CHERNOBYL HOW IT HAPPENED

Table of contents :
Contents......Page 5
Introduction......Page 8
About the Author......Page 9
Foreword......Page 11
Dear Reader!......Page 15
List of Abbreviations......Page 20
Chapter 1......Page 22
Five Years Later......Page 23
Chapter 2......Page 42
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant......Page 43
RBMK-1000 REACTOR......Page 47
Chapter 3......Page 65
Program......Page 66
Chapter 4......Page 77
How It Happened......Page 78
Operational Reactivity Margin......Page 128
Chapter 5......Page 158
After The Explosion......Page 159
Chapter 6......Page 188
Whose The Commission, Creator?......Page 189
Commission A.G. Meshkov......Page 192
Commission G. A. Shasharin......Page 198
V. P. Volkov......Page 206
Soviet informants at the IAEA......Page 216
IAEA Experts......Page 231
Forensic Technical Expert Commission......Page 244
Chapter 7......Page 285
Obvious Resistance......Page 286
Chapter 8......Page 299
Academician A. P. Alexandrov......Page 300
Academician V. A. Legasov......Page 314
Dr. A.A. Abagyan......Page 318
Chapter 9......Page 321
Works of Art......Page 322
Chernobyl Notebook......Page 325
The Story "Chernobyl"......Page 374
Chapter 10......Page 381
About Operator Freedom......Page 382
Chapter 11......Page 394
Court......Page 395
Chapter 12......Page 417
Investigation Started......Page 418
Chapter 13......Page 457
Accident or Inevitability?......Page 458
Chapter 14......Page 474
Use of Atomic Energy......Page 475
Chapter 15......Page 495
Conclusion......Page 496
Chapter 16......Page 513
More About Chernobyl......Page 514
APPENDIX......Page 539
Appendix 1......Page 540
Appendix 2......Page 541
Appendix 3......Page 547
Appendix 4......Page 553
The Reactor Was Supposed To Explode......Page 554
Appendix 5......Page 574
Echo of Chernobyl......Page 575
Appendix 6......Page 585
Reactor Hostages......Page 586
Appendix 7......Page 600
Appendix 8......Page 612

Citation preview

CHERNOBYL HOW IT HAPPENED By: Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov

CHERNOBYL HOW IT HAPPENED Dyatlov A. S.

The text of the book is given according to the publication on the Internet: http://rrc2.narod.ru/book, illustrated by documents of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (http://www.chnpp.gov.ua). The PDF file was prepared by Konstantin (http://slavutich.kiev.ua/ ~sheffer), version 1.0

Dyatlov A. S. CHERNOBYL. HOW IT HAPPENED 2019 Version 1.0 The book was created using free and open-source software: • • • •

LibreOffice (AltSearch, Sk-spell) – typesetting Ubuntu GNU/Linux – operating system PT Serif – font family Inkscape, Krita, Gimp – graphics

The content has not been subjected to linguistic revision.

Dedicated To Heroes and Victims of Chernobyl Nuclear Accident 26 April 1986

Contents Introduction .............................................................1 About the Author .....................................................2 Foreword ..................................................................4 Dear Reader! .............................................................8 List of Abbreviations ..............................................13 Chapter 1 ................................................................15 Five Years Later ......................................................16 Chapter 2 ................................................................35 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant ..............................36 RBMK-1000 REACTOR ............................................40 Chapter 3 ................................................................58 Program .................................................................59 Chapter 4 ................................................................70 How It Happened ....................................................71 Operational Reactivity Margin..............................121 Chapter 5 ..............................................................151 After The Explosion ..............................................152 Chapter 6 ..............................................................181 Whose The Commission, Creator? ........................182 Commission A.G. Meshkov ...................................185 Commission G. A. Shasharin .................................191 V. P. Volkov ...........................................................199 Soviet informants at the IAEA ..............................209

IAEA Experts ........................................................224 Forensic Technical Expert Commission ................237 Chapter 7 ..............................................................278 Obvious Resistance ...............................................279 Chapter 8 ..............................................................292 Academician A. P. Alexandrov ...............................293 Academician V. A. Legasov ....................................307 Dr. A.A. Abagyan ...................................................311 Chapter 9 ..............................................................314 Works of Art .........................................................315 Chernobyl Notebook .............................................318 The Story "Chernobyl" ..........................................367 Chapter 10 .............................................................374 About Operator Freedom ......................................375 Chapter 11 .............................................................387 Court ....................................................................388 Chapter 12 .............................................................410 Investigation Started ............................................411 Chapter 13 .............................................................450 Accident or Inevitability? .....................................451 Chapter 14 .............................................................467 Use of Atomic Energy ...........................................468 Chapter 15 .............................................................488 Conclusion ...........................................................489 Chapter 16 .............................................................506

More About Chernobyl .........................................507 APPENDIX .............................................................532 Appendix 1 ...........................................................533 Appendix 2 ...........................................................534 Appendix 3 ...........................................................540 Appendix 4 ...........................................................546 The Reactor Was Supposed To Explode ................547 Appendix 5 ...........................................................567 Echo of Chernobyl ................................................568 Appendix 6 ...........................................................578 Reactor Hostages ..................................................579 Appendix 7 ...........................................................593 Appendix 8 ...........................................................605

Introduction

About the Author

Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov was born on March 3, 1931 in the village Atamanovo of Krasnoyarsk Krai. Father - a disabled person of the first world war worked as a whisker on the Yenisei river, his mother is a housewife. After completing 7 classes in 1945, he entered the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical College, whose electrical engineering department graduated with honors in 1950. For three years he worked in Norilsk at one of the enterprises of the Ministry of Environment and Economy. In 1953-1959, he studied at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, which he also graduated with honors, receiving the qualification of a physical engineer with a degree in automation and electronics.

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The distribution was sent to the shipyard them. Lenin Komsomol in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where he worked as a senior engineer, head of a physical laboratory, a supply mechanic for the main power plant of nuclear submarines. In 1973, for family reasons, he transferred to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant under construction, where he went from the deputy chief of the reactor department to the deputy chief engineer of the operation station. He was awarded the Order of Honor and the Red Banner of Labor. During the accident on April 26, 1986, he received a radiation dose of at least 550 rem. By the verdict of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was recognized as one of the perpetrators of the accident and sentenced to 10 years in prison in a penal colony. He served time in the village of Kryukovo, Poltava region. After numerous appeals from various organizations, friends, personally A.D. Sakharov, and after his death E.G. Bonner, on October 1, 1990 A.S.Dyatlov was prematurely released under Art. 220 (due to illness). Radiation sickness progressed rapidly, and despite the help of German doctors (since 1991, Dyatlov was treated twice a year in the burn department of the University Hospital of Munich) on December 13, 1995, A. Dyatlov died.

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Foreword The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986, in terms of scale, complexity and longterm consequences, is the largest and most severe disaster in the entire world history of the use of nuclear energy. Large amounts of radioactive substances from the reactor core were released into the atmosphere and then fell mainly in three large "spots" in the Republic of Belarus, Ukraine and Western regions of Russia. The total area of contaminated areas (Cesium-137-more than 1 Ki/ km2) it is almost 130 thousand km2 . Zones of radioactive contamination after the Chernobyl disaster were formed depending on the nature of emissions of the damaged reactor and weather conditions. During the period of intense emissions (April 26 - May 5, 1986) on different days in the expiring jet, the composition of radionuclides differed both in power and in their type. In accordance with the weather conditions in the first three days of radioactive clouds moved towards the Republic of Belarus. By April 30, the wind direction changed to the South and East. Accordingly, the flow of air masses contaminated with radionuclides, and the formation of a radioactive trace on the ground.

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At the same time, the lightest radioactive particles and gases rose into the upper atmosphere. They were deposited very slowly (from a few months to a year), having managed to circumnavigate the globe more than once, spreading throughout the Northern hemisphere. Heavier aerosols settled in the surface layer of air, from where they descended at different intervals to the earth's surface. In the first post-accident period (April-May 1986), the radiation situation was mainly determined by shortlived radionuclides, and primarily Iodine-131. After the natural decay of short and medium-lived radionuclides, the main danger is represented by radionuclides Cesium137, Strontium-90 and Plutonium. The consequences of the Chernobyl disaster were particularly severe for the Republic of Belarus. Here, 23% of the territory was exposed to radioactive contamination, which turned out to be 3 678 settlements and 20% of the population of the Republic. The total area with a density of Cesium-137 pollution over 1 Ki/km2 covered 3.2% of the European territory of the former USSR, and more than 0.2 Ki/km 2 23%. In the Russian Federation, Cesium-137 contamination of more than 1 Ki/km2 was recorded in 19 regions.

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The most polluted were Bryansk, Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan and Penza regions. About 2.3 million people live in areas contaminated with radionuclides in the Russian Federation. Today, 15 years after the accident, there is no clear and unambiguous answer to the question - what are the causes of the accident and who is to blame for its occurrence? A number of specialists have their own opinion. For example, academician L. A. Ilyin in his book "The Realities And Myths Of Chernobyl" (p. 79), analyzing the whole chain of events leading to the accident, suggested that the main cause of the accident at the 4th block initially lies in the defects of the project and the design of the RBMK reactor and especially in this type of apparatus, the so-called positive steam coefficient of reactivity. The opinion of the direct participant of the events at the Chernobyl station will probably be of particular value for the future generation. Therefore, the Publishing house "Nauchtehlitizdat" offers readers a book written by the former Deputy chief engineer of Chernobyl A. S. Dyatlov. We hope that many questions readers will receive the most complete and comprehensive answers.

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Vladimir Lomakin Deputy Director State Scientific and Technical Center on Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine T. G. Samkharadze Editor-in-Chief "Environmental Systems and Devices" Prof., Dr. Tech. Science Russian Academy of Engineering

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Dear Reader! Your attention is invited to the book, the author of which is an engineer, a direct participant in the events of the largest man made disaster-the accident at the 4th nuclear power unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The proposed book will help an open-minded reader, and prejudiced as well, to make or correct their own opinion about the causes of the disaster, the legality of the accusations of the operational personnel of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, officially declared the sole culprit of the disaster. In addressing You, dear reader, I ask you to be patient and read this book, and not to put it aside, guided only by the fact that You are working in another field and do not have sufficient knowledge in the field of reactor theory and operation of nuclear power plants. It is about more important, about the moral factor of the assessment of this event, the honor and dignity of the people involved in this process by the will of fate. Many of the direct participants are no longer with us. But for the rest of today living witnesses, relatives of the victims, for the staff of the ChNPP evaluation of companies care about.

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Today it is impossible to assess the extent of harm caused to staff entire nuclear power industry by the fact the official announcement of the personnel and technical management of the ChNPP the only culprit of the accident. Remained "behind the scenes" the fact that the staff did not run away, saving his life, and remained in his workplaces, performing his prescribed functions, doing everything possible and impossible to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The same personnel, restoring, carried out modernization of security systems, shortcomings in which caused the disaster, and then operated these units until recently. Harm to the existing and today "the high official estimates of" personnel actions is that in any extreme situation at the nuclear facility personnel will stand before a choice - to leave from the workplace, to abandon the struggle or to continue working, risking health, life and to be accused in all the "serious sins". By the will of fate I had to work under the leadership of Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov at the shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. I remember with gratitude the time when we worked together. There is no need to give him a characterization.

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Reading the book, You will see the integrity of character and outstanding civic courage of this Man! Today on ChNPP staff, held the "school of the Dyatlov" and gratefully remembered. On December 13, 1995 A. S. Dyatlov died, and on December 15, 2000 ahead of schedule, by the decision of the government of Ukraine, operation of the third, last of being in operation, power unit was stopped. In the press and on television was organized a noisy campaign about this event. However, this event did not become a holiday for the staff. The duty shift on the control block wore mourning armbands in protest. History has yet to give a true and unbiased assessment of all events in this enterprise and its personnel. So, what does the Chernobyl nuclear power plant staff do today?! Unusual silence in the turbine hall, cool and quiet in the Central hall, the staff is trying to understand their place in the light of the wording of OPB-88 - "the Final stage of operation of the nuclear power plant is the stage of its decommissioning...» Dear reader, ending this introduction, I want to note the following. In one of the reports of the Central television devoted to the decommissioning of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the "official version" was again sounded. That's what made me take up my pen.

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I do not know what else to write, to make this completely crafty "official version" sunk into oblivion! There is no doubt that the book before you is a weighty stone on the scientific pile of pseudo-facts and facts, lies and injustice, built in a barrier by pundits and government agencies. That is what "built" the building had as its objective to shift the whole responsibility on the personnel of the ChNPP, the author of books on engineers who dared to have their own opinions, which do not coincide with the opinion of doctors, academics who care about the honor of their uniforms. In principle, the expectation that a verdict will be delivered by the prosecutors General of Russia and Ukraine is not justified. They're not up to it today. But maybe the national Academies of Sciences of Russia and Ukraine would find in their ranks courageous people who are able to speak on this issue, given that it does not require fundamental researches. However, no one wants to look back and look at the current engineering practice at that time, and maybe something else. But there is no doubt that there must be a verdict on this issue that will put this tragedy in the box of history. I would like to see such a document in life.

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Let's not lose hope!

V. A. Chugunov Engineer Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

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List of Abbreviations A3 AZM AZS AR NPP MCR VNIIAES SCNT MCP AP IAE KMPC LAR IAEA MVTS MPA NIKIET ORR OPB PBJ

- Emergency Protection - Alarm on Excess Power - Alarm Rate of Rise of Power - Automatic Regulator - Nuclear Power Plant - Main Control Room - All-Union Research Institute for NPP Operation - State Committee on Science and Technology - Main Circulation Pump - Additional Absorber - Institute of Atomic Energy. I. V. Kurchatov - Circuit of Multiple Forced Circulation - Local Automatic Regulator - International Atomic Energy Agency - Interdepartmental Scientific and Technical Council - Maximum Design Accident - Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering - Operational Reactivity Margin - "General Safety Provisions" - "Nuclear Safety Rules"

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RBMK RR ECCS SIUR SUZ FA Fuel Rod TG USP ChNPP

- High Power Boiling Reactor - Manual Adjustment - Emergency Core Cooling - Senior Reactor Control Engineer - Control and Protection System - Fuel Assembly - Fuel Element - Turbogenerator - Shortened Rod-Absorber - Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

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Chapter 1

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Five Years Later On April 26, 1986, at one hour twenty three minutes forty seconds, the shift supervisor of the Chernobyl NPP unit 4, Alexander Akimov, ordered the reactor to be shut off after completion of work carried out before the shutdown of the power unit for the scheduled repair. The command was given in a quiet working environment, the central control system does not record a single alarm or warning signal about the deviation of the parameters of the reactor or service systems. Reactor operator Leonid Toptunov removed the cap from the A3 button to protect against accidental erroneous pressing and pressed the button. According to this signal, 187 rods of the reactor control system began to move down into the active zone. The backlight bulbs lit up on the mimic panel, and the arrows for the position indicators of the rods came into motion. Alexander Akimov, halfway to the reactor control panel, observed this, also saw that the “bunnies” of the AR unbalance indicators “darted to the left” (his expression), as it should be, which meant reducing the reactor power, turned to the safety panel, for which was observed by the experiment.

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But then what happened was something that even the most unbridled fantasy could not predict. After a slight decrease, the reactor power suddenly began to increase at an ever increasing speed, and alarms appeared. L.Toptunov shouted about an emergency increase in power. But to do anything was not in his power. All he could do was hold the A3 button, the control rods went into the active zone. There are no other means at his disposal. Yes, and all the others too. A. Akimov sharply shouted: “Turn off the reactor!”. I jumped to the console and de-energized the electromagnetic couplings of the drives of the CPS rods. The action is true, but useless. After all, the logic of the CPS, that is, all its elements of logic circuits, worked correctly, the rods went into the zone. Now it’s clear after pressing the A3 button there was no right action, there was no means of salvation. Another logic failed! Two powerful explosions followed with a short interval. The A3 rods stopped moving before they were halfway through. They had nowhere else to go. At one hour, twenty-three minutes, forty-seven seconds, the reactor collapsed as a result of a thermal explosion caused by acceleration of power by instant neutrons. This is a crash, the ultimate catastrophe that could be in an energy reactor.

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They did not comprehend it, did not prepare for it, no technical measures for localization at the block and station were provided. There are no organizational measures. Confusion, bewilderment and complete misunderstanding of what and how it happened, did not long possess us. There were pressing matters, the execution of which drove all other thoughts from his mind. Looking back, I do not know how to say - a long time ago (more than five years have passed) or recent: everything still stands before my eyes - with good reason I state that then we did everything possible in that extreme situation. There was nothing more useful to be done. I didn't observe any panic, any psychosis. Not a single person voluntarily left the block, leaving only by order. All of us came out of this ordeal with serious health injuries, for many – fatal. Need to particularly be noted. They were professional workers, clearly aware of the danger of working in that environment. Not flinched. Paying tribute to the professional, courageous, on the verge of self-sacrifice of the staff after the accident, this can not be said. I do not set the task to trace the origins of such behavior, to explore the subtleties of the psychological state of people in extreme, completely unacceptable conditions.

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It's a subject for a good writer. My task is simpler: to show why people were in such circumstances that they were forced to reveal all their mental qualities. Was it inevitable because of the use of nuclear power or other reasons. To speak, virtually, the only about the past, strictly adhering to facts. All the facts can be documented or indicate where the documents are. It's too serious. The question concerns a huge number of people in several generations. Enough speculation. I don't see myself as a writer, and I would never take up a pen. However, five years have passed, and there is no reliable description of the events and their causes. It is necessary to perform a duty to the dead (or rather killed) colleagues. From the Prosecutor's office: “The criminal prosecution is terminated in relation to Akimov A.F., Toptunova L.F. and Perevozchenko V.I. on the basis of Article 6, paragraph 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Ukrainian SSR on November 28, 1986”

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They would have been tried and imprisoned, no doubt, but they would have died. They won't say anything in their defense. Their relatives little loss, so the Prosecutor's office reminds them: your son, father, husband-criminal, remember! Truly a dog. Not the ones they were clinging to. No, I have not been silent all these 5 past years. Recognizing neither himself nor the personnel guilty of a reactor explosion, he wrote detailed technical justifications for this. Where? Yes, it's easier to say where I did not write. All is useless. Only R.P. Sergienko in his film and the Ukrainian newspaper "Komsomolskoye Znamen" gave the opportunity to speak a little. Naturally, due to the limited time in the film and the place in the newspaper, a detailed explanation of such a complex problem cannot be given. I am writing and thinking whether I will be able to print? Interestingly is obtained in our blessed country! As some get access to newspapers, magazines, so others have the road closed. I don't know, should I? Why different views on the same problem? The truth is the same. When I was in Germany, I found it possible to organize nearly a half-hour broadcast on television, printed an essay in the newspaper. And this without any initiative on my part.

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In October 1990, I read the report of the IAEA team of specialists, issued in 1986 after the information of Soviet specialists in Vienna about the causes of the Chernobyl disaster. Since Soviet informants led by academician V. A. Legasov did not seek the truth, in slander against the staff resorted to lies, kept silent about the known facts, and the report of the IAEA experts contained obvious inaccuracies. I have sent comments on the report to Mr. H. Blix, Director of the IAEA. Now here's the thing. My comments somehow caught the eye of the editor of the magazine "Nuclear Engineering", and he, in a letter to I was asked to write for the magazine article, which published in September 1995, As normal people, they want to learn from the mistakes of others. And we do not want, let everyone fill their own cones. I read the partisan interview in Academician A.P. Aleksandrov in the “Spark” partisan (in the sense of perseverance, unchanged position in the prosecution of personnel), wrote an article and brought it to the editor. I didn’t ask for a word - I indicated where I could check what was written. I agreed to any change to the article, of course, while retaining the meaning of what was said. Not printed. They need it, but we don’t.

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I understand that there is little space in Ogonyok, but after that after that they found a place for slanderous fabrications for the staff for Kevrolev and Asmolov. I affirm: slanderous. And this is in 1991! Of course, one cannot say that nothing is changing. Contrary to the powerful synclite of doctors and academicians, by the efforts of single enthusiasts V.P. Volkov, A.A. Abagyan. No, I’m wrong - they don’t find out. They are clear for a long time, and to the creators of the reactor - clear immediately after the accident. The reasons are written in report, which previously cannot be done. allowed. And now it is still available only to a narrow circle. It is required to overcome obstacles. Strange doctors and academics were selected in this matter: for years they did not see the obvious at point blank range. And still I believe - the truth will be made public, and even I believe - not in 50 years, but earlier! The official version of the causes of the disaster 26 April 1986, still remains unchanged, clearly laid the blame on the operational staff. Clarification of view began to come later. Why it happened-it is difficult to say unequivocally, I will describe how it seems to me. I thought about it a lot, there are clear questions, and there are incomprehensible.

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The conclusions of the authorities on the causes of the disaster. Everything is simple here. It seems to me that at that time there could be no other conclusions, because the investigation from the very beginning was unnaturally given into the hands of the creators of the reactor, that is, potential culprits. Not a single commission had a person interested in calling the causes of the accident the reactor, its properties. And vice versa, directly, indirectly, as a last resort, corporate, everyone was satisfied with the blaming on the staff. And, most importantly, everything is simple and clear. Usually he follows the track that was rolled up for the Soviet Union. We have no other reasons for the occurrence of accidents, except sloppiness and illiteracy serving people. Even if the commissions made a conclusion that was true (after all, we can assume this), they would have buried it from “political” considerations and made public what was announced. No, there could not be another. Press. Why did our discerning meticulous correspondents believe everything so recklessly and unconditionally? Why were they not alerted by the onesided, biased selection of commissions? Well, of course, the commissions are heavy, reputable, do not cause doubts. But there were doubters and with the opinion, directly opposite to the official. They were ignored.

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The press did one thing: chilling staff. From different sides, with different bitterness. In addition to two articles in the Literary Newspaper explaining that there are RBMKs and near-reactor cases, nothing, it seems there were no other thoughts. The correspondent M. Odints is subject to conviction even the fact that A. Dyatlov defended himself in court. In our Soviet, certainly righteous court, do not even dare to defend yourself. But, on the other hand, such obvious malice is better than an accusation from the standpoint of seemingly sympathy. So, in an interview with the correspondent of "Arguments and Facts," the chief acts Chernobyl press Kovalenko. The man decided that if he was put in touch with the press, he already began to understand the reactors. He says with confidence: "All textbooks and instructions indicate that the reactor cannot explode under any circumstances." And more: “It seems so today. They lived according to the laws and concepts of his time. And then they were sure that no matter what you do with the reactor, an explosion is impossible. ” I have not seen in textbooks or instructions that the explosion of a reactor is impossible under any circumstances. Moreover, in 1986 he knew at least five cases, in fact about explosions, in our country.

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The reactor operator, and in any case RBMK, clearly knows that you can’t do what you want with the reactor. An explosion is not an explosion, but an accident in this case will definitely be, and severe. We were put up for fools, they say, what to take from them. True, Dr. O. Kazachkovsky, on the contrary, called “professionals” - he directly spilled balm on his soul, with tar. Yes, a lot of them practiced on our account. Both unpredictable and unlikely violations were committed by personnel. That's why they are scientists, their minds are inventive. And the press regularly conveyed all these fabrications to society. In fact, a wide technical community and the public came to the conclusion about the causes of the accident, adopted at the MVTS under the chairmanship of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.P. Aleksandrov. But somehow it passed by the attention of the press that the president is the inventor and scientific leader of the RBMK topic. How does this fit, say, with ethics? Needless to say, the law. The first to suspect that something was wrong with the official version of the causes of the accident was the operators of nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors.

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This is understandable: as soon as we looked at and comprehended the technical measures carried out on the remaining reactors, the technical condition of the reactors for them in April 1986 became clear for them. They understood what they had been holding on to for all years. But this is the narrowest and most informed (involuntarily) category of people. It seemed to the authorities that the criminals had been found, announced, and sentenced - everything was in order! Society has reacted in a peculiar and, according to common sense, in the exact opposite direction. The catastrophe led to grave consequences with the withdrawal from use of a large territory in long term. It happened as a result of a personnel error. Is it possible to further rule out errors? Of course not. No normal person will dare to answer in the affirmative. No matter how good the operators are, there are no guarantees of errorfree operation and cannot be. There are thousands of operators. And if so, then the use of nuclear energy is generally unacceptable. What it turned into, we know. How it burps - remains to be seen. Can such a course of events be foreseen? Of course, this is the most normal reaction of people. Yes, foreseeing the social consequences of decisions made has never been a strong point of the Soviet and party authorities.

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They did not develop, this side, due to uselessness. A propaganda machine was launched, and black was already white, and if necessary a punitive detachment was ready. There is no reason to think. The Soviet engineering corps is undoubtedly powerful and competent, it is not possible to form an opinion had, in view of the complete information hunger. Although, it would seem, what to hide if everyone reported to the IAEA? The position taken by IAEA experts deserves special discussion. According to the new Soviet policy, a group of specialists prepared a report for the international community on the Chernobyl disaster, consisting of two parts: a small book about the causes of the accident and a large one - with coverage of radiation and medical problems. We will not touch the second part. How the international community was informed on the first part I will tell you more further. Here we consider the issue without going into details. The reactor exploded under normal ordinary conditions: • There were no natural disasters: floods, earthquakes, Tunguska or other meteorite; • There was no sabotage; • There was no terrorism.

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Despite all the shortcomings of the information, nevertheless, the IAEA experts were informed mainly of the actual circumstances of the accident and the graphs of the parameters. And in these conditions, IAEA experts actually agreed with Soviet informants and also blamed the personnel for the explosion. In this regard, the question arises: Do experts allow the possibility of explosion (nuclear explosion) of a reactor, executed in accordance with regulatory documents, due to operator error? If allowed, then their propaganda on the development of nuclear energy is immoral. And in the West, operators are mistaken. After the accident, I analyzed many times the regulatory documents adopted in the Soviet Union for the design of atomic reactors and did not find a situation in which a reactor designed in accordance with the ABY and BPS would explode. Natural anomalies and sabotage are not considered. Of course, I do not dare to lay claim to a comprehensive completeness of analysis; it is beyond the power of one person. But the teams of drafters of documents do not see such situations, otherwise countermeasures would have been provided.

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Given the qualifications of the IAEA experts, it was not difficult for them, on the basis of the materials available to them, to find numerous discrepancies of the reactor design to regulatory documents and to draw a conclusion about its unsuitability for operation. It was not difficult for them to conclude that the violations of instructions attributed to us (in fact they were not) in no case blew up the reactor that meets the design standards. Apparently dumbfounded by the information that had fallen on his head, usually from the Soviet Union by others. The methods obtained, the experts hastened to release a report, literally following the Soviet informants. Otherwise, nothing can be explained, for example, such an excerpt from the report: "This printout shows that too many control rods were removed from the reactor core and that it did not have sufficient reactivity margin to meet the shutdown requirements. At this time, the operator should have stopped the reactor." What is it wrong and why is it unacceptable for such competent people:

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1) There was no printout; it was received after the accident. We will take this to the conscience of informants. 2) A printout of the positions of the rods at time 1 h 22 min 30 sec. Button A3 is pressed in the 1 h 23 min 40 sec. This is the time to review the printout, I need to learn 211 rods. Still have time? Soviet informants understand that it is necessaryto discredit the staff. But why don't the experts even think a little? But this is so, the other is more serious. 3) Really experts do not see the contradiction: “... that he did not have a sufficient reserve of reactivity to fulfill the requirements during shutdown. At that time, the operator should have shut down the reactor ... ” It turns out - you can’t execute mercy - without punctuation marks at all. Suppose we saw on the printout a small margin, according to the Regulation, when the parameter is rejected, we reset the protection - we get an explosion. So it was 26 April 1986, we only pressed the protection button at the end of the work.

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4) And most importantly. How to understand that the reactor"...did not have enough reactivity to meet the requirements when stopping…?" In books written for the reactors that the reactor needs to have a reactivity not more than allowed by the authorities impact on the reactivity. This is understandable and in full agreement with the physics of reactors. And there is not even a hint in the books about some necessary minimum for a safe stop (?!) reactivity margin. That the A3 becomes the accelerating device (universal protection) and documents on RBMK: the project, the Regulations, the instructions. That this is so, it became known after the accident, when the calculations were done. The designers of the control rods gave birth to freaks, Soviet informants to the IAEA after the accident, say nothing, and - surprisingly - persuaded the IAEA experts. Inconceivable! Persuading Soviet informants knew that such construction of the terminals unfit for work: immediately after the accident, the lift rods are restricted and then replaced by rods of a different design. They had a goal-to persuade that bad staff blew up a good reactor.

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And after all reached. Why V. A. Legasov was not awarded the title of Hero, as V. Gubarev regrets it, I do not understand. In this respect at other times you can not agree to lie. Only three dozen words, and how many bear false information! Other statements of the IAEA specialist report of the same kind. And he went to the whole world, oil spilled on the heads of Soviet informants. Returning to the consideration of the report in 1991, whether the IAEA experts will find the determination to write a report that is true and worthy of this organization, will show near future. Of course, scientists from different countries continue to be interested in the Chernobyl disaster, and they are not inclined to take anything for granted. But mostly the research deals with certain aspects, and the report of experts is complex, and therefore continues to play a negative role. It is difficult for a person to resist the information that has fallen on him. Welcome information. Report of the Government Commission, conclusions of various commissions, newspapers, magazines, writers... And all winds in one direction, all in one pipe. How can you not believe it? Well, the question is, why the Deputy The Chairman of the Council of Ministers B. E. Shcherbina to speak not that?

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Why him, father-father (all under his hand), and guilty to forget, the innocent to blame? So it is. Why another Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers G. Vedernikov just say (frankly-lie) that brought in Chernobyl "all four stages of protection against the fool"? He doesn't need it. So they did. German magazine "Spiegel" No. 29 for 1987 (Appendix 1) under the photo of the defendants: Directors Bryukhanov, Deputy chief engineer Dyatlov, chief engineer Fomin writes: "Mess, negligence, negligence." However, it is unclear how this could affect the physical characteristics reactor's. Was he offended? The oppression of the official accusation pressed and continues to press on consciousness men's. No, the accident couldn't have happened that easily. It worked the same reactors. That this is not argument, somehow I don't think. They can't see what's on the surface. 1) Why is the accident classified? Unavailable until now. And the reactor is unclassified. 2) It is not necessary to be a specialist to draw a conclusion: there were or were not mistakes of personnel, but the reactor exploded in ordinary conditions. Therefore, such a reactor is useless.

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3) Why in the Soviet Union, no accident occurred because of poor equipment? Well, it is clear, the Soviet equipment-the best in the world, but still not ideal. Am I wrong? So I will try to answer these and other questions.

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Chapter 2

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Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located near the Dnieper river on the Pripyat river. In 1986-it is a large power unit with a capacity of 4 million kW. The first power unit was launched on September 26, 1977, the next-in December 1978, 1981 and 1983 respectively. Together with the construction of the station grew and formed a team of operators. Special problems with the staff was not, I think, because of the good prospects for obtaining an apartment and the location of the station. In the reactor hall of the first block, basically, people came with a similar device for so-called industrial reactors. They formed the backbone. In the future, this source was exhausted, but there was already an opportunity to translate from working to the input unit. The usual problems of a new enterprise, mitigated by the gradual introduction of blocks in action. The station worked quite satisfactorily. Until 1986, there was one serious accident, a rupture of the technological channel on the first block in 1982. It led to long-term repair and significant exposure of repair personnel. Within normal limits for those working at the station.

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There was one case of contamination of the territory of the station, several tens of square meters, with decontaminating solution after washing the first circuit due to a small leak of the pipeline. The surface layer of soil was removed, buried. In General, the Chernobyl station incidents occurred less than the average number of nuclear power plants in the country. Power generation in the last time before the accident was about 28 billion kWh per year, which is only slightly inferior to the Leningrad NPP. But there was already an established team. We were constantly moving staff and the influx of new people. And in 1985-86 some of the experienced operatives were transferred to the fifth block under construction. Passed, of course, good workers, because: • The station is one, they didn’t give to the side. They perfectly understood the difficulties of the starting period; • As a rule, passed with promotion. In this case it is inconvenient to hold a person; • And the bosses of the third stage (fifth and sixth blocks) - their station workers, they knew who is who.

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I must say, at the Chernobyl station, technical middle managers were appointed from the station workers, not from the outside. I don't remember any aliens, except for the first time. There are pros and cons in this, but I think the positives are still pulling. All shift supervisors unit, and the supervisors of the shops, worked only at the Chernobyl the station is at least five years old. This is not some sit-the chiefs and the people directly implementing and controlling the technological process. After the accident, all operational personnel passed re-examination, you know, with a passion and recognized fit for work. I'll refer here to the report of the Commission of Gospromatomnadzor of January 4, 1991: "In the writings of psychological branch scientific-research laboratory "Prediction" of Minatomenergoprom of the USSR (was research and others – A.D) the results of the analysis of personal and socio-psychological characteristics of Chernobyl personnel before and after the accident, which showed that personal data Chernobyl operational personnel did not have such differences from the data of the personnel of other stations, which could be the direct cause of the accident.

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And in general the collective of Chernobyl in 1986 is characterized as quite ordinary, mature, formed, consisting of qualified specialists - at a level recognized as satisfactory in the country. The team was not better, but not worse than others NPP. And why is it that ordinary normal operators suddenly allow "an extremely unlikely combination of violation of order and operation", as it was presented by Soviet informants in the IAEA? Maybe the combination of the change on April 26 there was some particularly outstanding? No, regular shift. And not too many "unlikely"? It certainly was, and I will say more about it. One stage of the station included two power units. But almost every unit functioned independently, there are few connections. The main equipment of the unit: reactor, two TG and transformer.

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RBMK-1000 REACTOR For further understanding, it is necessary to briefly describe what a nuclear reactor in general and the RBMK reactor in particular are. The nuclear reactor of power plants is a device for converting nuclear energy into thermal energy. Fuel in the vast majority of reactors is weakly enriched uranium. In nature, the chemical element uranium consists of two of its isotopes: 0.7% isotope with an atomic weight of 235, the rest - an isotope with an atomic weight of 238. The fuel is only the isotope Uranium-235. When the neutron is captured (absorbed) by the Uranium-235 nucleus, it becomes unstable and, by everyday standards, instantly disintegrates into two, mostly unequal, parts with the release of a large amount of energy. In each act of nuclear fission, energy is released millions of times more than in the combustion of a molecule of oil or gas. In such a large reactor as Chernobyl, when operating at full power, it "burns" about four kilograms of uranium per day.

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The energy released during each fission of the uranium nucleus is realized as follows: the main part is in the form of the kinetic energy of fission "fragments", which during braking transfer it almost all in the reactor fuel element and in its structural shell. Exit beyond the shell of any noticeable part of the fragments is unacceptable. If we look at the periodic table, we will see that the nuclei of fission fragments have a clear excess of neutrons in order to be stable. Therefore, as a result of a chain of β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, they are shifted to the right to a stable state according to the table of chemical elements. This process, accompanied by the emission of β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, particles and γ radiation, for each type of fragment has its own biography and its own half-lives. It is the fission fragments that make up the majority of the radiation pollution of the territory in the accident after the destruction and release of fuel rods in the explosion. During normal operation of the reactor, β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,-particles also do not go beyond the fuel rods and there they lose their energy; γ radiation is also mostly absorbed inside the reactor. After the cessation of the chain reaction, when the reactor is stopped, the residual heat from the decay of fission products for a long time forced to cool the fuel rods.

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At each fission of a uranium nucleus, two to three, on average about two and a half, neutrons are emitted. Their kinetic energy is absorbed by the moderator, fuel and structural elements of the reactor, then transferred to the coolant. It is precisely the neutrons that make it possible to carry out a chain reaction of fission of Uranium-235 nuclei. If one neutron from each fission causes a new fission, then the reaction intensity will remain at the same level. Most neutrons are emitted immediately upon nuclear fission. These are instant neutrons. A small part, about 0.7%, after a short period of time, after seconds and tens of seconds, are delayed neutrons. They allow you to control the intensity of the uranium fission reaction and regulate the power of the reactor. Otherwise, the existence of energy reactors would become problematic - only an atomic bomb. The rest of the fission energy is the instantaneous γ-radiation emitted directly during fission, and the neutrino energy, which we do not capture and do not see. Usually, energy reactors use not natural, but somewhat enriched isotope-235 uranium. But still, most of it is Uranium-238, and therefore a significant amount of neutrons is absorbed by it.

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The Uranium-238 nucleus, after neutron absorption, is unstable and through double β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, decay turns into the chemical element Plutonium-239, which is also capable of fission during absorption of thermal neutrons, like Uranium-235. The properties of plutonium as a fuel differ from uranium and, if accumulated sufficiently after prolonged operation of the reactor, they slightly change the physics of the reactor. Plutonium thrown out during the accident also contributes to the pollution of the territory. And there is no hope for its decay (the half-life of Plutonium-239 is more than 24 thousand years), only migration deep into the earth. Other plutonium isotopes are also present. Properties of Uranium-235: • Share when its nucleus absorbs a thermal (lowenergy) neutron; • Release a large amount of energy; • Emit during fission neutrons necessary for selfsustaining reaction. Uranium-235 is the basis for the creation of nuclear power reactors. Almost all nuclear reactors operate with thermal neutrons, i.e. neutrons with low kinetic energy.

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Neutrons after fission of uranium or plutonium undergo the stages of deceleration, diffusion and capture by nuclei of fuel and structural materials. Part of the neutrons flies beyond the active zones - leak. At the same time, a large number of fissions occur, and, therefore, in a working reactor there is always a large number of neutrons that make up the neutron flux, the neutron field. The burning of fuel nuclei occurs slowly, and therefore, in a sufficiently long period of time, the amount of fuel in the reactor can be considered unchanged. Then the number of neutrons absorbed by the fuel, and at the same time the number of divided nuclei and the number received energy will be directly proportional to the neutron flux in the core. In fact, the task of operators is to measure and maintain the neutron flux according to the requirements for maintaining power. If we conventionally divide fission neutrons into successive generations (the convention is as follows since fission occurs inconsistently, then this is similar to motion unorganized crowd, not the steps of the army column) with the number of neutrons No. 1, No. 2, and so on, then if the number of neutrons in each generation is equal, the reactor power will be constant.

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Such a reactor will be called critical and the neutron multiplication factor equal to the ratio of the number of neutrons of the next generation to previous equal to one. With a multiplication coefficient greater than unity, the number of neutrons and power continuously increase supercritical reactor. The higher the multiplication coefficient, the greater the rate of power increase, and the power increases over time not exponentially, but exponentially. In operational work, as a rule, they use not the value of the reproduction coefficient K, but the value of the so-called reactivity ρ, which at К, slightly differing, which at К, slightly differing from unity, with sufficient accuracy seems to be equal to (K – 1). In normal practice, the operator is dealing with a reactor whose supercriticality or positive reactivity is not more than one tenth of a percent. With more reactivity, the slew rate becomes too large, dangerous to the integrity of the reactor and service systems. All power reactors have an automatic A3, which shuts off the reactor at high power increase rates. RBMK A3 reacted at the reactor at a rate of power increase twice in a time of 20 s. The most important moment. In fission of a uranium nucleus, approximately 0.7% of neutrons are produced not in fission, but with some delay.

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They are included in the total number of neutrons of a given generation and thereby increase the lifetime of a neutron generation. The fraction of delayed neutrons is usually denoted by β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. If the excess (positive) reactivity reaches (and more) β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, then the reactor becomes critical only at instant neutrons, the generation rate of which is high - is determined by the time of neutron deceleration and diffusion, and therefore the rate of increase in power is very high. There is no protection in this case - only the destruction of the reactor can interrupt the chain reaction. So it was April 26, 1986 at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In fact, due to the accumulation of plutonium in the core and the difference in the properties of instantaneous and delayed neutrons in the RBMK reactor, the β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,-effective value was not 0.7, but 0.5%. The RBMK-1000 reactor is a channel type reactor, the neutron moderator is graphite, and the coolant is ordinary water. A fuel cartridge is drawn from 36 fuel rods of three and a half meters long. The fuel rods with the help of spacer grids mounted on the central bearing rod are placed on two circles: on the inside 6 pieces and on the outside 12 pieces.

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Each cassette consists of two tiers in height. Thus, the active zone has a height of seven meters. Each fuel rod is dialed from UO2 tablets placed in a sealed zirconium-niobium alloy pipe. Unlike hull reactors, where all fuel cartridges are located in a common housing designed for full operating pressure, in the RBMK reactor, each cassette is placed in a separate process channel, which is a pipe with a diameter of 80 mm. The active zone of the RBMK reactor with a height of 7 and a diameter of 11.8 m is composed of 1,888 graphite columns with central openings each where the channels are installed. Of these, 1,661 are technological channels with fuel cartridges, the rest are CPS channels, where 211 neutron-absorbing rods and 16 control sensors are located. CPS channels are evenly distributed along the core in the radial and azimuthal directions. From below, a coolant is supplied to the technological channels - ordinary high-pressure water that cools fuel elements. Water partially evaporates and in the form of a steam-water mixture from above. It is diverted to drum separators, where the steam is separated and fed to the turbines. Water from the drumseparators using the MCP is again fed to the entrance to the technological channels.

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The steam after condensation in the turbines condenses and returns to the coolant circuit. Thus, the water circulation loop is closed. If we accept the design of the active zone given, we will see where the fission neutrons go. Part of the neutrons leaves the core and is lost forever. Some neutrons are absorbed by the moderator, coolant, structural materials and fission products of fuel nuclei. This is a futile loss of neutrons. The rest are absorbed by fuel. To maintain constant power, the amount of neutrons absorbed by the fuel must also be unchanged. Consequently, from the two and a half (on average) neutrons emitted during each fission of the fuel core into leakage and capture by non-fissile materials, we can lose one and a half neutrons. This will be a critical reactor. Such a reactor cannot work, if only for the following reason: during the fission of uranium, nuclei of various chemical elements are formed, and among them there is a significant amount of xenon with an atomic weight of 135, which has a very large neutron absorption cross section. As the power rises, xenon begins to form, and the reactor shuts down. So it was with the first American reactor. E. Fermi considered the neutron capture cross section as a xenon nucleus and jokingly said that the nucleus is the size of an orange.

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To compensate for this and other effects, the fuel is loaded into the reactor with an excess, which increases the proportion of absorption by the fuel when neutrons are constantly leaked and absorbed by non-fissile materials. To avoid a constant increase in the power of such a reactor, the so-called reactivity impact bodies containing materials that intensively absorb neutrons are introduced into the active zone. Methods of compensation can be different, we will consider them just for example, RBMK. In the CPS channels are rods containing a strong neutron absorber - boron, with the help of which the necessary neutron balance and, therefore, the reactor power are maintained. If it is necessary to increase power, part of the rods is fully or partially withdrawn from core, as a result of which the proportion of neutrons absorbed by the fuel increases, the power increases and the rods are reintroduced into the core when they reach the desired power level. As a rule, the new position of the control rods is not identical to the original one - it depends on the change core reactivity when changing power - from the power factor of reactivity. If it is necessary to reduce power, rods are introduced into the core, i.e. they introduce negative reactivity, the reactor becomes subcritical and the power begins to decrease.

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At a new level, power is stabilized by changing the position of the rods. All this is carried out by the AR. The operator at the touch of a button changes the level of the set power, and the rest is up to the regulator. True, in the case of the RBMK reactor, this is not entirely true, and sometimes not at all, - the operator is forced to the intervention to adjust the operation of the regulator mainly to establish the energy release in one or another part of the zone. In the newly constructed reactor, the technological channels are loaded with fresh unburned fuel cartridges. If all 1,661 channels are loaded with cassettes, then the reproduction rate will be so large that it will be impossible to extinguish it with existing control rods. Therefore, about 240 technological channels instead of fuel cartridges are loaded with special neutron-absorbing rods. And several hundred more absorbers are placed in the holes of the central bearing rods of the fuel cartridges. As fuel burns out, these absorbers are gradually removed and replaced by fuel cartridges. When all absorbers are removed, the necessary core reactivity is maintained by replacing the most burnt out cassettes with fresh ones. There is a stationary overload mode.

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In the RBMK reactor, fuel cartridges are replaced when the reactor is operated at power by a special unloading and loading machine. At this time, the active zone contains completely burnt out cassettes, fresh and with intermediate burnout. It is for this mode that the number of control and protection rods is calculated. Each CPS rod introduces some kind of reactivity, which depends on its location in the zone and the shape of the neutron field. In the RBMK reactor, reactivity is usually measured in rods, the efficiency of one rod is conventionally accepted as 0.05%. As already explained, the rate of increase in reactor power is greater, the greater its positive reactivity. The power reduction rate is also greater with a greater negative reactivity introduced. As a result of violations of the regime and malfunctions in systems, it becomes necessary to quickly shut down the reactor in order to avoid damage. Therefore, the number of CPS rods should always be in excess to bring the reactor into a state with the necessary subcriticality. When the reactor is in a critical state (critical means not catastrophic, but that its reproduction coefficient is unity and, accordingly, the reactivity is zero), it must be at least some number of rods removed from the core and ready for immediate entry into the zone for termination of the chain reaction.

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And the more rods are removed from the core, the more confidence that the reactor will be shut off quickly if necessary, with great subcriticality. This is true for all reactors designed to meet safety standards and requirements. In all reactors, one way or another, part of the reactivity impacting organs is introduced into the reactor — this is necessary for maneuvering with power. For example, with a forced partial decrease in power, the amount of xenon temporarily increases (they say that the reactor is poisoned by xenon), the increase in the number of neutron absorber must be compensated by removing some of the quickly removed absorber from the zone. Otherwise, the reactor will have to shut down and wait for the decay of xenon. In the RBMK reactor, during operation, a part of the SUZ rods is partially or completely in the core and suppresses (compensates) some excess reactivity. Now let's define the concept of ORR. The operational reactivity margin is the positive reactivity that the reactor would have with all the CPS rods removed.

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Like normal reactors, the RBMK reactor also needs a reactivity margin for power maneuvers. Even after the accident in 1975, the minimum reactivity margin of 15 rods was determined for RBMK at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP based on the need to regulate energy release in the core. And after the Chernobyl accident, perfect savagery was found, absurdity - with a small supply of A3, it does not jam, but accelerates the reactor. The smaller the reactivity margin, the more nuclear is RBMK ?! Know ours! .. We are not like the others. There are still no reactors with such properties. You can understand that A3 could not cope with the jamming of the reactor, but that it itself accelerates reactor - this is not a dream in a nightmare. Like OZR, the text will often mention the vapor effect of reactivity and the power coefficient of reactivity. Let's clarify the concepts. Let the reactor operate at some power with a constant flow of coolant. In the process channel, the water is heated to a boil and steam appears. As you move in the channel, more and more water, which removes heat from the fuel rods, turns into steam. Thus, in stationary mode, we have a certain amount of steam within the active zone.

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Now increase the power of the reactor. The amount of heat increases and, therefore, there will be more water vapor in the core. How this will affect the reactivity of the core - in the direction of decrease or increase depends on the ratio in the zone of the nuclei of the moderator and fuel. Water is also a neutron moderator, like graphite, and with increasing amount of steam in the core becomes less water. The designers, apparently, based on economic considerations, chose the ratio of the moderator nuclei and fuel in RBMK so that a complete replacement of water with steam leads to an increase in reactivity by five to six β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. Why is this scary? For example, when a coolant pipe with a diameter of 800 mm ruptures, dehydration occurs after a few seconds and a slow-moving A3 would not cope with the released reactivity. Explosion, as on April 26. That is not all. With increasing power, the temperature of the fuel always rises and this leads to a decrease in reactivity. In the RBMK reactor, when the power changes, basically two factors affect the reactivity: the negative temperature effect of the fuel and the positive vapor effect. They make up a fast power reactivity coefficient – change reactivity when changing power by one megawatt (or kilowatt).

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Other effects of changes in reactivity depending on power: the temperature effect of graphite and poisoning of the reactor with xenon, although they are significant, are manifested with a large delay and dynamics are not affected. For a properly designed reactor, the power factor should be negative. This means that with any disturbance, the reactivity increases, the power begins to increase with it, and this leads to a decrease in reactivity, and the power stabilizes, although at a higher level. At the RBMK reactor, the power factor was positive in a wide range of capacities - in violation of regulatory requirements. This directly affected the accident on April 26th. "The first power unit was launched on September 26, 1977, the next-in December 1978, 1981 and 1983 respectively."

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Chapter 3

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Program Its full name is "the working program of tests of the Chernobyl NPP turbogenerator No. 8 in the modes of joint run - out with the load of own needs". There is nothing outstanding in the Program, a regular program, normally written. Its received fame only in connection with an accident that occurred during its conduct. There is no technical connection between the accident and the Program; pure chance connects them and the dishonesty of the investigators. If in the last minutes before the start of the test there was an automatic response by some signal (you don’t believe the commissions and free writers that we blocked the defenses - they were all in operation for the regime at 200 MW), then the accident would have happened just like that same. There would be an accident because of this Program, then everything is simple - prohibit the conduct at other reactors and there are no more problems. But this is not so. Critics Of The Program. “The tests under the Program cannot be considered purely electric, they are complex, they concern the entire unit.”

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And who considered them purely electric? Have you come up with yourself or asked someone? It is enough to look at the signatures for the Program so that the question disappears by itself. If the tests are purely electric, then why are the signatures of the reactor, turbine, and thermal automation workshops? Program Coordination. Here is how the commission of the State Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision Commission writes in 1991: “Such tests should qualify as complex tests of the unit, and the program of their implementation should have been agreed with the General Designer, Chief Designer, Scientific Director and state oversight body. However, the pre-accident PBY-04-74 and OPB-82 did not require the management of nuclear plants to coordinate such programs with the above organizations. ” I thought that it was necessary to agree on the order, which I told the chief engineer about. Coordination with external organizations is the responsibility of the Technical Department of the station and the chief engineer. I was satisfied with the signatures that were.

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There was a nuclear accident, and the Program is not coordinated with the Department of nuclear safety stations. But the introduction of excessive reactivity was not due to the Program. The above-named Commission on this occasion writes: “A specific thermohydraulic feature of the planned mode was the increased, relative to the nominal, initial flow rate of the coolant through the reactor. The vapor content was minimal with a slight underheating of the coolant to the boiling point at the entrance to the core. Both of these factors, as it turned out, were directly related to the scale of the effects manifested during the tests. ” That is, according to the commission, the implementation of the Program, if it did not cause the accident, still affected. Not this way. When the coolant flow rate was more than the nominal, there were no incidents with the reactor. And indeed the whole ideology of design and on the basis of them compiled operational documents, including the Regulations, prescribes the consumption of "no less" and nowhere is "no more."

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Having examined all the documents, the commission did not find deviation of the parameters from the norm, they were not there until the button A3 was pressed. But the flow rate of the coolant at that time was already equal to the nominal. And the underheating of the coolant as it was, it was like that - the personnel do not regulate it. So there is no reason to approve the commission. And the difference in reactivity effects (for example, six pumps would work) is as follows: a person drowned at a depth of one hundred meters, if only ninety … This example shows that even people who have largely abandoned the bald accusations of personnel by stating in the report that the ABY and OPB reactors are completely inconsistent and have crossed the forbidden barrier, still cannot refuse the stereotypical formulations accusing the staff. And in the report this is more than once encountered. Security measures. Skate of all critics. And what is the entire second section of the Program about? According to them, mechanisms are backed up for backup power, which are quite sufficient not only for cooling the unit, but even for operating the reactor at power. Only the blind can not see this.

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No reactivity effects, exceeding in magnitude those that during normal operation, were not expected under the Program, they were not in connection with its implementation. Naturally, the operators use all the operational documentation. Power level. According to the Program, the power level is 700 ~ 1,000 MW. Before it, we had a capacity of 200 MW. Why it happened - I will tell further. But what are we, a bone was thrown into the teeth of our accusers. They still continue to nibble. Even the Soviet informants at the IAEA were introduced into sin. They, poor ones, seduced by a good chance to smear mud at the staff, headed by Academician V.A. Legasov, in the face of the whole world, lied that the Regulations on work with a capacity of less than 700 MW were prohibited. Why did they do this? Just - after the accident it turned out that low power for the RBMK-1000 reactor is the most dangerous. Well, what would we do without academics and doctors? It is necessary to get out - them forward. Who will suspect such handsome-looking people in a lie? There are programs for which power level matters. Thus, the check of the main safety valves can not be carried out at low power, because when the valves are opened, the pressure in the first circuit will quickly decrease and disrupt the MCP.

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For the programme rundown TG power level values has no, and we beginning the experiment the reactor was going to suppress (see section 2.12 of the Program). According to the station, Instructions for programming should be specified capacity. In developing the programme, clarity was not what we are going to execute just before an experience, and established 700 ~ 1,000 MW as maximum power, not minimum power. When the power fell during the transition to the regulators, there was no need to raise it. And for normal reactor, executed according to ABY and OPB, no matter. And we didn't break anything contrary to statements of all commissions and informants. Conclusion of the reactor emergency cooling system. This theme has exhausted itself long ago. Back in 1986, the Commission of G. A. Shasharin established the absence of any connection of this fact with the occurrence and development of the accident. Currently, only academician A. P. Alexandrov continues to develop this topic. We wish him success. Informants at the IAEA claimed that with the withdrawal of the CAEP, the possibility of reducing the scale of the accident was lost. Without explanation here, I will give an excerpt from the report of the Commission N. A. Steinberg:

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“Thus, the“ possibility of reducing the scale of the accident ”due to shutdown of the SAOR was not lost, but in principle was absent in specific conditions on 26 April 1986” The inclusion of eight MCPS. We didn't break anything by it, there are also in instructions such modes. There are no technical considerations that prevent the parallel operation of pumps with constant speed and with reducing speed, powered by a running generator. As soon as the pump pressure decreases, the pump will be switched off by its protection. It is no different from a normal pump stop. I will explain other remarks of critics of the Program in the course of the text. I am sure, and in light of the accident, when writing the Program now nothing significant would be added to it, as well as not removed. Well, would make any excerpts from Regulations or instructions.

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“Such tests should qualify as complex tests of the unit, and the program of their implementation should have been agreed with the General Designer, Chief Designer, Scientific Director and state oversight body. However, the pre-accident PBY-04-74 and OPB-82 did not require the management of nuclear plants to coordinate such programs with the above organizations. ”

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Chapter 4

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How It Happened April 26, 1986 ill-Fated day. He divided the lives of many people into before and after. What to say about my life - a deep abyss divided into two completely dissimilar parts. He was practically healthy and in recent years he spent only three or four days on the sick leave - became disabled. He was a reliable law-abiding person - he became a criminal. And, finally, he was a free citizen - he became a convicted citizen. That is what the convicts are now called. In what sophisticated mind did such an unnatural combination of words arise? After analyzing recently adopted laws in defense of human rights, Y. Feofanov in the newspaper Izvestia is forced to state: “So far, alas, the word citizen is still closer to the word”. Then how many citizens are there in the convict? And at the end of the memory, apparently, for a clear separation of the two parts of life, almost erased the events of 25 April, remained vague memories, although the events related to the accident, the same memory recorded clearly and without omissions, all confirmed or witnesses or in the readings.

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So, I don’t remember anything as I walked to the station on the evening of April 25th. I always walked to and from work, four kilometers one way. This gave a month of two hundred kilometers. To add a hundred kilometers of regular jogging is enough to maintain a normal body. And the main thing, perhaps, in walking is the preservation of the nervous system. You go, disconnected from any unpleasant thoughts. Something got into my head - add speed. Oh, how the nerves came in handy later. Both walking and running were simply necessary in those living conditions. We somehow do not get normal measured work. And even more so at enterprises under construction. I got to participate in the installation, commissioning and operation of all four blocks of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In the positions of deputy head of the department, head of the reactor department and deputy chief engineer. The smallest is a ten-hour working day for all working Saturdays, on hot days and Sundays. But this was not exhausting. Six months after the launch of the fourth unit, everything settled down and regular work was established, but still I didn’t leave work before six o’clock in the evening, and this was normal.

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It was possible to work on updating or updating technical information at work, without which, I think, an engineer cannot get along. No, the unreasonable organization of labor, unreasonable requirements for the employee, unrealistic plans exhausted physically and exhausted the soul. Not often seen in print and at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant that, due to the premature delivery - low quality construction and installation. I don't know. I arrived on station in September 1973 on building dining room - the slogan of the launch of the first unit in 1975 Passed the deadline - five rewritten to six. Actually the first unit of Chernobyl NPP was launched on 26 September 1977 and the Second unit in December 1978, but, to believe, its term was moved because of delay of start-up of the first. Also, two follow-up unit. About early delivery is not necessary to speak. Interestingly, until 31 December to speak aloud about the impossibility of starting this year is impossible. Then comes the emissary and begins drafting new unrealistic plans and schedules. Made up, signed, left emissary. And here in the first time begins nerve-racking due to the strict control of the schedule, impossible from the moment of drawing up. Tough operational meetings, late-night work calls.

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Inevitable lag increases, control falls down, starts the normal operation. Until the next arrival of the head. I never understood the essence of these invigorating injections. In my opinion, they only brought harm. If an unrealistic deadline has been set, then a conscientious employee will try to do for some time. Then everyone recognizes the impossibility. And this allows unscrupulous employees not to perform the feasible task. Noticed many times. The benefit from such pumping is the same as from the slogan, which is practically constant: “We will give all our strength to starting block No __ by the __ date”. A normal person smirks - I will give all my strength, and then what? I think V. T. Kizima and assemblers N.T.Antoshchuk, A. I. Zayats, P. V. Tokarenko all of these assaults did not take seriously, although mind did not show. They anyone could tell me how, and when, moreover, really will be done. In general, I believe installers are immune to AIDS. They are already immune to any external stuff biological or psychological it origin. Otherwise, in those conditions can not long withstand.

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It is quite appropriate to say here. Installation at the Chernobyl NPP according to Soviet criteria is well done. Despite the large number of welded joints on the pipelines of the primary circuit, I recall only one cracked joint in a serious pipeline. And that must, apparently, be attributed to the rigidity of the structure and, therefore, unsatisfactory compensation during thermal expansions. Installation and fitters have nothing to do with the accident on April 26. I came to the station from the shipyard, participated in the delivery of submarines. Things weren't going smoothly there either. And night work, and continuous-a day or more. I remember, almost a joke. On acceptance basis at the hotel we continued to play cards. Late in the evening the mechanic V. Buyansky comes and addresses to the representative of military acceptance. • • • •

We've fixed the system, we have to accept it. I can't, Victor. Need a premium burning. I'm on transport. All right, let's go.

A minute later, the military representative returns and admits that his illness is an exacerbation of hemorrhoids.

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A. Buyansky offered him a comfortable ride in the back seat of a motorcycle. This, of course, did not end there, we arrived on the bus. But still there it was more reasonably organized. For example, at the station I couldn’t understand why I, the operator, needed to know constantly, on which pipeline how many valves were mounted and how many meters of the pipe. I only need the entire pipeline with supports, suspensions and other accessories. Then you can start some kind of adjustment work with him. The point is not that this is useless knowledge, it is harmful, because it distracts from the really necessary work that no one will do for me. And they laid a pipe up to a corner or around a corner; let the installer know that he needs it to prepare the work. The cult of knowledge to detail, the cult of "ownership situation" built on undeserved height than is replaced by the real business competency of the employee. Except for the report to the superior, most often such knowledge is not needed. The chief takes a piece of paper and draws, in what form he needs help. Other demands for a different form. In our general computerization with the help of the account, all these references take a lot of time.

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And graphics. They, it turns out, can be made on all sorts of different occasions, and all this without justification for the provision of workers, materials and equipment. Only based on the period, named general supervisor. Needless to say, they were not observed. In addition to a second block, the remaining pieces of ten had scheduled delivery of the premises. Comes the head "of Glavatomenergo" Nevskiy and you receive the schedule of delivery piping systems. The schedule is drawn up in June, and in August, based on the scheduled start-up time, there is already a washing of the first circuit CMC. Pipes contour diameter of 800 mm, welding responsible, certified only a few welders. It takes seven days for each welded joint according to the technology. And what is interesting: Nevsky, in the recent past the installer, could not but see the unreality of the terms. Arrives the employee of the Central Committee of Marin, it seems, in the past, the electrician, and the schedule already drawn up the other setup electric valves. And so on. But, as I already said, perhaps even the initiators themselves did not take them seriously. Construction went on as usual. Builders and installers adapted to such impromptu. At first I was wild. At the previous job it was not so.

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We read the report of Admiral Rickover, the father of American submarines; they had to face a number of problems when creating the boats. Of course, we had them. But, excluding the first two or three boats, then the scheduled dates were respected. The term for complex testing of the power plant has been assigned - that means there will be a shift of no more than a week. And the deadline was met. It is difficult to imagine such an unrealistic perception of the observed reality with one's own eyes. Here are two examples - here and there. On a boat practically ready for testing, ion-exchange resins got into the reactor core from a shore filter. I had to replace the fuel in the reactors. The chief arrived, sorted out and postponed the deadline for the quarter. There was no talk: what you yourself screwed up, try to catch up yourself, you have five more months ahead ... As they say, the chairman (first) of the Government Commission B.E. Shcherbin, who arrived after the explosion at the Chernobyl station, made him compose a schedule for the restoration of the block by the fall of 1986. Phantasmagoria cannot be called otherwise. True, there is no clarity with the timing of the commissioning of Chernobyl units for people of my level. The duration of the construction is not very different even from the world.

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Not a single block was within the originally announced deadlines, but the prize for timely launch was received, it seems, for everything. What is the secret? I don’t know. Maybe in the order of payment of premiums, maybe in the existence of a schedule unknown to nongoverning people. We have both options pass. The most troubles during the construction were delivered by technical decisions about changes in design conditions. They were taken for various reasons. After the start of construction of the Leningrad NPP with RBMK reactors, a government decree was adopted on the construction of the same power plants - Kursk and Chernobyl. Without waiting for the launch and trial operation of RBMK reactors, they were launched into series. The RBMK reactor cannot be called equipment, but rather a structure. It is impossible to transport the main metal structures along the roads; they are assembled and welded directly at the station site from factory-made parts. For large products, ten or more sets are already a series, and small products for both the reactor itself and auxiliary ones fell into the category of non-standard equipment.

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And these are supports and suspensions for pipe communications of the reactor itself and transport technology equipment designed to move fuel and radioactive products through the building, assemble fuel cartridges, load and unload from the reactor, etc. All equipment must be performed at a good technical level. To handle spent fuel that is extremely radioactive, now no need to explain it. Fresh fuel is only weakly radioactive, does not present any particular danger, but also requires careful careful handling in order to avoid even the slightest damage, which at first time of operation may not manifest itself in any way, but will later speak about itself and loudly. The Leningrad NPP, subordinate to the Ministry of Medium Engineering, was designed by its organizations, under its plants equipped with modern equipment. Kursk and Chernobyl stations belonged to the Ministry of Energy and Electrification. The Government Decree indicated that non-standard equipment for the four blocks of the first stages of these stations will be manufactured by the same factories as for Leningradskaya. But for the Ministry of Environment, the Government Decree is not a decree even at a time when the governments were still a bit obedient.

