Catholicism and Nationalism: Changing Nature of Party Politics

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Catholicism and Nationalism: Changing Nature of Party Politics

Table of contents :
Contents......Page 2
Preface......Page 3
Abbreviations......Page 4
Introduction......Page 5
1 Nationalism and Catholicism: Concepts and processes......Page 10
2 National Catholicism and the church under authoritarian regimes......Page 17
3 The church political strategies during the transition......Page 27
4 The impact of church strategies on party system consolidation and survival of National Catholicism......Page 34
5 The outcome: The reformulation of the nationalist discourses in Spain and Poland......Page 44
6 Conclusion......Page 53
References......Page 54
Index......Page 61

Citation preview

9 Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory Mathew Humphrey 10 Reinventing the Italian Right Territorial politics, populism and 'post-Fascism' Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella 11 Political Extremes An investigation into the history of terms and concepts from antiquity to the present Uwe Backes 12 The Populist Radical Right in Poland The patriots Raja! Pankowski 13 Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola Paul Furlong 14 Radical Left Parties in Europe Luke March 15 Counterterrorism in Turkey Policy choices and policy effects toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Mustafa Co~ar Una!

17 Rethinking the French New Right Alternatives to modernity Tamir Bar-On

Catholicism and Nationalism Changing nature of party politics

18 Ending Terrorism in Italy Anna Bull and Philip Cooke 19 Politics of Eugenics Productionism, population, and national welfare Alberto Spektorowski and Liza Saban

Madalena Meyer Resende

20 Democratic Extremism in Theory and Practice Power to the people Paul Lucardie 21 Populism in Western Europe Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands Teun Pauwels 22 Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia Anders Widfeldt 23 Catholicism and Nationalism Changing nature of party politics Madalena Meyer R esende

16 Class Politics and the Radical Right Edited by Jens Rydgren

I~ ~~o~;~:n~s~~up LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OXl4 4RN

Contents

and by Routledge 71 1 Third Avenue, New York, NY I0017 First issued in paperback 2016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an infonna business

© 20 15 Madalena Meyer Resende The right of Madalena Meyer Rcscnde to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs a nd Patent Act 1988.

List of figures Preface Abbreviations Introduction

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in a ny information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 13: 978-0-415-79367-4 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-67007-4 (hbk)

viii ix xi X lll

1

Nationalism and Catholicism: concepts and processes

2

National Catholicism and the church under authoritarian regimes

14

3

The church political strategies during the transition

34

4

The impact of church strategies on party system consolidation 48 and survival of National Catholicism

5

The outcome: the reformulation of the nationalist discourses in Spain and Poland

69

Conclusion

86

References Index

102

Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

6

89

Preface

Figure

1.1 Trajectories of church, parties and nationalism

3

My work on this book started several years ago in Lisbon and was finished in Berlin. T he book is at the intersection of distinct literatures: of religious actors as political agents, of political parties and of nationalism, and it aims at providing a coherent argument linking the three strands of scholarship. During the research and writing of the book I have been fortunate to have the support of mentors, colleagues and friends in academia, in Portugal, Britain and Germany. I started the project as a researcher at the Portuguese Institute for International Relations in Lisbon, where a conducive environment for research and creativity was established thanks to the commitment of Carlos Gaspar, who is partially responsible for the journey that led me to this book, and Nuno Severiano Teixeira. My colleagues and friends Isabel Alcario, Carmen Fonseca, Daniel Marcos a nd Monica Fonseca were a daily company who made the vicissitudes of research much more joyful. At the Department of Political Studies of the New University of Lisbon I later came to enjoy the privilege of a collegial environment of teaching and research. I would like to thank fust Jose Esteves Pereira and Pedro Tavares de Almeida for their support, but also my colleagues Marco Lisi, Tiago Moreirn de Sa, Catherine Moury, Rui Branco and Tiago Fernandes. As a guest researcher at Europa Universitaet Viadrina I profited from the helpful advice of Michael Minkenberg and the enthusiasm of Anja Hennig, who read several parts of the book and provided invaluable comments. Equally, I express my appreciation for the friendship of Miijam Kunkler, who has inspired my interest in the theme of religion and politics, and of Katarzyna and Jan Sk6rzynski, for their generous help and sharing of precious insights on the processes described in the book. I would also like to thank the editor of the series E x tremism and Democracy, Roger Eatwell, and the editorial assistants at Routledge, as

x Preface well as two anonymous reviewers for supporting the project from its early stages. Last, it is my family who have made it all possible. First, my parents Antero and Teresa Resende, who have been the pillars of our family. Last, Michael, my husband, who together with Sofia and Charlotte are the companions of many adventures throughout Europe. It is to them that this book is dedicated.

