Chairman Hua: Leader of the Chinese Communists 9780773594067

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Plates
Foreword by Jorgen Domes
Preface
Chronology
Map of China
1. Said to be an Illegitimate Child
2. Shansi, 1920-1949
3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1956
4. The Hunan Period, 1956-1971
5. The Peking Period, 1971-1978
6. 1976: An Eventful Year
7. Factions, Policies, Prospects
Appendixes
Notes and References
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

CHAIRMAN HUA

CHAIRMAN HUA Leader of the Chinese Communists

by TING WANG

McGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS MONTREAL

First published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1-2 Henrietta Street, London WC2E 8PS Published simultaneously in Canada by McGill-Queen's University Press 1020 Pine Avenue West, Montreal H3A 1A2 © 198o, by Ting Wang ISBN O-7735- 0525-3 Legal deposit second quarter 198o Bibliotheque Nationale du Quebec

Printed in Hong Kong by Libra Press Ltd. 56 Wong Chuk Hang Road 5D

CONTENTS FOREWORD BY JORGEN DOMES

Vii

ix

PREFACE CHRONOLOGY

Xiii

MAP OF CHINA

XVI

I. Said to be an Illegitimate Child 8

2.

Shansi, 1920-1949

.

3.

Hsiangtan, 1949-1956

28

4.

The Hunan Period, 1956-1971

5

5. The Peking Period, 1971-1978

73

6.

1976: an Eventful Year .

Ioo

7.

Factions, Policies, Prospects

121

APPENDIXES

141

NOTES AND REFERENCES

143

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

172

INDEX

178

PLATES (between pages

112

and 113)

1. Official portrait of Hua Kuo-feng, 1976. 2. Hua leading guerrillas against the Japanese in Shansi, early 1940. 3. Changsha, provincial capital of Hunan. 4. Hua at a construction site on the Shaoshan irrigation project. 5. Part of the Shaoshan irrigation project. 6. Hua with a family in Tibet, 1975• 7. Hua with Mao Tse-tung in Peking, April 1976. 8. A display with Mao's handwritten message to Hua: "With you in charge I am at ease". 9. Hua inspecting a rural commune in Shansi, May 1977. Jo. Hua writing an inscription for the Taching oilfield, April 1977. II. At the Eleventh CCP Congress in Peking, August 1977.

12. Hua at the Miyun reservoir outside Peking, 1977. 13. A caricature of Chiang Ching. 14. A rally held by people of Li nationality on Hainan Island to denounce the "Gang of Four". 15. Hua at the Black Sea resort of Constanta, Romania. 16. Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, August 1977.

vi

FOREWORD In the last few years, history and political science have experienced a remarkable revival of the art of political biography, which had been almost forgotten during a decade of abstract theorising and attempts to deliver ideological explanations for almost every phenomenon in the realm of politics. With this revival, the politics of the past and present appear in a more lively manner, and hence become more transparent, although by no means less complicated. Students of Chinese politics will therefore appreciate that, with the present volume, the first academically researched biography of Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and Premier of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) State Council, becomes available in a Western language. Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the PRC who have made their way to Hong Kong during the last twenty years, only a few have turned their own experiences into balanced analysis, thus adding to our systematised academic knowledge of China today. Ting Wang is one of these. Ever since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he has dedicated himself to the systematic analysis of current events, and later also of past developments, in the PRC. As editor of the China news page of the large and respected Hong Kong Chinese-language daily Ming Pay — a paper which has always taken a position independent of both Peking and Taipei—and editor of the book section of its affiliate, the intellectually important Ming Pao Monthly, he has collected over the years immense documentary resources. This has enabled him to edit several collections of documents which arc regularly used by most China specialists. Furthermore, a number of his analytical contributions have been translated into English. Hence he now has increasing prestige in the West too, which has resulted in his receiving invitations for several lecture tours to Japan and the United States. During this summer, he received a visiting research scholarship from the renowned East-West Center at the University of Hawaii. The particular strength of TingWang's scholarly vii

viii

Chairman Hua

work lies in his intimate knowledge of Chinese Communist history and politics, and even more in his comprehensive research on PRC leadership personnel. He was thus exceptionally well equipped for the task of writing this biography of Hua Kuo-feng. The book is the result of more than three years of painstaking research, during which Ting Wang was able to locate a number of sources hitherto unknown to most China specialists. Nevertheless, one need not agree with all his conclusions. In particular, one may dispute his tendency, common to other Chinese observers of Chinese politics, sometimes to take CCP sources too much at face value. Nevertheless, I consider this biography a major scholarly breakthrough for our knowledge about the man who is now, at least in name, the leader of the CCP and the administrative head of the PRC. The work of Ting Wang shows Hua Kuo-feng as an astute, shrewd, but also exceptionally ruthless and career-conscious politician, who made his way to the very top as a Cultural Revolutionary upstart from provincial-level cadre rank since the late 196os. His strengths seem to lie in his intimate knowledge of the basic- and mid-level organisation, his deep roots in the security machine, and his obvious managerial abilities in the field of water conservancy. His weaknesses, on the other hand, may be found in. his lack of ability in the field of foreign relations and scanty knowledge of the international scene, the small size of his personal loyalty group among the Chinese elite, and his obvious utter lack of personal charisma. In China today, people see Hua Kuo-fcng as the man who, by changing sides at the very last moment, facilitated the Peking coup d'etat of 6 October 1976, in which the leaders of the Cultural Revolutionary left were purged. But they know him also as the man who engineered the brutal repression of the demonstrations of $ April 1976 in Peking. And Ting Wang's study shows us that most major steps in Hua's comparatively rapid career were taken during periods of Maoist, leftoriented, mobilisatory policies. Hence, he is not exactly the most convincing representative of the more pragmatic, growth-oriented and somewhat domestically relaxing policies of the China of 1978 and 1979, for which another man rightfully holds the place of honour—Teng Hsiaoping.Thus the personal future of Hua Kuo-feng cannot safely bepredictcd His past, however, is presented here in a balanced, matter-of-fact way in a book that I can warmly recommend to be thoroughly read. Saarbriicken, September 1979

JURGEN DOMES

AUTHOR'S PREFACE In October 1976 the "Gang of Four"—consisting of the radical leaders led by Mao Tsc-tung's wife, Chiang Ching—was finally deposed. In the months that followed, the Chinese media began to publish accounts of the extravagance and abuse of power of Chiang Ching and her supporters, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wcn-yuan. The Chinese press seldom publishes revelations of the private lives of the nation's leaders, but in this case the flurry of newspaper articles and commentaries exposing for the first time the misdeeds of the disgraced palace politicians, who had previously been revered as people of impeccable integrity, provided the mainland populace with interesting gossip and unusual topics of conversation. According to these accounts of the disgraceful conduct of the ousted Maoist radicals, Wang Hung-wen, a former vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was a blackguard and a petty thief. While serving in the Chinese army in Korea during the Korean war, he sought to become a trumpeter in a military band so as to avoid going into the front line, and he frequently stole preserved vegetables prepared by the Koreans. After the war, while working in a Shanghai textile mill, he used sometimes to take home cotton cloth for making shirts without the knowledge of his fellow-workers.1 After Mao promoted him to CCP vice-chairman, he was alleged to have squandered US$5 million from precious state funds on a luxurious villa on the outskirts of Pelcing,2 and had a house constructed in bullet-proof, anti-quake glass and steel imported from abroad at the cost of the equivalent of US$22o,000.3 A three-month sojourn in Shanghai apparently cost the public coffers the equivalent of US$r4,000.4 It was said that the money he spent in one day could have supported a worker's family for six months. When he was in Peking, ten prominent medical doctors were in attendance on him.5 He indulged himself freely and seemingly without conscience, determined to enjoy life as fully as his powers would permit and without regard to the constraints suffered by the rest of the people. ix

x

Chairman Hua

Like Wang Hung-wen, Chiang Ching apparently lived extravagantly and insisted that her whims be satisfied. As an example of this, it is said that she took a particular dislike to the sand at the mineral springs in Canton where she went on vacation, and so had a special plane sent to fetch sea-sand from Hainan island,6 and, furthermore, had cases of goldfish shipped in by air from Peking.? To please her American biographer, Roxane Witke, she asked the municipal authorities of Canton to convert a public playground into a private swimming pool overnight, so that both might bathe at their leisure.8 According to the report that emerged after her downfall, Chiang Ching, although past fifty, led as vigorous a sexual life as someone half her age. Young men were apparently invited to her house to give special "performances of Chinese kung fu",9 and it was said that her young lovers included the former world table tennis champion, Chuang Tse-tung, and a number of actors. As rewards for their services, they were all promoted to high posts in State Council ministries.1° These examples serve to show the difficulties facing the biographer of any contemporary figure in the People's Republic of China. The difference between the way in which the official media portray a figure while still in power and the kind of details disseminated after his or her downfall is only too apparent—and neither should be taken as wholly reliable. Since the official media constitute more or less the only source of information on contemporary events in China, it is very difficult for a biographer to gain any clear insight into the leading political figures, let alone hope to portray them in any depth or colour. Details about the private lives of China's leaders traditionally remain closely guarded secrets—until they have been discredited. About all we know of Hua's private life for example is that he is married to Han Chih-chun and has four children. The information released by the official media is closely regulated. Hua Kuo-feng, as China's first post-Mao chairman, has naturally been the focus of attention in the Chinese media; yet although no words are spared in recounting episodes of his revolutionary career and other praiseworthy deeds of the past, we are told virtually nothing about his childhood and youth before 1937, and so far no detailed account of his recent rise to power in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy has been published. The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in mid-1966 plunged mainland China into chaos, an upheaval that was complicated by the political strivings of individuals and the power struggle within the

Preface

xi

leadership. Shifts in the distribution of power came quite unexpectedly, not the least of these being the abrupt leadership realignment in April 1976 in which Hua became first vice-chairman of the CCP and premier of the State Council. Hua took over Mao's mantle in October 1976, and the legitimacy of his succession was officially confirmed at the third plenum of the tenth CCP congress held in July 1977. He had risen from the position of a provincial CCP secretary in 1966 to the nation's top post in 1977, a rapid advance that surprised many people within China as well as the world at large. But without the Cultural Revolution and without the machinations of the disgraced "Gang of Four", Hua would not have become China's new leader. Marx once said that by force of circumstances even a person worthy of ridicule can become a hero. An ordinary cadre with little importance on the political scene, Hua did not come into national prominence until August 1973, when he was elected to the Politburo, an appointment which was to lead to his role in overthrowing the "Gang of Four" three years later. Since then, the power structure has shifted again. The return of Teng Hsiao-ping in July 1977, and the sweeping measures introduced by him to sort out the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, have increased the power and prestige of the "restorationists" led by him, posing a further potential political crisis for Hua. The preparation of this volume has required three years of close study and intensive research, in the course of which I have interviewed a number of people who have information on the political scene of Shansi province in the 192os and 193os and talked at length with people who worked in Hunan in the 195os and 196os and who now reside in Hong Kong. (Some of them are former Red Guards.) The book, however, is based primarily on. published sources. It is hoped that through Hua's political career the reader will be able to gain an impression of the wider leadership conflicts and political developments in post-1949 China. This book has incorporated materials from my articles in Ming Pao, a Chinese-language daily with wide circulation in Hong Kong; Chuokoron, a respected Japanese monthly in Tokyo; Chinese Law and Government, a journal of translations in the United States; and material from my Japanese edition of Hua Kuo-feng: a Critical Biography, published in 1978. Of course, I have updated the earlier material and included new information that became available before July 1978.

xii

Chairman Hua

I. wish to thank several people who have been instrumental in the publication of this book. I am deeply grateful to Professor Jurgen Domes, a well-known German China specialist, for inspiring me to publish this book in English and for contributing a Foreword. The encouragement given to the author by Mr Christopher Hurst, the publisher, is much appreciated. Thanks arc due to several translators in Hong Kong, who wish to remain unnamed, for translating my Chinese manuscript into English. I also want to thank Mr Chu Li, a research associate of the Mass Communication Centre of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Mr Ku Liu, a columnist, who helped with improving the English translation. Finally, I owe a special debt to Mr Antony Mason, the editor, for his invaluable assistance. TING WANG

Hong Kong, July 1979

CHRONOLOGY Administrative Grade

Date

Hua Kno-jeug's Career and Positions held

1920 or 1921

Born in Chiaochcng county. Shansi province

1925 or 1926-32(?)

Received primary education

1932-8(?)

Received secondary education

193 8-40

Joined the guerrillas operating in Chiaocheng county and surrounding mountains

1940-5

23-21

Headed an anti-Japanese and national salvation group in Chiaocheng

1942-3

20-18

Headed a front-line group against the enemy in the same county

1942-5

18-17

Became propaganda chicf of the CCP Chiaocheng county Committee

17-15

Summer 1945winter 1945(?) Spring 1946autumn 1947

Possibly underwent training in Yenan (?) Became secretary of CCP Chiaocheng county Committee and political commissar of the county's armed forces detachment

Autumn 1947early 1949

16-15

Became secretary of CCP Yangchu county Committee and political commissar of the County's armed forces detachment

16-15

Early 1949March 1949

Became propaganda chief of Central Shansi's CCP

March 1949-

Went to the south with Communist army

August 1949 August '949June 1951

first district Committee

en route

15-13

units

to Hopels

Became secretary of CCP Hsiangyin county (Hunan) Committee and political conunissar of the county's armed forces department

June 1951August 5952

Became secretary of CCP Hsiangtan county Committee, political commissar of the county's armed forces department and principal of the county's middle school

August 1952-

Became deputy secretary of CCP Hsiangtan prefectural

summer 1953

Committee and commissioner of Hsiangtan district

Summer 1953May 5956

Appointed secretary of CCP Hsiangtan prefectural

12-11

Committee and political commissar of Hsiangtan sub-military district

May 1956summer 1957

Headed Hunan provincial culture and education office and served as vice-chairman of the provincial

Putunghtta

popularisation committee

11-9

xiv Dare

Summer 1957early 5958 1958September 1959 1958-66 September 1959-66 1960M-5

Chairman Hua Hua Kuo-feng's Career and Positions held

Headed CCP Hunan provincial Committee's united front department Became alternate secretary of CCP Hunan provincial Committee and responsible for the economic leading group under the provincial Party Committee Became vice-governor of Hunan Became secretary of CCP Hunan provincial Committee Became in a concurrent capacity secretary of CCP Hsiangtan prefectural Committee July 1965Director and political commissar for an irrigation July 1966 project in Shaoshan, Hunan October 1966Became CCP secretary and concurrently director July 1970 of the Ouyang Hai irrigation project in Hunan 1967-8 Became deputy head of a preparatory group for Hunan provincial revolutionary committee April 1968-1970 Became vice-chairman of Hunan's provincial revolutionary Committee 1969-78 Elected member of CCP Central Committee 197o-7 Became first secretary of CCP Hunan provincial Committee and concurrently acting chairman of its revolutionary committee 1971-7 Became political commissar of the Canton military region in a concurrent capacity Became a leading cadre in the State Council 1971-4 (equivalent to vice-premier) October 1972-1977 Became in a concurrent capacity first political commissar of Hunan provincial military district August 1973-1978 Elected to the CCP politburo January 1975-1976 Became vice-premier and concurrently minister of public security January 1976Became acting premier April 1976 April 1976-78 Named premier April 5976October 1976 Became first CCP vice-chairman October 1976-1978 Named Chairman of the CCP and its military commission

Administrative Grade

9-8

8-7 8-6 7-5

5-4

4-3

3-2

2-I

NOTES 1. Hua's early and later careers are given in chronological order based mostly on material emanating from official sources, though some arc based on other confirmed source materials. 2. Government functionaries are graded administratively on the "salary scales in force in government organs" announced in 1956. Before that year, there were no administrative grades for officials serving in various governmental departments.

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I SAID TO BE AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD Hua Kuo-feng is very tall, with big penetrating eyes set in a square face. Although he wears a serious expression most of the time, he, like Mao Tse-tung, will smile and wave at the people at mass gatherings and, when visiting factories or agricultural projects, will stop to shake hands and chat with the labourers. On the political stage in Peking Hua is keen to make himself the focus of public attention. Yet the public have a very limited understanding of their new national leader, despite the fact that Peking's mass news media devote considerable space to extolling him. Hua's life before he turned seventeen is virtually a blank; his parents, his family background, his childhood and education remain obscure, perhaps for some reason deliberately shrouded in mystery. One of the widely-circulated rumours that has arisen in this absence of official information claims that Hua Kuo-feng is the illegitimate child of a landlord's daughter. In traditional Chinese society illegitimate children have no social status; but should a child one day reach a position of power, no mention will be made of his uncertain parentage. To do so would go against the traditional Chinese code of behaviour. In Chinese history, many who emerged in positions of power during major social upheavals came from lowly backgrounds. Liu Pang, first emperor of the Han dynasty (206 s.c. to A.D. 220), was a man of great talent, but before ascending the throne he was a minor official attending to rural affairs. The founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-164, Chu Yuan-chang, was once a poor monk familiar with only a few written characters. Tsao Tsao (155-220), a chief minister in the last years of the Han dynasty and a prominent figure in Chinese history, came from an insignificant family of minor officials; in his younger days he kept the company of wandering ne'er-do-weels and had no proper occupation.'

Chairman Hua Later, however, he was to wield vast power and become known for his literary accomplishments and political astuteness. Emperor Wen of the Han dynasty was a popular and capable administrator. According to historical record, Liu Pang defeated the prince ofWei and captured his beautiful concubine, Pu-chi. Liu later picked her to be his own favourite concubine. She gave birth to a boy2 who, with the backing of powerful military officers, later became Emperor Wen. In October t976 Hua Kuo-feng, who at various times has been alleged to have been born out of wedlock, was voted Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by the veteran Marshal Ych Chienying and other powerful figures. There are thus certain similarities between the Han emperor and the CCP Chairman. During his twenty-three-year reign Emperor Wen abolished heavy torture and exempted peasants from paying tax on the land which they tilled. His vigorous promotion of farming and the attention he gave to his subjects' livelihood were factors responsible for the resuscitation of the social economy.3 In a notable poem Tu Mu, a poet of the Tang dynasty (618-907), refers to the capture of the Prince of Wei's concubine and the boy born to her by Liu Pang, and dwells on the way that these events heralded the period of prosperity during the reign of Emperor Wen.4 After Hua Kuo-feng assumed power, Peking's newspapers and periodicals spared no effort in alluding to Hua's vision of "bringing about great order across the land" and cited the flourishing reign of Emperor Wen.° But whether Hua is endowed with Emperor Wen's ability and will be able to match his accomplishments, ushering in a comparable age of prosperity for the country, remains to be seen. 1. Shansi, Taiyuan and Chiaocheng

Hua Kuo-feng was born in Chiaocheng county, Shansi province, north China.6 This county is to the south-west of Taiyuan,7 the provincial capital, and although about 5o km. from the urban centre, it lies close to Taiyuan's outskirts: indeed a part of Chiaocheng was once incorporated into the Kuchiao prefecture in Taiyuan.8 Chiaocheng lies to the west of the Tungpu railway, which runs across the province,6 west of the river Fen" and east of Luliang mountains," at Long. 112° E. and Lat. 37.5° N." It is now under the jurisdiction of the Luliang special prefecture.

1. Said to he an Illegitimate Child

3

Shansi borders on Hopei province and is within easy reach of Peking. With an area of iso,000 square km. and a population of 18,oio,000, it lies cast of Taihsing mountain and north and east of the Yellow river,13 that is, cast of the Shansi plateau. The greater part of the region is L000 in. above sea level. The province is rich in natural resources, especially coal and iron ore, with coal deposits estimated to be about 3o per cent of those of the entire colmtry,.14 The industrial base was firmly established in the 193os, when many big collieries, iron and steel mills and arsenals came into operation. Industry and farming are the mainstay of the provincial economy, with livestock breeding in second place. Tachai, in Hsiyang county to the east, is a model of "advanced farm production"." Taiyuan in Shansi's central basin rises 85o m. above sea level, 813 m. higher than Peking." The extensive tracts of lowland south-east of the municipality are particularly good for farming, which makes Taiyuan compare favourably with the fertile farmland south of the Yangtse river. With industry dominating the economic sector, the municipality thrives on an abundance of raw materials essential to the heavy machinery industry; thus it has facilities such as are found in any modern metropolis. Taiyuan is an ancient Chinese city dating back more than 2,40o years. During the Tang dynasty, then known as Chinyang, it rivalled well-known cities like Loyang. Changan and Kaifeng." The Chin temple is today a famous tourist attraction. The modern industrial city has a population of over 1 million." Chiaocheng is a medium-sized county of some 18o,000 inhabitants, about 70o m. above sea-level. It boasts a number of related ancient monuments and many temples, and its beautiful landscape, notably the hills in the north-west of the county, was praised by the early Cling scholars and poets.23,21 Chiaocheng was an old revolutionary base arca, the headquarters of the eighth sub-district of the Shansi-Suiyuan military district during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45).22 2. A revealing leaflet Hua Kuo-feng was born in 192o or 1923.23 He is considered to be in his prime compared to the other Chinese leaders, most of whom arc either approaching or are already in their seventies, or even their eighties. The official Chinese press- has so far disclosed nothing about his family, or his childhood and adolescence, and the absence of official information on this remains a riddle. However, before Teng Hsiao-ping

4

Chairman Hua

was returned to power, a pro-Teng secret organisation named "637 Headquarters" produced a leaflet entitled "Bombard Hua Kuo-feng" (one in a series which was aimed at encouraging criticism of Hua), and in this something of Hua's early life was revealed. The leaflet was mimeographed by the "Chungshan University Sparta corps" in Canton and distributed elsewhere. Copies were reportedly taken to Peking and found their way into cars belonging to foreign diplomats. A full translation later appeared in China News Analysis, published in Hong Kong.24 According to this leaflet, Hua Kuo-feng was born out of wedlock in May 19w in a village in Chiaocheng county. His mother, Hua Yu, was born in 19oz and belonged to a big land-owning family. She had studied in a primary school, and begun mixing with men at the age of fifteen. Expelled from home by her father, she was sold as a concubine to a rich peasant named Liu. Nicknamed "White Monkey" because he apparently looked like one, Liu was already fifty-eight when he acquired Hua Yu (his first wife was sixty-four). Their relationship was unhappy, probably because of the age difference, and Hua Yu had a liaison with a tenant farmer employed by the Liu household. The young man, named Chin, was a former private in Yen Hsi-shan's army, who had deserted when he was caught red-handed with the concubine of his superior, a company leader. Hua Yu bore Chin a child in 192o. The boy was named Liu Cheng-jung, but was later to take the name Hua Kuo-feng. "White Monkey" Liu suspected nothing, and indeed was so pleased at having a child in his advanced years that he gave a big banquet to celebrate the occasion. As the boy grew up, however, he clearly bore no resemblance to Liu, and when Hua Yu's relationship with Chin was discovered and disclosed to him by his family, he promptly expelled her. Hua Yu and her son then moved to an area near Taiyuan and Chiaocheng county, where they lived for two years. There she met a native of Shansi province, Peng Chen, who was Secretary of the Chengtai Railway Federation of Trade Unions,25 and was directing the Chinese Communist labour movement in Shansi. He sympathised with Hua Yu and advised her to see an underground worker named Hua (given name unknown). This she did, and ended up as Hua's wife. It was from this time that her son was known as Hua Kuo-feng. In the winter of 1937 both Taiyuan and Chiaocheng were under Japanese occupation. Hua Yu went to Yenan and found work there. In February 1938, she became acquainted with Kang Sheng who had just

1. Said to be an Illegitimate Child

5

returned from Moscow, and their relationship became intimate. Shortly afterwards, her husband was murdered by secret agents under Kang's direction,26 a fact which came to light in 196o through investigations conducted by Peng Chen, an old friend of the victim. In the winter of 1935, the murdered man had wanted Hua Kuo-feng to work for the Chinese Communist Party, but his mother objected because she wanted him to go to school and acquire an education. In August 1937, Hua Kuo-feng had a liaison with a girl student, because of which he had to discontinue his education and return to Chiaocheng, where he was soon to join the guerrillas operating in the hills. 3.

Truth or hearsay?

The leaflet cited above27 appears to be the only detailed material available about Hua Kuo-feng's family background and early life, although the truth of what it says has yet to be verified; the possibility of it being a fabrication cannot be entirely ruled out. However, the content of the leaflet is given here not so much to endorse any claim to its accuracy and authenticity, but because before official sources disclose the truth of Hua's family background and early life, this material may serve as a useful point of reference. After careful examination of the wording of the original leaflet it becomes clear that no ordinary student or minor official could have produced such a document. It could, however, have been drafted by a high-ranking cadre with a good understanding of Marxism-Leninism and a good knowledge of Hua's past and the history of the Chinese Communists. It is noteworthy that the leaflet was distributed by the "Chungshan University Sparta corps", probably an assumed name for a pro-Teng and anti-Hua group of young people operating covertly. Inasmuch as the leaflet pointedly refers to Hua's close ties with the "Gang of Four" and his efforts to thwart Teng's comeback, the group seems to be closely linked to the leadership conflict and its backers could be a powerful group. As already mentioned, copies of the leaflet were distributed in Canton and Peking. Canton's military leaders such as Hsu Shih-yu and Wei Kuo-ching were known to have exerted considerable influence in securing Teng's return to power. Is it possible that the leaflet originated from the highly-placed officials in Canton, who then used their children in the Chungshan University as a means of exposing Hua's inglorious family background in order to put pressure on Hua to allow Teng's

6

Chairman Hua

rehabilitation? Before and after Teng was returned to power in July 1977, wall posters were put up in Canton criticising Hua's connections with the 'Gang of Four". Many of the disclosures were largely based on fact," and it is possible that they were directly related to the attempts made by Teng's supporters to represent Hua as an accomplice of the "Gang". Several items of information in the leaflet, such as Hua's year of birth, Peng Chen's post in the Chentai railway federation of trade unions, and Rang Sheng's control of the security apparatus, accord with facts—one reason why the leaflet should not be lightly dismissed. One thing we should not overlook is the fact that, prior to July 1977, while the official Chinese news media spared no efforts to extol Hua's accomplishments and build up his cult of personality, nothing was said, in all the literature published, about Hua's pre-1937 activities, his family and schooling (with the exception of a primary school he attended). This is highly remarkable. In praising leading figures in the past such as Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien, the Chinese press has always given details of their family and early life. Mao, who came from a rich peasant family, is pictured as having been a child who loved to work. His rebellious spirit, his defiance of parental authority, his sympathy for the poor and his revolutionary ideals are themes that were all emphasised in his life-story, right from the beginning. Likewise Chou's early life has been described in detail. To establish Hua's leadership status and enhance his prestige among his countrymen, laudatory articles carried in the Chinese news media might have been expected to follow this pattern, but the absence of such material suggests that something is being discreetly withheld. The delayed rehabilitation of Peng Chen may be explained in the context of what the leaflet has alleged. Before 1966, Peng was a member of the CCP Central Committee's politburo, secretary of the Central Committee secretariat, first secretary of the Peking municipal Party Committee, and mayor of Peking. Ranked ninth in the CCP hierarchy, he was purged by Mao in April 1966. After February 1977, there was speculation that he might at any time be rehabilitated.29 But he was not rehabilitated until December 1978, apparently due to the obstruction of the group led by Hua." As one of Teng's trusted colleagues, Peng was not only very capable but also had great political courage; for example, he stood firm in defying Chiang Ching during the early tages of the Cultural Revolution.31 Did someone try to block Peng's

1. Said to be an Illegitimate Child

7

rehabilitation because he knew too much about Hua's early background? At present, this question cannot be answered. Kang Sheng, a former vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee who was criticised in the leaflet,32 died in December 1975. After the ousting of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, the Chinese news media mentioned Kang on several occasions in a positive way, but this paled in comparison with the lavish praises heaped on Chou En-lai and Chu Te, and even. Chen I, Ho Lung and Liu Chih-tan, who ranked below Kang in the party hierarchy. Since the spring of 1978, the Chinese press has implicitly attacked Kang and criticised him for having collaborated with the "Gang of Four".33 It should be reiterated that the particulars given in the leaflet cannot yet be confirmed, but we have pointed out several reasons why the leaflet is noteworthy. A book published in Peking in September 1978 disclosed two items of information—that Hua Kuo-feng came from a poor family in Chiaocheng, and that his mother loved him very muchm—but it failed to mention his father at all, did not identify his mother by name and background, and said little of his childhood. If Hua was really from a poor family, how could he have afforded secondary education? In October 1979, just before his departure to visit four countries in Western Europe, Hua told the British journalist Felix Greene during an interview held in Peking that his father died when he was a child. However, he seemed to avoid mentioning his parents' background. Thus Hua's family background and early life remain shrouded in secrecy.

