB) .… 10.7 Ryder v Frohlich [2004] NSWCA 472 .… 21.23, 22.9 — v Taylor (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 31 .… 7.45, 7.47 — v Wombwell (1868) LR 4 Exch 32 .… 17.5

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496 .… 3.14 Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65 .… 2.3, 3.69, 10.3, 10.8, 10.12, 10.16, 12.2, 12.30, 12.31, 12.32, 12.33, 12.35, 12.37, 12.38, 12.41, 21.28, 21.38, 22.6 Ryrie v Cruikshank (1896) 17 LR (NSW) 195 .… 16.37 S S&C Nicola Pty Ltd v Peter Holmes Investment Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 72 .… 10.30 S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637 .… 2.12, 3.70, 22.6 S & N Carbone Family Trust v Mills [2019] NSWCA 15 .… 2.13 S Gormley & Co Pty Ltd v Cubit [1964–5] NSWR 557 .… 11.47, 11.74, 11.86 S H Lock (Australia) Ltd v Kennedy (1988) 12 NSWLR 482 .… 11.103 Saad v TWT Ltd [1998] NSWSC 282 .… 10.5, 10.16, 10.23, 10.57, 22.12, 23.42 Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880 .… 2.20, 26.8 Sabouni v Revelop Building and Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 31 .… 23.24 Sacher Investments Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Ltd (1976) 1 NSWLR 5 .… 23.43 Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472 .… 18.14 Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 .… 3.6, 3.11, 5.19, 5.24, 10.16 Sagar v Closer Settlement Ltd (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 199 .… 11.36, 11.37 Sahade v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 512 .… 3.67 — v Owners Corporation SP 62022 [2013] NSWSC 1791 .… 12.35 Sahin v National Australia Bank Ltd [2011] VSCA 64 .… 11.115 Saint v Adams (1921) QSR 41 .… 16.62 Saints Gallery Pty Ltd v Plummer (1988) 80 ALR 525 .… 11.121, 11.122 Saitta Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2001) 162 FLR 35; [2001] VSC 170 .… 11.109 Salcombe Investments Pty Ltd v Cement Aids Ltd (Qld) (1987) ASC 55–565 .… 10.72

Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.18, 2.19, 2.30, 10.3, 10.7 Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 1532 .… 8.7 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466; [2003] VSCA 1 .… 3.68, 7.28, 8.47 Salvation Army (South Australia Property Trust) v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347 .… 25.13 Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P & CR 179 .… 2.14 Sam Management Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] NSWSC 676 .… 10.55 SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132 .… 12.30 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; 286 ALR 257; [2011] FCAFC 156 .… 24.19, 24.20, 24.22 San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 68 ALR 161 .… 11.41, 11.88, 12.17 Sanctuary Investments Pty Ltd v St Gregory’s Armenian School Inc [1998] NSWSC 788; (1999) ANZ ConvR 454 .… 20.12, 20.16, 21.35 Sande v Medsara Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 147 .… 12.53 Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 .… 10.55, 10.60 Sanderson Motors (Sales) Pty Ltd v Yorkstar Motors Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 513 .… 24.21 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 .… 8.16, 8.25, 8.28, 8.31, 8.36 Sandhurst & Northern District Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Warren [1918] VLR 209 .… 25.6 Sandra Investments Pty Ltd v Booth (1983) 153 CLR 153; 50 ALR 385 .… 5.25, 20.1, 20.4, 20.8, 20.13 Sandri v O’Driscoll [2014] VSCA 88 .… 2.8 Sandtara Pty Ltd v Longreach Group Ltd [2008] NSWSC 373 .… 4.22 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 .… 18.16 Sanpine Pty Ltd v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council [2006] NSWCA 291 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.22

cxxx

Table of Cases Sansom v Westpac Banking Corp [1996] Aust Torts Rep 81-383 .… 14.9 Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9 .… 26.9 Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 272 .… 2.3, 22.4, 22.6 Santos Ltd v BNP Paribas [2019] QCA 11 .… 7.50 Sanwa Australia Finance Ltd v Finchill Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 466 .… 26.3 Sapuppo v Ribchenkov [2001] FCA 1428 .… 14.17 Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 .… 2.13, 2.28 Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634; [1974] HCA 40 .… 1.124, 10.26, 11.47, 11.49, 11.50, 20.9, 20.15, 20.18, 21.23, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31 — v Campbell [1972–3] ALR 708 .… 11.10, 11.53, 11.76 Sargood Bros v Commonwealth (1910) 11 CLR 258 .… 26.1 SAS (Vic) Pty Ltd v Urban Ecological Systems Ltd [2021] VSCA 335 .… 10.30 Satellite Estate Pty Ltd v Jaquet [1968] 2 NSWR 340; (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 126; 88 WN (NSW) 159 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.20 Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp 2014 SCC 53 .… 10.12 Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004 .… 12.3, 12.63, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70 — v Glev Franchises Pty Ltd (1995) 133 ALR 73 .… 11.147, 25.12 — v Pilcher [1949] 2 All ER 1097 .… 16.29 Savage v Intercoiffure Pty Ltd (1987) ASC 55-574 .… 11.98 Savcor Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 587 .… 18.34 Savoy Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v Global Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 284 .… 21.12 Sayed v National Australia Bank Ltd [2013] NSWCA 304 .… 5.24 Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 159; [2011] WASCA 159 .… 4.24 Scammell v Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 6.3, 6.8 Scammell & Nephew Ltd v H C & J G Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 6.1 Scandrett v Dowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483 .… 5.10 Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 173 .… 11.146



Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 169; [1943] HCA 43 .… 1.107, 19.4, 19.6, 19.7, 19.9, 19.11, 19.12, 19.13, 19.15, 19.16, 19.19, 19.21, 19.22, 19.23, 19.25 Scarborough v Sturzaker (1905) 1 Tas LR 117 .… 17.5, 17.6 Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345; [1881-5] All ER Rep 651 .… 8.47 Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] AC 572; (1975) 49 ALJ 223 .… 3.71, 5.8, 16.54 Schebsman, Re [1944] 1 Ch 83; [1943] 2 All ER 768 .… 7.2 ScheldeMarinebouw BV v A-G [2005] NZAR 356 .… 3.39 Schenker & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Maplas Equipment and Services Pty Ltd [1990] VR 834 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.35, 10.64, 10.77 Schepis v Elders IXL Ltd (1986) 70 ALR 729; (1987) 9 ATPR 40-759 .… 11.118, 11.146 Schering AG v Parmedica Pty Ltd (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 137; 52 SR (NSW) 16 .… 18.31 Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 .… 3.47, 3.60 Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 .… 18.37, 18.38 Scholey v Central Railway Co of Venezuela (1868) LR 9 Eq 266n .… 11.49 Schreuders v Grandiflora Nominees Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 93 .… 10.32, 22.5 Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] QCA 208 .… 14.18 Schwarstein v Watson [1985] 3 NSWLR 134 .… 16.54, 16.55 Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 .… 4.35 Schwartz Family Co Pty Ltd v Capitol Carpets Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 238 .… 12.25 Scolio Pty Ltd v Cote (1992) 6 WAR 475 .… 13.3, 13.5, 13.9 Scotson v Pegg (1861) 6 H & N 295; 158 ER 121; 3 LT 753 .… 4.34 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 HLC 811 …. 18.34 — v Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd (1995) ATPR (Dig) 46-154 .… 11.128 — v Bradley [1971] Ch 850 .… 16.35 — v Coulson [1903] 2 Ch 249 .… 12.12 — v English [1947] VLR 445 .… 22.11 — v Ennis-Oakes [2020] NSWCA 239 .… 21.13, 23.22

cxxxi



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Hanson (1829) 1 Russ & M 128; 39 ER 49 .… 11.11 — v Littledale (1858) 8 E & B 815; 120 ER 304 .… 12.45 — v Morley (1888) 20 QBD 120 .… 17.60 — v Rayment (1868) LR 7 Eq 112 .… 24.12 — v Scott (1904) 10 ALR 43 .… 18.26 — v White [1938] VLR 188 .… 16.63 — v Wise [1986] 2 NZLR 484 .… 15.9 Scott Carver Pty Ltd v SAS Trustee Corporation [2005] NSWCA 462 .… 23.27, 23.38 Scott Fury t/a Fury Custom Boats v Nasso [2021] WASCA 171 .… 26.4 Scottish Halls Ltd v The Minister (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 81 .… 19.4, 19.8, 19.16, 19.19, 19.20 Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564 .… 12.17, 12.47 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 .… 8.47 Scuderi v Morris (2001) 39 ACSR 592; (2001) 4 VR 125; [2001] VSCA 190 .… 4.40, 18.21 SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 .… 19.3, 19.21, 24.10 SEA Food International Pty Ltd v Lam [1998] FCA 130 .… 16.35 Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd v JLW (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 415 .… 10.3 Seabridge Pty Ltd v JLW (NSW) (1991) 29 FCR 415 .… 11.122 Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (2012) 297 ALR 337; [2012] FCA 1346 .… 11.114 Sealand of the Pacific Ltd v Ocean Cement Ltd (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 625 .… 11.88 Seamez v McLaughlin [1999] NSWSC 9 .… 10.53 Searle v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] NSWCA 127 .… 18.30, 23.15 Secretary, Department of Social Security v Agnew (2000) 96 FCR 357 .… 16.72, 16.73, 16.74 Secretary, Department of Transport (Vic) v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 261 ALR 39; [2009] FCA 1209 .… 7.5 Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson [2005] WASC 264 .… 10.3, 10.16 Secure Parking Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council [2016] NSWCA 154 .… 3.37, 21.26 Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 .… 8.8, 10.40, 10.41, 10.42, 10.49, 10.55, 10.56, 20.1, 20.16, 21.24

Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1; 93 ALR 271 .… 18.6 Seddon v North Eastern Salt Co Ltd [1905] 1 Ch 326; [1904–7] All ER Rep 817 .… 11.61, 11.63, 12.29 Sedgwick Ltd v Bain Clarkson Ltd (1995) 129 ALR 493 .… 11.114 Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 37 .… 10.73 Segacious Pty Ltd v Fabrellas [1991] 1 Qd R 471 .… 21.26, 23.2, 24.9 Segal v Young [2001] NSWCA 141 .… 25.2 Segal t/as Segal Litton & Chilton v Fleming [2002] NSWCA 262 .… 25.5 Segenhoe Ltd v Akins (1990) 29 NSWLR 569 .… 23.43 Seidler v Schallhofer [1982] 2 NSWLR 80 .… 18.27 Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216 .… 3.22, 3.42 Sekisui Rib Loc Australia Pty Ltd v Rocla Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 140; [2012] SASCFC 21 .… 10.56 Selectmove Ltd, Re [1995] 1 WLR 474; [1995] 2 All ER 531 .… 4.38 Selen v Selen (2013) 49 Fam LR 164; [2013] FamCAFC 39 .… 4.12 Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 661; 320 ALR 47; [2015] HCA 18 .… 11.129, 11.131, 11.132, 11.134 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 120 ALR 16; [1994] HCA 4 .… 10.15, 10.25, 10.41, 10.48, 10.56, 10.58, 11.125, 11.146, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16 Sellin v Scott (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 64 .… 17.22 Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 .… 11.84, 11.85 Semrani v Manoun [2001] NSWCA 337 .… 11.115 Senanayake v Cheng [1966] AC 63; [1965] 3 All ER 296 .… 11.11, 11.50, 11.53, 11.57, 11.62 Sensis Pty Ltd v McMaster-Fay [2005] NSWCA 163 .… 23.15, 23.16 Sent v Jet Corp of Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 540 .… 11.147 — v Primelife Corporation Ltd [2006] VSC 443 .… 20.13 Sentinel Countrywide Retail Ltd v PC Emerald (Qld) Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 348 .… 24.13

cxxxii

Table of Cases Sentinel Robina Office Pty Ltd v Clarence Property Corporation Ltd [2018] QCA 314 .… 10.44 Serrata Investments Pty Ltd v Rajane Pty Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 419 .… 11.108 Serrata Pty Ltd v Rajane Pty Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 419 .… 11.118 Serrin Hire Pty Ltd v Tidd Ross Todd Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 891 .… 10.77 Servcorp WA Pty Ltd v Perron Investment Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 79 .… 6.11, 10.41, 10.55, 10.56 Serventy v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 223 .… 15.9, 15.31 Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 234; (1993) 117 ALR 393 .… 10.43, 10.61 Setka v Carroll [2019] VSC 571 .… 5.1, 5.10 Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 .… 2.8, 2.13, 2.16, 2.20 Sevastopoulos v Spanos [1991] 2 VR 194 .… 16.55 Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2000] FCA 350; (2000) 171 ALR 89; 175 ALR 433 .… 3.11, 22.2, 22.5, 28.6 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2005) 222 ALR 569; [2005] FCAFC 144 .… 6.6 — v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 .… 2.8, 2.16, 2.20 Seymour v Seymour (1996) 40 NSWLR 358 .… 2.16, 11.147 Seymour Whyte Constructions Pty Ltd v Ostwald Bros Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 99 NSWLR 317; [2019] NSWCA 11 .… 10.35, 12.30 SGIC v Giacomelli (1993) 9 SR (WA) 126 .… 7.3 SH Lock (Australia) Ltd v Kennedy (1988) 12 NSWLR 482 .… 15.12, 15.29, 18.10 Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta CC (1981) 150 CLR 225 .… 11.88, 11.89 Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 CBNS 159; 142 ER 62 .… 4.34 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists [2007] FCA 693; (2008) 168 FCR 46; 248 ALR 267; [2008] FCAFC 72 .… 5.11, 11.107, 11.146 — v The Australasian College of Dermatologists [2007] FCA 693 .… 11.119



Shakibaee v Chan (2001) 24 WAR 97 .… 10.13, 20.13, 21.14, 21.24 Shanahan v Fitzgerald [1982] 2 NSWLR 513 .… 20.3, 20.12 Shanklin Pier v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854 .… 3.9 Sharah v Healey [1981] 2 NSWLR 223 .… 18.37 Sharjade Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2009] NSWCA 373 .… 21.26, 23.2 Sharman v Kunert (1985) 1 NSWLR 225 .… 15.26 Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801 .… 2.26 — v — (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-051; (1994) 6 BPR 13,801; [1995] ANZ ConvR 501; (1994) NSW ConvR 55–721 .… 5.8, 16.56, 16.60, 16.67 — v Batt (1930) 25 Tas LR 33 .… 19.2, 19.17, 19.23 — v Cain [1924] SASR 203 .… 18.38 — v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 110 .… 10.16 — v Ellis; Re Edward Love & Co Pty Ltd [1972] VR 137 .… 4.23, 27.14 Sharpe, Re [1980] 1 WLR 219 .… 16.70 Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449 .… 5.11 Shaw v Ball [1963] SR (NSW) 910 .… 26.4 — v Bindaree Beef Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 125 .… 7.2 — v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167 .… 7.29, 8.12 — v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102 .… 10.52 — v Wheeler (1919) 22 WALR 15 .… 10.23 Shaw & Co v Moss Enterprises and Bastow (1908) 25 TLR 190 .… 8.8 Sheehan v Zaszlos [1995] 2 Qd R 210 .… 3.11, 5.24 Sheffield Nickel Co v Unwin (1877) 2 QBD 214 .… 11.56 Shelburne v Inchiquin (1784) 1 Bro CC 338; 28 ER 1166 .… 12.35 Sheldon v Metrokane Inc [2004] FCA 19 .… 10.54 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co (1895) 1 Ch 287 .… 24.30 Shell Oil of Australia Ltd v McIllwraith McEacharn Ltd (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 144 .… 7.31 Shephard v Galea as executor and trustee of the estate of the Late Joseph Galea [2020] WASCA 152 .… 14.2 — v Midland Bank Plc .… 14.20

cxxxiii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Baster [2005] WASC 23; [2006] WASC 176 .… 16.21, 21.27, 24.31 — v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 385 .… 8.4, 8.9, 8.16, 8.17, 8.26, 8.28, 8.38 — v Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359 .… 10.41, 10.52, 21.24, 21.38 — v Noyes Bros Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 40588 .… 11.146 — v Council of Ryde (1952) 85 CLR 1 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.56 Shepperd, Re (1893) 5 QLJ 116 .… 10.9 Sheridan v Nikolic [1982] Qd R 725 .… 20.13 Sherson & Associates Pty Ltd v Bailey (2001) .… 23.38 Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 .… 21.9, 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 21.21, 21.22, 23.22, 23.23 Shiel v Colonial Bank of Australasia (1870) 1 VR (E) 40 .… 16.63 Shiell v Symons [1951] SASR 82 .… 19.15, 19.25 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 .… 24.13 Shimden Pty Ltd v Rona [2006] NSWCA 256 .… 10.56 Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1038 .… 23.44 Shipley UDC v Bradford Corp [1936] Ch 375 .… 12.36, 12.40 Shire of Yea v Roberts (1879) 5 VLR (E) 222 .… 16.62 Shivas v BTR Nylex Holdings NZ Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 318 .… 3.39 Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2002] QB 834 .… 12.60 Shoreham Park Pty Ltd v John Foote Bloodstock Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 778 .… 20.4 Shortall v White [2007] NSWCA 372 .… 5.4 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 .… 7.27, 8.12, 8.18, 8.34 Showtime Touring Group Pty Ltd v Mosley Touring Inc [2011] NSWSC 1401; (2013) 296 ALR 597; [2013] NSWCA 53 .… 11.110, 11.114 Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 .… 11.136 Shuey v United States 92 US 73 (1876) .… 3.66 Sibbles v Highfern Pty Ltd (1987) 164 CLR 214 .… 21.20, 21.24

Sibley v Grosvenor (1916) 21 CLR 469 .… 11.74, 11.79, 11.84 Sibree v Tripp (1846) 15 M & W 23; 153 ER 745 .… 4.37 Sidameneo (No 456) Pty Ltd v Alexander [2011] NSWCA 418 .… 18.37 Sidenham and Worlington’s Case (1585) 2 Leon 324; 74 ER 497 .… 4.20 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 .… 2.6, 2.9, 2.10, 2.14, 16.69, 16.70 Sidney Eastman Pty Ltd v Southern [1963] NSWR 815 .… 6.8, 6.11, 7.28 Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Nuplex Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA .… 23.34, 23.35 Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy Pty Ltd v Bulgana Wind Farm Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 318 .… 24.23 Siev v Magid [2004] NSWCA 135 .… 26.4 Siglin v Choules [2002] WASCA 9 .… 14.20 Sigma Coachair Group Pty Ltd v Bock Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 684 .… 11.114 Sigma Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v Marvell Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 242 .… 24.19 Sigma Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v NucOne Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] VSC 20 .… 21.35 Sigman Finance Corp (in admin rec), Re [2010] 1 All ER 571 .… 10.12 Silberman v Silberman (1910) SR (NSW) 554 .… 23.19 Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 .… 2.2, 2.5 Silva v Tarval Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9101 .… 19.9 Silver v Dome Resources NL [2007] NSWSC 455 .… 4.35, 7.3, 7.8, 24.5 Simakoff v The Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils of Australia Inc [1999] ACTSC 58 .… 23.42 Simeone v Pesatura General Contractors Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 453 .… 23.17, 23.32 Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; 339 ALR 200; [2016] HCA 47 .… 3.15, 7.2, 7.50, 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 12.30, 12.33, 12.34, 12.41, 24.23 Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187 .… 3.6 Simmons Ltd v Hay [1964–5] NSWR 416 .… 19.5, 19.12, 19.18, 19.21, 19.22 Simon v Motivos (1766) 1 Wm Bl 599; 96 ER 347 .… 16.5

cxxxiv

Table of Cases Simonious Vischer & Co v Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 .… 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.56, 10.59, 23.37, 23.43 Simons v Zartom Investments Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 30 .… 10.21, 11.9, 11.10, 11.40, 11.41, 11.69 Simos v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1976) 10 ACTR 4 .… 11.9, 11.38, 11.41, 26.5 Simpkins v Pays [1955] 1 WLR 975; [1955] 3 All ER 10 .… 5.9 Simpson v Simpson, The Times, 11 June 1988 .… 14.16 — v Surman (1922) 24 WALR 79 .… 21.15 Simpson Steel Structures v Spencer [1964] WAR 101 .… 26.6, 26.13 Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346; 321 ALR 509; [2015] FCAFC 80 .… 11.112 — v Commonwealth [2022] NSWCA 194 …. 26.1 — v Gawne [2005] NSWSC 750 .… 18.7, 18.9 — v Robertson (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 246 .… 16.35 Sinclair v Elderton (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 21 .… 15.2 — v Preston [1970] WAR 186 .… 11.84 — v Schildt (1914) 16 WALR 100 .… 6.5, 6.6, 16.66 — v SSET Constructions Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 125 .… 23.16 Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 .… 10.16, 3.11, 5.19, 5.24, 16.35 Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661; (1984) 55 ALR 1 .… 3.10, 3.33, 3.57, 21.19, 21.20 Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164 .… 7.42 Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 80 .… 10.14 — v — (No 2) [2017] WASCA 76 .… 24.21 — v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 101 .… 26.5 Sion v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2013] NSWCA 337 .… 5.1, 5.2, 6.5 Siqueira v Noronha [1934] AC 332 .… 17.33 Sistrom v Rangott [2004] ACTCA 14 .… 25.12 Sivewright v Casey (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 294 .… 20.7, 20.18 SJ Mackie Pty Ltd v Dalziell Medical Practice Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 87 .… 3.11



Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad & El 983; 113 ER 688 .… 13.4 Skilled Group Ltd v CSR Viridian Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 290 .… 26.8 Skinner v Redmond Family Holdings Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 329 .… 11.115 Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 954; [1974] 1 WLR 576 .… 24.17, 24.21 Skyrise Consultants Pty Ltd v Metroland Funds Management Ltd [2011] NSWCA 406 .… 10.20 Skyrne v Butolf YB 2 Ric 2 (Ames Series) 223 .… 27.6 Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd v Northern Territory (1987) 45 NTR 29 .… 24.13 Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.7 Slator v Trimble 14 Ir C L Rep 342 .… 17.22 Slatter v Railway Commissioners (NSW) (1931) 45 CLR 68 .… 24.25 Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196 .… 16.68 Slee v Warke (1949) 86 CLR 271 .… 12.4, 12.32, 12.33, 12.40, 12.45, 12.55, 22.4, 24.7, 24.8 Slinger v Southern White Pty Ltd (2005) 92 SASR 303; [2005] SASC 267 .… 11.146 Smilie Pty Ltd v Bruce (1998) 8 BPR 15; (1999) ANZ ConvR 412 .… 21.19, 21.20, 21.35 Smith v ACT [2015] ACTSC 7 .… 25.12 — v ANL Ltd (2000) 176 ALR 449 .… 10.53 — v Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd (in liq) (1956) 95 CLR 381 .… 20.8 — v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187; [1881–5] All ER Rep 242 .… 11.34 — v Clegg [2005] 1 Qd R 561 .… 14.2 — v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 667 .… 12.59 — v Glegg [2005] 1 Qd R 561; [2004] QSC 443 .… 14.7, 14.13, 15.11 — v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 .… 12.44, 12.45, 12.51 — v Iliffe (1875) LR 20 Eq 666 .… 12.35 — v Jenkins (1969) 119 CLR 397; (1970) 44 ALJR 78 .… 18.14, 27.15 — v Jones (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 444 .… 26.13 — v Kay (1859) 7 HL Cas 750; 11 ER 299 .… 14.7 — v Land and House Property Corp (1884) 28 Ch D 7 .… 11.16, 11.116

cxxxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Lush (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 207 .… 16.35 — v Maloney (2005) 223 ALR 101 .… 11.72 — v Mansi [1963] 1 WLR 26 .… 3.10 — v Moloney (2005) 92 SASR 498 .… 11.127 — v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803 .… 3.67, 6.8 — v Noss [2006] NSWCA 37 .… 11.127 — v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1910) 11 CLR 148 .… 8.9, 8.16, 8.17 — v Pisani (2001) 78 SASR 548 .… 20.2 — v Smith [2004] NSWSC 663 .… 12.51 — v UMB Chrysler (Scotland) Ltd [1978] SC (HL) 1 .… 10.62 — v Westall 1698) 1 Ld Raym 316; 91 ER 1106 .… 16.30 — v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38 .… 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9, 13.12 — v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 .… 17.73 — v Young [2016] NSWCA 281 .… 25.1, 25.8 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 .… 7.25 Smith Bros Trade & Transport Terminal Pty Ltd v Pacific Power [1998] NSWSC 392 .… 10.60, 19.17, 19.21 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 .… 11.83 Smits v Roach [2002] NSWSC 241; [2004] NSWCA 233 .… 18.33, 18.46, 26.2 Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445 .… 3.10, 3.46, 3.61 Smythe v Thomas (2007) 71 NSWLR 537; [2007] NSWSC 844 .… 3.22, 10.23, 16.42 Snarski v Barbarich [1969] WAR 46 .… 11.9, 11.76 Snelling v John G Snelling Ltd [1973] 1 QB 87; [1972] 1 All ER 79; [1972] 2 WLR 588 .… 7.5, 7.9, 7.11 Snowlife Pty Ltd v Robina Land Corp Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 Qd R 584 .… 20.7, 20.18, 21.35, 22.12 Snyman v Cooper (1990) 24 FCR 433; 12 ATPR 40-993 .… 11.107 Society of Lloyd’s v White [2004] VSCA 101 .… 11.114, 11.153 Software Integrators Pty Ltd v Roadrunner Couriers Pty Ltd (1997) 69 SASR 288 .… 11.115 Sola Basic Australia Ltd v Morganite Ceramic Fibres Pty Ltd .… 10.12

Solicitor-General v Wylde (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 83 .… 18.34 Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671; [1949] 2 All ER 1107 .… 11.13, 11.62, 12.3, 12.4, 12.8, 12.17, 12.18, 12.19, 12.20, 12.25, 12.26, 12.29, 12.53, 12.54 Solomons v Halloran (1906) 7 SR (NSW) 32 .… 21.19 Soltykoff, Re; Ex parte Margrett [1891] 1 QB 413 .… 17.29 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160; 232 ALR 232; [2007] HCA .… 11.59 Sopov v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 510; [2009] VSCA 141 .… 26.6, 26.7 Soteria Insurance Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 440 .… 23.7 South African Territories Ltd v Wallington [1898] AC 309 .… 24.5 South Australia v Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130 .… 5.1, 5.2, 5.28 — v Day [2000] SASC 451 .… 10.56 — v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161 .… 11.83, 11.85, 11.88, 11.90, 11.91, 25.7 — v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344; [2009] SASC 219 .… 10.52 South Australian Cold Stores Ltd v Electricity Trust (SA) (1965) 115 CLR 247 .… 10.60, 18.39, 18.47 — v Electricity Trust of Australia (1957) 98 CLR 65 .… 12.8, 18.7, 18.20, 18.48, 26.3, 26.5 South Australian Railways Commissioner v Egan (1973) 130 CLR 506 .… 10.62, 10.64, 18.34 South Coast Basalt Pty Ltd v R W Miller & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 356 .… 23.39 South Coast Oils (Qld and NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.6, 6.8, 16.37 South Dowling Pty Ltd v Cody Outdoor Advertising Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 407; [2005] NSWC 391 .… 21.18 South Launceston Football Club Inc v Tasmanian Football League Ltd (1995) 4 Tas R 342 .… 3.8 South Suburban Land & Finance Co Ltd v Hughes (1889) 15 VLR 751 .… 16.35, 16.37 South Sydney Council v Royal Botanic Gardens [1999] NSWCA 478 .… 10.41, 26.3, 26.5 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177

cxxxvi

Table of Cases ALR 611; (2001) 181 ALR 188; [2000] FCA 1541 .… 10.39, 10.43, 10.45, 10.46, 10.49 South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd [1905] AC 239 .… 28.17 South Western Sydney Local Health District v Gould (2018) 97 NSWLR 513; [2018] NSWCA 69 .… 10.32 Southage Pty Ltd v Vescovi [2015] VSCA 117 .… 26.1, 26.5 Southdown Publications Pty Ltd v ACP Magazines Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 347 .… 12.63 Southern British National Trust Ltd (in liq) v Pither (1937) 57 CLR 89 .… 8.40 Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340 .… 21.9 Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 .… 3.67 Southern Resources Ltd v Technomin Australia NL [1990] WAR 72 .… 10.12 Southern Waste Resource Co Pty Ltd v Adelaide Hills Region Waste Management Authority [No 3] [2019] SASC 192 .… 11.92 Southern Water v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077 .… 7.38 Sovereign v Bevillesta [2001] NSWSC 369 .… 10.64, 10.74 Sowler v Potter [1940] 1 KB 271 .… 12.60 SPA Property and Investments Co Pty Ltd v Pembroke Antiques Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 547 .… 11.22, 11.30, 11.79 Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Ltd [2003] FCA 1025 .… 26.1, 26.2 SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 35; [2014] FCAFC 50 .… 11.117, 11.118 Spathis v Hanave Investment Co Ltd [2002] NSWSC 304 .… 12.36 Spears v Hartly (1800) 3 Esp 81; 170 ER 545; [1775–1802] All ER 181 .… 25.11 Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 .… 3.7, 3.26, 4.19 Specialist Diagnostic Services Pty Ltd v Healthscope Ltd (2012) 41 VR 1; 305 ALR 569; [2010] VSC 443; (2012) 41 VR 1; [2012] VSCA 175 .… 7.49, 10.43, 18.35, 18.37 Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 617 .… 3.46



Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 30 NSWLR 185 .… 11.54 Spellman v Spellman [1961] 1 WLR 921; [1961] 2 All ER 498 .… 5.4 Spence v Crawford [1939] 3 All ER 271 .… 11.45, 11.53, 11.57 — v Duffield (1870) 1 VR (L) 49 .… 23.39 Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418; [1907] HCA 82 .… 6.5 — v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561 .… 3.17, 3.19 Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilla World Service BV [2002] EWCA Civ 15 .… 11.20 Spiers Earthworks Pty Ltd v Landtec Projects Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASCA 53; (2012) 287 ALR 360 .… 10.12, 21.27, 23.45 Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Harrison (1990) 19 NSWLR 211 .… 11.145 Spina v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2009] NSWCA 206 .… 15.31 Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 57 NSWLR 544; [2003] NSWCA 180 .… 10.45, 10.49, 13.12, 15.8 Spiro v Lintern [1973] 3 All ER 319 .… 3.44 Spoilt Pty Ltd v Ticking Pty Ltd [2010] QDC 259 .… 11.129 Spong v Spong (1914) 18 CLR 544 .… 14.5, 14.7, 14.11 Spoor v Price (2019) 3 QR 176; [2019] QCA 297 .… 18.6 Sportsvision Australia Pty Ltd v Tallglen Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 103 .… 6.6, 10.16 Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane [2012] EWHC 1290 .… 3.7, 4.17 Springwell Navigation Corp v J P Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 12; [2010] CLC 705 .… 2.3, 10.7 Spunwill Pty Ltd v BAB Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 290 .… 6.6, 10.5, 10.13, 10.16, 10.32, 10.34, 10.35 Squibb & Sons Pty Ltd v Tully Corp Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-691 .… 11.122, 11.123 Squires v SA Steel and Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 142 .… 8.19, 8.34 — v South Australian Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 142 .… 8.18 SST Consulting Services Pty Ltd v Rieson (2006) 225 CLR 516; 228 ALR 417; [2006] HCA 31 .… 6.17, 18.1, 18.7, 18.38, 18.40, 18.41, 18.42 St Barbara Ltd v Hughes (No 2) [2011] WASCA 235 .… 25.12

cxxxvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

St Clair v Petricevic (1988) NSW ConvR 55-426; ASC 55-688; (1989) 63 ALJ 495 .… 13.10, 15.28, 15.31 St George Bank Ltd v Quinerts (2009) 25 VR 666; [2009] VSCA 245 .… 11.136 — v Trimarchi [2004] NSWCA 120 .… 14.20, 15.31 St George Commercial Credit Corp Ltd v Collins Wallis Properties Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 649 .… 23.35, 23.43 St George Soccer Football Association Inc v Soccer NSW Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1288 .… 10.43, 11.111, 11.118 St Hilliers (Developments) Pty Ltd v Radmanovich [2002] NSWSC 524 .… 8.8 St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons Ltd .… 7.7 Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261; 46 ALR 451 .… 11.118, 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 Stacks Managed Investments Ltd v Tolteca Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 276 .… 15.16 Stacks/Taree v Marshall (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 77 .… 18.35 Stadium Australia Management Ltd v Sodexho Venues (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 437 .… 10.12 Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 150 CLR 535 .… 26.12 Stained Glass Overlay Australasia Pty Ltd v Rea [1998] WASC 325 .… 18.37 Stammers v Akron Securities Ltd (1997) 140 FLR 146 .… 18.11 Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164 .… 2.14 Standard Portland Cement Pty Ltd v Good (1983) 47 ALR 107; 57 ALJR 151 .… 12.37, 12.41 Staniland v Kentucky Homes Pty Ltd (1987, unreported) .… 18.3 Stankovic v Aufderheide [2003] SASC 378 .… 16.55 Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [2006] WASCA 56 .… 7.7 Stanway, Re [1913] VLR 327 .… 17.63 Star Entertainment Group Ltd v Chubb Insurance Australia Ltd [2022] FCAFC 16 .… 10.30 Starceavich v Swart & Associates Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 960 .… 15.4, 15.7, 15.8 Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 .… 21.20

Starlink International Group Pty Ltd v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1154 .… 10.43 St-Arnaud v Facebook, Inc [2011] QCCS 1506 .… 3.7 Startup v Macdonald (1843) 6 Man & G 593; 134 ER 1029 .… 9.9 State Bank of New South Wales v Chia (2000) 50 NSWLR 588; [2000] NSWSC 552 .… 6.15 — v Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 47; (2001) 51 NSWLR 399 .… 10.15, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.59, 10.60, 10.61, 23.19 — v Hibbert [2000] NSWSC 628 .… 14.17, 14.20, 15.28 — v Layoun [2001] NSWSC 113 .… 14.20 — v Swiss Bank Corp Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 350 .… 26.5 State Bank of South Australia v Macintosh (NSWSC, Young J, 31 May 1995, unreported) .… 22.5 State Government Insurance Corp v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511; 101 ALR 259 .… 11.113 State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 228 .… 21.38 State Lotteries Office v Burgin .… 10.12 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 .… 2.13, 2.14, 2.16, 2.18, 2.20, 15.8 — v Ferreri (1990) ANZ ConvR 211; NSW ConvR 55512 .… 12.52, 12.53, 12.54 — v Hammond (1988) 15 NSWLR 395 .… 25.7 — v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 .… 10.3, 10.5 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 338 .… 7.42 State Transport Authority v Apex Quarries Ltd [1988] VR 187 .… 24.20 Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536; [1974] 3 WLR 56; [1974] 2 All ER 977 .… 16.59, 16.65 — v Drinkle [1916] AC 275 .… 21.36 Steel Wing Co Ltd, Re [1921] 1 Ch 349; [1920] All ER Rep 292 .… 8.26 Steele v Marshan [2012] NSWCA 141 .… 3.27 — v Tardiani (1946) 72 CLR 386 .… 26.6, 26.13

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Table of Cases Steelhomes (1985) Pty Ltd v Hutts (1993) 9 SR (WA) 143 .… 18.49 Steggall v Lymburner (1912) 14 WALR 201 .… 16.19 Steggles Ltd v Yarrabee Chicken Co Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 91 .… 10.12 Steinberg v Scala (Leeds) Ltd [1923] 2 Ch 452; [1923] All ER Rep 239 .… 17.19, 17.21, 17.23 Steiner v Magic Carpet Tours Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 40-490 .… 11.146 Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119 .… 3.49, 5.24, 16.35 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 .… 18.37 Stephens v Cameron [2021] VSCA 208 .… 26.3 Stephenson v Dwyer [2008] NSWCA 123 .… 5.24 Stepps Investments Ltd v Security Capital Corp Ltd (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 351 .… 12.52 Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology 939 Fd 2d 91 .… 3.55 Stericorp Ltd v Stericycle Inc [2005] VSC 203 .… 11.152 Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489; 81 ALR 463; 168 CLR 489; [1988] HCA 51 .… 2.16, 15.13, 21.11, 21.21, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 Sternbeck v Sternbeck (1968) 11 FLR 360 .… 13.2 Steve Parrott Pty Ltd v Fire Protection Association Australia [2016] NSWSC 1393 .… 21.12 Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1 .… 18.33 — v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323 .… 2.4 — v Trewin [1968] Qd R 411 .… 6.9 Stevenson v Ellis (1912) 29 WN (NSW) 52 .… 6.5 — v Hook (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 307 .… 21.12 Stevenson Jacques & Co v McLean [1880] 5 QBD 346 .… 3.30, 3.65 Stevter Holdings Ltd v Katra Constructions Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 459 .… 24.32 Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104 .… 3.14 — v Mooney (1897) 18 LR (NSW) Eq 178 .… 17.71 Stickney v Keeble [1915] AC 386; [1914–15] All ER Rep 73 .… 24.7 Stilbo Pty Ltd v MCC Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 11 Tas R 63; [2002] TASSC 6 .… 25.12



Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168 .… 4.32, 4.33 Stillwell Trucks Pty Ltd v Nectar Brook Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 115 ALR 294 .… 10.30, 1034 Stinchcombe v Thomas [1957] VR 509 .… 6.1, 6.5 Stirling Properties Ltd v Yerba Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ACTR 1 .… 9.8 Stivactas v Michaletos (No 2) (1993) NSW ConvR 55-683; Aust Contract Rep 90-031 .… 14.5 Stockdale v Dunlop (1840) 6 M & W 224; 151 ER 391 .… 16.50 Stocker v Wedderburn (1857) 3 K & J 393; 69 ER 1162 .… 24.11 Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De G M & G 11; 43 ER 411 .… 8.18 — v Wilson [1913] 2 KB 235; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1512 .… 17.37, 17.42 Stocks & Holdings (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Arrowsmith (1964) 112 CLR 646 .… 6.9, 6.10, 10.60 Stoddart v Union Trust Ltd [1912] 1 KB 181 .… 8.40, 8.42 Stoddart Tiles Pty Ltd v Alcan Australia Ltd (1983) .… 10.5, 10.6 Stoelwinder v Southern Health Care Network (2000) 177 ALR 501 .… 11.111 Stoffel & Co v Grondona [2021] AC 540; [2020] UKSC 42 .… 18.46 Stogdon v Lee [1891] 1 QB 661 .… 17.61 Stokely-Van Camp Inc v New Generation Beverages Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 607; [1998] ATPR 41-290; [1998] ATPR 41657 .… 18.37 Stokes v Whicher [1920] 1 .… 16.45 Stokolosa v Weeks Peacock Homes [1998] SASC 6956 .… 18.10 Stone v Chappel (2017) 128 SASR 165; [2017] SASCFC 72 .… 23.27 — v Hoskins [1905] P 194 .… 5.8 — v Hume [1948] SR (Tas) 40 .… 10.2, 10.9 — v Wythipol (1588) Cro Eliz 126; 1 Leon 113; Owen 94; Latch 21; 78 ER 383 .… 4.25, 27.11 Stone James v Pioneer Concrete (WA) Pty Ltd [1985] WAR 233 .… 25.12 Strachan & Co Ltd v Lyall & Sons Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 81 .… 16.64 Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 .… 2.4, 2.14, 2.31, 21.32

cxxxix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Lend Lease Services Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 98 .… 24.23 Suisse Atlantique Société d’ Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361 .… 10.76 Sullavan v Teare (2011) 1 Qd R 292; [2010] QCA 70 .… 25.5 — v Sclanders [2000] SASC 273 .… 18.32 — v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312 .… 2.5, 2.9, 16.70 Sultman v Bond [1956] St R Qd 180 .… 17.5, 17.7 Sumampow v Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 64 .… 2.3, 10.48, 20.4, 20.15, 21.32 Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149 .… 21.29 Summers v Cocks (1927) 40 CLR 321 .… 24.8 — v Commonwealth (1918) 25 CLR 144; (1919) 26 CLR 180 .… 10.54, 21.12, 22.9 Summertime Holidays Pty Ltd v Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 29 .… 23.19, 23.24 Summit Chemicals Pty Ltd v Vetrotex Espana SA [2004] WASCA 109 .… 25.12 Sumpter v Hedges [1898] 1 QB 673 .… 26.6 Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 .… 16.11, 16.15, 21.12, 21.13, 21.24, 21.26, 21.29, 21.35, 23.22, 26.12 Suncorp Building Society Ltd, Re [1994] 2 Qd R 570 .… 18.12 Suncorp-Metway Ltd v Bellairs [2009] NSWSC 135 .… 15.27 Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323 .… 4.32, 4.35 Sunset Vineyard Management Pty Ltd v Southcorp Wines Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 234; [2008] VSCA 98 .… 10.13, 10.58 Sunstar Fruit Pty Ltd v Cosmo [1995] 2 Qd R 214 .… 21.12, 21.19, 26.6 Sunvara Pty Ltd v Williams [2001] NSWSC 433 .… 23.19 Supalux Paint Co Pty Ltd v Vyse [1999] WASC 78 .… 2.20, 6.1, 10.13, 18.37, 22.6 Superannuation & Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Turner [2020] NSWCA 246 .… 15.27, 15.28 Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 563 .… 22.9 Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd v Tass James [2004] NSWSC 61 .… 21.24

Stradbroke Waters Co-owners Co-operative Society Ltd v Taylor [1988] 1 Qd R 595 .… 6.5 Straits Exploration (Australia) Pty Ltd v Murchison United NL (2005) 31 WAR 187; [2005] WASCA 241 .… 5.15, 18.34 Strangeborough v Warner 4 Leon 3; 74 ER 686 .… 27.12 Stratton Finance Pty Ltd v Webb (2014) 314 ALR 166; [2014] FCAFC 110 .… 10.12 Streamline Fashions Pty Ltd, Re [1965] VR 418 .… 12.35 Strickland v Minister for Lands for Western Australia (1998) 85 FCR 303 .… 6.15 — v Turner (1852) 7 Exch 208; 155 ER 919 .… 12.12 Striker Resources NL v Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) [2006] WASC 153 .… 21.24, 21.38 Stromdale and Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] 1 All ER 59 .… 7.28 Strover v Harrington [1988] 2 WLR 572 .… 11.35, 11.36 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Cable Sands Pty Ltd (2010) 41 WAR 318; [2010] WASCA 222 .… 6.15 — v — (No 3) [2009] WASC 352 .… 10.47 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2016] WASCA 177 .… 11.45, 11.50, 21.38 Stuart v Kingston (1923) 32 CLR 309 .… 11.78 — v Wilkins (1778) 1 Doug KB 18; 99 ER 15 .… 27.26 Stuart Pty Ltd v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 334 .… 7.41, 23.13, 23.39 Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 6 .… 15.6, 15.8, 15.9, 15.10, 15.16, 15.31 Stumer Investments Pty Ltd v Azzura Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 352 .… 11.147 Sturlyn v Albany (1587) Cro Eliz 67; 78 ER 327 .… 4.12 STY (Afforestation) Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2006] VSCA 283 .… 21.29, 21.31 Suata Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corp (1989) 86 ALR 532 .… 5.29, 11.109 Subiaco v Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 140 .… 19.6 Suburban Homes Pty Ltd v Topper (1929) 35 ALR 294 .… 11.42 Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444 .… 6.9, 6.11 cxl

Table of Cases Surfstone Pty Ltd v Morgan Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 290; [2016] 2 Qd R 194; [2016] QCA 213 .… 10.70 Surrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka [1977] 2 All ER 481 .… 25.8 Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361; [1993] 3 All ER 705 .… 24.1 Sutton v A J Thompson Pty Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 233 .… 11.110, 11.122, 11.123, 11.124, 11.129 — v Lintot (1859) Legge 1229 .… 16.52 — v Sutton [1984] Ch 184; [1984] 1 All ER 168 .… 24.11 — v Zullo Enterprises Pty Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 196; [1998] QCA 417 .… 16.55, 18.7 Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 .… 16.7, 16.51, 20.4, 20.8, 20.13, 20.15, 20.16, 21.26, 22.4, 22.5, 24.2, 24.8 Svanosio v McNamara (1956) 96 CLR 186 .… 10.21, 10.24, 11.64, 12.20, 12.27, 12.29 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 279 .… 6.6, 10.6, 23.24, 23.25, 23.32 Swan Pools Ltd v Baker (1980) 25 SASR 103 .… 25.2 Swann v Phillips (1838) 8 Ad & E 457; 112 ER 912 .… 11.80 Swanson v Board of Land and Works [1928] VLR 283 .… 18.34 Swanville Investment Pty Ltd v Riana Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 121 .… 24.4 Sweet & Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd [1964] 2 QB 699 .… 6.7, 6.11 Sweetman v Bradfield Management Services Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-290 .… 11.112, 11.116, 11.125 Swettenham v Wild [2005] QCA 264 .… 16.73 SWF Hoists & Industrial Equipment Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Commission (1990) ATPR 41-045 .… 11.116, 11.147 Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v LeRoi International Inc (No 2) (2015) 48 WAR 376 .… 23.8, 23.26 — v Norncott Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 184 .… 3.15 Swift v Jewsbury and Goddard (1874) LR 9 QB 301 .… 11.81 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1995) ATPR 41-401 .… 15.8, 15.16 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyd’s Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584; [1981] 2 All ER 449; [1981] 2 WLR 893 .… 7.31, 8.19, 24.6



SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 .… 3.46 Sydbank Soenderjylland A/S v Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 539; 149 ALR 134. .… 3.3, 11.114 Sydney Attractions Group Pty Ltd v Frederick Schulman [2013] NSWSC 858 .… 10.32, 10.48 Sydney CC v West (1965) 114 CLR 481 .… 10.62, 10.64, 10.70, 10.72, 10.73, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77 Sydney Consumers’ Milk & Ice Co Ltd v Hawkesbury Dairy & Ice Society Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 458 .… 24.1, 24.8, 24.10 Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 .… 3.11, 6.12 Sydney MC v M’Beath (1881) 2 LR (NSW) 142 .… 17.71 Sydney Municipal Council v Australian Metal Co Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 550 .… 19.20 Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games v Zhu [2002] NSWCA 380 .… 21.24 Sydney Strata Securities Pty Ltd v Elders Finance Ltd (FCA, Davies J, 20 December 1990) .… 23.13 Sydney Water Corporation v Makucha [2010] NSWSC 114 .… 3.15, 17.70 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528 .… 4.31 — v Reserve Bank of Australia (1998) 158 ALR 710 .… 11.117 — v Stratton [1972] 1 NSWLR 145 .… 18.25 Symbion Pathology Pty Ltd v Healthscope Ltd [2006] VSC 191 .… 7.27, 7.31, 7.49 Symmons Plains Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Youl [2005] TASSC 35 .… 16.35 Symons v Williams (1875) 1 VLR (Eq) 199 .… 14.2 Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd v North Sydney Leagues’ Club Ltd [2009] NSWCA 140 .… 10.12 Syros Shipping Co SA v Elaghill Trading Co (The Proodos C) [1981] 3 All ER 189; [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 390 .… 4.32 Sze Tu v Lowe [2014] NSWCA 462; (2014) 89 NSWLR 317 .… 25.13 Szep v Blanken [1969] SASR 65 .… 11.50 T T J Precision Engineering Pty Ltd v Crane Copper and Aluminium Pty Ltd [1968] 3 NSWR 360 .… 8.47

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T Palmerston (Qld) Pty Ltd v Fogg [1983] 2 Qd R 700 .… 10.32 Ta Ho Ma Pty Ltd v Allen (1999) 47 NSWLR 1 .… 11.38, 11.122 TAA Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323 .… 13.7 Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272; [2009] HCA 8 .… 24.1, 23.6, 23.26, 23.27, 28.17 Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36 .… 23.14 Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177 .… 11.113, 11.116 Taddy v Sterious [1904] 1 Ch 354 .… 7.12 Tadrous v Tadrous [2012] NSWCA 16 .… 16.70 Taheri v Vitek (2014) 87 NSWLR 403; [2014] NSWCA 209 .… 11.35, 11.39, 11.45, 11.53 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; [1886-90] All ER Rep 486 .… 8.12, 8.28 Tait v Bonnice [1975] VR 102 .… 6.17, 20.13 TAL Life Ltd v Shuetrim (2016) 332 ALR 507; [2016] NSWCA 68 .… 7.3, 10.32 Talbot v Talbot [1968] Ch 1 .… 6.8 Talk of the Town Pty Ltd v Hagstrom (1990) 99 ALR 130 .… 18.37 Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Vic) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 .… 1.22, 3.60, 3.61, 4.32, 5.20, 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 16.46 Tamanna v Zattere; Thakorlal v Zattere; Rabac Pty Ltd v Zattere [2017] NSWSC 1388 .… 24.31 Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 .… 18.44 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 191 ALR 449; [2002] HCA 35 .… 10.53 Tameeka Group Pty Ltd v Landan Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 733 .… 10.43, 15.16 Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch D 215 .… 12.4, 12.55, 24.7 Tanah Merah Vic Pty Ltd v Owners’ Corporation No 1 of PS631436T [2021] VSCA 72 .… 11.133, 11.134 Tanaka v Tokyo Network Computing Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 114 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.38, 23.22, 23.44 Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239 .… 8.23, 8.25 Tang v Chong (1988) 63 ALJ 349 .… 24.9 — v — (1989) NSW ConvR 55-449 .… 21.36

Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 .… 5.7 Tannous v Cipolla Bros Holdings Pty Ltd (2001) 10 BPR 18,563; [2001] ANZ ConvR 430 .… 9.8 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 215; 217 CLR 315; 201 ALR 359; [2003] HCA 57 .… 2.16, 15.2, 20.18, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9, 28.31 Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (2000) 9 BPR 17,287; (1999) NSW ConvR 55-908; ATPR (Digest) 46-195; [1999] NSWSC 478 .… 12.30, 12.36, 12.41, 15.2, 15.8 Taouk v Assure (NSW) Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 227; [2017] NSWSC 534 .… 10.3, 10.32 Tapiolas v Tapiolas [1985] 2 Qd R 310 .… 25.8 Tarbet Investments Pty Ltd v Overett [1983] Qd R 280 .… 21.18 Tarongo Land Pty Ltd v Lyons [2005] VSC 491 .… 20.3, 20.15, 21.32 Tasmania & Director of Housing v Shaw [2001] TASSC 119 .… 21.10 Tasman Capital Pty Ltd v Sinclair (2008) 75 NSWLR 1; [2008] NSWCA 248 .… 5.24 Tasman Express Line Ltd v JI Case (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 108 .… 10.64, 10.73, 10.76 Tasmania Development & Resources v Martin (2000) 97 IR 66; [2000] FCA 414 .… 10.12, 20.7, 22.12, 23.14, 23.32 Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2005) 15 Tas R 243; [2005] TASSC 133 .… 23.45 — v Shaw [2001] TASSC 119 .… 23.44, 26.9 Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v Kossman [2005] TASSC 5; [2006] TASSC 40 .… 19.15 — v MacQueen [2005] TASSC 36 .… 19.15 Tate v Williamson (1866) 2 Ch App 55 .… 14.5 Tatlock v Harris (1789) 3 TR 174; 100 ER 517 .… 8.47 Tatton v Wade (1856) 18 CB 371; 139 ER 1413 .… 11.80 Tavefund Pty Ltd v Stephen Fitzgerald & Co Pty Ltd [1989] ACTSC 57 .… 22.10 Taxation Services of Australia Ltd v Townsend (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 98 .… 18.37 Taylor v Burgess [2002] NSWSC 170 .… 18.16 — v Caldwell 32 LJQB 164; 122 ER 309; [1861–73] All ER Rep 24 .… 27.26

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Table of Cases — v Crossman (No 2) (2012) 199 FCR 363; [2012] FCAFC 11 .… 11.111 — v Dexta Corporation Ltd [2006] NSWCA 310 .… 6.5, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 10.34 — v Gosling [2010] VSC 75 .… 11.142 — v Great Eastern Railway Co [1901] 1 QB 774 .… 16.87 — v J Thomas & Son (1983) 2 ANZ Ins Cas 60-524 .… 26.9 — v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422; 45 ALR 265; [1983] HCA 5 .… 1.89, 5.17, 10.26, 12.2, 12.3, 12.25, 12.26, 12.27, 12.44, 12.48, 12.51, 12.52, 12.53, 12.56, 12.57, 12.62, 12.63, 12.66, 12.71, 21.35, 28.6 — v Lowe (1901) 11 QLJ 90 .… 16.23 — v Oakes Roncoroni & Co (1922) 127 LT 267 .… 21.24 — v Smith [1926] VLR 100; (1926) 38 CLR 48 .… 12.66, 26.3 — v Taylor (1890) 11 NSWR 323 .… 18.29 — v — [1956] NZLR 99 .… 16.70 — v — [2021] VSCA 352 .… 2.9 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 .… 2.6, 16.61, 16.68 TC Industrial Plant Pty Ltd v Robert’s Queensland Pty Ltd (1963) 180 CLR 130; 37 ALJR 289 .… 22.5, 23.5, 23.7, 23.11, 23.13, 23.14, 23.26, 23.41, 23.42 TC Whittle Pty Ltd v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1977) 52 ALJR 173 .… 10.32 TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Hayden Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 130 .… 10.30, 10.32, 23.41 TD Keegan Ltd v Palmer [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 449 .… 13.4 Tea Tree Gully Builders Co Pty Ltd v Martin (1992) 59 SASR 344 .… 16.55, 18.39, 18.49 Teachers Health Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne (1996) NSW ConvR 55-785 .… 14.20, 15.28 Teats v Willcocks [2013] NZCA 162 .… 4.35 Technilock (Aust) Pty Ltd v Mondami Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 320 .… 23.42 Techno Developers Pty Ltd v Homes Corporation of Australia [2005] NSWSC 23 .… 10.54 Technology Leasing Ltd v Lennmar Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 709 .… 19.21 Technomin Australia Pty Ltd v Xstrata Nickel Australasia Operations Pty Ltd (2014) 48 WAR 261; [2014] WASCA 164 .… 10.12 Técnicas Reunidas SA v Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 .… 3.6, 22.3, 22.9



Ted Brown Quarries Pty Ltd v General Quarries (Gilston) Pty Ltd (1977) 16 ALR 23 .… 11.83 Tefbao Pty Ltd v Stannic Securities Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 565 .… 11.128 Tekely v Pryce [2000] NSWCA 6; Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 .… 21.19 Tekmat Pty Ltd v Dosto Pty Ltd (1990) 102 FLR 240 .… 22.3 Telina Developments Pty Ltd v Stay Enterprises Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 585 .… 20.9 Telstra Corp Ltd v First Netcom Pty Ltd (1997) 148 ALR 202 .… 24.21, 24.24 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 296 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.48 — v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Ltd [2003] FCA 786 .… 11.104 Tenji v Hennenberry & Associates Pty Ltd (2000) 172 ALR 679 .… 11.147 Tenth Vandy Pty Ltd v Natwest Markets Australia Ltd [2012] VSCA 103 .… 21.35 Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (1990) 3 WAR 486 .… 6.8 Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd [1988] 1 WAR 144; 98 FLR 328 .… 3.11, 6.6, 10.16, 26.4 Territory Insurance Office v Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd [1999] NTSC 16 .… 23.17 Territory Loans Management v Turner (1992) 110 FLR 341 .… 19.6, 19.16 Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd [2022] SASCA 107 …. 11.143 Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2020] UKSC 47 .… 25.6 Thanh v Hoang (1994) 63 SASR 277 .… 18.6, 18.49 Thanh & Nguyet v Hoang (1994) 63 SASR 276 .… 23.12 The Albazero [1977] AC 774; [1976] 3 All ER 129 .… 7.7 The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 .… 2.3, 2.6, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 7.16, 7.17 The Capricornia Electricity Board v John M Kelly (Builders) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 240 .… 18.10

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The Club Cape Schanck Resort Co Ltd v Cape Country Club Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 526; [2001] VSCA 2 .… 12.30 The Craftsmen Restoration & Renovations Pty Ltd v Boland [2011] NSWCA 147 .… 21.12, 21.26 The Dragon [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 257 .… 3.4 The Eagle [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70 .… 3.4 The Edge Development Group Pty Ltd v Jack Road Investments Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 91 .… 5.19, 10.16 The Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 .… 18.34 The Millstream Pty Ltd v Schultz [1980] 1 NSWLR 547 .… 24.18, 24.30, 24.31 The Movie Network Channels Pty Ltd v Optus Vision Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 111 .… 10.13 The National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 .… 23.35 The National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v O’Hea (1904) 29 VLR 814 .… 4.15 The Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd [2007] NSWSC 676 .… 7.49 The Ritz Jewellers Pty Ltd v Australian Artimports Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 51 .… 10.26 The Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 56 ALJR 113 .… 25.8 The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609 .… 7.38 Thearle v Keeley (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 48 .… 19.15, 19.25 Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 612; 219 ALR 296; [2005] HCA 45 .… 16.21, 16.29, 16.58 Theodorou, Re [1993] 1 Qd R 588 .… 10.27 Thermoplastic Foam Industries Pty Ltd v Imthouse Pty Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 11,181 .… 12.36, 12.52 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 102 .… 5.16, 21.32, 22.12 Thiess Pty Ltd v FLSMIDTH Minerals Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 6 .… 12.30 Thirkell v Cambi [1919] 2 KB 590 .… 16.37 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505 .… 6.8, 6.9, 12.53 Thomas v Brown (1876) 1 QBD 714 .… 16.48, 16.52

— v Crown (1904) 2 CLR 127 .… 16.65 — v Harper (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 142 .… 24.11, 24.14 — v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448; [1999] QCA 525 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Nelson (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 579 .… 10.20 — v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851; 114 ER 330 .… 4.12 — v — [1956] NZLR 785 .… 16.69 — v University of Bradford [1987] AC 795; [1987] 1 All ER 834 .… 5.1 Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391 .… 18.11, 18.41, 18.45 Thompson v Henderson & Partners Pty Ltd (1989) 51 SASR 431 .… 11.91 — v London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1 KB 41 .… 3.4 — v Marshall (1866) 3 WW&A’B (L) 150 .… 23.39 — v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 .… 2.3, 2.15, 10.3, 11.9, 21.32, 22.10 — v Randwick Corp (1950) 81 CLR 87 .… 17.69 — v White [2006] NSWCA 350 .… 3.11, 5.24, 16.21 Thomson v McInnes (1911) 12 CLR 562 .… 16.41, 16.45 Thomson Publications (Australia) Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 27 ALR 551 .… 11.109 Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597; [1964] HCA 41 .… 1.36, 6.4, 6.7, 10.48, 18.21 Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; 350 ALR 1; [2017] HCA 49 .… 5.5, 13.2, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.10, 14.11, 15.8, 15.16 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; [1937] 3 All ER 157 .… 13.6 Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776; [2009] UKHL 18 .… 10.11 Thornley v Tilley (1925) 36 CLR 1 .… 10.16, 10.54 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 .… 3.21, 10.70 Thoroughgood v Cole (1582) 2 Co Rep 9a; 76 ER 408 .… 12.67 Thorp v Thorp (1701) 12 Mod Rep 455; 88 ER 1448 .… 4.10 Thorpe v Bristile Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 720 [1997] FCA 1369 .… 15.13, 15.16 — v Lochel [2005] WASCA 85 .… 23.19 Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 .… 10.60, 19.5, 19.21, 21.26, 24.10

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Table of Cases Thwaites v Ryan [1984] VR 65 .… 16.68 Till v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2004] ACTCA 26 .… 21.12, 26.9 Tillett v Varnell Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1040 .… 14.7 Tilley v Official Receiver (1960) 103 CLR 529 .… 9.8 Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd [2019] UKSC 32; [2020] AC 154 .… 18.35, 18.38 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 29 .… 19.25 Timber Top Realty Pty Ltd v Mullens [1974] VR 312 .… 16.72 Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v FTM Nominees Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 498 .… 8.27 Timmerman v Nervina Industries (International) Pty Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 1; [1983] 2 Qd R 261 .… 6.5, 6.7, 6.10, 9.7, 24.14 Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] 1 .… 16.45 Timothy v Simpson (1834) 6 C & P 499 .… 3.20 Tincknell v Duthy Homes Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 24 .… 23.27 Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT Rep 271 .… 3.41, 3.46 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 .… 18.46 Tinyow v Lee [2006] NSWCA 80 .… 4.35 Tiplady v Gold Coast Carlton Pty Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 426; 8 FCR 438 .… 11.50, 20.18, 21.18, 21.29, 21.38, 23.20 Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2009) 38 WAR 488; 258 ALR 124; [2009] WASCA 126 .… 2.26, 16.7, 16.9, 16.15, 16.67 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd [2000] FCA 1524 .… 10.35 Titan Support Systems Inc v Nguyen [2014] FCA 884 .… 11.107, 11.114 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 1 Ch 106; [1977] 3 All ER 129 .… 8.47, 8.53, 24.4, 24.7, 24.13, 25.6 Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell [1975] Ch 146 .… 5.24, 5.25, 16.38 TM Burke Estates Pty Ltd v PJ Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [1991] 1 VR 610 .… 21.35, 21.36 TM Duche & Sons (UK) Ltd v Walworth Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd [1962] SR (NSW) 165 .… 19.15



TMA Australia Pty Ltd v Indect Electronics & Distribution GmbH [2015] NSWCA 343 .… 10.55, 15.16 TN Lucas Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 110 .… 11.84, 11.85, 11.86, 11.122 TNT (Melbourne) Pty Ltd v May & Baker (Aust) Pty Ltd (1966) 115 CLR 353 .… 10.62, 10.64, 10.69, 10.70, 10.72, 10.73, 10.76, 10.77 Tobacco Institute of Australia v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (1993) ATPR 41-199 .… 11.123 — v — (No 2) (1993) 113 ALR 257 .… 11.124 Toben v Mathieson [2013] NSWSC 1530 .… 11.111 — v Milne [2014] NSWCA 49 .… 11.112 Todd v Alterra at Lloyds Ltd [2016] FCAFC 15 .… 10.12, 10.33 — v Nicol [1957] SASR 72 .… 5.7, 10.1 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 .… 23.32 Toikan International Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Plasteel Windows (Australia) Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 641 .… 8.49, 22.5 Tokio Marine & Michido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114 .… 10.35 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660; [1903] AC 414; [1900-3] All ER Rep 386 .… 3.74, 8.6, 8.18, 8.47, 8.51 — v — [1902] 2 KB 660 .… 8.6 Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 .… 1.76, 3.4, 3.11, 3.26, 3.27, 7.35, 7.38, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.20, 10.26, 10.28, 10.31, 10.69, 11.122, 12.64 Toll (FHL) Pty Ltd v Prixcar Services Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 187 .… 18.34 Toma v Olcorn [2019] VSCA 116 .… 12.53 Tomac v Papp [2016] NSWSC 1472 .… 15.28 Tomanovic Multiown Pty Ltd v Interlux Projects Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 190 .… 15.27 Tomasetti v Brailey (2012) 274 FLR 248; [2012] NSWCA 399 .… 11.136 Tomko v Palasty [2007] NSWCA 258 .… 10.16 Tomlinson v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-151 .… 11.145 — v Gill (1756) Amb 330; 27 ER 22 .… 7.46 Tonelli v Komirra Pty Ltd (1972) VR 737 .… 6.5, 16.35

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Tongue v Council of the City of Tamworth [2004] FCA 209 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.7, 19.12, 19.22 Tonitto v Bassal (1992) 28 NSWLR 564 .… 16.45 Tonkawa Nominees Pty Ltd v Sword (1987) 5 SR (WA) 1 .… 18.22 Tonkin v Cooma-Monaro Shire Council [2006] NSWCA 50 .… 18.8, 18.10, 18.20, 18.43, 18.49 Tonner v Delaporte [2018] WASCA 115 .… 22.9 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (2011) 15 BPR 29,699; [2011] NSWCA 389 .… 15.1, 15.9, 15.16, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 Tony J Boulos Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 105 .… 2.5 Toogood v Mills (1896) 23 VLR 106 .… 16.35 Toohey v Gunter (1928) 41 CLR 181 .… 7.31 Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499 .… 3.17, 5.23 Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657 .… 2.15 Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88 .… 11.60 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 .… 8.5, 8.18, 8.40 — v Fleming (1859) 2 Legge 1152 .… 3.58, 3.60 Tooth & Co Ltd v Barker [1960] NSWR 51 .… 7.31 — v Bryen (No 2) (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 541 .… 16.35 Toppin v Lomas (1855) 16 CB 145; 139 ER 711 .… 16.22 Torcaso v Papaleo [2001] NSWSC 314 .… 21.19, 21.21 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427; [19003] All ER Rep 991 .… 8.29, 8.31, 8.40 Tornatora v Palatinus [1966] WAR 14 .… 16.64, 16.65 Torpey van der Have Pty Ltd v Mass Constructions Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 263 .… 10.52 Torrac Investments Pty Ltd v Australian National Airline Commission (1985) ANZ ConvR 82 .… 16.40 Torrance v Bolton (1872) LR 8 Ch App 118 .… 11.44, 12.51 Toscano v Holland Securities Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 145 .… 15.26, 15.27, 15.29 Tosich Construction Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 73 FCR 219; 143 ALR 18 .… 18.33

Total Destination Marketing Pty Ltd v Horizons Snowy Mountains Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1349 .… 10.12 Total Liban SA v Vitol Energy SA [2000] 1 All ER 267 .… 8.7 Tote Tasmania Pty Ltd v Garrott [2008] TASSC 86 .… 10.43 Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647 .… 11.82, 11.83, 23.8 Tottenham Investments Pty Ltd v Carburettor Services Pty Ltd (1994) Aust Torts Rep 81–292 .… 10.53 Touche v Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co (1871) 6 Ch App 671 .… 7.46 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 .… 11.115 Town & Country Property Management Systems Pty Ltd v Elie Kaltoum [2003] NSWSC 813 .… 18.9 Townsend v BBC Hardware Ltd [2003] QCA 572 .… 10.53 — v Roussety & Co (WA) Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 40 .… 11.112, 11.115, 11.122 — v Townsend [2006] NTSC 7 .… 5.8, 16.24, 16.60, 16.66, 24.1 Toyota Finance Australia Ltd v Gardiner [2016] NSWCA 162 .… 10.27 Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106 .… 3.11 Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384 .… 10.62, 10.66, 10.73, 10.75, 26.1 TP Rich Investments Pty Ltd v Calderon [1964] NSWR 709 .… 18.22, 18.23, 18.28 TPC v Annand & Thompson Pty Ltd (1978) 19 ALR 730 .… 11.10 — v Collings Construction Co Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 43 .… 11.146 — v Lamova Publishing Corp Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 416 .… 11.116 — v Radio World Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-973 .… 11.150 — v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-286 .… 11.108 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) 58 ALR 423 .… 11.108 TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747 .… 11.105, 11.127 Trade Practices Commission v Milreis Pty Ltd (1977) 14 ALR 623 .… 18.7

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Table of Cases — v Optus Communications Pty Ltd (1996) 18 ATPR 41-478 .… 11.115 — v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 455 .… 11.108 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] NSWCA 94 .… 11.106, 11.115 Trainor v Kilmore Council (1862) 1 W & W (E) 293 .… 17.71 Trampoline Enterprises Pty Ltd v Fresh Retailing Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 74 .… 10.44 Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 632 .… 21.14, 21.18 Tranchita v Retravision (WA) Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 265 .… 15.8 Tranquility Pools & Spas Pty Ltd v Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 75 .… 11.129 Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 953 .… 15.16 Transfield Properties (Kent Street) Pty Ltd v Amos Aked Swift Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 321 .… 3.37, 16.22, 10.48 Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83; 30 ALR 201; [1980] HCA 15 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.52, 18.6, 18.40 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (‘The Achilleas’) [2009] 1 AC 61 .… 23.39, 23.40, 28.7 Transglobal Capital Pty Ltd v Yolarno Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 68 .… 11.122 Transmotors Ltd v Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 .… 3.32 Trans-Pacific Insurance Co v Grand Union Insurance Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 675 .… 10.41, 10.48, 23.17 Transport Tyre Sales Pty Ltd v Montana Tyres Rims and Tubes Pty Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 421 .… 11.116 Transpower New Zealand Ltd v Meridian Energy Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 700 .… 3.27 Travel Compensation Fund v John Harvey Blair [2003] NSWSC 720 .… 8.7 — v Robert Tambree t/as R Tambree and Assocs (2005) 224 CLR 627; 222 ALR 263; [2005] HCA 69 .… 11.127 — v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627; 222 ALR 263; [2005] HCA 59 .… 11.112 Travers v Richardson (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 367 .… 24.5 Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd Trading as ‘Uncle Bens of Australia’ (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 .… 6.6, 6.10, 10.12, 21.12

Traywinds Pty Ltd v Cooper [1989] 1 Qd R 222 .… 3.69 Trazray Pty Ltd v Russell Foundries Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-393 .… 6.9 Treadwell v Hickey [2009] NSWSC 1395 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Martin (1976) 67 DLR (3d) 493 .… 11.58 Treifus & Co Ltd v Post Office [1957] 2 QB 352 .… 5.29 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629; [1982] AC 679; [1981] 3 All ER 520 .… 8.7 Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242 .… 2.5, 2.11, 16.69 Trestrail v Briggs [1999] SASC 413 .… 23.42 Trevenar v Ussfeller [2005] NSWSC 582 .… 14.5 Trevey v Grubb (1982) 44 ALR 20 .… 5.9 Trevilyan v Donaldson [1997] SASC 6502 .… 10.41, 21.18, 21.23 Triarno Pty Ltd v Triden Contractors Ltd (1992) 10 BCL 305 .… 6.11 Tricare Aust Ltd v Highmist Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 251 .… 20.3, 20.8 Tricontinental Corp v HDFI Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 689 .… 20.1 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 164; 80 ALR 574; ; 62 ALJR 508; [1988] HCA 44 .… 1.40, 2.21, 4.7, 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.14, 7.15, 7.17, 7.30, 7.43, 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.50, 8.3, 23.2, 26.9 Trifid Pty Ltd v Ratto [1985] WAR 19 .… 16.21, 16.62, 16.64, 16.65 Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v CML Assurance Society Ltd (1992) ANZ Ins Cas 61119 .… 15.2, 15.8 Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd, Re [1992] FCA 124 .… 24.12 Trimat Holdings Pty Ltd v Investment Club Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 29 .… 26.5 Trimis v Mina [1999] NSWCA 140 .… 21.12, 21.24, 23.26, 26.5 Trimtor Building Consultants Pty Ltd v Hilton [1983] 1 NSWLR 259 .… 16.55 Trinity Point Hotel Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [1993] QCA 421 .… 21.12 Triple ‘C’ Holdings Pty Ltd v Hogan [1983] 1 NSWLR 252 .… 16.55 Trippe Investments Pty Ltd v Henderson Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 214 .… 2.16

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Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246 .… 3.69, 3.70, 10.16 Tri-Star Customs & Forwarding Ltd v Denning [1999] 1 NZLR 33 .… 12.53 Trollope & Colls Ltd v Atomic Power Constructions Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 333 .… 3.34 Tropeano v Riboni [2005] VSC 229 .… 21.11, 21.12, 21.15, 21.18, 21.29, 21.30, 23.13 Tropeanor v Riboni [2005] VSC 229 .… 18.37 Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1093; (2010) 274 ALR 626 .… 10.16 Tropical Traders Ltd v Goonan (1964) 111 CLR 41 .… 11.47, 11.50, 20.9, 21.19, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30 Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office [1998] NTSC 74 .… 10.35, 23.17, 23.21 Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228 .… 4.38 Trueman v Hurst (1785) 1 TR 40; 99 ER 960 .… 17.33 Trupkovic v Furrer [2007] QSC 027 .… 20.13, 20.15 Truran v Cortorillo [2011] VSC 488 .… 15.8, 15.9 Trust Company of Australia Ltd (trading as Stockland Property Management) v Skiwing Pty Ltd (trading as Café Tiffany’s) (2006) 66 NSWLR 77; 234 ALR 398; 226 FLR 147; [2006] NSWCA 185 .… 11.151 Trustee v Wadley (1997) 7 Tas R 35 .… 2.9 Trustee Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Webster [1907] VLR 318 .… 17.61 Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Peters (1960) 102 CLR 537 .… 6.6, 6.17, 10.27, 10.32, 10.60, 24.10 Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; [2007] NSWCA 117 .… 3.15, 5.10, 17.72 Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591 .… 11.124 TS & B Retail v 3Fold Resources (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; [2007] FCA 151 .… 10.54, 18.33 Tsangaris v Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 82 FLR 269 .… 24.10 Tsaoucis v Gallipoli Memorial Club Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,265 .… 3.70 TSB Bank plc v Camfield [1995] 1 WLR 430; [1995] 1 All ER 951 .… 11.56, 11.72

Tsimidopoulos v Mulson Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 359 .… 20.8 Tszyu v Fightvision Pty Ltd; Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323 .… 8.49 Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720 .… 23.37 Tucker v Bennett (1887) 38 Ch D 1 .… 12.30 Tudehope v Gordonstone Coal Management Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 914 .… 21.17, 21.18, 21.19 Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263 .… 2.2, 21.29, 21.32 Tuedwell Pty Ltd v JC Craig Constructions Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 450 .… 21.19 Tufton v Sperni (1952) 2 TLR 516 .… 14.5 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143; [1843-60] All ER Rep 9 .… 7.12, 7.27, 7.31 Tulloch (deceased) v Braybon (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 650 .… 14.5 Tully v Irish Bond Commission (1961) 97 ILTR 174 .… 3.24 Turnbull & Co v Duvall [1902] AC 429 .… 14.17 Turner v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation (1984) 55 ALR 635; 6 FCR 177 .… 24.12, 24.27 — v Bladin (1951) 82 CLR 463 .… 6.6, 16.54, 16.66, 23.21, 24.1, 24.4, 24.6, 24.11, 24.16, 26.9 — v General Motors (Australia) Pty Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 352 .… 15.2 — v Green [1895] 2 Ch 205 .… 11.17, 12.51 — v Kwikshift Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 8 .… 23.19, 23.25, 23.39, 23.43 — v Labafox International Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 660 .… 11.50, 21.28, 21.29 — v O’Bryan-Turner [2021] NSWSC 5 .… 15.6, 15.10 — v Windever [2003] NSWSC 1147; [2005] NSWCA 73 .… 15.8, 15.9, 15.10 Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498 .… 3.29 Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10 .… 12.27, 12.29, 12.30, 12.37, 12.52 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 .… 4.6, 7.1 Tweed Motors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Moran Motors Pty Ltd (1965) 39 ALJR 279 .… 24.16 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and Matt Groening Productions Inc

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Table of Cases v South Australian Brewing Co Ltd and Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1484 .… 11.104 Twenty Ninth Macorp Nominees Pty Ltd v George [2017] VSC 136 .… 14.18 Twenty-First Australia Inc v Shade [1998] NSWSC 325 .… 18.37, 18.38 Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464 .… 23.43 Twigg v Twigg [2022] NSWCA 68 .… 25.13 Two Lands Services Pty Ltd v Gregory Robert Cave [2000] NSWSC 14 .… 18.37 Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Anburn Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-498 .… 16.35 Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333 .… 23.11, 23.42, 23.43 Tymshare Inc v Covell 727 F2 d 1145 .… 10.49 Tytel v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 67 ALR 532 .… 11.109 Tytel Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 67 ALR 433 .… 11.109 Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd v Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 50 .… 11.136 U UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corp [1984] QB 713 .… 11.80 Uber Builders and Developers Pty Ltd v MIFA Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 596 .… 24.23 Uber Technologies Inc v Heller 2020 SCC 16 .… 15.8 UI International Pty Ltd v Interworks Architects Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 158; [2007] QCA 402; [2007] QSC 96 .… 7.7, 23.27 Ulbrick v Laidlaw [1924] VLR 247 .… 3.24 Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277 .… 25.7 Underwood v Gerrard (1894) 15 LR (NSW) Eq 155 .… 17.63 Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1992) 107 ALR 709 .… 11.111, 11.112 Unimin Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 2 ACTR 71; (1977) 18 ACTR 1 .… 16.25, 16.29, 16.64 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711 .… 14.2



Union Club v Lord Andrew Charles Robert Battenberg [2006] NSWCA 72 .… 10.12, 10.31 Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514; (1998) 12 JCL 189 .… 21.17, 21.19, 21.36 Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v Gibson [1971] VR 573 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11 Unique Building Pty Ltd v Brown [2010] SASC 106 (FC) .… 23.27 Unique International College Pty Ltd v ACCC (2018) 266 FCR 631; [2018] FCAFC 155 .… 15.1, 15.9, 15.16 Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v Robertson [2005] VSC 347 .… 4.22 Unisys Australia Ltd v RACV Insurance Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 81 .… 11.104, 11.118, 11.146 Unit 11 Pty Ltd v Sharpe Partners Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 43 .… 23.14 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673 .… 8.4 United Dominion Trust v Western [1976] QB 513; [1975] 3 All ER 1017 .… 12.69 United Dominions Corp (Jamaica) Ltd v Shoucair [1968] 3 WLR 893; [1969] 1 AC 340 .… 22.4, 22.5 United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74 .… 3.28, 3.69 United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB 431; [1966] 1 All ER 968 .… 7.50 United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2003) 198 ALR 466; 123 IR 86; [2003] FCA 480 .… 5.26 United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] NSWCA 177 .… 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 10.44, 10.47 United Motels Ltd v Cooper [1964] NSWR 1252 .… 10.48 United Pacific Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Govindasamy [2020] NSWSC 128 .… 25.3 United Pacific Transport Pty Ltd, Re [1968] Qd R 517 .… 10.35 United Petroleum Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (2013) 1 Qd R 272 .… 21.24 — v Pentaco Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (2016) FCA 118 .… 3.67 United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904 .… 21.19

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United States v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196; [1923] All ER Rep 773 .… 12.30, 12.36 — v Stump Home Specialities Manufacturing, Inc 905F 2d 1117 (1990) .… 4.35 United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd (1983) 2 NSWLR 157 .… 18.37 Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 603 .… 10.53, 23.14, 23.35, 23.39, 23.41, 23.42, 23.43 Universal Greening Pty Ltd v Sabine [1997] FCA 529 .… 4.17 Universal Guarantee Pty Ltd v Carlile (1957) VR 68 .… 3.29 Universe Tankships of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366; [1982] 2 All ER 67 .… 13.2, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9, 13.12 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346; [2009] FCAFC 116 .… 10.52 Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre (1990) 20 NSWLR 251 .… 2.4, 2.29, 2.31, 4.32, 6.17, 10.35, 16.46, 22.4, 22.6, 26.5 Update Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] VSCA 218 .… 5.1 Upintheair Pty Ltd v Business Custodians Ltd [2016] NSWCA 287 .… 10.55 Upjay Pty Ltd v MJK Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 32; [2001] SASC 62 .… 16.55, 18.6, 18.46, 26.6 Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co (1968) 118 CLR 429 .… 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.10, 10.30, 10.32, 22.5 Upper Hunter Timbers Pty Ltd v Forestry Commission of NSW [2001] NSWCA 64 .… 10.41, 18.30, 19.5, 23.13, 23.22 Upside Property Group Pty Ltd v Tekin [2016] NSWSC 1260; [2017] NSWCA 336 .… 21.6, 23.2 Upton-on Severn Rural District Council v Powell [1942] 1 All ER 220 .… 5.3 Uranium Equities Ltd v Fewster (2008) 36 WAR 97; [2008] WASCA 33 .… 3.11 Uremovic v PEI Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR 55-311 .… 21.29 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1965) 117 CLR 118 .… 27.1 — v Uren [2018] VSCA 141 .… 25.1 Urica Library Systems BV v Sanderson Computers Pty Ltd .… 10.34

Urquhart v MacPherson (1878) 3 App Cas 831; (1880) 6 VLR 17 .… 11.53, 25.13 US Trust Co of New York v Master and Crew of ‘Ionian Mariner’ (1997) 77 FCR 563 .… 7.43 Uszok v Henley Properties (NSW) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 31 .… 10.54, 23.24 Uther v FCT (1947) 74 CLR 508 .… 8.11 UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667 .… 18.33 V Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102; 130 ALR 570; [1995] HCA 14 .… 1.10, 11.39, 11.44, 11.45, 11.53, 11.56, 11.60, 11.122, 11.129, 11.147, 13.11, 15.12, 15.13 Vaddat v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 94 .… 14.9 Vakele Pty Ltd v Assender (1989) 4 BPR 9591; NSW ConvR 55-467 .… 15.31, 24.7 Vakras v Cripps [2015] VSCA 193 .… 10.43 Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 .… 2.14 Valcorp Australia Pty Ltd v Angas Securities Ltd [2012] FCAFC 22 .… 11.129, 11.146 Valentines Properties Ltd v Huntco Corp Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 16 .… 6.6 Valentini v Canali [1886–90] All ER Rep 883; 24 QBD 166 .… 17.21, 17.35 Valkonen v Jennings Constructions Ltd (1995) 184 LSJS 87 .… 10.77 Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 .… 2.7, 2.17, 22.4 Valve Corp v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224 .… 3.7, 3.47, 3.56, 11.114, 11.153 Vamiso Pty Ltd v Chopard [2000] ANZ ConvR 403 .… 20.1 Van den Esschert v Chappell [1960] WAR 114 .… 10.6 Van der Sluys v Anaconda Nickel NL [2002] NSWSC 673 .… 10.3 Van der Sterren v Cibernetics (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1970] ALR 751 .… 10.28, 10.62, 10.73, 10.75, 10.77, 21.38 Van Lynn Developments Ltd v Pelias Construction Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 607; [1968] 3 All ER 824 .… 8.34 Van Reesema v Giameos (No 1) (1978) 17 SASR 353 .… 21.18, 21.21 Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 .… 4.23, 4.39 cl

Table of Cases



Veremu Pty Ltd v Ezishop. Net Ltd [2003] NSWCA 317 .… 10.7, 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.13, 19.22 Verrall v Great Yarmouth BC [1981] QB 202; [1980] 1 All ER 839 .… 24.8 Vetro Glass Pty Ltd v Fitzpatrick [1963] SR (NSW) 697; [1964] NSWR 822 .… 16.35 Vettese v Kemp (2000) 77 SASR 53; [2000] SASC 154 .… 11.96, 11.98, 11.99 Vickers and Vickers v Stichtenoth Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 90 .… 21.10 Vickery v Waitaki International Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 58 .… 10.40 — v Woods (1952) 85 CLR 336 .… 7.29, 8.49, 22.5 Vickery’s Motors Pty Ltd v Tarrant [1924] VLR 195 .… 17.28 Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291 .… 18.6 — v Tatts Group Ltd (2016) 90 ALJR 392; [2016] HCA 5 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.30, 10.31 Victorian Economic Development Corporation v Clovervale Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 596 .… 23.26 Victorian Producers Co-operative Co Ltd v Edwards (1994) 62 SASR 415 .… 6.11 Vieira v O’Shea [2012] NSWCA 21 .… 23.25 Vigers v Pike (1842) 8 Cl & Fin 562; 8 ER 220 .… 11.53 Village Building Company Ltd v Canberra International Airport Pty Ltd (No 2) (2004) 134 FCR 422; 208 ALR 98; [2004] FCA 133 .… 11.109, 11.111 Vimig Pty Ltd v Contract Tooling Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 731 .… 11.64 Vinden v Vinden [1982] 1 NSWLR 618 .… 16.69 Vink v Schering Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41064 .… 11.147 Violet Homes Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 4 VR 202; 300 ALR 770; [2013] VSCA 56 .… 15.13, 15.16, 15.31 VIP Homes Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v Swan (2011) 110 SASR 157 .… 21.16 Visic v State Government Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 122 .… 7.3, 7.17, 7.22, 7.35 Visscher v Honourable President Justice Giudice (2009) 239 CLR 361 .… 21.10, 21.23 Visy Packaging Pty Ltd v Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 301 ALR 569; [2013] FCA 231 .… 23.34

Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York [1933] AC 70; [1932] All ER Rep 527 .… 7.44, 7.45, 7.46 Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 AC 291; [1967] 1 All ER 1; [1967] 2 WLR 87 .… 8.21 Vandyke v Vandyke (1976) 12 ALR 621 .… 21.38 Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Cussen (1994) 121 ALR 619 .… 24.31 Vantage Navigation Corp v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138 .… 4.13, 13.4, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9 Vantage Systems Pty Ltd v Priolo Corporation Pty Ltd (2015) 47 WAR 547; [2015] WASCA 21 .… 5.19, 12.30 Varley v Spatt [1955] VLR 403 .… 18.3 Vasco Investment Managers Pty Ltd v Morgan Stanley Australia Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 445 .… 26.1, 26.8 Vasiliou v Marchesi [2006] FCAFC 197 .… 8.39 Vauxhall Motors Ltd (formerly General Motors UK Ltd) v Manchester Ship Canal Co Ltd [2019] .… 21.36 Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] 2 NZLR 444 .… 10.12 Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 .… 3.71, 26.11, 26.12 Velik v Steingold [2012] NSWSC 860; [2013] NSWCA 303 .… 21.12, 21.19 Vella v Ayshan [2008] NSWSC 84 .… 4.35 Vella v Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 505 .… 11.136 Velvet Glove Holdings Pty Ltd v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [2011] QCA 312 .… 10.12, 10.13 Venerdi Pty Ltd v Anthony Moreton Group Funds Management Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 214; [2013] QSC 219 .… 11.150, 18.10, 18.19 Venning v Suburban Taxi Service Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-468 .… 15.16 Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd v Dib Group Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 963 .… 11.142 Venuti and Venuti v Toop Real Estate Group Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 23; [2004] SASC 169 .… 3.24, 12.51, 16.42 Vercorp Pty Ltd v ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd as trustee of the Williams Family Trust (No 2) [2010] QSC 405 .… 7.28 Verduci v Golotta [2010] NSWSC 506 .… 14.6, 14.13, 15.11, 15.26, 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 cli



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract W A Dewhurst v Cawrse [1960] VR 278 .… 3.47 W and J Sharp v Thomson (1915) 20 CLR 137 .… 12.47 W and K Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mayo [2013] NSWSC 1063 .… 4.35 W B Anderson & Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 850 .… 11.80 W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lumbers [2007] SASC 20 .… 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.8 W Higgins Ltd v Northampton Corp [1927] 1 Ch 128 .… 12.35, 12.40 W Scott Fell & Co Ltd v Lloyd (1906) 4 CLR 572 .… 11.17 Wacal Investments Pty Ltd v Hurley [1992] 1 Qd R 455 .… 21.19 Waddell v Waddell (2012) 292 ALR 788; [2012] NSWCA 214 .… 2.15 Wagdy Hanna and Associates Pty Ltd v National Library of Australia (2012) 7 ACTLR 70; 267 FLR 356; [2012] ACTSC 126 .… 25.13 Wagners Cement Pty Ltd v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 124 .… 10.13 Waight v Seirlis (2015) 1 Qd R 337; [2014] QCA 177 .… 11.136 Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) .… 2.14, 2.18, 10.3 Wait, Re [1927] 1 Ch 606; [1926] All ER Rep 433 .… 24.18 Waitemata Stevedoring Services Ltd v The Ship ‘Rangitata’ [1998] FCA 885 .… 21.19 Wakefield Trucks Pty Ltd v Lach Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 517; [2001] SASC 168 .… 11.146 Wakeling v Ripley (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 183 .… 5.7 Waldorf Apartment Hotel, The Entrance Pty Ltd v Owners Corp Sp 71623 [2010] NSWCA 226 .… 3.27 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128; [1992] 2 WLR 174 .… 6.12, 10.47 Walker, Re [1905] 1 Ch 160 .… 17.55 Walker, Re (1911) 7 Tas LR 51 .… 17.63 Walker v Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Banking Group Ltd (No 2) (2001) 39 ACSR 557 .… 10.43, 10.44, 20.18, 21.34, 21.35, 21.37, 22.12 — v Boyle [1982] 1 WLR 495 .… 11.73 — v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 101 .… 10.27, 10.52, 21.34, 23.14, 23.19

Vita Pacific Ltd & GIO General Ltd v Heather [2001] TASSC 137 .… 10.16, 10.18, 10.56, 10.61 Vitale v Bednall [2000] WASC 207 .… 10.7, 10.55, 10.60, 23.19 Vitek v Taheri [2013] NSWSC 589 .… 11.64 Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118 .… 11.115 Vitol v SA Norelf Ltd (The ‘Santa Clara’) [1996] AC 800 .… 21.23 Vitosh v Brisbane CC (1960) 5 LGRA 342 .… 11.13 Vivian Fraser & Associates Pty Ltd v Shipton [1999] FCA 60 .… 26.8 VL Credits Pty Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1991] 2 VR 311 .… 10.48 — v Switzerland Insurance Co [1990] VR 938 .… 7.10 VL Finance Pty Ltd v Legudi [2003] VSC 57 .… 25.3 Vodafone Pacific Ltd v MI Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15 .… 10.1, 10.7, 10.39, 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48, 10.49, 10.50, 10.52, 21.35, 22.12 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74 .… 7.41 Vollenbroich v Krongold Constructions (Domestic Building) [2006] VCAT 1710 .… 11.139 Voskuilen v Morisset Mega-Market Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 63 .… 24.19 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 .… 11.10 Vroon BV v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [1994] 2 VR 32 .… 3.6, 6.6, 6.8, 10.55, 22.5 VTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667 .… 8.7 Vukicevic v Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 13 .… 16.29 Vuksic v Metimex (1995) V ConvR 54-511 .… 23.23 W W v G (1996) 20 Fam LR 49 .… 2.2, 2.11 W & CA Price Constructions Pty Ltd v Australian Building Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 39 .… 10.41, 23.35 W & J Investments Ltd v Bunting [1984] 1 NSWLR 331 .… 23.45 W & J Sharp v Thomson (1915) 20 CLR 137 .… 6.6 W & R Pty Ltd v Birdseye (2008) 102 SASR 477; [2008] SASC 321 .… 21.19, 21.32 clii

Table of Cases — v Citigroup Global Markets Pty Ltd (2006) 226 ALR 114; [2005] FCA 1678 .… 10.52, 11.146, 21.34 — v Nussey (1847) 16 M & W 302; 153 ER 1203 .… 16.84 — v Sell (2016) 245 FCR 308; [2016] FCA 1259 .… 11.107, 11.111 — v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2001] QCA 296 .… 21.24 Walker Corp Ltd v Australia NID Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-430; FCA 1474 .… 5.24, 11.115, 11.118, 16.21 Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd v Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 27 .… 8.2, 10.31, 10.32, 23.27, 23.42 Walker Hobson & Hill Ltd v Johnson [1981] 2 NZLR 532 .… 11.88 Wallace v Hermans (1974) 131 CLR 672 .… 21.29 — v McGirr [1936] NZLR 483 .… 12.55 — v Walplan Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 771 .… 11.108 Wallace-Smith v Thiess Infraco (Swanston) Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 1; [2005] FCAFC 49 .… 10.62, 20.1, 21.21, 21.23, 21.29, 21.32, 22.7, 23.22, 23.23 Wallera Pty Ltd v CGM Investments Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 279 .… 22.9 Walley v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 366; 137 ALR 561 .… 6.15 Wallis Nominees (Computing) Pty Ltd v Pickett (2013) 45 VR 657; [2013] VSCA 24 .… 18.37, 18.38 Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394 .… 10.74 Wallwyn v Coutts (1815) 3 Mer 707; 36 ER 272 .… 7.46 Walmsley v Cosentino [2001] NSWCA 403 .… 23.19 Walsh v Alexander (1913) 16 CLR 293 .… 18.7, 18.9 — v Police Association [2000] VSC 292 .… 19.18, 19.24 Walsh, Spriggs, Nolan and Finney v Hoag & Bosch Pty Ltd [1977] VR 178 .… 4.23 Walter and Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584; [1955] 1 All ER 843 .… 8.26, 8.27, 8.31 Walter Construction Group Ltd v Walker Corp Ltd [2001] NSWSC 283 .… 21.14, 21.31, 22.4, 22.6, 26.6, 26.7 Walterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300 .… 22.6



Walters v Morgan (1861) 3 De G F & J 718 .… 11.17 Waltip Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-975 .… 11.150 Walton Stores v Sydney CC [1968] 2 NSWR 109 .… 10.76 Waltons v Maher (2013) 7 J Eq 171 .… 2.5, 2.9 Waltons (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; 76 ALR 513; 62 ALJR 110 .… 2.1, 2.5, 3.11, 3.64, 3.67, 3.71, 4.4, 4.15, 5.17, 5.19, 5.23, 10.3, 10.6, 11.13, 12.8, 12.53, 16.56, 16.67, 16.68, 21.28, 21.32, 24.31, 28.9, 28.24 Wan v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 340 .… 18.6 Wang v Garland Lot 3 Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1112 .… 3.33 — v Kaymet Corporation Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1459 .… 20.16 Wannon Roadways Pty Ltd v Wallace-Smith [2004] VSC 230 .… 10.35 Wansborough v Edwards (1941) 36 Tas LR 1 .… 16.80 Warburton v National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 238 .… 12.33 — v Whiteley (1989) NSW ConvR 55-453 .… 14.17, 14.19 Ward v Byham [1956] 2 All ER 318; [1956] 1 WLR 496 .… 4.30, 4.31, 4.35 — v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 .… 8.18 — v Eltherington [1982] Qd R 561 .… 5.10, 17.73 — v Griffiths Bros Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 425 .… 16.53, 26.6 — v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 .… 21.35 — v Lewis (1896) 22 VLR 410 .… 25.5 — v Ward [2011] NSWSC 107 .… 15.9 Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 .… 3.60, 10.16 Wardley Australia Ltd v McPharlin (1984) 3 BPR 97,214 .… 13.6, 13.7 — v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 .… 11.104, 11.125, 11.127, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147, 25.1, 25.12 Wardman v Hatfield [2003] NSWCA 283 .… 25.5 Warlow v Harrison [1859] 1 E & E 309; 120 ER 925 .… 3.24 Warming’s Used Cars Ltd v Tucker [1956] SASR 249 .… 10.20 Warner v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (1992) 113 ALR 517 .… 11.115

cliii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Ingolia [1965] NSWR 988 .… 18.37, 24.25, 24.26 — v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209; [1936] 3 All ER 160 .… 24.1, 24.25, 24.26 Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 105; [1975] 2 WLR 816; [1976] QB 430 .… 8.12, 8.18 Warren v Lawton (No 3) [2016] WASC 285 .… 15.8, 18.35 — v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103 .… 24.25, 24.26 Warren, Re (1884) 53 LJ Ch 1016 .… 4.39 Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd v Alpine Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 224 ALR 134; [2005] WASCA 174 .… 11.122, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146 Water v Everard [1891] 2 QB 369 .… 17.11 Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 .… 21.24 Waterhouse v Power [2003] QCA 155 .… 16.73 Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 .… 2.5, 2.29, 20.1, 20.8, 20.15, 21.28, 21.32 Waters Lane v Sweeney [2007] NSWCA 200 .… 10.44, 10.52, 21.18, 21.29 Waters Lane Pty Ltd v Sweeney [2006] NSWSC 222 .… 10.44, 10.52 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1165; [1964] NSWR 1085 .… 11.50, 11.58 Waters Trading Co Ltd v Dalgety and Co Ltd (1951) 52 SR (NSW) 4 .… 7.37, 7.40 Waterside Workers’ Federation v Stewart (1919) 27 CLR 119 .… 23.45 Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 276 .… 24.1, 24.4, 24.16, 24.30 Watkins v Coombes (1922) 30 CLR 180 .… 14.10, 14.11, 14.12 Watkins Tapsell v De Varda [2003] NSWCA 242 .… 11.112 Watney v Mass (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 203 .… 26.1, 26.4 Watson v Campbell (No 2) [1920] VLR 347 .… 17.28, 17.39 — v Delaney (1991) 22 NSWLR 358 .… 16.62 — v Issell (1890) 16 VLR 607 .… 16.35 — v McFadden (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 128 .… 4.23 — v Phipps (1985) 63 ALR 321; 60 ALJR 1 .… 6.5, 6.6, 10.35, 12.41

— v Royal Permanent Building Society (1888) 14 VLR 283 .… 16.48 Watson’s Bay and South Shore Ferry Co v Whitfield (1919) 27 CLR 268 .… 18.30 Watt v State Bank of New South Wales [2003] ACTCA 7 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Westhoven [1933] VLR 458 .… 11.67, 11.68 Watton v Brinth 1400 YB 2 Hen 4, fo 3, pl 9 .… 27.7 Watts v Turpin (1999) 21 WAR 402 .… 23.32 Waugh v Harper (1937) QSR 327 .… 16.28 Wauton v Coppard (1899) 1 Ch 92 .… 11.44 Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1941] 1 All ER 9; [1944] 1 All ER 9 .… 3.27, 3.44 WB Anderson & Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 850 .… 11.81 WD & HO Wills (Aust) Ltd v State Rail Authority .… 7.42 We Are Here Pty Ltd v Zandata Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 262 .… 12.36 Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd v Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd [2009] VSC 7 .… 11.143 Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 64 .… 11.132 Webb v Australian Agricultural Machinery Pty Ltd (1990) 6 WAR 305 .… 15.9 — v England (1860) 29 Beav 44; 54 ER 541 .… 24.12 Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15; 117 ALR 321 .… 11.59 Webster v Yorke (1869) 6 WW & A’B (E) 294 .… 17.61 Weddell v J A Pearce and Major [1988] Ch 26; [1987] 3 All ER 624 .… 8.27, 8.34 Weeds v Blaney (1976) Est Gaz Dig 738; (1978) Est Gaz Dig 902 .… 12.30, 12.53 Weemah Park Pty Ltd v Glenlaton Investments Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 150 .… 3.46 Wegert v Westpac Banking Corp (1987, unreported) .… 12.69 Wehbe v Rolando (1990) NSWSC 384; Coyne v Commercial Equity Corp Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 109 .… 23.2 Wehr v Thom [1969] WAR 39 .… 11.82 Weily v Williams (1895) 16 LR (NSW) Eq 190 .… 24.30 Weir v Hoylevans Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 23 .… 10.3, 10.6, 18.37 cliv

Table of Cases



Westbourne Grammar School v Sanget Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 39 .… 8.23, 8.34 Westeq Ltd v Challenger Mining Corp NL (1988) 13 ACLR 627; 6 ACLC 868 .… 9.8 Western Australia v Bond Corp Holdings Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-081 .… 11.117 — v Njamal People (1996) 134 FLR 211 .… 6.15 — v Wardley Australia Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 213 .… 11.147 Western Australian Bank v Royal Insurance Co (1908) 5 CLR 533 .… 10.34, 10.74 Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton (1924) 35 CLR 355 .… 11.9, 21.32 Western Australian Land Authority v Simto Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 262 .… 10.58, 21.38 Western Bank of Scotland v Addie (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 145 .… 11.53 Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 604; [2011] HCA 45 .… 10.12 Western Metals Resources Ltd v Murrin Murrin East Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 257 .… 10.41 Western Power Corp v Normandy Power Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 202 .… 10.12, 22.12, 19.6 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528; [2007] HCA 45 .… 10.30 Westham Dredging Co Pty Ltd v Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 287 .… 11.106, 11.111 Westina Corporation Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd (2009) 41 WAR 263; [2009] WASCA 213 .… 7.17 Westinghouse Electric Corp v Thermopart Pty Ltd [1969] WAR 39 .… 15.2 Westmelton (Vic) Pty Ltd v Archer and Schulman [1982] VR 305 .… 14.6 Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja [1970] 1 NSWR 526; (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222 .… 3.68, 7.28, 16.22, 16.35, 16.37 Westminster Properties Pty Ltd v Comco Constructions Pty Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 191 .… 10.55, 20.12, 20.18, 20.19, 21.35, 21.36, 21.37 Weston v Beaufils (No 2) (1994) 50 FCR 476; 122 ALR 240 .… 18.5, 18.25, 18.45, 18.47 Westpac Banking Corp v Cockerill (1998) 152 ALR 267 .… 13.5, 13.6, 13.7 — v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA

Welby v Drake (1825) 1 C & P 557; 171 ER 1315 .… 4.41 Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394 .… 25.12 Wellington v Huaxin Energy (Aust) Pty Ltd (formerly Cuesta Coal Ltd) [2020] QCA 114 .… 10.41, 10.42 Wellington City Council v Body Corporate 51702 [2002] 3 NZLR 486; [2002] NZCA 191 .… 6.15, 10.47 Wells v Birtchnell [1893] 19 VLR 473 .… 5.23 — v Kingston-upon-Hull Corp (1875) LR 10 CP 402 .… 17.71 Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand and Silica Co Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170 .… 3.9 Welsham v Robertson (1875) 1 VLR (L) 124 .… 16.46 Wendt v Bruce (1931) 45 CLR 245 .… 11.49, 21.19, 21.29 Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.25, 23.26, 23.39, 23.42, 24.30 Wenkart v Pantzer [2003] FCA 315 .… 20.12 — v Pitman (1998) 46 NSWLR 502 .… 23.41 Wenkheim v Arndt (1873) 1 NZ Jurist 73 .… 3.62 Wennall v Adney (1802) 3 B & P 247; 127 ER 137 .… 27.13 Wenning v Robinson (1964) 81 WN Pt 2 (NSW) 269; [1964-5] NSWR 614 .… 6.5, 6.10 Wentworth v Cock (1839) 10 Ad & El 42; 113 ER 17 .… 8.55 — v Rogers [2006] NSWCA 145 .… 26.6 — v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 .… 24.30 Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 125 FCR 570; [2002] FCAFC 400 .… 3.39 Werrin v Commonwealth (1938) 59 CLR 150 .… 26.3 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32 .… 3.67, 10.33, 10.41, 21.14, 21.18 West v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 610 .… 15.4, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 — v Houghton (1879) 4 CPD 197 .… 7.5 — v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109 .… 14.7 — v Stowel (1577) 2 Leon 154; 74 ER 437 .… 27.12 West London Commercial Bank v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360 .… 11.13 clv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

157 .… 2.5, 4.40, 6.6, 7.17, 11.108, 11.115, 15.16 — v Bickley [2001] NSWSC 756 .… 19.4 — v Dawson (1990) 19 NSWLR .… 12.56 — v Hughes (2011) 278 ALR 145; [2011] QCA 42 .… 25.12 — v Jamieson [2016] 1 Qd R 495; (2015) 294 FLR 48; [2015] QCA 50 .… 11.112, 23.32 — v Kurobe Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 537 .… 3.46 — v Lee [2013] NSWCA 375 .… 11.115, 11.121, 11.122 — v Paterson (2002) 187 ALR 168; [2001] FCA 1630 (Full FC) .… 15.8 — v Robinson (1993) 30 NSWLR 668 .… 15.5 — v Smith (1991, unreported) .… 10.9 — v South Carolina National Bank (1986) 64 ALR 30; 60 ALJR 358 .… 7.50 — v Spice (1990) ATPR 41-024 .… 11.112, 11.115 — v Sugden (1988) NSW ConvR 55-377 .… 15.29 — v Tanzone Pty Ltd (2000) 9 BPR 17,521; [2000] ANZ ConvR 354; (2000) NSW ConvR 55-939; [2000] NSWCA 25 .… 6.5, 10.2, 10.35, 12.36 — v Wittenberg [2016] FCAFC 33 .… 11.111 Westpoint Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253 .… 23.27 Westpork Pty Ltd v Bio-Organics Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 291 .… 12.25 Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 .… 7.18, 7.19 Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361; [1936] HCA 6 .… 20.8, 20.20, 21.9, 21.38, 26.10, 26.11, 26.14 Westwill Pty Ltd v Heath (1989) 52 SASR 461; (1990) ANZ ConvR 416 .… 15.7, 15.8, 15.9 WF Harrison & Co Ltd v Burke [1956] 1 WLR 419; [1956] 2 All ER 169 .… 8.34 Whalebone v Auto Panel Beaters & Radiators Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 176 .… 3.15 Wharf St Pty Ltd v Amstar Learning Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 256 .… 10.13, 23.45 Wharton v Mackenzie (1844) 5 QB 606; 114 ER 1378 .… 17.5 Wheeler v Atkinson (1925) 28 WALR 12 .… 11.53

— v Ecroplot Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 61 .… 23.27 — v Philip Morris (1989) 97 ALR 282 .… 23.32 Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v Wright (1989) 11 ATPR .… 11.108, 11.110, 11.112, 11.117, 11.118 Whelan, Ex parte [1986] 1 Qd R 500 .… 10.35, 21.29 Whelan, Re [1897] 1 IR 575 .… 3.73 Whereat v Duff [1972] 2 NSWLR 147 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11, 14.14 Whim Well Copper Mines Ltd v Pratt (1910) 12 WAR 166 .… 19.18 Whitaker v Paxad Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 47 .… 11.146 White v Australian and New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 266 .… 6.6, 10.12, 10.16, 10.52, 23.14 — v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ (NS) Ex 36 .… 4.12, 4.18 — v Neaylon (1886) 11 App Cas 171 .… 16.62 — v Ormsby (1988) ASC 55-665 .… 14.20, 15.31 — v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 115 .… 22.4 — v Shortall [2006] NSWSC 1379 .… 8.30 — v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq); Collins v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] VSCA 361 .… 3.6 — v Wills [2014] NSWSC 1160 .… 14.5, 14.10, 15.28 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413; [1961] 3 All ER 1178 .… 21.10, 23.44, 26.9 White Industries Ltd v Piling Contractors Pty Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 353 .… 3.32 White Rose Flour Milling Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1944) 18 ALJR 324 .… 13.7 White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 .… 3.28, 3.44, 3.71, 21.12 Whitegum Petroleum Pty Ltd v Bernadini Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 229 .… 3.46 Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428 .… 2.3, 2.20, 7.2, 10.3 — v Carlton (1987) 70 ALR 251 .… 13.10 Whiteley v Hilt [1918] 2 KB 808 .… 24.18 Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71 .… 23.2 Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd v Gadsdon (1992) 6 WAR 537 .… 7.16, 7.47 Whitlock v Brew (No 2) (1968) 118 CLR 445; [1967] VR 803 .… 6.5, 6.11, 6.17

clvi

Table of Cases Whitsunday Shire Council v Laguna Australia Airport Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 084 .… 18.7, 18.41 Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146 .… 2.3, 2.18, 10.3 Whittingham v Murdy (1889) 60 LT 956 .… 17.18, 17.27 Whittington v Seale-Hayne (1900) 82 LT 49 .… 11.55, 11.63, 11.85 Whittle v Filaria Pty Ltd [2004] ACTSC 45 .… 11.98 — v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 129 .… 20.4 Whitwood Chemical Co v Hardman [1891] 2 Ch 416 .… 24.26 Whundo Copper Syndicate v Ferrari [1962] WAR 24 .… 17.16, 17.20 Whurr v Devenish (1904) 20 TLR 385 .… 11.63 Whyked Pty Ltd t/as Ezysend v Yahoo Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 650 .… 8.8 Wickham v Canberra District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [1998] ATPR 41,390 .… 18.36 Wicklow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Doysal Pty Ltd (1986) 45 SASR 247 .… 17.18 Wicks v Bennett (1921) 30 CLR 80 .… 15.2 Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586 .… 4.26, 4.28, 4.33, 10.36, 10.48, 21.13, 23.27, 23.34 — v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291 .… 4.23 Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd v New Hope Corporation Ltd [2019] NSWCA 316 .… 10.30 Wight v Haberdan Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 280 .… 16.37, 24.4, 24.5 Wilby v St George Bank (2001) 80 SASR 404; [2001] SASC 388 .… 15.8 Wilcher v Steain [1962] NSWR 1136 .… 11.34, 11.40 Wild v Tucker [1914] 3 KB 36 .… 4.23 Wilde v Anstee (1999) 48 NSWLR 387 .… 21.19 — v Gibson (1848) 1 HL Cas 605; 9 ER 897 .… 11.63 Wilding v Sanderson [1897] 2 Ch 534 .… 12.52 Wilkie v Brown (1946) 41 QPJR 139 .… 18.43 — v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522; [2005] HCA 17 .… 10.12, 10.32 — v Hunt (1864) 1 WW & A’B (L) 66 .… 16.84



— v LPTB [1947] 1 All ER 258 .… 3.4, 4.14 Wilkinson v Johnson (1824) 3 B & C 428 .… 12.64 — v Osborne (1915) 21 CLR 89 .… 18.15, 18.19, 18.29, 18.43 Willett v Thomas [2012] NSWCA 97 .… 11.117 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co [1905] AC 454 .… 8.16, 8.18, 8.39 William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 .… 24.25 William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire CC [1994] 3 All ER 932 .… 11.72 Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81; [1932] All ER Rep 32 .… 8.26, 8.31, 8.34 — v Bayley [1866] LR 1 HL 200 .… 13.5 — v Bulat [1992] 2 Qd R 566 .… 12.61, 24.7 — v Carwardine (1833) 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590 .… 3.40, 4.31 — v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156; 288 ALR 410; [2012] HCA 23; (2014) 252 CLR 416; 309 ALR 41; [2014] HCA 23 .… 5.28, 17.74 — v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 5) [2001] FCA 399 .… 18.3, 18.35, 18.37 — v Harrison (1691) Carthew 160; 90 ER 698 .… 17.29 — v IRC [1965] NZLR 395 .… 8.14, 8.28 — v Leper (1766) 3 Burr 1886; 97 ER 1152 .… 16.18 — v Maalouf [2005] VSC 346 .… 15.9 — v Mason (1873) 28 LT 232 .… 11.80 — v Moor (1843) 11 M & W 256; 152 ER 798 .… 17.24, 17.33 — v Pisano (2015) 90 NSWLR 342; 299 FLR 172; [2015] NSWCA 177 .… 11.111, 11.134, 11.136 — v Protheroe (1829) 2 Moo & P 779; 130 ER 1080 .… 8.7 — v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512 .… 4.32, 4.35, 4.38, 7.8, 13.7 — v Scott [1900] AC 499 .… 3.14 — v State Transit Authority of NSW [2004] NSWCA 179 .… 3.39, 11.109 — v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 148; [1957] 1 All ER 305 .… 4.30, 4.35 — v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 493 .… 25.7 Williams Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker [2015] NSWSC 1907 .… 3.52

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Williamson v Commissioner for Railways [1960] SR (NSW) 252 .… 23.32 — v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 174 .… 23.42 — v Murdoch (1912) 14 WALR 54 .… 9.5, 26.13 — v Tait (1892) 18 VLR 649 .… 16.87 Willing v Baker (1992) 58 SASR 357 .… 20.13 Willis v Crosland [2021] VSCA 320 .… 21.13, 21.26 Willmore v South Eastern Electricity Board [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 375 .… 5.29 Willmott v McLeay [2013] Q ConvR 54797; [2013] QCA 84 .… 21.38 Willoughby v Barrett-Lennard [1979] WAR 167 .… 20.4, 24.16 Willshee v Westcourt Ltd [2009] WASCA 87 .… 23.27 Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v Queensland Sugar Ltd [2019] QSC 116 .… 2.3 Wilson v Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313; 76 ALJR 1306; [2002] HCA 29 .… 10.1 — v Arwon Finance Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 137 .… 2.5 — v Brisbane CC [1931] St R Qd 360 .… 11.64 — v Commissioner of Probate (Vic) (1978) 8 ATR 799 .… 8.6 — v Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 258 .… 10.70 — v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43 .… 7.37, 7.40, 7.41, 7.43, 7.45, 10.62, 10.64, 10.77 — v Fitzsimons [2006] NSWSC 1318 .… 12.37, 12.53 — v Grimwade [1995] 2 VR 628 .… 25.1 — v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 713 .… 21.28 — v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279 .… 24.1, 24.4 — v West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Co (1864) 34 Beav 187; 55 ER 606 .… 17.71 — v Winton [1969] Qd R 536 .… 3.29, 24.8 Wilson International Pty Ltd v International House Pty Ltd [1983] WAR 243 .… 18.7, 18.48 — v — (No 2) [1983] WAR 257 .… 18.45 Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 .… 4.22, 4.24 Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646 .… 10.26, 12.66, 15.5, 15.7, 15.9

Wiltrading (WA) Pty Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2005) 30 WAR 290; [2005] WASCA 106 .… 21.28, 21.31 Wiluna Road Board v Bonola (1936) 10 ALJ 289 .… 12.30 Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v Iluka Midwest Ltd [2002] FCA 653 .… 10.41 WIN Corporation Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 297 .… 10.12, 10.40, 10.42 Wincant Pty Ltd v South Australia (1997) 69 SASR 126 .… 10.58 Windle, Re [1975] 1 WLR 1628 .... 16.61 Windrum v Rejilo Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 491 .… 16.61 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 301 ALR 1; [2012] FCA 1028 .… 11.102, 11.136 Winkie Meat Works Ltd v Ballard [1960] SASR 312 .… 18.37, 23.32 Winks v W H Heck & Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 226 .… 12.8, 12.30, 12.39, 12.40 Winnote Pty Ltd (in liq) v Page t/as Freehill Hollingdale & Page (2006) 68 NSWLR 531; [2006] NSWCA 287 .… 25.5 Winslade Partners Pty Ltd v Steri-flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (2012) 113 SASR 69; [2012] SASCFC 65 .… 26.2 Winstonu Pty Ltd v Pitson [2001] FCA 541 .… 10.16 Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Hambros Australia Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 363; (1992) 111 ALR 649 .… 7.3, 11.115, 21.12, 21.13, 21.32 Wise v Perpetual Trustee Co [1903] AC 139 .… 17.68 With v O’Flanagan [1936] Ch 575; 1 All ER 727 .… 11.19 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 .… 24.1 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489 .… 6.11 Woden Squash Courts Pty Ltd v Zero Builders Pty Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 212 .… 16.38, 16.41, 16.45 Wolfe v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2012] VSC 275; [2013] VSCA 331 .… 4.38, 10.42, 15.16 Wollondilly Shire Council v Picton Power Lines Pty Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 551 .… 8.8, 18.35 Wollongong Coal Ltd v Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd (2019) 100 NSWLR 432; [2019]

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Table of Cases NSWCA 135 .… 3.8, 7.1, 7.2, 10.32, 21.31 Wolseley Investments Pty Ltd v Gillespie [2007] NSWCA 358 .… 24.1, 24.5 Wolverhampton and Walsall Railway Co v London and North Western Railway Co (1873) LR 16 Eq 433 .… 24.2 Wolverhampton Corp v Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515 .… 24.14 Wong v Citibank Ltd [2004] NSWCA 396 .… 11.110 — v Hutchison (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 55; (1959) 68 WN (NSW) 55 .… 23.13, 23.39 Wood v Allen [1956] VLR 111 .… 24.1 — v Browne [1984] 2 Qd R 593 .… 16.69, 16.71 — v Capita Insurance Services [2017] UKSC 24 .… 10.12 — v Corrigan (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 492 .… 8.28, 24.19, 24.24, 24.26 — v Griffith (1818) Swan 44; 36 ER 291; [1814-23] All ER Rep 294 .… 8.27 — v Laverty [2003] QSC 405 .… 14.13, 15.11 — v Little (1921) 29 CLR 564 .… 18.29 — v Midgley (1854) 5 De G M & G 41; 43 ER 784 .… 16.67 — v Mortgage Loan & Finance Co of Australia (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 255 .… 10.6 — v Roberts (1818) 2 Stark 417; 171 ER 691 .… 4.40 — v Scarth (1858) 1 F & F 293; 175 ER 733 .… 12.45 Wood Factory Pty Ltd v Kiritos Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 105 .… 21.11, 21.21, 21.23, 23.23, 23.25 Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443; [1979] HCA .… 22.2, 24.23 Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571; [1980] 1 WLR 277 .… 7.4, 7.7, 23.2 Woodbud Pty Ltd v Warea Pty Ltd (1995) 125 FLR 346 .… 10.3 Woodcock v Parlby Investments Pty Ltd [1989] ANZ ConvR 454; (1988) 4 BPR 9568 .… 20.12, 20.18 Woodcock, Re (FC, Appeal No SA, CSA 63/96, No AD 4674 of 1996, unreported) .… 18.34 Woodgate v Keddie [2006] FCA 1728 .… 26.5 Woodhouse v Fitzgerald [2021] NSWCA 54 .… 11.137



Woodman v Rasmussen [1953] St R Qd 202; [1953] QSR 202 .… 23.39 Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245 .… 3.67, 10.32, 16.22 Woods v Woods [2000] NSWSC 851 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.23, 21.29 Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H&R-E & W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380 .… 7.3, 7.37 Woodward v Johnston [1992] 2 Qd R 214 .… 5.7, 16.73 — v McGregor [2003] NSWSC 672 .… 26.12 — v Nagel [2003] QSC 100 .… 20.8, 20.13 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 205 ALR 522; [2004] HCA 16 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.41, 25.5 Woolcorp Pty Ltd v Rodger Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 21 .… 26.8 Woolf v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 51 .… 17.35, 17.51 Woolworths Group Ltd v Gazcorp Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 19 .… 19.1, 22.3, 22.9 Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603 .… 23.18 — v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 .… 4.6, 4.11, 4.12, 4.26 — v Olson [2004] NSWCA 372 .… 6.8, 18.37, 18.38 WorkCover Corporation (San Remo Macaroni Co Pty Ltd) v Lian Da Ping (1994) 175 LSJS 469 .… 18.10, 18.11 WorkCover Queensland v AMACA Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 240 .… 8.7 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 .… 23.45 WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 378 ALR 585; [2020] FCAFC 84 .… 10.16, — v — (2021) 271 CLR 456; [2021] HCA 23 …. 10.16, 10.30, 10.60 Workplace Safety Australia v Simple OHS Solutions Pty Ltd (2015) 318 ALR 533; [2015] NSWCA 84 .… 10.46 World Audio Ltd v GB Radio Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 855 .… 10.47, 10.48 World Best Holdings Ltd v Sarker [2010] NSWCA 24 .… 10.12, 10.16, 23.12 Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386 .… 10.35 — v Fenton [1925] QSR 256 .… 16.64, 16.65, 16.66 — v Gasweld Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 317 .… 18.37, 18.38 — v Griffin (1916) 38 ALT 10 .… 22.4 clix



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Y

— v Groves [2011] QSC 66 .… 10.52 — v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] QCA 36 .… 2.30, 10.6 — v Langlands’ Foundry Co (1874) 5 AJR 113 .… 23.39 — v Lend Lease Building Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 463 .… 10.32, 10.35 — v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343 .… 3.24, 16.42 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 679; 85 ALR 442 .… 11.118 Wright (AR) & Son Ltd v Romford BC [1957] 1 QB 431 .… 17.70, 17.71 Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 182 .… 10.12 Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30; [1977] 3 All ER 897 .… 24.31 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798; [1974] 2 All ER 321 .… 24.1, 24.31 WTE Co-Generation v RCR Energy Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 314 .… 6.11, 6.16 Wu v Ling [2016] NSWCA 322 .… 15.8, 15.9 Wyatt v Ball [1955] St R Qd 515 .… 4.12 Wykes v Samilk Pty Ltd (1999) Aust Contract Rep 90-097 .… 2.6 Wylie v The ANI Corp Ltd [2000] QCA 314 .… 10.56 Wyndham v Chetwynd (1757) 1 Wm Bl 95; 96 ER 53 .… 16.5 Wyzenbeek v Australasian Marine Imports Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCAFC 167 .… 11.82, 11.118, 11.146

Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v CTG Pty Ltd (1992) 109 FLR 249 .… 25.7 Yan Seng PTE Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 .… 10.43 Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Aust Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410 .… 18.1, 18.7, 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.13, 18.16, 18.19, 18.20, 18.22, 18.43 Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfert Australia Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 128 .… 19.2 Yaroomba Beach Development Co Pty Ltd v Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398 .… 4.10, 6.11, 10.9, 18.24, 18.25, 18.28 Yarra Capital Group Pty Ltd v Sklash Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 109 .… 23.45 Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394 .… 2.4, 2.9, 24.1 Yates v Mobile Marine Repairs Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1463 .… 11.142 Yau’s Entertainment Pty Ltd v Asia Television Ltd [2002] FCA 338 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.59, 21.24, 21.34 Yaxley v Gotts [2000] .… 16.56 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 WLR 828; [1961] 2 All ER 294 .… 16.15, 17.36 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 .… 12.70, 14.1, 14.5, 14.6, 14.9, 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 15.7, 15.8, 15.31 — v — (1940) 63 CLR 649 .… 28.29 York Air Conditioning v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 11; [1949] HCA 23 .… 1.38, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, 10.12, 26.3, 26.5 York House Pty Ltd v FCT (1930) 43 CLR 427 .… 24.14 York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2007) 162 FCR 358; 240 ALR 567; [2007] FCA 922 .… 11.5, 11.45, 11.69 Yorke v Lucas (1983) 49 ALR 672 (Full Federal Court); (1985) 158 CLR 661 .… 11.110, 11.121 — v Ross Lucas Pty Ltd (1982) 69 FLR 116; (1982) 45 ALR 299; (1983) 68 FLR 268 .… 11.52, 11.85, 11.110, 11.146 — v Treasureway Stores Pty Ltd (1983) 5 ATPR 40-336 .… 11.121 Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 .… 11.112 — v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127 .… 8.42 — v Lamb [2001] NSWCA 225 .… 3.46 — v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 .… 9.9, 25.3, 26.1, 26.9, 26.10, 26.12, 27.19

X X v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 575 .… 27.1 XCB Pty Ltd v Creative Brands Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 424 .… 12.53 Xiao Hui Ying v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 124 .… 4.12 XL Insurance Co SE v BNY Trust Company of Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 215 .… 10.30, 10.32 XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984–85) 155 CLR 448 .… 23.2 Xu v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZSC 68 .… 8.6 — v Jinhong Design & Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 277 .… 16.55 clx

Table of Cases — v Tockassie (1905) 2 CLR 470 .… 10.14, 10.54 Yuan v O’Neill [2020] SASC 49 .… 7.7 Z Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 .… 3.10, 3.33, 21.19 Zachariadis v Allforks Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 47; [2009] VSCA 258 .… 23.45 Zahedpur v Idameneo (No 3) Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 134 .… 23.13 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd .… 8.6 Zamet v Hyman [1961] 3 All ER 933; (1962) 78 LQR 24; [1961] 1 WLR 1442 .… 14.6 Zamperoni Decorators Pty Ltd v Lo Presti [1983] VR 338 .… 26.13 Zaps Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v PJG Warehousing & Distribution Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 97 .… 10.32, 23.24 Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 438 .… 18.49 Zdrojkowski v Pacholczak (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 382 .… 12.36 Zeke Services Pty Ltd v Traffic Technologies Ltd [2005] 2 Qd R 563; [2005] QSC 135 .… 5.15, 6.16, 18.34 Zervas v Burkitt (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 236 .… 11.102, 11.136 Zhang v BM Sydney Building Materials Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 166 .… 10.33, 10.34, 10.74 — v ROC Services (NSW) Pty Ltd (2016) 93 NSWLR 561; [2016] NSWCA 370 .… 10.74

Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 211 ALR 159; [2004] HCA 56 .… 3.42, 24.1, 10.32, 28.17 Zieme v Gregory [1963] VR 214 .… 6.17, 20.4, 20.16 Zierholz@UC Pty Ltd v University of Canberra [2019] ACTSC 310 .… 5.16 Zivkovic v Parke [2022] VSCA 43 .… 4.24 Zoneff v Elcom Credit Union Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 445; (1990) 12 ATPR 41-009 .… 11.146, 11.147 Zoobury Pty Ltd v Cariste Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 18 .… 10.16 Zorba Structural Steel Co Pty Ltd v Watco Pty Ltd (1993) 115 FLR 206 .… 10.53, 23.27 Zucchiatti v Ferrara (1976) 1 BPR 9199 .… 6.11 Zucker v Straightlace Pty Ltd (1986) 11 NSWLR 87; (1987) 11 NSWLR 87 .… 21.23, 21.29 Zullo Enterprises Pty Ltd v Sutton [1998] QCA 417 .… 18.7, 18.43, 18.46, 18.48, 18.49 Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd (2009) 240 CLR 391; [2009] HCA 50 .… 18.41 Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd, Re [1999] 2 Qd R 203 .… 10.3, 10.33, 10.34 Zurich Insurance plc v Hayward [2016] UKSC 48; [2017] AC 142 .… 11.35 Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029; [2008] SGCA 27 .… 10.12

clxi



Table of Statutes References are to paragraph numbers

COMMONWEALTH Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 2C(1) .… 17.74 s 25E .… 17.2 s 36(1) .… 25.2 Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 s 7 .… 17.74 Australian Consumer Law .… 1.3, 1.11, 1.12, 1.15, 1.19, 1.20, 1.72, 1.88, 1.128, 1.131, 3.7, 3.19, 3.20, 3.48, 3.67, 5.12, 5.20, 7.23, 7.24, 7.30, 11.1, 11.80, 11.109, 11.124, 12.4, 13.11, 13.13, 14.13, 15.14, 15.16, 15.20, 15.21, 15.25, 18.34, 18.40, 18.42, 18.44, 21.1, 21.5, 21.37, 22.3, 23.2, 23.8, 23.45, 24.31, 25.1 Ch 3 .… 10.37 Ch 3, Pt 3-2, Div 1 .… 28.19 Ch 3, Pt 3-3 .… 28.19 Ch 3, Pt 3-5 .… 28.19 Pt 2-1 .… 11.106, 11.134 Pt 2-2 .… 11.106, 15.14 Pt 2-3 .… 11.106, 15.20 Pt 3 .… 11.150 Pt 3-1 .… 11.102, 11.106, 11.110, 11.129, 11.134 Pt 3-1, Div 2 .… 1.22 Pt 3-2 .… 10.37, 11.150, 16.77 Pt 3-3 .… 11.135 Pt 3-4 .… 11.134 Pt 3-5 .… 7.30 Pt 5-3 .… 11.114 Pt 5-4, Div 2 .… 3.9 Pt 5-5 .… 3.9 s 2 .… 11.102, 11.111 s 2(1) .… 7.1, 7.30, 11.110, 11.112, 11.142 s 2(2) .… 11.102, 11.113, 11.115 s 2(2)(a) .… 11.104, 11.118 s 2(2)(b) .… 11.104, 11.118 s 2(2)(c) .… 11.115, 11.118 s 2(2)(c)(i) .… 11.115 s 3 .… 15.21 clxiii

s 3(1)(b) .… 15.21 s 4 .… 1.88, 11.102, 11.115, 11.117, 11.118, 11.121, 15.15 s 4(1) .… 11.117 s 4(2) .… 11.115, 11.117, 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.117 s 4(2)(c) .… 11.115 s 4(3) .… 11.117 s 4(3)(b) .… 11.117 s 4(4) .… 11.117 s 16 .… 18.39, 18.41, 18.42 s 18 .… 1.19, 1.79, 1.86, 2.27, 3.9, 3.19, 3.20, 3.23, 3.39, 4.26, 5.17, 5.19, 8.55, 10.2, 10.7, 11.1, 11.10, 11.42, 11.102, 11.103, 11.104, 11.105, 11.106, 11.107, 11.109, 11.110, 11.111, 11.114, 11.115, 11.116, 11.117, 11.118, 11.119, 11.120, 11.121, 11.122, 11.124, 11.129, 11.134, 11.142, 11.145, 11.146, 11.147, 11.148, 11.149, 11.150, 11.151, 16.67, 18.10, 18.19, 18.44, 20.15, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.26, 28.9, 28.20 s 20 .… 1.11, 1.12, 1.77, 2.9, 10.2, 12.4, 13.11, 13.12, 14.13, 15.8, 15.13, 15.14, 15.16, 16.57, 16.66, 20.19, 21.37, 24.23 ss 20–22 .… 12.2, 15.14, 23.45 s 20(1) .… 15.13 s 20(2) .… 15.14 s 21 .… 1.11, 1.12, 1.77, 6.15, 10.2, 10.44, 13.13, 15.1, 15.13, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.17, 15.19, 15.26, 17.53, 20.19, 21.35, 21.37, 28.9, 28.31 s 21(1) .… 15.15, 15.16 s 21(2) .… 15.16 s 21(3)(a) .… 15.15 s 21(3)(b) .… 15.15 s 21(4) .… 1.11, 15.15, 15.16 s 21(4)(a) .… 15.16 s 21(4)(c) .… 15.16 s 22 .… 1.11, 13.13, 15.1, 15.14, 15.16, 15.22, 17.53, 21.35 s 22(1) .… 15.16 s 22(1)(l) .… 6.15, 10.44, 15.16 s 22(2) .… 15.16 s 22(2)(d) .… 13.13 s 22(2)(l) .… 6.15, 10.44, 15.16 s 22(3)(d) .… 13.13 s 22A .… 15.15



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Australian Consumer Law – cont’d s 23 .… 10.7, 18.39, 21.1, 22.3, 23.45 s 23(1) .… 15.20 s 23(2) .… 15.20, 15.23 s 23(3) .… 15.21 s 23(4) .… 15.21 s 23(4)(b) .… 15.20 s 23(5) .… 15.20 s 24 .… 15.22 s 24(1) .… 15.22 s 24(2) .… 15.22 s 24(3) .… 15.22 s 24(4) .… 15.22 s 25 .… 21.1 s 25(1) .… 10.7, 15.22 s 25(1)(c) .… 23.45 s 25(1)(d) .… 22.3 s 26(1) .… 15.21 s 27(1) .… 15.21 s 27(2) .… 15.21 s 28 .… 15.21 s 29 .… 11.102 ss 29–34 .… 11.129 ss 29–37 .… 3.19, 3.20, 11.106 s 29(1)(m) .… 11.114 s 31 .… 11.102 s 33 .… 11.102 s 34 .… 11.102 s 35 .… 1.19 s 37 .… 11.102 ss 41–42 .… 3.44 s 50 .… 13.12, 13.13 s 51A .… 11.110, 11.117, 11.118 s 51A(1) .… 11.117 s 51A(2) .… 11.117 s 52 .… 11.104, 11.106, 11.110, 11.115, 11.117, 11.118, 11.121, 11.124, 11.125, 11.145, 11.148 s 64 .… 10.37, 11.150, 28.8 s 64A .… 11.73 s 67(b) .… 11.114, 11.151 s 82 .… 11.125, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.148 s 82(1) .… 11.125, 11.146 s 87 .… 11.125, 11.129, 11.147, 11.148 s 97 .… 28.8 s 140C .… 11.151 s 151 .… 11.110

s 168 .… 13.13 s 218 .… 15.13 s 224 .… 11.110, 13.13, 15.13 s 232 .… 11.124, 13.12, 15.13, 15.17 s 232(3) .… 15.20 15.23 s 236 .… 1.12, 1.13, 3.23, 10.37, 11.105, 11.110, 11.114, 11.124, 11.125, 11.129, 11.134, 11.135, 11.146, 11.147, 11.149, 13.12, 15.13, 15.17, 23.8, 23.26 ss 236–237 .… 15.18 s 236(1) .… 11.103, 11.110, 11.124, 11.129, 11.146 s 236(2) .… 11.148, 15.18 s 237 .… 1.13, 8.7, 8.47, 11.58, 11.103, 11.105, 11.124, 11.125, 11.129, 11.134, 11.145, 11.147, 11.148, 11.149, 15.13, 15.23, 20.15, 24.1, 28.8 s 237(1) .… 1.12, 11.110, 11.147 s 237(1)(a)(ii) .… 15.20 s 237(2) .… 11.147 s 237(3) .… 11.148, 15.18, 15.24 s 238 .… 11.147 s 238(1) .… 11.147 s 238(1)(b) .… 15.18, 15.20 s 239 .… 11.147 ss 239–241 .… 7.24 s 239(1) .… 11.147, 15.23 s 243 .… 1.12, 1.13, 8.7, 8.47, 11.58, 11.103, 11.124, 11.129, 11.145, 11.147, 11.150, 13.12, 15.13, 15.16, 15.17, 15.23, 24.1, 28.8 s 243(a) .… 11.60, 11.129 s 243(b) .… 11.147 s 250 .… 11.147, 15.20, 15.23, 15.24 s 266 .… 7.1, 7.24 s 271 .… 7.24 ss 271–273 .… 7.1 s 274 .… 7.30 Sch 2 .… 11.102 Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 s 5(2) .… 17.68 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 s 97 .… 17.71 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 .… 13.13 s 12CB .… 13.13 clxiv

Table of Statutes Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 .… 1.11, 1.86, 11.1, 11.80, 11.109, 11.124, 14.17, 15.16, 15.17, 15.20, 15.21, 25.1 Pt 2, Div 2 .… 11.102 Pt 2, Div 2, Subdiv GA .… 11.132 s 12AC .… 11.114, 15.15 s 12AE .… 15.14 s 12BA(1) .… 11.109 s 12BA(2) .… 11.113, 11.115 s 12BAA .… 11.102 s 12BAB .… 11.102 s 12BAB(1) .… 14.17, 15.16 s 12BB .… 11.117, 15.15 s 12CA .… 12.2, 14.17, 15.13, 15.14, 15.26 s 12CB .… 12.2, 14.17, 15.9, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.26, 15.31 s 12CB(1) .… 15.16 s 12CB(4)(a) .… 15.16 s 12CC .… 12.2, 15.9, 15.14, 15.16, 15.26 s 12DA .… 11.102, 11.103, 11.109, 11.121 s 12DA(1) .… 11.102 s 12DA(1A) .… 11.102 s 12GB(1) .… 11.103 s 12GD .… 11.124, 15.17 s 12GF .… 11.124, 11.146 s 12GF(1) .… 15.17 s 12GF(1B) .… 11.129 s 12GF(2) .… 11.148, 15.18 s 12GH .… 11.108, 14.17 s 12GI .… 11.103 s 12GJ .… 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 s 12GM .… 11.124, 11.147 s 12GM(2) .… 11.148 s 12GM(5) .… 11.148 s 12GM(7)(a) .… 11.129 s 12GNA .… 11.146 s 12GNA(3) .… 11.146 s 12HD .… 11.124 ss 12BF–12BM .… 15.20, 15.21 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulations 2001 reg 2B(1)(h) .… 14.17, 15.16 Australian Securities Commission Act 2001 s 12DA .… 18.19



Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 s 4 .… 18.31 Banking Act 1959 s 8 .… 18.10 Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 5 .… 8.56 s 58 .… 8.56 s 116 .… 8.56 s 133(1A) .… 8.56 s 133(5A) .… 8.56 s 133(7) .… 8.56 s 153 .… 4.23 s 269(1)(b) .… 18.9 Bills of Exchange Act 1909 .… 7.23 s 27 .… 17.29 s 32 .... 1.27 s 32(2) .… 8.45 ss 36–43 .… 8.3 s 67 .… 22.8 s 95 .… 22.8 Cheques Act 1986 .… 7.23 s 30 .… 17.29 s 35 .… 4.23 Civil Aviation (Carrier’s Liability) Act 1959 s 34 .… 25.1 Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 107B(2)(b) .… 11.134 Commonwealth Bills of Exchange Act 1909 .… 4.23 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 .… 5.10 s 6 .… 17.68 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution s 5(1)(g) .… 11.114 s 109 .… 11.80 s 139B(1) .… 11.108 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Australian Consumer Law) .… 5.27, 11.10, 11.102, 11.107, 11.109, 11.124, 11.132, 11.134, 13.12, 13.13, 18.10, 18.35 Pt IIIA .… 18.35 Pt IV .… 3.36, 18.7, 18.10, 18.35 Pt IVB .… 18.10 clxv



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Australian Consumer Law) – cont’d Pt VI .… 18.10, 18.35 Pt VIA .… 11.132 Pt VII .… 18.35 Pt VIII .… 7.12, 18.35 Pt X .… 18.35 Pt XI, Div 8 .… 15.19, 15.25 Pt XIB .… 18.35 s 2A .… 15.15 s 2A(1) .… 11.109 s 2A(2) .… 11.109 s 2B .… 15.15 s 2BA .… 15.15 s 2C .… 11.109 s 4 .… 11.110 s 4(1) .… 11.102, 11.107, 11.109 s 4(2) .… 11.115, 15.15 s 4(2)(a) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.118 s 4K .… 11.125 s 4L .… 6.17 s 5 .… 11.110, 11.114 s 5(1) .… 11.110, 11.114 s 5(1)(g) .… 11.114 s 5(1)(h) .… 11.114 s 5(1)(i) .… 11.114 s 5(3) .… 11.114 s 5(4) .… 11.114 s 6 .… 11.107, 11.114, 11.129 s 6(4) .… 11.112 s 45 .… 13.12, 18.7, 18.35 s 45B .… 13.12 s 45C .… 13.12 s 45D .… 13.12 s 46 .… 13.12, 18.35 s 47 .… 13.12, 18.35 s 48 .… 7.12, 13.12, 18.35 s 49 .… 18.35 s 50 .… 18.35 s 67 .… 11.114 s 75B .… 11.110, 11.145 s 76 .… 18.35 s 80 .… 18.35 s 82 .… 18.35 s 84 .… 11.108 s 84(2) .… 11.109

s 87 .… 11.145, 18.35 s 87CB .… 11.133 s 87CB(1) .… 11.134, 11.135 s 87CB(3) .… 11.136 s 87CC .… 11.138 s 87CC(2) .… 11.138 s 87CD(1)(a) .… 11.131 s 87CD(3)(a) .… 11.142 s 87CD(3)(b) .… 11.139 s 87CE .… 11.139, 11.140 s 87CF(b) .… 11.140 s 87CG .… 11.139 s 87CH .… 11.139 s 87CI .… 11.137 s 131 .… 11.102, 11.107, 15.13, 15.14 s 131A .… 11.102, 11.129, 15.13 s 137(3) .… 11.146 s 137B .… 11.107, 11.129 s 137C .… 11.146 s 137E .… 11.146 s 138(1) .… 11.151 s 138A(1) .… 11.151 s 138B .… 15.19, 15.25 s 138B(1) .… 11.151 s 138B(5) .… 11.151 s 139A .… 11.146 s 139B .… 11.108, 14.17, 15.13 s 139B(2) .… 11.110, 11.137, 15.15, 15.16 s 139C .… 11.108 s 139C(1) .… 11.108 s 139C(2) .… 11.108, 11.110 s 139G .… 11.102 s 140 .… 11.102 s 140B .… 11.102 s 163A .… 11.103 s 163A(1)(aaa) .… 11.124 s 237 .… 11.114 Sch 2 .… 1.11, 11.1, 13.12, 15.13, 15.14, 22.3, 23.45 Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2011 .… 15.15, 15.16 Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 Pt 6 .... 11.102 reg 8A .… 11.146 clxvi

Table of Statutes Contracts Review Act 1980 s 16 .… 25.1

s 3 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 s 9 .… 3.56 ss 9–12 .… 3.56 s 10 .… 3.52, 3.56 s 11 .… 3.56 s 12(1) .… 3.56 s 12(2) .… 3.56 s 14 .… 3.56 s 14A .… 3.56 s 14A(2) .… 3.56 s 14B .… 3.56 s 14B(2)–(4) .… 3.56 s 15 .… 3.56 s 15A .… 3.56 ss 15A–15F .… 3.56 s 15B .… 3.51, 3.56 s 15C .… 3.54, 3.56 s 15D .… 3.56 s 15D(3) .… 3.56 s 15E .… 3.56 s 15F .… 3.56

Copyright Act 1968 ss 196–197 .… 8.3 Corporations Act 2001 .… 3.53, 3.56, 4.30, 11.1, 11.27, 11.102, 17.68, 17.69, 17.70, 17.71, 18.11 Ch 6D .… 11.27 Pt 6 .… 11.102 Pt 7 .… 11.132 Pt 10, Div 2A .… 11.132 s 110 .… 3.56, 4.1 ss 110–110B .… 3.53, 3.56 s 110A .… 3.56, 4.1 s 110B .… 3.56, 4.1 s 119 .… 17.68 s 124(1) .… 17.68 s 125 .… 17.69 ss 126–127 .… 17.70 ss 126–129 .… 3.53, 3.56, 17.70 s 127 .… 3.15, 3.56, 4.1 ss 128–129 .… 3.15 s 140 .… 3.8 s 199A .… 4.26 ss 205–206 .… 18.20 s 415D .… 21.2 s 477 .… 8.7 s 477(2) .… 8.6 s 563A .… 11.59 s 670A .… 11.102 s 708 .… 11.121 s 728 .… 11.102 s 953A .… 11.102 s 1022A .… 11.102 s 1041I .… 11.129, 11.132 s 1041L .… 11.132 s 1070A .… 8.30 s 1071B .… 8.30 s 1073 .… 11.147 Corporations Law 1990 .… 18.11 s 241 .… 4.26 Credit Code .… 3.9 Currency Act 1965 .… 9.8 Electronic Transactions Act 1999 .… 3.52, 3.53, 3.56 Pt 2A .… 3.56



Electronic Transactions Regulations 2000 .… 3.56 Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 Sch, item 23 .… 3.56 Evidence Act 1995 s 7B .… 3.56 s 131(2) .… 5.20 s 131(2)(h) .… 5.20 Fair Work Act 2009 .… 5.26 s 228 .… 6.15 Family Law Act 1975 .… 5.19, 11.28, 18.26, 28.29 Pt VIIIA .… 5.5, 14.2, 15.8 Pt VIIIAB, Div 4 .… 5.6 s 4AA .… 5.6 s 79 .… 16.75 s 86A .… 4.27 s 87(8) .… 11.28 s 90B .… 5.5 s 90C .… 5.5 s 90D .… 5.5 s 90E .… 5.5 s 90F .… 5.5 s 90G .… 5.5

clxvii



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Marriage Act 1961 s 111A .… 2.2, 2.11, 4.34, 16.20, 17.28, 18.26

Family Law Act 1975 – cont’d s 90J .… 5.5 s 90K .… 5.5 s 90KA .… 5.5 s 90RA .… 5.6 s 90RC .… 5.6 s 119 .… 5.4

Migration Act 1958 .… 18.46

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 59(2B) .… 25.12

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 .… 15.9, 17.2 s 76 .… 15.14 Sch .… 17.2, 17.36 Sch, s 60(3) .… 17.36

Federal Court Rules O 29, r 2 .… 18.35

National Credit Code s 218(7) .… 17.2, 17.36

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 8.21(2) .… 25.12 r 15.15(2) .… 25.12

National Credit Code see National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 .… 18.48, 22.5, 26.3 Pt III .… 18.48 s 261 .… 18.48 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 .… 1.42, 20.1 s 9 .… 7.22 s 13 .… 10.43 s 14 .… 10.43 s 15(2)(d) .… 15.21 s 21 .… 7.10, 11.26 s 45(1) .… 18.41 s 48 .… 1.43, 4.7, 7.3, 7.10, 7.17, 7.21, 7.22, 7.43, 11.26 s 48(3) .… 7.10, 7.21 s 48A .… 7.3, 7.22 s 48AA .… 7.3, 7.22 s 54 .… 7.10, 7.22 s 54(1) .… 7.10 s 56 .… 7.10 Judiciary Act 1903 s 56 .… 5.27 s 64 .… 5.27, 24.3 s 79 .… 11.145, 15.26 Life Insurance Act 1995 s 199 .… 17.4 ss 200–203 .… 8.3 Marine Insurance Act 1909 s 20(2) .… 7.22 s 56 .… 8.3

Native Title Act 1993 s 31(1)(b) .… 6.15 Norfolk Island Act 1979 .… 17.74 s 71(1) .… 17.74 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 s 5 .… 17.74 Patents Act 1990 .… 10.30 s 14 .… 8.3 Patents Regulations 1991 .… 10.30 Reserve Bank Act 1959 s 36 .… 9.8 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 s 60 .… 8.5 Social Services Act 1947 ss 59–60 .… 18.27 Superannuation Act 1976 s 3 .… 18.27 Trade Practices Act s 20 .… 10.2 s 21 .… 10.2 Trade Practices Act 1974 .… 6.17, 11.102, 18.35, 24.23 Pt V .… 11.106 Pt V, Div 1 .… 11.106 s 4(2) .… 11.115 s 4(2)(a) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(c) .… 11.117 s 4L .… 18.42 s 5 .… 11.114

clxviii

Table of Statutes Apportionment Act 1905 s 4 .… 26.13

s 6 .… 11.114 s 6(3) .… 11.107 s 47 .… 18.42 s 51AA .… 15.8, 15.11, 15.13, 15.14, 15.16, 21.37, 24.23 s 51AA(2) .… 15.14 s 51AB .… 15.14, 15.16, 20.19, 21.37 s 51AC .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.26, 21.37, 24.23, 28.31 s 51AD .… 18.10 s 51AF .… 11.102 s 52 .… 11.1, 11.10, 11.104, 11.106, 11.115, 23.6, 23.8, 23.15, 23.26 s 52(1) .… 11.102 s 52A .… 20.19 s 52AD .… 18.10 s 53 .… 11.112 s 73 .… 11.102 s 75B .… 11.107, 11.110 s 82 .… 11.104, 23.6, 23.8, 23.26 s 82(1) .… 11.103 s 82(1B) .… 11.129 s 84 .… 15.16 s 84(2) .… 11.108 s 87 .… 8.7, 8.47, 11.104, 11.129, 15.11, 15.16, 15.18

Associations Incorporation Act 1991 .… 17.73 Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 s 33 .… 22.4 Building Act 2004 s 88(3) .… 7.26 s 142(1) .… 25.5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 Ch 7A .… 11.132 Pt 15.3 .… 7.22 ss 15–18 .… 8.55 s 99 .… 23.19 ss 101–102 .… 23.30 s 107B(3)(b) .… 11.134, 11.135 s 107C .… 11.134, 11.135 ss 172–179 .… 11.72, 11.92 s 173(1)(b)(i) .… 11.70 s 174 .… 3.9, 11.80 s 176 .… 11.73 s 221 .… 8.7, 18.33 Sch 4 .… 11.146 Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 s 201 .… 16.21 s 201(3)(a) .… 8.21 s 204 .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.34, 16.41, 16.42, 16.57, 16.66 s 204(2)(c) .… 16.57 s 205 .… 8.30 s 205(1) .… 8.30 s 208 .… 3.14 s 212 .… 7.25 s 219 .… 4.1 s 501 .… 21.19

Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 .… 11.117 Trade Practices (Industry Codes — Franchising) Regulations 1998 Sch .… 18.10 Treasury Laws Amendment (Australian Consumer Law Review) Act 2018 s 5 .… 15.15 Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 .… 15.20

Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34

Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act s 55 .… 25.10

Commercial Arbitration Act 2017 .… 18.34

Water Act 2007 s 73 .… 6.15

Court Procedures Act 2004 Pt 4 .… 5.27, 24.3

Workplace Relations Act 1996 .… 18.11, 24.13

Court Procedures Rules 2006 r 503 .… 25.12

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Age of Majority Act 1974 .… 17.2

Domestic Relationships Act 1994 Pt 4 .… 5.6

clxix





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 Pt 2 .… 11.102 s 2 .… 11.151 ss 15–16 .… 11.109 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 s 71 .… 17.55 s 72 .… 17.55 Imperial Acts (Substituted Provisions) Act 1986 s 3 .… 16.7 Land Titles Act 1925 s 110 .… 3.14 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 s 68 .… 18.33 Law Reform (Misrepresentation) Act 1977 .… 11.72, 11.92 Legislation Act 2001 s 8(3) .… 25.7 s 8(3)(b)(i) .… 25.7 s 17 .… 25.10 s 30 .… 25.7 s 30(1)(f) .… 25.7 s 31 .… 25.7 s 32(1) .… 25.8 s 32(5) .… 25.8 s 32(6)(b) .… 25.9 ss 33–34 .… 25.6 s 40 .… 25.7 s 43 .… 25.11 s 44 .… 25.11 s 45 .… 25.11 ss 46–49 .… 25.10 s 47(2) .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 49 .… 25.10 s 149 .… 17.2 s 151(3) .… 25.2 Limitation Act 1985 s 8(3) .… 25.7 s 11(1) .… 25.1 s 12 .… 25.1 s 13 .… 25.1

ss 22–26 .… 25.1 s 32(4) .… 25.8 s 36 .… 25.7 s 40 .… 25.5 Married Persons’ Property Act 1986 s 3 .… 17.65 s 6 .… 17.64 Mercantile Law Act 1962 s 15 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.26 s 16 .… 11.80 Rules of the Supreme Court O 32 r 1 .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1954 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(2) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 29(1) .… 3.42 s 33(5) .… 9.9 s 35(2) .… 21.15 s 37 .… 9.5 s 52(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 52(2) .… 26.12 s 53(1) .… 25.2 s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(1) .… 25.2 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 60 .… 3.22 s 62(1) .… 11.66 s 62(2) .… 11.68 Sale of Goods Act 1975 s 2 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 Sale of Goods Ordinance 1954 s 5 .… 24.18 s 5(1) .… 21.18 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 16(3) .… 21.18 s 55 .… 24.18 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31 clxx

Table of Statutes Supreme Court Act 1933 .… 23.33 s 34 .… 24.29

s 5 .… 15.26 s 6 .… 15.27 s 6(1) .… 15.27 s 6(2) .… 15.27 s 7 .… 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 s 7(1) .… 7.24, 15.11, 15.26, 15.28, 15.29 s 8 .… 15.29 s 9 .… 12.5, 15.1, 15.28, 15.31 s 9(1) .… 15.28 s 9(2) .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 s 9(2)(a) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(b) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(c) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(d) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(e) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(f) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(g) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(h) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(i) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(j) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(k) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(l) .… 15.28 s 9(4) .… 15.28 s 9(5) .… 15.28 s 10 .… 15.29 s 12 .… 15.29 s 14 .… 15.29 s 15 .… 15.29 s 16 .… 15.30 s 17(1) .… 15.26 s 17(2)(b) .… 15.29 s 17(3) .… 15.26 s 17(4) .… 15.26 s 17(5) .… 15.26 s 18 .… 15.26 s 21 .… 15.27 s 22 .… 15.26 Sch 1, cl 1(c) .… 7.24, 15.29

Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act s 46 .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 55 .… 25.10

NEW SOUTH WALES Agricultural Holdings Act 1941 .… 16.33 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 .… 17.73 Builders Licensing Act 1971 .… 26.6 s 45 .… 16.55 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 s 13 .… 11.149 s 14 .… 11.149 s 15 .… 11.149 Building Services Corporation Act 1989 s 10 .… 16.55 Civil Liability Act 2002 .… 11.137 Pt 4 .… 11.132 s 3A(2) .… 11.141 s 16 .… 23.19 Sch 2, cl 2 .… 8.7 Civil Liability Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Act 2018 .… 3.15 Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 65 .… 25.12 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 .… 5.6 Companies (NSW) Code .… 18.46 Pt IV, Div 6 .… 18.46 s 170(1) .… 18.46 Contracts Review Act 1980 .… 1.12, 4.28, 12.2, 12.5, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 15.1, 15.4, 15.9, 15.14, 15.16, 15.26, 15.27, 15.31, 17.52, 17.53, 23.45, 28.8 s 4 .… 15.28 s 4(1) .… 15.26, 15.28 s 4(2) .… 15.27



Conveyancing Act 1919 Pt 3 .… 4.1 Pt 8, Div 4 .… 3.69 s 6C .… 3.53 s 12 .… 8.30, 8.34 s 13 .… 21.19 s 23C .… 3.56, 8.21, 16.21 s 23C(2) .… 16.21 s 24 .… 3.14 clxxi



Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Conveyancing Act 1919 – cont’d s 36C(1) .… 7.25 s 38A .… 3.53 s 54A .… 3.56, 16.7, 16.21, 16.35, 16.67 s 54A(2) .… 16.57 s 54B .… 23.6 s 55(2A) .… 26.4 s 66L .… 24.7 s 66M .… 24.7 s 66N .… 24.7 s 72 .… 3.14 s 133B .… 8.8 s 133E .… 3.69 s 144(1) .… 26.13 s 170 .… 3.61, 8.34 s 184 .… 12.64

s 6(1)(c) .… 19.39 s 6(1)(d) .… 19.39 s 6(1)(e) .… 19.39 s 6(2) .… 19.39 s 6(3) .… 19.26 ss 7–8 .… 19.37 s 11 .… 19.38 s 12 .… 19.38 s 13 .… 19.38 s 15 .… 19.38 s 15(1) .… 19.39 Home Building Act 1989 s 10(3) .… 16.55 s 18D .… 7.26 s 48K(6) .… 25.5 Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 s 8 .… 16.7

Co-Operatives Act 1992 s 21 .… 17.68

Interpretation Act 1987 s 36(1) .… 25.2 s 37 .… 17.2

Crimes Act 1900 Sch 3, cl 5 .… 8.7 Crown Proceedings Act 1988 .… 5.27, 24.3

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 s 2 .… 8.55

De Facto Relationships Act 1984 .… 18.27 Deserted Wives and Children Act 1901 .… 4.27

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 s 6 .… 7.22

District Court Act 1973 s 134B .… 15.26

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 ss 8–9 .… 23.30

Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 App .… 3.57 s 9(1) .… 3.57 s 9(3) .… 3.57

Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 .… 22.4 Legal Profession Act 2004 s 186 .… 18.33

Electronic Transactions Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 6.20 .… 25.5 Fair Trading Act 1987 .… 11.107, 11.146 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 30 .… 11.151 ss 36–37 .… 11.109 s 74(4) .… 11.146 Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 .… 19.37, 19.39, 25.1 s 6(1)(b) .… 19.39

Limitation Act 1969 Pt 3, Div 3 .… 25.7 s 11(3) .… 25.7 s 11(3)(b)(i) .… 25.7 s 14 .… 25.1 s 14(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 14A .… 25.1 s 15 .… 25.1 s 16 .… 25.1 s 20 .… 25.10 s 23 .… 25.13 ss 40–46 .… 25.1

clxxii

Table of Statutes s 18 .… 17.44, 17.46 s 19 .… 17.45, 17.47 ss 19–25 .… 17.45 s 20 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 20(3) .… 17.47 s 21 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 22 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 23 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 24 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 25 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 26 .… 17.48 s 27 .… 17.48 s 28 .… 17.48 s 29 .… 17.48 s 30 .… 17.45 s 30(1)(a) .… 17.49 s 30(1)(b) .… 17.49 s 30(2) .… 17.49 s 30(3) .… 17.49 s 30(4) .… 17.49 s 31 .… 17.49 s 31(2) .… 17.49 s 33 .… 17.49 s 34 .… 17.49 s 37 .… 17.49 s 38 .… 17.49 s 43 .… 17.47 s 47 .… 17.50, 17.51 s 48 .… 17.50 s 50 .… 17.48

s 52 .… 25.7 s 52(1)(e) .… 25.7 s 53 .… 25.7 s 54 .… 25.8 s 54(4) .… 25.8 s 54(5) .… 25.8 s 54(6) .… 25.9 ss 55–56 .… 25.6 s 63 .… 25.11 s 64 .… 25.11 s 65 .… 25.11 s 68 .… 25.11 s 68A .… 25.11 ss 69–73 .… 25.10 s 70(2) .… 25.10 s 71 .… 25.10 s 72 .… 25.10 s 73 .… 25.10 Sch 4 .… 25.11 Liquor Act 2007 .… 18.10 s 92 .… 18.10 s 92(1) .… 18.10 s 92(1)(d) .… 18.10 Local Courts Act 1982 .… 15.26 Local Government Act 1993 s 55 .… 18.8 s 55(1) .… 18.8 Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 ss 3–4 .… 18.33 s 6 .… 8.7 Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1996 Pt 2 .… 17.65 s 10 .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1886 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1901 .… 17.60 Mining Act .… 19.15 Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 .… 17.2, 17.4, 17.43 s 6(1) .… 17.45 s 6(3) .… 17.46 s 8 .… 17.45 s 17 .… 17.45

Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 s 10(7) .… 7.1 Professional Standards Act 1994 .… 11.146 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 Pt 4 .… 5.6 s 20 .… 16.75 Real Property Act 1900 .… 15.29 Restraints of Trade Act 1976 .… 18.38 s 4 .… 18.38, 18.39 s 4(3) .… 18.38 Retail Lease Act 1994 .… 12.25, 18.10 Pt 7A, Div 1 .… 15.14 Sale of Goods Act 1923 Pt III .… 17.47 clxxiii





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Sale of Goods Act 1923 – cont’d s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 4(2A) .… 11.68 s 4(2A)(a) .… 11.70 s 5 .… 24.18 s 5(1) .… 21.18 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17, 19.37 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 23 .… 17.47 s 28(1) .… 3.42 s 32(4) .… 9.9 s 33 .… 9.5 s 34(2) .… 21.15 s 51(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 51(2) .… 26.12 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53(1) .… 25.2 s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 57 .… 10.65 s 60 .… 3.22

s 20ZD(4) .… 17.70 Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 s 8 .… 17.68 Superannuation Act 1916 s 88 .… 8.5 Supreme Court Act 1970 .… 23.33 s 68 .… 24.29, 24.31 Supreme Court Rules 1970 Pt 8 .… 18.33 r 13(1) .… 18.33 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules .… 3.29 Usury, Bills of Lading, and Written Memoranda (Amendment) Act 1989 .… 11.80

NORTHERN TERRITORY Age of Majority Act 1974 .… 17.2 Apportionment Act 1905 s 3 .… 26.13 Associations Act 2003 .… 17.73 Bills of Lading Act 1859 s 1 .… 8.3 s 3 .… 8.3 Building Act 1993 s 54AD .… 7.26 s 54BB .… 7.26 s 160 .... 25.5

Sale of Goods Act 1988 s 4(5) .… 21.18

Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 Pt 10 .… 15.14

Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1988 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 s 9(3) .… 16.84

Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 .… 18.34

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 Securities Industry Act 1970 .… 18.41 s 70 .… 18.19, 18.21 State Owned Corporations Act 1989 s 20ZD .… 3.15 s 20ZD(3) .… 17.70

Commercial Arbitration (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2013 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 Pt 4 .… 11.102 ss 35–36 .… 11.109 Crown Lands Ordinance 1831 .… 12.40 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 .… 5.27, 24.3 De Facto Relationships Act 1991 .… 18.27 Pt 3 .… 5.6 De Facto Relationships (Northern Territory Request) Act 2003 .… 5.6

clxxiv

Table of Statutes Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2001 .… 3.56 s 5 .… 3.56

s 12(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 13 .… 25.1 s 18 .… 25.10 s 21 .… 25.13 ss 25–30 .… 25.1 s 36 .… 25.7 ss 36–39 .… 25.7 s 36(1)(e) .… 25.7 ss 37–39 .… 25.7 s 41 .… 25.8 s 41(5)(b) .… 25.9 ss 42–43 .… 25.6 s 44 .… 25.7 s 44(3)(b) .… 25.6 ss 45–48 .… 25.10 s 46(2) .… 25.10 s 47 .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 48A .… 25.12

Guardianship of Adults Act 2016 s 25 .… 17.55 Interpretation Act 1987 s 28(1) .… 25.2 s 30 .… 17.2 Law of Property Act 2000 .… 1.42 Pt 6, Div 1 .… 4.1 s 5(c) .… 16.57 s 10 .… 16.21 s 10(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 12 .… 7.25 s 13 .… 3.14 s 56 .… 7.3, 7.15 s 56(2) .… 7.19 s 56(3)(a) .… 7.18 s 56(3)(b) .… 7.20, 8.53 s 56(3)(d) .… 7.19 s 56(4) .… 7.21 s 56(6) .… 7.17 s 56(7) .… 7.21 s 57 .… 17.71 s 58 .… 16.7, 16.9, 16.19 s 58(2) .… 16.35 s 59 .… 16.9 s 62 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 65 .… 21.19 s 70 .… 23.6 s 134 .… 8.8 s 143 .… 3.69 s 182 .… 8.30 s 221 .… 16.7 Sch 4 .… 16.7

Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1989 s 3(1) .… 17.64, 17.65 s 3(3) .… 17.64 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act s 27 .… 23.19 Professional Standards Act .… 11.146 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 .… 11.132 s 4(3)(b) .… 11.135

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Pt II .… 8.55 s 15 .… 11.129 s 16 .… 11.129 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 Pt VIII .… 7.22 ss 15–16 .… 23.30 Limitation Act 1981 s 4(1) .… 25.7

Sale of Goods Act 1972 s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 5 .… 24.18 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(2) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8, 6.11 s 28(1) .… 3.42 s 32(5) .… 9.9 s 33 .… 9.5 s 51(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 51(2) .… 26.12 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53(1) .… 25.2

clxxv





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 .… 17.69

Sale of Goods Act 1972 – cont’d s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 60 .… 3.22

Civil Liability Act 2003 Ch 2, Pt 2 .… 11.132 Ch 3 .… 23.19 Pt 2A .… 3.15 s 7(3) .… 11.141 s 28(1)(a) .… 23.31 s 28(1)(b) .… 11.134 s 28(3)(b) .… 11.135 s 29 .… 11.135 s 30(1) .… 11.136 s 32F .… 11.134

Sale of Goods Amendment Act 1999 s 2 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 8 .… 24.29

Supreme Court Act 1979 .… 23.33 s 14(1)(b) .… 24.29 ss 62–63 .… 24.29

Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 .… 18.34

Supreme Court Rules 1987 reg 36.01(6) .… 25.12

Common Law Practice Act .… 23.33

Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 .… 5.6

Water Act 1992 .… 18.10, 18.20, 18.43

Crown Proceedings Act 1980 .… 5.27, 24.3 Domestic Building Contracts Act 2000 s 30 .… 16.55 s 55 .… 16.55

QUEENSLAND Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 38(1) .… 25.2 s 38A .… 17.2

Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 .… 3.56 s 14 .… 3.49 Sch 2 .… 3.56

Associations Incorporation Act 1981 .… 17.73 Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 s 76(1)(a) .… 16.55 s 76(1)(c) .… 16.55

Fair Trading Act 1989 .… 11.102 ss 24–25 .… 11.109 ss 48–51 .… 11.151 s 107 .… 11.150

Builders’ Registration and Home-owners’ Protection Act 1979 s 53(2)(d) .… 16.55 s 75 .… 16.55

Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 ss 148–153 .… 17.69

Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 s 67G .… 16.55 Building Services Authority Act 1991 .… 16.55 s 42(1) .… 16.55 s 42(3) .… 16.55 s 58(1) .… 16.55

Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 33 .… 17.55 Judicature Act 1876 s 5(11) .… 22.4 Land Title Act 1994 .… 7.10 s 62 .… 8.6 Law Reform Act 1995 s 5 .… 23.30

clxxvi

Table of Statutes s 55(1) .… 7.15 s 55(2) .… 7.19 s 55(3)(a) .… 7.18 s 55(3)(b) .… 7.20, 8.53 s 55(3)(d) .… 7.19 s 55(4) .… 7.21 s 55(5) .… 7.15 s 55(6) .… 7.17 s 55(7) .… 7.21 s 56 .… 16.7, 16.9, 16.19 s 56(2) .… 16.35 s 59 .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 s 62 .… 21.19 s 68(1) .… 23.6 s 68A .… 26.4 s 121 .… 8.8 s 128 .… 3.69 s 199 .… 8.30 s 200 .… 8.30, 8.38, 8.39 s 227 .… 17.71 s 232 .… 26.13

s 10 .… 23.30 s 17 .… 17.2 s 18 .… 17.65 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s 5(2) .… 25.7 s 10(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 10(1)(c) .… 25.10 s 10(2) .… 25.1 s 10(3) .… 25.1 s 10(6)(b) .… 25.13 s 24 .… 25.11 s 26 .… 25.1, 25.7 s 29 .… 25.7 s 31 .… 25.7 s 35(3) .… 25.8 s 36 .… 25.8 s 37(5) .… 25.9 s 37(6) .… 25.9 s 37(6A) .… 25.9 s 38 .… 25.6 s 41 .… 25.10 s 41(2) .… 25.10 s 41(3) .… 25.10 s 41(5) .… 25.10 Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 1952 s 4 .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1890 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1897 .… 17.60 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 s 87 .… 14.2, 14.7 Professional Standards Act 2004 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1974 .… 7.18 Pt 6 .… 4.1 s 5 .… 7.15 s 6(d) .… 16.57 s 11 .… 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 s 13 .… 7.25 s 14 .… 3.14 ss 44–46 .… 17.71 ss 44–53B .… 3.53 s 50 .… 3.14 s 55 .… 1.42, 7.3, 7.15, 7.17

Property Law Bill 2022 Pt 6 .... 4.1 s 9 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 13 .… 3.14 s 65 .… 3.14 s 70 .… 7.15 s 71 .… 16.7, 16.9 s 75 .… 16.7, 21.9 s 84 .… 23.6 s 86 .… 26.4 s 129 …. 8.8 s 151 …. 3.70 s 156 .... 26.13 s 180 …. 8.30 s 181 …. 8.30, 8.39 s 249 .… 25.1 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 Pt 6, Div 8A .… 15.14 Rules of the Supreme Court O 32 r 1 .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 3 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18

clxxvii





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Sale of Goods Act 1896 – cont’d s 5 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 5(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 9 .… 12.12 s 10 .… 19.17 s 11 .… 6.8 s 12 .… 6.11 s 13 .… 21.19 s 14(2) .… 21.18 s 27(1) .… 3.42 s 31(4) .… 9.9 s 32 .… 9.5 s 33(2) .… 21.15 s 50(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 50(2) .… 26.12 s 51(1) .… 25.2 s 51(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53 .… 24.18 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 59 .… 3.22 s 61(2) .… 11.66

s 6(2) .… 16.55 s 32(3) .… 7.26 Carriage Documents Act 1998 s 7 .… 8.3 Civil Liability Act 1936 s 52 .… 23.19 Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2009 .… 5.6 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 Sch 11 .… 8.7, 18.33 Crown Proceedings Act 1992 .… 5.27, 24.3 Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 Pt 2 .… 5.6 Electronic Communications Act 2000 .… 3.56 Electronic Transactions Act 2000 s 5 .… 3.56

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1996 .… 7.23 s 6 .… 8.3 Statute of Frauds Act 1972 .… 17.4, 11.80 s 3 .… 16.7

Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 reg 3 .… 15.14 s 3 .… 15.14 Sch 1 .… 15.14

Succession Act 1981 s 66 .… 8.55 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 reg 376 .… 25.12

SOUTH AUSTRALIA Aged and Infirm Persons’ Property Act 1940 s 27(1) .… 17.55 Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 .… 17.2, 17.51 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 .… 17.73

Fair Trading Act 1987 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 16 .… 11.151 ss 22–23 .… 11.109 s 96 .… 11.150

Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 .… 19.40 s 3 .… 19.41 s 3(1) .… 19.40 s 4(1)(b) .… 19.42 s 4(2)(b)–(e) .… 19.42 s 5 .… 19.26 s 7(1) .… 19.41 s 7(4) .… 19.41

Builders Licensing Act 1986 s 39 .… 16.55

Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 s 39 .… 17.55 s 42(1) .… 17.55

Building Work Contractors Act 1995 s 6 .… 16.55

Land Agents Act 1994 s 6(2) .… 16.55 clxxviii

Table of Statutes Law of Property Act 1936 s 7 .… 16.25 s 15 .… 8.30 s 16 .… 21.19 s 24A .… 17.51 s 24A(1) .… 17.51 s 26(1) .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.60 s 26(2) .… 16.57 s 29 .… 16.21 s 29(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 31(d) .… 16.57 s 34(1) .… 7.25 s 40 .… 3.14 s 41 .… 4.1 s 64 .… 26.13 s 92 .… 17.65 s 110 .… 17.64 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 Pt 3 .… 11.132 s 3 .… 11.129, 23.30 s 3(1) .… 11.136, 11.141 s 3(2)(b) .… 11.136 s 3(2)(c) .… 11.138 s 4(1)(b) .… 23.31 s 4(1)(c) .… 11.134 s 7 .… 23.30 s 8(4)(d) .… 11.141 Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 s 44(1) .… 25.2 s 49(2) .… 17.2 Limitation of Actions Act 1936 s 28 .… 25.11 s 33 .… 25.1 s 34 .… 25.1 s 35 .… 25.10 s 35(a) .… 25.1 s 35(b) .… 25.1 s 42 .… 25.8 s 42(1) .… 25.8 s 42(2) .… 25.9 s 44(1), item 3 .… 25.2 s 45 .… 25.7 ss 45–46 .… 25.7 s 48 .… 25.7 s 48(3)(b) .… 25.6

s 50 .… 25.9 Local Government Act 1999 s 37(b) .… 17.71 Married Women’s Property Act 1883 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1902 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1911 .… 17.60 Minors Contracts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1979 .… 17.51 s 4 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.26, 17.51 s 5 .… 17.51 s 6 .… 17.51 s 7 .… 17.51 s 8 .… 17.51 Misrepresentation Act 1972 s 6(1)(a) .… 11.70 s 7(1) .… 3.9, 11.80, 11.92 s 7(2) .… 3.9, 11.92 s 7(3) .… 11.72 s 7(3)–(6) .… 11.72 s 7(5) .… 11.72 s 7(6) .… 11.72 s 8 .… 11.73 Professional Standards Act 2004 .… 11.146 Real Property Act 1886 s 69(b) .… 17.18 Residential Tenancies Act 1995 s 748.8 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 48(1) .… 25.2 s 49(1) .… 25.2 s 50(1) .… 25.2 s 59(2) .… 11.66 Sale of Goods Act 1895–1972 .… 3.22 s 2 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 2(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 6 .… 12.12 s 7 .… 19.17, 19.40 s 8 .… 6.8 s 9 .… 6.11 s 10 .… 21.19 clxxix





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Sale of Goods Act 1895–1972 – cont’d s 11(2) .… 21.18 s 25(1) .… 3.42 s 29(4) .… 9.9 s 30 .… 9.5 s 31(2) .… 21.15 s 48(1) .… 26.12 s 48(2) .… 26.12 s 49(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 50(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 51 .… 24.18 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 57 .… 3.22 s 60 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 60(1) .… 21.18 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80 Statutes Amendment (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1982 s 3 .… 16.7 s 4 .… 16.7 Supreme Court Act 1935 .… 23.33 s 28 .… 22.4 s 30 .… 24.29 Survival of Causes of Actions Act 1940 ss 2–3 .… 8.55 Survival of Causes of Actions Act 1940 s 5 .… 8.55

Associations Incorporation Act 1964 .… 17.73 Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 Pt 2 .… 11.102 s 8(2) .… 11.151 ss 14–15 .… 11.109 Building Act 2016 s 327(7) .… 25.5 Civil Liability Act 2002 Pt 9A .… 11.132 s 3A(3) .… 11.141 s 27 .… 23.19 s 28E .… 8.7 Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006 .… 5.6 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 36 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 36(1) .… 16.57 s 36(2) .… 16.57 s 43 .… 17.63 s 45 .… 17.64 s 60 .… 16.21 s 60(2)(c) .… 8.21 s 61(1) .… 7.25 s 62 .… 3.14 s 63 .… 4.1 s 86 .… 8.30 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 .… 5.27, 24.3

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 r 69.2 .… 25.12

Electronic Transactions Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 3 .… 3.56

TASMANIA

Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 s 56 .… 17.55

Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 29(1) .… 25.2 Administration and Probate Act 1935 s 27 .… 8.55 Age of Majority Act 1973 .… 17.2 s 4(1) .… 17.2 Apportionment Act 1871 s 2 .… 26.13

Infants’ Relief Act 1875 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.29, 17.39 s 1 .… 17.37 Limitation Act 1974 s 2(2) .… 25.7 s 2(3) .… 25.7 s 4(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 4(1)(c) .… 25.10 clxxx

Table of Statutes s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 30 .… 9.5 s 30(1) .… 3.42 s 34(4) .… 9.9 s 36(2) .… 21.15 s 40 .… 16.82 s 53(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 53(2) .… 26.12 s 54(1) .… 25.2 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 55(1) .… 25.2 s 55(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 57(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 62 .… 3.22

s 4(2) .… 25.1 s 4(3) .… 25.1 s 5(3) .… 25.7 s 9 .… 25.13 s 21 .… 25.11 s 23 .… 25.1 s 23A .… 3.70 s 26 .… 25.7 s 28 .… 25.7 s 29(4) .… 25.8 s 30 .… 25.8 s 30(1) .… 25.8 s 31(5) .… 25.9 s 31(7)–(8) .… 25.9 s 32 .… 25.6 s 33 .… 25.10 s 33(1) .… 25.10 s 33(2) .… 25.10 s 33(3) .… 25.10 s 33(5) .… 25.10

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31

Married Women’s Property Act 1884 .… 17.60

Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .... 7.23 s 7 .… 8.3

Married Women’s Property Act 1900 .… 17.60

Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 .… 23.33 s 11(7) .… 21.19 s 11(10) .… 22.4 s 11(13) .… 24.29 s 11(13)(b) .… 24.31

Married Women’s Property Act 1935 s 3 .… 17.65 Mercantile Law Act 1935 s 6 .… 16.7, 16.8, 16.9, 16.20, 16.21, 16.30, 16.57 s 11 .… 11.80 s 12 .… 16.35 Minors Contracts Act 1988 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.37 s 4 .… 17.36 Professional Standards Act 2005 .… 11.146 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 3 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18 s 5(2) .… 11.66 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 9 .… 16.7, 16.77 s 9(1) .… 16.77 s 9(3) .… 16.82 s 11 .… 12.12

Supreme Court Rules 2000 r 184(1) .… 25.12 r 427(2A) .… 25.12 Wrongs Act 1954 s 2 .… 11.129, 23.30 s 4 .… 23.30

VICTORIA Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 29 .… 8.55 Age of Majority Act 1977 .… 17.2 s 2(1) .… 17.2 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 .… 17.73

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Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2011 s 223 .… 11.151

Frustrated Contracts Act 1959 .… 19.32, 19.34 s 3(2) .… 19.29, 19.34

Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 Ch 2 .… 11.102 Pt 3.2 .… 19.32, 19.33, 19.36 ss 16–18 .… 11.109 s 24(1) .… 11.68 s 24(2) .… 11.70 s 35(3) .… 19.36 s 36(1) .… 19.34 s 36(2) .… 19.34 s 37 .… 19.34 s 38 .… 19.35 s 38(3)(a) .… 19.35 s 38(3)(b) .… 19.35 s 41 .… 19.36

Goods Act 1958 Pt IV .… 3.31 s 3 .… 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18 s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17, 19.32 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 38(2) .… 21.15 s 55(1) .… 26.12 s 55(2) .… 26.12 s 56(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 57(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 58 .… 24.18 s 59(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 Sch .… 3.31

Building Act 1993 .… 16.55 s 134 .… 25.1, 25.5 s 134A .… 25.5 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2004 .… 5.6

House Contracts Guarantee Act 1987 s 19(1) .… 16.55

Companies Act 1938 .… 18.5 Crimes Act 1958 s 322A .… 8.7, 18.33 Crown Proceedings Act 1958 .… 5.27, 24.3 Crown Remedies and Liability Act 1890 s 20 .… 8.11 Domestic Building Contracts Act 1995 .… 16.55 s 9 .… 7.26 Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 7 .… 3.56 s 12A .… 3.53, 4.1 Fair Trading Act 1999 .… 11.118 Pt 2B .… 15.20 Pt 2C .… 19.32 Fair Trading Act 2012 s 24(1) .… 11.68

Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 s 52(1) .… 17.55 s 52(2) .… 17.55 s 52(3) .… 17.55

Instruments Act 1958 Pt VA .… 17.71 s 126 .… 11.118, 16.9, 16.21, 16.34, 16.39, 16.41, 16.42, 16.57, 16.66, 16.67 s 127 .… 16.41, 16.66 s 128 .… 11.80, 16.54 s 129 .… 16.35 Instruments Act 1958 s 126 .… 16.7 Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 44(1) .… 25.2 Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 .… 3.15 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 s 3(2) .… 25.7

clxxxii

Table of Statutes s 169 .… 17.63

s 3(2)–(3) .… 25.7 s 3(3) .… 25.7 s 5(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 5(1)(c) .… 25.10 s 5(2) .… 25.1 s 5(3) .… 25.1 s 5(8) .… 25.13 s 18 .… 25.11 s 20 .… 25.1 s 21(1)(b) .… 25.13 s 23 .… 25.7 s 23(2) .… 25.7 s 23A .… 25.7 s 24(3) .… 25.8 s 25 .… 25.8 s 26(5) .… 25.9 s 26(6) .… 25.9 s 27 .… 25.6 s 28(1) .… 25.10 s 28(2) .… 25.10 s 28(3) .… 25.10 s 28(5) .… 25.10 s 29 .… 25.10 s 34 .… 25.12

Retail Leases Act 2003 Pt 9 .… 15.14 Retail Tenancies Reform Act 1998 s 8(2) .… 16.55 Sale of Goods Act s 13 .… 6.8, 6.11 s 30 .… 3.42 s 36(4) .… 9.9 s 37 .… 9.5 s 64 .… 3.22 Sale of Goods Act 1958 s 55(1) .… 25.2 s 56(1) .… 25.2 s 57(1) .… 25.2 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 s 3 .… 16.29 s 8 .… 16.7 s 9 .… 16.7 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 s 44 .… 17.69

Marriage Act 1958 s 156 .… 17.65 s 157(2) .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1870 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1884 .… 17.60 Professional Standards Act 2003 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1958 s 18 .… 16.25 s 28B .… 17.31 s 41 .… 21.19 s 49 .… 17.31 s 53 .… 16.21 s 53(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 56(1) .… 7.25 s 73 .… 4.1 s 73A .… 4.1 s 74 .… 4.1 s 82 .… 3.14 s 134 .… 8.30, 8.42 s 144 .… 8.8

Supreme Court Act 1986 .… 23.33, 24.29 s 29(1) .… 22.4 s 49 .… 17.4, 17.30, 17.38 s 50 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.27 s 51 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.29 s 54 .… 26.13 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 36.01(6) .… 25.12 Wrongs Act 1958 .… 11.136 Pt IVAA .… 11.132 s 23B .… 11.145 ss 25–26 .… 23.30 s 28G .… 23.19 s 32 .… 8.7, 18.33

WESTERN AUSTRALIA Age of Majority Act 1972 .… 17.2 s 4(1) .… 17.2 Associations Incorporation Act 2015 .… 17.73 clxxxiii





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Builders Registration Act 1939 s 4 .… 16.55

s 25 .… 17.64

Civil Liability Act 2002 Pt 1F .… 11.132 s 4A .… 11.141 s 5AL(2) .… 11.140 s 9 .… 23.19 Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 Pt IIA, Div 1 .… 15.14 Crown Suits Act 1947 .… 5.27, 24.3 Electronic Transactions Act 2011 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 English Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 s 3 .… 16.35 Fair Trading Act 2010 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 13 .… 11.150 ss 28–29 .… 11.109 Family Court Act 1997 Pt 5A, Div 3 .… 5.6 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 s 77(1) .… 17.55 s 77(1)–(3) .… 17.55 s 82 .… 17.55

Limitation Act 2005 Pt 3, Div 1 .… 25.7 Pt 3, Div 2 .… 25.7 s 13 .… 25.1 s 18 .… 25.1 ss 20–22 .… 25.1 s 26 .… 25.1 s 27 .… 25.13 s 27(1)(b) .… 25.13 s 29 .… 25.10 s 30 .… 25.7 ss 30–31 .… 25.7 s 32 .… 25.7 s 33 .… 25.7 s 38 .… 25.6 s 41 .… 25.7 s 42 .… 25.7 s 47 .… 25.8 ss 48–49 .… 25.8 s 52 .… 25.7 s 54 .… 25.10 s 59 .… 25.3 s 63 .… 25.10 s 64 .… 25.10 s 75 .… 25.11 s 76 .… 25.11 s 88 .… 25.10 Limitation Act 2005 s 36 .… 25.7

Home Building Contracts Act 1991 s 25D .… 25.5

Local Government Act 1995 s 2.5(2) .… 17.68

Interpretation Act 1984 s 61(1) .… 25.2

Married Women’s Property Act 1892 .… 17.60

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 .… 8.55 s 3 .… 17.65 s 4 .… 8.55

Married Women’s Property Act 1895 .… 17.60

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 ss 3A–4 .… 23.30 Law Reform (Statute of Frauds) Act 1962 s 2(a) .… 16.7 s 2(b) .… 16.7 s 2(c) .… 16.7

Morley Shopping Centre Redevelopment Agreement Act 1992 Sch 6 .… 23.6 Professional Standards Act 1997 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1969 .… 7.25 Pt II .... 7.16 Pt VII, Div 2 .… 3.69 s 7 .… 16.25 s 9 .… 4.1

clxxxiv

Table of Statutes s 10(3) .… 17.71 s 11 .… 1.42, 7.16 s 11(1) .… 7.16, 7.25 s 11(1)(c) .... 8.21 s 11(2) .… 7.3, 7.16, 7.17, 7.25, 7.47 s 11(2)(b) .… 7.17 s 11(2)(c) .… 7.20 s 11(3) .… 7.9, 7.16, 7.18 s 11(3)(c) .… 8.53 s 12 .… 4.1, 7.15 s 20 .… 8.30 s 20(3) .… 8.26, 8.30, 8.31, 8.37 s 21 .… 21.19 s 31(1) .… 17.64 s 34 .… 16.21, 16.57 s 34(1) (c) .… 8.21 s 34(1)(a) .… 16.21 s 35 .… 16.57 s 36 .… 16.57 s 44 .… 3.14 s 52 .… 3.14 ss 124–125 .… 12.8 s 125(1) .… 26.5 s 131 .… 26.13 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 21 r 5(2) .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 2 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 2(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 4 .… 16.7, 16.77 s 4(1) .… 16.77 s 4(3) .… 16.82 s 6 .… 12.12 s 7 .… 19.17 s 8 .… 6.8 s 9 .… 6.11 s 10 .… 21.19 s 11(2) .… 21.18 s 30 .… 9.5 s 31(2) .… 21.15 s 35 .… 16.82 s 48(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 48(2) .… 26.12 s 49(1) .… 25.2 s 49(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 50(1) .… 25.2

s 50(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 51 .… 24.18 s 52(2) .… 23.8, 23.26 s 52(3) .… 23.8, 23.25, 23.26 s 57 .… 3.22 s 59(2) .… 11.66 s 60 .… 16.29, 21.18, 24.18 s 252(1) .… 3.42 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 Statute of Frauds 1677 s 4 .… 5.4 Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp) .… 16.9 s 4 .… 16.7, 16.21 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80 Supreme Court Act 1935 .… 23.33 s 25(10) .… 24.29 s 25(12) .… 22.4 Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 s 303 .… 8.5

IMPERIAL Imperial Act (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 5 .… 17.4, 17.25

INTERNATIONAL Principles of European Contract Law 1998 .… 10.44 Art 1.201 .… 10.43 Art 6.111 .… 19.6, 19.7 Art 8.108 .… 19.2 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 .… 3.55 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 .… 18.34 Art 8 .… 18.34 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 Art 1.7 .… 10.43 Art 6.2.2 .… 19.7, 19.12 clxxxv





Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 – cont’d Art 7.1.7 .… 19.2, 19.12 Arts 6.2.1–3 .… 19.6

Judicature Act 1873 .… 8.4, 8.29, 8.31, 24.29 s 25(6) .… 8.26 Law of Property Act 1925 .… 7.25 s 56(1) .… 7.16 s 136 .… 8.30 s 196 .… 3.61

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Art 19 .… 3.31 Art 19(3) .… 3.31 s 7(1) .… 10.43

Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2(1) .… 16.5 s 2(8) .… 16.5, 16.56

CHINA Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999 Art 6 .… 10.43

Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 .… 19.32, 19.36 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 .… 16.77

FRANCE

Limitation Act 1980 s 6 .… 25.3

Civil Code .… 27.20, 27.24 Art 1101 .… 4.1

Lord Cairns’ Act .… 16.24, 16.66, 23.30, 24.1, 24.19, 24.29, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32

NEW ZEALAND

Lord Tenterden’s Act .… 11.80, 17.25, 17.26, 17.28

Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 s 35 .… 23.8 s 50 .… 10.7

Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 .… 17.52 Misrepresentation Act 1967 .… 11.70, 11.72 s 2(1) .… 11.80 s 3 .… 11.73

Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 .… 7.15 Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 s 8 .… 12.56

Property Law Act 1925 s 40 .… 16.5

Fair Trading Act 1986 .… 11.118 s 9 .… 11.102

Road Traffic Act 1960 s 151 .… 4.14

Public Works Act 1882 .… 16.71

Sale of Goods Act of 1893 .… 27.26

UNITED KINGDOM

Settled Land Act 1925 .… 16.70

Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018 .… 8.8

Statute of Frauds (29 Car 2 c 3) 1677 .… 1.93, 6.6, 16.1, 16.2, 16.19, 16.21, 16.23, 16.28, 16.29, 16.33, 16.36, 16.42, 16.46, 16.54, 16.67, 16.72, 16.77, 16.82, 24.7, 24.11, 27.18 ss 1–3 .… 16.3 s 4 .… 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.8, 16.26, 16.47, 16.55, 16.57, 16.81, 16.86, 16.87 s 5 .… 16.4 ss 5–9 .… 16.3 s 6 .… 16.4 s 17 .… 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.26, 16.77, 16.86, 16.87

Consumer Rights Act 2015 .… 15.20 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 .… 7.15, 7.17 Evidence Act 1851 .… 16.48 Hire Purchase Act 1964 s 27 .… 12.60 Infants Relief Act 1874 .… 17.4, 17.18, 17.36 s 1 .… 17.27 s 2 .… 17.27

clxxxvi

Table of Statutes Statute of Gloucester 1278 .… 27.5

s 1-203 .… 10.43 s 2 .… 10.21 s 22(2) .… 3.6 s 45 .… 3.71 s 87 .… 3.67 s 87(2) .… 3.67 s 90 .… 2.8 s 90(1) .… 2.5, 2.8 s 205 .… 10.43, 10.44

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 11(1) .… 11.73 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 .… 15.20 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 .… 15.20

UNITED STATES AMERICA Restatement (Second) on Contracts s 322(2) .… 8.8 s 328 .… 8.53 Uniform Commercial Code Art 9-318(4) .… 8.8 s 2-210 .… 8.53

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Federal Trade Commission Act s 5 .… 11.107 Restatement (Second) on Contracts .… 10.43

Statute of Frauds .… 3.52 Uniform Commercial Code .… 4.35 s 1-102(3) .… 10.45 s 1-206 .… 3.52 s 2-201 .… 3.52 s 2-204(1) .… 3.7 s 2-205 .… 3.67 s 2-206(1)(b) .… 3.27 s 2-207 .… 3.31, 3.32 s 2-209(1) .… 4.35 s 2-302 .… 15.4, 15.16 s 8-319 .… 3.52 s 9-203 .… 3.52

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PART I Overview of the Law of Contract

Chapter 1

Overview of Contract Law Introduction 1.1  Use of this chapter. This chapter is intended for use by: • • • •

legal professionals in need of a short account of modern Australian contract law; non-legal professionals involved in making, drafting, administering or performing contracts; students; and contracting parties.

It contains an up-to-date overview of the most important principles of contract law. Knowledge of at least the basic principles is indispensable for dealing with any problem that concerns the enforcement of a contract. However, a person faced with a practical problem cannot be expected to read a treatise on contract law from cover to cover. In this chapter, therefore, contract law is presented in summary form. Sufficient information is provided to enable the reader to approach any contract problem systematically, and to identify the legal issues raised by it and the relevant rules. References to more detailed discussion in other parts of the book are included throughout. 1.2  The key issues: liability and remedy. A person engaging with the law of contract for a practical reason needs, above all, to know whether a particular course of events has exposed, or will expose, a particular party to legal liability. It is then necessary to consider whether that liability generates a useful remedy. Whatever the context of inquiry — negotiation, drafting, interpretation, administration, performance, breach, termination — these are the key issues. Even if no dispute has as yet arisen, the issue is still how to avoid, or anticipate, prepare or plan for, potential claims of liability and potential remedies. Contract law can readily be described from this perspective. It provides the rules that determine when one party is liable to another, and the consequences of that liability, under or in connection with a contract. The rules define the elements of a successful claim of liability and remedy. At the same time, they may provide defences against such a claim. Contracts are about getting things done. A court’s job is, in the event of a dispute, to give effect, so far as possible, to the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. Ascertaining intention is a fundamental exercise that arises at various stages of the contract inquiry. Courts adopt the technique of the objective test, namely, they ascertain intention by reference to a hypothetical reasonable observer: what would

3

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1.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

a reasonable person conclude the parties intended? This is in contrast to a subjective test, which would involve asking the parties what they intended.1 1.3  Contractual and non-contractual liability. Breach of contract is not the only potential source of liability in connection with a contractual transaction. Legal liability may arise from statements or other conduct of the parties to a transaction, even if no contract was made, or no liability for breach can be established. Such liability may be in addition, or in the alternative, to contractual liability. Some of these principles may render a contract vulnerable to cancellation. A comprehensive account of contract law must therefore include some consideration of non-contractual sources of liability. In particular, a transaction involving an actual or putative contract may: •

• • • • • •

involve misleading or unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce, and therefore lead to liability and remedies under the Australian Consumer Law; involve negligence or deceit (fraud), and therefore lead to liability in tort; result in the unjust enrichment of a party, and therefore lead to liability in restitution; result in the creation of a debt; result in the creation of property rights; involve a fiduciary relationship, and therefore lead to liability for breach of fiduciary obligation; and/or generate other equitable rights (including property rights) that are enforceable independently of any contract, usually through the doctrine of estoppel.

Non-contractual sources of liability are identified at several points in this chapter and considered at appropriate points throughout this book.2 1.4  Australian Contract Code. In 1992 the Law Reform Commission of Victoria published its Discussion Paper No 27, An Australian Contract Code.3 The paper contained, in addition to the text of a proposed code, a discussion of the advantages of codification, a commentary on the code and examples of its application. In 2012 the Commonwealth Attorney-General initiated a project to codify the law of contract in Australia.4 A draft Australian Law of Contract was submitted as a report to the Attorney-General in 2014.5 This draft sought to codify and simplify the Australian judge-made law with one legislative statement. At the same time, the draft text harmonised the law of contract with various international precedents and included reforms aimed at modernising the law. The proposal was controversial.6 This initiative has stalled. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

In very limited circumstances a subjective test is applied. Examples are where a contract is rectified or non est factum is pleaded: see 1.89. Restitution and debt are separately dealt with in Chapter 26. Ellinghaus and Wright, An Australian Contract Code (Law Reform Commission of Victoria, 1992). Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012). Wright, Ellinghaus and Kelly, A Draft Australian Law of Contract (2014). Available at SSRN: . See, for example, Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36(1) Syd LR 131; compare Nottage, ‘The Government’s Proposed Review of Australia’s Contract

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Overview of Contract Law

1.6

Elements of Liability for Breach of Contract 1.5  Traditional elements of liability for breach of contract. To succeed in a claim of liability for breach of contract against another party, the claimant must first of all show that a contract was made with that party. Whether a contract has been made depends on the rules of contract formation.7 In addition, a contract may have been made but is vulnerable to cancellation because of defective negotiations, for example, it was induced by misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable dealing. Next, the claimant must show that a breach has occurred. Whether a contract has been breached depends on rules defining what conduct amounts to breach, and on rules governing the determination of the content of contracts (the rules relating to the identification and construction of contractual terms).8 A claimant who can show that a contract was made with another party and that it was breached by that party may not yet have established liability. If the other party can show that he or she is excused from the obligation to perform the contract there is no liability for not performing it.9 The law recognises a variety of excuses based on invalidating or vitiating factors affecting the negotiation and formation of the contract.10 Contractual clauses may also provide an excuse or defence to breach or its consequences: exclusion clauses.11 Even if a contract was validly formed, there may be no liability because the contract was terminated before any breach occurred. The law recognises a number of ways in which a contract can be brought to an end by the act of a party, or by the course of events.12 What follows from the establishment of liability is that the claimant must then make out an entitlement to a remedy. The remedies most often claimed for breach of contract are money compensation (damages) or, less commonly, orders compelling performance of the contract (specific performance, injunction). The law provides rules governing the operation of these remedies that can cause an otherwise valid claim for breach of contract to fail at this last obstacle.13 1.6  Overriding obligations of conscience and good faith. ‘Unconscionability’ has been adopted by Australian courts and legislatures as an overriding source of the creation, as well as negation, of rights as between contracting parties.14 This means that in some cases: Law: An Interim Positive Response’ in Keyes and Wilson (eds), Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives (2014), ch 7; Tettenborn, ‘Codifying Contracts — An Idea Whose Time has Come?’ (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 273; Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and “Certainty”’ (2018) 35 JCL 146. 7. See 1.15–1.48. See breach and construction: 1.49–1.77. 8. 9. In such a case it may be said either that no breach occurred since performance was excused, or that a breach occurred but was excused. 10. See excuses: 1.78–1.104. 11. See terms limiting liability: 10.62–10.67. 12. See termination of contracts: 1.105–1.127. 13. See remedies: 1.128–1.144. 14. See 1.8–1.14. This includes parties to contract negotiations as well as parties to a concluded contract.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.6

•

a party may not be liable for a breach of contract even if all formal elements of liability are present — because it is unconscionable to assert liability; or a party may be liable for breach of contract even if a formal element of liability is missing — because it is unconscionable to deny liability.

•

Because of the overriding role of unconscionability in contract law, it is dealt with at the head of the summary of contract law that follows. Australian courts have also recognised that a duty of good faith and fair dealing may be implied in many contracts, although good faith has not yet been unequivocally recognised as a mandatory obligation imposed on the parties to a contract transaction, as it has been in most of the world’s major jurisdictions. Breach of good faith may overlap with unconscionable conduct, so that the need for a separate good faith standard has been questioned.15 1.7  Checklist of elements of liability and remedy for breach of contract. In summary, a claim of liability for breach of contract with another party will succeed if: 1. a contract was made with that party; and 2. that party has breached the contract as correctly construed; and 3. performance is not excused by an exempting provision or invalidating or vitiating factor; and 4. the contract was not terminated before the breach; and 5. a remedy is available; and 6. it is not unconscionable to make the claim. Conversely, a claim of liability for breach of contract will not succeed if: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

no contract was formed; or a contract was formed but it was vitiated by defective negotiation; or no breach of the contract as correctly construed occurred; or performance is excused; or the contract was terminated before the breach; or a remedy is not available; or it is unconscionable to make the claim.

Unconscionability 1.8  Judicial and statutory applications. Both courts and legislatures have applied conscience as a criterion of liability. They have done so by utilising the negative forms ‘unconscionable’ and ‘unconscionability’. The courts have not formally adopted a general principle prohibiting the unconscionable assertion of a right or denial of an obligation, but have identified specific categories of unconscionability, whose separately defined parameters must normally be satisfied before relief can be claimed on the basis of unconscionability. Because unconscionability can apply

15.

See further 1.69.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.10

in a variety of contractual circumstances, it has no single, unvarying meaning but, instead, is determined by the particular context. Under both judge-made law and legislation, unconscionability can create as well as excuse liability in relation to a contract.

Judge-made law 1.9  Creating or precluding rights of enforcement: estoppel. A party can be prevented or ‘estopped’ from denying or departing from an assumption, whether of fact, law or a future state of affairs, made by another party if this would be unconscionable in the circumstances. It will normally be unconscionable for A to depart from an assumption made by B if A induced or shared the assumption, it was reasonable for B to make it, and B reasonably relied on it in some material way so that departure from it would be detrimental to B. Unconscionability and detriment are closely linked: it is unconscionable for A to act contrary to the assumption because B has detrimentally relied on it. This means that, for example, a party who induces or shares an assumption that a contract has been or will be made may be liable even if no contract was actually made, although remedies for breach of contract, for example, damages for the full value of the lost performance, or orders compelling performance, may not be awarded if a lesser remedy is appropriate to the case (the ‘minimum equity’ approach).16 Estoppel is not limited to assumptions about the formation of a contract. Any legally significant assumption relating to the operation or enforcement of a contract has the potential to generate an estoppel if it would be unconscionable for the other party to depart from it.17 Hence, a party may be estopped from, for example: • • • •

asserting a particular construction of a contract;18 relying on a particular right under a contract; relying on a particular excuse, such as lack of writing;19 or asserting the termination of a contract as a result of frustration,20 failure of condition21 or breach.22

1.10  Denying rights of enforcement: unconscionable conduct in negotiation; unconscionable exercise of rights. The law excuses a party from performance of a contract where it would be unconscionable to enforce the contract because of unjust factors affecting its negotiation. This principle is applied by reference to established categories of unconscionable conduct. Thus, equity23 excuses a party from performance of a contract if in making it the other party engaged in unconscionable 16. See 2.9. 17. Estoppel can ‘override’ many contract rules and doctrines. See 2.19–2.32. 18. See 10.3. 19. See 16.67. 20. See 19.24. 21. See 20.15. 22. See 21.32. 23. The words ‘common law’ and ‘equity’ refer originally to the different rules applied by different courts in England (several ‘common law’ courts on the one hand, the Court of Chancery on the other). The separate jurisdictions of common law and equity have long been amalgamated by legislation. Contract law contains rules originating in both. In case of conflict, the rules of equity prevail.

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1.10

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

dealing. Unconscionable dealing is defined as taking unfair advantage of a disability seriously affecting the other party’s pre-contractual decision-making, including drunkenness, emotional dependence, poverty, illiteracy, lack of education, lack of information and (in some circumstances) lack of independent advice.24 The law also excuses a party if a contract was affected by misrepresentation, mistake, duress or undue influence, usually occurring during the negotiation period. All these can be regarded as constituting the established categories of unconscionable conduct vitiating a contract otherwise legally formed.25 The law also recognises an overriding equitable principle that precludes the unconscionable exercise of rights and powers conferred by a contract, such as a right to terminate a contract,26 or a right to liquidated damages.27 As in the case of excuses from performance based on unconscionability, the principle is not applied directly, but rather via mediating categories or doctrines. Thus, the exercise of a right to terminate for breach may be unconscionable because of fraud, mistake, accident or surprise,28 or estoppel.29

Statutory unconscionability 1.11  Unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce. The Australian Consumer Law30 confers power on the courts to order relief against actual or potential loss resulting from unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce.31 Section 20 prohibits unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce under the judge-made law. Section 21 deals with unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services in trade or commerce. ‘Unconscionable conduct’ is not defined in the Australian Consumer Law. Section 20 has been interpreted to refer to forms of unconscionable conduct recognised by the courts. Section 22 lists matters to which the court may (but not must) have regard in determining whether such conduct has occurred in contravention of s 21, including inequality of bargaining position, unreasonable conditions, lack of understanding, unfair tactics, and prices and terms offered by other suppliers. It is clear by virtue of the interpretive principles in s 21(4) that unconscionable conduct under s 21 has a wider ambit than under the judge-made law. 1.12  Statutory excuse from liability under a contract: unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms and unjust contracts. Sections 20 and 21 do not specifically refer to contracts as such; rather, they prohibit unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce. But a link to contracts is made in the remedial provisions of the Law. Under s 236, an order for damages may be made. Under s 237(1), a party who has Unconscionable dealing is discussed in 15.3–15.12. For mistake, see Chapter 12; duress, Chapter 13; and undue influence, Chapter 14. 25. Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102 at 111; 130 ALR 570 at 575–6; [1995] HCA 14 at [21]. 26. See 21.35. 27. See 23.45. 28. See 21.35. 29. See 21.32. 30. Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). See 15.14–15.19. 31. Unconscionable conduct in the supply of financial services is separately covered by mirror provisions in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). These provisions are fully discussed in 15.14–15.19. 24.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.14

suffered, or is likely to suffer, ‘loss or damage’ by unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce may apply to the court for orders that will compensate for or prevent that loss or damage. Under s 243, the court is expressly given wide powers to make orders in relation to contracts. It may, among other things: • • •

declare the whole or any part of a contract void; vary a contract; and/or refuse to enforce any or all provisions of a contract.

As a result of these provisions, a contracting party may be partly or wholly excused by the court from performance. The Australian Consumer Law also deals with unfair contract terms in standardform contracts supplying to consumers and supplying to or purchasing from small businesses.32 It is possible for a court to declare that a contract term is void. In New South Wales, the Contracts Review Act 1980 performs a similar function in respect of unjust contracts.33 The Act is restricted to non-business transactions, though in its actual application the courts have sometimes overcome this limitation. 1.13  Statutory creation of liability under a contract. Under s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law, damages may be claimed for loss caused by a contravention of the unconscionability sections. Under ss 237 and 243, the court is not limited to excusing performance of a contract. It may make orders, among other orders, directing a person who engaged in unconscionable conduct: • • •

to pay the amount of loss or damage suffered by the applicant; to repair goods or provide parts; and/or to supply specified services,

or such other orders as the court thinks appropriate. Under these provisions a court may thus impose obligations of performance on a contracting party or award other relief where a contracting party engages in unconscionable conduct. 1.14  Unconscionability as a general restriction on assertion of rights and denial of obligations. The variety of contexts in which unconscionability plays a role in determining the existence, validity and enforcement of rights and obligations as between contracting parties means that it must always be taken into account in assessing their legal position. In effect, unconscionability functions as a general restriction on the assertion or denial of such rights and obligations. Anyone considering a claim for breach of contract is therefore well advised to consider whether the claim is for any reason offensive to conscience in the circumstances, notwithstanding that the other party’s liability can be formally established. This also applies to denials of liability in response to such claims.

32. Part 2-3. See 15.20–15.25. 33. See 15.26–15.31.

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1.15

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Formation of Contracts 1.15  Estoppel. As explained in 1.9, a party may be estopped from denying liability under a contract even if, by the rules of formation, no contract has in fact been made. If A has led B reasonably to assume that a contract has been or will be made, and B had relied on that assumption to his or her detriment, A may be estopped from departing from the assumption. Broadly speaking, in such a case the court treats the parties as if they had made a contract. However, the court is not in general limited to this option, but may give whatever remedy is appropriate in the circumstances to enforce the assumption. In this way the modern law has provided a safety net for situations that, judged strictly by the rules of formation, would be classified as pre-contractual. The availability of estoppel in pre-contractual situations does not make the rules of formation of contracts redundant. If no contract came into existence, the court may be reluctant to impose obligations of a ‘contractual’ character by way of estoppel. This will particularly be so where the parties are ‘commercial enterprises, well-resourced and advised, dealing in a commercial transaction’.34 Nevertheless, modern courts have constructed a powerful doctrine of estoppel that possesses both common law and equitable components, and which applies equally to assumptions about present and future, fact or law.35 Conduct falling short of the formation of a contract may also generate statutory liability if it involves misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.36 Potential liability under this legislation must always be considered when contractual negotiations are in issue. 1.16  Making a contract. The major elements of formation of a contract are usually identified as the following: • • • •

agreement (offer and acceptance);37 consideration;38 intention to create legal relations;39 and certainty of terms.40

Agreement may be inferred from conduct as an alternative to the offer-andacceptance analysis: see 1.24. Agreement and giving consideration together constitute a process that, to make a contract, requires: • • •

at least two parties; a promise or undertaking by at least one of them; and an exchange between them, either promise-for-promise (bilateral contract) or promise-for-act (unilateral contract).

34. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 585 (Kirby P). 35. Its operation is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 36. See 11.102–11.153. 37. See Chapter 3. 38. See Chapter 4. 39. See Chapter 5. 40. See Chapter 6. A contract does not usually have to be in writing to be valid. In some classes of contracts, however, legislation requires written evidence, although even here an unwritten contract may be enforceable if it has been partly performed. The absence of writing where required does not, technically speaking, prevent the formation of a contract, but rather prevents its enforcement, and the topic is therefore dealt with under excuses: see 1.92–1.96.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.16

Exchange. There can be no offer, acceptance or consideration unless the parties’ agreement effects an exchange. According to a classic formula, ‘the relation of a quid pro quo must subsist between’ the promises of each party (in a bilateral contract) or the promise of the one and the act of the other (in a unilateral contract).41 In short, the party seeking to enforce a contractual undertaking must show that she or he ‘paid’ a specified ‘legal price’ (gave requested consideration) in return for that undertaking. The requirement of exchange means that a third party not involved in the exchange cannot enforce the contract (see Privity of contract below). Offer.42 To show that a party made an offer it is necessary to identify an express or implied promise by that party to perform a specified act in exchange for another party’s: • •

specified counter-promise; or specified act.

Acceptance of an offer occurs when an offeree makes the specified counterpromise43 (bilateral contract) or performs the specified act (unilateral contract) in response to the offer.44 Consideration. In a bilateral contract, each promise is the consideration for the other promise. In a unilateral contract, the promise is the consideration for the requested act, and the requested act is the consideration for the promise. But neither a promise nor a requested act is consideration in the legal sense (‘good consideration’) unless it has some value, at least according to the idiosyncratic rules of the law on this topic. If a promise or act has no value in the eye of the law, it is not good consideration, even if it is the promise or act specified by the other party as consideration. A promisor who requires a counter-promise or act of no value from the promisee is making a conditional gift, not a contract.45 Intention to create legal relations need not be present subjectively. In the law of contracts, intention or intentional states are usually established objectively, that is, a party will be held to that intention which would be reasonably inferred in the circumstances.46 Certainty and completeness is required, but only in relation to essential terms. The court has wide powers to imply terms and to fix meaning.47 Privity of contract. A contract can be enforced only by the parties against each other. A contract between A and B cannot be enforced by X, even if X is intended to gain a benefit from its performance. Conversely, a contract between A and B cannot be enforced against X, even if it purports to make X liable. This is the doctrine of ‘privity of contract’, that is, only the parties to a contract are bound by it and can benefit from it.48 41.

Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 at 456–7; [1954] HCA 20 at [31]–[32]. See 1.17. 42. See 1.18–1.20. 43. This may simply be agreeing to the offer. 44. See 1.21–1.25. 45. Gift promises are enforceable in some cases, but failure to perform such a promise is not a breach of contract. See 1.26–1.30. 46. See 1.31–1.37. 47. See 1.38. 48. See 1.39–1.48.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.17

Agreement 1.17  No offer or acceptance without exchange. There can be neither an offer nor an acceptance unless the parties intend to effect an exchange. A promise qualifies as an offer only if it proposes an exchange. A promise or performance qualifies as an acceptance only if it is given in response to that proposal: if given coincidentally, or inadvertently, it cannot be an acceptance. (Nor can it be good consideration.)49 In practice, this requirement poses a problem only where a unilateral contract is in issue. Where a bilateral contract is alleged, the necessary reciprocity of the promise and counter-promise will usually be self-evident. But where a unilateral contract is alleged, that is, where the contract is said to consist of an exchange of a promise for an actual performance, the presence of the element of exchange may need to be positively established. An example is a promise of a reward for the return of a lost dog. The promise will be an offer in such cases if it can be shown that it was held out to the offeree as a ‘quid pro quo’ for returning the dog. The specified act amounts to acceptance only if it is given in response to the offer. If the act specified by the offer is performed in ignorance of it, or without advertence to it, it cannot constitute an acceptance. For example, a person who returns a dog in ignorance of a reward offer cannot claim the reward. 1.18  Offer. An offer is a promise to give a specified performance in exchange for another’s specified promise or performance. An offer may be made by words or conduct. It may be addressed to a specified individual or entity, or to a group, or to the world at large. There is no offer unless there is a promise: a proposed assumption of legal contractual obligation immediately upon acceptance by the party or parties to whom the offer is addressed. Hence, an offer must be distinguished from a mere statement of intention or other non-promissory conduct. 1.19  An invitation to treat is not an offer. The law distinguishes between offers and statements or conduct merely signifying a willingness to receive an offer. Such conduct is called an ‘invitation to treat’.50 The distinction is between conduct intended to initiate or facilitate negotiations, and conduct indicating a readiness to be bound upon acceptance.51 The circumstances must be considered in each case, but some generalisations are possible, for example: •

Price lists, quotations, advertisements and shop displays. These are generally not offers but invitations to treat.52

49. See 1.27. 50. See 3.18. 51. Although an invitation to treat cannot be ‘accepted’ so as to form a contract, it may give rise to liability under the Australian Consumer Law. For example, an advertisement that is only an invitation to treat may nevertheless attract statutory liability if it involves ‘misleading or deceptive conduct’ or ‘bait advertising’. 52. See 3.19–3.20. An advertisement that is not an offer may nevertheless generate statutory liability if it is misleading or deceptive under the Australian Consumer Law s 18. ‘Bait advertising’ is specifically proscribed by the Australian Consumer Law s 35.

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Overview of Contract Law

• •

•

•

1.20

Reward offers. These have been treated as contractual offers.53 Auctions. An advertisement of an auction is generally an invitation to treat and not an offer to hold it. Similarly, the auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer; rather, each bid is an offer that may be accepted or rejected by the auctioneer on the seller’s or buyer’s behalf.54 Tenders. A call for tenders is usually not an offer, but an invitation to treat. Rather, it is the tender that, if it contains the required promissory element, is the offer, and which may therefore be accepted or rejected by the caller of the tender.55 Standing offers. An arrangement to supply goods or services if and when required is usually regarded as a standing offer by the supplier that is separately accepted on each occasion on which the offeree places an order. On this basis the offer may be withdrawn at any time before an order is placed.56

1.20  Termination of offers. An offer does not remain open forever. It may be withdrawn before acceptance.57 If stated to be open for a specified period, it expires accordingly.58 If not expressly limited in duration, it expires at the end of what is a reasonable time in the circumstances.59 It expires on rejection by the offeree.60 It may expire on the death of the offeror or of the offeree.61 The traditional rule is that an offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. This applies even if the offeror has promised to keep the offer open for a stated period, unless the promise is recorded in a deed,62 or is given for good consideration and intended to have contractual force (called an option).63 However, the traditional rule that a non-contractual promise to keep an offer open is not binding must be reconsidered in the light of the modern doctrine of estoppel. An offeror who leads the offeree reasonably to assume that an offer will not be withdrawn for a given period may be compelled to comply with that assumption, if it would be unconscionable64 not to do so.65 The revocation of an offer is not effective until it has been communicated to the offeree.66 53. See 3.16, 3.40. 54. See 3.22–3.25, 3.35. 55. See 3.36–3.39. 56. See 3.38. 57. See 3.64, 3.71. 58. See 3.72. 59. See 3.72. 60. See 3.29–3.32. 61. See 3.73–3.74. 62. See 1.26. 63. See 3.67–3.70. 64. The withdrawal of an offer in such circumstances may also attract liability for misleading or unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. 65. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 66. See 3.65–3.66.

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1.20

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

However, an offer may become irrevocable once the offeree embarks on a course of conduct intended to culminate in its acceptance. Where the offer is to be accepted by the giving of a counter-promise (bilateral contract), or by the performance of a simple act (such as payment in cash, or execution of a document), no such issue will arise. But if the offer is to be accepted by acts of performance extending over time, the power to withdraw it may be lost or curtailed once the offeree embarks on that performance.67 1.21  Acceptance. An acceptance occurs when a party to whom the offer is addressed responds to it, by making the required counter-promise or by providing the performance specified in the offer, before it has expired.68 Where an exchange of promises is intended, a definite indication of assent to the offer amounts to an acceptance by counter-promise. If the offeree’s conduct indicates that the offer has been accepted, an express counter-promise is inferred.69 1.22  Communication of acceptance. Where the offer proposes a unilateral contract, that is, an acceptance by an actual performance rather than a counterpromise, it is usually inferred that no notice of acceptance need be given. Where the offer proposes a bilateral contract, that is, an exchange of promises, communication of acceptance is necessary unless it has been clearly dispensed with.70 In the absence of an indication to the contrary, the offeror will be taken to have promised to assume an obligation only upon being informed of an acceptance. A decision to accept an offer, even if communicated to third parties, is therefore normally not translated into an acceptance until its communication to the offeror. However, as noted, notice of acceptance may be dispensed with expressly or by inference. In such cases the contract is concluded by appropriate action on the part of the offeree, without communication. There is no absolute rule that silence cannot constitute acceptance. It is clear that the offeror cannot impose a contract on the offeree by stating that a failure to respond will amount to an acceptance. But the silence of the offeree in conjunction with other circumstances may indicate that the offer has been accepted.71 According to the only explicit statement in the High Court on the point, an acceptance by post is concluded only upon receipt of the letter, unless the offer or circumstances indicated otherwise.72 However, other Australian courts have approved the English rule that acceptance is normally effective on posting.73 But in the case of instantaneous modes of communication such as telegrams, telexes, facsimile transmissions, electronic communications and even telephone conversations, acceptance is normally effective only upon receipt.74 67. See 3.71. 68. See 3.26. 69. See 3.27. 70. See 3.43–3.45. 71. See 3.44. It should be noted, however, that ‘inertia selling’ (the practice of sending unordered goods to a person on terms that they will be taken to have been bought unless returned within a specified time) is an offence under consumer protection legislation, and may entitle the recipient to keep the goods without payment: Australian Consumer Law Pt 3-1 Div 2. 72. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Vic) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111–12; [1957] HCA 10 at [20] (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J). 73. See 3.58–3.62. 74. See 3.47–3.57.

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Overview of Contract Law

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The use of electronic communications and the internet has been accommodated by the law of contract, assisted by electronic transactions legislation in each jurisdiction.75 1.23  The acceptance must conform to the offer. No acceptance occurs if the offeree, though purporting to accept, proposes terms additional to or different from those of the offer. The offeree is in such a case taken to have rejected the offer, and to have made a counter-offer.76 However, a mere request for further information, conveying no rejection or counter-proposal, must be distinguished from a counter-offer. Moreover, where an acceptance was clearly intended, the courts have shown some latitude in reconciling it with the offer. Thus, an inaccurate paraphrase of an offer does not amount to a counter-offer if there was a clear intention to be bound by its actual terms. If the offeror has stipulated a particular method or manner of acceptance, it must be adhered to. But the stipulation must be unequivocal. In the absence of mandatory language, the offeror’s reference to a particular method of acceptance may be treated as a statement of preference or recommendation only.77 1.24  Offer and acceptance may be inferred. In some cases the analysis of a transaction in terms of offer and acceptance is artificial. It has been rightly recognised that such an analysis is ‘not a comprehensive means of determining the existence of a concluded contract’.78 The court may therefore dispense with a formal demonstration of these elements. Adopting a ‘global’ approach, it will infer their presence if it is clear that the parties intended by their conduct to make a contract.79 Some problem situations include the following: Execution of documents. In the case of a contract to be concluded by parties executing a single document, the first signature must be regarded as the offer, the second as the acceptance. Exchange of documents. In transactions that are customarily concluded by an exchange of documents (for example, land transactions), the presumption (which may be rebutted) is that no contract is formed until the exchange occurs. Which party is the offeror and which the offeree, or at what precise point the exchange is effected, must depend on the circumstances.80 The law recognises a notional exchange, that is, where solicitors agree that exchange has occurred (for example, by email or telephone) even though no physical exchange has happened.81 Tickets. The formation of contracts involving the issue of a ticket or similar document containing terms has been variously analysed. The issue of a ticket may be an offer that is accepted by not rejecting the ticket in reasonable time. Whether

75. See 3.7, 3.48–3.57. 76. See 3.29–3.33. 77. See 3.46. 78. Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 195 (Ormiston J). 79. See 3.4, 3.5–3.7, 3.11. 80. See 3.10. 81. See 3.57.

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this analysis applies to tickets issued by vending machines is uncertain, at least where there is no opportunity to reject the ticket.82 Lengthy negotiations. It will often be difficult to identify offer and acceptance where the parties’ negotiations are lengthy, complex or ill-defined. While some decisions insist on identifying the precise moment at which an offer was made and an acceptance given, it may suffice to say that agreement has occurred at some time, that is, it can be inferred from the conduct of the parties.83 1.25  Impact of estoppel on offer and acceptance. The doctrine of estoppel may preclude a party who has induced another to assume that an offer was made, or that an acceptance was given, from departing from that assumption where it would be unconscionable to do so.84

Consideration 1.26  Good consideration.85 A contract is formed only if the promise or act of each party constitutes good consideration. To constitute good consideration, the promise or act relied on must be given in exchange for the other party’s promise or act, and must have ‘value’ in the eyes of the law.86 Consideration is not required for a promise recorded in a deed, that is, a formal document ‘signed, sealed and delivered’.87 1.27  Consideration requires exchange. As with offer and acceptance, consideration requires exchange. A promise or act cannot be good consideration unless given in exchange for the promise or act of the other party.88 This means that a past promise or act cannot be good consideration:89 ‘past consideration is no consideration’.90 So a promise to pay for goods or services made after they have been supplied lacks consideration and cannot be enforced as a contractual promise. However, this narrow view of exchange rests on old authority, and has long been subject to evasion. So a promise to pay for past services or goods already delivered can be interpreted91 as proof of an earlier implied promise to pay, or as enforceable on some other basis.92 1.28  Gift promises. An unconditional promise to make a gift (‘I will give you $1000 tomorrow’) is a promise not made in exchange for anything. Such a promise is not enforceable as a contract,93 unless it is recorded in a deed.94

82. See 3.4. 83. See 3.6, 3.11. 84. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 85. Consideration is discussed in Chapter 4. 86. See 1.27, 1.29. 87. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 88. See 4.5, 4.6. 89. See 4.19. 90. There is an exception to this rule: past consideration is sufficient to support a bill of exchange: Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 32. 91. The law of restitution may also apply to such situations: see Chapter 25. 92. See 4.20–4.23. 93. See 4.2. 94. Gift promises may be enforceable in equity in some circumstances.

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Overview of Contract Law

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However, if the promise is conditional, for example, ‘I will give you $1000 if you come to Sydney’, the possibility that an exchange is intended arises, especially if fulfilment of the condition will benefit the promisor. If an exchange is intended, fulfilment of the condition in such a case supplies consideration for the promise, so that a contract is made if the other elements of formation are present. It is sometimes not easy to distinguish a conditional gift promise from an exchange. If a promise is made with the intention of giving a present or doing a favour, or by way of grace or charity, the fact that it is conditional does not make it contractual. So a promise to make a donation is not contractual just because it is conditional on being applied to a particular project or purpose but this would depend on whether the condition amounts to a benefit to the promisor.95 1.29  Consideration must be of value. The promise or performance given in exchange must have a value recognised by the law in order to amount to consideration.96 But although consideration must be of value, it need not be of equivalent value. The puzzling formula ‘consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate’ is intended to convey this point.97 It is generally said that the parties to a contract are free to make their own bargain, that is, to decide what value shall be attached to the undertaking of each. A promise or performance may therefore be a valid consideration even if it is objectively inadequate when compared with the counter-promise or counter-performance. A nominal consideration, such as a token payment of $1, will suffice if the parties clearly attached binding force to it (as in the case of an option for a nominal payment). Many examples exist of cases in which the court has ignored an obvious lack of, or disparity in, objective value of the parties’ respective undertakings.98 The notorious peppercorn concept captures this idea: the promise of a peppercorn is regarded as a good consideration. On the other hand, it has been held that consideration is lacking if a promise or performance has no objective value in the eyes of the law. Examples are: 1. an illusory promise;99 2. an invalid promise, such as one that is illegal; 3. a promise to perform, or the performance of, an already extant obligation.100 But this is subject to the qualification that such a promise or performance may be good consideration where it is of ‘practical benefit’ to the promisor;101 4. a promise to pay, or payment of, a lesser sum than is owed;102 and 5. a promise to forbear, or forbearance, from pursuing a claim or action that has no substance. However, the law recognises that the settlement of disputes without resort to litigation is of great practical importance, 95. See 4.13. 96. See 4.9–4.12. 97. See 4.10–4.12. 98. See 4.12. 99. See 1.36. 100. See 4.29–4.35. 101. See 4.35. 102. See 4.36–4.41.

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and usually recognises the binding force of agreements to compromise and settlements out of court.103 1.30  Impact of estoppel on consideration. In modern contract law the assertion by one party that a promise or performance by the other party is not good consideration is subject to the application of estoppel. If the promisee was induced by the promisor to assume that an exchange was intended, or that an act or promise given in exchange had value, it may be unconscionable for the promisor to depart from that assumption.104

Intention to create legal relations 1.31  Intention to create legal relations. The High Court has said: It is of the essence of contract, regarded as a class of obligation, that there is a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty.105

Of course, this statement misleads in one important respect. ‘Voluntariness’ in the assumption of a contractual obligation can hardly be regarded as the ‘essence’ of a contractual obligation given that a lack of voluntariness in fact usually does not prevent a contract from being formed according to the normal rules of contract formation.106 What is essential, however, is that the assumption of legal contractual obligation was intended by the party alleged to have assumed it, irrespective of whether that intention was ‘voluntarily’ produced.107 The intention of the parties is normally inferred objectively from their conduct.108 It would be misleading, therefore, to speak of a requirement of actual intention to create legal obligations. In most cases such an intention is inferred and goes without saying.109 1.32  Commercial agreements normally create legal obligation. In commercial agreements it is readily inferred that legal relations are intended. The court will, however, give effect to any expressed or implied intention not to create legal relations. If commercial parties stipulate that legal effect shall not attach to their agreement, this will be respected by the court.110 1.33  Social or domestic engagements may not be binding. Agreements made by relatives in the conduct of familial or household relations are not usually legally binding. However, if substantial effort and expenditure is incurred in some special transaction undertaken by relatives, contractual obligations may arise. If the parties’ transaction has a commercial setting, the fact that they are related may be irrelevant. Agreements made after the breakdown of a domestic or familial relationship may also be intended to be legally binding.111 103. See 4.24–4.28. 104. See Chapter 2, particularly at 2.8. 105. Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 at 457; [1954] HCA 20 at [33]. 106. For example, a contract procured under duress or undue influence is still ‘a contract’, although it may, owing to its unjustness, be avoided by the victim of the duress or undue influence. What this demonstrates is that ‘involuntariness’ in the assumption of a contractual commitment generally speaks to the ‘justice’ of a transaction rather than its formal validity. 107. Hence, even ‘compulsory’ contracts (entered into involuntarily) are ‘contracts’ nonetheless. 108. See 1.2. 109. See generally Chapter 5. 110. See 5.14–5.20. 111. See 5.4–5.9.

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Overview of Contract Law

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The rules of unincorporated bodies such as clubs or political parties may be contractual in character.112 1.34  Undertakings by governments and instrumentalities. Relations with and among governments and government instrumentalities that might be considered contractual are extremely diverse in their character.113 On the one hand, there are agreements of a clearly commercial character, for example, those involving the supply of goods or services for payment. On the other hand, there are arrangements that are better understood as subject to political rather than legal sanction. This is true of inter-government relations, though there are some such agreements domestically that are intended to be contractual. An intention to assume legal contractual obligation may also be absent in relations directly involving private citizens. The cases exhibit a general disinclination of the courts to attribute contractual intent to government instrumentalities engaging in regulatory or redistributional activity. On the other hand, the High Court has said: A basic assumption of our law is that bargains are to be kept. This applies today to the contracts which the Crown makes with a subject as forcefully as it does to contracts between subject and subject.114

1.35  Agreements subject to execution of a document or other condition.115 Parties may stipulate that no obligation shall arise until the happening of a specified event. For example, their intention may be to postpone legal contractual obligation until execution of a document, particularly where the transaction is of a type normally effected by a formal contract, for example land transactions. In that event, no contract arises until all parties have executed it.116 1.36  Illusory promises. A promise to perform at one’s choice is illusory.117 A promise is a definite commitment to a future course of action, and an undertaking given in terms that make its performance a matter of discretion cannot therefore be regarded as a promise. So it has been said that ‘where words which by themselves constitute a promise are accompanied by words which show that the promisor is to have a discretion or option as to whether he will carry out that which purports to be the promise, the result is that there is no contract’.118 However, a promise is not illusory because it allows for a measure of discretion in its performance. In such cases the promisor is required to act honestly, or honestly and reasonably, or in good faith, in the exercise of the discretion. Where a party excludes all liability for failure to perform a promise, no contract may result. But clauses in contracts that exclude liability are not often construed as having this effect.119 112. See 5.10. 113. See 5.27–5.29; Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018). 114. Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 at 373; [1969] HCA 29 at [15]. 115. See 5.21–5.25. 116. The happening of a specified event may be regarded as a condition of performance rather than formation of the contract. In that event a contract has been made, but it is liable to be terminated if the condition is not fulfilled. See 1.113–1.114. 117. See 4.16–4.18. 118. Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597 at 605; [1964] HCA 41 at [11] (McTiernan J). 119. See 1.75.

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1.37  Impact of estoppel on intention. The modern doctrine of estoppel is clearly again relevant in the present context. A party who induces another party to assume that the creation of legal relations is intended may be estopped from denying that intention if it would be unconscionable to do so.120

Certainty of terms 1.38  Certainty of terms. There may be no contract if an important term has been omitted, or left to later agreement, or expressed in words of uncertain meaning. If these defects affect only inessential terms, the court may imply a missing term, or ignore or sever an uncertain term. But if the parties have failed to provide for, or articulate clearly, an important element of their transaction, the court may be left without an adequate basis of enforcement.121 The cases on uncertainty show a divergence of judicial responses. In some, when faced with the difficulty of an uncertain contract, the court has been strict to the point of dogmatism; in others, it has shown great latitude. It may be said, however, that the preponderant approach is to endeavour to make an imperfect contract work and hold the parties to it, notwithstanding uncertainty. This is particularly so if performance of the contract has been embarked on. There are numerous examples of judicial readiness to cure uncertainty; in particular: 1. Omissions. If an obligation has been omitted or insufficiently defined, the court will generally imply an agreement to do what is reasonable in the circumstances, drawing on what is usual or normal in such transactions, or on what may be fairly derived from the particular context. For instance, if no time for performance has been fixed, the court will normally imply a promise to perform within a reasonable time, and will, if necessary, stipulate what is a reasonable time in the case. However, the court is reluctant to supply what is missing if the term is one to which no convention or standard applies.122 So the price in a contract of sale will not be fixed by the court unless an established means of valuation (for example, market value) is applicable.123 The parties themselves may define performance by reference to what is reasonable, for example, by agreeing that the price paid shall be a reasonable price, or that stock is sold ‘at valuation’, or that one party shall do what the other reasonably requires. In some situations an ‘open’ contract may be made, omitting all details that can be supplied by law. It is settled that such a contract may be made for the sale of land.124 Logically an open contract should be acceptable whenever its subject-matter is ascertainable and the transaction is of a recognised type with well-established features. However, the concept cannot be applied if no clearly established model exists for the transaction in question.

120. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 121. Uncertainty is discussed in Chapter 6. 122. On implied terms generally, see 1.67–1.71. 123. See 6.6. 124. Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20 at 25; [1952] HCA 26 at [6].

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Overview of Contract Law

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2. Deferred terms. Where terms have been left to be fixed by a third party, there is normally no objection to the conclusion that a contract has been made. If the third party fails to act, the court is prepared to settle the terms. The better view is that this also applies where terms have been left to be stipulated by one of the parties. A duty to act reasonably is usually implied in such a case. But where the parties have left an important term to their own future agreement, there may be merely an ‘agreement to agree’, falling short of contract.125 Nevertheless, agreements to negotiate have come to be regarded as at least potentially enforceable.126 3. Ambiguity or otherwise unclear language. The courts do not hold that no contract was made because words are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. ‘The court has the power to fix the meaning of any agreement, unless no external standard or test of its operation is provided.’127 The court has the power to supply, disregard or correct words in order to avoid absurdity or inconsistency.128 For example, if the parties obviously meant ‘consistent’ when they said ‘inconsistent’, the court may correct the error.129 If the parties have adopted a document in which they have not filled in blanks, or crossed out what is inapplicable, the court can resolve any ambiguity by choosing an appropriate construction. If a standard set of terms is incorporated by reference, and those terms are not fully consistent with the transaction between the parties, only those terms that are consistent with what has been expressly agreed are incorporated.130

The privity rule 1.39  Contracts cannot be enforced by or against third parties. In the absence of an assignment,131 a contract can only be enforced by or against anyone who is ‘privy’ to it, that is, a party. Persons who are not privy to a contract are referred to as ‘third parties’. Privity is discussed below132 and in Chapter 7. 1.40  Who is a party to a contract? In the leading case on the doctrine of privity of contract, Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd,133 three members of the High Court adopted the view that to enforce a contract a person must not only be a ‘party to the contract’, but must also be a ‘party to the consideration’.134 To utilise an example put forward in that case: 1. If A promises B to pay C $1000 if B will erect a gate for A, C cannot compel A to carry out the promise of $1000, as C was not a party to the contract between A and B. 2. If A promises B and C jointly to pay C $1000 if B will erect a gate for A, C still cannot compel A to pay, for C, though now a party to the promise, 125. See 6.8–6.11. 126. See 6.12–6.16. 127. York Air Conditioning v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 11 at 62; [1949] HCA 23 at [27] (Dixon J). 128. See 6.5–6.7, 10.34–10.35. 129. Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 at 426–7; [1956] HCA 53 at [4]. 130. See 10.27. 131. See 1.48. 132. See 1.46. 133. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 115–16, 164; [1988] HCA 44 at [15]–[16] (Mason CJ and Wilson J), [4] (Toohey J). 134. See 7.2–7.3.

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is still a ‘stranger to the consideration’. Here, ‘party to the consideration’ evidently means ‘participant in the performance’. It is implicit in this conception that the right to enforce a contract requires participation both in the formation of the contract and in its performance. C must at least assume a commitment to be contractually liable should B fail in his or her performance, that is, B and C are jointly liable to perform. Although the members of the court in Trident who adopted this view purported, in doing so, to give effect to the ‘weight of authority’, their approach is clearly inconsistent with an earlier decision of the High Court,135 in which it was held that, where A promises both B and C to confer a benefit on C in return for a consideration given by B, C can enforce the promise though not a party to the consideration, which is supplied by B on behalf of both B and C. This is arguably the better view. The notion that the right to enforce a contract requires not only inclusion in the promise but participation in the counter-performance unnecessarily restricts the right of contracting parties to make their own bargain. A promise made by A to B and C jointly for a consideration supplied by B should be enforceable by C. A different aspect of who the parties to a contract are is that it may not be clear who was intended to be a party. This is a matter of interpretation of the contract by ascertaining the intention of the parties.136 1.41  An inconvenient rule. The rule that third parties cannot enforce contracts sometimes causes inconvenience and injustice.137 Where parties to a contract clearly intend to confer a benefit on a third person, a strong case can often be made for allowing enforcement, particularly by a third party who has acted in reliance upon the expected performance of the contract. Even where tangible reliance is difficult to prove, it is often not easy to see why the beneficiary should not in conscience be entitled to enforce the contract. Other common law jurisdictions (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand) allow for third-party claims in some circumstances. 1.42  Statutory reform. Three jurisdictions, Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory, have each passed legislation conferring rights of enforcement on third parties, subject to restrictions: Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 11; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55; and Law of Property Act 2000 (NT).138 Under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), and state legislation relating to motor vehicle insurance, insurance policies may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries.139 1.43  The possibility of judicial reform. As long ago as 1969 a judge of the High Court, after referring to the abandonment of the privity requirement in the United States, expressed his view ‘that someday this court too … will see the way clear to take the same path’.140 The decision in Trident141 was thought to be a step 135. Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] HCA 3. 136. See 7.2. 137. See 7.1. 138. See 7.15–7.21. 139. See 7.22. 140. Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 393; [1969] HCA 3 at [23] (Windeyer J). 141. See 1.40.

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Overview of Contract Law

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in this direction. In that case a third party was permitted to enforce an entitlement under an insurance policy.142 However, the court was not then prepared to abandon privity as a general principle, one important reason being that a new rule structure would have to be put in place, as has happened under state and territory legislation: see 1.42. No subsequent cases have indicated abandonment. 1.44  The rule may be circumvented. The courts have found ways of conferring rights upon third parties notwithstanding their official adherence to the doctrine of privity of contract. These fall into either of two categories: (a) converting a third party into a contracting party; or (b) allowing enforcement of contractual rights by third parties through non-contractual mechanisms. Of the first category, the most important examples are: 1. Agency. Although A has ostensibly contracted with B, it may be possible to infer that C was B’s principal, and therefore that C, not B, is actually the contracting party. It must be remembered that the relation of principal and agent can arise not merely by express agreement but also by implication, estoppel or ratification,143 and that a contract may be made on behalf of an undisclosed principal.144 2. Joint parties.145 It may be possible to infer that A’s promise, though ostensibly made to B, was in fact made to B and C jointly.146 Of the second category, the most important examples are: 1. Trust. Where A has contracted with B to confer a benefit on C, B may sometimes be regarded as a trustee of A’s promise, and thus be compelled by C to seek enforcement of the contract. In Trident, the High Court went to some lengths to endorse the operation of the law of trusts in the present context.147 2. Commercial law (assignment, letters of credit, negotiable instruments, bills of lading, insurance).148 3. The law of property (covenants concerning land, other proprietary and possessory rights).149 Other potential means of circumventing the doctrine of privity are supplied by the law of torts and of restitution. In Trident, Gaudron J relied on the law of restitution. Some support for this approach was also expressed by Deane J. Restitutionary remedies have gained increasing recognition as a means of supplementing the rights of contracting parties.150 1.45  Enforcement by the promisee. It is axiomatic that a contract, though made for the benefit of a third party, may be enforced by the contracting parties themselves. 142. The case would now be covered by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48. 143. See 7.35–7.36. 144. By utilising the concept of agency the protection of terms limiting liability can be extended to third parties: see 1.76. 145. See 7.2. 146. But see the discussion of the meaning of ‘party’ in 1.40. 147. See 7.43–7.49. 148. See 7.22–7.25. 149. See 7.27–7.33. 150. See Chapter 25.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

However, the extent of damages available to the promisee may be limited.151 On the other hand, specific performance is particularly appropriate as a remedy for breach of a contract for the benefit of a third party.152 1.46  Contracts imposing liability on third parties. A and B cannot by contract between them impose a contractual obligation on X.153 However, a third party who claims the benefit of a contract may also have to accept its burdens.154 Moreover, contractual restrictions on the use of land or goods may bind a subsequent transferee, X.155 1.47  Impact of estoppel on privity requirement. It may be unconscionable for a contracting party to deny an obligation to a third party who reasonably assumed that he or she would have a right to enforce the contract. The modern doctrine of estoppel is therefore potentially of aid to third parties. In Trident, although estoppel was not pleaded, four members of the court expressly recognised the possibility that it might apply.156 The doctrine of estoppel must equally be potentially applicable where an obligation is sought to be imposed on a third party.157 1.48  Assignment of contract rights and liabilities. In many (but not all) situations a contracting party can assign the right to receive performance of the contract to a third party. An effective assignment confers on the third party the rights of the assignor.158 In some situations the assignment of an obligation to perform a contract is also possible. This must be done by a novation.159

Breach 1.49  What amounts to breach of contract? A breach of contract occurs when a party: • •

actually fails to perform the contract as agreed when performance falls due; or manifests unwillingness or inability to perform the contract as agreed.

Of course, in many cases, these two kinds of breaches overlap. A failure to perform is often also a manifestation of unwillingness or inability to perform. But not always. A party may fail to perform, though willing and able to do so. Conversely, a manifestation of unwillingness or inability may precede any failure to perform, if it occurs in advance of the time when performance is due. If A tells B that A will not or cannot deliver goods, or pay money to B, as and when required by their contract, 151. See 7.7. 152. See 7.8. 153. It is not clear whether the conception of ‘party’ put forward in Trident is intended to apply equally to claims of benefit and burden. 154. See 7.12. 155. See 7.27–7.31. 156. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123, 140, 145; [1988] HCA 44 at [32] (Mason CJ and Wilson J), [2] (Brennan J), [8] (Deane J). 157. See 7.3. 158. Assignment is discussed in Chapter 8. 159. See 8.46–8.48.

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Overview of Contract Law

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this is a breach even though delivery or payment is not yet due. As the time for performance has not yet arrived, such a breach is called an ‘anticipatory breach’.160 Unless a party fails or is unwilling or unable to perform at all, proof that a breach has occurred requires the identification of a specific term of the contract that has been breached. This is a matter of construction: see below. Performance means exact compliance with the contract. Anything short of such compliance is a breach. A performance that does not comply with the contract is a breach, even if it is as valuable, or more valuable, than the performance required by the contract. An inexact or partial performance is as much a breach as a failure to perform at all. There are no degrees of breach when the issue is whether a breach has occurred. However, rights arising from a breach may vary with the type or degree of breach. In particular, unless otherwise agreed, a right to terminate the contract arises only if there has been a serious breach.161 In addition, a right to damages may be ‘empty’ if the party claiming cannot prove loss arising from a breach. In such a case a court will award nominal damages.

Construction of Contracts 1.50  Construction of contracts. Contracts are about getting something done. A claim to enforce or to resist enforcement of a contract almost always depends on the ascertainment of at least some of the obligations contained in it. Whether a contract was made at all, with whom, whether a breach has occurred, whether the contract is valid or performance is excused, whether the contract has been or can be terminated, whether a particular remedy is available — all these issues depend at least to some extent on the actual or putative obligational content (what is required to be done) in the contract in question. The process of ascertaining this content may be referred to as ‘construing’ or ‘interpreting’ the contract, so as to arrive at its ‘construction’, which is ultimately about ascertaining what the parties intended. A court’s job is, so far as possible, to give effect to the intention of the parties as embodied in the contract. Construing a contract involves consideration of a number of issues: 1. Admissible evidence. If the contract has been recorded in writing, evidence of unrecorded terms may be inadmissible.162 2. Actual terms. The actual or express terms (written or oral) of the contract are those that the parties actually agreed to incorporate in it. The law provides criteria for determining whether a term has been incorporated, and how it should be interpreted if there are ambiguities in its expression.163 3. Implied terms. In addition to the actual terms of a contract, the law recognises the existence of terms implied in it. These are of three kinds: universal terms, generic terms and specific terms.164 160. See Chapter 9. 161. See 1.120. 162. See 1.51–1.58. 163. See 1.59–1.66. 164. See 1.67–1.71.

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4. Terms limiting liability. Terms that exclude or limit a party’s liability under a contract have been singled out for special treatment by the courts.165 5. Unconscionability plays a role in the construction of contracts.166 The content of a contract is fixed at the time of its formation. But the parties are always free to amend or ‘vary’ their contract.167 The principles of construction are discussed in Chapter 10. Although modern Australian courts have on the whole retreated from the literalism and legalism characteristic of an earlier phase in the development of contract doctrine, they have adhered to an explicitly objective approach to the construction of contracts, particularly of written contracts. Both in determining what terms have been incorporated in a contract, and in interpreting those terms, the construction exercise involves ascertaining not the subjective intention or assumptions of the parties, but rather what a reasonable person in their situation would have understood or assumed.168

Admissibility of evidence 1.51  Evidence of matters not included in a document may be inadmissible. Where there is a written record of the contract, the so-called parol evidence rule aims to exclude evidence that subtracts from, adds to, varies or contradicts the language of the document. The purpose of the rule is to provide certainty and finality in formal (written) contractual dealings. The rule excludes both oral and written evidence extrinsic to a document intended to record the whole contract. It affects both the incorporation and (to a lesser extent) the interpretation of such documents. As a matter of common sense, a document adopted by the parties as a record of their contract deserves in general to be preferred to other evidence at variance with it. Cases nevertheless occur in which such a document does not reflect the agreement of the parties. A number of ‘exceptions’169 to the parol evidence rule have been admitted to cater for such cases.170 1.52  Evidence is admissible where a document is only a partial record of the contract. Evidence of terms agreed to in addition to those recorded in a contract document is admissible if the document was intended only to be a partial or provisional record of the contract. Where the document obviously does not record the whole contract, as in the case of receipts, tickets, invoices and other documents that manifestly constitute only a partial record of the contract, there is no objection to admitting evidence of further terms. But even if a document is ostensibly a complete record of a contract, the court may conclude that in reality it is not. The fact that the document itself states, as many commercial contracts do, that it is the final and entire record of the parties’ agreement (the entire agreement clause) is not necessarily conclusive.171 165. See 1.72–1.76. 166. See 1.77. 167. See 1.127. 168. See 10.1. 169. These are less ‘exceptions’ than situations where the parol evidence rule simply is not triggered, or is inapplicable given its scope and purposes. 170. Admissibility of evidence is considered in 10.3–10.16. 171. See 10.5, 10.7.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.53  Evidence of a collateral contract is admissible. Evidence of a prior contract, collateral to the contract recorded in a document, is admissible. An undertaking given prior to the execution of a contract document constitutes a collateral contract if it was given in consideration of the other party’s entry into the contract recorded in the document. However, the following points should be noted: 1. Statements, written or oral, that are relied on as constituting a collateral contract must be clearly promissory in nature. The distinction between promissory and non-promissory statements is discussed below.172 2. The undertaking relied on must not be one that would be expected to be incorporated in the principal contract. The attempt to divide what is clearly one transaction between the parties into two contracts is often artificial. 3. The undertaking relied on must not be inconsistent with the principal contract. However, this rule is problematic and must be reconsidered in the light of the modern doctrine of estoppel, which provides a possible means of circumventing it.173 1.54  Evidence is admissible in support of rectification or estoppel. Where a mistake has been made in recording the agreement reached by the parties, either party may apply to the court to have the document ‘rectified’ to express their common intention.174 To establish the error, extrinsic evidence must be admitted.175 Estoppel may also be relied on in some cases to circumvent the parol evidence rule.176 1.55  Evidence that a document is inoperative or contingent is admissible. Evidence of an unrecorded agreement that a document should not operate until after the occurrence of a stipulated event is admissible.177 1.56  Evidence of subsequent variation is admissible. It is axiomatic that the parties are always free to add to, subtract from, or otherwise alter the terms of their contract, by further agreement.178 Evidence of such a variation is always admissible.179 1.57  Extrinsic evidence and interpretation. There have been many judicial statements seeking to define what evidence may be admitted where the meaning of the language of a document is in doubt, and not all of these statements can easily be reconciled.180 Two principal requirements have traditionally been applied by the authorities: (1) the language of the document must be ambiguous; and (2) the extrinsic evidence must be of objective background, not merely of subjective unilateral intention.

172. See 1.60. 173. See further 10.3. 174. See 12.30. 175. See 10.8. 176. See 10.3. 177. See 10.9. 178. See 22.1. 179. See 10.10. 180. See 10.11–10.14.

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However, recent judgments have arguably abandoned the first, though adhering firmly to the second, of these requirements.181 This move remains controversial. Evidence of conduct subsequent to formation of the contract is regarded in some (though not all) courts as inadmissible on the question of interpretation of a document, on the basis that the relevant intention is at the time of contract formation and that a party may opportunistically adjust its conduct so as to give veracity to a meaning not intended at the time when the contract was made. But not all subsequent conduct is necessarily tainted in this way.182 There is no objection to evidence of subsequent conduct on the interpretation of a variation of a contract document.183 1.58  Evidence in aid of implication.184 Extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a term should be implied, subject to the same limits that apply to evidence on interpretation. The High Court has rejected the view that an implied term can only be inferred from the express terms of the document.185

Actual terms 1.59  Actual terms depend on intention. The actual terms of a contract are those that the parties objectively intended to include in it.186 They comprise the terms expressed by the parties, as well as terms that it must be inferred they intended even though they were not expressed.187 1.60  Pre-contractual statements. Contracting parties are frequently in dispute about the binding nature of statements made prior to the execution of a contract document. As explained above, evidence of such statements is not admissible unless the document is only a partial record of the contract, or the statements constitute a collateral contract (leaving aside a claim of rectification or estoppel). In neither case, however, are such statements binding unless they constitute a promise. The law distinguishes between promissory statements and non-promissory statements (often called representations or mere representations). A non-promissory statement may give rise to other forms of legal liability (for example, if it is fraudulent or negligent, or involves misleading conduct),188 but not to liability for breach of contract. To constitute a promise a statement need not be subjectively intended as such. If a statement was reasonably understood by the other party as a promise, it is promissory whether this was actually intended or not. The form of a statement must have a bearing on whether it should be regarded as promissory. But the legal conception of promise encompasses statements that are not in promissory form. Hence, statements of condition, description, intention,

181. See 10.12–10.13. 182. See 10.16. 183. See 1.128. 184. See 10.15. 185. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337; [1982] HCA 24. 186. See 10.17. 187. See 10.18. 188. See 1.79ff.

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Overview of Contract Law

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opinion or prognosis may be terms of a contract if they are implicitly promissory in themselves, or in combination with explicitly promissory statements.189 1.61  Inducement not enough. The fact that a statement was intended or likely to induce, or in fact induced, a party to make the contract does not suffice to make it a term of the contract. But the evidential burden may be on the party who made such a statement to displace the inference that it was promissory.190 1.62  Signed documents. Signature of a contractual document normally indicates the adoption of its entire content, read and unread, so long as the signatory knows or ought to know that the document contains contractual terms, there is no vitiating or invalidating element, and no identifiable basis for legal, equitable or statutory relief.191 Notwithstanding such ameliorating factors, High Court decisions demonstrate a strong commitment to the objective enforcement of signed contract documents. The ‘signature rule’ provides a barrier to the inclusion of pre-contractual terms. This barrier is additional to, and independent of, the parol evidence rule, although apparently subject to the same exceptions.192 1.63  Terms incorporated by reference or notice. Contract documents executed by the parties may incorporate the terms of some other document, for example, the terms of standard forms produced by legal and other professional bodies. Standard forms adopted in this way apply only to the extent to which they are consistent with the parties’ agreement.193 Moreover, terms that significantly add to or alter the effect of the incorporating document may require more than a generalised reference.194 Unsigned documents containing terms, such as tickets, may also be incorporated in a contract if reasonable notice has been given of them.195 Such documents may also be incorporated on the basis of prior dealing.196 1.64  Objective interpretation of express terms. There are no strict rules for the interpretation of the text of a contract. Since the variety of contracts is unlimited, it is idle to expect the court to fetter itself by adherence to strict rules of interpretation. In most cases the ascertainment of meaning is a pragmatic process conducted without explicit resort to any such rules.197 The traditional rule precluding the consideration of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of written contracts has been abandoned by some courts in recent times, as discussed in 1.57. The court fixes the ‘objective’ meaning of the contract, that is, the meaning that it is reasonable to infer from the words and conduct of the parties, and the parties are bound by the objective meaning so ascertained. The objective approach can be taken to extremes. For example, the objective meaning may prevail even if both parties agree on a different meaning.198 189. See 10.21–10.22, 10.24–10.25. 190. See 10.23. 191. The same applies to an ‘I agree’ button on the internet. See 3.51. 192. See 10.26. 193. See 10.27. 194. See 10.68. 195. See 10.28. 196. See 10.29. 197. See 10.30. 198. See 10.31.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

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1.65  Ambiguity resolved by reference to context. Most disputes over the interpretation of a contract arise because the words of a contract are patently or latently ambiguous. The court resolves such ambiguity by considering: 1. the factual context of the transaction, including its genesis and aim, and the shared assumptions of the parties; and 2. the verbal context of the words, giving due weight to other terms of the contract, including recitals and headings.199 In at least some contexts, where a term purports to limit or exclude liability or to shift risk to the other party, the court may resolve ambiguity by construing a term contra proferentem, that is, against the party by whom or in whose interest it was included.200 The court also considers the consequences of adopting a particular interpretation. If more than one meaning is open, an interpretation that avoids capricious, unreasonable, uncommercial, inconvenient or unjust consequences will be preferred.201 1.66  Plain or literal meaning not applied if this leads to absurdity. In line with the objective approach, where the parties have used language that has a plain, literal, natural or ordinary meaning, this is usually applied notwithstanding the consequences. However, modern courts have modified the rigour of this position. ‘There is more to the construction of the words of written instruments than merely assigning to them their plain and ordinary meaning.’202 This proposition applies with even greater force to oral contracts. The court may therefore decline to apply a literal meaning where this leads to a wholly irrational or absurd result.203

Implied terms 1.67  The role of implied terms. The content of a contract is not limited to the terms actually adopted by the parties, but includes terms implied by the courts to fill gaps and to regulate the performance and enforcement of contracts.204 These ‘hidden’ terms are enforceable in the same way as express terms. Statutory terms are also implied in many contracts, for example, in the supply of goods and services, sales and leases of land, contracts of insurance and partnership. Such terms are beyond the scope of this book — specialist texts must be consulted. Three different kinds of implied terms can be distinguished. They are: •

obligations implied in all contracts, for example, the obligations of cooperation and (arguably) of good faith. These can be called universal terms;205

199. See 10.32. 200. See 10.33. 201. See 10.34. 202. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 348; [1982] HCA 24 at [12] (Mason J). 203. See 10.35. 204. See 10.36. 205. See 10.41–10.49.

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Overview of Contract Law

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•

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obligations implied in particular classes or types of contract, for example, the duty of reasonable care in contracts for professional services. These can be called generic terms;206 obligations implied in a specific contract. These are obligations implied ad hoc in the particular contract made by the parties. They can be called specific terms.207

The courts imply terms, at least generic and specific terms, only to the extent to which this is consistent with the actual terms of the contract.208 1.68  Universal term of co-operation. The following formula has been adopted by Australian courts: It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other to have the benefit of the contract.209

It follows that each party must not merely comply with the letter of the contract, but must also act so as to protect the other party’s interests where it is necessary and reasonable to do so. The duty to co-operate also acts as a restraint on the exercise of contractual rights and powers, for example, the right to terminate a contract.210 1.69  Universal term of good faith? Australian courts were for long reluctant to impose any duty to act in good faith on contracting parties, other than fiduciaries. However, in a series of more recent cases, a duty of good faith and fair dealing in performing and enforcing contracts has been implied notwithstanding the absence of any fiduciary relationship. But the universality of such an implication has not yet been established in Australian law. On the authorities as they stand, the implication in a contract of a duty of good faith must be justified on a generic basis, or by the criteria of implication of specific terms: see below. The reluctance shown by Australian courts to treat good faith as a term implied in all contracts is at odds with the approach of most of the world’s major legal systems, in which good faith is a mandatory standard of conduct for contracting parties.211 1.70  Generic terms. Whenever a contract can be said to belong to a class, the law implies in it any terms that are inherent in that class. Generic terms are implied to protect the enjoyment of rights normally conferred by contracts of the class in question. Many classes of contracts, and the terms implied in them, are well established. A tenant is entitled to ‘quiet enjoyment’; a client of a professional person is entitled to expect a professional standard of care; and a tenderer to government is entitled to expect that the government will consider tenders fairly and diligently. But the classes of contracts are not closed.212 Generic terms include obligations implied by custom in a particular trade or industry.213 206. See 10.50–10.54. 207. See 10.55–10.61. 208. See 10.37. 209. Drawn from Butt v M’Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 at 70–1. 210. See 10.41–10.42. 211. See 10.43–10.47. 212. See 10.50–10.53. 213. See 10.54.

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1.71  Specific terms. Specific terms are implied because they are necessary to give a particular contract its intended operation or ‘business efficacy’. The conditions that must be satisfied for the implication of such terms have been laid down as follows (they may overlap): (1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’; (4) it must be capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract.214

Each of these criteria must be satisfied. If one criterion cannot be satisfied, the argument for an ad hoc specific implied term will fail.

Terms limiting or shifting liability 1.72  Limiting terms subject to special scrutiny. Terms expressly limiting or excluding the liability of a party for breach of contract or other actionable conduct, often referred to as exclusion, exception or exemption clauses or disclaimers, or by other names,215 appear in many contracts and take many forms. (Limiting terms may also be implied in some situations.216) These types of terms are about managing foreseeable risks of failure or adverse events. Unless prohibited by statute, as, for example, in the supply of goods and services to consumers under the Australian Consumer Law, such terms are not invalid. The High Court has specifically rejected any notion that liability cannot be curtailed for serious breaches of contract.217 It is debatable whether limiting terms are subject to special rules of incorporation and interpretation that are different from the usual rules of construction. However, limiting terms have traditionally been singled out for special scrutiny by the courts. 1.73  Onus. The onus of showing that a limiting term applies is on the party relying on it, who must show that: • •

it was incorporated as a term of the contract; and it applies as a matter of construction to the liability or loss in issue.218

1.74  Incorporation of limiting terms must be strictly proved. A party seeking to rely on a provision limiting liability bears the onus of establishing its inclusion as a term of the contract. Signature of a document that includes such a term is conclusive so long as the signatory should have been aware of the contractual nature of the document.219 In non-signature (‘ticket’) cases, reasonable notice of the limiting term must have been given before the contract was concluded.220 A history of prior dealing between the parties may be relevant in this respect.221 214. BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20 at 26; 16 ALR 363 at 365. The operation of these criteria is discussed in 10.55–10.61. 215. An indemnity clause is a ‘reverse’ exclusion clause whereby a loss is shifted from one party to the other. 216. See 10.65. 217. See 10.64. 218. See 10.66. 219. See 10.69. 220. See 10.70–10.71. 221. See 10.72.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.75  Interpretation of limiting terms. Traditionally, limiting terms have been construed strictly or narrowly, and, in cases of ambiguity, against the party relying on such a term (‘contra proferentem’). However, this approach is no longer applied mechanically. In the leading modern case Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd,222 the High Court held that the meaning of a limiting term: … is to be determined by construing the clause according to its natural and ordinary meaning, read in the light of the contract as a whole, thereby giving due weight to the context in which the clause appears including the nature and object of the contract, and, where appropriate, construing the clause contra proferentem in case of ambiguity. [emphasis added]

Nevertheless, this passage shows that it will still be appropriate in some cases to interpret an ambiguous clause contra proferentem so as to confine its operation. It is sometimes very difficult to predict when a court will apply a strict test. The courts also still refer to other traditional principles that require the interpretation of limiting terms in conformity with the main object of a contract, and preclude their application to acts not authorised by the contract, or to its deliberate breach.223 1.76  Protection of third parties. A party may be protected by a limiting term in a contract ostensibly made between other parties. In Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd,224 the Privy Council, reversing a majority in the High Court,225 and in disregard of previous Australian authority, held that a stevedore could rely on an appropriately drafted clause in a contract of carriage made between the consignor and consignee of the goods. The doctrine of privity of contract was circumvented by utilisation of the concept of agency to construct a separate contract between the stevedore and the consignee.226 The effect of this decision was that an exempting provision (covering loss of or damage to goods) travelled with the goods on their journey.

Unconscionability and construction 1.77  Unconscionability in the construction of contracts. It is clear that asserting a particular construction of a contract may in some circumstances constitute unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce within the meaning of s 20 or s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law. There are also traces of equitable relief against the unconscionable construction of a contract.227 However, the primary medium by which unconscionability is brought to bear on the determination of the obligational content of a contract is estoppel, which has had a strong impact on the construction of written contracts. It provides a potential means of circumventing obstacles to the incorporation of pre-contractual terms, posed by the parol evidence rule, the rule requiring consistency of collateral contracts and the binding force of signature. Estoppel can also affect the interpretation of a written contract. Two forms of 222. Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500 at 510; [1986] HCA 82 at [16]; approved in Nissho Iwai Australia Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1989) 167 CLR 219 at 227; [1989] HCA 32 at [12]. 223. See 10.74–10.77. 224. (1980) 144 CLR 300. See 7.38. 225. (1978) 139 CLR 231. 226. The High Court has since reaffirmed this use of the principle of agency: Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; [2004] HCA 52 at [79]. See further 7.37–7.42. 227. See 10.2.