Abbreviations

ACNdP AP AWS

ccco

CD CiU ETA EU HOAC ISKK SAC KAW KIE KIK KLD KOR LPR PCE PDC PDP PiS PL PNV PO pp PSL PSOE PZPR RPR RSAWS SdRP

National A ssociation of Catholic Propagandists Popular Alliance Electoral Action Solidarity Workers' Commissions Christian Democrats [Catalan] Convergence and Union Basque Homeland and Freedom European Union Workers' Brotherhoods of the Catholic Action Catholic Church Statistical Institute Catholic Electoral Action Committee for European Integration Club of Catholic Intellectuals Coalition of Liberal Democrats Committee for the D efense of Workers League of Polish Families Spanish Communist Party Democratic Pact for Catalonia Christian Democratic Party Law and Justice Liberal Party Basque National Party Civic Platform Popular Party Polish Peasant Party Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Polish United Workers Party (Polish Communist Party) Movement for the Republic AWS Social Movement Social Democracy of the Polish Republic

xii Abbreviations SKL SLD UCD UD UDF

uw

ZChN

Conservative People's Party Democratic Left Alliance Union of Democratic Centre Union for Democracy Union for French Democracy Union for Freedom Christian National Union

Introduction

This book addresses the adaptation of nationalism to the sharing of sovereignty with other nations in supranational arrangements beyond the state, like the European Union, or with nations and nationalities within the state. The book compares the adaptation of nationalism in Spain, where a unified right-wing partially reconciled Spain with the Catalonian, Basque and Galician nationalisms, and Poland, where two opposed conceptions of nationalism divided the post-Solidarity right. The book relates the transformation of nationalism in Poland and Spain and the Catholic Church's interaction with political regimes in the second part of the 20th century. The main point of the book is that the decision of the Polish hierarchy to mobilize National Catholicism as a political identity in the early years of democracy had a lasting impact on the shape of the right wing and, ultimately, also on the consolidation of an introverted nationalism skeptical of European integration. The effects of the engagement of the Polish church with National Catholic forces appear more vivid when compared with the neutrality of the Spanish Catholic church regarding political parties during the transition. With no support from the Spanish hierarchy, Catholic political forces remained fragmented; the religious divide declined in political relevance and was no longer a source of disagreement among the right wing forces. The comparison between Spain and Poland highlights the importance of the politicization of religious identities for the development of party systems. Although the Catholic Church was a relevant actor in the transition to democracy of other countries in Southern and Central Europe, in no other case its social and political weight was of such high strategic importance for the fate of political divisions and the reformulation of nationalism. The comparative trajectory of the two cases serves as a fitting illustration of the causal relations between the

xiv Introduction trajectories of the church in Poland and Spain during the instauration, establishment and the demise of authoritarian regimes and the prominence of nationalist parties in opposition to European integration. Whereas the Polish church saw democracy as an opportunity to increase its authority after decades of persecution by the communist regime, in Spain the Catholic hierarchy, satisfied with its hegemonic position in social and cultural spheres but weary of its association with Franco, was willing to trade state privileges for freedom from political interference, and thus saw transition as an opportunity to disengage from the political sphere. The next pages summarize the key points of the trajectories of church and state interaction, and its effect on the shape of the party systems and the reform of introverted nationalism.

