Capitalism and Labor: Towards Critical Perspectives 3593508974, 9783593508979

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
Introduction: Theorizing Capitalism and Labor: Challenges for Sociology • Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja and Dieter Sauer
I. The Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism
Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism: Mistakes, Limits, Possibilities • Christoph Deutschmann
Work—More than Employment? Critique of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work • Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer
Landnahme through Tests: A Useful Concept for the Sociology of Work • Klaus Dörre and Tine Haubner
II. What Do Theories of Capitalism Contribute to the Sociology of Work?
Diverging Views on Capitalism and Work: How Feminist Analyses of Capitalism Relate to the Theory of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work • Brigitte Aulenbacher
The Theory of Regulation and Labor Policy • Hans-Jürgen Bieling
Subalternity and the Social Division of Labor: Sociology of Work meets Materialist State Theory • Stefanie Hürtgen and Jens Wissel
Work and Critical Theory: An Unfinished Project • David Strecker
Capitalist Society: A View from the Theory of Functional Differentiation • Uwe Schimank
Financial Market Capitalism or Financial Market Rationality? • Jürgen Kädtler
Re-Constructing the Future Flexibilization and the Temporality of Capitalism • Hajo Holst
III. What Does the Sociology of Work Contribute to the Critique of Capitalism?
Serfdom—(Lost) Love’s Labor—Service Industries: Services from Feudal Times to Late Capitalism • Cornelia Klinger
Work and Reproduction • Kerstin Jürgens
Labor, Insecurity, Informality • Nicole Mayer-Ahuja
Work and Subjectivity • Stephan Voswinkel
Informatization as Force of Production: The Informatized Mode of Production as Basis of a New Phase of Capitalism • Andreas Boes and Tobias Kämpf
Capitalist Work Organization and Self-activity • Harald Wolf
Work and Consumption:A New Perspective for Economic Democracy• Jörn Lamla
Work and Sustainability • Stefanie Hiß
IV. Theory of Capitalism and Critique of Capitalism
Growth Critique as Critique of Capitalism • Brigit Mahnkopf
Work and Alienation • Hartmut Rosa
Social Critique and Trade Unions Outlines of a Troubled Relationship • Hans-Jürgen Urban
Work and Societal Legitimation: What a Normative Sociology of Work and Industrial Relations Can Contribute to the Theory of Capitalism • Wolfgang Menz
In Lieu of a Conclusion: Towards Critical Perspectives • Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja and Dieter Sauer
Authors
Index

Citation preview

ISBN 978-3-593-50897-9

Dörre, Mayer-Ahuja, Sauer, Wittke Capitalism and Labor

Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dieter Sauer, Volker Wittke (eds.)

Capitalism and Labor Towards Critical Perspectives

€ 39,95 [ D ]

Social theory has largely abandoned a focus on ›labor‹ and with it its empirical foundation, while the sociology of work has neglected the production of theory more generally. It is for precisely this reason that Capitalism and Labor has become a standard work on this subject. Labor and employment relations have become both increasingly diverse as well as less secure while, at the same time, labor and distributional struggles are being waged ever more fiercely. Adequately grasping these changes requires innovative impulses emerging from the analysis of capitalism, just as the sociology of work has a lot to contribute to the former. In this translated and updated edition the authors discuss current theoretical approaches in an attempt to once again conceive capitalism and labor together.

Internationale Arbeitsstudien International Labour Studies

Capitalism and Labor

International Labour Studies – Internationale Arbeitsstudien Edited by Klaus Dörre und Stephan Lessenich Volume 16

Klaus Dörre, Dr., is Professor for the Sociology of Work at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dr., is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Sociolgical Research Institute (SOFI) at the Georg August University, Göttingen. Dieter Sauer, Dr., is a senior researcher at the Institute for Social Science Research (ISF), München. Volker Wittke (1957–2012), Dr., was Professor at the Sociolgical Research Institute (SOFI) at the Georg August University, Göttingen.

Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dieter Sauer, Volker Wittke (eds.)

Capitalism and Labor Towards Critical Perspectives

Campus Verlag Frankfurt/New York

ISBN 978-3-593-50897-9 Print ISBN 978-3-593-43891-7 E-Book (PDF) All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Despite careful control of the content Campus Verlag GmbH cannot be held liable for the content of external links. The content of the linked pages is the sole responsibility of their operators. Copyright © 2018 Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt-on-Main Cover design: Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt-on-Main Printing office and bookbinder: CPI buchbuecher.de, Birkach Printed on acid free paper. Printed in Germany www.campus.de www.press.uchicago.edu

To Volker Wittke We owe him a lot.

Contents

Introduction Theorizing Capitalism and Labor: Challenges for Sociology ........................ 11 Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja and Dieter Sauer

I.

The Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism

Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism: Mistakes, Limits, Possibilities ............................................................................. 35 Christoph Deutschmann Work—More than Employment? Critique of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work ......................................... 44 Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer Landnahme through Tests: A Useful Concept for the Sociology of Work ................................................. 71 Klaus Dörre and Tine Haubner

II. What Do Theories of Capitalism Contribute to the Sociology of Work? Diverging Views on Capitalism and Work: How Feminist Analyses of Capitalism Relate to the Theory of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work ............................................................................... 115 Brigitte Aulenbacher

8

CAPITALISM AND LABOR—TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Theory of Regulation and Labor Policy ................................................. 128 Hans-Jürgen Bieling Subalternity and the Social Division of Labor: Sociology of Work meets Materialist State Theory ...................................... 143 Stefanie Hürtgen and Jens Wissel Work and Critical Theory: An Unfinished Project ....................................... 157 David Strecker Capitalist Society: A View from the Theory of Functional Differentiation .............................. 171 Uwe Schimank Financial Market Capitalism or Financial Market Rationality? ................... 185 Jürgen Kädtler Re-Constructing the Future Flexibilization and the Temporality of Capitalism........................................ 201 Hajo Holst

III. What Does the Sociology of Work Contribute to the Critique of Capitalism? Serfdom—(Lost) Love’s Labor—Service Industries: Services from Feudal Times to Late Capitalism............................................ 227 Cornelia Klinger Work and Reproduction.................................................................................... 241 Kerstin Jürgens Labor, Insecurity, Informality .......................................................................... 257 Nicole Mayer-Ahuja Work and Subjectivity........................................................................................ 269 Stephan Voswinkel

CONTENTS

9

Informatization as Force of Production: The Informatized Mode of Production as Basis of a New Phase of Capitalism ...................................... 283 Andreas Boes and Tobias Kämpf Capitalist Work Organization and Self-activity ............................................. 302 Harald Wolf Work and Consumption: A New Perspective for Economic Democracy ............................................. 318 Jörn Lamla Work and Sustainability ..................................................................................... 335 Stefanie Hiß

IV. Theory of Capitalism and Critique of Capitalism Growth Critique as Critique of Capitalism ................................................... 349 Brigit Mahnkopf Work and Alienation.......................................................................................... 368 Hartmut Rosa Social Critique and Trade Unions Outlines of a Troubled Relationship............................................................... 378 Hans-Jürgen Urban Work and Societal Legitimation: What a Normative Sociology of Work and Industrial Relations Can Contribute to the Theory of Capitalism ......................................................... 400 Wolfgang Menz In Lieu of a Conclusion: Towards Critical Perspectives .............................. 415 Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja and Dieter Sauer Authors ................................................................................................................ 427 Index ..................................................................................................................... 431

Introduction: Theorizing Capitalism and Labor: Challenges for Sociology Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dieter Sauer Despite its triumph in the confrontation between the East and the West, doubts concerning the future of capitalism are on the rise. While some point to the ecological limits of economic growth, others emphasize the growing inequality in terms of wealth, life chances, and political influence which calls into question the close connection between capitalism and democracy that countries of the so-called “Global North”, or the capitalist centers, have become used to after the Second World War. Under these conditions, it is high time to come to terms with the complex and conflictual relationship between capitalism and labor, and to explore new critical perspectives. Moreover, what role could sociology play in this? After all, the most important lines of friction we envisage today are closely linked to structures and processes, which constitute the very field of labor sociology. How is abstract labor transformed into concrete labor, how is the latter coordinated and controlled, and what implications do the changes which can be discerned on the shop-floor today have for the chances of men and women to take their own decisions about how to work, how to live and how to reproduce their labor power, as individuals and as social collectives? What transformations have occurred with regard to the organizational structures in which labor is performed? If companies take to a disintegration of value chains, outsource parts of their business to other firms or even to individuals, and spread their operations across an ever increasing part of the globe, what effects does this have on power relations between capital and labor, between the “Global North” and the “Global South”, and for competition and solidarity among an increasingly fragmented working population? Finally, how can we account for the changing character of the socioeconomic system we live in today? If we call it capitalism (as we suggest) what does this tell us about the interrelations between economy, politics,

12

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

and society? Does the term capitalism refer only to (a specific part of) the economic sphere, or to the system as a whole? Is there one capitalism or a variety of different capitalisms? Has capitalism entered a new phase of development, thus turning into financial market capitalism, and does labor still have a role to play? Questions like these have inspired generations of researchers in labor sociology and beyond. Today, however, they acquire a new urgency: Capitalist development seems to have entered a phase in which crisis has turned from a relatively silent companion of capitalist “innovation” to an overt challenge, as the worldwide economic crisis in the years following 2007 indicates. At the same time, labor is faced by multiple transformations which call into question established modes of production (digitization), employment (precarization), and ways of working and living (as exemplified by a continuous intensification of work and the dissolving of its boundaries, in terms of timing, performance, and work organization). Taken together, these transformations seem to deprive ever more working men and women of the chance to plan and live their lives according to their own wishes, and they provoke fundamental questions: Does capitalism have a future at all? What will and what should it look like? What role will labor play in the future development of this system? This book is based on a collected volume that assembled a wide range of expertise (from predominantly German-speaking countries) in 2012. As we write this introduction to the English edition in the fall of 2017, a new rightist, and in parts fascist, party has just entered the National Parliament (Bundestag), calling themselves “Alternative for Germany”. Their impressive electoral success is described by many observers as the revenge of white male workers for decades of neoliberal “reform” and political neglect, thus mirroring the electorate of Marine Le Pen in France and Donald Trump in the United States. Is this the only opposition against the distortions of capitalism to be envisaged today or can sociological research point to lines of friction, to possibilities for intervention, and to potentials of solidarity, which could pave the ground for political movements with an anticapitalist agenda, striving for a democratization of economy and society? We will return to suggestions for a new direction of sociological critique in the last chapter of this book. At this point, however, it might be useful to move one step backwards and take a closer look at two central questions: What is capitalism and what is labor?