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estoppel, promissory estoppel (equity) and estoppel by convention (common law), have been utilised in this regard.228

Excuses 1.78  Duty to perform a contract can be excused. The obligation to perform a contract is not absolute. The law excuses parties from performance on a variety of grounds. A party may be excused from performance of a contract if: • •

• • • • •

the party made the contract as a result of misrepresentation or misleading conduct by the other party;229 the party made the contract as a result of a serious mistake about its content or subject-matter, the identity of the other party or some other significant factor;230 the party made the contract as a result of duress or undue influence by the other party;231 the party made the contract as a result of unconscionable dealing (taking unfair advantage of impaired judgement or volition) by the other party;232 written evidence of the contract is required by statute and is lacking;233 the party lacked legal capacity to make a contract;234 or making or performing the contract is illegal.235

Performance of a contract is also excused if the contract has been validly terminated. Termination can occur in a variety of ways, and is discussed below.236 Except in cases of illegality (which the court may raise of its own motion), a party entitled to invoke an excuse may choose whether to rescind (cancel) the contract or not. A party who has a right to rescind but does not exercise it may lose the right by affirming the contract, or be estopped from exercising it, or for some other reason.237

Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 1.79  Misrepresentation and misleading conduct. Under judge-made (common) law, a party who has made a contract, in reliance on a false belief induced by statements or other conduct of the other party (misrepresentation), may have the right to rescind (cancel) the contract for misrepresentation, that is, to treat it as invalid from the outset (ab initio). This is true whether the statement or conduct was made fraudulently or innocently. In addition, a right to damages may be generated 228. See 1.9 and 10.3. Estoppel in general is discussed in Chapter 2. 229. See 1.79–1.88. 230. See 1.89. 231. See 1.90. 232. See 1.91. 233. See 1.92–1.96. 234. See 1.97–1.99. 235. See 1.100–1.104. 236. See 1.105ff. 237. See 1.84.

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by a misrepresentation, stemming from tort or statute.238 The rules governing misrepresentation are of judicial origin but have been modified by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia.239 Relief in the nature of rescission or other remedies can also be obtained if a contract was induced by misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.240 However, statutory misleading conduct applies only to conduct ‘in trade or commerce’, so that non-commercial transactions are covered only by the law of misrepresentation. Statutory misleading conduct has assumed great importance in Australian commerce.241 ‘Trade or commerce’ covers a wide compass including consumer purchasing, advertising and business-to-business transactions.242 The law of misrepresentation and misleading conduct is fully described in Chapter 11. 1.80  Scope of misrepresentation. Both statements and conduct (including silence or non-disclosure) can constitute misrepresentation. But not every falsehood amounts to an actionable misrepresentation. The common law distinguishes between representations of present or past fact, on the one hand, and other representations, such as representations of law, opinion, intention or prediction, on the other. In principle only the former, if false, count as misrepresentations. However, the distinction between false statements of fact and other false representations may be difficult to discern and cannot be applied in an unnuanced fashion.243 The law also distinguishes between representations and promises, but this is again subject to qualification.244 These distinctions do not apply to statutory misleading conduct where the inquiry is simpler: did A mislead B? 1.81  Misrepresentation must have induced contract. A misrepresentation gives rise to a right of rescission only if it induced the making of the contract. Although it need not have been the sole inducement, it cannot be relied on if the contract would have been made in any event.245 1.82  Right to rescind.246 Misrepresentation excuses the misled party from performance of the contract in the sense that the law confers a right to ‘rescind’, that is, cancel the contract. The right is elective; a contract induced by misrepresentation is not ‘void’, only ‘voidable’. The representee may affirm and carry on with the contract if this is preferred. Rescission, if opted for, cancels the contract from its beginning (‘ab initio’). A court may order partial rescission in an appropriate case. 1.83  Bars to rescission. Since rescission for misrepresentation results in cancellation of the contract from the beginning, it must be possible to restore the parties, at

238. See 1.89. 239. See 11.64, 11.68, 11.70, 11.72–11.73, 11.92–11.100. 240. See 1.86. 241. See 11.104. 242. See 11.111–11.112. 243. See 11.9–11.29. 244. See 1.60, 11.2–11.3, 11.69–11.71. 245. See 11.31–11.42. 246. See 11.43–11.60.

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least substantially, to their pre-contractual situation (‘restitutio in integrum’).247 As contracts have often gone some way forward before a misrepresentation is discovered or relied upon, the application of this principle can cause difficulty. The right to rescind for innocent (non-fraudulent) misrepresentation is additionally limited by the so-called rule in Seddon’s case, which bars rescission if the contract has been ‘executed’ on both sides.248 The rule has been abolished by legislation in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, and modified or qualified in other jurisdictions.249 Doubts also exist about the availability of rescission for innocent misrepresentation in the sale of goods, owing to infelicitous drafting of the relevant legislation.250 1.84  Right to rescind may be lost. In addition to the bars to rescission just discussed, if the right to rescind is not exercised promptly, it may be lost. The right is lost by any conduct indicating affirmation of the contract. It can also be lost by any other conduct suggesting that it will not be exercised.251 In such cases the court may rule that the right was waived, or that the party is estopped from exercising it. Affirmation, waiver and estoppel apply also to the right to terminate a contract that was validly formed.252 1.85  Right to rescind for misrepresentation may be excluded by the contract. A contract that provides that a party has not been induced by any representation may preclude that party from exercising a right to rescind the contract for an innocent (though not for a fraudulent) misrepresentation.253 However, by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia such a provision is ineffective if it is unreasonable in the circumstances.254 By contrast, the exclusion of remedies for statutory misleading conduct by such provisions has been rejected by the courts.255 1.86  Misleading conduct.256 Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law prohibits ‘conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive’ in ‘trade or commerce’. The legislation applies to all persons, corporations and other entities, although its application to governments and their instrumentalities is limited.257 The Law also contains other and more specific prohibitions of false or misleading conduct relating to the supply of goods and services, the transfer of interests in land, offers of employment, of investment, or of participation in business activities, and other matters.258 247. See 11.53–11.60. 248. It is not clear whether ‘executed’ bears its ordinary meaning of ‘signed’ or means ‘fully performed’: see 11.62. 249. See 11.61–11.64. 250. See 11.66. 251. See 11.47–11.52. 252. See 1.117, 1.123–1.124. The law distinguishes between rescission of a contract (based on and resulting in its invalidity ab initio) and termination of a contract (based on events that have occurred after its formation, and resulting in its prospective but not retrospective cessation): see 21.9. 253. See 11.42, 11.73. 254. See 11.73. 255. See 1.87. 256. For an overview, see 11.104. 257. See 11.107–11.110. 258. See 11.102. Misleading conduct in the supply of financial services is separately covered by mirror provisions in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).

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‘Misleading conduct’ is a broader concept than ‘misrepresentation’. Fault is not required to establish misleading conduct. The legislation establishes a broad potential liability for all forms of misrepresentation, including innocent misrepresentation. Section 18 has transformed the law of misrepresentation in commercial contexts. It extends not only to conduct that amounts to misrepresentation, but also to conduct that would not be actionable as such. In particular, conduct engaged in after the contract was made can qualify as a ground for relief under the Australian Consumer Law. Indeed, s 18 is not confined to contract situations, but applies generally to conduct in trade and commerce, for example advertising.259 However, it does not apply to private transactions not coming within the words ‘trade or commerce’, such as selling a household item on eBay. 1.87  Relief from enforcement of contracts on the ground of misleading conduct. Contravention of the statutory misleading conduct provisions entitles a court, on application, to ‘make such order or orders as it thinks appropriate’ in favour of a party who ‘has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss by’ the conduct in question. It follows that a contracting party relying on misleading conduct as a ground for relief against the enforcement of a contract must show that its enforcement would result in ‘loss’ attributable to the conduct in question.260 ‘Loss’ has been widely interpreted. The right to relief under the statute cannot be excluded by the contract.261 The court is expressly empowered to declare a contract void, wholly or in part, ab initio or from any other date, to vary a contract or to refuse enforcement of it. No power to rescind is conferred directly on the victim, as under the common law doctrine of misrepresentation. The statutory remedies are not subject to the bars to rescission that are a part of the judge-made doctrine of misrepresentation. However, the powers of the court under the legislation are discretionary, and the exercise of that discretion can be affected by factors analogous to those that apply in the law of misrepresentation. So conduct affirming a contract, or the inability to make restitution, may be taken into account by the court in deciding whether, or to what extent, a contract affected by misleading conduct should be enforced or excused. 1.88  Damages for misrepresentation and misleading conduct. In contract law a sharp distinction is made between ‘misrepresentation’ and ‘breach of contract’. A misrepresentation that induces a contract is by hypothesis pre-contractual. So it cannot be a launching pad for a claim to damages for breach of contract, or for specific performance, or for other contractual remedies or relief.262 However, a misrepresentation may attract liability as a tort if it is fraudulent or negligent.263 The tests for fraud are stringent (although recklessness may count as fraud). Negligence requires a demonstration that a duty to take reasonable care arose and was breached. 259. See 11.111–11.123. 260. See 11.124–11.147. 261. However, it is always open to a representor to make sure that what is said or done is not misleading or deceptive by qualifying statements or other conduct: see 11.150. 262. However, a discretionary remedy of damages is provided by misrepresentation legislation in South Australia and the ACT: see 11.92–11.100. 263. See 11.75–11.91.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Similarly, misleading conduct under the Australian Consumer Law generates an independent statutory right to sue for damages (and other relief).264 The right is conferred on persons and entities who suffer loss as a result of misleading conduct in trade or commerce. Where there are two or more defendants to a claim for misleading conduct a court may apportion the obligation to pay damages under a principle called ‘proportionate liability’.265 It is still unclear to what extent contractual promises are included within the ambit of the statute. It can be argued that the statutory liability encompasses at least some cases of breach of contract.266 In part this is the result of s 4 of the Australian Consumer Law, which provides that ‘a representation with respect to any future matter’ is taken to be misleading if there are no reasonable grounds for making it.

Mistake 1.89  Effect of mistake. A party who has entered into a contract as a result of a serious mistake about the then existing state of affairs may be excused from its performance. (Mistakes about the future are dealt with by the doctrine of frustration.)267 A contracting party must clearly assume the risk of a misapprehension or misjudgment of the existing situation to some extent. The problem lies in formulating the criteria by which legally inoperative mistakes can be distinguished from operative mistakes. In attempting to provide such criteria, courts distinguish between: • •

unilateral, mutual and common mistakes; and mistakes as to subject-matter, terms and identity of parties.

There is a heavy onus on a party attempting to argue mistake. The cases are rare where the attempt succeeds. Distinct principles have been devised to cope with mistakes about the content of documents. A party who signs or otherwise adopts a document under a radical misapprehension about its effect may be entitled to plead ‘non est factum’ (it is not my deed),268 thereby escaping liability under it.269 Alternatively, a party may be entitled to apply for ‘rectification’ of the document, to make it conform to the actual agreement of the parties.270 Both principles are subject to stringent restrictions. The ambit of relief based on mistake has given rise to controversy, particularly as to what types of mistake are serious enough to trigger relief and whether an operative mistake makes a contract ‘void’ or ‘voidable’. In Taylor v Johnson,271 the High Court seemed to indicate that a party should have the right to rescind a contract on the basis of a mistake that makes enforcement of the contract unconscionable in the

264. See 11.102, 11.146. 265. See 11.130–11.145. 266. See 11.118. 267. See 1.107–1.111. 268. The doctrine covers forgery where it is true to say ‘it is not my deed’ but also circumstances where a person has signed under a serious misapprehension about what is being signed. 269. See 12.64–12.70. 270. See 12.30–12.43, 12.53–12.54. 271. (1983) 151 CLR 422; [1983] HCA 5.

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Overview of Contract Law

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circumstances.272 However, the law has not developed to this level of simplicity, but remains in a historically conditioned state of complexity, described in Chapter 12.

Duress and Undue Influence 1.90  Effect of duress and undue influence. A party who enters into a contract as a result of duress (see Chapter 13) or undue influence (see Chapter 14) by another party has the right to rescind and may refuse to perform it. Duress traditionally means violence or the threat of damage to person or property in support of a demand (in this context to enter into a contract or a contract variation or release). However, in modern times ‘economic duress’, that is, illegitimate commercial pressure inducing a contract or contract modification, has been established as a (not easily defined) category of duress. Undue influence means ‘unfair persuasion’ or taking unfair advantage of a special position of dominance or ascendancy in a relationship between the parties (for example, parent–child, doctor–patient, solicitor–client), or (more infrequently) in a particular situation between intimates or where a close relationship has developed. More recently it has been described simply in terms of a will that has been substantially impaired by the presence of personal influence to such a degree that it cannot be said that the affected party’s decision to enter into the contract was ‘independent and voluntary’.

Unconscionable Dealing and Unconscionable Conduct 1.91  Unconscionable dealing in equity and statutory unconscionable conduct. These are grounds for rescinding and excusing a party from performance of a contract, and have already been described.273

Informality 1.92  Informality (lack of writing). The courts have never required that a contract must be in writing in order to be enforceable. However, legislation has been passed in all states and territories preventing the court enforcement of some contracts unless there is evidence in writing or, in some cases, the contract itself is in writing. In addition to legislation based on the English Statute of Frauds,274 various transactions, such as loans, sales of motor vehicles, tenancy agreements, contracts of insurance, bills of exchange and building contracts, can be affected by such provisions (usually rendering the contract unenforceable by court order). The law deriving from the Statute of Frauds is discussed in Chapter 16. The myriad other statutory provisions, mostly consumer protection legislation, are not covered. 272. See 12.3. 273. See 1.10, 1.12. 274. See 1.93.

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1.93  Statute of Frauds legislation. The longest-standing legislation is that derived from the English Statute of Frauds of 1677, which now applies uniformly only to contracts disposing of interests in land. Other contracts, including guarantees, are still affected in some jurisdictions.275 On the whole (though not with perfect consistency) the courts have shown some reluctance to excuse a contracting party from performance on the basis of this legislation because it provides a fortuitous and unmeritorious defence to that party. Non-compliance can be relied on only if it is expressly pleaded, and has not been waived. Non-compliance results in a contract that is not void or voidable but, rather, unenforceable by a court. Legislation derived from the Statute of Frauds requires a signed ‘note or memorandum’ of the contract in question. The courts have accepted as sufficient even casual documents, such as letters, notices, invoices or minutes, which may if necessary be joined together to constitute a sufficient note or memorandum of a contract. The requirement of signature has also been loosely interpreted so as to include other forms of endorsement or acknowledgment, not necessarily handwritten. 1.94  Part performance may suffice. The courts have long imposed an overriding qualification on the operation of the statute known as ‘the doctrine of part performance’.276 According to that doctrine, a party who has embarked on performance of a contract required to be evidenced by writing and signature may be able to compel its performance by the other party even if the contract is not evidenced by writing and signature. 1.95  Impact of estoppel and constructive trust. It has also been held that a party can be estopped from invoking the statutory defence if the other party justifiably relied on the assumption that an enforceable contract was made.277 Additionally, the equitable doctrine of constructive trust has been invoked to evade harsh consequences of the legislation.278 These efforts of the courts to contain the effect of Statute of Frauds provisions are clearly prompted by the realisation that it can be unconscionable to rely on the absence of formalities as an excuse from performance. 1.96  Effect of non-compliance. Even if a contract is unenforceable because of lack of writing, it is not necessarily wholly inoperative; for example, it may validly transfer title to money or property.279 Moreover, a party may be able to claim the value of any performance actually given under the law of restitution for unjust enrichment.280

Incapacity 1.97  Incapacity. Not all persons or entities have the capacity to make a binding contract. Incapacity is discussed in Chapter 17. The most important categories of persons who may be excused from liability under a contract because of lack of capacity include: 275. See table at 16.7. 276. See 16.57–16.66. 277. See 16.67–16.71. 278. See 16.72–16.76. 279. See 16.52. 280. See 16.53–16.55; see also Chapter 25.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.100

minors (persons under the age of 18); and persons suffering from a mental disability.

A drunk person may also lack capacity.281 The contractual incapacity of married women that once existed under the common law has been abolished by statute in all Australian jurisdictions, though a tiny residue survives in some states.282 Governments undoubtedly have the capacity to make contracts, but this capacity is subject to special rules.283 Corporations and unincorporated associations may also lack capacity to make contracts in some circumstances.284 1.98  Minors. At common law, a contract made by a minor (now a person under the age of 18) was in general voidable at his or her option, except for beneficial contracts of service and contracts for the supply of necessaries, such as food, shelter and education. This principle has been modified by differing legislation in all Australian jurisdictions.285 1.99  Mental disability. A person who can show that he or she was at the time of making a contract incapable of understanding its essential terms is excused from performing the contract if the other party was, or ought to have been, aware of the incapacity.286 Drunkenness is thought to be subject to the same rule. (The excuses already discussed, mistake, duress, undue influence and unconscionable dealing, as well as statutory misleading and unconscionable conduct, may also be available to a person suffering from mental incapacity or intoxication.)

Illegality and Public Policy 1.100  Illegality. A party may be excused from performance of a contract because its formation or performance is illegal or contrary to public policy.287 The law is described in Chapter 18. The matter is not left in the hands of the parties. If from any material before the court it appears that a claim is tainted by illegality, the court may raise the issue of its own motion.288 Strictly, a contract can be called illegal only to the extent to which it involves a breach of the law. But the courts have gone further by refusing to enforce contracts that are against ‘public policy’. In most such cases an actual or prospective breach of the law is involved, but not in all. 281. See 17.56. 282. See 17.58–17.66. 283. See 17.74. 284. See 17.67–17.73. 285. See 17.4–17.52. 286. See 17.53–17.55. 287. Although this is expressed as a type of ‘excuse’, the principle behind it is that the courts will not enforce such contracts. 288. See 18.3.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

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1.101  Statutory illegality. A contract that is expressly prohibited by statute is clearly illegal. But even if there is no express prohibition, a contract that involves or is linked to conduct prohibited by statute may be prohibited by implication. For example, where a statute requires a licence to carry out a specified activity, it may be implied that a contract to engage in that activity without a licence is prohibited. Whether a statute impliedly prohibits contracts is a matter of statutory interpretation.289 1.102  Public policy. As noted, the courts have also relied on ‘public policy’ as a ground for refusing enforcement of a contract.290 Although ‘public policy’ cannot be exhaustively defined, and may change over time, there are recognised ‘heads’ of public policy that affect contracts: • • • • • • • • • •

involving unlawful conduct;291 prejudicial to the status of marriage;292 involving sexual immorality;293 defrauding the revenue;294 prejudicing the impartiality of public officials;295 fettering public duties or powers;296 prejudicial to national or international security;297 prejudicial to the administration of justice;298 excluding the jurisdiction of the courts;299 and in unreasonable restraint of trade.300

Where a contract involves conduct that is prohibited by statute, the court may refuse to enforce the contract on the basis of public policy even if the statute itself neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits any contract.301 1.103  Severance of illegal part of a contract. Illegality may affect the contract in part only, in which case the court may sever the illegal portion and enforce the rest.302 1.104  Effect of illegality and public policy. The word most commonly used by the courts to describe the legal status of a contract that is unlawful or contrary to public policy is ‘void’. However, the effect of illegality on a contract cannot be encapsulated in a single word. The main points are: 1. Illegality affects a contract only to the extent to which it cannot be severed: see above. 289. See 18.6–18.13. 290. See 18.14–18.15. 291. See 18.18–18.25. 292. See 18.26. 293. See 18.27. 294. See 18.28. 295. See 18.29. 296. See 18.30. 297. See 18.31. 298. See 18.32–18.33. 299. See 18.34. 300. See 18.35–18.38. 301. See 18.19–18.20. 302. See 18.38, 18.41–18.42.

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2. An illegal contract or term of a contract is prima facie enforceable by neither party, but an exception may be made in favour of the more innocent party where the parties are not equally at fault (in pari delicto).303 3. Claims based on negligence, fraud, misleading conduct or other actionable wrongs may be allowed notwithstanding that the transaction between the parties involved an illegal contract.304 4. Rights of ownership and possession of land and goods may be effectively transferred under an illegal contract.305 The law of restitution may require the return of money paid or compensation for benefits conferred under an illegal contract.306

Termination of Contracts 1.105  Termination of contracts generally. A contract can be terminated by: • • • •

operation of law as a result of a frustrating event;307 termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance;308 termination for breach;309 or termination by consent or at will.310

Frustration brings a contract to an end automatically. Termination for nonfulfilment of a contingent condition is not necessarily automatic unless this has been unequivocally agreed. Similarly, a breach does not terminate the contract of itself, but may confer a right of termination on an injured party; the contract does not come to an end unless that right is validly exercised. A right to terminate a contract can be both a shield and a weapon. A party may claim to terminate a contract in order to resist its enforcement by the other party. In such cases a valid termination of the contract excuses its performance. But a valid termination can also provide the basis for a claim to damages311 or restitution.312 1.106  Effect of termination. Termination of a contract means that performance of outstanding obligations is excused. Termination of a contract does not absolve the parties from liability for any breach that has already occurred. Termination of a contract therefore does not deprive a party from suing for damages or other remedy for such a breach. Termination of a contract is different from rescission for misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable dealing, which operates retrospectively, so that liability under the contract is avoided from the beginning.313 303. See 18.43. 304. See 18.44. 305. See 18.45. 306. See 18.46–18.49. 307. See 1.107–1.111. 308. See 1.112–1.118. 309. See 1.119–1.125. 310. See 1.126–1.127. 311. See 1.135. 312. See Chapter 25. 313. See 1.82, 1.84.

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Termination of the contract may also generate restitutionary rights to the return of money or property, or to an award of money representing the value of benefits conferred prior to termination.314

Frustration 1.107  Automatic termination by frustration. The law recognises that events not provided for in the contract may affect its performance so adversely as to bring it to an end. The contract has then been ‘frustrated’.315 Frustration occurs only when the course of events brings about a situation that is radically different from that contemplated by the parties at the time when the contract was made. To excuse performance of a contract merely because events have made its performance unexpectedly difficult or even impossible would be to strike at the institution of contract itself.316 ‘Prima facie a promisor takes the risk of an event happening which prevents him from performing his promise.’317 Whether there is a radical difference between the actual situation and that contemplated obviously involves a difficult judgment of degree.318 Frustration of a contract implies an alteration of the contractual situation that is not merely of a passing nature. Events that cause a delay in performance do not result in frustration until it becomes clear, on the balance of probabilities, that only a performance radically different from that originally contemplated is possible. However, a party is entitled not to be left in indefinite suspense, especially where resources are tied up that might be used elsewhere.319 1.108  Examples of frustration. It would be misleading to suggest that the doctrine of frustration is applied according to any rigid classification of events. However, certain situations provide recurrent examples of frustrating events: • • • • •

state intervention, including compulsory acquisition;320 physical destruction;321 death or incapacitation;322 non-occurrence of an expected event;323 or war.324

1.109  Assumption of risk bars reliance on frustration. A party who has expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of the event in question cannot rely on frustration. The assumption of at least ‘normal’ risks is implied in most contracts. Failure to make

314. See 1.111, Chapter 25. 315. See Chapter 19. 316. See 19.4. 317. Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 169 at 200; [1943] HCA 43 at [7] (Latham CJ). 318. See 19.5. 319. See 19.5. 320. See 19.15–19.16. 321. See 19.17. 322. See 19.18. 323. See 19.19. 324. See 19.20.

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provision in the contract for risks that are, or ought to be, known to exist may imply their assumption.325 1.110  A party cannot rely on self-induced frustration. A state of facts brought about by the act or election of a party cannot be relied on by that party as frustrating the contract. The onus of proving that frustration was self-induced usually rests on the party raising the allegation.326 1.111  Effect of frustration. Termination by frustration is not a matter of choice or election by the parties. Frustration terminates the contract automatically by operation of law. Notwithstanding this, the right to rely on frustration may be lost by conduct indicating that it will not be exercised.327 Traditionally, the effect of frustration was to excuse the parties from further performance, and no more. The parties were entitled to retain the benefit of any performance already given before the frustrating event. But this principle can favour one party at the expense of the other. Money may have been paid in advance for a performance that, after frustration, need no longer be given; conversely, a performance may have been given in advance of a payment that need no longer be made. The law of restitution has been applied to achieve a more flexible operation of the doctrine of frustration.328 In Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, legislation now governs the effect of frustration. Although the Acts differ, their general effect is to allow the court to adjust the position of the parties after frustration to prevent unfairness, so that money already paid under a frustrated contract may be recoverable, and performance already rendered may be compensable. The application of the legislation may be excluded by the parties. Certain contracts are specifically excluded from it, notably contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, most charterparties and contracts of insurance.329

Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition 1.112  Termination for non-fulfilment of contingent condition. The obligation to perform a contract may be conditional on the happening of a contingency that neither party has promised will happen: a common example is a contract of sale that is ‘subject to finance’. Another is a contract that is ‘subject to planning approval’. Such a condition is a contingent condition of performance. The law dealing with such conditions is described in Chapter 20. 1.113  Contingent conditions of performance distinguished from contingent conditions of formation. Situations in which there is no contract at all until some contingency occurs, for example, the execution of a document,330 must be distinguished from those considered here, in which a contract has come into existence 325. See 19.21–19.22. 326. See 19.23. 327. See 19.24. 328. See 19.26–19.30. 329. See 19.31–19.42. 330. See 5.21–5.25.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

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but is liable to termination if a specified event occurs or does not occur. In such cases some obligations may have to be performed before the outcome is known.331 Contingent conditions are, if possible, treated as conditions of performance rather than of formation, especially if the parties have settled all the terms of their transaction.332 1.114  Promissory conditions distinguished. Contingent conditions of performance must be distinguished from promissory conditions, that is, the essential promises of the contracting parties, breach of which justifies termination by the innocent party.333 Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition is not, as such, a breach of contract.334 1.115  Termination may be automatic or elective. Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition can result in automatic termination of a contract where the parties have unequivocally agreed that this shall be the case. Otherwise, the contract remains in operation until a party elects to terminate it. In many cases, therefore, the contract continues on foot, notwithstanding non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance, until one of the parties exercises the right to terminate.335 However, the right to terminate may in such cases be exercised immediately upon non-fulfilment of the condition: no prior notice is required.336 1.116  Termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition is subject to restrictions. The terminating party may be precluded from relying on non-fulfilment as a basis for termination on a number of grounds relating to conduct and the course of events both before and after non-fulfilment: • • • • •

where the enforcing party waived the condition: see 1.117; where the terminating party prevented or dispensed with its fulfilment;337 where the terminating party affirmed the contract, waived the right to terminate or is estopped from terminating;338 where the terminating party breached an obligation of co-operation (see 1.118) or of good faith;339 or where termination is unconscionable in equity or under legislation.340

Waiver by the enforcing party (waiver of the benefit of a condition) is a restriction peculiar to termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance. All the other grounds listed above apply also to termination for breach: see 1.122–1.124. The two grounds most often invoked in relation to contingent conditions are briefly described below.

331. See 20.3. 332. See 20.3–20.4. 333. See 20.1. 334. See 20.2. 335. See 20.8. 336. See 20.9. 337. See 20.14. 338. See 20.15. 339. See 20.17. 340. See 20.18–20.19.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.117  Waiver of benefit of condition. In some cases, a party can waive the requirement that a condition be fulfilled so as to prevent the other party from relying on its nonfulfilment as a basis for termination (‘waiver of the benefit of a condition’). A party can ‘waive the benefit’ of a condition in this way only if the condition is primarily for his or her benefit. It is not entirely clear how one-sided a condition must be to fall within the ambit of this principle.341 1.118  Implied duty to co-operate. Where a contract is subject to a contingent condition, the duty to co-operate implied in all contracts342 normally imposes on each party the duty to do what is reasonably necessary to enable fulfilment of the condition. So, a contract of sale made ‘subject to finance’ normally implies that the buyer will do what is reasonably necessary to obtain finance. ‘Subject to planning approval’ imports an obligation to provide the necessary documents to the planning body. Nearly every contingent condition can therefore be said to have a ‘promissory element’ or to imply a promise. If its non-fulfilment is due to a party’s obstruction or failure to do what is reasonably necessary, there is not only a breach of contract, but the party is also disqualified from relying on non-fulfilment of the condition as a ground of termination. In such cases, as it is sometimes put, the condition is treated as satisfied.343

Termination for breach 1.119  Termination for breach. A party may be entitled to terminate a contract because of breach by the other party.344 Termination carries a risk, as discussed below, because it is the most drastic action that can be taken under a contract. A right of termination arises if the other party has breached the contract and: 1. the contract itself provides for a right of termination for the breach in question; or 2. the breach is sufficiently serious in law to justify termination. Unless otherwise agreed, a contractual right to terminate for breach does not preclude the existence of a concurrent right conferred by law.345 The parties may validly stipulate that any breach at all, major or minor, shall entitle the other party to terminate the contract. However, the law exercises some control over contractual rights to terminate. They will be construed, if possible, so as to avoid unreasonable consequences.346 Moreover, unless otherwise agreed, such rights are subject to the same restrictions that apply to rights conferred by law.347 1.120  Right to terminate conferred by law. A right to terminate is conferred by law only for a serious breach of the contract. A precipitate termination may therefore backfire, since a wrongful termination (that is, the breach was not sufficiently serious) is not only ineffective but also entitles the other party to terminate the 341. See 20.13. 342. See 1.68. 343. See 20.16. 344. The law on this topic is considered in Chapter 21. 345. See 21.3. 346. See 21.4. 347. See 21.6.

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contract (wrongful termination is itself a serious breach) and to sue for damages.348 Termination is therefore risky because it is not always easy to assess whether it will be found to be legally justified, that is, whether the breach was sufficiently serious. There are many cases in the law reports of backfiring terminations. Further, a court is inclined to examine closely the conduct of a party purporting to terminate. The courts have failed to devise a wholly uniform approach in defining the kind of breach that justifies termination. However, the weight of authority favours a tripartite classification of such breaches:349 • • •

Repudiation. This is breach consisting of the manifestation of unwillingness or inability to perform the contract at all or in substance.350 Breach of essential term or condition. This is breach consisting of failure to perform a term designated as essential by the contract or by the law.351 Breach of intermediate term causing substantial loss of benefit. This is breach of a term that is not necessarily essential but its breach has the effect of substantially depriving the injured party of the benefit of the contract.352

It is clear that these categories of breach may overlap in their application.353 Breach of an essential term and breach of an intermediate term causing substantial loss by definition involve an actual breach of the contract in the sense of a failure to perform when performance is due. However, unwillingness or inability to perform may be manifested before any performance is due under a contract. When this happens the case is one of anticipatory breach. If such a breach is serious enough to constitute repudiation, the innocent party may terminate the contract forthwith, before performance falls due.354 1.121  Notice of termination required. A breach that justifies termination does not of itself terminate the contract. The innocent party may elect to terminate or keep the contract on foot, at least where this is feasible and reasonable, and reserve the right to damages or other appropriate remedy for the breach.355 The contract remains in operation until the innocent party elects to terminate it. An election to terminate a contract requires notice, and is not effective until communicated. A notice is not ineffective, despite being based on an invalid ground, as long as termination is justified on some other valid ground.356 1.122  Restrictions on exercise of a right to terminate for breach. Even where a right to terminate for breach has arisen, its exercise is subject to a number of restrictions: • •

where the terminating party was not ready and willing to perform: see 1.123; where performance was prevented or dispensed with by the terminating party;357

348. See 21.12. 349. See 21.11. 350. See 21.12–21.15, 21.20. 351. See 21.16–21.19. 352. See 21.21–21.22. 353. See 21.11. 354. See 21.13. 355. See 21.10. 356. See 21.24. 357. See 21.27.

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Overview of Contract Law

• • • • •

1.125

where the terminating party has elected to affirm the contract, waived the right to terminate, or is estopped from terminating: see 1.124; where termination breaches implied obligations of co-operation or good faith;358 where termination is unconscionable in equity;359 where termination would cause an unjust forfeiture of property;360 or where termination is unconscionable conduct under legislation.361

Subject to two qualifications, these restrictions apply also to the exercise of a right to terminate for non-fulfilment of contingent conditions of performance: see 1.116. The two qualifications relate to the requirement of readiness and willingness, which may not apply to contingent conditions,362 and to relief against forfeiture of a proprietary right, which again may not apply to such conditions.363 1.123  Readiness and willingness to perform. A party itself unable or unwilling to perform a contract has no right to terminate for breach by the other party, even if that breach would otherwise justify termination. Where a contract provides for contemporaneous or concurrent performance by the parties, each party must demonstrate its readiness and willingness to perform by tendering performance. To establish readiness and willingness, the terminating party must show both intention and ability to perform when performance was due. But the law does not require absolute readiness and willingness to perform the contract in every detail. A party need only be ready and willing to perform the contract in substance. Inability or unwillingness to perform, or breach of, an inessential term does not preclude termination for breach by the other party.364 1.124  The right to terminate may be lost by affirmation, waiver or estoppel. Conduct following breach that conveys to the other party that a right to terminate will not be exercised may result in the loss of that right by affirmation, waiver and/or estoppel. It is impossible to maintain distinct roles for these concepts without some artificiality.365 1.125  Effect of termination for breach. An election to terminate for breach puts an end to the contract from the time of its communication. Both parties are released from all further performance of the contract. However, the contract is treated as valid up to the moment of termination, so that terms that are intended to operate in the event of breach (for example, terms limiting liability or the right to a remedy for the breach) may be relied on. Similarly, rights that unconditionally accrued before the breach may be enforced.366 358. See 21.33–21.34. 359. See 21.35. 360. See 21.36. 361. See 21.37. 362. See 20.11. 363. See 20.12. 364. See 21.26. 365. See 21.28–21.32. See Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 655; [1974] HCA 40 at [22] (Mason J): ‘[T]he appellants were precluded from exercising the right of rescission. It is perhaps not of much importance whether one ascribes this result to … election, waiver or estoppel’. 366. See 21.38.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.126

Termination by consent or at will 1.126  A contract may be terminated by consent. As a contract is created by consent, it can also be undone by consent: see Chapter 22. Termination by consent may be accomplished by: • • • •

a further contract between the parties;367 conduct amounting to abandonment of the contract;368 estoppel or waiver;369 or relinquishing the right to sue for breach.370

Many contracts contain terms that expressly confer a unilateral right on a party to terminate at its will or for convenience. By virtue of their incorporation in a contract such rights, though unilateral, must be regarded as rooted in the agreement or consent of the parties. In that sense they constitute a form of termination by consent. A right to terminate at will may be implied as well as expressed. So a contract of indefinite duration — for example, a contract of employment — may imply a right of termination at will by reasonable notice. The ambit and operation of a right to terminate at will is determined by the usual rules of construction. Even a term that confers a wholly discretionary right to terminate the contract may thus be subject to at least residual requirements of co-operation and good faith.371 1.127  Termination and variation. The termination of a contract by consent must be distinguished from its variation. If a contract has been terminated, it need no longer be performed. But if it has been varied, an obligation to perform subsists, though in modified form. A variation may terminate the previous contract and replace it with a new contract, or it may alter the previous contract without affecting its existence. This may be a matter of degree: if the variation is so inconsistent with the original contract as to destroy its substance, termination will be inferred.372 To establish a variation of a contract it is normally necessary to show that a further contract was made between the parties by which their existing contract was modified. Thus, a unilateral variation is ineffective unless the original contract provided for it (for example, a bank altering the interest rate in a loan contract). But a party may be estopped from denying a variation. Waiver has also been invoked as a vehicle of variation.373

Remedies 1.128  Limitation of actions. Under limitation of actions legislation in all states and the Australian Capital Territory, an action for breach of contract must be brought within 367. See 22.7. 368. See 22.9. 369. See 22.11. 370. See 22.11. 371. See 22.12. 372. See 22.5. 373. See 22.3, 22.6.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.131

six years from the date on which it occurred. The period is three years in the Northern Territory. The period is also six years for actions under the Australian Consumer Law.374 1.129  Remedies for breach of contract. The orders that can be obtained from a court upon proof by a party of a breach of contract may be referred to as courtordered remedies.375 As stressed in 1.2, entitlement to a remedy is an essential element of a successful claim for breach of contract. A claimant who fails to obtain a remedy goes away as empty-handed as if no obligation or breach had been proved. The standard remedies for breach of contract are: • •

damages; and orders compelling performance (specific performance and injunction).

An award of damages is a sum of money that the court orders to be paid by the contract-breaker to the claimant. Any breach of contract, no matter how insignificant, entitles a party to damages. However, compensation for loss caused by the breach is awarded only if the rules governing entitlement to, and assessment of, damages are satisfied.376 If a claimant fails to prove these elements, a court will award nominal damages (for example, $1).377 An award of damages is the principal remedy for breach of contract. Actual performance of a contract can be compelled by an order of ‘specific performance’ (or in some cases an ‘injunction’). Such orders are ultimately within the discretion of the court, and there are rules governing this discretion that result in these remedies being exceptional.378 Other remedies are also available in respect of a contract that has miscarried in some way, including restitutionary remedies379 and declaratory orders that determine the rights and obligations of the parties without awarding compensation or compelling performance.380 1.130  Remedies in cases of estoppel. Where no contract was actually made, but a party is nevertheless estopped from denying contractual obligation because of reliance on a mistaken assumption that a contract had been or would be made, the court normally aims to prevent or cure the detriment arising from that reliance. A court may award remedies enforcing a promise, or making good a representation.381 In addition, an estoppel can operate ‘within’ a contract to provide a remedy or, in some cases, deny the right to enforce a remedy.382 1.131  Non-contractual remedies. Breach of contract is not the only potential source of liability in a contract transaction. As already explained,383 many contract 374. The limitation of actions is considered in Chapter 25. 375. The word ‘remedies’ is sometimes used more broadly to include self-help remedies such as rescission for misrepresentation or termination for breach. Another self-help remedy is an agreed damages clause: see 1.140. 376. See 1.132–1.140. 377. See 23.1. 378. See 1.141–1.143. 379. See 16.53–16.55, 23.9, Chapter 26. 380. See 24.28. 381. See 2.9. 382. See 2.31. 383. See 1.3.

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1.131

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

transactions contain elements that may attract other forms of liability, for example, in tort; under the Australian Consumer Law; in equity; in restitution; and in debt. Remedies available for such contract-related causes of actions differ in range and kind from contractual remedies. They are mentioned at appropriate points throughout this book.384

Damages for breach of contract 1.132  Damages for breach of contract. The most common remedy for breach of contract is an award of damages, that is, an order to pay an amount of money. The rules governing damages for breach of contract are complex, and it is no easy task to state them coherently. Many judges have acknowledged that the decision whether and what damages should be awarded is to some extent a pragmatic one, governed by guidelines rather than rules.385 Apart from nominal damages,386 damages for breach of contract are awarded to compensate for loss caused by the breach. Punitive, exemplary or other noncompensatory damages are not awarded for breach of contract.387 Compensatory damages are awarded if: • • •

•

a compensable and measurable loss has been incurred;388 the loss was caused by the breach;389 the loss was not ‘too remote’, that is, it was a ‘natural’ result of the breach or ‘in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract’;390 and the loss could not have been prevented by reasonable effort to mitigate it.391

1.133  Expectation damages. Damages for breach of contract are awarded with the object of placing the injured party, so far as money can do it, in the same situation as if the contract had been performed. The law sets out to measure the difference between the position that would have been created by full performance of the contract and the position that has actually been created by the breach. If the value of the hypothetical position is greater than that of the actual position, a loss has been suffered. Damages are awarded to cover that loss. Such damages protect the expectation that a contract will be performed, and are commonly described as expectation damages. In assessing the difference in value between the actual and the hypothetical position, the law takes account of all benefits, direct and indirect, that would have flowed from full performance of the contract. The law also takes into account extra cost or injury incurred as a result of the breach. However, the law sets off 384. In particular, the difference between contract damages and damages in tort and under the Australian Consumer Law is dealt with in 11.82–11.86, 11.124–11.147 and 23.8–23.9. Restitution and debt are examined in Chapter 26. 385. The law of contract damages is described in Chapter 23. 386. See 23.1. 387. See 23.2. 388. See 23.6–23.30. 389. See 23.34–23.38. 390. See 23.39–23.40. 391. See 23.38–23.41.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.135

against lost benefits and extra cost the value of any benefits obtained prior to, or notwithstanding, the breach.392 1.134  Recognised kinds of loss. Although in principle contract damages cover any loss incurred as a result of the breach, there are well-recognised categories of compensable loss. So, damages may be recovered for: •

• • • • • •

expenditure and liability incurred in preparation for or in the course of performance of the contract.393 Two qualifications apply: –– Costs can be recovered only to the extent to which they are wasted as a result of the breach. So, if an asset was acquired that can be resold or used to generate income, the cost of its acquisition can be recovered only to the extent to which it exceeds the present value of the asset. –– Costs can be recovered only to the extent to which they would have been recouped had the contract been fully performed. If performance would have resulted in a loss, damages are reduced accordingly. But in a commercial contract, the onus of proving that expenditure or liability reasonably incurred would not have been recouped is on the contract-breaker; loss of profit;394 loss of chance or opportunity;395 loss of use of money;396 personal injury;397 mental distress and loss of reputation;398 cost of rectification or replacement.399

1.135  Effect of termination of contract. In principle, loss caused by a breach of contract is compensable whether the contract is terminated for the breach or not. Where the breach is not such as to entitle the other party to terminate, any loss that results from it is nevertheless compensable. Where the breach does entitle the other party to terminate the contract, termination is a prerequisite to any damages at all while there is only an anticipatory breach.400 Termination, whether for actual or anticipatory breach, is a prerequisite of ‘loss of bargain’ damages, awarded for the full value of the performance lost by termination, including all benefits that would have been gained if the contract had not been terminated.401 Such damages can, however, only be claimed upon exercising a right to terminate for breach conferred by law (see 1.120), not merely a right to termination conferred by the contract, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.402 392. See 23.6–23.10. 393. See 23.11–23.12. 394. See 23.13. 395. See 23.14–23.16. 396. See 23.17. 397. See 23.18. 398. See 23.19. This head of damages is limited to certain types of contracts. 399. See 23.27. 400. See 23.21. 401. See 23.22. 402. See 23.23.

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1.136

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.136  Valuation of loss. In putting a money value on benefits that have been lost the court will adopt their market value, if any, as the basis of its assessment. However, it is not always appropriate or possible to do this. For example, it may be appropriate to award the cost of rectifying a defective performance even where this exceeds the market value gained by such rectification. So, where a builder erects a house in breach of contract specifications, the proprietor may be entitled to the cost of rebuilding the house to specifications, even if the house as actually built has a market value and the cost of rectification exceeds that value.403 If there was an identifiable chance that the loss in question would have happened anyway, independently of the breach, damages are discounted accordingly.404 1.137  Only loss caused by the breach is recoverable. The onus of establishing the causal link generally lies on the claimant. However, the court sometimes infers that the loss was caused by the breach in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In contract law, the question of whether loss was caused by breach is decided by applying common sense and policy rather than strict logic or science.405 The law accepts that events may be due to multiple causes; it is only necessary for the breach in question to be one of them.406 At the same time, the law also accepts that the causal link between breach and loss can be severed by an intervening cause.407 It is also possible in those types of contracts involving the exercise of professional care for the damages to be reduced because the claimant contributed to the claimed loss by his or her own fault.408 1.138  Loss that is too remote is not recoverable. The application of this criterion is determined by reference to the so-called rule in Hadley v Baxendale.409 Two branches or limbs of the rule recognise two separate grounds for holding that a loss is not too remote. The first is that a reasonable person would have realised that such a loss was likely to occur as a usual consequence of such a breach. The second is that the defendant should have realised that such a loss was likely to occur on the basis of actual knowledge of the particular circumstances. In either case it is reasonable for the plaintiff to suppose, in the absence of contrary agreement, that the defendant accepted the risk of the loss in question.410 1.139  Mitigation. Loss is not recoverable to the extent that it could have been mitigated (reduced) by reasonable effort of the claimant. The cost of mitigation may be claimed. The party in breach has the onus of establishing failure to mitigate.411 In general, an unjustifiable failure to obtain a substitute performance from another readily available source is a failure to mitigate. A substitute performance may have to be accepted in mitigation of loss even if offered by the party in breach.412 403. See 23.27. 404. See 23.28–23.29. 405. See 23.34–23.36. 406. See 23.37. 407. See 23.38. 408. See 23.30. 409. (1854) 9 Exch 341 at 354; 156 ER 145 at 151. 410. See 23.39–23.40. 411. See 23.41. 412. See 23.42.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.143

But the injured party is obliged to take only such steps as are reasonable, and need not resort to measures that are costly, complex or extravagant.413 1.140  Agreed damages. The parties to a contract may stipulate what damages shall be payable for a breach (‘liquidated damages’). However, the law exercises some control over such stipulations. Terms that overcompensate the injured party may be considered to be ‘penalties’.414 The clause must be unconscionable, extravagant or out of all proportion to the foreseeable harm for it to be characterised as a penalty. If it is so characterised, then it is effectively severed from the contract, and the claimant must resort to common law damages.

Specific Performance and Injunction 1.141  Orders compelling performance. A court may make an order of specific performance, that is, an order requiring a party to perform the contract (as nearly as possible) in accordance with its terms. The court may also issue an injunction. An injunction is usually an order that a party refrain from acts that would constitute breach of contract, but it can also be a positive order that a particular term be carried out. Such orders are here referred to as ‘orders compelling performance’.415 1.142  Orders compelling performance are discretionary. The court will not make such an order where an award of damages is an adequate remedy.416 This means that orders of specific performance and injunctions are not usually made in relation to most commercial contracts. However, in some transactions, for example, the sale of land, an order compelling performance will be made almost as a matter of course.417 1.143  Requirements. A number of rules and practical factors limit the availability of these discretionary remedies compelling performance: •

• • • •

Performance of the contract must not require continuing supervision by the court, as, for example, in a complex contract stretching over an extended period.418 Contracts for personal services are not compellable.419 The claimant must be ready and willing to perform.420 The claimant’s performance must also be compellable.421 The order must not result in excessive hardship.422

413. See 23.43. 414. See 23.45. Terms that under-compensate are also subject to special scrutiny, since they in effect limit liability for breach of contract: see 1.72–1.75. 415. Specific performance and injunction are discussed in Chapter 24. 416. The converse — that where damages are inadequate the claimant is entitled to an order to compel performance — does not follow. 417. See 24.4. 418. See 24.13. 419. See 24.12. 420. See 24.10. 421. See 24.11. 422. See 24.8.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.144

Unconscionability and Remedies 1.144  Unconscionability plays a role in the award of remedies. The notion that a remedy should not be granted where this is unconscionable in the circumstances plays a discernible role in the law. It is explicit where liability is assessed on the basis of estoppel.423 It is the explicit basis on which the law denies the enforcement of ‘penalties’.424 It is also implicit in numerous statements in the cases that the law, in awarding damages, aims at ‘fair compensation’, and in the ‘hardship’ limitation placed on the availability of orders compelling performance.425 In seeking a particular remedy, therefore, a claimant is well advised to consider whether it conforms to the demands of conscience as well as the technical requirements of the law.

423. See 1.9. 424. See 1.140. 425. See 1.143.

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PART II Contract Formation

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Chapter 2

Estoppel The Importance of Estoppel 2.1  Estoppel and contract. It may seem odd to start a book on the law of contract with a doctrine that is not contract. The law of contract is about legally enforceable consensual obligations. We will see in the following chapters the traditional elements for establishing the existence of a contract. But, as pointed out in the previous chapter, it is no longer sufficient to consider the legal relationship between two entities purely in terms of a contract that they have made. Instead, the student and practitioner must think in terms of a broader concept of obligations, some self-imposed (that is, expressly or impliedly agreed to) and some imposed by law.1 Usually the engagement is commercial or trading in character, but the obligations can also occur in other relationships. Estoppel, as a device for the imposition of obligation, has become of central importance. The seminal High Court case of Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher2 transformed the law of estoppel and consequently many other areas of the law, including contract. Estoppel’s impact has implications for, among other things, the negotiation of a contract, the rules of formation, the doctrine of consideration, the modification of a contractual relationship, breach, the settlement process and the conduct of litigation.3 It also has implications more generally for the law of obligations.4 Estoppel operates both within and outside contract, that is, it may be the basis for imposing or modifying obligations in relationships both contractual and otherwise. Because what is said about estoppel in non-contractual cases has implications for its operation in connection with the law of contract, it is necessary to draw on such cases. It is accordingly appropriate to introduce this treatment of the law of contract with a discussion of estoppel that has the potential for casting new light on almost every aspect of the law of contract.

How estoppel works 2.2  The underlying principle and the elements of estoppel. The basic principle underlying the idea of estoppel is the popular saying that ‘you cannot blow hot and cold’. This is a normative admonition reflected in the role of unconscionability in estoppel cases. It is about inconsistent behaviour where that behaviour adversely affects another.

1. See 28.9, where it is argued that possibly ‘contract’ itself is no longer confined to the traditional, selfcontained model but should be more broadly thought of as a subset of the law of obligations. One of the main factors in support of this idea is the emergence in Australia of a revivified doctrine of estoppel. 2. (1988) 164 CLR 387. See 2.7. 3. See 2.19–2.32 for a survey of the impact of estoppel in various areas of the law of contract. 4. See Robertson, ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations’ (1997) 19 Syd LR 32.

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2.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The fact that the law is prepared to provide a remedy in such a situation necessarily means that estoppel is limited in its reach. Generally, the law has no business in remedying social relations so that there is an element equivalent to the contract requirement of an intention to create, or affect, legal relations.5 This aspect of estoppel usually goes without saying so that there is little in the way of judicial statements on the necessarily restricted reach of estoppel.6 In Public Trustee v Kukula,7 it was held that promissory estoppel could not be employed to enforce a promise to marry, such promise being unenforceable by way of the old breach of promise action because of its abrogation by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. On the other hand, in W v G8 it was held that an estoppel operated to make one partner in a relationship liable for the maintenance of two children whom both had agreed to raise. The requirement that estoppel only affects legal relations is, in fact, a circular statement. There are certain categories of non-commercial relationships where estoppel can operate.9 For example, it will be seen in Chapter 1610 that proprietary estoppel often applies to family arrangements concerning land. It is clear that estoppel cannot work against some types of statutory provisions, that is, it may not be possible for an estoppel to abrogate a right or duty provided by legislation. This is shown by Public Trustee v Kukula, discussed above, and other cases.11 However, the type of statutory provision must be closely examined. If it confers private rights then it may be possible that the right can be modified or lost by estoppel.12 Similarly, although an estoppel can apply to government in relation to some activities, it cannot affect a government in carrying out its public functions.13

5. See 2.11 below and, on intention to create legal relations, see Chapter 5. There are judicial statements (and disagreements) about the appropriateness of arguing estoppel in what 6. might be termed ‘hard-nosed’ commercial relationships. This is a different issue and is discussed below at 2.16 and 2.20. 7. (1990) 14 Fam LR 97. 8. (1996) 20 Fam LR 49. Another illustration of estoppel in a non-commercial relationship is Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 (witness protection program — various assurances not kept). See also Chanrich Properties Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2001] NSWSC 229 (council bound by undertakings to pay market value for land dedicated as a public reserve). 9. Thus, where contract or the competition and consumer legislation may be inapplicable, an estoppel could operate. An example is Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241. 10. See 16.68–16.69. 11. See Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Boss Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 270 (no estoppel to extend time limit under a statutory demand under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [59]–[61] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263, where it was held that a statutory right to rescind could not be lost through the operation of estoppel; Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 1017 (Viscount Radcliffe). See extensive discussion by Basten JA in Tudor at [50]–[72]. 12. See Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 (statutory limitation period), where there is extensive discussion of the difference between statutory provisions that can, and cannot, be affected by an estoppel. A limitation period defence may be lost through the operation of an estoppel. As to whether estoppel can ‘cure’ non-compliant execution of a deed, see Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.32]. See also Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Traspunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2011] 2 Qd R 114; [2010] QCA 119 at [62]–[69] (Muir JA, Holmes and Chesterman JJA concurring). In Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, a remedy was fashioned so as not to breach a statutory provision. 13. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [5.25]. See discussion by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 at 108–18.

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Estoppel

2.3

The elements of estoppel exist when: •

• •

a promise, a representation or the conduct of one party leads another to assume that the first party will follow a certain course of action or that certain facts are established or that a certain legal relationship exists or will exist; the other party reasonably relies on the promise, representation or conduct, that is, acts on that assumption in some material way; and because of that reliance, the other party would suffer detriment if the first party acts inconsistently with the promise, representation or conduct and the consequent assumption, such that it would be unjust or unconscionable for the first party to go back on the promise or representation or to undermine the assumption generated by his or her conduct.

These elements are the ‘bare bones’ for the operation of estoppel.14 The discussion in this chapter shows that there are numerous sub-issues that may arise from these elements. Further, there are various categories of estoppel,15 each of which has its own special rules. This treatment covers estoppels of most relevance to contractual and domestic relationships. These are equitable estoppels which cover proprietary and promissory estoppel. 2.3  The various types of estoppel.16 It will be seen from the examination of the Waltons case below that the recasting of estoppel was brought about in part because of a desire by the judges of the High Court to unify the various strands of estoppel that have developed in the case law. The promissory estoppel described in 2.5 is but one such strand, albeit the one closest to contract. The various types of estoppel relevant to this treatment are now briefly described: •

•

Estoppel by representation (or in pais) operates to prevent departure from a representation, by words or conduct, of existing fact if the representee has acted in reliance on it.17 A related concept is estoppel by convention whereby a party is not permitted to depart from an assumption that has been adopted by both parties,18 if to do so would be unjust in the circumstances.19

14. See the more elaborate statement of the elements by Brennan J in the extract from Waltons below at 2.5. 15. See 2.3. 16. The brief discussion here only covers types of estoppel relevant to commercial and family dealings. See Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016) for coverage of all types of estoppel. 17. Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 at [149]–[158] (Gageler J); Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547 (Dixon J); Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674–6 (Dixon J); Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563. The stipulation that a representation must be one of fact is questionable. See Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3467]–[3469]; Sumampow v Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 64 at [181]. See also Hudson, ‘The True Purpose of Estoppel by Representation’ (2015) 32 JCL 275. 18. Estoppel by deed is arguably a form of estoppel by convention, though some would argue that estoppel by deed is unique. See discussion in Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [5.5]. 19. Con-Stan Industries Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Aust) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 at 244–5; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84; Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146; MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley [2005] NSWCA 89; Davis v CGU Insurance Ltd [2009] SASC 220 at [21]–[35] (Vanstone J); Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65 at [200]; Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5 at [30]–[33] (Brereton J); Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Co Ltd [2008] WASCA 119 at [156]–[187] (Buss JA). See Derham,

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2.3

•

•

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Proprietary estoppel20 gives enforceable rights over land to a person who has been assured or allowed to assume21 that he or she has, or will have, an interest in the land owned by the person giving such assurance, so long as the promisee acts on the assurance, by, for example, making improvements. Promissory estoppel prevents departure from promissory statements that have been relied on. This development was regarded as controversial because it had been thought that estoppel could not apply to promises.22

The first two categories are termed common law estoppel. The second two categories are termed equitable estoppel. The difference between these various types of estoppel is not always clear when applying the principles to a given fact situation. The different interpretations of the facts by the judges of the High Court in Waltons (see 2.7) illustrate this. A new type of estoppel — ‘contractual estoppel’ — has emerged in the United Kingdom.23 It is controversial and even its categorisation as estoppel is contested.24 It manifests itself in contractual clauses that are intended to establish unchallengeable facts, states of affairs or assumptions. These clauses are designed to prevent any attempt to argue in litigation a fact or assumption contrary to the clause, most commonly via misrepresentation.25 When carefully drafted, such a clause embeds what can amount to a falsehood, for example, that the representee has not relied on information provided by the representor. This type of clause is arguably a type of estoppel by convention analogous to estoppel by deed. They have been used in sophisticated transactions such as syndicated loans and derivatives contracts. They have, however, spread to everyday business and consumer contracts. Their use puts one in mind of mid-twentieth-century exemption clauses. The United Kingdom courts have broadly endorsed their use as a manifestation of freedom of contract.

20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II). In Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428, an estoppel by convention determined the identity of the legal entity with which BHP was dealing. There has been controversy as to whether the assumption forming the basis of an estoppel by convention is as to facts or law. The modern view is that the assumption may be about the legal effect of, for example, a clause or document: see Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [758]–[779] (Edelman J); The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3469] (Owen J); Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175 at 185–9 (Samuels JA); Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 at [147]–[155] (Austin J); Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 272, in which there is extensive discussion of estoppel by convention by each of Lander, Williams and Besanko JJ; Rae & Partners Pty v Shaw [2020] TASFC 14. See discussion in 16.68–16.71. Such assurance may be tacit, as where the owner stands by without objection while the other makes improvements, termed estoppel by acquiescence. Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, in which it was held that estoppel could only apply to representations of existing fact, not future intention. Jorden was followed in Chadwick v Manning [1896] AC 231. These cases have been overruled. See Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 452 (Deane J); Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410 (Mason CJ). Braithwaite, ‘The Origins and Implications of Contractual Estoppel’ (2016) 132 LQR 120. See Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386; Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2014] AC 436. See also Trukhtanov, ‘Misrepresentation: Acknowledgement of Non-reliance as Defence’ (2009) 125 LQR 648; Trukhtanov, ‘Receipt Clauses: From Estoppel by Deed to Contractual Estoppel’ (2014) 130 LQR 3. Ibid Braithwaite at 120–1. See also Trukhnatov, ‘Receipt Clauses: From Estoppel by Deed to Contractual Estoppel’ (2014) 130 LQR 3; Trukhnatov, Contractual Estoppel (2018); Leeming, ‘Receipts Clauses and “Contractual Estoppel” Revisited’ (2018) 134 LQR 171 at 175. See also 11.42.

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Estoppel

2.4

At present this development has not occurred in Australia.26 Some powerful voices have spoken out against it.27 It would certainly run into difficulties if the inclusion of a clause was misleading or deceptive or amounted to an attempt to eliminate liability for such conduct. And, arguably, the law of estoppel in Australia would not permit the use of such a clause if its effect is unconscionable. 2.4  The development of estoppel in the law of contract. Prior to the Waltons case, estoppel in contractual relations operated in a limited way. Lord Denning’s famous statement in the High Trees case28 established, or revived,29 a principle — promissory estoppel — that a contracting party may be prevented from insisting on his or her strict contractual rights if, having regard to the dealings that have taken place between the parties, in particular assurances about how the contract will proceed, it would be inequitable to allow such insistence.30 Thus, a landlord who promises to accept a reduced rent may be prevented (or estopped) from claiming the full rent,31 even though the promise by the landlord is not supported by consideration (and therefore, as a matter of strict contract law, is not a binding variation to the contract).32 Or, a contracting party may promise the other that he or she will not insist on a contractual deadline, and may then be estopped from relying on that deadline as a basis for alleging breach.33 Thus, it can be seen, promissory estoppel traditionally had a limited area of operation in contract: it was confined to negative promises (‘you need not pay the full rent …’) by way of an indulgence or concession relating to existing contractual relations.34 The transformation that occurred as a result of the Waltons case gives promissory estoppel a far wider compass: first, it may be used to enforce a positive promise — as a sword not just as a shield;35 and second, it is no longer confined to existing contractual relations. 26. Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v Queensland Sugar Ltd [2019] QSC 116 at [174]–[175] (Davis J). 27. Heydon, Heydon on Contract (2019), [5.770]; Handley, ‘Reinventing Estoppel in the Privy Council’ (2014) 130 LQR 370; Leeming, ‘Receipts Clauses and “Contractual Estoppel” Revisited’ (2018) 134 LQR 171. 28. Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. 29. Denning J based his argument on two nineteenth-century cases, Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 and Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268, discussed in 2.5. 30. As, for example, in Stevens v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323, in which a mortgage could only be enforced to a limited amount because of a course of conduct by the bank that amounted to an assurance that the amount would not be exceeded. See also Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251, where a principal in a construction contract, whose agent authorised varied performance not in accordance with the contractual procedure for making variations, was estopped from arguing the failure to use the proper procedure with the result that the variation was binding; see 2.29. 31. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. Contrast Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435 (reduction of rent by deed not binding on assignee landlord even though reduced rent had been accepted by new landlord without objection). 32. As to the doctrine of consideration, see Chapter 4. 33. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, discussed below in 2.5. On the facts, the estoppel was not successfully argued. Compare Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 (vendor prevented from insisting on deadline after solicitor said, two days before deadline, that request for extension should be submitted in writing and instructions would be sought). A mere extension of time may be binding in the absence of both consideration and estoppel: Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 at [45]–[51] (Keane JA), though on the facts estoppel could also operate (at [51]). 34. A statement of this limited principle can be found in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220 (Denning LJ). 35. Some judges insist that promissory estoppel can only be used as a defensive equity. See, for example, Handley AJA in Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76]; Handley,

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2.4

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The interaction between estoppel and contract is further discussed below in 2.8 and 2.19–2.32. 2.5  Equitable estoppel. Probably the most commonly cited passage for the requisite elements of equitable estoppel is that of Brennan J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher:36 In my opinion, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant had induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff’s action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise.

It can be seen from these elements that determining whether an estoppel operates in a particular case is a very fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, decided cases may not be particularly helpful unless they contain statements about the underlying legal principles rather than their application. Nevertheless, decided cases can provide guidance on the operation of estoppel. The difficulty encountered in an estoppel case is that, in the absence of the ironclad assumptions generated by a contract, a court must closely examine the conduct of the defendant and then turn to the state of mind and conduct of the plaintiff and assess the interaction between these two to determine whether the plaintiff’s assumption and reaction were reasonable and whether it was productive of loss once the defendant changed its stance.37 All this must be done ‘objectively’ of course, despite the unavoidably subjective nature of the overall inquiry. The consequence for an appeal court can be very arduous. It must not only (re)interpret the facts but also then interpret the trial judge’s treatment of those facts.38 The old-fashioned word ‘estoppel’ may also be used in its verb form: the first party is estopped from denying the state of affairs that has been acted on by the other party. Once these elements are established, the court must then fashion an appropriate remedy to redress the detriment suffered by the second party.39 In some cases involving common law estoppels, the estoppel will work to ‘set the scene’ for the parties. Estoppel then has a merely evidentiary role. This is particularly so when the promise or representation relates to purely factual matters. The one party will be estopped from denying the facts that, in turn, may provide the basis for some cause of action or dispute resolution. In other cases, involving equitable ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625. Compare Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394 at [133]–[136] (Jagot J). 36. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 428–9. Another useful list of elements, distilling and refining what was decided in Waltons, was provided by Priestley JA in Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 at 472 and in Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 604, 610–12. 37. The complexity of this examination is captured by Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230. 38. See, for example, Wilson v Arwon Finance Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 137. Assessing detriment can be very difficult. See, for example, Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220. 39. See 2.9.

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Estoppel

2.5

estoppel, the estoppel will work more directly to provide a remedy.40 Estoppel thus can itself be a cause of action. Some of these elements are the subject of a great deal of debate and disagreement.41 For example, Brennan J did not mention ‘unconscionable’ and yet it is undoubtedly an element of actionable estoppel.42 Nor did his Honour include a statement that a plaintiff’s response in reliance on the defendant’s promise or conduct must be reasonable.43 The controversial aspects of estoppel will emerge in the discussion below. An important treatment of a number of controversies about estoppel, particularly proprietary estoppel, occurred in Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd.44 This coverage attempts to present the law from the decided cases, particularly Australian cases, of which the Waltons case is the leader.45 In the following discussion the language of promise is sometimes used for convenience. Estoppel is not confined to circumstances where a promise is made; it covers a wider range of conduct.

40.

This follows from what was said in Waltons, discussed below. From time to time, judges still insist that promissory estoppel (but not necessarily other types of estoppel) can only be used as a defensive equity. See, for example, Handley AJA in Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76] and in DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [93]. This view has been both doubted and supported. See, for example, in support Nock v Maddern [2018] NSWCA 239 at [35] (White JA, Leeming JA and Sackville AJA concurring); Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 at [26] (Meagher JA, Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq concurring). By contrast, see Campbell, ‘Waltons v Maher: History, Unconscientiousness and Remedy — the “Minimum Equity”’ (2013) 7 J Eq 171 text at fn 68. In FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 at [251]–[268], both the Handley view and its opposite were canvassed but ultimately not decided because an estoppel by convention could be enforced without using estoppel as a cause of action. In Commercial & General Corporation Pty Ltd v Manassen Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] SASCFC 40, the controversy is canvassed at length by Livesey J concluding at [181] that ‘In an appropriate case promissory estoppel can operate as a positive source of legal rights’. 41. As noted, Justice Handley in particular has criticised the Australian development of estoppel in, and since, Waltons. See Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016); Handley, ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724; Handley, ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625; Handley, ‘Exploring New and Old Ideas about Estoppel and Election’ (2019) 93 ALJ 594. For insights into some of the continuing controversies, the thorough analysis by White J in Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717 is very helpful. This judgment was upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. See also the extensive discussion of various strands of estoppel by Lindsay J in Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich [2013] NSWSC 97. For views critical of the Handley rejection of Waltons, see Robertson, ‘Three Models of Promissory Estoppel’ (2013) 7 J Eq 226; Silink, ‘Can Promissory Estoppel be an Independent Source of Rights?’ (2015) 40 UWALR 39; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021). 42. See 2.16. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. Compare Young, ‘Unconscionability and Promissory Estoppel’ (2016) 90 ALJ 878. 43. See 2.14. 44. (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. 45. See Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 118. Compare Handley, referred to above. He is particularly critical of the use of promissory estoppel to enforce positive promises: ‘Non-contractual but enforceable promises which confer positive rights in personam are a recent invention without a respectable pedigree’: ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724 at 728. The American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 90(1), in part relied on by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons, is not a ‘recent invention’. The Handley view is, to say the least, controversial: Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [117]–[118] (Bathurst CJ); Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [769] (Edelman J).

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2.5

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

When the basis for an estoppel argument is a promissory statement, it has been stipulated that the statement or representation be reasonably clear and unambiguous.46 If there is any doubt on this score then a court may conclude that an estoppel does not operate.47 The more that a statement is promissory in nature, conveying a clear undertaking, the more likely that a person to whom it is made will justifiably rely on it. Accordingly, the courts have sometimes insisted on the statement being promissory in intent,48 such intention being judged objectively.49 However, the strict approach to this issue appears to be less demanding in some cases.50 The question of what was conveyed by the party against whom estoppel is argued is context-specific. For example, in family or domestic circumstances often involving proprietary estoppel, clarity of meaning is less likely to be found or expected.51 In addition, these cases can depend on silence — acquiescence — being the crucial element of the defendant’s conduct. In non-domestic cases, the need for certainty parallels,52 or is possibly more stringent53 than, the requirements of certainty in contract formation.54 Thus, for 46.

Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54. See Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 143–6. 47. Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26; DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348; Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 at 235 followed in Tony J Boulos Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 105. The statements relied on must be ‘unqualified, firm and specific’ so as to induce an assumption that a particular legal relationship would be established or an interest would be granted. 48. Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220; Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Instruments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 at 884 (Lord Diplock); James v Heim Gallery (London) Ltd [1980] Est Gaz Dig 184 at 190 (Buckley LJ). 49. Bremer HandelsgesellschaftmbH v VandenAvenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 at 126. 50. See, for example, Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 at [121] (Campbell JA) citing Flinn v Flinn [1993] 3 VR 712 at 738–9 (Brooking CJ); Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 at [93]–[94] (Tobias JA). See also Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 at [133]–[137] (Dodds-Streeton JA); Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312 at [85] (Hodgson JA); Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 at [52]–[53] (Meagher JA, Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq concurring). 51. DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [54] (Meagher JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel). In Doueihi at [171]–[185] it was made clear that there is no division or dichotomy between commercial and domestic estoppel cases. See also at [186]–[201] on the requirement of certainty. 52. See Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [142]–[143], [147] (Keane J). Contrast Nettle J at [211]–[212] and [218]. This case is closely examined by Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137. 53. See the discussion by Mason and Deane JJ in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 435–7. See also Ipp JA in Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 at [182]. It seems from these statements that a court, in interpreting an ambiguous promise in the context of estoppel, would not be so generous in finding a meaning as is demonstrated in ordinary contract cases involving uncertainty: see, for example of the latter, Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571, discussed in 6.6. But compare Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2014) 45 VR 771; [2014] VSCA 353 at [84] (Warren CJ); Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 at [93] (Tobias JA). In Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [1748]–[1751], Drummond AJA argued that in promissory estoppel cases, clarity of what is allegedly promised is essential. 54. As to which see Chapter 6. This precept of certainty is not firmly embedded and it has been stated that no bright line exists to treat domestic cases differently from commercial cases: Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242 at [146] (Bathurst CJ).

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Estoppel

2.5

example, estoppel would not operate if the party making the statement expressly reserved his or her rights,55 or where the statement was equivocal, as in Legione v Hateley.56 In that case, the purchasers of land needed to obtain bridging finance and, the day before the date for settlement, their solicitors asked the vendor’s solicitors for a short extension of time. A secretary said, ‘I think that’ll be all right but I’ll have to get instructions’. This was thought by Mason and Deane JJ not to be a clear enough statement. Brennan J based his reasoning on the view that the vendor’s solicitors did not have authority to give an assurance granting an extension of time. On the other hand, Gibbs CJ and Murphy J thought that the statement was sufficiently clear to induce the purchasers’ solicitors to believe that there would not be a strict insistence on the deadline.57 In the end, the statement or conduct that is put forward as a basis for estoppel must be objectively construed in its context and so it may be possible for apparent ambiguity to be removed by consideration of surrounding circumstances and the parties’ evident intention.58 The statement must ultimately be capable of inducing reliance in the recipient; this can happen with statements that are not models of clarity.59 More difficult questions arise when the basis of an estoppel argument is not promissory conduct. The need for clarity is more difficult to satisfy. Yet there is no doubt that estoppel can operate on the basis of an understanding, assumption or nonpromissory conduct. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co,60 a six-month period within which the tenant was obliged to effect repairs was held to be extended because the parties entered into negotiations for the purchase of the tenant’s interest after the notice to repair had been sent. The negotiations did not result in an agreement and the House of Lords held that, while negotiations were on foot, there was an implied understanding or assumption that the running of the period was suspended.61 Suppose a party to a contract has accepted defective performance, such as consistently late payment of instalments. Does the acceptance without objection indicate that future payments need not be on time? On one argument it could be said that the party not in breach has lulled the other into a belief that late payments are good enough. On the other hand, it may be harsh to take away the innocent party’s rights for the future if he or she has been kind enough to let the other party pay late. The answer is that, unless a clear and unambiguous assurance can be spelt 55. Finagrain AS Geneva v P Kraus Hamburg [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 508. 56. (1983) 152 CLR 406. 57. Compare Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26, where a statement that a tenant would be ‘looked after at renewal time’ if the tenant carried out extensive refurbishments was not sufficient to found an estoppel. 58. Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 at [179]–[208], where Ipp JA canvassed the authorities. See also Flinn v Flinn (1999) 3 VR 712 at 738 (Brooking JA, with whom Charles and Batt JJA agreed). Brooking JA carried out a very extensive analysis of the authorities. 59. See Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 at [133]–[137] (Dodds-Streeton JA), a case in which a much-emphasised assurance that an investment was for the ‘long term’ was held to be sufficient basis for an estoppel. In Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242, a proprietary estoppel case, Bathurst CJ stated at [120] ‘equitable estoppel can be established despite the expectation being based on a promise or representation that would not be sufficiently certain to amount to a valid contract, or is formed on the basis of vague assurances’ and at [122] ‘a proprietary estoppel may be established where the promise or representation relied upon did not define the interest the party was expected to receive’ (Bell P and Leeming JA concurring). 60. (1877) 2 App Cas 439. 61. Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268 was a similar case (tacit understanding that a contractual period would not run while building operations were delayed).

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2.5

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

out from the indulgent party’s conduct, an estoppel will not operate to defeat his or her contractual rights.62 Further, it is usually not unconscionable to withdraw the indulgence of allowing late payments. In cases like Waltons (discussed fully in 2.7), where an estoppel argument is employed to try to establish a contract in the absence of formal execution, the court must be able to spell out what the alleged contract is and what its essential terms are. If an important matter has not been finalised, the estoppel argument may fail.63 On the other hand, there are cases where a court will be prepared to fashion an order that fills in a considerable level of detail about the future dealings between the parties.64

The Overarching Estoppel Theory 2.6  A unified estoppel? All of these threads have a common theme: a person will be prevented from departing from a representation, promise or assurance that he or she has made if it would be unconscionable to do so in the circumstances, namely, where the other party has detrimentally relied on the representation, promise or assurance.65 Broadly, these strands of estoppel can be woven together into a general doctrine of estoppel by conduct.66 As Mason CJ put it in Commonwealth v Verwayen: In conformity with the fundamental purpose of all estoppels to afford protection against the detriment which would flow from a party’s change of position if the assumption that led to it were deserted, these developments have brought a greater underlying unity to the various categories of estoppel. Indeed, the consistent trend in the modern decisions points inexorably towards the emergence of one overarching doctrine of estoppel rather than a series of independent rules.67

This unification idea has, in turn, made it possible to use estoppel as a basis for enforcing positive promises. This is because proprietary estoppel, in particular, generated positive rights (for example, to compensation or to an interest in land) and this feature has been absorbed into the doctrine developed by the High Court in 62. Compare Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257; Kostopoulos v G E Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 311 at [35]–[37] (Keane JA); Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 (no estoppel arising from non-enforcement of a take or pay clause); see also John Burrows Ltd v Subsurface Surveys Ltd (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 354. For a case where the dealings between the parties concerning late payments did create an estoppel, see Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 at [98]–[99] (Brereton J). For further discussion of waiver, election and contract variation, see 2.29. 63. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, more fully discussed in 2.20 below. See also Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1. 64. A remarkable example is Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717: see discussion of the authorities by White J at [230]–[245]. This case is noted in (2015) 89 ALJ 223. The decision of White J was upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. 65. See Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985), 59; Robertson, ‘Towards a Unifying Purpose for Estoppel’ (1996) 19 Mon LR 1. 66. This is the label preferred by Deane J in Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 447–53; in Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 434–6; and in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 431. 67. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410. See also Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 411–13, 435–6; Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510 at 515–16; Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Trustees Co [1982] QB 133 at 153; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 122; A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114 at 123–4.

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Estoppel

2.6

the Waltons and Verwayen cases. Proprietary estoppel has also contributed another important feature, namely, flexibility of remedies: see 2.9. There is by no means unanimity in support of the unification principle.68 Gaudron J in Waltons69 and McHugh J in Verwayen70 retained a clear distinction between common law estoppel as a rule of evidence and equitable estoppel which can create substantive rights.71 Equitable estoppel covers both proprietary and promissory estoppel, and, as already noted, some judges draw a distinction between the two in that proprietary estoppel can generate substantive rights whereas promissory estoppel can only be used as a defensive equity. There are also differences between the common law and equitable branches of estoppel that need to be resolved if a truly unified doctrine is to emerge.72 There is no doubt that judges continue to identify the relevant subset of estoppel in a particular case even if it could be argued that there is an overarching principle.73 The overarching estoppel project is moribund. To say the least, the diversity of judicial approaches makes life difficult for practitioners. The overarching estoppel theory would have the merit of, to some extent, eliminating fine distinctions that have substantive effects,74 for example, the sword/shield distinction.75 Why, it may be asked, should a plaintiff’s rights be determined by whether the other party’s conduct can be characterised as affecting real property but not some other species of right or interest?76 Or whether the assurance given by the defendant is of existing fact as opposed to future intention?

68.

Heydon, Leeming and Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, 2014), [17-055]; Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (2009), [12.300] which declares the idea ‘jettisoned’. See also Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016); Handley, ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724; Handley, ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625. 69. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 458. 70. (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 585. 71. See also the equivocation on this issue in Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 at [7] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ): ‘There is no occasion in this appeal to consider whether the various doctrines and remedies in the field of estoppel are to be brought under what Mason CJ called “a single overarching doctrine” or what Deane J identified as a “general doctrine of estoppel by conduct”’ (footnotes omitted). In Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 308 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19, the controversy was mentioned but the overarching theory was not supported: see fn 2 (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 72. See The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 at [3456] (Owen J); Robertson, ‘Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel’ (1998) 24 Mon LR 115; Robertson, ‘Estoppel by Conduct: Unresolved Issues at Common Law and in Equity’ (1999) National LR 7. 73. See the discussion by Sheller JA (with the concurrence of Stein and Beazley JJA) in Wykes v Samilk Pty Ltd (1999) Aust Contract Rep 90-097 at 91,008–13. See also Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158, which shows clearly that ‘overarching’ estoppel is not applied. Giles JA thought that estoppel by representation should be kept separate from equitable estoppel (at [51]–[56]). See, similarly, Hodgson JA in MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39 at [71]–[72]. In Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [37], French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ considered that this controversy was ‘as yet unresolved’. See also Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137 at 139–40; Hudson, ‘The Price of Coherence in Estoppels’ (2017) 39 Syd LR 1. 74. See Bryan, ‘Unifying Estoppel Doctrine: The Argument for Heresy’ (2013) 7 J Eq 209. Contrast McFarlane, ‘The Limits to Estoppels’ (2013) 7 J Eq 250, which argued for the maintenance of the different categories which ‘rest on a number of irreducibly dissimilar principles’. Silink, whilst conceding that a unified theory is not supported, argues for a unified theory for equitable estoppel (proprietary and promissory): ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 118–19. 75. See Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 425–6 (Brennan J). 76. Ibid at 426.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

2.6

Or that, when a defendant is estopped from denying a contract, this is not using estoppel as a sword?77 The Waltons case demonstrates how judges differ on the characterisation question. It also demonstrates that the different views about characterisation did not, in the end, matter.

The Waltons case 2.7  Estoppel reformulated. Waltons needed a new retail store in Nowra. It negotiated with Maher, who had a suitable site with existing buildings on it that would have to be demolished. The plan was for Maher to build a suitable store and lease it to Waltons for six years. Negotiations had reached an advanced stage. There was some urgency as Waltons’ lease on another building was about to expire. An agreement, prepared by Maher’s solicitor, was in almost final form. Some final minor amendments (schedule of finishes and floor plans) had to be made. Waltons’ solicitors indicated on 7 November 1983 that the amendments were acceptable although they had not received specific instructions in respect of each amendment: ‘We shall let you know tomorrow if any amendments are not agreed to’. Having heard nothing further, the relevant documents were executed by Maher and forwarded on 11 November by their solicitor ‘by way of exchange’ to Waltons’ solicitors in Sydney. These documents were received in Sydney on or about the 14th but were never executed by Waltons because it had changed its retailing policy. Meanwhile, Maher started to demolish the existing buildings. Waltons was aware of this by at least 10 December. There was no correspondence between the parties until 22 or 23 January when Waltons’ solicitors informed Maher by letter that Waltons would not proceed with the agreement. By then the old buildings had been demolished and the new store had reached a stage where 60 to 70 per cent of the brickwork had been completed and 40 per cent of the concrete had been poured. Maher brought an action for a declaration that there was in existence a valid contract, specific performance or alternatively damages. The action was successful at all stages with no dissenting judge. Waltons was ordered by the trial judge, Kearney J, to pay damages in lieu of specific performance. The judges differed on the interpretation of the facts. Kearney J said that Maher mistakenly believed that the formalities of exchange had been completed and that Waltons was estopped from denying this assumption because it had contributed to it. This view was rejected by a majority of the High Court and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Priestley JA, with whom Glass and Samuels JJA agreed). The latter held that Maher was under a mistaken assumption that the agreement was binding despite the lack of exchange. This mistaken belief was known to Waltons, who were estopped from denying it. Three judges of the High Court (Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ), on the other hand, held that Waltons had indicated that exchange would take place, there having been an express or implied promise to that effect. These different interpretations of fact gave rise to different possible estoppel analyses. But, in view of the suggested unification theory, discussed above, in the 77.

See Heydon, Leeming and Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, 2014), [17-275].

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Estoppel

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end it did not matter which interpretation of the facts was adopted. Waltons was estopped from denying that a contract had come into being, despite the lack of formal exchange and despite the lack of a written note or memorandum in a transaction involving an interest in land.78 Mason CJ and Wilson J delivered a joint judgment that, because of their interpretation of the facts, made it necessary to discuss promissory estoppel. First, can promissory estoppel operate during negotiations for a contract, as opposed to during the contractual relationship (as in High Trees)? There was no difficulty in finding authority for a positive answer to this question.79 The second issue was whether estoppel could be used for the positive enforcement of rights as opposed to being employed as a defensive equity. Could it be used as a sword rather than a shield? In relation to the facts of Waltons, could Waltons’ implied undertaking — that contracts would be exchanged — be enforced? Here, as noted above, the unification theory played an important role, because Mason CJ and Wilson J drew on proprietary estoppel cases80 (which hitherto had not impinged on contractual relations81) to demonstrate that estoppel could be used to create positive rights. They found a common thread in estoppel cases, namely: … the principle that equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relation to which the other party to the transaction has ‘played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it’: per Dixon J in Grundt;82 see also Thompson.83 Equity comes to the relief of such a plaintiff on the footing that it would be unconscionable conduct on the part of the other party to ignore the assumption.84

Brennan J also assumed that Waltons had made an implied promise to exchange contracts and held that such a promise should be enforceable by drawing on the proprietary estoppel cases. No sensible distinction could be drawn between promissory and proprietary estoppel in relation to the sword/shield question.85 Deane J interpreted the facts differently, saying that Maher was entitled to assume that a contract had come into being in the absence of exchange. This assumption was encouraged or caused by Waltons and it was precluded from departing from it.86 Gaudron J adopted similar reasoning, though based on a slightly different interpretation of the facts, namely, that Maher had assumed that contracts had been exchanged; but, again, this assumption could not be denied by Waltons.87 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

As to this last point, see 2.26. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 399 citing Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839 at 847 (Donaldson J); A-G v Codner [1973] 1 NZLR 545 at 553; Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3. In particular Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; [1979] 2 All ER 945; and Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129. See also 16.68–16.71, where proprietary estoppel is discussed in the context of evasion of the Statute of Frauds requirements. Even though the language of contract has been used in proprietary estoppel cases: Dillwyn v Llewellyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517 at 521; 45 ER 1285 at 1286 (Lord Westbury); New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd v Glebe Municipal Council (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 288 at 308 (Jordan CJ). (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 675. (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 404. Ibid at 425–6. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 444. Ibid at 463–4.

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2.7

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

What should be stressed is that the underlying principle is the detrimental reliance by the one party on an assumption generated by the other party that makes it unconscionable for the other party to renege. These elements were present in abundance in the Waltons case so that no difficulty was encountered by the judges in invoking estoppel. But these key elements are by no means so easily found or identified in other cases. These will be discussed in 2.10–2.16. There is a very practical lesson to be learned from Waltons and other estoppel cases. The court’s concern after the event is to provide a remedy that neutralises the detriment suffered as a result of reliance: see 2.9. Advisers may be able to avoid a looming estoppel if they consider the position of the other party to the transaction or dealing and ask what steps could be taken to pre-empt detriment. The crucial time is when the person who made the original promise or representation wants to go back on it. The question to ask is whether that is going to cause detriment to another and what, if anything, can be done about it.88 For example, in the Waltons case, if, once Waltons decided to change its plans, it had immediately informed Maher of this, there would have been no case. 2.8  Estoppel and consideration. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that the traditional analysis of contract formation requires that a contractual promise cannot be legally binding unless it is supported by consideration.89 That is, the promise must be part of an agreement involving mutual exchange. If a positive promise can be enforced through the mechanism of estoppel, where does this leave the doctrine of consideration? The judges in Waltons were very concerned to ensure that the doctrine should be preserved and would, in the usual case, be the determining principle as to the enforceability of promises: [G]enerally speaking, a plaintiff cannot enforce a voluntary promise because the promisee may reasonably be expected to appreciate that, to render it binding, it must form part of a binding contract.90

This argument, based as it is on expectations about how the law works, may lose its force as courts are more prepared to hold that promises are enforceable in the absence of consideration through the mechanism of estoppel. And, of course, consideration is irrelevant in non-contract cases in which estoppel is used. Nevertheless, the quotation serves to show that the use of estoppel is to be considered as exceptional rather than simply as another way to enforce promises.91 Certainly a court that is inclined to deny estoppel may rely on the argument that the parties would have made a contract if the relevant obligation was expected to be enforceable.92 A related point 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

An effort to put an end to an estoppel or to nip it in the bud must be conveyed by a clear message. The estoppel will operate if there is a failure in this regard: Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 at [91]–[105] (Bell P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJ concurring). It is also possible to make a promise legally binding by embodying it in a deed under seal. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 403 (Mason CJ and Wilson J). Compare the American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 90(1), under which promises inducing reliance are enforceable in the absence of consideration. Mason CJ and Wilson J discussed § 90 at 401–2. See, for example, DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [66] (Meagher JA). In a non-commercial setting, this type of argument is obviously less valid. However, even a sophisticated commercial party may have a reasonable expectation of commitment despite absence of contract. An example is Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at

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Estoppel

2.9

is that some judges take the view that a court should be cautious to allow an estoppel to disturb the presumably well-understood positions of commercial players.93 Contract and estoppel exist side by side occupying different niches: But there are differences between a contract and an equity created by estoppel. A contractual obligation is created by the agreement of the parties; an equity created by estoppel may be imposed irrespective of any agreement by the party bound. A contractual obligation must be supported by consideration; an equity created by estoppel need not be supported by what is, strictly speaking, consideration. The measure of a contractual obligation depends on the terms of the contract and the circumstances to which it applies; the measure of an equity created by estoppel varies according to what is necessary to prevent detriment resulting from unconscionable conduct.94

Relief 2.9  Variable remedy. Because the focus of attention in establishing liability in estoppel cases is the detrimental reliance of the party pleading estoppel, the remedy should logically be dictated by this concern. The remedy has been said to be limited to eliminating the detriment — the ‘minimum equity to do justice’.95 There is a symmetry in providing a reliance-based remedy — protecting the reliance rather than the expectation interest — in relation to a liability that is determined by detrimental reliance. However, it will be seen that the case law does not necessarily support this symmetry.96 The ‘minimum equity’ may or may not be achieved by enforcing a promise or making good a representation: [T]he object of the principle can be seen to be the avoidance of … detriment and the satisfaction of the equity calls for the enforcement of a promise only as a means of avoiding the detriment and only to the extent necessary to achieve that object. So regarded, equitable estoppel does not elevate non-contractual promises to the level of contractual promises and the doctrine of consideration is not blown away by a side-wind.97

It is thus not correct to see estoppel as necessarily concerned with the enforcement of promises, though it can be used in this way and was so in Waltons.98 Satisfying the equity may, for example, be achieved by an award of compensation, by an

93.

94. 95.

96. 97. 98.

[140]–[152] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring) (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel). Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 585–6 (Kirby P), discussed below in 2.20; Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J). Surprisingly, this argument was used in a family proprietary estoppel case in Sandri v O’Driscoll [2014] VSCA 88. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 425 (Brennan J). Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 at 198 (Scarman LJ). See Robertson, ‘Satisfying the Minimum Equity: Equitable Estoppel Remedies after Verwayen’ (1996) 20 MULR 805; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 146–50 who argues for convergence in the treatment of proprietary and promissory estoppel cases. See Robertson, ‘Reliance and Expectation in Estoppel Remedies’ (1998) 18 Leg Stud 360. At 366–7 Robertson noted that in most cases the court protects the expectation interest rather than the reliance interest. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 427 (Brennan J); see also at 423–4. See also at 405 (Mason CJ and Wilson J): ‘Holding the representor to his representation is merely one way of doing justice between the parties.’ Interlocutory relief may be based on an estoppel argument: see Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 at [119]–[135], [161]–[162] (Weinberg J).

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2.9

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

injunction, by a constructive trust99 or by granting a lien or charge over property.100 In fact a notion of proportionality emerges from Verwayen,101 that is, it may be necessary to ensure that the remedy is proportional to the detrimental conduct or that a balance is achieved between the disadvantage that would affect the party estopped and the detriment that would be suffered by the other party if the estoppel remedy is denied.102 The Verwayen case reveals that the question of remedy is an area of estoppel where there can be disagreement about the appropriate response. The question arose in that case whether the Commonwealth could renege on an assurance that it had given that it would not use the statute of limitations in defence to a claim.103 Two judges104 held that the Commonwealth had waived its right to plead the limitation defence. Those judges who thought that estoppel was the appropriate principle to apply105 differed about the remedy that should be ordered. Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ thought that the minimum equity that would remedy the detriment suffered by the plaintiff, who had acted on the assumption that the defence would not be pleaded, was to allow him wasted legal costs (a reliance-based remedy). The Commonwealth, according to these judges, should nevertheless be allowed to change its mind and argue the defence. Dawson and Deane JJ said that the appropriate remedy was to prevent the Commonwealth from going back on its assurance which meant, of course, that the Commonwealth could not plead the defence (an expectation-based remedy).106 Gaudron and Toohey JJ, who argued on the basis of waiver, came to the same conclusion with the result that, in the end, the plaintiff was able to proceed with his claim.107 Despite these differences about what constitutes the supposed minimum equity needed to remove detriment, it is true to say that estoppel is often used to fulfil the expectation interest. This has certainly been a feature of proprietary estoppel cases.108 What this means in practical terms is that the person who has made a 99. See 16.72–16.76. 100. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 419 (Brennan J). 101. (1990) 170 CLR 394. 102. Ibid at 417 (Mason CJ), 429–30 (Brennan J), 441–2 (Deane J). An example of a case where it was held that the detriment suffered was not sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of an estoppel is Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198. See also Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 at [934]–[945] (Redlich J); and DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [79]–[89] (Meagher JA), where it seems that the fortuitous success of the overall project meant that the party claiming estoppel could not show detriment. 103. The claimant was a sailor injured in the Voyager disaster. The Commonwealth had also said that it would not rely on another defence based on the military’s immunity from tort claims. For the purpose of discussion, the statute of limitations point only is covered. 104. Gaudron and Toohey JJ. 105. Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Deane and McHugh JJ. 106. For a similar difference of views about whether the reliance or expectation interest should be protected, see Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312. 107. Another case arising out of the Voyager disaster, which raised the same issue and was decided the same way, was Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333. For a case where it was unsuccessfully argued that a limitation period had been waived or else could not be relied on because of an estoppel, see Meredith Projects v Fletcher Construction [2000] NSWSC 493. 108. See, for example, McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352. See commentary Pilkington, ‘The Nature of and Approach to Relief for Proprietary Estoppel: McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352’ (2018) 92 ALJ 76. See also critical analysis of expectation-based relief in proprietary estoppel cases: Liew, ‘The “Prima Facie Expectation Relief Approach” in the Australian Law of Proprietary Estoppel’ (2019) 39 OJLS 183; Liew, ‘Proprietary Estoppel in Australia: Two Options for Exercising Remedial Discretion’ (2020) 43 UNSWLJ 281. McNab is further considered on the question of the limitation period at 25.13.

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Estoppel

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promise or representation must keep the promise or make the representation good. In Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd,109 Jagot J made orders tantamount to specific performance.110 The unified doctrine theory expounded in Waltons drew on the proprietary estoppel cases and in those cases the courts have sometimes awarded a remedy that appears to exceed the ‘minimum equity’.111 For example, if someone has expended money on improving a house in the expectation of becoming owner of the house, the minimum equity would surely be compensation to cover those expenses, not full ownership.112 The answer appears to be that in certain circumstances nothing less than fulfilling the expectation interest will satisfy the minimum equity,113 though it is sometimes not very clear why. As already noted, this is a controversial area, as demonstrated by the differing views expressed in the Verwayen case.114 The High Court in Giumelli certainly did not see the reasoning in Verwayen as placing any curtailment of the relief available in estoppel cases,115 or at least in proprietary estoppel cases. It seems that the same approach can be applied in promissory estoppel cases as well.116 The decision of the High Court 109. [2010] FCA 394 at [169]–[170], [183]. See also Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 381 at [383] (Layton J). 110. See also the very elaborate orders made by White J in Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717, upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. In Cresswell v Cresswell [2017] VSCA 272, the remedy of specific performance as relief in a proprietary estoppel case was discussed at some length but ultimately not granted because of deficiencies in the way the litigation was conducted. 111. See 16.68–16.71. In the nineteenth century, the proprietary estoppel cases sometimes treated the doctrine as equivalent to contract, which explains why the expectation interest was fulfilled in those cases. See Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985). See also Bright and McFarlane, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights’ (2005) 64 CLJ 449, who argued that the remedial response should be personal rights and not property rights if the former will meet the justice of the case. 112. See, for example, Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431, where full fee simple ownership was granted. See discussion in 16.70. Compare Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [84] (small monetary outlay on a property would justify compensation remedy). 113. In Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10, the High Court ruled that the expectation interest of the party pleading estoppel in a proprietary estoppel case should be protected but, on the facts, this could only be achieved by an award of compensation. See also, on the question of the appropriate remedy in proprietary estoppel cases, Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254 and Public Trustee v Wadley (1997) 7 Tas R 35. The difficulty of determining the appropriate remedy is illustrated by the latter case, in which the Full Court was split on this question. See case note by Robertson (1998) 13 JCL 178. 114. See Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis [2007] FCAFC 29, where it was essential to know for the purpose of a means test whether Mr and Mrs T had divested themselves of their interest in their property or whether the circumstances supporting proprietary estoppel merely imposed an obligation to pay compensation. The Full Federal Court was divided on this question, with the majority (Dowsett and Edmonds JJ) opting for compensation and the minority (Spender J) for full or part ownership. The case was complicated by the beneficiary of the estoppel being bankrupt, and had to be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 115. Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 at [35]–[48] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ). See Donis v Donis (2007) 19 VR 577; [2007] VSCA 89 at [18]–[20] (Nettle JA), where the relationships of detriment, proportionality and expectation interest are discussed in the context of proprietary estoppel involving the promise of a house to newlyweds and the marriage failing. See also discussion by Handley AJA in Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [56]–[89] and at [3]–[5] (Allsop P) on detriment and proportionality; Harrison v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170. Some commentators consider that the ‘minimum equity’ requirement has been put to rest after Giumelli and Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19. See, for example, Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Enforcing Expectations (Most of the Time)’ (2014) 31 JCL 234. Campbell, writing before the High Court’s decision in Sidhu, argued that fulfilling the expectation interest is consistent with the ‘minimum equity’ requirement: ‘Waltons v Maher: History, Unconscientiousness and Remedy – the “Minimum Equity”’ (2013) 7 J Eq 171. See also Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 146–50. 116. In Taylor v Taylor [2021] VSCA 352, the unsuccessful appeal related to a determination of the amount of damages in equity in response to a claim based on promissory estoppel.

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2.9

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

in Sidhu v Van Dyke117 complements Giumelli, being a successful claim based on proprietary estoppel where the remedy was the monetary value of the full expectation interest of the gift of a property. The minimum equity dictum appears to have been replaced by the proportionality principle.118 Ultimately, the court is vested with a wide discretion in shaping the appropriate remedy, as demonstrated in Giumelli, where a number of practical factors shaped the eventual compensatory remedy. This gives advocates the opportunity of making ambit claims, but, of course, the court’s task is to arrive at a fair result. It seems that the expectation interest is the starting point, with the onus on the party arguing for a lesser remedy to make his or her point.119 One basis for making this argument is that a full protection of the expectation interest would be disproportionate. There is a possibility that the range of remedies available under the Australian Consumer Law may be available in a suitable case involving estoppel against a person who has acted unconscionably in trade or commerce. This is because s 20 prohibits ‘conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and Territories’, and this could be interpreted to include all general law doctrines in which unconscionability is an element. This possibility is discussed in 15.13.

Reliance and unconscionability 2.10  The key elements — detrimental reliance and unconscionability. It is not sufficient, according to Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons, that the party arguing estoppel has merely relied on a promise or representation: As failure to fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, mere reliance on an executory promise to do something, resulting in the promisee changing his position or suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more would be required.120

That ‘something more’ is unconscionable conduct on the part of the promisor.121 It is here that the greatest difficulty lies. For, it may be asked, how can one assess the conduct of the promisor and the actions of the promisee that have been done in reliance on the promisor’s conduct? The answer is that they must be looked at in combination. Simply to change one’s mind or to break a promise is not of itself unconscionable in the eyes of the law. But it becomes so the more that reliance has been placed on the promisor not changing his or her mind and the greater the consequential detriment that will be suffered by the promisee. It is here that unconscionability is found.122 In acquiescence cases, unconscionability is found in 117. (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19. This case is minutely analysed by Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 with a view to demonstrating the formidable difficulties facing courts in proprietary estoppel cases. 118. Harris v Harris [2021] VSCA 138, where the notion of proportionality is extensively discussed; Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 at [171]; Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [142] (Bathurst CJ). 119. Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Enforcing Expectations (Most of the Time)’ (2014) 31 JCL 234 at 235. 120. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 406. 121. See Young, ‘Unconscionability and Promissory Estoppel’ (2016) 90 ALJ 878. 122. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. The concept is mentioned 31 times in Waltons, 36 in Verwayen and 9 in Sidhu.

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Estoppel

2.10

the party against whom estoppel is argued remaining silent in the knowledge of the other party’s mistaken assumption.123 Reliance has two aspects in terms of causation. The promisor must cause the promisee to adopt an assumption that is generated by the promisor’s promise, representation or conduct. And the promisee must then act on that assumption in a manner that is detrimental if the assumption is falsified.124 There are differing views about the appropriate test for causation in estoppel cases. Handley argues that it is sufficient if the promisor’s conduct was a contributing cause to the promisee’s change of position.125 On the other hand, Silink argues that a more demanding ‘but for’ test should be employed.126 Handley asserts that it is not appropriate for hypothetical counterfactuals (what if the promisor had not made the promise?) to be employed to ascertain causation. However, there are examples of such a technique being endorsed.127 It is clear that the question of reliance and unconscionability should be tested at the time when the promisor wishes to assert his or her rights or otherwise pursue a course of action contrary to what was promised or was assumed.128 Whether a court will allow the breaking of the promise or action contrary to the assumption depends upon the circumstances at that time in the light of the dealings that have taken place between the parties. It appears that the potential for detriment is sufficient. In Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis,129 it was necessary for the purpose of a means test to assess whether Mr and Mrs T had divested themselves of their property in favour of their son. They of course wanted to argue that they had divested themselves of their property and so the case was rather different from the usual (proprietary) estoppel case. The case was complicated because the son had become bankrupt during the period that was crucial to determining whether an estoppel had arisen.130 One argument that was tried unsuccessfully was that there was no detriment suffered by the son: the parents had not reneged on their assurances that the property was his. The Full Federal Court summarily dismissed this argument.131 The son had expended time, effort and money on the property. The case illustrates the difficulty about remedy discussed in 2.9, namely, whether the appropriate remedial response is to fulfil the reliance or expectation interest. The Full Court was divided on this question.132 It is therefore crucial to examine the promisee’s reliance. Reliance is a multifaceted thing, involving both parties to the relationship. Its constituent elements will now be examined. What follows shows that the reliance element must involve 123. Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155. 124. Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 231 posit three levels of causation, the third being a causal inquiry as to extent of remedy. 125. Handley, ‘Recent Cases: Estoppel: Conventional Estoppel – Detriment – Contract – Proprietary Estoppel – Equity – Equitable Remedies’ (2017) 91 ALJ 812 relying on Lynch v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428. 126. Silink, ‘Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2016) 43 Aust Bar Rev 320. 127. Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 at [87]–[91], [116]–[117]; Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 9 at [77]; Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [124]. Compare Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121 at [217]–[221]. 128. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 at 106, 114. 129. [2007] FCAFC 29. 130. The case went twice to the Full Federal Court. The first decision was [2004] FCAFC 332. 131. [2007] FCAFC 29 at [104] (Dowsett and Edmunds JJ). 132. Spender J considered that the expectation interest should be vindicated; Dowsett and Edmunds JJ the reliance interest.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

material reliance: see 2.15. The onus of proof of reliance rests on the party arguing for an estoppel.133 There is no notion of a shifting onus, for example to the defendant to show that there was no reliance, in estoppel cases.134

Reliance 2.11  Reliance must relate to legal relations. As already noted in 2.2, the reliance must relate to existing or potential legal relations or facts that affect legal relations,135 though not necessarily commercial relations.136 This element is not difficult to satisfy, and merely does for estoppel what the doctrine of intention to create legal relations does for contract.137 In estoppel cases, the concept of ‘legal relations’ is more diffuse, and is not confined to an expectation or assumption that a contract has been, or will be, established.138 One aspect of reliance may concern who is the relying party. In Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700,139 a general meeting of an owners corporation was given an assurance by the majority owner of lots that all lot holders would have access to a swimming pool. The representor then prevented access by some lot holders. One issue was whether the individual lot holders could assert an easement when the representee was the owners corporation. Leeming JA undertook an extensive analysis of the strata titles legislation (which had changed during the time relevant to the dispute) and concluded that a proprietary estoppel ruling in favour of the body corporate bound its members. It was artificial to distinguish between the corporation and its members.140 2.12  Encouraged or induced reliance. If the promisee’s or representee’s reliance has been encouraged or induced by the other party, then there is unconscionable conduct if the latter reneges.141 In other words, it does not lie in the mouth of a promisor to set out to encourage or induce a certain response in the other and then complain that that response was not reasonable in the circumstances.142 2.13  Reliance with knowledge of party estopped.143 It has been said that reliance must either be intentionally induced or encouraged or, if inducement was not actively 133. Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [50]–[61], [90]. 134. Ibid. 135. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 420–1 (Brennan J). See Public Trustee v Kukula (1990) 14 Fam LR 97, where it was held that a promise to marry could not be enforced by way of estoppel, given that the action for breach of promise of marriage has been abolished by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. 136. W v G (1996) 20 Fam LR 49; Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241; Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318. 137. See Chapter 5. 138. Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at [153]–[170] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring). 139. [2021] NSWCA 242. 140. Ibid at [171]–[203]. 141. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 406–7 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 420 (Brennan J); illustrated by S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Bros Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637 (tenant led to believe that there was no need formally to exercise an option to renew). 142. See Re Ferdinando; Ex parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 243, where F provided a mortgage as security for a personal loan. The mortgage covered ‘… any guarantee … which may hereafter be given’. Seven years later the bank asked for a guarantee relating to a business debt. F did not link the guarantee to the earlier mortgage. The bank did not say anything about the link. It was held that by its inaction the bank had encouraged F to assume that there was no link between the mortgage and the guarantee, with the result that the bank was estopped from using the mortgage as security for the guarantee. 143. See Robertson, ‘Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel’ (1998) 24 Mon LR 115.

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Estoppel

2.14

pursued, the person estopped must have knowledge of the reliance by the other party.144 Brennan J’s fourth element (see 2.5) states ‘the defendant knew or intended him to do so’. This again provides the element of unconscionability: it does not lie in the mouth of the promisor to complain of reliance by the promisee when the former knew full well that would happen and had done something to generate that reliance or, as in Waltons, had omitted to disabuse the other party of the assumption generated by the promisor. On the other hand, there can be no relevant reliance if the other party has done nothing to foster reliance or has positively indicated that there should not be reliance.145 Whether some element of objective or constructive knowledge could give rise to an estoppel is not settled.146 For example, would it be a defence for Waltons to say ‘We did not intend Maher to act on our tacit promise; we did not know that he would start work’? It is submitted that an objective test should be applied, as it is in other areas involving unconscionability,147 so that it is no defence to say ‘We did not intend …’ or ‘We did not know …’ when a reasonable person should have realised that there would be reliance. The answer to such a claim is ‘You ought to have realised …’.148 An estoppel therefore will not arise on the basis of ‘an unforeseen and unforeseeable detriment but nor is it necessary that the precise detriment relied upon be foreseen or foreseeable’.149 On the other hand, if a person makes a mistaken representation and does not intend his or her words or conduct to be understood as they were reasonably understood by the other party, this does not preclude an estoppel arising so long as there was sufficient detrimental reliance.150 2.14  Reasonableness of reliance.151 Again, linked to the idea of unconscionability is the reasonableness of the other party’s expectation and responses. Reliance has 144. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 423, 429 (Brennan J). See also Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 at 306–7 (Doyle CJ). 145. Carbone as Trustee for the S & N Carbone Family Trust v Mills [2019] NSWCA 15 (mistaken belief in no way contributed to by the promisor not sufficient); State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170; Budmore Pty Ltd v Johnson (1993) 6 BPR 13,574 (starting to perform work before contract finalised where no encouragement to do so; held not unconscionable to deny existence of contract because party had taken the risk by starting work). A similar case is Gobblers Inc Pty Ltd v Stevens (1993) 6 BPR 13,591 (entry into possession before lease executed not a representation that a lease existed). 146. In Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 445, Deane J discussed an objective test. 147. See, for example, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, discussed in Chapter 15, particularly in 15.5. See also The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3478]–[3480] (Owen J). 148. The Victorian Court of Appeal in New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd [2004] VSCA 163 at [99] (Nettle JA, Hansen AJA and Ormiston JA concurring) expressed a preference for an objective test. In this case the terms of an insurance policy did not cover the risk but by an estoppel it was held that the risk was covered. See also Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158. 149. Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 at 307 (Doyle CJ). For a case of unforeseen reliance, see New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 54; (2003) 57 NSWLR 1. 150. Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 at 327 (Isaacs J); Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 at 215 (Lord Shand). In Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370, a refinancing settlement was concluded with all parties declaring that everything was in order. One of the parties then discovered that a mistake had been made and acted promptly to retrieve a discharge of mortgage. It was argued that its assurance that everything was satisfactory raised an estoppel. A majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal (Maxwell P and Redlich JA, Dixon AJA dissenting) held that no estoppel operated because the mistaken assurance was not made to the incoming lender but to the borrower. 151. See Robertson, ‘The “Reasonableness” Requirement in Estoppel’ (1995) 1 Canberra LR 231; Robertson, ‘Reasonable Reliance in Estoppel by Conduct’ (2000) 23(2) UNSWLJ 87; Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 239–48.

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2.14

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

two aspects: the reasonableness of the adoption of the assumption or expectation allegedly generated by the other party;152 and the reasonableness of the action taken in reliance on that assumption or expectation.153 As to the latter, it is sufficient if the reliance is only partial, that is, the information, promise or representation was only a reason for the recipient relying to his or her detriment.154 It is not enough that the promisee has a hope or unjustified expectation that the promise will be kept.155 Of course, there is a danger here of question-begging. When is reliance justified? Two cases illustrate this aspect of the complex of factors that must be weighed in the balance in estoppel cases. In A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd,156 an estoppel argument failed in circumstances where protracted negotiations for a contract, involving substantial detrimental reliance, in the end came to nothing because one party pulled out. Importantly, the negotiations were ‘subject to contract’ and this precluded the possibility of arguing for the formation of a contractual relationship in the absence of a formal contract.157 Even so, it is not impossible for negotiations that are ‘subject to contract’ to generate an estoppel.158 The other case is the Waltons case itself, where the background (particularly the fact that Waltons was under time pressure to get on with the project and had conveyed this concern to Maher) was such as to tip the balance the other way. The reasonableness of the reliance is tied to the promisor’s conduct, discussed above. That is, if the promisor has encouraged reliance or knows, or ought to know, that the promisee will act in reliance in a certain way, then the promisee who acts in that way is generally acting reasonably and satisfies this element of estoppel. On the other hand, if the acts in reliance are either unreasonable because the promisor

CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 1; 237 ALR 420; [2007] HCA 36 illustrates the difficulties that can be encountered on the reliance question. A majority of the High Court held that no requisite reliance was established. 152. See, for example, Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at [202]–[217] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring) (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel; reliance on trust generated by family setting was reasonable in the circumstances). 153. The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 at [3482] (Owen J). 154. Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [71], [90]; Lifoon Pty Ltd v Gillard; Hendriks v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 at [23] (Handley JA, Ipp and Tobias JJA concurring). See Edelman, ‘Unnecessary Causation’ (2015) 89 ALJ 20 at 28, who argued that strict ‘but for’ causation is not applied in estoppel cases. This view is endorsed by Handley, ‘Recent Cases: Estoppel: Conventional Estoppel – Detriment – Contract – Proprietary Estoppel – Equity – Equitable Remedies’ (2017) 91 ALJ 812 relying on Lynch v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428. Contrast Gageler J in Sidhu at [91]–[95] and Silink, ‘Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2016) 43 Aust Bar Rev 320. See also Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 250–61. 155. A borderline case is Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v City of Penrith (1989) NSW ConvR 55-438, in which the Association had a strong expectation that it would be granted a lease but was specifically told that no assurance was being given. Hodgson J said that Waltons was not applicable but was nevertheless prepared to make a restitutionary order because it would be unconscionable for the council to take the benefit of resurfaced tennis courts without paying for them. See also Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 (mere hope that a lease would be entered into not sufficient to found an estoppel). 156. [1987] AC 114. 157. See 5.24. 158. See Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) Aust Contract Rep 90-094 at 90,805, 90,810 (Ormiston J), though on the facts no estoppel was generated in this case. In Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P & CR 179, an estoppel overrode a ‘subject to contract’ clause. This possibility was acknowledged in Humphreys Estate itself: [1987] AC 114 at 127–8. See Silink, ‘Equitable Estoppel in “Subject to Contract Negotiations”’ (2011) 5 J Eq 252; Handley, ‘Exploring New and Old Ideas about Estoppel and Election’ (2019) 93 ALJ 594 at 599.

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Estoppel

2.15

specifically warned the other party not to rely,159 or because common sense dictates that it would be unreasonable to rely,160 or are acts that could never have been foreseen by the promisor, then the estoppel argument will not be successful. The reasonableness of reliance is also tied to the promisee’s state of mind. For example, it would be unreasonable of a person who had been told a fact to rely on it when he or she knew that it was unreliable. This must be distinguished from the situation where two parties have for convenience adopted an assumption that they both know may not reflect the facts but which facilitates their relationship in some way, for example, that an exchange rate will remain constant. Estoppel may prevent a departure by either party from the assumption (known as estoppel by convention).161 It appears that a person who is told something by another is not required to investigate. It is not therefore possible to argue that the person receiving the information had constructive knowledge that it was incorrect and therefore could not be said to have relied on it.162 This is obviously a matter of degree and no hard and fast rule can be stated but the general principle that a person need not investigate the truth of what he or she is told is in accord with the same principle in the law of misrepresentation.163 Nevertheless, the promisee’s constructive knowledge, or something close to that state of mind, may go to the question whether it was reasonable to rely on the representation or assumption generated by the other party. 2.15  Detrimental reliance. As already pointed out, reliance must be something more than merely expecting the other party to keep to his or her word. Probably the greatest controversy lies in the question of what acts in reliance are sufficient to raise an estoppel. The difficulty here is that the acts in reliance must be sufficiently serious or substantially ‘material’, even if not necessarily quantifiable.164 Another difficulty with the notion of detrimental reliance is that the relevant acts or conduct may not be initially detrimental (for example, paying reduced rent) but only become so because the other party has changed his or her stance.165 There is therefore the notion of reliance that is potentially detrimental. 159. State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 (not reasonable to rely on assurances about how an unambiguous termination clause would be interpreted after person giving assurance had said he had no authority to change or delete the clause). 160. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1 (not reasonable to rely on a statement made by a secretary in a solicitor’s office). Compare Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 (vendor prevented from insisting on deadline after solicitor said, two days before deadline, that request for extension should be submitted in writing and instructions would be sought). See also Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, where it was held that it was not reasonable for a company to rely on a stance taken by the Australian Securities Commission which was changed when a newly decided case came to light. 161. See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II); 2.3. 162. Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164. 163. See 11.35–11.36. 164. Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 at [150] (Gageler J); Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [141]–[147] (Bathurst CJ). See Aitken, ‘Unscrambling “Detriment” — Unjust Enrichment, Mistaken Payments, and Estoppel’ (2014) 38 Aust Bar Rev 269. 165. Waddell v Waddell (2012) 292 ALR 788; [2012] NSWCA 214 at [65]–[67] (Campbell JA, Allsop P and Sackville AJA concurring) (forgone career path found to be sufficient detriment). In Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65, reliance by a son-in-law on his deceased wife’s mother’s promise to transfer a burial licence for the burial of the deceased wife and future burial of the son-in-law was sufficient to establish an estoppel when the mother-in-law reneged.

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2.15

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

At times the concept of detriment is not treated with clarity. It is said that the underlying purpose of estoppel is to ‘prevent’ detriment. In most cases the acts in reliance have already occurred and are, by themselves, neutral. The detriment occurs when the promisor switches and renders the promisee’s prior acts in reliance either wasted or unproductive. The purpose of estoppel is to redress this consequence. The statements of principle occupy a continuum that is strict at one end (the promisee must have detrimentally altered his or her position in reliance on the promise),166 and less stringent at the other end (the promisee must have acted on the promise).167 What is not always clear is what these expressions mean in the circumstances of a particular case. Two commentators168 have suggested three ‘levels’ of response to a promise or representation of the type being considered here: 1. A promisee may merely have accepted and acquiesced in the new arrangement believing that the promise would be kept. 2. A promisee may have changed his or her position, that is, done something that he or she would not have done if the promise had not been made. 3. The promisee may have changed his or her position as in (2) but, in addition, would suffer a material disadvantage or detriment if the promisor were allowed to resile. The level of reliance is, in its turn, crucial in, first, establishing whether estoppel is made out (liability) and, second, if liability is established, what the appropriate remedy should be.169 As already pointed out, identifying the relevant detriment (and therefore remedial response) was the controversial issue in the Verwayen case discussed in 2.9. In deciding the appropriate remedial response, a court is not involved in ‘measuring’ detriment170 but instead in weighing the various consequences resulting from the promisor’s change of stance, including benefits derived by the promisee from acting on the promisor’s assurances.171 Probably the best guide is to go back to one of the founding statements on the law of estoppel in Australia. In Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd,172 Dixon J said: … it is often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to 166. Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657; Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556. Deane J in Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 at 278 spoke of ‘material disadvantage’. 167. Denning LJ in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220. 168. Lindgren and Nicholson, ‘Promissory Estoppel in Australia’ (1984) 58 ALJ 249. 169. See, for example, Re Neal; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659, where a creditor gave an assurance that a dishonoured bill of exchange would not be enforced in exchange for the debtor paying a sum of money. The debtor then incurred legal costs in meeting this requirement. It was held that the incurring of legal costs was a sufficient detriment to raise an estoppel and that the subsequent bankruptcy notice was consequently invalid. In Equititrust Ltd v Franks (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128 at [35]–[40], it was sufficient that the promisee stopped seeking refinancing, albeit on the facts for a limited period of four months (which, in turn, dictated a limited remedy). See discussion of detriment, particularly lost opportunity detriment, by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3495]–[3511]. 170. Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [18] (Macfarlan JA), [164] (Emmett AJA). 171. Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 illustrates the extensive analysis that assessing detriment can involve. The weighing of benefits is discussed at [139]–[155]. It is not necessary to quantify the exercise of weighing detriments and benefits (at [157]). 172. (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674.

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Estoppel

2.16

no misunderstanding, it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted that led to it.

In a given case, the circumstances that usually give rise to the most difficulty are such that (1) and (2) are satisfied but (3) arguably is not. The Australian pronouncements talk of detrimental reliance so that it would appear that level (3) reliance must be satisfied.173 Certainly there are many reported cases where an estoppel has failed for want of sufficient detrimental reliance being established.174 All the same, experience with the actual results of cases shows that this formula is easily stated but less easily comprehended. For example, in the paradigm case of promissory estoppel, where a landlord has promised to reduce the rent and the tenant has duly relied on that promise by paying less rent, what detriment has the tenant suffered?175 It is not fatal to establishing an estoppel that the plaintiff cannot positively prove that he or she would have been better off had the defendant adhered to the promise or assumption.176

Unconscionability 2.16  Unconscionable conduct. We have seen that the element of unconscionability is inextricably linked to the question of reliance.177 Whether reneging on a promise or assurance or denying represented facts or acting inconsistently with an assumption is unconscionable depends on the level of reasonable reliance by the other party and the practical and material effect that the inconsistent behaviour will have on the party who has relied. In short, it is necessary to examine the predicament of the plaintiff at the time that the defendant reneges and the extent to which the defendant was responsible for that predicament.178 The question of what is unconscionability is sometimes elusive.179 Some statements of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer180 and 173. See the discussion of this issue by Kirby P in Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) 5 BPR 11,477 at 11,487, where it was held that there was no relevant detriment suffered by a purchaser at an auction who had relied on the auctioneer’s erroneous statement that the property was no longer subject to a reserve price and kept open his last bid so that the property was knocked down to him. The purchaser was not successful in arguing that the auctioneer and vendor were estopped from arguing that the sale was on the basis of a reserve price. 174. See DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [79]–[89] (Meagher JA), where it seems that the fortuitous success of the overall project meant that the party claiming estoppel could not show detriment. 175. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 (discussed in 2.16), where it was accepted that there would be a detriment if the tenant had to meet an accumulated amount of unpaid rent. 176. Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [5] (Allsop P). 177. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. There were 31 references to the concept in Waltons, 36 in Verwayen and 9 in Sidhu. 178. It has been said that a finding of unconscionability is to state a conclusion rather than a step in the reaching the conclusion: Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [764] (Edelman J). This logical point arises in many aspects of legal reasoning and is often troublesome. It is not a convincing reason for saying that unconscionability is not an element in the estoppel equation. Without unconscionability, there is no estoppel. 179. If the person making a statement or promise was mistaken, this does not necessarily mean that he or she has acted innocently (and therefore arguably not unconscionably). It was held that a mistaken representation was capable of giving rise to an estoppel in Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring). 180. (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

in Grundt v Great Boulder Gold Mines Pty Ltd181 (which have been so influential in the development of estoppel in Australia) may be thought to preclude the use of a broad concept of unconscionability as a basis for determining whether the promisor may resile. One criticism of such a concept is that it would lead to uncertainty and may be ‘a charter for idiosyncratic concepts of justice and fairness’.182 In Grundt, Dixon J had said that: … the law does not leave such a question of fairness or justice at large. It defines with more or less completeness the kinds of participation in the making and acceptance of the assumption that will suffice to preclude the party if the other requirements for an estoppel are satisfied.183

Deane J has said: In this as in other areas of equity-related doctrine, conduct which is ‘unconscionable’ will commonly involve the use of or insistence upon legal entitlement to take advantage of another’s special vulnerability or misadventure (cf Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489 at 526–7) in a way that is unreasonable and oppressive to an extent that affronts ordinary minimum standards of fair dealing. That being so, the question whether conduct is or is not unconscionable in the circumstances of a particular case involves a ‘real process of consideration and judgement’ (cf Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231 at 240) in which the ordinary processes of legal reasoning by induction and deduction from settled rules and decided cases are applicable but are likely to be inadequate to exclude an element of value judgment in a borderline case …184

Although unconscionability may be difficult to define, in any given case it is usually not difficult to recognise.185 But the difficulty is to assess whether the conduct is sufficiently unconscionable.186 As already stated, breaking a promise is not by itself sufficiently unconscionable (though it is unconscionable in ordinary parlance). One view that has been strongly put by Justice Kirby is that, in commercial dealings between well-advised corporations, the notion of unconscionability may be inappropriate.187 There is no doubt that views differ on this question. There is also 181. 182. 183. 184.

(1937) 59 CLR 641 at 676. Ibid; repeated by Mason and Deane JJ in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 431. (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 676. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 441. See also Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 215; 201 ALR 359; [2003] HCA 57 at [23]–[26] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), where their Honours more generally (not in the context of estoppel) issued a warning about unthinking resort to unconscionability as a reason for seeking relief. 185. In National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 2 WLR 588 at 602, Lord Scarman said, ‘Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the particular facts of the case’. 186. So, for example, in Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, it was held that it was not unconscionable or unjust for the Australian Securities Commission to take a different attitude from that it had previously adopted to a proposed scheme of arrangement, when a newly decided case came to light. 187. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 586, discussed below in 2.20. See also Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J); State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177, where Kirby P warned of the dangers of estoppel intruding into the pre-contract period so that a court will have to examine a ‘wilderness of pre-contract conversations’. The remedies available for misleading conduct already make this danger unavoidable: see Chapter 11. See also Bryson J’s expression of irritation in Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 at 279 at the misuse of estoppel in commercial cases: ‘Poorly based and incompletely considered forensic attempts to set up pre-contractual estoppels are unfortunately common, and in most cases they are quite unuseful and very wasteful of resources’.

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no doubt that estoppel has been used successfully in many commercial cases, as in Waltons.188 The unconscionability question necessarily involves a consideration of the behaviour of the promisor.189 Of course, in a case where that behaviour is such that there is little doubt about its unconscionability, it is clear that a court does take such conduct into account.190 But sometimes the courts appear to focus almost entirely on the detriment suffered by the promisee. For example, in Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia,191 a classic case of a landlord agreeing to accept a reduced rent, the court was concerned to analyse what detriment the tenant suffered when the landlord sued for the unpaid back rent. No attention was paid to the fact that the landlord had willingly agreed to reduce the rent (because of a downturn in retail activity) thereby securing the advantage of retaining a reliable tenant.192 Yet it is relevant to ask whether it was unconscionable for the landlord to secure this advantage and then try to secure the full rent as well. In other words, the question of unconscionability needs to be determined by looking both to the promisee’s detrimental reliance and the conduct of the promisor. Where the former is ‘sparse’ (as in Quaglia) the latter may be determinative. More generally, it is relevant to look at the conduct of both parties to see where the equities lie.193 It is therefore relevant to look to the conduct of the promisee. If, as in D & C Builders v Rees,194 the promisee/debtor took advantage of the promisor/creditor’s poor financial position to extract a settlement of a debt for a lesser sum, then promissory estoppel would not assist the debtor and the creditor would be quite justified in insisting on his or her strict legal rights and claiming the full amount.195 Similarly, in Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd196 it was a relevant consideration that the promisee had kept its options open by not entering into a formal lease. This is consistent with the view that all relevant factors need to be weighed in the balance in deciding whether conduct is unconscionable or not.197

188. See Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 at [40] (Buchanan JA). 189. Thus, if the promisor or representor has acted innocently, his or her behaviour is not unconscionable. For example, a vendor’s silence in the face of breach by a purchaser will not mean that the vendor has waived the breach if he was ignorant of it: Berry v Hodsdon [1989] 1 Qd R 361. 190. Discussed in ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 at [172]–[181]. 191. (1980) 26 SASR 101. See also Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165, involving a promise, prior to execution, to reduce the rent. 192. In Machirus Properties Ltd v Power Sports World (1987) Ltd (unreported, NZ High Ct, 26 May 1998, noted in [1998] BCL [723]), Heron and Gendall JJ said that the benefit to the landlord in retaining a tenant was held to amount to a consideration. 193. Thus, in Trippe Investments Pty Ltd v Henderson Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 214 at 231, it was not unconscionable for a representor to depart from a representation when the representee had engaged in misleading conduct, albeit innocently. 194. [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. See also Re Goile; Ex parte Steelbuild Agencies Ltd [1963] NZLR 666 at 679. 195. See 4.36 on the principle of consideration relating to payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction of a larger debt. 196. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, discussed in 2.20. See also Seymour v Seymour (1996) 40 NSWLR 358 at 365–7, where Mahoney A-CJ, with the concurrence of Meagher JA and Abadee A-JA, discussed the possibility of the plaintiff being in ‘breach’, though, on the facts, no such finding was made. 197. See Goff J in The Post Chaser [1982] 1 All ER 19 at 27. See also Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 at [14] (Campbell JA): ‘in some circumstances an equity that arises by estoppel may be conditional upon the performance by the plaintiff of certain obligations’.

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In addition, ‘he who comes to equity must come with clean hands’.198 In Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd,199 it was held that a restraint of trade clause was illegal. It was then argued that the party supposedly bound by the clause was nevertheless estopped from competing with the other party. It was held that the clean hands doctrine prevented the party from arguing estoppel, that is, it could not use estoppel as an indirect way to enforce an illegal clause.200 However, this depends on the particular circumstances and, in the case of alleged statutory illegality, the policy of the legislation.201

The effect of an estoppel 2.17  Is estoppel suspensory or permanent? We saw in 2.5 that an estoppel may act to ‘set the scene’ for a cause of action or it may be a cause of action in itself. In the past it has been said that an estoppel is generally suspensory and only becomes permanent if it is impossible to restore previous relations because of some change of circumstance. But, in the light of modern developments in estoppel, this is now not correct: an estoppel may be capable of permanent operation from the outset. It depends on what assurance, promise or representation was made by the party estopped. This question may be relevant, in particular, to those cases where one party has promised not to enforce his or her strict legal rights. In cases such as Hughes,202 the estoppel operated to suspend the running of a time period with the ultimate consequence that the tenant was not in breach by repairing later than the original agreement required. Thus, the doctrine did not extinguish the landlord’s substantive right to have the repairs done. An example of a substantive right being extinguished is the landlord and tenant case where, if the estoppel operates, the right to unpaid back rent is extinguished forever.203 The landlord’s right to reinstate the full contract rent for the future by giving notice is, however, preserved.204 In this latter sense an estoppel may be suspensory and the only limitation to this is that the former terms cannot be reinstated if it is no longer possible to do so.205 Then the estoppel becomes permanent. It follows that it

198. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 641. An attempt to argue that a party could not benefit from an estoppel because its hands were not clean was unsuccessful in Rawlings Pty Ltd v Redder than Red Tomato Co Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 367. See also Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 at [927]–[933], [951] (Redlich J). 199. [2004] WASCA 82. 200. Ibid at [100]–[105]. See also Bullhead Pty Ltd v Brickmakers Place Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] VSCA 316 at [115]–[121], where the conduct of the party pleading estoppel was ‘unlawful and immoral’. In Plath v Plath [2020] QCA 43, an estoppel argument was allowed so long as the party arguing it ‘washed’ his hands by returning a first home owner’s government grant. A son had agreed to buy his parents’ house but it was intended that the sale and mortgage would not be enforced. 201. See Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 at [35]–[38] (Buchanan JA): ‘Unmeritorious or immoral conduct will not disentitle a plaintiff from equitable relief unless it has “an immediate and necessary relationship to the equity sued for”’, citing Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318 at 319 (Lord Chief Baron Eyre). See also Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2012) 45 WAR 29; 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 at [308]–[310] (McLure P, Newnes JA and Le Miere J concurring). 202. Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439, discussed in 2.5. 203. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. 204. Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. 205. Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326 at 1330; [1964] 3 All ER 556 at 559 cited in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 420. See also Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839.

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may be possible to give notice to change the circumstances on which the estoppel is based if it is possible on the facts to resume the earlier state of affairs.206 Another example is where a promise is made to accept a lesser sum in satisfaction of a debt. It was stated by Lord Denning MR in D & C Builders v Rees207 that, had the estoppel operated, the right to the balance of the debt would have been extinguished. Similarly, in Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr208 the right of a landlord to seek contribution for roof repairs under a contract was extinguished. Whether an assurance operates to suspend or extinguish will depend upon its interpretation. The surrounding circumstances may be relevant to such interpretation. For example, an assurance to accept reduced rent could mean either that the obligation to pay full rent is delayed or it is extinguished. Usually, in such cases, the latter interpretation will prevail. By contrast, in credit transactions, an assurance allowing the paying party not to meet the periodic deadlines will be interpreted, as a matter of common sense, to mean that the debtor’s obligations are suspended (or delayed), not extinguished.209 A possible source of confusion here is the statement that estoppel is suspensory and will only become permanent if the promisee cannot resume his or her position.210 This statement does not take into account what was promised or assumed in the first place. It is appropriate if the promise was by its terms suspensory but then something happened that made it impossible to resume the former contractual relations. It is not, however, applicable to cases where the promise, by its terms, extinguishes rights.211 It cannot be said, in the case of reduced rent having been paid, that the promisee cannot resume his or her position. It is not impossible for the tenant to pay the unpaid back rent. Yet the courts clearly treat the estoppel as being permanent and not merely suspensory, that is, the tenant’s obligation to pay the difference is extinguished rather than delayed.

Evidence and estoppel 2.18  Estoppel, the parol evidence rule and entire agreement clauses.212 It will be seen in Chapter 10 that in dealing with the question whether a written contract represents the entire terms agreed to between the parties, the courts may call in aid the parol evidence rule. This rule gives primacy to the written document and forbids attempts to add to, vary or contradict the written contract by adducing evidence of conversations, letters and so forth, so long as the parties intended that the document constituted their entire agreement.

206. See, for example, ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 at [171]. The possibility of nipping an estoppel in the bud before detriment is suffered is discussed at 2.7. See Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 at [91]–[105] (Bell P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA concurring). 207. [1966] 2 QB 617. See 2.16. 208. [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737. 209. Compare Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556. 210. Ibid at 1330; 559 cited by Brennan J in Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 426. 211. See Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ ConvR 307 at 310. 212. Jackman, ‘Some Judicial Fallacies Concerning Entire Agreement Clauses’ (2015) 89 ALJ 791; Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

There are a number of exceptions to the rule. In so far as estoppel allows evidence of, for example, pre-contractual conversations, the question may arise whether this oral evidence can be used in a way that will affect the operation of the written contract.213 For example, suppose that a landlord says to a tenant, before the written lease is executed, that he (the landlord) will not actually enforce a clause that forbids domestic animals on the premises. If the landlord later objects to the tenant keeping a cat on the premises, could evidence of the understanding be adduced to support an estoppel argument? The answer is that it clearly could and that estoppel represents yet another exception to the parol evidence rule.214 The parol evidence rule is often ‘reinforced’ by the use of an entire agreement clause in the written contract. This clause is clearly effective to ensure that only the terms in the written contract are binding on the parties and that any external alleged contractual promises (such as in a letter) are excluded. In short, the clause is effective to exclude extra terms. But the clause commonly attempts, in addition, to exclude prior representations, statements or information. Is it effective to preclude an estoppel argument based on a prior representation? It is suggested that it would not be effective, just as it is not effective in purporting to exclude the consequences of misleading conduct.215 This is because the elements of estoppel are entirely situation-specific. If a case should arise where these elements are found, so that it would be unconscionable for one party to go back on a representation made during the negotiations for a contract, the statement in an entire agreement clause that the prior representation is excluded or ‘superseded’ by the contract makes no difference to the fact that one party has caused detriment to the other by his or her unconscionable conduct. To give primacy to the written word over the spoken word, particularly when the written word consists of a standard-form contract or else a contract containing standard-form ‘boiler plate’ clauses, is to ignore the realities of human interaction.216

213. In Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 501; [2009] FCA 1220 at [121], Finn J commented on the unsatisfactory position judges find themselves in when evidence of prior negotiations is inadmissible for contract interpretation whereas the same evidence is admitted for an estoppel or misleading conduct argument. 214. See State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170, where it was acknowledged that evidence to support an estoppel is admissible, though in this particular case the estoppel argument failed. See also Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146, where parol evidence was adduced to establish an estoppel by convention, namely, an understanding that an all moneys mortgage would in fact only be enforced up to $100,000. See also the discussion by Ormiston J in Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) Aust Contract Rep 90-094, where it was assumed that an estoppel could be generated by pre-contractual statements; Grace v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [1998] QSC 27 (evidence admissible to found equitable estoppel as well as estoppel by convention); Gregory v Beecraft (1998) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-401; Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 at [33] (Malcolm CJ). However, in Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 at 46, McPherson J expressed the view that it would be difficult to add to or vary a written contract using estoppel by convention. A similar view was expressed by McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 followed in Retirement Services Australia Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd (2012) 37 VR 486; [2012] VSCA 134 at [137]–[138]. See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II), particularly at 867–70. 215. See 11.150. See further 10.7. 216. See Seddon, ‘A Plea for the Reform of the Rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer’ (1978) 52 ALJ 372; Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126; Lindgren, ‘Estoppel Against Enforcing a Contract According to its Correct Construction’ (2012) 6 J Eq 144. See also Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [57], [66], [68] (Handley AJA, Giles JA and Sackville AJA concurring).

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Estoppel

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In opposition to the argument just put, it might be said that, if the parties have expressly agreed not to base any legal argument on any information, statements or representations made during negotiations, then this agreement precludes an estoppel based on one of those statements or representations.217 Estoppel is arguably different from misleading conduct in that the latter is the product of legislation that cannot be excluded by contract. In Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd,218 Bryson J held that an entire agreement clause embodied in a comprehensive written agreement precluded an estoppel argument based on an alleged assurance made during negotiations.219 However, there are also judicial statements, including from the Full Federal Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeal, supporting the view that one cannot contract out of estoppel.220 There is therefore judicial disagreement about this question. Suffice it to say here that any clause that is used to exclude an argument based on estoppel should be construed contra proferentem so that the party against whom an estoppel is argued would bear a heavy onus in showing that the clause was successful.221 Ultimately, the question is whether one can contract out of unconscionability: one can contract out of one’s own negligence but not fraud. Unconscionability would appear to lie somewhere in between, though equity has always called it fraud. It must be acknowledged that the relationship between an alleged estoppel and a written contract is always going to be difficult but there is no doubt that an estoppel can, in appropriate circumstances, cut across what the parties have apparently agreed to in a fully written contract. This is clearly true of estoppel modifying or overriding a substantive undertaking in a contract. But it is also true of what may be termed a ‘procedural’ contractual provision, such as an entire agreement clause.222 It must depend on how the court assesses the overall intentions of the parties. In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd,223 estoppel was argued to contradict a contract. It was argued that a common assumption (that a loan would be limited recourse) that was inconsistent with the contract was really what the parties agreed 217. It has been argued that the entire agreement clause itself sets up an estoppel: the party is estopped from attempting to argue that the entire agreement clause is not effective because that party agreed to it. See, for example, Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 at 196 (McLelland J). 218. (1999) 46 NSWLR 267. 219. In doing so he expressly declined to follow the view of Rolfe J in Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146, which, in turn, was based on the opinion of McHugh JA in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170. Instead, Bryson J preferred the views of McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 and Miles CJ in Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61. See also Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 at 46 (McPherson J); Chint Australasia Pty Ltd v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 635 at [138]–[141] (Einstein J). 220. Rolfe J in Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146; McHugh JA in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [444]–[448] (Allsop J, speaking for the Full Federal Court); Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 407 at [554]–[571] (Campbell JA), [32]–[33] (Allsop P), [42] (Giles JA); Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [52]–[75] (Handley AJA); Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165 at [73] (Bathurst CJ, McColl and Macfarlan JJA concurring). In Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40, it was held that estoppel was not precluded by standard no-waiver clause — see at [107]–[118] (Finn and Sundberg JJ). 221. See Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126 at 134. 222. Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274. 223. [2006] QCA 194.

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to. The Queensland Court of Appeal rejected this argument but this appeared to be because of the way the case had been argued.224 It is of course possible that an assumption sufficient to generate an estoppel may be superseded or displaced by a subsequent contract.225

The Impact of Estoppel in the Law of Contract 2.19  Wider implications of estoppel. It is clear from the Waltons case that estoppel may operate in any relationship (not just pre-contractual or contractual ones) so long as its essential elements are satisfied. It is also clear that it may be used as a ‘sword’, despite the insistence by Deane J in Commonwealth v Verwayen226 that ‘estoppel by conduct does not of itself constitute an independent cause of action’. In the analysis of Deane J, the estoppel ‘sets the stage’ for a cause of action that is otherwise available. But this view is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the remedy flowing from estoppel is not necessarily the full remedy that would be available for (say) breach of contract.227 The remedy is limited to what is needed to satisfy the equity.228 This remedy is unique to estoppel cases and would not be appropriate if some other cause of action were brought. In any case, there are many examples from the cases where estoppel has been treated as a cause of action in its own right.229 Estoppel opens up new ways of pursuing traditional contractual arguments and new ways to argue for obligation where traditionally the law of contract denied liability or the law of contract simply had nothing to say. For example, a promise to pay a lesser sum in satisfaction of a larger debt may be binding through estoppel but not under the traditional rules of contract.230 The following list, expressed necessarily in summary form, is not comprehensive because there is little doubt that estoppel will make its presence felt in new areas, as the case law develops. 2.20  Negotiations and formation of contract.231 In the following chapters, the traditional rules for establishing contract formation are discussed. It can be seen from the discussion above that estoppel can be used to establish a contract in the absence of the usual process of offer, acceptance and consideration.232 The Waltons case demonstrates this. It is also possible for an estoppel to operate when a ‘contract’ 224. The case had already been to the High Court on other issues: Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 472; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55. 225. Both McPherson JA and Holmes J referred to McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190. 226. (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 560. See also Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76] (Handley AJA). 227. Deane J himself supported the limited remedy principle (ibid at 355). He said that the remedy available represents the ‘outer limits within which the relief appropriate to do justice between the parties should be framed’ (at 357). But the remedy for (say) breach of contract is not an ‘outer limit’; it is the remedy. 228. See 2.9. 229. Robertson, ‘Three Models of Promissory Estoppel’ (2013) 7 J Eq 226. 230. Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329. See also 4.36–4.38. 231. See Silink, ‘Equitable Estoppel in “Subject to Contract Negotiations”’ (2011) 5 J Eq 252. 232. An example is Painaway Australia Pty Ltd v JAKL Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 205 at [246]–[256], where Ward J, as an alternative to acceptance by conduct, found there was a contract on the basis of estoppel by convention. For offer and acceptance, see Chapter 3. For consideration, see Chapter 4.

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is void for uncertainty.233 Estoppel can nullify a ‘subject to contract’ stipulation.234 It may be used to establish the correct party to the contract.235 It may be used to cure a defect in the execution of a deed.236 It is difficult to state the limits of the operation of estoppel in contract formation, other than that there must be present the elements of detrimental reliance and unconscionability. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd237 shows how difficult it is to fix the limits. There was detrimental reliance and (arguably) unconscionability aplenty in this case, yet the New South Wales Court of Appeal, by a majority, was not prepared to hold that there was a contract by estoppel: Negotiations between A and F for the erection and lease from A to F for 15 years of a supermarket were at a very advanced stage when A pulled out, saying it was going to lease to B instead. The salient facts were: no formal lease had been executed because F had said it was not ready to do so; but F had sent a letter of intent and had said that it regarded itself as bound by it; the letter of intent contained details of work which had to be carried out on the premises by A and F; F, at A’s request, sent a letter to A’s bankers stating the terms of the lease; F indicated it wanted floor space additional to what was originally agreed but a rent was not agreed to for this additional space; F gave up a lease on another property in anticipation of the lease being negotiated with A; the building was being built to F’s requirements, using F’s expertise as an experienced supermarket operator. F sued for specific performance or damages, claiming there was an enforceable agreement for a lease.

The trial judge, Needham J, held in favour of F, saying that A was precluded from denying a lease agreement even though at law no concluded agreement had been reached because the vital rent factor had not been finalised. Estoppel operated because A had acted unconscionably in accepting valuable advice, information and materials from F and then not going ahead with the deal. Needham J was prepared to find a mechanism for settling the outstanding rental term. The Court of Appeal by a majority238 reversed this decision. Kirby P stressed that the use of estoppel in the circumstances was inappropriate (though not out of the question) because the parties were well-advised, substantial commercial enterprises. Having pointed out that the parties’ actions ‘typically depend on self-interest and profit-making not conscience or fairness’, he said: [C]ourts should, in my view, be wary lest they distort the relationships of substantial, well-advised corporations in commercial transactions by subjecting them to the overly tender consciences of judges.239

The majority were very much persuaded by the fact that both parties were playing a ‘sort of cat and mouse game … each trying to put the other one in a corner yet reserving for himself the liberty to have an out’.240 The other major consideration was the fact that no agreement had been finalised on the question of rent.241 Priestley JA 233. Supalux Paint Co Pty Ltd v Vyse [1999] WASC 78 at [145]–[151]. 234. See 2.14. 235. Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428. 236. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.32]. 237. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582. 238. Kirby P and Rogers A-JA, Priestley JA dissenting. 239. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 586. Kirby P expressed similar sentiments in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177. 240. Ibid at 585. 241. DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 is a case where lack of details about the proposed arrangement told against an estoppel.

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2.20

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

in dissent expounded at length the law on estoppel242 (with which Kirby P agreed)243 but differed in its application to the facts of the case. The difference of views in this case shows the difficulties confronting advisers in predicting the outcomes of commercial dealings. One important difference that can be identified is the extent to which it is appropriate or proper to apply equitable notions of fair dealing in commercial relations. Kirby P and Rogers A-JA gave a clear indication that such application should be sparing;244 Priestley JA was more ready to apply such standards. It was Priestley JA in the Waltons case who spoke of ‘simple standards of honesty and fair dealing’.245 Another difficulty for advisers is to know what is the appropriate analysis of contract formation when the parties have acted ambivalently. A particular course of negotiation leading to an alleged contract may be seen as acceptance by conduct,246 as simply contract by conduct,247 as estoppel, as misleading conduct, as part performance248 or as a case of restitution.249 It is common in commercial litigation to use these various approaches as alternatives. 2.21  The privity rule. In Chapter 7 the privity rule is discussed, that is, the rule that only the parties to a contract can enforce it and benefit from it, even if a contractual promise is made in favour of a third party. There are numerous exceptions and qualifications to the privity rule which are fully discussed in Chapter 7. One exception can arise from an estoppel which can bypass contract and establish a legal link between a promisor and a third-party beneficiary that would otherwise be denied by the privity rule. This was acknowledged with differing levels of enthusiasm by some judges in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd.250 If the requisite elements of estoppel are satisfied, then it is clear that an estoppel can operate to overcome the limitations of the privity rule.251 2.22  Tendering. The issue of whether any legal obligations arise during the tendering process is one that has received some attention. The traditional view is that 242. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 604–12. 243. Ibid at 585. 244. See also Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J); Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 at 279 (Bryson J). 245. (1986) 5 NSWLR 407 at 423. 246. See 3.27. 247. See 3.5–3.7. 248. See 16.57–16.66. The case of Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36 illustrates the blurring of the different possible analyses. In that case the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld an oral lease on the basis of part performance. The case could have equally well been analysed as an estoppel case. 249. Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. This case was decided before the revolutionary re-casting of estoppel by the High Court in Waltons. The same facts could equally have been dealt with on the basis of estoppel after Waltons. 250. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 145 (Deane J). 251. See CSR Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-034; Hoylevans Pty Ltd v Weir [2000] WASC 144 (restraint of trade clause binding on company but not director but latter bound by an estoppel — estoppel point not disturbed on appeal [2001] WASCA 23). In Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571, an estoppel operated not so much as an exception to the privity rule but by way of establishing a link between parties (a bank and a builder) which the usual pattern of contracts does not supply. The builder did not have a contract with the owner’s financier, but in this case the bank’s assurance that the builder would be paid was enforceable. See also Drummoyne District Rugby Club Inc v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-039 discussed in 7.31.

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Estoppel

2.25

a tender is an offer that becomes a contract upon its acceptance, which means that there are no contractual obligations arising out of the tendering process. This view is becoming less tenable. One way in which obligations may arise in the tendering process before acceptance of a particular tender is through the use of estoppel: see 3.36–3.39.252 2.23  Irrevocable offer. If an offer is made with the promise that it will remain open for a certain time, we will see in Chapter 3 that this promise is not binding unless the offer is an option, that is, it is supported by a consideration: see 3.67. However, if the promisee incurred expense in reliance on the promise to keep the offer open, it would be arguable that the promisor would be estopped from breaking the promise even though the offer was not in the form of an option.253 Similarly, in unilateraltype offers, estoppel could be used to prevent the offeror from withdrawing the offer before completion of the requested act, so long as the offeree started to perform.254 2.24  Forbearance and compromise.255 It is possible through an estoppel to hold a party to a promise in anticipation of, or in the actual conduct of, litigation in the absence of consideration. In Newton, Bellamy & Wolfev SGIO (Qld),256 the words ‘liability is not in issue’ in a letter sent during negotiations for the settlement of a claim were held to give rise to a contract. But it was recognised that an alternative footing for holding the writer to these words was estoppel.257 Similarly, in Commonwealth v Verwayen258 a firm assurance that the statute of limitations would not be relied upon was held to be binding in the absence of consideration. In negotiations for settlement of insurance claims, the conduct of the insurer may amount to an election not to rely on a defence if it otherwise appears to be processing the claim.259 On the other hand, in Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd,260 a majority of the South Australian Full Court held that a creditor who had indicated that a debt would be written off, but who sued for it some three years later, was not estopped. The debtor did not provide evidence of detrimental reliance. Doyle CJ conceded that this was harsh for the debtor: interest had accumulated over the three years. Bollen J, in dissent, was prepared to infer that there was sufficient detrimental reliance. Similarly, in Lewis v Cook261 an estoppel argument was not successful on the facts to make a supposed waiver of a debt legally binding.262 2.25  Gift promises. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that the traditional approach to a gift promise is that, unless it is in a deed under seal, it is unenforceable for want of consideration. Estoppel operates independently of the doctrine of consideration. It is 252. Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.27]. 253. See 3.67; in particular the reference to Drennan v Star Paving Co (1958) 333 P 2d 757. 254. See 3.71. 255. See 4.24–4.28. 256. [1986] 1 Qd R 431. 257. Ibid at 436–7. A similar case is Lindsay v Smith [2002] 1 Qd R 610; [2001] QCA 229. 258. (1990) 170 CLR 394; 95 ALR 321. See 2.9. 259. See extensive consideration of the authorities in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121. 260. (1996) 69 SASR 302. 261. (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191. 262. See also discussion of contract variation at 2.29.

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2.25

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

therefore possible that a gift promise could be binding on the basis of estoppel.263 So, the paradigm case of a promise of a gift to a charitable institution, discussed in 4.15, may well provide the necessary elements of estoppel so long as the institution has committed itself in a material way on the strength of the promise and this was apparent to the donor. 2.26  Evasion of the Statute of Frauds. It is clear from the Waltons case itself that, if an estoppel argument is successful in relation to a land transaction, then there is no requirement of a note or memorandum in writing as would normally be required by the appropriate Statute of Frauds provision. Estoppel may be used to establish a contract, or an interest in land264 (in either case no written evidence is required). Or it may be used simply to preclude reliance on the Statute of Frauds when it would be unconscionable in the circumstances to argue the defence.265 These possibilities are fully discussed in Chapter 16.266 2.27  Misrepresentation. The actionability of pre-contractual misrepresentations has been greatly enhanced. The impact of the Australian Consumer Law s 18 (prohibition of misleading conduct) is fully discussed in Chapter 11. In addition, in an appropriate case, a representation may form the basis of an estoppel argument. In such a case the person who made the representation may be prevented from departing from it if the other party has sufficiently relied on it.267 It is very common in litigation for estoppel and misleading conduct to be argued in parallel, based on the same events. Estoppel can operate where, for one reason or another, misleading conduct does not apply. For example, the relevant interactions may not have been in ‘trade or commerce’ or a government party may not be bound by the legislation.268 2.28  Mistake. If during negotiations for a contract, one party knows that the other party is mistaken, we will see in Chapter 12 that a failure to correct the mistake may give the mistaken party the right to rescind the contract or seek rectification. Another possible outcome is that the party who stood by and allowed the other to commit himself or herself on the basis of the mistake is estopped from denying the mistaken, as opposed to the true, version of the facts.269 Similarly, in common mistake cases, rather than setting the contract aside, it may be that a court would hold that the parties are bound by the common, incorrect assumption.270 263. See DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88. 264. See, for example, Kintominas v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475 (mother promised to leave house to son in her will and son spent money on renovations; held: son had beneficial ownership of the house). 265. Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510; Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801; Agius v Sage [1999] VSC 100. Estoppel was not successful in Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51 (see 16.67); Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 126 (for different reasons: no clear statement; and no authority to make the statement). See Robertson, ‘The Statute of Frauds, Equitable Estoppel and the Need for “Something More”’ (2003) 19 JCL 173 commenting on the contrasting English and Australian law on this issue. 266. See 16.67–16.71. 267. As to whether this possibility would be precluded by the existence of an entire agreement clause that purports to exclude prior representations, see 2.18. 268. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 6. 269. Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563. 270. Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84.

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Estoppel

2.29

If a person makes a mistaken representation and does not intend his or her words or conduct to be understood as they were reasonably understood by the other party, this does not preclude an estoppel arising so long as there was sufficient detrimental reliance.271 2.29  Contract variation.272 Estoppel may operate during the course of a contractual relationship to prevent departure from a negative promise varying a term of the contract (for example, ‘You need not pay the full rent …’), as already discussed.273 Or it may bind the parties to a common assumption (traditionally called estoppel by convention).274 This assumption may be mistaken but is nevertheless binding if to depart from it would be unconscionable. Estoppel may also operate during the course of the contract in connection with other types of contract variations.275 It is very common during a contractual relationship, particularly long-term or complex commercial transactions, for contract modifications to be made. The rules of consideration, discussed in Chapter 4, are particularly rigid and are sometimes incapable of giving force to the evident intentions of the parties when an attempt is made to modify a contract in some respect.276 For example, a promise, voluntarily given, to pay more than the contract price or to accept less than the amount contractually due, are not binding, according to the traditional rules.277 The whole question of modification of contractual obligations, in particular where the modification consists of an indulgence granted by one party to the other, is complicated and dogged by doctrinal dispute.278 This is hardly surprising because of the number of ways in which the parties in a contract may make adjustments to their relationship. The dealings between them may be explicit or tacit, may be mutually beneficial or by way of indulgence by one party to the other, may affect major or minor obligations, may relate to substantive or procedural matters, may be made in anticipation of trouble or after trouble has struck, and so forth. In the course of these dealings promises, understandings, representations, assumptions, permissions, requests, actions in reliance and mistakes may be made. The contract itself may lay down a procedure for making changes to the contract. The law is then asked to distinguish these many shades of conduct and response with a coherent set of rules, a task that it has so far failed to accomplish. The debate in this area goes to the very root of contract law, that is, the extent to which the law should give its backing to the consequences and expectations created by consensual relations, which inevitably 271. Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 at 327 (Isaacs J); Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 at 215 (Lord Shand). 272. See 4.32–4.33, 22.2–22.6. 273. See 2.4, 2.17. 274. See 2.3. Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 577; Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ ConvR 307; Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 (Ipp J); Olga Investments Pty Ltd v Citipower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 (no estoppel generated by failure to send bill over an extended period). See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II). 275. See Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251; Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49. See also GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for variation to a multi-party agreement. 276. See Giancaspro, ‘The Rules for Contractual Renegotiation: A Call for Change’ (2014) 37 UWALR 1. 277. See 4.36. 278. See Stoljar, ‘The Categories of Waiver’ (2013) 87 ALJ 482.

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2.29

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

go through changes. In some instances, these dynamic interactions are poorly served by the doctrine of consideration. Estoppel undoubtedly has a role in dealing with the problem of contract variations, as do the related concepts of waiver and election.279 Broadly, if the elements of estoppel are satisfied,280 a change to the contract will be binding, even though the rules of the doctrine of consideration have not been met, and, in an appropriate case, even where the change has not been made in accordance with a formal procedure for change included in the contract.281 Estoppel should be distinguished from waiver in connection with contract variation. It is commonly assumed that if a party does not assert its rights when a breach of contract has occurred, it has waived the right to performance (to be distinguished from waiving the right to terminate). The commonly used ‘no waiver’ clause282 in standard agreements appears to make this assumption.283 As with any promise, there are only three ways in which waiver of a substantive obligation in a contract can be legally enforceable: by contract,284 deed or estoppel. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that, absent contract, deed or estoppel, non-enforcement of a contractual right,285 or even a positive promise not to enforce a right,286 amounts to a waiver in the sense of precluding enforcement of that right.287 Only if the limitation period has expired is it correct to say the right has been given up (in the absence of contract, deed or estoppel), and, even then, it is still substantively 279. See the discussion of these concepts in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]; Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32; and Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55. See also on election 11.47–11.52 (rescission), 20.15 (contingent condition), 21.29 (termination). 280. Thus, for example, the statement relied on to vary the contract must be clear and unequivocal. It was held not to be so by a majority in Hodgins v Duke Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 74. This case contains a useful discussion of the principles, in particular in the dissenting judgment of Williams J. 281. See 4.32 and Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251, where a variation was made without following the procedure laid down by the contract. It was held that the owner was estopped from relying on the strict contractual procedure after its architect had acquiesced to the change. See also Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50 at [213]– [222] (Finn J). 282. For example, ‘Failure by either party to enforce a term of the Contract shall not be construed as in any way affecting the enforceability of that term of the Contract as a whole’. 283. In Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40 at [107]–[118] (Finn and Sundberg JJ), it was held that estoppel was not precluded by a standard no waiver clause. 284. That is, a contractual variation with consideration. A contract variation is itself a contract: Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2002] HCA 35 at [22]. 285. For a case where non-insistence on timely payments created an estoppel, see Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 at [98]–[99] (Brereton J). Contrast Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 (no estoppel arising from non-enforcement of a take or pay clause). 286. Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 discussed in 2.24. Contrast where a party is given more time to meet a deadline. This is, in one sense, a giving up of a right but it is not regarded in the same light as a forgiving of a substantive obligation. See Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155, where it was held that a mere extension of time may be binding in the absence of both consideration and estoppel. Contrast Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100], where an assurance to treat a late payment as on time was not held to be binding. See also Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55. 287. In Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [144]–[145], Kirby J tentatively supported the possibility of waiver of a substantive contract right absent consideration, deed or estoppel.

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Estoppel

2.32

in existence. It is, of course, possible for a party to waive (in the true sense) reliance on the expiry of the limitation period, or be estopped from relying on it.288 2.30  Parol evidence and the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer. Mention has already been made in 2.18 that estoppel may be used to add to, vary or even contradict the written terms of a contract, though judicial attitudes to this use of estoppel are mixed.289 Another aspect of the primacy given to the written contract is the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer.290 This rule holds that a collateral contract will not be enforced if it contradicts the main contract.291 So, if in negotiations for a lease, a landlord assures a tenant that he will not enforce clause 5, and, having received that assurance the tenant then signs the lease, the landlord may break the promise. It would be possible to argue that the landlord is estopped from enforcing clause 5 because the tenant has acted on the promise by entering into the lease and it would be unconscionable for the landlord to break the promise given the reliance on it by the tenant.292 If this argument were successful, there is the anomalous situation that a promise supported by consideration (the collateral promise)293 is not enforceable as a contract but is enforceable on the basis of estoppel.294 The conclusion is that the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer should be changed.295 2.31 Breach. The doctrine of estoppel is, in most instances, concerned with precluding someone from relying on his or her strict legal rights. It is therefore possible for estoppel to operate to prevent a party from relying on a breach of contract. This may be because of an express assurance, for example, a promise not to insist on a contractual deadline;296 or it may be that conduct has led the other party to assume that strict rights will not be enforced;297 or that performance would be pointless.298 As already noted above (in 2.29), these examples are not waiver and, in each case, unless the essential elements of detrimental reliance and unconscionability can be demonstrated, the promises not to insist on contractual performance would not be binding, absent contract variation. Conduct occurring after a breach may have the effect of waiving the breach or may amount to an election not to rely on the breach.299 2.32  The creation of proprietary interests. The influence of proprietary estoppel on the development of the overarching doctrine of estoppel in Australia has already been noted. Cases in which, in the absence of contract, enforceable obligations relating to property arise are discussed in 16.68–16.71. 288. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394. 289. See further 10.3, 10.67. 290. (1919) 27 CLR 133. 291. See 10.6. 292. See Liangis Investments Pty Ltd v Daplyn Pty Ltd (1994) ANZ ConvR 638; Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3; Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737. 293. The consideration is the tenant going ahead, after receiving the promise, and signing the lease. 294. This anomaly was briefly alluded to by Mason CJ and Wilson J in the Waltons case (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 401. See Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [58]–[63] (Handley AJA) and Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] QCA 36, where the rule in Hoyt’s was outflanked by estoppel; Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWCA 169 at [111] (obiter dicta by Hodgson JA); Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167. 295. See Seddon, ‘A Plea for the Reform of the Rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer’ (1978) 52 ALJ 372. 296. See Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284. 297. See Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251; 2.29. See further 21.32. 298. Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385; Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524. See 21.23, 21.25, 21.29–21.32. 299. Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121. See 21.29–21.32.

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Chapter 3

Agreement — Offer and Acceptance Introduction 3.1  Pre-contractual obligations. It has already been noted that the law of contract is part of a broader law of obligations.1 This is evident particularly at the formation stage of contract. The traditional rules for contract formation determine that there is a moment of contract — when an offer has been accepted — and assume that the bargaining period does not generate, in the absence of fraud, any enforceable obligations. This assumption is no longer valid. Three specific instances illustrate this. First, statements made during the bargaining period may generate substantial remedies if the statements are either misleading, deceptive, negligent or fraudulent.2 Second, a court may decide that a ‘contract’ has come into being through the operation of estoppel even though the contemplated formalities have not taken place and even though the traditional rules for contract formation have not been satisfied.3 Third, it is possible for a person who invites offers to make a binding commitment to accept an offer in certain circumstances.4 These instances are not exhaustive and merely illustrate a broader trend, particularly evident in Australia, towards the imposition by the courts and the legislature of standards of fair dealing when parties engage with each other. The man who said ‘I never sign contracts’5 may have been safe enough in the nineteenth century; but not so now. The consequence is that, in thinking about contract and commercial relations, it is sometimes less appropriate to ask: ‘Have the rules of offer, acceptance and consideration been satisfied?’ than it is to ask: ‘Have the parties engaged with each other in such a way that, if one party were to pull out or fail to fulfil an undertaking, the other party would be adversely affected?’ It may even be possible to see  the negotiating process as one where the parties are on a continuum of commitment, weak at the beginning and stronger as the process of negotiation develops. Of course, the law may not have a suitable formula to deal with such a theory of engagement but there is a discernible trend in that direction. Judges will certainly differ on the question of the extent to which it is appropriate to discard the old rules and replace them with ‘fuzzy’ ones. All that is being said here is that the traditional rules, that are about to be discussed, are not necessarily the definitive or exclusive answer to a contract, or near-contract, problem. This makes life difficult for practitioners and students of contract law. 1. See Chapter 1, 2.1; see also 28.9. 2. See Chapter 11. 3. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See Chapter 2. 4. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd [1986] AC 207. See 3.25, 3.28, 3.35. 5. Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 526. See 3.27.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.3

Offer and Acceptance The traditional rules of contract formation 3.2  The essentials of a binding contract. In order to determine whether a contract — that is, a legally enforceable agreement — has come into being, the common law has traditionally required two essential elements: agreement and consideration.6 Whether or not there is agreement — that is, whether negotiations have crystallised into an accord — has traditionally been determined by the rules of offer and acceptance.7 The doctrine of consideration provides the essential elements for determining whether an agreement so reached is legally binding. The law requires there to be a reciprocal exchange in that agreement. A ‘one-way’ or gift promise is not legally enforceable as a contract, even if agreement is present.8 The doctrine of consideration is intimately connected with the rules of offer and acceptance, both involving the essential element of reciprocal exchange. The promise or promises constituting an offer are the consideration for the promise, promises or act constituting the acceptance, and vice versa. The doctrine of consideration is discussed in Chapter  4. The requirement of reciprocal exchange means that a contract binds both parties as from the moment of formation. It is not possible for one party to be bound by a contract while the other party is not. The rules that determine whether an agreement has been reached are of great importance. They determine when the parties have gone past the point of no return, that is, when they become legally bound by a contract. There are very many cases in the law reports where the dispute is about whether the parties are bound or whether they had not gone that far. A party who thinks that he or she has not committed to a contract, but in fact and law has, is inevitably in breach. Given the objective theory,9 contract can be a trap. 3.3  Offer and acceptance. The rules of offer and acceptance answer several questions. Has agreement been reached? When was agreement reached? Where was agreement reached? The rules also determine what the express content of the contract is. As a general rule, a contract comes into being when and where an acceptance of an offer is communicated to the offeror.10 (An exception to this is the postal acceptance rule.)11 The terms of the offer determine the express content of the contract. (There may also be further, unexpressed or implied terms.)12

6.

A third element, intention to create legal relations, is also necessary. It has been argued, however, that this element is not separate from the requirement of consideration: Williston, Contracts, vol 1, Section 21; Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1954) 1 Syd LR 289 at 314–15. Whether this theory is sound or not, the question of intention is in any case only of importance when it is alleged to be absent. See Chapter 5. An alternative model for determining whether there is agreement (inference from conduct) is discussed in 7. 3.5. It may be made legally enforceable by being embodied in a deed. A brief description of deeds is found in 8. 4.1. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 9. See 3.4, 28.6. 10. See 3.26. 11. See 3.60. 12. See 10.36–10.61.

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3.3

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Concerning the ‘when’ question,13 the offer and acceptance model of contractual engagement provides great precision: the moment of communication of acceptance of an offer. This has been called the ‘guillotine model of contract’. Usually, such precision is not needed for the resolution of a dispute about whether the parties have committed. The alternative inference model14 — a contract may be inferred from the conduct of the parties — does not provide this precision as to timing. Concerning the ‘where’ question,15 the place of the contract is where the communication of acceptance occurs, that is, the place of receipt of the message.16 Another aspect of the rules of offer and acceptance is that they presuppose that there are at least two parties (or sides) to a contract. The common law stipulates that one cannot make a contract with oneself. This is discussed in more detail in 3.14. The parties must also be recognised legal entities.17 3.4  Difficulties in applying the rules. The rules of offer and acceptance sometimes represent a form of legalistic straitjacket on dealings between people. The rules reflect the economist’s perfect competition market in which it is assumed that people of equal bargaining power negotiate until they finally reach agreement and strike a bargain. This model presupposes freedom of contract where there is supposedly freedom to negotiate whatever terms suit the parties’ needs and a choice whether or not to enter into contract.18 This model works reasonably well if parties engage in formal contracting, such as signing a formal document,19 or, in less formal contracting, where the rules of the game are well known, such as ordering goods over the telephone from an established supplier. This model is not so well suited to some everyday transactions such as taking a bus ride, buying a can of soft drink from a vending machine, buying a plane ticket or entering into a contract to carry goods. In such cases there may be no conversation at all or, at best, a desultory conversation, the contents of which would appear to be devoid of any matters of legal significance. These types of problems are compounded in online transactions. It is a court’s task to discern from such exchange as there is (which includes conduct as well as words) whether the process of offer and acceptance has taken place. In performing its task, the court will apply the familiar objective test: what would a reasonable person infer or deduce from observing the exchange between

See discussion of the electronic transactions legislation in 3.56 for the ‘when’ issue in relation to electronic communications. 14. See 3.5. See discussion of the electronic transactions legislation in 3.56 for the ‘where’ issue in relation to electronic 15. communications. 16. See  3.47. See  also Brinkibon Ltd v  Stahag Stahl und StahlwarenhandelsgesellschaftmbH [1983] 2 AC 34; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA); SydbankSoenderjylland A/S v Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 539; 149 ALR 134 at 142 (telephone conversation between Denmark and Australia with acceptance heard in Australia; contract formed in Australia). 17. See 3.13–3.15, 17.1, 17.68, 17.72, 17.74. 18. The reality of this choice is, of course, somewhat artificial in many transactions. However, it is still an essential hallmark of contract. In Braverus Maritime Inc v  Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68; [2005] FCAFC 256 at [190], it was confirmed by the Full Federal Court on appeal that a relationship dictated by legislation was not a contract. 19. As to the significance of signature, see 3.27. 13.

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the parties — contract or no contract?20 Ultimately, the court must determine whether the parties intended to commit to contract, and this intention is ascertained objectively. In some cases, the outward behaviour of the parties may lead a court to conclude that the parties have not intended to contract, even though they appear to have gone through the motions of offer and acceptance.21 Equally, it can happen that the parties subjectively may not have considered that they were contracting and yet the application of the objective test means that a court would say that there was a contract.22 The somewhat artificial analysis of offer and acceptance has been recognised judicially. In New  Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v  A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd,23 Lord Wilberforce said: It is only the precise analysis of this complex of relations into the classical offer and acceptance, with identifiable consideration, that seems to present difficulty, but this same difficulty exists in many situations of daily life, eg, sales at auction; supermarket purchases; boarding an omnibus; purchasing a train ticket; tenders for the supply of goods; offers of rewards; acceptance by post; warranties of authority by agents; manufacturers’ guarantees; gratuitous bailments; bankers’ commercial credits. These are all examples which show that English law, having committed itself to a rather technical and schematic doctrine of contract, in application takes a practical approach, often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into the marked slots of offer, acceptance and consideration.24

The difficulty of analysing contract formation in some cases is well illustrated by MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA),25 where the High  Court had to decide exactly what happens in terms of offer and acceptance when someone buys a plane ticket. Three different opinions were expressed by the three judges who were sitting.26 A similar diversity of views has been shown in other contracts of carriage. It has been said variously: that an offer is constituted by an announcement in a timetable that a train will run which is presumably accepted by the passenger buying the ticket;27 that the act of providing buses is an offer accepted by a passenger getting on the bus;28 that a passenger booking a passage on a ship makes an offer that is accepted by confirmation of the 20.

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 at [38]– [41]; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 701; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55 at [34]. 21. See Chapter 5. 22. McLauchlan, ‘Contract Formation and Subjective Intention’ (2017) 34 JCL 41 provides a convincing case questioning the dominance of, and deference to, the objective test. See also McLauchlan, ‘The Continuing Confusion and Uncertainty over the Relevance of Actual Mutual Intention in Contract Interpretation’ (2021) 37 JCL 25. 23. [1975] AC 154. 24. Ibid at 167. See MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 136–7 (Stephen J); Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 at 11,117–18 (McHugh JA). See also Lücke, ‘Striking a Bargain’ (1962) 1(3) Adelaide LR 293. 25. (1975) 133 CLR 125. 26. Barwick CJ used a unilateral contract analysis: see  3.28. Stephen J employed a traditional ‘ticket case’ analysis in which the customer is offered a ticket that he or she is taken to have accepted if the ticket is not rejected: see 10.28, 10.70. Jacobs J appeared to use an amalgam of the two, saying that there were two contracts, one bilateral and one unilateral: (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 146. See Gulf Air Company GSC v Fattouh (2008) 251 ALR 183; [2008] NSWCA 225 at [77]–[91]. 27. Denton v Great Northern Railway Co (1856) 5 E & B 860; 119 ER 701. It is doubtful whether this case would be followed today. 28. Wilkie v London Passenger Transport Board [1947] 1 All ER 258 at 259.

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booking clerk, even though a ticket is issued later;29 and that a ticket is itself an offer which is accepted by a passenger who received it without objection.30 This is merely to illustrate that the application of the rules is not straightforward. The difficulties encountered with applying the rules of offer and acceptance may be alleviated by an alternative model. The rules of offer and acceptance are not the exclusive model for determining contractual commitment.

Agreement in the absence of offer and acceptance 3.5  Alternative approaches. The rigidity of offer and acceptance is sometimes ill-suited to what people actually do, with the consequence that the law of contract may dictate that no agreement has been reached when the parties themselves would consider that they have entered into a contractual relationship. This is particularly evident with the ‘battle of the forms’.31 There are many circumstances of modern commerce that do not easily fit the formal offer-acceptance model, as noted in 3.4.

The inference model 3.6  The ‘global’ model. From time to time, attempts have been made to escape the straitjacket of offer and acceptance by adopting a ‘global’ approach to negotiations between parties. On this approach the court’s task is to ask whether, objectively and having regard to the totality of the dealings between the parties, they should be considered to have entered into a contractual relationship without inquiring closely into the formalities of offer and acceptance.32 Sometimes this approach is dictated by the circumstances of the case, such as where parties have ‘drifted’ into a contractual relationship, there being no precise time when it could be said that an offer had been accepted.33 Such was the case in Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd,34 in which McHugh JA said ‘a contract may be inferred from the acts and conduct of parties as well as or in the absence of their words’.35 He went on to say that ‘action and conduct before 29.

The Eagle [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70; The Dragon [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 257. Compare Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v  Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 (contract formed when ‘exchange order’ issued to passenger, such order being exchanged for ticket on arrival in foreign country); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (contract formed at moment when ticket issued to passenger). 30. MacRobertson Miller (1975) 133 CLR 125 at  137 (Stephen J); Thompson v  London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1 KB 41. 31. See 3.32. 32. Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v  Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559 at  567 (Buchanan JA with the concurrence of Ormiston and Callaway JJA) (quotation provided ‘subject to conditions of tender attached’ but none were attached; held that the standard terms nevertheless were agreed to); Marist Brothers Community Inc v Shire of Harvey (1994) 14 WAR 69; Farmers’ Mercantile Union and Chaff Mills Ltd v Coade (1921) 30 CLR 113 at 125 (Higgins J). See also 3.11. 33. See  Ormwave Pty Ltd v  Smith [2007] NSWCA 210 at  [68]–[75] (Beazley JA, Santow and Ipp JJA concurring). 34. (1988) 5 BPR 11,110. See also Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346; 321 ALR 404; [2015] FCAFC 37 at [150] (North and Bromberg JJ). 35. Ibid at 11,117 relying on Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd later reported at (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 (discussed below in 3.27). See also Pobjie Agencies Pty Ltd v VinidexTubemakers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 105, where Mason P, with the concurrence of Meagher and Handley JJA, found that a contract existed from a course of dealing. To similar effect is Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [71]–[80] (Heydon JA); Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 at [51] (Nettle JA); Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 at 377 (Cooke J); Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [369] (Allsop J); Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 at [39]–[45] (Tamberlin J for the Full Federal Court). Compare Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v  St Vincent’s Hospital

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the inception of a controversy is of much greater weight than what they said or did after a dispute arose’.36 Despite this statement by McHugh JA, it is clear that conduct occurring after the inception of the alleged contract is admissible for the purpose of ascertaining whether the parties did in fact intend to commit to contract.37 It is not sufficient that such conduct is either consistent (or inconsistent) with the contract alleged. The conduct must ‘necessarily’ lead to the inference that consensus had been reached.38 Such action and conduct may also generate an estoppel argument so that contractual relations cannot be denied.39 Another example of the global approach can be seen in the following passage taken from the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Gibson v Manchester CC:40 To my mind it is a mistake to think that all contracts can be analysed into the form of offer and acceptance. I know in some of the text books it has been the custom to do so: but, as I understand the law, there is no need to look for a strict offer and acceptance. You should look at the correspondence as a whole and at the conduct of the parties and see there from whether the parties have come to an agreement on everything that was material. If by their correspondence and their conduct you can see an agreement on all material terms — which was intended thenceforward to be binding — then there is a binding contract in law even though all the formalities have not been gone through …41

Ormiston J in Vroon BV v  Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd42 was prepared to conclude that the existence of a contract may be ‘evidenced otherwise than by offer and acceptance’,43 though stressing that offer and acceptance was the primary mode of ascertaining the existence of agreement. His Honour drew particularly on the American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 22(2), which provides: A manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined. (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70, where the Court of Appeal was not prepared to infer an agreement from the conduct of the parties when they had unsuccessfully attempted to novate an agreement and the assignee and original party had acted on the basis that the novation had occurred. Estoppel was not argued because it had not been raised at trial. As to inference that a contract of retainer exists between solicitor and client, see Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187 at [23]–[24]. 36. (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 at 11,117–18 citing Fincke v US (1982) 675 F 2d 289 at 295. 37. Brambles Holdings Ltd v  Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at  [71]–[80] (Heydon JA); Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd (formerly Mayne Group Ltd) [2008] NSWCA 149 at [99]–[106] (Giles JA, Hodgson and Campbell JJA agreeing); Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [5] (Allsop P, Macfarlan JA concurring), [109] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Holt v Bunney [2020] SASCFC 89 at [141] (Nicholson J, Kourakis CJ and Hughes J agreeing). 38. See  3.11. Kriketos [2009] NSWCA 96 at  [115]–[117], [160] (McColl JA); Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand (Australia) Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [142] (Giles JA, Priestley and Meagher JJA concurring). 39. See Chapter 2. 40. [1978] 1 WLR 520 reversed on appeal: [1979] 1 WLR 294. 41. Ibid at 523–4. Another example of the ‘global’ approach is to be found in the trial judge’s treatment of the ‘battle of the forms’ problem in Butler Machine Tool Co v Ex-Cell-O Corp and in its endorsement by Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal: [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 404. 42. [1994] 2 VR 32 at 79–83. See also Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 at [51]: ‘a manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer or acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined’ (Nettle JA with whom Chernov and Ashley JJA concurred). An attempt to argue this analysis in Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 failed on the facts. 43. [1994] 2 VR 32 at 83. See also White v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq); Collins v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] VSCA 361 at [145]–[146].

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

These approaches, as alternatives to the offer-acceptance model, to determining contract formation are well established in Australia.44 It is a beneficial development in the law, reflecting what many commercial people actually do rather than artificially analysing their interactions by reference to the traditional offer and acceptance model.

Shrink wrap, click wrap, etc 45 3.7  Electronic terms. Other examples of adaptation of the traditional formation rules to modern commercial conditions are the contractual arrangements involved in buying software or imposing licence terms — the so-called ‘shrink wrap’ licence; purchasing by telephone or on the internet (by a ‘click wrap’ agreement);46 and the provision of terms which are accepted by the use of an internet site (called ‘browse wrap’ terms).47 As to the shrink wrap licence, the problem is that the terms cannot be perused until after the product has been opened. Does this mean that the terms are ineffectual? On the ordinary application of the rules of contract formation, terms cannot be added after acceptance of an offer (except by way of variation by agreement).48 In Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg,49 Easterbrook J, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit, adopted a very pragmatic approach to the problem,50 and held that a ‘money now, terms later’ arrangement was legally binding. The terms allowed the purchaser to reject the goods if dissatisfied but the purchaser had not availed himself of that opportunity. Easterbrook J relied on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(1): A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.

Easterbrook J assumed that the retail vendor makes the offer and may therefore determine a particular method of acceptance, including, in this case, stipulating that use of the product constitutes acceptance. In Australia it is generally the case that the retail buyer makes the offer: see  3.20. So, there may be some difficulties in applying the reasoning of Easterbrook J to Australian shrink wrap contracts.51 44.

Tecnicas Reunidas SA v  Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 at  50 (Leeming JA, Bathurst CJ and White JA concurring). 45. See also treatment of electronic transactions at 3.48–3.56. 46. See  Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 6. ‘Shrink wrap’ refers to the typical packaging used with off-the-shelf software. ‘Click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ are adaptations of this expression, to describe the making of an agreement online by clicking on an ‘I agree’ or ‘Accept’ icon on an internet page. See 3.26 on whether clicking amounts to acceptance. See Kunkel, ‘Recent Developments in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in the United States’ [2002] MurUEJL 34. See also Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 101–2, which discusses click wrap agreements of various kinds, including online auctions. 47. These types of electronic and online contracts are discussed by Beach J in Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd  v Instagram  Inc [2020] FCA 1846 at  [239]–[255]. In this case an arbitration clause was upheld. See also Gupta, ‘Are Websites Adequately Communicating Terms and Conditions Link in a Browse-wrap Agreement?’ (2012) 3(2) EJLT . See also 3.48–3.56. 48. See Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152 at 156–66. 49. 86 F 3d 1447 (1996). See also MA Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp 93 Wn App 819 (1999). 50. A similar facilitative approach to the use of electronic contracts can be discerned in the approach of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Century 21 Canada Ltd Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc [2011] BCSC 1196. 51. The Pro CD decision is controversial, both in so far as other courts have decided against the enforceability of shrink wrap terms and in attracting criticism from commentators. See the extensive survey conducted by Vratil J in Klocek v Gateway, Inc 104 F Supp 2d 1332 at 1337–41 (2000). See also Blount, Electronic

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Even so, it is observed in the discussion of shop displays and the like that there may be exceptional circumstances where the vendor makes the offer. Clearly, it is the common assumption of the parties to a software contract that the vendor dictates the method of acceptance and so this type of transaction could constitute an exception to the usual rule that applies to shop displays and the like. Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg was followed and applied to the purchase of a computer by telephone or through the internet in Hill v Gateway 2000 Inc.52 Again the problem is that the terms may be delivered with the computer,53 so that it is possible to argue that they are too late if it is assumed that the contract was made over the telephone or internet. Easterbrook J presided in this case too, and naturally was inclined to follow what he said in Pro CD. The terms again allowed the purchaser to reject the goods within 30 days but the purchaser had not done that. It was held that the terms included with the computer were binding.54 As to click wrap and browse wrap, the issue is again whether the online customer has had an opportunity to peruse the terms before committing to the contract.55 They are therefore similar to ticket cases where it is necessary for the vendor to provide reasonable notice of the terms. The design, get-up and user-friendliness of the website are important factors.56 The ease with which vendors can impose unfair or voluminous terms is a matter of concern.57 In Australia, the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law58 could be used to challenge such terms where either a consumer or a small business59 is the customer. One type of potentially unfair term is a choice of law or jurisdiction clause that effectively makes dispute resolution impossible for the customer.60 The universally acknowledged phenomenon Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), 6.7–6.9; Hogan-Doran, ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The When and Where of On-line Contracts’ (2003) 77 ALJ 377; Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197; Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152. 52. 105 F 3d 1147 (1997). See also DeJohn v TV Corp Int’l, 245 F Supp 2d 913 (2003). 53. With internet transactions, the terms will often have been displayed to the purchaser, who cannot proceed to complete the purchase without agreeing to the terms. See I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002). 54. Legal issues arising from the use of electronic communications are further discussed in 3.48–3.56. 55. Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir). 56. See  Gupta, ‘Are Websites Adequately Communicating Terms and Conditions Link in a Browse-wrap Agreement?’ (2012) 3(2) EJLT , where the author surveyed United States and Canadian case law in which the courts lay down standards of accessibility. The author also conducted an empirical survey of a sample of European websites to assess whether they met the standards. See also Moringiello, ‘Notice, Assent, and Form in a 140 Character World’ (2014) 44 Southwest Law Rev 275 (available free at  ); Kim, ‘Wrap Contracting and the Online Environment: Causes and Cures’ (2016) California Western School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-08 (available free at ). 57. See  Moringiello ibid and Preston, ‘“Please Note: You have Waived Everything”: Can notice redeem online contracts?’ (2015) 64 Am U Law Rev 535 (available free at ). 58. See  15.20–15.25. See also Clapperton and Corones, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 ABLR 152, written before the enactment of the Australian Consumer Law unfair contract terms legislation. 59. Small business is protected as from 12 November 2016. 60. See  Gonzalez v  Agoda Co Pte Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1133 and discussion of this case by Bloemendal and Josey, ‘“Click–Clash” — Be Alert to Hidden Icebergs within Online Contracts’, April 2018 Internet Law Bulletin 182. See O’Hara, ‘Strategies for Avoiding a Jurisdiction Clause in International Litigation’ (2020) 94 ALJ 267. Forum clauses have been a problem in the United States. See  Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (2012), ch 1. See  also the Canadian case St-Arnaud v Facebook, Inc [2011] QCCS 1506, where the court declined to exercise jurisdiction because the contract provided that Californian courts were the chosen forum for disputes. Compare ACCC v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v Australian

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of users clicking without reading61 does not deter courts from holding that terms are binding, just as in the ticket cases where the same (un)reality exists. An exception was Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane,62 where the sheer volume of terms combined with their essentially exempting the merchant from everything (and hence not providing consideration) resulted in the term in contention not being enforceable. Needless to say, there is a wealth of United States material on the legal issues that arise out of this type of contracting or use of websites.63 For online auctions, see 3.22. For further discussion of electronic contracting, see 3.48–3.56. 3.8  Multi-party transactions. In some circumstances the rules of offer and acceptance are manipulated to the point of distortion so as to find that there is a contractual relationship, the court having formed the view that there must be such a relationship in the circumstances. Two examples of this process are cases in which third parties are held to be protected by exemption clauses in contracts of carriage64 and cases in which multi-party transactions are upheld by the courts. In relation to multi-party transactions, although almost all contracts involve two parties, or at  least two sides65 (with a side consisting of possibly more than one party), there is no reason why a contract cannot exist between a number of parties (for example, a five-sided contract). Usually, it is not very practical to construct such a contract because of the difficulties of designating who does what and who can complain in the event of non-performance.66 But in some circumstances the multisided contract serves a useful purpose and can be made to work. Thus, it has been held that entrants in a race who undertook to a yacht club that they would abide by the rules of the club were in a contractual relationship with each other.67 Similarly, motor dealers who contracted with the manufacturing company were held to be bound to each other by the terms of the agreement.68 The constitution of a company

Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224), a misleading conduct case, where the Federal Court had jurisdiction in respect of a United States corporation selling online into Australia. See 11.114. 61. See Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (2015), 145; Tonking, ‘Making Liars of Us All!’ (2020) 48 ABLR 89. 62. [2012] EWHC 1290 (Comm). 63. Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) 91 Minn Law Rev 459 provides a comprehensive guide to the then current United States case law. See also Moringiello, Kim and Ottaviani, ‘Notice and Assent Through Technological Change: The Enduring Relevance of the Work of the ABA Joint Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices’ (2020) 75 The Business Lawyer 1725 (available ) which surveys the development of United States law on electronic contracts over 20 years. 64. See 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 65. An example being the contracts discussed in South Launceston Football Club Inc v Tasmanian Football League Ltd (1995) 4 Tas R 342, in which it was found that there were contracts between each participating club and the League and between each player and the League. It was not necessary to determine whether these contracts imposed rights and obligations between the clubs or between the players but probably they did not. 66. See GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for the difficulties in working out whether a multi-party contract had been varied. Wollongong Coal Ltd v  Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 135 involved a multi-party deed. The case demonstrates that a party to such an arrangement may not necessarily be able to enforce against one of the other parties. 67. Clarke v  Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 applied in Commissioner of Taxation v  Racing Queensland Board [2019] FCAFC 224 at [99]–[103]; Angela Raguz v Sullivan (2000) 50 NSWLR 236; [2000] NSWCA 240 at [65]–[67]. But contrast Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 at 285 (Santow J) (mere entry into race not sufficient to constitute a contract governed by the rules of the race). 68. McCannell v Mabee MacLaren Motors Ltd (1926) 36 BCR 369.

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has been held to create not just a contract between each member and the company but also a contract between the members.69 3.9  Tripartite collateral contract. Another example of multi-party transactions is the curiously named tripartite collateral contract. In these cases, the courts are prepared to hold that a contractual relationship exists between A and B when A makes a promise to B who, in reliance on that promise, enters into a contract with a third party, C, when that contract is of some benefit to A. The consideration given by B for A’s promise is the indirect benefit that A derives from the contract between B and C. However, the transaction is more difficult to analyse in terms of offer and acceptance. Presumably A’s promise contains at least an implied invitation to B to enter into a contract with C (or at least someone from whom A benefits). When B actually makes the contract with C, B has accepted and consequently a unilateral contract70 has been formed with A. Examples of tripartite collateral contract (which bears no relation to two-party collateral contract)71 are: •

•

•

•

A paint company promised that its paint was suitable for the plaintiff’s pier. The plaintiff told painting contractors to use the paint. The paint was unsuitable and the pier owner successfully sued the paint company for damages for breach of the promise as to quality.72 A car dealer made assurances about a car on the strength of which the customer purchased the car on hire-purchase from a finance company. The dealer’s promise was actionable in contract even though no direct contractual relationship existed between dealer and customer.73 A car owner left his car to be repaired by a crash repairer. The contract for repairs was between the repairer and the car owner’s insurance company. Nevertheless, certain implied contractual obligations, such as the duty to repair within a reasonable time and to do the job properly, arose between repairer and owner.74 A travel association displayed a sign describing the protection that would be provided if a member of the association went into liquidation or was otherwise unable to provide a holiday already purchased. It was held that the sign amounted to an offer to customers who accepted by entering into a contract with a particular travel agent.75

69.

Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140. This contract has some special features that takes it out of the realm of general contract law and into corporations law. See the discussion of what is called this ‘special contract’ in Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399; 132 ALR 1, particularly at 434–40; 26–30 (McHugh and Gummow JJ). 70. See 3.28. 71. See  10.6. In particular, the rule that the collateral promise and the main contract must be consistent (Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133) does not apply. See, for example, CJ Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22. 72. Shanklin Pier v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854. See also Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand and Silica Co Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170. 73. Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229; Brown v Sheen & Richmond Car Sales [1950] 1 All ER 1102; Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186; Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301 at 309; C J Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22. The liability of a dealer or retailer for express or implied promises made to a customer who buys from a finance company is now governed by the interaction of the Credit Code and the Australian Consumer Law Pt 5-5. 74. Charnock v Liverpool Corp [1968] 1 WLR 1498; Brown and Davis v Galbraith [1972] 1 WLR 997. 75. Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agents [1996] CLC 451.

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•

Company directors guaranteed the quality of work to be performed by the company with which the plaintiffs were about to contract. It was held that a collateral contract existed between the directors and the plaintiffs.76

Some of these cases could be analysed in terms of an estoppel binding a party who made a representation which was acted on by the other party entering into a contract with a third party. One application of tripartite collateral contract has parallels in the Australian Consumer Law Pt 5-4 Div  2, under which a consumer may sue a manufacturer77 directly for damages in respect of defects in the goods even though the purchase was from a retailer. In the South  Australian and Australian Capital Territory misrepresentation legislation,78 a person who makes a misrepresentation that induces another to enter into a contract with a third party, from which the representor derives some benefit, may be liable for an action for damages. Thus, an agent may be liable under this provision for inducing a contract with his or her principal; a car dealer may be liable for inducing a contract with a finance company. Another possible way in which legislation may be used to achieve the same result as tripartite collateral contract is to seek damages from the person promising or making representations under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.79 Much of the usefulness of tripartite collateral contract has therefore been overtaken by legislation and by the law of estoppel. It nevertheless remains as a device to be applied to new circumstances in which a person makes a promise that is acted on by the promisee entering into a contract with a third party from which the promisor benefits.

Offer and acceptance and exchange of land contracts 3.10  Land dealings. Another, and common, example of the difficulty of matching the language of offer and acceptance to what people do is the exchange of counterpart contracts in land dealings. The ‘ceremony of exchange’ undoubtedly brings a contract into existence,80 but it is not clear who offers or who accepts: It seems to be straining language to talk of an offeror and an offeree in a land contract … Exchange of parts more easily connotes mutual exchange, rather than a two stage contractual process between offeror and offeree.81

An analysis by way of alternatives was put by counsel for the appellant in Sindel v Georgiou: ‘exchange brings into existence a binding contract by means of written offer and written acceptance — one copy being the offer and the other being the 76. 77. 78.

Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79. Defined broadly to include importer and ‘brand name’ appearance of manufacturer: see s 7. SA: Misrepresentation Act 1972 s 7(1) and (2); ACT: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 174 discussed in 11.92–11.101. 79. See Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79 and Chapter 11. 80. Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 666; Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 at 531–3; Brien v Dwyer (1978) 141 CLR 378 at 391; Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 415; 51 ALJR 743. In Western Australia and South Australia, a single contract is used. In Victoria, a single contract is used in triplicate so that exchange, strictly so called, does not occur. 81. Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 at 81 (Hedigan J). See further 3.33.

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acceptance or, alternatively, each being a simultaneous offer and acceptance’.82 In support of the first alternative is the view that ‘the offer is made when the first party to do so signs and delivers the formal contract to the other’.83 When exchange takes place by post it is not clear whether acceptance occurs when the second copy, duly signed, is put into the post or when both copies have been received,84 though if the offeror (the person who sends a counterpart to be signed and returned) stipulates that posting of the counterpart is not to be deemed acceptance then the position is clear.85 There is judicial recognition of ‘exchange’ taking place by telephone and other electronic modes of communication: see 3.57. As to the requirement that both parts should be identical, see  3.33. As to the application of the postal acceptance rule, see 3.61. As to whether in a land transaction, where formal exchange is the accepted mode of contracting, informal dealings could give rise to a contract, see 3.11.

Flexibility in applying the rules 3.11  Protracted, informal or imprecise negotiations. When there are protracted or imprecise negotiations, there will often be doubt about whether finality of agreement has been reached. This problem has generated a very large number of reported cases. The court’s task is to ascertain from the dealings between the parties whether they intended to make a concluded bargain or not. That intention is, of course, tested objectively by reference to what a reasonable observer would have concluded.86 This kind of problem potentially involves at least three areas of contract law: contract formation (often in the absence of identifiable offer and acceptance);87 intention to create legal relations (including ‘subject to contract’);88 and agreements to agree.89 Where dealings have been informal there is often a problem in ascertaining exactly 82. 83.

Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 665. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), vol 9, para 232. See Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93; Smith v Mansi [1963] 1 WLR 26. 84. Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93 at 98 (Lord Greene MR). See also Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 at [31] (Campbell JA, who discussed the roles of the respective solicitors); Waite, ‘Formation of Contracts in Conveyancing’ (1980) 130 New LJ 774. 85. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v  Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74, the purchaser’s solicitor made it clear that receipt, not posting, of the counterpart contract was effective acceptance. Similarly, in Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445, the exercise of an option required ‘return’ of an executed contract. 86. Of many pronouncements on the test of intention, a typical one is that of Gleeson CJ (Hope and Mahoney JJA concurring) in Australian Broadcasting Corp v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 at 548–50. See Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 407 at [4]–[5] (Allsop P); Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 at [22]; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 at [40]–[46]; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 at  350; 41 ALR 367 at  373–4 (Mason J). Compare McLauchlan, ‘Contract Formation and Subjective Intention’ (2017) 34 JCL 41 who provides a convincing case questioning the dominance of, and deference to, the objective test; McLauchlan, ‘The Continuing Confusion and Uncertainty over the Relevance of Actual Mutual Intention in Contract Interpretation’ (2021) 37 JCL 25. See also 5.19, where the case law on the parties’ use of documents of indeterminate status (for example, a heads of agreement or a letter of intent) is discussed. 87. See 3.5–3.7. 88. See Chapter 5, particularly at 5.19 and 5.24. 89. See  Chapter  6, particularly at  6.8 and 6.12. In Peabody (Wilkie Creek) Pty Ltd v  Queensland Bulk Handling Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 202, a contract renewal clause required a party to provide a ‘binding indication of preparedness to commit’ to continuing the agreement. This was provided. The court held that this was a binding commitment and not just a warranty of the party’s state of mind at the time the notice was provided. This case turned on contextual and commercial interpretation of the contract.

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what the parties may have agreed, that is, there is uncertainty of terms.90 In addition, misleading conduct and estoppel very frequently feature in cases of this kind. If the parties have expressly indicated that the negotiations are ‘subject to contract’ then there is a very strong presumption that contractual relations will not be established unless and until a formal contract has been executed (or, in some cases, exchange of contracts has taken place): see 5.24. In cases where the intention of the parties is equivocal, it has been established that conduct or correspondence subsequent to the alleged offer and acceptance can be used as evidence to show whether or not a contract was concluded,91 though subsequent events cannot be used to show that there was no contract when the court could otherwise conclude that there was one.92 (This is not to be confused with cases where subsequent conduct amounts to acceptance of an offer not previously accepted: see  3.27. Nor should it be confused with the often asserted rule that subsequent conduct cannot be used to determine the meaning of what was agreed: see 6.6 and 10.16.) Conversely, if the court concludes that the dealings between the parties did not result in a contract, then subsequent events or statements cannot be used to show that there was a contract.93 None of these statements is hard and fast because so much depends on the interpretation of the particular facts. For example, subsequent conduct may itself indicate that the parties have ‘drifted’ into a contract in which case it is not so much subsequent as the relevant evidence that shows that the parties have committed to a contract.94 Or the conduct may not be subsequent but anticipatory: ‘businessmen not uncommonly act upon an anticipated contractual relationship prior to the contract’.95 The court may also look to such factors as the customary method of concluding a contract, for example, exchange of formal contracts in land dealings,96 or whether an informal exchange that is alleged to lead to contract would accord with the 90. See Chapter 6, particularly at 6.1–6.7. 91. Howard Smith & Co Ltd v  Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68; Barrier Wharfs Ltd v  W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647; B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147; Film Bars Pty Ltd v  Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1  BPR  9251; Australian Broadcasting Corp v  XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540; Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v  Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 14,551 at 14,569 (Kirby P); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 (Tamberlin J); (2000) 175 ALR 433 (Full Federal Court); Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [25] (Heydon JA). In order for a court to be able to infer that a contract has arisen from conduct it is not sufficient that the conduct is consistent with the contract alleged. There needs to be a positive indication that the conduct is evidence of the contract alleged: Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [142]; Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [117]–[120] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring). 92. Darzi Group Pty Ltd v  Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 at  [155]–[160] (Emmett AJA); Lennon v Scarlett & Co (1921) 29 CLR 499 at 509. 93. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207 at 226, 234–5; Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 213; Commercial Bank of Australia v GH Dean & Co Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 204 at 209; Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42 at [185] (Dodds-Streeton J) (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112). 94. A good summary of the rules relating to ascertaining whether the parties have made a contract is provided by Einstein J in African Minerals v Pan Palladium Ltd [2003] NSWSC 268 at [12]–[40]. 95. Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 at [117] (Giles JA). 96. See 3.10. GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 at [99] (Gleeson JA); Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528. But compare Lake Macquarie Municipal Council v Bortolus Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 46 LGRA 292, where it was clear that the parties intended conduct prior to formal exchange of contracts should constitute formation.

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expectations of the parties in a contract of the kind under consideration.97 Broadly, the bigger the deal, the less likely that a court would conclude that informal exchange amounts to a contract.98 The number of issues about which the parties have to reach agreement is a telling factor: [A]s a matter of fact and common sense, other things being equal, the more numerous and significant the areas in respect of which the parties have failed to reach agreement, the slower a court will be to conclude that they had the requisite contractual intention.99

The mere fact that the parties have committed substantial resources does not necessarily mean that they have made a contract. Tamberlin J in Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd100 made the point that the parties may well have made a commercial commitment (involving many millions of dollars in that case) without necessarily having made a legal commitment.101 A similar idea is seen in cases involving the payment of a ‘holding deposit’ or ‘pre-contract’ deposit. The mere payment of such a deposit does not necessarily indicate that the parties have committed to contract if other factors would indicate otherwise.102 If such a deposit is paid with a view to committing to negotiate towards a concluded agreement and in fact the negotiations are not successful, then it is clear that the deposit must be returned.103 None of the statements that can be made about informal or imprecise contract negotiations are hard and fast rules, as already noted. The decision in a particular case is very much a matter of circumstance and, it must be said, judicial attitude. An illustrative case is Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v  Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd,104 in which an oral agreement to settle pending litigation was alleged. The parties agreed on a sum (without lawyers present) and shook hands. 97.

98.

99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9251 (inherently unlikely that a contract for sale of land for $385,000 would be concluded by informal exchange); Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1983) 50 ALR 363 (inherently unlikely that the Commonwealth would commit to purchasing a motel by an informal process evidenced by a letter of intent). Similar reasoning was used in Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480 by Young J at 58, 486. Yet, in Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144, an oral agreement for the acquisition of oil exploration permits was held to be enforceable. Sale of business attracts the same expectation of formality (exchange) as sale of land: Begna Holdings applying Elgas Pty Ltd v AJ Young Industries Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-329. Sinclair, Scott and Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 at 316–17 (Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ); Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106 at 131 (Brooking J); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 (Tamberlin J); (2000) 175 ALR 433 (Full Federal Court); New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 (it would normally be expected that a government would commit to a contract by formal means). Australian Broadcasting Corp v  XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 at  548 (Gleeson CJ, Hope and Mahoney JJA concurring); GC NSW Pty Ltd v  Galati  [2020] NSWCA 326 at  [70], [71]–[84] (Gleeson JA); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v  Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 at 113–15 (Tamberlin J); Uranium Equities Ltd v Fewster (2008) 36 WAR 97; [2008] WASCA 33. However, the so-called fourth category of ‘subject-to-contract’ cases, discussed in 5.24, allows a binding contract to come into existence even though a number of matters have not yet been agreed. (2000) 171 ALR 89 at 121. On appeal (Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v  Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 433) a majority (Moore and Gyles JJ, Beaumont J dissenting) upheld the finding of Tamberlin J that no contract had been made. Allens Group Ltd v Arena Meetings Conventions & Exhibitions Pty Ltd (1997) 8 BPR 15,623; Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 (NSWCA). See 5.19, 6.12. Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 (NSWCA). (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-059; BC9505503.

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The New South Wales Court of Appeal had to decide whether this was a binding agreement. The majority (Gleeson CJ and Kirby P) held that it was, even though the parties intended to embody the agreement in a more formal form to be drawn up by solicitors.105 Kirby P carried out a thorough review of the authorities falling on either side of the line106 and came to the conclusion that there was a contract here, stressing the importance of the law’s flexible approach and the fact that the courts should strive to uphold the parties’ agreement.107 The fact that this was a case in which the parties were trying to settle out of court was significant because the law has always encouraged settlement rather than litigation. One interesting issue that was the subject of disagreement was the significance in law of the parties shaking hands. Kirby P was particularly persuaded that this indicated that the parties had reached agreement,108 whereas Powell JA thought that there was no particular legal significance in shaking hands.109 Powell JA dissented and said that on his reading of the facts the parties did not intend to be bound until terms of settlement and draft minutes of orders had been drawn up. This case merely illustrates how difficult it is to predict the outcome of imprecise commercial dealings and how judges will differ in their interpretation of the parties’ conduct. We have seen from the Geebung case and other cases just discussed that the type of contract may be significant in the final outcome. This can cut both ways. The courts encourage settlements of pending litigation and so the approach is flexible. On the other hand, big commercial transactions are less likely to be treated with flexibility. The same is generally true of contracts involving land. In relation to land contracts, it commonly happens that the parties have agreed informally but have not yet exchanged contracts. If one party decides to pull out before exchange, it has been frequently argued that there is an enforceable contract. The courts have tended to adopt a formalist approach to land contracts (and to sales of businesses)110 and stressed that exchange is essential for formation.111 McHugh JA has gone so far as to say that in land transactions there is a presumption that exchange is the contemplated mode of formation.112 In other words, the courts may be prepared to 105. Compare PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310, in which an invitation to tender document stipulated ‘The Contract shall not come into effect until the formal instrument of agreement (Conformed Contract Document) is executed by the parties’. PRA was told it had won the tender. No formal instrument was executed but the invitation to tender document included special and general conditions of contract. The parties proceeded with the project. It was held that there was a binding contract. Alternatively, an estoppel operated to support formation of contract. 106. (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-959 at 90, 322–90, 327. 107. Ibid at 90, 329. 108. Ibid. As to a shrug of the shoulders amounting to assent, see Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v Kovan Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2006) 225 ALR 57; [2005] FCA 1521 at [104]ff (Crennan J). 109. Ibid (Geebung) at 90, 340. 110. Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR 55-329; Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480. 111. See Lezabar Pty Ltd v Hogan (1989) NSW ConvR 55-468; Encino Plaza Pty Ltd v Wilson International Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 326. 112. G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-324 at 56, 984 applied in GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 at [99] (Gleeson JA); Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-329 at 57,016; Dowdle v Inverell Shire Council (1998) 9 BPR 97,800. See also SJ Mackie Pty Ltd v Dalziell Medical Practice Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 87 at 92–3 (McPherson J); Marek v Australian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 at 527–8 (Cooper and Byrne JJ); Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v  Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149. Contrast Sheehan v Zaszlos [1995] 2 Qd R 210, where the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that in commercial contracts for the sale and purchase of land there is a presumption or natural inference that the parties do not intend to be bound until the contract has been formally executed. See also Darter Pty Ltd v Malloy

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read into the negotiations for sale of land that they are ‘subject to contract’.113 But this appears to apply to sales rather than other land transactions such as leases.114 Nevertheless, the courts are also prepared to ignore the customary formalities, either because there is a compelling case where to deny a deemed contract would be unconscionable;115 or because the parties have, in the eyes of the court, irrevocably committed themselves by their imprecise words or conduct.116 There is no doubt that in some circumstances the imprecision of the parties makes it extremely difficult to advise on the legal consequences.117 There are often difficult evidentiary problems for a court faced with an alleged agreement evidenced only by conversations or informal written exchanges.118 As noted, the offer and acceptance analysis is just one way of looking at  a particular relationship with a view to answering the question: have the parties made a contract? Many are the cases where the parties have behaved imprecisely and a court is ultimately required to decide whether or not the relationship should be dealt with on the basis of contract with its concomitant remedies. A negative answer may be reached by saying that: • • •

• • •

an offer was never made;119 or an offer was made but it was never accepted;120 or although no identifiable offer and acceptance were made, the dealings between the parties were not such as to amount to a contract by inference from the parties’ conduct or by way of estoppel; or the parties never intended their exchanges to give rise to legal relations;121 or the parties’ arrangement was just too vague to amount to a contract;122 or the parties’ arrangement was a preliminary agreement that left important matters to be agreed later and for that reason did not amount to a contract.123

Of course, each of these may, on the facts, arrive at the opposite conclusion. In addition, what appears to be a contract may be nullified, or be capable of being cancelled, if a relevant vitiation factor comes into play.124 Some of these doctrines are (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-017, where the same court was prepared to hold that the exchange of letters constituted a contract for the sale of land. 113. See 5.24. 114. Darzi Group Pty Ltd v Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 at [6] (Bathurst CJ). 115. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See Chapter 2. 116. See, for example, South Coast Oils (Qld and NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680; Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36; Terrex Resources NL v  Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144; Plastyne Products Pty Ltd v  Gall Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-376. 117. An example being Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167, in which a document had been signed by one party but not by the other, yet the other had paid part of the purchase money in accordance with the supposed contract. Ormiston J said there was no contract; Murray J said that there was; McGarvie J expressed no opinion. 118. See, for example, Thompson v White [2006] NSWCA 350 at [10]–[13] (Tobias JA). 119. See 3.12–3.25. 120. See 3.26–3.62 on acceptance. 121. See Chapter 5. 122. See Chapter 6, 6.5–6.7. 123. See 6.8. 124. See Chapters 11–18.

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analysed in terms of contract formation, that is, a relevant vitiation factor occurs in the negotiation period. It is common for a court, mindful of the possibility of an appeal, to base its decision on a combination of these types of arguments, even though one by itself is sufficient.125

Offer 3.12  Introduction. We have seen that the primary model for determining whether agreement has been reached is to analyse the exchange between the parties in terms of offer and acceptance. On this model, it is only when a statement, capable in law of being an offer, is accepted that a contract is formed (assuming that there is consideration). We need, therefore, to analyse in more detail what is an offer. Before doing so it is necessary to deal with two fundamental points about the process of making offers: an offer must be made to another person; and that person must be a recognised legal entity.

An offer must be made to another or others 3.13  An offer must generally be made to another legal entity. This apparent truism reflects the basic idea that a contract must be an arrangement between at least two ‘sides’,126 each of which must be a recognised legal entity (see below).

No self-dealing rule 3.14  It is not possible at common law to make a contract with oneself.127 This may sound implausible at first but it is quite possible for there to be the same party on each side, for example, when a partner in a firm sells property to the firm.128 Another illustration is a government department charging another government department for a service provided or goods sold. So long as the departments are part of the same polity then no contract is possible.129 The common law rule, though perfectly logical, is therefore inconvenient. Nevertheless, it has been asserted that ‘where a person has different capacities, he may have power to contract in his representative capacity as an individual’.130 On the strength of this pronouncement, Kilner Brown J in Rowley, Holmes & Co v Barber131 held that it is possible for a personal representative to employ himself in a 125. An example being Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106. 126. As to ascertaining who are the parties to a contract, see 7.2. It is possible for a contract to be multi-sided: see 3.8. It is also possible for each ‘side’ to have more than one person, that is, joint promisees: see Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460 discussed in 4.8. 127. Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410 at 434–5; 178 ALR 193; [2001] HCA 9 at [51]–[53]; Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496. 128. Ellis v Joseph Ellis & Co [1905] 1 KB 324. See Ellis v Kerr [1910] 1 Ch 529 (a person cannot be both a covenantor and covenantee); Williams v Scott [1900] AC 499 (trustee cannot sell property to himself. This decision hinged on equitable principles involving fiduciaries). The case law is discussed in Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104. See also Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 v Halloran [2004] NSWCA 118 at [54] (Bryson JA, Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA concurring). 129. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [4.2]. 130. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), vol 9, p 81, para 204. No authority is cited. 131. [1977] 1 WLR 371.

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solicitor’s practice between the death of his employer and the appointment of a new employer. In ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Leagrove Pty Ltd; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v  Stafford,132 a company, in its capacity as trustee, validly guaranteed a loan made to the company in its trading capacity. The common law rule has been partly abrogated by statute in all jurisdictions.133 The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia only deals with the situation where a person makes an agreement with himself or herself and another or others, so that it would cover the partnership situation but it would not cover the government departments example above. Further, the legislation is not uniform. For example, the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 72 mentions both covenants and agreements and appears to be of general application.134 To like effect is the legislation in Queensland,135 Victoria and Western Australia. On the other hand, the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 110 refers only to covenants and only those mentioned in the previous section, namely, covenants in instruments ‘under this Act’. The Northern Territory, South Australian and Tasmanian legislation (though not identical) covers conveyances of land or any other property by a person to himself or herself alone and also allows trustees to convey property to one of their number (with a suitable proviso to prevent such a conveyance if it is in breach of a fiduciary duty). Because this legislation varies in detail it is necessary to look closely at the local version.

Legal entity 3.15  The parties must be legal entities. A legal entity can be an individual, a corporation136 or a body politic (that is, a government, such as the Commonwealth of Australia or the State of Tasmania). A partnership is a collective of individuals, and is given special status by Partnership Acts. The partnership name can be used for contracts. A trust is in essence the trustee, who is either an individual or a corporation who should be named as such on a contract. Corporations and bodies politic must necessarily act through individuals.137 The law of agency applies in these circumstances.138 It is possible that a corporation or a government may be able to deny the efficacy of an apparent contract because an individual had no authority as agent to make an offer or to accept an offer.139 For corporations formed under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 128–129 reflect the

132. [2011] QCA 131 at [37]–[38] (McMurdo P, White JA and Martin J concurring). 133. ACT: Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 s 208; Land Titles Act 1925 s 110; NSW: Conveyancing Act 1919 ss 24 and 72; NT: Law of Property Act 2000 s 13; Qld: Property Law Act 1974 ss 14 and 50 and Property Law Bill 2022 ss 13 and 65; SA: Law of Property Act 1936 s 40; Tas: Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 62; Vic: Property Law Act 1958 s 82; WA: Property Law Act 1969 ss 44 and 52. 134. It was assumed in Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104 that the provision is of general application and is not confined to real property transactions. 135. See Re Broons [1989] 2 Qd R 315. 136. See 17.68. 137. Corporations can contract ‘directly’ by the use of the corporate seal (see  17.70), but by far the most common type of contract is through an individual who acts as agent for the corporation. See Corporations Act 2001 s 127 for corporations registered under that Act. 138. See  Dal Pont, Law of Agency (4th ed, 2020). See  also Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 1 Agency, [15-315]; Laws of Australia 8.1 Agency, [68]. 139. An example being Left Bank Investments Pty Ltd v  Ngunya Jarjum Aboriginal Corporation [2020] NSWCA 144.

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common law rule about ostensible or apparent authority.140 Anyone dealing with such a corporation is entitled to assume that the individual apparently acting for the corporation has authority to act unless the outsider knows or has reason to know otherwise.141 For entities not governed by this legislation or similar legislation,142 the similar common law rule applies. It is difficult for a body to deny a contract on this basis. When an individual acts as agent for a corporation or a government body in executing or agreeing to a contract, that person is not personally liable under the contract.143 The requirement of legal entity means that there can be serious problems if a party is incorrectly named, that is, there is no such entity or the wrong party is named.144 It may be possible for an error of this kind to be corrected by the usual process of interpretation or under the doctrine of rectification.145 In addition, it may be legally impossible for an entity to be a contracting party or for that entity to be sued.146 3.16  Offer may be made to the world at  large. In the famous case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co147 it was argued that an effective offer cannot be made to the public at large. In that case the defendants, who were the purveyors of a specific called ‘The Carbolic Smoke Ball’, issued an advertisement in which they offered to pay £100 to any person who succumbed to influenza after having used one of their smoke balls in a specified manner and for a specified period. They added that they had deposited a sum of £1000 with their bankers ‘to show their sincerity’. The plaintiff, on the faith of the advertisement, bought and used the ball as prescribed, but caught influenza. She sued for the £100. 140. See Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 at [35]–[44]. This principle is a species of estoppel. 141. Australia and New  Zealand Banking Group Ltd v  Frenmast Pty Ltd (2013) 282 FLR 351; [2013] NSWCA 459. This principle may not operate if an individual signs a contract apparently on behalf of a corporation in a qualified way: see 7.2. 142. See, for example, State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) s 20ZD and Sydney Water Corporation v Makucha [2010] NSWSC 114. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [3.18]–[3.19], [4.2] for a discussion of contract formation by statutory corporations. 143. See 7.2 for brief discussion of qualified signatures. Sometimes it is not clear in what capacity someone has signed a contract. 144. In MacMillan v Mumby [2006] NSWCA 74, a loan was made to a non-existent company. It was held that the loan was not made to the individuals who controlled the entity. In Bon McArthur Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Caruana [2013] NSWCA 101, the wrong company of related companies was named in an insurance policy. In Davies v Apted [2013] SASCFC 92, it was not clear whether a loan was made to an individual or a company. In Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v Norncott Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 184, an appeal from a judgment against a deregistered company was held to be incompetent. 145. In Whalebone v Auto Panel Beaters & Radiators Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 176, a company was misnamed and the court ordered that the land register should be rectified. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; 339 ALR 200; [2016] HCA 47, two bank performance bonds incorrectly named a government statutory corporation. The High  Court held that correcting a wrongly named party was not amenable to principles of interpretation but, rather, it was appropriate to make an order for rectification. 146. If there is no legal entity it is impossible to sue: see Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; [2007] NSWCA 117. The Church as such is not a legal entity. This problem has been rectified by special legislation. See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) Pt 2A; Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act  2018 (Vic); Civil Liability Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Act 2018 (NSW). In Roman Catholic Trusts Corp v Van Driel Ltd [2001] VSC 310, a building contract incorrectly named the principal as ‘Emmaus College’, a non-existent entity. It was held that the corporation was the proper plaintiff. A government department is not a legal entity. The correct legal entity is the relevant body politic. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [4.2]. 147. [1892] 2 QB 484 affirmed [1893] 1 QB 256. For a fascinating account of the setting of this case, see Simpson (1985) 14 J Leg Stud 345.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

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The defendants displayed the utmost ingenuity in their search for defences. They argued that the transaction was a bet within the meaning of the Gaming Acts, that it was an illegal policy of insurance, that the advertisement was a mere ‘puff’ never intended to create a binding obligation,148 that there was no consideration, that there was no offer to any particular person, and that, even if there were, the plaintiff had failed to notify her acceptance. The Court of Appeal found no difficulty in rejecting these various pleas. Bowen LJ effectively demolished the argument that an offer cannot be made to the world at large: It was also said that the contract is made with all the world — that is, with everybody, and that you cannot contract with everybody. It is not a contract made with all the world. There is the fallacy of the argument. It is an offer made to all the world; and why should not an offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes forward and performs the condition? … Although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that limited portion of the public who come forward and perform the condition on the faith of the advertisement.149

This was a case of a unilateral contract where the number of people accepting was presumably limited. It is possible to make an offer to the world for either a unilateral or bilateral contract.150 In either case the offeror may find that he or she is bound to a large number of people. There is no principle of contract law that prevents a person making a number of contracts for the same subject-matter: see 3.42. That person may be in breach to all but one of the accepting parties.

The essentials of offer 3.17  What is an offer? An offer is a clear statement of the terms151 by which the person making the offer is prepared to be bound. An offer may be conditional.152 At  the same time an offer conveys to the other party an invitation to accept and confers on that party the power to bind both parties in contract.153 A person who makes an offer submits, in a sense, to the will of the other party because it is the latter who decides whether or not to bring a contract into being by the act of acceptance. An offer may be terminated before the act of acceptance.154 In deciding whether an offer has been made, the courts employ the objective test, determining the question as a matter of construction.155 The fact that the word

148. On this aspect of the argument, see 5.11. 149. [1893] 1 QB 256 at 268. 150. For an example of a bilateral contract, an internet company offering an item where the customer clicks ‘I agree’. 151. The terms must be promissory in intent. The test of what is promissory is discussed in 10.21–10.25. In  Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v  Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42, a statement made in a humorous promotional presentation was held not to be an offer (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112). 152. See 5.23. See also 3.22 where a bid at an auction is a conditional offer if the auction was announced to be subject to a reserve price. 153. Corbin, ‘Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 181–2. 154. See 3.63. 155. In Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499, redundancy offers were made to a number of people. The calculations of the amounts were incorrect. White J had to decide whether the mistaken offers were offers (they were) and whether they were accepted. Some were and some were withdrawn before acceptance. The case was not argued on the basis of mistake.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

‘offer’ or ‘guarantee’ or ‘promise’ is used is not conclusive.156 A mere statement of the price that someone would contract for, if they decided to sell, does not amount to an offer.157 The objective test is applied to determine whether an offeree would reasonably assume158 that the alleged offeror has stated the terms upon which he or she is prepared to be bound if the offeree accepts; or whether, on the other hand, the supposed offeror has merely stated a negotiating position or possibly only provided information. Given the natural imprecision with which people communicate, it may be difficult to discern whether an offer has been made. A mistaken offer, if accepted, will generally give rise to issues of mistake, dealt with in Chapter 12. But this depends on the interpretation of the offer.159 3.18  Offer distinguished from invitation to treat. An offer, capable of being converted into a contract by acceptance, must be distinguished from what is somewhat quaintly referred to as an invitation to treat. This expression covers all those aspects of the negotiating process expressed before a final offer. In other words, anything that is said that invites a bargaining response rather than an acceptance is an invitation to treat. Bowen LJ in the Carlill case (see  3.16), referring to the advertisement, which normally would be merely an invitation to treat, said: It is not like cases in which you offer to negotiate, or you issue advertisements that you have got a stock of books to sell, or houses to let, in which case there is no offer to be bound by any contract. Such advertisements are offers to negotiate — offers to receive offers — offers to chaffer.160

Exceptionally, this advertisement was an offer. 3.19  Instances of invitation to treat. The distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat has been considered in various practical circumstances. The issue, for instance, of a circular or catalogue advertising goods for sale is a mere attempt to induce offers, not an offer itself.161 As a matter of commercial reality, a supplier should not be potentially bound to supply to all comers who respond to price lists, shop displays or catalogues.162 Whether this view would invariably prevail in the light of some of the more extravagant ‘offers’ that are made in advertisements has received little attention in the courts of Australia and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, such ‘offers’ may be dismissed as exuberant sales talk; on the other hand, it must be remembered that

156. Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42 at [186] (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112); B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147; Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561; Clifton v Palumbo [1944] 2 All ER 497. 157. Harvey v Facey [1893] AC 552. 158. Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v KS Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 at 336 (McHugh JA). 159. Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499. 160. [1893] 1 QB 256 at 268. 161. Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561 (circular saying ‘We are instructed to offer … for sale by tender …’ held not to be an offer). Contrast Re Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd (in liq) [1963] ALR 346 (circular sent to shareholders appealing for funds that would be held in trust pending preparation of debenture documents held to be an offer accepted by the sending of money). 162. Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 at 334 (Lord Herschell). A similar rule has been applied to the notice of a scholarship (Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 Ch 480) and also to advertisements (Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421; [1968] 1 WLR 1204). As to the possibility of making multiple contracts with respect to the same subject-matter, see 3.42.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

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an advertisement can contain an offer.163 In Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Stores,164 it was held that an advertisement for a fur stole ‘worth $139.50’ for $1 ‘first come first served’ was an offer. So long as the alleged offer ‘is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer …’.165 Advertisements, circulars and catalogues may contain statements which, even if not offers, may be the subject of proceedings under the Australian Consumer Law.166 3.20  Shop displays. If goods are exhibited in a shop window or inside a shop with a price attached, does this constitute an offer to sell at that price? It has long been accepted that such a display is not an offer and consequently the customer makes the offer.167 This view was confirmed in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd,168 where the point was tested in a self-service store with a check-out. It was held that an offer to buy was made when the customer put an article in the basket or at least when he or she brought the item to the check-out, and this offer the defendant shopkeeper was free to accept or to reject at  the check-out. Again, this view may not be invariably accepted by a court if the shop display is couched in the language of offer.169 Further, as noted earlier in relation to advertisements and the like, a shop display, though not amounting to an offer, may nevertheless give rise to enforceable rights under the Australian Consumer Law.170 3.21  Specific instances of offer. In order to fit everyday transactions into the rubric of offer and acceptance the courts have had to decide, in specific circumstances, what amounts to an offer. The position is confused in relation to contracts of carriage and contracts for the sale of land, as noted earlier.171 Automatic vending machines apparently make a mute offer that is accepted by the purchaser inserting money or otherwise activating the machine.172 Similarly, at  automatic car parks the offer is made by the presence of the machine, which offer is accepted by the customer who activates the machine that issues a ticket.173 Other ‘ticket’ cases involve an offer by the customer that is accepted by the issue of a ticket which itself contains no contractual terms (as with going to the cinema) or does contain writing but such

163. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256. 164. (1957) 86 NW 2d 689. 165. Ibid at  691. Contrast Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v  Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42, where a statement, made in a humorous promotional presentation, that dealers could purchase photocopiers for $1 was held not to be an offer (affirmed on appeal [2007] VSCA 112). 166. Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29–37. See Chapter 11. 167. Timothy v Simpson (1834) 6 C & P 499 at 500; 172 ER 1337. 168. [1952] 2 QB 795; [1952] 2 All ER 456; affirmed [1953] 1 QB 401; [1953] 1 All ER 482. A similar case is Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 at 399; [1960] 3 All ER 731 at 733 (Lord Parker). Surprisingly, there is no Australian contract case directly on point. There are cases involving criminal prosecutions as in Fisher v Bell. 169. Smithers J in Reardon v Morley Ford Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 401 at 407–8 indicated that a shop display may in appropriate circumstances amount to an offer. Lords Simon and Wilberforce considered that advertising posters could be offers in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1; [1976] 1 All ER 117. In Goodwin’s of Newtown Pty Ltd v Gurry [1959] SASR 295 and in A-G (NSW) v Mutual Home Loans Fund of Australia Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 162, non-technical meanings were given to ‘offer’ and, in the latter case, ‘option’. 170. Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29–37. See Chapter 11. 171. See 3.4, 3.10. 172. Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169 (Lord Denning MR). 173. Ibid.

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writing is not incorporated into the contract;174 or the ticket itself is the offer that is accepted by the customer taking it without objecting to any of the terms contained in it.175 It has been held that an invoice may amount to an offer that is accepted by the sending of a cheque.176 These various situations usually raise the question whether displayed or printed terms are part of the contract. So long as they are available for inspection by the customer before the contract is made by acceptance, they are part of the contract: see  10.71. The precise timing of offer and acceptance can therefore be crucial in determining whether printed terms are contractual. For example, displaying terms on a car parking ticket or inside the car park is too late.177

Auctions and fixed bid sales 3.22  A bid is an offer. The offer and acceptance analysis was from early times applied to auctions. In Payne v Cave,178 it was held that the bidder makes the offer, which the auctioneer is free to accept or reject.179 In accordance with this principle the Sale of Goods Acts provide that a sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner, and that until such announcement is made any bid may be retracted.180 A bid may be acknowledged but it is not accepted unless and until the hammer falls.181 If an auction is announced to be subject to a reserve price, offers made by bidders are subject to this condition so that, if the auctioneer mistakenly sells at below the reserve price, there is no contract.182 These rules have to be adapted for online auctions. For example, online, there is no auctioneer.183

174. Parker v  South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 at  419 (turnpike example); Causer v  Browne [1952] VLR 1; Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 (contract formed when ‘exchange order’ issued to passenger, such order to be exchanged for a ticket upon arrival in a foreign country. Terms on ticket therefore not part of contract); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (contract formed at moment when ticket issued to passenger. Terms on ticket therefore not part of contract). 175. See, for example, MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 137 (Stephen J). 176. Associated Midland Corp Ltd v  Bank of NSW (1984) 51 ALR 641. But this, of course, depends on the circumstances. An invoice may more naturally be an acknowledgement of a contract already made: Galaxidis v CBFC Leasing [2005] NSWCA 347 at [10]–[14] (Basten J). 177. See discussion of the controversial United States case Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg at 3.7 where click wrap contract terms viewed after contract formation were held to be binding. 178. (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502. See also British Car Auctions Ltd v Wright [1972] 1 WLR 1519, where it was held for the purposes of a penal statute that an auctioneer had not ‘offered to sell’ a defective car. 179. AGC (Advances) Ltd v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454 at 9457 (Holland J). 180. ACT: s 60; NSW: s 60; NT: s 60; Qld: s 59; SA: s 57; Tas: s 62; Vic: s 64; WA: s 57. 181. Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216. See also HZD Pty Ltd v McInnes [2007] QSC 213. 182. McManus v Fortescue (1907) 2 KB 1. 183. See the very thorough discussion by Rein AJ in Smythe v Thomas (2007) 71 NSWLR 537; [2007] NSWSC 844 (eBay auction held to be binding and specific performance ordered). See also eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd (2006) 170 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 1768; Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 5; Reynolds, ‘E-auctions: Who Will Protect the Consumer?’ (2002) 18 JCL 75; Kariyawasam and Guy, ‘The Contractual Legalities of Buying and Selling on eBay: Online Auctions and the Protection of Consumers’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 42 (available on Austlii).

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

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3.23  Advertisement of auction is not an offer to hold it. It follows that steps taken to organise the auction are in the nature of invitations to treat.184 Nevertheless, it is at least arguable nowadays that a person who has suffered damage as a result of a cancelled auction could claim damages under s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law for breach of s 18.185 3.24  Auction without reserve. Another question that has arisen in relation to auctions is whether an advertisement that the sale will be without reserve constitutes a definite offer to sell to the highest bidder. Is it possible to make a legally binding commitment to accept an offer that satisfies certain requirements — in this particular case, the requirement of being the highest (or lowest) bid? On the analysis of auction sales already outlined, the answer would appear to be No because the auctioneer is free to decline to accept a bid. This was the approach by a Scottish court which held that no agreement is complete unless and until the auctioneer acknowledges the acceptance of the bid by the fall of the hammer.186 The point was the subject of obiter dicta in Warlow v  Harrison.187 The action in that case failed both in the Queen’s Bench and in the Court of Exchequer Chamber because the plaintiff pleaded his claim upon an obviously incorrect ground. But three of the judges in the Exchequer Chamber were of the opinion that he would succeed if he brought a fresh action pleading that the auctioneer by his advertisement had implicitly pledged himself to sell to the highest bidder. In the view of these judges, two separate questions must be disentangled. On the one hand, had a contract of sale been concluded, and, if so, at what moment of time? Since the advertisement was not itself an offer to sell the goods but only an invitation to treat, the plaintiff’s bid was not an acceptance and did not constitute a sale. Was there, on the other hand, a binding promise that the sale would be without reserve? The majority of the Exchequer Chamber was prepared to discover such a promise. The auctioneer in his advertisement had made a definite offer to this effect, and the plaintiff, by making his bid in reliance upon it, had accepted the offer. This constituted a distinct and independent contract with the auctioneer, and for its breach an action would lie. It follows from this analysis that the auctioneer cannot reject the bid without being in breach of contract unless the auctioneer has a legally recognised excuse.188 If the auctioneer does choose to break this contract by not bringing down the hammer, the only remedy available to the highest bidder is presumably damages. There is no contract of sale (because the hammer never fell) so that specific performance cannot be ordered.189 Whether damages would be worth pursuing depends on the 184. Harris v Nickerson (1873) LR 8 QB 286. 185. See  Chapter 11. It would be difficult to argue that it was misleading conduct if an auction was merely cancelled. 186. Fenwick v Macdonald, Fraser & Co (1904) 6 F (Ct of Sess) 850. 187. [1859] 1 E & E 309; 120 ER 925. See Johnston v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73 and Rainbow v Hawkins & Sons [1904] 2 KB 322. 188. In Venuti and Venuti v Toop Real Estate Group Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 23 (confirmed on appeal [2004] SASC 169), it was held that an auctioneer was justified in not accepting a bid that was clearly mistaken. If it were otherwise, the sale would be vulnerable to being set aside on the basis of mistake. The case involved an unsuccessful allegation by the seller that the auctioneer was in breach of its duty by not knocking down the property to the mistaken bidder. 189. In Proctor v  Almansask Distributors Ltd (1985) 37 Alta LR (2d) 164, it was held that there was a contract between bidder and auctioneer that was broken by the auctioneer failing to bring down the

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

particular circumstances, but in many cases there would be no substantial loss.190 In  Barry v  Davies,191 substantial damages were awarded against the auctioneer because he had made a statement that the item was worth a certain amount and then refused to bring down the hammer when the bidding reached only a fraction of that amount. The damages were the difference between the stated value and the highest bid. The view that a separate contract with the auctioneer can arise has not escaped criticism.192 The case of Ulbrick v  Laidlaw193 provides some support for the view set out above that there is an independent contract between the auctioneer and the bidder. In that case a condition — that if there were a dispute between two or more bidders then the lot should be re-auctioned — was held to apply. Such a condition, governing as it does the bidding process, can only operate as a result of a contract formed prior to the fall of the hammer.194 In short, the terms on which an auction is conducted can be the subject of a separate contract.195 The two-contract analysis must also receive support from Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd, discussed in 3.25 and 3.35, and developments in the law of tenders, discussed in 3.39. Another aspect of auctions arises where the successful bidder refuses to sign a note or memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.196 Although the auctioneer may sign on the purchaser’s behalf, if the auctioneer does not in fact do so, the bidder cannot be forced to do so. In Wright v Madden,197 it was held that it was not possible to sue the purchaser for damages for breach of a ‘collateral’ contract to execute a proper contract. The trial judge had awarded damages representing the difference between the price bid by the purchaser and the next best bid. The Queensland Full Court held that this was not a correct decision because the assumption behind the award of damages was that the contract with the purchaser who had refused to sign

hammer in a ‘without reserve’ auction. The bidder was able to obtain substantial damages (the difference between the value of what he had bid for and his bid) because it was held that, in this particular auction, the auctioneer was also the seller (though this would not seem to be essential in order to prove loss). However, in other cases the purchaser may have some difficulty in establishing what he or she has lost. Compare Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-004, where the auctioneer mistakenly sold a property below the reserve price. The contract was not enforceable because no note or memorandum was ever signed and a claim against the auctioneer for breach of warranty of authority was unsuccessful because of inability to prove loss. 190. The same reasoning applies if the vendor prevents execution of a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. There is a breach of a ‘collateral’ contract that may sound in damages. See the discussion in Wright v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343 at 348–9 and analysis of Johnston v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73. 191. [2000] 1 WLR 1962. See comment thereon by Carter, ‘Auction “Without Reserve” — Barry v Davies’ (2001) 17 JCL 69. 192. See the discussion between Gower and Slade in (1952) 68 LQR 238 and 457 and (1953) 69 LQR 21. 193. [1924] VLR 247. 194. The two-contract analysis has been supported in Tully v Irish Bond Commission (1961) 97 ILTR 174, and receives some support from Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington CC [1985] NZLR 520 at 526. It has been questioned in AGC (Advances) Ltd v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454, where it was said that an action against the auctioneer ‘would be an anomaly in the law of auctions’ (Holland J at 9458). See criticism of the two-contract analysis in Commonwealth v John White & Sons (NT) Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 172 at 177 (Blackburn J). 195. This view is supported by the judgment of Ormiston J in Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 230–1. See 11.118. 196. See 16.42. 197. [1992] 1 Qd R 343.

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was an enforceable contract whereas it was not because there was no sufficient note or memorandum.198 3.25  Fixed-bid sales. Auctions are not dissimilar from competitive tenders199 or fixed-bid sales. The latter are characterised by the seller inviting bids from buyers and undertaking to sell to the highest bidder but each bidder makes his or her bid in ignorance of the other bidders’ offers. Two important points were made concerning fixed-bid sales by the House of Lords in Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd.200 The first point concerned referential bids. In Harvela, one bidder offered a certain sum ‘or C$101,000 in excess of any other offer which you may receive’. This bid was accepted but the House of Lords held that it was invalid and the contract should have been awarded to the other bidder who had made a fixed bid. More importantly, the second point decided in Harvela provides support for the view, discussed above, that a promise to accept the highest (or lowest) bid, whether in auctions ‘without reserve’ or fixed-bid sales, is binding once the bidder has acted in the appropriate manner by putting in a valid, highest (or lowest) bid. It was held that such a promise amounts to a unilateral offer that is accepted by the highest (or lowest) bidder. Acceptance creating a unilateral contract is then followed by a bilateral contract comprising the actual sale.201

Acceptance 3.26  What is an acceptance? Acceptance of an offer creates contractual relations. An acceptance is a communication to the offeror of an unqualified202 assent to both the terms of the offer and to the implied invitation in every offer that the offeree commit himself or herself to a contract. Communication of acceptance, as a general rule,203 fixes the moment when the contract begins and the place of the contract, that is, the time and place where the acceptance message is received.204 Acceptance may be by way of a promise or promises; or by way of performing acts that are specified in the offer. The former is called bilateral and the latter unilateral contract.205 Whether or not there is acceptance is determined objectively by reference to the words or actions of the offeree as reasonably perceived by the offeror. The law has to deal with a great variety of different ways in which people commit to contracts 198. It may be possible to sue for damages for misleading conduct. See Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 discussed in 11.118. 199. See 3.36–3.39. 200. [1986] AC 207; (1985) 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. The facts are more fully set out in 3.35. 201. As to unilateral contract, see 3.28. 202. As to whether acceptance can be conditional, see 5.23. 203. The postal rule is an exception. See 3.60. 204. Hampstead Meats Pty Ltd v  Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109; Express Airways v  Port Augusta Air Services [1980] Qd R 543; Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 366; Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327; Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 205. Unilateral contracts are discussed in 3.28.

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and so no universal principle, apart from the objective test, can be put forward as the answer to the question: has there been acceptance? The most obvious way in which such commitment is made is by signature.206 The High Court confirmed in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd207 that a person is bound by signature whether or not he or she has read the contract.208 Here the objective test works satisfactorily, for the rule that a person is bound by his or her signature accords with popular expectation. A reasonable person would rightly assume that a person who signed what was obviously a contract intended to be bound by it, or at least was prepared to take the risk of being bound by it.209 The same applies to online transactions where clicking ‘I agree’ is the equivalent of signature (whether or not the available terms have been actually read).210 See 3.52 for a discussion of electronic signatures. Not so satisfactory are the ‘ticket cases’211 where the law has adopted a somewhat pragmatic rule that a person is taken to have accepted the terms of a ticket (or displayed sign) so long as he or she had an opportunity to examine the terms before committing to the transaction212 (even though it is almost universally the case that that opportunity is not availed of).213 It will be seen below, particularly in the discussion of acceptance by conduct (3.27), that, just as the law has taken a flexible approach to contract formation generally, it has also taken a flexible approach to determining whether there has been acceptance. Depending on the circumstances, acceptance may be inferred from somewhat vague or equivocal dealings; or it may only be found where there is strict compliance with the method laid down for acceptance. As an illustration of a strict approach, in Redowood Pty Ltd v  Mongoose Pty Ltd214 the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal had to consider whether there had 206. See  10.26 and 16.40. The courts have been generous in treating rudimentary or not-real signatures as effective so long as they can be construed as authentication of a document or email. In Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550, the English Court of Appeal (Evershed MR and C Romer LJ, Denning LJ dissenting) held that a person signed a document if he himself affixed his facsimile rubber stamp signature to a document. See Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 at [34] (White J). 207. (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52. See Peden and Carter, ‘Incorporation of Terms by Signature: L’Estrange Rules!’ (2005) 21 JCL 96. 208. See 7.2, where there is a brief discussion of cases where a person signs in a qualified way. 209. See Robertson, ‘The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract’ (2005) 29 MULR 179 at fns 74–6, which discuss this phenomenon. 210. Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd v Instagram Inc [2020] FCA 1846 at [239]–[255] (Beach J); I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002); Hotmail Corp v Van$ Money Pie Inc 47 USPQ 2d 1020, 1025 (ND Cal 1998). See also 3.7. Compare Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir), where a ‘download’ button appeared before any invitation to agree to licence terms. It was held that the licence terms did not apply. See Macdonald, ‘Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting — Clicking “I Agree”’ (2011) 27 JCL 198 and Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152 at 153 for evidence that people do not read the terms in online transactions. Paterson makes the point (at 163) that clicking on an icon does not necessarily indicate assent to the supplier’s terms and conditions. It depends how explicit the website is and how it is designed. 211. See 3.4, 10.28. 212. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 137 (Stephen J); Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 228–9 (Brennan J). This is the most usual analysis of ticket cases. Paragraph 3.4 shows that there are variations on this analysis. 213. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 136–7; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60 at [217] (Kirby J). 214. [2005] NSWCA 32.

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been an acceptance by Redowood of an offer by Mongoose to purchase rights in Anaconda Nickel. Redowood had already successfully sold some 65 million rights to Mongoose. It purported to sell a further 55 million rights. In doing so it incorrectly filled in the rights acceptance form by inserting the wrong Security Holder Reference Number. The majority judges held that this was a fatal flaw and no acceptance had taken place. Why so strict? Because this was a massive transaction involving the processing of thousands of documents in circumstances of urgency. There could be no room for individualising each transaction by reference to interactions or conversations and so forth. Certainty and precision were of the essence. There was no scope for accommodating ad hoc dealings as there often is in other kinds of contracts. The acceptance inquiry involves two sub-questions, both of which must be positively answered. Has there been unqualified assent? Has this assent been communicated to the offeror?215 These will be dealt with under the heads ‘The fact of acceptance’ and ‘The communication of acceptance’.

The fact of acceptance Acceptance by various means 3.27  Acceptance by conduct. It has already been noted that the language of offer and acceptance often constitutes an artificial construct imposed on the dealings between people. The offer and acceptance model works satisfactorily in relation to formal contracting where the parties negotiate, draw up a formal contract and then sign it.216 It can also work satisfactorily in less formal dealings where it is objectively clear that the parties have reached agreement, such as ordering goods over the telephone or shaking hands as a sign of final agreement.217 It will sometimes be the case that, where there is a clear offer, there is doubt about precisely when, or if, there was acceptance of that offer. Yet the parties have proceeded. The law has responded by moulding the rules of acceptance to accommodate imprecise human behaviour or to common practice. Acceptance can be inferred from conduct if that inference is indicated by the objective circumstances. An offeree ‘promises’ to be bound by the terms of the offer by simply getting on with it. This is an important aspect of the law because it recognises what commercial people actually do. For example, it is routine contracting practice to respond to an order for goods by starting the process of fulfilling the order.218 215. Communication of acceptance may occur even if it is during or after performance in some special cases. An example is acceptance by conduct. 216. As noted in 3.26, signature is probably the clearest indication of assent: see generally Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52. However, its absence where a signature would be expected does not necessarily indicate lack of assent, depending on the circumstances. As will be seen below, there may be other ways of indicating acceptance, such as getting on with the work or allowing the other party to. If a person deliberately does not sign because he or she does not agree to the terms of the document and communicates this to the other party, then there is clearly no acceptance. An example is Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 116 (discussed below). 217. As to the significance of shaking hands, see discussion of Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-059 in 3.11. 218. See, for example, Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1. The offeree’s conduct may be such that he or she is estopped from denying that there is a contract. See the discussion by Ormiston J in Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at  203. Compare the United States Uniform Commercial Code § 2-206(1)(b), which

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Acceptance by conduct was recognised in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co.219 Brogden had for years supplied the defendant company with coal without a formal agreement. At length the parties decided to regularise their relations. The company’s agent sent a draft form of agreement to Brogden, and the latter, having inserted the name of an arbitrator in a space which had been left blank for this purpose, signed it and returned it, marked ‘approved’. The company’s agent put it in his desk and nothing further was done to complete its execution. Both parties acted thereafter on the basis of its terms, supplying and paying for the coal in accordance with its clauses, until a dispute arose between them and Brogden denied that any binding contract existed. It could not be argued that the return of the draft was an acceptance of the company’s offer, since Brogden, by inserting the name of an arbitrator, had added a new term (thus making a counter-offer), which the company had had no opportunity of approving or rejecting. But assuming that the delivery of the document by Brogden to the company, with the addition of the arbitrator’s name, was a final and definite offer to supply coal on the terms contained in it, when was that offer accepted? No further communication passed between the parties so that there was no express acceptance. On the other hand, the subsequent conduct of the parties was explicable only on the assumption that they mutually approved the terms of the draft. The House of Lords held that a contract came into existence either when the company ordered its first load of coal from Brogden upon these terms or at least when Brogden supplied it. Brogden has been applied many times by Australian courts.220 In this case it was relatively easy to determine what the terms of the agreement were. In other cases, where there is acceptance by conduct, it may be difficult.221 The courts may be able to imply terms in such cases.222 The courts generally have adequate powers to deal with the uncertainties arising from agreements reached by conduct rather than express acceptance.223 It was essential in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd224 to decide whether a term in a printed contract applied because that term gave a firm of managing architects security over land, whereas a contract inferred from conduct would not have provided such security. The case is interesting because it involved a man who ‘never signs contracts’. The architects performed a considerable amount of work for the owners of the land and, after some time, submitted a standard contract to recognises that acceptance may take place either by prompt notification that the order will be met or by actual shipment of the order. 219. (1877) 2 App Cas 666. 220. Applied to acceptance by conduct of a variation of a contract in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567 and Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49. See GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for acceptance by conduct of variation to a multi-party agreement. 221. In PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310, a successful tenderer was supposed to sign a formal agreement but this never happened. The project went ahead. There were sufficient terms in the request for tender for the court to conclude that there was acceptance by conduct. 222. See Chapter 10; in particular at 10.55, where the point is made that implication of terms is more easily done when the parties have engaged in informal contracting (where the need for implied terms is more pressing). 223. See Chapter 6. 224. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523.

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be signed. The document was never signed and yet the parties proceeded in a manner that was consistent with the terms of the unsigned contract. The New South Wales Court of Appeal225 had to decide whether the terms of the written contract should nevertheless apply. They concluded that they should, applying Brogden’s case. Kirby P said, having noted that estoppel was not pleaded, that there was an implied acceptance stemming from the conduct of the parties.226 He stressed that it would be inherently unlikely for parties to enter into protracted commercial arrangements without settling the terms of their relationship in some detail.227 McHugh JA, using American authority, said that there were circumstances (such as custom, a course of dealing or previous relationship) in which a duty is imposed on the offeree ‘to reject the offer or be bound’.228 If, instead of rejecting the offer, the offeree takes the benefit of what is offered, then he or she is taken to have accepted.229 In a case involving alleged acceptance by conduct, the conduct must ‘necessarily’ provide evidence of acceptance.230 It may not be enough if the conduct is only consistent with acceptance.231 However, this very much depends on the particular circumstances as the inquiry in each case is fact-specific.232 A nice illustration of the point that a person must reject the offer or be bound, is provided by Airways Corp of New  Zealand Ltd v  Geyserland Airways Ltd.233 Airways Corporation, a newly corporatised body that was charged (under statute) with the responsibility of providing air traffic control services in New Zealand, sent its terms and conditions to the various airlines operating in the country. Two small airlines rejected the terms and conditions and yet used the services because they were obliged to under statute. It was held that there was no contract because there never was an acceptance of the terms and conditions (and in fact they were rejected in no uncertain terms). In this case it was argued strenuously that merely using the air traffic 225. Kirby P, Samuels and McHugh JJA. 226. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 528–31. In Lucas v Public Transport Corp Victoria [2000] 1 VR 156; [2000] VSCA 35, a settlement agreement was not signed by the plaintiff and yet was held to be binding. 227. Ibid at 530. However, each case depends on its facts. In Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181, a letter of intent was signed and work was performed and yet the New South Wales Court of Appeal concluded that there was no acceptance by conduct because of some important unresolved issues between the parties. See 5.19. 228. Ibid at 534 citing CMI Clothesmakers Inc v ASK Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447; Brooks Towers Corp v Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203; Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464. 229. Ibid at 535. McHugh JA compared this situation with the ticket cases. 230. Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 at [5]–[9] (Macfarlan JA). 231. Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [117]–[120] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Hopcroft & Edwards v Edmunds [2013] SASCFC 38 at [80]–[94] (White J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J concurring). See, for example, Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 (solicitor’s retainer agreement not signed and held not to be accepted by conduct). Compare Steele v  Marshan [2012] NSWCA 141 and Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1941] 1 All ER 9 at 10 (real estate agent’s fees deemed to be accepted). 232. Judges will therefore differ on the interpretation of the facts, as illustrated by Waldorf Apartment Hotel, The Entrance Pty Ltd v Owners Corp Sp 71623 [2010] NSWCA 226 and Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44. 233. [1996] 1 NZLR 116. Another example is Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v  Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [133]–[150], where there was an unsuccessful attempt to rely on Empirnall. This case illustrates that what actually happened is all-important. Did the conduct indicate agreement to the terms, or were there differences between the parties as to the basis of proceeding with the relevant project? On the facts of Industrial Rollformers it was clear that there were important differences between the parties as to the terms on which they would proceed. A similar case to Airways Corporation is Transpower New Zealand Ltd v Meridian Energy Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 700, where use of services, when there was a clear disagreement about the terms, was not enough to create a contract.

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control services constituted acceptance but the argument was not successful because it was plain to Airways Corporation that its terms and conditions had been rejected. Of course, the argument would have been successful if the airlines had remained silent and used the services but they in fact engaged in vigorous correspondence that made it perfectly clear that they were not interested in the corporation’s attempt to engage in contractual relations with them.234 Thus, the failure to sign a written agreement may have a very different complexion, depending on the particular circumstances.

Acceptance and unilateral contracts 3.28  Unilateral contracts.235 Acceptance by conduct giving rise to a bilateral contract must not be confused with acceptance by conduct giving rise to a unilateral contract.236 The terms and nature of the offer will usually determine whether the appropriate response by the offeree is to commit himself or herself to future performance (bilateral) or merely to carry out the requested act of performance at his or her option (unilateral). Occasionally, the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contract is not clear.237 Unilateral contracts serve a useful role in catering for reward cases and the like in which the offeree is at no stage bound to perform and the offeror only becomes bound once the offeree has performed the requested act. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,238 which has already been discussed,239 is the classic statement on unilateral contract. More recently, unilateral contract has been employed in circumstances far removed from its traditional stereotype. In MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA),240 Barwick CJ considered that an airline passenger makes a unilateral contract with the airline company: In general, therefore, the entitlement of the airline company to retain the prepaid fare is dependent on the actual performance of carriage. The situation is an example of the payment of a reward for an act performed at request with no antecedent promise by the person performing the act to do so.241 234. An attempted unilateral contract argument was also not successful because the act of using the services was not in response to and because of the offer. See 3.39. The case was not argued (despite inquiry from the judge) on the basis of restitution, that is, the claim for money for services rendered was based purely on a contract argument. 235. See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co at  3.16, the paradigm unilateral contract case. See also 3.71 on withdrawal of offer for a unilateral contract. 236. This point is very clearly made by Ormiston J in Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 203. 237. See, for example, White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101, particularly at 103. In Howes v Miller [1970] VR 522, it was held that an offer of settlement of a negligence claim by the injured party for $1066 was an offer to accept actual payment, not a promise of payment. An English example is United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74. For criticism of the bilateral/unilateral dichotomy in the context of this case, see Atiyah, ‘Conceptualism Triumphant in the Court of Appeal’ (1968) 31 MLR 332. Compare majority (de Jersey CJ and Mackenzie J) and minority (McPherson JA) in JV Property Syndicate Pty Ltd v Croakybill Ltd [2005] QCA 479. 238. [1893]1 QB 256. See also Abbott v Lance (1860) 2 Legge 1283 discussed in 3.71; Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 at [94]–[105] (Pullin JA, Martin CJ and Murphy JA concurring) (option as unilateral contract). 239. See 3.16, 3.19. 240. (1975) 133 CLR 125 also discussed in 3.4. 241. Ibid at 133. See Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 151 NTR 1; [2006] NTSC 4 at [65] (Mildren J), where this analysis was applied.

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This view was motivated by the fact that the airline company had issued a ticket in which it specifically exempted itself from having to carry the passenger. Thus, the company was promising nothing. Nevertheless, it was clear that some kind of contractual relationship existed. A similar motivation — to find a contractual relationship upon which to build obligations — can be detected in Harvela Investments Ltd v  Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd,242 where unilateral contract was employed to impose an obligation to accept the highest bid in a fixed-bid sale. Another curious application of unilateral contract is to be found in the cases in which it has been held that exemption clauses in contracts of carriage of goods extend to protect third parties such as stevedores and truck drivers who have negligently damaged the goods.243 The unilateral contract in these cases consists of an offer of exemption by the owner of goods to the servants, agents, subcontractors, etc of the carrier (for example, a stevedore or truck driver), which offer is conveyed to those parties by the carrier who acts as agent for the stevedore or truck driver for this purpose,244 and which is accepted by them when they deal with the goods according to their function (loading or unloading in the case of stevedores and carrying in the case of truck drivers).245 Such an analysis is patently artificial, as a matter of contract law, whatever may be the merits of these cases in terms of policy so far as allocation of risks and the making of insurance arrangements are concerned.246 The unilateral analysis was rejected in the New York Star by three members of the High Court247 and not followed by two other members,248 though followed by the Privy Council in that case on appeal from the High Court. The analysis raises a number of issues that are dealt with in the appropriate parts of this book.249 Suffice it to say here that ‘conjuring up’ a unilateral contract between the goods owner and the third party is a curious way of overcoming the privity rule.250 If it is thought to be desirable to

242. [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. See 3.25, 3.35. 243. New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300; Celthene Pty Ltd v W K J Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. See Malcolm, ‘The Negligent Pilot and the Himalaya Clause: A Saga of Disagreement’ (1993) 67 ALJ 14. These cases raise a number of issues. See  3.8, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. See 7.38 for a full statement of the facts and discussion of the leading case, The Eurymedon. 244. See The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609 for a case in which it was held that the carrier could not be said to be acting as agent for the purpose of conveying the offer of exemption to the stevedore. 245. One issue is whether there is truly acceptance when the party dealing with the goods may be ignorant of the offer of exemption, or may not have it in mind, when dealing with the goods. This issue is discussed in 3.40. 246. The solution supports the more efficient insurance arrangement, namely, first-party insurance by the goods owner rather than third-party (or liability) insurance by the various parties who handle the goods during the course of the journey. 247. Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1978) 139 CLR 231 (Barwick CJ, Stephen and Murphy JJ). Murphy  J said that ‘My conclusion is that a contract should not be conjured up out of the circumstances in order to extend the exemptions … to the stevedore’: at 285). Barwick CJ adopted a very different analysis involving the notion of a pre-contractual arrangement that ripens into contract on the happening of a certain event. Such an arrangement is neither a bilateral nor a unilateral contract: at 243–6. 248. Mason and Jacobs JJ, who accepted the unilateral contract argument but thought that in this particular case the exemption clause no longer applied once the goods were warehoused. 249. See 3.8, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 250. See 7.38.

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extend exemption clauses in this way, it would be better to do so directly by making appropriate modifications to the privity rule.251

Distinction between acceptance and counter-offer 3.29  Counter-offer is usually a final rejection of original offer. To hold that there is an acceptance the offeree must unreservedly assent to the exact terms proposed by the offeror — sometimes referred to as the mirror principle. If, while purporting to accept the offer as a whole, the offeree introduces a new term which the offeror has not had the chance of examining, he or she is in fact merely making a counter-offer. The effect of this is said to destroy the original offer. Thus, in Hyde v Wrench,252 the defendant on 6 June offered to sell an estate to the plaintiff for £1000. On 8 June, in reply, the plaintiff made an offer of £950, which was refused by the defendant on 27 June. Finally, on 29 June, the plaintiff wrote that he was now prepared to pay £1000. It was held that no contract existed. By his letter of 8 June, the plaintiff had rejected the original offer and he was no longer able to revive it by changing his mind and tendering a subsequent acceptance. The proposition that a rejected offer is killed must depend on the circumstances. For example, if in a subsequent conversation it was obvious that the original offer was still open, then it would be possible to accept it, even though it was originally rejected. Heydon JA has commented: A rejected offer may remain operative if in the circumstances it should be treated despite its rejection as remaining on foot, available for adoption as the basis of mutual assent manifested by conduct.253

As a rule, when new terms are included in the purported acceptance, there is no contract,254 although a document containing new terms sent in error may be disregarded.255 An unauthorised alteration to an offer constitutes a counter-offer,256 as does purported acceptance by the offeree and another or by the offeree on behalf of himself or herself and another.257 251. See  Reynolds, ‘Again the Negligent Stevedore’ (1979) 95 LQR 183 at  187; ‘The Negligent Stevedore Yet Again’ (1980) 96 LQR 506 at 508; Clarke, ‘The Reception of the Eurymedon Decision in Australia, Canada and New Zealand’ (1980) 29 ICLQ 132. 252. (1840) 3 Beav 334; 49 ER 132 applied in Fletcher v Minister for the Environment (1999) 73 SASR 474; [1999] SASC 223 at [30] (Bleby J); Baker v Taylor (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 500; and Harris v Jenkins [1922] SASR 59. If a counter-offer is accepted there is a binding contract: Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1. See also Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 at 6, 12–13; Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498; Davies v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 258; Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20; JS Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 at 43, 62; Brierley (RA) Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 at 233–4; Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221 (document signed by one party altered before being signed by the other). 253. Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [80]. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v  Vass [2018] NSWCA 259, an offer of settlement was rejected but nevertheless was later successfully accepted. The court made it clear that contractual analysis does not apply to statutory schemes such as the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules but, in any case, in appropriate circumstances a rejection of an offer does not necessarily kill the offer, as Heydon JA made clear. 254. Grainger v Vindin (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 32; Davies v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 260; Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498. 255. Universal Guarantee Pty Ltd v Carlile (1957) VR 68. 256. Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221. 257. Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1. Contrast Wilson v Winton [1969] Qd R 536, in which an offeree who had executed a trust of his interest in an option in favour of third parties was not making a counter-offer when he exercised the option. He remained personally liable under the contract.

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3.30  Cases not amounting to counter-offers. By contrast, the courts are prepared to show a more flexible approach to the matching of offer and acceptance where the mirror approach would be inappropriate. This flexibility accommodates the fact that people do not woodenly repeat in precisely the same terms the elements of the offer when they are accepting. Thus the mere adding of some detail in the acceptance which does not affect the terms of the offer does not amount to a counter-offer.258 It has been said that if a new element in the purported acceptance is purely for the benefit of the offeror, this can constitute a valid acceptance.259 A verbal discrepancy between the offer and the acceptance will not amount to a rejection and counter-offer if, on its most probable construction, the acceptance is merely a paraphrase of the offer.260 Even an inaccurate statement of the terms of the offer may not necessarily vitiate the acceptance.261 A mere request for further information does not amount to a counter-offer.262 If an offer is framed in such a way that it makes clear that the offeree can accept within a specified range of terms, then an acceptance within that range is not a counter-offer. Thus, someone seeking workers’ compensation insurance cover is requesting such indemnity as the insurer is prepared to provide ‘so that the insurer does not refuse the offer embodied in the request by specifying some limited period’.263 3.31  A more flexible approach. It is worth noting that in the international sale of goods governed by the Vienna Convention, and in the United States, attempts have been made to deal with the inconvenience of the traditional analysis of offer and counter-offer by specifically allowing for discrepancies between offer and acceptance in certain circumstances. Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods264 allows for an acceptance that modifies the terms of an offer so long as the discrepancies do not ‘materially alter the terms of the offer’.265 The offeror may nevertheless promptly object to the purported acceptance in which case it is not effective. A similar solution is envisaged by § 2-207 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, but more specific attention is paid in this section to the ability of either party to indicate expressly that his or her terms prevail. Both provisions incorporate the concept of ‘material alteration’ that precludes effective acceptance. This concept may not be clear,266 and is a source of potential 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264.

265. 266.

Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (reference to ‘inventory’ in acceptance). Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWCA 94 at [76]–[78] (Beazley JA, Mason P and Ipp JA concurring). Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20. Quadling v  Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192, particularly at  197 (Barwick CJ) and at  201 (Gibbs J); Mendel v Benjamin (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90-088 (NSWCA). Stevenson Jacques & Co v McLean [1880] 5 QBD 346; Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 51 ALJR 743 at 748. Georgoulis v Mandalinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 at 615 (Hutley JA). For the text see  the Goods Act  1958 (Vic) Schedule. This legislation has been adopted in all states and territories in Australia: ACT: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; NSW: Sale of Goods (Vienna  Convention) Act  1986; NT: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; Qld: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1986; SA: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1986; Tas: Sale of Goods  (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; Vic: Goods Act  1958 Pt IV; WA: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986. See Hunter, ‘Is the CISG Slowly Becoming Part of the Common Law?’ (2018) 35 JCL 1 at 6–8. Article 19(3) provides: ‘Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.’

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litigation. Both these provisions were aimed at the problem that has become known as the ‘battle of the forms’. 3.32  The battle of the forms. The pedantic or mirror approach to acceptance, whereby the court requires a precise matching of acceptance to offer, may cause some difficulties in transactions between businesses in which each business has its own standard printed form. Business A may, for example, send an order form with one set of terms and Business B may respond with a confirmation note or an invoice containing a different set of terms. Business A may then appear to restate its terms by referring to them again. There is some empirical evidence that business people consciously enter into the battle of the forms and some at least are aware of the rules of the game and attempt to ensure that their terms prevail.267 At the same time, through a reluctance to push this too far with the possibility of loss of business, or because the costs of negotiating outweigh the benefits, business people may be content to leave the discrepancies unresolved.268 The consequence in law, at least on one analysis, may be that there is no contract. Two questions may arise in these battle-of-the-forms cases. Has a contract been concluded at all? If there is a contract, whose terms prevail? The answers to these questions are determined by a close examination of precisely what occurred between the parties. Sometimes the outcome of these cases is fickle in the sense that a chance event (almost certainly not thought to be of any significance by the parties) may determine the result. This is illustrated by Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco (Aust) Pty Ltd.269 H  sent a purchase order. R faxed a reply ‘will confirm order on our official confirmation sheets, over next few days. Please accept this as our confirmation in mean time’. The subsequent official form contained terms that were different from the terms in the original purchase order. A majority of the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal held that R’s faxed reply was an acceptance of H’s purchase order because the magic word ‘accept’ appeared therein. Kirby P in dissent considered that this word was not determinative. It was very unlikely that the person who sent the fax was using the word ‘accept’ in a technical, legal sense and in fact the rest of the message clearly indicated that the fax was not an acceptance. As to the first question — has a contract been concluded? — it may be that no contract is formally concluded because the parties have merely made offers and counter-offers that are never accepted. This problem may be solved by resorting to the notion of acceptance by conduct270 if the parties have proceeded with the commercial arrangement, in which case the last counter-offer is accepted. But it may still be arguable that, if the parties have made it quite clear that they will not accept each other’s terms, then acceptance of any one set of terms by conduct is 267. Beale and Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Law Soc 45 at 49–50. 268. Rawlings, ‘The Battle of the Forms’ (1979) 42 MLR 715 at 718; Beale and Dugdale, ibid at 49–50. 269. (1988) 5 BPR 11,106. 270. Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v  Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523; Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666. See 3.27.

