Castle-talks on Cross-Border Cooperation: Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border 9783515120081

Table of contents :
Table of Contents / Table des matières / Inhaltsverzeichnis
(BIRTE WASSENBERG)
Foreword / Avant-Propos / Vorwort
(ULI, HARALD & THOMAS LEIBRECHT)
Castle-talks at Pourtalés / Castle-talks à Pourtalès / Castle-talks in Pourtalès
(BIRTE WASSENBERG)
Introduction / Introduction / Einleitung
PRELIMINARY PART: BORDERS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION / FRONTIÈRES, RELATIONS
INTERNATIONALES ET COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE /
GRENZEN, INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN UND
GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT
(JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER)
International Relations and Area Studies / Relations Internationales
et Area Studies / Internationale Beziehungen und Area Studies
(BERNARD REITEL)
Cross-Border Cooperation and International Relations: Towards the
Emergence of a Cross-Border Regime?
(EMMANUEL BRUNET-JAILLY) Borders and Border Disputes in the European Union
PART 1: BORDERS AND GOVERNANCE : A NEW FOREIGN
POLICY ? / FRONTIÈRES ET GOUVERNANCE: UNE NOUVELLE
POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE? / GRENZEN UND GOVERNANCE :
EINE NEUE AUßENPOLITIK ?
(KARL-HEINZ LAMBERTZ)
Cross-Border Governance in Europe: A New Foreign Policy?
(JOACHIM BECK)
Territorial Institutionalism and the European Administrative Space.
A Conceptual Framing for Capturing the Institutional Dynamics of
Cross-Border Cooperation
(CHRISTOPHER HUGGINS)
Building Cross-Border Governance in the Channel / La Manche Region:
Successes and Failures
(MARCIN KRYMUSKI/PETER ULRICH)
Actor´s Participation in Cross-Border Governance Structures at the
German-Polish Border. Case Studies from the Viadrina Region
(HYNEK BÖHM)
Networks As Functional New Micro-diplomacy Tools Supporting Crossborder
Co-operation: Evidence and Lessons from Czech-Slovak Border
PART 2: BORDERS: THE GATEKEEPERS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
SECURITY / FRONTIÈRES : LES GARDIENS DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET
DE LA SÉCURITÉ / GRENZEN: DIE WÄCHTER DER SOUVERÄNITÄT
UND SICHERHEIT
(WALTER SPINDLER)
Welcome Speech: Borders – Security and Geopolitical Aspects
(ANTOINE ULLESTAD)
Protecting the Security of the EU through its External Borders
(JAUME CASTAN PINOS)
Conflicts over Sovereignty in Europe in the so-called Post-Sovereignty Era
(MANUEL FRIESECKE)
The Pertinence of the External EU Border: A Swiss Point of View
PART 3: BORDERS, THE “SCARS” OF HISTORY OR PLACES OF
RECONCILIATION? / FRONTIÈRES, LES « CICATRICES » DE
L’HISTOIRE OU LIEUX DE RÉCONCILIATION?/ GRENZEN, DIE
„NARBEN“ DER GESCHICHTE ODER VERSÖHNUNGSORTE?
(GERHARD BESIER)
Mental Borders Create Limited Minds: How to Overcome Prejudices,
Stereotypes and Concepts of an “Enemy” in the Second Decade of the
21rst Century
(BIRTE WASSENBERG)
The Rhine: A Border of Peace? Memories from Key Players in the Upper
Rhine Region
(BERNHARD KÖPPEN)
Beyond “Erbfeind” and after Reconciliation. Shopping? A Comparative Study
on French-German and Polish-German Cross-Border Tourism as a Common,
Integrative Routine
(BEATA HALICKA)
The Polish-German Border: A Laboratory of Transnational Cooperation
(KATARZYNA STOKLOSA)
The Finnish-Russian Border between Myth and Reality
PART 4: BORDER CONFLICTS, BARRIERS AND RESISTANCE TO
INTEGRATION / CONFLITS FRONTALIERS, BARRIÈRES ET RÉSISTANCE
À L’INTÉGRATION / GRENZKONFLIKTE, BARRIEREN UND
WIDERSTAND GEGEN INTEGRATION
(JEAN PEYRONY)
Integration in Cross-Border Regions: Obstacles and Solutions
(ANNE THEVENET)
Capacity-Building as a Tool to Overcome Obstacles in Border Regions.
The TEIN Approach
(JORDI CICRES & SÍLVIA LLACH)
The Role of Languages in Cross-Border Cooperation: Obstacle or
Opportunity?
(ANDY POLLAK)
Irish-British Relations, 1998–2012: From Provincial Conflict to European
Tensions
(RUTH TAILLON)
Cross-Border Cooperation and Peace-Building in Ireland
(ALESSANDRO TORELLO)
Barriers to the Bulgarian Cross-Border Cooperation with Rumania
(ADRIANA DORFMAN)
Smuggling in Sant’ana Do Livramento (Brazil) – Rivera (Uruguay):
Unification, Mirroring and Difference Processes and Transitional Dispositives
in Border Condition
ANNEXES /ANHÄNGE /APPENDICES
LES AUTEURS/ DIE AUTOREN/AUTHORS
CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE « ÉTUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION
EUROPÉENNE »
ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN DER GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“
ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION”

Citation preview

Castle-talks on Cross-Border Cooperation Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border Edited by Birte Wassenberg

SGEI – SHEI – EHIE

EI SGEI EI SHEI HIE EHIE Geschichte

Franz Steiner Verlag

Castle-talks on Cross-Border Cooperation Edited by Birte Wassenberg

Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) Études sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE) Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) Band / Volume 32 Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert In Verbindung mit / In cooperation with / En coopération avec Charles Barthel / Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussière / Antonio Costa Pinto / Desmond Dinan / Michel Dumoulin / Michael Gehler / Brian Girvin / Wolf D. Gruner / Wolfram Kaiser / Laura Kolbe / Johnny Laursen / Wilfried Loth / Piers Ludlow / Maria Grazia Melchionni / Enrique Moradiellos Garcia / Sylvain Schirmann / Antonio Varsori / Tatiana Zonova

Castle-talks on Cross-Border Cooperation Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border

Edited by Birte Wassenberg as Part of her Jean Monnet Chair and Project Activities

Franz Steiner Verlag

Publié avec le concours de l’Université de Strasbourg.

Umschlagabbildung: Château de Pourtalès, Straßburg (mit freundlicher Genehmigung) Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2018 Druck: Bosch Druck, Ergolding Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-12008-1 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12018-0 (E-Book)

Table of Contents / Table des matières / Inhaltsverzeichnis BIRTE WASSENBERG Foreword / Avant-Propos / Vorwort .....................................................................

9

ULI, HARALD & THOMAS LEIBRECHT Castle-talks at Pourtalés / Castle-talks à Pourtalès / Castle-talks in Pourtalès

19

BIRTE WASSENBERG Introduction / Introduction / Einleitung ...............................................................

25

PRELIMINARY PART: BORDERS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION / FRONTIÈRES, RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE / GRENZEN, INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN UND GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER International Relations and Area Studies / Relations Internationales et Area Studies / Internationale Beziehungen und Area Studies .......................

59

BERNARD REITEL Cross-Border Cooperation and International Relations: Towards the Emergence of a Cross-Border Regime? ...................................................................

69

EMMANUEL BRUNET-JAILLY Borders and Border Disputes in the European Union ..........................................

85

PART 1: BORDERS AND GOVERNANCE : A NEW FOREIGN POLICY ? / FRONTIÈRES ET GOUVERNANCE: UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE? / GRENZEN UND GOVERNANCE : EINE NEUE AUßENPOLITIK ? KARL-HEINZ LAMBERTZ Cross-Border Governance in Europe: A New Foreign Policy? ............................

103

JOACHIM BECK Territorial Institutionalism and the European Administrative Space. A Conceptual Framing for Capturing the Institutional Dynamics of Cross-Border Cooperation ........................................................................................

109

CHRISTOPHER HUGGINS Building Cross-Border Governance in the Channel / La Manche Region: Successes and Failures ...............................................................................................

137

6

Table des matières – Inhaltsverzeichnis – Table of contents

MARCIN KRYMUSKI/PETER ULRICH Actor´s Participation in Cross-Border Governance Structures at the German-Polish Border. Case Studies from the Viadrina Region ........................

153

HYNEK BÖHM Networks As Functional New Micro-diplomacy Tools Supporting Crossborder Co-operation: Evidence and Lessons from Czech-Slovak Border ..........

183

PART 2: BORDERS: THE GATEKEEPERS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY / FRONTIÈRES : LES GARDIENS DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ / GRENZEN: DIE WÄCHTER DER SOUVERÄNITÄT UND SICHERHEIT WALTER SPINDLER Welcome Speech: Borders – Security and Geopolitical Aspects ..........................

201

ANTOINE ULLESTAD Protecting the Security of the EU through its External Borders ..........................

219

JAUME CASTAN PINOS Conflicts over Sovereignty in Europe in the so-called Post-Sovereignty Era ....

239

MANUEL FRIESECKE The Pertinence of the External EU Border: A Swiss Point of View .....................

253

PART 3: BORDERS, THE “SCARS” OF HISTORY OR PLACES OF RECONCILIATION? / FRONTIÈRES, LES « CICATRICES » DE L’HISTOIRE OU LIEUX DE RÉCONCILIATION?/ GRENZEN, DIE „NARBEN“ DER GESCHICHTE ODER VERSÖHNUNGSORTE? GERHARD BESIER Mental Borders Create Limited Minds: How to Overcome Prejudices, Stereotypes and Concepts of an “Enemy” in the Second Decade of the 21rst Century ...............................................................................................................

265

BIRTE WASSENBERG The Rhine: A Border of Peace? Memories from Key Players in the Upper Rhine Region ...............................................................................................................

281

BERNHARD KÖPPEN Beyond “Erbfeind” and after Reconciliation. Shopping? A Comparative Study on French-German and Polish-German Cross-Border Tourism as a Common, Integrative Routine ....................................................................................................

295

BEATA HALICKA The Polish-German Border: A Laboratory of Transnational Cooperation .........

305

KATARZYNA STOKLOSA The Finnish-Russian Border between Myth and Reality ......................................

321

Table des matières – Inhaltsverzeichnis – Table of contents

7

PART 4: BORDER CONFLICTS, BARRIERS AND RESISTANCE TO INTEGRATION / CONFLITS FRONTALIERS, BARRIÈRES ET RÉSISTANCE À L’INTÉGRATION / GRENZKONFLIKTE, BARRIEREN UND WIDERSTAND GEGEN INTEGRATION JEAN PEYRONY Integration in Cross-Border Regions: Obstacles and Solutions ...........................

331

ANNE THEVENET Capacity-Building as a Tool to Overcome Obstacles in Border Regions. The TEIN Approach ...................................................................................................

347

JORDI CICRES & SÍLVIA LLACH The Role of Languages in Cross-Border Cooperation: Obstacle or Opportunity? ..............................................................................................................

369

ANDY POLLAK Irish-British Relations, 1998–2012: From Provincial Conflict to European Tensions .......................................................................................................................

389

RUTH TAILLON Cross-Border Cooperation and Peace-Building in Ireland ...................................

397

ALESSANDRO TORELLO Barriers to the Bulgarian Cross-Border Cooperation with Rumania ..................

407

ADRIANA DORFMAN Smuggling in Sant’ana Do Livramento (Brazil) – Rivera (Uruguay): Unification, Mirroring and Difference Processes and Transitional Dispositives in Border Condition ...................................................................................................

427

ANNEXES /ANHÄNGE /APPENDICES ABBRÉVIATIONS /ABKÜRZUNGEN/ABBREVIATIONS ET SIGLES ............................... LES AUTEURS/ DIE AUTOREN/AUTHORS ..................................................................

445

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE « ÉTUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE » .............................................................................................................

453

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN DER GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ .......

454

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” ......

455

FOREWORD CASTLE-TALKS ON CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION BIRTE WASSENBERG The “Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation” were first introduced in 2012– 2013, in the framework of my Jean Monnet Chair on the contribution of crossborder cooperation to the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Chair’ objective was to develop new teaching modules in Border Studies at the Institut d’études politiques (IEP) of the University of Strasbourg, especially for the Master 1 in Etudes interdisciplinaires européennes (Interdisciplinary European Studies) and the Master 2 in Relations Internationales et processus d’intégration régionale (International Relations and Processes of Regional Integration). As co-head of the Master 2, responsible for the section on cross-border cooperation and as a visiting professor and member of the CEPA foundation at the château Pourtalès, which offers study abroad programs for American students, I had the idea to create a forum of discussion on cross-border cooperation at the château between the European students of my Master 2 and the American students of the CEPA program. The aim of the “castle-talks” was to deepen research and to encourage interest of young researchers for the field of Border Studies. Indeed, there are only very few Master programs specialized in the subject. My Jean Monnet Chair aimed at filling in this gap: the castle-talks were conceived as interdisciplinary research seminars, which were to be organized yearly at the Pourtalès Castle in Strasbourg, as a cooperation project between the IEP and the US-CEPA program. The title “Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation” was invented at the second seminar, in December 2013, on “Borders and Governance”. Key note speaker Karl-Heinz Lambertz, then Minster-President of the German Community of Belgium, talked about “the contribution of cross-border cooperation to foreign policy”. He mentioned that, “in the past history of Europe, Foreign policy has often been discussed in castles” and that, maybe “a castle ghost at the château Pourtalès” was listening to these talks on cross-border cooperation”. The terminology was forged: from then onwards, the seminars were called “castle-talks on crossborder cooperation”. The concept of the castle-talks was as follows: the seminars presented an occasion both for researchers to present papers on a specific aspect of cross-border cooperation and for European and American students from the Master 2 on International Relations of the IEP in Strasbourg, the University West Virginia and Georgia State University to exchange on these subjects. The idea was also to draw from this experience and open up the seminars to other scientific disciplines and researchers coming from other border regions in the world. The encounter between European and American Master students and young researchers/PhD candidates presented an ideal framework for a fruitful interdisciplinary discussion on cross-border cooperation.

10

BIRTE WASSENBERG

However, progressively, this concept of the “castle-talks” evolved. Indeed, the seminars at the château Pourtalès were successively linked to three initiatives which gradually changed their character: The first to be mentioned is the excellence initiative IDEX “The European Integration and the New anti-Europeanism” of the University of Strasbourg’s research unit Dynamiques européennes (UMR) and the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). This project for the period 2013–2015, which was also supported by Airbus, focused its research on Euroscepticism, a phenomenon which is also largely palpable in European border regions1. Several castle-talks were therefore dedicated to this topic, especially to the consequences of the different crises at EU-borders for cross-border cooperation and of the problem of the “pertinence” of the border. After the end of the period of my Jean-Monnet chair in 2016, I then continued to organize the “castletalks” in the framework of two other Jean Monnet activities I take part in: a Jean Monnet project on “conflict and cooperation at European borders” which I obtained for the period 2017–2018 and a Jean Monnet network on “Borders and migration”, which has been set up under the leadership of Emmanuel BrunetJailly from the University of Victoria in Canada and which brings together researchers from Japan, Canada, Turkey and the EU. The “castle-talks” are now organized each semester (twice a year) and they last for two days, one being focused more on research, with presentations by specialists from universities and research centers and one on teaching, with working group presentations by European and American students. This volume publishes the results of the four first castle-talks organized between 2012–2016: – Cross-border Cooperation and International Relations (6 December 2012) – Borders and Governance (3 December 2013) – Fear of Integration: The Pertinence of the Border (8–9 December 2014) – The Border: Source of Conflict or a Place of Reconciliation? (7–8 December 2015). I would like to express my gratitude to several partners and institutions, without whom the castle-talks could not have been realized. First, the CEPA foundation and its founders, our hosts at the château Pourtalès, Uli and Harald Leibrecht, who have always supported my work actively and whose friendship I appreciate immensely. Second, the Transfrontier European Network (TEIN)2 based at the Euro1

2

Four books have been published : LIBERA, M., SCHIRMANN, S., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016 ; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I. The 2014 European Election: the Rise of Anti-Europeanism in Western Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016, MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II. The 2014 European election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III. Perceptions of External States on European Integration, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2017. Composed of: the IEP of Strasbourg, Centre for Cross Border Studies (Ireland), ICRESS (Université Perpignan), Université de Nice, University of Southern Denmark, University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Carinthia University of Applied Sciences (Austria), Viadrina Center Borders in Motion (Frankfurt/Oder, Germany) ; Anci/ForSer Friuli Venezia Giulia (Italy), Olza Association (Cieszyn, Poland), Institute EuroSchola (Trinec, Czech Republic), University of Applied Sciences and Euro-Institute of Kehl, Research Centre « Discontinuités » of the Université d’Arras/Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, University of Girona (Spain).

FOREWORD

11

institute Kehl3 whose members have participated, as researchers and specialists on cross-border cooperation in the different castle-talks thus largely contributing to the scientific excellence of the project. My special thanks in this respect goes to the Euro-institute deputy director and my friend Anne Thevenet, who has always helped with the conceptual and logistic organization of the seminars. This also counts for the other members of the Jean Monnet project steering committee, Joachim Beck, Bernard Reitel, Jean Peyrony and Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly. Without their help, the scientific excellence of the seminars would not have been possible. For the logistic organization, I also owe my gratitude to the CEPA team at the château, in particuar Mireille Schmitt and the team of the Fédération de recherché Europe en mutation, headed by my dear colleague Frédérique Berrod. Special thanks are to be addressed to Aurélie Kraft for the program conception and logistic organization and to Jocelyne Kautzmann for her financial management. Finally, I would like to mention the European Commission, especially the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet activities, the CNRS, the University of Strasbourg, my research unit Dynamiques européennes and Airbus, whose financial support largely contributed to the success of the castle-talks.

3

The Euro-Institute is a pluridisciplinary Franco-German further education body specialized in the study, research and expert council on cross-border cooperation in Europe.

PRÉFACE LES CONVERSATIONS AU CHÂTEAU SUR LA COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE Les « Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation » (conversations au château sur la coopération transfrontalière) ont débuté entre 2012 et 2013 dans le cadre de ma Chaire Jean Monnet sur la contribution de la coopération transfrontalière à la Politique Européenne de Voisinage (PEV). L’objectif de la Chaire était de développer de nouveaux modules d’enseignement des Etudes Transfrontalières à l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) de l’Université de Strasbourg, et en particulier pour le Master 1 en Etudes Interdisciplinaires Européennes et pour le Master 2 en Relations Internationales et Processus d’Intégration Régionale. En tant que codirectrice du Master 2 en charge de la section coopération transfrontalière et professeur associée et membre de la fondation CEPA au Château de Pourtalès qui propose des programmes d’échange pour des étudiants américains, j’ai eu l’idée de créer une plateforme d’échange sur la coopération transfrontalière au Château entre les étudiants européens de mon Master 2 et les étudiants américains du programme CEPA. Le but premier des « castle-talks » était d’approfondir la recherche dans le domaine des Etudes Transfrontalières et d’attiser l’intérêt de jeunes chercheurs pour ce qui ne fait que très peu l’objet de spécialisation de Master. Ma Chaire Jean Monnet avait donc pour objectif de pallier ce manque : les « castle-talks » ont été conçus sous forme de séminaires de recherche interdisciplinaires et organisés de manière annuelle au Château de Pourtalès à Strasbourg, comme projet de coopération entre l’IEP et le programme US-CEPA. Le titre « Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation » a émergé en décembre 2013 lors du second séminaire « Borders and Governance » (Frontières et Gouvernance). Durant ce séminaire, un des intervenants clés, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, alors Ministre-Président de la communauté allemande en Belgique, a évoqué « la contribution de la coopération transfrontalière dans la politique étrangère ». Il a aussi mentionné que, « dans le passé en Europe on discutait également politique étrangère dans des Châteaux » et qu’il se pourrait qu’un « fantôme de Château » eu écouté aux portes de ces séminaires sur la coopération transfrontalière. A partir de ce moment, la terminologie fut fixée : les séminaires allaient s’appeler « Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation ». Le concept des « castle-talks » était le suivant : les séminaires représentaient d’une part une opportunité pour les chercheurs de présenter leurs travaux sur un aspect précis de la coopération transfrontalière et d’autre part pour les étudiants européens et américains du Master 2 de Relations Internationales, de l’IEP de Strasbourg, de l’université de West Virginia et de l’université de Georgia State, une occasion pour échanger sur cette thématique. L’idée était aussi de tirer des conclusions de cette expérience et d’ouvrir ces séminaires à d’autres disciplines scientifiques et à d’autres chercheurs venant de différentes régions frontalières dans le monde. La rencontre entre des étudiants européens et américains de

FOREWORD

13

Master et de jeunes doctorants présenta un contexte idéal pour une discussion interdisciplinaire fructueuse sur la coopération transfrontalière. Cependant, ce concept de « castle-talks » a progressivement évolué. En effet, les séminaires au Château de Pourtalès ont été successivement rattachés à trois initiatives qui ont peu à peu changé leur nature (ou identité) : la première fut l’initiative d’excellence (IDEX) « The European Integration and the New anti-Europeanism » (L’Intégration européenne et le nouvel anti-européanisme) de l’Unité Mixte de Recherche (UMR) Dynamiques Européennes de l’Université de Strasbourg et du Centre de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). Entre 2013 et 2015, ce projet également soutenu par Airbus, a centré sa recherche sur l’euroscepticisme, un phénomène de plus en plus répandu dans les régions frontalières européennes4. Plusieurs « castle-talks » furent donc consacrées à ce sujet, et plus précisément aux conséquences que les différentes crises aux frontières européennes ont eu sur la coopération transfrontalière, et à la « pertinence » même de la frontière. Au terme de ma Chaire Jean Monnet en 2016, j’ai poursuivi le projet des « castletalks » dans le cadre de deux autres activités Jean Monnet auxquelles je participe : le projet Jean Monnet « Conflits et coopérations dans les régions frontalières de l’Union Européenne » que j’ai obtenu pour la période 2017-2018, et le réseau Jean Monnet « Frontières et migration », qui a été mis en place sous la direction d’Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly de l’Université de Victoria au Canada, et qui a réuni des chercheurs du Japon, du Canada, de la Turquie et de l’Union Européenne. Les « castle-talks » sont désormais organisés chaque semestre (deux fois par an) et durent deux jours, l’un étant plus focalisé sur la recherche avec des présentations faites par des spécialistes d’universités et de centres de recherches et l’autre plus axé sur l’enseignement, avec des présentations faites par des groupes de travails composés d’étudiants européens et américains. Ce volume présente les résultats des quatre premiers « castle-talks » organisés entre 2012 et 2016 : – Coopération transfrontalière et Relations Internationales (6 décembre 2012) – Frontières et gouvernance (3 décembre 2013) – Peur de l’intégration : la pertinence de la frontière (8–9 décembre 2014) – La frontière : source de conflit ou lieu de réconciliation ? (7–8 décembre 2015) Je souhaiterais exprimer ma gratitude envers plusieurs partenaires et institutions, sans lesquels les « castle-talks » n’auraient pas pu voir le jour. Tout d’abord, la fondation CEPA et ses fondateurs, nos hôtes au Château de Pourtalès, Uli et Harald Leibrecht, qui ont toujours soutenu mon travail de manière active et avec qui j’ai développé des liens d’amitié.

4

Quatre livres ont été publiés : LIBERA, M., SCHIRMANN, S., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016 ; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integra-tion and new Anti-Europeanism I. The 2014 European Election: the Rise of Anti-Europeanism in Western Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016, MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II. The 2014 European election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III. Perceptions of External States on European Integration, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2017.

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Ensuite, je souhaite remercier le Réseau Transfrontalier des Euro-Instituts (Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network, TEIN5), basé à l’Euro-Institut6 à Kehl et dont les membres ont participé aux différents « castle-talks » en qualité de chercheurs et spécialistes de la coopération transfrontalière et ont donc largement contribué à l’excellence scientifique du projet. J’adresse aussi mes remercîments particuliers à sa directrice adjointe et à mon amie Anne Thevenet, qui m’a toujours épaulé sur l’organisation logistique et conceptuelle des séminaires. Cela vaut aussi pour les autres membres du comité de pilotage du projet Jean Monnet Joachim Beck, Bernard Reitel, Jean Peyrony et Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly. Sans leur soutient, l’excellence scientifique des séminaires n’aurait pu être atteinte. Concernant l’organisation logistique, j’adresse mes remerciements à l’équipe CEPA du Château, et en particulier à Mirelle Schmitt et à l’équipe de la Fédération de recherche : L’Europe en mutation, dirigée par ma chère collègue Frédérique Berrod. Un remerciement tout spécial à l'endroit d’Aurélie Kraft pour la conception du programme et son appui à l’organisation logistique et à Jocelyne Kautzmann pour la gestion financière. Enfin, je voudrais mentionner la Commission Européenne, et en particulier les activités Erasmus+ Jean Monnet, le CNRS, l’Université de Strasbourg, l’unité de recherche Dynamiques Européennes et Airbus, dont le soutien financier a largement contribué au succès des « castle-talks ».

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Composé de: L‘IEP de Strasbourg, Centre for Cross Border Studies (Ireland), ICRESS (Université Perpignan), Université de Nice, University of Southern Denmark, University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Carinthia University of Applied Sciences (Austria), Viadrina Center Borders in Motion (Frankfurt/Oder, Germany) ; Anci/ForSer Friuli Venezia Giulia (Italy), Olza Association (Cieszyn, Poland), Institute EuroSchola (Trinec, Czech Republic), University of Applied Sciences and Euro-Institute of Kehl, Centre de recherche « Discontinuités » de l‘Université d’Arras/Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Université de Girona (Spain). L’Euro-Institut est un organisme franco-allemand de formation continue pluridisciplinaire spécialisé dans l’étude, la recherche et le conseil d’expertise sur la coopération transfrontalière en Europe.

VORWORT SCHLOSSGESPRÄCHE ÜBER GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT Die „Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation“ (Schlossgespräche über die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit) fanden erstmals in 2012–2013 im Rahmen meines Jean-Monnet-Lehrstuhls über den Beitrag der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit zur Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik statt. Das Ziel des Lehrstuhls war es, ein neues Lehrmodule im Bereich „Border Studies“ am Institut d’études politiques (IEP) der Universität Straßburg, insbesondere für den Master 1 Etudes interdisciplinaires européennes (Interdisziplinäre europäische Studien) und den Master 2 in Relations Internationales et processus d’intégration régionale (Internationale Beziehungen und Prozesse der regionalen Integration) einzuführen. Als stellvertretende Leiterin des Master 2 und verantwortlich für den Bereich grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und als Gastprofessorin und Mitglied der CEPA-Stiftung im Schloss Pourtalès, die Auslandsstudienprogramme für amerikanische Studenten anbietet, hatte ich die Idee ein Diskussionsforum über grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit auf dem Schloss zu organisieren und zwar zwischen den europäischen Studenten meines Meisters 2 und den amerikanischen Studenten des CEPA-Programms. Ziel der „castle-talks“ war es, die Forschung zu vertiefen und das Interesse junger Forscher für den Bereich der Grenzforschung zu fördern. Tatsächlich gibt es nur sehr wenige Master-Programme, die auf dieses Thema spezialisiert sind. Mein Jean-Monnet-Lehrstuhl zielte darauf ab, diese Lücke zu schließen: Die Schlossgespräche wurden als interdisziplinäre Forschungsseminare konzipiert, die jährlich auf dem Schloss Pourtalès in Straßburg als Kooperationsprojekt zwischen dem IEP und dem US-CEPA-Programm organisiert werden sollten. Der Titel „Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation“ wurde auf dem zweiten Seminar im Dezember 2013 über „Grenzen und Regierungsstrukturen“ festgelegt. Key-Note-Sprecher Karl-Heinz Lambertz, damals Ministerpräsident der Deutschen Gemeinschaft Belgiens, sprach über „den Beitrag der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit zur Außenpolitik“. Er erwähnte, dass „in der Geschichte Europas die Außenpolitik oft in Schlössern besprochen wurde“ und dass „vielleicht ein Schlossgespenst im Château Pourtalès die Gespräche über die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit belauscht“. Die Terminologie war geboren: Von nun an wurden die Seminare „Castle-talks on Cross-border Cooperation“ genannt. Das Konzept der „castle-talks“ war wie folgt: Die Seminare stellten eine Gelegenheit sowohl für Forscher dar, Papiere zu einem bestimmten Aspekt der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit vorzustellen, wie auch für europäische und amerikanische Studenten des Master 2 internationale Beziehungen des IEP in Straßburg, der Universität West Virginia und der Georgia State University, sich zu diesem Thema auszutauschen. Die Idee war auch, von dieser Erfahrung zu lernen und die Seminare für andere wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen und Forschern aus anderen Grenzregionen der Welt zu öffnen. Die Begegnung zwischen europäischen und amerikanischen Masterdstudenten und Nachwuchswissen-

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schaftlern/Doktoranden stellte einen idealen Rahmen für eine fruchtbare interdisziplinäre Diskussion über die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit dar. Doch schrittweise entwickelte sich das Konzept der „castle-talks“. Die Seminare im Château Pourtalès wurden sukzessiv mit drei Initiativen verknüpft, die allmählich ihren Charakter geändert haben: Als erstes ist hier die Exzellenzinitiative IDEX „Die europäische Integration und der neue Anti-Europäer“ der Forschungsanstalt der Universität Straßburg Dynamiques européennes (UMR) und dem Centre de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) zu nennen. Dieses Projekt, das auch von Airbus unterstützt wurde, war für den Zeitraum 2013–2015 bestimmt und konzentrierte seine Forschung auf den Euroskeptizismus, ein Phänomen, das auch in den europäischen Grenzregionen weitgehend fühlbar ist7. Mehrere Schlossgespräche widmeten sich daher diesem Thema und vor allem den Konsequenzen der verschiedenen Krisen an den EU-Grenzen für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und dem Problem der „Relevanz" der Grenze. Nach dem die Zeit meines Jean-Monnet-Lehrstuhls im Jahr 2016 zu Ende ging, habe ich weiterhin die „castle-talks” im Rahmen von zwei anderen Jean-Monnet-Aktivitäten organisiert: ein Jean-Monnet-Projekt zum Thema „Konflikt und Kooperation an Europäische Grenzen“, das ich für den Zeitraum 2017–2018 durchführen sollte, und ein Jean-Monnet-Netzwerk zum Thema „Grenzen und Migration“, das unter der Leitung von Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly von der University of Victoria in Kanada ins Leben gerufen wurde und das Wissenschaftler aus Japan, Kanada, die Türkei und die EU zusammenbringt. Die „castle-talks“ finden nun jedes Semester (zweimal jährlich) statt und dauern zwei Tage lang, wobei sich eins mehr auf die Forschung konzentriert, mit Präsentationen von Universitäten und Forschungszentren und das andere auf die Lehre mit Arbeitsgruppenpräsentationen von europäischen und amerikanische Studenten. Dieser Band veröffentlicht die Ergebnisse der vier ersten Schlossgespräche zwischen 2012–2016: – Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und internationale Beziehungen (6. Dezember 2012) – Grenzen und Governance (3. Dezember 2013) – Angst vor der Integration: Die Bedeutung der Grenze (8.–9. Dezember 2014) – Die Grenze: Konfliktquelle oder ein Ort der Versöhnung? (7.–8. Dezember 2015). Ich möchte mich bei mehreren Partnern und Institutionen bedanken, ohne die die Schlossgespräche nicht hätte realisiert werden können. Zuerst die CEPA-Stiftung und ihre Gründer, unsere Gastgeber im Château Pourtalès, Uli und Harald Leibrecht, die meine Arbeit immer aktiv unterstützt haben und deren Freundschaft ich sehr schätze. Zweitens haben die Mitglieder des Transfrontier European Net7

Vier Bücher wurden veröffentlicht: LIBERA, M., SCHIRMANN, S., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016 ; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I. The 2014 European election: the rise of anti-europeanism in Western Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016, MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II. The 2014 European election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016; MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III. Perceptions of External States on European Integration, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2017.

FOREWORD

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work (TEIN)8 am Euroinstitut Kehl9, als Forscher und Spezialisten für grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit an den verschiedenen Schlossgesprächen teilgenommen und damit weitgehend zur wissenschaftlichen Exzellenz des Projekts beigetragen. Mein besonderer Dank geht dabei an den stellvertretenden Direktor des Euro-Instituts und an meine Freundin Anne Thevenet, die immer mit der konzeptionellen und logistischen Organisation der Seminare geholfen hat. Dies gilt auch für die anderen Mitglieder des Jean-Monnet-Projekt-Lenkungsausschusses, Joachim Beck, Bernard Reitel, Jean Peyrony und Emmanuel BrunetJailly. Ohne ihre Hilfe wäre die wissenschaftliche Exzellenz der Seminare nicht möglich gewesen. Für die logistische Organisation danke ich auch dem CEPA-Team im Château, insbesondere Mireille Schmitt und dem Team der Fédération de recherché Europe en mutation unter der Leitung von meinem lieben Kollegen Frédérique Berrod. Ein besonderer Dank gilt Aurélie Kraft für die Programmkonzeption und logistische Organisation und Jocelyne Kautzmann für ihr Finanzmanagement. Schließlich möchte ich die Europäische Kommission, insbesondere die Erasmus + Jean Monnet Aktivitäten, die CNRS, die Universität Straßburg, meine Forschungseinheit Dynamiques européennes und Airbus erwähnen, deren finanzielle Unterstützung weitgehend zum Erfolg der Schlossgespräche beigetragen hat.

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Bestehend aus: Dem IEP Straßburg, Centre for Cross Border Studies (Ireland), ICRESS (Université Perpignan), Université de Nice, University of Southern Denmark, Universität von Ljubljana (Slovenia), Carinthia University of Applied Sciences (Österreich), Viadrina Center Borders in Motion (Frankfurt/Oder, Deutschland); Anci/ForSer Friuli Venezia Giulia (Italien), Olza Association (Cieszyn, Polen), Institute EuroSchola (Trinec, Tschechische Republik), University of Applied Sciences und Euro-Institut Kehl, Forschungseinrichtung « Discontinuités » der Université d’Arras/Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Universität von Girona (Spanien). Das Euro-Institut ist eine pluridisziplinäres deutsch-französisches Weiterbildungseinrichtung, die sich auf die Studie, Forschung und Beratung im Bereich der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa spezialisiert hat.

WELCOME ADDRESS THOMAS, HARALD & ULI LEIBRECHT∗ The topic of the castle-talks on cross-border cooperation is: Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border. There are few places as appropriate as the Château of Pourtalès in Strasbourg to host conferences on this very subject. The original château was more a maison de champagne, and it was already connected to the topic of borders. In the 18th century, Joseph Guerault built the strong Strasbourg border fortress on the Rhine: from his commission, he also built a small chateau here.1 Later, the Bussierre and Pourtalès families lived in this château. Both these families had seen much misery as refugees – they had to flee outside the borders of their original homeland, and later they became successful business people and world citizens, with branches of the family living in France, Switzerland, and Germany.2 One can come across the Pourtalès name not only here among one of the neighbouring borders in Neuchâtel, Baden or Prussia, but also across the Atlantic in Colorado Springs, where a famous hotel and conference centre reminds us of a distant traveller from this family. Likewise, in the Caribbean Sea, an underwater coral reef plateau is named after another one of those counts. The château is located just a few yards from the Rhine, the river which marks the French-German border (a border, which in the past few hundred years, that has been crossed by armies in both directions back and forth several times; undoubtedly, these armies brought years of misery to both sides of the river). Today, this river is no longer a border. The “natural” barrier is gone, even if in these difficult times of migration and terrorism, state border controls might have been temporarily re-established in some places. The Rhine is indeed mostly an international waterway connecting neighbours from six countries as friends and has become the backbone for European cooperation. Here we are in a beautiful château, but in its surroundings not far away in the park, there are ugly grey bunkers of an old border fortification, which mark and remind us of the militaristic extremes of borders. These lavishly decorated halls and ballrooms have not only seen handsome countesses, stately princes and proud kings dancing away, they also were, at times, forcefully occupied and used as command posts by the members of advancing armies. On the other side again, these walls have also provided shelter for those who were wounded in the attempt to move borders further to one side or back. Fortunately, the chandeliers have cast their light not only on misery, but also they provided the light for enlightened conferences of diplomats from all over Europe and beyond. These diplomats discussed how borders could be overcome ∗ 1 2

Written by Thomas Leibrecht. GRODEKI, C., Le Château de la Robertsau. Architecture et décor, Saisons d’Alsace no. 26, 1968, p. 228–230. DE POURTALÈS, E., Au Château de la Robertsau. I – Des origines à la fin du second Empire, Saisons d’Alsace no. 26, 1968, p. 159–204 ; MAYRAN, C., “Colloque a la Robertsau”, Saisons d’Alsace no. 26, 1968, p. 220–223.

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in order to provide a more stable peace.3 The same chandeliers lit up the books and lives of students who fled across one of the most drastic borders in history, named the “Iron Curtain,” during the difficult time appropriately called ”The Cold War”.4 After the few years during which the château stood empty, more than 40 years ago, in 1972, it was woken from its fairy tale sleep by our late father, Dr. Walter Leibrecht, to become a venue for young people from all over the globe. It hosts individuals who are eager to learn about different cultures, and who want to see what life looks like abroad – on the other side of the border.5 We are happy that so many students and researchers come together here for the castle-talks and we are looking forward to learn from then about new inspiring perspectives for a better understanding of the border and of cross-border cooperation. Welcome to the Château de Pourtalès!

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DE PANGE, J., Au Château de la Robertsau. III – L’entre-deux guerres, Saison d’Alsace no. 26, 1968, p. 212–219. SCHANG, A., Au Château de la Robertsau. IV – La période universitaire, Saisons d’Alsace no. 26, 1968, p. 224–227. MARTZ, C., Le Château de Pourtalès, Deux siècles d’histoire, Collection Kaléidoscope d’Alsace, Strasbourg 1986, p. 38–39.

ALLOCUTION DE BIENVENUE Les discussions autour des châteaux et des coopérations transfrontalières porteront aujourd’hui sur la problématique suivante : la peur de l’Intégration ? La pertinence de la frontière. Il y a peu d’endroits aussi appropriés que celui du Château de Pourtalès à Strasbourg pour accueillir de telles conférences sur ce sujet. A l’origine, le château était d’avantage une maison de campagne et il était déjà lié au sujet des frontières. Au 18ème siècle, Joseph Guerault fut chargé de renforcer les fortifications de Strasbourg sur le Rhin et c’est également à cet endroit qu’il construisit ce petit château. Un peu plus tard, les familles Bussierre et Pourtalès vécurent dans ce château. Ces deux familles durent toutes deux traverser une période de misère en tant que réfugiés puisqu’ils durent fuir leur pays d’origine. Plus tard, ils devinrent d’importants hommes d’affaires et des citoyens du monde, avec des parties de leur familles vivant en France, en Suisse et en Allemagne. Il est en effet possible de rencontrer le nom de Pourtalès non seulement dans l’une des régions frontalières de Neuchâtel, de Baden ou de la Prusse, mais aussi de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique à Colorado Springs, où un hôtel et centre de conférence de renommé nous rappellent l’histoire d’un voyageur distant issu de cette famille. De même, dans la mer des Caraïbes, une barrière de corail sous-marine porte le nom d’un de ces Comtes. Le château est situé tout près du Rhin, la rivière marquant la frontière entre la France et l’Allemagne (une frontière qui depuis les cents dernières années a été franchie dans les deux sens et à plusieurs reprises par des armées qui ont sans doute apporté des années de misère des deux côtés de la rivière). Aujourd’hui, cette rivière n’est plus une frontière. La barrière « naturelle » est tombée, même si en ces temps difficiles de migration et de terrorisme, les contrôles nationaux aux frontières ont été temporairement remis en place. Le Rhin est en effet une voie d’eau internationale connectant les voisins de six pays devenus alliés et constitue désormais un des piliers de la coopération européenne. Aujourd’hui, nous nous tenons dans un magnifique château, mais dans ses alentours, proche du parc, on peut encore y voir d’horribles bunkers gris d’une ancienne fortification frontalière, qui symbolisent la forme extrême militaire que peuvent prendre les frontières. Ces halls somptueusement décorés et ces salles de balle n’ont pas seulement vu de magnifiques princesses, de beaux princes et de fiers rois dansant, ils étaient également occupés de force et utilisés comme postes de commandement par des membres d’armées occupantes. D’autre part, ces murs ont aussi fourni un abri à ceux blessés dans leur effort de traverser la frontière dans un sens ou dans l’autre. Heureusement, les chandeliers n’ont pas qu’éclairé la misère ; ils ont aussi révélé de merveilleuses conférences de diplomates venant de toute l’Europe et du monde. Ces diplomates ont discuté des possibilités de dépasser les limites des frontières afin de garantir une paix plus stable. Les mêmes chandeliers ont éclairé les livres et les vies d’étudiants fuyant l’une des frontières les plus drastiques de l’histoire, le « rideau de fer », durant la période difficile de la Guerre Froide.

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Après quelques années d’abandon, le château fut réveillé de son sommeil de conte de fée en 1972, il y a plus de 40 ans par notre dernier père, Docteur Walter Leibrecht, pour devenir un lieu de rencontre pour les jeunes du monde entier. Il accueillit des individus avides de découvrir de nouvelles cultures et la façon dont les gens vivaient à l’étranger, de l’autre côté de la frontière. Nous sommes ravis que tant d’étudiants et de chercheurs se réunissent aujourd’hui pour les discussions autour des châteaux et nous avons hâte d’en apprendre plus sur de nouvelles perspectives inspirantes, pour une meilleure compréhension de la frontière et de la coopération transfrontalière. Bienvenu au Château de Pourtalès !

BEGRÜSSUNGSANSPRACHE Das Thema der Schlossgespräche über grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit lautet: Angst vor Integration? Die Relevance der Grenze? Es gibt nur wenige so passende Orte wie das Schloss Pourtalès in Straßburg, um eine Konferenz zu diesem Thema zu beherbergen. Das eigentliche Schloss war vielmehr ein maison de champagne und ist eng verbunden mit der Grenzthematik. Im 18. Jahrhundert baute Joseph Guerault die mächtige Straßburger Grenzfestung auf dem Rhein: von seiner Provision baute er hier ein kleines Schloss. Später lebten die Familien Bussierre und Pourtalès in diesem Schloss. Beide Familien hatten viel Elend als Flüchtlinge erlebt – sie mussten aus ihren Heimatländern fliehen und wurden später erfolgreiche Geschäftsleute und Weltbürger, mit Familienzweigen in Frankreich, der Schweiz und Deutschland. Man stolpert jedoch nicht nur an den benachbarten Grenzen zu Neuenburg, Baden oder Preußen über den Namen Pourtalès, sondern auch über den Atlantik hinweg in Colorado Springs, wo ein Hotel und ein Kongresszentrum uns an den entfernten Reisenden dieser Familie erinnert. Außerdem wurde ein Korallenriff im karibischen Meer nach einem der Grafen benannt. Das Schloss befindet sich ein paar Meter vom Rhein entfernt, der Fluss, der die deutsch-französische Grenze markiert (eine Grenze, die in den letzten paar hundert Jahren von Armeen in beiden Richtung mehrmals überquert wurde; ohne Zweifel brachten diese Armeen Jahre des Elends auf beiden Seiten des Flusses mit sich). Heutzutage ist der Fluss keine Grenze mehr. Die „natürliche“ Grenze gibt es nicht mehr, auch wenn in diesen schwierigen Zeiten der Migration und des Terrorismus an manchen Stellen Grenzkrontrollen zeitweise wieder eingeführt wurden. Der Rhein ist meistens ein internationaler Wasserweg, der Nachbarn aus sechs Ländern freundschaftlich miteinander verbindet und ist das Rückgrat der europäischen Zusammenarbeiten. Wir befinden uns hier in einem schönen Schloss, aber in seiner Umgebung nicht weit entfernt im Park findet man alte graue Bunker einer alten Grenzfestung, die nicht nur die militärischen Extremen an Grenzen markieren, sondern uns auch an diese erinnern sollen. Diese aufwendig geschmückten Hallen und Ballräume haben nicht nur schöne Gräfinnen, stattliche Prinzen oder stolze Könige tanzen gesehen, sondern wurden auch gewaltsam besetzt und als Kommandozentrale der vorrückenden Armee genutzt. Auf der anderen Seite, haben diese Wände wiederum Schutz für die diejenigen geboten, die bei dem Versuch den Grenzverlauf zu verschieben. Glücklicherweise haben die Kornleuchter ihr Licht nicht nur auf Leid scheinen lassen, sondern auch auf Konferenzen von Diplomaten aus ganz Europa und darüber hinaus. Diese Diplomaten diskutierten darüber, wie Grenzen überwunden werden können, um einen stabileren Frieden zu erreichen. Die selben Kronleuchter beleuchteten Bücher und erhellten die Leben von Studenten, die über einer der tragischsten Grenzen in der Geschichte, „der eiserne Vorhang“ genannt, während der schwierigen Zeit, die passenderweise „der kalte Krieg“ genannt wird.

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Nachdem das 40 Jahre lang leer stand, wurde es 1972 vom bereits verstorbenen Gründer, Dr. Walter Leibrecht, aus seinem Dornröschenschlaf geweckt, um ein Treffpunkt für junge Leute aus der ganzen Welt zu werden. Es beherbergt Person, die begierig sind mehr über andere Kulturen zu lernen und die wissen wollen wie das Leben im Ausland – auf der anderen Seite der Grenze – aussieht. Wir sind glücklich, dass so so viele Studenten und Forscher hier für die Schlossgespräche zusammenkommen und wir freuen uns darauf von ihnen zu lernen und neue inspirierende Perspektiven für ein besseres Verständnis für die Grenze und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zu gewinnen. Willkommen im Schloss Pourtalès!

INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG The present publication regroups the contributions to four “castle-talks on crossborder cooperation” organized at the château Pourtalès between 2012 and 2016,1 in the framework of my Jean Monnet chair and project activities supported by the European Commission.2 The title of the third conference in 2014 – “Fear of Integration? The pertinence of the border” – has been chosen as an overall heading for this publication as it well reflects the current changes in the perception of borders and their meaning for European Integration and cross-border cooperation. Indeed, in Europe, the Schengen crisis, spurred off by the unexpected migration flow in 2015, led to a re-questioning of the functions of “borders” in European Integration.3 Especially the ideal of a “Europe without borders” is crumbling, which has been propagated by the European Union (EU) since the ambitious project of the Single European Market in 1987. It is the heart and spirit of the Schengen agreement abolishing internal border checks of EU citizens which is now at stake.4 The re-introduction of “border controls” in several EU Member States not only slows down the process of European Integration, but it also represents an obstacle to cross-border cooperation in Europe: the “separation” function of the border is being reinforced and “the pertinence of the border” seems being largely confirmed.5 One of the main consequences of this crisis is also growing Euroscepticism and a new “fear of integration” which might even lead to the disintegration of the EU.6 This Euroscepticism does not stop at the border regions of Europe. It is precisely in cross-border spaces that the problems, which have surfaced in many

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“Cross-border cooperation and International Relations (6 December 2012); “Borders and governance” (3 December 2013); “Fear of Integration: The pertinence of the border” (8–9 December 2014), “The Border: Source of Conflict or a Place of Reconciliation? (7–8 December 2015)”. A research project on conflict and cooperation at EU borders (2016–2018) and a research network (Europe, Canada, Japan, Turkey) on migration policies. SAURUGGER, S., “Crise de l’Union européenne ou crise de la démocratie”, Politique étrangère, 1, 2017, p. 23–33. GUILD, E., BROUWER, E., GROENEDIJK, K., CARRERA, S., “What is happening to the Schengen borders?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, n°85, December 2015, p. 1–26; Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?, Study for the LIBE committee, European Parliament, June 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/ 2016/571356/IPOL_ STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf (2.3.2017). WASSENBERG, B., “La frontière, objet d’intégration ou cicatrice de l’Histoire”, Revue RECERQ n°9, 2017 ; www.recerc.casa-paisos-catalans.eu (to be published). See MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism, Vol. 1 and 2, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016.

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areas because of gaps or a lack of European Integration, become visible.7 Administrative, legal, psychological and linguistic barriers emerge when borders are crossed, when the political and administrative structures of neighbouring countries come up against each other. The lack of knowledge about the historical and cultural context of one’s neighbour regularly leads to misunderstandings and even to intercultural conflicts between citizens living on borders8. Even with its ideal of a united Europe, the existence of the EU is not necessarily a guarantee against the insecurity and fear of “the other” beyond the border, which is more specifically felt in Euroregions since it is there that close contacts can be established with the other and otherness.9 In order to re-question the role of the border in European Integration, the main objective of this research volume is therefore to establish a link between three so far not well connected interdisciplinary research fields: Border Studies, Cross-border Cooperation and European Integration. Border Studies are a discipline in International Relations, which focusses on the analysis of the border and its (geopolitical) functions in the world. They have been initially launched in the United States in 1976, when a network of researchers, mainly geographers, set up the Association for Borderland Studies (ABS), which then developed and spread internationally. ABS regularly publishes the Journal of Borderland studies, which deals with very diverse subjects related to the border.10 In Europe, the border has also been subject of a large number of research works and the historiography on the matter is abundant.11 Geographers often put the accent on the (geo-)political dimension of the border which becomes apparent with its territorial affirmation, i.e. the articulation of politics and of space, as Michel Foucher explains it.12 More recently, Border Studies in Europe have been analysed in this sense by Marie-Christine Fourny and Anne-Laure Amilhat-Szary.13 But this dimension has also been stressed by political scientists such as Malcolm Anderson and Eberhart Bort, who have studied the Western and the Eastern European borders.14 The historical dimension of the border has been recently examined in two books, one edited by Sabine Dullin and Sophie Cœuré on the Frontières du communisme (Frontiers of communism) and the other 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

WASSENBERG, B., “Can Cross-Border Cooperation Provoke Opposition to Europe? The Example of the Upper Rhine Region”, in: WASSENBERG, B., CLAVERT, F., HAMMAN, Ph. (ed.), Antieuropéisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1): les concepts, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, p. 285–307. DUSSAP-KÖHLER, A., “Les sensibilités interculturelles dans les régions transfrontalières”, in : WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011, p. 129–145. GABBE, J., “Sensibilität in europäischen Grenzregionen“, in: WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transforntalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, op.cit., p. 93–105. See http://absborderlands.org/journal-of-borderlands-studies (2.3.2017). REITEL, B., Villes et frontières. Un jeu de construction de territoires, Bâle, Berlin, Strasbourg, University of Paris, 2010, largely reports on the scope and scale of geographic works on the notion of the border. FOUCHER, M., Fronts et frontières, Fayard, Paris, 1986. AMILHAT-SZARY, A.-L., FORUNY, M.-Ch. (ed.), Après la frontière, avec la frontière : nouvelles dynamiques transfrontalières en Europe, Editions de l’Aube, Paris, 2006. ANDERSON, M., Frontier regions in Western Europe, Frank Cass, London, 1983 ; Malcolm Anderson, Eberhart Bort, Boundaries and identities: the Eastern frontier of the European Union, Edinburgh, Social Science Institute, 1996.

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by Michael Gehler and Andreas Pudlat on Grenzen in Europa (Borders in Europe).15 Cross-border Cooperation is a relatively new research field which has been developed as a “European” branch of Border Studies. The study of these relations below state level that have been established after the Second World War alongside European borders has been initiated in the 1970s. The first multidisciplinary studies were in fact launched by Raimondo Strassoldo and his colleagues at the International Sociological Institute of Gorizia created a network of researchers who led a scientific study on cross-border relations and cooperation at local and regional level in Europe.16 Since then, other scientific disciplines have shown an interest for the field of cross-border cooperation: geographers mainly analyse the functions and effects of borders ; law specialists examine the legal tools and problems of cooperation ; political and administrative scientists regard the cooperation in relation with the subject of governance, federal and regional studies ; economists study the economic disparities and flows between border regions and historians look at the origins and the development of neighbourhood relations in cross-border areas.17 The first attempts to study Cross-border Cooperation with regard to European Integration were made by political scientists in the mid-1990s who regarded the cooperation in relation with the subject of a “Europe of Regions”, where local and regional actors were the central focus of European Integration, because they seemed to represent the “most ideal” level of governance for achieving a united Europe closest to the citizen.18 In this context, Cross-border Cooperation was mainly identified as a means to implement the Single European Market and to establish a “Europe without borders” with free movement of goods, services, capital and people.19 Until the recent crises of the EU culminating in the Brexit decision of 2016, the positive link between Cross-border Cooperation and European Integration did seem to make sense. Especially since the completion of the single market in 1992 the effects of integration have been directly felt in Europe’s border regions. And it is notably for this reason that they have increasingly been identified, both in theory and in practice, as “models” of the process of European unification20. Indeed, 40% of the EU’s territory is covered by border regions containing approximately 30% of the EU population. The effects of the progress of European Inte15 16 17

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DULLIN, S., COERÉ, S., Frontières du communisme. Mythologies et réalités de la division de l’Europe de la révolution d’Octobre au mur de Berlin, La Découverte, Paris, 2007 ; GEHLER, M., PUDLAT, A. (ed.), Grenzen in Europa, Olms Georg Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 2009. STRASSOLDO, R., Bounderies and regions, International Sociological Institute de Gorizia, Trieste, 1973. For the bibliographical references of the different disciplines, see WASSENBERG, B., “Historiographie de la coopération transfrontalière”, in: L’approche pluridisciplinaire de la coopération transfrontalière. Les jalons pour un travail de recherche interdisciplinaire, Cahier FARE n°5, 2015, p. 9–15. GROM, I., Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als Beitrag zur Förderung der europäischen Integration, Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 1995 ; RAICH, S., Grenzüberschreitende und interregionale Zusammenarbeit in einem Europa der Regionen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1995. RICQ, Ch., “Les Cantons frontaliers et l’intégration européenne, Acte Unique européen, 1992” , report from the symposium of 28.10.1988 in Geneva, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1990. LAMBERTZ, K.-H. (ed.), Die Grenzregionen als Labor und Motor kontinentaler Entwicklungen in Europa. Berichte und Dokumente des Europarates sowie Reden zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Dike/Nomos, Zürich, Baden-Baden, 2010.

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gration can therefore be studied here: horizontal mobility of goods, capital and people are very obvious in border regions.21 As a result, from having previously been rated as outlying, peripheral and disadvantaged areas, border regions have been elevated to the rank of central spaces in the process of European unification where the effects of integration have become measurable “on a small scale” and were representative of the whole Community.22 But it is exactly for this reason that the effects of the border crises induced by excessive migration flows and terrorist threats since 2015 have also become first palpable in Europe’s border regions. What used to be “models of integration” might now represent how it looks like when “the border comes back in Europe”, as images of newly imposed border controls in well integrated cross-border spaces such as the Oresund region or the Strasbourg-Kehl/Ortenau Eurodistrict illustrate. This publication does not deal with the consequences of these recent crises, but the different contributions show the diversity of functions, positive or negative, that the border might take in the process of European Integration and in International Relations.23 It therefore moves away from a too one-sided, positivist approach to cross-border cooperation as a necessary contribution to European Integration. Instead, it re-establishes the research field of Cross-Border Cooperation as a specific branch of Border Studies (International Relations) which may help to explain the process of European Integration and/or Disintegration. The preliminary part of the publication therefore deals with the theoretical link between “Borders, International Relations and Cross-border Cooperation”. It repositions the theoretical approach to cross-border cooperation from three different perspectives. First, Jean-Christophe Romer (International Relations and Area Studies) explains the viewpoint of contemporary historians who situate crossborder cooperation as a specific case within the field of Area Studies, within the History of International Relations. As a geographer, Bernard Reitel (Cross-Border Cooperation and International Relations: Towards the Emergence of a Cross-Border Regime?) then moves on to illustrate the link between International Relations and cross-border cooperation by emphasizing that the European frontiers have developed from a border regime ruled by the Nation States to a cross-border regime defined by the EU. He therefore clearly establishes a link between the EU as an international actor and cross-border cooperation. However, he prefers “Europeanization” rather than European Integration to define this process. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly then explains the link between Border Studies and European Integration. In his article on “Borders and Border Disputes in Europe” he reveals that despite having no specific border dispute policies, the EU has acted to resolve and limit border disputes since the very beginning of the European Integration process. This does not prevent the sovereign and guarding functions of borders from being maintained and territorial, positional and functional disputes may still exist in the EU – a reason to encourage further cross-border cooperation.

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Beck, J. “Introduction”, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération territoriale en Europe (Vol. 6) : vers une cohésion territoriale ?, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2014, p. 37 ff. MESTRE, CH., Les incidences de l’achèvement du Marché unique sur les régions transfrontalières, Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1992. WASSENBERG, B., “The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations”, in: DOMINGUEZ, L., PIRES, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2014, p. 67–81.

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In the first part of the publication on “Borders and Governance: A New Foreign Policy?”, borders are examined as a place of governance and cross-border cooperation as a possible tool of “small foreign policy”.24 Today, with the ongoing process of globalization, local and regional actors in the EU might be just as interested in positioning their cross-border space in International Relations as in contributing to European Integration. Also, depending on their local and regional interests, they might wish to complement or to counteract existing bilateral relations between their respective central governments. Cross-border governance or “secondary foreign policy” in border regions is therefore the expression of a new tendency in the development of International Diplomacy performed by non-state government actors.25 In his contribution on “Cross-Border Governance in Europe: A New Foreign Policy?, Karl-Heinz Lambertz gives an overview on the experiences, challenges and future perspectives of this small foreign policy by local and regional actors. Joachim Beck then presents his theory on cross-border governance in “Territorial Institutionalism and the European Administrative Space. A Conceptual Framing for Capturing the Institutional Dynamics of Cross-Border Cooperation”. As he affirms, local and regional actors in European border regions have progressively constructed an institutional governance system sui generis – which is not always linked to EU. Constantly changing institutional challenges and specific preconditions have in each border region led to the development of specific solutions of the respective cross-border governance structures.26 In order to illustrate different types and spaces of cross-border governance, three case-studies are discussed. The first is presented by Christopher Huggins who analyses successes and failures of “Building Cross-Border Governance in the Channel/La Manche Region”. He shows that cross-border cooperation has succeeded where sub-national authorities have been able to capitalize on opportunities to address functional policy challenges, but has failed when policy issues “become embroiled in ‘high politics’ at the national level”. The second case-study by Marcin Krymuski and Peter Ulrich then draws on experiences from the Viadrina Region at the German-Polish border. Focusing on “Actor´s Participation in Cross-Border Governance Structures at the German-Polish Border”, they examine “participatory governance” in three cross-border governance institutions. They reveal that participation results in higher legitimation of the EU and that, in order to impede nationalist uprisings in Europe, more effective, smart and multi-stakeholder cross-border governance in the Europe is needed. Finally, in “Networks as Functional New Micro-diplomacy Tools Supporting Cross-border Co-operation”, Hynek Böhm gives evidence and lessons from the Czech-Slovak border. He insists on the fact that institutionalization of cross-border governance under the umbrella of a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) has improved mutual cooperation. In the second part of the publication, attention will be drawn to the function of “Borders: The Gatekeepers of Sovereignty and Security”, a function which has 24 25 26

See special issue by KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., “Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation?”, Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 27, Issue 3, 2017, p. 205–358. WASSENBERG, B., “The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations”, in: DOMINGUEZ, L., Pires, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 67–81. See examples in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Bd.2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011.

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gained in significance since the migration crisis and with the international terrorist threat.27 At the internal and external borders of the EU, security issues are now of crucial importance and local and regional actors might be interested in the security function of the border in order to prevent cross-border crime, increase internal security and to contribute to the European Neighborhood Policy.28 However, this function of the border is mainly reserved for the national States and they watch over this competence as an expression of their legitimacy in Foreign and Defense Policy, but also as a safeguard of their national sovereignty.29 Therefore, the Member States of the EU are reluctant to share power with European Institutions (Schengen Information System, Europol, Frontex) on the management of the national border for security reasons and they do not favor participation by local and regional authorities either.30 In his Welcome Speech on “Borders, Security and Geopolitical Aspects” Walter Spindler, at the time Deputy Commander of the Eurocoprs in Strasbourg, highlights the function of national borders as invaluable assets for a nation to exercise sovereign powers within its territory. In his view, whereas the Westphalian border was highly relevant from a security and geopolitical perspective, borders between post-modern states have lost some of their geopolitical relevance due to globalisation, world-wide mobility and transnational interactions. But as borders are not only permeable with respect to the flow of goods, services and information, but also let admit crime and violence, they still serve an important security function. From a legal point of view, Antoine Ullestad confirms that globalization has modified the very definition of borders. In his article “Protecting the Security of the EU through its External Borders” he develops an interesting theory by affirming that borders have now acquired a new function: they serve the EU’s strategy to influence world trade liberalization pushing its external (legal) borders way beyond the geographical limits of the European continent. They thus become “lines that redistribute the world map according to legal closeness, rather than by political separation”. The mobility of these borders and their new locations are a sign of the EU’s normative enlargement and hence mark a new way to ensure the area’s security. Jaume Castan Piños then discusses “Conflicts over Sovereignty in Europe in the so-called PostSovereignty Era”. He challenges the view, that the Westphalian order of borders has been overcome in Europe by emphasizing that the EU is not immune to sovereignty and territorial conflicts. These disputes may be of a sub-national, national, or supranational nature as he illustrates with various examples including Northern Ireland, the Brexit referendum or the Gibraltar issue. Borders as gatekeepers of sovereignty therefore still matter. This point is equally confirmed 27

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CORNAGO, N., “Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the Redefinition of International Security: Dimensions of Conflict and Co-operation”, in: ALDECOA, F., KEATING, M. (ed.), Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass, London, Portland, 1999, p. 40–57. WASSENBERG, B., “Le voisinage de proximité : les eurorégions “géopolitiques” aux frontières externes de l’UE (1993–2009)”, in : ROLLAND, D. ROMER, J.-CH. (ed.), “Espaces de voisinage”, Les espaces de voisinage. De Monroe à la politique européenne de voisinage. Identité et altérité, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n°97 & 98, janvier-juin 2010, p. 45–49. BLATTER, J., KREUTZER, M., RENTL, M., THIELE, J. (2008), “The Foreign Relations of European Regions: Competences and Strategies”, West European Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, p. 464–490. With the notable exception maybe of the regional State level of government in those Member States of the EU which have a federal political structure, especially concerning the German Länder.

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by Manuel Friesecke in “The Pertinence of the External EU Border: A Swiss Point of View”. He explains that Switzerland is holding on to its national borders as gatekeepers of sovereignty and rejects the EU with its principle of free movement of people. By dissociating themselves from their neighbours and the European unification process, the Swiss are also “drawing up borders in their minds”, with no connection to the economic and cultural realities of interdependency. The third part of this publication “Borders, the “scars” of History or Places of Reconciliation?” deals with a function already identified by one of the pioneers of cross-border cooperation in Europe, Alfred Mozer who described the borders in Europe as “scars of history which should be overcome”.31 The specificity of the function of the border as a place of reconciliation can be traced back to very beginning of cross-border cooperation in Europe.32 It mainly started at the FrancoGerman border in the Upper Rhine or the Saar-Lor-Lux Region as a bottom-up approach. It is thus different compared to the more top-down national reconciliation frameworks which were established, for example, by the Treaty of Elysée between France and Germany in 1963.33 Cross-border reconciliation at the Eastern borders was first hampered by the beginning of the Cold War, so that the peace-building process at the Polish-German border, for instance, had to wait until after the fall of the Berlin wall in the early 1990s.34 Gerhard Besier first explains in is article on “Mental Borders Create Limited Minds: How to Overcome Prejudices, Stereotypes and Concepts of an “Enemy” in the Second Decade of the 21rst Century” how the process of reconciliation actually works both from a psychological point of view and taking into account the historical heritage in Europe of WWI and II and of the Cold War. Four case studies then follow: one from the Upper Rhine Region, one comparing Franco-German and German-Polish reconciliation and the other two examining East-West reconciliation. In “The Rhine: A Border of Peace? Memories from Key Players in the Upper Rhine Region”, Birte Wassenberg retraces the reconciliation process in the Franco-German-Swiss cross-border region. On the basis of interviews with key actors from the region asking them about their perceptions of European integration, cross-border cooperation and intercultural relations with their neighbours, she emphasizes the positive results of a bottom-up reconciliation process which has led to stable friendly relations in an area that has been particularly marked in the past by the “scars” of the Franco-German wars. Bernhard Köppen illustrates the same positive effect of reconciliation by comparing shopping behaviour at the FrancoGerman border between Alsace and the Palatinate with the Polish-German bor31 32

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MOZER, Alfred, “Entwicklungspolitik zu Hause”, in: Entwicklungsregionen in der EWG, Schriften der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1973, p. 14. WASSENBERG, B., “Secondary foreign policy as a peace-building tool? The contribution of cross-border cooperation to reconciliation and stability in Europe” in: KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., “Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation?”, op.cit., p. 219–237 WASSENBERG, B., “Grenzorte: von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation. Das Beispiel des Oberrheins”, in: DEFRANCE, C., PFEIL, Ulrich (ed.), Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem “Zvilisationsbruch”?, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2016a, p. 349. OPILOWSKA, E., “Reconciliation through Europeanization: Secondary foreign policy in the Germa-Polish borderlands” (p. 283–303) and BÖHM, H., DRÁPELA, E., “Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool : Example from the east Czecj-Polish borders” (p. 35–319), in: KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., “Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation?”, op.cit.,

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der in Slubice (Beyond “Erbfeind” and after Reconciliation. Shopping? A Comparative Study on French-German and Polish-German Cross-Border Tourism as a Common, Integrative Routine). However, he holds that whereas cross-border shopping is certainly an indicator of dynamic cross-border relations, it does not necessarily result in sustainable regional integration or in the total elimination of stereotypes and distrust towards the other. Beata Halicka shows more scepticism about the reconciliation process in the border regions between Germany and Poland. Her article on “Polish-German Border: A Laboratory of Transnational Cooperation”, admits that the EU, with its political and financial instruments, has facilitated the creation of a peaceful neighbourhood. But while political borders have become more permeable, cultural and symbolic boundaries often remain an obstacle in transborder relations which, in her opinion, ultimately take on a very “insular” character. The reconciliation process is thus far from being completed. Katarzyna Stoklosa shares this view by taking the example of “The Finnish-Russian Border between Myth and Reality”. In her article, she reveals the “myths” constructed around the Finnish-Russian border concluding with an even more pessimistic view on the process of reconciliation: even today, in spite of cross-border interaction, it continues to represent a hermetic border between Eastern and Western Europe. The final part of the publication focusses on “Border Conflicts, Barriers and Resistance to Integration”. Compared to other regional spaces, border regions are characterized by a very specific structural situation: natural and/or socioeconomic phenomena like transport, labor market, migration, criminality, pollution, commuters, etc. have typically a border-crossing dimension directly affecting the neighboring states. The resulting structural or everyday policy problems require close cross-border co-operation between those actors, which are competent and responsible for problem resolution within the institutional context of the respective national state.35 But there are often still latent conflicts, persistent barriers or even resistance to cross-border cooperation. Indeed, in contrast to a national context, where regional cooperation is taking place within a uniform legal, institutional and financial context, cross-border governance is characterized by the challenge to manage the working together of politico-administrative systems which have a distinctive legal basis and share a different degree of vertical differentiation both in terms of structure, resources equipment and autonomy of action.36 In addition, cross-border cooperation is still confronted and finds itself sometimes in conflict with the principle of territorial sovereignty of the respective national states.37 Even in those regions where the degree of cooperation is well developed, cross-border cooperation is therefore still marked by administrative, political and cultural obstacles and decisions often have to be taken outside the 35

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LAMBERTZ, K.-H., RAMAKERS, J., “Vielfalt und Hürden kennzeichnen die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa“, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen (Bd.5): Integration und (trans-)regionale Identitäten, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2013, p. 61–73. EISENBERG, E., “Learning form Cultural Experiences and Interactions: Cross-Border Administrative Cultures”, in: THEDIECK, F. (ed.), Foundations of Administrative Culture in Europe, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2007. BECK, J., PRADIER, E., “Governance in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik : Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Kooperationsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen“, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Band 2), Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, op.cit., p. 107.

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cross-border governance sphere.38 Three articles are dedicated to the identification of obstacles to cross-border cooperation and how to overcome them. Jean Peyrony introduces the subject with his contribution on “Integration in CrossBorder Regions: Obstacles and Solutions”. By analyzing the EU’s cohesion policy and using two sociological models by Durkheim and Boltanski and Thévenot, he proposes a set of measures to eliminate barriers to cross-border cooperation. The EU should focus on the learning of the neighbor’s language, on the development of interpersonal links through micro project funds, on the building of sustainable cross-border observation systems, on cross border media, on intercultural training and capitalization and on projects in the field of education to develop a sense of belonging and common visions. Anne Thevenet then follows on to propose “Capacity-Building as a Tool to Overcome Obstacles in Border Regions”. The Transborder Euro-Institute Network (TEIN) which brings together 14 training organizations and universities from 8 regions in the EU, counts on practical solutions offered by specialized training, counselling and support, adapted to the specific characteristics of each frontier. Capacity-building in cross-border contexts thus allows to overcome obstacles to cooperation that remain due to lack of knowledge vis-a-vis the “other” and the lack of appropriate methods for cross-border project management and intercultural work. Finally, Jordi Cicres and Sílvia Llach examine more in detail “The Role of Languages in Cross-Border Cooperation: Obstacle or Opportunity?”. Linguistic differences are often identified as one of the main obstacles to cross-border cooperation. However, whereas linguistic diversity might constitute a barrier to communication, according to them, it is also a cultural asset. Besides, minority languages such as Catalan can present an opportunity as a cultural bridge in a former unified regional space now separated by two Nation States. The publication closes with four case studies on barriers and conflicts in specific cross-border spaces. Andy Pollack (Irish-British Relations, 1998–2012: From Provincial Conflict to European Tensions) and Ruth Taillon (CrossBorder Cooperation and Peace-Building in Ireland) start by analyzing the Northern Ireland conflict and the possible contribution of cross-border cooperation to overcome it. According to Andy Pollack, the reconciliation process was largely facilitated by the EU membership of Ireland and the UK and the support given by the Structural Funds. Brexit therefore causes a new threat of disintegration – which might spread to other regions in the EU (Scotland, Catalonia, etc.). Similarly, Ruth Taillon emphasizes the positive role that the Interreg and Peace programs have played since the 1990s for the resolution of the conflict, a role now threatened by the Brexit decision. Alessandro Torello then gives an overview on “Barriers to the Bulgarian Cross-Border Cooperation with Rumania”. The border region suffers from important deficits hindering cross-border cooperation. Apart from financial, economic and transport difficulties, there are also more sensitive issues. Corruption, organized crime, trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings thus constitute serious threats to good neighborhood relations and to the security at the border. However, since 1989, the EU’s operational programs have progressively put in place the conditions for developing cross-border strategic concepts and provide ground for investment interventions aimed at minimizing the bor38

BECK, J., “Cross-border cooperation in Europe – The example of the Upper-Rhine“, in: KÖNIG, K., FOSLER, S. (ed.), Regionalization below State-level in Germany and the United States, Speyer, Deutsches Forschungsinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung, 1999, p. 137.

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der obstacles and at resolving issues of common concern. Finally, Adriana Dorfman presents a case-study from outside Europe: In her article on “Smuggling in Sant’ana Do Livramento (Brazil) – Rivera (Uruguay): Unification, Mirroring and Difference Processes and Transitional Dispositives in Border Condition”, she confronts us with a different perspective on cross-border cooperation. At the border between Brazil and Uruguay, the border condition engendered the growth of regular informal economic activities, stimulating extraterritorial regimes and legal and illegal cross-border trade – without any need of an official regime of free movement as it exists in the EU. The “smuggling” of small volumes is an accepted and unofficially tolerated practice because it corresponds to social needs for employment, better consumption standards and supplying of scarce products. All contributions in this research volume confirm three major tendencies: first, the pertinence of the border exists and is currently being reinforced by the European crises of migration and terrorism. Second, the myth of a “Europe without borders” propagated by the EU is about to be dismantled, revealing borders as a crucial part to be re-reflected when developing any future project on European Integration. Third, cross-border cooperation does not always and necessarily contribute to the European Integration process: border regions can be “models for integration” but they can also be mirrors of a growing Euroscepticism or a place where “fear of Integration” persists.

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INTRODUCTION La présente publication regroupe les contributions faites durant quatre « castletalks » sur la coopération transfrontalière, organisés au château de Pourtalès entre 2012 et 201639, dans le cadre de ma Chaire Jean Monnet et des activités de projet soutenues par la Commission Européenne.40 Le titre de la troisième conférence en 2014 – « Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border » (Peur de l’intégration : la pertinence de la frontière) – a été choisi comme titre général de cette publication car il reflète bien les changements actuels de perception des frontières et leur signification pour l’Intégration Européenne et la coopération transfrontalière. En effet, la crise de l’espace Schengen en Europe, provoquée par la vague d’immigration inattendue de 2015, a conduit à une remise en causes des fonctions des « frontières » dans l’intégration européenne. L’idéal d’une « Europe sans frontières » porté par l’Union Européenne (UE) depuis la mise en place de l’ambitieux projet du marché unique européen en 1987, semble s’écrouler. C’est l’abolition des contrôles aux frontières intérieurs pour les citoyens de l’UE, élément central de l’accord de Schengen, qui est en jeu aujourd’hui. 41 La réintroduction des « contrôles aux frontières » dans plusieurs pays membres de l’UE ralentit non seulement le processus d’intégration européenne, mais constitue également un obstacle à la coopération transfrontalière en Europe : le caractère « séparateur » de la frontière est renforcé et la « pertinence de la frontière » semble largement confirmée. 42 L’une des principales conséquences de cette crise est aussi la montée de l’euroscepticisme et une nouvelle « peur de l’intégration » qui pourrait même conduire à la désintégration de l’UE. 43 Cet euroscepticisme ne s’arrête pas aux régions frontalières de l’Europe. C’est précisément dans les espaces transfrontaliers que les difficultés apparues dans de nombreux domaines, à l’origine de lacunes ou d’un manque d’intégration européenne, deviennent visibles. 44 Des barrières administratives, légales, psychologiques ou linguistiques apparaissent lorsque les frontières sont franchies, lorsque 39

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42 43 44

« Cross-border cooperation and International Relations (6 December 2012); « Borders and governance » (3 December 2013); « Fear of Integration: The pertinence of the border » (8–9 December 2014), « The Border: Source of Conflict or a Place of Reconciliation? (7–8 December 2015) ». A research project on conflict and cooperation at EU borders (2016–2018) and a research network (Europe, Canada, Japan, Turkey) on migration policies. GUILD, E., BROUWER, E., GROENEDIJK, K., CARRERA, S., « What is happening to the Schengen borders? », CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, n°85, December 2015, p. 1–26; Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?, Study for the LIBE committee, European Parliament, June 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/ 2016/571356/IPOL_ STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf (2.3.2017). WASSENBERG, B., « La frontière, objet d’intégration ou cicatrice de l’Histoire », Revue RECERQ n°9, 2017 ; www.recerc.casa-paisos-catalans.eu (to be published). See MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism, Vol. 1 and 2, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016. WASSENBERG, B., « Can Cross-Border Cooperation Provoke Opposition to Europe? The Example of the Upper Rhine Region », in: WASSENBERG, B., CLAVERT, F., HAMMAN, Ph. (ed.), Antieuropéisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1): les concepts, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, p. 285–307.

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les structures politiques et administratives de pays voisins se confrontent. Le manque de connaissance du contexte historique et culturel de son voisin mène régulièrement à des incompréhensions et parfois même à des conflits interculturels entre citoyens frontaliers. 45 Même avec son idéal d’une Europe unie, l’existence de l’UE n’est pas nécessairement une garantis contre l’insécurité et la peur de « l’autre » au-delà des frontières, peur particulièrement ressentie dans des eurorégions puisque c’est là que des contacts étroits avec l’autre et l’altérité peuvent s’établir. 46 Afin de remettre en question le rôle de la frontière dans l’intégration européenne, l’objectif principal de ce volume de recherche est donc d’établir un lien entre trois domaines de recherche interdisciplinaires, jusque-là très peu liés : les études transfrontalières, la coopération transfrontalière et l'intégration européenne. L’étude des frontières est une discipline des relations internationales qui se concentre sur l’analyse de la frontière et de ses fonctions (géopolitiques) dans le monde. Elle a d’abord été initiée aux Etats-Unis en 1976, lorsqu’un réseau de chercheurs, principalement géographes, ont créé l’Association for Borderland Studies (ABS), qui s’est par la suite développée et diffusée à l’échelle internationale. L’ABS publie régulièrement le Journal of Borderland Studies qui traite de sujets très divers liés à la frontière. 47 En Europe, la frontière a également fait l’objet de nombreux travaux de recherche et l’historiographie sur le sujet est abondante. 48 Les géographes mettent souvent l’accent sur la dimension (géo)politique de la frontière qui se manifeste par son affirmation territoriale, c'est-à-dire l'articulation de la politique et de l'espace, comme l'explique Michel Foucher.49 Plus récemment, les études transfrontalières en Europe ont été analysées en ce sens par MarieChristine Fourny et Anne-Laure Amilhat-Szary.50 Mais cette dimension a aussi été soulignée par des politologues comme Malcolm Anderson et Eberhart Bort, qui ont étudié les frontières occidentales et orientales de l’Europe. 51 La dimension historique de frontière a récemment été examiné dans deux ouvrages, l’un écrit par Sabine Dullin et Sophie Cœuré sur les Frontières du Communisme et l’autre par Michael Gehler et Andreas Pudlat sur Grenzen in Europa (les frontières en Europe).52 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

DUSSAP-KÖHLER, A., « Les sensibilités interculturelles dans les régions transfrontalières »”, in : WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011, p. 129–145. GABBE, J., « Sensibilität in europäischen Grenzregionen », in: WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transforntalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, op.cit., p. 93–105. See http://absborderlands.org/journal-of-borderlands-studies (2.3.2017). REITEL, B., Villes et frontières. Un jeu de construction de territoires, Bâle, Berlin, Strasbourg, University of Paris, 2010, largely reports on the scope and scale of geographic works on the notion of the border. FOUCHER, M., Fronts et frontières, Fayard, Paris, 1986. AMILHAT-SZARY, A.-L., FORUNY, M.-Ch. (ed.), Après la frontière, avec la frontière : nouvelles dynamiques transfrontalières en Europe, Editions de l’Aube, Paris, 2006. ANDERSON, M., Frontier regions in Western Europe, Frank Cass, London, 1983 ; Malcolm Anderson, Eberhart Bort, Boundaries and identities: the Eastern frontier of the European Union, Edinburgh, Social Science Institute, 1996. DULLIN, S., COERÉ, S., Frontières du communisme. Mythologies et réalités de la division de l’Europe de la révolution d’Octobre au mur de Berlin, La Découverte, Paris, 2007 ; GEHLER, M., PUDLAT, A. (ed.), Grenzen in Europa, Olms Georg Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 2009.

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La Coopération transfrontalière est un domaine de recherche relativement nouveau, qui s’est développé en tant que branche « européenne » des études transfrontalières. L’étude de ces relations infra-étatiques, établies après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale avec les frontières européennes, a été initiée dans les années 1970. Les premières études pluridisciplinaires ont en fait été initiées par Raimondo Strassoldo et ses collègues de l’Institut Sociologique International de Gorizia) ont créé un réseau de chercheurs qui ont mené une étude sur les relations et la coopération transfrontalière au niveau local et régional en Europe. 53 Dès lors, d’autres disciplines scientifiques se sont intéressées au domaine de la coopération transfrontalière : les géographes analysent principalement les fonctions et les effets des frontières ; les juristes examinent les outils juridiques et les problèmes portant sur la coopération ; les politologues et les scientifiques administratifs approchent le sujet de la coopération en relation avec celui de la gouvernance et des études fédérales et régionales ; les économistes étudient les disparités économiques et les flux entre régions frontalières et les historiens examinent les origines et le développement des relations de voisinage dans les zones transfrontalières. 54 Les premières tentatives d'étude de la coopération transfrontalière en matière d'intégration européenne ont été faites par des politologues au milieu des années 1990 qui ont considéré la coopération en relation avec le thème de l' « Europe des régions », où les acteurs locaux et régionaux étaient au centre de l'intégration européenne, car ils semblaient représenter le niveau de gouvernance « le plus idéal » pour parvenir à une Europe unie, plus proche de ses citoyens. 55 Dans ce contexte, la coopération transfrontalière a été essentiellement identifiée comme un moyen de mettre en œuvre le marché unique européen et d’établir une « Europe sans frontières » avec la libre circulation des biens, des services, des capitaux et des personnes. 56 Jusqu’aux récentes crises de l’UE aboutissant au choix du Brexit en 2016, le lien positif entre la coopération transfrontalière et l’intégration européenne semblait logique. Depuis l'achèvement du marché unique en 1992, les effets de l'intégration se sont fait directement sentir dans les régions frontalières de l'Europe. Et c’est notamment pour cette raison qu’ils ont été de plus en plus identifiés, tant en théorie qu’en pratique, comme des « modèles » du processus d’unification européenne. 57 En effet, 40% du territoire de l’UE est couvert de régions frontalières, représentant environ 30% de la population de l’UE. Les effets des progrès de l’intégration européenne peuvent donc être étudiés dans les régions frontalières 53 54

55 56 57

STRASSOLDO, R., Bounderies and regions, International Sociological Institute de Gorizia, Trieste, 1973. For the bibliographical references of the different disciplines, see WASSENBERG, B., « Historiographie de la coopération transfrontalière », in: L’approche pluridisciplinaire de la coopération transfrontalière. Les jalons pour un travail de recherche interdisciplinaire, Cahier FARE n°5, 2015, p 9–15. GROM, I., Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als Beitrag zur Förderung der europäischen Integration, Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 1995 ; RAICH, S., Grenzüberschreitende und interregionale Zusammenarbeit in einem Europa der Regionen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1995. RICQ, Ch., « Les Cantons frontaliers et l’intégration européenne, Acte Unique européen, 1992 » , report from the symposium of 28.10.1988 in Geneva, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1990. LAMBERTZ, K.-H. (ed.), Die Grenzregionen als Labor und Motor kontinentaler Entwicklungen in Europa. Berichte und Dokumente des Europarates sowie Reden zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Dike/Nomos, Zürich, Baden-Baden, 2010.

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où la mobilité horizontale des biens, des capitaux et des personnes y sont particulièrement visibles.58 En conséquence, après avoir été classées auparavant comme zones périphériques, périphériques et défavorisées, les régions frontalières ont été élevées au rang d'espaces centraux dans le processus d'unification européenne où les effets de l'intégration sont devenus mesurables « à petite échelle » et représentatifs de l'ensemble de la Communauté. 59 C'est précisément pour cette raison que les effets des crises frontalières engendrées par des flux migratoires excessifs et de multiples menaces terroristes depuis 2015 se font également sentir pour la première fois dans les régions frontalières européennes. Ces espaces qui étaient auparavant avant érigés en « modèles d’intégration » sont maintenant représentatifs du « retour de la frontière en Europe », comme l’illustre les cas de la région de l’Oresund ou de l’Euro-district de Strasbourg-Kehl/Ortenau où de nouveaux contrôles à la frontière ont été imposés dans ces espaces transfrontaliers fortement intégrés. Cette publication ne traite pas des conséquences de ces crises récentes, mais les différentes contributions illustrent la diversité des fonctions, positives ou négatives, que la frontière peut avoir dans le processus d’intégration européenne et dans les relations internationales. 60 Elle se détache donc d’une approche trop unilatérale et positiviste de la coopération transfrontalière considérée en tant qu’élément nécessaire à l’intégration européenne. Au lieu de cela, elle rétablit le domaine de recherche de la coopération transfrontalière en tant que branche spécifique des études de transfrontalières (relations internationales) qui peuvent contribuer à expliquer le processus d’intégration et/ou de désintégration Européenne. La première partie de cette publication traite donc du lien théorique entre « Frontières, Relations Internationales et coopération transfrontalière ». Elle repositionne l’approche théorique de la coopération transfrontalière sous trois angles différents. Tout d’abord, Jean-Christophe Romer (International Relations and Area Studies), explique le point de vue d’historiens contemporains qui envisage la coopération transfrontalière comme un cas spécifique dans le domaine des études régionales, dans l’histoire des relation internationales. En tant que géographe, Bernard Reitel (Cross-Border Cooperation and International Relations: Towards the Emergence of a Cross-Border Regime?) se penche ensuite sur l’illustration du lien entre les relations internationales et la coopération transfrontalière en soulignant le fait que les frontières européennes sont passées d’un régime frontalier régi par les Etats nations à un régime transfrontalier défini par l’UE. Il établit donc clairement le statut de l’UE en tant qu’acteur international de la coopération transfrontalière. Cependant, il préfère définir ce processus d’« Européanisation » plutôt que d’intégration européenne. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly explique ensuite le lien entre les études frontalières et l’intégration européenne. Dans son article « Borders and Border Disputes in Europe », il révèle que malgré l'absence de politiques spécifiques en matière de conflits frontaliers, l'UE a pris des mesures pour résoudre et limiter les conflits aux frontières depuis le tout début du processus 58 59 60

BECK, J. « Introduction », in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération territoriale en Europe (Vol. 6) : vers une cohésion territoriale ?, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2014, p. 37 ff. MESTRE, CH., Les incidences de l’achèvement du Marché unique sur les régions transfrontalières, Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1992. WASSENBERG, B., « The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations », in: DOMINGUEZ, L., PIRES, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2014, p. 67–81.

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d'intégration européenne. Cela n’empêche pas le maintien du caractère protecteur et souverain des frontières et les conflits territoriaux, positionnels et fonctionnels pourraient subsister au sein de l’UE – une raison de plus pour encourager la poursuite de la coopération transfrontalière. Dans la première partie de la publication « Frontières et gouvernance : une nouvelle politique étrangère ? », les frontières sont examinées comme lieu de gouvernance et la coopération transfrontalière comme un possible outil de « petite politique étrangère ». 61 Aujourd’hui, avec le processus de mondialisation en cours, les acteurs locaux et régionaux de l’UE pourraient être tout autant intéressés à positionner leur espace transfrontalier dans les relations internationales qu’à contribuer à l’intégration européenne. En outre, en fonction de leurs intérêts locaux ou régionaux, ils pourraient souhaiter compléter ou contrecarrer les relations bilatérales existantes avec leurs gouvernements centraux respectifs. La gouvernance transfrontalière ou « politique étrangère secondaire » dans les régions frontalières est donc l’expression d’une nouvelle tendance dans le développement de la diplomatie internationale des acteurs non gouvernementaux. 62 Dans sa contribution « Cross-Border Governance in Europe: A New Foreign Policy? », KarlHeinz Lambertz donne un aperçu des expériences, des défis et des futures perspectives de cette petite politique étrangère des acteurs locaux et régionaux. Joachim Beck présente ensuite sa théorie sur la gouvernance transfrontalière dans « Territorial Institutionalism and the European Administrative Space. A Conceptual Framing for Capturing the Institutional Dynamics of Cross-Border Cooperation ». Comme il l’affirme, les acteurs locaux et régionaux des régions frontalières européennes ont progressivement construit un système de gouvernance institutionnel sui generis – qui n’est pas toujours associé à l’UE. L'évolution constante des défis institutionnels et les conditions préalables spécifiques de chaque région frontalière a conduit au développement de solutions spécifiques des structures de gouvernance transfrontalières respectives. 63 Afin d’illustrer les différents types et espaces de gouvernance transfrontalière, trois études de cas sont discutés. La première est présentée par Christopher Huggins qui analyse les succès et les échecs de « Building Cross-Border Governance in the Channel/La Manche Region ». Il montre que la coopération transfrontalière a réussi là où les autorités infranationales ont été capable de capitaliser sur des opportunités pour adresser des enjeux de politique fonctionnelle, mais ont échoué lorsque les enjeux politiques « deviennent mêlés à la ‘haute politique’ au niveau national ». La seconde étude de cas menée par Marcin Krymuski et Peter Ulrich s’inspire des expériences de la région Viadrina à la frontière germano-polonaise. Se concentrant sur « la participation des acteurs dans les structures de gouvernance transfrontalière à la frontière germano-polonaise », ils examinent « la gouvernance participative » dans trois institutions de gouvernance transfrontalière. Ils révèlent que la participation donne lieu à une plus forte légitimation de l’UE et qu’une gouvernance trans61 62 63

See special issue by KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., « Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation? », Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 27, Issue 3, 2017, p. 205–358. WASSENBERG, B., « The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations », in: DOMINGUEZ, L., Pires, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 67–81. See examples in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Bd.2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011.

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frontalière intelligente et comprenant une approche multipartite est nécessaire si l’on souhaite freiner la montée du nationalisme en Europe. Enfin, dans « Networks as Functional New Micro-diplomacy Tools Supporting Cross-border Cooperation », Hynek Böhm présente le cas édifiant de la frontière entre la République Tchèque et la Slovaquie. Il insiste sur le fait que l’institutionnalisation de gouvernance transfrontalière sous l’égide du Groupement Européen de Coopération Territoriale (GECT) a amélioré la coopération mutuelle entre les deux pays. Dans la deuxième partie de la publication, l’accent sera mis sur la fonction des« Frontières : les gardiens de la souveraineté et de la sécurité », une fonction qui a gagné en importance depuis la crise migratoire et la menace terroriste internationale. 64 Aux frontières intérieures et extérieures de l’UE, les enjeux de sécurité revêtent désormais une importance cruciale et les acteurs locaux et régionaux pourraient s’intéresser à la fonction sécuritaire des frontières dans le but d’enrayer la criminalité transfrontalière, d’accroître la sécurité intérieur et de contribuer à la Politique européenne de Voisinage.65 Cependant, cette fonction de la frontière est principalement réservée aux Etats nationaux et ils veillent à ce que cette compétence soit l'expression de leur légitimité dans la politique étrangère et de défense, mais aussi la sauvegarde de leur souveraineté nationale. Par conséquent, les Etats Membres de l’UE sont réticents à l’idée de partager du pouvoir avec les Institutions européennes (le Système d’information Schengen, Europol et Frontex) sur la gestion des frontières nationales pour des raisons de sécurité, et ils ne voient pas d’un bon œil la participation des autorités locales ou régionales non plus. 66 Dans son Discours de Bienvenue « Borders, Security and Geopolitical Aspects », Walter Spindler, alors commandant adjoint de Eurocorps à Strasbourg, met en lumière la fonction des frontières nationales comme un atout inestimable pour une nation dans l'exercice des pouvoirs souverains sur son territoire. Selon lui, alors que la frontière de la Westphalie était d'une grande importance du point de vue de la sécurité et de la géopolitique, les frontières entre les États postmodernes ont perdu une partie de leur pertinence géopolitique en raison de la mondialisation, de la mobilité mondiale et des interactions transnationales. Mais puisque les frontières ne sont pas seulement perméables aux flux de biens de services et d’information mais aussi au crime et à la violence, elles continuent de jouer un rôle important dans la sécurité. D’un point de vue légal, Antoine Ullestad confirme que la mondialisation a modifié la définition même des frontières. Dans son article « Protecting the Security of the EU through its External Borders », il développe une théorie intéressante selon laquelle les frontières ont désormais acquis une nouvelle fonction : elles servent la stratégie de l’UE pour influencer la libéralisation du commerce mondial en poussant ses frontières extérieures « légales » bien au-delà des limites géographique du continent européen. Elles deviennent donc des « lignes qui redistribuent la carte du monde en fonc64

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CORNAGO, N., « Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the Redefinition of International Security: Dimensions of Conflict and Co-operation », in: ALDECOA, F., KEATING, M. (ed.), Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass, London, Portland, 1999, p. 40–57. LATTER, J., KREUTZER, M., RENTL, M., THIELE, J. (2008), « The Foreign Relations of European Regions: Competences and Strategies », West European Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, p. 464–490. With the notable exception maybe of the regional State level of government in those Member States of the EU which have a federal political structure, especially concerning the German Länder.

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tion de la proximité juridique, plutôt que par séparation politique ». La mobilité de ces frontières et leur nouvel emplacement sont un signe de l’élargissement normative de l’UE et marquent donc une nouvelle voie pour assurer la sécurité de la région. Jaume Castan Piños évoque lui les « Conflicts over Sovereignty in Europe in the so-called Post-Sovereignty Era ». Il conteste l’idée selon laquelle l’ordre des frontières de la Westphalie a été dépassé en soulignant que l’UE n’est pas à l’abri de la souveraineté et des conflits territoriaux. Ces différends peuvent être de nature infranationale, nationale ou supranationale comme il l’illustre à l’aide de plusieurs exemples tels que l’Irlande du Nord, le référendum du Brexit ou la question de Gibraltar. Le rôle de gardien de la souveraineté des frontières semble donc être toujours d’une grande importance. Cet argument est également appuyé par Manuel Friesecke dans « The Pertinence of the External EU Border: A Swiss Point of View ». Il explique que la Suisse s’accroche à ses frontières en tant que gardienne de la souveraineté et rejette l’UE et son principe de libre circulation des personnes. En se dissociant de leurs voisins et du processus d’unification européenne, les Suisses « tracent également des frontières dans leurs esprits », en mettant totalement de côté la réalité économique et culturelle qu’engendre l’interdépendance. La troisième partie de cette publication « Les Frontières, ‹ cicatrices › de l’Histoire ou lieux de réconciliation ? » traite d’une fonction déjà identifiée par l’un des pionniers de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe, Alfred Mozer, qui qualifie les frontières en Europe de « cicatrices de l’histoire à surmonter ».67 La spécificité de la fonction de la frontière en tant que lieu de réconciliation remonterait au tout début de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe. 68 Elle fut soulignée pour la première comme approche ascendante avec l’exemple de la frontière Franco-Allemande dans la région du Haut-Rhin ou de la Saar-Lor-Lux. Ce cas est donc différent des cadres de réconciliation nationale plus descendants qui ont été établis, par exemple, par le Traité de l'Elysée entre la France et l'Allemagne en 1963. La réconciliation transfrontalière aux frontières orientales a d’abord été entravée par la Guerre Froide, de sorte que le processus de consolidation de la paix à la frontière germano-polonaise a dû attendre la chute du mur de Berlin aux débuts des années 1990 pour être initié.69 Gerhard Besier explique dans son article « Mental Borders Create Limited Minds: How to Overcome Prejudices, Stereotypes and Concepts of an « Enemy » in the Second Decade of the 21rst Century », comment le processus de réconciliation fonctionne en réalité d’un point de vue psychologique tout en prenant en compte le patrimoine historique de l’Europe des deux Guerres Mondiales et de la Guerre Froide. Suivent ensuite quatre études de cas : l’une de la région du Rhin supérieur, une autre comparant les réconciliations franco-allemande et germano-polonaise et les deux 67 68

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MOZER, Alfred, « Entwicklungspolitik zu Hause ”, in: Entwicklungsregionen in der EWG, Schriften der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1973, p. 14. WASSENBERG, B., « Secondary foreign policy as a peace-building tool? The contribution of cross-border cooperation to reconciliation and stability in Europe » in: KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., « Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation? », op.cit., p. 219– 237 OPILOWSKA, E., « Reconciliation through Europeanization: Secondary foreign policy in the Germa-Polish borderlands » (p. 283–303) and BÖHM, H., DRÁPELA, E., « Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool : Example from the east Czecj-Polish borders » (p. 35–319), in: KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., « Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation? », op.cit.,

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autres examinant la réconciliation est-ouest. Dans « The Rhine: A Border of Peace? Memories from Key Players in the Upper Rhine Region », Birte Wassenberg retrace le processus de réconciliation dans la région transfrontalière franco-allemandesuisse. Sur la base d'entretiens avec des acteurs clés de la région, interrogés sur leur perception de l'intégration européenne, de la coopération transfrontalière et des relations interculturelles avec leurs voisins, elle souligne les résultats positifs d'un processus de réconciliation ascendant qui a permis d'établir des relations d'amitié stables dans un domaine particulièrement marqué par le passé par les « cicatrices » des guerres franco-allemandes. Bernhard Köppen illustre le même effet positif de la réconciliation en comparant le comportement des consommateurs à la frontière franco-allemande entre l'Alsace et le Palatinat avec la frontière germano-polonaise à Slubice (« Beyond « Erbfeind » and after Reconciliation. Shopping? A Comparative Study on French-German and Polish-German Cross-Border Tourism as a Common, Integrative Routine »). Cependant, il soutient que si les achats transfrontaliers sont certainement un indicateur de relations transfrontalières dynamiques, ils n'aboutissent pas nécessairement à une intégration régionale durable ou à l'élimination totale des stéréotypes et de la méfiance à l'égard de l'autre. Beata Halicka fait preuve d'un plus grand scepticisme à l'égard du processus de réconciliation dans les régions frontalières entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne. Son article « Polish-German Border: A Laboratory of Transnational Cooperation » admet que l'UE, avec ses instruments politiques et financiers, a facilité la création d'un voisinage pacifique. Mais si les frontières politiques sont devenues plus perméables, les frontières culturelles et symboliques restent elles souvent un obstacle dans les relations transfrontalières qui, à son avis, finissent par revêtir un caractère très « insulaire ». Le processus de réconciliation est donc loin d'être achevé. Katarzyna Stoklosa partage ce point de vue en prenant l'exemple de « The Finnish-Russian Border between Myth and Reality ». Dans son article, elle dévoile les « mythes » construits autour de la frontière finno-russe, et conclut par une vision encore plus pessimiste du processus de réconciliation: aujourd'hui encore, malgré les interactions transfrontalières, ils continuent de représenter une frontière hermétique entre l'Europe de l'Est et l'Europe de l'Ouest. La dernière partie de la publication est consacrée aux « Conflits frontaliers, barrières et résistance à l'intégration ». Comparées à d'autres espaces régionaux, les régions frontalières se caractérisent par une situation structurelle très spécifique: des éléments naturels et/ou socio-économiques tels que les transports, le marché du travail, les migrations, la criminalité, la pollution, les ordinateurs, etc. ont généralement une dimension transfrontalière qui touche directement les États voisins. Les problèmes structurels ou de politique quotidienne qui en résultent exigent une coopération transfrontalière étroite entre ces acteurs, qui sont compétents et responsables de la résolution des problèmes dans le contexte institutionnel de l'État membre concerné. 70 Mais il y a souvent encore des conflits latents, des barrières persistantes ou même des résistances à la coopération transfrontalière. En effet, contrairement au contexte national, où la coopération régionale s'inscrit dans un contexte juridique, institutionnel et financier uniforme, la gou70

LAMBERTZ, K.-H., RAMAKERS, J., « Vielfalt und Hürden kennzeichnen die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa », in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen (Bd.5): Integration und (trans-)regionale Identitäten, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2013, p. 61–73.