INTRODUCTION

13

1. What is Capitalism? In sociological discussions, within this volume and beyond, vastly different theoretical approaches are employed in order to define capitalism—if it is defined at all. Depending on the conceptual background, capitalism is presented as a world system, as a specific social formation, as a sequence of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation, like Fordism or financial market capitalism, as a social subsystem, as a society based on economic growth, as a multi-stage process, etc. Such diversity is not accidental. Even when the focus is directed at the set of structural features that characterize any capitalist social formation (rather than at institutional divergence), the social sciences do not seem to provide an unambiguous reply to the question of what capitalism actually is. To put it positively: Whoever asks the C-question today, that is, whoever wishes to scrutinize the specific characteristics of capitalist societies in the 21st century, thus evokes an ambitious research agenda. It can build upon a rather sound theoretical basis, however, which deserves to be recapitulated at the outset of this volume. What is capitalism? When Karl Marx discussed the structures and dynamics of capitalist accumulation, he never used this term. Nonetheless, he analyzed the emergence of a specific and novel way of organizing economy, politics, and society that seemed to take shape, and to accelerate, in the 19th century. According to Marx, an economy can be called capitalist when money (M) is invested in commodities (C) with the goal of obtaining more money (M’)—a discovery that can be abbreviated in the formula M–C–M’. Marx assumes that this specific approach to economics dominates the entire social formation “in the last instance”. The latter implies that social actors enjoy a certain degree of autonomy but remain ultimately tied in one way or another to the abstract principle of value creation, even when their actions are motivated by completely different goals. The constant struggle to bring contradictory interests, competition and conflict between diverging individuals and groups in line with value creation, and to optimize accumulation, whether by way of innovation or destruction, is an essential driver of capitalist development. For Marx, capitalism is more than just a particular type of economic subsystem; it is a socioeconomic formation whose peculiar dynamism, institutional form, and concrete spatio-temporal manifestations must all be taken into account analytically. This was a fundamental premise for classic theories of capitalism in the social sciences, which often borrowed from Marx, even if they criticized

14

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

him tacitly or explicitly. Following Maurice Dobb (1981, 1–32), we can distinguish three basic definitions of capitalism that provide rather different accounts of its historical genesis and structural features, although they overlap in some regards. The first definition—and probably the one most widely used in sociology—was provided by Werner Sombart. He defined capitalism as a specific economic mentality (Wirtschaftsgesinnung) that fuses the spirit of the entrepreneur and adventurer with the calculative and rational elements of the “bourgeois spirit”. This economic mentality has created its own subjects and organizations (Sombart 1928, 25). The emergence of capitalism is thus explained by a peculiar mindset, inspiring a specific kind of human behavior. Max Weber’s definition of capitalism has modified this approach and made it more precise. According to Weber, we can speak of capitalism when specific social groups pursue their aims and fulfill their demands by way of rational endeavors (rationale Unternehmungen). “Each individual operation undertaken by a rational profit-making enterprise is oriented towards its estimated profitability, by means of calculation” (Weber 1978, 91). According to Weber, an (economic) organization can be considered capitalist if it monitors its profitability mathematically through balance sheets and modern accounting techniques. A capitalist economic mentality in line with Weber’s definition has existed as early as in antiquity, but only the modern nation state allowed for the emergence of capitalism in its current Western shape, and “[i]t is the confined national state which provides capitalism with a chance for continuity” (Weber 1961, 249). In its modern form, capitalism has turned into a “force of fate”, as Sombart puts it, which subjects (not just) the capitalists’ way of life to matter-of-fact, rational goals that are based on quantitative calculations, the more precise the better (Sombart 1928, 329). The second definition, as sketched by Dobb, describes capitalism as a specific system of trade, based upon a monetary economy, or as “the organization of production for a distant market” (Dobb 1981, 6). This definition is not as clear as the first one. Dobb essentially takes it from historical studies, especially the development theories of the German historical school. The expansion of market relations is fundamental to this definition because it increases the distance that a commodity must travel from producer to consumer. This spatio-temporal expansion of market-based socialization is the necessary condition for the establishment of an economic system in which profit-seeking becomes the guiding motive for a particular

INTRODUCTION

15

class of actors. Capitalism is seen as a monetary society, an “exchangebased economy”, whose guiding principle is unlimited profit-seeking. Accordingly, capitalism is assumed to have emerged through the activities of merchants and traders from the 12th century AD onwards. There are similarities to Fernand Braudel’s definition of capitalism, but Braudel gives a peculiar twist to his interpretation of the capitalist monetary economy by systematically distinguishing between market economy and capitalism. For him, capitalism implies that market-based socialization has to be reinforced by networks of social power. One could argue, thus, that the sphere of small businesses (that is: market economy proper) is, strictly speaking, not part of capitalist production. It would therefore be misleading, from Braudel’s point of view, to assume that society as a whole, or even just the economic system, is comprehensively shaped by capitalist socialization: “As a matter of fact, [...] there is a lively dialectic between capitalism on the one hand, and its opposite, which can be found far below and cannot be called real capitalism. It is sometimes argued that big companies tolerate small firms [...] The truth is that they need the smaller firms, first and foremost to carry out the myriad humble tasks indispensable to any society, but which capitalism does not care to handle. Secondly, like the eighteenth-century manufacturers which frequently drew on close by artisanal workshops, subcontractors are put in charge of providing finished or semi-finished goods by the big companies.” (Braudel 1984, 630–631)

From this perspective, capitalism presupposes a hierarchy of social spaces and modes of production, in which big companies operating on capitalist principles “take up a position at the top of this hierarchy, whether or not being responsible for its creation” (ibid., 65). Braudel’s approach takes us to a third definition of capitalism, which, again, has emerged from the writings of Marx. For Marx, capitalism is not identical to the system of commodity production. It is not just a monetary system and an exchange-based economy, but a socioeconomic formation in which labor power itself has become a commodity. This definition provided by Marx differs from the others in that neither profit-seeking and calculative behavior nor the emergence of overseas trade, of the credit system or of a separate class of merchants or financiers are seen as sufficient conditions for capitalist socialization: “Capitalists, however mercenary, are not enough: their capital must be used in a way which ensures that surplus value is created in the process of production, by way of utilizing labor power” (Dobb 1981, 8). According to Marx, the transformation of labor and natural resources into capital “with a view to deriving a

16

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

profit—that is to say, increasing the capital which will in turn be reinvested” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 4–5)—constitutes the peculiar dynamism of the capitalist economy. Only with the advance of the Industrial Revolution has capitalist economy become capable of reproducing itself, based on its own strength. It presupposes a class division between capital and labor, and it is based on the exploitation of the latter, even though the exchange of equivalents is generalized in formal terms. We will not try to determine which of these definitions is most plausible, but obviously, elements of one or the other are easy to detect in the contributions to this volume. What is crucial for discussions about the development and the future of capitalism, however, is the observation that we need to tackle this phenomenon on at least three different levels: To start with, analysis will have to focus on the macro-level of socioeconomic development and political regulation. After all, many observers would identify a deep crisis of capitalism today. This is not due, in the first place, to oppositional movements posing a serious threat to the survival of this socioeconomic formation, but rather to intrinsic crisis mechanisms, which seem to turn more and more destructive. This may well provoke questions with regard to social alternatives. One aspect of this intrinsic crisis of capitalism, which has been discussed for decades now, are the limits of natural resources, which become more and more obvious with every increase in economic growth. Climate change, the exploitation of fossil fuels and other finite resources, but also the destructive potential of nuclear energy (e.g. Fukushima) can be argued to be pushing mankind towards a global tipping point (i.e. the transgression of maximal output) in the near future (Meadows et al. 2004). The progressing economicecological crisis exposes what is known in heterodox environmental economics as the growth dilemma (Jackson 2009) of modern capitalist societies: A decrease in economic output in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) likely leads to growing unemployment, precarity and inequality. Economic growth, on the other hand, entails even more consumption of finite fossil resources, more polluting emissions, the warming of the earth’s atmosphere, and a rise in ecological threats. Hence even segments of the capitalist elite are concerned about the viability of capitalism, especially since the stability not only of the capitalist economy, but also of welfarestates and democratic institutions crucially depend on economic growth— and on the specific mode in which it is generated. So far, the growth dy-

INTRODUCTION

17

namic within the advanced capitalisms of the Global North has not died down entirely, and more or less robust welfare states continue to partially mitigate social risks. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the tensions between capitalism and democracy are returning to the fore rather boldly (Streeck 2011). In the old centers of capitalism, i.e. Europe and the United States, a state of (not only economic) crisis has become the norm. And even in countries like Brazil, Russia, India and especially China, which had been made out as the new growth regions around the turn of the millennium, social and ecological conflicts are escalating to an extent that has triggered discussions about a change of course (Arrighi 2007; Silver and Lu Zhang 2009). Under these conditions, what began in 2007 as a subprime crisis in the United States would rapidly grow into a global wildfire as the structural crisis of capitalism was reinforced by a very acute and worldwide economic crisis. In contrast to numerous precursor crises, the convulsions of 2007 to 2009 even reached the old centers of capitalist production. When economic growth collapsed, unemployment and precarity were increasing worldwide. Although the economy quickly recovered and picked up steam again in some emerging countries and especially in Germany, unemployment figures remained high on a global scale, and the polarization with regard to incomes and wealth reached new levels. 1 Unemployment across the European Union stagnated at a record high of more than 11 percent for many years (OECD 2012). At the same time, the continent was deeply divided. While unemployment rates rose only moderately and went down in some of the Northern and Central European countries—and especially in Germany—shortly after 2009, they had increased dramatically and remained very high in other countries. France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain in particular are still facing double-digit unemployment rates today. Moreover, social inequality is growing even in the alleged “winner” states. In Germany, for instance, the share of wages, salaries and social benefits has fallen by 5 percent (from 67 to 62 percent) of the German national income over the past 20 years. During the same period, the concentration of wealth has increased, leaving the top 10 percent of German households with more than 50 percent of all assets (Frick and Grabka 2009). All in all, a noticeable redistribution in favor of capital

——————

1 Even though the world economy grew by 5 percent on average following the initial crisis peak, and by another 4 percent the following year, in 2011 there were about 197 million unemployed, about 27 million more than before the crisis; about 900 million lived below the absolute poverty line defined as an income of two US dollars per day (ILO 2012).