The interactions between the Polish church, political parties and nationalism The church response to the communist regime in Poland was determined by the resolve to survive the attack of a totalitarian atheist regime. In 1945, as Stalin imposed communist rule on Poland, the main strength of the church was the identification of Polish national survival with Catholicism and a renewed support for the church as a protector of the nation against foreign assault. Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries under communism, the church in Poland maintained a substantial degree of autonomy. After the crisis of communism in October 1956, the rehabilitated communist leader Stanislaw Gomulka established a pact with Cardinal Wyszynski. In exchange of freedom of cult, which the church used to strengthen its position, the regime won clerical support to stabilize the country. To mobilize the faithful the church started in 1960 the Novena of the Millennium, a program to prepare for the celebration of the millennium anniversary of the baptism of First Polish King Miesko I in 966. Inspired by the introverted National Catholic conceptions, the program postulated the primarily religious roots of the Polish nation and the role of the church as its protector against foreign attack. Because Cardinal Wyszynski consolidated church resistance to communism on nationalist grounds, the doctrinal changes of the Vatican Council II, in particular those regarding the independence of the religious and political spheres. Introverted nationalism was the basis of a protective attitude against Vatican interference on Polish affairs. Nevertheless, the Council strengthened the universalist and progressive faction of the Polish church, which had its basis on the Clubs

Introduction

xv

of Catholic Intellectuals (KJK) and their publications, legalized by the regime during the 1956 crisis. Due to its role in the Council, Karol Wojtyla, Archbishop of Krakow since 1964, became the author and protagonist of a universalist resistance to the regime: that communism infringed on Human Rights and was thus illegitimate. In the late sixties, partially as a result of Vatican Council II's influence, Catholic liberal lay groups grew stronger and politically more relevant (Gregg 2002: 60). In the pre-transition period the response of the church to communist repression was marked by the alliance with former Marxist dissidents estranged by the regime during the Warsaw student revolts of 1968. A loose anti-communist cooperation between the "Church and the Left" developed, involving new dissident organizations such as the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR). Left-wing intellectuals formed the core of KOR, but progressive Catholic clerics such as Father Jan Zieja were also founding members and the group had strong links with the Warsaw KIK (Osa 2003: 181). The election of Karol Wojtyla to the papacy in 1978 gave this anti-communist alliance a new thrust and a global dimension. The alliance of workers, the Catholic Church and the secular dissidents resulted in the creation of the Solidarity trade union in 1980, which caused a far-reaching mobilization of Polish society from its legalization in September 1980 until its legal extinction in December 198 1. During the 1980- 81 crisis the Polish church acted both as a supporter and as a mediator between Solidarity and the communist government. It can be argued, however, that the church's long-lasting impact on Solidarity was the joint formulation of a conception of f'riendly relations with other nations, which resulted in a reversal of Poland's historically strained relation with its neighbors during the democratic transition. After the imposition of martial law and the suppression of Solidarity in December 1981 , the Pope upheld the credibility of the underground opposition through his apostolic visits to Poland. The Polish church, despite the division between National Catholics and progressive universalists, was united in its plight against communism. In 1988 progressive bishops took the mediators in the negotiations with Solidarity and the church remained a key facilitator of agreements between the regime and the opposition during and after the round table negotiations. Between 1989 and 1993 Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski implemented a pro-European policy, resulting not only in the primacy of the policy of Polish membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions but also in the improvement of relations with neighboring nations. Skubiszewski's priority was the establishment of relations with Germany

xvi Introduction but, from 1991 to 1994, Polish diplomacy also signed bilateral treaties of friendship and good-neighborhood with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Both policies were based on Solidarity's formulation of a Polish extroverted nationalism. Although the church was an important source of Solidarity's universalist spirit, after the split between the liberal intelligentsia and Lech Wal~sa, the hierarchy engaged with National Catholics. The progressive intelligentsia's preference for a secular state went against the Polish church's strong resolve to use the opportunities offered by the transition to gain clerical authority over issues of morality and public affairs. Thus, the Episcopate took sides with Lech Wat~sa, arguing that he was the "real" Pole in the National Catholic tradition. In the October 1991 parliamentary elections the hierarchy supported National Catholic parties and the ' Catholic block' accounted for 25 percent of the parliamentary seats. Also, the church's direct influence on decision-makers, both during the ordinary legislative process and in the framing of the concordat and a new constitution contributed to the further politicization of religious issues. Left and liberal forces fo ught the Polish hierarchy and National Catholic political forces over the concession of extensive privileges to the church. The demand of extensive privileges was defended on the basis of National Catholic arguments, which portrayed the nation as a millennial community of Catholic Poles forged in war and under foreign occupation. Although the divide between National Catholics and liberal minded political elites continued to deepen in the late nineties, in the summer of 1996 the post-Solidarity forces formed a temporary alliance - the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS), to compete in the autumn 1997 elections. However, the heterogeneity of political forces prevented its consolidation. The demise of the AWS in 2001 cleared the way for the institutionalization of the division between liberal conservatives and National Catholics. The party of the twin brothers Kaczynski, the Law and Justice party (PiS), adopted the National Catholic mantle and a triad of liberal conservative politicians established the Civic Platform (PO). The PO and the PiS adopted opposing attitudes towards other nations and European integration; the PO's Europhilism contrasted with the PiS assigning to Poland the statute of a millennial Catholic nation fighting for survival against Russian and German enemies. The party's National Catholic identity was fu-st established in Jarostaw Kaczynski's programmatic speech at the party's National Constitutional Convention in 2003, and was further developed in the following