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impossible.271 The outcome may then be that there is acceptance by conduct for the purposes of formation, but that the terms have not been expressly agreed to, in which case they must be implied.272 Another possible outcome is that there is no contract and that any goods or services actually provided must be paid for on the basis of the law of restitution.273 An illustrative case on this problem is Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England Ltd)274 in which the seller offered a machine to the buyer on the seller’s standard terms that were expressly said to prevail over any other terms. The seller’s terms included a price variation clause. The buyer responded by sending an order form that was materially different in a number of respects including a fixed-price clause. The buyer’s form also included a tear-off acknowledgement slip, which the seller was asked to sign, stating ‘we accept your order on the Terms and Conditions stated hereon’. The seller signed this slip but at the same time wrote that they were fulfilling the order ‘in accordance with our revised quotation of May 23’ which included the price variation clause. The English Court of Appeal’s analysis revealed some differences in approach in deciding the victor of the battle. There were five possible outcomes, not all of which were canvassed. (1) There was no contract at all.275 (2) A contract existed in terms of the last counter-offer (the ‘last shot’ solution).276 (3) A contract existed in terms of the document that prevailed for one reason or another. A document may prevail because it was more obviously contractual than its rival, or it was ‘higher status’,277 or it was said to prevail by its terms.278 (4) No document prevailed because each cancelled the other out with the result that terms have to be implied.279 (5) A combination of terms from both documents governed the contractual relationship (the ‘global approach’). The Court of Appeal held that the ‘last shot’ approach was appropriate with the result that the seller’s acknowledgement (by signing the slip) of the buyer’s terms was the final acceptance so that there was no price variation clause. The seller’s apparent attempt to reassert its terms despite signing the buyer’s acknowledgement slip was unsuccessful and was treated by the court as merely a method of identifying the machine. Lord Denning MR approved of the global approach that had been adopted by the trial judge, Thesiger J. On this approach the court will infer that a contract has been formed because of the conduct of the parties and then attempt to extract from the totality of the dealings between the parties what the terms are.280 If different terms can be reconciled with each other, they are part of the contract. If they cannot, the 271. Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 406 (Lawton LJ), 408 (Bridge LJ). 272. This view was canvassed without much enthusiasm by Mocatta J in Transmotors Ltd v  Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. See too Lord Denning MR in Butler at 405. 273. See Chapter 26. See McKendrick, ‘Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution’ (1988) 8 OJLS 197. 274. [1979] 1 WLR 401. 275. In which case, as noted, resort may be had to the law of restitution. 276. British Road Services Ltd v Arthur V Crutchley & Co Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811. 277. Mocatta J in Transmotors Ltd v Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. 278. The approach adopted by Thesiger J, the trial judge in Butler (unreported). 279. Mocatta J in Transmotors [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. 280. This approach can be seen in the reasoning of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v  Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559, particularly at  567 (Buchanan JA with the concurrence of Ormiston and Callaway JJA), and similarly in Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v  Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704 at [55]–[57] (Macready M).

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court must step in and imply appropriate terms. This approach, however, produced different results in the hands of the trial judge and Lord Denning MR. Thesiger J had concluded that the seller’s terms should prevail because of the express reference to their prevailing (approach (3) above); while Lord Denning MR, despite his adherence to the ‘global’ approach, concluded that the buyer’s terms prevailed because the seller signed the acknowledgement slip. Lord Denning’s approach was remarkably similar to § 2-207 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, discussed earlier.281 While this section represents a valiant attempt to accommodate to business realities, it has not been successful in that its uncertainties, particularly as to what is ‘material’ and what is not, have generated more problems than the section was supposed to solve. The result is that Australian courts will probably follow the more traditional ‘matching’ approach, which has the merit of ease of application.282 On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of being inflexible, and may encourage business people to escalate the battle. 3.33  Exchange of land contracts.283 In relation to exchange of counterpart contracts for the sale of land,284 conveyancers will endeavour to make sure that the two parts are identical. If they are not, then the second copy delivered may be a counter-offer rather than an acceptance. In England it has been held in Harrison v Battye285 that the two parts must be identical. However, in Australia, the High Court has held in Sindel v Georgiou286 that the exchange of non-identical parts is not necessarily fatal to the formation of a contract. In that case, the lack of correspondence between the two parts came about because of a failure to complete the counterpart signed by the vendor and to annex to it a copy of a survey report. In a joint judgment, it was held that if the parties intend to create a contract by exchange of parts, then a contract will come into being so long as the lack of correspondence between the parts can be remedied by rectification287 or interpretation.288 This all depends upon the intention of the parties. ‘It will be otherwise when it appears that the parties intend to be bound only by an exchange of parts in identical terms …’.289 In this case, the fact that there was no contradiction between the terms of the two parts (as there was in

281. See 3.31. 282. Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,106. See also White Industries Ltd v Piling Contractors Pty Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 353. Subcontractor P started work on the basis of its terms. W sent a contract with a term ‘Any conditions of contract or sale attached to or embodied in the subcontractor’s quotation are deemed to be withdrawn in favour of the conditions incorporated herein’. P refused to sign. It was held that there was a contract on the basis of the subcontractor’s terms. 283. For an account of the roles of the respective solicitors in an exchange of land contracts, see  Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 at [31] (Campbell JA). It is worth noting that the method of exchange of parts, inherited from the United Kingdom, is not universally used in Australia. In South Australia one contract is signed by each party. Of course, a copy of that contract is also created. 284. See 3.10 for discussion of offer and acceptance when there is such an exchange. 285. [1974] 3 All ER 830. 286. (1984) 154 CLR 661. See  also Starke, ‘Effect of Exchange of Contracts in Establishing a Concluded Agreement of Sale of Land’ (1985) 59 ALJ 50. 287. As to the doctrine of rectification, see Chapter 12. In Hayward v Planet Projects Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1105, non-identical parts were exchanged and Simos J was of the opinion that the contract could be rectified and so the discrepancy between the two parts removed. There is a logical difficulty here that is overlooked to achieve practical justice: rectification cannot be ordered if there is no contract. 288. See below 6.5 and 6.6, where what is termed ‘informal rectification’ is discussed. 289. (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 667.

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Harrison v Battye) helped the court to conclude that there was a binding agreement. ‘There is nothing in either part to raise any doubt as to the agreed terms.’290 In Zaccardi v  Caunt,291 non-identical parts were exchanged and Campbell JA undertook a close examination of the two parts to see whether the difference was material. He found that the parts were materially different but nevertheless concluded that the intention of the parties, as objectively ascertained, was to commit to contract by exchange. There was evidence that the parties intended to commit on the basis of one of the signed parts. The High Court emphasised in Sindel that intention was the paramount consideration.292 Campbell JA was also of the view that the High Court in Sindel did not lay down that rectification was necessarily a prerequisite to effective exchange of non-matching parts. As to ‘exchange’ made by telephone, see 3.57.

Retrospective acceptance 3.34  May acceptance be retrospective? It is not uncommon for commercial parties to start performing a contract before making it in a formal sense. Apart from contract by inference from conduct (see 3.6), by estoppel and acceptance by conduct (see 3.27), where the parties have started work on a project with the understanding that a formal contract will be executed at some later stage, the question is whether the activities carried out prior to execution are governed by the contract. The answer to this is straightforward if the parties have expressly provided that the agreement will operate as from a date earlier than its execution date. The agreement has retrospective effect.293 But what if their intention is not clearly expressed? Megaw J considered the question in Trollope & Colls Ltd v  Atomic Power Constructions Ltd294 and held that because the parties had acted for some time prior to the actual execution of a written contract, their rights and obligations arising from their prior actions must be regulated by the written contract. Although the written contract did not state that it was to have retrospective effect, the court considered that it was a necessary inference to be drawn from the course of dealings between the parties. Similarly in City of Box Hill v EW Tauschke Pty Ltd,295 the Victorian Supreme Court gave a written agreement retrospective operation. T was the successful tenderer for road work and was obliged to sign a contract with an indemnity clause. A claim for personal injuries was successfully made against the City of Box Hill arising out of an accident that occurred after the tenderer had started work but before the 290. Ibid at  668. Contrast De Jong v  Carpenter (1982) 2  BPR  9524 and Longpocket Investments Pty Ltd v Hoadley (1985) NSW ConvR 55-244; 3 BPR 9606. 291. [2008] NSWCA 202. 292. In Wang v Garland Lot 3 Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1112, Robb J, after a thorough examination of the analysis of Campbell JA in Zaccardi, concluded that on the facts in Wang it could not be said that the parties had a mutual intention that could be inferred from non-identical parts. 293. Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd (1959) SR (NSW) 130 at 133, 135–6. 294. [1963] 1 WLR 333 at 339; [1962] 3 All ER 1035 at 1040 applied in Murray Goulburn Co-Operative Co Ltd v Cobram Laundry Service Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 57 at [16] (Chernov JA, Brooking and Batt JJA concurring); QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749 (Hall J); Murphy Corporation Ltd v Acumen Design & Development (Qld) Pty Ltd & Derek Graham Hooper (1995) 11 BCL 274. 295. [1974] VR 39. See  also QCoal Pty Ltd v  Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479 at  [35] (Ann Lyons J).

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formal contract containing the indemnity clause was signed. The City of Box Hill was successful in invoking the indemnity clause against T. On the other hand, in Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd,296 the trial judge and, on appeal, a majority of the Full Court of New South Wales, decided that a contract could not have retrospective effect unless it is expressly so provided in the terms. In spite of a strong dissenting judgment by Sugerman J, leave to appeal to the High Court was refused. It is, perhaps, a matter for regret that the High Court did not take the opportunity to consider the matter, especially in view of the opinions expressed by two of its members in Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson,297 which, like the Newlands case, involved a hire-purchase agreement. In the former case Williams and Kitto JJ said: The agreements provide that the term of the hiring is to commence from the date of the agreement, which means apparently the date the document is signed by the hirer. They also provide that upon such signature they are to operate only as an irrevocable offer for fourteen days from the date thereof and shall not be binding until a memorandum of acceptance shall have been signed by the plaintiff company and that, inter alia, any delivery shall, pending acceptance, be conditional only. But it would appear that upon acceptance the agreement would operate from the date it was signed by the hirer.298

The question of inferred retrospectivity may be regarded as open, at  any rate in states other than possibly New  South  Wales,299 and it is one of considerable importance in the context of modern commercial practice. For example, in a consumer credit transaction that is to be financed by a finance company, the dealer and the buyer will often act before the finance company has executed the agreement. The dealer may deliver the chattel that is to be bought and the buyer may have delivered a trade-in. This practice is so general that finance companies must be taken to know of it and, indeed, to conduct their business on that basis. In such cases there is much to be said for allowing the agreement, when it is accepted by the finance corporation, to have retrospective effect and to cover the prior actions of the dealer and the buyer. This is, ultimately, simply a matter of discerning the parties’ evident intention and no blanket rule is appropriate.

Commitment to acceptance 3.35  Acceptance before offer — fixed bid sales and auctions. A somewhat analogous problem was posed by Harvela Investments Ltd v  Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd.300 Is it possible to commit to acceptance of an offer before it is made? That is, is it possible to make a binding commitment to contract before the price and the party are known? On the principles so far discussed it would seem not. But the exceptions arise in cases of fixed-bid sales, possibly in tenders301 and auctions 296. (1959) SR (NSW) 130. 297. (1951) 82 CLR 477. 298. Ibid at 488. 299. See  Hawkins v  Clayton t/a Clayton Utz & Co (1986) NSWLR 109 at  130 (McHugh JA) endorsing Newlands: ‘At least in this State the law must be taken as settled that, in the absence of a contractual provision, express or implied, a contract does not have a retrospective effect.’ However, to the contrary was Hall J in Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749. See also Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235 at [73] (Young CJ in Eq). 300. [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. Also discussed above in 3.25, 3.28. 301. See 3.39.

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‘without reserve’.302 In Harvela, the first defendants held some 12 per cent of the shares of a company as trustees of a settlement. They wished to sell the shares. The two obvious buyers were the plaintiffs who owned 43 per cent of the shares and the second defendants who owned 40 per cent of the shares, since if either bought the shares, they would obtain control of the company. The first defendants decided to dispose of the shares by sealed fixed bids and sent identical telexes to the plaintiffs and the second defendants inviting tenders and stating ‘We confirm that if any offer made by you is the highest offer received by us we bind ourselves to accept such offer providing that such offer complies with the terms of this telex’. The plaintiffs bid $2,175,000. The second defendants bid $2,100,000 or ‘$101,000 in excess of any other offer which you may receive which is expressed as a fixed monetary amount, whichever is higher’. The first defendants accepted the second defendants’ offer. It was held that the first defendants were legally obliged to accept the plaintiffs’ offer, it being the highest legitimate offer.303 In coming to this conclusion Lord Diplock analysed the problem on the basis of there being two contracts. The telex was treated as an offer of a unilateral contract to accept the highest bid that would be followed by a bilateral contract with the highest bidder.

Tenders 3.36  Acceptance in the case of tenders.304 A final illustration of the difficulty experienced in deciding whether an offer has been accepted is afforded by the cases where a tender is invited for the supply of goods or services.305 Before examining tenders, it is worth noting that sometimes organisations may simply seek ‘expressions of interest’ in which case the party who responds is merely providing information. The more usual form of tender is where an organisation asks for tenders for the supply of an item (or for the purchase of an item) and each tenderer puts in a bid in ignorance of what the other tenderers have bid.306 There is no doubt that the tender (unlike an expression of interest) is an offer. The question, however, is whether its ‘acceptance’ by the principal is an acceptance in the legal sense so as to produce a binding contract. This can be answered only by examining the language of the original invitation to tender. There are at least two possible cases. 3.37  Two classes of tenders. First, the principal may state that it will require a specified quantity of goods, for instance, where it issues a request for tenders for 1000 computers to be supplied during the period from 1 January to 31 December. This is an invitation to treat. Tenderers who respond to this make offers.307 Here 302. Auctions without reserve are discussed above in 3.24. 303. It was held that a referential bid was not a legitimate offer. See 3.25. 304. For an extensive discussion of tenders in the context of government procurement, see Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 7. 305. Of course, a tender may be for a sale, but usually tendering is used for purchasing. 306. Or at  least that is how a tender is supposed to be conducted. Collusive bidding and other practices that corrupt the tendering process are illegal under the Competition and Consumer Act  2010 (Cth) Pt IV and under other legislation and may also generate civil causes of action, for example, in deceit or for misleading conduct. See Metroplaza Pty Ltd v  Girvan Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR 41-241 for the array of remedies available to the victim of collusive bidding, including conspiracy and restitution. See  also Energex Ltd v Alstom Australia Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 504; [2005] FCAFC 215. 307. Re Klown Production Pty Ltd and Australian Trade Commission (1992) 26 ALD 763.

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‘acceptance’ of a tender is an acceptance in the legal sense, and it creates a contract.308 It is common for the request document to stipulate when a contract comes into being. So, for example, a communication that a particular bidder has won the tender would not be legal acceptance if the request document had stipulated that contract formation occurs only on execution of a contract. If fixed quantities are not specified, it is still possible for the party seeking supplies to bind himself or herself to deal exclusively with the other party.309 Second, if the corporation advertises that it may require articles of a specified description, as, for instance, where it invites tenders for the supply during the coming year of stationery, deliveries to be made if and when demanded, the effect of the so-called ‘acceptance’ of the tender is very different. The supplier has made what is called a standing offer in response to the tender invitation. Until revocation, he or she stands ready and willing to deliver stationery at the agreed price when the corporation from time to time demands a precise quantity. The ‘acceptance’ of the tender, however, does not convert the offer into a binding contract, for a contract of sale implies that the buyer has agreed to accept the goods. In the latter case the principal has not agreed to take any quantity of stationery (and this is usually stated in the request document). It has merely stated that it may require supplies. 3.38  Position where tender is a standing offer.310 In this latter case the standing offer may be revoked at  any time provided that it has not been accepted in the legal sense.311 And acceptance in the legal sense is complete as soon as an order for a definite quantity of goods is made. Each order by the offeree is an individual act of acceptance that creates a separate contract. If, however, the supplier revokes the offer, he or she cannot be made liable for further deliveries312 but is bound by orders already made.313 The nature of a standing offer was considered in Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid.314 The plaintiff company agreed to supply the government of New South Wales with ammunition in such quantities as might from time to time be required by the government. Under this agreement the plaintiff supplied large quantities of ammunition which were duly paid for by the government. Eventually, the government decided that it needed new types of ammunition and bought these from other firms. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that there was no contract unless and until an order was made for a specific quantity: 308. Northern Territory v Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 20; Secure Parking Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council [2016] NSWCA 154. The latter case demonstrates that care must be exercised if lastminute changes are sought by the principal. The tenderer’s bid was not modified by changes sought by the council so that the council’s purported acceptance of the tender did not match what was offered. 309. See Milne v Sydney Corp (1912) 14 CLR 54 (mechanical repair services). See also Jarvis v Pitt Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 506, discussed below. 310. Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.7]. 311. Sometimes the standing offer is in a deed which provides that the offer will be kept open for the term of the deed. 312. Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748; 142 ER 1336. The position would be different if the offeror has bound itself by deed to keep the standing offer open for a certain time. 313. Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 applied in Kelly v Caledonian Coal Co (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 1. 314. (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338. See also Munday and Shreeve v Western Australia [1962] WAR 65 (tender for transport of grain and superphosphate in which government specifically said that there was no guarantee of a minimum or any quantity to be transported. Held: standing offer only).

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Once they order the ammunition there is a contract to take the ammunition, but until they give the order, this agreement is nothing more than a tender on the part of the plaintiffs to supply the Government at the prices therein named with the ammunition ordered. It is clear that in this agreement there is no undertaking in terms by the Government to take one ounce of ammunition …315

It may be difficult to decide which type of tender exists when someone agrees to take such quantity as is required, and the quantity is not fixed. This happened in Jarvis v Pitt Ltd,316 in which a builder agreed317 to a quarry-master’s terms and prices for the supply of stone to build the Bonython Hall at  the University of Adelaide. The High Court held that this was not a standing offer but a contract to buy all the stone from the quarry company (a requirement contract): The respondent’s [quarry-master’s] proposal … was for the supply of all the stone, and that implies a promise on the part of the contractor to take it all. It is an offer to supply stone as ordered at the stated prices, if all the stone needed is taken from the respondent. Accordingly, to assent to the proposal is to promise to take the entire quantity of stone required to fulfil the specifications.318

3.39  Departure from stipulated tendering procedure and other problems in tendering.319 A number of problems may arise in connection with tendering. The basic issue is: do any enforceable obligations arise between tenderers and the party calling for tenders before any particular tender is accepted? Is there an analogy with auctions without reserve and sealed bids, discussed earlier?320 The practical implication of this possibility is that the tender process is governed by the rules announced in the request for tender and a departure may generate legal liability. The first point that can be made is that, if the particular tendering process is in fact conducted like an auction, then there is no reason why the Harvela case321 should not apply. Thus, if the request for tender stated that the lowest (or highest) tender would be accepted, there would be an obligation, arising from a unilateral contract, to accept the lowest (highest) tender that conformed to the terms of the advertisement.322 Generally, the party seeking tenders does not make such a commitment because very often price is not the only criterion for selecting the successful tender. But even without such a commitment, there may be an arguable case for a preliminary contract. This is discussed further below. One problem that arises quite commonly is that a tender is accepted even though it does not comply with the terms of the request document that sought tenders. This naturally gives rise to some dissatisfaction on the part of the unsuccessful tenderers. 315. (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 at 345. 316. (1935) 54 CLR 506. 317. The formation of this agreement was complicated by the fact that the builder’s tender to the university and its subsequent acceptance by the university also constituted formation of a contract with the quarrymaster. This aspect of the case is discussed in 5.23. 318. (1935) 54 CLR 506 at 516. 319. For a full analysis of the issues raised here, see Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 7. 320. See 3.24 and 3.35, where it is argued that separate contractual obligations may arise before acceptance of the highest bid. 321. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. See 3.24, 3.35. 322. See Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 at 274–5 (Estey J for Supreme Court of Canada); Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469.

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Have they any remedy? On the traditional analysis, the tenderer makes an offer which, even though it does not comply with the terms of the advertisement, can nevertheless be accepted by the other party. But this does not answer the question whether there is breach of some possible obligation to the other tenderers who did comply. Basically, are the terms of the request for tender legally binding so that a disgruntled tenderer could seek damages if the party conducting the tender departs from the rules?323 A possible way in which damages could be recovered is to argue that it is misleading conduct to seek tenders, stipulating for certain terms (including a deadline for submission of tenders) and specifications, and then to accept a noncomplying tender.324 If the transaction came within s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law,325 the disgruntled tenderers may at least be able to recover damages for their wasted expenses in preparing tenders.326 It would not be misleading conduct if it was made clear that the organisation seeking tenders reserved the right to accept noncomplying tenders. An alternative analysis that might be employed to impose obligations during the tendering process is through estoppel.327 The body seeking tenders may be estopped in appropriate circumstances from departing from the terms set out in the tender advertisement.328 A further analysis, that has found favour in the United Kingdom,329 Canadian and New  Zealand courts and applied in Australia (see  below), is that there is a preliminary contract (contract A)330 between the organisation seeking tenders and any tenderer who puts in a complying tender. The actual acceptance of a particular tender (contract B) then may follow. Thus, the request for tender is both an invitation to treat asking for offers for contract B (its traditional role) and an offer capable of being accepted (thus creating contract A) by each tenderer who puts in a complying tender. The terms of this preliminary contract A are those stated in the tender advertisement or request for tender and they govern the actual conduct of the tender process up until the main contract is awarded. The principal or a tenderer may then be in breach if either does not comply with the terms. The Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario v  Ron Engineering &  Construction Eastern Ltd331 held that, once a tenderer has put in a complying tender, then the 323. As to the measure of damages, see  Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.22]. 324. Misleading conduct was one basis for finding liability in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1. 325. See Chapter 11. 326. There are nevertheless some difficult problems of causation in assessing damages in such a case. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.22]. 327. BGC Construction Pty Ltd v Minister for Works [2009] WASC 398 at [40]–[44] (Kenneth Martin J). 328. See Chapter 2. 329. Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195. 330. The terminology of contract A and contract B is taken from the Canadian cases. There are very many Canadian cases following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ron Engineering. These cases are analysed in Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.24]–[7.25]. 331. (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 (Estey J for Supreme Court of Canada). The tenderer was required to pay a deposit. Under the terms of the tender advertisement the deposit was liable to be forfeited in certain circumstances. It was held that the deposit was forfeited. The case also involved a mistake by the tenderer but the mistake was held not to be operative. This analysis has been followed in New Zealand. See  Markholm Construction Co Ltd v  Wellington CC [1985] 2 NZLR 520; Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469; Gregory v Rangitikei District Council [1995] 2 NZLR 208;

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tenderer is bound and, in this particular case, the tender could not be withdrawn for 60 days because the advertisement for tenders so specified. Unlike in the Harvela case, it appears that the nature of this preliminary contract is bilateral rather than unilateral. This is because the request for tender may impose terms on either party. Most of the tender challenge cases involve alleged breach by the principal rather than a tenderer.332 The two-contract approach was applied in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia.333 Finn J held that the Civil Aviation Authority (which became Airservices Australia) was in breach of the ‘process’ contract (contract A in Canadian terminology) created by the request for tender document when the Authority changed the selection criteria without informing the bidders. As already noted, this was also found to constitute misleading conduct. The growing body of case law using the two-contract analysis in tenders has principally been applied to government tenders.334 This may seem odd, but the cases do reveal a concern for special considerations that apply in public tenders, namely, the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the process. The whole purpose of conducting a tender is to obtain best value in the spending of public money. There was also a further consideration, emphasised by Finn J in Hughes Aircraft,335 that the government or a government body is expected to adhere to high standards of commercial conduct. The implications of these decisions are serious because they remove a degree of flexibility in the tendering process.336 On the one hand, it is important for the probity of the tendering process that the body seeking tenders, particularly a government body or instrumentality, should adhere to its own stipulated terms and procedures. On the other hand, a degree of flexibility must be maintained if the whole purpose of seeking tenders — to obtain the most competitive offer — is not to be undermined. It is possible in the invitation for tenders to stipulate that no ‘process’ contract will be created.337 The fact that in these cases there is usually a specific disclaimer (for example, ‘the Department will not necessarily accept the lowest offer, nor will it be bound to accept any tender submitted …’) provides some flexibility to the Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand (2005) 2 NZLR 433; [2003] UKPC 83; ScheldeMarinebouw BV v A-G [2005] NZAR 356. 332. In Canada tenderers have been sued by the principal. See, for example, Calgary v Northern Construction Co Division of Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc [1986] 2 WWR 426 affirmed by the Supreme Court [1987] 2 SCR 757; [1988] 2 WWR 193. 333. (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1. See also Ipex ITG Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 480; Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 656; Edmondson v Warringah Council (1999) 105 LGERA 37; Williams v State Transit Authority of NSW [2004] NSWCA 179; Dockpride Pty Ltd v  Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211. In a very different context not involving tendering, a preliminary ‘process’ contract was discussed in Wenzel v  Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 125 FCR 570; [2002] FCAFC 400. The possibility of Hughes being applied to private sector tenders was canvassed in Macquarie Generation v  CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040; Hickinbotham Developments Pty Ltd v Woods (2005) 92 SASR 52; and Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 at [499]–[529] (Allsop J). 334. In Shivas v BTR Nylex Holdings NZ Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 318, an attempt to argue the two-contract approach to a private sector tender was unsuccessful. Compare Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 at [499]–[529] (Allsop J). 335. (1997) 46 ALR 1 at  41. See  Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [1.8]–[1.10], where this idea is discussed. 336. The Canadian decisions are criticised on this ground by Devonshire, (1989) 23 UBC Law Rev 335. See also Phang, ‘Tenders and Uncertainty’ (1991) 4 JCL 46. 337. The Commonwealth Government routinely excludes a process contract in its tender documents.

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body seeking tenders but does not prevent the preliminary contract A (or ‘process’ contract) from coming into being. Nor does such a disclaimer justify departure from the rules announced in the request for tender.338

‘Acceptance’ in ignorance of offer 3.40  Must acceptor have knowledge of offer or be acting in response to offer? Do contractual obligations arise if services are rendered, that in fact fulfil the terms of an offer, but are performed in ignorance of the existence of the offer? The defendant may, for example, have offered a reward to anyone who gives information ensuring the conviction of a criminal. If the plaintiff supplies the information in ignorance of the reward, can he or she afterwards claim it? This question raises a fundamental point about contract formation. On the one hand, it is necessary to show that there is agreement, tested generally by the rules of offer and acceptance. On the other hand, because the law uses an objective test, it is possible for a court to find that there is an agreement — to all outward appearances there appeared to be an agreement — when the parties were actually unaware of it. So, an apparent acceptance can create a contract. But can it do so where it can be proved that the purported acceptance was made in ignorance of the offer? Despite one or two nineteenth-century cases to the contrary,339 the answer is that no contract can be formed in such a case.340 Agreement, it is true, has often been inferred from the conduct of the parties although it does not exist in fact, but the inference can scarcely be drawn from the mere coincidence of two independent acts. The plaintiff, when he or she acted in supplying information, intended not to sell information, but to give it, and there was nothing to justify any reasonable third party in inferring the contrary.341 The point was tested on the somewhat unusual facts in R v  Clarke.342 The Government of Western Australia offered a reward of £1000 ‘for such information as shall lead to the arrest and conviction of’ the murderers of two police officers, and added that, if the information should be given by an accomplice, not being himself the murderer, he should receive a free pardon. Clarke saw the offer and sometime later gave the necessary information. He claimed the reward from the Crown by Petition of Right. He admitted not only that he had acted solely to save his own skin, but that, at the time when he gave the information, the question of the reward had passed out of his mind. The High Court of Australia held that his claim must fail. He was, in their opinion, in the same position as if he had never heard of the reward. In the words of Higgins J: Clarke had seen the offer, indeed; but it was not present to his mind — he had forgotten it, and gave no consideration to it, in his intense excitement as to his own danger. There cannot be assent without knowledge of the offer; and ignorance of the offer is the same thing whether it is due to never hearing of it or to forgetting it after hearing.343

338. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.20]. 339. Neville v Kelly (1862) 12 CBNS 740; 142 ER 1333; Gibbons v Proctor (1891) 64 LT 594. 340. For a contrary view, see Mitchell and Phillips, ‘The Contractual Nexus: Is Reliance Essential?’ (2002) 22 OJL S 115. 341. See Fitch v Snedaker (1886) 38 NY 248. 342. (1927) 40 CLR 227. 343. (1927) 40 CLR 227 at 241.

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Isaacs CJ reinforced his opinion with a hypothetical illustration: An offer of £100 to any person who should swim a hundred yards in the harbour on the first day of the year, … would not in my opinion be satisfied by a person who was accidentally or maliciously thrown overboard on that date and swam the distance simply to save his life, without any thought of the offer.344

The High  Court’s analysis in R v  Clarke certainly raises difficulties because it introduces motive, or even dominant motive, into the analysis of offer and acceptance. There is a tension between the objective test that is customarily applied in contract cases and the idea that a party’s motive (which must necessarily be subjectively ascertained) is a relevant consideration. The position would have been different in R v Clarke if the offer of the reward had been present to the plaintiff’s mind when he acted, although he may also have been influenced by some other motive. In Williams v Carwardine,345 where a notice had been published in terms similar to those in R v Clarke, the plaintiff had supplied the information with knowledge of the reward but moved rather by remorse for her own misconduct. Parke J gave judgment in her favour, and the defendant moved to enter a nonsuit on the ground that the suggested contract had been negatived by the finding of the jury ‘that the plaintiff gave the information to ease her conscience and not for the sake of the reward’. But the judgment was upheld in the King’s Bench. Motive was irrelevant, provided that the act was done with knowledge of the reward. Acceptance was then related to offer. The debate would seem to be somewhat arcane but it has been given new impetus by the more recent cases, discussed earlier,346 in which unilateral contract is employed in contracts of carriage of goods to provide the benefits of exemption clauses to third-party contractors such as stevedores and truck drivers.347 These cases raise the issue: in order to qualify for the benefit of the exemption clauses, must the thirdparty contractor know of the offer of exemption, or at least be responding to that offer, when performing the ‘requested’ acts of unloading or transporting the goods? Given that the stevedore or truck driver is in these cases often remote from the original contract of carriage, it is plausible to argue that the acts of unloading or transporting the goods are done for reasons other than responding to a unilateral offer, even if the contractor does happen to know of the offer. This argument was not apparently addressed in the Eurymedon case, except by counsel for the goods owner before the Privy Council,348 and it was not alluded to in the judgments. On the other hand, in the New York Star349 the point was relied on by the New South Wales Court of Appeal to deny the benefit of the exemption 344. Ibid at 235. 345. The case was decided in 1833 and was variously reported: 5 C & P 566; 172 ER 1101 is the best report, and brings out clearly that the plaintiff knew of the reward; see also 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590; 1 Nev & M (KB) 418; 2 LJKB 101. 346. See 3.28. See also 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 347. New Zealand Shipping Co Ld v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd (The New York Star) (1978) 139 CLR 231; 18 ALR 333 (High Court); (1980) 144 CLR 300; 30 ALR 588 (Privy Council); Celthene Pty Ld v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. See Malcolm, ‘The Negligent Pilot and the Himalaya Clause: A Saga of Disagreement’ (1993) 67 ALJ 14. See 7.38 for a full statement of the facts in The Eurymedon. 348. [1975] AC 154 at 160–1. 349. (1978) 139 CLR 231; 18 ALR 333 (HC); (1980) 144 CLR 300; 30 ALR 588 (PC).

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clause to the stevedores.350 It was held that the stevedores, though knowing of the offer, had not established by evidence that their unloading the goods was in response to and (at least in part) because of the offer of exemption. The point was taken up in the appeal to the High Court by Mason and Jacobs JJ,351 who came to the opposite conclusion. The question of reliance turns on the burden of proof. In circumstances where B has apparently responded to A’s offer, is it necessary for B to show that the response was in fact in reliance on the offer or is it for A to show that B’s actions were not in response to A’s offer but are to be explained in some other way? Mason and Jacobs JJ, drawing on the judgment of Starke J in R v Clarke,352 said that the onus is on the offeror to displace by evidence the inference that a court will draw from the fact that B has apparently accepted.353 So, in the New York Star, the onus was on the owner of the goods to show that the stevedores were not responding to the offer of exemption when they unloaded the goods, rather than on the stevedores to show that they were, as the Court of Appeal had held. It hardly needs to be said that such an onus is almost impossible to discharge depending, as it does, on the proof of lack of intention. In Celthene Pty Ltd v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd,354 Yeldham J said that the second defendant, who was a truck driver, did not need to have knowledge of the offer of exemption when carrying the goods.355 In that case it was held that both the carrier company and its employee were protected by an exemption clause. His Honour explained his extending the exemption to the truck driver by referring to The Eurymedon. Possibly his Honour’s remark could be explained by the onus of proof argument discussed above, though this was not alluded to in the judgment. It should be noted that proof that an apparent response to an offer is not in fact an acceptance is very much easier when the offeree does not know of the offer than when the offeree does know but may be acting for some other reason. In Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd,356 the point was not discussed directly. Hutley JA, when discussing the relationship between the consignor and the subcontractor of the defendant carrier, said, ‘[w]hen he accepted the goods for delivery, it was pursuant to a form of contract drawn so as to appear to protect him. He should be taken to be accepting the goods on those terms and the consignor making an offer to him direct’.357 Finally, it is worth noting that in Dalgety Australia Ltd v  Harris358 the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal adopted a practical approach to the onus of proof problem in relation to acceptance of unilateral offers. Whether an apparent acceptance is in fact an acceptance very much depends on the circumstances. In some 350. [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 445 at 449 (Glass JA), 451–2 (Hutley JA). 351. (1978) 139 CLR 231 at 271–4. See also McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC; Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC v James [2016] NSWCA 36 at [11] (Macfarlan JA), [191] (Tobias AJA). 352. (1927) 40 CLR 227 at 244. 353. A slightly different view about the onus of proof was put in Dalgety Australia Ltd v  Harris [1977] 1 NSWLR 324 at 328 (Glass JA). See below. 354. [1981] 1 NSWLR 606. 355. Ibid at 616. 356. [1983] 1 NSWLR 43l. 357. Ibid at 437. Emphasis added. 358. [1977] 1 NSWLR 324. See also Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v Sztrochlic [2015] NSWSC 885 at [68]–[74] (Fagan J).

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cases, a strong inference will be drawn from the acts of the offeree that conform to the offer; in other cases, such acts may carry very little weight. The onus of proof is thus determined by the circumstances. In Dalgety itself, the fact that Dalgety made further sales to a company after a guarantee of payment had been obtained from Harris was sufficient to raise an inference that the further sales were made because of the guarantee. 3.41  Does agreement result from cross-offers? The answer to this is that logically there is no contract because no offer has been accepted. This is borne out by Tinn v Hoffmann & Co,359 where the parties offered to sell and offered to buy 800 tons of iron on the same terms, their letters crossing in the mail. It was held by five judges against two that on the facts of the case no contract had been concluded. Of the five judges in the majority, Archibald and Keating JJ proceeded on the ground that the letters in question contained diverse terms so that the parties were not ad idem, while Blackburn, Brett and Grove JJ denied that cross-offers could, in the most favourable circumstances, constitute a contract.

Offers capable of being accepted by more than one person 3.42  Acceptance by more than one person. Finally, it is necessary to consider cases where an offer is capable of being accepted by more than one person, although the resultant contract can be performed with only one acceptor. In such cases the liabilities of the offeror will depend on the construction placed upon the terms of the offer by the court. Thus, in reward cases where more than one person has given information leading to the desired result, the courts have tended to construe the offer as being made to the first person to give such information.360 On the other hand, as shown by the reward offer in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,361 the nature of the offer may be such as potentially to create a number of contracts. In other cases, as, for example, where property is offered to more than one person and more than one accepts, there are as many contracts as there are acceptances.362 In such cases, if the property offered is either land or specific goods, it will usually vest, either in equity or at law, in the first person to accept, so that the offeror will have put it out of his or her power to perform the contracts with the other acceptors who will be left to pursue their remedies in damages for breach of contract.363 There is no principle of contract law that it is impossible to agree to sell what you do not have to sell.364 Nor is entering into a second inconsistent contract necessarily a breach of the first contract.365 359. 360. 361. 362.

(1873) 29 LT Rep 271. Robinson v M’Ewan (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 65; Orr v R (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 71. [1892] 2 QB 484; affirmed [1893] 1 QB 256, discussed in 3.16, 3.18. Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530; 211 ALR 159; [2004] HCA 56 at [149]–[152], discussed in the context of the tort of interference with contractual relations; Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216 at [20] (Young CJ in Eq). 363. Patterson v  Dolman [1908] VLR 354. In the case of specific goods, it may be possible for the second acceptor to acquire a title by delivery under the Sale of Goods Acts: ACT: s 29(1); NSW: s 28(1); NT: s 28(1); Qld: s 27(1); SA: s 25(1); Tas: s 30(1); Vic: s 30; WA: s 25(1). 364. See, for example, McRae v  Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377 discussed in 12.16. 365. Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Ltd [2008] FCA 1915 at [51]–[52] (Gordon J).

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The communication of acceptance 3.43  The necessity for communication of acceptance. A contract is not formed until there is acceptance and that acceptance has been communicated to the offeror. There must be an external manifestation of assent: some word spoken or act done by the offeree or by his or her authorised agent366 that the law can regard as the communication of the acceptance to the offeror. This is the general rule, but it is subject to exceptions. What constitutes communication varies with the nature of the case and has provoked many difficult problems.

Acceptance by silence 3.44  Effect of silence. An offeror may not arbitrarily impose contractual liability upon an offeree merely by proclaiming that silence shall be deemed consent. In Felthouse v Bindley,367 the plaintiff, Paul Felthouse, wrote to his nephew, John, on 2  February, offering to buy his horse for £30 15s, and adding ‘If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at that price’. The nephew made no reply to this letter, but intimated to the defendant, an auctioneer who was going to sell his stock, that the horse was to be kept out of the sale. The defendant inadvertently sold the horse to a third party at an auction held on 25 February, and the plaintiff sued him in conversion. The Court of Common Pleas held that the action must fail as there had been no communication of acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer before 25 February, and the plaintiff had therefore, at that date, no title to maintain conversion. This was despite the fact that the offeree was perfectly happy to sell the horse to his uncle and had so indicated to the auctioneer. It may be that, on the facts of this particular case, the correct analysis was that the uncle’s offer was accepted by conduct: see 3.27. Nevertheless, the general point is an important one. It should not be possible to foist a contract on another by stipulating that if he or she does nothing this will be taken to be acceptance. This kind of conduct has caused problems in consumer cases where a householder is sent unsolicited goods and is trapped into a contract by unscrupulous traders. The unsolicited goods may be accepted by the householder by conduct, for example, using the goods. Because a householder can be trapped in this way, consumer protection legislation has been passed to deal with this problem.368 The view that silence cannot amount to acceptance must be qualified, as we have already noted, when a case arises in which there is acceptance by conduct leading to a bilateral contract.369 The two are distinguishable: in a case like Felthouse v Bindley there is never any communication of acceptance whereas in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd there is either communication when the offeror

366. See Powell v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284 and Batt v Onslow (1892) 13 LR (NSW) Eq 79. 367. (1862) 11 CBNS 869; 142 ER 1037. Compare White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 and Boyd v Holmes (1878) 4 VLR (E) 161. See also Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 527–8 (Kirby P), 534 (McHugh JA). 368. See Australian Consumer Law ss 41–42. 369. Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666; Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523. See 3.27.

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finds out what the offeree is doing, or communication may not be necessary in some cases.370 The question then arises whether there can be acceptance by conduct when the offeror is ignorant of the conduct. In Felthouse v Bindley, the nephew had indicated by his conduct (the instructions to the auctioneer) that he had accepted his uncle’s offer, but the uncle never knew of it. However, the position is different if the offeree’s conduct is referable to what is asked for in the offer, that is, the offeree starts to perform. For example, if the offeror asks the offeree to prepare or deliver goods and the latter starts work, there is an acceptance by conduct even though the offeror is ignorant of the relevant conduct.371 Such cases can be explained as ones where communication of acceptance has been waived (see below) or on the basis of estoppel. Whether Felthouse v  Bindley will invariably apply has been questioned by Corbin.372 If the offeree takes the offeror at his or her word (on the same facts as in Felthouse v Bindley) and wishes to enforce the contract, the offeror should not then be allowed to deny the existence of a contract.373 In such a case there is no transgression of the policy that prevents a person from being able to foist contractual relations on another by stipulating that silence will be treated as acceptance: [T]he offeror has only himself to blame if the terms of his offer put him at the mercy of the offeree … he should not be permitted to escape liability when he has induced the offeree to believe that there is a contract and to act in reliance thereon.374

In Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v  Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd,375 the New South Wales Court of Appeal acknowledged that the general rule is that a person cannot force a contract on another by stipulating that silence will be acceptance but qualified the rule where the circumstances were such as to show that a contractual relationship had arisen by the conduct of the parties.376 McHugh JA went so far as to say that, in appropriate circumstances, silence does amount to acceptance. In American cases377 it has been recognised that ‘custom of the trade, the course of dealing, or the previous relationship between the parties imposed a duty to reject the offer or be bound’.378 In the Canadian case Manco Ltd v  Atlantic Forest Products Ltd, Hughes JA expressed a similar view: 370. ‘So long as the offeror knows of the acceptance, there can be a contract even though the acceptance was not brought to his notice by the offeree’ quoted in Brambles Holdings Ltd v  Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [86] (Heydon JA) from Chitty on Contracts (28th ed, 1999), vol 1, para 2-041. 371. Brogden (1877) 2 App Cas 666 at 691; White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 at 103. 372. Corbin, ‘Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 200. 373. This argument rests on estoppel. See Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 528, where Kirby P acknowledged the possibility of an estoppel argument but did not apply it because it was raised for the first time on appeal. See also Spiro v Lintern [1973] 3 All ER 319. 374. Corbin, (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 200. See Nortel Australia Pty Ltd v Portfolio Leasing Australia Ltd (1998) 8 BPR 15,857 (Bruce J), noted in (1998) 72 ALJ 355, where an option provided that contract would be ‘automatically renewed’. It was held that the contract was renewed without any positive act by the grantee of the option. 375. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 discussed in 3.27. 376. Ibid at 527–8 (Kirby P), 534 (McHugh JA). 377. C M I Clothesmakers Inc v A S K Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447; Brooks Towers Corp v HunkinConkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203; Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464. 378. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 534.

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I take the applicable rule to be that failure to reject an offer does not of itself constitute evidence of its acceptance unless the offeree’s silence would in the circumstances lead a reasonable person in the position of the offeror to believe that the offeree had accepted the terms offered, and unless the offeror did in fact believe the offeree had accepted them and proceeded under that belief.379

3.45  Waiver of communication. It is always possible for the offeror to waive the need to communicate acceptance. Such waiver may be expressed or may be inferred from the circumstances. Waiver will normally be assumed in unilateral contracts.380 In this type of case the offer usually takes the form of a promise to pay money in return for an act;381 the performance of that act will usually be deemed an adequate indication of assent. In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, the facts of which have already been given,382 the argument that the plaintiff should have notified her intention to put the defendants’ specific to the test was dismissed as absurd. Bowen LJ, after stating the normal requirements of communication, continued: But there is this clear gloss to be made upon that doctrine, that as notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who makes the offer, the person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so, … and if the person making the offer, expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification … [I]n the advertisement cases it seems to me to follow as an inference to be drawn from the transaction itself that a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition … [F]rom the point of view of commonsense no other idea could be entertained. If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and write me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal?383

On the other hand, in executory bilateral contracts an inference that the offeror has agreed to waive communication is not so readily drawn. For example, in Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Knight,384 the customer made an offer to enter into a hire-purchase agreement with the company. The printed form of the offer had been supplied by the company and it stated ‘this offer shall … not be binding upon you the offeree [that is, the company] until the memorandum of acceptance endorsed hereon shall have been 379. (1971) 24 DLR (3d) 194 at 200. These words exactly fit what happened in Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1944] 1 All ER 9, in which a real estate agent sent a scale of charges to the defendant. The latter neither expressly accepted nor rejected the scale of charges but allowed the agent to find a buyer. The Court of Appeal held that there was a contract. The case is discussed by Murdoch, ‘The Nature of Estate Agency’ (1975) 91 LQR 357 at 378–9. Contrast Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 (solicitor’s retainer agreement not signed and held not to be accepted by conduct). 380. See Brett J in Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 cited by Darley J in Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 at 347. See also Wise J in Abbott v Lance (1860) Legge 1283 at 1284. See 3.28. 381. Though it is also possible for the payment of money to be the requested act: see Re Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd (1963) 4 FLR 478 (circular sent to shareholders amounted to offer of security by way of a debenture accepted by sending money). 382. See 3.16. 383. Carlill [1893] 1 QB 256 at 269–70. Compare Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 especially at 456–60. 384. [1969] 2 NSWR 79. See also Northstate Carpet Mills Pty Ltd v B R Industries Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1057; Icta Investments Pty Ltd Trading as Jolly Roger v GE Commercial Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 290.

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signed by you …’. The company signed the memorandum but, before it had notified the acceptance to the customer, he withdrew his offer. It was held that there was no binding contract because, although the company had taken its own step to accept the customer’s offer, it had never communicated that acceptance to the customer.

Prescribed mode of acceptance 3.46  Mode of communication prescribed by offeror. An offeror may expressly prescribe the method of communicating acceptance or a deadline for acceptance.385 It is also possible for a mode of communication to be inferred from the circumstances.386 There is, for instance, authority for the view that an offer by telegram was presumptive evidence of a desire for a prompt reply and that an acceptance sent by post may in such a case be treated as ineffective.387 In modern times, an emailed offer would require a prompt response unless some contrary indication is conveyed. The observance of the mode prescribed, expressly or impliedly, by the offeror obviously suffices to complete the agreement. Whether precise observance is necessary is, however, a matter of some controversy.388 For example, suppose that the offeror makes it clear that he or she expects an acceptance by post but the offeree in fact accepts by email. It would be odd, to say the least, if this faster mode of communication should result in there being no contract and there is authority that holds that a more expeditious mode of communication is effective.389 The result would, of course, be otherwise if the offeror had insisted that a reply should be sent by a particular method and by that method only.390 But even here the offeror may waive the necessity of following the exclusive method prescribed and allow a substitute.391 It was pointed out in Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd392 that the correct analysis in this situation is not waiver of the stipulated mode of acceptance but acceptance of a counter-offer.393 An offeror will need to use very clear language before a mode of acceptance will be treated by the courts as mandatory.394 385. In counting days, the day on which the offer is received is omitted: Ford v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455 citing Prowse v McIntyre [1961] HCA 79; (1961) 111 CLR 264. 386. See Kennedy v Thomassen [1929] 1 Ch 426; [1928] All ER Rep 525. 387. Quenerduaine v Cole (1883) 32 WR 185. See also the observations of Griffith CJ in Howard Smith & Co v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68 at 79. 388. The particular circumstances may dictate that precise acceptance is mandatory. See Redowood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 32 discussed in 3.26. 389. Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT 271; Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd (1974) 2 NSWLR 617; SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 at [50] (Barrett J). 390. See, for example, Diakogiannis v Johnson (1989) NSW ConvR 55-472 (option exercised before specified date; held not an effective exercise of the option); Rushton (SA) Pty Ltd v Holzberger [2003] QCA 106 (precise notice requirements not followed). 391. See the difficult case of Compagnie de Commerce et Commission SARL v Parkinson Stove Co [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 487 discussed by Eckersley, ‘Illusory Consent’ (1954) 17 MLR at 476–7. See also Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v  Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 at 245–6 (Buckley J) (waiver of stipulated mode of acceptance). See  on the whole subject the article by Professor Winfield entitled ‘Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance’ (1939) 55 LQR 499 at 515–16. 392. [1959] SR (NSW) 122 at 123–4. Followed in BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-a-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589. See also 3.69 on conditional options. 393. See Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101, where it was held that an option exercised out of time but nevertheless accepted by the other party was effective to create a new lease. De Jersey J thought that the exercise of the option in this way was in truth a counter-offer: at 106. 394. JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v  Matos [2016] QCA 355 (in an option standard contract was stipulated, referring to 8th edition; option exercised using 10th edition; held ineffective exercise of option); George Hudson Holdings Ltd v Rudder (1973) 128 CLR 387. Compare Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Kosta (1969)

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Alternatively, an apparently mandatory mode of acceptance may be modified by the operation of an estoppel.395 In FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Parras,396 the New South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider whether an option to renew a lease had been properly exercised. The lease included both a clause for exercising the option (which was complied with) and a general clause for sending notices (which was not complied with). It was held the notice clause did not qualify the exercise of option clause but that failure to comply with the notice clause sounded in damages. The damages were the cost of litigation! Cases involving the exercise of an option have reflected the flexible approach outlined above.397 That is, unless the language used is framed in mandatory terms,398 whether an option has been exercised is tested objectively and according to common sense.399 It is certainly necessary for the exercise to be unequivocal and not qualified in some way400 but this does not mean that a court will take a magnifying glass to the conduct of the grantee of the option.401 Instead, the court’s task is to ascertain whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the grantor of the option would conclude that the grantee had intended to exercise the option.402 Judges will differ about how strict an approach to this issue is appropriate.403

14 FLR 343 (notice exercising option required to be sent by registered mail. Notice sent by ordinary mail not effective). Similarly, in Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1959] SR (NSW) 122, the terms of an option had to be strictly complied with. On the other hand, in Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 617, Wootten J held that an option offer that required the offeree to give ‘notice in writing to be sent by pre-paid registered mail’ could be accepted by communication by ordinary mail that arrived within the stipulated time limit. Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 is to the same effect (in that the contractual stipulation was not regarded as the exclusive method by which an option could be exercised) except in that case the posted exercise of the option never arrived and was not effective because the express stipulation displaced the operation of the postal rule. 395. Westpac Banking Corporation v Kurobe Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 537 at [36]–[53] (Pembroke J). 396. (2002) 55 NSWLR 498; [2002] NSWCA 334. 397. See also 3.70. 398. For example, Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445, where the exercise of an option required ‘return’ of an executed contract. This was not satisfied by posting it. 399. Even where the language is expressed in mandatory terms, the parties may conduct themselves so as to renew by some other method, as in Weemah Park Pty Ltd v Glenlaton Investments Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 150. In this case there was no resort to an estoppel argument. 400. Quadling v Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192 at 200–1 (Gibbs J); Hagerty v Hills Central Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 200 purported exercise of option requested longer settlement period; held not an exercise of the option. This decision is criticised by Angyal (2019) 93 ALJ 346. 401. The approach is very much one of substance over form, that is, the application of the objective test to ascertain whether the option has been accepted (‘exercised’). See the discussion by Kirby P in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Health Minders Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 673 at 677 and by Stein JA in Young v Lamb [2001] NSWCA 225 at [15]–[31]. 402. Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at 126 (Isaacs J). See the interesting discussion of ‘the commercially sensible construction’ approach by Butt, ‘Exercising Option to Renew Lease’ (1998) 72 ALJ 662. He refers to the decision in Bava Holdings Pty Ltd v Pando Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,295, in which the flexible approach was discussed and applied. Santow J drew on the House of Lords’ statement of principle on interpretation of commercial documents in Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 and Lord Hoffmann’s five-point summary in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich BS [1998] 1 WLR 896. 403. As illustrated by the 2–1 split in Whitegum Petroleum Pty Ltd v Bernadini Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 229, where the majority (Buss JA, Murphy JA concurring) took a flexible approach and Newnes JA in dissent took a strict approach. The exercise of the option required two notices. The second notice was flawed but its intent, according to the majority, was obvious and so effective. See commentary on this case by Butt, ‘Exercise of Option: Choose Your Words Carefully’ (2011) 85 ALJ 263. Compare JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v Matos [2016] QCA 355 (in an option standard contract was stipulated, referring to 8th edition; option exercised using 10th edition; held ineffective exercise of option).

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If an offeror stipulates a mode of acceptance that could result in mistaken acceptance, then a court may be inclined to hold that there is no contract even though the stipulated act has occurred. The same concern expressed in cases involving acceptance by silence — that it is not possible to foist a contract on another — can be seen in cases of this kind. In Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd,404 an offer of settlement contained a cheque and the offeror stipulated that banking the cheque would constitute acceptance. The offeree’s solicitor paid the cheque into its trust account without the knowledge of the offeree. Almost immediately, on realising its mistake, it communicated to the offeror that the banking of the cheque was not intended to be acceptance. It was held that there was no acceptance.405

Instantaneous modes of communication and electronic transactions 3.47  Where no mode of communication is prescribed: oral offers and other instantaneous modes of communication. If no particular method is prescribed, the form of communication will depend upon the nature of the offer and the circumstances in which it is made. If the offeror makes an oral offer to the offeree and it is clear that an oral reply is expected, the offeree must ensure that the acceptance is understood by the offeror. The risk of non-communication of an acceptance is on the acceptor. This rule — that acceptance is incomplete until received and understood by the offeror — governs other modes of communication no less than discussions face to face. In Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp,406 the plaintiffs were a London company and the defendants were an American corporation with agents in Amsterdam. Both the plaintiffs in London and the defendants’ agents in Amsterdam had telex equipment whereby messages could be despatched by a teleprinter operated like a typewriter in one country and almost instantaneously received and typed in another. By this method the plaintiffs made an offer to the defendants’ agents to buy goods from them, and the latter accepted the offer by telex. The plaintiffs later alleged that the defendants had broken their contract and wished to serve a writ upon them. This they could do, although the defendants were an American corporation with no branch in England, provided that the contract was made in England. The defendants contended that they had accepted the offer in Holland and that the contract had therefore been made in that country. But it was held by the Court of Appeal that the parties were in the same position as if they had negotiated in each other’s presence or over the telephone, that there was no binding acceptance until it had been received by the plaintiffs, that this took place in London and that a writ could therefore be issued. Parker LJ, after reciting circumstances where expediency might demand another rule, said: So far as telex messages are concerned, though the dispatch and receipt of a message is not completely instantaneous, the parties are to all intents and purposes in each other’s presence just as if they were in telephonic communication, and I can see no reason for departing from the general rule that there is no binding contract until notice of the acceptance is received by the offeror. That being so, and since the

404. [1999] 1 NZLR 395. 405. See Currie, ‘Accord and Satisfaction by Way of Full Settlement Cheque’ (2011) 27 JCL 119. 406. [1955] 2 QB 327; [1955] 2 All ER 493. See also Aviet v Smith and Searies Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 274; W A Dewhurst v Cawrse [1960] VR 278; and Hampstead Meat Pty Ltd v Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109.

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offer … was made by the plaintiffs in London, and notification of the acceptance was received by them in London, the contract resulting therefrom was made in London.407

Entores was adopted by the House of Lords in Brinkibon Ltd v  Stahag Stahl und StahlwarenhandelsgesellschaftmbH,408 that is, telex was treated as a form of instantaneous communication. Lord Wilberforce pointed out that the ruling in Entores ‘which has passed into the textbooks, including Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed (1957), appears not to have caused either adverse comment, or any difficulty to business men. I would accept it as a general rule’.409 His Lordship went on to say that treating telex as an instantaneous form of communication is not necessarily a universal rule. This is because circumstances and the intention of the parties may displace such an assumption, as where, for example: The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or upon the assumption, that they will be read at  a later time. There may be some error or default at  the recipient’s end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons. And many other variations may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases: they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie: see Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant 4 Ex D 216 at 227 per Baggallay LJ and Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27 per Lord Herschell.410

In New South Wales, Entores was followed in Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd,411 and other courts in Australia have adopted this approach to telex and other instantaneous communication such as fax and email.412 Thus, in such cases, the postal acceptance rule (see 3.60) is displaced. However, as made clear by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon, there are no hard and fast rules. In Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd,413 it was held that where an offer sent by telex contemplated a reply by telex using a public telex facility, then, by analogy with sending a telegram to which the postal rule applies,414 dictation of an acceptance over the telephone to a clerk of the public telex facility was the moment of acceptance. Communication by facsimile machine is no different in principle from telex. It is effectively an instantaneous mode of communication with the same possible combination of features noted by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon. Therefore, the general rule will apply, namely, that it is incumbent on the offeree to ensure that his

407. Ibid at 337; 498. See 3.58–3.62 as to negotiations conducted through the post. 408. [1983] 2 AC 34. 409. Ibid at 42. 410. Ibid. 411. [1981] 1 NSWLR 366. 412. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 at  [78]–[80] (Edelman J) (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224); Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12  VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at  [11]; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v  HamonSobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 413. [1986] WAR 244. 414. See 3.60.

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or her message has got through.415 It is suggested in 3.55 that the same applies to emails despite a superficial similarity to old-fashioned ‘snail mail’. It is worth comparing the cases on acceptance with cases of misrepresentation. It may be necessary to determine where a misrepresentation took place.416 The courts have adopted the same approach as in acceptance cases: it is where the communication is received that is determinative.

Electronic transactions 3.48  Electronic transactions and the internet.417 The use of various forms of electronic contracts and modes of communication is of great commercial importance, and the adaptation of the law of contract to accommodate these phenomena is necessary. This account is necessarily limited. The area warrants separate books.418 Bygrave examines the use of contract in the internet from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’. To the uninitiated it is quite surprising that the vast edifice is very largely established through contracts, including the establishment of a naming and numbering system419 and the myriad communications networks. Even apparently free services such as Google and Facebook are arguably contracts.420 The account in this treatment focuses on the ‘bottom’ end, that is, contracts with end users. The discussion of misleading conduct in Chapter  11, and other aspects of the Australian Consumer Law, are relevant to internet transactions, including the possibility that this law can apply to international transactions, such as buying goods or services on the internet.421 At the outset, it is worth making the point that the common law of contract has been very undemanding (or perhaps flexible) about how parties should make their contracts. The genius of the common law has been very largely to leave it to the parties to decide how, when and where they commit to contract and, of course, what they decide to include in their contract is, again, up to them, with some exceptions. We have seen in this chapter the law’s ability to respond flexibly to how people actually do business. For example, the apparently rigid offer and acceptance model

415. Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 416. See 11.114. 417. See  Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (2006) which provided guidance to business in dealing with consumers, published by the Commonwealth government; Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152; Nimmer, ‘The Legal Landscape of E-commerce: Redefining Contract Law in an Information Era’ (2007) 23 JCL 10; Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95; Morgan-Taylor and Willett, ‘The Quality Obligation and Online Market Places’ (2005) 21 JCL 155. 418. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (2015); Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015); Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce (2009), chs 3–5; Forder and Svantesson, Internet and E-commerce Law (2008); Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law: Technology, Law and Policy (2011). 419. By an agreement between a Californian corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the United States Government Department of Commerce. See Bygrave, ibid, ch 4. 420. Mik, ‘Problems of Intention and Consideration in Online Transactions’ at  6. See  also the withering attack on this type of contract: Torbert, ‘Because It Is Wrong: An Essay on the Immorality and Illegality of the Online Service Contracts of Google and Facebook’ (2020) . The unique ability of online providers to exploit and manipulate customers is the subject of an extensive analysis by Abdussalam, ‘Regulating Advantagetaking in the Formation and Renewal of Contractual Relations in the Technology Management Age: A Focus on Consumer Contracts’ (2021) 28 CCLJ 335. 421. See 11.114.

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of contract formation is not applied when it is inappropriate.422 Accordingly, the starting point with electronic modes of contracting is that the basic task of a court in dealing with an alleged contract arising out of such usage is to ascertain the intention of the parties as objectively determined.423 The method of contracting makes no difference to this axiom. It must be said that some strange and fanciful notions have emerged from the uneasy mix of law and technology. It has been suggested, for example, that computers or their operating systems are effectively legal persons in some applications and that machines (or their software) have ‘intentions’ or ‘decide’ or, conversely, lack the requisite intention required by the law of contract. These notions are incisively examined by Eliza Mik who ably explains the interaction of contract and technology.424

Email 3.49  The application of basic contract principles is borne out by the use of email. There is no reason why email should be treated as any different from other methods of communication. This is illustrated by Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd,425 where the vendor of a service station attempted unsuccessfully to argue that the email exchanges between the parties did not amount to a binding contract. Martin J dealt with the various issues by reference to established authorities. This was a sale of real property, but the Statute of Frauds writing and signature requirements426 were satisfied by the use of email, having regard to the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld) s 14. This legislation is further discussed below at 3.56.

Online auctions 3.50  Adaptation of contract rules. Online auctions are discussed at  3.22. Adaptations are necessary. For example, there is no auctioneer on eBay.

Shrink wrap, click wrap, etc 3.51  Electronic terms. Examples of the law’s (or at least United States law’s) ability to adapt are shown by the cases discussed in 3.7, namely, the use of ‘shrink wrap’ licences and ‘click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ agreements.427

422. See 3.4–3.7. 423. This is how the courts approached the task of determining the efficacy of faxes in contractual dealings. See discussion by Dorney, ‘The Use of the Facsimile Machine and Contractual Intention’ (1991) 4 JCL 243. 424. Mik, ‘From Automation to Autonomy: Some Non-existent Problems of Contract Law’ (2020) 36 JCL 205. Mik also uncovers the misconceptions associated with so-called ‘smart contracts’ showing that this label is a misleading misnomer: Mik, ‘Smart Contracts: A Requiem’ (2019) 36 JCL 70. See also Brown, ‘Limitations of Code in Contracts: What We Can Learn From the Plain English Movement’ (2019) 9(1) VULJ 57. 425. [2015] QSC 119. See Butt’s discussion of this case and another case, Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41, in ‘Writing Requirements and Email Contracts’ (2015) 89 ALJ 754. See also C&P Syndicate Pty Ltd v Reddy [2013] NSWSC 643 at [110]–[111] (Lindsay J); Kavia Holdings Pty Ltd v Suntrack Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 716 at [33] (Pembroke J) (contractual stipulation of notice in writing satisfied by email notice). 426. See 16.35, 16.40 and 16.43. See Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 2. 427. See Blount, ibid, ch 6.

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The courts also appear to be adaptable in their analysis of the relationships created by the use of credit and debit cards.428 Much depends on the particular transaction.429 If, in an internet transaction, the visitor to a website is asked to agree to terms and conditions by clicking an ‘I agree’ icon, it may be supposed that this constitutes contract formation.430 But this would not be so if agreeing to the terms was a step prior to selecting the goods or software for purchase, or providing credit card details was a necessary step after the terms and conditions had been viewed and agreed to. Commentators and courts generally try to draw parallels with existing contract principles,431 so that, for example, the mere presence of a website with products to sell is usually an invitation to treat.432 But it is not always possible to draw analogies from the real world in the cyber world. It is a common feature of electronic transactions that the user selects what he or she wants to do but the website will present a window that reiterates what the user wants to do as the last chance to withdraw. Internet banking is an example. Not until the last click on ‘OK’ is the transaction complete. Therefore, a good working rule is to assume that the last act is the definitive act in terms of committing to a transaction.433 The same may be applied to electronic contracts. Thus, a new contract formation rule may emerge for electronic transactions — the ‘last act’ rule whereby the last act is equivalent to acceptance.

Writing and signature 3.52  Electronic documents and signatures. Much of the focus of international developments in electronic commerce is on the requirements of writing and signature.434 Australian contract law does not generally require contracts to be in writing or to be signed: the formal requirements are minimal except in those contracts covered by specific legislation either derived from the Statute of Frauds435 or other legislation, such as consumer protection, deeds436 or intellectual property legislation. Readers using United States materials and analysis of electronic commerce should be aware that the Statute of Frauds provision (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201)

428. See  8.50 and the discussion of Re  Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch  497; [1988] 3 All ER 702; Commissioner of Taxation v American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122 at [97]. See Tucker, ‘Some Legal Issues Relating to Digital Cash on the Information Highway’ (1995) 6 JLIS 46. 429. See  Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197 at  198–200, where the author discusses formation rules in the light of the very interesting judgment in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 (affirmed [2005] 1 SLR 502). The case is discussed in 12.52. 430. See 3.26 and Macdonald, ‘Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting — Clicking “I Agree”’ (2011) 27 JCL 198, which focused on whether clicking ‘I agree’ is the same as signature. 431. See eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1768, where failure to post a crucial term meant that the term was not part of the contract. 432. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 104. This is confirmed by s 15B of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), and mirror state and territory provisions. Compare Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), 3.9 (display of terms and conditions on website can be an offer). 433. See the discussion by Rares J in eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1768, where, without close analysis (which was not required), it was assumed that the last act made the contract. 434. See discussion of the Electronic Transactions Acts at 3.56. 435. See Chapter 16. 436. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022).

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still applies to sale of goods transactions over $500,437 whereas this is not an issue in Australia except in Tasmania and Western Australia.438 Electronic signatures, which include facsimile signatures and secure encrypted ‘signatures’, are facilitated by the Electronic Transactions Acts.439 It is necessary to use a method to identify the person signing and to indicate that person’s intention of authentication in respect of the information communicated; and the method must be as reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic communication was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement. The relaxed attitude to the treatment of signature in Statute of Frauds cases440 is followed under this legislation.441 Electronic signatures may be convenient but, as with ordinary signatures, they can be abused. In Williams Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker,442 a party had for convenience established an electronic signature but it was used by someone else to execute a guarantee. The case was equivalent to a forgery case, and it was held that the signature was not effective. The establishing of the means to use an electronic signature did not amount to a representation sufficient for ostensible authority.

Virtual execution of documents 3.53  Electronic dealings. The United Kingdom Law Society issued a document in 2010 and revised in 2020 entitled ‘Execution of documents by virtual means’443 which deals with practices such as signing a contract or deed and then sending a pdf copy by email. This mode of contracting is acceptable. In Australia a similar acceptance of adaptation to electronic means of doing business has occurred.444 A group of law firms has issued a protocol in lieu of any law society initiative.445 In response to COVID-19, Commonwealth, state and territory legislatures introduced various measures, some temporary, to facilitate electronic transactions and other documents. The main focus was on deeds which, without legislative 437. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 1-206 (personal property not covered by other Statute of Frauds sections), § 8-319 (securities) and § 9-203 (security agreements). 438. See 16.77–16.87. The limit is still $20, following the 1677 figure of £10. 439. The discussion of this legislation below focuses on the Commonwealth Act. See s 10 of this Act, which is mirrored in the state and territory Acts. See Bolam and Choi, ‘Electronic Signatures: When Are They Effective?’ (2012) 15(7) Internet Law Bulletin 118; Moran, ‘The Law of Signatures: The Signs, They are a Changin’’ (2016) 19(2) Internet Law Bulletin 284. 440. See 16.40. 441. A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1; 295 ALR 197; [2013] HCA 3 at [21]–[24] (French CJ), [126]–[127] (Hayne J), [191]–[194] (Crennan and Kiefel  JJ); Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 at [34] (White J); Faulks v Cameron (2004) 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61 (printed ‘signature’ in email); Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220 at [80]–[83] (Le Miere J). 442. [2015] NSWSC 1907 confirmed on appeal: [2016] NSWCA 265. 443. . 444. See  the discussion of the electronic transactions legislation below. Although not relevant to contract execution, GetUp Ltd v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 189 FCR 165; 268 ALR 797; [2010] FCA 869 demonstrates such adaptation. It was there held that a facsimile signature on an enrolment application was valid under the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 445. See  The Walrus Committee, ‘Remote Signing Protocols for Financing Transactions’ (2015) 43 ABLR 497. See also D’Angelo, ‘“Split Executions” and s 127 of the Corporations Act 2001’, May/June 2015 Australian Banking & Finance Law Bulletin 89.

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intervention, must be on paper.446 Amendments to the Corporations Act  2001447 were made. This Act enables electronic documents, split executions448 and electronic signatures (including deeds) by companies. At state and territory level the position has been somewhat chaotic with a number of legislative measures (some temporary) dealing with a variety of types of documents.

Electronic data interchange 3.54  Automatic transactions. Electronic data interchange (EDI)449 or other forms of electronic commerce may be used to make contracts, usually in business-to-business transactions. EDI involves communication between computers. For example, a manufacturer and wholesaler may establish an EDI link whereby the wholesaler orders goods as needed. An order is automatically triggered when inventory reaches a certain level. An electronic message is sent from the wholesaler’s computer to the manufacturer’s computer specifying quantity, type, delivery date and place and any other relevant requirements. The order is processed automatically. A paperless contract is created with no human interaction.450 There are a number of legal issues that are generated by this form of communication. Generally, there are two contractual relationships: one between the user and the company that supplies the communication network — called a value-added network service (VANS); the other between the two parties who are buying and selling. The terms of the contract between the VANS and the user will specify where the risks of failure of the system lie. Clearly a failure or corruption in communication could cause losses to the users. If overseas experience is anything to go by, the contract with the VANS will exclude any liability for such failures.451 The VANS may be subject either to a statutory duty of confidentiality or a contractual one. The other contract, between the buyer and seller, raises the same issues as any other form of contracting. When and where is the contract made? Are requirements (if any) as to form satisfied? Who should bear the risk of miscommunication? If a dispute arises, how can the contract and its terms be proved? A majority of EDI links are established on the basis of trading partner (or interchange) agreements that attempt to spell out the terms of EDI communications before they commence. The aim of such agreements is twofold: to establish a set of technical rules to cope with the electronic medium; and to sort out legal issues such as the duties of, and risks borne by, the respective parties in the event of a failure of communication. Not all EDI contracts or other forms of electronic commerce are made against a background of one-to-one trading partner agreements. In Europe the tendency has 446. New South Wales legislated to allow electronic deeds in the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 6C and 38A. This is not a temporary COVID-19 amendment. Victoria has also permanently enabled electronic deeds: Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (Vic) s 12A. Queensland has enabled electronic deeds: Property Law Act 1974 ss 44–53B. These measures are fully discussed in Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 447. Sections  110–110B were added to mirror the electronic transactions legislation and ss  126–129 were modified. 448. Where two company officers sign different copies of the execution page. 449. Clarke, ‘Electronic Data Interchange (EDI): An Introduction’, . 450. See the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 15C and equivalent state and territory mirror provisions discussed below. 451. Walden (ed), EDI and the Law (1989), 50; Schneider, Electronic Commerce (12th ed, 2016).

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been to enter into group agreements. And many electronic transactions are made with no background agreement, such as by the use of email.

Other issues 3.55  Miscellaneous contract issues in electronic dealings. Electronic transactions can generate problems such as the ‘battle of the forms’452 which are no more easily solved in electronic transactions than they are in more conventional agreements. The inability to negotiate terms is as much a problem as it is in either face-to-face transactions or ordering by snail mail.453 Similarly, a ‘postal rule’ problem454 could arise but is probably dealt with by the electronic transactions legislation, discussed below. This may seem odd in the context of electronic communications but it arises because the network may include electronic ‘mailboxes’ that have to be ‘cleared’ from time to time. There are in fact two mailboxes, the sender’s and the recipient’s. A message is generated and deposited in the sender’s mailbox. It then is transferred to the recipient’s mailbox. The recipient periodically clears its mailbox. The question arises: when is the message effectively communicated? If the message is an acceptance of an offer, when is it effective? If an email is not an acceptance of an offer but, instead, has an attachment that is a letter of acceptance, is there then room for the operation of the postal acceptance rule? Ironically, the views expressed by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon (set out in 3.47) about instantaneous modes of communication may not be appropriate to electronic communication because it has some parallels with old-fashioned letters.455 It would be odd if the postal rule has a renaissance. It is suggested that custom in relation to electronic commerce should establish the rule that communication is essential and this would be a more sensible approach.456 The electronic transactions legislation discussed below deals with both dispatch and receipt of electronic communications. If an error or mistake is made as a result of, or in connection with, online or internet transactions, the normal contract rules apply.457 452. See 3.32. See also Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology 939 Fd 2d 91 (3d Cir 1991). 453. See Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152; Clapperton and Corones, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 ABLR 152. See also Chapter 15 for discussion of the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law. 454. See 3.60. 455. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 106–10, who argued, after a detailed examination of the issues (including what the technology has to offer by way of tracing communications), that emails should be treated as instantaneous modes of communication despite the fact that they sometimes are not. Mik suggests that the dichotomy between instantaneous and non-instantaneous communications should be abandoned: Mik, ‘The Effectiveness of Acceptance Communicated by Electronic Means, or — Does the Postal Acceptance Rule Apply to Email?’ (2009) 26 JCL 68. 456. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v  Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email). See  Hogan-Doran, ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The When and Where of On-line Contracts’ (2003) 77 ALJ 377 at 385; Mik, ‘The Effectiveness of Acceptance Communicated by Electronic Means, or — Does the Postal Acceptance Rule Apply to Email?’ (2009) 26 JCL 68. 457. See  Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197 at  198–200, where the author discusses formation rules in the light of the very interesting judgment in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 (affirmed [2005] 1 SLR 502). The case is discussed in 12.52. See also Ooi, ‘Contracts Formed by Software: An Approach from the Law of Mistake’ (2019) ; Ooi, ‘Rethinking Mistake in the Age of Algorithms’ (2020) where the author discusses Quoine Pte Ltd v  B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02. This case involved a fully automated trading algorithm that malfunctioned with the result trades were

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Problems arising out of international contracts may be difficult to resolve unless there is a choice of law and jurisdiction clause.458 The use of blockchain technology has the potential to transform some types of contracting.459 This has attracted a great deal of attention and raises issues that are beyond the scope of this book.460 Mention has been made of some misconceived reactions to this and other electronic technology.461 Other legal issues arising out of the use of electronic commerce are still to be tested in Australia. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 formed the basis for the electronic transactions legislation.462

The Electronic Transactions Acts 463 3.56  The legislation. A legislative scheme to facilitate electronic dealings has been implemented in Australia. The Commonwealth Act464 is substantially mirrored in the slightly more detailed state and territory legislation.465 All Acts were amended in 2011, under an agreement made by the Standing Committee of AttorneysGeneral, with new provisions having specific application to contracts. The Acts are supposed to be a ‘uniform legislative scheme’466 but, unfortunately, the Acts differ slightly, including in the numbering of sections. Further differences have emerged as a result of emergency legislative responses to COVID-19. In this treatment, the Commonwealth Act is principally examined with some reference to the state and

made at approximately 250 times the market value. Action was brought by a trader against the exchange operator which had reversed the trades despite a clause stating that this was not possible. The action was successful. The doctrine of mistake was inapplicable. A case note is also provided by Low and Mik, ‘Lost in Transmission: Unilateral Mistakes in Automated Contracts’ (2020) 136 LQR 563. 458. See  3.7, where it is pointed out that a choice of law clause may itself generate a problem of lack of accessibility to dispute resolution. 459. See Wang, ‘Blockchain and the Law’ (2016) 19(1) Internet Law Bulletin 250; Kiviat, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions’ (2015) 65 Duke LJ 569. 460. The possibility and actuality of contracts that are written in code, that is, ‘in turning contracts into what are, effectively, computer programs’ are discussed in a high-level overview of the complexities by Mik, ‘Contracts in Code?’ (2021) 13 Law, Innovation and Technology 478. 461. Mik, ‘Smart Contracts; A Requiem’ (2019) 36 JCL 70. See  also Bacon, Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (2017) which provides a very thorough guide to the technology and its legal implications; Singh and Michels, ‘Blockchain as a Service: Providers and Trust’ (2017) ; Cuccuru, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: An Early Overview on Smart Contracts’ (2017) 25 Int Jo of Law & Information Technology 179; Arachchi, ‘Chains, Coins and Contract Law: The Validity and Enforceability of Smart Contracts’ (2019) 47 ABLR 40; Reed, Sathyanarayan, Ruan and Collins, ‘Beyond BitCoin — Legal Impurities and Off-chain Assets’ (2017) ; Zetzsche, Buckley and Arner, ‘The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain’ (2017) . 462. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at  112–13, which discussed the UNCITRAL Model Law and European and United States initiatives. The Model Law was updated by the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005, which was the basis for the 2010–11 amendments to the Australian Electronic Transactions Acts. For background and critical commentary on this, see Mik, ‘“Updating” the Electronic Transactions Act? — Australia’s Accession to the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005’ (2010) 26 JCL 184. 463. See 3.57 for electronic conveyancing legislation. 464. Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 465. Electronic Transactions Act  2001 (ACT); Electronic Transactions Act  2000 (NSW); Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act  2001 (NT); Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act  2001 (Qld); Electronic Communications Act  2000 (SA); Electronic Transactions Act  2000 (Tas); Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic); Electronic Transactions Act 2011 (WA). 466. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Electronic Transactions Action (Amendment) Bill 2011 (Cth).

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territory legislation. Unless the context otherwise indicates, section  numbers are those of the Commonwealth Act. It is important to note that each Act contemplates the possibility of exemptions from the legislation, or parts thereof, provided for in regulations467 or in the Act itself.468 Most of the exemptions do not affect contracts as such. The exemptions are by no means uniform across Australia. For example, powers of attorney are exempted in the Northern Territory and enduring powers of attorney in Tasmania and Western Australia.469 It is therefore important to check the ‘local’ Act and regulations, particularly because regulations can be amended with relative ease. The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 provides: The object of this Act is to provide a regulatory framework that: (a) recognises the importance of the information economy to the future economic and social prosperity of Australia; and (b) facilitates the use of electronic transactions; and (c) promotes business and community confidence in the use of electronic transactions; and (d) enables business and the community to use electronic communications in their dealings with government.

The legislation provides that for the purposes of a law of the relevant jurisdiction,470 a transaction is not invalid because it took place by means of one or more electronic communications.471 This is the basic provision of the legislation. Thus, where a paperbased transaction has been traditionally used (whether because of legal requirement or otherwise), an electronic-based transaction is equally valid, unless there is an express exclusion of the application of the legislation under the Act or by regulation. Despite this provision, it is arguable that the basic provision does not facilitate electronic deeds (see below). Importantly, this basic provision does not apply to the Corporations Act 2001.472 Instead, the Corporations Act has been amended so as to enable electronic documents and signatures (including deeds) executed by companies.473 The following requirements imposed under a law of the Commonwealth can be met in electronic form: • •

a requirement to give information in writing (s 9); a requirement to provide a signature (s 10);

467. The regulations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is not practical to set out the various provisions here. Readers should check the relevant regulations. 468. The Act does not apply to the practice and procedure of a court or tribunal or to the operation of the Evidence Act: s 7B. 469. See the Electronic Transactions Regulations in each jurisdiction. 470. In state and territory Acts (other than that of the Australian Capital Territory) a law of the jurisdiction is defined as covering written or unwritten law, and excludes a Commonwealth law. See NSW: s 5; NT: s 5; Qld: Sch 2; SA: s 5; Tas: s 3; Vic: s 3; WA: s 5. 471. Cth: s 8; ACT: s 7; NSW: s 7; NT: s 7; Qld: s 8; SA: s 7; Tas: s 5; Vic: s 7; WA: s 8. 472. Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) Schedule item 23. In addition, the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 9–12, 14, 14A, 14B and 15 do not apply to the Corporations Act. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110–110B partly fill this gap. These sections only deal with technology-neutral signing. 473. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110, 110A, 110B and 126–129.

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a requirement to produce a document (s 11); a requirement to record information (s 12(1)); and a requirement to retain a document (s 12(2)).

Because Commonwealth legislation mostly does not apply to contracts,474 these applications of the legislation are not directly relevant to most contracts. However, s  15E, introduced in 2011, applies s  8 (the basic provision) and ss  14, 14A and 14B (time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications) to contracts, that is, the application of these sections  is not limited to ‘a law of the Commonwealth’.475 Further, a new Pt 2A (ss 15A–15F) was added which is directly relevant to contracts (see below). Section 14 deals with the time of dispatch of electronic documents.476 Importantly, the parties are free to agree on these matters,477 but, in the absence of agreement, dispatch occurs at: •

•

the time when the electronic communication leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator; or if the electronic communication has not left an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator, the time when the electronic communication is received by the addressee.

Section  14 applies even if the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located is different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been dispatched under s 14B (see below). Section  14A deals with the time of receipt of electronic documents. Again, the parties are free to agree on these matters, but, in the absence of agreement, receipt occurs at: •

•

the time when the electronic communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee  at  an electronic address designated by the addressee; or where receipt of the electronic communication is at  another electronic address of the addressee, the time when both: 1. the electronic communication has become capable of being retrieved by the addressee at that address; and 2. the addressee  has become aware that the electronic communication has been sent to that address.

474. The exemptions found in the Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) include various insurance Acts and consumer credit laws. Yet the Consumer Credit Code s  187 specifically provides that the Electronic Transactions Act can apply. 475. As noted, ss 9–12, 14, 14A and 14B and 15 do not apply to the Corporations Act: Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) Schedule item 23. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110–110B which only deal with technology-neutral signing. 476. Rock Solid Surfaces Pty Ltd v Biesse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 42 at [22]–[25] (Gilmour J). 477. See, for some practical advice about managing risks, Hayford, ‘Hit “Send” and Hope? Reducing Your Risks When Using Email for Contractual Communications’ (2008) 122 Aus Construction Law Newsletter 32 (available on Austlii).

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Section 14A(2) provides that it is to be assumed that the electronic communication is capable of being retrieved by the addressee  when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address. Section  14A applies even if the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located is different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been received under s 14B (see below). Section 14B deals with place of dispatch and receipt. Unless otherwise agreed: • •

the electronic communication is taken to have been dispatched at the place where the originator has its place of business; and the electronic communication is taken to have been received at the place where the addressee has its place of business.478

Subsections 14B(2)–(4) then deal with various situations concerning where a place of business is located. Part 2A applies directly to contracts. Section 15A provides that Pt 2A applies to the use of electronic communications in connection with the formation or performance of a contract between parties where the proper law of the contract is (or would on its formation be) the law of the jurisdiction. Section 15B then provides that a proposal to form a contract on an internet site or other form of electronic communication addressed to the world at large is treated as making an invitation to treat unless the wording clearly indicates an offer. This includes a process where there are interactive applications for the placement of orders. Section 15C provides that a contract formed by the use of an automated message system, including where no natural person is involved (as with EDI, discussed above) is not invalid, void or unenforceable on the sole ground that no natural person reviewed or intervened in each of the individual actions carried out by the automated message system or the resulting contract. Section  15D deals with input errors when dealing with an automated message system that does not provide a person with an opportunity to correct the error. Such a person has the right to withdraw the portion of the electronic communication in which the input error was made. This is done by the person notifying the other party of the error as soon as possible after having learned of the error and indicating that he or she made an error. This is subject to the person not having used or received any material benefit or value from the goods or services, if any, received from the other party. It seems that this can apply to an erroneous acceptance, for example, clicking the ‘I agree’ icon. The section specifically includes ‘an offer and the acceptance of an offer’. Nevertheless, subs (3) provides that ‘the right of withdrawal of a portion of an electronic communication under this section is not of itself a right to rescind or otherwise terminate a contract’. A note to this section states the obvious point that aborting the transaction will usually be sufficient, but this would not be so if the 478. The question of where and when an electronic communication is deemed to be received is by no means straightforward. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 114–22. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 at [78]–[80] (Edelman J) (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224) discussed in 11.114.

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person has in error carried out the last act, such as clicking ‘OK’. Notifying an error is clearly difficult without a possibility of dialogue. Some websites meet this problem by offering a chat icon. Section 15E, as already discussed, applies the basic provisions479 to contracts, that is, they are not confined to a statutory law of the jurisdiction. Section 15F makes clear that the operation of the Commonwealth Act should not override any state or territory legislation under s 109 of the Constitution. By contrast to Commonwealth legislation, state and territory legislation contains many laws stipulating writing requirements in contracts.480 Each Electronic Transactions Act speaks of the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. As already noted, it is essential to scrutinise the relevant regulations to see whether the provisions of the legislation are excluded from certain types of contracts. For example, it could be expected that consumer protection legislation that typically requires a consumer to be furnished with a written copy of the contract would require hard copy unless an electronic copy is adequate to provide the information.481 Although not free from doubt, it is probably the case that this legislation does not apply to facilitate the use of electronic deeds.482 The argument is complicated, and is set forth elsewhere.483 The main point is that this legislation supports the substitution of electronic means for writing. A deed must not only be in writing but must also be on paper. The legislation does deal with paper, but only in the context of producing and retaining documents.484 The legislation refers to ‘contracts’ but not deeds. There is also the difficulty, but not impossibility, of attesting an electronic document. 3.57  ‘Exchange’ of land contracts485 by electronic means.486 The High  Court in Sindel v Georgiou487 specifically approved the English Court of Appeal decision in Domb v Isoz488 in so far as it dealt with exchange of contracts by telephone in land sales.489 Of course, these cases were dealing with hard-copy contracts.490 In each case it was recognised that there could be a constructive exchange. For this to happen both parts must in fact have been signed and each part must be in the physical control of one or other of the solicitors.491 Buckley LJ said: 479. Sections 8, 14, 14A, 14B. 480. For example, a requirement of a note or memorandum in writing under the Statute of Frauds provisions would be satisfied by an email, even one not printed out. See  16.35. In New South Wales, s 23C but not s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) is exempted in the Regulations. In South Australia, all legislation dealing with writing requirements for interests in land are exempted by the Regulations. 481. Compare Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41, where a PowerPoint version of the terms and conditions sufficed for ‘written’ terms. The court did not resort to the electronic transactions legislation. 482. As noted above, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria have enabled electronic deeds. Electronic deeds executed by companies are separately enabled under the Corporations Act ss 110, 110A, 110B and revised s 127. 483. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.28]. 484. Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 11, 12(2). 485. See also 3.10, 3.33. 486. As to making a pdf copy of a signed contract and sending as an attachment to email, see 3.53. 487. (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 666. 488. [1980] Ch 548. 489. See conveyancing note Skapinker, ‘Telephone Exchange of Contracts — New South Wales Experience’ (1988) 62 ALJ 639. 490. For emails, see 3.49 and 3.61. 491. [1980] Ch 548 at 564 (Templeman LJ). This would cover the situations where both parts are in the hands of one solicitor or each part is in the hands of the respective solicitors. See the remarks of Young J in Henderson v Hopkins (1988) ANZ ConvR 229 at 231.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Exchange of a written contract for sale is in my judgment effected as soon as each part of the contract, signed by the vendor or the purchaser as the case may be, is in the actual or constructive possession of the other party or of his solicitor. Such possession need not be actual or physical possession: possession by an agent of the party or of his solicitor, in such circumstances that the party or solicitor in question has control over the document and can at any time procure its actual physical possession will, in my opinion, suffice.492

These conditions were not satisfied in Henderson v Hopkins,493 in which a secretary agreed to an exchange by telephone without understanding its significance. Further, one of the party’s solicitors did not have possession of one part nor was one part in complete form. Exchanging contracts by fax attracts the same requirements as exchanging by telex, that is, fax is a more or less instantaneous mode of communication, which means that the message will not be effective until it is actually received. The risk of non-communication falls on the sender. Thus, in the usual case, the purchaser’s solicitor sends a signed contract by fax ‘by way of exchange’. The vendor’s solicitor then sends back a signed contract and the contract is formed when the purchaser’s solicitor receives the vendor’s part. Fax is a more satisfactory way to exchange than by post, because there is still doubt in relation to post whether the acceptance occurs when the vendor’s part is posted or when it arrives.494 No such doubt arises with fax. It could never be argued, for example, that a fax that has been sent but which has not arrived could be an effective acceptance. The same principles should apply to exchange of contracts by email.495 The uniform Electronic Conveyancing National Law496 s  9(1) provides that a registry instrument that is in a form in which it can be lodged electronically under s 7 has the same effect as if that instrument were in the form of a paper document, and s 9(2) facilitates the use of digital signatures. Section 9(3) provides: If a registry instrument is digitally signed in accordance with the participation rules applicable to that instrument: (a) the instrument is to be taken to be in writing for the purposes of every other law of this jurisdiction, and (b) the requirements of any other law of this jurisdiction relating to the execution, signing, witnessing, attestation or sealing of documents must be regarded as having been fully satisfied.

A registry instrument is defined as any document that may be lodged under the land titles legislation for each jurisdiction. This depends on titles office practice.

492. [1980] Ch 548 at 557. 493. (1988) ANZ ConvR 229. 494. See 3.10. 495. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email). 496. The text can be seen in the Appendix  to the Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW).

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.60

The postal acceptance rule 3.58  Communications through the post. If no particular method of communication is prescribed and the parties are not in each other’s presence, the rule that an acceptance speaks only when it is received by the offeror may be impracticable or inconvenient. Such may well be the case where the negotiations have been conducted through the post. The question as to what in these circumstances is an adequate communication of acceptance arose as early as 1818 in the case of Adams v Lindsell.497 The plaintiffs were woollen manufacturers in Bromsgrove, Worcestershire. The defendants were wool-dealers at St Ives in Huntingdon. On 2 September 1817, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs, offering a quantity of wool on certain terms and requiring an answer ‘in course of post’. The defendants misdirected their letter, which did not reach the plaintiffs until the evening of 5 September. That same night the plaintiffs posted a letter of acceptance, which was delivered to the defendants on 9 September. If the original offer had been properly addressed, a reply could have been expected by 7 September and meanwhile, on 8 September, not having received such a reply, the defendants had sold the wool to third parties. The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiffs on the ground that the delay was due to the defendants’ negligence, and the defendants obtained a rule nisi for a new trial. The vital question was whether a contract of sale had been made between the parties before 8 September. Two cases only were cited by counsel498 and none by the court, and it was treated virtually as a case of first impression. 3.59  Three possible solutions. As an academic problem, three possible answers were available. An offer made through the post might be regarded as accepted in the eyes of the law: 1. as soon as the letter of acceptance is put into the post; 2. when the letter of acceptance is delivered to the offeror’s address; or 3. when the letter of acceptance is brought to the actual notice of the offeror. If the first answer were adopted, no further question would arise upon the facts in Adams v Lindsell. The contract was completed on 5 September. If either of the other solutions were adopted, the problem is complicated. As the law is now understood, the plaintiffs would have succeeded on any of these theories, since the defendants’ offer would not be revoked by their sale to third parties on 8 September.499 But in 1818 there were no developed rules as to revocation of offers, and the court may well have thought it arguable that the sale was sufficient to revoke500 so that the effective acceptance would need to take place before 8 September. 3.60  Solution in Adams v Lindsell: acceptance complete when posted. Each answer offers a practical solution, not one compelled by logical necessity, and the choice is

497. (1818) 2 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250. 498. Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502; Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785. In Tooth v Fleming (1859) 2 Legge 1152 (see 3.60), no cases were cited on this point either by counsel or by the court. 499. See 3.42. 500. This view was current as late as Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463.

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3.60

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

arbitrary. The German legal system, for example, prefers the second solution.501 The Court of King’s Bench in Adams v Lindsell preferred the first. There was a sufficient act of acceptance when the plaintiffs put their letter into the post on 5 September. The solution adopted in Adams v Lindsell (which also applied to telegrams)502 may be explained not so much by reference to the court, for practical reasons, making an exception to the rule that acceptance must be communicated, so much as the court operating without rules to guide it. Adams v Lindsell was the first genuine offer and acceptance case in English law,503 and in 1818 there was no rule that acceptance must be communicated. Thus, the exception preceded the rule. The decision was undoubtedly potentially troublesome.504 So long as it was felt, with whatever reservations, that there could be no contract without a ‘meeting of the minds’, there was a natural reluctance to admit the existence of an agreement merely because a letter of acceptance had been put into the post. Before it reached the offeror, either party might have changed his or her mind.505 On the other hand, the second and third solutions are also troublesome because they would require further communications once the letter of acceptance had arrived, either by the offeror contacting the offeree to indicate that the letter of acceptance had arrived or by the offeree contacting the offeror to ascertain the same.506 A further reason for adopting the first solution was emphasised by Mellish LJ, who stressed the ‘very mischievous consequences’ of adopting either of the alternative solutions: No mercantile man who has received a letter making him an offer, and has accepted the offer, could safely act on that acceptance after he has put it into the post until he knew that it had been received … [A]ccording to the argument presented to us, if the person who has sent the offer finds that the market is falling, and that it will be a bad bargain for him he may, at any time, before he has received the answer, revoke his offer.507

The rationale for the rule has been characterised as the ‘pragmatic necessity of having a rule of some sort, and that rule being no worse than any alternative’.508 As early as 1859 the Supreme Court of New  South  Wales had no hesitation in adopting the first solution509 and, subject to what is said below, the postal acceptance 501. See Winfield, ‘Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance’ (1939) 55 LQR 499 at 506–7. But note that some of the effect of this difference between the two systems is cancelled by the rule of German law that an offer (unless expressed to be revocable) is binding on the offeror for a reasonable time even before acceptance. See Nussbaum, ‘Comparative Aspects of the Anglo American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine’ (1936) 36 Col LR 920 and Samek, ‘A Reassessment of the Present Rule Relating to Postal Acceptance’ (1961) 35 ALJ 38. 502. Cowan v O’Connor (1888) 20 QBD 640. 503. Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 LQR 247 at 260. 504. In The British & American Telegraph Co Ltd v  Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 at  119, Bramwell B remarked: ‘If it should be argued that convenience requires such a rule, as otherwise persons might untruly deny the receipt of letters, the answer is, that if such a rule prevailed persons would untruly assert the posting of them.’ 505. See Thesiger LJ in Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 220; [1874–80] All ER Rep 919 at 922. 506. Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 at 595 (Mellish J quoting from Adams v Lindsell). 507. Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 at 594. 508. Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at [145] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring). 509. Tooth v Fleming (1859) Legge 1152 at 1156 (Stephen CJ speaking for the Full Court). See also Patterson v Dolman [1908] VLR 354 and the observations of Lindley J in Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) LR 5 CPD 344 at 348; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432 at 1435.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.61

rule has become the law in Australia.510 It applies to acceptance only, and is not a general rule about the use of the post.511 The solution in Adams v  Lindsell is particularly troublesome if the letter of acceptance is either delayed or does not arrive through no fault of the sender. Despite strong protestations in British & American Telegraph about the unfairness that could result from holding someone to a contract of which he or she is ignorant, the accepted position now is that posting a letter that never arrives is an effective acceptance so long as the circumstances are appropriate for the application of the postal rule, that is, the rule has not been displaced by express provision of the offeror or by implication.512 If the letter does not arrive because it was not properly addressed or because of some other failing on the part of the sender, then the postal rule does not apply.513 One possible justification for the postal acceptance rule is that the postal authority is an agent for the recipient. This argument has been rejected.514 Although the postal rule has been accepted in Australia, there is one pronouncement from the High  Court that could be taken to support a communication rule, that is, that acceptance through the post is effective when the letter arrives, unless the parties have specified otherwise. In Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd,515 Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said, having pointed out that the general rule is that a contract is not completed until an acceptance has been actually communicated, that the postal rule will only apply if it can be ‘inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended that his offer might be accepted by the doing of that act’, that is, posting. It is certainly arguable that in most circumstances an offeror would not contemplate and intend that acceptance should be effective upon posting because non-lawyers do not generally know about the postal rule and would probably be surprised when informed of it. Despite this argument, Bowen CJ in Bressan v Squires did not interpret the High Court judges to be putting forward a general rule in opposition to the postal rule.516 3.61  Exclusion of the postal rule. It needs to be stressed that the rule may be displaced either expressly by the offeror, or by inference from the circumstances of negotiation,517 or where the application of the rule would lead to manifest 510. Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at [11] (Charles JA, Ashley JA concurring). 511. Wardle v  Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [145]–[147], [212]–[217] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring) (payment by cheque through the post). The rule does not apply to revocation of offer: see 3.65. 512. Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v  Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216; Georgoulis v Mandelinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 at 616 (Hutley JA), 619 (Glass JA). Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 is an example of a case where a letter never arrived but the terms of the option displaced the operation of the postal rule so that the purported exercise of the option was ineffective. As to exclusion of the postal rule, see 3.61. 513. Getreide-Import-GesellschaftmbH v  Contimar SA Compania Industrial Comercial y Maritima [1953] 1 WLR 207. 514. Wardle v  Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [141]–[144] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring). See also Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 393. 515. (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111. 516. [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 462. See also Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [134]–[135] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring); Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at [11]; Lewis Construction Co Pty Ltd v Tichauer SA [1966] VR 341. 517. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111 (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J); Hinkley v De Vries (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1049 (Gzell J); Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan

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3.61

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

absurdity or inconvenience.518 It has not been applied to instantaneous modes of communication, such as telex, fax and email.519 In Bressan v Squires,520 the Supreme Court of New South Wales followed Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes521 and held that the words ‘notice in writing addressed to me’ in an option displaced the operation of the postal rule and that actual notice was therefore required.522 In both these cases it was said that the statutory notice provisions governing property dealings523 applied to the exercise of an option so that, in the absence of a contrary intention, actual rather than deemed communication is required in land transactions.524 In some offers, particularly in options, it is specified in the document that the post is the appropriate mode of acceptance and the offer states that notice of acceptance will be deemed to be delivered in due course of the post or some similar phrase. In such cases the offeree must send the letter so that, in the ordinary course of post, it will arrive before expiry of the offer525 and, if registered or certified post is stipulated, must send the letter by that means if the clause is to operate.526 The ordinary course of post is determined by what would normally be the expected delivery time. The fact that the offeror is not open for business on the day specified does not prevent effective acceptance of the offer.527 In the discussion of email communications in 3.55, the possibility of the postal acceptance rule applying to exchange of emails is canvassed. It is suggested that, because emails are more or less instantaneous and the electronic transactions legislation deals with time of dispatch and time of arrival, the postal acceptance rule is inappropriate.528

Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445 (MacKenzie J); Lew Footwear Holdings Pty Ltd v  Madden International Ltd [2014] VSC 320 at [137]–[156] (Elliott J). 518. See the examples given by Bramwell B in British & American Telegraph Co v Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 at 118. See also Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 WLR 155 at 161; [1974] 1 All ER 161 at 167. 519. See 3.47 and 3.48–3.56. 520. [1974] 2 NSWLR 460. 521. [1974] 1 WLR 155; [1974] 1 All ER 161. 522. The decision was a near thing. Bowen CJ stressed that ‘the matter is largely one of impression’ [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 463. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74, the words ‘receipt by us of an identical part’ were held to displace the operation of the postal rule. In Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235, a clause stipulating that a notice sent by registered or certified post will be deemed to have been delivered, though not held to be the exclusive means by which notice could be sent, nevertheless impliedly excluded the operation of the postal rule. A notice had been sent by ordinary mail but it never arrived. Had it been sent by registered mail it would have been deemed to have arrived because of the contractual provision that dealt with registered mail. It was held that the express provision dealing with registered mail impliedly excluded the postal rule in relation to ordinary mail. 523. Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 170; Law of Property Act 1925 (UK) s 196. 524. Bressan [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 463; Holwell [1974] 1 WLR 155 at 161; [1974] 1 All ER 161 at 167. See also the discussion of a possible presumption that the postal rule does not apply to the exchange of identical parts in land sales by Hedigan J (without reaching a conclusion) in Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 at 81–2. 525. Lewes Nominees Pty Ltd v Strang (1983) 49 ALR 328; Alexander v Stocks & Holdings (Sales) Pty Ltd [1975] VR 843; Kudeweh v T & J Kelleher Builders Pty Ltd [1990] VR 701 at 708–9 (Ormiston J). 526. Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235. 527. Bowman v Durham Holdings Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8 (registered letter of acceptance of option held to be effective on Saturday although not delivered till Monday because postman knew office would be closed on Saturday). 528. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email).

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.62

3.62  May acceptance be recalled before it reaches offeror? May an offeree, perhaps by telephone or email, recall a letter of acceptance after it has been posted but before it has reached the offeror?529 A rigorous application of the postal rule would forbid him or her to do so: the contract is complete from the moment that the letter has been put into the post. The Scots case of Dunmore (Countess) v  Alexander530 is sometimes cited to support the view that the offeree may be allowed to withdraw. The countess on 5 November wrote to Alexander, accepting the latter’s offer to enter her service. On 6 November she wrote a second letter cancelling the acceptance. Both letters were delivered to Alexander at the same moment. The Court of Session held that the acceptance had been effectively withdrawn and that there was no contract. In New  Zealand, on the other hand, Chapman J denied the possibility of altering the effect of a letter of acceptance once it has been put into the post.531 The choice between these opinions must rest upon convenience rather than logic. It is possible for a person who has posted a letter to recover it. The effect of this on the postal acceptance rule has not yet been considered by an Australian court. However, in the United States of America, where there is a similar regulation, the Court of Claims has decided on two occasions that the postal regulation nullifies the acceptance on posting rule.532 It is not safe to assume that the Australian regulation will have an identical effect for two reasons. In the first place, the American regulation appears to confer an indefeasible right upon the sender of a letter to recover it at any time before delivery to the addressee533 whereas the Australian regulation merely vests a discretion in the postal authorities. Second, and perhaps because of the absolute nature of the sender’s right, the Court of Claims appears to have based its decisions on the fact that the Post Office Department is the agent of the sender534 who through it retains control of the letter of acceptance until it is delivered to the addressee. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v  Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd,535 a purchaser’s solicitor sent to a vendor’s solicitor a counterpart contract of sale executed by the purchaser. An accompanying letter made it clear that the vendor’s solicitor should hold the counterpart on the purchaser’s behalf until an identical part executed by the vendor was received by the purchaser’s solicitor. A week later the vendor’s solicitor posted an executed counterpart to the purchaser’s solicitor. The next day, before the vendor’s counterpart had arrived by post, the vendor’s solicitor told the purchaser’s solicitor by telephone that the acceptance was withdrawn. The purchaser argued that a contract was formed on posting of the counterpart by the vendor. It was held that the letter made it clear that the postal rule was displaced and that accordingly acceptance was not effective until the counterpart had arrived. 529. See Hudson, ‘Retraction of Letters of Acceptance’ (1966) 82 LQR 169. 530. (1830) 9 Sh (Ct of Sess) 190. It will be seen from the facts of the case that it was not a question of sending a telegram to recall a letter but of the simultaneous receipt of two letters. 531. Wenkheim v Arndt (1873) 1 NZ Jurist 73, though the decision may have been influenced by the fact that the revocation was dispatched by a third party who may have lacked authority to revoke the offer. 532. Dick v United States (1949) 82 Fed Supp 326 and Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417. 533. (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 at 419–20, cited by Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 392. 534. Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 at 420. 535. [1994] 1 VR 74.

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3.62

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

It was therefore open to the vendor to withdraw acceptance before that moment. This case does not deal with the issue discussed above, namely, whether a purported withdrawal of acceptance is effective when the postal rule is operative. If in Australia the acceptance on posting rule is purely one of commercial convenience, it is pertinent to ask, ‘whose convenience?’. Clearly it cannot be that of the offeror who under it remains in a state of uncertainty until he or she has actual knowledge of the acceptance. Indeed, as a learned writer has observed, if the offeror learns of the ‘revocation’ of the acceptance before the letter of acceptance is received, he or she in fact benefits from the earlier release from uncertainty.536 On the other hand, if, as appears more probable, the rule was evolved for the convenience of the offeree, then to allow him or her to revoke before the offeror is aware of the acceptance benefits the offeree without in any way prejudicing the offeror.

Termination of Offer 3.63  Various ways in which an offer may terminate. It is now necessary to consider the circumstances in which an offer may be terminated. We have already seen that it is possible for the offeree effectively to terminate an offer by rejecting it, either outright or by making a counter-offer: see 3.29. An offer may also be terminated if it is revoked by the offeror, it may lapse, or it may be affected by the death of one of the parties. An offer may lapse or not be capable of acceptance if it is subject to a condition which is not fulfilled: see 5.23.

Revocation 3.64  An offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. It has been established ever since the case of Payne v Cave537 that revocation is possible and effective at any time before acceptance: up to this moment no legal obligation exists. Nor, as the law stands, is it relevant that the offeror has promised to keep the offer open for a given period (sometimes referred to as a ‘validity period’).538 Such an undertaking is but part and parcel of the original offer which must stand or fall as a whole. The offeror may, of course, promise, by a separate and specific contract — an ‘option’ — to keep the offer open; but the offeree must, at  least according to traditional analysis,539 prove all the elements of a valid contract, including agreement and consideration, for there to be a valid option. In the words of Griffith CJ: But an offer may be withdrawn at  any time before acceptance. A mere promise to leave it open for a specified time makes no difference, because there is, as yet, 536. Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 396. 537. (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502. 538. GIO General Ltd v  Allen [2002] NSWCA 333 at  [10]–[11] (Hodgson JA — in the absence of deed, estoppel or an option, an offer — in this case a Calderbank offer — can be withdrawn despite a promise to keep it open). 539. It is possible that a court may be inclined, in appropriate circumstances, to hold that an offer is irrevocable through the operation of estoppel, that is, when the offeree has acted in reliance on the promise that the offer will be kept open for a certain time, using the reasoning in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See  2.23. Thus, a subcontractor’s quote may be irrevocable if it is relied on by a head contractor to win a tender. See Drennan v Star Paving Inc 333 P 2d 757 (Cal, 1958).

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.66

no agreement, and the promise, if made without distinct consideration, is nudum pactum and not binding. But if there is (as in the present case) a consideration for the promise it is binding. This is often expressed by saying that an option given for value is not revocable …540

The nature of options will be discussed below.541 3.65  Revocation of offer must be communicated. The revocation of an offer by an offeror is ineffective unless it has been communicated to the offeree542 or his or her agent.543 It is not enough for the offeror to change his or her mind. For some years, it is true, obsessed with the theory of consensus, the judges were content with the mere alteration of intention.544 But business convenience demanded a more stringent rule for revocation of offer than for acceptance. To post a letter could be a sufficient act of acceptance. The offeror, when he or she decided to revoke, could rely on no such rule. Thus, in Byrne v Van Tienhoven,545 the defendants posted a letter in Cardiff on 1 October, addressed to the plaintiffs in New York, offering to sell 1000 boxes of tinplates. On 8 October they posted a letter revoking the offer. On 11 October the plaintiffs telegraphed their acceptance and confirmed it in a letter posted on 15 October. On 20 October the letter of revocation reached the plaintiffs. It was held that the revocation was inoperative and that the offer, therefore, continued open and that it had been accepted by the plaintiffs. Lindley J, giving judgment for the plaintiffs, pointed out ‘the extreme injustice and inconvenience which any other conclusion would produce’. 3.66  What constitutes communication of revocation? The offeror, therefore, in revoking must communicate that decision. But it would seem that the offeror need not necessarily have furnished this information personally. In Dickinson v Dodds,546 the defendant, on 10 June, gave the plaintiff a written offer to sell a house for £800, ‘to be left over until Friday, 12 June, 9 am’. On Thursday, 11 June, the defendant sold the house to a third party, Allan, for £800, and that evening the plaintiff was told of the sale by a fourth man, Berry. Before 9 am on 12 June, the plaintiff handed to the defendant a formal letter of acceptance. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff, before attempting to accept, ‘knew that Dodds was no longer minded to sell the property to him as plainly and clearly as if Dodds had told him in so many words’, that the defendant had validly withdrawn his offer and that the plaintiff’s purported acceptance was too late. In Little v Trotman,547 it was held by the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court that the

540. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 at 678. 541. See 3.67. 542. IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205 at [1] (McPherson JA), [26] (Keane JA); Macquarie Generation v CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040 at [53] (Palmer J). 543. In IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205, McPherson JA at [2]–[3] and Keane JA at [32]–[37] make the point that a solicitor acting for the offeree is not an agent for this purpose unless expressly appointed as such. 544. See Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785 and Head v Diggon (1828) 3 Man & Ry (KB) 97. 545. (1880) 5 CPD 344; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432. See  also Stevenson Jacques & Co v  McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346 and Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; [1891–4] All ER Rep 908. 546. (1876) 2 Ch D 463. 547. (1885) 6 ALT 252.

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3.66

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question whether the prior sale had been communicated to the plaintiff before his acceptance was one of fact for the jury. The language of the judgments in Dickinson v Dodds reflects the persistence of the consensus theory and is not free from practical difficulty. Would the offeree in that case have been bound by any hint or gossip that he may have heard? All that can be said is that it is a question of fact in each case. Was the information such that a reasonable person should have been persuaded of its accuracy? Of course, if there was no reliable intimation that the offer was no longer open and it was accepted, the offeror would be twice bound: see 3.42. Finally, in relation to communicating a revocation of an offer, the problem of how this is to be done in a reward situation has received very little attention. If an offer of reward is made to the world, how is it to be withdrawn? The only authority on this question is an American case, Shuey v United States,548 where it was said that an offer will be effectively revoked if the same method that was used for advertising the offer was used for its revocation. This appears to require a positive notice of revocation (which may well be necessary in a case where the original offer was advertised in the press) but does not deal with the case where an offer of reward is simply displayed and then, after some time, taken down. Presumably, taking the notice down would constitute an effective revocation of the offer of reward contained in the notice.

Options, etc 549 3.67  Irrevocable offers, options and rights of pre-emption. Dickinson v Dodds550 illustrates that a bare promise to keep an offer open for a certain time is not binding. In traditional language, such a promise is a gift promise lacking consideration. It has already been seen in Chapter 2 on estoppel that the doctrine of consideration is now not the only basis for finding that a promise is enforceable. The fact that such a promise may raise expectations that are quite legitimate, or may cause the offeree to incur expenditure in reliance on the promise, has not deterred the courts in the past from declaring the offeror free to break the promise. But this view is now qualified, particularly in a case where there has been detrimental reliance and it would be unconscionable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise to keep the offer open.551 A court, tempted by this argument, would be reinforced by various suggestions for making promises to keep offers open for a certain time enforceable in the absence of consideration (called ‘firm offers’).552 No moves have been made to change the law in those Commonwealth countries whose common law is inherited from the United Kingdom.553 This is perhaps not surprising considering 548. 92 US 73 (1876). The case concerned a reward for the apprehension of an accomplice of Booth, President Lincoln’s assassin. 549. See Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010); Lücke, ‘Options’ (1968) 3(2) Adelaide LR 397 (available on Austlii). 550. See 3.66. 551. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. 552. See English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937) Cmnd 5449; English Law Commission Working Paper No 6: Firm Offers (1975); Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Sale of Goods (1979). 553. Contrast United States Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205 (a merchant who makes an offer said to be irrevocable in a signed document is bound to keep it open for the stated period). The Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 87 requires a signed document and a statement of a purported consideration. In addition, the contemplated exchange must be on fair terms.

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that an irrevocable offer may be a valuable asset in a rising market. Why, it may be asked, should a gift of such an asset554 be enforceable in this context when gift promises are otherwise not enforceable? The answer to this may be to argue, not for full enforceability of an offer declared to be irrevocable for a certain time, but for adequate compensation for a person who legitimately relies on the promise to his or her detriment.555 Such a solution may be possible either through the use of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law in appropriate cases556 or on the basis of estoppel557 but probably not negligence.558 The conventional way to make an offer irrevocable for a certain time — that is, to create an option — is for the offeree to pay (or promise to pay)559 usually a relatively small sum for the offeror’s promise. Alternatively, an option is sometimes created by providing for such in a contract, such as a lease whereby the lessee is able to exercise a right to renew the lease or to purchase the land or goods the subject of the lease at the end of the term. The consideration for an option in such a case is embodied in the original contract, one of the benefits of which is the option. A right of pre-emption — sometimes called a ‘first right of refusal’ — has been recognised judicially.560 Such a right is, as it were, one step back from an option. A promises B that, if A decides to sell (say) a block of land, A will first offer it to B. This kind of promise is enforceable so long as there is consideration for it561 or it is generated by estoppel.562 A’s obligation is to make a bona fide563 offer to B before offering it to someone else.564 There is no requirement that the terms of the offer must be agreed ahead of time.565 This right has been criticised for being vague — ‘a loose 554. The ‘asset’ is the difference in value of the subject-matter of the offer between the time of offer and the time of acceptance. 555. See, for example, the Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 87(2). Even so, the discussion of remedies in Chapter 2, particularly at 2.9, shows that the expectation interest may be protected by an estoppel. This would mean that the revocation of the offer would be ineffective. 556. See Chapter 11. 557. See Chapter 2 and Drennan v Star Paving Co 333 P 2d 757 (1958) (subcontractor’s quote used by head contractor in winning head contract; subcontractor held to its quote by estoppel). In Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171, estoppel was argued to make an offer irrevocable but, on the facts, did not succeed. 558. Holman Constructions Ltd v  Delta Timber Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 1081  at  1083 (Henry J), where an offeree building contractor unsuccessfully sought damages when a potential subcontractor withdrew an offer: ‘An offer is an offer and is not advice or information … The law on offer and acceptance is not to be qualified by some new duty of care …’. 559. Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120. 560. Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245; Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53 at 58 (Megarry J); Smith v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803; Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321 (Zelling J) and 339 (FC); see also Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) (1986) 45 SASR 57 (discussion of damages for breach of first right of refusal); Commonwealth v Hooper (1992) 2 Aust Contract Reporter 90-010. 561. In Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321, Zelling J held that a right of pre-emption was embodied in a collateral contract. 562. United Petroleum Pty Ltd v Pentaco Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (2016) FCA 118. Misleading conduct was also successfully argued in this case. 563. Smith v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803; Transfield Properties (Kent Street) Pty Ltd v Swift Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 321; Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd v  Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 510 at 522–9 (Young J); Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 at [39]–[54] (Croft J). 564. In Wesoky v  Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32, an obligation to provide a nonrecourse loan ‘subject to the mutual agreement of both parties’ was held to impose an obligation to make an offer, and Merkel J was prepared to set out the terms on which the offer should be made. 565. Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [266] (Gordon J).

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and colloquial expression’566 — and it is essential for the party granting the right to be absolutely clear.567 The existence of a right of pre-emption can generate some difficult questions, including interpretation of the clause, what constitutes a bona fide offer, whether the right is proprietary, whether it generates a right to equitable remedies and whether it could amount to a restraint on alienation.568 A transfer in breach of a right of pre-emption is effective569 and the innocent party must seek a remedy in damages or, possibly, a remedy that recognises that it has an equitable proprietary right arising from the grant of a right of pre-emption.570 It is misleading conduct to sell a property that is subject to a right of pre-emption without disclosing the right.571 3.68  Nature of option — competing theories. Although options are very common, particularly in land dealings, the legal nature of an option has been a ‘standing controversy’572 for over a hundred years. There are two theories: an option is an irrevocable offer that may be accepted at  any time during the period specified; alternatively, an option is a conditional contract, usually of sale573 or lease.574 It seems that the particular wording of the option is not necessarily determinative of the court’s choice.575 566. Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245 at 258 (Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 567. See  extensive discussion by Bryson JA, including of American cases, in Goldmaster Homes Pty Ltd v Johnson [2004] NSWCA 144 at [17]–[39]; by Giles JA in Moraitis Fresh Packaging (NSW) Pty Ltd v Fresh Express (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 327 (restraint on alienation also discussed); and by Croft J in Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 at [37]–[44]. See also John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc [2004] SASC 128 (very elaborate clause unsuccessfully challenged for uncertainty and for amounting to an illegitimate restraint on alienation); Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 at [56]–[68] (Tamberlin J) (use of ‘preferred supplier’ does not confer a right of pre-emption). See also Sahade v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 512, where Campbell J discussed the possibility of a right of pre-emption becoming an equitable interest in land; Octra Nominees Pty Ltd v Chipper [2007] FCAFC 92 (once offer made and refused no requirement to make a new offer even though sale to third party is on different terms). 568. See the extensive discussion by Whelan J in Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. See also Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010), chs 1, 7–9. 569. Reef & Rainforest Travel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (2002) 1 Qd R 683; [2001] QCA 249 at [10] (McPherson JA, Thomas and Muir JJA concurring). Compare Hunter v Hunter [1936] AC 222 not followed by Whelan J in Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. See discussion in 8.8 of prohibition of assignment and breach of such a provision. 570. Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. 571. Colliers Jardine (NSW) Pty Ltd v Balog Investments Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-140; [1996] ANZ ConvR 527; Mikaelian v CSIRO (1999) 163 ALR 172. 572. Dixon CJ in Braham v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 at 376. 573. That is, the optionee/grantee has a choice to buy (a ‘call’ option). A ‘put’ option confers a choice on the owner to require the other party to buy. 574. The cases in which various courts have expressed different views on the two theories of option are too numerous to list. The leading cases are: Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v  Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 (conditional contract, Griffith CJ and O’Connor J; irrevocable offer, Isaacs J); Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (conditional contract); Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v  Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 (irrevocable offer); Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 (conditional contract); Braham v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 (controversy discussed by Dixon CJ); Johnson v Bones [1970] 1 NSWR 28 (irrevocable offer); Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja [1970] 1 NSWR 526 (irrevocable offer); Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 (conditional contract, Gibbs J); O’Halloran Enterprises Pty Ltd v Farr [1979] VR 33 (irrevocable offer); Karaguleski v Vasil Bros & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 267 (irrevocable offer); David Deane and Assocs Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 270 (contract of sale so that agent was able to earn commission). Compare Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 23 (Leeming and Payne JJA held that an agent who secured options was not entitled to fee; White J held that such options were ‘contracts’). 575. See  Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (option expressed as irrevocable offer treated by majority of High Court as a conditional contract). See Gibbs J in Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 73.

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On the first analysis, there are two contracts: a ‘mini’ contract to keep the offer open for a certain time and the main contract of sale or lease that comes into being if the offer is accepted (when the option is ‘exercised’). On the second analysis, there is one contract that comes into being immediately the offeree pays or promises to pay the sum of money or, alternatively, when the original contract of lease is created, in cases where the option is contained in a lease. On this analysis the contract is subject to a condition subsequent, that is, if the condition is not satisfied the contract terminates. It is, thus, a contract for valuable consideration, viz, to sell the property (or whatever the subject matter may be) upon condition that the other party shall within the stipulated time bind himself to perform the terms of the offer embodied in the contract.576

At first sight a contract that is subject to a condition that allows one of the parties to decide whether or not to be bound is a contradiction. It appears to be a denial of contract. This would be so if it were not for the consideration (often nominal) provided by the grantee of the option.577 By giving the consideration, the grantee commits himself or herself to a contract but at  the same time buys the privilege of having the choice to decide within the stipulated time not to go ahead with the agreement.578 What is somewhat curious is that, on this analysis, there is an immediately binding contract, yet, unless the grantee takes positive steps to exercise the option (thereby satisfying the condition), the contract terminates automatically. It might be thought that, consistent with the notion of contract being a set of binding obligations, the contract should remain in force unless the grantee does something positive to bring it to an end (as with an election to rescind)579 rather than terminate automatically unless the grantee does something positive to keep it on foot. Suffice it to say that the option, analysed as a conditional contract, is a curious creature in the law of contract, though it is far too well established and familiar to lawyers and business people to be looked at afresh. The reason for the manifold cases that support the alternative theories of option is to be found in the purpose the court is trying to achieve in any particular case. Each theory has its uses, depending on what is the issue before the court. For example, the conditional contract theory is more easily reconciled with the fact that an option creates an equitable interest in land580 and with the view that an option may survive 576. Griffith CJ in Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 at 678. 577. Whether the option would not be binding on the grantor if the nominal sum is not in fact paid (even if acknowledged to have been paid) would depend on the circumstances. If the non-payment of the money is a failure to perform the requested act in a unilateral contract, then there would be no binding option: Michael v  Barnes (1987) NSW ConvR 55-343 at  57, 119. On the other hand, if non-payment of the money is a breach of a bilateral contract by the grantee (who has provided consideration by promising to pay), then there is a valid option but failure to pay arguably may entitle the grantor to terminate, though probably a failure to pay at least a nominal consideration would not seem to be a serious breach. The issue was raised but was not relevant to the facts of Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120 at 131. Compare Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 (court prepared to order specific performance of an agreement to grant an easement for one shilling once the shilling was paid or tendered) and Himbleton Pty Ltd v Kumagai (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 NSWLR 44 at 49–52 (promise to pay was sufficient consideration even though no payment actually made and despite erroneous acknowledgement of payment). 578. See the discussion by Gibbs CJ in Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 at 581. 579. The language of election is used by Smith J in Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 at 580–1. 580. Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127; Ballas v Theophilos (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193. See also Auburn Shopping Village Pty Ltd v Nelmeer Hoteliers Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 114 not involving land.

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the death of the grantor.581 On the other hand, the irrevocable offer approach creates fewer problems in giving force to the intention of the parties when the option is exercised by a nominee or other third party.582 The view that has often been expressed — that the debate is an arid one and makes no difference in practice583 — overlooks the fact that the two theories are useful and, further, that each may be determinative in some special cases.584 Thus theoretical purity must give way to pragmatism.585 Finally, if the grantor of an option wrongfully revokes, the grantee is entitled nevertheless to exercise the option.586 This ability to ignore the wrongful revocation is thought to be more consistent with the conditional contract theory.587 As to assignment of an option, see 8.6. 3.69  Conditional options. Options (particularly options to renew a lease) are sometimes subject to the fulfilment of prior conditions, for example, that the lessee has performed all covenants. Non-fulfilment of the terms may preclude exercise of the option, that is, adhering to the terms is a condition precedent to the exercise of the option.588 But this can lead to harsh results if the non-fulfilment is a not very serious breach of the relevant condition or there has been tolerance of breaches.589 The failure to observe a condition may be a breach of an existing contract or a failure to perform the requested acts in a unilateral contract590 depending on which theory of option is adopted. The courts may be inclined to treat non-adherence to

581. Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57. Generally, a contract survives the death of a contracting party whereas an offer may not. See 8.55 for the effect of death on a contract and 3.73–3.74 for the effect of death on an offer. 582. See  Rossiter, ‘Options to Acquire Interests in Land — Freehold and Leasehold’ (1982) 56 ALJ 576 at 577–81; Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010), ch 2; Lücke, ‘Options’ (1968) 3(2) Adelaide LR 397 at 210 (available on Austlii). As to nominee options, see  7.28; Macarthur v  Georgamlis (No 1) (1989) NSW ConvR 55-501; Chambers v  Odgers (1977) 1  BPR  9467 at  9472 (Holland J); Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 at 158–9 (Burt J); and Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466; [2003] VSCA 1 at [17]–[23] (Phillips JA). 583. Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at  123; Ballas v  Theophilos (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193 at  207; Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 73. 584. Gibbs J in Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 thought that the conditional contract theory was essential for the proposition that an option creates a proprietary interest. ‘An equitable interest cannot be created by a mere offer …’: at 76. 585. The debate continues. See  extensive discussion in Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v  Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 72; [2011] QCA 49 (Fraser JA, Chesterman JA and Martin J concurring); Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 23 (2–1 split). 586. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v  Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674. See  also Rossiter, ‘Options to Acquire Interests in Land — Freehold and Leasehold’ (1982) 56 ALJ 576 and 624. 587. Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 76 (Gibbs J). 588. Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v  Pitt Club Ltd (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 122 approved in Bowman v Durham Holdings Pty Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8; Commonwealth v Antonio Giorgio Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 244; BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-a-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589. In Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65, it was held that an exercise of an option when the option holder had not committed any breaches was valid but defeasible if the option holder committed breaches after the exercise and before the expiry of the term. 589. It has been held that waiver is not applicable in connection with options to renew. Strict compliance is required if the language is clear. See  BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v  Budget Rent-A-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589 and cases discussed therein. Yet in Traywinds Pty Ltd v Cooper [1989] 1 Qd R 222, it was held that the party granting the option to renew could waive the deadline for the exercise of the option, following Hill v Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231. Compare Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246 (failure to exercise the option on time could not be waived because there was nothing to waive; further engagement between the parties was simply a negotiation for a new contract). 590. Compare United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74.

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conditions with some leniency if the language of the option so permits.591 Further, there is statutory protection in some jurisdictions in the form of a requirement for the lessor to provide a notice specifying breaches where such breaches preclude the exercise of the option and a court discretion to overlook certain breaches.592 3.70  Exercise of an option. Apart from satisfying a specific condition attached to the exercise of an option, the exercise of an option (notification of acceptance of the offer, on one view of the nature of options) is governed by the same principles discussed earlier as to what constitutes acceptance. As seen earlier, acceptance may be inferred from conduct.593 The same applies to the exercise of an option.594 If a time is stipulated, the offeree must meet the deadline.595 If the deadline has passed then the option has ceased.596 If a method for exercising the option is prescribed, then the exercise of the option must follow that method, though judges differ as to how precisely this is necessary.597 Just as with acceptance, the offeree must be clear that he or she is exercising the option.598

Revocability of offer for unilateral contract 599 3.71  Is a promise in return for an act revocable once the promisee has started to perform? In connection with the question of revocation of offers, a difficulty arises because of the nature of unilateral contracts.600 If the offeror contemplates, not the creation of mutual promises, but the creation of an enforceable obligation upon the offeree’s performance of an act, may the offeror revoke the offer at any time before the completion of this act? The application of the ordinary rules of revocation would suggest an affirmative answer: an offer may be withdrawn before acceptance;601 and acceptance does not take place until the requested act is complete. The problem — an old favourite in the classroom but of limited practical significance — has given 591. See Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 at 263–6 (Fox J), where many of the authorities are discussed. See, too, Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-459; Nessmine Pty Ltd v Devuso Pty Ltd (1990) ANZ ConvR 298 (lessor wishing to deny renewal of lease on the basis of non-fulfilment of conditions must give statutory notice to lessee); JB (Northbridge) Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] NSWCA 249 (insolvency event not a default; equitable assignment not in breach of no assignment clause; and no notice had been provided by landlord under the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 133E). 592. Conveyancing Act  1919 (NSW) Pt 8 Div  4; Law of Property Act  2000 (NT) s  143; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 128 and Property Law Bill 2022 s 151; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) Pt VII Div 2. The interpretation of this provision, which varies between jurisdictions, is not straightforward. See discussion by Holmes and Morrison JJA in Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131. 593. See 3.27, 3.46. Compare S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Bros Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637, where a landlord was estopped from denying that an option had been exercised. 594. Fightvision Pty Ltd v  Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473 at  493–6. As to when an option to renew a lease may be exercised, in particular whether this is possible after expiry of the initial term, see Tsaoucis v Gallipoli Memorial Club Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,265 discussed by Butt, ‘Exercise of Option to Renew’ (1998) 72 ALJ 583. 595. In counting days, the day on which the offer is received is omitted: Ford v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455. In Tasmania, the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 23A provides for a one-year limitation period if an option or a right of pre-emption in respect of land does not have a deadline for its exercise. 596. Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246. Any subsequent negotiations are not ‘waiver’ so much as a fresh negotiation for a contract. 597. See 3.46. 598. Jong v Advanced Dental Services Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 318, where a desultory email exchange referring to ‘re-signing’ was not the exercise of an option. 599. As to the question of effective communication of a revocation of an offer of reward, see 3.66. 600. See 3.28. 601. See 3.64.

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rise to a certain amount of speculation.602 In the United States it has been suggested that there are in fact two separate offers — an express offer to pay on performance and an implied offer not to revoke if the offeree starts to perform.603 On this theory, the offer promise becomes in effect an option once the offeree has started to perform. In England, Pollock suggested that a distinction should be drawn between the acceptance of the offer and the consideration necessary to support it. The latter is completion of the requested act and until then the offeror is not obliged to pay. The  former may be assumed as soon as the offeree ‘has made an unequivocal beginning of the performance requested’, and proof of this fact makes the offer irrevocable.604 Pollock’s suggestion was adopted by the English Law Revision Committee.605 Alternatively, a court may be inclined to use the device of estoppel to prevent the offeror from revoking, once there has been detrimental reliance by the offeree.606 In Australia this question has received mixed answers.607 One problem, referred to by the Full Federal Court in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v  Wellcome International Pty  Ltd,608 is whether the purported revocation of the offer is effective even if it is in breach of an obligation not to revoke. The court thought that it was and that, at most, the offeree would be able to claim damages. But this would depend on the circumstances. It is certainly the case with options that a revocation may be treated as ineffective and specific performance may then be ordered, so long as the option has been exercised properly.609 An Australian court actually had to decide the principal question as long ago as 1860. In Abbott v Lance,610 the plaintiff and the defendant signed a memorandum in the following terms: The said T E Lance having stated to the said B Abbott a certain price and terms hereinafter specified, for and on which he was willing to sell his stations, Wirrha and Gilgil, and stock; but the said B Abbott being unwilling to purchase without previous inspection of those stations, he will take two months from this date for the purpose of inspecting them, and if within these two months the said B Abbott offers to purchase the said property on the said terms, then the said T E Lance engaged to sell to him on those terms; the said property by no means remaining during these two months under exclusive offer to the said B Abbott, the said T E Lance retaining full liberty to sell the said property to any other party on the conditions of paying to the 602. See  Wormser, ‘The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts’ (1916) 26 Yale LJ 136, which suggested that it is not obviously unjust in all cases if the offeror is free to withdraw. See the exchange between Williams J and counsel in Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748 at 753; 142 ER 1336 at 1338. 603. McGovney, ‘Irrevocable Offers’ (1914) 27 Harv LR 644. 604. Pollock on Contract (13th ed), 19. 605. English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937) Cmnd 5449, 23–4, 31. 606. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v  Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See  Chapter  2. See  also Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v  Wellcome International Pty  Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 at  228. In Forbes v  Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 at 283–4, Santow J was of the view that estoppel provides a more satisfactory answer to the problem here being discussed. 607. Contrast the approach in Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 in favour of irrevocability with that of the Full Federal Court in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198. 608. (1998) 153 ALR 198 at 228. 609. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674; see also 3.68. 610. (1860) Legge 1283 followed in Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 at 297–8 (McPherson J). See also Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 183–4 (McHugh JA); White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101; Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; [1952] 1 All ER 149; Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748 at 753; 142 ER 1336 at 1338 (Erle CJ). See McRae, ‘Revocation of Unilateral Contracts’ 1 Otago LR 149 and the United States Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 45, which provides that there is an option contract once the promisee has started to perform.

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said B Abbott the sum of £100 as a forfeit in case of sale to any other party, that is to say, provided the said B Abbott shall within the said two months make a bona fide offer to purchase the same on the terms hereinafter specified …

In pursuance of the agreement the plaintiff started on the 500-mile journey and when about halfway received the following letter from the defendant: ‘Dear Sir, — I hasten to inform you that I have absolutely sold my stations to another party. Trusting this may overtake you before you have ridden far’. The question for the Full Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the £100 specified in the agreement. It was held that he was so entitled. Although there may be some obscurities in the judgment, it appears to be authority for the proposition that, in order to give business efficacy to a unilateral contract, the offeror must be taken to have promised that, once the offeree has started to perform the stipulated act, the offer becomes irrevocable.611 However, this was not how the Full Federal Court interpreted the case in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd,612 where it was held that the contract in Abbott v Lance: … was simply a promise to pay £100 as compensation for the plaintiff’s time, trouble and expense in undertaking the inspection trip if the defendant should cause them to be wasted by selling to someone else, upon a condition that they would only be taken to have been wasted if the sale by the defendant occurred within two months and could be seen to have prevented the plaintiff from making, within that period, a bona fide offer to purchase.613

The court in Mobil argued that it was by no means self-evident that it was unfair to withdraw a unilateral type offer after the offeree had embarked on performance. This was partly because of the various circumstances in which such a revocation might occur and so no universal rule could be stated. Also, commencement of performance may or may not provide a benefit to the promisor, depending on the circumstances.614 On the facts of Mobil, the court held that an offer of incentive rewards to franchisees if they performed above certain levels could be withdrawn.615 The Full Federal Court examined the cases on this point and concluded that they did not stand for any binding rule. The argument that there can be no withdrawal once the offeree has embarked on performance may be displaced expressly, or in special circumstances a court will not regard the offer as irrevocable even when the offeree has started work. An example of the latter is the contract of agency with an estate agent who is asked to find a buyer in return for a commission. It has been held that the owner of the property is free to withdraw the offer at any time until the agent actually finds a buyer who signs 611. Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 at 297–8 (McPherson J). An obiter dictum of Goff LJ in Daulia Ltd v  Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch  231 at  238–9 supports this view. See  also Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] AC 572 at 585; [1972] 1 All ER 621 at 627; Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 183–4 (McHugh JA). This theory may explain why a banker’s irrevocable credit in favour of a seller in the context of bankers’ commercial credits is binding on the bank. See 7.50. 612. (1998) 153 ALR 198. 613. Ibid at 226. 614. This argument ignores the fact that consideration may also be provided if the relevant act constitutes a detriment to the promisee. If part performance does provide a benefit to the promisor, as in Errington v  Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (promisee  paying off mortgage on property owned by promisor), the solution nowadays would be based either on unjust enrichment or the imposition of a constructive trust. 615. This was strictly obiter dicta because the court had already come to the conclusion that no contractual offer had been made. Claims based on estoppel were also unsuccessful.

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3.71

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

a contract.616 Thus, as indicated by the Federal Court in Mobil, there is no simple answer to the issue that has been the subject of (perhaps unwarranted) attention from law teachers over many years.

Lapse of time 3.72  Expiry of offer. An offer may cease to exist by lapse of time, either because this is expressly provided or if the court thinks that this is a necessary inference to be drawn from the particular facts. If no time limit is expressly set, the offer must be accepted within a reasonable time or it lapses.617 The High Court decision in Ballas v Theophilos (No 2)618 offers an illustration. A partnership deed gave the surviving partner an option to purchase the deceased partner’s share in the capital and assets of the business on certain terms. The deed did not specify any time limit for the exercise of the option and the surviving partner purported to exercise it 16 months after the death of the deceased partner. The offer was held to have lapsed by the passage of time. It is, however, important to appreciate that what is a reasonable time varies with the nature of the contemplated contract.619

Death 3.73  Effect of death of offeror. The effect of death upon the continuity of an offer is not altogether clear.620 It has been assumed that an offeree cannot accept after receiving notice of the offeror’s death.621 However, the view was expressed in Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd622 that an option can be accepted after the death of the grantor, so long as the terms of the option do not exclude that possibility and so long as the contract was not personal to the grantor. But this view may not advance the debate if an option is considered to be a conditional contract (which does not generally lapse on death) rather than an irrevocable offer, as was in fact the case in Laybutt.623 Is the offeror’s estate bound if the offeree performs an act of acceptance in ignorance of the death? In Dickinson v Dodds,624 Mellish LJ by way of obiter dictum expressed the opinion ‘that, if a man who makes an offer dies, the offer cannot be accepted after he is dead’. But, in the context in which it was said, it could have meant that an offer cannot be accepted once the offeree knows of the offeror’s death. 616. Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v  Cooper [1941] AC 108; [1941] 1 All ER 33 endorsed in LJ Hooker Ltd v W J Adams Estates Pty Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 52 at 66–7 (Gibbs J), 78 (Stephen J), 83 (Jacobs J). 617. Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v  Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Exch 109 (offer to purchase shares in June purportedly accepted in November; held: acceptance too late). Compare Manchester Diocesan Council v Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 at 248, where Buckley J was of the view that an offer lapses after a reasonable time because it has been impliedly rejected by the offeree rather than impliedly withdrawn by the offeror. 618. (1957) 98 CLR 193. 619. Ibid at 197 (Dixon CJ). 620. As to the effect of death on existing contractual obligations, see 8.55. 621. See Re Whelan [1897] 1 IR 575; Coulthart v Clementson (1879) 5 QBD 42; [1874–80] All ER Rep 865; and Fong v Cilli (1968) 11 FLR 495. 622. (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 76 (Gibbs J). See also Consolidated Development Pty Ltd v Holt (1986) 6 NSWLR 607 at 618 (Young J). 623. See 3.68. 624. (1876) 2 Ch D 463 at 475.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.74

The case of Bradbury v Morgan625 suggests that, in principle at least, this opinion does not represent the law when the offeree is ignorant of the offeror’s death. The case is not directly on point because it deals with whether a contract lapses, rather than an offer. But because of the sparsity of authority on the point it may be some guide. X had written to the plaintiffs, requesting them to give credit to Y and guaranteeing payment up to £100. The plaintiffs gave credit to Y. X then died, and the plaintiffs, in ignorance of this fact, continued the credit to Y. The plaintiffs sued X’s executors on the guarantee. It was held that the defendants were liable. In the words of Pollock CB: This is a contract, and the question is whether it is put an end to by the death of the guarantor. There is no direct authority to that effect; and I think that all reason and authority, such as there is, are against that proposition.

Channell B was equally emphatic: In the case of a contract death does not in general operate as revocation, but only in exceptional cases, and this is not within them.

The better view would seem to be that the effect of death varies according to the nature of the particular offer. If, as in the case of a guarantee, the offer is of a promise that is independent of the offeror’s personality and that can be satisfied out of his or her estate, death does not, until notified, prevent acceptance. If, as in the case of agency or in an offer to write a book or to perform at a concert, some element personal to the offeror is involved, his or her death automatically terminates the negotiations.626 3.74  Effect of death of offeree. Where the offeree dies, there appears to be no authority, and the only assistance is to be found in a dictum by Warrington LJ in Reynolds v Atherton.627 He was of the opinion that an offer ceases, by operation of law, on the death of the offeree, though he regarded the language of revocation in this context as inappropriate: I think it would be more accurate to say that, the offer having been made to a living person who ceases to be a living person before the offer is accepted, there is no longer an offer at all. The offer is not intended to be made to a dead person or to his executors, and the offer ceases to be an offer capable of acceptance.

The point was expressly reserved by Lord Dunedin when the case reached the House of Lords.628 Even so, it is not unreasonable to suggest that an offer, unless made to the public at large, assumes the continued existence of a particular offeree, and that the destruction of this assumption frustrates the intention to contract. However, as we have already seen, if the offer takes the form of an option, then a contractual right is vested in the offeree. In the event of his or her death before the expiration of the agreed period, whether or not the offeree’s personal representatives can exercise the option by accepting the offer will depend on the nature of the contract. In the words of Knox CJ: 625. (1862) 1 H & C 249; 158 ER 877. 626. On the whole question, see Lücke, ‘Striking a Bargain’ (1962) 1(3) Adelaide LR 293 at 306 (available on Austlii). 627. (1921) 125 LT 690 at 695–6. 628. (1922) 127 LT 189 at 191.

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3.74

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

If the option is personal to the offeree, if, for instance, the agreement offered calls for the exercise of his personal skill or discretion, it can, of course, be accepted only during his lifetime and lapses on his death. Or it may be that the option, though not personal to the offeree in the sense of calling for his personal services or qualifications, on its true construction expressly or by necessary implication requires acceptance by him personally. The benefit of such an option could not pass to the executors of the offeree because it must be accepted if at all by the offeree personally. But, if the option be not personal to the offeree and do not expressly or by necessary implication … limit the time for acceptance to his lifetime, I think the result of the authorities is that the benefit of the option is an ordinary assignable chose in action which on the death of the offeree passes along with his other property to his personal representative.629

629. Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at 121 applying Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477 and Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 423; [1900–3] All ER Rep 386 at 390.

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Chapter 4

Consideration Function and Definition 4.1  The criteria for enforceability of promises. The doctrine of consideration is about what makes a promise legally enforceable. The law necessarily has to separate those promises that do not generate any legal liability from those that do. In order to do this, some criterion must be fixed on to make this discrimination. A number of criteria could be used to perform this task in a rational system of law. The promisor might, for example, be held liable just because he or she had made a serious promise or had made use of a well-known ritual that signals that a promise is to be treated as legally enforceable. Or the promisor might be held liable because the promisee had relied on the promise. Or the promisor might be legally bound if the promisee could prove that the promise was part of a transaction to which he or she had contributed a material share, in other words, that the promise was part of a reciprocal exchange. Each criterion may be defended. Most foreign systems adopt the first possibility.1 Modern Australian law uses all three criteria, though only one is contract. The third criterion, the notion of an exchange, is the traditional hallmark of consideration and is the focus of this chapter. It is not sufficient that the parties have made an agreement unless that agreement also involves mutual consideration. Reliance is playing an increasingly important role in the law of obligations.2 Reliance must be justified or reasonable in the circumstances and determining when reliance is so justified may prove to be difficult.3 Nevertheless, a positive promise is now enforceable, without consideration, through the mechanism of promissory estoppel in which detrimental reliance is an essential element.4 A broken promise may amount to misleading or deceptive conduct.5 Solemnity also has an important role in that a promise may be made binding by the use of a deed under seal.6 1.

See, for example, the French Civil Code art 1101, which defines a contract as ‘an agreement by which one or several persons bind themselves, in favour of one or several other persons, to give, or to do, or not to do, something’. 2. For example, in connection with negligent misrepresentation. See 11.87–11.91. 3. See Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981), 65–9. 4. See  Chapter 2. 5. See  11.118. 6. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). The common law requirements — that a deed had to be written on vellum, parchment or paper and had to be sealed and delivered — have been supplemented in part by legislation. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110, 110A, 110B and 127; Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 (ACT) s 219; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Pt 3; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) Pt 6 Div 1; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) Pt 6 and Property Law Bill 2022 Pt 6; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 41; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s 63; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) ss 73, 73A, 74; Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic) s 12A; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) ss 9 and 12. Unfortunately, the legislation is not uniform, and there are gaps in coverage. For example, there is no

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4.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

4.2  Consideration. The common law adopted the notion of exchange for the enforceability of contractual promises. To sustain an action on a contractual promise made by the defendant, the plaintiff must show that it is supported by the presence of ‘consideration’. The plaintiff — the promisee — has to show that the defendant’s promise, upon which the plaintiff is suing, is part of a bargain to which he or she (the plaintiff) has contributed.7 The defendant’s promise must have been offered in return for an act done or a counter-promise made by the plaintiff. It is to this requirement of mutuality that the term ‘consideration’ is given. Thus, only bargains would be enforced8 to be contrasted with gift promises which are not enforceable unless embodied in a deed or on which the promisee has relied to his or her detriment so as to attract an estoppel. If A promises B to deliver a ton of gravel next Friday and B readily agrees, by itself this is not a contract. A has promised a gift to B and, though B has agreed, there is no consideration moving from B and the promise is not enforceable. But if A promises to deliver a ton of gravel to B next Friday, payment on delivery, and B agrees, then there is a contract (assuming that the price is known or can be ascertained). This mutuality or exchange prompts the next logical question: what precisely is meant by an exchange? The answer to this apparently simple question has generated a vast amount of learning and judicial exegesis.9 The answer has two aspects. First, it is necessary to examine whether there has been an exchange between the two parties to the alleged contract. This aspect of the inquiry is concerned to ensure that each side has ‘paid for’10 the other’s promise or act and is summed up in the maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’. The second aspect is concerned with what in law amounts to a good consideration, that is, whether the thing given in exchange (a promise or an act) is recognised by the law as legally valuable, that is, a recognised species of consideration. These two aspects dictate the structure of this chapter. The maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’ is examined in 4.6–4.8, and the question of what in law amounts to (and does not amount to) a good consideration is examined in 4.9–4.41. It is worth noting that, as a practical matter, the rules of consideration rarely cause a problem at the formation stage of a contract. This is because, generally, commercial people do not promise to do something for nothing or, if they do, they would not intend such a promise to be legally enforceable. The issue of consideration does not arise if one party has, for example, agreed to sell goods or services to another. There is simply no doubt that there is a mutual consideration. (It is whether agreement has been reached that is commonly the subject of dispute and very many litigated cases.)

7.

8. 9. 10.

legislation dealing with how a government executes a deed. Seddon makes the point that the use of deeds is hazardous because there are so many ways in which a deed can fail. One of the puzzles of discussing consideration is the focus on one party — the promisee who is trying to enforce a promise. Of course, a contract involves both parties, each of which must have provided consideration, usually in the form of promises. The language of ‘promisor’ and ‘promisee’ has a tendency to cause confusion because each party is both. Hamson, ‘The Reform of Consideration’ (1938) 54 LQR 233; Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1954) 1 Syd LR 289. See Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 168 (Kirby P). Kiefel, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in Contract: Some Historical and Comparative Perspectives’ in Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp (eds), Contract in Commercial Law (2016). Which does not necessarily involve the payment of, or the promise of, money. A barter transaction is a contract.

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Consideration

4.4

Where consideration often does become a practical problem is when the parties attempt to modify or end their contract. Contract variations are just as much contracts as the original deal itself11 and therefore the rules of agreement and consideration apply to modifications to the contractual relationship. At times the rules of consideration do not work very well to accommodate the needs of business people when they wish to make changes to their commercial arrangements, as almost inevitably they will in any long-term or complex transaction.12 As a consequence, other doctrines (such as estoppel) at times are called upon to supplement the inadequacies of consideration.13 In other common law jurisdictions, it has been suggested, or even held by a court, that the requirement of consideration for contract variations should be dispensed with.14 For a more detailed treatment of the issues relevant to contract variation, see 2.29, 4.32–4.33 and Chapter 22. 4.3  Attempts to define consideration. As a result of Eastwood v Kenyon,15 it was clear that consideration was neither a mere rule of evidence nor a synonym for moral obligation. How then was it to be defined? In the course of the nineteenth century it was frequently said that a plaintiff/promisee could establish the presence of consideration in one of two ways: either by showing that he or she had conferred a benefit upon the defendant/promisor in return for which the defendant’s promise was given; or by showing that he or she had incurred a detriment for which the defendant’s promise was to compensate.16 Usually the two go together: it is both a benefit to the promisor to be promised (say) payment of money and it is at the same time a detriment to the promisee. But the two need not go together; either is sufficient. For example, in a contract of guarantee, the consideration for the guarantor’s promise is the lender’s promise of, or the actual making of, the loan to a third-party borrower. This is not necessarily a benefit to the guarantor (though in many commercial transactions it is) but it is a detriment to the promisee lender. 4.4  Antithesis of benefit and detriment not always satisfactory. The antithesis of benefit and detriment, though reiterated in the courts, is not altogether satisfactory. Detriment is often associated with reliance theory and the essence of the doctrine of consideration is not reliance but the forward commitment to performance — the 11.

Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ). 12. See Stoljar, ‘The Doctrine of Forbearance’ (2018) 92 ALJ 195 who discusses the difference between a contract variation and altering the mode of performance, particularly extending a deadline, suggesting that the rigours of consideration should be relaxed for mode of performance variations. 13. See  2.29. 14. This possibility is discussed at length, including New Zealand and Canadian cases, in Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 at [58]–[95] by Phang Boon Leong JA who concluded that consideration is required for contract variations. Dispensing with consideration for contract variations would be difficult in Australia in the light of the High Court’s pronouncements in Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 and Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57. 15. (1840) 11 Ad & El 438; 113 ER 482. See Chapter  27 for the historical significance of this case and 27.11–27.16 for the historical development of the doctrine of consideration. 16. ‘A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other’: Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 at 162. ‘The general rule is, that an executory agreement, by which the plaintiff agrees to do something on the terms that the defendant agrees to do something else, may be enforced, if what the plaintiff has agreed to do is “either for the benefit of the defendant or to the trouble or prejudice of the plaintiff”’: Lord Blackburn in Bolton v Madden (1873) LR 9 QB 55 at 56.

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4.4

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

commitment now to do something in the future. The typical modern contract is the bargain struck by the exchange of promises.17 If A orders goods from B, payment on delivery which is to take place in a month’s time, both A and B are bound from the moment of agreement, and, if the one subsequently refuses to be bound, the other may sue even though the time for performance has not arrived. Yet, at the time of agreement, no benefit has been conferred upon the defendant nor any detriment suffered by the plaintiff, unless it is assumed that the promises are binding. But the very question of whether they are binding is said to depend upon notions of benefit and detriment.18 Mutual promises alone exist, and the plaintiff, in calling upon the defendant to perform, need show no more than a willingness to implement his or her own undertaking.19 It is assumed that each promise is equally binding. Thus, the notion of mutual promises being consideration involves smoke and mirrors, but it has nevertheless stood the test of time. The concept of detriment in the sense of reliance, that is, the consequences of the defendant’s ‘default’, is increasingly being used as a basis for imposing obligations. As already noted, the source of obligations affecting contracting parties is now not solely rooted in exchange but also in reliance.20 Some would say that reliance-based obligations are not truly contractual.21 This is true in so far as the doctrine of consideration provides the basis for obligation. But, it is necessary to see commercial parties as being subject to a range of obligations, some purely contractual, others reliance-based. 4.5  Consideration the price of the promise. A different approach to the problem of consideration may be made through the language of purchase and sale. The plaintiff must show that he or she has ‘bought’ the defendant’s promise either by doing some act in return for it or by offering a counter-promise.22 Sir Frederick Pollock summarised the position in words adopted by the House of Lords in 1915: An act of forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.23

This definition of consideration as the price paid by the plaintiff for the defendant’s promise is sometimes preferable to the nineteenth-century terminology of benefit and detriment. It is easier to understand, it corresponds more happily to the normal exchange of promises and it emphasises the commercial character of contract. However, the language of benefit and detriment is sometimes useful for the purposes of analysis of a particular transaction. This is particularly so when there is some doubt about whether one of the parties has provided a consideration, such as in the existing duty cases discussed below in 4.29–4.35. 17.

Atiyah questions the assumption that this describes the typical contract in ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (1978) 94 LQR 193. 18. This logical impasse is discussed by Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981), 63–4 and Peel, Treitel, The Law of Contract (15th ed, 2020), [3-008], and an attempted solution is suggested by Coote, ‘The Essence of Contract’ (1988–9) 1 JCL 91 and 183. See also Coote, ‘Contract as Assumption and Remoteness of Damages’ (2010) 26 JCL 211 at 217, which noted Pollock’s anonymous article in (1914) 30 LQR 128, in which Pollock referred to the ‘secret paradox’ of consideration (at 129). 19. As to which see Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385. 20. Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (1978) 94 LQR 193. See also Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 discussed in Chapter 2. 21. For example, Kirby P in Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 168–70. 22. It is important to understand that the words ‘bought’ and ‘price’ are used broadly here and do not necessarily connote money or the promise of money. As noted earlier, a barter transaction is a contract. 23. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 130.

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Consideration

4.6

Consideration Must Move from the Promisee 4.6  Reciprocal exchange. The doctrine of consideration requires that only the person who has ‘paid’ the price of a promise could sue on it.24 How otherwise could the plaintiff prove his or her share in the bargain upon which the action was based? Thus, in Price v Easton,25 the defendant promised X that if X did certain work for him he would pay a sum of money to the plaintiff. X did the work, but the defendant did not pay the money to the plaintiff. The Court of Queen’s Bench held that the plaintiff could not claim from the defendant, and explained their decision in two different ways. Lord Denman said that the plaintiff could not ‘show any consideration for the promise moving from him to the defendant’. Littledale J said that ‘no privity is shown between the plaintiff and the defendant’. In Tweddle v Atkinson,26 the judges, while endorsing the decision in Price v Easton, preferred the first of these reasons: ‘It is now established,’ said Wightman J ‘that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit’. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd,27 Lord Haldane declared two principles to be ‘fundamental in the law of England’. The first was that ‘only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it’ (the privity rule); the second that ‘only a person who has given consideration may enforce a contract not under seal’ (the consideration rule).28 The rule is that consideration must move from the promisee. As such it is a rule that can cause some confusion to students of law. This is because the question whether a promise is enforceable is answered by looking, not to the promisor’s conduct,29 but to what the other person — the promisee — did in response to it. If what was done in response to the promise does not amount in law to a good consideration, then the promise is not enforceable. What does and does not amount to a good consideration is examined in 4.9–4.41. The discussion of a promise and the response to it has an air of unreality because most contracts consist of a bundle of rights and obligations. It is not necessary, when looking at a particular promise, to assign to it a particular counter-promise or act. It is sufficient that there is something in the bundle which amounts to a good consideration. This idea is captured in saying that consideration is not generally severable.30 However, when it comes to money, a court may have to examine components of the consideration and sever.31 24.

This was not always so. It used to be sufficient if someone had ‘paid’ for it, not necessarily the plaintiff. See Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 210; 85 ER 523. See also Chapter 7 on privity. 25. (1833) 4 B & Ad 433; 110 ER 518. 26. (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762. The case is also reported in 4 LT 468; 8 JurPt 1 332; 9 WR 781 and 30 LJ (NS) QB 265. It is only in the judgment of Wightman J as reported in 30 LJ (NS) QB at 267 that there is a mention of the privity principle. See the discussion by Toohey J in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 163–4. 27. [1915] AC 847 at 853; [1914–15] All ER Rep 333 at 334. 28. As to the relationship between these two rules, see 4.7–4.8. 29. If enforceability of promises depends on solemnity, the promisor’s conduct has to be examined, as is the case with the execution of a deed under seal where it must be ascertained whether the promisor has followed the legislative and common law requirements. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), chs 2 and 3. 30. See  McEwan v Dick (1985) 9 ACLR 1011 at 1022–3 (Cohen J). 31. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 (discussed in 4.26), where an amount agreed to be paid by way of a pension was found to be severable. See also Anderson v Glass (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152 discussed in 4.19.

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4.6

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

In stating the rule that consideration must move from the promisee, it should be noted that it need not move to the promisor.32 In a contract of guarantee, the consideration given in exchange for the guarantor’s promise is the lender’s promise of, or the actual making of, a loan to the third party/borrower.33 Thus consideration moves from the lender but does not move to the promisor/guarantor.34 4.7  The Trident case.35 A reappraisal of both rules — the consideration and privity rules — was undertaken by the High Court in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd.36 Most of what was said by the seven judges related to the privity rule rather than the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. But, in any case, a majority37 reasserted that both rules were too well-entrenched to be changed. It was nevertheless held that, at least in contracts of insurance under which the insurance company undertakes to indemnify third parties, a third-party insured may recover under the policy.38 Mason CJ and Wilson J in a joint judgment so held, making it clear that they were only answering a ‘limited question’ applying to a policy of insurance.39 Similarly, Toohey J formulated a rule that applied to insurance contracts only.40 Thus these three judges were prepared to formulate an exception to the privity rule. Gaudron J did not devise a direct exception to the wellestablished rules but, instead, held that, though the third-party company could not enforce the contract of insurance, it could sue in restitution because the insurance company would otherwise be unjustly enriched if it failed to pay out after having received the insurance premium.41 Thus the rule that consideration must move from the promisee is still part of Australian law. In Trident, the possibility of making the insurance company’s promise to indemnify a third party binding by the use of estoppel42 was briefly mentioned.43 It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the third party, having been informed of the policy of insurance, refrains from insuring, thus providing the necessary element of detrimental reliance. If it be objected that the insurance company has made no direct representation or promise to the third party, it would be possible to argue that the insured could act as an agent44 for the purpose of conveying the promise of indemnity to the third party, analogous to the agency device employed in New Zealand Shipping 32.

Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 392; [2005] HCA 13 at [66]; Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199. 33. If the consideration is not explicitly stated in the guarantee it may be inferred or parol evidence may be admitted to show what the true consideration is. See Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339. 34. In commercial loans the guarantor may well benefit or have a direct interest in the loan being granted, and thus it could be said that a consideration moves to the promisor. But this is not necessarily so. 35. See also 7.3. 36. (1988) 165 CLR 107; 80 ALR 574; 62 ALJR 508. See also 7.3. 37. Brennan, Dawson, Gaudron and Deane JJ. 38. Compare Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48, which was not in force at the time the cause of action arose in Trident. 39. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123. 40. Ibid at 172. 41. Ibid at 176. 42. See  Chapter 2. 43. Trident (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123 (Mason CJ and Wilson J): ‘We doubt that the doctrine of estoppel provides an adequate protection of the legitimate expectations of [third parties] and, even if it does, the rights of persons under a policy of insurance should not be made to depend on the vagaries of such an intricate doctrine.’ But see the very positive statement of Deane J at 145. 44. Problems may arise concerning ratification of the agency by the third party. Such was the case in Trident itself. See the discussion in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: (1987) 8 NSWLR 270 at 279–83.

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Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon)45 and similar cases.46 Thus, although no consideration is provided by the third-party promisee, the promisor is estopped from denying liability based on the promise of indemnity. In any case, this problem has now been resolved by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48, under which a third party can enforce a contract of insurance.47 4.8  Relation of consideration to the doctrine of privity. It has long been a controversial question whether the rule that consideration must move from the promisee and the doctrine of privity of contract are fundamentally distinct or whether they are merely variations of a common theme.48 The High Court of Australia appeared to favour the retention of the dichotomy in Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd.49 An agreement had been entered into in which C agreed to grant O’Neil Construction Co Ltd the exclusive right to quarry on his land in return for royalty payments. The agreement provided ‘I [C] authorise the above company to pay all money connected with this agreement to my wife … and myself … as joint tenants …’. The agreement was signed by Mr and Mrs C and by the company but Mrs C provided no consideration.50 When C died, his executors sought the court’s direction as to whether the company should continue to pay royalties to Mrs C. The court was divided in regard to the true construction of the agreement. The majority (Taylor, Owen and McTiernan JJ) held that it constituted a contract between the O’Neill company and the husband alone and that the clause authorising payment to husband and wife jointly was merely a revocable mandate which had been revoked by the death of the husband. However, Barwick CJ and Windeyer J each held that the wife was a party to the contract and, as such, a joint promisee with her husband. They considered that, where a promise is made to persons jointly, it can be enforced by them or by the survivor of them, so long as any one of them has provided consideration.51 Both Taylor and Owen JJ expressly agreed with this view, differing only in their construction of the agreement.52 It appears then that, in Australia, if not in other common law jurisdictions, the rule that consideration must move from 45. [1975] AC 154. 46. See  3.8, 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38. 47. This possibility of using estoppel to enforce a promise to a third party can be generalised to any thirdparty beneficiary of a contractual promise, not just insurance, so long as the third party has detrimentally relied on the promise. 48. In Trident (1988) 165 CLR 107, Mason CJ and Wilson J said ‘… the weight of authority points to the existence of two distinct, albeit interrelated, principles … however, it is of little consequence whether the rules are in fact separate’ (at 115–16); ‘… the distinction is well founded’ (Brennan J at 127); ‘… the one may in many circumstances be no more than the corollary of the other’ (Dawson J at 155); ‘What authority there is in Australia favours the view that the two doctrines are separate …’ (Toohey J at 164). In Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460 at 478, Barwick CJ pointed out that ‘Questions of consideration and privity are not always kept distinct’. 49. (1967) 119 CLR 460. In Beswick v Beswick [1966] Ch 538 at 557; [1966] 3 All ER 1 at 9, Lord Denning said, ‘The general rule undoubtedly is that “no third party can sue, or be sued, on a contract to which he is not a party”; but at bottom that is only a rule of procedure’. Clearly, if that rule meant the same as the rule that consideration must move from the promisee, it would be a rule of substantive law. 50. Mrs C made no promises to the company, though she was a signatory to the document. See Coote’s objection to the High Court’s joint promisee argument: ‘Consideration and the Joint Promisee’ [1978] CLJ 301. 51. Windeyer J found support for the proposition in the ancient authority of Rookwood’s case (1589) Cro Eliz 164; 78 ER 421, while Barwick CJ relied upon general principles relating to joint tenants. 52. (1967) 119 CLR at 486: ‘If, however, the correct conclusion is that the widow was a party to the contract it is, to our minds, clear that she is entitled to receive the royalties payable after her husband’s death notwithstanding that she, personally, gave no consideration for the company’s promise’.

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the promisee may be modified so as to read ‘consideration must move from the promisee or from any one of joint promisees’. However, it must be emphasised that, as in Coulls’ case itself, it may be a difficult question of construction whether a person, intended to take a benefit under a contract, is a joint promisee with the person who has provided the consideration.53

What Does and Does Not Constitute a Good Consideration in Law 4.9  The rules — an overview. There are various rules that answer the question whether a particular promise provided by the promisee, or act performed by the promisee, is recognised as a good consideration. These rules are the product of history and do not constitute a rational scheme. Indeed, some of the rules defy business common sense, particularly the negative rules, that is, those that dictate that certain types of promise or act do not constitute a good consideration. There is considerable pressure on these rules to change and one long-held rule — that performing an existing duty is no consideration — has changed.54 The rules are first discussed at a general level: see 4.10–4.18. The various rules themselves are then examined: see 4.19–4.41. The law has traditionally adopted what at first sight appears to be an odd approach to the question of what amounts to a good consideration, saying, on the one hand, that something apparently quite valuable or useful may not be a good consideration (for example, agreeing to continue to perform a contract that has turned out to be far more onerous than originally expected);55 and, on the other hand, that something of no value may be a good consideration (such as a scrap of paper or a peppercorn).

Consideration must be legally sufficient 4.10  Not every act or promise amounts to a good consideration. Consideration has, as we have seen, been defined as the act or promise provided by the one party (the promisee) as the ‘price’ of the other’s promise. The question now arises whether any act and any promise, regardless of their content, will satisfy this definition. The answer to this is clearly not. Certain acts and promises, it will be seen, are deemed incapable in law of supporting an action for breach of contract by the person who has supplied them. But, while most jurists have been forced by the results of litigation to accept this conclusion, there has been a great divergence of opinion as to the test of what is, and what is not, a good consideration. There is even doubt as to whether the criterion, whatever it may be, is equally applicable to acts and to promises. That there should be no difference was asserted by

53. See  McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co Ltd [1935] AC 24 at 43 (Lord Atkin) (joint account holders held to be joint and several contracting parties). See also Cullity, ‘Joint Bank Accounts with Volunteers’ (1969) 85 LQR 530, especially at 531–4 and Coote, ‘Consideration and the Joint Promisee’ [1978] CLJ 301. See, too, New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1975] AC 154 at 180; [1974] 1 All ER 1015 at 1030 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 54. See  4.35. 55. As already noted, this rule has changed. See 4.35.

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Holt CJ three centuries ago56 and reasserted by Leake in his book on contracts in the middle of the nineteenth century.57 On the other hand, Sir Frederick Pollock denied the possibility of a single criterion and declared that, in certain cases, a promise may, while an actual performance may not, afford a consideration to support a counterpromise.58 To confuse matters further, it seems that an act may, but a promise to do the same may not, amount to a good consideration in certain circumstances.59 Similarly, a promise may be illusory because it is discretionary, but the actual doing of the act may be consideration for a unilateral contract or possibly acceptance by conduct for the purpose of a bilateral contract.60 The law is concerned with substance and not form. Hence saying in a document that something has been provided ‘in consideration’ for something else is not necessarily determinative.61 A court may resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain what the true consideration is if it is not clear or obvious on the face of a document.62 4.11  Terminology. Historically, the words ‘adequate’ and ‘sufficient’ have been used (to the confusion of students first coming to the law of contract). These apparent synonyms are used to discriminate between those acts or promises that are regarded as a good consideration — they are ‘sufficient’ in law — from those that, as a matter of business or commercial good sense, would hardly be regarded as constituting the stuff of a bargain — they are commercially not adequate yet legally sufficient. (The paradigm consideration which is regarded as sufficient, though commercially worthless, is the peppercorn.) The courts, as a general rule, will not question the adequacy of consideration, reflecting the idea that the parties best know what they want to exchange.63 Yet the very rules of the doctrine of consideration, as already foreshadowed, deem certain acts and promises to be insufficient.

Commercially inadequate consideration is sufficient in law 4.12  Consideration need not be adequate — the peppercorn principle. It has been settled for well over 300 years that the courts will not inquire into the ‘adequacy of consideration’. By this is meant that they will not seek to measure the comparative value of the defendant’s promise and of the act or promise given by the plaintiff in exchange for it, nor will they denounce an agreement merely because it seems to be 56.

‘Where the doing a thing will be a good consideration, a promise to do that thing will be so too’: Thorp v Thorp (1701) 12 Mod Rep 455; 88 ER 1448. 57. Leake on Contracts (1st ed, 1867), 314. 58. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 144–7. 59. For example, a promise may be illusory, yet the actual doing may be a good consideration: see Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114 at 117–18 (Hood J). A promise not to seek maintenance is not a good consideration, whereas the actual forbearance to seek maintenance may be: Griffiths v Knight [1960] SR (NSW) 353 (discussed in 4.27); Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 221. Arguably, the act of forbearance in such a case is not equatable with the promise because the latter is not a good consideration only in the case where the promise is not to seek maintenance once and for all. A promise to return to cohabitation is not enforceable and yet the act of returning to cohabitation amounts to a good consideration: Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 at 198–9. 60. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 133–4 (Barwick CJ); British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd [1943] VLR 163 at 170–1. 61. McKay v National Australia Bank [1998] 1 VR 173 at 177; HCK China Investments Ltd v Solar Honest Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 680 at 721 (Hely J). 62. See  Yaroomba Beach Development Co Pty Ltd v Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398; Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339. 63. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 at 193–4 (Kirby P) for the policy justifications for the common law’s approach. This case is discussed in 4.26.

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unfair.64 This is the position at common law. In certain types of legislation, the courts may well inquire into the adequacy of consideration.65 This aspect of the doctrine of consideration is labelled the ‘peppercorn’ principle in that it is legally sufficient to agree, for example, to sell a valuable object or to let commercial premises in exchange for a nominal consideration, such as a peppercorn. There is a worrying uncertainty whether equity recognises the use of a nominal consideration. The significance of this is that equity may deny its remedies of specific performance or injunction66 if a transaction is construed as a gift because of the use of a nominal consideration. This is of some concern because lawyers frequently use nominal consideration to ensure that a transaction is a contract and not a gift.67 To treat the use of nominal consideration as a gift is to thwart the absolutely clear intention that is evident in the use of nominal consideration in a contract. Nevertheless, the promise must have been procured by the offer of something in return capable of expression in terms of value, however small. The law draws the line at some things which, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, it regards as ephemeral. So, a parent who makes a promise ‘in consideration of natural love and affection’68 or to induce his son to refrain from boring him with complaints,69 cannot be sued upon it, since the essential elements of a bargain are lacking.70 In Selen v Selen,71 it was held that, in circumstances involving a promise to allow parents to remain in possession of a house in exchange for the promise of a transfer of the property to a son, the promise by the son of occupation rights was not a good consideration, on the basis that the performance of the promise was impossible until transfer. This decision ignored the principle that a promise involving a future commitment is a perfectly good consideration.72 Many contracts involve promises the performance of which is impossible at the time of contract formation. There is no principle that impossibility of performance at the time of contract formation is a bar to the promise amounting to a good consideration. If there were such a principle, commerce would grind to a halt. It is common for a party to undertake to see to it that something happens.73 64.

If the consideration is inadequate, it may be a signal that the bargaining process was flawed; if that can be established, equitable principles may provide relief for the party who has been done down: see Chapters 13–15. 65. DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 (Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic)). 66. See  Chapter 24. 67. See Seddon, ‘Is a Provider of Nominal Consideration a “Volunteer”?’ (2016) 90 ALJ 81. There are conflicting views about whether equity should follow the law or whether it looks to substance over form. The problem is not overcome by using a deed: see Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [6.22]. Contrary to statements by some commentators (see, for example, Heydon, Heydon on Contract (2019), [27.80]), Seddon argued that a nominal consideration prevents a transaction from being a gift in equity’s eyes. This view was followed in Lithgow State Mine Railway Ltd v City of Greater Lithgow Mining Museum Inc (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1468 at [56] (Darke J). 68. Bret v J S (1600) Cro Eliz 756; 78 ER 987. This the position at common law. Equity treated love and affection as good consideration. See DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 at [2]–[7] (Gleeson CJ), [35]–[49] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [103]–[124] (Kirby and Crennan JJ). See also Xiao Hui Ying v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 124 (whether a consideration of love and affection excludes the presumption of advancement). 69. White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ (Ex) 36. Compare Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114, where a promise by a divorced wife to ‘conduct herself with sobriety, and in a respectable, orderly and virtuous manner’ was held to be good consideration. 70. Cases of this kind may alternatively be explained in terms of the parties not intending to enter into contractual relations. See Chapter 5. 71. (2013) 49 Fam LR 164; [2013] FamCAFC 39. 72. See  Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 182 (McHugh JA). 73. An example is Kelly v Mina [2014] NSWCA 9, where an undertaking that was literally impossible to fulfil was interpreted as an undertaking to cause the necessary conditions to be satisfied. See in particular Leeming JA at [107].

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So long as there is some sort of exchange, the courts will not balance the one side against the other. The parties are presumed to be capable of appreciating their own interests and of striking their own bargain.74 In 1587 it was said that, ‘when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action’,75 and this rejection of a quantitative test has been constantly reiterated.76 It is an axiomatic feature of the common law of contract that the parties are free to make their own bargain without interference from outside.77 Not surprisingly, the peppercorn rule has an important exception. The court will not make the attempt to match money against goods or services but it will not allow one sum of money to be consideration for a different sum of money.78 In relation to the special case of discharging a debt, a payment of $90 for a debt of $100, with the full consent of the creditor, is not a good consideration whereas a payment of $90 plus a peppercorn is. This rule will be examined in more detail below: see 4.36–4.41. 4.13  Distinction between gift and sale not always obvious. The refusal of the courts to discuss the adequacy of consideration may make it difficult, on occasion, to distinguish a gift and a sale. Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd79 illustrates the difficulty. The plaintiff was promised, as part of a promotional campaign, a record in exchange for chocolate wrappers from the defendant’s products. The argument that chocolate wrappers were part of the consideration for a record was as plausible as the view that they were merely a qualification, in the same way as getting influenza was a condition or qualification rather than a consideration in Carlill’s case.80 Nevertheless, it was held that the wrappers were a good consideration. If A promises B to give him his new Tesla for nothing, there is obviously no consideration and no contract. If A promises B to give him his new Tesla if B will fetch it from the garage, there is still no consideration and no contract. The requirement that B is to fetch the car is not the price of the promise, but the condition precedent to the operation of A’s generosity. The transaction is not a sale, but a conditional gift.81 But, if A promises B to give him his new Tesla if B will give him 10c, there is consideration and there is a contract. Such a conclusion has inspired the comment This aspect of contract law is embedded in laissez-faire economic theory: see 28.4. Sturlyn v Albany (1587) Cro Eliz 67; 78 ER 327 at 328. LSKF Holdings Pty Ltd v Shield Lifestone Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 129 at [30] (Leeming JA); Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 (grant of easement for one shilling); Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851; 114 ER 330 (occupation fee of £1 a year). Another illustration is afforded by the case of Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701 (used chocolate wrappers were consideration). Compare Wyatt v Ball [1955] St R Qd 515, where it was assumed that a request for the alteration of a name and telephone number in an advertisement, if acted upon, would be good consideration. See also Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 at 193–4 (Kirby P). 77. As already mentioned, this assumes no fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionable dealing and so forth. This principle has also been substantially changed by legislation in relation to certain contracts, for example, various types of consumer purchases, divestment of property before insolvency and contracts designed to avoid taxation. 78. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189. 79. [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701. 80. See  3.28. Lord Reid in Chappell argued that the acquisition of the wrappers was a consideration because they had to be acquired for each sale and because they constituted ‘something of value to the seller’ [1960] AC 87 at 109. The fact that the condition must be satisfied for each sale is not decisive (compare Carlill), and saying that they are ‘something of value’ adds nothing when the law does not question the adequacy of the consideration. 81. For cases where the judges experienced great difficulty in deciding whether they had to deal with a contract or a conditional gift, see Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, in which M offered land to 74. 75. 76.

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that the doctrine of consideration corresponds as little with reality and is as much a formality as the rule that a gratuitous promise becomes binding by the mere affixing of a seal.82 This may be so, but the doctrine of consideration has never been vaunted as a logical system and it has operated tolerably well for a very long time. 4.14  Manufactured consideration. From time to time the courts are prepared to go to some lengths to find a contract when there would not seem to be one. In doing so, a consideration must be found. An example is Cottee v Franklins SelfServe Pty Ltd,83 in which the Queensland Court of Appeal had to consider whether there is a contract of bailment between a supermarket and the user of a shopping trolley. It was held that there was, but the basis for this finding was not very clear. McPherson JA84 held that there was a unilateral contract whereby the supermarket offers a trolley that is fit for purpose and the customer accepts this offer by using the trolley for browsing the supermarket’s wares, such consideration being a detriment to the customer,85 whether or not the customer makes a purchase. On the other hand, Macrossan CJ said that the customer provides the consideration only when the customer pays for goods purchased. This solution has the curious effect that, if an accident occurs because of a defective trolley before check-out, the supermarket is under no contractual liability; whereas if it occurs on the way to the car park (as occurred in this case), the supermarket is under a contractual duty.86 There is some controversy as to whether a customer on premises who may or may not pay for whatever is being offered by the proprietor but who has not paid specifically to be on the premises provides consideration by simply being there.87 Another example of striving to find a consideration is De La Bere v Pearson,88 in which the defendants advertised in their newspaper that their city editor would answer inquiries from readers requesting financial advice. The plaintiff wrote asking for the name of a good stockbroker. The editor found a stockbroker who was in fact not a member of the stock exchange and who was an undischarged bankrupt. The plaintiff sent money to the stockbroker who misappropriated it. The plaintiff successfully sued the defendants on the basis that they were contractually bound to take reasonable care in providing advice or nominating a stockbroker. The consideration provided by the plaintiff was not apparently in issue, though it is by no means easy to see what consideration there was. The plaintiff paid for the copy of the paper, but did he pay for the recommendation? The mere act of sending in an inquiry can hardly be described as the price for the editor’s reply, though it could be said that it was a benefit to the editor to receive inquiries even though it was no detriment to the plaintiff

82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

Mr and Mrs B if they would come and work it (majority held contract); and Wyatt v Kreglinger & Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793; [1933] All ER Rep 349. ‘Ultimately the question of consideration is a formality as is the use of a seal or the agreement to give a peppercorn’: Hobhouse J in Vantage Navigation Corp v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138 at 147. See also Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 273. A deed is not in fact a substitute for consideration if the remedy sought is equitable. This is because equity will not assist a volunteer. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [6.22]. [1997] 1 Qd R 469. Ibid at 479. It was not considered that it was a benefit to the supermarket to have a customer browsing. The third judge, Moynihan JA, in a short judgment agreed with the other two judges that there was a breach of an implied term that the trolley should be reasonably fit for purpose. Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; 137 NTR 1; [2000] NTCA 15 (customer in pub provides consideration). Compare Calvert v Stollznow (1982) 1 NSWLR 175 at 177–8 (Samuels JA, Moffit P and Hope JA concurring) (restaurant patron does not provide consideration). [1908] 1 KB 280.

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to send one in.89 It could be argued that the plaintiff, in paying for the newspaper, also paid for the investment advice service, which was well known to him. None of these questions was canvassed by the English Court of Appeal. While, therefore, it is possible to support the decision on the ground of contract, it is not surprising that Sir Frederick Pollock should have suggested that the cause of action might be better regarded ‘as arising from default in the performance of a voluntary undertaking independent of contract’.90 The question, in other words, should be approached as a problem in tort, and, viewed from this angle, it would turn on the scope of the duty of care. To discuss this duty in any detail is outside the scope of this book; but in view of the developments in the law of negligence in connection with statements causing economic loss91 it is at least possible that, if the facts of De La Bere v Pearson were to recur, the plaintiff might succeed in an action for negligence. Another case that has puzzled contract lawyers is Gore v Van der Lann,92 in which it was held that there was a contract between the Liverpool Corporation and the plaintiff, an old-age pensioner, who was issued with a free travel pass.93 The plaintiff, ‘in consideration of my being granted a free pass’, undertook to abide by certain conditions, one of which purported to exclude liability for loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff arising out of the use of the corporation’s vehicles. She was injured while boarding a corporation bus. Although the language used in the application for the pass was couched in terms of a gratuitous revocable licence on conditions, it was held that there was a contract. The plaintiff had agreed to abide by the conditions. The fact that, in this case, the critical condition which purported to protect the corporation was void under s 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 (UK) did not seem to detract from the consideration provided by the plaintiff. The other conditions were sufficient.94 The case again raises the vexed question: what is the difference between a gift on condition and a contract?95 If the condition or conditions are sufficiently onerous, are they then regarded as the price for the promise? Certainly, in Gore v Van der Lann the conditions were not onerous, given that the only one that was a disadvantage to the plaintiff was not binding on her.96 4.15  Gifts to charitable institutions.97 Similar issues to those discussed above are raised when someone promises a gift of money to a charitable institution. If a deed under seal is not used, the question may arise whether such a promise is binding. The problem is particularly acute when the institution, in reliance on the gift, has made commitments, for example, entering into building contracts. It has been stated 89. Ibid at 287. 90. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 137. 91. See  11.87–11.91. 92. [1967] 2 QB 31. 93. Other free pass cases in which no contract was found are Cosgrove v Horsfall (1946) 62 TLR 140 and Wilkie v LPTB [1947] 1 All ER 258. 94. As noted in 4.6, there is usually no call for severing the consideration. 95. See  4.13. 96. If the condition requires the expenditure of money by the promisee, there is more likely to be a consideration. See, for example, Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211 (promise to transfer house if transferee paid outstanding mortgage instalments). 97. This treatment focuses on a limited issue within a complex area of the law which includes trusts and taxation law. See Dal Pont, Law of Charity (2nd ed, 2017). For example, the argument that a contract exists may thwart the tax law that allows deductions for charitable gifts.

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that mere reliance is not enough,98 though it should be possible in Australia to argue for the enforceability of such a promise on the basis of promissory estoppel in an appropriate case.99 If conditions are attached to the gift, does this convert it into a contract? For example, if the donor specifies that the money must be used for a certain purpose or that a plaque must be erected acknowledging the donor’s contribution, is a contract thereby created? Although the cases on this problem are sparse, there is sufficient authority to support the proposition that a return promise (that the money will be used for certain purposes) would be sufficient to create a contract.100 It seems that acts performed at the promisor’s request would also suffice to create a unilateral contract.101 Whether a consideration is provided if other subscribers promise money because of the promisor’s subscription is doubtful.102

Illusory consideration 4.16  The meaning of ‘illusory consideration’. The expression ‘illusory consideration’ is self-contradictory but serves a useful purpose in describing those cases where a supposed consideration fails. Some of the rules under which contract is denied, to be discussed in this chapter or in other chapters, could broadly embrace the concept of illusory consideration. Cases where the agreement is uncertain,103 or where there is a promise to do either the same or less than an existing obligation,104 or where the promise is made in honour only without attracting legal consequences,105 or where the promise is to do something illegal,106 could all be described as illusory. Here the word is used to describe two classes of cases that are not explained by any of the other rules discussed here and in other chapters: ‘promises’ that appear to be discretionary and ‘promises’ that lack content. 4.17  Discretionary ‘promises’. What appears to be a promise may, on closer examination, amount to an optional or discretionary ‘promise’: Whenever words which by themselves constitute a promise were accompanied by words which shewed that the promisor was to have a discretion or option as to whether he would carry out that which purported to be the promise, the result was that there was no contract on which an action could be brought at all.107

An example would be an exemption clause that removed all liability for breach of the supposed promise. The very essence of an executory contract is missing if a person is in fact not bound either to perform the promise or to pay damages in lieu.

98. See  Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 (where many of the relevant cases are discussed). 99. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 discussed in 2.7. 100. Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 at 597; The National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v O’Hea (1904) 29 VLR 814 at 821–2. 101. Re Soames (1897) 13 TLR 439 (S promised to leave money for the maintenance or advancement of a school. Held that acts done in reliance on this promise were sufficient to make it binding). 102. Governors of Dalhousie [1934] 3 DLR 593 at 595. See 3.8 on multi-party contracts. 103. See  Chapter 6. 104. See  4.29–4.41. 105. See  Chapter 5. 106. See  Chapter 18. A promise to do something illegal is not a good consideration: Aravco Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 419 at 427 (Sheller JA, Powell JA concurring). 107. Vaughan Williams LJ in Loftus v Roberts (1902) 18 TLR 532 at 534 adopted by Kitto J in Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 at 356.

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An exemption clause that ‘covers the field’ will be rare but in three Australian cases such clauses have been found. In British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd,108 clause 9 of an agreement to supply films to be exhibited stated that ‘under no circumstances shall the distributor be in any way liable for failure to supply to the exhibitor any of the films contemplated by the agreement’. The clause was held to have rendered illusory the executory promise to provide films. Similarly, Barwick CJ in MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA)109 held that there was in effect no promise by the airline to carry passengers. The ‘exemption of the ticket in this case fully occupies the whole area of possible obligation, leaving no room for the existence of a contract of carriage’.110 In Gippsreal Ltd v Registrar of Titles & Kurek Investments Pty Ltd,111 a lender (Gippsreal) used a standard form document for its lending arrangements. The document contained many obligations imposed on the proposed borrower, including that it must pay for preliminary costs and disbursements incurred by Gippsreal for setting up the loan and that Gippsreal had a charge over the land that was to secure the loan. Kurek, the borrower, signed this document. The document included a clause that stated that Gippsreal was not in any way obliged to provide a loan and that no contractual relationship came into existence until the loan was actually made. Gippsreal incurred preliminary costs and disbursements but then Kurek decided not to go ahead with the transaction. Gippsreal sued for the costs. The court upheld the trial judge’s finding that there was no contract. This was because Gippsreal had not undertaken to do anything. The consideration was said to be illusory.112 An English case, Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane,113 held that the voluminous terms (49 pages) of an internet site agreement included at least three terms that meant that the site provider promised nothing. There was therefore no contract governing the relationship. These cases show the danger of going too far in attempting to provide protection. For this reason, in such cases the plaintiff will be in the ironical position of arguing that its exemption clause has left some area of operation (however small), or else run the risk that there is no contract and therefore no remedy. The courts will lean against construing an exemption clause as so wide as to cancel all promises given by the person relying on the clause. This approach is consistent with the view that exemption clauses should be construed strictly so as to minimise the area of exemption. Such an approach is shown in Barnett v Ira L & A C Berk Pty Ltd,114 where Owen J115 said that, where the parties evidently intend to contract, the court should be slow to construe an exemption clause so as to defeat 108. [1943] VLR 163. 109. (1975) 133 CLR 125. 110. Ibid at 133. 111. (2007) 20 VR 157; [2007] VSCA 279. 112. Compare Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160 (in exchange for loan application fee, loan facilitator agreed to exercise best endeavours to find a suitable loan facility; held there was a good consideration). 113. [2012] EWHC 1290 (Comm). 114. (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 268. 115. Ibid at 275 (Street CJ and Herron J concurring).

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that intention. It is perhaps significant that in both MacRobertson Miller and British Empire Films, the judges were able to find a consideration by one means or another. In the first case, Barwick CJ found that there was a unilateral offer by a passenger that was accepted once the airline had completed its task of carrying the passenger.116 In the second case, the distribution company’s promise not to supply films to theatres that engaged in price-cutting was held to be a sufficient consideration.117 Alternatively, a contract was created when films were actually supplied.118 A similar attempt in Gippsreal — it was argued that the borrower invited a unilateral contract by giving the go-ahead for the lender to undertake the preliminary work — was not successful. When a promise is made with the rider ‘if I feel like it’ or some such similar qualification, there is clearly no promise at all. On the other hand, the position is not so clear if the rider is ‘when I can’ or ‘when I am in a financial position to do so’. The courts have been extraordinarily generous in upholding promises of the latter type. Such promises are vulnerable to attack either on the ground of uncertainty or as being illusory. In Head v Kelk,119 a promise by someone to repay a loan ‘when he was financially able to do so’ was upheld as valid, as was an agreement in which the promisor undertook to do his best to pay weekly maintenance for an illegitimate child in Egel v Drogemuller.120 In Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,121 a contract of loan, in which a husband borrower promised his wife that he would repay with interest when he was in a position to do so, was not challenged on the ground that the promise by the husband was illusory. Other similar cases are collected and discussed by Herron J in Head v Kelk.122 Similarly, ‘best endeavours’ clauses are not challenged as being either uncertain or illusory.123 By contrast, in Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd124 Sholl J was not prepared to give contractual force to a loan agreement in which the company would repay when it considered it was in a position to do so. ‘Either it is illusory, or it is not sufficiently certain to be enforceable.’125 This case may have involved a truly discretionary promise because the company could determine when it was in a position to repay whilst in cases like Casey the ability to repay could be determined more objectively. This may explain the difference between Bailes and the other cases, though Sholl J preferred to base his decision on uncertainty rather than on the argument that the

116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

124. 125.

(1975) 133 CLR 125 at 133–4. [1943] VLR 163 at 169. Ibid at 170–1. (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340; [1962] NSWR 1363. See also Universal Greening Pty Ltd v Sabine [1997] FCA 529; Heys v Gold Ribbon Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2000] TASSC 17. [1936] SASR 407. See also Rademacher v Kassab [2005] SASC 43 (agreement under which a loan would be repaid when the borrower was able to do so). [1959] NZLR 1052. [1962] NSWR 1363 at 1371; (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340 at 344–5. See also Sholl J in Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd [1964] VR 436 at 440–1; GoConnect Ltd v Sino Strategic International Ltd (in liq) [2016] VSCA 315 at [47]–[55]. Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; 306 ALR 25; [2014] HCA 7; Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83; 30 ALR 201; [1980] HCA 15; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417; [1984] HCA 64; Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan [2012] VSCA113; Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160. Best endeavours means reasonable endeavours in the circumstances: Hospital Products. See 6.7. [1964] VR 436. Followed in Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [1888] (Owen J). See also Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 discussed in 5.28; Argyll Park Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd v Glen Pacific Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 1. [1964] VR 436 at 441.

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promise was illusory.126 In Re Theodorou,127 it was held that a standard term that gave a bank the right unilaterally to vary the conditions of the contract did not render the consideration illusory because there were special terms that did have promissory content and these overrode the standard term. As long as there is some vestige of an objectively ascertainable obligation that can be broken by the promisor, then the promise probably amounts to a good consideration.128 In Meehan v Jones,129 it was held that a purchaser was entitled to the protection of a finance clause that allowed him to determine whether or not available finance was ‘satisfactory’. It was argued that this clause effectively rendered the purchaser’s performance voluntary. It was held that the purchaser was obliged to exercise a bona fide choice about satisfactory finance and thus did not have an unfettered discretion. A vestige of an obligation was there. A case mentioned in this context is Ledingham v Bermejo Estancia Co Ltd.130 A lent money to a company which was in financial difficulties. Later, in order to induce the company to continue trading, A promised that interest due on the loans would be waived ‘until such time as the company is in a position to pay the interest’. It was held that the later agreement was a valid contract. The case is sometimes cited as supporting the view that a seemingly discretionary promise amounts to a good consideration. But the exchange in this case was that the creditor agreed to suspend or waive interest due on the original agreement for a period in consideration for the company’s keeping on trading. The discretionary element in this case went to the question of the period of suspension or waiver. The consideration provided by the company was continuing to trade at A’s request. 4.18  Promises lacking content. It has already been noted that a promise made in consideration of natural love and affection was treated, at least at common law, as being unsupported by consideration.131 On the other hand, a promise to make an offer is well recognised.132 The dividing line between promises that the law treats as lacking content and those that are a good consideration, though worthless in economic terms, is sometimes hard to discern. The point is illustrated by Dunton v Dunton,133 in which a divorced wife’s promise to ‘conduct herself with sobriety, and in a respectable, orderly and virtuous manner’ was held to be a good consideration 126. In Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130, an employment contract promising an ‘option to participate in the Company’s senior staff equity sharing scheme’, such scheme not having been established by the company, was found to be either illusory or too uncertain. A similar case is Pepe v Platypus Asset Management Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 603. See also Ellington v Heinrich Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 475 (schedule for insurance policies left blank — obligation to insure illusory). Contrast Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 (‘5% equity’ unascertained but majority considered that it was sufficiently ascertainable); Dayeian v Davidson (2010) 76 NSWLR 512; [2010] NSWCA 42 at [60] (Campbell JA, Basten and Macfarlan JJA concurring) (contract entitling someone to occupy land ‘for as long as you live or wish to stay’ sufficiently certain so long as other requirements for a contract are met). 127. [1993] 1 Qd R 588. 128. In O’Sullivan Partners (Advisory) Pty Ltd v Foggo [2012] NSWCA 40, the New South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider a promise to provide a discretionary bonus. No issue arose as to whether the promise was illusory. It was held that failure to pay was a breach of contract. 129. (1982) 149 CLR 571. See 6.6. See also Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 (‘5% equity’ unascertained but majority considered that it was sufficiently ascertainable). 130. [1947] 1 All ER 749. 131. See  4.12. 132. See the discussion of a right of pre-emption at 3.67. See also Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [60]–[63] (Gageler J). 133. (1892) 18 VLR 114.

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for a promise of maintenance. The majority134 of the Supreme Court of Victoria contemplated (it seems with some prurience) what Mrs Dunton might have been free to do had she not made the promise. The minority judge, Hood J, thought that this was an illusory promise, citing White v Bluett,135 where a promise by a son not to bore his father was found to be illusory. A special class of case, illustrated by Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G,136 holds that governments cannot fetter their ability to govern. In Rothmans, the government undertaking not to legislate was held to be illusory.137 The cases under this heading are necessarily heterogeneous and may, in the final analysis, be said to be no more than examples of situations in which common sense dictates that the supposed promises are without content. Perhaps, in order to test a particular promise’s content, the question may be asked: could either specific performance be ordered or damages assessed for its breach?138 But this test is by no means complete and the courts may be influenced by other factors, particularly whether or not the promise was apparently contractual in intention. For example, in Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd,139 it was held that a clause in an agreement that imposed an obligation to mediate or conciliate was enforceable in principle, so long as the conduct required of the parties for participation in the process was sufficiently certain. It is common for parties to ‘dress up’ their agreement to make it look like a contract by using the language of consideration. But if what is stated to be a consideration turns out to have no content, then there will be no legal consideration. This is illustrated by McKay v National Australia Bank Ltd,140 where borrowers were asked to provide a fresh and more extensive guarantee in consideration for the bank ‘providing banking accommodation’ and for ‘forbearing to enforce immediate payment’ of the debt. In fact, no new financial accommodation was provided — the borrowers just continued to have the existing loan — and no demand had been made for repayment of the money. The Court of Appeal held that the fresh guarantee was not enforceable for want of consideration.141 It is clear from Dunton that refraining from doing what one is authorised to do, at the request of the promisor, is a good consideration. In Jamieson v Renwick,142 promises not to reside in a certain place, not to claim or attempt to claim any interest in the defendant’s land and not to visit the defendant were all upheld as being valid consideration.143 On the other hand, a promise not to annoy or interfere with the 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

Higinbotham CJ and Williams J. (1853) 23 LJ (NS) Ex 36. [1991] 2 NZLR 323. See further Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 5. The majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Kirby P and McHugh JA) in Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 found that a promise to provide an ‘option to participate in the company’s senior staff equity sharing scheme’, when such scheme was non-existent, was illusory because, among other things, it could not be valued. (1992) 28 NSWLR 194. But compare Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 709. See 6.16. [1998] 1 VR 173. The borrowers made some payments to reduce the debt and then argued, having discovered that the guarantee was unenforceable, that the payments were involuntary payments. This argument was not successful: McKay v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] 4 VR 677. (1891) 17 VLR 124. Ibid at 126–7.

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defendant was not because, it was said, a promise not to do an unlawful act is not a good consideration.144 Clearly, where the unlawful act is a threat to the promisor, a promise not to do it in exchange for a benefit is blackmail. A promise to refrain from unlawful conduct that would not adversely affect the promisor probably does not constitute good consideration because such a promise amounts to an undertaking to perform an existing duty, namely, not to break the law. Thus, although promising to give up smoking would be a good consideration,145 promising to give up smoking cannabis would not, though, on any other test of consideration, promising to give up smoking cannabis may well be a benefit to the other party (for example, a father promising payment to a son for refraining from smoking cannabis). Illegality as such is not involved so that it could not be said to be an illegal contract. If, as is argued below,146 performing an existing duty should in appropriate circumstances be a good consideration, there is no reason why promising to give up smoking cannabis should not be a good consideration. We now turn to specific rules which determine what does and does not amount to a good consideration.

Past consideration 4.19  A past consideration is no consideration. In order to understand fully what this rule means, it is necessary to clarify terminology that is used in the law of contract. The accepted classification of consideration is into the two categories, executory and executed. The classification reflects the two different ways in which the plaintiff may ‘buy’ the defendant’s promise. Consideration is called executory when the defendant’s promise is made in return for a counter-promise from the plaintiff (bilateral contract) and executed when it is made in return for the performance of an act (unilateral contract).147 It is, respectively, the counter-promise or the act that constitute the consideration for the defendant’s promise and without which the defendant would not be bound. An agreement for the sale of goods for future delivery, payment on delivery, is an example of the former. At the time when the agreement is made, nothing has yet been done to fulfil the mutual promises of the bargain. The whole performance remains in the future, yet the parties are bound from the moment of agreement. Of the latter (unilateral contract) the best example is the offer of a reward for an act. If A offers $50 to anyone who returns a lost dog, the return of the dog by B in response to the reward offer is at once the acceptance of the offer and the performance of the act constituting the required consideration. B has earned the reward by returning the dog, and only the offeror’s promise remains outstanding. The consideration provided by B is called an executed consideration. But whether the plaintiff relies upon an executory or on an executed consideration, it must be shown that the promise or act, together with the defendant’s promise, constitute one single transaction.148 The rule that a past consideration is no consideration is linked to the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. 144. Ibid at 127. 145. Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256. 146. See  4.35. 147. See  3.28 for further discussion of unilateral contract. 148. In Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65, it was argued that a son-in-law undertook to his mother-in-law to bury his deceased wife in a burial plot in exchange for the mother-in-law transferring the licence to the plot to the son-in-law so that he could eventually be buried with his wife. The court could not construe

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This latter maxim embodies the idea of a contemporaneous and mutual exchange. A promisee who has already provided something (that is, before he or she became a promisee) does not satisfy this rule. If the defendant makes a promise, subsequent to, and independent of, a transaction, or promises to reward someone for a past kind deed, it is regarded as a mere expression of gratitude for past favours or as a gift, and no contract will arise. In such a case the promise is declared, in traditional language, to be made upon a past consideration or, more accurately, to be made without consideration at all. Two cases illustrate what is a past consideration. In Anderson v Glass,149 G promised to give his overseer increased wages, not only for the future but for a past period during which the wages had been at a lower rate. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the promise to pay increased wages for the past period, being based upon a past consideration, did not constitute a binding contract. In Roscorla v Thomas,150 the plaintiff had bought a horse from the defendant. After the sale, the defendant promised the plaintiff in consideration of the sale that the horse was ‘sound and free from vice’. The plaintiff sued for breach of this promise. The court held (1) that the sale did not itself imply a warranty that the horse was sound and free from vice; and (2) that the express promise was made after the sale was over and was unsupported by fresh consideration. The plaintiff could show nothing but a past consideration and could not therefore enforce the promise about the horse’s supposed good qualities. This principle is of some importance in modern commercial life. For example, it is essential in ticket cases that displayed terms are visible before the contract is made151 and that agreement to terms and conditions on the internet is secured before the goods or services are ordered.152 4.20  Services performed at defendant’s request. The distinction between executed and past consideration, while comparatively easy to state in the abstract, is sometimes difficult to apply in practice. Both the distinction and the difficulty were appreciated by the judges before the close of the sixteenth century. They were required to consider the position where the plaintiff had performed services for the defendant without any agreement for remuneration and the defendant had subsequently promised to pay for them. They decided that assumpsit would lie if, but only if, the services were originally performed at the defendant’s request.153 The law was settled in this sense in 1615 in the case of Lampleigh v Brathwait.154 Thomas Brathwait had killed Patrick Mahume and had then asked Anthony the conversations as contractual promises; rather, they were sequential gift promises. In addition, there was no intention to create legal relations. However, an estoppel operated: see 2.15. 149. (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152. See also Magripilis v Baird [1924] St R Qd 303; Ahern v Power [1953] QWN 22; Re Gem Meat Production Pty Ltd (in liq); Ex parte Lindquist [1960] WAR 105; Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669; [1951] 1 All ER 905. 150. (1842) 3 QB 234; 114 ER 496. See Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301; Re Sander (1934) 7 ABC 129 (possible promise by father to repay money advanced by third party to daughter. Held: not enforceable as only supported by a past consideration). 151. See  3.21, 10.71. Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir). See also 3.7. 152. See  153. See  Hunt v Bate (1568) 3 Dyer 272a; 73 ER 605 and Sidenham and Worlington’s Case (1585) 2 Leon 324; 74 ER 497. 154. (1615) Hob 105; 80 ER 255. For a full discussion of the authorities, see Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186.

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Lampleigh to do all he could to get a pardon for him from the King. Lampleigh exerted himself to this end, ‘riding and journeying to and from London and Newmarket’ at his own expense, and Brathwait afterwards promised him £100 for his trouble. He failed to pay it and Lampleigh sued in assumpsit. It was argued that the consideration was past, but the court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that his services had been procured by the previous request of the defendant. The previous request and the subsequent promise were thus to be treated as part of the same, somewhat attenuated, transaction. This ruling is of great practical importance because of the way people commonly conduct business. It is a common practice, for example, to ring someone up and ask them to provide a service or deliver goods. Nothing is said about payment. But it is obvious that the person will charge for the services or goods. A subsequent undertaking to pay is referable back to the original telephone conversation and fills in a gap in that conversation, namely, the fact that nothing was expressly said about price. It cannot then be said that, because a vital element is missing, the bargain is incomplete.155 4.21  Distinction between past and executed consideration obscured. This view of executed consideration was applied at the end of the seventeenth century to cases where the defendant promised to pay a debt which, though it had once existed in fact, was not enforceable at the time of the promise, owing to some technical rule of law. Thus, in Ball v Hesketh,156 the defendant, when a minor, had borrowed money from the plaintiff and, after coming of age, had promised to repay it. In accordance with the general immunity conferred by the law upon minors, he could not have been made liable on the original loan. But it was held that his subsequent promise entitled the plaintiff to sue him in assumpsit. So, too, in Hyleing v Hastings157 it was held that a debt, the recovery of which was barred by the statute of limitations, was revived by a subsequent promise of payment. At the same time, the courts held that a plaintiff who sued on a negotiable instrument need only show that value had once been given for it by some previous holder and was absolved from the necessity of proving fresh consideration. All these developments threatened to obliterate the distinction between executed and past consideration and to sustain the validity of what appeared to be a gratuitous promise. 4.22  Settlement of question in nineteenth century. When, in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of consideration was settled, it became necessary to delimit afresh the boundaries of past and executed consideration. This was achieved by accepting the test of Lampleigh v Brathwait that the plaintiff’s services must have been rendered at the defendant’s request, but emphasising the further fact that both parties must have assumed throughout their negotiations that the services were ultimately to be paid for.158 They must have been performed in the way of business, not merely for friendship. This ‘revised version’ was adopted by the court in Re Casey’s Patents; 155. See  6.8 for discussion of incompleteness. 156. (1697) Comb 381; 90 ER 541. 157. (1699) 1 Ld Raym 389; 91 ER 1157. See also Sutton, ‘Existing Debt as Consideration’ (1957) 7 Res Judicatae 383 and Stoljar, ‘Consideration of Request’ (1966) 5 MULR 314. 158. This further fact, though it was not expressed by the court in Lampleigh v Brathwait, seems, on the whole, to be implicit in the language of the judgment.

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Stewart v Casey.159 A and B, the joint owners of certain patent rights, wrote to C as follows: ‘In consideration of your services as the practical manager in working our patents, we hereby agree to give you one-third share of the patents’. In an action that turned upon the effect of this agreement it was argued for A and B that their promise was made only in return for C’s past services as manager and that there was therefore no consideration to support it. Bowen LJ refused to accept this argument, and said: [T]he fact of a past service raises an implication that at the time it was rendered it was to be paid for, and, if it was a service which was to be paid for, when you get in the subsequent document a promise to pay, that promise may be treated either as an admission which evidences or as a positive bargain which fixes the amount of that reasonable remuneration on the faith of which the service was originally rendered. So that here for past services there is ample justification for the promise to give the third share.160

On this reasoning the fact that the promise was subsequent to the performance of the services was irrelevant. The original request was accompanied by a tacit understanding of recompense, and even if no express promise had ensued, the plaintiff might still have recovered reasonable remuneration on a quantum meruit. One view is that the express promise merely relieved the courts of the necessity of valuing the service. Another is that the abandonment of the claim to a quantum meruit is good consideration for the promise to pay a definite sum. But, either way, the promisee is entitled to be paid what he or she has been promised. The courts will in commercial transactions lean in favour of applying the principle in Re Casey’s Patents, or something analogous to it, rather than finding that there is only a past consideration.161 Even though the timing of arrangements between the parties may not follow the order that theoretical purity would dictate, the courts will treat the total transaction as one that is enforceable.162 Thus, in Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd,163 a guarantee was given in respect of money that had already been agreed to be loaned and part of which had already been loaned, but the bulk of which had yet to be advanced by the creditor. The trial judge, Yeldham J, had found that there was merely a past consideration in this arrangement but found an alternative consideration in (it would seem) a promise to perform an existing duty to a third party. The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the consideration was not past and that the guarantee applied to the whole amount.164 The reasoning of McHugh JA was not altogether clear but relied on the subsequent advances as being a good consideration rather than on the notion of implied request inherent in the Re Casey’s Patents principle (which was not specifically mentioned).

159. [1892] 1 Ch 104. See also Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677; 143 ER 268; Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186; Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052. 160. [1892] 1 Ch 104 at 115–16. 161. Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 at [23] (Callaway JA), [51] (Eames AJA); Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v Robertson [2005] VSC 347 at [122]–[125] (Dodds-Streeton J) upheld on appeal: [2007] VSCA 29. Coghlan v SH Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 (Privy Council); Forbes Engineering (Asia) PTE 162. See  Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 at [173] (Collier J). 163. (1987) 10 NSWLR 311. 164. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Coghlan v S H Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 particularly at 94.

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An application and extension of the principle in Re Casey’s Patents can be found in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long.165 In that case, purchasers of publicly listed shares undertook to the vendor company not to sell 60 per cent of the shares for a year. In a subsequent agreement, the principal owners of the vendor company promised the purchasers that they would indemnify them against any loss that they might suffer when they sold the shares after the year had elapsed. On the face of it, this second agreement seemed to be one-sided — a mere promise of indemnity. The Privy Council held that there was consideration for the promise of indemnity, namely, the earlier promise by the purchasers not to sell for a year. The purchasers expected some quid pro quo for this promise. The subsequent agreement provided it.166 The case is an extension of Re Casey’s Patents because it applied the principle to a subsequent promise of some benefit other than the mere payment of a sum of money. 4.23  Exceptions to rule that past consideration is insufficient. True exceptions to the past consideration rule have already been noted: the promise by an adult to pay a debt incurred during minority; the acknowledgement of a debt barred by the statute of limitations; and the liability to pay on a negotiable instrument. The position in relation to promises to pay debts incurred during minority is complicated; it is dealt with in Chapter 17.167 In relation to the second class, at common law the courts developed the rule that an acknowledgement of a statute-barred debt, either by words or by making a payment, imported a promise to pay which revived the debt.168 But did the plaintiff sue on the original debt or on the new promise? If the latter, then this seemed to represent an exception to the past consideration rule because there appeared to be nothing given in exchange for the later promise except the past liability. Now the position is governed by statute.169 The third class of case, where the defendant is sued on a negotiable instrument, survives as a genuine exception to the ban upon past consideration. It is to be explained as a concession to longstanding commercial custom, and it has been confirmed by s 32(1) of the Commonwealth Bills of Exchange Act 1909.170 By this section, ‘valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by (a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or (b) an antecedent debt or liability …’. To the same effect is s 35 of the Cheques Act 1986 (Cth). 165. [1980] AC 614 also discussed in 4.34, 13.7. See also Re Douglas; Ex parte Starkey (1987) 75 ALR 97; QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479 at [25]–[31] (Ann Lyons J) (solicitor–client costs agreement); Robertson v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 095 803 286) [2007] VSCA 29 at [54]–[55] (Habersberger AJA); Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199 (forbearance to sue assumed from implicit request). 166. Pao On was considered in Sandtara Pty Ltd v Longreach Group Ltd [2008] NSWSC 373, but the promise of remuneration was found to be too vague or an agreement to agree. However, the plaintiff succeeded on the basis of quantum meruit. See also Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 at [59]–[60]; Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2018] WASCA 90 at [81]–[86]; Robertson v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 29 at [55]. 167. See  17.24–17.28. 168. See the discussion in Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052 at 1058–62. See also 25.8. 169. See  25.8. The legislation differs in detail in the various jurisdictions. 170. In Oliver v Davis [1949] 2 KB 727; [1949] 2 All ER 353, it was held that the ‘antecedent debt or liability’ must be that of the maker or negotiator of the instrument and not of a stranger. See Walsh, Spriggs, Nolan and Finney v Hoag & Bosch Pty Ltd [1977] VR 178 at 183 (Young CJ); Dventures Pty Ltd v Wily [2001] NSWSC 641 at [58]–[62] (McLaughlin M).

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The cases on promises to pay debts that are unenforceable have attracted academic commentary,171 and some aspects of the law in this area are, to say the least, irrational. Whether the rule represents an example of a promise enforceable in the absence of consideration is an unresolved controversy. One theory is that such promises are supported by the consideration of forbearance (see 4.24) that has evidently been extended by the creditor. But this was regarded as a convenient fiction by Denning J in Bob Guiness Ltd v Salomonsen.172 Although a bare promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations is enforceable at common law, the same promise cannot be consideration for a counter-promise.173 Why this is so is not clear, because to promise to pay a debt that the debtor does not have to pay is surely a benefit to the other party (and a detriment to the debtor). The apparent anomaly may be justified in so far as a promise to pay an existing debt in exchange for a counter-promise is merely promising to perform an existing duty,174 that is, the debt, though barred, is still in existence. (The defect is merely procedural and not substantive.) However, when a bare promise to pay the debt is made, it is said that the consideration for such a promise is the original consideration. The position relating to debts barred by the statute of limitations is to be contrasted with debts discharged by bankruptcy. Although at common law a promise by a debtor to pay such a debt was held to be binding,175 this is no longer so because of s 153 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), under which a bare promise to pay the discharged debt will not be enforced by the courts.176 On the other hand, such a promise can be a good consideration for a counter-promise.177 Thus a promise to pay a debt that is entirely extinguished is a good consideration for a counter-promise whereas a promise to pay a debt that is merely unenforceable is not.178

Forbearance and compromise 4.24  Promise to settle. A very important rule of consideration in practical terms is the rule that a compromise of a claim, settlement of a dispute or a forbearance to sue will constitute a good consideration.179 These cases have sometimes been classed into two groups: those where the party threatened admits liability, but offers some promise to postpone litigation; and those where he or she denies liability but prefers to settle rather than to fight. In the first class, it is said, there is a ‘forbearance to sue’, in the second a ‘compromise (or settlement) of the suit’. The cases raise similar 171. Sutton, ‘Existing Debt as Consideration’ (1957) 7 Res Judicatae 383. 172. [1948] 2 KB 42 at 47. 173. Wigan v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291 at 297 (Parker J); Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 at 231–2 (Lord Hanworth). 174. Promising to perform an existing contractual duty has not been regarded as a good consideration: see 4.32. But this rule has changed: see 4.35. 175. See  Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 381. 176. Watson v McFadden (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 128. 177. Jakeman v Cook (1878–9) 4 Ex D 26; Wild v Tucker [1914] 3 KB 36. A promise to pay a debt discharged after a composition of creditors agreement cannot be enforced by the courts: see 4.40. 178. In the context of promises to pay past debts, see Sharp v Ellis; Re Edward Love & Co Pty Ltd [1972] VR 137 (promissory notes to pay past ultra vires debt not supported by good consideration). Compare Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 (performance of unenforceable duty regarded as a good consideration) discussed in 4.31. 179. A convenient summary of the rules on compromise and forbearance can be found in Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 at 96 (Isaacs J); Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 at [2]–[19] (Kourakis CJ). See also Stoljar, ‘The Consideration of Forbearance’ (1965) 5 MULR 34.

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arguments and will be dealt with together. Perhaps the point should be emphasised that a threat to sue is not necessary in these cases. Any settlement of an actual or potential dispute is sufficient to provide a consideration because it is always a benefit to the party against whom a complaint has been made to be rid of the complaint. The reason why this aspect of consideration is of such practical importance is that it is the basis for every settlement of a legal claim, whatever the nature of the cause of action. So, for example, every motor accident case that is settled out of court ends up as a contract. It will be seen from the discussion below that the courts, as a matter of policy, encourage settlement rather than litigation, and this policy concern has had an effect on shaping the way the rules are applied. A compromise agreement falls into two, or possibly three, classes.180 The first is termed an ‘accord executory’ which is in the form of a unilateral contract whereby the plaintiff promises to abandon a claim in exchange for the defendant doing something (usually paying money).181 The second type of compromise agreement is termed ‘accord and satisfaction’ whereby the plaintiff promises to abandon the claim in exchange for the defendant promising to do something.182 The significance of the distinction arises when the defendant fails to do what is required and the effect this has on the original cause of action or complaint that is being settled. In the case of an accord executory, where the defendant fails to perform the requested act, the plaintiff’s original rights continue on and can be enforced and no settlement agreement has eventuated.183 In the case of an accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff has forgone his or her original rights and can only enforce the settlement agreement.184 Thus, in the case of accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff replaces the original claim (which may or may not have succeeded) with an enforceable contract. There is a third category whereby the parties make an accord and satisfaction that is conditional, that is, the plaintiff only abandons his or her original rights so long as the defendant carries out his or her promise but, failing that, the plaintiff’s original rights can still be enforced.185 The question whether there has been an accord and satisfaction (or another category of settlement) is one of fact.186 The difference between these three possibilities depends on the drafting of the agreement and, ideally, as Phillips JA pointed out in Osborn v McDermott, the agreement should specify what is the consequence of the defendant failing to perform.187 The interpretation of a settlement agreement188 can 180. See extensive discussion with historical background in Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 159; [2011] WASCA 159 at [14]–[33]. 181. An attempt at settlement can, of course, occur the other way around. For example, a debtor may send a cheque stipulating that banking of the cheque will constitute settlement of the claim. This can give rise to some complicated problems, which are fully canvassed by Currie, ‘Accord and Satisfaction by Way of Full Settlement Cheque’ (2011) 27 JCL 119. See Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 395 discussed in 3.46 and by Currie. 182. McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 183–5 (Dixon J). See extensive discussion in El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 at [47]–[69] (McColl JA, Handley and Ipp JA concurring). 183. An example is Blue Moon Grill Pty Ltd v Yorkey’s Knob Boating Club Inc [2006] QCA 253. 184. FCT v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500; 154 ALR 1; [1998] HCA 33 at [116] (Gummow J). 185. Osborn v McDermott [1998] 3 VR 1 at 9–10 (Phillips JA). 186. El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 at [54] (McColl JA, Handley and Ipp JJA concurring). McColl JA also discussed the effect of withdrawing proceedings and whether waiver is an appropriate concept. 187. See  Zivkovic v Parke [2022] VSCA 43 at [75]–[90] where Kyrou JA (Beach and Walker JJA concurring) sets out the principles relating to the construction of settlement agreements. 188. There are some special rules unique to interpretation of settlement agreements, in particular in relation to the role of recitals and the coverage of the release. See Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954)

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be difficult if it has not been drafted well. In Jingalong Pty Ltd v Todd,189 the trial judge decided that an agreement was an accord executory that had been broken, and so the original cause of action still existed. The Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion. Sackville AJA pointed out that the court must interpret the agreement and the parties’ intention in accordance with normal principles rather than necessarily applying the labels discussed above.190 One of the curiosities of the legal world is that settlements are very commonly embodied in deeds. This is a mystery because there is no doubt about consideration.191 The common law required that an accrued cause of action must be released by deed but then recognised that this could be achieved by an agreement for valuable consideration amounting to an accord and satisfaction.192 4.25  Compromise of doubtful case is valid. It was originally held that a promise not to pursue a claim which in truth was without legal basis could not be good consideration. It was said that it could be no detriment to give up a claim which had little or no prospect of success and no benefit to the other party to be saved from such an action.193 But in the nineteenth century this position was abandoned, and the compromise of a doubtful claim was upheld by the courts. The change was justified on grounds of convenience. In the words of Bowen LJ, in Miles v New Zealand Alford Estate Co: The reality of the claim which is given up must be measured, not by the state of the law as it is ultimately discovered to be, but by the state of the knowledge of the person who at the time has to judge and make the concession. Otherwise you would have to try the whole cause to know if the man had a right to compromise it.194

In the modern law the consideration in such cases is said to be the surrender, not of a legal right, which may or may not exist and whose existence, at the time of the compromise, remains untested, but of the claim to such a right. 4.26  Safeguards surrounding the rule. If the claim is in fact baseless, the claimant, by the compromise, has obtained something for nothing. And there is potential for harassment in order to extract a payment.195 The rule has therefore certain safeguards. A plaintiff who relies upon the surrender of a claim to support a contract must be prepared to prove:

189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.

91 CLR 112 at 123–32 (Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ); Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [172]–[174] (Bathurst CJ). See extensive discussion of Grant in Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 at [15]–[52] (Leeming JA). See also Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [5.4]. [2015] NSWCA 7. Ibid at [68]–[69] (Meagher and Leeming JJA concurring). See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [1.11], [6.5]. A general point made in this book is that, where there is a choice between contract and deed, a contract should be used. This is because there are many technical ways that a deed can fail. McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 183–5 (Dixon J). Stone v Wythipol (1588) Cro Eliz 126; 78 ER 383. (1886) 32 CLD 266 at 291; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1726 at 1735. See also Callisher v Bischoffsheim (1870) LR 5 QB 449 and Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 especially at 96. This issue involves the notion of voluntariness and mistaken payments under the law of restitution. See the discussion by Ormiston JA in Hookway v Racing Victoria Ltd [2005] VSCA 310. It also may involve economic duress: see Chapter 13.

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1. that the claim is reasonable in itself, and not ‘vexatious or frivolous’;196 2. that he or she has an honest belief in the chance of its success; and 3. that he or she has not knowingly concealed from the other party any fact that might affect its validity.197 The dilemma which can be posed by these cases is well illustrated by Ballantyne v Phillott.198 Over a number of years a man gave or loaned sums of money to his mistress. After they had fallen out, the man sued for return of these sums but withdrew the claim. The parties then signed two documents, one a badly drafted informal statement and the other a statutory declaration, the evident intention of which was that each agreed to give up any claims against the other. The majority of the High Court (Menzies and Windeyer JJ) were not convinced that the mistress was giving up anything, even if the documents could be construed as containing an exchange of promises (which they doubted). The allegations which she made — that she might have been able to sue him for libel and that she was entitled to costs arising out of the discontinued action — were not accepted, with the result that she provided no consideration by giving up non-existent rights against her former lover. Accordingly, his promise not to sue for return of money was not barred by the documents. Dixon CJ dissented and, though troubled by the unsatisfactory evidence of the dealings between the parties, concluded that her promise was of some value. Although she had ‘no claim which a judge would enforce’, Dixon CJ thought that her agreeing not to pursue her various grievances arising from the man’s conduct in ‘putting her aside’ was a benefit to him. ‘Many men who have so behaved have failed to escape the natural consequences. Unless they “composed their differences” trouble might be expected.’ Dixon CJ observed that finding a sufficient consideration in this case was ‘authorised by this peculiar branch of the law’.199 A similar difficulty concerning the identification of precisely what is being exchanged for what is shown in the case of Woolworths Ltd v Kelly.200 In that case, a retired executive was ‘entitled’ to a pension but in fact the entitlement was not legally enforceable because there was no consideration. It was a voluntary scheme. The company, however, agreed to pay the executive a greater amount per annum than the (unenforceable) amount in exchange for the executive forgoing his right to a sum of money owing to him for consultancy work.201 It was held that the executive was only able to enforce the amount representing the increment for consultancy work for it was only in respect of the increment, and not the whole annual sum, for which consideration had been given.202 In short, the court engaged in the unusual exercise of severing the consideration. 196. Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 at 327 (Richardson J citing Corbin on Contracts § 140). 197. Such would seem to be the conclusions to be drawn from the language of the judgments in Callisher v Bischoffsheim and Miles v New Zealand Alford Estate Co. See also Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 discussed below in 4.28. 198. (1961) 105 CLR 379. 199. All quotations are from ibid at 390. 200. (1991) 22 NSWLR 189. 201. In other words, the lump sum for consultancy services was annualised (though discounted) and added to the pension. 202. The consideration appeared to be for past services, but In Re Casey’s Patents applied (see 4.22), though this case was not mentioned. Alternatively, it was a benefit to exchange a claim to a lump sum for an annuity.

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In Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson,203 the issue was whether it was possible to settle various claims that a company director had breached the Corporations Law 1990 (Cth) when s 241204 prohibited a company from indemnifying or exempting directors from liability in respect of such breaches. In fact, the court found that the director had not breached any of the duties. But, if he had, the court held that a settlement agreement is effective to ‘forgive’ such breaches, even those that stem from the Act rather than the general law. The prohibition in s 241 is to prevent blanket provisions provided by a company prospectively (although the court did not rule out the operation of s 241 in an appropriate case after a breach has occurred). But, the court held that a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim is valid to extinguish any possible civil liability for breach of the Law. The same would apply to a settlement of a claim for misleading conduct in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law even though it is not possible to contract out of the operation of s 18.205 4.27  Period of forbearance is not relevant. In the case of forbearance to sue it is irrelevant whether the time of forbearance be long or short or even whether it is for any specified time at all.206 Thus, in Griffiths v Knight,207 the parties were a deceased wife’s executors and her surviving husband. During her lifetime the wife had brought proceedings against her husband under the New South Wales Deserted Wives and Children Act 1901. These proceedings were terminated on the husband promising to pay off an overdraft on the wife’s bank account. The husband did not pay off the overdraft and the wife’s executors sued him for breach of contract. He pleaded, amongst other defences, that there was no consideration for his promise, in that his wife could not validly agree to forgo her claim to maintenance under the Act.208 The Full Court held unanimously that the consideration moving from the wife was not a final compromise of her claim, that is to say an undertaking not to take any further proceedings under the Act, but merely a forbearance to continue that particular action. 4.28  Implicit promise of forbearance to sue is sufficient. There need not be an express promise either to compromise or to forbear, if such an understanding can be inferred from the circumstances or from the negotiations between the parties.209 In McDermott v Black,210 the plaintiff had been induced to contract with the defendant by the latter’s fraudulent misrepresentation but during negotiations 203. (2005) 223 ALR 123; [2005] WASCA 144. 204. See now Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A. 205. See  11.150. 206. See  Newton, Bellamy and Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431 at 444 (McPherson J): ‘Forbearance to sue, even for a short period, is consideration …’. 207. [1960] SR (NSW) 353. See Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 (forbearance to take court action for one month against husband in exchange for husband and wife providing security over joint property) and Horton v Horton (No 2) [1961] 1 QB 215; [1960] 3 All ER 649. 208. See now Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 86A. 209. See, for example, Newton, Bellamy & Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431, in which the words ‘liability is not in issue’ in a letter sent during negotiations for settlement of a claim were held to give rise to a contract. An alternative ground for making such words enforceable was estoppel (at 436–7). See also Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, in which a majority of the High Court held the Commonwealth to its assurance that it would not use the statute of limitations as a defence on the basis of either waiver or estoppel. 210. (1940) 63 CLR 161.

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agreed to withdraw all allegations of fraud, provided that he was given an extension of time to complete the contract. The defendant granted an extension and, when the plaintiff failed to complete on the new date, repudiated the contract. The plaintiff sued for the return of his deposit on the ground that he had been induced to enter into the original contract by fraud. The High Court rejected the claim on the basis that the withdrawal of the allegations of fraud had amounted to a promise not to sue in respect of the misrepresentation and as such was good consideration for the defendant’s promise to give an extension of time. A further illustration of the courts’ willingness to draw inferences from the circumstances of negotiations so as to find a compromise or forbearance is Wigan v Edwards.211 Mr and Mrs Edwards agreed to buy a house built by Wigan. The Edwards gave Wigan a list of minor defects which needed to be remedied before they would complete the purchase. Wigan signed a document in which he agreed to remedy the listed defects and ‘any major faults in construction five years from purchase’. A major defect came to light and the Edwards sued on the written promise (rather than under the original contract of purchase). It was held by the High Court that the promise to remedy the defects was enforceable. It was argued that the Edwards were merely undertaking to complete in exchange for the promise, something that they were already bound to do.212 But the fact that there was a brewing dispute, which the document was designed to settle, was sufficient for the court to find a consideration in the form of a compromise. Although the defects probably would not have justified termination of the contract, there was nevertheless a good consideration because the Edwards had a bona fide belief that they had a right to terminate. Mason J speculated as to whether a bona fide belief in a claim by itself is sufficient to ground a compromise agreement when the claim is completely without foundation: see 4.25–4.26. His Honour was inclined to the view that the claim must be both bona fide and not vexatious or frivolous. He pointed out that the different formulations were, in practice, not very different because ‘[t]here will be few cases involving an honest or bona fide belief in a claim which is vexatious or frivolous’.213 Clearly, the courts are loath to reopen compromise agreements to test the merits of the claim forgone. However, the circumstances in which such agreements are entered into are often fraught, and a settlement agreement is like any other contract in so far as it is open to challenge on the basis of mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionability214 or possibly that the agreement, or a part of 211. (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586. See also Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365. 212. See  4.32ff. 213. (1973) 1 ALR 497 at 513; 47 ALJR 586 at 595. 214. See  Magee v Pennine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 891; [1969] 2 QB 507 (majority of the Court of Appeal held that compromise valid at common law could be set aside in equity for mistake): see 12.26. In Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1, a settlement was set aside on the basis that it was induced by misleading conduct and on the basis of unconscionability under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). In Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] VSCA 351, an argument that a settlement was procured by duress was not successful. It is argued by Seddon that economic duress could be used to set aside a settlement in certain circumstances where the duress takes the form of threatened litigation: see Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (1990), ch 5. In Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709 at [406], Santow J set out special rules applicable to the interpretation of a release, such rules being concerned to ensure that the party signing the release does so with full understanding of what

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it, amounts to a penalty215 or its terms may be in doubt.216 If compromise agreements could be challenged merely on the ground of the merits of the forgone claim, chaos would ensue, for no settlement would be safe. As a matter of policy, people should be encouraged to settle their differences themselves. The courts have supported this policy by their readiness to find a consideration of compromise or forbearance where parties are in dispute or potential dispute.

Existing duties 4.29  The various aspects of existing duties. If a person either promises or does something that he or she is already under a duty to do, can it be said that he or she has provided a good consideration? The answer to this depends on the nature of the duty and to whom the original duty is owed. The principles will be discussed first under the heading of public duties and then under the heading of contract duties. Under the latter heading there is a further distinction to be made between cases in which the contract duty is already owed to a third party and where it is owed to the promisor. The law is in transition; some very old and well-established rules have been questioned.

(1)  Where a public duty is imposed upon the plaintiff by law 4.30  Discharge of public duty is generally not consideration. A person who, by his or her official status or through the operation of the law, is under a public duty to act in a certain way is not regarded as furnishing consideration merely by promising to discharge that duty. No one, for example, would expect a police officer to bargain with a citizen for the price of providing protection. The position was stated in 1831 in Collins v Godefroy.217 The plaintiff had attended on subpoena to give evidence on the defendant’s behalf in a case in which the defendant was a litigant, and he alleged that the defendant had promised to pay him six guineas for his trouble. Lord Tenterden held that there was no consideration for this promise: If it be a duty imposed by law upon a party regularly subpoenaed, to attend from time to time to give his evidence, then a promise to give him any remuneration for loss of time incurred in such attendance is a promise without consideration.

It is not self-evident that ‘loss of time’ is not a good consideration (being a detriment to the promisee). If the six guineas were in exchange for the very duty he or she is giving up. This case was reversed on appeal (Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149; [2005] NSWCA 344), but elucidation of the law by Santow J is valuable. 215. Discussed in Auzcare Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 581; [2015] NSWCA 412 (no penalty found). 216. Marinchek v Cabport Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 334 illustrates that the drafting must be precise. Generally, it will be assumed that the settlement covers all disputed matters then known to the parties but not other matters that come to light after entering the settlement agreement or matters specifically carved out of the agreement: Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 123. However, it is possible to draft a settlement agreement to cover unknown defects or problems if the drafting is clear. See discussion by Santow J in Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709. It is also possible to cover a type of claim unknown to the law though the drafting would have to be very clear: Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 at [9]–[10]. See also extensive discussion of Grant in Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 at [15]–[52] (Leeming JA). 217. (1831) 1 B & Ad 950 at 956–7; 109 ER 1040 at 1042. Collins v Godefroy was applied in Westpac Banking Corp v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 143 ALR 35 at 46 (Cooper J), where the bank unsuccessfully argued that it had a common law right, derived from an alleged implied contract, to be reimbursed for its expenses in responding to statutory notices issued by the ASC to the bank.

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that was already legally mandatory (attending in court as a witness), then it appears that there is no consideration. But if, for example, the defendant had promised to reimburse travel and accommodation expenses, this would be an ordinary contract. Close attention must therefore be paid to what exactly the promisor was agreeing to pay for. If a government body, or a privatised body carrying out what were formerly government functions, is regulated by statute so that it is obliged to provide its services, does this mean that it cannot charge for the services under a contract because it will merely be performing its statutory duty? Clearly this would be an alarming conclusion in an era when such enterprises are expected by governments of all persuasions to act commercially and, so far as possible, mimic the private sector: see 5.29. Surprisingly, the issue has not been definitively tested. In Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd,218 Airways Corporation, a newly privatised body that was responsible (under statute) for providing air traffic control services in New Zealand, sent its terms and conditions to the various airlines operating in the country. Two small airlines rejected the terms and conditions and yet used the services because they were obliged to under statute. It was held that there was no contract because there never was an acceptance of the terms and conditions and so it was unnecessary to deal with the consideration point. The trial judge had indeed found that there was no consideration but on appeal Thorp J indicated that he thought that there would have been consideration, but without arguing the point fully.219 He relied on cases where the existing duty rule has been questioned.220 This appears to be a tacit acknowledgement that there indeed was only an existing duty but that it should be regarded as a good consideration, contrary to the traditional approach. This type of case provides yet another instance of the inappropriateness of the existing duty rule in a modern economy. The common law in times past considered that public utilities did not enter into contracts with their customers. This view is almost certainly now a dead letter.221 What amounts to a public duty is not always easy to discern. If the duty is imposed by statute, does this necessarily mean that it is a public duty? This issue arose in Ailakis v Olivero (No 2),222 where it was argued that a director’s duty under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was a public duty and that therefore performing such a duty could not amount to a consideration. This argument was rejected. A director’s duties are found in a mix of common law, equity and statute. The fact that some of those duties and their enforcement can be sourced in statute does not mean that they have a public character analogous to the duty to attend court in Collins v Godefroy.223 As to non-statutory ‘duties’, it has been held that a promise to refrain from doing an unlawful act is not good consideration,224 whereas a promise to refrain from doing something anti-social or immoral, but not unlawful, can be a good consideration.225 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225.

[1996] 1 NZLR 116. This case is also discussed in 3.27. Ibid at 127. Ward v Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496; Williams v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 148. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [3.5]. [2014] WASCA 127. Ibid at [103] (Martin CJ, Buss and Murphy JJA concurring). Jamieson v Renwick (1891) 17 VLR 124. See 4.18. Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114. See 4.18.

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4.31  Acts in excess of the duty constitute consideration. In some of the cases it has been successfully argued that there is a consideration if the promisee has done more than the existing duty requires. Thus, in England v Davidson,226 the defendant offered a reward to anyone who should give information leading to the conviction of a felon. The plaintiff, a police constable, gave such evidence. The defendant pleaded, not only that the plaintiff had merely done his duty, but that the contract was against public policy. Lord Denman’s judgment, rejecting these pleas, consists of two sentences: I think there may be services which the constable is not bound to render, and which he may therefore make the ground of a contract. We should not hold a contract to be against the policy of the law, unless the grounds for so deciding were very clear.

Where rewards are offered for information about serious crimes, the courts have consistently upheld the claimant’s right to the reward,227 although it could be argued that there is a duty on any citizen (not just police officers) to uncover serious crimes. A person who fails to report such a crime may have been guilty of misprision of felony,228 though now this offence has been abolished in all jurisdictions. Similar arguments were considered and again rejected in the case of Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council.229 The question had arisen as to how best to protect a coal mine during a strike. The police authorities thought it enough to provide a mobile force but the colliery manager wanted a stationary guard. It was ultimately agreed to provide the latter at a rate of payment that involved the sum of £2200. The company refused to pay and, when sued, pleaded the absence of consideration. The House of Lords gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The police were bound to afford protection, but they had a discretion as to the form it should take, and an undertaking to provide more protection than in their discretion they deemed necessary was consideration for the promise of payment. The readiness of the judges to find a consideration if possible is illustrated by the case of Popiw v Popiw230 applying Ward v Byham.231 The parties were husband and wife. The wife, having left her husband, was induced to return to him by his promise to transfer the matrimonial home from his sole ownership into their joint ownership. The wife shortly afterwards again left her husband because of his violence to her and subsequently applied to the court to determine the question whether she was entitled either at law or in equity to an interest in the matrimonial home, which still stood in her husband’s name. Although the wife’s claim was dismissed on the ground that at the time when she commenced her action there was no memorandum in writing of the alleged contract for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds,232 Hudson J expressed the opinion that, if she brought a new action, the affidavit sworn and filed by her husband in the action before him would constitute a sufficient memorandum, and she would then

226. (1840) 11 Ad & El 856; 113 ER 640. 227. Williams v Carwardine (1833) 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590. 228. Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528. 229. [1925] AC 270; [1924] All ER Rep 579. 230. [1959] VR 197. 231. [1956] 2 All ER 318. See 4.35. 232. See  16.37.

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be entitled to an order declaring the matrimonial home to be the property of herself and her husband in equal shares. His Honour said:233 The objection that the act of the applicant in returning to cohabitation did not amount to a valid consideration for the respondent’s promise was founded on the view that the applicant was already under a duty as the wife of the respondent to return to cohabitation and this being so it could not be said that by the act of the applicant she suffered any detriment or that the respondent gained any advantage in exchange for his promise. Although it may be true to state that the applicant was under a duty to cohabit with the respondent there was no remedy open to the respondent to compel the performance of that duty … From a practical point of view therefore what the respondent was to get in exchange for his promise was something which must be regarded as far more advantageous to him than the right of cohabiting with his wife which he had no means of enforcing and the applicant in returning was submitting to a detriment in placing herself in a position which she could not have been compelled to occupy. On any view therefore I think there was good consideration for the respondent’s promise.234

A further rationale for this result is that the alleged ‘duty’ was neither a public nor contractual duty so that fulfilling it did not fall into this category of the doctrine of consideration.

(2)  Where the plaintiff is bound by an existing contractual duty to the defendant — contract modification 4.32  Performing an existing contractual duty owed to the defendant traditionally is no consideration. If parties contract on the basis of, say, a fixed price for performance of services and the plaintiff is able to obtain a promise of extra payment in exchange for the promised performance of the services, there is said to be no consideration provided by the plaintiff because, it is argued, there is no detriment in doing what is already owed and no extra benefit to the defendant in receiving what is due. The promise of extra payment is therefore of no effect. This rule has been controversially modified in the English case of Williams v  Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.235 This case and its implications in Australia are discussed below (see 4.35) after first analysing the traditional rule. This rule is about contract variation rather than contract formation.236 The point has been made already (see 4.2) that the doctrine of consideration is generally of far more practical significance in relation to making changes to the contract after it has started rather than in relation to formation of contract in the first place. In complex or long-term contracts, it is almost inevitable that changes will be made to the contract, either informally or formally. The rules of consideration (and, more generally, contract formation) apply equally to any change that is made as they do to the initial contract.237 From the perspective of consideration, it is necessary therefore to examine what change has been made and whether it is part of an exchange or whether it is effectively a ‘gift’, that is, a one-way promise or act. 233. [1959] VR 197 at 198–9. 234. Compare 4.23 as to whether a right without a remedy may be the basis for a good consideration. 235. [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512. 236. For detailed treatment of variation, see Chapter 22. See also 2.29 (variation through estoppel). 237. See discussion of Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd below.

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As noted in 4.2, the possibility of dispensing with the need for consideration for contract variations has been canvassed.238 This idea has so far not been accepted in Australia. It is possible for a change to take place because the contract at the outset was drafted to allow for either unilateral variation (for example, an adjustment of an interest rate) or an agreed variation. Depending on the drafting of such a clause, it could be construed as dispensing with the need for fresh consideration.239 The problem is illustrated by Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd.240 Y agreed to sell a quantity of imported galvanised iron to S for a fixed price. S established a letter of credit sufficient to pay the contract price. Y then informed S that there was an unavoidable price increase due to government intervention in France. S protested that it was only bound to pay the original price but nevertheless increased the letter of credit. Y rejected S’s protests (specifically rejecting an order ‘without prejudice’ for the goods at the increased price) and made it clear that S would lose the goods if it did not pay the increased price. Matters remained unresolved but when the iron arrived it was delivered and the increased letter of credit was used for payment. S then sued for recovery of the excess over the price originally agreed to. The case raised a number of issues. Could it be said that the original contract had disappeared because it had been renegotiated and a new one put in its place? It is a question of fact, determined by the parties’ apparent intention, whether a renegotiation is so extensive that it amounts to a new contract in place of the old contract.241 It is not always easy to determine whether an amendment is a new contract entirely or a modification to the existing contract.242 Because an amendment must itself satisfy the rules of contract formation,243 it is a separate contract, even if it does not constitute a replacement of the original contract.244 The existing duty issue only arises if the later contract is a variation, rather than a replacement, of the original. If an entirely new contract is formed (and the old contract discharged by agreement), then there is automatically a consideration even if under the new contract the party performing work or services is paid more than under the original contract. 238. This possibility is discussed at length, including New Zealand and Canadian cases, in Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 at [58]–[95] by Phang Boon Leong JA who concluded that consideration is required for contract variations. 239. See ibid at [36]–[44] where Phang Boon Leong JA also discusses this possibility. 240. (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323. See Cook Islands Shipping Co Ltd v Colson Builders Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 422 for a modern application of the rule, which is said, somewhat controversially, to have originated with Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168. In the latter case sailors were promised the wages of two deserters if they sailed the ship home. They were unsuccessful in suing for the extra pay. One report makes no mention of consideration, and bases the decision on the public policy that sailors should not be in a position to hold the captain to ransom: Stilk v Meyrick 6 Esp 129; 170 ER 851. See Syros Shipping Co SA v Elaghill Trading Co (The Proodos C) [1981] 3 All ER 189; [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 390. 241. Quinn v Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd [1992] 1 VR 540; Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64 at [19] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See 22.3. 242. See Carter and Stewart, ‘The Effect of Formalising an Employment Contract: The High Court Misses an Opportunity’ (2001) 17 JCL 181, where the authors argue that the decision of the High Court in Concut (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64, that a contract had been varied rather than replaced by a new one, was erroneous. 243. An alternative way in which a contract variation may be binding is through the operation of an estoppel: see 2.29. 244. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 144 (Taylor J); Kiwi Brands Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 160 ALR 1; Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ).

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If the contract in Sundell was modified rather than replaced by a new contract, had the supplier Y provided a good consideration for the payment in excess of the original contract price? Could the payment of the excess be said to be a payment made under duress? As to the last point, the New South Wales Supreme Court held that there was duress and the case has now become one of the seminal cases on economic duress (discussed in Chapter 13). In addition, it was held that there had been no renegotiation to replace the old contract with a new one. Instead, there was a purported variation of the existing contract and no consideration for that variation was provided by the supplier. Y had merely performed precisely what it had originally promised to do, namely, to deliver the iron. An attempt was made to argue that the importer had made certain arrangements in France that would ensure that the goods would arrive. It was argued that S’s potential action for damages was therefore replaced by more certain delivery and that this amounted to an additional advantage. The court was not convinced and ordered repayment of the excess. In Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd,245 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ observed: When the parties to an existing contract enter into a further contract by which they vary the original contract, then, by hypothesis, they have made two contracts. For one reason or another, it may be material to determine whether the effect of the second contract is to bring an end to the first contract and replace it with the second, or whether the effect is to leave the first contract standing, subject to the alteration. For example, something may turn upon the place, or the time, or the form, of the contract, and it may therefore be necessary to decide whether the original contract subsists.246

As already noted, the effect of the second contract is determined by objectively ascertaining the intention of the parties. Generally speaking, it is more likely that the parties have intended to vary an existing contract rather than replace it with a new one — in which case the existing duty issue may be relevant. Whatever the effect of the second contract, the same rules apply to it as apply to any other type of contract. For example, it may be that there is acceptance of a variation suggested by one party by the other party’s conduct.247 Contract variation may occur in a quite informal way. In Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd,248 a brief conversation on a building site between the owner’s representative and the builder was sufficient to bring about a binding change in relation to the work to be done. The New South Wales Court of Appeal used an estoppel analysis to hold that the change was binding. Both in Update and in Crothall Hospital Services, the changes were held binding despite the fact that the variations were made informally and not in accordance with the relevant term in the contract

245. (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2002] HCA 35. See further 22.5. 246. Ibid at [22]. 247. Such was the case in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567, where the Commonwealth failed to reply to a letter and yet paid invoices on the basis of the change suggested by the contractor. This case was principally about whether there was agreement. Consideration was not mentioned. This was probably because the original agreement contemplated escalating remuneration of the contractor. See also Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 213 at [234]–[236] (acceptance of variation by conduct). 248. (1990) 20 NSWLR 251. See also GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP IT Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 50 at [213]ff (Finn J).

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that stipulated a formal process for making changes.249 In fact, such a term can never be drafted in such a way as to prevent informal contract variation. This is because the very clause governing contract changes may itself be changed (usually tacitly by the conduct of the parties). One particular type of change which appears to be ‘one-way’ is where a contractual deadline is extended, either after it has passed or by way of an undertaking before it has fallen due and nothing is sought in return. It is recognised that consideration is not necessary for this type of variation, though the doctrinal basis is uncertain.250 4.33  Doing more than the existing duty is a good consideration. In attempting to argue that it had provided an additional advantage in exchange for the extra money, the supplier in Sundell (discussed in 4.32) was trying to make use of the wellestablished principle that promising or doing more than is required under the contract is a good consideration. Thus, in Hartley v Ponsonby,251 sailors were promised extra wages if they sailed the ship home but, in contrast to Stilk v Myrick,252 the ship was dangerously short-handed. Working the ship in these circumstances was providing more than the original contract required and so the promise of extra wages was supported by a good consideration. An alternative explanation for the case is that the original contract was terminated by mutual consent and a new one was negotiated in its place. This analysis does not require an additional benefit to make the promise of extra pay binding. The issue is simply whether the parties have abandoned the original agreement and substituted a new one.253 A third explanation is that the sailors were discharged from further performance once the ship was dangerously short-handed and that therefore promising to perform was a good consideration. Analogous to this last explanation is the case where one party believes that he or she is entitled to terminate and obtains a promise from the other party in consideration for abandoning the supposed right to terminate.254 The above possibilities demonstrate how there may be a variety of ways of looking at contract variation, depending on the particular facts. Yet another possibility is that one party may, for example, have been promised more money but this may be part of a general reorganisation of the contract with each side either making concessions,

249. See also 22.5. In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has controversially ruled that a no oral variation clause renders an informal variation invalid: Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24. There is little chance of this being followed in Australia. See Sara Stockham Pty Ltd v WLD Practice Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 51 at [15]; Carter, Eldridge and Peden, ‘Agreed Writing Requirements for Contract Variation’ (2020) 36 JCL 107. 250. Stoljar, ‘The Doctrine of Forbearance’ (2018) 92 ALJ 195. See generally Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]. See also the discussion in Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 at [45]–[51] by Keane JA, who discussed both waiver and estoppel. In Henderson v Curtis [2008] WASC 283 at [16]–[19], Beech J held there was mutual consideration if the varied term was of mutual benefit or interest to the parties. A term imposing an obligation on one party would require an independent consideration to be varied, according to this view. 251. (1857) 7 El & Bl 872; 119 ER 1471. 252. (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168. 253. See  Martech International Pty Ltd v Energy World Corp Ltd [2007] FCAFC 35; (2007) 248 ALR 353. 254. Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586 discussed in 4.28. See also Electroboard Administration v O’Brien [1999] NSWCA 452 at [10], where Meagher JA, with the concurrence of Mason P and Priestley JA, held that not exercising a right to dismiss an employee constituted a good consideration for an addition to the terms of the employment contract (a restraint of trade clause) that benefited the employer. There was no mention of duress in this case.

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promising to perform in a different manner or settling potential disputes. In such a case there is no problem with consideration. More recent developments in the law about existing duties, discussed in 4.35, are very significant to the analysis of contract variations. The principle that the courts will not examine the adequacy of the consideration (see 4.12) applies equally in these cases. As long as there is some consideration for the promise of extra money or other benefit, the latter will be binding. This is illustrated by North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron),255 where a reluctant payment of some US$3 million extra for the building of a supertanker was upheld as being supported by a consideration provided by the shipbuilder when it arranged for an increase in a ‘return letter of credit’ providing a performance guarantee in favour of the buyer.256

(3)  Where the plaintiff is bound by an existing contractual duty to a third party 4.34  Performing an existing duty owed to a third party is a good consideration. Whereas performance or promise of performance of an existing contractual duty owed by B to A is said not to be a good consideration as between A and B, the same is a good consideration when performed for, or promised to, C. Thus, if B is obliged under contract with A to prepare a sculpture, C’s promise of money if B either promises to or actually prepares the sculpture is supported by a good consideration moving from B. Why this is so has long been the subject of academic speculation and commentary.257 It is sometimes said that B is twice bound, which is a disadvantage to B,258 but this is not correct if all that is requested by C is B’s performance in a potential unilateral contract. Presumably it is a benefit to C to ensure that B performs, or else C would not have provided the incentive.259 Whether actual performance or promise of performance should be differently treated in this context has been the subject of contrary views.260 On the one hand, Pollock thought that a promise might be a good consideration but performance not.261 On the other hand, Treitel has stated that at one time a promise to a third party to perform an existing duty was not a good consideration, citing Jones v Waite.262 Suffice it to say that now the accepted view is that either a promise or performance are sufficient consideration, although the cases are few. The rule that performing an existing contractual duty for a third party is a good consideration was firmly established in the nineteenth century by a trilogy of cases, each of which for various reasons was not altogether a satisfactory authority. The

255. [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 89; [1979] QB 705. 256. It was also held that this was a case of economic duress but that the owners had lost their right to challenge the payment of the extra $3 million on this ground because of delay. See Chapter 13. 257. Davis, ‘Promises to Perform an Existing Duty’ (1937) 6 Cambridge LJ 202. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 143–7. Holdsworth, History of English Law vol 8, 40–1. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), [131], [131A]. The cases here discussed are difficult to reconcile with the public duty cases in 4.30. 258. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 146. 259. See  Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), [131], [131A]. 260. See also 4.10. 261. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 144–7. 262. (1839) 5 Bing NC 341; 132 ER 1136. Peel, Treitel, The Law of Contract (15th ed, 2020), [3-055].

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

first was Shadwell v Shadwell,263 in which an uncle promised his nephew, who was engaged to one Ellen Nicholl, that he would pay him an annual sum of £150. The intent of the promise was that this sum was to be paid so long as the marriage went ahead, although this was not expressly stated. The nephew married Ellen Nicholl but the instalments promised by the uncle were not all paid during his life and, after his death, the nephew brought an action to recover the arrears from the personal representatives. The defendants pleaded that, as the plaintiff was already bound to marry Ellen Nicholl before the uncle wrote his letter (because he was engaged),264 there was no consideration for his promise. On these facts it might well have been held that there was no more than a conditional gift by the uncle265 and that the letter could not have been construed as giving rise to contractual relations.266 This was the view of the dissenting Byles J.267 The majority held that the letter was intended contractually and that there was consideration for it. Erle CJ, for the majority, thought that there was both a detriment to the plaintiff and a benefit to the uncle, each of which was questionable. The facts and decision in Chichester v Cobb268 were, for practical purposes, identical; there, Blackburn J found there was consideration without discussion of the issues. The third case was Scotson v Pegg.269 The plaintiffs had contracted with X to deliver a cargo of coal to X, or to the order of X. X sold this cargo to the defendant and directed the plaintiffs, in pursuance of their contract, to deliver it to the defendant. The defendant then made an agreement with the plaintiffs in which, ‘in consideration that the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendant, would deliver to the defendant’ the cargo of coal, the defendant promised to unload it at a stated rate. For breach of this promise the plaintiffs sued, and the defendant pleaded lack of consideration. If, it was argued, the plaintiffs were already bound by the contract with X to deliver the coal to the defendant in accordance with X’s order, what were they now giving in return for the defendant’s promise to unload at a certain rate? However, the two judges present at the hearing, Martin and Wilde BB, both gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Martin B was content to say that the delivery of the coal was a benefit to the defendant. Wilde B thought there was also a detriment to the plaintiffs. It might have suited them, as against X, to break their contract and pay damages, and the delivery to the defendant had prevented this possible course of conduct.270 If it should be thought that these authorities are not convincing and that the supposed rule is open to challenge, modern cases have accepted and applied the rule without questioning its validity. The cases in which exemption clauses have been

263. (1860) 9 CBNS 159; 142 ER 62. 264. Engagement was a contract. This has been abolished: Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. 265. See  4.13. 266. See  Chapter 5. 267. Compare Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328; [1969] 2 All ER 616, discussed in 5.7. 268. (1866) 14 LT 433. 269. (1861) 6 H & N 295; 158 ER 121; 3 LT 753. 270. This argument is only found in the report published at 3 LT 753.

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found to benefit third parties, discussed earlier,271 have employed the three-party existing duty rule to show that a consideration moves from stevedore or truck driver, as the case may be. Thus, unloading the goods pursuant to a separate contract is a good consideration provided by the stevedores for the benefit of an exemption clause in their favour agreed to by the owner of the goods. The three-party rule has been applied in another context. In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long,272 the purchasers of publicly listed shares undertook to the vendor company not to sell 60 per cent of the purchased shares for one year. In a subsequent agreement with the majority shareholders of the public company, the purchasers extracted a promise of indemnity against any loss arising from a fall in value of the shares. The consideration for this promise of indemnity was the promise not to sell 60 per cent of the shares for one year, an existing duty pursuant to the original sale agreement. The fact that the promise to the majority shareholders was the self-same promise that had been made to the company did not matter. The three-party rule was applicable.273 The case illustrates how arbitrary the rule is because the majority shareholders effectively controlled the company and the fact that the shareholders were a different legal entity from the company was fortuitous. Further, the three-party rule is difficult to reconcile with the rule that performing an existing duty imposed other than by contract is not a good consideration. Why should the contractual nature of the duty make the difference? The question is part of the wider problem in relation to existing duties, namely, that it is arguable that an existing duty, in appropriate circumstances, should be a good consideration, no matter what the source of the duty. 4.35  The existing duty rules questioned. In circumstances like those found in Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd274 questions of policy are raised. Should an unavoidable price rise be incapable of being passed on by adhering to the existing duty rule in all cases? The traditional rule is certainly protective of a contracting party who has been subjected to an extortionate demand but the rule also allows recovery of the extra payment even when it is paid quite willingly (absent an effective contract variation). Of course, one solution open to the parties is to agree to a price variation clause at the outset.275 But other unavoidable hazards may sometimes strike one of the parties to a contract, making it very much more onerous, without that party being able to obtain relief through the doctrine of frustration.276 The objective of protecting against extortionate demands can be served

271. The cases raise a number of issues, and are discussed in 3.8, 3.28, 3.40, 5.22, 7.38. They are New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300; Celthene Pty Ltd v W K J Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. 272. [1980] AC 614 also discussed in 4.22 and 13.7 and applied in Ailakis v Olivero (No 2) [2014] WASCA 127 at [107]–[109] (Martin CJ, Buss and Murphy JJA concurring). 273. Hill Equipment & Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd v Nuco Pty Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 25 (consideration for guarantee provided after execution of main contract found in performing main contract). 274. Discussed in 4.32. 275. As in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567, where the issue was whether a contract variation had been made. The principal focus of attention was whether a variation had been agreed when the variation was made not in accordance with the clause providing for variation. 276. See  Chapter 19.

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by the rules of duress,277 and it may therefore be unnecessary and inappropriate to call on the doctrine of consideration to serve this function. This is not to say that the problem is simply solved by altering the existing duty rule. The party who is faced with a serious difficulty, due to a change in circumstances, may have been paid to take that risk. Some of the precepts underlying the law of contract are not incompatible with the view that existing duties should amount to a good consideration. If parties have bargained willingly so that one promises to pay extra for the other’s performance, presumably the performance is regarded by the paying party as worth more than an action for damages.278 It is not then for the courts to question the parties’ assessment. If there is an allegation of unwillingness to agree to the extra payment, then, as argued above, the rules of duress should determine this issue. An analogous argument can be advanced for the cases involving non-contractual existing duties. Consideration should not enter into it. If there is some reason of policy why the bargain should not be enforced, then so be it, but otherwise the contract should stand. Judicial support for these views can be found in Ward v Byham,279 where the judgment of Denning LJ challenged the accepted rule: ‘[A] promise to perform an existing duty, or the performance of it, should be regarded as good consideration, because it is a benefit to the person to whom it is given.’280 He repeated this view in Williams v Williams281 but added the rider ‘so long as there is nothing in the transaction which is contrary to the public interest’. The same view was recommended by the English Law Revision Committee in 1937.282 In Australia, Hudson J in Popiw v Popiw283 has given support to Denning LJ in Ward v Byham, as did Thorp J in Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd.284 In the United States there has been judicial hostility to the rule and some legislative reform in some states and in the Uniform Commercial Code in relation to sale of goods.285 It appears that Lord Denning’s persistence has been vindicated by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.286 The defendant building contractor entered into a contract to refurbish a block of flats. It subcontracted the carpentry work to the plaintiff for an agreed sum of £20,000. The plaintiff carried out some of the work and received interim payments amounting to £16,200. The plaintiff then found that he was in financial 277. See  Chapter 13. The suggestion that the existing duty rule should be abandoned and that the doctrine of duress can take care of cases where there is oppression or extortion has been made by various commentators. See, for example, Reynolds and Treitel, ‘Consideration for the Modification of Contracts’ (1965) 7 Malaya Law Rev 1. See also Posner J in United States v Stump Home Specialities Manufacturing, Inc 905F 2d 1117 (1990) at 1121–2. 278. Posner argues that the enforceability of a promise to pay extra where the contract is more onerous is important both to payer and performer. The latter may default if he or she cannot be assured of extra payment. See ‘Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law’ (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 411, especially at 421. 279. [1956] 1 WLR 496; [1956] 2 All ER 318. 280. Ibid at 498; 319. 281. [1957] 1 WLR 148; [1957] 1 All ER 305. 282. Interim Report Cmnd 5449. 283. [1959] VR 197 at 199 discussed above in 4.31. 284. [1996] 1 NZLR 116 at 127. 285. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2–209(1). 286. [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512. See Adams and Brownsword, ‘Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path’ (1990) 53 MLR 536; Coote, ‘Consideration and Benefit in Fact and Law’ (1990) 3 JCL 23.

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trouble and had agreed to a price which was too low. The defendant became aware of this and, wishing to avoid penalty provisions in the head contract and the disruption associated with finding another subcontractor, agreed to pay the plaintiff an extra £10,300 to complete the work. The defendant’s representative initiated this subsidiary agreement, recognising that the plaintiff’s original price was too low. Only £1500 was paid pursuant to the subsidiary agreement. The plaintiff sued for the additional money. The Court of Appeal held that the subsidiary agreement was enforceable. Glidewell LJ drew on Ward v Byham, Williams v Williams and the Pao On case, and concluded: (i) if A has entered into a contract with B to do some work for, or to supply goods or services to, B in return for payment by B and (ii) at some stage before A has completely performed his obligations under the contract B has reason to doubt whether A will, or will be able to, complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B thereupon promises A an additional payment in return for A’s promise to perform his contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a result of A giving his promise B obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, and (v) B’s promise is not given as a result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, then (vi) the benefit to B [stemming from A’s commitment to complete the contract] is capable of being consideration for B’s promise, so that the promise will be legally binding.287

This was a case where the plaintiff, by agreeing merely to complete the work already contracted for, suffered no detriment but he did provide a benefit. ‘If both parties benefit from an agreement it is not necessary that each also suffers a detriment.’288 It was, of course, crucial in this case that the practical benefit to the head contractor (avoidance of penalty provisions and disruption) could be identified and that there was no hint of duress on the part of the carpenter. The essential change that this case makes to the law is that performing an existing duty may be a good consideration if doing so (or promising to do so) provides a practical benefit to the other party. This change is of some importance to the common practice of varying contracts.289 The possibility of using promissory estoppel as a vehicle for the enforcement of the promise to pay extra was canvassed but not, in the end, relied on. In Australia, this argument would have a firmer base because estoppel may be used to enforce positive promises where there is no consideration.290 There may, however, be some difficulty in arguing detrimental reliance if it consisted merely of doing what was already supposed to be done under a contract. However, even in the absence of an estoppel argument, the Australian courts are free to adopt the principle advanced in Williams v Roffey Bros, which, Glidewell LJ

287. Ibid at 15–6; 521–2. 288. Ibid at 23; 527 (Purchas LJ). 289. As shown by MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553, where the shift in approach provided by Williams v Roffey was used to find a good consideration provided by a debtor who benefited from a rescheduling of payments. This case was then reversed in the Supreme Court on the basis that the variation was invalid because it did not comply with a no oral variation clause. This then made the consideration issue moot. See Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24. 290. See  Chapter 2.

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asserted, does not contravene the principle in Stilk v Myrick291 but represents a refinement of it.292 The reasoning in Williams v Roffey Bros was applied in Australia by Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd,293 and it has been considered in other cases.294 This case at first sight appeared to be a classic promissory estoppel case, because the issue of immediate concern was whether a landlord’s promise to reduce the rent was binding. The case involved other issues, but we need only focus on the rent reduction question. Santow J based his conclusion that the landlord’s promise was binding on a consideration analysis rather than on an estoppel analysis. In doing so, he carefully analysed the supposed rationales for the existing duty rule. He used the six points made by Glidewell LJ in Williams v Roffey Bros (extracted above) and developed and extended those points.295 Santow J could see no logical distinction between one party to a contract promising the other more money or, on the other hand, granting a concession (such as reducing the rent). The same issue of consideration arises, namely, whether the person who is promised more money or who is promised the concession has provided anything in exchange for it. Santow J was also concerned to build into the principles stated by Glidewell LJ some notion of measurable practical benefit, that is, it should be possible for the court to conclude that the promised benefit or concession was made in exchange for something (continued performance of the contract) which was more beneficial than the remedy that would be available.296 For example, in the landlord and tenant example, it is worth more to the landlord to make a rent concession than it would be to sue the tenant for breach or go to the trouble of finding another tenant. The attempt to elaborate on the principles of Glidewell LJ in relation to the question of practical benefit runs into difficulties because the court appears to be assessing the commercial costs and benefits of the contract modification, something that the common law has traditionally eschewed. If we accept that practical benefit is to be regarded as consideration, it would be preferable to make the necessary modifications to the existing duty rule in terms of saying that, prima facie, if two commercial people have chosen to modify their business relationship, then it is presumed that they know what they are doing and it is not the court’s business to second guess their judgment of their own interests.297 Only if proof of duress is shown would this presumption be overturned and the contract modification be set aside. 291. See  4.33. 292. [1991] 1 QB 1 at 16; [1990] 1 All ER 512 at 522. 293. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723. 294. Both cases were followed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tinyow v Lee [2006] NSWCA 80 at [61] (Santow JA, Handley and Ipp JJA concurring). See also DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 at [43] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Hill v Forteng Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 105 (practical benefits accruing to a director who agreed to a reduced salary; included survival of the company and his directorship); W and K Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mayo [2013] NSWSC 1063 at [164]–[167] (Sackar J); Vella v Ayshan [2008] NSWSC 84 at [18] (White J); Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1071 at [144] (Flick J) (no practical benefit identified); Mitchell v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 86 at [36]–[39] (Ambrose J). See also Meyer-Rochow, ‘The Requirement of Consideration’ (1997) 71 ALJ 532. 295. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 at 747. 296. Santow J’s analysis was applied in Silver v Dome Resources NL [2007] NSWSC 455 at [121]–[137] (Hamilton J) affirmed on appeal: Dome Resources v NL Silver [2008] NSWCA 322. It was distinguished in Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 at [59]–[62] (no countervailing benefit identified for an alleged promise to extend the deadline for repayment of a loan). 297. The New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted such a rule in Teats v Willcocks [2013] NZCA 162 and Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith [2003] 2 NZLR 23. See Coote, ‘Consideration and Variations: A Different Solution’ (2004) 120 LQR 19; ‘Variations Sans Consideration’ (2011) 27 JCL 185. In the latter article Coote argued that consideration should be unnecessary for a contract variation, drawing on Antons,

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There is now an accumulation of Australian case law to support the proposition that the existing duty rule, as applied to contract variation, has been substantially modified in that a practical benefit amounting to a consideration may be found in circumstances where it appears that a party is merely performing an existing duty. The identification of the practical benefit, or avoidance of a disbenefit, in any given case is not without its difficulties. This development in the law is of significance to the next topic.