2 SHANSI, 1920-1949 Following the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" on 7 July 1937, the Chinese nation rose to resist Japanese aggression. On 8 November the Japanese Army took Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province, and the next day crossed the Fen river to capture the county of Chiaocheng.1 At that time Hua Kuo-feng was still studying in a middle school.2 He joined the guerrillas operating in the mountainous areas in Chiaocheng county in the autumn of 1938.2 Taking into consideration the Chinese school system at that time, ti may be assumed that Hua had attained an education equivalent to the second year in the senior middle school by the summer of 1938 (when he was eighteen). Before leaving his school in Taiyuan4 to join the guerrillas in Chiaocheng county, he had attended a vocational school. Earlier he graduated from primary school in 1933. The nursery and primary school he attended was named "the first two-grade school of Chiaocheng", established in 1912 in the premises of a former Confucian temple in Chiaocheng county; it was what is known as a "seven-year school" (one year nursery, six years primary).5 From the autumn of 1938 to the beginning of 1949, Hua Kuo-feng worked in the Luliangshan district of Shansi province.6 This was the first stage of his involvement in the Chinese Communist movement. From the autumn of 1938 to the autumn of 1947 he was active in Chiaocheng (Chiaotung) county, serving in succession as chairman of ;he Joint anti-Japanese association, head of the committee for the struggle against enemies', head of the propaganda department of the country CCP Committee, secretary of the country CCP Committee and concurrently political commissar of the armed detachment 8

2. Shansi, 1920-1949

9

(a position equivalent to political commissar in a regiment). Thereafter he was transferred to Yangchu county, serving as its CCP secretary and concurrently political commissar of its armed detachment. He thus worked for ten years in Shansi. 1. The Shansi-Suiyuan border region From the time of the 1911 Revolution, China was war-ridden. Before the "war against Japanese aggression", there were wars between local warlords, the northern expedition and the encirclement campaigns staged by the Kuomintang against warlords and the Red Army, respectively. After the destructive Sinoiapanese war of 1937-45 came the all-out civil war, from 1946 to 5949, between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Taiyuan, located not far from North China's political centre, Peking, is a place of military importance and a target certain to be seized by one or other of the contending forces in time of war. Furthermore, Shansi was at that time a province which had shown a strong inclination towards independence: it had been dominated by the warlord Yen Hsi-shan from 1911, and remained so right through to 1949. (i) Chinese Communist activities in Shansi prior to the Anti-Japanese War Yen Hsi-shan (1883-196o) had held positions as military governor of Shansi, governor of Shansi and commander-in-chief of the third group army since 1911.7 Notwithstanding the change of titles, he had all along been the ruler of Shansi, with all military and political power in his hands. In 1928, after the northern expedition had come to an end, his third group army had taken control of four North China provinces: Shansi, Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan.8 His wild political ambitions prompted him to join forces with the North-west Army led by the Shensi warlord Feng Yu-hsiang in 193o to oppose the central government. This led to a war in the central plains. Defeated, Yen Hsi-shan retreated into Shansi. He had his own aspirations and plans to build up the province; and had achieved some progress in developing its economy. However, being a warrior in the old tradition, he indulged in power politics to expand his own influence,

Chairman Hua

Io

in order to bargain with the central government. He regarded Shansi as his own "independent kingdom".

-

Po I po and the "Sacrifice for National Salvation League". Some years before the war, he set up in Shansi the "revolutionary comrades association" so as to strengthen the core of the right wing. But the "sacrifice for national salvation league" (SNSL), which he organised in 1936, and the newly-established "University for National Revolution" became the headquarters of the Communists and the left-wingers. The main purpose behind the formation of the SNSL was to accommodate Communist elements who had given themselves up and to absorb left-wing youths, while the "University for National Revolution" set up in Linfen was to train cadres in preparation for the war against the Japanese. However, he also had the intention of making use of the left wing as a force to oppose the central government and to safeguard the status of his "semi-independent kingdom". Three events contributed greatly to the growth of the Chinese Communist Party following 1936 and to its ultimate seizure of political power in China. These were, first, Japan's aggression against China, which seriously undermined the Kuomintang's bases of power and severely weakened its political support; secondly, the "Sian Incident" which saved the Chinese Communist Party from possible extinction; and thirdly, Yen Hsi-shan's accommodation of Communist elements, which thereby enabled them to infiltrate and win over the "Dare-to-Die Corps" and the Shansi New Army, and greatly boosted the Communists' military strength. Shansi was an important base of the Chinese Communist armed forces from 1937 to 1949. In the border areas of provinces adjacent to it, the Communists set up the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base. The armed forces operating from these bases later developed into the North China field army of the people's liberation army (PLA) under Nieh Jung-chen and Po I-po; the north-west field army (otherwise known as the first field army) under Peng Te-huai, Ho Lung and Hsi Chung-hsun; and the central plains field army (later renamed second field army) under Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping. These three field armies accounted for about half the total strength of the PLA. The extraordinary growth of Communist forces in Shansi was by no means accidental. Back in the 193os, cadres of the CCP North China Bureau had been clandestinely very active in the broad area of Peking, Tientsin and Taiyuan. They had successfully infiltrated into Yen

2.

Shansi, 1920-1949

JI

Hsi-shan's sphere of influence. Po I-po, later to become an alternate member of the politburo of the CCP Central Committee and a vice-premier of the State Council, was a key figure in those days as he had for a long time had dealings with Ycn Hsi-shan's brotherThe "December 9 1935 student movement" led by Peng Chen and the CCP North China bureau and the "Chinese national Liberation corps" (CNLPC) had had a great influence on the left-wingers in Taiyuan and Linfen in Shansi province." The North China bureau moved to Taiyuan in 1937 and Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Peng Chen stayed there for a while." Liu Shao-chi, Po I-po and others had secret talks with Yen Hsi-shan's confidant Liang Hua-chih.12 The headquarters of the CNLPC also moved to Taiyuan, and later to Linfen when Taiyuan fell to the Japanese." Consequently, Taiyuan and Linfcn became the centres of left-wing student movements and the assembly points of CCP members. Some members of the CNLPC and the CCP joined the SNSL in Taiyuan in the summer of 1936, while others joined the SNSL and the Shansi new army after the outbreak of the antiJapanese war. Many of them worked in Communist bases in the border areas of Shansi." Shansi was thus a hotbed for the growth of newborn Communist forces. The Red Army crosses the Yellow River. In February 1936, shortly after the "December 9 movement" was launched, the Red Army was ordered to cross the Yellow River in Shensi and march eastward. The red first army group lcd by Lin Piao and the red fifteenth army group led by Hsu Hai-tung fought their way into Shansi." In March the red fifteenth army group closed in on Taiyuan and occupied the Shansi temple in its suburbs. It fought all the way from central Shansi to the north-western part of the province." Seventy-five days later, the Red army crossed the Yellow river again—this time in a westerly direction, forcing Yen Hsi-shah to bring his forces in Shensi back to Shansi, thereby consolidating the security of the Communist base in northern Shensi. After the Red army ended its eastward march, the Red army guerrillas remaining in central Shansi under the leadership of Chang Kuo-hua" continued their clandestine activities along the railway lines in Shansi and in the Luliang mountains under the guise of lumbermen and other traders.12 When Yen Hsi-shan's "Anti-Communist Defence Corps" launched an encirclement campaign against them, they retreated to

12

Chairman Hua

northern Shensi. Nevertheless, their activities and the Red army's eastward march prepared the ground for the subsequent development of the Chinese Communist forces in Shansi. (ii) The 1 zoth Division and the Shansi-Suiyuan Base After the outbreak of the war against Japan on 7 July 1937, the Kuomintang and the Communists formally declared a united front against the Japanese. The Red army was reorganised as the eighth route army on 25 August, with Chu Te as commander-in-chief. It crossed the Yellow river in northern Shansi and moved into the area of Taiyuan and the Wutai mountains.19 This area was to be under the command of Yen Hsi-shan, commander of the second war zone, of which Chu Te became deputy commander.2° The Bases in Taching Mountains and North-west Shansi. The three divisions of the eighth route army set up three armed bases in the border regions of Shansi and its adjacent provinces. The izoth division under Ho Lung and Kuan Hsiang-ying set up a guerrilla base in the border area of Shansi and Suiyuan. The 358th brigade of the noth division led by its commander Peng Shao-hui and political commissar Lo Kuei-po had its base in the Luliang mountains area in north-west Shansi 21 The Brigade had control of the eighth sub-region of the Shansi-Suiyuan military region, and its headquarters was located in Chiaocheng county.22 In August 1938, Li Ching-chum led a regiment of the 358th brigade and a small number of guerrillas (which together were later renamed the "Taching mountains column") to move from north-west Shansi into the Taching mountains area in Suiyuan province and set up a base there,23 thus linking the south-eastern part of Suiyuan with the northwestern part of Shansi to form the Shansi-Suiyuan base. This base occupied an. area about 600 by 14o miles, stretching from the Tatung-Fenglingtukou railway in the east to the Yellow river in the west, and Yin mountains in the north to Luliang mountains in the south. It had under its jurisdiction the North-west Shansi district and the Taching Mountains district. To the east of this base was the ShansiChahar-Hopei base, to the south-east was in Shansi-Hopei-ShantungHonan base and to the west was the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. The base had its independent party, government and military organisations, namely the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the Shansi-Suiyuan border area administrative

2. Shansi, 192o-1949

13

office, and the Shansi-Suiyuan military region. The principal leaders were Ho Lung, Lin Feng, Li Ching-chuan, Lo Kuei-po and Hsu Fan-ting.24 The North-west Shansi District New Army and the "December Incident". The North-west Shansi district was the centre of the Shansi-Suiyuan border region, and crucial to the Communists in their struggle against Yen Hsi-sham for the expansion of territorial control and military strength. The main force in this district was Peng Shao-hui's 358th Brigade. But the troops under the "sacrifice for national salvation league" (SNSL) and the "battlefield general mobilisation committee of the national revolutionary war in the second war zone" (battlefield mobilisation committee for short) also played a part in building up the base. Yen Hsi-shan was president of the SNSL, which however was actually controlled by Po I-po.25 A native of Tinghsiang county, Shansi province, Po graduated from the Shansi citizens' normal school which was founded by Yen Hsi-shan. He was arrested while engaged in Communist underground activities in Tientsin in 1931, and imprisoned in an army reformatory in Peking. Between March and April 1936, he and others were freed after having written "letters of self-confession" in accordance with instructions from the CCP Central Committee. This was done in order to preserve and expand the strength of the Communist Party.26 After leaving the prison, Po was escorted to Shansi by Kuo Ting-yi, a schoolmate and subordinate of Yen Hsi-shan. Yen let him organise the SNSL, and many Communist Party members who left the prison at the same time became its backbone elements.27 The SNSL set up its organisations at the county level and formed its own armed force called the "youth anti-Japanese dare-to-die corps" consisting of four columns of three regiments each. Leaders of the corps were Communist Party members Po I-po, Han Tiao, Jung Wu-shcng and Lei Jen-min. It also organised the "workers' armed self-defence corps", consisting mainly of factory workers, which was later renamed "workers' defence brigade".28 The battlefield mobilisation committee mentioned above was another organisation set up at the recommendation of the Communists, and was headed by Hsu Fan-ling, a pro-Communist Shansi army man.29 This organisation had under its control an armed contingent called the "first provisional division" with Hsu Fan-ring as commander, stationed in the counties of Wenshui and Chiaocheng."

14

Chairman Hua

The armed forces controlled by the SNSL and the battlefield mobilisation committee were called the New Army, as distinguished from Ycn Hsi-shan's Shansi army. Its total strength was about 45,000 men," who were organised into forty regiments." Many of their leaders were concurrently special commissioners of the administrative districts in Shansi province, and thus held administrative powers. In March 1939 Yen Hsi-shan, who had become worried about the growth of the Communist forces, decided to reorganise the New Army. That winter he ordered the disbandment of the battlefield mobilisation committee, and restricted the activities of the SNSL. In December Lo Kuci-po, Peng Shao-hui and Lei Jen-min counter-acted by setting up a provisional general headquarters for the New Army, with Hsu Fan-zing as commander-in-chief and Lo Kuci-po as political commissar; these men led the New Army to cross over to the Communists. This was the so-called "December incident". In January 1940, the Northwest Shansi district formally declared that it had severed relations with Yen Hsi-shan.33 Thus the area north of the Fen Li highway (linking Fenyang and Lishih counties) in Shansi became an "independent kingdom" of the Chinese Communists. Yen Hsi-shan's original plan was to make use of the Communists to expand his own strength, but in the end he played into their hands and lost a large portion of his military strength, which helped the Communists to expand their Shansi-Suiyuan and Shansi-HopeiShantung-Honan border regions, thereby jeopardising his ruling position in Shansi. His domain was substantially reduced and was confined to the south-western part of the province. 2.

Hua Kno7 feng's activities (hiring the war against Japan

Hua Kuo-feng began his life as a guerrilla in the Luliang mountains in the autumn of 1938. (i) Head ofthe Joint Anti-Japanese Association in Chiaotung County, Shansi Hua became a member of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940.33 Because he had received secondary education and had shown his capabilities, the Communists appointed him Chairman of the "workerspeasants-youths-women-soldiers joint anti-Japanese national salvation association" (joint anti-Japanese association for short) in Chiaocheng (Chiaotung) county.36 This association was a civil body formed to

2. Shansi, 1920-1949

15

assist in mobilising the people to fight the Japanese. Its status was considerably lower than the regular Communist Party and government organs. Chiaocheng county was under the jurisdiction of the Luliang district. It was an outpost of the eighth sub-region of the Shansi-Suiyuan border region, and was the junction of the main communication routes between Yenan and various Communist bases. The Luliang district was, according to the administrative structure at that time, about the same as a prefecture of today, and the North-west Shansi district above it was about the same as a provincial unit. For a long time, the Luliang district was under the leadership of Lo Kuei-po and Peng Shao-hui. Approximately at the beginning of 1940, after the separation of Shansi's north-west district from Yen Hsi-shan's control, the Chinese Communists divided Chiaocheng county into Chiaotung county and Chiaohsi county in order to facilitate guerrilla operations, and assigned Hua to work in Chiaotung.85 At the end of the 1940s, however, the two counties were merged and Chiaocheng county was restored. Mobilising the People to join the war. The area encompassing Chiaocheng and Wenshui was the concentration point of the Communist forces in the north-west Shansi district. Units stationed there included the 358th brigade of the i2oth division, the Fourth Column of the "dare-to-die corps" (led by Lei Jen-min), the new first division and the workers' defence brigade (led by Hsu Fan-ting). Units stationed in south-west Shansi were the Second Column of the "dare-to-die corps" (led by Han Chun) and the West Shansi detachment led by Chen Shih-chu and Lin Feng. Those operating in south-east Shansi were the First and Third Columns of the "dare-to-die corps" under the command of Po I-po, Jung Wu-sheng and Tung Tien-chih; they built a stronghold in the Taiyuch area which was later incorporated into the Shansi-HopeiShantung-Honan border region under Liu Po-cheng and Tcng Hsiao-ping.37 The area encompassing Taiyuan and Chiaocheng was an important battleground in the war against Japan; it was also a focus of contention between the Communists and Yen Hsi-shan. The situation was very tense. Before Hua Kuo-feng assumed the post as chairman of the joint anti-Japanese association in Chiaotung county, the Japanese Army launched a mopping-up campaign against northwest Shansi in the

16

Chairman Hua

spring of 1939, and battles were fought at Hsingchiachuang in Chiaocheng county and at Mingchiachuang in Lan county." Hua Kuo-feng held the post in Chiaotung up to late 1944 or early 1945.39 His main job was to mobilise the people to fight the Japanese and also to deal with Yen Hsi-shan. He organised and expanded the "youth anti-Japanese pioneers", the "women national salvation association", the militia, and guerrilla units,4° and also set up a "Children's Corps"." He did his best to rally the people from all walks of life to join the guerrillas. Hua also participated in and directed guerrilla operations. He made a name in the Luliang mountains by manufacturing his own mines to use against the Japanese. He also organised "armed contingents for operations behind enemy lines" (shortened to "armed contingents") to carry out reconnaissance and commando activities. Munition co-operatives and mine warfare. In 1940, the Japanese Army launched three large-scale mopping-up campaigns against northwest Shansi,42 in which they continued to pursue a "three-all" policy (kill all, burn all, loot all)." Later, in the spring of 1941, the Japanese staged a powerful offensive against the area controlled by Yen Hsi-shan in south-west Shansi. The major forces were the Japanese First Army and the thirty-fifth division commanded by Kumakichi Harada." The war grew more intense across the whole of North China. The eighth route army in north-west Shansi plunged into battle in full force to resist the Japanese mopping-up operations. The new army and the local guerrilla and militia units also took part in the battles. The militiamen and guerrillas in Chiaotung county were short of weapons and ammunition, so Hua Kuo-feng suggested to the county CCP Committee that the masses should be mobilised to make their own. The Committee accepted this idea and sent Hua to the fifth ward to organise the setting up of the first "munition co-operative", in Lingshang village, Chiaotung county in 1942, and turn out the first batch of "home-made" mines and hand-grenades." (In 1946 the munition co-operative was expanded into an arsenal.) Hua also took the opportunity to encourage the masses to learn the techniques of mine-laying, so that "every family knows how to lay mines and set them off". Later, "munition co-operatives" were set up all over Chiaocheng county. At one time Hua led the militiamen in a battle against the Japanese, using land-mines, and thus made his name known throughout the Luliang mountains."

z.

Shansi, 192o-1949

17

In the summer of 1941, Hua and a signalman took part in a battle against the Japanese in a valley near Taiyuan.'" In the autumn of the same year, a unit of so° Japanese launched another mopping-up campaign against Chiaocheng. Hua led some zoo militiamen to fight and defeat the Japanese by using land-mines." Hua had gained his initial experience in guerrilla warfare in 1938 and 1939• In those days he often led a small detachment of armed workers to engage in scouting and intelligence-gathering activities, thereby familiarising himself with intelligence work. He also acquired experience in mobilising the masses and directing land-mine warfare. (ii) "Squeezing out the Enemy" by means of guerrilla warp-re In 1942, Hua Kuo-feng was promoted to become one of the major cadres of the CCP Chiaotung county Committee. He headed the leadership group of the newly-established committee for struggle against the enemy, and was charged with the responsibility of coordinating and directing the anti-Japanese activities of all the party's government, military and civilian bodies in Chiaotung county." In this role the twenty-two-year-old Hua went about the army strongholds in the mountainous areas in Chiaocheng mobilising the masses to set up an intelligence network 50 He sent competent agents into Japanese-occupied areas to spy on the enemy and co-ordinate the activities of the armed workers' detachments operating behind their lines. This was Hua's first experience of directing intelligence work at county level. The government of Chiaotung county was located in the former Nantou village by the Pingchuan river. It was here that Hua lived.51 He was kept very busy, since besides his party responsibilities he still took charge of the civilian "joint anti-Japanese association". Japanese Army's Large-Scale Mopping-Up Campaigns. At the time when Hua Kuo-feng was head of the leadership group of the Chiaotung county Committee for struggle against the enemy, China was experiencing the most difficult days of her war against Japan. In June 1941, war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany and in December the same year, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, igniting the Pacific war. In the meantime, the Japanese Army intensified its offensive in various parts of China, hoping to hasten its total conquest and turn China into a rear base for the Pacific War. The Communist base areas in North China were also subjected

Chairman Hua to intensified attack. Consequently, the area controlled by the eighth route army was greatly reduced in size between 1941 and 1942, and the population under its control likewise fell from too million to so million. The situation placed "both the army and the people in an awkward predicament".52 In the words of Chou Shih-ti, then deputy commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan military region, "1942 was the most difficult and miserable year for the Shansi—Suiyuan Anti-Japanese base. . . . The base area was reduced day by day. At one time, the eighth sub-region by the Pingchuan river in central Shansi only had seventeen villages under its control. North-west Shansi had been poverty-stricken to begin with, but now it was much more so as a result of the outrageous plunder and destruction by the enemy. The people there were underfed and underclothed; even the troops could not have meals regularly" 53 The eighth sub-region mentioned by Chou Shih-ti was the Luliang district, which included the Chiaotung county where Hua Kuo-fcng was. In 1942, the Shansi-Suiyuan border region was subjected to violent attacks from all sides by the Japanese Army. Fighting was especially fierce in the spring when the Japanese launched a large-scale mopping-up operation in north-west Shansi. This was followed by another major operation against the base areas in the Taching mountains and the central part of Suiyuan. In October 1942, Lin Feng, the person chiefly responsible in the Shansi-Suiyuan border region and the North-west Shansi district, went to Yenan to make a report to the CCP Central Committee on the situation in Shansi and Suiyuan. On returning, he relayed Mao Tsetung's directive "to squeeze out the enemy". In accordance with this directive, the Shansi-Suiyuan military region dispatched one-third of its forces to various places to lead the militia and the masses." "Squeezing out the enemy" required a change of tactics. While continuing to rely on guerrilla warfare as a major means of battle, regular forces would engage in mobile warfare when conditions were favourable. Small bands of mobile armed workers would sneak into Japanese-occupied areas to sabotage military installations, launch surprise attacks and mobilise the people to engage in guerrilla warfare. An editorial in the Liberation Daily, organ of the CCP Central Committee, published in September 1942 under the title "A most important policy", said: "As for the question of how to deal with the enemy's enormous apparatus, we can learn from the example of how the Monkey King dealt with Princess Iron Fan. The Princess was a formid-

2. Shansi, 1920-1949 able demon, but by changing himself into a tiny insect the Monkey King made his way into her stomach and overpowered her."55 The activities of Armed Workers' Detachments. After receiving orders to "squeeze out the enemy" and in accordance with the decision of the

Chiaotung County Party Committee, Hua Kuo-feng first went to Chihlan village of the third ward which had only twenty or thirty households. It so happened that in September 1942 the Japanese had set up a base in Chihlan village, using it to control traffic routes nearby and to cut offhand communication between Yenan and the Shansi-Suiyuan base area. Hence there was an urgent need for the Communists to drive the Japanese out. On several occasions, Hua disguised himself as a villager and came to Chihlan to plan actions against the Japanese, and propagate to the masses the significance of "squeezing out the enemy" by such tactics as putting all their food and provisions in hiding-places and so depriving the enemy of essential basic supplies. He also dispatched an armed workers' detachment to sneak into the Japaneseoccupied area and drop the carcasses of rats and cats into the only well used by the Japanese for drinking water." The Japanese, however, managed to drag the carcasses out of the water and, after sterilising it, continued to use the well. Someone then came up with the idea of dropping large quantities of short hair-clippings mixed with human excrement into the well. This was duly done on Hua's orders and this time the Japanese were unable to clear out the well, and thus lost their only source of drinking water." Hua also directed militiamen and armed workers' detachments in carrying out sabotage and harassment in the Japanese-occupied area, such as cutting electric wires, damaging roads and pill-boxes, and laying mines. This made it difficult for the Japanese to move about, and they were forced to leave their strongholds in Chihlan and in Chiaotung and Chiaohsi counties." The methods employed by Hua Kuo-feng to "squeeze out the enemy" in Chihlan were mentioned specifically in a report submitted to the CCP Central Committee by the Shansi-Suiyuan border region." The report also gave credit to the eighth sub-region in Luliang for its outstanding achievements in carrying out Mao Tse-tung's command. Mao immediately cabled back to the Shansi-Suiyuan border region, directing that the experience of the eighth sub-region be studied and popularised, so as to reduce the number of enemy strongholds and expand the Communist forces' own base area."'

20

Chairman Hun

The war situation changed again in the autumn of 1943, when the Japanese army took counter-action and staged another mopping-up campaign. Chou Shih-ti wrote: "Starting from i September, the Japanese fifty-ninth brigade and third independent mixed brigade, together with a large number of puppet troops, carried out a most frenzied and ferocious campaign against our Wenshui, Chiaocheng, Chinglo, Lanhsien . . at different times. Wherever they went, they looted all properties, razed the villages and farmsteads to the ground, and massacred numerous Chinese compatriots."61 As the Japanese continued their mopping-up operations, the Communist regular forces in north-west Shansi dispersed and avoided engaging in mobile warfare against the Japanese. In the meantime, the guerrilla units and the armed workers' detachments operating behind the enemy lines resorted to what Mao Tse-tung described as "sparrows' tactics".62 They moved here and there swiftly and unexpectedly, performing reconnaissance missions and launching surprise attacks on the Japanese. Not long afterwards, the Communist main forces counterattacked in co-ordination with the local forces, and by 1944 the situation had once again changed. Hua Kuo-feng did remarkably well in mobilising the militia and armed workers' detachments in the Chiaocheng mountains area to use the "sparrow's tactics" to harass the Japanese.63 He also displayed strong Party spirit and militancy in waging the struggle against the Japanese. He was firm and resolute in implementing the Chinese Communist policy of "class dictatorship" ; in 1944 he organised several rallies against landlords and eighteen war traitors who had collaborated with the Japanese. He had a tyrannical landlord and an uncooperative garrison corps commander executed on the spot without trial." (iii)

As the head of the propaganda department of Chiaotung county Party Committee Hua attached great importance to political propaganda. He showed considerable interest in literary and artistic activities for propaganda purposes, and gave his support to several small theatrical troupes. The "Hsiao Mu theatrical troupe", formed jointly by Hsiaoloufeng and Mulienpo villages in Yuanpingchuan, Chiaotung county, was very active in Kuchiao ward of Taiyuan city—this ward had originally been under the jurisdiction of Chiaocheng county. Hua Kuo-feng showed great concern for this propaganda troupe. He lent it his own handwritten text of Mao Tse-tung's "Talks at a Yenan forum on literature

2. Shansi, 1920-1949

21

and art" for study and discussion, and allocated to them, from the funds of the joint anti-Japanese association, L000 catties of millet so that they could procure some additional costumes. There were more than ioo such small theatrical troupes in the eighth sub-region of the Shansi—Suiyuan border region in 1945, and in propaganda work the Hsiao Mu troupe was rated as a model. Hua wrote a short article in the locally-published Kang Chan Daily to introduce and popularise their experience.65 Because of its outstanding contribution to propaganda work, and at Hua's recommendation, the Hsiao Mu troupe was awarded a banner bearing the inscription "A pioneer in the drama movement", as well as ten chang (approximately 118 feet) of white cloth for making a stage curtain." At that time Hua was director of the propaganda department of the Chiaotung county Party Committee, and was in charge of all political propaganda and cultural and educational work in the county. This job began in 1942 and lasted until the summer or autumn of 1945. He was concurrently chairman of the Chiaotung county armed defence committee and head of the joint anti Japanese association.67 The "armed defence committee" was an organisation similar to the "armed force department" afterwards set up under the CCP county committees, except that it had broader responsibilities. Besides taking charge of the local armed forces, it also handled security work, such as intelligence gathering and suppression of anti-Communist activities. After the Japanese surrender, Hua may have gone to Yenan for a short period of training." 3. During the Civil War Period In the summer of 1946, all-out civil war broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists. At that time Hua Kuo-feng had become secretary of the CCP Chiaotung county Committee and commissar of the county armed force." He held these posts from the spring of 1946 until the following summer. Concurrently he held another post as commissar of the Wenchiao (Wenshui-Chiaotung) guerrilla detachment," directing guerrilla operations in the Wenshui and Chiaotung counties. In the autumn of 1947, Hua was transferred to Yangchu county north of Taiyuan (now under the jurisdiction of Taiyuan municipality) as secretary of the county Party Committee and commissar of the

22

Chairman Hua

county armed force." He left Shansi for the south in early 1949,72 after having worked for a long time in the Luliang area in Shansi." (i) In Battles against Yen Hsi-span's Troops The three years when Hua Kuo-feng was Party secretary of Chiaotung and Yangchu counties was the period when military conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists was fiercest. From June 1946 to June 1947, the Communists pursued a policy of strategic defence in their base areas, and were relatively passive in the battlefields. Supporting battles at Luliang. The Taiyuan area was a point of strategic importance in the North China battleground. This area and south-west Shansi were under the control of Yen Hsi-shan, while Shensi province was within the sphere of influence of General Hu Tsung-nan. Military confrontation between the Communist units of Shansi-Suiyuan border region and the forces of Yen and Hu assumed serious proportions even before 1946. Between November 1946 and January 1947, the Shansi-Suiyuan military region and the Taiyueh column (equivalent to an army) of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan military region launched the Luliang and the Fenhsiao campaigns (otherwise called the Central Shansi campaign) to hold Hu Tsung-nan's forces in check and so reduce the pressure on Yenan. Some favourable results were achieved in the battles against Ycn Hsi-shan and Hu Tsung-nan's forces in Fenyang and Hsiaoyi counties in the Luliang mountain area." Hua Kuo-feng at that time was leading the guerrillas in the mountainous areas in Chiaotung and Wenshui counties to carry out activities on the outer perimeter in support of the regular forces. He mobilised the militiamen to support the front line in Fenyang county, which is adjacent to Chiaocheng (Chiaotung and Chiaohsi) and Wenshui. In the winter of 1946, Hua's militiamen often clashed with small bands of Yen Hsi-shan's troops when transporting supplies." The 358th brigade (later renamed the Seventh Column of ShansiSuiyuan military region) stationed in Chiaotung county was transferred in the summer of 1946. Taking this opportunity, Yen Hsi-shan's forces launched a concentrated attack upon the Luliang area from all directions. The situation in Chiaotung and Wenshui was critical, putting even greater pressure on Hua's guerrilla units. Paying particular attention to intelligence work to keep track of enemy movements, Hua used flexible guerrilla tactics to fight back."