18

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

incomes and high-income households can be stated (Brenke 2011, 92). 2 While productivity increases, real wages have gone down, thus lowering unit labor costs in Germany in comparison to other countries. However, neither the relatively strong competitive position of German companies on the world market nor the effective management of the 2007–09 crisis rested solely on such competitive advantages. Instead, the foundations of the so-called “German Miracle” have been created in a long process of permanent restructuring, deeply affecting the organization of companies and of work. For this reason, discussions about the emergence, crisis and future of capitalism have to tackle a second level of analysis: the meso-level of economic organizations and of the actual workplace, where capital is invested, labor power utilized, and surplus value accumulated (Marx), and where the entrepreneurial spirit (Weber) can be studied in action. On this level, massive changes have occurred over the last decades. Relocation, outsourcing, cost reduction programs, and a constant flexibilisation and intensification of work have boosted not only work pressure, but also the insecurity of employment and income. Therefore, the financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 did not occur as a singular and unprecedented event for the majority of wage earners in Germany, but rather as an escalation of “everyday” experiences of crisis they had already known for a long time. For them, the crisis has unfolded as a quasi-“permanent process” for more than a decade (see Detje et al. 2011). However, even in the world of work, this long-standing crisis was reinforced by the management of the acute, world economic crisis starting in 2007, which had severe consequences for work, employment, and social security. Since the “Keynesian moment” triggered by public stimulus packages for economic stabilization and the use of tax revenues to bail out insolvent banks came at a major cost for governments, many of them radicalized their austerity programs, either voluntarily or in order to comply with the strict conditions for access to the European bailout fund. Under these conditions, national governments could and would point to European regulations, if confronted with de-

——————

2 With the exception of the top tenth, net wages declined between 2000 and 2010 (ibid., 95). Net hourly wages adjusted to purchasing power among the bottom tenth decreased from 4.06 euro in 2000 to 3.86 euro in 2010 (Brenke 2011, 95). In the precarious sector, which comprises the larger part of those 23 percent of the workforce who are low-wage earners (2009, including pensioners as well as school and university students); in 2011, at least 3.4 million wage earners (10.7 percent of all wage earners) earn less than seven euro and about one million less than five euro per hour (Weinkopf 2010; IAQ 2012).

INTRODUCTION

19

mands for higher wages, better social security provisions, or for an increase in public sector employment. Democratic decision making was curtailed with reference to “empty coffers”—and the claim that there was no alternative to austerity policies might well have paved the way for political forces that offered a xenophobic and anti-democratic “alternative” (not only) for Germany. The third level of analysis which needs to be tackled in order to paint an adequate picture of present-day capitalism is the micro-level of working and living under the conditions of this specific socioeconomic constellation. The question of how men and women produce goods and services, and of how they reproduce their labor power, along the lines of gender, generation, and social class, is of crucial importance for the functioning of capitalism, since its legitimacy can be argued to depend not least on whether or not the social needs, political demands, and personal hopes of “the many, not the few” (as Jeremy Corbyn likes to put it) are taken account of in the organization of economy, politics, and society. We would thus like to suggest that “labor” constitutes a critical juncture in which many processes that are crucial for the development of capitalism coincide.

2. What is Labor? Again, we can rely on the classics of sociology in order to approach this question. According to Marx, labor is a purposeful activity by which human beings turn themselves into social beings through their interactions with nature. “So far therefore as labor is a creator of use-value, is useful labor, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life” (Marx 1954, 42–43).

The character of this purposeful activity changes in accordance with property relations and with the division of labor. Wage labor as a special type of labor only becomes widespread in capitalist societies. It is exploited and alienated labor, because the value it creates is appropriated and its concrete organization determined by those who purchase labor power, rather than by working men and women themselves. Labor can only shed its alienated character if the relations of production, and thus capitalist property rela-

20

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

tions, are abolished. The polarization of society between capital and labor, Marx has argued, creates the conditions for a revolutionary transformation that will “sublate” wage labor in a Hegelian sense (Marx and Engels 1976). Durkheim offers a different view. For him, the social division of labor is not a cause of alienation but “a source of solidarity” (Durkheim 1984, 308). “Thenceforth, however specialized, however uniform his activity may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for he [the worker] knows that his activity has a meaning” (ibid., 308). From this angle, the social division of labor is a source of organic solidarity. It creates social rules “ensuring peaceful and regular co-operation between the functions that have been divided up” (ibid., 338) and thus secures social cohesion. Organic solidarity is only disturbed when (a) the division of labor is enforced by “external” social inequalities—like class or caste—rather than evolving spontaneously; or (b) when the division of labor restricts the scope for individual action, and overspecialization leads to “anarchy” (ibid., 310–322, 323–328). An argument could be had as to whether the analytical perspectives of Marx and Durkheim are mutually exclusive. In societies that are based on class divisions, anomy might easily become permanent. If Marx differentiates between the “exchange value” and “use value” of labor, the latter points to the concrete, useful side of work, and it cannot be discussed without reference to cooperation and conflict, mutual respect and recognition. Moreover, both Marx and Durkheim tend to equate work in capitalism much too quickly with work for economic gain or—more narrowly still—with wage labor. Hidden behind the working “men” whom Marx saw as the bourgeoisie’s gravediggers (Marx and Engels 1976, 496), there are usually women who do not just take care of housework and children but also, when necessary, swell the ranks of the “industrial reserve army” of the un-, under- and precariously employed. As far as Durkheim’s organic solidarity is concerned—if it exists at all—it is structurally dependent on the “social ties” created by family, kin and friends. Social labor can, therefore, never be fully equated with work for economic gain, let alone wage labor. Instead, it encompasses domestic labor, reproductive labor for one’s own or others’ wellbeing, activities that serve no economic purpose, but are an end in themselves, and voluntary engagement that benefits the community (Gorz 1989, 139–171). Such activities are part of social labor, but the ways in which they relate to labor for economic gain vary from one socioeconomic formation to the other. Still, they are always hierarchically arranged, and they can be combined in different ways even within the same

INTRODUCTION

21

socioeconomic setting, depending on class, qualification, gender, ethnicity or nationality. The history of capitalism is a history of differentiation with regard to concrete forms of labor and activity. This differentiation has—with good reason—been used to criticize the fixation on wage labor, which was typical (not only) of labor sociology in the past. Many of the contributions to this volume, however, point out that an interesting counter-movement is taking place in contemporary capitalism. The range of work activities may be expanding, and fields of work, qualifications and responsibilities may become more differentiated. But eventually, these diverging demands and activities have to be coordinated by the individual owner of labor power. As the commodification of all kinds of human activity proceeds, the individual has to make congruent what society has separated. This may remind us (painfully) of the fact that “[l]abor is only another name for human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons” and that activity cannot “be detached from the rest of life” (Polanyi 2001, 75). Therefore, even that part of labor power which is up for sale is not a commodity like any other, but (like land and money) a fictitious commodity. For Polanyi, a free reign of the market mechanism would thus result in the self-destruction of society: “For the alleged commodity ‘labor power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In utilizing a man's labor power, the system would, incidentally, also utilize the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’, who carries that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of culturally specific institutions, social exclusion would make human beings perish.” (Polanyi 2001, 76)

Certain productive aspects notwithstanding, the restructuring of social labor in contemporary capitalism can be argued to display precisely this kind of self-destructive tendency. That, in any case, is what numerous contributions to this volume suggest. On the one hand, eroding boundaries of tasks and activities have counteracted differentiation to a remarkable degree, exceeding by far what Horst Kern and Michael Schumann once described, with reference to industrial reskilling, as the “end of the social division of labor” (Kern and Schumann 1984). The most significant shift in boundaries, however, concerns the relation between paid labor and reproductive activities. On the other hand, this erosion of boundaries occurs in a differentiated and socially differentiating way. Although labor power is

22

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

utilized in ever more intensive and extensive ways in different segments of the labor market and along transnational value chains, chances to come to terms with this challenge are unequally distributed. Even though IT specialists who subordinate their private lives to whatever project they are currently working on might be argued to face “tests” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 30) just like the migrant street vendor in the informal sector who puts in eighteen hours to make a living for himself and his family abroad, it is obvious, that they draw upon strikingly different resources in this endeavor. After all, the IT specialist may outsource reproductive tasks, for instance, whereas the informal worker cannot. Hence the erosion of the work-life distinction, which has been described as the “colonization of the life-world” (Habermas 2007) more than two decades ago, just like other aspects of eroding boundaries, connects different parts of the working population, but it also deepens the social and economic distinctions between them at the same time. The erosion of boundaries between the spheres of production and reproduction renders it more and more difficult to distinguish between productive and unproductive labor. This has ample implications for the concept of labor and the analysis of labor processes that for a long time were only discussed on the margins—if not entirely outside—of labor sociology (cf. among others, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge as well as Agnes Heller and the Budapest school). The Marxist heretic Henri Lefebvre, for instance, developed the concept of a concrete and complex totality in order to overcome economic determinism. Everyday life, rather than the economy, is the real center of social practice for Lefebvre, and people are productive not just as wage laborers but in a comprehensive sense (Lefebvre 1991). The routines and habits of everyday life, which emerge in the process of actively dealing with one’s social environment, are subject to a mostly unconscious adaptation to capitalist social relations. However, they also contain a potential for critique that questions the status quo. After all, everyday life depends on physical and biological processes, and it requires a certain stability that corresponds to “human nature” or, more precisely, to the bodily biorhythm and the temporal regimes it constitutes—all of which are, again, socially produced. It is this dimension of everyday life that defies the escalating logic of capitalist accumulation, and even material incentives to comply with this logic meet with their ends, because the number of consumer goods that can be used cannot grow infinitely (Alheit 1983, 83, drawing on Lefebvre). During the last decades, however, the continuous