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vernance transfrontalière se caractérise par le défi de gérer ensemble la gestion des systèmes politico-administratifs qui ont une base juridique distincte et partagent un degré différent de différenciation verticale tant en termes de structure, d'équipement des ressources que d'autonomie d'action. 71 En outre, la coopération transfrontalière est encore un sujet de discorde et se trouve parfois en conflit avec le principe de la souveraineté territoriale des États membres respectifs. 72 Même dans ces régions où le degré de coopération est bien développé, la coopération transfrontalière reste donc encore marquée par des obstacles administratifs, politiques et culturels et les décisions doivent souvent être prises en dehors de la sphère de la gouvernance transfrontalière. 73 Trois articles sont consacrés à l'identification des obstacles à la coopération transfrontalière et à la manière de les surmonter. Jean Peyrony introduit le sujet avec sa contribution sur « Integration in Cross-Border Regions: Obstacles and Solutions ». En analysant la politique de cohésion de l'UE et en utilisant deux modèles sociologiques de Durkheim et Boltanski et Thévenot, il propose un ensemble de mesures pour éliminer les ob stacles à la coopération transfrontalière. L'UE devrait se concentrer sur l'apprentissage de la langue du voisin, sur le développement des liens interpersonnels par le biais de micro-projets, sur la mise en place de systèmes d'observation et de conservation transfrontaliers durables, sur les médias transfrontaliers, sur la formation et la capitalisation interculturelles et sur des projets dans le domaine de l'éducation pour développer un sentiment d' appartenance et des visions communes. Anne Thevenet poursuit en proposant ensuite « Capacity-Building as a Tool to Overcome Obstacles in Border Regions ». Le Réseau Transfrontalier des EuroInstituts (Transborder Euro-Institute Network (TEIN)) qui regroupe 14 organismes de formation et universités de 8 régions de l'UE, compte sur des solutions pratiques offertes par des formations spécialisées, des conseils et un soutien adaptés aux spécificités de chaque frontière. Le renforcement des capacités dans des contextes transfrontaliers permet donc de surmonter les obstacles à la coopération qui subsistent en raison du manque de connaissances vis-à-vis de « l'autre » et du manque de méthodes appropriées pour la gestion de projets transfrontaliers et le travail interculturel. Enfin, Jordi Cicres et Sílvia Llach examinent plus en détail « The Role of Languages in Cross-Border Cooperation: Obstacle or Opportunity? ». Les différences linguistiques sont souvent identifiées comme l'un des principaux obstacles à la coopération transfrontalière. Cependant, si la diversité linguistique peut constituer un obstacle à la communication, elle constitue selon eux un atout culturel. En outre, les langues minoritaires comme le catalan peuvent présenter une op-possibilité comme un pont culturel dans un ancien espace régional unifié, aujourd'hui séparé par deux États nations. La publication se termine par quatre études de cas sur les obstacles et les conflits dans des espaces 71 72

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EISENBERG, E., « Learning form Cultural Experiences and Interactions: Cross-Border Administrative Cultures », in: THEDIECK, F. (ed.), Foundations of Administrative Culture in Europe, BadenBaden, Nomos, 2007. BECK, J., PRADIER, E., « Governance in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik : Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Kooperationsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen », in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Band 2), Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, op.cit., p.107. BECK, J., « Cross-border cooperation in Europe – The example of the Upper-Rhine », in: KÖNIG, K., FOSLER, S. (ed.), Regionalization below State-level in Germany and the United States, Speyer, Deutsches Forschungsinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung, 1999, p. 137.

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transfrontaliers spécifiques. Andy Pollack (« Irish and British Relations, 1998–2012 : From Provincial Conflict to European Tensions ») et Ruth Taillon (« Cross-border Cooperation and Peace-building in Ireland ») commencent par analyser le conflit en Irlande du Nord et la contribution possible de la coopération transfrontalière pour le surmonter. Selon Andy Pollack, le processus de réconciliation a été largement facilité par l'adhésion de l'Irlande et du Royaume-Uni à l'UE et le soutien des Fonds structurels. Le Brexit est donc à l'origine d'une nouvelle menace de désintégration, qui pourrait s'étendre à d'autres régions de l'UE (Écosse, Catalogne, etc.). De même, Ruth Taillon souligne le rôle positif que les programmes INTERREG ont joué depuis les années 1990 dans la résolution du conflit, un rôle aujourd'hui menacé par la décision Brexit. Alessandro Torello donne ensuite un aperçu sur « Barriers to Bulgarian Cross-border Cooperation with Romania ». La région frontalière souffre d'importants déficits entravant la coopération transfrontalière. Outre les difficultés financières, économiques et de transport, il y a aussi des questions plus sensibles. La corruption, la criminalité organisée, le trafic d'armes, de drogues et d'êtres humains constituent donc de graves menaces pour les relations de bon voisinage et la sécurité à la frontière. Cependant, depuis 1989, les programmes opérationnels de l'UE ont progressivement mis en place les conditions pour le développement de concepts stratégiques transfrontaliers et fournissent un terrain pour des interventions d'investissement visant à minimiser les obstacles frontaliers et à résoudre des questions d'intérêt commun. Finalement, Adriana Dorfman présente une étude de cas en dehors de l’Europe: dans son article sur « Smuggling in Sant’ana Do Livramento (Brazil) – Rivera (Uruguay): Unification, Mirroring and Difference Processes and Transitional Dispositives in Border Condition » elle nous confronte avec une autre perspective sur la coopération transfrontalière. A la frontière entre le Brésil et l'Uruguay, les conditions frontalières ont engendré la croissance d'activités économiques informelles régulières, stimulant les régimes extraterritoriaux et le commerce transfrontalier légal et illégal – sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'instaurer un régime officiel de libre circulation tel qu'il existe dans l'UE. La « contrebande » de petits volumes est une pratique acceptée et tolérée officieusement parce qu'elle correspond aux besoins sociaux en matière d'emploi, à de meilleures normes de consommation et à la fourniture de produits rares. Toutes les contributions dans ce volume de recherche confirment trois tendances majeures: premièrement, la pertinence de la frontière existe et est actuellement renforcée par les crises européennes migratoires et liées au terrorisme. Deuxièmement, le mythe d'une « Europe sans frontières » propagé par l'UE est sur le point d'être démantelé, révélant que les frontières sont un élément crucial à refléter dans le développement de tout futur projet d'intégration européenne. Troisièmement, la coopération transfrontalière ne contribue pas toujours et nécessairement au processus d'intégration européenne: les régions frontalières peuvent être des « modèles d'intégration », mais elles peuvent aussi être le reflet d'un euroscepticisme croissant ou d'un lieu où persiste la « peur de l'intégration ».

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EINFÜHRUNG BIRTE WASSENBERG In der vorliegenden Publikation werden die Beiträge von vier „castle-talks“ über die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zusammengestellt, die im Château Pourtalès zwischen 2012 und 201674 im Rahmen meines Jean-Monnet-Lehrstuhls und dessen Projektaktivitäten, die von der Europäischen Kommission unterstützt wurden, stattfanden75. Der Titel der dritten Konferenz im Jahre 2014 – „Fear of Integration? The Pertinence of the Border“ (Angst vor Integration? Die Persistenz der Grenze) – wurde als Gesamtüberschrift für die Publikation gewählt, da sie die gegenwärtigen Veränderungen in der Wahrnehmung der Grenzen und ihre Bedeutung für die europäische Integration und die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit gut widerspiegelt. In Europa hat die Schengen-Krise, die durch den unerwarteten Migrationsfluss im Jahr 2015 angetrieben wurde, zu einer wieder in Frage Stellung der Funktionen der „Grenzen“ in der europäischen Integration geführt.76 Vor allem das Ideal eines „Europa ohne Grenzen“, das seit dem ehrgeizigen Projekt des Binnenmarktes im Jahr 1987 von der Europäischen Union (EU) propagiert wurde, zerbröckelt. Es ist das Herz und der Geist des Schengener Abkommens, das die Binnengrenzkontrollen der EU-Bürger abschaffte und was jetzt auf dem Spiel steht. 77 Die Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen in mehreren EU-Mitgliedstaaten verlangsamt nicht nur den Prozess der europäischen Integration, sondern stellt auch ein Hindernis für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa dar: Die Trennungsfunktion der Grenze wird verstärkt und „die Persistenz der Grenze“ scheint weitgehend bestätigt zu werden. 78 Eine der Hauptfolgen dieser Krise ist auch der wachsende Euroskeptizismus und eine neue „Angst vor Integration“, die sogar zum Zerfall der EU führen könnte.79 Diese Euroskepsis hört nicht an den Grenzregionen Europas auf. Gerade in grenzüberschreitenden Räumen werden die Probleme, die in vielen Bereichen aufgrund von Lücken oder einem Mangel an europäischer Integration aufge74 75 76 77

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Cross-border cooperation and International Relations (6 December 2012); „Borders and governance“ (3 December 2013); „Fear of Integration: The pertinence of the border“ (8–9 December 2014), „The Border: Source of Conflict or a Place of Reconciliation? (7–8 December 2015)“. A research project on conflict and cooperation at EU borders (2016–2018) and a research network (Europe, Canada, Japan, Turkey) on migration policies. SAURUGGER, S., „Crise de l’Union européenne ou crise de la démocratie“ Politique étrangère, 1, 2017, p. 23–33. GUILD, E., BROUWER, E., GROENEDIJK, K., CARRERA, S., „hat is happening to the Schengen borders?“, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, n°85, December 2015, p. 1–26; Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?, Study for the LIBE committee, European Parliament, June 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/ 2016/571356/IPOL_ STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf (2.3.2017). WASSENBERG, B., „La frontière, objet d’intégration ou cicatrice de l’Histoire“, Revue RECERQ n°9, 2017 ; www.recerc.casa-paisos-catalans.eu (to be published). Vgl. MOREAU, P., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism, Vol. 1 and 2, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016.

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taucht sind, sichtbar. 80 Die administrativen, rechtlichen, psychologischen und sprachlichen Barrieren entstehen, wenn Grenzen überschritten werden, und Verwaltungsstrukturen der Nachbarländer aufeinandertreffen. Der Mangel an Wissen über den historischen und kulturellen Kontext des Nachbarn führt regelmäßig zu Missverständnissen und sogar zu interkulturellen Konflikten zwischen Bürgern, die an den Grenzen leben81. Auch mit dem Ideal eines vereinten Europas ist die Existenz der EU nicht unbedingt eine Garantie gegen die Unicherheit und die Angst vor dem „Anderen“ jenseits der Grenze, was in den Euroregionen stärker zum Vorschein tritt, da dort enge Kontakte mit dem andern und der Andersartigkeit bestehen.82 Um die Rolle der Grenze in der europäischen Integration zu hinterfragen, beteht das Hauptziel dieses Forschungsvolumens darin, eine Verbindung zwischen drei bisher kaum zusammenhängenden interdisziplinären Forschungsfeldern herzustellen: Grenzstudien, grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und europäische Integration. Grenzstudien sind eine Disziplin in den internationalen Beziehungen, die sich auf die Analyse der Grenze und ihrer (geopolitischen) Funktionen in der Welt konzentriert. Sie wurden ursprünglich in den Vereinigten Staaten im Jahr 1976 eingeführt, als ein Netzwerk von Forschern, vor allem Geographen, die Association for Borderland Studies (ABS) gründeten, die sich anschließend weiter entwickelte und sich international ausbreitete. ABS veröffentlicht regelmäßig das Journal of Borderland Studies, das sich mit sehr unterschiedlichen Themen beschäftigt, die alle einen Bezug zur Grenze aufweisen.83 In Europa ist die Grenze auch Gegenstand einer großen Anzahl von Forschungsarbeiten und die Historiographie bezüglich dieses Themengebiets ist reichlich. 84 Geographen legen häufig den Schwerpunkt auf die (geo-) politische Dimension der Grenze, die ihre territoriale Bekräftigung, d.h. der Artikulation von Politik und Raum, verdeutlicht, wie es Michel Foucher erklärt.85 In jüngster Zeit wurden in diesem Sinne Grenzstudien von Marie-Christine Fourny und Anne-Laure Amilhat-Szary in Europa analysiert.86 Jedoch wurde diese Dimension auch von Politikwissenschaftlern wie Malcolm Anderson und Eberhart Bort, die die westlichen und osteuropäischen Gren-

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WASSENBERG, B., „Can Cross-Border Cooperation Provoke Opposition to Europe? The Example of the Upper Rhine Region“ in: WASSENBERG, B., CLAVERT, F., HAMMAN, Ph. (ed.), Antieuropéisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1): les concepts, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, p. 285–307. DUSSAP-KÖHLER, A., „Les sensibilités interculturelles dans les régions transfrontalières“, in : WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011, p. 129–145. GABBE, J., „Sensibilität in europäischen Grenzregionen“, in: WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., Vivre et penser la coopération transforntalière (Vol. 4) : les régions frontalières sensibles, op.cit., p. 93–105. See http://absborderlands.org/journal-of-borderlands-studies (2.3.2017). REITEL, B., Villes et frontières. Un jeu de construction de territoires, Bâle, Berlin, Strasbourg, University of Paris, 2010, largely reports on the scope and scale of geographic works on the notion of the border. FOUCHER, M., Fronts et frontières, Fayard, Paris, 1986. AMILHAT-SZARY, A.-L., FORUNY, M.-Ch. (ed.), Après la frontière, avec la frontière : nouvelles dynamiques transfrontalières en Europe, Editions de l’Aube, Paris, 2006.

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zen studiert haben, betont.87 Die historische Dimension der Grenze wurde vor kurzem in zwei Büchern untersucht, eins herausgegeben von Sabine Dullin und Sophie Cœuré über Frontières du communisme (Grenzen des Kommunismus) und das andere herausgegeben von Michael Gehler und Andre Pudlat über Grenzen in Europa.88 Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit ist ein relativ neues Forschungsfeld, das als „europäischer“ Zweig der Border Studies entwickelt wurde. Das Studium dieser Beziehungen unterhalb der staatlichen Ebene, die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg neben den europäischen Grenzen gegründet wurden, wurde in den 1970er Jahren eingeführt. Die ersten multidisziplinären Studien wurden von Raimondo Strassoldo ins Leben gerufen und seinen Kollegen am Internationalen Soziologischen Institut von Görz schufen ein Netzwerk von Forschern, die eine wissenschaftliche Studie über grenzüberschreitende Beziehungen und Kooperation auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene in Europa durchführten.89 Seitdem haben auch andere wissenschaftliche Disziplinen ein Interesse für den Bereich der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit entwickelt: Geographen analysieren hauptsächlich die Funktionen und Auswirkungen der Grenzen; Rechtsspezialisten untersuchen die rechtlichen Instrumente und Probleme der Zusammenarbeit; politische und administrative Wissenschaftler betrachten die Zusammenarbeit im Zusammenhang mit dem Thema Governance, Bundes- und Regionalstudien; Ökonomen untersuchen die ökonomischen Disparitäten und Strömungen zwischen Grenzregionen und Historikern untersuchen die Ursprünge und die Entwicklung von Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Gebieten.90 Die ersten Versuche, die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im Hinblick auf die europäische Integration zu erörtern, wurden von Politikwissenschaftlern in der Mitte der neunziger Jahre unternommen, die die Zusammenarbeit im Zusammenhang mit dem Thema „Europa der Regionen“ betrachteten. Dabei lagen lokale und regionale Akteure im Mittelpunkt der europäischen Integration, da sie die „idealste“ Governance-Ebene für ein vereintes und bürgernahes Europa darstellten. 91 In diesem Zusammenhang wurde die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit vor allem als Mittel zur Umsetzung des Binnenmarktes und als „Europa ohne Grenzen“ mit freiem Waren-, Dienstleistungs-, Kapital- und Personenverkehr gesehen.92

87 88 89 90

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ANDERSON, M., Frontier regions in Western Europe, Frank Cass, London, 1983 ; MALCOLM ANDERSON, EBERHART BORT, Boundaries and identities: the Eastern frontier of the European Union, Edinburgh, Social Science Institute, 1996. DULLIN, S., COERÉ, S., Frontières du communisme. Mythologies et réalités de la division de l’Europe de la révolution d’Octobre au mur de Berlin, La Découverte, Paris, 2007 ; GEHLER, M., PUDLAT, A. (ed.), Grenzen in Europa, Olms Georg Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 2009. STRASSOLDO, R., Bounderies and regions, International Sociological Institute de Gorizia, Trieste, 1973. Für die bibliographischen Bezüge der verschiedenen Disziplinen siehe WASSENBERG, B., „Historiographie de la coopération transfrontalière“, in: L’approche pluridisciplinaire de la coopération transfrontalière. Les jalons pour un travail de recherche interdisciplinaire, Cahier FARE n°5, 2015, p. 9–15. GROM, I., Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als Beitrag zur Förderung der europäischen Integration, Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 1995 ; RAICH, S., Grenzüberschreitende und interregionale Zusammenarbeit in einem Europa der Regionen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1995. RICQ, CH., „Les Cantons frontaliers et l’intégration européenne, Acte Unique européen, 1992“, report from the symposium of 28.10.1988 in Geneva, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1990.

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Bis zur jüngsten Krisen der EU, die in der Brexit-Entscheidung 2016 gipfelte, schien die positive Verbindung zwischen grenzüberschreitender Zusammenarbeit und europäischer Integration sinnvoll zu sein. Vor allem seit der Vollendung des Binnenmarktes im Jahr 1992 sind die Auswirkungen der Integration in den Grenzregionen Europas direkt zu spüren. Und aus diesem Grunde haben sie sich in der Theorie und in der Praxis zunehmend als „Modelle“ des Prozesses der europäischen Einigung identifiziert93. Tatsächlich bestehen 40% des EU-Gebiets aus Grenzregionen, in denen etwa 30% der EU-Bevölkerung leben. Die Auswirkungen des Fortschritts der europäischen Integration können daher hier untersucht werden: Die horizontale Mobilität von Gütern, Kapital und Menschen ist in den Grenzregionen offenkundig.94 Zuvor als Außen-, Rand- und benachteiligte Gebiete eingestuft, werden nun die Grenzregionen infolgedessen als zentrale Gebiete im europäischen Einigungsprozess angesehen, in denen die Auswirkungen der Integration im „kleinem Umfang“ messbar und für die gesamte Gemeinschaft repräsentativ sind.95 Aber gerade aus diesem Grund sind die Auswirkungen der Grenzkrise, seit 2015 induziert durch übermäßige Migrationsströme und terroristische Bedrohungen, in den Grenzregionen Europas erstmals spürbar geworden. Was früher als „Modelle der Integration“ galt, könnte nun aufzeigen, wie „die Rückkehr der Grenzen in Europa“ aussehen, verdeutlicht durch Bilder von neu eingeführten Grenzkontrollen in gut integrierten grenzüberschreitenden Gebieten wie der Oresundregion oder dem Straßburg-Kehl / Ortenau Eurodistrict. Diese Publikation beschäftigt sich zwar nicht mit den Konsequenzen dieser jüngsten Krisen, jedoch zeigen die verschiedenen Beiträge die Vielfalt der Funktionen, positiv oder negativ, die die Grenze im Prozess der europäischen Integration und der internationalen Beziehungen einnehmen könnte.96 Es rückt daher von einem zu einseitigen, positivistischen Ansatz ab, der die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als notwendiger Beitrag zur europäischen Integration ansieht. Stattdessen etabliert sie das Forschungsfeld der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit als ein spezifischer Zweig der Border Studies (Internationale Beziehungen), der dazu beitragen kann, den Prozess der europäischen Integration und/oder Desintegration zu erklären. Der einleitende Teil der Publikation befasst sich daher mit der theoretischen Verbindung zwischen „Grenzen, internationale Beziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit“. Es neu positioniert den theoretischen Ansatz der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit aus drei verschiedenen Perspektiven. Zuerst erklärt Jean-Christophe Romer (International Relations and Area Studies) den Standpunkt der zeitgenössischen Historiker, die die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als konkreten Fall im Bereich der Regionalforschung im Rah93 94 95 96

LAMBERTZ, K.-H. (ed.), Die Grenzregionen als Labor und Motor kontinentaler Entwicklungen in Europa. Berichte und Dokumente des Europarates sowie Reden zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Dike/Nomos, Zürich, Baden-Baden, 2010. BECK, J. „Introduction“, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération territoriale en Europe (Vol. 6) : vers une cohésion territoriale ?, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2014, p. 37 ff. MESTRE, CH., Les incidences de l’achèvement du Marché unique sur les régions transfrontalières, Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1992. WASSENBERG, B., „The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations“, in: DOMINGUEZ, L., PIRES, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2014, p. 67–81.

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men der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen einordnen. Als Geograph geht Bernard Reitel (Cross-Border Cooperation and International Relations: Towards the Emergence of a Cross-Border Regime?) noch weiter und sieht eine Verbindung zwischen internationalen Beziehungen und der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, indem er betonen, dass sich die europäischen Grenzen von einem von dem Nationalstaaten regierten zu einem von der EU definierten grenzüberschreitenden Regime entwickelt haben. Er stellt also eindeutig eine Verbindung zwischen der EU als internationaler Akteur und der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit her. Allerdings bevorzugt er die „Europäisierung“ und nicht die europäische Integration, um diesen Prozess zu definieren. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly erklärt schließlich den Zusammenhang zwischen Grenzstudien und europäischer Integration. In seinem Artikel über „Borders and Border Disputes in the European Union“ zeigt er, dass die EU, obwohl es keine konkrete Grenzstreitpolitik gibt, dennoch seit Beginn des europäische Integrationsprozesses die Grenzstreitigkeiten versucht hat zu lösen und zu verringern. Dennoch kann nicht vermieden werden, dass die souveränen und bewachenden Funktionen der Grenzen beibehalten werden und territoriale, positionelle und funktionale Streitigkeiten in der EU bestehen können – ein Grund die grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit weiter zu Fördern. Im ersten Teil der Publikation zum Thema „Grenzen und Governance: Eine neue Außenpolitik“ werden die Grenzen als ein Ort der Regierungsführung und der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit als ein mögliches Instrument der „kleinen Außenpolitik“ untersucht.97 Heute mit dem laufenden Prozess der Globalisierung, können lokale und regionale Akteure in der EU ebenso daran interessiert sein, ihren grenzüberschreitenden Raum in den internationalen Beziehungen zu platzieren, um einen Beitrag zur europäischen Integration zu leisten. Auch können sie je nach ihren lokalen und regionalen Interessen die bestehenden bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen ihren jeweiligen Zentralregierungen ergänzen oder entgegenwirken. Die grenzüberschreitende Regierungsführung oder die „sekundäre Außenpolitik“ in den Grenzregionen ist daher Ausdruck einer neuen Tendenz bei der Entwicklung der internationalen Diplomatie von nichtstaatlichen Regierungsakteuren. 98 In seinem Beitrag zur „Cross-Border Governance in Europe: A New Foreign Policy?“, gibt Karl-Heinz Lambertz einen Überblick über die Erfahrungen, Herausforderungen und Zukunftsperspektiven dieser von lokale und regionale Akteure bestimmten kleinen Außenpolitik. Joachim Beck präsentiert dann seine Theorie über die grenzüberschreitende Regierungsführung im „Territorial Institutionalism and the European Administrative Space. A Con-ceptual Framing for Capturing the Institutional Dynamics of Cross-Border Cooperation“. Er bekräftigt, dass lokale und regionale Akteure in den europäischen Grenzregionen schrittweise ein institutionelles Governance-System sui generis aufgebaut haben, das nicht immer mit der EU verbunden ist. Streng veränderte institutionelle Herausforderungen und spezifische Voraussetzungen haben in jeder Grenzregion zur Entwicklung spezifischer Lösungen der jeweiligen grenzüberschreitenden 97 98

See special issue by KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., „Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation?“, Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 27, Issue 3, 2017, p. 205–358. WASSENBERG, B., „The Place of Cross-border Cooperation in International Relations“, in: DOMINGUEZ, L., PIRES, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning form the Past to the Future, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 67–81.

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Governance-Strukturen geführt.99 Um verschiedene Arten und Räume der grenzüberschreitenden Governance zu veranschaulichen, werden drei Fallstudien diskutiert. Die erste wird von Christopher Huggins präsentiert, der Erfolge und Misserfolge von „Building Cross-Border Governance im Kanal/La Manche Region“ analysiert. Er zeigt, dass die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit dort gelungen ist, wo die subnationalen Behörden in der Lage waren, die Chancen zur Bewältigung funktionaler politischer Herausforderungen zu nutzen, jedoch ist sie gescheitert, wenn politische Fragen „auf nationaler Ebene“ in „hoher Politik“ verwickelt werden. Die zweite Fallstudie von Marcin Krymuski und Peter Ulrich beruht dann auf Erfahrungen aus der Viadrina-Region an der deutsch-polnischen Grenze. Mit der Fokussierung auf die „Actor´s Participation in Cross-Border Governance Structures at the German-Polish Border. Case Studies from the Viadrina Region“ untersuchen sie die „partizipative Governance“ in drei grenzüberschreitenden Governance-Institutionen. Sie zeigen, dass die Beteiligung zu einer höheren Legitimation der EU führt und dass, um nationalistische Aufstände in Europa zu erschweren, eine effektivere, intelligentere und mehrstöckige grenzüberschreitende Regierungsführung in Europa erforderlich ist. Schließlich liefert Hynek Böhm in „Networks As Functional New Micro-diplomacy Tools Supporting Cross-border Cooperation: Evidence and Lessons from Czech-Slovak Border“ Beweise und Lehren aus der tschechisch-slowakischen Grenze. Er betont, dass die Institutionalisierung der grenzüberschreitenden Governance unter dem Dach einer europäischen Gruppierung der territorialen Zusammenarbeit (EVTZ) die gegenseitige Zusammenarbeit verbessert hat. Im zweiten Teil der Publikation wird auf die Funktion von „Grenzen: Die Wächter der Souveränität und Sicherheit“ hingewiesen, eine Funktion, die seit der Migrationskrise und mit der internationalen terroristischen Bedrohung an Bedeutung gewonnen hat.100 An den Binnen- und Außengrenzen der EU sind Sicherheitsfragen jetzt von entscheidender Bedeutung, und lokale und regionale Akteure sollten an der Sicherheitsfunktion der Grenze interessiert sein, um die grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität zu verhindern, die innere Sicherheit zu erhöhen und zur Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik beizutragen.101 Diese Funktion der Grenze ist jedoch vorwiegend den nationalen Staaten vorbehalten, die diese Kompetenz als Ausdruck ihrer Legitimität in der Außen- und Verteidigungspolitik, aber auch als Sicherung ihrer nationalen Souveränität ansehen.102 Daher zögern die EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Verwaltungsbefugnis über nationalen Grenzen mit den europäischen Institutionen (Schengener Informationssystem, Europol, 99 100

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102

See examples in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Bd.2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Stuttgart, Steiner-Verlag, 2011. CORNAGO, N., „Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the Redefinition of International Security: Dimensions of Conflict and Co-operation“, in: ALDECOA, F., KEATING, M. (ed.), Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass, London, Portland, 1999, p. 40–57. WASSENBERG, B., „Le voisinage de proximité : les eurorégions „géopolitiques“ aux frontières externes de l’UE (1993–2009)“, in : ROLLAND, D. ROMER, J.-CH. (ed.), „Espaces de voisinage“, Les espaces de voisinage. De Monroe à la politique européenne de voisinage. Identité et altérité, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n°97 & 98, janvier-juin 2010, p. 45–49. WASSENBERG, B., „Le voisinage de proximité : les eurorégions „géopolitiques“ aux frontières externes de l’UE (1993–2009)“, in : ROLLAND, D. ROMER, J.-CH. (ed.), „Espaces de voisinage“, Les espaces de voisinage. De Monroe à la politique européenne de voisinage. Identité et altérité, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n°97 & 98, janvier-juin 2010, p. 45–49.

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Frontex) aus Sicherheitsgründen zu teilen und befürworten auch nicht die Einbeziehung lokaler und regionaler Autoritäten. 103 In seiner Begrüßungsrede über „Borders – Security and Geopolitical Aspects“ hob Walter Spindler, damals stellvertretender Kommandant der Eurokorps in Straßburg, die Funktion der nationalen Grenzen als unschätzbares Gut für eine Nation, um souveräne Macht in seinem Gebiet auszuüben, hervor. Während seiner Ansicht nach die westfälische Grenze aus sicherheits- und geopolitischer Perspektive sehr relevant war, haben die Grenzen zwischen postmodernen Staaten aufgrund ihrer Globalisierung, der weltweiten Mobilität und der transnationalen Interaktionen etwas von ihrer geopolitischen Bedeutung verloren. Da jedoch die Grenzen nicht nur in Bezug auf den Fluss von Gütern, Dienstleistungen und Informationen durchlässig sind, sondern auch Kriminalität und Gewalt zulassen, dienen sie immer noch einer wichtigen Sicherheitsfunktion. Aus rechtlicher Sicht bestätigt Antoine Ullestad, dass die Globalisierung die Definition der Grenzen geändert hat. In seinem Artikel „Protecting the Security of the EU through its External Borders“ entwickelt er eine interessante Theorie, indem er betont, dass die Grenzen nun eine neue Funktion erworben haben: Sie dienen der EU-Strategie, die Welthandelsliberalisierung zu beeinflussen, indem sie ihre externen (rechtlichen) Grenzen weit über die geografischen Grenzen des europäischen Kontinents hinaus verschiebt. Sie werden also zu „Linien, die die Weltkarte nach rechtlicher Nähe verteilen, anstatt durch politische Trennung“. Die Mobilität dieser Grenzen und ihre neuen Standorte sind ein Zeichen für die normative Erweiterung der EU und damit eine neue Möglichkeit, die Sicherheit des Gebiets zu gewährleisten. Jaume Castan Piños diskutiert anschließend „Conflicts over Sovereignty in Europe in the so-called PostSovereignty Era“. Er stellt die Ansicht in Frage, dass die westfälische Grenzordnung in Europa überwunden wurde, indem er aufführt, dass die EU nicht immun gegen Souveränität und territoriale Konflikte ist. Diese Streitigkeiten können von einer subnationalen, nationalen oder supranationalen Natur sein, wie er mit verschiedenen Beispielen wie Nordirland, dem Brexit-Referendum oder der Gibraltar-Frage illustriert. Grenzen als Pförtner der Souveränität sind daher immer noch wichtig. Dieser Punkt wird gleichermaßen von Manuel Friesecke in „The Pertinence of the External EU Border: A Swiss Point of View“ bestätigt. Er erklärt, dass die Schweiz an ihren Staatsgrenzen als Pförtner der Souveränität festhält und die EU mit ihrem Grundsatz der Freizügigkeit ablehnt. Indem sie sich von ihren Nachbarn und dem europäischen Einigungsprozess distanzieren, ziehen die Schweizer auch „Grenzen in ihren Köpfen“, ohne Verbindung zu den wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Realitäten von Interdependenz. Der dritte Teil dieser Publikation „Grenzen, die „Narben“ der Geschichte oder Versöhnungsorte“ beschäftigt sich mit einer Funktion, die bereits von einem der Pioniere der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa identifiziert wurde, Alfred Mozer, der die Grenzen in Europa als „Narben der Geschichte, die überwunden werden sollten“.104 Die Besonderheit der Funktion der Grenze als Versöhnungsort kann bis auf den Beginn der grenzüberschreitenden Zusam103 104

With the notable exception maybe of the regional State level of government in those Member States of the EU which have a federal political structure, especially concerning the German Länder. MOZER, ALFRED, „Entwicklungspolitik zu Hause“, in: Entwicklungsregionen in der EWG, Schriften der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1973, p. 14.

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menarbeit in Europa zurückverfolgt werden.105 Es fand seinen Anfang vor allem an der deutsch-französischen Grenze Oberrhein oder Saar-Lor-Lux-Region als „bottom-up“-Ansatz. Es ist daher anders im Vergleich zu den „top-down“ nationalen Versöhnungsrahmen, die zum Beispiel durch den Vertrag von Elysée zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland im Jahre 1963 aufgebaut wurden.106 Die grenzüberschreitende Versöhnung an den östlichen Grenzen wurde zunächst durch den Beginn des Kalten Krieges behindert so dass der Friedensbildungsprozess an der polnisch-deutschen Grenze zum Beispiel bis zum Fall der Berliner Mauer Anfang der 90er Jahre warten musste.107 Gerhard Besier erklärt zunächst in seinem Artikel über „Mental Borders Create Limited Minds: How to Overcome Prejudices, Stereo-types and Concepts of an „Enemy“ in the Second Decade of the 21rst Century“, wie der Prozess der Versöhnung, unter Berücksichtigung des historischen Erbes in Europa des Ersten und des Zweiten Weltkrieges sowie des Kalten Krieges von einem psychologischen Gesichtspunkt aus funktioniert. Vier Fallstudien folgen: Einer aus dem Oberrhein, ein Vergleich der deutsch-französischen und deutsch-polnischen Versöhnung und die beiden anderen untersuchten die Ost-West-Versöhnung. In „The Rhine: A Border of Peace? Memories from Key Players in the Upper Rhine Region“, verfolgt Birte Wassenberg den Versöhnungsprozess in der deutsch-schweizerisch-grenzübergreifenden Region. Auf der Grundlage von Interviews mit wichtigen Akteuren aus der Region, die sie über ihre Wahrnehmung der europäischen Integration, der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit und der interkulturellen Beziehungen zu ihren Nachbarn befragte, betont sie die positiven Ergebnisse eines „bottom-up“ Versöhnungsprozesses, der zu stabilen freundschaftlichen Beziehungen geführt hat, in einem Gebiet, das in der Vergangenheit durch die „Narben“ der deutsch-französischen Kriege besonders geprägt war. Bernhard Köppen veranschaulicht die gleiche positive Wirkung der Versöhnung durch den Vergleich des Einkaufsverhaltens an der deutsch-französischen Grenze zwischen dem Elsaß und der Pfalz mit der polnisch-deutschen Grenze in Slubice (Beyond „Erbfeind“ and after Reconciliation. Shopping? A Comparative Study on French-German and Polish-German Cross-Border Tourism as a Common, Integrative Routine). Allerdings hält er fest, dass das grenzüberschreitende Einkaufen zwar ein Indikator für dynamische grenzüberschreitende Beziehungen ist, aber nicht zwangsläufig zu einer nachhaltigen regionalen Integration oder zur totalen Beseitigung von Stereotypen und Misstrauen gegenüber dem anderen führt. Beata Halicka zeigt mehr Skepsis gegenüber dem Versöhnungsprozess in den Grenzregionen zwischen Deutschland und Polen. Ihr Artikel über „The Polish-German Border: A Laboratory of Transnational Cooperation“ erkennt an, dass die EU mit ihren politischen und finanziellen Instrumenten die Schaffung einer friedlichen 105 106 107

MOZER, ALFRED, „Entwicklungspolitik zu Hause“, in: Entwicklungsregionen in der EWG, Schriften der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1973, p. 14. WASSENBERG, B., „Grenzorte: von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation. Das Beispiel des Oberrheins“, in: DEFRANCE, C., PFEIL, ULRICH (ed.), Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem „Zvilisationsbruch“?, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2016a, p. 349. OPILOWSKA, E., „Reconciliation through Europeanization: Secondary foreign policy in the Germa-Polish borderlands“ (p. 283–303) and BÖHM, H., DRÁPELA, E., „Cross-border cooperation as a reconciliation tool : Example from the east Czecj-Polish borders“ (p. 35–319), in: KLATT, M., WASSENBERG, B., „Secondary Foreign policy – local international relations: can, local cross border cooperation function as a tool to peace-building and reconciliation?“, op.cit.,

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Nachbarschaft erleichtert hat. Aber während politische Grenzen durch dringlicher geworden sind, bleiben kulturelle und symbolische Grenzen oft ein Hindernis für grenzüberschreitende Beziehungen, die ihrer Meinung nach letztlich einen „insularen“ Charakter annehmen. Der Versöhnungsprozess ist damit nicht abgeschlossen. Katarzyna Stoklosa teilt diese Ansicht anhand des Beispiels „The Finnish-Russian Border between Myth and Reality“. In ihrem Artikel zeigt sie die „Mythen“, die um die finnisch-russische Grenze konstruiert wurden, mit einer noch pessimistischeren Sicht auf den Prozess der Versöhnung: Auch heute noch, trotz grenzüberschreitender Interaktion, stellt sie weiterhin eine hermetische Grenze zwischen Ost und Westeuropa. Der letzte Teil der Publikation konzentriert sich auf „Grenzkonflikte, Barrieren und Widerstand gegen Integration“. Im Vergleich zu anderen regionalen Räumen zeichnen sich die Grenzregionen durch eine sehr spezifische strukturelle Situation aus: natürliche und/oder sozioökonomische Phänomene wie Verkehr, Arbeitsmarkt, Migration, Kriminalität, Verschmutzung, Pendler usw. haben in der Regel eine grenzüberschreitende Dimension, die direkt die Nachbarstaaten betreffen. Die daraus resultierenden strukturellen oder alltäglichen politischen Probleme bedürfen einer engen grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Akteuren, die für die Problemlösung im institutionellen Kontext des jeweiligen Nationalstaates zuständig und verantwortlich sind.108 Aber es gibt oft noch latente Konflikte, anhaltende Barrieren oder sogar Widerstand gegen die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit. Im Gegensatz zu einem nationalen Kontext, in dem die regionale Zusammenarbeit innerhalb eines einheitlichen rechtlichen, institutionellen und finanziellen Kontextes stattfindet, ist die grenzüberschreitende Governance durch die Herausforderung gekennzeichnet, die Zusammenarbeit von politisch-administrativen Systemen zu steuern, die eine distinktive Rechtsgrundlage haben und ein unterschiedliches Maß an vertikaler Differenzierung sowohl in Bezug auf Struktur, Ressourcen Ausrüstung und Autonomie des Handelns teilen.109 Darüber hinaus ist die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit immer noch konfrontiert und findet sich häufig im Konflikt mit dem Grundsatz der territorialen Souveränität der jeweiligen nationalen Staaten.110 Auch in den Regionen, in denen der Grad der Zusammenarbeit gut entwickelt ist, ist die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit daher immer noch von administrativen, politischen und kulturellen Hindernissen geprägt, und Entscheidungen müssen oft außerhalb des grenzüberschreitenden GovernanceBereichs getroffen werden.111 Drei Artikel haben sich die Ermittlung von Hinder108

109 110

111

LAMBERTZ, K.-H., RAMAKERS, J., „Vielfalt und Hürden kennzeichnen die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa“, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen (Bd.5): Integration und (trans-)regionale Identitäten, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2013, p. 61–73. EISENBERG, E., „Learning form Cultural Experiences and Interactions: Cross-Border Administrative Cultures“, in: THEDIECK, F. (ed.), Foundations of Administrative Culture in Europe, BadenBaden, Nomos, 2007. BECK, J., PRADIER, E., „Governance in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik : Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Kooperationsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen“, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen, (Band 2), Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, op.cit., p. 107. BECK, J., „Cross-border cooperation in Europe – The example of the Upper-Rhine“, in: KÖNIG, K., FOSLER, S. (ed.), Regionalization below State-level in Germany and the United States, Speyer, Deutsches Forschungsinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung, 1999, p. 137

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nissen für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und deren Überwindung zur Aufgabe gemacht. Jean Peyrony stellt das Thema mit seinem Beitrag zur „Integration in Cross-Border Regions: Obstacles and Solutions“ vor. Durch die Analyse der Kohäsionspolitik der EU und die Verwendung von zwei soziologischen Modellen von Durkheim und Boltanski und Thévenot schlägt er eine Reihe von Maßnahmen vor, um die Barrieren für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zu beseitigen. Die EU sollte sich auf das Erlernen der Nachbarsprache, auf die Entwicklung von zwischenmenschlichen Verbindungen durch Mikroprojektfonds, auf den Aufbau von nachhaltigen grenzüberschreitenden Beobachtungssystemen, über grenzüberschreitende Medien, auf interkulturelle Ausbildung und Kapitalisierung und auf Projekte im Bildungsbereich konzentrieren, um ein Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit und gemeinsame Visionen zu entwickeln. Anne Thevenet schlägt anschließend „Capacity-Building as a Tool to Overcome Obstacles in Border Regions“ vor. Das grenzüberschreitende Euro-Institut Netzwerk (TEIN), das 14 Ausbildungseinrichtungen und Universitäten aus 8 Regionen in der EU zusammenbringt, setzt auf praktische Lösungen, die durch spezialisierte Ausbildung, Beratung und Betreuung angeboten werden und an die spezifischen Merkmale jeder Grenze angepasst sind. Der Kapazitätsaufbau in grenzüberschreitenden Kontexten ermöglicht es daher, Hindernisse für die Kooperation zu überwinden, die aufgrund mangelnder Kenntnisse gegenüber dem „Anderen“ und dem Fehlen geeigneter Methoden für grenzüberschreitendes Projektmanagement und interkulturelle Arbeit bestehen bleiben. Schließlich untersuchen Jordi Cicres und Sílvia Llach mehr im Detail „The Role of Languages in Cross-Border Cooperation: Obstacle or Opportunity?“. Linguistische Unterschiede werden oft als eines der Haupthindernisse für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit bezeichnet. Doch während die sprachliche Vielfalt ein Kommunikationshindernis darstellen könnte, ist es auch ein kulturelles Gut. Des weiteren können Minderheitensprachen wie Katalanisch eine kulturelle Brücke in einem ehemaligen, einheitlichen regionalen Raum darstellen, der jetzt von zwei Nationalstaaten getrennt ist. Die Publikation endet mit vier Fallstudien über Barrieren und Konflikte in bestimmten grenzüberschreitenden Räumen. Andy Pollack (Irish-British Relations, 1998– 2012: From Provincial Conflict to European Tensions) und Ruth Taillon (Cross-Border Cooperation and Peace-Building in Ireland) beginnen mit der Analyse des Nordirland-Konflikts und des möglichen Mitwirkens der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, um diesen Konflikt zu überwinden Laut Andy Pollack wurde der Versöhnungsprozess weitgehend durch die EU-Mitgliedschaft in Irland und Großbritannien sowie die Unterstützung der Strukturfonds erleichtert. Brexit verursacht daher eine neue Bedrohung durch Desintegration – die sich auf andere Regionen in der EU (Schottland, Katalonien usw.) ausbreiten könnte. Ebenso unterstreicht Ruth Taillon die positive Rolle, die die Interreg- und Friedensprogramme seit den 1990er Jahren für die Beilegung des Konflikts gespielt haben. Eine Rolle, die jetzt von der Brexit-Entscheidung bedroht ist. Alessandro Torello gibt anschließend einen Überblick über „Barriers to the Bulgarian Cross-Border Cooperation with Rumania“. Die Grenzregion leidet unter wichtigen Defiziten, die die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit behindern. Neben finanziellen, wirtschaftlichen und Transportschwierigkeiten gibt es auch sensiblere Themen. Korruption, organisierte Kriminalität, Handel mit Waffen, Drogen und Menschen stellen ernsthafte Bedrohungen für gute Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen und die Sicherheit an der Grenze dar. Seit 1989 haben jedoch die operationellen Pro-

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gramme der EU schrittweise die Voraussetzungen für die Entwicklung grenzüberschreitender strategischer Konzepte geschaffen sowie Möglichkeiten für Investitionsinterventionen zur Minimierung der Grenzhemmnisse und zur Lösung gemeinsamer Anliegen. Schließlich präsentiert Adriana Dorfman eine Fallstudie außerhalb Europas: In ihrem Artikel zum Thema „Smuggling in Sant’ana Do Livramento (Brazil) – Rivera (Uruguay): Unifica-tion, Mirroring and Difference Processes and Transitional Dispositives in Border Condition“ konfrontiert sie uns mit einer anderen Perspektive auf grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit. An der Grenze zwischen Brasilien und Uruguay erzeugte die Grenze den Anstieg der regelmäßigen informellen Wirtschaftsaktivitäten, die Förderung extraterritorialer Regime und des rechtlichen und illegalen grenzüberschreitenden Handels – ganz ohne die Notwendigkeit eines offiziellen Regimes der Freizügigkeit, wie es in der EU besteht. Der „Schmuggel“ von kleinen Bänden ist eine akzeptierte und inoffiziell tolerierte Praxis, da sie den sozialen Bedürfnissen der Beschäftigung, den besseren Verbrauchsstandards und der Lieferung von knappen Produkten entspricht. Alle Beiträge in diesem Forschungsvolumen bestätigen drei große Tendenzen: Erstens besteht die Relevanz der Grenze und wird derzeit durch die europäischen Krisen der Migration und des Terrorismus verstärkt. Zweitens wird der von der EU verbreitete Mythos von „Europa ohne Grenzen“ abgebaut und die Grenzen als entscheidenden Teil enthüllt, der bei der Entwicklung eines zukünftigen Projekts zur europäischen Integration neu reflektiert werden muss. Drittens leistet die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nicht immer und zwangsläufig einen Beitrag zum europäischen Integrationsprozess: Grenzregionen können „Modelle für die Integration“ sein, aber auch Spiegel für eine wachsende Euroskeptik oder ein Ort, an dem „Angst vor Integration“ besteht.

Preliminary Part :

BORDERS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION FRONTIÈRES, RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE

GRENZEN, INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN UND GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE

ZUSAMMENARBEIT

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AREA STUDIES JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER Are International Relations and Area Studies academic disciplines? This question is very old and still up for debate. If all admit that the study of International Relations is not a science, the acceptance as an academic discipline may vary depending on the geographic area concerned. In many countries – mainly in the AngloSaxon world – International Relations is considered as an autonomous discipline and has conquered its specific place in Academia. Not in France however, where the question has been put forth for years, but has yet to find a unanimous answer. What is studying International Relations? By essence and necessity, it is an interdisciplinary field of research. Some see it through the lens of history, others law or sociology, but in fact it depends more so on the topic at hand and the approach you want to privilege. However, in no way it can be considered as the exclusive “property” of history, law, political science, sociology, economy, anthropology, geography, etc. When “classical” disciplines jealously defend their own identity, the perspective that International Relations might be accepted as an autonomous discipline is weak. Such is the situation in France. When looking at the debate on International Relations in an Area Studies Journal entitled International Social Science Bulletin which was published by UNESCO sixty years ago, it strikingly appears that everything could have been written yesterday, considering that the questions then put forth remain the same today – at least in France. While it is true that several projects, task forces and commissions have been initiated in France in an attempt to establish IR as an autonomous discipline, they have yet to succeed. Considering Area Studies the situation is even worse, at least on an institutional level, but fortunately not necessarily on an individual one. No one has yet been able to propose an acceptable translation into French for ‘Area Studies.’ Aires culturelles, aires politiques comparées are possibilities, however no one translation has been agreed upon and so the most acceptable translation remains ‘Area Studies.’ As with International Relations, Area Studies is by essence and necessity an interdisciplinary discipline. I shall propose a definition given by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in this Bulletin of 1952: “The ultimate aim of the area studies is to determine the role and place of a given geographical area in international relations by shedding light on fundamental and accidental data. The first problem of method then is obviously the choice of the geographical area to be studied”.1 The first point of Duroselle’s definition is devoted to the disciplinary field; the second is about the choice of the area to study.

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DUROSELLE, J.-B., Les frontières européennes de l’URSS, 1917–1941, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1954, p. 640–678.

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I. Area Studies and Academic Disciplines Duroselle considers that three disciplines have to play a major role in such studies: history (he is a historian), geography, and sociology. According to him, history helps to discriminate between the permanent and temporary factors of analysis; geography helps understanding the nature of borders and power competition within a territory (the exact definition of geopolitics by Y. Lacoste); and sociology because it studies group interactions and influences. But such a hierarchy has not been adopted by all authors. Even if history is commonly admitted as the first step in Area Studies (as in International Relations), not every author gives the same significance to the role to be played by it. For instance, Hans Morgenthau argues that while knowledge of history is a necessity for those who study Area Studies or International Relations, “[their] intellectual interest is not identical to that of the historian”.2 Morgenthau thinks actually that research in Area Studies deserves its own hierarchy of disciplines according to the precise needs of the specific subject of study. “The possible predominant interests are as numerous as are the legitimate objects of curiosity. It is then as legitimate to put economics in the center of International Relations as it is to put law or geography there and to subordinate others disciplines to the predominant economic, legal or geographical interests. In this view, as many ‘sciences’ of international relations are possible as there exists predominant interest which correspond to legitimate objects of intellectual curiosity”.3 Another important point, on which Morgenthau insists, is the possibility for Area Studies to be used as a weapon of war, but also for peace. Furthermore he considers it to be a direct consequence of World War II aiming to, “prepare members of the armed forces for service in foreign countries”.4 After all, when working on cross-border cooperation, aren’t borders the very core of our reflexions? Which begs the question: what are borders? They are together both the sources of war and their consequences. We can also consider that many other disciplines serve the military, recalling for example the title of a book by Yves Lacoste, which reintroduced geopolitics to French Academia at the end of the 1970’s: Geography is first used to make war. Or, to quote Morgenthau again: “Surely wars are due, at least in part, to the fact that the peoples do not understand one another? The main object of an area study is to try to understand another people or group of peoples”.5 But this does not mean that Area Studies are to be submitted to political powers as geopolitics was during its first period of existence. Its credibility depends on its capacity to remain a relevant academic topic, be it to be used by politics or not. Whatever be the predominant discipline, all authors agree that Area Studies demand a dialectical vision of a region: local and universal. But according to Duroselle, a lot depends also on the choice and the making of an area. 2 3 4 5

MORGENTHAU, HANS, “Area Studies and the study of international relations”, International Social Science Bulletin, No. 4, 1952, p. 648–686. Ibid., p. 654–693. Ibid., p. 647–685. Ibid., p. 634–672.

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II. The Making of an Area Area Studies supposes several levels of analysis: a country, a group of countries, supra or infra state levels, and so on. But the main aim of such studies is to choose an area which offers a minimum of common elements – be they historical, cultural, linguistic, economic, etc. – that makes it a coherent area. The end of the bipolar order led to the creation of several regional constructions all of which had their coherences and which could be considered as new areas to be studied in regards to how areas arise, thrive, perish or transform (since some of them were obviously temporary constructions). In 1989, the Visegrad group, the Council of the Baltic States, the Weimar Triangle and the Council of the Black Sea States gave new life to cross border cooperation through the development of ‘euro-regions.’ These developments gave new perspectives of bi- or multilateral regional cooperation such as the transformation of the inter-regional cooperation institution called the Alp-Adria Community (which first became an inter-state institution, then after several enlargements, the Central European Initiative). The importance of the choice and making of an area can be illustrated by an example that makes us temporarily leave our ‘brave old continent’ and compare two concepts of an area to be studied in depth. The first designates a region coined by former president G.W. Bush Jr. as the Greater Middle East, an area that illogically spans the distance from Morocco to Pakistan. Quite simply this area is ‘cultural nonsense’ at best and an intellectually dishonest at worst. It has not a single element of required coherence and represents a perfect artificial construction of an area that has never existed and will never exist as such. By contrast, some hundred years ago geographers developed the concept of the Middle East, which was differentiated from that of a Near East. In fact, we still have this distinction in French, even if many in France do not know the difference between them! The old style Middle East is defined as Muslim and non-Arab, that is to say an area which today includes: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and former Soviet central-Asian states. This area has a tangible coherence and raison d’être from either cultural, political, strategic, historical points of view. Afghanistan is far from France but its analysis has to take into account the realities of Area Studies – the more precisely you define an area, the more acute your analysis will be.

RELATIONS IINTERNATIONALES ET AREA STUDIES Relations internationales et Area Studies sont-elles des disciplines académiques ? La question est ancienne mais le débat est toujours d’actualité. S’il est communément admis que l’étude des Relations Internationales n’est pas une science, l’acceptation en tant que discipline académique peut varier en fonction de la zone géographique concernée. Dans de nombreux pays – principalement dans le monde anglo-saxon – les Relations Internationales sont considérées comme une discipline autonome et ont conquis leur place dans le monde universitaire. Ce n’est cependant pas le cas en France, où la question se pose depuis des années

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mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse unanime. Qu’est-ce que l’étude des Relations Internationales ? Par nature autant que par nécessité, c’est un champ de recherche pluridisciplinaire. Certains le voient à travers le prisme de l’histoire, d’autres du droit ou de la sociologie, bien que cela dépende en réalité plus du sujet considéré et de l’approche que vous voulez privilégier. En revanche, ce champ ne peut en aucun cas être considéré comme la « propriété » exclusive de l’histoire, du droit, des sciences politiques, de la sociologie, l’économie, l’anthropologie, la géographie, etc. Quand les disciplines « classiques » défendent jalousement leur identité propre, la perspective des Relations Internationales comme discipline autonome est faible, comme c’est le cas en France. En examinant le débat sur les Relations Internationales dans un journal consacré aux Area Studies publié par l’UNESCO il y a soixante ans, l’International Social Science Bulletin, il est frappant de constater que tout aurait pu être écrit hier, tant les questions posées à l’époque restent les mêmes aujourd’hui – au moins en France. Bien que plusieurs projets, groupes de travail et commissions ont été lancés en France dans le but d'établir les Relations Internationales en tant que discipline autonome, leur succès se fait encore attendre. Si l’on considère les Area Studies, la situation est encore pire, au moins au niveau institutionnel. Heureusement ce n’est pas forcément le cas au niveau individuel. Personne n’a encore été capable de proposer une traduction française acceptable pour Area Studies. « Aires culturelles » ou « aires politiques comparées » seraient possibles, mais aucune n’a fait l’objet d’un agrément et la traduction la plus convenable reste Area Studies. Comme les Relations Internationales, les Area Studies sont par nature et par nécessité une discipline interdisciplinaire. Je proposerai une définition donnée par Jean-Baptiste Duroselle dans ce Bulletin de 1952 : « L’objectif final de ces études est de déterminer le rôle et lieu d’une zone géographique donnée dans les relations internationales à la lumière de données fondamentales et hasardées. Le premier problème est ensuite évidemment le choix de la zone géographique à étudier ». Le premier point de la définition de Duroselle est consacré au domaine disciplinaire ; le second concerne le choix de la zone à étudier.

I. Area Studies et Disciplines Académiques Duroselle considère que trois disciplines doivent jouer un rôle majeur dans de telles études : l’histoire (il est historien), la géographie et la sociologie. Selon lui l'histoire aide à différencier les facteurs d'analyse permanents et temporaires ; la géographie aide à comprendre la nature des frontières et des compétitions de pouvoir sur un territoire (l’exacte définition de la géopolitique par Y. Lacoste) ; et la sociologie car elle étudie les interactions et les influences au sein et entre les groupes. Mais tous les auteurs n’ont pas adopté une telle hiérarchie. Même s’il est communément admis que l’histoire est un premier pas dans l’étude des Area Studies (comme dans les Relations Internationales), le rôle qu’elle doit jouer n’a pas la même importance pour tous les auteurs. Hans Morgenthau soutient que si la connaissance de l’histoire est un nécessité pour ceux qui étudient les Area Studies ou les relations internationales, « [leur] intérêt intellectuel n’est pas identique à celui de l’historien ». Morgenthau pense en fait que la recherche dans les Area

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Studies mérite sa propre hiérarchie des disciplines en fonction des besoins précis du sujet d'étude spécifique. « Les intérêts prédominants possibles sont aussi nombreux que les objets légitimes de la curiosité. Dès lors il est aussi légitime de placer l’économie au centre des Relations Internationales que d’y placer le droit ou la géographie et des subordonner les autres disciplines aux intérêts économiques, légaux ou géographiques prédominants. De ce point de vue, autant de «sciences» des relations internationales sont possibles qu’il existe d’intérêts prédominant correspondant à des objets légitimes de curiosité intellectuelle ». Un autre élément important sur lequel Morgenthau insiste est la possibilité pour les Area Studies d’être utilisées non seulement comme arme de guerre, mais aussi comme outil pour la paix. Il les considère aussi comme étant une conséquence directe de la Seconde guerre mondiale visant à : « … préparer les membres des forces armées au service dans des pays étrangers ». Après tout, lorsque l’on travaille sur la coopération transfrontalière, les frontières ne sont-elles pas le cœur de notre réflexion ? Ce qui implique la question suivante: que sont les frontières ? Elles sont à la fois sources et conséquences des guerres. Nous pouvons aussi considérer que de nombreuses autres disciplines servent à l’armée, rappelant le titre d’un ouvrage d’Yves Lacoste, qui réintroduit la géopolitique dans le monde universitaire français à la fin des années 1970 : La géographie, ça sert d’abord à faire la guerre. Ou, pour citer Morgenthau une fois de plus : « Les guerres sont certainement dues, au moins en partie, au fait que les gens ne se comprennent pas les uns les autres. Le principal objet d’une Area Study est de tenter de comprendre une autre personne ou un autre groupe de personnes ». Mais cela ne signifie pas que les Area Studies doivent être soumises au pouvoir politique comme l’était la géopolitique durant la première période de son existence. Leur crédibilité dépend de leur capacité à rester un sujet académique pertinent, qu’il soit utilisé politiquement ou non. Peu importe la discipline prédominante, tous les auteurs conviennent que les Area Studies requièrent une vision dialectique d’une région : locale et universelle. Mais selon Duroselle, beaucoup dépend aussi du choix et de la réalisation d'une zone.

II. La Réalisation d’une Zone Les Area Studies supposent plusieurs niveaux d’analyse : un pays, un groupe de pays, les niveaux infra et supra étatiques et ainsi de suite. Mais l'objectif principal de ces études est de choisir un espace qui offre un minimum d'éléments communs – qu'ils soient historiques, culturels, linguistiques, économiques, etc. – afin d’en faire une zone cohérente. La fin de l’ordre bipolaire fit émerger plusieurs constructions régionales dotées de leurs cohérences spécifiques, et pouvant être considérées comme de nouveaux espaces à étudier pour appréhender la façon dont les zones se développent, prospèrent, périssent ou se transforment (étant donné que certaines d’entre elles étaient évidement des constructions temporaires). En 1989 le groupe de Višegrad, le Conseil des États de la mer Baltique, le Triangle de Weimar et

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l’Organisation de coopération économique de la mer Noire ont donné une nouvelle vie à la coopération transfrontalière à travers le développement des « eurorégions ». Ces développements ont donné de nouvelles perspectives de coopération régionale bi- ou multilatérale, comme l’illustre la transformation de l’institution de coopération interrégionale appelée Communauté Alpes-Adriatique (qui fut d’abord une institution intergouvernementale puis après plusieurs élargissement devint l’Initiative centre-européenne). L'importance du choix et de la réalisation d'une zone peut être illustrée par un exemple nous permettant de quitter temporairement notre «brave vieux continent» et de comparer deux types de zone à étudier en profondeur. Le premier type désigne une région inventée par l'ancien président G.W. Bush Jr. sous le nom de Grand Moyen-Orient, une zone qui franchit en dépit de toute logique la distance entre le Maroc et le Pakistan. Pour le dire simplement, cette zone est au mieux un non-sens culturel et au pire une malhonnêteté intellectuelle. Elle n’a pas un seul des éléments de cohérence requis et représente une construction absolument artificielle d’une zone qui n’a jamais existé et n’existera jamais sous cette forme. En revanche, il y a une centaine d'années, les géographes ont développé le concept de Moyen-Orient, différencié de celui de Proche-Orient. Cette distinction existe d’ailleurs toujours en français, même si beaucoup en France ne connaissent pas la différence entre les deux ! Le Moyen-Orient est défini comme musulman et non-arabe, formant un domaine qui comprend aujourd'hui la Turquie, l'Iran, l'Afghanistan, le Pakistan, l'Azerbaïdjan et les anciens États soviétiques d'Asie centrale. Cette zone a une cohérence tangible et une raison d’être (NDT : en français dans le texte), tant d’un point de vue culturel que politique, stratégique ou historique. L'Afghanistan est loin de la France, mais son analyse doit tenir compte des réalités des Area Studies : plus précisément vous définissez une zone, plus votre analyse sera pertinente.

INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN UND REGIONALSTUDIEN Sind Internationale Beziehungen und Regionalstudien akademische Disziplinen? Diese Frage ist sehr alt und steht noch zur Diskussion. Wenn alle zugeben, dass internationale Beziehungen keine Wissenschaft sind, kann die Akzeptanz als akademische Disziplin je nach dem betreffenden geografischen Gebiet variieren. In vielen Ländern – vor allem in der angelsächsischen Welt – gelten die Internationale Beziehungen als autonome Disziplin und haben ihren eigenen Platz in der Akademie erobert. Aber nicht in Frankreich, wo die Frage seit Jahren gestellt worden ist, aber noch keine einstimmige Antwort gefunden hat. Was bedeutet Internationale Beziehungen studieren? Durch Essenz und Notwendigkeit ist es ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsgebiet. Manche sehen es durch die Linse der Geschichte, andere Gesetze oder Soziologie, aber in Wirklichkeit hängt es mehr von dem Thema und dem Ansatz ab, den Sie privilegieren möchten. Allerdings kann es in keiner Weise als das exklusive „Eigentum“ der Geschichte, des Rechts, der Politikwissenschaft, der Soziologie, der Wirtschaft, der Anthropologie, der Geographie usw. angesehen werden. Wenn „klassische“ Disziplinen eifersüchtig ihre eigene Identität verteidigen, ist die Perspektive, dass internationale Bezie-

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hungen als autonome Disziplin akzeptiert werden können, schwach. So ist die Situation in Frankreich. Bei der Betrachtung der Debatte über die Internationalen Beziehungen in dem Regionalstudienjournal International Social Science Bulletin, das vor sechzig Jahren von der UNESCO veröffentlicht wurde, scheint es auffällig, dass alles gestern geschrieben werden könnte, wenn man bedenkt, dass die gestellten Fragen heute gleich bleiben – zumindest in Frankreich. Während es wahr ist, dass in Frankreich mehrere Projekte, Arbeitsgruppen und Kommissionen eingeleitet wurden, um Internationale Beziehungen als autonome Disziplin zu etablieren, müssen sie noch erfolgreich sein. In Anbetracht der Area Studies ist die Situation noch schlimmer, zumindest auf institutioneller Ebene, aber zum Glück nicht unbedingt auf individueller Ebene. Bisher konnte niemand eine akzeptable Übersetzung ins Französische für Area Studies vorschlagen. Aires culturelles oder aires politiques comparées sind möglich, aber keine Übersetzung wurde vereinbart und so die annehmbarste Übersetzung bleibt Area Studies. Als Internationale Beziehungen sind Regionalstudien im Wesentlichen und notwendig eine interdisziplinäre Disziplin. Ich schlage eine Definition von JeanBaptiste Duroselle in diesem Bulletin von 1952 vor. „Das höchste Ziel der Area Studies ist es, die grundlegenden und zufälligen Daten zu beleuchten, die die Rolle und die Situation eines geografischen Gebiets in den internationalen Beziehungen bestimmen. Das erste Problem der Methode ist dann offensichtlich die Wahl des zu untersuchenden geographischen Gebietes“6. Der erste Punkt der Definition von Duroselle betrifft das Disziplinarfeld; Die zweite ist über die Wahl des Bereichs zu studieren.

I. Regionalstudien und Akademische Disziplinen Duroselle bedenkt, dass drei Disziplinen in solchen Studien eine wichtige Rolle spielen müssen: Geschichte (er ist ein Historiker), Geographie und Soziologie. Nach Ihm hilft die Geschichte, zwischen den permanenten und temporären Faktoren der Analyse zu unterscheiden. Geographie hilft der Natur der Grenzen und Macht Wettbewerb innerhalb eines Territoriums zu verstehen (die genaue Definition der Geopolitik von Y. Lacoste) und Soziologie studiert Gruppeninteraktionen und Einflüsse. Aber solch eine Hierarchie wurde nicht von allen Autoren übernommen. Auch wenn die Geschichte als erster Schritt in Area Studies (wie in International Relations) allgemein gültig ist, gibt nicht jeder Autor die gleiche Bedeutung für seine Rolle. Zum Beispiel argumentiert Hans Morgenthau dass, während historisches Wissen notwendig für die, die Regionalstudien oder Internationale Beziehungen studieren, ist, ist das „intellektuelle Interesse nicht identisch mit dem des Historikers“7. Morgenthau denkt eigentlich, dass die Forschung in Regionalstudien eine eigene Hierarchie der Disziplinen nach den genauen Bedürfnissen des spezifischen Studienfachs verdient. 6 7

DUROSELLE, J.-B., Les frontières européennes de l’URSS, 1917-1941, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1954, p. 640–678. MORGENTHAU, HANS, Area Studies and the study of international relations, International Social Science Bulletin, No. 4, p. 648–686.

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„Die möglichen vorherrschenden Interessen sind so viel wie die legitimen Gegenstände der Neugier. Es ist dann als legitime Wirtschaft als Rechtwissenschaft oder Geographie in den Mittelpunkt der internationalen Beziehungen zu setzen und andere Disziplinen zu den vorherrschenden wirtschaftlichen, rechtlichen oder geografischen Interessen unterzuordnen. In dieser Ansicht sind so viele „Wissenschaften“ der internationalen Beziehungen möglich, da es vorherrschendes Interesse gibt, das den legitimen Objekten der intellektuellen Neugier entspricht“. Ein weiterer wichtiger Punkt, auf den Morgenthau besteht, ist die Möglichkeit, dass Regionalstudien als Kriegswaffe, aber auch für den Frieden genutzt werden kann. Darüber hinaus hält er es für eine direkte Konsequenz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, mit dem Ziel, „die Mitglieder der Streitkräfte für den Dienst im Ausland vorzubereiten“. Immerhin wenn wir an der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit arbeiten, sind die Grenzen nicht der Kern unserer Reflexionen? Das bittet die Frage: Was sind Grenzen? Sie sind sowohl die Kriegsquellen als auch ihre Konsequenzen. Wir können auch bedenken, dass viele andere Disziplinen dem Militär dienen. Ein Beispiel dafür wäre der Titel eines Buches von Yves Lacoste, das Ende der 70er Jahre die Geopolitik zur französischen Akademie wieder einführte: Geographie wird zuerst verwendet, um Krieg zu machen. Oder um Morgenthau wieder zu zitieren: „Sicherlich sind die Kriege zumindest teilweise auf die Tatsache gestoßen, dass die Völker sich nicht verstehen? Das Hauptziel einer Bereichsstudie ist es, andere Menschen oder Gruppen von Völkern zu verstehen“. Aber das bedeutet nicht, dass Regionalstudien den politischen Mächten unterworfen werden sollen, da die Geopolitik während ihrer ersten Existenzperiode war. Seine Glaubwürdigkeit hängt davon ab, ein relevantes akademisches Thema zu verbleiben, sei es von der Politik genutzt werden oder nicht. Was auch immer die Hauptdisziplin ist, alle Autoren zustimmen, dass Regionalstudien eine dialektische Vision einer Region fordern: lokal und weltweit.

II. Die Herstellung eines Gebietes Regionalstudien setzten mehrere Analysenstufen voraus: ein Land, eine Gruppe von Ländern, infra und überstaatlichen Ebenen und so weiter. Aber das Hauptziel solcher Studien ist einen Gebiet mit einem Minimum an gemeinsamen Elementen zu wählen – seien es historische, kulturelle, sprachliche, ökonomische, usw. – das macht es zu einem kohärenten Bereich. Das Ende der bipolaren Welt gründete mehrere regionale Konstruktionen, die alle ihre Zusammenhänge hatten und die als neue Bereiche betrachtet werden könnten, um zu untersuchen, wie Gebiete entstehen, gedeihen, umkommen oder verwandeln (als einige von ihnen waren offensichtlich vorübergehende Konstruktionen). Im Jahr 1989 haben die Visegrád – Gruppe, der Rat der baltischen Staaten, das Weimarer Dreieck und die Schwarzmeer-Wirtschaftskooperation der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit durch die Entwicklung von „Euro-Regionen“ ein neues Leben gegeben. Diese Entwicklungen gaben neue Perspektiven für die bi- oder multilaterale regionale Zusammenarbeit wie die Umwandlung der interregionalen Kooperationsinstitution namens Alp-Adria-Gemein-

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schaft (die erstmals eine interstaatliche Institution wurde, dann nach mehreren Erweiterungen die Mitteleuropäische Initiative). Die Wichtigkeit der Wahl und der Herstellung eines Gebietes kann durch ein Beispiel veranschaulicht werden, die wir unseren ‚braven alten Kontinent‘ vorübergehend verlassen macht und zwei Gebietskonzepte vergleichen und tief untersuchen. Die erste ist eine Region, die als Großer Mittlerer Osten von dem ehemaligen Präsidenten G.W. Bush erfunden wurde. Ein Gebiet, das die Entfernung von Marokko nach Pakistan unlogisch erstreckt. Dieser Bereich ist ganz einfach ein „kultureller Unsinn“ am besten und ein intellektuell unehrlichsten am schlimmsten. Es hat kein einziges Element der notwendigen Kohärenz und ist eine vollkommen künstliche Konstruktion eines Gebietes, das es nie gegeben hat und niemals existieren wird. Im Gegensatz dazu entwickelten die Geographen vor einigen Jahrhunderten das Konzept des Mittleren Ostens, das sich von einem Nahen Osten unterscheidet. Eigentlich haben wir noch diese Unterscheidung in Französisch, auch wenn viele in Frankreich den Unterschied zwischen ihnen nicht wissen! Der alte Stil Mittlerer Osten ist definiert als muslimische und nicht-arabische, das heißt ein Gebiet, das heute umfasst: Türkei, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Aserbaidschan und ehemalige sowjetische zentralasiatische Staaten. Dieser Bereich hat eine konkrete Kohärenz und raison d’être aus kultureller, politischer, strategischer und historischer Sichtweise. Afghanistan ist weit von Frankreich entfernt, aber seine Analyse muss die Realitäten von Area Studies berücksichtigen. Je genauer Sie einen Bereich definieren, desto fein wird Ihre Analyse sein.

CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A CROSS-BORDER REGIME? BERNARD REITEL In international relation studies, cross-border cooperation plays a minor role, a very limited one, indeed. However, for more than two decades, this cooperation, defined as “the existence of lasting relations established at regional or local levels between actors situated in adjoining national regions”, 1 has been playing an ever more important role in the field of “border studies”. These studies investigate the dynamics and transformations of borders using a multidisciplinary approach. We want to give a brief overview of the role of cross-border cooperation and of the issues that arise concerning international relations. The point of view proposed is that of a geographer whose questions address spaces, scales, distances and challenges of the region. This paper will concentrate on the European space where the European Union has introduced cross-border cooperation as a means of promoting the integration of nation states on local and regional levels in addition to the devaluation of internal EU borders.2 The EU considers these initiatives laboratories of European integration.3 Presently, generalizations on the global level seem difficult because the situation of border regions is differing widely, depending on the regions of the world. From this point of view, Europe provides a specific context certain aspects of which shall be described. A priori, cross-border cooperation forms part of the context of international relations since the projects involve two or more actors situated in two or more nation states whose territories have to be contiguous. This cooperation does not only depend on the commitment of the actors but also on the existence of conventions and agreements which always have to be established on an international, bi-lateral, or multi-lateral level. Thus, the Karlsruhe Agreement signed by Germany, France, Luxemburg, and Switzerland in 1996 facilitated the establishment of cross-border cooperation bodies like the LGCC. The local grouping for cross-border cooperation is a “statutory body under public law” holding a “legal status and budgetary autonomy”. In Europe, in 1980, the Madrid Outline Convention created the legal frame which has since formalized cooperation and offered perspectives to regional and local authorities. 4 Its international nature is emphasized by the necessity to reconcile the legal systems of all states involved in the creation of a common project between local and regional authorities. In this sense, cross-country cooperation has a transnational dimension above all. The 1 2 3 4

PERKMANN, M., SUM, N.-L., Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions: scales, discourses and governance, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2002, p. 3–21. ANDERSON, J., ”Towards a theory of borders: states, political economy and democracy”, Annale, Serie Hist. sociol 11-2(26), 2002. WASSENBERG, B. (ed.). Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière: les régions frontalières françaises, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010. WASSENBERG, B., Histoire du Conseil de l’Europe, Edition of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2013.

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border is not considered in terms of its controlling and regulatory features but as the challenge of linking two contiguous political systems. The existence of appeased borders is the precondition of this system of cooperation: Stability and openness reflect the existence of mutual recognition of the nation states, their territories, and their borders. Security issues have become secondary. This mutual trust between the states proves that their sovereignty and their national interests are not challenged. Thus, cross-border cooperation is part of a top-down logic assuming the actor on the macro-geographic scale to influence and structure the behavior of actors on the meso- and micro-geographic scales. Doubtlessly, the European framework of the European Union and the Schengen Area, complies with this definition because it established an appeased context with an atmosphere conducive to the development of common projects.5 Furthermore, since 1990, the Interreg programs initiated by the European Commission have constituted a political and technical frame flanking cross-border cooperation with an approach of seeking to reconcile diversity (of actions and themes depending on dyads) and harmonization (programs promoting multilevel governance and the implementation of good practice).6 Though it took until 1990 until a political framework was established on the supranational level, cooperation initiatives had been started much earlier in certain regions of Western and Northern Europe. Some of them were created in the late 1950s: Euregio between Dutch and German regional and local authorities in 19587, Regio Basiliensis between civil society actors and regional and local authorities between Switzerland, Germany, and France in 19638, cooperation of the neighboring municipalities of Tornio in Finland and Haparanda in Sweden9. The period is favorable for reconciliation, but this cooperation also forms within the context of nation states granting substantial autonomy to their local authorities (Germany, Switzerland) or because the nation states formalized a transnational frame of cooperation (Nordic Council). These initiatives were sometimes presented as models able to inspire other geographical regions. In this respect, it may well be assumed that cross-border cooperation also follows a bottom-up logic in the sense that nation states take over from initiatives are able to bring forward new proposals. Within the EU, these two logics, top-down and bottom-up, definitely seem to feed off each other because the Interreg projects are objects of evaluations. Their results are utilized to develop the framework to be used in the succeeding phase of planning the program. The European project consists in bringing societies closer to each other which consider themselves different. In this sense, it is conducive to all endeavors to overcome the border. The political context is combined

5 6 7 8 9

REITEL, B., “Border temporality and space integration in a transborder agglomeration Basel”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 2013. WASRL-WALTER, D., KOFLER, A., “European Integration and border-related institutions: a practical guide”, Journal of Borderland Studies, vol. 15, 2000, p. 85–106. PERKMANN, M., “Construction of New Territorial Scales: a framework and case study of Euregio cross-border Region”, Regional Studies, 41 (2), 2007, p. 253–266. WASSENBERG, B., Vers une eurorégion? La coopération transfrontalière franco-germano-suisse dans l'espace du Rhin supérieur de 1975 à 2000, Peter Lang, Bern, 2007. LUNDÉN, TH., ZALAMANS, D., “Local co-operation, ethnic diversity and state territoriality – The case of Haparanda and Tornio on the Sweden – Finland border”, GeoJournal, Vol. 54, No. 1, Binational Cities: 2001, p. 33–42.

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with a standardized ideological and technical frame which encourages free movement and takes a positive view of open borders. Cooperation is a question of geographical neighborhood and considers the border a link rather than a disruption. The realization of common projects implies the possibility to meet regularly and frequently, sometimes even unexpectedly and informally. In Europe, the loss of significance of borders (the body of the European Union, the Schengen Agreement) has reinforced close neighborly relations: The disappearance of controls grants fluent and unfettered movement. Thus, travel time between places separated by a border has diminished. A priori, this is conducive to growth in interactions. There are many reasons for cooperation, and their number has grown over the years. The first initiatives sought to create the conditions for the existence of an appeased border and to overcome the periods of conflict. The need for reconciliation and developing relationships between populations who had considered each other enemies a short time ago was particularly observable along the FrenchGerman border. More recently, this was also the case along the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland10. Another reason for cooperation is the need to remove certain obstacles related to the presence of the border which affect the populations’ every-day life. Subsequently, in the context of open borders, economic growth, and the rising number of international borders, cooperation was considered a means to solve the problems related to the presence of the border as an obstacle or as revealing of differences. From the very beginning, cooperation has not simply been content with sharing information but has focused on technical and political issues which required negotiations in order to reach an agreement on joint positions. More recently, other strategies have been developed: the pooling of equipment and services especially in sparsely populated regions, exchange of experience, stimulating interaction in order to stimulate creativity and innovation, emergence of complementary arrangements, economic development based on co-construction and partnership in order to strengthen international visibility. Combined, these multiple strategies contribute to the construction of true cross-border regions11 characterized by a network of intense relations between regional and local authorities. After a certain threshold of cooperation, institutionalization seems to become inevitable: It indicates the intention to perpetuate ones projects and to position oneself as a key player on the European stage as well as the national levels. By the way, cooperation has significantly increased in the course of the enlargements and the growing number of regions eligible for the Interreg A programs across many dyads12. The European institutions made the development of this subnational para-diplomacy a paradigm in order to facilitate the integration of the Central and Eastern European states. For several decades, their borders were severely controlled and did not encounter a gradual loss of significance like in Western Europe.13 The multi-

10 11 12 13

MCCALL, C., ”European Union Cross-Border Cooperation and Conflict Amelioration”, Space and Polity, Vol. 17, No. 2: 2013, p. 197–216. WASSENBERG, B.. Vers une eurorégion ?, op.cit. WASSENBERG, B.. REITEL, B., Territorial cooperation in Europe: A historical perspective. Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg: 2015, p. 172. SCOTT, J, Territorial Cohesion in Europe. For the 70th Anniversary of the Transdanubian Research Institute. Institute for Regional Studies, Pécs, 2013.

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level system of governance14 attaches due importance to regional and local authorities. It provides them with the prospect of having direct relations with the European institutions and supports initiatives, too. But the multiplication of institutions on many dyads resembles an expansion that has also been criticized because it seems to undermine the visibility and credibility of actions. Thus, the network of cross-border relations, via partnerships and institutions, shapes a political framework in which the state appears to play a minor role. Its retreat from border areas does not indicate a lack of interest and must be seen in the context of the negotiating of statehood15. By retreat, we mean that the nation state has redeployed certain traditional functions of these internal EU borders to the external borders (international borders situated at the transport hubs, and borders with non-members of the EU or of the Schengen area). In a way, intense cross-border cooperation is an indicator of the degree of appeasement of a border. Therefore, support of this cooperation appears to be a form of investment aiming at a better employment of the resources of supervision and control and at transferring them to the borders where the “real international challenges” concentrate, those where the risks perceived by the states are still present. In particular, they include the control of the flows of people. The crisis of migrants and the difficulties of reaching an agreement between the nation states, however, seem to put this model to the test. Thus, cross-border cooperation is rarely managed directly by the states but by public authorities or even by civil society or scientific players who act on a local or regional scale. The states may have initiated the cooperation, but only rarely do they ensure coordination. The role and place of states vary according to the political systems, even if one quite often observes a game between the states and their collectivities in the cross-border context. However, cooperation induces a rescaling, i.e., territorial re-forming brought about by the public authorities after developing a political project in an area16: expansion of the scope of influence of cities, cooperation with collectivities with greater powers. They encourage the redefinition of areas of cooperation, jeux d’échelles, etc. Thus, this rearrangement does not only contribute to reconfiguring space but also to the strengthening of certain authorities. In this way, the visibility of collectivities is reinforced whose importance within the national territory might seem secondary. The challenge of visibility therefore constitutes an important motivation for the cooperation of collectivities. To be located at a border, provided that it is one with an EU member state, is a means to distinguish oneself and to be identified on a national level, to gain recognition, and indeed, legitimacy. Finally, cross-border cooperation is also a means to pave the way to international cooperation. Thereby, one can train interculturalism, relations with others, things one is not familiar with, in a context free of risk. Thus, vicinity constitutes a form of proximity that is certainly foreign – but also reassuring. Towns, cities, and regions have implemented international strategies within which the crossborder aspect occupies a special role. Their strategies may resemble a form of 14 15 16

MARKS, G., HOOGHE, L., “Optimality and Authority: A Critique of Neo-Classical Theory”, Journal of Common Market Studies 38, 5, 2000, p. 795–816. NEIL, B., “Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in Western Europe, 19602000”, Review of international political economy, 11, 3, August 2004, p. 447–488. GONZALES, S., “Scalar narratives in Bilbao: a cultural politics of scales approach to the study of urban Policy”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2006, p. 836–857.

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regional diplomacy. This way, a good many collectivities have successfully increased their legitimacy due to this cross-border dimension. This is particularly true of medium-sized and small towns. In this context, it is worth noting the stimulating role of towns and cities of all sizes. For them, cross-border cooperation is not only a means to make themselves visible but also to expand their influence on a wider area. Still, it is necessary to distinguish the towns and cities according to their size. For the smaller ones, the cross-border dimension is the only international element they are capable to develop. On the other hand, the bigger ones develop multi-level strategies in which the cross-border dimension is only one element. If in certain cases the existence of cross-border relations provided support for the subsequent development of new relations, it is possible that the strengthening of the will to participate in a European or global framework may put aside the cross-border dimension. This does not mean it will disappear, though. Maintaining good neighborly relations remains a shared goal even if cooperation seems to stagnate. As we pointed out before, cooperation involves collectivities whose powers and capacities to act are widely different. But cross-border cooperation ensures a balance in the sense that it is an attempt to prevent distortions in the representation in government bodies. Resorting to this form of diplomacy is a means to facilitate discussion and negotiations. This does not prevent the most affluent collectivities from providing leadership, in other words, from supporting initiatives, ensuring coordination between the actors involved, and even proposing project ideas, and making certain resources available to all partners. The cross-border cooperation of the trinational agglomeration of Basel shows the leadership of the Canton of Basel-Stadt which – as a federal state in a federation – enjoys wide powers. The Management Committee of the Eurodistrict Basel, however, consists of an equal number of representatives of the three countries. In this way, cooperation is a matter of human, financial, and technical resources17. This is an advantage for the big collectivities, cities, metropolises, and regions. Cooperation requires regional planning to set up and complete projects, language skills, and skills in how to negotiate with the other actors in a multi-level context. Ultimately, it may be assumed that in a few decades, the European frontiers shall have developed from a border regime ruled by the nation states to a crossborder regime defined by the European Union and the nation states together, and build in a permanent manner through the development of projects, the awarding of funds, the existence of standard practices, and the establishment of crossborder cooperation bodies. To speak of national frontiers makes but little sense in this context of co-sovereignty and multi-level governance. Instead, one could consider that on each national territory, there exist zones of transition which mark the passage between neighboring territories. A cross-border regime induces the existence of specific relations with the neighboring territory which emerge from the territorialities of mutual influence. Therefore, Europeanization is a sign of integration and the reconfiguration of spatiality.18 This cross-border regime 17 18

SOHN, CH., “The Border as a Resource in the Global Urban Space: A Contribution to the Cross-Border Metropolis Hypothesis”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38, issue 5, 2014, p. 1697–1711. O’DOWD, L., “Transnational integration and cross-border regions in the European Union” in: Transnational Democracy. Political Spaces and Border Crossings, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 111– 128.

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does not simply act any longer in the context of international relations due to the specific place the state occupies and the active role played by local and regional actors. Here, the border appears as an interface connecting national territories whose homogeneous character is no longer their essential component. However, it is worth considering the impact of the resurgence of nationalism in the European states. This actually announces the reactivation of symbolic borders which emphasize the idea of distancing. Cross-border cooperation is a longtime project, but any action challenging the border as an interface and a crossing point may undermine this orientation. In spite of a sometimes highly elaborated framework, cooperation occasionally seems to stagnate in spite of the existence of strong functional interactions. In certain cases, the motivation and the will to cooperate are questioned19. To be effective, cross-border cooperation does not only need horizontal relations between neighboring collectivities but also horizontal relations which provide the opportunity to mobilize resources. More than ever, cross-border cooperation remains a matter which associates different actors on multiple levels. This is where the states as well as the European institutions play their roles.

COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIERE ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES EN EUROPE : VERS L’EMERGENCE D’UN REGIME TRANSFRONTALIER ? Dans les études sur les relations internationales, la coopération transfrontalière n’occupe qu’une place mineure, voir confidentielle. Pourtant, cette dernière, définie ‘comme l’existence de relations durables établies aux échelles régionales ou locales entre des acteurs situés dans des territoires nationaux contigus’, occupe une place grandissante depuis plus de deux décennies dans le champ des ‘border studies’ qui interrogent les dynamiques et les transformations des frontières selon une approche pluridisciplinaire. Notre objectif est de dresser un bref aperçu de ce que représente la coopération transfrontalière et des enjeux qui s’y dessinent par rapport aux relations internationales en proposant un regard de géographe, dont les interrogations portent sur les espaces, les échelles, les distances et les enjeux de territoires. Les propos se concentreront sur l’espace européen où l’Union Européenne qui a instauré la coopération transfrontalière comme un moyen de favoriser l’intégration entre les Etats aux échelles locales et régionales en complément de la dévaluation des frontières internes et qui considère ces initiatives comme des laboratoires de l’intégration européenne. Une généralisation à l’échelle globale semble difficile pour l’instant, tant les situations des territoires frontaliers sont différentes selon les régions du monde. L’Europe présente de ce point de vue un contexte spécifique dont nous allons décrire certains aspects. La coopération transfrontalière s’inscrit a priori dans le registre des relations internationales dans la mesure où les projets impliquent des acteurs situés dans deux ou plusieurs Etats dont les territoires sont nécessairement contigus. Cette 19

YNDIGEGN, C., “Between debordering and rebordering Europe: Cross-border cooperation in the Øresund region or the Danish-Swedish border region, Eurasia Border Review, 2, 1, p. 47–59.

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coopération dépend non seulement de la volonté des acteurs, mais aussi de l’existence de conventions qui s’établissent toujours dans un cadre international, bilatéral ou multilatéral. L’accord de Karlsruhe signé entre Allemagne, France, Luxembourg et Suisse en 1996 a ainsi facilité l’instauration d’organismes de coopération transfrontalière comme le GLCT (Groupement local de coopération transfrontalière), qui est une « personne morale de droit public » dotée de la « capacité juridique et de l'autonomie budgétaire ». En Europe, c’est cependant la convention-cadre de Madrid qui formalise la coopération et qui offre des perspectives aux collectivités régionales et locales, à partir de 1980 en créant un cadre juridique. La dimension internationale est soulignée par la nécessité de concilier les systèmes juridiques de chaque Etat impliqué pour monter un projet commun entre des collectivités territoriales. En ce sens, la coopération transfrontalière a avant tout une dimension transnationale. La frontière n’est pas considérée en fonction de sa propriété de contrôle ou de régulation, mais du fait de l’enjeu d’articuler deux systèmes politiques contigus. Ce régime de coopération est né de l’existence de frontières apaisées : la stabilité et l’ouverture traduisent l’existence d’une reconnaissance mutuelle des Etats, de leurs territoires et de leurs frontières où les enjeux de sécurité sont devenus secondaires. La confiance réciproque qui existe entre les Etats signale que leur souveraineté et leurs intérêts nationaux ne sont pas remis en cause. La coopération transfrontalière s’inscrit ainsi dans une logique descendante qui considère que l’acteur intervenant à l’échelle macro-géographique influence et structure les comportements des acteurs intervenant aux échelles méso et micro-géographique. Le contexte européen, celui de l’Union européenne et de l’espace Schengen, répond indéniablement à cette définition car il établit un contexte apaisé où règne une ambiance propice à l’élaboration de projets. De plus, depuis 1990, les programmes Interreg initiés par la Commission Européenne constituent un cadre politique et technique qui encadre la coopération transfrontalière avec une vision qui cherche à concilier la diversité (des actions, des thématiques en fonction des dyades) et l’harmonisation (dispositifs favorisant la gouvernance multi-niveaux et l’instauration de bonnes pratiques). Cependant, s’il a fallu attendre 1990 avant qu’un cadre politique ne soit instauré à l’échelle supranationale, des initiatives de coopération ont été entreprises bien plus tôt dans certaines régions d’Europe occidentale et septentrionale. Certaines ont vu le jour dès la fin des années 1950 : Euregio entre collectivités néerlandaises et allemandes en 1958, Regio Basiliensis entre acteurs de la société civile et collectivités entre Suisse Allemagne et France en 1963, collaboration entre les municipalités voisines de Tornio en Finlande et Haparanda en Suède. La période est favorable à la réconciliation, mais la coopération s’inscrit aussi dans le cadre d’Etats qui accordent une forte autonomie à leurs collectivités locales (Allemagne, Suisse,) ou parce que les Etats ont formalisé un cadre transnational de coopération (Conseil Nordique). Ces initiatives ont parfois été présentées comme des modèles qui ont pu être inspirés d’autres zones géographiques. En cela, on peut estimer que la coopération transfrontalière s‘inscrit également dans une logique ascendante dans la mesure où les Etats relaient ces initiatives qui peuvent susciter de nouvelles propositions. En définitive, au sein de l’UE, les deux logiques, descendantes et ascendantes, semblent se nourrir, car les projets Interreg font l’objet d’évaluations dont les résultats sont utilisés pour élaborer les dispositifs qui seront utilisés dans les pha-

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ses suivantes de programmation. En ce sens, le projet européen qui consiste à rapprocher des sociétés qui se considèrent comme différentes est propice à toute entreprise de dépassement de la frontière. Le contexte politique est associé à un cadre idéologique et technique normalisé qui encourage la libre circulation et qui considère l’ouverture des frontières de manière positive. La coopération est affaire de proximité géographique et traduit que la frontière est plus un lien qu’une rupture. Réaliser des projets en commun implique la possibilité de se rencontrer régulièrement et fréquemment, y compris parfois de manière imprévue et informelle. En Europe, la dévaluation des frontières (institution de l’Union européenne, accords de Schengen) a renforcé la proximité : la disparition des contrôles permet une circulation fluide et sans entrave. Les temps de parcours entre des lieux séparés par une frontière ont ainsi diminué, ce qui est favorable, a priori, à la croissance des interactions. Les motivations de coopérer sont nombreuses et elles se sont élargies avec le temps. Les premières initiatives ont cherché à créer les conditions de l’existence d’une frontière apaisée et à dépasser les périodes de conflit. La nécessité de se réconcilier et de tisser des liens entre des populations qui se considéraient peu de temps auparavant comme des ennemis a notamment été observé sur la frontière franco-allemande, mais cela a été le cas aussi bien plus récemment sur la frontière entre la République d’Irlande et l’Irlande du Nord. Le besoin de lever certains obstacles liés à la présence de la frontière qui a un effet sur la vie quotidienne des populations constitue un autre motif de coopération. Par la suite, dans un contexte d’ouverture des frontières, de croissance économique et d’augmentation des frontières internationales, la coopération a été considérée comme un moyen de régler des problèmes liés à la présence de la frontière en tant qu’obstacle ou en tant que révélateur des différenciations. Dès le départ, la coopération ne s’est pas simplement contentée de procéder à des échanges d’informations, mais elle a porté sur des discussions techniques et politiques, qui nécessitent des négociations et donc de s’accorder sur des positions communes. Plus récemment, d’autres stratégies ont vue le jour : mutualisation d’équipements ou de services notamment dans des zones faiblement peuplées, échanges d’expériences, interactions stimulantes en vue de susciter la créativité ou l’innovation, émergence de complémentarités, développement économique basé sur la co-construction, partenariat en vue de renforcer la lisibilité internationale. En se combinant, ces stratégies multiples, participent à la construction de véritables régions transfrontalières caractérisées par le tissage de relations intenses entre collectivités. A partir d’un certain seuil de coopération, l’institutionnalisation semble devenir inéluctable : elle dénote une volonté de pérenniser les actions et de se positionner comme un acteur incontournable à l’échelle européenne et aux échelles nationales respectivement. La coopération s’est d’ailleurs largement diffusée au gré des élargissements et de l’extension des régions éligibles aux programmes Interreg A sur de nombreuses dyades. Le développement de cette paradiplomatie subnationale a été érigé comme un paradigme par les institutions européennes pour faciliter l’intégration des Etats d’Europe centrale et orientale dont les frontières ont fait l’objet pendant plusieurs décennies d’un sévère contrôle et qui n’ont pas connu une dévaluation progressive comme celles d’Europe occidentale. Le système de gouvernance multi-niveaux qui valorise les pouvoirs régionaux et locaux et qui leurs donnent la perspective d’avoir une relation directe avec les instances européenne est également favorable aux initiatives. La multiplication des instances

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sur de nombreuses dyades s’apparente à un foisonnement qui fait l’objet de critiques car il semble nuire à la lisibilité et à la crédibilité des actions. Le tissage des relations transfrontalières, à travers les partenariats et les institutions, dessine ainsi un cadre politique où l’Etat apparaît comme un acteur secondaire. Le désinvestissement de l’Etat des territoires frontaliers ne signifie pas pour autant un désintérêt et s’inscrit dans le cadre de la recomposition des Etats. Par désinvestissement, nous entendons que l’Etat a redéployé certaines fonctions traditionnelles de ces frontières internes sur les frontières externes (frontières internationales localisées dans les nœuds de transport ou frontières avec des Etats non-membre de l’UE ou de l’espace Schengen). L’existence d’une coopération transfrontalière intense est en quelque sorte un révélateur du degré d’apaisement d’une frontière. Le soutien à la coopération apparaît dès lors comme une forme d’investissement qui vise à mieux mobiliser les ressources de contrôle et de filtrage et à les transférer sur les frontières où se concentrent les « véritables enjeux internationaux », ceux où le risque tel qu’il est perçu par les Etats est toujours présent et qui passe notamment par le contrôle des flux de personnes. La crise des migrants et les difficultés de conciliation entre les Etats semblent cependant éprouver ce modèle. Ainsi, la coopération transfrontalière est rarement gérée directement par des Etats, mais elle l’est par des collectivités publiques, voire des acteurs de la société civile ou du champ scientifique qui agissent à une échelle locale ou régionale. Les Etats peuvent être les initiateurs de la coopération, mais ils n’en assurent qu’exceptionnellement la coordination. Le rôle et la place des Etats varient selon les régimes politiques, même si l’on observe très souvent un jeu entre les Etats et leurs collectivités dans un contexte transfrontalier. La coopération induit cependant un réagencement scalaire (rescaling), c’est-àdire des recompositions territoriales qui sont opérés par les pouvoirs publics afin de développer un projet politique sur un espace : extension des périmètres d’influence des villes, coopération avec des collectivités dont les pouvoirs sont plus importants qui incitent à redéfinir les zones de coopérations, jeux d’échelles, etc. Ce réagencement contribue ainsi non seulement à reconfigurer l’espace, mais aussi à renforcer certains pouvoirs. La lisibilité de collectivités qui dans un territoire national pourraient apparaître secondaires se trouve ainsi renforcée. L’enjeu de la lisibilité constitue ainsi une motivation importante de coopération des collectivités. Etre localisé à une frontière, y compris lorsqu’il s’agit d’un Etatmembre, est un moyen de se distinguer et d’être identifié dans un cadre national, d’obtenir une reconnaissance, voire une légitimité. Enfin, la coopération transfrontalière est aussi un moyen de poser les jalons d’une coopération internationale. On peut ainsi faire l’apprentissage de l’interculturalité, du rapport à autrui, de ce qui n’est pas familier dans un contexte qui ne présente pas de risque. Le voisinage constitue ainsi une proximité, certes dépaysant, mais aussi rassurante. Les villes et les régions mettent en œuvre des stratégies internationales au sein desquelles la dimension transfrontalière occupe une place particulière qui peuvent s’apparenter à une forme de diplomatie territoriale. Bon nombre de collectivités ont ainsi réussi à accroître leurs légitimités grâce à cette dimension transfrontalière et c’est notamment le cas de villes moyennes et petites. Dans ce cadre, il convient de noter le rôle stimulant des villes de toutes taille pour lesquelles la coopération transfrontalière n’est pas seulement un moyen de se rendre lisible, mais aussi d’étendre son influence sur

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un périmètre plus large. Cependant, il convient de distinguer les villes en fonction de leur taille. Pour les plus petites, la dimension transfrontalière est la seule dimension internationale qu’elles sont en mesure de développer. En revanche, les plus grandes développent des stratégies multi-scalaires au sein desquelles la dimension transfrontalière ne constitue qu’une des dimensions. Si dans certains cas l’existence de relations transfrontalières a permis de disposer d’un support pour développer par la suite de nouvelles relations, il peut cependant arriver que le renforcement de la volonté de s’inscrire dans un cadre européen, voire mondial, puisse mettre entre parenthèses la dimension transfrontalière, sans pour autant la faire disparaître. Conserver de bonnes relations de voisinage reste un objectif partagé, même lorsque la coopération semble marqueur le pas. Comme nous l’avons souligné, la coopération implique des collectivités dont les pouvoirs et les capacités d’action sont très différentes. La coopération transfrontalière permet cependant d’assurer un équilibre dans la mesure où l’on essaie d’éviter des distorsions dans les représentations dans les instances. Requérir à cette forme de diplomatie est un moyen de faciliter la discussion et les négociations. Cela n’empêche pas les collectivités les mieux dotées d’assurer un leadership, c’est-àdire de porter des initiatives, d’assurer une coordination entre les acteurs impliqués, voire de proposer des idées de projets et de mettre à la disposition de l’ensemble des partenaires certaines ressources. La coopération transfrontalière dans l’agglomération trinationale de Bâle montre le leadership du Canton de Bâle-Ville qui en tant qu’Etat fédéré dans un Etat fédéral disposer de larges pouvoirs. Le comité directeur de l’Eurodistrict de Bâle est cependant constitué part égale par des représentants de chacun des trois pays. La coopération est donc affaire de ressources, humaines, financières et techniques, ce qui avantage les grandes collectivités, villes, métropoles, régions. Coopérer nécessite de disposer d’une ingénierie territoriale pour monter des projets et les porter à terme, de compétences linguistiques et pour négocier avec les autres acteurs dans un contexte multi-niveaux. En définitive, on peut considérer qu’en quelques décennies, les frontières européennes sont passées d’un régime frontalier régi par les Etats à un régime transfrontalier défini conjointement par l’Union européenne et les Etats et qui est construit de manière continu par l’élaboration de projets, l’attribution de financements, l’existence de pratiques normalisées et la construction d’instances de coopération transfrontalière. Parler de territoire national délimité n’a plus vraiment de sens dans ce contexte de co-souveraineté et de gouvernance multiniveaux. Il faudrait plutôt envisager que les territoires nationaux sont chacun marqués par l’existence de zones de transition qui marquent le passage avec les territoires voisins. Le régime transfrontalier induit l’existence de relations spécifiques avec le territoire voisin, qui dessinent des territorialités des influences réciproques. L’européanisation est donc ici signe d’intégration et de reconfiguration de la spatialité. Ce régime transfrontalier ne ressort plus simplement d’un cadre de relations internationales, du fait de la place particulière qu’occupe l’Etat et du rôle actif que jouent les acteurs locaux et régionaux. La frontière apparaît ici comme une interface qui articule des territoires nationaux dont le caractère homogène n’est plus la composante essentielle. On peut cependant s’interroger sur les impacts d’une résurgence du nationalisme dans les Etats européens qui annonce en fait la réactivation de frontières symboliques qui accentuent l’idée de distanciation. La coopération transfronta-

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lière s’inscrit dans la longue durée, mais toute action qui remet en cause la frontière comme interface et comme lieu de passage peut contrecarrer cette orientation. En dépit de cadres parfois fort élaborés, la coopération semble parfois marquer le pas en dépit de l’existence de fortes interactions fonctionnelles et dans certains cas, les motivations et la volonté de coopérer sont interrogées. La coopération transfrontalière, pour être efficace ne nécessite pas que des relations horizontales, entre collectivités voisines, mais aussi des relations horizontales qui permettent de mobiliser des ressources. Plus que jamais la coopération transfrontalière reste une affaire qui associe des acteurs différents à des échelles multiples et les Etats comme les institutions européennes y jouent leurs rôles.

GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN IN EUROPA: AUF DEM WEG ZU EINEM GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDEN REGIME? In internationalen Beziehungsstudien spielt die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit eine untergeordnete Rolle. Dennoch, seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten spielt diese Kooperation, die als „die Existenz dauerhafter Beziehungen auf regionaler oder lokaler Ebene zwischen Akteuren in angrenzenden nationalen Regionen“ definiert wird, eine immer wichtigere Rolle im Bereich der „Grenzstudien“. Diese Studien untersuchen die Dynamik und die Umwandlung von Grenzen mit einem multidisziplinären Ansatz. Wir wollen im Folgenden einen kurzen Überblick über die Rolle der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit und über die aufkommenden Fragen bezüglich internationalen Beziehungen geben. Der betrachtete Standpunkt ist der eines Geographen, dessen Fragen Räume, Skalen, Entfernungen und Herausforderungen der Region betreffen. Diese Arbeit konzentriert sich auf den europäischen Raum, in dem die Europäische Union die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Förderung der Integration der Nationalstaaten auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene zusätzlich zur Abwertung der EU-Binnengrenzen eingeführt hat. Die EU betrachtet diese Initiativen als Labore der europäischen Integration. Derzeit sind Verallgemeinerungen auf globaler Ebene schwierig, da die Situation in den Grenzregionen abhängig von den Regionen auf der Welt sehr unterschiedlich ist. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt bietet Europa einen konkreten Kontext, dessen Aspekte beschrieben werden sollen. Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit ist a priori Teil des Kontextes der internationalen Beziehungen, da die Projekte zwei oder mehr Akteure involviert, die sich in zwei oder mehreren Nationalstaaten befinden und deren Territorien aneinandergrenzen müssen. Diese Kooperation hängt nicht nur vom Engagement der Akteure ab, sondern auch von der Existenz von Konventionen und Vereinbarungen, die immer auf internationaler, bilateraler oder multilateraler Ebene etabliert werden müssen. So erleichterte das 1996 von Deutschland, Frankreich, Luxemburg und der Schweiz unterzeichnete Karlsruher Abkommen die Gründung grenzüberschreitender Kooperationsgremien wie das LGCC. Die örtliche Gruppierung für grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit ist eine „gesetzli-

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che Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts“, die eine „Rechtsstellung und Haushaltsautonomie“ besitzt. In Europa hat 1980 die Madrider Rahmenkonvention den rechtlichen Rahmen geschaffen, der seither die Kooperation gefördert und den regionalen und lokalen Behörden Perspektiven angeboten hat. Die internationale Natur wird durch die Notwendigkeit betont, die Rechtssysteme aller Staaten, die an der Schaffung eines gemeinsamen Projekts zwischen den lokalen und regionalen Gebietskörperschaften beteiligt sind, in Einklang zu bringen. In diesem Sinne hat die länderübergreifende Zusammenarbeit vor allem eine transnationale Dimension. Die Grenze wird nicht in Bezug auf ihre Kontroll- und Regulierungsmerkmale berücksichtigt, sondern als Herausforderung, zwei aneinandergrenzende politische Systeme miteinander zu verbinden. Das Vorhandensein von abgeschwächten Grenzen ist die Voraussetzung für dieses Kooperationssystem: Stabilität und Offenheit spiegeln die Existenz der gegenseitigen Anerkennung der Nationalstaaten, ihrer Territorien und ihrer Grenzen wider. Sicherheitsfragen sind sekundär geworden. Dieses gegenseitige Vertrauen zwischen den Staaten beweist, dass ihre Souveränität und ihre nationalen Interessen nicht in Frage gestellt werden. So ist die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit Teil einer Top-down-Logik, die annimmt, dass die Akteure auf makrogeographischer Ebene das Verhalten der Akteure auf der meso- und mikrogeographischen Ebene beeinflussen und strukturieren. Zweifellos erfüllt der europäische Rahmen der Europäischen Union und des Schengen-Raums diese Definition, da dieser einen beschwichtigten Kontext mit einer förderlichen Atmosphäre für die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Projekte etablierte. Darüber hinaus haben die von der Europäischen Kommission initiierten Interreg-Programme seit 1990 einen politischen und technischen Rahmen geschaffen, der die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ziel verfolgt, die Vielfalt (Aktionen und Themen in Abhängigkeit von den Dyaden) und die Harmonisierung (Programme zur Förderung von mehrstufigen Governance und die Umsetzung bewährter Verfahren) zu vereinbaren. Obwohl es bis 1990 dauerte, bis ein politischer Rahmen auf supranationaler Ebene etabliert wurde, waren bereits in bestimmten Regionen West- und Nordeuropas Kooperationsinitiativen gestartet worden. Einige von ihnen wurden in den späten 1950er Jahren gegründet: Euregio zwischen niederländischen und deutschen regionalen und lokalen Behörden im Jahr 1958, Regio Basiliensis zwischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren und regionalen und lokalen Behörden zwischen der Schweiz, Deutschland und Frankreich im Jahr 1963, Kooperation der benachbarten Gemeinden Tornio in Finnland und Haparanda in Schweden. Die Periode ist für die Versöhnung günstig, aber diese Zusammenarbeit entsteht auch in den Kontext, dass Nationalstaaten ihren örtlichen Behörden (Deutschland, Schweiz) erhebliche Autonomie verleihen oder weil die Nationalstaaten einen transnationalen Rahmen der Zusammenarbeit (Nordischer Rat) formalisierten. Diese Initiativen wurden manchmal als Modelle dargestellt, die andere geographische Regionen inspirieren könnten. In dieser Hinsicht kann man davon ausgehen, dass die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit auch einer Bottom-up-Logik in dem Sinne verfolgt, dass Nationalstaaten Initiativen übernehmen und neue Vorschläge vorbringen können. Innerhalb der EU scheinen diese beiden Logiken, Top-down und Bottom-up, sich gegenseitig zu inspirieren, da die Interreg-Projekte Objekte von Auswertungen sind. Ihre Ergebnisse werden genutzt, um den Rahmen zu entwickeln, der in der nachfolgenden Phase der Programmplanung verwendet werden soll. Das

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europäische Projekt besteht darin, die Gesellschaften, die sich als unterschiedlich betrachten, näher zueinander zu bringen. In diesem Sinne ist es für alle Bemühungen, die Grenze zu überwinden, förderlich. Der politische Kontext wird mit einem standardisierten, ideologischen und technischen Rahmen kombiniert, der die Freizügigkeit fördert und offenen Grenzen positiv gegenüber steht. Die Zusammenarbeit ist eine Frage der geographischen Nachbarschaft und betrachtet die Grenze eher als eine Verbindung, als eine Störung. Die Realisierung gemeinsamer Projekte impliziert die Möglichkeit, sich regelmäßig und häufig, manchmal sogar unerwartet und informell zu treffen. In Europa hat der Bedeutungsverlust der Grenzen (das Gremium der Europäischen Union, das Schengener Abkommen) enge nachbarschaftliche Beziehungen verstärkt: Das Verschwinden der Kontrollen gewährt fließend und ungehinderte Bewegung. So ist die Reisezeit zwischen den Orten, die durch eine Grenze getrennt sind, vermindert. A priori ist dies für das Wachstum der Wechselwirkungen förderlich. Es gibt viele Gründe für die Zusammenarbeit, und ihre Anzahl ist im Laufe der Jahre gewachsen. Die ersten Initiativen wollten die Voraussetzungen für eine abgeschwächte Grenze schaffen und die Konfliktperioden überwinden. Die Notwendigkeit der Versöhnung und die Entwicklung von Beziehungen zwischen den Populationen, die sich vor kurzem noch als Feinde gesehen haben, waren vor allem an der deutsch-französischen Grenze zu beobachten. In jüngster Zeit war dies auch an der Grenze zwischen der Republik Irland und Nordirland der Fall. Ein weiterer Grund für die Zusammenarbeit ist die Notwendigkeit, bestimmte Hindernisse, die das alltägliche Leben der Bevölkerung durch das Vorhandensein der Grenze beeinflussen, zu beseitigen. Später wurde, im Rahmen der offenen Grenzen, des Wirtschaftswachstums und der steigenden Zahl internationaler Grenzen, die Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Lösung der Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der Grenze als Hindernis oder als Verdeutlichung von Unterschieden angesehen. Von Anfang an hat sich die Zusammenarbeit nicht einfach mit dem Teilen von Informationen begnügt, sondern konzentriert sich auf technische und politische Fragen, die Verhandlungen erfordern, um eine Einigung über gemeinsame Positionen zu erzielen. In jüngster Zeit wurden andere Strategien entwickelt: die Bündelung von Ausrüstungen und Dienstleistungen vor allem in dünn besiedelten Regionen, Erfahrungsaustausch, stimulierende Interaktion, um Kreativität und Innovation zu fördern, Komplementarrangements, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung basierend auf Co-Konstruktionen und Partnerschaft, um die internationale Sichtbarkeit zu fördern. Kombiniert tragen diese vielfältigen Strategien zum Aufbau echter grenzüberschreitender Regionen bei die durch ein Netzwerk intensiver Beziehungen zwischen regionalen und lokalen Behörden gekennzeichnet sind. Nach einer gewissen Kooperationsschwelle scheint die Institutionalisierung unvermeidlich zu sein: Sie weist auf die Absicht hin, Projekte zu verewigen und sich als Hauptakteur auf der europäischen Bühne sowie auf nationaler Ebene zu positionieren. Übrigens hat sich die Zusammenarbeit im Zuge der Erweiterungen und der wachsenden Zahl von Regionen, die für die Interreg A-Programme über viele Dyaden in Frage kommen, deutlich erhöht. Die europäischen Institutionen machten die Entwicklung dieser subnationalen Para-Diplomatie zum Paradigma, um die Integration der mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten zu erleichtern. Seit mehreren Jahrzehnten wurden ihre Grenzen stark kontrolliert und stießen nicht wie in Westeuropa auf einen allmählichen Bedeutungsverlust. Das mehrstufige Governance-System legt großen Wert auf die

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regionalen und lokalen Behörden. Sie stellt ihnen direkte Beziehungen zu den europäischen Institutionen in Aussicht und unterstützt auch Initiativen. Aber die Vervielfältigung von Institutionen auf vielen Dyaden ähnelt einer Entwicklung, die auch kritisch gesehen wurde, weil sie die Sichtbarkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit der Handlungen zu untergraben scheint. So bildet das Netz der grenzüberschreitenden Beziehungen über Partnerschaften und Institutionen einen politischen Rahmen, in dem der Staat eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt. Der Rückzug aus den Grenzgebieten deutet nicht auf einen Mangel an Interesse hin und muss im Kontext der Verhandlung der Staatlichkeit gesehen werden. Unter Rückzug verstehen wir, dass der Nationalstaat bestimmte traditionelle Funktionen dieser EU-Binnengrenzen an die Außengrenzen (internationale Grenzen an den Verkehrsknotenpunkten und Grenzen mit Nichtmitgliedern der EU oder des Schengen-Raums) umgeschichtet hat. In gewisser Weise ist eine intensive, grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit ein Indikator für den Grad des Appeasements einer Grenze. Daher scheint die Unterstützung dieser Kooperation eine Investitionsform zu sein, die auf eine bessere Einsetzung der Aufsichts- und Kontrollressourcen abzielt und sie an die Grenzen überträgt, an denen sich die „echten internationalen Herausforderungen" konzentrieren und wo die von den Staaten wahrgenommen Risiken noch bestehen. Insbesondere beinhalten sie die Kontrolle der Menschenströme. Die Krise der Migranten und die Schwierigkeiten, eine Einigung zwischen den Nationalstaaten zu erreichen, scheinen jedoch dieses Modell auf die Probe zu stellen. So wird die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nur selten von den Staaten direkt verwaltet, sondern von öffentlichen Stellen oder sogar von Zivilgesellschaft oder wissenschaftlichen Akteuren, die auf lokaler oder regionaler Ebene tätig sind. Die Staaten können die Zusammenarbeit initiiert haben, aber nur selten sorgen sie für eine Koordination. Die Rolle und die Stellung der Staaten variieren je nach den politischen Systemen, auch wenn man oft ein Spiel zwischen den Staaten und ihren Kollektiven im grenzüberschreitenden Kontext beobachtet. Allerdings induziert die Kooperation eine Neudimensionierung, d.h. die territoriale Umformung, die von den Behörden nach der Entwicklung eines politischen Projekts in einem Gebiet hervorgerufen wird: Ausbau des Einflussbereichs der Städte, Kooperation mit Kollektiven mit größeren Befugnissen. Sie fördern die Neudefinition von Kooperationsfeldern, verschiedenen Ebenen usw. So trägt diese Umstellung nicht nur zur Umgestaltung des Raumes, sondern auch zur Stärkung bestimmter Behörden bei. Auf diese Weise wird die Sichtbarkeit der Kollektive verstärkt, deren Bedeutung im Staatsgebiet sekundär erscheint. Die Herausforderung der Sichtbarkeit stellt daher eine wichtige Motivation für die Kooperation von Kollektiven dar. An einer Grenze zu liegen, vorausgesetzt, dass es sich um einen EU-Mitgliedsstaat handelt, ist ein Mittel, um sich zu unterscheiden und auf nationaler Ebene identifiziert zu werden, um Anerkennung zu erlangen, und natürlich auch Legitimität. Schließlich ist die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit auch ein Mittel, um den Weg zur internationalen Zusammenarbeit zu ebnen. Dabei kann man Interkulturalismus, Beziehungen zu anderen, Dinge, die man nicht kennt, in einem kontextfreien Risiko ausbilden. So bildet die Nähe eine Form der Nachbarschaft, die sicherlich fremd ist – aber auch beruhigend. Städte, Gemeinden und Regionen haben internationale Strategien umgesetzt, in denen der grenzüberschreitende Aspekt eine besondere Rolle einnimmt. Ihre Strategien können einer Form der

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regionalen Diplomatie ähneln. Aufgrund dieser grenzüberschreitenden Dimension haben viele Kollektive ihre Legitimität erfolgreich erhöht. Dies gilt besonders für mittelgroße und kleine Städte. In diesem Zusammenhang lohnt es sich, die anregende Rolle der Ortschaften und Städte aller Größen zu beachten. Für sie ist die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nicht nur ein Mittel, um sich selbst sichtbar zu machen, sondern auch ihren Einfluss auf ein breiteres Gebiet zu erweitern. Dennoch ist es notwendig, die Ortschaften und Städte nach ihrer Größe zu unterscheiden. Für die kleineren ist die grenzüberschreitende Dimension das einzige internationale Element, das sie entwickeln können. Auf der anderen Seite entwickeln die größeren Städte mehrstufige Strategien, in denen die grenzüberschreitende Dimension nur ein Element ist. Wenn in bestimmten Fällen die grenzüberschreitenden Beziehungen die spätere Entwicklung neuer Beziehungen unterstützt, so ist es möglich, dass die Stärkung des Teilnahmewillens an einem europäischen oder globalen Rahmen die grenzüberschreitende Dimension beiseitelegen kann. Das bedeutet nicht, dass sie verschwindet. Die Aufrechterhaltung guter nachbarschaftlicher Beziehungen bleibt ein gemeinsames Ziel, auch wenn die Kooperation zu stagnieren scheint. Wie wir bereits darauf hingewiesen haben, schließt die Zusammenarbeit Kollektiven ein, deren Machtbefugnisse und Handlungsfähigkeiten weit voneinander abweichen. Aber die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit sichert ein Gleichgewicht in dem Sinne, dass sie ein Versuch ist, Verzerrungen der Vertretung in Regierungsstellen zu vermeiden. Der Rückgriff auf diese Form der Diplomatie ist ein Mittel, um Diskussionen und Verhandlungen zu erleichtern. Dies hindert die wohlhabendsten Kollektive nicht daran, die Führungsrolle zu übernehmen, d.h. die Initiativen zu unterstützen, die Koordination zwischen den beteiligten Akteuren zu gewährleisten und sogar Projektideen vorzuschlagen und für alle Partner bestimmte Ressourcen zur Verfügung zu stellen. Die grenzüberschreitende Kooperation der trinationalen Agglomeration von Basel zeigt die Führung des Kantons Basel-Stadt, die – als Bundesstaat in einer Föderation – weitreichende Mächte genießt. Der Vorstand des Eurodistrict Basel besteht jedoch aus gleicher Anzahl von Vertretern der drei Länder. Auf diese Weise ist die Zusammenarbeit eine Frage der personellen, finanziellen und technischen Ressourcen .Dies ist ein Vorteil für die großen Kollektionen, Städte, Metropolen und Regionen. Die Kooperation erfordert eine regionale Planung, um Projekte, Sprachkenntnisse und Fähigkeiten aufzubauen und zu vervollständigen, wie auch die Fähigkeit mit anderen Akteuren in einem mehrstufigen Kontext verhandeln zu können. Letztlich kann man davon ausgehen, dass sich die europäischen Grenzen in ein paar Jahrzehnten von einem von den Nationalstaaten beherrschten Grenzregime zu einem von der Europäischen Union und den Nationalstaaten gemeinsam definierten, grenzüberschreitenden Regime entwickelt haben und durch die Entwicklung von Projekten, die Vergabe von Mitteln, das Vorhandensein von Standardpraktiken und die Einrichtung von grenzüberschreitenden Kooperationsgremien von dauerhaften Bestand sind. Von nationalen Grenzen zu sprechen macht in diesem Kontext der Co-Souveränität und der Multi-Level-Governance nur wenig Sinn. Stattdessen könnte man erwägen, dass es auf jedem Staatsgebiet Übergangszonen gibt, die den Durchgang zwischen benachbarten Gebieten markieren. Ein grenzüberschreitendes Regime veranlasst die Existenz spezifischer Beziehungen mit dem benachbarten Territorium, die aus den Territorialitäten des

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gegenseitigen Einflusses hervorgehen. Deshalb ist die Europäisierung ein Zeichen der Integration und der Neukonfiguration der Räumlichkeit. Aufgrund der spezifischen Stellung, die der Staat einnimmt, und die aktive Rolle der lokalen und regionalen Akteure, fungiert dieses grenzüberschreitende Regime nicht mehr im Kontext der internationalen Beziehungen. Hier erscheint die Grenze als Schnittstelle, die die nationalen Gebiete verbindet und deren homogener Charakter nicht mehr ihre wesentliche Komponente ist. Allerdings lohnt es sich, die Auswirkungen des Wiederauflebens des Nationalismus in den europäischen Staaten zu berücksichtigen. Dies kündigt tatsächlich die Reaktivierung von symbolischen Grenzen an, die die Idee der Distanzierung hervorheben. Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit ist ein langjähriges Projekt, aber jede Aktion, die die Grenze als Schnittstelle und als Kreuzungspunkt herausfordert, kann diese Orientierung untergraben. Trotz eines teilweise stark ausgearbeiteten Rahmens scheint die Kooperation gelegentlich trotz des Vorhandenseins starker funktioneller Wechselwirkungen zu stagnieren. In gewissen Fällen werden die Motivation und der Kooperationswille in Frage gestellt. Um effektiv zu sein, braucht die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nicht nur horizontale Beziehungen zwischen benachbarten Kollektive, sondern auch horizontalen Beziehungen, die die Möglichkeit bieten, Ressourcen zu mobilisieren. Mehr denn je bleibt die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit eine Angelegenheit, die verschiedene Akteure auf mehreren Ebenen verknüpft. Hier spielen die Staaten, sowie auch die europäischen Institutionen ihre Rollen.

BORDERS AND BORDER DISPUTES IN EUROPE EMANNUEL BRUNET-JAILLY When looking across the world, the territory of the European Union (EU) is an interesting place to study borders, their governance, their functions as guards of sovereign and secured states, and of economically and politically integrating states. Also, the EU’s borderlands are stimulating places of study for territorial disputes, and in particular, mechanisms of appeasements and cross border cooperation; even during a time of duress resulting from unexpected migration pressures since 2010. Indeed, the EU is fascinating because European integration is the process that over the last 50 years has brought European States to collaborate more and more, and the European Union institutions themselves were originally created to bring peace to the whole western side of the continent after it had faced two WorldWars (1914–19 and 1939–45) for nearly a century. When looking back today it is clear that the EU project has been effective and that the forebears of European integration should be more than satisfied that their ideas, and ideals, that turned out to be extremely successful. With 28 member states working together through the institutions of the European Union, Western Europe has become one of the most stable and peaceful regions of the world; indeed, the EU is a peace and prosperity project that is admired throughout the world, yet it has been continually questioned since its existence. This short essay starts with defining border disputes, and then reviews briefly the history of the European project, and in particular its implication for borders and border disputes; it concludes by underscoring the fact that the EU is a successful mediator of border disputes despite the fact that it does not have a formal policy in this regard.

I. What are border disputes? The literature on borders singles out three basic types of border disputes: there are territorial border disputes, positional disputes and functional disputes. Territorial disputes are, often but not always, the most complex, historically charged and violent types of disputes, which often result from a diversity of problems including challenges to sovereignty, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, cultural tensions, as well as questions of ownership of natural resources for instance water but also oil, gas, coal, fisheries, woods and agricultural lands: History’s oldest known dispute took place in Mesopotamia in 2600 B.C. between the Sumerians cities of Lagash and Umma over crop fields, and was solved by war. Today, many territorial disputes lead to wars; however, no such disputes in the European Union could lead to such violent situations. Positional disputes are both more recent and also more technical, and concurrently often also more easily resolved: they are primarily about the position or the

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location of the boundary line, which is often again, clearly delineated on a treaty but with approximate markers across the physical geography of the territory it crosses, and divides. The issue of demarcation of a boundary line on the ground, across a territory, or its delimitation at sea is often controversial because for instance treaties make references to specific features of the land that have disappeared, for instance and island, or a river, or a forest. At sea, rules were imprecise until the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Today, there are more positional disputes at sea because states have the ability to resolved disputes since the UNCLOS was endorsed by a large number of UN member states since 1982. Today, this convention defines what maritime disputes can be very clearly thanks to principled boundary delineation rules that dictate the distance between the coasts and the sea areas. But there are many areas at sea that can be claimed by more than one state because coasts are not rectilinear. Today there are limited positional disputes in the EU and none of them are so serious that they cannot be resolved. Functional disputes are the last area of dispute; they are about the functions of the border when understood as a unilateral policy enforcing a boundary line for a specific policy purpose for instance a state border is unmanned or it is closed and the other side would like a different form of administration of the boundary line. The other possibility is that a resource (water or coal for instance) is available on both sides of the border and neither state agrees on the terms of exploitation of that resource. Functional disputes can be alleviated when states align their border policies and coordinate the administrative functions of the border. Today in the EU, ongoing negotiations and institutionalised relationships have limited the possibility of functional disputes in because of the Interreg policies,1 and around the EU thanks to the Neighbourhood policies.2

II. History of the EU Projekt and its internal and external borders The European project became reality at the end of the Second World War but had been on the mind of many European intellectuals during the 19th century. Victor Hugo, a French writer, published a political essay in 1849, Pour les Etats Unis d’Europe, which advocated for the creation of a European Federal State that would force European nations to merge into one and grow into a European identity, and thus rule out war. The primary reason for these ideals was war. At first the European project was not about borders but was focused on making war impossible. The idea of integration dominated and states agreed to ‘integrate’ into the European Coal and Steel Communities set up in 1952, whose purpose was to collectively share the burden of controlling the amount of coal and steel produced in each country, and to prevent levels of production that would make war possible again. Jean Monnet, a French businessman and international expert with much experience in Canada and the United States, promoted the idea of weak functional 1 2

INTERREG policies, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/ cooperation/european -territorial/ (1.1.2017) Neighborhood policies, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/ neighbour hood_policy/index_en.htm (1.1.2017).

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communities that would bring states to co-operate and therefore control basic energy industries to control peace.3 At first, from 1957 onward the European Communities, as they were called until 1993 when the European Union was formed, managed specific areas of policy that were of particular strategic importance for the peace of western European states: coal, steel, atomic energy, agriculture, and trade. Those communities and their institutions did not expand to include borders, whether internal or external borders, until the Schengen treaty was signed in 1985 and enforced from 1995. Schengen is the first EU legislation that regulates the internal and external borders of the EU and EU Member states. Schengen, however, does not deal with boundary disputes, whether they are territorial, positional or functional. Schengen only regulates the functions of the internal and external borders of the EU. Regarding territorial disputes, the EU institutions have relied on equalisation principles and pressure on incoming member states, that is, candidates, so they are either resolved prior to full membership, or progressively addressed by EU member states negotiating with each other. Two cases illuminate both the complexity and the difficulty for all parties, including the EU, to resolve such situations: the Turkish/Greek “Cyprus” case, and the “Northern Ireland” case. Both disputes have a long history, and are perceived to be ethnic, religious and socioeconomic; both also result from a pre-existing colonial past, and both have been violent. In both situations, the EU has not followed dedicated policies but implemented policies that promote social and economic development, infrastructure, train civil society to regain confidence in peace, and to learn from other EU citizens. In the Cyprus case, for instance, the efforts before enlargement failed with the EU side of Cyprus voting down a 2004 proposal by 75%, but since then peace and resolution of the dispute made substantial progress thanks in part to EU funding. In the Northern Irish case the so called ‘Peace’ programmes4 and Interreg programmes5 were successful in bringing much cooperation across the boundary line without being able to resolve disagreements. Today, in Cyprus peace is real and the wall, also called the ‘green line’ has been destroyed or abandoned, and since May 2015 ongoing talks are going on. Today in Northern Ireland there are numerous programs of cooperation between municipalities across the boundary line and a cross-border health region provides health care to nearly 120,000 people with ambulances crossing the border without stopping. In sum, the EU does not have border policies but has used incentives to reduce the violence and to encourage members’ states and candidates to full membership to negotiate and cooperate towards finding solutions. The literature, however, suggests that the EU has a different approach depending on the status of the states involved in the dispute, whether it is a member, a candidate or not a candidate; for instance, in 2004 it was perceived as favoring Greece over Turkey,

3 4 5

UGLAND, T., Jean Monnet, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2011. PEACE programme, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html? ftuId=FTU_5.1.9.html (1.12.2017) INTERREG programmes Northern Ireland, http://www.seupb.eu/2014-2020Programmes/ INTERREGV_Programme/INTERREGV_Overview.aspx (1.12.2017)

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and Turkish negotiators suggest that such bias has slowed down accession progress for Turkey.6 Because it does not have a specific border dispute policy, the EU is still witness to a number of interesting positional disputes. For instance, the France-Spain Quinto Real dispute has not been resolved for nearly 400 years but the fight was addressed in 1856 when both kingdoms at the time agreed to sharing the valuable pastures that divided them; the area is on the Spanish side of the boundary line but France has exclusive rights to it thanks to an everlasting tenancy. Others had never been identified as being disputes until recently: this is the case of the 1980s Austrian-German Lake Constance situation, where a private property line issue led to questioning the maritime boundary crossing the lake. It is also the case of the Ems Dollart estuary that is shared by Germany and the Netherlands; its thalweg moves every season and therefor changes the seat of the boundary line at the bottom of the river, which has implications for the estuary and maritime border at sea. The Ems Dollart became a prominent issue because of Germany’s wish to build a wind farm in the mouth of the estuary. Disagreements were solved in 2013 when both sides agreed to co-management of the estuary, including who would distribute permits for wind turbines, pipelines, cable, gas, oil and sand or gravel exploitation. Also, Ireland and the United Kingdom have a dispute at the northwestern and south-eastern end of the boundary line that divides the Republic of Ireland with the rest of the UK in Northern Ireland. These two areas are called the Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough. They are interesting examples of territorial disputes that are progressively being moved into positional and possibly functional disputes thanks to increased cooperation among the parties. This particular case, due to the Foyle Agency, is a demonstration that cooperation promotes mutual economic interests where conflicting jurisdiction and political uncertainty have failed for centuries. Interestingly, functional disputes in the European Union are rare today because the European Neighborhood policies have implemented agreements that change the very nature of the relationship that the EU and its member states have with all the states that are around the EU; this includes all the states that are south of the Mediterranean sea and all the states that border the eastern member states of the EU (Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia). These policies were launched in 2004 thanks to a new awareness in the EU, whereby the European Commission and European Council white papers suggested that: “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close cooperative relations”7; Also suggesting that “the European Union’s interests require a continued engagement … through more effective economic, security, and cultural cooperation”8 and that “there cannot be sustained development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will

6 7 8

PACE, M., “Governing border conflicts: when Can the European Union be an effective media tor?“, ECPR Joint Session Workshop, Uppsala, 13-18.4.2004, Workshop 19 “The European Union and Conflict Resolution”. Council of European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 78367.pdf (1.1.2017) Council of the European Union, The European Security Strategy, www.consilium.europa.eu /.../european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/ (1.1.2017)

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be no peace. Threats to public health, pandemics, undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation.”9 Today, a large number of states contiguous to the EU member states have signed neighbourhood agreements. These adjacent states are brought together to negotiate comprehensive agreements that include cooperation policies regarding the voting rights of their citizens, information and security, but also trade and economic development agreements. All in all, the southern and eastern bordering states of the EU are brought to share some of the values of the European Union, which is also facilitated by their membership into the Council of Europe, a pan-European body, larger than the European Union that works to promote democratic values, the rule of law and protection of human rights. All in all, they are progressively aligning their own values and resources with those of the European Union; they are to continually exchanging information with the EU and its member states. In this ongoing context of exchange of information functional and positional border disputes, and even territorial border disputes are much more easily resolved. In conclusion, what we learn from this short essay on border disputes in the EU is that despite having no specific border dispute policies, the EU has acted to resolve and limit border disputes whether territorial, positional or functional; the EU is a creation of a pan European peace project that links up EU member states’ resource sectors and economies together to eliminate any chances that a war could happen again; hence, peace is Europe’s primary goal historically. The EU project does not have policies to address either territorial, positional or functional disputes stricto-sensus, but, the EU has incentives to limit the political and economic burden of peace resolution and peace construction. Yet, the EU has interesting territorial, positional and few functional disputes. All in all, the evidence presented in this essay illustrates the sovereign and guarding functions of borders, and the necessary appeasement and collaboration necessary across them to maintain and expand peace. This has regained particular attention since 2010, when unforeseen immigration at the eastern borders of the EU raised new challenges both to the EU Schengen treaty and Dublin regulation. Schengen enforces common border and visa policies and Dublin regulates common asylum policies among EU states. Today, those flows have led EU countries to take exceptional measures (such as the state of emergency status in Austria, France, Germany or Hungary) to reinstate boundary security checks and therefore raise functional border issues. Interestingly, however, those challenges have not derailed the peace process in Cyprus, and are continuously discussed among member states; it is information exchanges that leads to cooperation and alleviates border disputes in the European Union despite the inexistence of policy specific answers.

9

Council of the European Union, Report of the implementation of the EU Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630. pdf (1.1.2017)

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FRONTIÈRES ET CONFLITS FRONTALIERS DANS L’UNION EUROPÉENNE À travers le monde, le territoire de l'Union européenne (UE) est un espace particulièrement intéressant pour étudier les frontières, leur gouvernance, leurs fonctions de protection d’États souverains et sécurisés mais aussi d'intégration économique et politique des États. En outre, les zones frontalières de l'UE sont des espaces stimulants pour l’étude des conflits territoriaux, et notamment des mécanismes d'apaisement et de coopération transfrontalière, même en période de contrainte résultant des pressions migratoires inattendues depuis 2010. En effet, l'intégration européenne est un fascinant processus qui, depuis plus de 50 ans, a conduit les États européens à collaborer toujours plus, les institutions de l'Union européenne ayant vu le jour dans l’objectif d’apporter la paix à tout l’Ouest du continent, après deux guerres mondiales (1914–1918 et 1939–1945) en près d'un siècle. En regardant en arrière aujourd'hui, il apparaît clairement que le projet de l'UE a été efficace et que les pères de l'intégration européenne devraient être plus que satisfaits du succès rencontré par leurs idées et leurs idéaux. Avec 28 États membres travaillant ensemble par l'intermédiaire des institutions de l'Union européenne, l'Europe de l'Ouest est devenue l'une des régions les plus stables et les plus pacifiques du monde. En effet, l'UE est un projet de paix et de prospérité admiré dans le monde entier, et pourtant continuellement questionné depuis le début de son existence. Ce court essai commence par la définition des conflits frontaliers, puis examine brièvement l'histoire du projet européen, et en particulier son implication pour les frontières et les conflits frontaliers ; il conclut en soulignant que l'UE est un médiateur efficace des conflits frontaliers bien qu'elle ne dispose pas d'une politique formelle à cet égard.

I. Que sont les conflits frontaliers ? La littérature relative aux frontières distingue trois types fondamentaux de conflits frontaliers: les conflits frontaliers territoriaux, les conflits frontaliers positionnels et les conflits frontaliers fonctionnels. Les conflits territoriaux sont, fréquemment mais pas toujours, les conflits les plus complexes, historiquement chargés et violents, résultant souvent d'une diversité de problèmes parmi lesquels des défis à la souveraineté, des tensions ethniques, linguistiques, culturelles et religieuses, ainsi que des questions de propriété des ressources naturelles, par exemple l'eau, mais aussi le pétrole, le gaz, le charbon, les produits de la pêche, le bois et les terres agricoles. Le plus ancien conflit connu de l'histoire a eu lieu en Mésopotamie en 2600 avant J.-C., opposant les villes sumériennes de Lagash et d’Umma pour la propriété des champs de cultures, et a été résolu par la guerre. Aujourd'hui, de nombreux conflits territoriaux conduisent à des guerres; bien qu’aucun conflit de ce type dans l'Union européenne ne puisse conduire à de telles situations de violence. Les conflits positionnels sont à la fois plus récents et plus techniques, et pourtant souvent plus facilement résolus: ils concernent principalement la position ou

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l'emplacement de la ligne de démarcation, qui est souvent clairement définie par un traité mais dont les marqueurs matériels sur le territoire géographique physique qu’elle traverse et divise sont approximatifs. Le bornage d'une ligne de démarcation sur le terrain, à travers un territoire ou encore en mer est souvent controversé, par exemple car les traités font référence à des caractéristiques spécifiques du territoire qui ont disparu, comme une île, une rivière ou une forêt. En mer, les règles étaient imprécises jusqu’à la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM, ou UNCLOS pour United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Aujourd'hui, il y a plus de conflits positionnels en mer parce que les États ont la capacité de résoudre les différends depuis que la CNUDM a été approuvée par un grand nombre d'États membres de l'ONU depuis 1982. Aujourd'hui, cette convention définit très clairement les conflits maritimes grâce à des règles de délimitation des frontières qui dictent la distance entre les côtes et les zones maritimes. De nombreuses zones maritimes pouvant être réclamées par plus d'un État subsistent cependant, car les côtes ne sont pas rectilignes. De nos jours, les conflits positionnels sont en nombre limité au sein de l’UE, et aucun n’est grave au point de ne pouvoir être résolu. Les conflits fonctionnels sont le dernier domaine de contestation ; ils concernent les fonctions de la frontière lorsqu'elles sont comprises comme une politique unilatérale imposant une ligne de démarcation pour un but de politique spécifique. C’est par exemple le cas lorsque d’un côté la frontière de l’État n'est pas habitée voir fermée tandis que de l'autre côté on souhaiterait une forme d'administration différente de la frontière. L'autre possibilité est qu'une ressource (l'eau ou le charbon, par exemple) soit disponible des deux côtés de la frontière mais que les deux pays ne parviennent pas à s’entendre sur les conditions d'exploitation de cette ressource. Les conflits fonctionnels peuvent être atténués lorsque les États alignent leurs politiques frontalières et coordonnent les fonctions administratives de la frontière. Aujourd'hui au sein de l'UE les négociations permanentes et les relations institutionnalisées, notamment dans le cadre des politiques Interreg, ont limité la possibilité de conflits fonctionnels, tandis qu’aux limites externes de l'UE c’est le rôle des politiques de voisinage.

II. Histoire du projet d'Union Européenne et de ses frontières internes et externes Le projet européen est devenu réalité à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, mais était déjà présent dans l’esprit de nombreux intellectuels européens au cours du XIXè siècle. Victor Hugo, écrivain français, a publié en 1849 l’essai politique Pour les États-Unis d'Europe, qui préconisait la création d'un État fédéral européen qui obligerait les nations européennes à fusionner en une seule, développant ainsi une identité commune européenne, et excluant de ce fait la possibilité d’une guerre. La guerre était la première raison de ces idéaux. A l’origine le projet européen ne portait pas sur les frontières, mais cherchait à rendre la guerre impossible. L'idée d'intégration s’est imposée et les États ont convenu de «s'intégrer» dans la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA) mise en place en 1952, et dont le but était de partager le contrôle de la quantité de char-

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bon et d'acier produite dans chaque pays afin d’empêcher des niveaux de production qui rendraient à nouveau la guerre possible. Jean Monnet, homme d'affaires français et expert international doté d’une grande expérience au Canada et aux États-Unis, a promu l'idée de communautés fonctionnelles limitées amenant les États à coopérer pour contrôler les industries de l'énergie afin de contrôler la paix. Au début, à partir de 1957, les Communautés européennes, telles qu’appelées jusqu'en 1993 à la création de l'Union européenne, ont géré des domaines spécifiques d’une importance stratégique particulière pour la paix en Europe occidentale: le charbon, l'acier, l'énergie atomique, l'agriculture et le commerce. Ces Communautés et leurs institutions n’ont pas étendu leurs compétences pour inclure les frontières, internes ou externes, jusqu'à ce que l’Accord de Schengen n’ait été signé en 1985 et ne soit entré en vigueur à partir de 1995. Schengen est la première législation de l'UE qui réglemente les frontières internes et externes de l'UE ainsi que des États membres de l'UE. Schengen, cependant, ne traite pas des conflits frontaliers, qu'ils soient territoriaux, positionnels ou fonctionnels. Schengen ne règle que les fonctions des frontières internes et externes de l'UE. En ce qui concerne les conflits territoriaux, les institutions de l'UE se sont appuyées sur le principe de péréquation ainsi que sur les pressions exercées sur les candidats à l’adhésion, afin que les conflits soient ou bien résolus avant l’adhésion pleine et entière, ou bien résolus progressivement par des négociations entre États membres. Deux cas éclairent à la fois la complexité et la difficulté pour toutes les parties, y compris l'UE, de résoudre de telles situations: le cas de Chypre entre la Grèce et la Turquie et le cas de l’Irlande du Nord. Les deux conflits ont une longue histoire et sont perçus comme ethniques, religieux et socio-économiques, les deux résultent d'un passé colonial et les deux ont été violents. Dans les deux cas, l'UE n'a pas suivi de politiques spécifiques, mais a mis en place des politiques qui favorisent le développement social et économique, les infrastructures ainsi que la formation de la société civile pour retrouver confiance en la paix et pour apprendre des autres citoyens de l'UE. Dans le cas de Chypre, les efforts réalisés avant l'élargissement ont échoué lorsqu’en 2004 le côté aujourd’hui européen de Chypre a voté à 75% contre une proposition de réunification. Cependant depuis lors, la paix et la résolution du différend ont fait des progrès substantiels, en partie grâce au financement de l'UE. Dans le cas de l'Irlande du Nord, les programmes « PEACE » et les programmes Interreg ont réussi à fortement développer la coopération à la frontière, sans pour autant pourvoir résoudre les désaccords. Aujourd'hui à Chypre la paix est réelle et le mur, également appelé « ligne verte », a été détruit ou abandonné, et depuis mai 2015, des discussions se poursuivent. En Irlande du Nord, il existe de nombreux programmes de coopération entre les municipalités de part de d’autre de la frontière et une région sanitaire transfrontalière fournit des services de santé à près de 120 000 personnes avec des ambulances traversant la frontière sans devoir s'arrêter. En somme, l'UE n'a pas de politique frontalière mais a utilisé des mesures incitatives pour réduire la violence et encourager les États membres et les États candidats à l’adhésion à négocier et à coopérer pour trouver des solutions. Cependant, la littérature suggère que l'UE a une approche différente en fonction du statut des États impliqués dans le conflit, qu'il s'agisse d'un États membre, d'un

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États candidat ou d’un États non candidat. Par exemple, en 2004, l’UE a été perçue comme favorisant la Grèce par rapport à la Turquie, et les négociateurs turcs suggèrent qu'un tel biais a ralenti les progrès de l'adhésion pour la Turquie. Parce qu'elle ne dispose pas d'une politique spécifique aux conflits frontaliers, l'UE est toujours témoin d'un certain nombre de conflits positionnels intéressants. Par exemple, le conflit franco-espagnol « Quinto Real » n'a toujours pas été résolu depuis près de 400 ans, mais la bataille a pris fin en 1856, lorsqu’à l'époque les deux royaumes ont convenu de partager les pâturages précieux qui les avaient divisés. La zone est située du côté espagnol de la frontière, mais la France dispose de droits exclusifs grâce à une location perpétuelle. D'autres situations n'ont jamais été identifiées comme des litiges jusqu'à récemment: c'est le cas de la situation du lac de Constance entre l’Allemagne et l’Autriche, où une question de propriété privée a conduit à remettre en question la limite maritime traversant le lac. C'est également le cas de l'estuaire Ems-Dollart partagé par l'Allemagne et les Pays-Bas ; son thalweg se déplace chaque saison et modifie l’emplacement de la ligne de démarcation au fond de la rivière, ce qui a des répercussions sur l’estuaire et sur la frontière maritime en mer. L'Ems-Dollart est devenu un problème important en raison de l'intention de l'Allemagne de construire un parc éolien dans l’embouchure de l'estuaire. Les désaccords ont été résolus en 2013 lorsque les deux parties ont accepté la cogestion de l'estuaire, y compris des accords de permis pour les éoliennes, les pipelines, les câbles et l’exploitation du gaz, du pétrole, du sable ou du gravier. En outre, l'Irlande et le Royaume-Uni ont des différends aux extrémités nord-ouest et sud-est de la frontière qui divise la République d'Irlande du Royaume-Uni. Ces deux zones sont appelées Lough Foyle et Carlingford Lough. Ce sont des exemples intéressants de conflits territoriaux qui évoluent progressivement en conflits positionnels et éventuellement fonctionnels grâce à une coopération accrue entre les parties. Ce cas particulier, que l’on doit à la Foyle Agency, démontre que la coopération favorise les intérêts économiques réciproques là où les juridictions conflictuelles et l'incertitude politique ont échoué pendant des siècles. Il est intéressant de noter que les conflits fonctionnels sont aujourd'hui rares dans l'Union européenne parce que les politiques européennes de voisinage ont mis en œuvre des accords qui modifient la nature même de la relation que l'UE et ses États membres ont avec tous les États frontaliers de l'UE. Cela comprend tous les États qui se trouvent au sud de la Méditerranée et tous les États qui bordent les États membres de l'Est de l'UE (Turquie, Moldavie, Ukraine, Biélorussie et Russie). Ces politiques ont été lancées en 2004 grâce à une nouvelle prise de conscience au sein de l'UE, laquelle apparaît dans les livres blancs de la Commission européenne et du Conseil européen, qui suggèrent que « notre tâche est de promouvoir un cercle de pays bien gouvernés à l'Est de l'Union européenne et sur les frontières de la Méditerranée, avec lesquels nous pouvons avoir des relations de coopération étroites » ; suggérant également que « les intérêts de l'Union européenne nécessitent un engagement continu [...] par une coopération économique, sécuritaire et culturelle plus efficace » et qu’ « il ne peut y avoir de développement durable sans paix et sécurité, et que sans développement et éradication de la pauvreté il ne peut y avoir de paix. Les menaces à la santé publique, les pandémies, minent le développement. Les droits de l'homme sont une partie fondamentale de l'équation ». Aujourd'hui, un grand nombre d'États contigus aux États

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membres de l'UE ont signé des accords de voisinage. Ces États adjacents sont réunis pour négocier des accords globaux qui comprennent des politiques de coopération concernant les droits de vote de leurs citoyens, l'information et la sécurité, mais aussi des accords de commerce et de développement économique. Dans l'ensemble, les États limitrophes du sud et de l'est de l'UE sont amenés à partager les valeurs de l'Union européenne, ce qui est également facilité par leur adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe, un organisme paneuropéen à plus grande échelle que l'Union européenne et qui vise à promouvoir les valeurs démocratiques, la primauté du droit et la protection des droits de l'Homme. Dans l'ensemble, ils alignent progressivement leurs propres valeurs et leurs ressources avec celles de l'Union européenne et échangent continuellement des informations avec l'UE et ses États membres. Dans ce contexte d'échange continu de renseignements, les conflits frontaliers fonctionnels et positionnels, et même les conflits frontaliers territoriaux sont beaucoup plus facilement résolus. En conclusion, ce que nous avons appris de ce court essai sur les litiges frontaliers dans l'UE, c'est que, malgré l'absence de politiques spécifiques aux litiges frontaliers, l'UE a agi pour résoudre et limiter les conflits frontaliers, qu'ils soient territoriaux, positionnels ou fonctionnels. L'UE est un projet de paix paneuropéen qui lie les économies et les ressources des États membres de l'UE afin d'éliminer les chances d'une nouvelle guerre ; par conséquent, la paix est historiquement le principal objectif de l'Europe. L'UE n'a pas de politiques visant à régler les conflits territoriaux, positionnels ou fonctionnels stricto-sensu, mais l'UE a mis en place des incitations pour limiter la charge politique des accords de paix et de leur mise en œuvre. Néanmoins, il existe au sein de l’UE d’intéressants conflits territoriaux et positionnels ainsi que quelques conflits fonctionnels. Mais dans l'ensemble, les évidences présentées dans ce document montrent les fonctions de souveraineté et de protection des frontières et la nécessité d’apaisement et de coopération transfrontalière pour la préservation et la propagation de la paix. Cela fait l’objet d’une attention particulière depuis 2010, lorsque l'immigration imprévue aux frontières orientales de l'UE a soulevé de nouveaux défis tant pour las accords de Schengen que pour la réglementation de Dublin. Schengen applique les politiques communes en matière de frontières et de visas et Dublin réglemente les politiques communes d'asile parmi les États de l'UE. Aujourd'hui, ces flux ont amené les pays de l'UE à prendre des mesures exceptionnelles (telles que l'état d'urgence en Autriche, en France, en Allemagne ou en Hongrie) pour rétablir des contrôles de sécurité aux frontières, ce qui produit une hausse des problèmes fonctionnels aux frontières. Fait intéressant, cependant, ces défis n'ont pas fait dérailler le processus de paix à Chypre et sont discutés en permanence entre les États membres. Ce sont les échanges d'informations qui mènent à la coopération et atténuent les litiges frontaliers dans l'Union européenne malgré l'inexistence d’une stratégie politique dédiée.

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GRENZEN UND GRENZKONFLIKTE IN EUROPA Weltweit betrachtet ist die Europäische Union (EU) ein interessantes Gebiet, um Grenzen, ihr Management und ihre Funktion als Schutz von Souveränität und Sicherheit in sich ökonomisch und politisch integrierenden Staaten zu untersuchen. Ferner sind die Mitgliedsstaaten mit EU-Außengrenzen anregende Orte für die Analyse territorialer Konflikte, insbesondere der Mechanismen der Befriedungspolitik und grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit. Dies gilt sogar für die Zeit seit 2010 mit ihren großen Herausforderungen infolge des unerwarteten Migrationsdrucks. Die EU ist wirklich faszinierend, denn die europäische Integration ist ein Prozess, der in den letzten 50 Jahren zur immer engeren Zusammenarbeit der europäischen Staaten geführt hat. Schließlich waren die Institutionen der Europäischen Union ursprünglich geschaffen worden, um dem ganzen Westen des Kontinents Frieden zu bringen, wo zuvor in nicht einmal einem Jahrhundert zwei Weltkriege (1914–19 und 1939–1945) getobt hatten. Im Rückblick ist heute evident, dass das EU-Projekt effektiv war. Die Väter der europäischen Einigung können mehr als zufrieden sein, dass ihre Ideen und Ideale so außergewöhnlich erfolgreich waren. Mit 28 Ländern, die als Mitglieder in den Institutionen der Europäischen Union zusammenarbeiten, ist Westeuropa zu einer der stabilsten und friedlichsten Weltregionen geworden. Die EU ist in der Tat ein Friedensund Wohlstandsprojekt, das weltweit bewundert wird. Dennoch ist sie von Anfang an auch stets in Frage gestellt worden. Diese kurze Abhandlung beginnt mit der Definition von Grenzkonflikten, gibt dann einen kurzen Überblick über die Geschichte des europäischen Projekts, insbesondere seiner Implikationen bezüglich der Grenzen und Grenzkonflikte. Er schließt mit der Betonung der Tatsache, dass die EU ein erfolgreicher Vermittler in Grenzkonflikten ist, obwohl sie auf diesem Politikfeld keine offizielle Strategie definiert hat.

I. Was sind Grenzkonflikte? Die Literatur über Grenzen unterscheidet drei Grundformen von Grenzkonflikten: territoriale Grenzkonflikte, Grenzverlaufskonflikte und Grenzregimekonflikte. Territoriale Konflikte sind oft, aber nicht immer, die komplexesten, historisch belastetsten und gewalttätigsten Streitfragen. Ihnen liegen häufig vielfältige Probleme zugrunde. Dazu gehören die Bedrohung der Souveränität und ethnische, sprachliche, kulturelle oder religiöse Spannungen sowie die Eigentumsrechte an Bodenschätzen wie Wasser, aber auch Öl, Gas, Kohle, Fischfanggebiete, Wälder und landwirtschaftliche Flächen: Die älteste bekannte Auseinandersetzung der Geschichte fand 2600 vor Christus in Mesopotamien zwischen den sumerischen Städten Lagasch und Umma statt. Der Konflikt um Getreidefelder wurde mit einem Krieg gelöst. Auch heute führen viele Grenzkonflikte zu Kriegen. In der Europäischen Union jedoch könnten diese Streitigkeiten nicht zu solch gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen führen. Grenzverlaufskonflikte sind sowohl neuerer als auch eher technischer Natur. Deshalb können sie auch leichter gelöst werden. Sie drehen sich primär um die Position oder den genauen Verlauf der Grenz-

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linie. Diese wiederum ist häufig in einem Vertrag sehr klar festgelegt, aber mit groben Markierungen quer durch die physische Geographie des Territoriums, das sie durchquert und teilt. Die Frage der Festlegung des Grenzverlaufs am Boden durch ein Territorium oder die Grenzziehung auf See ist oft strittig, denn Verträge können auf spezifische Merkmale des Geländes verweisen, die verschwunden sind, zum Beispiel eine Insel, ein Fluss oder ein Wald. Auf See gab es vor dem Seerechtsübereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen (SRÜ – engl.: UNCLOS) keine präzisen Regeln. Aktuell gibt es mehr Grenzverlaufskonflikte auf See, denn die Staaten haben die Möglichkeit, ihre Streitfragen zu lösen, da seit 1982 eine große Zahl der UN-Mitglieder das SRÜ unterzeichnet hat. Heute definiert dieses Übereinkommen sehr klar, was maritime Konflikte sind. Der Grenzverlauf ist grundsätzlich geregelt durch die Festlegung des Abstands zwischen der Küste und den Seegebieten. Aber viele Gebiete auf See können von mehr als einem Staat beansprucht werden, weil die Küsten nicht geradlinig verlaufen. In der EU gibt es derzeit nur eine begrenzte Zahl von Grenzverlaufskonflikten. Keiner von ihnen ist so schwerwiegend, dass er nicht gelöst werden kann. Grenzregimekonflikte sind das letzte Feld der Auseinandersetzung. Sie entstehen um das Grenzregime im Sinne der einseitigen Politik der Durchsetzung einer Grenzlinie für spezifische politische Zwecke: Eine Staatsgrenze kann unbewacht oder geschlossen sein, während das Nachbarland eine andere Form der Verwaltung des Grenzverlaufs wünscht. Eine weitere Möglichkeit ist, dass eine Ressource (z.B. Wasser oder Kohle) auf beiden Seiten der Grenze verfügbar ist, aber die Staaten sich nicht auf die Bedingungen für deren Nutzung einigen können. Grenzregimekonflikte können entschärft werden, wenn Staaten ihre Grenzpolitik abstimmen und die Verwaltungsfunktionen der Grenze koordinieren. Heute haben regelmäßige Verhandlungen und institutionalisierte Beziehungen innerhalb der EU im Rahmen der Interreg-Politik und im direkten Umfeld der EU im Rahmen der Nachbarschaftspolitik die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Grenzregimekonflikten reduziert.

II. Die Geschichte des europäischen Projektes und seiner Binnenund Außengrenzen Das europäische Projekt wurde nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs Wirklichkeit, aber bereits im 19. Jahrhundert hatten viele europäische Intellektuelle darüber nachgedacht. Victor Hugo, ein französischer Schriftsteller, veröffentlichte 1849 einen politischen Essay Pour les Etats Unis d’Europe (Für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa), in dem er sich für die Schaffung eines europäischen föderalen Staates aussprach, der die europäischen Nationen zur Vereinigung und zur Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität zwingen und so Krieg ausschließen sollte. Der Hauptgrund für diese Ideale war der Krieg. Zunächst ging es bei dem europäischen Projekt nicht um Grenzen, sondern darum, Kriege unmöglich zu machen. Die Idee der Integration stand im Vordergrund, und Staaten stimmten der Integration in die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl zu. Sie wurde 1952 mit dem Ziel gegründet, gemeinsam die Kontrolle über die Kohle- und Stahlproduktion in allen beteiligten Ländern zu

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übernehmen, um auf diese Weise die Produktion von Mengen zu verhindern, die erneut einen Krieg möglich machen könnten. Jean Monnet, ein französischer Unternehmen und internationaler Experte mit großer Erfahrung in Kanada und den Vereinigten Staaten unterstützte die Idee schwacher Zweckgemeinschaften, welche Länder zur Kooperation zusammenführen und so die Basis der Energiewirtschaft kontrollieren sollte, um auf diese Weise den Frieden zu sichern. Ab 1957 regelten die Europäischen Gemeinschaften, wie sie bis 1993 hießen, als die Europäische Union gebildet wurde, bestimmte Politikfelder, die von besonderer strategischer Bedeutung für den Frieden in den westeuropäischen Staaten waren: Kohle, Stahl, Atomenergie, Handwirtschaft und Handel. Diese Gemeinschaften und ihre Institutionen erstreckten sich weder auf die inneren noch auf die äußeren Grenzen, bis 1985 das Schengener Abkommen unterzeichnet wurde und 1995 in Kraft trat. Das Schengener Abkommen ist die erste gemeinschaftliche Rechtsvorschrift der EU, die die Binnen- und Außengrenzen der EU und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten regelt. Aber Schengen befasst sich nicht mit Grenzkonflikten, egal ob sie territorialer Natur oder Grenzverlaufsbzw. Grenzregimekonflikte sind. Schengen regelt nur die Funktionen der Binnenund Außengrenzen der EU. Bezüglich der Territorialkonflikte haben sich die EU-Institutionen immer auf das Prinzip des Ausgleichs verlassen. Auf künftige Mitglieder, Beitrittskandidaten also, wird Druck ausgeübt, damit derartige Konflikte vor dem Erlangen der Vollmitgliedschaft gelöst oder – bei EU-Mitgliedsstaaten – in gemeinsamen Verhandlungen kontinuierlich behandelt werden. Zwei Fälle beleuchten sowohl die Komplexität als auch die Schwierigkeit für alle Parteien, einschließlich der EU, bei der Lösung solcher Problemfälle: der türkisch-griechische „Zypernkonflikt“ und der „Nordirlandkonflikt“. Beide Konflikte haben eine lange Geschichte und werden als ethnische, religiöse und sozioökonomische Auseinandersetzungen wahrgenommen. Beide sind auch Resultat einer präexistenten kolonialen Vergangenheit, und beide waren gewaltsam. In beiden Fällen verfolgte die EU keine spezifische Konfliktlösungspolitik, sondern implementierte eine Politik der Förderung der sozialen und ökonomischen Entwicklung sowie der Infrastruktur. Die Zivilgesellschaft wurde geschult, dem Frieden wieder zu vertrauen und von anderen EU-Bürgern zu lernen. In Zypern zum Beispiel scheiterten die Maßnahmen vor der Erweiterung, als 2004 der heute zur EU gehörende Teil Zyperns mit 75% den Vorschlag zum Beitritt der gesamten Insel ablehnte. Aber seither haben der Frieden und die Lösung des Konflikts deutliche Fortschritte gemacht, was teilweise auch EU-Mitteln zu verdanken ist. Im Falle Nordirlands sorgten die sogenannten „Peace“ Programme und Interreg-Maßnahmen mit Erfolg für intensive grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit, ohne jedoch den Konflikt lösen zu können. Heute ist in Zypern der Frieden real. Die Mauer, auch „grüne Linie“ genannt, wurde zerstört oder aufgegeben, und seit Mai 2015 wird wieder verhandelt. In Nordirland gibt es heute zahlreiche grenzüberschreitende Kooperationsprojekte zwischen Kommunen. Eine grenzüberschreitende Gesundheitsregion übernimmt die medizinische Versorgung von fast 120.000 Menschen. Krankenwagen müssen nicht mehr stoppen, wenn sie die Grenze passieren. Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass die EU keine Grenzpolitik hat. Stattdessen nutzt sie Anreize, um die Gewalt zu reduzieren und Mitgliedsländer und Beitrittskandidaten zu Verhandlungen und Kooperationen bei der Suche nach Lösungsmöglichkeiten zu ermuntern. Aber die Fachliteratur suggeriert, die EU

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habe eine unterschiedliche Herangehensweise, je nachdem, ob es sich um ein Mitglied, einen Beitrittskandidaten oder ein anderes Land handelt, die also vom Status der Konfliktparteien abhängt. 2004 zum Beispiel erweckte sie den Eindruck, als würde sie Griechenland gegenüber der Türkei bevorzugen. Türkische Verhandlungspartner deuten an, dass diese Voreingenommenheit den Beitrittsprozess der Türkei verlangsamt habe. Die EU hat keine spezifische politische Strategie zur Lösung von Grenzkonflikten hat, dennoch ist sie immer noch Zeugin einiger interessanter Grenzverlaufskonflikte. So dauert die französisch-spanische Auseinandersetzung um Quinto Real schon fast 400 Jahren. Der Konflikt wurde aber 1856 befriedet, als die beiden damaligen Königreiche sich auf die gemeinsame Nutzung des wertvollen Weidelandes, das sie spaltete, einigten. Das Gebiet liegt auf der spanischen Seite der Grenze, aber Frankreich hat dank eines unbefristeten Pachtvertrages das alleinige Verfügungsrecht. Andere Streitfälle wurden erst vor kurzer Zeit als solche erkannt: Dies gilt für die österreichisch-deutsche Grenze auf dem Bodensee. Dort führte ein Problem mit einer privaten Grundstücksgrenze dazu, dass der Grenzverlauf auf dem ganzen See in Frage gestellt wurde. Dies gilt auch für das Ems Dollart-Mündungsgebiet und für dessen Seegrenze. Das Thema Ems-Dollart wurde bekannt, weil Deutschland im Mündungsdelta eine Windfarm bauen wollte. Die Konflikte wurden 2013 gelöst, als beide Seiten der gemeinsamen Verwaltung des Mündungsgebietes zustimmten. Dies gilt auch für die Erteilung von Genehmigungen für Windräder, Pipelines und Kabel sowie die Erd-, Öloder Sandausbeutung. Auch zwischen Irland und dem Vereinigten Königreich bestehen Streitfälle am nordwestlichen und südöstlichen Ende der Grenzlinie, die die Republik Irland und das Vereinigte Königreich trennt. Bei den beiden Gebieten handelt es sich um Logh Foyle und Carlingford Lough. Sie sind zwei interessante Beispiele für territoriale Grenzkonflikte, die dank der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Konfliktparteien allmählich zu Grenzverlaufskonflikten und möglicherweise zu Grenzregimekonflikten werden. Dieser spezielle Fall ist dank der Foyle Agency zu einem Musterbeispiel dafür geworden, dass Zusammenarbeit im beiderseitigen wirtschaftlichen Interesse ist, nachdem einander widersprechende Rechtsprechung und politische Unsicherheit jahrhundertelang versagt haben. Interessanterweise gibt es derzeit nur wenige Grenzregimekonflikte in der Europäischen Union, denn die Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitiken haben Abkommen implementiert und so die Art der Beziehungen der EU und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten zu allen Staaten rund um die EU verändert. Dazu gehören die Staaten im südlichen Mittelmeerraum und alle Anrainerstaaten der EU-Mitgliedsländer im Osten (Türkei, Moldawien, Ukraine, Belarus und Russland). Diese Politiken wurden 2004 initiiert als Folge eines neuen Bewusstseins in der EU: Die Empfehlungen der Weißbücher der Europäischen Kommission und des Europäischen Rates lauten: „Wir müssen dafür sorgen, dass ein Ring verantwortungsvoll regierter Staaten im Osten der Europäischen Union und an den Mittelmeergrenzen entsteht, mit denen wir enge, auf Zusammenarbeit gegründete Beziehungen pflegen können“. Ferner betonen sie, dass „die Interessen der Europäischen Union ein kontinuierliches Engagement durch effektivere wirtschaftliche, Sicherheits- und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit erfordern“ und „Ohne Frieden und ohne Sicherheit kann es keine nachhaltige Entwicklung geben, und ohne Entwicklung und Beseitigung der Armut wird es keinen Frieden geben. Bedrohun-

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gen der öffentlichen Gesundheit und Pandemien beeinträchtigen die Entwicklung. Menschenrechte sind ein grundlegender Bestandteil dieser Gleichung.“ Heute hat eine große Zahl der Staaten, die an EU-Mitgliedsstaaten angrenzen, Nachbarschaftsabkommen unterzeichnet. Diese Nachbarländer werden zusammengebracht, um umfassende Abkommen auszuhandeln, die die Kooperation bezüglich des Wahlrechts ihrer Bürger, Information und Sicherheit ebenso wie Handelsabkommen und Vereinbarungen über die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit umfassen. Auf diese Weise werden die südlichen und östlichen Anrainerstaaten der EU veranlasst, Werte der Europäischen Union zu teilen. Ihre Mitgliedschaft im Europarat, einer gesamteuropäischen Organisation mit dem Auftrag, demokratische Werte, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte zu fördern, erleichtert diese Entwicklung. Insgesamt gleichen sie zunehmend ihre Werte und Ressourcen an diejenigen der Europäischen Union an und tauschen fortwährend Informationen mit der EU und ihren Mitgliedsstaaten aus. Im Kontext dieses permanenten Informationsaustausches sind Grenzregime- und Grenzverlaufskonflikte und sogar territoriale Grenzkonflikte erheblich einfacher zu lösen. Zusammenfassend lernen wir in dieser kurzen Abhandlung über Grenzkonflikte in der EU, dass diese, auch ohne eine spezifische politische Strategie zu deren Lösung, zur Beilegung und Entschärfung von Grenzkonflikten – sowohl territorialen, als auch Grenzverlaufs- und Grenzregimekonflikten – beigetragen hat. Die EU ist das Resultat eines gesamteuropäischen Friedensprojekts, das den Rohstoffsektor und die Volkswirtschaften der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten miteinander vernetzt, um die Gefahr eines künftigen Krieges zu bannen. Historisch gesehen ist also der Frieden Europas wichtigstes Ziel. Im eigentlichen Sinne verfügt das EU-Projekt über keine politischen Strategien zum Umgang mit territorialen, Grenzverlaufs- oder Grenzregimekonflikten. Aber die EU verfügt sehr wohl über Anreize zur Begrenzung der politischen und ökonomischen Belastungen durch Friedensabkommen und deren Umsetzung. Dennoch gibt es in der EU interessante territoriale, Grenzverlaufs- und auch einige Grenzregimekonflikte. Aber insgesamt zeigen die in dieser Abhandlung aufgeführten Beweise die Souveränitäts- und Schutzfunktion von Grenzen und die notwendige Befriedung und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zum Erhalt und zur Ausbreitung des Friedens. Diese Funktion ist seit 2010 wieder besonders aktuell geworden, denn die unerwartete Immigration über die Ostgrenzen der EU stellt eine neue Herausforderung für das Schengen-Abkommen und die Dublin-Verordnung dar. Schengen setzt eine gemeinsame Grenz- und Visapolitik um, während Dublin die gemeinsame Asylpolitik zwischen den EU-Staaten regelt. Heute haben infolge dieser Menschenströme einige EU-Länder Ausnahmeregelungen ergriffen (z.B. Ausnahme- oder Notfallzustand in Österreich, Frankreich, Deutschland oder Ungarn), um Grenzsicherheitskontrollen wieder einzuführen und infolgedessen Verfahrensfragen bezüglich der Grenzsicherung zu stellen. Interessanterweise haben diese Herausforderungen den Friedensprozess in Zypern nicht zum Scheitern gebracht. Sie werden beständig zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten diskutiert. Dieser Informationsaustausch führt zu Kooperation und entschärft Grenzstreitigkeiten in der Europäischen Union – trotz einer fehlenden spezifischen politischen Strategie.

Part 1:

BORDERS AND GOVERNANCE : A NEW FOREIGN POLICY ? FRONTIÈRES ET GOUVERNANCE: UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE?

GRENZEN UND GOVERNANCE: EINE NEUE AUßENPOLITIK?

CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY? KARL-HEINZ LAMBERTZ Is Cross-border governance in Europe a new foreign policy?” In order to answer that question, let us first examine the definition of foreign policy from Wikipedia: “A country's foreign policy consists of self-interested strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests (…). Since national interests are paramount, foreign policies are designed by the government through highlevel decision-making processes. Usually, creating foreign policy is the job of the head of government and the foreign minister.”1 To summarise this statement, we could say firstly, that foreign policy is steered by high-level national stakeholders and, secondly, that its goal is to safeguard national interests. If we speak of Governance in the broadest sense, it appears important to highlight the interdependences cross-border governance must deal with. I always like showing the Association of European Border Region (AEBR) map of cross-border areas that illustrates how numerous and diverse the cooperation along borders is in Europe. This complexity can be analysed by means of a clear definition of cross border cooperation. In the context of my role as “rapporteur on cross-border cooperation“ for the Congress of local and regional authorities within the Council of Europe, I have developed a classification of the type of cross-border regions based on four criteria. The first one regards the size of the region in question. It is evident that macro-regions and micro-regions don’t face the same challenges. The second criterion regards the complexities within that border-region. These can have different origins, such as the coexistence of different languages and cultures but also dissenting administrative structures and socio-economic traditions. The Euregio Meuse-Rhine is one example where complexity is mainly due to very different partners and their legal disparity. There is the German-speaking Community as a federal entity, which is very small but holds a wide range of competences. Next, there are the Belgian provinces of Liège and Limburg, which cannot be compared to the Dutch Province of Limburg. Finally the Zweckverband Region Aachen, as a representative for the German Partners around the city of Aachen. The third criterion is linked to the “type of border” we are dealing with. This is very important when analysing obstacles and considering how to overcome them. You will find natural boundaries such as mountains or seas, which give a clear distinction to the cooperation in the Baltic and the Adriatic Sea or around Lake Constance. National borders can be well established and peaceful, or on the contrary conflict-ridden due to history or rising hostilities. In these cases, coop-

1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy (2.7.2016).

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eration can be tense and extremely difficult. One must keep that in mind when seeking cooperation on such borders. The fourth criterion has strong political relevance: the degree of European integration plays an important role, even though the phenomenon of cross border cooperation should not be oriented exclusively towards the European Union. A region along the inner European borders can cooperates without the burden of a physical material border, since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Border regions became new EU inner borders after consecutive enlargements, and there are finally border regions along the new external borders of the EU where one can differentiate between facing a candidate country, and those along countries not being considered for inclusion. All these differentiations have an impact on cooperation. The border itself is a complex and rich phenomenon, the scientific study of which requires an interdisciplinary approach. The research cycle on “Living and researching cross-border cooperation” concluded by Birte Wassenberg and Joachim Beck in particular is extremely valuable in that respect.2 During today’s conference, we deal with borders and governance. Borders are the subject of cross-border cooperation whose main aim is to overcome or even remove them. The European Union (EU) considers border regions as disadvantaged and indeed, these areas have had – and continue – to combat numerous and diverse obstacles. Cross-border governance is intrinsic multi-level governance: from EUlevel, to national states, regional and local authorities must work together to solve very complex problems, overcome obstacles and to push for cooperation across borders. Therefore, I approve the concept of horizontal multi-level governance raised by Joachim Beck. It sticks closer to cross border cooperation as it regards not only politics, but also networks, economics, and civil society. To truly involve these actors in cooperation is one of the big challenges facing border regions. The governance set up for the tri-national metropolitan region of the Upper Rhine is a very interesting model of cross-border horizontal multi-level governance. If you look at the AEBR-map, you will easily understand that the challenges depend on the obstacles regions must battle against, and these are obviously not the same in the Upper Rhine Region as in the Carpathian Euroregio between Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. The historical and territorial context plays a crucial role in defining the obstacles to cooperation. In almost forty years of cooperation in the Euregio Meuse-Rhine, during my 23-year political career, and especially in my function as president of the Association of European border regions, I kept track of different phases of development in cross border cooperation. In fact, one can notice three “generations of obsta2

WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière: les régions frontalières françaises, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010; WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J., (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen: Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011; WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Living and Researching Cross-Border Cooperation: The European Dimension, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011; WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière: les régions frontalières sensibles, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011; WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen Integration und (trans)-regionale Identitäten, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2013; WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière: Vers une cohésion territoriale, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2014.

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cles”: The first generation is the dismounting of physical barriers. The Schengen Treaty abolished border controls within the European Union: tollgates, border posts and other customs authorities suddenly became unnecessary. Citizens could cross the border freely and profit from free movement of people and goods, a right that was anchored into European law with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1995). This first obstacle in the evolution of cross-border cooperation is overcome when mobility increases to the extent that it becomes a natural part of citizens’ daily life. This cannot be achieved solely by removing the physical barriers. In fact, many small projects, networks, and political action are needed to overcome the barriers that remain present in people’s minds. The second generation of obstacles appears when this new mobility brings people to work, spend their leisure time, and benefit from services on the other side of the border. Doing so, there are confronted with different laws, administrative structures, as well as cultural and linguistic barriers. This diversity is one of the unique selling points of Europe, but for commuters it mainly brings up complex questions regarding taxes, pension, insurance and social security. I like comparing those obstacles with a virus that permutes. As soon as it seems one problem is solved, new obstacles appear! In the Euregio Meuse-Rhine and in the Greater Region, we have created the “Taskforce Grenzgänger” to help commuters by analysing these obstacles to people’s mobility, and by working on suggestions to change legislation where needed. This naturally involves the national legislator. Keeping in mind that border regions represent forty per cent (40%) of Europe’s territory and thirty per cent (30%) of Europe’s population, national governments cannot hide behind the argument that it only affects a minority. So changes to the national legislation are sometimes necessary. I am convinced that some of these efforts could be avoided if new regulations were automatically run through an impact assessment that tests the compatibility of new national legislation with the situation in cross-border regions. The third generation of obstacles is a recent tendency of experienced cooperation areas, such as the upper Rhine, the Greater Region or the Euregio MeuseRhine, to develop towards cross-border integrated areas. Beyond project level, this level of cooperation involves joint spatial planning and a more functional view of the border area territory. A coherent regional development strategy must be seen as competitive, and an active actor on the European level. A common cross-border regional development strategy is a big challenge. It requires a high degree of integration and a tradition of long-lasting cooperation between the partners. In the end, that is where cross-border governance plays a crucial role in deepening cooperation. The desire for integration is an important driving force for cross-border cooperation. However, too high a degree of integration might contradict the principle of European diversity. Let us first examine the pre-conditions for successful cross-border cooperation. Firstly, partners must be willing to cooperate. So there must be an interest for both partners, and there needs to be added value for each of them. Moreover, it is not always easy to cooperate, not only across national, but also linguistic and cultural borders! If all partners want to cooperate, they also need to be allowed to. This is not always the case. I could tell you several examples where partners were willing to cooperate but were thwarted by their “national capitals”, which were suspicious

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about what was going on at the border – so far away from the capital, and seemingly out of their control. So sometimes, geopolitical or domestic circumstances make cooperation across borders impossible. If one wants to cooperate and is allowed to, one also needs to be able to. This pre-requisite may seem strange, but cooperation frequently fails due to simple misunderstandings between partners. In fact, a great deal of intercultural communication competence is needed to foster well working cross-border cooperation. And this does not only involve understanding one’s partner’s language. One must understand the other’s cultural, political and judicial systems as well in order to find solutions to your common problems. So to start cross-border cooperation, you generally need a great deal of endurance and courage. But we all know that it is worth the trouble! Many have understood that and this is why cross-border cooperation (whether within the framework of the 28 member states of the European Union or of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe) is not a recent phenomenon and has steadily increased in importance. Whereas borders were for a long time considered peripheral in every sense, the process of European integration and globalization has drawn them into the centre of attention. As mentioned before, there was a time when cooperation at the borders seemed suspicious to central governments. But today governments are becoming more and more aware of the opportunities present on the other side of the border, and of the role of border regions as testing grounds for European integration. Cross-border cooperation is also a priority for my home region, the Germanspeaking Community of Belgium. The same goes for many other countries and regions in Europe. In some countries, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, this tendency was even underlined by the nomination of a special ambassador for cross-border cooperation. I wish to conclude by inviting you to peek at the two aspects of foreign policy we defined previously: one concerned the actors involved, while the other was about the purpose of foreign policy. As for the actors involved, we can definitely say that cross-border cooperation has nothing to do with traditional foreign policy, which is mainly steered by high-level politicians in a country’s capital. We have seen that support from the national level is very important for cross-border cooperation, but we have all experienced that efficient cooperation very often develops on a regional or even local level. Border regions definitely play the most important role in developing this type of interaction between the European people. So whereas traditional foreign policy relies more on a top-down approach, cross-border cooperation has a strong emphasis on a bottom-up approach. As for the second aspect (the purpose of foreign policy), the definition referred to “the pursuit of national interests”. I think that everybody would agree with me that a nation’s most important concern is the wellbeing of its people. And we also all have experienced how cross-border cooperation directly improves people’s lives on each side of a border. It helps solving day-to-day problems that range from trivial things such as buying your Christmas gifts across the border to questions of livelihood linked to job-mobility. And cooperation can even be a question of life and death, as is the case with emergency medical aid. So the answer is yes! Cross-border governance does provide new means of safeguarding national interests and therefore constitutes a new form of foreign policy! And I would

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even go further by saying that cross-border cooperation alters the very notion of national interests: Previously, it had been defined as a country’s self-interest. But we have all experienced that this is no longer true. A paradigm-shift has occurred in Europe and this shift was born in the various border-regions of our continent. People no longer turn their backs on one another. They look each other in the eye and perceive their neighbours as part of their home-environment. Therefore, selfinterest is now inseparably linked to the interests of your neighbour. This is an incredible evolution in the history of Europe. And I am convinced that the next step in European integration will be fuelled by border regions. They are not only a laboratory, but also an important motor for deepening European integration!

GOUVERNANCE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE EN EUROPE: UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ? Deux principaux éléments caractérisent la politique étrangère, l’un concerne les acteurs qui y sont impliqués et l’autre son objectif : la politique étrangère est commandée par des parties prenantes nationales de haut niveau et son but est de conserver les intérêts nationaux. Concernant le premier élément, la coopération transfrontalière n’a rien à voir avec la politique étrangère traditionnelle, qui est principalement dirigée par des politiciens de haut niveau dans la capital d’un pays. Elle représente donc une nouvelle forme de politique étrangère. Le soutient au niveau national est très important, mais une coopération transfrontalière peut également se développer au niveau régional ou même local. Alors que la politique étrangère traditionnelle s’appuie plus sur une approche descendante, la coopération transfrontalière met l’accent sur une approche ascendante. Concernant le deuxième élément, en partant du postulat que la préoccupation la plus importante d’une nation est le bien-être de ses citoyens, la coopération transfrontalière améliore directement la vie des gens des deux côtés d’une frontière, puisqu’elle aide à résoudre des problèmes du quotidien. Elle fournit de nouveaux moyens de garantir l’intérêt national. Elle modifie même la notion même d’intérêt national : jusque-là définie comme l’intérêt propre d’un pays, une révolution conceptuelle est survenue en Europe et naquit dans les régions frontalières, où les voisins sont considérés comme partie intégrante de l’environnement habituel et où l’intérêt personnel est inséparablement lié à l’intérêt du voisin. C’est une évolution dans l’histoire de l’Europe. C’est pourquoi, la coopération transfrontalière représente non seulement une nouvelle forme de politique étrangère mais aussi un important moteur intensificateur d’intégration européenne.

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GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPA: EINE NEUE AUßENPOLITIK? Zwei wesentliche Aspekte charakterisieren die Außenpolitik. Der eine bezieht sich auf die beteiligten Akteure und der andere auf ihr Ziel: Die Außenpolitik wird von hochrangigen nationalen Akteuren gesteuert, deren Ziel es ist das nationale Interesse zu schützen. Was den ersten Aspekt angeht, hat grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nichts mit traditioneller Außenpolitik zu tun, die in erster Linie durch hochrangige Politiker in einer Landeshauptstadt gelenkt wird. Sie stellt daher eine neue Form der Außenpolitik dar. Unterstützung durch die nationale Ebene ist sehr wichtig, aber effiziente grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit entwickelt sich auf einer regionalen oder sogar lokalen Ebene. Während traditionelle Außenpolitik mehr auf einem Top-Down Ansatz beruht, hat die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit eine starke Betonung auf einen Bottom-Up Ansatz. Wenn man, den zweiten Aspekt betreffend, annimmt, dass das wichtigste Anliegen einer Nation das Wohlbefinden der Bürger ist, dann verbessert die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit direkt das Leben der Menschen auf beiden Seiten der Grenze, denn sie hilft tägliche Probleme zu lösen. Sie stellt daher neue Mittel zur Sicherung des nationalen Interesses zur Verfügung. Sie ändert sogar den Begriff des nationalem Interesses: bis hier hin definiert als das Eigeninteresse eines Landes, fand in Europa ein Paradigmenwechsel statt. Er wurde in den Grenzregionen geboren, in denen die Nachbarn als Teil der heimischen Umgebung wahrgenommen werden und wo das Eigeninteresse untrennbar mit den Interessen des Nachbarn verknüpft ist. Dies ist eine wichtige Entwicklung in der Geschichte Europas. Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit stellt daher nicht nur eine neue Form der Außenpolitik dar, sondern auch einen wichtigen Motor für die Vertiefung der europäische Integration.

TERRITORIAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMING FOR CAPTURING THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

JOACHIM BECK As part of European integration, interaction between different administrative levels has become more intense over years. Accordingly, the concept of European Administrative Space (EAS) has gained increasing interest from both academics and practitioners. Going beyond the classic vertical multi-level perspective, this article suggests understanding patterns of institutionalization, which are developed within the context of European territorial cooperation, as a complementary horizontal dimension of the EAS. Applying an inductive theoretical approach, and developing a heuristic concept of “territorial institutionalism”, the article demonstrates how neo-institutionalist approaches can successfully inspire a holistic framing of further research on the institutional patterns of cross-border cooperation in Europe.

I. Governance dimensions of cross-border cooperation Territorial cooperation has gained increasing importance in Europe over the last 25 years.1 Two main factors have influenced the development of this policy-field. One the one hand, with the fall of the iron curtain, more than 27.000 km of new borders have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe,2 and the question of how to manage transnational relations at a decentralized, territorial level has become a very practical challenge for many new border regions. Secondly, longtime experience from “older” border regions in Western Europe, which have started to build up territorial cooperation approaches right after World War II3 has demonstrated both the need and potential for territorial cooperation in the process of European integration:4 NUTS 2-level statistics show that nearly 40% of the EU territory can be classified as border-regions with 30% of the EU population living there.5 With the official taking up of the territorial cohesion objective into the 1 2 3 4 5

WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Living and researching cross-border cooperation (Vol. 3): The European Dimension of Cross-border Cooperation, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011. FOUCHER, MICHEL. L’obsession des frontières, Editions Perrin, Paris, 2007. WASSENBERG, B., Vers une eurorégion? La coopération transfrontalière franco-germano-suisse dans l'espace du Rhin supérieur de 1975 à 2000, Peter Lang, Bern, 2007. AGEG – Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen (ed.), Zusammenarbeit Europäischer Grenzregionen. Bilanz und Perspektiven, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008. Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière – MOT (ed.), Atlas de la coopération transfrontalière. Dynamiques transfrontalières et projets, second edition, Paris, 2007, www.espaces-transfron taliers.org (2.6.2016).

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Lisbon treaty, the case of territorial cooperation has been strengthened within the European cohesion policy6 even promoting a perception of border-regions as “laboratories for European integration”.7 The policy-approach of European territorial cooperation (ETC), can be differentiated into two but interlinked basic patterns. The first and most obvious are the Interreg-funding programs of the European Commission. These were – after an experimental phase between 1988 and 1989 – both conceptually (starting as a community initiative under Interreg I and II, being integrated into the structural funds regulation under Interreg II and IV and leading to an own regulation under Interreg V) and financially (from initially 1.1 billion Euro up to 10.1 billion Euro, with nearly 7 billion Euro exclusively dedicated to cross-border cooperation) expanded over five phases with a programmatic differentiation of three strands. These strands are: A = Cross-border cooperation with a focus on proximity-relations at contiguity-level; B = Transnational cooperation with a focus on planning in strategic areas relevant for European cohesion; C: Interregional cooperation with a focus on networking and exchange of good practices. The second approach goes beyond Interreg-financed programs and projects, focusing on transnational/cross-border institution-building at a territorial level. The best-known examples here are the so-called Euregios, formed by Germany and its western neighbors from the 1950’s onwards, the Inter-governmental Commissions with territorial differentiations such as the Upper-Rhine Conference, the Øresund Council/Greater Copenhagen and Skåne Committee, GrandRegion Summit (formerly known as SaarLorLux), or the more recent Eurodistricts. Here, territorial actors are developing approaches of political and administrative cooperation either to solve concrete problems, to develop territorial potentials jointly or to implement European sectoral policies (often transposed by the respective jurisdictions quite differently) in a coordinated way. As these bodies are not usually equipped with a subsequent budget, their functioning often depends on EU-funding. However, through the creation of a specific legal form, the EGTC (European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation), the European Commission in 2006 also tried to strengthen this form of territorial cooperation. The governance mode of territorial cooperation varies according to these two basic approaches.8 The so-called “Interreg-world” is characterized by a pattern in which both the financial and thematic design is negotiated vertically between MS and COM. This leads to a specific form of result-oriented framework planning where core elements, such as strategic objectives, specifications regarding financial management and control, or basic cooperation principles (such as partnership, co- and pre-financing etc.), are defined by the Commission – but are then horizontally embellished at a decentralized level by the very territorial actors themselves (design of a territorial development strategy, details of the rules, generation and selection of projects, co-financing etc.). Regarding the second pat6 7 8

BAILO, P., MEYNIER, D. (ed.), De la solidarité économique et sociale à la cohésion territorial, Collection Professionnels de l’Europe, PEAP, Strasbourg, 2012. LAMBERTZ, K.-H. (ed.), Die Grenzregionen als Labor und Motor kontinentaler Entwicklungen in Europa. Berichte und Dokumente des Europarates sowie Reden zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Nomos, Zürich/Baden-Baden, 2010. MOT (ed.), Guide méthodologique. Articuler la politique de cohésion, les dispositifs de gouvernance et les logiques territoriales transfrontalières, Paris, 2013, www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org (2.6.2016).

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tern of territorial cooperation, the distinguishing feature here is the absence of any European or national programming: cooperation approaches between public (and private) actors from either side of the border are developed bottom-up on a purely voluntary basis. No legal or financial program is determining or actively pursuing cross-border-cooperation evolvement at this level. Accompanying competencies, roles, procedures and forms must be negotiated and designed horizontally on the basis of voluntary acts. Both approaches, however, share the necessity of a close collaborative interaction between partners coming from different jurisdictions, representing different administrative systems and cultures. Following René Frey, territorial cooperation can thus be perceived as a horizontal sub-system created and run by the domestic partners participating, in order to create a tangible inter-institutional network allowing for the joint design and implementation of both, institutional arrangements, programs and projects. As the practical functioning of this sub-system is not ensured per se, but rather must be stabilized by and thus (often even on an ad hoc basis) depends on the contributions of the domestic partners involved, the result is a less formal outcome than a formally established governance mode. Both Interreg, which indeed is formally established and structured by decentralized conventions, and institutional cooperation – often based either on a legal form or at least on bi-lateral agreements and conventions too – are de facto fragile creations, which can erode very easily, once the necessary financial, logistical, administrative or political support by the partners involved is no longer provided.9 Seven practical challenges which characterize the governance-modes of such territorial cooperation can be cited10: 1. Developing functional equivalences between different politico-administrative systems – how to develop functional interfaces that allow for successful cooperation between partners coming from different institutional domestic backgrounds, with regards to distribution of power and resources, professional profiles and sometimes even the scope and legitimacy for transnational action 11 as such? 2. Creating effective knowledge-management for the cross-border territory – how to generate and use valid information about the characteristics, real world problems, and potentialities of a cross-border territory in a 360° perspective, and how to base future action on a sound and integrated empirical 12 basis, thus avoiding a negative “garbage can model” practice of cross-border policy making – ad hoc solutions developed by individual actors, based on individual preferences in search for an ex post justification and a real world problem); 3. Transferring competencies from principals to agents –how to reduce the dependency of cross-border actors and policy-making on the respective domestic 9 10 11 12

HOOPER, B. KRAMSCH, O. (ed.), Cross-Border Governance in the EU, Routledge, London, 2007. BECK, J., ”The Future of European Territorial Cohesion: Capacity-Building for a New Quality of Cross-Border-Cooperation”, in: WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière: Vers une cohésion territoriale, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2014, p. 333–351. BECK, J., THEDIECK, F. (ed.), The European Dimension of Administrative Culture, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008. COHEN, M. D., MARCH, J. G., OLSEN, J. P., “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 March 1972, p. 1–25.

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context by identifying fields of cross-border action that can be best implemented through transfer of real administrative and functional competences from national jurisdictions towards cross-border bodies with sufficient administrative, financial personnel capacity; how to design decision-processes in this 13 regard 4. Optimizing the interaction between actors – how to turn confrontation between different cultures, attitudes, expectations, assumptions, values, interests etc. into a productive working context, avoiding of mutual blockages and the 14 development of innovation and real added-values instead ; how to integrate actors representing different sectors (public, private, societal) and cultures into existing patterns and structures of cooperation; how to create and manage in15 ter-sectoral synergies from a cross-border perspective 5. Finding the right form of organization and legal structure – how to find the right degree of institutionalization and legal form for different cross-border tasks by developing a good balance between open network and classical organizational approaches when structuring the cross-border working context; 16 how to avoid institutional sclerosis and informal/individual arbitrariness 6. Capturing and measuring value-added and territorial impacts – how to preassess cross-border impacts of different policy-options before pursuing the chosen action; how to develop and inform specific indicators allowing for a better demonstration of the specific value-added of the integrated crossborder action compared to an action taken by neighboring jurisdictions sepa17 rately 7. Increasing sustainability beyond a simple multi-project approach – how to avoid the case of multiple uncoordinated sectoral projects creating fragmented cross-border activity for a certain time (funding) period only, by strengthening the target-orientation and selectiveness of cross-border policy-development 18 based on integrated (e.g. inter-sectoral) territorial development strategies. These horizontal patterns distinguish territorial cooperation from administrative interactions within the settled constellations of both domestic and classical vertical European politics –which have been central to considerations on European Governance and the European Administrative System so far.19 On the other hand, and as demonstrated in the next chapter, cross-border cooperation, as part 13 14

15 16 17 18 19

BENZ, A., LÜTZ, S., SCHIMANK, U., SIMONIS, G. (ed.) Handbuch Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder, Springer, Wiesbaden, 2007. DEMORGON, J., Critique de l`interculturel. L´horizon de la sociologie, Economica, Paris, 2005 ; EISENBERG, E., Learning from cultural experiences and interactions: Cross-border administrative cultures, in: THEDIECK, F. (ed.), Foundations of Administrative Culture in Europe, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007, p. 183–193. BECK, J., PRADIER, E., Governance in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik : Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Kooperationsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011, p. 107–135. BECK, J., Netzwerke in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik. Rahmenbedingungen, Funk-tionsweise, Folgen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997. TAILLON, R., BECK, J., RIHM, S., Impact Assessment Toolkit for Cross-Border Cooperation. Centre for Cross-Border Studies/Euroinstitut, Armagh/Kehl, 2011. CASTEIGTS, M., “La mise en cohérence des politiques publiques en territoire transfrontalier”, in: WASSENBERG, B. (ed.) Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière (Volume I): les régions françaises, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010. p. 307–321. BAUER, M.W., TRONDAL, J. (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, Palgrave, Houdmills, 2015.

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of the overall approach of European territorial cooperation, has over time generated a marked permanent horizontal administrative profile, which can even be understood as a horizontal dimension of the European Administrative Space.20

II. Cross-border cooperation: a horizontal pattern of the European administrative space Given the process of European integration, and especially within the European territorial cooperation approach, administrative interaction between the national and the European level has increased in intensity over the years. Both design and implementation of European policies today depends on collaborative working relations between the historically evolved national politico-administrative systems of member states and a supranational government system under permanent evolution and change. Against this background, the concept of the European Administrative Space (EAS) has gained increasing interest both from academia and practitioners. Originally directly linked to the notion of ever greater integration of a European government system, and thus assuming and predicting a process of increasing convergence and harmonization of the different national administrative systems towards a more unified reference model in Europe21, it has constantly evolved over time and is now discussed under the light of a broader perspective of European governance. Although the term is often applied, the very definition of EAS in the literature is yet quite diverse: some see the EAS as a “harmonized synthesis of values realized by the EU institutions and Member States’ administrative authorities through creating and allying EU law”22, others perceive it as an “area in which increasingly integrated administrations jointly exercise powers delegated to the EU in a system of shared sovereignty”23 and are underlying the “coordinated implementation of EU law and the Europeanization of national administrative law”. A more neutral perception stresses the erection of a “multilevel Union administration”24. A second line of argument focuses on the emergence of an increasingly differentiated European multi-level governance25 or suggests “a systematic distinction between direct administrative policy and indirect influences of EU policies on domestic administrations and the distinction between the respective constellations between supranational and state actors”26, hereby developing a conceptual focus with regard to the relationship between the governing 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

BECK, J., “Territorial Institutionalism – Capturing a Horizontal Dimension of the European Administrative Space”, Journal of European Integration, in process. SIEDENTOPF, H., SPEER, B., “The European administrative space from a German administrative science perspective”, International Review of Administrative Science 89 (1), 2013, p. 9–28. TORMA, A., “The European Administrative Space (EAS)”, European Integration Studies, Volume 9. Number 1. 2011, p. 149–161. HOFMANN, H.C.H., “Mapping the European Administrative Space”, West European Politics, 31 (4), 2008, p. 662–676. EGEBERG, M. (ed.), Multilevel Union Administration: The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, Basingstoke, 2006. KOHLER-KOCH, B., LARAT, F. (ed.), European Multi-level Governance. Contrasting Images in National Research, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009. HEIDBREDER, E.G., “Structuring the European administrative space: policy instruments of multi-level administration”, Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (5), 2011, p. 709–727.

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and the governed, and thus pleading for a combination of the dimensions of policy instrumentation in the EAS with the actor constellations and Europeanization mechanisms. As a third line of argument, and with regard to administrative law, Sommermann27 differs between a process of direct Europeanization – at the substantive administrative law level (technical norming, implementation of basic liberties, structuring of the internal market, etc.), at the level of administrative procedural law (starting in the 1980’s, i.e. with the introduction of the European environmental impact assessment) and the level of administrative organization law (increasingly since the 1990’s at the level of secondary law) – and a process of indirect Europeanization – functional adaption of administrative norms and procedures in relation with the cooperation principle, spill-over effects from EU-law to other national law domains, adaption due to competition phenomena of an increasing trans-nationalization of administrative relations, leading to an increasing “trans-culturalization” of the existing national legal and administrative systems in Europe. Finally, and in a more prospective reflection, Trondal/Peters28 are suggesting an “EAS II” concept, which takes the multi-level approach and the idea of loosely coupled inter-institutional networks29, jointly performing tasks, as a starting point. They suggest capturing the very role of the EAS in European integration of public administration by studying its empirical emergence with reference to the broader concepts of institutional independence, integration and co-optation. Three gaps can be identified when evaluating the current state of research on the EAS. First, nearly all reflections on the institutionalization of the EAS follow an exclusively theoretical understanding of vertical European integration, distinguishing between national and supra-national government-levels and studying the vertical interactions, interdependencies and mutual impacts between domestic and European corporate and/or individual administrative actors. The aim is to analyze to what extent a (still rather recent) additional administrative layer, directly linked with the process of European integration, has been developed at the supra-national level and how this impacts on historically developed administrative systems. This vertical thinking, however, risks fading out patterns of inter-administrative cooperation that have emerged at a horizontal, e.g. transnational, level: administrative actors – both at member state and sub-national and/or local level – are increasingly cooperating directly with administrative units from other (neighboring) states. This in itself represents a significant institutional pattern which, as I attempt to demonstrate below, would be more suitably included in a holistic understanding of the EAS. Following the very theoretical foundations of governance concepts30, such a horizontal dimension could lead to a complementary understanding of the vertically and horizontally differentiated nature 27 28 29 30

SOMMERMANN, K.P., Von der Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts zur Europäisierung der Verwaltungskultur?, Nomos, Zürich, Baden-Baden, 2015, p. 253–266. TRONDAL, J. PETERS, G.B., “A conceptual account of the European Administrative Space”, in: The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, op.cit., p. 79–92. BENZ, A., “The European Union as a loosely coupled multi-level System”, in: ENDERLEIN, H./WÄLTI, S./ZÜRN, M. (ed.), Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2015, p. 214–226. BENZ, A., LÜTZ, S., SCHIMANK, U., SIMONIS, G. (ed.), Handbuch Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder, op.cit.

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of the EAS – a dimension – mostly not yet covered by leading literature on European multi-level-policy-making – that still limits the horizontal dimension of the EAS to the study of inter-institutional constellations within level-specific administrative constellations, being itself covered up by a predominantly vertical interaction-logic (see, for instance, the contributions in part VII of Bauer/Trondal 2015). A second gap in research is the failure to include a spatial dimension in the EAS. While the temporal and functional stipulations of the EAS have been recognized31, its’ critical spatial dimension is poorly noted in the literature. The astonishing “spacelessness” of the EAS in most academic writing is somehow contradictory to well established concepts and traditions of public administration.32 Territorial cooperation, as I aim to demonstrate below, can add this spatial perspective to conceptual reflections on the EAS, thus laying the ground for a more manageable and realistic understanding of what the notion of EAS can mean in practical terms (both with regard to design and implementation of European politics). Drawing on neo-institutionalist perceptions, the concept of “territorial institutionalism”, drawn up below, can stimulate new research interests in this regard. A final observation is that most literature on the EAS focusses on officially established (and legally based) administrative arrangements and institutions, eg. the Commission, Parliament, Council, agencies, expert groups etc. and their formal and/or informal interlink with other institutional equivalents at different levels. Less identified, however, are patterns of vertical and horizontal administrative interaction within so called “unsettled administrative spaces”.33 There are numerous examples such as networks, forums, projects, committees, programs etc. that go beyond classical, functionally “closed” European organizational arrangements. Such unsettled administrative spaces can draw research attention to new and even less analyzed interactions between European administrative actors and their thematic or sectorial administrative environments. The example of a nascent European territorial governance system, which in itself is inter-sectorial per nature, can again illustrate to what extend the study of such unsettled patterns might contribute to a more holistic understanding of the EAS. In order to capture the administrative dimension of territorial cooperation and its possible relation/contribution to the EAS, I refer below – from an analytical approach – to the concept of EAS II developed by Trondal/Peters (2015). Accordingly, an EAS can only be recognizable if three main characteristics are met: First, an EAS needs to represent an independent institutional capacity for handling European Affairs differently. Second, an EAS needs to be characterized by a structure of integrated administrative action, allowing for the effective coordination of administrative units to fulfill European tasks; Third, the EAS is characterized by co-optation in the sense that it constitutes a recognized partner for external actors and incorporates their potentialities for its own tasks and/or a 31 32 33

HOWLETT, M., GOETZ, K.H., “Introduction: time, temporality and timescapes in administration and policy”, International Review of Administrative Sciences, September 2014, p. 477–492. KÖNIG, K., Moderne öffentliche Verwaltung. Studium der Verwaltungswissenschaft, Schriften der Hochschule Speyer, Berlin, 2008. TRONDAL, J. PETERS, G.B. “A conceptual account of the European Administrative Space”, in: BAUER, M.W., TRONDAL, J. (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, op.cit., p. 79–92.