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They say that you have your own factories, so do it, we’ll give you drawings. I visited some auxiliary equipment factories of the Ministry of Energy equipment at the level of inferior workshops. Entrusting them with the manufacture of equipment for the reactor workshop is the same as forcing a carpenter to do the work of a carpenter. And they suffered with the manufacture of each block. Something was possible to do, something never happened. Characteristically, it’s truly stagnation, the Ministry of Energy for several years has not even upgraded one of its plants so that it is able to produce not so complicated equipment. During the construction of the first block, a question arose with the manufacture of supports and suspensions for the reactor pipe communications. The plant of the Ministry of Environment refused to make them for us. I don’t know who decided to produce at the factories of the Ministry of Energy through direct agreements with them. I won’t say that I sabotaged this case, but I didn’t believe in the construction of the reactor using economic means, and therefore did not show my characteristic persistence. I was happy to hear from the chief engineer V.P. Akinfiev that I am withdrawing from this business and not to deal with it anymore.

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After some time, Akinfiev told me reproachfully: "You stopped working and things went." Made some basic details. I replied: "Well, God forbid our calf to eat a wolf." As expected, nothing came of this venture until it was put on a solid foundation. Director V.P. Bryukhanov at that time did not know the reactors; he was not accustomed to the culture of handling them. And then for a long time, the reactor was considered much simpler than a turbine. There were attempts, and Brukhanov supported them, to call the reactor operator the Reactor Control Engineer (and thereby reduce the salary), leaving the name of the Turbine Operator Senior Turbine Control Engineer. On this occasion, I ironically said that, of course, the turbine makes three thousand revolutions per minute, and the reactor only one revolution per day - together with the Earth. The operators of both the reactor and the turbines are not senior engineers at all; there are no engineers in their subordination. But in fact, in order to somehow be able to pay for really difficult work, they are forced to come up with job titles. Only gradually V.P. Bryukhanov, a competent engineer, realized that the reactor was not a piece of iron, not a blank.

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Especially, I think, I was impressed by the accident at the first unit with a break in the technological channel and the ejection of the fuel cartridge into the graphite masonry. The chief engineer V.P. Akinfiev, before coming to the station, worked at such reactors and at that time knew the RBMK reactor better than anyone at the station. Why he made such a decision is hard to say. Maybe because he previously worked at the Ministry of Environment, where it is really possible. They won’t do it themselves - they’ll agree so. They had opportunities for both. Somehow, the plant that manufactured the equipment for the Leningrad station referred to the lack of an X-ray film for monitoring. From the ministry they sent "Ikarus" loaded with film, along with the bus they handed it over to the plant. And what about the Ministry of Energy? In 1981, the station was already operating, it was producing full-blown billions of kilowatt-hours of electricity and even had no decent minibus. I had to somehow meet the Yugoslavs at the Kiev airport, the bus creaks, rattles, and is blown by northerly and southerly winds. A shame. There were many questions about pipelines due to the shortage of elements. You’ll think ten times before writing or signing a Technical Decision to deviate from the project.

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As a rule, this leads to deterioration and therefore always leaves bitterness in the soul. And so it went on from one block to another for ten years. He only sighed with relief after the fourth power unit, when only one concern remained - operation. True, the ongoing construction of the station, the fifth and sixth blocks, still made itself felt. The operative personnel went there, but this naturally and did not cause any sincere protest. And it did not create any special problems to equip one new unit with four blocks. An influx of fresh people was, time for preparation as well. After a long observation, I think this: after a year, the operative begins to fully meet his job requirements, and after two - you can confidently rely on him. Further, how much to keep a person in this position depends on the individual. There are many who do not at all strive for change and faithfully carry out their work. Among these, you just need not to miss the indifferent, who has lost interest. This is bad. Most are committed to advancement. The desire is understandable and deserves encouragement. Usually they are good workers, they are constantly expanding their horizons, neat and efficient. A dangerous category is people with great ambition, not backed up by solid technical knowledge.

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Everything seems to them that they are being pinched, circumvented, they are offended by everyone and begin to act recklessly. Such for operational work are not suitable, however, for other work too. By 1986, the skeleton of operational personnel had already been created in the third and fourth blocks, although there were twenty percent of those who worked in this position for up to a year, because have already begun to transfer people to the fifth block. You can work with such personnel, but … I liked the job, it suited me. At the start and stop of the blocks has always been from beginning to end - a day or more. And even that was satisfying when the job was done. Health allowed to work continuously and thirty hours. I'm not a cameraman - he can't. Without false modesty I can say - I knew the matter. He knew the reactor and the systems serving it thoroughly, more than once crawled through all the places. Others are worse, but also enough. Assisted in the development of the institute, assimilated general technical disciplines: mathematics, physics, mechanics, thermodynamics, electrical engineering. On this basis, most of the mechanisms and processes encountered at the station can be studied. He knew almost all the instructions, schemes.

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Of course, not the circuits of individual devices - this is not enough human life. The procedure for compiling instructions and diagrams was as follows: contractors and, in part, workshop workers themselves drafted and brought it to me. After viewing and comments, I gave the go-ahead to print, and if there were many comments, I asked for a second review. Then read in the final version. By virtue of this, you will know so much ... Here, of course, the question arises - what kind of knowledge are you talking about when the reactor did not meet the fundamentals of nuclear safety? This is discussed below. In the meantime, calmly went to work, confident in the reliability of the equipment. Here we have to dwell on two points. G. Medvedev's "Chernobyl notebook" writes that they are experienced operators (agree with his self), always felt what a sharp edge separates them from the accident. I can't imagine going to work with fear every day. It's some kind of masochism in the technical field. It is impossible for a normal person to be in fear for several hours every day. The normal psyche of such a test will not stand. Not nerves it is necessary to have the rope.

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And the second is about the reliability of the reactor. Well, the staff, considering the reactor reliable, treated it inappropriately, as they wanted, like with a cabinet, etc. Yes, of course, we considered it reliable, considered A3 reliable. Who else would work? But that the RBMK reactor is a complex apparatus, difficult to operate, requiring maximum concentration and attention, it was clear to any young SIUR, not to mention other engineering and technical workers. There are many more situations at the RBMK reactor that the operator will learn about during training, leading to quite severe accidents. It is clear that they do not compare with April 26, and this is not an accident at all, but a disaster. Not a single operator has any thoughts about the free handling of the reactor. For people, ordinary inhabitants of the Earth, an accident is what happened on April 26th. For the operator, an accident is simply a shutdown of the reactor without any damage to the reactor, or even any system. If there is damage due to the fault of the operator (I specify - such damage, which people do not need to know about and is not interested in), then this will erase the thoughts about a career for a long time. Newspapers print information: how many reactor shutdowns, forced power reductions. People do not need them at all.

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The reactor is stopped by automatic protection when the parameter is deviated or the mechanism stops - this is normal. To prevent damage. For the station, of course, it’s not normal - it incurs a loss due to underproduction of electricity, and if there was a restriction of consumers, then a fine. The inhabitants of the Earth need information only about accidents, usually they are associated in one way or another with destruction, with radioactive releases outside the station building or in the building itself, and with the pollution of rooms not intended for this. And another category of cases that do not lead either to shutdown or to a decrease in power and are not often called accidents, but lead to contamination of the station territory, not to mention outside it. This is what the population should be informed about. The rest of the population is not interested in knowing. If there are frequent stops, they will change the management, staff, with the transfer to private hands the station will go bankrupt. The order, one way or another, will be restored. Many people ask: did I have any foreboding of trouble? No, not. But frankly, I don’t really believe in forebodings. The various cases cited in the press, seemingly certain, do not convince. You also need to know those people.

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If a person has always done so, if he is not subject to hesitation and doubt in actions, and if he suddenly deviated from the rule, which saved him, then it makes sense to think. And if a huge worm of doubt sits in it, and he changes his mind dozens of times and now he hasn’t gone somewhere or gone, is it worth talking about. We went from Komsomolsk-on-Amur I.Leva and A.Volodya on vacation. In Khabarovsk - transfer by plane to Moscow, we went to a restaurant. Volodya got drunk and while messing around - they missed the plane, which crashed near Irkutsk. What is this hunch? Not. For Volodya this is a common occurrence. Now, if Leva got drunk, then one would think. No, I did everything that night as usual. Came into the office, called on the bloc to find out the situation. I smoked a cigarette, changed clothes and went, as always, first on the shield of the third block to find out how things are. And only after that went to the fourth block. The fourth power unit in coordination with the power system on April 25 had to stop for preventive maintenance. By midday, the reactor power had been reduced to fifty percent and one of the two TGS had been shut down.

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Further, the Manager of the grid has forbidden the decline to the passage of evening peak electricity consumption and stopping was allowed 23 hours and 25 April. Nothing noteworthy happened at that time. Inspections and tests, usually scheduled for stoppage, were carried out according to standard programs. Perhaps only one fact can be noted from this day. After the reactor power was reduced, its poisoning began with the fuel fission product, xenon, and, accordingly, a decrease in the ORM. There are other effects that affect reactivity, however, poisoning usually prevails. The minimum reactivity margin recorded by the block computer was 13.2 rods, which is less than the 15 rods allowed by the Regulation. At the same time, it was noted that, due to a malfunction in the calculation, the machine did not take into account the reactivity compensated by 12 AP rods located in intermediate positions along the height of the active zone. So they covered the missing 1.8 rods. Then the reactor began to get poisoned and at 23 hours on April 25 the reactivity margin was 26 rods. At the same time, the reactor power is 50%, one TG No. 8 is in operation, all parameters are normal.

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To create a holistic picture of what happened on the block will describe the events and conversations without explaining the physical processes and motives of the staff. Describe without disguise and additions in sequence, repeatedly verified to control records and operational logs by a group of employees of Scientifictechnical center of Gospromatomnadzor the Soviet Union to the report of the Board of this organization, "On the causes and circumstances of the accident at the 4th unit of the Chernobyl NPP on 26 April 1986" from 1 January 1991. These data do not differ from those previously given in the technical reports, they are only the most detailed. The full chronological list of events is given in Appendix 2, here - only the main ones. At 23 hours 10 minutes on April 25, after the permission of the dispatcher of the power system, a further decrease in the reactor power and, accordingly, the energy load on the operating TG was started. In 24 hours on April 25 during transmission shifts as the following: reactor power – 750 MW thermal, ORM 24 rod, all parameters are according to the Regulations. Before transmission of the change spoke to the shift supervisor of block Y. Tregub and incoming shift A. Akimov.

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It remains only to measure the vibration of the turbine at idle (no load on the generator) and conduct an experiment on the "TG run-out Program". No questions asked. Measurement of vibration is carried out at each stop for repair, everything is clear. And preparation of a final experiment in A. Akimova no questions, he watched on April 25th. After that, I left the control room-4 for inspection before stopping places of interest to me. I always did that. Firstly, defects are more “willing” to manifest themselves when the regime is changed, and secondly, when power is reduced, rooms with increased radiation hazard can be more closely examined. No, of course, I was not afraid to work in the area with radiation, but without the need I didn’t try to get an extra dose. Yes, and you can’t dial the annual dose before the end of the year - they will be suspended from work in the zone. He returned to the control panel at 00 hours 35 minutes. The time was set after the reactor power recording diagram. From the door I saw people bending over the control panel of the reactor, besides operator L.Toptunov, shift supervisor A. Akimov and interns V. Proskuryakov and A. Kudryavtsev. I don’t remember, maybe someone else. He came over, looked at the appliances.

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The reactor power is 50 ~ 70 MW. Akimov said that when switching from LAR to a regulator with side ionization chambers (AR), a power failure of up to 30 MW occurred. Now they are raising power. It didn’t excite me at all and did not alert me. Not an out of the ordinary phenomenon. Allowed the rise further and moved away from the console. With G. P. metlenko discussed the training Program "TG running-out" and marked in his copy of the program execution. Came Akimov and suggested not to raise the power up to 700 MW, as recorded in the "TG running-out Program", and limited to 200 MW. I agreed with him. The Deputy chief of turbine shop of R. Davletbaev said pressure drops of the primary circuit and may have to stop the turbine. I told him that the power is already rising and the pressure should stabilize. More Ever passed on the request of the representative of the Kharkov turbine plant A. F. Kabanova to measure turbine vibration on the freely coasting, i.e. by reducing the speed of the turbine with no load on the generator. But this delayed the work, and I refused him, saying: "When we experiment the reactor is shut down, try to pick up speed (approximately 2,000 rpm), a few more should be enough".

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At 00 hours 43 minutes, the A3 signal of the reactor on the shutdown of two TGs is blocked. The A3 setpoint for shutting down the turbine to reduce the pressure in the drum separators (in the primary circuit) from 55 atmospheres to 50 was somewhat earlier transferred. At 01 hours 03 and 07 minutes, the seventh and eighth MCPs were launched according to the Program. A. Akimov reported on readiness for the last experiment. He gathered participants to instruct who is watching what and for actions in case of malfunctions, except for the reactor operator - he should not be absent in this mode. Everyone went to their designated places. In addition to the shift operators, at this time, the control panel involved workers in the electric workshop (Suryadny, Lysyuk, Orlenko), a commissioning plant (Palamarchuk), deputy head of the turbine workshop Davletbaev, from the previous shift Y. Tregub and S. Gazin, the rest to see , shift supervisor of the reactor shop V. Perevozchenko and interns Proskuryakov, Kudryavtsev. Unit mode: reactor power-200 MW, from TG No 8 feed pumps and four of the eight MCP are powered. All other mechanisms are powered by electricity from the reserve. All parameters are normal.

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The control system objectively registered the absence of warning signals for the reactor and systems. To register some electrical parameters in the room outside the control room, a loop oscilloscope was installed, it was turned on by a command in the telephone - “Oscilloscope-start”. At the briefing, it was found that on this command at the same time: steam closes to the turbine; the MPA button is pressed - an abnormal button to turn on the coast unit in the generator excitation system; the AZ-5 button is pressed to kill the reactor. Team Toptunov gives Governors. ...At 01 hours 23 minutes 04 seconds, the control system registered the closure of the stop valves supplying steam to the turbine. The experiment started out at TG. With a decrease in the speed of the generator after the termination of the steam supply to the turbine, the frequency of the electric current, the speed and flow of the circulation pumps powered by the outrunning generator decreases. The flow rate of the other four pumps increases slightly, but the total flow rate of the coolant for 40 seconds is reduced by 10 ~ 15%. In this case, positive reactivity is introduced into the reactor, the AR stably holds the power of the reactor, compensating for this reactivity.

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To 01 hours, 23 minutes and 40 seconds not observed changes in the parameters on the block. The rundown goes smoothly. The control room is quiet, no talking. Hearing some conversation, I turned around and saw that the reactor operator L.Toptunov was talking with A. Akimov. I was ten meters away from them and what Toptunov said I did not hear. Sasha Akimov ordered to turn off the reactor and pointed with his finger - push the button. He turned back to the security panel he was watching. There was nothing disturbing in their behavior, a calm conversation, a calm team. This is confirmed by G.P. Metlenko and the master of the electrical workshop A.Kukhar, who has just entered the block board. Why Akimov was late with the team to shut down the reactor, now you won’t find out. In the first days after the accident, we still talked until we scattered them in separate chambers, and one could ask, but then, and even more so now, I did not attach any importance to this - the explosion would have occurred 36 seconds earlier, only the difference. At 01 h 23 min 40 s, a button press of the A3 reactor was registered to shut off the reactor at the end of work. This button is used both in emergency and normal situations.

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CPS rods in the amount of 187 pieces went into the active zone and according to all the canons were supposed to break the chain reaction. But at 01 h 23 min 43 s the occurrence of alarms was detected on excess power and to reduce the acceleration period of the reactor (high speed increase in power). According to these signals, the A3 rods should go to the active zone, but they already come from pressing the AZ5 button. Other alarm signs and signals appear: power increase, pressure increase in the primary circuit … At 01 hour 23 minutes 47 seconds - the explosion shook the whole building, and through 1-2 with my subjective feeling is even more powerful explosion. The rods A3 stopped, not having passed even half the way. Everything. In such a businesslike everyday situation, the RBMK1000 reactor of the fourth Chernobyl unit was blown up by an emergency protection button (!?!?). Next, I will try to show that for the explosion of that reactor, no special conditions were necessary. If I do not succeed, then only because of the inability to clearly explain. There are no other reasons, now everything that happened is clear.

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After describing the events on the fourth block on April 26, 1986, as perceived by eyewitnesses, it is necessary to explain: what happened to the reactor and its systems, why the personnel acted in this way, and not otherwise, what they violated and why. Indeed, according to the officially announced version, it is the personnel who are the culprit. The reactor, if it was not beautiful, it was probably good. Only with an incredible combination of violations of the order and operating rules of the reactor did it explode. A whole team of authors, about twenty people with various degrees, in the journal "Atomic Energy" claims that the operational staff made unpredictable violations. A lot of what our scientists (what scientists?) Said to the staff, but only from the staff no word was given to anyone. And so far, five years after the catastrophe, not a single central print organ — neither a newspaper nor a magazine — has printed anything that I wrote. They wrote only in response to further fabrications and slander. They pointed out where to check what was written, realizing that the prisoner could not be trusted. Not that the doctor, let alone the academician - they have complete trust in them. Only the Kiev newspaper Komsomolskoye Znamya printed, thanks to them. Something very very one-sided publicity with us.

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The shift, which entered the fourth block on the night of April 26, had to do quite a bit. It was necessary to remove the electric load from the generator, measure the vibration of the turbine at idle and conduct an experiment according to the “TG coasting program”. When I left the control room, apparently due to some kind of inconsistency between the Chernobyl shift manager B. Rogozhkin and A. Akimov, instead of simply removing the load from the generator, leaving the reactor power at 420 MW, they began to reduce it. The reactor at this time was controlled by the so-called power LAR with intraband sensors. This regulator made life easier for the operator at relatively high capacities, but at lower performance it worked unsatisfactorily. Therefore, we decided to switch to an AR with four ionization chambers outside the zone. There are two equivalent regulators and one more low power. When switching from LAR to AR, it turned out to be faulty, and a power failure of up to 30 MW occurred. Here, two violations are attributed to staff: • Power rise after failure; • Capacity was raised to 200 MW.

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The decrease in reactor power in itself for one reason or another is a frequent phenomenon; perhaps, there are no reactor operators who wouldn’t have this. Could it be possible to raise power after this, what should the operators be guided by? On instrument readings and Regulations. According to the Regulation, a decrease in reactor power manually or automatically to any level no lower than the minimum-controlled is considered a partial decrease in power. The minimum-controlled level is the power at which the low-power controller becomes on the machine, i.e. 8 ~ 100 MW. Without going into technical details, I will refer to the entry in the journal of the reactor operator that he reduced the setpoint of the power level adjuster, balanced the regulator, and set it on the machine. There is no reason to distrust this record, because at the time of recording he could not even know how to lie. And without this, there is no reason to suspect him of a lie. Another point. In the Regulation it is written that with a decrease in the ORR of less than 15 RR rods, the reactor must be shut off. What was the reactivity margin at 30 MW - cannot be measured, the metering device is not suitable.

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It was possible to make only an approximate calculation on the basis of information known at that time on poisoning, the power coefficient of reactivity. According to this, the reactivity margin in the event of a power failure of the reactor was more than 15 rods. This means that the staff did not commit violations. More on this later. Let's focus on the question of the power level. I must say at once that in any operational, design or Directive document on the RBMK reactor there is not even a hint of restriction to work at some capacity. And this is not typical of reactors. The Regulations explicitly state that the duration of operation at the minimum controlled power level is not limited. The same Regulation makes a recommendation when separating the power unit from the electrical system to reduce the power of the reactor to a value that provides the load of the mechanisms of the station's own needs, and this is the same 200 MW for which we are accused. Therefore, there is no violation on the part of the staff when it began to reduce power. Whoever orders it and why.

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I agreed with the proposal of Sasha Akimov to increase the capacity to 200 MW after a failure for a very simple reason: according to the Regulations, up to 700 MW, it is necessary to rise for at least half an hour, and we have to work for half an hour, this power is not needed to measure the vibration of the turbine, nor for the experiment on the “TG coasting program” - according to the latter, the reactor was generally shut off. When working on submarines, it was constantly necessary to consider the starting position of the reactivity impact organs, if some time passed after the fall of A3. Xenon poisoning and other reactivity effects had to be taken into account. It is impossible to make a calculation at the RBMK reactor with such accuracy, but it is perfectly acceptable to estimate. In my estimation, there could be no less than 15 rods up to half the second reactivity margin decrease. And now I'm sure of it. I did not expect a catch from the station's Department of Nuclear Safety. According to the requirements of regulatory documents, the Department periodically measured the characteristics of the reactor, including parameters such as the steam reactivity effect (αφ) and the fast power reactivity coefficient (αN).

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Here are the latest data received by operational staff to guide you: αφ =+1.29 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, and αN =-1,7×10-4 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,/MW. After the accident, the vapor effect was measured at other station blocks and received neither more nor less αφ=+5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. The difference is large, and hence the difference in the effect on the reactivity margin during the commissioning of the seventh and eighth MCPs and with an increase in feed water flow towards a decrease in the reactivity margin. The nuclear safety Department measured the power factor of reactivity at a power close to nominal, perhaps it was there and what we were given. And as they found out after the accident, at low capacities (from which beginning, until now, the Supervisor and Chief designer their organization, did not specify) the reactor had not a negative, but a positive power factor, and it is still unknown what magnitude. And at lower power has received no increase in reactivity at one terminal, and who knows what lowering. Therefore, the forecast of changes in the stock was wrong. Whether or not the Supervisor and Chief designer of the RBMK reactor knew that the reactor in a sufficiently large power range had a positive power reactivity coefficient, I can not say.

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But that in practice it was not considered - precisely. The station's nuclear safety Department worked under their guidance and, of course, had to measure performance in the most adverse areas. Consequently, the Department did not receive tips from scientific organizations, and those that received, were, to put it mildly, of the wrong quality. After the steam reactivity effect of 1.29 for the real 5, the Department has measured in their method. The creators of the reactor were clearly the negative impact of a large vapor effect of reactivity on the dynamic properties of the reactor. Here is what the chief designer of RBMK, academician N.A.Dollezhal writes in a note to the investigator: “At the very beginning of the construction of channel uranium-graphite reactors, based on the level of knowledge of that time (mid-60s), the reactor core was designed using uranium enriched with U-235 in 1.8%. After a certain period of operation of the first reactor, it became obvious the feasibility of raising this value to 2%, which allowed, in particular, to some extent to reduce the negative effect of the steam reactivity coefficient.”

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“Further study of all parameters characterizing the operation of the reactor, led to the conclusion that it is advisable to increase the enrichment of uranium to 2.4%. Such assemblies with active elements are manufactured and satisfactorily pass representative tests at operating channel reactors of nuclear power plants.” When creating a reactor core at this level of uranium enrichment, according to all the data, the influence of the steam reactivity coefficient is localized. Prior to this, i.e. with uranium enrichment of 2%, this effect is regulated by the introduction of special absorbers (DP) into the channels, which is strictly stipulated in the operating instructions. Deviation from them is unacceptable, as the reactor is “not at all ready” (mine discharge – A.D). I believe the word "uncontrollable" does not require explanation. The RBMK-1000 reactor of the fourth unit had uranium of 2% enrichment, it had no DP in the core, and, by the definition of the Chief Designer, it was uncontrollable.

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There were no instructions in the operating instructions and there was nowhere to appear from them - in the design materials the Chief Designer was not bothered to inform. In his NIKIET report entitled “Nuclear Safety of RBMK Second Stage Reactors. Neutron-physical parameters”, the steam reactivity coefficient does not exceed 1 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, and the power coefficient is negative. Okay, these are the calculations. Life makes adjustments. The active zones of RBMK reactors were formed according to NIKIET calculations. Not indicated in the design materials. They knew that in this form he was uncontrollable, and yet they did. It was the positive steam reactivity coefficient (effect) of an unacceptably large value that made the power reactivity coefficient positive. Why is this bad? In a critical reactor, power is kept constant. If now in some way (changing the flow rate of the coolant, feed water, pressure of the primary circuit) positive reactivity is introduced, then the power will begin to increase. In a correctly designed reactor, from the increase in power, negative reactivity (negative power factor) is introduced, which will compensate for the previously introduced reactivity, and the power will be set to a new, higher level. This is the principle of self-regulation.

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At the RBMK reactor, at least at low power, the power factor was positive. Now increasing the power of the reactor introduces additional positive reactivity, the reactor begins to increase power at a faster speed, which causes even more positive reactivity and conditions are created for accelerating the reactor. It cannot be said that such a reactor cannot work at all. An automatic regulator or operator can prevent the reactor from accelerating by its actions. But all this for the time being. When the excess reactivity of β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, (the fraction of delayed neutrons) is reached, the reactor is already accelerated at instant neutrons at a very high speed, and nothing can save it from destruction. Exotic research reactors are not taken into account. Regulatory document OPB-82 thus requires the design of reactors: ARTICLE 2.2.2. OPB “As a rule, a fast power reactivity coefficient should not be positive under any operating conditions of the nuclear power plant and any conditions of the heat removal system from the primary coolant. If the fast power reactivity coefficient is positive in any operating conditions, the design should ensure and justify the safety of the reactor in stationary, nonstationary and emergency modes."

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Well, at A3 with a speed of action of 18 ~ 20 s (champion in slow action), even with the normal design of CPS rods, there is no reason to talk about safety justification with a positive power factor. Similarly, the requirement of another regulatory document – ABY-04-74. It can be stated. We have the certificate of the Chief Designer about knowing how to make a safe reactor. We have the requirement of regulatory documents. Done the other way around. At 00 hours 43 minutes, shortly after the failure of the reactor power, the unit shift supervisor A. Akimov blocked the reactor protection by stopping two TGs. The easiest way would be to say that, according to the Regulations, this protection is removed when the capacity is less than 100 MW of electric power, we had 40 MW. And therefore, there is no violation. But it turned out, this violation, already in the international arena, and therefore it must be clarified. This protection, when the unit was stopped, was most often displayed in advance, since the operation of the reactor took some time to complete any checks. If you take the Regulations, it also says that the reactor power is reduced by the AR and then the A3-button is activated by A3 to shut down the reactor.

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This is a common and, most importantly, normal phenomenon. The purpose of this protection is to prevent a sharp increase in pressure in the primary circuit, since when they stop the turbines they stop consuming steam. And with a low turbine power, it consumes a little steam, and when stopped, there is nothing to protect the reactor from. How much I had to write on this protection - I don’t even know. And let it be withdrawn without violating the requirements of operational documents. But the question is: with the introduced protection, there would be no explosion? So no, it didn’t matter. After the arrest, when I was charged, I indicated to the investigator a paragraph of the document that there was no violation in blocking the defense. It would seem that the question is settled. There it was. It went to the Indictment and the Sentence. The judge asks a question to witness M. Yelshin, who was on the shift on April 26, who, in his opinion, brought out the defense? He replies that according to operational discipline, I think Akimov himself could not do this. Logically further follows ordered Dyatlov. The judge became very lively and even reminded the court clerk: “Be sure to write it down.” Although strange, it seems, everything should be recorded.

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An interesting phenomenon is how a person begins to flicker before an investigator, prosecutor, court. Especially in front of the investigator, people are still present in court, and there, one on one. Do not believe the stories of those who were under investigation for the first time, how they famously answered the investigator. Even witnesses who are not in danger do not always retain dignity. Wake the same M. Yelshin in a normal situation in the middle of the night and ask the same question. The answer will be different: the protection is blocked according to the Regulations, and in this case the unit shift supervisor has the right not to ask anyone for permission. Let it not seem strange, but Yelshin’s answer, there were others like that, I was satisfied, although he seems to blame me, which means that the staff taught me correctly. At that time A. Akimov did not ask me, and if he did, I would allow it. It had to be done. After the failure of the reactor power at 00 hours 28 minutes, the pressure in the primary circuit began to decrease. To prevent a deep subsidence of pressure, it might be necessary to close the steam to the turbine, but then the A3 reactor would work.

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For the same reason, the protection setting for stopping the turbine to reduce the pressure in the drum separators (in the primary circuit) was changed from 55 atmospheres to 50. The personnel selects this setting by own discretion, specially keys are displayed on the operational panel. Nobody brought protection. For forensic experts and others, this transformed into a blockage of the A3 pressure reactor in the primary circuit. There is also such protection - it acts to stop the reactor when the pressure in the primary circuit rises. But it was introduced all the time. As you can see, the actions of the staff on the “criminal” conclusion A3 actually agree with the current operational documentation, are caused by technical necessity and are not connected with the accident in any way. Another A3 reactor, which staff are accused of blocking, is lowering the coolant level in drum separators below minus 600 mm. This protection operates as follows: at a large level of reactor power, more than 60% of the nominal, it automatically reduces the reactor power to 60% when the level decreases. At low capacities, it shuts down the reactor. This change of functions is carried out using the key by operational staff. After power reduction, we did not.

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Why change functions not done automatically? The designer explains this in the following way: when power decreases, for example, by AZ-2 to 50%, the level in the drum separators usually decreases below 600 mm and during automatic switching the reactor will completely shut off. Therefore, it is necessary to wait for the stabilization of the parameters and only after that switch. At low power, the feed water regulators do not work very well, and on April 26, after reducing the reactor power, the level in the separators decreased to 600 mm. The reactor would be shut off when the protection was triggered - it is unknown, because it is difficult to say when the protection became inoperative. Even be sure: if A3 had been switched in level, then if it deviated at 01:00, the reactor would have been safely shut off - it does not mean anything. The operation of the reactor on the "if" can not be built. After all, not because of a level deviation, an accident occurred, but for completely different reasons. Yes, and protection to reduce the level of coolant in the drum separators to -1 100 mm remained introduced. Thus, the reactor emergency protection was in full for this mode, except for the level protection in the drum separators - it was -1 100 mm instead of -600 mm.

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On the inclusion of all eight MCPs. There were no restrictions on the maximum flow rate of the coolant, it was only on the flow rate through a separate technological channel from the conditions of vibration of the fuel cartridge. But before this was far away, there was not a single signal of excess water flow through the channel. The whole ideology of the Regulation and other documents is based on ensuring a minimum flow of coolant in order to avoid a boiling crisis. Yes, usually six pumps are switched on (three per side), and this is understandable - why lose the reserve when three are enough. Technical reasons preventing the inclusion of four pumps on the side, is not visible. And in the instruction manual for the reactor, agreed with scientific organizations, there are such modes: when replacing one pump with another, the fourth is turned on first and then the intended one stops, also when checking the repaired pump. There was no initiative, everything is based on documents. The pumps were switched on according to the “TG coasting program”, so that when the generator runs out, after the four pumps are stopped, the other four are left in operation, powered from the backup network.

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Amazingly, for five years now, according to many documents, the statement has been roaming that with a large flow of coolant, its temperature at the entrance to the active zone approaches the temperature saturation at which water boils. And on this basis, a conclusion is drawn about the thermohydraulic instability of the core. Wrong. The statement is true for the RCC suction, but not for entering the core. If there was instability, then this is a property inherent in the core, and not caused by personnel. After a failure of the reactor’s power due to a decrease in hydraulic resistance, the flow rate of two or three MCPs increased and exceeded the permissible level with such a quantity of feed water. Could these pumps disrupt, that is, they would stop the flow of coolant. The operator of the middle console B. Stolyarchuk was engaged in adjusting the level in the drum separators and did not have time to establish the desired flow rate of the MCP. In the event of a breakdown, even three of the eight pumps remaining are enough to remove heat at this power. And objectively, the monitoring system recorded the correct operation of all pumps without signs of failure and cavitation until the explosion of the reactor.

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Numerous judges of the operational staff argue that the staff, in order to fulfill the production assignment, violated the Rules and operational instructions. Here I told everything how it was at the control room on April 26, 1986. As you can see, there were practically no violations. Emergency protection, contrary to many reports, - according to the Regulations for such a regime; options as well. And there is no reason for not fulfilling the task. Of course, we sought to do the work - this is the production task, and not the decision of the pioneer meeting. On the other hand, nobody was going to do it at any cost either. There is no need for staff at all - no reward for fulfillment, no penalty for non-fulfillment. Frivolity was also not observed for me. At the same fourth unit, also when stopping for repairs while performing the first paragraph of the intended test program at a power close to the nominal value, the A3 reactor falsely tripped due to excess pressure in the primary circuit. Immediately figured out, everything was fixed. But in this case, according to the Rules, before the protection falls, the reactivity margin must be at least 50 rods - then you can again increase the power. There wasn’t such a reserve, and I, without hesitation, ordered to dampen the reactor, without completely completing the shutdown program.

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Here, everything was completed except for one. Well, they would have done forty days after the repair. There were no reasons to go out of my way. Naturally, our actions should not be evaluated from the bell tower of the current knowledge about the reactor, but based on the documentation that was in force at that time, taking into account the level of knowledge about the reactor from all sources available to personnel. As noted above, before the start of the experiment on the “TG coasting program”, the reactor parameters are normal, there are no warning or alarm signals on the unit. Nevertheless, the bomb was in full readiness at that time. If for some reason we refused to conduct the last experiment and, as the Rules recommended, the AZ-5 button was pressed to shut down the reactor, we would have got the exact same explosion. It would be the same if A3 were triggered by any signal. A retrospective look shows that RBMK reactors have been in this state more than once, and only a sharp edge separated earlier from the explosion. It turns out that RBMK, like all reactors, is nuclear hazardous with a large reactivity margin, but unlike all the others, it is even more dangerous with a small reactivity margin.

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Reactor books don't talk about that. And the creators of RBMK, having given birth to a shifter, by bashfulness or modesty kept silent about this property. However, if they had reported, then they hardly found consonants to exploit it. The chief designer, academician N.A. Dollezhal, in the document already mentioned above, writes: “The constant desire of the creators of a nuclear reactor to achieve its highest efficiency is associated, in particular, with the need to remove as much as possible elements from the core that are harmful and spuriously absorbing neutrons. Among others, one of these elements is the water remaining in the lower part of the channel occupied by the power control rod developed by the reactor. To avoid this influence, some lower part of the control rod of a certain strictly calculated size (my selection is A.D.) is made of non-absorbing material, displacing such in this way, the corresponding amount of water in this canal, which had been an absorber to this extent. ”

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That is, what did the designers do? A 4.5 m long graphite propellant was suspended from a boron carbide rod that strongly absorbed neutrons. With the absorber raised, the propellant is symmetrically located along the height of the active zone, leaving 1.25 m of water columns above and below the channel. It would seem that a propellant should be made over the entire height (7 m) of the active zone, the gain is greater. But with a symmetric displacer, you must either lengthen the channel - the room does not allow, or complicate the design of the rods. And since during the operation of the reactor the vast majority of the time the neutron field below and above is relatively small, the neutron gain is small. We stopped at the displacer 4.5 m. And then it turns out that the statement of the academician - “strictly calculated size” - is a pure bluff, not true. Whether they thought it or not, I don’t know, but there is no need to talk about rigor. When the rod moves from the upper position, an absorber enters the upper part of the zone and introduces negative reactivity; in the lower part of the channel, a graphite displacer replaces water and introduces positive reactivity. It turns out that the total reactivity with a neutron field shifted downward is positive during the first three seconds of the rod motion.

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The phenomenon is unacceptable. It was observed at the Ignalina station, at the Chernobyl during the physical start-up of the fourth unit reactor, but the scientists did not receive a proper assessment. The tricks of the 4.5meter displacer do not end there. The RBMK reactor is geometrically and, more importantly, physically large. Some of its areas can behave almost like independent reactors. When A3 is triggered, when a large number of rods go into the zone at the same time, a local critical mass is created in the lower part of the zone by rods. ARTICLE 3.3.28. "The Number, location, efficiency and speed of introduction of Executive bodies A3 should be determined and justified in the reactor design, where it should be shown that in any emergency conditions, Executive bodies A3 without one of the most effective body provide: the rate of emergency reduction of reactor power sufficient to prevent possible damage to fuel Rods in excess of permissible limits; bringing the reactor into a subcritical state and maintaining it in this state...;- prevention of formation of local critical masses."

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The CPS rods of the reactor not only did not prevent, but they themselves created a critical mass at the bottom of the core. The deputy director of NIKIET, I.Y. Emelyanov, under whose leadership the project of the control system was created, so calmly and academically, as at a lecture at the Bauman school, gives a testimony: “The reactivity organs should be designed so that when they move in one direction the sign of reactivity introduced did not change. ” As if not under his leadership, rods with opposite properties were created. When the CPS rod is in an intermediate position, the water from the bottom of the channel has already been displaced and when the rod moves, it immediately begins to introduce negative reactivity. With a large margin of reactivity, a certain number of rods is in an intermediate position and A3 somehow copes with its purpose. With a small margin, most of the rods are removed from the zone and when A3 is triggered, by a signal or from a button, it can introduce positive reactivity, according to post-emergency calculations, up to one beta. And only after 5 ~ 6 s, in emergency conditions it is an eternity, the defense begins to introduce negative reactivity.

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ARTICLE 3.3.5. NBSP "At least one of the provided reactivity impact systems shall be able to bring the reactor into a subcritical state and maintain it in this state under any normal and emergency conditions and under the condition of failure of one of the most effective reactivity impact bodies." On April 26, 1986, after pressing the A3 button, unfortunately (I didn’t make a reservation), it worked in its entirety and blew up the reactor. In the event of a failure, part of the accident protection might not have occurred. Paradox? Yes. But such is the protection.

Operational Reactivity Margin Usually ORM is needed to allow the maneuvering capacity. It is not possible to construct a reactor with a zero reactivity coefficient, so some reactivity margin is needed when operating modes change. For economic and security reasons, it should be minimal. Initially, the design documents for the RBMK reactor did not impose any restrictions on the minimum reserve.

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In 1975 at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP at power output after operation A3 there was an accident with a rupture of the technological channel due to overheating of a small part of the core. To reduce this part of power through the dive bars here and extract in other places was not possible. Due to xenon poisoning of the reactor, there was no reactivity reserve. It was the first bell, even the bell of a loud battle. The station was close to disaster. One channel was depressurized, and under those conditions there could have been several, and, as is now clear, this led to an accident similar to Chernobyl. After the accident, a commission of IAE and NIKIET employees examined the reactor and issued recommendations in 1976 on improving the performance of RBMK, which formed the basis of modernization measures ... in 1986, after the Chernobyl disaster. Well, ten years is not a deadline! Hence the entry in the Regulation on the prohibition of working with a reactivity margin of less than 15 PP rods. Everyone at the Chernobyl station, as well as at others with RBMK reactors, understood its necessity for controlling energy release by the core volume in order to be able to reduce the neutron flux in hot spots and increase in cold ones.

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The fact that with a small margin of reactivity due to the fundamentally incorrect design of the rods CPS A3 becomes its antipode - an accelerating device, the creators of the reactor did not tell us. Did you know the authors themselves about this? By the totality of the documents that have now become known, they should have known with an appropriate approach to comprehending the facts. In the IAE and NIKIET there were groups dealing with the topic of RBMK. Apparently, for the leaders of these groups, positions have long become a sinecure, and they regarded any proposals (commission on the accident at the Leningrad NPP, employees of the IAE V.P. Volkov and V. Ivanov) as an attempt on their peace. Philosophy prevailed - well, the reactors are working, what to look for? Another is hard to come up with. It seems to me that the leadership has a clear there was no understanding of the danger, otherwise it is impossible to understand the absolute inaction and neglect for the proposals of thinking workers. That the authors of the reactor did not directly correlate the reactivity margin and the A3 performance, can be seen in the clause of the Regulation, rewritten from the standard Regulation drawn up by them.

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P. 2.12.6. “If the reactor cannot be brought to a critical state within 15 minutes, despite the fact that all CPS rods (except for shortened absorber rods (USP)) are removed from the core, shut off the reactor with all the rods to the lower ends.” After the accident on April 26, employees of the IAE and NIKIET immediately understood the real causes of the disaster. I am absolutely convinced of this. If I stated four or five versions in the explanatory note immediately after the accident, for various reasons rejected them, except for one - the incorrect action of A3 due to the end effect of the rods, i.e. came to the correct conclusion, although this is not all, then, having operational data, even only those that I became aware of, they did not make a correct conclusion. Another thing is that they "darkened" and continue to this day - the reasons are clear. This is especially true for NIKIET employees. From under their pen, apart from a note by N.A. Dollezhal (with reservations), I did not see a single truthful document on the accident. I don’t know if a lie is included in the candidate’s minimum, or then they hone their skills, but they master it professionally.

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The first version, leading to the side, with the breakdown of the MCP failed because of a completely obvious juggling of facts. Then others went into action they invented staff violations, false calculations, and, most importantly, conclusions that were turned upside down. The NIKIET workers were again the most aggressive and peremptory. We were accused: due to the small margin of reactivity, the A3 lost its functional ability. Not because of the pathological design of the rods, but because of the small margin. Well, we will agree with them briefly and turn to ABY-04-74, which entered into force in 1974. We read. “The rules are binding on all enterprises, institutions and organizations in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants ...” And if the OZR parameter disables A3 (which could be worse for the reactor ?!), then why the project did not comply: ARTICLE 3.1.8. ABY “The alarm system of a nuclear power plant reactor should give the following signals: • Emergency (light, sound), including an alarm siren, when the parameters of the A3 trigger settings and emergency deviations of the technological mode;

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•

Warning (light and sound) when approaching the parameters to the set points of operation A3, increasing the radiation above the set limit, violations of the normal operation of the equipment."

ARTICLE 3.3.21. ABY “A high-speed A3 should be provided in the control and safety system to ensure that the reactor is shut down in the event of an emergency. The signals and settings for trip A3 must be justified in the design. ” None of this was in violation of the mandatory reactivity margin rules. After the accident, they tell us this is the most important parameter of the reactor. Let me not believe it. At the station, each pit for collecting leaks in the room has an alarm about filling and, often, automatic pumping. And the most important parameter that detonates a reactor during a deviation has nothing not even a continuous monitoring device. This is lyrics, and I stated the requirement of the Law a little higher. Operational personnel were not provided with controls and automation in accordance with the Law. Limited to indicating in the Rules.

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One of the Soviet specialists who informed the international community in the IAEA in August 1986 told me at the sixth hospital in Moscow that foreign experts said in this connection about the exorbitant load on the operator. But our experts began to talk about the difficulty of the problem of separation of functions between man and machine. A fair amount of cynicism must be possessed in order to talk about separation under these conditions. Deviations of the parameter lead to a global catastrophe, and the staff does not even see or hear. What was the measuring device - more on that below. If the deviation of the parameter leads to the block stop without damage, I agree to respond with a bonus, a reprimand. But why should the personnel, and not the sinners themselves, have to pay for other people's sins with life, health and freedom ?! I don’t want blood, I spent four years in jail and somehow I didn’t like it. But I’m scared that people who have designed an apparatus that is completely unusable still do not recognize this and, after a light shake, continue to do the same. What else will they give to humanity?

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Although we did not know beyond the reactivity margin of his ability to turn the A3 into an overclocking device and above, I said that we could not consider it important due to the lack of controls, but this last is just to object to the prosecutors. We were not going to violate ORR and did not violate. Violation - when deliberately ignored testimony, and April 26, no one saw a stock of less than 15 rods. Recording Rules must be followed in the regulation of energy release in the reactor is a serious thing, second. But, apparently, we are viewed (incorrectly, to look is just not what it was) reducing the stock. Although this is not so indisputable for the moment you press the A3 button. Block computing machine low-power, calculated the reactivity margin of the program "PRISM" for five minutes on the job. Possible whether to keep track of the parameter, if it changes by three or four rods in a few seconds, for example, when changing the flow of feed water. In stationary conditions, it is suitable, but not in transient conditions. To control the energy deposition in combination with physical control over the reactor energies, with its one hundred and thirty and twelve radial Samsonite altitude sensors - a method of measuring the stock arranged.

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But for the newly announced function - the guarantor of performance A3-did not fit in any way. And even if the staff does not know about it. The reactor operator would have to keep an eye on him. And control of the reactor makes more than a thousand of manipulation and control has more than a thousand parameters. I admit that they looked, but for this the project did everything and even more. As I already wrote, the Nuclear Safety Department supplied the operational personnel with incorrect information, which made it impossible to correctly forecast. And it turns out - it is impossible to measure the parameter, to predict too. Therefore, it does not fit into the head that the Scientific Director and the Chief Designer clearly represent the danger of their reactor. Otherwise, everything is very sad and complete hopelessness. However, this is not so and impossible. And the question is not whether they knew or not, clearly or vaguely imagined. They had to know!

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The designer have as much time as necessary to think and make technical decisions, so as not to put the operator, squeezed by the time frame, in extreme conditions. The operator should not have situations not previously thought out by the designer, and, of course, there should not be situations leading to destruction, not to mention global disasters. They should be blocked by constructive or design measures. With the enormous amounts of energy contained in modern devices, machines, pipelines, solutions a hundred years ago cannot be dispensed with, approaches must be adequate to the technique used. The RBMK reactor has a nominal power of 3.2 million kW, in the event of an accident, according to various estimates, the power ranged from twenty to one hundred ratings, it would increase to almost any value until the reactor collapses. There is no protection against acceleration at instant neutrons, it can only be prevented. There can be no question to make the occurrence of such a situation dependent on operator error. This is not my good wish, regulatory documents on reactor safety directly speak about this:

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ARTICLE 2.7.1. OPB "Protective systems shall perform safety functions and in case of failures independent from the initial event in accordance with clause 1.2.4." The erroneous action of the personnel is also the initial event. There is no room for arbitrariness to the designer. Want do, want not do. Obliged. This is directly in line with the PBJ requirements above. If the reactor was equipped with an alarm system and automatic protection, there could be no question of reducing the reactivity reserve in the danger zone. Another thing is that the minimum reactivity margin of 15 rods specified in the Regulation did not guarantee safety at all. Yes, and could not, because it was installed for completely different reasons. True, there is a calculation, I don’t remember which organization, where one of the numerous positions of the CPS rods was taken with a margin of 15 rods and it was shown that a positive run-out there is no reactivity when the protection is triggered. But this is designed for simpletons. Firstly, the stock can be realized at different positions of the rods and you need to choose the most unfavorable; secondly, the absence of a positive run-out does not show the performance of the A3.

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It is necessary to ensure the desired rate of introduction of negative reactivity from the first moment after operation. In any case, after the accident at the remaining RBMK reactors, the minimum reactivity margin was set at 30 rods, and this with a changed design and eighty DP installed, which significantly reduced the steam reactivity coefficient. In general, this is an unnatural phenomenon when a reactor is nuclear-hazardous with little excess reactivity. After the shut-off valves were closed at 01 hours 23 minutes 04 seconds, the steam supply to the turbine stopped, and the speed began to decrease. The experiment was supposed to end at a speed of about 2,000 per minute. I don’t know for what reason, I remember the number 2 370 - either during the explosion, or when I turned back to the devices after a conversation between A. Akimov and the reactor operator L. Toptunov. Everything went quietly, without deviations from the expected results. And in the first seconds after pressing the A3 button, none of those nearby showed concern. The central control systems, in particular, the DREG program, did not register until 01 hours 23 minutes 40 seconds - the moment the button was pressed - no changes in the parameters that could cause the operator to activate A3.

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The commission of the State Atomic Energy Agency under the chairmanship of N. Steinberg collected and analyzed a large number of materials and, as written in the report, could not establish a reliable reason for the A3 drop. Search and do not, there was no reason. The reactor was shut off at the end of work. As I observed, it has already been written. There is evidence of G.P. Metlenko in the case. He sat at the table of the shift supervisor close to Akimov and Toptunov. His testimony is on magnetic tape. But I have his letter in response to mine asking me to send a copy of the Program and answer some questions. On this occasion, he writes: “My impressions on Akimov’s command are as follows: the process was calm and he gave the command in a calm voice, turning half-turn and waving his hand, and then there was the impression of a booming water hammer.” There are also testimonies of A. Kuhar, who went to the control room immediately before Akimov’s order to shut down the reactor. Yes, it seems that now no one has any doubt that the A3 was activated in the absence of any technical reasons and the protection itself initiated the acceleration of the reactor.

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In addition to those whose opinion was determined from the very beginning to prove the guilt of the staff. Here's how, for example, you can beat a technically completely transparent and natural phenomenon. As a result of previous processes, the AR remained with minus (in fact, the reactor power is less than the set) imbalance within the insensitivity of the regulator, as evidenced by the “1PC up” signal recorded by DREG. When the generator ran out, the coolant flow rate decreased, which led to an increase in reactivity, and the reactor power began to increase, went into the area of positive imbalance, and the regulator started to move down. The signal "1PC down" was taken at 01 h 23 min 30 s. Forensic experts photographed the power recording on tape with a 17 and 30-fold increase, where they noticed an increase in power 20 seconds before the explosion. It went to the Indictment and further. Serious accusation. Only seventeen times increased and already noticeable increase in power. We had neither microscopes nor telescopes, but the increase in power noticeable to the naked eye was not something special. The automatic regulator begins to respond only when the imbalance is there and more than a certain value - this is the principle of operation.

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G. Medvedev picturesquely expounds in his opus: “Leonid Toptunov, senior reactor control engineer, was the first to sound the alarm. “We need to throw emergency protection, Alexander Fedorovich, we are accelerating,” he told Akimov. Akimov quickly looked at the printout of a computer. The process developed slowly, yes, slowly ... Akimov hesitated. " The computer does not give out printouts at all, by which one could see how the process is developing. For the printout to hit the control panel from the computer room, it takes about two minutes, if done without delay. There were no printouts at all for 01 h 22 min 30 s; it appeared after the accident. And the "process" began to develop after pressing a button. And the button was pressed not by Akimov, but by Toptunov (see above). G. Medvedev forgot to add that before pressing the button Akimov listened to how neutrons with a slight rustle divided uranium nuclei, sniffed footcloths and only then decided. If you write a documentary story, then you have to celebrate everything, cut the whole truth-womb.

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I didn’t hear what Toptunov told Akimov, only G. Metlenko could hear, but he didn’t tell anything, he was not interested in his negotiations. B. Stolyarchuk, busy with his own affairs, also did not listen. The rest were far away, and quiet, calm negotiations did not reach their ears. Judging by the behavior of Toptunov and Akimov, according to the recording of signals, one can say without fear of error - when the rods of the AP approached the bottom of the core, Toptunov asked what to do with the reactor. And Akimov, as was agreed at the briefing, ordered to jam. From that moment it all began. After a slight decrease in power at the very beginning of the movement of the rods into the core, which is understandable, because the neutron field was two-humped with a maximum at the top and a dip in the middle part in height. Such a field always happens after a decrease in power, since during operation the maximum field was in the middle and, therefore, the middle poisoning was greatest. Further, due to a defect in the design of the rods, a local supercritical reactor, a neutron flux, was created below, and with it the energy release increased, and decreased in the upper part. The total reactivity introduced by the rods became positive, and the power began to increase mainly below.

136

At 01 hours 23 min 40 s, when the button was pressed, the power could not significantly exceed 200 MW, otherwise the regulator would have knocked the controller out of the machine by a large imbalance. But already at 01 h 23 min 43 s, AZZ and AZM. were recorded. These signals should not be at all with the safety rods moving down! With correctly designed rods ... As some now recall, there were earlier cases when when A3 was triggered by different signals (level deviation in the drum separator and others), these signals also fell out. Neither the operation nor the developers of the CPS could explain the reason for their appearance. How many such cases were - not easy to say and, perhaps, everything is impossible to identify. The exploiters do not want to rummage through the archives; the governing bodies do not need this at all. Here's another thing: as a rule, the root cause of the fall of A3 is known and less attention is paid to other alarms, although the staff needed to list all the signals in the explanatory notes. At that time, these incident alarms were considered false and attributed to the imperfection of the CPS electronics. As is now clear, in fact they were evidence of the malfunctioning of the A3.

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There were actual power surges, but due to the imperfection of the measuring and recording instruments, they were not correctly evaluated and understood. Even on April 26, with a power of tens of ratings, the power meter showed less than one due to inertia. Those power surges were smaller and more fleeting, but ... the unsteady line separated from the disaster. The reactor operator L.Toptunov shouted about an emergency increase in reactor power. Akimov shouted loudly: “Shut off the reactor!” And darted to the control panel of the reactor. This second command jam already heard everything. It was, apparently, after the first explosion, because I heard from Akimov in the hospital that it was he who de-energized the clutch of the servo drives of the control and control system, and DREG recorded this at 01 h 23 min 49 s. The second team could not change anything at all, the button had already been pressed before, and the rods A3 went into the zone while they could. Experts and investigators really wanted to prove that the reactor began to collapse even before the A3 button was pressed. For what reasons, what are the objective indicators for such conclusions?

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By the time of writing the Indictment, there were already graphs of the parameters of the block and they are in the case, from which it is clear that there are no grounds for such conclusions. But there is a version, and under it there is a fitting of facts, evidence. I. Kirshenbaum, S. Gazin, G. Lysyuk, who were present on the control panel, showed that they heard a command to shut down the reactor immediately before or immediately after the explosion. That's right, they were far away and they did not hear the first order in a calm, quiet voice, only the second. A.Kuharya was forced to change his first testimony of April 26, where he says that Akimov said to shut down the reactor, and after a few seconds alarms and an explosion appeared. His second testimony is this: “... I heard a voice, but I don’t remember anyone, that the pressure in the KMPTs is 79 atmospheres, although the nominal setting is 70. At that time I heard Akimov’s command - we turn off the device. Literally immediately, there was a strong roar from the side of the mashine. ” A. Kuhar’s first testimony works against the version; he was rejected. The second testimony, in principle, is also true, if you indicate that it is a few seconds away from the first and Akimov’s team is repeated. This is the Cook and confirmed in court to my question: “Why did he change his testimony?”

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And now the investigator’s twist: “These testimonies are objectively confirmed by Toptunov’s explanatory note in the case file, which, in particular, reads:“ At the moment of the impact (or immediately after it) the CPS rods stopped ... ”. Subjectively or objectively - it does not matter, but the meaning is exactly the opposite: at the moment of impact the rods stopped, by this time they had passed 2.5 ~ 3 m, i.e. moved for seven seconds before the strike. If you say such things are simply refuted, you are mistaken. This requires people who want to listen. Will you find them in court? God help you! .. It seems that the author of the version about the destruction of the reactor before the fall of A3 was expert V. Dolgov from the city of Obninsk, while others did not mind. Here is their statement: “The fact that the development of the accident began before pressing the AZ-5 button is evidenced by the position of the CPS rods fixed by the specialists of NIKIET, Gosatomenergonadzor of the USSR and the Chernobyl NPP after the accident. In the appendix to the act, they noted that about 20 rods remained in the upper extreme position, and 14-15 rods plunged into the active zone by no more than 1 ~ 2 m due to channel deformation. ”

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What kind of destruction in the core should have happened for the deformation of the CPS channels? And so that there are no signals either in the reactor space, or along the CPS loop? We didn’t even bother to see that most of these channels are USPs, which according to the algorithm are motionless when A3 is triggered. Who can argue that the indicators of the position of the rods left the correct readings when the cables were torn under voltage and then everything turned off? Skilfully used by prosecutors of personnel listing the position of the rods of the CPS. Remember Medvedev Akimov quickly looked at the printout of the development of the process - well, this is a "spreading cranberry." Others do more skillfully. The block computer periodically records parameters, including the position of the rods, and according to the program calculates the OZR. After 01 h 22 min 30 with the calculation of the reserve for this position the machine did not have time to do before the accident, it was made at the Smolensk NPP and the reserve was 6~8 rods. Violation Of Regulations.

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At this time the stock was the most small, since the coolant flow rate was maximum, and to maintain the level in the drum separator, the operator increased the feed water flow, which at this power led to the collapse of steam in the core. A minute later stock was about 12 rods, and maybe more. Given people's ignorance of factual circumstances, prosecutors say that the staff knew about the violation, deliberately ignored the testimony and continued to work. Let's figure it out. Suppose a listing of the position of the rods at 01 h 22 min 30 s was done. It was necessary to cut it off from the teletype, register it in a magazine, bring the computer operator to the control room for fifty meters and hand it to the operator. Of course, no one was running. The print statement says nothing to the computer operator. By the beginning of the experiment under the “TG coasting program” at 01 h 23 min 04 s there could be no printout on the billboard. Let her appear in a minute, at 23 min. 30 s. Looked at the reactor operator or shift supervisor. Poorly. According to the Regulation, you must either bring the parameter back to normal (impossible) or reset A3. The protection was reset at 01 h 23 min 40 s - an explosion occurred.

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But the last paragraph is written only to show the obvious dishonesty of people who are technically literate, who knew specifically both the bloc and the circumstances. The staff did not take such printouts, it is impossible to establish a reactivity margin from them the operator is not a computer. We took printouts with the stock calculated by the machine. Emergency protection by the very name and is actually designed to jam the reactor without violating its elements and systems in an emergency situation, in any emergency and normal situations, as required by regulations and stated in the operating Regulations of RBMK. On April 26, 1986, we pressed the A3 button under normal parameters, stable mode, and in the absence of alarms and warnings, we received an explosion. ARTICLE 3.3.26. The Emergency protection of the reactor shall provide automatic fast and reliable quenching of the chain reaction in the following cases: • When the emergency power setting is reached; • Upon reaching the emergency setting at the rate of power rise; • By pressing the A3 buttons.

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"The Department [of nuclear safety] periodically conducted measurements ... parameters such as steam reactivity effect (αφ) and fast power reactivity coefficient (αN). Here are the latest data obtained by operational personnel to guide the work: αφ =+1.29 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, and αN =1.7×10-4 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, / MW."

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Chapter 5

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After The Explosion He listened, rather even looked, the conversation between Akimov and Toptunov and turned to the instruments. I knew the frequency at which the generator turned off, and translated it into revolutions using a digital pointer, since it was more convenient to monitor them. I didn’t do anything else - there was a blow. Debris of pressed false ceiling tiles sprinkled on top. He looked up - at this time a second blow shook the entire building. The lights went out and soon turned on. The lamps of a large number of signals flashed. The first thought is that something happened to the deaerators. These are large containers, partially filled with hot water and steam, in a room above the shield. And although there is metal flooring, cracks could appear with such an impact, and boiling water will pour into the control room. He commanded everyone in the backup control panel. However, everything calmed down, and in the future on the control room there were no leaks of water or steam, there were no fires. The command was canceled.

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I went along the panels with the instruments to the reactor control panel. Already the first inspection of the devices, and nothing could be said before the reactor control panel, except for the pressure in the primary circuit and the coolant circulation. Both that, and another - a zero. Already by these devices I realized that this was not an accident in its usual sense. There is no coolant flow due to the shutdown of the MCP - it does not matter if there is pressure, with such an initial power the natural circulation removes heat without question. And there is no pressure - TVELs die in the first minute. But the operator’s stereotype worked out over the years to provide core cooling - works. Sasha Akimov was ordered to turn on the SAOR pumps from automatically starting emergency diesel generators, and Valery Perevozchenko to open the valves on the circuit. Even then I understood that the fuel cartridges could not be saved, however, not knowing at all the nature of the destruction, I thought this way: fuel elements will begin to melt from overheating, the fuel will go into water communications and, gradually melting the pipes, will get into the premises. I considered the reactor muffled.

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At the console of the reactor my eyes climbed forehead. CPS rods are somewhere in intermediate positions, they don’t go down with de-energized servo couplings, a reactimeter shows positive reactivity. The operators are confused, I suppose, and I had the same look. Immediately sent A. Kudryavtsev and V. Proskuryakov to the central hall together with the operators to lower the rods manually. The guys ran. I immediately realized the absurdity of my order - since the rods do not go into the zone with de-energized couplings, they will not go when rotated manually. And that the readings of a reactimeter are not readings at all. He jumped out into the corridor, but the guys were already hiding. After the accident, he repeatedly, almost daily and until now, analyzed his orders and actions on April 26, 1986, and only this order was incorrect. I would like to look at that person who would have kept a clear mind in that setting. It was enough that it was my first and last nonsense. Calmness came, not retardation, namely calmness, and the only thought was what could be done. There is dust and smoke in the corridor. I returned to the control room and ordered to turn on the smoke exhaust fans. And he, through another exit, went to the engine room.

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There is a picture worthy of the pen of the great Dante! Part of the roof of the hall collapsed. How many? I do not know, three hundred meters - four hundred square meters. Plates collapsed and damaged oil and feed lines. Blockages. From the twelfth mark I looked down into the opening, there at the fifth mark there were feed pumps. From damaged pipes, jets of hot water beat in different directions and fall on electrical equipment. Around couples. And there are sharp, like a shot, clicks of short circuits in electrical circuits. In the area of the seventh TG, oil flowing out of the damaged pipes caught fire, operators with fire extinguishers ran there and uncoiled fire hoses. On the roof through the openings flashes of fire are visible. He returned to the control room and ordered Akimov to call the fire brigade, as I said, with all the reinforcement. It turns out that the station firefighters had already left by that time, since one of them was on the street at the time of the explosion. An ambulance was called. Akimov informed B. Rogozhkin, the shift supervisor, and he, according to the instructions, notified Moscow, Kiev.

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Station workers are notified automatically by recording on tape according to the category of accident in this case a General accident, the most severe, was announced. How was the notification of the authorities described, by the morning they began to appear from Kiev and Moscow. With a station alert, a tape recorder malfunctioned somewhere and the telephone operator additionally phoned the list. In addition to the chief engineer N.M. Fomin, the rest arrived at the station shortly after the accident. I did not see any bosses on the block until leaving. Valery Perevozchenko returned to the control panel after an unsuccessful attempt to get into the tank, where there are valves that connect the water supply to the primary circuit from the pumps. The entrance to the room is littered, it is impossible to pass. Sasha Kudryavtsev and Vitya Proskuryakov returned. Senior in age and position, most of the operators I called incomplete names. By name and patronymic, as an exception by last name, he named only when tense relations arose. Such, however, were rare and not for long. Sasha and Victor also failed to get into the central hall because of the rubble. In general, on April 26, 1986, at least until five in the morning, there was no one in the hall.

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But if you want to do something, you need to know something. On the instruments of the control panel, the picture seemed terrible, but did not give information on actions. He left the control room with the intention to see the situation in the reactor hall, where the top of the reactor goes. Did not reach. Met the gas circuit operators I. Symonenko and V. Semikopov and the central hall operators O. Henry and A. Kurguz. Tolya Kurguz was terribly burned, the skin of his face and hands hanging in shreds. What is under the clothes is not visible. He told them to quickly go to the medical center, where an ambulance should already come. Igor Simonenko said that the building of the reactor shop was destroyed. He walked a few meters quickly along the corridor at the tenth mark, looked out of the window and saw ... more precisely, he didn’t see it, it was not there - the walls of the building. Over the entire height from the seventieth to the twelfth mark, the wall collapsed. What else - is not visible in the dark. Further down the corridor, down the stairs and out of the building. I walk slowly around the fourth, then third block reactor building. I look up. There is something to see, but as they say, my eyes would not have looked ... at such a sight. Despite the night and poor lighting, one can see enough.