INTRODUCTION

23

recomposition of social labor has rendered it more and more difficult to distinguish neatly between productive and unproductive activities. On the one hand, even emotional labor is now affected by heteronomous appropriation (Illouz 1997); the latter penetrates the innermost personality, reaching deep into the psyche, causing exhaustion, fatigue, inability to relax or work addiction (Ehrenberg 2010). On the other hand, the emotional aspects of labor, for instance, resist complete commodification. They are not fully quantifiable or calculable, and their exploitation meets with limits, as set by body and person and thus by necessities of social reproduction. Most contemporary “middle-range” theories of capitalism, however, from the inspiring analyses of New Economic Sociology (Beckert and Deutschmann 2010) to current discussions about Global Value Chains (for a critique cf. Mayer-Ahuja 2016), tend to ignore labor altogether. It is striking, for example, that scholars in the field of New Economic Sociology, who turn to analyze firms, claim to examine problems of conflict and control, but most of them do not even mention the connection between these problems on the one hand and work-related processes and interests on the other (Maurer 2010, 214–16). The disappearance of labor from the center of analysis is noticeable even in the most sophisticated neo-Schumpeterian theories of capitalism. Christoph Deutschmann’s discussion of capitalist dynamism, for instance, at least mentions the Marxian “money-labor nexus” (Deutschmann 2010, 47), but barely expands on it and tends to hide it behind concepts like creative activity. Less sophisticated approaches even treat capitalism’s radical orientation towards the future (Schumpeter 2017) as a kind of natural law (Paqué 2010), without considering that any attempt to universalize entrepreneurial thinking and behavior in a given society will unleash exactly the kind of destructive potential that Polanyi has described so vividly in his “Great Transformation”. This can be demonstrated particularly well at the level of the individual subject. An “economic habitus” that makes entrepreneurial behavior possible requires a conscious orientation towards the future, but this kind of consciousness cannot emerge unless there is some basic social security (Bourdieu 2000). The “totalization of entrepreneurialism” that is inherent in the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) undermines this security, however, at the level of socioeconomic development and political regulation, at the workplace, and with regard to the everyday life of working individuals.

24

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

3. About this Book This volume proceeds from the considerations described above. It does not aim at presenting fully-formulated theoretical answers, however, but sets out, first of all, to explore the terrain. Which theories of capitalism can labor sociology build on in the future, in order to use its highly differentiated empirical research even more effectively for an analysis and critique of current developments in the world of work? How can findings from labor sociology contribute to the advancement of theories about the dynamism of capitalism? The problem of labor sociology is not, we would argue, that it clings to a theoretical foundation increasingly undermined by its own empirical research (see the chapter by Christoph Deutschmann in this volume). Much the opposite applies: labor sociology tends to conduct empirical research, which explores specific constellations in great detail, but finds it hard to generalize these findings beyond the specific empirical setting. In order to gain attention and claim originality, many of us take to dissecting “big” or even middle-range theories, which are then accused of de-differentiation. 3 This would not be particularly tragic if said empirical findings were actually used to drive forward the development of theory, but this is often enough not the case. This may be due to some extent to the fact that most research in labor sociology is conducted in the framework of projects, with a heavy focus on empirical analysis, and with a limited scope in terms of time and contents. This may explain the marked absenteeism of labor sociology with regard to theories of capitalism, but the latter still poses a serious problem. After all, as labor sociology increasingly refrained from connecting its results to the “grand narratives” of socioeconomic development, it risked losing its critical sting as well. As a result, an academic discipline that used to be dominated by critical analysts of social realities is now increasingly populated by highly specialized experts for a specific fragment of society (i.e. employment, work organization, etc.), who offer their consultation more often to the managerial staff of large corporations than to the organizations of wage earners. 4 We, the editors of this volume, suggest that it is high time to confront this development with hard theoretical labor. This endeavor is supported by the research groups we are part of, in Göttingen, Jena and Munich. All

——————

3 On the critical self-reflection of labor and industrial sociology, see also Huchler 2008. 4 The accusation of excessive proximity to the trade unions expressed by some critics may by now also be considered an instance of myth-making.

INTRODUCTION

25

differences in terms of methodology, empirical approaches, and theoretical references aside, we share the goal not only to preserve labor sociology’s longstanding claim to produce theories of society and capitalism, but to put the latter forward with new vigor. As a common point of reference, we draw upon institutionalist theories of capitalism, among them the works of the French regulation school in particular, which have provided an important, albeit not the only, analytical basis for theorizing the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (Wittke 1996; Dörre 2002; Sauer and Döhl 1994). For a long time, it was considered an advantage of this (deeply heterogeneous) theoretical programme (Aglietta 1979; Boyer 1997; Hirsch and Roth 1986; Lipietz 1983; critical: Schmidt 2013) that it suggested some correspondence between accumulation regime, regulatory mode and technological paradigm or production model (see the chapter by Hans-Jürgen Bieling in this volume). Moreover, this implied a close link between developments on the macro-level of socioeconomic development (accumulation regime, mode of regulation), on the meso-level of the workplace (production models), and (implicitly, although this was typically beyond the scope of research) on the micro-level of everyday working and living. To some extent, this perspective allowed for the integration of disparate empirical findings into an all-encompassing theory of capitalism. Even if the actual research of labor sociology more often than not focused exclusively on the production model, it was possible to argue that it contributed to the analysis of the entire capitalist formation. Today, these old certainties have been weakened in several respects. First of all, it was not least the highly differentiated findings of labor sociology which rendered it obvious that the postulated causality between the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis is not easy to prove in every case. Moreover, theoretical approaches that stressed the internal coherence of Fordist capitalism implied the expectation that post-Fordism should acquire a similar degree of coherence. Even if changes at the level of production models could be consistently interpreted in terms of “not yet” (Schumann et al. 1994; Schumann and Gerst 1996)— the old formation had not yet faded, while the new one was only discernible in an embryonic state—it soon became clear that capitalism “after Fordism” was characterized by the very fact that things had become more difficult; Even on the macro level of socioeconomic development, economic change and policies did not always fit together, there were contradictions between policies, and the dynamics of different economic sectors, of big and small business, showed a remarkable diversity. Moreover, this

26

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

translated into a wide range of strategies and practices on the level of companies and workplaces, and the situation was further complicated by the fact that working men and women displayed increasingly different approaches to working and living under conditions of “individualization” (Beck) and social polarization. Hence, labor sociologists found it increasingly difficult to detect those developments among these heterogeneous trends, which would be constitutive of a new capitalist formation. The outcome was a certain arbitrariness and randomness, as scholars kept referring to “a new complexity” (Habermas 1985) for several decades. It is no wonder that this prompted criticism, not least from within labor sociology (Mayer-Ahuja 2011). Thus contributions from the Institute of Social Research (ISF) in Munich emphasized the synchronicity of preFordist, Fordist and post-Fordist moments, captured in the formula of “capitalism in transition” (Bechtle and Sauer 2003; Sauer 2005). In this, post-Fordism was considered to represent the “incubation period of a new form of rule”, “Post-Fordism primarily refers to the decline of the Fordist form of rule, control and management, at the heart of which stood the workplace and its “command system”. This decline provides for a qualitatively new—yet at the same time ambivalent—status for the individual: the subject, the person as bearer of labor power, induces, on the one hand, a structural crisis of capitalist rule; on the other hand, the specific qualities of the person or the subject are partly utilized and promoted in order to overcome Fordism’s rationalization deficits” (Bechtle and Sauer 2003, 36-7). Studies from the Recklinghausen research group, which was to move to Jena later on, placed an even stronger emphasis on the restructuring dynamic of financial market capitalism and market-driven, flexible production models (Dörre 2001). Similar to the Munich approach, a marketcentered mode of control was regarded “as the center of the new production model”. This mode of control changed the rules of the economic game profoundly: “The new mode of control acts as connecting link between a flexible mode of production and a workplace environment marked by insecurity and destructive competition. In terms of labor market policy, market-centered control does not have a determining but certainly a selecting effect. […] It is not the stabilization of certain organizational forms that matters, but the movement as such.” (Dörre 2003, 28–9)

In contrast to the Munich research group, the scholars in Jena dealt with the downside of this selection—the precarization of work and employ-

INTRODUCTION

27

ment—from early on (Brinkmann et al. 2006). At the Sociological Research Institute (SOFI) in Göttingen, scholars were much more careful to subscribe to one of the middle-range theories of capitalism on offer “after Fordism”. Concepts of a financial market capitalism were criticized from an institutionalist perspective, but also with reference to in-depth workplace studies. “The more far-reaching and unambiguous the conclusions, frequently linked to ‘the’ globalization and especially to the influence of global financial markets, the less specific and the more schematic is the presentation of findings, when it comes to companies as sphere of social interaction. If, say, representatives of regulation theory [… make out] a new regime of accumulation, based on capital-income, companies and the actors within them turn into more or less irrelevant epiphenomena.” (Kädtler 2003, 227)

Still, SOFI offered valuable contributions to debates about the institutional divergence of national capitalisms, based on the analysis of changes on the shop-floor, and was among the first to extend research far beyond Germany in studies on the internationalization of value chains (Wittke 2001) and transnational project work (Mayer-Ahuja 2014). Moreover, the socioeconomic development of Germany during the last decades was tackled through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in an attempt to chart the break affecting “participatory capitalism” (Teilhabekapitalismus). The central aim of this endeavor was to provide an analytical framework that could integrate distinct empirical results (MayerAhuja et al. 2012, 15–40). Shortly after the economic hit in 2007 and effected social consequences on a world-wide scale which challenge not only the analytical agendas of labor sociology up to the present day, ISF Munich, SOFI Göttingen and the Department of Labor, Industrial and Economic Sociology at Friedrich Schiller University Jena organized a conference in cooperation with WissenTransfer titled “Bringing Capitalism back in!” in October 2009. It was attended by over 400 guests and scholars from Germany and around the world. The idea for this book arose from the inspiring discussions at and around this conference. Still, this book is not a conference volume. It is divided into four sections. The first section, The Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism, is dedicated to theoretical reflections about capitalism from different perspectives within German labor sociology and industrial sociology. The second section addresses the potential that theories of capitalism may have