Promises to pay lesser sums The rule in Pinnel’s case 4.36  Payment of a lesser sum is no satisfaction of a debt. If A owes a debt to B and pays or promises to pay part of it in return for B’s promise to forgo the balance, can A hold B to this promise? From a purely logical point of view, it is clear that if promising or performing an existing contractual duty traditionally is not a good consideration, then promising or paying less must not be a good consideration either. Of course, waiving the debt entirely is also not legally binding in the absence of consideration (or a deed).298 The problem was familiar to the common lawyers before the development of assumpsit as a contractual remedy and therefore before the doctrine of consideration had been developed. Its implications were examined within the sphere of debt in 1455 and again in 1495.299 In the latter year Brian CJ stated a rule that, though set in an archaic environment, has still a modern connotation: The action is brought for £20, and the concord is that he shall pay only £10, which appears to be no satisfaction for the £20, for payment of £10 cannot be payment of £20. But if it was of a horse which was to be paid according to the concord, this would be good satisfaction, for it does not appear that the horse be worth more or less than the sum in demand.

The rule enunciated by Brian CJ was adopted in 1602 in Pinnel’s case:300 Pinnel sued Cole in debt for £8 10s due on a bond on 11 November 1600. Cole’s defence was that, at Pinnel’s request, he had paid him £5 2s 6d on 1 October, and that Pinnel had accepted this payment in full satisfaction of the original debt.

Judgment was given for the plaintiff on a point of pleading, but the court made it clear that, had it not been for a technical flaw, they would have found for the defendant, on the ground that the part payment had been made on an earlier day than Williams v Roffey and the Canadian decision of Nav Canada v Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc [2008] 290 DLR (4th) 405 (New Brunswick CA). See also the Canadian case Rosas v Toca (2018) BCCA 191. Dispensing with consideration for contract variations would be difficult in Australia in the light of the High Court’s pronouncements in Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 and Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57. The issue of contract variation and accommodating Williams v Roffey continues to be controversial in the United Kingdom. See Sullivan, ‘Unconsidered Modifications’ (2017) 133 LQR 191; Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24 at [18] (Lord Sumption). 298. Lewis v Cook (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191. Austin J there provided an interesting discussion of the almost defunct notion of waiver. On waiver and related concepts, see Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]. 299. Anon (1455) YB 33 Hy VI f 48 pl 32; Anon (1495) YB 10 Hy VII f 4 pl 4. 300. (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a; 77 ER 237; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 612.

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that appointed in the bond. The debt could be discharged through the introduction, at the creditor’s request, of some new element, for example, the tender of a chattel instead of the debt or part payment at a fresh place or on an earlier date, but not by the payment of a smaller sum on the day the debt was due: Payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater cannot be any satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the judges that by no possibility, [can] a lesser sum … be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater sum: but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, etc in satisfaction is good.301

4.37  Application to negotiable instruments. If a creditor agreed to the discharge of a debt by the payment of a lesser sum by negotiable instrument, could it be argued that the extra feature of negotiability made up the difference? The early English cases vacillated on this question302 but ultimately a common sense argument prevailed: the use of a negotiable instrument to pay a lesser sum made no difference. This was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal in D & C Builders v Rees.303 In that case Lord Denning MR said: No sensible distinction can be taken between payment of a lesser sum by cash and payment of it by cheque. The cheque, when given, is conditional payment. When honoured, it is actual payment. It is then just the same as cash. If a creditor is not bound when he receives payment by cash, he should not be bound when he receives payment by cheque. … In point of law payment of a lesser sum, whether by cash or by cheque, is no discharge of a greater sum.304

On balance, if the rule that payment of a lesser sum is no discharge of a larger debt is to survive, then it does not seem to be logical or sensible to make an exception for payment by negotiable instrument or some other method, such as electronic transfer. 4.38  The rule today and possibilities for reform. Although it had long been accepted that the actual payment of a lesser sum did not of itself discharge the obligation to repay a debt for a larger sum, it was not until 1884 that the opinion of the House of Lords was tested in the case of Foakes v Beer:305 Mrs Beer had obtained a judgment against Dr Foakes for £2090 and Dr Foakes asked for time to pay. The parties agreed in writing that, if Dr Foakes paid £500 at once and the balance by instalments, Mrs Beer would not ‘take any proceedings whatever on the judgment’. Every judgment debt bears interest as from the date of the judgment, but the written agreement made no reference to the question of interest. Dr Foakes ultimately paid the whole amount of the judgment debt itself, and Mrs Beer then claimed the further sum of £360 as interest. Dr Foakes refused to pay this sum, and Mrs Beer applied ‘to be allowed to issue execution or otherwise proceed on the judgment in respect of the interest’. Dr Foakes pleaded the agreement, and Mrs Beer replied that it was unsupported by consideration.

The House of Lords admitted that the so-called ‘rule in Pinnel’s case’ rested merely on dicta, that it disregarded commercial convenience, that there was no previous 301. 77 ER 237 at 237. 302. Cumber v Wane (1721) 1 Stra 426; 93 ER 613; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 436; Sibree v Tripp (1846) 15 M & W 23; 153 ER 745; Goddard v O’Brien (1882) 9 QBD 37. 303. [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. 304. Ibid at 623–4; 840. See also Danckwerts LJ at 626; 842 and Winn LJ at 632–3; 846 respectively. 305. (1884) 9 App Cas 605; [1881–5] All ER Rep 106.

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decision by which the House was bound and that to upset what was doubtless a longstanding conception of the law would not, in these circumstances, disturb business confidence. Yet they unanimously306 applied the dicta and gave judgment in favour of Mrs Beer for the amount of the interest. The opportunity was thus lost to change the rule that, as Lord Blackburn pointed out, does not suit commercial convenience or practice: [A]ll men of business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognise and act on the ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce payment of the whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the credit of the debtor is doubtful it must be more so.307

The English Law Revision Committee was of the same view in 1937.308 On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, it is difficult to accommodate the reformist rule with the existing duty rule. It has already been argued that this latter rule, too, is in need of reform and has indeed been in the process of changing.309 The present rule does protect creditors from extortionate demands by debtors.310 But, as argued earlier in relation to existing duties, it would be desirable if this problem was taken care of by the rules of duress311 rather than the doctrine of consideration, which takes no account of whether the settlement is amicable or extortionate. The rule in Pinnel’s case and the existing duty rule each provides an out for people who want to break their word on a purely technical ground. Indeed, one suspects that most business people would not know that they have an out until they consult a lawyer. Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd312 certainly threw out a challenge to the rule in Pinnel’s case by holding that a landlord was bound by a promise to accept reduced rent payments on the basis of consideration rather than promissory estoppel: see 4.35. This did, however, depend on finding a practical benefit or avoidance of a disbenefit. It did not deal with the stark question: can a payment of $5 discharge a debt of $10?313 In terms of fulfilling the expectations of commercial people, a rule that forgiving part of a debt, or promising to pay some extra money for performance, is binding rather than not binding is preferable.314 306. Lord Blackburn had prepared a dissenting judgment, but reluctantly acquiesced in the views of his colleagues. 307. (1884) 9 App Cas 605 at 622. 308. Sixth Interim Report Cmnd 5449. 309. See  4.35. Adams and Brownsword in ‘Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path’ (1990) 53 MLR 536 argued that the rule in Pinnel’s case cannot logically survive if the existing duty rule has been effectively eliminated in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512. This argument has not, however, been accepted in England: Re Selectmove Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 474; [1995] 2 All ER 531. It was accepted by Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 discussed in 4.35. 310. D & C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. 311. See  Chapter 13. 312. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723. Amos v Citibank Ltd [1996] QCA 129 (Musumeci distinguished and Re Selectmove Ltd followed); 313. See  Wolfe v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2012] VSC 275 at [109]–[127] (Zammit AsJ) (practical benefit in not having to foreclose on property); to similar effect was Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228 at [54]–[67] (Gardiner AsJ). See also discussion by Judd J in MP Investments Nominees Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 43 at [107]–[115]. 314. See Thampapillai, ‘Practical Benefits and Promises to Pay Lesser Sums: Reconsidering the Relationship Between the Rule in Foakes v Beer and the Rule in Williams v Roffey’ (2015) 34 UQLJ 301 where the extensive academic debate is covered.

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4.39  Avoiding the rule. The rule in Pinnel’s case can be readily avoided by those aware of it, but the techniques for avoidance do not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem because ordinary people do not assume that a promise to forgo the balance of a debt is not binding. The parties can agree that the debtor will provide something to make up the difference, such as a peppercorn, or by paying early or at a different place at the request of the creditor.315 The parties can use a deed to record their settlement. Further, the rule will not apply if there is a dispute about the amount owing316 or the original claim is for an unliquidated sum.317 In each of these cases settlement of the uncertain amount is a good consideration. The doctrine of promissory estoppel318 may operate to prevent the creditor from reneging on the promise to forgo the balance of the debt but the necessary detrimental reliance may be hard to find.319 Finally, the rule does not apply to a composition of creditors agreement or where a lesser sum is paid by a third party — both of which will now be discussed.

An exception — compositions with creditors 4.40  Acceptance of a lesser sum as part of a composition agreement is binding. It has long been the practice for the creditors of an impecunious debtor to make an arrangement with him or her whereby each agrees to accept a stated percentage of the debt in full satisfaction. The search for a sufficient consideration to support this type of agreement has proved to be difficult. It would appear at first sight to fall under the ban in Pinnel’s case,320 but the inconvenience of such a conclusion was so manifest that it could not be accepted. Two alternative suggestions have been proffered. Lord Ellenborough suggested in 1812 that there was consideration for the composition in the fact that each individual creditor agreed to forgo part of the debt on the hypothesis that all the other creditors would do the same.321 Such a consideration clearly suffices to support the agreement as between the creditors themselves. The objection that the debtor has provided no consideration appears to be answered by the joint promisee concept enunciated by the High Court of Australia in Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd.322 In relation to any particular creditor the debtor is a joint promisee with all the other creditors and it does not matter that the debtor has not provided something that could be described as a consideration so long as a consideration has in fact been provided on behalf of the joint promisees. As already pointed out, the other creditors do provide a consideration by agreeing to forgo a percentage of their respective debts.323

315. But compare Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 (payment made at a different place for the debtor’s convenience did not evade the rule). 316. Cooper v Parker (1855) 15 CB 822; 139 ER 650; Re Warren (1884) 53 LJ Ch 1016; Homeguard Products (NZ) Ltd v Kiwi Packaging Ltd [1981] NZLR 322. 317. Ibberson v Neck (1886) 2 TLR 427. 318. See  Chapter 2. See also Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329. 319. See  2.15–2.16, particularly discussion of Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. 320. Such was the view adopted in 1804 by Lord Ellenborough in Fitch v Sutton (1804) 5 East 230; 102 ER 1058. 321. Boothbey v Sowden (1812) 3 Camp 175; 170 ER 1346. 322. (1967) 119 CLR 460. See 4.8. 323. This argument appears not to have convinced Bollen J in In the Estate of Whitehead (1986) 44 SASR 402 at 404–5 but this may have been because each creditor signed a release instead of entering into a collective agreement. Nevertheless, Bollen J was prepared to hold that there was consideration.

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The other suggestion is that no creditor will be allowed to go behind the composition agreement to the prejudice of the other creditors or of the debtor, because this would be fraud on all the parties concerned.324 This solution was suggested by Lord Tenterden in 1818325 and supported by Willes J in 1863.326 Although this latter theory has received support both in England and Australia327 it appears that, since Coulls’ case, it may be no longer necessary to rely on the second solution in Australia.

An exception — part payment by a stranger 4.41  Part payment by a third party discharges the debt. Suppose that A owes B $100 and that C promises B $50 on condition that B will discharge A. If the $50 is paid and B still sues A for the balance, has A a defence? A faces both a consideration problem and a privity problem. As no promise of discharge was given to A, she cannot bring herself within the joint promisee concept of Coulls’ case. The question arose in 1825 in Welby v Drake.328 The defendant had drawn a bill for £18 3s 11d which had been returned unaccepted and which had come into the hands of the plaintiff. The defendant’s father then made an agreement with the plaintiff, whereby he promised to pay him £9 in return for the plaintiff’s promise to receive it in full satisfaction of his claim. The money was duly paid, but the plaintiff sued the defendant. Abbott CJ directed judgment for the defendant: If the father did pay the smaller sum in satisfaction of this debt, it is a bar to the plaintiff’s now recovering against the son; because, by suing the son, he commits a fraud on the father, whom he induced to advance his money on the faith of such advance being a discharge of his son from further liability.329

The plea of fraud was approved by Willes J in Cook v Lister330 and applied by the English Court of Appeal in Hirachand Punamchand v Temple.331 These cases, therefore, should be treated as exceptions to the general requirement of consideration and privity. It is odd that reneging on a contract is treated as a species of fraud.

324. See the helpful discussion of the authorities by Chernov JA in Scuderi v Morris (2001) 4 VR 125; [2001] VSCA 190 at [58]–[71]. See also Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [2598] (Drummond AJA). 325. Wood v Roberts (1818) 2 Stark 417; 171 ER 691. 326. Cook v Lister (1863) 13 CBNS 543 at 595; 143 ER 215 at 235. 327. E T Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84; Couldery v Bartrum (1881) 19 Ch D 394; Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597; Re Pearse [1905] VLR 446. 328. (1825) 1 C & P 557; 171 ER 1315. 329. Ibid at 557; 1316. See also Gray v Pearson (1877) 3 VLR (L) 81 discussed in 16.13. 330. (1863) 13 CBNS 543 at 595; 143 ER 215 at 235. 331. [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597 approved in Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd & Campbell (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 431; 147 ALR 1 at 15 (Dawson, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See analysis of Hirachand in N Ray v DCT [2005] FMCA 1893 at [24]–[30] (Barnes FM).

229

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Chapter 5

Intention to Create Legal Relations Introduction 5.1  Is intention a separate requirement? The question now to be discussed is whether a contract necessarily results once a court has ruled that the parties must be taken to have made an agreement and that it is supported by consideration.1 This conclusion is sometimes denied. The law, it is said, does not necessarily hold that there is a contract merely because of the presence of mutual promises. Agreements are made every day in domestic and social life and even in commercial dealings, where the parties do not intend to sue if they are not honoured. The definition of contract is a legally enforceable agreement. It is therefore said that, in addition to the phenomenon of agreement and the presence of consideration, a third contractual element is required — the intention of the parties to create legal relations. This view has been challenged by Williston.2 He argued that the separate element of intention is foreign to the common law, imported from the Continent by academic influences in the nineteenth century3 and useful only in systems which lack the test of consideration to enable them to determine the boundaries of contract: The common law does not require any positive intention to create a legal obligation as an element of contract … A deliberate promise seriously made is enforced irrespective of the promisor’s views regarding his legal liability.4

In essence, if consideration is present, the additional element of intention is otiose. This view is reinforced by the use of the objective test in ascertaining intention.5 If, applying this test, the elements of contract are present, it is not to the point for a party to claim that he or she did not really intend to make a contract. Conversely, where parties make an arrangement that is clearly not intended to attract legal consequences, it could not be said that there has been an exchange of considerations. Consideration, bargain, legal consequences — these are interrelated concepts.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

It is assumed here that the contract cannot otherwise be challenged or impugned on various grounds, covered in this work, which could render the supposed contract, or a part of it, void, voidable or unenforceable. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), s 21. See Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 at [60] (consideration and intention to create legal relations can be distinct). Historically, this would appear to be correct. See Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 LQR 247 at 263–5. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), s 21. Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; 187 ALR 92; [2002] HCA 8 at [25].

230

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Cheshire and Fifoot

Law of Contract Twelfth Australian Edition

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Australian Editions First edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1966 Second edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1969 Third edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, 1974 Fourth edition — J G Starke QC and P F P Higgins, assisted by N C Seddon, 1981 Fifth edition — J G Starke QC, N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1988 Sixth edition — J G Starke QC, N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1992 Seventh edition — N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 1997 Eighth edition — N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 2002 Ninth edition – N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, 2008 Tenth edition – N C Seddon, R A Bigwood and M P Ellinghaus, 2012 Eleventh edition – N C Seddon and R A Bigwood, 2017

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Cheshire and Fifoot

Law of Contract Twelfth Australian Edition N C Seddon LLB (Hons) (Melb), B Phil (Oxon), PhD (ANU) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory Counsel, Ashurst Honorary Professor, ANU College of Law, Australian National University

R A Bigwood LLB (Hons) (Auckland), PhD (ANU), LLD (Auckland) Sir Gerard Brennan Chair in Law, Academic Dean and Head of School, TC Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New Zealand and the Australian Capital Territory

LexisNexis Australia 2023

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LexisNexis AUSTRALIA LexisNexis 475–495 Victoria Avenue, Chatswood NSW 2067 On the internet at: www.lexisnexis.com.au ARGENTINA LexisNexis Argentina, Buenos Aires AUSTRIA LexisNexis Verlag ARD Orac GmbH & Co KG, Vienna BRAZIL LexisNexis Latin America, Sao Paulo CANADA LexisNexis Canada, Markham, Ontario CHILE LexisNexis Chile, Santiago CHINA LexisNexis China, Beijing, Shanghai CZECH REPUBLIC Nakladatelství Orac sro, Prague FRANCE LexisNexis SA, Paris GERMANY LexisNexis Germany, Frankfurt HONG KONG LexisNexis Hong Kong, Hong Kong HUNGARY HVG-Orac, Budapest INDIA LexisNexis, New Delhi ITALY Dott A Giuffrè Editore SpA, Milan JAPAN LexisNexis Japan KK, Tokyo KOREA LexisNexis, Seoul MALAYSIA LexisNexis Malaysia Sdn Bhd, Petaling Jaya, Selangor NEW ZEALAND LexisNexis, Wellington POLAND Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, Warsaw SINGAPORE LexisNexis, Singapore SOUTH AFRICA LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban SWITZERLAND Staempfli Verlag AG, Berne TAIWAN LexisNexis, Taiwan UNITED KINGDOM LexisNexis UK, London, Edinburgh USA LexisNexis Group, New York, New York LexisNexis, Miamisburg, Ohio

ISBN:

9780409354867 (hbk). 9780409354874 (pbk). 9780409354881 (ebk).

© 2023 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis. First edition 1966; Second edition 1969; Third edition 1974; Fourth edition 1981; Fifth edition 1988; Sixth edition 1992; Seventh edition 1997; Eighth edition 2002; Ninth edition 2008 (reprinted 2012); Tenth edition 2012 (reprinted 2014 and 2015); Eleventh edition 2017 (reprinted 2018). This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Optima and Sabon. Printed in Australia. Visit LexisNexis at www.lexisnexis.com.au

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Contents Prefacevii Casesix Statutesclix

PART I  Overview of the Law of Contract Chapter 1  Overview of Contract Law 3 Introduction 3 Elements of Liability for Breach of Contract 5 Unconscionability 6 Formation of Contracts 10 Breach 24 Construction of Contracts 25 Excuses 34 Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 34 Mistake 38 Duress and Undue Influence 39 Unconscionable Dealing and 39 Unconscionable Conduct Informality 39 Incapacity 40 Illegality and Public Policy 41 Termination of Contracts 43 Remedies 50 Specific Performance and Injunction 55 Unconscionability and Remedies 56

PART II  Contract Formation Chapter 2  Estoppel The Importance of Estoppel The Overarching Estoppel Theory The Impact of Estoppel in the Law of Contract

59 59 68 90

Chapter 3  Agreement — Offer and Acceptance 98 Introduction 98 Offer and Acceptance 99 Offer 114 Acceptance 123 Termination of Offer 170 v

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Chapter 4 Consideration Function and Definition Consideration Must Move from the Promisee What Does and Does Not Constitute a Good Consideration in Law

183 183 187 190

230 Chapter 5  Intention to Create Legal Relations Introduction 230 Domestic and Social Agreements 234 Agreements within Clubs, Unincorporated Associations and Political Parties 241 Commercial Agreements 244 269 Government Transactions Chapter 6  Uncertainty 274 Introduction 274 Types of Uncertainty 276 Chapter 7  Privity of Contract The Privity Rule The Effect of the Rule Exceptions to the Privity Rule Circumventions of the Privity Rule

301 301 308 321 339

Chapter 8  Assignment of Contractual Rights and Liabilities The Voluntary Assignment of Contractual Rights The Voluntary Assignment of Contractual Obligations The Involuntary Assignment of Contractual Rights and Liabilities

365 366 410 418

PART III  Breach and Construction Chapter 9 Breach

423

Chapter 10  Construction of Contracts 429 General 429 Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence 431 Actual Terms — Incorporation 462 Actual Terms — Interpretation 474 Implied Terms 490 Terms Limiting Liability 540

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Contents



PART IV  Excuses Chapter 11  Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 559 Introduction and Overview 559 Rescission for Actionable Misrepresentation under the General Law 563 Damages 608 Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 627 734 Chapter 12 Mistake Introduction 734 Common Mistake 740 Mutual and Unilateral Mistake 770 Chapter 13 Duress

802

Chapter 14  Undue Influence Establishing Undue Influence The Yerkey v Jones Principle

823 824 844

Chapter 15  Unconscionable Conduct 856 Introduction 856 Unconscionable Dealing in Equity 858 Statutory Unconscionability 883 Chapter 16 Formalities History and Policy of the Statute of Frauds The Statute of Frauds: Section 4 Sale of Goods

921 921 927 984

Chapter 17 Incapacity 991 Minors 992 Persons Mentally Disabled and Drunkards 1023 Married Women 1027 Corporations 1030 1034 Unincorporated Associations The Crown 1035 Chapter 18  Illegal Contracts 1037 General 1037 1040 Contracts Illegal by Legislation Contracts Against Public Policy 1049 Effect of Illegality 1080

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

PART V  Termination Chapter 19  Termination by Frustration 1097 Basic Principles 1097 Application 1105 Limits of the Doctrine 1109 Effect of Frustration 1114 Chapter 20  Termination for Non-fulfilment of Contingent Condition 1121 Operation of Contingent Conditions 1121 1126 Non-fulfilment of Contingent Conditions Regulation of Termination 1128 1132 Restrictions on Termination Effect of Termination 1141 Chapter 21  Termination for Breach 1143 Overview 1143 Contractual Rights to Terminate for Breach 1143 Right to Terminate for Breach Conferred by Law 1148 Regulation of Termination 1174 Effect of Termination for Breach 1204 Chapter 22  Variation and Termination by Consent 1207 Variation and Termination 1207 Variation 1208 Termination by Consent 1213 Termination at Will 1218

PART VI  Remedies Chapter 23 Damages 1223 Overview 1223 Expectation Loss 1227 Recognised Losses 1235 Effect of Termination 1247 Valuation 1250 Causation 1263 Remoteness 1269 Mitigation 1274 Agreed Damages 1277 Chapter 24  Equitable Remedies Specific Performance

1289 1289 viii

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Contents



Specific Restitution of Chattels 1314 Injunction 1316 Declaration 1328 Equitable Damages under Lord Cairns’ Act 1329 Chapter 25  Limitation of Actions The Operation of the Legislation

1335 1335

Chapter 26  Restitution and Debt 1351 1351 Restitution for Unjust Enrichment Debt 1368

PART VII  History and Theory Chapter 27  Historical Introduction to the Law of Contract Australian Contract Law A Brief History of the Law of Contract

1377 1377 1380

Chapter 28  A Guide to Contract Theory 1397 Introduction 1397 The Classical Period 1400 Economic Analysis of Contract Rules 1408 Relational Theory 1419 Critical Legal Theory 1425 Promissory Theory 1429 Feminism 1431 Unconscionability 1433 Index1439

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Preface Given its bulk, some would say this is a book one cannot pick up. As with every new edition, the authors have reviewed the entire text and have been mindful to reduce material where possible, principally in culling old cases. There have been no spectacular developments in contract law since the publication of the 11th edition. The High Court has confirmed in Pipikos v Trayens, after many years of mild uncertainty, that the strict test for the doctrine of part performance in Statute of Frauds cases is the correct test. The High Court has also confirmed in Price v Spoor the long-established principle that the operation of limitation periods is in the control of the parties, even to the extent of excluding a period entirely. Arguably, though, the law relating to undue influence has changed in the wake of Thorne v Kennedy, where the High Court appears to have refashioned that law in such a manner that, were the current tests to be applied to the facts of Johnson v Buttress, that case could not be decided in the way it was by the majority of the High Court in 1936. On the topic of limitation periods (see Chapter 25), the centrally important notion of accrual has divided a five-judge New  South  Wales Court of Appeal in Globe Church Incorporated v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd on the question of when a right of action accrues in respect of indemnity insurance. Is it when the insured event occurs or when the insurance company fails to meet the claim? Three judges opted for the former. A similar trap can be set by loan contracts where, counter-intuitively, accrual occurs on the making of the loan unless the contract provides otherwise. The same court has clarified in Wollongong Coal Ltd v Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd that the doctrine of privity is a preclusionary principle and cannot be used as a sword. In multi-party contracts the existence of privity between the various parties does not mean that each has rights against each other party. The correct approach is determined by what the contract provides. The treatment of electronic transactions continues to attract extensive commentary, noted in Chapter  3. The anthropomorphising of contracts (can a machine have intention? Is it a legal entity?) is suggested but has not been well received. Some legislative responses to COVID-19 are noted, the most important of which are changes to the Corporations Act enabling the use of electronic documents, including deeds, by companies. The response at state level has been patchy, with some states and territories remaining unresponsive to the pleas of practitioners to enable electronic deeds. A muted controversy continues as to whether estoppel can in effect operate as a cause of action outside proprietary estoppel cases. The prevailing view is that it can, which accords with the decision of the High Court in the Waltons case. Misleading conduct cases continue apace, adding to the very extensive tapestry of case law on the 23 words of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law. A handful of single-judge cases consider whether it is possible to exclude the operation of the section (see 11.150), with three outliers saying that it is possible, despite extensive authority to the contrary. This possibility is vigorously advocated by two learned xi

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract



commentators. Such a development would be momentous and would need to be made by the High Court. The idea of market-based causation has taken root in misleading conduct cases. A person may suffer loss caused by misleading conduct that did not lead the claimant into error. A simple example is where customers of the claimant are misled and cease to buy the claimant’s products. Financial markets provide more complicated instances of this indirect causation. The High  Court and the Full Federal Court have continued in their attempts to throw light on the meaning of and approach to statutory unconscionability under s  21 of the Australian Consumer Law and its equivalents. There has been a retreat from the earlier apparent insistence on proof of conduct representing ‘a high level of moral obloquy’. Clarification around the relationship between statutory unconscionability and unconscionability in equity is also emergent in the field. In Mann v  Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd, the High  Court examined the intersection between contract and restitution, recognising the right of an innocent party who has lawfully terminated a contract by accepting the other party’s repudiation to elect between suing for damages for breach of contract or for restitution in respect of services rendered under the uncompleted contract (or uncompleted divisible stage of the contract). Differences in the reasoning in the various judgments, however, suggest that the relationship between contract and restitution may continue to be affected by uncertainty into the future. It is worth noting developments in the United Kingdom that have not taken root in Australia. They are: • • • • • • •

The discarding of Solle v Butcher in mistake cases; Wrothan Park damages (disgorgement damages); Damages payable for third-party loss (discussed 7.7); Disallowing an informal contract variation where there is a no-oralvariation clause; Not allowing estoppel to prevail over a failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds (see 16.67); Recognition of a standalone category of lawful-act (economic) duress; and Contractual estoppel where a clause (for example, that a party has not relied on information provided by the other party) cannot be denied.

As this book went to press the Queensland government revealed a Property Law Bill 2022. References to the relevant clauses of this Bill are included in our commentary. Nick Seddon Rick Bigwood October 2022

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Table of Cases References are to paragraph numbers 075 883 626 Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd (FCA, Cooper J, 17 July 1998, unreported) .… 21.10 400 George Street (Qld) Pty Ltd v BG International Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 302; [2010] QCA 245 .… 5.24 1144 Nepean Highway Pty Ltd v Abnote Australasia Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 551; (2009) 26 VR 59; [2009] VSCA 308 .… 24.13 21st Century Promotions Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp [2001] SASC 299 .… 21.19 A A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532; (1984) 156 CLR 542 .… 18.14, 18.15, 18.16, 18.30, 18.31, 18.32, 18.40, 18.41 A & A Property Developers Pty Ltd v MCCA Asset Management Ltd [2017] VSCA 365 .… 10.12 A & M Green Investments Pty Ltd v Progressive Pod Properties Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 502 .… 26.8 A Goninan & Co Ltd v Direct Engineering Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASCA 112 .… 10.32 A H McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506 .… 11.53 A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd v New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 385 .… 7.25 A Roberts & Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555 .… 12.53 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay 4 [1974] 3 All ER 616 .… 15.8 Aademy of Health and Fitness Pty Ltd v Power [1973] VR 254 .… 11.69 Aalborg CSP A/S v Ottoway Engineering Pty Ltd [2017] SASCFC 158 .… 11.149 Aardwolf Industries LLC v Tayeh [2020] NSWCA 301 .… 11.111 AB v CD [2015] 1 WLR 771; [2014] EWCA Civ 229 .… 24.4 Abadeen Group Pty Ltd v Bluestone Property Services Pty Ltd; Brown v Hodgkinson [2009] NSWCA 386 .… 5.19 ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 665 .… 26.7

ABB Power Generation Ltd v Chapple [2001] WASCA 412 .… 26.8 Abbott v Lance (1860) Legge 1283 .… 3.28, 3.45, 3.71, 27.1 — v Wolsey [1895] 2 QB 97 .… 16.84 Abdurahman v Field (1987) 8 NSWLR 158; (1987) 8 NSWLR 159 .… 18.43, 18.47 Abela v Lawnside Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-430 .… 21.32 Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Cheng [1960] AC 115 .… 20.8 Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181 .… 3.27, 5.19, 26.7 — v Sydney Catchment Authority [2004] NSWCA 270 .… 11.122 — v — [2005] NSWSC 662 .… 11.150 — v — (No 3) (2006) 67 NSWLR 341; [2006] NSWCA 282 .… 11.127, 11.146 Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45 .… 21.27 Abjornson v Urban Newspapers Ltd [1989] WAR 191 .… 16.21 ABL Custodian Services Pty Ltd v Smith [2010] VSC 548 .… 8.7 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; 309 ALR 445; [2014] FCAFC 65 .… 11.83, 11.114, 11.121, 11.124, 11.132 Aboody v Ryan [2012] NSWCA 395 .… 15.1, 15.3, 15.9, 15.10 Abram v AV Jennings Ltd [2002] SASC 417 .… 10.13, 20.15 Abram Steamship Co v Westville Shipping Co [1923] AC 773; [1923] All ER Rep 645 .… 11.45, 11.48 Abundant Earth Pty Ltd v R & C Products Pty Ltd (1984) 59 ALR 211 .… 11.150 AC Toepfer International Gmbh v Nidera Handelscompagnie BV (NSWCA, 16 October 1990) .… 21.18 Academy of Health and Fitness Pty Ltd v Power [1973] VR 254 .… 10.21, 11.46, 11.57, 11.69, 11.71 ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491; [2003] FCA 850 .… 15.16, 18.7 — v ACN 117 372 915 Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 368 .… 15.16, 15.22 — v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) FCA 17 .… 15.1, 15.16 — v Baxter Health Care Pty Ltd (2007) 232 CLR 1; 237 ALR 512; [2007] HCA 38 .… 17.74, 18.7 — v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1 .… 11.110

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract — v — (2002) 117 FCR 301; 189 ALR 76; [2002] FCA 62; [2002] FCAFC 4 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.13 — v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253; 178 ALR 304; [2000] FCA 1365 .… 15.16 — v Smart Corporation Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 347 .… 15.20 — v South East Melbourne Cleaning Ltd (in liq) (formerly known as Coverall Cleaning Concepts South East Melbourne Pty Ltd) (No 2) (2015) ATPR 42-492; [2015] FCA 257 .… 15.16 — v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; 304 ALR 186; [2013] HCA 54 .… 11.104, 11.105, 11.113, 11.118 — v Unique International College Pty Ltd (Imposition of Penalty) [2019] FCA 1773 .… 15.16 — v Universal Sports Challenge Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1276 .… 11.110, 11.117 — v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 .… 3.7, 11.114, 11.122, 11.153 Accordent Pty Ltd and Portellos v Bresimark Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 196; (2008) 101 SASR 286 .… 8.6, 7.27 Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 470; 114 ALR 355 .… 7.1, 10.21, 10.24, 11.118, 11.124, 11.146 Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 .… 2.5 Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55 .… 2.29 Ackers v Austcorp International Ltd [2009] FCA 432 .… 11.110 Aclaw Pty Ltd v Fullston [2000] SASC 440 .… 21.12, 21.19 ACMNET Pty Ltd v Ai Tel Pty Ltd [2007] SASC 96 .… 24.21 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) SASC 204 .… 7.35 ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 .… 2.16, 2.17 ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd v Vercorp Pty Ltd; Vercorp Pty Ltd v ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 189 .… 7.28, 24.4 Acohs Pty Ltd v RA Bashford Consulting Pty Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 528 .… 10.50, 10.52

— v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375 .… 11.115 — v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 491; 169 ALR 324; [2000] FCA 2; [2000] FCA 1376 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.13, 15.16 — v — (2003) 214 CLR 51; (2003) 197 ALR 153; [2003] HCA 18 .… 10.46, 13.11, 15.6, 15.8, 15.13, 21.37 — v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 1204 .… 15.22 — v CLA Trading Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 377 .… 15.22 — v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2018] FCA 703 .… 15.13 — v Geowash Pty Ltd (No 3) (2019) 368 ALR 441; [2019] FCA 72 .… 10.43, 10.44 — v Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 302 .… 11.110 — v Harrison (No 2) [2017] FCA 182 .… 15.17 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 819 .… 11.117 — v Keshow [2005] FCA 558 .… 15.16 — v Leelee Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1121 .… 6.15, 15.13 — v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 .… 15.16 — v Lux Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 926 .… 15.16, 17.53 — v Medibank Private Ltd [2018] FCAFC 235 .… 15.16 — v Oceana Commercial Pty Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 316; [2004] FCAFC 174 .… 15.15, 15.16 — v Origin Energy Electricity Ltd [2015] FCA .… 15.16 — v Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [2021] FCA 956 .… 15.16 — v Productivity Partners Pty Ltd (trading as Captain Cook College) (No 3) [2021] FCA 737 .… 15.16 — v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1062 .… 11.117 — v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 388 ALR 577; [2021] FCAFC 40 .… 15.16 — v Radio Rentals Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 292; [2005] FCA 1133 .… 15.13, 15.15, 15.16 — v Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 1294 .… 5.20 — v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1725 .… 15.8 xiv

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Table of Cases



Adelaide Development Co Pty Ltd v Pohlner (1933) 49 CLR 25 .… 18.7, 18.19, 18.40 Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-901 .… 11.117 Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 10 SASR 203 .… 18.34 Adenan v Buise [1984] WAR 61 .… 14.5 Adicho v Dankeith Homes Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 316 .… 10.6, 22.4 Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158; [1954] 3 All ER 21 .… 7.37 Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera (1973) 130 CLR 353 .… 10.16 Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 .… 6.6 — v Leahy (1961) 105 CLR 6 .… 5.28 Administrative and Clerical Officers Association v Commonwealth (1979) 26 ALR 497; 53 ALJR 588 .… 5.26 Adrenaline Pty Ltd v Bathurst Regional Council (2015) 322 ALR 180; [2015] NSWCA 123 .… 26.5 Advance Fitness Corp Pty Ltd v Bondi Diggers Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd [1999] NSWSC 264 .… 10.43, 10.45 Advance (NSW) Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd v Matthews (1989) 166 CLR 606 .… 7.10 Advanced Hair Studio Pty Ltd v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 615 .… 11.111 Advanced National Services Pty Ltd v Daintree Contractors Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 270 .… 26.9, 26.13 Adventure World Travel Pty Ltd v Newsom [2014] NSWCA 174 .… 10.46 AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 .… 24.22 Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-operative Society Ltd v Lee (2000) 102 FCR 125 .… 18.35, 18.36 Aerospace Publishing Ltd v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 3 .… 23.11 AFC Holdings Pty Ltd v Shiprock Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 28,199; [2010] NSWSC 985 .… 10.30 African Minerals Ltd v Pan Palladium Ltd [2003] NSWSC 268 .… 3.11, 5.21 A-G v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1913) 18 CLR 30 .… 18.37 — v Barker Bros Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 495 .… 6.9 — v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; [2000] 4 All ER 385; [2000] 3 WLR 625 .… 11.146, 23.2, 24.31

Acorn Consolidated Pty Ltd v Hawkeslade Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 322 .… 10.12, 10.34 Acron Pacific Ltd v Offshore Oil NL (1985) 157 CLR 514 .… 23.45 ACT Gaming and Liquor Authority v Andonaros (1991) 103 FLR 450 .… 18.6, 18.11, 18.12, 18.21, 18.32, 18.43, 18.45, 23.39 Actall Pty Ltd v Pacific Bay Development Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 190 .… 20.18, 21.34, 21.35 ACTEW Corporation Ltd v Pangallo (2002) 127 FCR 1; [2002] FCAFC 325 .… 5.26 Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering IN.GL. EN SpA [2003] 2 AC 541; [2003] 2 All ER 615; [2003] 2 WLR 1060; [2003] UKHL 17 .… 16.67 Active Leisure (Sports) Pty Ltd v Sportsman’s Australia Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 301 .… 24.22 Actron Investments Queensland Pty Ltd v DEQ Consulting Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 147 .… 11.110 Adam v Newbigging (1888) 13 App Cas 308 .… 11.44 — v Shiavon [1985] Qd R 1 .… 25.12 Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250 .… 27.21 — v — (1818) 2 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250 .… 3.58, 3.59, 3.60 — v Quasar Management Services Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 223 .… 21.19, 23.2 Adamson v Hayes (1973) 130 CLR 276 .… 8.21, 16.21, 16.25 — v — (1974) 48 ALJ 322 .… 16.21 — v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 319 .… 18.35, 18.36, 18.37 — v — (1993) 15 Syd LR 92 .… 18.35 — v West Perth Football Club (1979) 27 ALR 475 .… 18.36 — v Williams [2001] QCA 38 .… 10.41, 26.1, 26.6, 26.7 Adani Abbot Point Terminal Pty Ltd v Lake Vermont Resources Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 26 .… 15.15 Adaz Nominees Pty Ltd v Castleway Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 201 .… 10.16, 10.30, 10.41, 10.42 Adcon v Icon [2020] VSC 165 .… 24.23 Adelaide City Corp v Altmann (1987) 46 SASR 186 .… 10.32 — v Jennings Industries Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 455 .… 10.32 — v — (1985) 156 CLR 274 .… 10.55 xv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Codner [1973] 1 NZLR 545 .… 2.7 — v Ray (1874) 9 Ch App 397 .… 11.63 AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464; [2002] NSWSC 170 .… 18.16, 18.32, 24.19 A-G (Botswana) v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASCA 73 .… 21.22 A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114 .… 2.6, 2.14, 5.24, 5.25 A-G (NSW) v Mutual Home Loans Fund of Australia Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 162 .… 3.20 — v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 .… 24.1 — v Peters (1924) 34 CLR 146 .… 11.37 — v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; [2005] NSWCA 261 .… 15.1, 15.16 A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1; 295 ALR 197; [2013] HCA 3 .… 3.52 A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 353 .… 18.21 Agaiby v Darlington Commodities Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-535 .… 11.112, 11.122, 11.150 AGC v Ross [1983] 2 VR 319 .… 21.18 AGC (Advances) Ltd v FCT (1975) 132 CLR 175 .… 8.16, 8.28 — v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454 .… 3.22, 3.24 AGC Ltd v McClelland [1993] ASC 58,378 .… 14.17 Agius v Sage [1999] VSC 100 .… 2.26, 5.19, 6.6, 16.67, 24.7, 24.14 AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v Lockwood [2003] 10 VR 596; (2003) 183 FLR 242; [2003] VSC 453 .… 16.80 — v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173 .… 6.11 Agmon Investments Pty Ltd v Inglis [2006] NSWSC 932 .… 6.11 Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2006] NSWSC 202 .… 10.43, 19.2, 20.16 — v — [2010] NSWSC 635 .… 15.26, 15.27 — v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 .… 2.29, 4.2, 4.32, 4.35, 4.36, 6.18, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 10.33, 10.62, 10.66, 21.29, 21.31, 22.4 Agricultural Societies Council of NSW v Christie [2016] NSWCA 331 .… 5.10 Agripay Pty Ltd v Byrne [2011] QCA 85 .… 14.19, 14.20

Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd t/as Spring Air v Hatfield (2003) 7 VR 63; 174 FLR 395; [2003] VSCA 6 .… 25.12 AH McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506 .… 11.46 Ah Sam v Mortimer [2021] NSWCA 327 .… 15.8, 15.10 Ahern v Power [1953] QWN 22 .… 4.19 Ahmed Angullia bin Hadjee Mohamed Salleh Angullia v Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd [1938] AC 624; [1938] 3 All ER 106 .… 8.55 AHR Constructions Pty Ltd v Maloney (1994) 1 Qd R 461 .… 23.41 Aidinis v Hotchin [1971] SASR 446 .… 21.24 Ailakis v Olivero [2014] WASCA 127 .… 5.18 — v — (No 2) [2014] WASCA 127 .… 4.30, 21.29, 21.30, 23.25 Ailsa Craig Fishing v Malvern Fishing [1983] 1 WLR 964; 1 All ER 101 .… 10.62 Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1985] 2 NSWLR 309 .… 3.17, 5.1, 5.19, 5.24, 6.8, 6.11, 10.9, 12.64, 22.9 Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson (2005) 223 CLR 283; 218 ALR 700; [2005] HCA 39 .… 21.24, 25.12 Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 .… 2.2, 2.13, 2.16, 2.28, 7.2 Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 116 .… 3.27, 4.30, 4.35, 5.19, 5.29 Aitkin Transport Pty Ltd v Voysey [1990] 1 Qd R 510 .… 7.2 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236, 237; [1999] NSWSC 996 .… 6.15, 6.16, 10.43, 10.44, 10.47, 10.48, 24.13 Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556 .… 2.15, 2.17 Akins v National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 .… 14.18 Akot Pty Ltd v Rathmines Investments Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 302 .… 10.13 Akron Securities v Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353; 143 ALR 457 .… 11.129, 11.146, 11.147 Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477 .… 3.34 Al Achrafi v Topic [2016] NSWSC 1807 .… 10.32, 20.16

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Table of Cases Al Jadeed TV v United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd (2011) 283 ALR 206 .… 21.23 Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; 137 NTR 1; [2000] NTCA 15 .… 4.14, 10.53 Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 224 .… 26.9 Alan Davis Group v Rivkin Financial Services [2005] NSWSC 369 .… 21.18 Alanbert Pty Ltd v Bulevi Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 261 .… 13.6, 19.5, 19.8, 19.12 Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216 .… 10.21, 11.3, 11.44, 11.45, 11.53, 11.60, 11.69, 11.85, 11.104, 11.113, 11.147, 13.11 Albert House Ltd v Brisbane CC (1965) 118 CLR 145 .… 10.6 Albion Insurance Co Ltd v GIO (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 .… 11.145 Albury v Gulror Pty Ltd (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-018 .… 15.29 Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.34 Aldersea v Public Transport Corporation (2001) 3 VR 499; (2001) 183 ALR 545; [2001] VSC 169 .… 11.146, 21.34, 22.12, 23.19 Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd [1945] KB 189; [1945] 1 All ER 244 .… 10.77 Alderson v Maddison (1880) LR 5 Ex D 293 .… 16.54 — v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 435 .… 11.108, 14.17, 14.20 ALDI Foods Pty Ltd as General Partner of ALDI Stores (A Limited Partnership) v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2020] FCAFC 231 .… 11.111 Aldridge v Johnson (1857) 7 E & B 885; 119 ER 1476 .… 16.79 — v Miller (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 520 .… 21.19 Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd v Armidale City Council (1994) 51 FCR 378 .… 25.1 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil GB Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 944 .… 13.7, 13.11 Alex Kay Pty Ltd v General Motors Acceptance Corp [1963] VR 458 .… 10.74 Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 .… 23.5, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38, 23.39, 23.40 — v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2001] NSWCA 240 .… 10.64, 10.76, 10.77



— v — (2003) 216 CLR 109; (2004) 204 ALR 417; [2004] HCA 7 .… 11.145 — v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 .… 18.21 — v Standard Telephones & Cables Plc [1990] ICR 291 .… 24.27 — v Stocks & Holdings (Sales) Pty Ltd [1975] VR 843 .… 3.61 Alexiadis v Zirpiadis (2013) 302 ALR 148; [2013] SASCFC 64 .… 18.46, 26.1 Alexus Pty Ltd v Pont Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1171 .… 21.19 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518; [2000] 4 All ER 97; [2000] 3 WLR 946 .… 7.7, 7.30, 23.2, 23.19 ALH Group Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2012) 245 CLR 338; 286 ALR 1; [2012] HCA 6 .… 8.1, 8.46, 8.47, 22.5 Alinta 2000 Ltd v Petkov [2012] WASCA 258 .… 25.12 Allan Rowlands Holdings Pty Ltd v Gaye (No 1) Pty Ltd (1992) 107 FLR 313 .… 18.3, 18.4, 18.7, 18.9, 18.39, 18.47 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; [1886–90] All ER Rep 90 .… 14.2, 14.5, 14.8, 14.10, 14.11, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15 — v Walker [1896] 2 Ch 369 .… 12.23 Allcars Pty Ltd v Tweedle [1937] VLR 35 .… 6.5 Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 .… 3.10, 3.11, 10.12 — v Richardson (1879) 13 Ch D 524 .… 11.63 — v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685 .… 16.73, 16.75 Allen & Sons v Kirk [1927] St R Qd 85 .… 16.29 Allens Group Ltd v Arena Meetings Conventions & Exhibitions Pty Ltd (1997) 8 BPR 15,623 .… 3.11, 5.19, 6.12 Alleyn v Thurecht [1983] 2 Qd R 706 .… 21.29 Allhours Enterprises Pty Ltd v Global Food Services Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 459 .… 8.7, 8.47, 11.147 Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd v Hinton (1964) 1 DCR (NSW) 5 .… 17.5 Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464 .… 3.27, 3.44 Alliance Petroleum Australia NL v Australian Gas Light Co (1985) 39 SASR 84 .… 21.19 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121 .… 2.10, 2.24, 2.31, 21.29, 21.31 xvii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568; 215 ALR 385; [2005] HCA 26 .… 11.127 — v Haddad [2015] NSWCA 186 .… 11.115 — v Oakley (1987) 45 SASR 148; (1987) 48 SASR 337 .… 10.6, 10.9 Allied Mills Ltd v Gwydir Valley Oilseeds Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 26 .… 19.17, 19.23 Allison v Hewitt (1974) 3 DCR (NSW) 193 .… 23.19 Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 57 .… 21.12, 21.26, 21.37 Allpike Honda Pty Ltd v Marbellup Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 5 ATPR 40-385 .… 11.115 Allstate Enterprises v LV Beaconsfield Gold NL [1999] NSWSC 832 .… 10.12 Allstate Prospecting Pty Ltd v Posgold Mines Ltd (1995, unreported) .… 18.35 Alma Hill Constructions Pty Ltd v Onal [2007] VSC 86 .… 8.18 Al-Maha Pty Ltd v Coplin [2017] NSWCA 318 .… 15.31 Almond Investors Ltd v Kualitree Nursery Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 198 .… 21.26 Aloha Shangri-La Atlas Cruises Pty Ltd v Gaven [1970] Qd R 438 .… 7.25, 18.37 Alonso v SRS Investments (WA) Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 168 .… 5.1, 16.40, 16.45 Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Co Ltd [2008] WASCA 119 .… 2.3 Alstom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2012] SASC 49 .… 10.7, 10.41, 10.43, 10.52, 10.77, 22.4, 22.6 — v — (No 8) [2012] SASC 117 .… 10.14 Altmann v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (1986) 43 SASR 353 .… 18.30 Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 VR 386 .… 23.15, 23.27, 23.28 AMA Group Ltd v ASSK Investments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 45 .… 10.30, 20.7 Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2001] NSWSC 324 .… 10.2 — v Ridgeway [2005] NSWCA 417 .… 25.11 Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson (1998) 81 FCR 149 .… 18.11, 18.40, 18.41, 18.47 Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd [1976] 3 All ER 509 .… 12.1

— v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 .… 2.3, 2.6, 2.28 — (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 577 .… 2.29 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Television Corp Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 648 .… 10.32, 22.12 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 100 ALR 267 (Beaumont J); (1990) 22 FCR 527; 92 ALR 601; 92 ALR 603 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.21, 23.25, 21.33 Ambassador Refrigeration Pty Ltd v Trocadero Building and Investment Co Pty Ltd [1968] 1 NSWR 75 .… 18.43, 18.47 Amber Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Polona Pty Ltd (1982) 2 NSWLR 470 .… 20.8, 20.13, 20.16 Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd v Baker [2010] VSC 59 .… 7.28 Amco Enterprises Pty Ltd v Wade [1968] Qd R 445 .… 16.25 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2021] VSCA .… 10.30 Amcor Ltd t/as Australian Paper Manufacturers v Watson [2000] NSWCA 21 .… 15.28 American Express International Inc v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 10 VR 145; [2004] VSCA 193 .… 8.50 AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 564 .… 23.45 AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 70; (1986) 162 CLR 170; (1986) 162 CLR 171 .… 23.23, 23.45 Amey v Fifer (1971) 1 NSWLR 685 .… 17.73 Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 288 .… 18.35, 18.37 — v — (No 2) (1975) 133 CLR 331 .… 18.4 Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199 .… 4.6, 4.22 — v Citibank Ltd [1996] QCA 129 .… 4.38 AMP General Insurance Ltd v Kull [2005] NSWCA 442 .… 10.33 AMP Services Ltd v Manning [2006] FCA 256 .… 21.24 AMP Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [1990] VR 646 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.48 — v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 .… 10.16 — v Specialist Funding Consultants Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 .… 11.147, 11.149 Ampol Petroleum Ltd v Mutton (1952) 53 SR (NSW) 1 .… 24.20

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Table of Cases



— v — [1996] LMCLQ 337 .… 26.8 Anglican Development Fund Diocese of Bathurst v Palmer [2015] NSWSC 1856 .… 5.10, 5.17, 17.73 Anglo-Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 .… 18.31 Angus Developments Pty Ltd v Kim [2017] NSWSC 584 .… 10.31 Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549 .… 10.33, 20.1, 21.11, 21.18, 21.19, 21.21, 21.22 Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 .… 8.4, 8.8, 8.18, 8.34, 8.39 Ansett Australia Ltd v Diners Club Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 102 .… 10.13, 10.15, 26.5 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (1990) 95 ALR 211 .… 13.12 — v — (No 2) [1991] 2 VR 636 .… 5.26 — v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54 .… 5.28, 10.32, 10.48, 10.55, 10.59, 18.9, 18.30 Anthoness v Melbourne Malting and Brewing Co (1888) 14 VLR 916 .… 16.17 Antonovic v Volker (1986) 7 NSWLR 151 .… 15.1, 15.28, 15.31 Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith [2003] 2 NZLR 23 .… 4.35 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2004] QCA 6 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd (1982) 57 ALJR 35; (1982) 57 ALJR 352 .… 20.4, 21.17 — v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 478 .… 25.3 — v Frost Holdings Pty Ltd [1989] VR 695 .… 6.2, 6.3, 6.8 — v Manasseh [2016] WASCA 41 .… 22.2, 22.5 — v Pan Foods Co Importers and Distributors Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 29 .… 11.124 — v Petrik [1996] 2 VR 638 .… 11.39 — v Widin (1990) 2 FCR 21; (1990) 26 FCR 21; 102 ALR 289 .… 16.35, 16.65, 16.67 — v Wrenport Pty Ltd [1996] ANZ ConvR 102; [1995] QCA 140 .… 20.20, 26.4 ANZ Executors & Trustee Co Ltd v Qintex Australia Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 360 .…  17.69, 18.21, 24.7 — v Humes Ltd [1990] VR 615 .… 24.4 Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) (2013) 45 WAR 379; 307 ALR 376; [2013] WASCA 213 .… 7.41

Amsprop Trading Ltd v Harris Distribution Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1025 .… 7.25 Anaconda v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 .… 10.3 Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 .… 2.16, 2.30, 10.6, 10.43 — v — [2005] HCA Trans 151 .… 10.3 — v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 101; [2000] WASCA 27 .… 5.19, 6.6, 10.41 Anaconda Operations Pty Ltd v Fluor Daniel Pty Ltd [1999] VSCA 214 .… 24.23 Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; [2004] HCA 28 .… 10.12, 10.13, 10.31, 10.33, 10.40 Anderson v G H Michell and Sons Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 543 .… 18.34 — v Glass (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152 .… 4.19 — Anderson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2018] VSCA 22 .… 15.16 Andoy Pty Ltd v S & M Cannon Pty Ltd (1990) 17 IPR 533 .… 24.24 Andre & Cie SA v Ets Michel Blanc & Fils [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 166 .… 11.96 — v — [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 .… 11.13 Andrew Knox Holdings Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd .… 21.28, 21.29 Andrew Shelton & Co Pty Ltd v Alpha Healthcare Ltd [2002] VSC 248 .… 26.8 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205; 290 ALR 595; [2012] HCA 30 .… 23.45, 24.23 — v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229 .… 3.9 — v Parker [1973] Qd R 93 .… 18.27, 18.47 Androvitsaneas v Members First Broker Network Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 212 .… 10.43, 21.38 Anfrank Nominees Pty Ltd v Connell (1989) ACSR 365 .… 12.30 Angas Securities Ltd v Small Business Consortium Lloyds Consortium No 9056 [2016] NSWCA 182 .… 10.12 — v Valcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 190 .… 11.129, 11.146 Ange v First East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 638; [2011] VSCA 335 .… 10.27, 15.1, 19.21 Angel v Hope 1927] St R Qd 221 .… 16.18 — v Jay [1911] 1 KB 666; [1908–10] All ER Rep 470 .… 11.61, 11.62, 11.63 Angelopoulos v Sabatino (1995) 65 SASR 1; [1995] 65 SASR 17 .… 26.6, 26.8 xix

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Ardlethan Options Ltd v Easdown (1915) 20 CLR 285 .… 23.42 Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65 .… 2.15, 4.19, 5.7 Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112; 12 ATPR 41-015 .… 11.84, 11.111, 11.122 Argyll Park Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd v Glen Pacific Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 1 .… 4.17 Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581 .… 24.16, 24.17 Arktos Pty Ltd v Idyllic Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 119 .… 11.110 Arlett v Kinsella (1870) 1 AJR 2 .… 16.62 Arlone Pty Ltd v Teller Properties Pty Ltd (FCA, Lockhart J, 7 February 1995 .… 23.23 Armada Balnaves Pte Ltd v Woodside Energy Julimar Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 69 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 21.20, 21.29 — v — (No 2) [2020] WASC 14 .… 21.29 Armaghdown Motors Ltd v Gray Motors Ltd [1963] NZLR 5 .… 12.56 Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Strange 505 [1722] EWHC KB J94; 93 ER 664 .… 11.82 Arms v Houghton (2006) 151 FCR 438; [2006] FCAFC 46 .… 11.110 Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 KB 822; [1916–17] All ER Rep 1117 .… 11.63 — v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232 .… 11.79 Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd (No 9) [2016] NSWSC 1005 .… 21.26 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 .… 10.12, 10.30 Arnot v Hill-Douglas [2006] NSWSC 429 .… 10.3, 10.7 Arnott’s Ltd v Bourke (1998) 41 IPR 172 .… 18.37, 18.38 Aroney v Christianus (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 118 .… 17.17, 17.29 Aronis v Hallett Brick Industries Ltd [1999] SASC 92 .… 9.8 Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2002] FCA 1450 .… 15.2, 15.8, 15.15 Arshad Developments Pty Ltd v Wardle [2002] QSC 089 .… 10.35 Artcraft Pty Ltd v Chandler [2003] QSC 102 .… 18.37 ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512 .… 23.6, 24.30, 24.31

APD Parcel Delivery Pty Ltd v Baumann [2002] SASC 350 .… 11.97 Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49 .… 2.29, 3.27 APF Properties Pty Ltd v Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1561 .… 11.129 APIR Systems Ltd v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 45 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147 Apollo Shower Screen Pty Ltd v Building & Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1995) 1 NSWLR 561 .… 20.16 Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC [2016] VSCA 280 .… 10.12, 10.30, 22.3 Appleby v Pursell [1973] NSWLR 879 .… 10.14 Applegate v Moss [1971] 1 QB 406 .… 25.6 Application by Klumper, Re [2003] NSWSC 854 .… 17.48 Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 319 .… 21.24 APT Finance Pty Ltd v Bajada [2008] WASCA 73 .… 8.12, 8.18 Aquagenics Pty Ltd v Break O’Day Council [2010] TASFC 3 .… 11.141, 11.143 Aquatec-Maxcon Pty Ltd v Barwon Region Water Authority (No 3) [2006] VSC 270 .… 11.139 Arab Bank v Barclays Bank [1954] AC 495 .… 25.3 Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328 .… 23.45 Aravco Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 419 .… 4.16 Arbest Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1996) ATPR 41481 .… 11.112, 11.113, 11.114, 11.115, 11.118, 15.27 Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v S Spanglett Ltd [1961] 1 QB 374 .… 18.43 Archer v Archer [2000] NSWCA 314 .… 14.7, 15.7 — v Cutler [1980] 1 NZLR 386 .… 15.5, 17.53 — v Hudson (1844) 7 Beav 551; 49 ER 1180 .… 14.7 Archibald v Powlett [2017] VSCA 259; (2017) 53 VR 645 .… 23.19 Ardee Pty Ltd v Collex Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 836 .… 19.5, 19.7, 19.8, 19.15, 19.21, 19.24

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Table of Cases



Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 .… 10.28, 10.31, 10.55, 10.56, 10.61 — v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321 .… 3.67, 5.23 — v — (No 2) (1986) 45 SASR 57 .… 3.67, 23.13, 23.32 Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255 .… 12.15, 12.21 Associated Midland Corp Ltd v Bank of NSW (1984) 51 ALR 641 .… 3.21 Associated Newspapers Ltd v Bancks (1951) 83 CLR 322 .… 10.52, 21.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.15, 21.16, 21.18 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 155; 197 CLR 1 .… 10.53, 11.88, 23.8, 23.30, 23.39, 24.31, 28.7 — v Reynolds (1731) 2 Stra 915; 93 ER 939 .… 13.4 Astor Electronics Pty Ltd v Japan Electron Optis Laboratory Co Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 419 .… 24.13 Astra Resources Plc v Full Exposure Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1061 .… 11.111 Astrazeneca Pty Ltd v GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 22 .… 11.115, 11.122 Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corporation [2011] EWHC 1574 .… 10.73 ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460 .… 11.103, 11.124 Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 .… 3.6, 5.1, 5.17 Athens-MacDonald Travel Service Pty Ltd v Kazis [1970] SASR 264 .… 23.19 Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 481 .… 11.146, 23.24 Atlantic Civil Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corp (1992) 39 NSWLR 468 .… 18.34 Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641; [1989] QB 833 .… 13.7, 13.9 Atlas Steels (Aust) Pty Ltd v Atlas Steels Ltd (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 157 .… 24.12, 24.26 Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 144 CLR 203 .… 23.18, 23.32, 27.1 Atlee v Backhouse (1838) 3 M & W 633; 150 ER 1298 .… 13.4 Attia v Caird Seven Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 271 .… 21.29, 24.1, 24.10

Ashdown v Kirk [1999] 2 Qd R 1 .… 20.8, 21.23, 21.38, 23.45 Ashfind Pty Ltd v McDonald (1990) ANZ ConvR 108 .… 11.40, 11.41 Ashgrove Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 53 FCR 452 .… 16.29 Ashington Holdings Pty Ltd v Wipema Services Pty Ltd [1998] NSW ConvR 56, 694 .… 5.20 — v — [1999] NSWCA 456 .… 24.32 — v — (2000) NSW ConvR 55-928 .… 10.3, 19.24, 22.9 Ashton v Pratt [2012] NSWSC 3 .… 18.27 — v — (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 .… 2.5, 2.9, 2.15, 4.24, 5.1, 6.5, 18.3, 18.27 — v — (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 3 .… 18.3 Ashton Mining Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 590 .… 22.10 Ashvill Investments Ltd v Elmer Contractors Ltd [1989] QB 488 .… 11.60 Ashworth v Royal National Theatre [2014] 4 ALL ER 238; [2014] EWHC 1176 .… 24.12 Asia Pacific International Pty Ltd v Dalrymple [2000] 2 Qd R 229; [1999] QSC 204 .… 15.4, 15.7, 15.8, 15.11 — v Peel Valley Mushrooms Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 168 .… 21.19 — v Forestry Tasmania (No 2) [1998] TASSC 50 .… 10.47, 19.2, 22.12 — v Yau’s Entertainment Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 254 .… 21.24, 21.34 — v — [2003] FCA 720 .… 21.27, 23.16 ASIC v Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 540 .… 10.56 — v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2020] FCA 716 .… 15.20 — v Kobelt (2019) 267 CLR 1; [2019] HCA 18; (2019) 13(1) J Eq 81 .… 15.9, 15.13, 15.16 — v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 132; [2005] FCAFC 226 .… 15.16 Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 35 .… 18.14 Aslan v Stepanoski [2022] NSWCA 24 .… 21.12 Asmar v Albanese [2022] VSCA 19 .… 5.1, 5.10 Aspden v Seddon (1874) LR 10 Ch App 394 .… 10.30 — v — (No 2) (1876) 1 Ex D 496 .… 8.53 Asset Insure Pty Ltd v New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) (2006) 225 CLR 331 .… 10.54 xxi

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Attica Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei GMBH [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 .… 21.10, 26.9 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; [2000] 4 All ER 385; [2000] 3 WLR 625; [2000] UKHL 45 .… 24.1 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988; [2009] UKPC 10 .… 10.18, 10.55 — v — [2016] AC 742; [2015] UKSC 72 .… 10.40 Attorney General of the Virgin Islands v Global Water Associates Ltd [2020] UKPC 18 .… 23.39 Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; 331 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 16 .… 11.112 Attwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl & Fin 232; 7 ER 684; [1835–42] All ER Rep 258 .… 11.37, 11.53 Auburn Council v Austin Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] NSWSC 130 .… 21.24 Auburn Shopping Village Pty Ltd v Nelmeer Hoteliers Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 114 .… 3.68, 21.35 Aurel Forras Pty Ltd v Graham Karp Developments Pty Ltd [1975] VR 202 .… 19.22 Aurizon Network Pty Ltd v Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd (2019) 1 QR 392; [2019] QSC 163 .… 10.43 Auss Metals Pty Ltd v Express Mobile Services Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 745 .… 7.3 Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 406 .… 7.43 Aussie Home Loans v X Inc Services (2005) NSWSC 285 .… 18.37 Aussie Invest Corp Pty Ltd v Pulcesia Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 362 .… 9.5, 20.18, 21.19, 21.35 Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd [1998] 1 Qd R 1 .… 23.24 Austin v Sheldon [1974] 2 NSWLR 661 .… 19.16 — v United Dominions Corp Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 612 .… 23.45 Austino Wentworthville Pty Ltd v Metroland Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 59 .… 8.25 Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1996) ATPR 41-454 .… 11.145 Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 .… 1.15, 2.5, 2.8, 2.16, 2.20, 15.8

Austra Tanks Pty Ltd v Running [1982] 2 NSWLR 840 .… 6.8, 18.38 Austrak Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 103 .… 24.23 Austral Masonry (NSW) Pty Ltd v Cementech Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 72 .… 20.20, 21.38 Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524 .… 2.31, 21.26, 21.28, 21.32 Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 696 .… 21.23 Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 467 .… 12.33, 12.35 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Compagnie D’Assurances Maritimes Aeriennes et Terrestres [1996] 1 VR 561 .… 10.13 — v Frenmast Pty Ltd (2013) 282 FLR 351; [2013] NSWCA 459 .… 3.15, 17.70 — v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149; [2005] NSWCA 344 .… 4.28, 13.2, 13.5, 13.7, 14.4, 15.8 — v Larcos (1987) 13 NSWLR 286 .… 25.12 — v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 106 ALR 115 .… 11.145 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 164 CLR 662 .… 26.1, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5 Australia Bank Ltd v Stokes (1985) 3 NSWLR 174 .… 15.27 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd .… 23.45 Australia China Business Bureau Pty Ltd v MCP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 934 .… 6.15, 10.47 Australia City Properties Management Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 65111 [2021] NSWCA 162 .… 21.26 Australia Estates Pty Ltd v Cairns CC [2005] QCA 328 .… 12.3, 12.25 Australia Hotel Co Ltd v Moore (1899) 20 LR (NSW) Eq 155 .… 12.35 Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 .… 15.5 — v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.52 Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Kazi [2004] QCA 147 .… 18.11 Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council [2022] HCA 5 .… 7.9, 24.28 — v The Nuance Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 133 .… 6.11, 18.34 xxii

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Table of Cases Australian Airline Flight Engineers Association v Ansett Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1299 .… 10.41 Australian Airships v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 232 .… 10.73 Australian Aviation Underwriting Pty Ltd v Henry (1988) 12 NSWLR 121 .… 10.41 Australian Beauty Trade Suppliers Ltd v Conference & Exhibition Organisers Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 474 .… 11.106, 11.107 Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1963] AC 74 .… 22.12 Australian Breeders Cooperative Society Ltd v Griffith Morgan Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488 .… 18.11, 18.12, 18.41, 18.43, 18.46, 18.49 — v Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488 .… 11.124 Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.35 — v — (1997) 129 CLR .… 10.34 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Redmore Pty Ltd (1988) 166 CLR 454 .… 18.9 — v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 .… 21.35, 28.31 — v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 .… 3.11 Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 157 .… 13.6 Australian Capital Territory v Munday [2000] FCA 653 .… 18.3, 18.35 Australian Casualty Co Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 .… 10.34 Australian Coarse Grains Pool Pty Ltd v Barley Marketing Board [1989] 1 Qd R 499 .… 10.41 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 657; [2003] FCAFC 149 .… 5.11 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 819 .… 11.117 — v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 992 .… 11.117 — v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 378; [2012] FCAFC 56 .… 24.28 — v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 .… 3.47, 3.56 — v Woolworths Ltd [2019] FCA 1039 .… 11.117



Australian Consolidated Investments Ltd v England (1995) 13 ACLC 296 .… 11.115 Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 .… 2.16, 2.18, 2.20, 10.3, 10.7, 10.43, 10.45 Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 .… 2.2, 2.5, 2.11, 5.19 Australian European Finance Corp Ltd v Sheahan (1993) 60 SASR 187 .… 5.17 Australian Express Pty Ltd v Pejovic [1963] NSWR 954 .… 12.70 Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2011] NSWSC 267 .… 26.1 — v — (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 .… 2.3, 2.15, 12.56, 26.1, 26.3, 26.5 Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546 .… 5.10 Australian Fruit and Produce Co Ltd v Terry Pty Ltd (1934) 29 TAS LR 102 .… 23.13 Australian Gasfields Ltd v Kvaerner Process Systems Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 320 .… 24.23 Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL [2009] WASCA 98 .… 23.2, 23.6, 23.24, 23.35 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 .… 6.5 — v McClelland (1993) ASC 56-230; (1993) ATPR 41-254 .… 15.28, 15.29 Australian Gypsum Ltd v Hume Steel Ltd (1930) 45 CLR 54 .… 12.32, 12.35 Australian Hardwoods Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways [1961] 1 All ER 737; [1961] ALR 757 .… 24.2, 24.9, 24.10 — v Hudson Investment Group Ltd [2007] NSWCA 104 .… 24.6, 24.16 Australian Horizons (Vic) Pty Ltd v Ryan Land Co Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 463 .… 21.28, 21.29, 22.2, 22.5 Australian Hotels Association (NSW) v TAB Ltd [2006] NSWSC 293 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44 Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387 .… 23.18 Australian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Frugalis Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 201; [1990] 2 Qd R 203 .… 5.26, 10.56, 10.58, 10.61, 20.1 Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

501; [2009] FCA 1220 .… 2.18, 10.5, 10.8, 12.31 Australian Mortgage v Baclon [2001] NSWSC 774 .… 21.19, 21.27 Australian Mutual Provident Society v 400 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 417 .… 10.48, 10.60 — v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 .… 6.6 — v Gregory (1908) 5 CLR 615 .… 8.18 Australian National Airlines Commission v Robinson [1977] VR 87 .… 23.2 Australian National Hotels Pty Ltd v Jager (2000) 9 Tas R 153 .… 10.24, 10.39, 22.12 Australian National Nominees Pty Ltd v GPC No 11 Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 773 .… 10.21, 10.24 Australian Pipeline Ltd v Hastings Funds Management Ltd [2014] NSWCA 398 .… 10.13 Australian Postal Corporation v Oliver [2006] VSC 318 .… 10.6 Australian Provincial Assurance Association v ET Taylor & Co Ltd [1947] NZLR 793 .… 10.5 — v Rogers (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 202 .… 16.46, 22.4 Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Grice [1998] NSWSC 399 .… 10.61 — v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177 .… 10.53 Australian Real Estate Investment Co Ltd v Gillis [1935] SASR 148 .… 18.47 Australian Rugby League Ltd v Cross (1997) 39 IPR 111 .… 10.41 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 173 ALR 702; Aust Contract Rep 90-115 .… 8.53, 11.118 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 409 .… 25.12 — v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 177 ALR 329 .… 15.25 — v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364; 274 ALR 731; [2011] FCAFC 19 .… 5.19, 6.8 — v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2008] FCA 1071 .… 28.17 — v Narain [2008] FCAFC 120; (2008) 169 FCR 211 .… 11.110 Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 .… 2.14, 2.16

Australian Smelting Co v British Broken Hill Pty Ltd (1896) 22 VLR 190 .… 23.39 Australian Steel and Mining Corp Pty Ltd v Corben [1974] 2 NSWLR 202 .… 11.39, 11.40, 11.122 Australian Wheat Board v Ison [1967] 2 NSWR 643 .… 18.45 — v Reardon Smith Line Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 233 .… 23.37 Australian Widows’ Fund Life Assurance Society Ltd v National Mutual Life Assn of A’asia Ltd (1912) 14 CLR 141 .… 12.20 Australian Winch & Haulage Co Pty Ltd v Walter Construction Group Ltd [2002] FCA 1181 .… 10.55 Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 (HC); [1954] HCA 20; (1955) 93 CLR 546 (PC) .… 1.16, 1.31, 3.45, 5.28, 5.28, 10.9, 10.31, 26.5, 28.7 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 .… 6.15, 8.52, 9.7, 10.42, 10.47, 10.48, 10.51, 10.52, 24.25 Austress-Freyssinet Pty Ltd v Kowalski [2007] NSWSC 399 .… 18.37 Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286 .… 10.44, 10.46, 15.16, 21.14, 21.21, 21.34, 21.37 Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 .… 10.41, 21.10, 21.38, 23.42, 26.9, 26.14 Auzcare Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 581; [2015] NSWCA 412 .… 4.28, 23.45 Avel Pty Ltd v FCT [2004] FCAFC 70 .… 10.39 Avellino v All Australia Netball Association Ltd (2004) 87 SASR 504; [2004] SASC 56 .… 7.33, 18.36 Avenhouse v Council of the Shire of Hornsby (1998) 44 NSWLR 1 .… 23.19 Aventus Cranbourne Thompsons Road Pty Ltd v Home Consortium Leasehold Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 199 .… 10.30 Avenue (WA) Pty Ltd v Prazaline Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 173 .… 24.10 Aviation Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Byrt [2009] QSC 387 .… 8.9 Aviet v Smith and Searies Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 274 .… 3.47 Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281 .… 12.69, 14.16, 14.20 Avtex Airservices Pty Ltd v Bartsch (1992) 107 ALR 539 .… 21.28, 22.7, 22.10, 22.12

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Table of Cases Avzur Hotels Pty Ltd v Ivanhoe Entertainment Pty Ltd (2009) 257 ALR 498; [2009] FCA 701 .… 7.28 Awad v Twin Creeks Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 200 .… 11.147 Awap SGT Investment Ltd v CN Holdings Ltd [2020] WASCA 74 .… 26.4 Awaroa Holdings Ltd v Commercial Securities & Finance Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 19 .… 11.10, 11.19, 11.30, 11.79 AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133; [2011] CLC 312 .… 10.7 Axelsen v O’Brien (1949) 80 CLR 219 .… 6.2, 6.11, 24.8, 24.11, 24.16 Axxess Australia Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications (Aust) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 64 .… 24.21 Ayliff v Archdale (1660) Cro Eliz 920; 78 ER 1142 .… 17.5 Azzi v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 319 .… 7.41, 21.14 B B v McM (1987) 8 SR (WA) 36 .… 18.44 B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Brian A Cheeseman & Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 25 NSWLR 227 .… 10.4, 10.8, 10.12 B & H Constructions Pty Ltd v Campbell (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1234; 63 NSWR 333 .… 16.84 B & R Stevens Transport Pty Ltd v Burkitt [2016] NSWCA 259 .… 10.6, 10.20 B & S Contracts & Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd (1984) ICR 419 .… 13.9 B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147 .… 3.11, 3.17 Babsari Pty Ltd v Wong [2000] 2 Qd R 576 .… 5.19, 12.44, 12.47 Babstock Pty Ltd v Laurel Star Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 63 .… 21.12 Baburin v Baburin [1990] 2 Qd R 101 .… 14.10, 14.14, 15.8, 15.11 Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd v Joseph Nathan & Co Ltd (in liq) (1919) 26 CLR 410 .… 10.4, 10.12, 12.30, 18.35, 18.37 Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 VR 1 .… 24.23 Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 WLR 243 .… 15.8 Bacon v Purcell (1916) 22 CLR 307 .… 10.12, 22.6



Badat v DTZ Australia (WA) Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 83 .… 20.13, 21.31 Badenach v Calvert (2016) 257 CLR 440; [2016] HCA 18 .… 23.16 Badman v Drake [2008] NSWSC 1366 .… 14.5 Bagnall v White (1906) 4 CLR 89 .… 16.53 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; 78 ALR 1; [1988] HCA 16 .… 7.31, 7.45, 7.47, 7.48, 8.47, 8.53, 16.72, 24.2, 24.10 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v Sztrochlic [2015] NSWSC 885 .… 3.40 Baig v Baig [1970] VR 833 .… 7.7 Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd [1964] VR 436 .… 4.17, 6.7 Bailey v Cassaniti (1991) 5 BPR 11,683 .… 24.7 — v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 125 ALR 228 .… 23.8 — v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399; 132 ALR 1 .… 3.8, 7.22 — v Sweeting (1861) 9 CB (NS) 843 .… 16.37 Bain v Fothergill (1874) LR 7 HL 158 .… 23.6 — v — (1991) 4 JCL 230; (1991) 65 ALJ 285 .… 23.6 Bainbrigge v Browne (1881) 18 Ch D 188 .… 14.15 Baird v BCE Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 374 .… 11.64, 12.21, 12.30 — v Magripilis (1925) 37 CLR 321 .… 24.10 Bak v Glenleigh Homes Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 10 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.41, 23.42, 23.44 Bakarich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2007] NSWCA 169 .… 15.26 Baker v Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd (recs apptd) (in liq) [2011] VSCA 334 .… 7.28 — v Corp of City of Salisbury (1982) 2 IR 168 .… 24.27 — v Gough [1963] NSWR 1345 .… 24.12, 24.27 — v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145 .… 19.15 — v Liberal Party (SA Div) (1997) 68 SASR 366 .… 5.10 — v McLaughlin [1967] NZLR 405 .… 24.7, 24.8 — v Sheridan [2005] NSWCA 408 .… 8.7 — v Taylor (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 500 .… 3.29 Baker Perkins Ltd v Thompson [1960] NSWR 488 .… 10.28 xxv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bakewell v Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd [2019] NSWCA 199 .… 8.7 — v Deputy FCT (SA) (1937) 58 CLR 743 .… 8.9, 8.38 Balagiannis v Balagiannis [2022] NSWCA 18 .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.29 Balanced Securities Ltd v Dumayne Property Group Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 61 .… 22.5 Baldwin v Everingham [1993] 1 Qd R 10 .… 5.10 — v Icon Energy Ltd [2015] QSC 12; [2016] 1 Qd R 397 .… 6.15, 10.41, 10.47 Balesfire Pty Ltd t/as Gutter Shop v Adams [2006] NSWCA 112 .… 10.56, 10.58 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 .… 5.4 — v Hollandia Ravensthorpe NL (1978) 18 SASR 240 .… 11.7, 11.14, 11.53 Ball v Hesketh (1697) Comb 381; 90 ER 541 .… 4.21 Ballantine v Harold (1893) 19 VLR 465 .… 16.45, 16.86 Ballantyne v Phillott (1961) 105 CLR 379 .… 4.26, 10.21 — v Raphael (1889) 15 VLR 538 .… 11.16 Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 .… 3.68 — v — (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193 .… 3.68, 3.72, 21.19 Ballett v Mingay [1943] KB 281; [1943] 1 All ER 143 .… 17.40 Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379; affirmed in [1910] AC 295 .… 10.28, 10.72 Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd [2006] Lloyd’s Rep 629 .… 23.11 Balog v Crestani (1975) 132 CLR 289 .… 10.12, 21.19 Baloglow v Konstanidis [2001] NSWCA 451 .… 10.36, 16.21, 21.36 Baltic Shipping Co (The Mikhail Lermontov) v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 .… 3.21, 4.28, 10.64, 10.70, 10.71, 15.28, 15.28, 15.31, 23.19 — v — (1993) 176 CLR 344 .… 10.64, 23.5, 23.9, 23.18, 23.19, 23.39, 26.1, 26.2, 26.4, 26.5, 26.13 — v — (1994) 18 UQLJ 112 .… 23.19 — v Merchant ‘Mikhail Lermontov’ (1995) 36 NSWLR 361 .… 15.28, 15.30, 15.31 Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192 .… 10.43, 10.46, 21.33, 21.34, 21.35 Bamford v Pozenel [2001] SASC 132 .… 20.16 Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626 .… 11.80

Bandelle Pty Ltd v Sydney Capitol Hotels Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 303 .… 25.5 Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capell and Co [1919] AC 435 .… 19.23 Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3 .… 2.7, 2.30 Bank of America Australia Ltd v Ceda Jon International Pty Ltd (1988) 17 NSWLR 290 .… 11.103, 18.10 Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540 .… 10.4 — v Reynell (1892) 10 NZLR 257 .… 12.68 Bank of Baroda v Shah [1988] 3 All ER 24 .… 14.16 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1989] 2 WLR 759 .… 14.10 — v — [1990] 1 QB 923 .… 14.20 — v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 .… 4.28 Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120 .… 14.6, 14.9, 14.17 Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42 .… 14.15 Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 .… 10.13 — v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 27 NSWLR 91; 107 ALR 333 .… 11.147, 11.149 Bank of NSW v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42; 65 CLR 43 .… 12.66, 12.68, 12.70, 14.11 Bank of Queensland Ltd v Chartis Australia Insurance Ltd [2013] QCA 183 .… 10.35, 10.74 Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller [1925] VLR 642 .… 14.6, 14.9, 14.17, 15.12 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Abdul [2012] VSC 222 .… 14.16, 14.18 Banking Corp v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 143 ALR 35 .… 4.30 Banking Group Ltd v McGee [1994] ASC 56-278 .… 14.19 — v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 265; 106 ALR 115 .… 11.145 Bankrupt Estate of Piccolo v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] FCA 386 .… 22.2, 22.5 Banks v Williams (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 220 .… 23.11, 23.13, 23.22 Bankstown CC v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 660; 221 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 46 .… 24.20 Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502 .… 5.17, 6.6, 10.3, 10.25, 10.32 Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 191 .… 11.82, 11.83, 11.146, 23.11

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Table of Cases — v — [1996] 3 WLR 87 .… 11.85 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665 .… 11.95 Bantick v Boss Properties Pty Ltd [2001] ANZ ConvR 471; (2000) V ConvR 54629 .… 21.18 Barac v Farnell (1994) 53 FCR 193 .… 18.20, 18.21, 18.27 Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120 .… 3.67, 3.68 Barbados Trust Company Ltd v Bank of Zambia [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495; [2007] EWCA Civ 148 .… 8.8 Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 .… 24.30, 24.31 Barbaro v Millington [2007] ACTCA 1 .… 14.20 Barber v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 475 .… 26.9 — v Rowe [1948] 2 All ER 1050 .… 16.39 Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451 .… 24.23 Barclays Bank Plc v Coleman .… 14.9 — v Kennedy [1989] 1 Fam LR 356 .… 14.17, 14.20 — v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 .… 14.17 Barilla v James (1964) 81 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 457 .… 16.67 Barker v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2005) 91 SASR 167; [2005] SASC 81 .… 25.13, 25.14 — v Midstyle Nominees Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 75 .… 18.7 Barking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 221 .… 11.49 Barlow v Neville Jeffress Advertising Pty Ltd (1995) 17 ATPR 41-376 .… 18.37 Bar-Mordecai v Hillston [2004] NSWCA 65 .… 14.6, 14.13 Barnard v Australian Soccer Federation (1988) 81 ALR 51 .… 18.35, 18.36 Barnes v Addy [1874] 9 Ch App 244 .… 15.9 — v Alderton [2008] NSWSC 107 .… 16.68 — v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (2015) 316 ALR 408; [2014] FCAFC 152 .… 10.7, 10.55, 10.58, 11.115, 23.16, 23.39 Barnes, Re [1983] 1 VR 605 .… 17.55 Barnett v Ira L & AC Berk Pty Ltd (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 268 .… 4.17, 10.62, 10.75 Barns v Barns (2003) 214 CLR 169; 196 ALR 65; [2003] HCA 9 .… 5.8



Baron Corporation Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 69567 [2013] NSWCA 238 .… 7.26 Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149 .… 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 Barraclough v Hellyer (1964) 81 WN (NSW) 245 .… 21.10 Barrak Corporation Pty Ltd v Jaswil Properties Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 32 .… 21.19, 21.26, 21.35 Barrett, Re; Ex parte Young v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 508 .… 23.12 Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 .… 3.11, 5.19 Barro Group Pty Ltd v Fraser [1985] VR 577 .… 22.12 Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170 .… 7.2, 7.3, 7.10 Barrow v Barrow (1854) 18 Beav 529; 52 ER 208 .… 12.30 — v Chappell & Co [1976] RPC 355 .… 24.12 Barry v Davies [2000] 1 WLR 1962 .… 3.24 — v — (2001) 17 JCL 69 .… 3.24 — v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197 .… 12.70 Bartercard Ltd v Myallhurst Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 445 .… 23.45 Bartier v Kounza Investments Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 390 .… 21.27 Bartier Perry Pty Ltd v Paltos [2021] NSWCA 158 .… 11.112 Bartles v GE Custodians Ltd [2010] NZCA 174 .… 15.31 Bartlett v Arbuckle [2004] WASC 169 .… 20.4 Bartley v Myers (2002) 83 SASR 183; [2002] SASC 24 .… 11.124 Barto v GPR Management Services Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 339 .… 11.111 Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598; [1976] AC 104 .… 13.2, 13.3, 13.10 — v — [1976] AC 104 .… 11.39 Bartonvale Management Services Pty Ltd v International Linen Services Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 254 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.17 Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1534 .… 21.38 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; 161 ALR 399; [1999] HCA 9 .… 11.107 Bassano v Toft [2014] EWHC 377 .… 10.69 Bastard v McCallum [1924] VLR 9 .… 16.35, 16.86

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bateman Project Engineering Pty Ltd v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 69; 155 FLR 354; [2000] NTSC 34 .… 11.151 — v Resolute Ltd (2000) 23 WAR 493; [2000] WASC 284 .… 18.34, 24.23 Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 .… 11.116, 11.128, 11.150 Bates v Western (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,320 .… 24.18 Batey v Gifford (1997) 42 NSWLR 710 .… 23.6 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 .… 11.64, 11.122 Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85 .… 10.4, 10.12, 10.16, 10.40, 10.55 Batiste v Lenin [2002] NSWCA 316 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.21, 21.36 Batt v Onslow (1892) 13 LR (NSW) Eq 79 .… 3.43 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Kayah Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 14 BCL 277 .… 5.15, 18.34 Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v G R Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622 .… 5.24 Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97 .… 23.1 Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1985] 2 NSWLR 406 .… 16.72 — v — (1987) 164 CLR 137 .… 16.73, 16.75, 16.76 Bava Holdings Pty Ltd v Pando Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,295 .… 3.46 Bawdes v Amhurst (1715) Prec Ch 402; 24 ER 180 .… 16.58 Baxter v British Airways (1988) 82 ALR 298 .… 11.146 Baxton v Kara [1982] 1 NSWLR 604 .… 25.14 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Natural Gas Corp Energy Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 173 .… 8.40 Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd v Farbenfabriken Bayer AG (1965) 120 CLR 285 .… 18.31 Bayley v Wesfarmers Transport Ltd [2000] WASCA 399 .… 10.13 Bayside Council v V Corp Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 120 .… 10.30, 10.40, 10.56 Bayview Gardens Pty Ltd v The Shire of Mulgrave [1989] 1 Qd R 1 .… 13.7, 13.9

BB Australia Pty Ltd v Karioi Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 347 .… 18.37 BBB Construction Pty Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 225 .… 15.15 BBK Development Corp Pty Ltd v Luedi [2004] NSWSC 622 .… 20.15, 21.29 BDW Trading Ltd v J M Rowe (Investments) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 548 .… 10.55 Beach v Trims Investments Ltd [1960] SASR 5 .… 23.39 Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411 .… 11.114, 21.29 Beagle Holdings Pty Ltd v Equus Financial Services Ltd [2000] WASC 27 .… 10.41 Beale v Huggins [1918] SALR 15 .… 23.13 Beard v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 .… 18.33 Beardmore v T D Burgess Co 226 A (2d) 329 (1967) .… 11.83 Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 .… 16.25 — v — (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 .… 3.71, 4.2, 4.4, 4.12, 4.13, 5.2, 10.41, 16.68, 10.72, 19.3, 21.35, 23.26 — v Moore Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (1959) 104 CLR 107 .… 10.62, 10.72, 23.26 Beattie v Lord Ebury (1872) LR 7 Ch App 777 .… 11.13, 11.14 — v Szabo [1962] VR 401 .… 12.46 Beatty v Brash’s Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 .… 8.7 Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v GilbertAsh NI Ltd [1999] 1 AC 266 .… 10.30 Beaumont Investments Pty Ltd v Cyril Golding Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 593 .… 5.23 Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55459 .… 3.69 Beck v Montana Constructions Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 229; (1963) 5 FLR 298 .… 10.52 Becker Group Ltd v Motion Picture Co of Australia Ltd [2004] FCA 630 .… 21.12, 21.17, 21.18, 21.23, 21.24, 23.39 Beefeater Sales International Pty Ltd v MIS Funding No 1 Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 217 .… 10.74 Beer v Bowden (Note) [1981] 1 WLR 522 .… 6.8, 6.9 Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd (2012) 39 VR 1 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.45, 10.48, 10.49, 13.5, 13.6 Begbie v State Bank of New South Wales (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-038 .… 14.17

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Table of Cases Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480 .… 3.11 Behan v Reef Coast Investments No 2 Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 320 .… 21.26 Beil v Pacific View (Qld) Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 43 .… 21.27 — v — [2006] QSC 199 .… 23.45 Belflora Pty Ltd v Vinflora Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 178 .… 18.37 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161; [1931] All ER Rep 1 .… 12.2, 12.15, 12.18, 12.21, 12.23, 12.25, 12.26, 12.44, 12.51, 27.24 — v Scott (1922) 30 CLR 387 .… 21.12 Bell Bros Pty Ltd and Stewart v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 .… 3.68, 7.28, 12.66, 12.70 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp [2001] WASC 317 .… 10.12 — v — (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 .… 4.17, 11.108 Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613 .… 9.6, 23.27 Bellmere Park Pty Ltd v Benson [2007] QCA 102 .… 6.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.13 Beltech Corp Ltd v Wyborn (1988) 92 FLR 283 .… 24.20 Belvino Investments No 2 Pty Ltd v Australian Vintage Ltd [2014] NSWSC 978 .… 24.13 Bembridge v GKR Karate Australia Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 15 .… 10.5, 10.9 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Karamihos [2014] NSWCA 17 .… 15.28, 15.29 Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd v Karavas (1991) 23 NSWLR 256 .… 15.27, 15.28 — v Multiplex Construction Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 510 .… 3.67, 16.22, 17.69 — v Sharker (1993) 32 NSWLR 161 .… 23.26, 23.42, 23.45 Benlist Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-043 .… 11.116, 11.150 Bennell v Westlawn Finance Ltd [2010] FCA 658 .… 8.34 Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408 .… 23.16, 23.35 Benson v Rational Entertainment Enterprises Ltd [2018] NSWCA 111 .… 7.1, 7.3 Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd v Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 69 .… 10.41, 21.27 Berk v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 459 .… 14.11



Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364; [2006] HCA 32 .… 18.6 Berridge v Public Trustee (1914) 33 NZLR 865 .… 11.55 Berry v CCL Secure Pty Ltd (2020) 94 ALJR 715; 381 ALR 427; [2020] HCA 27 .… 11.82, 11.127 — v Hodsdon [1988] 1 Qd R 361 .… 2.16, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 361 .… 21.29 — v Wong [2000] NSWSC 1002 .… 18.4, 18.37, 22.5 Bert v Red 5 Ltd [2016] QSC 302 .… 23.35 Besier v Foster (1952) 94 CLR 526 .… 10.60 Best v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1989] VR 608 .… 22.5 Best Price Real Estate Pty Ltd v Equity 2 Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 99 .… 10.43 Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 30 .… 14.14 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; [1967] 2 All ER 1179; [1967] 2 All ER 1197 .… 4.8, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.25, 7.46, 23.2, 24.4, 24.5, 24.6, 24.11 Better Sprinkler Systems v Koussidis [1998] SASC 6892 .… 8.49 Bettison v Insurance Corp of British Columbia (1988) 22 BCLR (2d) 130 .… 5.11 Betts v Whittinglowe (1945) 71 CLR 637 .… 23.34 Bev Pak Australia Pty Ltd v Caines Packaging Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 397 .… 23.12 Bevanere Pty Ltd v Lubidineuse (1985) 59 ALR 334 .… 11.106, 11.111 Bevillestea Pty Ltd v Sovereign Motor Inns Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 279 .… 10.73 BGC Australia Pty Ltd v Fremantle Port Authority [2003] WASCA 250 .… 18.23, 18.30, 18.32 BGC Construction Pty Ltd v Minister for Works [2009] WASC 398 .… 3.39 BGC Residential Pty Ltd v Fairwater Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 268 .… 23.19, 23.35 BH Australia Constructions Pty Ltd v Kapeller [2019] NSWSC 1086 .… 10.16 Bhasin v Hrynew [2014] SCC 71; [2014] 3 SCR 495 .… 10.43 BHPB Freight Pty Ltd v Cosco Oceania Chartering Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1087 .… 11.129, 11.134 Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 154 ALR 534 .… 11.145

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bibby Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Sharma [2014] NSWCA 37 .… 21.24 Bicknell v Bell (1897) 3 ALR 162 .… 16.35 Bidjara Aboriginal Housing & Land Co Ltd v Bidjara Motor Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] QCA 196 .… 7.17 Big Kahuna Holdings Pty Ltd v Kitar [2012] NSWSC 615 .… 15.26, 15.29 Bigg v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 11 .… 5.8 Bilborough v Holmes (1876) 5 Ch D 255 .… 8.49 Bill Acceptance Corp Ltd v GWA Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 242; 78 FLR 171 .… 11.118, 11.122 Bingham v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 402 .… 24.19, 24.21, 24.22 — v Bingham (1748) 1 Ves Sen 126; 27 ER 934; 28 ER 462 .… 12.14 Bingo Holdings Pty Ltd v GC Group Company Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 184 .… 11.136 Biodiesel Producers Ltd (ACN 099 165 876) v Stewart [2007] FCA 722 .… 23.45 Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 .… 4.17, 4.18, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7, 10.42, 10.43 Birch v Birch [2020] QCA 31 .… 14.2 Bird v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1957] VR 619 .… 7.45 Birdanco Nominees Pty Ltd v Money (2012) 36 VR 341; [2012] VSCA 64 .… 18.35, 18.37, 23.45 Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1313 .… 11.149 Birkmyr v Darnell (1704) 1 Salk 27; 91 ER 27 .… 16.13 Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd (2014) 47 WAR 552; [2014] WASCA 180 .… 10.16 Birmingham v Renfrew (1936) 57 CLR 666 .… 5.8, 7.1, 7.47, 7.48, 16.24 Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268 .… 2.4, 2.5 Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447 .… 21.38 Birtwistle v Hann (1878) 4 VLR (L) 153 .… 18.37 Biscayne Partners Pty Ltd v Valance Corp Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 874 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.48, 23.2 Bishop v Taylor (1968) 118 CLR 518; [1968] Qd R 281 .… 21.26, 24.10, 24.12

Bishopsgate Insurance Australia Ltd v Commonwealth Engineering (NSW) Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 429 .… 12.35 Bisognin v Hera Project Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 75 .… 10.12, 10.52, 12.52 — v — [2018] VSCA 93 .… 21.12 Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177; [1926] All ER Rep 343 .… 11.15 Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 9; 232 FLR 1; [2006] NSWCA 238 .… 11.147, 15.13 Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438; [2007] HCA 31 .… 21.36 Blackbox Control Pty Ltd v Terravision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219 .… 10.30 Blackburn v YV Properties Pty Ltd [1980] VR 290 .… 18.45 Blacker v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] FCA 254 .… 11.85, 11.147 Blackler v Felpure Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 958 .… 22.12 Blackley v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1972] NZLR 1038 .… 11.35, 11.36 Blackley Investments Pty Ltd v Burnie CC (No 2) [2011] TASFC 6 .… 12.52 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 .… 3.39 Blacktown CC v Fitzgerald (1990) NSW ConvR 55-544 .… 21.35 Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254 .… 2.9, 6.8 Blazey v Polletti (1990) ANZ ConvR 168 .… 16.21 Bleakley v Higgins [2006] NTSC 89 .… 10.56 Blennerhassett’s Institute of Accountancy Pty Ltd v Gairns (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 89 .… 17.7 Bligh v Martin [1968] 1 All ER 1157 .… 12.14 Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362 .… 15.7 — v — (1956) 99 CLR 362 .… 12.66, 14.10, 15.1, 15.5, 15.7, 17.56, 24.8 Bloomer v Spittle (1872) LR 13 Eq 427 .… 12.54 Blue v Ashley [2017] EWHC 1928 .… 5.11 Blue Moon Grill Pty Ltd v Yorkey’s Knob Boating Club Inc [2006] QCA 253 .… 4.24 Bluebottle UK Ltd v DCT (2006) NSWSC 706 .… 8.31 — v — (2007) 232 CLR 598; 240 ALR 597; [2007] HCA 54 .… 8.28

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Table of Cases Bluehive Pty Ltd v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1307 .… 23.14 Blundstone v Johnson [2010] QCA 148 .… 25.1 BMW Australia Finance Ltd v Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 117 .… 11.115 BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45 .… 14.1 Board v Weekes (1898) 19 LR (NSW) Eq 200 .… 17.62 Bob Guiness Ltd v Salomonsen [1948] 2 KB 42 .… 4.23 Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2001] NZCA 348 .… 28.21 Bodapati v Westpac Banking Corp [2015] QCA 7 .… 15.8 Body Bronze International Pty Ltd v Fehcorp Pty Ltd (2011) 34 VR 536; [2011] VSCA 196 .… 15.16 Bodycorp Repairers Pty Ltd v AAMI [2015] VSCA 73 .… 18.37 Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269; [2009] HCA 44 .… 10.33, 15.2, 28.31 Bohemians Club v Acting FCT (1918) 24 CLR 334 .… 17.68 Bohn v Miller Bros Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 354 .… 16.68 Bojczuk v Gregorcewicz [1961] SASR 128 .… 17.5 Bolton v Madden (1873) LR 9 QB 55 .… 4.3 Bon McArthur Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Caruana [2013] NSWCA 101 .… 3.15 Boncristiano v Lohmann [1998] 4 VR 82 .… 23.19 Bond v Hongkong Bank of Australia Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 286 .… 22.2 — v Larobi Pty Ltd (1992) 6 WAR 489 .… 18.34 — v Rees Corporate Advisory Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 13 .… 21.38 Bond Corp Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215 .… 11.112 Bonda v Wagenmaker (1960) 77 WN (NSW) .… 22.12 Bondi Beach Astra Retirement Village Pty Ltd v Gora (2013) 82 NSWLR 665; [2011] NSWCA 396 .… 18.35 Bondlake Pty Ltd v The Owners — Strata Plan No 60285 [2005] NSWCA 35 .… 18.13, 18.15, 26.11 Bonham v Brophy (1880) 6 VLR (1) 64 .… 10.5



Bonhote v Henderson [1895] 1 Ch 742 .… 12.35 Boni v Kingsoak Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 174 .… 21.36 Bonic v Fieldair (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636 .… 23.17 Bonney v Hartmann [1924] St R Qd 232 .… 19.17 Bonython v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 589 .… 9.8 Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 600; 43 ALR 68 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.9, 6.11, 10.48, 20.4, 24.16 Boomer v Muir 24 P (2d) 570 (1933) .… 26.7 Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421 .… 8.11 Boothbey v Sowden (1812) 3 Camp 175; 170 ER 1346 .… 4.40 Boral Formwork & Scaffolding Pty Ltd v Action Makers Ltd [2003] NSWSC 713 .… 15.8, 15.13, 15.15, 15.16, 24.23 Boral Ltd v Foley & Bear Pty Ltd trading as J&R Industries [2016] NSWCA 373 .… 7.2 Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd v Donnelly [1988] 1 Qd R 506 .… 10.12 Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWCA 94 .… 3.30, 10.40 Borg v Borg (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 92 .… 16.53 — v Howlett (No 2) (1996) 8 BPR 15,535 .… 12.7, 12.47, 12.48, 12.50, 12.55, 24.17 Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp (Australia) Ltd v Diprose (1988) ANZ ConvR 57 .… 15.28 Borough of Tamworth v Sanders (1904) 2 CLR 214 .… 10.12, 10.60 Borrelli v Ting [2010] UKPG 21; [2010] Bus LR 1718 .… 13.6 Borrows v Ellison (1871) LR 6 Exch 128 .… 25.7 Borzi Smythe Pty Ltd v Campbell Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 233 .… 11.121, 11.122, 11.150 Bos v Helsham (1866) LR 2 Ex 72 .… 11.63 Bosaid v Andry [1963] VR 465 .… 11.30, 11.51, 11.52, 12.36, 16.45, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32 Bosca Land Pty Ltd v Wruck [1982] Qd R 111 .… 21.19 Boscaini Investments Pty Ltd v Petrides (1982) 103 LSJS 250; ASC 55-222 .… 11.20, 11.98

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 20 .… 23.32, 23.42, 24.12, 24.27 Boston v Boston (1904) 1 KB 124 .… 16.22 Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1352 .… 8.7 Bot v Ristevski [1981] VR 120 .… 21.38 Botany Fork & Crane Hire Pty Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 473 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.73 Boucaut Bay Co Ltd (in liq) v Commonwealth (1927) 40 CLR 98 .… 23.45 Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) 5 BPR 11,477; (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-004 .… 2.15, 3.24, 12.55, 16.42 Boulevarde Developments Pty Ltd v Toorumba Pty Ltd (1984) 15 ATR 1197; [1984] 2 Qd R 371 .… 18.24, 18.28 Boulton v Jones (1857) 2 H & N 564; 157 ER 232; 27 LJ (Ex) 117 .… 8.52, 12.58 Bourseguin v Stannard Bros Holdings Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 231 .… 12.52 Bovaird v Frost [2009] NSWSC 337 .… 5.7 Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 .… 8.27 Bowen v Alsanto Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 39 .… 20.13, 21.31 — v Blair [1933] VLR 398 .… 10.53 Bowen Central Coal Pty Ltd v Aquila Coal Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 334 .… 24.22 Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings (2008) 166 FCR 494; [2008] FCAFR 38 .… 23.27 Bower v Bantam Investments Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 349 .… 24.25 Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agents [1996] CLC 451 .… 3.9 Bowes v Chaleyer (1923) 32 CLR 159 .… 9.5, 21.10, 21.12, 21.13, 21.17, 21.19, 21.21, 21.31, 23.21 Bowesco Pty Ltd v Zohar [2007] FCAFC 1 .… 10.16 Bowler v Hilda Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 95 .… 11.117 — v — (in liq) (2001) 183 ALR 81 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.35 Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] 1 KB 65 .… 18.45 Bowman v Durham Holdings Pty Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8 .… 3.61, 3.69, 10.32 Box v FCT (1952) 86 CLR 387 .… 18.37 Boyana Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 37 .… 11.110, 11.121

Boyd v Holmes (1878) 4 VLR (E) 161 .… 3.44 — v Ryan (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 163 .… 17.18, 17.34 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow and South Western Railway Co [1915] SC (HL) 20 .… 11.57 Boydell v Drummond (1809) 11 East 142; 103 ER 958 .… 16.44 Boyle v Basan (1886) 8 ALT 82 .… 16.41 Boyns v Lackey (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 395 .… 24.8, 24.29, 24.30, 25.14 BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 520 .… 10.12 — v — [2004] FCAFC 163 .… 10.35, 26.4 BP Chemicals ANZ Pty Ltd v Manildra Starches Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1046 .… 22.12 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Hastings Shire Council (1977) 16 ALR 363 .… 5.28 — v Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20; 16 ALR 363; 180 CLR 266 (PC) .… 1.71, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61, 19.13, 22.8 Bradbury v Morgan (1862) 1 H & C 249; 158 ER 877 .… 3.73, 8.55 Bradford v Zahra [1977] Qd R 24 .… 6.18 Bradford House Pty Ltd v Leroy Fashion Group Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 305; 68 FLR 1 .… 10.61, 11.114 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 .… 11.22, 11.78 Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 .… 5.29 — v Voltex Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1230 .… 10.32 Bradley Egg Farm Ltd v Clifford [1943] 2 All ER 378 .… 5.10, 17.73 Bradshaw v Gilberts (Australasian) Agency (Vic) Pty Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 209 .… 18.7, 18.39, 18.40, 18.47 — v Hair Transplant Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 1 .… 25.12 — v Henderson [2010] QCA 8 .… 16.22 Bradto Pty Ltd v Victoria; Tymbook Pty Ltd v Victoria (2006) 15 VR 65; [2006] VSCA 89 .… 24.19, 24.22 Brady Contracting Pty Ltd v Kellyville Christmas Tree Farm Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 22 .… 26.3 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661; [2015] UKSC 17 .… 10.48 Braham v ACN 101 482 580 Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 108 .… 11.116

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Table of Cases — v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 .… 3.68, 18.4, 18.7, 18.20 Braidotti v Queensland City Properties Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 1 .… 21.12 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.29, 3.44, 5.19, 10.12, 10.16, 10.31, 10.40, 10.61, 22.3, 22.8, 26.1, 28.6, 28.23 Brand v Chris Building Co Pty Ltd [1957] VR 625 .… 16.68 Brandsma & Crockett Pty Ltd v Heindal Pty Ltd (2002) 26 WAR 323; [2002] WASCA 96 .… 25.12 Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1924] 1 KB 575 .… 7.24 Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 .… 2.18, 3.6, 5.19, 10.3, 10.5, 10.7 Braunbeck v Mercantile Land & Investment Co Ltd (1887) 9 LR (NSW) 9 .… 16.45 Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68; [2005] FCAFC 256 .… 3.4, 11.111 Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 1; [2002] FCA 243 .… 11.114 — v — (2003) 130 FCR 317; 200 ALR 607; [2003] FCAFC 153 .… 11.114 Braystock Pty Ltd v Garland [2004] NSWSC 874 .… 10.12 Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311 .… 24.30 Breen v Williams (1996) 168 CLR 71; 138 ALR 259 .… 10.18, 10.29, 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.59 Bremer HandelsgesellschaftmbH v VandenAvenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 .… 2.5 Brendon Pty Ltd v Russell (1994) 11 WAR 280 .… 6.8, 18.37, 18.38 Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 .… 26.6, 26.8 Bressan v Squires [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 .… 3.60, 3.61 Bret v J S (1600) Cro Eliz 756; 78 ER 987 .… 4.12 Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 311 .… 4.22 Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449 .… 18.33 — v — (No 2) [1967] VR 803 .… 6.17 Brewarrina Shire Council v Beckhaus Civil Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 248 .… 23.27, 26.4



Brice v Chambers [2014] QCA 310 .… 6.6, 6.8 Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 .… 10.53 Brickles v Snell [1916] AC 599 .… 21.36 Bridge Stock Brokers Ltd v Bridge (1984) 4 FCR 460 .… 11.121 Bridge UK Com Ltd (t/a Bridge Communications) v Abbey Pynford Plc [2007] EWHC 728 (TCC) .… 23.11 Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Australia) Ltd v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415 .… 6.2, 16.35, 24.1, 24.8 Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58; 97 ER 22 .… 14.15 Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 .… 14.4, 15.7, 15.8, 15.9 — v — (1999) 14 JCL 265 .… 15.8, 15.9 Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 415; 51 ALJR 743 .… 3.10, 3.30 Brien v Dwyer [1976] 2 NSWLR 420; (1978) 141 CLR 378 .… 3.10, 20.4, 21.18, 21.19, 21.24, 21.29, 21.35 Brierley (RA) Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 .… 3.29 Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333 .… 11.79 Brightman v Lamson Paragon Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 331 .… 18.37 Brighton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2011] NSWCA 152 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.58, 15.26, 15.27 Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737 .… 2.17, 2.30 Brimaud v Boston Securities Entertainment Pty Ltd [1998] 1392 FCA (9 October 1998) .… 23.25, 23.26, 23.42 — v — [1998] FCA 1104 .… 10.41, 23.2 Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 .… 3.3, 3.26, 3.47 Brirek Industries Pty Ltd v McKenzie Group Consulting (Vic) Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 165 .… 25.5, 25.12 Brisbane CC v Group Projects Pty Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 143 .… 19.3, 19.5, 19.8, 19.11, 19.13, 19.16 Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Collins (1995) 31 IPR 488 .… 18.37 Bristow v Moffat-Virtue (Qld) Pty Ltd [1962] Qd R 377. .… 11.9 Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 .… 16.58, 16.59 British & American Telegraph Co v Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 .… 3.60, 3.61, 38.4

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

British Bank for Foreign Trade v Novinex Ltd [1949] 1 KB 623 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.9 British Car Auctions Ltd v Wright [1972] 1 WLR 1519 .… 3.21 British Columbia Saw Mills Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499 .… 27.24 British Crane Hire Corp Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] 1 QB 303 .… 10.29 British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd [1943] VLR 163 .… 4.10, 4.17, 10.62 British Imex Industries Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1958] 1 QB 542; [1958] 1 All ER 264 .… 7.50 British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556; [1949] 1 All ER 208 .… 7.5, 7.13 British Movietonews Ltd v London & District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166 .… 19.13 British Road Services Ltd v Arthur V Crutchley & Co Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811 .… 3.32 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefonia 02 UK Ltd [2014] UKSC 42 .… 10.43 British Traders’ Insurance Co Ltd v Monson (1964) 111 CLR 86 .… 19.25 British Waggon Co v Lea and Co (1880) 5 QBD 149; [1874-80] All ER Rep 1135 .… 8.51, 8.52 Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd v Minister Assisting the Minister for Natural Resources (2004) 221 CLR 178; 204 ALR 46; [2004] HCA 4 .… 8.8 Broadlands International Finance Ltd v Sly (1987) ANZ ConvR 328 .… 15.28 Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405; [2000] WASCA 192 .… 11.108 Brodie v Cardiff Corp [1919] AC 337 .… 6.11 Brodyn Pty Ltd t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421; [2004] NSWCA 394 .… 16.55 Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666 .… 3.27, 3.32, 3.44 Broken Hill CC v Tiziani (1997) 93 LGERA 113 .… 23.19 Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v HapagLloyd Aktiengesellschaft [1980] 2 NSWLR 572 .… 7.9, 7.37, 24.20, 24.24 Bromell v Robertson (1886) 12 VLR 560 .… 16.22 Brooker v Pridham (1986) 41 SASR 380; (1986) 41 SASR 428 .… 25.2, 25.3, 25.8 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185;

313 ALR 408; [2014] HCA 36 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26 Brooks v Burns Philp Trustee Co (1969) 121 CLR 432 .… 6.17, 10.64, 18.4, 18.16, 18.34, 18.40, 18.41, 23.44 — v Wyatt (1994) 99 NTR 12 .… 24.29, 24.30 Brooks Robinson Pty Ltd v Rothfield [1951] VLR 405 .… 16.80 Brooks Towers Corp v Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203 .… 3.27, 3.44 Brooks, Re (1903) 21 WN (NSW) 4 .… 17.54 Broons, Re [1989] 2 Qd R 315 .… 3.15 Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16 .… 10.44 Brophy v NIAA Corp Ltd (1995) ATPR 41399 .… 11.115 Brosnan v Katke (2015) 236 FCR 567; [2015] FCA 203 .… 11.114 — v — [2016] FCAFC 1 .… 11.122 Brott v Grey (2000) 181 ALR 617 .… 26.12 — v Maher (No 2) [2004] VSCA 220 .… 13.7 Broughton v B & B Group Investments Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 227 .… 23.25 Brown v Fox (1897) 18 LR (NSW) Eq 8 .… 12.23 — v Gould [1972] Ch 53 .… 3.67, 6.3, 6.9, 6.10 — v Heffer (1967) 116 CLR 344 .… 20.12, 24.16 — v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1980) 35 ALR 79 .… 11.118, 11.122, 11.146 — v — (1981) 53 FLR 340 .… 11.104 — v Ogle [2006] QSC 74 .… 10.35, 10.36, 20.5, 20.6 — v R (1986) 160 CLR 171 .… 18.34 — v Raphael [1958] Ch 636; [1958] 2 All ER 79 .… 11.13, 11.16 — v Robertson (1890) 16 VLR 786 .… 16.23 — v Sheen & Richmond Car Sales [1950] 1 All ER 1102 .… 3.9 — v Smitt (1924) 34 CLR 160 .… 11.49, 11.53, 11.55 — v Southport Motors Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40-306; 43 ALR 183 .… 11.113 — v Willington [2001] ACTSC 100 .… 23.14 Brown and Davis v Galbraith [1972] 1 WLR 997 .… 3.9 Brown Boveri (Australia) Pty Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 94 FLR 425 .… 10.27

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Table of Cases Brown Falconer Group Pty Ltd v South Parklands Hockey & Tennis Centre Inc [2005] SASC 75 .… 23.27 Brownbill v Kenworth Truck Sales (NSW) Pty Ltd (1981) 59 FLR 56 .… 18.22 — v — (1982) 59 FLR 56; ATPR 40-269 .… 10.6, 18.3, 18.44 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App Cas 925 .… 11.63 Brownon Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 .… 8.7 Bruce v AWB Ltd [2000] FCA 594 .… 10.4, 10.5, 21.12, 21.18 — v Tyley (1916) 21 CLR 277 .… 8.6, 8.8, 8.52, 9.7, 12.58 — v Warwick (1815) 6 Taunt 118; 128 ER 978 .… 17.34 Brunker v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1937) 57 CLR 555 .… 14.5 Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1999] NSWCA 199; (1999) 46 NSWLR 538 .… 11.17 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 128 ALR 163 .… 7.1, 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.42, 10.53, 25.5 Bryant (Landlord) v Arsanis David (Tenant) [1996] NSWRT 192 .… 17.43, 17.46 Bryson v Bryant (1992) 29 NSWLR 188 .… 16.72, 16.73, 16.75 BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Renta-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589 .… 3.46, 3.69 Buccoliero v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2011] SWCA 371 .… 15.31 Buchanan v Byrnes (1906) 3 CLR 704 .… 21.14, 22.9, 22.10, 23.22 Buckenara v Hawthorn Football Club Ltd [1988] VR 39 .… 18.36, 18.37, 24.25 Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477 .… 3.74 Buckle & Sons Pty Ltd v McAllister (1986) 4 NSWLR 426 .… 18.37 Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353 .… 7.33, 18.35, 18.36, 18.37, 18.40 Buckman v Rose (1980) 1 BPR 97,059 .… 24.1, 24.10 Bucknell v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 155 .… 25.8 Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All ER 1145 .… 5.9 Buckworth v Gladio Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 54 .… 21.17, 23.39 Budget Stationery Supplies Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1996) 7 BPR 14,891 .… 10.3, 10.7, 10.33



Budmore Pty Ltd v Johnson (1993) 6 BPR 13,574 .… 2.13 Buhrer v Tweedie [1973] 1 NZLR 517 .… 5.23 Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 .… 17.74 Bulk Chartering & Consultants Australia Pty Ltd v T&T Metal Trading Pty Ltd (The Krasnogrosk) (1993) 31 NSWLR 18 .… 18.34 Bullabidgee Pty Ltd v McCleary [2011] NSWCA 259 .… 11.127, 11.146, 11.147 Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822 .… 24.25 Bullhead Pty Ltd v Brickmakers Place Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] VSCA 316 .… 2.16 Bulloch v Glasson (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 91 .… 10.6, 10.23 Bullock v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1955] Ch 317 .… 14.7 Bundanoon Sandstone Pty Ltd v Cenric Group Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 87 .… 21.34, 22.4 Bunge Corp New York v Tradax Export SA Panama [1981] 1 WLR 711 .… 21.22 Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] 3 All ER 1082; [2015] UKSC 43 .… 23.25 Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.34, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48, 10.50, 10.51, 10.52, 12.51, 21.18, 21.19, 21.24, 21.26, 21.33, 21.34, 23.2, 23.14, 23.15, 23.25, 23.29 Burges v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 504 .… 24.8, 24.9, 24.10 Burgess v Cox [1951] Ch 383 .… 16.35 Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp .… 11.151 Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 161 .… 11.145 — v — (2002) 209 CLR 282; 187 ALR 612; [2002] HCA 17 .… 11.145 — v State Bank of New South Wales (1994) 37 NSWLR 53; (1994) 37 NSWLR 55 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.35, 14.13, 14.17, 14.20 — v — (1995) 37 NSWLR 53 .… 14.20 Burke and Riversdale Road Pty Ltd v Gemini Investments Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 33 .… 21.24

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Burke Estates Pty Ltd v PJ Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [1991] 1 VR 610 .… 21.35 Burke (Raymond) Motors Ltd v Mersey Docks and Harbour Co [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 155 .… 7.38 Burleigh Forest Estate Management Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 54 .… 7.46 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 .… 8.25 Burmic Pty Ltd v Goldview Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 479 .… 18.9, 18.21, 18.22, 19.1, 19.24 Burnard v Haggis (1863) 14 CBNS 45; 143 ER 360 .… 17.39, 17.40 Burness v Hill [2019] VSCA 94 …. 10.13 Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304; 353 ALR 386; [2018] HCA 15 .… 11.151 — v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653 .… 23.6, 23.39, 23.40, 23.41, 23.43, 23.44 Burns Philp Hardware Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd (1986) 8 NSWLR 621 .… 7.31 — v — (1987) 8 NSWLR 642 .… 10.12 Burns Philp Trust Co Pty Ltd v Kwikasair Freightlines Ltd (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 801 .… 24.21 Burroughes v Abbott [1921] 1 Ch 86 .… 12.40 — v — [1922] 1 Ch 86 .… 12.39 Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816 .… 18.14 — v Winter (1929) Tas LR 45 .… 12.50 Burwood Project Management Pty Ltd v Polar Technologies International Pty Ltd (1999) 9 BPR 97, 801; [1999] NSWSC 1203 .… 8.6, 8.8 Busch v Stevens [1963] 1 QB 1; [1962] 1 All ER 412 .… 25.8 Buseska v Sergio (1990) 102 FLR 157 .… 12.48, 12.50, 12.52, 22.8, 22.11 Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186 .… 4.20, 4.22 — v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 NSWLR 390 .… 12.30 Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 741 .… 8.40, 8.42 Businessworld Computers Pty Ltd v Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 ALR 499 .… 24.21, 24.22, 24.24 Bustfree Pty Ltd v Llewellyn [2013] QCA 103 .… 13.6, 13.9, 13.11

Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60 .… 3.26, 10.70, 11.113, 11.115, 11.118, 11.121, 11.122, 11.147 — v Stapely (1685) 1 Vern 363; 23 ER 524 .… 16.56 Butler v Countrywide Finance Ltd (1992) 5 PRNZ 447 .… 12.31 — v — [1993] 3 NZLR 623 .… 24.1, 24.13, 24.17, 28.17 — v Craine [1986] VR 274 .… 16.74 — v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 .… 4.24, 4.25, 12.18, 23.2 Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England Ltd) [1979] 1 WLR 401 .… 3.6, 3.32 Butt v Long (1953) 88 CLR 476 .… 10.15, 10.40, 10.57, 18.35, 18.37 — v M’Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 .… 1.68, 10.41, 20.16 Butts v O’Dwyer (1952) 87 CLR 267 .… 10.39, 10.41, 18.7, 24.1, 24.16 Buxton v Bellin (1877) 3 VLR (E) 243 .… 16.37 — v Rust (1872) LR 7 Ex 279 .… 16.37 Byers v Dorotea Pty Ltd (1986) 69 ALR 715 .… 11.42, 11.73, 11.119, 11.147, 11.150 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410; 131 ALR 422 .… 5.26, 10.18, 10.39, 10.45, 10.50, 10.51, 10.52, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57 — v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735 .… 7.45, 7.47 — v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432 .… 3.60, 3.65 Byrne & Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 .… 24.12 Byrnes v Groote Eylandt Mining Co Pty Ltd (1990) 93 ALR 131 .… 25.11 — v Jokona Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 41 .… 21.14, 21.21 — v Kendle (2011) 279 ALR 212; [2011] HCA 26 .… 10.1, 10.12, 10.31 Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158 .… 2.6, 2.13 Bysouth v Shire of Blackburn and Mitcham (No 2) [1928] VLR 562 .… 8.8 Bytan Pty Ltd v BB Australia Pty Ltd (2012) 41 VR 46; [2012] VSCA 233 .… 10.43, 10.46 C C & S Constructions Pty Ltd v Dawson (1991) ATPR 41-088 .… 6.6

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Table of Cases C B Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.46 C Convenience Stores Pty Ltd v Wayville Plaza Retirement Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 229; [2012] SASC 14 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.41 C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos [1969] 1 AC 350; [1969] 1 AC 380 .… 23.39 C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWSC 242 .… 7.8 C H Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 960 .… 24.13 C J Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22 .… 3.9 C M I Clothesmakers Inc v A S K Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447 .… 3.44 C Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 16.63 CA & CA Ballan Pty Ltd v Oliver Hume (Australia) Pty Ltd (2017) 55 VR 62; [2017] VSCA 11 .… 12.30, 18.40 Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (2015) 328 ALR 396; [2015] FCAFC 94 .… 11.83, 11.124, 11.127 Cable (1956) Ltd v Caratti [1971] WAR 86 .… 16.45 — v Hutcherson Bros Pty Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 143 .… 10.12, 10.14 Caboche & Bond v Ramsay (1993) 119 ALR 215 .… 18.35 Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 .… 26.13 — v State Authorities Superannuation Board (1993) 47 IR 254 .… 19.18 Cactus Imaging Pty Ltd v Peters [2006] NSWSC 717 .… 18.37 Caddick v Skidmore (1857) 2 De G & J 52; 44 ER 907 .… 16.22 Cade Pty Ltd v Thomson Simmons [1998] SASC 6912 .… 23.14, 23.25 Cadman v Horner (1810) 18 Ves Jun 10; 34 ER 221 .… 11.44 Cadoks Pty Ltd v Wallace Westley & Vigar Pty Ltd [2000] 2 VR 457; [2000] 2 VR 569 .… 10.53, 23.8, 23.14, 23.26, 23.28, 23.38, 23.39 Cadorange Pty Ltd (in liq) v Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 26 .… 26.8 Caird v Moss (1886) 33 Ch D 22 .… 12.37 Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1 .… 8.8, 8.53 Calgary v Northern Construction Co Division of Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc [1986] 2 WWR 426 .… 3.39



Calkins and Burke Ltd v Empire Stevedoring Co Ltd (1976) 4 WWR 337 .… 7.38 Callaghan v Merivale CBD Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 985 .… 10.35 — v O’Neill [2002] NSWSC 877 .… 6.6 — v O’Sullivan [1925] VLR 664 .… 18.32, 18.47 Callisher v Bischoffsheim (1870) LR 5 QB 449 .… 4.25, 4.26 Calmao Pty Ltd v Stradbroke Waters Cooperative Society Ltd (1989) 21 FCR 28 .… 11.147 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Alderton and Knox [1964-5] NSWR 456 .… 6.17 — v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 11 ALR 227 .… 23.35, 23.38 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616; [2009] NSWCA 258 .… 7.41 Calvert v Stollznow (1982) 1 NSWLR 175 .… 4.14 Cam & Bear Pty Ltd v McGoldrick [2018] NSWCA 110 .… 11.136 Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Ramsay (1960) 104 CLR 247 .… 26.4 Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Hutcheson (1985) 9 ACLR 545 .… 23.37 Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; [2007] QCA 136 .… 11.150 Camenzuli v Morrison [2022] NSWCA 51 .… 5.1, 5.10 Cameron v Campbell & Worthington Ltd [1930] SASR 402 .… 23.26 — v Hillier [1941] St R Qd 298 .… 10.74 — v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 .… 5.1, 5.10 — v Murdoch [1983] WAR 321 .… 16.70 — v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 147 .… 15.1 — v UBS AG (2000) 2 VR 108 .… 23.45 Cameron & Co v Slutzkin Pty Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81 .… 10.12, 10.13 Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95 .… 11.122 — v — (2009) 238 CLR 304; 257 ALR 610; [2009] HCA 25 .… 10.41, 11.105, 11.113, 11.116, 11.118, 11.119, 11.122, 11.124, 11.150 — v Kitchen & Sons Ltd (1910) 12 CLR 515 .… 26.1 — v Ridgely (1887) 13 VLR 701 .… 17.39, 17.42, 17.43 — v University of Adelaide [2006] SASC 92 .… 10.24 Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 229 ALR 58; [2006] HCA 41 .… 8.7, 18.33

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Camping Warehouse Australia Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Ltd [2014] VSC 357 .… 11.127 Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; 169 ALR 677; [2000] HCA 12 .… 11.122 Canada Steamship Lines v The King [1952] AC 192 .… 10.77 Canberra Advance Bank Ltd v Benny (1992) 115 ALR 207 .… 10.48, 21.28, 21.33, 21.35 Canberra Pools Pty Ltd v MMI General Insurance Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 296; 174 ALR 755; [2000] FCA 751 .… 6.8, 18.3, 18.8, 18.9 Canning v Temby (1905) 3 CLR 419 .… 9.2, 10.36, 21.19, 24.10 Canon Australia Pty Ltd v Patton (2007) 244 ALR 759; [2007] NSWCA 246 .… 15.16 Cansdell v O’Donnell (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 596 .… 12.68 Cant v Miller (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 505 .… 24.26 Cant Contracting Pty Ltd v Casella [2007] 2 Qd R 13; [2006] QCA 538 .… 16.55 Canty v PaperlinX Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 309 .… 15.31 Cao v Baccello Pty Ltd as trustee for The Mondello Family Trust [2020] WASCA 82 .… 10.33 Capital Aircraft Services Pty Ltd v Brolin [2006] ACTSC 80 .… 18.35, 18.37 — v — [2007] ACTA 8 .… 10.56, 18.37 Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham [1975] 1 NZLR 576 .… 11.88 Caporn v Dixon (1904) 6 WALR 71 .… 16.59 Cappello v Hammond & Simonds NSW Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 57 .… 23.26 Caprice Property Holdings Pty Ltd v McLeay [2015] 1 Qd R 206; [2013] QCA 125 .… 21.19, 21.30 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525; [1963] 2 All ER 547 .… 11.48 Caraher v Lloyd (1905) 2 CLR 480 .… 8.28 Carbon Black Lab Pty Ltd v Launer [2015] VSCA 126 .… 21.19 Cardwell Shire Council v Calabrese (1975) 49 ALJR 164 .… 23.13, 23.20, 23.34 Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165 .… 2.16, 2.18, 12.30, 12.35, 12.43

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1892] 2 QB 484; [1893] 1 QB 256; [1891–94] All ER Rep 127 .… 3.16, 3.19, 3.28, 3.42, 3.45, 5.11, 5.12, 27.21, 27.22 Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd v EZ Industries Ltd [1988] VR 349 .… 6.5, 10.34 Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co v Bragg [1911] 1 KB 489; [1908–10] All ER Rep 977 .… 12.68 Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Elliott [1960] VR 320 .… 12.68, 12.70 — v Tooth & Co Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 543; 7 IPR 581 .… 7.31, 18.7 Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487 .… 17.73 Carmax v Haydon & Co Pty Ltd [2000] ACTSC 29 .… 21.29 Carmichael v Colonial Sugar Co Ltd (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 233 .… 19.18 — v National Power Plc [1999] 1 WLR 2042 .… 10.5 Carminco Gold & Resources Ltd v Findlay & Co Stockbrokers (Underwriters) Pty Ltd (2007) 243 ALR 472; [2007] FCAFC 194 .… 7.2 Carnham, Harris & Elton Ltd v Alfred W Ellis (Transport) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 940 .… 8.52 Carnival plc v Karpik (The Ruby Princess) [2022] FCAFC 149 …. 10.28, 10.60, 10.71, 15.22 Carpentaria Investments Pty Ltd v Airs and Arnold [1972] Qd R 436 .… 10.39, 20.8, 20.16, 24.1 Carpenter v McGrath (1996) 40 NSWLR 39 .… 21.19, 23.6, 23.22, 23.38, 23.39 Carpenters Estates Ltd v Davies [1940] Ch 160; [1940] 1 All ER 13 .… 24.14 Carpet Fashion Pty Ltd v Forma Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 460 .… 11.118 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan [2014] 1 NZLR 792; [2014] NZSC 75 .… 18.41 — v Gilsenan [1946] QSR 44 .… 13.7 — v JA Berriman Pty Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 327 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.20, 21.21, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 23.7, 23.11, 23.13 — v JS Berriman Pty Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 327 .… 21.12, 21.14 — v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (1994) 63 FCR 358 .… 22.12 Carrapetta v Rado [2012] NSWCA 202 .… 21.19 Carrington v Roots (1837) 2 M & W 248; 150 ER 748 .… 16.48

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Table of Cases Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd v Patrick Operations Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 745 .… 7.24, 7.38 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 .… 11.24 — v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 .… 3.30, 3.46, 3.68, 3.74, 8.6, 8.55, 24.8, 25.14 — v Mehmet [2021] NSWCA 286 .… 21.12 — v Silber [1892] 2 Ch 278 .… 17.22 — v Smith (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 290 .… 16.48, 16.66 Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052 .… 4.17, 4.22, 4.23, 25.8 Casey’s Patents, Re; Stewart v Casey [1892] 1 Ch 104 .… 4.22 Cash Orders (Amalgamated) Ltd v Haynes (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 157 .… 18.37 Casha v Georgiev [2000] VSC 248 .… 21.29, 21.32 Casinos Austria International (Christmas Island) Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 387 .… 21.12 Cassegrain v Cassegrain [2016] NSWCA 71 .… 11.135 Cassidy v Engwirda [1968] Qd R 159 .… 21.18 — v Saatchi & Saatchi Australia Pty Ltd (2004) 134 FCR 585; [2004] FCAFC 34 .… 11.110 Casson v Mirror Motors Pty Ltd (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 762 .… 20.2 Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Fekala Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 133 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.22, 23.26, 23.39, 23.41 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 468 .… 10.50, 10.52 — v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 .… 24.21 Castlepines (IBM) Pty Ltd v Residential Housing Corp Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 232 .… 10.35 Cathedral Place Pty Ltd v Hyatt of Australia Ltd [2003] VSC 385 .… 10.42 Cathels v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1959) 79 WN (NSW) 271; [1959] 62 SR (NSW) 455 .… 7.5, 7.6 — v — [1962] SR (NSW) 455 .… 7.6 Caton v Caton (1867) LR 2 HL 127 .… 16.40 Cator v Croydon Canal Co (1841) 4 Y & C Ex 593 .… 8.27 Cattanach v Melchior (1984) 156 CLR 532; (2003) 215 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 38 .… 18.15, 18.16, 18.35



Causer v Browne [1952] VLR 1 .… 3.21, 10.62, 10.66, 10.70 Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20; [1952] HCA 26 .… 1.38, 3.29, 3.30, 6.3, 6.8, 10.36 Cavasinni v Cavasinni [2001] NSWSC 223 .… 5.7, 22.9, 26.9 Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67; [2016] 2 All ER 519; [2016] AC 1172 .… 23.45 Caves Beachside Cuisine Pty Ltd v Boydah Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1273 .… 6.15, 10.47 CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.6, 8.16 CCH Australia Ltd v Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd, Re [1992] FCA 90 .… 11.64 CCPP Australian Airships Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 232 .… 10.31, 10.62, 11.115, 11.122, 23.9 CE Heath Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Grey (1993) 32 NSWLR 25 .… 7.2, 7.10, 11.26 Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 .… 2.5, 2.29, 22.9, 22.10, 23.45 Cedenko Foods Ltd v State Insurance Ltd [1996] 3 NZLR 205 .… 12.31 Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2005] NSWSC 222 .… 7.3 Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 213 .… 4.32, 22.3 Celthene Pty Ld v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606 .… 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38 Cenric Group v TWT Property Group [2018] NSWSC 1570 .… 22.4 Centennial Coal Company Ltd v Xstrata Coal Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 788 .… 6.8 Central Coast Council v Norcross Pictorial Calendars Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 75 .… 7.7, 10.33, 10.74 Central Commodities Services Pty Ltd v Hertzog (1989) NSW ConvR 55-467; ASC 55-706 .… 15.27, 15.31 Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2002] WASCA 94 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.49 — v — (2003) 31 UWALR 243 .… 10.44 Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 .… 2.4, 2.17 Central Pacific (Campus) Pty Ltd v Staged Developments Australia Pty Ltd [1998] V ConvR 54-575 .… 6.6, 21.19

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Champtaloup v Thomas [1975] 2 NSWLR 38 .… 20.7, 20.18 — v — [1976] 2 NSWLR 264 (CA) .… 11.50, 20.18, 21.29, 21.35 Chan v Cresdon Pty Ltd (1989) 168 CLR 242 .… 10.33, 24.4 — v Tan [2020] NSWCA 344 .… 6.5 Chan Cuong Su t/as Ausviet Travel v Direct Flights International Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41,677 .… 11.110 Chand v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] NSWCA 181 .… 23.25, 23.41 Chandos Developments Pty Ltd v Mulkearns [2008] NSWCA 62 .… 21.26, 24.9 Chaney v Maclow [1929] 1 Ch 461 .… 16.42 Chanrich Properties Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2001] NSWSC 229 .… 2.2 Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessy Building Pty Ltd (2020) 6 QR 38; [2020] QCA 219 .… 16.55, 18.49 Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 .… 23.14 — v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71; [1965] 3 All ER 764 .… 17.13, 17.21, 17.47 Chaplin & Co Ltd v Brammal [1908] 1 KB 233 .… 14.17 Chapman v Taylor [2004] NSWCA 456 .… 19.2, 19.5, 19.9, 19.18 Chapmans Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 402 .… 10.32 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 .… 10.53, 23.1, 23.14, 23.18, 23.28, 23.34, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38 Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701 .… 4.12, 4.13 Chaproniere v Lambert [1917] 2 Ch 356 .… 16.60 Charge Card Services Ltd, Re [1989] Ch 497; [1988] 3 All ER 702 .… 3.51 Charide Nominees Pty Ltd v Matour Nominees Pty Ltd [1987] WAR 137 .… 10.12, 18.37 Charles Lodge Pty Ltd v Menahem [1966] VR 161 .… 20.8, 20.13 Charlick v Foley Bros Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 249 .… 16.7, 16.67 Charmar Electrical Pty Ltd v Minda Incorporated (1990) 55 SASR 112 .… 10.35 Charmelyn Enterprises Pty Ltd v Klonis (1981) 2 BPR 9527 .… 6.9 Charnock v Liverpool Corp [1968] 1 WLR 1498 .… 3.9

Central Trust Co v Rafuse (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481 .… 7.41 Centrepoint Custodians Pty Ltd v Lidgerwood Investments Pty Ltd [1990] VR 411 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.32 Centurion Industries Ltd v Industrial Progress Corp Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 117 .… 23.13 Century 21 Canada Ltd Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc [2011] BCSC 1196 .… 3.7 Century 21 (South Pacific) Pty Ltd v Century 21 Real Estate Corp (1996) 136 ALR 687 .… 8.1 CF & SP Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd .… 10.7, 10.41 CFA Group v Mars Trading [2001] NSWSC 112 .… 21.26, 23.26, 23.41, 23.45 CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2001) 185 ALR 555; [2001] FCA 57 .… 15.8 CG Mal Pty Ltd v Sanyo Office Machines Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 445 .… 10.3, 10.7 CGM Investments Pty Ltd v Chelliah [2003] FCA 79; (2003) 19 JCL 280 .… 22.9 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 1; 237 ALR 420; [2007] HCA 36 .… 2.14, 10.45 — v One.Tel Ltd (in liq) (2010) 242 CLR 174; 268 ALR 439; [2010] HCA 26 .… 8.23 CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd v Garcia [2007] NSWCA 193 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 23.2 CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 All ER 960; [1972] 1 WLR 307 .… 24.2, 24.12 CH Real Estate Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd; Boyana Pty Ltd v Jainran Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 37 .… 11.110, 11.121 Chadwick v Manning [1896] AC 231 .… 2.3 — v Ritchie (1983) ASC 55-229 .… 11.95 Challenge Bank Ltd v Pandya (1993) 60 SASR 330 .… 14.17, 14.20, 15.9 — v VL Cooper & Associates Pty Ltd [1995] IVR 220 .… 23.43 Chamber Colliery Co Ltd v Twyerould [1915] 1 Ch 268n .… 8.53 Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502 .… 12.52 — v — (1991) 28 FCR 21; 98 ALR 617 .… 12.52 Chambers v Odgers (1977) 1 BPR 9467 .… 3.68

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Table of Cases



ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 167 .… 10.12, 10.56 Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1999] TASSC 40 .… 10.42, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56 Christiani & Nielsen Pty Ltd v Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd (1993) 2 Tas R 122 .… 7.13 Christiansen v Klepac [2001] NSWSC 385 .… 20.15, 21.29 Christie v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 60 IR 17 .… 5.26 — v — (1996) 138 ALR 19 .… 5.26 Christison v Warren [1903] St R Qd 186 .… 12.53 Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 4) (1995) 16 WAR 277 .… 23.22 Christopoulos v Krishna [2017] VSC 154 .… 18.3, 18.22, 18.46 Churchill v Connolly [2004] NSWCA 212 .… 23.6 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 .… 3.51, 3.55, 12.52 — v — [2005] 1 SLR 502 .… 12.25 Ciaglia v Ciaglia (2010) 269 ALR 175; [2010] NSWSC 341 .… 16.21, 16.62, 16.65, 16.72 Ciavarella v Balmer (1983) 48 ALR 407; 57 ALJR 632; 152 CLR 438; (1983) 153 CLR 438; [1983] 2 NSWLR 439 .… 21.9, 21.19, 21.29, 21.30, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 — v Polimeni [2008] NSWSC 234 .… 16.60, 16.70 CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200; [1993] 3 WLR 802 .… 14.10, 14.17, 14.19, 15.7 CIBC Wood Gundy Australia Ltd v ICL Australia Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 135 .… 10.14, 10.18, 10.31, 22.12 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-232 .… 22.9, 22.10 — v — [1997] HCA 2 .… 22.10 Cielo v MG Kailis Gulf Fisheries Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 189 .… 12.48, 12.50, 12.52 CIT Credit Pty Ltd v Keable [2006] NSWCA 130 .… 15.26 Citibank Savings Ltd v Nicholson .… 14.17, 14.20 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Hendry (1985) 4 NSWLR 1 .… 23.23

Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101 .… 10.12 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 .… 10.30 Charters v Seitz (1989) NSW ConvR 55-464 .… 12.70 Chater v Beckett (1797) 7 Term Rep 201; 101 ER 931 .… 16.5 Chattis Nominees Pty Ltd v Norman Ross Homeworks Pty Ltd (Receiver Appointed) (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 338 .… 10.29 Cheers v Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 1 .… 18.47 Chemeq Ltd v Shepherd Investments International Ltd [2007] WASCA 117 .… 10.12, 10.13 Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548; [2017] NSWCA 295 .… 10.12, 10.13, 10.16, 10.32, 10.33 Chethams v Remington & Co [1999] 3 VR 258 .… 25.8 Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 11 ATPR 40-971 .… 11.104, 11.112 Chichester v Cobb (1866) 14 LT 433 .… 4.34 Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v ALH Group Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 32 .… 8.47 — v Boss Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 270 .… 2.2 — v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1017 .… 10.6 Chilcott v KBRV Resort Operations Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 633 .… 10.67 Child v Commonwealth Development Bank [2000] NSWCA 256 .… 12.70, 15.29 China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v PS Chellaram Co Ltd (1990) 28 NSWLR 354 .… 10.27, 10.64, 10.67, 10.70 China Shipping (Australia) Agency Co Pty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1556 .… 11.151 Chinadotcom corporation v Morrow [2001] NSWCA 82 .… 6.16 Chinatex (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bindaree Beef Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 126 .… 19.19, 21.27 Chinnock v Sainsbury (1860) 30 LJ (Ch) 409 .… 24.12 Chint Australasia Pty Ltd v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 635 .… 2.18 Chocolate Factory Apartments v Westpoint Finance [2005] NSWSC 784 .… 10.52, 10.53, 10.59, 23.27

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v O’Brien (1996) 40 NSWLR 398 .… 15.28, 15.31 City & Industrial Demolitions v Shanahan (2001) Aust Contract Rep 90-122; [2000] NSWSC 1197 .… 10.40, 21.12, 22.2, 22.5 City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] 1 Ch 129 .… 12.43 City Bank of Sydney v McLaughlin (1909) 9 CLR 615 .… 17.29, 17.42 City Life Assurance Co Ltd, Re [1926] Ch 191 .… 8.18 City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Southern Aerial Super Service Pty Ltd (1961) 106 CLR 477 .… 9.9 City of Belmont v Link Interiors Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 1013 .… 18.4, 18.29, 20.4, 20.13, 20.15 City of Box Hill v EW Tauschke Pty Ltd [1974] VR 39 .… 3.34 City of Camberwell v Camberwell Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 163 .… 10.48, 18.30, 21.13 City of Subiaco v Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 146; [2001] WASCA 140 .… 18.30, 19.5, 19.15, 19.24, 19.25 City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 372 .… 21.34 City West Water Pty Ltd v Simon Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 248 .… 24.17 Civil & Civic Pty Ltd v Pioneer Concrete (NT) Pty Ltd (1991) 103 FLR 196 .… 22.5 Civil and Allied Technical Constructions Pty Ltd v A1 Quality Concrete Tanks Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 157 .… 18.16, 18.24 Civil Service Co-Operative Society of Victoria Ltd v Blyth (1913) 17 CLR 601 .… 11.49 Civoken Pty Ltd v Madden Grove Developments Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 283 .… 21.24 CJ Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22 .… 3.9, 10.21, 10.25 CL Seward & Co Pty Ltd v Thompson (1992) 17 MVR 70 .… 7.2 Clairs Keeley (A Firm) v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139; [2003] WASCA 299 .… 8.7, 18.16, 18.33 — v — (2004) 29 WAR 479; [2004] WASCA 277 .… 8.7 — v — [2005] WASCA 86 .… 8.7 Clancy v Salienta Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 248 .… 21.35, 26.4, 26.6 Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220 .… 3.52, 16.35

Clarence City Council v Commonwealth [2020] FCAFC 134 .… 7.9, 24.28 Clarence Property Corporation Ltd v Sentinel Robina Office Pty Ltd [2019] 1 Qd R 144 .… 10.44 Clark v Clark (1882) 8 VLR (E) 303 .… 25.6 — v Commonwealth [1994] 2 VR 333 .… 25.1 — v Gallop Reserve Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 146 .… 10.31 — v Local Government Training Authority SA Inc [2001] SASC 273 .… 19.4 — v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313 .… 7.28, 16.35 — v Macourt (2013) 253 CLR 1; [2013] HCA 56 .… 23.6, 23.25, 23.26, 23.41, 23.42 — v Malpas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401; 45 ER 1238 .… 15.7 — v Refeld (1980) 25 SASR 246 .… 20.9, 20.13 — v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752 .… 5.1 Clark Equipment Australia Ltd v Covcat Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ALR 367 .… 11.150 Clarke v Cobley (1789) 2 Cox Eq Cas 173; 30 ER 80 .… 17.42 — v Dickson (1858) EB & E 148; 120 ER 463 .… 11.53 — v Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 .… 3.8 — v Tyler (1949) 78 CLR 646 .… 16.22, 16.31, 16.33 Clarke & Co Pty Ltd v Owen [1915] VLR 23 .… 22.5 Clarkson Williams Partners Pty Ltd v Vaughan [2016] ACTCA 1 .… 11.115 Clasic International Pty Ltd v Lagos (2002) 60 NSWLR 241; [2002] NSWSC 1155 .… 12.8, 12.25, 12.27 Classified Pre-Mixed Concrete Pty Ltd v Oil Tool Sales Pty Ltd [1966] Qd R 388 .… 24.16 Claude Neon Ltd v Hardie [1970] Qd R 93 .… 19.4, 19.8, 19.16, 19.17, 19.19 Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410; 178 ALR 193; [2001] HCA 9 .… 3.14 Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Oil International Ltd, the Alaskan Trader (No 2) [1984] 1 All ER 129 .… 21.10, 26.9 Clearihan v Turbitt [1999] ACTSC 88 .… 10.64, 10.71 Clearihan t/a Braddon Auto Mart v Gerald Turbitt [1999] ACTSC 88 .… 11.72, 11.73

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Table of Cases Cleary v Australian Co-operative Foods (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 991 .… 11.102 — v Ayles (1903) 6 WALR 38 .… 17.60 Clegg v Wilson (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 109 .… 18.25, 18.32, 18.47 Clegg Parkinson & Co v Earby Gas Co [1896] 1 QB 592 .… 5.29 Clements v London and North Western Railway Co [1894] 2 QB 482; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1461 .… 17.13, 17.16 Clifford v Turrell (1841) 1 Y & CC 138; 62 ER 826 .… 24.11 — v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 135 .… 11.115 Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records [1975] 1 All ER 237 .… 15.8 Clifton v Coffey (1924) 34 CLR 434 .… 21.18 — v Palumbo [1944] 2 All ER 497 .… 3.17 Climit Pty Ltd v Captech Group Ltd [2003] NSWSC 491 .… 19.1, 19.5 Clohesy v Maher (1880) 6 VLR (L) 357 .… 16.40 Clohesy v Maher (1880) 6 VLR (L) 357 .… 16.41 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483 .… 7.31 Clough v London and North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Exch 26 .… 11.47, 11.49 — v Rowe (1888) 14 VLR 70 .… 10.20 Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [2007] FCA 881 .… 15.15, 21.35 — v — [2008] FCAFC 136 .… 24.23 CLP Holding Co Ltd v Singh and Kaur [2014] EWCA Civ 1103 .… 10.32 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 .… 23.45 Clyne v Bar Association of NSW (1960) 104 CLR 186 .… 18.33 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 .… 8.40 CMF Projects Pty Ltd v Riggall [2016] 1 Qd R 187; [2014] QCA 318 .… 16.55 CMG, Re [1970] Ch 574 .… 14.6 CMI Clothesmakers Inc v ASK Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447 .… 3.27 Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 14 NSWLR 1; 24 NSWLR 1 .… 6.15, 10.47 Coast Corp Pacific Pty Ltd v Stockland Development Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 305 .… 10.7



Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Melevende [1965] VR 433 (FCSC) .… 11.49, 11.50, 11.51, 11.52, 21.29 Coastalstyle Pty Ltd v The Proprietors ‘Surf Regency’ Building Units Plan No 4246 (1995) 1 Qd R 132 .… 11.107 Coates v Wilson (1840) 5 Esp 152; 170 ER 769 .… 17.5 Cobbold v Barrett [2006] WASC 252 .… 21.32, 21.35 Cochrane v Willis (1865) 1 Ch App 58 .… 12.14, 12.23 Codelfa and Bank of New Zealand with Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 597 .… 10.13 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 .… 1.58, 1.66, 3.11, 6.6, 10.1, 10.4, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.15, 10.16, 10.31, 10.32, 10.35, 10.40, 10.50, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61, 12.1, 12.42, 12.64, 19.1, 19.5, 19.12, 19.13, 19.21, 19.22, 21.23, 21.38 Coffin v Botany Fork & Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 83 .… 23.27 Coggin v Telstar Finance Company (Q) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 191 .… 15.16 Coghlan v Pyoanee Pty Ltd [2003] 2 Qd R 636; [2003] QCA 146 .… 22.3, 22.5, 24.10 — v SH Lock (1985) 4 NSWLR 158 .… 10.3 — v SH Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 .… 4.22 Cohen v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 57 .… 11.118 — v Cohen (1923) 33 CLR 174 .… 10.9 — v — (1929) 42 CLR 91 .… 5.4, 18.3, 25.8, 25.13 — v iSoft Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1071 .… 4.35 — v Nessdale Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 118 .… 16.65 — v Roche [1927] 1 KB 160 .… 24.18 — v Wilson Dowd [2000] TASSC 174; [2001] ANZ ConvR 285 .… 10.53, 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 Cohen & Co v Ockerby & Co Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 288 .… 10.30, 10.32, 21.13, 23.2 Colbron v St Bees Island Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 303 .… 18.10 Coldunell Ltd v Gallon [1986] 1 All ER 429 .… 14.16, 14.17 Cole v Willington Dairy Farmers’ Co-op Association [1917] NZLR 372 .… 8.6 xliii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Coleman v Bone (1996) 9 BPR 16,235 .… 5.7 — v Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-960 .… 11.112 — v Holecek 542 F (2d) 532 .… 12.52 — v Liberal Party of Australia, New South Wales Division (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 736 .… 5.10 — v Seaborne Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 60 .… 26.2, 26.8 Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Ltd [2008] FCA 1915 .… 3.42, 11.115, 11.118, 24.1, 28.17 Colin CM Moore Pty Ltd v Sivathasan [2022] NSWSC 532 .… 10.30 Colin R Price & Associates Pty Ltd v Four Oaks Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 764 .… 15.16 — v — [2017] FCAFC 75 .… 15.16 Collier v Electrum Acceptance Pty Ltd (1986) 66 ALR 613; 69 ALR 355 .… 11.115, 11.124, 11.147 — v Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd (1989) ASC 55-716 .… 15.27, 15.28, 15.31 — v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329 .… 2.19, 4.39 Colliers Jardine (NSW) Pty Ltd v Balog Investments Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-140; [1996] ANZ ConvR 527 .… 3.67, 10.52, 10.56, 10.60, 11.115 — v — (FCA, Beazley J, 16 December 1994, unreported) .… 19.12, 19.22 Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510 .… 2.6, 16.21, 16.41, 16.47, 16.58, 16.67, 21.35 Collings v ACCC (1998) 152 ALR 510 .… 11.146 Collings Construction Co Pty Ltd v ACCC (1998) 43 NSWLR 131; 152 ALR 510 .… 11.146 Collins v Godefroy (1831) 1 B & Ad 950; 109 ER 1040 .… 4.30 — v May (2000) Aust Contract Rep 90-109 .… 15.9 Collins Hill Group Pty Ltd v Trollope Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 205 .… 10.16 Collum v Opie (2000) 76 SASR 588; [2000] SASC 107 .… 25.14 Colman v Golder [1957] VR 196 .… 16.64 Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 .… 3.38, 3.45 Colonial Insurance Co of NZ v Adelaide Martin Insurance Co (1886) 12 App Cas 128 .… 9.5

Colyear v Mulgrave (1836) 2 Keen 81; 48 ER 559 .… 7.5, 7.32 Colyer v Clay (1843) 7 Beav 188; 49 ER 1036 .… 12.23 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45; 238 ALR 457; [2006] FCAFC 192 .… 11.60, 11.152 Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.15, 4.10 Combulk Pty Ltd v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 214 .… 11.108 Comcare v Martinez (No 2) (2013) 212 FCR 272; [2013] FCA 439 .… 10.32 Comcopy Pty Ltd v Chadwick [1999] VSC 31 .… 18.37 Cominos v Rekes (1979) 2 BPR 9619 .… 24.7 Command Energy Pty Ltd v Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust [2003] VSC 261 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.20, 21.21 Commercial & General Corporation Pty Ltd v Manassen Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] SASCFC 40 .… 2.5, 10.30, 20.8 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; 46 ALR 402; [1983] HCA 14 .… 2.13, 5.17, 11.56, 12.71, 14.10, 14.16, 14.20, 15.1, 15.2, 28.31 — v GH Dean & Co Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 204 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.8 — v Younis [1979] 1 NSWLR 444 .… 26.3, 26.5 Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Patrick Intermarine Acceptances Ltd (in liq) (1978) 19 ALR 563; 52 ALJR 404 (PC) .… 8.5 — v Pollard [1983] 1 NSWLR 74; (1983) ASC 55-244 .… 15.26, 15.27 — v R H Brown & Co (1972) 126 CLR 337 .… 11.30, 11.31, 11.42, 11.78, 11.79, 11.80 Commercial Base Pty Ltd v Watson [2013] VSC 334 .… 15.3 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Hazelwood-Smith (2000) 11 ANZ Ins Cas 61-469 .… 10.33 Commission Car Sales (Hastings) Ltd v Saul [1957] NZLR 144 .… 16.79 Commissioner for Railways v Dangar (1943) 15 LGR 101 (NSWSC) .… 23.39 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Quinn (1946) 72 CLR 345 .… 10.20, 10.62, 10.77 Commissioner of Police v Barbaro [2001] NSWCA 57 .… 10.35 xliv

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Table of Cases



— v Hooper (1992) 2 Aust Contract Reporter 90-010; (1992) 2 CCH Contract Reporter 90–010 .… 3.67, 18.30 — v John White & Sons (NT) Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 172 .… 3.24, 16.45 — v Ken [1919] SALR 201 .… 26.3 — v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309 .… 10.41 — v Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 167; (1995) 130 ALR 193 .… 18.4, 21.28 — v Silverton Ltd (1997) 130 ACTR 1 .… 23.32 — v Spotless Catering Services Ltd [2000] WASCA 302 .… 20.1, 20.4, 20.9 — v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; 95 ALR 321 .… 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2.13, 2.16, 2.19, 2.24, 2.29, 4.27, 5.28, 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 15.1, 16.67, 18.34, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 25.1, 25.14 — v Western Australia (1999) 196 CLR 392 .… 10.33 Commonwealth Bank v Finding [1998] QSC 68 .… 11.115 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Baltica General Insurance Co Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 579 .… 7.10, 11.26 — v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169; [2014] HCA 32 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.52, 10.55 — v Carotino (2011) 111 SASR 573; [2011] SASCFC 110 .… 5.17 — v Cohen (1988) ASC 55-681 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.19 — v Finding [2001] 1 Qd R 168 (CA) .… 11.115 — v Foxman Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 .… 11.120 — v Kojic [2016] FCAFC 186 .… 11.108, 15.16 — v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84 .… 11.112, 11.115, 11.122 — v Mileoak Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 12 .… 23.45 — v Spira [2002] NSWC 905 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.49 — v TLI Management Pty Ltd [1990] VR 510 .… 5.17, 10.25 Commonwealth Financial Planning Ltd v Couper [2013] NSWCA 444 .… 11.115 Commonwealth Homes and Investment Co Ltd v MacKellar (1939) 63 CLR 351 .… 11.46, 21.24 Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 .… 21.12, 23.5, 23.10, 23.14

Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Carlenka Pty Ltd (1995) 41 NSWLR 329 .… 12.30 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694; [1964] 3 All ER 692; [1964] 3 WLR 963 .… 8.21 Commissioner of State Revenue v Politis [2004] VSC 126 .… 7.28 Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51 .… 26.3, 26.5 Commissioner of Taxation v American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122 .… 3.51, 8.50 — v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150 .… 8.9 — v Hadidi (1994) 51 FCR 453 .… 22.11 — v Racing Queensland Board [2019] FCAFC 224 .… 3.8 — v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342 .… 23.45 — v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 .… 2.29, 4.2, 4.32, 4.35, 20.4, 20.12, 22.3, 22.5 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520 .… 10.41 Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 .… 3.68 Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) v Phillips (1936) 55 CLR 144 .… 23.32 Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies (in liq) [2018] AC 275; [2017] UKSC 29 .… 26.1 Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 .… 10.43, 10.48, 10.52, 21.12, 21.19, 21.21, 21.33, 21.35, 23.5, 23.6, 23.7, 23.9, 23.11, 23.12, 23.13, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.28, 23.39, 26.4 — v Antonio Giorgio Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 244 .… 3.69 — v Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926) 39 CLR 1 .… 17.69 — v Burns [1972] ALR 154 .… 26.3 — v Citra Construction Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 235 .… 11.88 — v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333 .… 2.9 — v Cornwell (2007) 229 CLR 519; 234 ALR 148; [2007] HCA 16 .… 23.5, 25.5, 25.6 — v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567 .… 3.27, 4.32, 4.35, 22.3, 22.4

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Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v Hollins [1956] VLR 169 .… 16.59, 16.64, 24.10 Commonwealth Portland Cement Co Ltd v Weber, Lohmann & Co Ltd (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 516 .… 23.39 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Reno Auto Sales Pty Ltd [1967] VR 790 .… 26.5 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Sydney Wide Stores Pty Ltd (1981) 55 ALJR 574 .… 23.37 Community Development Pty Ltd v Engwirda Construction Co (1969) 120 CLR 455 .… 10.62 Compagnie de Commerce et Commission SARL v Parkinson Stove Co [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 487 .… 3.46 Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 .… 8.7, 8.31 Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 .… 11.110, 11.115 Compass Building Society v Cervara Fifty-Seven Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 48 .… 18.10 Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v HowardSmith (1936) 54 CLR 614 .… 8.16, 8.17, 8.18 Computer World (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Internet Centre of Excellence 2000 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 91; [2006] FCA 752 .… 10.5, 10.6 Computershare Ltd v Perpetual Registrars Ltd [2000] VSC 233 .… 6.16 Con Kallergis Pty Ltd v Calshonie Pty Ltd (1998) 14 BCL 201 .… 10.47 Conagra International Fertiliser Co v Lief Investments Pty Ltd (1997) 141 FLR 124 .… 10.27 Concept Television Productions Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1988) 12 IPR 129 .… 26.8 Concrete Constructions Group v Litevale Pty Ltd (2002) 170 FLR 290; [2002] NSWSC 670 .… 11.118 Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594 .… 11.106, 11.111 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55 .… 10.39, 10.41, 10.50, 10.52 Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64 .… 4.32, 10.50, 21.24, 22.2, 22.5, 24.1

Condogianis v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 341; [1921] AC 125 .… 10.74 Conlon v Biggs [1943] SASR 103) .… 21.19 Conn Martusevicius (1991) 14 Fam LR 751 .… 16.75 Connex Group Australia Pty Ltd v Butt [2004] NSWSC 673 .… 6.15 Connolly v Beechworth Shire (1876) 2 VLR (E) 1 .… 17.71 Connor v Spence (1878) 4 VLR (L) 243 .… 19.4, 19.17, 19.21 — v Stainton (1924) 27 WAR 72 .… 9.5, 26.6, 26.13 — v Tasmanian Permanent Executors & Trustee Assn Ltd (1933) 28 Tas LR 9 .… 16.11, 16.15 Conroy v Lowndes [1958] Qd R 375 .… 24.32 Consolidated Credit Network Pty Ltd v Sonenco Apartments Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1000 .… 24.4, 24.14 Consolidated Development Pty Ltd v Holt (1986) 6 NSWLR 607 .… 3.73 Consolidated Neon (Phillips System) Pty Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 152 .… 19.4 Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Naylor (1963) 55 CLR 423 .… 8.34 Consolo Ltd v Bennett (2012) 207 FCR 127; [2012] FCAFC 120 .… 11.110 Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226; 64 ALR 481 .… 2.3, 12.2, 10.3, 10.39, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.61, 12.8 Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 .… 10.16, 10.30 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hay Point Services [2018] FCA 417 .… 5.26 Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717 .… 2.5, 2.9, 24.1 Consulere Ltd v Trikon Corp Pty Ltd (1990) 10 BCL 424 .… 24.26 Consulting Services Pty Ltd v Rieson (2006) 225 CLR 516; [2006] HCA 31 .… 18.41 Container Handlers Pty Ltd v Insurance Commission of WA [2001] WASCA 304 .… 10.73 Continental C & G Rubber Co Pty Ltd, Re (1919) 27 CLR 194 .… 18.2 xlvi

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Table of Cases Contra Fernandez v Glev Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1859 .… 11.110 Contra Salmon v Enares (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 202 .… 16.66 Conway-Cook v Town of Kwinana [2001] WASCA 250 .… 23.42 Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 50 ALR 363 .… 5.19, 5.28 — v — (1983) 50 ALR 363 .… 3.11, 16.45 Cook v Bank of New South Wales (1982) 2 BPR 9580 .… 11.9, 15.31 — v — (1986) 162 CLR 376 .… 27.1 — v Lister (1863) 13 CBNS 543; 143 ER 215 .… 4.40, 4.41 — v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 548 .… 11.151 — v Ravji [1967] NZLR 289 .… 24.6 Cook Islands Shipping Co Ltd v Colson Builders Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 422 .… 4.32 Cooke v Head [1972] 2 All ER 38 .… 16.73 — v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785 .… 3.58, 3.65 Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v SFS 007298633 Pty Ltd .… 16.55 Coolibah Pastoral Co v Commonwealth (1967) 11 FLR 173 .… 12.36, 12.40 Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 .… 14.5, 14.6 Coomber, Re [1911] 1 Ch 723 .… 14.5, 14.6 Coombs v Bahama Palm Trading Pty Ltd (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-002 .… 15.27 — v Wilkes [1891] 3 .… 16.35 Coomera Resort Pty Ltd v Kolback Securities Ltd [1998] QSC 20 .… 19.12, 20.9 Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 .… 16.57, 16.58, 16.60, 16.61, 16.65, 16.66 Cooper v Australian Electric Co (1922) Ltd (1922) 25 WALR 66 .… 26.13 — v Commonwealth Bank; Marshall v Commonwealth Bank [1998] SASC 6585 .… 17.51 — v Gardiner (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 67 .… 23.39 — v Harman (1866) LR 3 Eq 98 .… 8.55 — v Joel (1859) 1 De G F & J 240; 45 ER 350 .… 11.44 — v Municipality of Brisbane (1900) 10 QLJ 120 .… 25.8 — v Parker (1855) 15 CB 822; 139 ER 650 .… 4.39



— v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149; [1861–73] All ER Rep 2109 .… 12.23, 12.25 — v Ungar (1958) 100 CLR 510 .… 20.1 Cooper & Sons v Neilson & Maxwell Ltd [1919] VLR 66 .… 19.17, 19.20 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1991) 147 CLR 297 .… 10.35 Co-operative Bulk Handling Pty Ltd v Jennings Industries Ltd (1996) 17 WAR 257 .… 7.3 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 286; [1998] AC 1 .… 24.1, 24.12, 24.13 Copper Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hill & Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 .… 22.4 Cooper’s Trusts, Re (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 234 .… 17.63 Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1997) 67 SASR 525; [1997] SASC 5995 .… 11.82, 11.85, 11.97, 23.8 Coppleson v FCT (1981) 52 FLR 95 .… 5.11 Coras v Webb [1942] St R Qd 66 .… 17.18 Corbidge v Bakery Fun Factory Fun Shop Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 40-493 .… 11.127, 11.146 Corcoran v O’Rourke (1888) 14 VLR 889 .… 16.35 Cordon v Lesdor [2010] NSWSC 1073 .… 23.27 Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184 .… 10.43, 23.27, 26.13 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 .… 8.39, 24.1 Corio Guarantee Corporation v McCallum [1956] VLR 755 .… 26.13 Cork v Baker (1717) 1 Stra 34; 93 ER 367 .… 16.20 Cork and Bandon Railway Co v Cazenove (1847) 10 QB 935; 116 ER 355 .… 17.19 Corkin v Taylor [1963] Qd R 534 .… 22.6 Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M & W 358; 151 ER 450 .… 11.79 Cornish & Co v Kanematsu (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 83 .… 19.4, 19.17, 19.19, 19.23 Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 247 .… 21.29 Corp Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; 266 ALR 462; [2010] HCA 19 .… 16.72 Corpe v Overton (1833) 10 Bing 252; 131 ER 901 .… 17.23

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Corpers (No 664) Pty Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd [1989] ANZ ConvR 548; (1989) ASC 55-714; 20 ATR 1084; NSW ConvR 55-475 .… 24.30, 24.5 Corporate Express Australia Ltd v SwiftMcNair [1998] NSWSC 593 .… 18.38 Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 .… 10.32 Corradini v Lovrinov Crafter Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 125; [2000] SASC 224 .… 18.10, 18.12, 18.19, 18.20, 18.43, 18.49 — v O’Brien Lovrinov Crafter Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 125; [2000] SASC 224 .… 18.9 Correa v Whittingham (2013) 278 FLR 310; [2013] NSWCA 263 .… 17.70 Corrections Corp of Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2000) 104 FCR 448; [2000] FCA 1280 .… 11.109 Corser v Commonwealth General Assurance Corp Ltd [1963] NSWR 225 .… 6.11 Cortis Exhaust Systems Pty Ltd v Kitten Software Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1189; (2001) ATPR 41-837 .… 11.146, 15.13, 18.38 Cory v Gertcken (1816) 2 Madd 40; 56 ER 250 .… 17.42 Coset No 15 Pty Ltd v Blagojevic [2003] NSWSC 418 .… 12.36, 12.38 Cosgrove v Horsfall (1946) 62 TLR 140 .… 4.14, 7.37 Coshott v Fewings Joinery Pty Ltd (NSWCA, 15 July 1996) .… 23.19 Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2014) 45 VR 771; [2014] VSCA 353 .… 2.5, 6.5 Cossill v Strangman [1963] NSWR 1695 .… 8.16, 8.17, 8.19, 8.29, 8.34 Costa Vraca Pty Ltd v Berrigan Weed & Pest Control Pty Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 714 .… 11.115 Cottee v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 469 .… 4.14 Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 .… 4.26, 4.27 Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554 .… 10.28 Couldery v Bartrum (1881) 19 Ch D 394 .… 4.40 Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] HCA 385 .… 1.40, 3.13, 4.40, 4.8, 7.1, 7.2, 7.7, 7.8, 7.12, 7.25, 8.9, 8.17, 23.2, 24.1, 24.2, 24.4, 24.6, 24.17, 28.17 Coulthart v Clementson (1879) 5 QBD 42; [1874–80] All ER Rep 865 .… 3.73 Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 372

.… 10.16, 10.41, 10.42, 10.46, 10.48, 10.56, 21.12, 21.26 — v Goldspar Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 568 .… 11.110 — v Woodward [2000] NSWCA 201 .… 26.7 Council of the Shire of Noosa v JE Farr Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 060 .… 10.62, 10.67 Council of the Shire of Sutherland v James (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 273 .… 18.4 County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 .… 6.2, 6.6, 10.12, 10.16 Courtenay Polymers Pty Ltd v Deang [2005] VSC 318 .… 18.35, 18.37 Courtney v Powell [2012] NSWSC 460 .… 14.5, 14.12, 15.8 Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Bros (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297 .… 6.8, 6.15 Cousin v Grant (1991) 103 FLR 236 .… 7.3, 7.27 Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Ltd [2006] QSC 307 .… 10.43, 10.44 — v — [2007] QCA 192 .… 7.18 Coutts & Co v Browne-Lecky [1947] KB 104; [1946] 2 All ER 207 .… 17.36, 17.50 Couturier v Hastie (1852) 8 Exch 40; 155 ER 1250 .… 12.12, 12.16, 16.17 Cover v McLaughlin (1897) 18 LR (NSW) 107 .… 21.20 Cowan v O’Connor (1888) 20 QBD 640 .… 3.60 Coward v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1963] 1 QB 259 .… 5.9 Cowen v Pigott [1989] 1 Qd R 41 .… 14.6 Cowern v Nield [1911–13] All ER Rep 425; [1912] 2 KB 419 .… 17.16 Cox v Esanda Finance [2000] NSWSC 502 .… 13.5, 13.7 — v Troy (1822) 5 B & Ald 474; 106 ER 1264 .… 28.3 Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst [1990] 2 NZLR 15 .… 11.118 Coxhead v Mullis (1878) 3 CPD 439 .… 17.27, 17.28 Coyne v Commercial Equity Corp Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 109 .… 23.19 C&P Syndicate Pty Ltd v Reddy [2013] NSWSC 643 .… 3.49 CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] WASCA 123 .… 24.23 CPG01 Pty Ltd v Kourinos [2010] WASC 92 .… 7.28

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Table of Cases Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 .… 2.7, 2.9, 16.68, 16.69 Craddock Bros Ltd v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136; [1923] All ER Rep 394 .… 12.30 Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 .… 2.13, 2.28, 21.29, 21.31 Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant [2014] 2 All ER 279; [2014] UKSC 9 .… 11.38 Crane v Hegeman- Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662 .… 12.35, 12.40 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (1934) 55 LQR 54 .… 16.54 Crawford v Parish (1991) 105 FLR 361; [1991] ACTSC 87 .… 11.95, 11.97, 11.99 Crawford Fitting Co v Sydney Valve & Fittings Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 438 .… 10.15, 22.12 Creak v James Moore and Sons Pty Ltd (1912) 15 CLR 426 .… 12.56 Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 82 .… 2.16, 11.118, 18.4, 18.37 Creamoata Ltd v Rice Equalization Association Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 286 .… 7.45, 7.47, 18.35, 18.37, 22.4, 22.7 Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 .… 13.1, 13.6, 13.7, 13.10 Cresswell v Cresswell [2017] VSCA 272 .… 2.9 — v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255 .… 15.8 Crichton v Morris (1884) 10 VLR (E) 338 .… 16.35 Crick v Murray (1882) 3 LR (NSW) L 20 .… 17.18 Cripps v G & M Dawson Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 81 .… 23.39 Crisp v ANZ Bank Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-294 .… 11.115 Criss v Alexander (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 587 .… 23.41 Crocodile Marketing v Griffith Vintners (1992) 28 NSWLR 539 .… 11.110 Croft v Lumley (1858) 6 HL Cas 672 .… 21.29 Crombie v Crombie [1903] SALR 147 .… 16.65 Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ Conv R 307 .… 2.17, 2.29, 10.3 Crompton v Wheat (1983) 71 FLR 346 .… 16.70 Crook v Corporation of Seaford (1870) LR 10 .… 16.67



Crothers v Hire Finance Ltd (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 469 .… 21.15 Crouch v Hawes (1974) 9 SASR 391 .… 20.16 — v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1907] VLR 80 .… 8.5 Crow v Rogers (1724) 1 Stra 592; 93 ER 719 .… 7.4 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] NSWCA 41 .… 15.8, 15.31 Crowe Horwath (Aust) Pty Ltd v Loone [2017] VSC 163; [2017] VSCA 181 .… 21.38 Crowley v Worley Ltd [2022] FCAFC 33 .… 11.108 Crown Insurance Services Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] VSCA 218 .… 23.14, 23.16 Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 .… 2.5, 2.6, 3.67, 4.18, 6.5, 10.6 Crown Resorts Ltd v Zantran Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 1 .… 18.32 Crowther v Commr of Stamp Duties [1963] NSWR 858 .… 26.1 Crump v Sharah [1999] NSWSC 884 .… 23.19 CRW Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1972) AR (NSW) 17 .… 11.122 Crystal Auburn Pty Ltd v IL Wollerman Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 735 .… 11.147 CSG Ltd v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 335 .… 8.47 Csomore v Public Service Board of NSW (1986) 10 NSWLR 587 .… 26.13 CSR Ltd v Adecco (Australia) Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 121 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.33, 10.34 — v Amaca Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 .… 25.14 — v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 .… 24.20 — v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-034 .… 2.21, 7.45, 7.46 CSS Investments Pty Ltd v Lopiron Pty Ltd (1987) 6 FCR 15; 76 ALR 463 .… 10.41, 21.35, 21.36, 24.4, 24.9 CT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 .… 18.37 CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714 .… 13.5, 13.7 Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 656 .… 3.39

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Cullan v Pearse (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 200 .… 16.28 Cullen v Thomson (1862) 6 LT 870 .… 11.40 — v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1 .… 23.18, 23.32, 27.1 Culligan v Aco Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 290 .… 11.150 Cumber v Wane (1721) 1 Stra 426; 93 ER 613; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 436 .… 4.37 Cumins v DCT (Cth) [2007] WASCA 30 .… 26.1 Cumming v Ince (1847) 11 QB 112; 116 ER 418 .… 13.3 Cumming & Co Ltd v Hasell (1920) 28 CLR 508 .… 6.5 Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 .… 8.7 — v Lewis (1993) 113 ALR 285 .… 11.117 Cummins Generator Technologies Germany GmbH v Johnson Controls Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 326 ALR 556; [2015] NSWCA 264 .… 11.82, 11.128 Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1149 .… 12.28, 12.59, 12.60, 27.24, 28.3 Cunningham v National Australia Bank Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 495 .… 11.121 Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513 .… 23.35 Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 .… 4.3 Curro v Beyond Productions Pty Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 337 .… 10.52, 18.37, 24.24, 24.25 Curtin University of Technology v Woods Baget Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 449 .… 11.143 Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805 .… 11.9, 11.62, 11.122 Curwen v Yan Yean Land Co Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 745 .… 11.19 Cushman & Wakefield (NSW) Pty Ltd v Farrell [2017] NSWCA 24 .… 10.30 Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Dallas Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 92 .… 10.6 — v Gray [1991] 1 VR 540 .… 6.6 Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 Term Rep 320; 101 ER 573; [1775–1802] All ER Rep 159 .… 27.12 Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189 .… 10.6, 11.34, 11.40

Cypjayne Pty Ltd v Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR .… 6.8 Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos [1966] 2 QB 695 .… 24.1, 28.17 — v — [1969] 1 AC 380 .… 23.39 D D & C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837 .… 2.16, 2.17, 4.37, 4.38 D & G Cars Ltd v Essex Police Authority [2015] EWHC 226 .… 10.43 D & S Group of Companies Pty Ltd v O’Connor Investments Pty Ltd [1997] SASC 6436 .… 7.4 D G Australia Pty Ltd v Alexander [2003] SASC 176 .… 26.6 Da Yun Xu v Fang Lin [2005] NSWSC 569 .… 14.5, 15.8 Daher v Doulaveras [2008] NSWSC 583 .… 15.8 Dai v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89; (2000) 171 ALR 348 .… 15.16 Dainford Ltd v Juana Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 396 .… 21.30, 23.2 — v Smith (1985) 155 CLR 342 .… 21.12 Dairy Vale Foods v Manfield [1998] SASC 6992 .… 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.55 Dale v Copping (1601) 1 Bulst 39; 80 ER 743 .… 17.5 — v Hamilton .… 16.23 Dalecoast Pty Ltd v Guardian International Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 199 .… 23.2 — v — [2003] WASCA 142 .… 11.110, 11.146, 11.147 Daley, Re; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 390 .… 8.7 Dalgety & Co Ltd v AMP Society (1908) VLR 481 .… 11.22, 11.38 Dalgety Australia Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 NSWLR 324 .… 3.40 Dalgety Wine Estates Pty Ltd v Rizzon (1979) 26 ALR 355; 53 ALJR 647; (1979) 141 CLR 552 .… 24.20, 24.24, 24.25 Dalle-Molle v Manos (2004) 88 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 102 .… 17.53 Dallhold Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gold Resources Australia Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 587 .… 10.56, 10.57 Dalton v Ellis; Estate of Bristow (2005) 65 NSWLR 134; [2005] NSWSC 1252 .… 5.8, 7.25 Dalton v Lawson Hill Estate Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 169 .… 11.110, 11.121, 11.122, 11.128, 11.150 l

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Table of Cases



David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 468 .… 6.17, 7.28, 8.6 — v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 110 .… 23.18 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1; 93 ALR 271 .… 11.112, 11.115, 18.48 — v — (1992) 175 CLR 353 .… 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 12.39, 12.40, 18.6, 18.48, 26.1, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5 David T Boyd & Co v Louis Louca [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 209 .… 6.5 Davids Distribution (Vic) Pty Ltd v Dance [1999] VSC 258 .… 22.12 Davidson v Atlas Assurance Co Ltd [1932] NZLR 1163 .… 12.8 Davies v Apted [2013] SASCFC 92 .… 3.15, 7.2 — v Benyon-Harris (1931) 47 TLR 424 .… 17.18 — v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 .… 8.52 — v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359 .… 8.6 — v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 258; (1938) 12 ALJ 260 .… 3.29 Davinski Nominees Pty Ltd v I & A Bowler Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 220 .… 23.32 Davis v CGU Insurance Ltd [2009] SASC 220 .… 2.3 — v Commissioner for Main Roads (1968) 117 CLR 529 .… 10.62 — v Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd (NSWSC, Rolfe J, 20 April 1994, unreported) .… 18.43 — v Pearce Parking Station Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 642 .… 10.53, 10.60, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.76, 10.77 Davis & Co (Wines) Ltd v Afa-Minerva (EMI) Ltd [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 27 .… 11.97 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 .… 19.5 Davys v Buswell [1913] 2 KB 47 .… 16.18 Daw v Flinton Pty Ltd (1998) 85 IR 1 .… 21.12 Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260; [1904-7] All ER Rep 913 .… 8.7 Day v O’Leary (1992) 57 SASR 206 .… 23.27, 23.39 Day Ford Pty Ltd v Sciacca [1990] 2 Qd R 209 .… 18.4, 18.6 Dayeian v Davidson (2010) 76 NSWLR 512; [2010] NSWCA 42 .… 4.17

Daly v Egan (1886) 12 VLR 81 .… 9.8, 9.9 Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 371 .… 14.10 Dan v Barclays Australia Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 437; 57 ALJR 442 .… 22.5, 22.6 Danaris Pty Ltd v J and M United Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 220 .… 11.86 Danbol Pty Ltd v Swiss Re International SE [2020] VSCA 274 .… 6.8 D’Angibau, Re (1880) 15 Ch D 228; [187480] All ER Rep 1184 .… 7.32 Daniel v Sinclair (1881) 6 AC 181 .… 12.8 Daniel Efrat Consulting Services Pty Ltd, Re (1999) 162 ALR 429 .… 18.33 Daniels v Sabemo (SA) Pty Ltd (1986) 43 SASR 55 .… 22.6 — v Trefusis [1914] 1 .… 16.41 Darin Nominees Pty Ltd v Franklin’s Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 209 .… 10.35 Dark v Boock [1991] 1 NZLR 496 .… 15.9 Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 QB 65; [1995] 1 WLR 68 .… 7.7, 8.7 Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500; [1986] HCA 82 .… 1.75, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77, 27.1 Darmanin v Cowan [2010] NSWSC 1118 .… 5.7 Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1216 .… 11.132 Darter Pty Ltd v Malloy (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-017 .… 3.11 — v — [1993] 2 Qd R 615 .… 10.16, 16.64, 24.4, 24.10 Darzi Group Pty Ltd v Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 .… 3.11, 5.20, 5.24 Dataflow Computer Services Pty Ltd v Goodman (1999) 168 ALR 169 .… 11.107, 11.111 Dataforce Pty Ltd v Brambles Holdings [1988] VR 771 .… 24.26 Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231; [1978] 2 All ER .… 3.71, 16.22, 16.38, 16.61 Davey v Challenger Managed Investments [2003] NSWCA 172 .… 15.8 David by her Tutor the Protective Commissioner v David (1993) 30 NSWLR 417 .… 17.55 David Deane & Associates Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 270 .… 3.68, 20.3

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Debenham v Sawbridge [1901] 2 Ch 98 .… 12.14 Dedert Corporation v United Dalby Bio-Refinery Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 368 .… 24.23 Deeks v Little Moreton Trading Pty Ltd (1995) 14 WAR 58 .… 10.20 Deemcope Pty Ltd v Cantown Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 44 .… 10.48, 13.7 Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98 .… 8.7 DeJohn v TV Corp Int’l (2003) 245 F Supp 2d 913 .… 3.7 Del Borrello v Friedman and Lurie (a firm) [2001] WASCA 348 .… 10.12 Del Casale v Artedomus (Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 73 IPR 326; [2007] NSWCA 172 .… 24.1, 24.25 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 .… 2.9, 2.15, 5.4, 5.8, 16.70 Delaney v Delaney [2022] VSCA 48 .… 5.24, 24.16 — v T P Smith Ltd [1946] KB 393; [1946] 2 .… 16.48 Delbridge v Low [1990] 2 Qd R 317 .… 21.18 Delco Australia Pty Ltd v Equipment Enterprises Inc t/a Kukla Trenchers (2000) 100 FCR 385; [2000] FCA 821 .… 11.114 Delicacy Co Ltd v Patricia’s Chocolates & Candies Pty Ltd (1947) 77 CLR 57 .… 18.37 Dell v Beasley [1959] NZLR 89 .… 12.55, 24.30 Dellys v Elderslie Finance Corp Ltd [2002] WASCA 161 .… 10.52 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 204 ALR 281; [2003] FCA 1413 .… 8.7, 18.32 — v JP Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd [2007] FCAFC 52; (2007) 158 FCR 417 .… 8.7, 18.33 Delta Pty Ltd v Mechanical and Construction Insurance Pty Ltd [2019] QCA 62 .… 25.4 Dem Compagnie Pty Ltd v Telxon Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 66 .… 21.24 Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31; 110 ALR 608 .… 6.15, 11.32, 11.43, 11.84, 11.104, 11.113, 11.115, 11.121, 11.125, 11.147, 11.150 Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 561 .… 11.39, 11.78, 11.83, 14.13 Dempster v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 124 .… 22.8, 22.12

DCT v Advanced Communications Technologies (Australia) Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 487 .… 16.67, 23.45 — v Chamberlain (1990) 26 FCR 221; 93 ALR 729 .… 12.17, 12.50, 12.51, 12.52 — v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1993) 117 ALR 61 .… 8.7 DCT Projects Pty Ltd v Champion Homes Sales Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 117 .… 21.12 De Bortoli Wines Pty Ltd v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 645 .… 11.127 — v — [2012] FCAFC 28 .… 11.110, 11.129 De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 .… 25.14 De Cesare v Deluxe Motors Pty Ltd (1996) 67 SASR 28 .… 23.27 De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430; [1886–90] All ER Rep 414 .… 17.13, 17.14 De Garis v Dalgety & Co Ltd [1915] SALR 102 .… 17.7, 17.25 De Garis & Rowe’s Lease, Re [1924] VLR 38 .… 18.2 De Jong v Carpenter (1982) 2 BPR 9524 .… 3.33 De La Bere v Pearson [1908] 1 KB 280 .… 4.14 De Leuil v Jeremy (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 137 .… 16.45 de L’Isle v Knight [2021] NSWSC 809 .… 10.32 De Mattos v Gibson (1858) 4 De G & J 276; 45 ER 108; [1843-60] All ER Rep 803 .… 7.31 De More Constructions Pty Ltd v Garpace Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 132; [2001] NSWCA 350 .… 16.55 De Nier v Beicht [1982] VR 331 .… 25.1 De Paola v City of New York 394 NYS (2d) 525 .… 12.52 Deacon v Transport Regulation Board [1958] VR 458 .… 13.7 Dean v Gibson (1958) 4 LGRA 214; [1958] VR 563 .… 11.62, 11.64 Deane v City Bank of Sydney (1904) 2 CLR 198 .… 10.5 — v — (1918) 25 CLR 215 .… 25.8 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; 38 ER 475; [1824-34] All ER Rep 28 .… 8.18 — v Hall, Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weinenkauf GmbH and Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150 .… 8.18 lii

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Table of Cases



Dewhirst v Budget Rent-a-Car Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 1 .… 11.119 — v Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34 .… 16.69, 24.7 DHBC Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 98 .… 6.11 DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 .… 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.15, 2.20 Di Biase v Rezek [1970] 1 NSWR 661 .… 7.28 — v — [1971] 1 NSWLR 735 .… 16.22, 16.35, 16.45 Di Giovanni v Dark Horse Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] WASCA 188 .… 8.49 Diagnostic X-Ray Services Pty Ltd v Jewell Food Stores Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 632; [2001] VSC 9 .… 24.13, 24.21 Diakogiannis v Johnson (1989) NSW ConvR 55-472 .… 3.46 Dial-An-Angel v Penchtime Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 180 .… 18.37 Dialog Pty Ltd v Addease Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 600 .… 24.21 Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd v Instagram Inc [2020] FCA 1846 .… 3.7, 3.26 Diamanti v Martelli [1923] NZLR 663 .… 11.80 Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd [1979] QB 333 .… 11.80 — v British Columbia Thoroughbred Breeders’ Society and Boyd (1965) 52 DLR (2d) 146 .… 12.19 Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd v Newham (1993) 117 FLR 164 .… 18.12 Dib Group Pty Ltd v Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd (2011) 284 ALR 601; [2011] NSWCA 300 .… 11.117, 11.142 Dibble v Aldan Nominees Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-693. .… 11.123 Dick v United States (1949) 82 Fed Supp 326 .… 3.62 Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623; [1965] 2 All ER 65 .… 10.23, 10.24 Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463 .… 3.59, 3.66, 3.67, 3.73 Dickson v Gallagher (1985) 7 ATPR 40-550 .… 11.107 Dickson Property Management Services Pty Ltd v Centro Property Management (Vic) Pty Ltd (2000) 180 ALR 485 .… 10.43, 21.33, 21.34, 21.37, 22.12, 24.19

Demtear Pty Ltd v Abelian Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 103 .… 6.11 Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500; [2003] QCA 376 .… 8.6 Denkewitz v Hodgson [1998] QSC 261 .… 23.19 Dennant v Skinner and Collom [1948] 2 KB 164; [1948] 2 All ER 29 .… 12.60 Denne v Light (1857) 8 De GM & G 774; 44 ER 588 .… 24.7 Dennis Pethybridge v Stedikas Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 154 .… 7.2 Dennison v Ace Shohin (Aust) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 ATPR 40-793 .… 11.110, 11.112, 11.145 Dent v Bennett (1839) 4 My & Cr 269; 41 ER 105 .… 14.5 Dental Corporation Pty Ltd v Lee [2016] NSWSC 1859 .… 18.37 Denton v Great Northern Railway Co (1856) 5 E & B 860; 119 ER 701 .… 3.4 — v Ryde Municipal Council (1953) 19 LGR 152 and 159 .… 18.8 Derbyshire Building Co Pty Ltd v Becker (1962) 107 CLR 633 .… 23.38 Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318 .… 2.16 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1 .… 11.63, 11.76, 11.78 Despot v Registrar General of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 5 .… 21.29, 24.1, 24.13, 24.32 Deta Nominees Pty Ltd v Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VR 167 .… 16.84 — v Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VR 167 .… 16.80, 24.1 Deutsch v Deutsch [2012] VSC 227 .… 19.23 Devaugh Pty Ltd v Lamac Developments Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 280 .… 10.27, 10.31, 10.32, 10.40 Devaux v Steinkeller (1839) 6 Bing (NC) 84; 133 ER 33 .… 11.80 Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Perl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225 .… 8.6, 8.8, 10.50 Development Underwriting (Qld) Pty Ltd v Weaber [1971] Qd R 182 .… 12.35 Device Pty Ltd v Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority .… 20.8 Devpro (a firm) v Seamark [2007] QCA 241 .… 6.11 Dewar v Mintoft [1912] 2 KB 373 .… 16.37 liii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract DKB Investments Pty Ltd v Belcote Pty Ltd (1991) 79 NTR 38 .… 10.6 — v — (No 2) (1993) 113 FLR 290 .… 10.6 DKLR Holdings Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431 .… 8.21 Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234 .… 25.6 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 .… 18.34 Dobson v Dobson (1879) 13 SALR 137 .… 15.2 Dockpride Pty Ltd v Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211 .… 3.39 Dockside Holdings Pty Ltd v Rakio Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 374; [2001] SASC 78 .… 10.35, 12.36 Dodds v Premier Sports Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 948 .… 10.18 Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 Est Gaz 1115 .… 16.70 Doepel & Associates Architects Pty Ltd v Hodgkinson [2008] WASCA 262 .… 11.117, 11.146 Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2015) 47 VR 302; [2015] VSCA 351 .… 4.28, 10.2, 13.1, 13.5 Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709 .… 24.23 Dold v Murphy [2020] NZCA 313 .… 13.6, 13.7 Domazet v Jure Investments Pty Ltd [2016] ACTSC 33 .… 12.30 Domb v Isoz [1980] Ch 548 .… 3.57 Dome Resources NL v Silver [2008] NSWCA 322 .… 4.35, 7.8 Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd v Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 471 .… 11.122 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [1998] 2 All ER 608; affirmed [1999] 2 All ER 218 .… 8.5, 8.8 Donaldson v Bexton [2007] 1 Qd R 525; [2006] QCA 559 .… 20.8, 20.13, 20.15, 21.29 — v Freeson (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 113 .… 11.36, 11.37 — v — (1934) 51 CLR 598 .… 18.25, 18.45 Donau Pty Ltd v ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 185 .… 10.36, 21.19 Donellan v Read (1832) 3 B & Ad 899 .… 16.32 Doney v Palmview Sawmill Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 62 .… 11.110, 11.118 Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749 .… 3.34

Dietrich v Dare (1980) 30 ALR 407; 54 ALJR 388 .… 5.19 Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd v Brand [2004] NSWCA 58 .… 11.117, 11.127 Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Downs [1972] 2 NSWLR 49 .… 11.88 Dillon v Bepuri Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-436 .… 21.26, 21.36 — v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 92 ALR 331 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Nash [1950] VLR 293 .… 16.57, 16.66, 24.30 Dillwyn v Llewellyn (1862) 4 De G F & J 517; 45 ER 1285 .… 2.7, 16.68, 16.69, 16.70 Dimmock v Hallett (1866) 2 Ch App 21 .… 11.11 Dimond v Moore (1931) 45 CLR 159 .… 21.12 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Evia Luck) [1992] 2 AC 152 .… 13.10 Dinan v Harper [1922] VLR 49 .… 16.35 Dingjan, Re; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 69 ALJR 284 .… 21.38 Dinyarrack Investments Pty Ltd v Amoco Australia Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 214 .… 11.115 Diplock, Re; Diplock v Wintle [1948] Ch 465; [1948] 2 All ER 318 .… 25.6 Direct Acceptance Finance Ltd v Cumberland Furnishing Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1504 .… 21.21 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc [2002] 1 AC 481 .… 15.22 Director of Consumer Affairs v Scully (2013) 303 ALR 168; [2013] VSCA 292 .… 15.16 Director of Posts and Telegraphs v Abbott (1974) 2 ALR 625 .… 5.29, 18.30, 19.22 Distillers Co Bio-Chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co (1974) 130 CLR 1 .… 6.5 Ditcham v Worrall (1880) 5 CPD 410; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1324 .… 17.28 Diversified Mineral Resources NL v CRA Exploration Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-381 .… 11.115 Dixon v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1998) 90 FCR 390 .… 7.22 Dixon, Re [1994] 1 Qd R 7 .… 24.5 DJ Hill & Co Pty Ltd v Walter H Wright Pty Ltd [1971] VR 749 .… 10.20, 10.69, 10.71, 10.72 liv

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Table of Cases



Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2000) 182 ALR 481 .… 10.14, 10.16, 10.31, 10.32, 10.54 Dowdle v Inverell Shire Council (1998) 9 BPR 97,800 .… 3.11 Dowell v Custombuilt Homes Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 171 .… 26.8 Dowling v Rae (1927) 39 CLR 363; Perpetual Executors and Trustees Assn of Australia Ltd v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.46, 22.4, 22.6 Downer EDI Ltd v Gillies (2012) 229 IR 314; [2012] NSWCA 333 .… 21.24 Downey v Carlson Hotels Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 199 .… 11.108, 11.110 — v Crawford [2004] FCA 1264 .… 26.9 Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257 .… 12.36 Downward Bricklaying Pty Ltd v Goulburn-Murray Rural Water Authority [2003] VSC 171 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.48 Dowsett v Reid (1912) 15 CLR 695 .… 12.8, 14.12, 15.11, 24.1, 24.7, 24.8, 24.30 Doyle v Jacobs (1872) 11 SCR (NSW) 77 .… 23.39 — v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 .… 11.85 — v White City Stadium [1935] 1 KB 110; [1934] All ER Rep 252 .… 17.16 DPN Solutions Pty Ltd v Tridant Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 511 .… 10.49 DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 .… 4.12, 4.35 Dr Angel-Honnibal v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 263 .… 18.37 Drake Personnel Ltd v Beddison [1979] VR 13 .… 18.37 Drennan v Star Paving Co (1958) 333 P 2d 757 .… 2.23, 3.64, 3.67, 5.23 Dresna Pty Ltd v Linknarf Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] FCA 540 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.56, 21.34 Drever v Drever [1936] Arg L R 446 .… 18.23, 18.28 Dreverman v Doherty (1870) 1 VR (E) 4 .… 16.64, 16.65 Driat Pty Ltd v Thomas [2012] NSWSC 71 .… 15.27 Drinkwater v Caddyrack Pty Ltd (NSWSC, 25 September 1997 .… 21.27 Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1954] 1 QB 250 .… 7.25 Driveforce Pty Ltd v Gunns Ltd (No 3) [2010] TASSC 33 .… 10.43 Drozd v Vaskas [1960] SASR 88 .… 11.50, 11.53

Donis v Donis (2007) 19 VR 577; [2007] VSCA 89 .… 2.9, 16.70 Donnelly v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2014] NSWCA 145 .… 15.8, 15.12 — v McIntyre [1999] FCA 450 .… 22.9 Donohoe v Schroeder (1916) 22 CLR 362 .… 18.31 Donovan v TIC Realty Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 90 .… 6.6 Donut King Australia Pty Ltd v Wayne Gardner Racing Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 275 .… 21.12, 21.18 Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 .… 11.117, 11.134, 23.31 Dorotea Pty Ltd v Christos Doufas Nominees Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 91 .… 11.42 Dorrough v Bank of Melbourne Ltd (1995) ATPR .… 11.145 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 214 ALR 92; [2005] HCA 12 .… 11.112 Dotter v Evans [1969] VR 41 .… 24.1 Doubikin Holdings Pty Ltd v Grail Pty Ltd (1989) 5 WAR 563 .… 21.12, 21.24, 21.32 Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 .… 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11, 2.14, 16.69, 16.70, 24.1 Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142 .… 24.1, 24.4, 24.6, 24.11, 24.16, 24.17 Douglas v Cicirello [2006] WASCA 226 .… 21.16, 21.18, 21.19, 21.20, 21.23 — v Hill [1909] SASR 28 .… 16.22, 16.59, 16.66 Douglas, Re; Ex parte Starkey (1987) 75 ALR 97 .… 4.22 Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 89 .… 26.4 Douglass Automated Laboratories & Allied Services Pty Ltd v Sonic Technology Australia Ltd (1994) ATPR (Digest) 46129 .… 18.38 Doust v Hubbard [1964] Tas SR 260 .… 24.7 Dover v Lewkovitz [2013] NSWCA 452 .… 8.7 Dover Beach Pty Ltd v Geftine Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 442; [2008] VSCA 248 .… 16.55, 18.9, 18.10, 18.46 Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd v Bottrill Research Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 557 .… 21.18, 21.21, 21.24 Dovuro v Wilkins (2000) 105 FCR 476 .… 7.41 lv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Dunmore (Countess) v Alexander (1830) 9 Sh (Ct of Sess) 190 .… 3.62 Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114 .… 4.12, 4.18, 4.30 Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 179 .… 6.11 Duralla Pty Ltd v Plant (1984) 54 ALR 29 .… 11.40, 11.103, 11.147 Durant v Greiner (1990) 21 NSWLR 119 .… 11.112 Durban Roodeport Deep Ltd v Mostert [2004] WASC 9 .… 18.32 — v Newshore Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 231 .… 23.24, 26.9 Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765; [1895-9] All ER Rep 1683 .… 8.24 Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839 .… 2.7, 2.17 Durkin v Pioneer Permanent Building Society Ltd (ACN 087 652 042) [2003] FCA 419 .… 21.24 Durrell v Evans (1862) H & C 174; 158 ER 848 .… 16.40 Dusik v Newton (1985) 62 BCLR 1 .… 13.12, 15.8, 15.11 Duxbury v Pierce [2010] FCA 203 .… 11.138 Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410 .… 23.37 Dventures Pty Ltd v Wily [2001] NSWSC 641 .… 4.23 Dwyer v Craft Printing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 405 .… 11.115 — v O’Mullen (1887) 13 VLR 933 .… 12.70 Dyck v Manitoba Snowmobile Association Inc (1981) 5 WWR 97 .… 7.38 Dyco Hotels Pty Ltd v Laundry Hotels (Quarry) Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 332 .… 21.12 Dyke v McLeish Estates Ltd (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 74 .… 23.1 Dymocks v Capral [2010] NSWSC 195 .… 11.140 Dymocks Holdings Pty Ltd v Top Ryde Booksellers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 795 .… 23.14 Dynamic Hearing Pty Ltd v Polaris Communications Pty Ltd (2010) 273 ALR 696; [2010] FCAFC 135 .… 11.120 Dysart Timbers Ltd v Nielsen [2009] 3 NZLR 160; [2009] NZSC 43 .… 5.23, 10.55

Druiff v Lord Parker (1868) LR 5 Eq 131 .… 12.36 Drummoyne District Rugby Club Inc v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-039 .… 2.21, 7.1, 7.31 DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] Build LR 530 .… 13.7 DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423 .… 10.13, 21.9, 21.12, 21.17, 21.18, 21.19, 21.21, 21.26, 22.9, 26.4 DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88 .… 2.25 Du Buisson Perrine v Chan (2016) 49 WAR 432; [2016] WASCA 18 .… 21.19, 21.38, 26.4 Dual Homes Pty Ltd v Moores Legal Pty Ltd (2016) 306 FLR 277; [2016] VSC 86 .… 11.112, 23.32 Dubois v Ong [2004] QCA 185 .… 14.19 Dudgeon v Chie (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 450 .… 16.37, 24.19 Duff v Blinco [2007] 1 Qd R 407; [2006] QCA 497 .… 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd v Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 7 .… 10.33, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 23.23, 23.45 Duggan v Barnes [1923] VLR 27 .… 6.5 Duke v Royalstar Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 273 .… 24.8, 25.14 Duke of Bedford v British Museum Trustees (1822) 2 My & K 552; 39 ER 1055; [1814–23] All ER Rep 669 .… 24.7 Duke of Somerset v Cookson (1735) 3 P Wms 390; 24 ER 1114 .… 24.17 Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 180 .… 23.14 Duncan v Dixon (1890) 44 Ch D 211 .… 17.27 Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101 .… 3.46 Duncombe v Porter (1953) 90 CLR 295 .… 10.62, 10.74 Dunlop v Lambert (1839) 6 Cl & F 600; 7 ER 824 .… 7.7, 7.30 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 .… 23.45 — v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847; [1914–15] All ER Rep 333 .… 4.6, 7.1, 7.4, 7.12

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Table of Cases E



Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93 .… 3.10 Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544; [2017] HCA 12 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 Ecroyd v Davis (1872) 3 VR (L) 228 .… 16.42 Eddy Lau Constructions Pty Ltd v Transdevelopment Enterprise Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 273 .… 18.6 Eden Construction Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [2007] FCA 689 .… 22.12 Eden Productions Pty Ltd v Southern Star Group Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1166 .… 10.54 Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd [2001] VSC 502 .… 10.6, 10.43, 20.15 Edgar v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (1992) ATPR (Digest) 46-096 .… 11.115 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459; [1881–5] All ER Rep 856 .… 11.14, 11.39 Edmondson v Warringah Council (1999) 105 LGERA 37 .… 3.39 Edward Keller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Hennelly (1987, unreported) .… 18.24 Edward Street Properties Pty Ltd v Collins [1977] Qd R 399 .… 24.30 Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460 .… 7.3 — v Carter [1893] AC 360; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1259 .… 17.21, 17.22 — v Edwards (1918) 24 CLR 312 .… 10.13 — v — [1965] VR 486 .… 24.8 — v Newland & Co: E Burchett Ltd (third party) [1950] 2 KB 534; [1950] 1 All ER 1072 .… 8.52 — v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 494 .… 5.17, 5.18 Edwin Davey Pty Ltd v Boulos Holdings Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 65 .… 21.19, 21.30 Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517; [2007] EWCA Civ 547 .… 19.5 Effem Foods Pty Ltd trading as Uncle Ben’s of Australia v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599 .… 11.115 Effie Holdings Properties Pty Ltd v 3A International Pty Ltd [1984] NSW ConvR 55-174 .… 18.22, 18.25, 18.28 Egan v Caveny [1921] VLR 37 .… 6.5, 6.6 — v Ross (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 382 .… 16.35 — v — (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 382 .… 12.56, 12.57, 12.68, 12.69, 24.16

E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 310; 99 ALR 601 .… 11.111 E Brown Pty Ltd v Florence [1967] SASR 214 .… 8.52 E R Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 .… 16.69, 16.71 E T Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84 .… 4.40 E W Blanch Pty Ltd v Cooper [2004] NSWSC 631 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.58 EagleBurgmann Australia Pty Ltd v Ross Grant Leadbeater [2012] NSWSC 573 .… 18.37 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 8 Ch App 484 .… 15.1 Earl of Lucan, Re; Hardinge v Cobden (1890) 45 Ch D 470 .… 8.38 Earle v Peale (1712) 10 Mod 67; 88 ER 628 .… 17.5 Earney v Australian Property Investment Strategic Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 621 .… 21.12 Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.12, 21.19, 21.20 Earth Pty Ltd v Quoin Technology Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 89 SASR 337 [2004] SASC 257 .… 18.39 Earthworks & Quarries Ltd v Eastment & Sons [1966] VR 24 .… 26.6 Easling v Mahoney Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (2001) 78 SASR 489 .… 21.12, 23.42 Eastgate Properties Pty Ltd v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 196 .… 20.4 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413; [1963] 1 All ER 137 .… 7.33 Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson (2005) 223 ALR 123; [2005] WASCA 144 .… 4.26 Easts Van Villages Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act (2001) Aust Contract Rep 90-132; [2001] NSWSC 559 .… 10.43, 11.109 Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 11 A & E 438; 113 ER 482; [1835–42] All ER Rep 133 .… 4.3, 16.11, 27.13, 27.14, 27.21 Easyfind (NSW) Pty Ltd v Paterson (1987) 11 NSWLR 98 .… 12.52 eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd (2006) 170 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 1768 .… 3.22, 3.51, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.70, 11.116 lvii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Egel v Drogemuller [1936] SASR 407 .… 4.17, 6.7 Eggleston v Marley Engineers Pty Ltd [1979] 21 SASR 51 .… 10.20, 10.71, 10.72 Egmont v Smith [1877] 6 Ch D 469 .… 7.29 Eicholz v Bannister (1864) 17 CB NS 708; 144 ER 384 .… 27.26 Eimco Corp v Tutt Bryant Ltd [1970] 2 NSWR 249 .… 10.74, 10.75 El Ali v Tritton [2019] NSWCA 111 .… 23.25, 23.39 Elan Trading Corp Pty Ltd v Clarence Street Freeholds [2001] VSC 339 .… 24.17 Elcos Australia Pty Ltd v James Hardie Building Services & Technologies Ltd [1999] QSC 27 .… 20.4, 21.19, 21.21 Elder Dempster & Co v Paterson, Zochinos & Co [1924] AC 522; [1924] All ER Rep 135 .… 7.37, 7.40 Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd v McBride [1976] 2 NSWLR 631 .… 10.74, 10.75 Elders Lensworth Finance Ltd v Australian Central Pacific Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 364 .… 12.41 Elders Ltd v Incitec Pivot Ltd [2006] SASC 99 .… 10.45, 20.7, 21.24 Elders Rural Finance Ltd v Smith (1996) 41 NSWLR 296 .… 15.28, 15.29 Elder’s Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Commonwealth Homes & Investment Co Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 603 .… 11.49, 11.51, 11.59, 21.13, 21.29 — v EG Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193 .… 11.116 Electric Acceptance Pty Ltd v Doug Thorley Caravans (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] VR 799 .… 18.19, 18.20, 18.21, 18.40, 18.41, 18.43 Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; 306 ALR 25; [2014] HCA 7 .… 4.17, 6.50, 6.8, 10.12, 10.52 Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] WASCA 36 .… 13.1, 13.3, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 13.12, 14.4 Electronic Industries Ltd v David Jones Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 288 .… 10.41, 10.48, 22.2, 22.6 — v Harrisons & Crosfield (ANZ) Ltd (1965) 82 (WN) NSW 499 .… 20.8 — v — [1966] 2 NSWR 336 .… 11.46 Elesanar Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland [2007] QCA 208 .… 10.13

Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-329 .… 3.11 Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 35 NSWLR 709 .… 4.18, 6.10, 6.16 Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 .… 3.46, 3.60, 3.61 Elkateb v Lawindi (1997) 42 NSWLR 396 .… 16.55, 26.6 Elkerton and Willcocks in their capacity as Administrators of South Head & District Synagogue (Sydney) (in liq) v Milecki [2018] NSWCA 141 .… 5.7 Elkhoury v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 114 ALR 541 .… 21.38 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [2002] NSWCA 413 .… 11.56, 14.16, 14.20, 15.8, 15.26, 15.31 Ella v Wenham [1971] QWN 31 .… 24.30 Ellington v Heinrich Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 475 .… 4.17, 10.31 Elliott v Reading [1999] WASCA 11 .… 10.56, 10.58, 10.60, 20.1, 21.12, 23.22, 23.25, 23.35 Ellis v Barker (1871) 7 Ch App 104 .… 14.6 — v Ellis (1689) Comb 482; 90 ER 05 .… 17.5 — v Joseph Ellis & Co [1905] 1 KB 324 .… 3.14 — v Kerr [1910] 1 Ch 529 .… 3.14 — v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399; [1918–19] All ER Rep 1132 .… 8.7 Ellison v Lutre Pty Ltd (1999) 88 FCR 116 .… 11.50, 11.147 — v Vukicevic (1986) 7 NSWLR 104 .… 15.27, 15.29, 15.31, 16.25 Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374 .… 7.27 Ellul v Oakes (1972) 3 SASR 377 .… 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24 Ellul and Ellul v Oakes [1972] 3 SASR 377 .… 11.83, 11.146 El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 .… 4.24 Elmore v Pirrie (1887) 57 LT 333 .… 24.5 Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 271 .… 11.146, 11.147 Elsmore Resources Ltd, Re [2016] NSWSC 856 .… 15.27, 15.28 Elton v Cavill (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 289 .… 18.35 Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264 .… 2.29, 18.3, 18.10, 18.20, 18.43, 18.47, 18.49, 22.3, 22.6 Elzamtar v Bangladesh Islamic Centre of NSW Inc [2020] NSWSC 1161 .… 16.67

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Table of Cases



Enzed Technology Pty Ltd v Benge (1989) 1 WAR 164 .… 22.9 Equitable Life Assurance of the US v Bogie (1905) 3 CLR 878 .… 20.15 Equiticorp Finance Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 32 NSWLR 50 .… 13.3, 13.7 Equititrust Ltd v Franks (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128 .… 2.15 Equus Investment Services Pty Ltd v Bernard Curran McHugh Ltd .… 21.29 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Belperio [2006] VSC 14 .… 16.67, 18.4, 18.6 — v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55; (2004) 218 CLR 701 .… 2.19, 3.4, 5.11, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.9, 10.20, 10.26, 12.30, 21.29, 21.32 — v — [2006] QCA 194; [2006] QCA 414 .… 2.18, 10.3, 11.122 — v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498; 286 ALR 12; [2012] HCA 7 .… 8.7, 11.103, 11.150, 18.9, 18.33, 18.46, 18.47, 18.48, 26.1 — v Jimenez [2001] SASC 165 .… 10.35 — v Kamisha Corp Ltd (1999) ATPR 41697 .… 11.150 ER Henry Wherrett & Benjamin (a firm) v Catta Pty Ltd [2004] TASSC 148 .… 25.12 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2011) 274 ALR 705; [2011] FCAFC 11 .… 11.121 Erica Vale Australia Pty Ltd v Thompson & Morgan (Ipswich) Ltd (1994) 29 IPR 589 .… 23.23 Ericksson v Whalley [1971] 1 NSWLR 397 .… 21.33 Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 .… 11.53 Erley Pty Ltd v Gunzburg Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] ANZ ConvR 522; [1998] WASCA 75 .… 20.2 Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; 187 ALR 92; [2002] HCA 8 .… 5.1, 5.1, 5.7, 5.11, 5.17 Ernest Beck & Co v K Szymanowski & Co [1924] AC 43 .… 10.74 Eroc Pty Ltd v Amalg Resources NL [2003] QSC 74 .… 12.53 Errichetti Nominees Pty Ltd v Paterson Group Architects Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 77 .… 12.25 Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; [1952] 1 All ER 149 .… 3.71

Emanuele v Chamber of Commerce & Industry (SA) Inc (1994) ATPR (Dig) 46121 .… 11.147 EMCL Pty Ltd v ESANDA Finance Corp Ltd [1999] FCA 978 .… 20.1, 20.9, 21.18, 21.23 Emery v Spencer [1995] 1 Qd R 247 .… 21.24, 21.29 Emhill Pty Ltd v Bonsoc Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSCA 108 .… 11.56, 11.57, 21.26 Eminence Property Developments Ltd v Heaney [2010] EWCA Civ 1168 .… 21.12 Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 .… 3.1, 3.6, 3.27, 3.32, 3.44, 10.27, 10.61 Emu Brewery Mezzanine Ltd (in liq) v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] WASCA 105 .… 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24 Emu Gravel and Road Metal Co v Gibson (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 204 .… 23.39 Encino Plaza Pty Ltd v Wilson International Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 326 .… 3.11 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1971] Ch 591 .… 5.10 Energex Ltd v Alstom Australia Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 504; [2005] FCAFC 215 .… 3.36, 11.115, 11.147 Energy Brix Australia Corp Pty Ltd v National Logistics Coordinators (Morwell) Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 113 .… 22.4 Energy World Corporation Ltd v Maurice Hayes and Associates Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 34 .… 10.35, 22.12 Engineering Pty Ltd v Chilco Enterprises Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 291 .… 21.37 England v Davidson (1840) 11 Ad & El 856; 113 ER 640 .… 4.31 English v Gibbs (1888) 9 LR (NSW) 455 .… 17.35 — v Plath [2003] QSC 222 .… 21.18, 21.24, 21.29, 22.9, 23.14 English Scottish Mercantile Investment Co Ltd v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700 .… 11.76 Ennis Paint Australia Holding Pty Ltd v Lei [2015] NSWSC 1933 .… 23.14 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327; [1955] 2 All ER 493 .… 3.26, 3.47 Environmental Systems Pty Ltd v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 358; 227 FLR 1; [2008] VSCA 26 .… 10.77, 11.118, 11.146, 11.147, 11.150, 23.39 Enzed Holdings Pty Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 450 .… 11.110 lix

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Evalena Pty Ltd v Rising Sun Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 622 .… 26.9 Evans v Benson & Co [1961] WAR 13 .… 11.50, 11.51, 11.53 — v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 .… 2.5, 2.16 — v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2012) 289 ALR 237; [2012] FCAFC 81 .… 5.1, 5.7 Evans & Associates v Citibank Ltd [2003] NSWSC 204 .… 10.12 Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 .… 3.39, 3.67, 10.47 Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola [1973] 1 WLR 349 .… 24.4 Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (2009) 255 ALR 171; [2009] NSWCA 67 .… 24.5 Evening Standard Co Ltd v Henderson [1987] ICR 588 .… 24.25 Eves v Eves [1975] 3 All ER 768 .… 16.73 Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 381 .… 2.9, 24.1, 24.16 Excel Quarries Pty Ltd v Payne [1996] QCA 17 .… 20.6, 20.13 Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Scully (1998) 160 ALR 138 .… 17.72 Executor, Trustee & Agency Co of SA Ltd v Thompson (1919) 27 CLR 162 .… 25.8 Eximenco Handels AG v Partrederiet Oro Chief and Levantes Maritime Corp [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 .… 24.18 Expectation Pty Ltd v Pinnacle VRB Ltd [2001] WASC 144 .… 10.47 — v — [2002] WASCA 160 .… 20.16 — v — [2004] WASCA 261 .… 6.15 Express Airways v Port Augusta Air Services [1980] Qd R 543 .… 3.26 Exterior Home Improvements Pty Ltd v Stanger [1999] NSWSC 222 .… 23.27 Ezishop Net Ltd (in liq) v Veremu Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 156 .… 10.7, 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.13, 19.22

Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 188 CLR 241 .… 11.41, 11.88 — v Plessnig (1989) 166 CLR 131 .… 23.45 — v Tong (1997) 41 NSWLR 482 .… 15.28, 15.29 Esanda Ltd v Burgess [1984] 2 NSWLR 139 .… 5.11, 10.9 ESG Epping Pty Ltd v Love [2019] VSC 250 .… 21.23 Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175 .… 2.3, 7.46, 10.3, 12.8 Esplin v Murray [1998] NSWSC 338 .… 23.38 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 69 ALJR 404 .… 10.29, 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.56 — v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1; [1976] 1 All ER 117 .… 3.20, 5.13 — v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 26 .… 18.35 — v Mardon [1976] 1 QB 801 .… 11.15, 11.88, 11.89 Estate of Late Sir Donald Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (2010) 107 SASR 1; [2010] SASC 71 .… 25.7 Estate of Nitopi, Re (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 748 .… 15.10 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279 .… 8.6 ET Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84 .… 18.16, 18.21 Ethnic Earth Pty Ltd v Quoin Technology Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2006] SASC 7 .… 18.48 Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 .… 10.7, 20.1, 20.8 Ettridge v Vermin Board of the District of Murat Bay [1928] SASR 124 .… 21.38 Eunson v Beaulieu United Ltd [1999] FCA 1164 .… 23.19 Euphoric Pty Ltd v Ryledar Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 2 .… 12.35, 21.38 Eureka Operations Pty Ltd v Viva Energy Australia Ltd [2016] VSCA 95 .… 10.12 European Asian of Australia Ltd v Kurland (1985) 8 NSWLR 192 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.19, 15.8 European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 264 ALR 1; (2010) 240 CLR 432; [2010] HCA 6 .… 23.6, 23.39

F F & B Trading Co Pty Ltd v Steadfast Insurance Co Ltd (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 209 .… 20.13 F & G Sykes (Wessex) Ltd v Fine Fare Ltd [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53 .… 6.6, 6.8 F & H Entertainments Ltd v Leisure Enterprises Ltd (1976) 120 Sol Jo 331; 240 EG 445 .… 11.93, 11.96 Fabcot Pty Ltd v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council [2010] NSWSC 726 .… 6.14 lx

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Table of Cases



Farmers’ Executors Co-operative & Trustees Ltd v Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399 .… 14.4, 14.9 Farmers’ Mercantile Union and Chaff Mills Ltd v Coade (1921) 30 CLR 113 .… 3.6 Farnham v Orrell (1989) NSW ConvR 55443 .… 5.24, 15.27 Farrant v Leburn [1970] WAR 179 .… 21.38 Farrell v Bussell [1960] NSWR 398 .… 16.35, 24.8, 24.16 Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4 CP 744; [1861-73] All ER Rep 846 .… 8.55 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Edgar (1993) 114 ALR 1 .… 18.16, 18.19, 18.40 Fast Fix Loans Pty Ltd v Samardzic [2011] NSWCA 260 .… 15.26, 15.31 Faulks v Cameron (2004) 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61 .… 3.52 Fawcett v Smethurst (1914) 84 LJ (KB) 473 .… 17.40 — v Star Car Sales Ltd [1959] NZLR 952; [1960] NZLR 406 .… 12.60 Fawke v Holloway [1986] VR 411 .… 11.112 Fayad v B & G Properties Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 129 .… 10.30, 10.35 Fazari As Executrix of the Estate of Domenico Antonio Cosentino (Dec) v Cosentino [2010] WASC 40 .… 5.8 Fazio v Fazio [2012] WASCA 72 .… 22.9 FCT v Everett (1979) 143 CLR 440 .… 8.31 — v — (1980) 143 CLR 440 .… 8.3, 8.4, 8.9, 8.26, 8.28, 8.36 — v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500; 154 ALR 1; [1998] HCA 33 .… 4.24 — v Reliance Carpet Corp Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342 .… 21.9 — v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105 .… 23.32 — v Westgarth (1950) 81 CLR 396 .… 11.16 Federal Airports Corporation v Makucha Developments Pty Ltd (1993) 115 ALR 679 .… 21.35, 21.36 Federated Coal and Shipping Co v R [1922] 2 KB 42 .… 7.31 Federation Properties Pty Ltd v Tzioras [2001] VSC 125 .… 16.67 Fehlberg v Stanton [1960] ALR 299 .… 19.16, 23.20, 26.4 Feletti v Kontoulas [2000] NSWCA 59 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.37 Fell v NSW Oil and Shale Co (1889) 10 LR (NSW) Eq 255 .… 24.17, 24.30

— v — [2011] NSWCA 167 .… 11.115, 11.127 Fablo Pty Ltd v Bloore [1983] 1 Qd R 107 .… 16.54, 16.55 Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner [2022] FCAFC 9 .… 11.114 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (1997) 41 NSWLR 559 .… 11.45, 11.60 — v Parras (2002) 55 NSWLR 498; [2002] NSWCA 334 .… 3.46 — v RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 479 .… 11.122 FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Securities Ltd (1990) 3 ACSR 279 .… 10.14 — v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 343 .… 6.6, 10.16 Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346; 321 ALR 404; [2015] FCAFC 37 .… 3.6, 11.110 Fairway Trading Pty Ltd v Project Blue Moon Pty Ltd [1999] ACTSC 99 .… 19.15, 19.25 Falcone v Mentyn [2003] TASSC 79 .… 11.149 Falconer v Wilson [1973] 2 NSWLR 131 .… 21.19 Falko v James McEwan & Co Pty Ltd [1977] VR 447 .… 23.19, 23.43 Famestock Pty Ltd v The Body Corporate for No 9 Port Douglas Road [2013] QCA 354 .… 10.41, 10.42 Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos (1994) 115 FLR 443 .… 15.8 Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 .… 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.33, 21.34 Faraday v Rappaport [2007] NSWSC 34 .… 26.12 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22 .… 26.1 Faram v Kerr (1877) 3 VLR (L) 146 .… 10.28 Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732 .… 23.19 — v — (2006) 22 JCL 118 .… 23.19 Farmer v Honan and Dunne (1919) 26 CLR 183 .… 6.6, 10.16 Farmers’ Co-operative Executors & Trustees Ltd v Perks (1989) 52 SASR 399 .… 13.3, 14.10, 25.13

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2010] VSC 110 .… 10.43 Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CBNS 869; 142 ER 1037 .… 3.44, 16.50 Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 .… 18.34 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 .… 11.110, 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 Fenech v Sterling (1983) 51 ALR 205 .… 11.147 Fenn v Paul (1932) SR (NSW) 315 .… 13.5 Fensom v Cootamundra Racecourse Reserve Trust [2000] NSWSC 1072 .… 26.6, 26.8 Fenwick v Macdonald, Fraser & Co (1904) 6 F (Ct of Sess) 850 .… 3.24 Ferdinand Nemeth v Prynew Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1296 .… 11.136 Ferdinando, Re; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 42 FCR 243 .… 2.12, 15.9 Ferguson v Hullock [1955] VLR 202 .… 16.58 Ferguson, Re (1969) 14 FLR 311 .… 18.47 Ferraro v Smith (1991) NSW ConvR 55-581 .… 6.8 Ferris v Plaister (1994) 34 NSWLR 474 .… 10.31, 11.60 Fewstone Pty Ltd v Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 082 .… 21.18 Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235 .… 8.5 — v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285 .… 5.20 — v Shoalhaven Transport Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 96 .… 11.16 Field, Re [1968] 1 NSWR 210 .… 18.26 Fig Tree Developments Ltd v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd [2009] FCA 390 .… 21.24, 21.29 Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473 .… 3.70, 8.49, 22.5, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.28, 23.29 Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251 .… 3.11 Filmana Pty Ltd v Tynan [2013] QCA 256 .… 10.74 Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670 .… 24.22 Finagrain AS Geneva v P Kraus Hamburg [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 508 .… 2.5 Financial Integrity Group Ltd v Scott Farmer & Bravium Pty Ltd [2009] ACTSC 143 .… 24.29

Financings Ltd v Stimson [1962] 1 WLR 1184; [1962] 2 All ER 386 .… 5.23 Finch v Sayers [1976] 2 NSWLR 540 .… 19.18 Fincke v US (1982) 675 F 2d 289 .… 3.6 Findex Group Ltd v McKay [2020] FCAFC 182 .… 10.30, 18.35, 18.38 Findlay & Co Stockbrokers (Underwriters) Pty Ltd v Carminco Gold & Resources Ltd [2007] FCA 573 .… 26.4 Finesky Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport for Western Australia [2001] WASC 87 .… 20.4, 20.12 Finishing Services Pty Ltd v Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 177 .… 11.124 Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127 .… 23.12, 23.14, 23.19, 23.24 Finlayson v Carr [1978] 1 NSWLR 657 .… 5.10 — v Finlayson [2002] FCA 898 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.25 Finucane v New South Wales Egg Corp (1988) 80 ALR 486 .… 11.111 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951; [2007] UKHL 40 .… 11.60 Fiorelli Properties Pty Ltd v Professional Fencemakers Pty Ltd (2011) 34 VR 257; [2011] VSC 661 .… 21.36 Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Powell [1966] VR 513 .… 18.14 Firewatch Australia Pty Ltd v Country Fire Authority (1999) 93 FCR 520 .… 11.111 Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2015] 1 NZLR 432; [2014] NZSC 147 .… 10.12 Firmin v Gray & Co Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 160 .… 18.41 First City Corp v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710 .… 8.7 First Mortgage Managed Investments Pty Ltd v Pittman [2014] NSWCA 110 .… 11.56, 15.11, 15.12, 15.28, 15.29 — v — (No 3) [2014] NSWCA 361 .… 15.29 First National Reinsurance Co v Greenfield [1921] 2 KB 260; [1920] All ER Rep 777 .… 11.48, 11.49 Firstmac Fiduciary Services Pty Ltd v HSBC Bank of Australia Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1122 .… 11.150 Firth v Halloran (1926) 38 CLR 261 .… 19.13, 19.15, 19.25 Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 .… 3.20

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Table of Cases — v Bennett (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 399 .… 24.8 — v Degnan [2022] NSWCA 202 …. 10.32 Fisher & Co v Apollinaris Co (1875) 10 Ch App 297 .… 13.6 Fishlock v The Campaign Palace Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 531 .… 21.12 Fitch v Snedaker (1886) 38 NY 248 .… 3.40 — v Sutton (1804) 5 East 230; 102 ER 1058 .… 4.40 Fitzgerald v Dressler (1859) 7 CB (NS) 374; 141 ER 861 .… 16.18 — v FJ Leonhardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215 .… 10.41, 18.4, 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.14, 18.16, 18.18, 18.19, 18.20, 18.22, 18.23, 18.24, 18.40, 18.43, 18.46 — v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420; [1956] HCA 53 .… 1.38, 6.17, 10.27, 10.35, 22.7, 22.9, 24.8, 24.10, 25.13, 25.14 — v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268 .… 23.35 Fitzpatrick v Michel (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 285 .… 11.16 Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] FCA 1628 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.32 FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 .… 2.5 FJ Richards Pty Ltd v Mills Pty Ltd 1995) 1 Qd R 1 .… 16.55 Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Polly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500 .… 23.19 Fleeton v Fitzgerald [1998] NSWSC 696 .… 23.38 Fleming Bros (Monaro Agencies) Pty Ltd v Smith (1983) ATPR 40–389 .… 18.38 Flemington Properties Pty Ltd v Raine & Horne Commercial Pty Ltd (1997) 148 ALR 271 .… 11.83 Fletcher v Berriman [2001] NSWSC 457 .… 23.19 — v Manton (1940) 64 CLR 37 .… 19.25 — v Minister for the Environment (1999) 73 SASR 474; [1999] SASC 223 .… 3.29 — v St George Bank Ltd [2010] WASC 75 .… 25.12 Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1983] 3 VR 812 .… 10.30, 24.23 Flett v Deniliquin Publishing Co Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 383 .… 26.6 Flight v Bolland (1828) 4 Russ 298; 38 ER 817; [1824–34] All ER Rep 372 .… 17.34 — v Reed (1863) 1 H & C 703; 158 ER 1067 .… 27.14



Flight Centre Ltd v Louw (2010–11) 78 NSWLR 656; [2011] NSWSC 132 .… 23.19 Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109 .… 2.5, 16.70 Flint v Brandon (1803) 8 Ves 159; 32 ER 314 .… 24.4 Flourentzou v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90083 .… 14.17 Flower v London and North Western Railway Co [1894] 2 QB 65; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1459 .… 17.13 — v Sadler (1882) 10 QBD 572 .… 13.5 FMG Pilbara Pty Ltd v Cox (2009) 175 FCR 141; 255 ALR 229; [2009] FCAFC 49 .… 6.15 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605; [1881–5] All ER Rep 106 .… 4.38 Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 KB 1 .… 6.3, 6.6, 6.8 Folley v Marafioti (No 2) (1972) 9 SASR 9 .… 24.1 Fong v Cilli (1968) 11 FLR 495 .… 3.73 Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385; 88 ALR 413 .… 2.6, 2.31, 4.4, 9.2, 9.10, 10.3, 11.13, 12.8, 21.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.23, 21.24, 21.26, 21.27, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 23.2, 23.9, 23.21, 23.34, 24.10, 26.2, 26.4 Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 .… 2.2, 2.11, 3.8, 3.71, 10.31, 11.107, 11.111 — v NSW Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242 .… 18.37 Forbes Engineering (Asia) PTE Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 .… 4.22 Ford v Bartley (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 281 .… 18.3 — v Comber (1890) 16 VLR 540 .… 16.23 — v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455 .… 3.46, 3.70 — v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 42; [2009] NSWCA 186 .… 15.26, 15.27, 15.31, 18.46, 26.3 — v Young (1882) 8 VLR (E) 93 .… 16.35 Ford by his Tutor Watkinson v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 42; 257 ALR 658; [2009] NSWCA 186 .… 12.64, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70, 17.53 Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 1 WLR 339; [1969] 2 All ER 481 .… 5.26 Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd v Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd (2003) 134

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

FCR 522; [2003] FCAFC 313 .… 10.42, 10.57, 10.59, 11.127, 13.7, 15.2, 18.10, 18.19, 18.20 Forestry Commission of NSW v Stefanetto (1976) 133 CLR 507 .… 23.45 Forklift Engineering Australia Pty Ltd v Powerlift (Nissan) Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 443 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 21.21, 21.33, 21.34 Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 291 ALR 399; [2012] HCA 39 .… 11.76, 11.116 Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 291 ALR 399; [2012] HCA 39 .… 6.8 Foster v Genowlan Shale Co (1895) 16 LR (NSW) Eq 59 .… 7.46 — v Hall [2012] NSWCA 122 .… 6.8, 10.52 — v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704; [1861–73] All ER Rep 1913 .… 12.67 — v Wheeler (1887) 36 Ch D 695 .… 28.3 Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 83 .… 18.33 Fothergill v Rowland (1873) LR 17 Eq 132 .… 24.26 Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438 .… 23.43 Fox Entertainment Precinct Pty Ltd v Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust [2004] NSWSC 214 .… 12.50, 12.53 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 433 .… 3.11, 22.2, 22.5 FPM Constructions v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340 .… 21.24 Fragomeni v Fogliani (1968) 42 ALJR 263 .… 12.55, 24.7, 24.8 Fragoulis v Mountzouris (1973) 6 SASR 456 .… 20.8 Francis v Francis [1952] VLR 321 .… 16.61, 16.63 — v Lyon (1907) 4 CLR 1023 .… 23.26 — v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 343 .… 18.7, 18.39 — v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [2002] FCA 1306 .… 10.43, 21.10, 23.44, 26.9 Francis May Pty Ltd v Tikitere Pty Ltd (NSWSC, Miles J, 2 April 1982, unreported) .… 23.44, 26.9 Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160; 131 FLR 422 .… 11.114, 11.150, 11.153

Franckombe v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 21.18 Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459 .… 11.111, 11.115 Frank Davies Pty Ltd v Container Haulage Group Pty Ltd (1989) 98 FLR 289 .… 10.74 Frankcombe v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 26.4 Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 76; 264 ALR 14; [2009] NSWCA 40 .… 6.5, 6.6 Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2007] NSWSC 242 .… 10.3 — v — (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 406; [2009] NSWCA 407 .… 2.18, 3.11, 10.3, 10.7, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 12.7, 12.27, 12.30, 12.32, 12.34, 12.35, 12.36, 12.41 Franknelly Nominees Pty Ltd v Abrugiato [2013] WASCA 285 .… 12.33 Frankome v Foster Investments Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 41 .… 21.26 Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 127 ALR 543 .… 11.115, 11.122 — v Vic Railways Commissioners (1909) 8 CLR 54 .… 11.1 Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd v Can-Dive Services Ltd [1999] 3 SCR 108 .… 7.40 Fredensen v Rothschild [1941] 1 All ER 430 .… 12.37 Frederick E Rose (London) Ltd v William H Pim Jnr & Co Ltd [1953] 2 QB 450; [1953] 2 All ER 739 .… 12.19, 12.20, 12.30, 12.33 Freedom v AHR Constructions Pty Ltd [1987] 1 Qd R 59 .… 18.22, 18.28, 26.4 Freedom Homes Pty Ltd v Botros [2000] 2 Qd R 377; [1999] QCA 150 .… 16.55, 18.10, 18.12, 21.12, 21.24 Freemantles Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett [1999] VSC 129 .… 23.43 Freshmark Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 390 .… 21.28, 21.31 Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2001) 111 FCR 322; [2001] FCA 907 .… 7.43 Friedeberg-Seeley v Klass (1957) 101 Sol Jo 275 .… 13.3 Friedlander v Bank of Australasia (1909) 8 CLR 85 .… 21.17, 21.18 Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129; [2009] HCA 21; (2009) 255 ALR 601 .… 26.1

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Table of Cases



Gaffney v Ryan [1995] 1 Qd R 19 .… 18.10 Gagner Pty Ltd t/a Indochine Cafe v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd (2009) 262 ALR 691; [2009] NSWCA 413 .… 23.25 Gair v Smith [1964] 814 .… 21.24 Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243 .… 18.44 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.29, 21.30 Galaxidis v CBFC Leasing [2005] NSWCA 347 .… 3.21 — v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 .… 2.5, 16.70 Galaxy Media Pty Ltd, Re (2001) 167 FLR 149; [2001] NSWSC 917 .… 6.5, 6.6 Gall v Mitchell (1924) 35 CLR 222 .… 24.7, 24.8 Gallagher v Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 159 .… 22.12 — v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 .… 8.53 Gallic Pty Ltd v Cynayne Pty Ltd (1986) 83 FLR 31 .… 23.23 Gallie v Lee [1969] 2 Ch 17 .… 12.63, 12.67, 12.68, 12.70 Gallo v Gallo [1967] VR 190 .… 12.46 Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531 .… 12.12 Gander v Murray (1907) 5 CLR 575 .… 24.7 Gandy v Gandy (1885) 30 Ch D 57 .… 7.44, 7.45, 7.46 Gange v Sullivan (1966) 116 CLR 418 .… 5.25, 20.6, 20.8, 20.13, 22.9 Garbett v Midland Brick Company Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 36 .… 10.52 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395; 155 ALR 614; [1998] HCA 48 .… 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.20, 28.29 Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd (1988) 82 ALR 415; 10 ATPR 40-884 .… 11.121 Garden City Transport v National Manufactured Product No 2 Ltd (1995) 65 SASR 109 .… 10.72, 10.73 Garden State Packers v Lancken [2000] NSWSC 139 .… 23.14 Gardiner v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 235 .… 10.12, 10.32, 10.33, 10.62, 10.66, 19.2 — v Grigg (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 524 .… 10.23 — v Orchard (1910) 10 CLR 722 .… 20.7, 20.18

Frith v Gold Coast Mineral Springs Pty Ltd (1983) 47 ALR 547; 65 FLR 213 .… 11.128, 11.146 Fry v Daly [1988] VR 19 .… 11.25 — v Smellie [1912] 3 KB 282 .… 12.56 Fry, Re; Chase National Executors and Trustees Corp v Fry [1946] Ch 312; [1946] 2 All ER 106 .… 8.38 Fu Tian Fortune Pty Ltd v Park Cho Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 282 .… 7.29, 8.47, 8.49, 22.5 Fubilan Catering Services Ltd v Compass Group (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1205 .… 11.117 Fuji Xerox Finance Ltd v CSG Ltd [2012] NSWSC 890 .… 10.12 Fulham Partners LLC v National Australia Bank Ltd [2013] NSWCA 296 .… 8.8 Fuller v Albert (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 183 .… 24.1 Fuller’s Theatres Ltd v Musgrove (1923) 31 CLR 524 .… 12.44, 21.21, 24.7, 24.9 Fullerton Nominees Pty Ltd v Darmagio [2000] WASCA 4 .… 18.21, 18.25, 18.41, 18.47 Fully Profit (Asia) Ltd v Secretary for Justice [2013] HKCFA 40; (2013) 6 HKC 374 .… 10.12 Fulton Hogan Constructions Pty Ltd v Grenadier Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 358 .… 23.32 Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 .… 3.24, 10.6, 11.117, 11.118, 16.21, 16.42, 24.1 Futuris Corp Ltd v ERG Ltd [2001] FCA 1126 .… 10.34 Futuris Industrial Products Pty Ltd v Arrow Industries Pty Ltd (FC, Wilcox J, 22 June 1993, unreported) .… 10.61 Fysh v Page (1956) 96 CLR 233 .… 14.14 G G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 407 .… 24.23 G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 .… 5.19, 5.24 — v — (1987) NSW ConvR 55-324 .… 3.11 G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v H C & J G Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 5.2, 6.5 — v — (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721 .… 11.150 GA Nominees Pty Ltd v Barden Motors Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-519 .… 11.114 lxv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Gardner v Commissioner of Probate Duties [1967] WAR 106 .… 8.38 — v Coutts & Co [1967] 3 All ER 1064 .… 7.28 — v Smith [2001] WASCA 116 .… 26.6, 26.7, 26.13 Gardner Corp Pty Ltd v Zedbears Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 13 .… 11.129 Garms v Birnzwejg [1990] 2 Qd R 336 .… 18.7 Garnaut v Rowse (1941) 43 WALR 29 .… 11.9 Garnock v Black [2006] NSWCA 140 .… 21.36 Garrard v Frankel (1862) 30 Beav 445; 54 ER 961 .… 12.54 Garraway Metals Pty Ltd v Comalco Aluminium Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 118 .… 23.17, 23.39 Garrett v L’Estrange (1911) 13 CLR 430 .… 16.64 Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 903 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 15.16, 21.34, 21.37, 22.12 Gary Sydney Green v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1164 .… 11.115 Gasiunas v Meinhold [1965] ALR 121 .… 24.16 Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 149 .… 5.17, 7.3, 11.118 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1 .… 10.2, 10.6, 10.7, 10.21, 10.24, 11.146, 23.6, 23.7, 23.8, 23.9, 23.14, 23.22 — v — (1982) 68 FLR 74; 43 ALR 313 .… 11.146 Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd SA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357 .… 21.10 Gavalas v Singh [2001] 3 VR 404 .… 23.14 GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 .… 2.29, 3.8, 3.27, 22.6 GBAR (Australia) Pty Lyd v Brown [2016] QSC 234 .… 18.37 GC Dickson & Yourston (Builders) Pty Ltd v Hattam [1935] VLR 168 .… 18.3 GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 .… 3.11, 22.9 GE Capital Asset Services & Trading Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v Rocks Excavations & Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 99 .… 24.17 GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003)

128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50; (2003) 201 ALR 55 .… 2.29, 10.3, 10.7, 10.16, 10.27, 10.32, 10.33, 10.43, 10.49, 10.51, 10.55, 11.109, 20.20, 21.12, 21.24, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31, 21.38, 22.3, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 22.12, 23.11, 23.13, 26.6, 26.7, 26.13, 28.21 Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd v Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA .… 10.32 Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 14,551; Aust Contract Rep 90-059 .… 3.11, 3.27, 5.24, 6.6 Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v Gibbs, Bright & Co (1970) 122 CLR 504 .… 27.1 Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36 .… 2.20, 3.11, 16.60 GEJ & MA Geldard Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 2) [2011] QSC 33 .… 11.136 Gelling v Crespin (1917) 23 CLR 443 .… 19.13, 19.16 Gem Meat Production Pty Ltd (in liq); Re, Ex parte Lindquist [1960] WAR 105 .… 4.19 General Credits Ltd v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162 .… 12.50 — v Wenham (1989) 18 NSWLR 570 .… 25.8 General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v RACQ Insurance Ltd (2003) 12 ANZ Ins Cas 61-574; [2003] QSC 080 .… 7.10 Gentry Brothers Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-460 .… 11.84, 11.145 Geo Thompson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Vittadello [1978] VR 199; (1977) 33 FLR 465 .… 8.3, 8.28 George v Cluning (1979) 28 ALR 57 .… 9.8, 10.32 — v Greater Adelaide Land Development Co Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 91 .… 18.4, 18.7, 18.40, 18.47, 20.4 — v Roach (1942) 67 CLR 253 .… 6.11, 20.4 — v Webb [2011] NSWSC 1608 .… 11.135 George 218 Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 182 .… 10.3, 10.32 George Hudson Holdings Ltd v Rudder (1973) 128 CLR 387 .… 3.46 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock [1983] 2 AC 803 .… 10.62

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Table of Cases — v — [1983] QB 284 .… 28.17 George T Collings (Aust) Pty Ltd v HF Stevenson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41104 .… 10.26, 10.64, 15.8 Georges France Photography Pty Ltd v M & T Zimmermann Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 220 .… 21.24 Georgeson v Geach (1877) 3 VLR (L) 144 .… 16.25 Georgoulis v Mandelinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 .… 3.60 Gerace v Auzhair Supplies Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 435; 310 ALR 85; [2014] NSWCA 181 .… 25.13, 25.14 Geraghty v Minter (1979) 142 CLR 177 .… 18.35, 18.37 Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1992) 11 WAR 40 .… 21.26, 23.23 Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187 .… 8.6 Gerrard v Slamar [2004] WASCA 253 .… 10.53, 23.13, 23.24 Gerraty v McGavin (1914) 18 CLR 152 .… 18.2, 18.40, 19.15 Getreide-Import-GesellschaftmbH v Contimar SA Compania Industrial Comercial y Maritima [1953] 1 WLR 207 .… 3.60 GetUp Ltd v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 189 FCR 165; 268 ALR 797; [2010] FCA 869 .… 3.53 Giacci v Giacci Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 233 .… 25.8 Giancaspro v SHRM (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] SASC 340 .… 19.18 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 81 ALR 92 .… 11.112 Giasoumi v Hutton [1977] VR 294 .… 16.37, 16.38 Gibb v Sell [1922] VLR 561 .… 16.31 Gibbons v Pozzan [2007] SASC 99 .… 23.45 — v Proctor (1891) 64 LT 594 .… 3.40 — v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423 .… 17.53, 17.55 Gibbons Holdings Ltd v Wholesale Distributors Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 277 .… 10.16 Gibson v Manchester CC [1978] 1 WLR 520 .… 3.6 Gibson Motor Sport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes [2005] FCA 749 .… 10.56 — v Robert James Forbes [2005] FCA 749 .… 22.3, 22.12 Gilbert v Healey Investments Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 650 .… 20.8



Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 122 .… 3.46, 3.69 Gilbert Stokes & Kerr Pty Ltd v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 435 .… 7.37, 7.40 Gilchrist v ATS Amusements Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 558 .… 11.118 Gilchrist Watt & Sanderson Pty Ltd v York Products Pty Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 825 .… 7.42 Giles v Rooney (1996) 23 MVR 510 .… 17.53 — v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 .… 18.33 Giliberto v Kenny (1983) 48 ALR 620; 57 ALJR 283 .… 10.12, 10.27, 20.4 Gillespie v Commonwealth (1991) 104 ACTR 1 .… 23.39 — v Whiteoak [1989] 1 Qd R 284 .… 24.13, 24.21 Gillespie Brothers & Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] QB 400 .… 10.64 Gilligan’s Backpackers Hotel & Resort Pty Ltd v Mad Dogs Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 304 .… 21.12, 21.26, 23.2 Ginger Development Enterprises Pty Ltd v Crown Development Developments Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 295 .… 10.32 Gino D’Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v Powis [1987] 2 Qd R 40 .… 16.55 GIO General Ltd v Allen [2002] NSWCA 333 .… 3.64 Gipps v Gipps [1978] 1 NSWLR 454 .… 11.35 Gippsreal Ltd v Registrar of Titles & Kurek Investments Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 157; [2007] VSCA 279 .… 4.17 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; [1971] AC 905 .… 16.73, 16.74 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 .… 2.6, 2.9, 16.69, 16.70, 16.72 Given v Pryor (1979) 39 FLR 437 .… 11.119 Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 .… 1.24, 3.11, 3.27, 3.28 GL Nederland (Asia) Pty Ltd v Expertise Events Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 62 .… 10.73, 10.74, 10.77 Gladstone v Ball (1862) 1 W & W (E) 277 .… 16.40 Gladstone Ports Corporation Ltd v Murphy Operator Pty Ltd (2020) 6 QR 497; [2020] QCA 250 .… 18.16, 18.33

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council [1925] AC 270; [1924] All ER Rep 579 .… 4.31 Glasscock v Balls (1889) 24 QBD 13 .… 7.23 Glavanics v Brunninghausen (1996) 14 ACLC 345 .… 11.88 Glebe Island Terminals Pty Ltd v Continental Seagram Pty Ltd (1993) 40 NSWLR 206 .… 10.66, 10.73, 10.76 Gleeson v Gleeson [2002] NSWSC 418 .… 26.12 Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 .… 8.7 Glen King Marine & Trading Services v Owners of the Ship ‘Armada Ternak’ (FCA, Spender J, 16 June 1998, unreported) .… 19.23, 23.24, 23.26 Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd v Aurizon Network Pty Ltd (2020) 5 QR 392 .… 10.43 Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (No 2) (2000) 79 SASR 185 .… 10.75, 10.77, 18.21, 23.13, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.25, 23.27, 23.29 — v — (No 3) (2001) 79 SASR 288 .… 23.25 Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 323 .… 7.3, 7.9 Global Network v Legion Telecall [1999] NSWSC 1090 .… 22.3, 22.6, 22.9 Global Network Services Pty Ltd v Legion Telecall Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 279 .… 10.35, 23.15 Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82; 55 ALR 25 .… 11.113, 11.116 Globe Church Incorporated v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2019] NSWCA 27 .… 25.4 Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396 .… 22.4 Glorie v WA Chip and Pulp Co Pty Ltd (1981) 55 FLR 310 .… 11.112 Glover v Roche [2003] ACTSC 19 .… 18.23 GMA Garnet v Barton International Inc [2010] FCAFC 38 .… 10.13 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414; 320 ALR 489; [2015] HCA 23 .… 18.9, 18.10 Gobblers Inc Pty Ltd v Stevens (1993) 6 BPR 13,591 .… 2.13 GoConnect Ltd v Sino Strategic International Ltd (in liq) [2016] VSCA 315 .… 4.17, 6.7

Goddard v O’Brien (1882) 9 QBD 37 .… 4.37 Goddard, Ex parte; Falvey, Re (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 289 .… 17.68, 17.73 Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 629 .… 5.24, 6.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.11, 10.27 Godfrey Constructions Pty Ltd v Kanangra Park Pty Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 529 .… 20.7, 20.18, 23.6 Godfrey Spowers (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 84; [2008] VSCA 208 .… 11.139 Goggin v Majet [2016] 2 Qd R 401 .… 21.12 Goile, Re; Ex parte Steelbuild Agencies Ltd [1963] NZLR 666 .… 2.16 Gokora Pty Ltd v Montgomery Jordan and Stevenson Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-722 .… 11.110 Gold Coast Oil Co Pty Ltd v Lee Properties Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 416 .… 21.20 Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v Kovan Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2006) 225 ALR 57; [2005] FCA 1521 .… 3.11, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56 Goldburg v Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711 .… 6.6, 23.11, 23.22, 23.41 Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 224 .… 16.21 Golden Sands Pty Ltd v Excel Quarries Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 276 .… 11.115 Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] 3 AC 363; [2007] UKHL 12 .… 23.25 Golden West Refining Corp Ltd v Daly Laboratories Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-378 .… 11.115 Goldmaster Homes Pty Ltd v Johnson [2004] NSWCA 144 .… 3.67 Goldsbro v Walker [1993] 1 NZLR 394 .… 11.121 Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Black (1926) 29 WALR 37 .… 18.32 — v Carter (1914) 19 CLR 429 .… 12.12 — v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 .… 3.64, 3.68, 3.71, 12.4, 12.8, 12.45, 12.55, 12.70, 24.7, 24.8, 24.30, 28.17 Goldsmith v Rodger [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249 Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2001] NSWCA 246 .… 6.11

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Table of Cases Goldsworthy v Brickell (1987) Ch 378 .… 14.6, 14.10 Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18 .… 18.14, 18.45 Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435 .… 2.4 — v Karenlee Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 153 CLR 455 .… 22.6 Golski v Kirk (1987) 72 ALR 443 .… 25.12 Gonzalez v Agoda Co Pte Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1133 .… 3.7 Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) .… 23.14 Good Living Company Pty Ltd as trustee for the Warren Duncan Trust No 3 v Kingsmede Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 33 .… 15.16 Goode v Harrison (1821) 5 B & Ald 147; 106 ER 1147 .… 17.17, 17.20 Goodfellow v Life Assurance Co of Australia Ltd [1920] VLR 296 .… 10.12 Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550 .… 3.26 Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704 .… 3.32, 10.31, 10.54, 10.77 Goodridge v Macquarie Bank Ltd [2010] FCA 67; [2010] FCA 76 .… 15.13, 23.43 Goodwin v Francis (1870) LR 5 CP 295 .… 16.37 — v Goodwin (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 503 .… 7.46 — v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1968) 117 CLR 173 .… 15.5 — v Robarts (1876) 1 App Cas 476 .… 8.44 — v Vietnam Veterans Motor Cycle Club Australia NSW Chapter Inc (2008) 72 NSWLR 224; [2008] NSWSC 154 .… 5.10 Goodwin’s of Newtown Pty Ltd v Gurry [1959] SASR 295 .… 3.20 Google Inc v ACCC (2013) 249 CLR 435; 294 ALR 404; [2013] HCA 1 .… 11.113, 11.121 Gooley v NSW Rural Assistance Authority 2020] NSWCA 156 .… 15.31 Gorczynski v W & FT Osmo Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 62; 241 FLR 242; [2010] NSWCA 163 .… 7.22 Gordon v Australian & New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 512 .… 20.18 — v Gordon (1821) 3 Swan 400; 36 ER 910 .… 11.28 — v MacGregor (1909) 8 CLR 316 .… 10.5, 16.36



— v Murphy (1867) 4 WW & A’B (E) 120 .… 16.20 Gordon & Gotch Australia Pty Ltd v Horwitz Publications Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 257 .… 10.40 Gore v Montague Mining Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1214 .… 23.16, 23.35 — v Van der Lann [1967] 2 QB 31 .… 4.14 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 .… 26.4 Gough & Gilmour Holdings Pty Ltd v Caterpillar of Australia Ltd (No 11) [2002] NSWIR Comm 354 .… 28.21 Gough Bay Holdings Pty Ltd v TyrwhittDrake [1976] VR 195 .… 20.13 Gould v Gould [1969] 3 WLR 490; [1969] 3 All ER 728 .… 5.2 — v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 58 ALJR 560 .… 11.9, 11.32, 11.37, 11.39, 11.40, 11.41, 11.83, 11.85, 11.86, 11.122, 11.124 — v — (1985) 157 CLR 215 .… 23.8, 23.37 Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 .… 2.29, 10.41, 23.6 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v Atkinson-Leighton Joint Venture (1981) 146 CLR 206 .… 10.55 — v K A Reed Services Pty Ltd [1988] VR 829 .… 8.53 Government of Japan v Global Air Leasing Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 221 .… 18.21, 18.23, 18.24, 18.25, 21.29, 26.4 Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 .… 4.15 Govorko v Vicelic (1971) 2 BPR 9477 .… 16.24 Gowan v Hardy (unreported, 1991) .… 15.28 Gozzard v McKell (1931) 32 SR (NSW) 39 .… 18.3 GP Transport (SA) Pty Ltd v Cavill Power Products Pty Ltd [2009] SADC 77 .… 25.12 GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 23; 191 ALR 342; [2001] FCA 1761 .… 15.13 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) ANZ ConvR 367 .… 6.9, 6.11 — v — (No 4) (1990) 9 BPR 17,461 .… 12.35 GPT RE Ltd v Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1964 .… 20.3, 20.4

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Great City Pty Ltd v Kemayan Management Services (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 44; [1999] WASC 70 .… 16.55, 18.49 Great Fingall Consolidated Ltd v Sheehan (1905) 3 CLR 177 .… 18.9, 18.34 Great Northern Developments Pty Ltd v Lane [2021] NSWCA 150 .… 10.32, 26.3, 26.4 Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 .… 3.38, 3.45 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2003] QB 679; [2002] 4 All ER 689; [2002] 3 WLR 1617 .… 12.3, 12.21, 12.25 Great Union Pty Ltd v Sportsgirl Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 299 .… 10.30 Greco v Bendigo Machinery Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-521 .… 11.121, 11.146 Greek Macedonian Club Ltd v Pan Macedonian Greek Brotherhood NSW Ltd [2007] NSWSC 92 .… 16.69 Green v AMP Life Ltd (2005) 13 ANZ Ins Cas 90-124; [2005] NSWSC 370 .… 7.3 — v CGU Insurance Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 612; [2005] NSWSC 254 .… 7.2 — v Ford (1985) 7 ATPR 40-603 .… 11.107 — v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343 .… 16.74, 16.75 — v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226; [1959] 2 All ER 525 .… 7.5, 7.44, 7.45 — v Sommerville (1979) 141 CLR 594 .… 21.12, 21.19, 21.24, 21.29, 24.9, 24.10 Green Growth No 2 Ltd v Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust [2019] 1 NZLR 161; [2018] NZSC 75 .… 10.30 Greentown Bellambi Pty Ltd v Wong [2017] NSWSC 872 .… 14.18, 15.10 Greenwood v Greenwood (1863) 2 De G J & Sm 28; 46 ER 285 .… 11.28 Greetings Oxford Koala Hotel Pty Ltd v Oxford Square Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 33 .… 24.13, 24.14, 24.21 Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Pty Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 328 .… 11.124, 11.147, 15.13, 15.18 Gregory v Beecraft (1998) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-401 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.32 — v MAB Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 1 .… 5.23, 5.25, 6.6, 10.41, 20.3, 20.4, 20.16 — v Philip Morris Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 79 .… 5.26 — v — (1988) 80 ALR 455 .… 5.20, 24.12, 24.13, 24.28

GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 .… 20.9, 21.19 GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 .… 5.24 GR Securities with Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181 .… 5.24 Grace v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [1998] QSC 27 .… 2.18, 10.3 Graham v Freer (1980) 35 SASR 424 .… 11.67 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2000) 102 FCR 307 .… 7.30 Graham Evans Pty Ltd v Stencraft Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1670 .… 5.24 Graham H Roberts Pty Ltd v Maurbeth Investments Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 93 .… 24.14, 24.19, 24.25 Grainger v Vindin (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 32 .… 3.29 — v Williams [2009] WASCA 60 .… 11.122 Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 .… 3.19 Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Ltd [1992] 2 WLR 867 .… 11.98 Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638 .… 16.73, 16.74 — v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112; 91 CLR 123 .… 4.24, 4.28, 10.2, 10.13, 10.32, 10.62 Grantwell Pty Ltd v Franks (1993) 61 SASR 390 .… 11.116 Gray v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1914) 19 CLR 356 (HC); (1919) 26 CLR 249 .… 16.22 — v Ellis [1925] St R Qd 209 .… 16.48 — v Lang (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 7 .… 22.5, 22.6 — v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1 .… 23.2 — v Pastorelli [1987] WAR 174 .… 18.25, 18.28 — v Pearson (1877) 3 VLR (L) 81 .… 4.41, 16.13 — v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; 276 ALR 267; [2011] FCAFC 40 .… 11.146 Graziano v Graziano [2010] SASCFC 76 .… 6.8, 6.11 Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306 .… 16.69 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1998) 196 CLR 161 .… 10.27 lxx

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Table of Cases — v Rangitikei District Council [1995] 2 NZLR 208 .… 3.39 Gregory and Parker v Williams (1817) 3 Mer 582; 36 ER 224 .… 7.46, 7.47, 7.48 Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131 .… 3.69 Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 .… 8.17, 8.23, 8.34 — v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1; [1959] 3 All ER 603; [1959] 3 WLR 759 .… 8.21 Grieve v Enge [2006] QCA 213; [2006] QSC 37 .… 10.41, 10.60, 20.16, 21.26, 21.27, 24.1, 24.4 Griffith v Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434 .… 12.1 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; 213 ALR 724; [2005] HCA 7 .… 5.1 Griffiths v Knight [1960] SR (NSW) 353 .… 4.10, 4.27 Griggs v Noris Group of Companies [2006] SASC 23 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.60 Grime v Bartholomew [1972] 2 NSWLR 827 .… 6.18, 16.45 Grist v Bailey [1967] Ch 532; [1966] 2 All ER 875 .… 11.13, 12.8, 12.18, 12.25, 12.27, 12.29, 12.54 Grizonic v Suttor [2011] NSWSC 471 .… 16.35 Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd v APN DF2 Project 2 Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 190 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.59 Grogan v ‘The Astor’ Ltd (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 409 .… 11.64 Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] Ch 445; [1969] 3 All ER 1476 .… 11.31 Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1995) 129 ALR 372 .… 23.32 Growthbuilt Pty Ltd v Modern Touch Marble & Granite Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 290 .… 21.27 Grubb v Toomey (2003) 12 Tas R 205; [2003] TASSC 131 .… 10.41, 24.1 Grummitt v Natalisio [1968] VR 156; 42 ALJ 118 .… 16.21, 16.37, 16.41, 16.61 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641; [1937] HCA 58 .… 2.3, 2.15, 2.16, 10.3, 11.9, 12.37, 21.31, 21.32 GSA Group Pty Ltd v Siebe PLC (1993) 30 NSWLR 573 .… 10.42, 10.43 Guan v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 99 .… 23.45



Guardian Assurance Co Ltd v Condogianis (1919) 26 CLR 231 .… 11.24 Guest v Watson (1891) 17 VLR 497 .… 16.58 Guilford Municipality v Traylen (1908) 10 WALR 32 .… 17.71 Gulf Air Company GSC v Fattouh (2008) 251 ALR 183; [2008] NSWCA 225 .… 3.4 Gull v Saunders (1913) 17 CLR 82 .… 23.39 Gullett v Gardner (1948) 22 ALJ 151 .… 10.15 Gumland v Duffy [2006] NSWSC 10 .… 21.24 Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 237; 244 ALR 1; [2008] HCA 10 .… 8.6, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 23.23 Gummon v Barter (1899) 1 WALR 58 .… 16.59 Gunn v Meiners [2022] WASCA 95 .… 14.2, 14.5, 15.9 Gunston v Lawley (2008) 20 VR 33; [2008] VSC 97 .… 11.139 Gurdag v B S Stillwell Ford Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 526 .… 11.146 Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 .… 10.9 Gurney v Gurney (No 2) [1967] NZLR 922 .… 24.1, 24.7, 24.9, 24.10 Gurr & Gurr v Forbes (1996) 80 ATPR 41491 .… 11.121 Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 735 (NZSC) .… 15.9 Gustavson v Haviland [1919] 1 Ch 38 .… 8.31 Gustin v Taajamba Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-433 .… 21.19 Guthrie v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-463 .… 15.8 Gutnick v Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd [2016] VSCA 5 .… 11.45, 11.54 GW Sinclair & Co Pty Ltd v Cocks [2001] VSCA 47 .… 10.53, 23.6, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16, 23.43 Gwam Investments Pty Ltd v Outback Health Screenings Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 37 .… 10.55, 23.43 H H & H Security Pty Ltd v Toliopoulos (FCA, Madgwick J, 18 August 1997, unreported) .… 19.18 lxxi

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

H Lundbeck A/S v Sandoz Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 4 .… 10.1, 10.12, 10.32, 10.40, 10.55 H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 .… 23.39 H W Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 .… 11.122 Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 .… 18.33 Haas Timber and Trading Co Pty Ltd v Wade (1954) 94 CLR 593 .… 11.35 Hacker v Australian Property and Finance Co Ltd (1891) 17 VLR 376 .… 21.12 Haddin v Le Feuvre [1969] 2 NSWR 32 .… 18.43 Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [1999] FCA 1798 .… 10.59 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145; [1843–60] All ER Rep 461 .… 1.138, 23.39, 27.24 Hadoplane Pty Ltd v Edward Rushton Pty Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 156 .… 23.13 Hagerty v Hills Central Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 200 .… 3.46 Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60 .… 23.2 Halfpenny v Ballet (1699) 2 Vern 373; 23 ER 836 .… 16.58 Halkidis v Bugeia [1974] 1 NSWLR 423 .… 21.19 Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206 .… 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 6.11, 18.35, 27.19 — v Loder (1885) 7 NSWLR (Eq) 44 .… 17.18, 17.21 — v Queensland Truck Centre Pty Ltd [1970] Qd R 231 .… 10.77 — v Sawkins [2000] NSWSC 441 .… 10.26 — v Wells [1962] Tas SR 122 .… 12.3, 12.56, 17.37 Haller v Ayre [2005] 2 Qd R 410; [2005] QCA 224 .… 25.3, 25.8, 26.12 Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 637 .… 18.33 Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545; 224 ALR 79; [2006] HCA 3 .… 8.21, 16.21, 21.36 Halpern v Halpern (No 2) [2008] QB 195; [2007] EWCA Civ 291 .… 13.11 Halstead, Re; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 31 FCR 337 .… 14.13 Hamblin v Marjoram (1878) 12 SALR 62 .… 16.61

Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371; 98 ER 1136 .… 8.55 Hambly-Clark v Forsaith [1953] SASR 270 .… 16.35, 16.45 Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256 .… 4.18 Hamilton v Chapman [1902] QWN 86 .… 22.5 — v Kaljo (1989) 17 NSWLR 381 .… 25.6, 25.13 — v Lethbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236 .… 8.6, 17.13, 17.15, 17.47 — v Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineering Co [1894] 3 Ch 589 .… 17.23 — v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121; 82 ALR 626 .… 11.110 Hammer and Barrow v Coca-Cola [1962] NZLR 723 .… 21.15 Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 .… 2.5 Hampstead Meats Pty Ltd v Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109 .… 3.26, 3.47 Hampton v BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 285 .… 15.13 Hanau v Ehrlich [1912] AC 39; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1294 .… 16.31 Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 .… 3.68, 4.12 Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2012) 45 WAR 29; 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 .… 2.17, 10.12 — v — (2013) 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 .… 22.9 Handbury v Nolan (1977) 13 ALR 339 .… 10.14, 10.28, 10.62, 10.74 Handley v Gunner [2008] NSWCA 113 .… 10.36 Hanna v OAMPS Insurance Brokers Ltd [2010] NSWCA 267 .… 18.37 — v Raoul [2018] NSWCA 201 .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.10, 15.26, 15.31, 17.53 Hannah Louis Group Pty Ltd v Maxum Taxi Trucks Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 291 .… 10.55 Hanneybel v Uniflex (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 349 .… 10.41 Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Sayseng [2005] NSWCA 214 .… 7.3 Hansen v Marco Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1948] VLR 198 .… 22.11 — v Northern Land Council [1999] NTSC 69 .… 10.5, 23.42 Harbottle Brown & Co Pty Ltd v Halstead (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) NSW 432 .… 18.34

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Table of Cases Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Co Ltd [1993] QB 701 .… 11.60 Harburg India Rubber Comb Co v Martin [1902] 1 KB 778 .… 16.18 Hardchrome Engineering Pty Ltd v Kambrook Distributing Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 359 .… 10.28, 10.56, 10.58, 10.71, 23.34, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38, 23.39 Hardesty & Hanover International LLC v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 44 .… 6.10 Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442 .… 8.38 Hardingham v RP Data Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 148 .… 10.18, 10.55 Hardman v Booth (1863) 1 H & C 803; 158 ER 1107; [1861–73] All ER Rep 1847 .… 12.56 Hardware Services Pty Ltd v Primac Association Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 393 .… 23.22 Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1966] 1 All ER 309 .… 10.72 Hardy & Co v Hillerns and Fowler [1923] 2 KB 490; [1923] All ER Rep 275 .… 16.83 Hardy Wine Co Ltd v Tasman Liquor Traders Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] SASC 168 .… 10.35, 10.56 Harlou Pty Ltd, Re [1950] VLR 449 .… 6.8, 6.11 Harlow v Mitchell [1970] QWN 27 .… 16.51, 16.65 Harold R Finger & Co Pty Ltd v Karellas Investments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 123 .… 5.24, 6.15, 21.12, 23.42 Harpur v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1996] QCA 483 .… 5.24 Harrigan v Brown [1967] 1 NSWR 342 .… 18.37, 24.26 Harrington v Browne (1917) 23 CLR 287 .… 21.19 — v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 .… 5.20 Harris v Burrell and Family Pty Ltd [2010] SASCFC 12 .… 7.3 — v Carruthers (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 100 .… 23.43 — v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; 197 ALR 626; [2003] NSWCA 10 .… 23.2, 24.31, 27.1 — v Gollings (1891) 17 VLR 686 .… 12.47 — v Harris [2021] VSCA 138 .… 2.9 — v Jenkins (1922) 31 CLR 341; [1922] SASR 59 .… 3.29, 14.12



— v Nickerson (1873) LR 8 QB 286 .… 3.23 — v Pepperell (1867) LR 5 Eq 1 .… 12.54 — v Smith [2008] NSWSC 545 .… 12.36, 12.37 — v Sydney Glass & Tile Co (1904) 2 CLR 227 .… 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 18.6 — v Western Australian Exim Corp (1994) 129 ALR 387 .… 25.12 Harrison v Battye [1974] 3 All ER 830 .… 3.33 — v Cage (1698) 1 Ld Ray 386; 91 ER 1156 .… 16.20 — v Conto (1953) 55 WALR 58 .… 16.32, 16.40 — v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170 .… 2.9 — v National Bank of Australasia (1928) 23 Tas LR 1 .… 15.5, 15.7 Harrison and Jones Ltd v Bunten and Lancaster Ltd [1953] 1 QB 646; [1953] 1 All ER 903 .… 12.19 Harriton v Stephens [2002] NSWSC 461 .… 7.3 Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231 .… 2.16 — v Fidelity Nominees Pty Ltd [1985] 41 SASR 458 .… 7.28, 8.47 Harry Goudias Pty Ltd v Akakios [2007] SASC 81 .… 18.3, 18.20 Hart v Alexander (1837) 2 M & W 484; 150 ER 848 .… 8.49 — v Jacobs (1981) 57 FLR 18 .… 10.61 — v JGC Accounting & Financial Services Pty Ltd (2015) 47 WAR 582; [2015] WASCA 22 .… 11.131, 11.132, 11.136, 11.139, 11.140 — v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 417 .… 10.7, 10.16, 10.40 — v Mossensons [2000] WASC 295 .… 23.17 — v O’Connor [1985] 1 AC 1000 .… 15.1, 17.53 Hartigan v International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc [2002] NSWSC 810 .… 14.5, 14.8, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15, 15.11 Hartley v Ponsonby (1857) 7 El & Bl 872; 119 ER 1471 .… 4.33 Hartley Poynton Ltd v Ali [2005] VSCA 53 .… 23.33 Hartleys Ltd v Martin [2002] VSC 301 .… 18.37 Hartog v Colin and Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 .… 12.48, 12.52 Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller [2020] FCAFC 229 .… 11.125, 11.147

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd (CI) [1986] AC 207; (1985) 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276 .… 3.1, 3.11, 3.24, 3.25, 3.28, 3.35, 3.39 Harvey v Edwards Dunlop & Co Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 302 .… 16.19, 16.45 — v Facey [1893] AC 552 .… 3.17 — v Harvey (1970) 120 CLR 529 .… 10.61 — v MacDonald [1927] St R Qd 50 .… 16.84 Hasham v Zenab [1960] AC 316 .… 24.5 Haskew v Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1919) 27 CLR 231 .… 14.11 Hatcher v White (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 285 .… 18.25, 18.44, 18.47 Hatt v Magro [2007] WASCA 124 .… 11.118 Hauff v Miller [2013] QCA 048 .… 5.25, 6.6 Hausman v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (2009) 29 VR 213; [2009] VSCA 288 .… 11.150 Havenbar Pty Ltd v Butterfield (1974) 133 CLR 449 .… 20.8, 21.30 Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 273; [2009] FCA 242 .… 23.2, 23.34 Havyn Pty Ltd v Webster [2005] NSWCA 182 .… 11.111, 11.129, 11.146, 11.150, 20.18, 21.35 Hawcroft v Hawcroft General Trading Co Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 555 .… 12.25 Hawcroft General Trading Co Pty Ltd v Hawcroft [2017] NSWCA 91 .… 8.9, 22.4 Hawes v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1167 .… 20.18 — v — (1999) NSWSC 1167 .… 20.16 Hawke v Edwards (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 21 .… 10.5, 10.9 Hawker v Vickers [1991] 1 NZLR 399 .… 20.13 Hawker de Havilland Ltd v Fernandes (1996) ATPR 41-479 .… 18.38 Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 298 .… 13.4, 13.8, 13.9 Hawker Siddeley Building Supplies Pty Ltd v Hanson [1965] WAR 115; [1966] ALR 26 .… 8.25 Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1 Cowp 289; 98 ER 1091 .… 16.9, 27.13 Hawkesbury Bakery Pty Ltd v Moses [1965] NSWR 1241; [1965] NSWR 1242 .… 18.37

Hawkesbury Nominees Pty Ltd v Battik Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 185 .… 23.11, 23.12, 23.13, 23.44 Hawkins v Clayton (1986) 5 NSWLR 109 .… 25.5 — v — (1988) 164 CLR 539; [1988] HCA 15 .… 10.18, 10.29, 10.40, 10.50, 10.53, 10.55, 11.88, 11.147, 25.5 — v — (1992) 5 JCL 127 .… 10.53 — v Clayton t/a Clayton Utz & Co (1986) NSWLR 109 .… 3.34 — v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) (1996) 70 IR 213 .… 5.26 — v Pender Bros Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 135 .… 10.52 — v Price [1947] .… 16.35, 16.37 Hawthorn Football Club Ltd v Harding [1988] VR 49 .… 6.9, 24.25 Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd v Victorian Securities Corporation Ltd (2010) 241 FLR 335; [2010] VSCA 247, .… 11.129 Haydon v Jackson (1988) 10 ATPR 40-845 .… 11.107 — v McLeod (1901) 27 VLR 395 .… 16.37 Hayle Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Technology Group Ltd [2000] FCA 1242 .… 23.16 Haynes v Hirst (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 480 .… 21.29 — v Sutherland (1966) 83 WN (Pt 1) NSW 428 .… 18.8 — v Top Slice Deli Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Dig) 46-147 .… 11.124 Hayward v Darling Downs Aircraft Services Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 153 .… 25.12 — v Planet Projects Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1105 .… 3.33, 10.26 — v Zurich Insurance Co plc [2016] UKSC 48 .… 11.78 Haywood v Roadknight [1927] VLR 512 .… 11.29, 14.11, 14.15, 15.2, 15.11 Hazard Systems Pty Ltd v Car-Tech Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWCA 314 .… 8.7 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London BC [1992] 2 AC 1 .… 17.69 HCK China Investments Ltd v Solar Honest Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 680 .… 4.10 HDI Global Specialty SE v Wonkana No 3 Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 296 .… 10.32, 10.33, 10.35, 10.74, 12.30 Head v Diggon (1828) 3 Man & Ry (KB) 97 .… 3.65 — v Kelk (1961) 63 SR (NSW) 340 .… 9.7, 16.48, 16.52

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Table of Cases — v — [1962] NSWR 1363; (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340 .… 4.17, 6.7 Healy v The Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Incorporated [2005] WASCA 219 .… 5.10, 21.27 Hearle v Greenbank (1749) 3 Atk 695; 26 ER 1200 .… 17.21 Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 .… 6.10, 6.16 Heathwood v Murgon Shire Council [1941] St R Qd 275 .… 26.4 Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT (1965–6) 115 CLR 512; 40 ALJR 280 .… 23.32 HECEC Australia Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Corp (1999) ATPR 46-196; [1999] FCA 822 .… 15.8, 23.21 Heckenberg v Delaforce [2000] NSWCA 137 .… 26.4 Hector v Lyons (1988) 58 P & CR 156 .… 12.30, 12.60 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575 .… 11.41, 11.73, 11.87, 12.17 Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 .… 2.3, 10.3 Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30; [1911–13] All ER Rep 83 .… 27.22 Heimann v Commonwealth (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 691 .… 10.13, 10.56, 10.61 Heine Bros (Aust) Pty Ltd v Forrest [1963] VR 383 .… 18.37, 24.25 Helco Pty Ltd v O’Haire (1991) ATPR 41099 .… 11.116 Helicopter Sales (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rotor-Work Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 1 .… 10.65 Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235 .… 3.34, 5.24, 6.8 Helps v Clayton (1864) 17 CBNS 553; 144 ER 222 .… 17.5 Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire CC [1978] 3 All ER 262 .… 8.8 Hely v Stirling [1982] VR 246 .… 6.9 Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (1995) 140 ALR 391 .… 11.145 — v — (No 2) (1996) 62 FCR 221; 140 ALR 596 .… 18.9 — v Curtis [2008] WASC 283 .… 4.32 — v Hopkins (1988) ANZ ConvR 229 .… 3.57 Henderson’s Caveat, Re [1998] 1 Qd R 632 .… 20.12 Henderson (A Protected Party, by her litigation friend, The Official Solicitor) v Dorset Healthcare University NHS



Foundation Trust [2021] AC 563; [2020] UKSC 43 .… 18.46 Henderson, Re (1916) 12 Tas LR 40 .… 17.37, 17.40 Henderson’s Automotive Technologies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Flaton Management Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 539; [2011] VSCA 167 .… 26.1, 26.8 Hendriks v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 .… 2.14 Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1276 .… 8.8 Henfree v Bromley (1805) 6 East 309 .… 12.64 Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 39 FCR 546; 79 ALR 83 .… 11.17, 11.36, 11.53, 11.110, 11.113, 11.114, 11.115, 11.121, 11.123, 11.124, 11.129, 11.147, 11.150 Hennessey v Architectus Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1390 .… 12.33 — v Craigmyle & Co Ltd [1986] ICR 461 .… 13.9 Hennessey Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 24 .… 10.12 Henry v Sydney MC (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 264 .… 17.71 Henry Dean & Sons (Sydney) Ltd v P O’Day Pty Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 330 .… 21.26 Henry Kendall & Sons (a firm) v William Lillico & Sons [1969] AC 31 .… 10.29 Hensley v Reschke (1918) 18 CLR 452 .… 23.2 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; [1891–4] All ER Rep 908 .… 3.47, 3.65 Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459; 182 ALR 37; [2001] HCA 52 .… 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.147, 23.5, 23.30, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 Hepburn v A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd [1966] AC 451; [1966] 1 All ER 418 .… 7.43 — v McDonnell (1918) 25 CLR 199 .… 25.8 Heppingstone v Stewart (1910) 12 CLR 126 .… 16.37, 16.40 Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301 .… 3.9 Heron v Port Huon Fruitgrowers’ Cooperative Association Ltd (1922) 30 CLR 315 .… 18.35, 18.37 Herrick v Leonard and Dingley Ltd [1975] 2 NZLR 506 .… 7.38, 7.42

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Herring v Templeman [1973] 3 All ER 569 .… 5.1 Herro Trading Pty Ltd v Kang [2001] NSWCA 309 .… 22.2 Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 .… 16.80, 24.14 — v Casella [2006] WASC 254 .… 10.35 — v Debus [2004] NSWCA 54 .… 21.19, 21.35 — v Henderson [2006] WASCA 233 .… 25.12, 25.13 Hexiva Pty Ltd v Lederer [2006] NSWSC 1129 .… 10.52, 21.10, 21.31, 23.44, 26.9 Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2001) Aust Tort Rep 81-588 .… 11.110 Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 .… 11.60 Heys v Gold Ribbon Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2000] TASSC 17 .… 4.17 HG & R Nominees Pty Ltd v Fava [1997] 2 VR 368 .… 14.17, 14.20 Hibberson v George (1989) 12 Fam LR 725 .… 16.75 Hibiscus Shoppingtown Pty Ltd v Woolworths (Qld) Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 106 .… 10.3 Hickey v Australian Wire Rope Works Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 455 .… 7.17 Hickinbotham Developments Pty Ltd v Woods (2005) 92 SASR 52 .… 3.39 Hickman v Turn and Wave Ltd [2013] 1 NZLR 741; [2012] NZSC 72 .… 18.41 Hide & Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 310 .… 6.6, 10.30, 10.32, 10.35 Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 .… 11.60, 11.152 Higgins v Scott (1831) 2 B & Ad 413; 109 ER 1196 .… 25.11 Higgs v Assam Tea Co (1869) LR 4 Ex Ch 387 .… 8.44 Highfern Pty Ltd v Sibbles [1987] 2 Qd R 667 .… 21.30 Highlands Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109 .… 11.72 Highmist Pty Ltd v Tricare Ltd [2005] QCA 357 .… 9.2, 9.5, 10.35, 20.1, 20.6, 21.12, 21.24, 21.26, 21.29, 21.30, 22.9 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Building Insurers’ Guarantee Corp (2003) 202 ALR 610; 188 FLR 153; [2003] NSWSC 1083 .… 7.3, 7.22

HIH Claims Support Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 72; 280 ALR 1; [2011] HCA 31 .… 11.145 HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq), Re [2016] NSWSC 482 .… 11.110, 11.127 Hilad v SCI [1999] NSWSC 486 .… 10.35 Hilary Ignatius Lantry v Tomule Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 81 .… 20.11 Hill v CA Parsons & Co Ltd [1972] Ch 305 .… 24.27 — v Canberra Centre Holdings Ltd (1995) 122 FLR 434 .… 21.12, 21.29 — v Forteng Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 105 .… 4.35 — v Gateway 2000 Inc (1997) 105 F 3d 1147 .… 3.7 — v Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231 .… 3.69 — v Rose [1990] VR 129 .… 11.29, 15.11 — v Sawkins [2000] NSWSC 44 .… 10.27 — v Sidney [1991] 2 Qd R 547 .… 10.34, 10.48, 21.19, 21.26 — v Terry [1993] 2 Qd R 640 .… 20.12, 20.18, 21.35 — v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 .… 7.41, 11.88, 23.8 — v Willis (1880) 6 VLR (L) 193 .… 16.41 Hill & Plummer v Pinchin Johnson & Co Ltd [1957] NZLR 758 .… 24.26 Hillam v Iacullo (2015) 90 NSWLR 422; [2015] NSWCA 196 .… 8.47, 8.49, 10.5, 21.38, 22.5 Hilliard, Re; Ex parte Tinkler [1907] VLR 375 .… 8.5 Hillas v Arcos [1932] All ER 494 .… 6.6, 6.8 Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 503; [1932] All ER 494 .… 6.3, 6.6, 10.32 Hillboi Nominees Pty Ltd v Evenwood Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 66 .… 10.12, 10.13 Hillcrown Pty Ltd v O’Brien [2011] QCA 129 .… 19.5 Hillier v Hewett [2001] SASC 225 .… 23.32 Hillman v Ferro Con (SA) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] SAIRC 22 .… 18.14 Hills v Croll (1845) 1 De G M & G 627; 42 ER 698 .… 24.11 Hills Industries Ltd v Australian Financial Services & Leasing Pty Ltd (2012) 295 ALR 147; [2012] NSWCA 380 .… 12.56 Himbleton Pty Ltd v Kumagai (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 NSWLR 44 .… 3.68, 6.11, 10.41, 10.42, 10.60, 10.61 Hines v Birkbeck College [1986] Ch 524; [1985] 3 All ER 156 .… 5.1

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Table of Cases Hinkley v De Vries (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1049 .… 3.61 Hirachand Punamchand v Temple (1863) 13 CBNS 543; 143 ER 215 .… 4.41 — v — [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597 .… 4.40 Hirsch v Zinc Corp Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 34 .… 18.2, 19.13, 19.15, 19.20, 19.22 Hirst v West Riding Union Banking Co Ltd [1901] 2 KB 560 .… 11.80 Hiser v Hardex Cooperative Ltd (in liq) .… 10.26 Hitchcock v Giddings (1817) 4 Price 135; 146 ER 418; [1814–23] All ER Rep 781 .… 12.13 HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd v Psycadian Ltd [2005] WASC 234 .… 26.10, 26.12 Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168 .… 23.24 Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd (1977) 1 NSWLR 88 .… 23.11, 23.27 — v Swan (1920) 28 CLR 258 .… 21.12, 21.30 Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council .… 7.9, 24.28 Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 .… 23.17 Hobbs v Petersham Transport Co Pty Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 222 .… 10.53 Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd v Zupps Southside Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 319 .… 11.136 Hobhouse v Macarthur-Onslow [2022] NSWCA 158 …. 10.60 Hocking Stuart (Hawthorn) Pty Ltd v Vernea [2005] VSCA 129 .… 23.25, 23.26 Hodder & Tolley Ltd v Cornes [1923] NZLR 876 .… 8.8 Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70 .… 13.7 Hodgins v Duke Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 74 .… 2.29, 21.13, 22.6 Hodgson v Johnson (1858) EB & E 685; 120 ER 666 .… 16.47 Hodgson & Hodgson v Morella Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1975) 13 SASR 51 .… 10.14 Hoffman, Re; Ex parte Worrall v Schilling (1989) 85 ALR 145 .… 11.50, 21.29 Hogan v Howard Finance Ltd (1987) ASC 55-594 .… 15.28 — v Regional Centres Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 699; 81 WN (NSW) 59 .… 10.56 — v Tumut Shire Council (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 284 .… 24.26 Hohn v Mailler [2003] NSWCA 122 .… 10.35 Hohol v Hohol [1981] VR 221 .… 16.76



Holdcroft v Market Garden Produce Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 381 .… 18.3, 18.22, 18.28, 18.47 Holder v Holder [1968] Ch 353; [1968] 1 All ER 665 .… 11.53 Holidaywise Koala Pty Ltd v Queenslodge Pty Ltd [1977] VR 164 .… 18.22, 18.23, 18.24, 18.43 Holland v Goltrans Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 18 .… 19.16, 21.13 — v London Society of Compositors (1924) 40 TLR 440 .… 7.4 — v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409 .… 21.12, 21.18, 21.23, 21.29, 21.30, 21.38, 23.20 Hollander v Atkinson (1885) 6 LR (NSW) .… 16.61 Holloway v Witham (1990) 21 NSWLR 70 .… 11.118 Holman v Deol [1979] 1 NSWLR 640 .… 11.112 Holman Constructions Ltd v Delta Timber Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 1081 .… 3.67 Holmes v Blogg (1818) 8 Taunt 508; 129 ER 481 .… 17.23 — v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692 .… 11.34, 11.35, 11.83, 11.95, 23.6, 23.8 — v Walton [1961] WAR 96 .… 15.2 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; 11 ER 999 .… 8.28 Holt v Biroka Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 629 .… 11.118, 11.146 — v Bunney [2020] SASCFC 89 .… 3.6 — v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] KB 1; [1942] 1 All ER 404 .… 8.34 Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 WLR 155; [1974] 1 All ER 161 .… 3.61 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2004] 1 AC 715; [2003] 2 All ER 785 .… 7.38 Homeguard Products (NZ) Ltd v Kiwi Packaging Ltd [1981] NZLR 322 .… 4.39 Homestake Australia Ltd v Metana Minerals NL (1991) 11 WAR 435 .… 10.14 Homestake Gold of Australia v Peninsula Gold Pty Ltd (1996) 131 FLR 447 .… 17.4, 17.19, 17.45 Homfray Carpets Australia Pty Ltd and Hycraft Carpets Pty Ltd, Re (1996) 14 ACLC 555 .… 5.26, 10.16 Honeychurch Management Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2005] TASSC 13 .… 10.53, 10.56, 11.115 Honeyman v Nhill Hospital [1994] 1 VR 138 .… 5.26

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank v Lo Lee Shi [1928] AC 181 .… 12.64 Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Larobi Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 593 .… 18.34 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 .… 21.22, 27.1 Honner v Ashton (1979) 1 BPR 9478 .… 21.12, 21.21 — v — [1980] ANZ ConvR 343 .… 21.14, 21.19 Hoogerdyk v Condon (1990) 22 NSWLR 173 .… 23.24 Hooker Town Developments Pty Ltd v Jilba Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 320 .… 12.35, 12.41 Hookway v Racing Victoria Ltd [2005] VSCA 310 .… 4.26, 26.1, 26.5 Hooper v Oates [2014] Ch 287; [2013] EWCA Civ 91 .… 23.26 Hooper and Grass’ Contract, Re [1949] VLR 269 .… 13.7 Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 194 .… 4.18, 6.16, 18.34 Hop and Malt Exchange and Warehouse Co, Re; Ex parte Briggs (1866) LR 1 Eq .… 11.49 Hopcroft & Edwards v Edmunds [2013] SASCFC 38 .… 3.27 Hope v RCA Photophone of Australia Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 348 .… 10.5, 10.7, 10.12 Horace Holman Group Ltd v Sherwood International Group Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 83 .… 23.11 Horlock v Beal [1916] AC 486 .… 19.21 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247 .… 11.85 Horne v Barber (1920) 27 CLR 494 .… 18.29 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 216 .… 11.106, 11.121 Hortico (Aust) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Co (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 545 .… 16.15, 21.35, 24.23 Horton v Horton (No 2) [1961] 1 QB 215; [1960] 3 All ER 649 .… 4.27 — v Jones (1935) 53 CLR 475 .… 5.8, 16.24, 16.47 Horton Geoscience Consultants Pty Ltd v Energy Minerals Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 169 .… 10.12, 10.31

Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] 1 VR 643; [1998] VSCA 51 .… 17.1, 17.18, 17.31, 17.34, 17.38, 17.52 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.5, 10.6, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 10.25, 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56, 10.58, 10.60, 10.61 Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2001] FCA 1040; (2001) 110 FCR 157; ATPR 41-831; Aust Contract Rep 90-133 .… 8.53, 10.28, 10.70, 18.35, 23.2, 24.1, 28.17 Hotcopper Australia Ltd v SAAB [2002] WASCA 190 .… 26.9 Hotmail Corp v Van$ Money Pie Inc 47 USPQ 2d 1020, 1025 (ND Cal 1998) .… 3.26 Houghton v Arms (2006) 225 CLR 553; 231 ALR 534; [2006] HCA 59 .… 11.108, 11.110, 11.111, 11.114, 11.140, 11.142 Houlahan v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 259 .… 12.47 Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 .… 11.59 Hounslow London BC v Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 233 .… 21.10, 26.9 Hourigan v Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 619 .… 25.14 House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown CC (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 .… 10.32 Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 .… 3.47, 3.60 Housing Guarantee Fund Ltd v Dore [2003] VSCA 126 .… 10.75 — v Yusef [1991] 2 VR 17 .… 8.6 Howard v Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 253 CLR 83; 309 ALR 1; [2014] HCA 21 .… 8.7 Howard E Perry & Co v British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 .… 24.17 Howard F Hudson Pty Ltd v Ronayne (1972) 126 CLR 449 .… 18.35, 20.1, 20.8 Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd [1965] 2 QB 574 .… 11.98 — v — [1978] QB 574 .… 11.73 Howard Smith & Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68 .… 3.11, 3.46, 10.16 Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301 .… 23.14, 23.24

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Table of Cases Howes v Miller [1970] VR 522 .… 3.28 — v O’Neill (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 167 .… 24.26 Howie v NSW Lawn Tennis Ground Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 132 .… 7.31, 10.62 Howtrac Rentals Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors (NZ) Ltd [2000] VSC 415 .… 10.16, 10.42, 10.43, 10.54, 26.1 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 810 .… 21.26 Hoyle, Re [1893] 1 Ch 4 .… 16.37 Hoylevans Pty Ltd v Weir [2000] WASC 144 .… 2.21, 7.1, 10.3, 10.6, 18.37, 22.2, 22.5 Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1978) 52 ALJ 372 .… 2.18, 2.30, 10.6 — v Spencer (1989) 2 JCL 181 .… 10.6 — v — (1919) 27 CLR 133 .… 2.30, 3.9, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.30, 11.122, 12.43 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (2013) 306 ALR 53; [2013] NSWCA 479 .… 11.147, 11.149, 11.150, 25.11 — v Hartnett [2016] NSWCA 342 .… 10.30, 10.32 HR Westlake v White (1984) 3 ANZ Ins Cas 60–616 .… 18.41 HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640; 211 ALR 79; [2004] HCA 54 .… 11.83, 11.118, 11.146, 11.147, 23.25, 23.26, 23.39 Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Son Ltd [1895] 2 Ch 273 .… 12.24, 12.28, 12.29, 12.50, 12.52 Hudson v Gray (1927) 39 CLR 473 .… 15.2 — v Jope (1914) 14 SR (NSW) 351 .… 12.29 Hudson Crushed Metals Pty Ltd v Henry [1985] 1 Qd R 202 .… 21.14, 21.18 Hudson Investment Group Ltd v Australian Hardboards Ltd [2005] NSWSC 716 .… 22.9 Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 .… 11.112 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.17 — v Molloy [2005] VSC 240 .… 26.6, 26.8 — v NLS Pty Ltd [1966] WAR 100 (affirmed (1966) 120 CLR 583) .… 21.14 — v Pump House Hotel Co [1902] 2 KB 190; [1900-3] All ER Rep 480 .… 8.23, 8.24 — v Schofield [1975] 1 NSWLR 8 .… 24.8 — v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 .… 3.28



— v St Barbara Mines Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 160 .… 10.55, 11.83 — v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) (1986) 69 ALR 660 .… 18.36, 18.37 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1 .… 3.39, 5.14, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 10.51, 10.52, 10.58, 11.20, 11.21, 11.115, 11.118 Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (1993) 31 NSWLR 91 .… 10.48, 21.33 Hughes, Re (1850) 1 Legge 659 .… 17.62 Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves 273; 33 ER 526; [1803–13] All ER Rep 1 .… 14.5, 14.8 Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 .… 8.27, 24.11 Hume Steel Ltd v The Attorney General for Victoria (1927) 39 CLR 455 .… 10.27 Humphries v The Proprietors ‘Surfers Palms North’ Group Titles Plan 1955 (1993) 179 CLR 597 .… 17.69 — v — (1994) 121 ALR 1 .… 18.41 Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125 .… 11.54, 11.85, 23.2, 23.5, 23.9, 23.17, 23.25, 23.39 Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd v Burger King Corporation [1999] NSWSC 1029 .… 23.2 Hunnerup v Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Co (Australia) Ltd (1974) 7 SASR 215 .… 23.37 Hunt v Bate (1568) 3 Dyer 272a; 73 ER 605 .… 4.20, 27.11 Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 296 ALR 3; [2013] HCA 10 .… 11.131, 11.136 Hunter v Hunter [1936] AC 222 .… 3.67 Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507 .… 11.114 Hunter Valley Skydiving Centre Pty Ltd v Central Coast Aero Club Ltd [2008] NSWSC 539 .… 10.44 Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2018] WASCA 90 .… 4.22 Hunyor v Tilelli (1997) 8 BPR 14,269; (1997) 8 BPR 15,629 .… 20.16 Huppert v Stock Options of Australia Pty Ltd (1965) 112 CLR 414 .… 23.1, 23.21, 23.42

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 1497; [1999] FCA 1728 .… 10.62, 15.4, 15.13 — v — (2000) ATPR 41-741 .… 15.1, 15.16 Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 294 .… 18.9, 18.11, 18.12, 18.41, 18.46, 18.49 Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson [2007] 1 WLR 2351 .… 11.39 Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 .… 3.6 Hussain v Haynoum Developments Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 420 .… 10.55 — v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2006] FCA 1263 .… 18.49 Hussey v Bauer [2011] QCA 91 .… 5.8 — v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.73 Hutchence v South Sea Bubble Co Pty Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 330 .… 11.150 Hutchens v Deauville Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367; [1986] HCA 85 .… 8.6 — v — (2011) 27 JCL 65 .… 8.6 Hutchinson v Equititour Pty Ltd (2011) 2 Qd R 99; [2010] QCA 104 .… 11.147, 25.5 — v Payne [1975] VR 175; [1975] VR 242 .… 20.8, 20.13, 24.16 — v Scott (1905) 3 CLR 359 .… 18.4, 18.21, 18.23 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s LR 620 .… 13.6, 13.9, 13.10 HW Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Allen Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 .… 11.122 HWG Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairlie Court Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 519 .… 12.21, 12.25, 12.30 Hyatt Australia Ltd v LTCB Australia Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 260 .… 7.18 Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334; 49 ER 132 .… 3.29 Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 313 .… 10.27, 23.13, 23.25, 23.27 — v McGrath Sales Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 223 .… 11.41, 11.121, 11.129 Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous [2005] SASC 176 .… 6.8, 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Hyleing v Hastings (1699) 1 LdRaym 389; 91 ER 1157 .… 4.21

Hylton v Hylton (1754) 2 Ves Sen 547; 28 ER 349 .… 14.6 Hyundai Heavy Industries v Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129 .… 26.12 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Dartbrook Coal (Sales) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1324 .… 19.2 HZD Pty Ltd v McInnes [2007] QSC 213 .… 3.22 I I & L Securities Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2000) 179 ALR 89; [2000] QCA 383 .… 11.147 — v — (2002) 210 CLR 109; 192 ALR 1; [2002] HCA 41 .… 11.39, 11.99, 11.122, 11.123, 11.124, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.147 I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002) .… 3.7, 3.26 IAC (Leasing) Ltd v Humphrey (1972) 126 CLR 131 .… 23.45 Iannello v Sharpe [2007] NSWCA 61 .… 23.45 Iannotti v Corsaro (1984) 36 SASR 127 .… 18.20, 18.22, 18.28 Ibberson v Neck (1886) 2 TLR 427 .… 4.39 IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 466 .… 11.60 — v Queensland [2015] QSC 342 .… 10.2, 10.62 IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335 .… 6.8 IceTV v Ross [2007] NSWSC 635 .… 18.37 ICT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 .… 18.37, 18.38 Icta Investments Pty Ltd Trading as Jolly Roger v GE Commercial Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 290 .… 3.45 Idameneo (No 9) Pty Ltd v Bandevski (1989) NSW ConvR 55-460 .… 15.28, 15.31 Idameneo (No 123) v Robalino [2009] NSWSC 969 .… 21.22 Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Angel-Honnibal [2002] NSWSC 1214 .… 26.4 Idameneo Pty Ltd v Ticco Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 329 .… 18.37, 21.26, 21.27 Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2005] WASC 51 .… 10.35 — v — [2006] WASCA 215 .… 26.1, 26.4 lxxx

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Table of Cases IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd v Classified Transport Pty Ltd (2011) 111 SASR 155; [2011] SASCFC 123 .… 11.118, 11.122, 11.147 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 .… 10.41 Iezzi Constructions Pty Ltd v Watkins Pacific (Qld) Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 350 .… 26.7 IF Asia Pacific v Galbally (2003) 59 IPR 43 .… 18.37 IGA Distribution Pty Ltd v King & Taylor Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 440 .… 23.6 Igloo Homes Pty Ltd v Sammut Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 280 .… 12.53 IIR Pty Ltd v Buchman (1989) ATPR 40-955 .… 18.37 Ikin v Cox Bros (Aust) Ltd (1930) 25 Tas LR 1 .… 6.5 — v The Danish Club ‘Dannebrog’ Inc [2001] VSCA 123 .… 10.60 Illawong Village Pty Ltd v State Bank of NSW Ltd [2005] NSWCA 382 .… 22.5 Imac Security Services Pty Ltd v Tyco Australia Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 592 .… 24.21, 24.24 Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1992) 182 CLR 26 .… 20.15 — v — (1993) 182 CLR 26 .… 11.45, 11.47, 21.9, 21.29, 21.30 Imperial Brothers Pty Ltd v Ronim Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 172 .… 21.19 — v — [1999] 2 Qd R 172 .… 21.19 Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case, Re (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 .… 3.60 Imperial Loan Co v Stone [1892] 1 QB 599 .… 17.53 Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 .… 14.5, 14.11 Independent Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Noble Lowndes Superannuation Consultants Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 525 .… 10.55, 26.8 Indico Holdings Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 41 NSWLR 281 .… 11.73 Indus Realty Pty Ltd v Phillipson [2002] VSC 129 .… 10.16 Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v IngersollRand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.27, 18.37, 18.38 Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 495; [2011] FCA 183 .… 10.24, 18.37



— v — (2012) 207 FCR 298; [2012] FCAFC 165 .… 18.37 — v — (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 7 .… 10.24, 18.37 ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Leagrove Pty Ltd; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Stafford [2011] QCA 131 .… 3.14 Ingham v ACN 000 333 844 Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWCA 63 .… 10.33 Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Hannigan [2020] NSWCA 82 .… 10.30 Ingot Capital Investments v Macquarie Capital Markets (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; 252 ALR 659; [2008] NSWCA 206 .… 11.121, 11.127 — v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets (No 6) [2007] NSWSC 124 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.49 Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31; [1960] 3 All ER 332 .… 12.60, 12.63 Inlon Pty Ltd v Celli SpA [2017] NSWSC 569 .… 24.20 Inman v Stamp (1815) 1 Stark 12; 171 ER 386 .… 16.22 Inn Leisure Industries Pty Ltd v DF McCloy Pty Ltd (1991) 28 FCR 151 .… 11.116 — v — (No 1) (1991) 28 FCR 151 .… 11.116 Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 .… 2.4, 2.29, 4.32, 22.6 Insight Oceania Pty Ltd v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 710 .… 10.43 Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd [2013] FCAFC 62 .… 8.7 Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young [2010] NSWCA 137; (2010–11) 78 NSWLR 641 .… 23.19 — v — (2011) 243 CLR 149; [2011] HCA 16 .… 10.73, 23.19 Instyle Contract Textiles Pty Ltd v Good Environmental Choice Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 38 .… 24.20, 24.21 Insurance Commission of Western Australia v Container Handlers Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 89; [2004] HCA 24 .… 10.73 — v Woodings [2017] WASC 122 .… 10.41 Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 406 .… 23.45 Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

(1988) 5 BPR 11,110 .… 3.4, 3.6, 21.14, 22.3, 22.5 Intercontinental Packers Pty Ltd v Harvey [1969] Qd R 159 .… 13.9 Interlink Australia Pty Ltd v Lowe [2015] QCA 211 .… 5.19, 10.56 International Advisor Systems Pty Ltd v XYYX Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 2 .… 12.52, 12.53, 12.54, 12.55, 24.4, 24.7, 24.12 International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151 .… 10.12 International Alpaca Management Pty Ltd v Ensor (1995) 133 ALR 561 .… 10.13 International College Pty Ltd v ACCC (2018) 266 FCR 631; [2018] FCAFC 155 .… 15.16 International Drilling Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd [1986] Ch 513 .… 8.8 International Finance Ltd v Sly (1987) ANZ ConvR 328 .… 15.31 International Harvester Co v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644 .… 10.27 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 .… 8.6, 8.17, 8.23, 8.34, 21.14 International Palace Pty Ltd v Novaheat Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 75 .… 20.13 International Petroleum Investment Company v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea [2015] NSWCA 363 .… 6.5 International Terminal Operators Ltd v Miida Electronics Inc (1986) 28 DLR (4th) 641 .… 7.38 Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Homes Loans Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 310 .… 23.45 Interstate Express Parcel Co Pty Ltd v TimeLife International (Nederlands) BV (1977) 138 CLR 534 .… 10.61 Interstate Investment Co Ltd v Mobbs (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 572 .… 8.23, 8.24 Intertransport International Private Ltd v Donaldson [2005] VSCA 303 .… 26.1, 26.4 Investec Bank v Naude [2014] NSWSC 165 .… 15.13 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896; [1997] UKHL 28 .… 3.46, 10.12, 10.31, 10.35 Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 .… 16.69

IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech (1998) 156 ALR 470 .… 11.150 IOOF Building Society Pty Ltd v Foxeden Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 138 .… 23.14 IP Homes Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v Swan (2011) 110 SASR 157 .… 21.23 Ipex ITG Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 480 .… 3.39 Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 .… 4.17, 4.22, 6.5, 6.6, 6.8 Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd v APS Satellite Pty Ltd (2018) 356 ALR 440; [2018] NSWCA 15 .… 15.16 IPT Systems Ltd v Quadrant Management Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 216 .… 20.9 Iraf Pty Ltd v Graham [1982] 1 NSWR 419 .… 18.38 Ireland v Leigh [1982] Qd R 145 .… 21.26 — v WG Riverview Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 307 .… 11.150 Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186 .… 3.9 Isaac v Dargan Financial Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 343; [2018] NSWCA 163 .… 18.35, 18.37 Isabella Shipowner SA v Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (The Aquafaith) [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 461 .… 21.10 Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211 .… 16.35 Isotomic Pty Ltd v Adelaide International Raceway Pty Ltd [2007] SASC 111 .… 10.16, 21.24 ispONE Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2013] FCA 823 .… 15.16 Israel v Foreshore Properties Pty Ltd (1980) 54 ALJR 421 .… 10.56 Issa v Berisha [1981] 1 NSWLR 261 .… 12.30, 12.36, 12.41 Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427 .… 11.122 Ivanof v Phillip M Levy Pty Ltd [1971] VR 167 .… 11.45, 11.47, 11.48, 11.55, 11.79, 11.83, 11.84, 11.85 IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205 .… 3.65 J J & C Reid Pty Ltd v Abau Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-416 .… 21.21, 28.31 J & H West Nominees Pty Ltd v Twenty Four Outdoor Australia Pty Ltd [2021] VSCA 337 .… 6.2

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Table of Cases J&S Chan Pty Ltd v McKenzie [1994] ANZ ConvR 610 .… 21.10 J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 539 .… 13.4, 26.3 J B & B L Nominees Pty Ltd v McCormack [1982] WAR 258 .… 16.86 J B Rogers Ltd v Harry Lesnie Ltd (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 427 .… 6.8, 16.35, 16.86 J Boag & Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 118 .… 20.15, 21.28, 21.29, 21.31 — v — [2001] TASSC 29 .… 20.1 J C Reid Pty Ltd v Abau Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-416 .… 21.11 J C Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 10.41, 16.22, 16.58, 16.59, 16.63, 16.66 J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1078 .… 10.28 J Kitchen & Sons Pty Ltd v Stewart’s Cash and Carry Stores (1942) 66 CLR 116 .… 22.12 J P Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 3 .… 10.33 J S Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 .… 16.81 J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 2 All ER 121; 1 WLR 461 .… 10.72 J, Re [1909] 1 Ch 574; [1908–10] All ER Rep 1311 .… 17.8 Jabbcorp (NSW) Pty Ltd v Strathfield Golf Club [2020] NSWSC 1317 .… 10.12 Jackson v Crosby (1979) 21 SASR 280 .… 16.70 — v — (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; 21 SASR 281 .… 16.70 — v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438 .… 18.12, 18.44 — v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468; [1975] 3 All ER 92 .… 7.7 Jackson McDonald Services Pty Ltd v Woh Hup (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 77 .… 7.7 Jackson Nominees Pty Ltd v Hanson Building Product Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 126 .… 10.39, 10.41, 10.42, 10.56 Jacobs v Bills [1967] NZLR 249 .… 24.7, 24.8 Jacoby v Whitmore (1883) 49 LT 335; 32 WR 18 .… 8.6 JAD International Pty Ltd v International Trucks Australia Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 378 .… 11.45, 11.50, 11.51, 11.53, 11.54, 11.55, 11.64, 11.146, 11.147



Jaddcal Pty Ltd v Minson (No 3) [2011] WASC 362 .… 7.16 Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219; [2004] TASSC 126 .… 5.18 Jaeger v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2018] NSWCA 116 .… 8.9, 8.23, 8.31 Jafari v 23 Developments Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 201 .… 22.3, 22.9 Jakeman v Cook (1878–9) 4 Ex D 26 .… 4.23 James v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 ALR 347 .… 11.118, 11.147, 11.151, 14.6 — v Heim Gallery (London) Ltd [1980] Est Gaz Dig 184 .… 2.5 — v Thomas H Kent & Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 551 .… 16.54 James Adam Pty Ltd v Fobeza Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 311 .… 10.35, 12.30 James Jones & Sons Ltd v Earl of Tankerville [1909] 2 Ch 440; [1908–10] All LR Rep 1231 .… 24.17, 24.18 James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583 .… 10.16 James Talcott Ltd v John Lewis & Co Ltd and North American Dress Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 592 .… 8.19 Jamieson v Renwick (1891) 17 VLR 124 .… 4.18, 4.30 Jams 2 Pty Ltd v Stubbings [2020] VSCA 200 .… 15.9, 15.31 — v — (No 4) [2019] VSC 4; [2019] VSC 482 .… 15.11 Jandon Constructions v Lyons [1999] WASCA 310 .… 23.27 Janos v Chama Motors Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 238 .… 21.23, 23.25 Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 526; 109 ALR 638 .… 11.124, 11.127 Jaques v Lloyd D George & Partners Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 625; [1968] 2 All ER 187 .… 11.46 Jardin v Metcash Ltd (2011) 285 ALR 677; [2011] NSWCA 409 .… 18.37 Jarrett v Hunter (1886) 34 .… 16.35 Jarvis v Pitt Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 506 .… 3.37, 3.38, 5.23 Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd v Trina Solar Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1453 .… 11.60 JB (Northbridge) Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] NSWCA 249 .… 3.69, 8.8 JBS Southern Australia Pty Ltd v Westcity Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 476 .… 10.30, 10.31, 10.32

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 .… 18.49 JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .… 24.1, 24.2, 24.11, 24.12, 24.13, 24.24, 24.26, 24.30 Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 .… 2.4, 2.10, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 4.39, 22.6 Jebeli v Modir and Golyaei [2005] NSWCA 184 .… 11.85 Jeffrey v Anderson [1914] QSR 66 .… 16.22 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75 .… 8.7 Jekos Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Horticultural Finance Pty Ltd (1994) 2 Qd R 515 .… 11.147 Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 709; 74 ALJ 287 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Rundall (1799) 8 Term Rep 335; 101 ER 1419 .… 17.39, 17.40 — v Zihali-Kiss (1972) 2 SASR 493 .… 11.19 Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld) (1953) 90 CLR 113 .… 14.5, 14.6, 15.9 Jeppesons Road Pty Ltd v Di Domenico [2005] QCA 39 .… 21.17, 21.19, 21.26, 21.35 Jervis v Howle & Talke Colliery Co Ltd [1937] 1 Ch 87 .… 12.39, 12.40 Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1 .… 13.5 Jessica Holdings Pty Ltd v Anglican Property Diocese of Sydney (1992) 27 NSWLR 140 .… 20.12 Jessop v McInteer [2003] QCA 170 .… 10.5 Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Petres Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 722 .… 11.106 Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd [2011] EWHC 1529 .… 6.8 Jewelsnloo Pty Ltd v Sengos [2016] NSWCA 309 .… 11.150 Jezer Construction Group Pty Ltd v Lilischkies [2005] 1 Qd R 125; [2004] QSC 270 .… 6.11 Jillinda Pty Ltd v McCourt [1983] NSW ConvR 55-145 .… 21.19 Jingalong Pty Ltd v Todd [2015] NSWCA 7 .… 4.24, 22.11 Jireh International Pty Ltd t/as Gloria Jeans Coffee v Western Exports Services Inc

[2011] NSWCA 137 .… 10.30, 10.35, 11.122 JJ Savage & Sons Pty Ltd v Blakney (1970) 119 CLR 435 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.23, 10.25, 11.2 JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Companies Ltd (No 2) [2020] WASCA 112 .… 10.30 JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v Matos [2016] QCA 355 .… 3.46 JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou [1994] 1 VR 237 .… 11.146, 23.24 JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 .… 11.122 Jobbins v Capel Court Corp Ltd (1989) 91 ALR 314 .… 11.147 Jobern Pty Ltd v BreakFree Resorts (Victoria) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1066 .… 6.15, 10.43, 10.44, 10.47, 10.48 Jobst v Becke [2001] NSWSC 277 .… 10.42 Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 KB 863 .… 11.25 John v Coles [1931] SASR 254 .… 26.1 John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd .… 16.72 John Burrows Ltd v Subsurface Surveys Ltd (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 354 .… 2.5 John Cooke and Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1922) 31 CLR 394 .… 5.28 John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (NSWCA, 18 December 1996, unreported) .… 10.26, 10.53, 10.62, 10.64, 10.53, 10.62, 10.64, 10.69, 10.73, 10.74 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1977] 2 NSWLR 400 .… 5.29, 24.14 John Fairfax Ltd v Postal Commission (1977) 30 FLR 444 .… 5.29 John G Glass Real Estate Pty Ltd v Karawi Constructions Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR (Dig) 41-249 .… 11.121 John Holland Pty Ltd v Miami Gold (WA) Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 141 .… 26.2 John McGrath Motors (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Applebee (1964) 110 CLR 656; 37 ALJR 363 .… 11.10, 11.76 John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc (2004) 88 SASR 334; [2004] SASC 128 .… 3.67, 8.8, 10.32, 18.35 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; 172 ALR 625; [2000] HCA .… 11.150

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Table of Cases John S Chappel Pty Ltd v DK Pett Pty Ltd (1971) 1 SASR 188 .… 18.9 Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 .… 7.52 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 .… 23.25, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32 — v American Home Assurance Company (1998) 192 CLR 266 .… 10.31, 10.33, 10.73 — v Bones [1970] 1 NSWR 28 .… 3.68 — v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 184 .… 10.16 — v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 .… 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.11, 14.12 — v Mackinnon [2021] NSWCA 152 .… 11.17, 11.18, 11.76, 11.110, 11.115, 11.138 — v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 .… 23.5, 23.6, 23.25 — v Smith [2010] NSWCA 306 .… 15.1, 15.8 Johnson Matthey and Co Ltd v Constantine Terminals Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 215 .… 7.42 Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 .… 2.18, 2.19, 10.3, 10.7, 10.56 Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 477 .… 11.115 — v — (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572 .… 11.115, 11.151 — v — (No 2) (2000) 97 FCR 175 .… 7.41 Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra (1948) 72 CLR 544 .… 17.71 Johnston v Arnaboldi [1990] 2 Qd R 138 .… 12.53 — v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73 .… 3.24 — v Brightstars Holding Company Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 .… 6.6 — v Filaria Pty Ltd [2005] ACTCA 16 .… 11.98 Johnstone v Commerce Consolidated Pty Ltd [1976] VR 463; [1976] VR 724 (FC) .… 12.33, 12.35, 12.53 — v Knight [2006] QCA 322 .… 10.13 Jones v Acfold Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 512 .… 11.122 — v Aircrafts Pty Ltd [1949] St R Qd 196 .… 10.26, 10.69 — v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 176 ALR 137; [2000] HCA 56 .… 7.16, 7.17, 7.25, 10.53, 23.18 — v Bouffier (1911) 12 CLR 579 .… 18.33 — v Bright (1829) 5 Bing 533; 130 ER 1167 .… 27.26 — v Clifford (1876) 3 Ch D 779 .… 12.23



— v Dumbrell [1981] VR 199 .… 11.20, 11.21, 11.38 — v Edwards (1994) 3 Tas R 350 .… 23.41 — v Jones [1977] 2 All ER 231 .… 16.70 — v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 .… 13.5 — v Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd (1995) 142 ALR 561 .… 11.145 — v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328; [1969] 2 All ER 616 .… 4.34, 5.1, 5.7 — v Pease (1909) 10 SR (NSW) 64 .… 24.30 — v Persal & Co [2000] QCA 386 .… 10.53, 10.56 — v Peters [1948] VLR 331 .… 16.65 — v Schiffman (1971) 124 CLR 303 .… 23.24 — v Vernon’s Pools Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 626 .… 5.14 — v Waite (1839) 5 Bing NC 341; 132 ER 1136 .… 4.34 Jong v Advanced Dental Services Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 318 .… 3.70 Jonstan Pty Ltd v Nicholson (2003) 58 NSWLR 223; 184 FLR 247; [2003] NSWSC 500 .… 11.145 Jonval Builders Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2020] NSWCA 233 .… 11.125, 11.146, 11.147, 15.16 Jordan v Walker (1885) 11 VLR 346 .… 10.9 Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868 .… 2.3 Joscelin v Shelton (1557) 3 Leon 4, Benloe 57, and Moo KB 51; 74 ER 503 .… 27.10 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 .… 12.33, 12.35 Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942] AC 154 .… 19.13, 19.23 — v — [1948] AC 154 .… 19.23 Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan (2012) 38 VR 241; [2012] VSCA 113 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.52 Jovista Pty Ltd v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 130 NTR 1 .… 16.29 JPA Finance Pty Ltd v Gordon Nominees Pty Ltd (2019) 58 VR 393 .… 21.36 JQAT Pty Ltd v Storm [1987] 2 Qd R 162 .… 6.8, 18.38 JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 329 ALR 625; [2016] FCAFC 20 .… 10.16, 10.32, 22.9 JR Stevens Holdings Pty Ltd v Von Begensey (1992) NSW ConvR 55-623 .… 8.47

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

JS McMillan Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 419 .… 11.109, 11.111, 11.124, 11.125, 11.147 JS Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 .… 3.29 Julong Pty Ltd v Fenn [2002] QCA 479; [2002] QCA 529 .… 10.56, 26.9 Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162; [2016] VSCA 334 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Justelle Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin (No 3) [2009] WASC 264 .… 21.26 JV Property Syndicate Pty Ltd v Croakybill Ltd [2005] QCA 479 .… 3.28, 8.8 JWH Group Pty Ltd v Kimpura Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 39 .… 7.3 K K & K Real Estate Pty Ltd v Adellos Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 302 .… 21.26 K & S Freighters Pty Ltd v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1325 .… 10.43, 21.34, 22.12 KA & C Smith Pty Ltd v Ward (1998) 45 NSWLR 702 .… 18.37, 18.38 Kabbara v Australian National Sports Club Incorporated [2020] NSWSC 497 .… 10.40, 10.50 Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-950 .… 6.7, 11.115, 11.124 Kadner v Brune Holdings Pty Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 498 .… 11.50 Kai Ling (Australia) Pty Ltd v Rosengreen [2019] NSWCA 3 .… 8.47 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2009] VSC 559 .… 15.8 — v — [2012] VSCA 95 .… 15.8 — v — (2013) 250 CLR 392; 298 ALR 35; [2013] HCA 25 .… 14.1, 15.8, 15.9, 15.16, 17.53 Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737; [2002] NSWCA 383 .… 11.127 Kalnenas v Kovacevich [1961] WAR 188 .… 16.40, 16.61 Kamil Export (Aust) Pty Ltd v NPL (Australia) Pty Ltd [1996] 1 VR 538 .… 10.75, 10.77 Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Instruments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 .… 2.5 Kane Constructions v Sopov [2005] VSC 237 .… 21.12 Kapamadjian v Assandra Developments Pty Ltd (1994) 6 BPR 13,373 .… 21.29

Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 313 .… 15.27, 21.11, 21.17, 21.23, 23.23, 23.41, 23.43 — v — (2001) 15 APLB 81 .… 23.23 Karaggianis v Malltown Pty Ltd (1979) 21 SASR 381 .… 24.21 Karaguleski v Vasil Bros & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 267 .… 3.68, 7.28 Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709 .… 4.28, 10.2 Karasaridis v Kastoria Fur Products (1984) 37 SASR 345 .… 25.12 Karedis Enterprises Pty Ltd v Antoniou (1995) 59 FCR 35; 137 ALR 544 .… 11.147 Kargotich v Mustica [1973] WAR 167 .… 23.26, 23.42 Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 .… 3.26, 3.52 Katz v Jones [1967] NZLR 861 .… 24.4 Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591 .… 13.3, 13.4 — v McGillicuddy (1914) 19 CLR 1 .… 21.38 — v Michael (1892) 18 VLR 375 .… 16.62 Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79 .… 3.9, 11.146 — v Tasmania [2000] TASSC 45 .… 21.12 Kavia Holdings Pty Ltd v Suntrack Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 716 .… 3.49, 16.35 Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd v Laing O’Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd (2017) 96 NSWLR 329; [2017] NSWCA 291 .… 24.23 Kay v Playup Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 33 .… 21.36 Kay Group Holdings Pty Ltd v K & K Plastics Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 500 .… 11.150 Kay’s Leasing Corp Pty Ltd v Fletcher [1964–65] NSWR 25 .… 18.31 Kay’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1939] Ch 329; [1939] 1 All ER 245 .… 7.32 Kayserian Nominees (No 1) Pty Ltd v J R Garner Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 803 .… 20.13, 20.18, 21.35 Kayteal Pty Ltd v Dignan [2011] NSWSC 197 .… 11.140 Kaze Constructions Pty Ltd v Housing Indemnity Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 12 ATPR 41-017 .… 11.104, 11.146 KD Morris & Sons Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (1980) 54 ALJR 424 .… 22.2

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Table of Cases Kearney v Crepaldi [2006] NSWC 23 .… 18.37 Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107 .… 10.30 Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 100 .… 10.13, 21.12 Keen Mar Corp Pty Ltd v Labrador Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1988) ATPR 40853 .… 11.147 — v — (1989) 11 ATPR .… 11.150 Keith S Hall (Distributors) Pty Ltd v Smith [1955] QWN 6 .… 9.5, 21.24 Keith Woods v Rodney Mario de Gabriele [2007] VSC 177 .… 11.134 Kekewich v Manning (1851) 1 De G M & G 176; 42 ER 519 .… 8.20 Kell v Harris (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 473 .… 6.6, 17.18, 17.34 Kell & Rigby Pty Ltd v Flurrie Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 906 .… 16.67 Kellas-Sharpe v Psal Ltd [2013] 2 Qd R 233; [2013] QCA 371 .… 23.45 Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 55 .… 11.110 Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd v Australian Aerospace Ltd [2007] VSC 200 .… 22.12, 24.19, 24.22 Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1 .… 2.5 Kelly v Alford [1988] 1 Qd R 404 .… 10.48, 10.53 — v Bega Valley CC (NSWCA, 13 September 1982, unreported) .… 17.46 — v C A Bell Commodities Corp Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 248 .… 10.43 — v Caledonian Coal Co (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 1 .… 3.38 — v Desnoe [1985] 2 Qd R 477 .… 21.26 — v Mina [2014] NSWCA 9 .… 4.12, 5.14, 5.19 Kelrit Investments Pty Ltd v Transform Composites Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 662 .… 16.21 Kemp v Baerselman [1906] 2 KB 604 .… 8.6 Kendall v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 341 .… 5.29 Kendell v Carnegie (2006) 68 NSWLR 193; [2006] NSWCA 302 .… 12.52 Kendells (NSW) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sweeney [2005] QSC 064 .… 10.41, 10.43 Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677; 143 ER 268 .… 4.22 — v Hill [1999] SASC 440 .… 21.23



— v Lee (1817) 3 Mer 441; 36 ER 170; [1814–23] All ER Rep 181 .… 28.6 — v Panama etc Royal Mail Co (1867) LR 2 QB 580; [1861–73] All ER Rep 2094 .… 11.44, 11.63 — v Thomassen [1929] 1 Ch 426; [1928] All ER Rep 525 .… 3.46 — v Vercoe (1960) 105 CLR 521; (1960) 34 ALJR 310 .… 18.28, 20.3, 20.9, 20.16, 21.12, 24.15 Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd, Re [1973] VR 161 .… 8.7 Kenny v Brierty [1982] VR 339 .… 10.6 — v Fenton [1971] NZLR 1 .… 11.52, 11.56 — v Sholl (1905) 7 WALR 197 .… 12.35 Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (No 2) Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 163 ALR 611; [1999] HCA 25 .… 7.41, 11.82, 11.83, 11.88, 11.118, 11.128, 11.146, 23.35, 23.36, 23.38, 23.39 Kent v Brown (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 124 .… 12.36 Kern Consulting Group Pty Ltd v Opus Capital Ltd (2014) 2 Qd R 379; [2014] QCA 111 .… 7.2, 7.35 Kerr v West Australian Trustee Executor & Agency Co Ltd (1937) 39 WALR 34 .… 14.7, 14.14 Kerridge v Simmonds (1906) 4 CLR 19; (1906) 4 CLR 253 .… 13.5, 18.20, 18.32 Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144 .… 11.145 Ketchell v Master Education Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 161 .… 18.7 Kewley v Ball [1913] VLR 412 .… 16.52 Kham & Nates Shoes No 2 Inc v First Bank of Whiting (1990) 908 F 2d 1351 .… 10.45 Khan v Khan (2004) 62 NSWLR 229; [2004] NSWSC 1189 .… 14.8, 14.15 Khatijabai v Zenab [1960] AC 316 .… 24.4 Khattar v Hills Shoppingtown Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 363 .… 10.30 Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd [2010] VSCA 355 .… 11.141 Kheng v Secola [2001] WASCA 3 .… 20.2, 20.8 Khoury v GIO of NSW (1984) 165 CLR 622; 54 ALR 639; 58 ALJR 502 .… 11.50 — v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1984) 54 ALR 639 .… 10.55, 10.58, 21.29

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Khouri (2006) 66 NSWLR 241; [2006] NSWCA 184 .… 16.21, 16.60, 16.63, 16.65 — v Sidhu (No 2) [2010] FCA 1320 .… 11.129 Kilkerrin Investments Pty Ltd v Yiu Ying Mei Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 88 .… 10.12, 10.13 Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [2019] WASCA 156 .… 8.5 Kinch v Walcott [1929] AC 482 .… 12.52 King v Adams [2016] NSWSC 1798 .… 10.55 — v Cornell (1932) 50 WN (NSW) 50 .… 16.22 — v Coupland [1981] Qd R 21 .… 25.7 — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 184 ALR 98; [2001] FCA 308 .… 11.110 — v Grimwood (1891) 17 VLR 253 .… 16.58, 16.65 — v Ivanhoe Gold Corp Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 617 .… 6.5 — v Poggioli (1923) 32 CLR 222 .… 21.26, 24.10, 24.30 — v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1896] AC 250 .… 8.31 — v Yurisich [2005] FCA 1277 .… 11.112 King Mortgages Pty Ltd v Satchithanantham [2006] NSWSC 1303 .… 14.19, 15.28, 15.31 King, Re; Ex parte Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association (1858) 3 De G & J 63; 44 ER 1192 .… 17.42 Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell [1986] 1 WLR 119; [1986] 1 All ER 423 .… 14.17, 14.20 King’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett & Co Ltd (1897) 14 TLR 98 .… 12.59 Kingstream Steel Ltd v Stemcor UK Ltd [2001] WASCA 138 .… 22.2, 22.5 Kingswood Estate Co Ltd v Anderson [1963] 2 QB 169 .… 16.58 Kinivan v Maoudis (1988) ANZ ConvR 320 .… 6.11 Kintella Pty Ltd v Scotte [1999] ACTSC 100 .… 23.14, 23.15, 23.41, 23.42 Kintominas v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475 .… 2.26, 16.69 Kirkby v Turner [2009] NSWCA 131 .… 6.15 Kirkham v Marter (1819) 2 B & Ald 613; 106 ER 490 .… 16.10 Kirwin v Pearson (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 162 .… 10.9

Kitching v Phillips (2011) 278 ALR 551; [2011] WASCA 19 .… 10.18 Kiwi Brands Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 160 ALR 1 .… 4.32 Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281; 131 ALR 363; [1995] HCA 4 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147, 23.8 KKL Investments Pty Ltd v Daikyo (North Queensland) Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 25 .… 21.14, 21.23 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corp Bhd [1988] 1 All ER 714; [1989] 1 All ER 785 .… 5.17 Klocek v Gateway, Inc (2000) 104 F Supp 2d 1332 .… 3.7 Klown Production Pty Ltd and Australian Trade Commission, Re (1992) 26 ALD 763 .… 3.37 Knezevic v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2013] NSWCA 199 .… 15.28 Knight v Mayart Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 36 .… 10.33 Knogo Corp v Halligan (1984) ATPR 40460 .… 18.38 Knowles v Fuller (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 243 .… 18.3 Knox v Gye (1872) LR 5 HL 656 .… 25.13 Koala Pty Ltd v Queenslodge Pty Ltd [1977] VR 164 .… 18.21 Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 845; [2005] HCA 15 .… 10.55, 10.60 Koellner v Breese (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 457 .… 16.54 Koenigsblatt v Sweet [1923] 2 .… 16.40 Koh v Pateman [2005] WASC 172 .… 22.5, 22.10 Koikas v Green Park Construction Pty Ltd [1970] VR 142 .… 20.8, 20.13 Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 (PC) .… 2.2, 16.67 Kolavo v Pitsikas [2003] NSWCA 59 .… 10.53, 10.56 Kollman v Watts [1963] VLR 396 .… 23.39 Kompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115; [2007] HCA 61 .… 27.1 Kone Elevators Pty Ltd v Canberra Southern Cross Club Ltd [1998] ACTSC 113 .… 10.2, 10.13, 22.12 — v McNay (No 1) (1997) ATPR 41-563 .… 18.38 Konstas v Southern Cross Pumps and Irrigation Pty Ltd (1996) 217 ALR 310 .… 8.53

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Table of Cases Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 5 .… 10.35 Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115; [2007] HCA 61 .… 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 21.22 Koops Martin Financial Services Pty Ltd v Reeves [2006] NSWSC 449 .… 18.37, 18.38 Korda v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 62; 317 ALR 225; [2015] HCA 6 .… 7.45, 7.46 Kostopoulos v GE Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 311 .… 2.5, 20.18, 21.31, 21.32, 21.35, 21.36 Kosciuszko Thredbo Pty Ltd v ThredboNet Marketing Pty Ltd (2014) 223 FCR 517; 311 ALR 656; [2014] FCAFC 87 .… 18.35 Kotulski v Attard [1981] 1 NSWLR 115 .… 25.7 Koutsonicolis v Principe (1987) 48 SASR 328 .… 23.43 Koutsopoulos v Pintusen (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 122 .… 21.29 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd (2008) 77 NSWLR 205; 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343 .… 11.112, 11.115, 15.28, 15.31 Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2018] SASCFC 44 .… 7.46, 7.47 — v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370; [2007] FCA 1069 .… 11.111 Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119 .… 23.19 Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563; 130 ALR 1; [1995] HCA 68 .… 11.10, 11.19, 11.32, 11.40, 11.45, 11.64, 11.76, 15.16 Kramer v Duggan (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 385; 72 WN (NSW) 255 .… 11.55, 11.64 — v McMahon [1970] 1 NSWR 194 .… 10.21, 11.45, 11.53, 11.69 Kranz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2003) 8 VR 310; [2003] VSCA 92 .… 14.18, 14.20, 15.18 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 .… 12.1, 19.19 Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 .… 3.6, 3.11, 3.27 Krishell Pty Ltd v Nilant [2006] WASCA 223 .… 8.7 Kronenberg v Bridge (No 2) [2015] TASFC 9 .… 11.85



Kudeweh v T & J Kelleher Builders Pty Ltd [1990] VR 701 .… 3.61 Kudos Catering (UK) Ltd v Manchester Central Convention Complex Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 38 .… 10.73 Kullack v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-861 .… 11.112 Kumar Motors (Bankstown) Pty Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2016] NSWSC 1874 .… 20.20, 21.38 Kuper & Kuper v Keywest Constructions Pty Ltd [1990] 3 WAR 419 .… 10.41 Ku-ring-gai Council v Chan [2017] NSWCA 226 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.42 Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society, Re (No 12) Ltd (1978) 36 FLR 134 .… 11.111 Kurnell Developments Pty Ltd v Orica Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 163 .… 10.47 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 3 All ER 209 .… 11.127 Kuzmanovski v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (2010) 270 ALR 65; [2010] FCA 876 .… 7.38, 8.16 Kweifio-Okai v RMIT University [1999] FCA 1686 .… 21.18 KWS Capital Pty Ltd v Love [2015] WASCA 237 .… 10.16 Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 63 .… 15.8 Kylsilver Pty Ltd v One Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWC 226 .… 26.4 Kymbo Pty Ltd v Paxton Management Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 792 .… 6.6, 6.8, 6.11, 24.7 Kyrwood v Drinkwater [2000] NSWCA 126 .… 10.32, 10.35, 10.41, 19.23, 21.12, 21.14, 21.19, 21.26, 21.27, 21.35 L L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 .… 10.16 L Shaddock & Assocs Pty Ltd v Parramatta CC (1981) 150 CLR 225 .… 11.41, 12.17 La Rosa v Nudrill Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA .… 10.72 La Rosa, Re; Ex parte Norgard v Rodpat Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 83; 104 ALR 237 .… 11.145, 11.154 La Trobe Capital & Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Hay Property Consultants Pty Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 299; 273 ALR 774; [2011] FCAFC 4 .… 11.146

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380 .… 14.7, 14.11, 14.15 Land & Homes (WA) Ltd v Hendry (1930) 33 WALR 89 .… 11.34 — v Roe (1936) 39 WALR 27 .… 17.36, 17.41 Land Rover Group Ltd v UPF (UK) Ltd (in administrative receivership) [2003] 2 BCLC 222 .… 24.21 Landall Construction and Development Co Pty Ltd v Bogaers [1980] WAR 33 .… 18.4 Landbank Tinana Pty Ltd v McKay [2006] .… 21.35 Lander v Trigger [1999] NSWSC 1253 .… 15.27 Landers v Schmidt [1983] 1 Qd R 188 .… 21.12, 21.24 Landpower Australia Pty Ltd v Penske Power Systems Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 161 .… 11.131, 11.133, 11.136 Lane v Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 45 .… 24.12 Lane Cove Council v Michael Davies Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 727 .… 11.150 Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 .… 3.29, 12.58 — v Le Boursicot (1993) 5 BPR 11,782 .… 25.13 Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Peluso [2006] 1 Qd R 42; [2005] QSC 112 .… 24.31 Langdon v Reuss (1883) 4 LR (NSW) Eq 28 .… 15.2 Lantry v Tomule Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 81 .… 20.1, 20.9, 21.26 Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365 .… 4.28 Larking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 221 .… 21.30, 21.31, 25.2 Larratt v Bankers and Traders Insurance Co Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 215 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.38 Lasermax Engineering Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia Ltd) [2005] NSWCA 66 .… 10.31, 10.32 Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 2 NSWLR 923 .… 16.56 Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Knight [1969] 2 NSWR 79 .… 3.45 Latella v L J Hooker Ltd (1985) ANZ ConvR 141 .… 11.104, 11.111, 11.124 Laurelmont Pty Ltd v Stockdale & Leggo (Queensland) Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 212 .… 10.39, 10.42, 10.43, 10.56

Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich [2013] NSWSC 97 .… 2.5 Lacey v Hayden [2000] NSWCA 182 .… 21.26 Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 198; [2015] NSWCA 130 .… 23.45 Lactos Fresh Pty Ltd v Finishing Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 748 .… 10.32, 26.1, 26.3 Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWCA 169 .… 2.30, 10.6 Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 .… 3.27 Laing v Fidgeon (1815) 6 Taunt 108; 128 ER 974 .… 27.26 Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487 .… 12.60 Lake Koala Pty Ltd v Walker [1991] 2 Qd R 49 .… 11.111, 11.116, 11.117 Lake Macquarie Municipal Council v Bortolus Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 46 LGRA 292 .… 3.11 Lakomy v Accounting TEK Property Investment Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 1152 .… 10.26 Lakshmijit s/o Bhai Suchit v Faiz Mohammed Khan Sherani [1974] AC 605 .… 25.3 Lalor v Winfield [1925] VLR 306 .… 16.35 Lam v Ausintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd (1988) ASC 55-693 .… 15.28 — v — (1990) 97 FLR 458 .… 11.115 Lamare v Dixon (1873) LR 6 HL 414 .… 11.44 Lamb v Johnson (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 65 .… 11.10 — v Vice (1840) 6 M & W 467; 151 ER 495 .… 7.47 Lambert v Lewis (1982) AC 225 .… 23.38 Lamond v Calcraft (1945) 53 SR (NSW) 103 .… 24.24 Lamotte v Lamotte (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 99 .… 14.7 Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615) Hob 105; 80 ER 255 .… 4.20, 4.22 Lampropolous v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193 .… 15.10, 17.53 Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 3) [2014] WASC 162 .… 26.1, 26.8 Lamshed v Lamshed (1963) 109 CLR 440 .… 24.8 Lamson Paragon Ltd v Spicers (Australia) Ltd [1953] SASR 297 .… 10.62, 10.74, 23.11, 23.13, 23.39 xc

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Table of Cases



Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd v DHK Retailers Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 81 .… 23.23 Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co 2016 SCC 37 .… 10.12 Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VSCA 262 .… 7.2, 10.16 Ledingham v Bermejo Estancia Co Ltd [1947] 1 All ER 749 .… 4.17, 6.7 Lee v Ah Gee [1920] VLR 278 .… 12.46, 12.66, 12.71, 15.9 — v Chai [2013] QSC 136 .… 14.5, 15.9 — v Gaskell (1876) LR 1 QBD 700 .… 16.25 — v Griffin (1861) .… 16.80 — v Simmons (1999) ANZ ConvR 372 .… 8.6 Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571 .… 2.21, 7.1, 11.114, 11.115, 11.124, 16.55, 18.49 Leeda Projects Pty Ltd v Zeng (2020) 61 VR 384; [2020] VSCA 192 .… 23.13 Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851 .… 24.31 Leeman v Stocks [1951] 1 .… 16.41, 16.42 Lees v Fleming [1980] Qd R 162 .… 16.23, 18.12, 18.43 Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Stores (1957) 86 NW 2d 689 .… 3.19 Left Bank Investments Pty Ltd v Ngunya Jarjum Aboriginal Corporation [2020] NSWCA 144 .… 3.15 Legal and General Life of Australia Ltd v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314 .… 5.1, 6.11 Legal Services Commissioner v Baker [2006] QCA 145 .… 26.6 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1; [1983] HCA 11 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.14, 2.16, 2.17, 10.3, 15.13, 21.24, 21.32, 21.35, 21.36, 23.45, 24.9 Leibler v Air New Zealand [1999] 1 VR 1 .… 12.53 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1985] QB 350 .… 7.42 Leighton v Parton [1976] 1 NZLR 165 .… 12.52 Leipner v McLean (1909) 8 CLR 306 .… 16.36 Leitch v Reynolds [2005] NSWCA 259 .… 23.19 Lempriere v Large (1879) 12 Ch D 675 .… 17.42

Laurence v Lexcourt Holdings Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1128 .… 11.13, 12.8, 12.25, 12.29 Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623 .… 10.36, 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.19, 21.20, 21.21, 21.35 Lauvan Pty Ltd v Bega (2018) 330 FLR 1; [2018] NSWSC 154 .… 15.28 Laver v Fielder (1862) 32 Beav 1; 55 ER 1 .… 16.20 Lavery v Pursell (1888) 39 Ch D 508; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1583 .… 16.25, 16.66, 24.5, 24.30 Lavin v Toppi (2015) 254 CLR 459; 316 ALR 366; [2015] HCA 4 .… 11.145 Law v Harragin (1917) 33 TLR 381 .… 12.12 — v Jones [1974] .… 16.38 Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138 .… 7.31 Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan Investment Survey Pty Ltd [1973] VR 293 .… 8.14, 8.18, 8.34 Lawley v Terrace Designs Pty Ltd (Domestic Building) [2006] VCAT 1363 .… 11.142 Lawrence v Ciantar [2020] NSWCA 89 .… 10.16 — v Fordham [1922] VLR 705 .… 16.45 Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563 .… 2.3, 2.28, 12.58 Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 .… 3.68, 3.73, 6.17, 8.55, 10.27 Laythoarp v Bryant (1836) 2 Bing (NC) 735 .… 16.48 LCA Marrickville Pty Ltd v Swiss Re International SE [2022] FCAFC 17 .… 10.30, 10.33 LCR Group v Bell [2016] QSC 130 .… 18.37 Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pty Ltd v Iliadis [1998] 4 VR 661; [1998] VSC 104 .… 5.13, 10.26, 10.62, 10.66, 10.69, 10.75 Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 244 .… 3.47 Leadenhall Australia Ltd v Peptech Ltd [2001] NSWCA 272 .… 11.82 Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa [2007] NSWSC 228 .… 26.8 Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 KB 86; [1950] 1 All ER 693 .… 11.49, 11.62, 11.67, 11.71, 12.18, 12.19 Leason Pty Ltd v Princes Farm Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 381 .… 10.26, 11.62, 11.63, 11.64, 11.65, 11.67 Lecky v Walter (1914) 1 IR 378 .… 11.63 xci

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Lemura v Coppola [1960] Qd R 308 .… 26.13 Lend Lease Custodian Pty Ltd v DCT [2006] FCA 1790 .… 21.36 Leng & Co Ltd v Andrews [1909] 1 Ch 763 .… 17.13 Lennon v Scarlett & Co (1921) 29 CLR 499 .… 3.11, 21.12, 21.23 Leonard v Booth (1954) 91 CLR 452 .… 18.5, 18.45 Lepcanfin Pty Ltd v Lepfin Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 155 .… 10.30 Leroux v Brown (1852) 12 CB 801; 138 ER 1119 .… 16.48, 17.26 Les Affréteurs Reunis Société Anonyme v Walford [1919] AC 801 .… 7.43 Leslie Leithead Pty Ltd v Barber (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 172 .… 11.31 L’Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 .… 10.26, 12.64 — v — [1973] CLJ 104 .… 10.26 — v L’Estrange (1850) 13 Beav 281; 51 ER 08 .… 8.12 Levene v Brougham (1909) 25 TLR 265 .… 17.39 Leveraged Equities Ltd v Goodridge (2011) 191 FCR 71; 274 ALR 655; [2011] FCAFC 3 .… 8.5, 8.6, 8.34, 8.47 Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] QB 69 .… 10.64 Levy v Indooroopilly Golf Club [1990] 1 Qd R 316 .… 18.6 Lew Footwear Holdings Pty Ltd v Madden International Ltd [2014] VSC 320 .… 3.61, 11.145 Lewandowski v Mead Carney-BCA Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 640 .… 6.7 Lewes Nominees Pty Ltd v Strang (1983) 57 ALJR 823; 49 ALR 328 .… 3.61, 9.8 Lewis v Alleyne (1888) 4 TLR 560 .… 17.29 — v Averay [1971] 3 All ER 907; [1971] 3 WLR 603 .… 12.62, 12.63 — v Clay (1897) 67 LJ (QB) 224; [1895–9] All ER Rep 1738 .… 12.67 — v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528 .… 12.50, 12.52 — v Cook (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191 .… 2.24, 4.36 Lewis Construction (Engineering) Pty Ltd v Southern Electric Authority of Queensland (1976) 50 ALJR 769; 11 ALR 305 .… 10.31, 10.32, 10.34, 10.40, 10.56, 10.60, 12.30, 12.32 Lewis Construction Co Pty Ltd v Tichauer SA [1966] VR 341 .… 3.60

Lexane Pty Ltd v Highfern Pty Ltd [1985] 1 Qd R 446 .… 21.36 Lezabar Pty Ltd v Hogan (1989) NSW ConvR 55-468 .… 3.11 Lezam Pty Ltd v Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 535; 107 ALR 291 .… 11.122, 11.145, 11.150 LG Thorne & Co Pty Ltd v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A’asia) Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 81 .… 10.4, 10.5 L’Huillier v Victoria [1996] 2 VR 465 .… 18.30, 23.15 Li v Liu [2022] NSWCA 67 .… 11.103, 18.46 — v So [2021] VSCA 32 .… 18.40 Liangis Investments Pty Ltd v Daplyn Pty Ltd (1994) ANZ Conv R 638; 117 FLR 28 .… 2.30, 10.6 Liberty Investments Pty Ltd v Sakatik Pty Ltd (NSWCA, Mahoney ACJ, 30 August 1996) .… 19.8, 19.17, 19.25 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch trading as Liberty Specialty Markets v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 126 .… 12.30 Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 Term Rep 63; 100 ER 35 .… 12.56, 12.62 Lido-Savoy Pty Ltd v Paredes [1872] VR 267 .… 18.37 Liebe v Molloy (1906) 4 CLR 221 .… 22.4, 26.8 Lieberman v Morris (1944) 69 CLR 69 .… 18.15, 18.16, 18.34 Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 94 .… 10.43, 23.7 Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 .… 6.17, 10.5, 10.9, 10.12, 10.31, 12.47, 12.64 Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431 .… 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38, 10.75 Lifoon Pty Ltd v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 .… 2.14, 16.37 Lighting by Design (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cannington Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 35 WAR 520; [2008] WASCA 23 .… 16.60, 16.64 Ligon Sixty-Three Pty Ltd v Clarkekann [2015] QSC 153 .… 8.8 Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339 .… 4.6, 4.10 Lim v Hong [2021] SGCA 43 .… 22.4 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 .… 7.7, 7.30, 8.1, 8.8

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Table of Cases Linderstam v Barnett (1915) 19 CLR 528 .… 14.11 Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628 .… 18.35, 18.37, 18.38 Lindsay v Cundy (1876) 1 QBD 348 .… 12.59 — v Smith [2002] 1 Qd R 610; [2001] QCA 229 .… 2.24 Lindsay-Owen v Associated Dairies Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1095 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.15, 19.22 — v Winton Partners Funds Management Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 78 .… 10.30, 10.35 Linfield Linen Pty Ltd v Nejain (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 280 .… 24.11 Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates and Co Ltd [2004] NSWSC 943 .… 10.18 Ling v Commonwealth (1994) 51 FCR 88; 123 ALR 65 .… 8.11, 10.41, 10.60 Lintrose Nominees Pty Ltd v King [1995] 1 VR 574 .… 14.6 Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144; [2005] FCA 1812 .… 10.12 Lion White Lead Ltd v Rogers (1918) 25 CLR 533 .… 12.44 Lionsgate Australia Pty Ltd v Macquarie Private Portfolio Management Ltd [2007] NSWSC 371 .… 24.1, 24.4 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] AC 548 .… 26.5 Lipman v Lipman (1989) 13 Fam LR 1 .… 16.73, 16.75 Liristis v Wallville [2001] NSWSC 428 .… 21.12, 21.18, 21.23, 21.28, 21.35, 22.9 Liristis Holdings Pty Ltd v Q-Corp Marine Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 418 .… 24.21 Lisciandro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 69 FCR 180; 139 ALR 689 .… 10.35, 14.20, 15.7, 15.9 Lismore CC v Stewart (1989) 18 NSWLR 718 .… 5.28 Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 1 All ER 125 .… 11.140 Lithgow State Mine Railway Ltd v City of Greater Lithgow Mining Museum Inc (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1468 .… 4.12, 24.1, 24.19 Little v Law Institute of Victoria [1990] VR 257 .… 13.12 — v Trotman (1885) 6 ALT 252 .… 3.66



Littlefield v Shee (1831) 2 B & Ad 811; 109 ER 1343 .… 27.13 Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1977] 1 WLR 1472 .… 18.35 Liu v Adamson [2003] NSWSC 74 .… 14.17, 14.20 — v Chan [2020] QCA 25 .… 5.20 Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley & Ford [1927] VLR 523 .… 8.16 Liverpool Borough Bank; Duranty’s Case, Re (1858) 26 Beav 268; 53 ER 901 .… 11.44 Liverpool Holdings Ltd v Gordon Lynton Car Sales Pty Ltd [1979] Qd R 103 .… 21.12, 21.18 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603; 157 ER 978. .… 8.47 Livingston v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) (1960) 107 CLR 411 .… 8.4 LJ Hooker Ltd v W J Adams Estates Pty Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 52 .… 3.71, 10.61 Llewellyn v Brown & Milton Pty Ltd (1961) 80 WN (NSW) 336 .… 16.54 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 .… 11.79 — v Lloyd [1964] WAR 219 .… 16.35 Lloyd Steel Co (Australia) Pty Ltd v Jade Shipping SA (1985) 1 NSWLR 212 .… 25.1, 25.12 Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1337 .… 7.7, 7.46, 7.47 Lloyd’s Bank Ltd, Re [1931] 1 Ch 289 .… 14.6 Lloyd’s Ships Holdings Pty Ltd v Davros Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 505 .… 6.8, 18.38 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11, 15.6 LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886; [2003] NSWCA 74 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.6, 6.17, 10.4, 10.12, 19.23, 20.6, 23.24 Load v Green (1846) 15 M & W 216; 153 ER 828 .… 8.40 Loan Investment Corporation of Australasia v Bonner [1970] NZLR 724 .… 24.4, 24.5 Lobb v Vasey Housing Auxiliary (War Widows Guild) [1963] VR 239 .… 19.18, 19.22 Lockhart v Osman [1981] VR 57 .… 10.28, 10.65, 10.75 Loftus v Roberts (1902) 18 TLR 532 .… 4.17 Logan Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways [1960] Qd R 191 .… 5.28

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Lohar Corporation Pty Ltd v Dibut Pty Ltd (1976) 1 BPR 9177 .… 21.26 Lombard Australia Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 45 .… 7.10 Lombardo v Development Underwriting (WA) Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 188 .… 18.4 — v Morgan [1957] VR 153 .… 20.16 Lombok Pty Ltd v Supetina Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 226 .… 22.9 Lomsargis v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] QSC 199 .… 23.2 London City Corp v Goree (1676) Lev 174; 3 Keb 677; 1 Vent 298; 83 ER 488 .… 27.19 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642; [1914-15] All ER Rep 1008 .… 7.31 London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne and Nagel International Ltd (1990) 70 DLR; [1992] 3 SCR 299; [1993] 1 WWR 1; (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261 .… 7.40, 7.41 London General Omnibus Ltd v Holloway [1912] 2 KB 72 .… 11.24 Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 .… 8.12 Long v Lloyd [1958] 1 WLR 753 .… 11.49, 11.67 — v Millar (1879) LR 4 CPD 450 .… 16.45 Longden v Kenalda Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 128 .… 23.6, 23.16, 23.24, 23.39 Longpocket Investments Pty Ltd v Hoadley (1985) NSW ConvR 55-244; 3 BPR 9606 .… 3.33 Longstaff v Keogh (1877) 3 VLR (Eq) 175 .… 11.38 Lonsdale v Whittaker (1915) 17 WALR 111 .… 16.35, 16.66 Lopes v Taranto [2018] VSCA 288 .… 10.12 Lopwell Pty Ltd v Clarke [2009] NSWCA 165 .… 14.3, 14.5, 15.1, 15.8, 15.9, 15.12 Lord v Trippe (1977) 14 ALR 129 .… 7.28, 7.29 Lord Buddha Pty Ltd (in liq) v Harpur (2013) 41 VR 159; [2013] VSCA 101 .… 11.122 Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108; [1925] All ER Rep 87 .… 7.47, 7.31 Lords v Von Thomann (No 2) (2014) 47 WAR 473; [2014] WASC 320 .… 23.26 Lott v Collins (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 104 .… 16.35

Loughridge v Lavery [1969] VR 912 .… 21.12, 21.28, 21.29 Louinder v Leis (1982) 56 ALJR 433; 149 CLR 509 .… 9.2, 10.36, 21.9, 21.19, 21.20, 21.35 Loumbos v Ward [2016] NSWSC 885 .… 15.8 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; (1994) 19 MULR 701 .… 14.5, 15.8, 15.9, 15.10 Love v Simmons [2016] WASCA 176 .… 21.26 Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 66 .… 24.22 Lovell and Christmas v Beauchamp [1894] AC 607; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1184 .… 17.20 Lowe v Evans [1989] 1 Qd R 295 .… 21.19 Lowe Pty Ltd v Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 180 .… 25.6 Lowick Rose LLP (in liq) v Swynson Ltd [2018] AC 313; [2017] UKSC 32 .… 26.1 Lowther v Kim [2003] 1 NZLR 327 .… 16.21 — v Lowther (1806) 13 Ves 95; 33 ER 230 .… 24.17 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360 .… 8.3 Lloyd v Tedesco (2002) 25 WAR 360; [2002] WASCA 63 .… 16.73 LSKF Holdings Pty Ltd v Shield Lifestone Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 129 .… 4.12 LT King Pty Ltd v Besser (2002) 172 FLR 140; [2002] VSC 354 .… 11.112 Lu v Lim (1993) 30 NSWLR 332 .… 18.37 Lucas v Public Transport Corp Victoria [2000] 1 VR 156; [2000] VSCA 35 .… 3.27 Lucas & Tait (Investments) Pty Ltd v Victoria Securities Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 268 .… 24.8 Lucas Drilling Pty Ltd v Armour Energy Ltd [2013] QCA 111 .… 24.23 Lucas Stuart Pty Ltd v Hemmes Hermitage Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 283 .… 24.23 Luce Optical v Budget Specs (Franchising) [2005] FCA 1486 .… 10.43 Luck v Ilka [1951] St R Qd 281 .… 16.35 Lucy v Commonwealth (1923) 33 CLR 229 .… 23.22 Ludlow Corp v Charlton (1840) 6 M & W 815; 151 ER 642 .… 17.70, 17.71 Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520 .… 12.4, 12.20, 12.27, 12.29, 12.54

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Table of Cases Lukey v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 298 .… 11.145 Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; [2008] HCA 27 .… 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.8, 28.31 Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De G M & G 604; 42 ER 687 .… 24.25 Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286 .… 9.5, 21.12, 21.18, 23.1, 23.20 Luong v Du [2013] VSC 723 .… 12.68 Lutre Pty Ltd v Ellison (1997) 151 ALR 626 .… 18.3, 21.29 Luu v Sovereign Developments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 40 .… 23.45 Luu Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society Ltd (1999) 75 SASR 345 .… 23.19 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108; [1941] 1 All ER 33 .… 3.71 Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo [2011] NSWCA 303 .… 10.5, 10.16 Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] AC 653 .… 13.2 — v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428 .… 2.10, 2.14 Lyon v Home (1868) LR 6 Eq 655 .… 14.8 Lyons v Hughes (1875) 1 VLR (L) 1 .… 16.80 Lyth v Ault and Wood (1852) 7 Exch 669; 155 ER 117 .… 8.47 M M K & J A Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39 .… 10.3 M R Hornibrook (Pty) Ltd v Eric Newham (Wallerawang) Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 523 .… 12.33 MA & J Tripodi Pty Ltd v Swan Hill Chemicals Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 46 .… 23.16 Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 .… 4.2, 4.32 MA Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp (1999) 93 Wn App 819 .… 3.7 MAAG Developments Pty Ltd v Oxanda Childcare Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 289 .… 10.35, 12.30 Macarthur v Georgamlis (No 1) (1989) NSW ConvR 55-501 .… 3.68 Macaulay v Greater Paramount Theatres Ltd (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 64 .… 24.11 MacBain v Mailer (1886) 12 VLR 354 .… 11.15 MacCormac v Bradford [1927] SASR 152 .… 16.35



MacCormick v Nowland (1988) 10 ATPR 40-852 .… 11.110 Macdonald v Tully (1880) 5 QSCR 192 .… 23.39 MacDonald v Australian Wool Innovation Ltd [2005] FCA 105 .… 5.24, 6.6, 6.8, 23.15 — v Robbins (1954) 90 CLR 515 .… 7.29 — v Shinko Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 152 .… 10.7, 11.42, 12.31, 12.34 — v Yakiti Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 114 .… 15.10, 15.16 Macdonald Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd v Nikolas [2007] NSWSC 552 .… 23.45 Mace v Rutland House Textiles Ltd [2000] TLR 6 .… 12.38 MacFarlane v John Martin (1977) 1 ATPR 40-034 .… 11.119 Machirus Properties Ltd v Power Sports World (1987) Ltd (unreported, NZ High Crt, 26 May 1998) .… 2.16 MacIntosh v Bebarfalds Ltd (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 371 .… 24.20 Mack v Elvy (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 313 .… 25.5 Mackay v Brice (1979) 53 ALJR 603 .… 21.35 — v Dick (1881) App Cas 251 .… 10.41 — v Wilson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 315 .… 16.22 Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41 .… 3.49, 3.56, 16.35 Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590; [1966] 3 All ER 847 .… 11.22, 11.45, 11.60 Mackenzie v Albany Finance Ltd [2003] WASC 100; [2004] WASCA 301 .… 26.4, 26.9, 26.12 — v Rees (1941) 65 CLR 1 .… 21.13 — v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] AC 468 .… 11.13, 11.63 MacKinlay v Derry Dew Pty Ltd (2014) 46 WAR 247; [2014] WASCA 24 .… 6.17, 18.41, 23.35 Mackintosh v Baldock [2000] TASSC 6 .… 23.17 — v Johnson (2013) 37 VR 301; [2013] VSCA 10 .… 15.8, 15.9 Mackman v Stengold (1991) ATPR 41-105 .… 11.116, 11.121 Macks v Blacklaw & Shadforth Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 15 ACLC 341; 22 ACSR 641 .… 7.5 MacMillan v Mumby [2006] NSWCA 74 .… 3.15, 7.2, 12.56, 26.3 xcv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Macquarie Bank Ltd v Meinhardt (NSW) Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1320 .… 11.136 — v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 .… 15.16 Macquarie Generation v CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040 .… 3.39, 3.65 — v Peabody Resources [2000] NSWCA 361 .… 11.20, 11.32, 11.33, 11.38, 11.40 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District (2020) 19 BPR 40,463; [2020] NSWCA 161 .… 10.44, 10.49 — v Sydney South West Area Health Service (2010) 15 BPR 28,563; [2010] NSWCA 268 .… 10.44, 21.26, 23.2 Macqueen v Frackelton (1909) 8 CLR 673 .… 5.10, 18.34 MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 .… 3.4, 3.21, 3.26, 3.28, 4.10, 4.17, 10.71, 22.12 MacVean v Woolcott (1889) 11 ALT 74 .… 11.19 Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305 .… 24.29, 24.30, 24.31 Madders v Walker (1995) 2 Qd R 386 .… 18.10, 18.12 Maddestra v Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 303 .… 10.13, 10.35 Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467; (2018) 265 CLR 522; [2018] HCA 39 .… 16.48, 16.54, 16.58, 16.59, 16.60 Magann v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta [2020] NSWCA 167 .… 15.31 Magee v Pennine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 QB 507; [1969] 2 All ER 891 .… 4.28, 12.26 Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 152 .… 10.31, 10.35, 18.35, 18.37 Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 9; (1997) 142 ALR 198 .… 8.7, 18.33 Magic Mountain Developments Pty Ltd v Laureate Australia Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 570 .… 20.8 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 231 ALR 277; [2006] HCA 51 .… 5.4, 11.75, 11.78, 11.82 — v National Australia Bank [2001] NSWCA 221 .… 10.16 Magman International Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 104 ALR 575 .… 11.147

Magnacrete Ltd v Douglas-Hill (1988) 48 SASR 565 .… 13.7, 24.7 Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 395 .… 3.46, 4.24 Magripilis v Baird [1924] St R Qd 303 .… 4.19 Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449; (1997) 188 CLR 449; [1997] HCA 23 .… 11.29, 11.45, 11.53, 14.13, 15.11 Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 12 .… 13.5, 13.7, 14.4, 15.8 — v Millennium Markets Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 174 .… 13.7 Mahommed v Unicomb [2017] NSWCA 65 .… 8.7 Mahoney v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522 .… 23.35 — v Lindsay (1980) 33 ALR 601 .… 9.9, 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 21.26, 21.27 — v Purnell [1996] 3 All ER 61 .… 14.13, 14.15 Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727 .… 16.52, 16.64 Main Roads Property Group Pty Ltd v Pelligra and Sons Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 5 .… 11.139 Maine v Lyons (1913) 15 CLR 671 .… 18.2, 19.15 Mainieri v Cirillo (2014) 47 VR 127; [2014] VSCA 227 .… 16.72 Mainland Holdings Ltd v Szady [2002] NSWSC 699 .… 23.2 Mainline Investments Pty Ltd v Davlon Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 392 .… 16.22 Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 89 NSWLR 633; (2014) 310 ALR 113; [2014] NSWCA 184 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.35 Maio v City of Sterling (No 2) [2016] WASCA 45 .… 7.16 Maitland v Irving (1846) 15 Sim 437; 60 ER 688 .… 14.15 Maitland Holdings Pty Ltd v NTZ Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 710 .… 10.6 Maitland Main Collieries Pty Ltd v Xstrata Mt Owen Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1235 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.48, 10.49 Majeau Carrying Co Pty Ltd v Coastal Rutile Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 48 .… 10.54 Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225 .… 8.3, 12.36, 12.53 Majik Markets Pty Ltd v S & M Motor Repairs Pty Ltd (No 1) (1987) 10 NSWLR 49 .… 21.23, 21.29

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Table of Cases Major v Bretherton (1928) 41 CLR 62 .… 10.6 Major Engineering Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2011] VSCA 226 .… 10.77 — v Timelink Pacific Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 228 .… 10.61 Makings Custodian Pty Ltd v Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 33 .… 11.83, 11.121, 11.136 Mal Owen Consulting Pty Ltd v Ashcroft (2018) 97 NSWLR 1163; [2018] NSWCA 135 .… 23.16 Malabar RSL Sub-Branch Club Pty Ltd v RSL Custodians Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1016 .… 23.5 Malago Pty Ltd v AW Ellis Engineering Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 227 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.11 Malas v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; [1958] 1 All ER 262 .… 7.10, 7.50 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 .… 23.14, 23.15 Malhotra v Choudhury [1980] Ch 52; [1979] 1 All ER 186 .… 24.31 Malik v Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (in liq) [1998] AC 20 .… 10.52 Mallesons Stephen Jaques v Trenorth Ltd [1999] 1 VR 727 .… 23.35, 23.38 Mallett v Mallett (1984) 156 CLR 605 .… 16.75 Malliaris v Public Real Estate Bureau (1984) 112 LSJS 88 .… 20.13 Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66 .… 10.13 Malmsbury Confluence Gold-Mining Co Ltd v Tucker (1877) 3 VLR (L) 213 .… 16.25 Malozzi v Carapelli [1975) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 229 .… 6.8 Management Services Australia Pty Ltd v PM Works Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 107 .… 10.32 Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 .… 3.46, 372 Manco Ltd v Atlantic Forest Products Ltd (1971) 24 DLR (3d) 194 .… 3.44 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1992) 60 SASR 120 .… 23.45 Mander Forklift Pty Ltd v Dairy Farmers Co-operative (1990) ATPR (Digest) 46–061; BC9002635 .… 11.118 Mander Pty Ltd v Clements (2005) 30 WAR 46; [2005] WASCA 67 .… 12.30, 12.33



Manderson v Wright (No 2) [2018] VSC 162 .… 24.31 Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Mio Art Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 148 .… 8.25, 8.34 Mangrove Mountain Quarries Pty Ltd v Barlow [2007] NSWSC 492 .… 21.34 Mann v Capital Territory Health Commission (1982) 56 ALJR 261; 148 CLR 97 .… 23.19, 23.24, 23.34 — v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (2019) 267 CLR 560; 373 ALR 1; [2019] HCA 32 .… 6.1, 21.9, 21.38, 23.22, 26.1, 26.2, 26.6, 26.7, 28.17 Mann Judd v Papers Sales Australia (WA) Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 268 .… 23.40, 23.43, 23.44 Manna v Manna [2008] ACTSC 10 .… 12.25 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 945; [1997] AC 749 .… 3.46, 6.6, 10.35, 21.19 Mannix Electrical Pty Ltd v Belport Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 115 .… 25.12 Manock v South Australia (1979) 83 LSJS 64 .… 18.30 Manson v Thacker (1878) 7 Ch D 620 .… 11.63 Mantovani v Carapelli SpA [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375 .… 18.34 Manuel v Pasminco Cockle Creek Smelter Pty Ltd (1998) 83 IR 135 .… 5.26 Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd v Withers (1988) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-853 .… 10.12 Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 148 .… 21.15 Maralinga Pty Ltd v Major Enterprises Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 101; (1973) 128 CLR 336 .… 12.30, 12.34, 12.35, 12.53, 24.8 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 171 CLR 507 .… 11.82, 11.127, 23.35, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38 Marchesi v Apostolou [2007] FCA 986 .… 21.36 Marco Productions Ltd v Pagola [1945] KB 111; [1945] 1 All ER 155 .… 24.25 Marcus Clarke (Vic) Ltd v Brown (1928) 40 CLR 540 .… 10.34, 10.40 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia (The Laconia) [1977] AC 8 .… 24.18 Marek v Australian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 .… 3.11

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v CGA Fire & Accident Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 2 BCL 401 .… 18.34 Mareva Building Consultants v Zevon [2013] ACTCA 28 .… 22.9 Marginson v Ian Potter & Co (1976) 136 CLR 161 .… 16.7, 16.18 Margush v Maddeford (2014) 121 SASR 199; [2014] SASCFC 129 .… 20.2, 20.8, 21.19 Marinchek v Cabport Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 334 .… 4.28 Marist Brothers Community Inc v Shire of Harvey (1994) 14 WAR 69; [1995] ANZ ConvR 270 .… 3.6, 16.21 Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] AC 524 .… 19.23 Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority [1999] FCA 899 .… 13.7 Mark Sensing (Aust) Pty Ltd v Flammea [2003] VSCA .… 8.6 Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2013] QCA 379 .… 11.112 Market Terminal Pty Ltd v Dominion Insurance Co of Australia [1982] 1 NSWLR 105 .… 12.37 Markham v Bernales (1906) 8 WAR 208 .… 26.13 Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington CC [1985] 2 NZLR 520 .… 3.39, 3.24 Marks v CCH Australia [1999] 3 VR 513 .… 7.3, 7.43 — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 304; (1998) 196 CLR 494; 158 ALR 333; [1998] HCA 69 .… 10.2, 10.27, 11.104, 11.125, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147, 23.6, 23.8, 23.16 — v Hunt Bros (Sydney) Pty Ltd [1958] SR (NSW) 381 .… 10.6, 10.7 — v Jolly (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 351 .… 18.25, 18.47 — v Lilley [1959] 2 All ER 647 .… 24.5 Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742; [2015] UKSC 72 .… 10.40, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57 Marlow v Pitfield (1719) 1 P Wms 558; 24 ER 516 .… 17.5 Marmax Investments Pty Ltd v RPR Maintenance Pty Ltd (2015) 327 ALR 45; [2015] FCAFC 127 .… 10.41, 10.43, 10.44 Marminta Pty Ltd v French [2003] QCA 541 .… 22.9 Marquette v Walsh (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 298 .… 18.37

Marquis of Townshend v Stangroom (1801) 6 Ves 328; 31 ER 1076 .… 12.35 Marshall v Broadhurst (1831) 1 Cr & J 402; 148 ER 1480 .… 8.55 — v Colonial Bank of Australasia Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 632 .… 10.41 — v Glanvill [1917] 2 KB 87 .… 19.18 — v Green (1875) 1 CPD 35; [1874–80] All ER Rep 2198 .… 16.27 — v Marshall (1999) 1 Qd R 173 .… 18.39, 18.47, 18.48 Marshall, Re [1920] 1 Ch 284 .… 17.55 Martech International Pty Ltd v Energy World Corp Ltd [2006] FCA 1004; [2007] FCAFC 35; (2007) 248 ALR 353 .… 22.5, 22.7, 4.33 Martin v Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 222 .… 6.17 — v Gale (1876) 4 Ch D 428 .… 17.16 — v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297 .… 18.23, 18.28 — v Swan Aerated Water Co Ltd (1913) 15 WALR 112 .… 16.83 — v Tasmania Development and Resources (1999) 163 ALR 79 .… 11.111, 11.151 Marton v Evenwood Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 66 .… 10.26 Martyn v Glennan [1979] 2 NSWLR 234 .… 16.38 Marxen v Smith [1990] 3 NZLR 585 .… 6.11 Maskell v Horner [1915] 3 KB 106 .… 13.4, 13.6, 13.9 Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108 .… 13.4, 13.7, 13.9 — v Stevens (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 70 .… 16.48 Masonic Homes Ltd v Oppedisano & Platinum Property Retirement Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 196 .… 21.29 Massey v Johnson (1847) 1 Exch 241; 154 ER 102 .… 16.22 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320; 100 ER 1042 .… 8.10, 8.12 Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ketchell (2008) 236 CLR 101 .… 18.8, 18.10 Masters v Belpate Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 169 .… 20.16 — v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 .… 5.19, 5.24, 5.25, 6.8, 20.2 Masters Dairy Ltd v Nagy (1998) 156 ALR 262 .… 11.146 Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty Ltd v North East Solutions Pty Ltd [2017]

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Table of Cases VSCA 88 .… 10.12, 10.18, 10.44, 10.47, 23.16 Masters in Building Training Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 499 .… 10.45 Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234 .… 10.5, 10.12 Mastronardo v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2018] NSWCA 136 .… 15.16 Materials Fabrication Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 405 .… 18.34 Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) ATPR 41-192 .… 11.110 Mathew v Bobbins, The Times, 21 .… 14.6 Mathews v Mathews (1941) SASR 250 .… 22.9 Mathieson v Booth [2000] VSC 385 .… 10.41 — v Sunshine Wrappings Pty Ltd (1962) 80 WN (NSW) .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.21, 21.24 Matthes v Carter (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 357 .… 16.54 Matthew Short & Associates Pty Ltd v Riviera Marine (International) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 281 .… 7.42, 10.73 Matthews v Cool or Cosy Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 114 .… 26.14 — v Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777 .… 11.50 Mavaddat v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 94 .… 14.5, 14.10, 14.18, 14.19, 15.11 Mawson v Blane (1854) 10 Exch 206; 156 ER 417 .… 17.28 Maxcon Constructions Pty Ltd v Vadasz (No 2) [2017] SASCFC 2 .… 18.9, 18.14 Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559 .… 3.6, 3.32 Maxsujur Pty Ltd v Asimus [1980] 2 NSWLR 96 .… 21.19 May v Brahmbhatt [2013] NSWCA 309 .… 15.27 — v Gibson (1970) 71 SR (NSW) 79 .… 16.31, 16.51, 16.59 May & Butcher v R [1934] 2 KB 17n .… 6.6, 6.8 Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co (1953) 89 CLR 507 .… 10.5, 10.6, 10.60 Maye v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 14 .… 10.33



Mayfair Trading Co Pty Ltd v Dreyer (1958) 101 CLR 428 .… 16.55, 18.47 Maynard v Goode (1926) 37 CLR 529 .… 5.21, 6.6, 10.9, 10.16, 20.1, 20.4, 20.5, 20.9, 20.13 — v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia (1994) 11 WAR 1 .… 10.39, 10.50 Mayne Nickless Ltd v Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 108; [2001] FCA 1620 .… 11.146, 11.147 Mayor of Ludlow v Charlton (1840) 6 M & W 815; 151 ER 642 .… 17.71 Maywald v Riedel [1927] SASR 345 .… 16.52 MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 .… 10.12 Mbuzi v Griffith University [2016] FCAFC 10 .… 5.1 McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 187 .… 11.55, 11.85, 11.86 McArdle, Re [1951] Ch 669; [1951] 1 All ER 905 .… 4.19 McArthur v Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd [2001] QCA 317 .… 20.7, 26.11 McBean v Brown (1887) 13 VLR 726 .… 16.64, 16.66 McBride v Sandland (1918) 25 CLR 69 .… 7.1, 16.23, 16.60, 16.64, 16.67 McCann v Ngurli Ltd [1953] SASR 233 .… 15.2 — v Stark (1981) 2 BPR 9375 .… 24.10 — v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (2000) 176 ALR 711; 203 CLR 57 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 10.33, 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 McCannell v Mabee MacLaren Motors Ltd (1926) 36 BCR 369 .… 3.8 McCarthy v Australian Rough Riders Association (1988) ATPR 49,017 .… 18.36 — v Cunningham (1877) 3 VLR (L) 59 .… 25.8 — v McIntyre [1999] FCA 784 .… 26.9, 11.124 McCarthy Bros (Milk Vendors) Pty Ltd v The Dairy Farmers’ Co-operative Milk Company Ltd (1945) 45 SR(NSW) 266 .… 18.22 McCartney v Orica Investments Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 337 .… 23.14 McCaughey v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 192 .… 8.4

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 .… 17.46 McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 20; [2014] FCAFC 45 .… 18.37 McI v McI (1987) 10 NSWLR 243 .… 17.4 McIntosh v Dalwood (No 4) (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 415 .… 24.4, 24.5 — v Murphey 52 Haw 29 .… 16.67 — v Sashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 .… 8.27 McIntosh Hamson Hoare Govett v Pinnacle Properties [1995] QCA 156 .… 10.42, 26.6, 26.7 McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd [2010] 1 NZLR 463 .… 13.7, 13.9 — v Swyny (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 436 .… 11.13 McIvor v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] QSC 404 .… 14.20 McKain v RW Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1 .… 25.11 McKay v Gillespie (1885) 11 VLR 835 .… 22.5, 22.6 — v Hudson [2001] WASCA 387 .… 23.27 — v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] 1 VR 173; [1998] 4 VR 677 .… 4.10, 4.18, 13.9 McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC; Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC v James [2016] NSWCA 36 .… 3.40 McKellar v Singh [1999] WASC 145 .… 20.1, 20.8 McKendrick & Co Pty Ltd v Fush [2001] VSC 95; [2003] VSCA 88 .… 16.56, 16.61, 16.67 McKenna v McKenna [1984] VR 665 .… 27.1 — v Perecich [1973] WAR 56 .… 18.45 — v Richey [1950] VLR 360 .… 24.30, 24.31 McKenny v Drummond (1926) 29 WALR 6 .… 23.5, 23.9, 23.11, 23.26, 23.42 McKenzie v McDonald [1927] VLR 134 .… 11.29, 11.58, 14.6, 15.2, 15.11 — v Miller [2006] NSWCA 377 .… 11.1, 11.118 McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295 .… 5.10 McLachlan Consultants Pty Ltd v Boswell (1988) 30 IR 417 .… 18.37 McLarnon v McLarnon (1968) 112 Sol Jo 419 .… 13.3 McLaughlin v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 243 .… 12.56, 12.57, 12.63, 17.53

McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1959] SR (NSW) 122 .… 5.23 McCauley v FCT (1944) 69 CLR 235 .… 16.29 McClay v Seeligson (1904) 7 WALR 87 .… 9.5 McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club (2002) 191 ALR 759 .… 5.10 McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v QCLNG Pipeline Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 157 .… 23.2 McCormack v Bowen (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 621 .… 17.63 McCormick v Riverwood International (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 689 .… 11.111 McCourt v Cranston [2012] WASCA 60 .… 10.12 McCrohon v Harith [2010] NSWCA 67 .… 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.24, 23.25 McCulloch v Fern (2002) 18 JCL 138; [2001] NSWSC 406 .… 14.8, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15 McCutcheon v David Macbrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 .… 10.29, 10.72 McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 .… 4.24, 4.28, 22.10, 22.11 — v BP Australia Ltd [1997] ATPR 41-547 .… 24.21 McDevitt v Kattengall (1879) 5 VLR (L) 89 .… 10.20 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 .… 16.15, 21.9, 21.38, 23.20, 26.4, 26.10, 26.12, 26.14 McDowell v Meader (1891) 13 .… 16.35 McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co Ltd [1935] AC 24 .… 4.8 McEwan v Dick (1985) 9 ACLR 1011 .… 4.6 McFarlane v Daniell (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 337 .… 18.41 McGavin v Gerraty (1911) 32 ALT 151; 17 ALR 85 .… 24.29 McGrath v Sturesteps [2011] NSWCA 315 .… 10.12 McGrath; Re Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230; 246 ALR 514; [2008] FCAFC 2 .… 11.117, 11.118 McGregor v Fraser (1913) 32 NZLR 1325 .… 8.7 McGruther v Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306 .… 7.12 McGuigan Investments Pty Ltd v Dalwood Vineyards Pty Ltd [1970] 1 NSWR 686 .… 18.35, 18.37 c

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Table of Cases



McRoss Developments Pty Ltd v Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 183 .… 19.16, 23.22 McTier v Haupt [1992] 1 VR 653 .… 20.1, 20.8 McWilliam v McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd (1964) 114 CLR 656 .… 20.3, 20.12, 24.16 McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v Booth Wine Transport (1992) 25 NSWLR 723 .… 11.115 Mealey v Mountains Development Group Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 830 .… 21.17, 21.18, 21.35 Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 .… 3.6 Mecca Brands Pty Ltd v Kingdom Animalia LLC [2021] VSC 761 .… 18.35, 22.12 Media Arts Group Pty Ltd v Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd [2000] WASC 68 .… 21.37 Media World Communications Ltd (Administrator Appointed), Re (2005) 216 ALR 105; [2005] FCA 51 .… 11.59 Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 135 FCR 1; 205 ALR 402; [2003] FCAFC 289 .… 11.110 Medina v Stoughton (1700) 1 Salk 210; 1 Ld Raym 593; 91 ER 1297 .… 27.26 Mediratta v Clark [2019] VSC 685 .… 10.41 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 .… 23.35, 23.37, 23.38 Medsara Pty Ltd v Sande [2005] NSWCA 40 .… 12.53 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151 .… 21.24 Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 .… 2.5, 3.68, 4.17, 5.25, 6.3, 6.6, 6.8, 6.18, 10.30, 18.23, 20.1, 20.4, 20.5, 20.7, 20.8, 20.16, 20.17 Meetfresh Franchising Pty Ltd v Ivanman Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 234 .… 23.12 Mehmet v Benson (1965) 113 CLR 295 .… 21.19, 21.24, 21.31, 24.8, 24.9, 24.10, 24.16, 25.14 Mehta v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) Aust Torts Rep 81-046 .… 11.115 Melbourne Banking Corp v Brougham (1879) 4 App Cas 156 .… 17.71 Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Ltd [2015] VSC 540 .… 11.127 Melbourne Linh Son Buddhist Society Inc v Gippsreal Ltd [2017] VSCA 161 .… 10.12, 23.45

— v Darcy (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 585 .… 17.5, 17.16 — v Freehill (1908) 5 CLR 858 .… 17.54 McLaurin v FCT (1961) 104 CLR 381 .… 23.32 McLean v Cooper (1862) 1 SCR (NSW) 186 .… 16.66 McLean Tecnic Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 386 .… 11.127 McLeary v Swift [2012] NSWSC 1403 .… 7.9 McLennan v Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 46 .… 18.9, 18.11 McMahon v Ambrose [1987] VR 817 .… 24.2, 24.10, 24.31 — v National Foods Milk Ltd (2009) 25 VR 251; [2009] VSCA 153 .… 8.49, 10.7, 1835 McManus v Cooke (1887) 35 Ch D 681 .… 16.22 — v Fortescue (1907) 2 KB 1 .… 3.22 McMaster University v Wilchar Construction Ltd (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 9 .… 12.52 McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 1 .… 7.41, 11.109 McMurchy v Employsure Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 201 …. 18.37 McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352 (2018) 92 ALJ 76 .… 2.9, 16.73, 25.13 McNally v Waitzer [1981] 1 NSWLR 294 .… 21.19 McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis [2005] SASC 269 .… 16.37 McNulty v South East Queensland Electricity Board [1992] 2 Qd R 517 .… 15.16 McPhail v Darby (1879) 2 SCR (NSW)(NS) 225 .… 16.46 McPherson v Andrew Lees Ltd [1926] NZLR 523 .… 8.26 — v Moiler (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 535 .… 18.38 McPhillips v Ampol Petroleum (Vic) Pty Ltd (1990) 12 ATPR 41-014 .… 11.104, 11.108, 11.118, 11.147 McQueen v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [2017] QCA 259 .… 25.12 McRae v Bolaro Pty Ltd [2000] VSCA 72 .… 21.12, 21.14 — v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377; [1951] HCA 79 .… 3.42, 10.62, 10.74, 12.12, 12.16, 19.1, 19.13, 19.22, 23.9, 23.11, 23.12, 23.14, 23.24 ci

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v McLaurin & Tait (Developments) Pty Ltd (1976) 133 CLR 671 .… 19.13, 19.22, 19.25, 24.8, 24.10 Mermaids Café & Bar Pty Ltd v Elsafty Enterprises Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 271 .… 5.24 Merrell Associates Ltd v HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd .… 7.3 Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211; [1970] 2 All ER 760 .… 4.14, 5.4 Mersey Steel & Iron Co Ltd v Naylor, Benzon & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434 .… 21.12 Mertel v Rigney (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 122 .… 18.37 Merton Enterprises Pty Ltd v Nelson (1988) 13 NSWLR 454 .… 25.7 Messageries Imperiales Co v Baines (1863) 7 LT 763 .… 7.31 Metal Fabrications (Vic) Pty Ltd v Kelcey [1986] VR 507 .… 23.41, 23.43 Metal Roofing and Cladding Pty Ltd v Amcor Trading Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 472 .… 10.27, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.74, 23.26 Metalcorp Recyclers Pty Ltd v Metal Manufactures Ltd [2003] NSWCA 213 .… 11.115 Metcalf v Permanent Building Society (1993) 10 WAR 145 .… 10.31, 18.7, 18.8 Metcash Ltd v Joao Louis Jardim (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1042 .… 6.15 Metcash Trading Ltd v Hourigan’s IGA Umina Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 683 .… 11.112 Metha v Pereira Fernandes SA [2006] EWHC 813 .… 16.35 MetLife Insurance Ltd v RGA Reinsurance Company of Australia Ltd [2017] NSWCA 56 .… 10.32 Metro Chatswood Pty Ltd v CRI Chatswood Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWCA 49 .… 24.23 Metroplaza Pty Ltd v Girvan Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR 41-241 .… 3.36, 11.115 Metropolitan Gas Co v Federated Gas Employees’ Industrial Union (1925) 35 CLR 449 .… 10.32 Metropolitan Knitting and Hosiery Co Ltd (in liq) v Thomas Burnley & Sons Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 232 .… 16.84, 16.85 Metrotex Pty Ltd v Freight Investments Pty Ltd [1969] VR 9 .… 10.73, 10.76 Metway Leasing Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] QCA 54 .… 16.22, 16.37

Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner (2015) 229 FCR 221; [2015] FCAFC 20 .… 21.24, 21.38 Melic Pty Ltd v Lainson [2005] NSWSC 711 .… 10.12 Melverton v Commonwealth Development Bank (1989) ASC 55-921 .… 14.20, 15.27, 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160 .… 4.17 Mendel v Benjamin (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90-088 .… 3.30 Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 366 .… 3.26, 3.47 Mendelssohn v Normand [1970] 1 QB 177 .… 10.28 Menegazzo v Pricewaterhousecoopers (a Firm) [2016] QSC 94 .… 12.25 Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pty Ltd [1985] AC 511; [1985] 1 All ER 120 .… 24.31 Menhaden Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542 .… 11.111, 11.112 Mentink v Olsen [2020] NSWCA 182 .… 15.10 Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252; [1893] AC 317 .… 10.5 Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 2 QB 242 .… 12.68, 12.69 Mercantile Credit Ltd v Spinks [1968] QWN 32 .… 17.5, 17.29, 17.42 Mercantile Credits Ltd v Comblas (1981-2) 40 ALR 75 .… 6.6, 6.17 — v Harry [1969] 2 NSWR 248 .… 6.5 Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 .… 5.20 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Neilson (2004) 28 WAR 206; [2004] WASCA 60 .… 7.3 Mercantile Union Guarantee Corp v Ball [1937] 2 KB 498; [1937] 3 All ER 1 .… 17.16 Meredith Projects v Fletcher Construction [2000] NSWSC 493 .… 2.9, 10.33, 20.1, 25.1, 25.5 Meredith v Anthony [1980] 2 NSWLR 784 .… 6.8 Meridian Financial Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Ltd [2003] FCA 891 .… 24.21 Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 223 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 21.34, 21.37 cii

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Table of Cases



— v Luneburger Franchising Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 248 .… 23.16 — v New Zealand Alford Estate Co (1886) 32 CLD 266; [1886-90] All ER Rep 1726 .… 4.25, 4.26 Millar v Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 243 FCR 302; [2016] FCAFC 94 .… 5.11, 10.9 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357; 270 ALR 204; [2010] HCA 31 .… 11.115 Miller v Gulliver (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 176 .… 16.28, 16.36 — v JLCS Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 74 .… 10.16, 10.55, 21.12, 21.27 — v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; [2011] HCA 9 .… 18.9 — v Sutherland (1990) 14 Fam LR 416 .… 16.75 Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 .… 10.70 Milliner v Milliner (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 471 .… 5.4, 18.26 Milling v Hardie [2014] NSWCA 163 .… 16.69, 16.70 Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd (2015) 295 FLR 301; [2015] VSC 167 .… 23.32 Mills v Barber (1836) 1 M & W 425; 150 ER 500 .… 8.45 — v Dunham [1891] 1 Ch 576 .… 18.35 — v Fowkes (1839) 6 Bing (NC) 455; 132 ER 1174 .… 25.11 — v Ruthol Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 1; [2004] NSWSC 547 .… 24.11, 24.30, 24.31 — v Stokman (1967) 116 CLR 61 .… 16.25 Milne v A-G for Tasmania (1956) 95 CLR 460 .… 5.28 — v Sydney Corp (1912) 14 CLR 54 .… 3.37 Milton v Proctor (1989) NSW ConvR 55450 .… 21.36 Minchillo v Ford [1995] 2 VR 594 .… 10.33 Mincode Pty Ltd v Isa Pty Ltd (1996) 17 WAR 245 .… 12.30, 12.37, 12.38 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) (2015) 329 ALR 1; [2015] FCA 825 .… 2.3, 2.5, 2.16, 10.3, 10.16, 10.43, 10.48, 10.55, 21.12, 21.26, 21.31, 21.36, 22.5 — v — [2016] WASCA 105 .… 24.22 — v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 69 .… 10.32, 10.34

Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 981 .… 11.147 MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150; [2010] SGCA 36 .… 23.39, 23.40 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 313 .… 11.82 Miba Pty Ltd v Nescor Industries Group Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 527 .… 11.121 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd (1999) 75 SASR 1; [1999] SASC 265 .… 11.96, 15.8 Michael v Barnes (1987) NSW ConvR 55-343 .… 3.68 Michelmore v Breen [1920] St R Qd 266 .… 16.32 Mid Density Development Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1992) 39 FCR 579. .… 11.107, 11.111 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 .… 10.43 Midaz Pty Ltd v Benberg Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 66 .… 10.33 Mid-City Skin Cancer & Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak (2006) 67 NSWLR 569; [2006] NSWSC 844 .… 8.6, 8.18 Middleton v O’Neill (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 178 .… 18.3 Midland Bank Plc v Perry (1987) 56 P & CR 202 .… 14.17 — v Shephard [1988] 3 All ER 17 .… 14.6, 14.9 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp (a firm) [1979] Ch 384; [1978] 3 All ER 571 .… 25.5 Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd v Welsh [2006] WASC 122 .… 10.18, 22.5 Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446; [1962] 1 All ER 1 .… 7.37, 7.40 Mighell v Gargoura [2009] NSWSC 248 .… 15.26 Mihaljevic v Eiffel Tower Motors Pty Ltd [1973] VR 545 .… 10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 11.2, 11.53, 11.62, 11.76 Mikaelian v CSIRO (1999) 163 ALR 172 .… 3.67, 11.115, 11.124 Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42; [2007] VSCA 112 .… 3.11, 3.17, 3.19 Miles v Amos [2021] NSWCA 210 .… 8.9 — v Genesys Wealth Advisers Ltd [2009] NSWCA 25 .… 18.37 ciii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Misner v Australian Capital Territory (2002) 146 ACTR 1; [2000] ACTSC 87 .… 8.3, 12.30, 12.36 Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 .… 11.11, 11.85, 11.119, 11.146, 11.147 Mistrina Pty Ltd v Australian Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 223 .… 11.127, 11.128 Mitchell v 700 Young Street Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 42 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Leafs Gully Farm Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 92 .… 7.28 — v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 086; [2006] QSC 198; [2011] QCA 98 .… 4.35, 13.7, 14.4 — v Pattern Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 199 .… 20.6, 20.15, 20.18 — v Purnell Motors Pty Ltd [1961] NSWR 165 .… 8.42 — v Royal NSW Canine Council Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 242; [2001] NSWCA 162 .… 5.10 — v Valherie [2005] SASC 350 .… 11.10, 11.11, 11.119 Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd v Vella [2011] NSWCA 390 .… 11.136 Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission [2003] NSWCA 151 .… 10.59 Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd [2011] NSWCA 297 .… 10.35 Mizzi v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 37 .… 7.43 MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39; [2006] NSWSC 810 .… 2.6, 2.3, 10.7, 20.8, 20.15, 20.16, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31, 21.32 MLC Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 1971] AC 793 .… 11.80, 11.88 MLC Ltd v J & W Management Services Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 241 .… 11.124 MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May [2005] VSCA 29 .… 10.31, 23.2, 23.26, 24.4 Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Kosta (1969) 14 FLR 343 .… 3.46 — v McKenzie [1972] VR 315 .… 18.37 — v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 475; 153 ALR 198 .… 2.5, 3.71, 10.21, 23.14, 24.10 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v Development Auckland Ltd [2017] 1 NZLR 48; [2016] NZSC 89 .… 10.55

Minion v Graystone Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 157 .… 21.24 Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 v Halloran [2004] NSWCA 118 .… 3.14 Minister for Consumer Affairs v WW Vallack Real Estate Pty Ltd (1986) ASC 55-478 .… 15.26, 15.29 Minister for Education v Oxwell and Moreschini [1966] WAR 390 .… 18.26 Minister for Education & Training v Canham [2004] NSWSC 274 .… 12.27, 12.37 Minister for Immigration v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 .… 18.4 Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 .… 2.2 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30 .… 10.48 Minister for Industrial Affairs v Civil Tech Pty Ltd (1998) 70 SASR 394 .… 15.8 Minister for Lands (NSW) v King (1916) 22 CLR 193 .… 18.4 Minister for Lands and Forests v McPherson (1991) 22 NSWLR 687 .… 21.36 Minister for Transport v James Point Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 202 .… 21.30, 25.2 Minister for Youth and Community Services v Health and Research Employees’ Association of Australia (1987) 10 NSWLR 543 .… 5.28 Minister of Education v Oxwell [1966] WAR 39 .… 17.15 Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261 .… 19.25 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (Australia) Pty Ltd v Richards [1963] NSWR 1613 .… 18.37 Miotti v Belford [1962] NSWR 324; (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 98 .… 24.12 Mir Bros Trading Co Pty Ltd v Cavasinni Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1873 .… 10.36 Miraki v Griffith [2021] NSWCA 263 .… 26.4 Misiari v AFC Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 231 .… 20.13, 20.16 Misiaris v Saydels Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-474 .… 12.52, 12.53 Miskovic v Stryke Corporation Pty Ltd t/as KSS Security (No 2) (2011) 16 ANZ Ins Cas 61-873; [2010] NSWSC 1495 .… 10.33

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Table of Cases



Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1 .… 3.27, 3.29 Moonlighting International Pty Ltd v International Lighting Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 41 .… 24.21 Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2005) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30 .… 25.5 Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195 .… 8.6 — v Darton (1851) 4 De G & Sm 517; 64 ER 938; [1843-60] All ER Rep 814 .… 7.45 — v Lesbian Space Inc .… 18.43 — v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (2020) 268 CLR 326; [2020] HCA 17 .… 23.19 Moore & Co and Landauer & Co, Re [1921] 2 KB 519; [1921] All ER 466 .… 9.5 Moore Road Machinery (NSW) Pty Ltd v Sourry [1960] NSWR 227 .… 27.19 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1983) 156 CLR 414; (1984) 156 CLR 414 .… 10.41, 10.55 Moorhead v Brennan t/as Primavera Press (1991) 20 IPR 161 .… 10.41, 10.56 Moraitis Fresh Packaging (NSW) Pty Ltd v Fresh Express Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 626; [2008] NSWCA 327 .… 3.67, 10.35 Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5 .… 2.3, 2.29, 10.3, 21.28, 22.3, 22.6 Morehead v McIsaacs (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) (L) 295 .… 16.14 Morellini v Adams [2011] WASCA 84 .… 11.83, 11.146, 11.147 Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474 .… 25.12 — v Russell & Sons [1909] 1 KB 357 .… 16.25 — v Manner [1948] 1 KB 184 .… 19.18 Morgan Equipment Co v UMW Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] NSWCA 193 .… 10.32 Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC 56-095 .… 15.8 Morley v Loughnan [1893] 1 Ch 736 .… 14.14 Moromilov v Dragicevic [2013] ACTSC 91 .… 5.10 Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 2 All ER 725 .… 7.42 — v Hanley (2003) 173 FLR 83; [2003] NSWSC 42 .… 7.3 — v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.72

Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 .… 24.19, 24.21 Modern Weighbridge and Scale Services Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission (1995) 12 BCL 224; BC9503784 .… 8.8 Modifications Pty Ltd v Doyle (1991) NSW ConvR 55-578 .… 6.5 Moffatt Property Development Group Pty Ltd v Hebron Park Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 60 .… 5.24, 16.35 Mogg v Lord Raglan & St Arnaud Gold Mining Co (NL) (1878) 4 VLR (E) 138 .… 16.64 Mohamed v Farah [2004] NSWSC 482 .… 12.52 Mohr v Smith [1914] SALR 92 .… 21.12 Molodyski v Vema Australia Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55–446 .… 16.35 Molotu Pty Ltd v Solar Power Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-490 .… 21.29 Molton v Camroux (1848) 2 Exch 487; 154 ER 584 .… 17.56 Molyneux v Richard [1906] 1 Ch 34 .… 24.14 Monadelphous Engineering Pty Ltd v Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd [2014] QCA 330 .… 24.23 Monaghan County Council v Vaughan [1948] IR 306 .… 12.53 Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94 .… 11.145 Money v Money (No 2) [1966] 1 NSWR 348 .… 18.26, 18.40, 18.45 — v Ven-Lu-Ree Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 129 (PC) .… 6.11 Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 202 CLR 351; 177 ALR 390; [2001] HCA 2 .… 10.55, 10.56, 16.55, 23.37 Monk v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 .… 8.7 Monks v Poynice Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 662 .… 26.6, 26.8 Monroe Schneider Associates (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 397 .… 23.25 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 1056; (2002) 122 FCR 110; [2002] FCAFC 197 .… 11.112, 15.1, 15.16

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract MP Investments Nominees Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 43 .… 4.38 Mr Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 .… 11.118 MR Hornibrook (Pty) Ltd v Eric Newham (Wallerawang) Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 523 .… 20.1, 20.13 Mr Whippy Pty Ltd v Oceanwalk Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 8 .… 10.52 MSAS Cargo International Pty Ltd v AgfaGevaert Ltd [2000] VSCA 197 .… 10.18, 10.56, 10.61 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottone Anstalt [2015] 2 All ER (Comm 614) .… 21.10 Mulcahy v Hydro-Electric Commission (1998) 85 FCR 170; (1998) ATPR (Dig) 46-186 .… 11.111, 15.13 Mulherin v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] QSC 205 .… 7.18 Mulholland v Victorian Electoral Commission (2011) 247 FLR 230; [2011] VSC 89 .… 5.10 Mullett v Mason (1866) LR 1 CP 559 .… 11.85 Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 528; 191 ALR 402; [2001] FCA 226 .… 11.146, 11.147, 23.2 Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd v North Lanarkshirt Council [2011] 1 All ER 475 .… 10.32 Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Abgarus Pty Ltd (1992) 33 NSWLR 504 .… 23.45 — v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 61 .… 21.27 — v Suscindy Management Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 484 .… 10.34, 22.9 Multiplex Funds Management Ltd v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 275 .… 18.16 Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 84 ALR 700 .… 11.104, 11.121, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147 Munday and Shreeve v Western Australia [1962] WAR 65 .… 3.38, 5.28 Mundy, Re (1963) 19 ABC 165; [1963] ALR 264 .… 17.5 Municipal Council of Sydney v Australian Metal Co Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 550 .… 19.15 Munro v Morrison [1980] VR 83 .… 18.45 Murdoch v Mudgee Dolomite & Lime Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] NSWCA 12 .… 11.57

Morris, Re (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352 .… 18.34 Morris (dec’d), Re (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352 .… 18.15, 18.16 Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20 .… 24.1, 24.31 Morrison v Grosvenor (1884) 5 LR (NSW) 195 .… 26.13 Morrison-Knudsen International Co Inc v Commonwealth (1972) 46 ALJR 265 .… 11.88 Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 .… 2.13, 2.24, 2.29 Mortimer v Beckett [1920] 1 Ch 571; [1920] All ER Rep 179 .… 24.26 Morton v Baker [1993] FCA 111 .… 11.60 — v Elgin-Stuczynski (2008) 19 VR 294; [2008] VSCA 25 .… 10.16, 10.40 — v Tibbett (1850) 15 QB 428; 117 ER 520 .… 16.84 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331 .… 16.15 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 581 .… 27.19 Mostia Constructions Pty Ltd v Cox [1994] 2 Qd R 555 .… 16.55, 18.49 Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65 .… 11.117, 23.1, 23.34, 23.39 Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 Mount Gambier Co-operative Milling Society Ltd v Williams [1921] SASR 185 .… 11.31 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 .… 23.18 Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd, Re (1963) 4 FLR 478; [1963] ALR 346 .… 3.19, 3.45 Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Pty Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 335 .… 8.12, 8.18 Mountstephen v Lakeman (1871) LR 7 QB 196 .… 16.14 Mouritz v Hegedus [1999] WASCA 1061 .… 10.66, 10.69, 10.75, 10.77, 23.18, 23.41 Mowie Fisheries Pty Ltd v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 57 .… 21.31 Moxey v Lawrence (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 378 .… 16.66

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Table of Cases Murdock v Kennedy (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 191 .… 16.53, 16.54 Muriti v Prendergast [2005] NSWSC 281 .… 10.31 Murphy v Benson (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 66 .… 18.34 — v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138; (2004) 216 CLR 388; 204 ALR 26; [2004] HCA 3 .… 11.116, 11.125, 11.146, 11.147, 15.25 — v Simpson [1957] VR 598 .… 5.2, 5.7 — v Victoria (2014) 45 VR 119; 313 ALR 546; 289 FLR 337; [2014] VSCA 238 .… 11.99, 11.109, 11.111 — v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] FCA 1104 .… 11.111 — v Zamonex Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 439 .… 10.48, 11.149, 21.30 Murphy Corporation Ltd v Acumen Design & Development (Qld) Pty Ltd & Derek Graham Hooper (1995) 11 BCL 274 .… 3.34 Murray v Acraman (1875) 9 SALR 69 .… 16.85 — v Flavell (1883) 25 Ch D 89; [1881-5] All ER Rep 267 .… 7.44 Murray Goulburn Cooperative Co Ltd v Cobram Laundry Service Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 57 .… 3.34, 10.12, 10.18, 10.35, 21.12 Murray Irrigation Ltd v Balsdon [2006] NSWCA 253 .… 10.43, 21.10, 23.14, 23.39 Musca v Astle Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251 .… 11.146 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; (1987) 164 CLR 137 .… 16.73, 15.13, 16.72, 16.73, 16.75, 21.35 Musgrave v ACCC [2003] FCAFC 17 .… 11.110 Mushroom Composters Pty Ltd v IS & DE Robertson Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 1 .… 6.2 Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 .… 4.35, 4.38, 23.19 Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (‘The Lakatoi Express’) (1990) 19 NSWLR 285 .… 22.5 Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389 .… 13.3, 13.5, 13.8 Mutual Life and Citizens’ Assurance Co v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 628 .… 27.1 Mutual Life Assurance Society v Langley (1886) 32 Ch D 460 .… 8.18 MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016]



3 WLR 1519; [2016] EWCA Civ 553 .… 4.35, 22.4 MWH Australia Pty Ltd v Wynton Stone Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (2010) 31 VR 575; [2010] VSCA 245 .… 10.77, 11.118, 11.127, 11.150 Myers v Transpacific Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-673; ATPR 47,421 .… 11.84, 11.85, 11.147 N NA Retail Solutions Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] FCA 259 .… 24.22 Naaman v Sleiman [2015] NSWCA 259 .… 21.38 NAB Ltd v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] NSWSC 253 .… 18.33 Nadinic v Cheryl Drinkwater as trustee for the Cheryl Drinkwater Trust [2020] NSWCA 2 .… 11.147 — v Drinkwater (2017) 94 NSWLR 518; [2017] NSWCA 114 .… 11.53, 11.56, 11.72, 11.76 Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633; [1966] 1 All ER 689 .… 7.33 Nagy v Masters Dairy Ltd (1997) 150 ALR 273 .… 6.14, 11.111, 11.115 Nangus Pty Ltd v Charles Donovan Pty Ltd [1989] VR 184 .… 23.23, 23.25 Narain v Euroasia (Pacific) Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 290 .… 14.16, 15.9 Narhex Australia Pty Ltd v Sunspot Products Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-036 .… 11.123 Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 50 ALR 417 .… 10.16 Narni Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] VSCA 31 .… 10.55, 10.56, 10.59, 10.60, 10.61, 23.19, 23.24, 23.25 Nash v Hodgson (1855) 6 De GM & G 474 .… 25.11 — v Inman [1908] 2 KB 1; [1908–10] All ER Rep 317 .… 17.5, 17.6, 17.8, 17.10 Nashco Pty Ltd v Yang [2022] NSWCA 137 .… 8.6 Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 269 .… 10.6 National Australia Bank Ltd v Budget Stationery Supplies Pty Ltd (1997) 217 ALR 365; 9 BPR 97804 .… 6.1, 6.5, 10.2, 10.3, 10.7, 10.33, 12.31, 26.3 — v Clowes [2013] NSWCA 179 .… 6.5, 10.35, 12.41 — v Dionys as Trustee for the Angel Family Trust [2016] NSWCA 242 .… 10.66, 10.70

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Hall (1993) ASC 56-234; NSW ConvR 55-684 .… 15.5, 15.29 — v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 .… 10.56, 10.58 — v McKay (1995) ATPR 41-409 .… 15.16 — v Meek [2007] WASC 11 .… 15.16 — v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 18 .… 23.35, 23.39 — v Nobile (1988) ATPR 40-856 .… 15.5 National Bank Ltd v Savage [2013] NSWSC 1718 .… 15.9 National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (1982) 9 Syd LR 674 .… 19.25 National Engineering Pty Ltd v Chilco Enterprises Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 291 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.19, 23.2 National Engineering v Chilco [1999] NSWSC 1105 .… 21.37 National Equity Financial Services Pty Ltd v The Home Loans Group Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 310 .… 21.24 National Executors and Trustees Co of Tasmania Ltd v Edwards [1957] Tas SR 182 .… 7.45 National Foods Milk Ltd v McMahon Milk Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 150 .… 23.34 National Insurance Co of New Zealand v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 .… 11.146 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v S H Hallas Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 531 .… 18.3, 18.23, 18.25, 18.28 — v Walsh (1987) 8 NSWLR 585 .… 26.3, 26.5 National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 27 FLR 404; 6 ACTR 1 .… 8.18 National Mutual Property Services v Citibank Savings (1995) 132 ALR 514; [1995] FCA 1628 .… 8.7 National Oil Pty Ltd v Stephenson (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 51 .… 10.4 National Permanent Benefit Building Society, Re (1869) LR 5 Ch App 309 .… 17.5, 17.29 National Phonograph Co of Australia Ltd v Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481 .… 7.12 National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (NRMA) v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union [2019] FCA 1491 .… 11.111 — v Whitlam [2007] NSWCA 81 .… 10.7, 10.33, 10.58, 10.60

National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australia Ltd v Abercromby & Beatty Pty Ltd [1965] VR 675 .… 21.17 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 AC 686; [1985] 2 WLR 588 .… 2.6, 12.66, 14.5, 14.10, 14.12, 15.6, 15.7 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Vass [2018] NSWCA 259 .… 3.29 Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 .… 3.6, 3.67 Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook [2007] NSWSC 121 .… 26.1, 26.8 Nature Resorts Ltd v First Citizens Bank Ltd [2022] UKPC 10 .… 14.1 Nav Canada v Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc (2008) 290 DLR (4th) 405; 49 CBLJ 256 .… 4.35, 13.6 Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269 .… 23.14 NCON Australia Ltd v Spotlight Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] VSC 604 .… 23.24 NEA Pty Ltd v Magenta Mining Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 106; [2007] WASCA70 .… 10.73, 11.118, 11.150 Neal v Ayers (1940) 63 CLR 524 .… 18.3, 18.24, 18.25, 18.44 Neal, Re; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659 .… 2.15 Neale v Ancher Mortlock & Woolley Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 72 .… 21.38 — v Richardson [1938] 1 All ER 753 .… 6.11 Neate v Parfit [2006] WASC 121 .… 20.15 Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd v Phillips (1974) 131 CLR 286 .… 21.19, 21.20, 24.28 Neill v Hewens (1953) 89 CLR 1 .… 16.40 Neilsen v Hempston Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 302 .… 11.86, 11.123 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd [2002] WASC 231 .… 7.3 Nelson v Bellamy [2000] NSWSC 182 .… 11.111, 21.21, 23.22, 23.25, 23.39 — v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 .… 11.103, 18.1, 18.9, 18.10, 18.12, 18.14, 18.20, 18.40, 18.45, 18.46 — v Moorcraft (2014) 318 ALR 621; [2014] WASCA 212 .… 19.5 — v Stocker (1859) 4 De G & J 458; 45 ER 178; [1843–60] All ER Rep 865 .… 17.41 Nemeth v Australian Litigation Funders Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 198 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406 .… 10.5, 10.7, 10.25, 19.7

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Table of Cases



New South Wales v Banabelle Electrical Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 178; (2002) 54 NSWLR 503; [2002] NSWSC 178 .… 6.16, 10.41, 10.49, 10.56 New Standard Energy PEL 570 Ltd v Outback Energy Hunter Pty Ltd [2019] SASCFC 132 .… 10.41, 10.42 New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182 .… 10.13 New Zealand Licensed Rest Homes Associated Inc v Midland Regional Health Authority (unreported, NZ High Crt, 15 June 1999) .… 6.15, 28.21 New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co v Howes (1891) 4 QLJ 73 .… 11.44, 11.67 New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd [2004] VSCA 163 .… 2.13 New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154 .… 3.4, 3.28, 3.40, 4.7, 4.8, 4.34, 7.38 Newbigging v Adam (1886) 34 Ch D 582; [1886–90] All ER Rep 975 .… 11.53, 11.55 Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 52 CLR 723 .… 20.8, 20.9, 20.15, 21.23, 21.29 Newcastle Diocese Trustees v Ebbeck (1960) 104 CLR 394 .… 18.26 Newcombe v Chapple (1985) 3 BPR 9391 .… 24.4 Newell v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 311 .… 10.30 Newey v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] NSWCA 319 .… 10.12, 12.30, 12.39 Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 .… 8.40 Newham v Diamond Leisure Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 117 FLR 429 .… 18.6, 18.12 Newitt v Leitch (1997) 6 Tas R 396 .… 18.3, 26.4 Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd (1959) SR (NSW) 130 .… 3.34 Newman v Ivermee (1989) NSW ConvR 55-493 .… 5.19, 5.24, 6.8, 12.68, 12.69, 15.31 Newmont Pty Ltd v Laverton Nickel NL (1982) 44 ALR 598 .… 5.25, 20.4, 20.8, 20.16 News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410; 58 FCR 447; 135 ALR 33; 139 ALR 193 .… 5.10, 7.43, 10.41, 10.43, 11.111, 13.7, 18.42

Nemtsas v Nemtsas [1957] VR 191 .… 12.46, 12.66 Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v City of Penrith (1989) NSW Conv R 55438 .… 2.14 Neptune Hospitality Pty Ltd v Ozmen Entertainment Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 47 .… 10.44, 21.34 Nessmine Pty Ltd v Devuso Pty Ltd (1990) ANZ ConvR 298 .… 3.69 Netaf Pty Ltd v Bikane Pty Ltd (1990) 92 ALR 490 .… 11.146, 11.150 Netglory Pty Ltd v Caratti [2013] WASC 364 .… 25.3 Netline Pty Ltd v QAV Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 131 …. 23.2 Network Ten Pty Ltd v Fulwood (1995) 62 IR 43 .… 24.24 — v TX Australia Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 312 .… 6.11 Neuchatel Asphalte Co Ltd v Barnett [1957] 1 WLR 356 .… 6.5 Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Traspunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2011] 2 Qd R 114; [2010] QCA 119 .… 2.2, 11.149 Neville v Kelly (1862) 12 CBNS 740; 142 ER 1333 .… 3.40 New Dragon Investments Pty Ltd v Morgan and Banks Development Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1139 .… 22.10 New Hart Builders Ltd v Brindley [1975] .… 16.61 New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455 .… 17.74 — v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12 .… 23.14 — v Moss [2000] NSWCA 133 .… 23.15, 23.29 — v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235 .… 23.19 — v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 .… 2.5, 2.13, 3.11, 11.111 — v Stevens (2013) 82 NSWLR 106 .… 23.2 New South Wales Cancer Council v Sarfaty (1992) 28 NSWLR 68 .… 23.14 New South Wales Lotteries Corporation Pty Ltd v Kuzmanovski [2011] FCAFC 106 .… 8.16, 10.27 New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 740 .… 12.30, 12.31, 12.33, 12.39, 12.40 New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd v Council of the Municipality of Glebe (1937) SR (NSW) 288 .… 2.7, 16.68 cix

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Nitopi v Nitopi [2022] NSWCA 162 .… 15.9, 15.10 Nitschke v Rossair Pty Ltd (1989) 97 FLR 54 .… 7.3 Nixon v Furphy (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 151 .… 13.7 — v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 453; 165 ALR 515; [1999] FCA 1107 .… 11.146, 11.147 — v Slater and Gordon (2000) 175 ALR 15 .… 11.112 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (2000) 107 FCR 270; 186 ALR 442; [2000] FCA 1558 .… 10.67, 11.108 No Fuss Finance Pty Ltd v Miller [2006] NSWSC 630 .… 15.28 No TasWind Farm Group Inc v HydroElectric Corporation (No 2) [2014] FCA 348 .… 11.111 Nobes v Australian Cricket Board (1991, unreported) .… 18.36 Nobile v National Australia Bank Ltd (1987) 9 ATPR 40-787 .… 11.112 — v Maddison (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 435 .… 18.41 Noble v Public Trustee of Queensland [1994] 1 Qd R 402 .… 18.6 — v Victoria [1999] QCA 110 .… 26.9 Nobleza v Lampl (1986) 85 FLR 147 .… 12.36, 16.67, 24.10 Nock v Maddern [2018] NSWCA 239 .… 2.5 Nocton v Ashburton [1914] AC 932; [1914–15] All ER Rep 45 .… 11.36, 11.88, 14.6, 15.2 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014; [1940] 3 All ER 549 .… 8.6 Nolan v Nolan [2004] VSCA 109 .… 25.13 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 11 ATPR 40-982 .… 15.9 Nonferral (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia (1998) 43 NSWLR 312 .… 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.19, 18.20 Noonan v Martin (1987) 10 NSWLR 402 .… 8.16 Noor Al Houda Islamic College Pty Ltd v Bankstown Airport Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 625; 189 FLR 14; [2005] NSWSC 20 .… 11.115 Noosa Shire Council v Farr [2001] QSC 60 .… 7.38 Noranda Australia Ltd v Lachlan Resources NL (1988) 14 NSWLR 1 .… 10.43

Newton v Gapes (1910) 12 WALR 86 .… 18.33 Newton, Bellamy and Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431 .… 4.27, 25.1 Newton-King v Wilkinson [1976] 2 NZLR 321 .… 16.38 Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560; [1964] 3 All ER 532 .… 11.48 Next Stage Living Moonee Ponds Pty Ltd v Ardmillan Places Nominees Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 89 .… 21.12 Nextra Australia Pty Ltd v Fletcher (2014) 17(6) INTLB 138 .… 11.104 Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 270 .… 21.19 — v Clyde Securities Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 443 .… 10.52 — v Filmlock Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 389 .… 23.26 Nguyen v Luxury Design Homes Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 178 .… 23.6, 26.6 — v Taylor (1992) 27 NSWLR 48 .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.31, 16.21 Nicholas v Thompson [1924] VLR 554 .… 11.40 Nichols v Earth Spirit Home Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 219 .… 16.55 Nicholson and Venn v Smith Marriott (1947) 177 LT 189 .… 12.18 Nicolazzo v Harb [2009] VSCA 79 .… 10.4 Nicolene Ltd v Simmonds [1953] 1 QB 543 .… 6.17 Nicvara Nominees Pty Ltd v Humich Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 243 .… 10.41 Nield v Davidson (1890) 11 LR (NSW) Eq 209 .… 12.55 Niesmann v Collingridge (1921) 29 CLR 177 .… 5.21, 5.24, 6.8, 20.2 Nikolaidis v Satouris (2014) 317 ALR 761; [2014] NSWCA 448 .… 11.112 Nilant v Plexipack Packaging Services Pty Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 428 .… 7.5 Nina’s Bar Bistro Pty Ltd v MBE Corp (Sydney) Pty Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 613 .… 21.12, 21.26 Nine Films and Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2005] FCA 1404 .… 11.116 Nissho Iwai (Australia) Ltd v Oskar [1984] WAR 53 .… 22.11 Nissho Iwai Australia Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1989) 167 CLR 219; [1989] HCA 32 .… 1.75, 10.32, 10.64, 10.73, 10.74, 10.75 Nisyrios v Pavia (1985) ASC 55-409 .… 11.93 cx

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Table of Cases



Northumberland and Durham District Banking Co, Re; Ex parte Bigge (1858) 28 LJ (Ch) 50 .… 11.33 Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523 .… 18.11, 18.12, 18.23, 18.47, 24.7, 24.30 — v Relly (1764) 2 Eden 286; 28 ER 908 .… 14.8 Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Icecream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635 .… 23.37 Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 233 .… 3.68, 10.30, 11.112, 11.116 Norwest Beef Industries Ltd v Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Co (1987) 8 NSWLR 568 .… 10.5 Norwich CC v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 .… 7.41, 7.42 Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Price [1934] AC 455; [1934] All ER Rep 352 .… 12.18 Nosic v Zurich Australian Life Insurance Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 67 .… 10.5 Noske v McGinnis (1932) 47 CLR 563 .… 23.6 Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff 246; 66 ER 103; [1843–60] All ER Rep 764 .… 14.8 Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v Thurstan [1903] AC 6 .… 17.18, 17.29 Novamaze Pty Ltd v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1995) 128 ALR 540 .… 18.34 Novawest Contracting Pty Ltd v Taras Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] VSC 205 .… 10.61 NR Pty Ltd v Kearney [2000] ACTSC 92 .… 22.12 NRM Corporation Pty Ltd v ACCC [2016] FCAFC 98 .… 15.1, 15.16, 15.22 NRMA Ltd v Morgan [1999] NSWSC 407 .… 23.8, 23.11, 23.12, 23.35, 23.38, 23.43 NSW Association of Operative Plasterers v Sadler (1918) AR (NSW) 159 .… 13.3 NSW Cancer Council v Sarfaty (1992) 28 NSWLR 68 .… 10.5, 10.15, 10.41, 23.14, 23.32 NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 740 .… 12.41, 12.42 NSW Rifle Association Inc v Commonwealth (2012) 293 ALR 158; 266 FLR 13; [2012] NSWSC 818 .… 10.43 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [2001] FCA 334; (2001) 184 ALR 481 .… 10.7, 10.42, 10.43, 10.45, 10.56

Norco Co-operative Ltd v Parmalat Australia Ltd [2006] QSC 038 .… 10.35 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535 .… 18.37 Norfolk Estates Ltd v Cadiz Corp Pty Ltd (1977) 8 ATR 77 .… 12.33 Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 .… 8.3, 8.4, 8.9, 8.10, 8.12, 8.16, 8.18, 8.20, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.34, 8.35, 8.37, 8.38, 8.39, 8.46 Norman Baker Pty Ltd v Baker (1978) 3 ACLR 856 .… 17.22 Norman, Re; Forest Enterprises Ltd v FEA Plantation Ltd (2011) 195 FCR 97; 280 ALR 470; [2011] FCAFC 99 .… 5.17 Norrie v Senate of the University of Auckland [1984] 1 NZLR 129 .… 5.1 Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 .… 11.88 Nortel Australia Pty Ltd v Portfolio Leasing Australia Ltd (1998) 8 BPR 15,857 .… 3.44 North v Loomes [1919] 1 .… 16.41 — v Marra (1981) 148 CLR 42; [2003] NSWSC 64 .… 10.33, 18.1, 18.19, 18.21, 18.22, 18.40, 18.41, 18.43 North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd (2012) 285 ALR 217; [2012] FCAFC 1; (2010) 269 ALR 262; [2010] FCAFC 60 .… 11.83, 11.117 North East Solution Pty Ltd v Masters Home Improvement Australia Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 1 .… 6.16, 10.47 North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 89; [1979] 3 WLR 419; [1979] QB 705 .… 4.33, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, 13.9, 13.11 North Western Railway Co v M’Michael (l850) 5 Exch 114 .… 17.19 Northcliffe Constructions Pty Ltd v Stein [2000] NSWSC 1216 .… 6.16 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 146 ALR 572; [1997] HCA 39 .… 7.17, 7.18 Northern Territory v Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 20 .… 3.37 Northern Territory of Australia v Skywest Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 2 .… 18.30 Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146; 93 ALR 385 .… 17.70 Northstate Carpet Mills Pty Ltd v B R Industries Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1057 .… 3.45 cxi

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Trevor [2000] WASC 254 .… 8.9 Nudgee Bakery Pty Ltd’s Agreement, Re [1971] Qd R 24 .… 10.54 Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v The Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635.... 10.41, 10.52, 18.35 Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 .… 3.10, 3.61, 3.62 Nunkuwarrin Yunti v AL Seeley Constructions Pty Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 21 .… 16.55, 18.49 Nurisvan Investment Ltd v Anyoption Holdings [2017] VSCA 141 .… 5.24, 7.2, 10.16 Nyhuis v Anton [1980] Qd R 34 .… 20.3 Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin [2017] FCAFC 59 .… 11.111 NZI Capital Corp Ltd v Poignand (1997) ATPR 41-586 .… 11.56 NZI Insurance Australia Ltd v Baryzcka (2003) 85 SASR 497; [2003] SASC 190 .… 6.2, 6.8 O Oak Capital Mortgage Fund Ltd v Dlakic [2019] NSWSC 1538 .… 15.28 Oakacre Ltd v Claire Cleaners (Holdings) Ltd [1982] Ch 197; [1981] 3 All ER 667 .… 24.31 Oakes v Turquand and Harding (1867) LR 2 HL 325; [1861–73] All ER Rep 738 .… 11.59 Obeid v ACCC (2014) 226 FCR 471; 316 ALR 457; [2014] FCAFC 155 .… 11.111 O’Brien v ANZ Bank Ltd (1971) 5 SASR 347 .… 12.66, 15.2, 15.11, 25.14 — v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295 .… 21.19 — v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-028 .… 15.28 — v Melbank Corp Ltd (1991) 7 ACSR 19 .… 18.11, 18.41 — v Smolonogov (1984) 53 ALR 107 .… 11.107, 11.111 O’Callaghan v Lloyd Aviation Pty Ltd [1982] VR 387 .… 25.6 — v Olsen [1948] SASR 123 .… 6.8 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp v Skibs A/S Avanti [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293 .… 11.79, 13.7 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1987) ASC 55-568; (1988) 165 CLR 197 .… 3.4, 3.21, 3.26, 10.26, 10.27, 10.62, 10.68, 10.69, 10.70, 10.71, 15.26, 18.34, 22.12

Ockerby & Co Ltd v Watson (1918) 25 CLR 431 .… 19.13, 19.22 O’Connor v Leaw Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 285 .… 16.55, 18.49 — v S P Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248 .… 11.50, 21.29, 21.30 O’Connor’s Bills of Costs, Re [1993] 1 Qd R 423 .… 18.20, 18.49 Octra Nominees Pty Ltd v Chipper [2007] FCAFC 92 .… 3.67 O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 45 ALR 632; 152 CLR 359 .… 23.45 O’Dempsey v Hansen [1939] QWN 22 .… 10.23 O’Donnell v Thor Industries Pty Ltd (1977) 136 CLR 296 .… 10.57 Offer-Hoar v Larkstore Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 2926; [2006] EWCA Civ 1079 .… 8.40 Official Receiver v Cargo Superintendents (London) Ltd and Schebsman [1944] Ch 83; [1943] 2 All ER 768 .… 7.44 — v Feldman [1972] 4 SASR 246 .… 11.50 Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 641 .… 2.16 Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748; 142 ER 1336 .… 3.38, 3.71 Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VR 1041 .… 25.3, 25.8, 26.12 — v Ryan [1976] 2 NSWLR 504 .… 16.60, 16.76 Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 .… 21.12, 21.13, 21.20, 21.29, 21.30, 21.38, 23.20, 23.21, 24.32 O’Halloran Enterprises Pty Ltd v Farr [1979] VR 33 .… 3.68 — v Williamson [1979] VR 33 .… 7.28 O’Keefe v Taylor Estates Co Ltd [1916] QSR 301 .… 11.31, 11.74, 11.84 — v Williams (1910) 11 CLR 171 .… 10.41, 24.19 Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 .… 5.20, 8.8 Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd (1998) 3 VR 380; [1998] 3 VR 485 .… 2.29, 15.1, 15.8, 15.13, 24.23 Olga Investments Pty Ltd v Citipower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 .… 2.29 Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 .… 3.55, 3.57, 3.61

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Table of Cases Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd v Ballard (Kent) Ltd [2000] .… 21.30 — v Davis [1949] 2 KB 727; [1949] 2 All ER 353 .… 4.23 — v Lakeside Property Trust Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1040; [2006] NSWCA 285 .… 21.12, 21.18, 26.6, 26.13 O’Loughlin v O’Loughlin [1958] VR 649 .… 18.34 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365; [1969] HCA 3 .… 1.43, 7.1, 7.45, 8.38, 8.39, 8.46, 8.47, 16.68, 16.71, 21.35, 22.5 Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61 .… 10.18, 10.53, 10.54 Omega Air Inc v CAE Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 802 .… 11.150 O’Neil v Medical Benefits Funds of Australia Ltd (2002) 122 FCR 455; [2002] FCAFC 188 .… 11.117 O’Neill v Geddes [1971] 2 NSWLR 143 .… 22.5 — v O’Connell (1946) 72 CLR 101 .… 18.7, 18.8, 18.9, 18.39 OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 1; [2013] NSWCA 27 .… 10.30, 10.32 — v United KG Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 119 .… 10.56 One.Tel Ltd (in liq) v David Watson [2009] NSWCA 282 .… 8.23 Onley v Catlin Syndicate Ltd as the Underwriting Member of Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 [2018] FCAFC 119 .… 11.42 Onslow Salt Pty Ltd v Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation [2018] FCAFC 118 .… 6.16 Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 .… 3.39 oOh! Media Roadside Pty Ltd (formerly Power Panels Pty Ltd) v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 255; [2011] VSCA 116 .… 19.5, 19.7, 19.12 OPR WA Pty Ltd v Marron [2016] WASC 395 .… 15.22 Optimum Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Open Realty Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 110 .… 26.12 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Gilsan (International) Ltd [2006] NSWCA 171 .… 26.2, 26.5 — v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] FCA 1798; (2010) 265 ALR 281; [2010] FCAFC 21 .… 10.42, 10.44, 10.45, 24.1



Optus Vision Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd [2004] NSWCA 61 .… 10.12, 10.32 Oraka Pty Ltd v Leda Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) ATPR 41-558; [1998] ANZ Conv R 577 .… 11.150 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 .… 17.18 Oran Park v Fleissig [2002] NSWCA 371 .… 23.24 Orica Investments v McCartney [2010] NSWSC 488 .… 23.14 Orica Investments Pty Ltd v McCartney [2007] NSWSC 645 .… 18.37 Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 .… 3.27, 3.44 Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vic) (2002) 120 FCR 191; [2002] FCA 860 .… 11.111 Orix Australia Corporation Ltd v Moody Kiddell & Partners Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 257 .… 11.121, 11.122 Orlit Pty Ltd v JF&P Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 277 .… 23.11 Ormwave Pty Ltd v Smith [2007] NSWCA 210 .… 3.6, 5.24, 6.2, 10.1 O’Rourke v Hoeven [1974] 1 NSWLR 622 .… 16.61, 16.63, 16.66 Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 .… 25.14 — v R (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 71 .… 3.42 Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1319 .… 15.15, 24.23 Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Road Show Ltd [2007] VSC 1 .… 7.2 Orton v Melman [1981] 1 NSWLR 583 .… 18.37, 18.38 Orwell v Mortoft or The Case of the Sale of Barley (1505) YB 20 Hen 7, fo 8, pl 18; Anon, Keilfo 69 and 77 .… 27.8 Osborn v McDermott [1998] 3 VR 1 .… 4.24 Osborne v Estate of Frederick Osborne and Daisy Osborne [2001] VSCA 228 .… 5.8 — v Landpower Developments Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 117 .… 10.6 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 .… 10.24, 11.2, 12.29 Osland v Foot (No 1) (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 320 .… 16.48 Osorio v Cardona (1984) 15 DLR (4th) 619 .… 5.9 Osric Investments Pty Ltd v Clout [2001] FCA 1402 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.24

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1402 .… 21.24 Ostabridge Pty Ltd (in liq) v Stafford [2001] NSWSC 131 .… 8.40 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 428; [1985] 3 All ER 351 .… 11.53, 11.57, 15.8 — v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1913] VLR 173 .… 6.5 — v O’Leary [1955] VLR 52 .… 26.13 Otrava Pty Ltd v Mail Boxes Etc (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1066 .… 19.2, 19.5, 19.9, 23.15, 23.29, 23.30 Oudaille v Lawson [1922] NZLR 25 .… 11.13, 11.16 Oughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 206; [1959] 3 All ER 623; [1959] WLR 898 .… 8.21 Ousley v Varsity Life [2005] NSWSC 462 .… 19.23 Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221 .… 3.29 Ovenden v Palyaris Construction Pty Ltd (1975) 11 SASR 65 .… 18.4 — v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17 .… 10.43, 10.44, 10.45 Overlook Management BV v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 17 .… 10.3 Overmyer Industrial Brokers Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 305 .… 11.103, 16.67 Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 6 .… 16.55, 26.1, 26.3, 26.5 Owen v Homan (1853) 4 HL Cas 997; 10 ER 752 .… 15.9 — v John L Norris Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1312 .… 24.30 Owendale Pty Ltd v Anthony (1966) 40 ALJR 446; (1967) 117 CLR 539 .… 21.13, 21.29 Owerhall v Bolton & Swan Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 91 .… 15.9, 15.10 Owners Corp SP 72357 v Dasco Constructions Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 607; [2010] NSWSC 819 .… 11.134 Owners, Master and Crew of ‘The Cartela’ v The Inverness Shire (1916) 21 CLR 387; 22 ALR 126; [1916] HCA 15 .… 12.12 Owners of Strata Plan 5290 v CGS & Co Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 285; 281 ALR 575; [2011] NSWCA 168 .… 8.6 Owners — Strata Plan 60285 v Bondlake Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1037 .… 18.9

Owners — SP 62930 v Kell & Rigby Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1342 .… 11.150 Owners — Strata Plan 78102 v Owners — Strata Plan 78101 [2010] NSWSC 973 .… 6.11 Ownit Homes Pty Ltd v Batchelor [1983] 2 Qd R 124 .… 21.15, 21.38, 26.13 Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd (2011) 248 FLR 193; [2011] WASCA 76 .… 11.115 Oxborough v North Harbour Builders Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 145 .… 21.30 OXS Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2016] NSWCA 120 .… 11.115 OZ Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [2015] VSCA 346 .… 10.73, 10.74 P P&M Productions Pty Ltd v Elders Leasing Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 264 .… 18.7 P Ward v Civil and Civic [1999] NSWSC 727 .… 5.16, 10.26 Paal Wilson and Co v Partenreederei (The Hannah Blumenthal) (1983) 1 AC 854 .… 19.23 Pacer v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996, unreported) .… 12.26, 12.27 Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 28; [2005] FCA 288; (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40 .… 2.18, 2.29, 8.2, 8.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.40, 8.47, 8.49, 8.51, 10.43, 10.46, 21.12, 21.14, 21.28, 21.31, 21.32, 21.34, 21.37 Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.31, 3.11, 3.15 Pacific Film Laboratories v FCT (1970) 44 ALJR 376 .… 16.80 Pacific National (ACT) Ltd v Queensland Rail [2006] FCA 91 .… 15.15 Paciocco v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249; (2015) 236 FCR 199; [2015] FCAFC 50; (2016) 258 CLR 525; 333 ALR 569; [2016] HCA 28 .… 10.44, 15.1, 15.16, 23.45, 24.1, 27.1 Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549 .… 23.32 Page v Cox (1852) 10 Hare 163; 68 ER 882 .… 7.45 Page One Records Ltd v Britton [1968] 1 WLR 157; [1967] 3 All ER 822 .… 24.11, 24.24, 24.26 Paget v Marshall (1885) 28 Ch D 255 .… 12.54

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Table of Cases Painaway Australia Pty Ltd v JAKL Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 205 .… 2.20, 8.6 Pakenham Upper Fruit Co Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 .… 24.13, 24.26 Pakistan International Airline Corporation v Times Travel (UK) Ltd [2021] 3 WLR 727; [2021] UKSC 40 .… 10.43, 13.1, 13.2, 13.5, 13.9, 14.1, 14.4, 14.5, 15.6 Palaniappan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] WASCA 72 .… 11.149 Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 .… 8.28 Palmer v Bank of New South Wales [1973] 2 NSWLR 244 (CA); (1975) 133 CLR 150 (HC) .… 5.8, 6.5 — v Carey [1926] AC 703 .… 8.19 Paltara Pty Ltd v Dempster (1991) 6 WAR 85 .… 10.41, 10.52, 20.16 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 496 .… 11.60 Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v Ship ‘Comandate’ (No 2) [2006] FCA 1112 .… 10.41 Pan Foods Co Importers & Distributors Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 579; [2000] HCA 20 .… 6.6, 10.32, 10.33, 20.7, 20.9, 21.19, 21.23 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd, Re (2008) 165 FCR 230; 246 ALR 514; [2008] FCAFC 2 .… 11.117 Panel Tech Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pacific Sheet & Coil Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1230 .… 10.73 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 .… 4.22, 4.34, 13.2, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9 Paolucci v Makedyn Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 215 .… 24.1, 24.29 Papale v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd [2017] QSC 72 .… 15.16 Papapetros v Mazza (1989) 7 BCL 60 .… 22.4 Papas v Bianca Investments Pty Ltd (2002) 82 SASR 581; [2002] SASC 190 .… 12.61, 12.62 Papastravou v Gavan [1968] 2 NSWR 286 .… 18.37 Paper Products Pty Ltd v Tomlinson (Rochdale) Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-315; (1994) 122 ALR 279 .… 11.110, 11.114 Pappas v Soulac Pty Ltd (1983) 50 ALR 231 .… 11.119, 11.122 Para Motors Pty Ltd v Cocks (1974) 9 SASR 44 .… 16.32 Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26 .… 19.21



Paramasivam v Flynn [1998] ACTSC 10; (1998) 90 FCR 489; 160 ALR 203; [1998] FCA 1711 .… 25.13 Paramedical Services Pty Ltd v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [1999] FCA 548 .… 11.109 Parbury Henty & Co Pty Ltd v General Engineering & Agencies Pty Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 336 .… 16.37, 16.86 Parij v Parij (1997) 22 SASR 155 .… 16.75 Park v Allied Mortgage Corp Ltd (1993) ATPR (Digest) 46-105 .… 8.7 — v Brothers (2005) 80 ALJR 317; 222 ALR 421; [2005] HCA 73 .… 10.12, 10.31, 10.41, 10.49, 20.1, 20.16, 21.27, 21.29, 23.14 Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 .… 11.121, 11.122, 11.123 Parker v Barnett (1889) 16 VLR 214 .… 16.35 — v Clark [1960] 1 All ER 93 .… 5.7 — v Judkin [1931] 1 Ch 475 .… 7.47 — v Mortgage Advance Securities Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 275 .… 15.8 — v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 .… 27.1 — v Registrar-General [1976] 1 NSWLR 343 .… 11.50 — v South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 .… 3.21 Parkersinclair Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v ASIA Associates Inc [2000] VSC 362 .… 13.7, 13.11 ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] 3 WLR 1373; [2016] 2 All ER 516 .… 15.20 Parkinson v Lee (1802) 2 East 314; 102 ER 389 .… 27.26 Parland Pty Ltd v Mariposa Pty Ltd (1995) 5 Tas R 121 .… 7.28, 10.52, 22.5 Paroz v Paroz [2010] QCA 362 .… 15.9 Parr v Rural Agents Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 347 .… 18.34 Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 138 .… 10.39, 10.52 Parras Holdings Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 391 .… 13.7, 21.37 Parr’s Banking Co v Yates [1898] 2 QB 460 .… 25.3 Parsons v McBain (2001) 109 FCR 120; 192 ALR 772; [2001] FCA 376 .… 16.71, 16.73

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421; [1968] 1 WLR 1204 .… 3.19 Partyka v Wilkie (1982) ASC 55-213 .… 15.31 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; [1979] 2 All ER 945 .… 2.7, 2.9, 16.69, 16.72 Pascoe and Co Ltd v Holden’s Motor Body Builders Ltd [1931] SASR 180 .… 23.13 Pasdonnay Pty Ltd v SDS Corporation Ltd [2005] WASCA 9 .… 20.16 Pasedina (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Khouri (1977) 1 BPR 9460 .… 24.4, 24.8 Pasley v IRC [1958] NZLR 332 .… 16.29 Pasternacki and Solka-Pasternacki v Correy [2000] NSWCA 333 .… 14.20, 15.28 Patel v Ali [1984] Ch 283; [1984] 1 All ER 978 .… 24.8 — v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399; [2016] UKSC 42 .… 18.46 — v University of Bradford Senate [1978] 1 WLR 1488; [1978] 3 All ER 841 .… 5.1 Pateman v Koh [2007] WASCA 85 .… 10.34 Paterson v McNaghten (1905) 2 CLR 615, affirmed in (1907) 6 CLR 257 (PC) .… 20.15 — v Murphy (1853) 11 Hare 988; 69 ER 1198 .… 7.47 Patersons Securities Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2015] WASC 321 .… 10.77 Patience, Ex parte; Makinson v Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96 .… 8.11 Patrick v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 133 .… 11.111 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1; 153 ALR 643; [1998] HCA 30 .… 24.1, 24.12, 24.13 Patrick, Re; Bills v Tatham [1891] 1 Ch 82 .… 8.38 Patterson v Dolman [1908] VLR 354 .… 3.42, 3.60, 16.86 — v Lowe [1955] St R Qd 437 .… 18.43 Patti v Belfiore (1958) 100 CLR 198 .… 10.32 Pattison v Mann (1975) 13 SASR 34 .… 16.65 Paul v Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd [1985] 3 NSWLR 114 .… 16.55 — v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] QCA 252 .… 25.12 Pave Wealth Services Pty Ltd v Danielle Jones as executrix of the estate of the late Michael Frederick Jones [2021] WASCA 7 .… 11.110

Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 182 CLR 221; (1987) 162 CLR 221; 69 ALR 577 .… 7.3, 16.1, 16.53, 16.54, 16.55, 18.46, 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.6, 26.9, 27.19 Pavlovic v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 605; [2015] NSWCA 313 .… 5.19, 10.16 Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502 .… 3.22, 3.58, 3.64 — v McDonald (1908) 6 CLR 208 .… 18.25, 18.45 Paynter v Willems [1983] 2 VR 377 .… 9.8, 9.9 Payzu Ltd v Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581 .… 23.42 PC Developments Pty Ltd v Revell (1991) 22 NSWLR 615 .… 21.35, 23.45 PE Kafka Pty Ltd v The Hermitage Motel Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 94 .… 11.83 Peabody (Wilkie Creek) Pty Ltd v Queensland Bulk Handling Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 202 .… 3.11 Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 .… 8.6 Peanut Marketing Board v Cuda (1984) 79 FLR 368 .… 13.7, 13.9 Pearce v Brain [1929] 2 KB 310; [1929] All ER Rep 627 .… 17.21, 17.35 — v Brooks (1886) LR 1 Exch 213; [1861] All ER Rep 102 .… 18.27 — v Gardner [1897] 1 QB 688 .… 16.44 — v Kelly (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 88 .… 17.18, 17.23 — v Pearce [1977] 1 NSWLR 170 .… 16.70 Pears v Balzer (1996) 137 ALR 180 .… 11.111 Pearse, Re [1905] VLR 446 .… 4.40 Pearson v Arcadia Stores Guyra Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 571 .… 8.6, 25.14 — v Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd [1931] SASR 320 .… 16.15 — v HRX Holdings Pty Ltd (2012) 205 FCR 187; [2012] FCAFC 111 .… 18.37 — v Seligman (1883) 48 LT 842 .… 11.80 Pearson & Son Ltd v Dublin Corp [1907] AC 351 .… 11.42 Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353 .… 17.73 Peco Arts Inc v Hazlitt Gallery Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1315; [1983] 3 All ER 193 .… 25.6 Peddie v Stein (1988) NSW ConvR 55-379 .… 15.30

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Table of Cases Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 .… 11.31, 11.78 Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386 .… 2.3 Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd v Environmental Systems Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 194 .… 10.55 Peet v Richmond (2011) 33 VR 465; [2011] VSCA 343 .… 26.6 — v — (No 2) [2009] VSC 585 .… 23.32 Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 .… 5.24, 6.8 Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 .… 2.9, 2.16, 10.3, 24.32 Pejovic v Malinic (1960) SR (NSW) 184 .… 16.62 Pembroke Antiques Pty Ltd v SPA Property and Investments Co Pty Ltd .… 11.30, 11.79 Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd v Lednez Industries (Australia) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 282 .… 8.6 Pendlebury v Colonial Mutual Assurance Society Ltd (1912) 13 CLR 676 .… 11.76 Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 211 .… 11.115 Peninsula Securities, in Quantum Actuarial LLP v Quantum Advisory Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 227 .… 18.35 Peninsula Securities Ltd v Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd [2020] 3 WLR 521 [2020] UKSC 36 .… 18.35 Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625 .… 23.5, 23.6, 23.24, 23.25 Pennicott v Pennicott (1936) 30 Tas LR 111 .… 21.13 Pennsylvania Shipping Co v Compagnie Nationale de Navigation [1936] 2 All ER 1167; (1936) 155 LT 294 .… 11.69 Penrith City Council v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 24 NSWLR 564 .… 25.4 Penrith District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Fittler (NSWSC, 8 February 1996, Santow J, unreported) .… 10.13, 10.57, 10.58, 19.10, 19.13, 19.19, 19.23, 21.13 Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 176 .… 11.118, 16.22, 16.23, 16.56, 16.67 Pepe v Platypus Asset Management Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 603 .… 4.17



Peppers Hotel Management Pty Ltd v Hotel Capital Partners Ltd [2004] NSWCA 114 .… 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 10.34 Percy v Youngman [1941] VLR 275 .… 17.18 Perfection Dairies Pty Ltd v Australian Cooperative Foods Ltd t/as Dairy Farmers [2007] NSWSC 176 .… 10.42, 10.57 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 .… 8.18, 8.27, 8.36 Perkins Maritime International Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank (1991) 105 FLR 216 .… 24.23 Permaform Plastics Ltd v London & Midland General Insurance Co [1995] 8 WWR 201 .… 13.9 Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1992) 10 WAR 109; (1993) 10 WAR 109 .… 10.35, 18.7, 22.2, 22.5, 22.12 Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353; [2010] WASC 10 .… 14.13, 14.15, 14.17, 14.19, 14.20, 15.1, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9, 15.11, 15.16, 15.31 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514 .… 18.3 Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd v Bridgewater [1936] 3 All ER 501 .… 15.2 Permasteelisa Pty Ltd v Four Seas Network Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 98 .… 21.12 Perpetual Custodians Ltd v IOOF Investment Management Ltd (2013) 278 FLR 49; [2013] NSWCA 231 .… 10.32 Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Russell (1931) 45 CLR 146 .… 16.48 — v Wright (1917) 23 CLR 185 .… 18.25, 18.45 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1960] NSWSR 366; [1961] SR (NSW) 333 .… 8.4 — v Aroney (1944) SR (NSW) 313 .… 18.31 — v Bligh (1940) 41 SR (NSW) 33 .… 10.13 — v CTC Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 58 .… 11.133, 11.135, 11.140, 11.141, 23.31 — v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41 .… 15.8, 15.9, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 — v Michael Wilson Kwok [2011] NSWSC 422 .… 11.127

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Milanex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 367 .… 11.107, 11.129, 11.134, 11.136, 11.139, 11.142 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180 .… 7.41 Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537 .… 5.21, 5.25, 6.17, 10.36, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5, 20.8, 20.9, 20.12, 20.13, 20.16, 21.17, 21.19, 21.23, 21.29, 21.35 Perry v Anthony [2016] NSWCA 56 .… 10.12 Pesticcio v Huet [2004] EWCA Civ 372 .… 14.1 Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355 .… 10.26, 12.3, 12.44, 12.66, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70 Peter A Simon Real Estate Pty Ltd v Ghabash [2004] NSWCA 467 .… 10.73 Peter v Compton (1694) Holt (KB) 326; 90 ER 1080 .… 16.30 — v Shipway (1908) 7 CLR 232 .… 8.38 Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235 .… 19.2, 21.10, 21.13, 21.17, 21.26, 21.27, 21.29 Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149 .… 3.11 Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 .… 10.7, 11.150 Peters v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] ASC 56-135 .… 14.16, 15.27 — v General Accident and Life Assurance Co [1937] 4 All ER 628 .… 8.6 — v Tuck (1915) 11 Tas LR 30 .… 17.40 Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville Ltd [1999] FCA 1245; (2001) 181 ALR 337; 185 ALR 152; 205 CLR 126; [2001] HCA 45 .… 10.41, 18.35, 18.37 Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v Champion (1928) 41 CLR 316 .… 6.7, 10.57 — v Patricia’s Chocolates and Candies Pty Ltd (1947) 77 CLR 574 .… 18.37 Peters American Queensland Cooperative Milling Association v Pamag Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 2 .… 18.37 Peters Ice Cream (Vic) Ltd v Todd [1961] VR 485 .… 18.38 Petersville Ltd v Peters (WA) Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-674 .… 18.37 Petrie v Dwyer (1954) 91 CLR 99 .… 21.12, 21.28, 21.29 Petroleum Investment Company v Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea [2015] NSWCA 363 .… 6.11

Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777; [1969] 2 All ER 385 .… 5.4 Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 .… 16.73 Petty v Penfold Wines Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 282 .… 11.119 Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd v Probiotec Pharma Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 532 .… 11.138, 23.31 Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health [1965] AC 512 .… 5.29 Phak & Xu [2015] FamCA 939 .… 12.25 Pham v Doan [2005] NSWSC 201 .… 18.7, 18.9 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1952] 2 QB 795; [1952] 2 All ER 456 .… 3.20 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v A-G (2004) 2 NZCCLR 187 .… 13.9 Philegan & Co Pty Ltd v Blacktown Municipal Council (1974) 29 LGRA 231 .… 24.8 Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 .… 11.151 Phillip & Anton Homes Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 10 ATPR 40-838 .… 11.109, 11.150 Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Transport Commission [1975] Tas SR 128 .… 7.42 Phillip M Levy Pty Ltd v Christopoulos [1973] VR 673 .… 18.37 Phillips v Brooks Ltd [1919] 2 KB 243; [1918–19] All ER Rep 246 .… 12.60, 12.61, 12.62, 12.63 — v Butler [1945] .… 16.42 — v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 221 .… 16.46, 16.54, 22.4, 22.6, 26.6, 26.13 — v Hutchinson [1946] VLR 270 .… 14.7 Phillips Fox v Westgold Resources NL [2000] WASCA 85 .… 10.56 Phillips-Higgins v Harper [1954] 1 QB 411; [1954] 2 All ER 51 .… 25.6 Philpott v Wallet (1682) 3 Lev 65; 83 ER 579 .… 16.20 Phoenix Commercial Enterprises Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council [2010] NSWCA 64 .… 10.31, 10.32 Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 .… 10.73, 24.1 Pianta v National Finance and Trustees Ltd (1964) 38 ALJR 232; (1964) 180 CLR 146 .… 24.1, 24.4

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Table of Cases Pickering v Thoroughgood (1533) 93 YB Sel Soc 4 .… 27.8 Pickersgill & Harvey v Tsoukalas [2009] SASC 357 .… 5.11 Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2004] VSC 263 .… 11.110 — v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 204; (2005) 214 ALR 392; [2005] HCA 13 .… 4.6, 7.2 Pierce Bell Sales Pty Ltd v Frazer (1973) 130 CLR 575 .… 10.41, 10.46, 20.17, 20.18, 21.9 Pigram v A-G for NSW (1975) 132 CLR 216 .… 10.32, 10.34, 23.45 Pilbara Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Ammon [2020] WASCA 92 .… 10.40, 10.59 Pilmer v The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 180 ALR 249 .… 23.7, 23.11, 23.26, 23.30, 23.35 Pine Rivers, Caboolture & Redcliffe Group Training Scheme Inc v Group Training Association Queensland & Northern Territory Inc [2015] 1 Qd R 542; [2013] QCA 258 .… 5.10 Pink Floyd Music Ltd v EMI Records Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 770; [2010] EWCA Civ 1429 .… 10.35 Pinnel’s Case; Penny v Core (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a; 77 ER 237; [1558-1774] All ER Rep 612 .… 4.4, 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, 4.39 Pinter v Pinter [2016] QSC 314 .… 14.2, 14.13 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Galli [1985] VR 675 .… 18.37 Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 78 .… 11.79, 11.108 Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 883 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.48, 21.24, 21.34 Piper Ellis Pty Ltd v Farmland Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 157 .… 10.27, 10.35, 10.68, 10.69, 10.73 Pipikos v Trayans (2018) 265 CLR 522; [2018] HCA 39 .… 16.58, 16.59, 16.60, 16.64, 16.67 Pirie v Saunders (1961) 104 CLR 149 .… 16.35, 16.37 Pirrotta v Citibank Savings Ltd (1997) 70 SASR 206 .… 14.17, 14.20 Pisano v Dandris [2014] NSWSC 1070 .… 11.111 Pitcher Partners Consulting Pty Ltd v Neville’s Bus Service Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 119 .… 11.82



Pitt v PHH Assets Management Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327 .… 6.14 Pittmore Pty Ltd v Chan .… 6.5 Pizzino v Finance Brokers (WA) Pty Ltd (1982) 56 ALJR 843 .… 10.35 Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 768; [2003] HCA 10; (2003) 196 ALR 257 .… 5.16, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 21.32, 21.34, 23.9, 23.13, 23.24 Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353; [1969] HCA 29 .… 1.34, 4.17, 5.2, 5.28, 6.7, 7.2, 10.30 Planet Kids Ltd v Auckland Council [2014] 1 NZLR 149; [2013] NZSC 147 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.21 Plastyne Products Pty Ltd v Gall Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-376 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.8 Platemaster Pty Ltd v M&T Investments Pty Ltd [1973] VR 93 .… 26.3 Plath v Plath [2020] QCA 43 .… 2.16, 5.11 Player v Isenberg [2002] NSWCA 186 .… 10.58 Players Pty Ltd v Clone Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 118 .… 20.3 Playgoers’ Co-operative Theatres Ltd v Workers Educational Assoc of NSW (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 374 .… 24.19 Plenty v Seventh-Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie [2006] SASC 361 .… 23.19 Plenty & Plenty v Seventh-Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie; Plenty & Plenty v Dickson [2006] SASC 361 .… 5.10 Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235 .… 11.111, 11.112 Plimmer v Wellington Corp (1884) 9 App Cas 699 .… 16.69, 16.70, 16.71 Plomley, Re (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 115 .… 17.61 Plumor Pty Ltd v Handley (1996) 41 NSWLR 30 .… 20.16 Plumptre’s Marriage Settlement, Re [1910] 1 Ch 609 .… 7.32 Plytarias v Andrews [1974] 2 NSWLR 382 .… 26.4 PM Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd v Daihatsu Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 798 .… 23.13, 23.29 PMP Print Pty Ltd v Wood [2005] VSC 230 .… 10.24 PNC Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v REW08 Projects Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 27 .… 18.10, 18.28

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

PND Civil Group Pty Ltd v Bastow Civil Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 159 .… 23.11 Pobjie Agencies Pty Ltd v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 105 .… 3.6 Poche v Ellingworth [2022] NSWSC 700 .… 21.9 Podrebersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529; [1985] HCA 34 .… 11.129, 11.142 Pohlmann v Harrison (1995) 2 Qd R 59 .… 16.55 Poletti v May [2000] WASC 29 .… 17.53 Polimeni v Villacam Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 86 .… 12.69 Poliwka v Girgis [2021] WASCA 30 .… 11.127 Polleykett v Georgeson (1878) 4 VLR (E) 207 .… 16.58, 16.61 Pollock v Mackenzie (1866) 1 Qd SCR 156 .… 23.11 Pomeroy v Thwaites Witham Pty Ltd (2000) 76 SASR 184; [2000] SASC 44; (2001) 79 SASR 489; [2001] SASC 125 .… 25.7 Pondcil Pty Ltd v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR .… 10.27, 10.28, 10.61, 10.70, 10.72 Pontypridd Union v Drew [1927] 1 KB 214 .… 17.8 Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 58 SASR 184 .… 18.6, 23.17 Poort v Development Underwriting (Victoria) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1977] VR 454 .… 21.23, 21.24 Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 .… 4.10, 4.23, 4.31, 4.35, 5.4, 16.37 Pordage v Cole (1669) 1 Wms Saund 319; 85 ER 449 .… 27.12 Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 231; (1980) 144 CLR 300 .… 1.76, 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38, 10.62, 10.64, 10.73, 10.74, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77, 20.3, 21.38, 25.1 Port Line Ltd v Ben Line Steamers Ltd [1958] 2 QB 146; [1958] 1 All ER 787; (1960) 3 Syd LR 295 .… 7.31, 19.13 Port of Brisbane Corp v ANZ Securities [2002] QCA 158 .… 26.5 Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 85 ALJR 182; [2010] HCA 44 .… 18.30

Portal Software v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1179 .… 18.37 Porter v Audio Visual Promotions Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR 40-547 .… 11.122 — v Latec Finance (Qld) Pty Ltd (1964) 111 CLR 177 .… 12.56, 12.61, 26.3, 26.5 — v Sundance Resources Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 493 .… 10.18, 10.40, 10.55, 22.9 POS Media Online Ltd v Queensland Investment Corp [2001] FCA 809 .… 26.8 Poseidon Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1991) 105 ALR 25 .… 10.15, 10.25, 10.41, 10.48, 10.56, 10.58, 11.115 Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350; [1999] WASCA 217 .… 6.6, 10.16 Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch 25 .… 24.13 Potato Producers Cooperative Ltd v Pavone [1962] VR 231 .… 18.3, 18.37 Pottinger v George (1967) 116 CLR 328 .… 9.9, 18.10 Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 .… 11.83, 11.85, 23.8 — v Smith [1993] 2 Qd R 44 .… 18.3 Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211; [2005] FCAFC 131 .… 11.150 Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540 .… 8.7 Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210 .… 7.7 Powell v Brent London BC [1988] ICR 176 .… 24.27 — v Hoyland (1851) 6 Exch 67; 155 ER 456 .… 13.6 — v Jones [1968] SASR 394 .… 6.11 — v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284 .… 3.43 — v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243 .… 14.7, 14.11 — v Tasmania [2001] TASSC 114 .… 11.111 — v Whyte [1968] Qd R 255 .… 16.58, 24.10 Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51; [2005] HCATrans 94 .… 2.26, 16.22, 16.47, 16.67 Powercor Australia Ltd v Pacific Power [1999] VSC 110 .… 10.3, 10.12, 10.32, 11.120 Powys v Brown (1924) 25 SR (NSW) 65 .… 23.6 Poyser v Gajic [2006] VSC 380 .… 10.6 PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 432; (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310

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Table of Cases .… 3.11, 3.27, 5.19, 5.24, 20.1, 20.4, 20.13 Pratt v Rush (1879) 5 VLR (L) 421 .… 16.41 Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469 .… 3.39 — v Transit New Zealand (2005) 2 NZLR 433; [2003] UKPC 83 .… 3.39, 10.43 Precision Fabrication Pty Ltd v Roadcon Pty Ltd (1991) 77 NTR 1; 104 FLR 267 .… 23.6 Premier Pizza Distributors Pty Ltd v Baingold Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1218 .… 18.37 Premier Protection Agency (Aust) Pty Ltd v ASIC [2022] NSWSC 374 .… 13.5 Premiership Investments Pty Ltd v White Diamond (1995) 133 ALR 64 .… 8.55 Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732; [2013] NSWCA 252 .… 11.26 Presmist Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 478 .… 10.48 Prestia v Aknar (1996) 40 NSWLR 165 .… 11.111, 11.112 Price Higgins & Fidge v Drysdale [1996] 1 VR 346 .… 23.14, 23.16 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B & Ad 433; 110 ER 518 .… 4.6, 7.1 — v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704 .… 25.12 — v Murray [1970] VR 782 .… 8.6 — v Shalders (1897) 18 ALT 247 .… 16.35 — v Spoor (2021) 270 CLR 450; 391 ALR 532; [2021] HCA 20 .… 18.6, 25.1 — v Strange [1978] Ch 337; [1977] 3 All ER 371 .… 24.11, 24.13, 24.30 Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto (1994) ATPR 41365; V ConvR 54-513 .… 24.4 Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 .… 2.10, 2.15 Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Mfg Co 388 US 395 (1967) .… 11.60 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2014] AC 436 .… 2.3 Principal Properties Pty Ltd v Brisbane Broncos Leagues Club Ltd [2014] 2 Qd R 132; [2013] QSC 148; [2018] 2 Qd R 584; [2017] QCA 254 .… 20.8, 23.16 Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 .… 27.20 Prior v Payne (1949) 23 ALJ 298 .… 6.11 Pritchard v DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 196 .… 23.35



— v Merchant’s and Tradesman’s Mutual Life Assurance Society (1858) 3 CBNS 622; 140 ER 885 .… 12.12 — v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527; 72 FCR 203 .… 8.7, 11.125, 11.147, 15.13 Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg (1996) 86 F 3d 1447 .… 3.7, 3.21 Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444; [2012] IRLR 241 .… 18.35 Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v DDI Group Pty Ltd (2017) 95 NSWLR 82 .… 21.27 Proctor v Almansask Distributors Ltd (1985) 37 Alta LR (2d) 164 .… 3.24 — v Jetway Aviation Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 166 .… 25.11, 25.12 Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Computer Accounting and Tax Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 261 ALR 179; [2009] WASCA 183 .… 11.83, 11.146 Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651 .… 18.44 Progress & Properties (Strathfield) Pty Ltd v Crumblin (1984) 3 BPR 9496 .… 10.48 Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] EWHC 273; (2012) 2 All ER (Comm) 855 .… 13.5, 13.6 Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 ALR 17; 57 ALR 609 .… 7.27, 10.30, 19.13, 19.25, 21.9, 21.11, 21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 21.17, 21.21, 21.22, 21.23, 21.24, 23.20, 23.21, 23.22, 23.23 Project 28 Pty Ltd v Tim Barr Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 240 .… 8.7 Project Blue Moon Pty Ltd v Fairway Trading Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 127; [2000] ANZ ConvR 628 .… 10.50, 10.56, 10.60, 19.15, 19.25, 15.16, 21.37 Propell National Valuers (WA) Pty Ltd v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd (2012) 202 FCR 158; [2012] FCAFC 31 .… 11.116 Prosilis v Double Bay Newspapers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 30 .… 10.26 Prospect Resources Ltd v Molyneux [2015] NSWCA 171 .… 21.31 Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd t/a Strathearn Insurance Brokers [2012] NSWCA 192 .… 11.146, 23.15 Prosperity Group International Pty Ltd v Queensland Communication Company Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1122 .… 8.53

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481; 160 ER 196 .… 8.7 Protec Pacific Pty Ltd v Steuler Services GmbH & Co KG [2014] VSCA 338 .… 11.82, 11.83 Protector Glass Industries Pty Ltd v Southern Cross Austoglass Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 16 .… 21.24, 22.9 Proton Investments Pty Ltd v Vahekin Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-452 .… 21.29 Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 381 .… 4.23 Provident Capital Ltd v Papa (2013) 84 NSWLR 231; [2013] NSWCA 36 .… 15.28, 15.31 — v Printy [2008] NSWCA 131 .… 8.6 Provident Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Hammond [1978] VR 312 .… 8.40, 8.42 Provident Financial Group Plc v Hayward [1989] 3 All ER 298 .… 24.25 Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 .… 10.32 Provost Developments Ltd v Collingwood Towers Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 205 .… 5.25 Prowse v McIntyre [1961] HCA 79; (1961) 111 CLR 264 .… 3.46, 17.2 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v CM Breedon Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 452 .… 12.1 — v Health Minders Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 673 .… 3.46 Pryors Tours Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport [2003] WASCA 129 .… 10.60 P’s Bill of Costs, Re (1983) 8 Fam LR 489 .… 14.5, 14.6 Psaltis v Schultz (1948) 76 CLR 547 .… 10.61, 18.26, 21.12 PSL Industries Ltd v Simplot Australia Pty Ltd [2003] 7 VR 106; (2003) 174 FLR 111; [2003] VSCA 7 .… 11.147, 25.12 PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643 .… 12.64, 12.65, 12.69, 12.70, 17.53, 18.10 — v — (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241 .… 8.21 — v Spuds Surf Chatswood [2013] NSWCA 446 .… 15.16 Pua Hor Ong v Wu You Yang Pty Ltd (2008) 103 SASR 9; [2008] SASC 365 .… 6.5, 6.17 Public Service Credit Union v Campion (1984) 75 FLR 131 .… 13.3, 13.5

Public Service Employees Credit Union Cooperative Ltd v Campion (1984) 75 FLR 131 .… 13.5, 18.32 Public Trustee v Kukula (1990) 14 Fam LR 97 .… 2.2, 2.11, 16.73 — v Taylor [1978] VR 289 .… 11.13, 11.55, 11.85 Public Trustee (WA) v Brumar Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 161 .… 17.53 Pukallus v Cameron (1982) 180 CLR 447 .… 12.30, 12.35 Pullen v Gutteridge Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27 .… 10.53 Pump Distributors Pty Ltd v Athertons (Qld) Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 213 .… 21.24 Pura v Kornmehl [2004] NSWSC 260 .… 5.8 Purcell v Bacon (1914) 19 CLR 241 .… 26.13 Purves v Smith [1944] ALR 269 .… 7.47 Pusey v Pusey (1684) 1 Vern 273; 23 ER 465 .… 24.17 Pyle v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 511 .… 18.37 Pyramid Building Society v Viewbank Garden Estate [1998] VSC 104 .… 10.26 Q Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 .… 2.5, 2.9, 2.10, 2.15, 16.70, 16.72 Qanstruct Pty Ltd v Bongiorno Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 667 .… 11.116, 11.147 Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (1996) 145 ALR 294 .… 15.1 — v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280 .… 5.26 — v Dillingham Corporation Ltd .… 15.8 — v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26 .… 10.2, 18.34 — v Rohrlach [2021] NSWCA 48 .… 10.30 QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2009) 24 VR 326; [2009] VSCA 124 .… 7.3 QBE Insurance Australia Ltd v Vasic [2010] NSWCA 166 .… 10.13 QBE Insurance Ltd v Moltoni Corp Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 148; 155 FLR 379 .… 23.14, 23.16 QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 358; [2010] QSC 479 .… 3.34, 4.22, 11.115, 11.146 QH Tours Ltd v Ship Design and Management (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 371 .… 11.60

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Table of Cases QNI Resources Pty Ltd v North Queensland Pipeline No 1 Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 169 …. 10.43 Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 932 .… 18.33, 18.44 Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Assocs Pty Ltd (1990) 98 ALR 659 .… 11.150 Quadling v Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192 .… 3.30, 3.46, 5.23, 5.25, 20.4 Quadramain Pty Ltd v Sevastopol Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 133 CLR 390 .… 18.35, 18.36 Quality Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Builders (Vic) Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 502 .… 11.146 Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Quanta Systems Ltd [2004] FCA 1182 .… 22.10 Quantock v ACT Health and Community Service [2003] ACTSC 98 .… 23.14 Qube Ports Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [2018] FCAFC 72 .… 5.26 Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALR 243 .… 24.22 Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Pty Ltd v Pamag Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 260 .… 18.35, 18.37 Queensland Ice Supplies Pty Ltd v Anco Australasia Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 72 .… 23.13, 23.24, 23.37, 23.43 Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 .… 2.18, 10.3, 22.6 Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French (2007) 235 CLR 81; 240 ALR 234; [2007] HCA 53 .… 8.6 Queensland Trustees Ltd v Concannon (1910) QSR 162 .… 16.23 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 .… 13.7 Quek v Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11,761 .… 14.8, 14.11, 14.13 Quenerduaine v Cole (1883) 32 WR 185 .… 3.46 QuestCrown Pty Ltd v Insignia Towers (Southport) Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 378 .… 18.7, 18.10 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 184 ALR 260 .… 11.111 Quiggan Bros v Baker [1906] VLR 259 .… 17.5 Quikfund (Australia) Pty Ltd v Airmark Consolidators Pty Ltd (2014) 222 FCR



13; 312 ALR 254; [2014] FCAFC 70 .… 11.102, 15.27 Quin v Mutual Acceptance Co Ltd [1968] NSWR 122 .… 18.41 Quinlivan v ACCC (2004) 160 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 175 .… 11.110, 11.117 Quinn v Burch Bros (Builders) Ltd (1966) 2 QB 370 .… 23.38 — v Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd [1992] 1 VR 540; [1992] 1 VR 567 .… 4.32, 10.29, 22.5 Quinn Villages Pty Ltd v Mulherin [2006] QCA 433 .… 20.8, 20.15, 20.16, 21.32 Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02 .… 3.55, 12.52 R R v A-G for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 .… 13.5 — v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386 .… 18.29 — v Brown (1912) 14 CLR 14 .… 8.11, 26.1 — v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 .… 3.40 — v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia and Richardson-Merrel Pty Ltd; Ex parte Soul Pattinson (Laboratories) Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 113 .… 11.106 — v McNeil (1922) 31 CLR 76 .… 25.13 — v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 .… 27.1 — v Panayiotou [1973] 1 WLR 1032; [1973] 3 All ER 112 .… 13.5 — v Small Claims Tribunal; Ex parte Gibson [1973] Qd R 490 .… 11.112 — v Stanley; Ex parte Redapple Restaurants Pty Ltd (1976) 13 SASR 290 .… 25.7 — v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533 .… 11.107 — v Weaver (1931) 45 CLR 321 .… 11.11, 11.16 — v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 .… 18.15 R & A Cab Co Pty Ltd v Kotzman [2008] VSCA 68 .… 21.12 — v Rutty [2007] VSC 62 .… 21.19, 22.11 R A Brierley Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 .… 8.6 R D McKinnon Holdings Pty Ltd v Hind [1984] 2 NSWLR 121 .… 24.7, 24.8 R Leslie Ltd v Sheill [1914] 3 KB 607; [1914–15] All ER Rep 511 .… 17.39, 17.40, 17.41, 17.42, 17.50 R M Turton & Co Ltd (in liq) v Kerslake and Partners [2000] 3 NZLR 406 .… 7.41

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

R S Howard S Sons Ltd v Brunton (1916) 21 CLR 366 .… 19.15 R+V Versicherung AG v Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Solutions SA [2006] All ER (D) 209 .… 23.11 R W Cameron & Co v L Slutzkin Pty Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81 .… 12.44 R W Jaksch & Associates Pty Ltd v Hawks [2005] VSCA 307 .… 21.24 Raco v Grove Holmes Pty Ltd (1974) 2 BPR 9411 .… 21.19 Radcliffe v Price (1902) 18 TLR 466 .… 14.6 Rademacher v Kassab [2005] SASC 43 .… 4.17, 6.7 Radford v Ferguson (1947) 50 WALR 14 .… 18.47 Radley Investment Co Pty Ltd v Amque Clothing Pty Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-036 .… 11.122 Radosavljevic v Radin [2003] NSWCA 217 .… 23.16 Rae & Partners Pty v Shaw [2020] TASFC 14 .… 2.3 Raestreet Pty Ltd v The Farmers’ Shop Pty Ltd [1998] SASC 6753 .… 21.21 Raffaele v Raffaele [1962] WAR 29 .… 5.7, 16.68, 16.70 Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 725 .… 11.145 Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H & C 906; 159 ER 375 .… 6.6, 10.12, 12.3, 12.7, 12.47 Raftland Pty Ltd as trustee of the Raftland Trust v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516; 246 ALR 406; [2008] HCA .… 5.11 Raguz v Sullivan (2000) 50 NSWLR 236; [2000] NSWCA 240 .… 3.8 Rahme v Benjamin & Khoury Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 211 .… 11.133 RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 511 .… 11.116, 11.124 Rail Corporation New South Wales v Fluor Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 344 .… 7.41, 8.51 Rain v Fullarton (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 311 .… 14.14, 17.18, 17.21, 17.22 Rainbow v Hawkins & Sons [1904] 2 KB 322 .… 3.24 Rainbow Spray Sales Pty Ltd v Sanders [1964–65] NSWR 422 .… 10.13, 10.73, 21.12, 21.19 Raine and Horne Pty Ltd v Adacol Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 36 .… 18.37

Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 .… 10.12, 10.73 Ramadan v ACN 098 408 176 Pty Ltd [2017] SASC 63 .… 15.9, 15.13, 15.16 — v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129 .… 2.7, 16.68 Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd (1999) 164 ALR 239 .… 11.113, 11.115 Ramsey v Vogler [2000] NSWCA 260 .… 11.114 Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Exch 109 .… 3.72 Rana v Hyatt Regency Hotel Ltd [2007] SASC 7 .… 11.93 Randazzo v Goulding [1968] Qd R 433 .… 6.8, 6.9 Randwick CC v Nancor Trading Co Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 108 .… 5.24 Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 150 .… 21.24 Rankin Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v CMC Property Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 156 .… 10.40 Rann v Hughes (1778) 4 Bro Parl Cas 27; 7 Term Rep 350n; 2 ER 18; 101 ER 1014n .… 16.9, 27.13, 27.18 Rannie v Irvine (1844) 7 Man & G 969 .… 18.37 Ransley v Medical Benefits Fund (1980) ATPR 40-160 .… 11.118 Raphael v Watson [1998] FCA 577 .… 18.20 Raphael Shin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Waterpoint Shepherds Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 743 .… 10.7 Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 255 .… 18.32 Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Bartholomeus (2012) 114 SASR 448; [2013] SASCFC 23 .… 11.111, 20.8 Rasmussen v Rasmussen [1995] 1 VR 613 .… 16.72, 16.73 Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399 .… 3.67 Rava v Logan Wines Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 62 .… 10.34 Rawlings Pty Ltd v Redder than Red Tomato Co Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 367 .… 2.16 Rawlins v Wickham (1858) 3 De G & J 304; 44 ER 1285 .… 11.63 Rawlinson v Ames [1925] Ch 96 .… 16.58

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Table of Cases Rawson v Hobbs (1961) 107 CLR 466 .… 10.21, 10.25, 10.34, 20.20, 21.12, 21.24 Ray Brooks Pty Ltd v NSW Grains Board [2002] NSWSC 1049 .… 10.12 Ray v Davies (1909) 9 CLR 160 .… 10.5 Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1 .… 3.8 Rayment v Tuthill [1890] 16 VLR 854 .… 5.23 Razdan v Westpac Banking Corporation [2014] NSWCA 126 .… 15.13 RCR O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2016] QCA 214 .… 24.23 RDJ International Pty Ltd v Preformed Line Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 417 .… 10.41, 10.42, 10.56 Read v Croydon Corp [1938] 4 All ER 631 .… 5.29 — v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47 .… 23.37 Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Burstone Victoria Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 546 .… 10.41 Ready Construction Pty Ltd v Jenno [1984] 2 Qd R 78 .… 24.8 Real Estate Securities Ltd v Kew Golf Links Estate Pty Ltd [1935] VLR 114 .… 26.4 Realtek Holdings Pty Ltd v Wetamast Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1869 .… 15.16 Realty World Pty Ltd v Rovera Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] ACTSC 30 .… 18.27 Reardon v Morley Ford Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 401 .… 3.20 Reches Pty Ltd v Tadiran Ltd [1999] FCA 952 .… 22.12 Reck v Gilham [1995] 1 Qd R 302 .… 18.37 Recoveries Corporation Group Ltd v American Express Australia Ltd [2016] NSWSC 771 .… 20.20, 21.38 Rectron Australia BV v Lu [2013] VSC 384 .… 12.68 Red Eagle Corp Ltd v Ellis [2010] 2 NZLR 492; [2010] NZSC 20 .… 11.129 Redbridge London BC v Robinson Rentals Ltd (1969) 21 1 Est Gaz 1125 .… 12.48 Redden v Wilks (1994) 14 WAR 69; [1979] WAR 161 .… 16.21 Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Glossop; Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Fairfax Community Newspapers Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1201 .… 5.19



Redevelopments Pty Ltd v Enima Pty Ltd (2010) 174 ACTR 1; [2010] ACTCA 13 .… 12.36 Redglove Projects Pty Ltd v Ngunnawal Local Aboriginal Land Council [2005] NSWSC 892 .… 18.23, 20.4, 20.16, 20.20 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1; [1881–5] All ER Rep 77 .… 11.36, 11.44, 11.63, 11.67 Redken Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd v Docker (2000) Aust Contract Rep 90113 .… 10.53, 23.18, 23.38 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84 .… 7.1, 8.28, 8.27, 8.38, 8.40 Redmond v Devonport Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 176 .… 26.12 Redowood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 32 .… 3.26, 3.46, 28.23 Reed v Buck (1884) 10 VLR (E) 33 .… 15.5 — v Peridis [2005] SASC 136 .… 10.53, 10.56 — v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 .… 2.5, 2.15, 3.69 Reed Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1987) 3 BCL 384 .… 18.34 Reef & Rainforest Travel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (2002) 1 Qd R 683; [2001] QCA 249 .… 3.67, 8.12 Rees v Rees [2016] VSC 452 .… 12.25 Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 .… 3.3, 3.26, 3.32, 3.47 Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64 .… 11.16, 11.63 Reeve v Jennings [1910] 2 KB 522 .… 16.32 Refrigerated Express Lines (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat & Livestock Corp (No 2) (1980) 44 FLR 555 29 ALR 333 .… 10.27 Reg Glass Pty Ltd v Rivers Locking Systems Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 516 .… 23.34, 23.39 Regent v Millett (1976) 133 CLR 679 .… 16.60, 16.63, 16.64 Regional Development Australia Murraylands and Riverland Inc v Smith (2015) 251 IR 317; [2015] SASCFC 160 .… 19.5, 19.11, 19.22 Regional Power Corporation v Pacific Hydro Group Two Pty Ltd (No 2) (2014) 46 WAR 281; [2013] WASC 356 .… 10.77

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Regis Towers Real Estate v The Owners – Strata Plan 56443 [2002] NSWSC 1153 .… 18.9 Regreen Asset Holdings Pty Ltd v Castricum Brothers Australia Ltd [2015] VSCA 286 .… 10.15, 10.16, 10.18, 10.56 Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 .… 20.8 Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 …. 4.24, 4.28, 10.2, 10.13, 10.62 — v McIntyre (1905) 11 ALR 159 .… 8.38 — v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1 .… 10.36 — v Zoanetti [1943] SASR 92 .… 5.2 Reid House Pty Ltd v Beneke (1987) 5 ACLC 451 .… 19.22 Reid Murray Developments (WA) Pty Ltd v Hall [1968] WAR 3 .… 19.15, 20.4 Reilly v Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co [1893] 19 VLR 75 .… 18.33 — v Victoria (1991) 5 VIR 1 .… 24.27 Reinhold v NSW Lotteries Corp (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 187 .… 11.133, 11.142, 23.31 Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 .… 10.32 Rejfek v McElroy (1966) 112 CLR 517 .… 11.76 Relwood Pty Ltd v Manning Homes Pty Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 481 .… 6.8 Rely-a-Bell Burglar and Fire Alarm Co v Eisler [1926] Ch 609; [1926] All ER Rep 707 .… 24.26 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 .… 10.36, 10.39, 10.43, 10.44, 10.46, 10.48, 10.51, 10.52, 10.55, 10.56, 10.61, 15.1, 20.18, 21.33, 21.34, 21.35, 26.7 Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 151 NTR 1; [2006] NTSC 4 .… 3.28, 19.18 Rennie Golledge Pty Ltd v Ballard (2012) 82 NSWLR 231; [2012] NSWCA 376 .… 11.136 Renold Australia Pty Ltd v Fletcher Insulation (Vic) Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 294 .… 8.2, 8.7 Renowden v Hurley [1951] VLR 13 .… 24.2, 24.16 — v McMullin (1970) 123 CLR 584 .… 25.12 Rentokil Pty Ltd v Lee (1995) 66 SASR 301 .… 18.37, 18.38, 18.41

Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis (2007) 158 FCR 214; 239 ALR 491; [2007] FCAFC 29 .… 2.9, 2.10, 16.70 Rescando Pty Ltd v Brogan [2000] WASC 19 .… 21.11 Retirement Services Australia (RSA) Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd (2012) 37 VR 486; [2012] VSCA 134 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.7, 10.12, 10.31 Reunidas SA v Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 .… 22.9 Reuthlinger v MacDonald [1967] 1 NSWLR 88 .… 18.35 Revelle v PC Developments Pty Ltd (1990) NSW ConvR 55-527 .… 21.36 REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 269 .… 24.7 Reynolds v Atherton (1921) 125 LT 690 .… 3.74 — v Fury (1921) VLR 17 .… 26.12 RHG Mortgage Securities Pty Ltd v Elektra Purchase No 19 Ltd [2009] NSWSC 258 .… 8.3, 10.45, 12.30, 12.36 Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 .… 3.62 Rhodes, Re (1890) 44 Ch D 94; [1886–90] All ER Rep 871 .… 17.54 Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477; 68 ALR 77 .… 11.113, 11.115 Rialto Sports Pty Ltd v Cancer Care Associates Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 146 .... 23.27 Rian Financial Services Pty Ltd v Alfred Investment Project Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-400 .… 21.20 Ribchenkov v Suncorp-Metway Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 650 .… 14.17 Rich v BDO Kendalls [2007] QCA 147 .… 18.37 Richard Pitt & Sons Pty Ltd v Hydro Electric Commission [2000] TASSC 61 .… 22.6 Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 328 .… 18.32 Richardson v Greensboro Warehouse and Storage Co 223 NC 344; 26 SE 2d 897 (US 1934) .… 5.23 — v Otto (1938) QWN 15 .… 14.15 Richardson & Wrench (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Ligon No 174 Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 681 .… 11.110 Riches v Hogben [1986] 1 Qd R 315 .… 5.7, 16.22, 16.23, 16.58, 16.68, 16.70

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Table of Cases Rick Damelian Pty Ltd v Daewoo Automotive Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 92 .… 22.12 Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti (2004) 220 ALR 267; [2004] NSWSC 1041 .… 8.7 Ricochet Pty Ltd v Equity Trustees Executor and Agency Co Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 30 .… 11.124 Riddiford v Warren (1901) 20 NZLR 572 .… 11.68, 11.68 Rieson v SST Consulting Services Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 90; [2005] FCAFC 6 .… 6.17, 18.41 Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482; [1874–80] All ER Rep 592 .… 24.12 Rigg v Lee Loy Seng [1987] WAR 333 .… 21.14, 21.20 Riggall v Thompson [2010] QCA 144 .… 23.45 Riley v Melrose Advertisers (1915) 17 WALR 127 .… 16.35, 16.53 — v Osborne [1986] VR 193 .… 16.60, 16.61, 16.63 Riltang Pty Ltd v L Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 977 .… 10.35 Rinaldi and Patroni Pty Ltd v Precision Mouldings Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 131 .… 10.69, 10.72 Rinehart v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (2019) 267 CLR 514; [2019] HCA 13 .… 10.12 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1297; [2004] FCAFC 206; (2005) 224 CLR 656; 222 ALR 306; [2005] HCA 71 .… 21.24, 23.45 Ringstad v Gollin & Co Pty Ltd (1924) 35 CLR 303 .… 19.2, 19.9, 19.15, 19.20 Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Ltd v Graphite Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 276 .… 7.7, 7.30, 8.7 Riordan J in Simcevski v Dixon (No 2) [2017] VSC 531 .… 23.45 Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v St Vincent’s Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70 .… 3.6, 10.3 Rishmont Pty Ltd v Tweed City Medical Centre Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 372 .… 11.112 Ritter v Keatley Real Estate Pty Ltd (2013) 116 SASR 53; [2013] SASC 46 .… 10.12, 10.16 — v North Side Enterprises Pty Ltd (1975) 6 ALR 125; 132 CLR 301 .… 11.14, 11.16, 11.50, 11.76 Rivat Pty Ltd v B & N Elomar Engineering Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 638 .… 10.12, 10.27, 10.32, 21.23, 21.24



Riverland Inc v Smith [2015] SASCFC 160; (2015) 251 IR 317 .… 23.42 Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul [1975] 1 Ch 133; [1974] 2 All ER 656 .… 12.50, 12.52, 12.53, 12.54 Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick (2000) 177 ALR 193 .… 10.12, 10.17, 10.18, 10.27, 10.31, 10.32, 10.58 Riviera Holdings Pty Ltd v Fingal Glen Pty Ltd (2003) 120 SASR 450; [2013] SASC 77 .… 21.36 Riz v Perpetual Trustee Australia Ltd [2007] ANZ ConvR 615; [2007] NSWSC 1153 .… 15.31 Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd (2012) 43 WAR 91; 262 FLR 1; 287 ALR 315; [2012] WASCA 50 .… 11.60 RJR Holdings Pty Ltd v Balleroo Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 151 .… 21.19 Roache v Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Co Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1015; 81 WN (NSW) 400 .… 12.56, 12.61 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v CEL Home Video Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 .… 10.56, 21.12, 21.18, 21.19, 21.26 Robb v Hammersmith and Fulham London BC [1991] ICR 514 .… 24.27 Robert v Collier’s Bulk Liquid Transport Pty Ltd [1959] VR 280 .… 23.32 Robert Hastings Hitchcock v Goldspan Investments Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 205 .… 8.55 Roberts v Calvert [1937] St R Qd 12 .… 10.5 — v Gray [1913] 1 KB 520; [1911–13] All ER Rep 870 .… 17.11, 17.12 Robertson v Admans (1922) 31 CLR 250 .… 18.4, 18.11, 18.40 — v Robertson (1930) QWN 41 .… 13.3 — v Wilson (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 503 .… 19.25 — v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 095 803 286) [2007] VSCA 29 .… 4.22 Robertson Street Properties Pty Ltd v RPM Promotions Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 389 .… 11.110 Robin Pty Ltd v Canberra International Airport Pty Ltd (1999) 179 ALR 449 .… 11.112 Robinson v 470 St Kilda Road Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 84 .… 11.136 — v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1990) ASC 55-979 .… 14.20, 15.30, 15.31 — v Balmain New Ferry Co [1910] AC 295 .… 10.72

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Cook (1815) 128 ER 1064 .… 9.5 — v Craven (1994) 63 SASR 267 .… 25.11 — v Gollan [2012] NSWSC 51 .… 11.111 — v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579; [1935] All ER Rep 935 .… 16.80 — v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 .… 23.6 — v M’Ewan (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 65 .… 3.42 — v Podosky [1905] St R Qd 118 .… 8.24, 8.47 — v South Australia [1928] SASR 42 .… 8.27 Robinson, Re; McLaren v Public Trustee [1911] 1 Ch 502; [1911–13] All ER 296 .… 25.13 Robson and Sharpe v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303; 109 ER 1156 .… 8.52 Rocca v Ryde Municipal Council [1962] NSWR 600 .… 18.30 Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 43 ALR 659 .… 27.1 Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24; [2019] AC 119 .… 4.32, 4.35, 22.4 Rock Solid Surfaces Pty Ltd v Biesse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 42 .… 3.56, 11.114 Rocla Pty Ltd v Plastream Pipe Technologies Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 80 .… 7.3 Rod Ferguson Motor Co v Vasiliauskas (1985) 3 SR (WA) 15 .… 23.26 Rod Investments (Vic) Pty Ltd v Abeyratne [2009] VSC 278 .… 11.132 Rodgers v Moonta Town Corp (1981) 55 ALJR 710 .… 16.68 Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 175; 54 ER 68 .… 24.5 — v Resi-Statewide Corp Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 219; 101 ALR 377 .… 17.18 Rojain Pty Ltd v Ambrose McMahon [1986] VR 449 .… 24.4 Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill [2005] NSWCA 252 .… 23.38 Rolleston Coal Holdings Pty Ltd v ICRA Rolleston Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 352 .… 10.3, 21.19 Roman Catholic Trusts Corp v Van Driel Ltd [2001] VSC 310 .… 3.15, 7.7 Romanos v Pentagold Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 217 CLR 367; 201 ALR 399; [2003] HCA 58 .… 21.19, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 Romberg v Gilbert (1901) 11 QLJ 96 .… 9.5 Ronald v Lalor (1872) 3 VR (E) 98 .… 16.40

Rondo Building Services Pty Ltd v Casaron Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 78 .… 26.9 Ronim Pty Ltd, Re [1999] 2 Qd R 172 .… 10.56 Ronnoc Finance v Spectrum Network Systems Ltd (1997) 45 NSWLR 624 .… 23.22, 23.25, 24.32 Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 Ch 480 .… 3.19 — v Rooke (1610) Cro Jac 245; 1 Rolle 391; Moo KB 854; 79 ER 210 .… 27.19 Root v Bradley [1960] NZLR 756 .… 11.62 Rosas v Toca (2018) BCCA 191 .… 4.35 Roscorla v Thomas (1842) 3 QB 234; 114 ER 496 .… 4.19 Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20 .… 5.10 — v Sakkara Properties Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 304 .… 15.6 Rose and Frank Co v Crompton & Bros Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 (CA); [1925] AC 445 (HL) .… 5.4, 5.14 Rosemac Pty Ltd’s Caveat, Re [1994] 1 Qd R 137 .… 18.3, 18.6 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 178 ALR 577 .… 23.14, 23.36 Rosenhain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1922) 31 CLR 46 .… 10.54 Ross v Allis-Chalmers Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 561 .… 10.21, 10.25 — v IceTV [2010] NSWCA 272 .… 18.37, 18.38, 19.4 — v Meggitt Overseas Ltd (No 3) (1999) 18 NSWCCR 366 .… 23.32 — v Ratcliff (1988) 91 FLR 66 .… 18.12 Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 72; [2011] QCA 49 .… 3.68 Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2008] 1 All ER 1004 .… 11.39 Rosser v Austral Wine and Spirit Co Pty Ltd [1980] VR 313 .… 16.35 — v Marine Ministerial Holding Corp [1999] NSWCA 72 .… 22.12, 23.13, 23.24, 23.29 Rossiter v Miller (1878) 3 App Cas 1124 .… 5.24, 6.8, 16.35 Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G [1991] 2 NZLR 323 .… 4.18, 5.28, 24.28 Roude v Helwani [2020] NSWCA 310 .… 26.6 Rouen v Ryan [2001] NSWCA 230 .… 18.38 Roufos v Brewster (1971) 2 SASR 218 .… 5.7

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Table of Cases Rouleston Clarke Pty Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (2000) 11 ANZ Ins Cas 61-465 .… 10.33 Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 .… 18.33, 18.44 Rowe v Oades (1905) 3 CLR 73 .… 10.5, 10.60 Rowley, Holmes & Co v Barber [1977] 1 WLR 371 .… 3.14 Rowthorn v Queensland Newspapers Ltd [1962] QWN 111 .… 18.3 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2000) 22 Syd LR 636; (2001) 208 CLR 516; [2001] HCA 68 .… 10.39, 10.55, 10.61, 18.33, 26.1, 26.2, 26.3, 26.4, 26.5, 27.1 Roxburghe v Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520 .… 8.43 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 .… 14.1, 14.5, 14.9, 14.10, 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20 — v O’Donnell [2014] CSIH 84 .… 11.20 Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney CC (2002) 240 CLR 45; [2002] HCA 5 .… 6.9, 6.10, 10.4, 10.12, 10.13, 10.16, 10.41, 10.43, 10.55, 26.3, 26.5 Royal Exchange Assurance v Cook [1965] Ch 902; [1964] 3 All ER 898 .… 7.32 — v Hope [1928] Ch 179; [1927] All ER Rep 67 .… 7.44 Royal International (WA) v William Thomas John Valli [1998] WAIR Comm 55 .… 10.61 Royal Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Ltd v Mihailoff [2002] SASC 32 .… 10.56 Royal Victorian Aero Club v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 236 .… 10.32 Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297 .… 11.96, 11.97 RP Data Ltd v Queensland [2007] FCA 1639 .… 11.109 RS Howard & Sons Ltd v Brunton (1916) 21 CLR 366 .… 18.2 RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2003) NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 .… 11.109 Rudd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 366; 54 WN (NSW) 117 .… 6.8 Rudder v George Hudson Holdings Ltd (1972) 1 NSWLR 529 .… 24.4 Rudi’s Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jay (1987) 10 NSWLR 568 .… 20.8



Rufa Pty Ltd v Cross [1981] Qd R 365 .… 8.53 Rufo v Hosking [2004] NSWCA 391 .… 23.14 Rumbleows Ltd v AMK (1980) 19 BLR 25 .… 7.42 Rumney v Croaker [1905] QSR 177 .… 22.4 Rumpe v Camrol Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 40522 .… 11.122 Rural and Agricultural Management Ltd v West Merchant Bank Ltd (1995) 14 ACLC 11 .… 8.53 Rural Bank of NSW v Hobby [1967] 1 NSWR 210 .… 12.66, 12.69 Rush v WA Amateur Football League (Inc) (2007) 35 WAR 101; [2007] WASCA 190 .… 5.10 Rushcutters Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Dragon Asset Investment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 866 .… 21.38, 23.45, 26.4 Rushton (SA) Pty Ltd v Holzberger [2003] QCA 106 .… 3.46 Russell v Lee 1 Lev 86; 83 ER 310 .… 17.5 — v Slater (1912) QSR 237 .… 16.40 — v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney [2007] NSWSC 104 .… 10.43, 10.45, 10.52, 21.34 Russo v Resource Developments International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] NSWSC 838 .… 19.17, 19.22, 21.19 Ruthol Pty Ltd v Tricon (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 443 .… 23.42 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996) 1 AC 344 .… 7.7, 23.19 RWE Npower Renewables Ltd v FN Bentley Ltd [2013] EWHC 978 .… 10.32 Ryan v Hopkinson (1990) 14 Fam LR 151 .… 16.75 — v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116 .… 24.1, 24.13 — v Rouen [2000] NSWSC 468 .… 18.4, 18.37, 23.45 — v Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of Australia [1996] 2 VR 235 .… 5.26, 6.6, 10.16 Ryanair Ltd v SR Technics Ireland Ltd [2007] EWHC 3089 (QB) .… 10.7 Ryder v Frohlich [2004] NSWCA 472 .… 21.23, 22.9 — v Taylor (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 31 .… 7.45, 7.47 — v Wombwell (1868) LR 4 Exch 32 .… 17.5

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496 .… 3.14 Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65 .… 2.3, 3.69, 10.3, 10.8, 10.12, 10.16, 12.2, 12.30, 12.31, 12.32, 12.33, 12.35, 12.37, 12.38, 12.41, 21.28, 21.38, 22.6 Ryrie v Cruikshank (1896) 17 LR (NSW) 195 .… 16.37 S S&C Nicola Pty Ltd v Peter Holmes Investment Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 72 .… 10.30 S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637 .… 2.12, 3.70, 22.6 S & N Carbone Family Trust v Mills [2019] NSWCA 15 .… 2.13 S Gormley & Co Pty Ltd v Cubit [1964–5] NSWR 557 .… 11.47, 11.74, 11.86 S H Lock (Australia) Ltd v Kennedy (1988) 12 NSWLR 482 .… 11.103 Saad v TWT Ltd [1998] NSWSC 282 .… 10.5, 10.16, 10.23, 10.57, 22.12, 23.42 Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880 .… 2.20, 26.8 Sabouni v Revelop Building and Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 31 .… 23.24 Sacher Investments Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Ltd (1976) 1 NSWLR 5 .… 23.43 Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472 .… 18.14 Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 .… 3.6, 3.11, 5.19, 5.24, 10.16 Sagar v Closer Settlement Ltd (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 199 .… 11.36, 11.37 Sahade v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 512 .… 3.67 — v Owners Corporation SP 62022 [2013] NSWSC 1791 .… 12.35 Sahin v National Australia Bank Ltd [2011] VSCA 64 .… 11.115 Saint v Adams (1921) QSR 41 .… 16.62 Saints Gallery Pty Ltd v Plummer (1988) 80 ALR 525 .… 11.121, 11.122 Saitta Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2001) 162 FLR 35; [2001] VSC 170 .… 11.109 Salcombe Investments Pty Ltd v Cement Aids Ltd (Qld) (1987) ASC 55–565 .… 10.72

Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 .… 2.4, 2.5, 2.18, 2.19, 2.30, 10.3, 10.7 Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 1532 .… 8.7 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466; [2003] VSCA 1 .… 3.68, 7.28, 8.47 Salvation Army (South Australia Property Trust) v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347 .… 25.13 Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P & CR 179 .… 2.14 Sam Management Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] NSWSC 676 .… 10.55 SAMM Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Shaye Properties Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 132 .… 12.30 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; 286 ALR 257; [2011] FCAFC 156 .… 24.19, 24.20, 24.22 San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 68 ALR 161 .… 11.41, 11.88, 12.17 Sanctuary Investments Pty Ltd v St Gregory’s Armenian School Inc [1998] NSWSC 788; (1999) ANZ ConvR 454 .… 20.12, 20.16, 21.35 Sande v Medsara Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 147 .… 12.53 Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 .… 10.55, 10.60 Sanderson Motors (Sales) Pty Ltd v Yorkstar Motors Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 513 .… 24.21 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 .… 8.16, 8.25, 8.28, 8.31, 8.36 Sandhurst & Northern District Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Warren [1918] VLR 209 .… 25.6 Sandra Investments Pty Ltd v Booth (1983) 153 CLR 153; 50 ALR 385 .… 5.25, 20.1, 20.4, 20.8, 20.13 Sandri v O’Driscoll [2014] VSCA 88 .… 2.8 Sandtara Pty Ltd v Longreach Group Ltd [2008] NSWSC 373 .… 4.22 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 .… 18.16 Sanpine Pty Ltd v Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council [2006] NSWCA 291 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.22

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Table of Cases Sansom v Westpac Banking Corp [1996] Aust Torts Rep 81-383 .… 14.9 Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9 .… 26.9 Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 272 .… 2.3, 22.4, 22.6 Santos Ltd v BNP Paribas [2019] QCA 11 .… 7.50 Sanwa Australia Finance Ltd v Finchill Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 466 .… 26.3 Sapuppo v Ribchenkov [2001] FCA 1428 .… 14.17 Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 .… 2.13, 2.28 Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634; [1974] HCA 40 .… 1.124, 10.26, 11.47, 11.49, 11.50, 20.9, 20.15, 20.18, 21.23, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30, 21.31 — v Campbell [1972–3] ALR 708 .… 11.10, 11.53, 11.76 Sargood Bros v Commonwealth (1910) 11 CLR 258 .… 26.1 SAS (Vic) Pty Ltd v Urban Ecological Systems Ltd [2021] VSCA 335 .… 10.30 Satellite Estate Pty Ltd v Jaquet [1968] 2 NSWR 340; (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 126; 88 WN (NSW) 159 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.20 Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp 2014 SCC 53 .… 10.12 Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004 .… 12.3, 12.63, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70 — v Glev Franchises Pty Ltd (1995) 133 ALR 73 .… 11.147, 25.12 — v Pilcher [1949] 2 All ER 1097 .… 16.29 Savage v Intercoiffure Pty Ltd (1987) ASC 55-574 .… 11.98 Savcor Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 587 .… 18.34 Savoy Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v Global Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 284 .… 21.12 Sayed v National Australia Bank Ltd [2013] NSWCA 304 .… 5.24 Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 159; [2011] WASCA 159 .… 4.24 Scammell v Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 6.3, 6.8 Scammell & Nephew Ltd v H C & J G Ouston [1941] AC 251 .… 6.1 Scandrett v Dowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483 .… 5.10 Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 173 .… 11.146



Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 169; [1943] HCA 43 .… 1.107, 19.4, 19.6, 19.7, 19.9, 19.11, 19.12, 19.13, 19.15, 19.16, 19.19, 19.21, 19.22, 19.23, 19.25 Scarborough v Sturzaker (1905) 1 Tas LR 117 .… 17.5, 17.6 Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345; [1881-5] All ER Rep 651 .… 8.47 Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] AC 572; (1975) 49 ALJ 223 .… 3.71, 5.8, 16.54 Schebsman, Re [1944] 1 Ch 83; [1943] 2 All ER 768 .… 7.2 ScheldeMarinebouw BV v A-G [2005] NZAR 356 .… 3.39 Schenker & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Maplas Equipment and Services Pty Ltd [1990] VR 834 .… 10.13, 10.31, 10.35, 10.64, 10.77 Schepis v Elders IXL Ltd (1986) 70 ALR 729; (1987) 9 ATPR 40-759 .… 11.118, 11.146 Schering AG v Parmedica Pty Ltd (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 137; 52 SR (NSW) 16 .… 18.31 Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 .… 3.47, 3.60 Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 .… 18.37, 18.38 Scholey v Central Railway Co of Venezuela (1868) LR 9 Eq 266n .… 11.49 Schreuders v Grandiflora Nominees Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 93 .… 10.32, 22.5 Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] QCA 208 .… 14.18 Schwarstein v Watson [1985] 3 NSWLR 134 .… 16.54, 16.55 Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 .… 4.35 Schwartz Family Co Pty Ltd v Capitol Carpets Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 238 .… 12.25 Scolio Pty Ltd v Cote (1992) 6 WAR 475 .… 13.3, 13.5, 13.9 Scotson v Pegg (1861) 6 H & N 295; 158 ER 121; 3 LT 753 .… 4.34 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 HLC 811 …. 18.34 — v Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd (1995) ATPR (Dig) 46-154 .… 11.128 — v Bradley [1971] Ch 850 .… 16.35 — v Coulson [1903] 2 Ch 249 .… 12.12 — v English [1947] VLR 445 .… 22.11 — v Ennis-Oakes [2020] NSWCA 239 .… 21.13, 23.22

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Hanson (1829) 1 Russ & M 128; 39 ER 49 .… 11.11 — v Littledale (1858) 8 E & B 815; 120 ER 304 .… 12.45 — v Morley (1888) 20 QBD 120 .… 17.60 — v Rayment (1868) LR 7 Eq 112 .… 24.12 — v Scott (1904) 10 ALR 43 .… 18.26 — v White [1938] VLR 188 .… 16.63 — v Wise [1986] 2 NZLR 484 .… 15.9 Scott Carver Pty Ltd v SAS Trustee Corporation [2005] NSWCA 462 .… 23.27, 23.38 Scott Fury t/a Fury Custom Boats v Nasso [2021] WASCA 171 .… 26.4 Scottish Halls Ltd v The Minister (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 81 .… 19.4, 19.8, 19.16, 19.19, 19.20 Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564 .… 12.17, 12.47 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 .… 8.47 Scuderi v Morris (2001) 39 ACSR 592; (2001) 4 VR 125; [2001] VSCA 190 .… 4.40, 18.21 SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 .… 19.3, 19.21, 24.10 SEA Food International Pty Ltd v Lam [1998] FCA 130 .… 16.35 Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd v JLW (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 415 .… 10.3 Seabridge Pty Ltd v JLW (NSW) (1991) 29 FCR 415 .… 11.122 Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (2012) 297 ALR 337; [2012] FCA 1346 .… 11.114 Sealand of the Pacific Ltd v Ocean Cement Ltd (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 625 .… 11.88 Seamez v McLaughlin [1999] NSWSC 9 .… 10.53 Searle v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] NSWCA 127 .… 18.30, 23.15 Secretary, Department of Social Security v Agnew (2000) 96 FCR 357 .… 16.72, 16.73, 16.74 Secretary, Department of Transport (Vic) v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 261 ALR 39; [2009] FCA 1209 .… 7.5 Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson [2005] WASC 264 .… 10.3, 10.16 Secure Parking Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council [2016] NSWCA 154 .… 3.37, 21.26 Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 .… 8.8, 10.40, 10.41, 10.42, 10.49, 10.55, 10.56, 20.1, 20.16, 21.24

Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1; 93 ALR 271 .… 18.6 Seddon v North Eastern Salt Co Ltd [1905] 1 Ch 326; [1904–7] All ER Rep 817 .… 11.61, 11.63, 12.29 Sedgwick Ltd v Bain Clarkson Ltd (1995) 129 ALR 493 .… 11.114 Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 37 .… 10.73 Segacious Pty Ltd v Fabrellas [1991] 1 Qd R 471 .… 21.26, 23.2, 24.9 Segal v Young [2001] NSWCA 141 .… 25.2 Segal t/as Segal Litton & Chilton v Fleming [2002] NSWCA 262 .… 25.5 Segenhoe Ltd v Akins (1990) 29 NSWLR 569 .… 23.43 Seidler v Schallhofer [1982] 2 NSWLR 80 .… 18.27 Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216 .… 3.22, 3.42 Sekisui Rib Loc Australia Pty Ltd v Rocla Pty Ltd (2012) 291 ALR 140; [2012] SASCFC 21 .… 10.56 Selectmove Ltd, Re [1995] 1 WLR 474; [1995] 2 All ER 531 .… 4.38 Selen v Selen (2013) 49 Fam LR 164; [2013] FamCAFC 39 .… 4.12 Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 661; 320 ALR 47; [2015] HCA 18 .… 11.129, 11.131, 11.132, 11.134 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 120 ALR 16; [1994] HCA 4 .… 10.15, 10.25, 10.41, 10.48, 10.56, 10.58, 11.125, 11.146, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.16 Sellin v Scott (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 64 .… 17.22 Selman v Minogue (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 280 .… 11.84, 11.85 Semrani v Manoun [2001] NSWCA 337 .… 11.115 Senanayake v Cheng [1966] AC 63; [1965] 3 All ER 296 .… 11.11, 11.50, 11.53, 11.57, 11.62 Sensis Pty Ltd v McMaster-Fay [2005] NSWCA 163 .… 23.15, 23.16 Sent v Jet Corp of Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 540 .… 11.147 — v Primelife Corporation Ltd [2006] VSC 443 .… 20.13 Sentinel Countrywide Retail Ltd v PC Emerald (Qld) Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 348 .… 24.13

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Table of Cases Sentinel Robina Office Pty Ltd v Clarence Property Corporation Ltd [2018] QCA 314 .… 10.44 Serrata Investments Pty Ltd v Rajane Pty Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 419 .… 11.108 Serrata Pty Ltd v Rajane Pty Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 419 .… 11.118 Serrin Hire Pty Ltd v Tidd Ross Todd Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 891 .… 10.77 Servcorp WA Pty Ltd v Perron Investment Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 79 .… 6.11, 10.41, 10.55, 10.56 Serventy v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 223 .… 15.9, 15.31 Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 234; (1993) 117 ALR 393 .… 10.43, 10.61 Setka v Carroll [2019] VSC 571 .… 5.1, 5.10 Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 .… 2.8, 2.13, 2.16, 2.20 Sevastopoulos v Spanos [1991] 2 VR 194 .… 16.55 Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2000] FCA 350; (2000) 171 ALR 89; 175 ALR 433 .… 3.11, 22.2, 22.5, 28.6 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2005) 222 ALR 569; [2005] FCAFC 144 .… 6.6 — v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 .… 2.8, 2.16, 2.20 Seymour v Seymour (1996) 40 NSWLR 358 .… 2.16, 11.147 Seymour Whyte Constructions Pty Ltd v Ostwald Bros Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 99 NSWLR 317; [2019] NSWCA 11 .… 10.35, 12.30 SGIC v Giacomelli (1993) 9 SR (WA) 126 .… 7.3 SH Lock (Australia) Ltd v Kennedy (1988) 12 NSWLR 482 .… 15.12, 15.29, 18.10 Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta CC (1981) 150 CLR 225 .… 11.88, 11.89 Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 CBNS 159; 142 ER 62 .… 4.34 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists [2007] FCA 693; (2008) 168 FCR 46; 248 ALR 267; [2008] FCAFC 72 .… 5.11, 11.107, 11.146 — v The Australasian College of Dermatologists [2007] FCA 693 .… 11.119



Shakibaee v Chan (2001) 24 WAR 97 .… 10.13, 20.13, 21.14, 21.24 Shanahan v Fitzgerald [1982] 2 NSWLR 513 .… 20.3, 20.12 Shanklin Pier v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854 .… 3.9 Sharah v Healey [1981] 2 NSWLR 223 .… 18.37 Sharjade Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2009] NSWCA 373 .… 21.26, 23.2 Sharman v Kunert (1985) 1 NSWLR 225 .… 15.26 Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801 .… 2.26 — v — (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-051; (1994) 6 BPR 13,801; [1995] ANZ ConvR 501; (1994) NSW ConvR 55–721 .… 5.8, 16.56, 16.60, 16.67 — v Batt (1930) 25 Tas LR 33 .… 19.2, 19.17, 19.23 — v Cain [1924] SASR 203 .… 18.38 — v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 110 .… 10.16 — v Ellis; Re Edward Love & Co Pty Ltd [1972] VR 137 .… 4.23, 27.14 Sharpe, Re [1980] 1 WLR 219 .… 16.70 Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449 .… 5.11 Shaw v Ball [1963] SR (NSW) 910 .… 26.4 — v Bindaree Beef Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 125 .… 7.2 — v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167 .… 7.29, 8.12 — v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102 .… 10.52 — v Wheeler (1919) 22 WALR 15 .… 10.23 Shaw & Co v Moss Enterprises and Bastow (1908) 25 TLR 190 .… 8.8 Sheehan v Zaszlos [1995] 2 Qd R 210 .… 3.11, 5.24 Sheffield Nickel Co v Unwin (1877) 2 QBD 214 .… 11.56 Shelburne v Inchiquin (1784) 1 Bro CC 338; 28 ER 1166 .… 12.35 Sheldon v Metrokane Inc [2004] FCA 19 .… 10.54 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co (1895) 1 Ch 287 .… 24.30 Shell Oil of Australia Ltd v McIllwraith McEacharn Ltd (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 144 .… 7.31 Shephard v Galea as executor and trustee of the estate of the Late Joseph Galea [2020] WASCA 152 .… 14.2 — v Midland Bank Plc .… 14.20

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Baster [2005] WASC 23; [2006] WASC 176 .… 16.21, 21.27, 24.31 — v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 385 .… 8.4, 8.9, 8.16, 8.17, 8.26, 8.28, 8.38 — v Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359 .… 10.41, 10.52, 21.24, 21.38 — v Noyes Bros Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 40588 .… 11.146 — v Council of Ryde (1952) 85 CLR 1 .… 10.6, 10.21, 10.56 Shepperd, Re (1893) 5 QLJ 116 .… 10.9 Sheridan v Nikolic [1982] Qd R 725 .… 20.13 Sherson & Associates Pty Ltd v Bailey (2001) .… 23.38 Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 .… 21.9, 21.11, 21.12, 21.14, 21.17, 21.18, 21.21, 21.22, 23.22, 23.23 Shiel v Colonial Bank of Australasia (1870) 1 VR (E) 40 .… 16.63 Shiell v Symons [1951] SASR 82 .… 19.15, 19.25 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 .… 24.13 Shimden Pty Ltd v Rona [2006] NSWCA 256 .… 10.56 Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1038 .… 23.44 Shipley UDC v Bradford Corp [1936] Ch 375 .… 12.36, 12.40 Shire of Yea v Roberts (1879) 5 VLR (E) 222 .… 16.62 Shivas v BTR Nylex Holdings NZ Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 318 .… 3.39 Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2002] QB 834 .… 12.60 Shoreham Park Pty Ltd v John Foote Bloodstock Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 778 .… 20.4 Shortall v White [2007] NSWCA 372 .… 5.4 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 .… 7.27, 8.12, 8.18, 8.34 Showtime Touring Group Pty Ltd v Mosley Touring Inc [2011] NSWSC 1401; (2013) 296 ALR 597; [2013] NSWCA 53 .… 11.110, 11.114 Shrimp v Landmark Operations Ltd [2007] FCA 1468 .… 11.136 Shuey v United States 92 US 73 (1876) .… 3.66 Sibbles v Highfern Pty Ltd (1987) 164 CLR 214 .… 21.20, 21.24

Sibley v Grosvenor (1916) 21 CLR 469 .… 11.74, 11.79, 11.84 Sibree v Tripp (1846) 15 M & W 23; 153 ER 745 .… 4.37 Sidameneo (No 456) Pty Ltd v Alexander [2011] NSWCA 418 .… 18.37 Sidenham and Worlington’s Case (1585) 2 Leon 324; 74 ER 497 .… 4.20 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 .… 2.6, 2.9, 2.10, 2.14, 16.69, 16.70 Sidney Eastman Pty Ltd v Southern [1963] NSWR 815 .… 6.8, 6.11, 7.28 Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Nuplex Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA .… 23.34, 23.35 Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy Pty Ltd v Bulgana Wind Farm Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 318 .… 24.23 Siev v Magid [2004] NSWCA 135 .… 26.4 Siglin v Choules [2002] WASCA 9 .… 14.20 Sigma Coachair Group Pty Ltd v Bock Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 684 .… 11.114 Sigma Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v Marvell Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 242 .… 24.19 Sigma Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v NucOne Enterprises Pty Ltd [1998] VSC 20 .… 21.35 Sigman Finance Corp (in admin rec), Re [2010] 1 All ER 571 .… 10.12 Silberman v Silberman (1910) SR (NSW) 554 .… 23.19 Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 .… 2.2, 2.5 Silva v Tarval Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9101 .… 19.9 Silver v Dome Resources NL [2007] NSWSC 455 .… 4.35, 7.3, 7.8, 24.5 Simakoff v The Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils of Australia Inc [1999] ACTSC 58 .… 23.42 Simeone v Pesatura General Contractors Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 453 .… 23.17, 23.32 Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; 339 ALR 200; [2016] HCA 47 .… 3.15, 7.2, 7.50, 10.11, 10.12, 10.30, 10.31, 10.32, 12.30, 12.33, 12.34, 12.41, 24.23 Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187 .… 3.6 Simmons Ltd v Hay [1964–5] NSWR 416 .… 19.5, 19.12, 19.18, 19.21, 19.22 Simon v Motivos (1766) 1 Wm Bl 599; 96 ER 347 .… 16.5

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Table of Cases Simonious Vischer & Co v Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 .… 10.39, 10.50, 10.52, 10.56, 10.59, 23.37, 23.43 Simons v Zartom Investments Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 30 .… 10.21, 11.9, 11.10, 11.40, 11.41, 11.69 Simos v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1976) 10 ACTR 4 .… 11.9, 11.38, 11.41, 26.5 Simpkins v Pays [1955] 1 WLR 975; [1955] 3 All ER 10 .… 5.9 Simpson v Simpson, The Times, 11 June 1988 .… 14.16 — v Surman (1922) 24 WALR 79 .… 21.15 Simpson Steel Structures v Spencer [1964] WAR 101 .… 26.6, 26.13 Sims v Chong (2015) 230 FCR 346; 321 ALR 509; [2015] FCAFC 80 .… 11.112 — v Commonwealth [2022] NSWCA 194 …. 26.1 — v Gawne [2005] NSWSC 750 .… 18.7, 18.9 — v Robertson (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 246 .… 16.35 Sinclair v Elderton (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 21 .… 15.2 — v Preston [1970] WAR 186 .… 11.84 — v Schildt (1914) 16 WALR 100 .… 6.5, 6.6, 16.66 — v SSET Constructions Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 125 .… 23.16 Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 .… 10.16, 3.11, 5.19, 5.24, 16.35 Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661; (1984) 55 ALR 1 .… 3.10, 3.33, 3.57, 21.19, 21.20 Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164 .… 7.42 Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 80 .… 10.14 — v — (No 2) [2017] WASCA 76 .… 24.21 — v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 101 .… 26.5 Sion v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2013] NSWCA 337 .… 5.1, 5.2, 6.5 Siqueira v Noronha [1934] AC 332 .… 17.33 Sistrom v Rangott [2004] ACTCA 14 .… 25.12 Sivewright v Casey (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 294 .… 20.7, 20.18 SJ Mackie Pty Ltd v Dalziell Medical Practice Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 87 .… 3.11



Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad & El 983; 113 ER 688 .… 13.4 Skilled Group Ltd v CSR Viridian Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 290 .… 26.8 Skinner v Redmond Family Holdings Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 329 .… 11.115 Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 954; [1974] 1 WLR 576 .… 24.17, 24.21 Skyrise Consultants Pty Ltd v Metroland Funds Management Ltd [2011] NSWCA 406 .… 10.20 Skyrne v Butolf YB 2 Ric 2 (Ames Series) 223 .… 27.6 Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd v Northern Territory (1987) 45 NTR 29 .… 24.13 Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61 .… 2.18, 10.3, 10.7 Slator v Trimble 14 Ir C L Rep 342 .… 17.22 Slatter v Railway Commissioners (NSW) (1931) 45 CLR 68 .… 24.25 Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196 .… 16.68 Slee v Warke (1949) 86 CLR 271 .… 12.4, 12.32, 12.33, 12.40, 12.45, 12.55, 22.4, 24.7, 24.8 Slinger v Southern White Pty Ltd (2005) 92 SASR 303; [2005] SASC 267 .… 11.146 Smilie Pty Ltd v Bruce (1998) 8 BPR 15; (1999) ANZ ConvR 412 .… 21.19, 21.20, 21.35 Smith v ACT [2015] ACTSC 7 .… 25.12 — v ANL Ltd (2000) 176 ALR 449 .… 10.53 — v Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd (in liq) (1956) 95 CLR 381 .… 20.8 — v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187; [1881–5] All ER Rep 242 .… 11.34 — v Clegg [2005] 1 Qd R 561 .… 14.2 — v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 667 .… 12.59 — v Glegg [2005] 1 Qd R 561; [2004] QSC 443 .… 14.7, 14.13, 15.11 — v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 .… 12.44, 12.45, 12.51 — v Iliffe (1875) LR 20 Eq 666 .… 12.35 — v Jenkins (1969) 119 CLR 397; (1970) 44 ALJR 78 .… 18.14, 27.15 — v Jones (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 444 .… 26.13 — v Kay (1859) 7 HL Cas 750; 11 ER 299 .… 14.7 — v Land and House Property Corp (1884) 28 Ch D 7 .… 11.16, 11.116

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

— v Lush (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 207 .… 16.35 — v Maloney (2005) 223 ALR 101 .… 11.72 — v Mansi [1963] 1 WLR 26 .… 3.10 — v Moloney (2005) 92 SASR 498 .… 11.127 — v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803 .… 3.67, 6.8 — v Noss [2006] NSWCA 37 .… 11.127 — v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1910) 11 CLR 148 .… 8.9, 8.16, 8.17 — v Pisani (2001) 78 SASR 548 .… 20.2 — v Smith [2004] NSWSC 663 .… 12.51 — v UMB Chrysler (Scotland) Ltd [1978] SC (HL) 1 .… 10.62 — v Westall 1698) 1 Ld Raym 316; 91 ER 1106 .… 16.30 — v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38 .… 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9, 13.12 — v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410 .… 17.73 — v Young [2016] NSWCA 281 .… 25.1, 25.8 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 .… 7.25 Smith Bros Trade & Transport Terminal Pty Ltd v Pacific Power [1998] NSWSC 392 .… 10.60, 19.17, 19.21 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 .… 11.83 Smits v Roach [2002] NSWSC 241; [2004] NSWCA 233 .… 18.33, 18.46, 26.2 Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445 .… 3.10, 3.46, 3.61 Smythe v Thomas (2007) 71 NSWLR 537; [2007] NSWSC 844 .… 3.22, 10.23, 16.42 Snarski v Barbarich [1969] WAR 46 .… 11.9, 11.76 Snelling v John G Snelling Ltd [1973] 1 QB 87; [1972] 1 All ER 79; [1972] 2 WLR 588 .… 7.5, 7.9, 7.11 Snowlife Pty Ltd v Robina Land Corp Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 Qd R 584 .… 20.7, 20.18, 21.35, 22.12 Snyman v Cooper (1990) 24 FCR 433; 12 ATPR 40-993 .… 11.107 Society of Lloyd’s v White [2004] VSCA 101 .… 11.114, 11.153 Software Integrators Pty Ltd v Roadrunner Couriers Pty Ltd (1997) 69 SASR 288 .… 11.115 Sola Basic Australia Ltd v Morganite Ceramic Fibres Pty Ltd .… 10.12

Solicitor-General v Wylde (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 83 .… 18.34 Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671; [1949] 2 All ER 1107 .… 11.13, 11.62, 12.3, 12.4, 12.8, 12.17, 12.18, 12.19, 12.20, 12.25, 12.26, 12.29, 12.53, 12.54 Solomons v Halloran (1906) 7 SR (NSW) 32 .… 21.19 Soltykoff, Re; Ex parte Margrett [1891] 1 QB 413 .… 17.29 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160; 232 ALR 232; [2007] HCA .… 11.59 Sopov v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 510; [2009] VSCA 141 .… 26.6, 26.7 Soteria Insurance Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 440 .… 23.7 South African Territories Ltd v Wallington [1898] AC 309 .… 24.5 South Australia v Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130 .… 5.1, 5.2, 5.28 — v Day [2000] SASC 451 .… 10.56 — v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161 .… 11.83, 11.85, 11.88, 11.90, 11.91, 25.7 — v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344; [2009] SASC 219 .… 10.52 South Australian Cold Stores Ltd v Electricity Trust (SA) (1965) 115 CLR 247 .… 10.60, 18.39, 18.47 — v Electricity Trust of Australia (1957) 98 CLR 65 .… 12.8, 18.7, 18.20, 18.48, 26.3, 26.5 South Australian Railways Commissioner v Egan (1973) 130 CLR 506 .… 10.62, 10.64, 18.34 South Coast Basalt Pty Ltd v R W Miller & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 356 .… 23.39 South Coast Oils (Qld and NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680 .… 3.11, 5.24, 6.6, 6.8, 16.37 South Dowling Pty Ltd v Cody Outdoor Advertising Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 407; [2005] NSWC 391 .… 21.18 South Launceston Football Club Inc v Tasmanian Football League Ltd (1995) 4 Tas R 342 .… 3.8 South Suburban Land & Finance Co Ltd v Hughes (1889) 15 VLR 751 .… 16.35, 16.37 South Sydney Council v Royal Botanic Gardens [1999] NSWCA 478 .… 10.41, 26.3, 26.5 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd (2000) 177

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Table of Cases ALR 611; (2001) 181 ALR 188; [2000] FCA 1541 .… 10.39, 10.43, 10.45, 10.46, 10.49 South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd [1905] AC 239 .… 28.17 South Western Sydney Local Health District v Gould (2018) 97 NSWLR 513; [2018] NSWCA 69 .… 10.32 Southage Pty Ltd v Vescovi [2015] VSCA 117 .… 26.1, 26.5 Southdown Publications Pty Ltd v ACP Magazines Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 347 .… 12.63 Southern British National Trust Ltd (in liq) v Pither (1937) 57 CLR 89 .… 8.40 Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340 .… 21.9 Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 .… 3.67 Southern Resources Ltd v Technomin Australia NL [1990] WAR 72 .… 10.12 Southern Waste Resource Co Pty Ltd v Adelaide Hills Region Waste Management Authority [No 3] [2019] SASC 192 .… 11.92 Southern Water v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077 .… 7.38 Sovereign v Bevillesta [2001] NSWSC 369 .… 10.64, 10.74 Sowler v Potter [1940] 1 KB 271 .… 12.60 SPA Property and Investments Co Pty Ltd v Pembroke Antiques Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 547 .… 11.22, 11.30, 11.79 Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Ltd [2003] FCA 1025 .… 26.1, 26.2 SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 35; [2014] FCAFC 50 .… 11.117, 11.118 Spathis v Hanave Investment Co Ltd [2002] NSWSC 304 .… 12.36 Spears v Hartly (1800) 3 Esp 81; 170 ER 545; [1775–1802] All ER 181 .… 25.11 Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 .… 3.7, 3.26, 4.19 Specialist Diagnostic Services Pty Ltd v Healthscope Ltd (2012) 41 VR 1; 305 ALR 569; [2010] VSC 443; (2012) 41 VR 1; [2012] VSCA 175 .… 7.49, 10.43, 18.35, 18.37 Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 617 .… 3.46



Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 30 NSWLR 185 .… 11.54 Spellman v Spellman [1961] 1 WLR 921; [1961] 2 All ER 498 .… 5.4 Spence v Crawford [1939] 3 All ER 271 .… 11.45, 11.53, 11.57 — v Duffield (1870) 1 VR (L) 49 .… 23.39 Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418; [1907] HCA 82 .… 6.5 — v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561 .… 3.17, 3.19 Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilla World Service BV [2002] EWCA Civ 15 .… 11.20 Spiers Earthworks Pty Ltd v Landtec Projects Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASCA 53; (2012) 287 ALR 360 .… 10.12, 21.27, 23.45 Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Harrison (1990) 19 NSWLR 211 .… 11.145 Spina v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2009] NSWCA 206 .… 15.31 Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 57 NSWLR 544; [2003] NSWCA 180 .… 10.45, 10.49, 13.12, 15.8 Spiro v Lintern [1973] 3 All ER 319 .… 3.44 Spoilt Pty Ltd v Ticking Pty Ltd [2010] QDC 259 .… 11.129 Spong v Spong (1914) 18 CLR 544 .… 14.5, 14.7, 14.11 Spoor v Price (2019) 3 QR 176; [2019] QCA 297 .… 18.6 Sportsvision Australia Pty Ltd v Tallglen Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 103 .… 6.6, 10.16 Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane [2012] EWHC 1290 .… 3.7, 4.17 Springwell Navigation Corp v J P Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 12; [2010] CLC 705 .… 2.3, 10.7 Spunwill Pty Ltd v BAB Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 290 .… 6.6, 10.5, 10.13, 10.16, 10.32, 10.34, 10.35 Squibb & Sons Pty Ltd v Tully Corp Pty Ltd (1986) 8 ATPR 40-691 .… 11.122, 11.123 Squires v SA Steel and Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 142 .… 8.19, 8.34 — v South Australian Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 142 .… 8.18 SST Consulting Services Pty Ltd v Rieson (2006) 225 CLR 516; 228 ALR 417; [2006] HCA 31 .… 6.17, 18.1, 18.7, 18.38, 18.40, 18.41, 18.42 St Barbara Ltd v Hughes (No 2) [2011] WASCA 235 .… 25.12

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

St Clair v Petricevic (1988) NSW ConvR 55-426; ASC 55-688; (1989) 63 ALJ 495 .… 13.10, 15.28, 15.31 St George Bank Ltd v Quinerts (2009) 25 VR 666; [2009] VSCA 245 .… 11.136 — v Trimarchi [2004] NSWCA 120 .… 14.20, 15.31 St George Commercial Credit Corp Ltd v Collins Wallis Properties Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 649 .… 23.35, 23.43 St George Soccer Football Association Inc v Soccer NSW Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1288 .… 10.43, 11.111, 11.118 St Hilliers (Developments) Pty Ltd v Radmanovich [2002] NSWSC 524 .… 8.8 St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons Ltd .… 7.7 Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261; 46 ALR 451 .… 11.118, 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 Stacks Managed Investments Ltd v Tolteca Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 276 .… 15.16 Stacks/Taree v Marshall (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 77 .… 18.35 Stadium Australia Management Ltd v Sodexho Venues (Australia) Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 437 .… 10.12 Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 150 CLR 535 .… 26.12 Stained Glass Overlay Australasia Pty Ltd v Rea [1998] WASC 325 .… 18.37 Stammers v Akron Securities Ltd (1997) 140 FLR 146 .… 18.11 Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164 .… 2.14 Standard Portland Cement Pty Ltd v Good (1983) 47 ALR 107; 57 ALJR 151 .… 12.37, 12.41 Staniland v Kentucky Homes Pty Ltd (1987, unreported) .… 18.3 Stankovic v Aufderheide [2003] SASC 378 .… 16.55 Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [2006] WASCA 56 .… 7.7 Stanway, Re [1913] VLR 327 .… 17.63 Star Entertainment Group Ltd v Chubb Insurance Australia Ltd [2022] FCAFC 16 .… 10.30 Starceavich v Swart & Associates Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 960 .… 15.4, 15.7, 15.8 Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 .… 21.20

Starlink International Group Pty Ltd v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1154 .… 10.43 St-Arnaud v Facebook, Inc [2011] QCCS 1506 .… 3.7 Startup v Macdonald (1843) 6 Man & G 593; 134 ER 1029 .… 9.9 State Bank of New South Wales v Chia (2000) 50 NSWLR 588; [2000] NSWSC 552 .… 6.15 — v Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 47; (2001) 51 NSWLR 399 .… 10.15, 10.55, 10.56, 10.57, 10.59, 10.60, 10.61, 23.19 — v Hibbert [2000] NSWSC 628 .… 14.17, 14.20, 15.28 — v Layoun [2001] NSWSC 113 .… 14.20 — v Swiss Bank Corp Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 350 .… 26.5 State Bank of South Australia v Macintosh (NSWSC, Young J, 31 May 1995, unreported) .… 22.5 State Government Insurance Corp v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511; 101 ALR 259 .… 11.113 State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Brisbane Stevedoring Pty Ltd (1969) 123 CLR 228 .… 21.38 State Lotteries Office v Burgin .… 10.12 State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 .… 2.13, 2.14, 2.16, 2.18, 2.20, 15.8 — v Ferreri (1990) ANZ ConvR 211; NSW ConvR 55512 .… 12.52, 12.53, 12.54 — v Hammond (1988) 15 NSWLR 395 .… 25.7 — v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 .… 10.3, 10.5 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 338 .… 7.42 State Transport Authority v Apex Quarries Ltd [1988] VR 187 .… 24.20 Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536; [1974] 3 WLR 56; [1974] 2 All ER 977 .… 16.59, 16.65 — v Drinkle [1916] AC 275 .… 21.36 Steel Wing Co Ltd, Re [1921] 1 Ch 349; [1920] All ER Rep 292 .… 8.26 Steele v Marshan [2012] NSWCA 141 .… 3.27 — v Tardiani (1946) 72 CLR 386 .… 26.6, 26.13