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The roof and the two walls of the workshop were as it was. In the rooms through the openings of the absent walls, streams of water, flashes of short circuits on electrical equipment, several fires are visible in places. The gas cylinder room is destroyed, the cylinders are standing awry. There can be no talk of any access to gate valves, V. Perevozchenko is right. On the roof of the third block and the chemical workshop there are several foci, still small. Apparently, the fire came from large fragments of fuel ejected by an explosion from the core. Maybe from graphite, although at a power of 200 MW graphite had a temperature of no more than 350 ° C and, flying through the air, had to cool. But dispersed fuel could infiltrate graphite and then it would warm up after leaving the zone. True, this is doubtful. I did not see luminous pieces of graphite on the ground. I didn’t see the non-luminous ones, although once again later I walked along both streets along the street. But I didn’t look down, there weren’t any large pieces under my feet, so I never tripped. Near the premises of the backup control panel of the third block are fire engines. The driver of one of them was asked who was the eldest, and he pointed to a walking man. It was Lieutenant V. Pravik, I knew him by sight.

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He told Pravik that it was necessary to drive up to the collector of the fire pipeline going to the roof. Nearby was a hydrant for connection. Fire engines began to turn around, and I climbed onto the control panel of the third block. Y. Bagdasarov asked the shift supervisor of the third block whether anything was interfering with the work. He replied: "Not yet, examined the available places." The operators are clearly asking - what ?! However, not a single question out loud. They gave a drug for iodine prophylaxis. He accepted and, without saying anything to them, left. What could I say? I did not even think about the causes of the disaster at that time. The first time I began to try to figure out when they had already taken me to the hospital. I did not consider it necessary before, and there was something to do. When going around the blocks, a picture began to be drawn from the outside, I realized - the reactor tightened. I imagined it this way: technological channels broke, as a result of which pressure increased in the reactor space and tore off the upper two-four-ton structure, steam rushed into the hall and destroyed the building, the upper structure then “sat down” in place.

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What tossed it, and it stoods on the edge - before that I did not think of it, but it did not change the matter. From that moment on, the fourth block reactor for me began to exist only as a source of danger for the remaining blocks. Arriving at the control panel of the fourth unit, he ordered A. Akimov to stop the pumps launched after the explosion, since water from them could not be supplied to the reactor due to the destruction of the reinforcement assembly, and there was no need to do this after half an hour after the explosion. Everything that could happen in the absence of cooling has already happened. In the future, we did not take any measures to this. Petro Palamarchuk, a hefty man, brought Volodya Shashenka, the engineer of the commissioning enterprise, into the chair and sat in the room at the twenty-fourth mark for emergency devices, and he was scalded with water and steam. Now Volodya was sitting in an armchair and only slightly moving his eyes, neither screaming nor groaning. Apparently the pain exceeded all conceivable boundaries and turned off consciousness. Before that, I saw a stretcher in the corridor, suggested where to get them and carry him to the medical center. P. Palamarchuk and N. Gorbachenko carried away.

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Vladimir Shashenok died by morning; it turned out to be the second victim. P. Palamarchuk, looking for Shashenka, received a large dose, and when he was carrying, his clothes on his back were wet. The water is radioactive, and even after five years, the burn wounds on the back did not completely close. The shift supervisor V. Perevozchenko said that there is no MCC operator Valery Hodemchuk and two central hall operators. Briefly ordered: "Search!". An employee of the Kharkov Turbine Plant A.F. Kabanov came up with his two comrades. I told them to leave the block. A.Kabanov began to tell me that the vibration laboratory remains in the engine room. It was a good laboratory for the production of Germany, at the same time measured the vibration of all bearings, and the computer produced good visual prints. It was a pity to Kabanov to lose it. And here, for the only time on April 26, I raised my voice, cursed at him: "Damn this car, leave the block immediately." He is obliged to say: on April 26, 1986, everyone who was on the block carried out instructions on the first word, no excuses. I never had to repeat the order. What they could and saw the need for this - they did it themselves. They did not know what to do - it was. And who knew there?

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They did not prepare for such an accident. And, in my opinion, no need to prepare. Such an accident should not be, it should not be allowed. But everyone had a willingness to do, even non-operational workers did. True, they were quickly sent from the block. Only the shift supervisor Rogozhkin, I think, did not fulfill his duties properly. In practice, he had nothing to do with work on the fourth block, and it was he who was obliged to supervise over the post in an emergency. He was the only one who could not get to the control room because of the “blockages”. Others went. Yes, ikebana was not there. Fearfully? It was. What should the shift supervisor do when he sees the blockage? Take people and make out. And along the corridor at the tenth mark, the blockage consisted of kilogram aluminum false ceiling shields. But he did not receive a large dose. Be healthy, Boris Vasilievich. With the radiation monitor, Samoilenko measured the atmosphere in the control room. He had a device at 1000 μR / s or 3.6 R / h. In the left and middle parts of theR / s or 3.6 R / h. In the left and middle parts of the shield, the device showed 500 ~ 800 μR / s or 3.6 R / h. In the left and middle parts of theR / s, in the right - it went off scale. Since I did not expect a close source of radiation there, on the right side I counted no more than 5 R / h. I had no other choice. We measured the dose rate on the backup control panel.

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Well, there I went off scale, the transition there fell off by itself. A. Akimov was told to send the reactor operator L.Toptunov and the turbine operator I.Kirshenbaum to the third control room. They could not do anything useful, and the situation here is extremely unfavorable. Akimov and Stolyarchuk remained on the shield. Now they are engaged in the main useful work, which was carried out by the operational personnel of the fourth unit with a risk to life and health. Due to numerous damage to pipelines and building structures, short circuits in electrical circuits constantly occurred - a source of fires. When I walked from the third block, I met the deputy chief of the electric shop A.G. Lelechenko. I took it with me. Now he brought Lelechenko and Akimov together and ordered them to turn off the mechanisms and disassemble the electrical circuits in order to deenergize the maximum number of cables and electrical circuits. He also ordered to drain turbine oil into emergency tanks and displace hydrogen from electric generators. All this work was performed by the personnel of the electric and turbine workshops. Fulfilled. And who died, who received severe bodily harm.

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The deputy head of the turbine workshop R.I. Davletbaev and the electric workshop A.G. Lelechenko helped the shift staff well. The amazing man Alexander Grigorievich. And you won’t call him a healthy man. I don’t understand where he took his strength to go to work for two or three days after April 26, and again in the same radiation situation. And when he was taken to a hospital in Kiev, he did not live long. It was bitter and dismal to me to hear about the untidiness and desecration of the graves of dead operators at the Mitinsky cemetery in Moscow, as opposed to the graves of dead firefighters. About firefighters I will say a little further. Now about the operational staff. If he had not done what he had done, no doubt, new fires would have arisen, and even with a small number of persons on duty, they would have been detected with their strong development. Those fires that occurred during the explosion, and partially eliminated by personnel, disabled two fire units: the station and the city of Pripyat. Who would liquidate the new ones and at what cost? I think the staff acted correctly, exclusively selflessly and did everything possible in that setting. Nothing more could be done. I told you how it was, and you yourself can now judge.

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I do not want to judge people. But to desecrate graves, whatever they are, is barbarism. No one forces you to wear flowers, but you cannot throw away those brought in. The lying official version, dumped everything on the killed staff, and there does not give them rest. And they say - lies have short legs. It is visible no - and jumping, and tenacious … A. Akimov started to execute. And I went outside again - the pockets of fire on the roof had not yet been extinguished, so on the third block I ordered to shut down the reactor and damp with emergency speed. B. Rogozhkin, who was present on the shield of the third block, said that I should coordinate the situation with V.P. Bryukhanov, to which I replied: “Silence, while the situation is more or less normal.” Well, of course, no one was not normal and on the third block, just technologically, nothing hindered the work. Recently, there have been some strange conversations around firefighters. And their actions were wrong, and the situation was not called. The correspondent of the newspaper Komsomolskoye Znamya asked me about violations of fire regulations. I don’t know, maybe they violated some instructions, but nothing could change that. If they wore protective dosimetric clothing, they would not have helped them.

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Their regular clothes were made of rough material, their boots protected from β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,-radiation, and nothing could protect them from γ-radiation - there is no such clothing. Only automatic firefighting, which did not require the presence of people on the roof of the reactor and chemical plant, could save. There was none. There was a piping along the perimeter with branches for connecting firefighters sleeves that were next to the drawers. Without people there is nothing to be done. And the incomprehensible interview of Director V.P. Bryukhanov that there was no fire at all, and in vain completely sent firefighters to perish - to push the hot pieces of graphite. What, did I dream of a fire? After all, it was because of him that I gave the order to stop the third block. Yes, I admit, a raging fire, this was just not enough then, there wasn’t, only separate foci. So what did Lieutenant Pravik do: wait for them to unite into one grand flame? Then a transfer to three other blocks with completely unpredictable consequences is already inevitable. Maybe you had to wait until it goes out? Usually it goes out only when everything burns out, which can burn. And the questions of the correspondent to me, he himself did not come up with, and in an interview with Bryukhanov, the correspondent also asked, all these are links of one chain, it is not clear.

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Really enviable awards for deadly work? So repeat it, our reality of the cases provides enough. When leaving the third control room in the corridor, met V. Chugunov and A. Sitnikov, already dressed in dosimetric setting. I had the usual overalls and low shoes. Shoe covers would greatly alleviate my condition, protect my legs from terrible burns that still have not passed. But what kind of walking are they? And then I did not pay attention to it then. He carried the respirators in his pocket - he put on one, got into the vapor somewhere, no longer breathing, dropped it and did not put it on. They said that they were sent to inspect the 4th block of Bruchanov, who was in the refuge of civil defense. At that time I was no longer up to the conversation, answered that there was nothing to watch, and went to the 4th block. There appeared the deputy head of the safety department G.Krasnozen. He was small in haste and apparently didn’t pick up clothes in size, his head was wound like a turban with a waffle towel, only his eyes were visible. According to the dosimetric setting, he didn’t explain anything, but mocked with his appearance. To himself, not out loud, he laughed heartily, despite the tragedy of the situation and the crappy state. Periodically drawn uncontrollably to vomiting, but only the insides remained to throw out.

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There is nothing to describe. Described repeatedly by those who ... have not experienced this. On the billboard V. Perevozchenko said that the operators of the central hall were found, there is no V. Khodemchuk. The operators were not lost anywhere. When Perevozchenko told me earlier about their absence, I didn’t give his last name, but I would tell him about Kurguz and Henry. The three of us went, they took S. Yuvchenko and the dosimetrist. The device, as before, at 1000 μR / s or 3.6 R / h. In the left and middle parts of theR / s, where it showed where it went off scale. At the entrance to the hall of the MCP, the ceiling was failed. The dosimetrist was released - it is useless with his device. Sasha Yuvchenko and I were left in failure, and V. Perevozchenko climbed the console to the operator’s room, where, albeit with a low probability, Valery Hodemchuk could be. The door of the room is pushed by a crane. It was dangerous to climb, water poured from above. A thought flickered - no need. And they went, supplanted by another: “And then you can live if he is here and by this time has not yet received a lethal dose?” V. Khodemchuk was not there, his body was never found. Buried under concrete and metal.

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But Valery Perevozchenko, apparently, received a lethal supplement there. He was doused with water, and he died not from a large dose of radiation, but from radiation burns of the skin. And then I began to decline, complete apathy. This was caused by both a physical state and, apparently, the absence of a specific momentary task. I did not see anything else useful. We did everything possible and did the right thing. I have no confidence in ventilation, and now I do not know how it would be best. Then I ordered to turn off the ventilation of the fourth block and turn on all the supply ventilation in the engine room of the third block to prevent the spread of dirty air from the fourth block. Yes, he was dirty on the street. Let smart people figure it out. In court, an expert from either civil defense or health care accused me of incorrect ventilation actions. Yes, this leader also accused me of violating the job description of the shift supervisor. How would I break it without being the shift supervisor? On an equal footing, I can be accused of violating the instructions for Chiang Kai-shek. I was called to the phone. V.P. Bryukhanov. I don’t remember what they were talking about, it seems, they weren’t talking, he said: "Come to the headquarters of the civil defense.

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He took with him three diagram tapes: two with a record of reactor power and pressure in the primary circuit. Washed in the shower, according to the rules, first with cool water, then hot. In the bunker there are a lot of people, both station and unfamiliar. I saw Volodya Babichev, the shift supervisor of the block. About three o’clock I told A. Akimov that he should call himself a substitute. He called. He asked Babichev: “Why here?” He replied: “They will not let me in.” - Let's go to. And Babichev left to replace Akimov. Unfortunately, Sasha remained on the block after the change. Went to the next room of the bunker. Director V. Bryukhanov, and always something not too talkative, silent. He didn’t ask me anything. I sat down, laid out the diagrams and showed outlines of power and pressure. At the same time he said: "Some kind of incorrect reaction of the CPS." That's all, I didn’t say anything else. Bruchanov is depressed, silent. A colonel of some troops came up to the table, began to ask the director about the destruction for a report to his superiors, how many square meters of roofing and something else was there.

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My words - write, the fourth block has been destroyed the colonel arrogantly ignored. Uncontrollably pulled on vomiting, ran out of the bunker up, where I.N. Tsarenko helped to get into the ambulance. And the hospital for long six months. And another work on the fourth block was completed on April 26, so to speak, impromptu, the rest was already done according to plan. The chief engineer N.M. Fomin arrived at the station later than others, at 4 ~ 5 hours, and it would be better a few hours later. And he decided to organize the supply of water to the reactor. Why after so much time after the explosion? I do not know the conversations of V.P. Bryukhanov with A. Akimov and whether they were, but the director did not demand anything from me. And what is there to demand? It’s clear - I know the reactor better than him and once I’m on the block, I’ll do my best. On April 26 I didn’t see N.M. Fomin, I didn’t talk on the phone, and the organization of water supply to the reactor began after I left, otherwise I would say that the idea was unnecessary. The operation is useless, even harmful and expensive. The fact that they asked from Moscow whether the reactor is cooled, naturally for reactor specialists, is an essential basis in case of an accident.

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Why, from Moscow, the actual situation is not visible. That the operation is useless, it seems to me, I explained quite clearly, but experts do not need to explain. That the operation is harmful - it became clear after a few hours of water supply. Water, due to the destruction of pipe communications, did not reach the reactor (and there was no reactor) and began to spread through the rooms of the fourth and other blocks, spreading radioactive dirt. Of course they did. But this operation cost several people severe bodily harm, and L.Toptunov, A. Akimov and A. Sitnikov cost their lives. A. Sitnikov after inspecting the unit, where he, of course, received a large dose, but by no means fatal, of course, realized that the reactor was destroyed. What I reported. He was not on the roof and did not look at the reactor from above. They had an attempt to go to the roof, but the metal door was locked. Failed. And then A. Kovalenko and V. Chugunov would suffer the same bitter fate. I can’t understand why Sitnikov, already knowing about the destruction of the reactor, took part in a venture to supply water. There he received a completely unnecessary supplement. Well, others participated, not yet knowing about the destruction of the reactor.

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Tolya is a disciplined person, and for him the dictum “The order of the boss is the law for subordinates” was undoubted. L.Toptunov was sent from the block together with I. Kirshenbaum and, if he hadn’t returned to the block, he would have received the minimum dose without any practical consequences. When I came to the control panel after the second detour along the street, I saw Toptunov. I sharply asked: “Why are you here?” He did not answer and pointed to the magazine under his armpit. I thought he came to pick up the magazine. It turns out he stayed. A. Akimov received, of course, a more serious dose because he went to the premises of the block, and V. Babichev arrived at about five hours. But even his dose would be within 200 rem. Both of them stayed and participated in the water supply to the reactor. There they received lethal doses. There was no talk of anyone else's fault, either 26 or later in the early days. At least not with me. Just trying to understand why it happened, all the talk about it. A.P. Kovalenko, the head of the reactor shop, said that he had heard from Akimov in the hospital the following words: "Our main puncture - we belatedly pressed the A3 button."

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Sasha was mistaken. Not the reason. And no staff made fatal mistakes. It is a pity, as you can see with a false consciousness of guilt, the guys died. In the Pripyat hospital, the dosimetr measured, dropped all his things, washed himself, changed his clothes and went to the ward. Completely broken, immediately to bed - to sleep. There it was. A sister came with a dropper. I prayed: "Let me sleep, then do what you want." Persuasions are useless. And it’s a strange thing, after the dropper that they poured there - I don’t know, there’s no sleep, there was vigor, and left the room. Others have the same thing. The smoking room has lively conversations, and all about that and that. Reason, reason, reason? He said this: "The most stupid versions are accepted for consideration, nothing is being swept from the threshold." And there was talk right up to a divorce in separate wards already in the sixth hospital in Moscow, a few days after arrival there. The wife came. She brought cigarettes, a razor, and toiletries. I asked if vodka is needed? Already rumored that very vodka is useful for a large dose of radiation. He refused. In vain. Not because she’s very damned native, but because, it turned out, she refused for the long four and a half years.

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It, of course, is a small loss, if voluntarily. Still they drank on April 26, I don’t remember who they brought to. On the 26th evening they sent the first batch to Moscow. We drove off on the 27th at twelfth. They announced the landing and were voted by the mourning women. I said: "Women, bury us early." For all the symptoms, I was aware of the seriousness of our situation, but, frankly, I thought we would live. Not for everyone my optimism was justified. Amazingly clear, "word of mouth". Immediately after Chernobyl, the village of Zalesskoye, women with pity in their eyes are standing, propping their cheek with their palms. And then the incident - Viktor Smagin became ill, and the doctor in another bus had to stop. And quickly by the bus - a crowd of women wail, looking at us in hospital clothes. Yes, we have a sympathetic, sincere people, for what is Chernobyl and everything else leading to bitterness for him? We arrived at the airport without incident and directly to the plane. In Moscow, too, buses drove up to the plane - and to the hospital. There, several departments were released from patients - whom they discharged home, who were sent to other hospitals.

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At first I got to the gynecological department, but since I could not give birth to anyone, they transferred to another. And only six months later, on November 4, was discharged. Now it’s customary to scold our medicine and not only medicine. So cursed for every reason that, it seems, and remaining with himself, a person continues this worthy occupation. And others seem to have forgotten the words. One can hardly find any neutral note on an eight-page newspaper. Intellectuals, the soul of the nation - writers, behave like spiders in a bank. They forgot their vital work - to write. Even a good deed, the selfless help of the American Gale, managed to deceive. After all, it is clear that one doctor will not be able to do much, but another thing is clear - no matter how much he does, nothing should arise in normal people, except for a feeling of deep gratitude. No, I won’t scold the staff of the sixth hospital. They intercepted me and many others from the bony old woman. The line was unsteady. Poor, but thought. I thought the end was when they could not stop the bleeding from the nose, only gauze swabs changed. I know this, unfortunately. I can’t say how much time went on. It seemed to me that consciousness did not lose. But, apparently, it was somehow twilight, incomplete.

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Once I suddenly realized that my legs and my body. And since then it has already begun to perceive itself as a whole. It was from this state that the doctors pulled us out. First of all, Thanks to Sergey Filippovich Severin, he was in the most difficult time. Thanks to Sergey Pavlovich Khalezov, Lyudmila Georgievna Selezneva, Alexandra Fedorovna Shamardina and other doctors. And what can you feel for nurses who gently but persistently persuaded to eat at least a little? Maybe even then they angered me with this. Yes, you can’t live without food. And fed from a spoon. No, the girls did not perform the work, but nursed the patient. Thanks to them. Immediately after my release, I received a call from the sixth hospital, where I stayed for about three weeks. Six months later, went again. Both times corrected me. Especially noticeable Elena Mikhailovna Dorofeeva healed her throat, lived a year without constantly pestering dry throat. Now, apparently, I will be treated in Kiev if necessary, the trips are difficult, although not long-distance.

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“And I went outside again - the pockets of fire on the roof had not yet been extinguished, so on the third block I ordered to shut down the reactor and damp with emergency speed. B. Rogozhkin, who was present on the shield of the third block, said that I should coordinate the situation with V. P. Bryukhanov, to which I replied: “Silence, while the situation is more or less normal”

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Chapter 6

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Whose The Commission, Creator? The immediate appointment of a commission to investigate the causes of the disaster became completely natural. Chronologically, the first commission consisted of employees of the Ministry of Medium Engineering and the Ministry of Energy and Electrification represented by the Deputy Ministers (A.G. Meshkov and G.A. Shasharin) and organizations of these ministries: IAE and NIKIET creators of the RBMK reactor, the Hydroproject Institute - General station designer, VNIIAES - from the operating organization. It is not known to me who was appointed Chairman of the commission; I have not seen the order to create it. In the act, no one wanted to be called chairmen of commissions or groups. Almost no documents on the Chernobyl disaster have chairpersons, at least not at first. For brevity, I will call this commission the commission of Meshkov, as a senior in position, because G.A.Shasharin, also deputy minister, did not sign this act. In principle, the appointment of these workers of both ministries is quite natural and cannot cause a protest. This is the most knowledgeable and the reactor, and the station, and people. 182

Who, if not them, should investigate the causes of the accident. The trouble is that all these people are interested in the same thing, albeit to a different degree. Since the accident happened so serious that guilt in it did not threaten with deprivation of the prize, not with a break or collapse of a career, but with freedom itself, then this is not a matter of principle. Honor, conscience, if any, was on the side who needs them. The creators of the reactor are primarily interested in hiding the true causes of the disaster if they find themselves in the reactor itself. Others are interested in the same. The question is, what did the many VNIIAES staff do and where did they look? Why does it exist and has it fulfilled its role? That is why it was impossible to expect an objective investigation from this commission initially. Were other competent people somewhat neutral? Of course. RBMK reactors are not the only reactors in the country. There are others besides the organizations listed above that are involved in the design of nuclear power plants and research on reactors. These people, not knowing the specific device of RBMK power units, could quite figure it out. And especially in combination with employees of power plants: Chernobyl or others - Kursk, Smolensk. For example, shift supervisors.

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Of these, it was possible to choose literate two or three people and include in the commission. These are the only people who are not interested in the unreasonable charge of operational personnel, as they themselves may find themselves in a similar situation. Their specific knowledge of the power unit and reactor, together with the deeper scientific knowledge of neutral workers in design and scientific organizations, could well constitute a counterbalance, especially to employees of the IAE and NIKIET, the most unscrupulous and aggressive. In no way does my remark apply to the collectives of these institutes, but only to those who were investigating the Chernobyl accident, and not to everyone. But, as is customary in our country (I’m making such a conclusion not only on Chernobyl), the investigation is at the mercy of the potential and most often actual perpetrators of the accidents.

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Commission A.G. Meshkov The main conclusion of the Commission: “The most probable cause of the explosion was the steaming of the reactor core with rapid dehydration of the technological channels due to the emergence of a cavitation operation mode of the MCP.” The explosion occurred 42.5 seconds after the steam was closed to the turbine, i.e. at 01 h 23 min 46.5 s. Everything else in the act aims to justify this version. The people in the commission were literate, they knew the block firsthand. More than once participated in accident investigations; they are familiar with the calculations of both the reactor and systems. But something prevents them from seeing the apparent absurdity of the conclusion. Steaming and quick dehydration? The authors do not explain when it started, which means fast. If this is just before the explosion, then by that time the CPS rods had already entered the zone by at least 2.5 m, and why did this A3 not shut off the reactor?

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If at the time of the reset A3 and, presumably, that is why the protection was dropped, then, as we saw the need for such an action, after only three seconds there were signals of excess power and its rapid growth. There is no stop signal for the MCP. Why did this even disrupt the pumps when the conditions were less favorable and they worked without comment? And for what such mystical reasons could the pumps powered by the running-out generator be disrupted? For them, the conditions of normal operation were fully provided. And even with the failure of the other four pumps, they were quite enough to cool the core at a power of 200 MW. Why does the commission ignore the recording by the control system of the indications of expenditures of all eight MCPs? The costs recorded by the control system are normal at the start of the TG run-out in 23 min 04 s; further, the four “running out” MCPs reduce their costs, the four, powered from the backup network, slightly increase - this is how it should be. At 23 min 40 s the protection was reset, at 23 min 43 s there were alarm signals of excess power and its rapid growth, and the pumps continue to operate normally.

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What, lie devices? It is difficult to imagine that eight independent devices simultaneously began to lie one in one direction, the other in the other, but as folded as it should for technological reasons. And only when the capacity of the reactor jumped up to an unknown value, the pumps, according to natural laws, dropped their costs. The centralized control system on the block was called "The Rock", and so it turns out - why should the commission look at the testimony of this soulless stone? It shows not at all what is needed. And NIKIET seemed to have completely forgotten how to count. The act states that the weight content of steam in the coolant with four MCPs operating on the side and with a capacity of 200 MW will be 2%, in fact less than 1%. And the numbers suddenly forgot. To prove the failure of the MCP, the hydraulic resistance of the lowering path is indicated in the act - 8 m of water column at a flow rate of 21 thousand m 3, and in another certificate for another reason give 4 m at a higher flow rate. Everything is possible when necessary!

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And yet, why did the commission decide to make the failure of the pumps cause the accident? I say to put it out, because I have no doubt for a minute that the real causes of the commission’s accident, with the possible exception of someone else, were clear from the very beginning. Workers of the IAE and NIKIET knew, A.G. Meshkov knew ... He was previously the head of the main department dealing with RBMK reactors, and he knew all the documents on the Leningrad and other stations. Documents on accidents and operational measurements. The commission was not looking for the cause of the accident, it was looking for the most acceptable display. And the failure of the MCC was considered the most acceptable. The fact is that after reducing the reactor power, the pump flow rate increased and in 2-3 out of eight it exceeded the allowable for such a regime. The operator B. Stolyarchuk looked, maybe saw, but did not have time to reduce, busy with another. There is a violation of the Rules by the staff! The rest is a matter of technology. Could such a pump disrupt these pumps? It could. Did not have? Never mind. Guilty operational staff! To this I want to say the following. Even if the pumps were disrupted, then the personnel were not guilty of the explosion of the reactor.

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Disruption of the MCP and not two or three, but all at once - is a completely possible phenomenon. So, the actuation of the main safety valves with subsequent nonstop, especially at low power, will lead to a sharp decrease in pressure in the primary circuit and the failure of the MCP. Incorrect operation of the feed water regulator can lead to failure of one half of the pumps, which is enough to blow up the reactor that was. Therefore, the reactor must be such as to withstand the failure of the main pumps. And this is the task of science and designers. Back in the project, all such situations should be analyzed and all necessary safety measures taken. Did the commission of A.G. Meshkov understand this? Of course. But the calculation is simple: while they figure it out, time will pass, and these, so to speak, reactor flaws will be eliminated. And will they figure it out? What is classified as “Secret”, and what is unclassified, is still inaccessible. Those who have access and understand, they will shut their mouths with the threat of dismissal, and even worse - with the deprivation of access to secret work. In nuclear matters, without such a permit, a serious specialist had almost nothing to do.

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True, in the future, in view of the very clear fit of the facts, the MCPs actually refused the version of the breakdown. Only NIKIET still continues, albeit not very zealously, to adhere to it, forgetting even its report for No. 05-075-933, which states that the full effect of dehydration of the hot core is always negative. However, the report is incorrect.

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Commission G. A. Shasharin Deputy Minister of Energy and Electrification G.A. Shasharin refused to sign the investigation report, and a group of employees of the Hydroproject Institute and VNIIIAES involving the All-Union Heat Engineering Institute and the RCP designers conducted an investigation into the causes of the Chernobyl accident and issued a document entitled “Supplement to the investigation report” ... This document back in May 1986 correctly reflected the essence of what happened on the block. In any case, it could well become the basis for objective research. It convincingly shows: • The failure of the version of RCP failure; • The experiment on the "TG run-out Program" is not associated with the occurrence of an accident; • Jamming the reactor automatically at 01 h 23 min 04 s with the beginning of the experiment did not change the situation, and the explosion would have occurred 36 s earlier; • There was no rupture of pipelines of the first contour with a diameter of 300 mm and more.

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I will cite this document with some abbreviations. It deserves this not because it opens up some new aspects to the modern understanding of the causes of the accident, but because back in May 1986, the true causes of the accident were actually established, it was only necessary to approach the issue impartially. I quote the text while retaining the numbering of its paragraphs. 1. As follows from the prints of the DREG program, the decoding of the oscillograms of changing the operating parameters of the equipment during the joint run-out test of auxiliary needs with the TG (Appendix 2), diagrams of recorders, explanatory notes of the operating personnel, a reference from the organization’s designer - RCP (Appendix 3), disruption there was no circulation in the KMPC up to the uncontrolled acceleration of the reactor and the increase in pressure in the circuit. From these applications it can be seen that the flow rate of the coolant through each MCP and according to KMPTs in general was stable until 01 h 23 min 45 s, there were no signs of flow failure.

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2. The installation worked according to the normal technological scheme with one TG-8 turned on, having a power of 40 MW electric with a thermal power of the reactor of about 200 MW. The power of the reactor was supported by AR. Moreover, all the parameters characterizing the operation of the reactor installation, during the period preceding the accident, up to pressing the A3 button, were normal and stable. There were no process alarms on the unit. 4. Changing the operating mode of the unit after shutting down the TG-8 consisted of a gradual 30 ~ 40 reduction in flow through the reactor and the transition to work from eight to four MCPs with a constant reactor power of 6 ~ 7% of the nominal. During this mode, the flow rate through the reactor was reduced by 20% from the initial value. Water consumption through each of the four MCPs remaining at normal nutrition increased. This reduced the stock before steaming of these MCPs (Appendix 4), however, there were no signs of a pump head loss, a decrease in their productivity, a sharp decrease in the coolant flow rate through the reactor, changes in the core reactivity and an

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increase in power or other noticeable changes in parameters. The difference from normal operating modes was that: • In order to carry out the program to check the operating mode of the mechanisms of auxiliary needs stipulated by the project in case of loss of external power sources (de-energizing mode) due to TG energy, after its disconnection from the mains, eight RCPs were put into operation, which is not prohibited by the technological regulations and instructions; • The operational margin of reactivity before the accident, as established by an additional analysis, was about eight PP rods with a minimum of 15 PP rods allowed by the technological regulations. 5. The operational personnel committed the following violations: 5.1. For individual MCPs, the water flow exceeded the value of 7,000 m 3 / h, which was set as the limit when the feed water flow was less than 500 t / h.

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5.2 In the event of a power failure in the transient process lasting 12 minutes, the thermal power decreased to 40 ~ 60 MW, the ODS decreased below the permissible level and amounted to eight rods one minute before the accident. In addition, the reactor capacity was 200 MW in deviation from the program. 6. The expert group analyzed these violations and notes the following: To determine the ORM, it is necessary, at the request of the operator, to carry out the calculation according to the PRISM program and to analyze the printout of the calculation results. This process lasts 7 ~ 10 minutes, during which the situation changes significantly during the transition period. Another way to evaluate is to calculate the position of 211 rods using the direction indicators. But this is a long time. The design materials of the reactor installation and the technological regulations based on them do not justify the minimum reactivity margin in terms of reactor safety.

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In the technical design of the reactor installation and in the technological regulations there is no explanation about the possible consequences of the operation of the reactor with a small margin of reactivity. There are no indications of the optimal distribution of the rods during non-stationary poisoning. On the other hand, there is no indication in any materials about the special danger of operating at low power levels. All materials emphasize the particular risk of exceeding permissible limits at high power levels. Thus, the staff was neither technically nor psychologically prepared for the fact that such a low level of power could pose not less, but greater danger in certain circumstances than when working at full power. 11. Cause of accident. As follows from the calculations of VNIIAES, the main reason for uncontrolled acceleration of the reactor is the discharge of A3 under specific conditions: with a reactivity margin of eight rods located in the active zone and with little heating to the boiling point of the coolant at the reactor inlet.

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Such acceleration is possible due to simultaneous action of the following factors:

the

11.1 The fundamentally incorrect design of the control and protection rods, leading at the initial lowering of them to stop the chain reaction of fission to introduce positive reactivity in the lower part of the core. With some configurations of the neutron field and a large number of rods removed from the core, this can lead to both local and general acceleration of the reactor, instead of stopping it. 11.2 Presence of positive steam reactivity effect. 11.3 The presence, as shown by the accident in question, of a positive fast power reactivity factor, contrary to the assertion. 11.4 Operation of MCP at low reactor power with flow rate up to 56 thousand m3 / h at low feed water consumption. (This is not prohibited by technological regulations). 11.5 Unintentional violation by personnel of the requirements of the regulations in terms of maintaining the minimum reactivity reserve and the test program in terms of maintaining the

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reactor power level. 11.6 Insufficiency in the design of the reactor installation of technical means of protection and operational information to personnel, as well as instructions in the project materials and in the technological regulations on the danger of the above violations. The listed facts show that the most important requirements of paragraph 2.2.2 were not fulfilled in the design of the reactor installation. and 2.3.7. OPB. This is the only commission that noted the noncompliance of the reactor with regulatory documents. True, something prevented it, perhaps a lack of time, to establish that the reactor’s non-compliance with the fundamental requirements of the ABY, which became completely obvious after the accident, but if this document was accepted for consideration, then all the requirements of regulatory documents on reactor safety that the reactor didn’t answer were revealed would by themselves.

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V. P. Volkov Long before the accident, the IAE employee V.P. Volkov noted the unsatisfactory characteristics of the RBMK reactor core and its CPS. One and together with others made concrete proposals for modernization. In particular, he proposed the option of a high-speed A3. I don’t know the concrete essence of the proposals, and therefore I can’t express my opinion on them, but the phenomena that the proposals were aimed at eliminating should have been eliminated by accepting V.P. Volkov’s proposals or in another way, because it was because of these phenomena that the accident occurred . Over the years, its direct superiors A. Y. Kramerov and A. K. Kalugin did not take any measures to implement the proposals. Then V.P. Volkov wrote a memorandum to the director of the institute, scientific leader of the RBMK topic, academician A.P. Aleksandrov. Not an easy academician. His resolution on the report: “Comrade. Kalugin, urgently to have a meeting with me. ” But either the squiggle in the signature is not wrapped there, they say, do not pay attention, or other reasons, but the meeting did not take place before the accident.

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Volkov had nowhere else to write, because A.P. Aleksandrov was at the same time the President of the Academy of Sciences. Waited for the accident. V.P. Volkov handed over the documents to the prosecutor's office, as he was convinced, and quite rightly, that the explosion of the reactor occurred because of its unsatisfactory quality, and not at all through the fault of the personnel. And then the reaction of A.P. Aleksandrov was instantaneous - Volkov was no longer allowed to go to the Institute. This is not a production that can wait years for that ... eleven. Here, undermining your own reputation, and there is no delay in answering. Colonel Skalozub said: "I am the prince - Gregory and I will give you sergeant major in Voltaire." Our President doesn’t need sergeants as assistants. And V.P. Volkov - that’s annoying - writes to M.S. Gorbachev himself. By letter, a group is created under the leadership of Deputy Chairman of Gosatomenergonadzor V.A. Sidorenko. In practice, it confirmed the unsuitability of the reactor for operation. An interesting note was made by the group in a cover letter that Volkov underestimates the instructions in the Regulations. This, of course, refers to the indication in the Regulation on the minimum reactivity margin of 15 rods.

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This means: the supervisor takes on the protection of the decision of the designers to replace by indicating in the Regulation the signaling required by law for the deviation of the parameter, automatic shutdown of the reactor when it goes beyond the norm and even the absence of a satisfactory metering system. And this is the Supervisory authority! It is he who is called to watch so that the reactors are executed in accordance with the requirements of regulatory documents. However, there is no reason to be surprised. Just V.A.Sidorenko was responsible at the Gosatomenergonadzor for the nuclear safety of reactors. Everything is the same. After the conviction, I wrote a complaint to the Central Committee; there were people there, capable of knowing my knowledge of my arguments about the groundlessness of condemnation. For example, G.A. Kopchinsky previously worked as the deputy chief engineer of the station for science, he was engaged in nuclear safety issues. And what? My letter got to the Central Committee to the Deputy Prosecutor General O.V. Soroka, who approved my indictment. Guess what the answer was? That's right, that was it.

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Here is how V.P. Volkov says in one of his reports on the causes of the disaster: “In the analysis of the Chernobyl accident, it turned out: a large displacer effect, a large steam reactivity effect, the formation of an excessively large volume uneven energy release in the core during the accident. The latter circumstance is one of the most important and is due to the large size of the active zone (7 × 12 m), the low speed of the movement of inhomogeneous (having absorbers, displacers, and water columns) rods of 0.4 m / s and a large steam reactivity effect of 5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff . All this predetermined the size of the disaster. Thus, the scale of the Chernobyl accident is caused not by the actions of operational personnel, but by a misunderstanding, primarily from the scientific leadership, of the influence of steam content on the reactivity of the RBMK core, which led to an incorrect analysis of the reliability of operation; ignoring the repeated manifestations of a large value of the steam effect of reactivity during operation; to false confidence in the sufficient effectiveness of the CPS, which in fact could not

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cope with both the accident that occurred and with many others, in particular, with design basis accidents, and, of course, the drafting of the incorrect Operating Regulations. Such scientific and technical guidance is due, among other things, to the extremely low level of scientific and technical developments to substantiate neutron-physical processes occurring in the active zone of nuclear power plants with RBMK; ignoring the discrepancy between the results obtained by various methods; the lack of experimental studies in conditions most close to full-scale; the lack of analysis of special literature and, ultimately, the transfer to the chief designer of incorrect methods for calculating neutron-physical processes and their functions — substantiation of the processes occurring in the core, and justification of the safety of nuclear power plants with RBMKs. An important circumstance is that the Ministry of Energy has been passively operating NPPs with RBMKs with neutron-physical instability in the core for a long time, did not attach proper

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importance to the repeated drops of the AZM and gas station signals during A3 operation, did not require careful analysis of emergency situations ... It must be noted, that an accident like Chernobyl was inevitable. ” So: if scientists who have at their disposal a computing and experimental apparatus do not know, then how will the operators know? If science can not comprehend the experimental data from the stations, then how to do this for people working on a shift? In fairness, I must say, and V.P. Volkov is an example of this, not all were well-intentioned. We saw shortcomings and made suggestions for their elimination. But stumbled upon a blank guiding wall. On June 2 and 17, 1986, meetings of the MVTS were held under the chairmanship of A.P. Aleksandrov. The calculations of VNIIAES and the conclusions of the group of G.A. Shasharin were not taken into account. And, naturally, the arguments of V.P. Volkov are rejected. The President and Hero thrice crushed everyone with the authority of power. As a result, the causes of the accident were reduced solely to errors and incorrect actions by personnel. The decision of MVTS opened the way for misinformation of specialists and the public.

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In the future, everyone used this solution with some variations. The conclusion of the Government Commission, chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers B.E. Shcherbina, was quite logical in its illogic. The Commission found that the RBMK reactor had a positive fast power reactivity coefficient; immediately states that the coefficient should not be such. We must have looked at some regulatory documents, but there is no link. If this property of the reactor is unacceptable, then the commission establishes a completely paradoxical, normal human mind's incomprehensible, property A3 to introduce positive reactivity in the first few seconds after operation. And what is the conclusion of the high commission? Guilty operational staff! Logics!.. Did the staff design the reactor core, according to his calculations, it was formed so that it had a positive power factor? Not! Did the staff come up with the savage design of the rods? No! So why is the staff killed and crippled by this mastodon guilty?

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What is the fault of the shift supervisor Alexander Fedorovich Akimov, who ordered the A3 reactor to be activated in the absence of any alarm or even warning signals, and the reactor operator Leonid Fedorovich Toptunov, who executed this order? Nothing, of course. How can you blame the operator who, if necessary or without having pressed the A3 button? In any case, with the recognition of the fact of the explosion of the A3 reactor, according to the normal, non-governmental, human logic, any charges should be dropped from the operator. The country produces equipment without compliance with standards, and they stopped writing about this. Now the Government Commission legalizes this with its conclusion. Decisions are made as needed, according to the authors, for the benefit, well, of course, popular. There is no time to think about justice. The decision of the MVTS for reasons of the catastrophe, dictated by the creators of the reactor, is understandable - they defended their own interests. It is less clear why such a decision found such an endorsement in the Government Commission and above. But here it’s easy to figure it out. It is enough to imagine what the establishment and publication of the fact of the unsuitability of that reactor led to:

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•

• •

•

Both our and international society would require an immediate shutdown of the remaining RBMK reactors. And this is 13 million kilowatts of electric power, not counting the Ignalina station. No industry restrictions are indispensable; Two leading nuclear institutes in the country IAE and NIKIET were found to be insolvent; Gosatomenergonadzor, designed to prevent the use of unusable reactors, to put it mildly, slammed. And this already calls into question not only the RBMK reactor, but also others, i.e. all nuclear energy; What a blow to the prestige of the Country of Soviets ... All this is true, so it is in reality, but it cannot be recognized.

Much easier to blame the staff. Just a few unknown people. And this conclusion of the Government Commission and the subsequent decision of the Politburo opened the way for those wishing to blame the staff and, on the other hand, closed the possibility of an objective investigation.

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Now commissions, authors of magazine and newspaper articles, authors of fiction and "documentary" works knew what and how to write about the Chernobyl accident. According to the new state policy, the USSR stepped on the road of publicity and openness. Therefore, experts were sent to the IAEA, headed by Academician V. A. Legasov, for information from the “international community”. So called one of the informants - Dr. A.A. Abagyan.

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Soviet informants at the IAEA This commission has already abandoned the version of the disruption of the MCC, while retaining the focus on accusing staff. I will not expound and comment on the materials of the Report at the IAEA, the material is still specific. The report, although in a limited number of copies, can be obtained and read. I will dwell only on the necessary points. There are no calculations and links to them in the Report. Qualitative explanations are given and, at the same time, are rather arbitrary. This is how the start of the reactor acceleration is explained in the Report: “By the beginning of the tests, namely at 1 h 23 min, the reactor parameters were closest to stable. Closing the steam to the turbine led to a slow increase in pressure in the separator drums at a speed of about 6 kPa / s. At the same time, the coolant flow rate through the reactor began to decrease, due to the run-out of four out of eight MCPs. A minute before this, the operator had reduced feed water consumption. The decrease in the flow rate of the coolant through the reactor, as well as the feed water, despite competing (in terms

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of steam generation) pressure increase with these factors, ultimately led to an increase in reactor power, since the reactor has a positive feedback between power and vaporization. Under the conditions of the experiment, before the start of the TG run-out, there was an insignificant vapor content in the core, and its growth was many times greater than during normal operation at rated power. It was the increase in power that could prompt personnel to press the emergency protection button AZ-5. Since, in violation of the technological schedule, personnel removed more than the permissible number of PP absorbing rods from the core, the efficiency of the A3 rods was insufficient, and the total positive reactivity continued to grow. ” Thus, the acceleration (increase in power) of the reactor, according to the commission, began from the combined effect of reducing the flow of coolant and feed water and could not be repaid A3. I’ll try to state it clearly for a layman.

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Adding reactivity to a critical reactor leads to an increase in its power. The RBMK reactor had a positive steam reactivity effect — reactivity increased with increasing steam volume in the core. Reducing the flow of coolant and feed water leads to an increase in the volume of steam. The increase in pressure in the primary circuit is decreasing. What will be the result of their joint action? First of all, this is not some extraordinary phenomenon, but a quite possible situation in real operating conditions, only a decrease in the coolant flow rate not because of pump run-out, but because of a stop. Therefore, the reactor and its CPS are required to cope. In this situation, a change in feed water flow led to a quicker and larger change in reactivity, and up to 1 h 23 min there were several such cases - the reactor power AR satisfactorily coped, the recorder did not register any power surges. A change in the feed water flow rate, a normal occurrence for level control in drum separators, was a minute before the run-out. An elementary calculation shows that the disturbance from this to 1 h 23 min already worked out by the regulator.

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And if not worked out, for example, due to a malfunction, then signals would appear. They are not. There remains a smoother change in reactivity due to a change in the flow rate of the coolant, which is compensated regularly by the regulator - its growth by five megawatts over the past 4 minutes is recorded on the reactor power diagram. For the RBMK reactor, this is nothing. The phrase: “since the reactor has a positive feedback between power and vaporization” is some kind of Revelation from the Commission. And what kind of connection should this be for a boiling reactor? It is clear that the more power, the more steam. It should be so. If the commission wanted to say that the connection was positive between power and reactivity, then another thing. This connection can be any: negative for a correctly designed reactor and positive as it was for RBMK, which is unacceptable. The phrase regarding steam growth is many times greater than during normal operation at rated power, also unintelligible.

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You need to read it this way: at low power (always, and not only under experimental conditions), the increase in the volumetric content of steam in the coolant per unit of increase in power is several times greater than the same increase at nominal. That is why at low powers the RBMK reactor had positive feedback. Between power and reactivity. It was this most important fact for safety that scientists did not take into account when they recommended that stations measure the power factor at capacities close to nominal. With competent recommendations, a positive power factor would have long been detected by the Station Nuclear Safety Departments. And what does “normal operation at rated power” mean? Before the accident, 200 MW is also normal regulatory capacity. Further: "in violation of the technological regulations, personnel removed more than the permissible number of PP absorbing rods from the core, the effectiveness of the A3 rods was insufficient" …

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There is no paragraph in the Regulation indicating how many rods can be removed from the zone. There is only an indication in the “RBMK Operating Instructions” and in the “RBMK CPS Operation Instructions”, which states that with a small margin of reactivity and a neutron field below, it is necessary to limit the number of rods extracted from the core completely, with a total of 150, the remaining rods should be introduced no less than 0.5 m. On April 26, the neutron field had a maximum at the top. Therefore, we did not violate any instructions. These additions to the instructions are agreed with the Scientific Director, Chief Designer and made by letter of the Deputy Director of NIKIET Y.M. Cherkashov, where, in particular, it says: “We emphasize once again that a positive runout of reactivity will be observed when the rods move only from the extreme upper position and only when the neutron field is skewed below." The efficiency of the A3 rods was not even small, but with the opposite sign. Only this turned out to be due to the incorrect design of the rods. Why turn concepts upside down?

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The effectiveness of the rods does not depend on the number of lifted to the upper limit switch, but on their design and field configuration. With a neutron field at the bottom of the rod at the start of the upper end always makes the first positive reactivity, which contradicts all the canons of design. Yes, with a large reactivity margin, a part of the rods when triggered A3 starts from an intermediate position in the height of the core and immediately begins to introduce negative reactivity. But in any case, parts of the rods introduces positive reactivity at first, and what would be the sum of - God only knows. Can any honest person defend this position? In an effort to discredit staff before the international community, Soviet informants slid to the most vulgar lies. Well, you have to give up something, since it is no longer possible to "observe both the innocence and the capitalist." By the number of rods removed from the zone, we already know. Foreign experts said that the operator was entrusted with an exorbitant task: to maintain a minimum of reactivity margin in the absence of monitoring tools and information in transition mode.

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Then the informants say that the minimum supply of 30 rods was stipulated in the Rules. It really is so stipulated, only after the accident. It was not possible to hide the positive power factor at low reactor capacities, but it is known from the theory of automatic control that operation is extremely dangerous, and sooner or later this coefficient will manifest itself. Nothing is easier for our informants they say: work at a capacity below 700 MW was prohibited by the Regulation. Yes, prohibited by the Rules ... after an accident. By August 1986, when informants traveled to Vienna, there were already calculations showing that A3 could contribute positive reactivity of β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,eff. They kept silent about this. It is painfully odious phenomenon. Well, A3 didn’t do it, wherever it went, and A3, which itself explodes the reactor, is nonsense. How to admit it? There is a table in the Report of violations committed by personnel on April 26, 1986. It consists of three columns: violation, motivation and consequences. The second column does not interest us; I will give it in order without it.

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Violation 1. The decrease in the OZR is significantly below the permissible

2. Power failure below the test program

Effects

Comment (OT). Apparently right. At the time of pressing the button AZ-5, the stock was about 12-13 rods against the permissible 15

Reactor emergency protection was ineffective

Yes, but with a small stock, and not because of a small stock

There is no violation of the Rules and instructions The reactor was in a difficult to control state

The automatic controller quite well maintained the power of the reactor. Not fixed on recorder tape power neither oscillations nor bursts. Yes, as it is now clear, all the negative qualities of a reactor at this power are most pronounced. But what does the staff have to do with it !?

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3. Connection to the reactor of all MCPs with an excess of costs for individual MCPs established by the Regulations

There is no violation in connecting all the MCCs. There are such modes in the instructions The temperature of the coolant KMPTs (primary circuit) has become close to the saturation temperature

4. Blocking the protection of the reactor Loss of by the stop automatic signal of two reactor TG shutdown capability

To enter the active zone, and this is In view of informants, the statement is simply wrong

No violation. Made according to the Regulation It didn't matter. An accident would have occurred 36 seconds earlier

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5. Blocking of protection by water level and steam pressure in drum separators

In terms of water level, protection was from another group of devices. Over pressure protection was in service. To reduce pressure, the turbine protection was in operation, the setting was changed, this is the right of the operator. No violation Thermal reactor protection was completely disabled

The reactor protection was both in physical and in thermal parameters, according to the Regulations, for such a regime. In a report of the commission of N.A. Steinberg in 1991 (finally! A.D.) it was precisely on this occasion that it was said: “... the statement made in the Report that“ the protection of the reactor by thermal parameters was completely turned off "Not true"

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6. Disabling the protection system from MPA (shutting down SAOR)

Disabled according to a program approved by the Chief Engineer. According to the documents in force at that time, the Chief Engineer could allow a temporary shutdown Loss of opportunity to reduce the scale of the accident

In August, the commission knew well the system and nature of the destruction and clearly understood that the possibility of reduction was not lost, but was absent in principle

This is the case with personnel attributed violations. I don’t know how the international community believed in Soviet informants - in word or asked to show documents. They could take a word, because it is unlikely for him, the community, to understand why it is necessary to slander his own staff and why this is possible. The findings of the commission were a natural continuation of the investigation.

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“The developers of the reactor installation did not provide for the creation of protective safety systems that could prevent an accident if there was a set of deliberate shutdowns of technical equipment and violations of the operating regulations, since they considered such a combination of events impossible.” You see, they scolded, felt sorry for the poor developers: well, how could they foresee violations and intrigues of malicious personnel, who were eager to annoy the developers at all costs and blow up a completely good reactor. And these same developers, knowing the malice of the staff, realized the complete hopelessness to foresee some measures against his tricks and spat on the fulfillment of the lawful written requirements of regulatory documents. But this is silent. Read carefully the Report of informants in the IAEA and you will not find a word about the discrepancy between the RBMK ABY and OPB reactors. “Thus, the root cause of the accident was an extremely unlikely combination of violations of the order and operating mode committed by the personnel of the power unit.”

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The commission of violation came up with and shouts to the whole world: yes this is incredible! “The accident took on disastrous proportions due to the fact that the reactor was brought by the personnel into such an uncontrolled state, in which the influence of the positive reactivity coefficient on power growth was significantly enhanced.” I really liked the expression "such an unreasonable state of the reactor", many then took it into service. And what is it? Why did the control system not respond to it with a single signal? Either a regulatory condition, or a blind monitoring system. And in any case, what could be the complaint to the staff? Organoleptically, what was he supposed to determine? And the power factor at a large flow rate of the primary circuit is less, because the change in the vapor content, and hence the reactivity, will be less by the same change in power. The first General of the Jesuit Order, Ignatius Loyola, had been disturbed by his informants, and he would not have thought of such a thing.

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I was still in the hospital, my wife said that her niece had read an abusive article on staff in the German magazine Spiegel. It seems that the wool didn’t come off, and the tail didn’t fall off, and the reactor was controlled. I swore, not aloud, at the "damned." It turned out that the native compatriots made friends. Successfully, dear compatriots, in the international arena in an era of publicity. The informants defamed us, but they did not launder the reactor. They know how to count there. But this later, and at first they came on a horse. The prosecutor's office calls them leading physicists. Indeed, leading. Where to?

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IAEA Experts They also became victims (des.) - informants. Shortly after the Soviet experts reported in close collaboration with them, the International Atomic Energy Advisory Group at the IAEA issued a report on the Chernobyl accident. Its reasons are presented in two sections: the first for the average reader, the second almost repeats the first, but with technical details for specialists. Consider the first section. “After delays from the system dispatcher, on the night of April 25, the unit continued to prepare for testing, including a reduction to the target level of 700 ... 1,000 MW (thermal). This turned out to be difficult due to improper handling by the operator of the control system. As a result, the power of the reactor fell to a too low level. " As was the case with the reduction in power level - I described. The decrease was due to a regulator malfunction. The average reader will think that “too low a level” is a criminal phenomenon, unacceptable for reactors.

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In fact, for normal reactors made in accordance with the adopted regulatory documents, the phenomenon does not pose any danger. Simply, the power turned out to be small to continue the tests and it had to be increased to the level of 200 MW, sufficient to carry out the remaining work. “The power was again increased. With some difficulties, the level of 200 MW was reached, and this required the removal of many control rods. It should be noted that long-term operation below 700 MW thermal is prohibited by normal safety procedures due to problems of thermo-hydraulic instability. Two more circulation pumps were included in order to ensure after testing the possibility of continuing the operation of the reactor with the required number of pumps. The high water flow caused by the inclusion of these additional pumps was a violation of the normal operating procedures of the installation, since it exceeded the approved levels for both the reactor core and some individual pumps, and, more importantly, made it difficult to control the main coolant systems. ”

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Everything is wrong in this large paragraph. Why follow people pursuing a very specific goal? Yes, informants in the Report say that, apparently, they could not raise the power higher. But it should be clear to the reactor that if the reactor is brought into a critical state and the power is raised to 200 MW, then with a positive fast reactivity coefficient of reactivity, and this is exactly what it was, there are no obstacles to raising the power. There were no restrictions on the operating time of the reactor at power levels from 8 to 3,200 MW. There were no restrictions on the maximum flow rate through the core, as well as the inclusion of all eight pumps. Suppose that informants were fooled by the power level below 700 MW, the inclusion of pumps and the flow rate through the core. But why did the experts so easily agree with the statement about the difficulty of management with a large flow of coolant? With a large flow of coolant, the amount of steam within the core and steam-water pipelines is less than with a small flow at the same power level. Therefore, for example, when increasing the flow rate of feed water to maintain the level in the drum-separators, steam may collapse (collapse). And since it is smaller at high flow rates, the effect of collapse on the core reactivity and the level in the separator drums will be less.

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And underheating at the entrance to the core with a large flow rate is not less, at least. The question is purely technical and does not require knowledge of the specific instructions of the Chernobyl station. “One of the important consequences was that the operators blocked the automatic shutdown of the reactor according to parameters such as steam pressure and the water level in the separator drums, so that their instability would not cause such a shutdown of the reactor and would not stop the tests; again a serious violation of the normal operating procedure. " Not blocked. I already wrote about this. “Just before that, a computerized centralized control system gave the operator information about the state of the reactor, including the position of all control rods at that time. This was a clear warning, as it indicated the absence of a reserve of compensating ability of the control rods to organize protection against an emergency. An immediate shutdown of the reactor was required. However, the operator began electrical tests,

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although the condition of the unit, as is obvious and as will be discussed later, was extremely unstable. ” We already know that the staff did not have printouts at all. And it could not be at the beginning of the test, even if it was made. We leave this to the conscience of informants. I want to say something else here. IAEA experts are not ordinary readers. From the printout of the position of the rods (recall, made after the accident) it can be seen that most of them are removed from the core, i.e. is in a position where their compensating ability, that is, the ability to suppress reactivity, is maximum. This is a generally accepted rule for normal reactivity organs. And experts say that there is no stock of compensating ability of regulatory rods. When an alarm occurs, they do not act as regulators, but as protection rods. This expression of experts should be understood as agreement with such a design of the rods when they first introduce positive reactivity. It turns out like this. But this is completely unacceptable, and the perversity of the design of the rods is now universally recognized (subsequently, the design is changed).

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It is completely incomprehensible to me how the experts gave themselves to persuade in such a matter. “From the moment of testing the TG coasting started. A serious violation of the procedure should be noted here. Previously, the automatic shutdown of the reactor was blocked when both TGs were turned off, so that the reactor remained at power, to repeat, if necessary, tests. It should be clarified that the tests could and should have been carried out in such a way that the SAOR would work when the tests began. ” In blocking protection to stop two TGs, there is no violation of either procedures or instructions. Nobody was going to repeat the tests, these are the inventions of informants. The statement of informants, readily repeated by IAEA experts that the tests could and should have been carried out with automatic quenching of the reactor, is not based on anything. Neither documents nor technical considerations confirm this. Could with protection, of course, and an accident for 36 seconds would have been earlier. The report goes on to describe how and why the reactor was accelerated.

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It is no different from the version presented in the Report of Soviet informants and given here earlier. Reality does not correspond. The actions of personnel outlined by experts are, in fact, all the actions of April 26th. And all the violations, violations, violations. Did this not alert the IAEA experts? Did we study instructions, regulatory documents, and pass exams in order to know them and do the opposite? And they did not ask informants the question: why do you keep such personnel? After all, it cannot be that the staff followed clearly the instructions, and suddenly on April 26, 1986, became enraged and began to do everything wrong. So he did it before, but for some reason they kept it. Okay, even if not all, let Dyatlov from a competent (almost universally recognized), thinking engineer turned into a sort of hussar and let's command left and right: “Block! Disconnect ... ”So it was not easy for us to force the operator to violate the Rules or instructions. Either he refuses to execute, or he says: “Write in the journal - I will execute.” These are the questions that arise when reading the IAEA expert report.

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As for the questions of experts, Soviet informants were misleading, referring to provisions that did not exist or were introduced into the instructions after the accident. But experts readily followed informants and in technical matters, where they just had to think. Following V. Yavorivsky, I’m far from thinking of repeating that the IAEA is a mafia that feeds on the propaganda of nuclear energy. I am sure that these are people who are convinced of the necessity and acceptability of nuclear power plants, people who are convinced of their acceptable safety now and see in the future the possibility of increasing it. Nevertheless, their complaisance in the Chernobyl disaster is incomprehensible to me. Therefore, I consider them to be voluntary victims. The first time I read the report of the International Advisory Group in October 1990. I was surprised how this, we think, was carried out by experienced sparrows on the chaff. Without doing a full analysis of the report, I wrote comments on the second section and sent a letter to the Director of the IAEA, Mr. H. Blix. In the letter, he posed questions, the obvious answers to which showed the inconsistency of the version of the accident described in the report, and also that the report shows quite clearly the very shaggy physiognomy of the operators.

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In a response letter, Mr. H. Blix recognizes human qualities as well. As he writes: "The courage and devotion of your group during and after the accident, of course, are not qualities of ignorant" ghouls "and" troglodytes ", and this is recognized throughout the world." Thank you, Mr. H. Blix. Nevertheless, it is better and much more useful for the people of your Agency to be able to critically evaluate their positions, taking into account the new information that has become known to them. Unfortunately, I do not see such a desire and ability in the response of the Chairman of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, H.J.K. Kauts. “Regardless of whether the configuration of the rods played an important role in the accident and whether it was then permissible in accordance with the rules, the actions that led to this situation were not calculated correctly.”

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Here is how! Comrades and gentlemen, scientists somehow got to the bottom of the offices with computers, and the operator had to figure it out in passing. It turns out that not only by Soviet standards, but also by the criteria of the West (or only Mr. Kauts?) According to the rules, you acted or not - you are still guilty. On this occasion, Professor B.G. Dubovsky said: “They, that is, the operators, could have avoided the accident if they knew more about the Scientific Advisor about the reactor.” It's clear. And then Mr. Kauts continues: “In our opinion, the position of Mr. Dyatlov is that he attributes the accident entirely to the introduction of positive reactivity with the A3 rods.” Although the mere fact of introducing positive reactivity of A3 is absolutely monstrous and in other situations alone it could lead to disaster, on April 26 it acted in conjunction with a positive power factor. In my letter this is said in an absolutely unambiguous way.

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The same is with other issues raised in my letter. And the conclusion of Mr. Kauts’ answer is very familiar to me from the answers of the prosecutor’s office and the court: “We have no reason to change our point of view. The accident occurred as a result of unsatisfactory operation, regardless of the underlying causes, in combination with the specific poor design characteristics of the reactor. The fact that at present additional important details have appeared regarding these characteristics does not radically change this point of view. ” The informants slandered the staff, Mr. Kauts's group repeated them all over the world. To my simplicity, it seems sincere that if the staff were slandered alone, then this does not at all give the right to others to do the same. I indicated what the authors of the report accuse us unreasonably. I do not ask you to take my word for it. Check it out. Are you responsible for your words or not? I am not an academician, not an international expert, I am a former prisoner and therefore I only speak words that I can confirm with documents or with undeniable technical information. I answer for my words.

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Another of the measures that immediately after the accident began to be carried out on the remaining RBMK reactors, it is clear to the specialist that that reactor was not subject to operation. After that, other documents appeared. And Mr. Kauts is all talking about unsatisfactory exploitation, no matter what the underlying causes are. As a scientist, you have the right to impassively ascertain actions and qualify: these are right, these are wrong. Just do not need staff to attribute violations that are not made to them. In this case, you really may not be interested in “what reasons were its basis”. I would also like to hear from the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, I believe this is in its area of responsibility, not a statement of the “poor reactor performance”, but a clear view on the admissibility or inadmissibility of creating and promoting a reactor with these characteristics: 1. A positive power reactivity coefficient with a complete reactivity overrun due to this effect of several BETAeff.

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2. Reactivity influencing bodies that change the sign of reactivity introduced when moving in one direction. And, as a result, A3 when triggered in various situations can introduce positive reactivity. 3. Reactivity reactors do not prevent, but create a local critical mass themselves. The Group's report, released in 1986, actually repeats the report of Soviet specialists in the IAEA. The work of understanding the truth does not serve. The revelations of academician V. Legasov and Dr. A. Abagyan were so liked by the IAEA experts that they themselves decided not to think. What they wrote in the report: “Based on this information, we have a reliable explanation of the sequence of events at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP and did not try to find an alternative explanation.”

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Forensic Technical Expert Commission Frantic company. In some ways incompetent, mostly tendentious and in any case biased. Frankly, I do not want to write about this commission. I saw her at critical moments of my life, which I would not be able to forget about best. The representative of NIKIET, V. Mihan, looked especially “pretty”. Insolent, shameless. A little different from him and L.I. Martynovchenko from Gosatomenergonadzor. I didn’t see any other commissions then, and therefore they are represented in the consciousness quite abstractly, and not by specific people. Although most of them know in person, for example, the expression of the forensic technical commission in evidence of the reliability of the RBMK reactor that they had worked out about a hundred reactors by the time of the accident, the grinning physiognomy of the NIKIET employee V.N. Vasilevsky is clearly visible. This is where we start. In fact, by April 26, RBMK reactors, there were 14 of them, had completed 87 reactors. We agree with experts that this is a reliability criterion.