Introduction

xvn

decade. The two parties translated their national doctrines into foreign policy. Intense squandering with Poland's neighbors and skepticism towards European integration marked the PiS term in office (2005- 07), whereas the PO governments since 2007 restored the pro-European path of Polish foreign policy, turning Poland into an important partner of Germany in Europe.

The interactions between the Spanish church, political parties and nationalism In Spain, the political polarization of the Second Republic ( 1933- 1936) resulted in the mobilization of the church at the eve of the military coup of August 1936 against the threat posed by left-wing atheism. The violence against Catholic clerics during the early months of the war in the zones under Republican control further pushed the hierarchy to support Franco's military coup, and to legitimate it as a crusade against communist infidels. The only significant exception to the support of the church to Franco was the Basque church's support for the Republicans. The victory of the nationalist forces in 1939 resulted in the establishment of church privileges by the Franco regime, in what turned out to be a forty-year embrace of church and state. In 1942, as a consequence of the declining fate of the axis powers in World War II, Franco started to downgrade the Fascist elements in the Movimiento Nacional. To mitigate the international ostracism and isolation that the regime faced after the war, two months after the formal defeat of the Axis in May 1945, Franco performed a cabinet reshuffle in which he replaced influential Falangist ministers with Catholic figureheads and elevated National Catholicism to the regime's ideology (Payne 1978: 350- 367). The concordat between the Spanish state and the Vatican was signed in 1953, sealing the completion of a National Catholic regime, where the church was given political representation, social recognition and ideological hegemony over Spain. Franco gave the church a large set of privileges, such as mandatory canonical marriages for all Catholics and exemption from government taxation, and in return he obtained the right to name bishops and a veto over the appointments of all clerics. The Catholic hierarchy took full advantage of the new situation by re-establishing its position, in particular in those regions where it had lost ground during the Republic and the Civil War: Catalonia and the Basque country. The church was thus an instrument for the reestablishment of a "united, strong and free Spain" and continued to uphold the introverted rhetoric that positioned Catholic Spain against peripheral nationalisms.