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Table of Cases Steelhomes (1985) Pty Ltd v Hutts (1993) 9 SR (WA) 143 .… 18.49 Steggall v Lymburner (1912) 14 WALR 201 .… 16.19 Steggles Ltd v Yarrabee Chicken Co Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 91 .… 10.12 Steinberg v Scala (Leeds) Ltd [1923] 2 Ch 452; [1923] All ER Rep 239 .… 17.19, 17.21, 17.23 Steiner v Magic Carpet Tours Pty Ltd (1984) ATPR 40-490 .… 11.146 Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119 .… 3.49, 5.24, 16.35 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 391 .… 18.37 Stephens v Cameron [2021] VSCA 208 .… 26.3 Stephenson v Dwyer [2008] NSWCA 123 .… 5.24 Stepps Investments Ltd v Security Capital Corp Ltd (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 351 .… 12.52 Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology 939 Fd 2d 91 .… 3.55 Stericorp Ltd v Stericycle Inc [2005] VSC 203 .… 11.152 Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489; 81 ALR 463; 168 CLR 489; [1988] HCA 51 .… 2.16, 15.13, 21.11, 21.21, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9 Sternbeck v Sternbeck (1968) 11 FLR 360 .… 13.2 Steve Parrott Pty Ltd v Fire Protection Association Australia [2016] NSWSC 1393 .… 21.12 Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1 .… 18.33 — v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323 .… 2.4 — v Trewin [1968] Qd R 411 .… 6.9 Stevenson v Ellis (1912) 29 WN (NSW) 52 .… 6.5 — v Hook (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 307 .… 21.12 Stevenson Jacques & Co v McLean [1880] 5 QBD 346 .… 3.30, 3.65 Stevter Holdings Ltd v Katra Constructions Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 459 .… 24.32 Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104 .… 3.14 — v Mooney (1897) 18 LR (NSW) Eq 178 .… 17.71 Stickney v Keeble [1915] AC 386; [1914–15] All ER Rep 73 .… 24.7 Stilbo Pty Ltd v MCC Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 11 Tas R 63; [2002] TASSC 6 .… 25.12



Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168 .… 4.32, 4.33 Stillwell Trucks Pty Ltd v Nectar Brook Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 115 ALR 294 .… 10.30, 1034 Stinchcombe v Thomas [1957] VR 509 .… 6.1, 6.5 Stirling Properties Ltd v Yerba Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ACTR 1 .… 9.8 Stivactas v Michaletos (No 2) (1993) NSW ConvR 55-683; Aust Contract Rep 90-031 .… 14.5 Stockdale v Dunlop (1840) 6 M & W 224; 151 ER 391 .… 16.50 Stocker v Wedderburn (1857) 3 K & J 393; 69 ER 1162 .… 24.11 Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De G M & G 11; 43 ER 411 .… 8.18 — v Wilson [1913] 2 KB 235; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1512 .… 17.37, 17.42 Stocks & Holdings (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Arrowsmith (1964) 112 CLR 646 .… 6.9, 6.10, 10.60 Stoddart v Union Trust Ltd [1912] 1 KB 181 .… 8.40, 8.42 Stoddart Tiles Pty Ltd v Alcan Australia Ltd (1983) .… 10.5, 10.6 Stoelwinder v Southern Health Care Network (2000) 177 ALR 501 .… 11.111 Stoffel & Co v Grondona [2021] AC 540; [2020] UKSC 42 .… 18.46 Stogdon v Lee [1891] 1 QB 661 .… 17.61 Stokely-Van Camp Inc v New Generation Beverages Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 607; [1998] ATPR 41-290; [1998] ATPR 41657 .… 18.37 Stokes v Whicher [1920] 1 .… 16.45 Stokolosa v Weeks Peacock Homes [1998] SASC 6956 .… 18.10 Stone v Chappel (2017) 128 SASR 165; [2017] SASCFC 72 .… 23.27 — v Hoskins [1905] P 194 .… 5.8 — v Hume [1948] SR (Tas) 40 .… 10.2, 10.9 — v Wythipol (1588) Cro Eliz 126; 1 Leon 113; Owen 94; Latch 21; 78 ER 383 .… 4.25, 27.11 Stone James v Pioneer Concrete (WA) Pty Ltd [1985] WAR 233 .… 25.12 Strachan & Co Ltd v Lyall & Sons Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 81 .… 16.64 Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 .… 2.4, 2.14, 2.31, 21.32

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Lend Lease Services Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 98 .… 24.23 Suisse Atlantique Société d’ Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361 .… 10.76 Sullavan v Teare (2011) 1 Qd R 292; [2010] QCA 70 .… 25.5 — v Sclanders [2000] SASC 273 .… 18.32 — v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312 .… 2.5, 2.9, 16.70 Sultman v Bond [1956] St R Qd 180 .… 17.5, 17.7 Sumampow v Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 64 .… 2.3, 10.48, 20.4, 20.15, 21.32 Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149 .… 21.29 Summers v Cocks (1927) 40 CLR 321 .… 24.8 — v Commonwealth (1918) 25 CLR 144; (1919) 26 CLR 180 .… 10.54, 21.12, 22.9 Summertime Holidays Pty Ltd v Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 29 .… 23.19, 23.24 Summit Chemicals Pty Ltd v Vetrotex Espana SA [2004] WASCA 109 .… 25.12 Sumpter v Hedges [1898] 1 QB 673 .… 26.6 Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 .… 16.11, 16.15, 21.12, 21.13, 21.24, 21.26, 21.29, 21.35, 23.22, 26.12 Suncorp Building Society Ltd, Re [1994] 2 Qd R 570 .… 18.12 Suncorp-Metway Ltd v Bellairs [2009] NSWSC 135 .… 15.27 Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323 .… 4.32, 4.35 Sunset Vineyard Management Pty Ltd v Southcorp Wines Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 234; [2008] VSCA 98 .… 10.13, 10.58 Sunstar Fruit Pty Ltd v Cosmo [1995] 2 Qd R 214 .… 21.12, 21.19, 26.6 Sunvara Pty Ltd v Williams [2001] NSWSC 433 .… 23.19 Supalux Paint Co Pty Ltd v Vyse [1999] WASC 78 .… 2.20, 6.1, 10.13, 18.37, 22.6 Superannuation & Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Turner [2020] NSWCA 246 .… 15.27, 15.28 Supetina Pty Ltd v Lombok Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 563 .… 22.9 Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd v Tass James [2004] NSWSC 61 .… 21.24

Stradbroke Waters Co-owners Co-operative Society Ltd v Taylor [1988] 1 Qd R 595 .… 6.5 Straits Exploration (Australia) Pty Ltd v Murchison United NL (2005) 31 WAR 187; [2005] WASCA 241 .… 5.15, 18.34 Strangeborough v Warner 4 Leon 3; 74 ER 686 .… 27.12 Stratton Finance Pty Ltd v Webb (2014) 314 ALR 166; [2014] FCAFC 110 .… 10.12 Streamline Fashions Pty Ltd, Re [1965] VR 418 .… 12.35 Strickland v Minister for Lands for Western Australia (1998) 85 FCR 303 .… 6.15 — v Turner (1852) 7 Exch 208; 155 ER 919 .… 12.12 Striker Resources NL v Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) [2006] WASC 153 .… 21.24, 21.38 Stromdale and Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] 1 All ER 59 .… 7.28 Strover v Harrington [1988] 2 WLR 572 .… 11.35, 11.36 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Cable Sands Pty Ltd (2010) 41 WAR 318; [2010] WASCA 222 .… 6.15 — v — (No 3) [2009] WASC 352 .… 10.47 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2016] WASCA 177 .… 11.45, 11.50, 21.38 Stuart v Kingston (1923) 32 CLR 309 .… 11.78 — v Wilkins (1778) 1 Doug KB 18; 99 ER 15 .… 27.26 Stuart Pty Ltd v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 334 .… 7.41, 23.13, 23.39 Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 6 .… 15.6, 15.8, 15.9, 15.10, 15.16, 15.31 Stumer Investments Pty Ltd v Azzura Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 352 .… 11.147 Sturlyn v Albany (1587) Cro Eliz 67; 78 ER 327 .… 4.12 STY (Afforestation) Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2006] VSCA 283 .… 21.29, 21.31 Suata Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corp (1989) 86 ALR 532 .… 5.29, 11.109 Subiaco v Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 140 .… 19.6 Suburban Homes Pty Ltd v Topper (1929) 35 ALR 294 .… 11.42 Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444 .… 6.9, 6.11 cxl

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Table of Cases Surfstone Pty Ltd v Morgan Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 290; [2016] 2 Qd R 194; [2016] QCA 213 .… 10.70 Surrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka [1977] 2 All ER 481 .… 25.8 Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361; [1993] 3 All ER 705 .… 24.1 Sutton v A J Thompson Pty Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 233 .… 11.110, 11.122, 11.123, 11.124, 11.129 — v Lintot (1859) Legge 1229 .… 16.52 — v Sutton [1984] Ch 184; [1984] 1 All ER 168 .… 24.11 — v Zullo Enterprises Pty Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 196; [1998] QCA 417 .… 16.55, 18.7 Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 .… 16.7, 16.51, 20.4, 20.8, 20.13, 20.15, 20.16, 21.26, 22.4, 22.5, 24.2, 24.8 Svanosio v McNamara (1956) 96 CLR 186 .… 10.21, 10.24, 11.64, 12.20, 12.27, 12.29 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 279 .… 6.6, 10.6, 23.24, 23.25, 23.32 Swan Pools Ltd v Baker (1980) 25 SASR 103 .… 25.2 Swann v Phillips (1838) 8 Ad & E 457; 112 ER 912 .… 11.80 Swanson v Board of Land and Works [1928] VLR 283 .… 18.34 Swanville Investment Pty Ltd v Riana Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 121 .… 24.4 Sweet & Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd [1964] 2 QB 699 .… 6.7, 6.11 Sweetman v Bradfield Management Services Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-290 .… 11.112, 11.116, 11.125 Swettenham v Wild [2005] QCA 264 .… 16.73 SWF Hoists & Industrial Equipment Pty Ltd v State Government Insurance Commission (1990) ATPR 41-045 .… 11.116, 11.147 Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v LeRoi International Inc (No 2) (2015) 48 WAR 376 .… 23.8, 23.26 — v Norncott Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 184 .… 3.15 Swift v Jewsbury and Goddard (1874) LR 9 QB 301 .… 11.81 — v Westpac Banking Corp (1995) ATPR 41-401 .… 15.8, 15.16 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyd’s Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584; [1981] 2 All ER 449; [1981] 2 WLR 893 .… 7.31, 8.19, 24.6



SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 .… 3.46 Sydbank Soenderjylland A/S v Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 539; 149 ALR 134. .… 3.3, 11.114 Sydney Attractions Group Pty Ltd v Frederick Schulman [2013] NSWSC 858 .… 10.32, 10.48 Sydney CC v West (1965) 114 CLR 481 .… 10.62, 10.64, 10.70, 10.72, 10.73, 10.75, 10.76, 10.77 Sydney Consumers’ Milk & Ice Co Ltd v Hawkesbury Dairy & Ice Society Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 458 .… 24.1, 24.8, 24.10 Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 .… 3.11, 6.12 Sydney MC v M’Beath (1881) 2 LR (NSW) 142 .… 17.71 Sydney Municipal Council v Australian Metal Co Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 550 .… 19.20 Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games v Zhu [2002] NSWCA 380 .… 21.24 Sydney Strata Securities Pty Ltd v Elders Finance Ltd (FCA, Davies J, 20 December 1990) .… 23.13 Sydney Water Corporation v Makucha [2010] NSWSC 114 .… 3.15, 17.70 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528 .… 4.31 — v Reserve Bank of Australia (1998) 158 ALR 710 .… 11.117 — v Stratton [1972] 1 NSWLR 145 .… 18.25 Symbion Pathology Pty Ltd v Healthscope Ltd [2006] VSC 191 .… 7.27, 7.31, 7.49 Symmons Plains Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Youl [2005] TASSC 35 .… 16.35 Symons v Williams (1875) 1 VLR (Eq) 199 .… 14.2 Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd v North Sydney Leagues’ Club Ltd [2009] NSWCA 140 .… 10.12 Syros Shipping Co SA v Elaghill Trading Co (The Proodos C) [1981] 3 All ER 189; [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 390 .… 4.32 Sze Tu v Lowe [2014] NSWCA 462; (2014) 89 NSWLR 317 .… 25.13 Szep v Blanken [1969] SASR 65 .… 11.50 T T J Precision Engineering Pty Ltd v Crane Copper and Aluminium Pty Ltd [1968] 3 NSWR 360 .… 8.47

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

T Palmerston (Qld) Pty Ltd v Fogg [1983] 2 Qd R 700 .… 10.32 Ta Ho Ma Pty Ltd v Allen (1999) 47 NSWLR 1 .… 11.38, 11.122 TAA Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323 .… 13.7 Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272; [2009] HCA 8 .… 24.1, 23.6, 23.26, 23.27, 28.17 Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36 .… 23.14 Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177 .… 11.113, 11.116 Taddy v Sterious [1904] 1 Ch 354 .… 7.12 Tadrous v Tadrous [2012] NSWCA 16 .… 16.70 Taheri v Vitek (2014) 87 NSWLR 403; [2014] NSWCA 209 .… 11.35, 11.39, 11.45, 11.53 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; [1886-90] All ER Rep 486 .… 8.12, 8.28 Tait v Bonnice [1975] VR 102 .… 6.17, 20.13 TAL Life Ltd v Shuetrim (2016) 332 ALR 507; [2016] NSWCA 68 .… 7.3, 10.32 Talbot v Talbot [1968] Ch 1 .… 6.8 Talk of the Town Pty Ltd v Hagstrom (1990) 99 ALR 130 .… 18.37 Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Vic) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 .… 1.22, 3.60, 3.61, 4.32, 5.20, 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 16.46 Tamanna v Zattere; Thakorlal v Zattere; Rabac Pty Ltd v Zattere [2017] NSWSC 1388 .… 24.31 Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 .… 18.44 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 191 ALR 449; [2002] HCA 35 .… 10.53 Tameeka Group Pty Ltd v Landan Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 733 .… 10.43, 15.16 Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch D 215 .… 12.4, 12.55, 24.7 Tanah Merah Vic Pty Ltd v Owners’ Corporation No 1 of PS631436T [2021] VSCA 72 .… 11.133, 11.134 Tanaka v Tokyo Network Computing Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 114 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.18, 21.38, 23.22, 23.44 Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239 .… 8.23, 8.25 Tang v Chong (1988) 63 ALJ 349 .… 24.9 — v — (1989) NSW ConvR 55-449 .… 21.36

Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 .… 5.7 Tannous v Cipolla Bros Holdings Pty Ltd (2001) 10 BPR 18,563; [2001] ANZ ConvR 430 .… 9.8 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 215; 217 CLR 315; 201 ALR 359; [2003] HCA 57 .… 2.16, 15.2, 20.18, 21.35, 21.36, 24.9, 28.31 Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (2000) 9 BPR 17,287; (1999) NSW ConvR 55-908; ATPR (Digest) 46-195; [1999] NSWSC 478 .… 12.30, 12.36, 12.41, 15.2, 15.8 Taouk v Assure (NSW) Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 227; [2017] NSWSC 534 .… 10.3, 10.32 Tapiolas v Tapiolas [1985] 2 Qd R 310 .… 25.8 Tarbet Investments Pty Ltd v Overett [1983] Qd R 280 .… 21.18 Tarongo Land Pty Ltd v Lyons [2005] VSC 491 .… 20.3, 20.15, 21.32 Tasmania & Director of Housing v Shaw [2001] TASSC 119 .… 21.10 Tasman Capital Pty Ltd v Sinclair (2008) 75 NSWLR 1; [2008] NSWCA 248 .… 5.24 Tasman Express Line Ltd v JI Case (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 108 .… 10.64, 10.73, 10.76 Tasmania Development & Resources v Martin (2000) 97 IR 66; [2000] FCA 414 .… 10.12, 20.7, 22.12, 23.14, 23.32 Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2005) 15 Tas R 243; [2005] TASSC 133 .… 23.45 — v Shaw [2001] TASSC 119 .… 23.44, 26.9 Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v Kossman [2005] TASSC 5; [2006] TASSC 40 .… 19.15 — v MacQueen [2005] TASSC 36 .… 19.15 Tate v Williamson (1866) 2 Ch App 55 .… 14.5 Tatlock v Harris (1789) 3 TR 174; 100 ER 517 .… 8.47 Tatton v Wade (1856) 18 CB 371; 139 ER 1413 .… 11.80 Tavefund Pty Ltd v Stephen Fitzgerald & Co Pty Ltd [1989] ACTSC 57 .… 22.10 Taxation Services of Australia Ltd v Townsend (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 98 .… 18.37 Taylor v Burgess [2002] NSWSC 170 .… 18.16 — v Caldwell 32 LJQB 164; 122 ER 309; [1861–73] All ER Rep 24 .… 27.26

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Table of Cases — v Crossman (No 2) (2012) 199 FCR 363; [2012] FCAFC 11 .… 11.111 — v Dexta Corporation Ltd [2006] NSWCA 310 .… 6.5, 10.12, 10.16, 10.32, 10.34 — v Gosling [2010] VSC 75 .… 11.142 — v Great Eastern Railway Co [1901] 1 QB 774 .… 16.87 — v J Thomas & Son (1983) 2 ANZ Ins Cas 60-524 .… 26.9 — v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422; 45 ALR 265; [1983] HCA 5 .… 1.89, 5.17, 10.26, 12.2, 12.3, 12.25, 12.26, 12.27, 12.44, 12.48, 12.51, 12.52, 12.53, 12.56, 12.57, 12.62, 12.63, 12.66, 12.71, 21.35, 28.6 — v Lowe (1901) 11 QLJ 90 .… 16.23 — v Oakes Roncoroni & Co (1922) 127 LT 267 .… 21.24 — v Smith [1926] VLR 100; (1926) 38 CLR 48 .… 12.66, 26.3 — v Taylor (1890) 11 NSWR 323 .… 18.29 — v — [1956] NZLR 99 .… 16.70 — v — [2021] VSCA 352 .… 2.9 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 .… 2.6, 16.61, 16.68 TC Industrial Plant Pty Ltd v Robert’s Queensland Pty Ltd (1963) 180 CLR 130; 37 ALJR 289 .… 22.5, 23.5, 23.7, 23.11, 23.13, 23.14, 23.26, 23.41, 23.42 TC Whittle Pty Ltd v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1977) 52 ALJR 173 .… 10.32 TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Hayden Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 130 .… 10.30, 10.32, 23.41 TD Keegan Ltd v Palmer [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 449 .… 13.4 Tea Tree Gully Builders Co Pty Ltd v Martin (1992) 59 SASR 344 .… 16.55, 18.39, 18.49 Teachers Health Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne (1996) NSW ConvR 55-785 .… 14.20, 15.28 Teats v Willcocks [2013] NZCA 162 .… 4.35 Technilock (Aust) Pty Ltd v Mondami Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 320 .… 23.42 Techno Developers Pty Ltd v Homes Corporation of Australia [2005] NSWSC 23 .… 10.54 Technology Leasing Ltd v Lennmar Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 709 .… 19.21 Technomin Australia Pty Ltd v Xstrata Nickel Australasia Operations Pty Ltd (2014) 48 WAR 261; [2014] WASCA 164 .… 10.12 Técnicas Reunidas SA v Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 .… 3.6, 22.3, 22.9



Ted Brown Quarries Pty Ltd v General Quarries (Gilston) Pty Ltd (1977) 16 ALR 23 .… 11.83 Tefbao Pty Ltd v Stannic Securities Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 565 .… 11.128 Tekely v Pryce [2000] NSWCA 6; Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 .… 21.19 Tekmat Pty Ltd v Dosto Pty Ltd (1990) 102 FLR 240 .… 22.3 Telina Developments Pty Ltd v Stay Enterprises Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 585 .… 20.9 Telstra Corp Ltd v First Netcom Pty Ltd (1997) 148 ALR 202 .… 24.21, 24.24 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 296 .… 10.44, 10.45, 10.48 — v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Ltd [2003] FCA 786 .… 11.104 Tenji v Hennenberry & Associates Pty Ltd (2000) 172 ALR 679 .… 11.147 Tenth Vandy Pty Ltd v Natwest Markets Australia Ltd [2012] VSCA 103 .… 21.35 Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (1990) 3 WAR 486 .… 6.8 Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd [1988] 1 WAR 144; 98 FLR 328 .… 3.11, 6.6, 10.16, 26.4 Territory Insurance Office v Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd [1999] NTSC 16 .… 23.17 Territory Loans Management v Turner (1992) 110 FLR 341 .… 19.6, 19.16 Tesseract International Pty Ltd v Pascale Construction Pty Ltd [2022] SASCA 107 …. 11.143 Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2020] UKSC 47 .… 25.6 Thanh v Hoang (1994) 63 SASR 277 .… 18.6, 18.49 Thanh & Nguyet v Hoang (1994) 63 SASR 276 .… 23.12 The Albazero [1977] AC 774; [1976] 3 All ER 129 .… 7.7 The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 .… 2.3, 2.6, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 7.16, 7.17 The Capricornia Electricity Board v John M Kelly (Builders) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 240 .… 18.10

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The Club Cape Schanck Resort Co Ltd v Cape Country Club Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 526; [2001] VSCA 2 .… 12.30 The Craftsmen Restoration & Renovations Pty Ltd v Boland [2011] NSWCA 147 .… 21.12, 21.26 The Dragon [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 257 .… 3.4 The Eagle [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70 .… 3.4 The Edge Development Group Pty Ltd v Jack Road Investments Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 91 .… 5.19, 10.16 The Heart Research Institute Ltd v Psiron Ltd [2002] NSWSC 646 .… 18.34 The Millstream Pty Ltd v Schultz [1980] 1 NSWLR 547 .… 24.18, 24.30, 24.31 The Movie Network Channels Pty Ltd v Optus Vision Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 111 .… 10.13 The National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 .… 23.35 The National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v O’Hea (1904) 29 VLR 814 .… 4.15 The Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd [2007] NSWSC 676 .… 7.49 The Ritz Jewellers Pty Ltd v Australian Artimports Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 51 .… 10.26 The Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd (1981) 56 ALJR 113 .… 25.8 The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609 .… 7.38 Thearle v Keeley (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 48 .… 19.15, 19.25 Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 612; 219 ALR 296; [2005] HCA 45 .… 16.21, 16.29, 16.58 Theodorou, Re [1993] 1 Qd R 588 .… 10.27 Thermoplastic Foam Industries Pty Ltd v Imthouse Pty Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 11,181 .… 12.36, 12.52 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 102 .… 5.16, 21.32, 22.12 Thiess Pty Ltd v FLSMIDTH Minerals Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 6 .… 12.30 Thirkell v Cambi [1919] 2 KB 590 .… 16.37 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505 .… 6.8, 6.9, 12.53 Thomas v Brown (1876) 1 QBD 714 .… 16.48, 16.52

— v Crown (1904) 2 CLR 127 .… 16.65 — v Harper (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 142 .… 24.11, 24.14 — v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448; [1999] QCA 525 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Nelson (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 579 .… 10.20 — v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851; 114 ER 330 .… 4.12 — v — [1956] NZLR 785 .… 16.69 — v University of Bradford [1987] AC 795; [1987] 1 All ER 834 .… 5.1 Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391 .… 18.11, 18.41, 18.45 Thompson v Henderson & Partners Pty Ltd (1989) 51 SASR 431 .… 11.91 — v London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1 KB 41 .… 3.4 — v Marshall (1866) 3 WW&A’B (L) 150 .… 23.39 — v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 .… 2.3, 2.15, 10.3, 11.9, 21.32, 22.10 — v Randwick Corp (1950) 81 CLR 87 .… 17.69 — v White [2006] NSWCA 350 .… 3.11, 5.24, 16.21 Thomson v McInnes (1911) 12 CLR 562 .… 16.41, 16.45 Thomson Publications (Australia) Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 27 ALR 551 .… 11.109 Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597; [1964] HCA 41 .… 1.36, 6.4, 6.7, 10.48, 18.21 Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; 350 ALR 1; [2017] HCA 49 .… 5.5, 13.2, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.10, 14.11, 15.8, 15.16 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; [1937] 3 All ER 157 .… 13.6 Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776; [2009] UKHL 18 .… 10.11 Thornley v Tilley (1925) 36 CLR 1 .… 10.16, 10.54 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 .… 3.21, 10.70 Thoroughgood v Cole (1582) 2 Co Rep 9a; 76 ER 408 .… 12.67 Thorp v Thorp (1701) 12 Mod Rep 455; 88 ER 1448 .… 4.10 Thorpe v Bristile Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 720 [1997] FCA 1369 .… 15.13, 15.16 — v Lochel [2005] WASCA 85 .… 23.19 Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 .… 10.60, 19.5, 19.21, 21.26, 24.10

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Table of Cases Thwaites v Ryan [1984] VR 65 .… 16.68 Till v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2004] ACTCA 26 .… 21.12, 26.9 Tillett v Varnell Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1040 .… 14.7 Tilley v Official Receiver (1960) 103 CLR 529 .… 9.8 Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd [2019] UKSC 32; [2020] AC 154 .… 18.35, 18.38 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 29 .… 19.25 Timber Top Realty Pty Ltd v Mullens [1974] VR 312 .… 16.72 Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v FTM Nominees Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 498 .… 8.27 Timmerman v Nervina Industries (International) Pty Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 1; [1983] 2 Qd R 261 .… 6.5, 6.7, 6.10, 9.7, 24.14 Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] 1 .… 16.45 Timothy v Simpson (1834) 6 C & P 499 .… 3.20 Tincknell v Duthy Homes Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 24 .… 23.27 Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT Rep 271 .… 3.41, 3.46 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 .… 18.46 Tinyow v Lee [2006] NSWCA 80 .… 4.35 Tiplady v Gold Coast Carlton Pty Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 426; 8 FCR 438 .… 11.50, 20.18, 21.18, 21.29, 21.38, 23.20 Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2009) 38 WAR 488; 258 ALR 124; [2009] WASCA 126 .… 2.26, 16.7, 16.9, 16.15, 16.67 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd [2000] FCA 1524 .… 10.35 Titan Support Systems Inc v Nguyen [2014] FCA 884 .… 11.107, 11.114 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 1 Ch 106; [1977] 3 All ER 129 .… 8.47, 8.53, 24.4, 24.7, 24.13, 25.6 Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell [1975] Ch 146 .… 5.24, 5.25, 16.38 TM Burke Estates Pty Ltd v PJ Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [1991] 1 VR 610 .… 21.35, 21.36 TM Duche & Sons (UK) Ltd v Walworth Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd [1962] SR (NSW) 165 .… 19.15



TMA Australia Pty Ltd v Indect Electronics & Distribution GmbH [2015] NSWCA 343 .… 10.55, 15.16 TN Lucas Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 110 .… 11.84, 11.85, 11.86, 11.122 TNT (Melbourne) Pty Ltd v May & Baker (Aust) Pty Ltd (1966) 115 CLR 353 .… 10.62, 10.64, 10.69, 10.70, 10.72, 10.73, 10.76, 10.77 Tobacco Institute of Australia v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (1993) ATPR 41-199 .… 11.123 — v — (No 2) (1993) 113 ALR 257 .… 11.124 Toben v Mathieson [2013] NSWSC 1530 .… 11.111 — v Milne [2014] NSWCA 49 .… 11.112 Todd v Alterra at Lloyds Ltd [2016] FCAFC 15 .… 10.12, 10.33 — v Nicol [1957] SASR 72 .… 5.7, 10.1 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 .… 23.32 Toikan International Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Plasteel Windows (Australia) Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 641 .… 8.49, 22.5 Tokio Marine & Michido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Holgersson [2019] WASCA 114 .… 10.35 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660; [1903] AC 414; [1900-3] All ER Rep 386 .… 3.74, 8.6, 8.18, 8.47, 8.51 — v — [1902] 2 KB 660 .… 8.6 Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 .… 1.76, 3.4, 3.11, 3.26, 3.27, 7.35, 7.38, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.20, 10.26, 10.28, 10.31, 10.69, 11.122, 12.64 Toll (FHL) Pty Ltd v Prixcar Services Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 187 .… 18.34 Toma v Olcorn [2019] VSCA 116 .… 12.53 Tomac v Papp [2016] NSWSC 1472 .… 15.28 Tomanovic Multiown Pty Ltd v Interlux Projects Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 190 .… 15.27 Tomasetti v Brailey (2012) 274 FLR 248; [2012] NSWCA 399 .… 11.136 Tomko v Palasty [2007] NSWCA 258 .… 10.16 Tomlinson v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-151 .… 11.145 — v Gill (1756) Amb 330; 27 ER 22 .… 7.46 Tonelli v Komirra Pty Ltd (1972) VR 737 .… 6.5, 16.35

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Tongue v Council of the City of Tamworth [2004] FCA 209 .… 19.5, 19.6, 19.7, 19.12, 19.22 Tonitto v Bassal (1992) 28 NSWLR 564 .… 16.45 Tonkawa Nominees Pty Ltd v Sword (1987) 5 SR (WA) 1 .… 18.22 Tonkin v Cooma-Monaro Shire Council [2006] NSWCA 50 .… 18.8, 18.10, 18.20, 18.43, 18.49 Tonner v Delaporte [2018] WASCA 115 .… 22.9 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (2011) 15 BPR 29,699; [2011] NSWCA 389 .… 15.1, 15.9, 15.16, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 Tony J Boulos Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 105 .… 2.5 Toogood v Mills (1896) 23 VLR 106 .… 16.35 Toohey v Gunter (1928) 41 CLR 181 .… 7.31 Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499 .… 3.17, 5.23 Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657 .… 2.15 Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88 .… 11.60 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 .… 8.5, 8.18, 8.40 — v Fleming (1859) 2 Legge 1152 .… 3.58, 3.60 Tooth & Co Ltd v Barker [1960] NSWR 51 .… 7.31 — v Bryen (No 2) (1922) 22 SR (NSW) 541 .… 16.35 Toppin v Lomas (1855) 16 CB 145; 139 ER 711 .… 16.22 Torcaso v Papaleo [2001] NSWSC 314 .… 21.19, 21.21 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427; [19003] All ER Rep 991 .… 8.29, 8.31, 8.40 Tornatora v Palatinus [1966] WAR 14 .… 16.64, 16.65 Torpey van der Have Pty Ltd v Mass Constructions Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 263 .… 10.52 Torrac Investments Pty Ltd v Australian National Airline Commission (1985) ANZ ConvR 82 .… 16.40 Torrance v Bolton (1872) LR 8 Ch App 118 .… 11.44, 12.51 Toscano v Holland Securities Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 145 .… 15.26, 15.27, 15.29 Tosich Construction Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 73 FCR 219; 143 ALR 18 .… 18.33

Total Destination Marketing Pty Ltd v Horizons Snowy Mountains Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1349 .… 10.12 Total Liban SA v Vitol Energy SA [2000] 1 All ER 267 .… 8.7 Tote Tasmania Pty Ltd v Garrott [2008] TASSC 86 .… 10.43 Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647 .… 11.82, 11.83, 23.8 Tottenham Investments Pty Ltd v Carburettor Services Pty Ltd (1994) Aust Torts Rep 81–292 .… 10.53 Touche v Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co (1871) 6 Ch App 671 .… 7.46 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 .… 11.115 Town & Country Property Management Systems Pty Ltd v Elie Kaltoum [2003] NSWSC 813 .… 18.9 Townsend v BBC Hardware Ltd [2003] QCA 572 .… 10.53 — v Roussety & Co (WA) Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 40 .… 11.112, 11.115, 11.122 — v Townsend [2006] NTSC 7 .… 5.8, 16.24, 16.60, 16.66, 24.1 Toyota Finance Australia Ltd v Gardiner [2016] NSWCA 162 .… 10.27 Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106 .… 3.11 Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384 .… 10.62, 10.66, 10.73, 10.75, 26.1 TP Rich Investments Pty Ltd v Calderon [1964] NSWR 709 .… 18.22, 18.23, 18.28 TPC v Annand & Thompson Pty Ltd (1978) 19 ALR 730 .… 11.10 — v Collings Construction Co Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 43 .… 11.146 — v Lamova Publishing Corp Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 416 .… 11.116 — v Radio World Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-973 .… 11.150 — v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-286 .… 11.108 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) 58 ALR 423 .… 11.108 TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747 .… 11.105, 11.127 Trade Practices Commission v Milreis Pty Ltd (1977) 14 ALR 623 .… 18.7

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Table of Cases — v Optus Communications Pty Ltd (1996) 18 ATPR 41-478 .… 11.115 — v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd (1983) 76 FLR 455 .… 11.108 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] NSWCA 94 .… 11.106, 11.115 Trainor v Kilmore Council (1862) 1 W & W (E) 293 .… 17.71 Trampoline Enterprises Pty Ltd v Fresh Retailing Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 74 .… 10.44 Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 632 .… 21.14, 21.18 Tranchita v Retravision (WA) Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 265 .… 15.8 Tranquility Pools & Spas Pty Ltd v Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 75 .… 11.129 Transerve Pte Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 953 .… 15.16 Transfield Properties (Kent Street) Pty Ltd v Amos Aked Swift Pty Ltd (1994) 36 NSWLR 321 .… 3.37, 16.22, 10.48 Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83; 30 ALR 201; [1980] HCA 15 .… 4.17, 6.8, 10.52, 18.6, 18.40 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (‘The Achilleas’) [2009] 1 AC 61 .… 23.39, 23.40, 28.7 Transglobal Capital Pty Ltd v Yolarno Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 68 .… 11.122 Transmotors Ltd v Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 .… 3.32 Trans-Pacific Insurance Co v Grand Union Insurance Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 675 .… 10.41, 10.48, 23.17 Transport Tyre Sales Pty Ltd v Montana Tyres Rims and Tubes Pty Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 421 .… 11.116 Transpower New Zealand Ltd v Meridian Energy Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 700 .… 3.27 Travel Compensation Fund v John Harvey Blair [2003] NSWSC 720 .… 8.7 — v Robert Tambree t/as R Tambree and Assocs (2005) 224 CLR 627; 222 ALR 263; [2005] HCA 69 .… 11.127 — v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627; 222 ALR 263; [2005] HCA 59 .… 11.112 Travers v Richardson (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 367 .… 24.5 Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd Trading as ‘Uncle Bens of Australia’ (1992) 27 NSWLR 326 .… 6.6, 6.10, 10.12, 21.12



Traywinds Pty Ltd v Cooper [1989] 1 Qd R 222 .… 3.69 Trazray Pty Ltd v Russell Foundries Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-393 .… 6.9 Treadwell v Hickey [2009] NSWSC 1395 .… 8.12, 8.18 — v Martin (1976) 67 DLR (3d) 493 .… 11.58 Treifus & Co Ltd v Post Office [1957] 2 QB 352 .… 5.29 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629; [1982] AC 679; [1981] 3 All ER 520 .… 8.7 Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242 .… 2.5, 2.11, 16.69 Trestrail v Briggs [1999] SASC 413 .… 23.42 Trevenar v Ussfeller [2005] NSWSC 582 .… 14.5 Trevey v Grubb (1982) 44 ALR 20 .… 5.9 Trevilyan v Donaldson [1997] SASC 6502 .… 10.41, 21.18, 21.23 Triarno Pty Ltd v Triden Contractors Ltd (1992) 10 BCL 305 .… 6.11 Tricare Aust Ltd v Highmist Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 251 .… 20.3, 20.8 Tricontinental Corp v HDFI Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 689 .… 20.1 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 164; 80 ALR 574; ; 62 ALJR 508; [1988] HCA 44 .… 1.40, 2.21, 4.7, 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.14, 7.15, 7.17, 7.30, 7.43, 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.50, 8.3, 23.2, 26.9 Trifid Pty Ltd v Ratto [1985] WAR 19 .… 16.21, 16.62, 16.64, 16.65 Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd v CML Assurance Society Ltd (1992) ANZ Ins Cas 61119 .… 15.2, 15.8 Tri-Global (Aust) Pty Ltd, Re [1992] FCA 124 .… 24.12 Trimat Holdings Pty Ltd v Investment Club Pty Ltd [2022] WASCA 29 .… 26.5 Trimis v Mina [1999] NSWCA 140 .… 21.12, 21.24, 23.26, 26.5 Trimtor Building Consultants Pty Ltd v Hilton [1983] 1 NSWLR 259 .… 16.55 Trinity Point Hotel Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [1993] QCA 421 .… 21.12 Triple ‘C’ Holdings Pty Ltd v Hogan [1983] 1 NSWLR 252 .… 16.55 Trippe Investments Pty Ltd v Henderson Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 214 .… 2.16

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246 .… 3.69, 3.70, 10.16 Tri-Star Customs & Forwarding Ltd v Denning [1999] 1 NZLR 33 .… 12.53 Trollope & Colls Ltd v Atomic Power Constructions Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 333 .… 3.34 Tropeano v Riboni [2005] VSC 229 .… 21.11, 21.12, 21.15, 21.18, 21.29, 21.30, 23.13 Tropeanor v Riboni [2005] VSC 229 .… 18.37 Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1093; (2010) 274 ALR 626 .… 10.16 Tropical Traders Ltd v Goonan (1964) 111 CLR 41 .… 11.47, 11.50, 20.9, 21.19, 21.28, 21.29, 21.30 Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office [1998] NTSC 74 .… 10.35, 23.17, 23.21 Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228 .… 4.38 Trueman v Hurst (1785) 1 TR 40; 99 ER 960 .… 17.33 Trupkovic v Furrer [2007] QSC 027 .… 20.13, 20.15 Truran v Cortorillo [2011] VSC 488 .… 15.8, 15.9 Trust Company of Australia Ltd (trading as Stockland Property Management) v Skiwing Pty Ltd (trading as Café Tiffany’s) (2006) 66 NSWLR 77; 234 ALR 398; 226 FLR 147; [2006] NSWCA 185 .… 11.151 Trustee v Wadley (1997) 7 Tas R 35 .… 2.9 Trustee Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Webster [1907] VLR 318 .… 17.61 Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Peters (1960) 102 CLR 537 .… 6.6, 6.17, 10.27, 10.32, 10.60, 24.10 Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; [2007] NSWCA 117 .… 3.15, 5.10, 17.72 Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591 .… 11.124 TS & B Retail v 3Fold Resources (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; [2007] FCA 151 .… 10.54, 18.33 Tsangaris v Gaymark Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 82 FLR 269 .… 24.10 Tsaoucis v Gallipoli Memorial Club Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,265 .… 3.70 TSB Bank plc v Camfield [1995] 1 WLR 430; [1995] 1 All ER 951 .… 11.56, 11.72

Tsimidopoulos v Mulson Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 359 .… 20.8 Tszyu v Fightvision Pty Ltd; Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323 .… 8.49 Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720 .… 23.37 Tucker v Bennett (1887) 38 Ch D 1 .… 12.30 Tudehope v Gordonstone Coal Management Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 914 .… 21.17, 21.18, 21.19 Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263 .… 2.2, 21.29, 21.32 Tuedwell Pty Ltd v JC Craig Constructions Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 450 .… 21.19 Tufton v Sperni (1952) 2 TLR 516 .… 14.5 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143; [1843-60] All ER Rep 9 .… 7.12, 7.27, 7.31 Tulloch (deceased) v Braybon (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 650 .… 14.5 Tully v Irish Bond Commission (1961) 97 ILTR 174 .… 3.24 Turnbull & Co v Duvall [1902] AC 429 .… 14.17 Turner v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation (1984) 55 ALR 635; 6 FCR 177 .… 24.12, 24.27 — v Bladin (1951) 82 CLR 463 .… 6.6, 16.54, 16.66, 23.21, 24.1, 24.4, 24.6, 24.11, 24.16, 26.9 — v General Motors (Australia) Pty Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 352 .… 15.2 — v Green [1895] 2 Ch 205 .… 11.17, 12.51 — v Kwikshift Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 8 .… 23.19, 23.25, 23.39, 23.43 — v Labafox International Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 660 .… 11.50, 21.28, 21.29 — v O’Bryan-Turner [2021] NSWSC 5 .… 15.6, 15.10 — v Windever [2003] NSWSC 1147; [2005] NSWCA 73 .… 15.8, 15.9, 15.10 Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498 .… 3.29 Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10 .… 12.27, 12.29, 12.30, 12.37, 12.52 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 .… 4.6, 7.1 Tweed Motors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Moran Motors Pty Ltd (1965) 39 ALJR 279 .… 24.16 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and Matt Groening Productions Inc

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Table of Cases v South Australian Brewing Co Ltd and Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1484 .… 11.104 Twenty Ninth Macorp Nominees Pty Ltd v George [2017] VSC 136 .… 14.18 Twenty-First Australia Inc v Shade [1998] NSWSC 325 .… 18.37, 18.38 Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464 .… 23.43 Twigg v Twigg [2022] NSWCA 68 .… 25.13 Two Lands Services Pty Ltd v Gregory Robert Cave [2000] NSWSC 14 .… 18.37 Twynam Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Anburn Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-498 .… 16.35 Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333 .… 23.11, 23.42, 23.43 Tymshare Inc v Covell 727 F2 d 1145 .… 10.49 Tytel v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 67 ALR 532 .… 11.109 Tytel Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 67 ALR 433 .… 11.109 Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd v Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 50 .… 11.136 U UBAF Ltd v European American Banking Corp [1984] QB 713 .… 11.80 Uber Builders and Developers Pty Ltd v MIFA Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 596 .… 24.23 Uber Technologies Inc v Heller 2020 SCC 16 .… 15.8 UI International Pty Ltd v Interworks Architects Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 158; [2007] QCA 402; [2007] QSC 96 .… 7.7, 23.27 Ulbrick v Laidlaw [1924] VLR 247 .… 3.24 Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277 .… 25.7 Underwood v Gerrard (1894) 15 LR (NSW) Eq 155 .… 17.63 Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1992) 107 ALR 709 .… 11.111, 11.112 Unimin Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 2 ACTR 71; (1977) 18 ACTR 1 .… 16.25, 16.29, 16.64 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v Whitelaw [1906] VLR 711 .… 14.2



Union Club v Lord Andrew Charles Robert Battenberg [2006] NSWCA 72 .… 10.12, 10.31 Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514; (1998) 12 JCL 189 .… 21.17, 21.19, 21.36 Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v Gibson [1971] VR 573 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11 Unique Building Pty Ltd v Brown [2010] SASC 106 (FC) .… 23.27 Unique International College Pty Ltd v ACCC (2018) 266 FCR 631; [2018] FCAFC 155 .… 15.1, 15.9, 15.16 Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v Robertson [2005] VSC 347 .… 4.22 Unisys Australia Ltd v RACV Insurance Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 81 .… 11.104, 11.118, 11.146 Unit 11 Pty Ltd v Sharpe Partners Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 43 .… 23.14 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673 .… 8.4 United Dominion Trust v Western [1976] QB 513; [1975] 3 All ER 1017 .… 12.69 United Dominions Corp (Jamaica) Ltd v Shoucair [1968] 3 WLR 893; [1969] 1 AC 340 .… 22.4, 22.5 United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74 .… 3.28, 3.69 United Dominions Trust Ltd v Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB 431; [1966] 1 All ER 968 .… 7.50 United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2003) 198 ALR 466; 123 IR 86; [2003] FCA 480 .… 5.26 United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) 74 NSWLR 618; [2009] NSWCA 177 .… 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 10.44, 10.47 United Motels Ltd v Cooper [1964] NSWR 1252 .… 10.48 United Pacific Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Govindasamy [2020] NSWSC 128 .… 25.3 United Pacific Transport Pty Ltd, Re [1968] Qd R 517 .… 10.35 United Petroleum Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (2013) 1 Qd R 272 .… 21.24 — v Pentaco Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (2016) FCA 118 .… 3.67 United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904 .… 21.19

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Urquhart v MacPherson (1878) 3 App Cas 831; (1880) 6 VLR 17 .… 11.53, 25.13 US Trust Co of New York v Master and Crew of ‘Ionian Mariner’ (1997) 77 FCR 563 .… 7.43 Uszok v Henley Properties (NSW) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 31 .… 10.54, 23.24 Uther v FCT (1947) 74 CLR 508 .… 8.11 UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667 .… 18.33

United States v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196; [1923] All ER Rep 773 .… 12.30, 12.36 — v Stump Home Specialities Manufacturing, Inc 905F 2d 1117 (1990) .… 4.35 United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd (1983) 2 NSWLR 157 .… 18.37 Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 603 .… 10.53, 23.14, 23.35, 23.39, 23.41, 23.42, 23.43 Universal Greening Pty Ltd v Sabine [1997] FCA 529 .… 4.17 Universal Guarantee Pty Ltd v Carlile (1957) VR 68 .… 3.29 Universe Tankships of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366; [1982] 2 All ER 67 .… 13.2, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9, 13.12 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346; [2009] FCAFC 116 .… 10.52 Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre (1990) 20 NSWLR 251 .… 2.4, 2.29, 2.31, 4.32, 6.17, 10.35, 16.46, 22.4, 22.6, 26.5 Update Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] VSCA 218 .… 5.1 Upintheair Pty Ltd v Business Custodians Ltd [2016] NSWCA 287 .… 10.55 Upjay Pty Ltd v MJK Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 32; [2001] SASC 62 .… 16.55, 18.6, 18.46, 26.6 Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co (1968) 118 CLR 429 .… 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.10, 10.30, 10.32, 22.5 Upper Hunter Timbers Pty Ltd v Forestry Commission of NSW [2001] NSWCA 64 .… 10.41, 18.30, 19.5, 23.13, 23.22 Upside Property Group Pty Ltd v Tekin [2016] NSWSC 1260; [2017] NSWCA 336 .… 21.6, 23.2 Upton-on Severn Rural District Council v Powell [1942] 1 All ER 220 .… 5.3 Uranium Equities Ltd v Fewster (2008) 36 WAR 97; [2008] WASCA 33 .… 3.11 Uremovic v PEI Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR 55-311 .… 21.29 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1965) 117 CLR 118 .… 27.1 — v Uren [2018] VSCA 141 .… 25.1 Urica Library Systems BV v Sanderson Computers Pty Ltd .… 10.34

V Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102; 130 ALR 570; [1995] HCA 14 .… 1.10, 11.39, 11.44, 11.45, 11.53, 11.56, 11.60, 11.122, 11.129, 11.147, 13.11, 15.12, 15.13 Vaddat v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] WASCA 94 .… 14.9 Vakele Pty Ltd v Assender (1989) 4 BPR 9591; NSW ConvR 55-467 .… 15.31, 24.7 Vakras v Cripps [2015] VSCA 193 .… 10.43 Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 .… 2.14 Valcorp Australia Pty Ltd v Angas Securities Ltd [2012] FCAFC 22 .… 11.129, 11.146 Valentines Properties Ltd v Huntco Corp Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 16 .… 6.6 Valentini v Canali [1886–90] All ER Rep 883; 24 QBD 166 .… 17.21, 17.35 Valkonen v Jennings Constructions Ltd (1995) 184 LSJS 87 .… 10.77 Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 .… 2.7, 2.17, 22.4 Valve Corp v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224 .… 3.7, 3.47, 3.56, 11.114, 11.153 Vamiso Pty Ltd v Chopard [2000] ANZ ConvR 403 .… 20.1 Van den Esschert v Chappell [1960] WAR 114 .… 10.6 Van der Sluys v Anaconda Nickel NL [2002] NSWSC 673 .… 10.3 Van der Sterren v Cibernetics (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1970] ALR 751 .… 10.28, 10.62, 10.73, 10.75, 10.77, 21.38 Van Lynn Developments Ltd v Pelias Construction Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 607; [1968] 3 All ER 824 .… 8.34 Van Reesema v Giameos (No 1) (1978) 17 SASR 353 .… 21.18, 21.21 Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 .… 4.23, 4.39 cl

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Table of Cases



Veremu Pty Ltd v Ezishop. Net Ltd [2003] NSWCA 317 .… 10.7, 19.5, 19.6, 19.12, 19.13, 19.22 Verrall v Great Yarmouth BC [1981] QB 202; [1980] 1 All ER 839 .… 24.8 Vetro Glass Pty Ltd v Fitzpatrick [1963] SR (NSW) 697; [1964] NSWR 822 .… 16.35 Vettese v Kemp (2000) 77 SASR 53; [2000] SASC 154 .… 11.96, 11.98, 11.99 Vickers and Vickers v Stichtenoth Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 90 .… 21.10 Vickery v Waitaki International Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 58 .… 10.40 — v Woods (1952) 85 CLR 336 .… 7.29, 8.49, 22.5 Vickery’s Motors Pty Ltd v Tarrant [1924] VLR 195 .… 17.28 Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291 .… 18.6 — v Tatts Group Ltd (2016) 90 ALJR 392; [2016] HCA 5 .… 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.30, 10.31 Victorian Economic Development Corporation v Clovervale Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 596 .… 23.26 Victorian Producers Co-operative Co Ltd v Edwards (1994) 62 SASR 415 .… 6.11 Vieira v O’Shea [2012] NSWCA 21 .… 23.25 Vigers v Pike (1842) 8 Cl & Fin 562; 8 ER 220 .… 11.53 Village Building Company Ltd v Canberra International Airport Pty Ltd (No 2) (2004) 134 FCR 422; 208 ALR 98; [2004] FCA 133 .… 11.109, 11.111 Vimig Pty Ltd v Contract Tooling Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 731 .… 11.64 Vinden v Vinden [1982] 1 NSWLR 618 .… 16.69 Vink v Schering Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41064 .… 11.147 Violet Homes Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 4 VR 202; 300 ALR 770; [2013] VSCA 56 .… 15.13, 15.16, 15.31 VIP Homes Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v Swan (2011) 110 SASR 157 .… 21.16 Visic v State Government Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 122 .… 7.3, 7.17, 7.22, 7.35 Visscher v Honourable President Justice Giudice (2009) 239 CLR 361 .… 21.10, 21.23 Visy Packaging Pty Ltd v Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 301 ALR 569; [2013] FCA 231 .… 23.34

Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York [1933] AC 70; [1932] All ER Rep 527 .… 7.44, 7.45, 7.46 Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 AC 291; [1967] 1 All ER 1; [1967] 2 WLR 87 .… 8.21 Vandyke v Vandyke (1976) 12 ALR 621 .… 21.38 Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Cussen (1994) 121 ALR 619 .… 24.31 Vantage Navigation Corp v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138 .… 4.13, 13.4, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9 Vantage Systems Pty Ltd v Priolo Corporation Pty Ltd (2015) 47 WAR 547; [2015] WASCA 21 .… 5.19, 12.30 Varley v Spatt [1955] VLR 403 .… 18.3 Vasco Investment Managers Pty Ltd v Morgan Stanley Australia Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 445 .… 26.1, 26.8 Vasiliou v Marchesi [2006] FCAFC 197 .… 8.39 Vauxhall Motors Ltd (formerly General Motors UK Ltd) v Manchester Ship Canal Co Ltd [2019] .… 21.36 Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] 2 NZLR 444 .… 10.12 Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 .… 3.71, 26.11, 26.12 Velik v Steingold [2012] NSWSC 860; [2013] NSWCA 303 .… 21.12, 21.19 Vella v Ayshan [2008] NSWSC 84 .… 4.35 Vella v Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 505 .… 11.136 Velvet Glove Holdings Pty Ltd v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [2011] QCA 312 .… 10.12, 10.13 Venerdi Pty Ltd v Anthony Moreton Group Funds Management Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 214; [2013] QSC 219 .… 11.150, 18.10, 18.19 Venning v Suburban Taxi Service Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-468 .… 15.16 Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd v Dib Group Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 963 .… 11.142 Venuti and Venuti v Toop Real Estate Group Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 23; [2004] SASC 169 .… 3.24, 12.51, 16.42 Vercorp Pty Ltd v ACN 096 278 483 Pty Ltd as trustee of the Williams Family Trust (No 2) [2010] QSC 405 .… 7.28 Verduci v Golotta [2010] NSWSC 506 .… 14.6, 14.13, 15.11, 15.26, 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 cli

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Vita Pacific Ltd & GIO General Ltd v Heather [2001] TASSC 137 .… 10.16, 10.18, 10.56, 10.61 Vitale v Bednall [2000] WASC 207 .… 10.7, 10.55, 10.60, 23.19 Vitek v Taheri [2013] NSWSC 589 .… 11.64 Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118 .… 11.115 Vitol v SA Norelf Ltd (The ‘Santa Clara’) [1996] AC 800 .… 21.23 Vitosh v Brisbane CC (1960) 5 LGRA 342 .… 11.13 Vivian Fraser & Associates Pty Ltd v Shipton [1999] FCA 60 .… 26.8 VL Credits Pty Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1991] 2 VR 311 .… 10.48 — v Switzerland Insurance Co [1990] VR 938 .… 7.10 VL Finance Pty Ltd v Legudi [2003] VSC 57 .… 25.3 Vodafone Pacific Ltd v MI Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15 .… 10.1, 10.7, 10.39, 10.41, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.48, 10.49, 10.50, 10.52, 21.35, 22.12 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74 .… 7.41 Vollenbroich v Krongold Constructions (Domestic Building) [2006] VCAT 1710 .… 11.139 Voskuilen v Morisset Mega-Market Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 63 .… 24.19 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 .… 11.10 Vroon BV v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [1994] 2 VR 32 .… 3.6, 6.6, 6.8, 10.55, 22.5 VTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667 .… 8.7 Vukicevic v Alliance Acceptance Co Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 13 .… 16.29 Vuksic v Metimex (1995) V ConvR 54-511 .… 23.23 W W v G (1996) 20 Fam LR 49 .… 2.2, 2.11 W & CA Price Constructions Pty Ltd v Australian Building Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 39 .… 10.41, 23.35 W & J Investments Ltd v Bunting [1984] 1 NSWLR 331 .… 23.45 W & J Sharp v Thomson (1915) 20 CLR 137 .… 6.6 W & R Pty Ltd v Birdseye (2008) 102 SASR 477; [2008] SASC 321 .… 21.19, 21.32

W A Dewhurst v Cawrse [1960] VR 278 .… 3.47 W and J Sharp v Thomson (1915) 20 CLR 137 .… 12.47 W and K Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mayo [2013] NSWSC 1063 .… 4.35 W B Anderson & Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 850 .… 11.80 W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lumbers [2007] SASC 20 .… 18.49, 26.1, 26.2, 26.8 W Higgins Ltd v Northampton Corp [1927] 1 Ch 128 .… 12.35, 12.40 W Scott Fell & Co Ltd v Lloyd (1906) 4 CLR 572 .… 11.17 Wacal Investments Pty Ltd v Hurley [1992] 1 Qd R 455 .… 21.19 Waddell v Waddell (2012) 292 ALR 788; [2012] NSWCA 214 .… 2.15 Wagdy Hanna and Associates Pty Ltd v National Library of Australia (2012) 7 ACTLR 70; 267 FLR 356; [2012] ACTSC 126 .… 25.13 Wagners Cement Pty Ltd v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 124 .… 10.13 Waight v Seirlis (2015) 1 Qd R 337; [2014] QCA 177 .… 11.136 Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) .… 2.14, 2.18, 10.3 Wait, Re [1927] 1 Ch 606; [1926] All ER Rep 433 .… 24.18 Waitemata Stevedoring Services Ltd v The Ship ‘Rangitata’ [1998] FCA 885 .… 21.19 Wakefield Trucks Pty Ltd v Lach Transport Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 517; [2001] SASC 168 .… 11.146 Wakeling v Ripley (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 183 .… 5.7 Waldorf Apartment Hotel, The Entrance Pty Ltd v Owners Corp Sp 71623 [2010] NSWCA 226 .… 3.27 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128; [1992] 2 WLR 174 .… 6.12, 10.47 Walker, Re [1905] 1 Ch 160 .… 17.55 Walker, Re (1911) 7 Tas LR 51 .… 17.63 Walker v Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Banking Group Ltd (No 2) (2001) 39 ACSR 557 .… 10.43, 10.44, 20.18, 21.34, 21.35, 21.37, 22.12 — v Boyle [1982] 1 WLR 495 .… 11.73 — v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 101 .… 10.27, 10.52, 21.34, 23.14, 23.19 clii

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Table of Cases — v Citigroup Global Markets Pty Ltd (2006) 226 ALR 114; [2005] FCA 1678 .… 10.52, 11.146, 21.34 — v Nussey (1847) 16 M & W 302; 153 ER 1203 .… 16.84 — v Sell (2016) 245 FCR 308; [2016] FCA 1259 .… 11.107, 11.111 — v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2001] QCA 296 .… 21.24 Walker Corp Ltd v Australia NID Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-430; FCA 1474 .… 5.24, 11.115, 11.118, 16.21 Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd v Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 27 .… 8.2, 10.31, 10.32, 23.27, 23.42 Walker Hobson & Hill Ltd v Johnson [1981] 2 NZLR 532 .… 11.88 Wallace v Hermans (1974) 131 CLR 672 .… 21.29 — v McGirr [1936] NZLR 483 .… 12.55 — v Walplan Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 771 .… 11.108 Wallace-Smith v Thiess Infraco (Swanston) Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 1; [2005] FCAFC 49 .… 10.62, 20.1, 21.21, 21.23, 21.29, 21.32, 22.7, 23.22, 23.23 Wallera Pty Ltd v CGM Investments Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 279 .… 22.9 Walley v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 366; 137 ALR 561 .… 6.15 Wallis Nominees (Computing) Pty Ltd v Pickett (2013) 45 VR 657; [2013] VSCA 24 .… 18.37, 18.38 Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394 .… 10.74 Wallwyn v Coutts (1815) 3 Mer 707; 36 ER 272 .… 7.46 Walmsley v Cosentino [2001] NSWCA 403 .… 23.19 Walsh v Alexander (1913) 16 CLR 293 .… 18.7, 18.9 — v Police Association [2000] VSC 292 .… 19.18, 19.24 Walsh, Spriggs, Nolan and Finney v Hoag & Bosch Pty Ltd [1977] VR 178 .… 4.23 Walter and Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584; [1955] 1 All ER 843 .… 8.26, 8.27, 8.31 Walter Construction Group Ltd v Walker Corp Ltd [2001] NSWSC 283 .… 21.14, 21.31, 22.4, 22.6, 26.6, 26.7 Walterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300 .… 22.6



Walters v Morgan (1861) 3 De G F & J 718 .… 11.17 Waltip Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-975 .… 11.150 Walton Stores v Sydney CC [1968] 2 NSWR 109 .… 10.76 Waltons v Maher (2013) 7 J Eq 171 .… 2.5, 2.9 Waltons (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; 76 ALR 513; 62 ALJR 110 .… 2.1, 2.5, 3.11, 3.64, 3.67, 3.71, 4.4, 4.15, 5.17, 5.19, 5.23, 10.3, 10.6, 11.13, 12.8, 12.53, 16.56, 16.67, 16.68, 21.28, 21.32, 24.31, 28.9, 28.24 Wan v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 340 .… 18.6 Wang v Garland Lot 3 Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1112 .… 3.33 — v Kaymet Corporation Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1459 .… 20.16 Wannon Roadways Pty Ltd v Wallace-Smith [2004] VSC 230 .… 10.35 Wansborough v Edwards (1941) 36 Tas LR 1 .… 16.80 Warburton v National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 238 .… 12.33 — v Whiteley (1989) NSW ConvR 55-453 .… 14.17, 14.19 Ward v Byham [1956] 2 All ER 318; [1956] 1 WLR 496 .… 4.30, 4.31, 4.35 — v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 .… 8.18 — v Eltherington [1982] Qd R 561 .… 5.10, 17.73 — v Griffiths Bros Ltd (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 425 .… 16.53, 26.6 — v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 .… 21.35 — v Lewis (1896) 22 VLR 410 .… 25.5 — v Ward [2011] NSWSC 107 .… 15.9 Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 .… 3.60, 10.16 Wardley Australia Ltd v McPharlin (1984) 3 BPR 97,214 .… 13.6, 13.7 — v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 .… 11.104, 11.125, 11.127, 11.128, 11.146, 11.147, 25.1, 25.12 Wardman v Hatfield [2003] NSWCA 283 .… 25.5 Warlow v Harrison [1859] 1 E & E 309; 120 ER 925 .… 3.24 Warming’s Used Cars Ltd v Tucker [1956] SASR 249 .… 10.20 Warner v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (1992) 113 ALR 517 .… 11.115

cliii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Ingolia [1965] NSWR 988 .… 18.37, 24.25, 24.26 — v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209; [1936] 3 All ER 160 .… 24.1, 24.25, 24.26 Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 105; [1975] 2 WLR 816; [1976] QB 430 .… 8.12, 8.18 Warren v Lawton (No 3) [2016] WASC 285 .… 15.8, 18.35 — v Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103 .… 24.25, 24.26 Warren, Re (1884) 53 LJ Ch 1016 .… 4.39 Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd v Alpine Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 224 ALR 134; [2005] WASCA 174 .… 11.122, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146 Water v Everard [1891] 2 QB 369 .… 17.11 Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 .… 21.24 Waterhouse v Power [2003] QCA 155 .… 16.73 Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 .… 2.5, 2.29, 20.1, 20.8, 20.15, 21.28, 21.32 Waters Lane v Sweeney [2007] NSWCA 200 .… 10.44, 10.52, 21.18, 21.29 Waters Lane Pty Ltd v Sweeney [2006] NSWSC 222 .… 10.44, 10.52 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley (1963) 80 WN (NSW) 1165; [1964] NSWR 1085 .… 11.50, 11.58 Waters Trading Co Ltd v Dalgety and Co Ltd (1951) 52 SR (NSW) 4 .… 7.37, 7.40 Waterside Workers’ Federation v Stewart (1919) 27 CLR 119 .… 23.45 Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 276 .… 24.1, 24.4, 24.16, 24.30 Watkins v Coombes (1922) 30 CLR 180 .… 14.10, 14.11, 14.12 Watkins Tapsell v De Varda [2003] NSWCA 242 .… 11.112 Watney v Mass (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 203 .… 26.1, 26.4 Watson v Campbell (No 2) [1920] VLR 347 .… 17.28, 17.39 — v Delaney (1991) 22 NSWLR 358 .… 16.62 — v Issell (1890) 16 VLR 607 .… 16.35 — v McFadden (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 128 .… 4.23 — v Phipps (1985) 63 ALR 321; 60 ALJR 1 .… 6.5, 6.6, 10.35, 12.41

— v Royal Permanent Building Society (1888) 14 VLR 283 .… 16.48 Watson’s Bay and South Shore Ferry Co v Whitfield (1919) 27 CLR 268 .… 18.30 Watt v State Bank of New South Wales [2003] ACTCA 7 .… 14.20, 15.8 — v Westhoven [1933] VLR 458 .… 11.67, 11.68 Watton v Brinth 1400 YB 2 Hen 4, fo 3, pl 9 .… 27.7 Watts v Turpin (1999) 21 WAR 402 .… 23.32 Waugh v Harper (1937) QSR 327 .… 16.28 Wauton v Coppard (1899) 1 Ch 92 .… 11.44 Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1941] 1 All ER 9; [1944] 1 All ER 9 .… 3.27, 3.44 WB Anderson & Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 850 .… 11.81 WD & HO Wills (Aust) Ltd v State Rail Authority .… 7.42 We Are Here Pty Ltd v Zandata Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 262 .… 12.36 Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd v Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd [2009] VSC 7 .… 11.143 Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 64 .… 11.132 Webb v Australian Agricultural Machinery Pty Ltd (1990) 6 WAR 305 .… 15.9 — v England (1860) 29 Beav 44; 54 ER 541 .… 24.12 Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15; 117 ALR 321 .… 11.59 Webster v Yorke (1869) 6 WW & A’B (E) 294 .… 17.61 Weddell v J A Pearce and Major [1988] Ch 26; [1987] 3 All ER 624 .… 8.27, 8.34 Weeds v Blaney (1976) Est Gaz Dig 738; (1978) Est Gaz Dig 902 .… 12.30, 12.53 Weemah Park Pty Ltd v Glenlaton Investments Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 150 .… 3.46 Wegert v Westpac Banking Corp (1987, unreported) .… 12.69 Wehbe v Rolando (1990) NSWSC 384; Coyne v Commercial Equity Corp Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 109 .… 23.2 Wehr v Thom [1969] WAR 39 .… 11.82 Weily v Williams (1895) 16 LR (NSW) Eq 190 .… 24.30 Weir v Hoylevans Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 23 .… 10.3, 10.6, 18.37 cliv

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Table of Cases



Westbourne Grammar School v Sanget Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 39 .… 8.23, 8.34 Westeq Ltd v Challenger Mining Corp NL (1988) 13 ACLR 627; 6 ACLC 868 .… 9.8 Western Australia v Bond Corp Holdings Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-081 .… 11.117 — v Njamal People (1996) 134 FLR 211 .… 6.15 — v Wardley Australia Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 213 .… 11.147 Western Australian Bank v Royal Insurance Co (1908) 5 CLR 533 .… 10.34, 10.74 Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton (1924) 35 CLR 355 .… 11.9, 21.32 Western Australian Land Authority v Simto Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 262 .… 10.58, 21.38 Western Bank of Scotland v Addie (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 145 .… 11.53 Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 604; [2011] HCA 45 .… 10.12 Western Metals Resources Ltd v Murrin Murrin East Pty Ltd [1999] WASC 257 .… 10.41 Western Power Corp v Normandy Power Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 202 .… 10.12, 22.12, 19.6 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528; [2007] HCA 45 .… 10.30 Westham Dredging Co Pty Ltd v Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1983) 46 ALR 287 .… 11.106, 11.111 Westina Corporation Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd (2009) 41 WAR 263; [2009] WASCA 213 .… 7.17 Westinghouse Electric Corp v Thermopart Pty Ltd [1969] WAR 39 .… 15.2 Westmelton (Vic) Pty Ltd v Archer and Schulman [1982] VR 305 .… 14.6 Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja [1970] 1 NSWR 526; (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222 .… 3.68, 7.28, 16.22, 16.35, 16.37 Westminster Properties Pty Ltd v Comco Constructions Pty Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 191 .… 10.55, 20.12, 20.18, 20.19, 21.35, 21.36, 21.37 Weston v Beaufils (No 2) (1994) 50 FCR 476; 122 ALR 240 .… 18.5, 18.25, 18.45, 18.47 Westpac Banking Corp v Cockerill (1998) 152 ALR 267 .… 13.5, 13.6, 13.7 — v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA

Welby v Drake (1825) 1 C & P 557; 171 ER 1315 .… 4.41 Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394 .… 25.12 Wellington v Huaxin Energy (Aust) Pty Ltd (formerly Cuesta Coal Ltd) [2020] QCA 114 .… 10.41, 10.42 Wellington City Council v Body Corporate 51702 [2002] 3 NZLR 486; [2002] NZCA 191 .… 6.15, 10.47 Wells v Birtchnell [1893] 19 VLR 473 .… 5.23 — v Kingston-upon-Hull Corp (1875) LR 10 CP 402 .… 17.71 Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand and Silica Co Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170 .… 3.9 Welsham v Robertson (1875) 1 VLR (L) 124 .… 16.46 Wendt v Bruce (1931) 45 CLR 245 .… 11.49, 21.19, 21.29 Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454 .… 23.6, 23.13, 23.25, 23.26, 23.39, 23.42, 24.30 Wenkart v Pantzer [2003] FCA 315 .… 20.12 — v Pitman (1998) 46 NSWLR 502 .… 23.41 Wenkheim v Arndt (1873) 1 NZ Jurist 73 .… 3.62 Wennall v Adney (1802) 3 B & P 247; 127 ER 137 .… 27.13 Wenning v Robinson (1964) 81 WN Pt 2 (NSW) 269; [1964-5] NSWR 614 .… 6.5, 6.10 Wentworth v Cock (1839) 10 Ad & El 42; 113 ER 17 .… 8.55 — v Rogers [2006] NSWCA 145 .… 26.6 — v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 .… 24.30 Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 125 FCR 570; [2002] FCAFC 400 .… 3.39 Werrin v Commonwealth (1938) 59 CLR 150 .… 26.3 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32 .… 3.67, 10.33, 10.41, 21.14, 21.18 West v AGC (Advances) Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 610 .… 15.4, 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 — v Houghton (1879) 4 CPD 197 .… 7.5 — v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109 .… 14.7 — v Stowel (1577) 2 Leon 154; 74 ER 437 .… 27.12 West London Commercial Bank v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360 .… 11.13 clv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

157 .… 2.5, 4.40, 6.6, 7.17, 11.108, 11.115, 15.16 — v Bickley [2001] NSWSC 756 .… 19.4 — v Dawson (1990) 19 NSWLR .… 12.56 — v Hughes (2011) 278 ALR 145; [2011] QCA 42 .… 25.12 — v Jamieson [2016] 1 Qd R 495; (2015) 294 FLR 48; [2015] QCA 50 .… 11.112, 23.32 — v Kurobe Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 537 .… 3.46 — v Lee [2013] NSWCA 375 .… 11.115, 11.121, 11.122 — v Paterson (2002) 187 ALR 168; [2001] FCA 1630 (Full FC) .… 15.8 — v Robinson (1993) 30 NSWLR 668 .… 15.5 — v Smith (1991, unreported) .… 10.9 — v South Carolina National Bank (1986) 64 ALR 30; 60 ALJR 358 .… 7.50 — v Spice (1990) ATPR 41-024 .… 11.112, 11.115 — v Sugden (1988) NSW ConvR 55-377 .… 15.29 — v Tanzone Pty Ltd (2000) 9 BPR 17,521; [2000] ANZ ConvR 354; (2000) NSW ConvR 55-939; [2000] NSWCA 25 .… 6.5, 10.2, 10.35, 12.36 — v Wittenberg [2016] FCAFC 33 .… 11.111 Westpoint Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253 .… 23.27 Westpork Pty Ltd v Bio-Organics Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 291 .… 12.25 Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 .… 7.18, 7.19 Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361; [1936] HCA 6 .… 20.8, 20.20, 21.9, 21.38, 26.10, 26.11, 26.14 Westwill Pty Ltd v Heath (1989) 52 SASR 461; (1990) ANZ ConvR 416 .… 15.7, 15.8, 15.9 WF Harrison & Co Ltd v Burke [1956] 1 WLR 419; [1956] 2 All ER 169 .… 8.34 Whalebone v Auto Panel Beaters & Radiators Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 176 .… 3.15 Wharf St Pty Ltd v Amstar Learning Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 256 .… 10.13, 23.45 Wharton v Mackenzie (1844) 5 QB 606; 114 ER 1378 .… 17.5 Wheeler v Atkinson (1925) 28 WALR 12 .… 11.53

— v Ecroplot Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 61 .… 23.27 — v Philip Morris (1989) 97 ALR 282 .… 23.32 Wheeler Grace & Pierucci Pty Ltd v Wright (1989) 11 ATPR .… 11.108, 11.110, 11.112, 11.117, 11.118 Whelan, Ex parte [1986] 1 Qd R 500 .… 10.35, 21.29 Whelan, Re [1897] 1 IR 575 .… 3.73 Whereat v Duff [1972] 2 NSWLR 147 .… 14.5, 14.6, 14.11, 14.14 Whim Well Copper Mines Ltd v Pratt (1910) 12 WAR 166 .… 19.18 Whitaker v Paxad Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 47 .… 11.146 White v Australian and New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 266 .… 6.6, 10.12, 10.16, 10.52, 23.14 — v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ (NS) Ex 36 .… 4.12, 4.18 — v Neaylon (1886) 11 App Cas 171 .… 16.62 — v Ormsby (1988) ASC 55-665 .… 14.20, 15.31 — v Philips Electronics Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 115 .… 22.4 — v Shortall [2006] NSWSC 1379 .… 8.30 — v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq); Collins v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] VSCA 361 .… 3.6 — v Wills [2014] NSWSC 1160 .… 14.5, 14.10, 15.28 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413; [1961] 3 All ER 1178 .… 21.10, 23.44, 26.9 White Industries Ltd v Piling Contractors Pty Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 353 .… 3.32 White Rose Flour Milling Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1944) 18 ALJR 324 .… 13.7 White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 .… 3.28, 3.44, 3.71, 21.12 Whitegum Petroleum Pty Ltd v Bernadini Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 229 .… 3.46 Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428 .… 2.3, 2.20, 7.2, 10.3 — v Carlton (1987) 70 ALR 251 .… 13.10 Whiteley v Hilt [1918] 2 KB 808 .… 24.18 Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71 .… 23.2 Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd v Gadsdon (1992) 6 WAR 537 .… 7.16, 7.47 Whitlock v Brew (No 2) (1968) 118 CLR 445; [1967] VR 803 .… 6.5, 6.11, 6.17

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Table of Cases Whitsunday Shire Council v Laguna Australia Airport Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 084 .… 18.7, 18.41 Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146 .… 2.3, 2.18, 10.3 Whittingham v Murdy (1889) 60 LT 956 .… 17.18, 17.27 Whittington v Seale-Hayne (1900) 82 LT 49 .… 11.55, 11.63, 11.85 Whittle v Filaria Pty Ltd [2004] ACTSC 45 .… 11.98 — v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 129 .… 20.4 Whitwood Chemical Co v Hardman [1891] 2 Ch 416 .… 24.26 Whundo Copper Syndicate v Ferrari [1962] WAR 24 .… 17.16, 17.20 Whurr v Devenish (1904) 20 TLR 385 .… 11.63 Whyked Pty Ltd t/as Ezysend v Yahoo Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 650 .… 8.8 Wickham v Canberra District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [1998] ATPR 41,390 .… 18.36 Wicklow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Doysal Pty Ltd (1986) 45 SASR 247 .… 17.18 Wicks v Bennett (1921) 30 CLR 80 .… 15.2 Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586 .… 4.26, 4.28, 4.33, 10.36, 10.48, 21.13, 23.27, 23.34 — v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291 .… 4.23 Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd v New Hope Corporation Ltd [2019] NSWCA 316 .… 10.30 Wight v Haberdan Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 280 .… 16.37, 24.4, 24.5 Wilby v St George Bank (2001) 80 SASR 404; [2001] SASC 388 .… 15.8 Wilcher v Steain [1962] NSWR 1136 .… 11.34, 11.40 Wild v Tucker [1914] 3 KB 36 .… 4.23 Wilde v Anstee (1999) 48 NSWLR 387 .… 21.19 — v Gibson (1848) 1 HL Cas 605; 9 ER 897 .… 11.63 Wilding v Sanderson [1897] 2 Ch 534 .… 12.52 Wilkie v Brown (1946) 41 QPJR 139 .… 18.43 — v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522; [2005] HCA 17 .… 10.12, 10.32 — v Hunt (1864) 1 WW & A’B (L) 66 .… 16.84



— v LPTB [1947] 1 All ER 258 .… 3.4, 4.14 Wilkinson v Johnson (1824) 3 B & C 428 .… 12.64 — v Osborne (1915) 21 CLR 89 .… 18.15, 18.19, 18.29, 18.43 Willett v Thomas [2012] NSWCA 97 .… 11.117 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co [1905] AC 454 .… 8.16, 8.18, 8.39 William Robinson & Co Ltd v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 .… 24.25 William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire CC [1994] 3 All ER 932 .… 11.72 Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81; [1932] All ER Rep 32 .… 8.26, 8.31, 8.34 — v Bayley [1866] LR 1 HL 200 .… 13.5 — v Bulat [1992] 2 Qd R 566 .… 12.61, 24.7 — v Carwardine (1833) 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590 .… 3.40, 4.31 — v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156; 288 ALR 410; [2012] HCA 23; (2014) 252 CLR 416; 309 ALR 41; [2014] HCA 23 .… 5.28, 17.74 — v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 5) [2001] FCA 399 .… 18.3, 18.35, 18.37 — v Harrison (1691) Carthew 160; 90 ER 698 .… 17.29 — v IRC [1965] NZLR 395 .… 8.14, 8.28 — v Leper (1766) 3 Burr 1886; 97 ER 1152 .… 16.18 — v Maalouf [2005] VSC 346 .… 15.9 — v Mason (1873) 28 LT 232 .… 11.80 — v Moor (1843) 11 M & W 256; 152 ER 798 .… 17.24, 17.33 — v Pisano (2015) 90 NSWLR 342; 299 FLR 172; [2015] NSWCA 177 .… 11.111, 11.134, 11.136 — v Protheroe (1829) 2 Moo & P 779; 130 ER 1080 .… 8.7 — v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512 .… 4.32, 4.35, 4.38, 7.8, 13.7 — v Scott [1900] AC 499 .… 3.14 — v State Transit Authority of NSW [2004] NSWCA 179 .… 3.39, 11.109 — v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 148; [1957] 1 All ER 305 .… 4.30, 4.35 — v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 493 .… 25.7 Williams Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker [2015] NSWSC 1907 .… 3.52

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Williamson v Commissioner for Railways [1960] SR (NSW) 252 .… 23.32 — v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 174 .… 23.42 — v Murdoch (1912) 14 WALR 54 .… 9.5, 26.13 — v Tait (1892) 18 VLR 649 .… 16.87 Willing v Baker (1992) 58 SASR 357 .… 20.13 Willis v Crosland [2021] VSCA 320 .… 21.13, 21.26 Willmore v South Eastern Electricity Board [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 375 .… 5.29 Willmott v McLeay [2013] Q ConvR 54797; [2013] QCA 84 .… 21.38 Willoughby v Barrett-Lennard [1979] WAR 167 .… 20.4, 24.16 Willshee v Westcourt Ltd [2009] WASCA 87 .… 23.27 Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v Queensland Sugar Ltd [2019] QSC 116 .… 2.3 Wilson v Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313; 76 ALJR 1306; [2002] HCA 29 .… 10.1 — v Arwon Finance Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 137 .… 2.5 — v Brisbane CC [1931] St R Qd 360 .… 11.64 — v Commissioner of Probate (Vic) (1978) 8 ATR 799 .… 8.6 — v Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 258 .… 10.70 — v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43 .… 7.37, 7.40, 7.41, 7.43, 7.45, 10.62, 10.64, 10.77 — v Fitzsimons [2006] NSWSC 1318 .… 12.37, 12.53 — v Grimwade [1995] 2 VR 628 .… 25.1 — v Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 713 .… 21.28 — v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279 .… 24.1, 24.4 — v West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Co (1864) 34 Beav 187; 55 ER 606 .… 17.71 — v Winton [1969] Qd R 536 .… 3.29, 24.8 Wilson International Pty Ltd v International House Pty Ltd [1983] WAR 243 .… 18.7, 18.48 — v — (No 2) [1983] WAR 257 .… 18.45 Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 .… 4.22, 4.24 Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646 .… 10.26, 12.66, 15.5, 15.7, 15.9

Wiltrading (WA) Pty Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2005) 30 WAR 290; [2005] WASCA 106 .… 21.28, 21.31 Wiluna Road Board v Bonola (1936) 10 ALJ 289 .… 12.30 Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v Iluka Midwest Ltd [2002] FCA 653 .… 10.41 WIN Corporation Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 297 .… 10.12, 10.40, 10.42 Wincant Pty Ltd v South Australia (1997) 69 SASR 126 .… 10.58 Windle, Re [1975] 1 WLR 1628 .... 16.61 Windrum v Rejilo Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 491 .… 16.61 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 301 ALR 1; [2012] FCA 1028 .… 11.102, 11.136 Winkie Meat Works Ltd v Ballard [1960] SASR 312 .… 18.37, 23.32 Winks v W H Heck & Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 226 .… 12.8, 12.30, 12.39, 12.40 Winnote Pty Ltd (in liq) v Page t/as Freehill Hollingdale & Page (2006) 68 NSWLR 531; [2006] NSWCA 287 .… 25.5 Winslade Partners Pty Ltd v Steri-flow Filtration Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (2012) 113 SASR 69; [2012] SASCFC 65 .… 26.2 Winstonu Pty Ltd v Pitson [2001] FCA 541 .… 10.16 Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Hambros Australia Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 363; (1992) 111 ALR 649 .… 7.3, 11.115, 21.12, 21.13, 21.32 Wise v Perpetual Trustee Co [1903] AC 139 .… 17.68 With v O’Flanagan [1936] Ch 575; 1 All ER 727 .… 11.19 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 .… 24.1 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489 .… 6.11 Woden Squash Courts Pty Ltd v Zero Builders Pty Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 212 .… 16.38, 16.41, 16.45 Wolfe v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2012] VSC 275; [2013] VSCA 331 .… 4.38, 10.42, 15.16 Wollondilly Shire Council v Picton Power Lines Pty Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 551 .… 8.8, 18.35 Wollongong Coal Ltd v Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd (2019) 100 NSWLR 432; [2019]

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Table of Cases NSWCA 135 .… 3.8, 7.1, 7.2, 10.32, 21.31 Wolseley Investments Pty Ltd v Gillespie [2007] NSWCA 358 .… 24.1, 24.5 Wolverhampton and Walsall Railway Co v London and North Western Railway Co (1873) LR 16 Eq 433 .… 24.2 Wolverhampton Corp v Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515 .… 24.14 Wong v Citibank Ltd [2004] NSWCA 396 .… 11.110 — v Hutchison (1950) 68 WN (NSW) 55; (1959) 68 WN (NSW) 55 .… 23.13, 23.39 Wood v Allen [1956] VLR 111 .… 24.1 — v Browne [1984] 2 Qd R 593 .… 16.69, 16.71 — v Capita Insurance Services [2017] UKSC 24 .… 10.12 — v Corrigan (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 492 .… 8.28, 24.19, 24.24, 24.26 — v Griffith (1818) Swan 44; 36 ER 291; [1814-23] All ER Rep 294 .… 8.27 — v Laverty [2003] QSC 405 .… 14.13, 15.11 — v Little (1921) 29 CLR 564 .… 18.29 — v Midgley (1854) 5 De G M & G 41; 43 ER 784 .… 16.67 — v Mortgage Loan & Finance Co of Australia (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 255 .… 10.6 — v Roberts (1818) 2 Stark 417; 171 ER 691 .… 4.40 — v Scarth (1858) 1 F & F 293; 175 ER 733 .… 12.45 Wood Factory Pty Ltd v Kiritos Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 105 .… 21.11, 21.21, 21.23, 23.23, 23.25 Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443; [1979] HCA .… 22.2, 24.23 Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571; [1980] 1 WLR 277 .… 7.4, 7.7, 23.2 Woodbud Pty Ltd v Warea Pty Ltd (1995) 125 FLR 346 .… 10.3 Woodcock v Parlby Investments Pty Ltd [1989] ANZ ConvR 454; (1988) 4 BPR 9568 .… 20.12, 20.18 Woodcock, Re (FC, Appeal No SA, CSA 63/96, No AD 4674 of 1996, unreported) .… 18.34 Woodgate v Keddie [2006] FCA 1728 .… 26.5 Woodhouse v Fitzgerald [2021] NSWCA 54 .… 11.137



Woodman v Rasmussen [1953] St R Qd 202; [1953] QSR 202 .… 23.39 Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245 .… 3.67, 10.32, 16.22 Woods v Woods [2000] NSWSC 851 .… 21.12, 21.14, 21.23, 21.29 Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd v H&R-E & W Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 380 .… 7.3, 7.37 Woodward v Johnston [1992] 2 Qd R 214 .… 5.7, 16.73 — v McGregor [2003] NSWSC 672 .… 26.12 — v Nagel [2003] QSC 100 .… 20.8, 20.13 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 205 ALR 522; [2004] HCA 16 .… 7.7, 7.13, 7.26, 7.41, 25.5 Woolcorp Pty Ltd v Rodger Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 21 .… 26.8 Woolf v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 51 .… 17.35, 17.51 Woolworths Group Ltd v Gazcorp Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 19 .… 19.1, 22.3, 22.9 Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603 .… 23.18 — v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 .… 4.6, 4.11, 4.12, 4.26 — v Olson [2004] NSWCA 372 .… 6.8, 18.37, 18.38 WorkCover Corporation (San Remo Macaroni Co Pty Ltd) v Lian Da Ping (1994) 175 LSJS 469 .… 18.10, 18.11 WorkCover Queensland v AMACA Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 240 .… 8.7 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573 .… 23.45 WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 378 ALR 585; [2020] FCAFC 84 .… 10.16, — v — (2021) 271 CLR 456; [2021] HCA 23 …. 10.16, 10.30, 10.60 Workplace Safety Australia v Simple OHS Solutions Pty Ltd (2015) 318 ALR 533; [2015] NSWCA 84 .… 10.46 World Audio Ltd v GB Radio Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 855 .… 10.47, 10.48 World Best Holdings Ltd v Sarker [2010] NSWCA 24 .… 10.12, 10.16, 23.12 Wright v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2001] FCA 386 .… 10.35 — v Fenton [1925] QSR 256 .… 16.64, 16.65, 16.66 — v Gasweld Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 317 .… 18.37, 18.38 — v Griffin (1916) 38 ALT 10 .… 22.4 clix

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Y

— v Groves [2011] QSC 66 .… 10.52 — v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] QCA 36 .… 2.30, 10.6 — v Langlands’ Foundry Co (1874) 5 AJR 113 .… 23.39 — v Lend Lease Building Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 463 .… 10.32, 10.35 — v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343 .… 3.24, 16.42 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 679; 85 ALR 442 .… 11.118 Wright (AR) & Son Ltd v Romford BC [1957] 1 QB 431 .… 17.70, 17.71 Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 182 .… 10.12 Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30; [1977] 3 All ER 897 .… 24.31 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798; [1974] 2 All ER 321 .… 24.1, 24.31 WTE Co-Generation v RCR Energy Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 314 .… 6.11, 6.16 Wu v Ling [2016] NSWCA 322 .… 15.8, 15.9 Wyatt v Ball [1955] St R Qd 515 .… 4.12 Wykes v Samilk Pty Ltd (1999) Aust Contract Rep 90-097 .… 2.6 Wylie v The ANI Corp Ltd [2000] QCA 314 .… 10.56 Wyndham v Chetwynd (1757) 1 Wm Bl 95; 96 ER 53 .… 16.5 Wyzenbeek v Australasian Marine Imports Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCAFC 167 .… 11.82, 11.118, 11.146

Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v CTG Pty Ltd (1992) 109 FLR 249 .… 25.7 Yan Seng PTE Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 .… 10.43 Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Aust Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410 .… 18.1, 18.7, 18.9, 18.10, 18.11, 18.12, 18.13, 18.16, 18.19, 18.20, 18.22, 18.43 Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfert Australia Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 128 .… 19.2 Yaroomba Beach Development Co Pty Ltd v Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398 .… 4.10, 6.11, 10.9, 18.24, 18.25, 18.28 Yarra Capital Group Pty Ltd v Sklash Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 109 .… 23.45 Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394 .… 2.4, 2.9, 24.1 Yates v Mobile Marine Repairs Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1463 .… 11.142 Yau’s Entertainment Pty Ltd v Asia Television Ltd [2002] FCA 338 .… 10.18, 10.55, 10.56, 10.59, 21.24, 21.34 Yaxley v Gotts [2000] .… 16.56 Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] 1 WLR 828; [1961] 2 All ER 294 .… 16.15, 17.36 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 .… 12.70, 14.1, 14.5, 14.6, 14.9, 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 15.7, 15.8, 15.31 — v — (1940) 63 CLR 649 .… 28.29 York Air Conditioning v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 11; [1949] HCA 23 .… 1.38, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, 10.12, 26.3, 26.5 York House Pty Ltd v FCT (1930) 43 CLR 427 .… 24.14 York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2007) 162 FCR 358; 240 ALR 567; [2007] FCA 922 .… 11.5, 11.45, 11.69 Yorke v Lucas (1983) 49 ALR 672 (Full Federal Court); (1985) 158 CLR 661 .… 11.110, 11.121 — v Ross Lucas Pty Ltd (1982) 69 FLR 116; (1982) 45 ALR 299; (1983) 68 FLR 268 .… 11.52, 11.85, 11.110, 11.146 — v Treasureway Stores Pty Ltd (1983) 5 ATPR 40-336 .… 11.121 Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 .… 11.112 — v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127 .… 8.42 — v Lamb [2001] NSWCA 225 .… 3.46 — v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 .… 9.9, 25.3, 26.1, 26.9, 26.10, 26.12, 27.19

X X v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 575 .… 27.1 XCB Pty Ltd v Creative Brands Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 424 .… 12.53 Xiao Hui Ying v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 124 .… 4.12 XL Insurance Co SE v BNY Trust Company of Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 215 .… 10.30, 10.32 XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984–85) 155 CLR 448 .… 23.2 Xu v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZSC 68 .… 8.6 — v Jinhong Design & Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 277 .… 16.55 clx

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Table of Cases — v Tockassie (1905) 2 CLR 470 .… 10.14, 10.54 Yuan v O’Neill [2020] SASC 49 .… 7.7 Z Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 .… 3.10, 3.33, 21.19 Zachariadis v Allforks Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 26 VR 47; [2009] VSCA 258 .… 23.45 Zahedpur v Idameneo (No 3) Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 134 .… 23.13 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd .… 8.6 Zamet v Hyman [1961] 3 All ER 933; (1962) 78 LQR 24; [1961] 1 WLR 1442 .… 14.6 Zamperoni Decorators Pty Ltd v Lo Presti [1983] VR 338 .… 26.13 Zaps Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v PJG Warehousing & Distribution Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 97 .… 10.32, 23.24 Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 438 .… 18.49 Zdrojkowski v Pacholczak (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 382 .… 12.36 Zeke Services Pty Ltd v Traffic Technologies Ltd [2005] 2 Qd R 563; [2005] QSC 135 .… 5.15, 6.16, 18.34 Zervas v Burkitt (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 236 .… 11.102, 11.136 Zhang v BM Sydney Building Materials Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 166 .… 10.33, 10.34, 10.74 — v ROC Services (NSW) Pty Ltd (2016) 93 NSWLR 561; [2016] NSWCA 370 .… 10.74



Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 211 ALR 159; [2004] HCA 56 .… 3.42, 24.1, 10.32, 28.17 Zieme v Gregory [1963] VR 214 .… 6.17, 20.4, 20.16 Zierholz@UC Pty Ltd v University of Canberra [2019] ACTSC 310 .… 5.16 Zivkovic v Parke [2022] VSCA 43 .… 4.24 Zoneff v Elcom Credit Union Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 445; (1990) 12 ATPR 41-009 .… 11.146, 11.147 Zoobury Pty Ltd v Cariste Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 18 .… 10.16 Zorba Structural Steel Co Pty Ltd v Watco Pty Ltd (1993) 115 FLR 206 .… 10.53, 23.27 Zucchiatti v Ferrara (1976) 1 BPR 9199 .… 6.11 Zucker v Straightlace Pty Ltd (1986) 11 NSWLR 87; (1987) 11 NSWLR 87 .… 21.23, 21.29 Zullo Enterprises Pty Ltd v Sutton [1998] QCA 417 .… 18.7, 18.43, 18.46, 18.48, 18.49 Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd (2009) 240 CLR 391; [2009] HCA 50 .… 18.41 Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd, Re [1999] 2 Qd R 203 .… 10.3, 10.33, 10.34 Zurich Insurance plc v Hayward [2016] UKSC 48; [2017] AC 142 .… 11.35 Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029; [2008] SGCA 27 .… 10.12

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Table of Statutes References are to paragraph numbers

COMMONWEALTH Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 2C(1) .… 17.74 s 25E .… 17.2 s 36(1) .… 25.2 Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 s 7 .… 17.74 Australian Consumer Law .… 1.3, 1.11, 1.12, 1.15, 1.19, 1.20, 1.72, 1.88, 1.128, 1.131, 3.7, 3.19, 3.20, 3.48, 3.67, 5.12, 5.20, 7.23, 7.24, 7.30, 11.1, 11.80, 11.109, 11.124, 12.4, 13.11, 13.13, 14.13, 15.14, 15.16, 15.20, 15.21, 15.25, 18.34, 18.40, 18.42, 18.44, 21.1, 21.5, 21.37, 22.3, 23.2, 23.8, 23.45, 24.31, 25.1 Ch 3 .… 10.37 Ch 3, Pt 3-2, Div 1 .… 28.19 Ch 3, Pt 3-3 .… 28.19 Ch 3, Pt 3-5 .… 28.19 Pt 2-1 .… 11.106, 11.134 Pt 2-2 .… 11.106, 15.14 Pt 2-3 .… 11.106, 15.20 Pt 3 .… 11.150 Pt 3-1 .… 11.102, 11.106, 11.110, 11.129, 11.134 Pt 3-1, Div 2 .… 1.22 Pt 3-2 .… 10.37, 11.150, 16.77 Pt 3-3 .… 11.135 Pt 3-4 .… 11.134 Pt 3-5 .… 7.30 Pt 5-3 .… 11.114 Pt 5-4, Div 2 .… 3.9 Pt 5-5 .… 3.9 s 2 .… 11.102, 11.111 s 2(1) .… 7.1, 7.30, 11.110, 11.112, 11.142 s 2(2) .… 11.102, 11.113, 11.115 s 2(2)(a) .… 11.104, 11.118 s 2(2)(b) .… 11.104, 11.118 s 2(2)(c) .… 11.115, 11.118 s 2(2)(c)(i) .… 11.115 s 3 .… 15.21

s 3(1)(b) .… 15.21 s 4 .… 1.88, 11.102, 11.115, 11.117, 11.118, 11.121, 15.15 s 4(1) .… 11.117 s 4(2) .… 11.115, 11.117, 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.117 s 4(2)(c) .… 11.115 s 4(3) .… 11.117 s 4(3)(b) .… 11.117 s 4(4) .… 11.117 s 16 .… 18.39, 18.41, 18.42 s 18 .… 1.19, 1.79, 1.86, 2.27, 3.9, 3.19, 3.20, 3.23, 3.39, 4.26, 5.17, 5.19, 8.55, 10.2, 10.7, 11.1, 11.10, 11.42, 11.102, 11.103, 11.104, 11.105, 11.106, 11.107, 11.109, 11.110, 11.111, 11.114, 11.115, 11.116, 11.117, 11.118, 11.119, 11.120, 11.121, 11.122, 11.124, 11.129, 11.134, 11.142, 11.145, 11.146, 11.147, 11.148, 11.149, 11.150, 11.151, 16.67, 18.10, 18.19, 18.44, 20.15, 23.8, 23.14, 23.15, 23.26, 28.9, 28.20 s 20 .… 1.11, 1.12, 1.77, 2.9, 10.2, 12.4, 13.11, 13.12, 14.13, 15.8, 15.13, 15.14, 15.16, 16.57, 16.66, 20.19, 21.37, 24.23 ss 20–22 .… 12.2, 15.14, 23.45 s 20(1) .… 15.13 s 20(2) .… 15.14 s 21 .… 1.11, 1.12, 1.77, 6.15, 10.2, 10.44, 13.13, 15.1, 15.13, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.17, 15.19, 15.26, 17.53, 20.19, 21.35, 21.37, 28.9, 28.31 s 21(1) .… 15.15, 15.16 s 21(2) .… 15.16 s 21(3)(a) .… 15.15 s 21(3)(b) .… 15.15 s 21(4) .… 1.11, 15.15, 15.16 s 21(4)(a) .… 15.16 s 21(4)(c) .… 15.16 s 22 .… 1.11, 13.13, 15.1, 15.14, 15.16, 15.22, 17.53, 21.35 s 22(1) .… 15.16 s 22(1)(l) .… 6.15, 10.44, 15.16 s 22(2) .… 15.16 s 22(2)(d) .… 13.13 s 22(2)(l) .… 6.15, 10.44, 15.16 s 22(3)(d) .… 13.13 s 22A .… 15.15

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Australian Consumer Law – cont’d s 23 .… 10.7, 18.39, 21.1, 22.3, 23.45 s 23(1) .… 15.20 s 23(2) .… 15.20, 15.23 s 23(3) .… 15.21 s 23(4) .… 15.21 s 23(4)(b) .… 15.20 s 23(5) .… 15.20 s 24 .… 15.22 s 24(1) .… 15.22 s 24(2) .… 15.22 s 24(3) .… 15.22 s 24(4) .… 15.22 s 25 .… 21.1 s 25(1) .… 10.7, 15.22 s 25(1)(c) .… 23.45 s 25(1)(d) .… 22.3 s 26(1) .… 15.21 s 27(1) .… 15.21 s 27(2) .… 15.21 s 28 .… 15.21 s 29 .… 11.102 ss 29–34 .… 11.129 ss 29–37 .… 3.19, 3.20, 11.106 s 29(1)(m) .… 11.114 s 31 .… 11.102 s 33 .… 11.102 s 34 .… 11.102 s 35 .… 1.19 s 37 .… 11.102 ss 41–42 .… 3.44 s 50 .… 13.12, 13.13 s 51A .… 11.110, 11.117, 11.118 s 51A(1) .… 11.117 s 51A(2) .… 11.117 s 52 .… 11.104, 11.106, 11.110, 11.115, 11.117, 11.118, 11.121, 11.124, 11.125, 11.145, 11.148 s 64 .… 10.37, 11.150, 28.8 s 64A .… 11.73 s 67(b) .… 11.114, 11.151 s 82 .… 11.125, 11.127, 11.129, 11.146, 11.148 s 82(1) .… 11.125, 11.146 s 87 .… 11.125, 11.129, 11.147, 11.148 s 97 .… 28.8 s 140C .… 11.151 s 151 .… 11.110

s 168 .… 13.13 s 218 .… 15.13 s 224 .… 11.110, 13.13, 15.13 s 232 .… 11.124, 13.12, 15.13, 15.17 s 232(3) .… 15.20 15.23 s 236 .… 1.12, 1.13, 3.23, 10.37, 11.105, 11.110, 11.114, 11.124, 11.125, 11.129, 11.134, 11.135, 11.146, 11.147, 11.149, 13.12, 15.13, 15.17, 23.8, 23.26 ss 236–237 .… 15.18 s 236(1) .… 11.103, 11.110, 11.124, 11.129, 11.146 s 236(2) .… 11.148, 15.18 s 237 .… 1.13, 8.7, 8.47, 11.58, 11.103, 11.105, 11.124, 11.125, 11.129, 11.134, 11.145, 11.147, 11.148, 11.149, 15.13, 15.23, 20.15, 24.1, 28.8 s 237(1) .… 1.12, 11.110, 11.147 s 237(1)(a)(ii) .… 15.20 s 237(2) .… 11.147 s 237(3) .… 11.148, 15.18, 15.24 s 238 .… 11.147 s 238(1) .… 11.147 s 238(1)(b) .… 15.18, 15.20 s 239 .… 11.147 ss 239–241 .… 7.24 s 239(1) .… 11.147, 15.23 s 243 .… 1.12, 1.13, 8.7, 8.47, 11.58, 11.103, 11.124, 11.129, 11.145, 11.147, 11.150, 13.12, 15.13, 15.16, 15.17, 15.23, 24.1, 28.8 s 243(a) .… 11.60, 11.129 s 243(b) .… 11.147 s 250 .… 11.147, 15.20, 15.23, 15.24 s 266 .… 7.1, 7.24 s 271 .… 7.24 ss 271–273 .… 7.1 s 274 .… 7.30 Sch 2 .… 11.102 Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 s 5(2) .… 17.68 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 s 97 .… 17.71 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 .… 13.13 s 12CB .… 13.13 clxiv

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Table of Statutes Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 .… 1.11, 1.86, 11.1, 11.80, 11.109, 11.124, 14.17, 15.16, 15.17, 15.20, 15.21, 25.1 Pt 2, Div 2 .… 11.102 Pt 2, Div 2, Subdiv GA .… 11.132 s 12AC .… 11.114, 15.15 s 12AE .… 15.14 s 12BA(1) .… 11.109 s 12BA(2) .… 11.113, 11.115 s 12BAA .… 11.102 s 12BAB .… 11.102 s 12BAB(1) .… 14.17, 15.16 s 12BB .… 11.117, 15.15 s 12CA .… 12.2, 14.17, 15.13, 15.14, 15.26 s 12CB .… 12.2, 14.17, 15.9, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.26, 15.31 s 12CB(1) .… 15.16 s 12CB(4)(a) .… 15.16 s 12CC .… 12.2, 15.9, 15.14, 15.16, 15.26 s 12DA .… 11.102, 11.103, 11.109, 11.121 s 12DA(1) .… 11.102 s 12DA(1A) .… 11.102 s 12GB(1) .… 11.103 s 12GD .… 11.124, 15.17 s 12GF .… 11.124, 11.146 s 12GF(1) .… 15.17 s 12GF(1B) .… 11.129 s 12GF(2) .… 11.148, 15.18 s 12GH .… 11.108, 14.17 s 12GI .… 11.103 s 12GJ .… 11.151, 15.19, 15.25 s 12GM .… 11.124, 11.147 s 12GM(2) .… 11.148 s 12GM(5) .… 11.148 s 12GM(7)(a) .… 11.129 s 12GNA .… 11.146 s 12GNA(3) .… 11.146 s 12HD .… 11.124 ss 12BF–12BM .… 15.20, 15.21 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulations 2001 reg 2B(1)(h) .… 14.17, 15.16 Australian Securities Commission Act 2001 s 12DA .… 18.19



Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 s 4 .… 18.31 Banking Act 1959 s 8 .… 18.10 Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 5 .… 8.56 s 58 .… 8.56 s 116 .… 8.56 s 133(1A) .… 8.56 s 133(5A) .… 8.56 s 133(7) .… 8.56 s 153 .… 4.23 s 269(1)(b) .… 18.9 Bills of Exchange Act 1909 .… 7.23 s 27 .… 17.29 s 32 .... 1.27 s 32(2) .… 8.45 ss 36–43 .… 8.3 s 67 .… 22.8 s 95 .… 22.8 Cheques Act 1986 .… 7.23 s 30 .… 17.29 s 35 .… 4.23 Civil Aviation (Carrier’s Liability) Act 1959 s 34 .… 25.1 Civil Liability (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 107B(2)(b) .… 11.134 Commonwealth Bills of Exchange Act 1909 .… 4.23 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 .… 5.10 s 6 .… 17.68 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution s 5(1)(g) .… 11.114 s 109 .… 11.80 s 139B(1) .… 11.108 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Australian Consumer Law) .… 5.27, 11.10, 11.102, 11.107, 11.109, 11.124, 11.132, 11.134, 13.12, 13.13, 18.10, 18.35 Pt IIIA .… 18.35 Pt IV .… 3.36, 18.7, 18.10, 18.35 Pt IVB .… 18.10 clxv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Australian Consumer Law) – cont’d Pt VI .… 18.10, 18.35 Pt VIA .… 11.132 Pt VII .… 18.35 Pt VIII .… 7.12, 18.35 Pt X .… 18.35 Pt XI, Div 8 .… 15.19, 15.25 Pt XIB .… 18.35 s 2A .… 15.15 s 2A(1) .… 11.109 s 2A(2) .… 11.109 s 2B .… 15.15 s 2BA .… 15.15 s 2C .… 11.109 s 4 .… 11.110 s 4(1) .… 11.102, 11.107, 11.109 s 4(2) .… 11.115, 15.15 s 4(2)(a) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.118 s 4K .… 11.125 s 4L .… 6.17 s 5 .… 11.110, 11.114 s 5(1) .… 11.110, 11.114 s 5(1)(g) .… 11.114 s 5(1)(h) .… 11.114 s 5(1)(i) .… 11.114 s 5(3) .… 11.114 s 5(4) .… 11.114 s 6 .… 11.107, 11.114, 11.129 s 6(4) .… 11.112 s 45 .… 13.12, 18.7, 18.35 s 45B .… 13.12 s 45C .… 13.12 s 45D .… 13.12 s 46 .… 13.12, 18.35 s 47 .… 13.12, 18.35 s 48 .… 7.12, 13.12, 18.35 s 49 .… 18.35 s 50 .… 18.35 s 67 .… 11.114 s 75B .… 11.110, 11.145 s 76 .… 18.35 s 80 .… 18.35 s 82 .… 18.35 s 84 .… 11.108 s 84(2) .… 11.109

s 87 .… 11.145, 18.35 s 87CB .… 11.133 s 87CB(1) .… 11.134, 11.135 s 87CB(3) .… 11.136 s 87CC .… 11.138 s 87CC(2) .… 11.138 s 87CD(1)(a) .… 11.131 s 87CD(3)(a) .… 11.142 s 87CD(3)(b) .… 11.139 s 87CE .… 11.139, 11.140 s 87CF(b) .… 11.140 s 87CG .… 11.139 s 87CH .… 11.139 s 87CI .… 11.137 s 131 .… 11.102, 11.107, 15.13, 15.14 s 131A .… 11.102, 11.129, 15.13 s 137(3) .… 11.146 s 137B .… 11.107, 11.129 s 137C .… 11.146 s 137E .… 11.146 s 138(1) .… 11.151 s 138A(1) .… 11.151 s 138B .… 15.19, 15.25 s 138B(1) .… 11.151 s 138B(5) .… 11.151 s 139A .… 11.146 s 139B .… 11.108, 14.17, 15.13 s 139B(2) .… 11.110, 11.137, 15.15, 15.16 s 139C .… 11.108 s 139C(1) .… 11.108 s 139C(2) .… 11.108, 11.110 s 139G .… 11.102 s 140 .… 11.102 s 140B .… 11.102 s 163A .… 11.103 s 163A(1)(aaa) .… 11.124 s 237 .… 11.114 Sch 2 .… 1.11, 11.1, 13.12, 15.13, 15.14, 22.3, 23.45 Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2011 .… 15.15, 15.16 Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 Pt 6 .... 11.102 reg 8A .… 11.146 clxvi

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Table of Statutes Contracts Review Act 1980 s 16 .… 25.1

s 3 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 s 9 .… 3.56 ss 9–12 .… 3.56 s 10 .… 3.52, 3.56 s 11 .… 3.56 s 12(1) .… 3.56 s 12(2) .… 3.56 s 14 .… 3.56 s 14A .… 3.56 s 14A(2) .… 3.56 s 14B .… 3.56 s 14B(2)–(4) .… 3.56 s 15 .… 3.56 s 15A .… 3.56 ss 15A–15F .… 3.56 s 15B .… 3.51, 3.56 s 15C .… 3.54, 3.56 s 15D .… 3.56 s 15D(3) .… 3.56 s 15E .… 3.56 s 15F .… 3.56

Copyright Act 1968 ss 196–197 .… 8.3 Corporations Act 2001 .… 3.53, 3.56, 4.30, 11.1, 11.27, 11.102, 17.68, 17.69, 17.70, 17.71, 18.11 Ch 6D .… 11.27 Pt 6 .… 11.102 Pt 7 .… 11.132 Pt 10, Div 2A .… 11.132 s 110 .… 3.56, 4.1 ss 110–110B .… 3.53, 3.56 s 110A .… 3.56, 4.1 s 110B .… 3.56, 4.1 s 119 .… 17.68 s 124(1) .… 17.68 s 125 .… 17.69 ss 126–127 .… 17.70 ss 126–129 .… 3.53, 3.56, 17.70 s 127 .… 3.15, 3.56, 4.1 ss 128–129 .… 3.15 s 140 .… 3.8 s 199A .… 4.26 ss 205–206 .… 18.20 s 415D .… 21.2 s 477 .… 8.7 s 477(2) .… 8.6 s 563A .… 11.59 s 670A .… 11.102 s 708 .… 11.121 s 728 .… 11.102 s 953A .… 11.102 s 1022A .… 11.102 s 1041I .… 11.129, 11.132 s 1041L .… 11.132 s 1070A .… 8.30 s 1071B .… 8.30 s 1073 .… 11.147 Corporations Law 1990 .… 18.11 s 241 .… 4.26 Credit Code .… 3.9 Currency Act 1965 .… 9.8 Electronic Transactions Act 1999 .… 3.52, 3.53, 3.56 Pt 2A .… 3.56



Electronic Transactions Regulations 2000 .… 3.56 Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 Sch, item 23 .… 3.56 Evidence Act 1995 s 7B .… 3.56 s 131(2) .… 5.20 s 131(2)(h) .… 5.20 Fair Work Act 2009 .… 5.26 s 228 .… 6.15 Family Law Act 1975 .… 5.19, 11.28, 18.26, 28.29 Pt VIIIA .… 5.5, 14.2, 15.8 Pt VIIIAB, Div 4 .… 5.6 s 4AA .… 5.6 s 79 .… 16.75 s 86A .… 4.27 s 87(8) .… 11.28 s 90B .… 5.5 s 90C .… 5.5 s 90D .… 5.5 s 90E .… 5.5 s 90F .… 5.5 s 90G .… 5.5

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Marriage Act 1961 s 111A .… 2.2, 2.11, 4.34, 16.20, 17.28, 18.26

Family Law Act 1975 – cont’d s 90J .… 5.5 s 90K .… 5.5 s 90KA .… 5.5 s 90RA .… 5.6 s 90RC .… 5.6 s 119 .… 5.4

Migration Act 1958 .… 18.46

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 59(2B) .… 25.12

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 .… 15.9, 17.2 s 76 .… 15.14 Sch .… 17.2, 17.36 Sch, s 60(3) .… 17.36

Federal Court Rules O 29, r 2 .… 18.35

National Credit Code s 218(7) .… 17.2, 17.36

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 8.21(2) .… 25.12 r 15.15(2) .… 25.12

National Credit Code see National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 .… 18.48, 22.5, 26.3 Pt III .… 18.48 s 261 .… 18.48 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 .… 1.42, 20.1 s 9 .… 7.22 s 13 .… 10.43 s 14 .… 10.43 s 15(2)(d) .… 15.21 s 21 .… 7.10, 11.26 s 45(1) .… 18.41 s 48 .… 1.43, 4.7, 7.3, 7.10, 7.17, 7.21, 7.22, 7.43, 11.26 s 48(3) .… 7.10, 7.21 s 48A .… 7.3, 7.22 s 48AA .… 7.3, 7.22 s 54 .… 7.10, 7.22 s 54(1) .… 7.10 s 56 .… 7.10 Judiciary Act 1903 s 56 .… 5.27 s 64 .… 5.27, 24.3 s 79 .… 11.145, 15.26 Life Insurance Act 1995 s 199 .… 17.4 ss 200–203 .… 8.3 Marine Insurance Act 1909 s 20(2) .… 7.22 s 56 .… 8.3

Native Title Act 1993 s 31(1)(b) .… 6.15 Norfolk Island Act 1979 .… 17.74 s 71(1) .… 17.74 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 s 5 .… 17.74 Patents Act 1990 .… 10.30 s 14 .… 8.3 Patents Regulations 1991 .… 10.30 Reserve Bank Act 1959 s 36 .… 9.8 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 s 60 .… 8.5 Social Services Act 1947 ss 59–60 .… 18.27 Superannuation Act 1976 s 3 .… 18.27 Trade Practices Act s 20 .… 10.2 s 21 .… 10.2 Trade Practices Act 1974 .… 6.17, 11.102, 18.35, 24.23 Pt V .… 11.106 Pt V, Div 1 .… 11.106 s 4(2) .… 11.115 s 4(2)(a) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(b) .… 11.118 s 4(2)(c) .… 11.117 s 4L .… 18.42 s 5 .… 11.114

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Table of Statutes Apportionment Act 1905 s 4 .… 26.13

s 6 .… 11.114 s 6(3) .… 11.107 s 47 .… 18.42 s 51AA .… 15.8, 15.11, 15.13, 15.14, 15.16, 21.37, 24.23 s 51AA(2) .… 15.14 s 51AB .… 15.14, 15.16, 20.19, 21.37 s 51AC .… 15.1, 15.8, 15.14, 15.15, 15.16, 15.26, 21.37, 24.23, 28.31 s 51AD .… 18.10 s 51AF .… 11.102 s 52 .… 11.1, 11.10, 11.104, 11.106, 11.115, 23.6, 23.8, 23.15, 23.26 s 52(1) .… 11.102 s 52A .… 20.19 s 52AD .… 18.10 s 53 .… 11.112 s 73 .… 11.102 s 75B .… 11.107, 11.110 s 82 .… 11.104, 23.6, 23.8, 23.26 s 82(1) .… 11.103 s 82(1B) .… 11.129 s 84 .… 15.16 s 84(2) .… 11.108 s 87 .… 8.7, 8.47, 11.104, 11.129, 15.11, 15.16, 15.18

Associations Incorporation Act 1991 .… 17.73 Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 s 33 .… 22.4 Building Act 2004 s 88(3) .… 7.26 s 142(1) .… 25.5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 Ch 7A .… 11.132 Pt 15.3 .… 7.22 ss 15–18 .… 8.55 s 99 .… 23.19 ss 101–102 .… 23.30 s 107B(3)(b) .… 11.134, 11.135 s 107C .… 11.134, 11.135 ss 172–179 .… 11.72, 11.92 s 173(1)(b)(i) .… 11.70 s 174 .… 3.9, 11.80 s 176 .… 11.73 s 221 .… 8.7, 18.33 Sch 4 .… 11.146 Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 s 201 .… 16.21 s 201(3)(a) .… 8.21 s 204 .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.34, 16.41, 16.42, 16.57, 16.66 s 204(2)(c) .… 16.57 s 205 .… 8.30 s 205(1) .… 8.30 s 208 .… 3.14 s 212 .… 7.25 s 219 .… 4.1 s 501 .… 21.19

Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 .… 11.117 Trade Practices (Industry Codes — Franchising) Regulations 1998 Sch .… 18.10 Treasury Laws Amendment (Australian Consumer Law Review) Act 2018 s 5 .… 15.15 Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 .… 15.20

Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34

Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act s 55 .… 25.10

Commercial Arbitration Act 2017 .… 18.34

Water Act 2007 s 73 .… 6.15

Court Procedures Act 2004 Pt 4 .… 5.27, 24.3

Workplace Relations Act 1996 .… 18.11, 24.13

Court Procedures Rules 2006 r 503 .… 25.12

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Age of Majority Act 1974 .… 17.2



Domestic Relationships Act 1994 Pt 4 .… 5.6

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 Pt 2 .… 11.102 s 2 .… 11.151 ss 15–16 .… 11.109 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 s 71 .… 17.55 s 72 .… 17.55 Imperial Acts (Substituted Provisions) Act 1986 s 3 .… 16.7 Land Titles Act 1925 s 110 .… 3.14 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 s 68 .… 18.33 Law Reform (Misrepresentation) Act 1977 .… 11.72, 11.92 Legislation Act 2001 s 8(3) .… 25.7 s 8(3)(b)(i) .… 25.7 s 17 .… 25.10 s 30 .… 25.7 s 30(1)(f) .… 25.7 s 31 .… 25.7 s 32(1) .… 25.8 s 32(5) .… 25.8 s 32(6)(b) .… 25.9 ss 33–34 .… 25.6 s 40 .… 25.7 s 43 .… 25.11 s 44 .… 25.11 s 45 .… 25.11 ss 46–49 .… 25.10 s 47(2) .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 49 .… 25.10 s 149 .… 17.2 s 151(3) .… 25.2 Limitation Act 1985 s 8(3) .… 25.7 s 11(1) .… 25.1 s 12 .… 25.1 s 13 .… 25.1

ss 22–26 .… 25.1 s 32(4) .… 25.8 s 36 .… 25.7 s 40 .… 25.5 Married Persons’ Property Act 1986 s 3 .… 17.65 s 6 .… 17.64 Mercantile Law Act 1962 s 15 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.26 s 16 .… 11.80 Rules of the Supreme Court O 32 r 1 .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1954 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(2) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 29(1) .… 3.42 s 33(5) .… 9.9 s 35(2) .… 21.15 s 37 .… 9.5 s 52(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 52(2) .… 26.12 s 53(1) .… 25.2 s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(1) .… 25.2 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 60 .… 3.22 s 62(1) .… 11.66 s 62(2) .… 11.68 Sale of Goods Act 1975 s 2 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 Sale of Goods Ordinance 1954 s 5 .… 24.18 s 5(1) .… 21.18 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 16(3) .… 21.18 s 55 .… 24.18 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31 clxx

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Table of Statutes Supreme Court Act 1933 .… 23.33 s 34 .… 24.29

s 5 .… 15.26 s 6 .… 15.27 s 6(1) .… 15.27 s 6(2) .… 15.27 s 7 .… 15.28, 15.29, 15.31 s 7(1) .… 7.24, 15.11, 15.26, 15.28, 15.29 s 8 .… 15.29 s 9 .… 12.5, 15.1, 15.28, 15.31 s 9(1) .… 15.28 s 9(2) .… 15.26, 15.28, 15.31 s 9(2)(a) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(b) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(c) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(d) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(e) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(f) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(g) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(h) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(i) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(j) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(k) .… 15.28 s 9(2)(l) .… 15.28 s 9(4) .… 15.28 s 9(5) .… 15.28 s 10 .… 15.29 s 12 .… 15.29 s 14 .… 15.29 s 15 .… 15.29 s 16 .… 15.30 s 17(1) .… 15.26 s 17(2)(b) .… 15.29 s 17(3) .… 15.26 s 17(4) .… 15.26 s 17(5) .… 15.26 s 18 .… 15.26 s 21 .… 15.27 s 22 .… 15.26 Sch 1, cl 1(c) .… 7.24, 15.29

Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act s 46 .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 55 .… 25.10

NEW SOUTH WALES Agricultural Holdings Act 1941 .… 16.33 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 .… 17.73 Builders Licensing Act 1971 .… 26.6 s 45 .… 16.55 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 s 13 .… 11.149 s 14 .… 11.149 s 15 .… 11.149 Building Services Corporation Act 1989 s 10 .… 16.55 Civil Liability Act 2002 .… 11.137 Pt 4 .… 11.132 s 3A(2) .… 11.141 s 16 .… 23.19 Sch 2, cl 2 .… 8.7 Civil Liability Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Act 2018 .… 3.15 Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 65 .… 25.12 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 .… 5.6 Companies (NSW) Code .… 18.46 Pt IV, Div 6 .… 18.46 s 170(1) .… 18.46 Contracts Review Act 1980 .… 1.12, 4.28, 12.2, 12.5, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 15.1, 15.4, 15.9, 15.14, 15.16, 15.26, 15.27, 15.31, 17.52, 17.53, 23.45, 28.8 s 4 .… 15.28 s 4(1) .… 15.26, 15.28 s 4(2) .… 15.27



Conveyancing Act 1919 Pt 3 .… 4.1 Pt 8, Div 4 .… 3.69 s 6C .… 3.53 s 12 .… 8.30, 8.34 s 13 .… 21.19 s 23C .… 3.56, 8.21, 16.21 s 23C(2) .… 16.21 s 24 .… 3.14 clxxi

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Conveyancing Act 1919 – cont’d s 36C(1) .… 7.25 s 38A .… 3.53 s 54A .… 3.56, 16.7, 16.21, 16.35, 16.67 s 54A(2) .… 16.57 s 54B .… 23.6 s 55(2A) .… 26.4 s 66L .… 24.7 s 66M .… 24.7 s 66N .… 24.7 s 72 .… 3.14 s 133B .… 8.8 s 133E .… 3.69 s 144(1) .… 26.13 s 170 .… 3.61, 8.34 s 184 .… 12.64

s 6(1)(c) .… 19.39 s 6(1)(d) .… 19.39 s 6(1)(e) .… 19.39 s 6(2) .… 19.39 s 6(3) .… 19.26 ss 7–8 .… 19.37 s 11 .… 19.38 s 12 .… 19.38 s 13 .… 19.38 s 15 .… 19.38 s 15(1) .… 19.39 Home Building Act 1989 s 10(3) .… 16.55 s 18D .… 7.26 s 48K(6) .… 25.5 Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 s 8 .… 16.7

Co-Operatives Act 1992 s 21 .… 17.68

Interpretation Act 1987 s 36(1) .… 25.2 s 37 .… 17.2

Crimes Act 1900 Sch 3, cl 5 .… 8.7 Crown Proceedings Act 1988 .… 5.27, 24.3

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 s 2 .… 8.55

De Facto Relationships Act 1984 .… 18.27 Deserted Wives and Children Act 1901 .… 4.27

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 s 6 .… 7.22

District Court Act 1973 s 134B .… 15.26

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 ss 8–9 .… 23.30

Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 App .… 3.57 s 9(1) .… 3.57 s 9(3) .… 3.57

Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 .… 22.4 Legal Profession Act 2004 s 186 .… 18.33

Electronic Transactions Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 6.20 .… 25.5 Fair Trading Act 1987 .… 11.107, 11.146 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 30 .… 11.151 ss 36–37 .… 11.109 s 74(4) .… 11.146 Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 .… 19.37, 19.39, 25.1 s 6(1)(b) .… 19.39

Limitation Act 1969 Pt 3, Div 3 .… 25.7 s 11(3) .… 25.7 s 11(3)(b)(i) .… 25.7 s 14 .… 25.1 s 14(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 14A .… 25.1 s 15 .… 25.1 s 16 .… 25.1 s 20 .… 25.10 s 23 .… 25.13 ss 40–46 .… 25.1

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Table of Statutes s 18 .… 17.44, 17.46 s 19 .… 17.45, 17.47 ss 19–25 .… 17.45 s 20 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 20(3) .… 17.47 s 21 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 22 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 23 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 24 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 25 .… 17.45, 17.47 s 26 .… 17.48 s 27 .… 17.48 s 28 .… 17.48 s 29 .… 17.48 s 30 .… 17.45 s 30(1)(a) .… 17.49 s 30(1)(b) .… 17.49 s 30(2) .… 17.49 s 30(3) .… 17.49 s 30(4) .… 17.49 s 31 .… 17.49 s 31(2) .… 17.49 s 33 .… 17.49 s 34 .… 17.49 s 37 .… 17.49 s 38 .… 17.49 s 43 .… 17.47 s 47 .… 17.50, 17.51 s 48 .… 17.50 s 50 .… 17.48

s 52 .… 25.7 s 52(1)(e) .… 25.7 s 53 .… 25.7 s 54 .… 25.8 s 54(4) .… 25.8 s 54(5) .… 25.8 s 54(6) .… 25.9 ss 55–56 .… 25.6 s 63 .… 25.11 s 64 .… 25.11 s 65 .… 25.11 s 68 .… 25.11 s 68A .… 25.11 ss 69–73 .… 25.10 s 70(2) .… 25.10 s 71 .… 25.10 s 72 .… 25.10 s 73 .… 25.10 Sch 4 .… 25.11 Liquor Act 2007 .… 18.10 s 92 .… 18.10 s 92(1) .… 18.10 s 92(1)(d) .… 18.10 Local Courts Act 1982 .… 15.26 Local Government Act 1993 s 55 .… 18.8 s 55(1) .… 18.8 Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 ss 3–4 .… 18.33 s 6 .… 8.7 Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1996 Pt 2 .… 17.65 s 10 .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1886 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1901 .… 17.60 Mining Act .… 19.15 Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 .… 17.2, 17.4, 17.43 s 6(1) .… 17.45 s 6(3) .… 17.46 s 8 .… 17.45 s 17 .… 17.45



Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 s 10(7) .… 7.1 Professional Standards Act 1994 .… 11.146 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 Pt 4 .… 5.6 s 20 .… 16.75 Real Property Act 1900 .… 15.29 Restraints of Trade Act 1976 .… 18.38 s 4 .… 18.38, 18.39 s 4(3) .… 18.38 Retail Lease Act 1994 .… 12.25, 18.10 Pt 7A, Div 1 .… 15.14 Sale of Goods Act 1923 Pt III .… 17.47 clxxiii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Sale of Goods Act 1923 – cont’d s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 4(2A) .… 11.68 s 4(2A)(a) .… 11.70 s 5 .… 24.18 s 5(1) .… 21.18 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17, 19.37 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 23 .… 17.47 s 28(1) .… 3.42 s 32(4) .… 9.9 s 33 .… 9.5 s 34(2) .… 21.15 s 51(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 51(2) .… 26.12 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53(1) .… 25.2 s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 57 .… 10.65 s 60 .… 3.22

s 20ZD(4) .… 17.70 Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 s 8 .… 17.68 Superannuation Act 1916 s 88 .… 8.5 Supreme Court Act 1970 .… 23.33 s 68 .… 24.29, 24.31 Supreme Court Rules 1970 Pt 8 .… 18.33 r 13(1) .… 18.33 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules .… 3.29 Usury, Bills of Lading, and Written Memoranda (Amendment) Act 1989 .… 11.80

NORTHERN TERRITORY Age of Majority Act 1974 .… 17.2 Apportionment Act 1905 s 3 .… 26.13 Associations Act 2003 .… 17.73 Bills of Lading Act 1859 s 1 .… 8.3 s 3 .… 8.3 Building Act 1993 s 54AD .… 7.26 s 54BB .… 7.26 s 160 .... 25.5

Sale of Goods Act 1988 s 4(5) .… 21.18

Business Tenancies (Fair Dealings) Act 2003 Pt 10 .… 15.14

Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1988 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 s 9(3) .… 16.84

Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 .… 18.34

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 Securities Industry Act 1970 .… 18.41 s 70 .… 18.19, 18.21 State Owned Corporations Act 1989 s 20ZD .… 3.15 s 20ZD(3) .… 17.70

Commercial Arbitration (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2013 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 Pt 4 .… 11.102 ss 35–36 .… 11.109 Crown Lands Ordinance 1831 .… 12.40 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 .… 5.27, 24.3 De Facto Relationships Act 1991 .… 18.27 Pt 3 .… 5.6 De Facto Relationships (Northern Territory Request) Act 2003 .… 5.6

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Table of Statutes Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2001 .… 3.56 s 5 .… 3.56

s 12(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 13 .… 25.1 s 18 .… 25.10 s 21 .… 25.13 ss 25–30 .… 25.1 s 36 .… 25.7 ss 36–39 .… 25.7 s 36(1)(e) .… 25.7 ss 37–39 .… 25.7 s 41 .… 25.8 s 41(5)(b) .… 25.9 ss 42–43 .… 25.6 s 44 .… 25.7 s 44(3)(b) .… 25.6 ss 45–48 .… 25.10 s 46(2) .… 25.10 s 47 .… 25.10 s 48 .… 25.10 s 48A .… 25.12

Guardianship of Adults Act 2016 s 25 .… 17.55 Interpretation Act 1987 s 28(1) .… 25.2 s 30 .… 17.2 Law of Property Act 2000 .… 1.42 Pt 6, Div 1 .… 4.1 s 5(c) .… 16.57 s 10 .… 16.21 s 10(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 12 .… 7.25 s 13 .… 3.14 s 56 .… 7.3, 7.15 s 56(2) .… 7.19 s 56(3)(a) .… 7.18 s 56(3)(b) .… 7.20, 8.53 s 56(3)(d) .… 7.19 s 56(4) .… 7.21 s 56(6) .… 7.17 s 56(7) .… 7.21 s 57 .… 17.71 s 58 .… 16.7, 16.9, 16.19 s 58(2) .… 16.35 s 59 .… 16.9 s 62 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 65 .… 21.19 s 70 .… 23.6 s 134 .… 8.8 s 143 .… 3.69 s 182 .… 8.30 s 221 .… 16.7 Sch 4 .… 16.7

Married Persons (Equality of Status) Act 1989 s 3(1) .… 17.64, 17.65 s 3(3) .… 17.64 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act s 27 .… 23.19 Professional Standards Act .… 11.146 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 .… 11.132 s 4(3)(b) .… 11.135

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Pt II .… 8.55 s 15 .… 11.129 s 16 .… 11.129 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 Pt VIII .… 7.22 ss 15–16 .… 23.30 Limitation Act 1981 s 4(1) .… 25.7



Sale of Goods Act 1972 s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 5 .… 24.18 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(2) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8, 6.11 s 28(1) .… 3.42 s 32(5) .… 9.9 s 33 .… 9.5 s 51(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 51(2) .… 26.12 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53(1) .… 25.2

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 .… 17.69

Sale of Goods Act 1972 – cont’d s 53(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 60 .… 3.22

Civil Liability Act 2003 Ch 2, Pt 2 .… 11.132 Ch 3 .… 23.19 Pt 2A .… 3.15 s 7(3) .… 11.141 s 28(1)(a) .… 23.31 s 28(1)(b) .… 11.134 s 28(3)(b) .… 11.135 s 29 .… 11.135 s 30(1) .… 11.136 s 32F .… 11.134

Sale of Goods Amendment Act 1999 s 2 .… 16.7 s 5 .… 16.29 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 8 .… 24.29

Supreme Court Act 1979 .… 23.33 s 14(1)(b) .… 24.29 ss 62–63 .… 24.29

Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 .… 18.34

Supreme Court Rules 1987 reg 36.01(6) .… 25.12

Common Law Practice Act .… 23.33

Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 .… 5.6

Water Act 1992 .… 18.10, 18.20, 18.43

Crown Proceedings Act 1980 .… 5.27, 24.3 Domestic Building Contracts Act 2000 s 30 .… 16.55 s 55 .… 16.55

QUEENSLAND Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 38(1) .… 25.2 s 38A .… 17.2

Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 .… 3.56 s 14 .… 3.49 Sch 2 .… 3.56

Associations Incorporation Act 1981 .… 17.73 Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 s 76(1)(a) .… 16.55 s 76(1)(c) .… 16.55

Fair Trading Act 1989 .… 11.102 ss 24–25 .… 11.109 ss 48–51 .… 11.151 s 107 .… 11.150

Builders’ Registration and Home-owners’ Protection Act 1979 s 53(2)(d) .… 16.55 s 75 .… 16.55

Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 ss 148–153 .… 17.69

Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 s 67G .… 16.55 Building Services Authority Act 1991 .… 16.55 s 42(1) .… 16.55 s 42(3) .… 16.55 s 58(1) .… 16.55

Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 33 .… 17.55 Judicature Act 1876 s 5(11) .… 22.4 Land Title Act 1994 .… 7.10 s 62 .… 8.6 Law Reform Act 1995 s 5 .… 23.30

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Table of Statutes s 55(1) .… 7.15 s 55(2) .… 7.19 s 55(3)(a) .… 7.18 s 55(3)(b) .… 7.20, 8.53 s 55(3)(d) .… 7.19 s 55(4) .… 7.21 s 55(5) .… 7.15 s 55(6) .… 7.17 s 55(7) .… 7.21 s 56 .… 16.7, 16.9, 16.19 s 56(2) .… 16.35 s 59 .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 s 62 .… 21.19 s 68(1) .… 23.6 s 68A .… 26.4 s 121 .… 8.8 s 128 .… 3.69 s 199 .… 8.30 s 200 .… 8.30, 8.38, 8.39 s 227 .… 17.71 s 232 .… 26.13

s 10 .… 23.30 s 17 .… 17.2 s 18 .… 17.65 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s 5(2) .… 25.7 s 10(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 10(1)(c) .… 25.10 s 10(2) .… 25.1 s 10(3) .… 25.1 s 10(6)(b) .… 25.13 s 24 .… 25.11 s 26 .… 25.1, 25.7 s 29 .… 25.7 s 31 .… 25.7 s 35(3) .… 25.8 s 36 .… 25.8 s 37(5) .… 25.9 s 37(6) .… 25.9 s 37(6A) .… 25.9 s 38 .… 25.6 s 41 .… 25.10 s 41(2) .… 25.10 s 41(3) .… 25.10 s 41(5) .… 25.10 Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 1952 s 4 .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1890 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1897 .… 17.60 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 s 87 .… 14.2, 14.7 Professional Standards Act 2004 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1974 .… 7.18 Pt 6 .… 4.1 s 5 .… 7.15 s 6(d) .… 16.57 s 11 .… 16.21, 16.25, 16.29 s 13 .… 7.25 s 14 .… 3.14 ss 44–46 .… 17.71 ss 44–53B .… 3.53 s 50 .… 3.14 s 55 .… 1.42, 7.3, 7.15, 7.17



Property Law Bill 2022 Pt 6 .... 4.1 s 9 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 13 .… 3.14 s 65 .… 3.14 s 70 .… 7.15 s 71 .… 16.7, 16.9 s 75 .… 16.7, 21.9 s 84 .… 23.6 s 86 .… 26.4 s 129 …. 8.8 s 151 …. 3.70 s 156 .... 26.13 s 180 …. 8.30 s 181 …. 8.30, 8.39 s 249 .… 25.1 Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 Pt 6, Div 8A .… 15.14 Rules of the Supreme Court O 32 r 1 .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 3 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Sale of Goods Act 1896 – cont’d s 5 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 5(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 9 .… 12.12 s 10 .… 19.17 s 11 .… 6.8 s 12 .… 6.11 s 13 .… 21.19 s 14(2) .… 21.18 s 27(1) .… 3.42 s 31(4) .… 9.9 s 32 .… 9.5 s 33(2) .… 21.15 s 50(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 50(2) .… 26.12 s 51(1) .… 25.2 s 51(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 52(1) .… 25.2 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 53 .… 24.18 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 59 .… 3.22 s 61(2) .… 11.66

s 6(2) .… 16.55 s 32(3) .… 7.26 Carriage Documents Act 1998 s 7 .… 8.3 Civil Liability Act 1936 s 52 .… 23.19 Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2009 .… 5.6 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 Sch 11 .… 8.7, 18.33 Crown Proceedings Act 1992 .… 5.27, 24.3 Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 Pt 2 .… 5.6 Electronic Communications Act 2000 .… 3.56 Electronic Transactions Act 2000 s 5 .… 3.56

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1996 .… 7.23 s 6 .… 8.3 Statute of Frauds Act 1972 .… 17.4, 11.80 s 3 .… 16.7

Fair Trading (Code of Practice for Retail Tenancies) Regulations 1998 reg 3 .… 15.14 s 3 .… 15.14 Sch 1 .… 15.14

Succession Act 1981 s 66 .… 8.55 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 reg 376 .… 25.12

SOUTH AUSTRALIA Aged and Infirm Persons’ Property Act 1940 s 27(1) .… 17.55 Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 .… 17.2, 17.51 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 .… 17.73

Fair Trading Act 1987 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 16 .… 11.151 ss 22–23 .… 11.109 s 96 .… 11.150

Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 .… 19.40 s 3 .… 19.41 s 3(1) .… 19.40 s 4(1)(b) .… 19.42 s 4(2)(b)–(e) .… 19.42 s 5 .… 19.26 s 7(1) .… 19.41 s 7(4) .… 19.41

Builders Licensing Act 1986 s 39 .… 16.55

Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 s 39 .… 17.55 s 42(1) .… 17.55

Building Work Contractors Act 1995 s 6 .… 16.55

Land Agents Act 1994 s 6(2) .… 16.55 clxxviii

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Table of Statutes Law of Property Act 1936 s 7 .… 16.25 s 15 .… 8.30 s 16 .… 21.19 s 24A .… 17.51 s 24A(1) .… 17.51 s 26(1) .… 16.7, 16.21, 16.60 s 26(2) .… 16.57 s 29 .… 16.21 s 29(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 31(d) .… 16.57 s 34(1) .… 7.25 s 40 .… 3.14 s 41 .… 4.1 s 64 .… 26.13 s 92 .… 17.65 s 110 .… 17.64 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 Pt 3 .… 11.132 s 3 .… 11.129, 23.30 s 3(1) .… 11.136, 11.141 s 3(2)(b) .… 11.136 s 3(2)(c) .… 11.138 s 4(1)(b) .… 23.31 s 4(1)(c) .… 11.134 s 7 .… 23.30 s 8(4)(d) .… 11.141 Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 s 44(1) .… 25.2 s 49(2) .… 17.2 Limitation of Actions Act 1936 s 28 .… 25.11 s 33 .… 25.1 s 34 .… 25.1 s 35 .… 25.10 s 35(a) .… 25.1 s 35(b) .… 25.1 s 42 .… 25.8 s 42(1) .… 25.8 s 42(2) .… 25.9 s 44(1), item 3 .… 25.2 s 45 .… 25.7 ss 45–46 .… 25.7 s 48 .… 25.7 s 48(3)(b) .… 25.6



s 50 .… 25.9 Local Government Act 1999 s 37(b) .… 17.71 Married Women’s Property Act 1883 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1902 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1911 .… 17.60 Minors Contracts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1979 .… 17.51 s 4 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.26, 17.51 s 5 .… 17.51 s 6 .… 17.51 s 7 .… 17.51 s 8 .… 17.51 Misrepresentation Act 1972 s 6(1)(a) .… 11.70 s 7(1) .… 3.9, 11.80, 11.92 s 7(2) .… 3.9, 11.92 s 7(3) .… 11.72 s 7(3)–(6) .… 11.72 s 7(5) .… 11.72 s 7(6) .… 11.72 s 8 .… 11.73 Professional Standards Act 2004 .… 11.146 Real Property Act 1886 s 69(b) .… 17.18 Residential Tenancies Act 1995 s 748.8 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 48(1) .… 25.2 s 49(1) .… 25.2 s 50(1) .… 25.2 s 59(2) .… 11.66 Sale of Goods Act 1895–1972 .… 3.22 s 2 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 2(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 6 .… 12.12 s 7 .… 19.17, 19.40 s 8 .… 6.8 s 9 .… 6.11 s 10 .… 21.19 clxxix

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Sale of Goods Act 1895–1972 – cont’d s 11(2) .… 21.18 s 25(1) .… 3.42 s 29(4) .… 9.9 s 30 .… 9.5 s 31(2) .… 21.15 s 48(1) .… 26.12 s 48(2) .… 26.12 s 49(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 50(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 51 .… 24.18 s 52(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 57 .… 3.22 s 60 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 60(1) .… 21.18 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80 Statutes Amendment (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1982 s 3 .… 16.7 s 4 .… 16.7 Supreme Court Act 1935 .… 23.33 s 28 .… 22.4 s 30 .… 24.29 Survival of Causes of Actions Act 1940 ss 2–3 .… 8.55 Survival of Causes of Actions Act 1940 s 5 .… 8.55

Associations Incorporation Act 1964 .… 17.73 Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 Pt 2 .… 11.102 s 8(2) .… 11.151 ss 14–15 .… 11.109 Building Act 2016 s 327(7) .… 25.5 Civil Liability Act 2002 Pt 9A .… 11.132 s 3A(3) .… 11.141 s 27 .… 23.19 s 28E .… 8.7 Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006 .… 5.6 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 36 .… 16.7, 16.21 s 36(1) .… 16.57 s 36(2) .… 16.57 s 43 .… 17.63 s 45 .… 17.64 s 60 .… 16.21 s 60(2)(c) .… 8.21 s 61(1) .… 7.25 s 62 .… 3.14 s 63 .… 4.1 s 86 .… 8.30 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 .… 5.27, 24.3

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 r 69.2 .… 25.12

Electronic Transactions Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 3 .… 3.56

TASMANIA

Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 s 56 .… 17.55

Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 29(1) .… 25.2 Administration and Probate Act 1935 s 27 .… 8.55 Age of Majority Act 1973 .… 17.2 s 4(1) .… 17.2 Apportionment Act 1871 s 2 .… 26.13

Infants’ Relief Act 1875 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.29, 17.39 s 1 .… 17.37 Limitation Act 1974 s 2(2) .… 25.7 s 2(3) .… 25.7 s 4(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 4(1)(c) .… 25.10 clxxx

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Table of Statutes s 12 .… 19.17 s 13 .… 6.8 s 14 .… 6.11 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 30 .… 9.5 s 30(1) .… 3.42 s 34(4) .… 9.9 s 36(2) .… 21.15 s 40 .… 16.82 s 53(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 53(2) .… 26.12 s 54(1) .… 25.2 s 54(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 55(1) .… 25.2 s 55(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 56 .… 24.18 s 57(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 62 .… 3.22

s 4(2) .… 25.1 s 4(3) .… 25.1 s 5(3) .… 25.7 s 9 .… 25.13 s 21 .… 25.11 s 23 .… 25.1 s 23A .… 3.70 s 26 .… 25.7 s 28 .… 25.7 s 29(4) .… 25.8 s 30 .… 25.8 s 30(1) .… 25.8 s 31(5) .… 25.9 s 31(7)–(8) .… 25.9 s 32 .… 25.6 s 33 .… 25.10 s 33(1) .… 25.10 s 33(2) .… 25.10 s 33(3) .… 25.10 s 33(5) .… 25.10

Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 .… 3.31

Married Women’s Property Act 1884 .… 17.60

Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .... 7.23 s 7 .… 8.3

Married Women’s Property Act 1900 .… 17.60

Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 .… 23.33 s 11(7) .… 21.19 s 11(10) .… 22.4 s 11(13) .… 24.29 s 11(13)(b) .… 24.31

Married Women’s Property Act 1935 s 3 .… 17.65 Mercantile Law Act 1935 s 6 .… 16.7, 16.8, 16.9, 16.20, 16.21, 16.30, 16.57 s 11 .… 11.80 s 12 .… 16.35 Minors Contracts Act 1988 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.37 s 4 .… 17.36 Professional Standards Act 2005 .… 11.146 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 3 .… 16.29, 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18 s 5(2) .… 11.66 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 9 .… 16.7, 16.77 s 9(1) .… 16.77 s 9(3) .… 16.82 s 11 .… 12.12



Supreme Court Rules 2000 r 184(1) .… 25.12 r 427(2A) .… 25.12 Wrongs Act 1954 s 2 .… 11.129, 23.30 s 4 .… 23.30

VICTORIA Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 29 .… 8.55 Age of Majority Act 1977 .… 17.2 s 2(1) .… 17.2 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 .… 17.73

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2011 s 223 .… 11.151

Frustrated Contracts Act 1959 .… 19.32, 19.34 s 3(2) .… 19.29, 19.34

Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 Ch 2 .… 11.102 Pt 3.2 .… 19.32, 19.33, 19.36 ss 16–18 .… 11.109 s 24(1) .… 11.68 s 24(2) .… 11.70 s 35(3) .… 19.36 s 36(1) .… 19.34 s 36(2) .… 19.34 s 37 .… 19.34 s 38 .… 19.35 s 38(3)(a) .… 19.35 s 38(3)(b) .… 19.35 s 41 .… 19.36

Goods Act 1958 Pt IV .… 3.31 s 3 .… 24.18 s 3(1) .… 21.18 s 4(2) .… 11.66 s 7 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 7(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 11 .… 12.12 s 12 .… 19.17, 19.32 s 15 .… 21.19 s 16(2) .… 21.18 s 38(2) .… 21.15 s 55(1) .… 26.12 s 55(2) .… 26.12 s 56(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 57(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 58 .… 24.18 s 59(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 Sch .… 3.31

Building Act 1993 .… 16.55 s 134 .… 25.1, 25.5 s 134A .… 25.5 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 55 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2004 .… 5.6

House Contracts Guarantee Act 1987 s 19(1) .… 16.55

Companies Act 1938 .… 18.5 Crimes Act 1958 s 322A .… 8.7, 18.33 Crown Proceedings Act 1958 .… 5.27, 24.3 Crown Remedies and Liability Act 1890 s 20 .… 8.11 Domestic Building Contracts Act 1995 .… 16.55 s 9 .… 7.26 Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 .… 3.56 s 7 .… 3.56 s 12A .… 3.53, 4.1 Fair Trading Act 1999 .… 11.118 Pt 2B .… 15.20 Pt 2C .… 19.32 Fair Trading Act 2012 s 24(1) .… 11.68

Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 s 52(1) .… 17.55 s 52(2) .… 17.55 s 52(3) .… 17.55

Instruments Act 1958 Pt VA .… 17.71 s 126 .… 11.118, 16.9, 16.21, 16.34, 16.39, 16.41, 16.42, 16.57, 16.66, 16.67 s 127 .… 16.41, 16.66 s 128 .… 11.80, 16.54 s 129 .… 16.35 Instruments Act 1958 s 126 .… 16.7 Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 44(1) .… 25.2 Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 .… 3.15 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 s 3(2) .… 25.7

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Table of Statutes s 169 .… 17.63

s 3(2)–(3) .… 25.7 s 3(3) .… 25.7 s 5(1)(a) .… 25.1 s 5(1)(c) .… 25.10 s 5(2) .… 25.1 s 5(3) .… 25.1 s 5(8) .… 25.13 s 18 .… 25.11 s 20 .… 25.1 s 21(1)(b) .… 25.13 s 23 .… 25.7 s 23(2) .… 25.7 s 23A .… 25.7 s 24(3) .… 25.8 s 25 .… 25.8 s 26(5) .… 25.9 s 26(6) .… 25.9 s 27 .… 25.6 s 28(1) .… 25.10 s 28(2) .… 25.10 s 28(3) .… 25.10 s 28(5) .… 25.10 s 29 .… 25.10 s 34 .… 25.12

Retail Leases Act 2003 Pt 9 .… 15.14 Retail Tenancies Reform Act 1998 s 8(2) .… 16.55 Sale of Goods Act s 13 .… 6.8, 6.11 s 30 .… 3.42 s 36(4) .… 9.9 s 37 .… 9.5 s 64 .… 3.22 Sale of Goods Act 1958 s 55(1) .… 25.2 s 56(1) .… 25.2 s 57(1) .… 25.2 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 s 3 .… 16.29 s 8 .… 16.7 s 9 .… 16.7 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 s 44 .… 17.69

Marriage Act 1958 s 156 .… 17.65 s 157(2) .… 17.64 Married Women’s Property Act 1870 .… 17.60 Married Women’s Property Act 1884 .… 17.60 Professional Standards Act 2003 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1958 s 18 .… 16.25 s 28B .… 17.31 s 41 .… 21.19 s 49 .… 17.31 s 53 .… 16.21 s 53(1)(c) .… 8.21 s 56(1) .… 7.25 s 73 .… 4.1 s 73A .… 4.1 s 74 .… 4.1 s 82 .… 3.14 s 134 .… 8.30, 8.42 s 144 .… 8.8



Supreme Court Act 1986 .… 23.33, 24.29 s 29(1) .… 22.4 s 49 .… 17.4, 17.30, 17.38 s 50 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.27 s 51 .… 17.4, 17.25, 17.29 s 54 .… 26.13 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 36.01(6) .… 25.12 Wrongs Act 1958 .… 11.136 Pt IVAA .… 11.132 s 23B .… 11.145 ss 25–26 .… 23.30 s 28G .… 23.19 s 32 .… 8.7, 18.33

WESTERN AUSTRALIA Age of Majority Act 1972 .… 17.2 s 4(1) .… 17.2 Associations Incorporation Act 2015 .… 17.73 clxxxiii

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Builders Registration Act 1939 s 4 .… 16.55

s 25 .… 17.64

Civil Liability Act 2002 Pt 1F .… 11.132 s 4A .… 11.141 s 5AL(2) .… 11.140 s 9 .… 23.19 Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 .… 18.34 Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 .… 18.34 s 8 .… 18.34 Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 Pt IIA, Div 1 .… 15.14 Crown Suits Act 1947 .… 5.27, 24.3 Electronic Transactions Act 2011 .… 3.56 s 8 .… 3.56 English Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 s 3 .… 16.35 Fair Trading Act 2010 Pt 3 .… 11.102 s 13 .… 11.150 ss 28–29 .… 11.109 Family Court Act 1997 Pt 5A, Div 3 .… 5.6 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 s 77(1) .… 17.55 s 77(1)–(3) .… 17.55 s 82 .… 17.55

Limitation Act 2005 Pt 3, Div 1 .… 25.7 Pt 3, Div 2 .… 25.7 s 13 .… 25.1 s 18 .… 25.1 ss 20–22 .… 25.1 s 26 .… 25.1 s 27 .… 25.13 s 27(1)(b) .… 25.13 s 29 .… 25.10 s 30 .… 25.7 ss 30–31 .… 25.7 s 32 .… 25.7 s 33 .… 25.7 s 38 .… 25.6 s 41 .… 25.7 s 42 .… 25.7 s 47 .… 25.8 ss 48–49 .… 25.8 s 52 .… 25.7 s 54 .… 25.10 s 59 .… 25.3 s 63 .… 25.10 s 64 .… 25.10 s 75 .… 25.11 s 76 .… 25.11 s 88 .… 25.10 Limitation Act 2005 s 36 .… 25.7

Home Building Contracts Act 1991 s 25D .… 25.5

Local Government Act 1995 s 2.5(2) .… 17.68

Interpretation Act 1984 s 61(1) .… 25.2

Married Women’s Property Act 1892 .… 17.60

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 .… 8.55 s 3 .… 17.65 s 4 .… 8.55

Married Women’s Property Act 1895 .… 17.60

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 ss 3A–4 .… 23.30 Law Reform (Statute of Frauds) Act 1962 s 2(a) .… 16.7 s 2(b) .… 16.7 s 2(c) .… 16.7

Morley Shopping Centre Redevelopment Agreement Act 1992 Sch 6 .… 23.6 Professional Standards Act 1997 .… 11.146 Property Law Act 1969 .… 7.25 Pt II .... 7.16 Pt VII, Div 2 .… 3.69 s 7 .… 16.25 s 9 .… 4.1

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Table of Statutes s 10(3) .… 17.71 s 11 .… 1.42, 7.16 s 11(1) .… 7.16, 7.25 s 11(1)(c) .... 8.21 s 11(2) .… 7.3, 7.16, 7.17, 7.25, 7.47 s 11(2)(b) .… 7.17 s 11(2)(c) .… 7.20 s 11(3) .… 7.9, 7.16, 7.18 s 11(3)(c) .… 8.53 s 12 .… 4.1, 7.15 s 20 .… 8.30 s 20(3) .… 8.26, 8.30, 8.31, 8.37 s 21 .… 21.19 s 31(1) .… 17.64 s 34 .… 16.21, 16.57 s 34(1) (c) .… 8.21 s 34(1)(a) .… 16.21 s 35 .… 16.57 s 36 .… 16.57 s 44 .… 3.14 s 52 .… 3.14 ss 124–125 .… 12.8 s 125(1) .… 26.5 s 131 .… 26.13 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 21 r 5(2) .… 25.12 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 2 .… 17.5, 17.10 s 2(1) .… 17.54, 17.57 s 4 .… 16.7, 16.77 s 4(1) .… 16.77 s 4(3) .… 16.82 s 6 .… 12.12 s 7 .… 19.17 s 8 .… 6.8 s 9 .… 6.11 s 10 .… 21.19 s 11(2) .… 21.18 s 30 .… 9.5 s 31(2) .… 21.15 s 35 .… 16.82 s 48(1) .… 25.2, 26.12 s 48(2) .… 26.12 s 49(1) .… 25.2 s 49(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 50(1) .… 25.2



s 50(3) .… 23.25, 23.26 s 51 .… 24.18 s 52(2) .… 23.8, 23.26 s 52(3) .… 23.8, 23.25, 23.26 s 57 .… 3.22 s 59(2) .… 11.66 s 60 .… 16.29, 21.18, 24.18 s 252(1) .… 3.42 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 .… 3.31 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 .… 7.23 s 8 .… 8.3 Statute of Frauds 1677 s 4 .… 5.4 Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp) .… 16.9 s 4 .… 16.7, 16.21 Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Imp) (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 6 .… 11.80 Supreme Court Act 1935 .… 23.33 s 25(10) .… 24.29 s 25(12) .… 22.4 Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 s 303 .… 8.5

IMPERIAL Imperial Act (9 Geo IV, c 14) s 5 .… 17.4, 17.25

INTERNATIONAL Principles of European Contract Law 1998 .… 10.44 Art 1.201 .… 10.43 Art 6.111 .… 19.6, 19.7 Art 8.108 .… 19.2 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 .… 3.55 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 .… 18.34 Art 8 .… 18.34 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 Art 1.7 .… 10.43 Art 6.2.2 .… 19.7, 19.12 clxxxv

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010 – cont’d Art 7.1.7 .… 19.2, 19.12 Arts 6.2.1–3 .… 19.6

Judicature Act 1873 .… 8.4, 8.29, 8.31, 24.29 s 25(6) .… 8.26 Law of Property Act 1925 .… 7.25 s 56(1) .… 7.16 s 136 .… 8.30 s 196 .… 3.61

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Art 19 .… 3.31 Art 19(3) .… 3.31 s 7(1) .… 10.43

Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2(1) .… 16.5 s 2(8) .… 16.5, 16.56

CHINA Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999 Art 6 .… 10.43

Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 .… 19.32, 19.36 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 .… 16.77

FRANCE

Limitation Act 1980 s 6 .… 25.3

Civil Code .… 27.20, 27.24 Art 1101 .… 4.1

Lord Cairns’ Act .… 16.24, 16.66, 23.30, 24.1, 24.19, 24.29, 24.30, 24.31, 24.32

NEW ZEALAND

Lord Tenterden’s Act .… 11.80, 17.25, 17.26, 17.28

Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 s 35 .… 23.8 s 50 .… 10.7

Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 .… 17.52 Misrepresentation Act 1967 .… 11.70, 11.72 s 2(1) .… 11.80 s 3 .… 11.73

Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 .… 7.15 Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 s 8 .… 12.56

Property Law Act 1925 s 40 .… 16.5

Fair Trading Act 1986 .… 11.118 s 9 .… 11.102

Road Traffic Act 1960 s 151 .… 4.14

Public Works Act 1882 .… 16.71

Sale of Goods Act of 1893 .… 27.26

UNITED KINGDOM

Settled Land Act 1925 .… 16.70

Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018 .… 8.8

Statute of Frauds (29 Car 2 c 3) 1677 .… 1.93, 6.6, 16.1, 16.2, 16.19, 16.21, 16.23, 16.28, 16.29, 16.33, 16.36, 16.42, 16.46, 16.54, 16.67, 16.72, 16.77, 16.82, 24.7, 24.11, 27.18 ss 1–3 .… 16.3 s 4 .… 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.8, 16.26, 16.47, 16.55, 16.57, 16.81, 16.86, 16.87 s 5 .… 16.4 ss 5–9 .… 16.3 s 6 .… 16.4 s 17 .… 16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.26, 16.77, 16.86, 16.87

Consumer Rights Act 2015 .… 15.20 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 .… 7.15, 7.17 Evidence Act 1851 .… 16.48 Hire Purchase Act 1964 s 27 .… 12.60 Infants Relief Act 1874 .… 17.4, 17.18, 17.36 s 1 .… 17.27 s 2 .… 17.27

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Table of Statutes Statute of Gloucester 1278 .… 27.5 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 11(1) .… 11.73 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 .… 15.20 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 .… 15.20

UNITED STATES AMERICA Restatement (Second) on Contracts s 322(2) .… 8.8 s 328 .… 8.53 Uniform Commercial Code Art 9-318(4) .… 8.8 s 2-210 .… 8.53

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Federal Trade Commission Act s 5 .… 11.107 Restatement (Second) on Contracts .… 10.43



s 1-203 .… 10.43 s 2 .… 10.21 s 22(2) .… 3.6 s 45 .… 3.71 s 87 .… 3.67 s 87(2) .… 3.67 s 90 .… 2.8 s 90(1) .… 2.5, 2.8 s 205 .… 10.43, 10.44 Statute of Frauds .… 3.52 Uniform Commercial Code .… 4.35 s 1-102(3) .… 10.45 s 1-206 .… 3.52 s 2-201 .… 3.52 s 2-204(1) .… 3.7 s 2-205 .… 3.67 s 2-206(1)(b) .… 3.27 s 2-207 .… 3.31, 3.32 s 2-209(1) .… 4.35 s 2-302 .… 15.4, 15.16 s 8-319 .… 3.52 s 9-203 .… 3.52

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PART I Overview of the Law of Contract

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Chapter 1

Overview of Contract Law Introduction 1.1  Use of this chapter. This chapter is intended for use by: • • • •

legal professionals in need of a short account of modern Australian contract law; non-legal professionals involved in making, drafting, administering or performing contracts; students; and contracting parties.

It contains an up-to-date overview of the most important principles of contract law. Knowledge of at least the basic principles is indispensable for dealing with any problem that concerns the enforcement of a contract. However, a person faced with a practical problem cannot be expected to read a treatise on contract law from cover to cover. In this chapter, therefore, contract law is presented in summary form. Sufficient information is provided to enable the reader to approach any contract problem systematically, and to identify the legal issues raised by it and the relevant rules. References to more detailed discussion in other parts of the book are included throughout. 1.2  The key issues: liability and remedy. A person engaging with the law of contract for a practical reason needs, above all, to know whether a particular course of events has exposed, or will expose, a particular party to legal liability. It is then necessary to consider whether that liability generates a useful remedy. Whatever the context of inquiry — negotiation, drafting, interpretation, administration, performance, breach, termination — these are the key issues. Even if no dispute has as yet arisen, the issue is still how to avoid, or anticipate, prepare or plan for, potential claims of liability and potential remedies. Contract law can readily be described from this perspective. It provides the rules that determine when one party is liable to another, and the consequences of that liability, under or in connection with a contract. The rules define the elements of a successful claim of liability and remedy. At the same time, they may provide defences against such a claim. Contracts are about getting things done. A court’s job is, in the event of a dispute, to give effect, so far as possible, to the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. Ascertaining intention is a fundamental exercise that arises at various stages of the contract inquiry. Courts adopt the technique of the objective test, namely, they ascertain intention by reference to a hypothetical reasonable observer: what would

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1.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

a reasonable person conclude the parties intended? This is in contrast to a subjective test, which would involve asking the parties what they intended.1 1.3  Contractual and non-contractual liability. Breach of contract is not the only potential source of liability in connection with a contractual transaction. Legal liability may arise from statements or other conduct of the parties to a transaction, even if no contract was made, or no liability for breach can be established. Such liability may be in addition, or in the alternative, to contractual liability. Some of these principles may render a contract vulnerable to cancellation. A comprehensive account of contract law must therefore include some consideration of non-contractual sources of liability. In particular, a transaction involving an actual or putative contract may: •

• • • • • •

involve misleading or unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce, and therefore lead to liability and remedies under the Australian Consumer Law; involve negligence or deceit (fraud), and therefore lead to liability in tort; result in the unjust enrichment of a party, and therefore lead to liability in restitution; result in the creation of a debt; result in the creation of property rights; involve a fiduciary relationship, and therefore lead to liability for breach of fiduciary obligation; and/or generate other equitable rights (including property rights) that are enforceable independently of any contract, usually through the doctrine of estoppel.

Non-contractual sources of liability are identified at several points in this chapter and considered at appropriate points throughout this book.2 1.4  Australian Contract Code. In 1992 the Law Reform Commission of Victoria published its Discussion Paper No 27, An Australian Contract Code.3 The paper contained, in addition to the text of a proposed code, a discussion of the advantages of codification, a commentary on the code and examples of its application. In 2012 the Commonwealth Attorney-General initiated a project to codify the law of contract in Australia.4 A draft Australian Law of Contract was submitted as a report to the Attorney-General in 2014.5 This draft sought to codify and simplify the Australian judge-made law with one legislative statement. At the same time, the draft text harmonised the law of contract with various international precedents and included reforms aimed at modernising the law. The proposal was controversial.6 This initiative has stalled. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

In very limited circumstances a subjective test is applied. Examples are where a contract is rectified or non est factum is pleaded: see 1.89. Restitution and debt are separately dealt with in Chapter 26. Ellinghaus and Wright, An Australian Contract Code (Law Reform Commission of Victoria, 1992). Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012). Wright, Ellinghaus and Kelly, A Draft Australian Law of Contract (2014). Available at SSRN: . See, for example, Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36(1) Syd LR 131; compare Nottage, ‘The Government’s Proposed Review of Australia’s Contract

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Overview of Contract Law

1.6

Elements of Liability for Breach of Contract 1.5  Traditional elements of liability for breach of contract. To succeed in a claim of liability for breach of contract against another party, the claimant must first of all show that a contract was made with that party. Whether a contract has been made depends on the rules of contract formation.7 In addition, a contract may have been made but is vulnerable to cancellation because of defective negotiations, for example, it was induced by misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable dealing. Next, the claimant must show that a breach has occurred. Whether a contract has been breached depends on rules defining what conduct amounts to breach, and on rules governing the determination of the content of contracts (the rules relating to the identification and construction of contractual terms).8 A claimant who can show that a contract was made with another party and that it was breached by that party may not yet have established liability. If the other party can show that he or she is excused from the obligation to perform the contract there is no liability for not performing it.9 The law recognises a variety of excuses based on invalidating or vitiating factors affecting the negotiation and formation of the contract.10 Contractual clauses may also provide an excuse or defence to breach or its consequences: exclusion clauses.11 Even if a contract was validly formed, there may be no liability because the contract was terminated before any breach occurred. The law recognises a number of ways in which a contract can be brought to an end by the act of a party, or by the course of events.12 What follows from the establishment of liability is that the claimant must then make out an entitlement to a remedy. The remedies most often claimed for breach of contract are money compensation (damages) or, less commonly, orders compelling performance of the contract (specific performance, injunction). The law provides rules governing the operation of these remedies that can cause an otherwise valid claim for breach of contract to fail at this last obstacle.13 1.6  Overriding obligations of conscience and good faith. ‘Unconscionability’ has been adopted by Australian courts and legislatures as an overriding source of the creation, as well as negation, of rights as between contracting parties.14 This means that in some cases: Law: An Interim Positive Response’ in Keyes and Wilson (eds), Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives (2014), ch 7; Tettenborn, ‘Codifying Contracts — An Idea Whose Time has Come?’ (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 273; Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and “Certainty”’ (2018) 35 JCL 146. 7. See 1.15–1.48. See breach and construction: 1.49–1.77. 8. 9. In such a case it may be said either that no breach occurred since performance was excused, or that a breach occurred but was excused. 10. See excuses: 1.78–1.104. 11. See terms limiting liability: 10.62–10.67. 12. See termination of contracts: 1.105–1.127. 13. See remedies: 1.128–1.144. 14. See 1.8–1.14. This includes parties to contract negotiations as well as parties to a concluded contract.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.6

•

a party may not be liable for a breach of contract even if all formal elements of liability are present — because it is unconscionable to assert liability; or a party may be liable for breach of contract even if a formal element of liability is missing — because it is unconscionable to deny liability.

•

Because of the overriding role of unconscionability in contract law, it is dealt with at the head of the summary of contract law that follows. Australian courts have also recognised that a duty of good faith and fair dealing may be implied in many contracts, although good faith has not yet been unequivocally recognised as a mandatory obligation imposed on the parties to a contract transaction, as it has been in most of the world’s major jurisdictions. Breach of good faith may overlap with unconscionable conduct, so that the need for a separate good faith standard has been questioned.15 1.7  Checklist of elements of liability and remedy for breach of contract. In summary, a claim of liability for breach of contract with another party will succeed if: 1. a contract was made with that party; and 2. that party has breached the contract as correctly construed; and 3. performance is not excused by an exempting provision or invalidating or vitiating factor; and 4. the contract was not terminated before the breach; and 5. a remedy is available; and 6. it is not unconscionable to make the claim. Conversely, a claim of liability for breach of contract will not succeed if: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

no contract was formed; or a contract was formed but it was vitiated by defective negotiation; or no breach of the contract as correctly construed occurred; or performance is excused; or the contract was terminated before the breach; or a remedy is not available; or it is unconscionable to make the claim.

Unconscionability 1.8  Judicial and statutory applications. Both courts and legislatures have applied conscience as a criterion of liability. They have done so by utilising the negative forms ‘unconscionable’ and ‘unconscionability’. The courts have not formally adopted a general principle prohibiting the unconscionable assertion of a right or denial of an obligation, but have identified specific categories of unconscionability, whose separately defined parameters must normally be satisfied before relief can be claimed on the basis of unconscionability. Because unconscionability can apply

15.

See further 1.69.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.10

in a variety of contractual circumstances, it has no single, unvarying meaning but, instead, is determined by the particular context. Under both judge-made law and legislation, unconscionability can create as well as excuse liability in relation to a contract.

Judge-made law 1.9  Creating or precluding rights of enforcement: estoppel. A party can be prevented or ‘estopped’ from denying or departing from an assumption, whether of fact, law or a future state of affairs, made by another party if this would be unconscionable in the circumstances. It will normally be unconscionable for A to depart from an assumption made by B if A induced or shared the assumption, it was reasonable for B to make it, and B reasonably relied on it in some material way so that departure from it would be detrimental to B. Unconscionability and detriment are closely linked: it is unconscionable for A to act contrary to the assumption because B has detrimentally relied on it. This means that, for example, a party who induces or shares an assumption that a contract has been or will be made may be liable even if no contract was actually made, although remedies for breach of contract, for example, damages for the full value of the lost performance, or orders compelling performance, may not be awarded if a lesser remedy is appropriate to the case (the ‘minimum equity’ approach).16 Estoppel is not limited to assumptions about the formation of a contract. Any legally significant assumption relating to the operation or enforcement of a contract has the potential to generate an estoppel if it would be unconscionable for the other party to depart from it.17 Hence, a party may be estopped from, for example: • • • •

asserting a particular construction of a contract;18 relying on a particular right under a contract; relying on a particular excuse, such as lack of writing;19 or asserting the termination of a contract as a result of frustration,20 failure of condition21 or breach.22

1.10  Denying rights of enforcement: unconscionable conduct in negotiation; unconscionable exercise of rights. The law excuses a party from performance of a contract where it would be unconscionable to enforce the contract because of unjust factors affecting its negotiation. This principle is applied by reference to established categories of unconscionable conduct. Thus, equity23 excuses a party from performance of a contract if in making it the other party engaged in unconscionable 16. See 2.9. 17. Estoppel can ‘override’ many contract rules and doctrines. See 2.19–2.32. 18. See 10.3. 19. See 16.67. 20. See 19.24. 21. See 20.15. 22. See 21.32. 23. The words ‘common law’ and ‘equity’ refer originally to the different rules applied by different courts in England (several ‘common law’ courts on the one hand, the Court of Chancery on the other). The separate jurisdictions of common law and equity have long been amalgamated by legislation. Contract law contains rules originating in both. In case of conflict, the rules of equity prevail.

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1.10

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

dealing. Unconscionable dealing is defined as taking unfair advantage of a disability seriously affecting the other party’s pre-contractual decision-making, including drunkenness, emotional dependence, poverty, illiteracy, lack of education, lack of information and (in some circumstances) lack of independent advice.24 The law also excuses a party if a contract was affected by misrepresentation, mistake, duress or undue influence, usually occurring during the negotiation period. All these can be regarded as constituting the established categories of unconscionable conduct vitiating a contract otherwise legally formed.25 The law also recognises an overriding equitable principle that precludes the unconscionable exercise of rights and powers conferred by a contract, such as a right to terminate a contract,26 or a right to liquidated damages.27 As in the case of excuses from performance based on unconscionability, the principle is not applied directly, but rather via mediating categories or doctrines. Thus, the exercise of a right to terminate for breach may be unconscionable because of fraud, mistake, accident or surprise,28 or estoppel.29

Statutory unconscionability 1.11  Unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce. The Australian Consumer Law30 confers power on the courts to order relief against actual or potential loss resulting from unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce.31 Section 20 prohibits unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce under the judge-made law. Section 21 deals with unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services in trade or commerce. ‘Unconscionable conduct’ is not defined in the Australian Consumer Law. Section 20 has been interpreted to refer to forms of unconscionable conduct recognised by the courts. Section 22 lists matters to which the court may (but not must) have regard in determining whether such conduct has occurred in contravention of s 21, including inequality of bargaining position, unreasonable conditions, lack of understanding, unfair tactics, and prices and terms offered by other suppliers. It is clear by virtue of the interpretive principles in s 21(4) that unconscionable conduct under s 21 has a wider ambit than under the judge-made law. 1.12  Statutory excuse from liability under a contract: unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms and unjust contracts. Sections 20 and 21 do not specifically refer to contracts as such; rather, they prohibit unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce. But a link to contracts is made in the remedial provisions of the Law. Under s 236, an order for damages may be made. Under s 237(1), a party who has Unconscionable dealing is discussed in 15.3–15.12. For mistake, see Chapter 12; duress, Chapter 13; and undue influence, Chapter 14. 25. Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102 at 111; 130 ALR 570 at 575–6; [1995] HCA 14 at [21]. 26. See 21.35. 27. See 23.45. 28. See 21.35. 29. See 21.32. 30. Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). See 15.14–15.19. 31. Unconscionable conduct in the supply of financial services is separately covered by mirror provisions in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). These provisions are fully discussed in 15.14–15.19. 24.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.14

suffered, or is likely to suffer, ‘loss or damage’ by unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce may apply to the court for orders that will compensate for or prevent that loss or damage. Under s 243, the court is expressly given wide powers to make orders in relation to contracts. It may, among other things: • • •

declare the whole or any part of a contract void; vary a contract; and/or refuse to enforce any or all provisions of a contract.

As a result of these provisions, a contracting party may be partly or wholly excused by the court from performance. The Australian Consumer Law also deals with unfair contract terms in standardform contracts supplying to consumers and supplying to or purchasing from small businesses.32 It is possible for a court to declare that a contract term is void. In New South Wales, the Contracts Review Act 1980 performs a similar function in respect of unjust contracts.33 The Act is restricted to non-business transactions, though in its actual application the courts have sometimes overcome this limitation. 1.13  Statutory creation of liability under a contract. Under s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law, damages may be claimed for loss caused by a contravention of the unconscionability sections. Under ss 237 and 243, the court is not limited to excusing performance of a contract. It may make orders, among other orders, directing a person who engaged in unconscionable conduct: • • •

to pay the amount of loss or damage suffered by the applicant; to repair goods or provide parts; and/or to supply specified services,

or such other orders as the court thinks appropriate. Under these provisions a court may thus impose obligations of performance on a contracting party or award other relief where a contracting party engages in unconscionable conduct. 1.14  Unconscionability as a general restriction on assertion of rights and denial of obligations. The variety of contexts in which unconscionability plays a role in determining the existence, validity and enforcement of rights and obligations as between contracting parties means that it must always be taken into account in assessing their legal position. In effect, unconscionability functions as a general restriction on the assertion or denial of such rights and obligations. Anyone considering a claim for breach of contract is therefore well advised to consider whether the claim is for any reason offensive to conscience in the circumstances, notwithstanding that the other party’s liability can be formally established. This also applies to denials of liability in response to such claims.

32. Part 2-3. See 15.20–15.25. 33. See 15.26–15.31.

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1.15

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Formation of Contracts 1.15  Estoppel. As explained in 1.9, a party may be estopped from denying liability under a contract even if, by the rules of formation, no contract has in fact been made. If A has led B reasonably to assume that a contract has been or will be made, and B had relied on that assumption to his or her detriment, A may be estopped from departing from the assumption. Broadly speaking, in such a case the court treats the parties as if they had made a contract. However, the court is not in general limited to this option, but may give whatever remedy is appropriate in the circumstances to enforce the assumption. In this way the modern law has provided a safety net for situations that, judged strictly by the rules of formation, would be classified as pre-contractual. The availability of estoppel in pre-contractual situations does not make the rules of formation of contracts redundant. If no contract came into existence, the court may be reluctant to impose obligations of a ‘contractual’ character by way of estoppel. This will particularly be so where the parties are ‘commercial enterprises, well-resourced and advised, dealing in a commercial transaction’.34 Nevertheless, modern courts have constructed a powerful doctrine of estoppel that possesses both common law and equitable components, and which applies equally to assumptions about present and future, fact or law.35 Conduct falling short of the formation of a contract may also generate statutory liability if it involves misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.36 Potential liability under this legislation must always be considered when contractual negotiations are in issue. 1.16  Making a contract. The major elements of formation of a contract are usually identified as the following: • • • •

agreement (offer and acceptance);37 consideration;38 intention to create legal relations;39 and certainty of terms.40

Agreement may be inferred from conduct as an alternative to the offer-andacceptance analysis: see 1.24. Agreement and giving consideration together constitute a process that, to make a contract, requires: • • •

at least two parties; a promise or undertaking by at least one of them; and an exchange between them, either promise-for-promise (bilateral contract) or promise-for-act (unilateral contract).

34. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 585 (Kirby P). 35. Its operation is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 36. See 11.102–11.153. 37. See Chapter 3. 38. See Chapter 4. 39. See Chapter 5. 40. See Chapter 6. A contract does not usually have to be in writing to be valid. In some classes of contracts, however, legislation requires written evidence, although even here an unwritten contract may be enforceable if it has been partly performed. The absence of writing where required does not, technically speaking, prevent the formation of a contract, but rather prevents its enforcement, and the topic is therefore dealt with under excuses: see 1.92–1.96.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.16

Exchange. There can be no offer, acceptance or consideration unless the parties’ agreement effects an exchange. According to a classic formula, ‘the relation of a quid pro quo must subsist between’ the promises of each party (in a bilateral contract) or the promise of the one and the act of the other (in a unilateral contract).41 In short, the party seeking to enforce a contractual undertaking must show that she or he ‘paid’ a specified ‘legal price’ (gave requested consideration) in return for that undertaking. The requirement of exchange means that a third party not involved in the exchange cannot enforce the contract (see Privity of contract below). Offer.42 To show that a party made an offer it is necessary to identify an express or implied promise by that party to perform a specified act in exchange for another party’s: • •

specified counter-promise; or specified act.

Acceptance of an offer occurs when an offeree makes the specified counterpromise43 (bilateral contract) or performs the specified act (unilateral contract) in response to the offer.44 Consideration. In a bilateral contract, each promise is the consideration for the other promise. In a unilateral contract, the promise is the consideration for the requested act, and the requested act is the consideration for the promise. But neither a promise nor a requested act is consideration in the legal sense (‘good consideration’) unless it has some value, at least according to the idiosyncratic rules of the law on this topic. If a promise or act has no value in the eye of the law, it is not good consideration, even if it is the promise or act specified by the other party as consideration. A promisor who requires a counter-promise or act of no value from the promisee is making a conditional gift, not a contract.45 Intention to create legal relations need not be present subjectively. In the law of contracts, intention or intentional states are usually established objectively, that is, a party will be held to that intention which would be reasonably inferred in the circumstances.46 Certainty and completeness is required, but only in relation to essential terms. The court has wide powers to imply terms and to fix meaning.47 Privity of contract. A contract can be enforced only by the parties against each other. A contract between A and B cannot be enforced by X, even if X is intended to gain a benefit from its performance. Conversely, a contract between A and B cannot be enforced against X, even if it purports to make X liable. This is the doctrine of ‘privity of contract’, that is, only the parties to a contract are bound by it and can benefit from it.48 41.

Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 at 456–7; [1954] HCA 20 at [31]–[32]. See 1.17. 42. See 1.18–1.20. 43. This may simply be agreeing to the offer. 44. See 1.21–1.25. 45. Gift promises are enforceable in some cases, but failure to perform such a promise is not a breach of contract. See 1.26–1.30. 46. See 1.31–1.37. 47. See 1.38. 48. See 1.39–1.48.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.17

Agreement 1.17  No offer or acceptance without exchange. There can be neither an offer nor an acceptance unless the parties intend to effect an exchange. A promise qualifies as an offer only if it proposes an exchange. A promise or performance qualifies as an acceptance only if it is given in response to that proposal: if given coincidentally, or inadvertently, it cannot be an acceptance. (Nor can it be good consideration.)49 In practice, this requirement poses a problem only where a unilateral contract is in issue. Where a bilateral contract is alleged, the necessary reciprocity of the promise and counter-promise will usually be self-evident. But where a unilateral contract is alleged, that is, where the contract is said to consist of an exchange of a promise for an actual performance, the presence of the element of exchange may need to be positively established. An example is a promise of a reward for the return of a lost dog. The promise will be an offer in such cases if it can be shown that it was held out to the offeree as a ‘quid pro quo’ for returning the dog. The specified act amounts to acceptance only if it is given in response to the offer. If the act specified by the offer is performed in ignorance of it, or without advertence to it, it cannot constitute an acceptance. For example, a person who returns a dog in ignorance of a reward offer cannot claim the reward. 1.18  Offer. An offer is a promise to give a specified performance in exchange for another’s specified promise or performance. An offer may be made by words or conduct. It may be addressed to a specified individual or entity, or to a group, or to the world at large. There is no offer unless there is a promise: a proposed assumption of legal contractual obligation immediately upon acceptance by the party or parties to whom the offer is addressed. Hence, an offer must be distinguished from a mere statement of intention or other non-promissory conduct. 1.19  An invitation to treat is not an offer. The law distinguishes between offers and statements or conduct merely signifying a willingness to receive an offer. Such conduct is called an ‘invitation to treat’.50 The distinction is between conduct intended to initiate or facilitate negotiations, and conduct indicating a readiness to be bound upon acceptance.51 The circumstances must be considered in each case, but some generalisations are possible, for example: •

Price lists, quotations, advertisements and shop displays. These are generally not offers but invitations to treat.52

49. See 1.27. 50. See 3.18. 51. Although an invitation to treat cannot be ‘accepted’ so as to form a contract, it may give rise to liability under the Australian Consumer Law. For example, an advertisement that is only an invitation to treat may nevertheless attract statutory liability if it involves ‘misleading or deceptive conduct’ or ‘bait advertising’. 52. See 3.19–3.20. An advertisement that is not an offer may nevertheless generate statutory liability if it is misleading or deceptive under the Australian Consumer Law s 18. ‘Bait advertising’ is specifically proscribed by the Australian Consumer Law s 35.

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Overview of Contract Law

• •

•

•

1.20

Reward offers. These have been treated as contractual offers.53 Auctions. An advertisement of an auction is generally an invitation to treat and not an offer to hold it. Similarly, the auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer; rather, each bid is an offer that may be accepted or rejected by the auctioneer on the seller’s or buyer’s behalf.54 Tenders. A call for tenders is usually not an offer, but an invitation to treat. Rather, it is the tender that, if it contains the required promissory element, is the offer, and which may therefore be accepted or rejected by the caller of the tender.55 Standing offers. An arrangement to supply goods or services if and when required is usually regarded as a standing offer by the supplier that is separately accepted on each occasion on which the offeree places an order. On this basis the offer may be withdrawn at any time before an order is placed.56

1.20  Termination of offers. An offer does not remain open forever. It may be withdrawn before acceptance.57 If stated to be open for a specified period, it expires accordingly.58 If not expressly limited in duration, it expires at the end of what is a reasonable time in the circumstances.59 It expires on rejection by the offeree.60 It may expire on the death of the offeror or of the offeree.61 The traditional rule is that an offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. This applies even if the offeror has promised to keep the offer open for a stated period, unless the promise is recorded in a deed,62 or is given for good consideration and intended to have contractual force (called an option).63 However, the traditional rule that a non-contractual promise to keep an offer open is not binding must be reconsidered in the light of the modern doctrine of estoppel. An offeror who leads the offeree reasonably to assume that an offer will not be withdrawn for a given period may be compelled to comply with that assumption, if it would be unconscionable64 not to do so.65 The revocation of an offer is not effective until it has been communicated to the offeree.66 53. See 3.16, 3.40. 54. See 3.22–3.25, 3.35. 55. See 3.36–3.39. 56. See 3.38. 57. See 3.64, 3.71. 58. See 3.72. 59. See 3.72. 60. See 3.29–3.32. 61. See 3.73–3.74. 62. See 1.26. 63. See 3.67–3.70. 64. The withdrawal of an offer in such circumstances may also attract liability for misleading or unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. 65. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 66. See 3.65–3.66.

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1.20

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

However, an offer may become irrevocable once the offeree embarks on a course of conduct intended to culminate in its acceptance. Where the offer is to be accepted by the giving of a counter-promise (bilateral contract), or by the performance of a simple act (such as payment in cash, or execution of a document), no such issue will arise. But if the offer is to be accepted by acts of performance extending over time, the power to withdraw it may be lost or curtailed once the offeree embarks on that performance.67 1.21  Acceptance. An acceptance occurs when a party to whom the offer is addressed responds to it, by making the required counter-promise or by providing the performance specified in the offer, before it has expired.68 Where an exchange of promises is intended, a definite indication of assent to the offer amounts to an acceptance by counter-promise. If the offeree’s conduct indicates that the offer has been accepted, an express counter-promise is inferred.69 1.22  Communication of acceptance. Where the offer proposes a unilateral contract, that is, an acceptance by an actual performance rather than a counterpromise, it is usually inferred that no notice of acceptance need be given. Where the offer proposes a bilateral contract, that is, an exchange of promises, communication of acceptance is necessary unless it has been clearly dispensed with.70 In the absence of an indication to the contrary, the offeror will be taken to have promised to assume an obligation only upon being informed of an acceptance. A decision to accept an offer, even if communicated to third parties, is therefore normally not translated into an acceptance until its communication to the offeror. However, as noted, notice of acceptance may be dispensed with expressly or by inference. In such cases the contract is concluded by appropriate action on the part of the offeree, without communication. There is no absolute rule that silence cannot constitute acceptance. It is clear that the offeror cannot impose a contract on the offeree by stating that a failure to respond will amount to an acceptance. But the silence of the offeree in conjunction with other circumstances may indicate that the offer has been accepted.71 According to the only explicit statement in the High Court on the point, an acceptance by post is concluded only upon receipt of the letter, unless the offer or circumstances indicated otherwise.72 However, other Australian courts have approved the English rule that acceptance is normally effective on posting.73 But in the case of instantaneous modes of communication such as telegrams, telexes, facsimile transmissions, electronic communications and even telephone conversations, acceptance is normally effective only upon receipt.74 67. See 3.71. 68. See 3.26. 69. See 3.27. 70. See 3.43–3.45. 71. See 3.44. It should be noted, however, that ‘inertia selling’ (the practice of sending unordered goods to a person on terms that they will be taken to have been bought unless returned within a specified time) is an offence under consumer protection legislation, and may entitle the recipient to keep the goods without payment: Australian Consumer Law Pt 3-1 Div 2. 72. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Vic) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111–12; [1957] HCA 10 at [20] (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J). 73. See 3.58–3.62. 74. See 3.47–3.57.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.24

The use of electronic communications and the internet has been accommodated by the law of contract, assisted by electronic transactions legislation in each jurisdiction.75 1.23  The acceptance must conform to the offer. No acceptance occurs if the offeree, though purporting to accept, proposes terms additional to or different from those of the offer. The offeree is in such a case taken to have rejected the offer, and to have made a counter-offer.76 However, a mere request for further information, conveying no rejection or counter-proposal, must be distinguished from a counter-offer. Moreover, where an acceptance was clearly intended, the courts have shown some latitude in reconciling it with the offer. Thus, an inaccurate paraphrase of an offer does not amount to a counter-offer if there was a clear intention to be bound by its actual terms. If the offeror has stipulated a particular method or manner of acceptance, it must be adhered to. But the stipulation must be unequivocal. In the absence of mandatory language, the offeror’s reference to a particular method of acceptance may be treated as a statement of preference or recommendation only.77 1.24  Offer and acceptance may be inferred. In some cases the analysis of a transaction in terms of offer and acceptance is artificial. It has been rightly recognised that such an analysis is ‘not a comprehensive means of determining the existence of a concluded contract’.78 The court may therefore dispense with a formal demonstration of these elements. Adopting a ‘global’ approach, it will infer their presence if it is clear that the parties intended by their conduct to make a contract.79 Some problem situations include the following: Execution of documents. In the case of a contract to be concluded by parties executing a single document, the first signature must be regarded as the offer, the second as the acceptance. Exchange of documents. In transactions that are customarily concluded by an exchange of documents (for example, land transactions), the presumption (which may be rebutted) is that no contract is formed until the exchange occurs. Which party is the offeror and which the offeree, or at what precise point the exchange is effected, must depend on the circumstances.80 The law recognises a notional exchange, that is, where solicitors agree that exchange has occurred (for example, by email or telephone) even though no physical exchange has happened.81 Tickets. The formation of contracts involving the issue of a ticket or similar document containing terms has been variously analysed. The issue of a ticket may be an offer that is accepted by not rejecting the ticket in reasonable time. Whether

75. See 3.7, 3.48–3.57. 76. See 3.29–3.33. 77. See 3.46. 78. Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 195 (Ormiston J). 79. See 3.4, 3.5–3.7, 3.11. 80. See 3.10. 81. See 3.57.

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1.24

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

this analysis applies to tickets issued by vending machines is uncertain, at least where there is no opportunity to reject the ticket.82 Lengthy negotiations. It will often be difficult to identify offer and acceptance where the parties’ negotiations are lengthy, complex or ill-defined. While some decisions insist on identifying the precise moment at which an offer was made and an acceptance given, it may suffice to say that agreement has occurred at some time, that is, it can be inferred from the conduct of the parties.83 1.25  Impact of estoppel on offer and acceptance. The doctrine of estoppel may preclude a party who has induced another to assume that an offer was made, or that an acceptance was given, from departing from that assumption where it would be unconscionable to do so.84

Consideration 1.26  Good consideration.85 A contract is formed only if the promise or act of each party constitutes good consideration. To constitute good consideration, the promise or act relied on must be given in exchange for the other party’s promise or act, and must have ‘value’ in the eyes of the law.86 Consideration is not required for a promise recorded in a deed, that is, a formal document ‘signed, sealed and delivered’.87 1.27  Consideration requires exchange. As with offer and acceptance, consideration requires exchange. A promise or act cannot be good consideration unless given in exchange for the promise or act of the other party.88 This means that a past promise or act cannot be good consideration:89 ‘past consideration is no consideration’.90 So a promise to pay for goods or services made after they have been supplied lacks consideration and cannot be enforced as a contractual promise. However, this narrow view of exchange rests on old authority, and has long been subject to evasion. So a promise to pay for past services or goods already delivered can be interpreted91 as proof of an earlier implied promise to pay, or as enforceable on some other basis.92 1.28  Gift promises. An unconditional promise to make a gift (‘I will give you $1000 tomorrow’) is a promise not made in exchange for anything. Such a promise is not enforceable as a contract,93 unless it is recorded in a deed.94

82. See 3.4. 83. See 3.6, 3.11. 84. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 85. Consideration is discussed in Chapter 4. 86. See 1.27, 1.29. 87. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 88. See 4.5, 4.6. 89. See 4.19. 90. There is an exception to this rule: past consideration is sufficient to support a bill of exchange: Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 32. 91. The law of restitution may also apply to such situations: see Chapter 25. 92. See 4.20–4.23. 93. See 4.2. 94. Gift promises may be enforceable in equity in some circumstances.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.29

However, if the promise is conditional, for example, ‘I will give you $1000 if you come to Sydney’, the possibility that an exchange is intended arises, especially if fulfilment of the condition will benefit the promisor. If an exchange is intended, fulfilment of the condition in such a case supplies consideration for the promise, so that a contract is made if the other elements of formation are present. It is sometimes not easy to distinguish a conditional gift promise from an exchange. If a promise is made with the intention of giving a present or doing a favour, or by way of grace or charity, the fact that it is conditional does not make it contractual. So a promise to make a donation is not contractual just because it is conditional on being applied to a particular project or purpose but this would depend on whether the condition amounts to a benefit to the promisor.95 1.29  Consideration must be of value. The promise or performance given in exchange must have a value recognised by the law in order to amount to consideration.96 But although consideration must be of value, it need not be of equivalent value. The puzzling formula ‘consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate’ is intended to convey this point.97 It is generally said that the parties to a contract are free to make their own bargain, that is, to decide what value shall be attached to the undertaking of each. A promise or performance may therefore be a valid consideration even if it is objectively inadequate when compared with the counter-promise or counter-performance. A nominal consideration, such as a token payment of $1, will suffice if the parties clearly attached binding force to it (as in the case of an option for a nominal payment). Many examples exist of cases in which the court has ignored an obvious lack of, or disparity in, objective value of the parties’ respective undertakings.98 The notorious peppercorn concept captures this idea: the promise of a peppercorn is regarded as a good consideration. On the other hand, it has been held that consideration is lacking if a promise or performance has no objective value in the eyes of the law. Examples are: 1. an illusory promise;99 2. an invalid promise, such as one that is illegal; 3. a promise to perform, or the performance of, an already extant obligation.100 But this is subject to the qualification that such a promise or performance may be good consideration where it is of ‘practical benefit’ to the promisor;101 4. a promise to pay, or payment of, a lesser sum than is owed;102 and 5. a promise to forbear, or forbearance, from pursuing a claim or action that has no substance. However, the law recognises that the settlement of disputes without resort to litigation is of great practical importance, 95. See 4.13. 96. See 4.9–4.12. 97. See 4.10–4.12. 98. See 4.12. 99. See 1.36. 100. See 4.29–4.35. 101. See 4.35. 102. See 4.36–4.41.

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1.29

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

and usually recognises the binding force of agreements to compromise and settlements out of court.103 1.30  Impact of estoppel on consideration. In modern contract law the assertion by one party that a promise or performance by the other party is not good consideration is subject to the application of estoppel. If the promisee was induced by the promisor to assume that an exchange was intended, or that an act or promise given in exchange had value, it may be unconscionable for the promisor to depart from that assumption.104

Intention to create legal relations 1.31  Intention to create legal relations. The High Court has said: It is of the essence of contract, regarded as a class of obligation, that there is a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty.105

Of course, this statement misleads in one important respect. ‘Voluntariness’ in the assumption of a contractual obligation can hardly be regarded as the ‘essence’ of a contractual obligation given that a lack of voluntariness in fact usually does not prevent a contract from being formed according to the normal rules of contract formation.106 What is essential, however, is that the assumption of legal contractual obligation was intended by the party alleged to have assumed it, irrespective of whether that intention was ‘voluntarily’ produced.107 The intention of the parties is normally inferred objectively from their conduct.108 It would be misleading, therefore, to speak of a requirement of actual intention to create legal obligations. In most cases such an intention is inferred and goes without saying.109 1.32  Commercial agreements normally create legal obligation. In commercial agreements it is readily inferred that legal relations are intended. The court will, however, give effect to any expressed or implied intention not to create legal relations. If commercial parties stipulate that legal effect shall not attach to their agreement, this will be respected by the court.110 1.33  Social or domestic engagements may not be binding. Agreements made by relatives in the conduct of familial or household relations are not usually legally binding. However, if substantial effort and expenditure is incurred in some special transaction undertaken by relatives, contractual obligations may arise. If the parties’ transaction has a commercial setting, the fact that they are related may be irrelevant. Agreements made after the breakdown of a domestic or familial relationship may also be intended to be legally binding.111 103. See 4.24–4.28. 104. See Chapter 2, particularly at 2.8. 105. Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 at 457; [1954] HCA 20 at [33]. 106. For example, a contract procured under duress or undue influence is still ‘a contract’, although it may, owing to its unjustness, be avoided by the victim of the duress or undue influence. What this demonstrates is that ‘involuntariness’ in the assumption of a contractual commitment generally speaks to the ‘justice’ of a transaction rather than its formal validity. 107. Hence, even ‘compulsory’ contracts (entered into involuntarily) are ‘contracts’ nonetheless. 108. See 1.2. 109. See generally Chapter 5. 110. See 5.14–5.20. 111. See 5.4–5.9.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.36

The rules of unincorporated bodies such as clubs or political parties may be contractual in character.112 1.34  Undertakings by governments and instrumentalities. Relations with and among governments and government instrumentalities that might be considered contractual are extremely diverse in their character.113 On the one hand, there are agreements of a clearly commercial character, for example, those involving the supply of goods or services for payment. On the other hand, there are arrangements that are better understood as subject to political rather than legal sanction. This is true of inter-government relations, though there are some such agreements domestically that are intended to be contractual. An intention to assume legal contractual obligation may also be absent in relations directly involving private citizens. The cases exhibit a general disinclination of the courts to attribute contractual intent to government instrumentalities engaging in regulatory or redistributional activity. On the other hand, the High Court has said: A basic assumption of our law is that bargains are to be kept. This applies today to the contracts which the Crown makes with a subject as forcefully as it does to contracts between subject and subject.114

1.35  Agreements subject to execution of a document or other condition.115 Parties may stipulate that no obligation shall arise until the happening of a specified event. For example, their intention may be to postpone legal contractual obligation until execution of a document, particularly where the transaction is of a type normally effected by a formal contract, for example land transactions. In that event, no contract arises until all parties have executed it.116 1.36  Illusory promises. A promise to perform at one’s choice is illusory.117 A promise is a definite commitment to a future course of action, and an undertaking given in terms that make its performance a matter of discretion cannot therefore be regarded as a promise. So it has been said that ‘where words which by themselves constitute a promise are accompanied by words which show that the promisor is to have a discretion or option as to whether he will carry out that which purports to be the promise, the result is that there is no contract’.118 However, a promise is not illusory because it allows for a measure of discretion in its performance. In such cases the promisor is required to act honestly, or honestly and reasonably, or in good faith, in the exercise of the discretion. Where a party excludes all liability for failure to perform a promise, no contract may result. But clauses in contracts that exclude liability are not often construed as having this effect.119 112. See 5.10. 113. See 5.27–5.29; Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018). 114. Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 at 373; [1969] HCA 29 at [15]. 115. See 5.21–5.25. 116. The happening of a specified event may be regarded as a condition of performance rather than formation of the contract. In that event a contract has been made, but it is liable to be terminated if the condition is not fulfilled. See 1.113–1.114. 117. See 4.16–4.18. 118. Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597 at 605; [1964] HCA 41 at [11] (McTiernan J). 119. See 1.75.

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1.37

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.37  Impact of estoppel on intention. The modern doctrine of estoppel is clearly again relevant in the present context. A party who induces another party to assume that the creation of legal relations is intended may be estopped from denying that intention if it would be unconscionable to do so.120

Certainty of terms 1.38  Certainty of terms. There may be no contract if an important term has been omitted, or left to later agreement, or expressed in words of uncertain meaning. If these defects affect only inessential terms, the court may imply a missing term, or ignore or sever an uncertain term. But if the parties have failed to provide for, or articulate clearly, an important element of their transaction, the court may be left without an adequate basis of enforcement.121 The cases on uncertainty show a divergence of judicial responses. In some, when faced with the difficulty of an uncertain contract, the court has been strict to the point of dogmatism; in others, it has shown great latitude. It may be said, however, that the preponderant approach is to endeavour to make an imperfect contract work and hold the parties to it, notwithstanding uncertainty. This is particularly so if performance of the contract has been embarked on. There are numerous examples of judicial readiness to cure uncertainty; in particular: 1. Omissions. If an obligation has been omitted or insufficiently defined, the court will generally imply an agreement to do what is reasonable in the circumstances, drawing on what is usual or normal in such transactions, or on what may be fairly derived from the particular context. For instance, if no time for performance has been fixed, the court will normally imply a promise to perform within a reasonable time, and will, if necessary, stipulate what is a reasonable time in the case. However, the court is reluctant to supply what is missing if the term is one to which no convention or standard applies.122 So the price in a contract of sale will not be fixed by the court unless an established means of valuation (for example, market value) is applicable.123 The parties themselves may define performance by reference to what is reasonable, for example, by agreeing that the price paid shall be a reasonable price, or that stock is sold ‘at valuation’, or that one party shall do what the other reasonably requires. In some situations an ‘open’ contract may be made, omitting all details that can be supplied by law. It is settled that such a contract may be made for the sale of land.124 Logically an open contract should be acceptable whenever its subject-matter is ascertainable and the transaction is of a recognised type with well-established features. However, the concept cannot be applied if no clearly established model exists for the transaction in question.

120. See 1.9. Estoppel is discussed in Chapter 2. 121. Uncertainty is discussed in Chapter 6. 122. On implied terms generally, see 1.67–1.71. 123. See 6.6. 124. Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20 at 25; [1952] HCA 26 at [6].

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Overview of Contract Law

1.40

2. Deferred terms. Where terms have been left to be fixed by a third party, there is normally no objection to the conclusion that a contract has been made. If the third party fails to act, the court is prepared to settle the terms. The better view is that this also applies where terms have been left to be stipulated by one of the parties. A duty to act reasonably is usually implied in such a case. But where the parties have left an important term to their own future agreement, there may be merely an ‘agreement to agree’, falling short of contract.125 Nevertheless, agreements to negotiate have come to be regarded as at least potentially enforceable.126 3. Ambiguity or otherwise unclear language. The courts do not hold that no contract was made because words are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. ‘The court has the power to fix the meaning of any agreement, unless no external standard or test of its operation is provided.’127 The court has the power to supply, disregard or correct words in order to avoid absurdity or inconsistency.128 For example, if the parties obviously meant ‘consistent’ when they said ‘inconsistent’, the court may correct the error.129 If the parties have adopted a document in which they have not filled in blanks, or crossed out what is inapplicable, the court can resolve any ambiguity by choosing an appropriate construction. If a standard set of terms is incorporated by reference, and those terms are not fully consistent with the transaction between the parties, only those terms that are consistent with what has been expressly agreed are incorporated.130

The privity rule 1.39  Contracts cannot be enforced by or against third parties. In the absence of an assignment,131 a contract can only be enforced by or against anyone who is ‘privy’ to it, that is, a party. Persons who are not privy to a contract are referred to as ‘third parties’. Privity is discussed below132 and in Chapter 7. 1.40  Who is a party to a contract? In the leading case on the doctrine of privity of contract, Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd,133 three members of the High Court adopted the view that to enforce a contract a person must not only be a ‘party to the contract’, but must also be a ‘party to the consideration’.134 To utilise an example put forward in that case: 1. If A promises B to pay C $1000 if B will erect a gate for A, C cannot compel A to carry out the promise of $1000, as C was not a party to the contract between A and B. 2. If A promises B and C jointly to pay C $1000 if B will erect a gate for A, C still cannot compel A to pay, for C, though now a party to the promise, 125. See 6.8–6.11. 126. See 6.12–6.16. 127. York Air Conditioning v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 11 at 62; [1949] HCA 23 at [27] (Dixon J). 128. See 6.5–6.7, 10.34–10.35. 129. Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 at 426–7; [1956] HCA 53 at [4]. 130. See 10.27. 131. See 1.48. 132. See 1.46. 133. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 115–16, 164; [1988] HCA 44 at [15]–[16] (Mason CJ and Wilson J), [4] (Toohey J). 134. See 7.2–7.3.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

is still a ‘stranger to the consideration’. Here, ‘party to the consideration’ evidently means ‘participant in the performance’. It is implicit in this conception that the right to enforce a contract requires participation both in the formation of the contract and in its performance. C must at least assume a commitment to be contractually liable should B fail in his or her performance, that is, B and C are jointly liable to perform. Although the members of the court in Trident who adopted this view purported, in doing so, to give effect to the ‘weight of authority’, their approach is clearly inconsistent with an earlier decision of the High Court,135 in which it was held that, where A promises both B and C to confer a benefit on C in return for a consideration given by B, C can enforce the promise though not a party to the consideration, which is supplied by B on behalf of both B and C. This is arguably the better view. The notion that the right to enforce a contract requires not only inclusion in the promise but participation in the counter-performance unnecessarily restricts the right of contracting parties to make their own bargain. A promise made by A to B and C jointly for a consideration supplied by B should be enforceable by C. A different aspect of who the parties to a contract are is that it may not be clear who was intended to be a party. This is a matter of interpretation of the contract by ascertaining the intention of the parties.136 1.41  An inconvenient rule. The rule that third parties cannot enforce contracts sometimes causes inconvenience and injustice.137 Where parties to a contract clearly intend to confer a benefit on a third person, a strong case can often be made for allowing enforcement, particularly by a third party who has acted in reliance upon the expected performance of the contract. Even where tangible reliance is difficult to prove, it is often not easy to see why the beneficiary should not in conscience be entitled to enforce the contract. Other common law jurisdictions (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand) allow for third-party claims in some circumstances. 1.42  Statutory reform. Three jurisdictions, Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory, have each passed legislation conferring rights of enforcement on third parties, subject to restrictions: Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 11; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55; and Law of Property Act 2000 (NT).138 Under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), and state legislation relating to motor vehicle insurance, insurance policies may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries.139 1.43  The possibility of judicial reform. As long ago as 1969 a judge of the High Court, after referring to the abandonment of the privity requirement in the United States, expressed his view ‘that someday this court too … will see the way clear to take the same path’.140 The decision in Trident141 was thought to be a step 135. Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] HCA 3. 136. See 7.2. 137. See 7.1. 138. See 7.15–7.21. 139. See 7.22. 140. Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 393; [1969] HCA 3 at [23] (Windeyer J). 141. See 1.40.

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Overview of Contract Law

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in this direction. In that case a third party was permitted to enforce an entitlement under an insurance policy.142 However, the court was not then prepared to abandon privity as a general principle, one important reason being that a new rule structure would have to be put in place, as has happened under state and territory legislation: see 1.42. No subsequent cases have indicated abandonment. 1.44  The rule may be circumvented. The courts have found ways of conferring rights upon third parties notwithstanding their official adherence to the doctrine of privity of contract. These fall into either of two categories: (a) converting a third party into a contracting party; or (b) allowing enforcement of contractual rights by third parties through non-contractual mechanisms. Of the first category, the most important examples are: 1. Agency. Although A has ostensibly contracted with B, it may be possible to infer that C was B’s principal, and therefore that C, not B, is actually the contracting party. It must be remembered that the relation of principal and agent can arise not merely by express agreement but also by implication, estoppel or ratification,143 and that a contract may be made on behalf of an undisclosed principal.144 2. Joint parties.145 It may be possible to infer that A’s promise, though ostensibly made to B, was in fact made to B and C jointly.146 Of the second category, the most important examples are: 1. Trust. Where A has contracted with B to confer a benefit on C, B may sometimes be regarded as a trustee of A’s promise, and thus be compelled by C to seek enforcement of the contract. In Trident, the High Court went to some lengths to endorse the operation of the law of trusts in the present context.147 2. Commercial law (assignment, letters of credit, negotiable instruments, bills of lading, insurance).148 3. The law of property (covenants concerning land, other proprietary and possessory rights).149 Other potential means of circumventing the doctrine of privity are supplied by the law of torts and of restitution. In Trident, Gaudron J relied on the law of restitution. Some support for this approach was also expressed by Deane J. Restitutionary remedies have gained increasing recognition as a means of supplementing the rights of contracting parties.150 1.45  Enforcement by the promisee. It is axiomatic that a contract, though made for the benefit of a third party, may be enforced by the contracting parties themselves. 142. The case would now be covered by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48. 143. See 7.35–7.36. 144. By utilising the concept of agency the protection of terms limiting liability can be extended to third parties: see 1.76. 145. See 7.2. 146. But see the discussion of the meaning of ‘party’ in 1.40. 147. See 7.43–7.49. 148. See 7.22–7.25. 149. See 7.27–7.33. 150. See Chapter 25.

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1.45

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

However, the extent of damages available to the promisee may be limited.151 On the other hand, specific performance is particularly appropriate as a remedy for breach of a contract for the benefit of a third party.152 1.46  Contracts imposing liability on third parties. A and B cannot by contract between them impose a contractual obligation on X.153 However, a third party who claims the benefit of a contract may also have to accept its burdens.154 Moreover, contractual restrictions on the use of land or goods may bind a subsequent transferee, X.155 1.47  Impact of estoppel on privity requirement. It may be unconscionable for a contracting party to deny an obligation to a third party who reasonably assumed that he or she would have a right to enforce the contract. The modern doctrine of estoppel is therefore potentially of aid to third parties. In Trident, although estoppel was not pleaded, four members of the court expressly recognised the possibility that it might apply.156 The doctrine of estoppel must equally be potentially applicable where an obligation is sought to be imposed on a third party.157 1.48  Assignment of contract rights and liabilities. In many (but not all) situations a contracting party can assign the right to receive performance of the contract to a third party. An effective assignment confers on the third party the rights of the assignor.158 In some situations the assignment of an obligation to perform a contract is also possible. This must be done by a novation.159

Breach 1.49  What amounts to breach of contract? A breach of contract occurs when a party: • •

actually fails to perform the contract as agreed when performance falls due; or manifests unwillingness or inability to perform the contract as agreed.

Of course, in many cases, these two kinds of breaches overlap. A failure to perform is often also a manifestation of unwillingness or inability to perform. But not always. A party may fail to perform, though willing and able to do so. Conversely, a manifestation of unwillingness or inability may precede any failure to perform, if it occurs in advance of the time when performance is due. If A tells B that A will not or cannot deliver goods, or pay money to B, as and when required by their contract, 151. See 7.7. 152. See 7.8. 153. It is not clear whether the conception of ‘party’ put forward in Trident is intended to apply equally to claims of benefit and burden. 154. See 7.12. 155. See 7.27–7.31. 156. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123, 140, 145; [1988] HCA 44 at [32] (Mason CJ and Wilson J), [2] (Brennan J), [8] (Deane J). 157. See 7.3. 158. Assignment is discussed in Chapter 8. 159. See 8.46–8.48.

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Overview of Contract Law

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this is a breach even though delivery or payment is not yet due. As the time for performance has not yet arrived, such a breach is called an ‘anticipatory breach’.160 Unless a party fails or is unwilling or unable to perform at all, proof that a breach has occurred requires the identification of a specific term of the contract that has been breached. This is a matter of construction: see below. Performance means exact compliance with the contract. Anything short of such compliance is a breach. A performance that does not comply with the contract is a breach, even if it is as valuable, or more valuable, than the performance required by the contract. An inexact or partial performance is as much a breach as a failure to perform at all. There are no degrees of breach when the issue is whether a breach has occurred. However, rights arising from a breach may vary with the type or degree of breach. In particular, unless otherwise agreed, a right to terminate the contract arises only if there has been a serious breach.161 In addition, a right to damages may be ‘empty’ if the party claiming cannot prove loss arising from a breach. In such a case a court will award nominal damages.

Construction of Contracts 1.50  Construction of contracts. Contracts are about getting something done. A claim to enforce or to resist enforcement of a contract almost always depends on the ascertainment of at least some of the obligations contained in it. Whether a contract was made at all, with whom, whether a breach has occurred, whether the contract is valid or performance is excused, whether the contract has been or can be terminated, whether a particular remedy is available — all these issues depend at least to some extent on the actual or putative obligational content (what is required to be done) in the contract in question. The process of ascertaining this content may be referred to as ‘construing’ or ‘interpreting’ the contract, so as to arrive at its ‘construction’, which is ultimately about ascertaining what the parties intended. A court’s job is, so far as possible, to give effect to the intention of the parties as embodied in the contract. Construing a contract involves consideration of a number of issues: 1. Admissible evidence. If the contract has been recorded in writing, evidence of unrecorded terms may be inadmissible.162 2. Actual terms. The actual or express terms (written or oral) of the contract are those that the parties actually agreed to incorporate in it. The law provides criteria for determining whether a term has been incorporated, and how it should be interpreted if there are ambiguities in its expression.163 3. Implied terms. In addition to the actual terms of a contract, the law recognises the existence of terms implied in it. These are of three kinds: universal terms, generic terms and specific terms.164 160. See Chapter 9. 161. See 1.120. 162. See 1.51–1.58. 163. See 1.59–1.66. 164. See 1.67–1.71.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

4. Terms limiting liability. Terms that exclude or limit a party’s liability under a contract have been singled out for special treatment by the courts.165 5. Unconscionability plays a role in the construction of contracts.166 The content of a contract is fixed at the time of its formation. But the parties are always free to amend or ‘vary’ their contract.167 The principles of construction are discussed in Chapter 10. Although modern Australian courts have on the whole retreated from the literalism and legalism characteristic of an earlier phase in the development of contract doctrine, they have adhered to an explicitly objective approach to the construction of contracts, particularly of written contracts. Both in determining what terms have been incorporated in a contract, and in interpreting those terms, the construction exercise involves ascertaining not the subjective intention or assumptions of the parties, but rather what a reasonable person in their situation would have understood or assumed.168

Admissibility of evidence 1.51  Evidence of matters not included in a document may be inadmissible. Where there is a written record of the contract, the so-called parol evidence rule aims to exclude evidence that subtracts from, adds to, varies or contradicts the language of the document. The purpose of the rule is to provide certainty and finality in formal (written) contractual dealings. The rule excludes both oral and written evidence extrinsic to a document intended to record the whole contract. It affects both the incorporation and (to a lesser extent) the interpretation of such documents. As a matter of common sense, a document adopted by the parties as a record of their contract deserves in general to be preferred to other evidence at variance with it. Cases nevertheless occur in which such a document does not reflect the agreement of the parties. A number of ‘exceptions’169 to the parol evidence rule have been admitted to cater for such cases.170 1.52  Evidence is admissible where a document is only a partial record of the contract. Evidence of terms agreed to in addition to those recorded in a contract document is admissible if the document was intended only to be a partial or provisional record of the contract. Where the document obviously does not record the whole contract, as in the case of receipts, tickets, invoices and other documents that manifestly constitute only a partial record of the contract, there is no objection to admitting evidence of further terms. But even if a document is ostensibly a complete record of a contract, the court may conclude that in reality it is not. The fact that the document itself states, as many commercial contracts do, that it is the final and entire record of the parties’ agreement (the entire agreement clause) is not necessarily conclusive.171 165. See 1.72–1.76. 166. See 1.77. 167. See 1.127. 168. See 10.1. 169. These are less ‘exceptions’ than situations where the parol evidence rule simply is not triggered, or is inapplicable given its scope and purposes. 170. Admissibility of evidence is considered in 10.3–10.16. 171. See 10.5, 10.7.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.53  Evidence of a collateral contract is admissible. Evidence of a prior contract, collateral to the contract recorded in a document, is admissible. An undertaking given prior to the execution of a contract document constitutes a collateral contract if it was given in consideration of the other party’s entry into the contract recorded in the document. However, the following points should be noted: 1. Statements, written or oral, that are relied on as constituting a collateral contract must be clearly promissory in nature. The distinction between promissory and non-promissory statements is discussed below.172 2. The undertaking relied on must not be one that would be expected to be incorporated in the principal contract. The attempt to divide what is clearly one transaction between the parties into two contracts is often artificial. 3. The undertaking relied on must not be inconsistent with the principal contract. However, this rule is problematic and must be reconsidered in the light of the modern doctrine of estoppel, which provides a possible means of circumventing it.173 1.54  Evidence is admissible in support of rectification or estoppel. Where a mistake has been made in recording the agreement reached by the parties, either party may apply to the court to have the document ‘rectified’ to express their common intention.174 To establish the error, extrinsic evidence must be admitted.175 Estoppel may also be relied on in some cases to circumvent the parol evidence rule.176 1.55  Evidence that a document is inoperative or contingent is admissible. Evidence of an unrecorded agreement that a document should not operate until after the occurrence of a stipulated event is admissible.177 1.56  Evidence of subsequent variation is admissible. It is axiomatic that the parties are always free to add to, subtract from, or otherwise alter the terms of their contract, by further agreement.178 Evidence of such a variation is always admissible.179 1.57  Extrinsic evidence and interpretation. There have been many judicial statements seeking to define what evidence may be admitted where the meaning of the language of a document is in doubt, and not all of these statements can easily be reconciled.180 Two principal requirements have traditionally been applied by the authorities: (1) the language of the document must be ambiguous; and (2) the extrinsic evidence must be of objective background, not merely of subjective unilateral intention.

172. See 1.60. 173. See further 10.3. 174. See 12.30. 175. See 10.8. 176. See 10.3. 177. See 10.9. 178. See 22.1. 179. See 10.10. 180. See 10.11–10.14.

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1.57

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

However, recent judgments have arguably abandoned the first, though adhering firmly to the second, of these requirements.181 This move remains controversial. Evidence of conduct subsequent to formation of the contract is regarded in some (though not all) courts as inadmissible on the question of interpretation of a document, on the basis that the relevant intention is at the time of contract formation and that a party may opportunistically adjust its conduct so as to give veracity to a meaning not intended at the time when the contract was made. But not all subsequent conduct is necessarily tainted in this way.182 There is no objection to evidence of subsequent conduct on the interpretation of a variation of a contract document.183 1.58  Evidence in aid of implication.184 Extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a term should be implied, subject to the same limits that apply to evidence on interpretation. The High Court has rejected the view that an implied term can only be inferred from the express terms of the document.185

Actual terms 1.59  Actual terms depend on intention. The actual terms of a contract are those that the parties objectively intended to include in it.186 They comprise the terms expressed by the parties, as well as terms that it must be inferred they intended even though they were not expressed.187 1.60  Pre-contractual statements. Contracting parties are frequently in dispute about the binding nature of statements made prior to the execution of a contract document. As explained above, evidence of such statements is not admissible unless the document is only a partial record of the contract, or the statements constitute a collateral contract (leaving aside a claim of rectification or estoppel). In neither case, however, are such statements binding unless they constitute a promise. The law distinguishes between promissory statements and non-promissory statements (often called representations or mere representations). A non-promissory statement may give rise to other forms of legal liability (for example, if it is fraudulent or negligent, or involves misleading conduct),188 but not to liability for breach of contract. To constitute a promise a statement need not be subjectively intended as such. If a statement was reasonably understood by the other party as a promise, it is promissory whether this was actually intended or not. The form of a statement must have a bearing on whether it should be regarded as promissory. But the legal conception of promise encompasses statements that are not in promissory form. Hence, statements of condition, description, intention,

181. See 10.12–10.13. 182. See 10.16. 183. See 1.128. 184. See 10.15. 185. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337; [1982] HCA 24. 186. See 10.17. 187. See 10.18. 188. See 1.79ff.

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Overview of Contract Law

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opinion or prognosis may be terms of a contract if they are implicitly promissory in themselves, or in combination with explicitly promissory statements.189 1.61  Inducement not enough. The fact that a statement was intended or likely to induce, or in fact induced, a party to make the contract does not suffice to make it a term of the contract. But the evidential burden may be on the party who made such a statement to displace the inference that it was promissory.190 1.62  Signed documents. Signature of a contractual document normally indicates the adoption of its entire content, read and unread, so long as the signatory knows or ought to know that the document contains contractual terms, there is no vitiating or invalidating element, and no identifiable basis for legal, equitable or statutory relief.191 Notwithstanding such ameliorating factors, High Court decisions demonstrate a strong commitment to the objective enforcement of signed contract documents. The ‘signature rule’ provides a barrier to the inclusion of pre-contractual terms. This barrier is additional to, and independent of, the parol evidence rule, although apparently subject to the same exceptions.192 1.63  Terms incorporated by reference or notice. Contract documents executed by the parties may incorporate the terms of some other document, for example, the terms of standard forms produced by legal and other professional bodies. Standard forms adopted in this way apply only to the extent to which they are consistent with the parties’ agreement.193 Moreover, terms that significantly add to or alter the effect of the incorporating document may require more than a generalised reference.194 Unsigned documents containing terms, such as tickets, may also be incorporated in a contract if reasonable notice has been given of them.195 Such documents may also be incorporated on the basis of prior dealing.196 1.64  Objective interpretation of express terms. There are no strict rules for the interpretation of the text of a contract. Since the variety of contracts is unlimited, it is idle to expect the court to fetter itself by adherence to strict rules of interpretation. In most cases the ascertainment of meaning is a pragmatic process conducted without explicit resort to any such rules.197 The traditional rule precluding the consideration of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of written contracts has been abandoned by some courts in recent times, as discussed in 1.57. The court fixes the ‘objective’ meaning of the contract, that is, the meaning that it is reasonable to infer from the words and conduct of the parties, and the parties are bound by the objective meaning so ascertained. The objective approach can be taken to extremes. For example, the objective meaning may prevail even if both parties agree on a different meaning.198 189. See 10.21–10.22, 10.24–10.25. 190. See 10.23. 191. The same applies to an ‘I agree’ button on the internet. See 3.51. 192. See 10.26. 193. See 10.27. 194. See 10.68. 195. See 10.28. 196. See 10.29. 197. See 10.30. 198. See 10.31.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

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1.65  Ambiguity resolved by reference to context. Most disputes over the interpretation of a contract arise because the words of a contract are patently or latently ambiguous. The court resolves such ambiguity by considering: 1. the factual context of the transaction, including its genesis and aim, and the shared assumptions of the parties; and 2. the verbal context of the words, giving due weight to other terms of the contract, including recitals and headings.199 In at least some contexts, where a term purports to limit or exclude liability or to shift risk to the other party, the court may resolve ambiguity by construing a term contra proferentem, that is, against the party by whom or in whose interest it was included.200 The court also considers the consequences of adopting a particular interpretation. If more than one meaning is open, an interpretation that avoids capricious, unreasonable, uncommercial, inconvenient or unjust consequences will be preferred.201 1.66  Plain or literal meaning not applied if this leads to absurdity. In line with the objective approach, where the parties have used language that has a plain, literal, natural or ordinary meaning, this is usually applied notwithstanding the consequences. However, modern courts have modified the rigour of this position. ‘There is more to the construction of the words of written instruments than merely assigning to them their plain and ordinary meaning.’202 This proposition applies with even greater force to oral contracts. The court may therefore decline to apply a literal meaning where this leads to a wholly irrational or absurd result.203

Implied terms 1.67  The role of implied terms. The content of a contract is not limited to the terms actually adopted by the parties, but includes terms implied by the courts to fill gaps and to regulate the performance and enforcement of contracts.204 These ‘hidden’ terms are enforceable in the same way as express terms. Statutory terms are also implied in many contracts, for example, in the supply of goods and services, sales and leases of land, contracts of insurance and partnership. Such terms are beyond the scope of this book — specialist texts must be consulted. Three different kinds of implied terms can be distinguished. They are: •

obligations implied in all contracts, for example, the obligations of cooperation and (arguably) of good faith. These can be called universal terms;205

199. See 10.32. 200. See 10.33. 201. See 10.34. 202. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 348; [1982] HCA 24 at [12] (Mason J). 203. See 10.35. 204. See 10.36. 205. See 10.41–10.49.

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Overview of Contract Law

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•

1.70

obligations implied in particular classes or types of contract, for example, the duty of reasonable care in contracts for professional services. These can be called generic terms;206 obligations implied in a specific contract. These are obligations implied ad hoc in the particular contract made by the parties. They can be called specific terms.207

The courts imply terms, at least generic and specific terms, only to the extent to which this is consistent with the actual terms of the contract.208 1.68  Universal term of co-operation. The following formula has been adopted by Australian courts: It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other to have the benefit of the contract.209

It follows that each party must not merely comply with the letter of the contract, but must also act so as to protect the other party’s interests where it is necessary and reasonable to do so. The duty to co-operate also acts as a restraint on the exercise of contractual rights and powers, for example, the right to terminate a contract.210 1.69  Universal term of good faith? Australian courts were for long reluctant to impose any duty to act in good faith on contracting parties, other than fiduciaries. However, in a series of more recent cases, a duty of good faith and fair dealing in performing and enforcing contracts has been implied notwithstanding the absence of any fiduciary relationship. But the universality of such an implication has not yet been established in Australian law. On the authorities as they stand, the implication in a contract of a duty of good faith must be justified on a generic basis, or by the criteria of implication of specific terms: see below. The reluctance shown by Australian courts to treat good faith as a term implied in all contracts is at odds with the approach of most of the world’s major legal systems, in which good faith is a mandatory standard of conduct for contracting parties.211 1.70  Generic terms. Whenever a contract can be said to belong to a class, the law implies in it any terms that are inherent in that class. Generic terms are implied to protect the enjoyment of rights normally conferred by contracts of the class in question. Many classes of contracts, and the terms implied in them, are well established. A tenant is entitled to ‘quiet enjoyment’; a client of a professional person is entitled to expect a professional standard of care; and a tenderer to government is entitled to expect that the government will consider tenders fairly and diligently. But the classes of contracts are not closed.212 Generic terms include obligations implied by custom in a particular trade or industry.213 206. See 10.50–10.54. 207. See 10.55–10.61. 208. See 10.37. 209. Drawn from Butt v M’Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 at 70–1. 210. See 10.41–10.42. 211. See 10.43–10.47. 212. See 10.50–10.53. 213. See 10.54.

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1.71

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.71  Specific terms. Specific terms are implied because they are necessary to give a particular contract its intended operation or ‘business efficacy’. The conditions that must be satisfied for the implication of such terms have been laid down as follows (they may overlap): (1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’; (4) it must be capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract.214

Each of these criteria must be satisfied. If one criterion cannot be satisfied, the argument for an ad hoc specific implied term will fail.

Terms limiting or shifting liability 1.72  Limiting terms subject to special scrutiny. Terms expressly limiting or excluding the liability of a party for breach of contract or other actionable conduct, often referred to as exclusion, exception or exemption clauses or disclaimers, or by other names,215 appear in many contracts and take many forms. (Limiting terms may also be implied in some situations.216) These types of terms are about managing foreseeable risks of failure or adverse events. Unless prohibited by statute, as, for example, in the supply of goods and services to consumers under the Australian Consumer Law, such terms are not invalid. The High Court has specifically rejected any notion that liability cannot be curtailed for serious breaches of contract.217 It is debatable whether limiting terms are subject to special rules of incorporation and interpretation that are different from the usual rules of construction. However, limiting terms have traditionally been singled out for special scrutiny by the courts. 1.73  Onus. The onus of showing that a limiting term applies is on the party relying on it, who must show that: • •

it was incorporated as a term of the contract; and it applies as a matter of construction to the liability or loss in issue.218

1.74  Incorporation of limiting terms must be strictly proved. A party seeking to rely on a provision limiting liability bears the onus of establishing its inclusion as a term of the contract. Signature of a document that includes such a term is conclusive so long as the signatory should have been aware of the contractual nature of the document.219 In non-signature (‘ticket’) cases, reasonable notice of the limiting term must have been given before the contract was concluded.220 A history of prior dealing between the parties may be relevant in this respect.221 214. BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20 at 26; 16 ALR 363 at 365. The operation of these criteria is discussed in 10.55–10.61. 215. An indemnity clause is a ‘reverse’ exclusion clause whereby a loss is shifted from one party to the other. 216. See 10.65. 217. See 10.64. 218. See 10.66. 219. See 10.69. 220. See 10.70–10.71. 221. See 10.72.

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Overview of Contract Law

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1.75  Interpretation of limiting terms. Traditionally, limiting terms have been construed strictly or narrowly, and, in cases of ambiguity, against the party relying on such a term (‘contra proferentem’). However, this approach is no longer applied mechanically. In the leading modern case Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd,222 the High Court held that the meaning of a limiting term: … is to be determined by construing the clause according to its natural and ordinary meaning, read in the light of the contract as a whole, thereby giving due weight to the context in which the clause appears including the nature and object of the contract, and, where appropriate, construing the clause contra proferentem in case of ambiguity. [emphasis added]

Nevertheless, this passage shows that it will still be appropriate in some cases to interpret an ambiguous clause contra proferentem so as to confine its operation. It is sometimes very difficult to predict when a court will apply a strict test. The courts also still refer to other traditional principles that require the interpretation of limiting terms in conformity with the main object of a contract, and preclude their application to acts not authorised by the contract, or to its deliberate breach.223 1.76  Protection of third parties. A party may be protected by a limiting term in a contract ostensibly made between other parties. In Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd,224 the Privy Council, reversing a majority in the High Court,225 and in disregard of previous Australian authority, held that a stevedore could rely on an appropriately drafted clause in a contract of carriage made between the consignor and consignee of the goods. The doctrine of privity of contract was circumvented by utilisation of the concept of agency to construct a separate contract between the stevedore and the consignee.226 The effect of this decision was that an exempting provision (covering loss of or damage to goods) travelled with the goods on their journey.

Unconscionability and construction 1.77  Unconscionability in the construction of contracts. It is clear that asserting a particular construction of a contract may in some circumstances constitute unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce within the meaning of s 20 or s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law. There are also traces of equitable relief against the unconscionable construction of a contract.227 However, the primary medium by which unconscionability is brought to bear on the determination of the obligational content of a contract is estoppel, which has had a strong impact on the construction of written contracts. It provides a potential means of circumventing obstacles to the incorporation of pre-contractual terms, posed by the parol evidence rule, the rule requiring consistency of collateral contracts and the binding force of signature. Estoppel can also affect the interpretation of a written contract. Two forms of 222. Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500 at 510; [1986] HCA 82 at [16]; approved in Nissho Iwai Australia Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp, Berhad (1989) 167 CLR 219 at 227; [1989] HCA 32 at [12]. 223. See 10.74–10.77. 224. (1980) 144 CLR 300. See 7.38. 225. (1978) 139 CLR 231. 226. The High Court has since reaffirmed this use of the principle of agency: Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; [2004] HCA 52 at [79]. See further 7.37–7.42. 227. See 10.2.

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estoppel, promissory estoppel (equity) and estoppel by convention (common law), have been utilised in this regard.228

Excuses 1.78  Duty to perform a contract can be excused. The obligation to perform a contract is not absolute. The law excuses parties from performance on a variety of grounds. A party may be excused from performance of a contract if: • •

• • • • •

the party made the contract as a result of misrepresentation or misleading conduct by the other party;229 the party made the contract as a result of a serious mistake about its content or subject-matter, the identity of the other party or some other significant factor;230 the party made the contract as a result of duress or undue influence by the other party;231 the party made the contract as a result of unconscionable dealing (taking unfair advantage of impaired judgement or volition) by the other party;232 written evidence of the contract is required by statute and is lacking;233 the party lacked legal capacity to make a contract;234 or making or performing the contract is illegal.235

Performance of a contract is also excused if the contract has been validly terminated. Termination can occur in a variety of ways, and is discussed below.236 Except in cases of illegality (which the court may raise of its own motion), a party entitled to invoke an excuse may choose whether to rescind (cancel) the contract or not. A party who has a right to rescind but does not exercise it may lose the right by affirming the contract, or be estopped from exercising it, or for some other reason.237

Misrepresentation and Misleading Conduct 1.79  Misrepresentation and misleading conduct. Under judge-made (common) law, a party who has made a contract, in reliance on a false belief induced by statements or other conduct of the other party (misrepresentation), may have the right to rescind (cancel) the contract for misrepresentation, that is, to treat it as invalid from the outset (ab initio). This is true whether the statement or conduct was made fraudulently or innocently. In addition, a right to damages may be generated 228. See 1.9 and 10.3. Estoppel in general is discussed in Chapter 2. 229. See 1.79–1.88. 230. See 1.89. 231. See 1.90. 232. See 1.91. 233. See 1.92–1.96. 234. See 1.97–1.99. 235. See 1.100–1.104. 236. See 1.105ff. 237. See 1.84.

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Overview of Contract Law

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by a misrepresentation, stemming from tort or statute.238 The rules governing misrepresentation are of judicial origin but have been modified by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia.239 Relief in the nature of rescission or other remedies can also be obtained if a contract was induced by misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.240 However, statutory misleading conduct applies only to conduct ‘in trade or commerce’, so that non-commercial transactions are covered only by the law of misrepresentation. Statutory misleading conduct has assumed great importance in Australian commerce.241 ‘Trade or commerce’ covers a wide compass including consumer purchasing, advertising and business-to-business transactions.242 The law of misrepresentation and misleading conduct is fully described in Chapter 11. 1.80  Scope of misrepresentation. Both statements and conduct (including silence or non-disclosure) can constitute misrepresentation. But not every falsehood amounts to an actionable misrepresentation. The common law distinguishes between representations of present or past fact, on the one hand, and other representations, such as representations of law, opinion, intention or prediction, on the other. In principle only the former, if false, count as misrepresentations. However, the distinction between false statements of fact and other false representations may be difficult to discern and cannot be applied in an unnuanced fashion.243 The law also distinguishes between representations and promises, but this is again subject to qualification.244 These distinctions do not apply to statutory misleading conduct where the inquiry is simpler: did A mislead B? 1.81  Misrepresentation must have induced contract. A misrepresentation gives rise to a right of rescission only if it induced the making of the contract. Although it need not have been the sole inducement, it cannot be relied on if the contract would have been made in any event.245 1.82  Right to rescind.246 Misrepresentation excuses the misled party from performance of the contract in the sense that the law confers a right to ‘rescind’, that is, cancel the contract. The right is elective; a contract induced by misrepresentation is not ‘void’, only ‘voidable’. The representee may affirm and carry on with the contract if this is preferred. Rescission, if opted for, cancels the contract from its beginning (‘ab initio’). A court may order partial rescission in an appropriate case. 1.83  Bars to rescission. Since rescission for misrepresentation results in cancellation of the contract from the beginning, it must be possible to restore the parties, at

238. See 1.89. 239. See 11.64, 11.68, 11.70, 11.72–11.73, 11.92–11.100. 240. See 1.86. 241. See 11.104. 242. See 11.111–11.112. 243. See 11.9–11.29. 244. See 1.60, 11.2–11.3, 11.69–11.71. 245. See 11.31–11.42. 246. See 11.43–11.60.

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least substantially, to their pre-contractual situation (‘restitutio in integrum’).247 As contracts have often gone some way forward before a misrepresentation is discovered or relied upon, the application of this principle can cause difficulty. The right to rescind for innocent (non-fraudulent) misrepresentation is additionally limited by the so-called rule in Seddon’s case, which bars rescission if the contract has been ‘executed’ on both sides.248 The rule has been abolished by legislation in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, and modified or qualified in other jurisdictions.249 Doubts also exist about the availability of rescission for innocent misrepresentation in the sale of goods, owing to infelicitous drafting of the relevant legislation.250 1.84  Right to rescind may be lost. In addition to the bars to rescission just discussed, if the right to rescind is not exercised promptly, it may be lost. The right is lost by any conduct indicating affirmation of the contract. It can also be lost by any other conduct suggesting that it will not be exercised.251 In such cases the court may rule that the right was waived, or that the party is estopped from exercising it. Affirmation, waiver and estoppel apply also to the right to terminate a contract that was validly formed.252 1.85  Right to rescind for misrepresentation may be excluded by the contract. A contract that provides that a party has not been induced by any representation may preclude that party from exercising a right to rescind the contract for an innocent (though not for a fraudulent) misrepresentation.253 However, by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia such a provision is ineffective if it is unreasonable in the circumstances.254 By contrast, the exclusion of remedies for statutory misleading conduct by such provisions has been rejected by the courts.255 1.86  Misleading conduct.256 Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law prohibits ‘conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive’ in ‘trade or commerce’. The legislation applies to all persons, corporations and other entities, although its application to governments and their instrumentalities is limited.257 The Law also contains other and more specific prohibitions of false or misleading conduct relating to the supply of goods and services, the transfer of interests in land, offers of employment, of investment, or of participation in business activities, and other matters.258 247. See 11.53–11.60. 248. It is not clear whether ‘executed’ bears its ordinary meaning of ‘signed’ or means ‘fully performed’: see 11.62. 249. See 11.61–11.64. 250. See 11.66. 251. See 11.47–11.52. 252. See 1.117, 1.123–1.124. The law distinguishes between rescission of a contract (based on and resulting in its invalidity ab initio) and termination of a contract (based on events that have occurred after its formation, and resulting in its prospective but not retrospective cessation): see 21.9. 253. See 11.42, 11.73. 254. See 11.73. 255. See 1.87. 256. For an overview, see 11.104. 257. See 11.107–11.110. 258. See 11.102. Misleading conduct in the supply of financial services is separately covered by mirror provisions in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).

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‘Misleading conduct’ is a broader concept than ‘misrepresentation’. Fault is not required to establish misleading conduct. The legislation establishes a broad potential liability for all forms of misrepresentation, including innocent misrepresentation. Section 18 has transformed the law of misrepresentation in commercial contexts. It extends not only to conduct that amounts to misrepresentation, but also to conduct that would not be actionable as such. In particular, conduct engaged in after the contract was made can qualify as a ground for relief under the Australian Consumer Law. Indeed, s 18 is not confined to contract situations, but applies generally to conduct in trade and commerce, for example advertising.259 However, it does not apply to private transactions not coming within the words ‘trade or commerce’, such as selling a household item on eBay. 1.87  Relief from enforcement of contracts on the ground of misleading conduct. Contravention of the statutory misleading conduct provisions entitles a court, on application, to ‘make such order or orders as it thinks appropriate’ in favour of a party who ‘has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss by’ the conduct in question. It follows that a contracting party relying on misleading conduct as a ground for relief against the enforcement of a contract must show that its enforcement would result in ‘loss’ attributable to the conduct in question.260 ‘Loss’ has been widely interpreted. The right to relief under the statute cannot be excluded by the contract.261 The court is expressly empowered to declare a contract void, wholly or in part, ab initio or from any other date, to vary a contract or to refuse enforcement of it. No power to rescind is conferred directly on the victim, as under the common law doctrine of misrepresentation. The statutory remedies are not subject to the bars to rescission that are a part of the judge-made doctrine of misrepresentation. However, the powers of the court under the legislation are discretionary, and the exercise of that discretion can be affected by factors analogous to those that apply in the law of misrepresentation. So conduct affirming a contract, or the inability to make restitution, may be taken into account by the court in deciding whether, or to what extent, a contract affected by misleading conduct should be enforced or excused. 1.88  Damages for misrepresentation and misleading conduct. In contract law a sharp distinction is made between ‘misrepresentation’ and ‘breach of contract’. A misrepresentation that induces a contract is by hypothesis pre-contractual. So it cannot be a launching pad for a claim to damages for breach of contract, or for specific performance, or for other contractual remedies or relief.262 However, a misrepresentation may attract liability as a tort if it is fraudulent or negligent.263 The tests for fraud are stringent (although recklessness may count as fraud). Negligence requires a demonstration that a duty to take reasonable care arose and was breached. 259. See 11.111–11.123. 260. See 11.124–11.147. 261. However, it is always open to a representor to make sure that what is said or done is not misleading or deceptive by qualifying statements or other conduct: see 11.150. 262. However, a discretionary remedy of damages is provided by misrepresentation legislation in South Australia and the ACT: see 11.92–11.100. 263. See 11.75–11.91.

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Similarly, misleading conduct under the Australian Consumer Law generates an independent statutory right to sue for damages (and other relief).264 The right is conferred on persons and entities who suffer loss as a result of misleading conduct in trade or commerce. Where there are two or more defendants to a claim for misleading conduct a court may apportion the obligation to pay damages under a principle called ‘proportionate liability’.265 It is still unclear to what extent contractual promises are included within the ambit of the statute. It can be argued that the statutory liability encompasses at least some cases of breach of contract.266 In part this is the result of s 4 of the Australian Consumer Law, which provides that ‘a representation with respect to any future matter’ is taken to be misleading if there are no reasonable grounds for making it.

Mistake 1.89  Effect of mistake. A party who has entered into a contract as a result of a serious mistake about the then existing state of affairs may be excused from its performance. (Mistakes about the future are dealt with by the doctrine of frustration.)267 A contracting party must clearly assume the risk of a misapprehension or misjudgment of the existing situation to some extent. The problem lies in formulating the criteria by which legally inoperative mistakes can be distinguished from operative mistakes. In attempting to provide such criteria, courts distinguish between: • •

unilateral, mutual and common mistakes; and mistakes as to subject-matter, terms and identity of parties.

There is a heavy onus on a party attempting to argue mistake. The cases are rare where the attempt succeeds. Distinct principles have been devised to cope with mistakes about the content of documents. A party who signs or otherwise adopts a document under a radical misapprehension about its effect may be entitled to plead ‘non est factum’ (it is not my deed),268 thereby escaping liability under it.269 Alternatively, a party may be entitled to apply for ‘rectification’ of the document, to make it conform to the actual agreement of the parties.270 Both principles are subject to stringent restrictions. The ambit of relief based on mistake has given rise to controversy, particularly as to what types of mistake are serious enough to trigger relief and whether an operative mistake makes a contract ‘void’ or ‘voidable’. In Taylor v Johnson,271 the High Court seemed to indicate that a party should have the right to rescind a contract on the basis of a mistake that makes enforcement of the contract unconscionable in the

264. See 11.102, 11.146. 265. See 11.130–11.145. 266. See 11.118. 267. See 1.107–1.111. 268. The doctrine covers forgery where it is true to say ‘it is not my deed’ but also circumstances where a person has signed under a serious misapprehension about what is being signed. 269. See 12.64–12.70. 270. See 12.30–12.43, 12.53–12.54. 271. (1983) 151 CLR 422; [1983] HCA 5.

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circumstances.272 However, the law has not developed to this level of simplicity, but remains in a historically conditioned state of complexity, described in Chapter 12.

Duress and Undue Influence 1.90  Effect of duress and undue influence. A party who enters into a contract as a result of duress (see Chapter 13) or undue influence (see Chapter 14) by another party has the right to rescind and may refuse to perform it. Duress traditionally means violence or the threat of damage to person or property in support of a demand (in this context to enter into a contract or a contract variation or release). However, in modern times ‘economic duress’, that is, illegitimate commercial pressure inducing a contract or contract modification, has been established as a (not easily defined) category of duress. Undue influence means ‘unfair persuasion’ or taking unfair advantage of a special position of dominance or ascendancy in a relationship between the parties (for example, parent–child, doctor–patient, solicitor–client), or (more infrequently) in a particular situation between intimates or where a close relationship has developed. More recently it has been described simply in terms of a will that has been substantially impaired by the presence of personal influence to such a degree that it cannot be said that the affected party’s decision to enter into the contract was ‘independent and voluntary’.

Unconscionable Dealing and Unconscionable Conduct 1.91  Unconscionable dealing in equity and statutory unconscionable conduct. These are grounds for rescinding and excusing a party from performance of a contract, and have already been described.273

Informality 1.92  Informality (lack of writing). The courts have never required that a contract must be in writing in order to be enforceable. However, legislation has been passed in all states and territories preventing the court enforcement of some contracts unless there is evidence in writing or, in some cases, the contract itself is in writing. In addition to legislation based on the English Statute of Frauds,274 various transactions, such as loans, sales of motor vehicles, tenancy agreements, contracts of insurance, bills of exchange and building contracts, can be affected by such provisions (usually rendering the contract unenforceable by court order). The law deriving from the Statute of Frauds is discussed in Chapter 16. The myriad other statutory provisions, mostly consumer protection legislation, are not covered. 272. See 12.3. 273. See 1.10, 1.12. 274. See 1.93.

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1.93  Statute of Frauds legislation. The longest-standing legislation is that derived from the English Statute of Frauds of 1677, which now applies uniformly only to contracts disposing of interests in land. Other contracts, including guarantees, are still affected in some jurisdictions.275 On the whole (though not with perfect consistency) the courts have shown some reluctance to excuse a contracting party from performance on the basis of this legislation because it provides a fortuitous and unmeritorious defence to that party. Non-compliance can be relied on only if it is expressly pleaded, and has not been waived. Non-compliance results in a contract that is not void or voidable but, rather, unenforceable by a court. Legislation derived from the Statute of Frauds requires a signed ‘note or memorandum’ of the contract in question. The courts have accepted as sufficient even casual documents, such as letters, notices, invoices or minutes, which may if necessary be joined together to constitute a sufficient note or memorandum of a contract. The requirement of signature has also been loosely interpreted so as to include other forms of endorsement or acknowledgment, not necessarily handwritten. 1.94  Part performance may suffice. The courts have long imposed an overriding qualification on the operation of the statute known as ‘the doctrine of part performance’.276 According to that doctrine, a party who has embarked on performance of a contract required to be evidenced by writing and signature may be able to compel its performance by the other party even if the contract is not evidenced by writing and signature. 1.95  Impact of estoppel and constructive trust. It has also been held that a party can be estopped from invoking the statutory defence if the other party justifiably relied on the assumption that an enforceable contract was made.277 Additionally, the equitable doctrine of constructive trust has been invoked to evade harsh consequences of the legislation.278 These efforts of the courts to contain the effect of Statute of Frauds provisions are clearly prompted by the realisation that it can be unconscionable to rely on the absence of formalities as an excuse from performance. 1.96  Effect of non-compliance. Even if a contract is unenforceable because of lack of writing, it is not necessarily wholly inoperative; for example, it may validly transfer title to money or property.279 Moreover, a party may be able to claim the value of any performance actually given under the law of restitution for unjust enrichment.280

Incapacity 1.97  Incapacity. Not all persons or entities have the capacity to make a binding contract. Incapacity is discussed in Chapter 17. The most important categories of persons who may be excused from liability under a contract because of lack of capacity include: 275. See table at 16.7. 276. See 16.57–16.66. 277. See 16.67–16.71. 278. See 16.72–16.76. 279. See 16.52. 280. See 16.53–16.55; see also Chapter 25.

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Overview of Contract Law

• •

1.100

minors (persons under the age of 18); and persons suffering from a mental disability.

A drunk person may also lack capacity.281 The contractual incapacity of married women that once existed under the common law has been abolished by statute in all Australian jurisdictions, though a tiny residue survives in some states.282 Governments undoubtedly have the capacity to make contracts, but this capacity is subject to special rules.283 Corporations and unincorporated associations may also lack capacity to make contracts in some circumstances.284 1.98  Minors. At common law, a contract made by a minor (now a person under the age of 18) was in general voidable at his or her option, except for beneficial contracts of service and contracts for the supply of necessaries, such as food, shelter and education. This principle has been modified by differing legislation in all Australian jurisdictions.285 1.99  Mental disability. A person who can show that he or she was at the time of making a contract incapable of understanding its essential terms is excused from performing the contract if the other party was, or ought to have been, aware of the incapacity.286 Drunkenness is thought to be subject to the same rule. (The excuses already discussed, mistake, duress, undue influence and unconscionable dealing, as well as statutory misleading and unconscionable conduct, may also be available to a person suffering from mental incapacity or intoxication.)

Illegality and Public Policy 1.100  Illegality. A party may be excused from performance of a contract because its formation or performance is illegal or contrary to public policy.287 The law is described in Chapter 18. The matter is not left in the hands of the parties. If from any material before the court it appears that a claim is tainted by illegality, the court may raise the issue of its own motion.288 Strictly, a contract can be called illegal only to the extent to which it involves a breach of the law. But the courts have gone further by refusing to enforce contracts that are against ‘public policy’. In most such cases an actual or prospective breach of the law is involved, but not in all. 281. See 17.56. 282. See 17.58–17.66. 283. See 17.74. 284. See 17.67–17.73. 285. See 17.4–17.52. 286. See 17.53–17.55. 287. Although this is expressed as a type of ‘excuse’, the principle behind it is that the courts will not enforce such contracts. 288. See 18.3.

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1.101  Statutory illegality. A contract that is expressly prohibited by statute is clearly illegal. But even if there is no express prohibition, a contract that involves or is linked to conduct prohibited by statute may be prohibited by implication. For example, where a statute requires a licence to carry out a specified activity, it may be implied that a contract to engage in that activity without a licence is prohibited. Whether a statute impliedly prohibits contracts is a matter of statutory interpretation.289 1.102  Public policy. As noted, the courts have also relied on ‘public policy’ as a ground for refusing enforcement of a contract.290 Although ‘public policy’ cannot be exhaustively defined, and may change over time, there are recognised ‘heads’ of public policy that affect contracts: • • • • • • • • • •

involving unlawful conduct;291 prejudicial to the status of marriage;292 involving sexual immorality;293 defrauding the revenue;294 prejudicing the impartiality of public officials;295 fettering public duties or powers;296 prejudicial to national or international security;297 prejudicial to the administration of justice;298 excluding the jurisdiction of the courts;299 and in unreasonable restraint of trade.300

Where a contract involves conduct that is prohibited by statute, the court may refuse to enforce the contract on the basis of public policy even if the statute itself neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits any contract.301 1.103  Severance of illegal part of a contract. Illegality may affect the contract in part only, in which case the court may sever the illegal portion and enforce the rest.302 1.104  Effect of illegality and public policy. The word most commonly used by the courts to describe the legal status of a contract that is unlawful or contrary to public policy is ‘void’. However, the effect of illegality on a contract cannot be encapsulated in a single word. The main points are: 1. Illegality affects a contract only to the extent to which it cannot be severed: see above. 289. See 18.6–18.13. 290. See 18.14–18.15. 291. See 18.18–18.25. 292. See 18.26. 293. See 18.27. 294. See 18.28. 295. See 18.29. 296. See 18.30. 297. See 18.31. 298. See 18.32–18.33. 299. See 18.34. 300. See 18.35–18.38. 301. See 18.19–18.20. 302. See 18.38, 18.41–18.42.

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2. An illegal contract or term of a contract is prima facie enforceable by neither party, but an exception may be made in favour of the more innocent party where the parties are not equally at fault (in pari delicto).303 3. Claims based on negligence, fraud, misleading conduct or other actionable wrongs may be allowed notwithstanding that the transaction between the parties involved an illegal contract.304 4. Rights of ownership and possession of land and goods may be effectively transferred under an illegal contract.305 The law of restitution may require the return of money paid or compensation for benefits conferred under an illegal contract.306

Termination of Contracts 1.105  Termination of contracts generally. A contract can be terminated by: • • • •

operation of law as a result of a frustrating event;307 termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance;308 termination for breach;309 or termination by consent or at will.310

Frustration brings a contract to an end automatically. Termination for nonfulfilment of a contingent condition is not necessarily automatic unless this has been unequivocally agreed. Similarly, a breach does not terminate the contract of itself, but may confer a right of termination on an injured party; the contract does not come to an end unless that right is validly exercised. A right to terminate a contract can be both a shield and a weapon. A party may claim to terminate a contract in order to resist its enforcement by the other party. In such cases a valid termination of the contract excuses its performance. But a valid termination can also provide the basis for a claim to damages311 or restitution.312 1.106  Effect of termination. Termination of a contract means that performance of outstanding obligations is excused. Termination of a contract does not absolve the parties from liability for any breach that has already occurred. Termination of a contract therefore does not deprive a party from suing for damages or other remedy for such a breach. Termination of a contract is different from rescission for misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable dealing, which operates retrospectively, so that liability under the contract is avoided from the beginning.313 303. See 18.43. 304. See 18.44. 305. See 18.45. 306. See 18.46–18.49. 307. See 1.107–1.111. 308. See 1.112–1.118. 309. See 1.119–1.125. 310. See 1.126–1.127. 311. See 1.135. 312. See Chapter 25. 313. See 1.82, 1.84.

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Termination of the contract may also generate restitutionary rights to the return of money or property, or to an award of money representing the value of benefits conferred prior to termination.314

Frustration 1.107  Automatic termination by frustration. The law recognises that events not provided for in the contract may affect its performance so adversely as to bring it to an end. The contract has then been ‘frustrated’.315 Frustration occurs only when the course of events brings about a situation that is radically different from that contemplated by the parties at the time when the contract was made. To excuse performance of a contract merely because events have made its performance unexpectedly difficult or even impossible would be to strike at the institution of contract itself.316 ‘Prima facie a promisor takes the risk of an event happening which prevents him from performing his promise.’317 Whether there is a radical difference between the actual situation and that contemplated obviously involves a difficult judgment of degree.318 Frustration of a contract implies an alteration of the contractual situation that is not merely of a passing nature. Events that cause a delay in performance do not result in frustration until it becomes clear, on the balance of probabilities, that only a performance radically different from that originally contemplated is possible. However, a party is entitled not to be left in indefinite suspense, especially where resources are tied up that might be used elsewhere.319 1.108  Examples of frustration. It would be misleading to suggest that the doctrine of frustration is applied according to any rigid classification of events. However, certain situations provide recurrent examples of frustrating events: • • • • •

state intervention, including compulsory acquisition;320 physical destruction;321 death or incapacitation;322 non-occurrence of an expected event;323 or war.324

1.109  Assumption of risk bars reliance on frustration. A party who has expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of the event in question cannot rely on frustration. The assumption of at least ‘normal’ risks is implied in most contracts. Failure to make

314. See 1.111, Chapter 25. 315. See Chapter 19. 316. See 19.4. 317. Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 169 at 200; [1943] HCA 43 at [7] (Latham CJ). 318. See 19.5. 319. See 19.5. 320. See 19.15–19.16. 321. See 19.17. 322. See 19.18. 323. See 19.19. 324. See 19.20.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.113

provision in the contract for risks that are, or ought to be, known to exist may imply their assumption.325 1.110  A party cannot rely on self-induced frustration. A state of facts brought about by the act or election of a party cannot be relied on by that party as frustrating the contract. The onus of proving that frustration was self-induced usually rests on the party raising the allegation.326 1.111  Effect of frustration. Termination by frustration is not a matter of choice or election by the parties. Frustration terminates the contract automatically by operation of law. Notwithstanding this, the right to rely on frustration may be lost by conduct indicating that it will not be exercised.327 Traditionally, the effect of frustration was to excuse the parties from further performance, and no more. The parties were entitled to retain the benefit of any performance already given before the frustrating event. But this principle can favour one party at the expense of the other. Money may have been paid in advance for a performance that, after frustration, need no longer be given; conversely, a performance may have been given in advance of a payment that need no longer be made. The law of restitution has been applied to achieve a more flexible operation of the doctrine of frustration.328 In Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, legislation now governs the effect of frustration. Although the Acts differ, their general effect is to allow the court to adjust the position of the parties after frustration to prevent unfairness, so that money already paid under a frustrated contract may be recoverable, and performance already rendered may be compensable. The application of the legislation may be excluded by the parties. Certain contracts are specifically excluded from it, notably contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, most charterparties and contracts of insurance.329

Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition 1.112  Termination for non-fulfilment of contingent condition. The obligation to perform a contract may be conditional on the happening of a contingency that neither party has promised will happen: a common example is a contract of sale that is ‘subject to finance’. Another is a contract that is ‘subject to planning approval’. Such a condition is a contingent condition of performance. The law dealing with such conditions is described in Chapter 20. 1.113  Contingent conditions of performance distinguished from contingent conditions of formation. Situations in which there is no contract at all until some contingency occurs, for example, the execution of a document,330 must be distinguished from those considered here, in which a contract has come into existence 325. See 19.21–19.22. 326. See 19.23. 327. See 19.24. 328. See 19.26–19.30. 329. See 19.31–19.42. 330. See 5.21–5.25.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.113

but is liable to termination if a specified event occurs or does not occur. In such cases some obligations may have to be performed before the outcome is known.331 Contingent conditions are, if possible, treated as conditions of performance rather than of formation, especially if the parties have settled all the terms of their transaction.332 1.114  Promissory conditions distinguished. Contingent conditions of performance must be distinguished from promissory conditions, that is, the essential promises of the contracting parties, breach of which justifies termination by the innocent party.333 Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition is not, as such, a breach of contract.334 1.115  Termination may be automatic or elective. Non-fulfilment of a contingent condition can result in automatic termination of a contract where the parties have unequivocally agreed that this shall be the case. Otherwise, the contract remains in operation until a party elects to terminate it. In many cases, therefore, the contract continues on foot, notwithstanding non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance, until one of the parties exercises the right to terminate.335 However, the right to terminate may in such cases be exercised immediately upon non-fulfilment of the condition: no prior notice is required.336 1.116  Termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition is subject to restrictions. The terminating party may be precluded from relying on non-fulfilment as a basis for termination on a number of grounds relating to conduct and the course of events both before and after non-fulfilment: • • • • •

where the enforcing party waived the condition: see 1.117; where the terminating party prevented or dispensed with its fulfilment;337 where the terminating party affirmed the contract, waived the right to terminate or is estopped from terminating;338 where the terminating party breached an obligation of co-operation (see 1.118) or of good faith;339 or where termination is unconscionable in equity or under legislation.340

Waiver by the enforcing party (waiver of the benefit of a condition) is a restriction peculiar to termination for non-fulfilment of a contingent condition of performance. All the other grounds listed above apply also to termination for breach: see 1.122–1.124. The two grounds most often invoked in relation to contingent conditions are briefly described below.

331. See 20.3. 332. See 20.3–20.4. 333. See 20.1. 334. See 20.2. 335. See 20.8. 336. See 20.9. 337. See 20.14. 338. See 20.15. 339. See 20.17. 340. See 20.18–20.19.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.120

1.117  Waiver of benefit of condition. In some cases, a party can waive the requirement that a condition be fulfilled so as to prevent the other party from relying on its nonfulfilment as a basis for termination (‘waiver of the benefit of a condition’). A party can ‘waive the benefit’ of a condition in this way only if the condition is primarily for his or her benefit. It is not entirely clear how one-sided a condition must be to fall within the ambit of this principle.341 1.118  Implied duty to co-operate. Where a contract is subject to a contingent condition, the duty to co-operate implied in all contracts342 normally imposes on each party the duty to do what is reasonably necessary to enable fulfilment of the condition. So, a contract of sale made ‘subject to finance’ normally implies that the buyer will do what is reasonably necessary to obtain finance. ‘Subject to planning approval’ imports an obligation to provide the necessary documents to the planning body. Nearly every contingent condition can therefore be said to have a ‘promissory element’ or to imply a promise. If its non-fulfilment is due to a party’s obstruction or failure to do what is reasonably necessary, there is not only a breach of contract, but the party is also disqualified from relying on non-fulfilment of the condition as a ground of termination. In such cases, as it is sometimes put, the condition is treated as satisfied.343

Termination for breach 1.119  Termination for breach. A party may be entitled to terminate a contract because of breach by the other party.344 Termination carries a risk, as discussed below, because it is the most drastic action that can be taken under a contract. A right of termination arises if the other party has breached the contract and: 1. the contract itself provides for a right of termination for the breach in question; or 2. the breach is sufficiently serious in law to justify termination. Unless otherwise agreed, a contractual right to terminate for breach does not preclude the existence of a concurrent right conferred by law.345 The parties may validly stipulate that any breach at all, major or minor, shall entitle the other party to terminate the contract. However, the law exercises some control over contractual rights to terminate. They will be construed, if possible, so as to avoid unreasonable consequences.346 Moreover, unless otherwise agreed, such rights are subject to the same restrictions that apply to rights conferred by law.347 1.120  Right to terminate conferred by law. A right to terminate is conferred by law only for a serious breach of the contract. A precipitate termination may therefore backfire, since a wrongful termination (that is, the breach was not sufficiently serious) is not only ineffective but also entitles the other party to terminate the 341. See 20.13. 342. See 1.68. 343. See 20.16. 344. The law on this topic is considered in Chapter 21. 345. See 21.3. 346. See 21.4. 347. See 21.6.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.120

contract (wrongful termination is itself a serious breach) and to sue for damages.348 Termination is therefore risky because it is not always easy to assess whether it will be found to be legally justified, that is, whether the breach was sufficiently serious. There are many cases in the law reports of backfiring terminations. Further, a court is inclined to examine closely the conduct of a party purporting to terminate. The courts have failed to devise a wholly uniform approach in defining the kind of breach that justifies termination. However, the weight of authority favours a tripartite classification of such breaches:349 • • •

Repudiation. This is breach consisting of the manifestation of unwillingness or inability to perform the contract at all or in substance.350 Breach of essential term or condition. This is breach consisting of failure to perform a term designated as essential by the contract or by the law.351 Breach of intermediate term causing substantial loss of benefit. This is breach of a term that is not necessarily essential but its breach has the effect of substantially depriving the injured party of the benefit of the contract.352

It is clear that these categories of breach may overlap in their application.353 Breach of an essential term and breach of an intermediate term causing substantial loss by definition involve an actual breach of the contract in the sense of a failure to perform when performance is due. However, unwillingness or inability to perform may be manifested before any performance is due under a contract. When this happens the case is one of anticipatory breach. If such a breach is serious enough to constitute repudiation, the innocent party may terminate the contract forthwith, before performance falls due.354 1.121  Notice of termination required. A breach that justifies termination does not of itself terminate the contract. The innocent party may elect to terminate or keep the contract on foot, at least where this is feasible and reasonable, and reserve the right to damages or other appropriate remedy for the breach.355 The contract remains in operation until the innocent party elects to terminate it. An election to terminate a contract requires notice, and is not effective until communicated. A notice is not ineffective, despite being based on an invalid ground, as long as termination is justified on some other valid ground.356 1.122  Restrictions on exercise of a right to terminate for breach. Even where a right to terminate for breach has arisen, its exercise is subject to a number of restrictions: • •

where the terminating party was not ready and willing to perform: see 1.123; where performance was prevented or dispensed with by the terminating party;357

348. See 21.12. 349. See 21.11. 350. See 21.12–21.15, 21.20. 351. See 21.16–21.19. 352. See 21.21–21.22. 353. See 21.11. 354. See 21.13. 355. See 21.10. 356. See 21.24. 357. See 21.27.