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Then, with the remaining 13 RBMK reactors, we divide 87 by 13, and we will have Chernobyl every 6 ~ 7 years. I think such a prospect will not inspire anyone. Therefore, this criterion is not reliability, but hopelessness. And that's not it. After the construction of the reactor, not all technological channels are loaded with fresh fuel, since CPS rods will not be enough to suppress excessive reactivity. Approximately 240 channels are occupied by DP and several hundred more absorbers are placed in special cassettes. This eliminates the large vapor effect. They are extracted as the fuel burns out, for about two years, when the reactor goes into the so-called stationary overload mode. So, 28 years from 87 must be taken away. RBMK was especially dangerous at low power levels and a small reactivity margin. In such modes, it worked at shutdowns. This is only 10 ~ 20 hours per year at each reactor. Thus, all reactors in this mode were only two to three months old. But with the development of nuclear power plants at night, blocks with reactors would have to be unloaded, and then there would be much more dangerous modes. Already in 1985, the power system forced to reduce power at night, although then it was still insignificant.

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Only work in the basic mode with constant full power allowed those reactors to stretch these 87 reactors. In an effort to prove that the personnel by shutting down the A3 to stop two TGs violated the Rules, the commission arbitrarily interprets the clause of the Rules. How can one conclude from “turning on and off protections, automatics and interlocks in accordance with operational instructions and operating cards” that “interlocking is only allowed when the reactor is stopped and damped, not just when stationary with electrical power less than 100 MW?” By the way, stationary work when the load on the turbine is 100 MW is prohibited, and it was not on April 26. Here are the violations of the operational documents found by the commission in the “TG coasting program”: • It is not clear why the commission decided that, in our opinion, the tests concerned only electrical systems, and not the entire unit. Why then did we connect the reactor, turbine and automation shops to the development of the program? And there are signatures in the program. They wrote a personal program for electricians, which is quite natural.

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They are opposed to the inclusion of four MCPs from the running-out generator, since “either the check valves on the pressure of the running-out pumps close and, ultimately, their work is interrupted, or these valves are alternately closed and opened, causing flow fluctuations through all the pumps, which was observed during the tests on April 26. "

Either the experts do not know, or they do not want to know that each pump has an A3 for reducing flow and will shut it off when the valve is closed. They also do not want to see that on April 26, right up to the explosion of the reactor, a control system recorded costs of at least 5,000 m 3 / h. With this flow rate, there can be no talk of closing the valve. • According to the conclusion of the SAOR, reference is made to clause 5.4. ABY, which refers to an emergency reactor cooldown system, and SAOR refers to an emergency reactor cooling system. Two different systems.

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There was no documentation for the installation of the emergency button MPA - the maximum design accident. Firstly, the program contains the terminal numbers for connecting the button. And nowhere is it said that the documentation should only be in graphical form. Secondly, what is the talk about the button when the SAOR itself is disabled. The “RBMK Management Manual” has been violated, which provides for transitions to the MCP (that is, replacing one pump with another) in the presence of a representative of the Station's Nuclear Safety Department. There were no transitions along the MCP. The experts didn’t finish the point to the end, where it says: “from now on until the order is written.” This order was written. Apparently, the experts were in a hurry. "It is not indicated in the program where to put the excess steam." On the block there are automatically and remotely operating steam discharge devices, it is said in the Regulations and other instructions. Do not rewrite them in the program.

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Such are the violations. According to the commission, the RBMK reactor in the form in which it was in 1986 is quite suitable for operation. Such a conclusion is quite suitable for the court, but not for life. Therefore, immediately after the accident, modernization began at the remaining RBMK reactors. The masterpiece of the forensic technical commission is the following wording: "water displacement in the lower parts of the CPS canals could introduce additional positive reactivity, as provided for in the project." Here they give! Not the blunder of designers, but their foresight! This is directly from the Crocodile column - “you can’t imagine it on purpose”. But I'm not funny. All this went on a one-to-one scale to the Indictment, and then to the verdict. And go prove it. Provided and Basta! Article by a large group of authors “Accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant: a year later” // Atomic Energy Journal. 1988.V. 64. Issue. January 1.: “The Chernobyl lesson made it necessary to reckon with the fact that violations of the Rules can be the most unpredictable. Therefore, first of all, it was necessary to exclude the possibility of uncontrolled acceleration of the reactor in case of

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violations of the technological regulations. From this point of view, the most significant should be considered, firstly, the positive vapor effect of reactivity αφ and the corresponding positive effect of reactivity during dehydration of the core and, secondly, insufficient speed A3 in violation of the requirements of the technological operating procedure for a minimum reactivity margin in transient and stationary modes ”(p. 180). Yes, the acrobatic group study of scientists may well be envied by the artists of the most famous circus. We already know how the staff attributed violations of the Rules. The parameter "reactivity margin" remains. Is its violation "rather unpredictable", or rather, viewing by personnel? Here's what kind of conversation could take place between scientists and the operator: • Indeed, how could one see the decrease in reactivity margin? • But there is a great device for measuring the parameter. The operator only needs five minutes (!) To get a measurement. • Yes, the parameter in half a minute can change by 3-4 rods. For example, when changing the flow rate of feed water.

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So repeat the measurement. The operator has no such time. He performs 20 ... 30 manipulations of reactor controls in a minute. And it controls over 4,000 parameters. Fuck you. Still unpredictable.

Only for the sake of crappy operational staff have to, you see, reduce the positive steam effect. There are no other reasons. Normative documents do not exist. The chief designer of the reactor recognizes it as uncontrollable with this effect. So what? The SCST Commission says it exploded at the IPA. The Meshkov Commission, and in fact the IAE and NIKIET, says that it exploded when the RCC failed. So what? Only for the sake of crappy operational staff have to change the design beautiful, one might say exotic, A3. World champion in slow action. And the ability to turn protection into an overclocking device! We have achieved such a combination of functions, and now change it. You see, Reader, in what difficult conditions do scientists and reactor designers have to work? And that’s scary. If the accident did not happen on April 26, nothing would have been changed. So inevitably and went the reactor to the explosion.

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As it became known after the accident, almost all of this was clear to scientists long before April 26. No, Reader, I'm not a snitch. This I learned from the materials of the investigation, and they, of course, came through the prosecutor's office. I believe there are still materials. There is such a reason. We read further the article: “Calculations for different models give similar results, for example, show a quick shutdown of the reactor with a regulated reactivity margin (15 rods) at the time of resetting rods A3” (p. 18). Allow not to believe. Without resorting to other arguments, we turn to the same article on page 18. “It is envisaged to automatically shut down the reactor when the reactivity margin is reduced to 30 RR rods.”

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Pay attention: 30 rods and 15. And this is now 30: with the steam effect reduced by several times and, therefore, the speed and magnitude of the introduction of reactivity are reduced; a modified design of the rods of the CPS; input of the shortened absorber rods from signal A3 from the bottom of the active zone, i.e. in more favorable conditions. How can one not recall the noncommissioned officer widow? And not in Gogol’s, but literally. In the Soviet Union, ABY are the main regulatory documents that determine the nuclear safety of reactors. They indicate the requirements of what a reactor should be like so that accidents do not turn into disasters. Emergencies can occur both due to technical malfunctions and as a result of personnel errors. Clause 2.7.1. The "General Safety Provisions" expressly obliges designers to think through possible personnel errors leading to serious consequences, and neutralize them or prevent them. So the authors of the article in vain become in the pose of the benefactors of the operational staff. All this is their direct responsibility. And not after the accident, but even before it.

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Moreover, in addition to automatic protection to reduce the reactivity margin of less than 30 rods, the rest has nothing to do with personnel, but should be executed based on general technical rules. Let's look at the technical measures carried out after the accident at the RBMK reactors that remained in operation, in the light of their agreement with the requirements of the ABY and OPB: • Installation of DP in the core to reduce the steam effect of reactivity. - Complies with clause 2.2.2. OPB. • Changing the design of the CPS rods, introducing USP into the active zone by signal A3, increasing the ORM, increasing the speed of A3. - Bring in agreement with paragraphs. 3.3.5., 3.3.26., 3.3.28. ABY. • Reactivity margin alarm. - Complies with clause 3.1.8. ABY. • Automatic shutdown of the reactor while reducing the reactivity margin to 30 manual control rods. - Bring in agreement with paragraphs. 3.3.21. ABY and 2.7.1. OPB.

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As you can see, the measures taken after the accident at the reactors bring them into compliance with the requirements of mandatory regulatory documents. And only, nothing more. Consequently, before the reactor did not meet the requirements and was operated illegally. It is impossible to say that these measures are aimed at improving the reliability of reactors. This is the elimination of hopelessness. The authors of the following article in the same journal speak about this (p. 27): “The analysis performed has shown that priority measures already guarantee the safety of RBMK.” Therefore, before his safety ... Well, now it is clear to everyone. However, the recognition of the authors of the article is valuable in that they, the creators of the reactor, even after the accident at all intersections shouted: what a good RBMK. Here, in this article, they continue their unseemly business. It’s just that in that phrase the ears got out where you would put them like that. According to their calculation, the reactor does not explode if the MCP did not stop. And it explodes when the MCP is stopped. What can be said about this?

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In addition to recording the correct operation of the pumps by the monitoring system (all eight pumps, and not one, which may be erroneous and questioned), this is recognized by all other investigators - the IAE, VNIIIAES, the designer of the central monitoring station, etc. In the trial of the "Chernobyl criminals" witness Orlenko, shift supervisor of the electric shop, testified that he had extinguished the field of excitation of the generator, i.e. turned it off after a reactor explosion. In the explosion, he bounced off the shield under the powerful console of the column and then, overcoming fear, came up again and turned off the generator, as was agreed at the briefing in case of any troubles. Well, such a trifle - the reactor actually exploded.

The authors of the article were likened to a visitor to the zoo, who, looking at a giraffe, said: "There can be no such a long neck." If the authors have a calculation that is not crafty, then this is a great time, an excellent opportunity (too much for such an opportunity) to clarify the coefficients and calculation programs, and not persist in ambitions.

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NIKIET provided a lot of such calculations in a court case. Here is the candidate of technical sciences Gavrilov. According to his calculation, even when the speed of the MCP, supplied from the running-out generator, decreases to 0.9 from the rated pumps, according to the “head-toflow” characteristic, they switch to the left side of the “humpback” characteristic, in other words, stop pumping water. And what does the candidate care about: • Registered normal operation of the pumps at a speed of at least 0.75 of the nominal; • That in general the characteristic of the pumpthrottle-control valve complex is not “hunchback”, but falling • That with a drop in flow, the pump would be disabled by personal protection, but this was not noted. Here is a group of authors. I don’t know if there are doctors, but there are candidates for doctors. Again prove the failure of the MCP. Now, when the pressure drops in the primary circuit.

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And they don’t see on their compiled combined schedule that the pressure drop is a consequence of the increased feed water consumption, while the conditions for the operation of the MCP are quite acceptable. Here is the candidate of technical sciences K.K.Polushkin. As a witness (this department constructed exotic CPS rods), the court proves that the staff had a printout of the position of the CPS rods, indicating a low reactivity margin, and still continued to work. This printout, received after the accident, is the last position that remains in the memory of the computer. Suppose KK Polushkin does not know that a printout appeared after the accident. But he knows the location of the control room and the premises of computer technology. Now let's compare the time. Printout for 01 h 22 min 30 s. After receiving the printout, it is necessary to cut it off the teletype, register it in the magazine and bring it to the control room - this is about 40 meters. It is clear that no one was running. And the coastal experience began at 23 min 04 s. Could she appear on the shield for 34 seconds? Of course not. And what is the calculation of the reactivity margin curve from poisoning presented by NIKIET! Oooh!

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According to the above-mentioned printout of the position of the CPS rods at the Smolensk NPP, the reactivity margin of 6 ... 8 rods was calculated for 01 h 22 min 30 s. NIKIET produced a curve from 23 hours to 10 minutes, when the power was 50% and the reserve was 26 rods. Well, the NIKIET stock 24 of the 24th rod registered in the operational log for 24 hours ignores - the schedule is “ugly” breaks, so it passes through 19 rods. And ... miraculously gets to the point - a stock of 7 rods. As they say, on the nose. But for 23 min 30 s the supply was 3-4 rods less due to the high consumption of feed water. How did you manage to count this car? No, whatever you say, smart programs and machines in NIKIET? Or? .. Rather, or. Dear Reader, I want to hope that to some extent I have explained the reasons for the closure of materials on the accident. People who need it have been and are, and they are still influential. And, it turns out, there are quite a few of them. A.I.Solzhenitsyn in the "Archipelago" says that for decades they have chosen - who die, who live And, it seems, success in human selection is undeniable. The NKVD, apparently, is our only breeder who achieved the result. We want to have Dutch cows, English pigs.

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But there was no shortage of people for commissions. Commissions ready to formulate and sign as needed and what you want. Yes, these people with a clear conscience, in view of its complete absence. And since the closure of materials can only be with the consent and approval of senior officials, it is done, therefore, in the interests of the state. And what kind of people do we have such that the state has to hide everything from it? No, definitely not a good people. Some radical, non-formal, or — many of them have now divorced — a seditious little thought may arise: are not some powerful people confusing their own and group interests with state interests? The magazine “Young Guard” in No. 8 for 1990 published a letter from Donetsk region mine rescuers to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Prosecutor General of the USSR, it says: “Injuries with a severe and fatal outcome are much higher in our country than in any other developed country. Information about occupational diseases of miners is kept in great secret.

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In our deep conviction, huge damage is caused not so much by the specifics of working underground, as by the irresponsibility of the organizers of production. A system of collective irresponsibility and double morality is being created. Security days are held, headquarters for combating violators are sitting, there are, besides an army of persons of supervision, an army of public inspectors. But in parallel with this, cruel unwritten rules of the “game” are in effect, according to which the person in charge of the mine is obliged to give a plan, to carry out shift work at any cost. Those who disagree with these rules are mercilessly supplanted, replaced by others. Victims in this "game" will not find support anywhere. A system has been created and is clearly operating to evade the responsibility of the main “organizers” and “inspirers” of outrages. The monopolist himself investigates the accident, they plans and takes measures, they controls their implementation. For a number of reasons and “telephone” law, the trade union and

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bodies of Gospromnadzor are dependent on the monopolist. Most often, when investigating accidents, they do not “notice” that it was previously laid down in the scheme and program of work. ” Well said rescuers, they said right. Everything, or almost everything, also happened in Chernobyl. We saw the investigation of the accident, whose hands were given. And initially it was impossible to expect objective conclusions. About the same can be said of supervisory authorities. In 1983, during the physical start-up of the reactor of the fourth Chernobyl NPP unit, an unacceptable phenomenon was discovered - the CPS rods introduce positive reactivity into the zone when they begin to move. Gosatomnadzor inspector notes this phenomenon and misses the reactor into operation. Gosatomnadzor was part of the Ministry secondary engineering. The organizations that created the reactor were also part of this ministry. The dependence of the oversight body seems to be clear. The successor of Gosatomnadzor - Gosatomenergonadzor has already become a formally independent committee, but he did nothing.

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And still it must be said precisely the supervisor, now the State Atomic Energy Agency, the first of the organizations, began an objective investigation five years later. At the very least, rejected a false accusation of personnel. In the Soviet Union, accidents due to poor equipment do not occur. Take newspapers with accident reports in any area. Guilty master dispatcher. The captain, director is guilty of major accidents and disasters. This is not something there, beyond the hill. There is another matter. We read about the tragedy in Bhopal - an explosion at a chemical plant. Guilty is the company that supplied low-quality equipment. A close example to us. The accident at the American nuclear power plant Three Mile Island. Academician Aleksandrov in the newspaper Pravda says: "An accident at TMI could only occur in the capitalist world, where security is replaced by profit." According to our newspapers, it turns out: their accidents occur only because of poor equipment, in our country only because of poor service staff. Neither one nor the other is wrong. I have long suspected that the equipment was non-partisan, and it was only at its creation, as A.P. Aleksandrov did when creating the RBMK, to neglect the natural laws of how it refuses to work.

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The powerful ideological treatment of public opinion by the media always angered the operators, either completely innocent or guilty, not to the extent attributed to them. By operators I mean attendants regardless of job title. Bocharov, the correspondent of Literaturnaya Gazeta, describing a flight of an airplane that has not been piloted for a long time due to loss of consciousness, says that in our “fast-moving time” almost all accidents are caused by operators. Where such confidence? For obvious reasons, I have been interested in accidents in recent years and have come to a different opinion. Accidents occur in most cases due to the approaches of designers and designers based on centuries-old traditions. Because of the high leaders who are forcing the commissioning of facilities unfinished, even if the project was perfect. With the concentration of energy in modern equipment that a person has reasonably or unreasonably concluded in it, and technical solutions must be modern. The RBMK reactor can develop a generally unknown power, unimaginable in magnitude. But even this is not the main thing in it, the accumulated radioactive dirt is much worse.

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To curb such an uncontrolled reactor is hardly a feasible task. You can only prevent overclocking. And this is a direct task and duty of designers, not fulfilled by them, although they are written in normative documents. But the explosion in Sverdlovsk. And questions: • What kind of arrangement of station tracks is this when another one can enter a line with a passing train? • Why are tens of tons of explosives being transported through a crowded city in an ordinary carriage, by an ordinary train? • Why is it being taken at all in an explosive state, when it can be converted to safe by humidification? • It is not a matter of whether the dispatcher has the right to make a mistake or not, they were mistaken and will be mistaken. This is not a station of the XIX century. When I went and turned the arrow, thought, checked again. And there’s time for everything. How many dispatchers gives commands per shift? And in a month, a year? How many of them are dispatchers? Therefore, errors leading to serious consequences must be blocked by designers.

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The tragedy with the ship "Admiral Nakhimov." No one removes the guilt of captains in a collision. But the death toll is not on their conscience. Yes, apparently, in a collision there would have been deaths, but not five hundred. Proximity to the coast, warm calm sea, ambulance, with such favorable factors and such a tragedy. Vessels of this type are prohibited for use. Why was the ship pushed into the sea? The prosecutor's office says the Register has authorized. And this puts an end to. Why allowed and to whom it was beneficial? And the explosion near Ufa, I don’t know how to say trains or pipelines. The whole river of the most dangerous product - and the traditions of nine hundred shaggy years. What are the valves after 5 km without automation? G. Vedernikov, also deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, as well as B. E. Shcherbin, was the chairman of the commission for the investigation of the Ufa explosion. According to G. Vedernikov, the correspondent of N. Krivomazov in Pravda on 06/09/1989 writes: “At different times I was forced to chair more than one such commission and saw that with all the differences of all our troubles and accidents, they have one indistinguishable similarity. Recall

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that in Chernobyl there were as many as four systems of "protection against the fool" and all four managed to turn off ... " Well, of course, it was like that: we turned off one system, the second. Thought - do not explode. Let's turn it off. Only now, the Chernobyl reactor did not have a single “protection against the fool”, although it should be I wrote twice in Pravda and, as they say, no answer, no greetings. He wrote where you can check my words. But with us this way: you can walk around people with mud and then portray innocence on your face. It speaks of "protection from the fool," but the doctor of physical and mathematical sciences O. Kazachkovsky, and again in Pravda (dated October 15, 1989), says that “By the time of the accident, the Chernobyl reactor was not enough“ professor-stable ”, and the“ professors ”who so arrogantly started such a risky experiment were found there.” It is somehow doubtful that O. Kazachkovsky in 1989 did not know that the experiment and the accident have no connection. In the same article, he says:

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“Existing reactors to one degree or another have internal stability, which is provided on the basis of negative reactivity feedbacks. These connections can be improved by improving reactor physics. ” Golden words, although, of course, there is no novelty in them. And again, it is doubtful that O. Kazachkovsky did not know in 1989 about the existence of a positive fast (and full) power reactivity coefficient at the RBMK reactor. And for some reason does not talk about this in the article. Well, then he doesn’t want to. Other newspapers also had enough speeches. And pour as much dirt as possible onto the Chernobyl operational personnel. Here is Izvestia of February 11, 1990, also a doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, deputy chairman of the State Atomic Energy Agency V. Sidorenko, writes: “However, many IAEA experts believe that there would hardly have been a reactor in the world that withstood such illiterate work that it was conducted at the fourth unit in Chernobyl.”

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If O. Kazachkovsky might not know the exact circumstances of the accident, then V.A. Sidorenko knows well the RBMK reactor, the circumstances of the accident, and the causes of the accident, and how foreign experts were informed. Even before the accident, he wrote to the creators of the reactor what kind of "reactor" he was (good), only principles and courage were not enough to stop operation, although there were reasons and rights. But reports and studies have already appeared with obvious doubts about the correctness of the official version or with its complete denial, of which V.A.Sidorenko knew. Already in the newspapers there were reports about a revision of the causes of the Chernobyl disaster. Shameless accusations of personnel no longer pass. That is why the authority of foreign scientists was needed. There are so many, commissions and individual prosecutors. And they all blew one way. And ranks starting with the academician, and positions starting with the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Well, how can I not believe it? And they convinced me. Even the operational staff of the stations believed for a while. And no wonder - the accident materials were closed to everyone.

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And only gradually the operators, realizing the activities carried out on the remaining reactor blocks, began to understand on which powder keg they were sitting or, rather, they were kept for a long time. When the witness, the shift supervisor I.Kazachkov, said in court that the reactors were modernized at the first and second blocks of the station, the third was not yet Judge to him: "Well, you see, it is not carried out." To which Kazachkov replied: “The block is still not working. And if the launch is not done, it will be without me. ” I am 100% sure that today announce the return of the reactors to their previous state, tomorrow no operator will go to work. When a roasted rooster pecks your own ass, then you begin to perceive reality in a different way. Previously, I perceived the appointment of a government commission to investigate the causes of the accident with satisfaction until I came across it myself. And then I realized: in our conditions, at least at that time, the appointment of a government commission is a direct way to conceal the truth. The rule of introducing politics into everything, even where it didn’t lie nearby, turns everything upside down.

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The high leader of the commission, for example, in the rank of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, practically did not answer either to the people or to the law. Whether he does it right or wrong, anyway, no punishment will follow. And since there is no threat of punishment to the chairman of the commission, there is no such thing for members, hiding behind a broad back and they will without fear sign what they want. Since the head of the commission is involved in one way or another in involvement, if the accident occurred due to equipment, it will not appear, in any case it will not be made public. How can B.E.Shcherbin be interested in hiding the true causes of the accident? Simple: he oversaw the industry. Will he want to listen to complaints at his address, or maybe he will be dismissed from his post, even if the other is not so bad. So went secret and for the reasons and consequences of the accident. In general, I think that the commission of inquiry should not have one dominant person with the authority of a specialist, much less with the authority of the authorities. The first commission had two deputy ministers and two documents appeared: an investigation report signed by A.G. Meshkov, and additions to the act, and in fact an independent act signed by G.A. Shasharin.

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From the very beginning, everything could have taken the normal path, but other forces and other, introduced considerations intervened. I can’t classify myself as “idealistic carp”, I don’t believe in the universal triumph of free ideas for a long time. Years of formation and formation of views, from fourteen to twenty-two years, he lived in the polar city of Norilsk. Who lived there at that time knows that people were very different there. And with high moral qualities, and the most base scum. Naturally, in such an environment, it is difficult to maintain illusions. For example, acquaintance with political prisoners helped to dispel the faith in the holiness of Comrade Stalin by the age of twenty. It will be very opportune to say that those northern acquaintances were very strong. When after the accident he was in the hospital, many of them visited me. Even those with whom, after leaving the city of Norilsk in 1953, he practically lost touch, were M.I. Medvedkov, K. and N. Korneychuki. Having lost his illusion, he became neither a nihilist nor a cynic. Learned to firmly defend their opinions and human dignity. People were perceived as they are - with their strengths and weaknesses. I can not stand the lie - I consider it the biggest male vice. It was with her and had to face after the accident in abundance.

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This was the biggest shock, especially when old people practice lying. After all, it’s like cancer patients, on the threshold of That Life, only the truth should be told and nothing but the truth. Not the old people we have. What do two lives think live? Academician Petrosyants about fifteen minutes spread on all-Union television what crappy personnel at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant brought the SAOR out, otherwise ... It’s bad when a correspondent spreads a lie from someone’s words, well, the person was deceived, did not trust that. Academician Petrosyants has a book on RBMK, he wrote it himself, whether they wrote to him, but probably read it. That is, he knew that this system could not help. True, one can understand the academician: he defended his position. Chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy ministerial post, corresponding salary and ration. And no responsibility, one honor. Sinecure. Relations with Abroad. Like Vysotsky: “Maybe they’ll say: drink, eat Well, maybe not a damn thing. ” Here: “Drink constantly, eat And they won’t say a damn. ”

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Yes, for such and such a position you will make a reservation for your mother. It was not possible, however, to defend. So after all ... But another plan is an example. Academician L.A. Buldakov in the journal "Change" No 24 for 1989 writes: “Firstly, there was no delay, but there was an early eviction from Pripyat.” Please note: this is said at the end of 1989. Evacuation from the city of Pripyat began at 14 h on April 27. By 10 a.m. April 26, the impossibility of a long stay in the city was already clear on the basis of dosimetric measurements. Even with the exception of increasing the dose rate in the coming days, and there was no reason for this - the emissions continued, the need for evacuation was obvious. And it should have started a day earlier. Or dozens of rems received by each resident for this day, benefited them? Not being a specialist in radiation medicine, I do not presume to discuss the whole article. But the academician’s statement:

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“An analysis of the world experience of the influence of radiation on the body shows that the minimum significant dose with prolonged exposure is 100 ... 250 rem” Seems arbitrary enough. The radiation safety standards only say that 25 rem is the dose at which the methods of modern medicine do not detect changes in the body. But it is not said about their harmlessness. On this occasion, I have no firm conviction, but on the evacuation it is clear - I was late for a day. In my opinion, everyone agrees with this. I do not think that the academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences had doubts. He knows better than others the concept of radiation protection of the population about the possible reduction of individual and collective doses. And after all, this is what - L.A. Buldakov himself is not in any way involved in the occurrence of radiation pollution, nor is he responsible to a small degree. Why does it compromise with conscience? To the service of whom and what gives the authority of a scientist? And he is not alone. Science has been raped, turned into a maid. What can we say about people personally guilty of a catastrophe?

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Dear Reader, I will offer you the analysis of another Report with an attempt to separate it from others, since it was compiled much later than others, and there are more organizations participating in it than in the previous ones. We will not consider measures aimed at improving the reliability of RBMK reactors, they are described correctly (this is not surprising, the drafters are people who know), they are justified and indeed have greatly improved the physical characteristics of the core and A3 of the reactor. No need to be surprised at the fact that these same knowledgeable experts continue to affirm after five years - the RBMK-1000 reactor in 1986 was good, the CPS met the requirements for it. Confirm contrary to facts, contrary to their own statements, including in this Report. Yes, apparently, without these allegations, the authorities would not have signed the Report. “In 1983, during the physical start-up of the reactor of the fourth Chernobyl NPP unit, an unacceptable phenomenon was discovered - the CPS rods at the beginning of the movement bring positive reactivity into the zone. Gosatomnadzor inspector notes this phenomenon and puts the reactor into operation. ”

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"Why are materials about the accident classified? Not yet available. And the reactor is unclassified. ” “... to some extent I explained the reasons for the closure of materials after the accident. People who need it have been and are, and they are still influential. And it turns out that there are quite a few of them. ”

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Chapter 7

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Obvious Resistance In 1991, the report "Causes and circumstances of the accident at unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Measures to improve safety of NPPs with RBMK reactors" signed by the Director of IAE, E. P. Velikhov, the Director General of NPO "Energy" (VNIIAES) A. Abagyan, Director of the NIKIET E. O. Adamov, the Director of Institute of problems of safe development of atomic energy, USSR Academy of Sciences Leonid Bolshov, chief specialist of the Committee E. I. Chukardina, Director of the SEC of gospromatomnadzor V. A. Petrov. The report was compiled by the employees of these organizations, and since this is practically all organizations involved in RBMK reactors, it seems that this report should be considered a final document. Nothing else can be expected from them. Naturally, the drafters of the report did not put a hoax on hand. It would be useless to seek from them for violations in the draft requirements of regulatory documents. There are no violations. And there are no documents, they don’t know. In their opinion, RBMK reactor facilities have only features:

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"Insufficient automatic protection of the reactor installation from its translation into an unregulated state." That is, the reactor is in an explosive state, and the control system and automation and the ear does not. There is no warning signal or automatic tripping of the A3 to prevent the reactor from becoming hazardous. Including in terms of “an important physical characteristic from the point of view of reactor control and safety, called the operational reactivity margin”. Such a feature. I ask you to pay attention to the cynicism of the wording: "... from transferring it to an irregular state ...". The operating staff is sleeping and sees how to put the reactor in an explosive state, he has no other thoughts. Here, in the report, the compilers, it is not clear for what purpose, provide information from the Regulations: at rated power in stationary mode, the value of the reactivity margin should be 26 ~ 30 rods; when the stock is reduced to 15 rods, the reactor should be immediately shut off. Thus, only 11 ~ 15 rods separate the reactor from the normal state to the atomic bomb, while the effects of reactivity during regime change can amount to tens of rods. And, therefore, the reactor itself turns into a bomb, and it is not necessary to translate it.

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Only a clear system of measurement, alarm and automation could prevent this transformation, as the ABY requires. But the most basic compilers are silent the reactor should not become nuclear hazardous while decreasing the reactivity margin. There are no such reactors, only the the stupidity of physicists and designers of CPS rods led to this. “The nature of the change in the steam reactivity coefficient αφ and the effect of dehydration depending on the decrease in the density of the coolant in the core”. Well, of course, the compilers are all scientists and should not simply express their thoughts, but even with this in mind, the phrase is very “special”. However, it means the same thing: the reactor, with the composition of the core, had an unacceptable positive reactivity vapor effect. We have already talked about this. "Inadequate A3 performance and the ability to enter positive reactivity."

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In, feature! - A3 when activated, introduces positive reactivity, i.e. accelerates the reactor. With such “features”, a feature of the RBMK reactor became quite natural — sometimes explode. The drafters of the report in the reactor design do not see violations of the requirements of the documents adopted in the country, but they see: “The reactor control and protection system is based on the movement of 211 solid absorber rods in specially allocated channels cooled by water of an autonomous circuit. The system in the regulatory regimes and in the conditions of a design basis accident provided " And then comes a listing of the usual requirements for the system, including for reactor shutdown. Further “These characteristics of the reactor installation, together with safety systems: protective, localizing, and ensuring, ensure reliable and efficient operation of RBMK in all regulatory regimes and safety for the entire list of design basis accidents in accordance with the approved design documentation”

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What follows from these two excerpts? Control and protection systems and others were normal, efficient, and all reactor operating modes, including emergency ones, were provided in the best possible way. The RBMK reactor did not explode - “Churchill came up with all this in the eighteenth year”, which was an explosion. That the reactor exploded when the MCC failed, follows from the act of the Meshkov commission, which was dominated by NIKIET and IAE - the creators of the reactor. Later they refused this version, but not because an explosion was impossible, and there was no failure of the pumps; and what, according to the report of the IAE, the reactor could explode if the AR failed, the report compilers are silent about this. And many more situations, and even these are enough. Maybe they are not among the design basis accidents? It seems they should not. Disruption of pumps is entirely conceivable and, moreover, in various cases. Failure of the AR - all the more so, in all textbooks on the automatic regulation of the reactor it is necessarily considered. There is a conclusion of the SCST committee that with such a steam reactivity effect, the reactor explodes at MPA. This, the latter, can not be attributed to non-design, if any desire.

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However, the drafters of the report do not think the way they write. This is a continuation of the same policy - defending the honor of a uniform, contempt for people. After analyzing and listing the measures taken at the remaining reactors, they write: “The implementation of the planned measures to improve the neutron-physical characteristics of the reactor, a sharp increase in the efficiency of A3 made it possible to exclude uncontrolled increase in power in accidents with loss of coolant and to limit the consequences of all design basis accidents to acceptable levels of radiation exposure to personnel, the public and the environment." Whether this statement is indisputable, whether the safety of the RBMK reactor is really ensured, is not entirely obvious, but with this phrase the authors cross out the previous two that I cited. There is no doubt that the technical measures carried out after the accident at the reactors increased their reliability; more correctly, they made it possible to raise the question of the reliability of RBMK reactors.

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What happened before 1986, due to numerous deviations from the requirements of regulatory documents for the design of reactors, cannot be called a reactor, nor can it be said about its reliability. If, out of habit, it is still called the RBMK-86 reactor, then the RBMK-1000 reactor is completely different. Yes, there were no accidents for the reason that it was in 1986, and there will be no other reasons for this reactor. However, the inventors and designers of the reactor have so neglected the concept of safety so much that it is hardly possible with any modernization to reach the level already implemented in other projects. And I do not want to say, but most likely so: the hunchback grave will be corrected. For example, we can take the case of a break in the technological channel. Almost all reactors (with the exception of the third and fourth units of Smolensk NPP) are designed to break two channels simultaneously, no more. The rupture of more than two channels leads, if not to Chernobyl, then to a completely comparable accident. According to the NIKIET calculation, a simultaneous rupture of two channels is possible with a probability of 10 -8 events per reactor per year. This is a low probability, and a rupture of three or more channels is even less likely, one might say, hypothetical.

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Only there is one but ... Calculation should not be crafty. I do not doubt the conscientiousness of the calculator, one must think that he conducted it with the involvement of all knowledge, the entire mathematical apparatus, according to the assignment. And here’s the question. The fact is that in addition to channel breaks caused by manufacturing technology, control and operating conditions (environment, temperature, pressure, cyclicity), there are other, more difficult to take into account events (for example, local overheating of the core, violation of circulation). Is all this taken into account? In three excerpts from the report, I emphasized the words “design basis accident” not because they are important there. The reason is different. It is not clear why the authors push it with importunity. Accident is ruled out. Do they want to say that on April 26 the accident was undesigned? And with us, they say, bribes are smooth? Yes, the accident is not projected. Such an accident, even in the project, in my opinion, is not necessary to think about, only under some hypothetical conditions. It should be excluded by the design of the reactor and the design of the reactor installation, and our regulatory documents meet this condition.

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The reactor by design did not respond to them, which is why the accident occurred. And the creators of the reactor, Supervisory the organization has nothing to do with it? Accident non-design? No, it is a project (design) due. This creep of the creators of the reactor is fraught with serious consequences in the future, if allowed to grow stronger. Through the reverse, but the drafters of the report are dragging that the operation of the reactor at low power was prohibited. They write: • RBMK-1000 power units operate in the basic mode (at constant power); • Fast power factor at the operating point - and give a negative value. Everyone is trying to create the impression that the reactor was good. You could not pay attention, because there are normal correct thoughts in the report, but everything should be like this: the drafters (23 of them) are quite competent people, and the signers are really luminaries. But something prevents them and in five years it interferes. And you can’t dismiss this, because the future atomic energy depends on these, if not people, then organizations.

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The conclusion of the report turned out to be quite logical in connection with the dual position of the authors: 1. "The accident occurred as a result of the imposition of the following main factors: the physical characteristics of the reactor, the design features of the regulatory authorities, and the conclusion of the reactor in an unregulated state." Well, we have already sorely filled with features. An irregular state, too - again, the pointing finger is directed at the operating staff. But after all, the deviation of any parameter beyond the norm is an unregulated state; April 26 is a reserve of reactivity. And what, if the parameter deviates, the reactor should explode? Then all the reactors should explode, there are no reactors that would not have deviations of parameters beyond the norm. But their design and protection are such that the chain reaction stops without unacceptable violations.

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2. “The advent of new modern programs, the use of powerful computer technology, as well as the experimental study of RBMK dehydration, made it possible to clarify the basic physical parameters of the reactor and, therefore, to develop new requirements for systems that increase its safety.” Five percent true this statement. Only in the sense that the study and refinement should naturally continue while the reactor is in operation. It has nothing to do with the accident, they all knew for a long time: by the vapor effect *, and by A3, and by the design of the rods. And there are no new requirements in the measures adopted under the modernization plan. That the vapor effect should be no more than β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, - as early as 1976 a decision was made and how to achieve this was indicated by precisely those paths and went after the accident. High-speed protection with film cooling was developed no later than 1973. That it is impossible to design reactivity affecting organs that change the sign of introduced reactivity when moving them in one direction - this is the alphabet.

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The fact of the matter is that not a single factor unknown to them was identified in the accident; there is not a single new requirement after the accident, everything only aimed at fulfilling the requirements of safety standards and ABY, adopted and entered into force more than ten years before the accident. So here came the final report of organizations related to the RBMK reactor, and the supervisor together with them. The position of V. Petrov, the representative of the supervisory authority, is very interesting: in this report he signed under the allegations that the RBMK reactor with all systems, including the CPS, “ensured” safe operation; almost at the same time, he signed a report, which stated quite rightly, that this reactor did not meet the fifteen articles of OPB and ABY, directly affecting the occurrence of the accident on April 26, 1986. It turns out, according to Mr. State Comptroller, a reactor with a bunch of regulatory inconsistencies the documents are still good and quite serviceable. Maybe the State Comptroller, Mr. Petrov, with such a large number of deviations of the RBMK-86 design from the requirements of reactor design standards, no longer considers it a reactor (and this would be true) and is guided by other documents (which ones?) And intuition?

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But in the report, RBMK-86 is called a reactor, and then it must meet the requirements of OPB and ABY. But there is, there is a shift in five years. They squeezed out from themselves that the accident occurred due to the physical characteristics of the reactor, the design features of the regulatory bodies, and the reactor was brought into an unregulated state. Previously, these people recognized the cause only as an unlikely combination of violation of instructions and an irregular state. And since it is obvious that on April 26, 1986 an accident would not have happened even: • With a steam reactivity effect of 6β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,; • With a positive fast power coefficient of reactivity in a large range of reactor power; • Let A3 not meet the requirements for it, but at least not introduce a positive reactivity, Then how many years do these people need to unconditionally acknowledge solely the properties of the reactor as the cause of the accident? I write this only because these people are in living nuclear energy, they rule, and, as you can see, you don’t have to rely on their frankness. Note: Later V. Petrov withdrew his signature.

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Chapter 8

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Academician A. P. Alexandrov Of course, deserves a special discussion. In 1986, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the IAE, scientific director of the RBMK topic, inventor of the RBMK reactor *. What other posts and posts did he hold then, I don’t know - in the listed ones he was directly related to the catastrophe on April 26, 1986. It may turn out that I will be biased here because I am convinced that it was by the profession of Academician A.P. Aleksandrov that I lost my health and became a prisoner. As the inventor of the reactor and the Scientific Director, he did not provide the required quality. As the President, as the director of the institute, as the chair of the meetings of the IMTS, he directed the investigation in the wrong direction. And yet I will not allow any fabrication, I will only present facts known to me and my understanding of them. Twenty years ago, while still working in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, I came on a business trip to IAE. Employees of the Institute E. Alikin and others said that the Director of the rule: the paper must lie down and if it becomes notorious, it is necessary and it is time to give it a move.

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I did not think then that this manner of A. P. Alexandrov a heavy roller will pass on destinies of many people and mine. Apparently, following this rule of his own, A.P. Aleksandrov did not give suggestions to the commission after the accident at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP: the proposals of V.P. Volkov and V.L. Ivanov. These proposals, the decisions of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of Environment for reducing the steam effect of reactivity to 1β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, back in the seventies, like others, were lying under the cloth. Waited for scandal? Wait! .. Tell me, who would want and could prevent the academician from putting all this into practice? There are no such people. He himself did not need to do anything. Only allow, order. And as people did not know about Chernobyl before 1986, they would not have known until now. Here is an excerpt from the report of A.A. Yadrikhinsky: “Since 1965, employees of I.F. Zhezherun, V.P. Volkov, and V.L. Ivanov have been in the IAE itself, pointing to the nuclear danger of the proposed and subsequently implemented RBMK design. Their

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actions were successfully blocked by Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, and the reports were put under the cloth. The start-up and operation of the first unit of the Leningrad NPP in 1975 already in practice confirmed the nuclear danger of RBMK reactors. If violations of the Rules in the RBMK project can be considered errors prior to the startup of the first LNPP unit, then after the start-up and their experimental confirmation by the operational experience of the first LNPP unit and subsequent replication in all newly commissioned RBMK units, they can only be called a crime. ” In the future, during operation, there were other manifestations of unsatisfactory, dangerous qualities of the reactor, about which A.P. Aleksandrov knew. There is no doubt that, knowing all this even before the catastrophe on April 26, when it happened, the academician clearly realized: the accident is in its pure form the result of scientific and constructive miscalculations. And then, in order to save his own reputation (who would judge him - three times as a Hero with eight orders of Lenin?), He put into action all the levers for blaming the blame solely on the staff.

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It was not at all difficult for him to do this, since the investigation was dominated by the Ministry of Medium Engineering, IAE and NIKIET. And the conclusion of such a balm spilled on all hearts to the very top. And look how stubbornly the academician defends his position! Five years later no change. In partisans, he would not have had a price. In "Spark" No 35 for 1990, an interview with the academician is published. Very characteristic. Correspondent A.P. Aleksandrov replies that he was not a member of the commission investigating the causes of the accident. Formally, yes, this is not an academician to get into business where you will not earn anything but cones. In fact, he constantly monitored and directed where he needed to. Further his words: “Understand, the reactor has flaws. It was created by academician Dollezhal for a long time, taking into account the knowledge of that time. Now these shortcomings are reduced, compensated. It's not about the design. You drive a car, turn the steering wheel in the wrong direction an accident! Is the motor to blame? Or a car designer? Everyone will answer: "The unskilled driver is to blame."

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A very characteristic statement. It is amazing how much lies can be contained in some two dozen words. Let's see what's what here. The first one. The "disadvantages" of the reactor are. Not! These are unacceptable defects of the reactor, which excluded its operation, direct violations of regulatory documents adopted in the country. The academician does not talk about them; he, like the commissions, does not see these documents point blank. I in the text in the course of the description indicated how A3 is “consistent” with the requirements of the Rules. And here is what Professor B. G. Dubovsky, who headed the Nuclear Security Service in the USSR until 1973, says in an abstract: “It is incomprehensible to the mind, as the heads of the design engineers of the CPS, as well as the Gosatomenergonadzor of the USSR, could ... make such miscalculations, and in some cases devoid of elementary logic. Indeed, in fact, RBMK-86 reactors (meaning RBMK-1000 as it was in 1986, A.D.) did not have normal protection. Had no A3! Neither from below the core, nor from above. ”

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All this B.G.Dubovsky says after analyzing the defense. A few years before the accident, he gave suggestions for its improvement. The result of the offers is the same - to the basket. The Chief Designer N.A.Dollezhal himself admitted that a reactor with such a large positive reactivity effect is uncontrollable. I did not find it possible to lie in my declining years. Maybe the creator of the reactor does not know that he must meet the standards? Does it fit with common sense? The second one. Deftly, quite expertly, A.P. Aleksandrov moves the arrow to N.A. Dollezhal. Of course, the Chief Designer is responsible, but A.P. Aleksandrov should not leave her. Money for the invention was received not by Dollezhal, but by A.P. Aleksandrov. Twice applications for an invention were rejected by the Union Bureau (Literaturnaya Gazeta No 20 for 1989), then they pushed through the department as a secret. And, in my opinion, the Union Bureau rejected in vain. There are obvious features of the invention: • All reactors are nuclear hazardous only with a large ORM. RBMK - both with large and small;

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•

Universal A3 - and shuts down the reactor, and accelerates.

And further, A.P. Aleksandrov held an official position - Scientific Supervisor of the RBMK topic. Therefore, what the reactor was like when it was created, what it was like right up to the accident - the academician’s contribution is direct. The third. A.P. Aleksandrov says that now these shortcomings are reduced and compensated. He speaks correctly. And he is silent that he knew all these "shortcomings" long before the Chernobyl accident. Well, about the selectivity of the academician’s memory a little lower. Fourth. The academician winces when he talks about the car, the designer and the driver. According to the objective evidence of the control system, we pressed the A3 button in the absence of any alarms. Were we right to expect a normal shutdown of the reactor? Of course. Protection is obliged to do this even in the presence of alarms - for that it is A3. The activation of reactor protection by the operator cannot in any way be qualified as a violation of nuclear safety. Therefore, we didn’t turn the “wheel in the wrong direction”.

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A more appropriate and correct comparison with a car would be: “You drive a car, press the brake. Instead of braking, the car accelerates. Crash! Is the driver to blame? Or maybe a designer, a citizen, an academician? ” You see, Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, like a real academician, says: “Do you think why the accident occurred in Chernobyl, and not in Leningrad?” There was still not enough! In 1975, the Leningrad NPP only accidentally escaped a catastrophe somewhat different for reasons, but similar in scope to Chernobyl. As a result of local overheating of the zone, the process channel was depressurized. But in that situation, three or four channels could be depressurized at the same time, because about 20 pieces were replaced during the repair. As it is now clear, a simultaneous rupture of 3-4 channels led precisely to Chernobyl. The academician’s memory works purely selectively. He recalls the turbine, the valves, but at the reactor, which is clearly on the topic of conversation, A.P. Aleksandrov does not remember the accident.

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His memory also fails him when he talks about the Navy, about submarines. “We had no troubles in naval installations, but then, in 1957, industry was less developed, but nothing was done.” In Chernobyl, too, the industry coped, yes … In boat water-cooled reactors, until 1973, I also did not recall accidents due to manufacturing defects. But due to scientific support, or rather non-provision, to which the academician had a direct relationship, there were. If memory serves, in 1962 an impulse tube with a diameter of 10 mm broke off on a nuclear boat in a primary circuit pipeline. The tube is small, and there the first circuit is small in volume. The crew tried to take measures to prevent the core from being left without cooling. The guys understood that they were being reirradiated, and they did. Why? Because they were afraid: • Highly enriched fuel after melting will gather in a compact mass and a nuclear explosion will occur; • If the explosion does not occur, the bottom of the reactor vessel and the boat vessel may melt.

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After the accident, the institute performed a calculation, which showed that there would have been no explosion or penetration of the hull. After the accident, they counted, not before it! But the dead cannot be returned. If the crew had this information, they would have lifted up the compartment and went to the base, the reactor anyway died. And no casualties. I knew the crews of many submarines. I can’t say anything about the current ones, and then the officers serving the nuclear power plant were overwhelmingly competent specialists, the commanders of the warhead unit five, i.e. mechanics, all without exception. But the crew is not a staff of the institute; its capabilities and tasks are different. The crew fulfilled their duty with brute force, and the Scientific adviser A.P. Aleksandrov with a delay. Another case. At one of the shipyards, they left a temporary plug on the nozzle of the reactor cover, and during hydraulic tests it vomited. The rod of the lattice suppressing reactivity passed through the nozzle. When water gushed out, the stream lifted the grate, and an explosion occurred. By pressure, it lifted the reactor lid (pulled the mounting studs), threw water into the workshop, and the reaction stopped. I do not remember, it seems, there were no deaths.

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They planted the head of the physical laboratory of the plant. Like this. Two institutes - scientists and designers - did not lose the emergency situations, and the factory worker had to guess that if the plug was broken, it could raise the grill. How similar it is to Chernobyl. And the main character is the same. There was an accident, and immediately felt that this A3 in the first seconds can introduce positive reactivity up to 1 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. This is before the accident, and after! There is no need to talk about the conclusion of the SAOR and the test program, and again and again to refute speculation. But now I want to comment on the academician’s tirade, which is supposed to portray its horror and indignation. “So, you will not believe! At the very beginning of the Regulation of that experiment, it was written: "Turn off the emergency reactor cooling system - the SAOR system." But it is he who automatically turns on the emergency protection system. Moreover, all valves were closed so that it was impossible to turn on the protection system. Twelve times (!) The regulation of the experiment violates the operating instructions for the NPP.

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In a nightmare, this is not a dream. Eleven o'clock the NPP worked with disconnected SAOR! It was as if the devil was leading and preparing this explosion. ” What are the expressions, pathos! But this is all a game to the public. The academician knows very well that the conclusion of the SAOR did not affect the occurrence of the accident. This is recognized by everyone, including his student V.A.Legasov, and even the extremely biased judicial-technical commission. We deduced SAOR, because according to those documents the chief engineer was allowed to do this, although one can agree with the unconditional ban on the withdrawal of the system, no matter how small the likelihood of MPA (it was not on April 26) at the same time. The phrase: “But it is she who automatically turns on the emergency protection system,” I cannot understand with a non-academic mind. According to the BEP SAOR itself is a protection system and does not include anything. How violations are wound, we already know. Eleven o'clock was disconnected SAOR on the 4th block. Nightmare. Dear Anatoly Petrovich, I apologize for the naive question. And you don’t have nightmares that two units at the Leningrad, Kursk and Chernobyl NPPs have been working without SAOR for several years?

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After all, what is there, very approximately meets the requirements. And the Christian humility of Academician A.P. Aleksandrov: “I am not a judge to anyone,” is a hypocritical pose, just as he is like a wolf's sheep skin. But what is he doing in this interview? By repentance? Not seen. As the staff unrightly blamed, it continues. As they say, wherever you throw, everywhere a wedge. So it is with A.P. Aleksandrov. Whatever article is a lie. The newspaper "Izvestia" on 10/14/1989: "A little earlier, the beginning of nuclear energy was laid - the world's first nuclear power plant was built (Chernobyl is the result of a "period of stagnation", i.e. a period of General irresponsibility)." And this for the period of stagnation, dumps on the system. What does the stagnation period have to do with it? Who interfered, who could do this, eliminate unacceptable defects in the reactor? Irresponsibility is shown, first of all, by himself. If irresponsible, then by no means all. Suggestions, and moreover, the necessary ones, were long before the accident.

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There was no one over the RBMK reactor over A.P. Aleksandrov, all that was prescribed by him would have been done. Another thing, is it possible to truly manage, holding a bunch of posts and posts? The newspaper Pravda threw a pill to the academician by publishing his speech in the Central Committee of the CPSU with the mass resignation of elderly members of the Central Committee. There he said: “To manage such an institute as the IAE, the largest institute and the most complex work, and at the same time take care of the Academy - I must say, it was extremely difficult. In the end, it ended sadly. And when the Chernobyl accident happened, I believe that from that time on, my life began to end, and my creative life. ” Before that, he said that he was forcibly forced to be the president of the Academy. Maybe. It was impossible to refuse. And could you leave the post of director of the institute? Was it possible to refuse other posts? What can be done on the fields of ten to fifteen posts and posts? Only reap, where he did not plow, did not sow.

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Academician V. A. Legasov I agree, the rule about the dead or good or nothing, must be respected. But still I do not see much sin, since the academician himself did not adhere to it. The operators whom he accused of signing the conclusion of the government commission had already died by then. He did the same thing as the head of the Soviet experts, the IAEA informants. I do not want to talk about the work of V.A. Legasov in the aftermath of the accident. Recently, there have been statements about the fallacy of some technical decisions adopted at that time. Well, there has never been a lack of strong backward minds, and not now. Sitting in a comfortable office, for several years you can think of something useful. You are in extreme conditions, for a short time, make decisions and then see if they are all optimal. And besides, why is it that Legasov should be credited with incorrect decisions? Was he alone there? Velikhov was. Or is it dangerous to criticize Velikhov? Alive and in power. V.A.Legasov is not a reactor engineer by profession, he did not know the specific power units and, I believe, he could not understand exactly the whirlpool. By virtue of character, he trusted others.

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But this does not in any way justify or explain his signature under the conclusion of the Government Commission and activities in the IAEA. A man of wide erudition, he dealt with issues of industrial safety in general. For all the specifics of chemical, oil or nuclear enterprises, safety issues have much in common. No, academician V.A. Legasov could not understand that accusing the staff of such an explosion is unlawful. He could not help but understand that if the reactor exploded in the most ordinary conditions, without any natural disasters, therefore, he had no right to exist. Reactors cannot, must not explode with the release of huge quantities of radioactive substances into the environment. With this consciousness, and he couldn’t understand it in any way, he had to naturally come to the question - why did the explosion nevertheless happen? Not even understanding and not understanding staff errors. After such a question, the direct path to the following is: did the reactor meet accepted nuclear safety standards? If so, do these guidelines themselves adequately meet safety criteria? These questions could not arise.

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Any accident investigation is carried out with the use of operational and design documentation, equipment certificates. There is nothing new here. And the very first efforts in this direction would show obvious discrepancies between the ABY reactor and the OPB. Yes, there was no need to go anywhere for this, they are also in the conclusion of the Government Commission, only there is no reference to the "Rules" there, but are called shortcomings. Therefore, I am sure: there is no conscious mention of regulatory documents in the conclusion. And the main responsible person for this is Academician Legasov, along with the chairman of the commission B.E. Shcherbina. Not the Minister of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for his affairs in the commission, and not for equipment. V.A. Legasov does not bear any personal fault for the RBMK reactor; in general, he had no relation to his existence before the accident. With his signatures, he covered up other people's sins, covered up consciously. And not so unexpectedly is a letter from the Institute’s senior researcher: “Legasov is a vivid representative of the scientific mafia whose politicking instead of leading the science led to the Chernobyl accident ...”, which V. Gubarev writes in Pravda.

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Apparently, not so unexpectedly the non-election to the Scientific and Technical Council of the Institute: 100 - support, 129 – against. What did the scientist cast his authority on? Who put pressure on him? This we will not know. No, V.A.Legasov brought not his worldwide fame his report in Vienna at the IAEA conference. And he apparently understood this. I would like to think that the academician was mistaken, I did not understand the causes of the disaster, because it is painfully sad to think the contrary. What are you living for ?! I can’t, it doesn’t work. Elementary logic does not. And the death of V.A.Legasov on the anniversary of Chernobyl says the same. But I do not attribute it to the mafia. This man had a conscience. Under some circumstances, he made a cruel compromise with his conscience and could not stand it. Selection continues. Knocked out one way or another with human qualities.

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Dr. A.A. Abagyan Director of VNIIAES - his other posts do not interest us. He was also part of the first commission to investigate the causes of the Chernobyl accident. Together with the Deputy Minister G.A. Shasharin refused to sign the act as part of a group of employees of the Ministry of Energy, participated in writing a much more realistic addition to the act of investigation. Included in the composition of Soviet specialists, who informed the world community in the IAEA, he sharply changed his position. I don’t know for what reason he did this: either because Shasharin had been removed from office by that time and, therefore, was no longer the boss; either "received his sight" and joined the majority. What I don’t know, I don’t know. I simply state that the opinion of Dr. A.A. Abagyan within two months has been reversed without the appearance of any additional research materials. During this time, only the report of the Government Commission was released, which A.A. Abagyan did not provide new technical information, and the decision of the Politburo, which naturally did not contain any technical information.

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I will not completely compare the two documents, I will give only one specific example. - From the supplement to the act of investigation: Item 8. “The decommissioning of the A3 shutdown of two TGs does not contradict the Technical Regulations and Instructions, and the operation of this protection could not prevent the accident ... it would have occurred 35 seconds earlier.” From a report to the IAEA (table of violations committed by operational personnel): "Violation. Blocking reactor protection by a stop signal of two TGs. Effects. Losing the ability to shut down the reactor automatically. ” Both documents were signed by A.A. Abagyan: one in May, the other in July 1986. Suppose that the opinion on this issue has changed, the conclusions are different. Somehow you can understand. But how do you order, Dr. Abagyan, to understand your two opinions on blocking protection? The Regulation clearly states when it is displayed, and there can be no misunderstanding.

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In the magazine, it seems, “Our Contemporary”, the doctor reports that they answered questions of specialists and correspondents five hours a day. Little by little it becomes clear how they answered, how they tried to present the staff to the world community (A. A. Abagyan's expression), they presented them “beautifully”, “objectively”, thanks! For protection, we just saw. But in terms of reactor power: • In addition to the act, it is shown in detail that not a single pre-accident document contains a hint of restrictions on the operation of the reactor at any power level, including 200 MW; • The world community was informed: work at a power level of less than 700 MW was prohibited by the Regulation. Briefly and clearly. Lies, so what? These are the "principled" people who are engaged in and continue to investigate. Well, the owner of his own word: I gave, I took it back.

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Chapter 9

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Works of Art For a long time I didn’t read anything about the accident: neither magazines nor newspapers. When he was able to read at the hospital, Volodya Pchelin provided classics, and Pyotr Vyrodov provided detective literature. It seems that I didn’t read another there, I practically did not watch TV, although I was in the ward. At one time B.C. Konviz was in the hospital, offered the "Sarcophagus" by V. Gubarev, but I refused. The fact is that in the hospital the investigator interrogated me several times, while as a witness, but I already understood the general direction of the investigation, in which direction it was heading. And therefore from publications in newspapers and magazines did not expect to see real assessments of events. He was discharged from the hospital on November 4, 1986, and the next day he and his wife arrived in Kiev. A month he lived at large, with the help of two walks a day, he began to restore coordination of movements, and, in general, gradually came to his senses. All this was difficult. During the illness he “ate” fifteen kilograms, so he still hasn’t restored it. I “ate” muscles, I never had fat, and you can’t restore them with nutrition.

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And here, on December 4, they were relocated to the casemate. In the pre-trial detention center, the ability to follow the news is limited. And after the trial, shocked, for a long time, he could not read periodicals, normal books. Yes, frankly, I still have no desire to read about the disaster, although I do. Now there is no indiscriminate groaning of staff, but no, no, and even well-wishers will throw it up, which will distort it. For example, the staff considered the reactor simple and reliable, like a cabinet, it was not warned, because the staff violated the instructions. Gentlemen, there is no need for such protection or such accusations. We would have talked before with operators at RBMK and other reactors. Yes, an explosion is not expected, as in Chernobyl - this is a pathology. Yes, they do not expect that A3 will bring positive reactivity - it is even impossible to qualify. As the Ukrainian says - without a glitch, nitsenitnitsya (nonsense). That is, the operators do not wait on the part of the designers of tricks, traps. But even a normal reactor, made in accordance with the standards, if the operating rules are not observed, threatens disaster, albeit incomparable with Chernobyl. In any article you can stumble on a slap in the face. It would seem that there were so many of them, it's time to get used to it. No, it hurts.

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We will not touch on purely artistic works, this is a matter of literary critics. Consider only two documentary stories, in terms of how documentary they are. G. Medvedev

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Chernobyl Notebook It would not make sense to dwell on this work, if the author were to call it artistic. However, the author named the story documentary and retained the actual names of the participants in the events. As far as I understand this genre, according to its laws, the presentation of events, the actions of individuals are only to a small extent subject to the will and imagination of the author. Accuracy should in no way be sacrificed to the brilliance of descriptions. If you want to write beautifully, artistically, do not bind yourself with moral standards in front of people alive and dead, write as a free artist, without naming the actual names. G. Medvedev in the story took a mentoring, or rather, prosecutorial tone. The essay on the content and peremptory judgments can be considered an “indictment” and transferred to the court for the purpose of issuing a stricter sentence to us (me and the operating staff), since G. Medvedev brings new, unrecognized crimes in the story.

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Well then what? Probably, he has the moral right to judge if he has conscientiously figured out the circumstances of the accident and where he does not resort to the opinions of knowledgeable people, based on his own extensive experience of the operator, which he repeatedly mentioned in the story. Mentioned that which was not. In fact, it turns out that G. Medvedev did not work a day at operating nuclear power plants. He worked in the city of Melekess in 1964-1972. on the VK-50, but this is an experimental reactor, and not a nuclear plant. He was at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 19721974, when it was far from operation. The first unit at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was launched on September 16, 1977. Since 1974, lives in Moscow. As far as I know, there have never been nuclear power plants there. Even cabinet-wise, he was not connected with the operation of the NPP; he was engaged in the supply of equipment to the stations. This is actually the case with his "when he worked at the operation of nuclear power plants." From the same area and him: “I arrived at the construction site of the nuclear power plant in the village of Pripyat directly from the Moscow clinic, where I was

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treated for radiation sickness. I still felt bad, but I could walk and decided that, working, I would get back to normal faster. ” I don’t know how he walked - bad or good, but according to the 6th hospital (A.K. Guskov and A.F. Shamardin), G. Medvedev did not have radiation sickness and the dose was minimal. By virtue of the above circumstances, the knowledge of G. Medvedev of the technical part of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and technological systems (in 1974, when he left the station, there were not even any schemes yet) are purely approximate. Therefore, he himself could not figure out the causes of the accident. He did not resort to the help of knowledgeable people and, judging by the text of the story, his desk aid was a report of Soviet specialists in the IAEA, the incorrect provisions of which were reinforced by Medvedev’s own interpretation. Well, and in matters of physics of reactors, and physics of RBMK in particular, Medvedev himself does not resort to anyone's help and gets into trouble every minute. It’s even amazing how it is possible to achieve such an almost one hundred percent discrepancy between the presentation of the technical side and events with reality.

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It is pointless to criticize this part of the story; one would have to rewrite each paragraph and explain. Therefore, only to demonstrate the "documentary" work will make a few comments. At the end of the above quotations, I indicate the page of publication in the journal New World No. 6 for 1989, and you will see that the text is taken in a row and also not accurate in a row. G. Medvedev writes: “During the shutdown of the unit, according to the program approved by the chief engineer N.M. Fomin, it was supposed to carry out tests with the reactor shields disconnected in the mode of complete de-energization of the NPP equipment. To generate electricity, it was supposed to use the mechanical energy of the coast of the TG rotor (inertia rotation) ”(p. 16). Here is a program in front of me. It is also here in Appendix 7. There is not a single word in the “TG Coasting Program” about disabling reactor protection. Either the author of the lead-in did not see the program, or did not understand anything in it.

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No complete de-energization of the unit equipment was supposed. On the contrary, under the program, all the block mechanisms were switched to backup power, and only the mechanisms necessary for the experiment worked from the running-out TG. This was done in order to ensure normal cooling of the block after reducing the frequency of the running-out TG and disconnecting the mechanisms from it. In particular, four out of eight MCPs were powered from the reserve. Other auxiliary machinery and of all the mechanisms of reliable supply. “What is the essence of the experiment and why was it needed? The fact is that if the nuclear power plant is suddenly de-energized, then naturally all the mechanisms stop, including the pumps that pump water through the reactor core. As a result, the reactor core melts, which is equivalent to MPA. The use of any possible sources of electricity in such cases provides for an experiment with a run-out of the TG rotor. After all, while the TG rotor rotates, electricity is generated. It can and should be used in critical cases. Coasting mode is one of the subsystems for MPA ”(p. 16).