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joint task delivery. Applying these conceptual premises to the case of crossborder cooperation leads to interesting insights with regards to the role territorial cooperation may play in the context of a heuristic understanding of the European Administrative Space: 1. Institutional capacity Different approaches of analyzing the institutional capacity of territorial cooperation in Europe are possible. The most obvious approach is to capture the overall number of ECT programs officially co-financed by the European Union. According to official statistics34 the number of Interreg-programs (all strands) has evolved considerably over the last 25 years. Starting with only 14 pilot-projects in 1988, the first Interreg period (1990–1993) created 31, the second (1994–1999) 59, the third (2000–2006) 79, the fourth (2007–2013) 92, and the current (2014–2020) over 107 ECT programs with 60 focusing exclusively on cross-border cooperation. Under strand A alone, 14,965 projects have been funded and for the most part already implemented during the last Interreg IV period, leading to the creation of 50,179 new cross-border partnerships between (mostly public) actors. Given that a project lasted 3 years on average, a permanent annual projectcapacity of 6,413 and a permanent partnership capacity of 21,505 over the seven years of the programming period had been created. In terms of administrative capacity, it is interesting to point out that, following EU-regulations, each ETC program must built-up a specific management structure at a decentralized horizontal level. This management structure is composed of a Monitoring/Steering committee, responsible for determining the program strategy and the selection of projects (usually composed of the program partners at MS-level and/or their nominated sub-national representatives), a managing authority, responsible for the operational management and implementation of the program (technical representatives of the program partners) a joint secretariat, responsible for the day to day implementation of the program, the project generation and the preparation of documents and reports for the meetings of the other structures (program officials financed by the overhead of the respective program)35. In addition, the programs and projects also create respective transnational institutionalizations in the form of legal conventions or agreements, binding public partners with regards to financial obligations, thematic contributions and procedural patterns such as roles during the implementation and/or modes of decision-making, etc. Interreg IV has created more than 15,000 such conventions, interconnecting public actors both at Member State, sub-national, regional and local level – either for the duration of the entire programming period or at least for the funding period of an individual project – thus structuring the model of transnational action in many cross-border territories of Europe. As many projects continue after original funding ends – be it in the form of another Interreg-funding and/or a compensation of the loss of EU-funding by national partners involved (often, however, at a financially lower level), one can 34 35

The following figures have been calculated on the basis of statistical information available under the KEEP-database, see: http://www.keep.eu/keep/(2.6.2016). See INTERACT, Interreg Project management handbook, chapter I. p. 14.

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expect that the number of resulting conventions sustaining the interadministrative cooperation of former Interreg projects is relatively significant. Given that only 50% of the 50,179 partnerships created under Interreg IV are sustained, this would still lead to a significant capacity-building effect of transnational territorial institutionalization. While both the steering committee and the managing authority functions are in practice quite often carried out by administrative representatives of the program partners on a part-time basis, the members of the joint secretariats are usually employed on a full-time basis. This either in the form of seconded national experts, or those directly recruited and employed by the program. It is difficult to quantify the number of officials working in the ETC programs as practical implementation of management structures varies between programs. However, a realistic estimation of the number of officials working at program-level can be calculated on the basis of the share of personal costs out of the overall budget dedicated for technical assistance (which de facto covers the overall overhead costs of a program). In the absence of valid statistical information, it can be estimated that the average number of officials working at the level of the Management Authority and the Joint secretariat amounts up to 10 FTE,36 which would mean that under the current funding period of Interreg V a capacity of 1,070 FTEs has been established for the management of the ETC programs in Europe. In addition, most Interreg-projects need professional handling of both formal and thematic implementation, and thus usually establish a professional capacity for project-management, made possible by Interreg-funding. Under the assumption that the project-management capacity per Interreg project amounts up to at least 2 FTE/project37, Interreg IV has – between 2007 and 2013 – created a permanent project-based capacity of 12,826 FTE’s. In addition to the EU-funded “Interreg-world”, many other forms of horizontal administrative cooperation have evolved in Europe over time, taking place at different transnational territorial levels. In a recent study, Reitel and Wassenberg38 have developed a classification that distinguishes at the local scale an urban spatial dimension (cooperation between two or more contiguous urban municipalities like Frankfurt/Oder – Slubice; Eurode Kerkrade-Herzogenrath) and a rural spatial dimension (cooperation between contiguous municipal/intermunicipal bodies in sparsely built-up areas like Pyrenees-Cerdanya or the Mont Blanc Area); at a regional scale a cross-border metropolitan spatial dimension (cooperation between contiguous territories – NUTS 3 or 4 – with a monocentric or polycentric metropolitan structure like the Basel Trinational Eurodistrict, the Meuse-Rhine Eurodistrict or the Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai Eurometropolis) and a non-metropolitan dimension (cooperation between contiguous territories – NUTS 3 or 4 – without a metropolitan structure like the Euregios or the Catalan cross-border Area Eurodistrict); and at a supra-regional scale a metropolitan dimension (cooperation between contiguous territories – NUTS 2 or 3 – with a met-

36 37 38

The figure was developed on the basis of an internal review of DG Regio. The figure was developed on the basis of narrative evidence coming from different Interreg-A spaces REITEL, B., WASSENBERG, B., Territorial Cooperation in Europe. A Historical Perspective, European Commission, Luxembourg, 2015.

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ropolitan degree like The Greater Region or the Upper-Rhine) or a non-metropolitan dimension like the Channel Arc. According to this typology, Reitel and Wassenberg identified 364 “recognized frameworks” of institutional cross-border cooperation in the EU.39 To this can be added a macro-regional scale with cooperation approaches integrating classical cross-border, inter-regional and transnational levels into a broader territorial space covering more than 3 member states on the basis of shared territorial characteristic (such as the Baltic Sea; the Danube region, the Adriatic/Ionian Sea, or the Alpine space). From the point of territorial institutional capacity-building, the most relevant forms of such inter-administrative cooperation “beyond Interreg” are interlocal/euro-regional (local and regional level) and inter-governmental/network (supra- and macro-regional level) approaches. The Association of European Border regions (AEBR) has identified a total of nearly 200 euro-regional cooperation in Europe, the great majority of them running permanent secretariats with fulltime staff (in Germany alone – the MS with the most borders to neighboring countries in Europe – local and regional actors are participating in 32 of such Euroregions). Under the assumption that at least 80% of these Euroregions have permanent joint secretariats with a minimum average of 3 FTE’s (not carrying out Interreg-management functions but project and other management tasks related to the euro-regional working structures), the horizontal “euro-regional” institutional capacity created here would be around 480 FTE’s. Most of these Euroregional cooperation structures are built upon a legal form aiming at a more binding, sustainable and legally loaded transnational administrative interconnection than a simple project convention. Additionally, a total of 41 European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) have been created thus far in Europe, however most of these are not used to structure euro-regional tasks, but rather to fulfil project-based cooperation and implementation needs for the participating partners.40 Less well-documented are inter-governmental bodies and commissions set up between Member states from the 70’s onwards. Based on bilateral agreements, such intergovernmental structures and bodies very often frame the cross-border cooperation of an entire border-zone between two or more states, with a historically strong participation of officials from either national ministries or administrative units from the sub-national state-level (such as ministries of the governments of the German Länder, the préfecture in France, the woiwode-province in Poland, etc.). Most of these inter-governmental bodies are organizationally differentiated into territorial and/or thematic sub-units. On the one hand, they symbolize the political and legal support by Member states for carrying out crossborder cooperation at a decentralized level. On the other hand, they often promote a multi-level logic with the decentralized territorial levels (local, regional) implementing concrete projects, and the supra-regional levels of intergovernmental relations focusing rather on strategic planning issues and developing necessary framework conditions which require collaborative interaction between national governments. The horizontal administrative capacities created 39 40

Ibid., p. 18. European Parliament, European grouping of territorial cooperation as an instrument for promotion and improvement of territorial cooperation in Europe, Brussels, 2015.

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and symbolized by these intergovernmental bodies vary strongly between crossborder territorial constellations. While, for example, the Trilateral Conference of the Upper-Rhine, comprising of around 600 representatives from the respective subnational and regional governments of Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Alsace and Northwestern Switzerland collaborate in 12 standing thematic working-groups on a regular part-time basis, the 6 Agreement-implementing North/South bodies on the Irish/UK border counted an overall number of 578 FTE’s in 2013.41 Also, the composition of officials can vary considerably, for instance the Franco-Spanish Government Commission on maritime transport exclusively uniting government experts from the transportation sector. In addition, with recent initiatives to building up European macro-regions, specific transnational governance-structures have emerged, interlinking the three levels of meta-governance (Interaction between the European Commission, the European Council, high-level groups, national contact points and annual forums), thematic governance (Priority area coordinators, steering groups, governing boards, thematic working groups) and implementation-governance (project partners and the respective financing programs and institutions).42 The hundreds of new project initiatives plus the annual forums with over a thousand participants each represent a complex mix of public and private and/or third sector actors, yet still inter-administrative cooperation is at the core of the macroregional approach. However in order to capture the full picture a more valid estimation approach is needed. One established method for calculating the personnel needs of an administrative unit in the absence of quantitative figures is to develop a realistic vision of the administrative overhead (FTE) required per million inhabitants.43 Applying this method to the context of territorial cooperation, a pilot survey carried out by the author, among members of the TEIN-Network,44 came to the conclusion that, regarding cross-border cooperation, an average administrative overhead relation of 55 FTE per million cross-border territory inhabitants can be

41

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Analysis of the Annual Reports of the North/South Language Body, the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission, the Food Safety Promotion Board/SafeFood, the Trade and Business Development Body/InterTradeIreland, Waterways Ireland, SEUPB, carried out by the Centre for Cross Border Studies in Ireland on 13.1.2015, http://crossborder.ie/ (2.6.2016). SIELKER, F., ”Soft borders als neues Raumkonzept der EU? Das Beispiel der makroregionalen Kooperationen”, in: Arbeitsberichte der ARL (Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung), Heft 10: 2014, p. 79–94. HOPP, H., GÖBEL, A., Management in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Organisations- und Personalarbeit in modernen Kommunalverwaltungen, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2008. TEIN (Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network), Link: < http://www.transfrontier.eu> (2.6.2016).

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realistically assumed.45 This indicator can be used for an extrapolation of the administrative CBC capacity at the level of the entire European territory. Based on the assumption that at NUTS 2-level, 150 million EU inhabitants (e.g. 30% of the EU population) are living in border-regions46, one can estimate a total direct horizontal administrative capacity of 8,250 FTE. Adding the above calculated permanent capacity generated at project level (12,826 FTE), the total number of independent horizontal cross-border capacity would thus amount to around 21,076 FTE’s. The overall horizontal capacity of the entire European territorial cooperation, however, would certainly be significantly higher, as this figure is a conservative estimation for the narrower range of cross-border cooperation at contiguity level, leaving aside the many forms and levels of transnational cooperations that take place with or without EU funding in this regard. Compared to the administrative capacity of Member states, this remains as a rather weak profile given as it just regards the European institutions. However, it represents an administrative pattern of European institutional integration that seems worth considering. 2. Integration Regarding the second criterion of the EAS, which refers to the existence of a distinct administrative and functional integration, the case of territorial cooperation is quite descriptive too. The main pattern of territorial cooperation is still the project-approach. For a long time, the Leitmotiv that in the trans-national/crossborder context, finally the project would create the territory and not the other way around47, held. Project development, however, has changed considerably over the years. While in the early days of Interreg I and II, most territorial cooperation was characterized by a strong bottom-up approach, witch led to a patchwork of relatively un-coupled projects and related networks, over the years project generation has become more and more strategic in the sense that project selection is more often based on calls which themselves serve the implementation of strategic development objectives jointly agreed upon by the program part45

46 47

The calculation was done on the following basis: The TEIN partners were asked to first calculate the FTE’s for persons working exclusively for cross-border cooperation issues on a fulltime basis (captured were secretariats of CBC bodies, personnel of other permanent CBC institutions, Management-authorities of Interreg, full-time project managers as well as fulltime CBC services at the level of institutional partners). In addition, estimations as to what extent actors from partner institutions contribute to cross-border cooperation, but only on a parttime basis, such as public officials working in local and regional authorities with thematic cross-border cooperation being just a part of their job description (based on an annual capacity of 1575 working hours the average assumption per agent here was 5%, which means approximately a total of 10 working days per year). The individual FTE’s were then added to an institutional FTE-capacity dedicated to cross-border cooperation. Five territories of quite different structural peculiarities, but in a way representative for the European territory, were captured by this qualitative survey: the border-regions between France and Switzerland and France and Italy, between Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, between Germany and Denmark and between Germany, France and Northwestern Switzerland. This calculation is based on the conservative assumption of an average cross-border population of 2,5 Mio for each of the 60 Interreg A programs. CASTEIGTS, M., “La mise en cohérence des politiques publiques en territoire transfrontalier”, op.cit., p. 307–321.

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ners.48 A typical example is the thematic concentration principle demanded by the EU-Commission under Interreg V, which all territorial programs managed to respect and which symbolizes the drive for a much more integrated coordination of policy, leading to new forms of integrated horizontal administrative cooperation between local and regional partners. Beyond Interreg, many Euregios and Eurodistricts, as well as territorial cooperation approaches at a supra-regional level like the Upper-Rhine, the Great Region, the Lake of Constance, the Oeresund, plus the European macro-regions. These have developed integrated development strategies and use strategic objectives more and more as selection criteria for the identification of “lighthouse” projects with positive spillovers for the entire transnational territory. The second pattern relevant in this regard concerns the role of political leadership. Territorial cooperation is carried by political networks of high-level decision makers who actively call for it. Party-political preferences are far less important than in the domestic context. The administrative officials responsible for territorial cooperation at the level of the participating partner institutions are mostly located very close to the top political leadership of these institutions (cabinets, government offices both at local, regional and sub-national level). This gives such officials “borrowed” power allowing for a relatively strong position both in relation to the classical thematic organizational divisions of their domestic administrations, and their counterparts from the neighboring state. Close and functional inter-personal network constellations are established in this way, leading to functional patterns of informal preliminary decision-making at a technical level, thus developing stable modes of interlinked transnational executive leadership and government. A third and closely linked pattern is that productive territorial cooperation approaches at a transnational/cross-border scale develop inter-personal networks of trust permitting transcendence of formal administrative differences.49 This leads to a pattern of ever-growing synchronization of domestic capacities for transnational purposes, based on inter-institutional decision-making at an informal level. There is a high level of synchronization and horizontal coordination, plus an increased attempt to develop more integrated policy-making, today in most transnational territorial policy-making. Where in the past mostly distributive policies were handled at the transnational level, today successful transnational territorial cooperation also – at least in batches – allows for redistributive decisions (like joint approaches of a more integrated labor-market policy, economic and tourist development,50 or transport-policy51 trying to overcome classical territorial “location-egos” of the partners in favor of promoting the development needs of the entire territory. This in turn is closely interlinked with the fourth pattern, which is a tendency to overcome the principle of unanimity in decision-making, and to increasingly 48 49 50 51

MARIN, B. (ed.) Generalized Political Exchange. Antagonist Cooperation and Integrated Policy Circuit, Campus/Boulder, Frankfurt a. M/Westview, 1990. CHRISHOLM, D., Coordination Without Hierarchy. Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989. ZCHIEDRICH, H. (ed.) Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Grenzregionen. Erwartungen – Bedingungen – Erfahrungen, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 2011. DREWELLO, H. SCHOLL, B., Integrated Spatial and Transport Infrastructure Development. The Case of the European North-South Corridor Rotterdam-Genoa, Springer, Berlin, 2015.

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favor majority-voting. Here the example of the Eurodistrict Strasbourg/Ortenau can be cited, where a principle of double-majority has been introduced to the legal statute. However, this is still based on the consensus–principle, meaning that cross-border administrative patterns always need to be based on the systemic acceptance of either side of the border. Finally a fifth pattern can be cited: in contrast to the ordinary population, which still has a rather domestic territorial reference frame,52 actors of transnational territorial cooperation have a particularly strong identification with CBC issues. A recent survey amongst 132 cross-border actors, applying the analytical variables of the international Globe-project53 at the transnational territorial level54, identified a strongly mission-driven cooperation culture, based on shared belief-systems, leading to the transnational subsystem of cooperation de facto being a close community of committed actors, distinguishing itself clearly from the institutional domestic context with regards to variables such as in-group and institutional-collectivism, power-distance, human-orientation, assertiveness or uncertainty avoidance. 3. Co-optation Due to the fact that the sub-systems of territorial cooperation are mostly not yet equipped with proper competences and/or a solid legal funding by their constituent politico-administrative environments, co-optation can be understood as the sine qua non-condition for their proper functioning. Territorial cooperation is a permanent bargaining process, both between the very actors – coming from different systemic and cultural administrative backgrounds, and actors on the spot, having to persuade their institutional, political and legal headmasters, when more substantive engagements beyond symbols are required. Co-optation in this regard means both forging coalitions for “win win” constellations, and gaining the necessary institutional and financial support from domestic partners and national governments.55 A second field where co-optation takes place is the strategic approach for gaining support from the European level. It is interesting to study how after long years of decoupling, relevant co-optation approaches from cross-border territories have become more and more successful. Starting from the pilot-phase of 1989 where cross-border issues were placed into the general approach of the European cohesion policy for the first time, going over the establishment of Interreg as Community Initiative and it’s coming into being as mainstream program, the creation of the EGCT-regulation, the approach of macro-regions, the green-paper 52 53 54

55

SCHÖNWALD, A., “Expertise Identitäten und Stereotype in Grenzregionen am Beispiel der Großregion SaarLorLux“, MORO Informationen, 5/2, June 2010, p. 20–21. CHHOKAR, J.S., BRODBECK, F.C., HOUSE, R.J., Culture and Leadership Across the World: The GLOBE Book of In-depth Studies of 25 Societies, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, 2007. BECK, D., BECKER-BECKER, U., BECK, J., DUSSAP, A. (ed.) Kultur der grenzüberschreitenden Verwaltungszusammenarbeit – Eine empirische Modellstudie am Beispiel der Oberrhein-Region / Culture de la coopération transfrontalière administrative – Etude pilote empirique dans la région du Rhin supérieur, Speyerer Arbeitshefte Nr.221, Speyer, 2015. BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit erforschen und leben (Band 2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011.

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on territorial cohesion, and today the big efforts by the Commission to address the structural obstacles to cross-border cooperation or the proposal of the Committee of the Regions to develop a specific Territorial Impact Assessment for border-regions56 – all these developments can be interpreted as the result of crossborder actors trying to gain support from the European Institutions in order to increase the pressure on national and sub-national governments to better support initiatives coming from the bottom of the cross-border territories. The successful approach in highlighting the role of cross-border territories as “laboratories of European integration” and to raise awareness of the quantitative importance of their importance (though only from 2010 on, the argument that “30% of the EUpopulation live in cross-border areas” found its way into official documents of the European Commission) can be seen as the consequences of permanent lobbying by both the AEBR and some of its individual members, acting at official European positions like the Committee of the Regions, and individual regional actors trying to gain new fields of European action. A third level of co-optation are more recent attempts to develop inter-sectoral territorial governance approaches. While for the last 40 years cross-border cooperation has been the quasi-exclusive domain of administrative actors, new forms of territorial governance have more often been developed in the cross-border context recently. These are inspired by good practices taking place within the domestic context of regional governance57 and characterized by integrated networks of actors coming from the economic, societal, science/research, and public sector, combined with new participative approaches and forms of collective policy-development.58 For the existing sub-system of cross-border cooperation, such approaches also present opportunities to co-opt existing capacities of other sectors and use them for the purpose of transnational territorial institution-building: newly created boards and platforms, specific Interreg-projects, steering committees, governing-bodies with (or without) a permanent secretariat-function and so on contribute to the horizontal networking of new economic, societal, scientific actors, thus both increasing the sector-specific and the inter-sectoral capacity building at the horizontal level – leading to new dynamics and growth-paths of cross-border policy-making, which in turn finally revalues the administrative actors involved.59

56 57 58 59

See https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/activities/Pages/Territorial-Impact-Assess ment.aspx (2.6.2016) FÜRST, D., “Regional Governance – Was ist neu an dem Ansatz und was bietet er?”, in: BECK, J., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.): Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit erforschen und leben (Band 2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, op.cit., p. 89–105. KILPER, H. (ed.), Governance und Raum, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010. JANSEN, D. SCHUBERT, K. (ed.), Netzwerke und Politikproduktion. Konzepte, Methoden, Perspektiven. Schüren Presseverlag, Marburg, 1995.

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III. Territorial institutionalism – a conceptual framing for capturing cross-border institutional dynamics within the EAS According to the three basic criteria developed by Trondal/Peters60, territorial cooperation, and more precisely cross-border cooperation as described above, can be interpreted as a specific, horizontal pattern of the EAS. However, there are characteristics that also clearly distinguish this from the more classical vertical perspective of the EAS. First of all, the horizontal administrative profile is much less developed both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The specific institutional pattern of territorial cooperation is primarily a project-based approach of secondary organization, based on (informal) inter-institutional and inter-personal networks, rather than an administrative pattern that has a solid funding of primary organization. This includes a dedicated thematic profile, a differentiated personal status and an independent budget, allowing for the development of identifiable programmatic priorities.61 With the challenges of an inverse principal-agent constellation, worsened by the lack both of substantive thematic competencies at the CBC body level, and a fulfillment of permanent cross-border tasks in the form of shared services, both the institutional and functional framework of territorial cooperation is still rather limited compared to the vertical dimension of the EAS, which refers to the institutional context of the European institutions, characterized by a proper thematic competence and administrative capacity, based on European law and a specific personnel status.62 Secondly, within the horizontal dimension of territorial cooperation as such, the variety and degrees of institutional settings are far more diverse than the more uniform administrative pattern seen in the European institutions. The range of institutional and organizational solutions at the horizontal level covers loosely coupled single-issue networks, quasi-institutionalized groups, bodies and organs without any legal form/personality, and organizations such as Euroregions with a proper legal status and permanent (seconded or directly recruited) personnel.63 The specific, yet still limited horizontal institutional pattern of territorial cooperation can be interpreted by a more fundamental consideration of the functions institutions generally play within the context of public policy-making. Institutions can be understood as stable, permanent facilities for the production, regulation, or implementation of specific purposes.64 Such purposes can refer to social behavior, norms, concrete material or non-material objects. Following the understanding of administrative sciences, institutions can in this way be interpreted as corridors of collective action, playing the role of a “structural suggestion” for the 60 61 62 63 64

TRONDAL, J. PETERS, G.B., “A conceptual account of the European Administrative Space”, in: BAUER, M.W., TRONDAL, J. (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, op.cit., p. 79–92. DOMINGUEZ, L., PIRES, I. (ed.), Cross-border Cooperation Structures, Learning from the Past to the Future, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2014. DEMMKE, Ch.,” The Europeanization of Civil Services and Human Resources (HR) Policies”, in: BAUER, M.W. TRONDAL, J. (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, op.cit., p. 449–463. ZUMBUSCH, K., SCHERER, R., “Cross-Border Governance: Balancing Formalized and Less Formalized Co-Operations”, Social Sciences, 4, 2015, p. 499–519. SCHUBERT, K., KLEIN, M. (ed.), Das Politiklexikon. 5., Dietz, Bonn, 2015.

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organized interaction between different actors.65 The question of the emergence and changeability of such institutional arrangements in the sense of “institutional dynamics”66 is subject to a more recent academic school of thinking, trying to integrate the various mono-disciplinary theoretical premises under the conceptual framework of neo-institutionalism. Following Kuhlmann/Wollmann,67 three main theoretical lines of argument can be distinguished here: Classical historical neo-institutionalism68 assumes that institutions as historically evolved artefacts can be changed only very partially, and usually such change only takes place in the context of broader historical political fractures. Institutional functions, in this interpretation, impact actors, trying to change given institutional arrangements or develop institutional innovations, rather in the sense of restrictions. In contrast, rational-choice and/or actor-centered neoinstitutionalism69 emphasizes the interest-related configurability of institutions (in the sense of “institutional choice”). However, the choices that can realistically taken depend on the (limited) variability of the existing institutional settings. Approaches of sociological neo-institutionalism70, in their turn also basically recognize the interest-related configurability of institutions. However they reject the often rather limited model in institutional economics of a simple individual utility maximization of actors, and place greater emphasis on issues like groupmembership, thematic identification or cultural adherence as explanatory variables. From a neo-institutionalist point, the observation that, after more than 40 years of history of territorial cooperation in Europe, the transnational administrative profile is still rather low, can be interpreted in different ways. From the perspective of economic-institutionalism, this finding would rather act as an indicator, namely that the actors involved are obviously still not interested in the creation of formal transnational institutions with a proper thematic and/or legal functioning, because the non-formalization of the transnational territorial cooperation corridor in the form of networks in the end is better able to create addedvalues and thus better serves their institutional interests of implementing a maximum of projects (acquiring a maximum of EU-funding in this way) without changing given domestic structures or distributions of tasks. A historical institutionalism perspective would in turn argue that the more recent ambitions to create new approaches of transnational institution-building are simply not compatible with the historically (and yet un-harmonized) politico-administrative structural and systemic backgrounds of the partners involved: in the absence of proper transnational and/or European administrative law and procedures, even existing European legal forms, such as the GECT, finally depend, for their implementation and functioning, on the choice between one national jurisdiction 65 66 67 68 69 70

KUHLMANN, S., WOLLMANN, H., Verwaltung und Verwaltungsreformen in Europa. Einführung in die vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft, Springer, Wiesbaden, 2013. OLSON, J., “Analyzing institutional dynamics“, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 3, 1992, p. 247–271. Ibid., p. 65. PIERSON, P., Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis, Princeton, Oxford, 2004. SCHARPF, F.W., Interaktionsfromen. Akteurszentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 2000. BENZ, A., “Institutionentheorie und Institutionenpolitik“, in: Benz, A. et al. (ed.), Institutionenwandel in Regierung und Verwaltung, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2004, p. 19–31.

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(fixed by the national territory of the legal seat) – thus creating the obstacle of a legal predominance of one jurisdiction. Such an interpretation would also be shared by a sociological institutional view, however with a different explanation. Namely: the distinct legal and organizational culture, but also the differentiated group membership of transnational bodies, are in the end incompatible with the politico-administrative cultures and institutional competencies of the partners involved. In addition, the formalization of transnational institutional capacities would threaten the existing informal and inter-personal networks, perceived as highly functional to meet the multiple challenges in finding flexible and adapted solutions. On the other hand, the given needs and potentialities of cross-border territories in Europe still seem to be less attractive and/or evident than with domestic challenges of regional development. While in recent years, for instance, the creation of new metropolitan regions has led to a significant reshaping of both institutional, structural and procedural settings in many member states – thus developing a new territorial coherence between the administrative and the functional space71 – comparable challenges in the transnational context have not yet been aligned in a significant way. This despite both national and European law allowing in principle for the implementation of a huge variety of new forms of institutional choice. One of the reasons for this can be seen in the higher compliance costs for transnational territorial development, resulting from the high diversity of the still existing legal, inter-administrative and inter-cultural differences in Europe – making domestic-oriented cooperation in the end more attractive than a transnational cross-border approach. As has been shown above, the three neo-institutionalist paradigms represent meaningful independent variables which already allow for the conceptualisation of the different degrees and forms of institutional patterns in cross-border cooperation. Although “heuristically” representing quite different schools of thinking, it must be stressed that from an epistemological point of view they end up constituting complementary rather than alternative concepts, and that also from an analytical point of view, a distinction would ignore the multiple interrelationships that de facto do exist between historical, interest-related and cognitive/social determinants. However, what is less developed in the literature so far are conceptual reflections on the role possible intervening variables may play, e.g. those factors that may help to explain the significance of the respective independent variables itself. If we want to go beyond the somehow unsatisfactory statement that, in terms of institutionalism, both the historical, interest/actors-related and cognitive/sociological factors do matter, the question of why they do matter and what the specific reasons are for this arises automatically. With regard to the conceptual use of neo-institutionalist thinking, territorial cooperation represents an interesting application area for two reasons. Firstly, it constitutes an object-based framework, to which the above three lines of argument are related: the territorial reference-frame of politics, in which institutional arrangements are de facto materializing themselves. Secondly, territorial cooperation itself, as a dependent variable, can only be understood rightly if – with regard to its genesis, structural and procedural functioning and material effectiveness – both the historical, actor-centered and sociological factors are con71

LUDWIG, J., MANDEL, K., SCHWIEGER, CH., TERIZAKIS, G. (ed.), Metropolregionen in Deutschland. 11 Beispiele für Regional Governance, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009.

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sidered as explanatory variables, taking into account their respective interdependency. The related research question here would refer to the functionality of different degrees and arrangements of such territorial institutionalism from the point of the partners involved: what institutional functions are delivered and where can they be situated within the continuum of loosely coupled (interinstitutional and inter-personal) networks in the sense of a “transnational governance” on the one hand72 and more formal, institutionally solidified organizational structures as a “transnational government” on the other.73 The basic reference points of such patterns of European territorial institutionalism are the related territorial cooperation-needs, which are in turn derived from the different thematic and functional tasks of territorial development itself and which can be understood as intervening variables of such forms of institutionalism. Different degrees of cooperative institutionalization, as the related hypothesis would go, can be interpreted as a territorially influenced function. This results from the collective adjustment between different historically evolved and thus still rather persisting national systems (public administration, law, political, economic and social order, characterized by diverging functionalities), the interestrelated interaction between the actors involved (local communities, territorial governments, enterprises, associations, universities, etc., with individual institutional interests), and the cultural and group-related formations (administrative and organizational cultures, norms, leading ideas, mental models, etc., of both the collective and individual actors) which are finally, in turn, impacted/influenced by (interdependent) intervening territorial variables. The set of such variables can be classified according to the following five main territorial characteristics: 1. Geographical location: a very obvious territorial variable is the geographical 74 location of a cross-border region. While most cross-border territories are – at least as seen from their respective national and often even regional capitals – rather more peripheral than central regions, the relevant question is whether this also holds true for the territories on either side of the border. Secondly the natural function of the border plays a decisive role too: mountains, rivers, seas etc. can have either a separating (as it was the case in the past) or a specific integrating function (as it is the case for the European macro-regions and/or the Lake of Constance where the cooperation is largely based on an identification with the respective natural situation) – which in turn is again a different geographical precondition compared to a landscape that is (and always was) characterized by a rather consistent topography with a (a priori) continuously territorial accessibility leading to chance (or the risk) of an integrated utility of 75 space. In addition, as Reitel et al. (2015) pointed out, the different territorial scaling of cross-border regions may also have a significant impact on its functionality. Finally, the given settlement structures of a cross-border territory

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BENZ, A., LÜTZ, S., SCHIMANK, U., SIMONIS, G. (ed.), Handbuch Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder, op.cit. FÜRST, D., “Regional Governance – Was ist neu an dem Ansatz und was bietet er?“, op.cit., p. 89–105. JONES, M., JONES, R., WOODS, M., An introduction to political geography: Space, place and politics. Routledge, London, 2004. REITEL, B., WASSENBERG, B., Territorial Cooperation in Europe. A Historical Perspective, op.cit.

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can be cited as a further variable, varying between rather mono-centric and poly-centric cross-border constellations. 2. Socio-economic situation: cross-border territories may vary with regard to the degree and the dynamics of every-day socio-economic interaction/exchanges of people, goods and services, e.g. number of cross-border commuters, resi76 dents, tourists etc. This constitutes an important pattern which very often determines to what extent cross-border issues are perceived as important/promising, both from the perspective of political actors, and the relevant 77 target groups. Territories marked by a high level of cross-border mobility often have stronger commitments to the cause of cross-border cooperation (and are thus more willing to develop territorial potentialities) than territories where the level of exchange is still rather low, and both needs and potentialities are less evident. This, however, is very often closely linked to the given socio-economic situation which constitutes another variable: whether a crossborder region is economically prosperous/dynamic/wealthy or rather residual/non-dynamic/poor can both be a stimulus or an obstacle for the development of collaborative cross-border cooperation approaches. The same holds true for the given economic structure: diversified vs. mono-structured, industrial-agricultural vs. service-innovation oriented regional economies can both have promoting and hindering functions. From a cross-border perspective, however, the question as to what degree a given socio-economic structure is characterized by infra-territorial disparities between the respective subregions within a given cross-border territory can play a decisive role for the way cross-border cooperation is developed (or not). 3. Practical handling of functional development needs: a third set of territorial variables can be derived from the way territorial actors are perceiving and transforming the functional development needs of a given cross-border terri78 tory. On the one hand, many collaborative cross-border initiatives are mainly characterized by a coordination and/or synchronization of existing domestic policy-approaches across the border rather than by a real cooperation in the true sense of a joint development of new approaches. Whether policy-coordination or cooperation is the predominating pattern has a clear impact on the effectiveness of cross-border policy-designs. In addition, the question of whether cross-border cooperation is mainly perceived as a need of collaborative policy-design or whether the joint implementation of jointly reflected strategies/objectives and the consideration of the respective needs for a related structuration are part of this notion, plays an important role. Also, the very nature of both the form and content of the cooperation has to be considered too: is the primary pattern/approach the development and implementation of single projects (e.g. secondary organization solutions to problems with a defined start and a determined end) or shall the cooperation also cover areas of permanent public tasks, such as cross-border shared-services which require a much more robust engagement and structuring. Finally, a fur76 77 78

HAMMAN, Ph., Les travailleurs frontaliers en Europe, L’Hamattan, Paris, 2006. ZSCHIEDRICH, H. (ed.), Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Grenzregionen. Erwartungen – Bedingungen – Erfahrungen, op.cit. BENZ, A., SCHARPF, F.W., ZINTL, R., Horizontale Politikverflechtung. Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, Campus, Frankfurt, 1992.

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ther variation of impact can be delimited around the dichotomy of sectorial approaches, being led by technical expert-communities vs. integrated approaches, based on the territorial needs and led by generalists – this too will have clear consequences on the way cross-border cooperation manifests itself in a given territory. 4. Policy-typologies and/or policy-mix: a fourth set of variables can be delimited 79 around the very policy-typology in question , practiced within a given crossborder territory. The classical dichotomy here is a distributive versus a redistributive policy-approach. For instance, a financial promotion program like Interreg can be implemented in a very distributive way, e.g. in the form that projects are exclusively developed bottom-up and that for each project a promotion objective can be assigned and thus – if the formal requirements are met – funding can be granted for all project initiatives. Or it can be implemented in a redistributive way, e.g. that projects are selected on the basis of calls, consistently aligned with the strategic objectives defined. However, ac80 cording to a more classical understanding of policy-analysis the distinction between a distributive vs. redistributive policy is based on the functional character of a thematic policy for the respective target-groups/populations/territories concerned. If the impact of a certain policy is benefitting all target groups in a defined area, it is distributive (win-win-constellation). If, however, only one part of the target group is benefitting and other groups are disadvantaged and/or even must cover additional (direct or indirect) costs, the policy is re-distributive. A third policy-typology is regulative policy, which sets a binding normative frame for the entire target group (e.g. joint standards). Finally, a fourth policy-type can be identified as constituent, where institutions and/or organizational structures are built up to either handle collective issues or provide services for a given population and all have to participate in financing it (either in the form of financial contributions directly associated with a specific service consumed, or in the form of a global contribution with an unspecific assignment to concrete services, e.g. local taxes for public goods. The interesting issue here is that within the context of a given cross-border territory, the respective population usually is composed of target-groups living in sub-territories which belong to different jurisdictions. Accordingly, policy-fields that in a domestic context are usually conceived as distributive (e.g. economic promotion programs) can become re-distributive in nature if dissimilar benefits are likely to occur on both sides of the border. Also, the negative impacts of redistributive policies (such as environmental or natural protection, for instance) may be asymmetrical i.e. unilaterally in a cross-border perspective, while regulatory policy-approaches would – in theory – per definition require a unique jurisdiction (if the approach is intended to go beyond a voluntary and thus usually less effective approach) – which de facto does not exist in a cross-border constellation. It is thus evident that the policy-character of the thematic approaches developed and implemented in the context of cross-border cooperation plays a decisive role for its effective79 80

PARSONS, W., Public Policy – An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1995. BLUM, S., SCHUBERT, K., Politikfeldanalyse. Lehrbuchreihe: Elemente der Politik, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2009.

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ness and efficiency in meeting joint policy-challenges, problems, and for the 81 way institutional settings are designed respectively. The extent to which “package solutions” – in the domestic context often developed to maximize benefits and compensate deficits of single policy-approaches – are feasible at all in a cross-border context, constitutes yet another relevant determining territorial factor for the practical configuration of cross-border cooperation. 5. Culture: the last set of variables refers to the role culture plays in cross-border 82 cooperation. It is evident that the great variety of politico-administrative systems and cultures in Europe play an important role for the functional design of cross-border constellations. Kuhlmann/Wollmann for instance cluster five different basic types of administrative systems in Europe: the Continental European – Napoleonic country group (France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal), the Continental European federal country group (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), the Scandinavian country group (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland), the Anglo-Saxon country group (Great Britain, Malta, Ireland), and the Eastern European country group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania). In addition to the challenge of inter-systemic cooperation (differences between politico-administrative systems and cultures that meet at the border need to be overcome via functional equivalents) there are the classical challenges of inter-cultural communication (differences of values, formal and informal rules/norms and traditions of society leading to stereotypes), influencing the interaction between actors across borders. Both factors are evi83 dently impacting the way cross-border cooperation functions. In addition, historical experiences (conflicting/-non-conflicting constellations of the past) evidently also play an important role, as they often still shape the perception 84 (collective memory) and often even still motivate cross-border cooperation. Another quite important factor in this regard are the impacts of choices, patterns and shared experiences from the past, collected while doing cross-border cooperation with “the neighbor”: this often leads to non-functional stereotypes (for instance, a mindset based on “this never works with the Germans”, “the French will not accept this”, “the Poles prefer it this way…”) that can impact the specific pattern of cross-border cooperation in a given territory; however, again strongly differentiated by variable territorial contexts (e.g. West vs. Eastern Germany; Grand-Est vs. PACA; North vs. Southern Italy; Germanic vs. Romanic Switzerland …). Finally, and on the other hand, a long-lasting practice of cross-border cooperation, as is the case in Western European border regions, may lead to a distinct pattern which itself indeed can be inter85 preted as a distinctive culture of transnational cooperation. Such transna81 82 83 84 85

BECK, J., Netzwerke in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik. Rahmenbedingungen, Funk-tionsweise, Folgen, op.cit. EURO-INSTITUT (ed.) Interkultureller Leitfaden zur Moderation grenzüberschreitender Sitzungen, Nomos, Baden-Baden: 2007. EISENBERG, E., “Learning from cultural experiences and interactions: Cross-border administrative cultures”, in: Thedieck, F. (ed.) Foundations of Administrative Culture in Europe, op.cit., p. 183–193. WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Vivre et penser la cooperation transfrontalière (Volume 4): les régions frontalières sensibles, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011. BECK, J., LARAT, F. (ed.), Transnationale Verwaltungskulturen in Europa. Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven / Les cultures administrative transnationales en Europe. Etat des lieux et perspectives, Nomos, Zürich, Baden-Baden, 2015, p. 161.

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tional administrative culture can in turn, be used to explain a certain pathdependency of cross-border policy-making in a given territory. These territorial factors impact as (interrelated) intervening variables the independent variables covered by the classical understanding of neo-institutionalism. In this they can, for instance, explain the types of actors involved in cross-border cooperation (primarily public or economic and/or societal?), the specific interests and strategies they are following, but also the (diverging) institutional preferences that predominate within a set of given cross-border actors. Additionally, such territorial factors also impact the sociological pattern of cross-border cooperation: what types of networks exist (open/closed), what the main conceptual orientation of actors/within networks is, what patterns/forms/preferences of institutional change do exist and to what extent do they represent joint (or diverging) cognitive/thematic identifications, constitute epistemic-communities86 and/or cultural adherence? The relative importance of historical institutionalism can be impacted by these territorial factors as well: to what extent can a structural persistence and/or a specific path-dependency within a cross-border constellation be explained by the compatibility/incompatibility of institutional structures and/or the administrative cultures of the partners involved, by (negative or positive) past experiences, by joint traditions and patterns of cooperation that have (or have not yet) been developed over time and do represent a common understanding of “good practice” etc. ? The following chart illustrates the conceptual framing of such intervening variables with regard to the configuration of patterns of cross-border cooperation in the context of “territorial institutionalism”:

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HAAS, P.M., “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, Winter 1992, p. 1–35.

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IV. Perspectives of “Territorial Institutionalism” for future interdisziplinary research in the fields of cross-border-cooperation, EAS and IPA The concept of territorial institutionalism as outlined above has different promising potentialities in stimulating further research on transnational interadministrative constellations. Firstly, it can contribute to better connectivity in the growing research on cross-border cooperation with already well-established empirical findings, theories and research-concepts in the field of the European Administrative Space/EAS, but also – and thus interlining it to in a much broader perspective – to more recent scholar work in the area of International Public Administration/IPA.87 As shown in chapter 2 of this contribution, it can be useful to base the analysis of cross-border cooperation patterns on conceptual categories developed for the EAS. IPA literature, in turn, can stimulate a further theoretical founding of cross-border cooperation by providing evidence on transnational constellations, generated by the empirical testing of (interdisciplinary) theoretical concepts in the field of international administrative cooperation and supra-national institution-building – thus opening a promising comparative perspective which can further guide the (“middle-range”) theory-building in the area of cross-border cooperation. On the other hand (and maybe even more evident), by drawing on the example of European territorial cooperation and focusing on the specific case of crossborder cooperation, the above analysis has also illustrated the productivity of a reflection of cross-border cooperation being a horizontal dimension of the EAS. The importance of this specific type of region for the further process of European integration is not only limited to the hinge function between diverging politicoadministrative systems but materializes itself also in its socioeconomic and territorial potential: many border-regions in Europe, studied under a 360° perspective and with regard to indicators such as population, economic productivity or R&D, possess a capacity comparable with small or medium-large Member States. The functioning of transnational cooperation – and directly linked to this, the role inter-institutional arrangements are playing –should thus not be neglected when referring to the notion of the European administrative space. Such a research approach can indeed be a promising perspective for further discussion on the EAS itself, characterized by an increasing horizontal differentiation and networking of administrative functions.88 A similar potential of cross-border cooperation can be assumed in IPAs’ case. Moreover, a horizontal understanding of both the EAS and IPAs must not only be limited to the case of territorial cooperation as outlined above – which itself can be improved by a better flexibility of the existing legal and administrative

87 88

TRONDAL, J., PETERS, G.B., “A conceptual account of the European Administrative Space” in: BAUER, M.W., TRONDAL, J. (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System, op.cit., p. 79–92. MARIN, B., MAYNTZ, R., Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Campus, Frankfurt a. M., 1990.

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framework-conditions and the principle of mutual recognition89 in order to reduce the additional burden any transnational interaction still is facing. Territorial cooperation is just one of many, as of yet still not properly analyzed horizontal and “unsettled”90 dimensions of the EAS and IPAs: direct intergovernmental and inter-ministerial cooperation, intergovernmental commissions, multilateral cooperation in the area of policy and justice etc., can constitute interesting fields for further research on the complementary “horizontal” dimension of the EAS and IPAs too. In addition, such a horizontal understanding could also give more attention to the interaction between the European administrative system and its economic and societal environments. Most governance-concepts highlight the functional importance of such horizontal interaction as part of modern concepts of public policy-making.91 Although of a very practical importance both in Brussels (see for instance the smarter regulation approach) and in modern approaches of territorial cooperation, such thinking is still not yet integrated into the notion of the EAS or the conceptual reflection of the European administrative system. Finally, and especially in a context where the classical “Westphalian” equivalence between territory, power and people seems to be more and more resolved as part of an ever growing process of ‘globalization’,92 such a horizontal understanding of territorial institutionalism can help to better capture the kind of new functional equivalences that are emerging or already govern the unsettled horizontal interadministrative planes in a border-crossing dimension. Many cross-border territories are experimenting with new forms of collaboration, intending to go one step further and increase the liability and effectiveness of cross-border cooperation. Attempts of a more classical institution-building (which in principle is possible) in the cross-border context are often criticized for the danger of creating new borders: A Eurodistrict with a distinct legal and functional profile de facto creates a new “transnational” territorial unit and thus separates itself from both the politico-administrative and legal environment of its constituent jurisdictions. A debordering option, which is the right option from the perspective of the crossborder territory, thus leads to a re-bordering effect. The resolution of this paradox – which per consequence mostly leads to a rather symbolic than functional cross-border institution-building – is highly blurred. However, in most cases, related reflections could be rationalized by a better consideration of territorial realities which in the above conception of “territorial institutionalism” are classified as intervening variables. Combined with a pragmatic reflection on how far a notion of “horizontal subsidiarity”93 can be developed in the reality of crossborder policy-making, and based on the notion of “cross-border de-minimis ru-

89 90 91 92 93

BECK, J., “Cross-border cooperation and the European Administrative Space – Prospects from the principle of mutual recognition”, International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2015, p. 9–36. TRONDAL, J., “Advances to the study of international public administration”, Journal of European Public Policy, 23, 2016, p. 1097–1108. MAYNTZ, B., “Governance-Theorie: Erkenntnisinteresse und offene Fragen“, in: GRANDE, E., MAY, S. (ed.), Perspektiven der Governance-Forschung, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009, p. 9–19. AMILHAT SZARY, A.-L., Qu’est-ce qu’une frontière aujourd’hui?, PUF, Paris, 2015. BECK, J., “Prospects of Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe: Capacity-Building and the Operating Principle of Horizontal Subsidiarity”, International Public Administration Review, Volume 6, March 2013, p. 7–24.

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les”94, the concept of “territorial institutionalism” can finally also become an object of “applied research” – giving practitioners meaningful criteria and guidance on how a given cross-border constellation can be further developed in a sustainable way, allowing for a further functional de-bordering without falling into the trap of structural re-bordering.

INSTITUTIONNALISME TERRITORIAL ET L’ESPACE ADMINISTRATIF EUROPÉEN : UN CADRE CONCEPTUEL POUR APPRÉHENDER LES DYNAMIQUES INSTITUTIONNELLES DE COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE Au cours de l'intégration européenne, les interactions entre les différents niveaux d’action administrative se sont intensifiées. Ainsi, le concept d'espace administratif européen a suscité de plus en plus d’intérêt aussi bien pour la communauté scientifique que pour les professionnels de l’administration. Au-delà de la perspective traditionnelle, verticale et pluri-niveaux, cette contribution propose de comprendre les modèles institutionnels qui se sont développés dans le cadre de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe comme une dimension horizontale supplémentaire de l’espace administratif européen. Sur la base du concept heuristique d’un « institutionnalisme territorial », cet article montre comment l'approche néo-institutionnaliste peut être utilisée, de façon féconde, comme cadre conceptuel pour une recherche de modèles institutionnels de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe.

TERRITORIALER INSTITUTIONALISMUS UND DER EUROPÄISCHE VERWALTUNGSRAUM: EIN KONZEPTIONELLER RAHMEN ZUR ERFASSUNG DER INSTITUTIONELLEN DYNAMIKEN GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDER ZUSAMMENARBEIT Als Folge der Europäischen Integration haben sich im Laufe der Jahre die Interaktionen zwischen unterschiedlichen administrativen Handlungsebenen intensiviert. Entsprechend hat das Konzept des Europäischen Verwaltungsraumes sowohl auf wissenschaftlicher Ebene als bei Praktikern zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit gefunden. Der vorliegende Beitrag schlägt vor, institutionelle Muster, die sich im Rahmen der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa entwickelt haben, jenseits der klassischen vertikalen Mehr-Ebenen-Perspektive als eine komplementäre horizontale Dimension des Europäischen Verwaltungsraumes zu verstehen. Auf Basis des heuristischen Konzepts eines „Territorialen Institutionalismus“ zeigt der Beitrag, wie neo-institutionalistische Ansätze gewinnbringend 94

BECK, J., “Cross-border cooperation and the European Administrative Space – Prospects from the principle of mutual recognition”,.op.cit., p. 9–36.

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als konzeptioneller Rahmen zur Erforschung institutioneller Muster der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa genutzt werden können.

BUILDING CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE IN THE CHANNEL/ LA MANCHE REGION: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES CHRISTOPHER HUGGINS Since the 1990s, the foreign policy of sub-national government has been increasingly recognized. Often referred to as ‘paradiplomacy’1, these activities challenge the traditional perception that foreign policy is the sole preserve of nation states. This is particularly the case in Europe, where the multi-level nature of the European Union (EU) is seen to facilitate the active engagement of sub-national actors beyond their local boundaries. Cross-border co-operation represents one form of this paradiplomacy. While commonly regarded as a phenomenon developing from the mid-1980s, sub-national governments’ engagement beyond their administrative borders, and in particular cross-border co-operation, has a long tradition. Early examples of cross-border co-operation include various initiatives in the Upper Rhine Valley area.2 However, cross-border co-operation is now a feature of contemporary European governance and can be observed in all EU border regions.3 Cross-border co-operation and indeed wider transnational links between subnational government have been actively encouraged by the Council of Europe since the 1980s4, and the institution has adopted a number of declarations supporting the activity.5 However, due to the nature of this activity, which crosses national borders, sub-national authorities engaging in cross-border co-operation face a number of legal and administrative barriers; what the Mission opérationnelle 1 2

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Aaldecoa, F., KEATING, M., (ed.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Field Relations of Subnational Governments, Frank Cass, London, 1999. HANSEN, N., “Regional Transboundary Cooperation Efforts in Centralist States: Conflicts and Responses in France and Mexico”, The Journal of Federalism, n° 14, 1984; KOCH, S. J., “Toward a Europe of Regions: Transnational Political Activities in Alsace”, The Journal of Federalism, n° 4, 1974. PERKMANN, M., “Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders”, Regional Studies, n° 33, 1999; PERKMANN, M., “Cross-Border Regions in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross-Border Co-operation”, European Urban and Regional Studies, n° 10, 2003; WASSENEBRG, B., REITEL, B., Territorial Cooperation in Europe: A Historical Perspective, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxemburg, 2015. MURPHY, A., “Emerging Regional Linkages within the European Community: Challenging the Dominance of the State”, Tijschrift voor Economische em Sociale Geografie, n° 84, 1993, p. 11; SODUPE, K., “The European Union and Inter-Regional Co-operation”, in: ALDECOA, F., KEATING, M. (ed.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Field Relations of Subnational Governments, op.cit., 1999. Council of Europe, European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities, 1980, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/ 106.htm (2.3.2015); Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities, 1995, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/159.htm (2.3.2015); Council of Europe, Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities Concerning Interterritorial Cooperation, 1998, http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/169.htm (2.3.2015).

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transfrontalière (MOOT) describes as an inherent ‘frontier effect’.6 Indeed, early co-operation initiatives operated outside of legal frameworks and usually lacked formal recognition.7 Nevertheless, to underline its importance in the processes of European integration and governance, in 2006 cross-border co-operation was given a legal basis following the EU’s adoption of the European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) instrument. This chapter discusses one such case of cross-border co-operation: the English Channel region (‘la Manche’ in French). It charts the development of cross-border co-operation in this area and investigates attempts to build a form of cross-border governance in a region characterized by fundamental differences across national boundaries. Because of these differences, and the development of cross-border co-operation despite them, this region represents an interesting case. This chapter shows that cross-border co-operation has flourished where sub-national authorities have been able to capitalize on opportunities to address functional policy challenges. However, there are limits. The development of cross-border cooperation has been far from smooth, and prospects for collaboration are small when policy issues become embroiled in ‘high politics’ at the national level. The chapter starts by briefly discussing and English Channel region and the inherent challenges faced by sub-national authorities seeking to co-operate across this national and geographical frontier. It then charts the development of crossborder co-operation in this region during the 1990s before offering a reflection on the stability of this co-operation over time. Attention is then turned to two recent cases of cross-border co-operation as examples of an attempt to build crossborder governance. The case of migration is then highlighted as an illustration of the limits to cross-border co-operation. The chapter concludes by highlighting three themes from the English Channel case: firstly cross-border co-operation as predominantly bottom–up venture, secondly it is functional and pragmatic response to perceived transnational policy challenges and opportunities, and thirdly cross-border co-operation can only succeed where there is scope of sub-national authorities to lead it themselves.

I. Challenges to cross-border co-operation in the English Channel Region The completion of the Single European Market in the 1990s was heralded as a decline in the significance of national borders within the EU. Nevertheless, across the English Channel at least, very real barriers continued to exist. Unlike many other border regions in Europe, England and France do not share a land border. With 33 kilometres at its shortest distance between the two countries, the English Channel itself represents a fundamental geographical barrier, as well as a national one.8 This, along with the non-adoption of the Schengen Agreement by the 6 7 8

Practical Guide to Transfrontier Co-operation, Council of Europe editions, Strasbourg, 2006. ERCOLE, E., WALTERS, M., GOLDSMITH, M., “Cities, Networks, Euregions and European Offices”, in; GOLDSMITH, M., KLAUSEN, K. K. (ed.), European Integration and Local Government, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1997. HEDDEBAUT, O., “The Binational Cities of Dover and Calais and their Region”, GeoJournal, n° 55, 2001, p. 61–62.

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United Kingdom (UK) government, means cross-border travel is far from hassle free. Features which might be observed in some other European cross-border regions, such as cross-border commuting, are therefore significantly less prominent. The construction of the Channel Tunnel in the early 1990s is often cited as evidence that the geographical element of the frontier has been overcome. Indeed Kent County Council and the Conseil Régional du Nord-Pas de Calais were able to argue that the tunnel constituted a land border and thus secured their eligibility in early Interreg funding programmes.9 However, economic reality means regional transport links across the border have actually reduced since the tunnel’s operation began, as competition between ferry companies and Eurostar and Eurotunnel have concentrated cross-border transport links between Dover and Calais.10 Furthermore the tunnel and associated transport infrastructure has led to a ‘corridor effect’; while economic benefits are felt in national capitals, the transport links bypass Kent and the Pas de Calais, increasing the economic peripherality of Channel coastal regions.11 At the regional level at least, the Channel Tunnel seems to have exacerbated the geographical barriers presented by the English Channel and reaffirmed the status of the southern English and northern French coasts as peripheral border regions. Challenges to co-operation are exacerbated by the fact that sub-national authorities on either side of the English Channel operate under different constitutional systems. While both English and French sub-national government operate in centralized and unitary systems, and are subject to the same broad processes involved in the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ and Europeanization,12 a number of fundamental differences remain with their inter-governmental relations with the central state, policy competences, bureaucratic culture and of course language. As noted by Sparke, cross-border co-operation “developed in the context of a highly uneven and divided social, political, and economic geography, marked by a long history of disconnection and division … Thus, the initial plans for cross-channel cooperation were made by very different areas with contrasting regional identities, policy-making environments, and economies”.13 Despite this challenging context, however, cross-border co-operation has taken place and indeed continues to this day. This chapter now summarizes how this developed through the 1990s.

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BARBER, St., “International, Local and Regional Government Alliances”, Public Money and Management, n° 17, 1997, p. 20; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Cross-Border Co-operation, Institutionalization and Political Space across the English Channel”, Regional Studies, n° 33: 1999, p. 646. HEDDEBAUT, O., “The Binational Cities of Dover and Calais and their Region”, op.cit., p. 61. Ibid., 10 p. 62; SPARKE, M., “‘Chunnel Visions’: Unpacking the Anticipatory Geographies of an Anglo–European Borderland”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, n° 15, 2000, p. 198; VICKERMAN, R., “Kent in the Euroregion: Are There New Trends in Economic Development?”, Hommes et Terres du Nord, n° 3, 1998. COLE, A., JOHN, P., Local Governance in England and France, Routledge, London, 2001; JOHN, P., Local Governance in Western Europe, Sage Publications, London, 2001. SPARKE, M., “‘Chunnel Visions’: Unpacking the Anticipatory Geographies of an Anglo– European Borderland”, op.cit.

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II. Background to cross-border co-operation in the Channel: the 1990S Contemporary cross-border co-operation in the English Channel region has not occurred in isolation, but rather builds upon a number of civic town twinning links developed in the post-war period. Furthermore, despite the economic and geographic challenges outlined above, Buléon and Shurmer-Smith argue that the regions along the Channel coast have a sense of “shared history” which could be used as the basis for developing cross-border co-operation.14 Initial cross-border co-operation took the form of bilateral links between English county councils and French regional councils. Examples of these early links include those between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais in 1987, between Hampshire and Basse-Normandie in 1989, and between East Sussex and Haute-Normandie in 1993. By the mid-1990s there were 11 such bilateral links in place between subnational authorities on either side of the English Channel (see Figure 1).15 Such cases of co-operation went beyond the traditional civic and cultural nature of the traditional twinning links which had been developed earlier.

14 15

BULÉON, P., SHURMER-SMITH, L. (ed.), Espace Manche: Un Monde en Europe / Channel Spaces: A World Within Europe, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, Caen, 2008. POUSSARD, A., La Coopération Interrégional dans la Zone Transmanche, non-dated. http://atlastransmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/en/page-48.html (2.3.2015); POUSSARD, A. Les Années 1980–90: L’Augmentation de Accords de Coopération Transmanche, non-dated, http://atlastransmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/en/page-47.html (2.3.2015).

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Figure 1: Co-operation accords signed between sub-national authorities along the English Channel16

Source cross-channel atlas

As the number of these bilateral links grew, a number of initiatives took place to deepen and institutionalize this emerging cross-border co-operation. In many cases partnership agreements and accords were signed between the partners, focusing co-operation in particular policy areas. Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais’s agreement went further, establishing regular meetings and joint committees between the two authorities.17 Further intensification of cross-border co-operation took place following the creation of the Transmanche Euroregion. This built upon the early Kent–NordPas de Calais link (although it did not replace it), and also saw the involvement of the Belgian regions of Brussels-Capital, Flanders and Wallonia. Again, institutionalization was taking place; there were formal meetings as well as a secretariat based in Brussels to manage the network and its activities, financed by mem-

16 17

Source : Cross Channel Atlas. BARBER, St, “International, Local and Regional Government Alliances”, op.cit., p. 20

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bership fees paid by the authorities involved.18 Another example of multilateral cross-border co-operation was the creation of the Arc Manche network, led under the initiative of West Sussex and Haute Normandie. This was founded in 1996 and, covering all the upper-tier authorities along the Channel coast (although Cornwall and Devon only had ‘observer’ status), had a much wider geographical remit compared to the Transmanche Euroregion.19 Cross-border co-operation in the English Channel was thus moving from a bilateral enterprise to a multilateral one, involving several partners. The examples identified so far all refer to co-operation between ‘upper-tier’ sub-national authorities (those which represent the closest level of elected government next to the state). However, it is important to recognize that crossborder co-operation was also taking place at the urban level with the development of the Transmanche Metropole. This involved the local authorities of Caen, Le Havre and Rouen in France, and Southampton, Portsmouth, Bournemouth and Poole in England.20 The examples of the Transmanche Euroregion and the Arc Manche in particular illustrate how the initiatives of bilateral co-operation (between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais and West Sussex and Haute Normandie respectively) evolved into wider multilateral cross-border co-operation. This trend led Church and Reid writing towards the end of the 1990s to speculate about the creation of a transnational institutionalized political space in the English Channel region.21 This leads to questions about the governance of the English Channel as a crossborder region and the stability of these arrangements; questions which will be explored further below. Another significant development during the 1990s was the creation, and subsequent expansion, of the EU’s Interreg programme, and in particular the ‘A’ strand dedicated to cross-border co-operation. This was initially focused between Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, but the eligibility area gradually expanded to include the entirety of the English Channel. Interreg led to a range of shorter, timelimited cross-border co-operation initiatives in the form of transnational projects. The initial Interreg I programme between Kent and Nord-Pad de Calais, for example, led to 68 projects, most of which involved sub-national authorities on both sides of the English Channel.22 Indeed, lobbying for Interreg eligibility was a key objective of many of the bilateral and multilateral cross-border networks developed during the 1990s. 18

19 20 21 22

Ibid..; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Transfrontier Co-operation, Spatial Development Strategies and the Emergence of a New Scale of Regulation: The Anglo–French Border”, Regional Studies, 29, 1995; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Urban Power, International Networks and Competition: The Example of Cross-Border Cooperation”, Urban Studies, 33, 1996; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “CrossBorder Co-operation, Institutionalization and Political Space across the English Channel”, Regional Studies, 33, 1999; THOMAS, P., “Images and Economic Development in the CrossChannel Euroregion”, Geography, 91, 2006. CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Cross-Border Co-operation, Institutionalization and Political Space across the English Channel”, op.cit.; THOMAS, P., “Images and Economic Development in the Cross-Channel Euroregion”, op.cit. CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Transfrontier Co-operation, Spatial Development Strategies and the Emergence of a New Scale of Regulation: The Anglo–French Border”, op.cit., p. 202–203. CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Cross-Border Co-operation, Institutionalization and Political Space across the English Channel”, op.cit.. BARBER, St, “International, Local and Regional Government Alliances”, op.cit., p. 21.

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While it is often assumed Interreg is the driving force behind cross-border cooperation in the English Channel region,23 it is worth highlighting that many of the cross-border links outlined above are bottom–up ventures, and often pre-date eligibility under the Interreg programmes. The development of cross-border cooperation in the English Channel thus represents a mix of largely bottom–up initiatives by the sub-national authorities involved, while also partly facilitated by the top–down instruments of EU regional policy.

III. Reflecting on the stability of cross-border co-operation during the 1990S and 2000S The above overview shows that cross-border co-operation in the English Channel region emerged from the late 1980s and continued to develop throughout the 1990s. This co-operation became increasingly institutionalized throughout this period as cross-border networks grew and developed administrative structures to manage themselves. Eligibility in Interreg has also facilitated cross-border cooperation to some extent. However, a closer inspection reveals that throughout the 1990s and beyond, the ‘institutions’ of cross-border co-operation and the networks developed between sub-national authorities have not remained stable. This point is illustrated by the fact that two of the examples outlined above did not exist (at least in their institutional form) far beyond the 1990s. Regarding the Transmanche Euroregion, this had been effectively dormant since 2003 as members gradually disengaged from the network, before being completely disbanded in 2004.24 Regarding the Transmanche Metropole, even during the 1990s Church and Reid identified that it had been operating “in a low key manner” since it was unable to secure eligibility under the Interreg II programme25, and this network was also disbanded. The Arc Manche network, however, best exemplifies the lack of institutional stability in cross-border co-operation the English Channel region. Following the establishment of the network in 1996, the partners’ engagement quickly died down. A renewed declaration was signed in 200326, but co-operation became less active again. Indeed, as an indicator of this much of the Arc Manche’s website has not been updated since 201027. Nevertheless there appears to be a renewed interest in collaboration. During 2012 and 2013, just as as the 2014–2020 EU regional policy programmes were being developed, politicians from Arc Manche 23

24 25 26 27

CHURCH, A., Cohesion, Competition and Contradiction: INTERREG and Franco–British Cross Border Co-operation, 2007. http://recercat.net/bitstreeam/handle/ 2072/204066/Num.% 2015.pdf?sequence=1(2.3.2015); CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Transfrontier Co-operation, Spatial Development Strategies and the Emergence of a New Scale of Regulation: The Anglo–French Border”, op.cit.; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Urban Power, International Networks and Competition: The Example of Cross-Border Cooperation”, op.cit.; REES, N., “Inter-Regional Cooperation in the EU and Beyond”, European Planning Studies, 5, 1997. THOMAS, P., “Images and Economic Development in the Cross-Channel Euroregion”, Geography, 91 (1), p. 14;. Kent County Council, International Affairs Group Update, 2010, http://democracy.kent.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=158&MID=2994 (2.3.2015). CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Cross-Border Co-Operation, Institutionalization and Political Space across the English Channel”, Regional Studies Journal, n° 33, 1999, p. 649. Arc Manche, Arc Manche Declaration, 2003, retrieved through personal communication. http://arcmanche.com/en/ (2.6.2016).

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authorities were again beginning to meet together during regular cross-Channel forums. This shows that cross-border co-operation is far from stable. Once crossborder institutions are set up, future participation is not guaranteed and very much depends on the active engagement of the various partners, who will engage, then disengage, then later re-engage again. This cycle of engagement, disengagement and then re-engagement can be explained by the strategic approach sub-national authorities took to taking advantage of the opportunities offered by cross-border co-operation. While the Arc Manche sought to offer a number of benefits, the sub-national authorities involved were most interested in its potential to influence the allocation of EU structural and investment funds and the design on cohesion policy programmes in the English Channel region, especially Interreg. It is no coincidence, therefore, that periods of re-engagement with the network broadly match periods of time when EU regional policy programmes were under development. Another trend witnessed through the latter half of the 1990s and into the 2000s is where wider inter-regional and transnational links were emphasized over cross-border ones. On the one hand is a move to pursue wider transnational bilateral links, and not to simply confine them to cross-border neighbours. This has led sub-national authorities in the English Channel region to pursue bilateral agreements with localities in eastern and central Europe. For example, Kent has partnered with the Hungarian county of Bács-Kiskun, while Bretagne has developed a link with Wielkopolska in Poland. More ambitious global links beyond Europe can also be observed; Kent County Council has established a bilateral partnership with the US state of Virginia, for example.28 As a result, the crossborder bilateral links developed from the late 1980s and during the 1990s have become less active as partners’ attention is diverted elsewhere. Again, this shift in attention can be explained by sub-national authorities taking advantage of the opportunities presented to them. For example, there was a perception among the authorities in the English Channel region that as central and eastern European countries became members of the EU, then eligibility for EU regional policy programmes would target these countries, and that if English and French authorities wanted to continue accessing EU funds, collaboration with central and eastern European sub-national government was essential. Another trend during the 2000s saw a move to participate in European-wide multilateral transnational networks, again not necessarily confined to a crossborder remit. Some, such as the Assembly of European Regions, act as large peak associations for local and regional government. The vast majority however represent thematic policy interests. Examples of such networks include the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), Eurocities, the European Regions Research and Innovation network (ERRIN) and the Network of European Regions for a Sustainable and Competitive Tourism (NECSTouR). These networks have become an increasingly prevalent and influential in EU politics due to the relatively open nature of the EU policy process, which provides access opportunities for organized interests, including sub-national government.29 Indeed, al28 29

CASSON, R., DARDANELLI, P., “Local Government Paradiplomacy in the UK: the Case of the Kent–Virginia Project”, Local Government Studies, n° 38, 2012. HEINELT, H., NIEDERHAFNER, St., “Cities and Organized Interest Intermediation in the EU Multi-Level System”, European Urban and Regional Studies, n° 15, 2008.

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most all of the upper-tier sub-national authorities in the English Channel region are members of such networks.30 Again, sub-national authorities are seen to be taking advantage of the opportunities they are presented with. The picture painted during the 1990s and 2000s is one of inconsistency and flux. Attempts to build cross-border co-operation have been made, and at times have been successful. But these examples have not remained stable as subnational authorities engage and disengage over time according to their preferences and taking advantage of opportunities elsewhere. Rather than cross-border institutions providing a basis for stable and continuous co-operation, they provide a flexible option for sub-national authorities who wish to participate in cross-border co-operation, but might not want to commit long-term.

IV. Developing successful cross-border governance: the EMDI and CAMIS projects Despite the seemingly unstable and inconsistent approaches to cross-border cooperation in the English Channel region, a number of functional and transnational policy problems continue to exist. These include maritime safety in the world’s busiest seaway, environmental and coastal erosion issues, the impact of climate change, tourism and the management of fisheries, among many others.31 This transnational policy context cannot be addressed by single sub-national authorities acting alone, and has thus provided the impetus for attempts to build a form of cross-border governance. Two cross-border projects have sought to address this concern: the Espace Manche Development Initiative (EMDI) and Channel Arc Manche Integrated Strategy project (CAMIS). These projects were started under the auspices of the Arc Manche network and secured funding from Interreg programmes. While partly funded by the EU, the role of the Arc Manche in setting up these projects confirms the bottom–up nature of these initiatives. The EMDI project acknowledged the shared policy challenges faced by subnational authorities along the Channel coast. However, it also recognized that existing attempts to build cross-border co-operation, coupled with the several cross-border projects undertaken as part of the Interreg programme, had not been able to provide a stable and coherent response to this policy context. It was also recognized that because of this incoherence, the specificities of the English Channel region were being neglected in national and European decision making.32 The main output from the EMDI project would therefore be an in depth policy analysis of the English Channel region which would serve as a common information tool for all sub-national authorities in the area. Attempts to develop a common ‘cross-Channel atlas’ had been underway since the mid-1990s33, and the EMDI project built on this. This resulted in Buléon and Shurmer-Smith’s pu30 31 32 33

HUGGINS, CH., “Motivations Behind Local Government Transnational Networking”, Regional Insights, n° 4, 2013. Espace Manche Development Initative, A Strategic Vision for the Channel Area, 2006, http://www.emdi.certic.unicaen.fr/en/documents/strategic_vision.html (2.3.2015). Ibid. BULÉON, P., “Atlas Transmanche / Cross Channel Atlas: Une Collaboration Franco– Britannique née à Caen et à Portsmouth”, Norois, n° 169, 1996.

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blication: Channel Spaces: A World within Europe.34 This was supplemented with an associated website where the data could be, and indeed still is, kept up to date35. The policy analysis and the maps produced as part of this project are significant for two reasons. Firstly, by aggregating data from both England and France and presenting it in a single document or on a single map, the shared nature of policy challenges is highlighted. In effect the English Channel is conceptualized as a single policy area. The policy challenges present in this region are faced by all sub-national authorities along the coast, regardless of which side of the national border they are. Secondly, on many of the maps presented the administrative barrier between England and France (which would normally be clearly demarcated by a line) is absent. In this way the challenges of the English Channel region are presented in largely functional and geographical terms, something which cross-border co-operation could alleviate (see Figures 2 and 3).

34 35

BULÉON, P., SHURMER-SMITH, L. (ed.), Espace Manche: Un Monde en Europe – Channel Spaces: A World Within Europe, op.cit. ; TURBOUT, F., Focusing on the Channel: Collection of Maps, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, Caen, 2013. http://atlas-transmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/(2.6.2016).

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Figures 2 and 3: Examples of English Channel conceptualized as a single policy space36

The CAMIS project sought to use the information and analysis gathered as part of the EMDI project as a basis for identifying the key policy challenges in the English Channel region and how they could be addressed through cross-border co-operation. Like some of the initiatives described above, CAMIS sought to structure and institutionalize cross-border co-operation between sub-national authorities (and a range of other actors) in the English Channel region through a number of regular ‘cross-Channel forums’ and strategy development working groups. These initiatives fed into the development of an overall strategic vision for maritime policy in the English Channel. This strategy, along with associated documentation, commits sub-national actors to undertake a joint action plan with specific tasks and measureable outcomes.37 While CAMIS largely focused on producing a strategic vision (itself an attempt to develop some form of cross36 37

Source : Cross Channel Atlas Channel Arc Manche Integration Strategy, Integrated Maritime Strategy for the Channel Region: A Plan for Action, 2013, http://camis.arcmanche.eu/stock/files/user4/13_247_ Camis_doc_ strategie_maritime_UK_BD_1.pdf (2.3.2015).

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border governance) a number of more tangible outcomes have also been realized from co-operation through the project. One such example is the recent Fécamp declaration on maritime safety.38 Both the EMDI and CAMIS projects, therefore, represent a cross-border response to what is perceived as a set of functional cross-border policy problems. By conceptualizing the English Channel as a single policy space and using this as the basis for a common strategy and action plan, a form of cross-border governance is being developed.

V. Limits to cross-border co-operation? The case of migration The gradual, albeit erratic, development of links and networks since the late 1980s, along with examples such as the EMDI and CAMIS projects, illustrate how cross-border co-operation has developed in the English Channel region. However, other examples stress limits to what can be achieved. This is particularly marked with the case of migration. The long-standing presence of migrants based in Calais attempting to reach the UK has been a matter of contention for national and sub-national governments alike. However, the issue has been exacerbated by the recent migration crisis affecting the whole of Europe, which has seen the numbers of migrants based in Calais and attempting to cross the Channel increase. As with many of the policy issues identified by the EMDI and CAMIS projects, migration has a significant impact on the local level, especially so in border regions. It puts pressures on and affects the delivery of local public services and impacts local communities. It also affects local political dynamics. Populist parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) or the Front National (FN) have made strong local electoral gains in southern England and northern France by capitalizing on local voters’ perceptions of immigration. Given the transnational nature of migration as a policy issue, individual sub-national authorities are not able to address the challenges it raises alone. Cross-border cooperation therefore represents one possible solution. However, cross-border co-operation on migration has been virtually nonexistent between sub-national authorities along the English Channel. The main cause of this is that migration has become a security issue for many European states. This ‘securitization’ of migration has meant it has moved from the ‘low politics’ of public service provision, dealt with by sub-national authorities, to the ‘high politics’ of national immigration and security policy, dealt with at the national level. Indeed, the French and British governments’ response to has been to increase security at the border. This has primarily been through the erection of fencing around the port of Calais and the nearby Coquelles rail terminal, and additional resources for policing. Rather than alleviate the presence of the geo-

38

Channel Arc Manche Integration Strategy, Déclaration d’Intention des Collectivités Littorales de la Manche sur les Risques d’Accident et de Pollution Maritime / Declaration of Intent of the English Channel Local and Regional Government Organizations on Shipping Incidents and Maritime Pollution, 2013, http://www.eastsussex.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CAE62676-74B9-4F77-AB12-74 C5270B0717/33317/Item8ChannelShipping.pdf (2.3.2015).

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graphical barriers described above, these measures serve to reinforce the presence of the border across the English Channel. The role of national governments here means that, despite the impact migration has on the local level, sub-national authorities perceive it to be a national policy issue, rather than a local one. This is illustrated in the rhetoric of local political leaders. The mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, for example has blamed the situation on the UK’s immigration policy.39 Meanwhile the leader of Kent County Council, Paul Carter, cites a lack of resources from the UK government as the reason they are unable to adequately address the issue.40 In all cases migration is problematized by sub-national authorities as a national level issue rather than a local one. This leads sub-national authorities to shift responsibility for addressing the challenges of migration to national governments, rather than co-operating with each other.

Conclusions: Functional and pragmatic cross-border co-operation in the English Channel Region This chapter has reviewed the case of cross-border co-operation across the English Channel. As a border region it faces a number of unique challenges; a wide geographical barrier, along with stark differences in working practices, bureaucratic culture, administrative structures and language all exacerbate the frontier effect caused by the national border in this region. Despite these challenges, however, cross-border co-operation has taken place. From the late 1980s and through the 1990s a number of links were developed by sub-national authorities on either side of the border. Over time this co-operation has evolved from simple bilateral relationships to wider multilateral networking. Attempts have also been made to institutionalize this co-operation. The cases of the EMDI and CAMIS projects show that cross-border co-operation has been successful in addressing some of the transnational and functional policy problems presented to sub-national authorities in this region. However, the development of cross-border co-operation has not been a smooth, incremental process. Rather it has been sporadic and marked by instability. This was illustrated with the case of the Arc Manche network. In other cases cross-border co-operation has failed to develop. This was illustrated with the case of the recent migration situation in Calais. Three conclusions can be drawn from this account of cross-border cooperation across the English Channel. Firstly, cross-border co-operation broadly represents a bottom–up venture of sub-national government in the English Channel region. The initial bilateral links were developed directly between subnational authorities. It was these partnerships of sub-national authorities which led to the development of multilateral forms of cross-border co-operation, such as the Transmanche Euroregion or the Arc Manche. While successive Interreg programmes have provided some top–down impetus, many cases of cross39 40

Kent online, Calais mayor Natacha Bouchart tells MPs that migrants see life in UK as easy, 2015, http://www.kentonline.co.uk/kent/news/the-mayor-of-calais-threatens-42877/ (2.3.2015). BBC News, Calais migrant crisis: UK police and social services plead for help, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33722604 (2.3.2015).

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border co-operation pre-date this and most Interreg-funded projects built upon pre-existing cross-border networks. Other than the limited role played by Interreg, top–down drivers for cross-border co-operation appear to be limited. Indeed, part of the rationalization behind the EMDI and CAMIS projects was that the national and European levels have neglected the cross-border issues in the English Channel region, so the sub-national level has had to step in to address them themselves.41 Secondly, cross-border co-operation appears to be framed in rational or pragmatic terms by sub-national actors in the English Channel region. The policy analysis produced during the EMDI project illustrates this by conceptualizing the English Channel as a single policy space with inherent functional policy challenges shared by all sub-national authorities along the coast. The CAMIS project, and associated development of cross-border governance and strategy, is presented as a functional response to this cross-border context. This pragmatic approach seems to account for the fact co-operation has occurred despite the inherent differences between England and France, and indeed the often radically opposing ideologies of the political leaders involved.42 This also accounts for some of the instability witnessed in cross-border co-operation in this region; subnational authorities engage and disengage according to their interests, the opportunities they are presented with and the perceived value cross-border engagement will bring. In this sense the institutions of cross-border co-operation in the English Channel region which have been created since the 1990s do not lock subnational authorities together, but rather provide flexible structures for them to engage, disengage and re-engage with as their priorities, the context in which they are formed, and the opportunities they present dictate. Finally, cross-border co-operation flourishes in areas of functional ‘low politics’, where sub-national authorities are able to lead it, and stalls in areas of ‘high politics’ which are led by national governments. As noted above, this accounts for the inherently bottom–up nature of cross-border co-operation witnessed in the EMDI and CAMIS projects, particularly as cross-border co-operation can address policy problems neglected by other levels of government. This was most marked, however, in the case of migration. Here national governments took the lead. This meant the role of sub-national authorities, and consequently opportunities for bottom–up cross-border co-operation, was constrained. Indeed despite the impact of migration on the local level, sub-national authorities’ involvement has been limited to shifting responsibility for the issue to the national level. Overall, cross-border co-operation represents part of a wider trend of paradiplomacy, and in Europe in particular, has become increasingly prevalent. Subnational authorities in the English Channel region have been part of this process, despite some of the structural challenges they face. Nevertheless, the evidence from this region shows that there are limits. Cross-border co-operation has flourished where sub-national authorities have been able to capitalize on opportunities to address functional policy challenges, but prospects for collaboration are small when policy issues become embroiled in ‘high politics’ at the national level. 41 42

Espace Manche Development Initative, A Strategic Vision for the Channel Area, op.cit. BARBER, St., “International, Local and Regional Government Alliances”, op.cit.; CHURCH, A., REID, P., “Urban Power, International Networks and Competition: The Example of CrossBorder Cooperation”, op.cit.

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Continued cross-border co-operation therefore depends on the sub-national authorities involved. It is their ability to lead and their willingness to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them which ensures the continued success of cross-border co-operation.

CONSTRUIRE UNE GOUVERNANCE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE SUR LA MANCHE / LA RÉGION DE LA MANCHE : SUCCÈS ET ECHECS La construction d’une gouvernance transfrontalière à travers la Manche s’est révélée difficile. Une barrière géographique dense, ainsi que des différences de méthodes de travail, de cultures bureaucratiques, de structures administratives et de langue ont exacerbés « l’effet frontière » dans cette région. Cependant, la coopération transfrontalière y a bien eu lieu. Ce chapitre rend compte des développements de coopérations transfrontalières d’outre-Manche. Ce processus a été marqué de réussites : depuis les années 80 les autorités infranationales ont créé une variété de réseaux transfrontaliers et d’entreprises coopératives. Les arrangements de gouvernance transfrontalière ont été mis en place lorsque les autorités infranationales ont conceptualisé la Manche en tant que politique unique spatiale et ont adopté des stratégies transfrontalières. Cependant, le développement d’une gouvernance transfrontalière dans cette région est loin d’être paisible. Plusieurs des réseaux et des arrangements de gouvernance sont instables du fait que les autorités infranationales s’engagent et se désengagent continuellement selon leurs préférences individuelles, et dans certaines zones de “haute politique” comme la migration, ces autorités de chaque côté de la Manche ont été incapables de développer des solutions transfrontalières.

AUFBAU GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDER GOVERNANCE DES ÄRMELKANALS KANAL/ LA MANCHE REGION: ERFOLG UND MISSERFOLG Der Aufbau grenzüberschreitender Governance auf beiden Seiten des Ärmelkanal ( la Manche) war herausfordernd. Eine breite geographische Barriere, sowie Unterschieden in der Arbeitspraktiken, bürokratischer Kultur, Verwaltungsstrukturen und Sprache, verschärften die „Grenzeffekte“ in dieser Region. Dennoch fand hier grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit statt. Dieses Kapitel zeigt die Entwicklung der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit auf beiden Seiten des Ärmelkanals. Dieser Prozess war erfolgreich. Seit den 1980er Jahren haben nationale Behörden eine Vielzahl von grenzüberschreitenden Netzwerken und Kooperationen aufgebaut. Grenzüberschreitende Verwaltungsvereinbarungen wurden verabschiedet, wie zum Beispiel die Konzeptualisierung des Ärmelka-

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nals als einzelnen politischen Spielraum durch nationale Behörden oder auch die Festlegung grenzüberschreitende Strategien. Aber noch ist die Entwicklung der grenzüberschreitende Governance in dieser Region weit davon entfernt problemlos zu verlaufen. Viele der Netze und Verwaltungsvereinbarungen sind nicht stabil, vor allem da nationale Behörden sich ganz nach ihren individuellen Präferenz verpflichten und wieder entpflichten. Und in einigen Bereichen der „höheren Politik“ wie im Bereich der Migration, waren subnationalen Behörden auf beiden Seiten des Kanals nicht in der Lage sich auf grenzüberschreitende Antworten zu einigen.

ACTOR´S PARTICIPATION IN CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AT THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDER CASE STUDIES FROM THE VIADRINA REGION PETER ULRICH & MARCIN KRZYMUSKI The territorial cooperation within the European Union has sprung up all over Europe in the last 25 years. Political,1 legal2 and financial3 incentives initially by the Council of Europe and subsequently by the European Community (and later the European Union) have facilitated cooperation structures across territorial nation-state borders where once national egoisms and conflicts have been the dominant drivers. Ever since, more than 150 Euroregions4 and 63 European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC)5 have been established. Also at the German-Polish border area that has been classified by some authors as a “postconflict border”6 four Euroregions have been created from 1991–1995 in the heart of the EU-28 after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Besides these euroregional structures further institutions and development strategies have been created by actors on the subnational cross-border context in close consultation and negotiation with the national authorities under guidance of supranational priority-setting and strategic design of EU politics. This frequent and regular coordination and regional management of actors, strategies and development in a transnational context has condensed under the concept of “governance” that in view of the transborder subnational cooperation and the multilevel polity of the EU is la-

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3

4 5 6

The 1994 established Committee of the Regions (CoR) that has a consulting function in the European Union decision-making process, supports the interests of the European regions on the supranational level and supports the cross-border activities of its members. By the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity after the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) the implementing competence has been transferred to the subordinated entities in the case of shared competence of the EU and the nation-states in certain policy realms. Hence, in federal states like Germany a high degree of decision-making authority for local entities has been gained. Moreover, the establishment of a European Single Market and of the Schengen Agreement led to a higher freedom to travel and a circulation of persons, goods, capital and services across borders. The Madrid Outline Convention from the Council of Europe (1980) and the creation of the EU cross-border legal form European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) are some European legal initiatives to foster cross-border governance in Europe. The Joint Initiative INTERREG that has been introduced in 1990 represents the third objective of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and a EU financial instrument for crossborder, transnational and interregional cooperation in Europe. Especially in border regions, in the context of the administration and the implementation of those funds, abundant Euroregions were established in the beginning of the 1990´s. SVENSSON, S., “Forget the Policy Gap: Why local governments really decide to take part in cross-border cooperation initiatives in Europe”, Eurasian Geography and Economics 54/4, 2013, p. 409–422. See Committee of the Regions, List of European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation in Europe – EGTC, 1.7.2016. WASSENBERG, B., EU-GLOCAL-ACT: Cross-border Actors between Europeanization and Glocalization, EU HORIZON 2020 application, 2015, p. 16.

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belled by some authors as “multilevel governance”7 or “cross-border governance”.8 In the debate of the democratization of the EU, scholars and EU representatives have been seeking formats and styles for a “new governance” including civil society actors in governance arrangements. This concept has gained scholarly attention under the term “participatory governance”. Participation of civil society actors is expected to lead to further legitimation and innovation of EU governance. This article is focusing on the Viadrina region that is part of the GermanPolish border area and its participatory governance structures. As the term “Viadrina” is an unclear designation, the geographical scope can be defined according to historical terms as the territory along and/or across the Odra river or in an euroregional-administrative sense as the administrative space of the “Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina”. The main research interests are the governance structures in the Viadrina border region and its participatory potential. For the investigation of actors and governance arrangements the analytical model of Philippe C. Schmitter will be applied and investigated which type of networks of actors are participating in the governance structures of the Viadrina region in the context of cross-border governance institutions. To get an overall view about the historical and cultural links as well as the structural pre-conditions for the (crossborder) participatory governance the development of the Viadrina region in the context of the German-Polish European integration will be scrutinized in the third chapter. Before that the theoretical framework will be highlighted and will be tested in practice in the fourth chapter that focuses in three cross-border governance institutions: The TransOderana EGTC (under construction), the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina and the Frankfurt- Słubice Cooperation Center (Kooperationszentrum).

I. From cross-border governance in the EU multilevel polity to participatory mechanisms The European Union is an international organization constituted on various administrative layers and several administrative spaces of self-regulation.9 EU politics are frequently negotiated in a multilevel polity (local, regional, national, supranational) including various actors (private and public). Especially in the EU Regional Policy the dominant role of the supranational and subnational level becomes clear. This is the arena where national politics have lost their weight. As cross-border institutions are mostly blooming due to EU financial and political incentives they can be considered as effects of the Europeanization process of national administrations. This post-national construct of a strong supranational and subnational layer has been brought into the debate as a “Europe of the Re7 8 9

HOOGHE, L., MARKS, G., “Unravelling the Central State, but how? Types of Multi-Level Governance”, American Political Science Review 97/2, 2003, p. 233–243. KRAMSCH, O., HOOPER, B., Cross-border governance in the European Union Routledge, London, 2004. WOLF, D., “Contextualizing normative standards for legitimate governance beyond the state”, in: JÜRGEN, G., GBIKPI, B. (ed.), Participatory governance. Political and societal implications, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 2002, p. 35–50.

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gions”. The regular negotiation process and interest mediation is often framed as “governance” in this context. This term will be explained hereafter. 1. Governance in a multilevel polity Governance is a wide-spread term that has been used in several partly very divergent ways. Before defining the concept it is first crucial to highlight that governance exists in clear differentiation to the term government.10 As government is a clear top-down direction of action declared by a single legislator mostly in a national context, governance is an open multi-actor network that is mostly organized transnationally. Governance in this regard may be defined as coordination and controlling of political will formation, decision-making and policy implementation that is characterized by an extensive negotiation between a multitude of local, regional, national and sub- and supranational actors, and regulative politics are outsourced to functional differentiated institutions.11 Governance is therefore based on neo-functional and post-national premises which are also elucidated in the multilevel governance approach that assumes the nation-state to delegate “competences which previously belonged to central governments […] upwards, downwards, and sideways”.12 Especially in the EU Regional Policy this multilevel governance structure becomes clear. On a vertical dimension the negotiation, consultation and coordination of priority-setting and resource allocation of the programming period are taking place and on the horizontal subnational level various actors from administrations including the local and regional level, representatives of the private sector, the economic and social interest sector are working on the geographical and strategic priorities for projects and funding that then is negotiated with the supranational and to some extent with the national level. In a cross-border context like in the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC/INTERREG), this horizontal (local, urban, municipal and regional administrations, enterprises, associations, chambers of commerce) and vertical (supranational, national and subnational) dimension are joined by a diagonal dimension (different administrative levels in neighboring countries).13 The question is whether the network-like structure of governance is open towards forms of civil society inclusion and democratic forms of governance, especially in the cross-border context as the geographical proximity may lead to the hypothesis that European integration on a micro-scale and legitimacy of EU politics through civil society participation is more likely to attain on the subnational cross-border level.

10 11 12 13

BENZ, A., DOSE, N., Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2010. ACHTENFUCHS, M., KOHLER-KOCH, B., “Governance in der Europäischen Union“, in: BENZ, A., DOSE, N., Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung, op.cit., p. 69–93. Ibid. MAIER, J., “Rechtliche Hindernisse für die Implementierung des EVTZ-Instruments in die föderale Verfassungsstruktur Österreichs”, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus, Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung, Nomos, Tübingen, Baden-Baden, 2009, p. 455–471.

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156 2. Participation in governance arrangements

Participation in governance arrangements has been brought up by scholars and practitioners in the beginning of the 2000´s while the Commission launched a multi-stakeholder consultation process on “new governance” that should also lead to a further legitimation of EU politics and democratic confidence14 and to bring the “citizens back in”.15 Participation in Governance arrangements is purported to an enhancement of the democratic quality of EU cross-border governance, f.e. regarding the “openness and accessibility, the quality of deliberation taking in within them, their effectiveness [and] their links to the public sphere”,16 legitimation17 of EU politics and innovation18 of legislation processes. The main advantage of participation of civil society actors is the “local knowledge” that is promoted by the participation of citizens and residents so that the actors that are affected by those policies are the ones that are responsible in deliberation and decision-making of these policies. In general, participatory governance can be defined as “regular and guaranteed presence when making binding decisions of representatives of those collectivities that will be affected by the policy adopted”.19 But who are these collectivities especially in a cross-border subnational context and how is it possible to classify them? 3. Who participates? The concept of “Holders” Focusing on the opening of governance arrangements leads to the question who should participate and in which form. Talking about the democratization of governance arrangements the question is if there is some form of a cross-border citizenship or civil society that attends the network-like governance process. First of all, it is important to distinguish the concepts of civil society and citizen(ship). While Citizenship is mostly referred to “state-enforced rights and obligations” civil society is more about a “public sphere of associations and organizations that are engaged in debate and discussion”.20 So if we are looking at the collectivities participating in governance arrangements in the German-Polish border area – precisely in the Viadrina region – we are focusing more on the civil society and its collectivities. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

VIGNON, J., “Preface: The White Paper on EU Governance: An Innovative Initiative?”, in: KOHLER-KOCH, B., LARAT, F. (ed.), European Multi-Level Governance. Contrasting images in national research, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009. ZITTEL, TH., FUCHS, D., Participatory Democracy and Political Participation: Can Participatory Engineering Bring Citizens Back In?, Routledge, London, 2006. HEINELT, H., “Participatory Governance and European Democracy”, in: KOHLER-KOCH, B. (ed.), Debating the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2010, p. 217–233. KOHLER-KOCH, B., QUITTKAT, Ch., De-mystification of participatory democracy. EU-governance and civil society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. BUSSJÄGER, P., GAMPER, A., Demokratische Innovation und Partizipation in der Europaregion, New Academic Press, Wien, 2015. SCHMITTER, PH. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?”, in: JÜRGEN, R., GBIKPI, B. (ed.), Participatory governance. Political and societal implications, op.cit., p. 51–71. JANOSKI, TH., Citizenship and civil society. A framework of rights and obligations in liberal, traditional, and social democratic regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

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In general, the inclusion of a civil society in subnational governance arrangements in a demarcated cross-border territory contributes besides the already mentioned added values to the networked governance also “local knowledge”.21 Regarding the political elements of participatory governance three features of political design will be scrutinized: First, the purpose of the delegation of power to a governance structure; Second, who are the ones participating in it and, third, how decision-making is determined.22 Regarding the second question Schmitter provides a classification of actors participating in governance arrangements and links them with “set of principles” and “identities”. These persons and/or organizations that are invited to join governance structures are framed as “holders” and have certain attributes that qualifies them to take part in the governance process.23 Schmitter differentiates between seven sets of persons or organizations in participatory governance arrangements: First, citizens that are “attached to membership in a national political community”; Second “residents” that address “all those living on a regular basis within a demarcated territory”; Third, experts or guardians who own the already mentioned local knowledge that “is uniquely possessed by persons and organizations with certain forms of information or skills”; Fourth, owner or shareholder “that certifies that the bearer has a property right to some part of the assets that are going to be affected by any change in the allocation of resources or imposition of regulations”; Fifth; beneficiaries-cumvictims or stakeholder that “involve[…] all of those […] that could be materially or even spiritually affected by any given measure”; Sixth, spokespersons or interest holders which represent “any person or organization that demonstrates sufficient awareness about the issue being decided and makes known the desire to participate”; And seventh, representatives or status holders that “include all persons (but usually organizations) that have been recognized by the authorities ultimately responsible for decision and formally accorded the right to represent a designated social, economic or political category”.24 These typologies of actors shall be represented in a broad governance spectrum where a variety of actors are participating.

21

22 23 24

GREVEN, M., “Some Considerations on Participatory Governance”, in: KOHLER-KOCH, B. (ed.), Debating the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, op.cit., p. 233–249; SCHMITTER, PH. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?, op.cit.,, p. 56. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid.

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158 Graphic 1: “Holder” classification by Schmitter25

What is missing in this classification is the cross-border context that on the one hand exhibit a geographical proximity of actors in a cross-border region that on the other hand experience boundaries due to their division into two national public spheres and cultural spaces. Also the diagonal dimension of governance is missing in Schmitter´s analytical model. For the institutional participation in cross-border governance arrangements a classification by Engl may be helpful. She differentiates between (a) the participation of various governmental and administrative levels, (b) the participation of different political institutions of the same governmental and administrative level, (c) the participation of other public bodies and of (d) non-public or civil society actors and finally the (e) institutional consideration of the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the border region as features of participatory governance in institutional cross-border governance.26 As the points (c) and (d) are already covered by Schmitter´s “Holder” concept, they can be ignored. Nonetheless, the points (a), (b) and (c) provide a cross-border euroregional perspective on the participatory governance actors model by Schmitter and shall be taken into account in the empirical analysis. The main sets of actors (holders) are illustrated in graphic 2.

25 26

Source : SCHMITTER, PH. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?, op.cit., p. 51–71 ENGL, A., “Partizipative Governance und Mehrebenen-Governance in grenzüberschreitenden Kontexten: Ausgewählte EVTZ-Beispiele im Vergleich”, in: BUSSJÄGER, P., GAMPER, A., Demokratische Innovation und Partizipation in der Europaregion, New Academic Press, Wien, 2015, p. 130.

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Graphic 2: Groups of Holders participating in cross-border governance institutions27

The theoretical framework provides an overview about both the multilevel and cross-border governance characteristics that are describing networks and interaction of actors in EU cross-border cooperation and the open up (´democratization´) of governance for the civil society. As only few theoretical considerations in the participatory governance literature offer a comprehensive analytical model for the analysis of (civic) actors in cross-border governance processes, the analyses model of Schmitter has been applied. As it has been outlined, participation of the civil society on a subnational level may lead to a higher legitimation of EU governance, to innovation in legislation processes and to a higher transparency of EU politics on subnational level. The authors recognize that a wideranging every-day civic participation is utopic but important decisions on public measures on a subnational (cross-border) level shall include those who are finally affected or benefitting from the issues negotiated. In general, the authors follow the conviction that multilevel cross-border governance shall be built-up on following essential parts: – Comprehensive cross-border governance including as much administrative layers on both sides of the border as possible. – Effective cross-border governance: Identification of policy realms, requirements and tools for the most effective solution of problems in a cross-border context 27

Source : SCHMITTER, PH. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?, op.cit., p. 51–71

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– Open, transparent and participatory approach to multilevel and cross-border governance: Increase of visibility, legitimation and innovative EU governance. The participatory reality of cross-border governance will be scrutinized in chapter four. Before that the next chapter focusses on the pre-conditions that are important for cross-border governance arrangements in the Viadrina region. These pre-conditions comprise the historical, political, legal, institutional and strategic aspects of cross-border governance at the former “post-conflict” German-Polish border.

II. The German-Polish border area: from “Post-Conflict” to governance The discussion of the theoretical framework for this cross-border case study reveals that the study is an actor-centered research approach. Compared to other studies on border regions this treatise inhibits social network analyses but categorizes sets of actors and their relation to each other. In addition to that, also the potential to include civil society actors on a first sight is scrutinized and the actuality of this advantage and its pre-conditions are taken into consideration. Nonetheless, despite the focus on actors, institutions and interpersonal relations, the territorial dimension is not neglected and will be investigated in a spatially demarcated and geographically defined territory. The broader case study encompasses the cross-border territory of the 460 km28 long German-Polish border – in a more narrow sense the Viadrina region. More precisely, the Viadrina region can be spatially defined in a historic-cultural and in an administrative sense. In a historical context, Viados may be the ancient indication for the Odra River and the liminal river zone has been culturally transmitted into recent times as “Viadrina” region.29 In an administrative sense, two institutions along the Odra river have proclaimed that name: The European University Viadrina in the German-Polish border city Frankfurt (Oder) and the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina. The Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina encompasses five districts forming the viovodeship Lubuskie in Poland and the district-free city Frankfurt (Oder) and the districts Märkisch-Oderland and Oder-Spree.30 This administrative approximation to the term “Viadrina region” shall be used as a basis for the geographical definition of the Viadrina region. Before analyzing the specific case studies of the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, the TransOderana EGTC (under construction) and the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation Center (Kooperationszentrum) as some examples of cross-border participatory governance arrangements in the Viadrina region, first, the pre-conditions for participatory governance shall be scrutinized – the historical, legal and political structures in the region. In this regard, some considerations for example on the historical and political context were elaborated in a na28 29 30

Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, Raumordnerische Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum, Berlin, 2012. Stadtarchiv Frankfurt (Oder), Was bedeutet und woher kommt Viadrina als Name der Frankfurter Universität (1805–1811) – Vom Flussnamen zum Schmucknamen für die Universität?, http://www.stadtarchiv-ffo.de/faq/faq_stg/frage_4.htm (2.6.2016). Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, http://www.euroregion-viadrina.de/euroregion-proeuropa-viadrina/ueber-die-euroregion (2.6.2016).

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tional context, therefore the scope of study may be put on the national dimension of German and Polish national context. Nonetheless, the investigation tries to focus on the Viadrina region – zooming in from macro to micro-level (nationstate political and historical context to the impact on the institutions and group of actors in the cross-border Viadrina region).