28

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

for the advancement of labor sociology. These contributions deal with distinct theoretical approaches which are relevant—or may assume relevance in the future—for discussions in labor sociology. It intentionally includes approaches (such as theories of social differentiation or international political economy) which have not been central to these debates so far. In the third section, the perspective is reversed. Here, we ask how empirical findings of labor sociology could provide impulses for new approaches to a theory of capitalism. The contributions, implicitly or explicitly addressing this question, deal with a whole range of work activities, extending far beyond paid wage labor with social protection, which has long served as the point of reference for labor sociology. The concluding fourth section is dedicated to the question of how labor sociology may contribute to a critique of capitalism. Apart from a classical social critique, critiques of progress and growth are discussed as well. Despite its considerable volume, this book is not devoid of blind spots, since not all contributions we had hoped for did materialize. This applies, first of all, to institutionalist theories about Varieties of Capitalism. We are confident, however, that despite its limitations this publication will inspire debates about capitalism and labor, and we look forward to the feedback of readers, which we expect to prove controversial and critical. The volume represents a conscious attempt to gather contributions by authors from within and beyond labor sociology. The provocations this may imply are by all means welcome. It is not only labor sociology which is urgently in need of critical impulses; this volume is also supposed to fuel debates at the German Research Foundation’s Jena Centre for Advanced Studies on Post-Growth Societies. Most of the contributions were discussed during a workshop in Jena in February 2012 and subsequently revised. This volume would have been impossible without the inspiring and meticulous work of staff members at the Research Center: Tine Haubner, Harald Hoppadietz, Dimitri Mader and Hanno Pahl. The English edition would not have come about without Julian Müller whose thorough translation is very much appreciated. We would like to extend our thanks to Barbara Muraca and Michael Hofmann, who contributed to our discussions, to Peter Bescherer, who copy-edited the German manuscripts, supported us in organizational matters and cooperated closely with Campus Verlag, as well as to Elisabeth Franzmann, Alexander Lariviere, Anna Mehlis and Christine Schickert who worked on the English edition. Judith Wilke-Primavesi and Eva Janetzko at Campus Verlag played a major part in making this book possible. Final-

INTRODUCTION

29

ly, we would like to thank all of our authors for enriching our common debate with their contributions and for their reliable support with the publication of the English edition. We know that this cannot be taken for granted in today’s accelerated academic world! One last word. When the German original of this book was published in 2012, our friend and colleague Volker Wittke (SOFI) was among the editors. We have profited greatly from the discussions about the future of capitalism and labor with him, the hard-working scholar who was so immensely constructive and relentlessly critical with regard to our as well as to his own work. He passed away, much too young, in the very same year. Therefore, this book is dedicated to Volker. Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dieter Sauer, October 2017

Works Cited Aglietta, Michel (1979). A theory of capitalist regulation. The US-experience. London: New Left Books. Alheit, Peter (1983). Alltagsleben. Zur Bedeutung eines gesellschaftlichen “Restphänomens”. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Arrighi, Giovanni (2007). Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London: Verso. Bechtle, Günter, and Dieter Sauer (2003). Postfordismus als Inkubationszeit einer neuen Herrschaftsform. In Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (eds.). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells, 35–54. Hamburg: VSA. Beckert, Jens, and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). (2010). Wirtschaftssoziologie. Wiesbaden: VS. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York, Verso. Bourdieu, Pierre (2000). Die zwei Gesichter der Arbeit. Interdependenzen von Zeit- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen am Beispiel einer Ethnologie der algerischen Übergangsgesellschaft. Translated by Franz Schultheis. Konstanz: UVK. Boyer, Robert (1997). Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Braudel, Fernand (1984). The Perspective of the World. Civilization and Capitalism 15th– 18th Century. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

30

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

Brenke, Karl (2011). Einkommensverteilung, Sparen, Konsum und Wirtschaftsleistung. Ein Rückblick auf die letzten zehn Jahre. In Matthias Machnig (ed.). Welchen Fortschritt wollen wir? Neue Wege zu Wachstum und sozialen Wohlstand, 84– 102. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Brinkmann, Ulrich, Klaus Dörre, Silke Röbenack, Klaus Kraemer and Frederic Speidel (2006). Prekäre Arbeit. Ursachen, Ausmaß, soziale Folgen und subjektive Verarbeitungsformen unsicherer Beschäftigungsverhältnisse. Bonn: FES. Detje, Richard, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2011). Krise ohne Konflikt? Interessen- und Handlungsorientierungen im Betrieb—die Sicht von Betroffenen. Hamburg: VSA. Deutschmann, Christoph (2010). Soziologische Erklärungen kapitalistischer Dynamik. In Jens Beckert and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). Wirtschaftssoziologie, 43–66. Wiesbaden: VS. Dobb, Maurice (1981 [1946]). Studies in the Development of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers. Dörre, Klaus (2001). Das deutsche Produktionsmodell unter dem Druck des Shareholder Value. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 53(4), 675– 704. Dörre, Klaus (2002). Kampf um Beteiligung. Arbeit, Partizipation und industrielle Beziehungen im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2003) Das flexibel-markzentrierte Produktionsmodell- Gravitationszentrum eines “neuen Kapitalismus”?. In Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (eds.). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells, 7–34. Hamburg: VSA. Durkheim, Émile (1984 [1893]). The Division of Labour in Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Ehrenberg, Alain (2010). The Uneasy Society. Paris: Odile Jacob. Frick, Joachim R., and Markus M. Grabka (2009). Gestiegene Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland. DIW-Wochenbericht, 4/2009, 54–67. Gorz, André (1989). Critique of Economic Reason. London: Verso. Habermas, Jürgen (1985). Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Habermas, Jürgen (2007 [1989]). The Theory of Communicative Action. The Critique of Functionalist Reason. Oxford: Polity Press. Hirsch, Joachim, and Roland Roth (1986). Das neue Gesicht des Kapitalismus. Vom Fordismus zum Post-Fordismus. Hamburg: VSA. Huchler, Norbert (ed.). (2008). Ein Fach wird vermessen—Postionen zur Zukunft der Disziplin Arbeits- und Industriesoziologie. Berlin: edition sigma. Illouz, Eva (1997). Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Institut für Arbeit und Qualifikation (IAQ) (2012). IAQ-Report 2012-01. Duisburg: IAQ International Labour Organization (2012). Global Wage Report 2012–2013. Geneva: International Labour Office.

INTRODUCTION

31

Jackson, Tim (2009). Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet. London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Kädtler, Jürgen (2003). Globalisierung und Finanzialisierung. Zur Entstehung eines neuen Begründungskontexts für ökonomisches Handeln. In Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (eds.). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells, 227–249. Hamburg: VSA. Kern, Horst, and Michael Schumann (1984). Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung? Rationalisierung in der industriellen Produktion—Bestandsaufnahme, Trendbestimmung. München: C.H. Beck. Lefebvre, Henri (1991 [1947]). The Critique of Everyday Life. Vol. 1. London: Verso. Lipietz, Alain (1983). Le Capital et son espace. Paris: La Découverte. Marx, Karl (1954 [1887]). Capital. A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. Volume 1. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels (1976). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Collected Works. Volume 6: Marx and Engels 1845–1848. New York: International Publishers. Maurer, Andrea (2010). Die Institution der Wirtschaft. Soziologische Erklärungen wirtschaftlichen Sachverhalte. In Jens Beckert and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). Wirtschaftssoziologie, 208–218. Wiesbaden: VS. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2011). Jenseits der “neuen Unübersichtlichkeit”. Annäherung an Konturen der gegenwärtigen Arbeitswelt. SOFI Working Paper, 6/2011. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2014). “Everywhere is becoming the same?” Regulating IT-work between India and Germany. New Delhi: Social Science Press. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2016). Arbeit und transnationale Wertschöpfung. In Heinz Bude and Philipp Staab (eds.). Kapitalismus und Ungleichheit, 175–193. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole, Peter Bartelheimer and Jürgen Kädtler (2012). Teilhabe im Umbruch—Zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung Deutschlands. In Forschungsverbund sozioökonomische Berichterstattung (ed.). Berichterstattung zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Teilhabe im Umbruch. Zweiter Bericht, 15–40. Wiesbaden: VS. Meadows, Donella H., Jorgen Randers and Dennis L. Meadows (2004). Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing. OECD (2012). OECD Employment Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing. Paqué, Karl-Heinz (2010). Wachstum! Die Zukunft des globalen Kapitalismus. München: Hanser. Polanyi, Karl (2001 [1944]). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA. Sauer, Dieter, and Volker Döhl (1994). Kontrolle durch Autonomie. Zum Formwandel von Herrschaft bei unternehmensübergreifender Rationalisierung. In Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler (eds.). Management interorganisationaler

32

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

Beziehungen. Vertrauen, Kontrolle und Informationstechnik, 258–274. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Schmidt, Rudi (2013). Fordismus. In Heiner Minssen and Hartmut HirschKreinsen (eds.). Lexikon der Arbeits- und Indistriesoziologie, 227–233. Berlin: edition sigma. Schumann, Michael, Volker Baethge-Kinsky and Martin Kuhlmann (1994). Trendreport Rationalisierung: Automobilindustrie, Werkzeugmaschinenbau, chemische Industrie. Berlin: edition sigma. Schumann, Michael, and Detlef Gerst (1996). Produktionsarbeit—Bleiben die Entwicklungstrends stabil?. In ISF, INFES, IfS and SOFI (eds.). Jahrbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Technikberichterstattung. Schwerpunkt Reorganisation, 131–181. Berlin: edition sigma. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2017 [1926]). The Theory of Economic Development. London/New York: Routledge. Silver, Beverly, and Lu Zhang (2009). China as an Emerging Epicenter of World Labor Unrest. In Ho-fung Hung (ed.). China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism, 174–187. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sombart, Werner (1928). Der moderne Kapitalismus. Vol. 1. Leipzig: Duncker&Humblodt. Streeck, Wolfgang (2011). The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. New Left Review, 71, 5–29. Weber, Max (1961). General Economic History. Translated by Frank H. Knight. New York: Collier Books. Weber, Max (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weinkopf, Claudia (2010). Warum Deutschland einen gesetzlichen Mindestlohn braucht. Vorgänge, 49(3), 38–49. Wittke, Volker (1996). Wie entstand industrielle Massenproduktion? Die diskontinuierliche Entwicklung der deutschen Elektroindustrie von den Anfängen der “großen Industrie” bis zur Entfaltung des Fordismus (1880–1975). Berlin: edition sigma. Wittke, Volker (2001). Globalisierungsstrategien in der Mikroelektronik. In Werner Dostal and Peter Kupka (eds.), Globalisierung, veränderte Arbeitsorganisation und Berufswandel, 217–244. Nürnberg: wbv.