xviii Introduction Despite the privileges granted to them, the Catholic hierarchy maintained a lingering skepticism towards National Catholic system, in particular towards Franco's control over clerical appointments. By the end of the fifties Catholic political groups constituted the backbone of the reformist wing of Franco's party, the Movimiento Nacional. The opposition of Basque Catholics to Franco's centralist model was equally a stumbling stone to the unity of Catholicism and the Spanish nation. In the late sixties the Vatican Council II brought doctrinal changes that strengthened the progressive groups within the Spanish clergy and laity (Linz 1991a: 166), and strenghened the aperturista wing of the Movimiento (Palomares 2005: 143). The abandon of the church doctrine stating that the state had special duties towards God undermined the legitimacy of the Franco regime, whereas the encouragement for the political engagement of the laity in Lumen Gentio resulted in the alliance of Catholics and the left wing. In the late sixties Pope Paul VI started using its veto over bishops' appointments to force a change in the Episcopal Conference, most crucially through support to the appointment of moderate reformer Archbishop Vicente Taranc6n as leader of the Spanish hierarchy. Despite the regime's power over the appointment of bishops Pope Paul VI forced the promotion of progressive clerics to auxiliary bishops in vacant dioceses. In 1971 these bishops were given the right to vote in the Episcopal Conference and quickly proceeded to call a Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests, and issued the first statement condemning the association of the church with Franco. After assuming the chairmanship of the Episcopal Conference Taranc6n promoted the church's disengagement from the Franco regime, and the Episcopate became progressively a pro-democratic force, defending that a plurality of political opinions could be derived from faith (Patino 1984: 164). Although conservative counterforces in the church, such as the Opus Dei, tried to oppose the reformist trend and attempted to form a National Catholic political party, with no support from the Spanish hierarchy nor the Vatican, the effort was unrewarded. On the eve of the transition the combination of lay opposition movements, the Catholic political elite in the semi-opposition, the Basque nationalist priests and the majority of the bishops wider the leadership of Cardinal Taranc6n made the chmch an important pro-democratic actor. Crucially, the church was willing to exchange the privileges obtained under Franco for the freedom to devote itself to its religious function. Despite its intense political role during the first half of the 1970s, the hierarchy of the Spanish church took the transition as an opportunity to disengage from politics, in particular by abandoning the project of

Introduction

x1x

creating a strong confessional party. This was a crucial step because Christian democrats, although being central actors among the semiopposition and holding key ministerial positions in the transitional government of Adolfo Suarez (July 1976-June 1977), were also extremely fragmented. Without the weight of the hierarchy to sway them into one party, these forces remained divided and weak. During the negotiation of the new democratic constitution (AugustSeptember 1977) the hierarchy supported church disestablishment and the Episcopate used caution and restraint when arguing for the church recognition. The result was a mitigated secularism where religious freedom was guaranteed and the role of the church acknowledged. The framers of the 1978 constitution also reached a partial compromise on the territorial formula, although the ambiguities, internal contradictions and omissions in the constitutional provisions resulted in an incomplete settlement. By failing to distinguish properly the historical nationalities (Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia) from the remaining regions, the constitution left the final form of the territorial organization to be decided by ordinary politics. A hybrid semi-federal regime where all regional autonomies gained similar powers took form through secondary legislation, leaving Catalan and Basque unsatisfied. The second pillar of the National Catholic system - a centralized state - was replaced by a semi-federal system. The pacification of both the secular-religious and the center-periphe1y conflicts was concomitant with the victory of a center-right coalition of Christian democrats, liberals and nationalists, the Union of Democratic Centre (UCO), in the June 1977 parliamentary elections. Although the UCO disintegrated in 1981, the party played a crucial role in resolving the conflicts between liberals, Christian democrats and nationalists and provided a model for a future center-right party. The ex-Francoist Allianza Popular replaced the UCO as the largest right-wing party in the 1982 elections with 25 percent of the vote. In 1989 the AP transformed into the Partido Popular (PP) - a coalition of center-right forces that rupeated the UCD's formula (minus de social democrats). A young liberal oonservative politician, Jose Maria Azna1~ was elected party leader. In the PP the balance of power tilted in favor of the liberal reformist l'aucuses, thus allowing Aznar to reformulate Spanish conservative nntionalism, and reaching out to the Basque National Party (PNV) 11 11d the Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU). In the likely scenario 111' the party winning the 1996 national elections but not reaching 11bsolute majority, the PP would need the support of the PNV and the < 'iU. The new centrist platform showed that the national and religious

xx Introduction divisions had faded and confirmed the temporary formula of the UCO (minus the social democrats) could be repeated. The PP thus initiated an ideological revision of Spanish nationalism based on extroverted principles: the party now postulated that Spain was not threatened by the autonomy granted to the regions in the 1978 constitution. Regional autonomy was thus compatible, and could even be beneficial, to Spain's development. The ideological revisionism of Aznar was, however, only partial, and fell short of recognizing the peripheral nationalities as political entities. Aznar reconciled Spanish conservatives with the 'state of the autonomies' - the symmetric semifederal state born out of the constitutional formula. Aznar anchored the reform of Spanish nationalism by invoking prominent political and intellectual personalities of the first half of the 20th century. The party remained reserved about a complete federalization proposed by the Catalan and Basque nationalists. After winning an absolute majority of seats in the March 2000 parliamentru·y elections, and in face of the growing pressure for devolving powers to the regions, the PP added civic elements to its narrative of Spanish nationalism and stressed that no further devolution of powers was necessary. Spanish modern and civic nationalism was conflated with freedom and democracy, whereas peripheral nationalisms were accused of being based on ethnic and anti-liberal conceptions. Despite all the caveats to the PP's revision of conservative centralist state, the party effectively buried the faded cleavage between introverted National Catholics and extroverted nationalists within the Spanish right.