1. Historical divisions and lines of conflict The history and cultural linkage of today´s German-Polish border territory reveals a troubled past and paths. Some authors have labelled this border region also as “post-conflict” border.31 Especially after the Second World War, new international agreements defined that former East Prussian regions of Silesia, Lubuskie, Pomerania, Warmia and Masuria were now part of the Polish state where a large amount of German population lived at that time.32 The territory has been inhabited by Polish settlers that lived in the “eastern borderland of the Second Republic of Poland”.33 Where once eight million Germans lived, after the new international order four millions Polish inhabitants have settled over the years.34 Despite the fact that the local infrastructure has been empty for years, the slow settlement in the newly established hard border line and “emptied land” between East Germany and Poland has been reterritorialized.35 The Oder-Neisse border at that time recognized by the GDR but still not by the Federal Republic of Germany has developed as a liminal space of newly negotiated territory space of identity. Even though the East German and the Polish political system have been similar in ideology and political system, it has been a thick border line until 1990: “Although East Germany and Poland were ideological partners of the Soviet Union for most of the period between 1945 and 1989, the German- Polish border was characterized as a closed border with little to no cross-border interaction except for a short period of cross-border (labor) mobility in the 1970s. From 1989 onward, the German-Polish border region opened up, creating opportunities for cross-border contacts and interaction”.36 Nevertheless, the Oder-Neisse border has been a “place of remembrance for Germans and Poles”37 with the future task to reconstruct the Odra as European historical-cultural space.38 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

WASSENBERG, B., EU-GLOCAL-ACT: Cross-border Actors between Europeanization and Glocalization, op.cit. p. 16. ŁADYKOWSKA, A., ŁADYKOWSKI, P., “Anthropology of Borders and Frontiers. The Case of the Polish-German Borderland (1945-1980)”, in: LECHEVALIER, A., WIELGOHS, J. (ed.), Borders and border regions in Europe. Changes, challenges and chances, transcript, Bielefeld, 2013, p. 159. Ibid. EBERHARDT, P., Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich (1939-1950), Instytut Zachodni, Poznań, 2010. ŁADYKOWSKA, A., ŁADYKOWSKI, P., “Anthropology of Borders and Frontiers. The Case of the Polish-German Borderland (1945–1980)”, op.cit., p. 166. SZYTNIEWSKI, B., “The Dynamics of Unfamiliarity in the German-Polish Border Region in 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s”, in: LECHEVALIER, A., WIELGOHS, J. (ed.), Borders and border regions in Europe. Changes, challenges and chances, op.cit., p. 183–201. HALICKA, B., “The Oder–Neisse Line as a Place of Remembrance for Germans and Poles”, Journal of Contemporary History 49/1, 2014, p. 75–91. SCHLÖGEL, K., HALICKA, B., Oder-Odra. Blicke auf einen europäischen Strom, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2007.

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2. Germany and Poland in the joint European integration process After tracing the troubled and turbulent times of the today´s border region of Germany and Poland, the first steps of merging both countries into a peaceful environment have been chronologically accompanied by the fall of the Iron Curtain and the division of Europe in West and East. In comparison to the Western German border area where first symbolic and informal cross-border activities have been initiated in the 1950´s, cross-border cooperation measures on the German-Polish border area in a European law context started after 1990. One of the milestones for the peaceful convergence of both nation-states has been the “Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the confirmation of the frontier between them” – in short the German-Polish Border Treaty that has been negotiated between both countries and signed on 14 November 1990.39 The objective of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland was to finally acknowledge the nation-state border along the Oder-Neisse line.40 The treaty that finally recognizes the German-Polish nationstate border regarding international law signifies a turning point in the GermanPolish relations for a peaceful interaction of both countries. This national agreement on the consolidation of a nation-state border has been followed by a German-Polish agreement to make the border more permeable. The “Polish– German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation” – or briefly Treaty of Good Neighbourship (17 June 1991) is a political initial spark and a concrete set of agreements that names various policy fields for cross-border cooperation.41 In a cross-border governance context the most important provisions to mention are the political and economic accession process to the European Community of Poland with German support (Art. 8), the cooperation and partnership of regions, cities, municipalities and other territorial authorities, especially in the border region (Art. 12) and the enhancement of infrastructure of transport connections (Art. 18).42 Poland´s accession to the European Union was accomplished in May 2004. After the entrance into the EU Poland could not benefit from the full potential of the EU Single Market (and the free circulation of goods, persons, capital and services) due to the fact that it unfolded only seven years later. Also in the freedom of travel enabled through the Schengen Agreement (active since December 2007)43 and the currency policy there is a clear asymmetry and asynchronicity regarding the profundity of integration of both countries.

39 40 41 42 43

EBERWEIN, W.-D., ECKER-EHRHARDT, M., Deutschland und Polen – Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft? Die Eliten-Perspektive, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2001, p. 55. MORHARD, B., Das deutsch-polnische Grenzgebiet als Sonderfall europäischer Regionalpolitik. Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung zur Förderung grenzüberschreitender Kooperation im Kontext der EUErweiterungsstrategien im Zeitraum von 1989 bis 1998, Springer, Berlin, 2001. p. 87. Ibid., p. 90. See Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation”, original version in German: “Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit”. MIHUŁKA, K., “Der Oder-Neiße-Komplex – eine symbolische Grenze in den DeutschPolnischen Beziehungen”, Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature 32, 2008, p. 309.

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3. Legal forms for cross-border governance applicable for Polish-German border region The previously mentioned Treaty of Good Neighbourship is linked to the legal conventions of the Council of Europe like for example the “European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities” (1980) and the “European Charter of Local Self Government” (1985).44 The European outline convention from 1980 – often also called Madrid Convention – is classified by some scholars as a simple declaration of intent that has no direct legal effect on cross-border activities45 has caused, nevertheless a fostering and structuring of cross-border cooperation and mushrooming of Euroregions all over Europe.46 At the West German border area this Madrid Convention has served as a basis for some bilateral agreements like the Anholt (1991) or Karlsruhe Agreement (1996) while at the German-Polish border area there doesn´t exist any agreement due to the fact that Poland ratified the Madrid Convention but not the additional protocols that are necessary to build up a bilateral agreement based on the Madrid Convention.47 In addition to the Madrid Convention that may serve as a basis for crossborder governance of mainly public actors another legal instrument appeared on the political stage 2006: The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) a EU legal form dedicated to public institutions that provides the grouping with an own legal personality.48 This implementing provision by the EU had to be transposed in the national legislation. As Germany is a federalist country the EGTC regulation has been implemented in the federal state Brandenburg – where the Viadrina region is situated – and the responsible approval authority for EGTC in Brandenburg has been designated to the Ministry of the Interior whilst in Poland due to the centralistic state organization the regulation was implemented on nation-state level and the approval authority is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Poland. Public entities in the Viadrina region that are interested to build up a cross-border structure of a EGTC need to establish a cross-border agreement (convention and statutes) and to submit it to the respective approval authorities so that the grouping can be registered. The Madrid Convention and the EGTC are some of the legal bases that have been created by European institutions to foster cross-border cooperation. 44 45 46 47

48

MORHARD, B., Das deutsch-polnische Grenzgebiet als Sonderfall europäischer Regionalpolitik. Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung zur Förderung grenzüberschreitender Kooperation im Kontext der EUErweiterungsstrategien im Zeitraum von 1989 bis 1998, op.cit., p. 90. NADALUTTI, E., “Does the ´European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation´ promote Multilevel Governance within the European Union?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 51/ 4, 2013, p. 756–771. EISENDLE, A., Der Europäische Verbund für territoriale Zusammenarbeit (EVTZ): ausgewählte Rechtsfragen zur Verordnung (EG) 1082/2006, Accademia Europea di Bolzano, Bolzano, 2011. BUSSMANN, A., “Zehn Jahre Karlsruher Übereinkommen: Musterabkommen für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland und Polen?”, in: ALBRECHT, E., NOWACKI, K. (ed.), Die grenzüberschreitende Beteiligung der Öffentlichkeit,. Lexxion, Berlin, 2006, p. 219–232. JÓSKOWIAK, K., “Die Entwicklung der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit nationaler Hoheitsträger aus rechtshistorischer Perspektive”, in: KRZYMUSKI, M., KUBICKI, PH., ULRICH, P. (ed.), Der EVTZ als Instrument der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit nationaler öffentlicher Einrichtungen in der Europäischen Union, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2016.

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Besides the EGTC the public institutions from both EU member states can apply principally only private legal forms – especially in terms of associations and limited liability company. The area of responsibility of the joint institutions can only be effective in the field of competence of in the cooperation involved members.49 Informal forms of cooperation (e.g. town twinning projects and working groups) rely also on the already mentioned association and limited liability company legal form. Besides the legal support by the Council of Europe and the EU one of the main drivers for cross-border governance at EU internal borders have been the financial joint initiative Interreg that has been introduced by the former European Community in 1990. The financial support for cross-border regions and actors fostered the cross-border cooperation in all over Europe and also led to the establishment of numerous Euro(pa)regions. Also at the German-Polish border region several cross-border governance institutions have been established after 1990. 4. Town-twinning, Euroregions and Macroregions (de facto existing cooperation models) Along the national border between Poland and Germany, after 1990, three prominent town-twinning projects, four Euroregions and two Macroregions include the regional authorities in the mentioned territory. Town twinning – in this context regarding “border twin towns” can be understood as “interconnected organisms” that include “interactions between not only different cultural, legal, economic systems, but also between disparate government structures are tested in controlled conditions”.50 The functional and mostly also highly symbolic form of cooperation targets primarily the cooperation on administrative and organizational level and in a next step fosters the encounter and integration of the population on both sides of the border. In the analyzed border region there have been established the Eurocity Guben-Gubin, the European city Görlitz-Zgorzelec – both in 1998 – and the Cooperation center of the twin city Frankfurt-Słubice in 2010.51 The policy fields of cooperation vary between the twin cities. Guben-Gubin´s most noteworthy product of the cooperation of both cities can be considered the joint managed sewage treatment plant located on the Polish side of the city and managed under Polish law.52 Besides this concrete measure of cross-border cooperation the town twinning project does not go beyond a symbolic form of crossborder cooperation.53 The twin city Görlitz-Zgorzelec has been after a coopera49 50 51 52 53

See Art. 7 Para. 2 EGTC-Reg; Art. 28 Para. 2 German Grundgesetz, Art. 7 Polish Act on commune self-government. JAŃCZAK, J., “Borders and border dimensions in Europe. Between Frontierisation and Boundarisation”, Public Policy and Economic Development 5/1, 2014, p. 14. JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST, D., STOKŁOSA, K.,Geteilte Städte an Oder und Neisse: Frankfurt (Oder) – Slubice, Guben – Gubin und Görlitz – Zgorzelec 1945–1995, Verl. A. Spitz, Berlin, 2000. GERING, Ch., NEISS, M., Internationale Zusammenarbeit in der Raumplanung am Beispiel Deutschland-Polen. Rahmenbedingungen, Planungssysteme und Maßnahmen, TU Berlin, Berlin, 1999. KUBE, O., NAGLER, H., SCHWARTZE, F., “Stadt-Raum-Identität. Städtische Neuorientierung in der deutsch-polnischen Doppelstadt Guben-Gubin”, in: Zukunft von Stadt und Region. Beiträge zum Forschungsverbund "Stadt 2030”, Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik, Berlin, 2006, p. 131.

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tion treaty from 1992 proclaimed as a European city in 1998. In this regard, the European city has established two cross-border public bus transport lines (1992 and 1999), a German-Polish kindergarten and a cross-border hospital cooperation (1991) based on several agreements of cooperation between the both cities, f.e. Twin city agreement (1991), the cooperation contract between Görlitz and Zgorzelec (1993) and the agreement on cooperative partnership (1996).54 Besides these two town twining projects there are some more cross-border governance projects of towns and cities55 that will not be further investigated. The third towntwinning project Cooperation center of the twin city Frankfurt-Słubice that is situated in the Viadrina region will be examined below. Euroregional forms of cross-border governance (“Euroregions”) are mostly implementing and managing authorities (“Technical Assistance”) of the European Territorial Cooperation cross-border programs (Interreg-VA) in the respective assisted region.56 Euroregions can be defined as a cross-border loose coalition without legal personality or a coalition under private or public law.57 In addition to that, they are often composed by two national associations.58 At the GermanPolish border area there have been established within four years four Euroregions: The Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa (21 December 1991), the Euroregion Spree-Neisse-Bober (Sprewa-Nysa-Bóbr, 21 September 1993), Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina (21 December 1993) and the Euroregion Pomerania (15 December 1995). Further forms of cross-border governance in the German-Polish border area are the multinational territorial program areas also called macro-regions. Macroregions are transnationally defined and comprise not just cross-border regions but whole EU nation-states. They are spaces of transnational cooperation (Interreg-VB) of the European Territorial Cooperation. The German-Polish borderlands are situated in the program areas Baltic Sea Regions and Central Europe.

54

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ULRICH, P., “Grenzüberschreitende funktionale Kooperation im deutschpolnischen Grenzraum am Beispiel des TransOderana EVTZ – Akteure, Strategien und Institutionen”, in: KRZYMUSKI, M., KUBICKI, PH., ULRICH, P. (ed.), Der EVTZ als Instrument der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit nationaler öffentlicher Einrichtungen in der Europäischen Union, op.cit. Further local cross-border cooperation projects at the German-Polish border exist for example in Świnoujście and Heringsdorf (urban development model of dual city center, development center of the cross-border region, prolongation of Usedom “Bäder-Bahn” public train till Świnoujście), in the case of the twinning agreement of Cottbus and Zielona Góra (citizens meetings, common youth, culture and sports projects and cross-border tourism), in the metropolitan region Stettin-Szczecin (Project grouping of public and private actors who promote the development of the metropolitan region) and in the field of environmental tourism the international park “Unteres Odertal” situated between Mieszkowice and Schwedt and the “Pückler-Park” in Bad Muskau. PERKMANN, M., The rise of the Euroregion. A bird’s eye perspective on European cross-border cooperation, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, 2002, p. 11. ENGL, A., “Partizipative Governance und Mehrebenen-Governance in grenzüberschreitenden Kontexten: Ausgewählte EVTZ-Beispiele im Vergleich”, op.cit., p. 25. BECK, J., “Der EVTZ und seine Akteure – Territoriale Entwicklungssteuerung im Kontext transnationaler Institutionenbildung”, in: KRZYMUSKI, M., KUBICKI, PH., ULRICH, P. (ed.), Der EVTZ als Instrument der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit nationaler öffentlicher Einrichtungen in der Europäischen Union, op.cit.

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Besides town-twinning projects, Euroregional and macro-regions also other forms of cross-border strategic governance exist in the German-Polish border territory on governmental, state and voivodeship level. The Treaty of Good Neighbourship gave birth to the “German-Polish governmental commission for regional and cross-border cooperation” that represents an institution that determines the strategic alignment of German-Polish cooperation on inter-ministerial level.59 In 1992, the German-Polish spatial development commission composed by representatives of German and Polish ministries, federal states and voivodeships at the border60 has been established to coordinate the spatial development and the cross-border cooperation on various levels.61 The decisions and strategic measures by that informal network are not binding but the spatial development commission brings together political actors in the border region and generates stimuli for strategic and political cooperation. One of the main projects is the “common future concept for the German-Polish interrelation space 2030” that represents common programmatic ideas and concepts of the spatial development of the German-Polish border area62 and is negotiated in a multi-stakeholder process with the inclusion of academia and civil society.63 The Spatial Commission is composed by the same members as the “Oder Partnership” that represents an informal, project-oriented initiative of cross-border cooperation of voivodeships, federal states and cities in East Germany and West Poland with the goal of regional economic development by the promotion of political and infrastructural linkages in the Odra region64 The 2006 established Odra partnership aims at the creation of an economic region in the heart of Europe that in a long-term process can compete in the European network of regions and make the Odra region more visible on a supranational level.65

59 60 61 62

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Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, Raumordnerische Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum, op.cit. The members are the federal states Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Berlin, Brandenburg and Sachsen and the voivodeships Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie and Wielkopolskie. Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, Raumordnerische Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum, op.cit., p. 6, p. 57. Gemeinsame Landesplanung, Gemeinsames Zukunftskonzept für den deutsch-polnischen Verflechtungsraum 2030, http://gl.berlin-brandenburg.de/raumentwicklung/europaeische-raument wicklung/gemeinsames-zukunftskonzept-fuer-den-deutsch-polnischen-verflechtungsraum2030-433538.php (31.10.2016). See http://zk2030.kooperation-ohne-grenzen.de/de/ (31.10.2016). Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, Verkehrsinfrastruktur im deutschpolnischen Grenzraum, Bonn, 2012. PUPIER, P., Welcher Europäische Verbund für territoriale Zusammenarbeit an der deutsch-polnischen Grenze? Eurodistrikt TransOderana EVTZ, IAUL – Institut D´Aménagement & Urbanisme De Lille, Lille, 2011.

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III. The Viadrina region: case studieson actor´s participation After giving an overview about the German-Polish border area from a historic, political, legal and strategic perspective, the focus shall not put on the actual research emphasis and the focus on sets of actors participating in cross-border governance arrangements in the Viadrina region. Therefore, the analytical model of Schmitter will be applied. The empirical analysis is based on collected data by seven interviews with German and Polish mayors and representatives from municipalities and towns in the Viadrina region, with local project managers, legal advisors and representatives from the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and the Joint State Planning Authority of Berlin/Brandenburg. The interviews have been conducted between November 2015 and January 2016. The case studies are including different forms of spatial characteristics: an urban/twin city cooperation project (Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation Center), a cross-border euroregional association (Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina) and a planned model region along an infrastructural connection (TransOderana EGTC under construction) 1. Case Study of the cooperation center of the twin City Frankfurt-Słubice The twin city Frankfurt-Słubice is an urban region at the German-Polish border that encompasses the cities Frankfurt and Słubice (until 1945 Frankfurter Dammvorstadt) that are separated by the Odra river and comprises about 80.000 inhabitants.66 Since the 1990´s several agreements and cooperation contracts have been created for further cross-border cooperation in the region like the collaboration agreement between Frankfurt and Słubice (1993) that introduced regular meetings of the two mayors and the creation of a joint city council, the “integrated concept for a strategy Frankfurt (Oder)-Słubice 2003” to specify common projects, the “program for a common development and cooperation of the cities Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice” (2004) that approaches joint measures to tackle unemployment, a common concept for tourism and marketing and the participation in the EU network “City Twins” that proceeded from 2004-2006 as the European network of twin cities “City Twin Association” (CTA).67 In general, in Frankfurt (Oder)-Słubice the cross-border measures approached mostly single policy areas that needed and wanted to be dealt in a cross-border context. In 1993, the establishment of the joint research institution Collegium Polonicum that is financially supported by the European University Viadrina and the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań is an example for the functional and symbolic form of collaboration in a certain policy field – also it is not a product of the nego-

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BOLLMANN, S., Presentation on Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice – europäisches Labor der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, Frankfurt (Oder), 2015, p. 2, www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/ (2.6.2016). Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,15, geschichte_der_zusammenarbeit.html (31.10.2016).

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tiation process between both cities.68 Another instance is the “Investor Center Ostbrandenburg” (ICOB – established in 1996) that is a cross-border marketing institution for the urban region as an industry and economic location.69 Other measures by both cities are to foster the tourism in the cross-border region.70 In 2010, after the successfully concluded town-twinning INTERREG project of both city administrations the joint institution of both city administrations “Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center” has been established. The main goals of the cooperation center are to enhance sustainable cross-border urban and economic development, research and development and to establish the twin city as an international center of education.71 In a future conference with a participatory approach including 200 citizens the plan of action 2010–2020 has been established and adopted in 2010.72 As already realized projects of public service are a crossborder public bus transport line,73 the installation of a joint managed district heating system74 and German-Polish kindergartens. After this short introduction about the key facts in the next objects of interest are the activities the cooperation project is involved in, the legal structure of the project and the governance structure that will be analyzed using the “holder” concept by Schmitter and some information about the civic engagement and interaction. Activities On the web page of the “Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center” there are indicated seven policy fields the cooperation center is active in:75 – Education and neighbor language – Some projects in this policy sector are for example a continuing education event for bilingualism of the educators in kindergartens, events like the celebration of Europe Day with pupils from the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina or workshops about cross-border strategies on vocational training and strengthening of the education location. – Culture – Cultural projects are mostly meetings and encounter projects. So most projects carried out in the cultural sector are citizen’s receptions or the 100th anniversary of the women´s day. – Sports – In the realm of sport the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center organized a joint booth for the sports fair FISPO 2011 in Frankfurt (Oder). In this context, the organizers also managed to carry out the conference “Sports for

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MAHLKOW, N., “Interkulturelles Wissen studentischer Milieus in der Hochschulzusammenarbeit – ein Standortfaktor in europäischen Grenzstädten?”, in: MATTHIESEN, U., MAHNKEN, G. (ed.), Das Wissen der Städte. Neue stadtregionale Entwicklungsdynamiken im Kontext von Wissen, Milieus und Governance, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2009, p. 292. Investor Center Ostbrandenburg, Wirtschaftsregion im Aufwind, Frankfurt (Oder), 2011, p. 9. Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,15 ,geschichte _der_zusammenarbeit.html (31.10.2016). Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,16, vision___ ziele.html (31.10.2016). Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,15 ,geschichte _der_zusammenarbeit.html (31.10.2016). Markische Onlinezeitung, http://www.moz.de/artikel-ansicht/dg/0/1/1068942 (31.10.2016). Stadtwerke Frankfurt (Oder), Presentation Wärme verbindet – Ciepło zbliża. https:// www.stadtwerke-ffo.de/fileadmin/user_upload/BilderText/Das-Projekt-im-Ueberblick.pdf (31.10.2016). Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,17 ,projekte ___massnahmen.html (31.10.2016).

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all”. The visitor in both occasions could be informed about the sports offers within the city. Public transportation – The main public transport project of the twin city and the most substantial success of the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center is the cross-border public bus line 983. It has been opened on 09 December 2012 and it transports more than 1.000 inhabitants per day76 – more than initially expected. In 2006, a citizens’ decision prevented the construction of a crossborder tramway between Frankfurt and Słubice.77 Tourism – The realm of tourism is one of the main field of action of the cooperation center. It coordinates f.e. educational tours through the twin city, cruises on the river Odra, conferences on cross-border tourism or designing cross-border bilingual menus of the gastronomy in the urban region. Economy – in the field of medical services the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center fosters the exchange of information about medical specialists and their services in the cross-border region. Politics and administration – The main effort has been the elaboration of the plan of action 2010–2020 that has been carried out parallel to the foundation of the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center.78 In 2009, it has been compiled by 200 citizens and enacted by the city council in 2010. An update of the plan of action was performed in 2014.79 In the policy fields urban development, economy and research and the job market there have been defined 15 goals and 46 projects until 2020.80

Legal Structure The legal foundation for the establishment of the Cooperation center has been the town twinning agreement that has been signed 28 June 2011. As a result, the Cooperation center didn´t apply a solid legal form. The Cooperation center is composed by a common group of four administrative employees that are delegated by their city administrations (Frankfurt city administration and Słubice city office) to represent a joint institutional brand. This administrative staff is still part of the respective city administration and possesses the working contracts of their institution. Their tasks are to carry out initiatives and measures in the context of cross-border cooperation of the administrations, especially the development of joint projects and the application process for cross-border initiatives. Projects and initiatives by the Cooperation Center are mainly financed by Interreg-A funds. The project applications in the Interreg program are developed by the Cooperation Center and then submitted in a partnership structure by both cities.

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BOLLMANN, S., Presentation on Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice – europäisches Labor der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, op.cit., p. 9. Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,15, geschichte_der_zusammenarbeit.html (31.10.2016). Ibid. BOLLMANN, S., Presentation on Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice – europäisches Labor der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, op.cit.,, p. 7. Ibid.

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Following the Holder´s concept by Schmitter one needs to differentiate on the main actors within the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center (internal governance) and the actors associated or active in governance arrangements (external governance) or those who benefit or are affected by the policies adopted. The internal governance are the negotiation and cooperation of two city administrations that are meeting on a regular basis and that include in some consultation also local stakeholder and civil society actors. Actors in the external governance sphere are mostly the ones who benefit or affected by the policies adopted: the citizens of the twin city, associations, economy and also other institutions like the cooperation partners. Looking on the main question of the possibility for the civil society to actually participate in governance arrangements, the relevant categories are the rights holder and the spatial location holder. As the urban scale represents a limited but densely populated territory – compared to the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina and the TransOderana case study – and the differentiation of residents to citizens is more difficult, both analytical categories will be put together at this point. To analyze this point, it is important to distinguish between those who actively are involved in governance processes and those who benefit from decisions being made in governance processes. In the last 10 years there have been three examples for a citizen´s consultation for comprehensive cross-border projects in the public transport sector. Whilst the negative citizens’ decision in Frankfurt (Oder) on the construction of a cross-border tramway between Frankfurt and Słubice was a clear decision by the citizens, the development of a joint umbrella brand for the twin city Frankfurt (Oder)-Słubice81 and the plan of action 2010–2020 under consideration of a deliberation and consultation of 200 persons needs to be further discussed. It has been an open approach and the citizens were invited but as in the plan of action 2010–2020 the emphasized policy fields of the future were negotiated. Therefore, it could be assumed that representatives or knowledge holders from academia, economic sectors, administrations and the touristic sector were participating in this consultation process but also residents and/or citizens. The effects of the decision made in the governance processes are f.e. the crossborder bus transport line that more than 1000 citizens per day are using,82 the reception of 200 Polish children in German kindergartens and about ten German children Polish childcare,83 or the bilingual education at school84 are fostering the merging not only of the city´s administrations but also from the people. Nevertheless, looking on the numbers of children in neighbor kindergarten and pupils learning the foreign language there is still a big asymmetry between both the German and the Polish side. The Cooperation Center is cooperating with some scholars from the neighbor European university Viadrina and the Collegium Polonicum but it could be fur81

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Ibid., p. 11. Result of a 16-month long process from August 2011 until December 2012 where over 100 persons from both sides of the border participated within 10 meetings with mayors and 20 working meetings. See also: Runze & Caspar Werbeagentur GmbH, Zwischenbericht zur Markenentwicklung für Frankfurt (Oder) und Słubice, Frankfurt (Oder), 2012. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. 9% of Frankfurt pupils learn Polish and 69% of Słubice pupils learn German.

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ther promoted. Besides the academic part the Center is cooperating with institutions from the educational sector (bbw Bildungszentrum Frankfurt (Oder) GmbH, Bildungsserver Berlin-Brandenburg, Grundschule Mitte Frankfurt (Oder), schools in Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice, Landesinistitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg, Schule für Wirtschaft und Landwirtschaft (ZSER) Słubice, Volkshochschule Frankfurt).85 The members of the Cooperation center are representing the town halls of both cities. Both directors are subordinated the respective mayor.86 The staff is operationally running the Cooperation center and speaks for the two mayors in this twin city arrangement. Referring to Schmitter´s holder concept these city hall representative as the institutional structure can be labeled as status holder as “organizations recognized by the authorities ultimately responsible for decision and formally accorded the right to represent a designated social, economic or political category”.87 The city administrations are highly involved in the politics and decisions made by the Cooperation center. In addition to this, meetings are held regularly so that the public administrations are highly active in the cross-border governance processes. The administrations in addition to the representative character also symbolize ownership as they are “bearer [that have a] property right to assets that are affected by changes of allocation of resources”.88 The EU institutions are slightly included in the governance process of the institution. As the Cooperation Center might be a beneficiary of EU funding of the decentralized EU Cohesion Funds, especially from the European Territorial Cooperation, the strategic approach of the Cooperation Center expressed in the plan of action 2010–2020 is highly congruent to the EU objectives. As cooperation partners, institutions from the workforce sector89, civil protection90, consulting, economic and project management institutions91, touristic and sport sector92 and trade and industrial associations93 are participating in the cross-border governance arrangement of the Cooperation center. The cooperation and partnership with these institutions have to be considered as a lose forms of cooperation. In sum, the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center is a twin city project initiated by the two city administrations that follows an inclusive, attention-grabbing and transparent approach of cross-border governance. As only two partners (city administrations) are included in the cooperation structure that are directly linked to the mayors of both cities, regular interaction, consultation and decisionmaking processes between the German and Polish city administration is happe85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Frankfurt-Slubice-Kooperationszentrum, http://www.frankfurt-slubice.eu/article,de,21, kooperationspartner.html (31.10.2016). BOLLMANN, S., Presentation on Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice – europäisches Labor der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, op.cit., p. 8. SCHMITTER, Ph. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?, op.cit., p. 63. Ibid. Deutsche Angestellten-Akademie Frankfurt (Oder) gGmbH. Freiwilligenzentrum der Caritas Frankfurt (Oder). IHK-Projektgesellschaft mbH / Eurojob Viadrina, Investor Center Ostbrandenburg GmbH. Tourismusverein Frankfurt (Oder) e.V., Stadtsportbund Frankfurt (Oder) e.V., Sport- und Erholungszentrum Słubice, Messe und Veranstaltungs GmbH Frankfurt Oder. Industrie- und Handelskammer Ostbrandenburg.

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ning on a frequent level. The civil society has been invited to join the debate in public transport issues and in the future navigation of the twin city project. In the creation of the plan of action 2010–2020 citizens and administrative as well as representatives and interest holders participated. To which extent “ordinary citizens” from Frankfurt and Słubice participated is not known and a broad civic participation in the governance process can be doubted. Also the European multilevel aspect is missing here: The Cooperation center is just a potential beneficiary of European funding. Nevertheless, the documentation of the events and activities of the twin city project is well reported on the website and presentations. The Cooperation center, hence, provides a high degree of transparency. Graphic 3: Sets of Actors participating in cross-border governance: Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center

2. Case study of the Euroregion pro Europa Viadrina After introducing an urban project of cross-border governance the next case study includes a broader geographical scope and is domiciled in the euroregional context. The Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina was founded on 21 December 1993 with the set-up of a cooperation agreement of a German-Polish association compound.94 The Euroregion covers the territories of the districts Märkisch-Oderland and Oder-Spree as well as the district-free city Frankfurt (Oder) on the German side (federal state Brandenburg) and 28 municipalities of the voivodeship Lubuskie on the Polish side of the border.95 The cross-border governance institution is supported by two national associations – “Mittlere Oder e.V.” on the German side that contains already 15 members and the Polish association “Stowarzyszenie Gmin Polskich Euroregionu Pro Europa Viadrina”. The legal foundation of the Euroregions is therefore the respective national association law that the associations are built on. In the cooperation agreement the institutional de94 95

http://euroregion-viadrina.pl/beta/sites/default/files/ikonki/Umowa%20o%20 powstaniu%20 Euroregionu.doc (31.10.2016). SZYDŁAK, K., Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina. 15 Jahre Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum, Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, Gorzów Wlkp, 2009, p. 23.

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sign has been specified (Council of the Euroregion, presidium of the Euroregion, secretariat, revision committee, working groups)96 and the seat has been defined on the Polish side in Dąbroszyn. Besides the seat the Euroregion operates two branch offices. Activities The tasks and activities of all German-Polish Euroregions are referring to the fields of action of the already introduced German-Polish Treaty of Good Neighbourship from 1991. Logically, the assignment for the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina is closely linked to the deepening of the neighbourly relations through joint events and bilingual promotion, improvement of the infrastructure in the border region, extension and deepening of economic contacts through fairs, exhibitions, the foundations of joint ventures, improvement of the environmental situation and the deepening of cultural and sports contacts.97 The Euroregion is financially supported by the federal and voivodeship governments and through the Structural funds by the European Union, especially from the European territorial Cooperation (Interreg).98 In the budget period 2014–2020 the Euroregion continues its function as a managing authority for the Small Project Fund of the Interreg-A programme. The conceptual work of the Euroregion is determined by the concept for development and action “Viadrina 2014” that is the result of regular bilateral negotiations of both associations, consultations of municipalities and associations, German-Polish workshops and meetings of the members as well as the board.99 The key activities in the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina 2014–2020 will be the promotion of a common identity and of the European ideals, boosting of the touristic and economic location factors, strengthening the common infrastructure and public service and supporting education and innovation in the Viadrina region.100 Legal structure The legal framework is a cooperation agreement of two national associations from 1993. With founding the Euroregion the members relied on the Madrid Outline from 1980 convention. The Euroregion, hence, is a loose cooperation structure without legal personality. Consequently, it is not independent from its members and in the legal communication no juridical autonomous institution. The Euroregion will be represented by its organs (presidium) outwardly.101 The decisions are being taken by the Council of the Euroregion that represents the representatives of the districts, cities and municipalities.102

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Ibid., p. 37. Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, http://www.euroregion-viadrina.de/euroregion-proeuropa-viadrina/zur-geschichte/(31.10.2016). Ibid. SZYDŁAK, K., SCHIWIETZ, T., Entwicklungs- und Handlungskonzept der Euroregion PRO EUROPA VIADRINA, Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, Gorzów Wlkp, 2013, p. 9. Ibid., p. 47. SZYDŁAK, K., Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina. 15 Jahre Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum, op.cit., p. 44. Ibid., p. 38.

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Governance structure The extent of the participation of the local citizenship in the cross-border governance arrangements is limited. The institutional design and scope of work of the Euroregion that has been elaborated in 1993 has been achieved disregarding the civic opinion in the cross-border region. Also the elaboration of common sets and priorities for the strategic operational program of the Brandenburg-Poland Cooperation Programme 2014–2020 has been made in a multilevel context without any open consultations. The citizens can only benefit from Small Project Fund Projects that are managed by the Euroregion. The inclusion of knowledge holders is moderately pronounced. Here a clear asymmetry of knowledge holders shows up referring to the composition of the sponsoring associations. The German side includes – like the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center – a variety of actors from Consulting, project management and Academia – like the European University Viadrina, the Investor Center Ostbrandenburg and the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center itself. Also in the case of the Frankfurt-Słubice Cooperation center, the ties to the academic sector can be strengthened. Especially in the case of the elaboration of the concept for development and action “Viadrina 2014” no external expertise has been included in the negotiation process. For an innovative and a comprehensive concept based on perspectival richness, appropriate actors of the border region shall be included in the elaboration process. The Euroregion is composed by the German districts Märkisch-Oderland and Oder-Spree and the city Frankfurt (Oder) and 28 Polish municipalities. These members are represented geographically in the Euroregion. These are the ones that are negotiating with the national and European level regarding the strategic alignment of the priorities of the EU Regional Policy. The EU institutions are higher involved in the governance process of the Euroregion than in the other case studies. As the Euroregion is part of the negotiation and implementation process of the EU Structural Funds and the Cooperation Program of Brandenburg and Poland the Euroregion is a prime example for multilevel governance. The interest group is highly present in the cooperation structure. The Euroregion is a managing authority of the Small Project Funds. In addition to this, the Euroregion is part of the steering committee of the Interreg-VA programme. Therefore, several interest holders are exchanging and in interaction with the Euroregion. Besides that, also members of the association represent specific sectors that participate in this network, e.g. the Chamber of commerce and industry, the trade union confederation, a Protestant congregation, and associations of landscaping and businesses. In sum, the Euroregion represents both a managing authority for some of the cross-border Interreg funds and a cross-border European region in a spatialgeographical sense including various stakeholder from public administration, associations, business sectors and other interest groupings. To mediate between these numerous interests and actors the Euroregion is focusing more on the satisfaction of those actors than to turn their attention to the local citizenship. Nearly no measures have been taken to open up decision-making and deliberation for and with the local population. The civic population can benefit from projects from the Small Project Fund that finances mostly projects for the civic encounter.

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Another shortcoming is the little consideration of cross-border local knowledge in the actual work of the Euroregion – although the European University Viadrina is a member of the Euroregion. Nevertheless, the Euroregion can be a prime example for multilevel governance as the supranational, national and the crossborder subnational level are highly involved in the negotiation and implementation process of EU cross-border regional policy implementation and funding. Graphic 4: Sets of Actors participating in cross-border governance: Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina

3. Case study of the EGTC TransOderana (under construction) After the introduction to the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina another Europeanized cross-border structure under construction in the territory comprised by the Euroregion will be scrutinized. The TransOderana EGTC is a territorial grouping of towns, municipalities and districts that want to construct a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) along the former Royal Prussian “Ostbahn” railway that has been destroyed after the Second World War and has experienced a twofold way of revitalization. The 1857 established “Ostbahn” connected the Prussian capital Berlin with the East Prussian capital Königsberg and, thus, the industrially more developed Western provinces of Prussia with the rural areas of the East.103 The railway that led to accelerated economic and industrial development104 has been destroyed after Second World War. In 1999, a forum of citizens and transport stakeholders has initiated talks about the revitalization of the cross-border railway line. In 2006, the “IGOB Interessensgemeinschaft Eisenbahn Berlin – Gorzów” (Community of interest railway Berlin – Gorzów EEIG) has been created applying the EU cross-border private legal instrument European economic interest grouping (EEIG). The idea of this project has been to commence operations at the former Ostbahn railway of a 253 km long section

103 104

MUSEKAMP, J., Die Ostbahn im Spiegel der Zeit. Eine Reise von Berlin nach Königsberg, Katalog zur Ausstellung des Instituts für angewandte Geschichte und Eröffnungsvorträge von Jan Musekamp und Marcin Przegiętka, Frankfurt (Oder), 2010, p. 2. LINACK, E., LISSNER, A., Eisenbahninfrastruktur der Strecke Berlin-Piła, Cottbus, 2012, p. 1.

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from Berlin to Piła (Poland).105 Through the application of the legal form of the EEIG, it had been possible to attract private investors and to re-establish the train connection along the historical line from Berlin to Piła. The representatives of municipalities and towns along the route of the Ostbahn railway then decided to take the chance and to establish a Eurodistrict and a model region along the railway line applying the legal form of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The institutional design and the set-up of the EGTC are highly influenced by the German-French EGTC Eurodistrict Saarmoselle that has been registered in 2010. Due to a sceptic attitude of the approval authority of the federal state Brandenburg towards the EGTC structure and the personnel changes of the Polish members after the local elections (November 2014) and the Parliamentary election (October 2015) the TransOderana EGTC is still not formed. The planned grouping consists of seven municipalities and four cities covering about 100.000 inhabitants on the German side and 13 municipalities, three districts and the State College in Gorzów Wielkopolski covering about 590.000 inhabitants on the Polish side. Activities After the establishment of the IGOB EEIG in 2006, the members developed in working groups future measures how to revitalize the Ostbahn railway defined in the “Ostbahn future visions 2025”. The targeted goals are the renovation of the railway route including modern railway connections, a coordinated European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), railway station regeneration, sustainable transport, enhancement of cross-border tourism and the development of the rural region.106 After the revitalization of the old railway, the idea has grown to develop a model region under the label of a “Eurodistrict” and the legal form of an EGTC. For that purpose, the members of the grouping developed together with local academic spatial planners four fields of action. These fields of action focus on the “management of the endogenous potentials”, the consciousness raising of the Eurodistrict as a model region, the “management of regional networks” (social, economic and logistics) and the management of the demographic change”.107 Legal Structure From 2006–2014, German and Polish districts, towns and municipalities along the Ostbahn railway established the IGOB with the legal status of the European economic interest grouping (EEIG). The EEIG is a EU legal form that shall “facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members and […] improve or increase the results of those activities […] its purpose is not to make profits for itself”.108 The legal form is applicable for private entities and those who are acting economically. Public entities like regional or local authorities are therefore not ap105 106 107 108

ULRICH, P., “Grenzüberschreitende funktionale Kooperation im deutschpolnischen Grenzraum am Beispiel des TransOderana EVTZ – Akteure, Strategien und Institutionen”, op.cit. IGOB Interessengemeinschaft Eisenbahn Berlin-Gorzów EWIV, Ostbahn 2025 – Zukunftsvisionen, 2010, http://www.ostbahn.eu/html/ostbahn_2025.html (2.6.2016). KUJATH, H.-J., MUSEKAMP, J., BOSSAN, K.-H., “Weitere Entwicklung der Ostbahn – BerlinGorzów Wlkp.- Piła – als europäische Modellkorridorregion”, in: ZSCHIEDRICH, H., Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Grenzregionen, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2011, p. 167–175. Art. 3 EEIG Regulation.

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propriate to participate and can only be associated. The EEIG has been chosen by the members to attract investors and economically driven actors to open up the abandoned Ostbahn infrastructure. After this successful mission the members decided in 2009–2010 to create a Eurodistrict and model region applying the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). This legal form offers the public authorities that are part of the grouping a right to say and to vote that has impeded the EEIG structure. The EEIG in the eyes of those surveyed can be considered as an instrument to develop, to renovate and to promote infrastructure by attracting investors, whilst the EGTC can be considered a political organization instrument for political, economic, touristic and spatial development of a cross-border region.109 The EEIG has been dissolved in 2014 but the EGTC has still not been established. In retrospect, the persons involved admitted that the EEIG dissolution might have happened too fast due to the underestimation of the duration of the EGTC foundation process.110 Governance structure The differentiation between a citizen whose voice is heart and a citizen who benefits from the policy adopted must be differentiated here. As there are no public forums, surveys or polls conducted within the districts, municipalities and towns there is no clear civil society participating. Nevertheless, the citizens are benefiting from both the established railway line and the projects and measures undertaken in the model region once the EGTC is established. Especially, the city of Gorzów Wielkopolski (more than 120.000 inhabitants) might benefit from the direct train connection to Berlin. As the EGTC is composed by mainly municipalities the citizens may participate through direct contact on their mayor and local chairman. The initiation of the revitalization of the Ostbahn railway line can be described as a role model for bottom-up mobilization of regional politics in the EU multilevel polity. In 1999, a forum of local citizens and transport stakeholders from the cross-border region have initiated talks that led to concrete measures. Actors that were initially included in the foundation process are mainly from the geographical scope of the cross-border region. Referring to the inclusion of the linguistic diversity of the border region by Engl´s analytical model, the EGTC obtains the founding documents in German and in Polish and along the train line GermanPolish tourist information is provided at the train stations. Another role model is the way how the local knowledge holders are included in the decision-making process. For the choice of law, infrastructural and spatial planning matters for the IGOB scientists and researchers from the history and law departments of the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), the Leibniz Institute for Social Science-based Spatial Research (IRS Erkner) and the BTU Cottbus were included. One of the members of the EGTC is the State College of Gorzów Wielkopolski. The shareholder (owners) are the town and municipal administrations that are the main actors participating in the EGTC and also as associated members in the IGOB EEIG. As there are in total 20 municipalities there are few municipalities 109 110

ULRICH, P., “Grenzüberschreitende funktionale Kooperation im deutschpolnischen Grenzraum am Beispiel des TransOderana EVTZ – Akteure, Strategien und Institutionen”, op.cit. Ibid.

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that are the drivers of the cross-border cooperation some others are joining. Looking on both countries there is a clear asymmetry – in Germany the member group is homogeneous (only towns and municipalities) while in Poland the structure includes districts, municipalities and a state college. Here the diagonal dimension of cross-border governance becomes obvious. According to Engl´s model of participatory governance there is a clear inclusion of different administrative levels on the subnational layer in a cross-border context. One of the beneficiaries or victims (stake holder) can be considered the German state railway company as well as the Polish national railroad companies who are affected by the decisions made by the grouping. Politically and strategically, the EU is also involved in the fostering especially the EGTC structure due to the fact that it is a structure for public bodies. The EU consulting body of EU decision-making Committee of the Regions represents the European regions and has constituted the EGTC Platform – an arena that “aims to facilitate the exchange of experiences on the ground, promoting the EGTC as a tool for territorial cohesion and to give visibility to EGTC projects, while also supporting the consultative works of the CoR in cross-border issues”.111 In addition to this, a member from the European People´s Party and the Committee on Regional Development in the European Parliament, Joachim Zeller as well as the European Parliamentarian Michael Cramer and Bogusław Liberadzki are actively engaged to support the grouping on European level as well as on subnational level. The forum of the local spokespersons of the transport sector and experts in infrastructural matters were the ones initiating the process of the revitalization. These spokespersons were interest holders Their interest was clearly the establishment of new possibilities of transport as well the revitalization for historical and nostalgic reasons. For that category the representatives and status holders should be designated as the approval authorities for the registration of a EGTC as they represent “organizations recognized by the authorities ultimately responsible for decision”.112 The approval authority in Germany – due to the federal structure of Germany – is the Ministry of the Interior in Brandenburg and on Polish side – the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also here is a diagonal dimension (regional and national) of governance apparent. Both institutions play a strong role in the multilevel polity representing the regional or national layer and permit the foundation of the EGTC. As the ministry in Brandenburg mentioned its concerns about the EGTC regarding liability, financial and competence matters113 the EGTC is still not established. The communication and regular interaction with the ministry has been elusive. In sum, the TransOderana EGTC that is still under construction is a primarily a project of districts, municipalities and towns and interest holders like the railway operators. The civic participation has not been apparent in the foundation process. Nevertheless, the project tried to highly involve knowledge holders and the supranational level to make their demands and voices heard. In addition to this, 111 112 113

European Grouping of Territorial Cooperaiton1, https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/Pages / welcome.aspx (31.10.2016). SCHMITTER, Ph. C., “Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is there any Reason to Expect it will Achieve Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multilevel Context?, op.cit., p. 62. ULRICH, P., “Grenzüberschreitende funktionale Kooperation im deutschpolnischen Grenzraum am Beispiel des TransOderana EVTZ – Akteure, Strategien und Institutionen”, op.cit.

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the high amount of municipalities as members in the grouping offer a close proximity to the general public along the railway line. As representatives of the national and the federal state level the approval authorities are impeding the foundation of the TransOderana EGTC. Graphic 5: Sets of Actors participating in cross-border governance: TransOderana EGTC

OUTLOOK The Article attempted to give an overview about some theoretical considerations that have occurred in the beginning of the 2000´s concerning the democratization of governance in the European Union. The participatory governance approach developed by several scholars like Kohler-Koch, Schmitter and Heinelt has been linked to a cross-border subnational context. The border region that has been chosen is the German-Polish border region, especially the Viadrina region. For the analysis of actors and interaction the concept of “holders” by Schmitter has been applied. The empirical results showed that the three cases are examples for crossborder and multilevel governance but in every case different sets of actors were dominating the governance arrangement. The divergent actor’s approaches of the governance arrangements revealed that the three cases are highly heterogeneous and that the inclusion and open up of governance arrangements for the civil society are depending on the will, the cooperation structure and the target group of cooperation. As well, the civil society shall be differentiated between “givers” and “takers” – in some cases they actively participate in cross-border governance arrangements and in some cases they are benefitting. Referring to the participatory governance approach those who are affected by the policy adopted should be actively involved in the decision-making process. In general, the literature reveals that participation in governance arrangements results in higher legitimation of EU politics. Open and transparent way of activities of cross-border institutions may recreate trust in institutions. The case of the Viadrina region also shows that despite many activities and measures to include the civil society are being taken, further civic mobilization will be needed in the future. To impede

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nationalist uprising in the heart of Europe – effective, smart and multistakeholder cross-border governance in the Europe of the (cross-border) regions is essential.

LA PARTICIPATION DES ACTEURS DANS LES STRUCTURES DE COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE À LA FRONTIÈRE GERMANO-POLONAISE: LE CAS DE LA RÉGION DE VIADRINA Cet article est basé dans l’hypothèse que la coopération transfrontalière n’est pas un privilège des autorités administratives, mais qu’elle doit impliquer une multitude d’acteurs. La gouvernance transfrontalière dans un système européen à multiniveau a été élargie il y a 15 ans au concept de « gouvernance participative », grâce à la discussion sur la légitimité des politiques européennes. Le « holder » modèle de la participation dans le processus de gouvernance qui est a été introduit par Philippe Schmitter sera appliqué dans cet article à travers trois cas d’études d’initiatives transfrontalières dans la Viadrina région. Cette région au cœur de l’Europe sera illustrée comme l’interface entre la vieille et la nouvelle Europe. Comme conditions pour une gouvernance transfrontalière réussie cet article analyse des étapes d’intégration historiques, politiques, stratégiques supranationales et juridiques à la frontière germano-polonaise. Les cas d’études ainsi examinés au regard de la gouvernance participative et ses acteurs seront le Centre de Coopération Frankfurt-Slubice, l’Eurorégion Pro Europe Viadrina et le TransOderana EGTC (en construction).

AKTEURS-TEILNAHME AN CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE STRUKTUREN AN DER DEUTSCH-POLNISCHEN GRENZE. FALLSTUDIEN AUS DER VIADRINA REGION Der Artikel basiert auf der Annahme, dass grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit kein Privileg von administrativen Einheiten darstellt, sondern eine Vielzahl von Akteuren umfassen sollte. Cross-Border-Governance im europäischen MultiLevel-System wurde vor 15 Jahren mit der Diskussion über die Legitimation europäischen Regierens um den Begriff der „Partizipativen Governance“ erweitert. Das von Philippe Schmitter eingeführte „Holder“-Modell der Partizipation in Governance-Prozessen wird in dieser Abhandlung an drei grenzüberschreitenden Initiativen in der Viadrina-Region angewandt. Diese Region in der Mitte Europa wird dabei als Schnittstelle vom alten und neuen Europa dargestellt. Als Bedingungen für eine gelingende grenzüberschreitende Governance werden historische, politische, strategisch-supranationale und rechtliche Integrationsschritte angesehen, die in diesem Artikel an der deutsch-polnischen Grenzregion beleuchtet werden. Die analysierten Fallstudien in Bezug auf partizipative Governance und

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ihrer Akteure sind das Frankfurt-Słubice Kooperationszentrum, die Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina und der TransOderana EVTZ i.Gr.

NETWORKS AS FUNCTIONAL NEW MICRO-DIPLOMACY TOOLS SUPPORTING CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION: EVIDENCE AND LESSONS FROM CZECH-SLOVAK BORDER HYNEK BÖHM I. Initial remarks, theoretical background, methods and goals of the paper This paper addresses the topic of cross-border co-operation, which has been in Europe conducted since the end of 1950s1 and helped to overcome the barrier effect of borders.2 For the purpose of this paper, cross-border cooperation is understood as an interaction between neighbouring regions within the EU, more specifically those initiated by public actors at regional levels.3 Geographically, the article compares the co-operation on “north” and “centre-south” of the CzechSlovak border. The paper is based on outcomes of the project “Crossing the borders: Geographic and Structural Characteristics of Cross-Border Cooperation in the Danube Region”, led by Hungarian CESCI – Central European Service for Cross-border Initiatives. This article presents a condensed version of the comprehensive case study called “Co-operation of Moravian-Silesian (CZ) and Žilina (SK) Selfgoverning Regions in the EGTC TRITIA”, published as one of the research outcomes4. The above mentioned research project had an ambition to identify best possible examples of institutionalised micro-diplomacy structures on the border between countries creating Danube Macroregion.5 The co-operation between the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina region was selected as a possible example, because both regions created, jointly with the Opole and the Silesian Voivodeship, a European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) “TRITIA” and EGTCs are by definition of the EU regulation “highly institutionalised mechanisms”.6

1 2 3 4

5 6

DOKOUPIL, J. Evropské příhraniční prostory – euroregiony. In: JEŘÁBEK, M. (ed.), Geografická analýza pohraničí ČR, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1999, p. 180. Beck, J., WASSENBERG, B., Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen (Band 2) : Governance in Deutschen Grenzregionen, Fritz Steiner, Stuttgart, 2011, p. 363. PERKMANN, M., “Cross-Border Regions in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional CrossBorder Co-operation”, European Urban and Regional Studies, 10,153, 2011, p. 155–171. BÖHM, H., DOKOUPIL, J., JEŘÁBEK, M., “Co-operation of Moravian-Silesian (CZ) and Žilina (SK) Self-governing Regions in the EGTC TRITIA”, Crossing the Border, Studies, on cross-border cooperation within the Danube Region, Tritia, 2016, http://institute.cesci-net.eu/tiny_mce/ uploaded/EUSDR_Part_Two_05_Tritia.pdf (2.7.2017). Hereinafter referred to as Danube Region. Council of the EU, European Parliement and Council of Europe Regulation 1082/2006 on European Groupings of Territorial Co-operation, OJ EU L210/1, 2006.

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The EGTC TRITIA was created as a product of co-operation of selfadministrative regions, which delegate their representatives into executive bodies of the grouping. The performance of co-operation groupings run by regions (EGTC TRITIA) and by municipalities (Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty) was analysed in the framework of obtaining EU funds for mutual co-operation of their members. Municipalities and regions are indeed one of the key recipients of EU funds. When cross-border cooperation was connected with EU funds via the Interreg programme at the end of 1980s, the number of cross-border initiatives dramatically increased.7 Some authors thus contend that EU money is the only motivation for many cross-border initiatives;8 others consider working with Interreg as a primary purpose of Euroregions.9 As European funds are often the key incentive for cross-border co-operation, various forms of cross-border partnerships must be created to make it possible. The paper wants to bring evidence that institutionalization of cross-border cooperation between the Czech and Slovak side of the border (between the Moravian-Silesian region and Žilina region under the EGTC TRITIA in the north and municipalities creating Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty in the centre-south) significantly improved their mutual relations. Amin and Thrift contributed with their “institutional thickness” – concept to the group of institutional regional development theories.10 This particular theory says that institutions are not formal organisations only, but that they create informal conventions, habits and network of relations. The success of regions is then dependant on the ability of local actors to create such institutions, which can then create good framework conditions for economic and social regional development.11 According to Powell and Dimaggio there are four conditions for institutional thickness at regional level: 1. Presence of classical institutions and organisations. 2. High quality of collective and co-operative behaviour between these institutions. 3. Precise definition of competences and tasks of individual institutions and the entire system they co-create 4. Feeling of shared responsibility for the project in individual member organisations.12 According to many authors the last condition is the most important one.13 I share this point and will verify this point mainly by interviews with stakeholders, who 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ANDERSON, M., “Transfrontier Co-operation – History and Theory”, in: BRUNN, G. (ed): Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie – Empirie – Praxis, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997, p. 347. O’DOWD, L., “Transnational integration and cross-border regions in the European Union“, in: ANDERSON, J., Transnational Democracy. Political Spaces and Border Crossings, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 254. SCOTT, J. W., “Euroregions, Governance, and Transborder Cooperation Within the EU”, in: VAN DER VELDE, M., VAN HOUTUM, H., “Borders, Regions, and People”, European Research in Regional Science 10, Pion Limited, London, 2000, p. 320. AMIN, A., THRIFT, N., Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 268. RUMPEL, P. Teritoriální marketing jako koncept územního rozvoje, PřF OU, Spisy Přírodovědecké fakulty OU, Ostrava: 2002, p. 25. POWELL, W. W., DIMAGGIO, P. J. (ed.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991? RUMPEL, P. Teritoriální marketing jako koncept územního rozvoje, op.cit.

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are active in cross-border co-operation (which is an expression of microdiplomacy, sometimes also para-diplomacy14), the foreign policy which is implemented by actors at subnational level (here regions). The principle evidence documenting the positive role of cross-border networks and institutions is based on the analysis of lists of projects implemented under Slovak-Czech cross-border co-operation programs between 2004 and 2013. I will illustrate that institutionalisation of co-operation has helped to be more successful in obtaining funds for cross-border projects. The quantitative outputs will then be supported by the outcomes of interviews conducted with stakeholders responsible for cross-border cooperation on the both sides of the border. These findings will overall contribute to confirm the validity of the institutional thickness concept of cross-border cooperation.

II. The Czech-Slovak borderland and cross-border co-operation The entire length of the Slovak-Czech border is 251,8 km. There are 4 822 803 inhabitants on the territory of 32 000 km2. The average population density is 150,5 inh./km², which highly exceeds the average density of both the Czech (133 inh./km²) and the Slovak Republic (110,3 inh./km²). The landscape is rather diversified, which influences both the character of the settlements of the region and its economic diversity. Geographically, the region includes the rivers in the valleys (Váh, Kysuca, Turiec, Orava, Bečva, Morava), agricultural rural lands and forests or uninhabited mountain terrains of both the Tatra and Fatra mountains, Beskydy, Jaborníky and Bílé/Biele Karpaty.

14

DUCHACEK, I., Perforated sovereignties and international relations: trans-sovereign contacts of subnational governments, Greenwood Press, Boston, 1988, p. 234.

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Picture 1: All regions eligible for Slovak-Czech15 cross-border co-operation programs (source Interreg SK-CZ 2014–2020)

Each cross-border co-operation on the Czech-Slovak border is different compared to the other borders of both countries, as there are almost none or minimal mental and language barriers – yet the statement about the minimal language barrier cannot be applied for young people born in the 1990s. This has obviously been caused by the long common history, which was mainly characterized by a joint co-existence of Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1992, with the exception of the World War II period of 1939, when the independent Slovakia existed next to the Czech occupied territory (Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren). In times of the common state there were functional links between the Czech and Slovak part of the federation: daily commuting to work or school was a reality, Slovaks studied at higher education institutions in Slovakia and the other way around, public transport connections were in place and no mental barrier has been perceived between both parts of the federal State. Cross-border flows and connections between the Czech and Slovak part of the federation were thus frequent and borders between both parts of the federation were no real limit or barrier. After the division of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of two successor States (the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic) on 1st January 1993 these links have started to disappear and, moreover, a standard border regime was introduced between both countries. The division brought new borders and created physical barriers. Controls on border crossings were established and frequen15

When talking about Czech-Slovak CBC I mention the adjective Czech on the first place as it is a common habit. On the other hand when talking about Slovak-Czech Interreg or cooperation programme I place adjective Slovak on the first place as the programme is managed from Bratislava and the whole title of the programme is “terminus technicus”.

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cy of the connection by public transport decreased dramatically. These barriers also resulted in decrease of cross-border employment, which happened mainly in the very north of the Czech-Slovak border, where the labour force from Slovak Kysuce had always commuted to the Czech side to work in steel industry in Třinec and Ostrava and in coal-mining in the Ostrava-Karviná black coal rayon. When the industry restructuring took place in the 1990s and early 2000s, the first potential released workers were foreigners – Poles and Slovaks. This means that cross-border flows were decreased but certainly did not stop (one must also add that their intensity was restored again after the EU enlargement in 2004 and the Schengen area enlargement in 2007). But the division of Czechoslovakia also meant a different development of public administration structures in both countries: both of them dropped the regional level of public administration and the only level maintained between the municipal and national one was the district level: on the Czech side almost without changes, on the Slovak side with a reform of districts with 79 smaller districts replacing the original 37 bigger ones. This was not an environment favourable for cross-border co-operation. Moreover, no Euroregions were created on Czech-Slovak border in the 1990s. One could only observe the creation of Euroregions on the Czech-German border (1991, Euroregion Nisa-Nysa-Neisse or 1992, Euroregion Egrensis) or on the Czech-Polish border (1997 Euroregion Praděd/Pradziad, 1998 Euroregions Těšín/Cieszyn Silesia and Silesia). This was due to the rather negative welcome of Euroregions by the Slovak Prime-Minister Mečiar (1992–1998), whose administration did not provide any motivation or incentives for creating these type of cross-border structures. Therefore, the first Euroregions on the Czech-Slovak border were created only in 2000: the Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty (composed and controlled mainly by municipalities from the central and southern parts of border), the trilateral Euroregion Beskydy with Polish municipalities involved and the trilateral Euroregion Pomoraví-Weinviertel with Austrian members involved. All these Euroregions were controlled by municipalities and regions had almost no influence. The reason was very simple: In Slovakia, regions were introduced in 1996, whereas in the Czech Republic it was only in 2000. This means that municipalities, jointly with central States represented by national ministries, designed the ways how cross-border co-operation was conducted and how European funding (in the form of Phare CBC which appeared on the Czech-Slovak border in 1999) was raised. These mechanisms introduced at the end of 1990s are still mainly in place now. The co-operation at regional level has started in the northern part of the Czech-Slovak border in 2003, when the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina regions signed a co-operation agreement with the following co-operation areas: economic co-operation and regional development; spatial planning and tourism; transport infrastructure and environmental protection; culture and sport; European integration and joint implementation of EU funded projects. The Structural Funds, which became accessible for both countries after the EU enlargement in 2004, brought a new impulse for deeper relationships between both regions. The Community Initiative Programme Interreg 3A for the cross-border co-operation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia and its successor, the cross-border Cooperation Operational Programme Slovak Republic – Czech Republic 2007 – 2013 were the financial instruments, which led to the creation of the European Grou-

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ping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) TRITIA and to the institutionalization of co-operation between both regions (and two Polish voivodeships, Opole and Silesian). The primary motivation for selecting the legal form of an EGTC was the possibility that EGTC TRITIA might have a significant role in administration or at least the use of EU funds. However, because experience with this legal form was minimal in Slovakia and non-existent in Poland and the Czech Republic, the process of setting up the EGTC with the national authorities was slow. This slowness was also partly due to a competition between various levels of public administration: EGTC TRITIA with its flat structure ignoring other vertical (public administration) levels as well as economic actors and civic society organisations, accompanied by the unhidden ambition to have more control over the funds for crossborder co-operation, encountered a very hesitant welcome from the national authorities and a direct refusal from the Euroregions. This caused the EGTC failing to play the role of an administrator of parts of the Interreg program in 2014 – 2020. On the other hand, it helped to its members to institutionalize their cooperation more deeply and to plan joint projects, which would probably not have been invented and implemented without the EGTC.

III. The role of the networks in using EU funds: institutionalization matters Our analysis shows how cross-border co-operation between the MoravianSilesian and Žilina regions has changed during the process of establishing the EGTC TRITIA. This will be done in two ways: first, we will analyse the success of both regions in using the funds as a principal financial tool supporting crossborder co-operation (via the Operational Program CBC Slovakia-Czech Republic for the programming period 2007–2013). Second, we will present a qualitative research, based on the interviews with actors involved in cross-border cooperation in the northern part of the border. Both ways will be commented separately, but there will also be some cross-references, mainly showing the opinion of experts on the influence of the EGTC creation and the intensification and systematization of relations between both regions on the use of the financial instrument mentioned. Finally, the use of the EU funds for cross-border cooperation by bodies co-operating under the umbrella of the Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty in the central-southern part of border will also be analysed. The analysis will also take into account geographical factors influencing the use of the programme, such as the very short and mountainous section of the border between the MoravianSilesian and Žilina region compared to significantly longer border sections with very few geographical barriers in the southern part of Czech-Slovak borders. 1. Default geographical disadvantage for co-operation between the MoravianSilesian and Žilina region The disadvantages come from geographical settings: The mutual border between the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina region is significantly shorter that the border

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between other regions of Czech-Slovak borderland – only 45 km of the 252 kilometres of the entire border. Moreover, the physical conditions there are quite complicated as it is a mountain area with a rather low population density at both sides of the border. The border between the Zlín and Trenčín region can also be characterized as a mountain area, but it is significantly longer with more road and railway cross-border connections. The southern part of the Czech-Slovak border, between the Southern-Moravian and Trnava region is the longest one without major physical barriers. There are 6 districts with 300 municipalities in total in the Moravian-Silesian region. Cross-border cooperation with Slovakia is hardly thinkable for half of them and there is a similar problem for the municipalities from the Žilina region. The geography of both regions thus sets some default limits cross-border cooperation. One must also add that all districts which are in both regions far away from the Czech-Slovak border are on the contrary very close to the Czech-Polish or respectively the Slovak-Polish border; hence they tend to prefer Czech or Slovak/Polish cross-border co-operation. Table 1: Number of municipalities of regions covered by the Slovak-Czech cross-border cooperation operational program Region Moravian-Silesian (CZ) Zlín (CZ) Southern-Moravian (CZ) Žilina (SK) Trenčín (SK) Trnava (SK)

Number of municipalities 300 307 673 315 276 251

2. Analysis of the work with European funds The Interreg funds in the 2004–2006 and 2007–2013 program period constitute the substantial part of material for the research analysis, which will however be complemented by an overview on opinions from cross-border stakeholders in the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina regions. Community Initiative Program Interreg A Slovak Republic – Czech Republic 2004–2006 The principal financial tool supporting co-operation on the Czech-Slovak border was offered to both countries after their EU accession on 1st May 2004. The programme covered the territory of 6 regions, which are situated on the CzechSlovak border: the Trnava region (Trnavský kraj), the Trenčín region (Trenčianský kraj) and the Žilina region (Žilinský kraj) in Slovakia; the Southern-Moravian region (Jihomoravský kraj), the Zlín region (Zlínský kraj) and the Moravian- Silesian region (Moravskoslezský kraj) in the Czech Republic. The programme offered for all these regions 13 667 229 Euros of the funding from the European Regional

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Development fund (ERCF) and jointly with national co-funding the programme achieved an amount of 18 223 066 Euros, which was significantly less than its successor, which offered funds exceeding 93 000 000 Euros from the ERDF for the 2007–2013 program period. Both countries involved in the program approached its implementation differently: Slovakia, which enjoyed the position of the lead-partner of the program and hosted its secretariat, divided funds equally in advance between the three regions in the program area, whereas the Czech Republic allowed its regions to compete. The “absolute winners” of the program on the Czech side were stakeholders from the Zlín region. These stakeholders, including the Regional Authority of the Zlín region itself, managed to obtain some 85% of the funds distributed during the whole programme. Contrarily, the stakeholders from the MoravianSilesian region obtained with their 11 successful projects merely 457 000 Euros, i.e. slightly above 3% of the whole budget allocation. This number can be moved up to 5% when counting the micro-projects scheme for projects up to 20 000 Euros.16 The success of the Zlín region stakeholders must be attributed to the fact that they are supported by an efficient network, the Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty, and also by the fact that the Region’s partly owned Regional Development Agency co-managed part of the whole programme via the microprojects scheme.17 To conclude on the first program period (2004–2006) with the Czech Republic and Slovakia as full EU members, it should be said that equal distribution to Slovak regions, imposed by Slovak authorities, helped all regions whereas the Czech “laissez-faire” approach of a free competition constituted a significant and decisive advantage for the Zlín region, which had the networks in place in order to help its members using the funds heavily. The usefulness of these networks can be demonstrated also by the fact that some successful project promoters from the Moravian-Silesian region came from the Beskydy Euroregion – another small cross-border network. Cross-border Cooperation Operational Program Slovak RepublicCzech Republic 2007–2013 The cross-border cooperation operational program between Slovakia and the Czech Republic for the period 2007–2013 has provided Community support for the same 6 regions on the Slovak-Czech border as its predecessor. The programme had a total budget of around 109 million Euros. Community funding through the ERDF amounted to some 93 million Euros. Bearing in mind the weak performance of the 2004–2006 Interreg program the regional authorities of the Moravian-Silesian and the Žilina region, who had signed co-operation agreement in 2003, decided to invest in some technical assistance funds and prepared a series of meetings with representatives of all partner 16 17

There were 10 successful micro-projects, which could have obtained some 150 000 Euros at a maximum. Nevertheless, the micro-projects scheme as such is a systemic project submitted by the Zlín region. The Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty is in more detain described in next subchapter of this study dealing with the use of the EU funds for the CBC in the ending 2007–2013 programming period

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regions. This resulted in the decision to apply more actively for EU funds during the 2007–2013 program period. Although the opportunities for mono-national programs offered significantly better prospects for financing with a more straightforward grant process, the regions decided to change their attitude in favour of Interreg. The Moravian-Silesian region even conducted an analysis of “missed opportunities” which highlighted the use of cross-border co-operation programs and it was decided to approach them more systematically than before. We worked in this study with information on all projects which were supported by the Slovak-Czech Interreg programme. 258 projects obtained funding in the period of its implementation until the end of 2014 (we ignored projects supported in 2015). The projects were divided into two main categories: First, the systemic or technical assistance projects for both ministries responsible for the programme implementation, for the joint technical secretariat, for contact points or for macro-projects securing the operations of the micro-project scheme. These projects were not selected on the basis of the competition principle, as the beneficiaries were clearly defined in advance. We can say that these projects were awarded over 16% of the programme allocation (over 14 out of 92 million Euros coming from the ERDF fund). Second, the rest of the funds were distributed to projects in “free competition”: The programme organised 7 selection rounds, during which public and non-profit actors from the whole programme territory competed for allocation of resources.18 After having eliminated the category of systemic or technical assistance projects, the other projects were analysed according to their “region of origin”. First, we compared the projects which were submitted by Regional Authorities (kraje – krajské úřady) itself. We realised – and this presumption was also confirmed in interviews with experts – that the participation of both regions in the EGTC TRITIA construction had a huge impact on their performance in the use of the Interreg funds: The projects prepared by the two regional authorities or organisations controlled by them amounted up to 6,68 million Euros of ERDF funds obtained, which is around 7,3% of the whole allocation. This amount almost equals the sum allocated in total to four other regions involved in the programme implementation in the southern part of the Czech-Slovak border (6,9 million Euros). The funds obtained by the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina region were for the implementation of projects mainly in the field of infrastructure, transport connecting both countries/regions and innovation. Apart from the projects presented by the six regional authorities, there was also a category of projects which were developed mainly thanks to the process of the EGTC TRITIA construction, as the interviews with experts from the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina region reveal. These projects amount to slightly over 10 million Euros, which is almost 12% of the entire allocation of the ERDF funding. A prominent role has been played here by the Technical University of Ostrava, assisted by two minor regional universities and its counterpart in Žilina with more than 4 million Euros ERDF support obtained. Concerning other project promoters, the municipalities were the most numerous applicants. The municipalities from the Moravian-Silesia and the Žilina region were much less active than their counterparts in the other four regions eligible for application to the Interreg program. The reason for this must primarily be seen in the lower number of mu18

The 8th and final round was closed in January 2015 and not reflected in this study.

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nicipalities close to the border there. The highest number of projects and cooperation initiatives therefore comes from municipalities situated in the middle and south of the border, i.e. from other than the Moravian-Silesian and (less so) the Žilina region. However, there is other reason explaining this dynamic: these municipalities have been active in cross-border networking and cross-border structures, which have thematically been focused on Czech-Slovak cross-border co-operation. The role of networks and networking is therefore somehow documented in the table containing information on all approved projects under the Czech-Slovak Interreg programme for the 2007–2013 period. The Interreg program supported 258 projects until the end of 2014. 129 projects – exactly half of them – were projects, where municipalities or organisations managed by them acted as lead-partner or were at least one project partners. In 66 of these projects – more than a half – municipalities participated19 which belong to the Euroregion Bílé Karpaty/Biele Karpaty, the body gathering municipalities with an interest in cross-border co-operation from the Zlín and the Trenčín region. This is a sharp contrast to the performance of municipalities from the Moravian-Silesian region, which are not directly involved in the TRITIA cooperation network: There were only 10 projects with participation of municipalities from the Moravian-Silesian region or organisations controlled by them (municipal library or the elementary schools). Half of these projects had partners from the Euroregion Beskydy, the only Czech-Slovak institutionalized structure in the cross-border co-operation. The participation of municipal actors from the Žilina region is somewhat higher; there were 16 projects with participation of municipalities from the Žilina region and some of these projects had also partners from the Zlín region. Overrepresentation of municipalities belonging to the cross-border network Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty can act as an example of good practice: It shows that cross-border networks – here presented by Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty – have a clearly positive role in promoting cross-border co-operation. In addition to these larger co-operation networks, partnerships of municipalities act as an incentive as well: There were several projects resulting for example from the partnerships between Valašské Meziříčí – Čadca, Vendryně – Čierne or Turzovka – Metylovice. Universities were also important project promoters. In contrast to the municipalities from the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina region, the universities from both regions, mainly the Technical University of Ostrava and the Žilina University are predominately using the funds for cross-border co-operation: There were 21 projects with at least one participant being a university; 8 of them were bilateral projects between the two above mentioned universities but they were also involved in projects where their partners are not universities. According to the representatives of both universities, their success can be partially attributed to excellent personal relationships between experts from both schools in environmental and energy efficiency issues – these were the main project cooperation topics between both universities. In this context, the contribution of a cross-border university consortium deserves to be mentioned. The so-called “Progress 3 Consortium” was created in parallel to the EGTC TRITIA: its core mission was to create links among the universities of the Moravian-Silesian region, the Žilina region and the Silesian and 19

Or organisations – mostly schools – fully controlled by one or a union of these municipalities.

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Opole Voivodeships. The goal was to generate a concentration of research and innovation capacities which should facilitate more effective planning, management and practical implementation of research projects and their technical applications. At the moment, the Progress 3 consortium gathers 14 universities mainly from the TRITIA territory and regions nearby (the Trenčín and Trnava regions in Slovakia). The anchoring of 4 public universities from the Moravian-Silesian and the Žilina region in co-operation networks helped them indeed to be successful in Czech-Slovak cross-border co-operation: There are 16 public universities in 6 regions covered by the Slovak-Czech programme (6 of them in Brno, seat of the South-Moravian region) and the universities from both analysed regions clearly dominated in the programme use.20 3. Experts on meaning of networks The expert interviews were conducted during the preparation of this case study in the course of October and November 2014. The main target group were representatives of regional authorities from both regions, but also stakeholders from another background were asked. All experts agreed with the importance of the Schengen regime and the internal market, but as a principle motivation for cross-border cooperation they see EU programs supporting cross-border co-operation. They believe that these programs were the impulse for improving and sometimes establishing functional relations between the two regions, as illustrated by the following sentence: ”The topic of cross-border cooperation is quite new for my department and it has emerged when the first programs of the support from EU funds came into being.” Interviewed experts representing both regional authorities underlined that the process of the EGTC TRITIA creation was the real impetus for improving the quality of cross-border relations. They also think that European funds brought along an “upgrading of these relationships” and this is felt more intensively by those who are directly involved in the implementation of cross-border cooperation projects. They perceive the relations between both regions as very close and dynamic as this expert confirms: “But there is a strong personal cooperation. Recently, a delegation with representatives from many departments of our authority has visited Žilina. The journey wasn't focused on projects, but on finding common topics and ideas for a future collaboration. Representatives from the Transport Department, the Environment and Agriculture Department, the Regional Development, the Education, the Youth and Sports Department and the Tourism Department and European Projects Department [….] we can say that crucial departments from our authority participated in this visit and they met their counterparts from the Žilina Self-Governing Region. We [also] often meet counterparts within the meetings of the EGTC TRITIA and I think 20

On the other hand some universities from Brno have been very successful in use of the mononational Structural Funds programme for research and development and created large structures with the ERDF funding; they might have decided to focus on these programs and ignore CBC at this stage. But this was not subject of this research

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there is a lot of space for more intense cooperation. Mostly, the meetings result in concrete actions.” Rather concrete answers on the contribution of regular meetings for the development of joint strategies and projects were given by experts representing transport departments of both partner regions: “We made a common strategy with the Žilina Self-Governing Region (a definition of common goals, cooperation of various transport branches etc.) and this has evolved into specific investment projects. We succeeded in the reconstructions of all roads which are straight cross-borders connections between our region and the Žilina Self-Governing Region. And for the next period we are preparing a reconstruction of the other roads. There are no differences between the roads on the Czech and Slovak side of the border, every aspect is unified”. The co-operation of both regions under the TRITIA umbrella also influences the preparation of both regions for the 2014–2020 program period: “...our region is preparing for a new program period. Nowadays we have identified the roads which need a reconstruction within cross-border projects – we talk about concrete sections with specific financial proposals. There is a similar situation in the sphere of tourism (a propagation of attractive locations like castles, ski grounds and paths, cycling paths, technical heritage, culinary tourism). These investment and non-investment project proposals are similar on the Czech-Slovak and the Czech-Polish border. It is important to transform these specific proposals into projects after the approval of operational programs”. The co-operation of regional authorities themselves was valued quite highly among interviewed experts. Nevertheless, they still feel many gaps in cooperation between other stakeholders and criticism was also directed towards the local universities: “... despite of a lot of money having been spent within the EGTC TRITIA, some strategies have been prepared, a lot of people have met their counterparts, but I miss big projects. We cooperate successfully in tourism, but in the sphere of technical innovations (and the cooperation of main universities of our regions) I see a lot of insufficiencies. And these scientific sectors, as we know from the border area between Germany and France, are crucial for a development of whole regions. I know some cooperation between universities exists, but it doesn't lead to important projects. The MoravianSilesian region has a dense population and there aren't language barriers with regard to Slovakia and there is a great cultural similarity with Slovaks. So there is no reason not to deepen the cooperation between universities and scientific centers.” The interviewed experts were also invited to think about co-operation barriers which they did in the trilateral Czech-Slovak-Polish context. The problems they identified were much more related with Czech/Slovak-Polish rather than CzechSlovak co-operation:

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“Another potential hindering factor can be the difference in the competences on the level of cooperation between our regional authority and the Žilina Self-Governing Region. Official departments and sections may not match and sometimes there is a need to find partners from nonregional organisations. However, due to common history within Czechoslovakia these problems are quite rare (unlike with Poland)… There are also so-called mental barriers, especially in the sector of environmental protection and air pollution, where Poland has less rigor norms and limits. This fact hinders cooperation.” When being asked the questions on potentially interesting co-operation areas, the joint labour market and co-operation of education providers scored highly in many answers of the experts. These areas were underlined both with an accent on the current situation or the situation to come soon: “…I should mention the existence of numerous Slovak minorities in our region. This minority has lived here for generations and it's related to the industry in the Ostrava-Karviná coal basin. Many members of this minority have relatives and property in Slovakia. Secondly, the area called Kysuce (the cities Čadca, Krásno nad Kysucou) is quite poor, without developing industry or services, so people from there are moving to our region because of the employment. They have been used to migrating for centuries. Another important fact is a daily commuting which is possible, thanks to the improvement of the cross-border road network. We should realize that the distance between Ostrava and Nošovice and Čadca and Nošovice is similar. In future […] there is a great potential for a cross-border labour market. Nowadays, people from Slovakia work in our region. The cooperation between schools from the Moravian-Silesian region and Žilina SelfGoverning Region is in its infancy and the lack of information and crossborder cooperation between schools influences the labour market. Some fellowships and foreign stays can contribute to some kind of familiarization of the host region and to possible employment in this region. Long-term stays abroad should be supported on high schools and universities.” Some of the answers signalled that relations between Czech and Slovak public actors differ from “usual” or “good” cross-border relations: “We are in a very good relationship with the Transport Department of the Žilina Self-Governing Region. We can solve detailed problems and share our experience. Many people from our department and from the Roads Administration of the Moravian-Silesian region studied in Žilina, because there was the only school focused on transport in our federal country. So we have friendly relations and we speak the same expert language. We maintain a federal identity. We should thank the projects which led to our regular mutual meetings while working on joint strategies – be it the bilateral Czech-Slovak or the complex EGTC ones”.

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4. Lessons learnt The analysis shows that a more systemic approach towards cross-border cooperation brought clear results for the Moravian-Silesian and Žilina regions: The Moravian-Silesian regional authority managed to obtain more funds and helped to initiate more projects in the 2007–2013 period than in the previous 2004–2006 one. Moreover, the amount of money raised for the regional authority itself outperformed the results of the other two regional authorities on the Czech side of the border, which was hardly expectable taking into account the – from the point of view of cross-border co-operation – less favourable geographical default setting. The positive impact of existing cross-border networks on the ability of their members to conduct cross-border cooperation is measured in this paper by the ability of members of these networks to obtain external financial sources for cross-border cooperation: The most successful cross-border actors on the CzechSlovak border have been those from the Trenčín and Zlín region, where the Euroregion Bílé/Biele Karpaty has conducted its activities since 2000. In the 2007–2013 program period, two other cross-border networks also helped their members to achieve better results: the TRITIA EGTC and the Progress 3 consortium of universities. The union of municipalities working in the north of the Czech-Slovak border and involving also Polish partners, the Euroregion Beskydy, has shown its stimulating role mainly during the 2004–2006 program period, whereas at the end of the 2007–2013 period, this network has achieved somewhat less positive results. The interviewed experts have identified a clear contribution of the EGTC TRITIA creation to a more systemic and better planned conduct of cross-border co-operation. The newly introduced systemic approach has also helped to establish functional and friendly interpersonal relations between stakeholders responsible for the cross-border co-operation in both regions.

Conclusions This paper clearly illustrates that networks and institutionalization of crossborder relations between the Moravian-Silesian region and the Žilina region under the EGTC TRITIA umbrella has improved their co-operation. We documented that the European funds for cross-border co-operation brought some real and tangible results during the 2007–2013 Interreg program period. Until that time, co-operation was more present in declarations of political leaders than in reality.

The possibility to use the EU funds for cross-border co-operation also brought both regions to work on common cross-border development strategies. Apart from the strategies themselves, which outline measures, concrete cross-border cooperation projects and their promoters, the most important added value has been the whole co-operation process as such, when the representatives of both regions and other cross-border actors regularly meet and work on issues of common interest. The created cross-border Czech-Slovak network to the very north of the border is probably more valuable asset than funds already raised or projects identified

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in the strategies, as it shows the potential to approach existing problems of both regions together. The positive impact of existing cross-border networks on cross-border cooperation is therefore the most important outcome of this paper, confirmed by data and expert opinions. Realised cross-border projects, measures and projects planned in the strategies of co-operation between the analysed Czech and Slovak regions have contributed to overcome existing national burdens by crossborderization of their activities, in line with Boesler´s Entgrenzung (deborderization) theory.21 Cross-border networks help their members to engage cross-border projects and to obtain the funds for co-operation. These networks also help to build trust and functional relationships among their members and contribute thus to the higher level of institutional thickness in cross-border regions.

DES RÉSEAUX COMME NOUVEAUX OUTILS FONCTIONNELS DE MICRO-DIPLOMATIE À L’APPUI DE LA COOPÉRATION TRANSFRONTALIÈRE: PREUVES ET LEÇONS À LA FRONTIÈRE TCHÈQUE-SLOVAQUE L’objectif de ce cas d’études est d’analyser si l’institutionnalisation d’une coopération transfrontalière – indépendamment de la forme juridique de cette institutionnalisation – aide à rendre une coopération plus effective du point de vue financier et quant à l’intégration territoriale. La coopération entre les régions de la Moravie-Silésie et de l'Žilina sous la direction de TRITIA EGTC a été sélectionnée comme un exemple de coopération administré par les collectivités territoriales à un niveau qui est supérieur au local mais inférieur au national. La recherche, basée sur l'analyse de la manière dont les deux régions ont utilisé les fonds pour la coopération transfrontalière, a clairement montré que l'institutionnalisation de la coopération a entraîné son intensification, son accentuation, la définition de priorités communes et la collecte d’un montant beaucoup plus élevé de fonds communautaires pour la réalisation de projets communs. La comparaison entre deux programmes de coopération opérant dans le nord et le centre-sud de la frontière tchèque-slovaque a permis de prouver que l'institutionnalisation apporte des atouts considérables tant pour les entités de coopération gérées par les régions (coopération des régions de Moravie-Silésie et de Žilina ) que pour celles gérées par les municipalités (Eurorégion Bílé / Biele Karpaty).

21

BOESLER, K.-A., “Neue Ansätze der Politischen Geographie und Geopolitik“, Erdkunde Archiv für wissenschaftliche Geographie, 1997.

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NETZWERKE ALS NEUE FUNKTIONELLE MICRO-DIPLOMATIEWERKZEUGE ZUR UNTERSTÜTZUNG GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDER ZUSAMMENARBEIT: BEWEISMATERIAL UND LEKTIONEN VON DER TSCHECHISCHSLOWAKISCHEN GRENZE Das Ziel der Fallstudie war eine Analyse, ob die Institutionalisierung einer grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit – unabhängig von der Rechtsform dieser Institutionalisierung – dazu beiträgt, die Zusammenarbeit sowohl in finanzieller als auch in territorialer Integration effizienter zu gestalten. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mährisch-Schlesischen und den Žilina-Regionen unter dem TRITIA EVTZ-Dach wurde als Beispiel für die von den Gebietseinheiten verwaltete Kooperation auf einer höheren als der kommunalen, aber niedriger als der nationalen Ebene ausgewählt. Die Forschung auf der Grundlage der Analyse der Art und Weise, wie zwei Regionen die Mittel für die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit nutzen, zeigte eindeutig, dass die Institutionalisierung der Kooperation ihre Intensivierung, die schärfere Fokussierung, die Festlegung gemeinsamer Prioritäten und die deutlich höheren EU-Mittel für die gemeinsamen Projekte veranlasste. Der Vergleich zweier Kooperationsprogramme, die im Norden und Zentral-Süden der tschechisch-slowakischen Grenze tätig sind, brachte einen Beweis dafür, dass die Institutionalisierung sowohl für die von den Regionen (Kooperation der Mährisch-Schlesischen und der Žilina-Regionen) als auch von den Kommunen (Euroregion Bílé / Biele Karpaty) verwalteten Kooperationsgebiete klare Vorteile bringt.

Part 2:

BORDERS: THE GATEKEEPERS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY FRONTIÈRES : LES GARDIENS DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ

GRENZEN: DIE WÄCHTER DER SOUVERÄNITÄT UND SICHERHEIT

WELCOME SPEECH: BORDERS, SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS WALTER SPINDLER First of all, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity today to talk about a recurring topic that is relevant, and not only from a military point of view. Recent political developments all over the globe clearly underscore the explosive nature of the subject under discussion. It goes without saying, however, that this requires a clear definition and distinction between the various subdisciplines forming the basis of such general considerations. In order to be able to discuss “Borders – Geopolitical and Security Aspects” we not only need a general and comprehensive definition of the term “border”, we also have to outline the meaning of security and my underlying concept of geopolitics. So how do I define a border? The term “border” defines a strip of land that separates political entities or nation-states. A border relates to a nation characterised by three basic features: a population, a constitution, and of course the territory itself. This means that it defines a nation by determining its territory via the border demarcating it. However, there are in principle two different kinds of borders: The distinction is made between natural and artificial, i.e. “man-made” borders. Older political borders between sovereign states often coincide with their natural boundaries, many of which are hard to overcome, such as a mountain range, river, sea, strait, desert, a primeval forest or highlands. Such a border often constitutes a linguistic and/or cultural border at the same time. Nevertheless, borders are not necessarily the mere result of centuries of evolutionary processes. In many cases, they have been established through acts of volition by foreign rulers. Former colonies with present-day borders along latitudes and longitudes are a good example to illustrate this. What is my definition of geopolitics? Let me outline my understanding of this concept in a few quick words. Geopolitics is a science describing the impact of geographic facts and conditions on a state and its politics. It is only by referring to established and current geographical and spatial explanation models that we can conduct a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of global political events. That said, I would like to emphasise that this geopolitical approach serves as a neutral tool to be used rationally for analysing political conditions, and that it must in no way be abused to satisfy political cravings. In the end, the strategic relevance of geographical conditions for a state and its politics is defined by humans. What does security mean to me? Contrary to the traditional definition of security, the comprehensive security concept includes “social, economic, ecological and cultural aspects that can only be influenced in a context of multinational interaction”. This change in perspective is mostly due to an increased awareness of the security-related risks resulting from the elimination of borders and its global impact on populations. The international discussion about the elemental signifi-

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cance of this term has become ever more prominent in the face of environmental disasters, poverty, hunger and public debt in developing countries as well as the potential threats posed by global migration. Today, the concept of comprehensive security is of fundamental importance when it comes to defining networked security, also known as the “Comprehensive Approach”. This concept is composed of the following elements: preventive national security, multilateral coordination, interlocking institutions and interagency cooperation. It has to be said, however, that in reality we often deal with an empty phrase rather than an actively applied concept of security, which can be ascribed to the vanities of the different departments, agencies or states concerned: while everybody considers coordinated action to be a prerequisite, no one likes to be coordinated. This leads me to my first assumption: National borders are invaluable! They enable a nation to exercise sovereign powers within its territory, and they give it jurisdiction, i.e. the authority to establish and apply legal regulations governing domestic affairs. This puts the nation in a position to realise its potential! In other words, national borders circumscribe a territory with a specific administrative and legal order giving its population a certain degree of legal certainty and stability. There is thus a state monopoly on the use of force, which can be applied in order to exercise legitimate and justified pressure on persons and institutions in the state with a view to influencing the behaviour of the actors involved in the interest of public welfare. Frederick II, the great Prussian king, already stated as early as 1740 that everyone is free to do things in their own fashion. To this day, the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states constitutes a basic rule of international politics. It is based on the sovereignty of states, a principle which was for the first time set out in writing in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and subsequently became a constituent of international order. It has also been laid down in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, sovereignty is to be understood as the territorial integrity of a state which must never be infringed upon through foreign interference. We can thus state that borders between states serve as a dividing line between different norm and value systems rather than between persons and objects. My second assumption is that borders in crisis regions are highly relevant from a security and geopolitical perspective. Since the dawn of time, we have been fighting wars over the exact course of borders, and we have done so for a variety of reasons. Borders in crisis areas are usually the result of a division of territory along arbitrarily chosen demarcations. They have to be seen in the political context of their historical era; as such, they were not based on determining features such as a common culture, religion or language or even natural boundaries. In many cases, borders have been created for strategic reasons, such as gaining more control over specific regions through the establishment of buffer zones. The consequences we are faced with today are state borders that separate ethnic and cultural groups or are not accepted by the nations concerned, thus holding considerable conflict potential for the entire region. Many times, this has been done to prevent state formation processes where natural boundaries did not exist. An example to illustrate this is the establishment of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan along the Durand Line. It was set up in 1893 to demarcate Great Britain’s colonial estates in British India,

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cutting right through Pashtun settlement areas. In 1947, when Pakistan was founded, these settlement areas were included in the state’s territory and the Durand Line declared null and void, as the government of Pakistan was not involved in the original treaty. To date, this border issue holds much potential for conflict, which Eurocorps experiences on a daily basis. The same is true for the borders between Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, which were set up to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state. In these regions as well, the immense conflict potential resulting from political developments is materialising through an escalation of violence in the Syria conflict. When it comes to the physical properties of borders, there are of course various kinds and variations. Although borders are typically marked with signs like boundary stones, road signs or border posts, and precisely defined through coordinates, history also knows examples of extreme borders. The Berlin Wall and the protective measures along the inner-German border between the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic in recent times, and the still existing separation of Israel and Palestine in the Middle East through a mile-long border fence are but two examples of the many different forms borders can take. In both cases, they have not been set up to merely separate two different society systems, but also humans and objects. The significant quantities of construction material used to build such protective installations like watchtowers, walls and control posts and the subsequent need for personnel to protect, control and maintain such installations incurs massive costs for the nations concerned. In crisis areas, however, the utilization of public funds for the protection of borders will keep the nation from striving to realise its potential, because these funds are then withheld from the economy, welfare, infrastructure, education or culture, in order to facilitate the construction of extreme protective installations. However, the security and stability of a region significantly relies on structures that are solid, reliable and – most of all – oriented towards the future My third assumption is the following: Borders between post-modern states lose their geopolitical relevance as well as some of their relevance to security. It must be clearly stressed that in the age of globalisation, there are considerably growing numbers of transnational transactions and subsequently, the weakened capability of a state to control a wide range of resources. But which are these transnational actions and resources? I am thinking above all of information, goods, services and capital, which all play a fundamental role in the changing relevance of borders due to the degree of mobility made possible by more and more interconnection. So, we can state that the scope of action at the national level is becoming more restricted, while at the same time the geopolitical relevance of borders between post-modern countries is clearly weakening. But we can also state that the security relevance of these borders is increasing, if the necessary provisions have not been made in the various fields. What do I mean by these provisions? The Schengen Agreement can be cited as such a provision, and an example of how to counter security risks because of the diminishing significance of national borders between post-modern states. This agreement was supposed to help foster the European Single Market through the abolition of identity checks on inner-European borders; it was implemented when the German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990, and extended in 2005 through the Convention on the enhancement of cross-border cooperation, especially with respect to

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combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration (also called “Prümer Treaty” or “Schengen-III-Treaty”). The agreement even establishes the right of hot pursuit throughout the European Economic Area and Switzerland. By abolishing identity checks, the agreement has facilitated the enforcement of sovereign powers and tasks through the pursuit of fugitives beyond the limits of the national territory, thereby directly affecting the sovereignty of another state on its own territory. This practice thus allows the parties to the agreement to fight crime more efficiently within member states. One can clearly see that with this kind of agreement, borders are becoming ever more permeable. Even though such treaties do of course simplify mobility for criminals, they also permit the intensification of transnational cooperation. Intensified cooperation between the executive branches of government in turn allows a simplified exchange of information and common patrols within internal borders, and it offers potential for cross-border observation and persecution. But the agreement has other consequences, too. For instance, the elimination of identity checks along internal borders calls for a reinforcement of protective measures on the outer borders. So for those who live outside the Schengen area borders, the agreement causes additional inconveniences, since the conditions for entering the Schengen area have become stricter. Nowadays, in a world of tremendous technological advancement in which territorial border lines are losing their significance, the need for borders is diminishing. Instead, borders with decreasing importance are at the centre of attention, as it is the case with, for instance, the Schengen area. In addition, the Internet’s proverbial border-blurring effect significantly reduces the limiting effect of territories, which must be the guiding light of legal regulation. Global interaction and networks serve as another example illustrating the decreasing relevance of national borders: the constant increase in the use of technology has been and will continue to be the driving force behind the inexorable information revolution. Powerful computers, the extension of international communication networks and – last but not least – the availability of broadband channels, make it possible to exchange information and data with virtually any other place in the world in real time. The cyberspace in particular, i.e. the space of information and communication techniques linked with the Internet, has become a critical key infrastructure for modern information societies, due to the fact that other critical infrastructures, such as power supply, banks, insurances and transportation, are heavily dependent on it. It is not only the growing vulnerability from cyber-attacks on these structures that is becoming an ever greater cause for concern, as the implementation of technology develops at an enormous pace. This is where the security aspect of borders is coming into play again. Is it possible to guarantee the protection of the apparently unlimited cyber space in the first place? And who would be in charge of this anyway? The process of globalisation therefore requires a security strategy that is capable of adapting to this ever-changing environment and that meets these new and complex challenges. This is a fact that positively needs to be addressed in advance. Let me present my fourth and last assumption. Borders are a curse and a blessing at the same time, but they have lost and will keep losing importance in the future.

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Based on the statements made to support my first three assumptions, the consequences of globalisation are now becoming apparent: the growing crossborder mobility of resources and the interdependence of states in the context of globalisation must be interpreted as a sign of the changing role of nation-states’ borders. Borders no longer exist as a means for structuring and limiting social, political and economic transaction, or if they do, they do so in a different way, as they tend to become blurred and permeable in both directions. The desired reduction of borders is a consequence of tightly connected capital markets, commercial relations and interdependence, global work sharing and, last but not least, lowering mobility barriers for the population. After all, all of these factors serve the interests of economies, even world trade as a whole, since they further all types resource flows. The reduction is almost an automatic process, given the fast pace of technological progress. Sometimes it also happens spontaneously, as natural borders are overcome and unlimited information exchange is made possible. But borders are not only permeable with respect to the flow of goods, services and information; they also let admit crime and violence. On the one hand, borders give security and stability to a nation, thanks to the system of values and law in force and the enforcement of sovereignty in a state’s territory. And yet on the other, where sufficient provisions have not been made, they offer a degree of permeability that causes a nation, all of its sub-bodies, as well as its system of values, to become vulnerable and by doing so they begin to pose a significant threat to security. But if so, how is it possible to solve the dilemma between a maximum amount of national individuality and sovereignty on the one hand, and the growing interconnectedness of actors and government action on the other? To be frank, I have no Patent Rolls on this issue, but I do know that there are two kinds of cross-border commuters: the good and the bad ones. While the good one respects the do’s and do not’s on both sides of the border, the bad one abuses both systems in order to seek maximum personal advantage from them. So let us all work together in establishing political and legal mechanisms that prevent abuse in borderless regions and to harmonize our more or less different norm and value systems.