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When the mechanisms of the auxiliary needs of the power plant are de-energized (without MPA), the cooling of the core is provided by the MCP due to the kinetic energy of the inertial flywheel available at each pump, then due to the natural circulation of the coolant. The remaining mechanisms are powered by emergency diesel generators and batteries. SAOR is not involved. Reactor core melting is by no means equivalent to MPA. When melting the core, the RBMK reactor and the block are considered dead. Pollution of the building and, apparently, the station’s territory cannot be avoided. With MPA, this should not happen, although the accident is severe. Indeed, the generator run-down mode is used for one of the SAOR subsystems for MPA. But at the same time it is meant to ensure only the operation of the feed pumps, the rest of the mechanisms insofar as. Calculation at MPA with MPA is not performed, since they may, depending on the nature of the accident, be disrupted in the very first seconds. Of the long quotation, only the last phrase is partially true. “Similar tests, but with active reactor shields, were carried out earlier at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and at other nuclear power plants. I

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also had to take part in them ”(p. 16). All A3 for this mode were this time. Such tests were not carried out at other stations, which G. Medvedev himself writes about in his story. I participated in all these trials and did not see G. Medvedev. And in what capacity would he participate, engaged in the supply of equipment? This documentary! Words are only true, but not the content expressed by them. “When the reactor is loaded with fresh fuel, its reactivity margin (simplified - the ability to increase neutron power) exceeds the ability of absorbing rods to drown out the reaction. In this case, part of the fuel (cartridge) is removed and fixed absorbing rods are inserted in their place (they are called additional absorbers), as if to help the moving rods. As uranium burns out, the DP is removed, and nuclear fuel is installed in their place.

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However, the rule remains immutable: as the fuel burns out, the number of absorbing rods immersed in the active zone should not be less than twenty-eight to thirty (after the Chernobyl accident, this number was increased to seventytwo), since at any moment a situation may arise where the fuel’s ability to grow power will be greater than the absorption capacity of the control rods. These 28 ... 30 rods located in the zone of high efficiency, and make up the operational reactivity margin (my discharge - A.D.). In other words, at all stages of the operation of the reactor, its acceleration ability should not exceed the ability of the absorbing rods to drown the reactor ”(p. 17). Those who understand the physics of reactors, do not despair and do not call yourself stupid if you do not understand anything from this long exposure. There is nothing to understand. This is called - I heard a ring, but don’t know where it is. The point is this. After the start of the first unit of the Leningrad NPP, as fuel burned out, they began to extract the fuel supply and replace them with fuel cassettes.

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They began to notice that the reactor was behaving more and more “capricious” - for its control it was necessary to resort to the movement of the rods up to 40 times per minute. This was the result of an increase in the vapor effect of reactivity. Measurements were taken and recommendations were made to reduce it: to increase fuel enrichment with uranium-235 (at Leningrad NPP it was 1.8%) or not to take out part of the fuel supply. Then it was decided to leave at least 30 AP in the core. This, of course, is not enough with an enrichment of 1.8 and even 2.0%. Then they increased fuel enrichment to 2%, science unreasonably considered this sufficient, and then all DPs were already extracted, since they negatively affect profitability. So, by April 26, on the fourth block of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, there was one DP in the zone, I don’t remember why the remaining one was there. They have nothing to do with OZR DP. It is compensated (suppressed, absorbed) by CPS rods - PP, AR and USP rods and can be quickly (promptly) released by the reactor operator. And it takes several hours to extract one DP with the help of a loading and unloading machine, what kind of efficiency is it?

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Sorry for such a long excerpt from the story, but it is necessary. The author and further throughout the text, repeatedly and in the same way misinterpreting, refers to the concept of OZR and explains the ongoing processes. But how can one explain it without understanding it? Or according to the principle - I’ll explain it to people about five, maybe I can understand it myself. “In January 1986, NPP Director V.P. Bryukhanov sent a test program for approval to the general designer at Hydroproject and Gosatomenergonadzor. There was no response. Neither the directorate of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, nor the operational union of Soyuzatomenergo, bothered this. Hydroproject and Gosatomenergonadzor did not worry either” (p. 17). And then on two pages G. Medvedev describes what kind of irresponsible people there are and you do not need to expect good from them. To give credibility even specifically says " in January 1986." Remember how Saltykov-Shchedrin about the next mayor said: found in bed, eaten by bedbugs in 1856.

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No. This program was signed by the chief engineer on April 24, 1986. I do not want to say that gosatomenergonadzor and "Gidroproekt" faultlessly performed their duties, but it is not a lie to prove it. “Here it is necessary to add one more detail, which was not mentioned in any of the technical reports about the incident. Here is this detail: the run-down mode of the generator rotor with the A3 practically taken out of work was planned in advance and was not only reflected in the test program, but also prepared technically. Two weeks before the experiment, an MPA button was inserted on the control panel of the fourth power unit, the signal of which was brought into secondary circuits only, but without instrumentation and a pump part. That is, the signal of this button was purely imitative ”(p. 19). Oh, how he digs the earth. I unearthed the button. But not the first. It appears in judicial experts and in the Indictment. The button was installed not in two weeks, but on April 25, as the witness electrician Mole showed.

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Without a program, operators will not let you install anything. The commissions in the acts have no mention of this button, because nothing can be sucked out from the staff to charge the staff. Only forensic experts and G. Medvedev bring a living stream. Experts say that there were no documents on it, and G. Medvedev came up with a great idea. This is what he says. “Once again, we will explain to the general reader: when A3 is activated, all 211 pieces of absorbing rods fall down, cooling water is cut in, emergency pumps are turned on and reliable power diesel generators are deployed. Also included are pumps for emergency water supply from the tanks of pure condensate and pumps that supply water from the bubbler pool to the reactor. That is, remedies are more than enough if they work at the right time. So all these protections had to be put on the IPA button. But they, unfortunately, were taken out of work, because the operators were afraid of a thermal shock to the reactor, i.e. cold water entering the reactor. This frail idea apparently

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hypnotized both the leadership of the nuclear power plant (Brukhanova, Fomina, Dyatlova) and higher organizations in Moscow ”(p. 19). G.Medvedev mixed everything together. For different signals and the triggering algorithms are different mechanisms. Assume that he is talking about A3 with MPA. But during the experiment, the loop was not supposed to be drilled at all, why then connect the SAOR cylinders and pumps supplying water from the bubbler pools to it? There is simply nowhere to pump water separators will fill the drum. The emergency cooling system of the reactor is designed for use in MPA. April 26, 1986 was not it, not the MPA. I do not know how to qualify it, they call it the maximum hypothetical accident. So be it! I will not give any other considerations, I think people with frail thoughts should listen to the clever thoughts of an experienced NPP operator. What if it really could have prevented the accident? However, as they say, trust, but verify. G. Medvedev accepted the idea of connecting the SAOR with the start of the TG run-out. How could this affect the process in the reactor? The flow rate of the coolant was already large, therefore, only the addition of cold water to the reactor, namely in its core.

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Cold water would reduce vaporization and therefore reactivity. It is only necessary to consider the “instantaneous” part of the ECCS, everything else does not matter. Let's agree that the signal on A3 will also go from the MPA button. Of course, we will take the time to register the central control system “Skala”, and not the one cited in the story, taken from nowhere: • 01 h 23 min 40 s - Button AZ-5 is pressed, • 01 h 23 min 46 ... 47 s - Explosion of the reactor. So, we have 6 seconds at our disposal, because here the pressure in the circuit has already increased, and the water supply even by the feed pump would cease, not to mention the cylinders. The task before us is simple. Will cold water manage to reach the core in 6 seconds? Then it can affect. The calculation, which I do not present here, shows that even with incomplete opening of the valves, the water from the collector at +30 m will reach more than 10 s. And after 10, there is nothing to do with this water. There is no core.

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Another option is when the SAOR is connected with the steam closing to the turbine, and the A3 button is pressed after 36 seconds, as it was on the block. It also does not give anything. In 36 seconds, cold water will pass the entire zone, and the introduced negative reactivity will be compensated by the power regulator. So this is the case with the advice of G. Medvedev to connect the SAOR. It seems to me that the subject you are talking about needs to be known. I dwelled on this question in detail for the following reason: even when I was in custody, a pretty correspondent for French television sought from me why they didn’t give me water. I still could not understand what kind of water she was talking about. When the shooting was over, she said that she had read the book of G. Medvedev. Only then did I understand what kind of water the conversation was about. And the story walks around the world, spreading a lie. Already, the commission of forensic experts is tendentious and she was forced to admit that the conclusion of the SAOR did not affect the occurrence or development of the accident.

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And all further arguments in the story on this issue are completely unfounded, purely speculative, since they work flawlessly on the imagination of those who do not know the unit and reactor. And such an overwhelming majority even among specialists. General knowledge will not help here, concrete ones are needed. Here is a phrase from this field that simultaneously shows the author’s knowledge of physics. Very revealing. “But these 350 m3 of emergency water from the SAOR tanks, when acceleration by instant neutrons (emphasized by me - AD), when the MCP was disrupted and the reactor was left without cooling, could possibly save the situation and extinguish the vapor effect of reactivity, the most significant of all ... ”(p. 22). No, if acceleration by instant neutrons has begun, then there is no escape. Only the destruction of the reactor will stop it; there are no other means at power reactors. On page 10 in the story G. Medvedev provides a list of accidents in the USSR at reactors: “May 7, 1966, instantaneous neutron acceleration at a nuclear power plant with a boiling nuclear reactor in the city of Melekess.

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The radiation monitor and the shift supervisor of the nuclear power plant were irradiated. They extinguished the reactor by dropping two bags of boric acid into it. ” Indescribably lucky people - lazy caught instant neutrons. They managed to escape behind bags of acid and extinguished the reaction. When accelerating at normal instantaneous neutrons, people have no time to think. Such a spreading cranberry! “At the same time, the introduction of such a number of rods into the active zone gives a positive reactivity surge at the first moment, since the graphite ends (5 m long) and hollow sections of a meter long initially enter the zone. A surge in reactivity with a stable controlled reactor is not terrible, but if adverse factors coincide, this additive can be fatal, because it will lead to uncontrolled acceleration. Did the operators know about this or were in holy ignorance? I think that they knew, in any case, they had to know SIUR L.Toptunov in particular. But he is a young specialist, knowledge has not yet entered his flesh and blood ... ”(p. 27).

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The construction of the CPS rods and the mechanism for introducing positive reactivity by them G. Medvedev is distorted. But it is not important. Another thing is important. G. Medvedev finds the reactivity surge when A3 falls! To make such a statement, all concepts must be turned upside down. In any case, this is beyond the limits of normal engineering thinking. Emergency protection is designed to shut off the reactor not only in normal, but mainly in emergency situations. And now, for example, there was a signal to reduce the period of power doubling, when the reactor already has excessive emergency reactivity and it continues to be introduced for technological reasons - and A3 adds reactivity. So it was on April 26, 1986. True, at the moment the AZ-5 button was pressed, i.e. A3 response, the reactor was slightly supercritical, went into emergency state after 3 s. Isn't that scary ?! Yes it is monstrous !!! And legitimately puzzling shift supervisor unit Sasha Akimov: “I did everything right. I don’t understand why this happened ”(p. 27).

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And how can you understand this? In a normal situation, without any warning signs, a button is pressed to kill the reactor, and we get an explosion. Only with a complete distortion of the moral and ethical foundations in the country, with complete oblivion of the laws, can operational personnel be blamed, as it happened and continues. Neither Toptunov, nor Akimov, nor any of the operators at nuclear plants with RBMK reactors knew about this. And if we knew, would we agree to work? And our ignorance was not at all holy. This is a direct merit of the Scientific Director A.P. Aleksandrov and the Chief Designer N.A. Dollezhal. Their employees were required to know (and A.P. Aleksandrov personally knew - there are documents) the unacceptable properties of the reactor and take measures to eliminate them. And in any case, inform the operating personnel in the design documents of the properties of the reactor. And reported, but false. The NIKIET report states that the power factor of reactivity is always negative - it was actually positive. Now there are wise men, G. Medvedev among them, uttering reproachfully: "I did not know the operational personnel."

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This seems to be elementary. Yes, it’s not so simple. G. Medvedev himself does not understand now. In the hands of the IAE and NIKIET, as it turned out after the accident, there were quite enough experimental data from the stations for a complete and deep understanding of the processes at RBMK. They did not comprehend, did not. Gosatomenergonadzor, which also had data, did not do this either. I still think they were not thinking, for I can’t imagine that they knew and were silent, and didn’t do anything. Another quote from the story. “Here one more short explanation is needed. A nuclear reactor can only be controlled due to the fraction of delayed neutrons, which is indicated by the Greek letter β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, (beta). According to ABY, the rate of increase in reactor power should not exceed 0.0065 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, for 60 s. If the fraction of delayed neutrons is 0.5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, acceleration by instant neutrons begins. Violation of the reactor regulations and protections, which I spoke about above, threatened to release reactivity of at least 5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, which meant fatal explosive acceleration.

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Had the whole of this chain Bryukhanov, Fomin and Dyatlov, Akimov, Toptunov?"(page 27). As the Reader, understand? No? No wonder. It's impossible to understand. It is also not clear to me why G. Medvedev measures the rate of increase in power in units of reactivity. It’s interesting, but he didn’t try to measure with a spoon or a glass - it’s still wrong, but objects are more familiar and more convenient. “If the fraction of delayed neutrons is 0.5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,.” How can this value be equal to half of itself, because β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, is the fraction of delayed neutrons? All books on reactors say that instantaneous neutron acceleration occurs when positive reactivity is 1 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, not 0.5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. Discovery made. Registered or not yet? One can imagine a chain according to Medvedev only in a feverish brain. I believe that this is quite enough to assess the competence of the author of the Chernobyl Notebook in matters of unit construction, accident circumstances and reactor physics. And to understand how it is possible to explain the causes of the accident and the actions of operators from such positions.

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Difficult. Incredibly difficult. Yes, G. Medvedev is not afraid of difficulties. It is necessary. And go ... For the fee. What muddled the already slandered operators - so they have already died. What to reckon with them? And he needs to live. G. Medvedev thinks little, the slanderous statements of various commissions are unconvincing, and he is digging up the IPA button. On page 26 he cites “gross violations, both inherent in the program and committed in the process of preparing and conducting the experiment.” I will not repeat them, they are taken from the information of Soviet specialists in the IAEA. But with a novelty. Look at p. 5, it says there as consequences that the thermal protection was thereby completely disabled. Incorrectly said there. And Medvedev reinforces and says: “they blocked the protection by shutting down two turbines, by water level and steam pressure in drum separators, by thermal parameters.” I could not rewrite without errors. Weak? Still comes up with. “Finally, they blocked both diesel generators, as well as the working and start-up backup transformers, disconnecting the unit from power sources and from the power system. In an effort to

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conduct a “pure experiment,” they actually completed the chain of prerequisites for an ultimate nuclear disaster ”(p. 26). What lies? So after all a little, others something more. G. Medvedev added quite a bit. But then, what is the picture now! Protection? - Everyone's locked down, no big deal. Power supply? - Everything is disabled and blocked. Staff? - Well, it’s clear - troglodytes or just jumped on trees yesterday. So, dear Reader, we are besieged from all sides, and continue now with Medvedev. The description of events before the accident and their interpretation in the story are incorrect and cannot be true, judging by the knowledge of the author. Of course, you can write truthfully and without prior knowledge, if you listen to the opinions of competent people. But aplomb and advertising itself by an experienced exploiter do not allow G. Medvedev to consult with anyone. I will dwell on some more points.

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“At 1 h 07 min, six additional MCCs were additionally switched on one more in such a way that after the end of the experiment, 4 MCPs remained in the circulation loop to reliably cool the core” (p. 30). Correctly. But on page 34, “The total flow rate through the reactor began to fall due to the fact that all eight MCPs were operating from a run-down TG”. As you can see, the author has already forgotten that he said four pages before, or does not understand. How, then, do all eight MCPs feed from the running-out generator, and four, at the end of the running-out, remain for reliable cooling of the zone? However, everything is simple. Four MCPs, like the vast majority of the unit’s mechanisms, are powered by backup power, and all the author’s arguments about supplying backup power to avoid an accident are a bluff. It was. Watch the program. Look how the commission of G.A. Shasharin describes this on the basis of studying the registration of parameters by a centralized control system, rather than speculative conclusions. And here is a direct accusation, first of all of me, of gagging.

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The question is: can catastrophe be avoided in this situation? Can. It was only necessary to categorically refuse to conduct the experiment, connect it to the SAOR reactor and reserve the power supply in case of a complete blackout. Manually, in steps, begin to reduce the power of the reactor until it stops completely, in no case dropping the A3, because this was tantamount to an explosion … “But this chance was not taken" (p. 30). Well, advised. Everything is simpler. It was necessary to dial six rods PP and lower into the zone. And so the sixes continue to jam, and then fold A3. It was possible and four rods. It was possible to start with regulators. But this is now clear when the unnatural ability of A3 became known. Operations with SAOR and power supply are not needed. Then, before that, I ask you to apologize for the vulgarity, I didn’t dopper, I didn’t screw it up, I didn’t cut it as it should ... And if my skull had banged it, I would immediately have stood for Kashpirovsky, Chumak and Tarasov. And he would have demanded more orders than Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

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No, I don’t reproach myself for not knowing about the danger (?!) Of A3 dumping. And I do not accept reproaches. It is impossible to figure it out, you just need to know. But if I knew, I wouldn’t work a day at such a reactor. We dropped the A3 on April 26, but it can automatically work at any time, by an alarm. Then? A fantastic picture was invented by G. Medvedev. What for? There was no need to invent there, reality itself is a phantasmagoria. "And suddenly, Perevozchenko started. Started strong and frequent hammering, 350-pound cubes - they have another project called "Assembly eleven" - began to jump up and down on the head of channels, like one thousand, seven hundred people began to throw their caps. The whole surface of the patch came alive, quivering in a wild dance. Shuddered and sagged boxes BioShield around the reactor. This meant that popping explosive mixture have already occurred under them..."(p. 33). Well, the "build eleven" cubes are only 50 kilograms, it doesn't matter.

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Beautifully outlined by G. Medvedev. He made the men jump and throw their hats. Rich fantasy. Only technically this is unthinkable. Again - I heard a bell and don’t know where it is. This is about hydrogen G. Medvedev tells. And time will not work. 01 h 23 min 40 s, power 200 MW, parameters are stable. There is no fantasy-registration control system. Nothing can happen. In 43 s, signals of excess power and a decrease in the acceleration period of the reactor fell out. Nothing could be the same, since the capacity is only 520 MW. But there are already ambiguities and we will accept the beginning of the dance. At 47 s already an explosion. So, in four seconds from the balcony at the 50th mark, you can’t get out of the central alla under any extreme situation. There is no spiral staircase there, the author confused the first with the second. When, while still in jail, I read the story, I wrote several letters to eyewitnesses to clarify. Sasha Yuvchenko, senior mechanical engineer (SIM) of the reactor shop, wrote about this:

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"From the beginning of the shift and almost until the explosion, We were together with V. I. Perevozchenko. First in MCR-3, then the Riders of the third block, and then from me to You. And there was going to go to Hodemchuk for IV unit (room 435). But he suddenly got an emergency call MCR-IV and he left saying that I was waiting for him on the spot and one didn't. And after his departure (through 1...2 min) the first blow was heard, followed by an explosion. So he could not have time to visit the hall and observe what G. Medvedev describes. He never talked about it." I also confirm: Perevozchenko, right before the start of the run-out, came to the fourth block control room. No one heard such a story from Perevozchenko. Maybe Mr. Medvedev via the Holy spirit gives "documentary?". “Thus, according to the machine, in the upper third of the core there appeared a flattened ball of a region of high energy release with a diameter of about seven meters and a height of up to three meters, exactly in this part of the core (its weight is about fifty tons) and there was primarily

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acceleration to instant neutrons, it was here that the heat transfer crisis occurred, the destruction, fusion, and then the evaporation of nuclear fuel occurred. It was this part of the core that was thrown by the explosion of the explosive mixture into the atmosphere to a great height. ” A machine almost always, unlike people, must be trusted; it is not subject to market considerations. But the destruction nevertheless began from the bottom of the core, this is a universally recognized fact. After the rods begin to move into the active zone, absorbers enter the upper part and reduce the neutron field; in the lower part of the zone, water columns in the channels of the CPS are replaced by displacers, weaker than water absorbing neutrons; positive reactivity is introduced and it was in the lower part that a rapid increase in power began, where the zone first of all collapsed. Surprisingly, people were emboldened, irresponsible statements on issues in which “no ear, no snout” go sideby-side. Until a reliable picture of a reactor explosion has been created, it is possible to talk about the amount of fuel emitted only by monitoring the pollution of the territory and by measuring the inside of the unit.

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And, of course, with the freedom of science from the ideological press. In any case, references to the story of G. Medvedev by the number of discarded products that have already appeared in print are illegal. The author has clearly distorted ideas about the explosion picture, and from the wrong assumptions, you understand, you cannot draw the right conclusions. Now about Dyatlov's actions, i.e. mine, on April 26 and not only. It does not matter that Medvedev thought I was cross-eyed and crooked-legged. Maybe it really is. We're the ones who look beautiful. And if you could look at yourself from the outside, then... Well, this is not the case. Who am I and how did I get to the position of deputy chief operating engineer? After technical school, he worked at a factory for three years. Although the diploma was with honors and could enter the institute without working out, but I decided to fix it with practice. Then, after graduating from the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute in 1959, he was sent to the Far East. Soon they were appointed head of the physical laboratory.

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Little work seemed, little money. Family, two children. There was energy, knowledge, good faith and a desire to work. He asked to be sent to a training center, where he trained as the operator of the Main Power Plant of Nuclear Submarines. Remaining the head of the laboratory, he also worked in the delivery team on running (i.e., at sea) tests. Then all the operators were transferred to my subordination. Payment suited, work too. It just seems that the pieces of iron are all the same. But in fact, each boat, even one project, has its own characteristics. It worked fine, relations with subordinates and superiors are normal. I did not use love with my superiors because of obstinacy, but as an employee I was respected. I did not seek love from either subordinates or superiors. I consider it sufficient for normal production relations to be competent and fair. In any case, during the work, none of the subordinates left because of the inability to work with me. It can be harsh, but no more. Was demanding, yes. It’s hard for me to judge how I was the boss, if I knew the art of communication. Still, I think I was not the worst. When I quit the factory and entered the Chernobyl station, several people, who were my subordinates, also came to my station under my command. And I did not call any of them.

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Of course, when they arrived, I, knowing their qualities as workers, recommended that the director accept them. Of course, far from the idea that they came because of the desire to work in my submission. No, they wanted to leave Komsomolsk and were not afraid that I would be their head again. And do not speak about them with the arrogant neglect of "friends-comrades." All of them: A.A. Sitnikov, V. A. Chugunov, V. A. Orlov, V. V. Grishchenko, A. V. Kryat showed themselves to be good workers at the station. And why should I bury Glory to Orlov ahead of time, citizen Medvedev? I saw him yesterday. And he came to Poltava to pick me up after being released from jail. The time will come - we will die. Slava Orlov, Tolya Kryat, Valera Lomakin three times came to me in Poltava in a penal colony for a date. Thank you so much. This can not be appreciated. You have to be there to understand the meaning. How did I relate to people? As someone deserved it, so it was. Moreover, in production, only the quality of the employee mattered to me. I was aware that it was impossible to get more than 200 people who were pleasant in every way. There was no one to whom I would give indulgences, nor those to whom I would be meticulously treated.

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When disaster struck, the investigation stubbornly created an opinion of the guilt of the staff and especially Dyatlov. Nevertheless, I could not get evidence discrediting me, except for two authors, whom the court later did not call to court hearings. And from the city of Komsomolsk, where the investigator made the request, all eight evidence are favorable. Thank you, dear colleagues. And not only Dyatlov, but also other senior employees did not seek to create intolerable production relations at the station. Somehow there was no such purpose. During my time at the station twice, I don’t remember which organizations carried out sociopsychological research. And no deviations from the teams of other nuclear power plants were found either in the psychological qualities of the operators or in social relations. And this is not at all the cause of the accident on April 26th. It would have worked in the city of Komsomolsk, but there is, apparently, a path that was not intended by us. In addition, lengthy business trips, adverse working conditions at sea, when the boat has a naval crew, a delivery team and an acceptance committee, prompted a change of place.

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During the holidays I drove to the city of Pripyat and agreed with the director V.P. Bryukhanov for the position of deputy chief of the reactor department. There was no talk about the position of the head of the workshop, since the head was already there. There was no one in my conversation with Bruchanov, and Medvedev has nothing to do. And in general, he clearly exaggerates his role in manning the station, he quit the station in 1974, and then no money was allocated for recruiting staff. By the way, this is the surest factor by which one can judge whether or not the Ministry believes in the scheduled launch date of the block. No money has been allocated for recruitment, and there is no launch. Perhaps Medvedev also talked with V.P. Bryukhanov about people, but this is a matter of principle, and there could be no talk of specific individuals then. He arrived at the station after receiving a call in September 1973 after 14 years of work at the plant. Of course, boat reactors are not the same in design, and much smaller in size. But these are not toys, but real energy reactors. At the Chernobyl station he worked as deputy, then head of the reactor department and since February 1983, deputy chief engineer for the second stage. So I had experience in reactors.

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And the accusations against Dyatlov put forward by Medvedev have no basis. “So, was Dyatlov capable of an instantly and only correct assessment of the situation at the time of its transition to the accident? I think no. Moreover, in him, apparently, the necessary caution and sense of danger, so needed by the head of atomic operators, were not sufficiently developed. But there is more than enough disrespect for operators and technological regulations ... It was these qualities that developed in Dyatlov at full strength, when Leonid Toptunov was unable to keep the reactor at 1,500 MW and shut it down to 30 MW of thermal power when the local automatic control system of SIUR was turned off ”( pg. 24, 25). Although presumably, Medvedev denies Dyatlov the ability to assess the situation. On what basis? And not on any. In operational work, he did not see me. And on April 26, no dramatic decisions needed to be made. We acted according to operational documents operating at that time. The tragedy is that the disaster occurred in the most mundane environment.

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Our actions should be evaluated according to the provisions existing on April 26, and not from the bell tower of the present. I couldn’t think of such an absurdity that I shouldn’t throw the A3, I already spoke about this. And there was no printout of the position of the rods at 01 h 22 min 30 s, which Medvedev is talking about on page 31, he also said earlier. Those who worked with me say something else - be careful. Disrespect for technological regulations ... more than enough? Where did Medvedev come from? The indictment was also. But I myself did not perform any operations, I did everything through the shift supervisors of the blocks or the station. Therefore, he could not hide anything. In court, I specifically asked witnesses these questions - everyone answered negatively. In the end, the judge said that I was asking strange questions, not for violations, I was at the station. This was not in the preliminary testimony. This was not even on April 26th. So, both the prosecutor and the homegrown prosecutor G. Medvedev are wrong. There is more than enough disrespect for operators! On what basis is such a statement?

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Specially to G. Medvedev I will explain. There is no violation in raising the power of the reactor after the failure of L.Toptunov. According to clause 6.7. Typical Regulation failure to such a power is a partial unloading of the unit, and for the subsequent rise does not require a minimum margin of reactivity of 30 rods, as is necessary for a short stop. It is enough to have a stock of 15 rods. And it was. Since at 24 hours at a power of 760 MW, the supply was 24 rods and could not decrease due to poisoning in half an hour (failure at 00 h 28 min). And the power effect was negative for us. And a reproachful exclamation: “Eh, Dyatlov, you don’t know how quickly the reactor is poisoned,” - to anything. Dyatlov have long and firmly mastered this. And although, when I arrived at the control room, the operators had already raised the capacity, allowed or would have ordered it if I had been present at the failure. All according to the Regulations. And I did not express any discontent to anyone, and there were no reasons. I do not know the operators who, for one reason or another, did not reduce power. L.Toptunov is a young operator, so I would not have reproached him even with an error. Then, during the analysis, of course, he would have indicated errors, but only then.

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For a long time working with reactor operators (yes this applies to all remote controllers) he firmly adopted the rule: the operator at the console has no reprimands, no reproaches. He is already experiencing the incident, and who are indifferent to this - did not hold. Not a single remote control at the station can say that I scolded him at the remote control. It is more expensive to itself in this state it will make even more mistakes. However, I can’t recall, and I have a good memory, so that in the last three years I will scold one of the remote controllers even after. Immediately after the shift, a short meeting where the participants give explanatory notes and share their observations. Often no conclusions can be drawn from this. Only after analyzing the readings of the instruments and the control system do you come to the final conclusion. Passion will settle down. The punishment, of course, followed, if mistakes were made, in the form of a reduction in premiums of 20 ... 30, rarely 50%. But if a person is even a little able to be critical of himself, then what kind of grievances are there. For all the time I worked at the station, I did not put off a single operator during the shift. Why would I suddenly want to remove it on April 26: the dispatcher’s permission to stop was there, almost all the work has been done.

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We didn’t carry out an experiment, so we would carry it out after repair, it wouldn’t bind us in any way, since the system was put into operation after the completion of the coasting block in the generator excitation system and its idling tests. And when necessary, for example, I saw that the operator was demoralized by the power failure that had occurred, then I would definitely dismiss it without any threats. Moreover, it was replaced by someone. Did Dyatlov run around the premises and lose precious time? Dyatlov ran ... in the forest, but this has no relationship. And at the control room no one has ever seen me running. Why would it suddenly run on April 26? Such idiotic behavior of a senior technical person at the control room, as described by Medvedev, in itself can lead to an accident. But there was nothing of the kind. On April 26, 1986, I only spoke loudly twice: the first was the command “all to the backup control panel” and the second, when AF Kabanov began to say that the vibration laboratory remained in the shop, I ordered to leave the block immediately. All this after the accident. G. Medvedev writes in the story about the operators from the previous shift, Y. Tregube and S. Gazine, who remained to see. This is what they wrote in response to my questions.

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Y. Tregub. Before the accident, there was no talk of elevated tones with the faces of operational personnel, nor was there any dissatisfaction with the lack of power. Attempts to eliminate L.Toptunov’s management also did not occur, and he performed his duties throughout the entire shift. After a power failure, the AWP was turned on, and, on the command of the NSB A. Akimov, as I believe, agreed with you and the NSS, the upgrade to 200 MW was started. Nothing that could be regarded as a disagreement about the increase in power, while I did not notice (06/07/1990). S.Gazin. Before the accident, I did not hear the words spoken in a raised tone, but only instructions regarding the conduct of an experiment on the program. During a power failure, I approached the SIUR control panel, saw that, as far as I could understand, hard work was going on to raise and stabilize the reactor power by Toptunov. I didn’t see anything like attempts to remove or replace L.Toptunov, as well as pressure from you on A. Akimov and L.Toptunov, who allegedly refused to raise power after the failure, and the discontent caused by this failure. I believe that such a conflict situation at the control room could not be unnoticed (06/07/1990).

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There were some conversations regarding the removal of L.Toptunov. Apparently, they arose after I told Akimov to send him and Kirshenbaum to the third block due to the futility of their stay at BShU-4 and the dangerous radiation situation. It was about an hour after the accident. Another point needs clarification, since it is associated with the unjustified exposure of several people - this is Medvedev’s claim that the version about the integrity of the reactor after the explosion went for a walk from Dyatlov’s presentation. And how does he know everything? I didn’t tell anyone about this, including him. Perevozchenko didn’t tell anyone about the wild dance, but Medvedev knows. Nobody knows about the removal of L.Toptunov, but Medvedev knows. Nobody knows that L.Toptunov and A. Akimov resisted the rise in power, and Medvedev knows. Medvedev, it turns out, knows both what was and what was not. True, he writes mainly about what was not. Such a "documentary". As it was, I described. V.P. Bryukhanov did not ask me either by phone or in the bunker when I arrived there. On April 26, I did not speak with N.M. Fomin at all. If I thought that the reactor was intact, then, of course, I would try to organize the supply of water.

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I dare to assure you, I knew the block well, and nobody at the station knew the reactor shop better than I did. With a shortage of people, I would ask Bruchanov, but we did not do anything for this, which clearly says how I thought about the reactor. And the statement of G. Medvedev that L. Toptunov and A. Akimov behaved courageously, but to no avail, is immoral. Yes, Leonid Toptunov really couldn’t do anything by his post. But his behavior, when he himself returned to the block, showed a model of fidelity to the cause. And all the work to turn off the mechanisms, deenergize, drain turbine oil, displace hydrogen from generators, i.e. to prevent the occurrence of new fires, conducted under the direct supervision of Alexander Akimov. Nothing else useful could be done in that setting. And what has been done is a lot and is necessary. Alexander Akimov was a good, extremely conscientious employee. And he died worthily of Man. We examined the technical part of the story of G. Medvedev. Pay attention to the first quotations that I quoted and the pages of the journal at the end of quotations. And you will see that virtually everything is wrong. The rest of the words are between quotes for a bunch. Then I did not take in a row, but believe or check, and then everything is wrong. Contract!

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As for the other part of the story, I can’t say how documentary it is, despite the names indicated by the author. I spoke with one of those with whom Medvedev spoke, in 1990. Viktor Smagin said that Medvedev had distorted his words. According to V. Smagin, L. Akimova said the same thing. And it’s hard to imagine that the author will jump from his favorite skate. A naturalistic picture of eating a dog by pigs is, in principle, possible, but it is hard to imagine observing this by the author who appeared for five minutes in the city. It remains only to assume that the pigs were specially waiting for the appearance of G. Medvedev and postponed the meal. I myself and my existence refute the message of G. Medvedev about a dose in the region of the 4th block equal to 15 ~ 20 thousand Rem. I twice walked around the territory of the block, I spent probably 20 ~ 30 minutes and how many was in different places. I was given a dose of 550 rem. More and no - I would not live. In general, the author’s love for whip, hyperbole is noticeable. Tole Sitnikov is determined by a dose of 2,000 rem, as if death from 500 ~ 600 rem is not a tragedy. Now let's take a look at the entire Chernobyl Notebook. What did the author say in it? All the same as the commissions - the operational personnel and its head Dyatlov are guilty of the explosion.

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Do not agree? Well, yes, he talks about the shortcomings of the reactor. But it is, for averting eyes. Now is it possible to protect the RBMK reactor and its creators without recognizing something at the reactor. However, the author of the story is so twisted that the operational staff is still guilty. Dyatlov is even guilty of not knowing the danger of dropping the A3. Not a single commission, not even the prosecutor, blames this, understanding the absurdity, and G. Medvedev considers it his own way. It turns out that you can think like that. Well, we already talked about Dyatlov, that's enough. The reactor operator L.Toptunov is young, he’s still, you see, “the canons of operating the reactors haven’t entered the flesh and blood," and therefore … And why? What, what violations did L.Toptunov commit? Not according to Medvedev. Actually. Failed power? So this happened due to a faulty regulator to which he switched. Even if they were of low qualification or even of trivial rotational action. A lawsuit to reduce the power of the operator to initiate? And after all excited. Raised the power of the reactor after a failure according to the Regulations, not contrary. Viewed reactivity margin? Probably. So was he provided, according to the law, with the necessary means to monitor the parameter?

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Not. I’m not talking about the absence of A3 according to the law. The device for measuring the parameter is completely unsuitable in the transient process, which was on April 26, as in many other normal regulatory processes. So here. This is by law. I’m not talking about human concepts - they are alien to Medvedev. Let me remind others. The operator performs more than a thousand manipulations per hour while controlling the reactor and has more than 4,000 parameters under control. And to blame him for viewing a parameter that has neither a measuring device nor an alarm? Akimov Alexander - did not work in reactors, you see. He worked, although not for long, in preparation for the post. And yet, already being the shift supervisor, shortly before the accident. There was an opportunity and I gave him a month to work. And what did he break? He deduced the protection, and changed the setting for another - according to the operational documents. “The character was not enough. Reluctantly obeyed. " Nobody pressed him, and he did not break anything. See how G. Medvedev prints:

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“The total water flow through the reactor increased to 60 thousand m3 / h at a rate of 45 thousand, which is a gross violation of the operating regulations.” Everything is clear in numbers, with reference to the Rules. And all the bluffs: • Not 60 thousand, but 56, not more; • Not 45 thousand, but 48; • At the time of pressing the button, it was 48 thousand; • Not only in the Regulations, but also in no other document there is even a hint of limiting the flow of coolant to the maximum. Why, at whose request the Professor Grigory Medvedev to the whole lies in the operations staff adds another of our own? And the quintessence of the story is in the following sentence: “Nevertheless, in fairness it must be said that the death sentence was predetermined to some extent by the very design of RBMK. It was only necessary to ensure a combination of circumstances in which an explosion was possible. And it was done ”(emphasized by me – A.D).

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I have already said that it is impossible to protect the reactor and its creators without recognizing “shortcomings” behind it. • "Justice" is camouflage. There is no justice in this statement. • Let's look "to some extent" carefully. To some extent, everyone recognizes, except for Academician A.P. Aleksandrov. Well, three times you can Hero. The first one. The RBMK-86 rector did not meet the requirements of thirty-two points of regulatory documents, of which fifteen, as indicated in the report of the commission of N.A. Steinberg, were directly related to the accident on April 26. There are no redundant requirements in regulatory documents, as the implementation of each of them can cost a lot of money. But then the fulfillment of each requirement is mandatory. Fifteen were not executed here. The second one. Due to the positive power factor, the reactor was dynamically unstable, and because of the defective design of the rods, CPS A3 introduced positive reactivity. Nothing more is needed for the explosion. That is why it exploded on April 26th. And if it is "to some extent," how will it be entirely?

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But to blame the personnel for the explosion of the reactor is even "somewhat" unfair. Our actions were in accordance with the operational documentation, the only possible violation in viewing the reactivity margin is a consequence of a violation of the ABY in terms of equipping the reactor with automation, alarm and instruments. That reactor did not require any combination of circumstances to explode. It exploded in a number of situations. It’s not fashionable for us to not criticize those in power. But G. Medvedev somehow turns out that all criticism is parried off elementarily. This happened with the criticism of departments on agreeing on a coasting program - they will absolutely truthfully say that they have not seen this program. This happened with the amount of fission products thrown out of the reactor - the evidence report now with tens of thousands of measurements, of course, will draw speculative conclusions. This happened with the statement that B.E. Scherbina and Y.A. Israel stated at a press conference on May 6, 1986: radioactivity in the area of the fourth power unit is only 25 mR / h. They said different.

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There is reason to criticize Shcherbin, Israel, and the department for what it is, justified, but G. Medvedev was not going to do this at all. Yes, this is also evident from his position in life. Throughout the story, his involvement with the powers that be is visible. Look, he is with the generals, ministers, he is instructing everything. And couriers, couriers, couriers! Actually not so, well, yes, the desire is painfully strong to belong to the host of greats. Going beyond the circle is fraught with uncertainty, to say the least. It's all right. Supported, and with brute force, the government version. Loyal person. It is not clear what B.Kurkin had in mind when he said that the author needed courage to publish the Chernobyl Notebook. What courage is needed here? He added slander to the dead and those in custody. Brave man! And then whom to call a boor? Slanderer? Regarding the introduction by Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov to the Chernobyl Notebook, I can only say bitterly: apparently, a decent person will never learn to recognize the manysided villainy. Y.N. Shcherbak

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The Story "Chernobyl" Everything is simpler here. The story "Chernobyl" is clearly not drawn to the "outstanding" work like "Chernobyl notebook". For some reason, Yuri Nikolayevich Shcherbak tied himself with a promise: "I can not afford a single inaccurate word (however, this also did not fit the novelists), I have no right to speculation and conjecture." With such an installation, nothing good will come of it. Here is G. Medvedev: he takes the numbers ... from the lantern, refers to the Regulations .., which he did not see in his eyes, and it turns out documentary, convincing. And yet, in the story of Y.N. Shcherbak, not everything is accurate. Not because he invents or distorts the statements of the respondents, these statements themselves are incorrect, do not reflect the truth of the case and are illogical. I will only make a few comments on the technical side of the disaster. First of all, according to the statement that the accident could have occurred in the shift of I. Kazachkov (from 08 a.m. to 4 p.m. April 25), in the shift of Y. Tregub (from 16 to 24 a.m. on April 25), but the experiment was postponed for a night shift. Thus, the author connects the accident with the experiment on TG run-out.

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There is no such connection. An accident occurred during the experiment, but it could just as well have occurred during any other operation and, first of all, when the unit was stopped, when the reactor is in the stationary overload condition of the fuel cartridges. A. Uskov, of course, is right that if this experiment had been carried out during the start-up of the unit, then there would have been no accident. A. Uskov only forgets that in the first months after the start-up of the unit, such an accident could not have happened at all. The reactor is completely different! When there are more than two hundred DP in the reactor, its steam reactivity effect is negative, and these DPs to a large extent compensate for the end effect of the CPS rods. The presence of a large number of absorbers in the lower part of the core smoothed the effect of replacing water columns with displacers in the channels of the CPS. Namely, because of these reactivity effects, the reactor exploded, and it does not matter what kind of work was done. The statement of I. Kazachkov is completely incomprehensible: “To the head of the block change - i.e. to myself - I would give eight years. And if this happened on my shift, I would understand that this is fair. ”

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Well, his "i.e. to myself ”- a clean chatter. In fact, to A. Akimov. In court, I. Kazachkov said quite rightly that if modernization was not carried out on the third block, he would refuse to work on it. His own words: "That start will be without me." That is, a person understands that it is impossible to work at the reactor, which he was before the accident. Now that he has learned what kind of monster he was, he admits that this could happen in his shift. That is, regardless of the operator: Akimov, Kazachkov, Tregub ... That is, it means that the disaster occurred due to the reactor, its properties, and not the properties of the operator. Nevertheless, he would have given Akimov eight years. And I would consider fair. I refuse to understand! By lifting power after a failure. After the testimony of G.P. Metlenko in court, I am clearly convinced that I was not on the shield at the very failure, I went in a little later. And then I already began to doubt whether I remember exactly when I read the testimonies of the guys where they say that I was. I do not need to deny my presence - I still bear responsibility for the actions of the staff, whether or not. I or Sasha Akimov gave an order to increase the power - there is no violation. When I asked Akimov what power had decreased, he called 30 MW, and allowed to go further.

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I had no reason not to believe Akimov, he was a competent specialist and an honest person. After the investigation, the Meshkov commission named the same power of 30 ... 40 MW, and there were enough "well-wishers" there and they would not have failed to seize themselves in case of failure to zero, the Shasharin commission and, finally, the government. And only the forensic-technical commission, where there were no workers at the reactor, absolutely unreasonably speaks of failure to zero. After analyzing the power diagrams, I am convinced that it was at least 30 MW. And this is a "partial reduction in power" according to the Regulation. And there is no violation in the rise of power. And the reactivity margin at that time could not be less than 15 rods. At 24 o’clock he was 24 rod, there is a journal entry. Take the toughest option - the power jumped from 50% to 0 failed. In half an hour, poisoning does not amount to 9 rods - look at the poisoning curve. The power factor, of course, be considered negative, so it was given to us. So why should Akimov or Dyatlov be "severely punished"? They acted according to operational documents. I. Kazachkov had to think before saying: “But they wanted to bring the trials to the end.”

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It was in his shift in 1985 that A3 fell when the unit was scheduled to stop due to improper operation of the devices. At the very first point of the program of work, scheduled for shutdown. There was no reactivity margin of 55 rods, and Dyatlov gave the order to dampen the block without doing anything. Here, almost everything was done, but for some reason Dyatlov is in violation. Some kind of stereotype is working. When questions are asked in an unusual situation or on an extraordinary occasion-a person is like a bull on a rope, instead of saying: "Sorry, the question is incorrect." And Arkady Uskov is tormented if he succumbed to the pressure of the boss or did not succumb. I decided to give in. Yes, there was no pressure, as there were no violations. Gentlemen, when will we start to think? A. Uskov was offended when I expressed all this to him at a meeting. And what is offended? This is the meanest kind of accusation, when it seems to sympathize with the staff and sincerely tries to understand why he committed violations, and as if justifies it. People get the impression - if a person friendly to the staff admits that there were violations, then they were.

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To this case, as best as possible, fits: Deliver me, God, from such friends, and from enemies I myself will get rid. Statements by V.A. Zhiltsov I will not comment. To a large extent has already been said. Only one: “Moreover, that rare situation arose when the A3 system served as a starting impetus for the acceleration of the reactor. If A3 were normal, the reactor would never have accelerated, no matter what mistakes SIUR L.I.Toptunov made. For the brake pedal should slow down, and not accelerate the car. " According to this statement of a person who “devoted his whole life to nuclear energy”, questions arise: • It is not clear to V.A.Zhiltsov, which is rare, and not rare, but should the A3 never act as an overclocking device? • V.A. Zhiltsov admits the defense is abnormal, but blames the staff? • V.A.Zhiltsov is driving a car, sees a man coming out onto the road, slows down. The car accelerates instead of stopping and crushing a person. Will V.A. Zhiltsov consider himself guilty?

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Of course, he will not consider himself guilty, the staff – yes. I wonder right away how gentlemen, scientists and unlearned scientists admit that emergency protection blew up the reactor (!!!), and, in spite of everything, they continue to seek out the sins of personnel. Savagery. Absurd.

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Chapter 10

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About Operator Freedom The accepted idea of operator freedom in decisionmaking, expressed by I. Kazachkov and A. Uskov in the story of Y. Scherbak “Chernobyl”, in my opinion, is unlawful when applied to the Chernobyl collective and certainly does not relate to the accident on April 26 . Freedom of decision-making, regardless of any incident, other than technical considerations, is needed not only by the operator, but by everyone. But complete freedom does not and cannot be. In any system, in any production relationship. I am talking only about wage earners, to whom I include everyone in Soviet state enterprises. In my opinion, for the vast majority of workers, this freedom was enough for us because in the event of conflict and the inability to work here, one could always find another job with such a salary, with little to no loss, only in the first time. Of course, if you are a skilled worker. Under any system, you can't expect your boss to RUB your hair and say, " what a good guy, he's barking at me." But if you stick to two basic rules: • Do not "climb into the bubble" on trifles • Still be right, objecting, the boss will boil and move away.

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He, the boss, in the posts on which production depends, first of all needs knowledgeable, and only then flexible ones. True, we have many worthless posts, here you can first of all be flexible. It seems to me that the so-called psychological climate at the station was quite acceptable. The main merit in this, in my opinion, is the director V.P. Bryukhanov. Man by nature is not tough, restrained, did not make hasty conclusions. Of course, everything happened, especially in a nervous, extremely tense, with a lot of questions arising questions during the construction and installation of blocks. But all this was confined to the heads of the shops and deputies. In order to have external freedom, one must have internal freedom, self-esteem. I could object, and actually did, to anyone at the station. The chief engineer V.P. Akinfiev is not a mean person, but he had an amazing ability to offend a person out of the blue. On the first block, elements of the pipeline were mounted in the SAOR system - squares manufactured by the Bagley plant of the Ministry of Energy. They were manufactured according to the required standard, but the plant had permission to produce elements for pressure only up to 22 atm.

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Then I worked as deputy chief of the reactor department. I went to the factory, which has the right to manufacture elements, since it was already at it earlier after the conclusion of the contract for the supply of pipelines. I arrived at the factory, they say no, because your installers have already arrived. To establish a “contact” through a restaurant, I had to spend the money taken to buy a suit. Agreed, ordered in excess, still on another block used. Three days later, Akinfiev comes in and asks: “Not yet made?” I say no. • What did you say they'd do? • Chief, are you "crazy"? During this time, it is impossible to do. Although simple documentation, but it must be passed through the design, technological, production departments. Rude reproach, I said too rude. We had a good conversation later. They sent each other in three letters and "not on BAM, but on the old road." Another case. On the third block, membranes with a diameter of 600 mm were needed, and in the country, stainless tape is rolled no wider than 400 mm.

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It is necessary to weld. Installers are not taken, thin. Established contact with the Institute of Welding in Kiev. I tell Akinfiev that I need a day to travel to Kiev. Go, but without a chatter (!?) Of course, it blew me up. It would be necessary to spit, not my duty. Yes, there’s nowhere to go - we still have demand from the shop manager. I went and looked at welded samples, brought a labor agreement for 150 membranes at three rubles apiece. On the fourth block did not engage. Someone agreed with VNIIAES, they started up on new equipment and the station cost forty-six thousand rubles. But on the "new technology" received a prize. Well, this restored my spending on gas: I drove my car to Kiev. In various similar cases, and there were many of them, I never wondered what I would have to endure for this. And with the deputy chief engineer Y.A. Kamenev, he swore to death three times. I don’t know how Y.A. Kamenev, he’s a hot-tempered man, but quick-witted, and V.P. Akinfiev, I am sure, went to V.P. Bryukhanov with a corresponding view of me. But nothing. Although sometimes he felt slanting glances. But it didn’t bother me much.

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I always thought: serve the cause, not the person. Only thing not fooled. Truth, and in this one times doubted. In November 1986, after discharge from the hospital came to Kiev. In the new apartment books were piled, and began to go through. And such anger took that all the technical literature was thrown away. Twentiethcentury Luddite... Those machines were smashed, and I attacked the books. Intelligently. Yes if all correctly to do, so bored. Of course, I didn't mindlessly object to the authorities. There were escape routes. First, thought (so far as is reasonably...) that with their knowledge and attitude to work always find it. Secondly, the salary was always given to his wife, and she spent it on her own. But still in Komsomolsk-on-Amur I told that three thousand always were. Then it was still enough to move in case of need. It was in these two conditions that my freedom was. It is necessary to be ready to any reaction of the chief, up to dismissal. About any freedom can not be out of the question, if you're always going to weigh on pharmaceutical scales of consequences of their objections: seven Rublev prize will give less, the permit in sanatorium clamp…

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But this is generally, and in particular at the Chernobyl station, I do not know a single case of the dismissal of the operator, except for the absolutely indisputable omissions in the work. Yes, and these can be counted on the fingers of one hand. By operators I mean everyone, starting with the shift supervisor. Specifically, on April 26, 1986, I.Kazachkov and A.Uskov are completely in vain tormented if they could or could not violate the instructions. There were no violations! And we didn’t see the decrease in reactivity margin, “thanks” to the designers, on April 26, so no one was tormented either by Akimov, Toptunov or Dyatlov. I simply did not expect it until 1 h 30 min. And there wouldn’t be it at a negative power factor, as follows from the design documents and the measurement of the Station Department of Nuclear Safety. How did we know that "everyone lies calendars"? And all the same-thoughtlessness, when it does not directly concern you. Well, Uskov not the operator, although the position of the user and he should know. And the answer Kazachkova on the question of the author of the novel Y. N. Scherbak is incomprehensible: • Is power lifting the most fatal decision? • Yes, it was a fateful decision ...

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And further he says that if he did, he would understand and acknowledge the lawfulness of the punishment. And Kazachkov would have done, without a moment's doubt, and would not have violated anything neither the Regulations, nor the instructions. What is the basis of the accusation? On accident knowledge? So from them it is also clear that neither a power failure, nor a subsequent rise at the reactor, made in accordance with the requirements of ABY and OPB, would have no negative consequences. We hired to work on a normal reactor. Here it is, blindness of thinking. What does the freedom of the operator have to do with it - economic or any other? Who is pushing you here? Freedom cannot be understood as freedom from responsibility, from conscience. When you talk about specific people, then base your statements on a clear knowledge of the circumstances. Otherwise, you can only make assumptions, but say so. Of course, it is not enough for the writer to remain within the framework of real events, and now the outbreak of fantasy is piling into a "documentary" story of "detail", which was not even mentioned. And G. Medvedev forgot that, speaking of really existing people, it is necessary to observe at least elementary decency.

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Introduces Conflict: How is it a Conflict-Free Tragedy? But the liveliness of presentation appears and gives critics food for thought. You learn about yourself and others from these works and what happened, and what did not. Maybe from the point of view of professional and critical analysis of the Chernobyl Notebook by I. Borisova (October 10, 1990), it’s good, but it only relates to reality in the same way as the story itself. Let's see what I. Borisova writes, and compare with reality: “But while an order pushed him (Dyatlov — AD), he acted within its framework and pushed others as they pushed him, transmitting, transporting this pressure. Before the explosion, Dyatlov demanded to continue the experiment with the coast of the TG, regardless of the emergency reality. After the explosion, he fabricated a lie that the reactor was supposedly intact, because they expected this lie from him. ” “In the Chronicle, Dyatlov is being crushed, and Dyatlov is crushing. The pressure system is fanned out. Crushing Dyatlov, crushing Fomin,

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crushing Bruchanov, crushing Shcherbin ... The Chronicle captures the "physiology" of pressure, its processes and reactions, accessible to observation and recording. And those who press, and those who are pressured, they ultimately are not divorced from the camps. ” No, Dear I. Borisova, they were just divorced into the camps: Bruchanov, Fomin, Dyatlov and Akimov, Toptunov, Perevozchenko, too, but the actual culprits of the tragedy, who are hiding, including for works like “Chernobyl notebooks, ”they are grinning at large. Of course, you are talking about other camps, but these words of mine should not be taken as a joke. About pressure favorably painted by G. Medvedev and picked up by a critic. Nobody pressed me visibly or invisibly. Not one of those who succumb to pressure. And I didn’t press anyone. Neither April 26, nor earlier. There were no words in my vocabulary - do as I said - and the like. Persuasion with reference to instructions and technical information - yes, but not a bare order. Perhaps, on my part, there was involuntary pressure on the staff because of the broader (as Y. Tregub and I. Kazachkov put it - a cut above that of others) knowledge. Well, so I didn’t pretend to be a fool.

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And on April 26 I did not convince anyone, since not a single person had any protests. And there’s nothing to be with them. If G. Medvedev makes his lie about the lies of official commissions, then the critic naturally builds up the third floor of a lie. "Before the explosion, Dyatlov demanded to continue the experiment with the coast of the TG, regardless of the emergency reality." Back in May 1986, the commission of G.A.Shasharin established that at the time of pressing the A3 button there are no warning or alarm signals. In January 1991, the same was confirmed by the commission of N.A. Steinberg. Other commissions, for obvious reasons, do not focus attention on this, but they do not call and cannot name any signals about “emergency reality”. So on what basis would someone protest, and would Dyatlov need to press? The third floor also includes "After the explosion, he fabricated a lie that the reactor was supposedly intact, because they expected this lie from him."

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We leave to the conscience of the author of the story and criticism that someone was waiting for this lie. They say that a goose during molting, when it cannot fly, in danger hides its head in a bump - he does not see, which means they do not see him either. Well, you do not respect the people you write about, but why compare them to geese. It’s probably my fault that in that whirlwind I didn’t explain to anyone that the reactor had died and it was not necessary to cool it. He didn’t even explain anything to Sasha Akimov. After the first detour of the block, I realized all the uselessness and simply told Akimov to stop the pumps that were started immediately after the explosion by my own order. He considered Sasha to be a competent engineer, and he understood my order to stop the pumps. Yes, I think he understood, and his participation in the water supply to the reactor is explained by the desire to do something at least. As I already wrote, we didn’t have a conversation with V.P. Bryukhanov on this topic, I didn’t see N.M. Fomin on April 26 I didn’t even talk on the phone. By the way, Fomin did not forbid stopping the third block even to Yu. Baghdasarov, and in general no one forbade after my order.

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According to the scheme, writers think - in every play there should be heroes and scoundrels. In the Chernobyl tragedy, there were no scoundrels among the protagonists. They stayed behind the scenes.

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Chapter 11

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Court The court is like a court. Normal Soviet. Everything was predetermined in advance. After two meetings in June 1986, the MVTS under the chairmanship of Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, dominated by employees of the Ministry of Secondary Engineering - the authors of the reactor design, an unambiguous version was announced about the guilt of the operating personnel. Other considerations, and they were then, were discarded as unnecessary. The subsequent decision of the Politburo actually duplicated the conclusion of the MVTS, although it noted the shortcomings of the reactor. After such a decision, the Politburo must be completely naive in order to hope for a favorable outcome. For our people's (?) Court in 1987, the decision of the Politburo was quite enough to convict Jesus Christ himself for the atheism. And for an ordinary person there will always be sins. They are jurisdictional or not - what does it matter. If there was a man, an article would be found. This cynical expression went for a walk around the country with the filing of the NKVD and our, so to speak, law enforcement agencies. And this expression, by no means, is a tribute to eloquence, but a clear reflection of the actual essence of the matter.

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Here, by the way, mention the article. They convicted me under Article 220 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for the improper operation of explosive enterprises. Nuclear power plants do not appear in the list of explosive enterprises in the USSR. The forensic technical commission retrospectively assigned the nuclear power plant to potentially explosive enterprises. This was enough for the court to apply the article. This is not the place to disassemble or not to explode nuclear power plants, install retroactively and apply the article of the Criminal Code is clearly illegal. Who will point to the Supreme Court? There was someone, he acted on their orders. Anything will be explosive if you do not follow the design rules. And then, what does it mean potentially explosive? So Soviet TVs explode regularly, several dozen people die every year. Where to take them? Who is guilty? A stumbling block for a Soviet court would be a lawsuit for the death of viewers. Indeed, with all the desire, you can’t blame the viewers who were sitting in front of the TV without helmets and body armor. Blame the company? State? Does this mean the state is to blame? Soviet something? The court cannot tolerate such a distortion of principles. A person is guilty before the state - yes. And if not, then no one.

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For seven decades, our courts turned the nut only in one direction. How many recent years have been talking about independence, the independence of the courts, serving the law and only the law. I’m still waiting for a precedent when in court not a person will be guilty, but a state. Only this is unlikely to happen in the coming years. Until mastodons grown on the leaven of Vyshinsky and his ilk become extinct, there will be no changes. When he was in the camp, his wife went to all officials and organizations. Wherever she was! I got with ordeals to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Smolentsev. Here's a conversation with them: • Well, what do you want - others have judged, and I, to release your husband? To be kind? • Well no. In no case do I count on kindness. I rely only on justice. Indeed, it is now known that the reactor was unsuitable for operation. And my husband is innocent of this. • So you, well, want me to plant Alexandrov? So old? A natural continuation would be: Dyatlov are younger, let them sit.

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So the Supreme Judge talks with the wife of the convict, substantiates the justice of the sentence. It’s like having a cup of tea with friends who are extremely indifferent to who is behind bars. *** In the sixth Moscow hospital I stayed for six months and was discharged on November 4, 1986. I was afraid to break Away from the hospital and, not only because my legs had open non-healing wounds, but mainly because my legs seemed to flow through the whole skin in many places for some unknown reason. And as its stop - is unknown. However, the doctors did not know. But still, by the method of samples of different drugs was stopped. What should I do? Usually, after being discharged from the hospital, the Chernobyl victims were sent to a sanatorium for two to three weeks, and I also asked to return to the hospital if something happened. They refused. I understood the reason a little later. It turns out that the investigation has repeatedly solicited my arrest. On the fifth of November my wife and I arrived in Kiev. But the investigation, apparently, something has changed, they have given me a month to live at home. It's good. In a month I learned to walk a little.

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For ten minutes I reduced the travel time around the block. But then they stopped me. December 4, almost four years moved to government housing. There is nothing to describe here, everything is repeatedly described. Your immediate, most memorable impressions are: • The most disenfranchised among the prisoners is the person under investigation. It all depends on the investigator or, at the end of the investigation, on the judge. No rules. And this is transferred all the more difficult because you have not yet been convicted, no one has yet formally stripped of your civil rights. But in fact you are deprived of all rights, you can only ask. After the trial, it is easier both morally and physically. The scope of your duties and, albeit small, rights is stipulated by the internal rules of the colony. And you are not limited to four walls, even though you can walk around the “locale”. Each hut in the area is additionally fenced - this is the “locale". Of course, I had noticed earlier that the leaves on the trees were green, and I was happy about it, especially in the spring. The trial has been held in Chernobyl since early July. Almost a year did not see the greenery. I don’t

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•

•

remember, apparently, it rained and washed the trees. What emerald foliage was on the trees, not a single yellowness. You should go and touch, and here the guard is a step to the left, a step to the right is considered to be an escape ... We do not value the available and, only having lost, we cry. Stages This is a nightmare for me. No, I didn’t have the chance to drive thirty people in a compartment, but fifteen too much, but everyone smokes. And the stages are not long at all: Kiev Poltava, Poltava - Kiev. True, one should not think that Kiev - Poltava is so: they sat in Kiev and arrived in Poltava. In fact, for some reason, they landed in Sumy, although the train went to Kharkov. Then they brought to Kharkov. There are very good transit chambers - and there is no person per square meter. All three of my stages ended in a long illness. And the last one. I was very depressed by the knowledge that I was imprisoned. The fact itself. It can be seen, I'm an old-fashioned person. During the Soviet period, people unlearned to be ashamed of a criminal record. Grabbed and thrown into jail for no reason. About spikelets and the 58th article I will not speak. Here is a

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recent example for you: a war and labor veteran (his own little haty has collapsed) has received an apartment in a block of flats built by the collective farm. As always, after the builders around the house collapse. The veteran put the plot in order, went, gathered a clover seed mitten on the collective farm and sowed the plot. Theft. Court. At the trial, the veteran launched a handful of orders and medals in the judges. And who is he in the minds of people and his own - a criminal or a victim of arbitrariness? And here are extracts from the verdict: “... he stole without the purpose of misappropriation and sale ...”, “... sold 9 bottles of vodka to 15 rubles to unidentified persons, due to which he received illegal income in the amount of 135 rubles ...” . The court does not know to whom, but sold for 15 rubles. And the income is 135 rubles, as if in a store he was given vodka for free. And for three years in prison they added the confiscation of Moskvich as a means of transporting vodka from the store. The state itself created vodka idiocy and sent an army of guardsmen over the people. Well, yes we are off topic.

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*** According to the medical certificate, it was possible to interrogate me no more than two hours a day. In fact, the interrogation and familiarization with the case lasted 6 ~ 8 hours. But this was not pressure from the investigation, I myself wanted to quickly get clarity. I strove for court, and he was put off further and further. December, January and February for me went through interrogations, familiarizing myself with the materials and then interpreting them, and therefore I was not bothered by the contents of the detention center. In the future, it became unclear to me. I did not represent public danger. The investigation ended, and I could not influence the testimonies of witnesses. They even changed the testimony in court, since by July 1987, many had become clear to many the illegality of the staff’s charges. Witnesses knew what measures were being taken to modernize the remaining reactors, comprehended and drew conclusions. The modernization undertaken was inadequate to the announced version of the causes of the accident. I am still convinced that there were no reasons to detain me before the trial.

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Yes, of course, at large I could more clearly understand the causes of the accident. But is this to the detriment of the truth? It was only during the trial that I realized that the judge did not strive for truth in any way. It didn’t need him at all. Judge R.K. Breeze announced that questions of the expert commission should be submitted in writing. With a dim lamp hidden behind a frequent bars, I wrote 24 questions. Most of them were aimed at ascertaining the compliance of the reactor with nuclear safety documents: ABY and OSB. The next day the judge, apparently having consulted with experts, rejected all my questions without motivation. Why? But very simple. Although the open trial took place in a closed zone, there were also operators in the hall to whom the requirements of the ABY and the safety standards were clear, but they were not complied with at the reactor. No, this, I’m sure, would not have affected the decision of the court, but it could have created some inconvenience, maybe a big one. It is much easier to pretend that all the commissions did, that these documents do not exist, that the reactor should or should not answer them - we do not know. The forensic technical expert commission, when asked whether the reactor could be operated, responds by listing what the reactor had, what kind of protection.