Conclusion The Catholic Church's political involvement during and after the democratic transition had a relevant effect on the survival of introverted nationalist forces in Poland. In Spain, partially due to the withdrawal of church support to political groups favoring the introverted nationalist cause, National Catholic forces declined and became irrelevant. During the transition the Spanish church abandoned National Catholicism both as a model for church-state relations and for the relations between Spain and its historical nationalities. The downgrading of the religious and national divisions during the transition and in its aftermath enabled liberals, Christian democrats and exFrancoist nationalists to form a broad coalition in a center-right party in the late 1980s. This party would then proceed to reformulate Spanish nationalism .

In troduction

xxi

The political withdrawal of the Spanish church after Franco's death contrasts with the involvement of the Polish Catholic Church with the National Catholic forces after the split of Solidarity in 1990. Church political activities contributed to the deepening of the religious cleavage and the survival of National Catholic political forces. Although a temporary alliance between liberals and National Catholics was formed between 1997 and 2001 , the animosities between the groups ran deep. When the accession negotiations with the EU began in 1997 the differences between National Catholics' introverted nationalism and liberals' extroverted attitudes to European integration came to light. The splinter parties resulting from the AWS's implosion, the PO and the PiS, were divided by their different conception of relations with other nations and Eurnpean integration.

1

Nationalism and Catholicism Concepts and processes

In the process of forming a party, Polish and Spanish conservative political elites faced the task of reforming the legacies of National Catholicism, the dominant right-wing ideology in both countries during most of the 20th century. In both countries the prominence of ational Catholicism led to an identification of the nation with the C'atholic faith, and the submission of Catholic universalism to the logic of an introverted nationalism that opposes sharing sovereign ty, either with other nations and nationalities within the state or with forces beyond the state. This book compares the formulation and reformulation of Catholic Nationalism in Spain and Poland before, during and 11f'ter their transitions to democracy in 1975 and 1989. In Spain rightwing political elites pursued this transformation, and conservative forces l'Ume to partly accommodate the devolution of significant power to the regions and integration into the European Union. In Poland, introv1.>11ted National Catholicism remained an important political identity, "lt11>picious of both internal and external constraints on national "IOVereignty. The revisionism of National Catholicism will be studied as part of the process of forming a center-right political party and its identity as 111111bling conditions for the reformulation of introverted National < 'ntholicism and, in particula r, its impact on the political strategy of t ltc church and its interaction with political forces, in particular N11Lional Catholics. Crucially, National Catholics-in Poland within lltc Solidarity movement, in Spain among the ex-Franco elite-were 1111portant actors during the transitions. Their presence among center11~1ht groups- and their opposition to European integration or the 1 lt•volution of powers to the regions- was a roadblock in the process of p,111ty formation. In Spain, liberal conservatives led the formation of 11 Iller-right parties and absorbed the National Catholic forces, result1111& in the reconciliation of nationalism with the sharing of sovereignty.