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DISCOURS DE BIENVENUE: FRONTIÈRES, SÉCURITÉ ET ASPECTS GÉOPOLITIQUES Tout d'abord, je tiens à vous remercier de me donner aujourd’hui l’opportunité d’aborder un sujet à la fois récurrent et pertinent, et ce au-delà du seul point de vue militaire. Les développements politiques récents dans le monde soulignent clairement la nature explosive de ce sujet. Il va sans dire que cela requiert une définition et une distinction claire entre les différentes sous-disciplines sur lesquelles se basent des études aussi générales. Afin de pouvoir débattre des « Frontières – Aspects géopolitiques et sécuritaires », nous avons besoin d’une définition générale et complète du terme « frontière ». Nous avons aussi besoin de déterminer ce que l’on entend par « sécurité » – ainsi que ma conception sous-jacente de la géopolitique. Donc, quelle est ma définition des frontières ? Le terme «frontière» définit une bande de terrain qui sépare des entités politiques ou des États-nations. Une frontière se rapporte à une nation caractérisée par trois éléments fondamentaux: une population, une constitution et bien sûr le territoire lui-même. Cela signifie que l’on définit une nation en déterminant son territoire par le tracé de la frontière. Cependant il y a en principe deux types de frontières : naturelles et artificielles, c’est-à-dire une frontière faite par l’Homme. Les anciennes frontières politiques entre États souverains coïncident souvent avec leurs limites naturelles, dont nombre d’entre elles sont difficiles à franchir à l’image d’une chaîne de montagnes, d’une rivière, d’une mer, d’un détroit, d’un désert, d’une forêt ou de hauts plateaux. Ce type de frontière constitue souvent une frontière culturelle et/ou linguistique par la même occasion. Néanmoins, les frontières ne sont pas nécessairement le résultat de processus d’évolution sur plusieurs siècles. Dans de nombreux cas, elles résultent de la volonté de souverains étrangers. Les anciennes colonies dont les frontières actuelles suivent les latitudes et les longitudes en sont un bon exemple. Quelle est ma définition de la géopolitique ? Laissez-moi exposer ma conception en quelques mots. La géopolitique est une science décrivant l’impact d’éléments et de situations géographiques sur un État et sa politique. C’est seulement en se référant à des modèles d’explication géographiques et spatiales établis et actualisés que l’on peut conduire une analyse complète et une évaluation des évènements politiques mondiaux. Cela dit, j’aimerai mettre l’accent sur cette approche géopolitique en tant qu’outil neutre pour une analyse rationnelle des conditions politiques, qui ne doit en aucun cas être détourné pour satisfaire les désirs politiques. En fin de compte, la pertinence stratégique des conditions géographiques pour un État et sa politique est définie par l’Homme. A mon sens, que signifie le concept de sécurité ? Contrairement à la définition traditionnelle de la sécurité, le concept de sécurité globale ( comprehensive security ) intègre des aspects « sociaux, économiques, écologiques et culturels, qui peuvent uniquement être influencés dans un contexte d’interaction multinationale ». Ce changement de perspective est principalement dû à une prise de conscience accrue des risques liés à la sécurité, résultant de l'élimination des frontières et de

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leur impact global sur les populations. La discussion internationale sur l'importance fondamentale de ce terme prend de plus en plus d’ampleur face aux catastrophes environnementales, à la pauvreté, à la faim et à la dette publique dans les pays en développement, ainsi que face aux menaces potentielles posées par les migrations internationales. Aujourd'hui, le concept de sécurité globale est d'une importance fondamentale lorsqu'il s'agit de définir la sécurité en réseau, également appelée « Approche globale » (Comprehensive Approach . Ce concept se compose de plusieurs éléments: sécurité nationale préventive, coordination multilatérale, institutions interconnectées et coopération entre les agences. Il faut cependant bien avouer qu’en réalité ce ont souvent des phrases creuses plutôt qu’un concept de sécurité activement appliqué. Ce que l’on peut mettre sur le compte de l’orgueil des différents départements, agences ou États concernés : alors que tous considèrent que l'action coordonnée est une condition préalable, personne ne souhaite vraiment être coordonné. Cela m'amène à ma première hypothèse : Les frontières nationales sont inestimables! Elles permettent à une nation d'exercer des pouvoirs souverains sur son territoire et lui confèrent la compétence, c'est-à-dire l'autorité d'établir et d'appliquer des règles légales régissant les affaires intérieures. Cela permet à un pays de réaliser tout son potentiel! En d'autres termes, les frontières nationales circonscrivent un territoire doté d'un ordre administratif et légal spécifique donnant à sa population un certain degré de sécurité juridique et de stabilité. Il y a donc un monopole d'État sur l'usage de la force, qui peut être utilisée pour exercer une pression, légitime et justifiée, sur les personnes et les institutions de l'État afin d'influencer le comportement des acteurs, dans l'intérêt du bien-être public. Frédéric II de Prusse, dit Le Grand, déclara déjà en 1740 que chacun est libre de faire les choses à sa manière. À ce jour, la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'autres États constitue une règle fondamentale de la politique internationale. Elle est basée sur la souveraineté des États, principe mis par écrit pour la première fois dans la Paix de Westphalie en 1648 et devenu par la suite un élément constitutif de l’ordre international. Il est également prévu par l'article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Dans ce contexte, la souveraineté doit être entendue comme l'intégrité territoriale d'un État ne devant jamais être violée par des interférences étrangères. Nous pouvons donc affirmer que les frontières entre les États servent de ligne de partage entre différents systèmes de normes et de valeurs plutôt qu'entre personnes et objets. Ma deuxième hypothèse est que les frontières dans les régions en crise sont d’une importance capitale tant pour la sécurité que pour la géopolitique. Depuis l’aube des temps nous avons mené des guerres pour le tracé exact des frontières, avec de nombreuses et diverses raisons. Les frontières dans les zones de crise résultent généralement d'une division du territoire selon des délimitations arbitraires. Elles doivent être considérées dans le contexte politique de leur époque historique; en tant que telles, elles n’étaient pas basées sur des caractéristiques déterminantes telles qu'une culture, une religion ou une langue commune ou même des limites naturelles. Dans de nombreux cas les frontières ont été créées pour des raisons stratégiques, comme le renforcement du contrôle exercé sur une région spécifique à travers la création de zones tampons. Les conséquences auxquelles nous sommes confrontés aujourd'hui sont des frontières nationales sépa-

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rant des groupes ethniques et culturels ou n’étant pas acceptées par les nations concernées, avec un potentiel de conflit considérable pour toute la région. A de nombreuses reprises l’objectif fut d’empêcher la formation d’un État, alors que des limites naturelles n’existaient pas. L'établissement de la frontière entre l’Afghanistan et le Pakistan le long de la ligne Durand illustre bien cela. Elle a été tracée en 1893 pour délimiter les propriétés coloniales de la GrandeBretagne en Inde britannique, coupant à travers les zones de peuplement pashtoun. En 1947 lors de la fondation du Pakistan, ces zones de peuplement lui furent rattachées et incluses dans le territoire de l'État, et la ligne Durand déclarée nulle et non avenue, étant donné que le gouvernement du Pakistan n'avait pas été impliqué dans le traité initial. À ce jour, ce problème frontalier comporte toujours un fort potentiel de conflit, dont l’Eurocorps fait l’expérience quotidiennement. Il en va de même pour les frontières entre la Turquie, la Syrie, l'Iran et l'Irak, tracées empêcher la formation d'un État kurde. Dans ces régions, l'immense potentiel de conflit résultant des développements politiques se matérialise par une escalade de la violence dans le conflit syrien. En ce qui concerne les propriétés physiques des frontières, elles sont bien sûr diverses. Bien que les frontières soient généralement marquées par des signes comme les bornes, les panneaux routiers ou les postes-frontières, et précisément définies par des coordonnées, l'histoire connaît également des exemples de frontières extrêmes. Récemment, le Mur de Berlin et les mesures de protection de long de la frontière interne à l’Allemagne entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et l’ancienne République démocratique allemande ainsi que la séparation toujours existante entre Israël et la Palestine au Moyen Orient par une clôture d’un mile (1 609m) de long ne sont que deux exemples des nombreuses formes que les frontières peuvent prendre. Dans les deux cas, elles n’ont pas été mises en place simplement pour séparer deux systèmes sociétaux différents, mais aussi pour séparer les Hommes et les choses. Les importantes quantités de matériaux de construction utilisés pour construire des installations de protection comme les tours de guet, les murs et les postes de contrôle ainsi que le besoin ultérieur de personnel pour protéger, contrôler et maintenir de telles installations entraînent des coûts massifs pour les nations concernées. Dans les zones de crise l'utilisation des fonds publics pour la protection des frontières empêchera la nation de réaliser son potentiel, car ces fonds sont retenus sur l'économie, le bienêtre, les infrastructures, l'éducation ou la culture, pour la construction d'installations de protection extrêmes. Toutefois la sécurité et la stabilité d'une région reposent sur des structures solides, fiables et surtout orientées vers l'avenir. Ma troisième hypothèse est la suivante: Les frontières entre les États postmodernes perdent de leur intérêt géopolitique ainsi que, en partie au moins, pour la sécurité. Il faut souligner clairement qu’à l'époque de la mondialisation, le nombre considérablement croissant de transactions transnationales affaiblit la capacité des États à contrôler un large éventail de ressources. Mais de quelles actions transnationales et ressources parle-t-on ? Je pense avant tout à l'information, aux biens, aux services et au capital, qui jouent tous un rôle fondamental dans l'évolution de la pertinence des frontières, en raison du degré de mobilité rendu possible par l’interconnexion toujours plus forte. Nous pouvons donc affirmer que la portée d’une action au niveau national devient de plus en plus limitée, alors que la pertinence géopolitique des frontières entre les pays post-modernes s'affaiblit clairement. Mais nous pouvons éga-

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lement affirmer que la pertinence de ces frontières en matière de sécurité augmente si les dispositions nécessaires n'ont pas été prises dans différents domaines. Qu’est-ce que j’entends par dispositions? On peut prendre l'accord Schengen comme exemple : il permet de contrecarrer les risques pour la sécurité grâce à cette importance décroissante des frontières nationales entre les États postmodernes. Cet accord était censé aider à favoriser le marché unique européen grâce à la suppression des contrôles d'identité sur les frontières intérieures européennes. Il a été mis en œuvre lorsque la République démocratique allemande a rejoint la République fédérale d'Allemagne en 1990 et a été prolongée en 2005 par le Traité relatif à l'approfondissement de la coopération transfrontalière, notamment en vue de lutter contre le terrorisme, la criminalité transfrontalière et la migration illégale (aussi connu comme « Traité de Prüm » ou « Schengen III »). L'accord établit même le droit de poursuite dans l'Éspace économique européen et en Suisse. En abolissant les contrôles d'identité, l'accord a facilité l'application de pouvoirs souverains et de tâches souveraines au-delà des limites du territoire national par la poursuite des fugitifs, ce qui affecte directement la souveraineté d'un autre État sur son propre territoire. Cette pratique permet ainsi aux signataires de l’accord de lutter plus efficacement contre la criminalité dans les États membres. Il apparaît clairement que ce type d'accord rend les frontières de plus en plus perméables. Mais même si ces traités facilitent évidement la mobilité des criminels, ils permettent également l'intensification de la coopération transnationale. La coopération intensifiée entre les organes exécutifs des gouvernements facilite à son tour les échanges d’informations et les patrouilles communes, dans les limites des frontières intérieures, et permet d’entreprendre des observations et des poursuites transfrontalières. Mais les conséquences de l'accord ne s’arrêtent pas là. Par exemple, l'élimination des contrôles d'identité le long des frontières intérieures exige un renforcement des mesures de protection sur les frontières extérieures. Pour ceux qui viennent de l'extérieur de l'espace Schengen, l'accord entraîne donc des inconvénients supplémentaires, puisque les conditions d'entrée dans l'espace Schengen sont devenues plus strictes. De nos jours, dans un monde d'avancement technologique énorme, les lignes de séparation territoriales perdent de leur sens, et le besoin de frontières diminue. Au lieu de cela, et malgré une importance décroissante, les frontières restent au centre de l'attention, comme c'est le cas par exemple dans l'espace Schengen. De plus, le proverbial effet d’effacement des frontières d’Internet réduit considérablement l'effet limitatif des territoires, qui doit être le principe directeur de la réglementation juridique. L'interaction et les réseaux mondiaux constituent un autre exemple de la pertinence décroissante des frontières nationales: l'augmentation constante de l'utilisation de la technologie a été et continuera d'être la force motrice de l’inexorable révolution de l'information. Les ordinateurs puissants, l'extension des réseaux de communication internationaux et, enfin, la disponibilité des canaux haut débit, permettent d'échanger des informations et des données avec pratiquement n'importe quel autre endroit du monde en temps réel. En particulier le cyberespace, l'espace des techniques de l'information et de la communication liées à Internet, est devenu une infrastructure essentielle pour les sociétés de l’information modernes, du fait que d'autres infrastructures cruciales,

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telles que l'alimentation électrique, les banques, les assurances et le transport, en sont fortement dépendantes. Ce n'est pas seulement la vulnérabilité croissante de ces structures face aux cyberattaques qui devient de plus en plus préoccupante, alors que la mise en œuvre de la technologie se développe à un rythme énorme. C’est ici que l’aspect sécurité des frontières entre de nouveau en jeu. En premier lieu, est-il seulement possible de garantir la protection d’un cyberespace apparemment illimité ? Et qui en serait responsable de toute façon? Le processus de la mondialisation rend donc indispensable une stratégie de sécurité capable de s'adapter à cet environnement en constante évolution, et qui réponde à ces nouveaux et complexes défis. C'est un fait qui doit absolument être abordé de manière anticipée. Laissez-moi présenter ma quatrième et dernière hypothèse. Les frontières sont à la fois une malédiction et une bénédiction, mais elles ont perdu et vont continuer de perdre de l’importance à l’avenir. Sur la base des constatations soutenant mes trois premières hypothèses, les conséquences de la mondialisation commencent à se manifester : la mobilité transfrontalière croissante des ressources et l’interdépendance des États dans le contexte de la mondialisation doivent être interprétées comme un signe de l’évolution du rôle des frontières des Étatsnations. Les frontières n'existent plus comme un moyen de structurer et de limiter les transactions sociales, politiques et économiques, ou si elles le font c’est de manière différente, car elles ont tendance à devenir floues et perméables dans les deux sens. L’affaiblissement souhaité des frontières est une conséquence des marchés de capitaux étroitement liés, des relations commerciales et de l'interdépendance, de la division internationale du travail et, en dernier lieu, de l'abaissement des obstacles à la mobilité de la population. Après tout, ces facteurs servent tous les intérêts des économies, et même le commerce mondial dans son ensemble, puisqu'ils développent les flux de ressources de tous types. L’affaiblissement est un processus presque automatique, compte tenu du rythme rapide du progrès technologique. Parfois, cela se produit spontanément, à mesure que les frontières naturelles sont surmontées et qu’un échange d'informations illimité devient possible. Mais les frontières ne sont pas seulement perméables aux flux de biens, de services et d'informations, elles laissent aussi passer le crime et la violence. D'une part, les frontières procurent sécurité et stabilité à une nation, grâce au système de valeurs et de loi en vigueur et à l’exécution de la souveraineté sur le territoire de l’État. Et pourtant d'autre part, si des dispositions suffisantes n'ont pas été prises, elles offrent une certaine perméabilité qui amène une nation, tous ses sous-corps, ainsi que son système de valeurs, à devenir vulnérables. Dès lors, elles commencent à représenter une menace significative pour la sécurité. Mais dans ce cas, comment est-il possible de résoudre le dilemme entre individualité nationale et souveraineté maximales d'une part, et interconnexion croissante des acteurs et de l'action gouvernementale de l'autre? Pour être honnête, je n'ai pas de brevet sur cette question, mais je sais qu'il existe deux sortes de personnes qui franchissent la frontière : les bonnes et les mauvaises. Alors que les bonnes respectent les choses à faire et à ne pas faire de chaque côté de la frontière, les mauvaises abusent des deux systèmes afin d’en tirer le maximum de profit personnel.

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Travaillons donc tous ensembles pour établir, dans des régions sans frontières, les mécanismes politiques et juridiques empêchant les abus et pour harmoniser nos systèmes de valeurs plus ou moins différents.

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WILLKOMMENSREDE: GRENZEN, SICHERHEIT UND GEOPOLITISCHE ASPEKTE Zunächst möchte ich mich bei Ihnen bedanken, dass ich heute über ein wiederkehrendes Thema sprechen kann, das maßgeblich ist und nicht nur aus militärischer Sicht. Die jüngsten politischen Entwicklungen auf der ganzen Welt unterstreichen die explosive Natur des Themas. Wohlverstanden ist, dass dies eine eindeutige Definition und Unterscheidung zwischen den verschiedenen Teilgebieten erfordert, die die Grundlage solchen allgemeinen Untersuchen bilden. Um „Grenzen – Geopolitische und Sicherheitsaspekte“ zu diskutieren, brauchen wir nicht nur eine allgemeine und umfassende Definition des Begriffs „Grenze“, sondern auch sollen wir die Bedeutung der Sicherheit und mein zugrunde liegendes Konzeption von der Geopolitik darstellen. Also, wie definiere ich eine Grenze? Der Begriff „Grenze“ definiert einen Landstrich, der politische Einheiten oder Nationalstaaten trennt. Eine Grenze bezieht sich auf eine Nation, die durch drei Grundzüge gekennzeichnet ist: eine Bevölkerung, eine Verfassung und natürlich das Gebiet selbst. Dies bedeutet, dass eine Nation durch die Bestimmung ihres Territoriums über die Grenzabgrenzung definiert wird. Allerdings gibt es grundsätzlich zwei verschiedene Arten von Grenzen: die Unterscheidung liegt zwischen natürlichen und künstlichen, d.h. „von Menschen geschaffen“ Grenzen. Ältere politische Grenzen zwischen souveränen Staaten fallen oft mit ihren natürlichen Grenzen zusammen. Viele von denen sind schwer zu überwinden, wie Gebirge, Flüsse, Meere, Meerengen, Wüsten, Urwalde oder Hochlande. Eine solche Grenze bildet oft eine sprachliche und / oder kulturelle Grenze gleichzeitig. Dennoch sind die Grenzen nicht notwendigerweise das Ergebnis von Jahrhunderten evolutionärer Prozesse. In vielen Fällen sind sie wegen des Willens der ausländischen Herrscher gegründet worden. Ehemalige Kolonien mit heutigen Grenzen entlang der Breiten und Längengrade sind ein gutes Beispiel dafür. Was ist meine Definition von Geopolitik? Lassen Sie mich mein Verständnis von diesem Konzept in ein paar schnellen Worten skizzieren. Geopolitik ist eine Wissenschaft, die die Auswirkungen der geographischen Fakten und Bedingungen auf einen Staat und seine Politik beschreibt. Nur unter Bezugnahme auf etablierte und aktuelle geographische und räumliche Erklärungsmodelle können wir eine umfassende Analyse und eine Bewertung weltweiter politischer Ereignisse durchführen. Allerdings möchte ich betonen, dass dieser geopolitische Ansatz als neutrales Instrument für die rationale Analyse der politischen Bedingungen dienen sollte und dass es in keiner Weise missbraucht werden muss, um politische Gier zu befriedigen. Am Ende wird die strategische Relevanz der geographischen Bedingungen für einen Staat und seine Politik von Menschen definiert. Was bedeutet für mich Sicherheit? Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Definition der Sicherheit enthält das umfassende Sicherheitskonzept „soziale, ökonomische, ökologische und kulturelle Aspekte, die nur im Kontext multinationaler Interaktion beeinflusst werden können“. Diese Perspektivänderung beruht vor allem auf

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einer erhöhten Erkenntnis der sicherheitsrelevanten Risiken, die sich aus der Beseitigung der Grenzen und ihren globalen Auswirkungen auf die Populationen ergeben. Die internationale Diskussion über die elementare Bedeutung dieses Begriffs ist angesichts von Umweltkatastrophen, Armut, Hunger und Staatsschulden in den Entwicklungsländern sowie der potenziellen Bedrohungen der globalen Migration immer wichtiger geworden. Heute ist das Konzept der globalen (comprehensive) Sicherheit von grundlegender Bedeutung, um vernetzte Sicherheit zu definieren, auch bekannt als der „globale Ansatz“ (Comprehensive Approach). Dieses Konzept setzt sich aus folgenden Elementen zusammen: präventive nationale Sicherheit, multilaterale Koordination, verbündete Institutionen und Zusammenarbeit der Regierungseinrichtung. Es muss jedoch gesagt werden, dass es in Wirklichkeit oft eine leere Phrase ist und nicht ein aktiv angewandtes Sicherheitskonzept. Es kann auf dem Stolz der verschiedenen Abteilungen, Agenturen oder zuständigen Staaten zurückzuführen sein: obwohl jeder koordinierte Aktion als Voraussetzung betrachtet, will niemand koordiniert werden. Das führt mich zu meiner ersten Hypothese: Nationale Grenzen sind von unschätzbarem Wert! Sie befähigen eine Nation in ihrem Hoheitsgebiet souveräne Mächte auszuüben, und sie geben ihr die Zuständigkeit, d.h. die Kompetenz, Rechtsakte für die innerstaatlichen Angelegenheiten einzurichten und anzuwenden. Damit ist die Nation in der Lage, ihr Potenzial auszuschöpfen! Mit anderen Worten feststellen die nationalen Grenzen einem Gebiet, der durch eine bestimmte administrative und rechtliche Ordnung zur Bevölkerung Rechtssicherheit und Stabilität in gewissem Maße verleiht. So gibt es ein staatliches Monopol der Gewaltanwendung. Es kann angewendet werden, um legitimen und gerechtfertigten Druck auf Personen und Institutionen im Staat auszuüben, um das Verhalten der Akteure, die an der öffentlichen Wohlfahrt beteiligt sind, zu beeinflussen. Friedrich II, der Große König von Preußen, stellte schon 1740 fest, dass jeder frei ist, die Dinge auf ihre eigene Weise zu tun. Bis heute ist die Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten eine Grundregel der internationalen Politik. Es beruht auf dem staatlichen Souveränitätsprinzip, das zum ersten Mal in den Westfälischen Frieden von 1648 geschrieben wurde und später ein Bestandteil der internationalen Ordnung wurde. Es wurde auch in Artikel 2 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen festgelegt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist die Souveränität als die territoriale Integrität eines Staates zu verstehen, der niemals durch fremde Einmischung verletzt werden darf. Wir können daher feststellen, dass die Grenzen zwischen Staaten Trennlinien zwischen unterschiedlichen Norm- und Wertsystemen und nicht zwischen Personen und Sachen sind. Meine zweite Hypothese ist, dass Grenzen in Krisenregionen aus Sicherheitsund geopolitischer Perspektive hoch relevant sind. Seit dem Beginn der Zeit haben wir aus verschiedenen Gründen Kriege über den genauen Verlauf der Grenzen geführt. Grenzen in Krisengebieten entstehen in der Regel aus einer willkürlichen Aufteilung des Gebiets. Sie sollen im politischen Kontext ihrer historischen Ära gesehen werden. Als solche waren sie nicht auf bestimmenden Elementen wie einer gemeinsamen Kultur, Religion oder Sprache oder sogar natürlichen Grenzen gegründet. In vielen Fällen wurden aus strategischen Gründen Grenzen geschaffen, wie z. B. die Kontrolle über bestimmte Regionen durch die Etablierung von

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Pufferzonen. Die Konsequenzen, mit denen wir heute konfrontiert sind, sind Staatsgrenzen, die ethnische und kulturelle Gruppen voneinander trennen oder von den betroffenen Nationen nicht akzeptiert werden und daher für die gesamte Region ein starkes Konfliktpotential haben. Es wurde oft gemacht, um staatliche Bildungsprozesse zu verhindern, wenn natürliche Grenzen nicht existierten. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die Grenze zwischen Afghanistan und Pakistan entlang der Durand-Linie. Es wurde im Jahre 1893 gegründet, um die britischen Kolonialstädte im britischen Indien abzugrenzen, und es schneidet durch die Paschtunischen Siedlungsgebiete. Im Jahr 1947, als Pakistan gegründet wurde, wurden diese Siedlungsgebiete in das Staatsgebiet aufgenommen und die Durand-Linie für nichtig erklärte, da die Regierung von Pakistan nicht in den ursprünglichen Vertrag involviert war. Bisher hat diese Grenzfrage viel Konfliktpotential, das Eurocorps täglich erlebt. Gleiches gilt für die Grenzen zwischen der Türkei, Syrien, dem Iran und dem Irak, die eingerichtet wurden, um die Bildung eines kurdischen Staates zu verhindern. Infolge der politischen Entwicklungen in diesen Regionen schuf das Konfliktpotential in Syrien eine Eskalation der Gewalt. Wenn es um die physikalischen Eigenschaften der Grenzen geht, gibt es natürlich verschiedene Arten und Variationen. Obwohl die Grenzen typischer weise mit Zeichen wie Grenzsteinen, Straßenschildern oder Grenzposten markiert sind und präzise durch Koordinaten definiert sind, kennt die Geschichte auch Beispiele extremer Grenzen. Die Berliner Mauer und die Schutzmaßnahmen an der innerdeutschen Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in der letzten Zeit und die noch bestehende Trennung von Israel und Palästina im Mittleren Osten durch einen Meilen-langen (1 609m) Grenzzaun sind zwei Beispiele für die vielen verschiedenen Formen Grenzen nehmen können. In beiden Fällen sind sie nicht eingerichtet worden, um nur zwei verschiedene gesellschaftliche Systeme zu trennen, sondern auch Menschen und Gegenstände. Die bedeutenden Mengen an Baustoffen, die zum Bau solcher Schutzeinrichtungen wie Wachtürme, Wände und Kontrollstelle verwendet werden, und der spätere Bedarf an Personal zum Schutz, zur Kontrolle und Instandhaltung solcher Anlagen sind für die betroffenen Nationen massive Kosten. In Krisengebieten wird jedoch die Auslastung der öffentlichen Mittel für den Schutz der Grenzen die Nation davon abhalten, ihr Potenzial zu verwirklichen, weil diese Mittel dann von Wirtschaft, Wohlfahrt, Infrastruktur, Bildung oder Kultur zurückgehalten werden, um extreme Schutzeinrichtungen zu bauen. Allerdings sind die Sicherheit und Stabilität einer Region stark abhängig von Strukturen, die solide, zuverlässig und – vor allem – in die Zukunft ausgerichtet sind. Meine dritte Hypothese ist die folgende: Aus geopolitischer Sicht und zum Teil aus Sicherheitsgründen verlieren Grenzen zwischen postmodernen Staaten ihre Relevanz. Es muss deutlich betont werden, dass es im Zeitalter der Globalisierung eine beträchtlich wachsende Zahl transnationaler Transaktionen gibt und anschließend eine schwächere staatliche Fähigkeit, eine breite Palette von Ressourcen zu kontrollieren. Aber was sind diese transnationalen Handlungen und Ressourcen? Ich denke vor allem an Information, Waren, Dienstleistungen und Kapital. Sie spielen eine fundamentale Rolle bei der Relevanz der Grenzen, die durch den Grad der Mobilität, der durch mehr und mehr Zusammenschaltung ermöglicht wird, sich ändern.

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So können wir feststellen, dass der Handlungsspielraum auf nationaler Ebene beschränkter wird, während gleichzeitig die geopolitische Relevanz der Grenzen zwischen den postmodernen Ländern deutlich abnimmt. Aber wir können auch feststellen, dass die Sicherheitsrelevanz dieser Grenzen zunimmt, wenn die notwendigen Maßnahmen in verschiedenen Bereichen nicht getroffen wurden. Was verstehe ich unter diesen Maßnahmen? Das Schengener Abkommen kann als solche Maßnahme genannt werden. Es ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie man den Sicherheitsrisiken entgegenwirkt, und zwar wegen der abnehmenden Bedeutung der nationalen Grenzen zwischen postmodernen Staaten. Dieses Abkommen sollte den europäischen Binnenmarkt durch die Abschaffung der Identitätskontrollen an den inner- europäischen Grenzen fördern. Es wurde 1990 als die Deutsche Demokratische Republik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beigetreten umgesetzt und 2005 durch das Vertrag über die Vertiefung der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, insbesondere zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, der grenzüberschreitenden Kriminalität und der illegalen Migration (auch als „Prümer Vertrag“ oder „Schengen-III-Vertrag“ genannt), erweitert. Das Abkommen begründet sogar ein Rechts der polizeilichen Nacheile im gesamten Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum und in der Schweiz. Das Abkommen hat, durch die Abschaffung der Identitätskontrollen, die Durchsetzung der souveränen Befugnisse und Aufgaben durch die Verfolgung von Flüchtende über die Grenzen des Staatsgebiets hinaus erleichtert. Auch wenn es die Souveränität eines anderen Staates in seinem eigenen Hoheitsgebiet unmittelbar beeinträchtigt. Es erlaubt den Mitgliedern des Abkommens, das Verbrechen in den Mitgliedsstaaten effizienter zu bekämpfen. Es ist klar, dass mit solchen Abkommen Grenzen immer mehr durchlässig werden. Auch wenn solche Verträge die Mobilität für Kriminelle natürlich vereinfachen, erlauben sie auch die Intensivierung der transnationalen Zusammenarbeit. Die intensivierte Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Regierungsstellen ermöglicht vereinfachte Informationsaustausche, gemeinsame Funkstreifen innerhalb der Binnengrenzen und grenzüberschreitende Beobachtungen und Verfolgungen. Aber das Abkommen hat auch andere Konsequenzen. Zum Beispiel erfordert die Abschaffung der Identitätskontrollen den Binnengrenzen eine Verstärkung der Schutzmaßnahmen an den Außengrenzen. Also für diejenigen, die außerhalb der Schengen-Raum Grenzen leben, verursacht das Abkommen zusätzliche Unannehmlichkeiten, da die Voraussetzungen für den Eintritt in den SchengenRaum strenger geworden sind. Heute in einer Welt von enormem technologischem Fortschritt, in dem territoriale Grenzlinien ihre Bedeutung verlieren, ist die Notwendigkeit für Grenzen abnehmend. Stattdessen stehen Grenzen mit abnehmenden Bedeutung im Mittelpunkt, wie es z.B. bei Schengen-Raum der Fall ist. Darüber hinaus reduziert die sprichwörtliche grenzüberschreitende Wirkung des Internets die Begrenzungseffekte der Territorien, die das Leitbild der gesetzlichen Regelung sein müssen. Weltweit Interaktion und Netzwerke sind ein weiteres Beispiel für die abnehmende Relevanz nationaler Grenzen: die ständige Steigerung des Einsatzes von Technologie ist und wird auch weiterhin die treibende Kraft hinter der unerbittlichen Informationsrevolution sein. Leistungsstarke Computer, die Erweiterung internationaler Kommunikationsnetze und nicht zuletzt die Verfügbarkeit

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von Breitbandkanälen ermöglichen es, Informationen und Daten mit nahezu jedem anderen Ort in der Welt in Echtzeit auszutauschen. Insbesondere der Cyberspace, d.h. der Raum der Informations- und Kommunikationstechniken, die mit dem Internet verbunden sind. Es ist eine kritische entscheidende Infrastruktur für moderne Informationsgesellschaften geworden, da andere kritische Infrastrukturen wie Stromversorgung, Banken, Versicherungen und Verkehrsmittel stark davon abhängig sind. Es ist nicht nur die wachsende Verwundbarkeit von Cyber-Angriffen auf diesen Strukturen, der eine immer größere Anlass zur Sorge ist, als die Umsetzung der Technologie in einem enormen Tempo entwickelt. Hier kommt der Sicherheitsaspekt der Grenzen wieder ins Spiel. Erstens ist es möglich, den Schutz des scheinbar unbegrenzten Cyberraums zu gewährleisten? Und wer wäre sowieso dafür verantwortlich? Der Prozess der Globalisierung erfordert daher eine Sicherheitsstrategie, die sich an diese ständig verändernde Umgebung anpassen kann und die diese neuen und komplexen Herausforderungen meistern kann. Dies ist eine Tatsache, die sicher im Voraus angesprochen werden muss. Lassen Sie mich meine vierte und letzte Hypothese vorstellen. Grenzen sind gleichseitig eine Verfluchung und ein Segen, aber sie haben verloren und werden weiterhin in der Zukunft an Bedeutung verlieren. Basierend auf den Feststellungen, die meine ersten drei Hypothesen unterstützen, werden nun die Konsequenzen der Globalisierung sichtbar: die zunehmende grenzüberschreitende Mobilität der Ressourcen und die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit der Staaten im Kontext der Globalisierung müssen als Zeichen für die veränderte Rolle der Staatengrenzen interpretiert werden. Grenzen bestehen nicht mehr als Mittel zur Strukturierung und Begrenzung der sozialen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Transaktionen, oder wenn sie es tun, tun sie dies anders, da sie in beide Richtungen verschwommen und durchlässig werden. Die erwünschte Herabsetzung der Grenzen ist eine Folge von eng miteinander verbundenen Kapitalmärkten, Handelsbeziehungen und Interdependenz, internationaler Arbeitsteilung und nicht zuletzt die Senkung der Mobilitätsbarrieren für die Bevölkerung. Am Ende, dienen diese Faktoren den Interessen der Wirtschaft, auch des Welthandels als Ganzes, da sie alle Arten von Ressourcenströmen weiterführen. Die Herabsetzung ist fast ein automatischer Prozess, angesichts der schnellen Geschwindigkeit des technologischen Fortschritts. Manchmal passiert es auch spontan, da natürliche Grenzen überwunden und unbegrenzter Informationsaustausch ermöglicht ist. Aber Grenzen sind nicht nur in Bezug auf den Waren-, Dienstleistungs- und Informationsfluss durchlässig; Sie lassen auch Kriminalität und Gewalt zu. Einerseits leisten die Grenzen Sicherheit und Stabilität für eine Nation, dank des Systems der Werte und des Gesetzes in Kraft und der Durchsetzung der Souveränität in einem Staatsgebiet. Anderseits wenn keine ausreichenden Vorbereitungen getroffen wurden, ermöglichen sie eine Durchlässigkeit, die sowohl eine Nation als auch alle ihre Unterorgane und ihr System von Werten anfällig macht. Auf diese Weise beginnen sie eine signifikante Bedrohung für die Sicherheit zu stellen. Aber wenn ja, wie ist es möglich, das Dilemma zwischen einer hohen nationalen Individualität und Souveränität einerseits und der wachsenden Verbundenheit von Akteuren und Regierungshandlungen andererseits zu lösen?

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Um ehrlich zu sein, habe ich keine Patent Rolls zu diesem Thema, aber ich weiß, dass es zwei Arten von grenzüberschreitenden Pendlern gibt: die guten und die schlechten. Während der Gute die do's und don'ts auf beiden Seiten der Grenze respektiert, missbraucht der Böse beide Systeme, um maximalen persönlichen Vorteil von ihnen zu suchen. So lassen wir uns gemeinsam arbeiten, um politische und rechtliche Mechanismen zu etablieren, die Missbrauch in grenzenlosen Regionen verhindern und unsere mehr oder weniger unterschiedlichen Norm- und Wertesysteme harmonisieren.

PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF THE EU THROUGH ITS EXTERNAL BORDERS1

ANTOINE ULLESTAD “This leaves indeed a rather vast margin. It opens up the possibility to take advantage of the situation in order to find other ways to cut space, new forms of phrasing the words and the world. This is about redistributing places and roles. With this hope on the horizon: to consider the border not only as an arbitrary limit, a dividing barrier but as an exchange zone, a place that is left for us to invest, in short: as a common territory.”2 This article has been written at a critical moment in the European integration. The European Union (EU) is going through various crises which challenge the European integration and suspect its construction; crises which raise the questions of why the EU (is the EU still pertinent?) and how the EU (is the construction of the EU still legitimate?). The methodology on which European construction sits seems disputable. Citizens and governments around the continent doubt the European Union’s ability to defend itself and its members within a system that relies upon the elimination of all types of borders. In the EU, borders should be opened rather than closed. The internal market’s objective is indeed to create an area without internal borders.3 The pertinence of borders is a frequently debated issue – one that has become crucial to the future of European integration and, unfortunately, of the EU itself. In 2016, the world is now more interdependent than ever. The priority given to issues to which solutions cannot be found within the borders of an isolated country – climate change, war against terrorism, migrant crises, etc. These issues intensify countries’ interdependence to such an extent that it seems no longer possible for a nation-state to be autonomous from the phenomenon of globalization. The proliferation of Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs), has also resolutely interconnected States around the planet. Professor Simon Evenett reckons that: “Having played an instrumental role in the development of the rules and institutions of the post-war international economy, European nations (often acting in collaboration) remain a dominant force in the multilateral trading system. Without question, national foreign policy and commercial goals have influenced trade policies of European nations; in addition, they have 1 2

3

The author would like to thank Sophie Planson for her wise advice regarding the content of this article. BALIBAR, E. Europe, Constitution, Frontière, Editions du Passant, Paris, 2005. The original in French : “Voilà qui laisse du jeu, ou plutôt de la marge. A nous d’en tirer profit pour trouver d’autres façons de découper l’espace, de nouvelles manières de phraser les mots et le monde. Histoire de redistribuer les lieux et les rôles. Avec, à l’horizon, cet espoir : envisager la frontière non plus comme une limite arbitraire, une barrière qui sépare, mais comme une zone d’échange, un lieu qu’il s’agit d’investir, bref comme un territoire commun”. Article 26 TFEU.

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signed bilateral trade agreements and multilateral accords with their own interests in mind”.4 While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) were the two main forums to discuss world trade governance, bilateralism seems to be now preferred over multilateralism as a way to deal with national interests in the international arena.5 Globalization is much more than just an economical process. In fact, it is a universal phenomenon – cultural, political, and legal – that puts everything ‘nearby’.6 Globalization has no boundaries, rendering formerly remote countries into close neighbors. Any previously distant culture or civilization now has its own roots in local or regional traditions. By reducing distances and interlinking countries globalization has silently, but decisively, standardized forms of modernity, as it has also reduced demarcations between populations.7 However, as globalization softens traditional borders, and the ‘global’ seems to erases the ‘local’, a reflex arises; a mental and/or material rebuilding of ancient borders to insure that that national identities do not disappear.8 Borders are at the core of globalization; therefore, a study about European borders cannot avoid a joint analysis about globalization. A “Borderless World” is no longer a utopia.9 While we tend to believe that the result of globalization is the complete elimination of all sorts of borders, this is unlikely to ever happen. The condition of the existence of every nation-state and of every human being depends on the existence of them. They are proof of our ability to seize and claim ownership of our planet, to organize on a common territory a unified and sovereign political system that allows us to coexist. Human beings – like nation-states – need limits.10 Simultaneous however, we need to accept that these borders have been modified. In both the traditional and legal sense, borders are lines that separate two different sovereign states and divide up the world in small but distinct sovereign entities. They encircle a state’s territory base and prevent the encroachment of other sovereignties. They also represent the only access point to a territory and thus, its first line of defense. Borders are conceived to last – they are sacrosanct and inviolable – and represent the very essence of a Nation.11 However, a definition of borders which presupposes that relations between states do not evolve with time is too static to fit in an interlinked European legal system. It is based on a preconceived and irrevocable picture of the world, within which states mark their leadership and their differences by tenured means. The EU has often been seen as a laboratory for the transformation of national borders. If we had to evaluate the EU’s changes and draw up a report on their implica4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

EVENETT, S. “EU Commercial Policy in a Multipolar Trading System”, CIGI Working Paper, n° 23, 2007, p. 2. LAIDI, Z. Le reflux de l’Europe, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2013, p. 71. BALIBAR, E. “Une culture mondiale ?”, Lignes, n° 32, 1997, p. 176. LAIDI, Z., “La mondialisation est aussi un imaginaire”, Revue Projet, n° 287, 2005, p. 17. Ibid. OHMAE, K., The Borderless World, Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, Harper Collins, New York, 1999. AMILHAT-SZARY, A-L., Qu’est-ce qu’une frontière aujourd’hui ?, PUF, Paris, 2015, p. 15; D’HUY, P., “Frontières animales”, Médium, n° 24–25, 2010, p. 157 ; BERNAD, M., DE EULATE, A., “La coopération transfrontalière”, Cours de l’Académie de La Haye, 2010, p. 310–325. ALLAND, D., Manuel de droit international public, PUF, Paris, 2014, p. 39 et 40.

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tions, it would be rather difficult to argue that the creation of a borderless Europe has been a mistake.12 Undoubtedly, the existence of borders reduces trade flows. The elimination of “border-effects” within the EU has been a good indicator of the level of economic and political integration, but also an effective way of increasing European growth. Though the EU is going through an identity crisis, its integration remains a success mainly because it rests upon a revolutionary idea. One, which unfortunately many Europeans still have a difficult time accepting; the efficiency of security policies does not depend on closed borders. In fact, the EU has indeed managed to ensure its security through sustainable and open borders. The main reason for this radical change of paradigm is the proven inefficiency of hermetic borders, which limit free movement and control free access, in an effort to protect or securitize an area. The EU seeks to devalue its internal and external borders through trade harmonization policies, similar to the ones conceived by the WTO, but which would impact world borders in a rather different manner. The European project and the WTO have the same objectives. Tariff and non-tariff barrier re-localization remains on European and multilateral agendas.13 While the idea is quite similar, the gap between these two organizations is quite clear. The EU is seeking legal homogenization globally, whereas the WTO focuses on regulatory cooperation. The effect of the EU’s strategy ultimately alters its external borders. Once the area becomes homogenous, borders are relocated to an outer shell. This re-localization marks a distinction between the new homogenous area, including the EU internal market and outer regions, and the rest of the world (as characterized by many autonomous legal systems). Borders are relocated, reconfigured, transformed, yet the question remains of extent to which such a model can be applied to regulate trade with third-party States.14 Firstly, this article intends to examine the extent to which the EU has been able to implement its innovative and ambitious vision of an open and interconnected market in the global economy to become a global actor regulating globalization’s course. Second, this article will look briefly at the way the EU ensures its security in a globalized world by exporting its own vision for the borders through the relations it builds with third-party countries, specifically the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

I. The European contribution to globalization By creating a borderless area, the European project has reinvented the concept of ‘border’ (1), whereby creating a new kind of border in its place; one which positions the EU ‘closer’ to every other area, region, or state in the world, regardless of actual geographical proximity (2).

12 13 14

HEAD, K., MAYER, T., “Effet frontière, intégration économique et Forteresse Europe”, Economie & Prevision, Commerce international, n° 152–153, 2002, p. 71–92 ; Parlement européen, Evaluer le coût de la non Europe 2014–2019, Brussels, 2014. WOOLCOCK, S., “The European acquis and Multilateral trade Rules: Are they Compatible”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, n° 4, 1993, p. 541. FOUCHER, M., Fronts et frontières : un tour du monde géopolitique, Fayard, Paris, 1991, p. 75.

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222 1. A borderless Europe

Border transformation is both consubstantial to the European philosophy and a causal belief that static borders do not fit in an interlinked legal system. War-borders V. Peace-borders The EU is a legal system, one that has been conceived for the sole purpose of preventing potential new conflicts between Nation-States. First, each system rests upon an objective; second, a means to achieve the objective; and third, a set of rules to realize those means (directive, regulation, case law, etc.). The objective that has led European integration was (and still is) peace. As Etienne Balibar explains, Europe is going to be killed by war, if it is not able to exist facing the war.15 Therefore, in order to establish this peace in the long-term, the means require the elimination of the European borders which have been almost unanimously been considered as too rigid to allow any form of economic, political or legal cooperation (that is to say, if we consider the borders as traditionally defined by public international law, cooperation between States is possible, but largely limited by the shortcomings inherent to traditional interstate cooperation) and approximation (that is to say, approximation that does not depend on military annexation). The idea that leads the European project is convergence through means other than cooperation and good will; the EU’s purpose is to unify States and individuals around common goals through the establishment of common legal rules and, thus, the elimination of national borders. Rules leading to a borderless Europe are the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers.16 Border devaluation is at the very core of European construction.17 This analysis is not surprising. Borders have traditionally been conceived of as a war-zone, a place where troops come to wait for an enemy to face.18 They were the incarnation of the divisions that crossed the European continent in the mid20th century and hindered the political and economic unification of Europe.19 A border acts as a prison. It locks up a national conception of the world. It confines both a national identity and sovereignty into a closed, hermetic territory, limiting contact with the outside world and sometimes even prohibiting it. The European challenge, and the key to its success, depends entirely on an awareness of the necessity for the elimination of national borders and the internal market has played a decisive role in this realization. It merged European populations by redefining their sense of belonging and by modifying national definitions of what (or who) constitutes ‘national’ and what (or who) is a ‘foreigner’, and therefore what should be included and what should be excluded from a na15 16

17 18 19

BALIBAR, E., CALVET, C., “Sommes-nous en guerre”, Libération, 16.11.2015. Article 34, 35 and 36 TFEU (free movement of goods) ; Article 20 TFEU (free movement of citizens) ; Article 45 TFEU (free movement of workers), Article 56 TFEU (free movement of services) ; Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capitals) ; Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment). FOUCHER, M., L’obsession des frontières, Tempus Perrin, Paris, 2012, p. 7, 8. Ibid. MATTERA, A., “Le marché intérieur, une brèche dans les dures murailles des souverainetés nationales”, Cahiers de droit européen, 2002, p. 523.

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tional community.20 The elimination of the classic distinction between the national community and an ‘other’, of the ‘neighbor’ as the one on the other side of the border, was a pre-condition to European integration and a premonition that national borders within the EU are no longer necessary. Free movement allows contact and this contact is a prerequisite to building a common feeling of belonging that could overtake national egoism. Thus, European integration has changed the legal lines of demarcation to install a common legal framework. In the best case scenario, this new legal framework does not take into account national preferences. In the worst case scenario, it simply accommodates national egoism to allow a legal merger.21 The traditional definition of borders has to evolve in order to serve the purpose of the EU: “war-borders” must become “peace-borders”. This was the first transformation of European borders. This statement blurs the traditional equation between borders and security. If borders exist because they ensure national and European security, how can the EU ensure its own security in a borderless continent? Borders in an interlinked legal system Borders have to evolve in order to adapt to the EU’s political project. The idea is to bind Member States by a common legal structure that makes war materially and culturally unthinkable – so that they stop considering peace as a simple gentlemen's agreement. Globalization has reconfigured the concept of ‘borders’ and in an interlinked world, borders tend to disappear. The Internet has no borders, just as terrorists, or radioactive clouds do not take them into account when they are moving. In the face of such changes, some Europeans would like to reactivate these traditional borders in order to fortify their differences, perhaps fearing that contact with foreign structures could alter it.22 This consideration explains why it has become popular to hide behind a thick wall, or why it seems easier to reinforce border control when a country wants to prevent a migration crisis from becoming a national issue. In 2016 borders can no longer only be seen as a separation between two distinct States. Today, the world contains many different borders that go beyond this separation, rather they are defined around issues to be solved, conflicts to end or prevent, or areas of influence into which to extend. From a legal perspective, economic integration of the EU blurs the concept of national territories. Mutual recognition in the internal market strengthened the interconnection between European markets by compelling the 28 Member States to accept every product that is legally produced abroad.23 By presuming the equivalence of national interests within the EU, national borders can no longer be the place to control products. Therefore, mutual recognition eradicates protectio20 21 22 23

CAROF, S., Hartemann, A., UNTERREINER, A., “La construction de l’Autre. Définir les identités à la marge dans l’espace européen”, Politique européenne, n° 47, 2015, p. 14. BARBULESCU, R., “Inside Fortress Europe. The Europeanisation of immigrant integration and its impact on identity boundaries”, Politique européenne, n° 47, 2015, p. 24–44. LAIDI, Z., “La mondialisation est aussi un imaginaire”,op.cit., p. 17. WILS, W., “The search for the rule in Article 30 EEC : much ado about nothing ?”, European Law Review, 1993, p. 475.

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nism and eliminates national barriers. Within the EU, a clear distinction between two States is no longer pertinent. This separation is transformed into an organized system of cross-border coordination and cooperation. The success of European integration has motivated the EU to export its vision of devalued borders to the international arena as a tool to organize and regulate world trade. Indeed, “in a globalized world, each party has an interest in seeing that the norms that are recognized on the international scale are as close as possible to its own interests and perspectives, for it is becoming difficult to ensure protection by traditional means.”24 Export of the acquis communautaire is the concrete result of the idea that third-party States should be, “sharing everything with the Union except for its institutions.” The alignment of third-party partners around the European acquis diminishes the risk of European economic units, as they become more able to control foreign legal environments. Globalization does not erase borders; it redesigns them. European borders are instruments of “its invasion by the forces at stake in the outside world, as they are instruments of its protection and its isolation.”25 It becomes quite clear that external borders of the EU act as safety nets. They stabilize the European internal legal structure and represent the projection of European interests throughout the world. These borders embody the European model beyond their original geographical location. Thus, the external borders of the EU are a rather modern defense mechanism that protects the European internal structure through the global extension of its norm. Etienne Balibar implies this when writing, “foreigners outside the European norm jam the uniqueness of the globalization and of the EU,” and the defense of the European specificity depends on the homogenization of the world legal structure.26 When trying to homogenize the world legal system by projecting its norms – and by extension relocating its external borders – the EU pacified the forces of globalization through its own political and legal choices. The EU has at least two kinds of borders: an immediate border – a “post-border” – glued to the area it intends to protect; and a more remote border – a “preborder” – sometime opened, sometime closed, not located at a predefined place, constantly moving and ensuring the protection of the vital interests of the EU.27 The EU’s security depends on the efficiency of these new pre and postborders. Food safety, consumer protection, energy and public security, are issues which cannot be solved in the same place. Control spreads through time and space. It is no longer focused on the physical border when imports enter the national market, hence implying that borders, as security, are conceived and understood as a plural concept.

24 25 26 27

LAIDI, Z., A normative hegemon ? The unintended consequences of the European power, Paper for the 6th ELIAMEP European Seminar “The Delphic Oracle on Europe: Politics and Policies”, Delphi, Greece, 25–28.6.2009, p. 4. BALIBAR, E., Europe, Constitution, Frontière, op.cit., p. 105. The original in French : “[les frontières de l’Europe unifiée] sont tout autant un instrument de son invasion par les forces du monde extérieur qu’un instrument de sa projection et de son isolement”. Ibid., p. 102. The original in French : “les étrangers hors de la norme européenne viennent dérayer l’unicité de la mondialisation et de l’Union européenne”. FOUCHER, M., Fronts et frontières : un tour du monde géopolitique, op. cit., p. 75.

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2. European external borders building process The EU faces a great challenge: the European project is no longer exclusively European, it is worldwide. In a globalized world, every system is subject not only to internal pressure, but also to external ones that may influence, even alter, the internal structure. The norm has been used as a tool by the EU, both within the EU and outside the EU as a bargain instrument with third-party States in order to ensure the defense of its own structure by building new external borders. The power of the European norm Within the EU the norm occupies a major role. In fact, the use of the norm is consubstantial with the European project itself.28 It reasons that, as the EU has been conceived as an instrument to defeat war, it would not count on military assumptions, or more generally speaking, the use of force to unify and discipline its Member States. Therefore, the European project rests upon the idea that a legitimate supranational norm can rule European affairs by diminishing national sovereignty without completely erasing it.29 EU law interconnects the European legal systems and guarantees their interoperability. In the EU, Member States can no longer act unilaterally. They can no longer write new technical regulations regarding commercialization of goods without consulting the opinion of all other Member States or the Commission. Neither is it possible, (as the negotiations surrounding the Brexit prove) to restrict welfare benefits to nationals only, without obtaining the approval of the whole Union. Undoubtedly, Member States are all bound by a set of rules that decide how they shall act and not act in the European area. The European norm controls and masters Member States’ behavior. In the EU influence does not depend on military power. Traditional diplomacy has been effectively replaced by a game of political and normative influence within the Council of Ministers and the European Council. It seems that a State’s true power today lies in its ability to compel a trade partner to adopt its norm. Behind the free trade of goods and services lies a standard and thus a norm, which would by extension also move freely across free-trading borders. It is a way of creating regulations that penetrate every market in Europe. Environmental, social, and sanitary standards move freely and penetrate the depths of one’s national legal system. This process reshapes a state’s legal body. On the international scene, outside the European scope, the norm is the only efficient European tool influencing an interlinked and interdependent world. Though the EU is not a traditional ‘superpower’, it excels in two particular sectors.30 First, the internal market became a great lever on the international scene and allowed the EU to emerge as ‘trading power’. The internal market of the EU is an economic monster. Both the size and efficiency of this market depend on a highly institutionalized and regulated system that has placed the EU as a precursor in 28 29 30

LAIDI, Z., La norme sans la force, L’énigme de la puissance européenne, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2013, p. 18–60. Ibid. Ibid.

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regional economic integration.31 Norms regulating the functioning of the internal market are highly restrictive, and thus, particularly protective.²² To allow free access, the internal market compels foreign exporters to respect its standards of protection, and it is in that sense, it becomes a rather effective political and legal bargaining tool.32 The economic capacity of the internal market gives the EU a great advantage when it comes down to mastering the outcomes of global trade liberalization. Some third countries have interpreted this strategy as interference in their national politics and as an alteration of their sovereignty: “On October 25th 2007 the Wall Street Journal published a blistering attack on Europe entitled “Regulatory Imperialism”. The editorial took issue with Europe’s intent to force its norms on the rest of the world by taking advantage of the dynamism of its internal market both affluent and attractive and in addition highly organized. Examples cited included the Microsoft Affair, the ban on the importation of chlorine-rinsed poultry, the Reach legislation on chemical products, as well as the plan to tax airline companies as part of the battle against climate change”.33 Second, the EU excels in norm-making. According to Professor Laidi, the use of the norm is the only mean by which the EU can spread its influence and change the course of globalization: “So if Europe won’t remain a great power, how can she appear powerful? Probably by strengthening what remains its major political resource: its ability to produce and implement a worldwide set of standards capable of organizing the world, to discipline its actors’ strategies, to introduce predictability in their behaviors, to develop their sense of common responsibility, to offer to those who engage in that direction, especially the weakest, the possibility of, at least partially, make these norms binding on all, including the world's most powerful”.34 The European norm has become a decisive instrument when acting in the international arena. It leaves an obvious feeling that the EU has the ability to shape and determine international standards by giving its own norms a universal reach.35 Therefore, the EU is also almost undoubtedly a normative power.36 This

31 32 33 34

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GSTÖHL, S., “The European Union’s trade policy”, Ritsumeikan International Affairs Vol. 11: 2013, p. 1–22 ; WOOLCOCK, S., “European Union trade policy”, in: The new Palgrave dictionary of economics online, 2011, p. 4. MEUNIER, S., NICOLAIDIS, K., “The European Union as a conflicted trade power”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 2011, p. 906–925. LAIDI, Z., A normative hegemon ? The unintended consequences of the European power, op.cit.,p. 1. Ibid. The original in French : “Si donc l’Europe ne sera pas une grande puissance, comment pourra-t-elle faire puissance ? Probablement en renforçant ce qui reste sa ressource politique majeure : sa capacité à produire et mettre en place à l’échelle du monde un dispositif aussi large que possible de normes capables d’organiser le monde, de discipliner le jeu de ses acteurs, d’introduire de la prévisibilité dans leurs comportements, de développer chez eux le sens de la responsabilité collective, d’offrir à ceux qui s’engagent sur cette voie, et notamment les plus faibles, la possibilité au moins partielle de rendre ces normes opposables à tous, y compris aux plus puissants du monde”. MANNERS, I., “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, p.235–258; MANNERS, I., “The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics”, Danish Institute for International Studies Brief, May 2009.

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is what Roman Prodi assessed when he said, “our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given the necessary institutional reforms, it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also work globally.”37 The internalization of the EU goes beyond promoting normative standards in its external relations with third-party States. The whole strategy relies upon the idea that method of EU integration is the best way to guarantee security at the EU’s border and beyond.38 The EU uses both its ‘trading power’ and its ‘normative power’ to achieve two goals. First, the EU seeks to protect its own internal market and to maximize its ‘trading power’ by opening new markets and gaining free access to other regions. Externalization of the internal market prevents any subsequent alterations when opening it to third-party countries because the EU’s trade partner agrees to play by the rules of the EU. Therefore, the EU gains access to the new market without having to address the question of security. Externalizing the internal market is the best way to ensure protection of national interest at EU’s border. Second, the EU uses this strategy to diffuse its trade standards of protection throughout the world. The EU plays a major role in the regulation of trade liberalization globally by promoting its own model. Therefore, spreading its norms beyond its borders into the core of other third-party legal systems is seen as a way of ensuring peace and stability around the globe and as a way to avoid the alteration of the EU’s internal structure, which is considered the best when it comes to maintaining a high level of protection for the national interest. The use of this strategy has the ultimate consequence of building new European external borders and re-shaping the international landscape. The export of EU norms homogenizes the world legal system. When the legal system of thirdparty countries resembles the EU’s own legal system, the initial borders that previously separated these two legal units are devalued. This assumption is, in fact, the ambivalence’s symptom of the EU on the global scene. If the internal market’s very existence is linked to its level of integration in global trade, the EU won’t sacrifice its values and level of protection in the search of opening third markets. Protection of the internal market is a priority that justifies the construction of occasionally closed borders; when the EU reckons its interests are being jeopardized or endangered by world trade liberalization.

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The conditions to the Normative Power Europe: normative intent: the seriousness/ genuineness of normative commitment; (ii) normative process: the extent to which an inclusive and reflexive foreign policy (promoting universal norms) is pursued (vs. an ‘our size fits all’ approach); (iii) normative impact: the development of norms in third countries. While the first and second dimensions are more inward-looking (why/how does the EU act?), the third dimension is more outward-looking (does the EU induce change?), see NIEMANN, A., DE WEKKER, T., “Normative power Europe? EU relations with Moldova”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 14, 2010. http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-014a.htm (2.6.2016). Speech to the 2nd COMECE Congress, Brussels, SPEECH/00/115. BÖRZEL, T. RISSE, T., “Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration”, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 7, September 2009.

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The EU contributes to globalization by exporting its trademark – the internal market – which is basically nothing more than a derived form of world liberalization, with the exception that is far more regulated. “[The] EU’s own experience in creating a common market reinforces the EU’s willingness to pursue a global order based on predictable rules. In forming the EU, the Member States retained their sovereignty. The only way to bind them to the common European enterprise was to have them adhere to common rules designed to create an internal market. More regulation meant more predictability and stability. This has fostered a belief within the EU that an extensive regulatory system is needed to preserve global public goods. The EU takes the view that trade liberalization without simultaneous harmonization of policies fails. This, for the EU, offers the most efficient and universally valid model of economic and political integration”.39 Consequently, it seems that the external border of the EU distinguishes an internal market within which trade is submitted to a strict standard of protection, as well as a wider area in which trade is less regulated. That is why the EU exports its acquis communautaire and seeks to implement it in the legal system of thirdparty countries.40 This strategy tends to normalize the international scene and duplicates the EU’s structure. Export of the acquis communautaire protects the interests and values of the EU by homogenizing the global legal system. The EU is no longer an isolated island. It becomes surrounded by legal systems that are compatible to its own. The export of the acquis communautaire changes the global trade system and therefore moves EU external borders. EU liberalization of trade is a model which impacts its economic partners. As a normative power, the EU requires its partners to line up on EU legislation. This process alters the legal identities of third-party countries. The urgent need to invest the rest of the world has created a new ratio of power between internal (within the EU) and external forces (coming from countries located outside the EU). These confrontations create new demarcations, “worldwide borders,” between the legal system of the EU and those who reject its model.41 Currently, influence is not only militaristic, but legal, economic, and cultural. Borders of a new nature and of a diminished importance – as opposed to the logic of integration and transnational networks – are rising. European integration has exported its vision of national borders throughout the world. That is why the world seems to be more shaped according to political and legal synergy and antagonism, rather than by military influence.42 The EU, as a normative power, reduces those antagonisms between its own legal system and that of third-party countries in order to approximate their structures and incorporate the external 39 40 41 42

BRADFORD, A., “Exporting standards: The externalization of the EU’s regulatory power via markets”, International Review of Law and Economics, 2014, p. 8. PETROV, R., “Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of Third Countries”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2008, p. 33–52. BALIBAR, E., Europe, Constitution, Frontière, op.cit., p. 95. The original in French : “frontière monde”. Ibid.

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legal systems into its own. This is what the EU does when negotiating a FTA and where these new “worldwide borders” are created. This phenomenon leads to the “cartographic illusion”: where do the external borders of the EU really lie? Are they still constituted by the sum of every Member States that encloses the EU (the geographical edges of the EU) or are they being pushed back and forth to new horizons? Are the external borders in Gibraltar and Hungary, or are they in South Korea, Morocco, Ukraine and Norway?43

II. The “cartographic illusion”: the examples of the TTIP and the EEA FTAs initiated by the EU are a major contributor to this redesign of EU external borders. The content of an EU trade agreement depends on the nature of its parties. EU external borders differ when it comes to negotiating with a powerful partner like the United-States (1) or a partner that may not have the ability to oppose the EU norm (2). 1. The TTIP: the issue of norm convergence The TTIP is the symbol of EU’s new trade policy, which consist of spreading EU standards worldwide through bilateral agreements rather than through multilateral forum. This new strategy impacts the permeability of EU’s external borders. The EU’s new trade policy The TTIP was officially launched on 17 June 2013. In a way, the TTIP will be the fulfillment of an ongoing reality: The United States (US) and the EU are each other’s main trading partner. Their relations in the fields of trade and investment are the largest in the world, representing 31% of world trade and over 53% of world GDP.44 The TTIP goes after the creation of the biggest free-trade area in the world, embracing both the EU and the United States of America; that is to say, the creation of a common market for about 820 million consumers characterized by common and simplified norms. The economic, political, and geopolitical significance of the TTIP is such that, whatever the result is, it is going to influence the rules and norms of global trade liberalization. The main objective of the TTIP is indeed to shape a ‘harmonized monster’ of economic and political standards that could compete with emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil. Hence, control of world trade is at stake for two reasons: First, the size of the transatlantic free trade area will ensure its leadership in trade globalization and to which access will soon become a political bargaining tool. Second, this bilateral FTA might hopefully raise the efficiency of the WTO, as “there may be sufficient

43 44

OHMAE, K., De l’État-nation aux États-régions, Dunod, Paris, 1996, p. 7–21. http://eeas.europa.eu/us/index_fr.htm (2.6.2016).

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convergence in the language of certain provisions that their codification into multilateral trade agreements may well be less challenging that appears at present.”45 Beyond its objectives, the TTIP has become the symbol of the EU’s new strategy to regulate globalization. The EU seems to favor the path of bilateralism rather than the use of multilateralism; considering bilateralism to be more effective to disseminate its standards beyond the EU borders.46 The multilateral trading framework provided by the WTO has indeed showed its limits.47 Professor Evenett foresees that: “Given the limited prospects for successful EU bilateral trade initiatives with Brazil, China, and India, whether the EU likes it or not, all roads lead back to the WTO. However, the very difficulties that the EU, China, and India, in particular, may have in making substantial reforms in the context of reciprocal trade agreements, suggest that the market-opening role of the WTO is likely to be demoted in the years to come”.48 The TTIP is a FTA of a ‘new generation’, characterized by the predominant role left to standards negotiation.49 This new type FTA aims at creating free-trade areas in which borders are devalued (they have no protectionist or discriminatory dimension) in order to enable free movement of goods and services. To ensure the devaluation of European external borders, the new generation of FTA contains a large dimension aimed at neutralizing regulatory barriers that result from different legal orders. Therefore, the goal is not only to remove tariff barriers to trade or ensure free access to the market by technical quotas or generalized preferences. This is where the TTIP goes beyond the definition that the ECJ gives of trade policy. American legislation and European norms are, for instance, rather different. Crossing the Atlantic and entering the European or the American market implies, among other things, respect for the legislation of both markets. Over a thousand different norms exist between the US and the EU, which hinders market access. The Atlantic Ocean is therefore one that is difficult to cross for all kinds of goods and even for more services. For instance, EU law requests white car lights, whereas the cars produced under US law have yellow lights. This slight difference between legislations makes exports very difficult. Car producers have to produce two different types of cars: one especially designed for the American market, and one destined to enter the European market. Protection of EU’s interests depends on the opening of its external borders and the dissemination of its standards. The EU is indeed, a legal set of ‘high standards’. Its environmental, social, and sanitary norms are among the highest in the world. Professor Laidi interprets this continuous movement towards the consolidation of European standards as a commercial insulation factor on the 45 46 47 48 49

EVENETT, S. “EU Commercial Policy in a Multipolar Trading System”, op.cit., p. 33; LAIDI, Z. Le reflux de l’Europe op.cit., p. 79–100. LAIDI, Z. Le reflux de l’Europe op.cit. EVENETT, S. “EU Commercial Policy in a Multipolar Trading System”, op.cit., p. 8; WOOLCOCK, S., “The European acquis and Multilateral trade Rules: Are they Compatible”, op.cit., p. 539. Ibid. p. 31. SAUDRAIS, R., “Accords de Libre-Echange nouvelle génération : bilan deux ans après l’entrée en vigueur de l’ALE UE-Corée du Sud et perspective pour les accords en cours”, Friedland Papers, n° 41, 2013.

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international scene.50 High standards are indeed resolutely defensive. As “protective norms,” they might deter access to the European market and strengthen the Union’s external borders.51 These standards must therefore be adopted by its trading partners if the EU doesn’t want to be completely isolated from world trade. The EU plays a decisive and almost exclusive role regarding its security, tending to protect the public interest rather than the intensification of uncontrolled liberalization. This strategy is reinforced by the regulatory dimension given to the FTAs: the EU is ready to open its internal market on the condition that its standards are adopted by the third legal order. Third-party states must line-up on the EU model, or give up any ambition of penetrating the internal market. Devaluation of EU external borders can only be definite if the EU can guarantee its security. If the EU focuses on high standards of protection, all parties involved in international trade cannot guarantee equivalent standards. Substantial normative gaps, due to different legal preferences, means that not all priorities can be met with consensus. To ensure its protection, the Union must disseminate its model and project its own standards beyond its borders. The adoption of EU standards, and their incorporation by the legal order of a third-party country, appears as the essential condition for FTA ratification and the devaluation of the European external borders. The third-party State resembles Member States’ legal order without being a member of the Union. The TTIP is the symbol of a new European trade policy. The focus is on regulatory convergence rather than on regulatory cooperation. It aims to produce standards to regulate trade which will imprint on the rest of the world. The first challenge is the protection of trade, and indirectly, of the EU. The combination of the regulatory dimension of this FTA and the normative dimension of the EU homogenizes both legal areas and the borders between the EU and the US are the first to be impacted by this strategy. Where are the borders between the EU and the United States? Often, European policies have to be rigid to be effective. That is to say, they have to follow a preconceived and irrevocable pattern. For instance, the inflexibility of infringement policy in the internal market has undoubtedly managed to make an area without borders. Nevertheless, in some cases the EU cannot afford to be too rigid if it wants to shape credible policies. The internationalization of the European space cannot answer to an inflexible strategy. The export of the acquis communautaire is an obvious example. Although the pattern is rather predetermined, the modalities for its implementation are widely adjustable to the objective of the agreement and to the nature of the partner it faces when negotiating the content of FTAs.52 The export of the acquis communautaire depends on the nature of the ‘receiving’ State 50 51 52

LAIDI, Z., La norme sans la force, op. cit., p. 95. Ibid. The original in French: “normes protectrices”. MADDALON, P., Les compétences externes de l’Union européenne et leurs utilisations après le Traité de Lisbonne, in : Le droit des relations extérieures de l’Union européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p. 23–40.

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and the ambition of the export changes, depending upon whether the receiving State is attracted by the EU or not. The content of the FTAs varies significantly, whether negotiated with an equivalent of the EU (an autonomous system of the European legal order) or with an influenced State (a legal system that cannot be free of the influence of European law).53 The EU is perceived as a global actor from small countries but as an equal from other global actors who have no need to accept the EU model without reciprocity. It is easier for the EU to be a model for those States which do not have the economic, political, or legal power to force negotiation. For example, the discussions between the US and the European Union cannot be similar to those between the Union and less powerful states, such as Norway, Switzerland, or Mexico for instance. The US is an economic and political giant and a major partner for the EU, in yet complicated to apprehend. The US is not naturally attracted to the European norms and relatively autonomous with regard to legal issues in Europe. The autonomy of the American legal and economic systems does not depend upon legal evolutions within the EU. Therefore, the EU cannot unilaterally export its political and legal achievements. Consequently, it is unlikely that the US would agree to amend their legislation into alignment without concession or reciprocity of the European legal model. There are two different methods to approximate the standards of two distinct legal systems. Both impact differently the external borders of the EU, but maintain with the same intensity the security of the European area. The first one is the harmonization of the European and the American legal systems. Harmonization implies that the US and the EU amend their respective standards in order to make them approximate. The second one is mutual recognition. The EU recognizes the American norms only if they are equivalent to its own rules in terms of protection. The US standards become acceptable from a European perspective and vice-versa. This strategy avoids blockage, since it implies that neither legal orders need to match. Approximation would indeed expose obvious political obstacles because the US or the EU would have to admit that one norm is more legitimate than the other. The question is, is there enough room for mutual recognition? It is important that standards are not too far apart which may limit the normative convergence of some technical issues. At the same time, it avoids flooding the European market with GMOs. Around three million Europeans are opposed to the transatlantic market, which embodies (to its opponents) the most advanced and extreme form of trade liberalism. They fear the battle over the convergence of legislations will lead towards a downward leveling of the EU’s high standards of protection. However, this is unlikely to happen. Greenpeace released documents showing that the TTIP contains a chapter on “regulatory cooperation.”54 The TTIP seems to advocate an approach centered on the mutual recognition of legislation in areas where the European and American norms and standards are relatively similar. The conception of a mutual recognition system is used to connect the US and European legal systems, while allowing them to maintain their specificity. Mutual recognition is the highest form of free movement of goods. It guarantees freedom of movement in areas where it is installed because it implies that levels of protection are equi53 54

LAIDI, Z., Le reflux de l’Europe, op.cit., p. 79. TTIP-Leaks by Greenpeace, https://ttip-leaks.org/(2.6.2016).

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valent both in the US and the EU. Mutual recognition eliminates ‘double controls’ and represents one of the most pertinent examples of border devaluation, resulting in the disappearance of their discriminatory burden. Therefore, in the context of the TTIP, as long as the security of both areas is guaranteed, the external border of the EU is no longer pertinent. Mutual recognition connects the American and European legal systems, yet they are still not homogenized. The EU’s external border is occasionally devalued in the areas included by the mutual recognition principle. The American legal system remains specific; it does not implement the acquis of the internal market, since it does not need to change its legislation. EU external borders do not disappear, though it may be permeable. 2. The EEA: cloning the EU’s system The European Economic Area (EEA) shows another method of how the EU protects itself through its external borders. The EEA is considered a model of its kind, as it has shaped the most integrated area beyond EU borders. The EU has managed indeed to duplicate its own domestic market to countries that are not members of the EU (A). Therefore, since the approximation of both legal systems is complete, the EU external border has been moved on a new outer shell now encompassing Europe of 28 plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (B). This relocation ensures EU security by effective export of its acquis. Externalizing the internal market The agreement on the EEA was signed in Porto, Portugal on 2 May 1992 between the EU and the States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The EEA agreement came into force on 1 January 1994. Today the EEA embraces Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, as well as all of 28 EU States. This agreement aims at fully integrating third countries to the internal market. To do this, the agreement is entirely based on the export of the acquis communautaire. The EEA agreement is the most pertinent example to underline EU’s ability to devalue its external border when acting as both a ‘trading power’ and a ‘normative power’. The efficiency of the EEA agreement rests upon the export of the acquis communautaire and the premise that these third-party countries implement EU legislation into their own legal system. The high intensity of the export of the acquis of the internal market implies that the EU does not ‘share’ small parts of its internal market but ‘externalizes’ it all to EFTA/EEA States.55 It means that the EU aims at reaching a high level of cooperation and a real symmetry of relations between the EU and the EFTA/EEA States. Firstly, within the EEA, liberalization implies the elimination of customs duties and taxes having equivalent effects to the import and to the export of goods (Article 10 of the Agreement, which reproduces the formulation of the Article 30 TFUE), and secondly, the elimination of non-tariff barriers such as quantitative restriction and measures having equivalent effect. These provisions are the exact 55

Ibid at 31.

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copy of the articles in the Lisbon Treaty regarding free movement of goods. They guarantee the devaluation of the borders between the EEA and the EU, in the same way they that they neutralized national borders inside the EU. Furthermore, the terminology and the content of these provisions leaves no doubt regarding their binding character. The acquis communautaire on the free movement of goods in the EEA Agreement must be adopted and implemented as such in the legal system of the EFTA/EEA States. These norms projected in the EEA legal order do not aim at simply ensuring market access, but they put the AELE/EEE States on an equal footing with Member States.56 Therefore, the legal structure of the EU, in terms of European norms regulating the functioning of the internal market, bypasses in effect the external borders of the EU through the EEA Agreement. The building of a new external border Contrarily to the US, EFTA / EEA member States are affected by EU law and political developments in Europe. EFTA/EEA countries share an attraction to European norms and, therefore, welcome it with open arms. This can explain the permeability of the external border between the EU and the EFTA/EEA member States. The EU indeed has a leading role when it comes to negotiation with EFTA/AELE States. The EU is perceived as a global actor from which small countries, like Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, naturally come to look for inspiration in order to reform their legal order or guarantee free access to the internal market. It is most likely easier for the EU to be a model in for those States which do not have the economic, political, or legal strength to dispute its influence. In Norway’s case, the EEA is more important to Oslo than it is to the EU. Norway shares the values of the EU, as well as its history, political traditions and legal culture. Norway has always been influenced by the political, economic and cultural developments of the EU. Although Norway is not formally a member of the EU, mutual trust exists between them and guarantees the pursuit of economic integration. The situation of Liechtenstein is not so different. From a geographical standpoint, Lichtenstein is a European country surrounded by Switzerland, Austria and Germany. In short, Lichtenstein is enclosed by a European group of States that respond to EU law. From a legal standpoint, Lichtenstein is a small island lost in the European ocean. Its size, remarkably small (sixth smallest country in the world) and its location restrains its ability to negotiate with the EU. The situation of Iceland is quite similar. Iceland has no means to engage with the EU in a normative battle. Its geographical location and economic weight pleads (pragmatically) towards its integration into the nearest normative partner; the EU. These are few of the reasons which explain why the EFTA/EEA contracting parties have aligned their entire legislation on the basis of the EU and why there are no debates when it all comes down to applying EU norms. The export of the EU norm is complete and ensures protection of the internal market. The EU’s 56

EFTA Court, Mag Instrument Inc c/ California Trading Company Norway, aff. E-2/97, 3 december 1997, p. 27; EFTA Court, Erla Maria Sveinbjörnsdottir c/ Iceland, aff. E-9/97, 12 november 1997, p. 59.

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external borders, initially located in Denmark, Sweden (excluding Norway and Iceland as it also did with Liechtenstein), are now relocated as this area becomes homogenous. Contrarily to the TTIP, the EEA is the cloning of the EU system. Mutual recognition facilitates free movement and devalues the external border of the EU, however within the EEA, completed by an approximation system that duplicates the EU’s entire legislation in the EFTA/EEA area. When the EU is placed in a position of normative superiority, the content of external agreements is extensive and legally binding. The EFTA/EEA countries are integrated to the European internal structure, as if they were European Member States. Mutual recognition is no longer sufficient. It is completed by an approximation system. From an EU perspective, legal harmonization solves all security issues. The EU constrains EFTA/EEA countries to enter the same normative game that the EU developed during its own construction, binding its Member States in an integrated internal market. Most importantly, it ensures that foreign legal systems meet the same protection requirements of the general interest that those governing the internal market. The external border of the EU is devalued, as it is also deconstructed. The intensity of the export of the acquis communautaire makes the borders between these three third-party States and the EU disappear. The external border of the EU has been moved to a new outer edge, which embraces now the EFTA/EEA countries. Within the EEA, the efficiency of this harmonization system rests on the homogeneity principle. The latter allows for the porosity of the borders between the EU and the EFTA/EEA countries.57 Certainly, the homogeneity principle prevents new trade obstacles from endangering the legal homogeneity of the whole area. The homogeneity principle is also an effective counterpart of the borders’ neutralization. By requesting that the EFTA/EEA countries constantly update their legislation to the new EU regulations coming into force, the EU forces the EFTA/EEA countries to maintain a high level of protection of their national interest according to what has been decided within the internal market. The objective is not only to mutually recognize its norms and legislations but to change the EFTA/EEA legal system. The highly elaborate institutional cloning of the EU system is also a means to ensure the approximation of both legal systems. There are only few examples of external agreements making such an export and effectively creating ad hoc institutions to monitor and implement the evolution of the acquis communautaire. The existence of these institutions presupposes that a particularly high degree of integration with third parties is sought.

Conclusion This article has attempted to show that one’s security does not depend necessarily on closed borders. The analysis of the EU’s strategy to influence world trade liberalization has shown that the external borders of the EU are no longer located where one expects them to be. Globalization has modified the very definition of borders. European borders seem to have found the limits to their own functional57

FORMAN, J., “The EEA Agreement Five Years On: Dynamic Homogeneity in Practice and Its Implementation by the Two EEA Courts”, CMLR, n° 4, 1999, p. 753.

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ity. Designed as a firewall between two distinct sovereignties, they inherently possessed an explosive dimension, obsolete in a world that is no longer conceived in rigid opposition but rather by close cooperation. The world map seems to have changed considerably. It is perhaps more pertinent to represent the globe by an accumulation of distinct homogenous regions that represent countries willing to work together without any consideration of geographical proximity. Is it that difficult to accept that the furthest of EU external borders could be Asia or the USA? These new borders are unique, though they’ve lost considerable precision. The external borders of the EU are amongst these new borders. They are lines that redistribute the world map according to legal closeness, rather than by political separation. They reflect the intricacy and the entanglement of various legal areas58.The mobility of these borders and their new locations are a sign of normative enlargement and hence mark a new way to ensure the area’s security.

ASSURER LA SÉCURITÉ DE L’UE PAR SES FRONTIÈRES EXTÉRIEURES La mondialisation est un phénomène total dont il n’est vraisemblablement plus possible de s'affranchir. En réduisant les distances et en intensifiant les flux, elle a fait de la frontière un concept mouvant. En effet, la mondialisation lime la frontière pour laisser passer de plus en plus de commerce. Mais elle joue aussi avec elle, la déplace et la délocalise. C'est le projet de l’Union européenne que de réaliser ces mutations par le droit. Dans la mondialisation, la frontière européenne devient plurielle, sans cesse en déconstruction et en reconstruction, à l’intérieur d’un espace ou à ses confins, ouverte comme un horizon de coopération ou fermée comme une limite hermétique ou une protection. L’utilité de la frontière n’est alors plus de séparer deux souverainetés mais de sécuriser l’espace qu’elle enserre par une stratégie particulière de protection, qui résulte de son adaptation à un monde juridiquement et économiquement interconnecté.

DIE GEWÄHRLEISTUNG DER EU-SICHERHEIT ÜBER IHRE AUßENGRENZEN Globalisierung ist ein globales Phänomen, von dem es vorrausichtlich nicht mehr möglich ist, sich zu befreien. Durch die Verringerung der Distanzen und die Intensivierung der Handelsströme hat sie die Grenze zu einem beweglichen Konzept gemacht. Tatsächlich feilt die Globalisierung die Grenze ab, um mehr und mehr Handel durchzulassen. Aber sie spielt auch mit ihr, bewegt sie und lagert 58

BLUMANN, C., Frontières et Limites. in La frontière, Colloque de Poitiers de la SFDI, Pedone, Paris, 1980, p. 3–33.

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sie aus. Es ist ein Projekt der EU, diese Veränderungen durch das Gesetz zu gewährleisten. In einer globalisierten Welt wird die europäische Grenze vielseitig, ständig innerhalb eines Raumes oder an ihren Grenzen dekonstruiert und rekonstruiert, offen als Horizont für Kooperation oder geschlossen als hermetische Grenze oder als Schutz. Der Nutzen der Grenze ist also nicht mehr nur der, zwei Gebietshoheiten voneinander zu trennen, sondern den von ihr umschlossenen Raum durch eine besondere Schutzstrategie zu sichern, die sich aus ihrer Anpassung an eine rechtlich und wirtschaftlich vernetzte Welt ergibt.

CONFLICTS OVER SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE IN THE SO-CALLED POST-SOVEIGNTY ERA JAUME CASTAN PINOS While aiming to shake some of the dominant narratives and conceptions concerning sovereignty and territoriality in the European Union, this chapter intends to contest the so called post-sovereignty approach that deems territorial and sovereignty related problématiques as epiphenomena; or at least as phenomena belonging to a different era. Such disputes are often labelled, with a clearly negative and démodé connotation, as Westphalian. One of the core arguments is that trends such as interdependence, increasing international trade, mobility, migration, cross-border cooperation, European integration, and the development an incipient form of global identity, leads to an inevitable demise of sovereignty. The current chapter does not intend to undermine such developments but to challenge the causal relationship established between these phenomena and the postsovereignty, post-territorial argument. In other words, sovereignty or at least some forms of sovereignty seem to be fully compatible with mobility and globalization. The chapter is divided in four parts. Firstly, some reflections about territorial and sovereignty conflicts will be critically discussed. Subsequently, it will be argued that the EU represents a fertile ground for these sorts of disputes. To illustrate this argument, the chapter will explain and scrutinise the impact of supranational, interstate and sub-national clashes in the European Union.

I. They do not know it, but they are doing it As O’Dowd argues, one of the problems of the narratives that advocate the postnational new world order is that they undermine the complexity and flexibility of a “state’s infrastructural power and its territorializing thrust.” More worryingly, they fail to grasp that “we continue to live in a world of diverse states.”1 For the sake of this chapter’s argument, it is necessary to state one of its core assumptions: far from disappearing, borders enjoy enviable health, and partly due to this, they are susceptible to causing friction between neighbours or between state actors and sub-state entities. As Stephen Krasner puts it, national borders, despite their alleged erosion, “still represent the fault lines of conflict.”2 As for states, despite their critical transformation over the past decades, they still repre-

1 2

O’DOWD, L. “From a ‘borderless world' to a `world of borders:' Bringing history back in”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 28, 2010, p. 1032–1034. KRASNER., S., “Sovereignty”, Foreign Policy, vol. 122, 2001, p. 20–22.

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sent the ideal form of organisation of nations, or at least the most popular, globally spread and with the greatest material power at their disposal.3 Brunet-Jailly, in his global encyclopaedia of border disputes, divides border conflicts in three different groupings: territorial, positional, and functional. The French scholar warns us that territorial disputes are the “most complex, most encompassing and most historically charged of all border disputes.”4 Bearing that in mind, it is not surprising that these disputes will be my primary focus. Regardless of whether they are of a violent nature or not, a great deal of border conflicts could be considered intractable. Sovereignty, I argue, is not just one more factor of such disputes. It seems reasonable to claim that sovereignty is at the very core of territorial disputes, or as the Arabic metaphor goes: “the mother of all factors”. Needless to say, as Brunet-Jailly suggests, we may have other significant factors contributing to territorial disputes – such as a sense of belonging, culture, religion, language, etc. – which underpin such territorial conflicts.5 However, they all seem to be related, and perhaps even subordinated to, sovereignty. In his renowned book Organized Hypocrisy, Krasner distinguishes between four different types of sovereignty: domestic, Westphalian, interdependence, and international legal sovereignty.6 Some of these typologies are associated with control (interdependence sovereignty), others with authority (Westphalian and international legal sovereignty) and finally domestic sovereignty, which is defined as the, “formal organization of political authority within the state [and] ability to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity,” and which encompasses both.7 The usefulness of this categorisation lies in the fact that it prevents scholars from using the concept in a unidirectional manner. In other words, losing interdependent sovereignty does not necessarily lead to losing international legal sovereignty, a dimension connected to recognition that is universally sought by states and aspiring states alike. For the sake of clarity it should be noted that my understanding of sovereignty is both straightforward and flexible. Straightforward in the sense of Krasner’s categorization, wherein sovereignty is ultimately connected to control, authority, and power over a particular territory; while also flexible, since the phenomenon does not merely characterise lines in the sand or agreements and disagreements between two or more states. The term sovereignty can also (and should also) be applied to conflicts between subnational polities, often referred to as national communities or encompassing groups and the state they aim to challenge, as well as between the state and supranational entities, as will be shown below.8 In order to develop my argument, it is imperative to scrutinise two initial considerations that are both inescapable and controversial. The famous quote, 3 4 5 6 7 8

PAASI, A., “The Political geography of Boundaries at the End of the Millennium: Challenges of the De-territorializing World”, in: ESKELINEN, H. et al. (ed.), Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, Ashgate Publishing ltd, Aldershot, 1999, p. 20. BRUNET-JAILLY, E., Border disputes: A global encyclopaedia, vol. 1, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA, 2015, p. xxv. Ibid. KRASNER, S., Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, Princetion NJ, 1999. Ibid., p. 4. MARGALIT, A., RAZ, J., “National Self-Determination”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 87, no. 9, 1990, p. 439–461.

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“Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es,” from the first volume Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, has been translated into English by the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek as, “They do not know it, but they are doing it.”9 According to Žižek, this Marxian sentence represents the most rudimentary conceptualisation of this illusion that structures our social reality –that of ideology.10 Arguably this same formula, (they do not know it, but they are doing it) can be applied to illustrate the territorial and sovereignty ethos that underlies some conflicts that are not generally associated with sovereignty and territorial matters. Let’s consider, for instance, the religious decoration and paraphernalia that the Islamic State (IS) is recurrently using to embellish and foster its narrative and its ideological aims. While some elements such as their religious zeal or their macabre modus operandi are well reported, the sovereignty dimension of the IS is often neglected in most analyses of the terrorist group. However, a closer look of their discourses reveals objectives of an eminently territorial nature. For instance, in the first edition of their propaganda magazine Dabiq, the group boasts about demolishing the Sykes-Picot Agreement demarcations11 and announces the, “further construction of the Islamic State and expansion of its territory.”12 These territorially driven semantics can further be seen in a video recorded in 2014, while the group was on a conquering rampage on the Syria-Iraq border. As one of the IS militants stated: “This is not the first border we will break, we will break other borders.”13 Hence what this group is implementing is perhaps not so much connected to the transnational idea of the supranational Muslim community or ummah (although they appeal to it), but rather to a territorially bounded project, which is therefore inevitably engaged in territorial frictions with its neighbours – that is those that have been disempowered and whose borders have been violated. The main point of this digression is that territorial and sovereignty conflicts transcend what we perceive as territorial disputes and as a result ‘non-territorial’ conflicts may in fact be rather territorial after all. In other words: they do not know it, but they are doing it. The second controversial assertion, briefly introduced above, consists of a critique of some of the globalist postulations according to which national borders are or are becoming irrelevant and sovereignty itself is waning and dissipating.14 I argue that, if this is our point of departure, we will probably find it impossible to explicate the existence, persistence and in some cases multiplication of conflicts linked to territoriality and sovereignty. For instance, the growing phenomenon of secessionism, which I claim is essentially driven by sovereignty, can hardly be explained if we remove the sovereignty dimension out of the equation. Therefore, to argue that sovereignty is becoming less relevant, as fashionable as it 9 10 11 12 13 14

ŽIŽE, S., The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, London, 1989, p. 28. Ibid. This 1916 agreement, also known as Asia Minor Agreement, between the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire was determinant in shaping the borders of what would later become the future states of Syria and Iraq. “The return of the Khilifah”, Dabiq Magazine, Issue 1, 2014. TRAN, M., WEAVER, M., “Isis announces Islamic caliphate in area straddling Iraq and Syria”, The Guardian, 2014. CASTAN PINOS, J., “Assessing the significance of borders and territoriality in a globalized Europe”, Regions and Cohesion, vol. 3, no. 2, 2013, p. 54–55.

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may be, has direct detrimental consequences for our understanding of contemporary [territorial]conflicts.

II. The EU fertile ground After setting the scene, it is now necessary to turn to the core of the chapter’s argument and put into question the image of Europe as the post-sovereignty ‘poster boy’. Indeed, Europe, and more specifically the European Union, has been used as the textbook example for the post-sovereignty, post-national order.15 However on closer inspection, as shocking as this may be to some, the EU appears to be fertile ground for conflicts of a territorial and sovereign nature. In brief, it seems as though we were dealing with a medical paradoxical reaction. European integration has created its own principles of disintegration and it may be prompting sovereignty related conundrums. To illustrate this point, this section will concentrate on sovereignty conflicts between member states and the European Union and on territorial disputes between member states. The EU has indeed gradually consolidated its own myth of post-territoriality, according to which this organization has successfully been able to become a postWestphalian polity, whereby ridding itself of territorial conflicts. This is not only incongruous, but also appears to be untrue. This incongruity is the best justification to focus an analysis of the importance of sovereignty in the 21st century in the EU; or more specifically on the territorial and sovereignty conflicts affecting the supranational organization. If we consider recent academic literature on the topic, we will soon notice that the EU has been used as a paradigmatic example and has served as some sort of dialectical ammunition to undermine the significance of borders and territoriality. For instance, the famous constructivist John Gerard Ruggie, claimed that in the EU, “the process of unbundling territoriality has gone further than anywhere else,” because it represents the first “multiperspectival polity”.16 The gloomy reality is however that borders and territoriality have not disappeared nor become unbundled from in the EU. To put it poetically, the main problem of this postsovereignty narrative is that by focusing on a tree, it has forgotten about the forest, and this forest is nowadays made up of several trees.

III. Euroscepticism: a matter of sovereignty One of these trees is Euroscepticism. This concept epitomises the opposition to European integration (and the EU in general) and has gained ground and mo-

15

16

SCHMITTER, P., “If the Nation-State Were to Wither Away in Europe, What Might Replace It?”, in: GUSTAVSSON, S., LEWIN, L. (ed.), The Future of the Nation-State: Essays on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 211–244; BALIBAR, E., We, the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton University Press, Princetion NJ, 2004. RUGGIE, J. G., “Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations”, International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, 1993, p. 171.

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mentum in several member states.17 Taggart distinguishes between two kinds of Euroscepticism: a contingent or qualified opposition, which is reluctant to accept further integration but that does not contemplate EU withdrawal, and an unqualified outright objection to the EU, which does.18 The term and the ideas behind it, though born and bred in Britain, have now spread to other parts of Western Europe and to Central and Eastern Europe.19 As a British construct, it could be argued that the idea is deeply embedded in British history and British political culture. Churchill’s famous quote, “we are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed,” is often used as evidence of such linkage.20 The prominence of the Eurosceptic ideology in the United Kingdom, and its influence amongst British conservatives, bear a great deal of responsibility for the celebration of June 2016 United Kingdom referendum on European Union membership – popularly known as the Brexit referendum. The results of the EU Parliament election on May 2014 represented a turning point, as they catapulted a genuinely Eurosceptic party, the United Kingdom’s Independence Party (UKIP), to the most voted party in the UK with over 26% of the votes and 24 MEP’s. This party’s success may be seen as one of the contributing factor to David’s Cameron call for an in or out referendum, due to take place in June 2016. While a detailed analysis of this plebiscite is not possible due to space constraints, it is worth noting that its celebration demonstrates that sovereignty disputes between member states and the EU are no longer at a latent stage but they are now an essential part of the political debate in Europe. Sovereignty and territoriality are indeed at the very core of the matter. As Glencross points out, Euroscepticism is connected to the need of asserting national distinctiveness through (re)establishing selfgovernment.21 This inevitably establishes a parallelism between this phenomenon and secessionism though with a scale difference: instead of aiming to secede from a nation-state, Euro-sceptics aim to withdraw the membership of their nationstate from a supranational organisation.22 As a result, in the particular case of Brexit, this re-establishment of sovereignty and self-government would have to be conducted through a repudiation of an international treaty.23 The Brexit referendum deserves a great deal of thinking and reflection that should go well beyond political quarrelling about the subject. It is overly simplistic to reduce the issue to mere political opportunism by certain individuals. Its 17 18 19

20 21 22 23

Perhaps it would be semantically more accurate to refer to the term as ‘EU-scepticism’, however, provided that ‘Euroscepticism’ is widely used in academia, and in order not to deviate the attention from the main argument, I have decided to stick to the latter. TAGGART, P., “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European party Systems”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 33, no. 3, 1998, p. 366. TAGGART, P., SZCZERBIAK, A, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States”, Sussex Euopean Institute Working Paper, no 51, 2002; RODRÍGUEZ-AGUILERA DE PRAT, C., Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism. The Radical Parties of the Right and Left vis-à-vis the European Union, Peter Lang, London, 2013. CHURCHILL, W., “The United States of Europe”, Saturday Evening Post, London, 1930, quoted in: URWIN, D. W., A Political History of Western Europe Since 1945, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 74. GLENCROSS, A., “Going it Alone? The Choice of Political Union in British Politics”, The Political Quarterly, vol. 86, no. 4, 2015, p. 555. It is, therefore, not surprising that the paradigmatic Eurosceptic party in the UK, the UKIP, uses the very word ‘independence’ on its name. MACSHANE, D., How Britain will leave Europe, I.B. Tauris, London, 2015, p. 2.

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roots are much deeper than that and deserve close examination by EU policymakers; not least because there is direct link between European integration and this sovereignty dispute. This problématique shows that not only has the EU been unable to create a cohesive European identity amongst its citizens, but it has, through a paradoxical reaction, awakened and even exacerbated territorially bounded tensions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

IV. Interstate conflicts in the EU In addition to Eurosceptic related tensions, there are additional problems related to sovereignty in the European Union. According to the data gathered by the Conflict Barometer, there are nine conflicts of an inter-state/territorial nature in Europe.24 Four of them include at least a member of the European Union as well as other non-member state: the conflict over the Arctic, which includes Denmark, Estonia and Russia over the demarcation of the common border, Turkey and Cyprus, and several conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Interestingly, in the case of Turkey these disputes occur between a member state and a candidate country. Decades of a (mostly) constructive bilateral relationship between the EU and Turkey has done little to tame territorial disputes between Ankara and two EU member states (for example Greece which has been in the EC/EU since 1981). Moreover, the Conflict Barometer highlights two cases where the territorial dispute is between two members of the EU: the conflict over Gibraltar between Spain and the UK and the maritime dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Gulf of Piran.25 These two rifts between EU member states demonstrate that far from being eroded by political integration, sovereignty disputes continue to exist and in some occasions they have the potential to poison bilateral relationships between partners. The dispute over Gibraltar’s sovereignty provides a useful illustration of the lack of entente between two states who are otherwise friends and members of the same political, economic, and military organizations. This territory, which covers an area of less than 7 km² and with just over 30,000 inhabitants, has been under British rule since 1713, when the territory was ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain.26 Spain has unsuccessfully attempted to retake the territory by force (1779–1883), by blockade (1969–1982) and by diplomatic means, in particular through favourable UN resolutions.27 Far from disappearing or becoming eroded, this sovereignty conflict has persisted and it continuous to create serious diplomatic frictions between Spain and the UK, as well as land-border and sea incidents. For instance, the disagreement over its territorial 24 25 26

27

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2015, Heidelberg, 2016, p. 44–45. Ibid . “Peace and Friendship Treaty of Utrecht between Spain and Great Britain”, https://en. wikisource.org/wiki/Peace_and_Friendship_Treaty_of_Utrecht_between_Spain_and_Great_ Britain (1.3.2016). Article X of such Treaty leaves no room for interpretation in terms of the ownership and sovereignty of Gibraltar: “The Catholic [Spanish] King does hereby […] yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever.” GOLD, P., Gibraltar: British or Spanish, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 1.

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waters has provoked very serious maritime incidents in the past years, the last of which occurred in August 2015. The most fundamental aspect of this conflict for our argument is that the Spanish claim over Gibraltar, which continues unabated despite decades of European integration. In other words, despite the fact that both states are considered to be close allies and they belong to the same supranational organisation (EU) and the same defence alliance (NATO), the inter-state dispute perseveres. Evidence that the conflict is, diplomatically speaking, in very good health is provided to us by the Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel García Margallo, who in September 2015 stressed at the UN General Assembly his wish to, “reinitiate a bilateral dialogue with the UK about the decolonisation of Gibraltar.” He added the rather straightforward and unambiguous comment that Gibraltar constituted the last colony in European territory.28 If we use journalistic parlance, we may consider these comments as sovereignty at its very best and probably at its rawest. Such semantics, with regard to the Gibraltar dispute, are not exceptional but rather common practice by Spanish policymakers, in particular in international fora such as the UN General Assembly. European integration has therefore failed to dissipate or even relax the Spanish sovereignty claim over Gibraltar; neither has it lessened the determination of the British government to relinquish its sovereignty over this small piece of land in the Mediterranean. In fact, when it seemed that the British position was becoming more flexible in the early 2000s, the Gibraltar administration and its citizens sent strong message to the Blair administration by refusing a potential (and illdefined) shared sovereignty plan that was rejected by 99% of the local voters in a referendum.29 Despite the fact that the 2002 plebiscite was not legally binding, it had direct consequences in terms of forcing the British government to abandon its accommodating policy towards Spain with regards to Gibraltar. Rhetorically speaking, the gap that appeared unbridgeable remained unbridgeable. Gibraltar is not the only sovereignty dispute between two EU member states that remains unsolved. Since their independence in the early 1990s, the young republics of Croatia and Slovenia have been involved in a threefold conflict that involves the ownership of a small strip (Dragonja), the integrity of the Piran Bay, and most importantly the delimitation of their maritime sea borders.30 The dispute, which dates back to the early years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), has been categorised an, “unresolved issue of an interstate boundary.”31 The fact that it was supressed during the SFRY period did not lead to its extinction or even diminishment. Similarly, to other territorial disagreements, sweeping sovereignty conflicts under the carpet does not make them di-

28 29 30 31

General Assembly of the United Nations, General debate of the 70th session”, 30.9.2015, http://gadebate.un.org/70/spain (2.6.2016). “Compendium for further details on the referendum”, BBC Q&A, 2016, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2400673.stm (2.6.2016). JOSIPOVIĆ, D., “Croatia-Slovenia: Dragonja Strip/Piran Bay”, in: BRUNET-JAILLY, E, Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopaedia, vol 2, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA, 2015, p. 563. Ibid., p. 564.

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sappear, but rather ensures that that they may remain a latent force that can potentially re-emerge at a later stage.32 To put the matter into perspective, it is worth noting that Croatia has been an EU member since 2013 and Slovenia since 2004. It has been argued that in this particular case, the EU norms and values were pivotal in terms of overcoming nationalist sentiments and fostering mutual adjustments: “Powerful nationalist sentiments [in Croatia and Slovenia] threatened disruption but were neutralised by the dominance of European integration.”33 However, this deterministic vision of territorial conflict being inevitably overcome by integration, European or otherwise, does not always work in a logical undeviating manner, as the CroatianSlovenian dispute illustrates. Far from being resolved as a result of their EU membership, the dispute has still not found a diplomatic solution. As supranational entity, The Permanent Court of Arbitration had been in charge of reaching a solution since 2010 – when the two states ratified an agreement to submit their territorial and maritime disagreements to arbitration – which was being brokered by the European Commission. Nevertheless this fact does not epitomise the end of the story and therefore should not lead to an excess of optimism driven by a naïve faith on the ‘healing power’ of integration. Indeed, in July 2015 Croatia withdrew from the Permanent Court of Arbitration over allegations of the court favouritism towards Ljubljana. As of 2016 the issue remains in an impasse since Croatia has, “ceased to apply the Arbitration Agreement.”34 This case shows that territorial disputes are tremendously delicate and any minor bump, irrespective of successful integration and arbitration from supranational institutions, has the potential to jeopardise agreements and render them futile.

V. Secessionism, the highest stage of sub-national conflicts With the aim of making the picture of sovereignty-related conflicts in the EU more complete, in addition to inter-state disputes and supranational frictions, we should also add the disputes of a separatist nature. As the title above indicates, secessionist conflicts represent the highest and most challenging stage of subnational quarrelling between a regional entity and its respective host government. If we approach the matter from a quantitative perspective, using data from Conflict Barometer completed by the Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Research in 2016, we can reach two preliminary conclusions with regards to the impact of such conflicts in EU member states.35 Firstly, there is certainly a positive achievement. Unlike in other world regions, there are currently no territorial, autonomy, or separatist disputes of a violent nature amongst the 28 member states. The picture was rather different some 32 33 34 35

CASTAN PINOS, J., “The Spanish-Moroccan Relationship. Combining Bonne Entente with Territorial Disputes”, in: STOKLOSA, K., BESIER, G., European Border Regions in Comparison. Overcoming Nationalistic Aspects or Re-Nationalization, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 109. GEDDES, A., TAYLOR, A., “Those Who Knock on Europe's Door Must Repent? Bilateral Border Disputes and EU Enlargement”, Political Studies, 2015, p. 10. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia. 2016, http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/3 (2.6.2016). Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2015, op.cit., p. 43–58.