2.

Shansi, 1920-1949

23

Participating in the Central Shansi Campaign. In June 1947, the ShansiHopei-Shantung-Honan field army led by Teng Hsiao-ping and Liu Po-cheng crossed the Yellow river to start the central plains campaign, marking a change in the Communist strategy from strategic defensive to strategic offensive." In October the same year, the Communists issued the "declaration of the Chinese people's liberation army", calling for the liberation of the whole country. Offensives were launched from various base areas on both the outer and inner lines. By the spring of 1948, the people's liberation army (PLA) had under it ten army groups, fifty columns (equivalent to corps in strength) and 156 brigades, with a total strength of 1,32o,000. If local forces, guerrillas and members of military establishments and schools in the rear areas are counted as well, the total was 2,490,000 or double that of 1946.78 The Communistoccupied areas were expanded accordingly. As the forces led by Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping marched into the central plains, only a small number of the troops formerly under the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan military region were left behind in the border areas of Shansi and Hopei. They were under the command of the military region's deputy commander Hsu Hsiangchien. Hsu spared no effort in developing the local forces in Shansi. In May 1948, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei military region under the command of Nieh Jung-then and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan military region were merged into the North China military region,79 with Nieh Jung-chen as commander, Po I-po as political commissar and Hsu Hsiang-chien as deputy commander. Hsu also held concurrent posts as commander and commissar of the first army group under the North China military region, with powers to direct all Communist operations in Shansi. The units formerly under the Luliang district of the Shansi-Suiyuan border region also came under his jurisdiction. They were formally incorporated into the first army group in early 5949, and Lo Kuei-po, formerly commissar of the Luliang military district, became deputy commissar of the first army group 8° Between June and July 1948, the First Army Group and units from the Luliang district under the command of Hsu Hsiang-chien launched the Central Shansi campaign. They captured fourteen medium-sized and small cities, thus isolating the city of Taiyuan.81 In October the same year Hsu Hsiang-chicn's troops encircled Taiyuan and started to attack the city's outer perimeter. Participating in this campaign were the first army group (later renamed eighteenth army group), the Seventh Column of the Shansi-Suiyuan military

24

Chairman Hua

region and troops of the Central Shansi military district.82 In December, the Communists also started the Peking—Tientsin campaign. Meanwhile, the campaign against Taiyuan made little progress due to strong resistance by Yen Hsi-shan's forces. They did not capture the city until April 1949. As the Communist armies launched into the stage of strategic offensive, Hua Kuo-feng, as Party secretary of Yangchu county and commissar of the county armed force, organised the guerrilla units, militiamen and armed workers' detachments there to support the Central Shansi and Taiyuan campaigns. From the end of 1947 to the end of 1948, local forces led by Hua fought more than twenty small actions in Yangchu county, which adjoins Taiyuan. Between the summer and autumn of 1948, Hua led his troops to participate in the Central Shansi campaign. While passing through a grape-growing village in Chinghsu county on the southern outskirts of Taiyuan, he enjoined the soldiers not to pick the grapes and to unfix their bayonets so as not to damage them. Thus he won the good feelings of the inhabitants there.83 (ii) Supervising Land Reform in the Countryside In May 1946, the CCP Central Committee issued a document announcing a change in the policy toward landlords in the country-side. Whereas previously it was only required of the landlords that they should lower their rents and interest rates, their land was now to be confiscated and redistributed to the peasants. In September the next year, the Communists convened a land conference, at which the "outline of agrarian law of China" was drawn up." More violent measures were to be adopted against the landlords, and an all-out "agrarian reform" carried out. Hua Kuo-feng took charge of the land reform in Chiaotung and Yangchu counties. He personally went to an experimental point in Chiaotung to mobilise the masses to struggle against the landlords and confiscate their lands. He even took time to carry water and sweep the grounds for the village elders, so as to attract their support.85 Violent means were used by the Communists to carry out the "land reform" in the countryside. The landlords were physically tortured. After their land and property were expropriated, they were driven out of their houses so that they and their families were deprived of any means of livelihood. The Communists deliberately created class antagonism and let the poor peasants and farm labourers satisfy their greed

2. Shansi, 1920-1949

25

for plundering, in order that they would be more responsive to the call for enlistment with the Communist army. Even Communist newspapers and publications subsequently conceded that allegations of indiscriminate use of violence were true. One authoritative publication on land reform, for example, stated: "The main problem at that time was left' deviation. Middle peasants were wrongly classified as landlords and rich peasants, which presented a threat to them; landlords were not given a way out, but were driven from their homes; industrial and commercial establishments of landlords and rich peasants were confiscated and redistributed." It also implied that there had been "random beatings and killings"." The Modern Chinese History of Ho Kan-chih (1956) also admitted that "in some places there were random beatings and killings".87 Hua Kuo-fcng was militant in the struggle and became notorious for being brutal and relentless. While supervising the "land reform" in the countryside, he also "beat and killed people at random". According to information circulated among the Red Guards in Hunan, Hua Kuo-fcng indiscriminately arrested and killed a number of peasants whom he called "landlords" while he was in Shansi.88 This was aimed at creating an atmosphere of terror to facilitate the confiscation of their land and property. In the name of "revolution" under the "dictatorship of the proletariat", such a matter was commonplace and not at all surprising. For the merit he gained in suppressing the landlords during the land reform and in supporting the Communist regular armies with the staple foods that he was able to gather, Hua was promoted in late 1948 or early in 1949 to a leading post in the office of a prefectural Party committee, serving as director of the propaganda department under the Chinchung (Central Shansi) first prefectural Committee until March 1949 when he left Shansi and went south with the southbound work group en route to Hopei." 4. Brief summary In the ten years he spent in Shansi, Hua Kuo-fcng was tempered by the war and local work. For a long time he participated in guerrilla activities, and being in charge of intelligence and security work at the county level, he gained much experience in setting up intelligence networks and in directing sabotage and harassment in the enemy's rear. He showed his competence in organising commando and infiltration action work which required flexibility, mobility and speed. His achievements in this

26

Chairman Hua

particular area led to speculations that he might have received training in Yenan in intelligence and espionage operations. If he never had any connection with the Chinese Communist "security" (special service) system, would it have been possible for him to have become minister of public security of the State Council in early 1975? This is a puzzle which has not yet been solved. While directing the land reform in Chiaotung and Yangchu counties, Hua accumulated some useful experience in "mass movements", which was to be helpful to him in directing the "land reform" and "agricultural co-operativisation" movements in Hunan in later years. Hua's concurrent posts as political commissar of the local armed forces of the Chiaotung and Yangchu countries were equivalent to a regimental commissar of the regular forces at that time, and his post as chairman of the Joint Anti-Japanese Association in the early 194os was even lower by comparison. He did not participate in the Long March of the Red Army before the war against Japan, and therefore could not have had very close relations with the party, government and military leaders of the Communist Shansi-Suiyuan border region and the North-west Shansi district in those years. Prominent among these leaders were Ho Lung, Lin Feng, Li Ching-chuan, Chou Shih-ti, Sun Chili-yuan and Chang Ping-hua," who later assumed important positions in the Chinese Communist hierarchy—Ho Lung and Li Ching-chuan as members of the CCP Politburo; Lin Feng as member of the CCP Central Committee and president of the Party school under the CCP Central Committee. Additionally, Hsu Hsiang-chien, formerly commander of the first army group under the North China field army and now minister of defence; Hu Yao-pang, director of the political department of the First Army Group ;91 and Yu Chiu-li, one-time commander of the seventh column of the Shansi-Suiyuan military region" (later renamed seventh army of the first field army) were indirect superior officers of Hua Kuo-feng during the Taiyuan campaign. However, they had nothing to do with Hua's subsequent promotions. The CCP leaders who were directly above Hua Kuo-feng in those years were Lo Kuei-po and Hsieh Hsuch-kung,93 who were secretary and deputy secretary respectively of the CCP Luliang District Committee. After 1949, Lo became ambassador to North Vietnam and vice-minister of foreign affairs, and Hsieh a secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and first secretary of the Tientsin municipal Party

2. Shansi, 192o-1949

27

Committee after the Cultural Revolution. (Hsieh was dismissed as Tientsin's first secretary in June 1978.) These two also had no influence on Hua's subsequent ascendancy, his promotions in the 197os being primarily due to his achievements in Hunan and other factors.

3 HSIANGTAN, 1949-1956 Hua Kuo-feng came to Hunan province from North China in August 1949. He worked there for twenty-two years, rising from Party secretary of Hsiangyin county to be the top leader of Hunan province. These years were of great importance in his political career. But the period from August 1949 until 1956 during which he worked in the Hsiangtan area was especially significant as it was in these seven years that he laid a solid foundation for his political future. 1. Hunan Province: A General Introduction Hunan is Mao Tse-tung's native province. He was born in a small village called Shaoshan in Hsiangtan county, about 104 km. south-west of the provincial capital, Changsha.1 It is now a renowned place of pilgrimage. (ii) The Communist Revolution in Hunan Hunan was an important base for the Communist movement in China. As early as in 192o, Mao Tse-tung had established a "Marxist cell" in Changsha, and after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921, he became secretary of its Hunan branch. He organised the Communist revolution in Hunan's urban and rural areas, and by 5927, the province had become noted for its peasant uprisings, which were more violent than in other southern provinces. In January 1927, Mao wrote the famous Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, later to become the bible for the Communist revolution in China's countryside.2 In August 5927, Chou En-lai, Chu Te and Ho Lung launched an armed uprising in Nanchang, Kiangsi province, and founded the Red Army. In September the same year Mao Tse-tung lcd the "Autumn 28

3. Hsiangtau, 1949-1956

29

harvest uprising" in the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi. This failed, and Mao led the rebellious peasants in a flight to Chingkangshan mountain in Kiangsi. In the same winter, Chu Tc and Chen I directed the remnants of the Nanchang uprising to stage a "year-end uprising" in the southern part of Hunan. Again defeated, they led their men to Chingkangshan to join forces with Mao Tse-tung and set up the Chingkangshan base. The forces of Chu and Mao later became the backbone of the Red First Front Army.3 In July 1928, Peng Te-huai launched the "Pingchiang uprising" in north-eastern Hunan. Later, he expanded his forces to become the Third Army Group of the Red First Front Army.4 After the Nanchang uprising, the Communists set up the HunanHupeh-Kiangsi border region, Hunan-Kiangsi border region and Hunan-Hupeh western border region in the border areas of Hunan and its adjoining provinces. There were Red army units in these base areas. The Hunan-Kiangsi border region was the base for the Red third army group. The forces led by Ho Lung in the Hunan-Hupeh western border region later developed into the Red second front army.8 In 1934 and 1935, the main forces of the Red army fled from Kiangsi and Hunan to north Shensi, leaving behind them a guerrilla force in the Hunan-Kiangsi border region to engage in harassing activities.8 During the Sino-Japanese war, Mao Tse-tung's teacher, Hsu Te-li, and Kao Wen-hua led the Communist underground Hunan provincial Committee to carry out extensive "united front" activities.? In 1944, the Communists sent a contingent consisting mainly of cadres of the 359th brigade of the eighth route army southward from north Shensi. It sneaked into Hunan via Honan and Hupeh8 to lay the groundwork for the eventual seizure of Hunan. The Communists had earlier laid a foundation for the Communist movement in Hunan; their underground organisation there was quite powerful. They also made use of the contradictions and factional strife among the Kuomintang leaders to sow discord in and split up the Hunan leadership. They succeeded in winning over such political opportunists as Cheng Chien and Chen Ming-jen, so that when the Communist army entered Hunan in 1949, it was able to seize the ruling powers without encountering much resistance. The Yangtze river crossing campaign began on 21 April 1949, and two days later the Communists captured the Nationalist capital, Nanking. On 16 May, they seized the Central China city of Wuhan.8 Hunan found itself besieged, and the situation was very critical. On

30

Chairman Hun

July, the Communists invaded Yuehyang county in the most northerly part of Hunan. On 4 August Hunan governor Chcng Chien and the commander of the first army group of the Nationalist army, Chen Ming-jen, surrendered to the Communists," and Hunan was "peacefully liberated". After taking over Hunan, the Communists set up a military and administrative council headed by Chcng Chien and Huang Ko-cheng." Actual powers, however, were in the hands of CCP Hunan provincial Committee secretary Huang Ko-cheng and deputy secretary Wang Shou-tao. Huang Ko-cheng was commander of an army group under the Fourth Field Army. At the same time as he led his troops into Hunan, the "southbound work group" sent by the Communists from North China arrived to take over the administration. 20

(ii) The geography of Hunan Hunan is situated in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River covering an area of 210,000 square km.—about two-thirds the size of Japan and slightly smaller than England. It has a population of 37 million, about 3 million more than the population of Spain.12 The people are of Han, Miao, Hui and Tuchia nationalities, with the Hans accounting for an overwhelming majority. The western part of Hunan is mountainous and wooded; the central part is covered by lesser hills; the northern part is a wide plateau and is one of the important centres of agricultural production in China. Rice is its principal agricultural product, which accounts for about 8o per cent of the province's total grain output. It also grows such important economic crops as cotton and fir trees, and is second among the hemp and tea producers in China. It is also rich in antimony and tungsten deposits." Railway communications and water transportation in Hunan are quite well-developed. Besides the Peking-Canton railway which cuts through the eastern part of the province, Hunan is linked by separate railway lines with Chekiang and Kiangsi, with Kwangsi and, by a newly-built line, with Kweichow. Changsha, the provincial capital, is an ancient city with a history of over 3,000 years." With a population of about 800,000," its principal industries are manufacturing, textiles and food processing. Hsiangtan is a newly-emerging industrial city of medium size, with a population of 300,000.16 It has a developing electrical machinery manufacturing

3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1956

3

industry. The famous Lake Tungting, the second largest fresh-water lake in China, is in the northern part of Hunan. In the flood water season, it fills an area of 3,900 square km." The four major rivers in Hunan—the Hsiang Chiang, Tzu Shui, Yuan Chiang and Li Shui—all flow into Lake Tungting. The plains around the Lake, which are formed of alluvia of the four rivers and the Yangtze, are an important grainproducing area in China. The land there is fertile and can be easily irrigated; it abounds in fishery and agricultural products and is known as the "granary of China".18 Grain production in the Lake Tungting plains accounts for about 20 per cent of the province's total grain output.19 This place is also famous for its lotus nuts. The floods of Lake Tungting flow into the Yangtze river through Yuchyang county in the northernmost part of Hunan. Standing by the lake in this county is the famous Yuehyang Tower, built some 1,70o years ago, and still frequented by visitors. An islet nearby—Chun Shan—is well known for its "silver-needle tea"." Also situated in the plains of Lake Tungting, is Hsiangyin county with which the political career of Hua Kuo-feng is closely connected. When he first arrived in. Hunan, he stayed in Yuehyang to make arrangements for taking over the Hsiangyin county government. His first job in Hunan was with the Communist administration in Hsiangyin. 2.

Two Years in Hsiangyin County

The situation in the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists abruptly shifted in the latter's favour in early 1949. By the end of January the Communists had occupied Peking and the liberation army was launching encircling attacks on many cities in North China and the central plains. In March, the CCP Central Committee and the headquarters of the liberation army moved from Shihchiachuang in Hopei to Peiping.21 The Communists had gained absolute control over the war.

04

Moving South from Shansi and Hopei to Hsiangyin After occupying Peiping, the Communists stepped up their preparations for crossing the Yangtze river to conquer the southern provinces. The CCP Central Committee drew a number of cadres from the army and the local party and government organisations to form "Southbound Work Groups". At the same time, the cultural and press circles also

32

Chairman Hua

trained a number of propaganda cadres,22 who were being prepared to take over administrative powers in the southern provinces. Hua Kuo-feng left Shansi in early 1949 and went to Hopei with a "southbound work group" from the Chinchung first prefectural Party Committee. While in Hopei, Hua and his group received training for one month in Shihchiachuang.23 As an article on him states: "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng led us southward along with the army in the spring of 1949. At that time he was propaganda department director of a prefectural party committee. . . . While under training in Shihchiachuang [capital of Hopei province], the southbound work group received from higher authorities in early April great leader Chairman Mao's "Report at the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee". In order to study this document better, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng . . . called the comrades of various counties together to compare notes".24 After the Chinese Communist troops had crossed the Yangtze on 21 April 1949, Hua, together with his Southbound Work Group, started moving southward with regular army units. The Communists took occupation of Yuehyang county in Hunan on 20 July 1949, and a southbound work group led by Hua arrived there at the same time. After establishing contacts with the Communist underground organisation in Hsiangyin county, he made preliminary preparations for taking the county over. On a August he led the work group, consisting of io6 cadres, on their journey to Hsiangyin county by boat. Arriving there on the same day, he met members of the Communist underground in a temple.25 This marked the beginning of Hua's twenty-two-year political career in Hunan province. He now assumed the positions as secretary of the Hsiangyin county CCP Committee, commissar of the county people's armed force department,26 and commissar of the local PLA forces in Hsiangyin.27 His status was equivalent to a regimental commissar of the PLA. He was also principal of the Hsiangyin county middle schoo1.28 As Hsiangyin. county was under the jurisdiction of the Changsha prefecture in Hunan, Hua also held another concurrent post as a member of the prefectural CCP Committee.29 This was of no special significance since at that time all county party secretaries were concurrently members of their prefectural Party Committees. Situated by Lake Tungting in the north-eastern part of Hunan, Hsiangyin county is about 70 km. north of the provincial capital, Changsha. At first, Hsiangyin county was under the Changsha prefecture;" it was placed under the jurisdiction of Hsiangtan prefecture in

3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1936

33

1952, but is now under the Yuehyang prefecture.31 The county has thirteen districts and 152 villages, with a widely scattered population totalling some 500,000.32 In 1949, communications in Hsiangyin were not well-developed. (ii) "Grain Requisition in Support of the Front" and "Liquidating Bandits and Opposing Local Bullies" Hua Kuo-feng worked in Hsiangyin county for about two years from August 1949 to June 195133 When he first arrived there, although the Communists declared on 4 August that Hunan had been "peacefully liberated", fighting had not in fact ended. Only Changsha and its vicinity and the north-eastern part of Hunan were occupied by the Communists. In September, the PLA was engaged in fierce fighting with troops under the Nationalist General Pai Chung-hsi; in October it fought Nationalist forces along the Hengyang-Paoching highway, in what was known as the "Hong Pao campaign";34 and in the meantime, fighting continued in the provinces lying to the south-west of Hunan. After Hua Kuo-feng arrived in Hsiangyin, the most urgent tasks were the consolidation of the original party organisations in the localities, the training of local cadres, the establishment of a leadership nucleus, and the launching of the movements of "grain requisition in support of the front" and "liquidating bandits, and opposing local bullies". To meet the needs on the war front, Hua Kuo-feng sent cadres down to the countryside to collect grain and other produce from the peasants and deliver them to designated points.36 The grain requisition movement was brought to an end in the autumn of 1950. Within a short period of only a few months, Hua had collected more than ro million catties of grain in Hsiangyin county.32 For this he was commended by higher authorities. Hsiangyin's rural areas were experiencing a serious famine soon after Hua's arrival. Production had not yet returned to normal and the peasants' living conditions were difficult. The grain requisition which had to be fulfilled in a short time added to the pressures on the peasantry. As a result, many grain robberies occurred in the spring of 1950. Hua immediately took strong counter-measures, killing a number of people and sending some peasants to jail to prevent such incidents from spreading any further.37 His success in bringing the situation under control was again commended, in a circular issued by a higher party organ.

34

Chairman Hua

When Hua first went to Hsiangyin, the situation was still chaotic in other ways. In addition to a small number of Kuomintang and other anti-Communist elements who were still putting up a resistance, a quite large number of local people, whom the Communists called "local bandits and bullies", were also active in the area of Lake Tungting. Eighteen groups of local bandits totalling some 5,000 men were active within the perimeter of the county, and the Communist "southbound work group" was upset by their activities. Moreover, a serious flood made some 140,000 people homeless while schistosomiasis (Asiatic bilharzia) was rampant, and a threat to the lives of the peasants. Large tracts of farmland were left unattended and agricultural production was greatly affected.38 Through the county's people's armed force department, Hua Kuofeng organised the militia in various localities and directed the peasant associations in the rural areas to set up self-defence corps. In conjunction with these local forces, he set about wiping out the "local bandits and bullies"39 and suppressing those peasants who opposed the Communists. Some of the so-called "bandits and bullies" were actually ordinary landlords who owned fishing rights in the rivers and lakes. Hua issued arms to the peasant associations and supported them in seizing such rights from the landlords. These landlords were brutally repressed° so as to create an atmosphere of terror in society which would pave the way for the "land reform" which was to be carried out later. For Hua Kuo-feng, with his experience of waging guerrilla warfare and harassing the enemy's rear, the task of liquidating bandits and local bullies was not difficult. The task was in fact almost entirely accomplished within six months, and Communist government was established at all levels throughout the county. (iii) Pushing through "land reform" by violent means After the conclusion of the movement to "Liquidate bandits and oppose local bullies", Hsiangyin county began to carry out "land reform" in a number of "experimental spots", beginning in the summer of 1950.41 Simultaneously, a movement was launched to "suppress counterrevolutionaries". "Experimental Land Reform" in Hunan. The area around Lake Tungting

is called "the country of fish and rice". The abundant land was very largely owned by landlords. It was therefore a major target for land

3. Hsiangtatt, 1949-1956

35

reform in Hunan, and Hsiangyin county was the "experimental spot" for the lakeside area. The policy research office of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee designated Hofeng village of Hsiangyin county as a model for a survey in land relations in the lakeside area. The findings were that 70 per cent of the farmland in Hsiangyin county was in the hands of landlords, who accounted for only 2 per cent of the total number of households, while in Hofeng village landlords, accounting for 3 per cent of the households, owned more than 60 per cent of the land, averaging 8o mou (5.3 hectares) per person.42 This survey report was completed with the assistance of Hua Kuo-feng; it was the first time he had participated in a social survey in the rural areas. The experimental programme for land reform in Hsiangyin county was first discussed and drafted by eight members of the county Party Committee as early as the spring of 1950.43 The Hunan provincial CCP Committee had sent a land reform experimental work team to Hsiangyin's Yunglo village to determine the class status of the peasants. Hua Kuo-feng saw a tendency of "peaceful land reform" in this, and submitted a new programme to the provincial Committee, which was subsequently approved for implementation in Hsiangyin county.44 In the summer of 1950 Hua went to Yunglo village to take personal charge of land reform experimental work, which was concluded in the same winter.° The experience gained in. Yunglo was later introduced throughout the county. By putting emphasis on suppression of the landlords, the county made rapid progress in confiscating their land and redistributing it to the peasants, and was therefore commended by the Provincial CCP Committee and the central-south bureau.° Before 1949, the land tenure system in China's rural areas had been rather abnormal. The prevalent situation was for landlords to charge the tenant-peasants excessive rents, thus causing them to live in poverty. This was conducive to the growth of Communist influence in the countryside; the carrying out of a socialist transformation in the rural areas and the redistribution of the lands according to the principle of "land to the tillers" would of course help to improve the peasants' livelihood and promote the rural economy. However, only a land reform accomplished by peaceful and rational means would truly benefit the peasants. The Chinese Communists over-emphasised class struggle; they created "class hatred" among the peasantry, thereby turning the land reform into a violent political movement. The landlords where paraded through the streets with their hands and feet

36

Chairman Hua

tightly bound, and many of them, together with their families, were cruelly tortured. The Communist cadres who came down to the southern provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi from the north employed the most outrageous and ruthless means to push the land reform forward, and there were many incidents involving bloodshed. All peasants who had been identified as landlords not only had their lands and properties confiscated, but were savagely beaten and made to endure other humiliations. Finally they were driven out of their homes to live in broken-down houses and huts, with nothing left but the clothes they stood up in. They were deprived of their most basic needs and means of livelihood. Inhuman acts of this kind were typical of the land reform movement in Communist China. The Yang Tieh-lung Incident. Even the official Communist press, such as the Chang Chiang Daily, organ of the CCP central-south bureau published in Wuhan, had to admit that the movement of land reform and "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" in the Central and South China provinces had been accompanied not only by indiscriminate beatings and other forms of physical torture, but also "excessive and indiscriminate killings", and that "indiscriminate arrests, beatings and killings had been a mistake committed by some comrades again and again despite repeated warnings against their doing so".47 The wanton beatings and killings of landlords and rich peasants and their children committed by the Communist cadres probably owed much to the influence of Mao Tse-tung's Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. In their anxiety to speed up the land reform and "suppression" movements, they resorted to violence. Moreover, the cadres who had come down from the north did not have much faith in the local cadres, and wanted to assert their authority over them.48 After Hua Kuo-feng became chairman of the CCP Central Committee, all writings about him avoided mention of his past errors and deviations. He is now being cast in a flawless, godlike image. However, pondering carefully over all the articles written in his praise, one can see traces of references to his ruthlessness in conducting the land reform and "suppression of counter-revolutionaries", and his brutality in random arrests, beatings and killings. One article states that Hua sent militiamen to other provinces to "catch and bring back bandit chieftains" and "had them all executed", adding that at one time in Changshu district in Hsiangyin county, he spent four days and nights "examining

3. Hsiangtan, 1 949-1956

37

and dealing with more than ioo cases".° These words were meant to indicate Hua's "firmness" in implementing party policies and his competence in exercising the "dictatorship of the proletariat". But after some reflexion, one cannot help wondering whether it was not somewhat hasty to examine and deal with more than ioo cases in only four days and nights! Since Hsiangyin county was an "experimental spot" for land reform, and the landlords there owned more land and property than the average, it was only natural that there were many deviations in carrying out land reform work. During the "three-anti" (anti-corruption, antiwaste, anti-bureaucracy) movement conducted among the Communist cadres in 1952, newspapers in Hunan brought to light incidents of both indiscriminate and mistaken executions during the land reform movement in Hsiangtan under Hua's leadership. The New Hunan Daily disclosed that in the winter of 195o some village and district-level cadres abused their authority and displayed a bad style of work. Some of them were even guilty of seduction and rape. A peasant, Yang Tiehlung, exposed and criticised such acts, only to have false charges then laid against him by the cadres. He was subsequently sentenced to death by a district court for "sabotaging the land reform". Yang's death sentence was later approved by the county court, and Hua Kuo-feng's approval was given by telephone. He was executed on 17 December. The case should have been submitted for approval to the special district authorities, but the cadres at the county and district levels were anxious to have the convict executed in order to cover up their own errors. A few hours after receiving the telephone call asking for instructions, Hua directed the county public security bureau and court to have Yang executed without making any investigation to verify the facts. Not until July 1972 was the truth of the case brought to light. Some of the cadres who handled the case were punished by administrative procedure. Hua Kuo-feng, however, suffered no serious trouble. He admitted his error of pursuing a "bureaucratic style of work" and was lightly criticised by a higher authority.° 3. In Hsiangtan County and Hsiangtan Prefecture (i) Transfers and Promotions in Five Years In June 1951, Hua Kuo-feng was transferred to Hsiangtan county to be secretary of the county's CCP Committee,51 political commissar of the