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And it turns out a lot and, at first glance, convincing. The RBMK-1000 reactor is a complex device, a multielement CPS, a branched monitoring system. List everything - and the list will look impressive. But the question is different. What the reactor did not have, prescribed by ABY: for example, according to the OZR parameter, the reactor did not have an automatic A3 or even an alarm. And when this parameter is rejected, the reactor exploded when A3 tripped automatically or from the button. So it was on April 26, 1986. It had a RBMK-1000 reactor and what no reactor should have is a positive fast power reactivity coefficient, which made it dynamically unstable. That was what the commission of experts kept silent about, and the court, rejecting my questions, facilitated this. At the first interrogation, I pointed out the groundlessness of the staff’s accusation of violating the Rules for blocking A3. Do you think it influenced? Not at all. The judge at the trial kept soliciting who ordered the withdrawal of the defense. And when Yelshin and other witnesses replied that, in their opinion, according to operational discipline, Akimov couldn’t withdraw the defense himself, the judge concluded - Dyatlov ordered, guilty. But, firstly, since when "in the opinion" has it become evidence?

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Secondly, the judge knew from the case materials that Dyatlov had ordered, whether Akimov himself had withdrawn the defense - there was no violation. And the third. This is enough to accuse Dyatlov, but not enough to conclude that the staff was accustomed to strict discipline. Any testimony of witnesses in favor of the accused in court did not find understanding. There was pressure on witnesses by the prosecutor or judge, or even in tandem. Who endured (G.A.Dik, I.I.Kazachkov), who did not (Y.Y. Tregub) this pressure. Judge - member of the Supreme Court of the USSR, prosecutor - head of the department of the USSR Prosecutor's Office for Supervision of Courts, who could besiege them with excessive zeal? What would seem to be the opinion of G.A. Dick about Dyatlov. But the prosecutor directly threatened to figure out who Dick works with when he expressed a favorable opinion about Dyatlov. And to whom it is not clear that the threat of the prosecutor in the general rank and position is not a harmless joke. Well, the prosecutor is the prosecutor, his zeal can be understood. But how to understand the judge’s behavior? True, A.F. Koni wrote that the prosecutor on the accused should use both negative and positive materials.

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But this is a Tsarist lawyer, in Soviet times he lived a little and did not have time to form, as it should. But the Soviet lawyer Y.N. Shadrin, out of dozens of testimonies of witnesses, chooses one thing - V.I. Fazly questions my production competence. Shadrin exclaims pathetically that the appointment of Dyatlov was a strategic (no more, no less) mistake. Although, from the same testimony, Shadrin, if desired, could extract the exact opposite. There are words in the testimony - the staff was competent, disciplined. For me, this is the highest praise. My main task is to select and train staff. I myself did not carry out operational actions and could be anything. We must pay tribute to the head of the investigation team, Y.A. Potemkin. Of course, he carried out and completed the task of accusing the staff. He wouldn’t do, he would do another. At the same time, in the court case there were materials that were not at all suitable for the prosecution; they might not have been attached to the case. These documents helped me understand the causes of the disaster. And, in fact, since January 1987, my views have not changed in any way, and I have not extracted practically anything new from the subsequent reports. At that time, I was only interested in the causes of the explosion, the first phase of uncontrolled acceleration.

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The second explosion that followed, and its causes, still do not interest me very much. This is important for scientists, and it is important for the operator to prevent the first phase. From materials in the court case and knowledge of the actual circumstances of the accident, I built a picture of the explosion, which most objective researchers now come to. However, I am 100% sure that this picture immediately after the explosion was clearly drawn in the minds of the creators of the reactor - the IAE and NIKIET workers; if they were at least a little conscientious, there would be no fog for five years. If there weren’t the blessings of the luminaries of nuclear energy: A.P. Aleksandrov on the scientific line, A.G. Meshkov on the administrative line, others might not have dared to lie so brazenly. The reports of A.A. Yadrikhinsky, B.G.Dubovsky and the especially detailed report of the commission of the State Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision do not add anything to my understanding, but they are important for another reason: I say not me - a former prisoner, but people whose interest is the same - to find out the truth. What can you expect from me? I must make excuses. And with immediate, pre-stored skepticism, my words are perceived, they do not even think about the meaning of what I said.

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And I couldn’t say anything yet. Complaints (the prisoner doesn’t write letters - complaints) have not been read from the prison. Letters to newspapers, magazines no one printed. The first complaint after the conviction was written in the name of M.S. Gorbachev as Secretary General. Clearly, I did not expect that the letter would reach him, but I did not expect it to be sent from the Central Committee to the Deputy Prosecutor General O.V. Soroka, who also approved the indictment. You can’t imagine any better. The answer, I believe, does not require comment. In fact, from the conclusion you can write as many complaints and petitions as you like without any results. Not recognizing myself and the staff as guilty of the explosion, I wrote, my wife wrote and walked. She could walk unlike me. I just could not put up and spend the rest of my life behind bars. For other people's sins. The examples cited by the press plunged into despondency and gave rise to hope. Like a case with the director of a state farm from the Krasnodar Territory. For three years, he and his wife wrote 375 complaints! And finally, there was a man (one must think of a black sheep in the orderly ranks of the prosecutor's office), who read the case and protested. This is how many people were involved in the “verification” of complaints.

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The answers to all came carefully. Here you will think whether to write or not to write. Depends on many reasons. Conclusion changes the human psyche. All life says: "Give up hope everyone who comes in here." I sometimes realized with fear that I had lived for several days, considering this life to be normal. That is, not that normal, but just did not think about its abnormality. This swamp may well drag out, and then any desire to do something for liberation is paralyzed. And sit at least ten times innocent, none of the law enforcement officers will remember. And despite the fact that he did not consider himself guilty for a minute. I haven’t yet understood the cause of the explosion - out of habit, do not blame anyone without understanding, and when I understand it — all the more so. Provided that they constantly wrote letters to me, except for my wife, relatives, acquaintances, fellow students at the institute. Constantly excited the mind. Zeku is feeling bad. There are letters, dates - bad, no worse. After meeting my wife, I came to my senses for several days. And if it weren’t for him, I don’t know how I would feel. Fortunately, I was not deprived of dates.

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In general, they did not allow me to fall asleep, forget that the natural state of a person is to be free. But still, as I understand it, my complaints, wherever they were written, did not produce a result. Only a person at liberty can move something by chores. I had a wife like that. I went to the most unimaginable instances and addressed different people. Finally, it finally worked, released. Many asked for me, I will name only one - the blessed memory of A.D. Sakharov. My deep gratitude to them. We must admit that they would have sent me to prison in 1987 under any ruler. But they released only under M.S. Gorbachev. With another ruler - hardly. And yet I do not thank. Not because it is now customary for rulers to bark, I just won’t figure out how to do this. Thank you for only four years in prison, and not a measured ten? Explicit ambiguity. But the prosecutor's office and the court are not strict on everyone. This is what the decision of the prosecutor’s office and, similarly, the court say: “In relation to the officials of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the city of Pripyat, responsible for organizing the civil defense, labor protection and safety measures, as well as to officials of the design and engineering

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organizations who have not taken the necessary measures to improve the control system for reactor plants with RBMK-1000 reactors On December 11, 1986, criminal cases were segregated into separate proceedings. ” Notice how gently formulated - did not improve reactor protection. With this wording, there will certainly be no bonus for the month. What kind of court are they not improving? It was impossible to formulate in another way by the designers. If you call everything by their proper names: they blinded an unusable reactor and defiant criticism, then why judge us? So they issued a resolution for the removal of eyes. There was no court, and it was not originally intended. It is impossible to judge the designer for not improving the reactor and protection. You can not judge for the "flaws", "features". You can only judge for noncompliance with regulatory requirements. And these are precisely all the commissions, including the forensic technical expert commission, the prosecutor’s office, and the court that they carefully avoided.

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It was not out of naivety that the judge rejected my questions at the trial, while at the same time, the judge favorably accepted all the questions of the remaining defendants, formulated by lawyers in a rather harmless form. And the commission gave answers in writing. No, there is clearly a clear understanding by the judge (I’m not talking about the commission) of the essence of the matter. And the same clear opposition to finding it out. When he was the head of the workshop, the deputy was Tolya Sitnikov. He often attended meetings in the party committee, factory committee, and personnel department; I frankly avoided such gatherings. Tolya comes in, swears - now, they make me make some lists. I ask: “Did you curse there?” "What for? Anyway, you have to do it. ” "So what? At least take your soul away. Yes, and they will think another time - to palm off on anyone unnecessary. ” By virtue of this character trait, in spite of the fact that the judge rejected my questions, I would force him to “shut up my mouth” with the deprivation of his word, or would force the commission to answer: “How does the reactor comply with the requirements of the ABY?”. For example, such:

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•

•

•

Upon deviation of the OZR parameter, the reactor exploded. According to clause 3.18. There should be an alarm, emergency and warning. Its was gone; According to clause 3.3.21. if the same parameter is rejected, the reactor should automatically stop. There was no such signal; According to clause 3.3.26. A3 should quickly and reliably extinguish a chain reaction when a button is pressed. It was from pressing that the accident began.

This would be opportune when, after my question, the shamelessly insolent expert from NIKIET V.I. Mikhan would answer that RBMK corresponded to ABY. But then I had a completely unsatisfactory physical condition, I could hardly say that the right side of my head was torn to pieces. Repeated requests to invite a dentist were ignored. After the court hearings from the “funnel”, we ran to the isolation ward (what a mess!) To take some kind of pill. Knowledgeable people grin - yes, by the run. Just try it. Well, running for me is not fast. Secondly, in the isolation ward, and with this ensign, he had already lived for eight months.

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Only at the end of the trial, when they brought him to the Lukyanovskaya prison in Kiev, the chief called and after a conversation asked what requests there were. Asked to refer to the dentist. He called immediately, and after an hour I could speak, my head returned to normal. And only one tooth less. On Thursday, September 27, 1990, in the evening, I was sitting in the library, reading the finished article in Ogonyok about the interview of A.P. Aleksandrov in this journal (never published by the free press). Vitya Chistyakov, a Zonovsky radio operator and projectionist, came. He said that they announced my release on the radio. After and others spoke. And on Friday the head of the colony V.P. Khizhnyak called and said the same thing. Then I believed. Naturally, on the basis of messages and phone calls, the chief cannot release. Each prisoner is numbered, inventoried and laced. Only documents can be released. And the boss, as much as possible, reduced my stay in the zone, called my wife. In order not to frighten the capricious fortune, I did not show any external signs, did not collect clothes, and did not even let in any thoughts inside. As the saying goes: "We are not superstitious, but why take the risk." The only thing I did was dump. You yourself think what you want, and observe the ritual.

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Well, I had enough tea, some food, cigarettes. Fine. Drink, sorry, was not. At all, I advise future prisoners: I went to prison, to the zone - accept the rules of conduct. And not outwardly accept, but inwardly. The game will not work. Convicts in general mode often think quite primitively (in enhanced and strict modes - people are serious), but in some ways sophisticated. Be at least three times innocent in the zone - that means a prisoner. Nobody cares about your troubles. To each his own term is long. Do not show your intellectual superiority, even if it is not imaginary. This will avoid unnecessary conflicts with both prisoners and the administration. On Monday, as usual, went to the post office in the village, for newspapers and magazines. The dentist Anatoly Danilovich met and, pointing to the folder, said: "I brought your release." This is where the heart skipped a beat. He brought newspapers, he did not begin to sort them out by units. I threw documents into my backpack, they were picked up, and several books. Then they came: “With things out!” But this is not the exclamation either in intonation or in content that pushes to the stage, although the words are the same.

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Vitya Chistyakov brought the backpack to the entrance, and there, he just left the zone - his wife and Slava Orlov were standing. This is already freedom! He changed his clothes, took as a souvenir a shirt with a tag and a hat with the romantic name “pederka”. Three years and ten months of life - a dog under the tail. Health was taken away, little seemed to them.

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Chapter 12

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Investigation Started Commissions and groups of authors of articles in technical journals, somewhat different from each other, have similarities in two positions: • Unanimous admission of the guilt of the personnel in the accident, the undoubted and unique guilt; • They are carefully avoiding the basic regulatory documents on nuclear safety of reactors - ABY and BPS. Naturally, since the reactor exploded, some sins are recognized behind it, which are referred to as shortcomings and features by different commissions. Everyone understands that there is nothing ideal, and one or another shortcoming is seen behind any reactor, there is nothing special about it, gradually everything is improving. And in the sun, they say, some spots were found. Not to pull him from the sky for this - it shines, heats. A person's characteristic is blond. What and to whom does it bother? So public opinion was lulled, even many experts were convinced. The commissions are different, and all with one voice.

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The composition of the commissions is all heavy academics, doctors and candidates; ministers, deputy ministers, directors of institutes and not at all petty other officials. All this creates the appearance of the objectivity of the investigation. In fairness, it must be said that not all teams blamed the staff. A group of scientists led by Ponomarev-Stepny concluded that a reactor explosion due to large positive steam reactivity effect. The commission, created by the decision of the SCST, also speaks of a large vapor effect and adds that with such a vapor effect, the reactor also exploded with MPA, which should not be. It has also been found to be an unacceptable fact of introducing A3 positive reactivity and says that such protection does not fulfill its function of jamming the reactor. Perhaps the commission considers (and this would be fair) that the one noted by it is enough to recognize the reactor as unfit for operation. There is no such conclusion in the act. In any case, the unconditionally competent commission did not answer the question about the correspondence of the ABY reactor and the OPB. Inexplicably, the commission does not see in it the marked properties of the reactor as contradicting the requirements of the standards for the design of reactors.

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Timidly noting the non-compliance with A3 requirements of paragraph 3.3.5. ABY to shut down the reactor in any normal and emergency conditions, the commission immediately questions this general requirement. But these groups do not express their opinion on the staff. They do not form their opinion on the admissibility or inadmissibility of operating such a reactor. So to say, passionless researchers. This is also useful if the study is objective, which cannot be said about the act of the committee of the SCST. For years, experts have bypassed regulatory documents on reactors. There are none and that's it. Well, not really like that. A large group of authors of the article in the journal "Atomic Energy" writes that the ABY and OSB after the accident were carefully considered and basically recognized as meeting safety criteria. Foreign scientists write about the same thing, for example, Professor A. Birkhofer from Germany. But all this, irrespective of the RBMK reactor, as of its state in 1986, they do not know at all that RBMK had to comply with these or any other Rules.

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Why, gentlemen, scientists and non-scientists do not want to answer a completely natural question? It is impossible to say that the reactor does not comply with the Rules. Clearly, I don’t want to lie either. That's all. Basically, according to actual data, the investigation materials are correct, there is little direct juggling. Only informants at the IAEA went on a clear forgery, but they probably hoped that this would remain unknown to Soviet people. Conclusions from the facts are not made, the facts are presented not so. One can always say to this - it was mistaken if they already got it. Recognition of the flaws and “features” of the reactor does not oblige anyone. There were and will be. We eliminate it. But the recognition of non-compliance with the direct requirements of regulatory documents in the design of the reactor is a matter of jurisdiction. Therefore, it is better to be silent. Will they put others? Yes, this is their concern. Here is the moral. It would seem - they said, did not say, what's the difference? All the same, the technical measures carried out on the remaining reactors did not change from this. There is a big difference. RBMKs are not the only reactors, and it would be foolish and unforgivable to make such mistakes.

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Designers are working on new reactors. They need. Approaches to security problems are similar in other sectors of the national (or what now?) Economy. It is also necessary. At least that. We have not yet grown up to justice and are not sure whether we need it. Like S. Yesenin: "Calm down, traveler, and do not demand the Truth that you do not need." One really does not need one - they protect their own skin. Others may and would like to say, but they were afraid after the decision of the Politburo. After all, these decisions are always correct. If they are not true, if de facto it was recognized, then it was impossible to speak out loud anyway. Collective wisdom. True, lately everything has been mixed up in our kingdom. Suddenly, it was said from the rostrum of the XXVIII Congress that, it turns out, the Politburo could be wrong. They say: did not understand. But this is not true. Alone and not the most informed, without access to all materials (more on that below) - were able to figure out and understand the true causes of the disaster, and the omnipotent authority, at the disposal of which were all the scientific forces of the country, could not.

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I can’t agree with the statements that are often found recently in the press that all fools were there. I am sure there were no fools there, they didn’t inherit from the Politburo. Anyone, but not fools. Unlimited power and complete lack of control allowed the Politburo to never even think about the justice and correctness of its decisions. What they decided is fair, as they decided, it’s right. Therefore, the decision was made as deemed necessary, regardless of the actual circumstances. They did not understand, because they did not try and did not want to. They just didn't need to. A statement from the rostrum of the congress was compelled, made under public pressure, in connection with the severity of the consequences of the accident. If not for this, if only for the reasons of the accident - no statement would have been made, everything remained, as it always was. Actually, the calculation of investigators is built on this. The top and bottom will be connected by a common incorrect version of the cause of the disaster, and no one will get to the bottom of the truth. Those wishing to shut down oxygen as they like with such an alliance. But perestroika did not bring harm in everything; there is also benefit. There were earlier people who were not afraid to go against the tide. They quickly drove someone to where.

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And now such a phenomenon is being observed, which we read about in the press. But there are no longer those unlimited possibilities for arbitrariness. And lonely enthusiasts have not yet transferred. First of all, this should include the IAE employee V.P. Volkov, about whom I already wrote. From the very beginning, he was convinced that the only reason for the explosion of the reactor was its completely unsatisfactory qualities. Of course, he was not the only one who thought so. But others thought and were silent, and V.P. Volkov reached the head of state. Well, then only appeal to God. Then two interesting reports, also single. The main difference from other scientific reports is that they distinguish between the share of guilt of personnel and the creators of the reactor. While other reports only state the causes of the explosion: a large vapor effect of reactivity and unsatisfactory A3, and this does not apply to physicists and designers. It seems that they themselves appeared at the reactor. And it’s even better to attribute to operational personnel, as if he formed such an active zone and designed the control rods, and not others. Well, under such operating conditions (a nod to the operators), the negative properties are especially sharp.

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As if it was not clear to them that under any operational and emergency conditions no properties of the reactor should lead to an explosion. The first was the work of Professor B. G. Dubovsky "On the factors of instability of nuclear reactors on the example of the RBMK reactor." B.G. Dubovsky in 19581973 was the head of the nuclear safety service in the USSR and the RBMK reactor knows firsthand. Back in the 70s, he made proposals to improve the protection of these particular reactors. The work examined and explained in detail the defects of the reactor control system. Here they are. The active zone has a height of seven meters, so it is possible the emergence of almost independent reactors at the bottom and top of the zone. At the same time, all the CPS rods involved in A3 are located at the top, and when a local reactor appears at the bottom, neutron absorbers are introduced there very late. There were also so-called shortened absorbent rods in the RBMK CPS. They are always located at the bottom of the core or taken down from it. Therefore, they can reach the bottom of the zone quickly. But

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“Due to a gross, completely illogical miscalculation in the protection project, the USP rods were not connected to the general emergency protection signal AZ-5, which excluded their rapid introduction into the volume of occurrence of an uncontrolled zone reactor in the lower part of the core — to the most dangerous area from the point view of the acceleration of the reactor. " At the bottom of the core, a local reactor was not created for technological reasons; it was created by the CPS system itself. Due to the heterogeneity of the rods (absorbers, displacers, water columns), when the rod is located at the top in the lower part of the channel, a water column 1.25 m high. Replacing these columns with a graphite displacer, which is weaker in absorbing neutrons, creates a local reactor. “The presence of water columns under graphite displacers led to the second gross miscalculation in the design of the CPS system.” Comments B.G.Dubovsky to this phenomenon:

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“Unfortunately, the dangerous pre-emergency situation, after pressing the АЗ-5 button made by the shift supervisor to stop the reactor, passed to the first stage of the emergency process, caused by the acceleration of the zone uncontrolled reactor formed in the lower part of the active zone (just think: pressing the emergency protection button AZ-5 - rescue buttons - causes a reactor explosion). ” “At the same time, the third fundamental miscalculation in the design of the A3 rods and of all the absorber rods showed itself - the low speed of their introduction into the active zone with an incredibly long total immersion time of 18 ... 20 s” At the same time, as a reactor with high supercriticality was created in the lower part and the neutron power in it began to increase sharply, the absorbers are still far away. During their movement, the neutron power manages to be realized in the thermal (for specialists, the thermal time constant of the fuel elements is 10 s).

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And here the steam effect of reactivity already manifests itself - water in the technological channels turns into steam, which again leads to an increase in reactivity and an increase in power. A surge in neutron power could lead to boiling of water in the channels of the CPS and also to an increase in reactivity. So the designers selected the characteristics of the reactor. “The choice of such unsuccessful, in fact, most dangerous physical characteristics, especially when the reactor was operating at a low power level, was apparently made to achieve more favorable economic indicators.” Having convincingly shown the failure of A3 and the entire control system, the professor is convinced that it, in combination with the large positive steam effect of reactivity, blew up the fourth block reactor on April 26, 1986. It is not only a matter of persuasion - there are many of them, it is also an active civic position of B.G. Dubovsky. Here is an excerpt from his letter to Mikhail Gorbachev after the organization of a commission in the Supreme Council to consider the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl accident:

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“The ongoing unfair charging of the Chernobyl personnel with responsibility precludes further development of the energy sector - it is impossible to exclude personnel errors in the future. The violations committed by the personnel, with the minimum compliance of the reactor protection to their intended purpose, would be reduced to a week-long downtime. The command and administrative near-science misled the people, the Academy of Sciences, Academician Sakharov, and the Supreme Council. I ask you to provide an opportunity to explain to the ecologists of the Supreme Council the true causes of the Chernobyl accident and the necessary safety measures. ” 11/27/1989 Speaking of a week-long downtime due to staff irregularities, the professor most likely pays tribute to the hanging staff. In fact, with normal protection, at the very least, an unauthorized stop could occur without any damage. After modernization, the RBMK reactor is actually a new reactor, which significantly differs from the previous one in terms of safety.

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“The measures taken are inadequate to the announced version of the guilt of the staff, it is clearly exaggerated. We need a correct assessment of the miscalculations and errors of the personnel and the creators of the reactor, which will only benefit the establishment of a normal psychological climate in the teams of nuclear power plants, their families and the population of the regions adjacent to the nuclear power plant. ” For fourteen years, B.G.Dubovsky led the country's nuclear security service, and repeatedly participated in the investigation of accidents involving a spontaneous chain reaction, which was in Chernobyl. He knows what he is talking about: “The expediency of conducting a second investigation, in addition to a clearer understanding of the scientific and technical miscalculations made, is due to the fact that immediately after the accident, some participants who made mistakes knowingly distort the circumstances that led to the accident; in some cases group conspiracy is possible. ”

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“Does the principle of humanity correspond to the mention of the leaders involved in the accident, who have already passed away (Feinberg, Kunegin) or who have become honored honored pensioners (Aleksandrov, Dollezhal)? It is believed that given the tragic consequences of the accident at the fourth Chernobyl NPP unit, it is precisely considerations of humanity that require renunciation of anonymity. In the name of memory of the dead and justice for the victims and, what is very important, to exclude the emergence of new large-scale accidents ” The words are fair, based on knowledge of the subject of conversation. Nothing said in the work of B.G. Dubovsky can be refuted, one can only state that it was so. There is only a clarification related to B.G.Dubovsky's ignorance of one practical circumstance. The professor says that experiments related to a change in reactivity of more than 0.5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff (equal to 5 rods of PP) should be carried out only when the stationary mode for xenon is reached and with a significant and approximately stable reactivity margin at a power of more than 30%.

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Although the statement is not certain, one can agree for the RBMK reactor. Based on these considerations, the conclusion is drawn: “The main miscalculation made by the personnel of the nuclear power plant was the extremely unsuccessful, illiterate timing for the obviously dangerous experiment - with a strong decrease in the reactivity margin due to the rapid radioactive accumulation of the strongest neutron absorber – xenon.” Without pretending to be very literate, I can say that the usual calculations for the operator were available to me. Changes in the reactivity associated with the experiment were observed only at start-up and shutdown of the MCP due to a change in the vapor content of the coolant. According to a certificate from the Department of Nuclear Safety issued to us, the steam effect of reactivity was +1.29 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff. From here, when stopping four out of eight pumps, the changes in reactivity should not be counted more than two rods. B.G.Dubovsky, apparently, had in mind the magnitude of the steam effect of 5-6 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff, intended after the accident.

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Pump stops and, moreover, faster than during the experiment, are possible during normal reactor operation when the electrical section is turned off. So, in general it was impossible to work there? However, this was so, but the experiment had nothing to do with it. Regulatory documents contain necessary and sufficient requirements for the design, construction and operation of reactors and power units. Each requirement of the Rules must be met, otherwise security must be justified, confirmed by calculation and agreed with the agreed authorities. No deviations were announced in the RBMK reactor and no approvals were made. It turns out, according to the authors, RBMK fully met the requirements of these documents. Doubts in it arose earlier, but only comprehension of accident and the subsequent calculations revealed for operators an essence of RBMK reactor. As pointed out by A. A. Jadrihinsky in the list drawn up at the Kursk NPP with the RBMK reactor is not more nor less - 32 derogation from the requirements of NSR, safety and Rules of arrangement and safe operation of nuclear power plants. It is clear, not all these deviations influenced occurrence of accident on April 26, 1986. But also those which "acted" on April 26, it is enough, more than ten, and it is convincingly shown in work.

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Establishment of specific paragraphs of documents that have not been implemented by designers that have the force of law is important. This excludes arbitrariness in interpretation, puts on a legal, legal basis - the reactor could or could not be safely operated. If the reactor did not meet the legal requirements, then its creators are responsible for this, and pushing the reactor into operation is criminal. This is explicitly stated in the ABY, as in other regulations: "Persons guilty of violating the" Rules "are brought to administrative or judicial responsibility in accordance with applicable law." Doubts about the objectivity of the investigation into the causes of the accident, where the main protagonists were the authors of the reactor project, the potential culprits of the accident, and forced to conduct an independent investigation. Based on this investigation, A. Yadrikhinsky concludes that "the authors of the project should be defendants, not plaintiffs, as is the case now." He calls specific individuals:

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“There are few real, current perpetrators of the Chernobyl accident. This is Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, Academician N.A. Dollezhal - the heads of all work on RBMK reactors, corresponding member I.Y. Emelyanov - the head of work on the reactor control system of the reactor and the Chief State Inspector for Nuclear Safety of the USSR N.I. Kozlov; the latter recognized the RBMK reactor as nuclear safe, knowing well that this is not so. ” They must be found guilty according to the same ABY. Not being a prosecutor or judge, I do not presume to judge the degree of responsibility of these persons, but their fault is beyond doubt. This is not about legal liability. More than five years after the accident. And our laws are cruel to someone, to whom they are superhuman. Recall the Minister of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan Yahyaev. Committing crimes, received orders. Then these awards became an indulgence for crimes. But it is necessary to find out the truth and remove unfounded accusations from the staff.

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It will not be easy to do this. The lie with clear eyes continues. The Ministry of Atomic Energy has issued a list of deviations agreed upon with the Chief Designer and the Scientific Advisor, where there are no major violations of ABY. There are no points 3.2.2, 3.3.21, 3.3.26, 3.3.28 that I quoted here. It is not clear how one can not notice or deny their violation. While the same people will be engaged, there will be no shift. At a meeting of the commission of the Supreme Council, where I was invited to tell the circumstances in which the accident occurred, the deputy director of NIKIET Y.M. Cherkashov, who was present there, began to find out if I was at the control room at the time of the failure of the reactor power. As if the physical phenomena from my presence could change. Debts from the forensic technical commission: “Why, in violation of the experimental program, brought protection to stop two TGs?” Although there is not a word about protection in the program, and he knows that. These participants are doing everything to drown the investigation in trifles that are completely unnecessary, but do not touch on the essence.

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True, the chairman of the commission quickly figured out. But I was only two times, and they are regular participants. I cannot and will not undertake to anticipate the decision of the commission of the Supreme Council. There is no certainty that the oppression of the official accusations of personnel will be overcome. Although, I think, the so-called shortcomings of the reactor will finally be given a true name. If the unacceptable defects of the reactor are flaws, then the detected vestal pregnancy is a flaw. And from history we know that vestals with such a "lack" were walled up alive. No matter how good, loyal and decisive the reports of A.A. Yadrikhinsky. Therefore, all official institutions can pretend that they do not exist. There are no organizations in the Soviet Union interested in establishing RBMK reactor non-compliance with regulatory documents. Be sure that if the reactor met the design standards, then a report with detailed evidence of the IAE and NIKIET would be created within a week after the accident. This is not necessary for the Ministry of Energy and its successor, the Ministry of Atomic Energy. The right and obligation to establish the agreement of the reactor with the norms lie directly with the supervisor - Gosatomenergonadzor.

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However, having failed to fulfill its supervisory functions before the accident, this body, or rather the people working in it, opposed for several years and after the accident. The supervisor, although called the State, was essentially not such. And until 1984, it was generally a division of the Ministry of Environment, a pocket oversight body. Formally endowed with great rights, he did not dare to actually use them. Even after the accident. The repeated requests of Gosatomenergonadzor to provide a safety justification for the RBMK reactor by its creators, the Scientific Director and the Chief Designer, were simply ignored. In 1986, when deciding on the launch of the first Chernobyl NPP unit, stopped after the accident, the question arose again about providing materials with a safety justification. To which the Scientific Supervisor A.P. Aleksandrov, who was present there, answered: "What other reasons are there for you if I’m here. I say: the reactor is safe - let it go." And according to the decision of the Government Commission, they let me go. Aplomb and the habit of rule by A.P. Aleksandrov are understandable.

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The actions of the supervisory authority and the entire commission are less clear: in the statements of A.P. Aleksandrov about the reliability of the reactor there was no shortage even before the accident. And here you go, it worked. And this time. Only after a change of leadership did the supervisor finally decide to look at the relationship between RBMK and the legitimate design requirements. In 1990, a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Section was held with the invitation of representatives of various organizations. The report of A.A.Yadrikhinsky was considered. I do not touch upon issues related to the process of the explosion and the amount of radioactive material released. One person can not solve this problem. I believe the exact picture of the explosion will never be described. We are not interested in it. We need to know the beginning, and what led to this ill-fated beginning. At a section meeting, for the first time, a commission of various organizations recognized a large (over 20) number of violations of articles of the ABY and BOP. Only representatives of the Chief Designer did not agree with this decision. This is already scary, such people should be removed from the design of reactors.

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Regardless of the motives by which they are guided: they are not aware of these violations or are aware of, but deny. Both that, and another is unacceptable. Commission N. A. Steinberg was appointed to the order of the Chairman of gosatomenergonadzor No 11 from 27.02.1990, and in January 1991 released a report. The Commission studied many dozens of documents on the design of the reactor, post-accident calculations and studies, emergency documentation. In my opinion (I don’t know everything), this is the most objective and comprehensive report covering various aspects of the reactor and the reasons for the disaster. In the statement of events on April 26, the commission does not resort to unreasonable assumptions, and conclusions are made almost exclusively on the basis of documents. My view, that of an eyewitness to the events, coincides with their description in the report in the last minutes before the explosion. I consider it necessary to bring with the preservation of all digital data. For specialists in nuclear energy it is of undoubted interest, the rest may not read.

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“Thus, before the start of testing, the parameters of the active zone determined the increased susceptibility of the reactor to a selfaccelerating process in the lower part of the active zone. The Commission believes that such a condition was created not only because there was an increase in the flow rate of the coolant through the reactor compared to the usual one (under the influence of eight instead of the usual six, the MCP increased flow rate prevents vaporization), and above all, the low value of the reactor power. Such thermohydraulic parameters can occur at each unloading of the reactor (emphasized by me – A.D.). The initial state of the unit immediately before the tests at 01 h 23 min was characterized by the following: power - 200 MW, OZR (the value obtained after the accident according to the PRISMA-ANALOG program as of 01 h 22 min 30 s) 8 RR rods, the field is two-humped in height maximum at the top, coolant flow rate - 56 thousand m3 / h, feed water flow rate - 200 t / h, thermal parameters are close to stable.

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The power unit shift management considered that the testing was prepared, and after switching on the oscilloscope, a command was followed to close the stop-control valves, which were closed at 01 h 23 min 04 s. Both during this period and during approximately 30 s of the run-out of 4 MCPs, the parameters of the power unit were confidently monitored, were within the limits expected for this mode and did not require any personnel actions. However, it was no longer possible to use the A3 reactor of this design under the conditions of permissible reduction of the OZR either by alarms or manually after testing without damaging the core, apparently starting from 00 h 30 min 04/26/1986, which needs to be verified by additional studies . 4.6.2. Program test period. Beginning at 01 h 23 min 04 the test caused the following processes in the reactor installation:

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MCPs that received power from the TG-8, which slowed down its rotation (MCP - 13, 14, 23, 24), reduced speed and decreased productivity. The remaining MCPs (MCP-11, 12, 21, 22) increased it to a small extent. The total flow rate of the coolant decreased. For 35 s of the transition process, it decreased by 10 ... 15% of the initial one. The decrease in the coolant flow rate caused a corresponding increase in the vapor content in the core, which to some extent (small) was counteracted by an increase in pressure due to the closure of the TG-8 air defense system. Mathematical modeling of this stage of the process was performed by Soviet and American specialists. It showed good agreement between theoretical predictions and truly recorded ones. Both calculations showed that the released void (vapor) reactivity was insignificant and could be compensated by a small immersion in the active zone of the AR rods (up to 1.4 m). In the process of coasting TG-8 there was no increase in reactor power. This is confirmed by the DREG program, which is from 01 h 19 min 39 s to 01 h 19 min 44 s

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and from 01 h 19 min 57 s to 01 h 23 min 30 s, i.e. before the tests, and a significant part of the test period, recorded the signal "PC - UP", in which the rods of the AR can not move into the active zone. Their provisions, recorded for the last time at 01 h 22 min 37 s, were: 1.4; 1.6; 0.2 m for 1AP, 2AP, 3AP, respectively. (The rods can move into the core. There simply was no reason for this - the reactor power did not increase – A.D.). Thus, neither the power of the reactor, nor other parameters of the reactor installation: pressure and level in the drum separators, flow rates of coolant and feed water, and others did not require any intervention by either personnel or safety devices during the period from the start of the test to pressing the button AZ-5. The commission did not identify events or dynamic processes, for example, an imperceptibly started acceleration of the reactor, which could become the initial event of the accident. The commission revealed the existence of a sufficiently long initial state of the reactor installation, in which, under the influence of positive reactivity

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that arose for some reason, the process of increasing power could develop under conditions when the A3 of the reactor might not be such. 4.6.3. The development of the emergency process. At 01 h 23 min 40 with the senior reactor control engineer, the button AZ-5 of the manual emergency stop of the reactor was pressed. The commission failed to reliably establish why it was pressed. ” The emergency protection button AZ-5 serves both for emergency and normal shutdown of the reactor. In this case, it was pressed to shut down the reactor at the end of work. Further, the commission, taking into account postaccident calculations, makes its conclusion at the beginning of the accident: "Thus, the results of calculation analyses performed, four years after the accident most competent in the issues of reactor physics institutions: NIKIET, VNIIAES, IPA, INR USSR

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Academy of Sciences, showed the possibility of threat increase the power of RBMK-1000 reactor with a multiple increase in local energy release in the active zone due to input terminals A3 to the reactor." Thus, as follows from the foregoing, the initial event of the accident was the pressing of the АЗ-5 button under the conditions that developed in the RBMK-1000 reactor at its low power and the PP rods being removed from the reactor in excess of their permissible number. Stressed by the authors of the report needs comments. Yes, and the A3 button could not be pressed (in, survived), and at low power it was impossible to work, and the PP rods could not be removed from the zone. It's like that. But it became known after the disaster. One of the most important conclusions of the commission, true in its technical essence, is formulated just in such a way as to blame the staff. According to the "General Safety Provisions": • Initial event - a single failure in the systems, an external event or an erroneous action of personnel that leads to a violation of normal operation and may lead to a violation of the

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•

limits and / or conditions of safe operation. The erroneous action of the personnel is an unintentional incorrect single action of the personnel in the process of fulfilling their duties.

The first one. Resetting the A3 with a button can in no case be either a mistake or a violation of nuclear safety. Neither in the books on reactors, nor in a single document specifically on RBMKs does there exist a hint that once it is impossible to drop A3. On the contrary, it is proclaimed everywhere: A3 must shut off the reactor in any normal and emergency conditions. Therefore, this action cannot be called a starting event. The work of A.A.Yadrikhinsky also has a conclusion formulated paradoxically: “A critical mistake of operational personnel in the Chernobyl accident is the pressing of the АЗ-5 button (correct operational action) when the reactor is operating with a reactivity margin of less than 15 rods.”

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But here the introductory words - the correct operational action - put everything in its place. And the paradox of the wording is legal under that unnatural defense. The second one. We have already talked about working at low power - there is no violation. The third. According to the wording of the commission - “extracting the PP rods from the reactor in excess of their permissible number” - one might think that the staff violated the requirement of some kind of instruction. Wrong. And this situation is already being used. A professor from Germany, A. Birkhofer, at the congress in memory of A. D. Sakharov, said that the staff committed a violation by removing rods from the zone “beyond the permissible” number. I can’t say for what reasons, maybe different people have different reasons, but even specialists who weren’t tied to the original lie and figured out what the reactor was like, still can’t completely refuse to blame the staff. What is here? Presses a formal charge? Or the fact that RBMK reactors still worked for some time? It seems that this fact should not affect specialists. Or the old saying is valid: I don’t know whether he stole a coat from someone, or it was stolen from him, but is involved in a dirty story.

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The "spirit" of the document is felt. Usually after reading the position of the authors becomes clear. According to the report of the commission of N.A. Steinberg, I did not see a desire to blame the personnel anyway, although the reactor was bad - without acknowledging this, not a single report will be taken seriously now. But something puts pressure on them, and I will make some comments on the report. The Commission found that the RBMK reactor did not comply with the requirements of nine articles of the ABY and six articles of the BOP, and, in this situation, does not make a natural conclusion about the unlawfulness of the operation of the RBMK. It should be noted that the commission is composed of employees of the supervisory authority. If they don’t speak, then who will say? What, expect this from the authors of the reactor design? Do not wait, no doubt. I would like to know who will protect the station personnel and the people of the country from unsuitable reactors, if not an organization whose very existence is caused by this particular duty. The phrase in the conclusion of the report:

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"RBMK-1000 reactor with its design characteristics and features as of 26.04.1986 had such serious inconsistencies with the requirements of safety norms and rules that its operation was possible only in conditions of insufficient level of safety culture in the country." Well said, only it has no legal force. The concept of a safety culture operates morally, is good for scientific discussions, and the norms and rules in force in the country clearly stipulate liability for their violation, up to the judicial one. So was the operation of a reactor designed with violations of fifteen articles of regulatory documents hidden by the authors of the project legal or illegal? The authors of the report record a violation committed by the staff - the operation of the reactor with a reactivity margin of less than 15 rods. So. But, firstly, not a violation, but a mistake, viewing. Not for nothing that all the prosecutors of the staff prove: violation. The parameter measurement system was bad, but nevertheless he (the staff) knew, since he had a printout. Although all, or almost all of them, knew that there was no printout, and it was impossible to determine the reactivity margin from this printout.

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The commission established - was not. It is also found a violation in the project in terms of signaling and emergency automatic shutdown of the reactor when the parameter deviates. The staff was not provided with controls and automation as required by law. Who, if not the controlling organization, should stand guard over the law? Or is the staff guilty anyway? This is approximately what the annotation to the report says: “Based on an analysis of the results of domestic and foreign studies, design data, and regulatory and technical documentation, it is concluded that the Chernobyl accident, which began as a result of operations by the operational personnel, acquired disastrous inadequate proportions due to the unsatisfactory design of the reactor.” Of course, operational personnel blew up the reactor; no one else worked on it. The commissions are clear and why the reactor exploded. It is clear to the commission that the actions of personnel at the reactor that meets the design rules would not have led to any accident, not only a disaster.

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And therefore, it has no reason to claim that the accident began due to the actions of operational personnel. Nevertheless, despite a number of inaccurate (there is no reason to think that biased) language, the commission’s report should have a positive effect on the investigation of the causes of the accident. First of all, by the official recognition of the non-compliance of the RBMK reactor in 1986 with the fundamental requirements of regulatory documents on nuclear safety. But, apparently, a long struggle (I would not want to use this word) is ahead for comprehension of the truth. Numerous and still influential opponents. “... as soon as I looked and comprehended the technical measures carried out on the remaining reactors, how ... the technical condition of the reactors as of April 1986 began to become clear” “In 1986, when deciding on the launch of the first Chernobyl NPP unit, stopped after the accident, the question arose again about providing materials with a safety justification.”

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Chapter 13

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Accident or Inevitability? The first written opinion known to me for the causes of the Chernobyl disaster belongs to the IAE employee V.P. Volkov. In a letter to the Director of the IAE A.P. Aleksandrov on May 1, 1986, and after a peculiar, but regular reaction to the letter, when V.P. Volkov’s access to the institute was closed, he expressed the following version in the name of M.S. Gorbachev: “The accident is not due to the actions of personnel, but to the design of the core and a misunderstanding of the neutron-physical processes taking place in it.” The direct reasons were named: the introduction of positive reactivity when A3 is triggered due to a structural defect in the CPS rods and the large positive reactivity vapor effect. This is the first and absolutely correct opinion, which receives public recognition only after five years. Of course, it was not expressed on a hunch, but on the basis of specific knowledge of the characteristics of RBMK, the unsatisfactory properties of which he had long and unsuccessfully warned management, including A.P. Aleksandrov.

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A letter from V.P. Volkov was sent from the Central Committee to Gosatomenergonadzor, where a commission chaired by V.A.Sidorenko actually recognized the correctness of the causes of the accident. A similar version then could not receive recognition. It is very bad for many. This is followed by an act of an interdepartmental commission chaired by Deputy Minister of Medium Engineering A.G. Meshkov. True, the interdepartmental commission was only at its appointment, after which it practically became the commission of the Ministry of Environment, i.e. the creators of the reactor, because the act was refused to sign because of its obvious bias, Deputy Minister of Energy G.A. Shasharin, Director of VNIIAES A.A. Abagyan, Chief Engineer B. Glavatomenergo B.Y. Prushinsky. According to the act of the commission, the reactor explosion occurred due to steaming of the core due to the failure of the MCP. Pump outage, i.e. the termination of their supply of coolant for cooling the core occurred due to a mismatch in the flow rate of the feed water and the flow rate of the coolant pumped by each pump. For many years I came across in work with enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Environment.

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The people there are qualified, order and discipline are better than in other places. But pride and aplomb more. Rarely, but they also allowed marriage to work. Eliminated, however, in the shortest technically possible time. However, so that no traces remain in the form of acts and protocols. They, of course, all this was recorded, closed by strict secrecy. I do not contradict the facts. It turns out that the department knew almost all the defects of RBMK, and only the mind’s incomprehensible inaction of the leadership did not allow them to be eliminated in a timely manner. The same V.P. Volkov came to Alexandrov. Where else could he go? Let him just try. An appeal to M.S.Gorbachev only in the light of the accident that actually happened came down, but they chew. If he had contacted before the accident, they would have poured as much dirt as he couldn’t wash himself forever. The commission of A.G. Meshkov worked according to established stereotypes, did not take into account the scale and nature of the disaster. We will write an act convenient for the crowd, and we will take the necessary measures ourselves. This can be seen from the list of technical measures developed by the IAE and NIKIET immediately after the accident for the remaining RBMK reactors.

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A review of these events shows that the creators of the reactor immediately understood why the explosion occurred, and they were darkening and continue to darken for obvious reasons, far from science and ethics. G.A.Shasharin, refusing to sign the act, the Ministry of Energy created the Commission, which, with the involvement of other workers, in particular OKBM - the designer of the central heating station and the All-Union Thermotechnical Institute, wrote an addendum to the act. This document basically correctly reflects the essence of the matter, compiled according to the calculations of VNIIIAES, takes into account the objective evidence of the control system and eyewitness accounts. The unfoundedness of the main conclusion of the commission of A.G. Meshkov about the failure of the pumps was also shown. In my opinion, the drawback of the document is the listing of all the factors that influenced the occurrence of the accident - significant and non-essential, which obscures the matter. And this document could be the basis for a correct conclusion. It was not taken into account. Then, on June 2 and 17, 1986, under the chairmanship of A.P. Aleksandrov at the MVTS, the reactor was recognized as good, and the staff as bad.

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He is guilty. And then - the report of the Government Commission and the decision of the Politburo. For thrice Hero and President of the Academy of Sciences, etc. etc. it was not difficult to select the necessary and discard unnecessary documents. Excellent switchman, he clearly translates the arrow in the right direction: who is guilty? - staff; Did Aleksandrov participate in the investigation of the accident? - Not; Who created the RBMK reactor? - N.A.Dollezhal, and Aleksandrov - the inventor and the Scientific adviser; to Chernobyl after the accident? - Legasova sent, although he, however, has nothing to do with it. This is not for orders, here he is the last in line. It should be noted here. At the moment of pressing the reset button A3, the control system does not record a single signal - neither alarm nor warning about the deviation of the parameters of the reactor and its systems. The reactor is blown up by emergency protection !!! Nonsense. The design of the reactor violated more than thirty articles of regulatory documents for the design of reactors. By establishing any of these three points, and it is impossible to challenge them, in a normal human society all sorts of charges can be removed from the staff. But this is in a normal society. And we have?

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Nowhere in the future will a failure of the MCP appear as the cause of the accident - it is very odious. Soviet informants at the IAEA generally vaguely explain the acceleration phase of the reactor. But then a new wording appeared: “Thus, the primary cause of the accident was an extremely unlikely combination of violations of the order and operating mode committed by the personnel of the power unit.” The term “such an uncontrolled state of the reactor” was launched by informants. I have already explained in detail the “personnel violations” and the “non-regulatory state”. I will only refer to the testimonies of other specialists who do not want to lie. G.A.Shasharin, “New World”, No 9 for 1991: “The press has already indicated that the operators turned off the A3 altogether. This is not true". “Some publications emphasize a number of other, allegedly erroneous, actions by personnel. None of them plays a role in the occurrence and

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even more so the development of the accident. Reducing power to 60 MW is also not prohibited by the Regulation, although this circumstance, as mentioned above, turned out to be extremely negative. ” I’ll add from myself - only on such a reactor, in such an emergency. But tenacious formulations, especially caressing rumors. Here is an excerpt from a letter dated March 26, 1990, signed by the First Deputy Director of the IAE N.N. Ponomarev-Stepny, Director of the NIKIET E.O. Adamov, Director of the VNIIIAES A.A. Abagyan: “The accident occurred as a result of bringing the reactor to an uncontrolled state, due to a number of reasons, the main of which are: a decrease in the ODS below the regulatory value, a small amount of underheating of the coolant at the inlet to the reactor. Under these conditions, a positive vapor effect of reactivity, design flaws of the CPS rods, as well as the unstable form of the neutron field that arose due to the complex transitional regime, were manifested. The accident ended with the acceleration of an instant neutron reactor. ”

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Let's take a closer look at this short excerpt. It deserves this, first of all, because these people are at the helm of nuclear energy - pay attention to the posts. Take a closer look at the time of writing - this is not 1986, when they still could not quite figure it out. So: • Unregulated condition. Small operational stock. Yes, probably it was. I say “probably”, because so far the authors of the reactor have not given a calculation of the stock at the time of pressing the button A3. And it is he who is important. It would be in vain to seek from the authors of the letter why it arose. It arose as a result of the lack of an automatic A3 and signaling in violation of the ABY requirements by the reactor designers. • Unregulated condition. Small underheating of the coolant at the entrance to the core. Why? It is always small at low power, and in 1986 all power levels were regulated. If the authors of the letter want to say that the underheating was small due to the large flow of coolant, then this is not true. And, in addition, when the button was pressed, after which it all started, the coolant flow was nominal. And in general, a boiling reactor can have any underheating - see the Regulations. Under these conditions, a positive vapor effect?

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First of all, not a positive steam effect, but an unacceptable value, a positive steam effect. This was said back in 1976 at the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of Environment, where it was decided that it should be no more than β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. We forgot about this absolutely correct decision, which we returned to only after the accident. But what, in other conditions, he would not have manifested? When the coolant circuit breaks, when the steam pipe breaks, when the main safety valves hang, when the MCP breaks down? Disadvantages of the design of rods CPS? I wonder how long until completely unacceptable defects will be bashfully called flaws? They, these "shortcomings", were manifested before, as evidenced by the appearance of signals of excess power and acceleration rate of the reactor when A3 falls on other signals. Do not comprehend them. God pardoned until April 26 from an accident with a significant rapid introduction of positive reactivity, otherwise an explosion was inevitable with such rods of the CPS. As if the authors of the letter are not aware that such a construction is unacceptable.

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What does the shape of the field have to do with it? It is always like this after a decrease in the power of a stationary poisoned reactor. This is completely natural for physical reasons. Field shape not suitable for jamming the reactor? Will we customize the form or make the protection normal? If the non-regulatory state of the reactor is not marked by any signals? But they were not there. If the positive vapor effect during dehydration of the core is 5-6 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,, what is unacceptable for various reasons? If A3 introduces positive reactivity when triggered, and the conditions under which this is realized are not prevented by any technical means? If the shape of the neutron field, which naturally occurs at every shutdown of the reactor, is unacceptable, can such a reactor be operated? Of course not, and this is actually recognized as a reconstruction of the remaining reactors.

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This position of the leaders of the most important institutions working in the nuclear energy industry is alarming. If even after four years they do not want to honestly admit, they are trying to disguise the causes of the disaster, can we hope for truthful information about current affairs? For what purpose are absolutely explicit miscalculations of physicists and reactor designers not recognized? The wording of the leaders of leading institutions is not a reservation, not an inaccuracy, but a position. It was ignoring the obvious facts that led to the Chernobyl disaster. Two examples. After the accident at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP in 1975 with a break in the technological channel, IAE staff issued recommendations to improve the nuclear safety of RBMK reactors. 1) Reducing the steam effect of RBMK reactors by: • Enrichment and fuel density; • reducing the amount of graphite in the core; • leaving in the core of the reactor DP; • Increase reactivity margin. 2) Change in the design of CPS rods with an increase in the length of the absorbing part and independent regulation of energy release along the height and radius, i.e. when adjusting the

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radial field, the axial field should not change. 3) Creating a high-speed A3. Later, at the Ignalina NPP and during the physical start-up in 1983 of the fourth unit, the Chernobyl NPP, the introduction of positive reactivity by CPS rods at the beginning of their movement into the core was detected. The reactors were approved for operation. The lingering correspondence between the Scientific Advisor and the Chief Designer on the elimination of an unacceptable phenomenon did not lead to anything real before the accident in 1986. Only after the accident did these measures begin to be implemented at reactors. They waited. *** Without understanding what has happened, there is no hope that this will not be repeated. What kind of comprehension can be discussed if, in the IAE, on the day of information after the official version was reported, even questions were forbidden.

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It is no coincidence that there is not a single document from the creators of the reactor, the IAE and NIKIET, that analyzes the compliance of the RBMK-1000 reactor with the basic regulatory documents, the requirements of which are mandatory for designers. And more than that. After graduation in 1989 A. A. Jadrihinsky report, "Nuclear accident at the fourth unit of Chernobyl and nuclear safety of RBMK reactors", independently has done a lot of analytical work, in Gosatomenergonadzor held a meeting at which representatives of NIKIET and not recognized in the RBMK design violations of the requirements of ABY and OPB, and core requirements. That's it-everyone recognizes, but they do not. Requirements are clear, the reactor is clearly not fulfilled. For the future, this situation does not add optimism, they continue to "create". A. A. Jadrihinsky refers to the document issued at the Kursk NPP, which lists 32 points NSR, safety and "Rules of safe design and operation of nuclear power plants," violated the creators of the RBMK.

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In January 1991, a report of the Commission of Gospromatomnadzor under the chairmanship of N. A.Steinberg, where does the name 15 of the articles of ABY and OPB violated in the design of the reactor and having a direct relationship to the accident of 1986, Any half of this will be enough for the recognition of the reactor unfit for use. Any product must be designed and manufactured in accordance with standards, norms. Naturally, this is also for the reactor, only here the standards are more stringent. The ABY and BOP says that any retreat must be justified, nuclear safety is ensured, agreed upon in the relevant authorities. None of this happened in the RBMK-1000 reactor. An unbiased commission composed of employees of the supervisory authority identified fifteen violations in the RBMK-1000 project only related to the accident of April 26, 1986. Therefore, there can be no talk of any accident. Disaster was inevitable! The reactor had a positive fast power reactivity coefficient, which made it dynamically unstable. The positive effect of reactivity during dehydration of the coolant circuit was 5-6 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,. Post-accident calculations show that the reactor exploded in a number of situations.

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Emergency protection when triggered, automatically or from a button, as it was on April 26, 1986, introduced positive reactivity up to β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, for five (!) Seconds. Such a phenomenon in normal human consciousness simply does not fit. It is clear to specialists that disaster was inevitable for such a reactor. During operation, starting with the launch of the first power unit of the Leningrad NPP in 1973, there were repeated manifestations of unsatisfactory, nuclear hazardous characteristics of the reactor. Unacceptable properties of the CPS were also identified. Scientists understood these dangerous properties, but all the proposals for many years, right up to the accident, were not implemented. Due to the neglect by the Scientific Director and the Chief Designer of the identified hazardous properties of the reactor that were unacceptable for operation, its catastrophe was inevitable. A short reminder in this chapter of the versions about the causes of the Chernobyl disaster put forward by the creators of the reactor, as well as an excerpt from a letter from the leaders of the IAE and NIKIET, shows that even after a long time they are not able to admit their mistakes, they are constantly trying to mislead the scientific, including the world, public. Misinform society.

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Using a monopoly on accident materials, they manage to do this for a long time. Such a situation not only does not guarantee the failure of the accident in the future, but also inspires direct concern. We need people who are capable of creative thinking.

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Chapter 14

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Use of Atomic Energy Nevertheless, one cannot do without expressing an opinion on the acceptability or unacceptability of the use of nuclear power plants. Somehow, when I asked a question about my attitude to the future of the nuclear power plant in connection with the Chernobyl disaster and my personal tragedy, I didn’t change God at sixty. Maybe. But Gods are not perfect either. How much evil on earth was created in the name of Jesus and Allah. Of course, all this was done by people, but if God is omnipotent, then why did he allow unseemly things to be done? When, after an illness, he began to regain consciousness a little, there was a complete mental disorder. It seemed that his whole life was devoted to a worthless business, and even if he were indifferent, indifferent to work, the loss was not great either. But my work has always been in the first place. Like the vast majority of people (I am convinced of this), I just wanted to live, work and get enough money for a decent living. And, I think, I had everything: family, different interests without any special hobbies, decent earnings by our standards.

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I have never had any deceptive ideas regarding the high calling of each person and I have not experienced any inferiority complexes from this. And yet, when it seemed that all life had been spent in vain, it became very, very sad. Is it all so hopeless? Is it possible to do without nuclear energy at the present stage? Yes you can. Would it be better? I am far from certain of this. Supporters of nuclear power plants say that they cannot do without them. Well, why? In 1990, nuclear power plants generated 211 billion kWh of electricity in the Soviet Union. This would require 50 ... 60 million tons of coal for thermal plants. With a total coal production of 700 million in the country, this amount does not seem impossible. And the additional burden on the environment is small, considering all types of fuel used. And burning fuel in power plants does less harm than burning primitive boiler houses and dwellings in the furnaces. So, but not so. It seems that not so much would these thermal stations add to the entire polluting complex (stations, cars, diesel locomotives, metallurgy, chemistry ...), but there is a lot of what is there, it is not necessary to add, but to reduce.

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And the generation of electricity at nuclear plants can be one of the ways to reduce the burden on the environment. A good nuclear power plant is cleaner than any thermal plant, including those using natural gas. The absence of visible smoke from the pipe of the latter should not be deceiving - it emits gases in huge quantities and constantly. Even at stations with RBMK reactors, fish were constantly caught in a cooling pond. There was a ban on fishing at the Chernobyl station, however, not because of radiation contamination of the fish, but in order to avoid accidents with the fishermen they were drowning, one threw a wire hook on the power line. The RBMK reactor in the 80s generally looked like a completely archaic structure. Its design closely matches industrial plutonium production reactors. In the global energy sector, such reactors are not used. In the literature, there are sometimes sayings that pursued cheapness. Not. Capital expenditures per installed kilowatt of electric power at stations with RBMK reactors are one and a half times higher than at stations with case reactors; operating costs are comparable. Their use at the stations is not due to technical considerations. After the decision by the authorities of the country on the development of atomic energy, a pace beyond industry was set.

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In the Soviet Union, it may not be the same as in China, but the authorities were also prone to leaps. So, the decision to use RBMK turned out to be a leap in breadth. And then it was understood that tank reactors, at least in the long term, provide higher reliability. But for the implementation of the adopted program, the industry could not ensure the production of basic equipment in sufficient quantities. Therefore, it was decided to build part of the power plants with RBMK reactors. He played the role and authority in the atomic affairs of the Ministry of Environment, academician A.P. Aleksandrov. Want a joke? In 1991, a meeting was held in Kiev to discuss the idea of A.D. Sakharov on placing reactors deep underground. Who has been nominated as the Scientific Director of the topic? And all the same Alexandrov. In, the flywheel gained momentum: in, inertia! Well, where without the “big coryphaeus” (as we in college said)? This is not hypnosis, this is psychosis. The RBMK reactor is not hopelessly bad. Although in some aspects it fundamentally does not meet the concept of security. For example, it cannot be enclosed in an airtight enclosure at reasonable cost. He was hopeless in 1986 due to miscalculations of physicists and designers, not at all caused by the design of the reactor.

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G. Medvedev writes in his story that the positive steam reactivity effect is the most significant in uranium-graphite reactors. Not so, and for uraniumgraphite reactors, as well as for others, it can be any in magnitude or sign, i.e. both positive and negative. It all depends on the composition of the components of the core. Correct calculation and adjustment according to experimental data at no particular cost made RBMK completely safe in this regard. But the rods of the CPS miscalculation in its purest form. For the manufacture of acceptable, say - correct, rods in general, no additional tools were required. The initial operation of the reactor at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP revealed almost negative hazardous properties. The experts of the IAE, they were understood, issued the right recommendations for their elimination. I have no information for what reasons Academician Alexandrov did not give them a go. And God was merciful - he let go of the swing for action for ten whole years. Yes, now, knowing the properties of the reactor as they were before 1986, one should not be surprised at the explosion, and why it did not happen before.

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And do not scold those people that they did not insist on the implementation of the necessary modernization, they had nowhere to turn to: it was useless to the authorities — they listened to Aleksandrov, and to the newspaper — not one would have printed. In the best case, they would be kicked out of the institute. Even after the catastrophe that actually happened, V.P. Volkov was brought to disability for his performances. Frankly, the fear takes that the “masters” in the institutes are all the same who invented not the reactor, but the bastard. It is difficult to believe these people if, in 1991, in a report I cite together, they say that the reactor control system of the reactor met all the requirements for such. The future of RBMK reactors? They do not have a future - this is unique. The question can only be posed this way: is their operation permissible until the development of the motor resource or is it closed immediately? I cannot answer this question. There are enough irresponsible statements, and I don’t want to add my own there. I think no one will answer this question alone. Yes, the reactor after modernization in many respects has acceptable properties that meet the necessary safety criteria.

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But, unfortunately, its initial rich emergency capabilities have not yet been exhausted. Severe accidents, maybe not the same as in Chernobyl, are not excluded at these reactors; they can be presented not hypothetically. The likelihood of their occurrence should be assessed by competent organizations. Whether only ours, with the involvement of international, but in no way a solution to this issue should not be left to the authors of the reactor. And make the decision based on the results of the assessment. The Chernobyl disaster is the worst that can be at the station. Accidents are unacceptable and less severe. In my opinion, the design of the reactor installation should be such that such accidents could not be presented under normal conditions, taking into account the natural disasters inherent in the area. There are no environmentally friendly power generation, and in the near future they are not very visible. Neither wind nor solar stations will produce a significant amount of energy. Of course, hydroelectric power stations in mountainous areas can be considered ideal, but their resource in terms of capacity is insufficient. And what do hydroelectric plants on lowland rivers give? Take Kiev.

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A large number of good floodplain lands have been flooded, I think in the future, and not so far, it will be necessary to reclaim these lands. And the station’s power is only enough to open the gateway gate. Well, not literally, but the energy generated by the station is by no means worth the occupied land. Flooded land impact of hydroelectric power on the environment is not limited. And the effect is negative. It was only illiterate ancestors who could influence the earth with benefit for themselves and without much or no harm to the earth. We are different. In the Soviet Union, perhaps, there is not a single “transformation” that would not come out sideways for nature and people. Of course, in the territory of the former Soviet Union there is a large reserve for saving energy, of all kinds, not just electric. Structural adjustment of industry how much can give. We produce most of all metal pipes and all are few, we also purchase. There, with a decrease in the output of ferrous metals, they increased the gross national product, and our economists, including the journal World Economy and International Relations, talked about the crisis in foreign metallurgy. Academician B. Paton, a respected man, talked about this at the XXVIth Party Congress, no one refuted it, but nothing changed. Zero.

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And if you look at empty heavy trucks scurrying back and forth? You can save a lot, but still, after some time, you will have to increase the production of electricity, because it is unlikely that a person will moderate his ambitions. A reasonable restriction of needs is not to be expected. I am convinced that any thermal power plant is environmentally dirtier than a good nuclear power plant. RBMK reactors have no future, and this is not surprising, because their design comes from the forties. Their use in the energy sector was made possible because there were people in power who were no longer able to think differently. But after all, light did not converge on these reactors. There are now much more reliable reactors, and if we abandon the persecution of atomic scientists, give them the opportunity to work normally, there will be reactors with a degree of reliability satisfactory to humans by the highest criteria. In no case do not hide from the population that there are problems that still do not have a satisfactory solution. First of all, this applies to spent fuel. The second problem is the decommissioning of the station. And here the RBMK reactor poses more complex questions than others.

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It seems that after Chernobyl they became convinced of what the lie leads to. They have completely achieved absolute distrust not only of their own, but also of foreign science. Any ignoramus is far more likely to be heard than a conscientious scientist. And if he says that he worked at the station (by whom - it does not matter) and will please the crowd, then the trust is complete. Here is how G. Medvedev writes: “The officers and soldiers don’t wear respirators, they hang on the neck. Illiteracy from poorly delivered training ... After all, these young guys will go offspring. Even 1 R / g. gives a 50% chance of mutation ... " This, of course, is terrible if it were true. The whole world works at the rate of five rem per year, for professionals. But there are many thousands of them. Not everyone gets the full dose. But, for example, the repair personnel of the reactor workshops selects this dose for almost the entire year. With five rems per year and mutations should be more common than with one. And what, no one notices these anomalies, neither the people themselves nor the doctors?