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Overview of Contract Law

• • • • •

1.125

where the terminating party has elected to affirm the contract, waived the right to terminate, or is estopped from terminating: see 1.124; where termination breaches implied obligations of co-operation or good faith;358 where termination is unconscionable in equity;359 where termination would cause an unjust forfeiture of property;360 or where termination is unconscionable conduct under legislation.361

Subject to two qualifications, these restrictions apply also to the exercise of a right to terminate for non-fulfilment of contingent conditions of performance: see 1.116. The two qualifications relate to the requirement of readiness and willingness, which may not apply to contingent conditions,362 and to relief against forfeiture of a proprietary right, which again may not apply to such conditions.363 1.123  Readiness and willingness to perform. A party itself unable or unwilling to perform a contract has no right to terminate for breach by the other party, even if that breach would otherwise justify termination. Where a contract provides for contemporaneous or concurrent performance by the parties, each party must demonstrate its readiness and willingness to perform by tendering performance. To establish readiness and willingness, the terminating party must show both intention and ability to perform when performance was due. But the law does not require absolute readiness and willingness to perform the contract in every detail. A party need only be ready and willing to perform the contract in substance. Inability or unwillingness to perform, or breach of, an inessential term does not preclude termination for breach by the other party.364 1.124  The right to terminate may be lost by affirmation, waiver or estoppel. Conduct following breach that conveys to the other party that a right to terminate will not be exercised may result in the loss of that right by affirmation, waiver and/or estoppel. It is impossible to maintain distinct roles for these concepts without some artificiality.365 1.125  Effect of termination for breach. An election to terminate for breach puts an end to the contract from the time of its communication. Both parties are released from all further performance of the contract. However, the contract is treated as valid up to the moment of termination, so that terms that are intended to operate in the event of breach (for example, terms limiting liability or the right to a remedy for the breach) may be relied on. Similarly, rights that unconditionally accrued before the breach may be enforced.366 358. See 21.33–21.34. 359. See 21.35. 360. See 21.36. 361. See 21.37. 362. See 20.11. 363. See 20.12. 364. See 21.26. 365. See 21.28–21.32. See Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 655; [1974] HCA 40 at [22] (Mason J): ‘[T]he appellants were precluded from exercising the right of rescission. It is perhaps not of much importance whether one ascribes this result to … election, waiver or estoppel’. 366. See 21.38.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.126

Termination by consent or at will 1.126  A contract may be terminated by consent. As a contract is created by consent, it can also be undone by consent: see Chapter 22. Termination by consent may be accomplished by: • • • •

a further contract between the parties;367 conduct amounting to abandonment of the contract;368 estoppel or waiver;369 or relinquishing the right to sue for breach.370

Many contracts contain terms that expressly confer a unilateral right on a party to terminate at its will or for convenience. By virtue of their incorporation in a contract such rights, though unilateral, must be regarded as rooted in the agreement or consent of the parties. In that sense they constitute a form of termination by consent. A right to terminate at will may be implied as well as expressed. So a contract of indefinite duration — for example, a contract of employment — may imply a right of termination at will by reasonable notice. The ambit and operation of a right to terminate at will is determined by the usual rules of construction. Even a term that confers a wholly discretionary right to terminate the contract may thus be subject to at least residual requirements of co-operation and good faith.371 1.127  Termination and variation. The termination of a contract by consent must be distinguished from its variation. If a contract has been terminated, it need no longer be performed. But if it has been varied, an obligation to perform subsists, though in modified form. A variation may terminate the previous contract and replace it with a new contract, or it may alter the previous contract without affecting its existence. This may be a matter of degree: if the variation is so inconsistent with the original contract as to destroy its substance, termination will be inferred.372 To establish a variation of a contract it is normally necessary to show that a further contract was made between the parties by which their existing contract was modified. Thus, a unilateral variation is ineffective unless the original contract provided for it (for example, a bank altering the interest rate in a loan contract). But a party may be estopped from denying a variation. Waiver has also been invoked as a vehicle of variation.373

Remedies 1.128  Limitation of actions. Under limitation of actions legislation in all states and the Australian Capital Territory, an action for breach of contract must be brought within 367. See 22.7. 368. See 22.9. 369. See 22.11. 370. See 22.11. 371. See 22.12. 372. See 22.5. 373. See 22.3, 22.6.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.131

six years from the date on which it occurred. The period is three years in the Northern Territory. The period is also six years for actions under the Australian Consumer Law.374 1.129  Remedies for breach of contract. The orders that can be obtained from a court upon proof by a party of a breach of contract may be referred to as courtordered remedies.375 As stressed in 1.2, entitlement to a remedy is an essential element of a successful claim for breach of contract. A claimant who fails to obtain a remedy goes away as empty-handed as if no obligation or breach had been proved. The standard remedies for breach of contract are: • •

damages; and orders compelling performance (specific performance and injunction).

An award of damages is a sum of money that the court orders to be paid by the contract-breaker to the claimant. Any breach of contract, no matter how insignificant, entitles a party to damages. However, compensation for loss caused by the breach is awarded only if the rules governing entitlement to, and assessment of, damages are satisfied.376 If a claimant fails to prove these elements, a court will award nominal damages (for example, $1).377 An award of damages is the principal remedy for breach of contract. Actual performance of a contract can be compelled by an order of ‘specific performance’ (or in some cases an ‘injunction’). Such orders are ultimately within the discretion of the court, and there are rules governing this discretion that result in these remedies being exceptional.378 Other remedies are also available in respect of a contract that has miscarried in some way, including restitutionary remedies379 and declaratory orders that determine the rights and obligations of the parties without awarding compensation or compelling performance.380 1.130  Remedies in cases of estoppel. Where no contract was actually made, but a party is nevertheless estopped from denying contractual obligation because of reliance on a mistaken assumption that a contract had been or would be made, the court normally aims to prevent or cure the detriment arising from that reliance. A court may award remedies enforcing a promise, or making good a representation.381 In addition, an estoppel can operate ‘within’ a contract to provide a remedy or, in some cases, deny the right to enforce a remedy.382 1.131  Non-contractual remedies. Breach of contract is not the only potential source of liability in a contract transaction. As already explained,383 many contract 374. The limitation of actions is considered in Chapter 25. 375. The word ‘remedies’ is sometimes used more broadly to include self-help remedies such as rescission for misrepresentation or termination for breach. Another self-help remedy is an agreed damages clause: see 1.140. 376. See 1.132–1.140. 377. See 23.1. 378. See 1.141–1.143. 379. See 16.53–16.55, 23.9, Chapter 26. 380. See 24.28. 381. See 2.9. 382. See 2.31. 383. See 1.3.

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1.131

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

transactions contain elements that may attract other forms of liability, for example, in tort; under the Australian Consumer Law; in equity; in restitution; and in debt. Remedies available for such contract-related causes of actions differ in range and kind from contractual remedies. They are mentioned at appropriate points throughout this book.384

Damages for breach of contract 1.132  Damages for breach of contract. The most common remedy for breach of contract is an award of damages, that is, an order to pay an amount of money. The rules governing damages for breach of contract are complex, and it is no easy task to state them coherently. Many judges have acknowledged that the decision whether and what damages should be awarded is to some extent a pragmatic one, governed by guidelines rather than rules.385 Apart from nominal damages,386 damages for breach of contract are awarded to compensate for loss caused by the breach. Punitive, exemplary or other noncompensatory damages are not awarded for breach of contract.387 Compensatory damages are awarded if: • • •

•

a compensable and measurable loss has been incurred;388 the loss was caused by the breach;389 the loss was not ‘too remote’, that is, it was a ‘natural’ result of the breach or ‘in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract’;390 and the loss could not have been prevented by reasonable effort to mitigate it.391

1.133  Expectation damages. Damages for breach of contract are awarded with the object of placing the injured party, so far as money can do it, in the same situation as if the contract had been performed. The law sets out to measure the difference between the position that would have been created by full performance of the contract and the position that has actually been created by the breach. If the value of the hypothetical position is greater than that of the actual position, a loss has been suffered. Damages are awarded to cover that loss. Such damages protect the expectation that a contract will be performed, and are commonly described as expectation damages. In assessing the difference in value between the actual and the hypothetical position, the law takes account of all benefits, direct and indirect, that would have flowed from full performance of the contract. The law also takes into account extra cost or injury incurred as a result of the breach. However, the law sets off 384. In particular, the difference between contract damages and damages in tort and under the Australian Consumer Law is dealt with in 11.82–11.86, 11.124–11.147 and 23.8–23.9. Restitution and debt are examined in Chapter 26. 385. The law of contract damages is described in Chapter 23. 386. See 23.1. 387. See 23.2. 388. See 23.6–23.30. 389. See 23.34–23.38. 390. See 23.39–23.40. 391. See 23.38–23.41.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.135

against lost benefits and extra cost the value of any benefits obtained prior to, or notwithstanding, the breach.392 1.134  Recognised kinds of loss. Although in principle contract damages cover any loss incurred as a result of the breach, there are well-recognised categories of compensable loss. So, damages may be recovered for: •

• • • • • •

expenditure and liability incurred in preparation for or in the course of performance of the contract.393 Two qualifications apply: –– Costs can be recovered only to the extent to which they are wasted as a result of the breach. So, if an asset was acquired that can be resold or used to generate income, the cost of its acquisition can be recovered only to the extent to which it exceeds the present value of the asset. –– Costs can be recovered only to the extent to which they would have been recouped had the contract been fully performed. If performance would have resulted in a loss, damages are reduced accordingly. But in a commercial contract, the onus of proving that expenditure or liability reasonably incurred would not have been recouped is on the contract-breaker; loss of profit;394 loss of chance or opportunity;395 loss of use of money;396 personal injury;397 mental distress and loss of reputation;398 cost of rectification or replacement.399

1.135  Effect of termination of contract. In principle, loss caused by a breach of contract is compensable whether the contract is terminated for the breach or not. Where the breach is not such as to entitle the other party to terminate, any loss that results from it is nevertheless compensable. Where the breach does entitle the other party to terminate the contract, termination is a prerequisite to any damages at all while there is only an anticipatory breach.400 Termination, whether for actual or anticipatory breach, is a prerequisite of ‘loss of bargain’ damages, awarded for the full value of the performance lost by termination, including all benefits that would have been gained if the contract had not been terminated.401 Such damages can, however, only be claimed upon exercising a right to terminate for breach conferred by law (see 1.120), not merely a right to termination conferred by the contract, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.402 392. See 23.6–23.10. 393. See 23.11–23.12. 394. See 23.13. 395. See 23.14–23.16. 396. See 23.17. 397. See 23.18. 398. See 23.19. This head of damages is limited to certain types of contracts. 399. See 23.27. 400. See 23.21. 401. See 23.22. 402. See 23.23.

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1.136

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.136  Valuation of loss. In putting a money value on benefits that have been lost the court will adopt their market value, if any, as the basis of its assessment. However, it is not always appropriate or possible to do this. For example, it may be appropriate to award the cost of rectifying a defective performance even where this exceeds the market value gained by such rectification. So, where a builder erects a house in breach of contract specifications, the proprietor may be entitled to the cost of rebuilding the house to specifications, even if the house as actually built has a market value and the cost of rectification exceeds that value.403 If there was an identifiable chance that the loss in question would have happened anyway, independently of the breach, damages are discounted accordingly.404 1.137  Only loss caused by the breach is recoverable. The onus of establishing the causal link generally lies on the claimant. However, the court sometimes infers that the loss was caused by the breach in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In contract law, the question of whether loss was caused by breach is decided by applying common sense and policy rather than strict logic or science.405 The law accepts that events may be due to multiple causes; it is only necessary for the breach in question to be one of them.406 At the same time, the law also accepts that the causal link between breach and loss can be severed by an intervening cause.407 It is also possible in those types of contracts involving the exercise of professional care for the damages to be reduced because the claimant contributed to the claimed loss by his or her own fault.408 1.138  Loss that is too remote is not recoverable. The application of this criterion is determined by reference to the so-called rule in Hadley v Baxendale.409 Two branches or limbs of the rule recognise two separate grounds for holding that a loss is not too remote. The first is that a reasonable person would have realised that such a loss was likely to occur as a usual consequence of such a breach. The second is that the defendant should have realised that such a loss was likely to occur on the basis of actual knowledge of the particular circumstances. In either case it is reasonable for the plaintiff to suppose, in the absence of contrary agreement, that the defendant accepted the risk of the loss in question.410 1.139  Mitigation. Loss is not recoverable to the extent that it could have been mitigated (reduced) by reasonable effort of the claimant. The cost of mitigation may be claimed. The party in breach has the onus of establishing failure to mitigate.411 In general, an unjustifiable failure to obtain a substitute performance from another readily available source is a failure to mitigate. A substitute performance may have to be accepted in mitigation of loss even if offered by the party in breach.412 403. See 23.27. 404. See 23.28–23.29. 405. See 23.34–23.36. 406. See 23.37. 407. See 23.38. 408. See 23.30. 409. (1854) 9 Exch 341 at 354; 156 ER 145 at 151. 410. See 23.39–23.40. 411. See 23.41. 412. See 23.42.

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Overview of Contract Law

1.143

But the injured party is obliged to take only such steps as are reasonable, and need not resort to measures that are costly, complex or extravagant.413 1.140  Agreed damages. The parties to a contract may stipulate what damages shall be payable for a breach (‘liquidated damages’). However, the law exercises some control over such stipulations. Terms that overcompensate the injured party may be considered to be ‘penalties’.414 The clause must be unconscionable, extravagant or out of all proportion to the foreseeable harm for it to be characterised as a penalty. If it is so characterised, then it is effectively severed from the contract, and the claimant must resort to common law damages.

Specific Performance and Injunction 1.141  Orders compelling performance. A court may make an order of specific performance, that is, an order requiring a party to perform the contract (as nearly as possible) in accordance with its terms. The court may also issue an injunction. An injunction is usually an order that a party refrain from acts that would constitute breach of contract, but it can also be a positive order that a particular term be carried out. Such orders are here referred to as ‘orders compelling performance’.415 1.142  Orders compelling performance are discretionary. The court will not make such an order where an award of damages is an adequate remedy.416 This means that orders of specific performance and injunctions are not usually made in relation to most commercial contracts. However, in some transactions, for example, the sale of land, an order compelling performance will be made almost as a matter of course.417 1.143  Requirements. A number of rules and practical factors limit the availability of these discretionary remedies compelling performance: •

• • • •

Performance of the contract must not require continuing supervision by the court, as, for example, in a complex contract stretching over an extended period.418 Contracts for personal services are not compellable.419 The claimant must be ready and willing to perform.420 The claimant’s performance must also be compellable.421 The order must not result in excessive hardship.422

413. See 23.43. 414. See 23.45. Terms that under-compensate are also subject to special scrutiny, since they in effect limit liability for breach of contract: see 1.72–1.75. 415. Specific performance and injunction are discussed in Chapter 24. 416. The converse — that where damages are inadequate the claimant is entitled to an order to compel performance — does not follow. 417. See 24.4. 418. See 24.13. 419. See 24.12. 420. See 24.10. 421. See 24.11. 422. See 24.8.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

1.144

Unconscionability and Remedies 1.144  Unconscionability plays a role in the award of remedies. The notion that a remedy should not be granted where this is unconscionable in the circumstances plays a discernible role in the law. It is explicit where liability is assessed on the basis of estoppel.423 It is the explicit basis on which the law denies the enforcement of ‘penalties’.424 It is also implicit in numerous statements in the cases that the law, in awarding damages, aims at ‘fair compensation’, and in the ‘hardship’ limitation placed on the availability of orders compelling performance.425 In seeking a particular remedy, therefore, a claimant is well advised to consider whether it conforms to the demands of conscience as well as the technical requirements of the law.

423. See 1.9. 424. See 1.140. 425. See 1.143.

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PART II Contract Formation

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Chapter 2

Estoppel The Importance of Estoppel 2.1  Estoppel and contract. It may seem odd to start a book on the law of contract with a doctrine that is not contract. The law of contract is about legally enforceable consensual obligations. We will see in the following chapters the traditional elements for establishing the existence of a contract. But, as pointed out in the previous chapter, it is no longer sufficient to consider the legal relationship between two entities purely in terms of a contract that they have made. Instead, the student and practitioner must think in terms of a broader concept of obligations, some self-imposed (that is, expressly or impliedly agreed to) and some imposed by law.1 Usually the engagement is commercial or trading in character, but the obligations can also occur in other relationships. Estoppel, as a device for the imposition of obligation, has become of central importance. The seminal High Court case of Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher2 transformed the law of estoppel and consequently many other areas of the law, including contract. Estoppel’s impact has implications for, among other things, the negotiation of a contract, the rules of formation, the doctrine of consideration, the modification of a contractual relationship, breach, the settlement process and the conduct of litigation.3 It also has implications more generally for the law of obligations.4 Estoppel operates both within and outside contract, that is, it may be the basis for imposing or modifying obligations in relationships both contractual and otherwise. Because what is said about estoppel in non-contractual cases has implications for its operation in connection with the law of contract, it is necessary to draw on such cases. It is accordingly appropriate to introduce this treatment of the law of contract with a discussion of estoppel that has the potential for casting new light on almost every aspect of the law of contract.

How estoppel works 2.2  The underlying principle and the elements of estoppel. The basic principle underlying the idea of estoppel is the popular saying that ‘you cannot blow hot and cold’. This is a normative admonition reflected in the role of unconscionability in estoppel cases. It is about inconsistent behaviour where that behaviour adversely affects another.

1. See 28.9, where it is argued that possibly ‘contract’ itself is no longer confined to the traditional, selfcontained model but should be more broadly thought of as a subset of the law of obligations. One of the main factors in support of this idea is the emergence in Australia of a revivified doctrine of estoppel. 2. (1988) 164 CLR 387. See 2.7. 3. See 2.19–2.32 for a survey of the impact of estoppel in various areas of the law of contract. 4. See Robertson, ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations’ (1997) 19 Syd LR 32.

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2.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The fact that the law is prepared to provide a remedy in such a situation necessarily means that estoppel is limited in its reach. Generally, the law has no business in remedying social relations so that there is an element equivalent to the contract requirement of an intention to create, or affect, legal relations.5 This aspect of estoppel usually goes without saying so that there is little in the way of judicial statements on the necessarily restricted reach of estoppel.6 In Public Trustee v Kukula,7 it was held that promissory estoppel could not be employed to enforce a promise to marry, such promise being unenforceable by way of the old breach of promise action because of its abrogation by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. On the other hand, in W v G8 it was held that an estoppel operated to make one partner in a relationship liable for the maintenance of two children whom both had agreed to raise. The requirement that estoppel only affects legal relations is, in fact, a circular statement. There are certain categories of non-commercial relationships where estoppel can operate.9 For example, it will be seen in Chapter 1610 that proprietary estoppel often applies to family arrangements concerning land. It is clear that estoppel cannot work against some types of statutory provisions, that is, it may not be possible for an estoppel to abrogate a right or duty provided by legislation. This is shown by Public Trustee v Kukula, discussed above, and other cases.11 However, the type of statutory provision must be closely examined. If it confers private rights then it may be possible that the right can be modified or lost by estoppel.12 Similarly, although an estoppel can apply to government in relation to some activities, it cannot affect a government in carrying out its public functions.13

5. See 2.11 below and, on intention to create legal relations, see Chapter 5. There are judicial statements (and disagreements) about the appropriateness of arguing estoppel in what 6. might be termed ‘hard-nosed’ commercial relationships. This is a different issue and is discussed below at 2.16 and 2.20. 7. (1990) 14 Fam LR 97. 8. (1996) 20 Fam LR 49. Another illustration of estoppel in a non-commercial relationship is Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 (witness protection program — various assurances not kept). See also Chanrich Properties Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Shire Council [2001] NSWSC 229 (council bound by undertakings to pay market value for land dedicated as a public reserve). 9. Thus, where contract or the competition and consumer legislation may be inapplicable, an estoppel could operate. An example is Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241. 10. See 16.68–16.69. 11. See Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Boss Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 270 (no estoppel to extend time limit under a statutory demand under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [59]–[61] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Tudor Developments Pty Ltd v Makeig (2008) 72 NSWLR 624; [2008] NSWCA 263, where it was held that a statutory right to rescind could not be lost through the operation of estoppel; Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 at 1017 (Viscount Radcliffe). See extensive discussion by Basten JA in Tudor at [50]–[72]. 12. See Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 (statutory limitation period), where there is extensive discussion of the difference between statutory provisions that can, and cannot, be affected by an estoppel. A limitation period defence may be lost through the operation of an estoppel. As to whether estoppel can ‘cure’ non-compliant execution of a deed, see Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.32]. See also Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Traspunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2011] 2 Qd R 114; [2010] QCA 119 at [62]–[69] (Muir JA, Holmes and Chesterman JJA concurring). In Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, a remedy was fashioned so as not to breach a statutory provision. 13. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [5.25]. See discussion by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93 at 108–18.

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Estoppel

2.3

The elements of estoppel exist when: •

• •

a promise, a representation or the conduct of one party leads another to assume that the first party will follow a certain course of action or that certain facts are established or that a certain legal relationship exists or will exist; the other party reasonably relies on the promise, representation or conduct, that is, acts on that assumption in some material way; and because of that reliance, the other party would suffer detriment if the first party acts inconsistently with the promise, representation or conduct and the consequent assumption, such that it would be unjust or unconscionable for the first party to go back on the promise or representation or to undermine the assumption generated by his or her conduct.

These elements are the ‘bare bones’ for the operation of estoppel.14 The discussion in this chapter shows that there are numerous sub-issues that may arise from these elements. Further, there are various categories of estoppel,15 each of which has its own special rules. This treatment covers estoppels of most relevance to contractual and domestic relationships. These are equitable estoppels which cover proprietary and promissory estoppel. 2.3  The various types of estoppel.16 It will be seen from the examination of the Waltons case below that the recasting of estoppel was brought about in part because of a desire by the judges of the High Court to unify the various strands of estoppel that have developed in the case law. The promissory estoppel described in 2.5 is but one such strand, albeit the one closest to contract. The various types of estoppel relevant to this treatment are now briefly described: •

•

Estoppel by representation (or in pais) operates to prevent departure from a representation, by words or conduct, of existing fact if the representee has acted in reliance on it.17 A related concept is estoppel by convention whereby a party is not permitted to depart from an assumption that has been adopted by both parties,18 if to do so would be unjust in the circumstances.19

14. See the more elaborate statement of the elements by Brennan J in the extract from Waltons below at 2.5. 15. See 2.3. 16. The brief discussion here only covers types of estoppel relevant to commercial and family dealings. See Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016) for coverage of all types of estoppel. 17. Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 at [149]–[158] (Gageler J); Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547 (Dixon J); Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674–6 (Dixon J); Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563. The stipulation that a representation must be one of fact is questionable. See Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3467]–[3469]; Sumampow v Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd [2005] WASCA 64 at [181]. See also Hudson, ‘The True Purpose of Estoppel by Representation’ (2015) 32 JCL 275. 18. Estoppel by deed is arguably a form of estoppel by convention, though some would argue that estoppel by deed is unique. See discussion in Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [5.5]. 19. Con-Stan Industries Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Aust) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 at 244–5; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84; Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146; MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley [2005] NSWCA 89; Davis v CGU Insurance Ltd [2009] SASC 220 at [21]–[35] (Vanstone J); Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65 at [200]; Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5 at [30]–[33] (Brereton J); Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Co Ltd [2008] WASCA 119 at [156]–[187] (Buss JA). See Derham,

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2.3

•

•

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Proprietary estoppel20 gives enforceable rights over land to a person who has been assured or allowed to assume21 that he or she has, or will have, an interest in the land owned by the person giving such assurance, so long as the promisee acts on the assurance, by, for example, making improvements. Promissory estoppel prevents departure from promissory statements that have been relied on. This development was regarded as controversial because it had been thought that estoppel could not apply to promises.22

The first two categories are termed common law estoppel. The second two categories are termed equitable estoppel. The difference between these various types of estoppel is not always clear when applying the principles to a given fact situation. The different interpretations of the facts by the judges of the High Court in Waltons (see 2.7) illustrate this. A new type of estoppel — ‘contractual estoppel’ — has emerged in the United Kingdom.23 It is controversial and even its categorisation as estoppel is contested.24 It manifests itself in contractual clauses that are intended to establish unchallengeable facts, states of affairs or assumptions. These clauses are designed to prevent any attempt to argue in litigation a fact or assumption contrary to the clause, most commonly via misrepresentation.25 When carefully drafted, such a clause embeds what can amount to a falsehood, for example, that the representee has not relied on information provided by the representor. This type of clause is arguably a type of estoppel by convention analogous to estoppel by deed. They have been used in sophisticated transactions such as syndicated loans and derivatives contracts. They have, however, spread to everyday business and consumer contracts. Their use puts one in mind of mid-twentieth-century exemption clauses. The United Kingdom courts have broadly endorsed their use as a manifestation of freedom of contract.

20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II). In Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428, an estoppel by convention determined the identity of the legal entity with which BHP was dealing. There has been controversy as to whether the assumption forming the basis of an estoppel by convention is as to facts or law. The modern view is that the assumption may be about the legal effect of, for example, a clause or document: see Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [758]–[779] (Edelman J); The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3469] (Owen J); Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175 at 185–9 (Samuels JA); Heggies Bulkhaul Ltd v Global Minerals Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 312; [2003] NSWSC 851 at [147]–[155] (Austin J); Santos v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 272, in which there is extensive discussion of estoppel by convention by each of Lander, Williams and Besanko JJ; Rae & Partners Pty v Shaw [2020] TASFC 14. See discussion in 16.68–16.71. Such assurance may be tacit, as where the owner stands by without objection while the other makes improvements, termed estoppel by acquiescence. Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, in which it was held that estoppel could only apply to representations of existing fact, not future intention. Jorden was followed in Chadwick v Manning [1896] AC 231. These cases have been overruled. See Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 452 (Deane J); Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410 (Mason CJ). Braithwaite, ‘The Origins and Implications of Contractual Estoppel’ (2016) 132 LQR 120. See Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386; Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2014] AC 436. See also Trukhtanov, ‘Misrepresentation: Acknowledgement of Non-reliance as Defence’ (2009) 125 LQR 648; Trukhtanov, ‘Receipt Clauses: From Estoppel by Deed to Contractual Estoppel’ (2014) 130 LQR 3. Ibid Braithwaite at 120–1. See also Trukhnatov, ‘Receipt Clauses: From Estoppel by Deed to Contractual Estoppel’ (2014) 130 LQR 3; Trukhnatov, Contractual Estoppel (2018); Leeming, ‘Receipts Clauses and “Contractual Estoppel” Revisited’ (2018) 134 LQR 171 at 175. See also 11.42.

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Estoppel

2.4

At present this development has not occurred in Australia.26 Some powerful voices have spoken out against it.27 It would certainly run into difficulties if the inclusion of a clause was misleading or deceptive or amounted to an attempt to eliminate liability for such conduct. And, arguably, the law of estoppel in Australia would not permit the use of such a clause if its effect is unconscionable. 2.4  The development of estoppel in the law of contract. Prior to the Waltons case, estoppel in contractual relations operated in a limited way. Lord Denning’s famous statement in the High Trees case28 established, or revived,29 a principle — promissory estoppel — that a contracting party may be prevented from insisting on his or her strict contractual rights if, having regard to the dealings that have taken place between the parties, in particular assurances about how the contract will proceed, it would be inequitable to allow such insistence.30 Thus, a landlord who promises to accept a reduced rent may be prevented (or estopped) from claiming the full rent,31 even though the promise by the landlord is not supported by consideration (and therefore, as a matter of strict contract law, is not a binding variation to the contract).32 Or, a contracting party may promise the other that he or she will not insist on a contractual deadline, and may then be estopped from relying on that deadline as a basis for alleging breach.33 Thus, it can be seen, promissory estoppel traditionally had a limited area of operation in contract: it was confined to negative promises (‘you need not pay the full rent …’) by way of an indulgence or concession relating to existing contractual relations.34 The transformation that occurred as a result of the Waltons case gives promissory estoppel a far wider compass: first, it may be used to enforce a positive promise — as a sword not just as a shield;35 and second, it is no longer confined to existing contractual relations. 26. Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v Queensland Sugar Ltd [2019] QSC 116 at [174]–[175] (Davis J). 27. Heydon, Heydon on Contract (2019), [5.770]; Handley, ‘Reinventing Estoppel in the Privy Council’ (2014) 130 LQR 370; Leeming, ‘Receipts Clauses and “Contractual Estoppel” Revisited’ (2018) 134 LQR 171. 28. Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. 29. Denning J based his argument on two nineteenth-century cases, Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 and Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268, discussed in 2.5. 30. As, for example, in Stevens v Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd (1988) 53 SASR 323, in which a mortgage could only be enforced to a limited amount because of a course of conduct by the bank that amounted to an assurance that the amount would not be exceeded. See also Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251, where a principal in a construction contract, whose agent authorised varied performance not in accordance with the contractual procedure for making variations, was estopped from arguing the failure to use the proper procedure with the result that the variation was binding; see 2.29. 31. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. Contrast Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435 (reduction of rent by deed not binding on assignee landlord even though reduced rent had been accepted by new landlord without objection). 32. As to the doctrine of consideration, see Chapter 4. 33. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, discussed below in 2.5. On the facts, the estoppel was not successfully argued. Compare Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 (vendor prevented from insisting on deadline after solicitor said, two days before deadline, that request for extension should be submitted in writing and instructions would be sought). A mere extension of time may be binding in the absence of both consideration and estoppel: Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 at [45]–[51] (Keane JA), though on the facts estoppel could also operate (at [51]). 34. A statement of this limited principle can be found in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220 (Denning LJ). 35. Some judges insist that promissory estoppel can only be used as a defensive equity. See, for example, Handley AJA in Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76]; Handley,

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2.4

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The interaction between estoppel and contract is further discussed below in 2.8 and 2.19–2.32. 2.5  Equitable estoppel. Probably the most commonly cited passage for the requisite elements of equitable estoppel is that of Brennan J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher:36 In my opinion, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant had induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff’s action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise.

It can be seen from these elements that determining whether an estoppel operates in a particular case is a very fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, decided cases may not be particularly helpful unless they contain statements about the underlying legal principles rather than their application. Nevertheless, decided cases can provide guidance on the operation of estoppel. The difficulty encountered in an estoppel case is that, in the absence of the ironclad assumptions generated by a contract, a court must closely examine the conduct of the defendant and then turn to the state of mind and conduct of the plaintiff and assess the interaction between these two to determine whether the plaintiff’s assumption and reaction were reasonable and whether it was productive of loss once the defendant changed its stance.37 All this must be done ‘objectively’ of course, despite the unavoidably subjective nature of the overall inquiry. The consequence for an appeal court can be very arduous. It must not only (re)interpret the facts but also then interpret the trial judge’s treatment of those facts.38 The old-fashioned word ‘estoppel’ may also be used in its verb form: the first party is estopped from denying the state of affairs that has been acted on by the other party. Once these elements are established, the court must then fashion an appropriate remedy to redress the detriment suffered by the second party.39 In some cases involving common law estoppels, the estoppel will work to ‘set the scene’ for the parties. Estoppel then has a merely evidentiary role. This is particularly so when the promise or representation relates to purely factual matters. The one party will be estopped from denying the facts that, in turn, may provide the basis for some cause of action or dispute resolution. In other cases, involving equitable ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625. Compare Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd [2010] FCA 394 at [133]–[136] (Jagot J). 36. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 428–9. Another useful list of elements, distilling and refining what was decided in Waltons, was provided by Priestley JA in Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 at 472 and in Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 604, 610–12. 37. The complexity of this examination is captured by Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230. 38. See, for example, Wilson v Arwon Finance Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 137. Assessing detriment can be very difficult. See, for example, Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220. 39. See 2.9.

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Estoppel

2.5

estoppel, the estoppel will work more directly to provide a remedy.40 Estoppel thus can itself be a cause of action. Some of these elements are the subject of a great deal of debate and disagreement.41 For example, Brennan J did not mention ‘unconscionable’ and yet it is undoubtedly an element of actionable estoppel.42 Nor did his Honour include a statement that a plaintiff’s response in reliance on the defendant’s promise or conduct must be reasonable.43 The controversial aspects of estoppel will emerge in the discussion below. An important treatment of a number of controversies about estoppel, particularly proprietary estoppel, occurred in Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd.44 This coverage attempts to present the law from the decided cases, particularly Australian cases, of which the Waltons case is the leader.45 In the following discussion the language of promise is sometimes used for convenience. Estoppel is not confined to circumstances where a promise is made; it covers a wider range of conduct.

40.

This follows from what was said in Waltons, discussed below. From time to time, judges still insist that promissory estoppel (but not necessarily other types of estoppel) can only be used as a defensive equity. See, for example, Handley AJA in Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76] and in DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [93]. This view has been both doubted and supported. See, for example, in support Nock v Maddern [2018] NSWCA 239 at [35] (White JA, Leeming JA and Sackville AJA concurring); Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 at [26] (Meagher JA, Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq concurring). By contrast, see Campbell, ‘Waltons v Maher: History, Unconscientiousness and Remedy — the “Minimum Equity”’ (2013) 7 J Eq 171 text at fn 68. In FJ & PN Curran Pty Ltd v Almond Investors Land Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 236 at [251]–[268], both the Handley view and its opposite were canvassed but ultimately not decided because an estoppel by convention could be enforced without using estoppel as a cause of action. In Commercial & General Corporation Pty Ltd v Manassen Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] SASCFC 40, the controversy is canvassed at length by Livesey J concluding at [181] that ‘In an appropriate case promissory estoppel can operate as a positive source of legal rights’. 41. As noted, Justice Handley in particular has criticised the Australian development of estoppel in, and since, Waltons. See Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016); Handley, ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724; Handley, ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625; Handley, ‘Exploring New and Old Ideas about Estoppel and Election’ (2019) 93 ALJ 594. For insights into some of the continuing controversies, the thorough analysis by White J in Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717 is very helpful. This judgment was upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. See also the extensive discussion of various strands of estoppel by Lindsay J in Labracon Pty Ltd v Cuturich [2013] NSWSC 97. For views critical of the Handley rejection of Waltons, see Robertson, ‘Three Models of Promissory Estoppel’ (2013) 7 J Eq 226; Silink, ‘Can Promissory Estoppel be an Independent Source of Rights?’ (2015) 40 UWALR 39; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021). 42. See 2.16. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. Compare Young, ‘Unconscionability and Promissory Estoppel’ (2016) 90 ALJ 878. 43. See 2.14. 44. (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. 45. See Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 118. Compare Handley, referred to above. He is particularly critical of the use of promissory estoppel to enforce positive promises: ‘Non-contractual but enforceable promises which confer positive rights in personam are a recent invention without a respectable pedigree’: ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724 at 728. The American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 90(1), in part relied on by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons, is not a ‘recent invention’. The Handley view is, to say the least, controversial: Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [117]–[118] (Bathurst CJ); Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [769] (Edelman J).

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2.5

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

When the basis for an estoppel argument is a promissory statement, it has been stipulated that the statement or representation be reasonably clear and unambiguous.46 If there is any doubt on this score then a court may conclude that an estoppel does not operate.47 The more that a statement is promissory in nature, conveying a clear undertaking, the more likely that a person to whom it is made will justifiably rely on it. Accordingly, the courts have sometimes insisted on the statement being promissory in intent,48 such intention being judged objectively.49 However, the strict approach to this issue appears to be less demanding in some cases.50 The question of what was conveyed by the party against whom estoppel is argued is context-specific. For example, in family or domestic circumstances often involving proprietary estoppel, clarity of meaning is less likely to be found or expected.51 In addition, these cases can depend on silence — acquiescence — being the crucial element of the defendant’s conduct. In non-domestic cases, the need for certainty parallels,52 or is possibly more stringent53 than, the requirements of certainty in contract formation.54 Thus, for 46.

Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54. See Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 143–6. 47. Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26; DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348; Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 at 235 followed in Tony J Boulos Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 105. The statements relied on must be ‘unqualified, firm and specific’ so as to induce an assumption that a particular legal relationship would be established or an interest would be granted. 48. Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220; Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Instruments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 at 884 (Lord Diplock); James v Heim Gallery (London) Ltd [1980] Est Gaz Dig 184 at 190 (Buckley LJ). 49. Bremer HandelsgesellschaftmbH v VandenAvenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 at 126. 50. See, for example, Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 at [121] (Campbell JA) citing Flinn v Flinn [1993] 3 VR 712 at 738–9 (Brooking CJ); Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 at [93]–[94] (Tobias JA). See also Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 at [133]–[137] (Dodds-Streeton JA); Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312 at [85] (Hodgson JA); Hammond v JP Morgan Trust Australia Ltd (2012) 16 BPR 30,901; [2012] NSWCA 295 at [52]–[53] (Meagher JA, Basten JA and Bergin CJ in Eq concurring). 51. DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [54] (Meagher JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel). In Doueihi at [171]–[185] it was made clear that there is no division or dichotomy between commercial and domestic estoppel cases. See also at [186]–[201] on the requirement of certainty. 52. See Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [142]–[143], [147] (Keane J). Contrast Nettle J at [211]–[212] and [218]. This case is closely examined by Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137. 53. See the discussion by Mason and Deane JJ in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 435–7. See also Ipp JA in Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 at [182]. It seems from these statements that a court, in interpreting an ambiguous promise in the context of estoppel, would not be so generous in finding a meaning as is demonstrated in ordinary contract cases involving uncertainty: see, for example of the latter, Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571, discussed in 6.6. But compare Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Ltd (2014) 45 VR 771; [2014] VSCA 353 at [84] (Warren CJ); Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111 at [93] (Tobias JA). In Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [1748]–[1751], Drummond AJA argued that in promissory estoppel cases, clarity of what is allegedly promised is essential. 54. As to which see Chapter 6. This precept of certainty is not firmly embedded and it has been stated that no bright line exists to treat domestic cases differently from commercial cases: Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242 at [146] (Bathurst CJ).

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Estoppel

2.5

example, estoppel would not operate if the party making the statement expressly reserved his or her rights,55 or where the statement was equivocal, as in Legione v Hateley.56 In that case, the purchasers of land needed to obtain bridging finance and, the day before the date for settlement, their solicitors asked the vendor’s solicitors for a short extension of time. A secretary said, ‘I think that’ll be all right but I’ll have to get instructions’. This was thought by Mason and Deane JJ not to be a clear enough statement. Brennan J based his reasoning on the view that the vendor’s solicitors did not have authority to give an assurance granting an extension of time. On the other hand, Gibbs CJ and Murphy J thought that the statement was sufficiently clear to induce the purchasers’ solicitors to believe that there would not be a strict insistence on the deadline.57 In the end, the statement or conduct that is put forward as a basis for estoppel must be objectively construed in its context and so it may be possible for apparent ambiguity to be removed by consideration of surrounding circumstances and the parties’ evident intention.58 The statement must ultimately be capable of inducing reliance in the recipient; this can happen with statements that are not models of clarity.59 More difficult questions arise when the basis of an estoppel argument is not promissory conduct. The need for clarity is more difficult to satisfy. Yet there is no doubt that estoppel can operate on the basis of an understanding, assumption or nonpromissory conduct. In Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co,60 a six-month period within which the tenant was obliged to effect repairs was held to be extended because the parties entered into negotiations for the purchase of the tenant’s interest after the notice to repair had been sent. The negotiations did not result in an agreement and the House of Lords held that, while negotiations were on foot, there was an implied understanding or assumption that the running of the period was suspended.61 Suppose a party to a contract has accepted defective performance, such as consistently late payment of instalments. Does the acceptance without objection indicate that future payments need not be on time? On one argument it could be said that the party not in breach has lulled the other into a belief that late payments are good enough. On the other hand, it may be harsh to take away the innocent party’s rights for the future if he or she has been kind enough to let the other party pay late. The answer is that, unless a clear and unambiguous assurance can be spelt 55. Finagrain AS Geneva v P Kraus Hamburg [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 508. 56. (1983) 152 CLR 406. 57. Compare Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26, where a statement that a tenant would be ‘looked after at renewal time’ if the tenant carried out extensive refurbishments was not sufficient to found an estoppel. 58. Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318 at [179]–[208], where Ipp JA canvassed the authorities. See also Flinn v Flinn (1999) 3 VR 712 at 738 (Brooking JA, with whom Charles and Batt JJA agreed). Brooking JA carried out a very extensive analysis of the authorities. 59. See Accurate Financial Consultants Pty Ltd v Koko Black Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 86 at [133]–[137] (Dodds-Streeton JA), a case in which a much-emphasised assurance that an investment was for the ‘long term’ was held to be sufficient basis for an estoppel. In Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700 [2021] NSWCA 242, a proprietary estoppel case, Bathurst CJ stated at [120] ‘equitable estoppel can be established despite the expectation being based on a promise or representation that would not be sufficiently certain to amount to a valid contract, or is formed on the basis of vague assurances’ and at [122] ‘a proprietary estoppel may be established where the promise or representation relied upon did not define the interest the party was expected to receive’ (Bell P and Leeming JA concurring). 60. (1877) 2 App Cas 439. 61. Birmingham & District Land Co v London & North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268 was a similar case (tacit understanding that a contractual period would not run while building operations were delayed).

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2.5

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

out from the indulgent party’s conduct, an estoppel will not operate to defeat his or her contractual rights.62 Further, it is usually not unconscionable to withdraw the indulgence of allowing late payments. In cases like Waltons (discussed fully in 2.7), where an estoppel argument is employed to try to establish a contract in the absence of formal execution, the court must be able to spell out what the alleged contract is and what its essential terms are. If an important matter has not been finalised, the estoppel argument may fail.63 On the other hand, there are cases where a court will be prepared to fashion an order that fills in a considerable level of detail about the future dealings between the parties.64

The Overarching Estoppel Theory 2.6  A unified estoppel? All of these threads have a common theme: a person will be prevented from departing from a representation, promise or assurance that he or she has made if it would be unconscionable to do so in the circumstances, namely, where the other party has detrimentally relied on the representation, promise or assurance.65 Broadly, these strands of estoppel can be woven together into a general doctrine of estoppel by conduct.66 As Mason CJ put it in Commonwealth v Verwayen: In conformity with the fundamental purpose of all estoppels to afford protection against the detriment which would flow from a party’s change of position if the assumption that led to it were deserted, these developments have brought a greater underlying unity to the various categories of estoppel. Indeed, the consistent trend in the modern decisions points inexorably towards the emergence of one overarching doctrine of estoppel rather than a series of independent rules.67

This unification idea has, in turn, made it possible to use estoppel as a basis for enforcing positive promises. This is because proprietary estoppel, in particular, generated positive rights (for example, to compensation or to an interest in land) and this feature has been absorbed into the doctrine developed by the High Court in 62. Compare Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257; Kostopoulos v G E Commercial Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 311 at [35]–[37] (Keane JA); Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 (no estoppel arising from non-enforcement of a take or pay clause); see also John Burrows Ltd v Subsurface Surveys Ltd (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 354. For a case where the dealings between the parties concerning late payments did create an estoppel, see Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 at [98]–[99] (Brereton J). For further discussion of waiver, election and contract variation, see 2.29. 63. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, more fully discussed in 2.20 below. See also Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1. 64. A remarkable example is Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717: see discussion of the authorities by White J at [230]–[245]. This case is noted in (2015) 89 ALJ 223. The decision of White J was upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. 65. See Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985), 59; Robertson, ‘Towards a Unifying Purpose for Estoppel’ (1996) 19 Mon LR 1. 66. This is the label preferred by Deane J in Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 447–53; in Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 434–6; and in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 431. 67. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 410. See also Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 411–13, 435–6; Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510 at 515–16; Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Trustees Co [1982] QB 133 at 153; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 122; A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114 at 123–4.

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Estoppel

2.6

the Waltons and Verwayen cases. Proprietary estoppel has also contributed another important feature, namely, flexibility of remedies: see 2.9. There is by no means unanimity in support of the unification principle.68 Gaudron J in Waltons69 and McHugh J in Verwayen70 retained a clear distinction between common law estoppel as a rule of evidence and equitable estoppel which can create substantive rights.71 Equitable estoppel covers both proprietary and promissory estoppel, and, as already noted, some judges draw a distinction between the two in that proprietary estoppel can generate substantive rights whereas promissory estoppel can only be used as a defensive equity. There are also differences between the common law and equitable branches of estoppel that need to be resolved if a truly unified doctrine is to emerge.72 There is no doubt that judges continue to identify the relevant subset of estoppel in a particular case even if it could be argued that there is an overarching principle.73 The overarching estoppel project is moribund. To say the least, the diversity of judicial approaches makes life difficult for practitioners. The overarching estoppel theory would have the merit of, to some extent, eliminating fine distinctions that have substantive effects,74 for example, the sword/shield distinction.75 Why, it may be asked, should a plaintiff’s rights be determined by whether the other party’s conduct can be characterised as affecting real property but not some other species of right or interest?76 Or whether the assurance given by the defendant is of existing fact as opposed to future intention?

68.

Heydon, Leeming and Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, 2014), [17-055]; Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (2009), [12.300] which declares the idea ‘jettisoned’. See also Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016); Handley, ‘The Three High Court Decisions on Estoppel 1988–1990’ (2006) 80 ALJ 724; Handley, ‘Waltons Stores Today’ (2016) 90(9) ALJ 625. 69. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 458. 70. (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 585. 71. See also the equivocation on this issue in Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 at [7] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ): ‘There is no occasion in this appeal to consider whether the various doctrines and remedies in the field of estoppel are to be brought under what Mason CJ called “a single overarching doctrine” or what Deane J identified as a “general doctrine of estoppel by conduct”’ (footnotes omitted). In Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 308 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19, the controversy was mentioned but the overarching theory was not supported: see fn 2 (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 72. See The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 at [3456] (Owen J); Robertson, ‘Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel’ (1998) 24 Mon LR 115; Robertson, ‘Estoppel by Conduct: Unresolved Issues at Common Law and in Equity’ (1999) National LR 7. 73. See the discussion by Sheller JA (with the concurrence of Stein and Beazley JJA) in Wykes v Samilk Pty Ltd (1999) Aust Contract Rep 90-097 at 91,008–13. See also Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158, which shows clearly that ‘overarching’ estoppel is not applied. Giles JA thought that estoppel by representation should be kept separate from equitable estoppel (at [51]–[56]). See, similarly, Hodgson JA in MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39 at [71]–[72]. In Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [37], French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ considered that this controversy was ‘as yet unresolved’. See also Hudson, ‘Certainty in Equitable Estoppels: Questions of Taxonomy, Unification and Coherence’ (2016) 10 J Eq 137 at 139–40; Hudson, ‘The Price of Coherence in Estoppels’ (2017) 39 Syd LR 1. 74. See Bryan, ‘Unifying Estoppel Doctrine: The Argument for Heresy’ (2013) 7 J Eq 209. Contrast McFarlane, ‘The Limits to Estoppels’ (2013) 7 J Eq 250, which argued for the maintenance of the different categories which ‘rest on a number of irreducibly dissimilar principles’. Silink, whilst conceding that a unified theory is not supported, argues for a unified theory for equitable estoppel (proprietary and promissory): ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 118–19. 75. See Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 425–6 (Brennan J). 76. Ibid at 426.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

2.6

Or that, when a defendant is estopped from denying a contract, this is not using estoppel as a sword?77 The Waltons case demonstrates how judges differ on the characterisation question. It also demonstrates that the different views about characterisation did not, in the end, matter.

The Waltons case 2.7  Estoppel reformulated. Waltons needed a new retail store in Nowra. It negotiated with Maher, who had a suitable site with existing buildings on it that would have to be demolished. The plan was for Maher to build a suitable store and lease it to Waltons for six years. Negotiations had reached an advanced stage. There was some urgency as Waltons’ lease on another building was about to expire. An agreement, prepared by Maher’s solicitor, was in almost final form. Some final minor amendments (schedule of finishes and floor plans) had to be made. Waltons’ solicitors indicated on 7 November 1983 that the amendments were acceptable although they had not received specific instructions in respect of each amendment: ‘We shall let you know tomorrow if any amendments are not agreed to’. Having heard nothing further, the relevant documents were executed by Maher and forwarded on 11 November by their solicitor ‘by way of exchange’ to Waltons’ solicitors in Sydney. These documents were received in Sydney on or about the 14th but were never executed by Waltons because it had changed its retailing policy. Meanwhile, Maher started to demolish the existing buildings. Waltons was aware of this by at least 10 December. There was no correspondence between the parties until 22 or 23 January when Waltons’ solicitors informed Maher by letter that Waltons would not proceed with the agreement. By then the old buildings had been demolished and the new store had reached a stage where 60 to 70 per cent of the brickwork had been completed and 40 per cent of the concrete had been poured. Maher brought an action for a declaration that there was in existence a valid contract, specific performance or alternatively damages. The action was successful at all stages with no dissenting judge. Waltons was ordered by the trial judge, Kearney J, to pay damages in lieu of specific performance. The judges differed on the interpretation of the facts. Kearney J said that Maher mistakenly believed that the formalities of exchange had been completed and that Waltons was estopped from denying this assumption because it had contributed to it. This view was rejected by a majority of the High Court and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Priestley JA, with whom Glass and Samuels JJA agreed). The latter held that Maher was under a mistaken assumption that the agreement was binding despite the lack of exchange. This mistaken belief was known to Waltons, who were estopped from denying it. Three judges of the High Court (Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ), on the other hand, held that Waltons had indicated that exchange would take place, there having been an express or implied promise to that effect. These different interpretations of fact gave rise to different possible estoppel analyses. But, in view of the suggested unification theory, discussed above, in the 77.

See Heydon, Leeming and Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, 2014), [17-275].

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Estoppel

2.7

end it did not matter which interpretation of the facts was adopted. Waltons was estopped from denying that a contract had come into being, despite the lack of formal exchange and despite the lack of a written note or memorandum in a transaction involving an interest in land.78 Mason CJ and Wilson J delivered a joint judgment that, because of their interpretation of the facts, made it necessary to discuss promissory estoppel. First, can promissory estoppel operate during negotiations for a contract, as opposed to during the contractual relationship (as in High Trees)? There was no difficulty in finding authority for a positive answer to this question.79 The second issue was whether estoppel could be used for the positive enforcement of rights as opposed to being employed as a defensive equity. Could it be used as a sword rather than a shield? In relation to the facts of Waltons, could Waltons’ implied undertaking — that contracts would be exchanged — be enforced? Here, as noted above, the unification theory played an important role, because Mason CJ and Wilson J drew on proprietary estoppel cases80 (which hitherto had not impinged on contractual relations81) to demonstrate that estoppel could be used to create positive rights. They found a common thread in estoppel cases, namely: … the principle that equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relation to which the other party to the transaction has ‘played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it’: per Dixon J in Grundt;82 see also Thompson.83 Equity comes to the relief of such a plaintiff on the footing that it would be unconscionable conduct on the part of the other party to ignore the assumption.84

Brennan J also assumed that Waltons had made an implied promise to exchange contracts and held that such a promise should be enforceable by drawing on the proprietary estoppel cases. No sensible distinction could be drawn between promissory and proprietary estoppel in relation to the sword/shield question.85 Deane J interpreted the facts differently, saying that Maher was entitled to assume that a contract had come into being in the absence of exchange. This assumption was encouraged or caused by Waltons and it was precluded from departing from it.86 Gaudron J adopted similar reasoning, though based on a slightly different interpretation of the facts, namely, that Maher had assumed that contracts had been exchanged; but, again, this assumption could not be denied by Waltons.87 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

As to this last point, see 2.26. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 399 citing Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839 at 847 (Donaldson J); A-G v Codner [1973] 1 NZLR 545 at 553; Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3. In particular Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; [1979] 2 All ER 945; and Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129. See also 16.68–16.71, where proprietary estoppel is discussed in the context of evasion of the Statute of Frauds requirements. Even though the language of contract has been used in proprietary estoppel cases: Dillwyn v Llewellyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517 at 521; 45 ER 1285 at 1286 (Lord Westbury); New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd v Glebe Municipal Council (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 288 at 308 (Jordan CJ). (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 675. (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 404. Ibid at 425–6. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 444. Ibid at 463–4.

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2.7

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

What should be stressed is that the underlying principle is the detrimental reliance by the one party on an assumption generated by the other party that makes it unconscionable for the other party to renege. These elements were present in abundance in the Waltons case so that no difficulty was encountered by the judges in invoking estoppel. But these key elements are by no means so easily found or identified in other cases. These will be discussed in 2.10–2.16. There is a very practical lesson to be learned from Waltons and other estoppel cases. The court’s concern after the event is to provide a remedy that neutralises the detriment suffered as a result of reliance: see 2.9. Advisers may be able to avoid a looming estoppel if they consider the position of the other party to the transaction or dealing and ask what steps could be taken to pre-empt detriment. The crucial time is when the person who made the original promise or representation wants to go back on it. The question to ask is whether that is going to cause detriment to another and what, if anything, can be done about it.88 For example, in the Waltons case, if, once Waltons decided to change its plans, it had immediately informed Maher of this, there would have been no case. 2.8  Estoppel and consideration. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that the traditional analysis of contract formation requires that a contractual promise cannot be legally binding unless it is supported by consideration.89 That is, the promise must be part of an agreement involving mutual exchange. If a positive promise can be enforced through the mechanism of estoppel, where does this leave the doctrine of consideration? The judges in Waltons were very concerned to ensure that the doctrine should be preserved and would, in the usual case, be the determining principle as to the enforceability of promises: [G]enerally speaking, a plaintiff cannot enforce a voluntary promise because the promisee may reasonably be expected to appreciate that, to render it binding, it must form part of a binding contract.90

This argument, based as it is on expectations about how the law works, may lose its force as courts are more prepared to hold that promises are enforceable in the absence of consideration through the mechanism of estoppel. And, of course, consideration is irrelevant in non-contract cases in which estoppel is used. Nevertheless, the quotation serves to show that the use of estoppel is to be considered as exceptional rather than simply as another way to enforce promises.91 Certainly a court that is inclined to deny estoppel may rely on the argument that the parties would have made a contract if the relevant obligation was expected to be enforceable.92 A related point 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

An effort to put an end to an estoppel or to nip it in the bud must be conveyed by a clear message. The estoppel will operate if there is a failure in this regard: Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 at [91]–[105] (Bell P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJ concurring). It is also possible to make a promise legally binding by embodying it in a deed under seal. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 403 (Mason CJ and Wilson J). Compare the American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 90(1), under which promises inducing reliance are enforceable in the absence of consideration. Mason CJ and Wilson J discussed § 90 at 401–2. See, for example, DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [66] (Meagher JA). In a non-commercial setting, this type of argument is obviously less valid. However, even a sophisticated commercial party may have a reasonable expectation of commitment despite absence of contract. An example is Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at

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Estoppel

2.9

is that some judges take the view that a court should be cautious to allow an estoppel to disturb the presumably well-understood positions of commercial players.93 Contract and estoppel exist side by side occupying different niches: But there are differences between a contract and an equity created by estoppel. A contractual obligation is created by the agreement of the parties; an equity created by estoppel may be imposed irrespective of any agreement by the party bound. A contractual obligation must be supported by consideration; an equity created by estoppel need not be supported by what is, strictly speaking, consideration. The measure of a contractual obligation depends on the terms of the contract and the circumstances to which it applies; the measure of an equity created by estoppel varies according to what is necessary to prevent detriment resulting from unconscionable conduct.94

Relief 2.9  Variable remedy. Because the focus of attention in establishing liability in estoppel cases is the detrimental reliance of the party pleading estoppel, the remedy should logically be dictated by this concern. The remedy has been said to be limited to eliminating the detriment — the ‘minimum equity to do justice’.95 There is a symmetry in providing a reliance-based remedy — protecting the reliance rather than the expectation interest — in relation to a liability that is determined by detrimental reliance. However, it will be seen that the case law does not necessarily support this symmetry.96 The ‘minimum equity’ may or may not be achieved by enforcing a promise or making good a representation: [T]he object of the principle can be seen to be the avoidance of … detriment and the satisfaction of the equity calls for the enforcement of a promise only as a means of avoiding the detriment and only to the extent necessary to achieve that object. So regarded, equitable estoppel does not elevate non-contractual promises to the level of contractual promises and the doctrine of consideration is not blown away by a side-wind.97

It is thus not correct to see estoppel as necessarily concerned with the enforcement of promises, though it can be used in this way and was so in Waltons.98 Satisfying the equity may, for example, be achieved by an award of compensation, by an

93.

94. 95.

96. 97. 98.

[140]–[152] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring) (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel). Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 585–6 (Kirby P), discussed below in 2.20; Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J). Surprisingly, this argument was used in a family proprietary estoppel case in Sandri v O’Driscoll [2014] VSCA 88. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 425 (Brennan J). Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 at 198 (Scarman LJ). See Robertson, ‘Satisfying the Minimum Equity: Equitable Estoppel Remedies after Verwayen’ (1996) 20 MULR 805; Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 146–50 who argues for convergence in the treatment of proprietary and promissory estoppel cases. See Robertson, ‘Reliance and Expectation in Estoppel Remedies’ (1998) 18 Leg Stud 360. At 366–7 Robertson noted that in most cases the court protects the expectation interest rather than the reliance interest. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 427 (Brennan J); see also at 423–4. See also at 405 (Mason CJ and Wilson J): ‘Holding the representor to his representation is merely one way of doing justice between the parties.’ Interlocutory relief may be based on an estoppel argument: see Mobileworld Operating Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 1365 at [119]–[135], [161]–[162] (Weinberg J).

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2.9

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

injunction, by a constructive trust99 or by granting a lien or charge over property.100 In fact a notion of proportionality emerges from Verwayen,101 that is, it may be necessary to ensure that the remedy is proportional to the detrimental conduct or that a balance is achieved between the disadvantage that would affect the party estopped and the detriment that would be suffered by the other party if the estoppel remedy is denied.102 The Verwayen case reveals that the question of remedy is an area of estoppel where there can be disagreement about the appropriate response. The question arose in that case whether the Commonwealth could renege on an assurance that it had given that it would not use the statute of limitations in defence to a claim.103 Two judges104 held that the Commonwealth had waived its right to plead the limitation defence. Those judges who thought that estoppel was the appropriate principle to apply105 differed about the remedy that should be ordered. Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ thought that the minimum equity that would remedy the detriment suffered by the plaintiff, who had acted on the assumption that the defence would not be pleaded, was to allow him wasted legal costs (a reliance-based remedy). The Commonwealth, according to these judges, should nevertheless be allowed to change its mind and argue the defence. Dawson and Deane JJ said that the appropriate remedy was to prevent the Commonwealth from going back on its assurance which meant, of course, that the Commonwealth could not plead the defence (an expectation-based remedy).106 Gaudron and Toohey JJ, who argued on the basis of waiver, came to the same conclusion with the result that, in the end, the plaintiff was able to proceed with his claim.107 Despite these differences about what constitutes the supposed minimum equity needed to remove detriment, it is true to say that estoppel is often used to fulfil the expectation interest. This has certainly been a feature of proprietary estoppel cases.108 What this means in practical terms is that the person who has made a 99. See 16.72–16.76. 100. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 419 (Brennan J). 101. (1990) 170 CLR 394. 102. Ibid at 417 (Mason CJ), 429–30 (Brennan J), 441–2 (Deane J). An example of a case where it was held that the detriment suffered was not sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of an estoppel is Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198. See also Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 at [934]–[945] (Redlich J); and DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [79]–[89] (Meagher JA), where it seems that the fortuitous success of the overall project meant that the party claiming estoppel could not show detriment. 103. The claimant was a sailor injured in the Voyager disaster. The Commonwealth had also said that it would not rely on another defence based on the military’s immunity from tort claims. For the purpose of discussion, the statute of limitations point only is covered. 104. Gaudron and Toohey JJ. 105. Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Deane and McHugh JJ. 106. For a similar difference of views about whether the reliance or expectation interest should be protected, see Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] NSWCA 312. 107. Another case arising out of the Voyager disaster, which raised the same issue and was decided the same way, was Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333. For a case where it was unsuccessfully argued that a limitation period had been waived or else could not be relied on because of an estoppel, see Meredith Projects v Fletcher Construction [2000] NSWSC 493. 108. See, for example, McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352. See commentary Pilkington, ‘The Nature of and Approach to Relief for Proprietary Estoppel: McNab v Graham [2017] VSCA 352’ (2018) 92 ALJ 76. See also critical analysis of expectation-based relief in proprietary estoppel cases: Liew, ‘The “Prima Facie Expectation Relief Approach” in the Australian Law of Proprietary Estoppel’ (2019) 39 OJLS 183; Liew, ‘Proprietary Estoppel in Australia: Two Options for Exercising Remedial Discretion’ (2020) 43 UNSWLJ 281. McNab is further considered on the question of the limitation period at 25.13.

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Estoppel

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promise or representation must keep the promise or make the representation good. In Yarrabee Chicken Company Pty Ltd v Steggles Ltd,109 Jagot J made orders tantamount to specific performance.110 The unified doctrine theory expounded in Waltons drew on the proprietary estoppel cases and in those cases the courts have sometimes awarded a remedy that appears to exceed the ‘minimum equity’.111 For example, if someone has expended money on improving a house in the expectation of becoming owner of the house, the minimum equity would surely be compensation to cover those expenses, not full ownership.112 The answer appears to be that in certain circumstances nothing less than fulfilling the expectation interest will satisfy the minimum equity,113 though it is sometimes not very clear why. As already noted, this is a controversial area, as demonstrated by the differing views expressed in the Verwayen case.114 The High Court in Giumelli certainly did not see the reasoning in Verwayen as placing any curtailment of the relief available in estoppel cases,115 or at least in proprietary estoppel cases. It seems that the same approach can be applied in promissory estoppel cases as well.116 The decision of the High Court 109. [2010] FCA 394 at [169]–[170], [183]. See also Ewing International LP v Ausbulk Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 381 at [383] (Layton J). 110. See also the very elaborate orders made by White J in Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717, upheld on appeal: Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105. In Cresswell v Cresswell [2017] VSCA 272, the remedy of specific performance as relief in a proprietary estoppel case was discussed at some length but ultimately not granted because of deficiencies in the way the litigation was conducted. 111. See 16.68–16.71. In the nineteenth century, the proprietary estoppel cases sometimes treated the doctrine as equivalent to contract, which explains why the expectation interest was fulfilled in those cases. See Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985). See also Bright and McFarlane, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights’ (2005) 64 CLJ 449, who argued that the remedial response should be personal rights and not property rights if the former will meet the justice of the case. 112. See, for example, Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431, where full fee simple ownership was granted. See discussion in 16.70. Compare Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [84] (small monetary outlay on a property would justify compensation remedy). 113. In Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10, the High Court ruled that the expectation interest of the party pleading estoppel in a proprietary estoppel case should be protected but, on the facts, this could only be achieved by an award of compensation. See also, on the question of the appropriate remedy in proprietary estoppel cases, Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254 and Public Trustee v Wadley (1997) 7 Tas R 35. The difficulty of determining the appropriate remedy is illustrated by the latter case, in which the Full Court was split on this question. See case note by Robertson (1998) 13 JCL 178. 114. See Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis [2007] FCAFC 29, where it was essential to know for the purpose of a means test whether Mr and Mrs T had divested themselves of their interest in their property or whether the circumstances supporting proprietary estoppel merely imposed an obligation to pay compensation. The Full Federal Court was divided on this question, with the majority (Dowsett and Edmonds JJ) opting for compensation and the minority (Spender J) for full or part ownership. The case was complicated by the beneficiary of the estoppel being bankrupt, and had to be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 115. Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; 161 ALR 473; [1999] HCA 10 at [35]–[48] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ). See Donis v Donis (2007) 19 VR 577; [2007] VSCA 89 at [18]–[20] (Nettle JA), where the relationships of detriment, proportionality and expectation interest are discussed in the context of proprietary estoppel involving the promise of a house to newlyweds and the marriage failing. See also discussion by Handley AJA in Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [56]–[89] and at [3]–[5] (Allsop P) on detriment and proportionality; Harrison v Harrison [2013] VSCA 170. Some commentators consider that the ‘minimum equity’ requirement has been put to rest after Giumelli and Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19. See, for example, Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Enforcing Expectations (Most of the Time)’ (2014) 31 JCL 234. Campbell, writing before the High Court’s decision in Sidhu, argued that fulfilling the expectation interest is consistent with the ‘minimum equity’ requirement: ‘Waltons v Maher: History, Unconscientiousness and Remedy – the “Minimum Equity”’ (2013) 7 J Eq 171. See also Silink, ‘Rationalising Australian Equitable Estoppel in the 21st Century’ in Eldridge and Pilkington (eds), Australian Contract Law in the 21st Century (2021), 146–50. 116. In Taylor v Taylor [2021] VSCA 352, the unsuccessful appeal related to a determination of the amount of damages in equity in response to a claim based on promissory estoppel.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

in Sidhu v Van Dyke117 complements Giumelli, being a successful claim based on proprietary estoppel where the remedy was the monetary value of the full expectation interest of the gift of a property. The minimum equity dictum appears to have been replaced by the proportionality principle.118 Ultimately, the court is vested with a wide discretion in shaping the appropriate remedy, as demonstrated in Giumelli, where a number of practical factors shaped the eventual compensatory remedy. This gives advocates the opportunity of making ambit claims, but, of course, the court’s task is to arrive at a fair result. It seems that the expectation interest is the starting point, with the onus on the party arguing for a lesser remedy to make his or her point.119 One basis for making this argument is that a full protection of the expectation interest would be disproportionate. There is a possibility that the range of remedies available under the Australian Consumer Law may be available in a suitable case involving estoppel against a person who has acted unconscionably in trade or commerce. This is because s 20 prohibits ‘conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and Territories’, and this could be interpreted to include all general law doctrines in which unconscionability is an element. This possibility is discussed in 15.13.

Reliance and unconscionability 2.10  The key elements — detrimental reliance and unconscionability. It is not sufficient, according to Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons, that the party arguing estoppel has merely relied on a promise or representation: As failure to fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, mere reliance on an executory promise to do something, resulting in the promisee changing his position or suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more would be required.120

That ‘something more’ is unconscionable conduct on the part of the promisor.121 It is here that the greatest difficulty lies. For, it may be asked, how can one assess the conduct of the promisor and the actions of the promisee that have been done in reliance on the promisor’s conduct? The answer is that they must be looked at in combination. Simply to change one’s mind or to break a promise is not of itself unconscionable in the eyes of the law. But it becomes so the more that reliance has been placed on the promisor not changing his or her mind and the greater the consequential detriment that will be suffered by the promisee. It is here that unconscionability is found.122 In acquiescence cases, unconscionability is found in 117. (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19. This case is minutely analysed by Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 with a view to demonstrating the formidable difficulties facing courts in proprietary estoppel cases. 118. Harris v Harris [2021] VSCA 138, where the notion of proportionality is extensively discussed; Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 at [171]; Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [142] (Bathurst CJ). 119. Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Enforcing Expectations (Most of the Time)’ (2014) 31 JCL 234 at 235. 120. (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 406. 121. See Young, ‘Unconscionability and Promissory Estoppel’ (2016) 90 ALJ 878. 122. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. The concept is mentioned 31 times in Waltons, 36 in Verwayen and 9 in Sidhu.

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Estoppel

2.10

the party against whom estoppel is argued remaining silent in the knowledge of the other party’s mistaken assumption.123 Reliance has two aspects in terms of causation. The promisor must cause the promisee to adopt an assumption that is generated by the promisor’s promise, representation or conduct. And the promisee must then act on that assumption in a manner that is detrimental if the assumption is falsified.124 There are differing views about the appropriate test for causation in estoppel cases. Handley argues that it is sufficient if the promisor’s conduct was a contributing cause to the promisee’s change of position.125 On the other hand, Silink argues that a more demanding ‘but for’ test should be employed.126 Handley asserts that it is not appropriate for hypothetical counterfactuals (what if the promisor had not made the promise?) to be employed to ascertain causation. However, there are examples of such a technique being endorsed.127 It is clear that the question of reliance and unconscionability should be tested at the time when the promisor wishes to assert his or her rights or otherwise pursue a course of action contrary to what was promised or was assumed.128 Whether a court will allow the breaking of the promise or action contrary to the assumption depends upon the circumstances at that time in the light of the dealings that have taken place between the parties. It appears that the potential for detriment is sufficient. In Repatriation Commission v Tsourounakis,129 it was necessary for the purpose of a means test to assess whether Mr and Mrs T had divested themselves of their property in favour of their son. They of course wanted to argue that they had divested themselves of their property and so the case was rather different from the usual (proprietary) estoppel case. The case was complicated because the son had become bankrupt during the period that was crucial to determining whether an estoppel had arisen.130 One argument that was tried unsuccessfully was that there was no detriment suffered by the son: the parents had not reneged on their assurances that the property was his. The Full Federal Court summarily dismissed this argument.131 The son had expended time, effort and money on the property. The case illustrates the difficulty about remedy discussed in 2.9, namely, whether the appropriate remedial response is to fulfil the reliance or expectation interest. The Full Court was divided on this question.132 It is therefore crucial to examine the promisee’s reliance. Reliance is a multifaceted thing, involving both parties to the relationship. Its constituent elements will now be examined. What follows shows that the reliance element must involve 123. Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155. 124. Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 231 posit three levels of causation, the third being a causal inquiry as to extent of remedy. 125. Handley, ‘Recent Cases: Estoppel: Conventional Estoppel – Detriment – Contract – Proprietary Estoppel – Equity – Equitable Remedies’ (2017) 91 ALJ 812 relying on Lynch v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428. 126. Silink, ‘Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2016) 43 Aust Bar Rev 320. 127. Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 at [87]–[91], [116]–[117]; Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 9 at [77]; Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [124]. Compare Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121 at [217]–[221]. 128. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 at 106, 114. 129. [2007] FCAFC 29. 130. The case went twice to the Full Federal Court. The first decision was [2004] FCAFC 332. 131. [2007] FCAFC 29 at [104] (Dowsett and Edmunds JJ). 132. Spender J considered that the expectation interest should be vindicated; Dowsett and Edmunds JJ the reliance interest.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

material reliance: see 2.15. The onus of proof of reliance rests on the party arguing for an estoppel.133 There is no notion of a shifting onus, for example to the defendant to show that there was no reliance, in estoppel cases.134

Reliance 2.11  Reliance must relate to legal relations. As already noted in 2.2, the reliance must relate to existing or potential legal relations or facts that affect legal relations,135 though not necessarily commercial relations.136 This element is not difficult to satisfy, and merely does for estoppel what the doctrine of intention to create legal relations does for contract.137 In estoppel cases, the concept of ‘legal relations’ is more diffuse, and is not confined to an expectation or assumption that a contract has been, or will be, established.138 One aspect of reliance may concern who is the relying party. In Trentelman v The Owners – Strata Plan No 76700,139 a general meeting of an owners corporation was given an assurance by the majority owner of lots that all lot holders would have access to a swimming pool. The representor then prevented access by some lot holders. One issue was whether the individual lot holders could assert an easement when the representee was the owners corporation. Leeming JA undertook an extensive analysis of the strata titles legislation (which had changed during the time relevant to the dispute) and concluded that a proprietary estoppel ruling in favour of the body corporate bound its members. It was artificial to distinguish between the corporation and its members.140 2.12  Encouraged or induced reliance. If the promisee’s or representee’s reliance has been encouraged or induced by the other party, then there is unconscionable conduct if the latter reneges.141 In other words, it does not lie in the mouth of a promisor to set out to encourage or induce a certain response in the other and then complain that that response was not reasonable in the circumstances.142 2.13  Reliance with knowledge of party estopped.143 It has been said that reliance must either be intentionally induced or encouraged or, if inducement was not actively 133. Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [50]–[61], [90]. 134. Ibid. 135. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 420–1 (Brennan J). See Public Trustee v Kukula (1990) 14 Fam LR 97, where it was held that a promise to marry could not be enforced by way of estoppel, given that the action for breach of promise of marriage has been abolished by the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. 136. W v G (1996) 20 Fam LR 49; Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241; Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318. 137. See Chapter 5. 138. Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at [153]–[170] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring). 139. [2021] NSWCA 242. 140. Ibid at [171]–[203]. 141. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 406–7 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 420 (Brennan J); illustrated by S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Bros Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637 (tenant led to believe that there was no need formally to exercise an option to renew). 142. See Re Ferdinando; Ex parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 243, where F provided a mortgage as security for a personal loan. The mortgage covered ‘… any guarantee … which may hereafter be given’. Seven years later the bank asked for a guarantee relating to a business debt. F did not link the guarantee to the earlier mortgage. The bank did not say anything about the link. It was held that by its inaction the bank had encouraged F to assume that there was no link between the mortgage and the guarantee, with the result that the bank was estopped from using the mortgage as security for the guarantee. 143. See Robertson, ‘Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel’ (1998) 24 Mon LR 115.

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Estoppel

2.14

pursued, the person estopped must have knowledge of the reliance by the other party.144 Brennan J’s fourth element (see 2.5) states ‘the defendant knew or intended him to do so’. This again provides the element of unconscionability: it does not lie in the mouth of the promisor to complain of reliance by the promisee when the former knew full well that would happen and had done something to generate that reliance or, as in Waltons, had omitted to disabuse the other party of the assumption generated by the promisor. On the other hand, there can be no relevant reliance if the other party has done nothing to foster reliance or has positively indicated that there should not be reliance.145 Whether some element of objective or constructive knowledge could give rise to an estoppel is not settled.146 For example, would it be a defence for Waltons to say ‘We did not intend Maher to act on our tacit promise; we did not know that he would start work’? It is submitted that an objective test should be applied, as it is in other areas involving unconscionability,147 so that it is no defence to say ‘We did not intend …’ or ‘We did not know …’ when a reasonable person should have realised that there would be reliance. The answer to such a claim is ‘You ought to have realised …’.148 An estoppel therefore will not arise on the basis of ‘an unforeseen and unforeseeable detriment but nor is it necessary that the precise detriment relied upon be foreseen or foreseeable’.149 On the other hand, if a person makes a mistaken representation and does not intend his or her words or conduct to be understood as they were reasonably understood by the other party, this does not preclude an estoppel arising so long as there was sufficient detrimental reliance.150 2.14  Reasonableness of reliance.151 Again, linked to the idea of unconscionability is the reasonableness of the other party’s expectation and responses. Reliance has 144. Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 423, 429 (Brennan J). See also Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 at 306–7 (Doyle CJ). 145. Carbone as Trustee for the S & N Carbone Family Trust v Mills [2019] NSWCA 15 (mistaken belief in no way contributed to by the promisor not sufficient); State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170; Budmore Pty Ltd v Johnson (1993) 6 BPR 13,574 (starting to perform work before contract finalised where no encouragement to do so; held not unconscionable to deny existence of contract because party had taken the risk by starting work). A similar case is Gobblers Inc Pty Ltd v Stevens (1993) 6 BPR 13,591 (entry into possession before lease executed not a representation that a lease existed). 146. In Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 445, Deane J discussed an objective test. 147. See, for example, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, discussed in Chapter 15, particularly in 15.5. See also The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3478]–[3480] (Owen J). 148. The Victorian Court of Appeal in New Zealand Pelt Export Co Ltd v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Ltd [2004] VSCA 163 at [99] (Nettle JA, Hansen AJA and Ormiston JA concurring) expressed a preference for an objective test. In this case the terms of an insurance policy did not cover the risk but by an estoppel it was held that the risk was covered. See also Byron Shire Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158. 149. Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 at 307 (Doyle CJ). For a case of unforeseen reliance, see New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 54; (2003) 57 NSWLR 1. 150. Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 at 327 (Isaacs J); Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 at 215 (Lord Shand). In Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370, a refinancing settlement was concluded with all parties declaring that everything was in order. One of the parties then discovered that a mistake had been made and acted promptly to retrieve a discharge of mortgage. It was argued that its assurance that everything was satisfactory raised an estoppel. A majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal (Maxwell P and Redlich JA, Dixon AJA dissenting) held that no estoppel operated because the mistaken assurance was not made to the incoming lender but to the borrower. 151. See Robertson, ‘The “Reasonableness” Requirement in Estoppel’ (1995) 1 Canberra LR 231; Robertson, ‘Reasonable Reliance in Estoppel by Conduct’ (2000) 23(2) UNSWLJ 87; Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 239–48.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

two aspects: the reasonableness of the adoption of the assumption or expectation allegedly generated by the other party;152 and the reasonableness of the action taken in reliance on that assumption or expectation.153 As to the latter, it is sufficient if the reliance is only partial, that is, the information, promise or representation was only a reason for the recipient relying to his or her detriment.154 It is not enough that the promisee has a hope or unjustified expectation that the promise will be kept.155 Of course, there is a danger here of question-begging. When is reliance justified? Two cases illustrate this aspect of the complex of factors that must be weighed in the balance in estoppel cases. In A-G (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd,156 an estoppel argument failed in circumstances where protracted negotiations for a contract, involving substantial detrimental reliance, in the end came to nothing because one party pulled out. Importantly, the negotiations were ‘subject to contract’ and this precluded the possibility of arguing for the formation of a contractual relationship in the absence of a formal contract.157 Even so, it is not impossible for negotiations that are ‘subject to contract’ to generate an estoppel.158 The other case is the Waltons case itself, where the background (particularly the fact that Waltons was under time pressure to get on with the project and had conveyed this concern to Maher) was such as to tip the balance the other way. The reasonableness of the reliance is tied to the promisor’s conduct, discussed above. That is, if the promisor has encouraged reliance or knows, or ought to know, that the promisee will act in reliance in a certain way, then the promisee who acts in that way is generally acting reasonably and satisfies this element of estoppel. On the other hand, if the acts in reliance are either unreasonable because the promisor

CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 1; 237 ALR 420; [2007] HCA 36 illustrates the difficulties that can be encountered on the reliance question. A majority of the High Court held that no requisite reliance was established. 152. See, for example, Doueihi v Construction Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 247; 333 ALR 151; [2016] NSWCA 105 at [202]–[217] (Gleeson JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA concurring) (commercial deal among family members where occupancy rights without a lease upheld through an estoppel; reliance on trust generated by family setting was reasonable in the circumstances). 153. The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 at [3482] (Owen J). 154. Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; 238 ALR 232; [2014] HCA 19 at [71], [90]; Lifoon Pty Ltd v Gillard; Hendriks v Gillard [2006] NSWCA 182 at [23] (Handley JA, Ipp and Tobias JJA concurring). See Edelman, ‘Unnecessary Causation’ (2015) 89 ALJ 20 at 28, who argued that strict ‘but for’ causation is not applied in estoppel cases. This view is endorsed by Handley, ‘Recent Cases: Estoppel: Conventional Estoppel – Detriment – Contract – Proprietary Estoppel – Equity – Equitable Remedies’ (2017) 91 ALJ 812 relying on Lynch v Stiff (1943) 68 CLR 428. Contrast Gageler J in Sidhu at [91]–[95] and Silink, ‘Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2016) 43 Aust Bar Rev 320. See also Ward and Puttick, ‘Willpower has no Voltage: Problems with Causation in Equitable Estoppel’ (2022) 49 UWALR 230 at 250–61. 155. A borderline case is Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v City of Penrith (1989) NSW ConvR 55-438, in which the Association had a strong expectation that it would be granted a lease but was specifically told that no assurance was being given. Hodgson J said that Waltons was not applicable but was nevertheless prepared to make a restitutionary order because it would be unconscionable for the council to take the benefit of resurfaced tennis courts without paying for them. See also Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 (mere hope that a lease would be entered into not sufficient to found an estoppel). 156. [1987] AC 114. 157. See 5.24. 158. See Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) Aust Contract Rep 90-094 at 90,805, 90,810 (Ormiston J), though on the facts no estoppel was generated in this case. In Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1980) 41 P & CR 179, an estoppel overrode a ‘subject to contract’ clause. This possibility was acknowledged in Humphreys Estate itself: [1987] AC 114 at 127–8. See Silink, ‘Equitable Estoppel in “Subject to Contract Negotiations”’ (2011) 5 J Eq 252; Handley, ‘Exploring New and Old Ideas about Estoppel and Election’ (2019) 93 ALJ 594 at 599.

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Estoppel

2.15

specifically warned the other party not to rely,159 or because common sense dictates that it would be unreasonable to rely,160 or are acts that could never have been foreseen by the promisor, then the estoppel argument will not be successful. The reasonableness of reliance is also tied to the promisee’s state of mind. For example, it would be unreasonable of a person who had been told a fact to rely on it when he or she knew that it was unreliable. This must be distinguished from the situation where two parties have for convenience adopted an assumption that they both know may not reflect the facts but which facilitates their relationship in some way, for example, that an exchange rate will remain constant. Estoppel may prevent a departure by either party from the assumption (known as estoppel by convention).161 It appears that a person who is told something by another is not required to investigate. It is not therefore possible to argue that the person receiving the information had constructive knowledge that it was incorrect and therefore could not be said to have relied on it.162 This is obviously a matter of degree and no hard and fast rule can be stated but the general principle that a person need not investigate the truth of what he or she is told is in accord with the same principle in the law of misrepresentation.163 Nevertheless, the promisee’s constructive knowledge, or something close to that state of mind, may go to the question whether it was reasonable to rely on the representation or assumption generated by the other party. 2.15  Detrimental reliance. As already pointed out, reliance must be something more than merely expecting the other party to keep to his or her word. Probably the greatest controversy lies in the question of what acts in reliance are sufficient to raise an estoppel. The difficulty here is that the acts in reliance must be sufficiently serious or substantially ‘material’, even if not necessarily quantifiable.164 Another difficulty with the notion of detrimental reliance is that the relevant acts or conduct may not be initially detrimental (for example, paying reduced rent) but only become so because the other party has changed his or her stance.165 There is therefore the notion of reliance that is potentially detrimental. 159. State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 (not reasonable to rely on assurances about how an unambiguous termination clause would be interpreted after person giving assurance had said he had no authority to change or delete the clause). 160. Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; 46 ALR 1 (not reasonable to rely on a statement made by a secretary in a solicitor’s office). Compare Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284 (vendor prevented from insisting on deadline after solicitor said, two days before deadline, that request for extension should be submitted in writing and instructions would be sought). See also Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, where it was held that it was not reasonable for a company to rely on a stance taken by the Australian Securities Commission which was changed when a newly decided case came to light. 161. See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II); 2.3. 162. Standard Chartered Bank Australia Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164. 163. See 11.35–11.36. 164. Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560; 307 ALR 512; [2014] HCA 14 at [150] (Gageler J); Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [141]–[147] (Bathurst CJ). See Aitken, ‘Unscrambling “Detriment” — Unjust Enrichment, Mistaken Payments, and Estoppel’ (2014) 38 Aust Bar Rev 269. 165. Waddell v Waddell (2012) 292 ALR 788; [2012] NSWCA 214 at [65]–[67] (Campbell JA, Allsop P and Sackville AJA concurring) (forgone career path found to be sufficient detriment). In Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65, reliance by a son-in-law on his deceased wife’s mother’s promise to transfer a burial licence for the burial of the deceased wife and future burial of the son-in-law was sufficient to establish an estoppel when the mother-in-law reneged.

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At times the concept of detriment is not treated with clarity. It is said that the underlying purpose of estoppel is to ‘prevent’ detriment. In most cases the acts in reliance have already occurred and are, by themselves, neutral. The detriment occurs when the promisor switches and renders the promisee’s prior acts in reliance either wasted or unproductive. The purpose of estoppel is to redress this consequence. The statements of principle occupy a continuum that is strict at one end (the promisee must have detrimentally altered his or her position in reliance on the promise),166 and less stringent at the other end (the promisee must have acted on the promise).167 What is not always clear is what these expressions mean in the circumstances of a particular case. Two commentators168 have suggested three ‘levels’ of response to a promise or representation of the type being considered here: 1. A promisee may merely have accepted and acquiesced in the new arrangement believing that the promise would be kept. 2. A promisee may have changed his or her position, that is, done something that he or she would not have done if the promise had not been made. 3. The promisee may have changed his or her position as in (2) but, in addition, would suffer a material disadvantage or detriment if the promisor were allowed to resile. The level of reliance is, in its turn, crucial in, first, establishing whether estoppel is made out (liability) and, second, if liability is established, what the appropriate remedy should be.169 As already pointed out, identifying the relevant detriment (and therefore remedial response) was the controversial issue in the Verwayen case discussed in 2.9. In deciding the appropriate remedial response, a court is not involved in ‘measuring’ detriment170 but instead in weighing the various consequences resulting from the promisor’s change of stance, including benefits derived by the promisee from acting on the promisor’s assurances.171 Probably the best guide is to go back to one of the founding statements on the law of estoppel in Australia. In Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd,172 Dixon J said: … it is often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to 166. Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657; Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556. Deane J in Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 at 278 spoke of ‘material disadvantage’. 167. Denning LJ in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220. 168. Lindgren and Nicholson, ‘Promissory Estoppel in Australia’ (1984) 58 ALJ 249. 169. See, for example, Re Neal; Ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659, where a creditor gave an assurance that a dishonoured bill of exchange would not be enforced in exchange for the debtor paying a sum of money. The debtor then incurred legal costs in meeting this requirement. It was held that the incurring of legal costs was a sufficient detriment to raise an estoppel and that the subsequent bankruptcy notice was consequently invalid. In Equititrust Ltd v Franks (2009) 258 ALR 388; [2009] NSWCA 128 at [35]–[40], it was sufficient that the promisee stopped seeking refinancing, albeit on the facts for a limited period of four months (which, in turn, dictated a limited remedy). See discussion of detriment, particularly lost opportunity detriment, by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [3495]–[3511]. 170. Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [18] (Macfarlan JA), [164] (Emmett AJA). 171. Q (a pseudonym) v E Co (a pseudonym) [2020] NSWCA 220 illustrates the extensive analysis that assessing detriment can involve. The weighing of benefits is discussed at [139]–[155]. It is not necessary to quantify the exercise of weighing detriments and benefits (at [157]). 172. (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674.

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no misunderstanding, it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted that led to it.

In a given case, the circumstances that usually give rise to the most difficulty are such that (1) and (2) are satisfied but (3) arguably is not. The Australian pronouncements talk of detrimental reliance so that it would appear that level (3) reliance must be satisfied.173 Certainly there are many reported cases where an estoppel has failed for want of sufficient detrimental reliance being established.174 All the same, experience with the actual results of cases shows that this formula is easily stated but less easily comprehended. For example, in the paradigm case of promissory estoppel, where a landlord has promised to reduce the rent and the tenant has duly relied on that promise by paying less rent, what detriment has the tenant suffered?175 It is not fatal to establishing an estoppel that the plaintiff cannot positively prove that he or she would have been better off had the defendant adhered to the promise or assumption.176

Unconscionability 2.16  Unconscionable conduct. We have seen that the element of unconscionability is inextricably linked to the question of reliance.177 Whether reneging on a promise or assurance or denying represented facts or acting inconsistently with an assumption is unconscionable depends on the level of reasonable reliance by the other party and the practical and material effect that the inconsistent behaviour will have on the party who has relied. In short, it is necessary to examine the predicament of the plaintiff at the time that the defendant reneges and the extent to which the defendant was responsible for that predicament.178 The question of what is unconscionability is sometimes elusive.179 Some statements of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer180 and 173. See the discussion of this issue by Kirby P in Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) 5 BPR 11,477 at 11,487, where it was held that there was no relevant detriment suffered by a purchaser at an auction who had relied on the auctioneer’s erroneous statement that the property was no longer subject to a reserve price and kept open his last bid so that the property was knocked down to him. The purchaser was not successful in arguing that the auctioneer and vendor were estopped from arguing that the sale was on the basis of a reserve price. 174. See DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 at [79]–[89] (Meagher JA), where it seems that the fortuitous success of the overall project meant that the party claiming estoppel could not show detriment. 175. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101 (discussed in 2.16), where it was accepted that there would be a detriment if the tenant had to meet an accumulated amount of unpaid rent. 176. Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [5] (Allsop P). 177. See Handley, ‘Unconscionability in Estoppel: Triable Issue or Foundational Principle?’ (2007) 7(2) QUTLJJ 477, who questions whether unconscionability as a separate element is historically justified. There were 31 references to the concept in Waltons, 36 in Verwayen and 9 in Sidhu. 178. It has been said that a finding of unconscionability is to state a conclusion rather than a step in the reaching the conclusion: Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [764] (Edelman J). This logical point arises in many aspects of legal reasoning and is often troublesome. It is not a convincing reason for saying that unconscionability is not an element in the estoppel equation. Without unconscionability, there is no estoppel. 179. If the person making a statement or promise was mistaken, this does not necessarily mean that he or she has acted innocently (and therefore arguably not unconscionably). It was held that a mistaken representation was capable of giving rise to an estoppel in Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring). 180. (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547.

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in Grundt v Great Boulder Gold Mines Pty Ltd181 (which have been so influential in the development of estoppel in Australia) may be thought to preclude the use of a broad concept of unconscionability as a basis for determining whether the promisor may resile. One criticism of such a concept is that it would lead to uncertainty and may be ‘a charter for idiosyncratic concepts of justice and fairness’.182 In Grundt, Dixon J had said that: … the law does not leave such a question of fairness or justice at large. It defines with more or less completeness the kinds of participation in the making and acceptance of the assumption that will suffice to preclude the party if the other requirements for an estoppel are satisfied.183

Deane J has said: In this as in other areas of equity-related doctrine, conduct which is ‘unconscionable’ will commonly involve the use of or insistence upon legal entitlement to take advantage of another’s special vulnerability or misadventure (cf Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489 at 526–7) in a way that is unreasonable and oppressive to an extent that affronts ordinary minimum standards of fair dealing. That being so, the question whether conduct is or is not unconscionable in the circumstances of a particular case involves a ‘real process of consideration and judgement’ (cf Harry v Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231 at 240) in which the ordinary processes of legal reasoning by induction and deduction from settled rules and decided cases are applicable but are likely to be inadequate to exclude an element of value judgment in a borderline case …184

Although unconscionability may be difficult to define, in any given case it is usually not difficult to recognise.185 But the difficulty is to assess whether the conduct is sufficiently unconscionable.186 As already stated, breaking a promise is not by itself sufficiently unconscionable (though it is unconscionable in ordinary parlance). One view that has been strongly put by Justice Kirby is that, in commercial dealings between well-advised corporations, the notion of unconscionability may be inappropriate.187 There is no doubt that views differ on this question. There is also 181. 182. 183. 184.

(1937) 59 CLR 641 at 676. Ibid; repeated by Mason and Deane JJ in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 431. (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 676. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 441. See also Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 215; 201 ALR 359; [2003] HCA 57 at [23]–[26] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), where their Honours more generally (not in the context of estoppel) issued a warning about unthinking resort to unconscionability as a reason for seeking relief. 185. In National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 2 WLR 588 at 602, Lord Scarman said, ‘Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the particular facts of the case’. 186. So, for example, in Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, it was held that it was not unconscionable or unjust for the Australian Securities Commission to take a different attitude from that it had previously adopted to a proposed scheme of arrangement, when a newly decided case came to light. 187. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 586, discussed below in 2.20. See also Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J); State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177, where Kirby P warned of the dangers of estoppel intruding into the pre-contract period so that a court will have to examine a ‘wilderness of pre-contract conversations’. The remedies available for misleading conduct already make this danger unavoidable: see Chapter 11. See also Bryson J’s expression of irritation in Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 at 279 at the misuse of estoppel in commercial cases: ‘Poorly based and incompletely considered forensic attempts to set up pre-contractual estoppels are unfortunately common, and in most cases they are quite unuseful and very wasteful of resources’.

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no doubt that estoppel has been used successfully in many commercial cases, as in Waltons.188 The unconscionability question necessarily involves a consideration of the behaviour of the promisor.189 Of course, in a case where that behaviour is such that there is little doubt about its unconscionability, it is clear that a court does take such conduct into account.190 But sometimes the courts appear to focus almost entirely on the detriment suffered by the promisee. For example, in Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia,191 a classic case of a landlord agreeing to accept a reduced rent, the court was concerned to analyse what detriment the tenant suffered when the landlord sued for the unpaid back rent. No attention was paid to the fact that the landlord had willingly agreed to reduce the rent (because of a downturn in retail activity) thereby securing the advantage of retaining a reliable tenant.192 Yet it is relevant to ask whether it was unconscionable for the landlord to secure this advantage and then try to secure the full rent as well. In other words, the question of unconscionability needs to be determined by looking both to the promisee’s detrimental reliance and the conduct of the promisor. Where the former is ‘sparse’ (as in Quaglia) the latter may be determinative. More generally, it is relevant to look at the conduct of both parties to see where the equities lie.193 It is therefore relevant to look to the conduct of the promisee. If, as in D & C Builders v Rees,194 the promisee/debtor took advantage of the promisor/creditor’s poor financial position to extract a settlement of a debt for a lesser sum, then promissory estoppel would not assist the debtor and the creditor would be quite justified in insisting on his or her strict legal rights and claiming the full amount.195 Similarly, in Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd196 it was a relevant consideration that the promisee had kept its options open by not entering into a formal lease. This is consistent with the view that all relevant factors need to be weighed in the balance in deciding whether conduct is unconscionable or not.197

188. See Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 at [40] (Buchanan JA). 189. Thus, if the promisor or representor has acted innocently, his or her behaviour is not unconscionable. For example, a vendor’s silence in the face of breach by a purchaser will not mean that the vendor has waived the breach if he was ignorant of it: Berry v Hodsdon [1989] 1 Qd R 361. 190. Discussed in ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 at [172]–[181]. 191. (1980) 26 SASR 101. See also Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165, involving a promise, prior to execution, to reduce the rent. 192. In Machirus Properties Ltd v Power Sports World (1987) Ltd (unreported, NZ High Ct, 26 May 1998, noted in [1998] BCL [723]), Heron and Gendall JJ said that the benefit to the landlord in retaining a tenant was held to amount to a consideration. 193. Thus, in Trippe Investments Pty Ltd v Henderson Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 214 at 231, it was not unconscionable for a representor to depart from a representation when the representee had engaged in misleading conduct, albeit innocently. 194. [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. See also Re Goile; Ex parte Steelbuild Agencies Ltd [1963] NZLR 666 at 679. 195. See 4.36 on the principle of consideration relating to payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction of a larger debt. 196. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, discussed in 2.20. See also Seymour v Seymour (1996) 40 NSWLR 358 at 365–7, where Mahoney A-CJ, with the concurrence of Meagher JA and Abadee A-JA, discussed the possibility of the plaintiff being in ‘breach’, though, on the facts, no such finding was made. 197. See Goff J in The Post Chaser [1982] 1 All ER 19 at 27. See also Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 at [14] (Campbell JA): ‘in some circumstances an equity that arises by estoppel may be conditional upon the performance by the plaintiff of certain obligations’.

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In addition, ‘he who comes to equity must come with clean hands’.198 In Cream v Bushcolt Pty Ltd,199 it was held that a restraint of trade clause was illegal. It was then argued that the party supposedly bound by the clause was nevertheless estopped from competing with the other party. It was held that the clean hands doctrine prevented the party from arguing estoppel, that is, it could not use estoppel as an indirect way to enforce an illegal clause.200 However, this depends on the particular circumstances and, in the case of alleged statutory illegality, the policy of the legislation.201

The effect of an estoppel 2.17  Is estoppel suspensory or permanent? We saw in 2.5 that an estoppel may act to ‘set the scene’ for a cause of action or it may be a cause of action in itself. In the past it has been said that an estoppel is generally suspensory and only becomes permanent if it is impossible to restore previous relations because of some change of circumstance. But, in the light of modern developments in estoppel, this is now not correct: an estoppel may be capable of permanent operation from the outset. It depends on what assurance, promise or representation was made by the party estopped. This question may be relevant, in particular, to those cases where one party has promised not to enforce his or her strict legal rights. In cases such as Hughes,202 the estoppel operated to suspend the running of a time period with the ultimate consequence that the tenant was not in breach by repairing later than the original agreement required. Thus, the doctrine did not extinguish the landlord’s substantive right to have the repairs done. An example of a substantive right being extinguished is the landlord and tenant case where, if the estoppel operates, the right to unpaid back rent is extinguished forever.203 The landlord’s right to reinstate the full contract rent for the future by giving notice is, however, preserved.204 In this latter sense an estoppel may be suspensory and the only limitation to this is that the former terms cannot be reinstated if it is no longer possible to do so.205 Then the estoppel becomes permanent. It follows that it

198. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 641. An attempt to argue that a party could not benefit from an estoppel because its hands were not clean was unsuccessful in Rawlings Pty Ltd v Redder than Red Tomato Co Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 367. See also Pegela Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 at [927]–[933], [951] (Redlich J). 199. [2004] WASCA 82. 200. Ibid at [100]–[105]. See also Bullhead Pty Ltd v Brickmakers Place Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] VSCA 316 at [115]–[121], where the conduct of the party pleading estoppel was ‘unlawful and immoral’. In Plath v Plath [2020] QCA 43, an estoppel argument was allowed so long as the party arguing it ‘washed’ his hands by returning a first home owner’s government grant. A son had agreed to buy his parents’ house but it was intended that the sale and mortgage would not be enforced. 201. See Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167 at [35]–[38] (Buchanan JA): ‘Unmeritorious or immoral conduct will not disentitle a plaintiff from equitable relief unless it has “an immediate and necessary relationship to the equity sued for”’, citing Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318 at 319 (Lord Chief Baron Eyre). See also Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2012) 45 WAR 29; 294 ALR 550; [2012] WASCA 216 at [308]–[310] (McLure P, Newnes JA and Le Miere J concurring). 202. Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439, discussed in 2.5. 203. Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. 204. Central London Property Trust v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. 205. Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326 at 1330; [1964] 3 All ER 556 at 559 cited in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 420. See also Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839.

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may be possible to give notice to change the circumstances on which the estoppel is based if it is possible on the facts to resume the earlier state of affairs.206 Another example is where a promise is made to accept a lesser sum in satisfaction of a debt. It was stated by Lord Denning MR in D & C Builders v Rees207 that, had the estoppel operated, the right to the balance of the debt would have been extinguished. Similarly, in Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr208 the right of a landlord to seek contribution for roof repairs under a contract was extinguished. Whether an assurance operates to suspend or extinguish will depend upon its interpretation. The surrounding circumstances may be relevant to such interpretation. For example, an assurance to accept reduced rent could mean either that the obligation to pay full rent is delayed or it is extinguished. Usually, in such cases, the latter interpretation will prevail. By contrast, in credit transactions, an assurance allowing the paying party not to meet the periodic deadlines will be interpreted, as a matter of common sense, to mean that the debtor’s obligations are suspended (or delayed), not extinguished.209 A possible source of confusion here is the statement that estoppel is suspensory and will only become permanent if the promisee cannot resume his or her position.210 This statement does not take into account what was promised or assumed in the first place. It is appropriate if the promise was by its terms suspensory but then something happened that made it impossible to resume the former contractual relations. It is not, however, applicable to cases where the promise, by its terms, extinguishes rights.211 It cannot be said, in the case of reduced rent having been paid, that the promisee cannot resume his or her position. It is not impossible for the tenant to pay the unpaid back rent. Yet the courts clearly treat the estoppel as being permanent and not merely suspensory, that is, the tenant’s obligation to pay the difference is extinguished rather than delayed.

Evidence and estoppel 2.18  Estoppel, the parol evidence rule and entire agreement clauses.212 It will be seen in Chapter 10 that in dealing with the question whether a written contract represents the entire terms agreed to between the parties, the courts may call in aid the parol evidence rule. This rule gives primacy to the written document and forbids attempts to add to, vary or contradict the written contract by adducing evidence of conversations, letters and so forth, so long as the parties intended that the document constituted their entire agreement.

206. See, for example, ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argot Unit Trust) v The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (2008) 21 VR 351; [2008] VSCA 247 at [171]. The possibility of nipping an estoppel in the bud before detriment is suffered is discussed at 2.7. See Valmont Interiors Pty Ltd v Giorgio Armani Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 93 at [91]–[105] (Bell P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA concurring). 207. [1966] 2 QB 617. See 2.16. 208. [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737. 209. Compare Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1326; [1964] 3 All ER 556. 210. Ibid at 1330; 559 cited by Brennan J in Waltons (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 426. 211. See Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ ConvR 307 at 310. 212. Jackman, ‘Some Judicial Fallacies Concerning Entire Agreement Clauses’ (2015) 89 ALJ 791; Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126.

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There are a number of exceptions to the rule. In so far as estoppel allows evidence of, for example, pre-contractual conversations, the question may arise whether this oral evidence can be used in a way that will affect the operation of the written contract.213 For example, suppose that a landlord says to a tenant, before the written lease is executed, that he (the landlord) will not actually enforce a clause that forbids domestic animals on the premises. If the landlord later objects to the tenant keeping a cat on the premises, could evidence of the understanding be adduced to support an estoppel argument? The answer is that it clearly could and that estoppel represents yet another exception to the parol evidence rule.214 The parol evidence rule is often ‘reinforced’ by the use of an entire agreement clause in the written contract. This clause is clearly effective to ensure that only the terms in the written contract are binding on the parties and that any external alleged contractual promises (such as in a letter) are excluded. In short, the clause is effective to exclude extra terms. But the clause commonly attempts, in addition, to exclude prior representations, statements or information. Is it effective to preclude an estoppel argument based on a prior representation? It is suggested that it would not be effective, just as it is not effective in purporting to exclude the consequences of misleading conduct.215 This is because the elements of estoppel are entirely situation-specific. If a case should arise where these elements are found, so that it would be unconscionable for one party to go back on a representation made during the negotiations for a contract, the statement in an entire agreement clause that the prior representation is excluded or ‘superseded’ by the contract makes no difference to the fact that one party has caused detriment to the other by his or her unconscionable conduct. To give primacy to the written word over the spoken word, particularly when the written word consists of a standard-form contract or else a contract containing standard-form ‘boiler plate’ clauses, is to ignore the realities of human interaction.216

213. In Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 501; [2009] FCA 1220 at [121], Finn J commented on the unsatisfactory position judges find themselves in when evidence of prior negotiations is inadmissible for contract interpretation whereas the same evidence is admitted for an estoppel or misleading conduct argument. 214. See State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170, where it was acknowledged that evidence to support an estoppel is admissible, though in this particular case the estoppel argument failed. See also Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146, where parol evidence was adduced to establish an estoppel by convention, namely, an understanding that an all moneys mortgage would in fact only be enforced up to $100,000. See also the discussion by Ormiston J in Waipara Pty Ltd v The Police Association (1998) Aust Contract Rep 90-094, where it was assumed that an estoppel could be generated by pre-contractual statements; Grace v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [1998] QSC 27 (evidence admissible to found equitable estoppel as well as estoppel by convention); Gregory v Beecraft (1998) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-401; Earnshaw v Gorman & Sons Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 50 at [33] (Malcolm CJ). However, in Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 at 46, McPherson J expressed the view that it would be difficult to add to or vary a written contract using estoppel by convention. A similar view was expressed by McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 followed in Retirement Services Australia Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd (2012) 37 VR 486; [2012] VSCA 134 at [137]–[138]. See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II), particularly at 867–70. 215. See 11.150. See further 10.7. 216. See Seddon, ‘A Plea for the Reform of the Rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer’ (1978) 52 ALJ 372; Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126; Lindgren, ‘Estoppel Against Enforcing a Contract According to its Correct Construction’ (2012) 6 J Eq 144. See also Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [57], [66], [68] (Handley AJA, Giles JA and Sackville AJA concurring).

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In opposition to the argument just put, it might be said that, if the parties have expressly agreed not to base any legal argument on any information, statements or representations made during negotiations, then this agreement precludes an estoppel based on one of those statements or representations.217 Estoppel is arguably different from misleading conduct in that the latter is the product of legislation that cannot be excluded by contract. In Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd,218 Bryson J held that an entire agreement clause embodied in a comprehensive written agreement precluded an estoppel argument based on an alleged assurance made during negotiations.219 However, there are also judicial statements, including from the Full Federal Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeal, supporting the view that one cannot contract out of estoppel.220 There is therefore judicial disagreement about this question. Suffice it to say here that any clause that is used to exclude an argument based on estoppel should be construed contra proferentem so that the party against whom an estoppel is argued would bear a heavy onus in showing that the clause was successful.221 Ultimately, the question is whether one can contract out of unconscionability: one can contract out of one’s own negligence but not fraud. Unconscionability would appear to lie somewhere in between, though equity has always called it fraud. It must be acknowledged that the relationship between an alleged estoppel and a written contract is always going to be difficult but there is no doubt that an estoppel can, in appropriate circumstances, cut across what the parties have apparently agreed to in a fully written contract. This is clearly true of estoppel modifying or overriding a substantive undertaking in a contract. But it is also true of what may be termed a ‘procedural’ contractual provision, such as an entire agreement clause.222 It must depend on how the court assesses the overall intentions of the parties. In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd,223 estoppel was argued to contradict a contract. It was argued that a common assumption (that a loan would be limited recourse) that was inconsistent with the contract was really what the parties agreed 217. It has been argued that the entire agreement clause itself sets up an estoppel: the party is estopped from attempting to argue that the entire agreement clause is not effective because that party agreed to it. See, for example, Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 at 196 (McLelland J). 218. (1999) 46 NSWLR 267. 219. In doing so he expressly declined to follow the view of Rolfe J in Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146, which, in turn, was based on the opinion of McHugh JA in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170. Instead, Bryson J preferred the views of McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190 and Miles CJ in Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61. See also Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40 at 46 (McPherson J); Chint Australasia Pty Ltd v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 635 at [138]–[141] (Einstein J). 220. Rolfe J in Whittet v State Bank of New South Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146; McHugh JA in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [444]–[448] (Allsop J, speaking for the Full Federal Court); Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 407 at [554]–[571] (Campbell JA), [32]–[33] (Allsop P), [42] (Giles JA); Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [52]–[75] (Handley AJA); Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165 at [73] (Bathurst CJ, McColl and Macfarlan JJA concurring). In Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40, it was held that estoppel was not precluded by standard no-waiver clause — see at [107]–[118] (Finn and Sundberg JJ). 221. See Seddon, ‘Can Contract Trump Estoppel?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 126 at 134. 222. Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274. 223. [2006] QCA 194.

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to. The Queensland Court of Appeal rejected this argument but this appeared to be because of the way the case had been argued.224 It is of course possible that an assumption sufficient to generate an estoppel may be superseded or displaced by a subsequent contract.225

The Impact of Estoppel in the Law of Contract 2.19  Wider implications of estoppel. It is clear from the Waltons case that estoppel may operate in any relationship (not just pre-contractual or contractual ones) so long as its essential elements are satisfied. It is also clear that it may be used as a ‘sword’, despite the insistence by Deane J in Commonwealth v Verwayen226 that ‘estoppel by conduct does not of itself constitute an independent cause of action’. In the analysis of Deane J, the estoppel ‘sets the stage’ for a cause of action that is otherwise available. But this view is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the remedy flowing from estoppel is not necessarily the full remedy that would be available for (say) breach of contract.227 The remedy is limited to what is needed to satisfy the equity.228 This remedy is unique to estoppel cases and would not be appropriate if some other cause of action were brought. In any case, there are many examples from the cases where estoppel has been treated as a cause of action in its own right.229 Estoppel opens up new ways of pursuing traditional contractual arguments and new ways to argue for obligation where traditionally the law of contract denied liability or the law of contract simply had nothing to say. For example, a promise to pay a lesser sum in satisfaction of a larger debt may be binding through estoppel but not under the traditional rules of contract.230 The following list, expressed necessarily in summary form, is not comprehensive because there is little doubt that estoppel will make its presence felt in new areas, as the case law develops. 2.20  Negotiations and formation of contract.231 In the following chapters, the traditional rules for establishing contract formation are discussed. It can be seen from the discussion above that estoppel can be used to establish a contract in the absence of the usual process of offer, acceptance and consideration.232 The Waltons case demonstrates this. It is also possible for an estoppel to operate when a ‘contract’ 224. The case had already been to the High Court on other issues: Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 472; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55. 225. Both McPherson JA and Holmes J referred to McLelland J in Johnson Matthey Ltd v AC Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) 23 NSWLR 190. 226. (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 560. See also Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [74]–[76] (Handley AJA). 227. Deane J himself supported the limited remedy principle (ibid at 355). He said that the remedy available represents the ‘outer limits within which the relief appropriate to do justice between the parties should be framed’ (at 357). But the remedy for (say) breach of contract is not an ‘outer limit’; it is the remedy. 228. See 2.9. 229. Robertson, ‘Three Models of Promissory Estoppel’ (2013) 7 J Eq 226. 230. Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329. See also 4.36–4.38. 231. See Silink, ‘Equitable Estoppel in “Subject to Contract Negotiations”’ (2011) 5 J Eq 252. 232. An example is Painaway Australia Pty Ltd v JAKL Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 205 at [246]–[256], where Ward J, as an alternative to acceptance by conduct, found there was a contract on the basis of estoppel by convention. For offer and acceptance, see Chapter 3. For consideration, see Chapter 4.

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Estoppel

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is void for uncertainty.233 Estoppel can nullify a ‘subject to contract’ stipulation.234 It may be used to establish the correct party to the contract.235 It may be used to cure a defect in the execution of a deed.236 It is difficult to state the limits of the operation of estoppel in contract formation, other than that there must be present the elements of detrimental reliance and unconscionability. Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd237 shows how difficult it is to fix the limits. There was detrimental reliance and (arguably) unconscionability aplenty in this case, yet the New South Wales Court of Appeal, by a majority, was not prepared to hold that there was a contract by estoppel: Negotiations between A and F for the erection and lease from A to F for 15 years of a supermarket were at a very advanced stage when A pulled out, saying it was going to lease to B instead. The salient facts were: no formal lease had been executed because F had said it was not ready to do so; but F had sent a letter of intent and had said that it regarded itself as bound by it; the letter of intent contained details of work which had to be carried out on the premises by A and F; F, at A’s request, sent a letter to A’s bankers stating the terms of the lease; F indicated it wanted floor space additional to what was originally agreed but a rent was not agreed to for this additional space; F gave up a lease on another property in anticipation of the lease being negotiated with A; the building was being built to F’s requirements, using F’s expertise as an experienced supermarket operator. F sued for specific performance or damages, claiming there was an enforceable agreement for a lease.

The trial judge, Needham J, held in favour of F, saying that A was precluded from denying a lease agreement even though at law no concluded agreement had been reached because the vital rent factor had not been finalised. Estoppel operated because A had acted unconscionably in accepting valuable advice, information and materials from F and then not going ahead with the deal. Needham J was prepared to find a mechanism for settling the outstanding rental term. The Court of Appeal by a majority238 reversed this decision. Kirby P stressed that the use of estoppel in the circumstances was inappropriate (though not out of the question) because the parties were well-advised, substantial commercial enterprises. Having pointed out that the parties’ actions ‘typically depend on self-interest and profit-making not conscience or fairness’, he said: [C]ourts should, in my view, be wary lest they distort the relationships of substantial, well-advised corporations in commercial transactions by subjecting them to the overly tender consciences of judges.239

The majority were very much persuaded by the fact that both parties were playing a ‘sort of cat and mouse game … each trying to put the other one in a corner yet reserving for himself the liberty to have an out’.240 The other major consideration was the fact that no agreement had been finalised on the question of rent.241 Priestley JA 233. Supalux Paint Co Pty Ltd v Vyse [1999] WASC 78 at [145]–[151]. 234. See 2.14. 235. Whitehouse v BHP Steel Ltd [2004] NSWCA 428. 236. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.32]. 237. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582. 238. Kirby P and Rogers A-JA, Priestley JA dissenting. 239. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 586. Kirby P expressed similar sentiments in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177. 240. Ibid at 585. 241. DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd (formerly called AIM Resources Ltd) (2011) 83 NSWLR 728; [2011] NSWCA 348 is a case where lack of details about the proposed arrangement told against an estoppel.

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in dissent expounded at length the law on estoppel242 (with which Kirby P agreed)243 but differed in its application to the facts of the case. The difference of views in this case shows the difficulties confronting advisers in predicting the outcomes of commercial dealings. One important difference that can be identified is the extent to which it is appropriate or proper to apply equitable notions of fair dealing in commercial relations. Kirby P and Rogers A-JA gave a clear indication that such application should be sparing;244 Priestley JA was more ready to apply such standards. It was Priestley JA in the Waltons case who spoke of ‘simple standards of honesty and fair dealing’.245 Another difficulty for advisers is to know what is the appropriate analysis of contract formation when the parties have acted ambivalently. A particular course of negotiation leading to an alleged contract may be seen as acceptance by conduct,246 as simply contract by conduct,247 as estoppel, as misleading conduct, as part performance248 or as a case of restitution.249 It is common in commercial litigation to use these various approaches as alternatives. 2.21  The privity rule. In Chapter 7 the privity rule is discussed, that is, the rule that only the parties to a contract can enforce it and benefit from it, even if a contractual promise is made in favour of a third party. There are numerous exceptions and qualifications to the privity rule which are fully discussed in Chapter 7. One exception can arise from an estoppel which can bypass contract and establish a legal link between a promisor and a third-party beneficiary that would otherwise be denied by the privity rule. This was acknowledged with differing levels of enthusiasm by some judges in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd.250 If the requisite elements of estoppel are satisfied, then it is clear that an estoppel can operate to overcome the limitations of the privity rule.251 2.22  Tendering. The issue of whether any legal obligations arise during the tendering process is one that has received some attention. The traditional view is that 242. (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 604–12. 243. Ibid at 585. 244. See also Settlement Group Pty Ltd v Purcell Partners (a firm) [2013] VSCA 370 at [47] (Maxwell P); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 386 at [46] (Pembroke J); Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 at 279 (Bryson J). 245. (1986) 5 NSWLR 407 at 423. 246. See 3.27. 247. See 3.5–3.7. 248. See 16.57–16.66. The case of Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36 illustrates the blurring of the different possible analyses. In that case the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld an oral lease on the basis of part performance. The case could have equally well been analysed as an estoppel case. 249. Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. This case was decided before the revolutionary re-casting of estoppel by the High Court in Waltons. The same facts could equally have been dealt with on the basis of estoppel after Waltons. 250. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 145 (Deane J). 251. See CSR Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Rep 90-034; Hoylevans Pty Ltd v Weir [2000] WASC 144 (restraint of trade clause binding on company but not director but latter bound by an estoppel — estoppel point not disturbed on appeal [2001] WASCA 23). In Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571, an estoppel operated not so much as an exception to the privity rule but by way of establishing a link between parties (a bank and a builder) which the usual pattern of contracts does not supply. The builder did not have a contract with the owner’s financier, but in this case the bank’s assurance that the builder would be paid was enforceable. See also Drummoyne District Rugby Club Inc v New South Wales Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Rep 90-039 discussed in 7.31.

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a tender is an offer that becomes a contract upon its acceptance, which means that there are no contractual obligations arising out of the tendering process. This view is becoming less tenable. One way in which obligations may arise in the tendering process before acceptance of a particular tender is through the use of estoppel: see 3.36–3.39.252 2.23  Irrevocable offer. If an offer is made with the promise that it will remain open for a certain time, we will see in Chapter 3 that this promise is not binding unless the offer is an option, that is, it is supported by a consideration: see 3.67. However, if the promisee incurred expense in reliance on the promise to keep the offer open, it would be arguable that the promisor would be estopped from breaking the promise even though the offer was not in the form of an option.253 Similarly, in unilateraltype offers, estoppel could be used to prevent the offeror from withdrawing the offer before completion of the requested act, so long as the offeree started to perform.254 2.24  Forbearance and compromise.255 It is possible through an estoppel to hold a party to a promise in anticipation of, or in the actual conduct of, litigation in the absence of consideration. In Newton, Bellamy & Wolfev SGIO (Qld),256 the words ‘liability is not in issue’ in a letter sent during negotiations for the settlement of a claim were held to give rise to a contract. But it was recognised that an alternative footing for holding the writer to these words was estoppel.257 Similarly, in Commonwealth v Verwayen258 a firm assurance that the statute of limitations would not be relied upon was held to be binding in the absence of consideration. In negotiations for settlement of insurance claims, the conduct of the insurer may amount to an election not to rely on a defence if it otherwise appears to be processing the claim.259 On the other hand, in Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd,260 a majority of the South Australian Full Court held that a creditor who had indicated that a debt would be written off, but who sued for it some three years later, was not estopped. The debtor did not provide evidence of detrimental reliance. Doyle CJ conceded that this was harsh for the debtor: interest had accumulated over the three years. Bollen J, in dissent, was prepared to infer that there was sufficient detrimental reliance. Similarly, in Lewis v Cook261 an estoppel argument was not successful on the facts to make a supposed waiver of a debt legally binding.262 2.25  Gift promises. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that the traditional approach to a gift promise is that, unless it is in a deed under seal, it is unenforceable for want of consideration. Estoppel operates independently of the doctrine of consideration. It is 252. Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.27]. 253. See 3.67; in particular the reference to Drennan v Star Paving Co (1958) 333 P 2d 757. 254. See 3.71. 255. See 4.24–4.28. 256. [1986] 1 Qd R 431. 257. Ibid at 436–7. A similar case is Lindsay v Smith [2002] 1 Qd R 610; [2001] QCA 229. 258. (1990) 170 CLR 394; 95 ALR 321. See 2.9. 259. See extensive consideration of the authorities in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121. 260. (1996) 69 SASR 302. 261. (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191. 262. See also discussion of contract variation at 2.29.

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therefore possible that a gift promise could be binding on the basis of estoppel.263 So, the paradigm case of a promise of a gift to a charitable institution, discussed in 4.15, may well provide the necessary elements of estoppel so long as the institution has committed itself in a material way on the strength of the promise and this was apparent to the donor. 2.26  Evasion of the Statute of Frauds. It is clear from the Waltons case itself that, if an estoppel argument is successful in relation to a land transaction, then there is no requirement of a note or memorandum in writing as would normally be required by the appropriate Statute of Frauds provision. Estoppel may be used to establish a contract, or an interest in land264 (in either case no written evidence is required). Or it may be used simply to preclude reliance on the Statute of Frauds when it would be unconscionable in the circumstances to argue the defence.265 These possibilities are fully discussed in Chapter 16.266 2.27  Misrepresentation. The actionability of pre-contractual misrepresentations has been greatly enhanced. The impact of the Australian Consumer Law s 18 (prohibition of misleading conduct) is fully discussed in Chapter 11. In addition, in an appropriate case, a representation may form the basis of an estoppel argument. In such a case the person who made the representation may be prevented from departing from it if the other party has sufficiently relied on it.267 It is very common in litigation for estoppel and misleading conduct to be argued in parallel, based on the same events. Estoppel can operate where, for one reason or another, misleading conduct does not apply. For example, the relevant interactions may not have been in ‘trade or commerce’ or a government party may not be bound by the legislation.268 2.28  Mistake. If during negotiations for a contract, one party knows that the other party is mistaken, we will see in Chapter 12 that a failure to correct the mistake may give the mistaken party the right to rescind the contract or seek rectification. Another possible outcome is that the party who stood by and allowed the other to commit himself or herself on the basis of the mistake is estopped from denying the mistaken, as opposed to the true, version of the facts.269 Similarly, in common mistake cases, rather than setting the contract aside, it may be that a court would hold that the parties are bound by the common, incorrect assumption.270 263. See DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88. 264. See, for example, Kintominas v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475 (mother promised to leave house to son in her will and son spent money on renovations; held: son had beneficial ownership of the house). 265. Collin v Holden [1989] VR 510; Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801; Agius v Sage [1999] VSC 100. Estoppel was not successful in Powercell Pty Ltd v Cuzeno Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 51 (see 16.67); Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 126 (for different reasons: no clear statement; and no authority to make the statement). See Robertson, ‘The Statute of Frauds, Equitable Estoppel and the Need for “Something More”’ (2003) 19 JCL 173 commenting on the contrasting English and Australian law on this issue. 266. See 16.67–16.71. 267. As to whether this possibility would be precluded by the existence of an entire agreement clause that purports to exclude prior representations, see 2.18. 268. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 6. 269. Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563. 270. Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84.

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Estoppel

2.29

If a person makes a mistaken representation and does not intend his or her words or conduct to be understood as they were reasonably understood by the other party, this does not preclude an estoppel arising so long as there was sufficient detrimental reliance.271 2.29  Contract variation.272 Estoppel may operate during the course of a contractual relationship to prevent departure from a negative promise varying a term of the contract (for example, ‘You need not pay the full rent …’), as already discussed.273 Or it may bind the parties to a common assumption (traditionally called estoppel by convention).274 This assumption may be mistaken but is nevertheless binding if to depart from it would be unconscionable. Estoppel may also operate during the course of the contract in connection with other types of contract variations.275 It is very common during a contractual relationship, particularly long-term or complex commercial transactions, for contract modifications to be made. The rules of consideration, discussed in Chapter 4, are particularly rigid and are sometimes incapable of giving force to the evident intentions of the parties when an attempt is made to modify a contract in some respect.276 For example, a promise, voluntarily given, to pay more than the contract price or to accept less than the amount contractually due, are not binding, according to the traditional rules.277 The whole question of modification of contractual obligations, in particular where the modification consists of an indulgence granted by one party to the other, is complicated and dogged by doctrinal dispute.278 This is hardly surprising because of the number of ways in which the parties in a contract may make adjustments to their relationship. The dealings between them may be explicit or tacit, may be mutually beneficial or by way of indulgence by one party to the other, may affect major or minor obligations, may relate to substantive or procedural matters, may be made in anticipation of trouble or after trouble has struck, and so forth. In the course of these dealings promises, understandings, representations, assumptions, permissions, requests, actions in reliance and mistakes may be made. The contract itself may lay down a procedure for making changes to the contract. The law is then asked to distinguish these many shades of conduct and response with a coherent set of rules, a task that it has so far failed to accomplish. The debate in this area goes to the very root of contract law, that is, the extent to which the law should give its backing to the consequences and expectations created by consensual relations, which inevitably 271. Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v McKenzie (2009) 77 NSWLR 299; 264 ALR 709; [2009] NSWCA 429 at [83], [93] (Allsop P and Handley AJA, Hodgson JA concurring); Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305 at 327 (Isaacs J); Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203 at 215 (Lord Shand). 272. See 4.32–4.33, 22.2–22.6. 273. See 2.4, 2.17. 274. See 2.3. Moratic Pty Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 5; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 577; Cromcorp Quay Street Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) ANZ ConvR 307; Government Employees Superannuation Board v Martin (1997) 19 WAR 224 (Ipp J); Olga Investments Pty Ltd v Citipower Ltd [1998] 3 VR 485 (no estoppel generated by failure to send bill over an extended period). See Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (1997) 71 ALJ 860 (Pt I) and 976 (Pt II). 275. See Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251; Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49. See also GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for variation to a multi-party agreement. 276. See Giancaspro, ‘The Rules for Contractual Renegotiation: A Call for Change’ (2014) 37 UWALR 1. 277. See 4.36. 278. See Stoljar, ‘The Categories of Waiver’ (2013) 87 ALJ 482.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

go through changes. In some instances, these dynamic interactions are poorly served by the doctrine of consideration. Estoppel undoubtedly has a role in dealing with the problem of contract variations, as do the related concepts of waiver and election.279 Broadly, if the elements of estoppel are satisfied,280 a change to the contract will be binding, even though the rules of the doctrine of consideration have not been met, and, in an appropriate case, even where the change has not been made in accordance with a formal procedure for change included in the contract.281 Estoppel should be distinguished from waiver in connection with contract variation. It is commonly assumed that if a party does not assert its rights when a breach of contract has occurred, it has waived the right to performance (to be distinguished from waiving the right to terminate). The commonly used ‘no waiver’ clause282 in standard agreements appears to make this assumption.283 As with any promise, there are only three ways in which waiver of a substantive obligation in a contract can be legally enforceable: by contract,284 deed or estoppel. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that, absent contract, deed or estoppel, non-enforcement of a contractual right,285 or even a positive promise not to enforce a right,286 amounts to a waiver in the sense of precluding enforcement of that right.287 Only if the limitation period has expired is it correct to say the right has been given up (in the absence of contract, deed or estoppel), and, even then, it is still substantively 279. See the discussion of these concepts in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]; Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32; and Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55. See also on election 11.47–11.52 (rescission), 20.15 (contingent condition), 21.29 (termination). 280. Thus, for example, the statement relied on to vary the contract must be clear and unequivocal. It was held not to be so by a majority in Hodgins v Duke Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 74. This case contains a useful discussion of the principles, in particular in the dissenting judgment of Williams J. 281. See 4.32 and Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251, where a variation was made without following the procedure laid down by the contract. It was held that the owner was estopped from relying on the strict contractual procedure after its architect had acquiesced to the change. See also Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50 at [213]– [222] (Finn J). 282. For example, ‘Failure by either party to enforce a term of the Contract shall not be construed as in any way affecting the enforceability of that term of the Contract as a whole’. 283. In Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 395; 230 ALR 56; [2006] FCAFC 40 at [107]–[118] (Finn and Sundberg JJ), it was held that estoppel was not precluded by a standard no waiver clause. 284. That is, a contractual variation with consideration. A contract variation is itself a contract: Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2002] HCA 35 at [22]. 285. For a case where non-insistence on timely payments created an estoppel, see Waterman v Gerling Australia Insurance Co Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 300; 194 FLR 419; [2005] NSWSC 1066 at [98]–[99] (Brereton J). Contrast Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd v Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd (2014) 45 VR 79; [2014] VSCA 32 (no estoppel arising from non-enforcement of a take or pay clause). 286. Mortgage Acceptance Nominees Ltd v Australia Thoroughbred Finance Pty Ltd (1996) 69 SASR 302 discussed in 2.24. Contrast where a party is given more time to meet a deadline. This is, in one sense, a giving up of a right but it is not regarded in the same light as a forgiving of a substantive obligation. See Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155, where it was held that a mere extension of time may be binding in the absence of both consideration and estoppel. Contrast Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100], where an assurance to treat a late payment as on time was not held to be binding. See also Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55. 287. In Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [144]–[145], Kirby J tentatively supported the possibility of waiver of a substantive contract right absent consideration, deed or estoppel.

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Estoppel

2.32

in existence. It is, of course, possible for a party to waive (in the true sense) reliance on the expiry of the limitation period, or be estopped from relying on it.288 2.30  Parol evidence and the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer. Mention has already been made in 2.18 that estoppel may be used to add to, vary or even contradict the written terms of a contract, though judicial attitudes to this use of estoppel are mixed.289 Another aspect of the primacy given to the written contract is the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer.290 This rule holds that a collateral contract will not be enforced if it contradicts the main contract.291 So, if in negotiations for a lease, a landlord assures a tenant that he will not enforce clause 5, and, having received that assurance the tenant then signs the lease, the landlord may break the promise. It would be possible to argue that the landlord is estopped from enforcing clause 5 because the tenant has acted on the promise by entering into the lease and it would be unconscionable for the landlord to break the promise given the reliance on it by the tenant.292 If this argument were successful, there is the anomalous situation that a promise supported by consideration (the collateral promise)293 is not enforceable as a contract but is enforceable on the basis of estoppel.294 The conclusion is that the rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer should be changed.295 2.31 Breach. The doctrine of estoppel is, in most instances, concerned with precluding someone from relying on his or her strict legal rights. It is therefore possible for estoppel to operate to prevent a party from relying on a breach of contract. This may be because of an express assurance, for example, a promise not to insist on a contractual deadline;296 or it may be that conduct has led the other party to assume that strict rights will not be enforced;297 or that performance would be pointless.298 As already noted above (in 2.29), these examples are not waiver and, in each case, unless the essential elements of detrimental reliance and unconscionability can be demonstrated, the promises not to insist on contractual performance would not be binding, absent contract variation. Conduct occurring after a breach may have the effect of waiving the breach or may amount to an election not to rely on the breach.299 2.32  The creation of proprietary interests. The influence of proprietary estoppel on the development of the overarching doctrine of estoppel in Australia has already been noted. Cases in which, in the absence of contract, enforceable obligations relating to property arise are discussed in 16.68–16.71. 288. Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394. 289. See further 10.3, 10.67. 290. (1919) 27 CLR 133. 291. See 10.6. 292. See Liangis Investments Pty Ltd v Daplyn Pty Ltd (1994) ANZ ConvR 638; Bank Negara Indonesia v Hoalim [1973] 2 MLJ 3; Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB 467; [1979] 2 WLR 737. 293. The consideration is the tenant going ahead, after receiving the promise, and signing the lease. 294. This anomaly was briefly alluded to by Mason CJ and Wilson J in the Waltons case (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 401. See Saleh v Romanous (2010) 79 NSWLR 453; [2010] NSWCA 274 at [58]–[63] (Handley AJA) and Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2003] QCA 36, where the rule in Hoyt’s was outflanked by estoppel; Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWCA 169 at [111] (obiter dicta by Hodgson JA); Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 167. 295. See Seddon, ‘A Plea for the Reform of the Rule in Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer’ (1978) 52 ALJ 372. 296. See Strada Estates Pty Ltd v Harcla Hotels Pty Ltd (1980) 25 SASR 284. 297. See Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 251; 2.29. See further 21.32. 298. Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385; Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524. See 21.23, 21.25, 21.29–21.32. 299. Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121. See 21.29–21.32.

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Chapter 3

Agreement — Offer and Acceptance Introduction 3.1  Pre-contractual obligations. It has already been noted that the law of contract is part of a broader law of obligations.1 This is evident particularly at the formation stage of contract. The traditional rules for contract formation determine that there is a moment of contract — when an offer has been accepted — and assume that the bargaining period does not generate, in the absence of fraud, any enforceable obligations. This assumption is no longer valid. Three specific instances illustrate this. First, statements made during the bargaining period may generate substantial remedies if the statements are either misleading, deceptive, negligent or fraudulent.2 Second, a court may decide that a ‘contract’ has come into being through the operation of estoppel even though the contemplated formalities have not taken place and even though the traditional rules for contract formation have not been satisfied.3 Third, it is possible for a person who invites offers to make a binding commitment to accept an offer in certain circumstances.4 These instances are not exhaustive and merely illustrate a broader trend, particularly evident in Australia, towards the imposition by the courts and the legislature of standards of fair dealing when parties engage with each other. The man who said ‘I never sign contracts’5 may have been safe enough in the nineteenth century; but not so now. The consequence is that, in thinking about contract and commercial relations, it is sometimes less appropriate to ask: ‘Have the rules of offer, acceptance and consideration been satisfied?’ than it is to ask: ‘Have the parties engaged with each other in such a way that, if one party were to pull out or fail to fulfil an undertaking, the other party would be adversely affected?’ It may even be possible to see  the negotiating process as one where the parties are on a continuum of commitment, weak at the beginning and stronger as the process of negotiation develops. Of course, the law may not have a suitable formula to deal with such a theory of engagement but there is a discernible trend in that direction. Judges will certainly differ on the question of the extent to which it is appropriate to discard the old rules and replace them with ‘fuzzy’ ones. All that is being said here is that the traditional rules, that are about to be discussed, are not necessarily the definitive or exclusive answer to a contract, or near-contract, problem. This makes life difficult for practitioners and students of contract law. 1. See Chapter 1, 2.1; see also 28.9. 2. See Chapter 11. 3. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See Chapter 2. 4. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd [1986] AC 207. See 3.25, 3.28, 3.35. 5. Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 526. See 3.27.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.3

Offer and Acceptance The traditional rules of contract formation 3.2  The essentials of a binding contract. In order to determine whether a contract — that is, a legally enforceable agreement — has come into being, the common law has traditionally required two essential elements: agreement and consideration.6 Whether or not there is agreement — that is, whether negotiations have crystallised into an accord — has traditionally been determined by the rules of offer and acceptance.7 The doctrine of consideration provides the essential elements for determining whether an agreement so reached is legally binding. The law requires there to be a reciprocal exchange in that agreement. A ‘one-way’ or gift promise is not legally enforceable as a contract, even if agreement is present.8 The doctrine of consideration is intimately connected with the rules of offer and acceptance, both involving the essential element of reciprocal exchange. The promise or promises constituting an offer are the consideration for the promise, promises or act constituting the acceptance, and vice versa. The doctrine of consideration is discussed in Chapter  4. The requirement of reciprocal exchange means that a contract binds both parties as from the moment of formation. It is not possible for one party to be bound by a contract while the other party is not. The rules that determine whether an agreement has been reached are of great importance. They determine when the parties have gone past the point of no return, that is, when they become legally bound by a contract. There are very many cases in the law reports where the dispute is about whether the parties are bound or whether they had not gone that far. A party who thinks that he or she has not committed to a contract, but in fact and law has, is inevitably in breach. Given the objective theory,9 contract can be a trap. 3.3  Offer and acceptance. The rules of offer and acceptance answer several questions. Has agreement been reached? When was agreement reached? Where was agreement reached? The rules also determine what the express content of the contract is. As a general rule, a contract comes into being when and where an acceptance of an offer is communicated to the offeror.10 (An exception to this is the postal acceptance rule.)11 The terms of the offer determine the express content of the contract. (There may also be further, unexpressed or implied terms.)12

6.

A third element, intention to create legal relations, is also necessary. It has been argued, however, that this element is not separate from the requirement of consideration: Williston, Contracts, vol 1, Section 21; Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1954) 1 Syd LR 289 at 314–15. Whether this theory is sound or not, the question of intention is in any case only of importance when it is alleged to be absent. See Chapter 5. An alternative model for determining whether there is agreement (inference from conduct) is discussed in 7. 3.5. It may be made legally enforceable by being embodied in a deed. A brief description of deeds is found in 8. 4.1. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 9. See 3.4, 28.6. 10. See 3.26. 11. See 3.60. 12. See 10.36–10.61.

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3.3

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Concerning the ‘when’ question,13 the offer and acceptance model of contractual engagement provides great precision: the moment of communication of acceptance of an offer. This has been called the ‘guillotine model of contract’. Usually, such precision is not needed for the resolution of a dispute about whether the parties have committed. The alternative inference model14 — a contract may be inferred from the conduct of the parties — does not provide this precision as to timing. Concerning the ‘where’ question,15 the place of the contract is where the communication of acceptance occurs, that is, the place of receipt of the message.16 Another aspect of the rules of offer and acceptance is that they presuppose that there are at least two parties (or sides) to a contract. The common law stipulates that one cannot make a contract with oneself. This is discussed in more detail in 3.14. The parties must also be recognised legal entities.17 3.4  Difficulties in applying the rules. The rules of offer and acceptance sometimes represent a form of legalistic straitjacket on dealings between people. The rules reflect the economist’s perfect competition market in which it is assumed that people of equal bargaining power negotiate until they finally reach agreement and strike a bargain. This model presupposes freedom of contract where there is supposedly freedom to negotiate whatever terms suit the parties’ needs and a choice whether or not to enter into contract.18 This model works reasonably well if parties engage in formal contracting, such as signing a formal document,19 or, in less formal contracting, where the rules of the game are well known, such as ordering goods over the telephone from an established supplier. This model is not so well suited to some everyday transactions such as taking a bus ride, buying a can of soft drink from a vending machine, buying a plane ticket or entering into a contract to carry goods. In such cases there may be no conversation at all or, at best, a desultory conversation, the contents of which would appear to be devoid of any matters of legal significance. These types of problems are compounded in online transactions. It is a court’s task to discern from such exchange as there is (which includes conduct as well as words) whether the process of offer and acceptance has taken place. In performing its task, the court will apply the familiar objective test: what would a reasonable person infer or deduce from observing the exchange between

See discussion of the electronic transactions legislation in 3.56 for the ‘when’ issue in relation to electronic communications. 14. See 3.5. See discussion of the electronic transactions legislation in 3.56 for the ‘where’ issue in relation to electronic 15. communications. 16. See  3.47. See  also Brinkibon Ltd v  Stahag Stahl und StahlwarenhandelsgesellschaftmbH [1983] 2 AC 34; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA); SydbankSoenderjylland A/S v Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 539; 149 ALR 134 at 142 (telephone conversation between Denmark and Australia with acceptance heard in Australia; contract formed in Australia). 17. See 3.13–3.15, 17.1, 17.68, 17.72, 17.74. 18. The reality of this choice is, of course, somewhat artificial in many transactions. However, it is still an essential hallmark of contract. In Braverus Maritime Inc v  Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68; [2005] FCAFC 256 at [190], it was confirmed by the Full Federal Court on appeal that a relationship dictated by legislation was not a contract. 19. As to the significance of signature, see 3.27. 13.

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.4

the parties — contract or no contract?20 Ultimately, the court must determine whether the parties intended to commit to contract, and this intention is ascertained objectively. In some cases, the outward behaviour of the parties may lead a court to conclude that the parties have not intended to contract, even though they appear to have gone through the motions of offer and acceptance.21 Equally, it can happen that the parties subjectively may not have considered that they were contracting and yet the application of the objective test means that a court would say that there was a contract.22 The somewhat artificial analysis of offer and acceptance has been recognised judicially. In New  Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v  A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd,23 Lord Wilberforce said: It is only the precise analysis of this complex of relations into the classical offer and acceptance, with identifiable consideration, that seems to present difficulty, but this same difficulty exists in many situations of daily life, eg, sales at auction; supermarket purchases; boarding an omnibus; purchasing a train ticket; tenders for the supply of goods; offers of rewards; acceptance by post; warranties of authority by agents; manufacturers’ guarantees; gratuitous bailments; bankers’ commercial credits. These are all examples which show that English law, having committed itself to a rather technical and schematic doctrine of contract, in application takes a practical approach, often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into the marked slots of offer, acceptance and consideration.24

The difficulty of analysing contract formation in some cases is well illustrated by MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA),25 where the High  Court had to decide exactly what happens in terms of offer and acceptance when someone buys a plane ticket. Three different opinions were expressed by the three judges who were sitting.26 A similar diversity of views has been shown in other contracts of carriage. It has been said variously: that an offer is constituted by an announcement in a timetable that a train will run which is presumably accepted by the passenger buying the ticket;27 that the act of providing buses is an offer accepted by a passenger getting on the bus;28 that a passenger booking a passage on a ship makes an offer that is accepted by confirmation of the 20.

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 at [38]– [41]; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 701; 211 ALR 101; [2004] HCA 55 at [34]. 21. See Chapter 5. 22. McLauchlan, ‘Contract Formation and Subjective Intention’ (2017) 34 JCL 41 provides a convincing case questioning the dominance of, and deference to, the objective test. See also McLauchlan, ‘The Continuing Confusion and Uncertainty over the Relevance of Actual Mutual Intention in Contract Interpretation’ (2021) 37 JCL 25. 23. [1975] AC 154. 24. Ibid at 167. See MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 136–7 (Stephen J); Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 at 11,117–18 (McHugh JA). See also Lücke, ‘Striking a Bargain’ (1962) 1(3) Adelaide LR 293. 25. (1975) 133 CLR 125. 26. Barwick CJ used a unilateral contract analysis: see  3.28. Stephen J employed a traditional ‘ticket case’ analysis in which the customer is offered a ticket that he or she is taken to have accepted if the ticket is not rejected: see 10.28, 10.70. Jacobs J appeared to use an amalgam of the two, saying that there were two contracts, one bilateral and one unilateral: (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 146. See Gulf Air Company GSC v Fattouh (2008) 251 ALR 183; [2008] NSWCA 225 at [77]–[91]. 27. Denton v Great Northern Railway Co (1856) 5 E & B 860; 119 ER 701. It is doubtful whether this case would be followed today. 28. Wilkie v London Passenger Transport Board [1947] 1 All ER 258 at 259.

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3.4

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

booking clerk, even though a ticket is issued later;29 and that a ticket is itself an offer which is accepted by a passenger who received it without objection.30 This is merely to illustrate that the application of the rules is not straightforward. The difficulties encountered with applying the rules of offer and acceptance may be alleviated by an alternative model. The rules of offer and acceptance are not the exclusive model for determining contractual commitment.

Agreement in the absence of offer and acceptance 3.5  Alternative approaches. The rigidity of offer and acceptance is sometimes ill-suited to what people actually do, with the consequence that the law of contract may dictate that no agreement has been reached when the parties themselves would consider that they have entered into a contractual relationship. This is particularly evident with the ‘battle of the forms’.31 There are many circumstances of modern commerce that do not easily fit the formal offer-acceptance model, as noted in 3.4.

The inference model 3.6  The ‘global’ model. From time to time, attempts have been made to escape the straitjacket of offer and acceptance by adopting a ‘global’ approach to negotiations between parties. On this approach the court’s task is to ask whether, objectively and having regard to the totality of the dealings between the parties, they should be considered to have entered into a contractual relationship without inquiring closely into the formalities of offer and acceptance.32 Sometimes this approach is dictated by the circumstances of the case, such as where parties have ‘drifted’ into a contractual relationship, there being no precise time when it could be said that an offer had been accepted.33 Such was the case in Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd,34 in which McHugh JA said ‘a contract may be inferred from the acts and conduct of parties as well as or in the absence of their words’.35 He went on to say that ‘action and conduct before 29.

The Eagle [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70; The Dragon [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 257. Compare Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v  Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 (contract formed when ‘exchange order’ issued to passenger, such order being exchanged for ticket on arrival in foreign country); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (contract formed at moment when ticket issued to passenger). 30. MacRobertson Miller (1975) 133 CLR 125 at  137 (Stephen J); Thompson v  London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1 KB 41. 31. See 3.32. 32. Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v  Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559 at  567 (Buchanan JA with the concurrence of Ormiston and Callaway JJA) (quotation provided ‘subject to conditions of tender attached’ but none were attached; held that the standard terms nevertheless were agreed to); Marist Brothers Community Inc v Shire of Harvey (1994) 14 WAR 69; Farmers’ Mercantile Union and Chaff Mills Ltd v Coade (1921) 30 CLR 113 at 125 (Higgins J). See also 3.11. 33. See  Ormwave Pty Ltd v  Smith [2007] NSWCA 210 at  [68]–[75] (Beazley JA, Santow and Ipp JJA concurring). 34. (1988) 5 BPR 11,110. See also Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346; 321 ALR 404; [2015] FCAFC 37 at [150] (North and Bromberg JJ). 35. Ibid at 11,117 relying on Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd later reported at (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 (discussed below in 3.27). See also Pobjie Agencies Pty Ltd v VinidexTubemakers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 105, where Mason P, with the concurrence of Meagher and Handley JJA, found that a contract existed from a course of dealing. To similar effect is Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [71]–[80] (Heydon JA); Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 at [51] (Nettle JA); Meates v A-G [1983] NZLR 308 at 377 (Cooke J); Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [369] (Allsop J); Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 at [39]–[45] (Tamberlin J for the Full Federal Court). Compare Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v  St Vincent’s Hospital

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Agreement — Offer and Acceptance

3.6

the inception of a controversy is of much greater weight than what they said or did after a dispute arose’.36 Despite this statement by McHugh JA, it is clear that conduct occurring after the inception of the alleged contract is admissible for the purpose of ascertaining whether the parties did in fact intend to commit to contract.37 It is not sufficient that such conduct is either consistent (or inconsistent) with the contract alleged. The conduct must ‘necessarily’ lead to the inference that consensus had been reached.38 Such action and conduct may also generate an estoppel argument so that contractual relations cannot be denied.39 Another example of the global approach can be seen in the following passage taken from the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Gibson v Manchester CC:40 To my mind it is a mistake to think that all contracts can be analysed into the form of offer and acceptance. I know in some of the text books it has been the custom to do so: but, as I understand the law, there is no need to look for a strict offer and acceptance. You should look at the correspondence as a whole and at the conduct of the parties and see there from whether the parties have come to an agreement on everything that was material. If by their correspondence and their conduct you can see an agreement on all material terms — which was intended thenceforward to be binding — then there is a binding contract in law even though all the formalities have not been gone through …41

Ormiston J in Vroon BV v  Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd42 was prepared to conclude that the existence of a contract may be ‘evidenced otherwise than by offer and acceptance’,43 though stressing that offer and acceptance was the primary mode of ascertaining the existence of agreement. His Honour drew particularly on the American Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 22(2), which provides: A manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined. (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70, where the Court of Appeal was not prepared to infer an agreement from the conduct of the parties when they had unsuccessfully attempted to novate an agreement and the assignee and original party had acted on the basis that the novation had occurred. Estoppel was not argued because it had not been raised at trial. As to inference that a contract of retainer exists between solicitor and client, see Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187 at [23]–[24]. 36. (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 at 11,117–18 citing Fincke v US (1982) 675 F 2d 289 at 295. 37. Brambles Holdings Ltd v  Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at  [71]–[80] (Heydon JA); Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd (formerly Mayne Group Ltd) [2008] NSWCA 149 at [99]–[106] (Giles JA, Hodgson and Campbell JJA agreeing); Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [5] (Allsop P, Macfarlan JA concurring), [109] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Holt v Bunney [2020] SASCFC 89 at [141] (Nicholson J, Kourakis CJ and Hughes J agreeing). 38. See  3.11. Kriketos [2009] NSWCA 96 at  [115]–[117], [160] (McColl JA); Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand (Australia) Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [142] (Giles JA, Priestley and Meagher JJA concurring). 39. See Chapter 2. 40. [1978] 1 WLR 520 reversed on appeal: [1979] 1 WLR 294. 41. Ibid at 523–4. Another example of the ‘global’ approach is to be found in the trial judge’s treatment of the ‘battle of the forms’ problem in Butler Machine Tool Co v Ex-Cell-O Corp and in its endorsement by Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal: [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 404. 42. [1994] 2 VR 32 at 79–83. See also Husain v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 269 at [51]: ‘a manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer or acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined’ (Nettle JA with whom Chernov and Ashley JJA concurred). An attempt to argue this analysis in Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 failed on the facts. 43. [1994] 2 VR 32 at 83. See also White v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq); Collins v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] VSCA 361 at [145]–[146].

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3.6

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

These approaches, as alternatives to the offer-acceptance model, to determining contract formation are well established in Australia.44 It is a beneficial development in the law, reflecting what many commercial people actually do rather than artificially analysing their interactions by reference to the traditional offer and acceptance model.

Shrink wrap, click wrap, etc 45 3.7  Electronic terms. Other examples of adaptation of the traditional formation rules to modern commercial conditions are the contractual arrangements involved in buying software or imposing licence terms — the so-called ‘shrink wrap’ licence; purchasing by telephone or on the internet (by a ‘click wrap’ agreement);46 and the provision of terms which are accepted by the use of an internet site (called ‘browse wrap’ terms).47 As to the shrink wrap licence, the problem is that the terms cannot be perused until after the product has been opened. Does this mean that the terms are ineffectual? On the ordinary application of the rules of contract formation, terms cannot be added after acceptance of an offer (except by way of variation by agreement).48 In Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg,49 Easterbrook J, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit, adopted a very pragmatic approach to the problem,50 and held that a ‘money now, terms later’ arrangement was legally binding. The terms allowed the purchaser to reject the goods if dissatisfied but the purchaser had not availed himself of that opportunity. Easterbrook J relied on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(1): A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.

Easterbrook J assumed that the retail vendor makes the offer and may therefore determine a particular method of acceptance, including, in this case, stipulating that use of the product constitutes acceptance. In Australia it is generally the case that the retail buyer makes the offer: see  3.20. So, there may be some difficulties in applying the reasoning of Easterbrook J to Australian shrink wrap contracts.51 44.

Tecnicas Reunidas SA v  Andrew [2018] NSWCA 192 at  50 (Leeming JA, Bathurst CJ and White JA concurring). 45. See also treatment of electronic transactions at 3.48–3.56. 46. See  Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 6. ‘Shrink wrap’ refers to the typical packaging used with off-the-shelf software. ‘Click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ are adaptations of this expression, to describe the making of an agreement online by clicking on an ‘I agree’ or ‘Accept’ icon on an internet page. See 3.26 on whether clicking amounts to acceptance. See Kunkel, ‘Recent Developments in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in the United States’ [2002] MurUEJL 34. See also Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 101–2, which discusses click wrap agreements of various kinds, including online auctions. 47. These types of electronic and online contracts are discussed by Beach J in Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd  v Instagram  Inc [2020] FCA 1846 at  [239]–[255]. In this case an arbitration clause was upheld. See also Gupta, ‘Are Websites Adequately Communicating Terms and Conditions Link in a Browse-wrap Agreement?’ (2012) 3(2) EJLT . See also 3.48–3.56. 48. See Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152 at 156–66. 49. 86 F 3d 1447 (1996). See also MA Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp 93 Wn App 819 (1999). 50. A similar facilitative approach to the use of electronic contracts can be discerned in the approach of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Century 21 Canada Ltd Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc [2011] BCSC 1196. 51. The Pro CD decision is controversial, both in so far as other courts have decided against the enforceability of shrink wrap terms and in attracting criticism from commentators. See the extensive survey conducted by Vratil J in Klocek v Gateway, Inc 104 F Supp 2d 1332 at 1337–41 (2000). See also Blount, Electronic

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Even so, it is observed in the discussion of shop displays and the like that there may be exceptional circumstances where the vendor makes the offer. Clearly, it is the common assumption of the parties to a software contract that the vendor dictates the method of acceptance and so this type of transaction could constitute an exception to the usual rule that applies to shop displays and the like. Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg was followed and applied to the purchase of a computer by telephone or through the internet in Hill v Gateway 2000 Inc.52 Again the problem is that the terms may be delivered with the computer,53 so that it is possible to argue that they are too late if it is assumed that the contract was made over the telephone or internet. Easterbrook J presided in this case too, and naturally was inclined to follow what he said in Pro CD. The terms again allowed the purchaser to reject the goods within 30 days but the purchaser had not done that. It was held that the terms included with the computer were binding.54 As to click wrap and browse wrap, the issue is again whether the online customer has had an opportunity to peruse the terms before committing to the contract.55 They are therefore similar to ticket cases where it is necessary for the vendor to provide reasonable notice of the terms. The design, get-up and user-friendliness of the website are important factors.56 The ease with which vendors can impose unfair or voluminous terms is a matter of concern.57 In Australia, the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law58 could be used to challenge such terms where either a consumer or a small business59 is the customer. One type of potentially unfair term is a choice of law or jurisdiction clause that effectively makes dispute resolution impossible for the customer.60 The universally acknowledged phenomenon Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), 6.7–6.9; Hogan-Doran, ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The When and Where of On-line Contracts’ (2003) 77 ALJ 377; Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197; Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152. 52. 105 F 3d 1147 (1997). See also DeJohn v TV Corp Int’l, 245 F Supp 2d 913 (2003). 53. With internet transactions, the terms will often have been displayed to the purchaser, who cannot proceed to complete the purchase without agreeing to the terms. See I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002). 54. Legal issues arising from the use of electronic communications are further discussed in 3.48–3.56. 55. Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir). 56. See  Gupta, ‘Are Websites Adequately Communicating Terms and Conditions Link in a Browse-wrap Agreement?’ (2012) 3(2) EJLT , where the author surveyed United States and Canadian case law in which the courts lay down standards of accessibility. The author also conducted an empirical survey of a sample of European websites to assess whether they met the standards. See also Moringiello, ‘Notice, Assent, and Form in a 140 Character World’ (2014) 44 Southwest Law Rev 275 (available free at  ); Kim, ‘Wrap Contracting and the Online Environment: Causes and Cures’ (2016) California Western School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-08 (available free at ). 57. See  Moringiello ibid and Preston, ‘“Please Note: You have Waived Everything”: Can notice redeem online contracts?’ (2015) 64 Am U Law Rev 535 (available free at ). 58. See  15.20–15.25. See also Clapperton and Corones, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 ABLR 152, written before the enactment of the Australian Consumer Law unfair contract terms legislation. 59. Small business is protected as from 12 November 2016. 60. See  Gonzalez v  Agoda Co Pte Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1133 and discussion of this case by Bloemendal and Josey, ‘“Click–Clash” — Be Alert to Hidden Icebergs within Online Contracts’, April 2018 Internet Law Bulletin 182. See O’Hara, ‘Strategies for Avoiding a Jurisdiction Clause in International Litigation’ (2020) 94 ALJ 267. Forum clauses have been a problem in the United States. See  Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (2012), ch 1. See  also the Canadian case St-Arnaud v Facebook, Inc [2011] QCCS 1506, where the court declined to exercise jurisdiction because the contract provided that Californian courts were the chosen forum for disputes. Compare ACCC v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v Australian

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of users clicking without reading61 does not deter courts from holding that terms are binding, just as in the ticket cases where the same (un)reality exists. An exception was Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane,62 where the sheer volume of terms combined with their essentially exempting the merchant from everything (and hence not providing consideration) resulted in the term in contention not being enforceable. Needless to say, there is a wealth of United States material on the legal issues that arise out of this type of contracting or use of websites.63 For online auctions, see 3.22. For further discussion of electronic contracting, see 3.48–3.56. 3.8  Multi-party transactions. In some circumstances the rules of offer and acceptance are manipulated to the point of distortion so as to find that there is a contractual relationship, the court having formed the view that there must be such a relationship in the circumstances. Two examples of this process are cases in which third parties are held to be protected by exemption clauses in contracts of carriage64 and cases in which multi-party transactions are upheld by the courts. In relation to multi-party transactions, although almost all contracts involve two parties, or at  least two sides65 (with a side consisting of possibly more than one party), there is no reason why a contract cannot exist between a number of parties (for example, a five-sided contract). Usually, it is not very practical to construct such a contract because of the difficulties of designating who does what and who can complain in the event of non-performance.66 But in some circumstances the multisided contract serves a useful purpose and can be made to work. Thus, it has been held that entrants in a race who undertook to a yacht club that they would abide by the rules of the club were in a contractual relationship with each other.67 Similarly, motor dealers who contracted with the manufacturing company were held to be bound to each other by the terms of the agreement.68 The constitution of a company

Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224), a misleading conduct case, where the Federal Court had jurisdiction in respect of a United States corporation selling online into Australia. See 11.114. 61. See Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (2015), 145; Tonking, ‘Making Liars of Us All!’ (2020) 48 ABLR 89. 62. [2012] EWHC 1290 (Comm). 63. Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) 91 Minn Law Rev 459 provides a comprehensive guide to the then current United States case law. See also Moringiello, Kim and Ottaviani, ‘Notice and Assent Through Technological Change: The Enduring Relevance of the Work of the ABA Joint Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices’ (2020) 75 The Business Lawyer 1725 (available ) which surveys the development of United States law on electronic contracts over 20 years. 64. See 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 65. An example being the contracts discussed in South Launceston Football Club Inc v Tasmanian Football League Ltd (1995) 4 Tas R 342, in which it was found that there were contracts between each participating club and the League and between each player and the League. It was not necessary to determine whether these contracts imposed rights and obligations between the clubs or between the players but probably they did not. 66. See GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for the difficulties in working out whether a multi-party contract had been varied. Wollongong Coal Ltd v  Gujarat NRE India Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 135 involved a multi-party deed. The case demonstrates that a party to such an arrangement may not necessarily be able to enforce against one of the other parties. 67. Clarke v  Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 applied in Commissioner of Taxation v  Racing Queensland Board [2019] FCAFC 224 at [99]–[103]; Angela Raguz v Sullivan (2000) 50 NSWLR 236; [2000] NSWCA 240 at [65]–[67]. But contrast Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 at 285 (Santow J) (mere entry into race not sufficient to constitute a contract governed by the rules of the race). 68. McCannell v Mabee MacLaren Motors Ltd (1926) 36 BCR 369.

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has been held to create not just a contract between each member and the company but also a contract between the members.69 3.9  Tripartite collateral contract. Another example of multi-party transactions is the curiously named tripartite collateral contract. In these cases, the courts are prepared to hold that a contractual relationship exists between A and B when A makes a promise to B who, in reliance on that promise, enters into a contract with a third party, C, when that contract is of some benefit to A. The consideration given by B for A’s promise is the indirect benefit that A derives from the contract between B and C. However, the transaction is more difficult to analyse in terms of offer and acceptance. Presumably A’s promise contains at least an implied invitation to B to enter into a contract with C (or at least someone from whom A benefits). When B actually makes the contract with C, B has accepted and consequently a unilateral contract70 has been formed with A. Examples of tripartite collateral contract (which bears no relation to two-party collateral contract)71 are: •

•

•

•

A paint company promised that its paint was suitable for the plaintiff’s pier. The plaintiff told painting contractors to use the paint. The paint was unsuitable and the pier owner successfully sued the paint company for damages for breach of the promise as to quality.72 A car dealer made assurances about a car on the strength of which the customer purchased the car on hire-purchase from a finance company. The dealer’s promise was actionable in contract even though no direct contractual relationship existed between dealer and customer.73 A car owner left his car to be repaired by a crash repairer. The contract for repairs was between the repairer and the car owner’s insurance company. Nevertheless, certain implied contractual obligations, such as the duty to repair within a reasonable time and to do the job properly, arose between repairer and owner.74 A travel association displayed a sign describing the protection that would be provided if a member of the association went into liquidation or was otherwise unable to provide a holiday already purchased. It was held that the sign amounted to an offer to customers who accepted by entering into a contract with a particular travel agent.75

69.

Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140. This contract has some special features that takes it out of the realm of general contract law and into corporations law. See the discussion of what is called this ‘special contract’ in Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399; 132 ALR 1, particularly at 434–40; 26–30 (McHugh and Gummow JJ). 70. See 3.28. 71. See  10.6. In particular, the rule that the collateral promise and the main contract must be consistent (Hoyt’s Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133) does not apply. See, for example, CJ Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22. 72. Shanklin Pier v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854. See also Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand and Silica Co Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170. 73. Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229; Brown v Sheen & Richmond Car Sales [1950] 1 All ER 1102; Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186; Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301 at 309; C J Grais & Sons Pty Ltd v F Jones & Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 22. The liability of a dealer or retailer for express or implied promises made to a customer who buys from a finance company is now governed by the interaction of the Credit Code and the Australian Consumer Law Pt 5-5. 74. Charnock v Liverpool Corp [1968] 1 WLR 1498; Brown and Davis v Galbraith [1972] 1 WLR 997. 75. Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agents [1996] CLC 451.

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•

Company directors guaranteed the quality of work to be performed by the company with which the plaintiffs were about to contract. It was held that a collateral contract existed between the directors and the plaintiffs.76

Some of these cases could be analysed in terms of an estoppel binding a party who made a representation which was acted on by the other party entering into a contract with a third party. One application of tripartite collateral contract has parallels in the Australian Consumer Law Pt 5-4 Div  2, under which a consumer may sue a manufacturer77 directly for damages in respect of defects in the goods even though the purchase was from a retailer. In the South  Australian and Australian Capital Territory misrepresentation legislation,78 a person who makes a misrepresentation that induces another to enter into a contract with a third party, from which the representor derives some benefit, may be liable for an action for damages. Thus, an agent may be liable under this provision for inducing a contract with his or her principal; a car dealer may be liable for inducing a contract with a finance company. Another possible way in which legislation may be used to achieve the same result as tripartite collateral contract is to seek damages from the person promising or making representations under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.79 Much of the usefulness of tripartite collateral contract has therefore been overtaken by legislation and by the law of estoppel. It nevertheless remains as a device to be applied to new circumstances in which a person makes a promise that is acted on by the promisee entering into a contract with a third party from which the promisor benefits.

Offer and acceptance and exchange of land contracts 3.10  Land dealings. Another, and common, example of the difficulty of matching the language of offer and acceptance to what people do is the exchange of counterpart contracts in land dealings. The ‘ceremony of exchange’ undoubtedly brings a contract into existence,80 but it is not clear who offers or who accepts: It seems to be straining language to talk of an offeror and an offeree in a land contract … Exchange of parts more easily connotes mutual exchange, rather than a two stage contractual process between offeror and offeree.81

An analysis by way of alternatives was put by counsel for the appellant in Sindel v Georgiou: ‘exchange brings into existence a binding contract by means of written offer and written acceptance — one copy being the offer and the other being the 76. 77. 78.

Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79. Defined broadly to include importer and ‘brand name’ appearance of manufacturer: see s 7. SA: Misrepresentation Act 1972 s 7(1) and (2); ACT: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 174 discussed in 11.92–11.101. 79. See Kavanagh v Blissett [2001] NSWCA 79 and Chapter 11. 80. Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 666; Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 at 531–3; Brien v Dwyer (1978) 141 CLR 378 at 391; Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 15 ALR 415; 51 ALJR 743. In Western Australia and South Australia, a single contract is used. In Victoria, a single contract is used in triplicate so that exchange, strictly so called, does not occur. 81. Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 at 81 (Hedigan J). See further 3.33.

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acceptance or, alternatively, each being a simultaneous offer and acceptance’.82 In support of the first alternative is the view that ‘the offer is made when the first party to do so signs and delivers the formal contract to the other’.83 When exchange takes place by post it is not clear whether acceptance occurs when the second copy, duly signed, is put into the post or when both copies have been received,84 though if the offeror (the person who sends a counterpart to be signed and returned) stipulates that posting of the counterpart is not to be deemed acceptance then the position is clear.85 There is judicial recognition of ‘exchange’ taking place by telephone and other electronic modes of communication: see 3.57. As to the requirement that both parts should be identical, see  3.33. As to the application of the postal acceptance rule, see 3.61. As to whether in a land transaction, where formal exchange is the accepted mode of contracting, informal dealings could give rise to a contract, see 3.11.

Flexibility in applying the rules 3.11  Protracted, informal or imprecise negotiations. When there are protracted or imprecise negotiations, there will often be doubt about whether finality of agreement has been reached. This problem has generated a very large number of reported cases. The court’s task is to ascertain from the dealings between the parties whether they intended to make a concluded bargain or not. That intention is, of course, tested objectively by reference to what a reasonable observer would have concluded.86 This kind of problem potentially involves at least three areas of contract law: contract formation (often in the absence of identifiable offer and acceptance);87 intention to create legal relations (including ‘subject to contract’);88 and agreements to agree.89 Where dealings have been informal there is often a problem in ascertaining exactly 82. 83.

Sindel v Georgiou (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 665. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), vol 9, para 232. See Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93; Smith v Mansi [1963] 1 WLR 26. 84. Eccles v Bryant [1948] Ch 93 at 98 (Lord Greene MR). See also Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 at [31] (Campbell JA, who discussed the roles of the respective solicitors); Waite, ‘Formation of Contracts in Conveyancing’ (1980) 130 New LJ 774. 85. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v  Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74, the purchaser’s solicitor made it clear that receipt, not posting, of the counterpart contract was effective acceptance. Similarly, in Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445, the exercise of an option required ‘return’ of an executed contract. 86. Of many pronouncements on the test of intention, a typical one is that of Gleeson CJ (Hope and Mahoney JJA concurring) in Australian Broadcasting Corp v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 at 548–50. See Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 264 ALR 15; [2009] NSWCA 407 at [4]–[5] (Allsop P); Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 at [22]; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52 at [40]–[46]; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 at  350; 41 ALR 367 at  373–4 (Mason J). Compare McLauchlan, ‘Contract Formation and Subjective Intention’ (2017) 34 JCL 41 who provides a convincing case questioning the dominance of, and deference to, the objective test; McLauchlan, ‘The Continuing Confusion and Uncertainty over the Relevance of Actual Mutual Intention in Contract Interpretation’ (2021) 37 JCL 25. See also 5.19, where the case law on the parties’ use of documents of indeterminate status (for example, a heads of agreement or a letter of intent) is discussed. 87. See 3.5–3.7. 88. See Chapter 5, particularly at 5.19 and 5.24. 89. See  Chapter  6, particularly at  6.8 and 6.12. In Peabody (Wilkie Creek) Pty Ltd v  Queensland Bulk Handling Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 202, a contract renewal clause required a party to provide a ‘binding indication of preparedness to commit’ to continuing the agreement. This was provided. The court held that this was a binding commitment and not just a warranty of the party’s state of mind at the time the notice was provided. This case turned on contextual and commercial interpretation of the contract.

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what the parties may have agreed, that is, there is uncertainty of terms.90 In addition, misleading conduct and estoppel very frequently feature in cases of this kind. If the parties have expressly indicated that the negotiations are ‘subject to contract’ then there is a very strong presumption that contractual relations will not be established unless and until a formal contract has been executed (or, in some cases, exchange of contracts has taken place): see 5.24. In cases where the intention of the parties is equivocal, it has been established that conduct or correspondence subsequent to the alleged offer and acceptance can be used as evidence to show whether or not a contract was concluded,91 though subsequent events cannot be used to show that there was no contract when the court could otherwise conclude that there was one.92 (This is not to be confused with cases where subsequent conduct amounts to acceptance of an offer not previously accepted: see  3.27. Nor should it be confused with the often asserted rule that subsequent conduct cannot be used to determine the meaning of what was agreed: see 6.6 and 10.16.) Conversely, if the court concludes that the dealings between the parties did not result in a contract, then subsequent events or statements cannot be used to show that there was a contract.93 None of these statements is hard and fast because so much depends on the interpretation of the particular facts. For example, subsequent conduct may itself indicate that the parties have ‘drifted’ into a contract in which case it is not so much subsequent as the relevant evidence that shows that the parties have committed to a contract.94 Or the conduct may not be subsequent but anticipatory: ‘businessmen not uncommonly act upon an anticipated contractual relationship prior to the contract’.95 The court may also look to such factors as the customary method of concluding a contract, for example, exchange of formal contracts in land dealings,96 or whether an informal exchange that is alleged to lead to contract would accord with the 90. See Chapter 6, particularly at 6.1–6.7. 91. Howard Smith & Co Ltd v  Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68; Barrier Wharfs Ltd v  W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647; B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147; Film Bars Pty Ltd v  Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1  BPR  9251; Australian Broadcasting Corp v  XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540; Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v  Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 14,551 at 14,569 (Kirby P); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 (Tamberlin J); (2000) 175 ALR 433 (Full Federal Court); Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [25] (Heydon JA). In order for a court to be able to infer that a contract has arisen from conduct it is not sufficient that the conduct is consistent with the contract alleged. There needs to be a positive indication that the conduct is evidence of the contract alleged: Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [142]; Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [117]–[120] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring). 92. Darzi Group Pty Ltd v  Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 at  [155]–[160] (Emmett AJA); Lennon v Scarlett & Co (1921) 29 CLR 499 at 509. 93. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207 at 226, 234–5; Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 213; Commercial Bank of Australia v GH Dean & Co Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 204 at 209; Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42 at [185] (Dodds-Streeton J) (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112). 94. A good summary of the rules relating to ascertaining whether the parties have made a contract is provided by Einstein J in African Minerals v Pan Palladium Ltd [2003] NSWSC 268 at [12]–[40]. 95. Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 at [117] (Giles JA). 96. See 3.10. GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 at [99] (Gleeson JA); Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528. But compare Lake Macquarie Municipal Council v Bortolus Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 46 LGRA 292, where it was clear that the parties intended conduct prior to formal exchange of contracts should constitute formation.

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expectations of the parties in a contract of the kind under consideration.97 Broadly, the bigger the deal, the less likely that a court would conclude that informal exchange amounts to a contract.98 The number of issues about which the parties have to reach agreement is a telling factor: [A]s a matter of fact and common sense, other things being equal, the more numerous and significant the areas in respect of which the parties have failed to reach agreement, the slower a court will be to conclude that they had the requisite contractual intention.99

The mere fact that the parties have committed substantial resources does not necessarily mean that they have made a contract. Tamberlin J in Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd100 made the point that the parties may well have made a commercial commitment (involving many millions of dollars in that case) without necessarily having made a legal commitment.101 A similar idea is seen in cases involving the payment of a ‘holding deposit’ or ‘pre-contract’ deposit. The mere payment of such a deposit does not necessarily indicate that the parties have committed to contract if other factors would indicate otherwise.102 If such a deposit is paid with a view to committing to negotiate towards a concluded agreement and in fact the negotiations are not successful, then it is clear that the deposit must be returned.103 None of the statements that can be made about informal or imprecise contract negotiations are hard and fast rules, as already noted. The decision in a particular case is very much a matter of circumstance and, it must be said, judicial attitude. An illustrative case is Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v  Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd,104 in which an oral agreement to settle pending litigation was alleged. The parties agreed on a sum (without lawyers present) and shook hands. 97.

98.

99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9251 (inherently unlikely that a contract for sale of land for $385,000 would be concluded by informal exchange); Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1983) 50 ALR 363 (inherently unlikely that the Commonwealth would commit to purchasing a motel by an informal process evidenced by a letter of intent). Similar reasoning was used in Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480 by Young J at 58, 486. Yet, in Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144, an oral agreement for the acquisition of oil exploration permits was held to be enforceable. Sale of business attracts the same expectation of formality (exchange) as sale of land: Begna Holdings applying Elgas Pty Ltd v AJ Young Industries Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-329. Sinclair, Scott and Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 at 316–17 (Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ); Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106 at 131 (Brooking J); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 (Tamberlin J); (2000) 175 ALR 433 (Full Federal Court); New South Wales v RT & YE Falls Investments Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 54 (it would normally be expected that a government would commit to a contract by formal means). Australian Broadcasting Corp v  XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 at  548 (Gleeson CJ, Hope and Mahoney JJA concurring); GC NSW Pty Ltd v  Galati  [2020] NSWCA 326 at  [70], [71]–[84] (Gleeson JA); Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v  Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 89 at 113–15 (Tamberlin J); Uranium Equities Ltd v Fewster (2008) 36 WAR 97; [2008] WASCA 33. However, the so-called fourth category of ‘subject-to-contract’ cases, discussed in 5.24, allows a binding contract to come into existence even though a number of matters have not yet been agreed. (2000) 171 ALR 89 at 121. On appeal (Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v  Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 433) a majority (Moore and Gyles JJ, Beaumont J dissenting) upheld the finding of Tamberlin J that no contract had been made. Allens Group Ltd v Arena Meetings Conventions & Exhibitions Pty Ltd (1997) 8 BPR 15,623; Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 (NSWCA). See 5.19, 6.12. Sydney Harbour Casino Holding v NMBE Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 97,746 (NSWCA). (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-059; BC9505503.

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The New South Wales Court of Appeal had to decide whether this was a binding agreement. The majority (Gleeson CJ and Kirby P) held that it was, even though the parties intended to embody the agreement in a more formal form to be drawn up by solicitors.105 Kirby P carried out a thorough review of the authorities falling on either side of the line106 and came to the conclusion that there was a contract here, stressing the importance of the law’s flexible approach and the fact that the courts should strive to uphold the parties’ agreement.107 The fact that this was a case in which the parties were trying to settle out of court was significant because the law has always encouraged settlement rather than litigation. One interesting issue that was the subject of disagreement was the significance in law of the parties shaking hands. Kirby P was particularly persuaded that this indicated that the parties had reached agreement,108 whereas Powell JA thought that there was no particular legal significance in shaking hands.109 Powell JA dissented and said that on his reading of the facts the parties did not intend to be bound until terms of settlement and draft minutes of orders had been drawn up. This case merely illustrates how difficult it is to predict the outcome of imprecise commercial dealings and how judges will differ in their interpretation of the parties’ conduct. We have seen from the Geebung case and other cases just discussed that the type of contract may be significant in the final outcome. This can cut both ways. The courts encourage settlements of pending litigation and so the approach is flexible. On the other hand, big commercial transactions are less likely to be treated with flexibility. The same is generally true of contracts involving land. In relation to land contracts, it commonly happens that the parties have agreed informally but have not yet exchanged contracts. If one party decides to pull out before exchange, it has been frequently argued that there is an enforceable contract. The courts have tended to adopt a formalist approach to land contracts (and to sales of businesses)110 and stressed that exchange is essential for formation.111 McHugh JA has gone so far as to say that in land transactions there is a presumption that exchange is the contemplated mode of formation.112 In other words, the courts may be prepared to 105. Compare PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310, in which an invitation to tender document stipulated ‘The Contract shall not come into effect until the formal instrument of agreement (Conformed Contract Document) is executed by the parties’. PRA was told it had won the tender. No formal instrument was executed but the invitation to tender document included special and general conditions of contract. The parties proceeded with the project. It was held that there was a binding contract. Alternatively, an estoppel operated to support formation of contract. 106. (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-959 at 90, 322–90, 327. 107. Ibid at 90, 329. 108. Ibid. As to a shrug of the shoulders amounting to assent, see Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v Kovan Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2006) 225 ALR 57; [2005] FCA 1521 at [104]ff (Crennan J). 109. Ibid (Geebung) at 90, 340. 110. Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR 55-329; Begna Holdings Pty Ltd v Strand Music Co Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-480. 111. See Lezabar Pty Ltd v Hogan (1989) NSW ConvR 55-468; Encino Plaza Pty Ltd v Wilson International Pty Ltd (1988) ANZ ConvR 326. 112. G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-324 at 56, 984 applied in GC NSW Pty Ltd v Galati [2020] NSWCA 326 at [99] (Gleeson JA); Elgas Ltd v A J Young Industries Pty Ltd (1987) NSW ConvR 55-329 at 57,016; Dowdle v Inverell Shire Council (1998) 9 BPR 97,800. See also SJ Mackie Pty Ltd v Dalziell Medical Practice Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 87 at 92–3 (McPherson J); Marek v Australian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521 at 527–8 (Cooper and Byrne JJ); Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v  Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149. Contrast Sheehan v Zaszlos [1995] 2 Qd R 210, where the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that in commercial contracts for the sale and purchase of land there is a presumption or natural inference that the parties do not intend to be bound until the contract has been formally executed. See also Darter Pty Ltd v Malloy

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read into the negotiations for sale of land that they are ‘subject to contract’.113 But this appears to apply to sales rather than other land transactions such as leases.114 Nevertheless, the courts are also prepared to ignore the customary formalities, either because there is a compelling case where to deny a deemed contract would be unconscionable;115 or because the parties have, in the eyes of the court, irrevocably committed themselves by their imprecise words or conduct.116 There is no doubt that in some circumstances the imprecision of the parties makes it extremely difficult to advise on the legal consequences.117 There are often difficult evidentiary problems for a court faced with an alleged agreement evidenced only by conversations or informal written exchanges.118 As noted, the offer and acceptance analysis is just one way of looking at  a particular relationship with a view to answering the question: have the parties made a contract? Many are the cases where the parties have behaved imprecisely and a court is ultimately required to decide whether or not the relationship should be dealt with on the basis of contract with its concomitant remedies. A negative answer may be reached by saying that: • • •

• • •

an offer was never made;119 or an offer was made but it was never accepted;120 or although no identifiable offer and acceptance were made, the dealings between the parties were not such as to amount to a contract by inference from the parties’ conduct or by way of estoppel; or the parties never intended their exchanges to give rise to legal relations;121 or the parties’ arrangement was just too vague to amount to a contract;122 or the parties’ arrangement was a preliminary agreement that left important matters to be agreed later and for that reason did not amount to a contract.123

Of course, each of these may, on the facts, arrive at the opposite conclusion. In addition, what appears to be a contract may be nullified, or be capable of being cancelled, if a relevant vitiation factor comes into play.124 Some of these doctrines are (1992) Aust Contract Rep 90-017, where the same court was prepared to hold that the exchange of letters constituted a contract for the sale of land. 113. See 5.24. 114. Darzi Group Pty Ltd v Nolde Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 210 at [6] (Bathurst CJ). 115. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See Chapter 2. 116. See, for example, South Coast Oils (Qld and NSW) Pty Ltd v Look Enterprises Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 680; Geftakis v The Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1988) ANZ ConvR 36; Terrex Resources NL v  Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144; Plastyne Products Pty Ltd v  Gall Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1988) NSW ConvR 55-376. 117. An example being Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167, in which a document had been signed by one party but not by the other, yet the other had paid part of the purchase money in accordance with the supposed contract. Ormiston J said there was no contract; Murray J said that there was; McGarvie J expressed no opinion. 118. See, for example, Thompson v White [2006] NSWCA 350 at [10]–[13] (Tobias JA). 119. See 3.12–3.25. 120. See 3.26–3.62 on acceptance. 121. See Chapter 5. 122. See Chapter 6, 6.5–6.7. 123. See 6.8. 124. See Chapters 11–18.

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analysed in terms of contract formation, that is, a relevant vitiation factor occurs in the negotiation period. It is common for a court, mindful of the possibility of an appeal, to base its decision on a combination of these types of arguments, even though one by itself is sufficient.125

Offer 3.12  Introduction. We have seen that the primary model for determining whether agreement has been reached is to analyse the exchange between the parties in terms of offer and acceptance. On this model, it is only when a statement, capable in law of being an offer, is accepted that a contract is formed (assuming that there is consideration). We need, therefore, to analyse in more detail what is an offer. Before doing so it is necessary to deal with two fundamental points about the process of making offers: an offer must be made to another person; and that person must be a recognised legal entity.

An offer must be made to another or others 3.13  An offer must generally be made to another legal entity. This apparent truism reflects the basic idea that a contract must be an arrangement between at least two ‘sides’,126 each of which must be a recognised legal entity (see below).

No self-dealing rule 3.14  It is not possible at common law to make a contract with oneself.127 This may sound implausible at first but it is quite possible for there to be the same party on each side, for example, when a partner in a firm sells property to the firm.128 Another illustration is a government department charging another government department for a service provided or goods sold. So long as the departments are part of the same polity then no contract is possible.129 The common law rule, though perfectly logical, is therefore inconvenient. Nevertheless, it has been asserted that ‘where a person has different capacities, he may have power to contract in his representative capacity as an individual’.130 On the strength of this pronouncement, Kilner Brown J in Rowley, Holmes & Co v Barber131 held that it is possible for a personal representative to employ himself in a 125. An example being Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106. 126. As to ascertaining who are the parties to a contract, see 7.2. It is possible for a contract to be multi-sided: see 3.8. It is also possible for each ‘side’ to have more than one person, that is, joint promisees: see Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460 discussed in 4.8. 127. Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410 at 434–5; 178 ALR 193; [2001] HCA 9 at [51]–[53]; Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496. 128. Ellis v Joseph Ellis & Co [1905] 1 KB 324. See Ellis v Kerr [1910] 1 Ch 529 (a person cannot be both a covenantor and covenantee); Williams v Scott [1900] AC 499 (trustee cannot sell property to himself. This decision hinged on equitable principles involving fiduciaries). The case law is discussed in Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104. See also Minister Administering National Parks & Wildlife Act 1974 v Halloran [2004] NSWCA 118 at [54] (Bryson JA, Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA concurring). 129. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [4.2]. 130. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), vol 9, p 81, para 204. No authority is cited. 131. [1977] 1 WLR 371.

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solicitor’s practice between the death of his employer and the appointment of a new employer. In ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Leagrove Pty Ltd; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v  Stafford,132 a company, in its capacity as trustee, validly guaranteed a loan made to the company in its trading capacity. The common law rule has been partly abrogated by statute in all jurisdictions.133 The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia only deals with the situation where a person makes an agreement with himself or herself and another or others, so that it would cover the partnership situation but it would not cover the government departments example above. Further, the legislation is not uniform. For example, the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 72 mentions both covenants and agreements and appears to be of general application.134 To like effect is the legislation in Queensland,135 Victoria and Western Australia. On the other hand, the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 110 refers only to covenants and only those mentioned in the previous section, namely, covenants in instruments ‘under this Act’. The Northern Territory, South Australian and Tasmanian legislation (though not identical) covers conveyances of land or any other property by a person to himself or herself alone and also allows trustees to convey property to one of their number (with a suitable proviso to prevent such a conveyance if it is in breach of a fiduciary duty). Because this legislation varies in detail it is necessary to look closely at the local version.

Legal entity 3.15  The parties must be legal entities. A legal entity can be an individual, a corporation136 or a body politic (that is, a government, such as the Commonwealth of Australia or the State of Tasmania). A partnership is a collective of individuals, and is given special status by Partnership Acts. The partnership name can be used for contracts. A trust is in essence the trustee, who is either an individual or a corporation who should be named as such on a contract. Corporations and bodies politic must necessarily act through individuals.137 The law of agency applies in these circumstances.138 It is possible that a corporation or a government may be able to deny the efficacy of an apparent contract because an individual had no authority as agent to make an offer or to accept an offer.139 For corporations formed under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 128–129 reflect the

132. [2011] QCA 131 at [37]–[38] (McMurdo P, White JA and Martin J concurring). 133. ACT: Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 s 208; Land Titles Act 1925 s 110; NSW: Conveyancing Act 1919 ss 24 and 72; NT: Law of Property Act 2000 s 13; Qld: Property Law Act 1974 ss 14 and 50 and Property Law Bill 2022 ss 13 and 65; SA: Law of Property Act 1936 s 40; Tas: Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 62; Vic: Property Law Act 1958 s 82; WA: Property Law Act 1969 ss 44 and 52. 134. It was assumed in Stewart v Hawkins [1960] SR (NSW) 104 that the provision is of general application and is not confined to real property transactions. 135. See Re Broons [1989] 2 Qd R 315. 136. See 17.68. 137. Corporations can contract ‘directly’ by the use of the corporate seal (see  17.70), but by far the most common type of contract is through an individual who acts as agent for the corporation. See Corporations Act 2001 s 127 for corporations registered under that Act. 138. See  Dal Pont, Law of Agency (4th ed, 2020). See  also Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 1 Agency, [15-315]; Laws of Australia 8.1 Agency, [68]. 139. An example being Left Bank Investments Pty Ltd v  Ngunya Jarjum Aboriginal Corporation [2020] NSWCA 144.

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common law rule about ostensible or apparent authority.140 Anyone dealing with such a corporation is entitled to assume that the individual apparently acting for the corporation has authority to act unless the outsider knows or has reason to know otherwise.141 For entities not governed by this legislation or similar legislation,142 the similar common law rule applies. It is difficult for a body to deny a contract on this basis. When an individual acts as agent for a corporation or a government body in executing or agreeing to a contract, that person is not personally liable under the contract.143 The requirement of legal entity means that there can be serious problems if a party is incorrectly named, that is, there is no such entity or the wrong party is named.144 It may be possible for an error of this kind to be corrected by the usual process of interpretation or under the doctrine of rectification.145 In addition, it may be legally impossible for an entity to be a contracting party or for that entity to be sued.146 3.16  Offer may be made to the world at  large. In the famous case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co147 it was argued that an effective offer cannot be made to the public at large. In that case the defendants, who were the purveyors of a specific called ‘The Carbolic Smoke Ball’, issued an advertisement in which they offered to pay £100 to any person who succumbed to influenza after having used one of their smoke balls in a specified manner and for a specified period. They added that they had deposited a sum of £1000 with their bankers ‘to show their sincerity’. The plaintiff, on the faith of the advertisement, bought and used the ball as prescribed, but caught influenza. She sued for the £100. 140. See Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451; 208 ALR 213; [2004] HCA 35 at [35]–[44]. This principle is a species of estoppel. 141. Australia and New  Zealand Banking Group Ltd v  Frenmast Pty Ltd (2013) 282 FLR 351; [2013] NSWCA 459. This principle may not operate if an individual signs a contract apparently on behalf of a corporation in a qualified way: see 7.2. 142. See, for example, State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) s 20ZD and Sydney Water Corporation v Makucha [2010] NSWSC 114. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [3.18]–[3.19], [4.2] for a discussion of contract formation by statutory corporations. 143. See 7.2 for brief discussion of qualified signatures. Sometimes it is not clear in what capacity someone has signed a contract. 144. In MacMillan v Mumby [2006] NSWCA 74, a loan was made to a non-existent company. It was held that the loan was not made to the individuals who controlled the entity. In Bon McArthur Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Caruana [2013] NSWCA 101, the wrong company of related companies was named in an insurance policy. In Davies v Apted [2013] SASCFC 92, it was not clear whether a loan was made to an individual or a company. In Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v Norncott Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 184, an appeal from a judgment against a deregistered company was held to be incompetent. 145. In Whalebone v Auto Panel Beaters & Radiators Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 176, a company was misnamed and the court ordered that the land register should be rectified. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; 339 ALR 200; [2016] HCA 47, two bank performance bonds incorrectly named a government statutory corporation. The High  Court held that correcting a wrongly named party was not amenable to principles of interpretation but, rather, it was appropriate to make an order for rectification. 146. If there is no legal entity it is impossible to sue: see Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565; [2007] NSWCA 117. The Church as such is not a legal entity. This problem has been rectified by special legislation. See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) Pt 2A; Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act  2018 (Vic); Civil Liability Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Act 2018 (NSW). In Roman Catholic Trusts Corp v Van Driel Ltd [2001] VSC 310, a building contract incorrectly named the principal as ‘Emmaus College’, a non-existent entity. It was held that the corporation was the proper plaintiff. A government department is not a legal entity. The correct legal entity is the relevant body politic. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [4.2]. 147. [1892] 2 QB 484 affirmed [1893] 1 QB 256. For a fascinating account of the setting of this case, see Simpson (1985) 14 J Leg Stud 345.

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The defendants displayed the utmost ingenuity in their search for defences. They argued that the transaction was a bet within the meaning of the Gaming Acts, that it was an illegal policy of insurance, that the advertisement was a mere ‘puff’ never intended to create a binding obligation,148 that there was no consideration, that there was no offer to any particular person, and that, even if there were, the plaintiff had failed to notify her acceptance. The Court of Appeal found no difficulty in rejecting these various pleas. Bowen LJ effectively demolished the argument that an offer cannot be made to the world at large: It was also said that the contract is made with all the world — that is, with everybody, and that you cannot contract with everybody. It is not a contract made with all the world. There is the fallacy of the argument. It is an offer made to all the world; and why should not an offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes forward and performs the condition? … Although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that limited portion of the public who come forward and perform the condition on the faith of the advertisement.149

This was a case of a unilateral contract where the number of people accepting was presumably limited. It is possible to make an offer to the world for either a unilateral or bilateral contract.150 In either case the offeror may find that he or she is bound to a large number of people. There is no principle of contract law that prevents a person making a number of contracts for the same subject-matter: see 3.42. That person may be in breach to all but one of the accepting parties.

The essentials of offer 3.17  What is an offer? An offer is a clear statement of the terms151 by which the person making the offer is prepared to be bound. An offer may be conditional.152 At  the same time an offer conveys to the other party an invitation to accept and confers on that party the power to bind both parties in contract.153 A person who makes an offer submits, in a sense, to the will of the other party because it is the latter who decides whether or not to bring a contract into being by the act of acceptance. An offer may be terminated before the act of acceptance.154 In deciding whether an offer has been made, the courts employ the objective test, determining the question as a matter of construction.155 The fact that the word

148. On this aspect of the argument, see 5.11. 149. [1893] 1 QB 256 at 268. 150. For an example of a bilateral contract, an internet company offering an item where the customer clicks ‘I agree’. 151. The terms must be promissory in intent. The test of what is promissory is discussed in 10.21–10.25. In  Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v  Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42, a statement made in a humorous promotional presentation was held not to be an offer (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112). 152. See 5.23. See also 3.22 where a bid at an auction is a conditional offer if the auction was announced to be subject to a reserve price. 153. Corbin, ‘Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 181–2. 154. See 3.63. 155. In Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499, redundancy offers were made to a number of people. The calculations of the amounts were incorrect. White J had to decide whether the mistaken offers were offers (they were) and whether they were accepted. Some were and some were withdrawn before acceptance. The case was not argued on the basis of mistake.

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‘offer’ or ‘guarantee’ or ‘promise’ is used is not conclusive.156 A mere statement of the price that someone would contract for, if they decided to sell, does not amount to an offer.157 The objective test is applied to determine whether an offeree would reasonably assume158 that the alleged offeror has stated the terms upon which he or she is prepared to be bound if the offeree accepts; or whether, on the other hand, the supposed offeror has merely stated a negotiating position or possibly only provided information. Given the natural imprecision with which people communicate, it may be difficult to discern whether an offer has been made. A mistaken offer, if accepted, will generally give rise to issues of mistake, dealt with in Chapter 12. But this depends on the interpretation of the offer.159 3.18  Offer distinguished from invitation to treat. An offer, capable of being converted into a contract by acceptance, must be distinguished from what is somewhat quaintly referred to as an invitation to treat. This expression covers all those aspects of the negotiating process expressed before a final offer. In other words, anything that is said that invites a bargaining response rather than an acceptance is an invitation to treat. Bowen LJ in the Carlill case (see  3.16), referring to the advertisement, which normally would be merely an invitation to treat, said: It is not like cases in which you offer to negotiate, or you issue advertisements that you have got a stock of books to sell, or houses to let, in which case there is no offer to be bound by any contract. Such advertisements are offers to negotiate — offers to receive offers — offers to chaffer.160

Exceptionally, this advertisement was an offer. 3.19  Instances of invitation to treat. The distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat has been considered in various practical circumstances. The issue, for instance, of a circular or catalogue advertising goods for sale is a mere attempt to induce offers, not an offer itself.161 As a matter of commercial reality, a supplier should not be potentially bound to supply to all comers who respond to price lists, shop displays or catalogues.162 Whether this view would invariably prevail in the light of some of the more extravagant ‘offers’ that are made in advertisements has received little attention in the courts of Australia and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, such ‘offers’ may be dismissed as exuberant sales talk; on the other hand, it must be remembered that

156. Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42 at [186] (affirmed on appeal: [2007] VSCA 112); B Seppelt & Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147; Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561; Clifton v Palumbo [1944] 2 All ER 497. 157. Harvey v Facey [1893] AC 552. 158. Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v KS Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 at 336 (McHugh JA). 159. Tooheys v Blinkhorn [2008] NSWSC 499. 160. [1893] 1 QB 256 at 268. 161. Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561 (circular saying ‘We are instructed to offer … for sale by tender …’ held not to be an offer). Contrast Re Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd (in liq) [1963] ALR 346 (circular sent to shareholders appealing for funds that would be held in trust pending preparation of debenture documents held to be an offer accepted by the sending of money). 162. Grainger & Son v Gough [1896] AC 325 at 334 (Lord Herschell). A similar rule has been applied to the notice of a scholarship (Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 Ch 480) and also to advertisements (Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421; [1968] 1 WLR 1204). As to the possibility of making multiple contracts with respect to the same subject-matter, see 3.42.

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an advertisement can contain an offer.163 In Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Stores,164 it was held that an advertisement for a fur stole ‘worth $139.50’ for $1 ‘first come first served’ was an offer. So long as the alleged offer ‘is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer …’.165 Advertisements, circulars and catalogues may contain statements which, even if not offers, may be the subject of proceedings under the Australian Consumer Law.166 3.20  Shop displays. If goods are exhibited in a shop window or inside a shop with a price attached, does this constitute an offer to sell at that price? It has long been accepted that such a display is not an offer and consequently the customer makes the offer.167 This view was confirmed in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd,168 where the point was tested in a self-service store with a check-out. It was held that an offer to buy was made when the customer put an article in the basket or at least when he or she brought the item to the check-out, and this offer the defendant shopkeeper was free to accept or to reject at  the check-out. Again, this view may not be invariably accepted by a court if the shop display is couched in the language of offer.169 Further, as noted earlier in relation to advertisements and the like, a shop display, though not amounting to an offer, may nevertheless give rise to enforceable rights under the Australian Consumer Law.170 3.21  Specific instances of offer. In order to fit everyday transactions into the rubric of offer and acceptance the courts have had to decide, in specific circumstances, what amounts to an offer. The position is confused in relation to contracts of carriage and contracts for the sale of land, as noted earlier.171 Automatic vending machines apparently make a mute offer that is accepted by the purchaser inserting money or otherwise activating the machine.172 Similarly, at  automatic car parks the offer is made by the presence of the machine, which offer is accepted by the customer who activates the machine that issues a ticket.173 Other ‘ticket’ cases involve an offer by the customer that is accepted by the issue of a ticket which itself contains no contractual terms (as with going to the cinema) or does contain writing but such

163. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256. 164. (1957) 86 NW 2d 689. 165. Ibid at  691. Contrast Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v  Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42, where a statement, made in a humorous promotional presentation, that dealers could purchase photocopiers for $1 was held not to be an offer (affirmed on appeal [2007] VSCA 112). 166. Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29–37. See Chapter 11. 167. Timothy v Simpson (1834) 6 C & P 499 at 500; 172 ER 1337. 168. [1952] 2 QB 795; [1952] 2 All ER 456; affirmed [1953] 1 QB 401; [1953] 1 All ER 482. A similar case is Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 at 399; [1960] 3 All ER 731 at 733 (Lord Parker). Surprisingly, there is no Australian contract case directly on point. There are cases involving criminal prosecutions as in Fisher v Bell. 169. Smithers J in Reardon v Morley Ford Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 401 at 407–8 indicated that a shop display may in appropriate circumstances amount to an offer. Lords Simon and Wilberforce considered that advertising posters could be offers in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1; [1976] 1 All ER 117. In Goodwin’s of Newtown Pty Ltd v Gurry [1959] SASR 295 and in A-G (NSW) v Mutual Home Loans Fund of Australia Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 162, non-technical meanings were given to ‘offer’ and, in the latter case, ‘option’. 170. Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29–37. See Chapter 11. 171. See 3.4, 3.10. 172. Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169 (Lord Denning MR). 173. Ibid.

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writing is not incorporated into the contract;174 or the ticket itself is the offer that is accepted by the customer taking it without objecting to any of the terms contained in it.175 It has been held that an invoice may amount to an offer that is accepted by the sending of a cheque.176 These various situations usually raise the question whether displayed or printed terms are part of the contract. So long as they are available for inspection by the customer before the contract is made by acceptance, they are part of the contract: see  10.71. The precise timing of offer and acceptance can therefore be crucial in determining whether printed terms are contractual. For example, displaying terms on a car parking ticket or inside the car park is too late.177

Auctions and fixed bid sales 3.22  A bid is an offer. The offer and acceptance analysis was from early times applied to auctions. In Payne v Cave,178 it was held that the bidder makes the offer, which the auctioneer is free to accept or reject.179 In accordance with this principle the Sale of Goods Acts provide that a sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner, and that until such announcement is made any bid may be retracted.180 A bid may be acknowledged but it is not accepted unless and until the hammer falls.181 If an auction is announced to be subject to a reserve price, offers made by bidders are subject to this condition so that, if the auctioneer mistakenly sells at below the reserve price, there is no contract.182 These rules have to be adapted for online auctions. For example, online, there is no auctioneer.183

174. Parker v  South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 at  419 (turnpike example); Causer v  Browne [1952] VLR 1; Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 (contract formed when ‘exchange order’ issued to passenger, such order to be exchanged for a ticket upon arrival in a foreign country. Terms on ticket therefore not part of contract); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (contract formed at moment when ticket issued to passenger. Terms on ticket therefore not part of contract). 175. See, for example, MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 137 (Stephen J). 176. Associated Midland Corp Ltd v  Bank of NSW (1984) 51 ALR 641. But this, of course, depends on the circumstances. An invoice may more naturally be an acknowledgement of a contract already made: Galaxidis v CBFC Leasing [2005] NSWCA 347 at [10]–[14] (Basten J). 177. See discussion of the controversial United States case Pro CD Inc v Zeidenberg at 3.7 where click wrap contract terms viewed after contract formation were held to be binding. 178. (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502. See also British Car Auctions Ltd v Wright [1972] 1 WLR 1519, where it was held for the purposes of a penal statute that an auctioneer had not ‘offered to sell’ a defective car. 179. AGC (Advances) Ltd v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454 at 9457 (Holland J). 180. ACT: s 60; NSW: s 60; NT: s 60; Qld: s 59; SA: s 57; Tas: s 62; Vic: s 64; WA: s 57. 181. Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216. See also HZD Pty Ltd v McInnes [2007] QSC 213. 182. McManus v Fortescue (1907) 2 KB 1. 183. See the very thorough discussion by Rein AJ in Smythe v Thomas (2007) 71 NSWLR 537; [2007] NSWSC 844 (eBay auction held to be binding and specific performance ordered). See also eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd (2006) 170 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 1768; Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 5; Reynolds, ‘E-auctions: Who Will Protect the Consumer?’ (2002) 18 JCL 75; Kariyawasam and Guy, ‘The Contractual Legalities of Buying and Selling on eBay: Online Auctions and the Protection of Consumers’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 42 (available on Austlii).

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3.23  Advertisement of auction is not an offer to hold it. It follows that steps taken to organise the auction are in the nature of invitations to treat.184 Nevertheless, it is at least arguable nowadays that a person who has suffered damage as a result of a cancelled auction could claim damages under s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law for breach of s 18.185 3.24  Auction without reserve. Another question that has arisen in relation to auctions is whether an advertisement that the sale will be without reserve constitutes a definite offer to sell to the highest bidder. Is it possible to make a legally binding commitment to accept an offer that satisfies certain requirements — in this particular case, the requirement of being the highest (or lowest) bid? On the analysis of auction sales already outlined, the answer would appear to be No because the auctioneer is free to decline to accept a bid. This was the approach by a Scottish court which held that no agreement is complete unless and until the auctioneer acknowledges the acceptance of the bid by the fall of the hammer.186 The point was the subject of obiter dicta in Warlow v  Harrison.187 The action in that case failed both in the Queen’s Bench and in the Court of Exchequer Chamber because the plaintiff pleaded his claim upon an obviously incorrect ground. But three of the judges in the Exchequer Chamber were of the opinion that he would succeed if he brought a fresh action pleading that the auctioneer by his advertisement had implicitly pledged himself to sell to the highest bidder. In the view of these judges, two separate questions must be disentangled. On the one hand, had a contract of sale been concluded, and, if so, at what moment of time? Since the advertisement was not itself an offer to sell the goods but only an invitation to treat, the plaintiff’s bid was not an acceptance and did not constitute a sale. Was there, on the other hand, a binding promise that the sale would be without reserve? The majority of the Exchequer Chamber was prepared to discover such a promise. The auctioneer in his advertisement had made a definite offer to this effect, and the plaintiff, by making his bid in reliance upon it, had accepted the offer. This constituted a distinct and independent contract with the auctioneer, and for its breach an action would lie. It follows from this analysis that the auctioneer cannot reject the bid without being in breach of contract unless the auctioneer has a legally recognised excuse.188 If the auctioneer does choose to break this contract by not bringing down the hammer, the only remedy available to the highest bidder is presumably damages. There is no contract of sale (because the hammer never fell) so that specific performance cannot be ordered.189 Whether damages would be worth pursuing depends on the 184. Harris v Nickerson (1873) LR 8 QB 286. 185. See  Chapter 11. It would be difficult to argue that it was misleading conduct if an auction was merely cancelled. 186. Fenwick v Macdonald, Fraser & Co (1904) 6 F (Ct of Sess) 850. 187. [1859] 1 E & E 309; 120 ER 925. See Johnston v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73 and Rainbow v Hawkins & Sons [1904] 2 KB 322. 188. In Venuti and Venuti v Toop Real Estate Group Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 23 (confirmed on appeal [2004] SASC 169), it was held that an auctioneer was justified in not accepting a bid that was clearly mistaken. If it were otherwise, the sale would be vulnerable to being set aside on the basis of mistake. The case involved an unsuccessful allegation by the seller that the auctioneer was in breach of its duty by not knocking down the property to the mistaken bidder. 189. In Proctor v  Almansask Distributors Ltd (1985) 37 Alta LR (2d) 164, it was held that there was a contract between bidder and auctioneer that was broken by the auctioneer failing to bring down the

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particular circumstances, but in many cases there would be no substantial loss.190 In  Barry v  Davies,191 substantial damages were awarded against the auctioneer because he had made a statement that the item was worth a certain amount and then refused to bring down the hammer when the bidding reached only a fraction of that amount. The damages were the difference between the stated value and the highest bid. The view that a separate contract with the auctioneer can arise has not escaped criticism.192 The case of Ulbrick v  Laidlaw193 provides some support for the view set out above that there is an independent contract between the auctioneer and the bidder. In that case a condition — that if there were a dispute between two or more bidders then the lot should be re-auctioned — was held to apply. Such a condition, governing as it does the bidding process, can only operate as a result of a contract formed prior to the fall of the hammer.194 In short, the terms on which an auction is conducted can be the subject of a separate contract.195 The two-contract analysis must also receive support from Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd, discussed in 3.25 and 3.35, and developments in the law of tenders, discussed in 3.39. Another aspect of auctions arises where the successful bidder refuses to sign a note or memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.196 Although the auctioneer may sign on the purchaser’s behalf, if the auctioneer does not in fact do so, the bidder cannot be forced to do so. In Wright v Madden,197 it was held that it was not possible to sue the purchaser for damages for breach of a ‘collateral’ contract to execute a proper contract. The trial judge had awarded damages representing the difference between the price bid by the purchaser and the next best bid. The Queensland Full Court held that this was not a correct decision because the assumption behind the award of damages was that the contract with the purchaser who had refused to sign

hammer in a ‘without reserve’ auction. The bidder was able to obtain substantial damages (the difference between the value of what he had bid for and his bid) because it was held that, in this particular auction, the auctioneer was also the seller (though this would not seem to be essential in order to prove loss). However, in other cases the purchaser may have some difficulty in establishing what he or she has lost. Compare Boulas v Angelopoulos (1991) Aust Contract Rep 90-004, where the auctioneer mistakenly sold a property below the reserve price. The contract was not enforceable because no note or memorandum was ever signed and a claim against the auctioneer for breach of warranty of authority was unsuccessful because of inability to prove loss. 190. The same reasoning applies if the vendor prevents execution of a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. There is a breach of a ‘collateral’ contract that may sound in damages. See the discussion in Wright v Madden [1992] 1 Qd R 343 at 348–9 and analysis of Johnston v Boyes [1899] 2 Ch 73. 191. [2000] 1 WLR 1962. See comment thereon by Carter, ‘Auction “Without Reserve” — Barry v Davies’ (2001) 17 JCL 69. 192. See the discussion between Gower and Slade in (1952) 68 LQR 238 and 457 and (1953) 69 LQR 21. 193. [1924] VLR 247. 194. The two-contract analysis has been supported in Tully v Irish Bond Commission (1961) 97 ILTR 174, and receives some support from Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington CC [1985] NZLR 520 at 526. It has been questioned in AGC (Advances) Ltd v McWhirter (1977) 1 BPR 9454, where it was said that an action against the auctioneer ‘would be an anomaly in the law of auctions’ (Holland J at 9458). See criticism of the two-contract analysis in Commonwealth v John White & Sons (NT) Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 172 at 177 (Blackburn J). 195. This view is supported by the judgment of Ormiston J in Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 at 230–1. See 11.118. 196. See 16.42. 197. [1992] 1 Qd R 343.

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was an enforceable contract whereas it was not because there was no sufficient note or memorandum.198 3.25  Fixed-bid sales. Auctions are not dissimilar from competitive tenders199 or fixed-bid sales. The latter are characterised by the seller inviting bids from buyers and undertaking to sell to the highest bidder but each bidder makes his or her bid in ignorance of the other bidders’ offers. Two important points were made concerning fixed-bid sales by the House of Lords in Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd.200 The first point concerned referential bids. In Harvela, one bidder offered a certain sum ‘or C$101,000 in excess of any other offer which you may receive’. This bid was accepted but the House of Lords held that it was invalid and the contract should have been awarded to the other bidder who had made a fixed bid. More importantly, the second point decided in Harvela provides support for the view, discussed above, that a promise to accept the highest (or lowest) bid, whether in auctions ‘without reserve’ or fixed-bid sales, is binding once the bidder has acted in the appropriate manner by putting in a valid, highest (or lowest) bid. It was held that such a promise amounts to a unilateral offer that is accepted by the highest (or lowest) bidder. Acceptance creating a unilateral contract is then followed by a bilateral contract comprising the actual sale.201

Acceptance 3.26  What is an acceptance? Acceptance of an offer creates contractual relations. An acceptance is a communication to the offeror of an unqualified202 assent to both the terms of the offer and to the implied invitation in every offer that the offeree commit himself or herself to a contract. Communication of acceptance, as a general rule,203 fixes the moment when the contract begins and the place of the contract, that is, the time and place where the acceptance message is received.204 Acceptance may be by way of a promise or promises; or by way of performing acts that are specified in the offer. The former is called bilateral and the latter unilateral contract.205 Whether or not there is acceptance is determined objectively by reference to the words or actions of the offeree as reasonably perceived by the offeror. The law has to deal with a great variety of different ways in which people commit to contracts 198. It may be possible to sue for damages for misleading conduct. See Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217 discussed in 11.118. 199. See 3.36–3.39. 200. [1986] AC 207; (1985) 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. The facts are more fully set out in 3.35. 201. As to unilateral contract, see 3.28. 202. As to whether acceptance can be conditional, see 5.23. 203. The postal rule is an exception. See 3.60. 204. Hampstead Meats Pty Ltd v  Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109; Express Airways v  Port Augusta Air Services [1980] Qd R 543; Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 366; Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327; Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 205. Unilateral contracts are discussed in 3.28.

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and so no universal principle, apart from the objective test, can be put forward as the answer to the question: has there been acceptance? The most obvious way in which such commitment is made is by signature.206 The High Court confirmed in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd207 that a person is bound by signature whether or not he or she has read the contract.208 Here the objective test works satisfactorily, for the rule that a person is bound by his or her signature accords with popular expectation. A reasonable person would rightly assume that a person who signed what was obviously a contract intended to be bound by it, or at least was prepared to take the risk of being bound by it.209 The same applies to online transactions where clicking ‘I agree’ is the equivalent of signature (whether or not the available terms have been actually read).210 See 3.52 for a discussion of electronic signatures. Not so satisfactory are the ‘ticket cases’211 where the law has adopted a somewhat pragmatic rule that a person is taken to have accepted the terms of a ticket (or displayed sign) so long as he or she had an opportunity to examine the terms before committing to the transaction212 (even though it is almost universally the case that that opportunity is not availed of).213 It will be seen below, particularly in the discussion of acceptance by conduct (3.27), that, just as the law has taken a flexible approach to contract formation generally, it has also taken a flexible approach to determining whether there has been acceptance. Depending on the circumstances, acceptance may be inferred from somewhat vague or equivocal dealings; or it may only be found where there is strict compliance with the method laid down for acceptance. As an illustration of a strict approach, in Redowood Pty Ltd v  Mongoose Pty Ltd214 the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal had to consider whether there had 206. See  10.26 and 16.40. The courts have been generous in treating rudimentary or not-real signatures as effective so long as they can be construed as authentication of a document or email. In Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550, the English Court of Appeal (Evershed MR and C Romer LJ, Denning LJ dissenting) held that a person signed a document if he himself affixed his facsimile rubber stamp signature to a document. See Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 at [34] (White J). 207. (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52. See Peden and Carter, ‘Incorporation of Terms by Signature: L’Estrange Rules!’ (2005) 21 JCL 96. 208. See 7.2, where there is a brief discussion of cases where a person signs in a qualified way. 209. See Robertson, ‘The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract’ (2005) 29 MULR 179 at fns 74–6, which discuss this phenomenon. 210. Dialogue Consulting Pty Ltd v Instagram Inc [2020] FCA 1846 at [239]–[255] (Beach J); I Lan Sys Inc v NetscoutServ Level Corp 183 F Supp 2d 328 (2002); Hotmail Corp v Van$ Money Pie Inc 47 USPQ 2d 1020, 1025 (ND Cal 1998). See also 3.7. Compare Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir), where a ‘download’ button appeared before any invitation to agree to licence terms. It was held that the licence terms did not apply. See Macdonald, ‘Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting — Clicking “I Agree”’ (2011) 27 JCL 198 and Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152 at 153 for evidence that people do not read the terms in online transactions. Paterson makes the point (at 163) that clicking on an icon does not necessarily indicate assent to the supplier’s terms and conditions. It depends how explicit the website is and how it is designed. 211. See 3.4, 10.28. 212. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 137 (Stephen J); Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 228–9 (Brennan J). This is the most usual analysis of ticket cases. Paragraph 3.4 shows that there are variations on this analysis. 213. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v  Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 136–7; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; 212 ALR 357; [2004] HCA 60 at [217] (Kirby J). 214. [2005] NSWCA 32.

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been an acceptance by Redowood of an offer by Mongoose to purchase rights in Anaconda Nickel. Redowood had already successfully sold some 65 million rights to Mongoose. It purported to sell a further 55 million rights. In doing so it incorrectly filled in the rights acceptance form by inserting the wrong Security Holder Reference Number. The majority judges held that this was a fatal flaw and no acceptance had taken place. Why so strict? Because this was a massive transaction involving the processing of thousands of documents in circumstances of urgency. There could be no room for individualising each transaction by reference to interactions or conversations and so forth. Certainty and precision were of the essence. There was no scope for accommodating ad hoc dealings as there often is in other kinds of contracts. The acceptance inquiry involves two sub-questions, both of which must be positively answered. Has there been unqualified assent? Has this assent been communicated to the offeror?215 These will be dealt with under the heads ‘The fact of acceptance’ and ‘The communication of acceptance’.

The fact of acceptance Acceptance by various means 3.27  Acceptance by conduct. It has already been noted that the language of offer and acceptance often constitutes an artificial construct imposed on the dealings between people. The offer and acceptance model works satisfactorily in relation to formal contracting where the parties negotiate, draw up a formal contract and then sign it.216 It can also work satisfactorily in less formal dealings where it is objectively clear that the parties have reached agreement, such as ordering goods over the telephone or shaking hands as a sign of final agreement.217 It will sometimes be the case that, where there is a clear offer, there is doubt about precisely when, or if, there was acceptance of that offer. Yet the parties have proceeded. The law has responded by moulding the rules of acceptance to accommodate imprecise human behaviour or to common practice. Acceptance can be inferred from conduct if that inference is indicated by the objective circumstances. An offeree ‘promises’ to be bound by the terms of the offer by simply getting on with it. This is an important aspect of the law because it recognises what commercial people actually do. For example, it is routine contracting practice to respond to an order for goods by starting the process of fulfilling the order.218 215. Communication of acceptance may occur even if it is during or after performance in some special cases. An example is acceptance by conduct. 216. As noted in 3.26, signature is probably the clearest indication of assent: see generally Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; [2004] HCA 52. However, its absence where a signature would be expected does not necessarily indicate lack of assent, depending on the circumstances. As will be seen below, there may be other ways of indicating acceptance, such as getting on with the work or allowing the other party to. If a person deliberately does not sign because he or she does not agree to the terms of the document and communicates this to the other party, then there is clearly no acceptance. An example is Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 116 (discussed below). 217. As to the significance of shaking hands, see discussion of Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) Aust Contract Rep 90-059 in 3.11. 218. See, for example, Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1. The offeree’s conduct may be such that he or she is estopped from denying that there is a contract. See the discussion by Ormiston J in Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at  203. Compare the United States Uniform Commercial Code § 2-206(1)(b), which

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Acceptance by conduct was recognised in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co.219 Brogden had for years supplied the defendant company with coal without a formal agreement. At length the parties decided to regularise their relations. The company’s agent sent a draft form of agreement to Brogden, and the latter, having inserted the name of an arbitrator in a space which had been left blank for this purpose, signed it and returned it, marked ‘approved’. The company’s agent put it in his desk and nothing further was done to complete its execution. Both parties acted thereafter on the basis of its terms, supplying and paying for the coal in accordance with its clauses, until a dispute arose between them and Brogden denied that any binding contract existed. It could not be argued that the return of the draft was an acceptance of the company’s offer, since Brogden, by inserting the name of an arbitrator, had added a new term (thus making a counter-offer), which the company had had no opportunity of approving or rejecting. But assuming that the delivery of the document by Brogden to the company, with the addition of the arbitrator’s name, was a final and definite offer to supply coal on the terms contained in it, when was that offer accepted? No further communication passed between the parties so that there was no express acceptance. On the other hand, the subsequent conduct of the parties was explicable only on the assumption that they mutually approved the terms of the draft. The House of Lords held that a contract came into existence either when the company ordered its first load of coal from Brogden upon these terms or at least when Brogden supplied it. Brogden has been applied many times by Australian courts.220 In this case it was relatively easy to determine what the terms of the agreement were. In other cases, where there is acceptance by conduct, it may be difficult.221 The courts may be able to imply terms in such cases.222 The courts generally have adequate powers to deal with the uncertainties arising from agreements reached by conduct rather than express acceptance.223 It was essential in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd224 to decide whether a term in a printed contract applied because that term gave a firm of managing architects security over land, whereas a contract inferred from conduct would not have provided such security. The case is interesting because it involved a man who ‘never signs contracts’. The architects performed a considerable amount of work for the owners of the land and, after some time, submitted a standard contract to recognises that acceptance may take place either by prompt notification that the order will be met or by actual shipment of the order. 219. (1877) 2 App Cas 666. 220. Applied to acceptance by conduct of a variation of a contract in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567 and Apex Gold Pty Ltd v Atlas Copco Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 49. See GB Energy Ltd v Protean Power Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 333 for acceptance by conduct of variation to a multi-party agreement. 221. In PRA Electrical Pty Ltd v Perseverance Exploration Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 487; [2007] VSCA 310, a successful tenderer was supposed to sign a formal agreement but this never happened. The project went ahead. There were sufficient terms in the request for tender for the court to conclude that there was acceptance by conduct. 222. See Chapter 10; in particular at 10.55, where the point is made that implication of terms is more easily done when the parties have engaged in informal contracting (where the need for implied terms is more pressing). 223. See Chapter 6. 224. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523.

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be signed. The document was never signed and yet the parties proceeded in a manner that was consistent with the terms of the unsigned contract. The New South Wales Court of Appeal225 had to decide whether the terms of the written contract should nevertheless apply. They concluded that they should, applying Brogden’s case. Kirby P said, having noted that estoppel was not pleaded, that there was an implied acceptance stemming from the conduct of the parties.226 He stressed that it would be inherently unlikely for parties to enter into protracted commercial arrangements without settling the terms of their relationship in some detail.227 McHugh JA, using American authority, said that there were circumstances (such as custom, a course of dealing or previous relationship) in which a duty is imposed on the offeree ‘to reject the offer or be bound’.228 If, instead of rejecting the offer, the offeree takes the benefit of what is offered, then he or she is taken to have accepted.229 In a case involving alleged acceptance by conduct, the conduct must ‘necessarily’ provide evidence of acceptance.230 It may not be enough if the conduct is only consistent with acceptance.231 However, this very much depends on the particular circumstances as the inquiry in each case is fact-specific.232 A nice illustration of the point that a person must reject the offer or be bound, is provided by Airways Corp of New  Zealand Ltd v  Geyserland Airways Ltd.233 Airways Corporation, a newly corporatised body that was charged (under statute) with the responsibility of providing air traffic control services in New Zealand, sent its terms and conditions to the various airlines operating in the country. Two small airlines rejected the terms and conditions and yet used the services because they were obliged to under statute. It was held that there was no contract because there never was an acceptance of the terms and conditions (and in fact they were rejected in no uncertain terms). In this case it was argued strenuously that merely using the air traffic 225. Kirby P, Samuels and McHugh JJA. 226. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 528–31. In Lucas v Public Transport Corp Victoria [2000] 1 VR 156; [2000] VSCA 35, a settlement agreement was not signed by the plaintiff and yet was held to be binding. 227. Ibid at 530. However, each case depends on its facts. In Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v ABB Service Pty Ltd (formerly ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd) [2004] NSWCA 181, a letter of intent was signed and work was performed and yet the New South Wales Court of Appeal concluded that there was no acceptance by conduct because of some important unresolved issues between the parties. See 5.19. 228. Ibid at 534 citing CMI Clothesmakers Inc v ASK Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447; Brooks Towers Corp v Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203; Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464. 229. Ibid at 535. McHugh JA compared this situation with the ticket cases. 230. Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 at [5]–[9] (Macfarlan JA). 231. Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96 at [117]–[120] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring); Hopcroft & Edwards v Edmunds [2013] SASCFC 38 at [80]–[94] (White J, Kourakis CJ and Stanley J concurring). See, for example, Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 (solicitor’s retainer agreement not signed and held not to be accepted by conduct). Compare Steele v  Marshan [2012] NSWCA 141 and Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1941] 1 All ER 9 at 10 (real estate agent’s fees deemed to be accepted). 232. Judges will therefore differ on the interpretation of the facts, as illustrated by Waldorf Apartment Hotel, The Entrance Pty Ltd v Owners Corp Sp 71623 [2010] NSWCA 226 and Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44. 233. [1996] 1 NZLR 116. Another example is Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v  Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111 at [133]–[150], where there was an unsuccessful attempt to rely on Empirnall. This case illustrates that what actually happened is all-important. Did the conduct indicate agreement to the terms, or were there differences between the parties as to the basis of proceeding with the relevant project? On the facts of Industrial Rollformers it was clear that there were important differences between the parties as to the terms on which they would proceed. A similar case to Airways Corporation is Transpower New Zealand Ltd v Meridian Energy Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 700, where use of services, when there was a clear disagreement about the terms, was not enough to create a contract.

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control services constituted acceptance but the argument was not successful because it was plain to Airways Corporation that its terms and conditions had been rejected. Of course, the argument would have been successful if the airlines had remained silent and used the services but they in fact engaged in vigorous correspondence that made it perfectly clear that they were not interested in the corporation’s attempt to engage in contractual relations with them.234 Thus, the failure to sign a written agreement may have a very different complexion, depending on the particular circumstances.

Acceptance and unilateral contracts 3.28  Unilateral contracts.235 Acceptance by conduct giving rise to a bilateral contract must not be confused with acceptance by conduct giving rise to a unilateral contract.236 The terms and nature of the offer will usually determine whether the appropriate response by the offeree is to commit himself or herself to future performance (bilateral) or merely to carry out the requested act of performance at his or her option (unilateral). Occasionally, the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contract is not clear.237 Unilateral contracts serve a useful role in catering for reward cases and the like in which the offeree is at no stage bound to perform and the offeror only becomes bound once the offeree has performed the requested act. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,238 which has already been discussed,239 is the classic statement on unilateral contract. More recently, unilateral contract has been employed in circumstances far removed from its traditional stereotype. In MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA),240 Barwick CJ considered that an airline passenger makes a unilateral contract with the airline company: In general, therefore, the entitlement of the airline company to retain the prepaid fare is dependent on the actual performance of carriage. The situation is an example of the payment of a reward for an act performed at request with no antecedent promise by the person performing the act to do so.241 234. An attempted unilateral contract argument was also not successful because the act of using the services was not in response to and because of the offer. See 3.39. The case was not argued (despite inquiry from the judge) on the basis of restitution, that is, the claim for money for services rendered was based purely on a contract argument. 235. See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co at  3.16, the paradigm unilateral contract case. See also 3.71 on withdrawal of offer for a unilateral contract. 236. This point is very clearly made by Ormiston J in Gjergja v Cooper [1987] VR 167 at 203. 237. See, for example, White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101, particularly at 103. In Howes v Miller [1970] VR 522, it was held that an offer of settlement of a negligence claim by the injured party for $1066 was an offer to accept actual payment, not a promise of payment. An English example is United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74. For criticism of the bilateral/unilateral dichotomy in the context of this case, see Atiyah, ‘Conceptualism Triumphant in the Court of Appeal’ (1968) 31 MLR 332. Compare majority (de Jersey CJ and Mackenzie J) and minority (McPherson JA) in JV Property Syndicate Pty Ltd v Croakybill Ltd [2005] QCA 479. 238. [1893]1 QB 256. See also Abbott v Lance (1860) 2 Legge 1283 discussed in 3.71; Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 at [94]–[105] (Pullin JA, Martin CJ and Murphy JA concurring) (option as unilateral contract). 239. See 3.16, 3.19. 240. (1975) 133 CLR 125 also discussed in 3.4. 241. Ibid at 133. See Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 151 NTR 1; [2006] NTSC 4 at [65] (Mildren J), where this analysis was applied.

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This view was motivated by the fact that the airline company had issued a ticket in which it specifically exempted itself from having to carry the passenger. Thus, the company was promising nothing. Nevertheless, it was clear that some kind of contractual relationship existed. A similar motivation — to find a contractual relationship upon which to build obligations — can be detected in Harvela Investments Ltd v  Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd,242 where unilateral contract was employed to impose an obligation to accept the highest bid in a fixed-bid sale. Another curious application of unilateral contract is to be found in the cases in which it has been held that exemption clauses in contracts of carriage of goods extend to protect third parties such as stevedores and truck drivers who have negligently damaged the goods.243 The unilateral contract in these cases consists of an offer of exemption by the owner of goods to the servants, agents, subcontractors, etc of the carrier (for example, a stevedore or truck driver), which offer is conveyed to those parties by the carrier who acts as agent for the stevedore or truck driver for this purpose,244 and which is accepted by them when they deal with the goods according to their function (loading or unloading in the case of stevedores and carrying in the case of truck drivers).245 Such an analysis is patently artificial, as a matter of contract law, whatever may be the merits of these cases in terms of policy so far as allocation of risks and the making of insurance arrangements are concerned.246 The unilateral analysis was rejected in the New York Star by three members of the High Court247 and not followed by two other members,248 though followed by the Privy Council in that case on appeal from the High Court. The analysis raises a number of issues that are dealt with in the appropriate parts of this book.249 Suffice it to say here that ‘conjuring up’ a unilateral contract between the goods owner and the third party is a curious way of overcoming the privity rule.250 If it is thought to be desirable to

242. [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. See 3.25, 3.35. 243. New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300; Celthene Pty Ltd v W K J Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. See Malcolm, ‘The Negligent Pilot and the Himalaya Clause: A Saga of Disagreement’ (1993) 67 ALJ 14. These cases raise a number of issues. See  3.8, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. See 7.38 for a full statement of the facts and discussion of the leading case, The Eurymedon. 244. See The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609 for a case in which it was held that the carrier could not be said to be acting as agent for the purpose of conveying the offer of exemption to the stevedore. 245. One issue is whether there is truly acceptance when the party dealing with the goods may be ignorant of the offer of exemption, or may not have it in mind, when dealing with the goods. This issue is discussed in 3.40. 246. The solution supports the more efficient insurance arrangement, namely, first-party insurance by the goods owner rather than third-party (or liability) insurance by the various parties who handle the goods during the course of the journey. 247. Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1978) 139 CLR 231 (Barwick CJ, Stephen and Murphy JJ). Murphy  J said that ‘My conclusion is that a contract should not be conjured up out of the circumstances in order to extend the exemptions … to the stevedore’: at 285). Barwick CJ adopted a very different analysis involving the notion of a pre-contractual arrangement that ripens into contract on the happening of a certain event. Such an arrangement is neither a bilateral nor a unilateral contract: at 243–6. 248. Mason and Jacobs JJ, who accepted the unilateral contract argument but thought that in this particular case the exemption clause no longer applied once the goods were warehoused. 249. See 3.8, 3.40, 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 250. See 7.38.

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extend exemption clauses in this way, it would be better to do so directly by making appropriate modifications to the privity rule.251

Distinction between acceptance and counter-offer 3.29  Counter-offer is usually a final rejection of original offer. To hold that there is an acceptance the offeree must unreservedly assent to the exact terms proposed by the offeror — sometimes referred to as the mirror principle. If, while purporting to accept the offer as a whole, the offeree introduces a new term which the offeror has not had the chance of examining, he or she is in fact merely making a counter-offer. The effect of this is said to destroy the original offer. Thus, in Hyde v Wrench,252 the defendant on 6 June offered to sell an estate to the plaintiff for £1000. On 8 June, in reply, the plaintiff made an offer of £950, which was refused by the defendant on 27 June. Finally, on 29 June, the plaintiff wrote that he was now prepared to pay £1000. It was held that no contract existed. By his letter of 8 June, the plaintiff had rejected the original offer and he was no longer able to revive it by changing his mind and tendering a subsequent acceptance. The proposition that a rejected offer is killed must depend on the circumstances. For example, if in a subsequent conversation it was obvious that the original offer was still open, then it would be possible to accept it, even though it was originally rejected. Heydon JA has commented: A rejected offer may remain operative if in the circumstances it should be treated despite its rejection as remaining on foot, available for adoption as the basis of mutual assent manifested by conduct.253

As a rule, when new terms are included in the purported acceptance, there is no contract,254 although a document containing new terms sent in error may be disregarded.255 An unauthorised alteration to an offer constitutes a counter-offer,256 as does purported acceptance by the offeree and another or by the offeree on behalf of himself or herself and another.257 251. See  Reynolds, ‘Again the Negligent Stevedore’ (1979) 95 LQR 183 at  187; ‘The Negligent Stevedore Yet Again’ (1980) 96 LQR 506 at 508; Clarke, ‘The Reception of the Eurymedon Decision in Australia, Canada and New Zealand’ (1980) 29 ICLQ 132. 252. (1840) 3 Beav 334; 49 ER 132 applied in Fletcher v Minister for the Environment (1999) 73 SASR 474; [1999] SASC 223 at [30] (Bleby J); Baker v Taylor (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 500; and Harris v Jenkins [1922] SASR 59. If a counter-offer is accepted there is a binding contract: Mooney v Williams (1905) 3 CLR 1. See also Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 at 6, 12–13; Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498; Davies v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 258; Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20; JS Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1956) 94 CLR 30 at 43, 62; Brierley (RA) Investments Ltd v Landmark Corp Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 at 233–4; Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221 (document signed by one party altered before being signed by the other). 253. Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [80]. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v  Vass [2018] NSWCA 259, an offer of settlement was rejected but nevertheless was later successfully accepted. The court made it clear that contractual analysis does not apply to statutory schemes such as the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules but, in any case, in appropriate circumstances a rejection of an offer does not necessarily kill the offer, as Heydon JA made clear. 254. Grainger v Vindin (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 32; Davies v Smith (1938) 12 ALJ 260; Turner Kempson & Co Pty Ltd v Camm [1922] VLR 498. 255. Universal Guarantee Pty Ltd v Carlile (1957) VR 68. 256. Outer Suburban Property Ltd v Clarke [1933] SASR 221. 257. Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1. Contrast Wilson v Winton [1969] Qd R 536, in which an offeree who had executed a trust of his interest in an option in favour of third parties was not making a counter-offer when he exercised the option. He remained personally liable under the contract.

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3.30  Cases not amounting to counter-offers. By contrast, the courts are prepared to show a more flexible approach to the matching of offer and acceptance where the mirror approach would be inappropriate. This flexibility accommodates the fact that people do not woodenly repeat in precisely the same terms the elements of the offer when they are accepting. Thus the mere adding of some detail in the acceptance which does not affect the terms of the offer does not amount to a counter-offer.258 It has been said that if a new element in the purported acceptance is purely for the benefit of the offeror, this can constitute a valid acceptance.259 A verbal discrepancy between the offer and the acceptance will not amount to a rejection and counter-offer if, on its most probable construction, the acceptance is merely a paraphrase of the offer.260 Even an inaccurate statement of the terms of the offer may not necessarily vitiate the acceptance.261 A mere request for further information does not amount to a counter-offer.262 If an offer is framed in such a way that it makes clear that the offeree can accept within a specified range of terms, then an acceptance within that range is not a counter-offer. Thus, someone seeking workers’ compensation insurance cover is requesting such indemnity as the insurer is prepared to provide ‘so that the insurer does not refuse the offer embodied in the request by specifying some limited period’.263 3.31  A more flexible approach. It is worth noting that in the international sale of goods governed by the Vienna Convention, and in the United States, attempts have been made to deal with the inconvenience of the traditional analysis of offer and counter-offer by specifically allowing for discrepancies between offer and acceptance in certain circumstances. Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods264 allows for an acceptance that modifies the terms of an offer so long as the discrepancies do not ‘materially alter the terms of the offer’.265 The offeror may nevertheless promptly object to the purported acceptance in which case it is not effective. A similar solution is envisaged by § 2-207 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, but more specific attention is paid in this section to the ability of either party to indicate expressly that his or her terms prevail. Both provisions incorporate the concept of ‘material alteration’ that precludes effective acceptance. This concept may not be clear,266 and is a source of potential 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264.

265. 266.

Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (reference to ‘inventory’ in acceptance). Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWCA 94 at [76]–[78] (Beazley JA, Mason P and Ipp JA concurring). Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 20. Quadling v  Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192, particularly at  197 (Barwick CJ) and at  201 (Gibbs J); Mendel v Benjamin (1997) Aust Contract Rep 90-088 (NSWCA). Stevenson Jacques & Co v McLean [1880] 5 QBD 346; Bridle Estates Pty Ltd v Myer Realty Ltd (1977) 51 ALJR 743 at 748. Georgoulis v Mandalinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 at 615 (Hutley JA). For the text see  the Goods Act  1958 (Vic) Schedule. This legislation has been adopted in all states and territories in Australia: ACT: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; NSW: Sale of Goods (Vienna  Convention) Act  1986; NT: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; Qld: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1986; SA: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act  1986; Tas: Sale of Goods  (Vienna Convention) Act  1987; Vic: Goods Act  1958 Pt IV; WA: Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986. See Hunter, ‘Is the CISG Slowly Becoming Part of the Common Law?’ (2018) 35 JCL 1 at 6–8. Article 19(3) provides: ‘Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.’

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litigation. Both these provisions were aimed at the problem that has become known as the ‘battle of the forms’. 3.32  The battle of the forms. The pedantic or mirror approach to acceptance, whereby the court requires a precise matching of acceptance to offer, may cause some difficulties in transactions between businesses in which each business has its own standard printed form. Business A may, for example, send an order form with one set of terms and Business B may respond with a confirmation note or an invoice containing a different set of terms. Business A may then appear to restate its terms by referring to them again. There is some empirical evidence that business people consciously enter into the battle of the forms and some at least are aware of the rules of the game and attempt to ensure that their terms prevail.267 At the same time, through a reluctance to push this too far with the possibility of loss of business, or because the costs of negotiating outweigh the benefits, business people may be content to leave the discrepancies unresolved.268 The consequence in law, at least on one analysis, may be that there is no contract. Two questions may arise in these battle-of-the-forms cases. Has a contract been concluded at all? If there is a contract, whose terms prevail? The answers to these questions are determined by a close examination of precisely what occurred between the parties. Sometimes the outcome of these cases is fickle in the sense that a chance event (almost certainly not thought to be of any significance by the parties) may determine the result. This is illustrated by Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco (Aust) Pty Ltd.269 H  sent a purchase order. R faxed a reply ‘will confirm order on our official confirmation sheets, over next few days. Please accept this as our confirmation in mean time’. The subsequent official form contained terms that were different from the terms in the original purchase order. A majority of the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal held that R’s faxed reply was an acceptance of H’s purchase order because the magic word ‘accept’ appeared therein. Kirby P in dissent considered that this word was not determinative. It was very unlikely that the person who sent the fax was using the word ‘accept’ in a technical, legal sense and in fact the rest of the message clearly indicated that the fax was not an acceptance. As to the first question — has a contract been concluded? — it may be that no contract is formally concluded because the parties have merely made offers and counter-offers that are never accepted. This problem may be solved by resorting to the notion of acceptance by conduct270 if the parties have proceeded with the commercial arrangement, in which case the last counter-offer is accepted. But it may still be arguable that, if the parties have made it quite clear that they will not accept each other’s terms, then acceptance of any one set of terms by conduct is 267. Beale and Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Law Soc 45 at 49–50. 268. Rawlings, ‘The Battle of the Forms’ (1979) 42 MLR 715 at 718; Beale and Dugdale, ibid at 49–50. 269. (1988) 5 BPR 11,106. 270. Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v  Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523; Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666. See 3.27.

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impossible.271 The outcome may then be that there is acceptance by conduct for the purposes of formation, but that the terms have not been expressly agreed to, in which case they must be implied.272 Another possible outcome is that there is no contract and that any goods or services actually provided must be paid for on the basis of the law of restitution.273 An illustrative case on this problem is Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England Ltd)274 in which the seller offered a machine to the buyer on the seller’s standard terms that were expressly said to prevail over any other terms. The seller’s terms included a price variation clause. The buyer responded by sending an order form that was materially different in a number of respects including a fixed-price clause. The buyer’s form also included a tear-off acknowledgement slip, which the seller was asked to sign, stating ‘we accept your order on the Terms and Conditions stated hereon’. The seller signed this slip but at the same time wrote that they were fulfilling the order ‘in accordance with our revised quotation of May 23’ which included the price variation clause. The English Court of Appeal’s analysis revealed some differences in approach in deciding the victor of the battle. There were five possible outcomes, not all of which were canvassed. (1) There was no contract at all.275 (2) A contract existed in terms of the last counter-offer (the ‘last shot’ solution).276 (3) A contract existed in terms of the document that prevailed for one reason or another. A document may prevail because it was more obviously contractual than its rival, or it was ‘higher status’,277 or it was said to prevail by its terms.278 (4) No document prevailed because each cancelled the other out with the result that terms have to be implied.279 (5) A combination of terms from both documents governed the contractual relationship (the ‘global approach’). The Court of Appeal held that the ‘last shot’ approach was appropriate with the result that the seller’s acknowledgement (by signing the slip) of the buyer’s terms was the final acceptance so that there was no price variation clause. The seller’s apparent attempt to reassert its terms despite signing the buyer’s acknowledgement slip was unsuccessful and was treated by the court as merely a method of identifying the machine. Lord Denning MR approved of the global approach that had been adopted by the trial judge, Thesiger J. On this approach the court will infer that a contract has been formed because of the conduct of the parties and then attempt to extract from the totality of the dealings between the parties what the terms are.280 If different terms can be reconciled with each other, they are part of the contract. If they cannot, the 271. Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 406 (Lawton LJ), 408 (Bridge LJ). 272. This view was canvassed without much enthusiasm by Mocatta J in Transmotors Ltd v  Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. See too Lord Denning MR in Butler at 405. 273. See Chapter 26. See McKendrick, ‘Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution’ (1988) 8 OJLS 197. 274. [1979] 1 WLR 401. 275. In which case, as noted, resort may be had to the law of restitution. 276. British Road Services Ltd v Arthur V Crutchley & Co Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811. 277. Mocatta J in Transmotors Ltd v Robertson, Buckley & Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. 278. The approach adopted by Thesiger J, the trial judge in Butler (unreported). 279. Mocatta J in Transmotors [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 224 at 234. 280. This approach can be seen in the reasoning of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Maxitherm Boilers Pty Ltd v  Pacific Dunlop Ltd [1998] 4 VR 559, particularly at  567 (Buchanan JA with the concurrence of Ormiston and Callaway JJA), and similarly in Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v  Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704 at [55]–[57] (Macready M).

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court must step in and imply appropriate terms. This approach, however, produced different results in the hands of the trial judge and Lord Denning MR. Thesiger J had concluded that the seller’s terms should prevail because of the express reference to their prevailing (approach (3) above); while Lord Denning MR, despite his adherence to the ‘global’ approach, concluded that the buyer’s terms prevailed because the seller signed the acknowledgement slip. Lord Denning’s approach was remarkably similar to § 2-207 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, discussed earlier.281 While this section represents a valiant attempt to accommodate to business realities, it has not been successful in that its uncertainties, particularly as to what is ‘material’ and what is not, have generated more problems than the section was supposed to solve. The result is that Australian courts will probably follow the more traditional ‘matching’ approach, which has the merit of ease of application.282 On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of being inflexible, and may encourage business people to escalate the battle. 3.33  Exchange of land contracts.283 In relation to exchange of counterpart contracts for the sale of land,284 conveyancers will endeavour to make sure that the two parts are identical. If they are not, then the second copy delivered may be a counter-offer rather than an acceptance. In England it has been held in Harrison v Battye285 that the two parts must be identical. However, in Australia, the High Court has held in Sindel v Georgiou286 that the exchange of non-identical parts is not necessarily fatal to the formation of a contract. In that case, the lack of correspondence between the two parts came about because of a failure to complete the counterpart signed by the vendor and to annex to it a copy of a survey report. In a joint judgment, it was held that if the parties intend to create a contract by exchange of parts, then a contract will come into being so long as the lack of correspondence between the parts can be remedied by rectification287 or interpretation.288 This all depends upon the intention of the parties. ‘It will be otherwise when it appears that the parties intend to be bound only by an exchange of parts in identical terms …’.289 In this case, the fact that there was no contradiction between the terms of the two parts (as there was in

281. See 3.31. 282. Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,106. See also White Industries Ltd v Piling Contractors Pty Ltd (1986) 2 BCL 353. Subcontractor P started work on the basis of its terms. W sent a contract with a term ‘Any conditions of contract or sale attached to or embodied in the subcontractor’s quotation are deemed to be withdrawn in favour of the conditions incorporated herein’. P refused to sign. It was held that there was a contract on the basis of the subcontractor’s terms. 283. For an account of the roles of the respective solicitors in an exchange of land contracts, see  Zaccardi v Caunt [2008] NSWCA 202 at [31] (Campbell JA). It is worth noting that the method of exchange of parts, inherited from the United Kingdom, is not universally used in Australia. In South Australia one contract is signed by each party. Of course, a copy of that contract is also created. 284. See 3.10 for discussion of offer and acceptance when there is such an exchange. 285. [1974] 3 All ER 830. 286. (1984) 154 CLR 661. See  also Starke, ‘Effect of Exchange of Contracts in Establishing a Concluded Agreement of Sale of Land’ (1985) 59 ALJ 50. 287. As to the doctrine of rectification, see Chapter 12. In Hayward v Planet Projects Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1105, non-identical parts were exchanged and Simos J was of the opinion that the contract could be rectified and so the discrepancy between the two parts removed. There is a logical difficulty here that is overlooked to achieve practical justice: rectification cannot be ordered if there is no contract. 288. See below 6.5 and 6.6, where what is termed ‘informal rectification’ is discussed. 289. (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 667.

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Harrison v Battye) helped the court to conclude that there was a binding agreement. ‘There is nothing in either part to raise any doubt as to the agreed terms.’290 In Zaccardi v  Caunt,291 non-identical parts were exchanged and Campbell JA undertook a close examination of the two parts to see whether the difference was material. He found that the parts were materially different but nevertheless concluded that the intention of the parties, as objectively ascertained, was to commit to contract by exchange. There was evidence that the parties intended to commit on the basis of one of the signed parts. The High Court emphasised in Sindel that intention was the paramount consideration.292 Campbell JA was also of the view that the High Court in Sindel did not lay down that rectification was necessarily a prerequisite to effective exchange of non-matching parts. As to ‘exchange’ made by telephone, see 3.57.

Retrospective acceptance 3.34  May acceptance be retrospective? It is not uncommon for commercial parties to start performing a contract before making it in a formal sense. Apart from contract by inference from conduct (see 3.6), by estoppel and acceptance by conduct (see 3.27), where the parties have started work on a project with the understanding that a formal contract will be executed at some later stage, the question is whether the activities carried out prior to execution are governed by the contract. The answer to this is straightforward if the parties have expressly provided that the agreement will operate as from a date earlier than its execution date. The agreement has retrospective effect.293 But what if their intention is not clearly expressed? Megaw J considered the question in Trollope & Colls Ltd v  Atomic Power Constructions Ltd294 and held that because the parties had acted for some time prior to the actual execution of a written contract, their rights and obligations arising from their prior actions must be regulated by the written contract. Although the written contract did not state that it was to have retrospective effect, the court considered that it was a necessary inference to be drawn from the course of dealings between the parties. Similarly in City of Box Hill v EW Tauschke Pty Ltd,295 the Victorian Supreme Court gave a written agreement retrospective operation. T was the successful tenderer for road work and was obliged to sign a contract with an indemnity clause. A claim for personal injuries was successfully made against the City of Box Hill arising out of an accident that occurred after the tenderer had started work but before the 290. Ibid at  668. Contrast De Jong v  Carpenter (1982) 2  BPR  9524 and Longpocket Investments Pty Ltd v Hoadley (1985) NSW ConvR 55-244; 3 BPR 9606. 291. [2008] NSWCA 202. 292. In Wang v Garland Lot 3 Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1112, Robb J, after a thorough examination of the analysis of Campbell JA in Zaccardi, concluded that on the facts in Wang it could not be said that the parties had a mutual intention that could be inferred from non-identical parts. 293. Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd (1959) SR (NSW) 130 at 133, 135–6. 294. [1963] 1 WLR 333 at 339; [1962] 3 All ER 1035 at 1040 applied in Murray Goulburn Co-Operative Co Ltd v Cobram Laundry Service Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 57 at [16] (Chernov JA, Brooking and Batt JJA concurring); QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749 (Hall J); Murphy Corporation Ltd v Acumen Design & Development (Qld) Pty Ltd & Derek Graham Hooper (1995) 11 BCL 274. 295. [1974] VR 39. See  also QCoal Pty Ltd v  Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479 at  [35] (Ann Lyons J).

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formal contract containing the indemnity clause was signed. The City of Box Hill was successful in invoking the indemnity clause against T. On the other hand, in Newlands v Argyll General Insurance Co Ltd,296 the trial judge and, on appeal, a majority of the Full Court of New South Wales, decided that a contract could not have retrospective effect unless it is expressly so provided in the terms. In spite of a strong dissenting judgment by Sugerman J, leave to appeal to the High Court was refused. It is, perhaps, a matter for regret that the High Court did not take the opportunity to consider the matter, especially in view of the opinions expressed by two of its members in Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson,297 which, like the Newlands case, involved a hire-purchase agreement. In the former case Williams and Kitto JJ said: The agreements provide that the term of the hiring is to commence from the date of the agreement, which means apparently the date the document is signed by the hirer. They also provide that upon such signature they are to operate only as an irrevocable offer for fourteen days from the date thereof and shall not be binding until a memorandum of acceptance shall have been signed by the plaintiff company and that, inter alia, any delivery shall, pending acceptance, be conditional only. But it would appear that upon acceptance the agreement would operate from the date it was signed by the hirer.298

The question of inferred retrospectivity may be regarded as open, at  any rate in states other than possibly New  South  Wales,299 and it is one of considerable importance in the context of modern commercial practice. For example, in a consumer credit transaction that is to be financed by a finance company, the dealer and the buyer will often act before the finance company has executed the agreement. The dealer may deliver the chattel that is to be bought and the buyer may have delivered a trade-in. This practice is so general that finance companies must be taken to know of it and, indeed, to conduct their business on that basis. In such cases there is much to be said for allowing the agreement, when it is accepted by the finance corporation, to have retrospective effect and to cover the prior actions of the dealer and the buyer. This is, ultimately, simply a matter of discerning the parties’ evident intention and no blanket rule is appropriate.

Commitment to acceptance 3.35  Acceptance before offer — fixed bid sales and auctions. A somewhat analogous problem was posed by Harvela Investments Ltd v  Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd.300 Is it possible to commit to acceptance of an offer before it is made? That is, is it possible to make a binding commitment to contract before the price and the party are known? On the principles so far discussed it would seem not. But the exceptions arise in cases of fixed-bid sales, possibly in tenders301 and auctions 296. (1959) SR (NSW) 130. 297. (1951) 82 CLR 477. 298. Ibid at 488. 299. See  Hawkins v  Clayton t/a Clayton Utz & Co (1986) NSWLR 109 at  130 (McHugh JA) endorsing Newlands: ‘At least in this State the law must be taken as settled that, in the absence of a contractual provision, express or implied, a contract does not have a retrospective effect.’ However, to the contrary was Hall J in Dong v Monkiro Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 749. See also Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235 at [73] (Young CJ in Eq). 300. [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. Also discussed above in 3.25, 3.28. 301. See 3.39.

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‘without reserve’.302 In Harvela, the first defendants held some 12 per cent of the shares of a company as trustees of a settlement. They wished to sell the shares. The two obvious buyers were the plaintiffs who owned 43 per cent of the shares and the second defendants who owned 40 per cent of the shares, since if either bought the shares, they would obtain control of the company. The first defendants decided to dispose of the shares by sealed fixed bids and sent identical telexes to the plaintiffs and the second defendants inviting tenders and stating ‘We confirm that if any offer made by you is the highest offer received by us we bind ourselves to accept such offer providing that such offer complies with the terms of this telex’. The plaintiffs bid $2,175,000. The second defendants bid $2,100,000 or ‘$101,000 in excess of any other offer which you may receive which is expressed as a fixed monetary amount, whichever is higher’. The first defendants accepted the second defendants’ offer. It was held that the first defendants were legally obliged to accept the plaintiffs’ offer, it being the highest legitimate offer.303 In coming to this conclusion Lord Diplock analysed the problem on the basis of there being two contracts. The telex was treated as an offer of a unilateral contract to accept the highest bid that would be followed by a bilateral contract with the highest bidder.

Tenders 3.36  Acceptance in the case of tenders.304 A final illustration of the difficulty experienced in deciding whether an offer has been accepted is afforded by the cases where a tender is invited for the supply of goods or services.305 Before examining tenders, it is worth noting that sometimes organisations may simply seek ‘expressions of interest’ in which case the party who responds is merely providing information. The more usual form of tender is where an organisation asks for tenders for the supply of an item (or for the purchase of an item) and each tenderer puts in a bid in ignorance of what the other tenderers have bid.306 There is no doubt that the tender (unlike an expression of interest) is an offer. The question, however, is whether its ‘acceptance’ by the principal is an acceptance in the legal sense so as to produce a binding contract. This can be answered only by examining the language of the original invitation to tender. There are at least two possible cases. 3.37  Two classes of tenders. First, the principal may state that it will require a specified quantity of goods, for instance, where it issues a request for tenders for 1000 computers to be supplied during the period from 1 January to 31 December. This is an invitation to treat. Tenderers who respond to this make offers.307 Here 302. Auctions without reserve are discussed above in 3.24. 303. It was held that a referential bid was not a legitimate offer. See 3.25. 304. For an extensive discussion of tenders in the context of government procurement, see Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 7. 305. Of course, a tender may be for a sale, but usually tendering is used for purchasing. 306. Or at  least that is how a tender is supposed to be conducted. Collusive bidding and other practices that corrupt the tendering process are illegal under the Competition and Consumer Act  2010 (Cth) Pt IV and under other legislation and may also generate civil causes of action, for example, in deceit or for misleading conduct. See Metroplaza Pty Ltd v  Girvan Pty Ltd (1993) ATPR 41-241 for the array of remedies available to the victim of collusive bidding, including conspiracy and restitution. See  also Energex Ltd v Alstom Australia Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 504; [2005] FCAFC 215. 307. Re Klown Production Pty Ltd and Australian Trade Commission (1992) 26 ALD 763.

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‘acceptance’ of a tender is an acceptance in the legal sense, and it creates a contract.308 It is common for the request document to stipulate when a contract comes into being. So, for example, a communication that a particular bidder has won the tender would not be legal acceptance if the request document had stipulated that contract formation occurs only on execution of a contract. If fixed quantities are not specified, it is still possible for the party seeking supplies to bind himself or herself to deal exclusively with the other party.309 Second, if the corporation advertises that it may require articles of a specified description, as, for instance, where it invites tenders for the supply during the coming year of stationery, deliveries to be made if and when demanded, the effect of the so-called ‘acceptance’ of the tender is very different. The supplier has made what is called a standing offer in response to the tender invitation. Until revocation, he or she stands ready and willing to deliver stationery at the agreed price when the corporation from time to time demands a precise quantity. The ‘acceptance’ of the tender, however, does not convert the offer into a binding contract, for a contract of sale implies that the buyer has agreed to accept the goods. In the latter case the principal has not agreed to take any quantity of stationery (and this is usually stated in the request document). It has merely stated that it may require supplies. 3.38  Position where tender is a standing offer.310 In this latter case the standing offer may be revoked at  any time provided that it has not been accepted in the legal sense.311 And acceptance in the legal sense is complete as soon as an order for a definite quantity of goods is made. Each order by the offeree is an individual act of acceptance that creates a separate contract. If, however, the supplier revokes the offer, he or she cannot be made liable for further deliveries312 but is bound by orders already made.313 The nature of a standing offer was considered in Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid.314 The plaintiff company agreed to supply the government of New South Wales with ammunition in such quantities as might from time to time be required by the government. Under this agreement the plaintiff supplied large quantities of ammunition which were duly paid for by the government. Eventually, the government decided that it needed new types of ammunition and bought these from other firms. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that there was no contract unless and until an order was made for a specific quantity: 308. Northern Territory v Skywest Airlines Pty Ltd (1987) 48 NTR 20; Secure Parking Pty Ltd v Woollahra Municipal Council [2016] NSWCA 154. The latter case demonstrates that care must be exercised if lastminute changes are sought by the principal. The tenderer’s bid was not modified by changes sought by the council so that the council’s purported acceptance of the tender did not match what was offered. 309. See Milne v Sydney Corp (1912) 14 CLR 54 (mechanical repair services). See also Jarvis v Pitt Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 506, discussed below. 310. Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.7]. 311. Sometimes the standing offer is in a deed which provides that the offer will be kept open for the term of the deed. 312. Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748; 142 ER 1336. The position would be different if the offeror has bound itself by deed to keep the standing offer open for a certain time. 313. Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 applied in Kelly v Caledonian Coal Co (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 1. 314. (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338. See also Munday and Shreeve v Western Australia [1962] WAR 65 (tender for transport of grain and superphosphate in which government specifically said that there was no guarantee of a minimum or any quantity to be transported. Held: standing offer only).

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Once they order the ammunition there is a contract to take the ammunition, but until they give the order, this agreement is nothing more than a tender on the part of the plaintiffs to supply the Government at the prices therein named with the ammunition ordered. It is clear that in this agreement there is no undertaking in terms by the Government to take one ounce of ammunition …315

It may be difficult to decide which type of tender exists when someone agrees to take such quantity as is required, and the quantity is not fixed. This happened in Jarvis v Pitt Ltd,316 in which a builder agreed317 to a quarry-master’s terms and prices for the supply of stone to build the Bonython Hall at  the University of Adelaide. The High Court held that this was not a standing offer but a contract to buy all the stone from the quarry company (a requirement contract): The respondent’s [quarry-master’s] proposal … was for the supply of all the stone, and that implies a promise on the part of the contractor to take it all. It is an offer to supply stone as ordered at the stated prices, if all the stone needed is taken from the respondent. Accordingly, to assent to the proposal is to promise to take the entire quantity of stone required to fulfil the specifications.318

3.39  Departure from stipulated tendering procedure and other problems in tendering.319 A number of problems may arise in connection with tendering. The basic issue is: do any enforceable obligations arise between tenderers and the party calling for tenders before any particular tender is accepted? Is there an analogy with auctions without reserve and sealed bids, discussed earlier?320 The practical implication of this possibility is that the tender process is governed by the rules announced in the request for tender and a departure may generate legal liability. The first point that can be made is that, if the particular tendering process is in fact conducted like an auction, then there is no reason why the Harvela case321 should not apply. Thus, if the request for tender stated that the lowest (or highest) tender would be accepted, there would be an obligation, arising from a unilateral contract, to accept the lowest (highest) tender that conformed to the terms of the advertisement.322 Generally, the party seeking tenders does not make such a commitment because very often price is not the only criterion for selecting the successful tender. But even without such a commitment, there may be an arguable case for a preliminary contract. This is discussed further below. One problem that arises quite commonly is that a tender is accepted even though it does not comply with the terms of the request document that sought tenders. This naturally gives rise to some dissatisfaction on the part of the unsuccessful tenderers. 315. (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 at 345. 316. (1935) 54 CLR 506. 317. The formation of this agreement was complicated by the fact that the builder’s tender to the university and its subsequent acceptance by the university also constituted formation of a contract with the quarrymaster. This aspect of the case is discussed in 5.23. 318. (1935) 54 CLR 506 at 516. 319. For a full analysis of the issues raised here, see Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 7. 320. See 3.24 and 3.35, where it is argued that separate contractual obligations may arise before acceptance of the highest bid. 321. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd [1986] AC 207; [1985] 2 All ER 966; [1985] 3 WLR 276. See 3.24, 3.35. 322. See Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 at 274–5 (Estey J for Supreme Court of Canada); Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469.

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Have they any remedy? On the traditional analysis, the tenderer makes an offer which, even though it does not comply with the terms of the advertisement, can nevertheless be accepted by the other party. But this does not answer the question whether there is breach of some possible obligation to the other tenderers who did comply. Basically, are the terms of the request for tender legally binding so that a disgruntled tenderer could seek damages if the party conducting the tender departs from the rules?323 A possible way in which damages could be recovered is to argue that it is misleading conduct to seek tenders, stipulating for certain terms (including a deadline for submission of tenders) and specifications, and then to accept a noncomplying tender.324 If the transaction came within s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law,325 the disgruntled tenderers may at least be able to recover damages for their wasted expenses in preparing tenders.326 It would not be misleading conduct if it was made clear that the organisation seeking tenders reserved the right to accept noncomplying tenders. An alternative analysis that might be employed to impose obligations during the tendering process is through estoppel.327 The body seeking tenders may be estopped in appropriate circumstances from departing from the terms set out in the tender advertisement.328 A further analysis, that has found favour in the United Kingdom,329 Canadian and New  Zealand courts and applied in Australia (see  below), is that there is a preliminary contract (contract A)330 between the organisation seeking tenders and any tenderer who puts in a complying tender. The actual acceptance of a particular tender (contract B) then may follow. Thus, the request for tender is both an invitation to treat asking for offers for contract B (its traditional role) and an offer capable of being accepted (thus creating contract A) by each tenderer who puts in a complying tender. The terms of this preliminary contract A are those stated in the tender advertisement or request for tender and they govern the actual conduct of the tender process up until the main contract is awarded. The principal or a tenderer may then be in breach if either does not comply with the terms. The Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario v  Ron Engineering &  Construction Eastern Ltd331 held that, once a tenderer has put in a complying tender, then the 323. As to the measure of damages, see  Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.22]. 324. Misleading conduct was one basis for finding liability in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1. 325. See Chapter 11. 326. There are nevertheless some difficult problems of causation in assessing damages in such a case. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.22]. 327. BGC Construction Pty Ltd v Minister for Works [2009] WASC 398 at [40]–[44] (Kenneth Martin J). 328. See Chapter 2. 329. Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195. 330. The terminology of contract A and contract B is taken from the Canadian cases. There are very many Canadian cases following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ron Engineering. These cases are analysed in Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.24]–[7.25]. 331. (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 (Estey J for Supreme Court of Canada). The tenderer was required to pay a deposit. Under the terms of the tender advertisement the deposit was liable to be forfeited in certain circumstances. It was held that the deposit was forfeited. The case also involved a mistake by the tenderer but the mistake was held not to be operative. This analysis has been followed in New Zealand. See  Markholm Construction Co Ltd v  Wellington CC [1985] 2 NZLR 520; Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North CC [1995] 1 NZLR 469; Gregory v Rangitikei District Council [1995] 2 NZLR 208;

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tenderer is bound and, in this particular case, the tender could not be withdrawn for 60 days because the advertisement for tenders so specified. Unlike in the Harvela case, it appears that the nature of this preliminary contract is bilateral rather than unilateral. This is because the request for tender may impose terms on either party. Most of the tender challenge cases involve alleged breach by the principal rather than a tenderer.332 The two-contract approach was applied in Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia.333 Finn J held that the Civil Aviation Authority (which became Airservices Australia) was in breach of the ‘process’ contract (contract A in Canadian terminology) created by the request for tender document when the Authority changed the selection criteria without informing the bidders. As already noted, this was also found to constitute misleading conduct. The growing body of case law using the two-contract analysis in tenders has principally been applied to government tenders.334 This may seem odd, but the cases do reveal a concern for special considerations that apply in public tenders, namely, the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the process. The whole purpose of conducting a tender is to obtain best value in the spending of public money. There was also a further consideration, emphasised by Finn J in Hughes Aircraft,335 that the government or a government body is expected to adhere to high standards of commercial conduct. The implications of these decisions are serious because they remove a degree of flexibility in the tendering process.336 On the one hand, it is important for the probity of the tendering process that the body seeking tenders, particularly a government body or instrumentality, should adhere to its own stipulated terms and procedures. On the other hand, a degree of flexibility must be maintained if the whole purpose of seeking tenders — to obtain the most competitive offer — is not to be undermined. It is possible in the invitation for tenders to stipulate that no ‘process’ contract will be created.337 The fact that in these cases there is usually a specific disclaimer (for example, ‘the Department will not necessarily accept the lowest offer, nor will it be bound to accept any tender submitted …’) provides some flexibility to the Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand (2005) 2 NZLR 433; [2003] UKPC 83; ScheldeMarinebouw BV v A-G [2005] NZAR 356. 332. In Canada tenderers have been sued by the principal. See, for example, Calgary v Northern Construction Co Division of Morrison-Knudsen Co Inc [1986] 2 WWR 426 affirmed by the Supreme Court [1987] 2 SCR 757; [1988] 2 WWR 193. 333. (1997) 76 FCR 151; 146 ALR 1. See also Ipex ITG Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 480; Cubic Transportation Systems Inc v New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 656; Edmondson v Warringah Council (1999) 105 LGERA 37; Williams v State Transit Authority of NSW [2004] NSWCA 179; Dockpride Pty Ltd v  Subiaco Redevelopment Authority [2005] WASC 211. In a very different context not involving tendering, a preliminary ‘process’ contract was discussed in Wenzel v  Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (2002) 125 FCR 570; [2002] FCAFC 400. The possibility of Hughes being applied to private sector tenders was canvassed in Macquarie Generation v  CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040; Hickinbotham Developments Pty Ltd v Woods (2005) 92 SASR 52; and Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 at [499]–[529] (Allsop J). 334. In Shivas v BTR Nylex Holdings NZ Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 318, an attempt to argue the two-contract approach to a private sector tender was unsuccessful. Compare Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 at [499]–[529] (Allsop J). 335. (1997) 46 ALR 1 at  41. See  Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [1.8]–[1.10], where this idea is discussed. 336. The Canadian decisions are criticised on this ground by Devonshire, (1989) 23 UBC Law Rev 335. See also Phang, ‘Tenders and Uncertainty’ (1991) 4 JCL 46. 337. The Commonwealth Government routinely excludes a process contract in its tender documents.