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years ago with the existence of several secessionist groups who were engaged in political violence against their respective host states. The most important in military terms was undoubtedly the (provisional) Irish Republican Army (IRA), whose main objective was the political reunification of the island of Ireland and therefore the termination of British rule in Northern Ireland/Ulster. In 2005, in an act that would be one of the most significant steps of the (Northern) Irish peace process, this armed group declared the end of its armed campaign. Causally or perhaps simply just correlatively, a similar effect followed amongst other secessionist groups in Europe. In 2011 the Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which had been violently fighting for Basque statehood for several decades, declared a permanent ceasefire in 2011. A similar step was taken by the Front de Libération National Corse (FLNC) in 2014. With the ceasefire of the latter, it is possible to claim that no EU member state is challenged by violent means by secessionist sub-national groups.36 On the other hand, the ratio of secessionist conflicts (12.5%) does not contain significant differences with other world regions. Indeed, the 28 states of the EU represent 15% of the total UN members and its inhabitants represent approximately 7% of the world’s total population.37 Consequently, this 12.5% is not abnormal in any way. The reflection that is worth considering is that far from disappearing, secessionist problems persevere and persist at an average ratio in the EU despite (or perhaps because of) decades of European integration. In spite of decades of integration and post-sovereignty myths that have undervalued, undermined, denied, and swept under the carpet territorial conflicts, these problems persist in both latent and manifest form in the EU and elsewhere. It is interesting to note that for decades, if we think in European terms, the phenomena of separatism and territorial disintegration had only affected the EU’s eastern neighbours with a socialist past: namely Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. In that regard, there is an astonishing inconsistency that is worth highlighting. While the EU was promoting the myth of undermining borders, territoriality, and national identities at an internal level, most of its members (23 out of 28) enthusiastically supported, encouraged, and lobbied (and continue lobbying) for Kosovo’s independence. As Ker-Lindsay points out, the international community solution for Kosovo shifted in the mid-2000s from a self-government plan for Kosovo, which would enjoy a high degree of autonomy within Yugoslavia/Serbia, to unilateral independence from Belgrade.38 The core EU member states embraced that idea enthusiastically as proven by the fact that it only took them from one (the UK and France) to three days (Germany) to recognise their unilaterally declared independence in February 2008. Bearing in mind such diplomatic endorsement as well as the institutional support on the ground,

36 37

38

At least not in a significant manner. For example, there are several dissident Republican groups operating in Northern Ireland but they represent a very low level of threat and certainly no threat in terms of territoriality. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2015, op.cit., p. 43–58. The Conflict Barometer identifies the following secessionist conflicts affecting EU member states: Cyprus, Corsica, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland and Northern Ireland. KER-LINDSAY, J., “From autonomy to independence: the evolution of international thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005“, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, no. 2, 2009, p. 141.

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it is therefore possible to argue that the birth of Kosovo as a (para)state is partly due to the legitimizing actions carried out by EU member states. It is sometimes neglected that the Kosovo conflict was triggered by a secessionist armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). As seen above, the same phenomenon took place in EU member states in previous decades. However, there is a fundamental difference. While it is true that armed groups with secessionist aims had a considerable importance in Western Europe in the 70s, 80s, and 90s in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and Corsica, these actors never challenged the border status quo. For Western European states, these groups represented at most, “an acceptable level of violence,” a term coined in 1971 by the British Home secretary Reginald Maudling to characterise the IRA armed campaign. In other words, the violence of groups such as the IRA or the ETA posed a security threat, albeit never shook the pillars of the state. Currently, however, the secessionist challenge in EU member states is much more serious than in previous decades though fascinatingly it does not come from the ‘armalite’ but from the ‘ballot box.’39 Table 1. Independence support in EU regions in regional elections40 Region

Independence Support

Population

Year

Basque Country

59.5%

2.15m (5%)

2012

Catalonia

48%

7.5m (16%)

2015

Scotland

48%

5.3m (8%)

2011

Northern Ireland

41%

1.8m (3%)

2011

Flanders

38%

6.3m (57%)

2014

Navarre41

31%

0,6m (1%)

2015

South Tyrol

27%

0,5m (1%)

2013

Sardinia

22%

1.6m (2.5%)

2014

Wales

18%

3m (5%)

2011

Corsica

8%

0.3m (-1%)

2015

With the aim of shedding some light on the impact of secessionism in Europe, I have compiled the regions and territories with the highest support for secession according to the latest regional elections. The procedure was methodologically simple. If a particular party had secession as a goal in its political programme or 39

40

41

The armalite and the ballot box is an expression used by the Irish Republican movement in order to describe their dual strategy, pursued in the 1980s and 1990s, which included electoral participation where the political wing, Sinn Féin, contested elections (ballot box), as well as armed struggle carried out by the Provisional IRA (armalite). Source: elaborated by author based on data from “Parties and Elections in Europe”, 2016. http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ (2.6.2016). It should be noted that Greenland (with a 69% support for independence) and the Feroe Islands (47% support for secession) have not been included in the list due to the fact that the former has the status of an Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT), whereas the latter is explicitly excluded from the EU. As a result, neither of the two territories can be considered an “EU region”. Those are Basque secessionist parties, who support the independence of the Basque and Navarrese autonomous regions from Spain as well as the Northern Basque Country from France. The secession of those territories, according to the Basque secessionist narrative, should lead to a federation of Basque territories which is popularly referred as “Euskal Herria”, that is, the land of the Basques.

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party manifesto, it was included. It must be noted that only parties with an explicit mention of political independence or secession as a goal were included and therefore autonomist or regionalist parties have been omitted. The list shows the usual suspects such as Catalonia, the Basque Country or Scotland ranking the highest and consequently it could be argued that the line-up is rather unsurprising, at least to those acquainted with secessionism in Europe.42 Despite the fact that the table represents a useful illustration of support for secession in European regions, it is important to note that it is also marred with inescapable quantitative limitations. Namely, not all secessionist parties aim to realise their goals at the same speed or at the same pace. While for some it is an imperative matter that requires immediacy and celerity, for others, independence is a long term goal, some sort of Ithaca that the nation has to aim for but lacking any time plan or concrete strategy. The former is exemplified by the cases of Scotland and Catalonia. Indeed, Scottish secessionists, led by the Scottish National Party (SNP), were successful in their push for a referendum in 2014 that they failed to win. After such defeat, the party’s leadership continues being committed to organizing a new referendum. In the Catalan case, the current President, Carles Puigdemont, elected in January 2016, has promised to stick to an 18-month road map that should lead to the secession of this territory. In a recent interview (conducted simultaneously by five major European newspapers)43 Puigdemont stressed the aims of his government in a completely unambiguous light: “Our roadmap is clear. Over the next sixteen months, we will write the laws that will pave the way to a new independent state. Then we will call for the election of a constituent Parliament and it will be up to those MP’s, thus fully legitimated, to carry out the unilateral declaration of independence from Spain”.44 Conversely, the hegemonic pro-sovereignty party in the Basque country, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), has rejected the Catalan method arguing in favour of a bilateral approach, rather than unilateral solutions and warning about the repercussions of secession in terms of being expelled from the European Union.45 Therefore, despite the fact that the PNV affirms in its party statutes that the Basque nation must, “regain its national sovereignty,” in practice, their actions are not aimed at reaching that goal.46 Likewise, it can be argued that the Corsican 42

43 44 45 46

Scholars focusing on secessionism generally use these three cases to illustrate their arguments: CONNOLLY, C., “Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union”, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 24, no. 1, 2013, p. 51–106; PAVKOVIĆ, A., RADAN, P., The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey, 2011; KEATING, M., Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001. “Kampf den Ewiggestrigen“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/katalonien-kampf-den-ewiggestrigen-1.2911884 (2.6.2016). “La Catalogna a Madrid:«Dateci il referendume votiamo sì al governo”, Corriere della Sera, 2016, http://www.corriere.it/esteri/16_marzo_18/catalogna-madrid-indipendenza-2fd1ccf8ec79-11e5-b4bb-fbc47dd8e9c6.shtml (2.6.2016). “Urkullu deja en evidencia la sinrazón de Mas”, ABC, 2016, http://www.abc.es/ espana/abci-urkullu-deja-evidencia-sinrazon-mas-201511042204_noticia.html (2.6.2016). “Estatutos Nacionales”, PNV, 2012, http://www.eaj-pnv.eus/adjuntos/ pnvDocumentos/ 10914_archivo.pdf (2.6.2016).

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secessionist party, Corsica Libera, views independence as a long term ‘romantic’ goal. While in their policy document published in 2015 Corcisa 21, they unequivocally assert that, “we have never stopped working for the goal of independence, which remains the only possible outcome of our struggle.”47 Its political actions are aimed at collaborating with other autonomist parties to increase the island’s autonomic powers, consolidate the role of the Corsican language, as well as secure the amnesty for FLNC militants. This last section leads us to some pertinent reflections regarding the two central subjects of this chapter: secessionism and the European Union. It appears evident that over the past decades there has been a transition from regionalism to separatism in several European regions. Perhaps Catalonia and Scotland are the territories that best epitomise this shift. It is relevant to focus on this transition to understand that in most cases, secessionism has deep roots and it rarely emerges from ‘out of the blue’. In the Catalan case, mainstream nationalism had traditionally favoured, “an accommodation […] within the framework of a pluri-national, highly decentralized Spanish state.”48 Until recently, support for independence oscillated between 10–15% of the population.49 This is no longer the case since today, a consistent majority of former pro-autonomists or pro-federalists support independence in Catalonia. As a result, the picture is that of a symmetrically polarised society.50 Both the supporters of secession and those who advocate for Catalonia remaining united with Spain both stand at 45%.51 Beyond the quantitative analysis, the most puzzling aspect of the transition from regionalism to secessionism, experienced particularly by Catalonia and Scotland, is that it occurred in parallel to the most successful period of European integration. This fact suggests that, contrary to the popularly held opinion that European integration erodes sovereignty driven conflicts, both phenomena (secessionism and integration) are perfectly compatible. It therefore appears obvious that such unlikely simultaneity and compatibility offers a window of opportunities for further research, especially bearing in mind the lack of previous studies on the subject. The present chapter should be considered as a humble contribution to this largely neglected connection.

Conclusion The arguments of this chapter do not contradict the fact that European integration has had a crucial positive effect in easing territorial tensions, particularly when considering the historically contested, volatile, and bloody Franco-German borders. Other disputed borders around Europe have also benefited from the positive territorial externalities of European integration and the ‘Europeanisation’ of border practices and territorial values and attitudes. However, as this 47 48 49 50 51

“Corsica 21U prugettu”, Corsica Libera, 2015, file:///C:/Users/jaume/Downloads/ corsica21_11_2015_final_1.pdf (2.6.2016). PEREZ, L., SANJAUME, M., “Legalizing Secession: The Catalan Case”, Journal of Conflictology, vol. 4, no. 2, 2013, p. 7. Centre d’estudis d’opinió, Political Opinion Barometer, no. 37, 2016, p. 9. This concept is used without any negative connotation and without denoting a social conflict between the supporters of the two options. Centre d’estudis d’opinió, Political Opinion Barometer,op.cit., p. 11.

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chapter has shown, the power of territorial unbundling is neither limitless nor omnipresent, nor insusceptible to being redressed. To put it simply, in some occasions frozen conflicts have become defrosted, as the Piran Bay dispute illustrates, and in others territoriality plays the role of a saboteur between allies, such as in the case of Gibraltar. Last but not least, in other cases secessionism or indeed Euroscepticism provides elites, as well as grassroots movements, with a territorially grounded political legitimacy which can be of a precious value. At any rate, the European Union, like most areas of the globe, is not immune to sovereignty and territorial conflicts. Whether these disputes are of a subnational, national, or supranational nature, territorially driven enjeux continue to shape and challenge a club that has constructed a narrative which very often claims to have overcome these very disputes in order to boast its legitimacy. The problem of undermining, or even negating the significance of such phenomena, is that the act of denial does not make them vanish. What it does, as this chapter has argued, is to act as a burden towards the understanding of such conflicts. In seems obvious that Euroscepticism, secessionism, or nation-state sovereignty conflicts cannot be comprehended if our initial premise is to claim that these phenomena are irrelevant, anachronistic, and products of a different area. These phenomena are (arguably) inherent to politics and indeed to the EU. Provided that this seems to be the case, they deserve to be analysed and understood, ideally avoiding normative points of departure.

LES CONFLITS DE SOUVERAINETÉ EN EUROPE DANS LA PÉRIODE DE POST-SOUVERAINETÉ Les conflits de souveraineté et de territoire semblent avoir une étonnante capacité à persévérer et survivre les contextes qui leurs sont défavorables. Ce chapitre analyse la persistance des conflits liés à la souveraineté dans l’Union européenne. En effet, tandis que l’intégration européenne a eu un effet positif crucial sur l’apaisement des tensions territoriales à travers « l’européanisation » des pratiques frontalières, des attitudes et des valeurs territoriales, une grande partie des conflits liés à la souveraineté continuent de mettre à l’épreuve le continent européen. Il est intéressant de noter que de tels conflits se produisent dans une période dite de post-souveraineté et dans un territoire (l’Europe) qui est considéré comme la référence de l’ordre post-territorial. L’un des arguments principaux de ce chapitre est que le pouvoir de ce découpage territorial n’est ni sans limite, ni omniprésent, ni impossible à corriger par des réactions paradoxales par exemple. Pour illustrer ces différents points, ce chapitre analyse des exemples de trois types de conflits liés à la souveraineté affectant l’Europe : les conflits entre les Etats- membres et l’Union européenne (parfaitement illustrés par le Brexit), les conflits territoriaux entre Etats-membres (tel que Gibraltar et la baie de Piran) et les conflits territoriaux de nature infranationale (le sécessionnisme étant le cas le plus problématique dans cette catégorie). L’analyse de ces cas suggère que l’Union européenne, comme n’importe quelle région du monde, n’est pas à l’abris de conflits territoriaux de souveraineté. Que ces conflits soient de nature

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infranationale, nationale, ou supranationale, les enjeux de territoires continuent à remettre en cause le statu quo en Europe et ailleurs.

SOUVERÄNITÄTSKONFLIKT IN EUROPA IN DER SOGENANNTEN POST-SOUVERÄNITÄTSÄRA Souveränitäts- und Territorialkonflikte scheinen die erstaunliche Fähigkeit zu besitzen, auch in offenbar ungünstigen Kontexten bestehen zu bleiben und somit zu überleben. Dieses Kapitel analysiert die Widerstandsfähigkeit von Souveränitätskonflikten in der Europäischen Union. Während die Europäische Integration eine entscheidend positive Wirkung auf die Lösung territorialer Spannungen gehabt hat, vor allem durch die „Europäisierung“ von Grenzpraktiken, von territorialen Werten und Einstellungen, stellt dennoch eine breite Palette von Souveränitätskonflikten weiterhin eine Herausforderung für den Europäischen Kontinent dar. Interessanterweise treten solche Streitigkeiten oft in der sogenannten post-souveränen Periode auf, in einem Gebiet (Europa), das oft als das Paradigma der post-territorialen Ordnung angesehen wird. Eines der Kernargumente dieses Kapitels ist, dass die Macht der territorialen Entflechtungen weder grenzenlos ist noch allgegenwärtig oder unempfindlich gegen Korrekturen durch paradoxe Reaktionen zum Beispiel. Um diese Punkte zu illustrieren, analysiert dieses Kapitel drei Beispiele von Souveränitätskonflikten, die derzeit Europa betreffen: Streitigkeiten zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und der Europäischen Union (verkörpert durch den Brexit), territoriale Streitigkeiten zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten selbst (wie Gibraltar und dem Golf von Piran) und territoriale Streitigkeiten subnationaler Natur (Sezessionsbestreben ist der problematischste Fall in dieser Kategorie). Die Prüfung dieser Fälle verdeutlicht, dass die Europäische Union, wie die meisten Regionen der Welt, gegen territoriale Souveränitätskonflikte nicht immun ist. Egal ob diese Streitigkeiten subnationaler, nationaler oder supranationaler Natur sind, territoriale Konflikte fordern weiterhin den territorialen Status-quo in Europa und anderswo heraus.

THE PERTINENCE OF THE EXTERNAL EU BORDER: A SWISS POINT OF VIEW

MANUEL FRIESECKE Historical sociologies of the rise of modern territoriality have deepened the understanding of the meaning and functions of borders. If it is now widely observed that territoriality is transformed, and that borders are becoming more dispersed and ambiguous.1 This observation is often paralleled with an argument about the changing nature of sovereignty. The process of change seems to be ongoing relations and there exists different meanings of state, sovereignty and territory. The concepts of state, sovereignty and territory are each socially constructed. They are defined, and redefined, by the rules, actions and practices of different agents, including in the case of states, by themselves. An examination of the contestation of different practices, resistances, rules, norms, legal challenges and public justifications provides important insights into the changing composition and definitions of state, sovereignty and territoriality. It is for this reason that this review has a decidedly constructivist orientation. Switzerland lies at the heart of Europe but is not a member of the European Union. It can be said without doubt that Switzerland belongs geographically, culturally and socially to Europe. In recent years, the country has gone the bilateral route with the EU, its most important trading partner. Economically speaking, Switzerland is virtually dependent on the European Union: More than two thirds of Swiss exports go to EU member states, and almost four fifths of all the country's imports come from there.2 Despite its strong political interconnections and shared interests with Europe, since 1945 Switzerland has always been in the passenger seat, rather than the driving seat. Looking at a political map of Europe, today Switzerland looks like the little village in Gaul where Asterix and Obelix resisted the Romans. The question of the Swiss external EU border has actually additional weight thanks to the vote in favour of the campaign against mass immigration on 9 February 2014.3 This campaign is directed against the principle of freedom of movement; its aim is to return to curbing immigration independently, by means of caps and quotas. Seen on a relief map of Western Europe, mountainous Switzerland stands out like a knucklebone between three great regions – France, Germany and Italy. The 1 2 3

O’DOWD, L.,”The Changing Significance of European Borders”, in: ANDERSON, J., O’DOWD, L., WILSON, Th. M. (ed.), New Borders for a Changing Europe, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 13–36. MÜLLER-JENTSCH, D., ZÜRCHER, B., “Eine Frage der Relationen”, Avenir Suisse, n 6, February 2012. This initiative calls for a move away from the current system, wanting Swiss control over all immigration. The number of residency permits would be limited by annual caps and quotas for all foreign nationals. Employers would have to give preference to Swiss workers on the labour market. Agreements under international law contradicting this would have to be renegotiated; this would include the agreement on freedom of movement.

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Alps are a watershed, an invitation, a barrier. Three groups of people, speaking three different languages, press against the Alps, trade through the mountain passes, squabble over possession of the valleys. Switzerland's history is implicit in its geography. These considerations become apparent once there are developed communities on all sides. In the Roman period, Switzerland has imperial order to the south and west, but tribal chaos (in varying degrees) to the north. History not only taught Switzerland to keep out of foreign conflicts, it also taught it the importance of active solidarity. Switzerland‘s involvement here ranges from humanitarian internment (example Bourbaki Army) to the world-wide engagement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

I. A typologie of borders There are many different types of border: Geographical and cultural ones between countries, towns and regions, or social, linguistic and ethnic borders within societies. What are borders? A simple question that is difficult to answer. Borders define an area but separate at the same time one area from another. It is doubtless that the borders between countries are those that first come to mind when we hear the word “border”, but that is not all the term means. There are also borders criss-crossing individual countries. The German word for “border” – Grenze – refers to even more kinds of limit, including those found within individuals. Borrowed from the Slavic word grenize, it is related to the Polish granica, a derivation with a narrower meaning: “Boundary marker”. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant played a crucial role in establishing the theoretical, humanist definition of a border. He made a series of philosophical observations about borders; those between people's different experiences and notions, and those between reason and religion; morals and ethics. Taking into account the political and legal definition, the following piece focuses on term “state border” under international law, describing a geographical line between two nation states' areas of sovereignty.4 In the social sciences, the use of “border” to mean a state border is sometimes viewed and criticised as a lack of any theoretically solid understanding of the term5. Following the tenet “Borders become borders when they are treated as such,”6 the main question is that of what significance the borders laid down under national law take on in different cooperative processes and for different actors. The proper definition and demarcation of a boundary is still as essential for law enforcement as it was throughout the history of boundary establishment. It prevents local misunderstandings that could lead to disputes. The state border is the imagined vertical plane that passes with the border line on the earth’s surface and separates the territory of a state, its land, inland waters, airspace and subsurface from that of other states. A border line is a marked or imagined line on the 4 5 6

GROM, I., Regional grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit als Beitrag zur Förderung der europäischen Integration, Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 1995, p. 38. KOHLER-KOCH, B. (ed.), “Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen”, PVS-Sonderheft, 29, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1998, p. 250. GÜNTHER, O., SYDOW, J., “Reflexion über Grenzen”, in : KOHLER-KOCH, B. (ed.), Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen, op.cit.,, p. 12.

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earth' surface along which stretches the state border and a border crossing point is the place designated for crossing of the state border. The definition of where state and territory boundaries lie has been constantly reviewed, sometimes causing great contention.

II. The changing functions of European borders Borders are relevant as dividing lines. At their respective borders, sovereign states are able to control and regulate imported and exported goods, flows of capital, services and people's movement. In addition to this barrier effect, state borders can take on a protective or fiscal function if customs duties are levied.7 These functions become apparent immediately when a border is crossed, from the obvious border controls. Since 31 December 1992, there has not only been the free movement of goods within the European Union but also the free movement of services, capital and people, known altogether as the four “freedoms” of the EU Single Market. The “open-border effect”8 is that whereby system borders appear after the visible territorial borders are removed. “System borders” means what are also known as the “soft borders” of potentially different economic, social and cultural systems. Borders are always a construct, whether they involve historical developments interacting with political decisions, then legal implementation, as in the case of state borders, or whether they are intellectual constructs. The latter is, for example, shared by a large group of people, which leads to a shared identification. Europe can be taken as a case of how border discourses on imaginary boundaries can play a causal role in the making of institutional Europe. Borders in a preinstitutional sense are boundaries that define a unity that we call a collective identity. Claiming a European identity is a mode of defining a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Europe has accumulated an immense history of images of its boundaries that are used selectively to define its borders. A legally defined space such as the EU is linked to the selective construction of legal borders.

III. The role of territorial cohesion Territorial cohesion, meaning the balanced distribution of human activities across the European Union, is complementary to economic and social cohesion. Hence, it translates the goal of sustainable and balanced development assigned to the Union into territorial terms. Territorial cohesion includes fair access for citizens and economic operators to services of general economic interest, irrespective of the territory to which they belong. In order to promote territorial cohesion, in 1999 the EU member states ministers responsible for spatial planning adopted the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). Some areas of the Union have specific problems. These include the mountain areas, islands and the most 7 8

RATTI, R., “How can Existing Barriers and Border Effects be Overcome? A Theoretical Approach”, in: CAPPELIN, R., BATEY, P. W. J. (ed.), Regional networks, Border Regions and European Integration, Pion, London, 1993, p. 61. Ibid p. 46.

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remote regions, most of which are also islands or mountainous and which are handicapped by being far from the Union’s institutional decision-making centres and markets. Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, the country is – at least geographically speaking – at the heart of its territory. Consequently, Switzerland cannot simply ignore the joint spatial planning initiatives of the EU Member States. This is especially true of the European Spatial Development Perspective. In view of its central location, Switzerland was invited in 1998 to state its position on the ESDP. In this position paper, Switzerland asserted that the ESDP was compatible with the Swiss Planning Policy Guidelines passed by the Federal Council in 1996. Switzerland also included specific proposals for working with the EU on spatial planning. Cooperation is essential if Switzerland does not want to remain for ever a blank outline or no-man's land on ESDP maps. Switzerland is also willing to play its part in implementing the ESDP and is participating to the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON). It also emphasised its considerable interest in cross-border, international and interregional collaboration.

IV. The Swiss understanding of the border 1. Geographical Switzerland is at the centre of Europe. It shares the entire length of its 1,899 km external border with five neighbouring countries, each section measuring as follows: France 572 km, Germany 362 km, Austria 180 km, Principality of Liechtenstein 41 km and Italy 744 km.9 The national border is simultaneously that of cantons, governmental regions, municipalities and private property. The topography of Switzerland is such that the borders run through cities (Geneva, Basel, Konstanz, Chiasso), on solid ground (717 km), through lakes, rivers and streams (436 km) and along mountains and peaks (746 km). The border sections on the ground are set out by 7,132 boundary markers. 2. Historical Switzerland and its borders were a subject of discussion at the Congress of Vienna. On 20 March 1815, the Congress of Vienna issued a declaration regulating various matters relating to Switzerland. Among other things, the internal and external Swiss borders were accepted by the great European powers and a territorial exchange was decreed. One point of particular importance was the recognition of the country's perpetual armed neutrality.10 On 12 September 1848 the modern Swiss federal state was established. The cantons were now under a national government (the Swiss Federal Council) and a national parliament (the Federal Assembly). The federation was mainly respon9 10

Figures according to the Federal Office of Topography, Bern. Declaration of the Congress of Vienna of 20.3.1815 on the Affairs of the Helvetic Confederacy: “... the guarantee ... of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, in her new frontiers”.

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sible for foreign policy, the army, the currency, the postal service and customs. When its neighbouring countries' revolutions failed, Switzerland became a democratic republican island among the monarchies of Europe for the second half of the 19th century.11 The Swiss amended their Constitution extensively in 1874, establishing federal responsibility for defense, trade, and legal matters, as well as introducing direct democracy by popular referendum. To this day, cantonal autonomy and referendum democracy remain trademarks of the Swiss politics. 3. Political and economic Due to the close geographical, social and economic ties between Switzerland and the countries of the European Union (EU), Swiss participation in the European integration process is thus of particular economic importance. Since the Swiss people and cantons rejected the EEC on 6 December 1992,12 relations between Switzerland and the European Union have, famously, followed the “bilateral route”, in that Switzerland stands on one side and the EU on the other, as opposed to the EEC, which regulates relations between an (increasingly smaller) group of countries (the EFTA countries except Switzerland) and the EU. Since 2002, there are two “packages” of bilateral agreements, which are actually in part multinational due to the participation of the EU member states as well as of the EU itself. Ties between Switzerland and the EU are extremely close and based on a network of accords consisting of roughly 20 central bilateral agreements and 100 other agreements. The most important agreement is the one of freedom of movement of people. Freedom of movement by people was introduced to a great extent by the country's bilateral agreements, though Switzerland is not part of the European Union Single Market. Therefore, there are still customs formalities, waiting times and rules product regulations on crossing the customs border. Even 20 years after the vote on the European Economic Area (EEC), the majority of the Swiss population still reject the idea of joining it. In a survey, 54 percent consider the result of the vote to have been positive. Only 23 percent believe that it was bad for Switzerland to have voted against entry into the EEC.13 Opinions are divided as to how relations with the EU should develop in future. Current debates in Switzerland (for example about freedom of movement by people, confidentiality in banking or trading agreements) show that, on this bilateral route, economic integration and the wish to maintain a Swiss identity lead to tension. 4. Culture and language The role that languages play in culture is infinite. Language unites a group of people. Language is significant in identifying cultures in that it is not just a way 11 12 13

KELLERHALS, K., Der gute Schüler war früher auch ein Mädchen, Haupt Verlag, Bern, 2010. Federal resolution on membership of Switzerland to the European Economic Area (EEC), rejected with 50.3% “no” votes on 6.12.1992. Survey by the gfs Bern Research Institute on behalf of the SRG broadcasting corporation, November 2012.

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to communicate, but is a tool that expresses a set of beliefs, interpretation of the surrounding world, and our concepts of reality. The use of the German language in Switzerland goes back to the early Middle Ages, when the Alamans invaded lands where Romance languages were developing. The dominance of German in Switzerland has been lessened by the bilingualism of the German-speaking region, where both standard German and Swiss German dialects are used. These dialects have a high social prestige among Swiss Germans regardless of education level or social class because they differentiate Swiss Germans from Germans. Swiss Germans often do not feel comfortable speaking standard German. In the French-speaking region, the original Franco-Provencal dialects have almost disappeared in favor of a standard French colored by regional accents. The Italianspeaking region is bilingual, and people speak standard Italian as well as different regional dialects. At home or with relatives, 60.1% of the permanent Swiss resident population speak usually Swiss German, 23.4% French, 10.1% German, 8.4% Italian and 4.6% English. Considering languages usually spoken at work and at home, 42.6% of the permanent resident population has indicated more than one language.

V. Perception of the borders in Switzerland Public perception of the borders in Switzerland is influenced by people's personal contacts, individual preferences, values and stereotypes, as well as by their formal knowledge about the border, generally focussed on local and national contexts. Reporting in the mass media plays a role in this, with generally only rudimentary reporting on the neighbouring country, or specifically the neighbouring region, even in the local print media at borders where there is not a language barrier.14 Even in the so-called “borderless Europe” – or especially there, as the sovereign nation states still manifest themselves within state borders as actors confronting the EU – state borders are considered extremely important. Another trend, which can be observed, is that the effects and significance of a state border develop in relation to other characteristics. Thus, in smaller countries, a relatively greater area is affected by the border than in larger countries, which can influence the attention, which smaller countries pay to their border areas or crossborder relationships. Equally, their relative position with regard to other countries at the borders can play a role; for example, if a small country borders a large one and sees the state border as a particularly effective means of protection against their neighbours' dominance.15

14 15

SCHEUER, A., Die Staatsgrenze in ihrem Einfluss auf den regionalen Entwicklungsstand. Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel Belgiens, der Niederlande und Nordrhein-Westfalens, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Brussels, New York, Oxford, Vienna, 2002, p. 76. Ibid, p. 51.

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VI. Switzerland's function as a transit country reduces the borders’s significance In functional terms, Switzerland has been since Roman times a transit country; it is central in Europe, the European centre; the spot where three large European language groups meet, and is thus extolled as a “model for Europe”. Switzerland’s position in the cross of Europe’s main development axes in particular affects spatial development in the alpine arc: there is a need for increasing transportation capacity (railways, roads) across the Alps and increasingly also on the East-West axis. The geographical distance to Europe is an insignificant category in the Swiss discourse, but is replaced by the metaphors of the “island”, a one-off “hedgehog mentality” and the country as an “Alpine fortress”. Switzerland sees itself as the self-assured, neutral heart of Europe, hence the lack of any widespread discussion on geographical belonging there.16 Nevertheless, it is based on an incorrect mind-mapping of integration processes. Geographical location and characteristics do not necessarily have any influence on people's description of a country or the metaphors used within a discussion on integration. In other countries, political influence is linked and equated with physical distance; here this is rarely the case. Accordingly, in the political discourse, a distinction tends to be made between the “elite up there” (the EU and Brussels) and the “man in the street down here” (the Swiss population).

VII. Relationship between Switzerland and the EU Over 900,000 EU citizens live and work in Switzerland and many more travel through its borders on a regular basis. There are currently around 750,000 Swiss nationals living abroad. Their reasons for deciding to emigrate vary enormously. The Swiss Abroad form what is now sometimes referred to as the Fifth Switzerland. The most popular country of residence is France, where almost 200,000 Swiss citizens are currently registered. The EU is the country's most important trading partner, accounting for around 60% of its exports and 80% of imports. For its part, the Union only exports more to the United States than it does to Switzerland. The establishment of the Economic Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 1972 between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Switzerland form the basis of its relations with the EU. The deal on the free movement of people between Switzerland and the EU came into force in 2002 and is a key element of the first package of bilateral accords between the two parties. Under the deal, nationals of Switzerland and EU member states are entitled to choose their place of work and residence within the territories of the signatories. The Swiss electorate has voted three times so far on the free movement of people17. In May 2000, it approved a first bilateral package and with it, the free movement accord by a large majority. In 2005 and 2009, vo16 17

HILLE, J., Gute Nation oder Europa – Euroskeptizismus in Norwegen und in der deutschsprachigen Schweiz, Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 2005, p. 160. Swiss Confederation, Switzerland’s European policy, 2016, www.eda.admin.ch/dea/ en/home/europapolitik/abstimmungen.html (2.6.2016)

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ters approved the extension of the treaty to new EU member countries, mostly in Eastern Europe. Votes are also due on the planned extension of the accord to the new EU member state Croatia.

VIII. The border “in people’s minds” and the “semblance of sovereignty” Since the people of Switzerland voted to restrict immigration in February 2014, it has been clear that the principle of freedom of movement by people is meeting with rejection. Switzerland is holding on to its self-determination and its national borders, and currently does not want to become part of Federal Europe. In this spirit, by dissociating themselves from their neighbours and the European unification process, people are drawing up borders in their minds with no connection to economic or cultural realities. Experts are united in their opinion that the Swiss prosperity is the product of its networked economy. The country has profited enormously from open borders and from an influx of qualified foreign workers. Indeed, the European Union is its largest trading partner. So what happens next? The so-called bilateral path, the country's carefully worked out relationship with the EU, which Switzerland has never sought to join, will probably reach a preliminary end. The government in Bern will now have to attempt to renegotiate its treaty with the EU on the freedom of movement. Moreover, Switzerland cannot create its own general definition of “sovereignty” with regard to the outside world, as this, too, is a concept taken from international law. Like all other countries, Switzerland is bound not only in the rules of international law but also in a global economic structure and communications network of a unique density and intensity never seen before in human history. In this context, what is often described as Swiss “sovereignty” should be seen only as a “semblance of sovereignty”. Sovereignty is a dynamic concept. It is in practice relative, not absolute. Swiss sovereignty has been shared already, but nothing essential to the well-being and sense of identity of the people of the member states has been lost. The sovereign nation state will be much less than in the past.

LA PERTINENCE DE LA FRONTIÈRE EXTERNE DE L’UE: LA VISION SUISSE La vision suisse des frontières est affectée par des facteurs économiques, historiques, géographiques et politiques bien que la distance, en tant que concept de la pensée politique, joue un rôle secondaire en raison de la situation géographique de la Suisse. Économiquement, la Suisse est bien intégrée à l’Europe pour tous les aspects pratiques, mais c’est loin d’être le cas dans le domaine politique. Le rôle de la Suisse comme un pays de transit au cours des derniers siècles a mené la population à ne pas se définir par les frontières géographiques, mais principalement par les procédures et les processus politiques européens. Les ef-

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fets de la frontière doivent être relativisés à cause de la forte interdépendance mondiale, économique et sociale. Les divers votes actuels relatifs à l’Europe et à l’international manifestent le fort scepticisme envers tout affaiblissement des frontières ou une plus grande intégration de la Suisse en Europe.

DIE RELEVANZ DER AUßENGRENZE DER EU: EINE VISION SCHWEIZ Die schweizerische Sicht auf die Grenzen ist von geographischen, historischen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren beeinflusst, obgleich die Distanz als eine Kategorie des politischen Denkens aufgrund der geographischen Lage der Schweiz eine sekundäre Rolle spielt. Wirtschaftlich ist die Schweiz für alle praktischen Zwecke in Europa integriert, aber politisch ist das weit davon entfernt, der Fall zu sein. Die Rolle der Schweiz als Transitland in den letzten Jahrhunderten hat dazu geführt, dass sich die Menschen nicht durch die geographische Grenze definieren, sondern hauptsächlich durch europäische politische Verfahren und Prozesse. Die Wirkung der Grenze muss darüber hinaus aufgrund der starken wirtschaftlichen und sozialen globalen Interdependenzen relativiert werden. Die verschiedenen aktuellen Stimmen zu europäischen und internationalen Themen in der Schweiz zeigen eine starke Skepsis gegenüber einer Schwächung der Grenzen oder einer stärkeren Integration der Schweiz in Europa.

Part 3:

BORDERS, THE “SCARS” OF HISTORY OR PLACES OF RECONCILIATION? FRONTIÈRES, LES « CICATRICES » DE L’HISTOIRE OU LIEUX DE RÉCONCILIATION? GRENZEN, DIE „NARBEN“ DER GESCHICHTE ODER VERSÖHNUNGSORTE?

MENTAL BORDERS CREATE LIMITED MINDS. HOW TO OVERCOME PREJUDICES, STEREOTYPES AND CONCEPTS OF AN “ENEMY” IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY GERHARD BESIER I. Stereotypes, prejudice and images of “the other” Human action is determined by both a genetic pre-disposition and the singularity of brain development.1 Both influences make up 50 per cent of our personality. A third influence is the pre-birth and early post-birth affective emotional experiences, which contribute to around 30 per cent of our personality. The process of socialization accounts for additional 20 per cent of our personality. This complex also comprises our culturally-determined self-conception and the prevalent norms of behavior. Elements of these are possibly also strengthened in our neuronal structures. These highly inter-related factors are compounded by specific situations – circumstances which causes people to undertake a particular course of action. Moreover, this situation is influenced by the behavior of the power elites. “Systems create hierarchies of dominance with influence and communication going down – rarely up – the line.”2 Open societies ascribing each individual with responsibility for their actions and which use the jargon of freedom to establish binding norms – such as universal human rights – as the foundation of their action also tend to seek to protect their citizens from the situational forces resulting in deindividuation. In doing so, they tend to achieve higher civilizatory standards than closed and interdependent societies in which the individual is absorbed by the collective. Anonymity not coupled to the assumption of responsibility tends to promote a readiness to obedience and destructive behavior.3 Such behavior is usually accompanied by fear and legitimated by dubious virtues such as ‘soldierly manliness’.4 With the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948 and endorsed after the collapse of communism in 1989/90, the ideals of the so-called ‘free world’ appeared to have triumphed. Nevertheless, the mood of optimism prevalent in these periods later gave way to sore disappointment. Often deformed by corruption, the perversion of justice, extreme social inequality, hunger, and torture, the non-Western democracies do not accord human rights the 1 2 3 4

ROTH, G., Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und andere zu ändern, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 2007, p. 103–5. ZIMBARDO, Ph. G., The Lucifer effect. Understanding how good people turn evil. Random House, New York, 2007, p. 10. Ibid., p. 219. WERNER, F., “Hart müssen wir hier draußen sein. Soldatische Männlichkeit im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1944”, GuG, 34, 2008, p. 5–40.

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same weight as in Europe or North America.5 A decline in democratic convictions can even be observed in East-Central Europe.6 A number of autocratic systems – sometimes with the consent of their populations – view Western appeals for the observation of human rights as Trojan horses designed to further their own interests and advance the cause of Western imperialism. The prosperity of authoritarian states, such as China, often makes them a role model for threshold countries.7 For example, authoritarian states, such as Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia, the governments of which repress free speech and censor the Internet, currently boast growth rates amounting between 7.4 and 9.7 per cent. The economic stagnation traditionally associated with military dictatorships is increasingly being replaced by efficiency and growth. Many citizens are all too glad to trade ‘Western freedoms’ for material security8, education, and health provision. The Western world, rocked by a series of financial and economic crises, often falls into despondency; unhappy at what it perceives as the apparent predominance accorded to economics over politics. New conflicts over resources, the widening gap between rich and poor and the increasing curtailment of social spending all serve to compound this feeling. Such developments are sure to exert an influence on the social behavior of people and doubtless not in a positive manner. Should these developments continue, the various and attractive chimera we maintain – ranging from the existence of a benign God to the existence of universal human rights – will begin to lose their attributive reality. A gently sloping path leading us from the “supposedly actual” via the “as if” will culminate in the disappearance of our socially-constructed reality.9 People from different cultures do not act differently in borderline or situations of extreme coercion. Nevertheless, individual social self-conception and the preferred forms taken by social interaction vary considerably between cultures. We in the Western world exhibit a tendency towards individualism and an independent self-perception. In such cultures, self-definition as a process is borne and

5 6 7 8 9

FRIEDMAN, TH. L., MANDELBAUM, M., That used to be us: how America fell behind in the world it invented and how we can come back, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011. See for example the backward development in Hungary. FERGUSON, N., Civilization: The West and the Rest, Allen Lane, London, 2011. SHALPER, St., The Beijing consensus: legitimizing authoritarianism in our time, Basic Books, New York, 2010. SCHRAMM, M. W., Symbolische Formung und die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit, UKV, Konstanz, 2014.

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fed by individual thoughts, feelings and actions, without reference to others.10 The inhabitants of such societies learn to define themselves in isolation to others and, in consequence, place particular importance on the traits of independence and uniqueness. In contrast, those socialized in Asian and other non-Western societies tend towards collectivism and an inter-dependent self-perception. Defining themselves on the basis of social relationships, they are aware that their own behavior is often influenced by the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. Ted Singelis developed a questionnaire to measure the extent to which people view themselves as independent or inter-dependent. He concluded that AsianAmericans respondents displayed a higher degree of conformity to interdependence, whilst in white Americans, this trend was reversed.11 Many interdependent cultures accord considerably greater importance to the in-group than it is the case for cultures underpinned by an independent selfconception. We can infer that members of interdependent cultures probably exhibit a greater level of altruism than the representatives of individualistic cultures. Nevertheless, interdependent cultures accord greater importance to the needs of their in-group than do those of Western cultures.12 The borders between “us” and “them” are more rigid and inflexible; they are probably less helpful

10

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CROSS, S., E., “Self-construals, coping, and stress in cross-cultural adaption”, Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 26, 1995, p. 673–97; DISKE, A. P. et al., “The cultural matrix of social psychology,” in: GILBERT, D. T., FISKE, S. T., LINDZEY, G. (ed.), The handbook of social psychology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p. 915–81; HEINE, ST. J., “Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?”, Psychological Review, 106, 1999, p. 766–94; KITAYAMA, SH., MARKUS, H. R., “Culture and the self: how cultures influence the way we view ourselves,” in: MATSUMOTO, D. (ed.), People: psychology from a cultural perspective, Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., Pacific Grove, 1994, p. 17–37; KITAYAMA, SH. et al., “Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1997, p. 1245–67; MARKUS, H. R., KITAYAMA, SH., “Culture and the self: implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation,” Psychological Review, 98, 1991, p. 224–53; MARKUS, H. R., KITAYAMA, SH., HEIMAN, R. J. Heiman, “Culture and ‘basic’ psychological principles,” in HIGGINS, E. T., KRUGLANSKI, A. W. (ed.), Social psychology: handbook of basic principles, Guilford Press, New York, 1996, p. 857–913; TAFARODI, R. W., SWANN, W. B., “Individualism – collectivism and global self-esteem: evidence for a cultural trade-off,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27, 1996, p. 651–72; TRAFIMOW, D., TRIANDIS, H. C., GOTO, SH. G., “Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 1991, p. 649–55; TRIANDIS, H. C., “Crosscultural studies of individualism and collectivism,” in: BERMAN, J. J. (ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1990, p. 41–133; TRIANDIS, H. C., Culture and social behavior, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1994; TRIANDIS, H. C., Individualism and collectivism, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995. SINGELIS, T. M., “The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 1994, p. 580–91. LEUNG, K., BOND, M. H., “The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1984, p. 793–804; MILLER, J. G., BERSOFF, D. M., HARWOOD, R. L., “Perceptions of social responsibilities in India and the United States: moral imperatives or personal decisions?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 1990, p. 33–47; MOGHADDAM, F. M., TAYLOR, D. M., WRIGHT, ST. C., Social psychology in cross-cultural perspective, W.H. Freeman, New York, 1993.

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towards members of an out-group than it is the case for more individualistic cultures.13 Membership of a group can promote de-individuation. This involves the display of modes of behavior, which deviate from usual social norms. Group membership often brings people to commit acts of which an individual would have been entirely incapable. The history of the 20th century is littered with such examples.14 Aside from extreme examples, such as genocide, mob hooliganism at soccer matches provides a perfect example of de-individuation. Analyzing 60 cases between 1899 and 1946 in which the Ku Klux Klan pursued and lynched African Americans, Brian Mullen15 concluded that the brutality and cruelty of the methods used to kill the victims increased with the size of the mob.16 Robert Watson’s comparative study of warriors in 24 cultures17 showed that the level of cruelty with which prisoners of war were treated increased in proportion to the level with which the warriors were able to conceal their identities with methods such as war paint. As Jürgen Rehm and his colleagues were able to demonstrate, the wearing of uniforms or at least uniform elements of clothing in an army or at sporting events also promotes the incidence of violence towards the opponent.18 De-individuation induces people to feel less responsibility for their actions due to the low probability of their being singled out for punishment.19 In a metaanalysis of more than 60 studies, Tom Postmes und Russell Spears20 established the correlation between de-individuation and the increasing extent to which a group standard is pursued. The presence of the other group members moves individuals to pursue group norms. It is the specific norms and the nature of the situation which determine whether de-individuation results in positive or negative behavior.21 13

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ELIAS, N., SCOTSON, J. L., The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems, Sage Publications, London-Thousand Oaks – New Delhi, 1994; L’ARMAND, K., PEPITONE, A., “Helping to reward another person: a cross-cultural analysis”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 1975, p. 189–98; TING, J.-CH., PILIAVIN, J. A., “Altruism In Comparative International Perspective”, in: PHILLIPS, J., CHAPMAN, B., STEVENS, D. (ed.) Between state and market: essays on charities law and policy in Canada”, McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, Montreal-Kingston, 2000, p. 51–105. WASSERSTEIN, B., Barbarism and civilization: a history of Europe in our time, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. MULLEN, B., “Atrocity as a function of lynch mob composition: a self-attention perspective”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 1986, p. 187–97. Ibid. WATSON, R., “Investigation into deindividuation using cross-cultural survey technique”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 1973, p. 342–45. REHM, J., STEINLEITNER, M., WALDEMAR, L., “Wearing uniforms and aggression: a field experiment”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 1987, p. 357–60. DIENER, E., “Deindividuation: the absence of self-awareness and self-regulation in group members” in: PAULUS, PAUL B. L. (ed.), Psychology of group influence, Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale NJ, 1980, p. 209–42; POSTMES, T., SPEARS, R., “Deindividuation and anti-normative behavior: a meta-analysis”, Psychological Bulletin, 123, 1998, p. 238–59; ZIMBARDO, Ph. G., “The human choice: individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse and chaos”, in: ARNOLD, W. J., LEVINE, D. (ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1969, p. 237–307. Ibid. GERGEN, K. J., GERGEN, M. M., BARTON, W. H., “Deviance in the dark”, Psychology Today, July 1973, p. 129–30; JOHNSON, R. D., DOWNING, L. L., “Deindividuation and valence of cues: effects on prosocial and antisocial behavior”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1979, p. 1532–38.

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Stereotypes are cognitive structures containing socially shared knowledge relating to the characteristic attributes of members of various social categories.22 As elementary “knowledge structures,” stereotypes should be differentiated from processes of stereotyping, i.e. the application of stereotype-based knowledge to individual members of a social category or group. A central mechanism in the development of stereotypes is the continual readiness of people to categorize others – such as members of one’s own or a foreign group.23 Social categorizing refers to a process in which groups of people involved in social interaction are viewed in a consolidated fashion. Stereotypes influence not only our mechanism of perception, but also its object. Adapting to expectation, he or she displays reactions which conform to the stereotype, thus confirming the original unfounded stereotyping. Viewed in this fashion, the stereotype fulfils a prophecy because the prophet acts in such a manner that forces fulfillment.24 Falling as we do into a number of social categories, our nature as individuals hampers clear classification and thus the application of stereotypes. Stereotypes are cognitive schemes permitting simplified modes of processing and judgement. Such methods of social categorization are often seen as providing a helpful framework of orientation, serving to simplify and provide structure to complex social situations. Category-based processing is, thus, often understood as an economical form of processing. The seating arrangement in a parliamentary setting thus enables perception of party allegiance by placing members of the same party in blocks. As such, the manufacture of social categories brings order to a large and otherwise unclear group of people and their complex interaction. Party allegiance is tied to stereotypical expectations concerning political belief and voting behavior. Categorization also permits conclusions to be drawn from stereotypical contents; people with which we are unfamiliar are often evaluated and judged according to the category to which they belong. National stereotypes function in just this manner. Stereotypical knowledge structures help us – allegedly or in reality – in the interpretation of events or statements with a high potential for a lack in clarity. They also serve to fill defects of memory by replacing or reconstructing forgotten information with a stereotypical content. The functional use of stereotypes is associated with a simplification of complex social environments.25 This procedure does not just involve considerable loss of information, but also carries the risk that the categories – and thus the associated stereotype contents – provide an unfounded representation of reality. This results in errors of judgement, relating to the positive or negative evaluation of categories and their representatives. We are able to speak of prejudice only after the evaluation is transferred to a member of a specific category without obtaining

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STANGOR, CH., SCHALLER, M., “Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations”, in: MACRAE, N., STANGOR, CH., HEWSTONE, M., Stereotypes and Stereotyping”, Guilford Press, New York, 1996, p. 3–37. BIELEFELD, U. (ed.), Das Eigene und das Fremde: Neuer Rassismus in der alten Welt?, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg, 1998. BESIER, G., Neither Good Nor Bad. Why Human Beings Behave How They Do, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014, p. 92. LEVITIN, D. J., The Organized Mind. Thinking Straight in the Age of Information Overload, Penguin Random House Company, New York, 2014.

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any further information about the person concerned. Discrimination results when a negative evaluation is given expression in the treatment of another. The impact of spontaneous social categorization was demonstrated by an experiment performed by Shelley E. Taylor and his team.26 A test person was instructed to follow a discussion conducted by six men, three of whom were white and three of whom were black. Asked subsequently to assign statements to their originator, the test person made a number of errors. Nevertheless, these errors displayed a certain pattern, and the test person rarely assigned a statement made by one of the black discussion partners to one of his white counterparts. This categorization according to skin colour occurred spontaneously and almost seamlessly without the test person being in any way aware of his pattern of behavior. The findings of this “who said what” experiment reinforced the assumption that such spontaneous social categorization remains seemingly impervious to cognitive challenges.27 Additional activities performed during listening were demonstrated to impair processes such as memory, but not those of categorization according to skin colour. Henri Tajfel also succeeded in demonstrating the effect of social categorization in categorical differentiation and accentuation. Whilst members of the same category are perceived as exhibiting a greater degree of similarity, the same test person emphasizes a higher degree of divergence between those drawn from different categories.28 Stereotypes also influence the manner in which we process information drawn from our social environment. Enabling rapid assimilation of all the information matching stereotypical explanations, this mechanism provides confirmation for the stereotype in question. This process is compounded by a complementary mechanism hindering the assimilation of information which is contradictory to our expectations.29 Stereotypes also produce different levels of memory to the extent that modes of behavior confirming our expectations are more easily remembered30 and accessed31 than those which do not. Moreover, stereotypes influence the manner in which we gain an impression of people and adapt our perceptions to conform to our expectations.32 In short, stereotypes have considerable potential to control the way in which we understand, evaluate, and react to our social en26 27

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TAYLOR, SH. E., FISKE, S. T., ETCOFF, N. J., RUDERMANN, A. J., “Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1978, p. 778–93. CHRISTOPH KLAUER, K., WEGENER, I., “Unraveling Social Categorization in the ‘Who Said What?’ Paradigm”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1998, p. 1155–78; CHRISTOPH KLAUER, K., EHRENBERG, K., “Social Categorization and Fit Detection Under Cognitive Load: Efficient or Effortful?”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 2005, p. 493–516. TAJFEL, H., Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Academic Press, London, 1978. DIJKSTERHUIS, A., VAN KNIPPENBERG, A., “The Knife That Cuts Both Ways: Facilitated and Inhibited Access to Traits as a Result of Stereotype Activation”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 1996, p. 271–88. SHERMAN, J. W., LEE, A. Y., BESSENHOFF, G. R., FROST, L. A., “Stereotype Efficiency Reconsidered: Encoding Flexibility Under Cognitive Load”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1998, p. 589–606. STANGOR, CH., MCMILLAN, D., “Memory For Expectancy-Congruent and ExpectancyIncongruent Information: A Review of the Social and Social Developmental Literatures”, Psychological Bulletin, 111, 1992, p. 42–61. MACRAE, N., MILNE, A. B., BODENHAUSEN, G. V., “Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek into the Cognitive Toolbox”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 1994, p. 37– 47.

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vironment.33 Many stereotypes even correspond to problematic social consensuses and are thus shared by a number of people within a sub-culture. This is also the case for national or gender-specific stereotypes. Whilst the Germans consider themselves to be industrious, they portray Poles as lazy. Other stereotypes are developed over the course of an individual lifetime through the coalescence of indirect information and direct experiences into a stereotype. In their perception of others, people often develop a range of psychological assumptions relating to the relationship between certain human characteristics and modes of behavior. Postulating a close relationship between numerous of potentially unrelated characteristics, the incidence of one or more such patterns trigger expectations of others. Many, for instance, believe that friendly individuals are especially talkative. Such spontaneous personality theories serve a social function, enabling us to understand our social environment, predict the behavior of those we meet and to influence our social environment.34 Such mechanisms are frequently used to assess other people in cases in which the information required to do so remains scarce.35 The initial overall impression of new acquaintances generated upon initial contact exercises a considerable influence on the perception of this person in other areas.36 Despite considerable similarity, such implicit personality theories should not be confused with other empirically-tested models, which focus on the description of the individual differences.37 A number of different explanations have been advanced for the influence of such spontaneous forms of impression formation. Focusing on the social experiences made in a cultural context, some even posit an extrapolated reflection of experienced reality. Others argue that filtered through unreliable memories and erroneous convictions, such experiences are converted into false similarities. A third hypothesis argues that, based on overlapping categories of behavior, such trait categories are often accorded greater weighting within the process of assessment.38 Whereas the indirect approach chosen by implicit personality theories undertakes personality assessments due to a lack of information, the direct approach is far more restricted in the immediacy of its assessment. Confining itself to an intuitive assessment of two or more personality traits, these features are quickly worked into a pre-existing holistic personality structure. The registration of positively-connoted characteristics such as “warm-hearted,” “industrious,” “generous,” and “good-natured,” easily result in a positive overall assessment, whilst impressions such as “cold,” “irascible” and “avaricious” are taken as indicating a

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SHERMAN, J. W., MACRAE, N., BODENHAUSEN, G. V., “Attention and Stereotyping: Cognitive Constraints on the Construction of Meaningful Social Impressions”, European Review of Social Psychology, 11, 2000, p. 145–75. SCHNEIDER, D. J., “Implicit Personality Theory”, Psychological Bulletin, 79, 1973, p. 294–309. REIMANN, R., “Implizite Persönlichkeitstheorien”, in: BIERHOFF, H.-W., FREY, D. (ed.), Handbuch der Sozialpsychologie und Kommunikationspsychologie, Hogrefe, Göttingen, 2006, p. 19–26. VISWESVARAN, Ch., SCHMIDT, F. L., ONES, D. S., “Is There a General Factor in Ratings of Job Performance? A Meta-analytic Framework for Disentangling Substantive and Error Influences”, Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 2005, p. 108–31. SIX, B., WOLFRADT, U., “Implizite (‘Naïve’) Persönlichkeitstheorien”, in: PAWLIK, K. (ed.), Theorien und Anwendungsfelder der Differentiellen Psychologie,. Hogrefe, Göttingen, 2004, p. 3–58. SCHNEIDER, D. J., The Psychology of Stereotypes,Guilford Press, New York, 2004.

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more negative personality.39 The greatest differences in initial characterization appear to be the result of an impression of “warm-heartedness” or “coldness.” Indeed, it is improbable that a person taken upon first glance as being “cold” will be accorded any positive traits. Implicit personality theories enable us to differentiate between groups of persons based on the attribution of specific character traits. Although based on a similar concept as stereotypes, they differ from such mechanisms in their identification of individuals as well as groups.40 Characterized by the social interaction of its members, the g roup represents a relatively constant social category. In contrast to stereotyping, the assessment of individuals rests on a number of stable factors such as appearance and gesture, a feature with consequences for the subsequent processing of this information. The behavioral discrepancies displayed by an isolated individual can be integrated into the interpretative schema far more easily than those exhibited by a group. As a result, implicit personality theories investigate the potential change of individual characteristics. Group theories, on the other hand, assume the necessity of coordinated group effort to affect any form of transformation.41 Despite this consideration, different groups also display very different characteristics. Families and other intimate groups prove to be small, impenetrable, and long-lasting. Their members display high levels of similarity and a high degree of interaction. Such factors differentiate these groups from functional groupings (e.g. teams and committees), social groups (based on factors such as gender and ethnicity), and other, even looser associations.42 The assessment of individuals always involves the implicit assessment of the mutability of their individual characteristics43 and represents a factor of constitutive significance for a number of social cognitive processes such as social perception, attribution, and stereotype formation. Whilst the assumption of mutable personality characteristics permits a consideration of the context of judgment formation, other approaches cannot. In such a world, human behavior is the direct result of personal traits transposed unchanged into any and every setting.44 Such an understanding favors the genesis of group-based stereotyping. Those stressing the potential for individual change and development are more wary in making such sweeping statements. Writing in 1954, the Nestor of the social-scientific study of prejudice, Gordon W. Allport, defined prejudice as a “deprecatory bearing towards a person of a 39 40 41 42 43

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ASCH, S. E., “Forming Impressions of Personality”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 41, 1946, p. 258–90. RYDELL, R. J., HUGENBERG, K., RAY, D., MACKIE, D. M., “Implicit Theories About Groups and Stereotyping: The Role of Group Entitativity”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 2007, p. 549–58. HAMILTON, D. L., SHERMAN, St. J., “Perceiving Individuals and Group”, Psychological Review, 103, 1996, p. 336–55. LICKEL, B., HAMILTON, D. L., WIECZORKOWSKA, G., LEWIS, A., SERHMAN, ST. J., UHLES, N., “Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 2000, p. 223–46. DWECK, C. S., Self-Theories: Their Role in Motivation, Personality, And Development. Psychology Press, Philadelphia, 1999; LEVY, Sh. R., DWECK, C. S., “The Impact of Children’s Static Versus Dynamic Conceptions of People on Stereotype Formation”, Child Development, 70, 1999, p. 1163–80. RYDELL, R. J., HUGENBERG, K., RAY, D., MACKIE, D. M., “Implicit Theories About Groups and Stereotyping: The Role of Group Entitativity”, op.cit., p. 6.

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specific group for the sole reason that he belongs to this group and consequently is taken to have or display the same deplorable characteristics which are attributed to this group as a whole.”45 Although Allport concedes the existence of positive prejudice, i.e. the development of an unfounded positive opinion of others,46 his definition, as with many others engaged in this field,47 concentrates on the negative aspect of prejudice. According to Bernd Schlöder, a stereotype first becomes a prejudice when it is associated with an evaluation, thus producing an emotional reaction.48 The majority of definitions assume that prejudices are variations of a specific form of attitude, (i.e. personal convictions and individual attitudes) directed towards groups or members of these groups. In this context, an attitude is defined as a set of organized and linked convictions of relative longevity which produce evaluative, cognitive and/or emotionally motivated actions towards a group, one of its members, a situation, or an issue. Fuelled by wide public interest in the source of inter-racial conflict between the white and black populations in the USA, attitude studies began to focus increasingly on the study of prejudice in the 1960s. Ethnic prejudices consist of antipathies resulting from defective generalizations ranged against a whole group or its members.49 Normative and moral factors play a specific role within this process.50 Other social problems providing the stimulus for these developments included the general Western patterns of gender-specific, age-related and disability-related prejudices51 as well as a politically-motivated interest in the origins of anti-democratic sentiment. As a result, there has been a flood of publications on racism52, sexism53, ageism54 and other prejudices contributing to the development of the authoritarian personality.

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ALLPORT, G. W., The Nature of Prejudice, Perseus Books, Cambridge MA, 1979, p. 6. DORSCHEL, A., Rethinking Prejudice, Ashgate Pub Ltd, Farnham, 2001. ZICK, A., Vorurteile und Rassismus: Eine sozialpsychologische Analyse, Waxmann, Münster, 1997; JONES, J. M., Prejudice and Racism, McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 1997. SCHLÖDER, B., “Vorurteile, Stereotype und die Verständigung zwischen Gruppen”, in: THOMAS, A. (ed.), Psychologie und multikulturelle Gesellschaft, Hogrefe, Göttingen, 1996, p. 109– 14; HORT, R., Vorurteile und Stereotype: Soziale und dynamische Konstrukte, VDM, Müller, Saarbrücken, 2007, p. 34. ARONSON, E., WILSON, T. D., AKERT, R. M., Social Psychology, Pearson, Boston, 2010. BERGMANN, W., “Was sind Vorurteile?”, Informationen zur Politischen Bildung, 271, 2001, p. 3–9. DEAL, M., “Aversive Disablism: Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People”, Disability & Society, 22, 2007, p. 93–107. ZICK, A., Vorurteile und Rassismus: Eine sozialpsychologische Analyse, Waxmann, Münster, 1997; JONES, J. M., Prejudice and Racism, McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 1997; DURRHEIM, K., DIXON, J., “Attitudes in the Fiber of Everyday Life: The Discourse of Racial Evaluation and the Lived Experience of Desegregation”, American Psychologist, 59, 2004, p. 626–36; QUILLIAN, L., “New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination”, Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 2006, p. 299–328; SEARS, D., O’HENRY, P. J., “Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 2005, p. 95– 150. For the aesthetical aspects of racism in the United States, where to be black has been stigmatized as ugly, see TATE, SH. A., Black Beauty: Aesthetics, Stylization, Politics, Farnham, Ashgate, 2009. GLICK, P. et al., “Hostile as well as Benevolent Attitudes Toward Men Predict Gender Hierarchy: A 16 Nation Study”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 2004, p. 713–28.

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This new wave of publications brought a fresh focus. Especially in the studies concerned with racism and sexism, these approaches moved away from a study of open prejudice55 towards an analysis of the subtle, yet symbolic “modern” form of prejudice involving adverse attitudes (in terms of misogyny and racism) held behind a politically correct façade. Thanks to the progress made in methodology, attitude research was then able to uncover implicit attitudes producing “automatic” affective reactions as soon as the relevant subjects were involved. Whilst explicit prejudice is based on open, cognitively accessible value-systems, it was demonstrated that implicit prejudice was often active without the holder of such attitudes being aware of its existence. As a result, they could only be accessed indirectly. A further question concerns the extent of interdependence between explicit and implicit prejudice and the possibility of predicting prejudicedriven actions on the basis of an investigation of implicit prejudice. In contrast to local-specific stigmatisms, evolutionary psychology has identified a number of cross-cultural stigmas. Established as cognitive patterns, they are the result of historical evolution. Performing an adaptive function, they serve to effect the exclusion of those individuals from an in-group who exhibit traits viewed as potentially dangerous for its survival.56 Including a number of mental disorders and physical handicaps, these characteristics also include transgressors (such as criminals and homosexuals), the ill (e.g. the carriers of HIV), and the members of religious or ethnic minorities. Social psychological and evolutionary psychological approaches to this phenomenon differ little in the explanations which they advance as to the criteria for such exclusion. Failing to fulfil the normative expectations of their immediate social grouping and forfeiting their full status as its member, the stigmatized often suffer damage to their social identity.57 Unable to deal with rejection, those with little stake in society eventually accept these external judgements and react with exceedingly low self-esteem. At the other end of the spectrum, no fewer interpret their ostracism as confirmation of their – often religiously founded – convictions, and experience reassurance of their elect status.58 Some of the stigmatized succeed in overcoming their “affliction.” Addressing the causes of their social estrangement, 54

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GORDON, R. A., ARVEY, R. D., “Age Bias in Laboratory and Field Settings: A Meta-analytic Investigation”, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 2004, p. 468–92; KITE, M. E., STOCKDALE, G. D., WHITLEY, B. E., JOHNSON, B. T., “Attitudes Toward Younger or Older Adults: An Updated Meta-analytic Review” Journal of Social Issues 61, 2005, p. 241–66; KLUGE, A., KRINGS, F., “Altersdiskriminierung – (K)ein Thema der deutschsprachigen Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie?”, Zeitschrift für Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie, 51, 2007, p. 180–89. Ireneusz Krzemiński used questionaires to investigate anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine. See KRZEMIŃSKI, I., “Nationale Opferkonkurrenz und Beharrlichkeit der Tradition: Antisemitismus in Polen und der Ukraine“ in: RENSMANN, L., SCHOEPS, J. H., Feindbild Judentum. Antisemitismus in Europa, Verlag für Berlin Brandenburg, Berlin, 2008, p. 347–76. KURZBAHN, R., LEARY, M. R., “Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The Functions of Social Exclusion”, Psychological Bulletin, 12, 2001, p. 187–208; NEUBERG, St. L., SMITH, D. M. Smith. ASHER, T. “Why People Stigmatize: Toward a Biocultural Framework”, in: HEATHERTON, T. F., KLECK, R., HEBL, M., HULL, J. G. (ed.), The Social Psychology of Stigma, Guilford Press, New York, 2000, p. 31–61. From a historical perspective see also the Journal National Identities, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon. CROCKER, J., MAJOR, B., “Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma”, Psychological Review, 96, 1989, p. 608–30; MAJOR, B., O’BRIEN, L. T., “The Social Psychology of Stigma”, Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 2005, p. 393–421.

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they manage to restore their attractiveness as a partner for social exchange.59 Proactive strategies to this end, such as weight-loss or cosmetic surgery, are joined by dissimulative approaches such as public apostasy. The stigmatized can also avoid the effects of stigmatization by avoiding social contacts or other forms of social attachment carrying the potential for rejection or ostracism. What do these anthropological and psychological insights mean for the relationship between the Western Sphere and other parts of the World, particular Russia and the former countries of the Soviet Union? In the following pages, I will try to answer these questions.

II. How to overcome different cultural habits, values and norms At the end of the First World War, the Germans established a democratic constitutional state – against the will of the conservative circles, who would have preferred an authoritarian system.60 Both the 1918 Socialist Revolution and the determination of the victorious powers, namely the USA, contributed to this development. However, political and economic conditions in the aftermath led to the reality that this democracy was doomed to fail. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, each of the European countries in which a democracy had been established after 1918 returned to one form or another of an authoritarian government in the interwar period.61 In the ensuing years, it was interpreted – with a clearly moral undertone – that these peoples of Europe were simply not yet “mature” enough for a democracy. From a more explanatory and descriptive perspective, it could be said that centuries-old, pronounced mentalities and social habits simply do not change overnight.62 In other words, collective attitudes and approaches, such as pride in one’s nation, cannot readily be removed by a process of individualisation – for instance through a sense of pride in one’s own individual achievements. This is also applicable for the reverse process: the collective humiliation of a nation, such as the way Germans felt in the light of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 – across the entire political spectrum – was a collective pattern of behaviour that could not be resolved.63 Naturally, both attitudes can be conceived side by side. The crucial question is then: which attitude will prevail? An infamous sentence from Nazi

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MAJOR, B., ECCLESTON, C., “Stigma and Social exclusion”, in: ABRAMS, D., HOGG, M. A., MARQUES, J. (ed.), The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion, Psychology Press, New York, 2005, p. 63–87. EITZ, TH., ENGELHARDT, I., Diskursgeschichte der Weimarer Republik, 2 vols, Hildesheim-ZürichNew York, 2015. BESIER, G., STOKŁOSA, K., European Dictatorships. A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013, p. 13. DUHIGG, CH., The Power of Habit. Why we do what we do and how to Change, Random House, London, 2013, p. 215. BESIER, G., STOKŁOSA, K., European Dictatorships. A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p. 126.

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ideology states, “You are nothing, your people are everything!”64 A willingness to make sacrifices arises from this attitude, which for many led to a total selfabandonment of individual interest. This went hand in hand with a willingness to obey, suspending any sense of personal responsibility, whereby obedience to commands was highlighted as a virtue within a hierarchical society.65 There is also a collective way of thinking in western societies – especially in some sub-cultures like the military – that pushes individual desires and expectations into the background.66 However, there has always been fierce public opposition to impositions of this sort in democratic societies that will not let itself be suppressed67 – in this context, one need only think of the opposition to the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, Guantánamo and the global spying activities of the NSA. Any such powerful opposition movements that constantly provide inspiration to change and reform would have been well and truly nipped in the bud in an authoritarian society. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989/90 appeared to change the world.68 In the 1990s, there was the impression that former Soviet Union states were developing into pluralist democracies. However, this difficult process was brought to an abrupt halt when Putin came to power,69 and had never even begun in some countries like Belarus. What are the reasons behind this adherence to authoritarian structures and the renunciation of pluralism and open society?70 It is typical for collapsed dictatorships that their chief stakeholders want to reconsolidate parts of the failed social order so that authoritarian thinking and its structures do 64

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BAJOHR, F., WILDT, M. (ed.), Volksgemeinschaft. Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus, S.Fischer, Frankfurt, 2009; THIESSEN, M., “Erinnerungen an die Volksgemeinschaft. Integration und Exklusion im kommunalen und kommunikativen Gedächtnis”, in: SCHMIECHEN-ACKERMANN, D. (ed.),Volksgemeinschaft: Mythos, wirkungsmächtige soziale Verheißung oder soziale Realität im Dritten Reich, Schöningh, Paderborn, 2012, p. 319–334; VON REEKEN, D., THIESSEN, M. (ed.), Volksgemeinschaft als soziale Praxis. Neue Forschungen zur NS-Gesellschaft vor Ort, Schöningh, Paderborn, 2013; STEBEN, M., GOTTO, B. (ed.), Visions of Community in Nazi Germany – Social Engineering and Private Lives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. BESIER, G., Neither Good Nor Bad. Why Human Beings Behave How They Do, op.cit., p. 6. HOGG, M. A. HAINS, S. C. Friendship and group identification: a new look at the role of cohesiveness in groupthink in European Journal of Social Psychology 28: 1998, p. 323–341; BARON, R. S., “So right it's wrong: groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision making”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 2005, p. 219–253; O'CONNOR, M.A., “The Enron board: the perils of groupthink”, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 71, 2003, p. 1233–1320; PACKER, D. J., “Avoiding groupthink: whereas weakly identified members remain silent, strongly identified members dissent about collective problems”, Psychological Science 20, 2009, p. 546–548; ROSE, J. D.; “Diverse perspectives on the groupthink theory – a literary review”, Emerging Leadership Journeys, 4, 2011, p. 37–57; KOWERT, P. A., Groupthink or deadlock: When do leaders learn from their advisors?, Blackwell Publishing, Albany, 2002. KRAMER, R. M., “Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?”, Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 73, 1998, p. 236–271; AHLFINGER, N. R., ESSER, J. K., “Testing the groupthink model: Effects of promotional leadership and conformity predisposition”, Social Behavior & Personality: An International Journal, 29, 2001, p. 31–42; PARKER, C. B., “Stanford Research shows how people emotionally turn against their groups in case of injustice”, Stanford Report, March 16, 2015. BESIER, G., STOKŁOSA, K., European Dictatorships. A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p. 567. POLITKOVSKAYA, A., Putin’s Russia, Harvill Press, London, 2004. SAXER, M., “Performance Matters – Challenges for the Democratic Model and Democracy Promotion”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2009, p. 81–99.

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not simply disappear. Members of the former organisational structures – army officers, secret service agents and party leaders – both utilise their old networks and create new ones in order to win back to some extent their lost political and economic positions of power. In contrast to this, reformist powers who are generally quarrelling amongst themselves mostly have neither the connections nor sufficient support within society at their disposal. This is because reform requires a fundamental rethinking, and increased effort. Most people are not prepared for this. They want to hang on to their familiar and trusted concepts, the old moral values and the lifestyle that they are accustomed to.71 As soon as people get the feeling that things are improving for them – even at the lowest possible level – and that strong leadership promises them security and order, then they will turn their backs on reforms that seem to demand so much from them. They have no desire to protest against corruption and injustice, but are more than willing to comply with whatever is available. Their thinking is bound to the old structures – it runs in the well-known tracks of good and evil. Over 70 years of antiimperialism, anti-capitalism on the one hand and socialism on the other hand, have shaped three generations at the very least.72 Old self-images and perceptions of others determine both thoughts and feelings. Once upon a time “we” were a feared superpower, but now we are only a “regional power”. Too many people come to this conclusion. We must win back the former greatness, ideally in the dimensions of the Tsarist Empire. People who are barely able to survive in authoritarian societies truly believe these images; even when their actual reality is a life in the deepest poverty, they can see prosperity on the streets of the big cities, and it is a prosperity that makes their head spin.73 Even so, these brutal contrasts do not kindle a revolutionary spirit within them. Instead, they project their desires and expectations onto an imaginary greatness for their own country. “Even though I am just a poor creature”, these people say to themselves, “I belong to an increasingly strong country”. They gain nothing individually from this state of affairs, but the thought fills them with pride. This feeling returns meaning to their humble existence. For those who live in the most miserable conditions, personal freedom is not actually important. They have never known personal freedom, they certainly do not miss it, and it is a foreign, even frightening, concept for them. There is only one freedom that is permitted in authoritarian states and which gives pleasure to their citizens – and that is consumer freedom. In China, we can observe an increasing rate of consumption and growing prosperity, and yet the people do not appear to regret the absence of political freedom or the right to determine the course of their own lives as they might desire, not according to state guidelines.74 China’s industrial development ploughs ahead at an unbelievable pace, and soon China’s gross national product will outstrip that of the USA. Does the future, in

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MOYERS, T. L., Wanderings: Exploring Moral Landscapes Past and Present, University Press of America, Boston, 1996, p. 109. BESIER, G., STOKŁOSA, K., European Dictatorships. A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century, op.cit., p. 20, p. 278, p. 364. BALMFORTH, T., “Divide between rich and poor increases in Russia”, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 2, 2013. NYE, J. S., “The Rise of China’s Soft Power”, Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29 2005.

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fact, belong to the authoritarian consumer state, which can dispense with all other civil liberties simply because these are not sought after?75 Before we turn to this question, we should emphasise that, among authoritarian states, China’s industrial development is the exception rather than the rule. Instead of reinvesting the profits from their rich reserves of raw materials in the countries’ economic, industrial and social infrastructure, generally only a very narrow upper echelon of society (oligarchs) benefit from state revenues in authoritarian states, not the wider population.76 State revenues trickle into often corrupt political and economic structures.77 As has happened for decades, enormous sums flow into the one-sided development and production of weapons systems, while other sectors – for example the civil high-technology sector – stagnate over the decades.78 At the start of the twentieth century, imperial size was determined by territorial gains and the number of able-bodied men ready to bear arms. These criteria have also changed since that time. There are bitterly poor regions in the world that are bristling with weapons. They bring war and suffering into their region with no economic or social gain. Alternately, small countries with modern, advanced technology are able to determine the trend of their economic and social development. Year after year, scientists measure the levels of people’s satisfaction and happiness in life across different regions of the world.79 There are no imperial powers among the countries that invariably score at or near the top. Instead, we find countries like Denmark or Switzerland – states that have long asserted neutrality from war and that measure progress by the degree of satisfaction among their citizens. Countries that shift categories such as these to the centre of their political action do not represent a threat to others. Nevertheless, such states cannot always live undisturbed and at peace when their neighbours think in the realms of spheres of influence and engage in military-based power politics. As a consequence, Denmark considered placing themselves under the protection of the NATO missile defence system, and immediately felt exposed to a new threat, or alternately, felt their analysis – that they were threatened – was justified.80 When seeking to understand others, it is fundamentally essential that an individual places oneself in another’s shoes – that an adoption of other perspectives is undertaken. EU-Europe has no interest in expanding its borders, nor any sense of looking for power options. Repeatedly, Ukraine’s desire to be admitted to the European Union (and to NATO) was rejected or put off. The West cannot be held responsible for Western-Ukraine’s aspiration for a western way of life. As one of Poland’s immediate neighbours, the West-Ukrainians can see how quickly a 75 76 77 78 79 80

FERGUSON, N., Civilization: The West and the Rest, Penguin Books, London-New York, 2012. “The Russian financial rally: Unfair”, The Economist, April 15 2015; “Russia’s Economy Steps Back from the Brink”, Bloomberg View, April 17 2015. Russia Corruption Profile from the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, http://www.businessanti-corruption.com (2.6.2016). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (2.3.2017). HELLIWELL, J. F., LAYARD, R., SACHS, J. (ed.), World Happiness Report 2015, Earth Institute, New York, 2015. ISHERWOOD, J., “Russia warns Denmark its warships could become nuclear targets”, The Telegraph, March 2015; WITNALL, A., “Russia threatens Denmark with nuclear weapons if it tries to join Nato defence shield”, The Independent, March 2015.

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more liberal state is developing there, how the general population’s prosperity is growing and how the diverse ways of life can enrich a society.81 In spite of all the problems – Greece being a glaring example – the European Union has proven to be an attractive model of life. Floods of refugees are streaming into European countries from across the world because they see the promise of a better life. The European Union is militarily weak but economically strong. The EU looks for ways to avoid all military conflicts and invests instead in education and research, in social achievements, equal opportunities and an egalitarian way of life. But now a change of perspective:82 From Moscow’s viewpoint, the European Union nonetheless does represent a threat.83 Although the EU’s military weakness might be ridiculed and their propensity for peace scorned as cowardice, the individual western lifestyle remains a temptation for Eastern Europeans. However, unlike their West-Ukrainian compatriots, citizens from Eastern Ukraine have had no experience of the West. They only know about the West from the propaganda of anti-western forces.84 But they do hope, with some justification, that life in Russia will be better than that in Ukraine. Therefore, they turn to Moscow. At least in Russia there is a minimum level of care for everyone. Even if salaries are low and living conditions are modest, people have a sense of security and safety – as long as they do not aim to change the system. They can feel they are part of a powerful empire and are not continually called upon to develop their spirit of initiative. The strict state order offers them support and stability. In reality, we are dealing with an antagonism between two ways of life. Neither side is willing to abandon its ideas and concepts. In this respect, political compromises have to be negotiated time and again. This is made all the more difficult because the peoples’ right to self-determination, proclaimed almost 100 years ago, has been quashed – just like any concept of open competition between various social models. Therefore, in order to cement the conditions as they currently stand for ever, force needs to be applied. This situation is a menace to world peace and threatens to set Europe back into the nineteenth century.

81 82

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BURANT, St. R., “International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours. Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 1993, p. 395–418. LIEBERMAN, R. C., “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Orders: Explaining Political Change”, American Political Science Review, 2002, p. 697–712; VOGELEY, G.R., FINK, G.R., Perspektivwechsel und soziale Kognition in Funktionelle MRT in Psychiatrie und Neurologie, Springer, Heidelberg, 2007, p. 350–360. BARANOWSKI, V., “Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe”, International Affairs, 76, 2000, p. 443–458; AVERRE, D., “Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?”, European Security, 14, 2005, p. 175–202. ORMISTON, S., “Russian Government propaganda stokes anti-West sentiments”, CBC News, February 2015; NAURECKAS, J., “Russia’s Anti-Western Anger: Funny How Russian Propaganda, US Free Press Produce Exact Same Mood Swings”, Global Research, March 2015.

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LES FRONTIÈRES MENTALES CRÉENT UN ESPRIT LIMITÉ : COMMENT SURMONTER LES PRÉJUGÉS, STÉRÉOTYPES ET IMAGES DE L’ENNEMI DANS LA SECONDE DÉCENNIE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE Prendre en compte les concepts psychologiques des stéréotypes, des préjudices et des classifications de groupes peut contribuer à comprendre le processus social de catégorisation formant les relations entre la sphère occidentale et le reste du monde. Récemment, des facteurs tels que la crise économique en Occident, ainsi que la prospérité économique d’Etats autoritaires présentent une menace pour la réalité socialement construite des individus, affaiblissant ainsi la stabilité de la paix mondiale.

GEISTIGE GRENZEN SCHAFFEN EINEN BEGRENZTEN VERSTAND: WIE ÜBERWINDET MAN VORURTEILE, STEREOTYPEN UND FEINDBILDER IM ZWEITEN JAHRZEHNT DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS Die Berücksichtigung psychologischer Konzepte von Stereotypen, Vorurteilen und Gruppierungen kann zum Verständnis von Prozessen der sozialen Kategorisierung beitragen, die die Beziehungen zwischen der westlichen Sphäre und anderen Teilen der Welt formen. Kürzlich stellten Faktoren, wie die Wirtschaftskrise in der westlichen Welt, wie auch prosperierende Volkswirtschaften in autoritären Staaten, eine Bedrohung für die sozial konstruierten Realitäten der Menschen dar und schwächen dadurch auch die Stabilität des Weltfriedens.

THE RHINE: A BORDER OF PEACE? MEMORIES FROM KEY PLAYERS IN THE UPPER RHINE REGION BIRTE WASSENBERG The Rhine, at first glance, cannot easily be qualified as a border of peace. Indeed, from the 19th Century onwards, it has been the subject of constant FrancoGerman rivalry, each nation claiming the river for itself. The Rhine lyrics from 1840 perfectly illustrate this fact, when Nicolas Becker claimed “You won’t have it, the free Rhine”1 and Alfred de Musset answered: “We got it, your German Rhine.”2 This rivalry ended up with a series of Franco-German wars between 1870 and 1945, during which the territory left and right of the Rhine was constantly disputed between the two nation states3. In the Upper Rhine Region, where for the most part, the Rhine marks the national border between France and Germany, the river would therefore at first sight symbolise pain, conflict and wars4 – the more recent of which is still remembered by the local population, particularly the experiences of the destructive First and Second World Wars.5 However, since 1945, the Western European States have launched a process of European Integration which has led to the creation of the first European Organizations, the Council of Europe in 1949 and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This reconciliation process started in the heart of the Upper Rhine Region, with the Council of Europe’s headquarters situated in Strasbourg – right on the Franco-German border.6 Slowly, as the history of European integration progressed, the Rhine changed its signification: it has increasingly become a symbol of peace and reconciliation rather than one of war and hatred.7 The Franco-German-Swiss cross-border cooperation, initiated in the 1960s, contributed to this memory reconversion from war to peace in the Upper Rhine Region.8 Indeed, cross-border cooperation was identified from its debut as a tool for peacebuilding in Europe: from the early 70s, Karl Ahrens, the first president of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), stressed that national borders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

BECKER, N., Das Rheinlied, 1840, quoted by TÜMMERS, H. J., Der Rhein, ein europäisischer Fluss und seine Geschichte, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1994, p. 223, 224. MUSSET, A., 1er février 1841, réponse à Nicolas Becker. VOGLER, B., “Baden und Elsass: Die Geschichte einer 2000 jährigen Nachbarschaft und ihre Folgen”, in: BECKER- MARX, K., JENTSCH, CH., Es ist Zeit für den Oberrhein, University Mannheim, 1996, p. 97. WASSENBERG, B., Vers une eurorégion ? La coopération transfrontalière franco-germano-suisse dans l’espace du Rhin supérieur de 1975 à 2000, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2007, p. 41–51. DENNI, K., Rheinüberschreitungen. Grenzüberwindungen. Die deutsch-französische Grenze und ihre Rheinbrücken (1861–2006), UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, Konstanz, p. 139, p. 140. WASSENBERG, B., “Introduction”, in: WASSENBERG, B., BECK, J. (ed.), Living and Researching Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe (Vol. 3): the European Dimension, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011, p. 41. WASSENBERG, B., “Grenzorte : von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation – das Beispiel des Oberrheins”, in: DEFRANCE, C., PFEIL, U. (ed.), Verständigung und Versöhnung. Deutschland nach dem Zivilisationsbruch, Peter Lang, Berlin, Bern, Brussels, 2016, p. 349–371. Ibid.

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were “the scars” of history and that the role of cross-border cooperation was to heal them.9 In order to refigure post-World War II memories of the Rhine as a border of peace, the European Association Mesa, together with the Raymond Poidevin Research Centre of the University of Strasbourg launched an interdisciplinary project in Autumn 2012, consisting in holding a number of interviews with key actors from the cross-border region asking them about their perceptions of European integration, cross-border cooperation and intercultural relations with their neighbours.10 In the following presentation, the methodology and approach of the project will briefly be explained, before presenting the results of the interviews with regards to three types of memories of peace in the Upper Rhine Region: the memory of peace as resulting from the European integration process, the memory of peace as an outcome of the Franco-German-Swiss cross-border cooperation between local and regional actors, and the memory of peace as one of intercultural understanding and building up a common regional and/or European identity.11

I. The project “memory of Europe, memory of peace: witnesses and perspectives from the Upper Rhine region” The project on the memory of peace in the Upper Rhine was jointly conducted by two researchers from the University of Strasbourg (Philippe Hamman, professor of sociology and Birte Wassenberg, professor of contemporary history). The idea was to proceed to an interdisciplinary interpretation of the material collected.12 However, it was primarily based on a sociological methodology focusing on interviews with key actors in the Upper Rhine Region, and not taking into account any additional sources (archives, press articles, etc.).13 The list of actors was drawn by the Mesa association, according to a grid of 5 categories: political, administrative, scientific, cultural and economic actors. These key actors were chosen from the geographical area of the Upper Rhine, i.e. the French Region Alsace, the German Länder Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz, and the Swiss Can9 10

11 12 13

AHRENS, K., Freundschaft über Grenzen, Relazioni Internazionali, scritti in onore di Guiseppe Vedovato, Vol. II, Florenz, 1997, p. 12. The project was conducted by students from the IEP of the university year 2013–2013 and supervised by two professors from the University of Strasbourg (Philippe Hamman, professor of Sociology and Birte Wassenberg, professor of contemporary history) and by Ulrich Bohner, president of the MESA Association in Strasbourg. It was linked to the activities on the memory pf peace in Europe that MESA organized during the year on intergenerational solidarity in 2012. This project will lead to a publication by HAMMAN, PH., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Mémoires d’Europe, mémoire de paix. Témoignages et perspectives de l’espace rhénan, Peter Lang, Brussels (to be published) in 2017. For the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach to research in cross-border cooperation see WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), L’approche pluridisciplinaire de la cooperation transfrontalière, Cahier FARE n°5, Harmattan, 2014. Cf. HAMMAN, PH., “Penser la différence à l’aune des espaces-frontières : une proposition d’analyse sociologique”, in : DENOOZ, L., THIÉBLEMONT-DOLLET, S. (ed.), Le moi et l’autre, MetzNancy, Presses universitaires de Nancy, 2011, p. 29–39 ; HAMMAN, PH., “Espaces-frontières et production du lien social : quelques propositions”, in : CAUSER, J.-Y., RAPHAËL, F., CASSILDE, ST. (ed.), Faire lien, Strasbourg, Néothèque, 2012, p. 73–99.

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ton of Basel. Most personalities interviewed either had a more or less direct link to the process of European integration (having worked in the European Organizations in Strasbourg, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights etc.), or of regional cooperation (having occupied functions in the governance structures of the Upper Rhine Conference, the Interreg programs, the Eurodistrict Kehl-Strasbourg, etc.). A major selection criterion was that the actors should no longer be active in their professional life so as to ensure a certain distance and freedom of judgment with regard to the institution for which they had been working. The age range of the interviewed personalities was therefore between 50 and 90 years. The list of over 30 key actors consisted of:14 – personalities from the Council of Europe such as Ulrich Bohner, former Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Klaus Schumann and Bruno Haller, former administrators of the Council, Jean-Paul Costa, former president of the Court of Human Rights, Hans-Christian Krüger, former Commissioner of the European Commission and Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Anna Sforza, former Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe and of the International Institute of Human Rights; – of high-ranking politicians such as Catherine Lalumière, former French Minister, Secretary General of the Council of Europe and Member of the European Parliament, Catherine Trautmann, former Mayor of Strasbourg and Member of the European Parliament and Karl-Heinz Lambertz, President of the Association for European Border Regions and Vice-President of the Committee of Regions; – but also of political leaders and personalities from the Upper Region active in cross-border cooperation, such as Jean-Paul Heider and Gerard Traband, former Conseillers regionaux d’Alsace, Hans-Martin Tschudi, former Regierungsrat from Basel, Jean-Marie Woehrling, former President of the Administrative Court in Strasbourg and Secretary General of the Rhine Commission, Robert Hertzog, the former director of the Strasbourg-Kehl Working Community Centre and Michel Krieger, painter and initiator of the Garden of two Rivers Strasbourg-Kehl and René Eckhard, the founder of the Association of Entrepreneurs in Europe and President of the Initiative Eurodistrict. – There were also leading cultural actors, such as Robert Walter, director of the Franco-German Cultural Centre in Karlsruhe, Marcel Spiesser, president of the Association of the Memorial Alsace-Moselle, Roger Siffer, Alsatian artist and director of the Cabaret La Coucrouterie, Pierre Kretz, Alsatian writer, Norbert Engel, former president of the Opera du Rhin, General Inspector for Culture and president of the international action for the Memory of the Shoah,

14

In total, the students realized 33 interviews with the following “grands témoins”: Paul Collowald, Jean-Paul Costa, René Eckhardt, Norbert Engel, René Gutman, Bruno Haller, Jean-Paul Heider, Robert Hertzog, Jean-Marie Heydt, Michel Hoeffel, Alain Howiller, Jean Hurstel, Claude Keiflin, Pierre Kretz, Michel Krieger, Hans-Christian Krüger, Catherine Lalumière, Kai Littmann, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, Léon Nisand, Lucienne Schmitt, Klaus Schumann, Anne Sforza, Roger Siffer, Marcel Spisser, Antoine Spohr, Gérard Traband (†), Catherine Trautmann, Hans Martin Tschudi, Karl von Wogau, Robert Walter, Jean-Marie Woehrling and Ulrich Bohner.

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Stéphane Grimaldi, General Director of the Memorial of Caen and Jean Hurstel, founder of the Universiy Theatre of Strasbourg. – Finally, included were: the former journalist and Member of the Directorate of Communication of the European Parliament (Paul Collowald), the former director of the regional Journal Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace (Alain Howiller) and the journalist and founder of the Forum Citroyen Eurodistrict (Kai Littmann), the Vice-President of the Protestant Federation of France (Michel Hoeffel), the founder of the International Centre of introduction to Human Rights (Lucienne Schmitt), as well as a former jewish member of the Resistance from Strasbourg (Léon Nisand). – The interviews were held by students divided into groups of two from the Franco-German option of the Master 2 European Public Policies at the Institut d’études politiques (IEP) in Strasbourg. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours and were orientated by means of a thematic grid of questions, the same for all interviewees. This grid consisted of three question categories: – First: what has your experience been in the European integration process since 1948? The students were instructed to ask about the process of reconciliation, but also more explicitly about how the interviewed person defined European integration and how and when he/she had been personally involved in this process. The list of points to cover also included the perception of European institutions and policies, the Euro and some more critical aspects concerning the European Union such as the financial crisis, the democratic deficit, etc. – The second category was: what is your experience of cross-border cooperation? In this section, the students focussed on the function and role of crossborder cooperation in the process of peace-building in the Upper Rhine Region. What is cross-border cooperation? Is it a laboratory or a model for European Integration? Is the Rhine still a border and is this border still a scar of history? The personalities were also interviewed in further detail regarding their view on the Eurodistrict Kehl-Strasbourg. – Finally, the third category was: what is your experience of regional and European identity and how have you experienced the relationship with neighbours across the border? The questions in this section dealt with intercultural differences between German, French and Swiss people, the different levels of identification – regional, national, European, and the affiliation of the interviewed persons to a common European identity. The results of the interviews showed that in general, all actors from the Upper Rhine Region manifested a positive memory of the European integration process and cross-border cooperation. In comparison to the war period, which a number of the interviewed personalities had personally experienced, they all confirmed that the Rhine has today become a border of peace. However, some more differentiated perceptions could be identified when analysing the respective weight of three categories of the interviews: the European integration process, cross-border cooperation and intercultural understanding with the neighbours.

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II. The memory of the process of European integration in the Upper Rhine region The European idea developed as a necessary and beneficial process of peacemaking and reconciliation. Key actors in this study show that Strasbourg plays an essential role in this construction: the process of European Integration becomes inevitably linked with the Franco-German border as a symbol of peace instead of a symbol of conflict and war.15 Reading the interviews reveals that the chosen actors did take an interest in the European construction in an innate way and that they themselves experienced this process of Europeanization.16 Specifically, the European construction has here been defined as a project, the European project, and it involves making a break with past – a belligerent one – through the establishment of new European institutions. Again, Strasbourg, as the seat of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament acquires a central position in this memory of peace following 1945.17 The goal of achieving peace comes up continually in the interviewees’ statements, the reconciliation between France and Germany, but also the rejection of the Soviet model, the engine of socialization to Europe.18 Nonetheless, the fundamentally novel view of this European construction in the framework of international relations isn’t mythicized: one specific path was chosen among many. Obviously, the personal experiences of those who faced the war increased their appreciation for the European idea.19 But the purpose of the European construction isn’t unique. Its explanation is interpreted in a changing and evolving sociopolitical and historical configuration. Depending on which European Organizations played a major role for the key actors, they also emphasize different periods and steps of this reconciliation process. For example, former actors from the Council of Europe put forward the leading role of the Court of Human Rights or the enlargement process of the Council of Europe to the Central and Eastern European states after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.20 Although based in Strasbourg, Franco-German reconciliation seems to have left a less pregnant memory in the minds of these actors than the East-West reconciliation. These actors do however mention the model function of the Rhine as a symbol of “Western” Franco-German reconciliation for the peace process along the iron curtain. Personalities that worked for EC institutions or for regional administrations were more inclined to stress the beginning of the European economic integration process having begun with the Schuman Plan in 1950 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957.21 Some witnesses even appropriate this European integration process for themselves, for example the journalist Paul Collowald who claims to have been informed by Robert Schuman in an interview in Strasbourg about the Schuman plan before its official announcement.22 For regional Alsatian politicians like Jean-Paul Hei15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

See for example interviews with Marcel Spiesser, Kai Littmann, Jean-Paul Heider. See for example interviews with Paul Collowald, Karl-Heniz Lambertz, Karl von Wogau. See for example interviews with Bruno Haller, Catherine Trautmann. See for example interviews with Jean-Paul Heider, Alain Howiller, Ulrich Bohner. See for example interviews with Paul Collowald, Lucienne Schmitt, Léon Nisand, Anne Sforza. See interviews with Catherine Lalumière, Jean-Paul Costa, Ulrich Bohner, Klaus Schumann. See interviews with Catherine Trautmann, Catherine Lalumière. See interview with Paul Collowald.

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der and Gérard Traband, the freedom of circulation in the Upper Rhine Region established after the realization of the Single Market in 1987 signified the end of the Rhine as a dividing border between nation states.23 Even Swiss actors, like Hans-Martin Tschudi identify themselves with the European integration process and the Rhine as a border of peace – not mentioning the problematic position of Switzerland as a non-member of the European Union.24 Whereas more or less all interviewed persons agree on the “new” constructed memory of the Rhine as a model of peace for Europe, there are more differentiated and sometimes critical views on the character of the unified Europe today and of its implications. The experiences of the key actors from the Upper Rhine indeed illustrate the diverse nature of the European construction process. Thus, the European idea led to several Europes according to the selected actors – or at least to the perception of two Europes. An initial contrariety is, for example, drawn between the European Union and the Council of Europe.25 Another common theme is the opposition between a humanist Europe and an economic one – it actually means different tendencies of Europe in particular sectors.26 It is sure among interviewees that this plurality causes difficulties and that there is no simplified outline explaining this construction in which one must consider the longterm perspective just as much as the little histories of partial successes or moments or integration (Single Market, European Monetary Union, Eastern Enlargement, etc.). The view that the economy triumphed is recurrent, in contrast with views on the weakness of democratic functioning of European institutions. The single currency is thus given a warm welcome,27 whereas conversely, the call for a Europe in which citizenship counts for more is regarded with scepticism.28 Witnesses who spoke out on this do indeed fear a lack of interest from citizens in the European cause. Nonetheless, they recognise the symbol that direct election of representatives to the European Parliament represents, despite the actual nationalistic and vote-catching anti-European tendencies.29 This European Parliament, again, is based in Strasbourg and thus, the European City at the Rhine becomes a symbol not only of Franco-German reconciliation and peace, but also that of a democratic Europe. The problems that arise from the spread of the Parliament’s institutions between Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxemburg – particularly the excessive costs – were not mentioned by the witnesses, as if they wished to avoid spoiling their positive memory of Strasbourg as a town symbolizing the success of European integration.30 Regarding the Council of Europe, the democratic image of Strasbourg is fostered by another element considered important, notably the work being done at the European Court of Human Rights. This “anti-chamber” to the European Union is recurrently depicted as unknown to the population

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

See interviews with Jean-Paul Heider and Gérard Traband. See interview with Hans-Martin Tschudi. See interview with Roert Hertzog or Kai Littmann. See interview with Gérard Traband, Jean-Marie Heydt or Roger Siffer. See for example interviews with René Eckhardt or René Gutman. See interwiews with Alain Howiller, Norbert Engel or Jean-Paul Heider. See interviews with Gérard Traband or Claude Keiflin. See interviews with Robert Hertzog, Kai Litmann, Paul Collowald, Marcel Spiesser.

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despite its high symbolic value and the fact that it dramatically increased Strasbourg’s visibility on the international stage.31 Referring to the present perception of the European Idea in the Upper Rhine, witnesses claim that the pacifying role of European integration has become so evident that it is taken for granted, ignoring the fact that new threats to peace of a different nature could disrupt the memory of the Rhine as a peace border.32 The evolution of international relations, the economic crisis, and the process of globalization modify the equilibrium of peace, necessitating a taking into account of emerging issues such as environmental security, growing economic inequalities, new nationalistic movements, etc. The witnesses thus stress the fact that the memory of the Rhine as a border of reconciliation is fragile; it has only been built up since the end of the Second World War and could therefore be subject to requestioning.33

III. The memory of cross-border cooperation The Rhine as a symbol of peace is not only a memory resulting from the process of European integration. Maybe even more importantly, key actors from the Upper Rhine attribute the process of Franco-German reconciliation to the development of cross-border cooperation on the borders between France, Germany and Switzerland.34 In general, reconciliation in border regions takes place as a bilateral process between local and regional actors. It is thus very different compared to the European integration process that has been launched by the Western European states after 1945. The witnesses who had been involved in cross-border cooperation identify this process of regional reconciliation indeed as unique and not necessarily linked to the European Organizations.35 They shift their attention away from Strasbourg to Basel, for this is where the cross-border cooperation started in the Upper Rhine Region36. It is interesting to note that the memory of the creation of the first Franco-German-Swiss association in the Upper Rhine Region, the Regio Basiliensis in 1963, is not linked with that of the Treaty of Elysée, which was signed the same year on 22 January 1963 between the General de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.37 Even though peace-building and reconciliation was an underlying motive for the two statesmen, the actors in the Upper Rhine preferred to appropriate the regional reconciliation process for themselves. There are two major reasons for this: first, the cross-border cooperation in the Upper Rhine Region was initiated by Swiss local politicians and economic actors of the City of Basel.38 The 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

See interviews with Jean-Paul Costa, Catherine Lalumière. See interviews with Michel Hoeffel, Jean-Paul Heider, Hans-Martin Tschudi. See interviews with Paul Collowald, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, Catherine Trautmann. See interviews with Jean-Paul Heider, Gérard Traband, Kai Littmann, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, Hans-Martin Tschudi. See for example interviews with Marcel Spiesser, Jean-Marie Woehrling. See for example interviews with Hans-Martin Tschudi and Jean-Paul Heider. See for example interviews with Gérard Traband, Jean-Paul Heider, Jean-Marie Woehrling. WASSENBERG, B., “Qu’est-ce-qui motive la coopération transfrontalière dans l’esapce francogermano-suisse ?” in : WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière (Vol. 1) : les régions frontalières françaises, Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010, p. 95–117.