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No wonder, like everything else, this statement by Medvedev is sucked out of his finger, does not correspond to reality. Here is what Academician N.P.Dubinin writes on this subject, judging by his biography, a geneticist by profession is not inclined to conformism: “The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, taking into account the world's leading specialists in radiation genetics, accepted that a doubling of the mutation frequency during acute exposure occurs under the action of 30 R. If a person is exposed to the chronic effect of small doses of radiation during the reproductive period (30 years), then the total a radiation dose capable of doubling the frequency of mutations is 100 R. Any increase in radiation entails one or another defeat of the person’s heredity, corresponding to the dose of radiation. " Do not pay attention to the name of the unit dose: Xray, rem, glad. With γ- and β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations,-radiation, they are equal; an ordinary person does not encounter other types of radiation.

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So, according to the conclusion of the UN committee, a single dose of 30 R or chronic in 100 R can double the frequency of mutations against the natural. With a natural radiation background, about 70 out of a thousand newborns have birth defects that cause various diseases. Thus, even a doubling dose does not lead to a 50% mutation. There is no question who to believe - Medvedev or Dubinin, or rather, the international committee. But some information of the media regularly and irresponsibly convey to the general public, while others remain the property of a narrow circle. A lot of different information can be gleaned from the newspapers, and everyone puts pressure on the psyche of already worried people. Here the "specialist" in atomic affairs broadcasts stating that the contamination of the territory in Curie was calculated by gamma radiation, but it is necessary by BETA, and this will be ten times more. If you are a specialist, you need to know that curie means a certain amount of decay of a substance per second and nothing more. A decay scheme, the harmfulness takes into account the pollution rate, which is different for each isotope. For plutonium, one; for cesium, another …

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Faced with allegations of greater harm to small doses than large ones. Then it would be simple - supplements that received a small dose, there are sources. And this comes from a misunderstanding of the following situation: the effect of small doses is more significant than that based on extrapolation from large doses. Just to illustrate the foregoing, let’s say: so, when the dose is reduced by a factor of ten, the effect decreases not by ten, but only by five times. Once again I ask you not to take the numerical values for truth. How much is written about the deceased liquidators of the Chernobyl accident who suffered from it. Died, got sick and that's it. Previously, they were not sick, did not die, there were no congenital malformations. No analysis by age composition, no comparison with the control group. Rides through the river. Dnieper bus, the driver lost consciousness, the bus moved into the river. Why would this driver pass out? The opinion of the inspector of the traffic police is unambiguous - from radiation. Today is April 26th - a mournful date. As expected, the victims are commemorated on this day, sympathy for the victims is expressed. And as it is customary, everything is poisoned by a lie.

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On the Ostankino channel in the Vesti program, the announcer (or as they are now called) confidentially reports that the accident occurred on April 26, and the government reported about it only on the 28th, when there were already several hundred dead. Where does this information come from? In fact, by April 28, two were killed: Valery Hodemchuk immediately after the explosion and Vladimir Shashenok died in the morning in the hospital in Pripyat. They lied under a totalitarian regime, democrats lie, at least they call themselves so. I listened and will say, the democratic lie is infamous no less totalitarian. This year Easter fell on April 26th. At least on Holy Day, beware of lying. I would like to know if such guardians know for the people, which do great harm to this? He is heavily superimposed on the really done harm and multiplies the suffering. There is the concept of iatrogenic disease - a disease suggested by a doctor. And it is punishable. Something did not find the concept of radiophobia in the dictionaries. Under this concept, I would not attribute any fear of radiation exposure, but only its inadequate perception by an informed person who knows the possible consequences depending on the dose.

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The rest can hardly be attributed to radiophobia, it is a natural concern of a person about his health, about the health of loved ones. And the population, basically, does not know serious information about the consequences of exposure and is forced to believe in the media. Only the initial wrong policy and practice of the authorities after the accident and, unfortunately the great one, the scientists brought to the crest of a muddy wave of numerous incompetent people, opportunists. Instead of a clear and honest communication to the public: • Actual pollution levels of the territory; • The harmful effects of radiation in any dose and degree of risk; • On the resettlement of families with children and young people from contaminated territories, if there was no possibility of general resettlement. And this is not neglect of the elderly and the elderly. In lightly contaminated areas at low doses, when they act, until then, these people will die naturally. And young live, give birth. I perfectly understand that I give an occasion to accuse me of savagery. Well, yes hypocrisy, hypocrisy is quite characteristic of the era.

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Is it better to keep children in adverse conditions for three to five years and then relocate? Demagogically shouting about immorality counting money when it comes to people's health is not difficult, it costs nothing personally and, on the contrary, creates popularity. But this is tantamount to a “thoughtful” statement: “It is better to be rich and healthy than poor and sick.” Well, give bone, so give. I will go further. During the liquidation of the accident, when it became clear that the unit was not subject to restoration, and this became clear immediately, there was nothing to smother the fever. First of all, fix the activity from dust dispersion and how to prepare. And, most importantly, to use in the work not young soldiers serving from the reserve, but to call on the older generation. These people would do the job more skillfully, with less dose and less genetic impact. This is unforgivable to either the medical profession or top management. Say - unscrupulous costing. So what to do? If disasters like Chernobyl cannot be ruled out, then there is no need to develop nuclear energy, is it impossible? But I do not think so. Chernobyl is a pathological case, it must be excluded from consideration.

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An explosion similar to Chernobyl for a reactor designed in accordance with accepted design rules is practically excluded. Designers know how to do this without any undue cost. The order should be such that each project meets the standards, passing an examination, including international. I think that now no adherent of sovereignty will consider the international examination a violation of sovereign rights. It will become more expensive for itself. Accidents cannot be completely ruled out, but localization methods are known. In campaigning for the acceptability of the nuclear power plant, exclude any omissions, pressure - they say they will sit the winter in the cold, agree. Each station according to the rules has a sanitary zone, where it is forbidden to build housing, and an observed zone. The population should be informed about the dosimetric situation in the observed area. Whether there were accidents, what were the outbursts of activity, what threatens the population. Or again, we don’t know about the effects of small doses on humans, as Hajiyev stated? This is in a country where thousands and thousands of people have been working with ionizing radiation for decades. And years Chelyabinsk, Semipalatinsk? Doses are different - from zero to lethal.

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If we talk about enterprises, then there are doses received by employees for all years, there are medical records, and those working in a clean zone - what are not the control groups? Talk about the high level of training of the operational personnel of the stations and the high responsibility of all employees should be left. These requirements are unconditional, of course, but they cannot convince anyone of the reliability of the stations. By the way, the Chernobyl personnel after the accident were recognized as well-trained, including by international experts. And to be objective, we must admit that the personnel of the Chernobyl station after 1986 are less well trained due to its large and constant replacement. Not because newcomers are worse, it just takes time to master. By order of the most strict, you cannot raise the qualifications of an employee; you need experience, skill. Staff errors were and will be. But what will be the result of the error: the explosion of the reactor, as it was at Chernobyl, when the personnel looked at the deviation of a parameter that did not even have a measuring device, or did not lead to anything, it depends on the equipment and the quality of the project.

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We need environmental education of the population. So that people would have neither indifference of the doomed, nor excessively high perception of the danger of radiation, as well as all other effects of anthropogenic environment. A lot of things fell upon us: food poisoned, not being able to increase productivity; poisoned the air; they ruined the land, releasing products that a person cannot attach to any place. You listen to the latest news on radio and television, and it seems that the news is in order to plague a person, and not to convey it. Therefore, we need a balanced approach without hysteria to the device of life. If we close the stations, then it’s normal, by the decision of the government, and not by disorganizing pickets. If you put it into operation, then again it’s normal, in a planned manner, and not under the pressure of compelling circumstances. There were reports of a possible resumption of the Armenian nuclear power plant. It is clear what caused this, but it will not be easy to start it, and, of course, all this is worse than if it worked continuously. I have no confidence in the ability of the people to reasonably organize social and state structures. Referenda, recent voting have shown this quite clearly. Moreover, there is no belief in the ability to correctly solve a special technical problem.

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And yet, in our conditions, the decision on the fate of nuclear energy should be given to the people, but not on the basis of rallying passions, where someone is shouting louder than the rights, but on the basis of a scientific one. For this, the former Soviet science (what is it now?) Must gain public confidence anew.

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Chapter 15

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Conclusion In describing the events of the Chernobyl tragedy, I was objective, did not hide anything, did not add anything. He spoke only about what I know reliably. By virtue of this special situation, so to speak, I was forced to resort not to references to documents, but to their literal presentation. Thus, I invite the reader to think and conclude, not to take a word. On the one hand, because the former prisoner and there is no trust, at least for many. Here is a small touch for you. After the accident, my daughter worked for a while at the station in the first department. The deputy HR director told her: “I can’t keep you in the first department, I can only offer you a place in the dining room.” Well, of course, they are going to put the father, and the daughter works in the secret department. Although what are the secrets? .. These people did not go anywhere. On the other hand, there are so many lies piled around Chernobyl that it is extremely difficult for a person to understand. So I give the actual events and the ABY article and propose to evaluate for ourselves how, for example, A3 fulfilled the requirement of this article.

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In practice, I am sure that he did not make inaccuracies in the presentation of events. Another thing is vision, assessment of events. You see, here I can’t be impartial with all the effort. And until now, either someone has come and talked late about the accident, or something had to be written - a sleepless night is provided. However, the situation, it seems to me, is so transparent that it is impossible to make a mistake even for a biased, interested, but not inclined to lie. Or I really don’t understand anything either in technology or in life. Judge for yourself. At 01 hours 23 minutes 40 seconds, the operator activated the A3 with a button to kill the reactor, when the central control system does not record a single deviation of the parameters of the reactor and its systems. This is an indisputable fact. Emergency protection, its material part was kept in good condition. The electronic part and the organs of influence on the reactivity (CPS rods) worked according to the algorithm and in full. Got a reactor explosion! ..

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What can be the claims against operational personnel? In a normal human society, none. Emergency protection in its name and purpose is intended to shut off the reactor in emergency situations without any damage. I’m not talking about the explosion. On April 26, the defense did not shut off the reactor in a stationary state. Even if we violated some provisions of the Rules or instructions earlier, this does not give any grounds for accusing the personnel of the explosion. After all, then nothing happened. Suppose we violated (in fact, no) the Regulation when we started to raise capacity after its “failure” and risked an accident similar to the one at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP in 1975. There was nothing. Suppose we violated the Rules by removing SAOR, but what does the explosion have to do with it? The reactor emergency cooling system from explosion could not be protected by the reactor, and after the explosion it was useless due to the destruction of the reactor. Only the “big exploiter” G. Medvedev says that it could in some mysterious way prevent the explosion, while the “naive” academician A.P. Aleksandrov was horrified by the conclusion.

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Even the official commissions, and they wouldn’t miss it, don’t talk about the possibility of preventing an accident using SAOR; even if only a ghostly opportunity had glimpsed, they would not have missed it. The reactor is blown up by emergency protection! .. The IAE Report lists thirteen alleged causes of a reactor explosion and, based on instrument readings and calculations, rejected all but one - the A3 rods introduced positive reactivity, which triggered the accident. Currently, it is this version, as the only consistent one, recognized by everyone for the cause of the accident. This has been clear for a long time, since 1986. The fact of introducing positive reactivity A3 when it is triggered, I refuse to qualify. Impossible. As Vitya Tarasenko put it, this is an oxymoron. This is so ingenious stupidity of the designers of the CPS rods that it could only be born in the heads when the owners of these heads took "seven hundred to the snout." After the fact of the explosion of the A3 reactor was established, what kind of fault can operational personnel be talking about? It turns out maybe. With morality turned inside out, anything is possible.

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And yet, dear citizens, gentlemen, when you talk about the Chernobyl tragedy, you want to throw a stone at the operators, remember that the reactor was blown up by A3. This phenomenon is not subject to engineering comprehension. The eternal monument to the headache of physicists and designers. The RBMK-1000 reactor in 1986 did not meet the fundamental requirements of regulatory and technical documents on nuclear safety. Based on the fact of the explosion, on the basis of post-accident calculations and experiments, the Gospromatomnadzor commission found fifteen violations of ABY articles in the reactor design that directly affected the occurrence and scale of the accident. In total, taking into account the “Rules for the Safe Construction and Operation of NPPs,” the reactor design contains thirty-two violated articles. A natural question arises: can this structure be called a reactor with so many deviations from the requirements? This is something else. Can such a structure work reliably? Although there is no question here. What is there to ask? The IAE report cited above in the “Most Plausible Versions and Their Analysis” section lists:

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3.1 Hydrogen explosion in a bubbler pool. 3.2 Hydrogen explosion in the lower cooling tank of the CPS loop. 3.3 Diversion. 3.4 Rupture of the pressure head manifold of the MCP or the distributing group collector 3.5 Rupture of the separator drum or steam-water communications. 3.6 The effect of displacers rods CPS. 3.7 Malfunction AR. 3.8 Gross error of the operator in the management of PP CPS 3.9 Cavitation of the MCP, leading to the supply of steam-water mixture into the technological channels. 3.10 Cavitation on throttle control valves. 3.11 Capture of steam from the separator drum into the downpipes. 3.12 Steam-zirconium reaction and explosion of hydrogen in the core. 3.13 Injection of compressed gas from ECCS cylinders.

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These are not all the possible reasons that led to the explosion of that device, but for a substantive conversation they are quite enough. For a version that does not contradict anything, accepted 3.6. Version 3.10 is perhaps impossible to implement. And now the most important thing. The remaining eleven versions of their implementation explode the reactor. And they can be realized quite well. And rejected not as impossible, but as contrary to the testimony of instruments and the logic of the events of April 26, 1986. This list is interesting because it was compiled by the creators of the reactor. The creators themselves admit that a number of situations lead this reactor to disaster. What is, for example, clause 3.7. "Fault AR"! Here is how the authors of the report write: "The malfunction associated with the immobility of all ARs can lead to acceleration of the reactor due to the large coefficient of reactivity in pairs." With such a coefficient as the RBMK reactor had in 1986, overclocking is really possible. Failure of the AR is not some incredible case, very likely.

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Moreover, the authors took a mild case of failure of the AR - the immobility of the rods. The theory of automatic control of reactors requires a trouble-free reactor in the more severe case of machine failure, namely: the movement of the rods in the direction of increasing reactivity. Then - the more explosion. While the authors of the report are in the framework of a technical study, competence and a sense of realism do not change them. As soon as they reached the conclusions, they had a strange transformation with logic: “It was determined that the primary cause of the accident was an extremely unlikely combination of violations of the order and operating mode committed by the personnel of the power unit (Here's an incredible thing!), Which revealed flaws in the design of the reactor and the CPS rods.” There is nothing to be surprised at, if we recall that the authors of the report - IAE workers - are the creators of the reactor. Thank you at least for what they called, they recognize the "explosive nature" of their offspring.

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Although not all cases have been named, these are enough to understand that such a reactor does not require any special circumstances to explode. But the unlikely and extremely unlikely RBMK reactor was. First, the unanimous commission of slanderous personnel. A company that includes scientists and unlearned ones (“not” can be written both together and separately - all the same, the meaning will be approximately the same). A commission of advanced old men and older, from the highest, administrators. With such a company, you can start any campaign without risking losing. And so far they have won a clearly wrong cause. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine how the creators in one reactor could assemble, it seems, all the defects conceivable for channel reactors. If not all, then the most terrible managed to collect. What an incredible thing! .. Three organizations are responsible for the quality of the RBMK-1000 project. The I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy provides the scientific justification for all questions on the reactor, including nuclear safety.

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His role is not limited to the issuance of scientific data and recommendations to designers, as A.P. Aleksandrov would like to present (his words: “Dollezhal created the reactor ...”). And then, in the process of operation, they were engaged in the reactor, for which the positions were appropriate: Scientific supervisor (Aleksandrov), two deputies (Kalugin, Kramerov) and a group of workers, one of whom I called here was V.P. Volkov. The Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering performed the design of the reactor, carried out field supervision during operation, and calculated the composition of the core using periodic data from power plants. Both of these organizations provided guidance on the work of the Station Nuclear Safety Departments. The State Oversight Committee is Gosatomenergonadzor, the first task of which is to install a barrier to the operation of reactors that do not meet the requirements of regulatory and technical documentation. The committee is not subordinate to any ministry. They gives permission to put the reactor into operation, by their decision the operation can be stopped at any time. The Committee has the right to demand any calculations, including additional ones. At least that's what it is.

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You can come up with another organization of work, but you can’t see why such a system should not work. But in the RBMK-1000 reactor, the system failed in all its links. Remember how it was with the rods of the CPS: • During the physical start-up of the reactor of the fourth unit in 1983, the introduction of positive reactivity was detected when the rod began to move into the zone. • The state inspector notes the inadmissibility of such a phenomenon and ... allows the commissioning of the reactor. • In December 1983, the supervisor wrote a letter to NIKIET about the need to eliminate the defect of the rods. • By December 1984, they accept and develop terms of reference for new rods. And that’s all. Neither working drawings, nor new rods until the accident. Here is an incredible combination, I don’t know what, but by no means the positive qualities of the Heroes and the Chairman of the Committee. As you can see, the Scientific Director, the Chief Designer, and the Supervision long before the accident understand the defect in the design of CPS rods.

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Replacing old rods with rods of a new design, without making the RBMK reactor safe, ruled out the accident on April 26 and in some other situations. Similarly for the steam reactivity coefficient. And if it had been reduced to an acceptable value, the reliability of the reactor would have increased by an order of magnitude. I can’t say why all those responsible for the design of the reactor, knowing its organic, completely unacceptable defects, were inactive. For the steam reactivity coefficient and CPS, I quoted the words of N.A. Dollezhal and I.Y. Emelyanov. Everyone knew and yet did nothing. Their positions were such that no one could prevent them. There is no system that would work. People work anyway. I don’t mean the political system, I don’t go there - illiterate. As before, for example, the bathhouse in the city of Torzhok was opened thanks to the party and to Comrade Stalin personally, and now everyone began to blame the system for stagnation. Even A.P. Aleksandrov, over whom the system did not dominate in any way, at least in RBMK affairs. A very convenient loophole to hide your idleness.

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Somewhere in the fifties, the scientific organization of labor began to enter into fashion with us. The engineer gives recommendations to the director of the plant to rearrange the table, bookcase, telephone. Aunt Masha washes the floor and says that before the revolution she worked in a mess, and when income fell, it was not furniture that was rearranged, but prostitutes were changed. Apparently, for a long time it was necessary to replace people in leadership positions on the RBMK topic. Aleksandrov, Dollezhal, Emelyanov quite manifested themselves in their statements after the accident. I think the leadership of Gosatomenergonadzor was incorrectly chosen. The head E. Kulov was always in the shadow of A.G. Meshkov, worked for a long time under his leadership and it was difficult to show independence in a new position. And his deputy Sidorenko came out from under Aleksandrov’s wing. It must be said that both Kulov and Sidorenko knew well that there was RBMK. The latter even wrote a letter indicating the negative properties of the reactor. But he mixed up something, in his post they do not write letters, but they prohibit the use of unusable equipment. There are writers for the epistolary genre.

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It would be possible to somehow understand all these leaders in the event of the discovery of completely unknown phenomena during the accident. Of course, this is unacceptable for the Scientific Advisor and the Chief Designer - they must know. But after all, they all knew everything that led to the accident long before it. Here is a combination of irresponsibility! .. Unlikely or extremely unlikely combination - I don’t know. Unnatural - yes. And maybe explainable. Which of them has been punished for criminal activity and inaction? No one! I don’t express my opinion about the possibility of using atomic energy to generate electricity. But, in my opinion, when deciding on the admissibility or inadmissibility of nuclear power plants, the Chernobyl accident should be excluded as a pathological case. In 1986, the RBMK-1000 reactor did not meet a large list of requirements of regulatory and technical documentation, including the fundamental, fundamental requirements for nuclear safety. Everyone was waiting, what kind of official organization in the Soviet Union would dare to declare that that reactor was in no way subject to operation, and first of all the crime was committed against the collectives of stations with these reactors.

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They were deceived on an atomic bomb because they were not informed of the true properties of the reactors. Now you can’t wait. And there is no Union, only disagreements remain. Even the commission of the State Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision, which God himself commanded to determine whether or not that reactor could be operated by installing a dozen or so violations of articles, did not find it possible to say directly. But the question is beyond doubt. General safety provisions and nuclear safety rules apply to nuclear power reactors. The design of the reactor was carried out with violations of these documents and, therefore, the reactor was not subject to operation. Our actions on April 26 at the reactor, executed in accordance with the ABY and BOP, did not lead to any accident, not to mention the explosion. This is perfectly clear. And, it would seem, the charges should be removed from the staff. There it was. There are people who are seeking out that if this were done, then there would be no accident. According to these people, it turns out that any rubbish can be thrust to the staff, and in the event of an accident, he is still guilty.

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We set traps, traps, and we fell into them. Einstein said: "God is sophisticated, but not evil." Designers turned out to be sophisticated and insidious. Now I know how to avoid an explosion on April 26th. However, provided that the A3 does not work on any signal automatically, otherwise - the coffin. Here, we survived: we are discussing how to escape ... from emergency protection. But this is April 26th, then there was nothing emergency at the reactor. In fact, one RBMK-1000 reactor was doomed to explode. According to the law, I don’t know who to ask the question, therefore I appeal to people in order to have an answer at least in moral terms. The reactor did not meet the design standards accepted in the country, and exploded precisely because of these inconsistencies. Is the staff guilty or are the designers guilty of it? I am writing these words, and everything in me shouts: you write nonsense. But no. At least, the lawyer answered me that he did not know the article in the USSR Labor Code or in another document having the force of law, where someone would be called guilty before the employee because of non-compliance of the equipment with the standard. Whether this is stupidity or not - I deduct it from reality.

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Well, of course, the laws in our country have always been directed in the one-state relationship only in one direction. The state could not be guilty. We were hired to work on equipment executed in accordance with the standards adopted in the country. The state has not complied with the terms of the contract. It’s not humanly, but the state cannot be blamed according to the laws. But we cannot be blamed in this case either by human standards, or even by laws. In the Soviet Union there has never been an organization or society capable or at least willing to protect a person. We will not talk about the state and the party, they are already gone. Law enforcement agencies have long and unequivocally aimed in one direction. The union, driven to the point of absurdity, when all in one union, naturally, could not protect anyone. And so on. We seem to be going to society with some kind of face. I want a person to not scream in horror at the sight of this face. In conclusion, I want to say the following. The Chernobyl disaster in its purest form is the result of gross miscalculations of physicists and reactor designers. It's time to say: the properties of the reactor have become not the main, not decisive, but the only cause of the Chernobyl disaster.

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Chapter 16

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More About Chernobyl (Unpublished Article in Russian) In 1986, the IAEA expert group released the INSAG-1 report on the causes of the Chernobyl disaster, and seven years later their revised INSAG-7 report came out. Seven years is enough to study many studies and form your own opinion. Following the release of INSAG-7, the article by Mr. D. Valley, “Who is to blame for the Chernobyl accident — mature thoughts of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group” was published in the journal Nuclear Engineering. Let’s try to evaluate the maturity of experts ’thoughts. 1. About coolant heating For eight years there has been an erroneous assertion that due to the large flow rate of the coolant, its underheating at the entrance to the core decreased, boiling began at the very bottom of the core and, as a result, thermal-hydraulic instability arose. The author of the article indicated the fallacy of this in 1986, then in a letter addressed to the director of the IAEA.

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1.1. Report, paragraph 2.9. “These conditions led to the onset of boiling in or near the bottom of the core.” According to the Regulation, underheating is the temperature difference between the water in the drum separators and at the entrance to the core. It really decreases with an increase in flow rate, but at the same time, the pressure at the inlet to the core increases and, accordingly, the boiling point (Fig. 1, Appendix 3). At a low reactor power, boiling generally begins outside the core in the PVC pipes, gradually dropping with increasing power. And the higher the flow rate, the higher the boiling point boundary. Specifically, on April 26, with a reactor power of 200 MW (channel power in the central part of the active zone of about 160 MW), boiling began at the very top of the zone (Table 1 and Fig. 2, Appendix 3). 1.2. Report, clause 5.2.3. “The reactor was operated in the mode of boiling the coolant in the core and at the same time with little or no underheating at the pump inlet and at the core inlet. This mode alone could lead to a devastating accident, ... given the positive feedback on the reactivity of the RBMK reactor. ”

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The reactor is operated only in boiling mode and, according to the Regulation, allows operation with small, even zero, underheating, see Regulation, chapter 9. This condition is mandatory, since such modes cannot be avoided in principle - they occur with any increase in power, with a decrease in pressure in the separators . An interesting position of experts is to explain to the staff the destructive effect of positive feedback. Good (operators will know why they died, crippled), but it is better that the reactor meets the design standards. If the reactor explodes in a mode that cannot be avoided, then there is only one answer - prohibition of operation. What is there to explain? On April 26, the underheating was approximately one degree, and the pressure slowly increased (Table 2, Appendix 3). 2. About the work of the MCP 2.1. Experts reanimated the long-rejected version of the failure of the pumps. There was no breakdown in circulation: • If the pumps didn’t break off when the pressure decreased, then why would this happen when the pressure increased?

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•

•

•

The control system recorded the correct operation of the pumps up to a sharp jump in power; The pumps powered from the “running-out” generator could not be disrupted - there is no reason; However, it was the “run-out” pumps that turned off first (see INSAG-7, Appendix I, Table I-I), and then those powered from the reserve. This indicates that the reason for the termination of the coolant supply was a sharp surge in power.

There are still arguments, however, if this is not enough for experts, then you can’t convince them of anything. 2.2. That reactor did explode when the MCC failed. And this could be when the steam lines were broken, when the main safety valves were opened and not planted, during MPA ... But only the authors of the reactor should be blamed for this. To finish about the MCP, I will stop: 2.3. Report, paragraph 2.8. “Moreover, since the temperature of the coolant in the section from the circulation pumps to the entrance to the core does not

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change significantly, with very little underheating, the temperature inside the pumps and at the suction in them is close to the boiling point.” Some strange explanation of the direct and clear: the temperature at the pump inlet approaches the boiling point at a high coolant flow rate due to less cooling of it with feed water and an increase in pressure loss in the lowering path (see Fig. 1, Appendix 3). 2.4. Report, paragraph 2.9. “After turning off the turbine, the operation of the pumps powered from it began to slow down, as the speed of rotation of the turbine decreased and the voltage of the generator connected with it decreased. A decreasing flow rate through the core caused an increase in vapor content in the core and caused the initial positive feedback on reactivity, which, at least in part, was the cause of the accident. ” • A 10% reduction in consumption over 36 s run-up caused an increase in reactivity, which AR successfully copes with. There was no increase in power. • It is enough to look at the capacity graph provided by the IAEA in 1986. This is also stated

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•

in Appendix 1, paragraphs 1-4.6.2. (INSAG-7). If it’s not enough, they would ask a member of the group E. Burlakov and he would present the calculation from 1986 of his employee A. Apresov (see table 2, Appendix 3).

During the run-out, the coolant density changed by 6 kg / m3 (Table 2, Appendix 3), which gives an increase in reactivity of the order of 24 × 10-6; in real conditions, the rate of change in reactivity is several times greater. So, in principle, a true thought without taking into account actual data and at least elementary calculations leads to unreasonable (false) conclusions. Thus, the questions about coolant underheating, about the breakdown and run-down of the MCP, as well as the question about the run-out of the heating system, have nothing to do with the accident. If at the very last moment they refused to conduct an experiment, the result would be the same.

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As it is now clear, more than once they were on the verge of disaster: following the operation of the A3, there were cases of loss of signals from the AZM and AZS. They should not be considered false, failing to comprehend.

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And these were actual power surges caused by the A3, not noted by the SFKRE recorder due to the inertia of the silver sensors used. And the AZM and AZS signals had time to drop out, since they work from less inertial ionization chambers, but there was no recording device from them. Compare with April 26: at 23 min. 40 with the button reset A3, after 3 s the signals AZM and AZS. It is appropriate to state the following: in Appendix II, chapter II-2.5.3. (INSAG-7) it is said that one of the calculation models does not reproduce such acceleration of the reactor when, in the third second from the moment of AZ-5 dumping, signals appear that exceed the settings for power and its slew rate. Perhaps, but it is necessary to consider not three, but almost four seconds, since the resolution of fixation is one second. Then (see Fig. 16.1), there are no contradictions. To clarify what was said: between the two events of 1994 and 1995. the time span can be two hours and two years without two hours. 3. Operational reactivity margin The authors of the reactor, and with them the IAEA experts, are incrementally assigning one function after another to the OZR parameter:

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3.1. The ability to maneuver power. 3.2. Compensation for fuel burnout. These are functions that are natural to all reactors; they are specified in books and regulations. 3.3. Regulation of energy release by reactor volume. It also seems to be a natural function based on the “continuous” mode of refueling and large sizes, although RBMK is not the only large reactor. 3.4. Guarantor of the reactor protection performance. Moreover, restrictions are not imposed to the maximum, which would be natural, but to the minimum (?). 3.5. Efficiency is provided not only with a certain OZR, but some configuration of the rods must also be observed. But this is absurd, a violation of all design standards. The designers made a clear mistake in the design of the rods when, when moving in one direction, they introduce reactivity of a different sign. Immediately after the accident, the rods were deemed unfit by everyone, including the authors, but, surprisingly, the designers found the support of experts.

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Report, clause 5.1. “A positive run-out of reactivity could only occur due to the special position of the CPS rods.” There are many such “special provisions”, and the reactivity run-out occurred only due to the erroneous construction of the rods. With a normal design, there are no "special provisions" and cannot be. The question is why did experts need to defend the long-rejected? And, finally, another function is the observance of the steam reactivity coefficient within the limits. Report, paragraph 4.2. “When discussing the scenario, it turned out that the operators apparently did not know about another reason for the importance of OZR, which is that it can greatly affect the steam and power coefficients.” Yes, the staff did not know how to find out if the authors of the reactor did not know. A. Abagyan, Y. Cherkashov and others “out of oblivion” did not tell when they became aware of this. Here, the change in the ORM occurs due to poisoning of the reactor, i.e. the appearance of xenon is offset by the removal of the rods.

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However, tantamount to affecting the reproduction rate, the effect on the steam ratio is not the same. And this is by no means obvious. Still appreciate the effect. The regulation defines the value of the OZR from 30 to 15 rods. Reducing up to 15 rods cannot be blamed on operators, and it is impossible to work otherwise. Operators have looked (there’s nothing to look at) the decrease in the OEC to eight rods. Total, on their conscience 7 rods. In the article by N. Laletin (Atomic Energy magazine. 1993. V.74. Issue 3), a change in the ORM of 25 rods changes the vapor effect by 0.5%. Therefore, seven rods added 0.14%. Bad, but not this additive played a fatal role, but the existing steam reactivity effect of 2.5 ... 3.0%. To understand this, one does not have to be in the rank of international experts. After the accident, 80 DPs were placed in the core (according to the effect on the vapor effect of the reactivity, DPs are equivalent to a CPS core). But 80 DPs are few, and you cannot place them anymore, since they are installed in technological channels and therefore the number of fuel assemblies decreases. Only out of need increased OZR to 43 ... 48 rods with the limitation of reducing the stock to 30, not less. Such a supply is not needed for operation, and it is forbidden for the operator to use it; at its disposal, as before the accident, 15 rods.

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Greater reactivity, offset by operational agencies, is a rather strange method of improving security. Mysterious affairs with the RBMK reactor. Before the accident, it was the only reactor in the world that was especially nuclearhazardous with a small reactivity margin. 4. Void coefficient of reactivity Both the expert report and other documents speak of a steam coefficient of reactivity, while it is necessary to speak of a steam coefficient of an unacceptable value. It turns out that after the accident at the Leningrad NPP in 1975, the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of Environment and Minerals decided to have it no more than 0.5%, which the creators of the reactor “safely” forgot. They were quite satisfied with the calculated curve 1 (Fig. 16.2).

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A small comment on the picture. Curve 1 does not provide safety - the reactivity overrun when the density changes to 0.4 g / cm 3 is 2 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff. The error is the same as with a change in reactivity compensated by CPS rods - only extreme states are considered. Curve 2 is named - actual dependence at the time of the accident on April 26. The Jesuit device is neither a lie nor a truth. Such a steam effect was observed at all RBMK reactors and not only on April 26th. The curve was obtained several years before the accident by the IAE employee V. Ivanov and confirmed by measurements after. The leadership of Ivanov did not believe. They understood that they were in danger of an explosion, but they did not check either by calculation or by experiment. Like this. One may ask why Ivanov did not scream? Shouted there alone, V.P. Volkov, so he was quickly brought to disability. Unclean tricks are also used by experts. 4.1. Report, paragraph 4.2. “During the accident, the steam coefficient increased to such an extent that it began to prevail over the other components of the power coefficient, and the power coefficient itself became positive.”

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The meaning of the phrase - April 26 was some kind of special regime, well, and who implemented it is understandable. The operators made the power factor positive, since the ORM was 8 rods. Is not it? Perhaps, as in 1986, the experts did not have information? It was. On page 45 of Appendix I to the INSAG-7 report we read: “The second generations of RBMK nuclear power plants were loaded from the very beginning with fuel enriched with 2% uranium-235, but even with this enrichment, as the burnup increases to 1,100 ... 1 200 MW day / fuel assemblies and with a regulated operational stock of 26 ... 30 PP rods, the value of the steam coefficient became close to +5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff. Close burnup values were at the 4th Chernobyl NPP unit before the accident. ” And further - with such a steam coefficient, the power factor is +0.6 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff / MW at a power of more than 50%. With less power, it is all the more positive. 4.2. In the article of N. Laletin mentioned above, it is noted: “It is important that for a uniformly burned-out zone the steam effect is approximately two times greater than for a zone with the same average burn-up, but distributed along the fuel channels from zero to about double the average value.

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It follows that the state of the reactor at the end of the transition period, when all additional absorbers are removed, is more dangerous than the state of steadystate overloads, although they coincide in average burnup. ” (At the initial loading of the reactor with fresh fuel assemblies, about 240 DP are loaded into the zone to extinguish excess reactivity). The active zone of the 4th block was located at the end of the transition period: 1 DP, 1 unloaded channel, 1,659 cassettes with an average burnup of 1,180 MW days / fuel assembly. The bulk of fuel assemblies (75%) consisted of first load assemblies with burnup of 1,150 ... 1,700 MW days / fuel assemblies. We can say that the vapor effect was more than +5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff, although this is quite enough for an explosion.And a question for experts - did the operators “make” the fast power factor or the designers positive? 4.3. Report, paragraph 2.1. “Therefore, although the steam reactivity coefficient varied in a wide range from negative to positive values depending on the composition of the active zone and the operating mode of the reactor, the fast power coefficient under normal operating conditions remained negative. During the accident, both steam and power reactivity ratios were positive. ”

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If not to justify the designers, then why all this phrase? According to the Regulation, all power levels from the minimum-controlled to the nominal were considered normal operating conditions, and the operating time was not limited anywhere. If experts wanted to say that the power coefficient remained negative at rated power, then true, but clearly not enough. Design standards require this for all operational and emergency conditions. 5. Further comments on the INSAG-7 report 5.1. Report, paragraph 4.1. “An emergency shutdown of the reactor before a sharp power surge that led to the destruction of the reactor, of course, could be a decisive factor contributing to this.” That is, experts say that a jump in reactor power should have occurred and the personnel either foresaw this, or accidentally dropped the protection before the jump, which accelerated or even predetermined the catastrophe.

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This is new. Why did not the experts express the reasons for the upcoming power surge, at least presumably? Not a single commission found reasons. The author of the article, as an eyewitness, claims: the protection button is pressed in a relaxed atmosphere. There is also evidence of eyewitnesses G. Metlenko and A. Kuhar. In Appendix I, paragraphs 1-4.9., To INSAG-7 it is said that the commission did not find the reasons for the reset of A3. The reason for the reset of protection is one - the desire to stop the reactor at the end of work. Resetting the protection did not “contribute” to the destruction of the reactor, but caused it. 5.2. Report, paragraph 4.1. “The destruction of the fuel channel would cause a sharp local increase in steam content due to the transformation into a coolant vapor; this would lead to a local increase in reactivity, which would cause the spreading effect of reactivity. " That reactor had much more “traps” for staff than what experts called. Gap channel (one, two) does not apply to them.

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If the channel ruptures, the amount of water in the zone will increase and does not matter - in the form of steam or liquid. In addition, water will cool the graphite. Both reasons will lead to a decrease in reactivity, 5.3. Report, clause 5.2.1. “It was stated that longterm operation of the reactor at a power level below 700 MW was prohibited. This statement was based on incorrect information. Such a prohibition should have existed, but at that moment it wasn’t ”. That reactor "successfully" exploded at 700 MW. There was no safe power level for him. It was only more or less dangerous. On the other hand, a design-compliant reactor does not need such a restriction. There is no technical safety justification for power above 700 MW. And they took on a directly mystical character (forcing the whole world to lie to academics and doctors) only to blame the staff. The level of 700 MW in the preparation of the program was established by the author of this article, based on secondary considerations. At the time of compiling the program, it was assumed that we would check the main safety valves, for which significant power is required - the throughput of one valve is 725 tons of steam per hour.

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Since the execution of the TG run-off program was carried to the very end (due to the connection of most mechanisms to the backup power supply - this is the security measures in the absence of which the program is criticized) and the reactor was muffled, in order not to wait for a decrease in power, the level was recorded with the alleged previous work. After an unplanned failure of the reactor power, the author of the article decided to limit himself to a rise of up to 200 MW due to the sufficiency, and not because of impossibility. Is it not clear that with a positive fast power factor there are no obstacles to raising power? Of course, when making the decision, it was taken into account that 200 MW is the usual power permitted by the Regulation. 5.4. This is not to say that emergency situations and operation data were not analyzed. So, after the accident at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP, the commission (E. Kunegin and others) issued recommendations in 1976: • To reduce the void coefficient; • Change the design of the CPS rods; • Create a high-speed A3.

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It was similar when detecting the introduction of positive reactivity protection. In December 1984, a technical design for new rods was even developed. There were other suggestions. However, all this was strongly ignored by the leadership, including IAEA experts Y. Cherkashov, V. Sidorenko, A. Abagyan. This, Mr. D. Valley, explains why there was so little benefit from the inclusion of high officials in the composition of experts, although they have in their hands technicians, calculators, and reactor characteristics … Due to the management’s neglect of the RBMK theme, both initially enshrined in the project and clearly dangerous physical characteristics revealed during operation, the RBMK reactor was doomed to explode. 6. Causes of the accident The reactor did not meet the requirements of more than three dozen articles of design standards - more than enough for an explosion. There is another way: the reactor was in the state of an atomic bomb before the protection was dropped and there was not even a single warning signal. How could the staff know about it - by smell, by touch?

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On April 26, the accident occurred as a result of the joint action of A3 due to the erroneous construction of its rods and a positive fast power reactivity coefficient. In other situations, each of these factors individually could lead to an accident. There is no point in talking about the rods of the CPS; everything is clear enough. But the power factor is needed. First of all, it makes sense to calculate the vapor effect in connection with the article by N. Laletin (see paragraph 4.2.). The RBMK reactor was most dangerous at power levels up to about 40%, depending on the flow rate of the coolant due to the large positive fast power factor. The change in the density of the coolant, and with it the reactivity, referred to a unit of power, at a lower level, is significantly greater than near the nominal value (see Fig. 4, Appendix 3). Of course, a change in reactivity cannot be directly related to density, but the character will remain the same. None of the documents on the reactor about this was written before the accident. Only after it began the study at low power levels, see, for example, the IAE report inventory number No ЗЗР / 1-1007-90 from September 1990.

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After all the measures taken to reduce the steam reactivity coefficient to 0.8 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff, the power coefficient at 200 MW became minus 6-10 -7 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff / MW. What was it like for the steam coefficient +5 β-decays, undergoing radiation transformations, eff? Moreover, contrary to experts, there is a great danger with less coolant flow. 7. Personnel Actions Before talking about the fault of personnel, think about it - the reactor is blown up by emergency protection! If Mr. D. Valley concluded that the accusations of the staff were unfair, based on an analysis of the factual material of the appendices to the report, then he is right. This does not follow from the expert report itself. Rather, the opposite. For example, in 1986 V. Legasov and A. Abagyan did not report the fact of introducing A3 positive reactivity due to its obvious odiousness. Experts write that if they knew, the conclusion would be different. They found out and concluded that they actually accused the personnel of resetting the protection, see section 5.1. articles. This was not done even at the time of the most rabid accusations of personnel.

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In clause 6.6. experts write the report: “And yet INSAG is still of the opinion that the critical actions of the personnel were mostly erroneous.” Now imagine a reactor that meets design standards. What actions of operators are erroneous, critical? How and why were operators obliged to compensate for unknown project errors? Only the lack of legal grounds for accusing the staff in 1986 forced V. Legasov and A. Abagyan to resort to blatant lies. Well, it’s clear with them. The readiness with which experts picked her up and acted as a prosecutor is amazing. Before the whole world, people are accused of violating documents that they themselves have not even seen. Tied to the first report, experts in the second are forced to keep the line. INSAG-7, like the first report, inaccurately and simply erroneously interprets events, processes, and, in principle, corrects the situation with false bias. Cannot play a positive role Experts should be thanked for the publication of Appendices I and II. The actual material in them is true, for experts, of course, valuable. But one must be careful with conclusions and value judgments.

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So, in Appendix II: “These characteristics of the reactor installation ... ensured the reliable and efficient operation of RBMK in all regulatory regimes and safety for the entire list of design basis accidents in accordance with the approved design documentation.” What is wrong is nothing to say. For order only: • The designer did not include in the list and is it clean? • With MPA, the reactor exploded.

Former deputy Chief Engineer Anatoly Dyatlov

Ukraine, Kiev, 1995

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APPENDIX

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Appendix 1

Viktor P. Bryukhanov, Anatoly S. Dyatlov and Nikolai M. Fomin on trail after the disaster.

Anatoly S. Dyatlov

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Appendix 2 Table II: Chronology of the technological process at the 4th block of the Chernobyl NPP Time

Events

April 25, 1986 (time according to the operational journal) 01 h 06 min

The beginning of unloading of the power unit; OZR is equal to 31 PP rod

03 h 45 min

Replacement of gas purge composition for graphite stack of the reactor with nitrogen-helium mixture for nitrogen

03 h 47 min

Thermal power of the reactor 1,600 MW

from 04 h 13 min Alternate measurement of characteristics to 12 h 36 min of control systems and vibrational characteristics of TG-7, -8 at constant thermal power of the reactor 1,500 MW 07 h 10 min

The OPR equals 13.2 RR core

13 h 05 min

Disconnected from the TG-7 network

14 h 00 min

SAOR disconnected from KMPTs

14 h 00 min

Postponement of the test program at the request of the dispatcher Kyivenergo

15 h 20 min

The OPR equals 16.8 PP core

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18 h 50 min

The load of auxiliary equipment not participating in the tests was transferred to power from a working transformer T6

23 h 10 min

Unloading of the power unit is continued, OZR is equal to 26 RR rods

01 h 06 min

The beginning of unloading of the power unit; OZR is equal to 31 PP rod

On April 26, 1986 (the time of the printout of DREG) 00 h 05 min The thermal power of the reactor was 720 (according to the MW operational journal) 00 h 28 min (according to the operational journal)

At a thermal power of the reactor of about 500 MW transition from the system of local automatic power control to the AR power of the main range (1AR, 2AR). During the transition, the program allowed an unintended reduction in thermal power to 30 MW (neutron power to zero). Started lifting capacity

00 h 34 min 03 sec

Emergency level deviations in separator drums

00 h 43 min 37 sec

Emergency level deviations in separator drums

00 h 52 min 27 s 01 h 00 min 04 s

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01 h 09 min 45 s 01 h 18 min 52 s 00 h 36 min 24 sec

A3 setpoint for pressure reduction in drum-separators transferred from 55 to 50 kgf / cm2

from 00 h 39 min DREG did not work 32 sec to 00 h 43 min 35 Personnel blocked A3 signal for stopping sec two TG from 00 h 41 min Disconnect from the TG-8 network to to 01 h 16 min remove vibration characteristics at idle (idle running log) from 00 h 52 min DREG did not work 35 s to 00 h 59 min 54 s 01 h 03 min The thermal power of the reactor was (according to the raised to 200 MW and stabilized operational journal) 01 h 03 min The seventh MCP (MCP-12) is included in (according to the the work operational journal)

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01 h 07 min The seventh MCP (MCP-22) is included in (according to the the work operational journal) 01 h 12 min 10 s DREG did not work to 01 h 18 min 49 s 01 h 19 min 39 s Signal “1 PC-UP” registered to 01 h 19 min 44 s 01 h 19 min 57 s Signal "1 PC-UP" 01 h 22 min 30 s The parameters were recorded on magnetic tape. (The calculation was made after the accident at the Smolensk NPP, the OZR under the PRISMA program turned out to be 8 rods of PP) 01 h 23 min 04 s The “Oscilloscope is on” command has been issued, the shut-off and control valves of turbine No. 8 are closed. Four MCPs have started coasting: -13, -23 (section 8PA), -14, -24 (section 8RB) 01 h 23 min 10 s MPA Button Press 01 h 23 min 30 s The signal "1 PC-UP" was taken (duration 3 min 33 s) 01 h 23 min 40 s The button AZ-5 is pressed. Rods A3 and (01 h 23 min 39 s PP started moving into the core by teletype)

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01 h 23 min 43 s A3 signals appeared over the acceleration period - a period of less than 20 s; and also in excess of capacity - a capacity of more than 530 MW 01 h 23 min 46 s Disabling the first pair of “running out” MCPs 01 h 23 min 46.5 Disabling the second pair of “running out” s MCPs 01 h 23 min 47 s A sharp decrease in expenses (by 40%) of MCPs not participating in the coast (MCP11, -12, -21, -22) and an unreliable indication of the costs of MCPs participating in the coast (MCP-13, -14, 23, -24 ); a sharp increase in pressure in the BS; a sharp rise in the level in the BS; signals “malfunction of the measuring part” of both APs of the main range (1AP, 2AP); 01 h 23 min 48 s Recovery of expenses for MCPs not participating in coasting to values close to the initial ones; on runaway MCPs on the left side, cost recovery is 15% lower than the original; on outgoing MCPs on the right side, recovery of flow rate by 10% of the initial for MCP-24; and unreliability for MCP-23; a further increase in pressure in the BS (the left side - 75.2 kgf / cm2, the right - 88.2 kgf / cm2) and the level in the BS; operation of BRU-K1, BRU-K2

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01 h 23 min 49 s The A3 signal "pressure increase in RP (open CC)"; the signal "no voltage=48 V" (power is removed clutches servos CPS); the signals of "failure of the Executive part 1АР, 2АР". From the record in operating log senior engineer of reactor control: "01 h 24 min: Strong shocks, the CPS rods stopped before reaching the NC (lower limit switch). Removed the key of a muffs feeding»

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Appendix 3

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Appendix 4 [Newspaper "Komsomolsk Banner". April 20, 1991]

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The Reactor Was Supposed To Explode Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov, the former deputy chief engineer of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, considers the scientific supervisor and chief designer of the RBMK1000 reactor to be directly responsible for the catastrophe. This is the same reactor that exploded on April 26, 1986. New Kiev microdistrict. Standard prefabricated house. Dermatine-studded door. We are calling. Opens a tall, sickly thin man. From under the whitish eyebrows a smart, attentive look. He smiles affably, holding out his hand ... Only after greeting, inadvertently notice the spots of radioactive burns on them. Pale pink, but noticeable spots ... This is the former deputy chief engineer of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant A.S.Dyatlov. Convicted, sentenced - means guilty of all known crime. By law and people, Dyatlov are recognized as one of the main "authors" of the largest catastrophe of the 20th century. Most recently, Anatoly Stepanovich returned home.

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From the “penal colony” - this is what he calls the penal colony of general regime, where he served his sentence under article 220 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Do not hide: we went to Dyatlov as a criminal. And they left his apartment, as if from the victim’s home. We were going to expose, but we had to sympathize ... And agree. Tell us a little about yourself. They say that before working at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, you were engaged in the nuclear power plants of nuclear submarines in the Far East? Yes it is. I was born in 1931 near Krasnoyarsk. By education and seniority - a qualified specialist in the operation of nuclear power plants. I liked the work in the Far East. But once during my vacation I stopped at the then-built Chernobyl nuclear power plant. And he agreed with the director Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov on the job as deputy head of the workshop. In Chernobyl, I participated in the installation, commissioning and operation of all four units. When the investigation was conducted, it all came down to the fact that the culprits were operational personnel, and primarily Dyatlov themselves. However, the Chernobyl workers understood that the accident was by no means our fault.

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Therefore, during the trial, the vast majority of witnesses did not deny my competence. Moreover, the materials of the process themselves, in my opinion, convincingly prove that the operational personnel of the station are innocent. But the verdict, as everyone knows, was completely different. How do you explain this? The sentence could not be different. I can argue that you will not name a single fact of punishment for the largest accidents of recent years, anyone other than dispatchers, operators, captains and other “switchmen”. It is well said about this in a letter printed in the magazine "Young Guard" by mountain rescuers from the Donetsk region who eliminated the consequences of mine poisoning: “A system has been created and is clearly operating to evade the responsibility of the main perpetrators of the outrages. The monopolist themself investigates the accident, they outlines the measures and monitors their implementation. " Everything was exactly the same with us at the Chernobyl station. Not a single commission, and there were several, included representatives of operational personnel, that is, those who were accused of an accident. The commissions consisted only of potential, and sometimes actual perpetrators of the disaster.

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An objective investigation could not be expected from them. He was not there. And those materials that refuted the generally accepted version were not given any attention at the interdepartmental scientific and technical councils on June 2 and 17, 1986 under the chairmanship of Academician A.P. Aleksandrov. At these meetings, the concept of the accident was developed, leading the creators of the equipment away from responsibility and shifting all the blame to the staff. The materials of the meetings formed the basis of the report of the government commission, which was sent to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the IAEA. True, the incredible sounded from the rostrum of the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU - it was said that the Politburo and the government did not understand the causes of the Chernobyl accident. No, it’s not true that, they say, “they didn’t figure it out,” they didn’t want to figure it out! After all, no one prevented the highest authorities from attracting the best scientific forces to the analysis of the causes of the accident, carefully studying the history of the issue, so to speak ... So, the Chernobyl disaster had certain prerequisites?

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Background? Not that word! The official explanation of what happened is as follows. The accident occurred as a result of the incredible coincidence of several gross violations by the maintenance personnel of the norms and rules of operation of the power unit. But it is not difficult for me to prove that the RBMK-1000 reactor inevitably had to explode somewhere. Such facts are practically unknown to the public. In 1975, an accident occurred at the Leningrad NPP: the channel was depressurized at the same reactor as in Chernobyl. A commission of Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy employees sorted out what had happened and developed a list of recommendations for improving the reliability of the reactor, including on such important issues as reducing the steam reactivity coefficient and creating a high-speed emergency protection system. These recommendations began to be implemented more than ten years later, after the Chernobyl disaster. Further. In 1983, when we, in Chernobyl, were loading the reactor with process fuel, physical measurements of the characteristics of the active zone were made and an extremely dangerous phenomenon was discovered - the emergency protection rods, when moving down for five seconds, introduced not negative, but positive reactivity into the reactor .

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However, the commission on physical start-up completely unreasonably considered it possible to allow the reactor to operate. The inspector of Gosatomenergonadzor also agreed with the commission. True, the supervisor, understanding how dangerous this is, writes a letter to the chief designer about the need to eliminate the defect. By December 1984, the designer was developing a technical task, and ... that’s it. It took a catastrophe to finally seriously address this issue and begin to change the rods in the reactor! And one more amazing fact. The head of the reliability and safety group of nuclear plants with RBMK reactors of the Kurchatov Institute laboratory V.P. Volkov repeatedly submitted memoranda to all his supervisors with justification of the danger of the reactor and gave suggestions for its improvement. Nobody paid attention to them. In the end, V.P. Volkov was forced to turn to the academician A.P. Aleksandrov himself. But, alas, that was his report in the office of the President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR until the accident. When trouble happened, Volkov handed over all the materials to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. After that, they stopped letting him go to college. Then, in search of the truth, he wrote to M.S. Gorbachev himself.

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From the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the materials of V.P. Volkov were sent to Gosatomenergonadzor. There they created a commission, which recognized the correctness of the specialist. This is where the truly incredible coincidence of blatant negligence! Nothing prevented the scientific supervisor of the work on creating the reactor, academician A.P. Aleksandrov and chief designer, academician N.A. Dollezhal to improve the reactor after the accident at the Leningrad NPP, after the results of starting tests in Chernobyl, after serious warnings of V.P. Volkov! It would be done on time - no disaster happened. So who are the real criminals - us or they? At the trial, by the way, materials about the fault of the designers of the reactor were singled out in a separate legal proceeding. How it ended - no one knows. How can it be? According to rumors (there are no official reports), the case of designers was dismissed due to the lack of a judicial perspective. They, you see, fall under the amnesty announced in connection with the 70th anniversary of Soviet power. However, now we are talking about something else. The truth about

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the true causes of the accident, if we understood you correctly, has still not been said. Why do you think so? Because the true culprits of the catastrophe are firmly bound by a common lie. Sometimes it is so obvious that you just wonder how people don’t know about it. How many times, for example, has been said about the unexplored issue of the effect on health of small doses of radiation. And this is said in a country where for thousands of years thousands of people have been working with radioactive materials. It is enough to take medical cards, collect pollution data over the years and derive elementary mathematical relationships to find out the answer to this question. The lie about Chernobyl is distributed in millions of copies. Here is an elementary example. The correspondent of Pravda Krivomazov, according to the chairman of the government commission for the investigation of the Ufa tragedy, writes: “Recall that in Chernobyl there were as many as four defense systems“ against the fool ”and all four managed to be disconnected.” Was it really so? If only people thought before speaking! Are we suicides to turn off protection?

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The truth is that in 1986 the RBMK-1000 reactor did not have a single so-called “protection against fool”. I wrote about this to the Pravda newspaper, but I didn’t get an answer ... The organ of the CPSU Central Committee, like Caesar’s wife, always comes out beyond suspicion? And this is not an isolated case. Academician L.A. Buldakov from the pages of Smena magazine (No 24 for the last year) claims that it was not belated, but there was an advance evacuation of the population from Pripyat. What advance can we talk about if it was already very clear by the 26th day by 12 noon that people should not live in Pripyat. The academician cannot but understand this. Why is he telling a deliberate lie? I want to emphasize: L.A. Buldakov is a physician, he does not bear direct responsibility for the accident. Now imagine what people with similar morality say, directly guilty of a disaster, say, academician Anatoly Petrovich Alexandrov. From the very beginning of the events to the current year (I judge by the latest publication of The Spark), he has been repeating the responsibility of service personnel. Let's think together. If the official version of the causes of the disaster is true, then why was it necessary to classify all the information about the accident?

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Journalists, suppose, can really confuse something. But specialists working at nuclear power plants must know everything about the disaster, so as not to make similar mistakes. But they did not say a word, either, since these people would immediately understand the true reliability of the Alexander-made reactor. Well, but no one has deprived you and other experts of the right to vote in court. Right. I was not going to be silent. Therefore, the materials of the process, as I said, fully prove our innocence. As an argument about the reliability of the reactors, forensic experts argued that by the time of the accident they had already worked out about 100 reactors (in fact, only 87). At first glance - convincing. But let's take a pencil in our hand. If 87 reactors are divided into 13 RBMK-1000 reactors existing in the country, then it turns out that every 5-6 years we should have Chernobyl. Does this suit anyone? Surely not. Moreover, the eloquent recognition of the academician N.A. Dollezhal was attached to the case. Let me quote it.

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“When working with two percent enrichment of uranium, the influence of the vapor effect and reactivity is regulated by the setting of channels of special absorbers, which is strictly provided for in the operating instructions. Deviation from them is unacceptable, as it makes the reactor uncontrollable. ” Our reactor did not have additional absorbers in the core. It turns out that sooner or later had to explode according to the recognition of the chief designer! Dollezhal, by the way, is the only one of the specialists who worked on reactors, who told the truth. As you see, he himself admitted that the reactor that was in Chernobyl was uncontrollable, and the emergency protection was not properly designed. Alexandrov is still blaming everything on the operational staff and does not recognize anything. Remember: the disaster began by pressing the emergency protection button. I want to clarify: this button also serves to shut down the reactor under normal conditions. So, on April 26, 1986, we pressed the button in the usual modes provided for by all instructions to drown out the reaction. And instead they got an explosion.

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How can this be at all - the emergency protection does not jam, but blows up the reactor? There can only be one answer - that is how it was designed. Given all the above, I want to say directly: neither the builders, nor the installers, nor the equipment manufacturers, nor the workers of the station are completely innocent in the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Physicists and constructors should be entirely responsible for it. An accident is a big disaster. Like any misfortune, she has culprits and saviors. What do you say about firefighters? Are there people who claim that their death was almost in vain? I don’t know, maybe they violated some instructions. But I am firmly convinced that on April 26, firefighters saved us from a global catastrophe. If the pockets of fire that they extinguished developed into a big fire and spread to other units operating at rated power, the scale of the tragedy would be disproportionately large. As for the deaths of firefighters, there is one “but”: even if they put on special clothes, this would not save them from gamma radiation. Those firefighters who extinguished the foci from the ejected hot fuel on the roof are certainly heroes. Only an automatic fire extinguishing system could save them from death. But it was not on the roof.

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Therefore, we must bow to the blessed memory of these courageous people. We understand your desire to shed light on the true causes of the accident. But let's talk about something else. The reactor is destroyed, the radioactive contamination of the area is growing. What, in your opinion, is the personal responsibility for the defeat of people - specialists of the station? Specifically - the director Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov? It’s hard for me to judge others. I see Bruchanov’s guilt in the fact that on the very first day he handed over to Kiev a certificate of the radiation situation with clearly underestimated data. But, I believe, this certificate could not affect decision-making in the future. Measurements were carried out regularly, and the authorities had to make adequate decisions based on them. Bruchanov, by the way, was not responsible for the civil defense of the city, but only the station. The decision was to be taken by the head of the civil defense of Pripyat, Vladimir Pavlovich Voloshko - chairman of the city executive committee. You can, of course, say that at that time Bruchanov was obliged, roughly speaking, to hit the table with his fist and insist on evacuation.

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Indecision at such a critical moment, of course, deserves condemnation. However, while discussing this, we are moving away from the topic of our conversation in the field of morality. How, interestingly, is the charge against the court sentence formulated? The verdict says: “The main reasons that led to the accident were gross violations of the rules established to ensure nuclear safety at a POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ENTERPRISE” Hence, article 220 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, on the basis of which they determined 10 years of “penal servicing”. But nuclear power plants were never considered explosive enterprises, like, say, powder factories! If nuclear power plants are really explosive, then they need to be designed and built in a completely different way. Some kind of utter nonsense: before the trial, I knew that I was working at an ordinary station and only at the court I suddenly found out that it was potentially explosive! The absurdity of such an accusation is clear to everyone. The court could easily figure out that the reactor would never explode if it met the requirements of the country's regulatory documents on the safety of nuclear power plants.

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Clear. In the eyes of the public, however, you look like a man who has started some ridiculous experiment in an existing industrial reactor. Please tell us about its essence. The authors of the experiment program were a representative of Dontehenergo Gennady Petrovich Metlenko and I. He had previously participated in testing many electrical systems at the station. The idea was to use the kinetic energy stored in the rotating rotor of the turbogenerator during its stop. Each unit of the station has an emergency reactor cooling system. It should prevent core melting in the design situation - the maximum design basis accident. This accident is considered to be a rupture of a pipeline of large diameter of the primary circuit. So, when the current is turned off in the power supply system at the maximum design accident, the generator continues to work on the feed pumps with a decreasing frequency. And thus, it must ensure that the water is supplied to the reactor before the long-term emergency cooling system is turned on. In order to make sure that the generator has enough operating time to complete this operation, we intended to conduct a test.

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The experiment program was compiled and approved. After the disaster, it was carefully analyzed by many experts, and no one found any errors. Everyone said, however, that the security measures in our program were not developed. Right. But they were carried out even before the start of this experiment and recorded in other sections of the program. It turns out that I am guilty of not rewriting the list of these measures from one section to another! Nobody wants to pay attention to the absurdity of such an accusation. Forensic experts write: according to the instructions for turning on the main circulation pump, it was necessary to invite a representative of the nuclear safety department. They just did not read the instructions to which they refer. It says that it was not necessary to do this “until further notice”. And such an order was given … You mention forensic experts all the time. As far as we understand, the court decision directly depended on them. What kind of people were they? The vast majority of experts are representatives of those very design and engineering organizations that are directly interested in maintaining the honor of the uniform of their “firms”. To admit them to the trial of the causes of the disaster is immoral. The conclusions of experts almost always do not hold water.

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The program of the experiment, say, was under the control of many experts and to say that it was drawn up unqualifiedly, illegally. This is the first. The second one. They say that the program has not been agreed with the governing bodies. Yes, this is so, but the instructions in force at that time did not provide for this. And finally, thirdly. Obviously, a catastrophe could occur during any other operation with such a reactor. This is not only my opinion. I refer at least to the conclusions of the commission of the Deputy Minister of Energy Gennady Alexandrovich Shasharin, who wrote an addendum to the protocol of the investigation back in May 1986. Why didn't the court take this fact into account? The answer to this question is obvious. Because it was necessary to divert public opinion from the true causes of the accident, obscure the issue, hide the names of the true culprits. Especially a lot of speculation around the issue of the conclusion during the experiment of the emergency reactor cooling system. For non-specialists, this causes bewilderment: how is it that an accident occurred, and the emergency cooling system of the reactor is turned off! This is disgrace! Not everyone knows that the instructions allowed the removal of this system for a time allowed by the chief engineer of the station.

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And it was he who approved the program. Further. The alarm system is not designed for such a case. Even if it was turned on, it would not have time to start acting. And, most importantly, this could no longer help. The reactor was completely destroyed by the explosion, the technological channels were broken, the fuel turned to dust. There was already nothing to cool. Do not be offended, but we are forced to ask: so who really are those who are convicted of the accident - criminals or victims of the disaster? We are certainly victims. The personnel of the block were the first to take the fatal blow of radiation. And those who survived had to endure the shame of the trial and the monstrous injustice of public condemnation. Those in power in our country are always at their fingertips … My comrades: the shift supervisor Sasha Akimov, the reactor operator Lenya Toptunov, the shift supervisor of the reactor shop Valera Perevozchenko - only death saved me from shame. It is outrageous that the cynicism of our bureaucratic machine knows no bounds.

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The USSR prosecutor’s office thought of sending the families of Toptunov, Perevozchenko and Akimov stateowned notices that they were exempted from judicial responsibility “in connection with their death”. Know that your dead sons, fathers and husbands are criminals. In fairness, it should be said that now the truth about what happened in Chernobyl still makes its way. There are, but so far practically no one knows such sensational documents as the report of the inspector of the State Committee for Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision A.A. Yadrikhinsky, the report of Professor B.G. Dubovsky, the conclusions of the commission chaired by N.A. Steinberg and many other materials. They provide a qualified analysis of the true causes of the disaster and practically prove our innocence. These documents are not classified, they can be read in the Commission for the investigation of the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Why doesn’t anyone write about them now? I associate all hopes for justice with the work of the said commission. How are you going to live on, Anatoly Stepanovich?