38

Chairman Hua

county's people's armed force department,52 principal of the county-run middle school (now called Hsiangtan municipal No. i middle school),53 and possibly also a member of the Hsiangtan prefecture (or special district) CCP Committee. Hsiangtan county had a population of 7oo,000." Shaoshan, Mao Tse-tung's birthplace, is in the north-western part of the county. Hua's transfer there was not a promotion to a more senior position, but it had a close bearing on his political future; it was a sensitive post which could easily attract Mao's attention. In August 1952 Hua left Hsiangtan county on transfer orders.55 The same autumn he was appointed commissioner of Hsiangtan prefecture —the highest administrative post of the prefecture—with concurrent responsibilities as deputy secretary of the prefecture CCP Committee.° The promotion from a county party secretary to deputy secretary of a prefecture, with concurrent administrative duties as the prefecture's commissioner, would be regarded as a good promotion under normal conditions, as promotion directly from county secretary to prefecture secretary would be given to very few. Hua was further promoted to be secretary of Hsiangtan prefecture CCP Committee in the summer or autumn of 1953.58 For some time he still held the concurrent post as commissioner of the prefecture,59 and he was also political commissar of the Hsiangtan military sub-district69 As prefectural party secretary he was the highest leader of the party organisations in the prefecture, with the provincial Party Committee above and a number of county Party Committees below. A People's Daily article has said that Hua worked in Hsiangtan for twelve years,° but it did not specify which years these were. Hsiangtan refers to Hsiangtan prefecture, and the twelve years should be the separate periods of 1949-56 and 196o-5.62 In the earlier period he held positions as Party secretary of Hsiangyin county and later Hsiangtan county, deputy secretary and Commissioner of Hsiangtan prefecture and secretary of Hsiangtan prefecture; in the last five years he was secretary of Hunan Provincial CCP Committee and concurrently Party secretary of Hsiangtan prefecture (or special district). ..7-192rmr

Co-operativisation in Hsiangtan Prefecture Hua's promotion to these posts in. Hsiangtan prefecture in 1952 marked the turning-point in his political career. According to the ranks of cadres in 1956, a prefectural commissioner ranked grade x x to 13 on the administrative scale,63 and was entitled to the exclusive use of a (ii)

3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1956

39

small chauffeur-driven sedan. Cadres of grade 13 up to grade i were known as "high-ranking cadres". Before 1952, Hsiangtan and Hsiangyin counties were part of the Changsha prefecture, which also covered Yuehyang and five other counties." After 1952, the Communists renamed Changsha prefecture as Hsiangtan prefecture, still controlling the original eight counties, plus a single additional one.° In the mid-i95os, Ninghsiang and three other counties were added to its jurisdiction to make up a total of twelve counties.° In the early 196os, Ninghsiang and Changsha counties were taken out of the prefecture, the Hsiangtan municipality was added to it, while two other counties were abolished.67 In 1964, Hsiangtan prefecture was split in two, with Yuehyang, Hsiangyin and two other counties in its northern part removed from its jurisdiction.° Hsiangtan prefecture lies in the eastern part of Hunan, with its several northern counties in the Lake Tungting plains. The area south of Hsiangyin is also an agricultural centre. Since agriculture was the most important item in its economy, the principal task of the prefectural Party Committee and the county Committees was to develop the "agricultural co-operativisation" movement. Throughout his twelve years in Hsiangtan, Hua Kuo-feng was engaged in rural work. In the first seven years he devoted his efforts to promoting the "land reform" and "agricultural co-operativisation" movements; in the last five years he was committed to the "people's commune" movement. When he first arrived, the authorities in Hsiangtan county were engaged in checking the results of the land reform. After assuming office, he ran a training class for "rectifying and screening of cadres".° With this he integrated the "three-anti" movement so as to consolidate the basic-level party organisations in the rural areas. He visited various districts and villages to inspect the work of checking the results of the land reform, and firmly implemented the Communist policy of "class dictatorship". The 120,000 households of farm labourers and poor peasants in Hsiangtan county were allocated land, farm implements and houses confiscated from the landlords." Then, however, Hua organised them to join the "co-operatives", and by the time they joined the "higher stage" co-operatives, they had once again lost control of their land, livestock and equipment—their means of production. Hua Kuo-feng paid special attention to Mao Tse-tung's birthplace and former residence, Shaoshan. Shortly after he arrived in Hsiangtan county, he went to inspect it and submitted a proposal through the

40

Chairman Hua

Hunan provincial CCP Committee to the CCP Central Committee to renovate the house in which Mao had lived. Later, he personally drafted the renovation plans.71 Hua is also on record as having helped Liu Hsin-hua, a poor peasant and two other poor farming families in Shaoshan to form the first "mutual assistance group" in Hsiangtan county;72 and having given guidance to Ho Chien-chang in the setting up of a similar group." 4.

The upsurge of agricultural co-operativisation

Agricultural co-operatives, to which Hua directed increased efforts after his transfer to the Hsiangtan prefecture, were organised in three different stages. At first, soon after the land reform, "agricultural producers' mutual assistance groups" were established. In 1952, some of these groups were reorganised into semi-socialist "elementary agricultural producers' co-operatives". Then came the upsurge of the Agricultural Co-operativisation Movement in the latter part of 1955, when many elementary co-operatives were transformed into agricultural producers' co-operatives according to the so-called "socialist pattern" of organisation." Co-operativisation was the main theme in the transformation of China's countryside. It facilitated the drawing up of an overall programme for agriculture and the execution of larger-scale farmland construction, water conservancy and irrigation projects, but on the other hand it also gave rise to a new bureaucracy in the countryside. Bureaucratism often hampered agriculture and dampened the peasants' enthusiasm in production. Co-operativisation also gave a boost to the mobilisation of manpower, although it was carried out by compulsion. The peasants lost their land, draught animals and implements, and were subjected to tight control as to their places of residence and their food supplies. They therefore lost their freedom as individual, self-employed labourers. When Hua Kuo-feng held office as Party secretary of Hsiangyin and later Hsiangtan county before his transfer to prefectural level, the agricultural co-operativisation movement in Hunan was still at the stage of mutual assistance groups. According to estimates by the economist Hsu Ti-hsin, 4o per cent of China's peasant households had joined the mutual assistance groups in 1952, and 58 per cent by 1954.72 As Hunan began its "land reform" much later than the old base areas in North China, the progress of agricultural co-operativisation there was also slower than in North China.

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41

(i) Setting up mutual assistance groups in Hsiangyin and Hsiangtau After the land reform in Hunan in 195o, the Hunan provincial CCP Committee had begun to set up agricultural producers' mutual assistance groups in various counties. In compliance with the policy of the provincial CCP Committee, Hua Kuo-feng had organised eight peasant families in Yunglo village (where the experimentation in land reform was taking place) into a mutual assistance group in February 1951, the first such group in Hsiangyin county as well as one of the first in the whole province.76 The next month Hua had convened the Hsiangyin county "agricultural labour models" congress, the first of its kind in Hunan;" at the congress, he urged the peasants to join the mutual assistance groups. During his less than two years in Hsiangyin, as we have seen, Hua's primary tasks were to "liquidate bandits and bullies", and to carry out the land reform; but agricultural co-operativisation was still in its embryo-form, and Hua had not had the opportunity to bring his talents into full play. However, his transfer to Hsiangtan county in June 195 r gave him the chance to show his paces in the agricultural co-operativisation movement. He wrote many articles to promote the organisation of mutual assistance groups, such as "How should Hsiangtan county promote its mutual assistance and co-operation movement?", "Make steady efforts to build and upgrade permanent mutual assistance groups", "How to rectify, consolidate and improve existing mutual assistance groups", etc. He also cultivated ten "red banners" (i.e. models) of mutual assistance groups in the county, and personally introduced the experience of the "Ho Chien-chang mutual assistance group" by publishing in a party newspaper the article "Steadfastly consolidate and improve the Ho Chien-chang mutual assistance group". Thanks to his promotion, 890 permanent mutual assistance groups were set up in Hsiangtan county by the end of 1952. In this respect, Hsiangtan county fared better than other counties in. the prefecture." While Hua was working in Hsiangtan county, he was extremely concerned about several mutual assistance groups which had been formed in Mao Tse-tung's birthplace Shaoshan. He went there to acquaint himself with conditions and gave the groups his resolute support." By so doing, he possibly brought himself to Mao's attention. Because of his achievements in organising mutual assistance groups and his resoluteness in implementing the Communist policy in the movement to "suppress the counter-revolutionaries", he won the

42

Chairman Hua

favour of Hunan party leaders Chin Ming and Chou Hsiao-chou, and was soon promoted to higher positions in the Hsiangtan Prefecture. (ii) Agricultural Co-operativisation in Hsiangtan Prefecture Hua Kuo-feng held the post of secretary of Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee for three years (1953-6), and during this period the agricultural co-operativisation movement went through drastic changes. In 1953 the Communists put their first five-year plan into effect, and brought forward the General Line (the policy for economic development at that time) for the transition. period. They planned to accomplish the "socialist transformation" of agriculture in five years. In December that year, the CCP Central Committee announced its "decision on the development of agricultural producers' co-operatives" 80 In 1954, a large number of mutual assistance groups were merged into elementary agricultural producers' co-operatives. Front Elementary to Higher-Stage Co-operatives. The co-operativisation movement met with considerable resistance. Many peasants had no keenness for it, and only joined the co-operatives under compulsion. They worked with much less fervour and efficiency than they had done while working on their own. They also lost much of their initiative for starting new enterprises. In the mean time, a fierce debate broke out among top-level cadres regarding the steps to be taken in co-operativisation, and the speed of implementing it. Some felt that it was too hasty to realise co-operativisation in three years, as it would be impossible to raise enough capital, and the peasants' enthusiasm for production would be dampened. They deemed it necessary to rectify tendencies of "impetuosity and rashness".81 These opinions gained considerable momentum in the early part of 1955, and were accepted by the CCP Central Committee in general. In May 1955, the Central Committee drew up a resolution on consolidating the agricultural co-operatives. Under the direction of Liu Shao-chi's and Teng Hsiao-ping, Teng Tzu-hui, director of the rural work department of the CCP Central Committee, and others pushed forward the new policy with great vigour and in two months cut down the number of agricultural co-operatives by 200,000.82 Their intention was to lower the speed of co-operativisation so that the peasants could gradually adapt themselves to the new changes, thus allaying their antagonistic feelings and alleviating the crisis with which the regime was being faced.

3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1956

43

However, Mao Tse-tung disagreed with them from beginning to end. He was extremely zealous about the co-operativisation of agriculture, and at the third national conference on agricultural mutual assistance and co-operation convened by the Party in the winter of 1953, he had criticised Teng Tzu-hui and others, accusing them of taking the opportunist line in the name of "rectifying tendencies of impetuosity and rashness".88 Late in 1955, in disregard of existing difficulties and differing opinions within the party, Mao took the drastic step of forcing the peasants to join the co-operatives. In July that year, he had convened a meeting of provincial party secretaries at which he made a report on "the question of agricultural co-operativisation". An "upsurge in agricultural co-operativisation" was whipped up immediately after the meeting, and most of the elementary co-operatives were converted into higher co-operatives between that winter and 1956. By the end of 1956, 96 per cent of the peasant households had joined the agricultural producers' co-operatives, of which those who joined the higher co-operatives accounted for 88 per cent of the peasantry.84 Thus, the Communists announced that the "socialist transformation" of agriculture had been "basically completed". Mao Tse-tung's radical approach to agricultural co-operativisation was similar to Stalin's "general collectivisation" in 1929. Between 1925 and 1927, the Soviet hierarchy had had a fierce debate on its agricultural policy, N. I. Bukharin being in favour of making some concessions to the peasantry so as to stimulate their enthusiasm for production and their willingness to sell more of their surplus grain, while Stalin drew up his forced collectivisation programme in the winter of 1927 and put it into effect in 1929. This aroused opposition from the peasantry, and a serious famine was the result.85 Mao was following in Stalin's footsteps. In less than three years after the establishment of elementary agricultural co-operatives, he had them converted into higher-stage co-operatives, and two years later again transformed them into "people's communes". This caused a serious famine between 1959 and 1961, which greatly harmed Communist China's economic vitality, and left a lamentable page in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Hua Kuo-feng's political career had a close connection with programme of agricultural co-operativisation. Setting up Hunan's first Higher Co-operative. During the co-operativisadon movement, Hua Kuo-feng's position was not high; he could not

44

Chairman Hua

have had any influence in the making of the Party's agricultural policy. However, he pushed the movement forward with great fervour in the Hsiangtan prefecture. Soon after he began to work in the prefecture, he set up a class for the training of "backbone cadres for building the co-operatives",86 and made overall arrangements for "co-operativisadon", handling the organisation of political propaganda and the mobilisation of the workforce. In the spring of 1953, on a trial basis, the Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee ran six elementary agricultural producers' co-operatives87 of which one, the Holungchia co-operative, was organised by expanding the Liu Cheng-chun mutual assistance group. It was the first elementary co-operative formed in Hsiangyin county (it was converted into a higher co-operative in early 1955).88 By the spring of 1954, seventy-five elementary co-operatives had been set up in Hsiangtan prefecture—still on a trial basis." Hua Kuo-feng then sent a work team to Tungtingwei in Hsiangyin county to form the first higher agricultural co-operative in Hunan by merging eighteen mutual assistance groups, comprising 127 peasant households." To transform mutual assistance groups directly into a higher co-operative was obviously adventuristic and reckless, for apart from a different name the new co-operative was practically no different from the mutual assistance groups in means and conditions of production. Although the Hunan provincial CCP Committee had approved the formation of that higher co-operative, it had doubts about its "superiority". At the end of that year, it sent two investigators to the Tungtingwei higher co-operative, and found that some peasants had withdrawn from it together with their draught animals.81 The cooperative was allowed to survive only because Mao had published the article "On the question of agricultural co-operativisation". Hsiangtan Prefecture Takes the Lead. After conducting investigations in the rural areas in Hsiangtan, Hsiangyin, Ninghsiang and Pingchiang counties, Hua Kuo-feng worked out plans to promote the co-operativisation movement in them. Between the winter of 1954 and the spring of 1955, 4,933 co-operatives were set up in Hsiangtan prefecture, with 5.2 per cent of the total number of the peasant households there participating." Thus of the 12,00o co-operatives that had been founded in the province by that time, those in Hsiangtan prefecture accounted for 4o per cent," making Hsiangtan the most advanced in the movement in Hunan.

3. Hsiangtan, 1949-1956

45

The struggle between the Left "adventurists" and the conservatives went through many twists and turns during the time when the agricultural co-operativisation movement was being implemented. Many people, from the CCP Central Committee down to Hunan province and its prefectures and counties, disagreed with Mao Tse-tung's radical ideas. They questioned the ability of the agricultural co-operatives to increase production owing to the lack of conditions or the innovation of agricultural techniques, and shortages of farm machinery and chemical fertilisers, and held that the speed of co-operativisation should be reduced." The attitude of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee was also on the conservative side. Hua Kuo-feng was originally to speak at a meeting of party secretaries of prefectures, counties and districts convened by the Provincial Party Committee in the first half of July 1955, but the Committee decided at the last minute to cancel his speech because of his "left adventurist" tendencies. While the meeting was in session, provincial party secretary Chou Hsiao-chou called Hua Kuo-feng and three other leading cadres of Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee to his house and gave them a reprimand, directing them to revise their programme for the development of agricultural co-operatives in a practical way according to actual conditions. The number of peasant households to be admitted into the co-operatives was to be limited to about 3o per cent of the total, a percentage considered at that time to be "just right, not deviating to the left or the right, and neither advanced nor backward"." Under Chou Hsiao-chou's pressure, Hua finally revised hisprogra mine" and decided to set up another 6,402 co-operatives in the Hsiangtan prefecture in the autumn of 1955. These, plus the 4,933 co-operatives founded earlier, represented i i per cent of the total of peasant households.97 Soon after the Hunan meeting of four-level party cadres, Mao Tse-tung called a meeting of provincial, municipal and regional party secretaries at the end ofJuly. It was at this meeting that Mao delivered his speech on agricultural co-operativisation, accusing some comrades of "tottering along like a woman with bound feet, while complaining that others were moving along too fast"." After the meeting, Mao ordered that "rightist ideas" in the agricultural co-operativisation movement be criticised and repudiated. Thus the situation underwent an abrupt change. The Hunan provincial CCP Committee convened the Seventh provincial Party Congress from 25 August to 16 September 1955 to

46

Chairman Hua

discuss Mao's report and "examine the rightist ideas of the Hunan party organisation in leading the agricultural co-operativisation in the past three years". To be in line with the wishes of Mao, it decided to increase the number of co-operatives in the province to 75,000 by the spring of 1956, to 130,00o by the spring of 1957, and to 150,00o the next winter; this would comprise 6o per cent of the total peasant households." After the publication of Mao's speech, a so-called "upsurgc of agricultural co-operativisation" took shape in the countryside. Hua Kuo-feng took the radical line in this movement. He drew up a very bold plan for the development of agricultural co-operatives: to form 20,000 co-operatives in Hsiangtan prefecture in the autumn and winter of 1955, with 75 per cent of all peasant households participating.mo He made speeches everywhere to promote co-operativisation, and commended a number of "outstanding cadres" and rural party branches in the name of the prefectural Party Committee for their positive role in leading the organisation of co-operatives."' Hsiangtan prefecture marched in the vanguard of the movement in Hunan. By the winter of 1955, 75 per cent of the peasant households had joined the co-operatives, thus "basically realising the co-operativisation of agriculture".102 Because of his outstanding performance in the co-operativisation movement, Hua was nominated to attend the sixth plenum of the seventh CCP Central Committee in October 1955 as a delegate without power to vote. He made a speech at the plenum, discussing his experience in the co-operativisation of agriculture in Hsiangtan."3 In the organisational life of the Chinese Communist Party, it was considered a great honour for a prefectural Party secretary to sit at a plenum of the Central Committee; the episode suggests that Hua had by then come to the attention of Mao Tse-tung. (iii) Hua's famous Hsiangtan investigations Skilled in organising mass movements and resolute in implementing Mao's policy of agricultural co-operativisation, Hua Kuo-feng paid particular attention to on-the-spot investigations. He had written some "investigation reports", and these, thanks to Mao's annotations, had won him a reputation in the political circles in Communist China. Mao Tse-tung's Annotations. After the publication of Mao Tse-tung's "On the question of agricultural co-operativisation", Hua wrote several articles introducing his experience in directing the co-operativisation movement and the results of his investigations. Among them arc

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47

"Overcome rightist ideas, enthusiastically greet the advent of a high tide in the agricultural co-operativisation movement", "Thoroughly study the movements in various strata in the countryside", "It is essential to rely firmly on the poor peasants in the co-operativisation movement", and "In the co-operativisation movement it is necessary thoroughly to mobilise ideologically the poor peasants and the young and old lower-middle peasants".104 Between 5 December 1955 and to April 1956, the Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee submitted seventeen brief reports on agricultural co-operativisation to the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, most of which were signed by Hua Kuo-feng.1°5 In the Hunan section. of The Upsurge of Socialism in China's Countryside (three volumes), compiled and edited under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung in 1955 with his own preface and notes, six investigation reports were included, four of them written by cadres in the Hsiangtan prefecture while another one, written by the Hunan work group of the secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, was an investigation report on the Changsha and Ninghsiang counties in Hsiangtan prefecture. The fact that five of the six reports concerned one prefecture, Hsiangtan, was very unusual. The four investigation reports written by cadres of Hsiangtan prefecture arc: (a) "How the Wutang agricultural producers' co-operative of Kaoshan village, Changsha county, changed from middle peasants holding the dominant position to poor peasants holding the dominant position", by Chou Ching-wen, 26 July 1955, originally published in Hunan Mutual Assistance and Co-operation, No. 9; (b) "Party branch of Chingfeng village, Hsiangtan county, helps poor co-operative members surmount their difficulties", by Kuo Chien-peng, 17 May 1955, originally published in Hunan Countryside, No. 113; (c) "Hsiangyin County solves the question of disposal of surplus labour force", by Jen Pci-wu, 3 April 1955, originally published in Hunan Countryside, No. no; (d) "Opinions concerning agricultural producers' co-operatives developing a diversified economy," by the rural work department of Ninghsiang county CCP Committee, Hunan, 21 June 1955, originally published in Hunan Mutual Assistance and Cooperation, No. 1.

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Chairman Rim

Hua Kuo-feng wrote the conclusions for three of the four investigation reports.'" All were commended by Mao Tse-tung in his notes. To the first investigation report, Mao added the note: "The experience of Kaoshan villages, Changsha county, Hunan province, tells us convincingly of the necessity and possibility of establishing the dominant position of the poor peasants and of proceeding therefrom to unite solidly with the middle peasants"; and to the second: "The policy of this co-operative is correct. All co-operatives should do likewise. The provinces should point out in their own resolutions or instructions concerning co-operativisation that all co-operatives have the duty of helping members who are widowers, widows, orphans or childless, or who cannot labour. . . ."107 An Exemplary Prefectural Party Secretary. Before The Upsurge of Socialise► in China's Countryside came off the press for open distribution., Study magazine, the organ of the CCP Central Committee, published a special edition on agricultural co-operativisation in November 1955, which contained Mao Tse-tung's "On the Question of Agricultural Co-operativisation" and the documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee entitled "Resolution on the question of agricultural co-operativisadon" and "Explanations to draft resolution on the question of agricultural co-operativisation". Besides these three documents, the special edition, which was intended for influencing public opinion in favour of an "upsurge of agricultural co-operativisation", also contained nine articles, among them four signed by local party leaders, one of whom was Ko Chingshih, secretary of the Shanghai bureau of the CCP Central Committee. The other three were investigation reports written by three prefectural Party secretaries—Lin Ming, secretary of Chiaochou prefectural CCP Committee, Shantung province; Chang Chun, secretary of Szumao prefectural CCP Committee, Yunnan province; and Hua Kuo-feng, secretary of Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee.'" Mao Tse-tung had chosen these three prefectural secretaries as models for promoting agricultural co-operativisation. In his investigation report entitled "Thoroughly study the movements in various strata in the countryside", Hua stressed that the co-operativisation movement must rely on the poor peasants to solve their practical problems. He repudiated the notion of relying on middle peasants to form the co-operatives, and accused some comrades of displaying "spontaneous capitalist tendencies".10 In his investigation

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reports and other articles, Hua took pains to expound Mao Tse-tung's theory of class struggle. He chose concrete examples which showed Mao's agricultural policy in a favourable light, to prove the "correctness" of Mao's class theory and "class line". Thus he won Mao's favour. 5. BriefSummary

During his seven years in the Hsiangtan prefecture, Hua Kuo-feng distinguished himself as a competent party secretary, and the experience he gained in rural work during this period paved the way for his promotion to the provincial party hierarchy. Also, his rich experience of party work at the county level accumulated during his nine years as a county cadre in Shansi, added to his experience in guerrilla life and in the land reform movement, enabled him to cope efficiently with the chaotic situation when he first arrived in Hunan. Hua was not only a good organiser: he also had a better education than most other party cadres at county and prefectural levels. Because in the past he had been engaged in propaganda work, he knew how to use the mass media to promote mass movements in Hunan and build up his own prestige. A propaganda work conference was convened in Hunan in 1951 to appraise the standards achieved by county-level party secretaries in political and theoretical studies, and Hua Kuo-feng emerged as the best. His "learnings from study" were printed and circulated by the Hunan provincial CCP Committee among those attending the conference.'" The fact of his being more advanced in political and theoretical studies is of course attributable to his higher standard of education. His main purpose in regularly publishing investigation reports and theoretical articles in the press was of course to promote agricultural co-operativisation. Another motive could possibly have been his desire for publicity. Thanks to his particular concern for mass communications, he had enjoyed increasing publicity in Hunan. He was famous in Hsiangtan for his resolute implementation of "class dictatorship". Despite his harshness in suppressing landlords and "counter-revolutionaries" during the land reform and "suppression" movements, his strong "party spirit" and staunch stand won the recognition of his superiors. Hua Kuo-feng was all along engaged in rural work in the Hsiangtan area, and this was extremely helpful to his political career. Mao Tse-tung was extremely concerned about the state of affairs in his birthplace

so

Chairman Hua

Shaoshan, where Hua had stayed for some time to direct the cooperativisation movement. The result had been a rapid increase in the number of peasant households joining the co-operatives. The party organisation in Shaoshan wrote a letter to Mao telling him of the rapid development of the movement, and Mao, in a handwritten reply, expressed his delight.'1' The extraordinary progress of the co-operativisation movement in Shaoshan and the Hsiangtan area must have given Mao a very farourable impression of Hua Kuo-feng.112 In pushing the agricultural co-operativisation movement, Mao adopted a left or radical line. His adventurism was opposed by both Liu Shao-chi and Teng Tzu-hui, who were in charge of rural work. They favoured step-by-step development and were against putting too much pressure on the peasantry; to do this could shake the foundations of the rural administration. Compared to Hua Kuo-feng, the principal party leader in Hunan, Chou Hsiao-chou, also adopted a conservative attitude towards the movement. So in his seven years in the Hsiangtan area, having to implement the co-operativisation movement under the leadership of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, Hua was very much under constraint, despite the fact that he was more on the radical side. After July 1955, however, constraints were removed and he became ever more feverish in supporting and implementing Mao's rural policy, and did his best to cater to Mao's craving for greatness and success. Here too he won favour. While working in the Hsiangtan area, Hua had to bear a considerable mental burden. At the same time, he naturally cherished a desire for advancement in his career. He may have paid a greater price than other prefectural party secretaries, but his endeavours produced results which more readily attracted Mao's attention—an advantage denied to others. His subsequent transfer to the provincial hierarchy, where he quickly acquired the status of a provincial party secretary, owed much to Mao's special approval and patronage.