2 Concepts and processes In Poland, National Catholicism survived as an elite identity and fostered a division with liberals, resulting in the deepening rather than the reform of introverted nationalist conceptions. The book takes the comparison between the two countries as an opportunity to shed light on the impact of the Catholic Church's strategies on party formation in new democracies (Casanova 1994; Kalyvas 1996; Warner 2000), and sees the hierarchy's ambitions as crucial for the politicization of National Catholicism. To explain the church's strategies in Spain and Poland, the analysis starts by characterizing the positions in which the religious hierarchies found themselves in the democratic transitions of the two countries. In Poland, the communist regime (19451989) tried to suppress the church, and barely tolerated it as a spiritual force. In Spain the Franco regime (1939- 1975) was built on a coalition of church and state where National Catholicism was the dominant ideology. Before and during the democratic transitions, the Spanish church was a status quo institution, while the Polish church was a frontline warrior. In Poland, the church's political involvement made it a supporter of National Catholic political groups such as the Christian National Union (ZChN). In contrast, the Spanish Catholic hierarchy under Cardinal Taranc6n decided to disengage from politics and maintain equal contacts with all political forces, rather than supporting a particular political sector. This significantly weakened the ideological and organizational strength of nationalist conservatives, who defended the centralization of power in Madrid and ultimately created the conditions for the emergence of a coalition between liberal reformists and nationalist conservatives, where the latter carried out the transformation of Spanish nationalism, in particular in its relations with the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalities. The book thus links the trajectories of church, nationalist parties and types of nationalism from the authoritarian period to the consolidation of party systems a nd the reform of nationalism. Figure 1.1 summarizes the argument.

Church trajectories and the formation of political parties The book follows the steps of institutional scholars, whose research has dealt with the way intermediating institutions shape different reactions to historic trends and events. The formation of political parties and party systems is one field where the literature on tl1e effects of intermediating institutions in shaping outcomes is most developed. Several prominent scholars have dwelt on the role of religious institutions in providing a setting for the formation of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage theo1y set the path for other institutionalist scholars studying the impact of

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vwC?t2-·!°' ._ ]&.go-€garding other nations' intentions, and thus shun the joint exercise of "nvereign powers. In this account the authors tend to see the state as a protective shell regarding the ethnic community.

8

Concepts and processes

There are, however, authors of the ethnic school who hold a more nuanced assessment of the nation's relations with other nations. Anthony Smith, in Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism (2009), straddles the civic/ethnic division, by considering the importance of ethnic communities as the basis for the emergence of nations, but nevertheless stresses the importance of the period of modernization and mobilization for the formation of modern nations. Smith thus considers that during the period of national mobilization more than one ethnic group may claim national status within a state, thus yielding on a strict congruence between nation and state in the classic pledge of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805- 72) "every nation a state- only one state for an entire nation" (Smith 1999: 60). It can be inferred that Smith considers that nationalists do not always strive for exclusive sovereignty, but accept arrangements implying the sharing of state powers. Smith's work shows that, despite some analogies between the two types, introverted nationalism is independent from the ethnic/primordialist theories of nationalism. Introverted nationalism is solely characterized by its defensive attitude towards other nations and the defense of the congruence between the national and state sovereignty, whereas the ethnic conceptions of the national community are concerned primarily with the internal composition of the nation, and only secondarily with attitudes towards other nations. The spelling of the introverted/extroverted categories contributes to a conceptual clarification of nationalism by limiting and defining the scope of the civic/ethnic types of nationalism. As several authors have claimed, the overuse of the civic/ethnic typology has led to a conceptual overstretch which makes it difficult to distinguish the limits of the two categories (Conversi 2002; Diez-Medrano 1995; Keating 1996, 2000). Other authors point that, in practice, nationalist discourses frequently combine civic and ethnic elements (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). Hence, by extricating the external (introverted/extroverted) dimension of nationalism from the internal dimension (civic/ethnic), increase the precision of both concepts. More specifically, by showing that the attitudes regarding European integration or the federalization of the state can be partially delinked from the discourse on the internal composition of nations, the book contributes to a conceptual clarification of the national phenomena.

Concepts and processes

9

processes of nation formation in Europe (see Brubaker 1992). The relation with other nations has been an element of national discourses, since the mobilization of ethnic identities into modem nations. This dimension of national identity was particularly prominent in the processes of nation formation in Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th century was the turf of conflicts between emerging nationalisms and the different centers of authority of the Hapsburg, the Russian and the Prussian Empires. Because these national movements had to choose between full independence in separate nation-states and accommodation with other nations within a federal state, some national doctrines emerging in the region chose the latter by formulating a friendly attitude towards other nations. National movements within the Hapsburg Empire illustrate the importance of extroverted views of relations with other nations: Hlongside political forces demanding independence and the dissolution of the Empire, there were nationalist movements which, although preH