I. The Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism

Sociology of Work and the Critique of Capitalism: Mistakes, Limits, Possibilities Christoph Deutschmann

What does a sociology of work have to do with a critique of capitalism? Forty years ago, the answer would have been: a lot! Back then, many in the fields of sociology of work and industrial relations seemed to consider criticizing the capitalist mode of production to be their primary occupation—not just in West Germany, but also in France, the UK and the US. For younger researchers who had gone through the 1968 student movement, grappling with Marx’ theory was a formative experience that also shaped their approach to the sociology of industrial relations. Whether they looked at “wildcat strikes”, new technologies, the Taylorisation of labor, or working-class consciousness, Marx’ theories usually provided the conceptual background for their studies. Class theory, crisis theory and state interventionism, but also concepts like “real subsumption” or the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, were the subjects of lively debates. The irony was that all this happened at a time when post-war prosperity still reigned and capitalism appeared to flourish like never before. That the “revolution” which so many talked about was less likely than ever was rarely acknowledged. Harry Braverman’s book Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) was the most influential expression of this Marxist, anti-capitalist consensus in industrial relations. This study, as we might recall, derived Taylorist and Fordist rationalization from the logic of surplus value inherent to capital, and from managers’ attempts to achieve comprehensive control over the labor process. It seemed to provide a well-founded Marxist response to all the empirical questions the sociology of industrial relations was raising, and attracted strong international interest, which, among other things, led to the famous Labor Process Debate. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Marx and Marxism enjoyed a virtual monopoly over theory construction in industrial relations. Beyond that, only Weber played a certain role.

36

CHRISTOPH DEUTSCHMANN

Those were the days. Looking at developments since the late 1970s, one can identify certain tendencies that have largely watered down the formerly critical and anti-capitalist stance taken by and within the sociology of work. The first part of this shift was the academic professionalization of industrial relations, which in turn was connected to the shift towards individual plant-level studies as the way to conduct empirical research (Pongratz and Trinczek 2010). The more industrial relations research immersed itself in the empirical diversity of labor policy at plant- and industry-level, the more difficult it became to stick to the inherited political-economic theory and its allegedly “objective” laws of capitalism. There was a growing disconnect between analyses at the plant level on the one hand, and macro-social analyses on the other, and interest in the big questions of social theory dwindled. The growth of empirical research was accompanied by increased competition for external funding and by the need to legitimize one’s work vis-à-vis competing approaches in sociology, organization studies and management science. As a consequence, the formerly near-exclusive relationship between industrial relations and Marxian theory loosened considerably. Industrial relations research was forced to prove its usefulness for solving concrete problems of industrial practice, be it labor relations, qualification, technological development or the reorganization of work and labor markets. In this situation, the inherited Marxist vocabulary, including the concept of “capitalism” itself, increasingly proved to be dead weight. It was relegated to ceremonial functions and was pushed back even further after the collapse of the “socialist camp”. Since the early 1980s, the shift in German industrial sociology away from its formerly Marxist orientation was reinforced by the interventions of Ralf Dahrendorf, Claus Offe and Jürgen Habermas, who questioned the macro-social centrality of its subject area. This took place against the backdrop of what was then often called “tertiarization”: the well-known structural tendency of a long-term decrease of economic activities classified as “manufacturing” in official statistics. Although there were well-founded arguments against the widely accepted hypothesis that suggested an erosion of a society centered around wage labor (Arbeitsgesellschaft), the discussion nonetheless came to be dominated by new issues that were connected to this concept, such as unemployment, working time reduction, quality of work or social segmentation. Further important inputs came from the research on labor market segmentation pioneered by Burkart Lutz, Werner

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

37

Sengenberger and the Munich Institute for Social Science Research (Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung—ISF). The implicitly teleological perspective with which traditional Marxism had approached industrial relations came to be viewed with increasing skepticism. Research increasingly focused on the multiplicity and variety of “services” and the ways in which they differed from traditional industrial labor, but also on the “tertiarization” of industrial labor itself. Eventually, this trend was made explicit when the discipline’s name was changed from “industrial sociology” to “sociology of work and industry”. This is not to say that the connection to social theory was completely severed; theories clearly standing in the Marxist tradition, like the French “regulation school”, still had a following. Apart from that, however, there was increasing reference to contemporary sociological theories, especially Ulrich Beck’s theories of “risk society” and “reflexive modernization”. Later, new theories of the knowledge or network society were added to the mix; Giddens’ theory of “structuration” as well as neo-institutionalism and systems theory also became influential. Like others, the sociology of work saw a pluralization of theoretical discourses, which sometimes bordered on being fashion-driven and an anything-goes attitude. This theoretical pluralism in the sociology of work can also be traced to the turbulences in the empirical field itself. The collapse of real socialism confronted the discipline with some entirely new practical challenges, as did the decline of the old industries and so-called “Fordism”. Other factors included radical changes in the models of production and work organization, the computerization and expansion of work, the globalization and financialization of the economy as well as the expansion of the service sector. From 1990 onwards, a globally triumphant capitalism seemed to produce one “revolution” after another, so that sociologists of work were kept busy empirically describing and conceptually grasping these changes. Given the speed of historical change, theoretical interpretations were increasingly made up on an ad hoc basis, rather than being derived from more general concepts—not that it was impossible to “critically” discuss phenomena like the expansion of the sphere of work, the “marketization” of organizations and institutions, or financial investors’ growing influence over corporate management. But such critiques drew more on prescientific interpretations—e.g. from trade union or other political backgrounds—or theories that were chosen ad hoc, rather than on some general, overarching analysis. There was, to be sure, no shortage of attempts to

38

CHRISTOPH DEUTSCHMANN

describe the institutional, political and economic changes through historical typologies, such as “post-Fordism” or “financial market capitalism”. Moreover, the varieties of capitalism debate engendered efforts to examine different national patterns of change, but these were almost exclusively concerned with diachronic or synchronic comparisons of different “regimes” or “varieties” of capitalism, ignoring their fundamental commonality. The general concept of “capitalism” was still used habitually and illustrated by well-known quotes from the “classics” (Marx, Weber, Polanyi) whenever necessary, but it was not seen as requiring further clarification. There was simply not enough strength and imagination left to analyze and criticize the capitalist mode of production to which there seemed no alternative after the collapse of real socialism; such an endeavor would have to appear as an eccentric theoretical fixation. Thus, in Germany, the sociology of work became a “normal” sociological subdiscipline without much in the way of theoretical ambition. It did remain open to what contemporary sociological theory had to offer, but more as recipient than producer and mostly abstaining from undertaking larger theoretical projects of its own. In recent years, turbulence of a different kind has rekindled the debate about capitalism, at least in the general public. In the autumn of 2008, the US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed and the global economic and financial crisis came to a head. The impending breakdown of the international financial system and the precipitous decline of global economic growth led the United States and several European governments to provide financial assistance at a historically unprecedented scale. Contrary to the neoliberal common sense that had been dominant until then, the state now seemed to be the savior of last resort. However, it, too, was soon overwhelmed. As Jens Beckert and Wolfgang Streeck have argued: “The different stages of the crisis have revealed a system for managing trust in which the loss of trust among actors at one level is—or is at least supposed to be—compensated through guarantees by other actors at higher levels of trust. Instead of calming the situation, however, these guarantees engender suspicion regarding the trustworthiness of the helpers themselves. At this point, trust reserves have been depleted.”

The possibility therefore arises that “the unresolved financial crisis will become a social and political crisis” (Beckert and Streeck 2011; translation JM). In this context, interest in the theory and critique of capitalism suddenly resurfaced. The journal Socio-Economic Review dedicated an entire issue not

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

39

to the “varieties”, but the “commonalities of capitalism” (Streeck and Feick 2011). Authors who could hardly be accused of harboring Marxist sympathies articulated profound doubts about the rationality of the capitalist system—a rationality that had once seemed entirely apparent (Cassidy 2009; Schirrmacher and Strobl 2010; Vogl 2014). Even the mass media discussed the question: “Can Capitalism Survive?” This discussion has just started and is likely to take some interesting and unexpected turns. The sociology of work, however, hardly takes part in it. For reasons mentioned above, it was largely unprepared for the crisis; like mainstream economics, it was caught off-guard. It had carefully paid a great deal of attention to changes in production regimes, modes of regulation and management models in the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism; it had also meticulously examined and debated the expansion of work into everyday life and the erosion of labor policy institutions through real or artificial market mechanisms. But no one had looked beyond these shifts and changes within capitalism and imagined that the question of the capitalist system as such would return to the agenda—and much more fundamentally than in the 1970s. Together with analyses of the capitalist system, theories of crisis had also fallen by the wayside, as noted by Dieter Sauer: “Our analyses lack a solid economic—or rather political-economic— foundation” (Sauer 2010, 32; translation JM). It is not that crisis theory had been terra incognita for the older generation of Marxist-educated industrial sociologists. They were still familiar with concepts like the organic composition of capital and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, but they had been content to treat the Marxian theory of accumulation and crisis as a lasting treasure to which no changes ever had to be made. This was clearly not sufficient to provide them with the tools to analyze the current crisis. They did not acknowledge that the critique of mainstream economic theories had not been accomplished once and for all by Marx’ teachings. Rather, it is a continuous, constantly renewed task, especially for sociologists. There are still good reasons to doubt that the existence of capitalism as such is really under threat right now, and even if one were to answer this in the affirmative, the follow-up would invariably be to inquire into what might come afterwards. After all, the debt and growth crisis does not affect capitalism as a whole, but merely the advanced industrialized countries in the West—which, to be sure, still dominate the global economy. Large emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa) are not