4 THE HUNAN PERIOD, 1956-1971 1. In Charge of Hunan's Cultural and Education Systems Hua Kuo-feng was transferred in May 1956 from Hsiangtan to the Hunan provincial People's council as chief of its culture and education office, and concurrently as acting secretary of the CCP section.' This marked the beginning of his assumption of Party and government posts at the provincial level.2 It should be explained that the State Council's general offices exercise jurisdiction over ministries dealing with specific affairs. At the provincial level, these offices supervise the affairs of subordinate departments and bureaux. The culture and education office, for example, oversees the provincial government's cultural bureau, education department, public health department, physical culture and sports committee, and other units. In Hunan, therefore, this office was under the dual leadership of the provincial People's Council and the State Council's culture and education office.3 But in its relations with the local Party Committee and the local government, it was under the propaganda department of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee.4 As head of this office, Hua was in a slightly lower position than the vice-governor and approximately of same standing as the CCP prefectural Committee secretary, i.e. a senior cadre. Normally, provincial government functionaries had better chances of promotion than those assigned to district-level offices.3 (i) Anti-illiteracy drive to popularise Putunghua Having been primarily engaged during his first seven years in Hunan in rural work to promote the agricultural co-operation movement, Hua was able, after being put in charge of the cultural and education programmes in the province, to draw on his many years of experience 5'

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Chairman Hua

in conducting propaganda and education work at county and prefectural levels. Policy shifts and trends. The year in which Hua was assigned to Hunan marked a shift to the right in CCP policy. The party newspaper, People's Daily, published articles endorsing the criticism of Stalin levelled by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the the Soviet Union. (CPSU) and opposing the "cult of personality".6 At the Eighth CCP Congress held in September 1956, Mao praised the policies formulated at the Soviet Congress, and criticised the shortcoming of the CCP? Influenced by the Soviet Congress, the CCP's Politburo modified its policy on intellectuals, relaxed its control over writers and artists, and pressed ahead with the development of education and science and technology. Before the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the CCP Central Committee held a meeting in January on the problems posed by intellectuals. Chou En-lai delivered a report and urged that more competent intellectuals be employed, to meet the pressing demands of economic construction.8 In May, Lu Ting-i, director of the CCP Central Committee's propaganda department, made a policy speech on "blossoming of a hundred flowers and contention of a hundred schools of thought". He stressed the need to mobilise "all the positive factors" of the intellectuals.9 Also in 1956, the CCP introduced a somewhat drastic programme for the development of education, science and technology. The programme envisaged in particular the accelerated development of science and technology, within twelve years, in order to catch up with and overtake levels in the advanced countries of the world." To make this advance possible, the central authorities spared no efforts to promote anti-illiteracy drives, build more schools, enrol more and better students, improve teaching materials and raise the quality of teaching. In this policy shift, Hua did his best to implement related central and provincial policies and guidelines. Plan for eradicating illiteracy. As head of the culture and education office, Hua was confronted by the difficult tasks of eradicating illiteracy in Hunan where many were illiterate, and of popularising the putunghua (popular spoken language or Mandarin). It was estimated that out of the 600 million constituting the population of China in 1956, 78 per cent were illiterate.n This high illiteracy rate hindered economic

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development and programmes of social modernisation. An antiilliteracy association was set up on is March in the State Council." Its members included the ministry of education, the committee for the reform of language, the Communist youth league (CYL), the federation of trade unions, and the women's federation." A top-level decision on eradicating illiteracy was jointly issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on 29 March." It was stipulated in the national programme for agricultural development that, beginning in 1956, "illiteracy among the rural populace should be basically eliminated within twelve years"." This large-scale programme against illiteracy began in the second half of 1955,16 but the drive became a massive movement in various localities in 1956. When Hua was assigned to Hunan, he was behind preparations for forming an anti-illiteracy association in Hunan, and after this organisation had been set up, he became its chairman. At a meeting on the subject held in October 1956, he urged his colleagues to attach maximum importance to the anti-illiteracy programme." He was also involved in the formulation of a similar programme for 1956-7 in Hunan." The anti-illiteracy programme conducted in Hunan was geared to the popularisation of the putunghua in that province. The directive on this was issued in February 1956 by the State Council, urging provincial and municipal governments to set up committees to this end." A work committee was formed in May, with Hua as its vice-chainnan,22 in which capacity he assisted Ting Ling, the chairman, who also headed the CCP provincial propaganda department in Hunan. (ii) Coping with the problems plaguing educational circles In his promotion of primary and secondary education in Hunan, Hua apparently displayed exceptional abilities for administration and organisation. Education made considerable headway in 1956, the year that marked the beginning of a twelve-year programme for the development of science. The plan envisaged the popularisation of primary education in the rural areas within seven to twelve years, with the emphasis on the development, by stages, of secondary education at both junior and senior levels in urban areas.21 From that year, student recruitment was expanded: the number of students enrolled in universities and colleges in China rose from around 90,000 in 1955 to more than 160,000.22 Some 360,000 students were admitted to senior middle schools, representing 46 per cent of the total number of 780,000 pupils

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Chairman Hua

at these schools.23 To accommodate such a large increase in new students, a number of junior-level middle schools and some primary schools were urged to set up additional senior- and junior-level classes known as "extension schools".2 Primary-level education was selectively popularised in such cities as Changsha, Chengchow, Shenyang, Changchun and Sian to accommodate school-age and physically fit children. The enrolment rate in schools in Peking and Shanghai during that year was fixed at 90 per cent of the total number of children of an eligible agc.28 Developing "extension schools". Hua was responsible for promoting primary education in Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan, although the municipal education bureau assumed overall charge. He was particularly keen on the expansion of the "extension schools", and through his efforts, many primary schools in Hunan began to set up affiliated middle schools at the junior leve1.28 Initially, the provincial authorities encountered financial difficulties in accommodating the large influx of new primary-level students. Under such circumstances, higher agricultural producer co-operatives and neighborhood committees were encouraged to run primary schools. The national programme for agricultural development specifically stipulated that rural schools in diverse forms should, where conditions permitted, be collectively or privately run so as to popularise primary-level education by stages.27 At the outset, Hua's radical approach to running primary schools resulted in early 1957 in the official take-over of privately-run schools. This ran counter to the provisions on running rural schools specified in the national programme for agricultural development, but the measure has now been interpreted as "a resolute struggle against the capitalist way of running schools that was preached by Liu Shao-chi".28 Due to unforeseen difficulties such as a lack of funds, Hua later abandoned this radical approach. In a speech he gave in May 1957 at a meeting of the Hunan CPPCC on the theme of operating primary and secondary schools, his emphasis was on the vigorous promotion of "communerun schools" (as distinct from those privately operated) such as those run by higher agricultural producer co-operatives, neighborhood committees or factories and industrial enterprises.29 Hua was also involved in the planning and development of intermediate-level specialised schools, as well as universities and colleges. In 1956, he was responsible for proposing the establishment of the medical

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school at Hengyang. He contended that the school should be set up in such a strategically located place so that a medical school in southern Hunan could serve the wounded in times of war.30 The State Council accepted Hua's proposal and approved the erection of the new medical school. It was completed in 1958.31 Hua's next action was to set up more intermediate-level schools for promoting public health and medical colleges. Through his efforts, four schools in Changtc, Hsiangtan, Hengyang and Shaoyang offered courses in medicine while three new schools dealing with health subjects were set up in Pingchow, Chuchow and the Miao Nationality Autonomous thou (prefecture) in western Hunan.32 Educational development in Hunan was part of central planning, and did not owe its existence to Hua's conception and initiative. The mass media, however, have made much of Hua's role in Hunan. In his planning of the province's educational progress, he evidently did display drive and organising ability. Mobilising students to settle in the countryside. The CCP's economic and educational policies had always showed signs of wavering, and became particularly unstable in 1956 when significant increases in student recruitment greatly taxed operating funds and schooling facilities. As a result, the student recruitment programme for the summer of 1957 was drastically curtailed. In order to accorrunodate primary school graduates who were unable to pursue secondary school education, the CCP Central Committee announced a student 'rustication' programme in the spring of 1957. CCP vice-chairman Liu Shao-chi, as the prime mover behind the drive to resettle students in rural areas, convened forums and briefing sessions in the five provinces in the central-south region, namely Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Honan, to acquaint local CCP Committees and education departments with the rustication programme. During his inspection tour of Hunan, Hua may have supplied him with pertinent information about student rustication. Liu's speech on the need for student participation in farm production was published in the People's Daily of 8 April 1957.33 A decade later, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the article was stigmatised as a "very poisonous weed". Liu was held responsible for leading young people astray,34 although Liu's talk and the published article in the form of a People's Daily editorial had been cleared by the CCP Central Committee.

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Hua appears to have respected the views expressed by Liu Shao-chi. In his speech at the provincial-level CPPCC held in May 1957, he urged the students' parents to be ideologically prepared for the slim chances their children would have of continuing their education, and to persuade them to participate in farm work.88 Hua was transferred away from Hunan in the latter part of 1957, and thus was no longer involved in the rustication programme from that time. (iii) Combating schistosomiasis From attending to the sports and public health sectors of provincial programmes, Hua moved on to the more complicated and specialised task of medical care for the people, such as setting up joint clinics in the rural areas and centres for directing the fight against the spread of schistosomiasis, which, with its wide range of symptoms from diarrhoea and anaemia to coma and paralysis, had ravaged the greater part of rural China. In the wake of the 1955 upsurge in "agricultural co-operation" in Hunan, at least 30,000 private medical practitioners, urged to take the "road of co-operativisation", ceased practising privately, to become consultants in "joint clinics" conducted under the supervision of provincial or county-level public health departments.86 This task did not seem to pose any challenge to Hua. What seemingly did do so was the nationwide programme of eradicating schistosomiasis. This and other pests had periodically plagued rural China, and fighting it therefore became the key task confronting the provincial authorities in 1956. At the height of the havoc caused by the disease between 1956 and 1957, eleven Chinese provinces south of the Yellow River and some 35o counties were affected. The number of victims, from light to serious cases, rose to more than ioo million, nearly one-sixth of China's total population." A nine-member leading group for fighting schistosomiasis, headed by Ko Ching-shih, first secretary of the Shanghai municipal CCP Committee, was set up by the CCP Central Committee in November 1955.88 Its basic goal was to exterminate the pest within seven years.3° A directive was issued by the State Council in April 1957, urging the provincial authorities to set up committees for controlling the spread of the disease and to draw up annual plans to that effect." Hua directed the programme for fighting schistosomiasis when he took charge of the education office in Hunan.41 He presided over the first work conference held in May 1956 to popularise proven methods for eliminat-

4.

The Hunan Period, 1956-1971

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ing the disease, and at the end of that year, he attended a national conference on its prevention, chaired by Ko Ching-shih.42 Hua had gained experience in combatting schistosomiasis when he lived for two years in Hsiangying county, close to infected areas such as the swampy regions along the Yangtse river basin. And when he later became provincial-level CCP secretary, he was still concerned with the prevention of the disease. While prevention of schistosomiasis was vigorously pushed ahead in seriously affected areas, the results achieved were less impressive than the authorities had anticipated. Despite the assertion at the outset that the pest would be basically eradicated within seven years, there were plans in 1978 to eliminate it by 1985.43 Because of the long delay in implementing the programme on a national scale, Hunan likewise has been unsuccessful in pushing through the task up to the present. (iv) Struggling against "Rightists" The "blooming and contending" campaign was launched by the CCP in May and June 1957. Its purpose was to encourage intellectuals to be outspoken in their criticism of the regime's policy on the very subject of intellectuals, but as the intellectuals became too critical of the CCP's policies and measures in published articles and at forums, the authorities relented and ordered that "blooming and contending" be suppressed and the critics branded as "anti-Party and anti-socialist rightists". The so-called "Hundred Flowers" period became a vehement campaign against these "rightists". Hua was then in charge of the "anti-rightist" campaign in cultural, educational, public health and sports circles. He distinguished himself by adhering to the Party line in suppressing the dissidents associated with the "literary salon clique". This "clique" consisted of writers and artists closely associated with Kang Te, director of the cultural bureau in Changsha, and Wei Meng-ko, a writer who had flourished in the 193os. During the "blooming and contending" period, they were outspokenly critical of the CCP's policy on literature and art and of its sectarian views on intellectuals. The Kangen-Wci clique was on good terms with the leading Hunan members of the Democratic League, one of the minority political groups approved of by the CCP. In the "blooming and contending" period, its leading figures in Peking, such as Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi, had political designs to expand the League's membership and

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Chairman Hua

to challenge the CCP's authority. The Hunan branch of the Democratic League had the same intentions. Long before 1955, the Kangen-Wei faction, together with a number of frustrated men of letters, were often critical of the CCP's literary dogmas. They became particularly active in the "blooming and contending" period in exposing the darker side of the literary world, and criticised the CCP's rough handling of traditional operas and its slighting of veteran stage artists which in certain cases had led to the artists committing suicide." The Kangen-Wci faction were particularly critical of the Hunan provincial cultural bureau and its bureaucratic manner of dealing with the veteran stage artists. They hoped to reorganise the cultural bureau and expected Kang Te to take over the top post and to put out their own newspaper.45 However, their hopes were in vain. Kang Te's outspoken views regarding reform of theatre work were more or less encouraged by Tien Han from behind the scenes. Tien was a prominent playwright, with an authoritative and scarcely challenged position in drama circles. He paid a visit to his native Hunan in 1956 and, through Kang Te, met Hunancsc actors. In subsequent meetings with the actors, he learned about their plight and the deviations in theatre reform. He was sympathetic towards the helpless actors who had been either ignored or discriminated against by the cultural bureau, and back in Peking, he wrote to the media about them." Tien may have met Hua in Hunan. His criticism of the inept cultural bureau was a slap in the face for Hua since the latter had jurisdiction over the provincial-level cultural bureau. Hua may have explained matters to Tien in the light of the conditions then prevailing. Anyway, he was firm in dealing with the "literary salon clique" during the 1957 campaign against the "rightists" 47 Hua was also responsible for stagemanaging the campaign against the "rightists" in educational circles. The student associations of institutions of higher education in Hunan met in June 1957 to call upon all college students in the province to rise against the "rightists" ;45 Hua went to No. 5 middle school in Changsha and visited a number of teaching research groups for the express purpose of inciting the radicals against them." During this campaign, some 200,000 graduates of primary and middle schools in Hunan were resettled in the countryside;" in this "rustication" programme Hua apparently played a prominent role.61

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(v) Moving up to a new post Hua's record in the campaign against the "rightists" and in the rustication programme was impressive. He was commended by the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, and may have pleased a fellow-Hunanese, Chou Yang, who was deputy director of the CCP Central Committee's propaganda department, in charge of the literature and art programmes. Hua was promoted director of United Front department in Hunan in the autumn or winter of 1957.52 This promotion to a senior post made him responsible to Li Wei-han, director of the "united front" department of the CCP Central Committee. Hua replaced Hsieh Hua, who had ceased to be United Front department director in Hunan,53 possibly due to the "right deviationist" mistakes he had made in dealing with the disputes among the minority nationalities. Despite Hua's short association with United Front work in Hunan, he was responsible for improving the relations between CCP organisations and minority political groups subordinate to the government of the People's Republic after its founding in 1949. The campaign against the "rightists" launched in Hunan was stalled by the minority political groups, which responded in a lukewarm way," and by the Miao nationality autonomous thou in western Hunan.55 Hua's impressive showing in countering the forces of resistance against the campaign was praised by Red Flag: "In the van of the struggle, he organised and led the anti-rightist struggle in accordance with Chairman Mao's and the CCP Central Committee's strategic plan, and adapting the plan to local conditions"." But it turned out that Hua was not the right person for directing "united front" work in Hunan. In the spring of 1958, he was transferred to another post. 2.

Front Vice-Governor to CCP First Secretary

Hua's replacement in the United Front post was announced in the New Hunan Daily in the spring of 1958.57 Hua himself took charge of promoting scientific work in the province° while still overseeing the anti-schistosomiasis programme. At a meeting in March 1958, he delivered a speech on some new aspects of fighting the disease.59 (i) Rising status After May 1958, Hua dissociated himself from cultural and educational work in Hunan and moved on to another sector dealing with the economy.60 He was later to assume overall charge of finance and trade

Go

Chairman Hun

programmes in Hunan province. After filling a number of posts related to capital and economic construction projects in the province in June or earlier, he became vice-governor of Hunan in July." Two months later, he was named alternate secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee62 and as one of the leading members of the Party Committee's economic section." His assumption of these posts paved the way for him to become a leading figure in Hunan. Cautious approach to the Great Leap Forward. Hua's involvement in economic work in Hunan coincided with the Great Leap Forward programmes introduced by Mao, embracing the people's commune and the general line—popularly known as the "Three Red Banners". The people's communes were introduced in July 195 8. Their development was affirmed by Mao in the following month: the CCP Central Committee decreed the establishment of people's communes in the rural areas." From that moment onwards, forcible measures were taken in the provinces to promote Mao's concept of the rural people's communes, and "to make steel in the backyards". Mao's Great Leap Forward programmes were promoted with enthusiasm by the provincial authorities in the central-south region, although Chou Hsiao-chou, first secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, allegedly pursued a more cautious course to avoid over-zealous demonstrations by extremist radicals." Hua followed Chou's example and did not contribute any article to the CCP's theoretical journal, Red Flag, which reflects official policies. While the course pursued by Hua in dealing with Great Leap Forward policies was generally cautious, he nevertheless made favourable comments on Great Leap Forward programmes, such as the speech he delivered at the Hunan provincial people's congress in July 1958.66 However, he used restraint in commenting on the technical difficulties facing the drive to "make steel in the backyards"." Dispute over Great Leap Forward policies. One of the goals of the Great Leap Forward was to catch up with the United Kingdom in fifteen years, to modernise Chinese industry and to advance to the front rank of the rations of the world. However, there were heated debates among the top leadership and the local authorities over ways of implementing the Great Leap Forward programmes. Exaggerated claims of farm output by the communes caused great confusion to the rural economy. and resulted in undue waste of manpower and financial resources. In

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February 1959, under pressure from the CCP politburo, Mao called a central work conference in Chengchow, the provincial capital of Honan, to rectify errors committed in what he termed "egalitarianism" and in improper appropriation of labour and products. He said: "Our Party's main thrust is directed towards the left." He urged reorganisation of the people's communes in various localities." Before and after the Chengchow meeting, Peng Te-huai, a politburo member and defence minister, went to Hunan to inspect the rural conditions. He found policy deviations in the Great Leap Forward programmes, and at the eighth plenum of the eighth CCP congress held in July 1959 (the Lushan meeting), he spoke critically of the programmes and the wasteful practices of the people's communes. Peng's views were supported by Huang Ko-cheng, chief of the PLA general staff, Hung Hsueh-chih, director of the PLA logistics department, and Chou Hsiao-chou, first secretary of Hunan. In thus supporting Peng they sought to avoid what could lead to great economic dislocation throughout the country.° Mao was furious, and confronted his critics. He relieved Peng and others of their posts, and assigned Chang Ping-hua to Hunan to replace Chou Hsiao-chou." This provided Hua with the chance of promotion. Hun promoted after the Lushan meeting. Hua supported Mao's agricultural co-operation programme. He was aware that transformation of the higher agricultural producer co-operatives into people's communes could significantly improve his promotion prospects. He visited Mao's native Hsiangtan, and may have promoted the establishment of rural communes in that area; this pleased Mao who, after the Lushan meeting, recommended that ;Hua be appointed 'secretary of jthe Hunan provincial CCP Committee's secretariat." The reorganisation of Hunan's CCP Committee was completed under the direction of Chang Ping-hua. A veteran of the eighth route army, Chang formerly headed the political department of the Shansi-Suiyuan military district." As Hua's superior, he gradually became close to him in overseeing party affairs in Hunan. Not until the summer of 1964 did Hua advance to the fourth or fifth place in the Provincial CCP Committee and become the most junior vice-governor in Hunan's administrative structure." He became second vice-governor in the autumn of 1964.74 Since Hunan's governor and first vice-governor were not CCP members, Hua was now in firm control of the provincial government.

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Chairman Hun

(ii) In charge of finance and trade Hua has often been described by Western observers as an "agricultural expert". Before assuming Hunan's top CCP post, he had been in charge of finance and trade programmes for several years; according to an article released by the finance and trade office of the Hunan provincial Revolutionary Committee, he had done so for as much as seven years in all,75 from 1958 to 1961 and again from 1964 to 1966. The introduction of the people's communes in 1958 posed great problems for the finance and trade sectors, disrupting in particular the procurement and supply of grain and subsidiary farm products between town and country. This serious dislocation greatly affected the national income, the circulation of commodities and the source of export goods." Hua took charge of finance and trade from May 1958, primarily with the intention of co-ordinating with the promotion of communes and industrialisation in Hunan. In early 1959, he became responsible for a group in support of farm production,77 and soon afterwards was named as deputy head of a committee for promoting increased production and thrift." These posts, which Hua assumed in a concurrent capacity, were related to the co-ordination of efforts to support farm and factory production and obtain funds and materials needed in production. Even so, Hua's authority and responsibilities did not extend to actual agricultural management and production." Apart from convening many finance and trade conferences at provincial and prefectural levels, Hua also went to Peking to attend finance and trade conferences at the central level." He presided at or attended financial and procurement work conferences in Hunan in 1959, at which he made important speeches to implement the resolutions adopted at central-level finance and trade conferences." Hua presided at a cadre conference on finance and trade in Hunan in the spring of 196o to transmit the resolutions of the finance and trade conferences sponsored by the secretaries of CCP provincial committees.82 At another important meeting, he made a report on strengthening grain production work in the rural areas." He was transferred to Hsiangtan in 1961, and returned to the Hunan provincial CCP Committee in the second half of 1964 to take charge of finance and trade programmes. He reported on grain work at the provincial National Party Congress." Tackling financial and commercial problems.

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Conducting investigations at grassroots level under Li Hsien-nieu. As finance and trade secretary in the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, Hua was under Li Hsien-nicn. This forged a close relationship between the two in conducting finance and trade work. Li, a politburo member and finance minister, assumed overall charge of finance and trade programmes; therefore he was in a far better position to 'appreciate Hua's administrative capacity than the capacity of, respectively, Hsu Hsiangchien or Yeh Chien-ying.85 When Hua was in charge of Hunan's finance and trade programme, the operations of financial institutions in that province were chaotic. Famine struck in Hunan during 1959-61 when the supply of consumer goods was scarce, although the situation there was no worse than that in Kansu, Anhwei and Kwangtung. In coping with shortages and arranging for loans from the banks, Hua handled problems realistically and energetically. He paid particular attention to conducting investigations among grassroots units in order to find out how the policies had been implemented and the difficulties had been encountered.86 These efforts of his contributed to his firm grasp of all aspects of finance and trade operations in Hunan Province. The experience he gained in Hunan proved immensely valuable to him in his later association with economic planning at the State Council. (iii) Returning to Hsingtan The collapse of the Great Leap Forward programme in the autumn of 196o and the serious attendant economic difficulties forced the CCP to abandon Mao's "three red banners". At the ninth plenum of the eighth CCP Congress held in January 1961, a revised programme for "adjusting, consolidating, filling out and improving" the national economic plan was announced. This relegated Mao's position to the second line,87 while Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping took over the consolidation work and drastically cut back the national economic plans. The "Sixty articles governing the work of the People's Commune" (revised draft) was promulgated in June the same year. The peasants were allowed to cultivate their small private plots and engage in peripheral occupations such as livestock breeding to tide over the lean years. Consolidating the rural communes. The CCP's rural programmes during this period were beset with mounting difficulties. Hua was named

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Chairman Him

secretary of the Hsiangtan CCP prefectural Committee in a concurrent capacity and was transferred from Changsha to assume his new post." Hua returned to Hsiangtan probably in early 1961 and assumed two party posts which lie held until 1965. A memoir written by one of his correspondents states that he moved to Hsiangtan with his whole family including four children, and lived in a small house with three rooms, where in his spare time lie grew vegetables in the front and the backyard until he was reassigned to the CCP Provincial Committee in 1964.89 Hua was one of the few leading provincial-level cadres assigned to the lower level during the 196os. This "sending down" programme was a bid to find a way of coping with the chaotic problems of farm production and famine and of providing leadership for the reorganisation of the people's communes. He had been sent to Hsiangtan because of his knowledge of conditions there; with this knowledge, he could be counted on to solve problems caused by the collapse of Mao's Great Leap Forward programmes. On. the other hand, he was a leading cadre at the provincial level, and sending him down to Hsiangtan could have been a test. In the shifting scene of Chinese politics, the collapse—much to Mao's displeasure—of the Great Leap Forward programme resulted in the shift to the left of the CCP's policy in 1963, following the holding of the tenth plenum of the eighth CCP congress in September 1962. At that meeting, Mao called for "class struggle", and this signalled the start in the following year of the socialist education movement in the rural areas. The three years during which Hua was in Hsiangtan marked many twists and turns in CCP policy—from left to right and then back again from right to left. Coping with this shifting political situation called for tact and adaptability, and Hua appeared to excel in both qualities. On his return to Hsiangtan, he had discussions with county-level CCP secretaries on correcting the deviations of Mao's Great Leap Forward programmes, which had plunged production in the rural areas of Hunan into chaos." It appears that he had some success in stabilising the situation in this sector. As an advocate of Mao's "people's commune" concept, Hua did not approve of measures that ran counter to the commune's ownership system, such as "fixing production quotas on the household basis", which was implemented experimentally in some areas before the tenth plenum of the eighth CCP congress. This measure appears to have impressed Tao Chu, first secretary of the CCP Central-South bureau,

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on the grounds that implementing this programme could alleviate rural economic problems." Hua, however, thought differently; he proposed to the Hunan CCP Committee that measures should be implemented that would strengthen the control of CCP branches over the production teams, and thus the collective economy of the communes could be advanced with the participation of the production teams.92 Hua played a significant role in promoting the socialist education movement in the rural areas after the close of the tenth plenum of the eighth CCP congress, particularly in the Hsiangtan area. Returning to Hunan CCP Committee with greater powers. Hua was transferred back to Changsha in the summer or autumn of 1964 with his status enhanced and his powers extended to finance and trade, industry, agriculture, education, culture and propaganda." He was in charge of theatre work in Hunan from 1964 to 1966,94 and was thus responsible for directing the revolution in that field and for promoting operas on contemporary revolutionary themes. An upsurge in the staging of such operas followed his banning, under Chiang Ching's instructions, of traditional repertoires in the province.° He was also responsible for promoting the study of Mao's works among writers and artists. So prominent a role did he play in this programme that Hunan was considered to have distinguished itself in popularising the study of Mao's writings." 3.

The Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution engulfed every Chinese province in the second half of 1966. Like CCP structures in the rest of the country, the Hunan provincial CCP Committee was closed down and its leading members, first secretary Chang Ping-hua and second secretaries Wang Yen-chun and Hua Kuo-feng, were stripped of their powers in early 1967. Both the offices of the Hunan CCP Committee and the provincial government were taken over by PLA Unit 69o0, formerly the 47th army of Lin Piao's fourth field army. This crack unit was commanded by Li Yuan, a close follower of Lin Piao. (i) Setting up Hunan's revolutionary committee In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's wife Chiang Ching" co-operated closely with Lin Piao in seizing Hunan's political and administrative structures. In doing so, they often clashed with

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Chairman Hua

Chou En-lai. A preparatory group was formed in the summer of 1967 to inaugurate the Hunan provincial revolutionary committee, comprising the PLA, the rebels and "leading revolutionary cadres", the latter in turn comprising rehabilitated CCP veterans. Chou En-lai was responsible for reinstating vereran cadres who had been toppled during the turmoil of the political upheaval in the Central-South region. He recommended that Hua should be one of the leading members of the preparatory group98 to assist Li Yuan," a PLA veteran and head of the group favoured by Lin Piao and Chiang Ching. Both Hua and Chang Po-sen were selected as members of the preparatory group on account of their experience in running Hunan's CCP committee. Since the rehabilitation of CCP veterans such as Chang Ping-hua and Wang Yen-chun would complicate problems in the new administrative structure, dominated by radical forces, that had been formed in Hunan, the selection of Hua and Chang for the administrative jobs would facilitate the operation of the provincial government and hold in check the radical forces led by Lin Piao. Hua's participation in the preparatory group conceivably incurred the displeasure of Lin Piao and Chiang Ching, but Mao appeared to take a wait-and-see attitude, as was clear when he paid a visit to Changsha in the fall of 1967. In his meeting with Li Yuan, Hua and Chang, who were responsible for directing Hunan's affairs under the "three-in-one combination" principle which he had conceived, Mao gave many instructions regarding the conduct of the Cultural Revolution in his native province.19° He questioned Hua concerning Hsiangtan.lu Hunan was placed under military control after the setting up of the preparatory group of the Hunan provincial revolutionary committee; the real power was exercised by Li Yuan and Hunan's military district commander, Lung Shih-chin, a close colleague of Lin Piao. The PLA's control of the central Chinese province of Hunan, however, produced little effect of stabilisation on the chaotic situation in the province, with the feuding factions—Red Guards and rebel workers—locked in. fierce armed clashes. The proclamation entitled "Whither China?" by a radical group which called itself the "league of proletarians in Hunan province" attracted considerable attention among young intellectuals throughout the country. This radical proclamation attacked Hua and Chang by name, calling them the "red capitalist class", and urging the rebels to "use violent means to topple the new bureaucratic class" and "completely smash the old state apparatus".102 The League, a revolutionary

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organisation, aimed at depriving the privileged class of bureaucrats of their domination of society. While the bureaucrats were considered to be a target of the Cultural Revolution in general, the League was not affiliated to the Lin Piao and Chiang Ching group; its dissatisfaction with Hua playing a prominent role in Hunan was, however, not inconsistent with the wishes of the Lin-Chiang faction. (ii)

Dispute over the composition of the Revolutionary Committee

The Hunan provincial revolutionary committee was formed in April 1968 when factional strife was at its height. Before its formation, Hua as a member of its preparatory group was sent to Peking to report to the central authorities on the composition of the new revolutionary committee. A meeting was held on 3o March to examine his report, attended by Chou En-lai and leading members of the radical Cultural Revolution group including Chen Pota, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan. At this top-level meeting, there were heated exchanges over the composition of the new revolutionary committee for Hunan. Chiang Ching was in favour of nominating Lin Piao's two sworn followers, Li Yuan and Lung Shu-chin, to head it ;I° she did this in order to block Hua from getting into the revolutionary committee's leading group. But Chou En-lai disagreed, maintaining that CCP veterans like Hua and Chang should be included in Hunan's new administrative structure. This infuriated Chiang Ching, frustrated by her own lack of effective authority in the question of appointments. She exclaimed angrily: "In your eyes there is no revolutionary leadership, only conservative leadership".104 The final composition of the Hunan provincial revolutionary committee, approved by Mao, included Li Yuan as chairman and Lung Shu-chin as first and Hua and Chang as vice-chairmen.'05 (iii)

Hua as Hunan's top leader

The two PLA veterans, Li Yuan and Lung Shu-chin, had the backing of Chiang Ching and Lin Piao, although neither had had any previous administrative experience. Hua was subordinate to them; however, with his election to the CCP Central Committee in April 1969, the political situation in Hunan gradually changed in his favour. He became acting chairman of the revolutionary committee in the fall of 1970, and was made first secretary of the newly-formed Hunan provincial CCP Committee in the winter of that year.'" Thus Hua assumed the top

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posts in Hunan after both Li Yuan and Lung Shu-chin were transferred away from the province. Beforc his downfall, Lin Piao curbed Hua's power over the provincial military district by naming Pu Chan-ya as Hunan's first political commissar, a post normally assumed by the first secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee in a concurrent capacity. Pu was relieved of this post only in 1972.107 As first secretary, Hua became second political commissar of the Canton military region, which exercises jurisdiction over the three provincial military districts in Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan."8 This abnormal situation reflected Lin Piao's considerable influence in Hunan. (iv) Prior knowledge of Lin Piao's purge In August 1971, Mao inspected a number of troublesome provinces. He did this to curb Lin Piao's expanding influence and to prepare the way for removing him when the time was ripe. When he was in Hupeh, he sent for Hua and instructed him in ways to deal with Lin Piao,"° such as calling on various localities to sing the two "revolutionary songs"—the Internationale and Three Major Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. The implied message was to obey the CCP's centralised command and to topple Lin Piao. Hua understood Mao's intentions with regard to Lin Piao. Shortly after his return to Hunan, the provincial CCP Committee issued a circular calling upon the populace to sing the two "revolutionary songs".1" Six days later, Lin Piao allegedly crashed to his death in an aeroplane while fleeing to the Soviet Union. Before the Lin Piao affair, Hua was assigned to the CCP Central Committee. After Lin's downfall, he remained in Peking until October 1972, when he returned to Hunan to direct the task of wiping out the last of Lin's supporters.tm Pu Chan-ya, Lin's number-one lieutenant installed in Hunan,112 was removed from his posts. Hua then returned to Peking to submit to Mao a report which, with Mao's approval, was released by the CCP Central Committee for circulation to provincial CCP Committees.'" Hua had reached a new high-point in his career. 4. Hua's accomplishments in Hunan Hua was associated with the Hunan provincial CCP Committee and the provincial government for fifteen years. Before 1965, he was chiefly responsible for finance and trade as well as cultural and education

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programmes. After 1965, he was mainly preoccupied with farm work. He was credited with having supervised the completion of the big Shaoshan irrigation project. This achievement made him well-known throughout the country. (i) The Shaoshan irrigation project In 1965 Hua proposed extending an old dam project, which had been abandoned in 1959, to Mao's native Shaoshan. The proposed plan. was accepted by the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, and construction of the enlarged irrigation project was begun on 1 July 1965.114 Commander-in-chief of the project. Hua directed the Shaoshan irrigation project in his capacity of secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee and secretary of the Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee."8 He was commander-in-chief and political commissar, and in this capacity he mobilised ioo,000 civilian workers for compulsory labour imposed under the commune system.'" Since the militaryrelated irrigation project called for intensive labour, the life of the labour force was particularly tough."? Because of the magnitude of the project, construction of a reservoir alone would absorb most of the farmland of some sixty-one production teams in two counties. To reduce encroachment on farmland to the minimum, Hua consulted the technical personnel of the project, and as a result of meticulous planning, the acreage absorbed was reduced by 55 per cent, while migration of the villagers and dismantling of dwellings were cut down by as much as 65 per cent. Hua made remarkably successful use of the experience he had gained in conducting political work in the army to expedite the progress of the project, the whole of which was completed in June 1966. The 240 km.-long main canal and the subsidiary canal, which was more than 2,50o km. in length, passed across six counties.118 By 1976 the irrigated area had reached 950,0o0 moil of farmland?" The completion in only one year of the huge multi-purpose water conservation project set an example for undertaking similar projects elsewhere, and it greatly boosted Hua's political prestige. Since the site of the dam project was in Mao's native Shaoshan, Mao was particularly impressed by Hua's capacity for work. Ouyang Hai irrigation project. After completing the Shaoshan project, Hua supervised another irrigation project in Hengyang in southern

Chairman Hun Hunan. The project was named after Ouyang Hai, a soldier who was given posthumous honour as a hero. It was begun in October 1966 and completed in July 1970. Hua was then Secretary of the Engineering Bureau's CCP Committee and director of the project.12° Its progress was affected by the armed clashes between rival factions during the Cultural Revolution. Through Hua's efforts, four main canals and a 1,600-km. subsidiary canal were completed, extending irrigated farmland to over 700,000 niou.121 The completion of the two projects had given Hua valuable experience, especially in directing farmland construction and in mobilising manpower. (ii) Building models Hua distinguished himself politically in Hunan through his efforts to conduct investigations in the rural areas, and to foster models of farm production, particularly those of "learning from Tachai in agriculture". Models of "Learning from Tachai in Agriculture". When Hua headed the Hsiangtan prefectural CCP Committee in a concurrent capacity, he was often preoccupied with conducting rural surveys. He stayed at selected spots in the rural areas in 1962 to solve problems which were besetting CCP organisations at the grassroots leve1.122 He later lived in Shaoshan for some time,123 during which he implemented Mao's directive on the need to strengthen class struggle. When he was in. northern Hunan, Hua was responsible for promoting a model of the district of Maotien. He was there four times from 1963 onward to conduct investigations and to guide rural communes in the building of irrigation. projects. In developing the collective economy of the communes and in stepping up the struggle against the old landlords and rich peasants, he played a leading role. He contributed an article to New Hunan Daily about popularising Maotien's experience in consolidating and developing the collective economy.124 Mao Tse-tung launched the "learn from Tachai in agriculture" movement in 1964.125 The Hunan provincial CCP Committee endorsed Hua's recommendation and made Maotien the first "red banner" in the campaign to "learn from Tachai" in Hunan.126 Hua later spared no efforts to extend the "learn from Tachai" movement by creating more models in Chante and other counties.127 Models of multi-level scientific experiments. Hua is credited with having conceived the idea of setting up in Huayung county a web of small-

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sized scientific experimentation units with the participation of countylevel scientific research organisations, communes, production brigades and production teams. These multi-level webs were aimed at promoting and improving farming. Huayung county's experience in promoting scientific farming, begun in 1970, was cited by Hua at a provincial conference on scientific and technical work. The method of scientific farming used there was later popularised in various localities outside Hunan, especially in 1973 and 1974.128 Another model, this time of commerce supporting agriculture, was also begun in Huayung in 1964, and was extensively promoted in 1972 through Hua's efforts. It became publicised as a "red banner" in the finance and trade systems for the significant contributions which it made towards supporting agriculture by a commune-run supply and marketing co-operative in the county.12° During the Cultural Revolution, Hua contributed significantly towards rebuilding county-level CCP Committees that had been disbanded by the militant rebels. He did this with particular success in Shangte by experimenting at selected places before introducing and applying the experience to a larger area.13° Hua also paid attention to assimilating the experiences gained by provinces outside Hunan. He accompanied Li Jui-shan, secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, to Kwangtung in October 1963 to study rural work in that province. After his return to Changsha, he submitted a report on Kwangtung's agricultural production to the CCP Central Committee. Mao was pleased with the report and commented on it. His instructions were transmitted to the provincial CCP Committees. This was another boost to Hua's role in increasing farm output, which has been the keystone of rural policies formulated by Mao.131 Building Mao's display hall in Shaoshan. To please Mao, Hua spared no efforts in Mao's native Shaoshan to project his pre-eminent image. The Hunan CCP committee decided in 1964 to erect a hall and other structures near Mao's former residence and office in Shaoshan. Hua planned and directed the different phases of contruction and renovation, begun in 1969, until the whole project—which preserved its fine surroundings—was completed. The impressive display hall housed fourteen separate sections, and covered an area of nearly 5,000 square metres, and it drew nearly 20 million visitors from 1965 to 1976. In 1967 a railway linking Shaoshan and Changsha was built under Hua's supervision. It facilitated the flow of passenger traffic to Shaoshan, and

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further flattered Mao's obsession with personality cult. To impress visitors, Hua went to great lengths to make Shaoshan attractive to the whole country, and not merely limit its appeal to Hunan province. Hua was the prime motive force behind the drive to build plants for manufacturing television sets, farm machines, cotton textiles and chemical fertilisers in Shaoshan, despite its industrially backward features. Yet another plant was built in Shaoshan in 1968 to produce Mao badges by the hundreds of millions; this plant was later extended to cover an area of over 12,000 square metres. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Hua suggested the restoration of the Hunan No. 1 normal school, which Mao had attended in his youth. He also recommended that the tomb of Mao's former wife, Yang Kai-hui, be rebuilt and that Hsiangtan be renamed Shaoshan and placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Hunan CCP Committee. Hua's recommendations were all accepted by the Hunan Committee.132 Transforming Shaoshan into a piece of "sacred land" of the Chinese revolution, along with the "sacred land" of Yenan, was part and parcel of Hua's scheme to exalt Mao's image. Erecting a large number of expensive public buildings in Shaoshan was supposedly carried out by the Hunan CCP Committee under cover of "strengthening education in revolutionary traditions", but it was Hua who was to benefit from these moves calculated to glorify Mao as the founder and supreme leader of the People's Republic of China.

S THE PEKING PERIOD, 1971-1978 Peking, the political and cultural centre of China, has a history of 3,000 years, and from the twelfth century it was the capital and court of feudal emperors from the Chin to the Ching dynasties. As the site of the palace museum, it still symbolises the imperial power of past ages. To the west of Tienanmen and the Forbidden City lies Chungnanhai. Set in its own beautiful surroundings, this has now become a restricted area inaccessible to people other than high-ranking officials and the CCP functionaries who live and work there. It has thus replaced the Forbidden City as the seat and nerve-centre of political power. Since the Cultural Revolution of mid-1966 subsided, Peking's political scene has been dominated by the shifts in the leadership struggle: many CCP veterans have been purged and stripped of their power, while many others have emerged to wield power and decide the destiny of China's 800 million people. In 1971 Hua Kuo-feng came as a newcomer to Chungnanhai. This was the beginning of his Peking period, which has continued up to the present. During his residence in Peking, the Red Guards dropped out of sight, but the leadership struggle at the top level ofthe CCP hierarchy became ever more intense. The period from 1970 to the autumn of 1973 saw the first stage in the top-level political conflicts between rival groupings seeking positions of advantage in the 197os. At this stage Mao Tse-tung removed his chosen successor, Lin Piao, and his political secretary, Chen Po-ta—the two figures who had dominated the tumultuous scenes in the great political upheaval that had engulfed every Chinese province up till 1968. After the tenth CCP congress was held in August 1973, Mao launched a campaign to criticise Confucius—which was exploited by Maoist 73

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radicals to launch an oblique attack on Chou En-lai and his supporters. This marked the second stage. It was followed by the third stage, beginning in October 1976, which saw the collapse of the "Gang of Four" championed by Mao, and the return to power ofTeng Hsiao-ping and a large number of the victims of the Cultural Revolution. At this stage, Hua was not in a position to stand apart from the leadership struggle within the CCP hierarchy. At the outset, he was rather inconspicuous as a responsible member of the State Council, but later he appears to have played a far more important role. It was he who handled the investigations into the Lin Piao case and was involved too in the movement to criticise Confucius. The bitter struggle between the hostile political factions led to Hua assuming greater power: in the words of an old Chinese proverb, "when a snipe and a mussel grapple with each other, the fisherman takes both."

1. Person responsible for handling Lin Piao's case The CCP has never publicly released the exact date when Hua was transferred to Peking, nor the very first post he filled. According to available material, he was still in Hunan in the spring of 1971, carrying out investigations into the political climate in Shaoshan. In February, as first secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, he watched a paratroop exercise mounted by a "scouting team behind the enemy lines" in Hunan.2 During the nine months after February 1971, he was still publicly active in Changsha, capital of Hunan province, while devoting the rest of his time to Peking. The national news media reported his activities in Peking in September that year. February 1971 was the date when Hua began his work for the central authorities. During these first years in Peking, his official titles included first secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee, acting chairman of the Hunan provincial revolutionary committee, commissar of the Canton military region3 and first commissar of the Hunan provincial military district.4 (i) Special panel for handling Chen Po-ta's case According to an article written by Chang Ping-hua, currently director of the CCP Central Committee's propaganda department, "At the

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second plenum of the ninth CCP congress held in Lushan. in 1970, the attempted coup plotted by the Lin Piao anti-Party clique was smashed, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung personally transferred Comrade Hua Kuo-feng to the CCP Central Committee to work there in the concurrent capacity of first secretary of the Hunan provincial CCP Committee." The article continued: "Chairman Mao came to Hunan in. the summer of 1971 to stress the importance of the tenth line struggle. He personally revived the singing of the revolutionary songs, the Internationale and Three Major Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. Comrade Hua followed Chairman Mao's instructions and asked the Hunan provincial Committee to implement them without any delay. The provincial Committee instructed its subordinate units to begin singing the two revolutionary songs, with attention to comprehending the meaning of the songs."5 The second Lushan meeting. The transfer of Hua Kuo-feng to the central establishment had little direct bearing on the removal of both Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. However, he may have been involved in some sort of work connected with the affair. The so-called tenth line struggle meant that both Lin Piao and his trusted colleague, Chen Po-ta, were to be purged on orders from Mao and the CCP Central Committee. The second plenum of the ninth CCP congress was held in August 1970 in Lushan (also called the second Lushan meeting), to discuss amendment of the constitution. Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta proposed that the post of head of state be created, and that Lin Piao be then appointed to fill it. This went against Mao Tse-tung's express desire "not to set up the post of head of state",6 and he vetoed it, thereby defying the so-called "counter-revolutionary" coup of Lin Piao and his supporters. A coup was thus aborted. At the second Lushan meeting, before Mao Tse-tung spoke, there were few Central Committee members who were against setting up the post of head of state. But Hua Kuo-feng was strongly opposed to the idea—and consequently made a great impression on Mao.? At the Lushan meeting, Mao's instruction that Chen Po-ta be criticised indicated that Lin Piao was to be protected. The matter appeared to implicate large numbers of people and officials, although there was widespread feeling that any purge should not be too severe. In Decem-

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ber 1970, Mao Tse-tung summoned an enlarged session of the CCP politburo (also known as the North China meeting) to criticise the supporters of Lin Piao, and showed his dissatisfaction with the prevailing tendency towards clemency. In April 1971, the Central Committee called a meeting to "criticise Chen Po-ta". Since ninety-nine high-ranking officials and representatives of the central and local cadres attended, it was called the "ninetynine-man meeting". At this meeting the criticism of Huang Yung-sheng, chief of staff of the PLA, and six other supporters of Lin Piao was discussed .° The summary report was prepared by Chou En-lai. Mao Tse-tung, however, was still not satisfied and insisted on expanding the purge.° By the time that "ninety-nine-man meeting" was in session, the Chinese media had already begun to hint that Chen Po-ta would be purged," and after the meeting there was a great increase in articles criticising him. Participating in the purge of Chen Po-ta. Hua Kuo-feng took part in the "ninety-nine-man meeting", and it was rumoured that he stayed in Peking after the meeting to perform some unspecified task in the special panel of the CCP Central Committee to handle the Chen Po-ta affair." However lie did not play a key role. This special panel, according to normal custom, is controlled by the standing committee of the politburo. Since the investigation and handling of special cases is a confidential matter, Communist China's news media did not reveal the activities of Hua Kuo-feng. Before the Cultural Revolution, Chen Po-ta was a member of the CCP Central Committee's politburo, and the chief editor of the journal Red Flag, and thus he was able to win the confidence of Mao Tse-tung. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, he took up the post of head of the central Cultural Revolution group. He and Chiang Ching, first deputy head, worked together to implement Mao Tsetung's plan to seize power. In April 1969, he became one of the five most senior standing committee members of the politburo. According to Chou En-lai's report at the tenth CCP congress, Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao drafted the political report to suggest that the main task after the ninth CCP congress would be the development of production and to "oppose the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat".12 This disagreement over economic policies

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was over-stated and by no means the most important factor in the downfall of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. (ii) Participating in the investigation of the Lin Piao group Lin Piao and his confidants were not purged immediately after the second plenum of the ninth CCP congress; they still kept their ranks and posts, and remained active. In March 1971 they drafted the construction memorandum" to plot a coup. On 8 September their plot to assassinate Mao Tse-tung, if it existed at all, failed; on 13 September, together with his wife and son, Lin Piao escaped in an aeroplane, apparently heading for the Soviet Union. The aeroplane crashed in Outer Mongolia and no one survived i3 "571

Reasons for purging Lin Piao. Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta had always supported the extreme left line of the Cultural Revolution. The most significant causes for their purge were not the discrepancies of political lines or economic policies, but the conflict of political power. It was with the support of Lin Piao and his military confidants that Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching launched the Cultural Revolution. Since both Lin Piao and Chiang Ching had had the common wish to seize power and dominate the CCP Central Committee, they cooperated very closely. When their common enemies, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen and Teng Hsiao-ping were toppled from power, Lin Piao's position was greatly enhanced. Being very ambitious, he encouraged his confidants and loyal subordinates to gain control of both the party and the military. Among the twenty-five politburo members, there were Lin Piao's wife, Yeh Chun, and the "Four Great King Kongs" in Lin Piao's army." Over 8o per cent of those in positions of responsibility in the central military affairs committee and department of the chief of staff were Lin Piao's former subordinates. The general logistics commander, the air force commander, the first-commissar of the navy, several naval deputy commanders, and the Peking garrison commander were all loyal friends. Such a set-up threatened the power and interests of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching, and obstructed Mao Tse-tung's plan to cultivate Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao as his successors. In order to prevent Lin Piao and his group from replacing Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-Chiao, Mao had no choice but to hasten his inevitable purge.

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Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution with the primary aim of overthrowing the leadership of the Party Committee and the administrative organisations. To do this he had to make use of the Red Guards and the military; but as a result of the military's participation in politics, its authority and influence became over inflated. It threatened the system of centralisation by which the military was controlled by the Party. Mao was afraid of having created the phenomena of "Napoleonism" and regionalism dominated by the military and thus wanted to weaken the political power of the professional military's by purging Lin Piao.16 Mao had another motive for purging Lin. Piao. The Cultural Revolution had been carried too far, and had attacked the old cadres and the intellectuals on a wide front. As a result, grievances were sown deeply. Mao wanted to use Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta as scapegoats in order to relieve Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao of any responsibility for these excesses and to pave the way for them to be his successors. In charge of the office of the Special Case Panel. After the Lin Piao incident, Mao ordered the creation of the "Lin Piao special case investigation panel". This was composed of six members: Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Chen Hsi-lien, Li Teh-sheng; Chi Teng-kuei and Wang Tung-hsing. Material concerning the Lin Piao incident, submitted from places all over the country, was to be handled by Li Te-sheng and Chi Teng-kuei.17 The six panel members were all members of the politburo. Although not a member of the politburo, it appears that Hua participated in the work carried out by the special case investigation panel after Lin's downfall in September 1971.18 Judging from Chang Ping-hua's remarks in Red Flag" and Hua's knowledge of Lin Piao's purge,2° this is highly probable, although it has not yet been verified. In October 1972, at Mao Tse-tung's suggestion, Hua returned to Hunan to investigate the major confidants of the Lin Piao group in Hunan, and on his return to Peking, Mao praised him warmly.21 This is another indication that he had participated in the special case investigation panel, and indeed, had he not been involved in the handling of the Lin Piao case and performed with credit, he would not have been named for the post of minister for public security, as was shortly to happen.

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Roles in the State Council

After the Lin Piao incident, Chou En-lai was in charge not only of the work of the CCP Central Committee,22 but at the same time, of the Lin Piao case,23 and he was directing the activities of the Lin Piao special case panel. Yeh Chien-ying, one of Chou's chief supporters, replaced Lin Piao and took charge of the day-to-day work of the military affairs committee in the CCPCC.24 (i) Vice-Premier or Secretary-General? When Hua Kuo-feng was transferred to Peking, he worked directly under Chou En-lai's leadership. Recollecting his audience with Hua Kuo-feng in Peking, the deputy commissar of the Hsiang-tang military sub-region of Hunan province, Chang Chou-chao, said: "In September 1972, my three comrades and I came to Peking to report to Chairman Hua on the work of the cadres in Hunan province. By the time he had heard the report and given instructions, it was already late at night, about i o'clock in the morning. At this moment, a secretary sent in a thick pile of documents. I said, 'It is already late, it is time to rest I' Chairman Hua said smilingly: 'These documents have to be sent to Premier Chou for examination, and before they are sent to him, I have to know what they are and be able to make comments.' "25 Worle in agriculture and forestry. When Communist China's newspapers and magazines mentioned Hua Kuo-feng's activities in the early 1970s, Hua was often reported to be carrying out his duties on the instructions of Chou En-lai. This is worth noting. Besides his work with the Lin Piao special case investigation panel, Hua's duty was to assist Chou En-lai in the daily transactions of the State Council. In 1971 and 1972 the national conferences on, respectively, agricultural mechanisation; forestry works; acquatic production works, and on the science and technology of agriculture and forestry, were called by the State Council. Hua Kuo-feng either chaired these conferences or delivered policy statements to them." In 1972, he also approved the holding of the national handicraft and arts exhibition.27 At the national conference on the qualities and quantities of the products of light industry, he gave an important report on the instructions of Chou En-lai.23 He also took part in receiving foreign visitors in the fields of agriculture and forestry. When he first joined the State Council, Hua Kuo-feng's work was mainly in the field of agriculture and forestry, although some of his

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Chairman Hua

time was given to light industry. In 1971, when the State Council called two conferences on forestry and aquatic products, Hua personally examined the reports submitted to the Central Committee." However, owing to the confusion of the appointment system of the cadres at that time, his formal title was never announced. In 1971 and 1972, when Hua Kuo-feng participated in public functions, in Peking, his name was listed after those of the politburo members and the vice-president of the NPC, but before those of foreign minister Chi Peng-fei, the minister for external liaison of the CCPCC Keng Piao, and the head of the Peking revolutionary committee Wu Te. Judging from the general practice of the listing of senior cadres, his position in the State Council was higher than that of a minister and close to that of a secretary-general or vice-premier. Otherwise, he would not have had the authority to examine and make decisions concerning the reports of the State Council to the CCPCC. Because of the Cultural Revolution, most of the leading cadres in the State Council had been stripped of their duties. Of the more than ten vice-premiers appointed before the Cultural Revolution, only Li Hsien-nein and Nieh Jung-then were still active in the early 1970s, while the rest had either been toppled from power, or were ill in hospital, or had died. Among others, the secretary-general of the State Council, Chou Jung-hsin, had been purged. When Chou En-lai was suffering from cancer, and there was a great shortage of manpower in the State Council, the fact that Hua Kuo-feng had the power of a secretary-general or a vice-premier is not at all surprising: during the Cultural Revolution, the appointments in the Chinese Communist hierarchy were very abnormal and confused. It was common practice for someone to be appointed to a certain post without an official announcement. Formally, appointment to the post of a secretarygeneral or vice-premier had to be passed by the NPC; since the fifth NPC had not been convened, the Chinese Communists were reluctant to announce in public the positions that Hua Kuo-feng now held.

A position higher than that of a minister.

(ii) Position elevated after Tenth Party Congress In August 1973, the tenth Party congress and the first plenum of the tenth congress met. Hua Kuo-feng was promoted to membership of the politburo and took part in the decision-making of the CCPCC. He continued to work in the State Council as vice-premier. An article

5. The Peking Period, 1971-1978 which appeared in the Peking Man exhibition hall read as follows: "On 6 August 1974 . . . as vice-premier in the State Council in charge of the works on the science and technology fronts, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng came to investigate the relics of Peking Man."3° In August 1974, the NPC did not meet and the reorganisation of the State Council was not announced. But this statement showed that Hua Kuo-feng had by that time actually acquired the post of vice-premier. Minister of Public Security. Since 1973, Hua Kuo-feng not only was in charge of the science and technology system in the State Council but also had the authority to inquire into the affairs of agriculture and forestry. At the same time, he had to meet foreign journalists and cultural delegations and was still in charge of the athletics committee of the State Council S1 Hence the role lie played was similar to that of a standing vice-premier before the Cultural Revolution. In January 1975, Communist China summoned the first meeting of the fifth NPC to reorganise the State Council. Hua Kuo-feng was formally appointed vice-premier of the State Council and concurrently minister of public security; he ranked sixth among the vice-premiers appointed at that time.32 Chou En-lai was the premier, but was seriously ill and undergoing treatment. The State Council and CCPCC were now in the charge of Teng Hsiao-ping,33 who had been reinstated as vice-premier in April 1973. In January 1975 Teng was promoted to vice-chairman of the CCPCC and chief of staff of the PLA. At the fifth NPC, plans for the modernisation of four major sectors of the economy—agriculture, national defence, science and technology —were put forward. Following this, Teng Hsiao-ping made an all-out effort to reshape the Party and right the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution in order to create the conditions for the implementation of these "four modernisations". China at this time was in a difficult predicament: the political situation was unstable and confused, and thus security in society as a whole was threatened. Furthermore, the country was suffering from an acute shortage of skilled labour in the fields of science and technology. The situation both demanded the implementation of the "four modernisation" yet seriously impeded it, and here Hua Kuo-feng shouldered great responsibilities. In Communist countries the duties of a minister of public security are of the utmost importance. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, Beria played the central role on the political stage. When Hua Kuo-feng assumed this post, he began to restore social order in the cities and to

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revive the role and functions of the police. He assisted the department of railways in the State Council in establishing a railway alliance and defence system to deal with the extreme leftist element that were carrying out sabotage of the railway system, and in July 1975 he presided over the "conference on railway security works" 34 In charge of science and technology. On the one hand, Hua Kuo-feng was in charge of the government's "dictatorship" work; on the other hand, he consolidated his position in the science and technology field." Under Teng Hsiao-ping's direction, he was in charge of the Chinese Academy of Science." Modernisation of science is the foundation-stone of the "four modernisation". But the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had created a standstill in education, and the extreme leftist political line had seriously eroded study and research in scientific fields. Chiang Ching's group had discriminated against the intellectuals to excess, so preventing the advancement of plans for the development of science. After the fifth NPC, Tcng Hsiao-ping was responsible for supervising a complete reorganisation; Hua Kuo-feng was vice-premier in charge of science and technology; and Teng's confidant, Hu Yao-pang, took over the Academy of Science. These three pushed forward the reorganisation of science and technology. In August 1975 Hua summoned the relevant personnel for a symposium called "let a hundred schools contend"" to promote and propagate the study of science and technology. He was also involved in the preparation of a collective report on the work of the Academy of Science.38 The "Outlines of the Collective Report" was a document drafted by Hu Yao-pang in accordance with the ideas of Teng Hsiaoping. The draft was begun in July 1975 and revised in September." Teng and Hua both heard this collective report and made various amendments to it. This document shaped the reorganisation of science and technology and the direction of scientific study and research, and made new arrangements for the environment in which scientists would work. It thus contributed greatly to settling the confused situation which had developed in this field. 3. Conflict of the two groups after the Tenth Party Congress The downfall of the Lin Piao group was a turning point in Chinese politics. Because Mao Tse-tung desperately needed the support of