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body seeking tenders but does not prevent the preliminary contract A (or ‘process’ contract) from coming into being. Nor does such a disclaimer justify departure from the rules announced in the request for tender.338

‘Acceptance’ in ignorance of offer 3.40  Must acceptor have knowledge of offer or be acting in response to offer? Do contractual obligations arise if services are rendered, that in fact fulfil the terms of an offer, but are performed in ignorance of the existence of the offer? The defendant may, for example, have offered a reward to anyone who gives information ensuring the conviction of a criminal. If the plaintiff supplies the information in ignorance of the reward, can he or she afterwards claim it? This question raises a fundamental point about contract formation. On the one hand, it is necessary to show that there is agreement, tested generally by the rules of offer and acceptance. On the other hand, because the law uses an objective test, it is possible for a court to find that there is an agreement — to all outward appearances there appeared to be an agreement — when the parties were actually unaware of it. So, an apparent acceptance can create a contract. But can it do so where it can be proved that the purported acceptance was made in ignorance of the offer? Despite one or two nineteenth-century cases to the contrary,339 the answer is that no contract can be formed in such a case.340 Agreement, it is true, has often been inferred from the conduct of the parties although it does not exist in fact, but the inference can scarcely be drawn from the mere coincidence of two independent acts. The plaintiff, when he or she acted in supplying information, intended not to sell information, but to give it, and there was nothing to justify any reasonable third party in inferring the contrary.341 The point was tested on the somewhat unusual facts in R v  Clarke.342 The Government of Western Australia offered a reward of £1000 ‘for such information as shall lead to the arrest and conviction of’ the murderers of two police officers, and added that, if the information should be given by an accomplice, not being himself the murderer, he should receive a free pardon. Clarke saw the offer and sometime later gave the necessary information. He claimed the reward from the Crown by Petition of Right. He admitted not only that he had acted solely to save his own skin, but that, at the time when he gave the information, the question of the reward had passed out of his mind. The High Court of Australia held that his claim must fail. He was, in their opinion, in the same position as if he had never heard of the reward. In the words of Higgins J: Clarke had seen the offer, indeed; but it was not present to his mind — he had forgotten it, and gave no consideration to it, in his intense excitement as to his own danger. There cannot be assent without knowledge of the offer; and ignorance of the offer is the same thing whether it is due to never hearing of it or to forgetting it after hearing.343

338. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [7.20]. 339. Neville v Kelly (1862) 12 CBNS 740; 142 ER 1333; Gibbons v Proctor (1891) 64 LT 594. 340. For a contrary view, see Mitchell and Phillips, ‘The Contractual Nexus: Is Reliance Essential?’ (2002) 22 OJL S 115. 341. See Fitch v Snedaker (1886) 38 NY 248. 342. (1927) 40 CLR 227. 343. (1927) 40 CLR 227 at 241.

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Isaacs CJ reinforced his opinion with a hypothetical illustration: An offer of £100 to any person who should swim a hundred yards in the harbour on the first day of the year, … would not in my opinion be satisfied by a person who was accidentally or maliciously thrown overboard on that date and swam the distance simply to save his life, without any thought of the offer.344

The High  Court’s analysis in R v  Clarke certainly raises difficulties because it introduces motive, or even dominant motive, into the analysis of offer and acceptance. There is a tension between the objective test that is customarily applied in contract cases and the idea that a party’s motive (which must necessarily be subjectively ascertained) is a relevant consideration. The position would have been different in R v Clarke if the offer of the reward had been present to the plaintiff’s mind when he acted, although he may also have been influenced by some other motive. In Williams v Carwardine,345 where a notice had been published in terms similar to those in R v Clarke, the plaintiff had supplied the information with knowledge of the reward but moved rather by remorse for her own misconduct. Parke J gave judgment in her favour, and the defendant moved to enter a nonsuit on the ground that the suggested contract had been negatived by the finding of the jury ‘that the plaintiff gave the information to ease her conscience and not for the sake of the reward’. But the judgment was upheld in the King’s Bench. Motive was irrelevant, provided that the act was done with knowledge of the reward. Acceptance was then related to offer. The debate would seem to be somewhat arcane but it has been given new impetus by the more recent cases, discussed earlier,346 in which unilateral contract is employed in contracts of carriage of goods to provide the benefits of exemption clauses to third-party contractors such as stevedores and truck drivers.347 These cases raise the issue: in order to qualify for the benefit of the exemption clauses, must the thirdparty contractor know of the offer of exemption, or at least be responding to that offer, when performing the ‘requested’ acts of unloading or transporting the goods? Given that the stevedore or truck driver is in these cases often remote from the original contract of carriage, it is plausible to argue that the acts of unloading or transporting the goods are done for reasons other than responding to a unilateral offer, even if the contractor does happen to know of the offer. This argument was not apparently addressed in the Eurymedon case, except by counsel for the goods owner before the Privy Council,348 and it was not alluded to in the judgments. On the other hand, in the New York Star349 the point was relied on by the New South Wales Court of Appeal to deny the benefit of the exemption 344. Ibid at 235. 345. The case was decided in 1833 and was variously reported: 5 C & P 566; 172 ER 1101 is the best report, and brings out clearly that the plaintiff knew of the reward; see also 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590; 1 Nev & M (KB) 418; 2 LJKB 101. 346. See 3.28. See also 4.34, 5.22, 7.38. 347. New Zealand Shipping Co Ld v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd (The New York Star) (1978) 139 CLR 231; 18 ALR 333 (High Court); (1980) 144 CLR 300; 30 ALR 588 (Privy Council); Celthene Pty Ld v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. See Malcolm, ‘The Negligent Pilot and the Himalaya Clause: A Saga of Disagreement’ (1993) 67 ALJ 14. See 7.38 for a full statement of the facts in The Eurymedon. 348. [1975] AC 154 at 160–1. 349. (1978) 139 CLR 231; 18 ALR 333 (HC); (1980) 144 CLR 300; 30 ALR 588 (PC).

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clause to the stevedores.350 It was held that the stevedores, though knowing of the offer, had not established by evidence that their unloading the goods was in response to and (at least in part) because of the offer of exemption. The point was taken up in the appeal to the High Court by Mason and Jacobs JJ,351 who came to the opposite conclusion. The question of reliance turns on the burden of proof. In circumstances where B has apparently responded to A’s offer, is it necessary for B to show that the response was in fact in reliance on the offer or is it for A to show that B’s actions were not in response to A’s offer but are to be explained in some other way? Mason and Jacobs JJ, drawing on the judgment of Starke J in R v Clarke,352 said that the onus is on the offeror to displace by evidence the inference that a court will draw from the fact that B has apparently accepted.353 So, in the New York Star, the onus was on the owner of the goods to show that the stevedores were not responding to the offer of exemption when they unloaded the goods, rather than on the stevedores to show that they were, as the Court of Appeal had held. It hardly needs to be said that such an onus is almost impossible to discharge depending, as it does, on the proof of lack of intention. In Celthene Pty Ltd v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd,354 Yeldham J said that the second defendant, who was a truck driver, did not need to have knowledge of the offer of exemption when carrying the goods.355 In that case it was held that both the carrier company and its employee were protected by an exemption clause. His Honour explained his extending the exemption to the truck driver by referring to The Eurymedon. Possibly his Honour’s remark could be explained by the onus of proof argument discussed above, though this was not alluded to in the judgment. It should be noted that proof that an apparent response to an offer is not in fact an acceptance is very much easier when the offeree does not know of the offer than when the offeree does know but may be acting for some other reason. In Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd,356 the point was not discussed directly. Hutley JA, when discussing the relationship between the consignor and the subcontractor of the defendant carrier, said, ‘[w]hen he accepted the goods for delivery, it was pursuant to a form of contract drawn so as to appear to protect him. He should be taken to be accepting the goods on those terms and the consignor making an offer to him direct’.357 Finally, it is worth noting that in Dalgety Australia Ltd v  Harris358 the New  South  Wales Court of Appeal adopted a practical approach to the onus of proof problem in relation to acceptance of unilateral offers. Whether an apparent acceptance is in fact an acceptance very much depends on the circumstances. In some 350. [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 445 at 449 (Glass JA), 451–2 (Hutley JA). 351. (1978) 139 CLR 231 at 271–4. See also McKeith v Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC; Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC v James [2016] NSWCA 36 at [11] (Macfarlan JA), [191] (Tobias AJA). 352. (1927) 40 CLR 227 at 244. 353. A slightly different view about the onus of proof was put in Dalgety Australia Ltd v  Harris [1977] 1 NSWLR 324 at 328 (Glass JA). See below. 354. [1981] 1 NSWLR 606. 355. Ibid at 616. 356. [1983] 1 NSWLR 43l. 357. Ibid at 437. Emphasis added. 358. [1977] 1 NSWLR 324. See also Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v Sztrochlic [2015] NSWSC 885 at [68]–[74] (Fagan J).

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cases, a strong inference will be drawn from the acts of the offeree that conform to the offer; in other cases, such acts may carry very little weight. The onus of proof is thus determined by the circumstances. In Dalgety itself, the fact that Dalgety made further sales to a company after a guarantee of payment had been obtained from Harris was sufficient to raise an inference that the further sales were made because of the guarantee. 3.41  Does agreement result from cross-offers? The answer to this is that logically there is no contract because no offer has been accepted. This is borne out by Tinn v Hoffmann & Co,359 where the parties offered to sell and offered to buy 800 tons of iron on the same terms, their letters crossing in the mail. It was held by five judges against two that on the facts of the case no contract had been concluded. Of the five judges in the majority, Archibald and Keating JJ proceeded on the ground that the letters in question contained diverse terms so that the parties were not ad idem, while Blackburn, Brett and Grove JJ denied that cross-offers could, in the most favourable circumstances, constitute a contract.

Offers capable of being accepted by more than one person 3.42  Acceptance by more than one person. Finally, it is necessary to consider cases where an offer is capable of being accepted by more than one person, although the resultant contract can be performed with only one acceptor. In such cases the liabilities of the offeror will depend on the construction placed upon the terms of the offer by the court. Thus, in reward cases where more than one person has given information leading to the desired result, the courts have tended to construe the offer as being made to the first person to give such information.360 On the other hand, as shown by the reward offer in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,361 the nature of the offer may be such as potentially to create a number of contracts. In other cases, as, for example, where property is offered to more than one person and more than one accepts, there are as many contracts as there are acceptances.362 In such cases, if the property offered is either land or specific goods, it will usually vest, either in equity or at law, in the first person to accept, so that the offeror will have put it out of his or her power to perform the contracts with the other acceptors who will be left to pursue their remedies in damages for breach of contract.363 There is no principle of contract law that it is impossible to agree to sell what you do not have to sell.364 Nor is entering into a second inconsistent contract necessarily a breach of the first contract.365 359. 360. 361. 362.

(1873) 29 LT Rep 271. Robinson v M’Ewan (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 65; Orr v R (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 71. [1892] 2 QB 484; affirmed [1893] 1 QB 256, discussed in 3.16, 3.18. Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530; 211 ALR 159; [2004] HCA 56 at [149]–[152], discussed in the context of the tort of interference with contractual relations; Seivewright v Brennan [2005] NSWSC 216 at [20] (Young CJ in Eq). 363. Patterson v  Dolman [1908] VLR 354. In the case of specific goods, it may be possible for the second acceptor to acquire a title by delivery under the Sale of Goods Acts: ACT: s 29(1); NSW: s 28(1); NT: s 28(1); Qld: s 27(1); SA: s 25(1); Tas: s 30(1); Vic: s 30; WA: s 25(1). 364. See, for example, McRae v  Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377 discussed in 12.16. 365. Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Ltd [2008] FCA 1915 at [51]–[52] (Gordon J).

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The communication of acceptance 3.43  The necessity for communication of acceptance. A contract is not formed until there is acceptance and that acceptance has been communicated to the offeror. There must be an external manifestation of assent: some word spoken or act done by the offeree or by his or her authorised agent366 that the law can regard as the communication of the acceptance to the offeror. This is the general rule, but it is subject to exceptions. What constitutes communication varies with the nature of the case and has provoked many difficult problems.

Acceptance by silence 3.44  Effect of silence. An offeror may not arbitrarily impose contractual liability upon an offeree merely by proclaiming that silence shall be deemed consent. In Felthouse v Bindley,367 the plaintiff, Paul Felthouse, wrote to his nephew, John, on 2  February, offering to buy his horse for £30 15s, and adding ‘If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at that price’. The nephew made no reply to this letter, but intimated to the defendant, an auctioneer who was going to sell his stock, that the horse was to be kept out of the sale. The defendant inadvertently sold the horse to a third party at an auction held on 25 February, and the plaintiff sued him in conversion. The Court of Common Pleas held that the action must fail as there had been no communication of acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer before 25 February, and the plaintiff had therefore, at that date, no title to maintain conversion. This was despite the fact that the offeree was perfectly happy to sell the horse to his uncle and had so indicated to the auctioneer. It may be that, on the facts of this particular case, the correct analysis was that the uncle’s offer was accepted by conduct: see 3.27. Nevertheless, the general point is an important one. It should not be possible to foist a contract on another by stipulating that if he or she does nothing this will be taken to be acceptance. This kind of conduct has caused problems in consumer cases where a householder is sent unsolicited goods and is trapped into a contract by unscrupulous traders. The unsolicited goods may be accepted by the householder by conduct, for example, using the goods. Because a householder can be trapped in this way, consumer protection legislation has been passed to deal with this problem.368 The view that silence cannot amount to acceptance must be qualified, as we have already noted, when a case arises in which there is acceptance by conduct leading to a bilateral contract.369 The two are distinguishable: in a case like Felthouse v Bindley there is never any communication of acceptance whereas in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd there is either communication when the offeror

366. See Powell v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284 and Batt v Onslow (1892) 13 LR (NSW) Eq 79. 367. (1862) 11 CBNS 869; 142 ER 1037. Compare White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 and Boyd v Holmes (1878) 4 VLR (E) 161. See also Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 527–8 (Kirby P), 534 (McHugh JA). 368. See Australian Consumer Law ss 41–42. 369. Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666; Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523. See 3.27.

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finds out what the offeree is doing, or communication may not be necessary in some cases.370 The question then arises whether there can be acceptance by conduct when the offeror is ignorant of the conduct. In Felthouse v Bindley, the nephew had indicated by his conduct (the instructions to the auctioneer) that he had accepted his uncle’s offer, but the uncle never knew of it. However, the position is different if the offeree’s conduct is referable to what is asked for in the offer, that is, the offeree starts to perform. For example, if the offeror asks the offeree to prepare or deliver goods and the latter starts work, there is an acceptance by conduct even though the offeror is ignorant of the relevant conduct.371 Such cases can be explained as ones where communication of acceptance has been waived (see below) or on the basis of estoppel. Whether Felthouse v  Bindley will invariably apply has been questioned by Corbin.372 If the offeree takes the offeror at his or her word (on the same facts as in Felthouse v Bindley) and wishes to enforce the contract, the offeror should not then be allowed to deny the existence of a contract.373 In such a case there is no transgression of the policy that prevents a person from being able to foist contractual relations on another by stipulating that silence will be treated as acceptance: [T]he offeror has only himself to blame if the terms of his offer put him at the mercy of the offeree … he should not be permitted to escape liability when he has induced the offeree to believe that there is a contract and to act in reliance thereon.374

In Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v  Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd,375 the New South Wales Court of Appeal acknowledged that the general rule is that a person cannot force a contract on another by stipulating that silence will be acceptance but qualified the rule where the circumstances were such as to show that a contractual relationship had arisen by the conduct of the parties.376 McHugh JA went so far as to say that, in appropriate circumstances, silence does amount to acceptance. In American cases377 it has been recognised that ‘custom of the trade, the course of dealing, or the previous relationship between the parties imposed a duty to reject the offer or be bound’.378 In the Canadian case Manco Ltd v  Atlantic Forest Products Ltd, Hughes JA expressed a similar view: 370. ‘So long as the offeror knows of the acceptance, there can be a contract even though the acceptance was not brought to his notice by the offeree’ quoted in Brambles Holdings Ltd v  Bathurst CC (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [86] (Heydon JA) from Chitty on Contracts (28th ed, 1999), vol 1, para 2-041. 371. Brogden (1877) 2 App Cas 666 at 691; White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101 at 103. 372. Corbin, ‘Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 200. 373. This argument rests on estoppel. See Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 528, where Kirby P acknowledged the possibility of an estoppel argument but did not apply it because it was raised for the first time on appeal. See also Spiro v Lintern [1973] 3 All ER 319. 374. Corbin, (1917) 26 Yale LJ 169 at 200. See Nortel Australia Pty Ltd v Portfolio Leasing Australia Ltd (1998) 8 BPR 15,857 (Bruce J), noted in (1998) 72 ALJ 355, where an option provided that contract would be ‘automatically renewed’. It was held that the contract was renewed without any positive act by the grantee of the option. 375. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 discussed in 3.27. 376. Ibid at 527–8 (Kirby P), 534 (McHugh JA). 377. C M I Clothesmakers Inc v A S K Knits Inc (1975) 380 NYS 2d 447; Brooks Towers Corp v HunkinConkey Construction Co (1972) 454 F 2d 1203; Alliance Manufacturing Co Inc v Foti (1962) 146 So 2d 464. 378. (1988) 14 NSWLR 523 at 534.

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I take the applicable rule to be that failure to reject an offer does not of itself constitute evidence of its acceptance unless the offeree’s silence would in the circumstances lead a reasonable person in the position of the offeror to believe that the offeree had accepted the terms offered, and unless the offeror did in fact believe the offeree had accepted them and proceeded under that belief.379

3.45  Waiver of communication. It is always possible for the offeror to waive the need to communicate acceptance. Such waiver may be expressed or may be inferred from the circumstances. Waiver will normally be assumed in unilateral contracts.380 In this type of case the offer usually takes the form of a promise to pay money in return for an act;381 the performance of that act will usually be deemed an adequate indication of assent. In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, the facts of which have already been given,382 the argument that the plaintiff should have notified her intention to put the defendants’ specific to the test was dismissed as absurd. Bowen LJ, after stating the normal requirements of communication, continued: But there is this clear gloss to be made upon that doctrine, that as notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who makes the offer, the person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so, … and if the person making the offer, expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification … [I]n the advertisement cases it seems to me to follow as an inference to be drawn from the transaction itself that a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition … [F]rom the point of view of commonsense no other idea could be entertained. If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and write me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal?383

On the other hand, in executory bilateral contracts an inference that the offeror has agreed to waive communication is not so readily drawn. For example, in Latec Finance Pty Ltd v Knight,384 the customer made an offer to enter into a hire-purchase agreement with the company. The printed form of the offer had been supplied by the company and it stated ‘this offer shall … not be binding upon you the offeree [that is, the company] until the memorandum of acceptance endorsed hereon shall have been 379. (1971) 24 DLR (3d) 194 at 200. These words exactly fit what happened in Way & Waller Ltd v Ryde [1944] 1 All ER 9, in which a real estate agent sent a scale of charges to the defendant. The latter neither expressly accepted nor rejected the scale of charges but allowed the agent to find a buyer. The Court of Appeal held that there was a contract. The case is discussed by Murdoch, ‘The Nature of Estate Agency’ (1975) 91 LQR 357 at 378–9. Contrast Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi and Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403 (solicitor’s retainer agreement not signed and held not to be accepted by conduct). 380. See Brett J in Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) LR 9 CP 16 cited by Darley J in Colonial Ammunition Co v Reid (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 338 at 347. See also Wise J in Abbott v Lance (1860) Legge 1283 at 1284. See 3.28. 381. Though it is also possible for the payment of money to be the requested act: see Re Mount Tomah Blue Metals Ltd (1963) 4 FLR 478 (circular sent to shareholders amounted to offer of security by way of a debenture accepted by sending money). 382. See 3.16. 383. Carlill [1893] 1 QB 256 at 269–70. Compare Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424 especially at 456–60. 384. [1969] 2 NSWR 79. See also Northstate Carpet Mills Pty Ltd v B R Industries Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1057; Icta Investments Pty Ltd Trading as Jolly Roger v GE Commercial Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 290.

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signed by you …’. The company signed the memorandum but, before it had notified the acceptance to the customer, he withdrew his offer. It was held that there was no binding contract because, although the company had taken its own step to accept the customer’s offer, it had never communicated that acceptance to the customer.

Prescribed mode of acceptance 3.46  Mode of communication prescribed by offeror. An offeror may expressly prescribe the method of communicating acceptance or a deadline for acceptance.385 It is also possible for a mode of communication to be inferred from the circumstances.386 There is, for instance, authority for the view that an offer by telegram was presumptive evidence of a desire for a prompt reply and that an acceptance sent by post may in such a case be treated as ineffective.387 In modern times, an emailed offer would require a prompt response unless some contrary indication is conveyed. The observance of the mode prescribed, expressly or impliedly, by the offeror obviously suffices to complete the agreement. Whether precise observance is necessary is, however, a matter of some controversy.388 For example, suppose that the offeror makes it clear that he or she expects an acceptance by post but the offeree in fact accepts by email. It would be odd, to say the least, if this faster mode of communication should result in there being no contract and there is authority that holds that a more expeditious mode of communication is effective.389 The result would, of course, be otherwise if the offeror had insisted that a reply should be sent by a particular method and by that method only.390 But even here the offeror may waive the necessity of following the exclusive method prescribed and allow a substitute.391 It was pointed out in Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd392 that the correct analysis in this situation is not waiver of the stipulated mode of acceptance but acceptance of a counter-offer.393 An offeror will need to use very clear language before a mode of acceptance will be treated by the courts as mandatory.394 385. In counting days, the day on which the offer is received is omitted: Ford v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455 citing Prowse v McIntyre [1961] HCA 79; (1961) 111 CLR 264. 386. See Kennedy v Thomassen [1929] 1 Ch 426; [1928] All ER Rep 525. 387. Quenerduaine v Cole (1883) 32 WR 185. See also the observations of Griffith CJ in Howard Smith & Co v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68 at 79. 388. The particular circumstances may dictate that precise acceptance is mandatory. See Redowood Pty Ltd v Mongoose Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 32 discussed in 3.26. 389. Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT 271; Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd (1974) 2 NSWLR 617; SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 at [50] (Barrett J). 390. See, for example, Diakogiannis v Johnson (1989) NSW ConvR 55-472 (option exercised before specified date; held not an effective exercise of the option); Rushton (SA) Pty Ltd v Holzberger [2003] QCA 106 (precise notice requirements not followed). 391. See the difficult case of Compagnie de Commerce et Commission SARL v Parkinson Stove Co [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 487 discussed by Eckersley, ‘Illusory Consent’ (1954) 17 MLR at 476–7. See also Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v  Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 at 245–6 (Buckley J) (waiver of stipulated mode of acceptance). See  on the whole subject the article by Professor Winfield entitled ‘Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance’ (1939) 55 LQR 499 at 515–16. 392. [1959] SR (NSW) 122 at 123–4. Followed in BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-a-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589. See also 3.69 on conditional options. 393. See Duncan Properties Pty Ltd v Hunter [1991] 1 Qd R 101, where it was held that an option exercised out of time but nevertheless accepted by the other party was effective to create a new lease. De Jersey J thought that the exercise of the option in this way was in truth a counter-offer: at 106. 394. JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v  Matos [2016] QCA 355 (in an option standard contract was stipulated, referring to 8th edition; option exercised using 10th edition; held ineffective exercise of option); George Hudson Holdings Ltd v Rudder (1973) 128 CLR 387. Compare Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Kosta (1969)

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

Alternatively, an apparently mandatory mode of acceptance may be modified by the operation of an estoppel.395 In FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Parras,396 the New South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider whether an option to renew a lease had been properly exercised. The lease included both a clause for exercising the option (which was complied with) and a general clause for sending notices (which was not complied with). It was held the notice clause did not qualify the exercise of option clause but that failure to comply with the notice clause sounded in damages. The damages were the cost of litigation! Cases involving the exercise of an option have reflected the flexible approach outlined above.397 That is, unless the language used is framed in mandatory terms,398 whether an option has been exercised is tested objectively and according to common sense.399 It is certainly necessary for the exercise to be unequivocal and not qualified in some way400 but this does not mean that a court will take a magnifying glass to the conduct of the grantee of the option.401 Instead, the court’s task is to ascertain whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the grantor of the option would conclude that the grantee had intended to exercise the option.402 Judges will differ about how strict an approach to this issue is appropriate.403

14 FLR 343 (notice exercising option required to be sent by registered mail. Notice sent by ordinary mail not effective). Similarly, in Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1959] SR (NSW) 122, the terms of an option had to be strictly complied with. On the other hand, in Spectra Pty Ltd v Pindari Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 617, Wootten J held that an option offer that required the offeree to give ‘notice in writing to be sent by pre-paid registered mail’ could be accepted by communication by ordinary mail that arrived within the stipulated time limit. Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 is to the same effect (in that the contractual stipulation was not regarded as the exclusive method by which an option could be exercised) except in that case the posted exercise of the option never arrived and was not effective because the express stipulation displaced the operation of the postal rule. 395. Westpac Banking Corporation v Kurobe Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 537 at [36]–[53] (Pembroke J). 396. (2002) 55 NSWLR 498; [2002] NSWCA 334. 397. See also 3.70. 398. For example, Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445, where the exercise of an option required ‘return’ of an executed contract. This was not satisfied by posting it. 399. Even where the language is expressed in mandatory terms, the parties may conduct themselves so as to renew by some other method, as in Weemah Park Pty Ltd v Glenlaton Investments Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 150. In this case there was no resort to an estoppel argument. 400. Quadling v Robinson (1976) 137 CLR 192 at 200–1 (Gibbs J); Hagerty v Hills Central Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 200 purported exercise of option requested longer settlement period; held not an exercise of the option. This decision is criticised by Angyal (2019) 93 ALJ 346. 401. The approach is very much one of substance over form, that is, the application of the objective test to ascertain whether the option has been accepted (‘exercised’). See the discussion by Kirby P in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Health Minders Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 673 at 677 and by Stein JA in Young v Lamb [2001] NSWCA 225 at [15]–[31]. 402. Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at 126 (Isaacs J). See the interesting discussion of ‘the commercially sensible construction’ approach by Butt, ‘Exercising Option to Renew Lease’ (1998) 72 ALJ 662. He refers to the decision in Bava Holdings Pty Ltd v Pando Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,295, in which the flexible approach was discussed and applied. Santow J drew on the House of Lords’ statement of principle on interpretation of commercial documents in Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 and Lord Hoffmann’s five-point summary in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich BS [1998] 1 WLR 896. 403. As illustrated by the 2–1 split in Whitegum Petroleum Pty Ltd v Bernadini Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 229, where the majority (Buss JA, Murphy JA concurring) took a flexible approach and Newnes JA in dissent took a strict approach. The exercise of the option required two notices. The second notice was flawed but its intent, according to the majority, was obvious and so effective. See commentary on this case by Butt, ‘Exercise of Option: Choose Your Words Carefully’ (2011) 85 ALJ 263. Compare JLF Corporation Pty Ltd v Matos [2016] QCA 355 (in an option standard contract was stipulated, referring to 8th edition; option exercised using 10th edition; held ineffective exercise of option).

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If an offeror stipulates a mode of acceptance that could result in mistaken acceptance, then a court may be inclined to hold that there is no contract even though the stipulated act has occurred. The same concern expressed in cases involving acceptance by silence — that it is not possible to foist a contract on another — can be seen in cases of this kind. In Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd,404 an offer of settlement contained a cheque and the offeror stipulated that banking the cheque would constitute acceptance. The offeree’s solicitor paid the cheque into its trust account without the knowledge of the offeree. Almost immediately, on realising its mistake, it communicated to the offeror that the banking of the cheque was not intended to be acceptance. It was held that there was no acceptance.405

Instantaneous modes of communication and electronic transactions 3.47  Where no mode of communication is prescribed: oral offers and other instantaneous modes of communication. If no particular method is prescribed, the form of communication will depend upon the nature of the offer and the circumstances in which it is made. If the offeror makes an oral offer to the offeree and it is clear that an oral reply is expected, the offeree must ensure that the acceptance is understood by the offeror. The risk of non-communication of an acceptance is on the acceptor. This rule — that acceptance is incomplete until received and understood by the offeror — governs other modes of communication no less than discussions face to face. In Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp,406 the plaintiffs were a London company and the defendants were an American corporation with agents in Amsterdam. Both the plaintiffs in London and the defendants’ agents in Amsterdam had telex equipment whereby messages could be despatched by a teleprinter operated like a typewriter in one country and almost instantaneously received and typed in another. By this method the plaintiffs made an offer to the defendants’ agents to buy goods from them, and the latter accepted the offer by telex. The plaintiffs later alleged that the defendants had broken their contract and wished to serve a writ upon them. This they could do, although the defendants were an American corporation with no branch in England, provided that the contract was made in England. The defendants contended that they had accepted the offer in Holland and that the contract had therefore been made in that country. But it was held by the Court of Appeal that the parties were in the same position as if they had negotiated in each other’s presence or over the telephone, that there was no binding acceptance until it had been received by the plaintiffs, that this took place in London and that a writ could therefore be issued. Parker LJ, after reciting circumstances where expediency might demand another rule, said: So far as telex messages are concerned, though the dispatch and receipt of a message is not completely instantaneous, the parties are to all intents and purposes in each other’s presence just as if they were in telephonic communication, and I can see no reason for departing from the general rule that there is no binding contract until notice of the acceptance is received by the offeror. That being so, and since the

404. [1999] 1 NZLR 395. 405. See Currie, ‘Accord and Satisfaction by Way of Full Settlement Cheque’ (2011) 27 JCL 119. 406. [1955] 2 QB 327; [1955] 2 All ER 493. See also Aviet v Smith and Searies Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 274; W A Dewhurst v Cawrse [1960] VR 278; and Hampstead Meat Pty Ltd v Emerson & Yates Pty Ltd [1967] SASR 109.

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offer … was made by the plaintiffs in London, and notification of the acceptance was received by them in London, the contract resulting therefrom was made in London.407

Entores was adopted by the House of Lords in Brinkibon Ltd v  Stahag Stahl und StahlwarenhandelsgesellschaftmbH,408 that is, telex was treated as a form of instantaneous communication. Lord Wilberforce pointed out that the ruling in Entores ‘which has passed into the textbooks, including Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed (1957), appears not to have caused either adverse comment, or any difficulty to business men. I would accept it as a general rule’.409 His Lordship went on to say that treating telex as an instantaneous form of communication is not necessarily a universal rule. This is because circumstances and the intention of the parties may displace such an assumption, as where, for example: The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or upon the assumption, that they will be read at  a later time. There may be some error or default at  the recipient’s end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons. And many other variations may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases: they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie: see Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant 4 Ex D 216 at 227 per Baggallay LJ and Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27 per Lord Herschell.410

In New South Wales, Entores was followed in Mendelson-Zeller Co Inc v T & C Providores Pty Ltd,411 and other courts in Australia have adopted this approach to telex and other instantaneous communication such as fax and email.412 Thus, in such cases, the postal acceptance rule (see 3.60) is displaced. However, as made clear by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon, there are no hard and fast rules. In Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd,413 it was held that where an offer sent by telex contemplated a reply by telex using a public telex facility, then, by analogy with sending a telegram to which the postal rule applies,414 dictation of an acceptance over the telephone to a clerk of the public telex facility was the moment of acceptance. Communication by facsimile machine is no different in principle from telex. It is effectively an instantaneous mode of communication with the same possible combination of features noted by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon. Therefore, the general rule will apply, namely, that it is incumbent on the offeree to ensure that his

407. Ibid at 337; 498. See 3.58–3.62 as to negotiations conducted through the post. 408. [1983] 2 AC 34. 409. Ibid at 42. 410. Ibid. 411. [1981] 1 NSWLR 366. 412. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 at  [78]–[80] (Edelman J) (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224); Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12  VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at  [11]; Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v  HamonSobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 413. [1986] WAR 244. 414. See 3.60.

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or her message has got through.415 It is suggested in 3.55 that the same applies to emails despite a superficial similarity to old-fashioned ‘snail mail’. It is worth comparing the cases on acceptance with cases of misrepresentation. It may be necessary to determine where a misrepresentation took place.416 The courts have adopted the same approach as in acceptance cases: it is where the communication is received that is determinative.

Electronic transactions 3.48  Electronic transactions and the internet.417 The use of various forms of electronic contracts and modes of communication is of great commercial importance, and the adaptation of the law of contract to accommodate these phenomena is necessary. This account is necessarily limited. The area warrants separate books.418 Bygrave examines the use of contract in the internet from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’. To the uninitiated it is quite surprising that the vast edifice is very largely established through contracts, including the establishment of a naming and numbering system419 and the myriad communications networks. Even apparently free services such as Google and Facebook are arguably contracts.420 The account in this treatment focuses on the ‘bottom’ end, that is, contracts with end users. The discussion of misleading conduct in Chapter  11, and other aspects of the Australian Consumer Law, are relevant to internet transactions, including the possibility that this law can apply to international transactions, such as buying goods or services on the internet.421 At the outset, it is worth making the point that the common law of contract has been very undemanding (or perhaps flexible) about how parties should make their contracts. The genius of the common law has been very largely to leave it to the parties to decide how, when and where they commit to contract and, of course, what they decide to include in their contract is, again, up to them, with some exceptions. We have seen in this chapter the law’s ability to respond flexibly to how people actually do business. For example, the apparently rigid offer and acceptance model

415. Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sobelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 97,325 (NSWCA). 416. See 11.114. 417. See  Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (2006) which provided guidance to business in dealing with consumers, published by the Commonwealth government; Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152; Nimmer, ‘The Legal Landscape of E-commerce: Redefining Contract Law in an Information Era’ (2007) 23 JCL 10; Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95; Morgan-Taylor and Willett, ‘The Quality Obligation and Online Market Places’ (2005) 21 JCL 155. 418. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (2015); Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015); Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce (2009), chs 3–5; Forder and Svantesson, Internet and E-commerce Law (2008); Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law: Technology, Law and Policy (2011). 419. By an agreement between a Californian corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the United States Government Department of Commerce. See Bygrave, ibid, ch 4. 420. Mik, ‘Problems of Intention and Consideration in Online Transactions’ at  6. See  also the withering attack on this type of contract: Torbert, ‘Because It Is Wrong: An Essay on the Immorality and Illegality of the Online Service Contracts of Google and Facebook’ (2020) . The unique ability of online providers to exploit and manipulate customers is the subject of an extensive analysis by Abdussalam, ‘Regulating Advantagetaking in the Formation and Renewal of Contractual Relations in the Technology Management Age: A Focus on Consumer Contracts’ (2021) 28 CCLJ 335. 421. See 11.114.

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of contract formation is not applied when it is inappropriate.422 Accordingly, the starting point with electronic modes of contracting is that the basic task of a court in dealing with an alleged contract arising out of such usage is to ascertain the intention of the parties as objectively determined.423 The method of contracting makes no difference to this axiom. It must be said that some strange and fanciful notions have emerged from the uneasy mix of law and technology. It has been suggested, for example, that computers or their operating systems are effectively legal persons in some applications and that machines (or their software) have ‘intentions’ or ‘decide’ or, conversely, lack the requisite intention required by the law of contract. These notions are incisively examined by Eliza Mik who ably explains the interaction of contract and technology.424

Email 3.49  The application of basic contract principles is borne out by the use of email. There is no reason why email should be treated as any different from other methods of communication. This is illustrated by Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd,425 where the vendor of a service station attempted unsuccessfully to argue that the email exchanges between the parties did not amount to a binding contract. Martin J dealt with the various issues by reference to established authorities. This was a sale of real property, but the Statute of Frauds writing and signature requirements426 were satisfied by the use of email, having regard to the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld) s 14. This legislation is further discussed below at 3.56.

Online auctions 3.50  Adaptation of contract rules. Online auctions are discussed at  3.22. Adaptations are necessary. For example, there is no auctioneer on eBay.

Shrink wrap, click wrap, etc 3.51  Electronic terms. Examples of the law’s (or at least United States law’s) ability to adapt are shown by the cases discussed in 3.7, namely, the use of ‘shrink wrap’ licences and ‘click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ agreements.427

422. See 3.4–3.7. 423. This is how the courts approached the task of determining the efficacy of faxes in contractual dealings. See discussion by Dorney, ‘The Use of the Facsimile Machine and Contractual Intention’ (1991) 4 JCL 243. 424. Mik, ‘From Automation to Autonomy: Some Non-existent Problems of Contract Law’ (2020) 36 JCL 205. Mik also uncovers the misconceptions associated with so-called ‘smart contracts’ showing that this label is a misleading misnomer: Mik, ‘Smart Contracts: A Requiem’ (2019) 36 JCL 70. See also Brown, ‘Limitations of Code in Contracts: What We Can Learn From the Plain English Movement’ (2019) 9(1) VULJ 57. 425. [2015] QSC 119. See Butt’s discussion of this case and another case, Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41, in ‘Writing Requirements and Email Contracts’ (2015) 89 ALJ 754. See also C&P Syndicate Pty Ltd v Reddy [2013] NSWSC 643 at [110]–[111] (Lindsay J); Kavia Holdings Pty Ltd v Suntrack Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 716 at [33] (Pembroke J) (contractual stipulation of notice in writing satisfied by email notice). 426. See 16.35, 16.40 and 16.43. See Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), ch 2. 427. See Blount, ibid, ch 6.

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The courts also appear to be adaptable in their analysis of the relationships created by the use of credit and debit cards.428 Much depends on the particular transaction.429 If, in an internet transaction, the visitor to a website is asked to agree to terms and conditions by clicking an ‘I agree’ icon, it may be supposed that this constitutes contract formation.430 But this would not be so if agreeing to the terms was a step prior to selecting the goods or software for purchase, or providing credit card details was a necessary step after the terms and conditions had been viewed and agreed to. Commentators and courts generally try to draw parallels with existing contract principles,431 so that, for example, the mere presence of a website with products to sell is usually an invitation to treat.432 But it is not always possible to draw analogies from the real world in the cyber world. It is a common feature of electronic transactions that the user selects what he or she wants to do but the website will present a window that reiterates what the user wants to do as the last chance to withdraw. Internet banking is an example. Not until the last click on ‘OK’ is the transaction complete. Therefore, a good working rule is to assume that the last act is the definitive act in terms of committing to a transaction.433 The same may be applied to electronic contracts. Thus, a new contract formation rule may emerge for electronic transactions — the ‘last act’ rule whereby the last act is equivalent to acceptance.

Writing and signature 3.52  Electronic documents and signatures. Much of the focus of international developments in electronic commerce is on the requirements of writing and signature.434 Australian contract law does not generally require contracts to be in writing or to be signed: the formal requirements are minimal except in those contracts covered by specific legislation either derived from the Statute of Frauds435 or other legislation, such as consumer protection, deeds436 or intellectual property legislation. Readers using United States materials and analysis of electronic commerce should be aware that the Statute of Frauds provision (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201)

428. See  8.50 and the discussion of Re  Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch  497; [1988] 3 All ER 702; Commissioner of Taxation v American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122 at [97]. See Tucker, ‘Some Legal Issues Relating to Digital Cash on the Information Highway’ (1995) 6 JLIS 46. 429. See  Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197 at  198–200, where the author discusses formation rules in the light of the very interesting judgment in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 (affirmed [2005] 1 SLR 502). The case is discussed in 12.52. 430. See 3.26 and Macdonald, ‘Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting — Clicking “I Agree”’ (2011) 27 JCL 198, which focused on whether clicking ‘I agree’ is the same as signature. 431. See eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1768, where failure to post a crucial term meant that the term was not part of the contract. 432. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 104. This is confirmed by s 15B of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), and mirror state and territory provisions. Compare Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd ed, 2015), 3.9 (display of terms and conditions on website can be an offer). 433. See the discussion by Rares J in eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1768, where, without close analysis (which was not required), it was assumed that the last act made the contract. 434. See discussion of the Electronic Transactions Acts at 3.56. 435. See Chapter 16. 436. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022).

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still applies to sale of goods transactions over $500,437 whereas this is not an issue in Australia except in Tasmania and Western Australia.438 Electronic signatures, which include facsimile signatures and secure encrypted ‘signatures’, are facilitated by the Electronic Transactions Acts.439 It is necessary to use a method to identify the person signing and to indicate that person’s intention of authentication in respect of the information communicated; and the method must be as reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic communication was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement. The relaxed attitude to the treatment of signature in Statute of Frauds cases440 is followed under this legislation.441 Electronic signatures may be convenient but, as with ordinary signatures, they can be abused. In Williams Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker,442 a party had for convenience established an electronic signature but it was used by someone else to execute a guarantee. The case was equivalent to a forgery case, and it was held that the signature was not effective. The establishing of the means to use an electronic signature did not amount to a representation sufficient for ostensible authority.

Virtual execution of documents 3.53  Electronic dealings. The United Kingdom Law Society issued a document in 2010 and revised in 2020 entitled ‘Execution of documents by virtual means’443 which deals with practices such as signing a contract or deed and then sending a pdf copy by email. This mode of contracting is acceptable. In Australia a similar acceptance of adaptation to electronic means of doing business has occurred.444 A group of law firms has issued a protocol in lieu of any law society initiative.445 In response to COVID-19, Commonwealth, state and territory legislatures introduced various measures, some temporary, to facilitate electronic transactions and other documents. The main focus was on deeds which, without legislative 437. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 1-206 (personal property not covered by other Statute of Frauds sections), § 8-319 (securities) and § 9-203 (security agreements). 438. See 16.77–16.87. The limit is still $20, following the 1677 figure of £10. 439. The discussion of this legislation below focuses on the Commonwealth Act. See s 10 of this Act, which is mirrored in the state and territory Acts. See Bolam and Choi, ‘Electronic Signatures: When Are They Effective?’ (2012) 15(7) Internet Law Bulletin 118; Moran, ‘The Law of Signatures: The Signs, They are a Changin’’ (2016) 19(2) Internet Law Bulletin 284. 440. See 16.40. 441. A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1; 295 ALR 197; [2013] HCA 3 at [21]–[24] (French CJ), [126]–[127] (Hayne J), [191]–[194] (Crennan and Kiefel  JJ); Kation Pty Ltd v Lamru Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 219 at [34] (White J); Faulks v Cameron (2004) 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61 (printed ‘signature’ in email); Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 220 at [80]–[83] (Le Miere J). 442. [2015] NSWSC 1907 confirmed on appeal: [2016] NSWCA 265. 443. . 444. See  the discussion of the electronic transactions legislation below. Although not relevant to contract execution, GetUp Ltd v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 189 FCR 165; 268 ALR 797; [2010] FCA 869 demonstrates such adaptation. It was there held that a facsimile signature on an enrolment application was valid under the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 445. See  The Walrus Committee, ‘Remote Signing Protocols for Financing Transactions’ (2015) 43 ABLR 497. See also D’Angelo, ‘“Split Executions” and s 127 of the Corporations Act 2001’, May/June 2015 Australian Banking & Finance Law Bulletin 89.

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intervention, must be on paper.446 Amendments to the Corporations Act  2001447 were made. This Act enables electronic documents, split executions448 and electronic signatures (including deeds) by companies. At state and territory level the position has been somewhat chaotic with a number of legislative measures (some temporary) dealing with a variety of types of documents.

Electronic data interchange 3.54  Automatic transactions. Electronic data interchange (EDI)449 or other forms of electronic commerce may be used to make contracts, usually in business-to-business transactions. EDI involves communication between computers. For example, a manufacturer and wholesaler may establish an EDI link whereby the wholesaler orders goods as needed. An order is automatically triggered when inventory reaches a certain level. An electronic message is sent from the wholesaler’s computer to the manufacturer’s computer specifying quantity, type, delivery date and place and any other relevant requirements. The order is processed automatically. A paperless contract is created with no human interaction.450 There are a number of legal issues that are generated by this form of communication. Generally, there are two contractual relationships: one between the user and the company that supplies the communication network — called a value-added network service (VANS); the other between the two parties who are buying and selling. The terms of the contract between the VANS and the user will specify where the risks of failure of the system lie. Clearly a failure or corruption in communication could cause losses to the users. If overseas experience is anything to go by, the contract with the VANS will exclude any liability for such failures.451 The VANS may be subject either to a statutory duty of confidentiality or a contractual one. The other contract, between the buyer and seller, raises the same issues as any other form of contracting. When and where is the contract made? Are requirements (if any) as to form satisfied? Who should bear the risk of miscommunication? If a dispute arises, how can the contract and its terms be proved? A majority of EDI links are established on the basis of trading partner (or interchange) agreements that attempt to spell out the terms of EDI communications before they commence. The aim of such agreements is twofold: to establish a set of technical rules to cope with the electronic medium; and to sort out legal issues such as the duties of, and risks borne by, the respective parties in the event of a failure of communication. Not all EDI contracts or other forms of electronic commerce are made against a background of one-to-one trading partner agreements. In Europe the tendency has 446. New South Wales legislated to allow electronic deeds in the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 6C and 38A. This is not a temporary COVID-19 amendment. Victoria has also permanently enabled electronic deeds: Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (Vic) s 12A. Queensland has enabled electronic deeds: Property Law Act 1974 ss 44–53B. These measures are fully discussed in Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). 447. Sections  110–110B were added to mirror the electronic transactions legislation and ss  126–129 were modified. 448. Where two company officers sign different copies of the execution page. 449. Clarke, ‘Electronic Data Interchange (EDI): An Introduction’, . 450. See the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 15C and equivalent state and territory mirror provisions discussed below. 451. Walden (ed), EDI and the Law (1989), 50; Schneider, Electronic Commerce (12th ed, 2016).

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been to enter into group agreements. And many electronic transactions are made with no background agreement, such as by the use of email.

Other issues 3.55  Miscellaneous contract issues in electronic dealings. Electronic transactions can generate problems such as the ‘battle of the forms’452 which are no more easily solved in electronic transactions than they are in more conventional agreements. The inability to negotiate terms is as much a problem as it is in either face-to-face transactions or ordering by snail mail.453 Similarly, a ‘postal rule’ problem454 could arise but is probably dealt with by the electronic transactions legislation, discussed below. This may seem odd in the context of electronic communications but it arises because the network may include electronic ‘mailboxes’ that have to be ‘cleared’ from time to time. There are in fact two mailboxes, the sender’s and the recipient’s. A message is generated and deposited in the sender’s mailbox. It then is transferred to the recipient’s mailbox. The recipient periodically clears its mailbox. The question arises: when is the message effectively communicated? If the message is an acceptance of an offer, when is it effective? If an email is not an acceptance of an offer but, instead, has an attachment that is a letter of acceptance, is there then room for the operation of the postal acceptance rule? Ironically, the views expressed by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon (set out in 3.47) about instantaneous modes of communication may not be appropriate to electronic communication because it has some parallels with old-fashioned letters.455 It would be odd if the postal rule has a renaissance. It is suggested that custom in relation to electronic commerce should establish the rule that communication is essential and this would be a more sensible approach.456 The electronic transactions legislation discussed below deals with both dispatch and receipt of electronic communications. If an error or mistake is made as a result of, or in connection with, online or internet transactions, the normal contract rules apply.457 452. See 3.32. See also Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology 939 Fd 2d 91 (3d Cir 1991). 453. See Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracting in the Age of the Digital Natives’ (2011) 27 JCL 152; Clapperton and Corones, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 ABLR 152. See also Chapter 15 for discussion of the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law. 454. See 3.60. 455. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 106–10, who argued, after a detailed examination of the issues (including what the technology has to offer by way of tracing communications), that emails should be treated as instantaneous modes of communication despite the fact that they sometimes are not. Mik suggests that the dichotomy between instantaneous and non-instantaneous communications should be abandoned: Mik, ‘The Effectiveness of Acceptance Communicated by Electronic Means, or — Does the Postal Acceptance Rule Apply to Email?’ (2009) 26 JCL 68. 456. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v  Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email). See  Hogan-Doran, ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The When and Where of On-line Contracts’ (2003) 77 ALJ 377 at 385; Mik, ‘The Effectiveness of Acceptance Communicated by Electronic Means, or — Does the Postal Acceptance Rule Apply to Email?’ (2009) 26 JCL 68. 457. See  Phang, ‘Contract Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace’ (2005) 21 JCL 197 at  198–200, where the author discusses formation rules in the light of the very interesting judgment in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 594 (affirmed [2005] 1 SLR 502). The case is discussed in 12.52. See also Ooi, ‘Contracts Formed by Software: An Approach from the Law of Mistake’ (2019) ; Ooi, ‘Rethinking Mistake in the Age of Algorithms’ (2020) where the author discusses Quoine Pte Ltd v  B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02. This case involved a fully automated trading algorithm that malfunctioned with the result trades were

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Problems arising out of international contracts may be difficult to resolve unless there is a choice of law and jurisdiction clause.458 The use of blockchain technology has the potential to transform some types of contracting.459 This has attracted a great deal of attention and raises issues that are beyond the scope of this book.460 Mention has been made of some misconceived reactions to this and other electronic technology.461 Other legal issues arising out of the use of electronic commerce are still to be tested in Australia. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 formed the basis for the electronic transactions legislation.462

The Electronic Transactions Acts 463 3.56  The legislation. A legislative scheme to facilitate electronic dealings has been implemented in Australia. The Commonwealth Act464 is substantially mirrored in the slightly more detailed state and territory legislation.465 All Acts were amended in 2011, under an agreement made by the Standing Committee of AttorneysGeneral, with new provisions having specific application to contracts. The Acts are supposed to be a ‘uniform legislative scheme’466 but, unfortunately, the Acts differ slightly, including in the numbering of sections. Further differences have emerged as a result of emergency legislative responses to COVID-19. In this treatment, the Commonwealth Act is principally examined with some reference to the state and

made at approximately 250 times the market value. Action was brought by a trader against the exchange operator which had reversed the trades despite a clause stating that this was not possible. The action was successful. The doctrine of mistake was inapplicable. A case note is also provided by Low and Mik, ‘Lost in Transmission: Unilateral Mistakes in Automated Contracts’ (2020) 136 LQR 563. 458. See  3.7, where it is pointed out that a choice of law clause may itself generate a problem of lack of accessibility to dispute resolution. 459. See Wang, ‘Blockchain and the Law’ (2016) 19(1) Internet Law Bulletin 250; Kiviat, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions’ (2015) 65 Duke LJ 569. 460. The possibility and actuality of contracts that are written in code, that is, ‘in turning contracts into what are, effectively, computer programs’ are discussed in a high-level overview of the complexities by Mik, ‘Contracts in Code?’ (2021) 13 Law, Innovation and Technology 478. 461. Mik, ‘Smart Contracts; A Requiem’ (2019) 36 JCL 70. See  also Bacon, Michels, Millard and Singh, ‘Blockchain Demystified’ (2017) which provides a very thorough guide to the technology and its legal implications; Singh and Michels, ‘Blockchain as a Service: Providers and Trust’ (2017) ; Cuccuru, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: An Early Overview on Smart Contracts’ (2017) 25 Int Jo of Law & Information Technology 179; Arachchi, ‘Chains, Coins and Contract Law: The Validity and Enforceability of Smart Contracts’ (2019) 47 ABLR 40; Reed, Sathyanarayan, Ruan and Collins, ‘Beyond BitCoin — Legal Impurities and Off-chain Assets’ (2017) ; Zetzsche, Buckley and Arner, ‘The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain’ (2017) . 462. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at  112–13, which discussed the UNCITRAL Model Law and European and United States initiatives. The Model Law was updated by the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005, which was the basis for the 2010–11 amendments to the Australian Electronic Transactions Acts. For background and critical commentary on this, see Mik, ‘“Updating” the Electronic Transactions Act? — Australia’s Accession to the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005’ (2010) 26 JCL 184. 463. See 3.57 for electronic conveyancing legislation. 464. Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 465. Electronic Transactions Act  2001 (ACT); Electronic Transactions Act  2000 (NSW); Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act  2001 (NT); Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act  2001 (Qld); Electronic Communications Act  2000 (SA); Electronic Transactions Act  2000 (Tas); Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic); Electronic Transactions Act 2011 (WA). 466. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Electronic Transactions Action (Amendment) Bill 2011 (Cth).

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territory legislation. Unless the context otherwise indicates, section  numbers are those of the Commonwealth Act. It is important to note that each Act contemplates the possibility of exemptions from the legislation, or parts thereof, provided for in regulations467 or in the Act itself.468 Most of the exemptions do not affect contracts as such. The exemptions are by no means uniform across Australia. For example, powers of attorney are exempted in the Northern Territory and enduring powers of attorney in Tasmania and Western Australia.469 It is therefore important to check the ‘local’ Act and regulations, particularly because regulations can be amended with relative ease. The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 provides: The object of this Act is to provide a regulatory framework that: (a) recognises the importance of the information economy to the future economic and social prosperity of Australia; and (b) facilitates the use of electronic transactions; and (c) promotes business and community confidence in the use of electronic transactions; and (d) enables business and the community to use electronic communications in their dealings with government.

The legislation provides that for the purposes of a law of the relevant jurisdiction,470 a transaction is not invalid because it took place by means of one or more electronic communications.471 This is the basic provision of the legislation. Thus, where a paperbased transaction has been traditionally used (whether because of legal requirement or otherwise), an electronic-based transaction is equally valid, unless there is an express exclusion of the application of the legislation under the Act or by regulation. Despite this provision, it is arguable that the basic provision does not facilitate electronic deeds (see below). Importantly, this basic provision does not apply to the Corporations Act 2001.472 Instead, the Corporations Act has been amended so as to enable electronic documents and signatures (including deeds) executed by companies.473 The following requirements imposed under a law of the Commonwealth can be met in electronic form: • •

a requirement to give information in writing (s 9); a requirement to provide a signature (s 10);

467. The regulations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is not practical to set out the various provisions here. Readers should check the relevant regulations. 468. The Act does not apply to the practice and procedure of a court or tribunal or to the operation of the Evidence Act: s 7B. 469. See the Electronic Transactions Regulations in each jurisdiction. 470. In state and territory Acts (other than that of the Australian Capital Territory) a law of the jurisdiction is defined as covering written or unwritten law, and excludes a Commonwealth law. See NSW: s 5; NT: s 5; Qld: Sch 2; SA: s 5; Tas: s 3; Vic: s 3; WA: s 5. 471. Cth: s 8; ACT: s 7; NSW: s 7; NT: s 7; Qld: s 8; SA: s 7; Tas: s 5; Vic: s 7; WA: s 8. 472. Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) Schedule item 23. In addition, the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 9–12, 14, 14A, 14B and 15 do not apply to the Corporations Act. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110–110B partly fill this gap. These sections only deal with technology-neutral signing. 473. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110, 110A, 110B and 126–129.

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a requirement to produce a document (s 11); a requirement to record information (s 12(1)); and a requirement to retain a document (s 12(2)).

Because Commonwealth legislation mostly does not apply to contracts,474 these applications of the legislation are not directly relevant to most contracts. However, s  15E, introduced in 2011, applies s  8 (the basic provision) and ss  14, 14A and 14B (time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications) to contracts, that is, the application of these sections  is not limited to ‘a law of the Commonwealth’.475 Further, a new Pt 2A (ss 15A–15F) was added which is directly relevant to contracts (see below). Section 14 deals with the time of dispatch of electronic documents.476 Importantly, the parties are free to agree on these matters,477 but, in the absence of agreement, dispatch occurs at: •

•

the time when the electronic communication leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator; or if the electronic communication has not left an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator, the time when the electronic communication is received by the addressee.

Section  14 applies even if the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located is different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been dispatched under s 14B (see below). Section  14A deals with the time of receipt of electronic documents. Again, the parties are free to agree on these matters, but, in the absence of agreement, receipt occurs at: •

•

the time when the electronic communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee  at  an electronic address designated by the addressee; or where receipt of the electronic communication is at  another electronic address of the addressee, the time when both: 1. the electronic communication has become capable of being retrieved by the addressee at that address; and 2. the addressee  has become aware that the electronic communication has been sent to that address.

474. The exemptions found in the Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) include various insurance Acts and consumer credit laws. Yet the Consumer Credit Code s  187 specifically provides that the Electronic Transactions Act can apply. 475. As noted, ss 9–12, 14, 14A and 14B and 15 do not apply to the Corporations Act: Electronic Transactions Regulations 2020 (Cth) Schedule item 23. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110–110B which only deal with technology-neutral signing. 476. Rock Solid Surfaces Pty Ltd v Biesse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 42 at [22]–[25] (Gilmour J). 477. See, for some practical advice about managing risks, Hayford, ‘Hit “Send” and Hope? Reducing Your Risks When Using Email for Contractual Communications’ (2008) 122 Aus Construction Law Newsletter 32 (available on Austlii).

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Section 14A(2) provides that it is to be assumed that the electronic communication is capable of being retrieved by the addressee  when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address. Section  14A applies even if the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located is different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been received under s 14B (see below). Section 14B deals with place of dispatch and receipt. Unless otherwise agreed: • •

the electronic communication is taken to have been dispatched at the place where the originator has its place of business; and the electronic communication is taken to have been received at the place where the addressee has its place of business.478

Subsections 14B(2)–(4) then deal with various situations concerning where a place of business is located. Part 2A applies directly to contracts. Section 15A provides that Pt 2A applies to the use of electronic communications in connection with the formation or performance of a contract between parties where the proper law of the contract is (or would on its formation be) the law of the jurisdiction. Section 15B then provides that a proposal to form a contract on an internet site or other form of electronic communication addressed to the world at large is treated as making an invitation to treat unless the wording clearly indicates an offer. This includes a process where there are interactive applications for the placement of orders. Section 15C provides that a contract formed by the use of an automated message system, including where no natural person is involved (as with EDI, discussed above) is not invalid, void or unenforceable on the sole ground that no natural person reviewed or intervened in each of the individual actions carried out by the automated message system or the resulting contract. Section  15D deals with input errors when dealing with an automated message system that does not provide a person with an opportunity to correct the error. Such a person has the right to withdraw the portion of the electronic communication in which the input error was made. This is done by the person notifying the other party of the error as soon as possible after having learned of the error and indicating that he or she made an error. This is subject to the person not having used or received any material benefit or value from the goods or services, if any, received from the other party. It seems that this can apply to an erroneous acceptance, for example, clicking the ‘I agree’ icon. The section specifically includes ‘an offer and the acceptance of an offer’. Nevertheless, subs (3) provides that ‘the right of withdrawal of a portion of an electronic communication under this section is not of itself a right to rescind or otherwise terminate a contract’. A note to this section states the obvious point that aborting the transaction will usually be sufficient, but this would not be so if the 478. The question of where and when an electronic communication is deemed to be received is by no means straightforward. See Squires, ‘Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements’ (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 114–22. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647; [2016] FCA 196 at [78]–[80] (Edelman J) (affirmed on appeal Valve Corp v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; [2017] FCAFC 224) discussed in 11.114.

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person has in error carried out the last act, such as clicking ‘OK’. Notifying an error is clearly difficult without a possibility of dialogue. Some websites meet this problem by offering a chat icon. Section 15E, as already discussed, applies the basic provisions479 to contracts, that is, they are not confined to a statutory law of the jurisdiction. Section 15F makes clear that the operation of the Commonwealth Act should not override any state or territory legislation under s 109 of the Constitution. By contrast to Commonwealth legislation, state and territory legislation contains many laws stipulating writing requirements in contracts.480 Each Electronic Transactions Act speaks of the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. As already noted, it is essential to scrutinise the relevant regulations to see whether the provisions of the legislation are excluded from certain types of contracts. For example, it could be expected that consumer protection legislation that typically requires a consumer to be furnished with a written copy of the contract would require hard copy unless an electronic copy is adequate to provide the information.481 Although not free from doubt, it is probably the case that this legislation does not apply to facilitate the use of electronic deeds.482 The argument is complicated, and is set forth elsewhere.483 The main point is that this legislation supports the substitution of electronic means for writing. A deed must not only be in writing but must also be on paper. The legislation does deal with paper, but only in the context of producing and retaining documents.484 The legislation refers to ‘contracts’ but not deeds. There is also the difficulty, but not impossibility, of attesting an electronic document. 3.57  ‘Exchange’ of land contracts485 by electronic means.486 The High  Court in Sindel v Georgiou487 specifically approved the English Court of Appeal decision in Domb v Isoz488 in so far as it dealt with exchange of contracts by telephone in land sales.489 Of course, these cases were dealing with hard-copy contracts.490 In each case it was recognised that there could be a constructive exchange. For this to happen both parts must in fact have been signed and each part must be in the physical control of one or other of the solicitors.491 Buckley LJ said: 479. Sections 8, 14, 14A, 14B. 480. For example, a requirement of a note or memorandum in writing under the Statute of Frauds provisions would be satisfied by an email, even one not printed out. See  16.35. In New South Wales, s 23C but not s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) is exempted in the Regulations. In South Australia, all legislation dealing with writing requirements for interests in land are exempted by the Regulations. 481. Compare Mackay Sugar Ltd v Quadrio [2015] QCA 41, where a PowerPoint version of the terms and conditions sufficed for ‘written’ terms. The court did not resort to the electronic transactions legislation. 482. As noted above, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria have enabled electronic deeds. Electronic deeds executed by companies are separately enabled under the Corporations Act ss 110, 110A, 110B and revised s 127. 483. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [2.28]. 484. Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 11, 12(2). 485. See also 3.10, 3.33. 486. As to making a pdf copy of a signed contract and sending as an attachment to email, see 3.53. 487. (1984) 154 CLR 661 at 666. 488. [1980] Ch 548. 489. See conveyancing note Skapinker, ‘Telephone Exchange of Contracts — New South Wales Experience’ (1988) 62 ALJ 639. 490. For emails, see 3.49 and 3.61. 491. [1980] Ch 548 at 564 (Templeman LJ). This would cover the situations where both parts are in the hands of one solicitor or each part is in the hands of the respective solicitors. See the remarks of Young J in Henderson v Hopkins (1988) ANZ ConvR 229 at 231.

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Exchange of a written contract for sale is in my judgment effected as soon as each part of the contract, signed by the vendor or the purchaser as the case may be, is in the actual or constructive possession of the other party or of his solicitor. Such possession need not be actual or physical possession: possession by an agent of the party or of his solicitor, in such circumstances that the party or solicitor in question has control over the document and can at any time procure its actual physical possession will, in my opinion, suffice.492

These conditions were not satisfied in Henderson v Hopkins,493 in which a secretary agreed to an exchange by telephone without understanding its significance. Further, one of the party’s solicitors did not have possession of one part nor was one part in complete form. Exchanging contracts by fax attracts the same requirements as exchanging by telex, that is, fax is a more or less instantaneous mode of communication, which means that the message will not be effective until it is actually received. The risk of non-communication falls on the sender. Thus, in the usual case, the purchaser’s solicitor sends a signed contract by fax ‘by way of exchange’. The vendor’s solicitor then sends back a signed contract and the contract is formed when the purchaser’s solicitor receives the vendor’s part. Fax is a more satisfactory way to exchange than by post, because there is still doubt in relation to post whether the acceptance occurs when the vendor’s part is posted or when it arrives.494 No such doubt arises with fax. It could never be argued, for example, that a fax that has been sent but which has not arrived could be an effective acceptance. The same principles should apply to exchange of contracts by email.495 The uniform Electronic Conveyancing National Law496 s  9(1) provides that a registry instrument that is in a form in which it can be lodged electronically under s 7 has the same effect as if that instrument were in the form of a paper document, and s 9(2) facilitates the use of digital signatures. Section 9(3) provides: If a registry instrument is digitally signed in accordance with the participation rules applicable to that instrument: (a) the instrument is to be taken to be in writing for the purposes of every other law of this jurisdiction, and (b) the requirements of any other law of this jurisdiction relating to the execution, signing, witnessing, attestation or sealing of documents must be regarded as having been fully satisfied.

A registry instrument is defined as any document that may be lodged under the land titles legislation for each jurisdiction. This depends on titles office practice.

492. [1980] Ch 548 at 557. 493. (1988) ANZ ConvR 229. 494. See 3.10. 495. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email). 496. The text can be seen in the Appendix  to the Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 (NSW).

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The postal acceptance rule 3.58  Communications through the post. If no particular method of communication is prescribed and the parties are not in each other’s presence, the rule that an acceptance speaks only when it is received by the offeror may be impracticable or inconvenient. Such may well be the case where the negotiations have been conducted through the post. The question as to what in these circumstances is an adequate communication of acceptance arose as early as 1818 in the case of Adams v Lindsell.497 The plaintiffs were woollen manufacturers in Bromsgrove, Worcestershire. The defendants were wool-dealers at St Ives in Huntingdon. On 2 September 1817, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs, offering a quantity of wool on certain terms and requiring an answer ‘in course of post’. The defendants misdirected their letter, which did not reach the plaintiffs until the evening of 5 September. That same night the plaintiffs posted a letter of acceptance, which was delivered to the defendants on 9 September. If the original offer had been properly addressed, a reply could have been expected by 7 September and meanwhile, on 8 September, not having received such a reply, the defendants had sold the wool to third parties. The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiffs on the ground that the delay was due to the defendants’ negligence, and the defendants obtained a rule nisi for a new trial. The vital question was whether a contract of sale had been made between the parties before 8 September. Two cases only were cited by counsel498 and none by the court, and it was treated virtually as a case of first impression. 3.59  Three possible solutions. As an academic problem, three possible answers were available. An offer made through the post might be regarded as accepted in the eyes of the law: 1. as soon as the letter of acceptance is put into the post; 2. when the letter of acceptance is delivered to the offeror’s address; or 3. when the letter of acceptance is brought to the actual notice of the offeror. If the first answer were adopted, no further question would arise upon the facts in Adams v Lindsell. The contract was completed on 5 September. If either of the other solutions were adopted, the problem is complicated. As the law is now understood, the plaintiffs would have succeeded on any of these theories, since the defendants’ offer would not be revoked by their sale to third parties on 8 September.499 But in 1818 there were no developed rules as to revocation of offers, and the court may well have thought it arguable that the sale was sufficient to revoke500 so that the effective acceptance would need to take place before 8 September. 3.60  Solution in Adams v Lindsell: acceptance complete when posted. Each answer offers a practical solution, not one compelled by logical necessity, and the choice is

497. (1818) 2 B & Ald 681; 106 ER 250. 498. Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502; Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785. In Tooth v Fleming (1859) 2 Legge 1152 (see 3.60), no cases were cited on this point either by counsel or by the court. 499. See 3.42. 500. This view was current as late as Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463.

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arbitrary. The German legal system, for example, prefers the second solution.501 The Court of King’s Bench in Adams v Lindsell preferred the first. There was a sufficient act of acceptance when the plaintiffs put their letter into the post on 5 September. The solution adopted in Adams v Lindsell (which also applied to telegrams)502 may be explained not so much by reference to the court, for practical reasons, making an exception to the rule that acceptance must be communicated, so much as the court operating without rules to guide it. Adams v Lindsell was the first genuine offer and acceptance case in English law,503 and in 1818 there was no rule that acceptance must be communicated. Thus, the exception preceded the rule. The decision was undoubtedly potentially troublesome.504 So long as it was felt, with whatever reservations, that there could be no contract without a ‘meeting of the minds’, there was a natural reluctance to admit the existence of an agreement merely because a letter of acceptance had been put into the post. Before it reached the offeror, either party might have changed his or her mind.505 On the other hand, the second and third solutions are also troublesome because they would require further communications once the letter of acceptance had arrived, either by the offeror contacting the offeree to indicate that the letter of acceptance had arrived or by the offeree contacting the offeror to ascertain the same.506 A further reason for adopting the first solution was emphasised by Mellish LJ, who stressed the ‘very mischievous consequences’ of adopting either of the alternative solutions: No mercantile man who has received a letter making him an offer, and has accepted the offer, could safely act on that acceptance after he has put it into the post until he knew that it had been received … [A]ccording to the argument presented to us, if the person who has sent the offer finds that the market is falling, and that it will be a bad bargain for him he may, at any time, before he has received the answer, revoke his offer.507

The rationale for the rule has been characterised as the ‘pragmatic necessity of having a rule of some sort, and that rule being no worse than any alternative’.508 As early as 1859 the Supreme Court of New  South  Wales had no hesitation in adopting the first solution509 and, subject to what is said below, the postal acceptance 501. See Winfield, ‘Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance’ (1939) 55 LQR 499 at 506–7. But note that some of the effect of this difference between the two systems is cancelled by the rule of German law that an offer (unless expressed to be revocable) is binding on the offeror for a reasonable time even before acceptance. See Nussbaum, ‘Comparative Aspects of the Anglo American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine’ (1936) 36 Col LR 920 and Samek, ‘A Reassessment of the Present Rule Relating to Postal Acceptance’ (1961) 35 ALJ 38. 502. Cowan v O’Connor (1888) 20 QBD 640. 503. Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 LQR 247 at 260. 504. In The British & American Telegraph Co Ltd v  Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 at  119, Bramwell B remarked: ‘If it should be argued that convenience requires such a rule, as otherwise persons might untruly deny the receipt of letters, the answer is, that if such a rule prevailed persons would untruly assert the posting of them.’ 505. See Thesiger LJ in Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 220; [1874–80] All ER Rep 919 at 922. 506. Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 at 595 (Mellish J quoting from Adams v Lindsell). 507. Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Harris’ Case (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587 at 594. 508. Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at [145] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring). 509. Tooth v Fleming (1859) Legge 1152 at 1156 (Stephen CJ speaking for the Full Court). See also Patterson v Dolman [1908] VLR 354 and the observations of Lindley J in Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) LR 5 CPD 344 at 348; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432 at 1435.

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rule has become the law in Australia.510 It applies to acceptance only, and is not a general rule about the use of the post.511 The solution in Adams v  Lindsell is particularly troublesome if the letter of acceptance is either delayed or does not arrive through no fault of the sender. Despite strong protestations in British & American Telegraph about the unfairness that could result from holding someone to a contract of which he or she is ignorant, the accepted position now is that posting a letter that never arrives is an effective acceptance so long as the circumstances are appropriate for the application of the postal rule, that is, the rule has not been displaced by express provision of the offeror or by implication.512 If the letter does not arrive because it was not properly addressed or because of some other failing on the part of the sender, then the postal rule does not apply.513 One possible justification for the postal acceptance rule is that the postal authority is an agent for the recipient. This argument has been rejected.514 Although the postal rule has been accepted in Australia, there is one pronouncement from the High  Court that could be taken to support a communication rule, that is, that acceptance through the post is effective when the letter arrives, unless the parties have specified otherwise. In Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd,515 Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said, having pointed out that the general rule is that a contract is not completed until an acceptance has been actually communicated, that the postal rule will only apply if it can be ‘inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended that his offer might be accepted by the doing of that act’, that is, posting. It is certainly arguable that in most circumstances an offeror would not contemplate and intend that acceptance should be effective upon posting because non-lawyers do not generally know about the postal rule and would probably be surprised when informed of it. Despite this argument, Bowen CJ in Bressan v Squires did not interpret the High Court judges to be putting forward a general rule in opposition to the postal rule.516 3.61  Exclusion of the postal rule. It needs to be stressed that the rule may be displaced either expressly by the offeror, or by inference from the circumstances of negotiation,517 or where the application of the rule would lead to manifest 510. Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at [11] (Charles JA, Ashley JA concurring). 511. Wardle v  Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [145]–[147], [212]–[217] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring) (payment by cheque through the post). The rule does not apply to revocation of offer: see 3.65. 512. Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v  Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216; Georgoulis v Mandelinic [1984] 1 NSWLR 612 at 616 (Hutley JA), 619 (Glass JA). Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235 is an example of a case where a letter never arrived but the terms of the option displaced the operation of the postal rule so that the purported exercise of the option was ineffective. As to exclusion of the postal rule, see 3.61. 513. Getreide-Import-GesellschaftmbH v  Contimar SA Compania Industrial Comercial y Maritima [1953] 1 WLR 207. 514. Wardle v  Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [141]–[144] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring). See also Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 393. 515. (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111. 516. [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 462. See also Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 at  [134]–[135] (Campbell JA, Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurring); Schib Packaging SrL v Emrich Industries Pty Ltd (2005) 12 VR 268; [2005] VSCA 236 at [11]; Lewis Construction Co Pty Ltd v Tichauer SA [1966] VR 341. 517. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 111 (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J); Hinkley v De Vries (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1049 (Gzell J); Smoothseas Pty Ltd v Lawloan

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absurdity or inconvenience.518 It has not been applied to instantaneous modes of communication, such as telex, fax and email.519 In Bressan v Squires,520 the Supreme Court of New South Wales followed Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes521 and held that the words ‘notice in writing addressed to me’ in an option displaced the operation of the postal rule and that actual notice was therefore required.522 In both these cases it was said that the statutory notice provisions governing property dealings523 applied to the exercise of an option so that, in the absence of a contrary intention, actual rather than deemed communication is required in land transactions.524 In some offers, particularly in options, it is specified in the document that the post is the appropriate mode of acceptance and the offer states that notice of acceptance will be deemed to be delivered in due course of the post or some similar phrase. In such cases the offeree must send the letter so that, in the ordinary course of post, it will arrive before expiry of the offer525 and, if registered or certified post is stipulated, must send the letter by that means if the clause is to operate.526 The ordinary course of post is determined by what would normally be the expected delivery time. The fact that the offeror is not open for business on the day specified does not prevent effective acceptance of the offer.527 In the discussion of email communications in 3.55, the possibility of the postal acceptance rule applying to exchange of emails is canvassed. It is suggested that, because emails are more or less instantaneous and the electronic transactions legislation deals with time of dispatch and time of arrival, the postal acceptance rule is inappropriate.528

Mortgages Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 445 (MacKenzie J); Lew Footwear Holdings Pty Ltd v  Madden International Ltd [2014] VSC 320 at [137]–[156] (Elliott J). 518. See the examples given by Bramwell B in British & American Telegraph Co v Colson (1871) LR 6 Exch 108 at 118. See also Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 WLR 155 at 161; [1974] 1 All ER 161 at 167. 519. See 3.47 and 3.48–3.56. 520. [1974] 2 NSWLR 460. 521. [1974] 1 WLR 155; [1974] 1 All ER 161. 522. The decision was a near thing. Bowen CJ stressed that ‘the matter is largely one of impression’ [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 463. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74, the words ‘receipt by us of an identical part’ were held to displace the operation of the postal rule. In Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235, a clause stipulating that a notice sent by registered or certified post will be deemed to have been delivered, though not held to be the exclusive means by which notice could be sent, nevertheless impliedly excluded the operation of the postal rule. A notice had been sent by ordinary mail but it never arrived. Had it been sent by registered mail it would have been deemed to have arrived because of the contractual provision that dealt with registered mail. It was held that the express provision dealing with registered mail impliedly excluded the postal rule in relation to ordinary mail. 523. Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 170; Law of Property Act 1925 (UK) s 196. 524. Bressan [1974] 2 NSWLR 460 at 463; Holwell [1974] 1 WLR 155 at 161; [1974] 1 All ER 161 at 167. See also the discussion of a possible presumption that the postal rule does not apply to the exchange of identical parts in land sales by Hedigan J (without reaching a conclusion) in Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74 at 81–2. 525. Lewes Nominees Pty Ltd v Strang (1983) 49 ALR 328; Alexander v Stocks & Holdings (Sales) Pty Ltd [1975] VR 843; Kudeweh v T & J Kelleher Builders Pty Ltd [1990] VR 701 at 708–9 (Ormiston J). 526. Elizabeth City Centre Pty Ltd v Corralyn Pty Ltd (1994) 63 SASR 235. 527. Bowman v Durham Holdings Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8 (registered letter of acceptance of option held to be effective on Saturday although not delivered till Monday because postman knew office would be closed on Saturday). 528. Olivaylle Pty Ltd (ACN 080 670 640) v Flottweg Ag (formerly FlottwegGmbh & Co KGAA) (ABN 95 101 547 424) (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522 at [25] (Logan J) (acceptance occurred on arrival of email).

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3.62  May acceptance be recalled before it reaches offeror? May an offeree, perhaps by telephone or email, recall a letter of acceptance after it has been posted but before it has reached the offeror?529 A rigorous application of the postal rule would forbid him or her to do so: the contract is complete from the moment that the letter has been put into the post. The Scots case of Dunmore (Countess) v  Alexander530 is sometimes cited to support the view that the offeree may be allowed to withdraw. The countess on 5 November wrote to Alexander, accepting the latter’s offer to enter her service. On 6 November she wrote a second letter cancelling the acceptance. Both letters were delivered to Alexander at the same moment. The Court of Session held that the acceptance had been effectively withdrawn and that there was no contract. In New  Zealand, on the other hand, Chapman J denied the possibility of altering the effect of a letter of acceptance once it has been put into the post.531 The choice between these opinions must rest upon convenience rather than logic. It is possible for a person who has posted a letter to recover it. The effect of this on the postal acceptance rule has not yet been considered by an Australian court. However, in the United States of America, where there is a similar regulation, the Court of Claims has decided on two occasions that the postal regulation nullifies the acceptance on posting rule.532 It is not safe to assume that the Australian regulation will have an identical effect for two reasons. In the first place, the American regulation appears to confer an indefeasible right upon the sender of a letter to recover it at any time before delivery to the addressee533 whereas the Australian regulation merely vests a discretion in the postal authorities. Second, and perhaps because of the absolute nature of the sender’s right, the Court of Claims appears to have based its decisions on the fact that the Post Office Department is the agent of the sender534 who through it retains control of the letter of acceptance until it is delivered to the addressee. In Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v  Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd,535 a purchaser’s solicitor sent to a vendor’s solicitor a counterpart contract of sale executed by the purchaser. An accompanying letter made it clear that the vendor’s solicitor should hold the counterpart on the purchaser’s behalf until an identical part executed by the vendor was received by the purchaser’s solicitor. A week later the vendor’s solicitor posted an executed counterpart to the purchaser’s solicitor. The next day, before the vendor’s counterpart had arrived by post, the vendor’s solicitor told the purchaser’s solicitor by telephone that the acceptance was withdrawn. The purchaser argued that a contract was formed on posting of the counterpart by the vendor. It was held that the letter made it clear that the postal rule was displaced and that accordingly acceptance was not effective until the counterpart had arrived. 529. See Hudson, ‘Retraction of Letters of Acceptance’ (1966) 82 LQR 169. 530. (1830) 9 Sh (Ct of Sess) 190. It will be seen from the facts of the case that it was not a question of sending a telegram to recall a letter but of the simultaneous receipt of two letters. 531. Wenkheim v Arndt (1873) 1 NZ Jurist 73, though the decision may have been influenced by the fact that the revocation was dispatched by a third party who may have lacked authority to revoke the offer. 532. Dick v United States (1949) 82 Fed Supp 326 and Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417. 533. (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 at 419–20, cited by Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 392. 534. Rhode Island Tool Co v United States (1955) 128 Fed Supp 417 at 420. 535. [1994] 1 VR 74.

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It was therefore open to the vendor to withdraw acceptance before that moment. This case does not deal with the issue discussed above, namely, whether a purported withdrawal of acceptance is effective when the postal rule is operative. If in Australia the acceptance on posting rule is purely one of commercial convenience, it is pertinent to ask, ‘whose convenience?’. Clearly it cannot be that of the offeror who under it remains in a state of uncertainty until he or she has actual knowledge of the acceptance. Indeed, as a learned writer has observed, if the offeror learns of the ‘revocation’ of the acceptance before the letter of acceptance is received, he or she in fact benefits from the earlier release from uncertainty.536 On the other hand, if, as appears more probable, the rule was evolved for the convenience of the offeree, then to allow him or her to revoke before the offeror is aware of the acceptance benefits the offeree without in any way prejudicing the offeror.

Termination of Offer 3.63  Various ways in which an offer may terminate. It is now necessary to consider the circumstances in which an offer may be terminated. We have already seen that it is possible for the offeree effectively to terminate an offer by rejecting it, either outright or by making a counter-offer: see 3.29. An offer may also be terminated if it is revoked by the offeror, it may lapse, or it may be affected by the death of one of the parties. An offer may lapse or not be capable of acceptance if it is subject to a condition which is not fulfilled: see 5.23.

Revocation 3.64  An offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. It has been established ever since the case of Payne v Cave537 that revocation is possible and effective at any time before acceptance: up to this moment no legal obligation exists. Nor, as the law stands, is it relevant that the offeror has promised to keep the offer open for a given period (sometimes referred to as a ‘validity period’).538 Such an undertaking is but part and parcel of the original offer which must stand or fall as a whole. The offeror may, of course, promise, by a separate and specific contract — an ‘option’ — to keep the offer open; but the offeree must, at  least according to traditional analysis,539 prove all the elements of a valid contract, including agreement and consideration, for there to be a valid option. In the words of Griffith CJ: But an offer may be withdrawn at  any time before acceptance. A mere promise to leave it open for a specified time makes no difference, because there is, as yet, 536. Pannam, ‘Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post’ (1960) 2 MULR 388 at 396. 537. (1789) 3 Term Rep 148; 100 ER 502. 538. GIO General Ltd v  Allen [2002] NSWCA 333 at  [10]–[11] (Hodgson JA — in the absence of deed, estoppel or an option, an offer — in this case a Calderbank offer — can be withdrawn despite a promise to keep it open). 539. It is possible that a court may be inclined, in appropriate circumstances, to hold that an offer is irrevocable through the operation of estoppel, that is, when the offeree has acted in reliance on the promise that the offer will be kept open for a certain time, using the reasoning in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See  2.23. Thus, a subcontractor’s quote may be irrevocable if it is relied on by a head contractor to win a tender. See Drennan v Star Paving Inc 333 P 2d 757 (Cal, 1958).

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no agreement, and the promise, if made without distinct consideration, is nudum pactum and not binding. But if there is (as in the present case) a consideration for the promise it is binding. This is often expressed by saying that an option given for value is not revocable …540

The nature of options will be discussed below.541 3.65  Revocation of offer must be communicated. The revocation of an offer by an offeror is ineffective unless it has been communicated to the offeree542 or his or her agent.543 It is not enough for the offeror to change his or her mind. For some years, it is true, obsessed with the theory of consensus, the judges were content with the mere alteration of intention.544 But business convenience demanded a more stringent rule for revocation of offer than for acceptance. To post a letter could be a sufficient act of acceptance. The offeror, when he or she decided to revoke, could rely on no such rule. Thus, in Byrne v Van Tienhoven,545 the defendants posted a letter in Cardiff on 1 October, addressed to the plaintiffs in New York, offering to sell 1000 boxes of tinplates. On 8 October they posted a letter revoking the offer. On 11 October the plaintiffs telegraphed their acceptance and confirmed it in a letter posted on 15 October. On 20 October the letter of revocation reached the plaintiffs. It was held that the revocation was inoperative and that the offer, therefore, continued open and that it had been accepted by the plaintiffs. Lindley J, giving judgment for the plaintiffs, pointed out ‘the extreme injustice and inconvenience which any other conclusion would produce’. 3.66  What constitutes communication of revocation? The offeror, therefore, in revoking must communicate that decision. But it would seem that the offeror need not necessarily have furnished this information personally. In Dickinson v Dodds,546 the defendant, on 10 June, gave the plaintiff a written offer to sell a house for £800, ‘to be left over until Friday, 12 June, 9 am’. On Thursday, 11 June, the defendant sold the house to a third party, Allan, for £800, and that evening the plaintiff was told of the sale by a fourth man, Berry. Before 9 am on 12 June, the plaintiff handed to the defendant a formal letter of acceptance. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff, before attempting to accept, ‘knew that Dodds was no longer minded to sell the property to him as plainly and clearly as if Dodds had told him in so many words’, that the defendant had validly withdrawn his offer and that the plaintiff’s purported acceptance was too late. In Little v Trotman,547 it was held by the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court that the

540. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 at 678. 541. See 3.67. 542. IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205 at [1] (McPherson JA), [26] (Keane JA); Macquarie Generation v CNA Resources Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1040 at [53] (Palmer J). 543. In IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 205, McPherson JA at [2]–[3] and Keane JA at [32]–[37] make the point that a solicitor acting for the offeree is not an agent for this purpose unless expressly appointed as such. 544. See Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Term Rep 653; 100 ER 785 and Head v Diggon (1828) 3 Man & Ry (KB) 97. 545. (1880) 5 CPD 344; [1874–80] All ER Rep 1432. See  also Stevenson Jacques & Co v  McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346 and Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; [1891–4] All ER Rep 908. 546. (1876) 2 Ch D 463. 547. (1885) 6 ALT 252.

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question whether the prior sale had been communicated to the plaintiff before his acceptance was one of fact for the jury. The language of the judgments in Dickinson v Dodds reflects the persistence of the consensus theory and is not free from practical difficulty. Would the offeree in that case have been bound by any hint or gossip that he may have heard? All that can be said is that it is a question of fact in each case. Was the information such that a reasonable person should have been persuaded of its accuracy? Of course, if there was no reliable intimation that the offer was no longer open and it was accepted, the offeror would be twice bound: see 3.42. Finally, in relation to communicating a revocation of an offer, the problem of how this is to be done in a reward situation has received very little attention. If an offer of reward is made to the world, how is it to be withdrawn? The only authority on this question is an American case, Shuey v United States,548 where it was said that an offer will be effectively revoked if the same method that was used for advertising the offer was used for its revocation. This appears to require a positive notice of revocation (which may well be necessary in a case where the original offer was advertised in the press) but does not deal with the case where an offer of reward is simply displayed and then, after some time, taken down. Presumably, taking the notice down would constitute an effective revocation of the offer of reward contained in the notice.

Options, etc 549 3.67  Irrevocable offers, options and rights of pre-emption. Dickinson v Dodds550 illustrates that a bare promise to keep an offer open for a certain time is not binding. In traditional language, such a promise is a gift promise lacking consideration. It has already been seen in Chapter 2 on estoppel that the doctrine of consideration is now not the only basis for finding that a promise is enforceable. The fact that such a promise may raise expectations that are quite legitimate, or may cause the offeree to incur expenditure in reliance on the promise, has not deterred the courts in the past from declaring the offeror free to break the promise. But this view is now qualified, particularly in a case where there has been detrimental reliance and it would be unconscionable to allow the promisor to go back on the promise to keep the offer open.551 A court, tempted by this argument, would be reinforced by various suggestions for making promises to keep offers open for a certain time enforceable in the absence of consideration (called ‘firm offers’).552 No moves have been made to change the law in those Commonwealth countries whose common law is inherited from the United Kingdom.553 This is perhaps not surprising considering 548. 92 US 73 (1876). The case concerned a reward for the apprehension of an accomplice of Booth, President Lincoln’s assassin. 549. See Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010); Lücke, ‘Options’ (1968) 3(2) Adelaide LR 397 (available on Austlii). 550. See 3.66. 551. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. 552. See English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937) Cmnd 5449; English Law Commission Working Paper No 6: Firm Offers (1975); Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Sale of Goods (1979). 553. Contrast United States Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205 (a merchant who makes an offer said to be irrevocable in a signed document is bound to keep it open for the stated period). The Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 87 requires a signed document and a statement of a purported consideration. In addition, the contemplated exchange must be on fair terms.

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that an irrevocable offer may be a valuable asset in a rising market. Why, it may be asked, should a gift of such an asset554 be enforceable in this context when gift promises are otherwise not enforceable? The answer to this may be to argue, not for full enforceability of an offer declared to be irrevocable for a certain time, but for adequate compensation for a person who legitimately relies on the promise to his or her detriment.555 Such a solution may be possible either through the use of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law in appropriate cases556 or on the basis of estoppel557 but probably not negligence.558 The conventional way to make an offer irrevocable for a certain time — that is, to create an option — is for the offeree to pay (or promise to pay)559 usually a relatively small sum for the offeror’s promise. Alternatively, an option is sometimes created by providing for such in a contract, such as a lease whereby the lessee is able to exercise a right to renew the lease or to purchase the land or goods the subject of the lease at the end of the term. The consideration for an option in such a case is embodied in the original contract, one of the benefits of which is the option. A right of pre-emption — sometimes called a ‘first right of refusal’ — has been recognised judicially.560 Such a right is, as it were, one step back from an option. A promises B that, if A decides to sell (say) a block of land, A will first offer it to B. This kind of promise is enforceable so long as there is consideration for it561 or it is generated by estoppel.562 A’s obligation is to make a bona fide563 offer to B before offering it to someone else.564 There is no requirement that the terms of the offer must be agreed ahead of time.565 This right has been criticised for being vague — ‘a loose 554. The ‘asset’ is the difference in value of the subject-matter of the offer between the time of offer and the time of acceptance. 555. See, for example, the Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 87(2). Even so, the discussion of remedies in Chapter 2, particularly at 2.9, shows that the expectation interest may be protected by an estoppel. This would mean that the revocation of the offer would be ineffective. 556. See Chapter 11. 557. See Chapter 2 and Drennan v Star Paving Co 333 P 2d 757 (1958) (subcontractor’s quote used by head contractor in winning head contract; subcontractor held to its quote by estoppel). In Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171, estoppel was argued to make an offer irrevocable but, on the facts, did not succeed. 558. Holman Constructions Ltd v  Delta Timber Co Ltd [1972] NZLR 1081  at  1083 (Henry J), where an offeree building contractor unsuccessfully sought damages when a potential subcontractor withdrew an offer: ‘An offer is an offer and is not advice or information … The law on offer and acceptance is not to be qualified by some new duty of care …’. 559. Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120. 560. Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245; Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53 at 58 (Megarry J); Smith v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803; Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321 (Zelling J) and 339 (FC); see also Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) (1986) 45 SASR 57 (discussion of damages for breach of first right of refusal); Commonwealth v Hooper (1992) 2 Aust Contract Reporter 90-010. 561. In Associated Grocers Co-operative Ltd v Hubbard Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 42 SASR 321, Zelling J held that a right of pre-emption was embodied in a collateral contract. 562. United Petroleum Pty Ltd v Pentaco Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (2016) FCA 118. Misleading conduct was also successfully argued in this case. 563. Smith v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803; Transfield Properties (Kent Street) Pty Ltd v Swift Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 321; Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd v  Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 510 at 522–9 (Young J); Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 at [39]–[54] (Croft J). 564. In Wesoky v  Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32, an obligation to provide a nonrecourse loan ‘subject to the mutual agreement of both parties’ was held to impose an obligation to make an offer, and Merkel J was prepared to set out the terms on which the offer should be made. 565. Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [266] (Gordon J).

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and colloquial expression’566 — and it is essential for the party granting the right to be absolutely clear.567 The existence of a right of pre-emption can generate some difficult questions, including interpretation of the clause, what constitutes a bona fide offer, whether the right is proprietary, whether it generates a right to equitable remedies and whether it could amount to a restraint on alienation.568 A transfer in breach of a right of pre-emption is effective569 and the innocent party must seek a remedy in damages or, possibly, a remedy that recognises that it has an equitable proprietary right arising from the grant of a right of pre-emption.570 It is misleading conduct to sell a property that is subject to a right of pre-emption without disclosing the right.571 3.68  Nature of option — competing theories. Although options are very common, particularly in land dealings, the legal nature of an option has been a ‘standing controversy’572 for over a hundred years. There are two theories: an option is an irrevocable offer that may be accepted at  any time during the period specified; alternatively, an option is a conditional contract, usually of sale573 or lease.574 It seems that the particular wording of the option is not necessarily determinative of the court’s choice.575 566. Woodroffe v Box (1954) 92 CLR 245 at 258 (Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 567. See  extensive discussion by Bryson JA, including of American cases, in Goldmaster Homes Pty Ltd v Johnson [2004] NSWCA 144 at [17]–[39]; by Giles JA in Moraitis Fresh Packaging (NSW) Pty Ltd v Fresh Express (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 327 (restraint on alienation also discussed); and by Croft J in Southern Region Ltd v Wallington Hardware & Timber Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 95 at [37]–[44]. See also John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc [2004] SASC 128 (very elaborate clause unsuccessfully challenged for uncertainty and for amounting to an illegitimate restraint on alienation); Nationwide Produce (Holdings) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Linknarf Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 129 at [56]–[68] (Tamberlin J) (use of ‘preferred supplier’ does not confer a right of pre-emption). See also Sahade v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 512, where Campbell J discussed the possibility of a right of pre-emption becoming an equitable interest in land; Octra Nominees Pty Ltd v Chipper [2007] FCAFC 92 (once offer made and refused no requirement to make a new offer even though sale to third party is on different terms). 568. See the extensive discussion by Whelan J in Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. See also Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010), chs 1, 7–9. 569. Reef & Rainforest Travel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (2002) 1 Qd R 683; [2001] QCA 249 at [10] (McPherson JA, Thomas and Muir JJA concurring). Compare Hunter v Hunter [1936] AC 222 not followed by Whelan J in Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. See discussion in 8.8 of prohibition of assignment and breach of such a provision. 570. Rathner v Lindholm (2005) 194 FLR 291; [2005] VSC 399. 571. Colliers Jardine (NSW) Pty Ltd v Balog Investments Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR (Digest) 46-140; [1996] ANZ ConvR 527; Mikaelian v CSIRO (1999) 163 ALR 172. 572. Dixon CJ in Braham v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 at 376. 573. That is, the optionee/grantee has a choice to buy (a ‘call’ option). A ‘put’ option confers a choice on the owner to require the other party to buy. 574. The cases in which various courts have expressed different views on the two theories of option are too numerous to list. The leading cases are: Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v  Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 (conditional contract, Griffith CJ and O’Connor J; irrevocable offer, Isaacs J); Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (conditional contract); Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v  Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 (irrevocable offer); Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 (conditional contract); Braham v Walker (1961) 104 CLR 366 (controversy discussed by Dixon CJ); Johnson v Bones [1970] 1 NSWR 28 (irrevocable offer); Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja [1970] 1 NSWR 526 (irrevocable offer); Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 (conditional contract, Gibbs J); O’Halloran Enterprises Pty Ltd v Farr [1979] VR 33 (irrevocable offer); Karaguleski v Vasil Bros & Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 267 (irrevocable offer); David Deane and Assocs Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 270 (contract of sale so that agent was able to earn commission). Compare Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 23 (Leeming and Payne JJA held that an agent who secured options was not entitled to fee; White J held that such options were ‘contracts’). 575. See  Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 (option expressed as irrevocable offer treated by majority of High Court as a conditional contract). See Gibbs J in Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 73.

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On the first analysis, there are two contracts: a ‘mini’ contract to keep the offer open for a certain time and the main contract of sale or lease that comes into being if the offer is accepted (when the option is ‘exercised’). On the second analysis, there is one contract that comes into being immediately the offeree pays or promises to pay the sum of money or, alternatively, when the original contract of lease is created, in cases where the option is contained in a lease. On this analysis the contract is subject to a condition subsequent, that is, if the condition is not satisfied the contract terminates. It is, thus, a contract for valuable consideration, viz, to sell the property (or whatever the subject matter may be) upon condition that the other party shall within the stipulated time bind himself to perform the terms of the offer embodied in the contract.576

At first sight a contract that is subject to a condition that allows one of the parties to decide whether or not to be bound is a contradiction. It appears to be a denial of contract. This would be so if it were not for the consideration (often nominal) provided by the grantee of the option.577 By giving the consideration, the grantee commits himself or herself to a contract but at  the same time buys the privilege of having the choice to decide within the stipulated time not to go ahead with the agreement.578 What is somewhat curious is that, on this analysis, there is an immediately binding contract, yet, unless the grantee takes positive steps to exercise the option (thereby satisfying the condition), the contract terminates automatically. It might be thought that, consistent with the notion of contract being a set of binding obligations, the contract should remain in force unless the grantee does something positive to bring it to an end (as with an election to rescind)579 rather than terminate automatically unless the grantee does something positive to keep it on foot. Suffice it to say that the option, analysed as a conditional contract, is a curious creature in the law of contract, though it is far too well established and familiar to lawyers and business people to be looked at afresh. The reason for the manifold cases that support the alternative theories of option is to be found in the purpose the court is trying to achieve in any particular case. Each theory has its uses, depending on what is the issue before the court. For example, the conditional contract theory is more easily reconciled with the fact that an option creates an equitable interest in land580 and with the view that an option may survive 576. Griffith CJ in Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674 at 678. 577. Whether the option would not be binding on the grantor if the nominal sum is not in fact paid (even if acknowledged to have been paid) would depend on the circumstances. If the non-payment of the money is a failure to perform the requested act in a unilateral contract, then there would be no binding option: Michael v  Barnes (1987) NSW ConvR 55-343 at  57, 119. On the other hand, if non-payment of the money is a breach of a bilateral contract by the grantee (who has provided consideration by promising to pay), then there is a valid option but failure to pay arguably may entitle the grantor to terminate, though probably a failure to pay at least a nominal consideration would not seem to be a serious breach. The issue was raised but was not relevant to the facts of Barba v Gas and Fuel Corp of Victoria (1976) 136 CLR 120 at 131. Compare Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 (court prepared to order specific performance of an agreement to grant an easement for one shilling once the shilling was paid or tendered) and Himbleton Pty Ltd v Kumagai (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 NSWLR 44 at 49–52 (promise to pay was sufficient consideration even though no payment actually made and despite erroneous acknowledgement of payment). 578. See the discussion by Gibbs CJ in Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 at 581. 579. The language of election is used by Smith J in Ballas v Theophilos [1958] VR 576 at 580–1. 580. Commissioner of Taxes (Qld) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127; Ballas v Theophilos (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193. See also Auburn Shopping Village Pty Ltd v Nelmeer Hoteliers Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 114 not involving land.

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the death of the grantor.581 On the other hand, the irrevocable offer approach creates fewer problems in giving force to the intention of the parties when the option is exercised by a nominee or other third party.582 The view that has often been expressed — that the debate is an arid one and makes no difference in practice583 — overlooks the fact that the two theories are useful and, further, that each may be determinative in some special cases.584 Thus theoretical purity must give way to pragmatism.585 Finally, if the grantor of an option wrongfully revokes, the grantee is entitled nevertheless to exercise the option.586 This ability to ignore the wrongful revocation is thought to be more consistent with the conditional contract theory.587 As to assignment of an option, see 8.6. 3.69  Conditional options. Options (particularly options to renew a lease) are sometimes subject to the fulfilment of prior conditions, for example, that the lessee has performed all covenants. Non-fulfilment of the terms may preclude exercise of the option, that is, adhering to the terms is a condition precedent to the exercise of the option.588 But this can lead to harsh results if the non-fulfilment is a not very serious breach of the relevant condition or there has been tolerance of breaches.589 The failure to observe a condition may be a breach of an existing contract or a failure to perform the requested acts in a unilateral contract590 depending on which theory of option is adopted. The courts may be inclined to treat non-adherence to

581. Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57. Generally, a contract survives the death of a contracting party whereas an offer may not. See 8.55 for the effect of death on a contract and 3.73–3.74 for the effect of death on an offer. 582. See  Rossiter, ‘Options to Acquire Interests in Land — Freehold and Leasehold’ (1982) 56 ALJ 576 at 577–81; Farrands, The Law of Options and Other Pre-emptive Rights (2010), ch 2; Lücke, ‘Options’ (1968) 3(2) Adelaide LR 397 at 210 (available on Austlii). As to nominee options, see  7.28; Macarthur v  Georgamlis (No 1) (1989) NSW ConvR 55-501; Chambers v  Odgers (1977) 1  BPR  9467 at  9472 (Holland J); Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 at 158–9 (Burt J); and Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466; [2003] VSCA 1 at [17]–[23] (Phillips JA). 583. Carter v  Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at  123; Ballas v  Theophilos (No 2) (1957) 98 CLR 193 at  207; Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 73. 584. Gibbs J in Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 thought that the conditional contract theory was essential for the proposition that an option creates a proprietary interest. ‘An equitable interest cannot be created by a mere offer …’: at 76. 585. The debate continues. See  extensive discussion in Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v  Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 72; [2011] QCA 49 (Fraser JA, Chesterman JA and Martin J concurring); Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 23 (2–1 split). 586. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v  Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674. See  also Rossiter, ‘Options to Acquire Interests in Land — Freehold and Leasehold’ (1982) 56 ALJ 576 and 624. 587. Laybutt (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 76 (Gibbs J). 588. Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v  Pitt Club Ltd (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 122 approved in Bowman v Durham Holdings Pty Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8; Commonwealth v Antonio Giorgio Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 244; BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-a-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589. In Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 603; [2007] NSWCA 65, it was held that an exercise of an option when the option holder had not committed any breaches was valid but defeasible if the option holder committed breaches after the exercise and before the expiry of the term. 589. It has been held that waiver is not applicable in connection with options to renew. Strict compliance is required if the language is clear. See  BS Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v  Budget Rent-A-Car System Pty Ltd [1990] VR 589 and cases discussed therein. Yet in Traywinds Pty Ltd v Cooper [1989] 1 Qd R 222, it was held that the party granting the option to renew could waive the deadline for the exercise of the option, following Hill v Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231. Compare Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246 (failure to exercise the option on time could not be waived because there was nothing to waive; further engagement between the parties was simply a negotiation for a new contract). 590. Compare United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74.

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conditions with some leniency if the language of the option so permits.591 Further, there is statutory protection in some jurisdictions in the form of a requirement for the lessor to provide a notice specifying breaches where such breaches preclude the exercise of the option and a court discretion to overlook certain breaches.592 3.70  Exercise of an option. Apart from satisfying a specific condition attached to the exercise of an option, the exercise of an option (notification of acceptance of the offer, on one view of the nature of options) is governed by the same principles discussed earlier as to what constitutes acceptance. As seen earlier, acceptance may be inferred from conduct.593 The same applies to the exercise of an option.594 If a time is stipulated, the offeree must meet the deadline.595 If the deadline has passed then the option has ceased.596 If a method for exercising the option is prescribed, then the exercise of the option must follow that method, though judges differ as to how precisely this is necessary.597 Just as with acceptance, the offeree must be clear that he or she is exercising the option.598

Revocability of offer for unilateral contract 599 3.71  Is a promise in return for an act revocable once the promisee has started to perform? In connection with the question of revocation of offers, a difficulty arises because of the nature of unilateral contracts.600 If the offeror contemplates, not the creation of mutual promises, but the creation of an enforceable obligation upon the offeree’s performance of an act, may the offeror revoke the offer at any time before the completion of this act? The application of the ordinary rules of revocation would suggest an affirmative answer: an offer may be withdrawn before acceptance;601 and acceptance does not take place until the requested act is complete. The problem — an old favourite in the classroom but of limited practical significance — has given 591. See Reed v Sheehan (1982) 39 ALR 257 at 263–6 (Fox J), where many of the authorities are discussed. See, too, Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1989) NSW ConvR 55-459; Nessmine Pty Ltd v Devuso Pty Ltd (1990) ANZ ConvR 298 (lessor wishing to deny renewal of lease on the basis of non-fulfilment of conditions must give statutory notice to lessee); JB (Northbridge) Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd [2010] NSWCA 249 (insolvency event not a default; equitable assignment not in breach of no assignment clause; and no notice had been provided by landlord under the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 133E). 592. Conveyancing Act  1919 (NSW) Pt 8 Div  4; Law of Property Act  2000 (NT) s  143; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 128 and Property Law Bill 2022 s 151; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) Pt VII Div 2. The interpretation of this provision, which varies between jurisdictions, is not straightforward. See discussion by Holmes and Morrison JJA in Grepo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131. 593. See 3.27, 3.46. Compare S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Bros Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637, where a landlord was estopped from denying that an option had been exercised. 594. Fightvision Pty Ltd v  Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473 at  493–6. As to when an option to renew a lease may be exercised, in particular whether this is possible after expiry of the initial term, see Tsaoucis v Gallipoli Memorial Club Ltd (1998) 9 BPR 16,265 discussed by Butt, ‘Exercise of Option to Renew’ (1998) 72 ALJ 583. 595. In counting days, the day on which the offer is received is omitted: Ford v La Forrest [2002] 2 Qd R 44; [2001] QCA 455. In Tasmania, the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 23A provides for a one-year limitation period if an option or a right of pre-emption in respect of land does not have a deadline for its exercise. 596. Tripple A Pty Ltd v WIN TV Qld Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 246. Any subsequent negotiations are not ‘waiver’ so much as a fresh negotiation for a contract. 597. See 3.46. 598. Jong v Advanced Dental Services Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 318, where a desultory email exchange referring to ‘re-signing’ was not the exercise of an option. 599. As to the question of effective communication of a revocation of an offer of reward, see 3.66. 600. See 3.28. 601. See 3.64.

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rise to a certain amount of speculation.602 In the United States it has been suggested that there are in fact two separate offers — an express offer to pay on performance and an implied offer not to revoke if the offeree starts to perform.603 On this theory, the offer promise becomes in effect an option once the offeree has started to perform. In England, Pollock suggested that a distinction should be drawn between the acceptance of the offer and the consideration necessary to support it. The latter is completion of the requested act and until then the offeror is not obliged to pay. The  former may be assumed as soon as the offeree ‘has made an unequivocal beginning of the performance requested’, and proof of this fact makes the offer irrevocable.604 Pollock’s suggestion was adopted by the English Law Revision Committee.605 Alternatively, a court may be inclined to use the device of estoppel to prevent the offeror from revoking, once there has been detrimental reliance by the offeree.606 In Australia this question has received mixed answers.607 One problem, referred to by the Full Federal Court in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v  Wellcome International Pty  Ltd,608 is whether the purported revocation of the offer is effective even if it is in breach of an obligation not to revoke. The court thought that it was and that, at most, the offeree would be able to claim damages. But this would depend on the circumstances. It is certainly the case with options that a revocation may be treated as ineffective and specific performance may then be ordered, so long as the option has been exercised properly.609 An Australian court actually had to decide the principal question as long ago as 1860. In Abbott v Lance,610 the plaintiff and the defendant signed a memorandum in the following terms: The said T E Lance having stated to the said B Abbott a certain price and terms hereinafter specified, for and on which he was willing to sell his stations, Wirrha and Gilgil, and stock; but the said B Abbott being unwilling to purchase without previous inspection of those stations, he will take two months from this date for the purpose of inspecting them, and if within these two months the said B Abbott offers to purchase the said property on the said terms, then the said T E Lance engaged to sell to him on those terms; the said property by no means remaining during these two months under exclusive offer to the said B Abbott, the said T E Lance retaining full liberty to sell the said property to any other party on the conditions of paying to the 602. See  Wormser, ‘The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts’ (1916) 26 Yale LJ 136, which suggested that it is not obviously unjust in all cases if the offeror is free to withdraw. See the exchange between Williams J and counsel in Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748 at 753; 142 ER 1336 at 1338. 603. McGovney, ‘Irrevocable Offers’ (1914) 27 Harv LR 644. 604. Pollock on Contract (13th ed), 19. 605. English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937) Cmnd 5449, 23–4, 31. 606. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v  Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. See  Chapter  2. See  also Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v  Wellcome International Pty  Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198 at  228. In Forbes v  Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241 at 283–4, Santow J was of the view that estoppel provides a more satisfactory answer to the problem here being discussed. 607. Contrast the approach in Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 in favour of irrevocability with that of the Full Federal Court in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 153 ALR 198. 608. (1998) 153 ALR 198 at 228. 609. Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674; see also 3.68. 610. (1860) Legge 1283 followed in Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 at 297–8 (McPherson J). See also Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 183–4 (McHugh JA); White Trucks Pty Ltd v Riley (1948) 66 WN (NSW) 101; Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; [1952] 1 All ER 149; Offord v Davies (1862) 12 CBNS 748 at 753; 142 ER 1336 at 1338 (Erle CJ). See McRae, ‘Revocation of Unilateral Contracts’ 1 Otago LR 149 and the United States Restatement (Second) on Contracts § 45, which provides that there is an option contract once the promisee has started to perform.

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said B Abbott the sum of £100 as a forfeit in case of sale to any other party, that is to say, provided the said B Abbott shall within the said two months make a bona fide offer to purchase the same on the terms hereinafter specified …

In pursuance of the agreement the plaintiff started on the 500-mile journey and when about halfway received the following letter from the defendant: ‘Dear Sir, — I hasten to inform you that I have absolutely sold my stations to another party. Trusting this may overtake you before you have ridden far’. The question for the Full Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the £100 specified in the agreement. It was held that he was so entitled. Although there may be some obscurities in the judgment, it appears to be authority for the proposition that, in order to give business efficacy to a unilateral contract, the offeror must be taken to have promised that, once the offeree has started to perform the stipulated act, the offer becomes irrevocable.611 However, this was not how the Full Federal Court interpreted the case in Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd,612 where it was held that the contract in Abbott v Lance: … was simply a promise to pay £100 as compensation for the plaintiff’s time, trouble and expense in undertaking the inspection trip if the defendant should cause them to be wasted by selling to someone else, upon a condition that they would only be taken to have been wasted if the sale by the defendant occurred within two months and could be seen to have prevented the plaintiff from making, within that period, a bona fide offer to purchase.613

The court in Mobil argued that it was by no means self-evident that it was unfair to withdraw a unilateral type offer after the offeree had embarked on performance. This was partly because of the various circumstances in which such a revocation might occur and so no universal rule could be stated. Also, commencement of performance may or may not provide a benefit to the promisor, depending on the circumstances.614 On the facts of Mobil, the court held that an offer of incentive rewards to franchisees if they performed above certain levels could be withdrawn.615 The Full Federal Court examined the cases on this point and concluded that they did not stand for any binding rule. The argument that there can be no withdrawal once the offeree has embarked on performance may be displaced expressly, or in special circumstances a court will not regard the offer as irrevocable even when the offeree has started work. An example of the latter is the contract of agency with an estate agent who is asked to find a buyer in return for a commission. It has been held that the owner of the property is free to withdraw the offer at any time until the agent actually finds a buyer who signs 611. Veivers v Cordingley [1989] 2 Qd R 278 at 297–8 (McPherson J). An obiter dictum of Goff LJ in Daulia Ltd v  Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch  231 at  238–9 supports this view. See  also Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] AC 572 at 585; [1972] 1 All ER 621 at 627; Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290; Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 183–4 (McHugh JA). This theory may explain why a banker’s irrevocable credit in favour of a seller in the context of bankers’ commercial credits is binding on the bank. See 7.50. 612. (1998) 153 ALR 198. 613. Ibid at 226. 614. This argument ignores the fact that consideration may also be provided if the relevant act constitutes a detriment to the promisee. If part performance does provide a benefit to the promisor, as in Errington v  Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (promisee  paying off mortgage on property owned by promisor), the solution nowadays would be based either on unjust enrichment or the imposition of a constructive trust. 615. This was strictly obiter dicta because the court had already come to the conclusion that no contractual offer had been made. Claims based on estoppel were also unsuccessful.

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a contract.616 Thus, as indicated by the Federal Court in Mobil, there is no simple answer to the issue that has been the subject of (perhaps unwarranted) attention from law teachers over many years.

Lapse of time 3.72  Expiry of offer. An offer may cease to exist by lapse of time, either because this is expressly provided or if the court thinks that this is a necessary inference to be drawn from the particular facts. If no time limit is expressly set, the offer must be accepted within a reasonable time or it lapses.617 The High Court decision in Ballas v Theophilos (No 2)618 offers an illustration. A partnership deed gave the surviving partner an option to purchase the deceased partner’s share in the capital and assets of the business on certain terms. The deed did not specify any time limit for the exercise of the option and the surviving partner purported to exercise it 16 months after the death of the deceased partner. The offer was held to have lapsed by the passage of time. It is, however, important to appreciate that what is a reasonable time varies with the nature of the contemplated contract.619

Death 3.73  Effect of death of offeror. The effect of death upon the continuity of an offer is not altogether clear.620 It has been assumed that an offeree cannot accept after receiving notice of the offeror’s death.621 However, the view was expressed in Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd622 that an option can be accepted after the death of the grantor, so long as the terms of the option do not exclude that possibility and so long as the contract was not personal to the grantor. But this view may not advance the debate if an option is considered to be a conditional contract (which does not generally lapse on death) rather than an irrevocable offer, as was in fact the case in Laybutt.623 Is the offeror’s estate bound if the offeree performs an act of acceptance in ignorance of the death? In Dickinson v Dodds,624 Mellish LJ by way of obiter dictum expressed the opinion ‘that, if a man who makes an offer dies, the offer cannot be accepted after he is dead’. But, in the context in which it was said, it could have meant that an offer cannot be accepted once the offeree knows of the offeror’s death. 616. Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v  Cooper [1941] AC 108; [1941] 1 All ER 33 endorsed in LJ Hooker Ltd v W J Adams Estates Pty Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 52 at 66–7 (Gibbs J), 78 (Stephen J), 83 (Jacobs J). 617. Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v  Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Exch 109 (offer to purchase shares in June purportedly accepted in November; held: acceptance too late). Compare Manchester Diocesan Council v Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241 at 248, where Buckley J was of the view that an offer lapses after a reasonable time because it has been impliedly rejected by the offeree rather than impliedly withdrawn by the offeror. 618. (1957) 98 CLR 193. 619. Ibid at 197 (Dixon CJ). 620. As to the effect of death on existing contractual obligations, see 8.55. 621. See Re Whelan [1897] 1 IR 575; Coulthart v Clementson (1879) 5 QBD 42; [1874–80] All ER Rep 865; and Fong v Cilli (1968) 11 FLR 495. 622. (1974) 132 CLR 57 at 76 (Gibbs J). See also Consolidated Development Pty Ltd v Holt (1986) 6 NSWLR 607 at 618 (Young J). 623. See 3.68. 624. (1876) 2 Ch D 463 at 475.

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The case of Bradbury v Morgan625 suggests that, in principle at least, this opinion does not represent the law when the offeree is ignorant of the offeror’s death. The case is not directly on point because it deals with whether a contract lapses, rather than an offer. But because of the sparsity of authority on the point it may be some guide. X had written to the plaintiffs, requesting them to give credit to Y and guaranteeing payment up to £100. The plaintiffs gave credit to Y. X then died, and the plaintiffs, in ignorance of this fact, continued the credit to Y. The plaintiffs sued X’s executors on the guarantee. It was held that the defendants were liable. In the words of Pollock CB: This is a contract, and the question is whether it is put an end to by the death of the guarantor. There is no direct authority to that effect; and I think that all reason and authority, such as there is, are against that proposition.

Channell B was equally emphatic: In the case of a contract death does not in general operate as revocation, but only in exceptional cases, and this is not within them.

The better view would seem to be that the effect of death varies according to the nature of the particular offer. If, as in the case of a guarantee, the offer is of a promise that is independent of the offeror’s personality and that can be satisfied out of his or her estate, death does not, until notified, prevent acceptance. If, as in the case of agency or in an offer to write a book or to perform at a concert, some element personal to the offeror is involved, his or her death automatically terminates the negotiations.626 3.74  Effect of death of offeree. Where the offeree dies, there appears to be no authority, and the only assistance is to be found in a dictum by Warrington LJ in Reynolds v Atherton.627 He was of the opinion that an offer ceases, by operation of law, on the death of the offeree, though he regarded the language of revocation in this context as inappropriate: I think it would be more accurate to say that, the offer having been made to a living person who ceases to be a living person before the offer is accepted, there is no longer an offer at all. The offer is not intended to be made to a dead person or to his executors, and the offer ceases to be an offer capable of acceptance.

The point was expressly reserved by Lord Dunedin when the case reached the House of Lords.628 Even so, it is not unreasonable to suggest that an offer, unless made to the public at large, assumes the continued existence of a particular offeree, and that the destruction of this assumption frustrates the intention to contract. However, as we have already seen, if the offer takes the form of an option, then a contractual right is vested in the offeree. In the event of his or her death before the expiration of the agreed period, whether or not the offeree’s personal representatives can exercise the option by accepting the offer will depend on the nature of the contract. In the words of Knox CJ: 625. (1862) 1 H & C 249; 158 ER 877. 626. On the whole question, see Lücke, ‘Striking a Bargain’ (1962) 1(3) Adelaide LR 293 at 306 (available on Austlii). 627. (1921) 125 LT 690 at 695–6. 628. (1922) 127 LT 189 at 191.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

If the option is personal to the offeree, if, for instance, the agreement offered calls for the exercise of his personal skill or discretion, it can, of course, be accepted only during his lifetime and lapses on his death. Or it may be that the option, though not personal to the offeree in the sense of calling for his personal services or qualifications, on its true construction expressly or by necessary implication requires acceptance by him personally. The benefit of such an option could not pass to the executors of the offeree because it must be accepted if at all by the offeree personally. But, if the option be not personal to the offeree and do not expressly or by necessary implication … limit the time for acceptance to his lifetime, I think the result of the authorities is that the benefit of the option is an ordinary assignable chose in action which on the death of the offeree passes along with his other property to his personal representative.629

629. Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115 at 121 applying Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477 and Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 423; [1900–3] All ER Rep 386 at 390.

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Chapter 4

Consideration Function and Definition 4.1  The criteria for enforceability of promises. The doctrine of consideration is about what makes a promise legally enforceable. The law necessarily has to separate those promises that do not generate any legal liability from those that do. In order to do this, some criterion must be fixed on to make this discrimination. A number of criteria could be used to perform this task in a rational system of law. The promisor might, for example, be held liable just because he or she had made a serious promise or had made use of a well-known ritual that signals that a promise is to be treated as legally enforceable. Or the promisor might be held liable because the promisee had relied on the promise. Or the promisor might be legally bound if the promisee could prove that the promise was part of a transaction to which he or she had contributed a material share, in other words, that the promise was part of a reciprocal exchange. Each criterion may be defended. Most foreign systems adopt the first possibility.1 Modern Australian law uses all three criteria, though only one is contract. The third criterion, the notion of an exchange, is the traditional hallmark of consideration and is the focus of this chapter. It is not sufficient that the parties have made an agreement unless that agreement also involves mutual consideration. Reliance is playing an increasingly important role in the law of obligations.2 Reliance must be justified or reasonable in the circumstances and determining when reliance is so justified may prove to be difficult.3 Nevertheless, a positive promise is now enforceable, without consideration, through the mechanism of promissory estoppel in which detrimental reliance is an essential element.4 A broken promise may amount to misleading or deceptive conduct.5 Solemnity also has an important role in that a promise may be made binding by the use of a deed under seal.6 1.

See, for example, the French Civil Code art 1101, which defines a contract as ‘an agreement by which one or several persons bind themselves, in favour of one or several other persons, to give, or to do, or not to do, something’. 2. For example, in connection with negligent misrepresentation. See 11.87–11.91. 3. See Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981), 65–9. 4. See  Chapter 2. 5. See  11.118. 6. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022). The common law requirements — that a deed had to be written on vellum, parchment or paper and had to be sealed and delivered — have been supplemented in part by legislation. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 110, 110A, 110B and 127; Civil Law (Property) Act 2006 (ACT) s 219; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Pt 3; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) Pt 6 Div 1; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) Pt 6 and Property Law Bill 2022 Pt 6; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 41; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s 63; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) ss 73, 73A, 74; Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic) s 12A; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) ss 9 and 12. Unfortunately, the legislation is not uniform, and there are gaps in coverage. For example, there is no

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4.2

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

4.2  Consideration. The common law adopted the notion of exchange for the enforceability of contractual promises. To sustain an action on a contractual promise made by the defendant, the plaintiff must show that it is supported by the presence of ‘consideration’. The plaintiff — the promisee — has to show that the defendant’s promise, upon which the plaintiff is suing, is part of a bargain to which he or she (the plaintiff) has contributed.7 The defendant’s promise must have been offered in return for an act done or a counter-promise made by the plaintiff. It is to this requirement of mutuality that the term ‘consideration’ is given. Thus, only bargains would be enforced8 to be contrasted with gift promises which are not enforceable unless embodied in a deed or on which the promisee has relied to his or her detriment so as to attract an estoppel. If A promises B to deliver a ton of gravel next Friday and B readily agrees, by itself this is not a contract. A has promised a gift to B and, though B has agreed, there is no consideration moving from B and the promise is not enforceable. But if A promises to deliver a ton of gravel to B next Friday, payment on delivery, and B agrees, then there is a contract (assuming that the price is known or can be ascertained). This mutuality or exchange prompts the next logical question: what precisely is meant by an exchange? The answer to this apparently simple question has generated a vast amount of learning and judicial exegesis.9 The answer has two aspects. First, it is necessary to examine whether there has been an exchange between the two parties to the alleged contract. This aspect of the inquiry is concerned to ensure that each side has ‘paid for’10 the other’s promise or act and is summed up in the maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’. The second aspect is concerned with what in law amounts to a good consideration, that is, whether the thing given in exchange (a promise or an act) is recognised by the law as legally valuable, that is, a recognised species of consideration. These two aspects dictate the structure of this chapter. The maxim ‘consideration must move from the promisee’ is examined in 4.6–4.8, and the question of what in law amounts to (and does not amount to) a good consideration is examined in 4.9–4.41. It is worth noting that, as a practical matter, the rules of consideration rarely cause a problem at the formation stage of a contract. This is because, generally, commercial people do not promise to do something for nothing or, if they do, they would not intend such a promise to be legally enforceable. The issue of consideration does not arise if one party has, for example, agreed to sell goods or services to another. There is simply no doubt that there is a mutual consideration. (It is whether agreement has been reached that is commonly the subject of dispute and very many litigated cases.)

7.

8. 9. 10.

legislation dealing with how a government executes a deed. Seddon makes the point that the use of deeds is hazardous because there are so many ways in which a deed can fail. One of the puzzles of discussing consideration is the focus on one party — the promisee who is trying to enforce a promise. Of course, a contract involves both parties, each of which must have provided consideration, usually in the form of promises. The language of ‘promisor’ and ‘promisee’ has a tendency to cause confusion because each party is both. Hamson, ‘The Reform of Consideration’ (1938) 54 LQR 233; Shatwell, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law’ (1954) 1 Syd LR 289. See Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 168 (Kirby P). Kiefel, ‘The Doctrine of Consideration in Contract: Some Historical and Comparative Perspectives’ in Degeling, Edelman and Goudkamp (eds), Contract in Commercial Law (2016). Which does not necessarily involve the payment of, or the promise of, money. A barter transaction is a contract.

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Consideration

4.4

Where consideration often does become a practical problem is when the parties attempt to modify or end their contract. Contract variations are just as much contracts as the original deal itself11 and therefore the rules of agreement and consideration apply to modifications to the contractual relationship. At times the rules of consideration do not work very well to accommodate the needs of business people when they wish to make changes to their commercial arrangements, as almost inevitably they will in any long-term or complex transaction.12 As a consequence, other doctrines (such as estoppel) at times are called upon to supplement the inadequacies of consideration.13 In other common law jurisdictions, it has been suggested, or even held by a court, that the requirement of consideration for contract variations should be dispensed with.14 For a more detailed treatment of the issues relevant to contract variation, see 2.29, 4.32–4.33 and Chapter 22. 4.3  Attempts to define consideration. As a result of Eastwood v Kenyon,15 it was clear that consideration was neither a mere rule of evidence nor a synonym for moral obligation. How then was it to be defined? In the course of the nineteenth century it was frequently said that a plaintiff/promisee could establish the presence of consideration in one of two ways: either by showing that he or she had conferred a benefit upon the defendant/promisor in return for which the defendant’s promise was given; or by showing that he or she had incurred a detriment for which the defendant’s promise was to compensate.16 Usually the two go together: it is both a benefit to the promisor to be promised (say) payment of money and it is at the same time a detriment to the promisee. But the two need not go together; either is sufficient. For example, in a contract of guarantee, the consideration for the guarantor’s promise is the lender’s promise of, or the actual making of, the loan to a third-party borrower. This is not necessarily a benefit to the guarantor (though in many commercial transactions it is) but it is a detriment to the promisee lender. 4.4  Antithesis of benefit and detriment not always satisfactory. The antithesis of benefit and detriment, though reiterated in the courts, is not altogether satisfactory. Detriment is often associated with reliance theory and the essence of the doctrine of consideration is not reliance but the forward commitment to performance — the 11.

Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ). 12. See Stoljar, ‘The Doctrine of Forbearance’ (2018) 92 ALJ 195 who discusses the difference between a contract variation and altering the mode of performance, particularly extending a deadline, suggesting that the rigours of consideration should be relaxed for mode of performance variations. 13. See  2.29. 14. This possibility is discussed at length, including New Zealand and Canadian cases, in Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 at [58]–[95] by Phang Boon Leong JA who concluded that consideration is required for contract variations. Dispensing with consideration for contract variations would be difficult in Australia in the light of the High Court’s pronouncements in Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 and Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57. 15. (1840) 11 Ad & El 438; 113 ER 482. See Chapter  27 for the historical significance of this case and 27.11–27.16 for the historical development of the doctrine of consideration. 16. ‘A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other’: Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 at 162. ‘The general rule is, that an executory agreement, by which the plaintiff agrees to do something on the terms that the defendant agrees to do something else, may be enforced, if what the plaintiff has agreed to do is “either for the benefit of the defendant or to the trouble or prejudice of the plaintiff”’: Lord Blackburn in Bolton v Madden (1873) LR 9 QB 55 at 56.

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

commitment now to do something in the future. The typical modern contract is the bargain struck by the exchange of promises.17 If A orders goods from B, payment on delivery which is to take place in a month’s time, both A and B are bound from the moment of agreement, and, if the one subsequently refuses to be bound, the other may sue even though the time for performance has not arrived. Yet, at the time of agreement, no benefit has been conferred upon the defendant nor any detriment suffered by the plaintiff, unless it is assumed that the promises are binding. But the very question of whether they are binding is said to depend upon notions of benefit and detriment.18 Mutual promises alone exist, and the plaintiff, in calling upon the defendant to perform, need show no more than a willingness to implement his or her own undertaking.19 It is assumed that each promise is equally binding. Thus, the notion of mutual promises being consideration involves smoke and mirrors, but it has nevertheless stood the test of time. The concept of detriment in the sense of reliance, that is, the consequences of the defendant’s ‘default’, is increasingly being used as a basis for imposing obligations. As already noted, the source of obligations affecting contracting parties is now not solely rooted in exchange but also in reliance.20 Some would say that reliance-based obligations are not truly contractual.21 This is true in so far as the doctrine of consideration provides the basis for obligation. But, it is necessary to see commercial parties as being subject to a range of obligations, some purely contractual, others reliance-based. 4.5  Consideration the price of the promise. A different approach to the problem of consideration may be made through the language of purchase and sale. The plaintiff must show that he or she has ‘bought’ the defendant’s promise either by doing some act in return for it or by offering a counter-promise.22 Sir Frederick Pollock summarised the position in words adopted by the House of Lords in 1915: An act of forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.23

This definition of consideration as the price paid by the plaintiff for the defendant’s promise is sometimes preferable to the nineteenth-century terminology of benefit and detriment. It is easier to understand, it corresponds more happily to the normal exchange of promises and it emphasises the commercial character of contract. However, the language of benefit and detriment is sometimes useful for the purposes of analysis of a particular transaction. This is particularly so when there is some doubt about whether one of the parties has provided a consideration, such as in the existing duty cases discussed below in 4.29–4.35. 17.

Atiyah questions the assumption that this describes the typical contract in ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (1978) 94 LQR 193. 18. This logical impasse is discussed by Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981), 63–4 and Peel, Treitel, The Law of Contract (15th ed, 2020), [3-008], and an attempted solution is suggested by Coote, ‘The Essence of Contract’ (1988–9) 1 JCL 91 and 183. See also Coote, ‘Contract as Assumption and Remoteness of Damages’ (2010) 26 JCL 211 at 217, which noted Pollock’s anonymous article in (1914) 30 LQR 128, in which Pollock referred to the ‘secret paradox’ of consideration (at 129). 19. As to which see Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385. 20. Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (1978) 94 LQR 193. See also Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 discussed in Chapter 2. 21. For example, Kirby P in Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 168–70. 22. It is important to understand that the words ‘bought’ and ‘price’ are used broadly here and do not necessarily connote money or the promise of money. As noted earlier, a barter transaction is a contract. 23. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 130.

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Consideration

4.6

Consideration Must Move from the Promisee 4.6  Reciprocal exchange. The doctrine of consideration requires that only the person who has ‘paid’ the price of a promise could sue on it.24 How otherwise could the plaintiff prove his or her share in the bargain upon which the action was based? Thus, in Price v Easton,25 the defendant promised X that if X did certain work for him he would pay a sum of money to the plaintiff. X did the work, but the defendant did not pay the money to the plaintiff. The Court of Queen’s Bench held that the plaintiff could not claim from the defendant, and explained their decision in two different ways. Lord Denman said that the plaintiff could not ‘show any consideration for the promise moving from him to the defendant’. Littledale J said that ‘no privity is shown between the plaintiff and the defendant’. In Tweddle v Atkinson,26 the judges, while endorsing the decision in Price v Easton, preferred the first of these reasons: ‘It is now established,’ said Wightman J ‘that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit’. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd,27 Lord Haldane declared two principles to be ‘fundamental in the law of England’. The first was that ‘only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it’ (the privity rule); the second that ‘only a person who has given consideration may enforce a contract not under seal’ (the consideration rule).28 The rule is that consideration must move from the promisee. As such it is a rule that can cause some confusion to students of law. This is because the question whether a promise is enforceable is answered by looking, not to the promisor’s conduct,29 but to what the other person — the promisee — did in response to it. If what was done in response to the promise does not amount in law to a good consideration, then the promise is not enforceable. What does and does not amount to a good consideration is examined in 4.9–4.41. The discussion of a promise and the response to it has an air of unreality because most contracts consist of a bundle of rights and obligations. It is not necessary, when looking at a particular promise, to assign to it a particular counter-promise or act. It is sufficient that there is something in the bundle which amounts to a good consideration. This idea is captured in saying that consideration is not generally severable.30 However, when it comes to money, a court may have to examine components of the consideration and sever.31 24.

This was not always so. It used to be sufficient if someone had ‘paid’ for it, not necessarily the plaintiff. See Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 210; 85 ER 523. See also Chapter 7 on privity. 25. (1833) 4 B & Ad 433; 110 ER 518. 26. (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762. The case is also reported in 4 LT 468; 8 JurPt 1 332; 9 WR 781 and 30 LJ (NS) QB 265. It is only in the judgment of Wightman J as reported in 30 LJ (NS) QB at 267 that there is a mention of the privity principle. See the discussion by Toohey J in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 163–4. 27. [1915] AC 847 at 853; [1914–15] All ER Rep 333 at 334. 28. As to the relationship between these two rules, see 4.7–4.8. 29. If enforceability of promises depends on solemnity, the promisor’s conduct has to be examined, as is the case with the execution of a deed under seal where it must be ascertained whether the promisor has followed the legislative and common law requirements. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), chs 2 and 3. 30. See  McEwan v Dick (1985) 9 ACLR 1011 at 1022–3 (Cohen J). 31. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 (discussed in 4.26), where an amount agreed to be paid by way of a pension was found to be severable. See also Anderson v Glass (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152 discussed in 4.19.

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4.6

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

In stating the rule that consideration must move from the promisee, it should be noted that it need not move to the promisor.32 In a contract of guarantee, the consideration given in exchange for the guarantor’s promise is the lender’s promise of, or the actual making of, a loan to the third party/borrower.33 Thus consideration moves from the lender but does not move to the promisor/guarantor.34 4.7  The Trident case.35 A reappraisal of both rules — the consideration and privity rules — was undertaken by the High Court in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd.36 Most of what was said by the seven judges related to the privity rule rather than the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. But, in any case, a majority37 reasserted that both rules were too well-entrenched to be changed. It was nevertheless held that, at least in contracts of insurance under which the insurance company undertakes to indemnify third parties, a third-party insured may recover under the policy.38 Mason CJ and Wilson J in a joint judgment so held, making it clear that they were only answering a ‘limited question’ applying to a policy of insurance.39 Similarly, Toohey J formulated a rule that applied to insurance contracts only.40 Thus these three judges were prepared to formulate an exception to the privity rule. Gaudron J did not devise a direct exception to the wellestablished rules but, instead, held that, though the third-party company could not enforce the contract of insurance, it could sue in restitution because the insurance company would otherwise be unjustly enriched if it failed to pay out after having received the insurance premium.41 Thus the rule that consideration must move from the promisee is still part of Australian law. In Trident, the possibility of making the insurance company’s promise to indemnify a third party binding by the use of estoppel42 was briefly mentioned.43 It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the third party, having been informed of the policy of insurance, refrains from insuring, thus providing the necessary element of detrimental reliance. If it be objected that the insurance company has made no direct representation or promise to the third party, it would be possible to argue that the insured could act as an agent44 for the purpose of conveying the promise of indemnity to the third party, analogous to the agency device employed in New Zealand Shipping 32.

Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 392; [2005] HCA 13 at [66]; Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199. 33. If the consideration is not explicitly stated in the guarantee it may be inferred or parol evidence may be admitted to show what the true consideration is. See Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339. 34. In commercial loans the guarantor may well benefit or have a direct interest in the loan being granted, and thus it could be said that a consideration moves to the promisor. But this is not necessarily so. 35. See also 7.3. 36. (1988) 165 CLR 107; 80 ALR 574; 62 ALJR 508. See also 7.3. 37. Brennan, Dawson, Gaudron and Deane JJ. 38. Compare Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48, which was not in force at the time the cause of action arose in Trident. 39. (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123. 40. Ibid at 172. 41. Ibid at 176. 42. See  Chapter 2. 43. Trident (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 123 (Mason CJ and Wilson J): ‘We doubt that the doctrine of estoppel provides an adequate protection of the legitimate expectations of [third parties] and, even if it does, the rights of persons under a policy of insurance should not be made to depend on the vagaries of such an intricate doctrine.’ But see the very positive statement of Deane J at 145. 44. Problems may arise concerning ratification of the agency by the third party. Such was the case in Trident itself. See the discussion in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: (1987) 8 NSWLR 270 at 279–83.

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Consideration

4.8

Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon)45 and similar cases.46 Thus, although no consideration is provided by the third-party promisee, the promisor is estopped from denying liability based on the promise of indemnity. In any case, this problem has now been resolved by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48, under which a third party can enforce a contract of insurance.47 4.8  Relation of consideration to the doctrine of privity. It has long been a controversial question whether the rule that consideration must move from the promisee and the doctrine of privity of contract are fundamentally distinct or whether they are merely variations of a common theme.48 The High Court of Australia appeared to favour the retention of the dichotomy in Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd.49 An agreement had been entered into in which C agreed to grant O’Neil Construction Co Ltd the exclusive right to quarry on his land in return for royalty payments. The agreement provided ‘I [C] authorise the above company to pay all money connected with this agreement to my wife … and myself … as joint tenants …’. The agreement was signed by Mr and Mrs C and by the company but Mrs C provided no consideration.50 When C died, his executors sought the court’s direction as to whether the company should continue to pay royalties to Mrs C. The court was divided in regard to the true construction of the agreement. The majority (Taylor, Owen and McTiernan JJ) held that it constituted a contract between the O’Neill company and the husband alone and that the clause authorising payment to husband and wife jointly was merely a revocable mandate which had been revoked by the death of the husband. However, Barwick CJ and Windeyer J each held that the wife was a party to the contract and, as such, a joint promisee with her husband. They considered that, where a promise is made to persons jointly, it can be enforced by them or by the survivor of them, so long as any one of them has provided consideration.51 Both Taylor and Owen JJ expressly agreed with this view, differing only in their construction of the agreement.52 It appears then that, in Australia, if not in other common law jurisdictions, the rule that consideration must move from 45. [1975] AC 154. 46. See  3.8, 3.28, 3.40, 4.34, 7.38. 47. This possibility of using estoppel to enforce a promise to a third party can be generalised to any thirdparty beneficiary of a contractual promise, not just insurance, so long as the third party has detrimentally relied on the promise. 48. In Trident (1988) 165 CLR 107, Mason CJ and Wilson J said ‘… the weight of authority points to the existence of two distinct, albeit interrelated, principles … however, it is of little consequence whether the rules are in fact separate’ (at 115–16); ‘… the distinction is well founded’ (Brennan J at 127); ‘… the one may in many circumstances be no more than the corollary of the other’ (Dawson J at 155); ‘What authority there is in Australia favours the view that the two doctrines are separate …’ (Toohey J at 164). In Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460 at 478, Barwick CJ pointed out that ‘Questions of consideration and privity are not always kept distinct’. 49. (1967) 119 CLR 460. In Beswick v Beswick [1966] Ch 538 at 557; [1966] 3 All ER 1 at 9, Lord Denning said, ‘The general rule undoubtedly is that “no third party can sue, or be sued, on a contract to which he is not a party”; but at bottom that is only a rule of procedure’. Clearly, if that rule meant the same as the rule that consideration must move from the promisee, it would be a rule of substantive law. 50. Mrs C made no promises to the company, though she was a signatory to the document. See Coote’s objection to the High Court’s joint promisee argument: ‘Consideration and the Joint Promisee’ [1978] CLJ 301. 51. Windeyer J found support for the proposition in the ancient authority of Rookwood’s case (1589) Cro Eliz 164; 78 ER 421, while Barwick CJ relied upon general principles relating to joint tenants. 52. (1967) 119 CLR at 486: ‘If, however, the correct conclusion is that the widow was a party to the contract it is, to our minds, clear that she is entitled to receive the royalties payable after her husband’s death notwithstanding that she, personally, gave no consideration for the company’s promise’.

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4.8

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

the promisee may be modified so as to read ‘consideration must move from the promisee or from any one of joint promisees’. However, it must be emphasised that, as in Coulls’ case itself, it may be a difficult question of construction whether a person, intended to take a benefit under a contract, is a joint promisee with the person who has provided the consideration.53

What Does and Does Not Constitute a Good Consideration in Law 4.9  The rules — an overview. There are various rules that answer the question whether a particular promise provided by the promisee, or act performed by the promisee, is recognised as a good consideration. These rules are the product of history and do not constitute a rational scheme. Indeed, some of the rules defy business common sense, particularly the negative rules, that is, those that dictate that certain types of promise or act do not constitute a good consideration. There is considerable pressure on these rules to change and one long-held rule — that performing an existing duty is no consideration — has changed.54 The rules are first discussed at a general level: see 4.10–4.18. The various rules themselves are then examined: see 4.19–4.41. The law has traditionally adopted what at first sight appears to be an odd approach to the question of what amounts to a good consideration, saying, on the one hand, that something apparently quite valuable or useful may not be a good consideration (for example, agreeing to continue to perform a contract that has turned out to be far more onerous than originally expected);55 and, on the other hand, that something of no value may be a good consideration (such as a scrap of paper or a peppercorn).

Consideration must be legally sufficient 4.10  Not every act or promise amounts to a good consideration. Consideration has, as we have seen, been defined as the act or promise provided by the one party (the promisee) as the ‘price’ of the other’s promise. The question now arises whether any act and any promise, regardless of their content, will satisfy this definition. The answer to this is clearly not. Certain acts and promises, it will be seen, are deemed incapable in law of supporting an action for breach of contract by the person who has supplied them. But, while most jurists have been forced by the results of litigation to accept this conclusion, there has been a great divergence of opinion as to the test of what is, and what is not, a good consideration. There is even doubt as to whether the criterion, whatever it may be, is equally applicable to acts and to promises. That there should be no difference was asserted by

53. See  McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co Ltd [1935] AC 24 at 43 (Lord Atkin) (joint account holders held to be joint and several contracting parties). See also Cullity, ‘Joint Bank Accounts with Volunteers’ (1969) 85 LQR 530, especially at 531–4 and Coote, ‘Consideration and the Joint Promisee’ [1978] CLJ 301. See, too, New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1975] AC 154 at 180; [1974] 1 All ER 1015 at 1030 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 54. See  4.35. 55. As already noted, this rule has changed. See 4.35.

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Consideration

4.12

Holt CJ three centuries ago56 and reasserted by Leake in his book on contracts in the middle of the nineteenth century.57 On the other hand, Sir Frederick Pollock denied the possibility of a single criterion and declared that, in certain cases, a promise may, while an actual performance may not, afford a consideration to support a counterpromise.58 To confuse matters further, it seems that an act may, but a promise to do the same may not, amount to a good consideration in certain circumstances.59 Similarly, a promise may be illusory because it is discretionary, but the actual doing of the act may be consideration for a unilateral contract or possibly acceptance by conduct for the purpose of a bilateral contract.60 The law is concerned with substance and not form. Hence saying in a document that something has been provided ‘in consideration’ for something else is not necessarily determinative.61 A court may resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain what the true consideration is if it is not clear or obvious on the face of a document.62 4.11  Terminology. Historically, the words ‘adequate’ and ‘sufficient’ have been used (to the confusion of students first coming to the law of contract). These apparent synonyms are used to discriminate between those acts or promises that are regarded as a good consideration — they are ‘sufficient’ in law — from those that, as a matter of business or commercial good sense, would hardly be regarded as constituting the stuff of a bargain — they are commercially not adequate yet legally sufficient. (The paradigm consideration which is regarded as sufficient, though commercially worthless, is the peppercorn.) The courts, as a general rule, will not question the adequacy of consideration, reflecting the idea that the parties best know what they want to exchange.63 Yet the very rules of the doctrine of consideration, as already foreshadowed, deem certain acts and promises to be insufficient.

Commercially inadequate consideration is sufficient in law 4.12  Consideration need not be adequate — the peppercorn principle. It has been settled for well over 300 years that the courts will not inquire into the ‘adequacy of consideration’. By this is meant that they will not seek to measure the comparative value of the defendant’s promise and of the act or promise given by the plaintiff in exchange for it, nor will they denounce an agreement merely because it seems to be 56.

‘Where the doing a thing will be a good consideration, a promise to do that thing will be so too’: Thorp v Thorp (1701) 12 Mod Rep 455; 88 ER 1448. 57. Leake on Contracts (1st ed, 1867), 314. 58. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 144–7. 59. For example, a promise may be illusory, yet the actual doing may be a good consideration: see Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114 at 117–18 (Hood J). A promise not to seek maintenance is not a good consideration, whereas the actual forbearance to seek maintenance may be: Griffiths v Knight [1960] SR (NSW) 353 (discussed in 4.27); Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 221. Arguably, the act of forbearance in such a case is not equatable with the promise because the latter is not a good consideration only in the case where the promise is not to seek maintenance once and for all. A promise to return to cohabitation is not enforceable and yet the act of returning to cohabitation amounts to a good consideration: Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 at 198–9. 60. MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) 133 CLR 125 at 133–4 (Barwick CJ); British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd [1943] VLR 163 at 170–1. 61. McKay v National Australia Bank [1998] 1 VR 173 at 177; HCK China Investments Ltd v Solar Honest Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 680 at 721 (Hely J). 62. See  Yaroomba Beach Development Co Pty Ltd v Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398; Lilley v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 339. 63. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 at 193–4 (Kirby P) for the policy justifications for the common law’s approach. This case is discussed in 4.26.

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4.12

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unfair.64 This is the position at common law. In certain types of legislation, the courts may well inquire into the adequacy of consideration.65 This aspect of the doctrine of consideration is labelled the ‘peppercorn’ principle in that it is legally sufficient to agree, for example, to sell a valuable object or to let commercial premises in exchange for a nominal consideration, such as a peppercorn. There is a worrying uncertainty whether equity recognises the use of a nominal consideration. The significance of this is that equity may deny its remedies of specific performance or injunction66 if a transaction is construed as a gift because of the use of a nominal consideration. This is of some concern because lawyers frequently use nominal consideration to ensure that a transaction is a contract and not a gift.67 To treat the use of nominal consideration as a gift is to thwart the absolutely clear intention that is evident in the use of nominal consideration in a contract. Nevertheless, the promise must have been procured by the offer of something in return capable of expression in terms of value, however small. The law draws the line at some things which, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, it regards as ephemeral. So, a parent who makes a promise ‘in consideration of natural love and affection’68 or to induce his son to refrain from boring him with complaints,69 cannot be sued upon it, since the essential elements of a bargain are lacking.70 In Selen v Selen,71 it was held that, in circumstances involving a promise to allow parents to remain in possession of a house in exchange for the promise of a transfer of the property to a son, the promise by the son of occupation rights was not a good consideration, on the basis that the performance of the promise was impossible until transfer. This decision ignored the principle that a promise involving a future commitment is a perfectly good consideration.72 Many contracts involve promises the performance of which is impossible at the time of contract formation. There is no principle that impossibility of performance at the time of contract formation is a bar to the promise amounting to a good consideration. If there were such a principle, commerce would grind to a halt. It is common for a party to undertake to see to it that something happens.73 64.

If the consideration is inadequate, it may be a signal that the bargaining process was flawed; if that can be established, equitable principles may provide relief for the party who has been done down: see Chapters 13–15. 65. DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 (Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic)). 66. See  Chapter 24. 67. See Seddon, ‘Is a Provider of Nominal Consideration a “Volunteer”?’ (2016) 90 ALJ 81. There are conflicting views about whether equity should follow the law or whether it looks to substance over form. The problem is not overcome by using a deed: see Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [6.22]. Contrary to statements by some commentators (see, for example, Heydon, Heydon on Contract (2019), [27.80]), Seddon argued that a nominal consideration prevents a transaction from being a gift in equity’s eyes. This view was followed in Lithgow State Mine Railway Ltd v City of Greater Lithgow Mining Museum Inc (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 1468 at [56] (Darke J). 68. Bret v J S (1600) Cro Eliz 756; 78 ER 987. This the position at common law. Equity treated love and affection as good consideration. See DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 at [2]–[7] (Gleeson CJ), [35]–[49] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [103]–[124] (Kirby and Crennan JJ). See also Xiao Hui Ying v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 124 (whether a consideration of love and affection excludes the presumption of advancement). 69. White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ (Ex) 36. Compare Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114, where a promise by a divorced wife to ‘conduct herself with sobriety, and in a respectable, orderly and virtuous manner’ was held to be good consideration. 70. Cases of this kind may alternatively be explained in terms of the parties not intending to enter into contractual relations. See Chapter 5. 71. (2013) 49 Fam LR 164; [2013] FamCAFC 39. 72. See  Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162 at 182 (McHugh JA). 73. An example is Kelly v Mina [2014] NSWCA 9, where an undertaking that was literally impossible to fulfil was interpreted as an undertaking to cause the necessary conditions to be satisfied. See in particular Leeming JA at [107].

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So long as there is some sort of exchange, the courts will not balance the one side against the other. The parties are presumed to be capable of appreciating their own interests and of striking their own bargain.74 In 1587 it was said that, ‘when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action’,75 and this rejection of a quantitative test has been constantly reiterated.76 It is an axiomatic feature of the common law of contract that the parties are free to make their own bargain without interference from outside.77 Not surprisingly, the peppercorn rule has an important exception. The court will not make the attempt to match money against goods or services but it will not allow one sum of money to be consideration for a different sum of money.78 In relation to the special case of discharging a debt, a payment of $90 for a debt of $100, with the full consent of the creditor, is not a good consideration whereas a payment of $90 plus a peppercorn is. This rule will be examined in more detail below: see 4.36–4.41. 4.13  Distinction between gift and sale not always obvious. The refusal of the courts to discuss the adequacy of consideration may make it difficult, on occasion, to distinguish a gift and a sale. Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd79 illustrates the difficulty. The plaintiff was promised, as part of a promotional campaign, a record in exchange for chocolate wrappers from the defendant’s products. The argument that chocolate wrappers were part of the consideration for a record was as plausible as the view that they were merely a qualification, in the same way as getting influenza was a condition or qualification rather than a consideration in Carlill’s case.80 Nevertheless, it was held that the wrappers were a good consideration. If A promises B to give him his new Tesla for nothing, there is obviously no consideration and no contract. If A promises B to give him his new Tesla if B will fetch it from the garage, there is still no consideration and no contract. The requirement that B is to fetch the car is not the price of the promise, but the condition precedent to the operation of A’s generosity. The transaction is not a sale, but a conditional gift.81 But, if A promises B to give him his new Tesla if B will give him 10c, there is consideration and there is a contract. Such a conclusion has inspired the comment This aspect of contract law is embedded in laissez-faire economic theory: see 28.4. Sturlyn v Albany (1587) Cro Eliz 67; 78 ER 327 at 328. LSKF Holdings Pty Ltd v Shield Lifestone Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 129 at [30] (Leeming JA); Hancock v Wilson [1956] St R Qd 266 (grant of easement for one shilling); Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851; 114 ER 330 (occupation fee of £1 a year). Another illustration is afforded by the case of Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestlé Co Ltd [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701 (used chocolate wrappers were consideration). Compare Wyatt v Ball [1955] St R Qd 515, where it was assumed that a request for the alteration of a name and telephone number in an advertisement, if acted upon, would be good consideration. See also Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 at 193–4 (Kirby P). 77. As already mentioned, this assumes no fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionable dealing and so forth. This principle has also been substantially changed by legislation in relation to certain contracts, for example, various types of consumer purchases, divestment of property before insolvency and contracts designed to avoid taxation. 78. See  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189. 79. [1960] AC 87; [1959] 2 All ER 701. 80. See  3.28. Lord Reid in Chappell argued that the acquisition of the wrappers was a consideration because they had to be acquired for each sale and because they constituted ‘something of value to the seller’ [1960] AC 87 at 109. The fact that the condition must be satisfied for each sale is not decisive (compare Carlill), and saying that they are ‘something of value’ adds nothing when the law does not question the adequacy of the consideration. 81. For cases where the judges experienced great difficulty in deciding whether they had to deal with a contract or a conditional gift, see Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, in which M offered land to 74. 75. 76.

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that the doctrine of consideration corresponds as little with reality and is as much a formality as the rule that a gratuitous promise becomes binding by the mere affixing of a seal.82 This may be so, but the doctrine of consideration has never been vaunted as a logical system and it has operated tolerably well for a very long time. 4.14  Manufactured consideration. From time to time the courts are prepared to go to some lengths to find a contract when there would not seem to be one. In doing so, a consideration must be found. An example is Cottee v Franklins SelfServe Pty Ltd,83 in which the Queensland Court of Appeal had to consider whether there is a contract of bailment between a supermarket and the user of a shopping trolley. It was held that there was, but the basis for this finding was not very clear. McPherson JA84 held that there was a unilateral contract whereby the supermarket offers a trolley that is fit for purpose and the customer accepts this offer by using the trolley for browsing the supermarket’s wares, such consideration being a detriment to the customer,85 whether or not the customer makes a purchase. On the other hand, Macrossan CJ said that the customer provides the consideration only when the customer pays for goods purchased. This solution has the curious effect that, if an accident occurs because of a defective trolley before check-out, the supermarket is under no contractual liability; whereas if it occurs on the way to the car park (as occurred in this case), the supermarket is under a contractual duty.86 There is some controversy as to whether a customer on premises who may or may not pay for whatever is being offered by the proprietor but who has not paid specifically to be on the premises provides consideration by simply being there.87 Another example of striving to find a consideration is De La Bere v Pearson,88 in which the defendants advertised in their newspaper that their city editor would answer inquiries from readers requesting financial advice. The plaintiff wrote asking for the name of a good stockbroker. The editor found a stockbroker who was in fact not a member of the stock exchange and who was an undischarged bankrupt. The plaintiff sent money to the stockbroker who misappropriated it. The plaintiff successfully sued the defendants on the basis that they were contractually bound to take reasonable care in providing advice or nominating a stockbroker. The consideration provided by the plaintiff was not apparently in issue, though it is by no means easy to see what consideration there was. The plaintiff paid for the copy of the paper, but did he pay for the recommendation? The mere act of sending in an inquiry can hardly be described as the price for the editor’s reply, though it could be said that it was a benefit to the editor to receive inquiries even though it was no detriment to the plaintiff

82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

Mr and Mrs B if they would come and work it (majority held contract); and Wyatt v Kreglinger & Fernau [1933] 1 KB 793; [1933] All ER Rep 349. ‘Ultimately the question of consideration is a formality as is the use of a seal or the agreement to give a peppercorn’: Hobhouse J in Vantage Navigation Corp v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 138 at 147. See also Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 273. A deed is not in fact a substitute for consideration if the remedy sought is equitable. This is because equity will not assist a volunteer. See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [6.22]. [1997] 1 Qd R 469. Ibid at 479. It was not considered that it was a benefit to the supermarket to have a customer browsing. The third judge, Moynihan JA, in a short judgment agreed with the other two judges that there was a breach of an implied term that the trolley should be reasonably fit for purpose. Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; 137 NTR 1; [2000] NTCA 15 (customer in pub provides consideration). Compare Calvert v Stollznow (1982) 1 NSWLR 175 at 177–8 (Samuels JA, Moffit P and Hope JA concurring) (restaurant patron does not provide consideration). [1908] 1 KB 280.

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to send one in.89 It could be argued that the plaintiff, in paying for the newspaper, also paid for the investment advice service, which was well known to him. None of these questions was canvassed by the English Court of Appeal. While, therefore, it is possible to support the decision on the ground of contract, it is not surprising that Sir Frederick Pollock should have suggested that the cause of action might be better regarded ‘as arising from default in the performance of a voluntary undertaking independent of contract’.90 The question, in other words, should be approached as a problem in tort, and, viewed from this angle, it would turn on the scope of the duty of care. To discuss this duty in any detail is outside the scope of this book; but in view of the developments in the law of negligence in connection with statements causing economic loss91 it is at least possible that, if the facts of De La Bere v Pearson were to recur, the plaintiff might succeed in an action for negligence. Another case that has puzzled contract lawyers is Gore v Van der Lann,92 in which it was held that there was a contract between the Liverpool Corporation and the plaintiff, an old-age pensioner, who was issued with a free travel pass.93 The plaintiff, ‘in consideration of my being granted a free pass’, undertook to abide by certain conditions, one of which purported to exclude liability for loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff arising out of the use of the corporation’s vehicles. She was injured while boarding a corporation bus. Although the language used in the application for the pass was couched in terms of a gratuitous revocable licence on conditions, it was held that there was a contract. The plaintiff had agreed to abide by the conditions. The fact that, in this case, the critical condition which purported to protect the corporation was void under s 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 (UK) did not seem to detract from the consideration provided by the plaintiff. The other conditions were sufficient.94 The case again raises the vexed question: what is the difference between a gift on condition and a contract?95 If the condition or conditions are sufficiently onerous, are they then regarded as the price for the promise? Certainly, in Gore v Van der Lann the conditions were not onerous, given that the only one that was a disadvantage to the plaintiff was not binding on her.96 4.15  Gifts to charitable institutions.97 Similar issues to those discussed above are raised when someone promises a gift of money to a charitable institution. If a deed under seal is not used, the question may arise whether such a promise is binding. The problem is particularly acute when the institution, in reliance on the gift, has made commitments, for example, entering into building contracts. It has been stated 89. Ibid at 287. 90. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 137. 91. See  11.87–11.91. 92. [1967] 2 QB 31. 93. Other free pass cases in which no contract was found are Cosgrove v Horsfall (1946) 62 TLR 140 and Wilkie v LPTB [1947] 1 All ER 258. 94. As noted in 4.6, there is usually no call for severing the consideration. 95. See  4.13. 96. If the condition requires the expenditure of money by the promisee, there is more likely to be a consideration. See, for example, Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211 (promise to transfer house if transferee paid outstanding mortgage instalments). 97. This treatment focuses on a limited issue within a complex area of the law which includes trusts and taxation law. See Dal Pont, Law of Charity (2nd ed, 2017). For example, the argument that a contract exists may thwart the tax law that allows deductions for charitable gifts.

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that mere reliance is not enough,98 though it should be possible in Australia to argue for the enforceability of such a promise on the basis of promissory estoppel in an appropriate case.99 If conditions are attached to the gift, does this convert it into a contract? For example, if the donor specifies that the money must be used for a certain purpose or that a plaque must be erected acknowledging the donor’s contribution, is a contract thereby created? Although the cases on this problem are sparse, there is sufficient authority to support the proposition that a return promise (that the money will be used for certain purposes) would be sufficient to create a contract.100 It seems that acts performed at the promisor’s request would also suffice to create a unilateral contract.101 Whether a consideration is provided if other subscribers promise money because of the promisor’s subscription is doubtful.102

Illusory consideration 4.16  The meaning of ‘illusory consideration’. The expression ‘illusory consideration’ is self-contradictory but serves a useful purpose in describing those cases where a supposed consideration fails. Some of the rules under which contract is denied, to be discussed in this chapter or in other chapters, could broadly embrace the concept of illusory consideration. Cases where the agreement is uncertain,103 or where there is a promise to do either the same or less than an existing obligation,104 or where the promise is made in honour only without attracting legal consequences,105 or where the promise is to do something illegal,106 could all be described as illusory. Here the word is used to describe two classes of cases that are not explained by any of the other rules discussed here and in other chapters: ‘promises’ that appear to be discretionary and ‘promises’ that lack content. 4.17  Discretionary ‘promises’. What appears to be a promise may, on closer examination, amount to an optional or discretionary ‘promise’: Whenever words which by themselves constitute a promise were accompanied by words which shewed that the promisor was to have a discretion or option as to whether he would carry out that which purported to be the promise, the result was that there was no contract on which an action could be brought at all.107

An example would be an exemption clause that removed all liability for breach of the supposed promise. The very essence of an executory contract is missing if a person is in fact not bound either to perform the promise or to pay damages in lieu.

98. See  Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 (where many of the relevant cases are discussed). 99. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 discussed in 2.7. 100. Governors of Dalhousie College v Boutilier [1934] 3 DLR 593 at 597; The National Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v O’Hea (1904) 29 VLR 814 at 821–2. 101. Re Soames (1897) 13 TLR 439 (S promised to leave money for the maintenance or advancement of a school. Held that acts done in reliance on this promise were sufficient to make it binding). 102. Governors of Dalhousie [1934] 3 DLR 593 at 595. See 3.8 on multi-party contracts. 103. See  Chapter 6. 104. See  4.29–4.41. 105. See  Chapter 5. 106. See  Chapter 18. A promise to do something illegal is not a good consideration: Aravco Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 419 at 427 (Sheller JA, Powell JA concurring). 107. Vaughan Williams LJ in Loftus v Roberts (1902) 18 TLR 532 at 534 adopted by Kitto J in Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 at 356.

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Consideration

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An exemption clause that ‘covers the field’ will be rare but in three Australian cases such clauses have been found. In British Empire Films Pty Ltd v Oxford Theatres Pty Ltd,108 clause 9 of an agreement to supply films to be exhibited stated that ‘under no circumstances shall the distributor be in any way liable for failure to supply to the exhibitor any of the films contemplated by the agreement’. The clause was held to have rendered illusory the executory promise to provide films. Similarly, Barwick CJ in MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA)109 held that there was in effect no promise by the airline to carry passengers. The ‘exemption of the ticket in this case fully occupies the whole area of possible obligation, leaving no room for the existence of a contract of carriage’.110 In Gippsreal Ltd v Registrar of Titles & Kurek Investments Pty Ltd,111 a lender (Gippsreal) used a standard form document for its lending arrangements. The document contained many obligations imposed on the proposed borrower, including that it must pay for preliminary costs and disbursements incurred by Gippsreal for setting up the loan and that Gippsreal had a charge over the land that was to secure the loan. Kurek, the borrower, signed this document. The document included a clause that stated that Gippsreal was not in any way obliged to provide a loan and that no contractual relationship came into existence until the loan was actually made. Gippsreal incurred preliminary costs and disbursements but then Kurek decided not to go ahead with the transaction. Gippsreal sued for the costs. The court upheld the trial judge’s finding that there was no contract. This was because Gippsreal had not undertaken to do anything. The consideration was said to be illusory.112 An English case, Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane,113 held that the voluminous terms (49 pages) of an internet site agreement included at least three terms that meant that the site provider promised nothing. There was therefore no contract governing the relationship. These cases show the danger of going too far in attempting to provide protection. For this reason, in such cases the plaintiff will be in the ironical position of arguing that its exemption clause has left some area of operation (however small), or else run the risk that there is no contract and therefore no remedy. The courts will lean against construing an exemption clause as so wide as to cancel all promises given by the person relying on the clause. This approach is consistent with the view that exemption clauses should be construed strictly so as to minimise the area of exemption. Such an approach is shown in Barnett v Ira L & A C Berk Pty Ltd,114 where Owen J115 said that, where the parties evidently intend to contract, the court should be slow to construe an exemption clause so as to defeat 108. [1943] VLR 163. 109. (1975) 133 CLR 125. 110. Ibid at 133. 111. (2007) 20 VR 157; [2007] VSCA 279. 112. Compare Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160 (in exchange for loan application fee, loan facilitator agreed to exercise best endeavours to find a suitable loan facility; held there was a good consideration). 113. [2012] EWHC 1290 (Comm). 114. (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 268. 115. Ibid at 275 (Street CJ and Herron J concurring).

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that intention. It is perhaps significant that in both MacRobertson Miller and British Empire Films, the judges were able to find a consideration by one means or another. In the first case, Barwick CJ found that there was a unilateral offer by a passenger that was accepted once the airline had completed its task of carrying the passenger.116 In the second case, the distribution company’s promise not to supply films to theatres that engaged in price-cutting was held to be a sufficient consideration.117 Alternatively, a contract was created when films were actually supplied.118 A similar attempt in Gippsreal — it was argued that the borrower invited a unilateral contract by giving the go-ahead for the lender to undertake the preliminary work — was not successful. When a promise is made with the rider ‘if I feel like it’ or some such similar qualification, there is clearly no promise at all. On the other hand, the position is not so clear if the rider is ‘when I can’ or ‘when I am in a financial position to do so’. The courts have been extraordinarily generous in upholding promises of the latter type. Such promises are vulnerable to attack either on the ground of uncertainty or as being illusory. In Head v Kelk,119 a promise by someone to repay a loan ‘when he was financially able to do so’ was upheld as valid, as was an agreement in which the promisor undertook to do his best to pay weekly maintenance for an illegitimate child in Egel v Drogemuller.120 In Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,121 a contract of loan, in which a husband borrower promised his wife that he would repay with interest when he was in a position to do so, was not challenged on the ground that the promise by the husband was illusory. Other similar cases are collected and discussed by Herron J in Head v Kelk.122 Similarly, ‘best endeavours’ clauses are not challenged as being either uncertain or illusory.123 By contrast, in Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd124 Sholl J was not prepared to give contractual force to a loan agreement in which the company would repay when it considered it was in a position to do so. ‘Either it is illusory, or it is not sufficiently certain to be enforceable.’125 This case may have involved a truly discretionary promise because the company could determine when it was in a position to repay whilst in cases like Casey the ability to repay could be determined more objectively. This may explain the difference between Bailes and the other cases, though Sholl J preferred to base his decision on uncertainty rather than on the argument that the

116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

124. 125.

(1975) 133 CLR 125 at 133–4. [1943] VLR 163 at 169. Ibid at 170–1. (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340; [1962] NSWR 1363. See also Universal Greening Pty Ltd v Sabine [1997] FCA 529; Heys v Gold Ribbon Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2000] TASSC 17. [1936] SASR 407. See also Rademacher v Kassab [2005] SASC 43 (agreement under which a loan would be repaid when the borrower was able to do so). [1959] NZLR 1052. [1962] NSWR 1363 at 1371; (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 340 at 344–5. See also Sholl J in Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd [1964] VR 436 at 440–1; GoConnect Ltd v Sino Strategic International Ltd (in liq) [2016] VSCA 315 at [47]–[55]. Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; 306 ALR 25; [2014] HCA 7; Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83; 30 ALR 201; [1980] HCA 15; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417; [1984] HCA 64; Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan [2012] VSCA113; Memery v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd [2012] QCA 160. Best endeavours means reasonable endeavours in the circumstances: Hospital Products. See 6.7. [1964] VR 436. Followed in Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 225 FLR 1; [2008] WASC 239 at [1888] (Owen J). See also Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353 discussed in 5.28; Argyll Park Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd v Glen Pacific Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 1. [1964] VR 436 at 441.

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promise was illusory.126 In Re Theodorou,127 it was held that a standard term that gave a bank the right unilaterally to vary the conditions of the contract did not render the consideration illusory because there were special terms that did have promissory content and these overrode the standard term. As long as there is some vestige of an objectively ascertainable obligation that can be broken by the promisor, then the promise probably amounts to a good consideration.128 In Meehan v Jones,129 it was held that a purchaser was entitled to the protection of a finance clause that allowed him to determine whether or not available finance was ‘satisfactory’. It was argued that this clause effectively rendered the purchaser’s performance voluntary. It was held that the purchaser was obliged to exercise a bona fide choice about satisfactory finance and thus did not have an unfettered discretion. A vestige of an obligation was there. A case mentioned in this context is Ledingham v Bermejo Estancia Co Ltd.130 A lent money to a company which was in financial difficulties. Later, in order to induce the company to continue trading, A promised that interest due on the loans would be waived ‘until such time as the company is in a position to pay the interest’. It was held that the later agreement was a valid contract. The case is sometimes cited as supporting the view that a seemingly discretionary promise amounts to a good consideration. But the exchange in this case was that the creditor agreed to suspend or waive interest due on the original agreement for a period in consideration for the company’s keeping on trading. The discretionary element in this case went to the question of the period of suspension or waiver. The consideration provided by the company was continuing to trade at A’s request. 4.18  Promises lacking content. It has already been noted that a promise made in consideration of natural love and affection was treated, at least at common law, as being unsupported by consideration.131 On the other hand, a promise to make an offer is well recognised.132 The dividing line between promises that the law treats as lacking content and those that are a good consideration, though worthless in economic terms, is sometimes hard to discern. The point is illustrated by Dunton v Dunton,133 in which a divorced wife’s promise to ‘conduct herself with sobriety, and in a respectable, orderly and virtuous manner’ was held to be a good consideration 126. In Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130, an employment contract promising an ‘option to participate in the Company’s senior staff equity sharing scheme’, such scheme not having been established by the company, was found to be either illusory or too uncertain. A similar case is Pepe v Platypus Asset Management Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 603. See also Ellington v Heinrich Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 475 (schedule for insurance policies left blank — obligation to insure illusory). Contrast Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 (‘5% equity’ unascertained but majority considered that it was sufficiently ascertainable); Dayeian v Davidson (2010) 76 NSWLR 512; [2010] NSWCA 42 at [60] (Campbell JA, Basten and Macfarlan JJA concurring) (contract entitling someone to occupy land ‘for as long as you live or wish to stay’ sufficiently certain so long as other requirements for a contract are met). 127. [1993] 1 Qd R 588. 128. In O’Sullivan Partners (Advisory) Pty Ltd v Foggo [2012] NSWCA 40, the New South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider a promise to provide a discretionary bonus. No issue arose as to whether the promise was illusory. It was held that failure to pay was a breach of contract. 129. (1982) 149 CLR 571. See 6.6. See also Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 (‘5% equity’ unascertained but majority considered that it was sufficiently ascertainable). 130. [1947] 1 All ER 749. 131. See  4.12. 132. See the discussion of a right of pre-emption at 3.67. See also Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; 333 ALR 384; [2016] HCA 26 at [60]–[63] (Gageler J). 133. (1892) 18 VLR 114.

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for a promise of maintenance. The majority134 of the Supreme Court of Victoria contemplated (it seems with some prurience) what Mrs Dunton might have been free to do had she not made the promise. The minority judge, Hood J, thought that this was an illusory promise, citing White v Bluett,135 where a promise by a son not to bore his father was found to be illusory. A special class of case, illustrated by Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G,136 holds that governments cannot fetter their ability to govern. In Rothmans, the government undertaking not to legislate was held to be illusory.137 The cases under this heading are necessarily heterogeneous and may, in the final analysis, be said to be no more than examples of situations in which common sense dictates that the supposed promises are without content. Perhaps, in order to test a particular promise’s content, the question may be asked: could either specific performance be ordered or damages assessed for its breach?138 But this test is by no means complete and the courts may be influenced by other factors, particularly whether or not the promise was apparently contractual in intention. For example, in Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd,139 it was held that a clause in an agreement that imposed an obligation to mediate or conciliate was enforceable in principle, so long as the conduct required of the parties for participation in the process was sufficiently certain. It is common for parties to ‘dress up’ their agreement to make it look like a contract by using the language of consideration. But if what is stated to be a consideration turns out to have no content, then there will be no legal consideration. This is illustrated by McKay v National Australia Bank Ltd,140 where borrowers were asked to provide a fresh and more extensive guarantee in consideration for the bank ‘providing banking accommodation’ and for ‘forbearing to enforce immediate payment’ of the debt. In fact, no new financial accommodation was provided — the borrowers just continued to have the existing loan — and no demand had been made for repayment of the money. The Court of Appeal held that the fresh guarantee was not enforceable for want of consideration.141 It is clear from Dunton that refraining from doing what one is authorised to do, at the request of the promisor, is a good consideration. In Jamieson v Renwick,142 promises not to reside in a certain place, not to claim or attempt to claim any interest in the defendant’s land and not to visit the defendant were all upheld as being valid consideration.143 On the other hand, a promise not to annoy or interfere with the 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

Higinbotham CJ and Williams J. (1853) 23 LJ (NS) Ex 36. [1991] 2 NZLR 323. See further Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), ch 5. The majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Kirby P and McHugh JA) in Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 found that a promise to provide an ‘option to participate in the company’s senior staff equity sharing scheme’, when such scheme was non-existent, was illusory because, among other things, it could not be valued. (1992) 28 NSWLR 194. But compare Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 709. See 6.16. [1998] 1 VR 173. The borrowers made some payments to reduce the debt and then argued, having discovered that the guarantee was unenforceable, that the payments were involuntary payments. This argument was not successful: McKay v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] 4 VR 677. (1891) 17 VLR 124. Ibid at 126–7.

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defendant was not because, it was said, a promise not to do an unlawful act is not a good consideration.144 Clearly, where the unlawful act is a threat to the promisor, a promise not to do it in exchange for a benefit is blackmail. A promise to refrain from unlawful conduct that would not adversely affect the promisor probably does not constitute good consideration because such a promise amounts to an undertaking to perform an existing duty, namely, not to break the law. Thus, although promising to give up smoking would be a good consideration,145 promising to give up smoking cannabis would not, though, on any other test of consideration, promising to give up smoking cannabis may well be a benefit to the other party (for example, a father promising payment to a son for refraining from smoking cannabis). Illegality as such is not involved so that it could not be said to be an illegal contract. If, as is argued below,146 performing an existing duty should in appropriate circumstances be a good consideration, there is no reason why promising to give up smoking cannabis should not be a good consideration. We now turn to specific rules which determine what does and does not amount to a good consideration.

Past consideration 4.19  A past consideration is no consideration. In order to understand fully what this rule means, it is necessary to clarify terminology that is used in the law of contract. The accepted classification of consideration is into the two categories, executory and executed. The classification reflects the two different ways in which the plaintiff may ‘buy’ the defendant’s promise. Consideration is called executory when the defendant’s promise is made in return for a counter-promise from the plaintiff (bilateral contract) and executed when it is made in return for the performance of an act (unilateral contract).147 It is, respectively, the counter-promise or the act that constitute the consideration for the defendant’s promise and without which the defendant would not be bound. An agreement for the sale of goods for future delivery, payment on delivery, is an example of the former. At the time when the agreement is made, nothing has yet been done to fulfil the mutual promises of the bargain. The whole performance remains in the future, yet the parties are bound from the moment of agreement. Of the latter (unilateral contract) the best example is the offer of a reward for an act. If A offers $50 to anyone who returns a lost dog, the return of the dog by B in response to the reward offer is at once the acceptance of the offer and the performance of the act constituting the required consideration. B has earned the reward by returning the dog, and only the offeror’s promise remains outstanding. The consideration provided by B is called an executed consideration. But whether the plaintiff relies upon an executory or on an executed consideration, it must be shown that the promise or act, together with the defendant’s promise, constitute one single transaction.148 The rule that a past consideration is no consideration is linked to the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. 144. Ibid at 127. 145. Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256. 146. See  4.35. 147. See  3.28 for further discussion of unilateral contract. 148. In Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65, it was argued that a son-in-law undertook to his mother-in-law to bury his deceased wife in a burial plot in exchange for the mother-in-law transferring the licence to the plot to the son-in-law so that he could eventually be buried with his wife. The court could not construe

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This latter maxim embodies the idea of a contemporaneous and mutual exchange. A promisee who has already provided something (that is, before he or she became a promisee) does not satisfy this rule. If the defendant makes a promise, subsequent to, and independent of, a transaction, or promises to reward someone for a past kind deed, it is regarded as a mere expression of gratitude for past favours or as a gift, and no contract will arise. In such a case the promise is declared, in traditional language, to be made upon a past consideration or, more accurately, to be made without consideration at all. Two cases illustrate what is a past consideration. In Anderson v Glass,149 G promised to give his overseer increased wages, not only for the future but for a past period during which the wages had been at a lower rate. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the promise to pay increased wages for the past period, being based upon a past consideration, did not constitute a binding contract. In Roscorla v Thomas,150 the plaintiff had bought a horse from the defendant. After the sale, the defendant promised the plaintiff in consideration of the sale that the horse was ‘sound and free from vice’. The plaintiff sued for breach of this promise. The court held (1) that the sale did not itself imply a warranty that the horse was sound and free from vice; and (2) that the express promise was made after the sale was over and was unsupported by fresh consideration. The plaintiff could show nothing but a past consideration and could not therefore enforce the promise about the horse’s supposed good qualities. This principle is of some importance in modern commercial life. For example, it is essential in ticket cases that displayed terms are visible before the contract is made151 and that agreement to terms and conditions on the internet is secured before the goods or services are ordered.152 4.20  Services performed at defendant’s request. The distinction between executed and past consideration, while comparatively easy to state in the abstract, is sometimes difficult to apply in practice. Both the distinction and the difficulty were appreciated by the judges before the close of the sixteenth century. They were required to consider the position where the plaintiff had performed services for the defendant without any agreement for remuneration and the defendant had subsequently promised to pay for them. They decided that assumpsit would lie if, but only if, the services were originally performed at the defendant’s request.153 The law was settled in this sense in 1615 in the case of Lampleigh v Brathwait.154 Thomas Brathwait had killed Patrick Mahume and had then asked Anthony the conversations as contractual promises; rather, they were sequential gift promises. In addition, there was no intention to create legal relations. However, an estoppel operated: see 2.15. 149. (1865) 5 WW & A’B (L) 152. See also Magripilis v Baird [1924] St R Qd 303; Ahern v Power [1953] QWN 22; Re Gem Meat Production Pty Ltd (in liq); Ex parte Lindquist [1960] WAR 105; Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669; [1951] 1 All ER 905. 150. (1842) 3 QB 234; 114 ER 496. See Hercules Motors Pty Ltd v Schubert (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 301; Re Sander (1934) 7 ABC 129 (possible promise by father to repay money advanced by third party to daughter. Held: not enforceable as only supported by a past consideration). 151. See  3.21, 10.71. Specht v Netscape (2002) 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir). See also 3.7. 152. See  153. See  Hunt v Bate (1568) 3 Dyer 272a; 73 ER 605 and Sidenham and Worlington’s Case (1585) 2 Leon 324; 74 ER 497. 154. (1615) Hob 105; 80 ER 255. For a full discussion of the authorities, see Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186.

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Lampleigh to do all he could to get a pardon for him from the King. Lampleigh exerted himself to this end, ‘riding and journeying to and from London and Newmarket’ at his own expense, and Brathwait afterwards promised him £100 for his trouble. He failed to pay it and Lampleigh sued in assumpsit. It was argued that the consideration was past, but the court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that his services had been procured by the previous request of the defendant. The previous request and the subsequent promise were thus to be treated as part of the same, somewhat attenuated, transaction. This ruling is of great practical importance because of the way people commonly conduct business. It is a common practice, for example, to ring someone up and ask them to provide a service or deliver goods. Nothing is said about payment. But it is obvious that the person will charge for the services or goods. A subsequent undertaking to pay is referable back to the original telephone conversation and fills in a gap in that conversation, namely, the fact that nothing was expressly said about price. It cannot then be said that, because a vital element is missing, the bargain is incomplete.155 4.21  Distinction between past and executed consideration obscured. This view of executed consideration was applied at the end of the seventeenth century to cases where the defendant promised to pay a debt which, though it had once existed in fact, was not enforceable at the time of the promise, owing to some technical rule of law. Thus, in Ball v Hesketh,156 the defendant, when a minor, had borrowed money from the plaintiff and, after coming of age, had promised to repay it. In accordance with the general immunity conferred by the law upon minors, he could not have been made liable on the original loan. But it was held that his subsequent promise entitled the plaintiff to sue him in assumpsit. So, too, in Hyleing v Hastings157 it was held that a debt, the recovery of which was barred by the statute of limitations, was revived by a subsequent promise of payment. At the same time, the courts held that a plaintiff who sued on a negotiable instrument need only show that value had once been given for it by some previous holder and was absolved from the necessity of proving fresh consideration. All these developments threatened to obliterate the distinction between executed and past consideration and to sustain the validity of what appeared to be a gratuitous promise. 4.22  Settlement of question in nineteenth century. When, in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of consideration was settled, it became necessary to delimit afresh the boundaries of past and executed consideration. This was achieved by accepting the test of Lampleigh v Brathwait that the plaintiff’s services must have been rendered at the defendant’s request, but emphasising the further fact that both parties must have assumed throughout their negotiations that the services were ultimately to be paid for.158 They must have been performed in the way of business, not merely for friendship. This ‘revised version’ was adopted by the court in Re Casey’s Patents; 155. See  6.8 for discussion of incompleteness. 156. (1697) Comb 381; 90 ER 541. 157. (1699) 1 Ld Raym 389; 91 ER 1157. See also Sutton, ‘Existing Debt as Consideration’ (1957) 7 Res Judicatae 383 and Stoljar, ‘Consideration of Request’ (1966) 5 MULR 314. 158. This further fact, though it was not expressed by the court in Lampleigh v Brathwait, seems, on the whole, to be implicit in the language of the judgment.

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Stewart v Casey.159 A and B, the joint owners of certain patent rights, wrote to C as follows: ‘In consideration of your services as the practical manager in working our patents, we hereby agree to give you one-third share of the patents’. In an action that turned upon the effect of this agreement it was argued for A and B that their promise was made only in return for C’s past services as manager and that there was therefore no consideration to support it. Bowen LJ refused to accept this argument, and said: [T]he fact of a past service raises an implication that at the time it was rendered it was to be paid for, and, if it was a service which was to be paid for, when you get in the subsequent document a promise to pay, that promise may be treated either as an admission which evidences or as a positive bargain which fixes the amount of that reasonable remuneration on the faith of which the service was originally rendered. So that here for past services there is ample justification for the promise to give the third share.160

On this reasoning the fact that the promise was subsequent to the performance of the services was irrelevant. The original request was accompanied by a tacit understanding of recompense, and even if no express promise had ensued, the plaintiff might still have recovered reasonable remuneration on a quantum meruit. One view is that the express promise merely relieved the courts of the necessity of valuing the service. Another is that the abandonment of the claim to a quantum meruit is good consideration for the promise to pay a definite sum. But, either way, the promisee is entitled to be paid what he or she has been promised. The courts will in commercial transactions lean in favour of applying the principle in Re Casey’s Patents, or something analogous to it, rather than finding that there is only a past consideration.161 Even though the timing of arrangements between the parties may not follow the order that theoretical purity would dictate, the courts will treat the total transaction as one that is enforceable.162 Thus, in Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd,163 a guarantee was given in respect of money that had already been agreed to be loaned and part of which had already been loaned, but the bulk of which had yet to be advanced by the creditor. The trial judge, Yeldham J, had found that there was merely a past consideration in this arrangement but found an alternative consideration in (it would seem) a promise to perform an existing duty to a third party. The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the consideration was not past and that the guarantee applied to the whole amount.164 The reasoning of McHugh JA was not altogether clear but relied on the subsequent advances as being a good consideration rather than on the notion of implied request inherent in the Re Casey’s Patents principle (which was not specifically mentioned).

159. [1892] 1 Ch 104. See also Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677; 143 ER 268; Bush v Burns (1873) 12 SCR (NSW) 186; Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052. 160. [1892] 1 Ch 104 at 115–16. 161. Ipex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239 at [23] (Callaway JA), [51] (Eames AJA); Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd v Robertson [2005] VSC 347 at [122]–[125] (Dodds-Streeton J) upheld on appeal: [2007] VSCA 29. Coghlan v SH Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 (Privy Council); Forbes Engineering (Asia) PTE 162. See  Ltd v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675 at [173] (Collier J). 163. (1987) 10 NSWLR 311. 164. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Coghlan v S H Lock (Aust) Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 88 particularly at 94.

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An application and extension of the principle in Re Casey’s Patents can be found in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long.165 In that case, purchasers of publicly listed shares undertook to the vendor company not to sell 60 per cent of the shares for a year. In a subsequent agreement, the principal owners of the vendor company promised the purchasers that they would indemnify them against any loss that they might suffer when they sold the shares after the year had elapsed. On the face of it, this second agreement seemed to be one-sided — a mere promise of indemnity. The Privy Council held that there was consideration for the promise of indemnity, namely, the earlier promise by the purchasers not to sell for a year. The purchasers expected some quid pro quo for this promise. The subsequent agreement provided it.166 The case is an extension of Re Casey’s Patents because it applied the principle to a subsequent promise of some benefit other than the mere payment of a sum of money. 4.23  Exceptions to rule that past consideration is insufficient. True exceptions to the past consideration rule have already been noted: the promise by an adult to pay a debt incurred during minority; the acknowledgement of a debt barred by the statute of limitations; and the liability to pay on a negotiable instrument. The position in relation to promises to pay debts incurred during minority is complicated; it is dealt with in Chapter 17.167 In relation to the second class, at common law the courts developed the rule that an acknowledgement of a statute-barred debt, either by words or by making a payment, imported a promise to pay which revived the debt.168 But did the plaintiff sue on the original debt or on the new promise? If the latter, then this seemed to represent an exception to the past consideration rule because there appeared to be nothing given in exchange for the later promise except the past liability. Now the position is governed by statute.169 The third class of case, where the defendant is sued on a negotiable instrument, survives as a genuine exception to the ban upon past consideration. It is to be explained as a concession to longstanding commercial custom, and it has been confirmed by s 32(1) of the Commonwealth Bills of Exchange Act 1909.170 By this section, ‘valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by (a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or (b) an antecedent debt or liability …’. To the same effect is s 35 of the Cheques Act 1986 (Cth). 165. [1980] AC 614 also discussed in 4.34, 13.7. See also Re Douglas; Ex parte Starkey (1987) 75 ALR 97; QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479 at [25]–[31] (Ann Lyons J) (solicitor–client costs agreement); Robertson v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 095 803 286) [2007] VSCA 29 at [54]–[55] (Habersberger AJA); Amos v Bauer [2010] QCA 199 (forbearance to sue assumed from implicit request). 166. Pao On was considered in Sandtara Pty Ltd v Longreach Group Ltd [2008] NSWSC 373, but the promise of remuneration was found to be too vague or an agreement to agree. However, the plaintiff succeeded on the basis of quantum meruit. See also Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 at [59]–[60]; Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2018] WASCA 90 at [81]–[86]; Robertson v Unique Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 29 at [55]. 167. See  17.24–17.28. 168. See the discussion in Casey v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1959] NZLR 1052 at 1058–62. See also 25.8. 169. See  25.8. The legislation differs in detail in the various jurisdictions. 170. In Oliver v Davis [1949] 2 KB 727; [1949] 2 All ER 353, it was held that the ‘antecedent debt or liability’ must be that of the maker or negotiator of the instrument and not of a stranger. See Walsh, Spriggs, Nolan and Finney v Hoag & Bosch Pty Ltd [1977] VR 178 at 183 (Young CJ); Dventures Pty Ltd v Wily [2001] NSWSC 641 at [58]–[62] (McLaughlin M).

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

The cases on promises to pay debts that are unenforceable have attracted academic commentary,171 and some aspects of the law in this area are, to say the least, irrational. Whether the rule represents an example of a promise enforceable in the absence of consideration is an unresolved controversy. One theory is that such promises are supported by the consideration of forbearance (see 4.24) that has evidently been extended by the creditor. But this was regarded as a convenient fiction by Denning J in Bob Guiness Ltd v Salomonsen.172 Although a bare promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations is enforceable at common law, the same promise cannot be consideration for a counter-promise.173 Why this is so is not clear, because to promise to pay a debt that the debtor does not have to pay is surely a benefit to the other party (and a detriment to the debtor). The apparent anomaly may be justified in so far as a promise to pay an existing debt in exchange for a counter-promise is merely promising to perform an existing duty,174 that is, the debt, though barred, is still in existence. (The defect is merely procedural and not substantive.) However, when a bare promise to pay the debt is made, it is said that the consideration for such a promise is the original consideration. The position relating to debts barred by the statute of limitations is to be contrasted with debts discharged by bankruptcy. Although at common law a promise by a debtor to pay such a debt was held to be binding,175 this is no longer so because of s 153 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), under which a bare promise to pay the discharged debt will not be enforced by the courts.176 On the other hand, such a promise can be a good consideration for a counter-promise.177 Thus a promise to pay a debt that is entirely extinguished is a good consideration for a counter-promise whereas a promise to pay a debt that is merely unenforceable is not.178

Forbearance and compromise 4.24  Promise to settle. A very important rule of consideration in practical terms is the rule that a compromise of a claim, settlement of a dispute or a forbearance to sue will constitute a good consideration.179 These cases have sometimes been classed into two groups: those where the party threatened admits liability, but offers some promise to postpone litigation; and those where he or she denies liability but prefers to settle rather than to fight. In the first class, it is said, there is a ‘forbearance to sue’, in the second a ‘compromise (or settlement) of the suit’. The cases raise similar 171. Sutton, ‘Existing Debt as Consideration’ (1957) 7 Res Judicatae 383. 172. [1948] 2 KB 42 at 47. 173. Wigan v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291 at 297 (Parker J); Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 at 231–2 (Lord Hanworth). 174. Promising to perform an existing contractual duty has not been regarded as a good consideration: see 4.32. But this rule has changed: see 4.35. 175. See  Proudfoot v Drake (1882) 3 LR (NSW) 381. 176. Watson v McFadden (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 128. 177. Jakeman v Cook (1878–9) 4 Ex D 26; Wild v Tucker [1914] 3 KB 36. A promise to pay a debt discharged after a composition of creditors agreement cannot be enforced by the courts: see 4.40. 178. In the context of promises to pay past debts, see Sharp v Ellis; Re Edward Love & Co Pty Ltd [1972] VR 137 (promissory notes to pay past ultra vires debt not supported by good consideration). Compare Popiw v Popiw [1959] VR 197 (performance of unenforceable duty regarded as a good consideration) discussed in 4.31. 179. A convenient summary of the rules on compromise and forbearance can be found in Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 at 96 (Isaacs J); Wilson Pastoral International Pty Ltd v George Street Steel Pty Ltd [2020] SASCFC 54 at [2]–[19] (Kourakis CJ). See also Stoljar, ‘The Consideration of Forbearance’ (1965) 5 MULR 34.

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arguments and will be dealt with together. Perhaps the point should be emphasised that a threat to sue is not necessary in these cases. Any settlement of an actual or potential dispute is sufficient to provide a consideration because it is always a benefit to the party against whom a complaint has been made to be rid of the complaint. The reason why this aspect of consideration is of such practical importance is that it is the basis for every settlement of a legal claim, whatever the nature of the cause of action. So, for example, every motor accident case that is settled out of court ends up as a contract. It will be seen from the discussion below that the courts, as a matter of policy, encourage settlement rather than litigation, and this policy concern has had an effect on shaping the way the rules are applied. A compromise agreement falls into two, or possibly three, classes.180 The first is termed an ‘accord executory’ which is in the form of a unilateral contract whereby the plaintiff promises to abandon a claim in exchange for the defendant doing something (usually paying money).181 The second type of compromise agreement is termed ‘accord and satisfaction’ whereby the plaintiff promises to abandon the claim in exchange for the defendant promising to do something.182 The significance of the distinction arises when the defendant fails to do what is required and the effect this has on the original cause of action or complaint that is being settled. In the case of an accord executory, where the defendant fails to perform the requested act, the plaintiff’s original rights continue on and can be enforced and no settlement agreement has eventuated.183 In the case of an accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff has forgone his or her original rights and can only enforce the settlement agreement.184 Thus, in the case of accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff replaces the original claim (which may or may not have succeeded) with an enforceable contract. There is a third category whereby the parties make an accord and satisfaction that is conditional, that is, the plaintiff only abandons his or her original rights so long as the defendant carries out his or her promise but, failing that, the plaintiff’s original rights can still be enforced.185 The question whether there has been an accord and satisfaction (or another category of settlement) is one of fact.186 The difference between these three possibilities depends on the drafting of the agreement and, ideally, as Phillips JA pointed out in Osborn v McDermott, the agreement should specify what is the consequence of the defendant failing to perform.187 The interpretation of a settlement agreement188 can 180. See extensive discussion with historical background in Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd (2011) 42 WAR 159; [2011] WASCA 159 at [14]–[33]. 181. An attempt at settlement can, of course, occur the other way around. For example, a debtor may send a cheque stipulating that banking of the cheque will constitute settlement of the claim. This can give rise to some complicated problems, which are fully canvassed by Currie, ‘Accord and Satisfaction by Way of Full Settlement Cheque’ (2011) 27 JCL 119. See Magnum Photo Supplies Ltd v Viko New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 395 discussed in 3.46 and by Currie. 182. McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 183–5 (Dixon J). See extensive discussion in El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 at [47]–[69] (McColl JA, Handley and Ipp JA concurring). 183. An example is Blue Moon Grill Pty Ltd v Yorkey’s Knob Boating Club Inc [2006] QCA 253. 184. FCT v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500; 154 ALR 1; [1998] HCA 33 at [116] (Gummow J). 185. Osborn v McDermott [1998] 3 VR 1 at 9–10 (Phillips JA). 186. El-Mir v Risk [2005] NSWCA 215 at [54] (McColl JA, Handley and Ipp JJA concurring). McColl JA also discussed the effect of withdrawing proceedings and whether waiver is an appropriate concept. 187. See  Zivkovic v Parke [2022] VSCA 43 at [75]–[90] where Kyrou JA (Beach and Walker JJA concurring) sets out the principles relating to the construction of settlement agreements. 188. There are some special rules unique to interpretation of settlement agreements, in particular in relation to the role of recitals and the coverage of the release. See Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954)

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Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

be difficult if it has not been drafted well. In Jingalong Pty Ltd v Todd,189 the trial judge decided that an agreement was an accord executory that had been broken, and so the original cause of action still existed. The Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion. Sackville AJA pointed out that the court must interpret the agreement and the parties’ intention in accordance with normal principles rather than necessarily applying the labels discussed above.190 One of the curiosities of the legal world is that settlements are very commonly embodied in deeds. This is a mystery because there is no doubt about consideration.191 The common law required that an accrued cause of action must be released by deed but then recognised that this could be achieved by an agreement for valuable consideration amounting to an accord and satisfaction.192 4.25  Compromise of doubtful case is valid. It was originally held that a promise not to pursue a claim which in truth was without legal basis could not be good consideration. It was said that it could be no detriment to give up a claim which had little or no prospect of success and no benefit to the other party to be saved from such an action.193 But in the nineteenth century this position was abandoned, and the compromise of a doubtful claim was upheld by the courts. The change was justified on grounds of convenience. In the words of Bowen LJ, in Miles v New Zealand Alford Estate Co: The reality of the claim which is given up must be measured, not by the state of the law as it is ultimately discovered to be, but by the state of the knowledge of the person who at the time has to judge and make the concession. Otherwise you would have to try the whole cause to know if the man had a right to compromise it.194

In the modern law the consideration in such cases is said to be the surrender, not of a legal right, which may or may not exist and whose existence, at the time of the compromise, remains untested, but of the claim to such a right. 4.26  Safeguards surrounding the rule. If the claim is in fact baseless, the claimant, by the compromise, has obtained something for nothing. And there is potential for harassment in order to extract a payment.195 The rule has therefore certain safeguards. A plaintiff who relies upon the surrender of a claim to support a contract must be prepared to prove:

189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.

91 CLR 112 at 123–32 (Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ); Ashton v Pratt (2015) 88 NSWLR 281; 318 ALR 260; [2015] NSWCA 12 at [172]–[174] (Bathurst CJ). See extensive discussion of Grant in Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 at [15]–[52] (Leeming JA). See also Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [5.4]. [2015] NSWCA 7. Ibid at [68]–[69] (Meagher and Leeming JJA concurring). See Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (2nd ed, 2022), [1.11], [6.5]. A general point made in this book is that, where there is a choice between contract and deed, a contract should be used. This is because there are many technical ways that a deed can fail. McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 183–5 (Dixon J). Stone v Wythipol (1588) Cro Eliz 126; 78 ER 383. (1886) 32 CLD 266 at 291; [1886–90] All ER Rep 1726 at 1735. See also Callisher v Bischoffsheim (1870) LR 5 QB 449 and Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 especially at 96. This issue involves the notion of voluntariness and mistaken payments under the law of restitution. See the discussion by Ormiston JA in Hookway v Racing Victoria Ltd [2005] VSCA 310. It also may involve economic duress: see Chapter 13.

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Consideration

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1. that the claim is reasonable in itself, and not ‘vexatious or frivolous’;196 2. that he or she has an honest belief in the chance of its success; and 3. that he or she has not knowingly concealed from the other party any fact that might affect its validity.197 The dilemma which can be posed by these cases is well illustrated by Ballantyne v Phillott.198 Over a number of years a man gave or loaned sums of money to his mistress. After they had fallen out, the man sued for return of these sums but withdrew the claim. The parties then signed two documents, one a badly drafted informal statement and the other a statutory declaration, the evident intention of which was that each agreed to give up any claims against the other. The majority of the High Court (Menzies and Windeyer JJ) were not convinced that the mistress was giving up anything, even if the documents could be construed as containing an exchange of promises (which they doubted). The allegations which she made — that she might have been able to sue him for libel and that she was entitled to costs arising out of the discontinued action — were not accepted, with the result that she provided no consideration by giving up non-existent rights against her former lover. Accordingly, his promise not to sue for return of money was not barred by the documents. Dixon CJ dissented and, though troubled by the unsatisfactory evidence of the dealings between the parties, concluded that her promise was of some value. Although she had ‘no claim which a judge would enforce’, Dixon CJ thought that her agreeing not to pursue her various grievances arising from the man’s conduct in ‘putting her aside’ was a benefit to him. ‘Many men who have so behaved have failed to escape the natural consequences. Unless they “composed their differences” trouble might be expected.’ Dixon CJ observed that finding a sufficient consideration in this case was ‘authorised by this peculiar branch of the law’.199 A similar difficulty concerning the identification of precisely what is being exchanged for what is shown in the case of Woolworths Ltd v Kelly.200 In that case, a retired executive was ‘entitled’ to a pension but in fact the entitlement was not legally enforceable because there was no consideration. It was a voluntary scheme. The company, however, agreed to pay the executive a greater amount per annum than the (unenforceable) amount in exchange for the executive forgoing his right to a sum of money owing to him for consultancy work.201 It was held that the executive was only able to enforce the amount representing the increment for consultancy work for it was only in respect of the increment, and not the whole annual sum, for which consideration had been given.202 In short, the court engaged in the unusual exercise of severing the consideration. 196. Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 at 327 (Richardson J citing Corbin on Contracts § 140). 197. Such would seem to be the conclusions to be drawn from the language of the judgments in Callisher v Bischoffsheim and Miles v New Zealand Alford Estate Co. See also Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 discussed below in 4.28. 198. (1961) 105 CLR 379. 199. All quotations are from ibid at 390. 200. (1991) 22 NSWLR 189. 201. In other words, the lump sum for consultancy services was annualised (though discounted) and added to the pension. 202. The consideration appeared to be for past services, but In Re Casey’s Patents applied (see 4.22), though this case was not mentioned. Alternatively, it was a benefit to exchange a claim to a lump sum for an annuity.

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4.26

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

In Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson,203 the issue was whether it was possible to settle various claims that a company director had breached the Corporations Law 1990 (Cth) when s 241204 prohibited a company from indemnifying or exempting directors from liability in respect of such breaches. In fact, the court found that the director had not breached any of the duties. But, if he had, the court held that a settlement agreement is effective to ‘forgive’ such breaches, even those that stem from the Act rather than the general law. The prohibition in s 241 is to prevent blanket provisions provided by a company prospectively (although the court did not rule out the operation of s 241 in an appropriate case after a breach has occurred). But, the court held that a bona fide settlement of a disputed claim is valid to extinguish any possible civil liability for breach of the Law. The same would apply to a settlement of a claim for misleading conduct in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law even though it is not possible to contract out of the operation of s 18.205 4.27  Period of forbearance is not relevant. In the case of forbearance to sue it is irrelevant whether the time of forbearance be long or short or even whether it is for any specified time at all.206 Thus, in Griffiths v Knight,207 the parties were a deceased wife’s executors and her surviving husband. During her lifetime the wife had brought proceedings against her husband under the New South Wales Deserted Wives and Children Act 1901. These proceedings were terminated on the husband promising to pay off an overdraft on the wife’s bank account. The husband did not pay off the overdraft and the wife’s executors sued him for breach of contract. He pleaded, amongst other defences, that there was no consideration for his promise, in that his wife could not validly agree to forgo her claim to maintenance under the Act.208 The Full Court held unanimously that the consideration moving from the wife was not a final compromise of her claim, that is to say an undertaking not to take any further proceedings under the Act, but merely a forbearance to continue that particular action. 4.28  Implicit promise of forbearance to sue is sufficient. There need not be an express promise either to compromise or to forbear, if such an understanding can be inferred from the circumstances or from the negotiations between the parties.209 In McDermott v Black,210 the plaintiff had been induced to contract with the defendant by the latter’s fraudulent misrepresentation but during negotiations 203. (2005) 223 ALR 123; [2005] WASCA 144. 204. See now Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A. 205. See  11.150. 206. See  Newton, Bellamy and Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431 at 444 (McPherson J): ‘Forbearance to sue, even for a short period, is consideration …’. 207. [1960] SR (NSW) 353. See Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 (forbearance to take court action for one month against husband in exchange for husband and wife providing security over joint property) and Horton v Horton (No 2) [1961] 1 QB 215; [1960] 3 All ER 649. 208. See now Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 86A. 209. See, for example, Newton, Bellamy & Wolfe v SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd R 431, in which the words ‘liability is not in issue’ in a letter sent during negotiations for settlement of a claim were held to give rise to a contract. An alternative ground for making such words enforceable was estoppel (at 436–7). See also Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, in which a majority of the High Court held the Commonwealth to its assurance that it would not use the statute of limitations as a defence on the basis of either waiver or estoppel. 210. (1940) 63 CLR 161.

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agreed to withdraw all allegations of fraud, provided that he was given an extension of time to complete the contract. The defendant granted an extension and, when the plaintiff failed to complete on the new date, repudiated the contract. The plaintiff sued for the return of his deposit on the ground that he had been induced to enter into the original contract by fraud. The High Court rejected the claim on the basis that the withdrawal of the allegations of fraud had amounted to a promise not to sue in respect of the misrepresentation and as such was good consideration for the defendant’s promise to give an extension of time. A further illustration of the courts’ willingness to draw inferences from the circumstances of negotiations so as to find a compromise or forbearance is Wigan v Edwards.211 Mr and Mrs Edwards agreed to buy a house built by Wigan. The Edwards gave Wigan a list of minor defects which needed to be remedied before they would complete the purchase. Wigan signed a document in which he agreed to remedy the listed defects and ‘any major faults in construction five years from purchase’. A major defect came to light and the Edwards sued on the written promise (rather than under the original contract of purchase). It was held by the High Court that the promise to remedy the defects was enforceable. It was argued that the Edwards were merely undertaking to complete in exchange for the promise, something that they were already bound to do.212 But the fact that there was a brewing dispute, which the document was designed to settle, was sufficient for the court to find a consideration in the form of a compromise. Although the defects probably would not have justified termination of the contract, there was nevertheless a good consideration because the Edwards had a bona fide belief that they had a right to terminate. Mason J speculated as to whether a bona fide belief in a claim by itself is sufficient to ground a compromise agreement when the claim is completely without foundation: see 4.25–4.26. His Honour was inclined to the view that the claim must be both bona fide and not vexatious or frivolous. He pointed out that the different formulations were, in practice, not very different because ‘[t]here will be few cases involving an honest or bona fide belief in a claim which is vexatious or frivolous’.213 Clearly, the courts are loath to reopen compromise agreements to test the merits of the claim forgone. However, the circumstances in which such agreements are entered into are often fraught, and a settlement agreement is like any other contract in so far as it is open to challenge on the basis of mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionability214 or possibly that the agreement, or a part of 211. (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586. See also Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365. 212. See  4.32ff. 213. (1973) 1 ALR 497 at 513; 47 ALJR 586 at 595. 214. See  Magee v Pennine Insurance Co Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 891; [1969] 2 QB 507 (majority of the Court of Appeal held that compromise valid at common law could be set aside in equity for mistake): see 12.26. In Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1, a settlement was set aside on the basis that it was induced by misleading conduct and on the basis of unconscionability under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). In Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] VSCA 351, an argument that a settlement was procured by duress was not successful. It is argued by Seddon that economic duress could be used to set aside a settlement in certain circumstances where the duress takes the form of threatened litigation: see Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (1990), ch 5. In Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709 at [406], Santow J set out special rules applicable to the interpretation of a release, such rules being concerned to ensure that the party signing the release does so with full understanding of what

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4.28

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

it, amounts to a penalty215 or its terms may be in doubt.216 If compromise agreements could be challenged merely on the ground of the merits of the forgone claim, chaos would ensue, for no settlement would be safe. As a matter of policy, people should be encouraged to settle their differences themselves. The courts have supported this policy by their readiness to find a consideration of compromise or forbearance where parties are in dispute or potential dispute.

Existing duties 4.29  The various aspects of existing duties. If a person either promises or does something that he or she is already under a duty to do, can it be said that he or she has provided a good consideration? The answer to this depends on the nature of the duty and to whom the original duty is owed. The principles will be discussed first under the heading of public duties and then under the heading of contract duties. Under the latter heading there is a further distinction to be made between cases in which the contract duty is already owed to a third party and where it is owed to the promisor. The law is in transition; some very old and well-established rules have been questioned.

(1)  Where a public duty is imposed upon the plaintiff by law 4.30  Discharge of public duty is generally not consideration. A person who, by his or her official status or through the operation of the law, is under a public duty to act in a certain way is not regarded as furnishing consideration merely by promising to discharge that duty. No one, for example, would expect a police officer to bargain with a citizen for the price of providing protection. The position was stated in 1831 in Collins v Godefroy.217 The plaintiff had attended on subpoena to give evidence on the defendant’s behalf in a case in which the defendant was a litigant, and he alleged that the defendant had promised to pay him six guineas for his trouble. Lord Tenterden held that there was no consideration for this promise: If it be a duty imposed by law upon a party regularly subpoenaed, to attend from time to time to give his evidence, then a promise to give him any remuneration for loss of time incurred in such attendance is a promise without consideration.

It is not self-evident that ‘loss of time’ is not a good consideration (being a detriment to the promisee). If the six guineas were in exchange for the very duty he or she is giving up. This case was reversed on appeal (Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam (2005) 64 NSWLR 149; [2005] NSWCA 344), but elucidation of the law by Santow J is valuable. 215. Discussed in Auzcare Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 581; [2015] NSWCA 412 (no penalty found). 216. Marinchek v Cabport Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 334 illustrates that the drafting must be precise. Generally, it will be assumed that the settlement covers all disputed matters then known to the parties but not other matters that come to light after entering the settlement agreement or matters specifically carved out of the agreement: Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 123. However, it is possible to draft a settlement agreement to cover unknown defects or problems if the drafting is clear. See discussion by Santow J in Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2001] NSWSC 709. It is also possible to cover a type of claim unknown to the law though the drafting would have to be very clear: Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 at [9]–[10]. See also extensive discussion of Grant in Reid v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] NSWCA 134 at [15]–[52] (Leeming JA). 217. (1831) 1 B & Ad 950 at 956–7; 109 ER 1040 at 1042. Collins v Godefroy was applied in Westpac Banking Corp v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 143 ALR 35 at 46 (Cooper J), where the bank unsuccessfully argued that it had a common law right, derived from an alleged implied contract, to be reimbursed for its expenses in responding to statutory notices issued by the ASC to the bank.

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that was already legally mandatory (attending in court as a witness), then it appears that there is no consideration. But if, for example, the defendant had promised to reimburse travel and accommodation expenses, this would be an ordinary contract. Close attention must therefore be paid to what exactly the promisor was agreeing to pay for. If a government body, or a privatised body carrying out what were formerly government functions, is regulated by statute so that it is obliged to provide its services, does this mean that it cannot charge for the services under a contract because it will merely be performing its statutory duty? Clearly this would be an alarming conclusion in an era when such enterprises are expected by governments of all persuasions to act commercially and, so far as possible, mimic the private sector: see 5.29. Surprisingly, the issue has not been definitively tested. In Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd,218 Airways Corporation, a newly privatised body that was responsible (under statute) for providing air traffic control services in New Zealand, sent its terms and conditions to the various airlines operating in the country. Two small airlines rejected the terms and conditions and yet used the services because they were obliged to under statute. It was held that there was no contract because there never was an acceptance of the terms and conditions and so it was unnecessary to deal with the consideration point. The trial judge had indeed found that there was no consideration but on appeal Thorp J indicated that he thought that there would have been consideration, but without arguing the point fully.219 He relied on cases where the existing duty rule has been questioned.220 This appears to be a tacit acknowledgement that there indeed was only an existing duty but that it should be regarded as a good consideration, contrary to the traditional approach. This type of case provides yet another instance of the inappropriateness of the existing duty rule in a modern economy. The common law in times past considered that public utilities did not enter into contracts with their customers. This view is almost certainly now a dead letter.221 What amounts to a public duty is not always easy to discern. If the duty is imposed by statute, does this necessarily mean that it is a public duty? This issue arose in Ailakis v Olivero (No 2),222 where it was argued that a director’s duty under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was a public duty and that therefore performing such a duty could not amount to a consideration. This argument was rejected. A director’s duties are found in a mix of common law, equity and statute. The fact that some of those duties and their enforcement can be sourced in statute does not mean that they have a public character analogous to the duty to attend court in Collins v Godefroy.223 As to non-statutory ‘duties’, it has been held that a promise to refrain from doing an unlawful act is not good consideration,224 whereas a promise to refrain from doing something anti-social or immoral, but not unlawful, can be a good consideration.225 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225.

[1996] 1 NZLR 116. This case is also discussed in 3.27. Ibid at 127. Ward v Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496; Williams v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 148. See Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (6th ed, 2018), [3.5]. [2014] WASCA 127. Ibid at [103] (Martin CJ, Buss and Murphy JJA concurring). Jamieson v Renwick (1891) 17 VLR 124. See 4.18. Dunton v Dunton (1892) 18 VLR 114. See 4.18.

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4.31

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

4.31  Acts in excess of the duty constitute consideration. In some of the cases it has been successfully argued that there is a consideration if the promisee has done more than the existing duty requires. Thus, in England v Davidson,226 the defendant offered a reward to anyone who should give information leading to the conviction of a felon. The plaintiff, a police constable, gave such evidence. The defendant pleaded, not only that the plaintiff had merely done his duty, but that the contract was against public policy. Lord Denman’s judgment, rejecting these pleas, consists of two sentences: I think there may be services which the constable is not bound to render, and which he may therefore make the ground of a contract. We should not hold a contract to be against the policy of the law, unless the grounds for so deciding were very clear.

Where rewards are offered for information about serious crimes, the courts have consistently upheld the claimant’s right to the reward,227 although it could be argued that there is a duty on any citizen (not just police officers) to uncover serious crimes. A person who fails to report such a crime may have been guilty of misprision of felony,228 though now this offence has been abolished in all jurisdictions. Similar arguments were considered and again rejected in the case of Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council.229 The question had arisen as to how best to protect a coal mine during a strike. The police authorities thought it enough to provide a mobile force but the colliery manager wanted a stationary guard. It was ultimately agreed to provide the latter at a rate of payment that involved the sum of £2200. The company refused to pay and, when sued, pleaded the absence of consideration. The House of Lords gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The police were bound to afford protection, but they had a discretion as to the form it should take, and an undertaking to provide more protection than in their discretion they deemed necessary was consideration for the promise of payment. The readiness of the judges to find a consideration if possible is illustrated by the case of Popiw v Popiw230 applying Ward v Byham.231 The parties were husband and wife. The wife, having left her husband, was induced to return to him by his promise to transfer the matrimonial home from his sole ownership into their joint ownership. The wife shortly afterwards again left her husband because of his violence to her and subsequently applied to the court to determine the question whether she was entitled either at law or in equity to an interest in the matrimonial home, which still stood in her husband’s name. Although the wife’s claim was dismissed on the ground that at the time when she commenced her action there was no memorandum in writing of the alleged contract for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds,232 Hudson J expressed the opinion that, if she brought a new action, the affidavit sworn and filed by her husband in the action before him would constitute a sufficient memorandum, and she would then

226. (1840) 11 Ad & El 856; 113 ER 640. 227. Williams v Carwardine (1833) 4 B & Ad 621; 110 ER 590. 228. Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528. 229. [1925] AC 270; [1924] All ER Rep 579. 230. [1959] VR 197. 231. [1956] 2 All ER 318. See 4.35. 232. See  16.37.

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be entitled to an order declaring the matrimonial home to be the property of herself and her husband in equal shares. His Honour said:233 The objection that the act of the applicant in returning to cohabitation did not amount to a valid consideration for the respondent’s promise was founded on the view that the applicant was already under a duty as the wife of the respondent to return to cohabitation and this being so it could not be said that by the act of the applicant she suffered any detriment or that the respondent gained any advantage in exchange for his promise. Although it may be true to state that the applicant was under a duty to cohabit with the respondent there was no remedy open to the respondent to compel the performance of that duty … From a practical point of view therefore what the respondent was to get in exchange for his promise was something which must be regarded as far more advantageous to him than the right of cohabiting with his wife which he had no means of enforcing and the applicant in returning was submitting to a detriment in placing herself in a position which she could not have been compelled to occupy. On any view therefore I think there was good consideration for the respondent’s promise.234

A further rationale for this result is that the alleged ‘duty’ was neither a public nor contractual duty so that fulfilling it did not fall into this category of the doctrine of consideration.

(2)  Where the plaintiff is bound by an existing contractual duty to the defendant — contract modification 4.32  Performing an existing contractual duty owed to the defendant traditionally is no consideration. If parties contract on the basis of, say, a fixed price for performance of services and the plaintiff is able to obtain a promise of extra payment in exchange for the promised performance of the services, there is said to be no consideration provided by the plaintiff because, it is argued, there is no detriment in doing what is already owed and no extra benefit to the defendant in receiving what is due. The promise of extra payment is therefore of no effect. This rule has been controversially modified in the English case of Williams v  Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.235 This case and its implications in Australia are discussed below (see 4.35) after first analysing the traditional rule. This rule is about contract variation rather than contract formation.236 The point has been made already (see 4.2) that the doctrine of consideration is generally of far more practical significance in relation to making changes to the contract after it has started rather than in relation to formation of contract in the first place. In complex or long-term contracts, it is almost inevitable that changes will be made to the contract, either informally or formally. The rules of consideration (and, more generally, contract formation) apply equally to any change that is made as they do to the initial contract.237 From the perspective of consideration, it is necessary therefore to examine what change has been made and whether it is part of an exchange or whether it is effectively a ‘gift’, that is, a one-way promise or act. 233. [1959] VR 197 at 198–9. 234. Compare 4.23 as to whether a right without a remedy may be the basis for a good consideration. 235. [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512. 236. For detailed treatment of variation, see Chapter 22. See also 2.29 (variation through estoppel). 237. See discussion of Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd below.

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4.32

Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract

As noted in 4.2, the possibility of dispensing with the need for consideration for contract variations has been canvassed.238 This idea has so far not been accepted in Australia. It is possible for a change to take place because the contract at the outset was drafted to allow for either unilateral variation (for example, an adjustment of an interest rate) or an agreed variation. Depending on the drafting of such a clause, it could be construed as dispensing with the need for fresh consideration.239 The problem is illustrated by Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd.240 Y agreed to sell a quantity of imported galvanised iron to S for a fixed price. S established a letter of credit sufficient to pay the contract price. Y then informed S that there was an unavoidable price increase due to government intervention in France. S protested that it was only bound to pay the original price but nevertheless increased the letter of credit. Y rejected S’s protests (specifically rejecting an order ‘without prejudice’ for the goods at the increased price) and made it clear that S would lose the goods if it did not pay the increased price. Matters remained unresolved but when the iron arrived it was delivered and the increased letter of credit was used for payment. S then sued for recovery of the excess over the price originally agreed to. The case raised a number of issues. Could it be said that the original contract had disappeared because it had been renegotiated and a new one put in its place? It is a question of fact, determined by the parties’ apparent intention, whether a renegotiation is so extensive that it amounts to a new contract in place of the old contract.241 It is not always easy to determine whether an amendment is a new contract entirely or a modification to the existing contract.242 Because an amendment must itself satisfy the rules of contract formation,243 it is a separate contract, even if it does not constitute a replacement of the original contract.244 The existing duty issue only arises if the later contract is a variation, rather than a replacement, of the original. If an entirely new contract is formed (and the old contract discharged by agreement), then there is automatically a consideration even if under the new contract the party performing work or services is paid more than under the original contract. 238. This possibility is discussed at length, including New Zealand and Canadian cases, in Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2020] SGCA 106 at [58]–[95] by Phang Boon Leong JA who concluded that consideration is required for contract variations. 239. See ibid at [36]–[44] where Phang Boon Leong JA also discusses this possibility. 240. (1955) 56 SR (NSW) 323. See Cook Islands Shipping Co Ltd v Colson Builders Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 422 for a modern application of the rule, which is said, somewhat controversially, to have originated with Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168. In the latter case sailors were promised the wages of two deserters if they sailed the ship home. They were unsuccessful in suing for the extra pay. One report makes no mention of consideration, and bases the decision on the public policy that sailors should not be in a position to hold the captain to ransom: Stilk v Meyrick 6 Esp 129; 170 ER 851. See Syros Shipping Co SA v Elaghill Trading Co (The Proodos C) [1981] 3 All ER 189; [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 390. 241. Quinn v Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd [1992] 1 VR 540; Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64 at [19] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See 22.3. 242. See Carter and Stewart, ‘The Effect of Formalising an Employment Contract: The High Court Misses an Opportunity’ (2001) 17 JCL 181, where the authors argue that the decision of the High Court in Concut (2000) 176 ALR 693; [2000] HCA 64, that a contract had been varied rather than replaced by a new one, was erroneous. 243. An alternative way in which a contract variation may be binding is through the operation of an estoppel: see 2.29. 244. Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93 at 144 (Taylor J); Kiwi Brands Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 160 ALR 1; Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ).

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If the contract in Sundell was modified rather than replaced by a new contract, had the supplier Y provided a good consideration for the payment in excess of the original contract price? Could the payment of the excess be said to be a payment made under duress? As to the last point, the New South Wales Supreme Court held that there was duress and the case has now become one of the seminal cases on economic duress (discussed in Chapter 13). In addition, it was held that there had been no renegotiation to replace the old contract with a new one. Instead, there was a purported variation of the existing contract and no consideration for that variation was provided by the supplier. Y had merely performed precisely what it had originally promised to do, namely, to deliver the iron. An attempt was made to argue that the importer had made certain arrangements in France that would ensure that the goods would arrive. It was argued that S’s potential action for damages was therefore replaced by more certain delivery and that this amounted to an additional advantage. The court was not convinced and ordered repayment of the excess. In Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd,245 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ observed: When the parties to an existing contract enter into a further contract by which they vary the original contract, then, by hypothesis, they have made two contracts. For one reason or another, it may be material to determine whether the effect of the second contract is to bring an end to the first contract and replace it with the second, or whether the effect is to leave the first contract standing, subject to the alteration. For example, something may turn upon the place, or the time, or the form, of the contract, and it may therefore be necessary to decide whether the original contract subsists.246

As already noted, the effect of the second contract is determined by objectively ascertaining the intention of the parties. Generally speaking, it is more likely that the parties have intended to vary an existing contract rather than replace it with a new one — in which case the existing duty issue may be relevant. Whatever the effect of the second contract, the same rules apply to it as apply to any other type of contract. For example, it may be that there is acceptance of a variation suggested by one party by the other party’s conduct.247 Contract variation may occur in a quite informal way. In Update Constructions Pty Ltd v Rozelle Child Care Centre Ltd,248 a brief conversation on a building site between the owner’s representative and the builder was sufficient to bring about a binding change in relation to the work to be done. The New South Wales Court of Appeal used an estoppel analysis to hold that the change was binding. Both in Update and in Crothall Hospital Services, the changes were held binding despite the fact that the variations were made informally and not in accordance with the relevant term in the contract

245. (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2002] HCA 35. See further 22.5. 246. Ibid at [22]. 247. Such was the case in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567, where the Commonwealth failed to reply to a letter and yet paid invoices on the basis of the change suggested by the contractor. This case was principally about whether there was agreement. Consideration was not mentioned. This was probably because the original agreement contemplated escalating remuneration of the contractor. See also Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 213 at [234]–[236] (acceptance of variation by conduct). 248. (1990) 20 NSWLR 251. See also GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP IT Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 50 at [213]ff (Finn J).

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that stipulated a formal process for making changes.249 In fact, such a term can never be drafted in such a way as to prevent informal contract variation. This is because the very clause governing contract changes may itself be changed (usually tacitly by the conduct of the parties). One particular type of change which appears to be ‘one-way’ is where a contractual deadline is extended, either after it has passed or by way of an undertaking before it has fallen due and nothing is sought in return. It is recognised that consideration is not necessary for this type of variation, though the doctrinal basis is uncertain.250 4.33  Doing more than the existing duty is a good consideration. In attempting to argue that it had provided an additional advantage in exchange for the extra money, the supplier in Sundell (discussed in 4.32) was trying to make use of the wellestablished principle that promising or doing more than is required under the contract is a good consideration. Thus, in Hartley v Ponsonby,251 sailors were promised extra wages if they sailed the ship home but, in contrast to Stilk v Myrick,252 the ship was dangerously short-handed. Working the ship in these circumstances was providing more than the original contract required and so the promise of extra wages was supported by a good consideration. An alternative explanation for the case is that the original contract was terminated by mutual consent and a new one was negotiated in its place. This analysis does not require an additional benefit to make the promise of extra pay binding. The issue is simply whether the parties have abandoned the original agreement and substituted a new one.253 A third explanation is that the sailors were discharged from further performance once the ship was dangerously short-handed and that therefore promising to perform was a good consideration. Analogous to this last explanation is the case where one party believes that he or she is entitled to terminate and obtains a promise from the other party in consideration for abandoning the supposed right to terminate.254 The above possibilities demonstrate how there may be a variety of ways of looking at contract variation, depending on the particular facts. Yet another possibility is that one party may, for example, have been promised more money but this may be part of a general reorganisation of the contract with each side either making concessions,

249. See also 22.5. In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has controversially ruled that a no oral variation clause renders an informal variation invalid: Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24. There is little chance of this being followed in Australia. See Sara Stockham Pty Ltd v WLD Practice Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 51 at [15]; Carter, Eldridge and Peden, ‘Agreed Writing Requirements for Contract Variation’ (2020) 36 JCL 107. 250. Stoljar, ‘The Doctrine of Forbearance’ (2018) 92 ALJ 195. See generally Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]. See also the discussion in Inness v Waterson A/T for Cobok Family Trust [2006] QCA 155 at [45]–[51] by Keane JA, who discussed both waiver and estoppel. In Henderson v Curtis [2008] WASC 283 at [16]–[19], Beech J held there was mutual consideration if the varied term was of mutual benefit or interest to the parties. A term imposing an obligation on one party would require an independent consideration to be varied, according to this view. 251. (1857) 7 El & Bl 872; 119 ER 1471. 252. (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168. 253. See  Martech International Pty Ltd v Energy World Corp Ltd [2007] FCAFC 35; (2007) 248 ALR 353. 254. Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497; 47 ALJR 586 discussed in 4.28. See also Electroboard Administration v O’Brien [1999] NSWCA 452 at [10], where Meagher JA, with the concurrence of Mason P and Priestley JA, held that not exercising a right to dismiss an employee constituted a good consideration for an addition to the terms of the employment contract (a restraint of trade clause) that benefited the employer. There was no mention of duress in this case.

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promising to perform in a different manner or settling potential disputes. In such a case there is no problem with consideration. More recent developments in the law about existing duties, discussed in 4.35, are very significant to the analysis of contract variations. The principle that the courts will not examine the adequacy of the consideration (see 4.12) applies equally in these cases. As long as there is some consideration for the promise of extra money or other benefit, the latter will be binding. This is illustrated by North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron),255 where a reluctant payment of some US$3 million extra for the building of a supertanker was upheld as being supported by a consideration provided by the shipbuilder when it arranged for an increase in a ‘return letter of credit’ providing a performance guarantee in favour of the buyer.256

(3)  Where the plaintiff is bound by an existing contractual duty to a third party 4.34  Performing an existing duty owed to a third party is a good consideration. Whereas performance or promise of performance of an existing contractual duty owed by B to A is said not to be a good consideration as between A and B, the same is a good consideration when performed for, or promised to, C. Thus, if B is obliged under contract with A to prepare a sculpture, C’s promise of money if B either promises to or actually prepares the sculpture is supported by a good consideration moving from B. Why this is so has long been the subject of academic speculation and commentary.257 It is sometimes said that B is twice bound, which is a disadvantage to B,258 but this is not correct if all that is requested by C is B’s performance in a potential unilateral contract. Presumably it is a benefit to C to ensure that B performs, or else C would not have provided the incentive.259 Whether actual performance or promise of performance should be differently treated in this context has been the subject of contrary views.260 On the one hand, Pollock thought that a promise might be a good consideration but performance not.261 On the other hand, Treitel has stated that at one time a promise to a third party to perform an existing duty was not a good consideration, citing Jones v Waite.262 Suffice it to say that now the accepted view is that either a promise or performance are sufficient consideration, although the cases are few. The rule that performing an existing contractual duty for a third party is a good consideration was firmly established in the nineteenth century by a trilogy of cases, each of which for various reasons was not altogether a satisfactory authority. The

255. [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 89; [1979] QB 705. 256. It was also held that this was a case of economic duress but that the owners had lost their right to challenge the payment of the extra $3 million on this ground because of delay. See Chapter 13. 257. Davis, ‘Promises to Perform an Existing Duty’ (1937) 6 Cambridge LJ 202. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 143–7. Holdsworth, History of English Law vol 8, 40–1. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), [131], [131A]. The cases here discussed are difficult to reconcile with the public duty cases in 4.30. 258. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 146. 259. See  Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), [131], [131A]. 260. See also 4.10. 261. Pollock, Principles of Contract (12th ed, 1946), 144–7. 262. (1839) 5 Bing NC 341; 132 ER 1136. Peel, Treitel, The Law of Contract (15th ed, 2020), [3-055].

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first was Shadwell v Shadwell,263 in which an uncle promised his nephew, who was engaged to one Ellen Nicholl, that he would pay him an annual sum of £150. The intent of the promise was that this sum was to be paid so long as the marriage went ahead, although this was not expressly stated. The nephew married Ellen Nicholl but the instalments promised by the uncle were not all paid during his life and, after his death, the nephew brought an action to recover the arrears from the personal representatives. The defendants pleaded that, as the plaintiff was already bound to marry Ellen Nicholl before the uncle wrote his letter (because he was engaged),264 there was no consideration for his promise. On these facts it might well have been held that there was no more than a conditional gift by the uncle265 and that the letter could not have been construed as giving rise to contractual relations.266 This was the view of the dissenting Byles J.267 The majority held that the letter was intended contractually and that there was consideration for it. Erle CJ, for the majority, thought that there was both a detriment to the plaintiff and a benefit to the uncle, each of which was questionable. The facts and decision in Chichester v Cobb268 were, for practical purposes, identical; there, Blackburn J found there was consideration without discussion of the issues. The third case was Scotson v Pegg.269 The plaintiffs had contracted with X to deliver a cargo of coal to X, or to the order of X. X sold this cargo to the defendant and directed the plaintiffs, in pursuance of their contract, to deliver it to the defendant. The defendant then made an agreement with the plaintiffs in which, ‘in consideration that the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendant, would deliver to the defendant’ the cargo of coal, the defendant promised to unload it at a stated rate. For breach of this promise the plaintiffs sued, and the defendant pleaded lack of consideration. If, it was argued, the plaintiffs were already bound by the contract with X to deliver the coal to the defendant in accordance with X’s order, what were they now giving in return for the defendant’s promise to unload at a certain rate? However, the two judges present at the hearing, Martin and Wilde BB, both gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Martin B was content to say that the delivery of the coal was a benefit to the defendant. Wilde B thought there was also a detriment to the plaintiffs. It might have suited them, as against X, to break their contract and pay damages, and the delivery to the defendant had prevented this possible course of conduct.270 If it should be thought that these authorities are not convincing and that the supposed rule is open to challenge, modern cases have accepted and applied the rule without questioning its validity. The cases in which exemption clauses have been

263. (1860) 9 CBNS 159; 142 ER 62. 264. Engagement was a contract. This has been abolished: Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 111A. 265. See  4.13. 266. See  Chapter 5. 267. Compare Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328; [1969] 2 All ER 616, discussed in 5.7. 268. (1866) 14 LT 433. 269. (1861) 6 H & N 295; 158 ER 121; 3 LT 753. 270. This argument is only found in the report published at 3 LT 753.

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found to benefit third parties, discussed earlier,271 have employed the three-party existing duty rule to show that a consideration moves from stevedore or truck driver, as the case may be. Thus, unloading the goods pursuant to a separate contract is a good consideration provided by the stevedores for the benefit of an exemption clause in their favour agreed to by the owner of the goods. The three-party rule has been applied in another context. In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long,272 the purchasers of publicly listed shares undertook to the vendor company not to sell 60 per cent of the purchased shares for one year. In a subsequent agreement with the majority shareholders of the public company, the purchasers extracted a promise of indemnity against any loss arising from a fall in value of the shares. The consideration for this promise of indemnity was the promise not to sell 60 per cent of the shares for one year, an existing duty pursuant to the original sale agreement. The fact that the promise to the majority shareholders was the self-same promise that had been made to the company did not matter. The three-party rule was applicable.273 The case illustrates how arbitrary the rule is because the majority shareholders effectively controlled the company and the fact that the shareholders were a different legal entity from the company was fortuitous. Further, the three-party rule is difficult to reconcile with the rule that performing an existing duty imposed other than by contract is not a good consideration. Why should the contractual nature of the duty make the difference? The question is part of the wider problem in relation to existing duties, namely, that it is arguable that an existing duty, in appropriate circumstances, should be a good consideration, no matter what the source of the duty. 4.35  The existing duty rules questioned. In circumstances like those found in Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty Ltd274 questions of policy are raised. Should an unavoidable price rise be incapable of being passed on by adhering to the existing duty rule in all cases? The traditional rule is certainly protective of a contracting party who has been subjected to an extortionate demand but the rule also allows recovery of the extra payment even when it is paid quite willingly (absent an effective contract variation). Of course, one solution open to the parties is to agree to a price variation clause at the outset.275 But other unavoidable hazards may sometimes strike one of the parties to a contract, making it very much more onerous, without that party being able to obtain relief through the doctrine of frustration.276 The objective of protecting against extortionate demands can be served

271. The cases raise a number of issues, and are discussed in 3.8, 3.28, 3.40, 5.22, 7.38. They are New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1975] AC 154; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300; Celthene Pty Ltd v W K J Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606; Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431. 272. [1980] AC 614 also discussed in 4.22 and 13.7 and applied in Ailakis v Olivero (No 2) [2014] WASCA 127 at [107]–[109] (Martin CJ, Buss and Murphy JJA concurring). 273. Hill Equipment & Refrigeration Co Pty Ltd v Nuco Pty Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 25 (consideration for guarantee provided after execution of main contract found in performing main contract). 274. Discussed in 4.32. 275. As in Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services (Aust) Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 567, where the issue was whether a contract variation had been made. The principal focus of attention was whether a variation had been agreed when the variation was made not in accordance with the clause providing for variation. 276. See  Chapter 19.

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by the rules of duress,277 and it may therefore be unnecessary and inappropriate to call on the doctrine of consideration to serve this function. This is not to say that the problem is simply solved by altering the existing duty rule. The party who is faced with a serious difficulty, due to a change in circumstances, may have been paid to take that risk. Some of the precepts underlying the law of contract are not incompatible with the view that existing duties should amount to a good consideration. If parties have bargained willingly so that one promises to pay extra for the other’s performance, presumably the performance is regarded by the paying party as worth more than an action for damages.278 It is not then for the courts to question the parties’ assessment. If there is an allegation of unwillingness to agree to the extra payment, then, as argued above, the rules of duress should determine this issue. An analogous argument can be advanced for the cases involving non-contractual existing duties. Consideration should not enter into it. If there is some reason of policy why the bargain should not be enforced, then so be it, but otherwise the contract should stand. Judicial support for these views can be found in Ward v Byham,279 where the judgment of Denning LJ challenged the accepted rule: ‘[A] promise to perform an existing duty, or the performance of it, should be regarded as good consideration, because it is a benefit to the person to whom it is given.’280 He repeated this view in Williams v Williams281 but added the rider ‘so long as there is nothing in the transaction which is contrary to the public interest’. The same view was recommended by the English Law Revision Committee in 1937.282 In Australia, Hudson J in Popiw v Popiw283 has given support to Denning LJ in Ward v Byham, as did Thorp J in Airways Corp of New Zealand Ltd v Geyserland Airways Ltd.284 In the United States there has been judicial hostility to the rule and some legislative reform in some states and in the Uniform Commercial Code in relation to sale of goods.285 It appears that Lord Denning’s persistence has been vindicated by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.286 The defendant building contractor entered into a contract to refurbish a block of flats. It subcontracted the carpentry work to the plaintiff for an agreed sum of £20,000. The plaintiff carried out some of the work and received interim payments amounting to £16,200. The plaintiff then found that he was in financial 277. See  Chapter 13. The suggestion that the existing duty rule should be abandoned and that the doctrine of duress can take care of cases where there is oppression or extortion has been made by various commentators. See, for example, Reynolds and Treitel, ‘Consideration for the Modification of Contracts’ (1965) 7 Malaya Law Rev 1. See also Posner J in United States v Stump Home Specialities Manufacturing, Inc 905F 2d 1117 (1990) at 1121–2. 278. Posner argues that the enforceability of a promise to pay extra where the contract is more onerous is important both to payer and performer. The latter may default if he or she cannot be assured of extra payment. See ‘Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law’ (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 411, especially at 421. 279. [1956] 1 WLR 496; [1956] 2 All ER 318. 280. Ibid at 498; 319. 281. [1957] 1 WLR 148; [1957] 1 All ER 305. 282. Interim Report Cmnd 5449. 283. [1959] VR 197 at 199 discussed above in 4.31. 284. [1996] 1 NZLR 116 at 127. 285. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2–209(1). 286. [1991] 1 QB 1; [1990] 1 All ER 512. See Adams and Brownsword, ‘Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path’ (1990) 53 MLR 536; Coote, ‘Consideration and Benefit in Fact and Law’ (1990) 3 JCL 23.

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trouble and had agreed to a price which was too low. The defendant became aware of this and, wishing to avoid penalty provisions in the head contract and the disruption associated with finding another subcontractor, agreed to pay the plaintiff an extra £10,300 to complete the work. The defendant’s representative initiated this subsidiary agreement, recognising that the plaintiff’s original price was too low. Only £1500 was paid pursuant to the subsidiary agreement. The plaintiff sued for the additional money. The Court of Appeal held that the subsidiary agreement was enforceable. Glidewell LJ drew on Ward v Byham, Williams v Williams and the Pao On case, and concluded: (i) if A has entered into a contract with B to do some work for, or to supply goods or services to, B in return for payment by B and (ii) at some stage before A has completely performed his obligations under the contract B has reason to doubt whether A will, or will be able to, complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B thereupon promises A an additional payment in return for A’s promise to perform his contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a result of A giving his promise B obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, and (v) B’s promise is not given as a result of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, then (vi) the benefit to B [stemming from A’s commitment to complete the contract] is capable of being consideration for B’s promise, so that the promise will be legally binding.287

This was a case where the plaintiff, by agreeing merely to complete the work already contracted for, suffered no detriment but he did provide a benefit. ‘If both parties benefit from an agreement it is not necessary that each also suffers a detriment.’288 It was, of course, crucial in this case that the practical benefit to the head contractor (avoidance of penalty provisions and disruption) could be identified and that there was no hint of duress on the part of the carpenter. The essential change that this case makes to the law is that performing an existing duty may be a good consideration if doing so (or promising to do so) provides a practical benefit to the other party. This change is of some importance to the common practice of varying contracts.289 The possibility of using promissory estoppel as a vehicle for the enforcement of the promise to pay extra was canvassed but not, in the end, relied on. In Australia, this argument would have a firmer base because estoppel may be used to enforce positive promises where there is no consideration.290 There may, however, be some difficulty in arguing detrimental reliance if it consisted merely of doing what was already supposed to be done under a contract. However, even in the absence of an estoppel argument, the Australian courts are free to adopt the principle advanced in Williams v Roffey Bros, which, Glidewell LJ

287. Ibid at 15–6; 521–2. 288. Ibid at 23; 527 (Purchas LJ). 289. As shown by MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553, where the shift in approach provided by Williams v Roffey was used to find a good consideration provided by a debtor who benefited from a rescheduling of payments. This case was then reversed in the Supreme Court on the basis that the variation was invalid because it did not comply with a no oral variation clause. This then made the consideration issue moot. See Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24. 290. See  Chapter 2.

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asserted, does not contravene the principle in Stilk v Myrick291 but represents a refinement of it.292 The reasoning in Williams v Roffey Bros was applied in Australia by Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd,293 and it has been considered in other cases.294 This case at first sight appeared to be a classic promissory estoppel case, because the issue of immediate concern was whether a landlord’s promise to reduce the rent was binding. The case involved other issues, but we need only focus on the rent reduction question. Santow J based his conclusion that the landlord’s promise was binding on a consideration analysis rather than on an estoppel analysis. In doing so, he carefully analysed the supposed rationales for the existing duty rule. He used the six points made by Glidewell LJ in Williams v Roffey Bros (extracted above) and developed and extended those points.295 Santow J could see no logical distinction between one party to a contract promising the other more money or, on the other hand, granting a concession (such as reducing the rent). The same issue of consideration arises, namely, whether the person who is promised more money or who is promised the concession has provided anything in exchange for it. Santow J was also concerned to build into the principles stated by Glidewell LJ some notion of measurable practical benefit, that is, it should be possible for the court to conclude that the promised benefit or concession was made in exchange for something (continued performance of the contract) which was more beneficial than the remedy that would be available.296 For example, in the landlord and tenant example, it is worth more to the landlord to make a rent concession than it would be to sue the tenant for breach or go to the trouble of finding another tenant. The attempt to elaborate on the principles of Glidewell LJ in relation to the question of practical benefit runs into difficulties because the court appears to be assessing the commercial costs and benefits of the contract modification, something that the common law has traditionally eschewed. If we accept that practical benefit is to be regarded as consideration, it would be preferable to make the necessary modifications to the existing duty rule in terms of saying that, prima facie, if two commercial people have chosen to modify their business relationship, then it is presumed that they know what they are doing and it is not the court’s business to second guess their judgment of their own interests.297 Only if proof of duress is shown would this presumption be overturned and the contract modification be set aside. 291. See  4.33. 292. [1991] 1 QB 1 at 16; [1990] 1 All ER 512 at 522. 293. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723. 294. Both cases were followed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tinyow v Lee [2006] NSWCA 80 at [61] (Santow JA, Handley and Ipp JJA concurring). See also DPP (Vic) v Le (2007) 232 CLR 562; 240 ALR 204; [2007] HCA 52 at [43] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Hill v Forteng Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 105 (practical benefits accruing to a director who agreed to a reduced salary; included survival of the company and his directorship); W and K Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mayo [2013] NSWSC 1063 at [164]–[167] (Sackar J); Vella v Ayshan [2008] NSWSC 84 at [18] (White J); Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1071 at [144] (Flick J) (no practical benefit identified); Mitchell v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 86 at [36]–[39] (Ambrose J). See also Meyer-Rochow, ‘The Requirement of Consideration’ (1997) 71 ALJ 532. 295. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 at 747. 296. Santow J’s analysis was applied in Silver v Dome Resources NL [2007] NSWSC 455 at [121]–[137] (Hamilton J) affirmed on appeal: Dome Resources v NL Silver [2008] NSWCA 322. It was distinguished in Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 at [59]–[62] (no countervailing benefit identified for an alleged promise to extend the deadline for repayment of a loan). 297. The New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted such a rule in Teats v Willcocks [2013] NZCA 162 and Antons Trawling Co Ltd v Smith [2003] 2 NZLR 23. See Coote, ‘Consideration and Variations: A Different Solution’ (2004) 120 LQR 19; ‘Variations Sans Consideration’ (2011) 27 JCL 185. In the latter article Coote argued that consideration should be unnecessary for a contract variation, drawing on Antons,

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There is now an accumulation of Australian case law to support the proposition that the existing duty rule, as applied to contract variation, has been substantially modified in that a practical benefit amounting to a consideration may be found in circumstances where it appears that a party is merely performing an existing duty. The identification of the practical benefit, or avoidance of a disbenefit, in any given case is not without its difficulties. This development in the law is of significance to the next topic.

Promises to pay lesser sums The rule in Pinnel’s case 4.36  Payment of a lesser sum is no satisfaction of a debt. If A owes a debt to B and pays or promises to pay part of it in return for B’s promise to forgo the balance, can A hold B to this promise? From a purely logical point of view, it is clear that if promising or performing an existing contractual duty traditionally is not a good consideration, then promising or paying less must not be a good consideration either. Of course, waiving the debt entirely is also not legally binding in the absence of consideration (or a deed).298 The problem was familiar to the common lawyers before the development of assumpsit as a contractual remedy and therefore before the doctrine of consideration had been developed. Its implications were examined within the sphere of debt in 1455 and again in 1495.299 In the latter year Brian CJ stated a rule that, though set in an archaic environment, has still a modern connotation: The action is brought for £20, and the concord is that he shall pay only £10, which appears to be no satisfaction for the £20, for payment of £10 cannot be payment of £20. But if it was of a horse which was to be paid according to the concord, this would be good satisfaction, for it does not appear that the horse be worth more or less than the sum in demand.

The rule enunciated by Brian CJ was adopted in 1602 in Pinnel’s case:300 Pinnel sued Cole in debt for £8 10s due on a bond on 11 November 1600. Cole’s defence was that, at Pinnel’s request, he had paid him £5 2s 6d on 1 October, and that Pinnel had accepted this payment in full satisfaction of the original debt.

Judgment was given for the plaintiff on a point of pleading, but the court made it clear that, had it not been for a technical flaw, they would have found for the defendant, on the ground that the part payment had been made on an earlier day than Williams v Roffey and the Canadian decision of Nav Canada v Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc [2008] 290 DLR (4th) 405 (New Brunswick CA). See also the Canadian case Rosas v Toca (2018) BCCA 191. Dispensing with consideration for contract variations would be difficult in Australia in the light of the High Court’s pronouncements in Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520; 172 ALR 346; [2000] HCA 35 and Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57. The issue of contract variation and accommodating Williams v Roffey continues to be controversial in the United Kingdom. See Sullivan, ‘Unconsidered Modifications’ (2017) 133 LQR 191; Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24 at [18] (Lord Sumption). 298. Lewis v Cook (2000) 18 ACLC 490; [2000] NSWSC 191. Austin J there provided an interesting discussion of the almost defunct notion of waiver. On waiver and related concepts, see Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; 251 ALR 322; [2008] HCA 57 at [40]–[100]. 299. Anon (1455) YB 33 Hy VI f 48 pl 32; Anon (1495) YB 10 Hy VII f 4 pl 4. 300. (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a; 77 ER 237; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 612.

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that appointed in the bond. The debt could be discharged through the introduction, at the creditor’s request, of some new element, for example, the tender of a chattel instead of the debt or part payment at a fresh place or on an earlier date, but not by the payment of a smaller sum on the day the debt was due: Payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater cannot be any satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the judges that by no possibility, [can] a lesser sum … be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater sum: but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, etc in satisfaction is good.301

4.37  Application to negotiable instruments. If a creditor agreed to the discharge of a debt by the payment of a lesser sum by negotiable instrument, could it be argued that the extra feature of negotiability made up the difference? The early English cases vacillated on this question302 but ultimately a common sense argument prevailed: the use of a negotiable instrument to pay a lesser sum made no difference. This was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal in D & C Builders v Rees.303 In that case Lord Denning MR said: No sensible distinction can be taken between payment of a lesser sum by cash and payment of it by cheque. The cheque, when given, is conditional payment. When honoured, it is actual payment. It is then just the same as cash. If a creditor is not bound when he receives payment by cash, he should not be bound when he receives payment by cheque. … In point of law payment of a lesser sum, whether by cash or by cheque, is no discharge of a greater sum.304

On balance, if the rule that payment of a lesser sum is no discharge of a larger debt is to survive, then it does not seem to be logical or sensible to make an exception for payment by negotiable instrument or some other method, such as electronic transfer. 4.38  The rule today and possibilities for reform. Although it had long been accepted that the actual payment of a lesser sum did not of itself discharge the obligation to repay a debt for a larger sum, it was not until 1884 that the opinion of the House of Lords was tested in the case of Foakes v Beer:305 Mrs Beer had obtained a judgment against Dr Foakes for £2090 and Dr Foakes asked for time to pay. The parties agreed in writing that, if Dr Foakes paid £500 at once and the balance by instalments, Mrs Beer would not ‘take any proceedings whatever on the judgment’. Every judgment debt bears interest as from the date of the judgment, but the written agreement made no reference to the question of interest. Dr Foakes ultimately paid the whole amount of the judgment debt itself, and Mrs Beer then claimed the further sum of £360 as interest. Dr Foakes refused to pay this sum, and Mrs Beer applied ‘to be allowed to issue execution or otherwise proceed on the judgment in respect of the interest’. Dr Foakes pleaded the agreement, and Mrs Beer replied that it was unsupported by consideration.

The House of Lords admitted that the so-called ‘rule in Pinnel’s case’ rested merely on dicta, that it disregarded commercial convenience, that there was no previous 301. 77 ER 237 at 237. 302. Cumber v Wane (1721) 1 Stra 426; 93 ER 613; [1558–1774] All ER Rep 436; Sibree v Tripp (1846) 15 M & W 23; 153 ER 745; Goddard v O’Brien (1882) 9 QBD 37. 303. [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. 304. Ibid at 623–4; 840. See also Danckwerts LJ at 626; 842 and Winn LJ at 632–3; 846 respectively. 305. (1884) 9 App Cas 605; [1881–5] All ER Rep 106.

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decision by which the House was bound and that to upset what was doubtless a longstanding conception of the law would not, in these circumstances, disturb business confidence. Yet they unanimously306 applied the dicta and gave judgment in favour of Mrs Beer for the amount of the interest. The opportunity was thus lost to change the rule that, as Lord Blackburn pointed out, does not suit commercial convenience or practice: [A]ll men of business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognise and act on the ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce payment of the whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the credit of the debtor is doubtful it must be more so.307

The English Law Revision Committee was of the same view in 1937.308 On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, it is difficult to accommodate the reformist rule with the existing duty rule. It has already been argued that this latter rule, too, is in need of reform and has indeed been in the process of changing.309 The present rule does protect creditors from extortionate demands by debtors.310 But, as argued earlier in relation to existing duties, it would be desirable if this problem was taken care of by the rules of duress311 rather than the doctrine of consideration, which takes no account of whether the settlement is amicable or extortionate. The rule in Pinnel’s case and the existing duty rule each provides an out for people who want to break their word on a purely technical ground. Indeed, one suspects that most business people would not know that they have an out until they consult a lawyer. Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd312 certainly threw out a challenge to the rule in Pinnel’s case by holding that a landlord was bound by a promise to accept reduced rent payments on the basis of consideration rather than promissory estoppel: see 4.35. This did, however, depend on finding a practical benefit or avoidance of a disbenefit. It did not deal with the stark question: can a payment of $5 discharge a debt of $10?313 In terms of fulfilling the expectations of commercial people, a rule that forgiving part of a debt, or promising to pay some extra money for performance, is binding rather than not binding is preferable.314 306. Lord Blackburn had prepared a dissenting judgment, but reluctantly acquiesced in the views of his colleagues. 307. (1884) 9 App Cas 605 at 622. 308. Sixth Interim Report Cmnd 5449. 309. See  4.35. Adams and Brownsword in ‘Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path’ (1990) 53 MLR 536 argued that the rule in Pinnel’s case cannot logically survive if the existing duty rule has been effectively eliminated in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512. This argument has not, however, been accepted in England: Re Selectmove Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 474; [1995] 2 All ER 531. It was accepted by Santow J in Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 723 discussed in 4.35. 310. D & C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. 311. See  Chapter 13. 312. (1994) 34 NSWLR 723. 313. See  Amos v Citibank Ltd [1996] QCA 129 (Musumeci distinguished and Re Selectmove Ltd followed); Wolfe v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2012] VSC 275 at [109]–[127] (Zammit AsJ) (practical benefit in not having to foreclose on property); to similar effect was Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228 at [54]–[67] (Gardiner AsJ). See also discussion by Judd J in MP Investments Nominees Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 43 at [107]–[115]. 314. See Thampapillai, ‘Practical Benefits and Promises to Pay Lesser Sums: Reconsidering the Relationship Between the Rule in Foakes v Beer and the Rule in Williams v Roffey’ (2015) 34 UQLJ 301 where the extensive academic debate is covered.

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4.39  Avoiding the rule. The rule in Pinnel’s case can be readily avoided by those aware of it, but the techniques for avoidance do not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem because ordinary people do not assume that a promise to forgo the balance of a debt is not binding. The parties can agree that the debtor will provide something to make up the difference, such as a peppercorn, or by paying early or at a different place at the request of the creditor.315 The parties can use a deed to record their settlement. Further, the rule will not apply if there is a dispute about the amount owing316 or the original claim is for an unliquidated sum.317 In each of these cases settlement of the uncertain amount is a good consideration. The doctrine of promissory estoppel318 may operate to prevent the creditor from reneging on the promise to forgo the balance of the debt but the necessary detrimental reliance may be hard to find.319 Finally, the rule does not apply to a composition of creditors agreement or where a lesser sum is paid by a third party — both of which will now be discussed.

An exception — compositions with creditors 4.40  Acceptance of a lesser sum as part of a composition agreement is binding. It has long been the practice for the creditors of an impecunious debtor to make an arrangement with him or her whereby each agrees to accept a stated percentage of the debt in full satisfaction. The search for a sufficient consideration to support this type of agreement has proved to be difficult. It would appear at first sight to fall under the ban in Pinnel’s case,320 but the inconvenience of such a conclusion was so manifest that it could not be accepted. Two alternative suggestions have been proffered. Lord Ellenborough suggested in 1812 that there was consideration for the composition in the fact that each individual creditor agreed to forgo part of the debt on the hypothesis that all the other creditors would do the same.321 Such a consideration clearly suffices to support the agreement as between the creditors themselves. The objection that the debtor has provided no consideration appears to be answered by the joint promisee concept enunciated by the High Court of Australia in Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd.322 In relation to any particular creditor the debtor is a joint promisee with all the other creditors and it does not matter that the debtor has not provided something that could be described as a consideration so long as a consideration has in fact been provided on behalf of the joint promisees. As already pointed out, the other creditors do provide a consideration by agreeing to forgo a percentage of their respective debts.323

315. But compare Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties Ltd [1933] 2 KB 223 (payment made at a different place for the debtor’s convenience did not evade the rule). 316. Cooper v Parker (1855) 15 CB 822; 139 ER 650; Re Warren (1884) 53 LJ Ch 1016; Homeguard Products (NZ) Ltd v Kiwi Packaging Ltd [1981] NZLR 322. 317. Ibberson v Neck (1886) 2 TLR 427. 318. See  Chapter 2. See also Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643; [2007] EWCA Civ 1329. 319. See  2.15–2.16, particularly discussion of Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101. 320. Such was the view adopted in 1804 by Lord Ellenborough in Fitch v Sutton (1804) 5 East 230; 102 ER 1058. 321. Boothbey v Sowden (1812) 3 Camp 175; 170 ER 1346. 322. (1967) 119 CLR 460. See 4.8. 323. This argument appears not to have convinced Bollen J in In the Estate of Whitehead (1986) 44 SASR 402 at 404–5 but this may have been because each creditor signed a release instead of entering into a collective agreement. Nevertheless, Bollen J was prepared to hold that there was consideration.

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The other suggestion is that no creditor will be allowed to go behind the composition agreement to the prejudice of the other creditors or of the debtor, because this would be fraud on all the parties concerned.324 This solution was suggested by Lord Tenterden in 1818325 and supported by Willes J in 1863.326 Although this latter theory has received support both in England and Australia327 it appears that, since Coulls’ case, it may be no longer necessary to rely on the second solution in Australia.

An exception — part payment by a stranger 4.41  Part payment by a third party discharges the debt. Suppose that A owes B $100 and that C promises B $50 on condition that B will discharge A. If the $50 is paid and B still sues A for the balance, has A a defence? A faces both a consideration problem and a privity problem. As no promise of discharge was given to A, she cannot bring herself within the joint promisee concept of Coulls’ case. The question arose in 1825 in Welby v Drake.328 The defendant had drawn a bill for £18 3s 11d which had been returned unaccepted and which had come into the hands of the plaintiff. The defendant’s father then made an agreement with the plaintiff, whereby he promised to pay him £9 in return for the plaintiff’s promise to receive it in full satisfaction of his claim. The money was duly paid, but the plaintiff sued the defendant. Abbott CJ directed judgment for the defendant: If the father did pay the smaller sum in satisfaction of this debt, it is a bar to the plaintiff’s now recovering against the son; because, by suing the son, he commits a fraud on the father, whom he induced to advance his money on the faith of such advance being a discharge of his son from further liability.329

The plea of fraud was approved by Willes J in Cook v Lister330 and applied by the English Court of Appeal in Hirachand Punamchand v Temple.331 These cases, therefore, should be treated as exceptions to the general requirement of consideration and privity. It is odd that reneging on a contract is treated as a species of fraud.

324. See the helpful discussion of the authorities by Chernov JA in Scuderi v Morris (2001) 4 VR 125; [2001] VSCA 190 at [58]–[71]. See also Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 44 WAR 1; 270 FLR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [2598] (Drummond AJA). 325. Wood v Roberts (1818) 2 Stark 417; 171 ER 691. 326. Cook v Lister (1863) 13 CBNS 543 at 595; 143 ER 215 at 235. 327. E T Fisher & Co Pty Ltd v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd (1940) 64 CLR 84; Couldery v Bartrum (1881) 19 Ch D 394; Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597; Re Pearse [1905] VLR 446. 328. (1825) 1 C & P 557; 171 ER 1315. 329. Ibid at 557; 1316. See also Gray v Pearson (1877) 3 VLR (L) 81 discussed in 16.13. 330. (1863) 13 CBNS 543 at 595; 143 ER 215 at 235. 331. [1911] 2 KB 330; [1911–13] All ER Rep 1597 approved in Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd & Campbell (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 431; 147 ALR 1 at 15 (Dawson, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See analysis of Hirachand in N Ray v DCT [2005] FMCA 1893 at [24]–[30] (Barnes FM).

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Chapter 5

Intention to Create Legal Relations Introduction 5.1  Is intention a separate requirement? The question now to be discussed is whether a contract necessarily results once a court has ruled that the parties must be taken to have made an agreement and that it is supported by consideration.1 This conclusion is sometimes denied. The law, it is said, does not necessarily hold that there is a contract merely because of the presence of mutual promises. Agreements are made every day in domestic and social life and even in commercial dealings, where the parties do not intend to sue if they are not honoured. The definition of contract is a legally enforceable agreement. It is therefore said that, in addition to the phenomenon of agreement and the presence of consideration, a third contractual element is required — the intention of the parties to create legal relations. This view has been challenged by Williston.2 He argued that the separate element of intention is foreign to the common law, imported from the Continent by academic influences in the nineteenth century3 and useful only in systems which lack the test of consideration to enable them to determine the boundaries of contract: The common law does not require any positive intention to create a legal obligation as an element of contract … A deliberate promise seriously made is enforced irrespective of the promisor’s views regarding his legal liability.4

In essence, if consideration is present, the additional element of intention is otiose. This view is reinforced by the use of the objective test in ascertaining intention.5 If, applying this test, the elements of contract are present, it is not to the point for a party to claim that he or she did not really intend to make a contract. Conversely, where parties make an arrangement that is clearly not intended to attract legal consequences, it could not be said that there has been an exchange of considerations. Consideration, bargain, legal consequences — these are interrelated concepts.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

It is assumed here that the contract cannot otherwise be challenged or impugned on various grounds, covered in this work, which could render the supposed contract, or a part of it, void, voidable or unenforceable. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), s 21. See Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newtronics Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2009) 25 VR 411; [2009] VSCA 238 at [60] (consideration and intention to create legal relations can be distinct). Historically, this would appear to be correct. See Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 LQR 247 at 263–5. Williston on Contracts (3rd ed), s 21. Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; 187 ALR 92; [2002] HCA 8 at [25].

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