40

CHRISTOPH DEUTSCHMANN

or only barely affected and may even benefit. “The system” is not in danger, but we might see a “hegemonic” transformation in the sense articulated by Arrighi and Silver (1999), that is, the end of US hegemony and the rise to hegemony of other powers. In any case, the crisis and the long economic stagnation predicted by most experts for Europe, North America and parts of East Asia will have serious social and political consequences: banking crises and, perhaps, bankruptcies of entire countries are to be expected; the common European currency is under threat; mass unemployment, poverty, social divisions and conflicts, including violent ones, will increase. These trends may not yet be visible in Germany, but they are in the United States, Great Britain, Ireland and in the Southern European countries. Without a theoretical reorientation, the sociology of work will not be able to deal with these changes in a fashion other than a merely reactive one. Of course, no one can predict in detail how the crisis will develop. Nonetheless, if the sociology of work wants to do more than merely reproduce what the newspapers already know, it will have to revisit those fundamental issues it had either ignored for a long time or considered settled by Marx and other “classics”: What is “capitalism”, and why does it make sense for social theory to use this concept, rather than the widespread “market” concepts? How can the interplay of micro- and macrosocial drivers of capitalist dynamism be better understood? What is the respective role of the “real” economy and the financial sector in generating profits for capital? Why do markets emerge and disappear? How are economic “values” created, and how are they destroyed? What role does uncertainty play? How is market dynamism related to the structuring role of institutions, networks and organizations? What is the significance of hegemonic power structures in the capitalist world system? How can the limits of capitalism, Landnahme 1 and acceleration be determined more precisely? What methodological problems arise for a theory of capitalism as such? Most of these questions are hardly new, but, from a sociological point of view, they have by no means been exhaustively discussed, let alone definitively answered. It is clearer now than ever before that they cannot be left to economics, which is itself in a deep crisis following the apparent failure of the neoclassical paradigm. Nor can they be addressed by merely reinterpreting the sociological “classics” (Marx, Weber, Polanyi, Parsons).

——————

1 For more on the concept of Landnahme see the contribution by Dörre and Haubner in this volume.

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

41

What we need is the intelligent development of those classical analyses that would take into account the current state of the art in sociological research, theory and methodology. As fundamental as the above questions may be, the goal cannot be to return to some grand philosophy of history in the vein of Hegel—from which Marx, despite his critique of Hegel, never fully managed to detach himself. A contemporary theory of capitalism should be a mid-range theory that is historically embedded and conscious of its own historical position, and which does not claim to explain the meaning and final goal of history. It should, however, explain the unplanned micro/macro connections of contemporary social structures, as well as their crisis tendencies. To this end, it should make use of the methodological and conceptual toolkit of sociology to examine concrete conditions (for more detail: Deutschmann 2009; 2011a, b). Only through this kind of sociological analysis of the historical conjuncture will it be able to contribute to the search for new political answers to the social and labor policy problems created by the crisis. And what else could the task for the sociology of work be? In fact, this discussion has already started, just not in the sociology of work, but in economic sociology, its twin discipline. The concept of “capitalism” may be contested in economic sociology, but the discipline has been trying for a while now to develop a genuinely sociological approach to the analysis of the basic phenomena of capitalist economies: institutions, markets, capital, money, and financial markets (for an overview: Beckert 2002; Nee and Swedberg 2005; Beckert and Deutschmann 2009). In addition, economic sociology and political economy in the US have in recent years produced a series of analyses of the financial crisis and the process driving it, namely the “financialization” of American capitalism. These studies make an important contribution to understanding the current situation and to the clarification of theoretical issues (Epstein 2005; Krippner 2005; Davis 2009; Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010). In the German context, a recent essay by Dörre, Lessenich and Rosa (2015) points in a similar direction; drawing on different sociological theories, they try to (re-) gain a perspective on capitalism as a systemic whole and to elaborate on the possible dimensions of critique. The sociology of work in Germany would stand to benefit from opening itself more to these elements of macro-social reflection within economic sociology. There are historical reasons why industrial relations research in Germany developed in relative isolation from the more internationally

42

CHRISTOPH DEUTSCHMANN

oriented field of economic sociology, but this fact has now become problematic. Fortunately, there are increasing signs that this problem is being recognized both in the sociology of work and within economic sociology, and that both are working to bridge this gap. The sooner they succeed, the better sociologists of work—and sociologists in general—will become at understanding and analyzing the current politico-economic conjuncture(s).

Works Cited Arrighi, Giovanni, and Beverly J. Silver (1999). Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press. Beckert, Jens (2002). Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. Beckert, Jens, and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). (2009). Wirtschaftssoziologie. Wiesbaden: VS. Beckert, Jens, and Wolfgang Streeck (2011). Die nächste Stufe der Krise. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 20.08.2011. Braverman, Harry (1974). Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. Cassidy, John (2009). How Markets Fail. The Logic of Economic Calamities. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. Davis, Gerald F. (2009). Managed by the Markets. How Finance Reshaped America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deutschmann, Christoph (2009). Soziologie kapitalistischer Dynamik. MPIfG Working Paper 5/09, Cologne. Deutschmann, Christoph (2011a). A Pragmatist Theory of Capitalism. SocioEconomic Review, 9(1), 83–106. Deutschmann, Christoph (2011b). Limits to Financialization. Sociological Analyses of the Financial Crisis. European Journal of Sociology, 52(3), 347–389. Dörre, Klaus, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism— Critique. London/New York: Verso. Epstein, Gerald A. (ed.). (2005). Financialization and the World Economy. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Krippner, Greta R. (2005). The Financialization of the American Economy. SocioEconomic Review, 3(2), 173–208. Lounsbury, Michael, and Paul M. Hirsch (eds.). (2010). Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis. Bingley: Emerald.

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

43

Nee, Victor, and Richard Swedberg (eds.). (2005). The Economic Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. Pongratz, Hans J., and Rainer Trinczek (eds.). (2010). Industriesoziologische Fallstudien. Entwicklungspotentiale einer Forschungsstrategie. Berlin: edition sigma. Sauer, Dieter (2010). Umbruch der Arbeitsgesellschaft. Zeitdiagnosen zur Entwicklung der Arbeit. In Norbert Altmann and Fritz Böhle (eds.). Nach dem ‘Kurzen Traum’. Neue Orientierungen in der Arbeitsforschung, 17–36. Berlin: sigma. Schirrmacher, Frank, and Thomas Strobl (eds.). (2010). Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Streeck, Wolfgang, and Jürgen Feick (2011). Editorial. Socio-Economic Review, 9(1), 1–2. Vogl, Joseph (2014). The Specter of Capital. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Work—More than Employment? Critique of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work Sarah Nies, Dieter Sauer

1. Work: Does it Matter? In the current debates on how to explain and cope with capitalist crises there is a great deal of talk about money in various forms—debt, interest, taxes, currencies—and about institutions that deal with money, such as banks, governments and international monetary institutions. The so-called real economy is only mentioned in passing, and work is not really mentioned at all. Depending on their political leanings, observers blame either (debtor) states that have lived beyond their means or unchained financial markets and greedy banks for the crisis. Apparently capitalism has reached a new stage in which the mystification of social relations has reached a new quality and where they appear inverted. As finance capital, capital seems to have become independent not just from labor, but from the real economy in general, and money seems capable of growing without any material intermediation 1, even though the latest crisis has somewhat lifted that fog again. Companies, whose real processes of producing goods and services and whose technology and organization were once considered reliable sources of growth and wealth, but also, and above all, living labor as the source of value, have been relegated to a strangely dependent position. Since at least the 1990s, the financialization of the economy, that is the dominance of financial and capital markets, has also been increasingly felt in Germany. Thanks to the relative autonomization of money capital accumulation, productive capital has become an investment—or, more precisely, an investment option—for global, interest-bearing capital. The pro-

——————

1 Marx has described the basic features of the role of “interest-bearing money capital” as “the capital mystification in the most flagrant form” (Marx 1981, 516): “In this way, all connection with the actual process of capital’s valorization is lost, right down to the last trace, confirming the notion that capital is automatically valorized by its own powers.” (ibid., 597)

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

45

cesses of production in the company are no longer taken as given, but as something that has to adapt. This also applies to labor power as a resource. When the returns required by investors are “set” in advance, the rest is merely a matter of cost. Wages and working conditions become residual categories, variables that depend on market prices and expected earnings. The disappearance of work from public discourse is primarily the result of these social reversals and financialization tendencies, which are themselves aspects of a long-standing historical process of marketization. Many social scientists who discuss and examine the recent crises also treat work as subordinate. In this context, work is only seen as employment, as a field which has to cope with the consequences of crisis—if it is discussed at all. They do not take the connection between financialization at the corporate level and changed conceptions of performance in the labor process into account; in other words, the tendency of defining and controlling work performance in terms of market results. The “inner quality” of labor—its content, form of expenditure and consequences of its utilization—“disappears” behind an abstract concept of wage labor that disregards content and merely focuses on the subsistence aspect of employment (“any job is a good job”). The qualitative aspects of work only come into view negatively, for example as increasing health care costs due to the massive growth in mental illnesses. Apart from unemployment, the focus of attention is above all on the growth of precarious forms of employment like agency work, small odd jobs (“mini-jobs”) and wages below the subsistence level. Therefore, criticizing the increasing precariousness of employment is crucial to any contemporary critique of capitalism. Along with the critique of unfair distribution, it is an essential component of a “social critique” that is based on the condemnation of exploitation. We are far from questioning the importance of this basic form of criticizing capitalism, but we consider it a fatal mistake to set in opposition social issues and the question of the “inner quality” of labor (the consequences of alienation) or to play them off against each other. This would mean misunderstanding or interpreting one-sidedly the contradictory relation between capital and labor that has consistently assumed new forms in the history of capitalist development. Both sides must be taken into account to arrive at an adequate understanding of capitalism and its current trends. We believe that a sociological critique of capitalism that focuses on social issues, but dismisses the “inner quality of work”—if not as a luxury problem of privy-