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Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and the administrative bureaucrats to wipe out the Lin Piao group, Chou, Yeh and the bureaucrats were given an opportunity to regain and enlarge their power and influence." Chou and Yeh respectively controlled the CCPCC and the supreme command of the armed forces—the military affairs committee of Central Committee. Under the arrangement of Chou En-lai, a large number of old cadres and military men purged by Mao, Lin and Chiang Ching were rehabilitatedfi and reinstated, among them Teng Hsiaoping, Chou En-lai's most trusted and foremost lieutenant. Originally a standing member of the politiburo, Teng occupied a very prominent position and wide influence. In the process of wiping out the remnants of the Lin Piao group, Chou, Teng and Yeh also expanded the power and influence of the bureaucrats and righted some of the mistakes which ,the extreme leftists had committed in the Cultural Revolution. At the same time they adopted a more flexible policy in order to deal with the many practical difficulties this had caused. Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching's despotic measures had aroused the antipathy of the cadres and the military. Since the extreme leftist line of the Cultural Revolution had entirely lost its appeal to the hearts of the populace, the bureaucrats were able to resurrect themselves on the political scene, putting heavy pressure on Mao and Chiang Ching. Mao Tse-tung's line in the Cultural Revolution, which was aimed at paving the way for his family to be his successors, thus met an obstruction. Therefore, he and Chiang Ching had to arrange for a counterattack so as to maintain the original line of the Cultural Revolution and sustain its "new strength" which they had cultivated. (i) A struggle of ideology The political struggle between the bureaucrats, headed by Chou, Teng, Yeh and Chu Teh, and the Group led by Chiang Ching was formally unveiled during the tenth Party congress in August 1973 and lasted until the downfall of the Chiang Ching group in October 1976. Before discussing the general conditions of the political battle between the two groups and their differences in policy and their power struggle, we should first consider the unique pattern of Communist China's political struggle, the control of and influence on public opinion exercised by the Chiang Ching group, and the pattern of the mass media's attack on political opponents. In an article entitled "The Cultural Revolution and China's search for political order", Byung-j o on

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Ahn has argued that the politics of Communist China is neither a rational struggle carried out under the condition of a balance of power, nor is it immune from ideological and policy conflicts. Therefore, to study Communist China's political development it is necessary to take account of three variables: ideology, policy and power.42 These three variables are also the elements that the present writer has stressed in his past studies of political struggle in Communist China. The three are interrelated and arc never isolated. The political struggle at the higher level of the Chinese Communists is almost inseparable from ideology. The most interesting aspect is that Mao Tse-tung had created a unique pattern of political struggle and mass movement: it begins with ideology, the sending out of the struggle signal; and then, from the debates among the various sectors in arts, education and thought, this expands to become a widespread and multifarious mass movement. The "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" in 1955 began with the purge of author Hu Feng and his group; the "anti-rightist movement" of 1957 began with the purge of the works of various authors and artists; the Cultural Revolution of the 196os had its catalyst in the historical play Hai Si►ui .13a Kuan (Hai Shui's dismissal from office) written by Wu Han. Although each of the political struggles inside the Party has its own special complications, the struggle inside the higher level that turns into public mass movement always has its origins in literature, the arts and education. This kind of pattern is perhaps influenced by Marx's Critique of Political Economics. In this famous work, Marx particularly emphasised that a change in the economic foundation is always accompanied by a change in the superstructure's ideology, including law, politics, religion, arts and philosophy.43 In September 1962, at the tenth plenum of the eighth Party congress, Mao Tse-tung said: "Isn't writing novels very popular now? It is a great invention to use writing novels to carry out anti-party activities. To overthrow a government, first of all, it is necessary to create public opinion, to make ideology, and to build the superstructure."'" In January 1967, in one of his instructions to the central cultural revolutionary group, he said again: "To make a revolution, it is necessary first of all to create public opinion".43 After the tenth Party congress, Mao launched his struggle against Chou En-lai and the bureaucrats". This too began in ideology. First, the "Restoration to the Court" in the sector of education was criticised, to be followed by "Criticism of Confucius", and vilification of the

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classic novel, The Water Margin; modern novels, dramas, and Western music were also on the list. Certainly, this campaign was directly related to the differences in ideology of the two parties, but it was also a conflict of policy and power. (ii) The major foothold of the Chiang Ching group After their efforts in promoting the Cultural Revolution in Liaoning province, the Chiang Ching group had established political footholds in that province and in Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin. They were in control of the ministries of culture, public health and the committee on physical culture and sports. They also had considerable influence in the ministries of education, public security, and metallurgy. Besides these party and government organisations, the Chiang Ching group had also infiltrated the military and, by means fair or foul, had won over some high-ranking generals. In different areas, the Chiang Ching group had also made use of the influence of the workers' unions and in many provinces and industrial cities, it established a foothold with the workers' militia in preparation for confronting the disobedient regular army." The predominant force of the Chiang Ching group in politics was the fact that it was promoted by Mao Tse-tung during the Cultural Revolution; it was portrayed as "the new life force" and the embodiment of Mao's revolutionary spirit. At the same time, it controlled the country's propaganda machine. The Party newspapers and magazines like People's Daily, Red Flag, Kwang Ming Daily, Studies of History, Studies and Criticism, Wen Wei Po, Chieh Fang Jill Pao (Liberation Daily), Liaoning Daily, and Liaoning University Journal had all become its mouthpieces, and consequently played very important roles in the political struggle after the tenth Party congress. The strength of Chou, Teng and Yeh and the bureaucrats and the popularity of their realistic policies were factors which Mao Tse-tung had to consider with caution. He could not afford to confront them directly or attempt to remove them from their positions, but rather had to make full use of the propaganda machine at his disposal to attack them indirectly and create a climate of opinion which would support him when the crucial moment arrived. Chiang Ching no longer needed the Red Guards; she now wanted to cultivate an "ideological revolution" of the masses and use the force of the masses to watch over the bureaucrats and ease them out of power. This kind of new "mass movement" was quite different from the Red Guards movement in the

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Cultural Revolution. The former put stress on activities with a view to seizing power, while the latter put stress on "the formation of public opinion". (iii) The pattern of attack by innuendos Before the Cultural Revolution, the leadership system of the Chinese Communist Party was on the road towards "institutionalisation". Communications between the upper and lower echelons depended mainly on formal documents passing through the organisations. The relationships of the leadership, both horizontal and vertical, supported this tendency.° After the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, the internal structure of Communist China was broken up and its Party committee system was severely shaken. The direct communication of views, however, posed great difficulties. Mao's order to purge Chou En-lai and the bureaucrats could not be given through the normal directives. In this situation the mass media, under the control of Chiang Ching, played an important role. From 1973 to 1976, however, the Chiang Ching group never attacked Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying by name. Even in the second purge of Teng Hsiao-ping he was only named after the Tienanmen Square incident in April 1976. Instead they used the method of indirect attack by innuendo. For instance, China's philosopher Confucius, and Sung Chiang, the chief character in The Water Margin, were used metaphorically to represent Chou En-lai in the "opinion offensive" of the Chiang Ching group (although sometimes they also used Confucius as a means of indicating Hua Kuo-feng)." Unable to attack Chou En-lai by name, the Chiang Ching group had more hurdles to clear in channelling its wishes to the masses. Thus, Chiang Ching had to stress the cultivation of "opinion leadership" and the "two-step communications" method to convey their political intentions. American communication specialists have analysed the role of "opinion leadership" in society. Paul L. Lazarsfield believed that opinion leaders formed the key links in the "two-step flow of information".49 In the political struggle against Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching cultivated a group of opinion leaders. Being close to Chiang, they could obtain instructions direct from her and knew both her political intentions and the essential points of every stage of attack. Then they used primary information in a round-about but well-reasoned way to create a fixed pattern of "attack by innuendo" to communicate the

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political intentions of Chiang Ching to the general reader through the mass media." The "opinion leaders" Chiang Ching had cultivated were the influential groups of writers. They included the "Liang Hsiao" (the criticism group of Peking and Tsing Hua Universities) which they controlled directly; the "Chu Lan" and "Chiang Tien" writing groups of the ministry of cultures, the "Tang Hsiao-wen" group of the Central Party Schools, the "Chih Hcng" group of the Red Flag journal and the "Lo Si-ling" group of Shanghai city committee. "Lo Si-zing" had been founded earlier, and it controlled the monthly journal Studies and Criticism, while the rest were founded in the early 197os for the sole purpose of attacking Chou En-lai. They published a large quantity of articles in newspapers and magazines which were conducive to the mobilisation of support for Chiang Ching.51 The "ideological struggle" and the pattern of attack instigated by Mao and Chiang after the tenth Party congress bore a close relation to the political life of Hua Kuo-feng in Peking. For instance, Chiang Ching's purge of The Song of the Gardener, a Hsiang opera, involved Hua. (iv) Struggle after the Tenth Party Congress Mao Tsc-tung's struggle with Chou En-lai and the "bureaucrat group" can be divided into four stages. From the meeting of the tenth Party congress to the end of 1973 was the first stage. The Chiang Ching group began the "anti-current", i.e. the "turning to the right to return to court" movement in the educational sector. From early 1974 to the cnd of the year, Mao and Chiang rigorously pursued the "criticism of Confucius" movement which attacked Chou En-lai by innuendo. This was the second stage. January to October of 1975 saw the third stage, during which Teng Hsiao-ping was in charge of the State Council and the CCPCC.52 He pushed forward reorganisational work, and the "bureaucrat group" gained the upper hand. The fourth stage was from October 1975 to October 1976. During this stage, the Chiang Ching group began its all-out 'counter-attack, leaving the "bureaucrat group" in a difficult predicament. The trial "Anti-Current" Movement. In August 1973, the tenth Party congress was convened and the criminal charges against Lin Piao were announced. It also gave the signal for the purge of Chou En-lai. The major character in the Chiang Ching group, Wang Hung-wen, made

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a report for the amendment of the Party constitution at the congress and proposed the slogan of "anti-current", using the words of Mao Tse-tung: "Anti-current is a principle of Marxism-Leninism" 53 "Anticurrent" means "anti right-turning current". All the implemented policies and the day-to-day work of Chou En-lai, when he was in charge of the CCPCC, were termed by the Chiang Ching group as "turning to the right to return to court". In 1972, before the tenth Party congress, Chiang Ching, with Mao's support, began a trial attack on Chou En-lai. In the December issue of Red Flag she published Yang Jung-kuo's article: "The two lines of struggle in the realm of thought during the spring and autumn period: the social reforms of the spring and autumn and warring periods vie -Ned in relation to the struggle between the Confucianists and the legalists." It accused Confucius of "overcoming oneself to re-establish the law", "protecting the old institution", and suppressing "the revolutionary group" and "newly-emerging force". It was the first article to attack Chou En.-lai in this way. Even before the article by Yang Jung-kuo was published, the conflict in education policies had aggravated the relations between the Chiang Ching group and Chou En-lai. In 1972, Chou appointed Peking University as an experimental centre for the strengthening of the study of fundamental theories and research in universities and educational organisations. Chang Chun-chiao and the Chiang Ching group secretly obstructed and sabotaged it, describing it as "restoration for the return to court".54 Afterwards, a month before the opening of the tenth Party congress, Mao Yuan-hsin, Mao Tse-tung's nephew, created an "anti-current model" : an educated youth of Liaoning province, Chang Tieh-sheng, participated in the university entrance examination and handed in a blank examination paper; accompanied by a letter attacking the education system. Mao Yuan-hsin, who was in charge of the work of the Party Liaoning province, commended the youth as the "hero of the anti-current", and publicised the case in newspapers and magazines.55 Before long the confidants of Chiang Ching created another "model who disrespects the teacher and the Tao", with a primary school pupil accusing his teacher.56 These models and the "anti-current" movements being waged everywhere in China were the main demonstrations against the normalisation of the education system. Their purpose was to push forward the "education revolution" master-minded by the Chiang Ching group.

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The "Criticism ty-Cot!fucius" movement. The "movement of anti-current" of Chiang Ching in the sector of education was merely a prelude to the seizure of power from the bureaucrats. In January 1974, Chiang summoned two rallies in. Peking, each attended by xo,000 people. All the cadres in the military, government and Party organisations in Peking were ordered to take part. These so-called "mobilisation rallies to criticise Lin and Confucius" were carefully designed to manipulate public feeling against Chou En-lai and Ych Chien-ying.57 After the rallies, the newspapers and magazines controlled by the Chiang Ching group published a large number of articles criticising Confucius. Among them, the article by Liang Hsiao entitled "Confucius the man" clearly indicated that Chou En-lai represented the "restoration group", i.e. those who were being accused of attempting to restore the policies of the pre-Cultural Revolution era. Lang Hsiao wrote: "Confucius would always jump out madly to oppose those new-born things emerging in great social changes." He described Confucius' crime as "overcoming oneself to re-establish the law" to "revive the states that should have been extinguished, restore the lines of succession that have been broken, and appoint people to important positions from obscurity".58 This article was designed as a criticism of Chou En-lai's "liberation" policy to rehabilitate a large number of the old cadres toppled during the Cultural Revolution, to revive the old system, to restore capitalism and to suppress the "new-born things of the Cultural Revolution."59 In June 1974, Chiang Ching stepped up the "criticism of Confucius and commendation of the legalists" campaign. She went to Tientsin and the suburban Hsiao-Chin-Chuang to deliver a talk attacking Chou En-lai by encouraging criticism of Confucius and labelling her own group as the "reformists". Her confidants were ordered to write articles in praise of seven of the empresses and queens in Chinese history.° In accordance with Chiang Ching's instructions, Kivang Ming Daily praised "Empress Lu in control of the Han dynasty after Liu Pang's death".61 It used the Han emperor Liu Pang to represent Mao Tse-tung and Empress Lu to reflect Chiang Ching so as to lead public opinion towards accepting her as Mao's heir.62 In Hsiao-chin-chuang, a village on the outskirts of Tientsin municipality, Chiang Ching also cultivated a model of "revolution in the field of ideology". Under the planning of Chiang Ching, the peasants in Hsiao-chin-chuang wrote poems, sang model operas (like Red Lantern), joined political evening schools and spread the "criticism of Confucius"

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movement. The propaganda machines under Chiang Ching's control hailed it as a model in the criticism of Confucius and Chou En-lai. The Hsiao-chin-chuang model was propagated to compete with the Tachai model in agricultural production.63 The scope of issues which the Chiang Ching group exploited for their attacks on Chou En-lai and the bureaucrats was very wide. For example, it waged a vehement campaign against foreign films—in particular those by Antonioni—and Western classical music, in order to attack Chou En-lai's foreign policy and activities. (Chou En-lai had approved Antonioni's visit to China to produce a documentary film, and had also invited the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra to perform in Peking.) Articles published by the Chiang Ching group implied that cultural exchange with the West would being about the spread of Western ideology's bad influence. The Struggle in 1975. In January 1975, a far-reaching change occurred in the politburo: the "bureaucrat group" finally overcame the Chiang Ching group. During that month both the second plenum of the tenth Party congress and the fifth NPC were called. Teng Hsiao-ping was promoted to the post of vice-chairman of the CCP's Central Committee and the first vice-premier of the State Council, and acted on behalf of the sick Chou En-lai in running the government and the Party. Chou En-lai and Chu Te remained respectively premier of the State Council and president of the NPC. In the reorganisation of the State Council, the "bureaucrat group" had gained the upper hand. Under Teng Hsiao-ping's leadership the group produced three important documents: (1) "Comment on the general outline of works of the whole Party and the whole country", (2) "Some problems concerning the speeding up of industrial development (The Twenty Articles of Industry)", and (3) "The outline of the collective report on the works of the Academy of Science". Hua Kuo-feng participated in the examination of the last-named document and in the decision-making which resulted. These three documents were produced in. accordance with the "four modernisation" projects proposed at the fifth NPC. They outlined measures designed to clear up the chaos created in the Cultural Revolution, to re-establish discipline in production and industrial management, and to redress the status of scientific and technological research. The "bureaucrat group" wanted to turn the confused "revolutionary" situation into a new stage of institutionalisation, with the resumption

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of production and economic development as its focus, so as to foster modernisation in industry, agriculture and national defence as well as science and technology. During the first half of 1975, when Teng Hsiao-ping was in charge of the meetings of the politburo, severe criticism was directed at Chiang Ching." The struggle between the two factions was complex. In March, while the bureaucrat group was working hard to right the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan launched a bitter attack on "empiricism" through the propaganda media under their control, referring to it as the major danger inside the Communist Party—clearly pointing a finger at the `bureaucrat group'. In April, Chang Chun-chiao published his article "On total dictatorship over the capitalist class" in. the Red Flag journal, asserting that there were many "die-hard capitalists" inside the Party. This view was developed later in 1976 into a theory that "a capitalist class had formed inside the Party".66 This was a new directive for mobilisation of "continued revolution" against the "bureaucrat group". In August, Mao initiated the criticism of The Water Margin. He said that "Sung Chiang as a capitulationist was involved in revisionism", and "excluded Chao Kai from the io8 heroes".67 Sung Chiang was used to reflect Chou En-lai; Sung Chiang's chief assistant Lu Chun-yi to reflect Teng Hsiao-ping; and Chao Kai to reflect Mao Tse-tung. Chiang Ching gave instructions that the criticism of The Water Margin was to be "tied to reality". She said: "Inside our Party, there is a capitulation group, a big one"; and "At present, in the Central Committee of the CCP there are people who overrule Mao Tse-tung". Sung Chiang, she said, "brought many court officials, high ranking generals, military officers, and civil servants to take important posts in Liang-shan."68 This implied that Chou and Teng had allowed a large number of old cadres and military men to return to the court, and by so doing had overruled Mao Tse-tung. The spread of the criticism of The Water Margin posed a new political crisis for the bureaucrat group. In September, the Central Committee of the CCP summoned a Tachai conference. At this meeting Teng Hsiao-ping and Chiang Ching fought bitterly against each other, making it almost impossible for the conference to proceed. Finally, Hua Kuo-feng made a general summary report, calling an end to the conference. After October, Mao Tse-tung decided to launch a direct purge of the "bureaucrat group". In November, he released the letters from Liu

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Ping, and the Chiang Ching group, under Mao's leadership, launched the struggle of "curious talks and queer theories of the education sector". Liu Ping was the deputy secretary of theParty committee of Tsing-hua University. He had written to Mao Tse-tung twice, reporting on the confusion created by the "education revolution". The letters were referred to Mao by the minister for education, Chou Jung-hsin." Mao instructed the students at Tsing-hua to "debate" the letters by Liu Ping. He said: "The matters in which Tsing-hua was involved were not isolated: they are the reflection of the two different lines that arc being pursued at present."" It was the beginning of an all-out attack on the "bureaucratic group". Criticism of "curious talks and queer theories of the education sector" became the "anti-rightist reversal of verdict" movement in January 1976 when Chou En-lai died. This was, in effect, the siege of Teng Hsiao-ping. (v) Conflict in ideology, policy and power

From the tenth Party congress up to its downfall, the Chiang Ching group's struggle with the "bureaucrat group" was directly related to the conflict of policy lines, interests and power. In the realm of ideology, the dispute as to whether or not there was a "capitalist class inside the Party" had crucial implications. In 1975, in the fourth issue of the Red Flag, Chang Chun-chiao wrote in an article entitled "On the total dictatorship over the capitalist class": "Only when we exert a total dictatorship over the capitalist class and only when we carry out to the end a continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship will the proletarian dictatorship not become an empty word. To exercise an incomplete dictatorship over the capitalist class, that is to practise dictatorship in some areas and not in all areas, or in some stages and not in all stages, is not a complete eradication of the capitalist class, for some remnants will be left who may eventually expand their team. Isn't this a preparation of conditions for the restoration of the capitalist class?" The so-called industrial and commercial capitalists of the bourgeois class had lost their means ofproduction as long ago as 1955; the capitalists to whom Chang Chun-chiao referred were, of course, the "bureaucratic group".

Concerning the dispute over the "capitalist class" inside the Party.

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In early 1976, Mao Tse-tung launched the movement of "anti-rightist reversal of verdict", and suggested that "the capitalist class is right inside the Communist Party".71 The Chiang Ching group then developed this into a theory: "A capitalist class has formed inside the Party",72 by which they claimed that the capitalist-roaders inside the Party—i.e. Chou, Teng and the "bureaucrat group"—were former "capitalist democrats" who had joined the revolutionary activities of the Communist Party with the ultimate aim of diverting it towards capitalistic democratism. They had accepted only the lowest Party plank, i.e. the revolutionary plank of neo-democratism, but "they did not understand—nor were they prepared to implement—the supreme Party plank", i.e. socialism and Communism. They had been revolutionary during the neo-democratic period of the revolution, i.e. the years before 1949, but when it changed from a neo-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution after 1949, their ideology did not change with it. They remained as "capitalistic democrats" opposing the socialist revolution. The Chiang Ching group deemed the "bureaucrat group" to be the "class and ideological root of the rightist reversal of verdict" ; and when the "capitalistic democrats" became the capitalistroaders inside the Party, they were sure to become "the targets of socialist revolution"." Chiang Ching had woven this "theory" in order to create favourable "public opinion" for her to seize power from the "bureaucrat group". However, Chou, Teng and the "bureaucrats" had been the pillars of Chinese socialist revolution since 1949. They were the leaders in the "land reform" movement and the "socialist reform" in agriculture, commerce and industry. To label them as the "capitalistic democrats" opposing socialist revolution was in diametric contradiction to the facts. Naturally Chou, Teng and the "bureaucrats" were opposed to such "theory", and did not believe that there was "a capitalist class" within the Party. The older cadres who had offered their invaluable service to the revolution were certainly not the "capitalist democrats". If some cadres lacked a clear understanding of socialist revolution, this was only a problem of ideological understanding; they were by no means "capitalist-roaders" and certainly not the natural "targets of socialist revolution"." They concluded that the Chiang Ching group was trying to frame the cadres by such charges as "capitalist democrats" and "capitalist class inside the Party", not only damaging the democratic centralism inside the Party but also turning the Party into a fascist one, i.e. dominated by personal hegemony and without "democracy within

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the Party". They said that the "Gang of Four" were traitors who had crept into the Party and were the newly-born capitalist class. Such disputes over class theories were symptomatic of a ,'political struggle in which both logic and realism were too often lacking. Dualism in the production relations of socialism. The theory of a "capitalist class inside the Party" is based on the hypothesis of "the dualism of the production relations in socialism". From June 1971 to October 1976, the Chiang Ching group amended unceasingly their then unpublished work, "Political Economics of Socialism". This stated that "to understand the dualism of the production relations in socialism is . . . a premise to the understanding of the new bourgeoisie and particularly the bourgeoisie inside the Party, under socialist conditions."75 "Dualism" is explained in "Political Economics of Socialism" as follows: "The production relations in socialism express its duality: on the one hand, they are the living element of Communism; on the other hand, they are the dying tradition or track of capitalism. Thus is formulated the contradictory process of rise for the one and fall for the other, or vice versa, of production relations in socialism." It claimed that "the tradition or track of capitalism" is the "origin of capitalism and the bourgeoisie in the production relations in socialism". It said that "the re-production process of the production relations in socialism will, on the one hand, unceasingly yield capitalism and the bourgeoisie. Since the bourgeoisie inside the Party either protects or represents the rotten production relations of capitalism," the restoration of capitalism is therefore unavoidable. The "bureaucrat group" considered this kind of "theory" unrealistic. The private plot and the free market in the villages have many restrictions and arc therefore not enough to influence the production relations in socialism. The differences in line and policy. The conflict in line and policy is witnessed in the differences between institutionalisation/modernisation and revolutionary change/politicisation. The "bureaucrat group" did not oppose the idea of "politics in command", however, it did believe that politics was not primarily the shouting of slogans, but something to be learnt from working experience and the profession itself. The development of the economy and technology presupposes the political objectives of consolidation in the rule of the Communist Party.

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The "bureaucrat group" was anxious to end the Cultural Revolution so as to salvage China from the economic crisis and backwardness it had caused. It wanted to alter the Cultural Revolution's extreme leftist policy and put the Party, government and the military back on the road to normalisation, to re-establish the system of enterprise management and production discipline, and to recuperate production; thus the economy would be developed step by step. To accelerate the development of industry, the group proposed to make use of advanced Western science, technology and equipment, and at the same time ease China's relations with foreign countries with a view to expanding her foreign trade. Because of the needs of the "four modernisation", the "bureaucrat group" had to dampen the radicalism of the "education revolution", strengthen fundamental scientific education, enlarge the field of research in science and technology, and enlarge the role of intellectuals in the modernisation of society. Since the political life of the Chiang Ching group was so closely related to the Cultural Revolution, it set out to exaggerate the need for "continuous revolution" in order to retain its position embodying the "new-born things of the Cultural Revolution". This also meant that it had to carry on the "anti-current" in all areas, and oppose the normalisation of education, science, and technology, and the economy. It insisted on the extreme leftist line of the Cultural Revolution because it wanted power. It considered itself the executants of Mao's revolutionary line, and his rightful successors. It was back in August 1973, following the tenth Party conference, that the leaders of the Chiang Ching group began to be identified as a distinct unit of four. In October 1974 Wang Hung-wen appealed to Mao Tse-tung, saying that Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiaoping and Li Hsien-nien were united in their opposition to Chiang Ching, and that he, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chunchiao should be allowed to wield more power.77 In this way, the group that later became known as the "Gang of Four" clearly showed itself to be a self-proclaimed political unit posing a direct threat to the Chou En-lai group. 4. Hua Kuo-feng and the conflict between the two groups Hua Kuo-feng undoubtedly played a part in the three-year power struggle after the tenth Party congress, but he was neither a member of the Chiang Ching group, nor a main pillar of the Chou, Teng and

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"bureaucrat" group. His position was somewhere between the two, maintaining a precarious balance. Before February 1976 he leaned closer to the "bureaucrats" in policy matters, but after this his attitude became more ambivalent. He appears to have been enthusiastic about the purge of Teng, but otherwise his relations with the Chiang Ching group were by no means without conflict. Indeed the beginnings of this uneasy relationship date back to August and September 1971, when Hua conducted the national conference on agricultural mechanisation. After the conference he reviewed and revised the People's Daily editorial entitled "The basic problem in agriculture lies in mechanisation". When the manuscript was sent to Yao Wen-yuen, then the politburo member in charge of propaganda, it was suppressed." In 1972 Hua approved the holding of the national exhibition of handicraft arts. Afterwards, the Chiang Ching group labelled it a "black art exhibition" and attempted to make an investigation on Chou En-lai who had supported it from behind the scenes." The most important matters involving Hua Kuo-feng in the tense power struggle were the Song of the Gardener affair and the Tachai conference. The former involved a "struggle in ideology" and educational policy. (i) The Song of the Gardener affair The Song of the Gardener was a Hsiang opera set in modern times. It was about a worker's son, Tao Li, who from his earliest childhood liked to play with a small toy train and always wanted to become a locomotive engineer. However, he took no interest in his studies, and did not obey the school rules—hence his grades were far from good. A teacher coached him with great patience and eventually changed him into a hard-working, obedient and courteous student. The opera was performed at the Hunan province arts show in 1972. On Hua Kuo-feng's recommendation, a documentary film was made about it, but after seeing a preview of it, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan banned it from public showing." In August 1974 Chiang Ching ordered the purge of The Song of the Gardener. The People's Daily and Kuangniing Daily published articles by "the writing group of the ministry of culture" ("chu lang") calling The Song of the Gardener "a requiem for the revisionist line in education", aimed at countering the Cultural Revolution.81 This was designed to put pressure on Hua Kuo-feng. In. February and March 1976 Chiang Ching summoned the leaders in twelve provinces to a meeting and

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publicly scolded the second Party secretary of Hunan province, Chang Ping-hua, who had been responsible for staging the opera." Chiang Ching's criticism of The Song of the Gardener formed part of the purge of the "rightist restoration to return to the court". In order to "rebel and seize power", the Chiang Ching group had to implement a policy of misleading the people by putting great stress on "politics in command" and "class struggle". The normalisation of education and the teaching of cultural and general knowledge in schools were seen as obstructions to the Chiang Ching group's plot to "seize power in chaos". The purge of The Song of the Gardener by Chiang Ching was aimed at negating the policy of normalisation of education proposed by the "bureaucrat group". (ii) Differences at the Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture In September 1975 the State Council summoned the conference on learning from Tachai in agriculture. In accordance with Teng Hsiaoping's idea to remedy the chaotic conditions resulting from the Cultural Revolution, many new directives for work in rural areas were proposed. At the conference the struggle between the two groups became very tense. Teng Hsiao-ping delivered a policy talk and Hua Kuo-feng gave a report on the "mobilisation of the whole Party for agricultural development and the struggle for the popularisation of Tachai Hsien". In a fury, Chiang Ching shouted out objections and delivered a strongly-worded counter-attacking speech to the conference. In principle Hua's report represented the ideas of the State Council, but in fact it followed Teng Hsiao-ping's outlines for the reorganisation of rural villages. He said that to popularise the Tachai model throughout China's rural villages and resume normal production, the basic structure of the Party organisation in these villages would have to be reshaped and the mentality of "softness, laziness and distraction" cured. Angry scenes and quarrels at the conference made it impossible for any conclusions to be reached. Afterwards, three different reports were sent to Mao Tse-tung for his decision. Mao took the middle way by withholding the reports of Chiang Ching and Teng Hsiao-ping and permitting only Hua's report to be released. It was issued as "document no. zi of the Central Committee of the CCP" (1975), distributed to all areas of China, and published in the People's Daily. The Red Flag journal, which was entirely controlled by Yao Wen-yuan, refused to publish it on the grounds that it was "a revision of Marxist-Leninism". Chang Chun-chiao forbad its circulation in Shanghai, and work teams