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Swiss actors are particularly proud of this regional development. On the other hand, the Treaty of Elysée is above all a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation, which leaves little space for the Swiss in this process. Secondly, the local and regional actors from the Upper Rhine tend to regard cross-border cooperation as a means of building up a common regional identity, in which the Rhine becomes a border of peace, not necessarily for the purpose of European integration, but for the creation of a Franco-German-Swiss Euroregion.39 This Euroregion recalls memories of a different kind than that of unified Europe after 1945, for example the past heritage of the Alemannic traditions and the Habsburg dynasties.40 The problem with the European Union is that Switzerland is not a part of it, and that the cross-border memory therefore must be constructed as another form of “common” identity than that promoted by the European Institutions in Brussels. Those interviewed personalities who have been actively working in the field of cross-border cooperation therefore mostly put an emphasis on common crossborder institutions that have been created and which led to regular and structured contacts of political, administrative and economic local and regional actors: the Upper Rhine Conference, the Regional Parliamentary Council, or more recently the Eurodistrict Strasbourg-Kehl.41 They emphasize that reconciliation could only be progressively attained by forcing the former enemies to work together in common institutions, realizing common activities and accomplishing common projects.42 In this respect, their view on the process of reconciliation in border regions functions according to the same rules as that of European integration process, the only variation is the difference in actors involved. Indeed, most personalities from the Upper Rhine region clearly admit that a link between the process of regional cooperation and European integration can be felt from the 1990’s onwards, when the European Community introduced a program supporting cross-border projects in border regions: the so-called Interreg initiative.43 Simultaneously involving European institutions as well as state and regional actors, cross-border cooperation not only became a tool for the accomplishment of the Single Market, but also for a multi-level governance approach to European integration44. Indeed, by the end of the 1990’s, cross-border cooperation was no longer a random phenomenon: all border regions of the EU and their neighbours now engaged in Interreg cooperation projects.45 The interviewees qualify the Euroregion of the Upper Rhine as a model for this type of European integration. They are keen to give their personal experiences of this 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

WASSENBERG, B., “Coopération franco-germano-suisse et identité régionale (1963–2007). L’identité régionale favorise-t-elle la cooperation transfrontalière dans l’espace rhénan?” in : Libera, M., WASSENBERG, B. (ed.), L’Europe au cœur, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2009, p. 141–163. See for example interview with Jean-Paul Heider or Hans-Christian Krüger. See for example interviews with Jean-Marie Woehrling or Robert Hertzog. See for example interview with Marcel Spiesser. See interviews with Gérard Traband and Jean-Paul Heider. See for example: GRANDE, E., JACHTENFUCHS, M. (ed.), Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000, KRIELE, A., LESSE, U., RICHTER, E., Politisches Handeln in transnationalen Räumen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005. Concerning the Upper Rhine, see also NEWRLY,P., Transnationaler Regionalismus. Die grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit am Oberrhein, Lit-Verlag, Münster, 2002. LAMBERTZ, K.-H. (ed.), Die Grenzregionen als Labor und Motor kontinentaler Entwicklungen in Europa. Berichte und Dokumente des Europarates sowie Reden zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Zürich,Dike/Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010, p. 10–30.

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“local” micro-process of integration, explaining how the relations with Europe can thus really be felt at a local level.46 The primary function of cross-border cooperation as a means to overcome national borders is also crucial here. It is put forward by the interviewees to underline the “local” transformation of the memory of the Rhine from a border of separation to a border of contact.47 Most regional actors understand borders between states as a framework for public territorial action, but they also feel them as unnatural dividing lines between the neighbouring nations in the Upper Rhine Region. The effectiveness of cross-border cooperation can therefore be measured by means of the multiple projects realized “across” the border, some of which are even symbolically placed right at or on the river Rhine: the Franco-German fire boat, the pedestrian bridge between Strasbourg and Kehl or the Garden of the two rivers in the Eurodistrict Strasbourg-Kehl-Ortenau.48 For the “inter-border” cooperation witnesses notice that partnership is essential for its good functioning: it is identified as possibly the most relevant criterion for its implementation, and as a remedy for the problems arising from the different administrative and political practices in each country, which might become impassable obstacles.49 On the other hand, it turns out that cross-border cooperation leads to a whole variety of possible perceptions from different individuals. The border and what it implies can indeed be considered as a deterrent, or as a deserted area on the edge of the national perimeter, but this border can also become the engine of an essential collaboration.50 Cross-border cooperation goes through the step-by-step establishment of Euroregions, of which there are a plurality of definitions. This cooperation is like a positive dynamic facilitated by the local setting of the Upper Rhine in the eyes of interviewees, seeing in it either a federalist intention, an “inter-local” cooperation, or an in-between thing.51 However, regarding the place of citizens in this process, the cultural actors and witnesses from civil society are generally very critical. The citizens are not aware of any cross-border or European impact, as they do not have enough opportunities to be associated with the cooperation process.52 This process is monopolized by the local and regional elected officials for whom cross-border initiatives are a way of distinguishing themselves. The same is true at the more specific level of the Strasbourg-Ortenau Eurodistrict, despite a quite different official discourse. Most witnesses admit not knowing much about this project, officially celebrated as the symbol of successful Franco-German cross-border cooperation launched by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder at the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Elysée in 2003.53 These testimonies prove that cross-border cooperation is not always accessible, that it is an unfinished mechanism and that its success depends on surrounding human and social fabric, of which a better development is necessary. It 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

See interviews with Jean-Paul Heider, Gérard Traband, Hans-Martin Tschudi, Jean-Marie Woehrling, Robert Hertzog. Ibid. See for example interviews with Marcel Spiesser, Ulrich Bohner, Kai Littmann. See interviews with Robert Hertzog and René Eckhardt. See for example interview with Alain Howiller, Gérard Traband and Robert Walter. See interviews with Antoine Spohr, Jean-Marie Heydt, Robert Hertzog. See interviews with Kai Littmann, Alain Hohwiller, René Gutman. See interview with Roger Siffer, Antoine Spohr.

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also shows that “positive” memories in the Upper Rhine cannot be easily constructed by political discourse: the actors in a cross-border region live the reality of a border and they will know from their daily experience of crossing the border whether this border really becomes a place of mobility, peace, and contact, or whether it is still difficult to overcome.54 This “pragmatic” and “realistic” memory of peace is even more pressing when it comes to the question of intercultural understanding and the building of a common regional or European identity.

IV. The memory of intercultural understanding and regional/European identity Do the various experiences of the actors from the Upper Rhine Region reveal the construction of a regional or European identity? The memory of the neighbour – has it shifted from that of an enemy to one of a friend, from stranger to someone familiar? After studying the interviews, the answer for both questions is generally ‘yes’. The witnesses have been involved either in the European integration process or in cross-border cooperation, and they have mostly bi-cultural backgrounds or have families with members coming from different European states.55 Their multicultural work experience and the fact that they have lived in a crossborder region between France, Germany and Switzerland has converted them into convinced Europeans.56 The neighbours are more than familiar, they are often close friends or part of their family and their intercultural competence is well developed. They generally speak several foreign languages and confirm that language fluency positively contributes to a European “feeling”.57 The Rhine is therefore no longer an obstacle for these actors who believe that the bordering states have been revisited by a process of Europeanization. Besides, interviews show that if the nation state is still perceivable, it is often considered as an inadequate governance level in the Upper Rhine region.58 This regional area grew in importance thanks to the European construction and cross-border cooperation, allowing for common economic, political and cultural development. Most actors also envision the establishment of a United States of Europe.59 However, the different levels of identification –regional, national, European – cause difficulties sometimes for those interviewed, and the witnesses generally prefer not to rank these affiliations.60 The regional actors are also conscious of their privileged situation. The Rhine has become a symbol of regional and European integration. But they recognize that elsewhere identification with Europe is hardly palpable. This identification is plural and heterogeneous, especially as Europe’s borders constantly move – in54 55 56 57 58 59 60

See for example interview with Jean-Paul Heider. See for example interviews with Kai Littmann, René Eckhardt, Ulrich Bohner. See for example interviews with Bruno Haller, Catherine Trautmann, Jean-Marie Woehrling. This is generally a characteristic of the civil servants working for the European Organizations (European Parliament, Council of Europe), but it also counts for the cross-border actors in the Region, who generally have at least a bi-lateral Franco-German intercultural competence. See for example interviews with René Eckhardt, Karl Von Wogau, Jean-Paul Heider, Gérard Traband. See interviews with Klaus Schumann, Robert Hertzog, Paul Collowald. See interviews with Roger Siffer, Michel Hoeffel, Ulrich Bohner.

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ternally with the establishment of a variable Schengen zone or monetary zone, as well as externally with the process of enlargement. The actors of the Upper Rhine have no problem reconciling their European identity with a Franco-GermanSwiss regional identity, although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, whereas they are hesitant to admit the European identity of candidate states already negotiating for admission.61 The examination of Turkey’s case is emblematic: witnesses have difficulties admitting that it has European characteristics. Requirements are thus mentioned, such as geographic location, geopolitical context, and fundamental rights.62 As a matter of fact, the issue remains a particularly sensitive one, just like topical debates regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union. However, actors in the Upper Rhine Region as a whole try to minimize the criticisms of European identity even if they admit that there is a growing tendency for anti-Europeanism. When the question of the future of Europe arises, the actual crisis is perceived as the right time for a full review of European issues.63 What has been done so far is now considered to be firmly grounded, but all witnesses encountered hope for an indispensable “reorientation” while remaining optimistic on Europe’s outlook, which is constantly under construction.64 And in this respect, the transformation of the Rhine from the border of war to a border of peace can only be qualified as a model to follow for other European borders.65

Conclusion The memory of the Rhine border has largely shifted from one of war to one of peace. The actors interviewed from the Upper Rhine Region all agree on this, even though a majority of them have themselves experienced at least one of the two world wars. This “new” memory of peace, which has developed steadily since 1945, is associated by some with the process of European integration and the European Organizations in Strasbourg, the Council of Europe and the European Community/European Union. Others attribute a leading position to crossborder cooperation between the German, Swiss and French regions bordering the Rhine and to a historical common regional identity in the Upper Rhine. Be it a top-down or bottom-up process, reconciliation has left a deep mark on the interviewed personalities in this Franco-German border region, who have in most cases themselves been involved in the European construction, or the cross-border cooperation process. They are conscious of the model character of the Rhine as a peace symbol, which is even physically visible if one looks at, for example, the statute of two people embracing each other in front of the new pedestrian bridge between Strasbourg and Kehl.66 For they also know that in other parts of Europe, 61 62 63 64 65 66

See interview with Hans-Martin Tschudi. See for example interviews with Claude Keiflin, Robert Hertzog, Robert Walter. This is mentioned by almost all interviewed personalities. See interviews of Catherine Trautmann, Catherine Lalumière, Jean-Paul Costa, Ulrich Bohner. See interview with Karl-Heinz Lambertz. See WASSENBERG, B., “ La cooperation transfrontalière dans l’espace du Rhin supérieur : un modèle de réconciliation franco-allemande”, in: PAUN, N., SCHIRMANN, S. (ed.), Borders, Identities, Communities : the road to Reconciliation and Partnership in Central and Eastern Europe, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2016, p. 295–316.

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the border is still a “scar” of history, painful and symbolic of hatred and conflict, more than friendship and peace.

LE RHIN : UNE FRONTIÈRE DE PAIX ? MÉMOIRES D’ACTEURS CLÉS DE LA RÉGION DU RHIN SUPÉRIEUR Cet article traite du sujet de la frontière en tant qu’endroit de réconciliation et de paix. Il se concentre sur l’expérience de réconciliation dans la région du Rhin supérieur et sur le processus de reconversion du Rhin, d’une frontière de conflit et de guerre, en une frontière d’amitié et de paix. Pour cela, un projet de recherche intitulé “Mémoire d’Europe. Mémoire de Paix”, conduit entre 2012 et 2013 par le centre de recherche (UMR) Dynamiques européennes de l’Université de Strasbourg et l’association européenne Maison de l’Europe Strasbourg-Alsace (Mesa) avec un certain nombre de témoins clés de la Région du Rhin Supérieur, est analysé en détail ici. En interrogeant les différents acteurs sur leurs perceptions sur l’intégration européenne, les coopérations transfrontalières et les relations interculturelles avec leurs voisins, il est apparu que l’image de la frontière du Rhin a très largement évolué, passant d’une image de guerre à une image de paix. Le processus de réconciliation a laissé une trace profonde sur les individus interviewés dans la région de la frontière franco-germanique, individus qui ont eux-mêmes dans la plupart des cas été engagés dans la construction européenne, ou bien dans le processus de coopération transfrontalière. Ils sont conscients du caractère exemplaire du Rhin, symbole de paix, ce qui est même physiquement visible si l’on considère la statue représentant deux personnes s’embrassant devant le nouveau pont piéton entre Strasbourg et Kehl. Ils savent également que dans d’autres parties de l’Europe, la frontière représente toujours une “cicatrice” de l’histoire, plus symbolique de souffrance, de haine et de conflits que d’amitié et de paix.

DER RHEIN: EINE GRENZE DES FRIEDENS? ERINNERUNGEN VON HAUPTAKTEUREN AUS DER OBERRHEINREGION Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit der Grenze als Ort der Versöhnung und des Friedens. Er konzentriert sich auf die Erfahrung der Versöhnung in der Oberrhein Region und auf den Wandlungsprozess des Rhein von einer Grenze des Konflikts und des Kriegs hin zu einer der Freundschaft und des Friedens. Zu diesem Zweck wurde ein Forschungsprojekt zum Thema “Mémoire d’Europe. Mémoire de Paix” (Erinnerungen an Europa, Erinnerungen an den Freiden) detailliert analysiert, das 2012–2013 von der Forschungseinheit (UMR) Dynamiques européennes der Universität Straßburg und der Europäischen Vereinigung Maison de l'Europe Straßburg-Alsace (Mesa), mit einer Reihe von wichtigen Zeugen aus der Oberrhein Region durchgeführt wurde.

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Bei deren Befragung über ihre Wahrnehmung von der Europäischen Integration, grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und interkulturelle Beziehungen zu ihren Nachbarn, scheint es, dass sich die Erinnerung von der Rheingrenze sich weitgehend von einer des Krieges zu einer des Friedens hin verschoben hat. Der Versöhnungsprozess hat tiefe Spuren bei den Befragten in dieser deutschfranzösischen Grenzregion hinterlassen, die, in den meisten Fällen, selber an der europäischen Konstruktion oder dem grenzüberschreitenden Kooperationsprozess beteiligt waren. Auch sind sie sich um den Modellcharakter des Rheins als Friedenssymbol bewusst, das auch physisch sichtbar ist, wenn man die Statur vor der neuen Fußgängerbrücke zwischen Straßburg und Kehl betrachtet, die zwei sich umarmende Menschen darstellt. Ihnen ist bewusst, dass auch in anderen Teilen Europas die Grenze immer noch eine „Narbe“ der Geschichte ist, schmerzhaft und mehr ein Symbol des Hasses und des Konflikts, als der Freundschaft und des Friedens.

BEYOND “ERBFEIND” AND AFTER RECONCILIATION: SHOPPING? A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON FRENCH-GERMAN AND POLISH-GERMAN CROSS-BORDER TOURISM AS A COMMON, INTEGRATIVE ROUTINE BERNHARD KÖPPEN Shopping tourism can be considered a typical phenomenon in border areas, reflecting mostly differences in wealth and prosperity, differences in national taxes, or quality and availability of certain goods. These specific incentives seem quite obvious and easy to understand. The renaissance of border studies in a supposed, globalized, ‘borderless’, world is also due to the contemporary world’s asymmetries of wealth and power; as evidence by their growing visibility in border-regions on a micro scale.1 The formation of border-regions being based on socio-spatial formal and informal activities has been described by various authors.2 Hence, “borders are understood as formal and informal institutions of spatial and social practice, as well as physical and symbolical markers.”3 In this contribution, I put emphasis on the aspect of cross-border shopping tourism as an example of frequent socio-spatial practice which can, to a certain extent, reveal the permeability of a border as well the state of cross-border integration. The study is based on comparative empirical field work carried out between 2008 and 2011 in Germany, France, Finland, and Poland, with emphasis on the French-German border at the Outre-Fôret and the Palatinate. Field work included mapping, price comparisons, and interviews, carried out by students within an Erasmus IP project Small Scale European Integration through Crossborder Cooperation and during general fieldwork of students from Universität KoblenzLandau.4 Furthermore, the research work by J.-C. Lafos, A. Willms and I. Burk-

1 2

3 4

HAGEN, J., DIENER, A., “Theorizing Borders in a Borderless World: Globalization, Mobility and Scale”, Geography Compass, v. 3, no. 3, 2009, p. 1196–1216. Ibid.; NEWMAN, D., PAASI, A., “Fences and neighbors in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography”, Progress in Human Geography, 22 (2), 1998, p. 186–207; VAN HOUTUM, H., “The geopolitics of borders and boundaries”, Geopolitics, 10 (4), 2005, p. 672–679; HOUTUM, H., KRAMSCH, O., ZIERHOFER, W. (ed.), B/Ordering space, Ashgate, Burlington, 2005. HAGEN, J., DIENER, A., “Theorizing Borders in a Borderless World: Globalization, Mobility and Scale”, op.cit., p. 1198. KEPPLER, L., KÖPPEN, B., HORN, M., “Besuchsgründe und Shoppingtourismus im Nordelsass. Ergebnisse eines studentischen Geländepraktikums”, in: KÖPPEN, B., HORN, M. (ed.), Das Europa der EU an seinen Grenzen!? – Konzepte und Erfahrungen der europäischen grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation, Logos, Berlin, 2009, p. 121–133; KÖPPEN, B., “Motivations de visite et tourisme d’achat dans la région Outre Forêt et le Palatinat”, Questions de communication, série Actes, 12, 2011, p. 165–176; IBRAGIMOW, A., ALBRECHT, M., “Neue/Alte Herausforderungen für die grenzübergreifende deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit seit Polens Schengen-Beitritt: Słubice und Frankfurt (Oder)”, Europa Regional, 23, 2015, p. 33–45.

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hart5 on the French-German border and on small scale integration serve as empirical evidence.6 Shopping tourism is not only a frequent phenomenon in border regions, it is also highly visible. Quite flashy examples are the so called ‘kiosk-markets’ – also named Polenmarkt or Vietnamesenmarkt at the Polish-German or the CzechGerman border;7 but also at relatively closed borders, such as the FinnishRussian border, shopping tourism is a common phenomenon.8 Some people even buy a one-year visa exclusively for the purposes of cross-border shopping, the costs for which are seemingly outmatched by the savings on cheap gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol and similar goods. In the German case specifically, so called Butterfahrten to Denmark, where dairy products used to be cheaper, became a term synonymous with cross-border-shopping in general.9 The main motivation for cross-border shopping and the use of services on the ‘other side of the border’ is linked to economic factors of general disparities in wealth and standard of living, divergences in the taxation of goods, or increased purchasing power due to macroeconomic conditions. Additionally, particularities of certain products are of importance; either some goods are not available in one country or the quality is lower/higher. Thus, cross-border-shopping might serve as a suitable indicator of inequalities between two neighboring regions. According to the above mentioned economic motivation, it would follow that, if shopping tourism between two regions is a visible and dominant part of daily life, a high degree of difference between the two societies would exist. The German-Polish and German-Czech border, or the Finnish-Russian and the U.S.-Mexican borders, serve as good examples for the latter statement. Even in ‘wealthy’ contexts, like the USA-Canada border, or difficult borders, such as Finland-Russia and U.S.A.-Mexico, which require entry visas and long wait times, this phenomenon is still well known due to the above

5

6

7

8

9

LAFOS, J. C., Leben im Grenzraum, BA & MA. Universität Koblenz-Landau, 2010; WILLMS, A., Wahrnehmung und Umgang mit Grenzen am Beispiel Oberrhein, BA & MA. Universität KoblenzLandau 2012; BURKHART, I., Wahrnehmung des Nachbarn Frankreich im Grenzgebiet, BA & MA. Universität Koblenz-Landau, 2013. Underlying empirical research on Cross-Border-Shopping and integration: Questionnaire based survey in Wissembourg (F): 156 German shopping tourists asked (17.05.2008); Survey in Wissembourg (F), Bitche (F), Forbach (F) & Border-Communities (D): 317 German shopping tourists asked (20.12.12–12.01.2013); Comparative survey on price differences in German & French Supermarkets (20.12.12–12.01.2013); Project SEICOP: Questionnaire based survey on 8th/9th of March 2009 in the region of Outre-Forêt (F) & Palatinate (D): 135 French and German shopping tourists; Comparative survey on price differences in German & French Supermarkets, March 2009, Project SEICOP III: Comparative survey on price differences in German & Polish Supermarkets Frankfurt/Oder (D) – Słubice (PL), April 2011. KÖPPEN, B., “Auswirkungen des Einkaufstourismus im nordböhmischen Grenzraum”, Europa Regional, 2, 2000, p. 19–31; KACZMAREK, J., “Der Slubicer Polenmarkt: Eine visuellsoziologische Studie”, in: SCHULTZ, H. (ed.), Grenzen im Ostblock und Ihre Überwindung, Frankfurter Studien zur Grenzregion, Band 6, 2001, p. 327–335. KORTELAINEN, J., KÖPPEN, B., “Trust as a Basic Factor for Effective Cross-Border Co-operation: The Examples of the German-Czech and Finnish-Russian Border Areas”, in: FRITSCH, M., JURCZEK, P., KÖPPEN, B., KORTELAINEN, J., VARTIAINEN, P. (ed.), “Cross-border Structures and Co-operation on the Finnish-Russian and German-Czech Borders: A Comparative Perspective”, Reports of the Karelian Institute, No. 2, 2009, p. 17–29. WEIGANDT, K., “Drei Jahrzehnte Einkaufstourismus über die deutsch- dänische Grenze”, Geographische Rundschau, 4, 1990, p. 286–290.

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mentioned disparities in wealth and purchase power.10 However, the idea that trans-border shopping-tourism is going only into one direction and is depending on some sort of gradient, is not true. Our studies at the German-French border show, that shopping tourism can be a visible feature, even when the general conditions between two neighboring countries are very similar. Cross-border shopping as an ‘event’ is an experience of ‘unfamiliarity’, which can be an attraction itself.11

I. Cross-border-shopping without a cause? Investigating France and Germany The nation border between Germany and France is – not only due to Schengen – one of the most permeable and least perceptible borders in Europe. Especially in Palatinate and Alsace region, where architecture and traditional culture on both sides of the border are very similar and few markers of the border itself remain. Even during the national state of emergency in France after the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015, this border remained open and practically invisible (with a few exceptions of non-systematic, ad hoc police controls for special events, such as the European Football Championship). In the Alsace-Palatinate region, shopping is a major activity for Germans crossing the border – as our surveys in 2008 and 2013 showed.12 In 2013, more than 2/3 of all persons asked (n=302) mentioned shopping as an activity related to their tourist trips in France. Comparing the purchasing power parities between Germany and France (the most frequently used indicators of price level differences across countries), we can observe that the general price level in Germany is lower than in France. A closer look on different branches, however, reveals further variations (tab 1.). Tab. 1: Price level indices for consumer goods in Germany and France 201413 Price level indices for consumer goods and services, 2014 (EU27=100) EU27 Germany France

10 11 12 13

Total

Food and nonalcoholic beverages

Alcoholic beverages and tobacco

Clothing

Consumer electronics

Personal transport equipment

Restau rants and hotels

100 102 108

100 109 107

100 89 108

100 101 102

100 95 101

100 96 104

100 97 112

THIMOTHY, D., BUTLER, R., “Cross-border shopping. A North America perspective”, Annals of Tourism Research, 22, 1, 1995, p. 16–34. SPIERINGS, B., VAN DER VELDE, M., “Shopping, Borders and Unfamiliarity: Consumer Mobility in Europe”, Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, vol. 99, Issue, 4, September 2008, p. 497–505. KEPPLER, L., KÖPPEN, B., HORN, M., “Besuchsgründe und Shoppingtourismus im Nordelsass. Ergebnisse eines studentischen Geländepraktikums”, op.cit.; KÖPPEN, B., “Motivations de visite et tourisme d’achat dans la région Outre Forêt et le Palatinat”, op.cit. Source: Eurostat 2015.

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Assuming bargains being the major motivation for shopping trips, it seems that only French citizens should head for Germany, as alcoholic beverages, tobacco and consumer electrics are less expensive there. As for food, the level between both countries is almost even. Argumentum e contrario and taking into consideration additional costs such as travel time, language barriers, fuel, etc. which reduce potential savings, the phenomenon of cross-border shopping tourism from Germany to France should be estimated to be very low. Surprisingly, this assumption is far from reality. It is true that shopping tourism between Germany and France is not a dominant feature in the border area and there are no similar facilities such as kiosk-markets or huge specialized supermarkets like those that were installed in the Danish-German borderland.14 Nevertheless, shopping tourism is very frequent in on both sides of the French-German border and specifically in supermarkets that have intentionally chosen to be in close vicinity to the border crossings. The small Palatine village of Schweigen got a new discount market almost at the border and French costumers are obviously an important group. The medium-sized town of Kehl, the direct neighbor of Strasbourg, has four discount markets of DM – a company specializing in cosmetics and household goods.15 Customers from Alsace are a major focus here as well, especially as these goods tend to significantly more expensive in France than in Germany. These examples certainly support the fact that a significant range of food and non-food products is cheaper in Germany than in France. On the other hand, German shopping tourists are also an important group of customers in French supermarkets close to the border. The Carrefour supermarket in the French part of Scheibenhard hamlet is placed in ultimate proximity to the former Autobahn border crossing and sign postings in the shop are bilingual French-German. At first view, this is astounding as the price differences between Germany and France are either insignificant or unfavorable for German customers. Standardized ‘cross-border-shopping carts’ with directly comparable products (brand and/or quality and quantity) illustrate this well (Tab. 2):

14 15

WEIGANDT, K., “Drei Jahrzehnte Einkaufstourismus über die deutsch- dänische Grenze”, op.cit.; KACZMAREK, J., “Der Slubicer Polenmarkt: Eine visuell-soziologische Studie”, op.cit. City-Center bald mit dm-Markt: //www.baden-online.de/news/ artikel.phtml?page_id =&db=news_lokales&table=artikel_kehl&id=5812 (2.3.2015).

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Tab. 2: Example of a standardized cross-border-shopping cart

The 2013 survey revealed that – due to higher taxes in France – even shopping exactly the same products in a Lidl discount supermarket will result in a significantly higher bill in France. According to the interviews with Germans heading for France for shopping16, general enjoyment, or culinary delight and the search for special products are significant incentives for cross-border shopping. In particular, finding different and/or uncommon products is important. Price sensitive citizens living in the closer border area do practice selective shopping. They target those items, which are significantly cheaper than in Germany and provide offres spéciales. In a broader context, it can be argued that this very selective consumption pattern and the quantity of information available regarding special offers related to products of interest, is an expression of the daily ‘routinizing’ of cross-border integration. For citizens living in the border-region, it is absolutely normal to cross the border even for simple goods. Certainly, this behavior is just one small aspect and not a major marker of integration. On the other hand, the customers are fully aware that they are crossing a state border; going somewhere ‘different’ is one motivation of their activity. Thus, vivid shopping tourism can exist even without significant price differences between two places – as the German-French example shows – so long as the general atmosphere and/or products themselves differ significantly (Fig. 1).

16

KEPPLER, L., KÖPPEN, B., HORN, M., “Besuchsgründe und Shoppingtourismus im Nordelsass. Ergebnisse eines studentischen Geländepraktikums”, op.cit., KÖPPEN, B., “Motivations de visite et tourisme d’achat dans la région Outre Forêt et le Palatinat”, op.cit.

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Fig. 1: Main drivers for cross-border-shopping between Germany and France

Therefore, the otherness of the neighbor state as well the act of ‘crossing the border’ is appealing in itself, whilst at the same time the freedom to do this at any time and as often as one wants, is taken for granted and as a matter of course.17

II. Kiosk Folklore – the Polenmarkt in Słubice Quite a different situation exists at the German-Czech and the German-Polish border. Here, significant differences in purchasing power and wealth do occur. This situation led to the sprout of (sometimes informal) ‘kiosk-markets’, directly located at the border and major roadways. These improvisational markets became synonyms for inexpensive goods of all kind; especially cheap alcohol, tobacco, and counterfeit name brands. Due to the harsh economic disparities, services from hairdressers to prostitution are/were also linked to the kiosk-market shopping scene.18 According to the special character of these semi-ambulant markets in appearance and atmosphere but also the internal organization, their image is sometimes related to informality and ‘underworld’. Nevertheless, the vendors are rather important taxpayers to the local communities and today’s kiosk-market is totally formalized; so much so that regular, often community owned marketplaces with standardized stands have been established. Just after the fall of the iron curtain, kiosk-markets became an almost ubiquitous feature of the borderland in the Czech Republic and Poland and still are present, although, due to various factors, they have lost much of their initial attraction. First, the quality of most goods offered is quite poor and consumers have been saturated with this type of product. Second, after becoming EU members, prosecution of product pirates was stiffened. Third, formal supermarkets went into direct com17 18

SPIERINGS, B., VAN DER VELDE, M., “Shopping, Borders and Unfamiliarity: Consumer Mobility in Europe”, op.cit. KÖPPEN, B., “Auswirkungen des Einkaufstourismus im nordböhmischen Grenzraum”, op.cit.,; KACZMAREK, J., “Der Slubicer Polenmarkt: Eine visuell-soziologische Studie”, op.cit.

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petition with the markets. Fourth, infrastructural and administrative measures by the local authorities ruled out a certain number of suppliers, and fifth, the convergence of differences in purchasing power – however still significant – does diminish the attraction of the kiosk-markets for certain goods. At this point should be stated that, despite high disparities of purchasing power, there is a long tradition of shopping tourism even from the relatively poor to wealthy neighbor. In Germany, consumers do look for brand name products which are not available in their home country or, due to regulations making imports more expensive, are of a much higher price. Furthermore, German electronic discounters and building supply stores are known for extremely competitive prices and a particularly wide range of products. Hence, the variety of electronic goods, is a key feature in this context. Nonetheless, in border markets shopping tourism from Germany to Poland and the Czech Republic remains a persistent feature. Some authors such as T. Stryjakiewicz and T. Kaczmarek have argued that the informal kiosk character is due to the economic and societal transformation in Central Europe and expected a progressive change from kiosks to formal shops and shopping centers with increasing capital of the market vendors.19 At a first glimpse, this assumption seems to have come true. The small town of Słubice can serve as a model of these changes. The chaotic kiosk agglomerations have been mostly replaced by modern, standardized vending complexes. Also the number of vendors has diminished, while pseudo taxfree shopping centers have emerged and a proliferation of discount supermarkets has emerged, far above the actual need of the inhabitants. Nevertheless, kioskmarkets still exist (there are two of them in Słubice; close to the town center and a larger one at the periphery). Price comparisons in 2011 showed that no bargains can be made at the markets in contrast to the formal shops. The unique selling points of these markets are shopping tourist focused goods, such as sports equipment, textiles and foodstuffs. Concerning formal shops, a direct price comparison for similar products (via the standardized cross-border shopping cart) of the discounters Aldi in Frankfurt/Oder (Germany) and Biedronka in Słubice (Poland) showed significant differences, with Biedronka being the cheaper of the two.20 However, comparing the also popular discounter Lidl, which has stores on both sides of the border, delivered surprising results; the price level for identical products was absolutely the same. Due to exchange rate loss on Euro and Złoty, the shopping at Słubice’s Lidl was even a few cents more expensive than in Germany, at the time of the survey. Nevertheless, hundreds of German shoppers heading for Lidl in Słubice can be spotted every day, utterly convinced that they’re making a bargain. This gives a hint as to why the kiosk complexes themselves still exist, even while it would have been easy to build fancy shopping complexes in their place. Obviously, a large number Germans are still confident, that shopping in Poland is a bargain without checking and comparing prices critically. The kiosk market is the ‘symbol of bargain’. It is emblematic, a mythic place of cross-border shopping. This may explain why the kiosk-market has been 19

20

KACZMAREK, T., STRYJAKIEWICZ, T., “Die Formen der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Aktivität im deutsch-polnischen Grenzgebiet”, in: ECKHART, K., KOWALKE, H. (ed.), Die Euroregionen im Osten Deutschlands, Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Deutschlandforschung, Bd. 55, Berlin, 1997, p. 29–48. Aldi and Biedronka are the respectively lowest priced discounters in Germany and Poland.

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maintained; it is as a symbol and a brand. Customers going to Poland expect kiosk markets at the border. Today, these markets are neither the result of an economy in transition (as it used to be until the mid -1990s) nor a stopover on the way towards commercialized retail shops. They represent a formal part of consumer oriented marketing that refers to some kind of post-socialist, transitional bazaar folklore. The above mentioned formalization of the border-bazaar is based on rather stable consumer behavior for the last two decades, which directly relates the permeability of the border. Visiting the Polenmarkt has become a part of the postCold War collective memory and a ritualized behavior for some Germans visiting Poland. Thus, while the Polish (Czech)-German situation in shopping tourism is still based on significant differences in purchasing power, similarly to the situation on the German-French border, it also occurs due to the progressive normalization of the activity. Shopping in Poland is practiced by some living in twin cities as an almost daily routine. (Fig. 2.). This also means that the border is not a real barrier in daily behavior.21 Fig. 2.: Main drivers and motivations for cross-border-shopping in France, Germany and Poland (Czechia)

21

On cross-border cooperation see also IBRAGIMOW, A., ALBRECHT, M., “Neue/Alte Herausforderungen für die grenzübergreifende deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit seit Polens Schengen-Beitritt: Słubice und Frankfurt (Oder)”, op.cit.

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Conclusions Shopping Tourism can be considered as a typical phenomenon in border areas, reflecting mostly significant differences in wealth and prosperity, differences in national taxes, or quality and availability of certain goods. The specific incentives in different border areas seem generally quite obvious and easy to understand. As empirical studies show, shopping tourism takes place due to these international disparities. However, the idea of pure ‘one-way systems’ being the main phenomenon in trans-border shopping tourism is not absolutely true. Shopping tourism is still a significant feature when the general conditions between two neighboring countries are very similar or even equal, therefore, no elusive incentives for cross-border shopping exist, if one believes in bargains being the major motivation. Today, cross-border shopping is a flexible, self-evident routine in cross-border interaction and a ritualized practice Putting emphasis on the French-German example, with its two-way shopping movements under leveled circumstances, it can be argued that, while bargains are certainly of great importance, other motivations, such as general enjoyment or culinary delight, are also important incentives. When speaking of integration in borderlands more officially, one would refer to cultural activities, exchanges, economic links, etc. However, it should also be discussed, if the existence of vivid shopping-tourism might serve as a good indicator of ‘everyday cross-borderintegration’ by the citizens, rather than being judged as a rather atavistic activity. Integration on a practical level means neither to ‘love the other people’, nor the total elimination of stereotypes and distrust towards the other. Thus, the presence of shopping tourism can be considered as an indicator of cross-border integration in terms of daily behavior, but not necessarily as one the dignified forms of cross-border interaction which lead to sustainable borderland integration.

AU-DELÀ DE « L’ENNEMIE HÉRÉDITAIRE » ET APRÈS LA RÉCONCILIATION: SHOPPING ? UNE ÉTUDE COMPARATIVE DU TOURISME TRANSFRONTALIER FRANCO-ALLEMAND ET GERMANO-POLONAIS COMME ROUTINE INTÉGRATIVE Tourisme d’achat est un phénomène assez typique dans les régions transfrontaliers et lié aux différences des prix, du au pouvoir d’achat ou taxation. L’exemple franco-allemand montre que même sans une différence des prix significative, le tourisme d’achat persiste. En comparaison avec la situation entre la Pologne et l’Allemagne, il est évident que le tourisme d’achat est de moins en moins la recherché des bonnes affaires, mais une forme du tourisme événementiel.

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ÜBER DEN „ERBFEIND“ HINAUS UND NACH DER VERSÖHNUNG: SHOPPING? EINE VERGLEICHENDE STUDIE ÜBER DEN GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDEN DEUTSCHFRANZÖSISCHEN UND DEUTSCH-POLNISCHEN TOURISMUS ALS GEMEINSAME, INTEGRATIVE ROUTINE Shopping Tourismus ist ein typisches Phänomen in Grenzräumen und meist durch Preisdifferenzen durch Wohlstandgefälle oder unterschiedliche Steuersätze bedingt. Am Beispiel der französisch-deutschen Grenzregion jedoch lässt sich belegen, dass auch ohne markante Preisgefälle nennenswerter Einkaufstourismus in das jeweilige Nachbarland festzustellen ist. Auch im Vergleich mit der polnisch-deutschen Grenze zeigt sich, dass Shopping-Tourismus von Konsumentenseite zunehmend erlebnisorientiert ist und tatsächliche Preisvorteile bisweilen überschätzt werden.

THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDER: A LABORATORY OF TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION

BEATA HALICKA The Polish-German border today is a place of transnational cooperation; a laboratory of cross-border cooperation through processes which are constantly in flux. Anssi Paasi is right when he writes borders are dynamic geographical and social spaces that are constantly negotiated and contested.1 In European history, border formation was often a result of historical changes, wars, and military invasions. Often borders cut across ethnic, cultural and linguistic configurations, which had an enormous effect on borderland societies.2 This was the case of Polish-German border in 1945. After World War II it was a source of conflict and remained closed for many decades. The way of reconciliation between Poles and Germans proceeded very slowly. The last 25 years have marked the most stable phase in German-Polish relations. The development of the European Union’s regional policy, with its political and financial instruments, has facilitated the de-bordering of European space and the creation of a peaceful neighbourhood. In Eastern Central Europe unfettered relations across the national borders were possible only after the fall of communism, despite some initiatives in the previous period. However, while political borders have become more permeable, cultural and symbolic boundaries often remain an obstacle in trans-border relations. Human life continues to take place mostly within well-defined national territories.3 This paper will present Polish-German relations after 1945, the roots of conflict between the two nations, and the dynamics of their border interactions through the work of Oscar J. Martinez' on categories of borderlands.4 My conclusion is that the idealistic picture of integrated borderlands by Martinez does not fit the Polish-German borderland today. While cross-border interactions do occur in large areas, they ultimately have an “insular” character.

I. 1945: A new borderland on the river Oder and Neisse The term borderland here implies a spatial concept, a zone of overlapping cohabitation and contact between different polities, cultures, and peoples. Border1 2 3 4

PAASI, A., “Territory”, in: AGNEW, J., MITCHELL, K., TOAL, G. (ed.), A Companion to Political Geography, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2003, p. 109–122. OPIŁOWSKA, E., KURCZ, Z., ROOSE, J. (ed),. Advances in European Borderlands Studies, German and European Studies of the Willy Brandt Center at the Wroclaw University, Nomos, BadenBaden, 2016. NEWMAN, D., “The Lines That Continue To Separate Us: Borders In Our “Borderless” World”, Progress in Human Geography, 30/2, 2006, p. 141–161. MARTINEZ, O. J., “The Dynamics of Border Interaction. New approaches to border analysis”, in: SCHOFIELD, C. H. (ed.) Global Boundaries, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 1–14.

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lands are very often areas of conflict between cultures and religions and between centres and peripheries.5 With the creation of nation-states the role of boundaries increases. States create not only borders but boundaries often as a line of fortifications to protect themselves against intrusions by neighbours. Other purposes of boundaries have included border control, the imposition of duties, regulation or encouragement of trade, and the control of immigration and emigration. The First and the Second World Wars brought to the people of Europe, especially in East-Central Europe, an immense destruction perpetrated by nations against one other. The head politicians of Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States were convinced that State and ethnic borders had to be erased in order to stabilize East-Central Europe and regarded population movement as the only means of preventing violence. When Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met for the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam from November 1943 to July 1945, they agreed that post-war Europe should be rearranged in a way which would prevent future wars. In particular, the German minorities in East-Central Europe had to be “dissolved”.6 Germany would lose its territories in the East and be divided into four zones of occupation. The trickiest problem was Poland, which had been an ally of Britain and France since the outbreak of the war. Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union should be allowed to retain the territory it had already annexed in eastern Poland in 1939. Since the Soviet Union had borne the main burden of the war in the East, the Western powers found it difficult to resist Stalin's demands.7 Therefore, the Allies decided to move Poland westward, which resulted in over 180 000 km2 of pre-war Polish territory going to the Soviet Union in the east (46% of old Polish state from 1939) and 102 855 km2 of former German territory in the north and west (33% of new polish state from 1945). At 312 000 km2, Poland was more than 20% smaller than it had been prior to the war.

5 6

7

PRUSIN, A. V., The Lands between. Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992, Fordham University Press, New York, 2010, p. 10–11. THER, PH., “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing”, in: THER, PH., SILJAK, A., Redrawing Nations. Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, 2001, p. 43–74. Ibid.

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Map 1. Shifting of Polish State

The establishment of the Oder-Neisse borderline during the Potsdam Conference in August 1945 brought about the split of historically cohesive regions, which were enclosed by the two rivers. Primarily, this affected the former German province of Brandenburg, the Eastern part of which now constitutes the Ziemia Lubuska, or the Lubusz Region belonging to Poland, along with those parts of Pomerania in the lower region of the river Oder, which had also been split up at the end of the war. The regions of Lower and Upper Silesia, in the drainage basin of the Oder, as well as lands running along the Baltic Sea, together with the southern part of East Prussia, also became Polish. The lands to the east of the Oder and Western Neisse became places of almost complete population exchange, with a severing of the cultural continuity of one society and the creation of new traditions and communities. This concerned, in particular, the lands situated in the central and lower Oder. Approximately 50 % of the German population fled the region due to the approaching eastern front, while the remainder were either expelled between June and July 1945, or forcibly migrated at some point thereafter. Before the war, these regions had been inhabited by almost 8.5 million people, mainly Germans. The Polish share of the population in 1931 comprised 8.7 % and lived primarily in Upper Silesia and Southeast Prussia.8

8

HRYCIUK, G., SIENKIEWICZ, W., Zwangsumsiedlung, Flucht und Vertreibung 1939 bis 1959, Atlas zur Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 2009, p. 16.

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308 Map 2. Ethnic Composition of the Population in 1931

Z. Anthony Kruszewski wrote in his book The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland's Modernisation in 1972: “The West is aware of the transfer of German territory to Poland, but it is comfortably unfamiliar with the forced human dislocations that accompanied it. This relocation is a veritable major resource for social science analysis, as well as one of the most dramatic events of postwar history”.9 To understand the consequences of those processes, it is necessary to recognize that the creation of a post-war European order based on homogenous nationstates began in eastern Poland. For most of its history, the Polish people existed within the framework of multinational, multi-ethnic societies and polities. The country had a particularly large Jewish population (over 9%) prior to World War II. The eastern part of Poland was particularly multinational and multi-ethnic. Only 29.3 % of the population of East Poland, consider themselves Polish, while 9

KRUSZEWSKI, Z. A., The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland’s Modernisation, Praeger Publishers, New York: 1972, p. VII; See also some newer publications about this topic: CURP, T. D., A clean sweep? The politics of ethnic cleansing in western Poland, 1945–1960, University Rochester Press, New York, 2006; DOUGLAS, R. M., Orderly and humane. The expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2012.

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41.3 % declared Ukrainian nationality. The second largest minority group were Belarusians at 16.9 %. Although this region belonged to Poland, Poles were not in the position of the majority. This was the reason for Stalin to initiate a territorial and political ‘reconfiguration’ of Eastern Europe. Both he and Hitler shared an interest in revising of the post-war Versailles order in Europe. At the end of World War II, Stalin decided to keep the occupied territories as a part of Soviet Union and ‘clean’ it ethnically with the help of Polish communists. In September 1944 the Polish Committee for National Liberation signed treaties with the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the ‘evacuation’ of the Polish population from these territories. Between 1944 and 1948 over 1.1 million Poles were forcibly transferred from the East to the West. 2.9 million more people from Central Poland settled in new territories in Western and Northern Poland. About 2.2 million Poles survived as forced labourers and prisoners of war in Germany and came back to Poland.10 The new Polish inhabitants of the borderland at the rivers Oder and Neisse, therefore, were a mixture of ethnic and national backgrounds, which consisted of these three large groups. Moreover, Poles that had come from abroad settled here, along with Ukrainian, Jewish, Greek and other minorities. In this way, a completely new society emerged; a heavily war-affected region had to create, social and cultural institutions as well as structures of authority, rebuild factories and organize agricultural production. It is no wonder that the first years were quite chaotic, as not everything could have been organized at once. Often a big disappointment was with those settlers who came to the west in order to get rich quickly and not necessarily work for the common good. This is why my book, which was devoted to this topic, is entitled Polish Wild West, applying this term to the Oder basin during the initial post-war years.11 Settlers who, to some extent, voluntarily came to the Oder basin motivated by a desire to look for better living conditions (many of them had lost their houses and property during wartime) found it a bit easier in this new reality. However, those expelled from the eastern marches of Poland known as the Kresy, usually had a major problem to reconcile themselves with the new situation. Enormous homesickness for their homeland made them suffer from extreme apathy, as well as declining health and for many years, they had their bags packed ready to return. The forced resettlement of the heavily destroyed region posed a great challenge to Poland and Eastern Germany. Its reconstruction and cultivation required a lot of energy, commitment, and the sacrifice of those trying to build a new society. However, the political system and the central communist regime controlled by Warsaw and East Berlin was an obstacle to the region's development rather than a help. For this reason, the new inhabitants often only managed to establish roots and to consider the Oder region as their home by the second or third generation.

10 11

HRYCIUK, G., SIENKIEWICZ, W., Zwangsumsiedlung, Flucht und Vertreibung 1939 bis 1959, Atlas zur Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, op.cit., p. 240. HALICKA, B.; Polens Wilder Westen. Erzwungene Migration und die kulturelle Aneignung des Oderraumes 1945–1948, Schöningh, Paderborn, 2013.

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310

II. Polish-German relations after 1945 The borderland in the Odra region is a specific one because it was drawn by force in a province, which before the war was dominated by Germans. The establishment of the Oder-Neisse line brought about the split of historically cohesive regions. The Polish communistic government made an effort to create a nationally homogenous state. The eastern part of Germany remained under Soviet occupation, which began transferring administrative responsibility to German communist leaders in 1948, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) began to function as a state on 7 October 1949. The Soviet zone surrounded West Berlin did not include it and as a result West Berlin remained outside the control of the GDR. The 1950 Treaty of Zgorzelec between Poland and East Germany, was signed in the city's community centre. It recognized the Oder-Neisse line implemented by the Potsdam Agreement as the border between the two states. Although the treaty was binding, it was not recognized by many western members of the international community. The West German government stressed the status of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse-line being, “under Polish and Soviet administration.” In spite of the Treaty of Zgorzelec and the communistic propaganda about the friendship between Poland and East Germany, the Oder-Neisse boundary remained for the most time closed. It was tightly controlled up until the 1970s when the border regime was relaxed. It was tightened again in 1981 by the GDR leadership as a precaution against the spread of Solidarnosc-style activism. It is important to understand that on both sides of the Oder-Neisse-line after 1945 new societies have been created and isolated from each other. The inhabitants of the region didn’t believe the communistic propaganda which stressed friendly relations between Poles and Germans. Most Poles had experienced the cruelty of the German occupiers throughout the war. Many had participated actively in the fight against national socialists or had suffered for years in concentration camps or as forced labourers with the hope that Germans would one day have to pay for their crimes. The idea of the collective responsibility of the Germans was widespread in Poland at the end of the war and it remained so until at least the 1960s when a public debate on the issue erupted.12 On the western side of the border rivers, Germans built a new society consisting of old inhabitants of this region and of expellees from the East, who for a long time hoped to be allowed to come back to their homeland. They treated themselves as victims of expulsion and believed that Poles were the initiators of the expulsion of Germans, and the Poles were those who took their homeland away. The German side was, for a long time, not aware of the fact that most Poles were themselves victims of the war started by the Germans. East German and Polish societies both consist of a mix of different ethnic and regional groups, each of which having been expected to be unified by the national propaganda that was being enforced from above. As Rogers Brubaker established, the part of the national society which lives on the periphery of its res12

The discussion about German collective guilt was encouraged by the Polish Catholic press as early as the late 1940s, but did initially not find much resonance with the broader population, compare: ŻUREK, R., Zwischen Nationalismus und Versöhnung. Die Kirchen und die deutschpolnischen Beziehungen 1945–1956, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, 2005, p. 113–141.

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pective state quite naturally makes contact with “foreigners”.13 However, this does not only have a positive effect on mutual understanding but also has a significant influence over how much quicker and more intensively nationalism can thrive on the periphery than at the centre. On the Polish side, the ruling communists developed the idea of “Recovered Territories,” which had to stress the Polishness of the lands joined to Poland 1945. This was in accordance with the notion that the Poles had regained these territories after a century-long sacrifice, as an act of historical justice. The Second World War, as well as the German occupation, was seen as the crescendo of a “thousand-year struggle” between Germany and Poland, which allowed one to right the balance of the traumatic experience of the past.14 This kind of propaganda was widespread in west Polish parts and remained for a long time an obstacle in Polish-German relations. On the German side, the communistic government forced a quick assimilation of East German refugees and expellees, introduced their ideological re-education and destroyed all hope for an eventual return to homelands. Officially, those people were disassociated with their pasts and forbidden to speak about their experiences. In the private sphere, they kept very strong resentments against Poles and were unable to start a dialogue with their neighbours. At the same time, there were groups of people looking for contact, developing common projects even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, creating informal networks between intellectuals and actors, arranged via school and business exchange meetings. After the political change of 1989/90, an intensive process of Polish-German reconciliation received support from national governments and European institutions and a huge number of activities of organizations and associations could make cross-border relation much more visible. The past decades in the German-Polish border region have seen both, an openness towards neighbours, as well as national fragmentation.

III. The dynamics of cross-border interaction “To be a borderlander is to have opportunities unavailable to people from heartland areas. Trough exposure to transnational interactions and transculturation, borderlanders are able to develop versatility in their human relationship (…). Finally, questions of national identity emerge as borderlanders fuse their culture with that of their neighbors, creating new social patterns that people in the heartland may find abhorrent”.15 This kind of description did not exactly fit the experience of Polish-German borderland populations in the first decades after the end of World War II. The border remained closed for a long time and, because of this, transnational interactions were very rare. The process of transculturation did not proceed at least until 1950 and signing of the Treaty of Zgorzelec. As already mentioned, borders 13 14 15

BRUBAKER, R., Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. See the political text by WOJCIECHOWSKI, Z., Polska, Niemcy. Dziesięć wieków zmagania, Instytutu Zachodniego, Poznań, 1945. MARTINEZ, O., Border people. Life and society in the U.S.Mexico borderlands, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1994, p. 24.

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are dynamic geographical and social spaces that are constantly negotiated and contested. The dynamics of cross-border interaction between Poles and Germans was changing in last seven decades and it seems to be useful to analyse this process based on Oscar J. Martinez’s categories of borderlands. The interactions across the border lines began from the standpoint of almost complete isolation, intensified gradually and developed over time more varied forms, depending on the political situation and the degree openness of the border. Oscar J. Martinez’s division of boarder into: alienated, co-existent, interdependent, and integrated borderlands, makes the changes in the dynamics of cross-border interaction of Polish-German borderland more visible. 1. Alienated Borderland This category of borderland existed in the period of post-war years until 1950. As described bevor the Polish-German relation was very difficult at this time, tension prevailed. The border was practically closed and the cross-border interactions were totally or nearly totally absent. The residents of each country acted as strangers to each other. This affected not only residents on both sides of the border but also politicians and representatives of the regional administration. 2. Co-existent Borderlands After signing of the Treaty of Zgorzelec in 1950 one can already speak about a coexistent borderland between Poland and East Germany. The border remained closed until 1972, but a limited amount of bi-national interactions became possible. Especially affected were politicians and representatives of the regional administration. The residents of each country dealt with each other as casual acquaintances, but borderlanders developed closer relationships. In the 1960s, the second generation of the two new societies reached adulthood. People, who were born after the war in the Oder region, consider it undoubtedly as their home. Now they were taught in school that they had to identify less with their region and much more with the socialist fatherland. Engaged local citizens hoped that the second generation would make the region their own and identify with it completely. From today's perspective we can say that it could be fulfilled, however, only to a very limited extent due to the intensive interference of the communist system in the lives of the people of the Western Polish region and German eastern periphery. Given the finally unclarified border issue, it was especially for the Poles difficult to feel at home on the Odra and Neisse. 3. Interdependent Borderlands A major turning point in Polish-German relation is the year 1972 and the opening of the border. The decision can be seen as a response to the new Eastern European politics of the western Federal Republic of Germany and the Treaty of Warsaw signed between West Germany and the People's Republic of Poland in 1970.

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Officially, the opening of the border had to deepen the East German-Polish friendship. Mieczysław Tomala recalls that for the GDR the opening of the border was considered a kind of compensation for the closed border to the west. For the Poles, it had primarily an economic reason.16 There was hope to alleviate shortages in the supply of the Polish society in this way. As a direct result, it came to the enormous growth of shopping tourism on both sides of the border. In the first eleven months of 1972, more than nine million Polish tourists visited the GDR; and in reverse direction there were 6.5 million Germans.17 Different than the free market economy, where the increase in purchasing power can be seen as a positive result of such a growth of buyers, in a socialist economy of scarcity such increase can lead to many problems and even aggravation of ethnic conflicts. After the great wave of German visits to Poland in the early months of 1972, their number decreased considerably. The visits of Polish tourists in the GDR, however, remained consistently high because of the attractiveness of lower prices and greater choice of products. This led to resentment among the East German population, which felt largely that Polish border shopping could cause a shortage of supply of their own fellow citizens. Małgorzata Mazurek has shown in her research in Polish and German archives how the mutual stereotypes were revived in this context and what (often negative) emotions were linked to these contacts.18 At the same time many examples can be found, where national resentments have hardly played a role and economic profit took precedence. Many GDR citizens started to trade in major cities of western Poland and operated with second-hand clothing. The Poles specialized in selling certain western goods, which were particularly popular in the GDR.19 All the activities have led to the emergence of numerous collaborations, labour migration of Poles in the GDR and numerous mixed marriages. Although the communist regime did not allow speaking publicly about such politically difficult topics such as the flight and expulsion of Germans, or the repopulation of the area east of the river Oder with Poles, nevertheless everyday, cross-border interactions took place mainly in the economic and cultural fields. For this period, stability prevailed most of the time and led to the expansion of an interdependent borderland. The situation changed with the opposition activities of ‘Solidarity’ in Poland, which were considered by Eastern German communists as dangerous and used to limit the shopping tourism and cross-border interactions. The border was closed again and residents of both countries required a visa to cross the border. The positive phase of the development of German-Polish neighbourhood in the 1970s was stopped in 1981 and could only be continued again with the end of communism.

16 17 18 19

TOMALA, M., Patrząc na Niemcy. Od wrogości do porozumienia 1945-1991, Polska Fundacja Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw, 1997, p. 452. ZATLIN, J. R., “Polnische Wirtschaft, deutsche Ordnung? Der Umgang mit Polen in der DDR unter Honecker”, in: MÜLLER, CH. TH., POUTROUS, P. G. (ed.), Ankunft-Alltag-Ausreise. Migration und Interkulturelle Begegnungen in der DDR, Böhlau Verlag, Köln-Weimer, 2005, p. 295–315. MAZUREK, M., Antropologia niedoboru w NRD i PRL. 1971–1989, Oficyna Wydawnicza Atut, Wrocław, 2010, p. 25–60. Ibid.

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314 4. Integrated Borderland

In 1989, a peaceful revolution in Poland and in the GDR led to the destruction of the communist regime. The following year, free elections were held and international negotiations led to the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 and signing of the German–Polish Border Treaty (1990) and the Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation (1991). For the German-Polish border region, this political upheaval meant a total turn in all areas of life. The inhabitants of the border region welcomed the re-opening of visa-free movement with great hope. However, two opposite moods dominated in the western periphery of Poland and eastern Germany in the 1990s. Most Germans were afraid of the consequences of the free movement of Polish traders and alleged car thieves into the newly united German market. The fears on the Polish side mainly concerned the danger of German (especially economic) expansion. Secondly, positive sentiments were widespread, which drew from the conviction that the historical moment constitutes a unique opportunity for the economic and cultural revitalization of the border area. The feverish bustle surprised everyone, but also laid formal barriers, legal gaps and obstacles of cooperation open, which required quick solutions. Regional and local politicians, journalists and the media, as well as the residents themselves, contributed to the mutual social approach movement and designed a new reality for the border region.20 For the purpose of stimulating of cooperation between Polish and German inhabitants of the region three cross-border regions have been created along the rivers the Oder-Neisse in the early 1990s. These Euroregions are territorial entities of several local or regional authorities that are co-located, yet belong to both nation-states and received financial support from the European Commission via its Interreg program for cross-border cooperation. These activities were very important to homogenize the living conditions in Germany and Poland. The OderNeisse line persisted through the 1990s and also in the next decade as the boundary of prosperity, which influenced not only relations between Poles and Germans, but also inhabitants of EU and non-EU countries. From the reunification of Germany, till the Polish accession to the EU's structures in 2004, rivers Oder and Neisse – as the eastern boundary of the European Union – were the best guarded borders in Europe.21 For illegal immigrants it became a door to the “Western” world, and to the so-called ‘Fortress Europe’ – not to mention a place for a wide range of smuggling activities. This situation changed after the Polish accession to the Schengen Zone in December 2007, which shifted the eastern boundary of the European Union to the Polish eastern borders. Since then vehicles have been allowed to cross Polish-German borders without boarder controls and residents in border areas have the freedom to cross borders away from fixed checkpoints. However, this raises the question of whether the region can be called an ‘integrated borderland’ as defined by Martinez. Although the economies of both countries are closely interconnected and there is complete freedom of movement 20 21

KERSKI, B., KOTULA, A., “Die Entwicklung der politischen Kultur im deutsch-polnischen Grenzgebiet. Eine Bilanz der beiden letzten Jahrzehnte”, Inter Finitimos, 8, 2010, p. 33–46. WITT, A., Die deutsch-polnische und die US-mexikanische Grenze – Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zwischen regionaler Identität, nationaler Priorität und transkontinentaler Integration, Dissertation, Philosophische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 2003.

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for people and goods across the border, it cannot be said unequivocally that residents of the borderland see themselves as members of a single social system. The predominant orientation of borderlanders is towards the heartland of their respective countries. The belonging to the national group remains in the foreground. Even if the specific circumstances of the transnational border region influence significantly influence the daily life of most of its residents, the identification with the region and the borderland is secondary. The dynamic of border interaction at the rivers Oder and Neisse is to be placed between Martinez's categories of “everyday interdependent” and “integrated borderland”.22 The idealistic picture of a fully integrated borderland is still not the reality of the PolishGerman borderland, even if the relations between the inhabitants of both sides of the border belong to the best in their history of thousands of years.

IV. The cross-border cooperation at the German-Polish border today Existence ‘on the periphery’ of the state influenced the lives of its residents substantially and forced them to keep contacts across the border. Their intensity depended largely on the political situation in both countries, in Europe and on the world political situation as whole. Looking at the cross-border cooperation at the German-Polish border today, it is necessary to investigate it in a broader context. An overview of territorial cooperation in Europe, presented in the newest book of Birte Wassenberg and Bernard Reitel, put the region on the rivers Oder and Neisse in the European perspective; arguing that that, in comparison to other regions in Europe, “Polish cross border cooperation projects […] take several different forms. There is intensive cooperation at the local scale on the western border.”23 This positive evaluation should be complemented by some critical remarks about some of the key problems the inhabitants of the region have to deal with; despite the immense political, structural, and financial support from institutions of European Union, the main obstacle in the cross-border cooperation remains that of language and local and/or regional identity and that of national stereotypes and resentments. While admittedly these have become much weaker in last two decades, they still play an important role among the borderlanders. According to the latest sociological studies, German and Polish youth show a relatively low interest in the neighbours on the other side of the border.24 This is due to the lack of language skills of the respective country and little knowledge of the culture of the neighbours altogether. The leaders of the collaboration are mostly forty and fifty years old. For younger people, a world without borders is probably so obvious that they do not recognize the contacts across the border as an important objective of their actions. Barbara Jańczak stresses the overwhelming predominance of English at Polish schools in 2014: over two million primary school pupils attended English classes as an obligatory subject, compared to only 22 23 24

MARTINEZ, O. J., “The Dynamics of Border Interaction. New approaches to border analysis”, in: SCHOFIELD, C. H. (ed.), Global Boundaries, op.cit., p. 1–14. REITEL, B., WASSENBERG, B., Territorial Cooperation in Europe. A Historical Perspective, European Commission, Luxembourg, 2015, p. 130. “Vertrauen über die Grenzen hinaus-grenzüberschreitende Massnahmen zur Vertrauensbildung”, 22.6.2014 http://www.is.uz.zgora.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=391 &Itemid=117(2.6.2016).

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127,000 that had German as an obligatory subject.25 When comparing the number of pupils learning the language of their neighbours an immense asymmetry can be noted: only 0.84%–0.45% of German pupils of the borderland were learning Polish as an additional foreign language in the years 2011-2013, while about 78– 87% Polish pupils were learning German as an additional foreign language, of which 51–58% were doing so in obligatory classes in the years 2014–15.26 The investigation of reciprocal influence and cultural exchange was one of the main goals of a comparative study on cross-border cooperation between the twin cities Frankfurt (Oder)/Słubice and El Paso/Ciuda Juarez on the Mexico-US border. The authors of a book on the subjet, Francisco Llera and Ángeles LòpezNòrez, stress that in Europe, as opposed to the North American context, the main target is full integration of the member countries and not only economic interaction among them. The European Union encourages cross-border cooperation among the different European border regions with the help of special funds and programs, as well as with the emergence of particular territorial organisations such as Euroregions or the City Twins Association. Their conclusion is that, “cross-border collaboration is nurtured gradually and needs to be envisioned as a comprehensive process in which neither top-down policies nor bottom-up actions alone will be sufficient enough. In other words, since cross-border collaboration is a gradual process to be developed with the purpose of searching for different degrees of integration, it must be conducted in a parallel form being the top down policies accompanied by bottom-up actions and vice versa.”27 The example of the twin city Frankfurt (Oder)/Słubice shows how they became involved in a gradual exchange of activities on different levels of social life. The legal, economic, and political framework of EU and Polish-German cooperation on the state level has helped the twin city to develop the Common Local Action Plan 2020, which has been comprehensive encompassing coordination in environmental, social and cultural actions, public administration, and economic promotion.28 The most challenging point in the realisation of this plan seems to be the involvement of civil society. The question is how to motivate more and more civilians to become engaged in common work with neighbours from the other side of the border. As previously mentioned the main obstacles in cross-border cooperation remain that of language and local and/or regional identity and that of national stereotypes and resentments which are a consequence of the history of both nations. These factors are often not taken into account while dealing with transnational relations; in particular, the question of reconciliation between Poles and Germans after WWII and the role of negative national stereotypes are important for understanding of the dynamics of today's German-Polish border region.

25 26 27 28

JAŃCZAK, B., “German-Polish bilingualism: bilingual language education and language policy – Polish towns in the German-Polish border region”, in: SCIRIHA, L. (ed.), International perspectives on bilingualism, Cambridge Scholars publishing, Cambridge, 2016, p. 91–108. JAŃCZAK, B., “The East still looks west! (A)symmetries in language contact and the role of German and English in the German-Polish borderland, in the context of the size of the locations”, in: ZIOBROSTRZĘPEK, J., CHLOPICKI, W., (ed.) Across Borders 6, The West looks East, PWSZ, Krosno, 2017. LLERA, F., LÒPEZ-NÒREZ, A., Cross-border collaboration in border twin cities. Lessons and Challenges for the Ciudad-Juárez, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, El Paso and the Frankfurt, Słubice Ciudad-Juárez, 2012, p. 54. See http:///C:/Users/pnib/Downloads/local_action_plan_frankfurt-slubice_final8version_ en.pdf (2.6.2016).

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V. The way to reconciliation and good neighbourhood The specific character of the Oder-Neisse line after 1945 was the result of a policy aimed at the formation of nationally homogeneous societies. Poles and Germans have been separated from each other by a state border, which remained closed for many decades. The process of reconciliation between Poles and Germans after 1989 received a new intensity. After the German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Kniefall (genuflection) in front of the memorial for the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1970, the next important step was the public expression of regret of Polish elites in the 1990s in recognition of the injustice committed in the expulsions of the German civilian population.29 The mutual perception of 'average citizens', however, changed very slowly. After fifty years of more or less closed border, the Oder and Neisse remained a very strong mental blockade in the minds of persons living in the region. People, who were born here after the World War II, consider the Oder region undoubtedly as their home. But they have been taught under the communistic regime that they are to identify less with their region and much more with the socialist fatherland. Despite this kind of propaganda some engaged local leaders tried to support the inhabitants in developing their local and regional identity. Given the finally unclarified border issue, it was especially difficult for the Poles to feel at home on the Odra and Neisse. This meant a challenge of how to construct their territorial identity in response to official narratives and in relation to constructions of the nation on both sides of the border. According to Martinez, the local identity is defined as the interest of the population to remain in the region and to be recognized as a resident from that region rather than as a person from one nationality.30 Good conditions to create a community of borderlanders appeared at the Oder and Neisse first after the political changes of 1989/90. In the 1990s the inhabitants recognized that they have certain opportunities unavailable to people from heartland areas. Through exposure to transnational interactions they started to develop a versatility of human relationship; on the one side, confronted with questions of national identity and, on the other, with contacts with the culture with of their neighbours. A questioning of the definition of the ‘others’ arose and the creation of new social patterns that people in the heartland may find abhorrent. According to the results of studies carried out by Galasiński and Meinhof in 2002 and conducted in the towns of Guben (Germany) and Gubin (Poland) separated by the river Neisse, we can see how the discourses of the ‘others’ were constructed by the members of the oldest generation.31 While Polish narratives construct German neighbours in terms of a threat to the status quo, the German nar29

30 31

TRABA, R., ZUREK, R., “Vertreibung oder Zwangsumsiedlungen. Die deutsch-polnische Auseinandersetzung um Termini, das Gedächtnis und den Zweck der Erinnerungspolitik”, in GÓRALSKI, W. M. (ed.), Historischer Umbruch und Herausforderungen für die Zukunft. Der deutschpolnische Vertrag über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit vom 17. Juni 1991 in Rückblick nach zwei Jahrzehnten, ELIPSA, Warsaw, 2001, p. 409–451. MARTINEZ, O. J., “The Dynamics of Border Interaction. New approaches to border analysis”, op.cit., p. 1–14. GALASIŃSKA, D., MEINHOF, U. H., “Looking across the river: German-Polish border communities and the construction of the Other”, Journal of Language and Politics, Volume 1, Number 1, 2002, p. 23–58.

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ratives position the Polish town of Gubin mostly in terms of the nostalgic past. The older generation of German inhabitants of the region focused time and time again on key narratives of their lost home. However, this sense of loss was not accompanied by making claims to Polish territory, but by an empathy towards their Polish neighbours who had equally lost their homes in former Polish eastern regions. By contrast, similar semi-structured interviews conducted in another Polish-German twin city, Görlitz-Zgorzelec, demonstrate that there is an absence of such narratives in all generations. Especially in younger generations of German inhabitants of Görlitz no longer see Zgorzelec (the Polish part of the city) as the lost part of Görlitz. They have grown up accustomed to the fact of the separation. They see their city as a complete whole having nothing to do with the town on the other side of the border. The Polish Zgorzelec participants construct the separateness of their town as something negative and undesirable.32 It has been highlighted by its descriptions as a town, which does not have a ‘proper’ centre; the central point of the city is located on the German side and because of this, they position Görlitz as belonging together with the Polish town. Görlitz is incorporated by Zgorzelec inhabitants through the most popular cross-border activity; shopping. This accessibility of shopping in another part of the city is emphasized by references to the fact that there are no temporal limits to this practice. Despite the construction of an everyday spatial unity between the two towns, Görlitz and Zgorzelec belong at the same time to the heavily nationalized discourse about the ‘other’. Görlitz is always situated ‘on the German side’ and Zgorzelec ‘on the Polish side’. In this way, the German inhabitants are marking the Polish town as separate and foreign and not part of the home with which they identify so strongly. Zgorzelec was in the past often depicted by Polish communistic propaganda as one of the key elements of the so-called “Regained Territories” – the regions acquired by Poland after WWII – emphasising again and again the Polishness of these regions.33 This example shows us how people living in this evolving context have begun to espouse the ‘new era’. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that at the moment these constructions are very mixed and contradictory. Polish inhabitants of Zgorzelec can once be de-nationalized paying customers and Poles who still fell inferior to their German neighbours.34 When the border along the Oder-Neisse line was relaxed more than two decades ago a need arose to establish commonly agreed norms in the public and private lives across the river. The representatives of communities and organizations especially had to renegotiate not only their own status in relation to each other, but also their status with in regards to the region, the state and its system. First steps to create supranational structures have been done already; for example, the decision by local politicians to establish Eurocity Görlitz-Zgorzelec in May 1998. Along the border, there are much more such examples for cross-border activity. Gubin-Guben has a common waste water plant and this investment has been cost effective for both communities. In Frankfurt (Oder) / Słubice there is a 32 33 34

GALASIŃSKA, A., ROLLO, C., MEINHOF, U. H., “Urban Space and the Construction of Identity on the German-Polish Border”, in: MEINHOF, U. H. (ed.), Living (with) Borders. Identity discourses an East-West Borders in Europe, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2002, p. 124. OPOŁOWSKA, E., Kontinuitäten und Brüche Deutsch-polnischer Erinnerungskulturen. Görlitz/Zgorzelec 1945–2006, Neisse Verlag, Dresden, 2009. GALASIŃSKA, A., ROLLO, C., MEINHOF, U. H., “Urban Space and the Construction of Iden-tity on the German-Polish Border”, op.cit., p. 138.

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common German-Polish institution called Collegium Polonicum, which has been working as part of the European University Viadrina on the German side and the Polish University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań for twenty-five years. It is not easy to implement ideas of supranational institutions in everyday life. The inhabitants have always struggled with different national lows, different cultures, different habits and ways of living. But they also benefit from this diversity, learn much from each other and are able to reach more in common work. Thomas Lunden in his book, On the Boundary, describes the relation between the state, the individual at the borderland as follows: “At the state boundary, loyalty against the state is utterly important, and there is always a possible conflict between the state and the individual even when and if the boundary is not questioned. Living and working at a relatively open state boundary almost always means both assets and problems. The state and its subordinate organizations must try to utilize the advantages of border location to the advantages of its citizens and in the best of cases also to the advantages of the neighbouring population. On the state level this can be done through co-operation with the neighbouring state in order to facilitate life on the border. Municipalities and other organizations have to work “upwards” to the authoritative hierarchy in order to accomplish this, but also “downwards”, for and with its resident, in order to make the boundary area an advantageous location, thereby forming a loyalty among the border residents”.35 For twenty-five years there is a polyphony of different activities in the OderNeisse borderland that have led to a growing together of this region. The policy gives it an institutional framework, scholars explain relationships and create an intellectual basis. But there are firstly individuals who cross the border with their ideas every day and make examples of best praxis. For some, it is the curiosity of foreign countries and cultures, for others economic interests or even an interest in the past. In many cases, history is the unifying element of the entire border space and dealing with it brings the people who live here now, and those who have previously lived in the country, closer together. Meanwhile, German-Polish cooperation is much more than official cultural exchange; people have cooperated, built and acted together. No longer are meetings and art projects the engine of cooperation on the Oder and Neisse, but companies that offer benefit to – morally and economically. This has been demonstrated in a project which examined cross-border initiatives in 2009 along the two border rivers. The resulting exhibition, “A Boundary. Which boundary?”, showcases in its title alone an interesting message. This exhibition showed that the first steps of creation of a community of the borderland on the Oder and Neisse have been already done. The borderland is a zone of overlapping, cohabitation and contact between different politics, cultures, and people and seventy years after the end of the war, no longer an area of conflict, but that of a laboratory of transnational cooperation. Migration and a changing social structure ensures an intertwining of different social, ethnic, and religious groups, beyond the borders of the nations concerned. Cross-border interactions occur in large areas but ultimately in an ‘insular’ manner, because of 35

LUNDEN, TH., On the boundary. About humans at the end of territory, Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, 2004, p. 23.

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this, the idealistic picture of a fully integrated borderland is still not the reality of the Polish-German borderland.

FRONTIÈRE GERMANO-POLONAISE: UN LABORATOIRE DE LA COOPÉRATION TRANSNATIONALE Cet article est basé sur l’hypothèse que la coopération transfrontalière n’est pas seulement un privilège des autorités administratives, mais devrait aussi inclure une grande variété d’acteurs. Il y a une quinzaine d’années l’idée de gouvernance transfrontalière dans le cadre de l’organisation européenne multiniveau s’est développée avec les discussions sur la légitimité de la gouvernance de l’Union européenne, notamment par le concept de « gouvernance participative ». Le modèle « Holder » de Philippe Schmitter concernant la participation des acteurs dans la gouvernance sera appliquée dans cet article aux trois cas d’études des initiatives de coopération transfrontalière de la région Viadrina. Cette région au cœur de l’Europe sera constituée comme l’interface entre la vieille et la nouvelle Europe. Les conditions pour une le succès de la gouvernance transfrontalière sont constituées d’étapes à la fois légales, politiques, historiques, stratégiques supranationales et d’intégration, qui sont mise en lumière dans cet article par la région frontalière germano-polonaise. Les cas d’études, analysés au regard de la gouvernance participative et de ses acteurs, sont le Centre de Coopération Frankfurt-Słubice, l’Eurorégion Pro Europa Viadrina et le TransOderana EGTC (en construction).

DEUTSCH-POLNISCHE GRENZE: EIN LABOR DER TRANSNATIONALEN KOOPERATION Der Artikel basiert auf der Annahme, dass grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit kein Privileg von administrativen Einheiten darstellt, sondern eine Vielzahl von Akteuren umfassen sollte. Cross-Border-Governance im europäischen MultiLevel-System wurde vor 15 Jahren mit der Diskussion über die Legitimation europäischen Regierens um den Begriff der „Partizpativen Governance“ erweitert. Das von Philippe Schmitter eingeführte „Holder“-Modell der Partizipation in Governance-Prozessen wird in dieser Abhandlung an drei grenzüberschreitenden Initiativen in der Viadrina-Region angewandt. Diese Region in der Mitte Europa wird dabei als Schnittstelle vom alten und neuen Europa dargestellt. Als Bedingungen für eine gelingende grenzüberschreitende Governance werden historische, politische, strategisch-supranationale und rechtliche Integrationsschritte angesehen, die in diesem Artikel an der deutsch-polnischen Grenzregion beleuchtet werden. Die analysierten Fallstudien in Bezug auf partizipative Governance und ihrer Akteure sind das Frankfurt-Słubice Kooperationszentrum, die Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina und der TransOderana EVTZ i.Gr.

THE FINNISH-RUSSIAN BORDER BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY

KATARZYNA STOKŁOSA A considerable number of conferences and festivals were held in 2014 in connection with the 75th anniversary of World War II. New books and articles have appeared or are soon to be published. For countries like Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Baltic Countries or Finland, the Second World War played a significant role, and so many historical narratives and interpretations are to be found there. This war is still strongly present in the collective memories and consciousness of these countries.1 The experience of war is, without a doubt,

1

IFVERSEN, J., “Myth and History in European Post-War Writing”, in: SPIERING, M., WINTLE, M. (ed.), European Identity and the Second World War, Palgrave Macmillan, HoundmillsBasingstoke-Hampshire-New York, 2011, p. 75–91; FLIERL, Th., MÜLLER, E. (ed.), Osteuropa – Schlachtfeld der Erinnerungen, Karl Dietz, Berlin, 2010; OVERY, R., “8. Mai 1945: Eine internationale Perspektive“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 70 Jahre Kriegsende, no 65, 2015, p. 16–17; SØRENSEN, N. A., “Narrating the Second World War in Denmark since 1945“, Contemporary European History, vol. 14, no 3, 2005, p. 295–315; SKOV, N. A., “The Use of Historical Myth: Denmark’s World War II Experience Made to Serve Practical Goals”, Scandinavian Studies, vol. 72, no 1, 2000, p. 89–110; VILHJÁLMSSON, V. Ö., “Rescue, Expulsion, and Collaboration: Denmark’s Difficulties with its World War II Past”, Jewish Political Studies Review, vol. 18, no 3– 4, 2006, p. 3–29; ØSTERGÅRD, U., “Swords, Shields or Collaborators? Danish Historians and the Debate over the German Occupation of Denmark”, in: STENIUS, H., ÖSTERBERG, M., ÖSTLING, J. (ed.), Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited, Nordic Academic Press, Lund, 2011, p. 31–53; ÖSTLING, J., “Swedish Narratives of the Second World War: A European Perspective”, Contemporary European History, vol. 17, no 2, 2008, p. 197–211; ÖSTLING, J., “The Rise and Fall of Small-State Realism Sweden and the Second World War”, in: STENIUS, H., ÖSTERBERG, M., ÖSTLING, J. (ed.), Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited, op.cit., p. 127–147; CORELL, S., “The Solidity of a National Narrative. The German Occupation in Norwegian History Culture” in: STENIUS, H., ÖSTERBERG, M., ÖSTLING, J. (ed.), Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited, op.cit., p. 101–125; SZACKA, B., “Polish Remembrance of World War II”, International Journal of Sociology, vol. 36, no 4, Winter 2006–7, p. 8–26; GOLECZEWSKI, F., “Poland’s and Ukraine’s Incompatible Pasts”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 54, no 1, Special issue: “Gespaltene Geschichtskulturen? Zweiter Weltkrieg und kollektive Erinnerungskulturen in der Ukraine”, 2006, p. 37–49; MOTYKA, G., “Der Zweite Weltkrieg im ukrainisch-polnischen historischen Gedächtnis”, in: KRASNODĘBSKI, Z., GARSZTECKI, St., RITTER, R. (ed.), Last der Geschichte? Kollektive Identität und Geschichte in Ostmitteleuropa. Belarus, Polen, Litauen, Ukraine, Dr. Kovač, Hamburg, 2008, p. 119–170; ULDRICKS, T. J., “War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II”, History & Memory, vol. 21, no 2, 2009, p. 60–82; BUBNYS, A., “Der Zweite Weltkrieg im litauischen historischen Gedächtnis”, in: KRASNODĘBSKI, Z., GARSZTECKI, St., RITTER, R. (ed.), Last der Geschichte? Kollektive Identität und Geschichte in Ostmitteleuropa. Belarus, Polen, Litauen, Ukraine, op.cit., p. 171–186; MEINANDER, H., “A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War”, in: STENIUS, H., ÖSTERBERG, M., ÖSTLING, J. (ed.), Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited, op.cit., p. 55–77.

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a part of the European nations’ shared history. This has become evident in countless monuments, cemeteries and museums spread out all over Europe.2 There have been some attempts to bring together the sometimes disparate histories of war in Eastern and Western Europe. Since 1989, the sense of a common history has grown rapidly in these two regions that had previously been hermetically sealed in different compartments for more than four decades.3 In 2015, the German History Museum in Berlin curated an exhibition that explored the different experiences of 12 countries affected by World War II. The exhibition’s primary focus was new beginnings after the war.4 Consequences of World War II included changes to borders, battles in border regions and the movement of people across borders. For this reason, it is reasonable to assert that border regions played a special role in relation to World War II. Furthermore, this historical event produced a lot of myths regarding various battles, border changes, people’s movement and a new life in border regions. This is, of course, different in the case of border regions where border changes didn’t affect the life of their inhabitants so much, where people were allowed to stay in their territories even when they became a part of another country. Such was the case for the Danish-German border after World War II, where Danish and German people simply continued their lives in Schleswig, but under changed rule.5 In the German-Polish border region, where German inhabitants were expelled from the new Polish territories, or in the Polish-Soviet border region where Poles lost their homes and had to move either to Central or to Northern and Western Poland, World War II is clearly present in the narratives and the collective memory of these regions’ inhabitants.6 In this article, the example of the Finnish-Russian border will provide evidence of how changeable borders are, and how many myths have been constructed in connection with borders. This border region is exemplary in demonstrating the development of Eastern European borders, because even today, in spite of cross-border interaction, it continues to represent a hermetic border between Eastern and Western Europe.7

2

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JARECKA, U., J., “War Tourism in Poland and Germany”, in: NIŻNIK, J. (ed.), Twentieth Century Wars in European Memory, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2013, p. 151–178; TROEBST, St., WOLF, J. (ed.), Erinnern an den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Mahnmale und Museen in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Universitätsverlag, Leipzig, 2011; ŁUCZEWSKI, M., WIEDMANN, J. (ed.), Erinnerungskultur des 20. Jahrhunderts. Analysen deutscher und polnischer Erinnerungsorte, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2011. DYROFF, St., KRZOSKA, M. (ed.), Geschichtsbilder und ihre museale Präsentation. Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Polen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Martin Meidenbauer, München, 2008. WINTER, J., “Places and Traces”, in: NIŻNIK, Józef. (ed.), Twentieth Century Wars in European Memory, op.cit., p. 19. Deutsches Historisches Museum (ed.), 1945, Defeat. Liberation, New Beginning: Twelve European Countries after the Second World War, Theiss, Darmstadt, 2015. FRANDSEN, St. B., “Schleswig: A Border Region Caught Between Nation-states”, in: STOKŁOSA, K., BESIER, G. (ed.), European Border Regions in Comparison: Overcoming Nationalistic Aspects or Re-Nationalization? Routledge, London-New York, 2014, p. 93–94. STOKŁOSA, K., “Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskultur im osteuropäischen Raum”, Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte, no 2, 2011, p. 167–185. KOLOSSOV, V., SCOTT, J. W., “Karelia. A Finnish-Russian borderland on the edge of neighbourhood”, in: ESKELINEN, H., LIIKANEN, I., SCOTT, J. W. (ed.), The EU-Russia Borderland. New contexts for regional co-operation, Routledge, London-New York, 2013, p. 195–210.

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In the following, an example of a construction of the history between myth and reality after World War II in the Finish-Russian border region will be presented. Today, this border is 1,340 kilometres long.8 During World War II, all the major battles between Finland and the Soviet Union took place in Finnish Karelia and in Soviet Eastern Karelia. For this reason, Karelia became particularly important in the Finnish memory culture. Nowadays, the “Karelia issue” mostly refers to the question of the areas annexed by the Soviet Union in World War II. Finns have started to talk about “lost Karelia”, but not about the question of creating Greater Finland through the incorporation of Eastern Karelia.9 This is similar to the case of the Polish Eastern territories that became a part of the Soviet Union after World War II, and which many Poles started to refer to as “the lost Polish ground”. But the otherwise new Western and Northern Polish territories, which had originally been part of Germany, were called the “recovered Polish territories”.10 Two wars took place in the Finnish-Soviet border region between 1939 and 1945. Finns generally describe three separate wars: the Winter War (1939–1940), the Continuation War (1941–1944) against the Soviet Union and the Lapland War (1944–1945) against Germany.11 One consequence of the first two wars was the emergence of an ethnic and cultural border.12 The Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939. On the Soviet side, more than 200,000 people were killed, and still more wounded. No precise numbers were published until recently. Among the Finns, almost 25,000 were killed and more than 43,500 wounded. For a nation with a population of only 3.75 million, this loss was enormous. Finland lost about 10 per cent of its pre-war Finnish territory, some 12 per cent of the population, 30 per cent of its energy resources and 20 per cent of its railway lines.13 Furthermore, Finland lost a part of “Finnish Karelia”, including the Karelian Isthmus and the Ladoga Karelia, together with the city of Vyborg, the heart of the region. The Soviet Union annexed these areas after the Winter War in 1940, and although they were recaptured by the Finns in 1941, they were lost again in 1944.14 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

Ibid., p. 198. FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, in: KINNUNEN, T., KIVIMÄKI, V. (ed.), Finland in World War II. History, Memory, Interpretations, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2012, p. 483–484. FARALDO, J. M., THUM, G., “Las regiones occidentales polacas. Experimento social y arquitectura de las identidades”, Cuadernos de historia contemporánea, no 22, 2000, p. 325–348; STOKLOSA, K., “Conflict and co-operation: Poland’s border regions in the Cold War and after”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), no 42, 2013, p. 7. MEINANDER, H., “A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War”, op.cit., p. 55. KOLOSSOV, V., SCOTT, J. W., “Karelia. A Finnish-Russian borderland on the edge of neighbourhood”, op.cit., p. 199. HENRIK, O., LUNDE, O., Finland’s War of Choice. The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II, Casemate, Philadelphia-Oxford, 2013, p. 16–19; FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 490. FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 483–484; See also the Russian perspective: KONSTANTIN, G., Tajni lesnoj vojni. Partizanskaja vojna w Karelii 1941–1944 godov v vospominanijach, fotografijach i dokumentach [Mysteries of the Forest War. Guerilla War in Memoirs, Pictures and Documents], Petrozavodsk, Octrova, 2007.

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The so-called “Karelian evacuees”15 were evacuated and resettled inside the new Finnish borders, while the former inhabitants had to move closer together in order to make space for newcomers.16 They also had to adjust to people with other habits and in many cases a different (Orthodox) religion. The majority of these expellees returned to their homes during the Continuation War, only to be expelled again in 1944. Almost the entire population of these areas, more than 420,000 Finnish Karelian citizens, had to leave their homes after their regions were annexed by the Soviet Union.17 There was no further return for the Karelian evacuees and they had to establish new homes in other Finish regions.18 World War II changed the Finnish-Russian border radically. Finnish inhabitants of the border region never really accepted the new border agreement that had been signed in Moscow in 1944.19 Before the final peace terms were confirmed in 1947, the evacuees and many other Finns hoped that the border question could still be changed.20 The lost region of Karelia became a place ensconced in the memory of the Karelian evacuees, a place preserved in their narratives and hopes. The Karelian refugees’ memories were closely connected with their dreams of returning home.21 People living close to the border felt insecure, and their emotions were dominated by fear. They were afraid that something dangerous could happen yet again.22 A similar atmosphere existed in the German-Polish border region after World War II. German evacuees continued to hope for changes to the border and to be able to return to their old homes up until the recognition of the GermanPolish border in June 1950 in Görlitz. At the same time, the new Polish inhabitants of the border region were also afraid that the border could change again and they would once again have to leave their new home.23 “Eastern Karelia” has never truly been a part of Finland. During the 1941–44 Continuation War, Finland occupied most of Eastern Karelia for over two and a half years. This is when the dream of Greater Finland became a reality. Many 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

In Finnish “evakko”: FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 484. MØLLER, E. ”Indledning” [Introduction] in: CLAUS, B., WARRING, C., WARRING, A., (ed.), Finland og Danmark: krig og besættelse 1939–45 [Finland and Denmark: War and Occupation 1939–45], Universitetsforlag, Roskilde, 2007, p. 8–7. LAINE, J., New Civic Neighbourhood. Cross-border Cooperation and Civil Society. Engagement at the Finnish-Russian Border, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, 2013, p. 38. FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 484. LAURÉN, K., “Fear in Border Narratives: Perspectives of the Finnish-Russian Border. In: Borders and Life-Stories”, Folklore, no 52, 2012, p. 48. FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 491. Ibid., p. 501. LAURÉN, K., “Fear in Border Narratives: Perspectives of the Finnish-Russian Border. In: Borders and Life-Stories”, op.cit., p. 48. STOKLOSA, K., “Integration durch Zwang 1948–1953. Die Oder-Neiße-Grenze und die mühsame Integration” [Integration through Force. The Oder-Neisse border and Troublesome Integration], in: KLEßMANN, CH., CIESLA, B., HERTLE, H.-H. (ed.), Vertreibung, Neuanfang, Integration. Erfahrungen in Brandenburg, Potsdam, Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Brandenburg, 2001, p. 74–88; STOKŁOSA, K., Grenzstädte in Ostmitteleuropa. Guben – Gubin 1945–1995 [Border Cities in Central Eastern Europe. Guben-Gubin 1945–1995], Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2003, p. 119–130; JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST, D., STOKŁOSA, K., Geteilte Städte an Oder und Neiße. Frankfurt (Oder) – Słubice, Guben – Gubin und Görlitz – Zgorzelec, 1945–1995 [Divided Cities on the Oder and Neisse. Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice, Guben-Gubin und Görlitz-Zgorzelec, 1945– 1995], Arno Spitz,Berlin, 2000, p. 19–61.

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Finns, especially people with right-wing tendencies, welcomed the conquest with great enthusiasm.24 This part of Finnish-Russian history continues to be essentially a taboo topic until the present day. Likewise, the occupation of Soviet Eastern Karelia and the close relationship with the Third Reich, including Finland’s role in the Holocaust, persists as a difficult topic.25 Finnish narratives describe the double aggression by the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1941. According to them, Finland was only a Waffenbruder (brother-in-arms) and the Continuation War was a legitimate extension of the Winter War.26 First and foremost, Finns identify with their nation through the memory of the Winter War (1939–40) and the Continuation War (1941–44). This is, above all, the case for those Finns who live in the Finnish-Russian border region, in Karelia or the Karelian evacuees.27 Immediately after World War II, there was a deafening silence about the war in official, state-level memory production. The Soviet Union was presented as a brother country, and bilateral relations between the countries were to be based on mutual cooperation and trust. A very similar atmosphere existed in Poland regarding Katyń, near Smolensk in Russia, where a mass execution of Polish military officers was carried out by the Soviet Union in April and Mai 1940. Because of the Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, this was a taboo topic in Poland until the breakdown of Communism.28 A very similar development could be observed in Finland: Among ordinary people, there was also relative silence about their war experiences. The people were mentally tired and didn’t want to talk any more about the violent events. But that doesn’t mean that the Finnish interpretations of the Second World War also corresponded to the official Soviet view.29 In Central and Eastern European countries, the Communist narrative that had underlined the anti-Fascist resistance began to dominate. In addition, in the Western European countries that had been occupied by Germany, the myth of collective resistance and victimhood became the most important part of historic narratives, while collaboration and co-responsibility were downplayed. Official silence about the war-era became necessary political realism.30 In Finland, discussions about the meaning of the Winter War and the Continuation War first began in the 1950s with the production of war fiction and statefunded historical research.31 In the years 1951–75, the Office of Military History 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

FINGERROOS, O., “‘Karelia Issue’. The Politics and Memory of Karelia in Finland”, op.cit., p. 489–490. MEINANDER, H., “A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War”, op.cit., p. 55–77. KINNUNEN, T., JOKISIPILÄ, M., “Shifting Images of “Our Wars”: Finnish Memory Culture of World War II”, in: KINNUNEN, T. KIVIMÄKI, V. (ed.), Finland in World War II. History, Memory, Interpretations. Brill, Leiden-Boston: 2012, p. 455. Ibid., p. 435–437. ALLEN, P., Katyń Stalin's massacre and the triumph of truth, Northern Illinois Univ. Press, DEKALB, 2010; WOJCIECH, M., Katyń od kłamstwa ku prawdzie[Katyn: From the Lie to the Truth], Rytm, Warsaw, 2012; KADELL, F., Katyn das zweifache Trauma der Polen, Herbig, München, 2011. MEINANDER, H., “A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War”, op.cit., p. 58–66. KINNUNEN, T., JOKISIPILÄ, M., “Shifting Images of “Our Wars”: Finnish Memory Culture of World War II”, op.cit., p. 454. MEINANDER, H., “A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War”, op.cit., p. 67.

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under the Finnish General Staff published an 11-volume history of the Continuation War, and in the years 1977–81, a four-volume history of the Winter War followed. In 1988–94, an updated, six-volume history of the Continuation War was published.32 After the collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989, a new trend referring to the memory of the Winter War began to develop. Many Finns became interested in the Finnish wars against the Soviet Union. But instead of critical interpretations, nationalistic discourse about 1939–44 started to dominate.33 This development was typical not only in Finland, but also in many CentralEastern and Eastern European countries.34 In Finnish nationalistic discourse, the Winter War and the Continuation War have been described as the ‘best qualities of Finnishness’: the will to sacrifice oneself for the common good, national solidarity and a sovereign state. Once again, Finland was not the only state to act in this way. In Poland, there was a very similar mode of describing the Polish nation.35 The Karelia region plays a very special role in the Russian and Finnish memory process. This is a place where Finish and Russian perceptions of history meet, a place of memories and utopias.36 The Finnish deconstruction of the nationalist paradigm in this region was the first step in this process, whereby Russian inhabitants of the formerly Finnish areas now speak openly about pre-war history. Intercultural dialogue has also contributed to the Finnish-Russian notion of Karelia.37 This can be compared to the former German city Breslau, which officially became a Polish town with the new name Wrocław after World War II. Nowadays, Polish inhabitants are proud of the German descent of their town.38 Karelia is a region where a common Finnish-Russian space and perhaps a common picture of history will be able to develop in the future. During the anniversaries of the outbreak of the Winter War in 1989/90, 1999/2000 and 2009/2010, the Winter War had a high level of visibility in public commemorations. Although Finland had lost both the Winter War and the Continuation War in military terms, the wars are remembered as heroic defensive victories. Even today, the memory of these wars forms an integral part of the nation’s most important collective experience. In public commemorations, the 1939–44 wars are celebrated as the cornerstone of national independence. It is interesting to note that the memory of the Winter War is becoming more and more significant over time. A 2009 opinion poll on Finnish attitudes regarding the Winter War revealed that memories of the Winter War now played a more important role for Finnish citizens than they had among those who had been 32 33 34 35 36 37

38

KINNUNEN, T., JOKISIPILÄ, M., “Shifting Images of “Our Wars”: Finnish Memory Culture of World War II”, op.cit., p. 448–449. Ibid. p. 450. STOKŁOSA, K., “Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskultur im osteuropäischen Raum”, op.cit.. STOKŁOSA, K., Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2011, p. 35–80. FINGERROOS, O., “A Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, vol. 23, issue 2, 2008, p. 235–254. IZOTOV, A., “Repositioning a Border Town Sortavala”, in: ESKELINEN, H., LIIKANEN, I., SCOTT, J. W. (ed), The EU-Russia Borderland. New contexts for regional co-operation, op.cit., p. 177–17; KOLOSSOV, V., SCOTT, J. W., “Karelia. A Finnish-Russian borderland on the edge of neighbourhood”, op.cit., p. 204; SCOTT, J. W., “Constructing Familiarity in Finnish-Russian Karelia: Shifting Uses of History and the Re-Interpretation of Regions”, European Planning Studies, vol. 1, no 1, 2013, p. 75–92. THUM, G., Uprooted. How Breslau became Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.

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questioned 20 years earlier.39 This demonstrates how strong the influence of state propaganda can be in bringing national heroes back. One reason behind this development was the breakdown of the Soviet Union, not to mention the subsequent high level of unemployment in Finland. At the same time, Finnish foreign policy had to be redefined in order to fit the changing context of post-Communist Europe. The policy of neutrality and arguments about its economic benefits became very important for Finland.40 Against this background, both politicians and ordinary people have started to look for heroes and models from the past.41

Conclusion Karelia in the Finnish-Russian border region has played a central role in Finnish nationalism and has been a place of various interests and aspirations. But being a member of the European Union also includes membership of the European memory community. This is a very real challenge for the Finnish neo-patriotic paradigm. The last developments demonstrate that Karelia is on the way to developing into a place of cross-border memory.

LA FRONTIÈRE FINNOIS-RUSSE : ENTRE MYTHE ET RÉALITÉ Cet article présente l’exemple de la construction de l’histoire, entre mythe et réalité, dans la région frontalière finnois-russe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. De nos jours, il s’agit d’une frontière entre l'UE et un pays non-membre de l’UE. Au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, tous les principaux combats entre la Finlande et l’Union soviétique ont eu lieu dans la région finlandaise de la Carélie ainsi que dans la région soviétique de la Carélie orientale. Aujourd’hui, on associe surtout à la « question carélienne » l'annexion de territoires par l'Union soviétique pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En Finlande, on a commencé à évoquer la « Carélie perdue », mais on n’aborde pas la création d’un grand État finlandais par l'annexion de la Carélie orientale. Cet article utilise l’exemple de la frontière finnois-russe pour montrer à quel point les frontières peuvent être changeantes, et combien de mythes ont été construits en rapport avec les frontières. Ladite région frontalière est un exemple très parlant de l'évolution des frontières de l'Europe de l'Est car, en dépit de l’interaction transnationale, elle continue de représenter une frontière hermétique entre l'Europe orientale et occidentale.

39 40 41

KINNUNEN, T., JOKISIPILÄ, M., “Shifting Images of “Our Wars”: Finnish Memory Culture of World War II”, op.cit., p. 451–452, p. 481. LAINE, J., New Civic Neighbourhood. Cross-border Cooperation and Civil Society. Engagement at the Finnish-Russian Border, op.cit., p. 245–258. KINNUNEN, T., JOKISIPILÄ, M., “Shifting Images of “Our Wars”: Finnish Memory Culture of World War II”, op.cit., p. 453.

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DIE FINNISCH-RUSSISCHE GRENZE: ZWISCHEN MYTHOS UND WIRKLICHKEIT In diesem Artikel wird ein Beispiel für die Konstruktion der Geschichte zwischen Mythos und Realität in der finnisch-russischen Grenzregion nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg präsentiert. Heutzutage handelt es sich dabei um eine Grenze zwischen der EU und einem Nicht-EU-Land. Während des Zweiten Weltkrieges fanden alle bedeutsamen Kampfhandlungen zwischen Finnland und der Sowjetunion in der finnischen Region Karelien sowie der sowjetischen Region Ostkarelien statt. Heute verbindet man mit der „Karelien-Frage“ vor allem die Annexion der Gebiete durch die Sowjetunion während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. In Finnland begann man, vom „verlorenen Karelien“ zu sprechen, nicht aber über die Frage nach der Errichtung eines großfinnischen Staates durch die Angliederung Ostkareliens. Im folgenden Artikel wird die finnisch-russische Grenze als Beispiel benutzt, um aufzuzeigen, wie veränderlich Grenzen sein können, und wie viele Mythen im Zusammenhang mit Grenzen konstruiert wurden. Besagte Grenzregion ist beispielhaft für die Entwicklung der osteuropäischen Grenzen, weil sie trotz länderübergreifender Interaktion weiterhin eine hermetische Grenze zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa darstellt.

Part 4:

BORDER CONFLICTS, BARRIERS AND RESISTANCE TO INTEGRATION CONFLITS FRONTALIERS, BARRIÈRES ET RÉSISTANCE À L’INTÉGRATION GRENZKONFLIKTE, BARRIEREN UND WIDERSTAND GEGEN INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION IN CROSS-BORDER REGIONS: OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS

JEAN PEYRONY The con