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My only task is to achieve the publication of the truth about the causes of the disaster, to save from shame at least the memory of my fallen comrades. I have no other personal plans and cannot be. I received 550 rem during the accident, and about 100 rem - during the previous work. The skin is burned by radiation. Now I am a disabled person of the second group. Life is running out. Therefore, day and night I think only about one thing, I want only one thing - the truth, and nothing but the truth. The conversation was conducted by A. BUDNITSKY, V. SMAGA

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Appendix 5 [The newspaper "Evening Kiev". June 22, 1992 No. 120 (14484)]

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Echo of Chernobyl Radioactive Defeat of Conscience Future historians will very accurately determine the beginning of the post-Chernobyl era in the life of mankind. On April 26, 1986, at 1 hours 23 minutes 40 seconds, operator Alexander Akimov pressed the emergency protection button for the reactor of the fourth power unit and ... an explosion followed. In the avalanche of grief that hit us during the aftermath of the accident, this incredible fact was simply lost. The protection system blew up the reactor … Think it over! Imagine that you put a hunting rifle on the guard so that there is no shot, but it firing from both barrels. Until now, the world is comprehending the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, trying to find a way out of the impasse into which civilization has led the rapid development of nuclear energy. To refuse it at all is very difficult. Not to take into account the fact that every day nuclear plants of the planet produce several hundred “Chernobyls”, it is impossible to radioactive waste that brings death to all living things.

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Therefore, the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant will long be the focus of discussions on the future of scientific and technological progress. The culprits of the disaster in July 1987, the judicial board for criminal cases of the Supreme Court of the former Soviet Union considered the director of the station Viktor Bryukhanov, chief engineer Nikolai Fomin, deputy chief engineer Anatoly Dyatlov, shift supervisor Boris Rogozhkin, head of the reactor shop Alexander Kovalenko, inspector of Gosatomenergonadzor Yuri Laushkin. All of them were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment and, according to fellow citizens, bear heavy moral responsibility for the largest nuclear catastrophe of the 20th century. Journalists were not allowed to go to trial in Chernobyl, an ambulance and, as it is now known for certain, wrong. In the official materials about the accident, widespread in the country and abroad, it was said that the disaster occurred due to "extremely unlikely combinations of violations of the order and operating mode committed by the personnel of the power unit." To a simple Soviet man, this is so understandable - the slobs gathered and blew up the reactor! Specialists reacted to this conclusion differently, especially those working at Chernobyl-type reactors - RBMK.

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They needed to know the reasons for what had happened, if only so that nothing like this would happen again. But no. All materials about the accident were classified even from nuclear power workers. Now, when the truth about the disaster with such difficulty breaks into the light of day, you well understand why this was done. The Chernobyl “six” was just a group of “switchmen” who were supposed to distract the attention of the public from individuals of much higher rank. They, as was long established in the empire, did not sit in the dock, but dictated their findings to the forensic technical examination, on the provisions of which the indictment was based. However, everything in order … Long before the accident, the head of the reliability and safety group of nuclear power plants with a RBMK reactor at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy V.P. Volkov wrote to the chief-director of the institute, academician A.P. Aleksandrov, several reports on the design flaws of the reactor. They were put under the cloth.

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When the explosion struck, Volkov, in an appeal to the country's leadership, the USSR Prosecutor’s Office and, of course, his immediate superiors, outlined his version of the accident, which, he said, was “not due to the actions of the operating personnel, but to the construction of the core and an incorrect understanding of neutron-physical processes flowing in it. " To the opinion of a specialist, and this time did not listen. But Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, despite being busy with meetings at scientific and technical meetings figuring out the causes of the disaster, still found the time to order to expel Volkov from work. So, brazenly and rudely, the truth was hiding about the true causes of the Chernobyl disaster. But, as they say, the awl in a bag cannot be hidden. Now there are several documents at once that do not leave stone on stone from the scientific and technical part of the indictment filed against the Chernobyl Six. Perhaps the most interesting for us is the report of the commission of the State Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision of the former USSR, signed by Mykola Shteinberg - now the chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, published last year.

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By the way, it should be said that the former State Atomic Energy and Energy Supervision itself is also not without sin. Back in 1983, during the physical start-up of the reactor of the fourth unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, an extremely dangerous phenomenon was discovered - the introduction of positive reactivity when the rods began to move into the zone. The State Inspector notes this and ... allows the start of the reactor. In the same year, the supervisor of studies, academician A.P. Aleksandrov, wrote a letter to the chief designer, academician N.A. Dollezhal, about the need to eliminate the defect of the rods. On a team of the designer, the technical task for this work is being developed. But it didn’t even reach the blueprints until the Chernobyl accident … This is where the very criminal negligence in which the Chernobyl operational staff was accused was fully manifested! Now it has been established for certain that it was the introduction of positive reactivity by the rods that caused the explosion. However, not everyone knows that the report of the Institute of Atomic Energy itself lists twelve other quite possible causes of the accident. Each of them, in principle, leads to an explosion.

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So it turns out that the RBMK reactor is an eternal monument to the headshoting of high-ranking physicists and designers. Immediately after the accident, based on calculations and experiments, it was found that in the reactor design there are 32 violated articles of regulatory documents on the safe construction and operation of nuclear power plants. An analysis of them allowed the commission of Nikolai Steinberg to formulate the following conclusion: "the design flaws of the RBMK, which was operated at the fourth power unit of the nuclear power plant, predetermined the grave consequences of the Chernobyl disaster." Somewhat more terrible words were said in the aforementioned document: “... it must be noted that an accident like Chernobyl was inevitable.” In the eyes of the public, the main culprits of the disaster, as already mentioned, are still not the aforementioned academics, but the Chernobyl “six”. A.P. Aleksandrova and N.A. Dollezhal were brought out from under the blow in a simple and amazing way by judicial crocheting. The Chernobyl court singled out materials against the creators of the reactor in a separate clerical work. And the Supreme Court of the former USSR soon dismissed the case “in the absence of a judicial perspective”.

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To deal with gray-haired and well-deserved people, one must assume that they considered it useless because the charges against them were still subject to some kind of amnesty. It must be said bluntly: I am writing these lines not at all in order to bring the above-mentioned academicians to justice, but only in order to triumph justice. A direct participant in the Chernobyl events, Minister of Energy of Ukraine Vitaliy Sklyarov answered my question about personal responsibility for the disaster of Aleksandrov and Dollezhal: To reduce the essence of the matter to these two names is to simplify the problem. The whole system is to blame. Dollezhal and Alexandrov created the atomic bomb. Energy production has become a kind of "consumer goods" of the military. When it turned out that a lot of warheads had been done, they began to search for "peaceful application of powerful technology." Plutonium reactor, colloquially called "Ivan", quickly turned into RBMK. The creators of the reactor were under powerful pressure from the ruling circles and were in a hurry.

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Therefore, a construction appeared on the light of God that was based on an erroneous concept of security and sooner or later had to lead the country to disaster. The children and grandchildren of Viktor Bryukhanov, Nikolai Fomin, Anatoly Dyatlov, Boris Rogozhkin, Alexander Kovalenko, Yuri Laushkin from ascertaining the flawed design of the reactor is not easier. In the eyes of others, to this day, they are relatives of criminals who caused a terrible disaster in their native land. Of course, in the Chernobyl “six” there are not angels, but living and sinful people. The conclusions of the commission of Nikolai Steinberg, by the way, objectively say about their mistakes. But compared with the monstrous accusation of primary responsibility for the Chernobyl disaster, they seem like a trifle. And can six people be guilty of a radioactive, so to speak, defeat of the conscience of the leaders of the world's most powerful nuclear monopoly the late Ministry of Atomic Energy of the former USSR. It was in it, with stupid stubbornness of intelligent robots, infinitely scooping up money from the budget, that populated the vast expanse of the collapsed empire with such dangerous equipment as RBMK reactors, which now work at many nuclear power plants.

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There is no longer the country of the Soviets, its nuclear monopoly split up into several concerns, and the Supreme Court of the USSR also ordered a long life, in which just before the liquidation they were going to reconsider the Chernobyl “six” case. Convicts, most of whom are our fellow citizens, found themselves in a kind of legal vacuum. The case materials are in Moscow, and the Russian prosecutor’s office does not want to deal with them because they judged people under the articles of the criminal code of Ukraine. Academician N.A. Dollezhal stubbornly keeps silent about all the accusations in the press. Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, blamingly blames all the blame for what happened on station staff, in particular, in an interview with Ogonyok magazine. This cannot go on forever. The prosecutor’s office of Ukraine has the right to request the case of the Chernobyl “six” from Moscow and seek a review by the Supreme Court of Ukraine in the light of newly discovered new circumstances. A lot of material on this topic is concentrated in the Commission of the Supreme Council on Chernobyl disaster.

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It would be nice at the highest legal level of our country to evaluate the results of an independent investigation into the causes of the accident by the Ukrainian environmental association Zeleniy Svit. The whole truth about Chernobyl has not yet been told … Valentin SMAGA

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Appendix 6 [Newspaper "Trud". April 3, 1996]

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Reactor Hostages In connection with the Chernobyl accident, two criminal cases were opened. The first one was in 1986-1987, then the director of the station Bruchanov and other employees were convicted and convicted. The second time - in 1991. It was already, among other things, about the structural defects of the reactor. But two years later, the case was dismissed by the senior investigator for particularly important cases at the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, senior adviser to justice Boris UVAROV. Today we are printing (in abbreviation) excerpts from the “Decision to Terminate the Criminal Case”. It has not been published anywhere before and, in our opinion, sheds additional light on those terrible events. At the same time, we asked Boris Ivanovich Uvarov to comment on this document in the hope that the person who thoroughly investigated the tragedy of ten years ago would clarify the current state of the issues raised in the investigation. “... April 26, 1986, about 1 hour 24 minutes at the 4th power unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as a result of a thermal explosion, a major accident occurred with the destruction of the RBMK-1000 reactor …

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.. A criminal case was opened. For abuse of official position and violation of safety rules in this case, they were prosecuted and convicted in 1987 by the Chernobyl director Bryukhanov and other employees of the station. The investigation carried out by the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Court of the USSR, which examined this case in the first instance, came to the conclusion that the main cause of the accident was a violation of the operating rules of the 4th power unit by maintenance personnel and plant managers. ... The press published statements by deputies, journalists, and some nuclear scientists who expressed their disagreement with the conclusions of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Many believed that “scapegoats” were brought to justice in the person of Bryukhanov and others and that the true causes of the Chernobyl accident were the design flaws of the RBMK-1000 reactor, and the development of the accident, its development into a catastrophe, was made possible due to the absence of this at the reactors type (contrary to world practice) of localization systems for such accidents, the so-called containment (concrete caps). The press and critical speeches called the

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culprits of the accident from among high-ranking scientists, party and economic leaders who determined back in the 70s the wrong principles for the development of nuclear energy without sufficient safety. With this in mind, under the former Supreme Council of the USSR (by a resolution of its Presidium of 10/01/1990), a Commission was formed to review the causes of the Chernobyl accident and evaluate the actions of officials in the post-accident period. An expert group was created under this commission, which prepared a report in 1991, in which, on the basis of the opinions of individual scientists, a conclusion was made about the design flaws of the RBMK-1000 reactor that caused the accident … A paradoxical situation arose in the country on the one hand, there was a verdict of the Supreme Court of the USSR, which limited the causes of the Chernobyl accident to the mistakes of the operators, and on the other, there was a conclusion of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which recognized the design flaws as the cause of the accident, and especially its catastrophic consequences. ..

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... This forced the former party-state leadership of the USSR at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU to instruct the USSR Prosecutor's Office to verify the validity and timeliness of measures to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. In this regard, the Acting Prosecutor General of the USSR A. Vasiliev By his order of August 6, 1990, he formed a working group of prosecutors of the USSR, RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR prosecutors who were entrusted with an additional check ... On January 25, 1991, a new criminal case was opened … In December 1991, in connection with the liquidation of the USSR Prosecutor’s Office, the investigation team working on the case broke up. The case (in volume 41) was referred to the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation. Some volumes remained in the prosecutor's offices of Ukraine and Belarus ... To date, decisions on their termination have been made in these cases in both states. In Ukraine - for prescription (in relation to the leaders of the republic), in Belarus for lack of evidence of guilt …

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During the investigation of the case in Russia, the investigation obtained data on the design flaws of the RBMK-1000 reactor, which were the main cause of the Chernobyl accident on April 26, 1986. ... The report of the government commission noted that in the context of violations committed by the station personnel, "the reactor emergency protection system did not fulfill its functions. The development of the accident that led to the destruction of the reactor occurred due to design flaws in the reactor ... " ... Interrogated as a witness, the deputy director of the Research Institute of Energy Engineering, Academician Orlov V.V., dealing with problems of reactor engineering, said that the RBMK-1000 reactor design flaws that appeared in the Chernobyl accident were the result of omissions in the physical justification of the project and in the design of the reactor realized in an accident due to unauthorized actions of personnel … With regard to the design and development flaws of the RBMK-1000 reactor, Doctor of Technical Sciences BG Dubovsky, who has extensive experience in the field of nuclear safety,

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showed that the root cause of the accident was a lack of understanding by the developers of the reactor design of neutron processes and errors in the design of emergency protection ... Time The operation of the A3 absorbers (emergency protection) exceeded 18 seconds, while the development of emergency processes in this reactor took 3-4 seconds. He also showed that when he was still working as the head of the nuclear safety department at the Physics and Power Engineering Institute, his research on the example of the accident at the Leningrad NPP in 1975 led him to the conclusion that, in the lower part of the RBMK-1000 reactor, due to the peculiarities of the neutron field in a separate explosive reactor appears in the core ... According to Professor Dubovsky, B.G., the station personnel are not to blame for the accident that occurred only due to structural defects of the reactor. According to prof. Dubovsky B.G., chief designer, Academician Dollezhal did not provide devices for steam discharges in this type of reactor in case of damage to one or several channels, which led to the development of the accident …

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In his testimony, the former chief designer of the RBMK-1000 reactor, Academician N.A. Dollezhal, in particular, said that after the accident at Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP, it became clear that the system for controlling the energy release at the reactor was imperfect. But, since this was the first RBMK-1000 reactor, then they still did not know much. But after the accident, two systems were developed at the Institute of Power Engineering: LAR (local automatic regulation) and LAZ (local automatic protection), which all RBMK reactors were equipped with, including at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As for the design of the reactor absorber rods, this part was dealt with by his deputy academician Emelyanov. As established during the investigation, the design of the absorber rods had significant shortcomings, which manifested itself during the Chernobyl accident. In this regard, the team leaders of the Institute of Power Engineering Demin I.N. and Potapova V.P. showed that after the Chernobyl accident, the design of the absorber rods was changed in all RBMK reactors, and a new high-speed protection was introduced, with the help of which the absorber rods enter the core in

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2.5 seconds and completely extinguish the reactor. In his testimony, a former member of the USSR Gosatomnadzor Commission to investigate the causes and circumstances of the Chernobyl accident, MI Miroshnichenko said that almost all the design flaws of the RBMK-1000 reactor and the control and protection systems were known before the accident, and the technical measures to eliminate them were clear … ... It should be noted that on the fact of the design flaws of the reactor, a criminal case was isolated in 1987, however, shortly after the main case was examined in relation to Bruchanov and others in court, it was terminated by the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Meanwhile, many facts related to design flaws as the cause of the accident were not known to the court at the time of the sentencing ... In this regard, these circumstances should be recognized as newly discovered, and they are subject to further investigation. If their truth is established, the sentence in the case of Bryukhanov and other Chernobyl workers, whose guilt in the light of these circumstances may be doubtful, should be canceled due to the fact that earlier the main causes of the accident were

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recognized not by the design flaws of the reactor, but by personnel errors during its operation. .. In the course of the upcoming investigation, it is necessary to deeply understand the causes of the accident at Unit 1 of the same Chernobyl nuclear power plant that took place in 1982. Professor Dubovsky called this accident, like the accident at the Leningrad NPP in 1975, “rehearsal of the Chernobyl accident 26 April 1985 ”- due to the identity of the causes of all these three accidents at similar RBMK-1000 reactors. According to Dubovsky, only by a lucky coincidence of the accident of 1975 and 1982. they didn’t have serious consequences (similar to what happened in Chernobyl), but they were a formidable warning that the industry leadership did not heed, and the fact of these accidents (1975 and 1982) was unreasonably classified at the time … As can be seen from the case materials, some scientists of the former USSR, including Academician V. Legasov, analyzing the causes of the catastrophic consequences of the Chernobyl accident, pointed to an erroneous concept in nuclear energy in the 60-70s, when it was adopted at the government level the decision to use RBMK-

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1000 reactors that are not equipped with an accident localization device, the so-called containers (concrete caps). This decision was due to economic considerations in order to reduce the cost of building nuclear power plants with reactors of this type and due to design features (mainly due to the large size of the reactor) that precluded the possibility of installing such caps on them. In addition, experience has shown that scientists led by academicians Dollezhal and Alexandrov, who carried out the design and scientific management, were mistaken in calculating the physical characteristics of the reactor and not only did not predict the possibility of explosion and destruction of the reactor during operation, but also gave an erroneous justification for the impossibility of such accidents … Taking into account the foregoing ... the investigation decided to allocate these materials with their direction for permission to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine ... "

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Boris Ivanovich, you sent all the documents on the Chernobyl accident related to design flaws of the reactor to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. More than two years have passed. Did the investigation continue there? If so, what conclusions did it lead to? The issue of sending materials to Ukraine was agreed between the prosecutors general of Russia and Ukraine. I myself took all the materials to Kiev and left them in the hope that an investigation would be continued on them. However, as far as I know, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine did not do this. Meanwhile, it is extremely important to establish the final truth, because discussions about what was the main cause of the accident do not cease: operator errors in reactor control or its design flaws. I am on the side of those who consider design flaws to be the main reason. At the same time, I proceed from a simple truth: when it comes to nuclear energy, the reliability of the equipment should be such as to automatically exclude any incidents, even with operator errors.

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The influence of the design flaws of the reactor on the occurrence and development of the accident was fully established after the court considered the case of Bryukhanov and other employees of the station. So, maybe, in connection with these newly discovered circumstances, they should be recognized not guilty and apologize to people who were unjustly sentenced to long terms of imprisonment? Yes, new circumstances have opened up. And in the light of their question of the guilt or innocence of station workers can only solve a new judicial review. But I would not mix the guilt of the director of the station with the guilt of other managers and operators. The director is to blame for the fact that he did not give accurate information on the level of radiation pollution of the station territory in a timely manner, and hid the true extent of the accident. And for this, and only for this, he had to bear responsibility. Other workers, in my opinion, are innocent. So the case is indeed subject to review. At the same time, it is finally necessary, in a judicial proceeding, to determine the measure of guilt and responsibility of the reactor designers, its developers and scientific supervisors.

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There are sixteen reactors of the Chernobyl type in the territory of the former Union. Have they eliminated those design flaws that contributed to the accident? What is the situation at the Chernobyl station itself? As far as I know, many of those design flaws that contributed to the occurrence and development of the accident have been eliminated. So, the lowering speed of the protection rods has been increased, a device has been made to discharge excess steam, and a number of other upgrades have been carried out. But the main design flaw is the lack of a device on this reactor that can localize the accident - a concrete cap. After all, with any unpredictable accidents, he simply would not allow radiation to escape. However, the containment at stations of this type cannot be established not only because of its hefty cost (as discussed in the press), but also because the huge size of the reactor simply does not allow it to be done technologically. That is why the construction of the Chernobyl type, I am sure, from the very beginning simply should not have the right to life.

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We must be aware that some kind of risk remains in the absence of a safety cap on reactors of this type. Alas, they will have to wait until they simply exhaust their resources and gradually incapacitate the existing ones. As for the Chernobyl station itself, Ukraine does not have enough funds to close it - this is a very expensive undertaking. It remains to be hoped that the measures taken to modernize and more reliable work of the operators will save us from another disaster … The publication was prepared by Nadezhda NADEZHDINA

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Appendix 7 USSR MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND ELECTRIFICATION VPO SOYUZATOMENERGO CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. V. I. LENIN I affirm: Chernobyl Chief Engineer ________________ N.M. Fomin WORK PROGRAMME tests of turbo-generator No 8 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in modes of joint coasting with a load of own needs Deputy chief engineer Head of VET Head of EC Head of NPNP SAEN Head of RC-2 Head of Shop Center Head of TsTAI Deputy Head of EC Deputy Head of EC for RZAI Dontehenergo

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A. S. Dyatlov A.D. Gellerman A.T. Zinenko I.P. Alexandrov A.P. Kovalenko L.A. Khoronzhuk E.A. Wart V.I. Metelev S.A. Malafienko G.P. Metlenko

WORK PROGRAMME tests of turbine generator No 8 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the mode of joint run-off with auxiliary load 1. COMMON PART 1.1. The purpose of the tests is an experimental verification of the possibility of using energy of mechanical run-out to maintain the performance of auxiliary mechanisms in the de-energized conditions. 1.2. Tests are carried out before the unit is put out for preventive maintenance (PPR), according to the allowed application. 1.3. The test duration is 4 hours. 2. TEST CONDITIONS No p-p

Description

PIC

2.1

Reduce unit load to 700...1 000 MW thermal

NSS

2.2

Disconnect and stop the TG-7 turbogenerator (or on VPU). Disconnect the VTG-7 switch and the RTG-7 disconnector

NSB NS ETS

594

2.3

Own needs of the TG-7 section 7RA and 7RB powered from 6T

2.4

The turbine generator TG-8 is at the working NS excitation, blocks run-out of ARV-ARV and SD- ETS VG was introduced to the work

2.5

Assemble the circuit tone MPA in the electrical ETL part of the circuit step set of loading the diesel generator (DG) and in the scheme of coasting on two sets of automation 4ЩАНП-3 what: panel No 2 (left side) CHM API-3 to connect contacts additionally installed button, shown out on a MCR-4 (p. PB-3) to terminals 10 (0911) 18 (09-1) and CL. 10 (01-1) 36 (031-1), as well as panel No. 3 (left side panel) to terminals 10 (01-2) 18 (09-2) and 10 (01-2) 36 (031-2)

2.6

Power sections 8PA. 8RB. 8РНА is carried out according to working inputs

NS ETS

2.7

On section 8PA, include the following mechanisms: 4PN-3,4; 4CHCN-13.23; 41KN73.82; 42KN-73.82; 4NGO-81; 2TsN-10

NS ETS NSB

2.8

In section 8RB, include the following mechanisms: 2NPRT-5; 41KN-83; 42KN-83; 4CHC-14.24; 4PN-5; 4NGO-82; VK-15; 2TsN11,12

NS ETS NSB

2.9

The power supply of the 0.4 kV sections should be transferred to the backup power supply: the 164N section from the 24TR pipe - "- 74N -" - 21TR

595

NS ETS

- “- 78N -“ - 23TR - "- 232Н -" - 231Т - "- 180N -" - 179T - "- 225N -" - 226T - "- 75N -" - 22TR - “- 167Н -“ - 24ТР - “- 228Н -“ - 227Т - "- 165Н -" - 24ТР - "- 220N -" - 221T - "- 208Н -" - 208Т - “- 160N -“ - 159T 2.10 On section 8РНА, include the following connections: 92ТНЦ, 91ТИП, 93ТИП, 224Т, 4НСОС-3, 4НС-3, 4-ЗТНПС, 2НА-6

NS ETS NSB

2.11 Transfer the power supply to the 0.4 kV backup NS busbar trunking blocks No. 3 from the 16TR TP, ETS turning on the sectional switch RSh-15, 16TR and RSh-16, 17TR Disconnect the 0.4 kV circuit breakers of the 15, 17TR 2.12 The reactor cooldown in the experiment is MSB provided by sections 7PA, 7RB, 7RNA, 7RNB, for which they should include one PN (4NP-1 or 4NP-2), two RCPs (4GTSN-11.21; 4GTsN12.22) and one KN 2 of elevation 42KN-71 (72) and 42KN-81, as well as 2NA-4 (5) in sections 7NRB, 7NRA 2.13 Indoor switchgear-6 kV and control room-4 to collect test circuits for oscillography parameters: • voltage and current of the stator TG-8;

596

DTE SRSA TSITI ETL

• •

• •

TG-8 rotor voltage and current; voltage and currents of inputs of sections 8PA, 8RB, 8RNA; rotational speed of TG-8; currents and revolutions of the monitors and MCP; closing moment of stop valves

2.14 To fix the technological parameters of the unit TSITI in the experiments, the Skala UVS and CPNP standard recording devices are used. Appendix List 1. The list of parameters recorded using additionally installed recorders is given in Appendix 2 2.15 Close manual valves to prevent water being RTS-2 thrown into the KMPTs according to RC-2 to all CPNP three SAOR 4PV-3 / 2,1,4,5 subsystems; 4PV53.54.63.64.73.74; 4PV-25.26.35.36.45.46; 4PV-83.84 Arrange people to control opened valves and triggered mechanisms of SAOR

597

3. PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT 3.1

Before the experiment, carry out paragraphs 2.1 ... 2.15 of this program

3.2

Check on H. H. (under load) diesel generator 2DG-6 and enter in the " hot " reserve

3.3

To withdraw from the action of the ABP circuit NS of sections 8PA, 8RB with PB keys on the 2E ETS BShCH-4 remote control

3.4

Set the operator on the 1E control panel, NS which, when the TG-8 rotor current increases ETS more than 3,000 A, extinguishes the field without a command with the field blanking key or extinguishes it after 60 seconds at the command of the test manager

3.5

Reduce the load of the TG-8 to the load level of MSB its own needs on the 28T pipeline

3.6

Remove trim 27N “Closing SC TG-8” when disconnecting B2-6T or VTG-8 ”on the 24RG panel

3.7

Disconnect the B2-6T transformer switch from NS the 1E remote control ETS

3.8

Team leader testing included oscilloscopes and MSB key management electromagnetic protective devices in the panel 6T struggling protective device TG-8 and the signal MPA electrical part is additionally displayed, click on p. PB-3

598

NSB NS ETS

EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS In this case, the excited generator will run out together with the electric motors of the section 8РА, 8РБ, feeding the latter and maintaining their electromagnetic moment (and, consequently, productivity). Section 8РНА will disconnect the sectional switches (1ВС-2ВС) and disable all mechanisms (except for the non-disconnectable stage), as well as launch 2DG-6. After the 2DG-6 turn and exit to the section, stepby-step start of the mechanisms of section 8РНА will occur according to the MPA program. 3.9

Records and waveforms are examined, equipment is inspected, records of dropped blinkers and tanned signs are displayed, test instrument readings

CPNP NSB NS ETS DTE

3.10

Power is restored to the sections 8РА, 8РB (sections) 0.4 kV

NS ETS

3.10.1 All circuit breakers of S.N. on de-energized sections 8PA, 8RB

NS ETS

3.10.2 Backup inputs of sections 8PA, 8RB are turned off

NS ETS

599

3.10.3 Of necessity, include mechanisms S. N. on this section

NSB

3.10.4 The 6 kV circuit breakers of S.N. 6 / 0.4 kV in sections 8PA, 8RB

NS ETS

3.10.5 Work included the inputs of sections of 0.4 kV

NS ETS

3.10.6 The position of the valves closed according to paragraph 2.15 is restored

RTS-2 CPNP

3.10.7 Disables the input 2DG-6 and included breakout switches 1ВС-2ВС RIA at the section 8РНА panel PB-3 MCR-4 and the necessary mechanisms

NSB NS ETS

3.10.8 If necessary, from 8PA, 8RB are transferred to working power

4. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 4.1. In the process of testing, all switching in the primary circuits is carried out by the duty staff at the request of the technical supervisor of the tests, with the permission of the NSS. 4.2. If equipment malfunctions are detected during testing, further work on the program is suspended until the cause of the malfunction is eliminated. In the event of an emergency on the unit, the actions of the personnel are determined by local emergency response

600

instructions. 4.3. Before starting the test, the test director instructs the staff on duty on duty (WIG). 5. PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR TESTING 5.1. The technical supervisor of the tests is the team engineer Dontehenergo Metlenko G.P. 5.2. During testing, the responsible persons are: 5.2.1. For operational switching in the electrical part, safety and fire safety deputy. beg. EC for operation Lelechenko A.G. 5.2.2. For serviceability of relay protection and automation circuits of unit No. 4 of ZNEC - Malafienko S.A. 5.2.3. For serviceability of start-up circuits at MPA and a reliable power supply system bl. No 4 ZNEC - Metelev V.I. 5.2.4. For ensuring the registration of technological parameters in the experiments - deputy. beg. CTAI Lapuga N.R. 5.2.5. For operational switching on the equipment of SN workshops of the RC, TC, CTAI - shift supervisors of the corresponding workshops.

601

5.2.6. The general management during the tests is carried out by the deputy. Chief Engineer for Operation 2 Phase A. Dyatlov APP No 1 for the program ANALOG PARAMETERS ARE CALLED FROM THE PROGRAM DRAG EXPERIENCE No p-p

Name of the control area

Point designation

Note

1

G p. V. and B/s

P1G1111

2

-//-//-

P2G1111

3

P in B / s

P1P2111

4

-//-//-

P2P2111

5

H in b / s

P1H2511,21

6

-//-//-

P2H2511,21

7

G in the pressure port of the MCP pumps

H1G1211,21,31,41 0 ... 12 500 m3 / h

8

P water in the pressure head PN

DOR7311,21

9

P in suction. call KN-11 Т2Р4311

602

0 ... 1 600 t/h 0 ... 100 kgf / cm2

0 ... 160 kgf / cm2 0 ... 15 kgf

/ cm2 10

Power MR

T2N7111

0 ... 600 MW

11

For example, on CH 6 kV

T2H7412.13

0 ... 7.8 kV

12

P in the manifold of the AOP3211 CPS

13

Stop valve closed

0 ... 6 kgf / cm2

Т2А1411

Note: 1. All parameters are interrogated with a cycle of 2 s. 2. A printout of the parameters according to DREG is given by SREDT - resp. NS TSTAI

APPENDIX 2 LIST OF PARAMETERS RECORDED ON THE EIC EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE No p-p

Name

Designation

1

The feed water flow rate on four threads

P2G1311,12

2

The water pressure on the suction side of RCP

H2P1111,13

3

The water pressure in the MCP pressure

Н2Р1211,13

603

4

Water flow in the pressure header of MCP-of 13.23

H1G1231, H2G1231

5

The water pressure in the pressure header PAN

DOR7311.12

6

Pressure for KN 1 the rise of the TG-8

Т2Р4111

7

Suction pressure KN 2 lift TG-8

Т2Р4311

8

Pressure pressure KN 2 lift TG-8

Т2Р4411

9

The condensate flow after PND-5

T2G4611

10

Water pressure in the suction manifold PN (2 points)

DOR4311

604

Appendix 8 What a guy he was ... Memories of A.S.Dyatlov I I would like to highlight a short period of our life with Dyatlov, study and work in the city of Norilsk. There, at the end of the 40s, the Mining and Metallurgical College of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was opened, at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering of which I first met in 1946 and met Tolya. In between classes, he first came to meet me. I was very surprised at this, because I considered myself an adult (I was 19 years old, although only 165 cm tall), and four years of work in a train depot among prisoners weaned from excessive sociability. We met. I looked a little darn, other guys became interested and also approached to get acquainted. I supervised this action, as I later learned, the head of the group, a front-line soldier. Among these guys were respectable people - participants in the war.

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In comparison with them, my first acquaintance Tolya Dyatlov looked quite a youth at the age of 15, although he was tall and broad-shouldered. Nevertheless, among other adults, he somehow did not get lost, was not embarrassed. I liked him for his openness, the confidence of the Siberian. What I liked about him, and how the friendship began, I do not know. At first, we tried to outdo each other in our studies, and often became excellent students (scholarships were higher by 25%) for six months or a year. But for a year he was more likely to succeed, usually the spring session failed me. They lived together in dormitories. The last two courses of the technical school were especially memorable when we lived in the same room. As in any student environment, there were disputes, quarrels, and fights. But we had no quarrels or fights with him, although there were disputes. I think the point is this. Uninhabited by fate (since 1944 he lived on his own, leaving his stepmother when his father was mobilized), I suddenly felt that he was kind of taking care of me, making sure not to offend me. Although I was older and more experienced than him in life matters, here I succumbed to such care, mentally calling him "my protector."

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In general, I was not a good child, sometimes flashed like gunpowder and scandal, it seemed, was inevitable. But Tolya somehow determined the right moment, appeared from nowhere and, putting his hand on the shoulder of my opponent, asked: "What are we making noise, men?" His growth and build allowed him to be condescending, made a proper impression and the quarrel ended. After graduating from college, Tolya and I began to work in the secondary school, to receive “heavy water”. Then he went to study at MEPhI, but our friendship continued. After the institute, Anatoly ended up in the Far East, and I in the west in Obninsk, where after graduating from the evening department of MEPhI for many years worked at the test bench for reactors for nuclear submarines, here we prepared the first crews for nuclear submarines. Anatoly came to our stands several times. I want to note one important circumstance. For all the years of the almost 50-year friendship “until the days of the last don” I did not see from Tolia a single dishonest act towards me, my relatives or friends. He liked me with his bluntness, determination, courage, intelligence and kindness to people. Throughout his life, he confirmed these qualities.

607

P.V. Vyrodov Former Art. Ing. Test bench management nuclear submarine reactors

608

II “There is nothing secret that would not become apparent; not a secret that would not be known and not be revealed ”(Luke 8-27) The years 1953-59 were the years of our youth, students. Tolya was five years older than most of us. But then he seemed to us a wise life experience. He was always an authority and was loved by us. Warden of our group. After graduating from the institute in 1959, some of the boys were allocated to facilities related to nuclear energy, to the production and operation of nuclear facilities, to the Lenin nuclear-powered icebreaker, to the cities of Dubna, Sverdlovsk, and Tolya ended up in the Far East. Our group turned out to be wonderful. For 40 years now, we regularly arrange meetings. In addition to them, the "boys" (and all the same and always for us boys) keep in touch separately, like our flock of "girls". I remember all the meetings of our group. The meeting about the 20th anniversary of the end of MEPhI was especially memorable. Tolya was so cheerful, energetic, hardly spoke prose, he loved poetry so much. 1979 - there were more than six years before the explosion.

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Our ranks began to melt. Many have gone to another world. And only one was killed. It turned out to be Tolya Dyatlov. How and by whom Anatoly and the young guys were killed - the personnel at the 4th Chernobyl NPP unit on April 26, 1986, how the firemen who extinguished the fire at the 4th block after the explosion were killed, and many, many in the past, present and future, how and by whom - it became clear after reading this book. This is the cry of the soul of an insulted and ruined life. The book is written in such detail and convincingly, so understandable even for a layman that there is no doubt after reading it. Tolya writes: “April 26, 1986. Unfortunate day. He divided the lives of many people into before and after. What to speak of my life - in a deep gap, it divided into two completely dissimilar parts. He was practically healthy and in recent years he spent only three or four days on the sick leave - became disabled. He was a reliable law-abiding person - he became a criminal. And, finally, he was a free citizen - he became a convicted citizen. "

610

And not just a criminal, but a criminal to whom blame for the most monstrous catastrophe of the 20th century is attributed - the explosion of a nuclear reactor with all the ensuing consequences. April 26, 2001 marks the 15th anniversary of the explosion. There is no longer alive either the inventor of this reactor, the scientific adviser on the topic of its development, at that time the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, academician A.P. Aleksandrov, or the chief designer N.A. Dollezhal, who were so carefully guarded by our justice. True - about the dead or good or nothing. Therefore, about them, as about the main developers, about the fact that they developed and put into operation an unreliable reactor (reactor !!!), that at one time they ignored the warnings of their own employees V.P. Volkov and V.L. Ivanov they didn’t do anything about the danger of its use, that led to the explosion and death of people (that’s why I say - Tolya was killed), only one thing can be said about them: God is their judge! And about the court and about the same as the court, biased commissions said: “By what court you judge, you will be judged like that; and by what measure you measure, so will they measure you ”(Gospel of Matthew 7-2).

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Almost ten years of life were given to a terminally ill patient who received an exorbitant dose of Tole. Of these, four he spent in custody. Many of his friends, students, employees, those who were with him at the station on April 26, 1986, have long passed away from this life. But Tolya still lived. He lived a book, in the hope that it would be published, that people would learn the truth about the guilty without guilt and about those who were really guilty. I thank God for giving Tolya these years of life, for the fact that these years were enough for him to finish his work. He lived for 64 years. Now he would be 70. He was a very courageous man, strong physically and spiritually. He could still continue to work and enjoy life. And, most importantly, Tolya must be rehabilitated, must be!

T. Pokrovskaya

612

III I first met Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, when I arrived in 1967 as a young distribution specialist after finishing TEM at the Plant named after Lenin Komsomol (ZLK). Rather, I didn’t even meet, but in absentia I found out about him from those around me with whom I had to work in “Service 22” - that was the name of the unit where the personnel department of the plant sent me to work. At that time, the ZLK was a closed plant, working for defense. Not surprisingly, everything was shrouded in a veil of secrecy. Any questions that were not related to direct activity could cause a certain interest of the relevant authorities. And yet, after some time, without undue curiosity, I found out about the existence of “Laboratory 23”, which was part of “Service 22”. The head of this laboratory was A.S. Dyatlov. Later, when I was obliged to participate in many months of testing “orders,” I got to know the guys from Laboratory 23 and their boss more closely. It was a team of energy order management specialists. When studying order systems, while working in delivery teams, he was repeatedly convinced of the highest qualifications of "managers".

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They could get an answer to almost any question related to power plants, of course, within their competence. One of the main reasons for this attitude was the high demands of the head of the management team. Anatoly Stepanovich enjoyed unquestioned authority among his subordinates, because Before fanaticism he himself was devoted to the assigned work, knew it perfectly and demanded the same from his subordinates. There was no “drawing” in him and he himself did not accept anything false, far-fetched. In conditions of total secrecy, “Laboratory 23” lived its own life closed from strangers. We, who worked in other divisions of the test department, essentially did not know anything about the internal relationships, the internal life of the laboratory. I recall one episode. Everyone who lived in those years perfectly remembers systematic spring subbotniks dedicated to the birthday of V.I. Lenin, May 1, etc. Under the leadership of the party committee of the plant, the party organization of the units, many days before the next clean-up day, comprehensive preparations for its holding began. The composition of the participants was determined, work was planned in advance. It was desirable that this was a noticeable job, so engineers, as a rule, worked on cleaning the territory.

614

On one of these subbotniks, the entire testing department, as always, worked in the plant’s culture park, we had our own corner there, where we raked leaves and garbage into a heap every spring. And "laboratory 23" was supposed to work on the territory of the plant - they had to scatter a heap of land that had been delivered a few days before the cleanup. After the subbotnik it turned out that the “laboratory 23" subbotnik disrupted. It turned out that the day before the subbotnik Anatoly Stepanovich, not really caring about the ritual component of the work planned for the subbotnik, asked the bulldozer, who worked nearby, at the same time to level the “subbotnik” pile of land. When the program for the large-scale construction of nuclear power plants in the European part of the USSR began to be implemented, Dyatlov moved to the village. Pripyat to work in the direction of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant under construction. The Komsomol members, who worked together with Anatoly Stepanovich in the “laboratory 23”, in the test department of the ZLK, followed him. Moreover, A.S.Dyatlov, as I know, did not invite anyone. Each of the Pripyat Komsomol members at one time turned to Anatoly Stepanovich with a request to accept application documents and, if possible, to send a call.

615

So it happened with me. At the Chernobyl NPP A.S.Dyatlov, working as a deputy. Head of the reactor-turbine workshop in the reactor compartment, and then deputy. Chief of the reactor shop (RC) for operation, did not change his principles - to know the assigned business thoroughly. During the installation of equipment and systems, the RC studied “to the last suspension” the equipment and systems of the reactor installation. And then began picking shifts. It was necessary to prepare jobs for operational personnel, to equip them with operational documentation. Several “creative teams” were created from the operators to create a set of operational schemes for the reactor compartment. Anatoly Stepanovich set the task: the scheme should be as clear as possible. And then, many times, he returned to remake circuits that did not meet this principle, without explaining anything particularly, simply said: “The circuit is bad - think!”. As a result, an excellent set of operational schemes was created in the RCs, which later made only current changes, without altering their structure. After the launch of the 1st, and then the 2nd Chernobyl power units, the workdays began. A.S.Dyatlov was demanding, one might say, a tough leader.

616

Remembering that time (I was then working as a senior mechanical engineer, and then as a shift supervisor of the RC), I can confidently say that there were no problems with A.S. those operators who in good faith, with full dedication to their work. Sometimes it was necessary to connect a savvy to carry out a shift task - to pump out water without a pump, to heat frozen pipes without heaters ... Those who worked at RBMK1000 know what this project is. Those who sought to deceive, “crawl” away from the assignment, hide behind far-fetched reasons, and even more so hide the violation of instructions, Dyatlov “calculated” instantly. And then get what you deserve. Many were indignant, offended, understanding in their hearts the justice of the assessment. As the construction of the 3rd Chernobyl NPP unit was going on, the formation of the operational units of the 2nd stage began. A.S.Dyatlov was appointed the head of the RC-2, who, in turn, had already begun recruiting the future RC-2. Naturally, the core of the new workshop was specialists from RC-1, who already had experience in commissioning and operational work at the existing power unit. It so happened that Anatoly Stepanovich also suggested that I go to RC-2 as the deputy operation director.

617

I agreed and have already begun to study the systems of the second stage, to delve into the problems of the block under construction. But after a while A.S. He called me aside (they were still in RC-1 then) and said that there was a hitch with my transition to RC-2. As he then said: “I can’t convince the party committee of the station. They persistently “push” their candidacy. The main complaint - I was non-partisan. Stepanovich then said: “Sorry, it doesn’t work out as planned. Let it then be both in their own way and not in my opinion. ” And he proposed another candidate, which met the formal requirements of the station party committee. Further our paths diverged. Anatoly Stepanovich worked at the II-nd phase of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as the head of RC-2, and then the deputy. chief engineer of the station for the operation of the second stage. And we “crossed” already on the day of the accident on April 26, 1986. True, I did not meet Dyatlov directly at the station on the day of the accident. When we, i.e. help group from RC-1, consisting of: Art. shift mechanical engineer No 5 A.A. Nekhaev, Art. RC-1 operation engineer A.G. Uskov and I arrived at the emergency unit on April 26th, Anatoly Stepanovich was not already at the unit — health was over.

618

And we met in the medical unit of Pripyat in the evening of the same day. Next was the road to the 6th clinical hospital in Moscow and long-term treatment. Chernobyl residents were placed on all floors of the hospital. Anatoly Stepanovich was placed in a ward on the 4th floor of the hospital, and I ended up on the 6th floor. But this did not stop all of us, Chernobylists, sometimes, as a rule, in the evenings from meeting on the landing between the floors and hotly discussing what had happened, who did what, saw what happened, what could be the reason. Then everyone was still alive - there was a period, as the doctors said, of imaginary well-being. We did not yet know the true causes of the accident; there were many different versions. There was simply no necessary information, but the fact that the reason was already laid down in the design of the station, that we, it turns out, were working at an explosive enterprise (!!!) - of course, none of us could have imagined that. Next was the consequence. Court. I did not attend any court hearings, although I received an official invitation as a victim. I just did not want to attend that farce whose final result was predetermined in advance by the official version of the causes of the accident.

619

There was a large-scale campaign to evade the responsibility of the true perpetrators of the accident. The media purposefully formed a public opinion about the fault of the station personnel, who allegedly brought out all the protections and locks for almost the only purpose - to blow up the reactor (!!!). Many “writers and poets” nimble at the pen made money on this, in the wake of which they ultimately significantly improved their well-being. And behind all this, the true culprits of the accident hid, those who, in violation of all the rules and regulations, designed the explosive reactor, who after the accident investigated the causes of the accident and, of course, did everything to transfer the blame to the station personnel. As it became known later, the real causes of the accident were known to the designers in May, but all this was for internal use. The real technical cause of the accident for specialists at nuclear power plants with RBMK, including the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, became clear from a set of measures that became urgently implemented at RBMK units. Of course, we did not know all the details of the events at the control room-4 and the 4th power unit.

620

But somehow I could not believe that Dyatlov, whom we knew as a boss, as a specialist, who always strictly, punctually required the execution of instructions, suddenly allowed in his presence to make violations that are attributed to the staff, and even more so ordered him to violate instructions inappropriately. And none of the guys - operators of the 4th block eyewitnesses of the events (many of them were still alive then), when talking in the 6th hospital, did not say anything like that. Of course, during the discussions there were statements that it was not necessary to do this or that operation, for example, to rise after a power failure, etc., but these are all the arguments from the series “if I knew where I would fall I threw straws”. The bottom line is that the staff did only what they had the right to do according to the instructions valid at that time, and this is not a violation. During the investigation, in conditions of isolation and lack of health, Anatoly Stepanovich conducted his investigation of the causes of the accident. We, those who were free, were often amazed at the questions that he transmitted from the detention center through his wife, Isabella Ivanovna. He requested in his notes, for example, to inform the exact version of a specific paragraph of the Nuclear Safety Rules.

621

At the same time, he quoted the first two paragraphs of this paragraph almost verbatim and basically conveyed the essence of the latter, the full version of which he asked him to inform. Who does not understand what this means, let him try to read at least one page of the Rules, and then quote it. This was the whole Dyatlov. We visited Stepanovich several times when he was serving a term in a “penal colony,” as he himself said. And then in these meetings the conversation continued about the details of the accident. Isabella Ivanovna once said that Stepanovich was finally released. It was necessary to pick it up no later than 16 hours. Time was running out, and the path was not close. We arrived at 15 h 30 min. Stepanovich appeared on the threshold of the checkpoint after 4 pm. He had some things in his hands. At this time, a detachment of prisoners entered the gates of the colony, probably returning to the area after work. Several voices from the column shouted to Stepanovich the words of farewell. He raised his hand and answered something. It was felt that he was respected here. We returned to Kiev already at night. PS: After his release, Anatoly Stepanovich did not stop destroying the official version of the causes of the accident, he continued to contact various departments up to the IAEA.

622

And this began to yield results, although high organizations, including foreign ones, which at one time had been propagating the version of personnel violations, could not admit their mistake and now, already defending the “honor of their uniform”, they persistently continue to multiply the lie.

V.A. Orlov

623

IV Dear reader, you are invited to a book written by a person who went through the first most tragic hours of the accident together with Chernobyl personnel and managed to survive under a constant hail of accusations and lies. Being mortally ill and realizing that information would go away with him, he found the strength to fulfill his duty to the dead and tell about the events that happened on that terrible night on April 26, 1986. Fate brought me to Anatoly Stepanovich for the first time in 1969 in the Far East, when I, a young specialist, came to the factory after graduation, the second time our destinies crossed in 1974, when I came to work at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Principle, honesty, personal responsibility and devotion to the work that you serve, impeccable knowledge of technology, simple human decency and plus complete dedication - these are the criteria that everyone who was going to work with Dyatlov had to meet.

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At first, it was not just hard for us young specialists, but it seemed impossible to raise the entire volume of technical material in order to master the reactor plant as AS himself knew it, not only twelve hours of work, but also Saturdays and Sundays were missing , and only time confirmed that he was right, and we became like-minded people. He could understand the mistakes made by staff, if they are well-reasoned, but he absolutely could not accept sloppiness, incompetence and negligent attitude to his duties. A.S., as a rule, was distinguished by the directness, clarity and conciseness of the presentation of their position, and this did not always benefit him. A.S. he did not allow himself or anyone else in his presence to carry out a showdown with personnel who had made mistakes and who were currently at the workplace. I recall the case when I (I was at the control panel) the reactor protection tripped and the ship was left without a course when it sailed from the pier. The change mechanic began to educate me, but A.S. just put it out of the control room. After the change was completed, during the analysis of the cause of the A3 operation - I made a mistake - I got my full program from A to Z, but not from the mechanic, but from A.S.

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A characteristic feature of his character was the pathological rejection of all unrighteousness and lies. If someone was caught even in an untruthful account of events, not to mention deception, he never believed this person in his word. A.S. there was a person who had his own point of view on all issues (and often did not coincide with the generally accepted one). He was strict in requirements, but not cruel in relations, he was not afraid to take responsibility within his competence and answer for it, but he was not going to bear responsibility for the ignorance, inability and unprofessionalism of others. He knew how to listen and hear the interlocutor, to argue his position, which brilliantly confirmed the "trial" in 1987. Such an episode is characteristic. When it was said at the court that RBMK still does not meet today (and it was already 1987, i.e. a year has passed since the accident) to the requirements of the norms, rules and standards for nuclear safety, the judge replied that this was not the case. It turns out that the case for which the Chernobyl victims were tried is not relevant. That was such a court, so A.S. was formally convicted, but the system was sentenced.

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A keen sense of responsibility was combined in this man with a powerful intellect, his phenomenal memory was simply amazing when he read the memory of Yesenin or Blok. Outwardly A.S. he didn’t particularly care about his image; from the outside, he seemed sharp, categorical and generally a person with a complex character. But it was necessary to know Dyatlov, it was necessary to see how he loved children, nature, the forest, to see his eyes, face - therefore, believing him in 1969, I believe him today.

A. V. Krat State Inspector for Nuclear Safety of Ukraine

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V Isabella Ivanovna asked me to write short memoirs about Dyatlov, and I don’t know how to do this briefly, because it is a whole life. It is impossible to separate Dyatlov from our mutual acquaintances from work, and actually the memories of Dyatlov are the memories of work, of the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, of Pripyat and, of course, of the accident. I have been connected with Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov for many years of joint work, and, perhaps, to a greater extent, after the Chernobyl accident, although after the accident we did not meet with him as often as needed. First a few words about yourself. I am a professional nuclear power engineer both by education and by work throughout my life. In 1970, I first met with Anatoly Stepanovich in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where I came to work at the Plant named after Lenin Komsomol after graduation. At that time, nuclear submarines were being built at this plant, and it really was the flagship of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Huge workshops, in which atomic missile carriers, modern for that time, were completed at various levels of readiness.

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Workshop No. 22, in which I started working, was auxiliary and brought together several laboratories and sites that provided radiation safety, assembly of reactors and measurements of neutron-physical characteristics, installation and commissioning of special electronic navigation equipment and reactor control systems. The laboratory in which I worked was called a physical one, and its main tasks were to control the assembly of the ship’s main power plant, including reactor equipment, and to set up this equipment, to participate in submarine acceptance tests. The head of this laboratory was Dyatlov. The laboratory was small, about twenty people, only men. All young, only three Rusakov, Dyatlov and Fochkin were old, they were about forty. At that time, they didn’t stay there for a long time, the term of the young specialist and on the mainland ended. In our laboratory, only Borya Rusakov was local, he graduated from the evening institute and with great difficulty was accepted into the laboratory, you see, his education was not a physical engineer. In the laboratory, Dyatlov was the undisputed leader, and probably not by official position, but simply no one doubted it. Of course, we can say that in such a team, where more than half of the staff are young specialists, I would not say simply to be a leader.

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At the plant, Dyatlov was an absolute authority in matters of physics and safety of a nuclear power plant, with his opinion, I think, were considered by our supervisors (IAE named after I.V. Kurchatov and the IPPE Obninsk). My fate, like many other laboratory staff, was determined by Dyatlov. He moved to work in Chernobyl, and other Komsomol members (Kryat, Padenok, Sitnikov, Chugunov, Shulgin) followed him. In Pripyat we supported fraternity, communicated with families. I can’t say that I was a friend of Dyatlov, probably only Sitnikov maintained very close friendly relations with him. Dyatlov was a difficult person to communicate with, direct, had his own point of view and never changed it at the request of the boss, persuaded, did not agree, in the end, obeyed, but remained at his own opinion. Similarly, he had little regard for the opinions of subordinates. As you know, not everyone loves such a person. Once we had a conversation with him about money, and he said that he had a little more than five thousand rubles on his passbook. He explained that he needed this book for independence: “if they break it, I’ll leave work and somehow interrupt for several months.” He had some kind of inner core, beliefs through which he could never step over.

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Even in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Volodya Vlasov called him a Kerzhak, and not because Dyatlov was born and raised in Siberia, but because it was almost impossible to force him to do it against his convictions. And when they say that for the sake of the director of the station or chief engineer, Dyatlov could have ignored the safety principles, instructed to turn off the reactor protection or violated the instructions, I will never believe that.

V.V.Grischenko Chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear Safety of Ukraine

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VI In the life of any person there are people whose personal qualities evoke a certain sympathy and respect. But only a few of them leave a bright and indelible mark that remains in the soul for life. One of the few people I met in my life was A.S. Dyatlov. I met A.S.Dyatlov in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1973, where I started working after graduating from the institute in 1972. Before Anatoly Stepanovich moved to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant II stage in 1979, my entire career was connected with him. Since the formation of the reactor shop collective, where A.S. Dyatlov was the deputy head of the operation workshop, there were only a few people young engineers like me. Before the start-up of the block, it was still a long way off, and all the workers in the workshop performed the assigned work, which the workshops usually carry out at the stage of construction and installation of the block. In addition, the future operational employees A.S.Dyatlov set the task of preparing for exams for the position and, accordingly, studying equipment, operating documents, etc.

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There was a corresponding order, schedules for passing exams, but the question arose about the lack of time for study during the working day, which was asked to A.S.Dyatlov. The answer was brief: “Learn after work and on weekends,” which he himself did. And everyone needed to learn, RBMK-1000 was a new technique for everyone at that time, and even more so for us young. First of all, Stepanych, as we called him among ourselves, was demanding of himself and gave himself to work according to the full scheme, but also asked about the completion of the task in full. He did not recognize trifles in our work, both during installation and during operation. Whoever did not understand this, specially explained to him, knew how not only to convince, but also to listen to the employee. Anatoly Stepanovich did not tolerate sloppiness in work, and especially if they tried to carry him out - to deceive, to tell a lie. In such cases, he immediately went to the name and patronymic during the conversation, and the culprit often knew that he would be ten times more likely to report on the work, ask him more strictly, and trust would be lost for a long time.

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Anatoly Stepanovich was stingy in praising the work, he took the work for granted, but could stand before the boss for the workshop worker if he was offered to punish him undeservedly. For a heart-to-heart talk, if necessary, it was open to both a simple workshop worker and an engineer, and never boasted of his position. He does not hold feelings of humor, read the book and see for yourself. It must be said that many of us, A.S. Dyatlov, were amazed by his knowledge of not only matters. I will give one example. One late evening, during a shift for accepting reactor designs, AS Dyatlov came in to the trailer, where several people from the shift were, to check how the work was going. Two young specialists solved a differential equation for someone from external students and they didn’t succeed, they were noisy and didn’t notice it. Dyatlov asked them to move on the bench, crouched and within a short time indicated a mistake and solved the problem. And then he said: "At work you need to do work, I will see again, you will write explanatory notes."

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It is quite understandable that not everyone liked his exactingness to carry out work at least “well”, and some understood this later, but naturally there were those who took the opportunity to throw a stone at him during the investigation, but did not appear at court .. . I am personally grateful to Anatoly Stepanovich for the fact that his “school” helped me to fully join the ranks of the best specialist operatives at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. For the second time, our tragedy brought me close to A.S.Dyatlov on 04/26/1986. I want, dear readers, to share with you how I still knew the courageous nature of Anatoly Stepanovich. Judge for yourself, here is an excerpt from the letters, starting in 1989, on behalf of the Kiev Council of the "Society of Veterans of the liquidation of the accident and consequences at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant," which are practically unchanged in nature and were sent alternately to the Supreme Court of the USSR, the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and, finally, USSR President Gorbachev M.S.

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“Of the fourteen diseases of the convict Dyatlov A.S. five diseases (coronary heart disease, diffuse pneumosclerosis, atrial fibrillation, chronic obstructive bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema) are in the list of diseases that are the basis for granting convicts exemption from punishment in accordance with Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 213 of 10/30/1987. In this List there is no such disease as acute radiation sickness (ARS) of the 2nd and 3rd degree, which, in our opinion, is inhumane, and this issue requires an immediate solution. We want to emphasize that a disabled person of the 2nd group Dyatlov A.S., who is ill with ARS of the 3rd degree at the age of 59 years, who is serving his sentence in prison, can not improve his state of health, because ARS disease constantly causes undefined side effects that worsen the condition of the patient. We believe that the response of the Medical Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR is out. 4 / 1-69 of 02.02.1990 to our address, which, in particular, sets out the following:

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“Release from places of deprivation of liberty due to illness Dyatlov A.S. not subject, does not fall under the requirement of the Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, ”is unlawful ... Of the six convicted in this case, only two are in prison - Dyatlov A.S. and Fomin N.M., who, due to their state of health, cannot, like the other convicts, be conditionally released upon serving 1/3 of the term with the obligatory involvement of the convicts. ” After a deceitful trial, while in a camp from which, according to the law, the authorities should release, but do not want to, release resistance by “No”, A.S.Dyatlov found the strength to overcome moral and physical suffering and state the truth about events 04/26/1986, to analyze and evaluate various documents about the accident, hoping that they would nevertheless someday hear and understand it. The machine of lies about the causes of the Chernobyl accident worked without interruptions until 1988, so few of the former student colleagues at work kept in touch with A.S.Dyatlov when he was serving time. Some are still tormented, is Stepanych right in everything? Strong lies, but not eternal.

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A.S.Dyatlov did not live long after his release, very often we, his comrades in the struggle for the truth about Chernobyl, got together and saw how hard it was for him, how he was tormented by his illnesses, and how bravely he endured it all. Bright memory to him! V.V. Lomakin Deputy Director of the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine

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VII On the night of April 25-26, 1986, with N.V. Navalny, at 24:00, I accepted a shift on the radiation control panel of the second stage. Our responsibilities included radiation monitoring of the central halls of reactors of the 3rd and 4th units and all adjacent premises with increased radiation hazard. After bypassing the 3rd block, I returned to the shield, I did not go to the 4th block, because he stopped. Just a few minutes passed, when there was a roar from the side of the machine room. After 5 ... 10 with a thud a powerful blow. The light and light alarm on the panel of the 4th block went out, the panel of the 3rd block lit up in red and the audible alarm squealed, black dust fell from the supply ventilation hatch ... So I was at the epicenter of a nuclear disaster, which in a matter of minutes could become fatal for me. That night I had to face the shift supervisor of the 4th block A.F. Akimov, deputy chief engineer for the operation of the second stage A.S.Dyatlov, L.Telyatnikov and many other participants in the liquidation of this disaster, unfortunately, many are no longer alive.

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On the next 15th anniversary of that terrible night, I want to remember all of our children who died: Akimova A.F., Baranova A.I., Brazhnika BC, Vershinina Yu.A., Degtyarenko V.M., Konoval Yu.I., Kudryavtseva A.G., Kurguza A.Kh., Lelechenko A.G., Lopatyuk V.I., Novika A.V., Perevozchenko V.I., Perchuk K.G., Proskuryakova V.V., Sitnikova A. A., Toptunova L.F., Khodemchuk V.I. (grave - 4th block), Shapovalova A.I., Shashenka V.F., Busygina G.V., Kovalenko A.P., Dyatlova A.S., Gashimova M.U. ... It wasn’t that night panic, negligence and sloppiness, there was no fear and unskilled actions, as much has been written over these 15 years. Everyone had a dumb question in their eyes - why? And everyone did what he should, what he owed, what he could, saved the equipment, extinguished fires, searched for and carried out the victims. On April 27, together with A.S. Dyatlov, I ended up in the 6th hospital in Moscow. In the early days, the same conversations were held: they supposed, argued, thought - why the explosion? Anatoly Stepanovich was thin, fit, always calm and restrained, convincingly saying: “we did everything right”, sometimes thought ... Investigators often pestered, it was believed that this was sabotage.

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There were versions of the guilt of the staff ... Almost every day someone dies ... There is emptiness in the soul, the future is unknown - to live or die, where is the family? On the 60th day I started a second wave of burns, the first ones have not yet been healed, and new red-cherry spots began to appear, every day more and more ... Long months of treatment. A low bow to all doctors, and doctors and nurses. On October 27, they were discharged home by a disabled person with dressings on wounds that have been alarming to this day. On December 31, 1986, they were taken to their home station and secretly presented government awards: orders and medals to the living, orders posthumously to the widows. Didn’t they find a place in Kiev or only heroes were awarded in it ?! Found the "switchman" - judged. A few years later they are released. And silence again ?! How to look into the eyes of the children of the fallen ?! For what or whom did their fathers die ?! On the 60th day I started a second wave of burns, the first ones have not yet been healed, and new red-cherry spots began to appear, every day more and more ... Long months of treatment. A low bow to all doctors, and doctors and nurses.

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On October 27, they were discharged home by a disabled person with dressings on wounds that have been alarming to this day. On December 31, 1986, they were taken to their home station and secretly presented government awards: orders and medals to the living, orders posthumously to the widows. Didn’t they find a place in Kiev or only heroes were awarded in it ?! Found the "switchman" - judged. A few years later they are released. And silence again ?! How to look into the eyes of the children of the fallen ?! For what or whom did their fathers die ?! With Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov lived in the same house, often met in the yard, in hospitals. The last time several months before his death lay in Pushcha-Voditsa. In the evening, we are going to have dinner, Anatoly Stepanovich had severe headaches, and he says: “How do you guys want to hear the truth when, finally, the people find out how it was ?! How I want to live yet, but my head does not give me life - neither day nor night, but how I want to pull a glass and eat black bread with lard! ”Stepanych ate black bread with lard with pleasure. Man was a man. The kingdom of heaven, the earth with all their might and the eternal memory of the living, and not dumb silence and non-existence.

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N. F.Gorbachenko Former on-duty dosimetr 5th shift of the Chernobyl NPP Department of Occupational Health and Safety

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Chernobyl letter, ref. No 19-10175 dated 11/30/1983 to the head of the enterprise post office A-7291 to the chief designer Academician N. Dollezhal (Page 18) Priority changes and additions to the Nuclear Safety Rules for Nuclear Power Plants (PBY-04-74), approved in June 1987 by the USSR Gosatomenergonadzor, the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and the USSR GKAE (Page 22) Act of the commission for verification of nuclear safety at I, II phases of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, inv. No 5 on 01/16/1986 (Page 43) The operational log of the NSB of the Chernobyl NPP block No. 3 for the period from 23:25 04/25/1986 to 08:00 04/26/1986 (Page 56) Act of the physical commission commission on the completion of the physical launch of the RBMK-1000 reactor of the IV unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant No. 92 / IV of 12/18/1983 (Page 80)

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ChNPP Order "On Strengthening the Secrecy Regime According to Information Relating to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant." No 5 ДСП from 07/06/1986 (Page 85) The safety justification for the 1st generation RBMK reactor based on the results of the "Activities ..." dated 06/27/86 at the 1st Chernobyl NPP dated 09/28/1986 (Page 130)

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