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sent out to implement the reorganisation were barred from the rural villages. He also asked his confidants in Shanghai to criticise Hua's report clause by clause,83 saying that "reorganisation means restoration" The present writer, in his Biographies of Wang Hung-wen and Chang Chun-chiao, observed: "Chang Chun-chiao's line-up to disturb the reorganisation in rural villages was an agitation of 'rebellion' against upper-level leaders. It was a scheme orchestrated together with their plot to seize power. That the 'bureaucrats' sent a large number of cadres to rural villages to start their reorganisation work also aimed at diverting attention of the lower-level cadres so as to ameliorate the pressure of power seizure. Thus the struggle between the two groups had a lot to do with the element of power."84 (iii) The conflict over "Criticism of Confucius" in the State Council's Physical Culture Committee A struggle in the State Council's physical culture committee also involved Hua Kuo-feng. At the beginning of the "criticise Lin and criticise Confucius" campaign in 1974, Chiang Ching and Wang Hung-wen had a good foothold in this committee. In their first move, Wang Meng, nominated by Chou En-lai to be the committee's chairman, was forced to stand down, and Chiang Ching's confidant Chuang Tse-tung took over." The Central Committee of the CCP, however, appointed Hua Kuo-feng to take charge of the physical committee's "criticise Lin and criticise Confucius" campaign." Because of interference by Wang Hung-wen and Chiang Ching, Hua Kuo-feng was unable to carry out his appointed task or wield any authority. Chiang Ching instructed Chuang Tse-tung to consult Hua only on routine matters and to refer all important matters to her.87 They then carried out a "big shuffle of cadres" in the physical culture committee, and imposed various labels of guilt and misdemeanour on the old cadres in order to have them dismissed and replaced by their confidants at every layer of the organisation. The Tiyu Pao (Sports Daily)„re-publication of which had met with Chou En-lai's approval, was ordered to be the target of "bombardment". They made every effort to strangle Chou En-lai's influence in the physical culture committee and create difficulties for him. Wang Hung-wen even succeeded in forcing Chou En-lai to amend one of the committee's important instructions involving the "criticise Lin and criticise Confucius" campaign, towards which the committee had originally adopted a conservative approach.88

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Hua supported this campaign but was against the "big shuffle of the cadres". He requested the committee not to disturb the cadres too seriously and not to cause such widespread confusion, but Chiang Ching and Wang Hung-wen paid no attention. Indeed Chiang Ching encouraged her confidants to have courage in carrying out her plans, and to make every effort to extend the group's influence, with the intention of isolating Hua.89

6 1976: AN EVENTFUL YEAR In the history of the Chinese Communist Party, 1976 was an eventful year marked by political upheavals and significant changes. During that year, China's three most influential leaders, Chou En-lai, Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung, died one after the other. Chou's death resulted in Teng Hsiao-ping's second downfall and the intensified attack on the "bureaucrat group" orchestrated by Chiang Ching. The Tienanmen riot fuelled the conflict between the two rival groups and generated widespread social disturbances. A succession of major earthquakes further aggravated the economic crisis in China, causing increased hardship for everyone. The coup in October sealed the doom of the Chiang Ching faction and closed the chapter of the Cultural Revolution. It was in these delicate circumstances that Hua emerged as the CCP's new leader. 1. In charge of the CCP Headquarters and the State Council apparatus Chou En-lai was the major stumbling block in the Chiang Ching group's attempt to succeed Mao. His death in early 1976 greatly cased the constraints on Mao, and he moved quickly to oust Teng and so pave the way for the elevation of Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao. Chou's departure created two top-level vacancies: the premiership and the CCP first vice-chairmanship. There was keen competition between the bureaucratic group and the Chiang Ching group to fill these two top posts. When Chou was alive, he supported Teng's rehabilitation and arranged for Teng to be in charge of the day-to-day decision-making in the Party headquarters in the State Council in his place, hoping to secure Teng as successor to himself and eventually to Mao.' On the other hand, Mao intended to transfer the supreme power to the Chiang Ching group, with his wife succeeding him as CCP I00

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chairman and her two close associates, Chang Chun-chino and Wang Hung-wen, as premier and NPC chairman.2 (i) Hua as Acting Premier Mao's supposed intention to name Chiang Ching as his successor and Chang Chun-chiao to replace Chou naturally met with strong opposition from the bureaucrats and the PLA leaders. Li Hsien-nien, one of the vice-premiers who ranked second only after Teng and Chang as a potential leader, was apparently not considered for the premiership on account of his close association with the "bureaucrat group".3 In these circumstances, Mao picked Hua as a compromise, appointed him premier, and empowered him to run the daily affairs of the CCP headquarters. The politburo issued a directive on behalf of the CCP Central Committee naming Hua as "acting premier" on 3 February 1976—an important turning-point in his political career.4 Mao then launched the so-called "anti-rightist campaign" to attack Teng and the bureaucratic group, a movement which had begun to take shape in the last few months of 1975. Mao sought to discredit Teng by means of a mass campaign, negating a set of rectification policies under Teng's stewardship and reaffirming the "new-born things" of the Cultural Revolution. Teng and his followers were depicted in the media as "capitalist-roaders still on the capitalist road", while Chiang Ching and her followers were described as advocates of the "correct line". Under the guise of defending the newly-emerging forces of the Cultural Revolution, Mao sought to secure the Chiang Ching group's accession to power. As acting premier, Hua's role in the campaign against Teng and the bureaucratic group was difficult and ambivalent. The campaign was personally directed by Mao and pushed by the radicals, and Hua was caught between the two. Under the command and political pressure of Mao, Hua had no choice but to take part in the campaign. Hua's dilemma Hua was clearly caught on the horns of a political dilemma. On the one hand, he had to carry out Mao's orders to purge and discredit Teng, but on the other, he needed to hold his fire against the "bureaucrat group" so as not to alienate this powerful political force. In this precarious situation he found himself severely constrained by the Chiang Ching group. There is no question that after Chou died, the Chiang Ching group intended to seize the premiership.5 Although they

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succeeded in discrediting Teng, alluding to him as an "unrepentant capitalist-roader"° and denying him the premiership, they failed to capture the position for themselves. It was not long before it became Hua's turn to be subjected to oblique attacks. For example, in an unpublished poem to vent his bitterness, Chang Chun-chiao accused Hua of having implemented an "erroneous line" in the past.? The Chiang Ching group also encouraged the "mass criticism group" of Peking and Tsing-hua Universities to publish an article entitled "More on Confucius the man".° In this an unfavourable comparison was implied between Hua in his role as "acting premier" and Confucius.° At a meeting of the politburo held in February and March 1976 to brief the provincial leaders on the campaign against "rightist deviationist" tendencies, Hua gave a speech, and its text was approved by the Politburo for dissemination to the officials in the provinces. Apparently dissatisfied with Hua's moderation, Chiang Ching also called a separate meeting of top provincial leaders from twelve provinces and urged them to step up the campaign against Teng and his supporters. She denounced the economic policies formulated by Chou and Teng, labelling such measures as expansion of foreign trade and importation of Western technology and equipment as "capitulationist" and a "national betrayal". She even accused Teng of being a "representative of the landlord class" and an "agent of international capitalists".1° During those months of February and March 1976, when Hua was first in charge of the Party centre and the State Council, he acted with caution, pursuing a course that inclined neither to right nor to left. On major issues, he always followed Mao's instructions, but he strove at the same time to avoid antagonising either the "bureaucrat group" or the Maoist radicals led by Chiang Ching. In many respects Hua seemed to be walking a political tight-rope. Overall, Hua failed to distinguish himself during this period. There were several reasons for this. He lacked real political strength and had few supporters among the true holders:of power. Secondly, the power to decide on major issues still remained with Mao. Thirdly, he was constrained both by the "bureaucrat group" and the Chiang Ching group. Hua's political role was limited; he confined himself to transmitting divergent views to Mao for the resolution of conflicts, and did not exercise the kind of power wielded by Chou En-lai.

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The Tienanmen Incident

The disturbances that erupted in Peking's Tienanmen Square on 5 April were the direct result of the antagonism that had grown up between the "bureaucrats" and the Maoist radicals. The factors that precipitated the massive political riots in the Square included public discontent with the extremist policies pursued by the Maoist radicals, and Mao's dictatorship in general—particularly the persecution of Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping. The way in which the radicals suppressed the mourning for Chou had aroused strong resentment. When Chou died the Chiang Ching faction managed to restrict meetings, memorial services and other manifestations that were to be held in the late Premier's honour, and passed orders to the media to play down the coverage of Chou's funeral." At the Tsing-hua University in Peking, for instance, the students were prevented from mourning Chou in any way, such as by wearing black armbands or making paper wreaths. Those who did were harassed, and four were even arrested.12 Similar incidents were reported from other schools in Peking and from other cities. Chou was a revered and sympathetic leader, and his death drew widespread and spontaneous grief from the Chinese people. The almost total ban imposed by the leftists on articles commemorating him and on local mourning was eventually to culminate in the extraordinary Tienanmen Square incident three months later. (i) Clash during the Ching Ming festival On 5 April 1976 the Ching Ming festival (the annual Chinese festival for the dead) was held. In Peking it drew large crowds who came together to pay tribute to the late premier Chou En-lai. In fact, wreaths in tribute to Chou had already been placed on the "monument of people's heroes" in the Tienanmen Square as early as 3o March. On April Ho Yen-kuang, a cadre of the Peking chemical fibres plant, and some eighty young workers carried to the monument a huge wreath, bearing a poem praising Chou and critising the radicals. The poem was removed the same day by supporters of Chiang Ching, but Ho attached a new poster to the wreath expressing his opposition to the political campaign which was still attacking the rehabilitated officials in the Party as "capitalist-roaders".13 Apparently there were many who shared Ho's sentiments, and who went to Tienanmen not merely to lay wreaths, but also to display placards and posters, recite poems expressing

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support for Chou, Teng and the moderate policies associated with them, and show their strong disapproval of the Chiang Ching group and its campaign against Teng. From 3o March to 4 April endless streams of students, workers and cadres converged on the square to place wreaths on the monument and to recite poems to large crowds of onlookers. The implications of these activities were not lost on the Chiang Ching group; indeed, it was reported that Wang Hung-wen and Chang Chun-chiao watched the scene closely from the People's Great Hall near the square. Then on the night of 4 April the radical leaders issued an order to have all the wreaths removed. Those who went to the square the next morning became incensed when they saw what had been done. An angry crowd, estimated at Io,000 or more, overturned a loud-speaker car of the municipal public security bureau. By noon, nearly ioo,000 people had surged into the square, and the pro-Chou elements proclaimed the inauguration of a "committee of the people of the capital for commemorating the premier”." The crowd's anger rose to a fever-pitch when a dozen leftist supporters, at the instigation of Wang Hung-wen, shouted "Down with Chou En-lai !” and "Chou En-lai is Teng Hsiao-ping's chief backer !"15 Pro-Chou youths carrying slogans denouncing Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi16 and Indira Gandhi then clashed with the police and militiamen patrolling the square, and in the violent riot that followed the demonstrators beat up the leftist sympathisers, set fire to cars and a barracks belonging to the public security forces, attempted to storm the Great Hall, and injured hundreds of police and militiamen who were trying to keep order. (ii) Suppression by police and militia As acting premier and minister of public security, Hua Kuo-feng had the overall responsibility for maintaining law and order, but he moved cautiously, choosing to refer to the politburo and Chairman Mao for guidance. Judging from the fact that the riot lasted the whole day of 5 April, it seems likely that Hua did in fact call a politburo meeting, but that it reached deadlock—or at least was unable to come to any quick agreement on measures to be adopted—at which point Hua then sought Mao's instructions directly. The critical decision to use force to suppress the rioters appears to have been made after some deliberation by Mao himself.

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In a broadcast speech made at 6.3o p.m. on s April, the Peking mayor Wu Te blamed "wicked people with ulterior motives" for engineering "a political incident". He called the Tienanmen demonstration "counterrevolutionary" and urged the crowds to disperse immediately.'? When they defied this order, militia contingents, numbering tens of thousands and commanded by Ma Hsiao-liu, Chiang Ching's confidant and deputy commander of the Peking militia headquarters, were sent in.18 In the ensuing action, heavy casualties were inflicted on both the demonstrators and innocent bystanders. The victims included the sons of high-ranking officials and PLA veterans; Marshal Chu Te's grandson and former vice-premier Lu Ting-Yi's son were reportedly among those killed. Their bodies were secretly flown to Shanghai for cremation on the orders of Wang Hung-wen.13 The young men who, at Wang's command, started the provocations in the square were executed to prevent them from revealing the plot.20 The Chinese authorities have never revealed the full casualty figures; allegedly close to io,000 people were injured or killed, and it took soo people three days to clear up the square in the aftermath of the carnage. The disturbances were followed by massive arrests in Peking and in other cities. Some 3,000 people were apparently arrested in Shanghai alone,21 and thousands were interrogated, tortured and jailed.22 Although the riot had been forcibly put down, popular discontent and resentment were further intensified. In a sense, the Tienanmen Square incident was a de facto "public opinion" survey which revealed the political sentiments of China's attentive public. It reflected the wide support existing for Chou's moderate policies and for his protege, Teng Hsiao-ping, whose rehabilitation and grooming for the premiership were more Chou's doing than anyone else's. In addition, the demonstration was unmistakably directed against those who were behind the campaign to criticise the policies of Chou and Teng. Accounts of the incident in the radical-controlled Party press reported that many of the posters and placards displayed by the marchers denounced Chiang Ching and equated Chairman Mao with Chin Shih Huang, the notorious tyrant in China's history, and that the crowds were chanting: "The era of Chin Shih Huang is gone" and "Gone for good is Chin Shih Huang's feudal society".23 In his post-1949 political career, Mao had committed many costly policy and political errors. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had clearly failed, leaving a variety of fundamental problems in their wake. His attempts to discredit the popular Chou En-lai

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in the "criticise Lin Piao and Confucius" campaign in 1974, to downgrade Chou's image and deprive his protege, Teng Hsiao-ping ofpower after January 1976, and to groom the radicals as his successors were not only extremely unpopular, but also led eventually to the political debacle of the Chiang Ching group.24 (iii) Mao's two directives In Mao's view, the Tienanmen incident was "counter-revolutionary", in view of which he "proposed" to have Teng stripped of all his leadership posts except membership of the CCP, and Hua Kuo-feng appointed as the first vice-chairman of the Party and premier.26 On 7 April the politburo "unanimously" approved these two "proposals" in two resolutions. However, this claimed unanimity is highly questionable: some members of the Politburo, for example Hsu Shih-yu, did not even attend the session. Moreover, the two resolutions clearly violated the provisions of the CCP and PRC constitutions. The politburo did not have the authority either to dismiss Teng from the posts of Party vice-chairman and vice-premier, or to appoint Hua as the premier, the power of appointment being vested in the National People's Congress. But while Mao still lived, his word was like an imperial edict and could not be challenged, and indeed, after the two politburo resolutions were made public, provincial authorities throughout China held mass rallies to pledge support. In his fmal years, Mao was whimsical, paranoid and a recluse. He trusted and patronised the young rebel Wang Hung-wen and ideologue Yao Wen-yuan, and listened exclusively to the advice of a few like the "Gang of Four", cutting himself off virtually from all the veteran party and army leaders. He acquiesced in, if he did not actually instigate, the persecution of many of his old comrades by Chiang Ching and her cohorts.26 In those days, besides the "Gang of Four", only four other individuals had unlimited access to Mao. Three of them—Tang Wen-sheng, Chang Han-chih and Wang Hai Jung—were women foreign service cadres (Tang was Mao's English interpreter, Chang was the wife of the now disgraced foreign minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and Wang was vice-foreign minister and Mao's niece).27 Collectively, they were nicknamed "the kitchen cabinet". The fourth was Mao's nephew, Mao Yuan-hsin, a young man in his thirties, who had held the titles of political commissar of the Shenyang military region and CCP secretary in Liaoning province. In 1975-6 he stayed in Peking and served as the chairman's "liaison officer".

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In reality, he was also deputy director of the Party Central Committee staff office and political commissar of the "8341 unit", Mao's "praetorian guard". As Mao's "liaison officer", he relayed reports from below, conveyed Mao's directives to others, and was in a position to control other leaders' access to the isolated and ageing Chairman. Even such senior leaders as Party vice-chairman Kang Sheng did not have direct access, and had to communicate with the Chairman via the few privileged young officers in his entourage. Mao was senile and at times did not have full control of himself and thus could be easily manipulated by those close to him. It is rumoured that the orders issued by Mao to dismiss Teng and elevate Hua were in fact transmitted—and possibly tampered with—by Mao Yuan-hsin; but it is unlikely that the truth of these rumours will ever be substantiated as Mao Yuan-hsin was killed in the coup of October 1976. One thing seems clear, however. In the light of the demonstration in Peking in support of Chou and Teng, and given the strong backlash directed against the radical leaders, Chang Chun-chiao was no longer a viable candidate for premiership, and Mao had no choice but to reiterate his confidence in Hua and elevate him to the posts of Party first vice-chairman and premier. It does not follow, however, that Mao had thereby explicitly designated Hua as his chosen successor as Hua has since claimed. (An item central to Hua's claim is a note handed to him by Mao on 3o April 1976 which read: "With you in charge, I am at easc."28 But it remains a question of interpretation: Mao's note may well have been no more than simple words of encouragement.) (iv) Stepping up the campaign against Teng The campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping was intensified after the Tienanmen disturbances, as the country's mass media began to single him out as the "chief culprit of the Tienanmen. incident" 29 Teng was also equated with Imre Nagy in the 1956 Hungarian uprising. He was accused of pushing a "revisionist line"." In fact, Teng had no part in instigating the Tienanmen disturbances.31 His so-called "revisionist line", said to have been embodied in a lengthy and comprehensive document, took the form of a general policy to rectify various measures introduced during the Cultural Revolution which placed excessive emphasis on ideology, and to adopt a pragmatic approach to speed up China's economy and arrest Chinese backwardness in education and science and technology.

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In any case, in the wake of Tienanmen, the pragmatic policies were rejected, the values of the Cultural Revolution were strongly reaffirmed, and those who had previously supported Teng's policies were purged. One of the major victims of the radicals' persecution was Chou Junghsin, minister of education, who later died of this mistreatment.32 His colleagues in the ministry of education lost their jobs, and many other officials involved in higher education and scientific research were suspended. Wang Hung-wen played a key role in aggravating the Tienanmen affair. The radical-controlled press amplified events, playing on Mao's sayings "The capitalist-roaders are still on the capitalist road" and "The bourgeoisie is right inside the Communist Party".33 The "counterrevolutionary" Tienanmen incident was cited to prove that the bourgeois class was still exercising power in the Party and to justify the radicals' design for a large-scale purge of the "capitalist-roaders".34 Tienanmen also caused the leadership to be further polarised and the political conflict to become more intense. As Mao showed his strong disapproval of the policies pushed by Teng and "personally launched and led the repudiation of Teng's counter-revolutionary revisionist line",32 Hua had no choice but to follow Mao's lead in implementing the anti-Teng campaign. Under Mao's ruthless dictatorship, no one dared to oppose his decisions. Even Teng's staunch followers, such as the "strong men of South China" Hsu Shih-yu and Wei Kuo-ching, felt compelled to make speeches pledging support for Mao's two directives following Tienanmen. Hence it is not difficult to understand why Hua had to attack Teng. Besides, Hua benefited from Teng's political downfall. It should be pointed out, however, that in putting the anti-Teng campaign into action Hua moved cautiously and steered a middle course with skill. On the one hand, he delivered speeches to repudiate Teng according to the tone set by Mao in order to gain Mao's confidence; on the other hand, he resisted the radicals' attempts to expand the purge to the "bureaucrat group" and refrained from attacking other veteran officials. In fact, Hua's past record identified him more with the "bureaucrat group", and in 1975 he had actually been working with Teng to rectify the chaotic conditions created by the Cultural Revolution. Yet caution is Hua's hallmark, now as then, and he may not have approved the haste and the abrasive manner with which Teng pushed the new programme.

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3. Hua under attack Hua's political moderation and his sudden rise to eminence over the heads of the "Gang of Four" evidently earned him their rancour, and hence they sought to undermine him politically. For example, the radical-controlled media continuously gave prominence to Chiang Ching, to the obvious detriment of Hua. It is reported that Yao Wenyuan even censored and edited out pictures of Hua from television programmes and news releases in order to deny him publicity.36 Chiang Ching and her supporters also used the New China News Agency (NCNA) and the People's Daily to gather news unfavourable to him. For example, on 12 June 1976 the NCNA distributed an "internal reference" news item on an interview with a worker at Hsiangtang, Hunan, who was quoted as saying: "Hua Kuo-feng is Chou En-lai's man."37 The worker was a former Red Guard leader and patronised by Chiang Ching. What made Hua more uncomfortable was a series of press articles which attacked him by implication. For example, after April 1976, the media concentrated fire on the policy document "The outline of the collective report on the work of the Academy of Sciences", which was drafted under Teng's supervision but with Hua's assistance. The radical publicists twisted Hua's remarks, put them into the mouth of Teng, and singled them out for attack.38 Likewise, the radicals vilified Teng's policy to rectify rural cadres infected with "bourgeois factionalism" as utterly "revisionist"; in fact, these were the very type of people singled out for rectification in Hua's summing-up speech at the conference "on learning from Tachai in agriculture" in October 1975. There is no doubt that the radicals considered Hua to be stepping into Teng's shoes and siding with the "bureaucrat group"; they thus continued to exert pressure on him, and to remove from office other "capitalist-roaders" in the leadership. As the radicals saw it, "the downfall of one representative figure [Teng] will not cause the capitalistroaders to disappear", and indeed they could use their title of "Communist Party members" and their positions as leading cadres to usurp through the revisionist line in a legitimate form.38 Mao's epigram that "the bourgeoisie is right inside the Communist Party" was repeatedly invoked by the radicals as an ideological justification to remove the entire bureaucratic group." In spite of their relentless campaigning, the radicals' anti-rightist movement appears to have gradually lost momentum after June 1976.

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There was considerable support among those holding power for the modernisation programme and they stonewalled the radicals who sought to obstruct it. Moreover, as Mao's health grew worse, the radicals who had previously conducted the campaign in his name apparently had difficulty in convincing cadres that the campaign was still under his personal leadership; the uncertainty concerning Mao's role must have further emboldened those in power to resist. The radicals were well aware of the situation, and an article in the People's Daily on 22 June 1976 acknowledged "twists and turns" in the campaign but urged the "revolutionary people" to break through "lines of resistance [erected] by the capitalist-roaders".41 In August, Yao Wen-yuan reportedly directed the writing group of the CCP Shanghai Committee to compile a book entitled Khrushchev's Rise to Power, with a special emphasis on the following themes: "Krushchev started his political career from his line of work in agriculture", "Khrushchev's collusion with Zhukov" and "the role played by capitalist-roaders in the Soviet Red Army in Krushchev's rise". In the book Zhukov, who was minister of defence, was obviously meant to provide a parallel to Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, and Krushchev to Hua Kuo-feng (reflecting his agricultural work in Hunan). 4. Factional conflict in post-Mao China Mao died on 9 September 1976, aged eighty-two. The rivalry for power between the radicals, led by Chiang Ching, and the "bureaucrat group" intensified as each manoeuvred to assume Mao's role. A climax swiftly followed. (i) Chiang Ching took Mao's papers In the Chinese political system there are no institutionalised procedures for the transfer of power, and the Chinese leaders were unable to agree on the methods to be used to select a new leader. The radicals, for their part, found Hua's claim that he was Mao's chosen successor quite unacceptable. The day after Mao's death, Party vice-chairman Wang Hung-wen dispatched his confidant to the secretarial section of the Central Committee staff office to be "on duty"; the aide then allegedly telephoned the CCP provincial committees directing the provincial leaders to report to him and seek instructions from him thence forth.42 By such manipulation, Wang sought to cut off Hua's contact with provincial leaders and undermine Hua's claim to power.

6. 1976: an Eventful Year

III

Since Mao's personal approval was crucial to the contenders for his mantle, they did their utmost to collect, or even fabricate, evidence of such approval to buttress their claims. Shortly after Mao died, Chiang Ching and Mao Yuan-hsin reportedly went to the CC staff office and prevailed upon Mao's personal secretary, Chang Yu-feng, to give up the dead Chairman's papers and confidential documents. Chang complied but reported the incident to Wang Tung-hsing, director of the office where the Party documents and Mao's papers were kept. Wang tried unsuccessfully to retrieve the documents from Chiang Ching,43 and so he finally went to Hua Kuo-feng. When Hua instructed Chiang Ching to return those documents, she allegedly telephoned him and shouted: "You want to throw me out when the Chairman's remains have not yet turned cold! Is this the way to show your gratitude for the kindness of the Chairman who promoted you?" He replied: "I will never forget Chairman Mao's kindness . . . as to throwing you out, I have no such intention. You live peacefully in your own house, no one will dare to drive you out."44 Hua did get the documents back but not, it seems, before some of them had been tampered with. (ii) Forging Mao's "last words" If the story told in Peking can be trusted, the radicals fabricated Mao's so-called "adjuration" as their first move to usurp power. The catchphrase "Act according to the principles laid down", which the radicals claimed to have been taken from Mao's final testimony, first appeared in a joint editorial of the radical-controlled press on 16 September 1976. From 17 September on, various propaganda organs controlled by the radicals directed their energies towards repeating and publicising Mao's "last words", which were described as a "masterly generalisation and incisive summary of the historical experience of our Party and the entire international Communist Party" and an "everlasting guide for our continuous advance in this generaton and the next. . . ." The date on which Mao's "last words" first appeared in the newspapers was significant: it was several days after the publication of the leadership's "message to the whole Party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country", which informed the nation of Mao's death, and shortly before the date set for a memorial ceremony at which Hua Kuo-feng was to deliver the eulogy. No mention of Mao's supposed adjuration had been made in the "message", and the radicals knew in advance that there was no intention of mentioning it in the eulogy either. By publicising Mao's last words separately

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in the media under their control, the radicals, or so their detractors have claimed, tried to give the impression that Hua and other leaders had concealed Mao's "last words" from the public and that they alone were the messengers and defenders of Mao's last wish." At a meeting of the politburo towards the end of September, some Party officials were said to have criticised the radicals for their insidious propaganda. On 2 October Hua Kuo-feng personally deleted the sentence "Act according to the principles laid down" from a prepared text for a speech that foreign minister Chiao Kuan-hua was to give at the United Nations, and penned in these words: "I have checked it. . . . What Chairman Mao wrote and what I relayed to the politburo is `Act in line with past principles'. I have struck out the sentence to prevent the erroneous version from being disseminated."47 Meanwhile, the radicals directed their followers in Peking to distribute the mimeographed text of Mao's purported testament. According to a copy of this seen in Hong Kong at the end of September, Mao, in a meeting with Hua Kuo-feng, Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Tung-hsing and a few others in June 1976, said he would be "seeing God soon", expressed his wish to be buried in his hometown in Hunan, and requested the leaders present to assist Chiang Ching in "hoisting the Red Flag"." It seems likely that Mao did in fact leave some kind of testament at his death, but that the version distributed by the radicals was not the original one—which would explain why they did not wish to publish it in full in the press. But, by distributing their mimeographed version, they were evidently trying to cast doubt on Hua's claim to be Mao's chosen successor. (iii) Stepping up the campaign against the "chieftain of the revisionist line" When Hua took issue with the alleged "adjuration" of Mao Tse-tung by striking out the sentence "Act according to the principles laid down", the wily Chang Chun-chiao came forward and suggested that, in order to "avoid unnecessary complications", Hua's comments on the document should not be relayed to the lower levels.49 Chiang Ching promptly voiced support. But two days later, on 4 October, the radicals published an article under the pseudonym "Liang Hsiao" entitled "Forever act according to the principles laid down" which contained a thinly-veiled attack on Hua and accused him of tampering with the "principles laid down". It stated: "Tampering with the principles laid down by Chairman Mao means betraying Marxism, betraying socialism and betraying the great theory of continuing the

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