46

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

leged employees, then at least as mere secondary critique—simply mirrors the disappearance of work in public discourse. Referring to Boltanski and Chiapello, our contribution looks at the origins and consequences of a critique that one-sidedly emphasizes social critique. Against the hypothesis of the absorption of artistic critique, we emphasize the lasting potential for resistance inherent in a critique of alienation that is oriented towards autonomy and self-determination. We articulate our critique against the backdrop of an historic transformation of domination—the material basis of the “New Spirit of Capitalism”—as well as the changing role of the subjective qualities of work and of demands concerning the content of work. We then discuss the connection between precarization and subjectification as key phenomena in the field of social and artistic critique; we see them as contradictory, but connected, dimensions of the same development. Finally, we discuss what a one-sided critique of capitalism means for the interest-based mobilization of labor. We argue that a critique of capitalism that ignores the “inner quality” of work is blind to the specific critical potential because it does not use the mobilizing potential inherent in the contradictory nature of new forms of domination.

2. Social Critique instead of Artistic Critique? Critique of a One-sided Approach Those who set social concerns in opposition to what we will here call the “inner quality” of work find crucial theoretical support in the approach of Boltanski and Chiapello (2007). Its appeal undoubtedly is that it equally emphasizes the vulnerability and stupendous adaptability of capitalism. On the one hand, capitalism’s fundamental economic principle of accumulation as an end in itself undermines its own conditions. On the other, it has always managed to integrate critique levelled against it into the “spirit of capitalism” and use it for the long-term stabilization of the capitalist economy. As “normative support”, the spirit of capitalism binds the members of society, but it also restricts unchained accumulation. Therefore, it is not merely a source of legitimacy, but also a trigger of real change.

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

47

In the present context we focus on the distinction between social and artistic critique (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, esp. 36–42), which is frequently invoked in social sciences, as well as the argument that artistic critique has been absorbed by new management strategies and has therefore lost its critical edge. Freely drawing on their approach, one can say that the difference between artistic and social critique reflects the distinction between exploitation and alienation. Social critique primarily decries social inequality and poverty, whereas artistic critique strives for individual freedom and autonomy and criticizes the commodification of all areas of life, the rule of the market and the disciplining aspects of capitalism. 2 According to Boltanski and Chiapello, the demands of artistic critique have now been absorbed into the “New Spirit of Capitalism” where they inform the organization of company structures and human resources policy, stripping them of their former critical potential. Artistic critique has become a minion of capital, providing it with legitimacy on the one hand while drawing attention away from the issues of social critique on the other. They summarize this in a short and well-known phrase: security is exchanged for autonomy (ibid., 190–191, 198–199). 3 Thus, capitalism’s adjustment to the key demands of artistic critique—autonomy, authenticity, creativity—have led “to its revival” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001, 459; translation JM). Therefore, they see issues of social inequality, rather than autonomy and self-realization, as the inevitable center of any contemporary critique of capitalism. Our critique of their dismissal of demands for autonomy, like that dismissal itself, has two aspects that seem contradictory but are inextricably connected; in our opinion, the argument that demands for autonomy and self-realization have lost their critical edge rests as much on an

——————

2 Boltanski and Chiapello attribute social critique to the labor movement and artistic critique to circles of artists and intellectuals, later also to the 1968 student movement (2007, 169–172). However, sociologists of industrial relations who still recall the classic critique against Taylorism will attribute the demands for autonomy, self-determination and individual responsibility—the content of artistic critique according to Boltanski and Chiapello—less to artistic and intellectual circles and more to the traditional critique of alienation, and therefore see it as deeply rooted in the traditions of the labor movement (Dörre 2005). Among other things, they informed the government-funded attempts to humanize work in the 1970s and 1980s that tried to overcome restrictive structures in the workplace. 3 Beck already said similar things in 1986 (the date of the German publication of “Risk Society”): “The workers exchange a bit of freedom from work for new types of constraints and material insecurities” (Beck 2009, 144).

48

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

overestimation of how far such demands have been put into practice as it does on an underestimation of their continuing critical potential. Boltanski/Chiapello usually assume in their study that the demands of artistic critique have been practically implemented in the “organizational structure and personnel management of companies” through the introduction of flatter hierarchies, the organization of labor into projects, increased discretion, etc. The only thing left for them to take issue with is the loss of security, which is the flipside of those autonomy gains, and maybe a certain “(i)mposed self-fulfillment” (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 429–430). 4 That means that they focus on the absorption of the form of critique, rather than the absorption of the demands as such in the sense of a re-articulation of their content. Boltanski and Chiapello fail to examine what really happens to freedom, autonomy and self-realization inside the firm. Simply equating management rhetoric with real processes in the firm—which they also do not examine—is clearly not adequate. This blind spot is consistent with their general approach, which focuses primarily on the development of critique and its influence, but remains conspicuously silent about its actual content. In short: they are interested in artistic critique as critique of capitalism, but not in the issues of autonomy, freedom or authenticity as such, which is why they do not bother to seriously examine their realization under the new mode of production. 5 It is true that far-reaching changes in corporate management have taken place which also touch upon the issues of artistic critique. However, whereas Boltanski and Chiapello see stronger market orientation merely as something that is subordinate to the expansion of the network logic (ibid., 103–108, 534), it is the focus on that same market logic as a driver of development that brings into view the unfree aspects of these new freedoms which Boltanski and Chiapello too often see as simple realization of artistic critique. If the claim to autonomy and self-realization as such is taken seriously, one cannot turn one’s back on these demands. One must confront them with their concrete realization in a market-centered mode of production that is necessarily (!) incomplete because it is alienated. That concerns the difference between individual

——————

4 In contrast, the discussion of Boltanski and Chiapello’s arguments, and the debate in the sociology of work and industrial relations in particular, have focused more on the flipside of these trends. 5 See also Christoph Deutschmann who argues that Boltanski and Chiapello “are only interested in the capitalist ‘spirit’, but not capitalism itself” (Deutschmann 2008, 130; translation JM).

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

49

autonomy and market freedom, as well as the conditions of self-realization through work, which stands in sharp contrast to the imperatives of valorization. This kind of critique has become more powerful because the ideals of autonomy and self-realization have themselves been integrated into the regime of justification. Such demands have become part of the apparatus of legitimacy, but they are far from being realized and cannot ever be realized in the capitalist system. In our opinion, this discrepancy provides a crucial starting block for a poignant critique of these internal contradictions.

3. How the Sociology of Work Turned its Back on Artistic Critique: The Turn in the Subjectification Debate As a result of the new management concepts of the 1990s, some essential criteria that critical students of Taylorism had used to analyze and evaluate labor processes were rendered useless because these new concepts—and to a large degree empirical reality at the workplace too—increasingly followed the very same principles that used to inform the critique of Taylorism: flexible and self-determined working hours, group work, job enrichment, reduction of hierarchies, self-organization, workers’ participation, etc. This left the critical sociology of work and industrial relations self-conscious and confused: “Does this mean that we are headed for a brave new world of self-determined, non-alienated labor in which the demands of the social critique articulated by industrial relations have been fulfilled? No one wants to simply say ‘yes’ to this— but the sociology of industrial relations is finding it difficult to say why” (Deutschmann 2001, 62; translation JM).

The “subjectification of work” was initially seen in a positive light, but recently the debate has increasingly focused on its downside (cf. Moldaschl and Voß 2002; Schönberger and Springer 2003; Arbeitsgruppe SubArO 2005; Matuschek et al. 2007). Subjectification was originally seen positively, as embodying workers’ demands for self-realisation and creativity (“normative subjectification”) 6, but is now interpreted as the consumption and de-

——————

6 Normative subjectification understood as strengthening what workers demand from their jobs in terms of content as well as expressive and communicative aspects, com-

50

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

pletion of subjective potentials and capabilities within the process of workplace rationalization. Therefore, the initially ambivalent effects of subjectification—like expanded freedom and the possibility of identifying with one’s work on the one hand, self-rationalization and “self-exploitation” on the other—are increasingly seen one-sidedly, that is, as predominantly negative. Thanks to this shift, the subjectification debate is losing sight of the potential for resistance which subjectification continues to possess. Baethge (1991) still assumed that “normative subjectification” would loosen the ties to the employer 7, but the exact opposite seems to be the case. Numerous studies have illustrated the phenomenon of “selfrationalization”; employees, seemingly out of their own volition, break company rules or labor laws and sometimes even go against their superiors, by doing “hidden surplus labor” and working to the brink of physical and mental exhaustion (cf. Menz et al. 2011; Gerlmaier and Latniak 2011; Ehrenberg 2010; Glißmann and Peters 2001; Badura et al. 1999). The pressure to rationalize seems higher than ever, and workers become the drivers of their own exploitation, apparently oblivious to relations of power and domination. With regard to interest-based mobilisation, workers who demand that their jobs satisfy subjective interests are once again treated with suspicion, much like in the white-collar debates of the 1970s. It is fitting that subjectified forms of work are seen as mostly concerning the “upper segments of labor-centered society”, that is, the highly skilled. What has also attracted increasing attention is that the workers’ demand that they should be able to identify with and bring intrinsic motivation to their jobs has now become a demanding and exhausting requirement on the part of their employers (cf. Honneth 2002; Bröckling 2015; Koppetsch 2006; Eichler 2009). These increasingly negative assessments of subjectification are formed against the backdrop of real changes that have affected management techniques. Their increasing orientation towards financial markets has endowed them with a new dynamism that also affects how work and performance are controlled. The “dynamization and finalization of control”, that is its

——————

bined with the “desire to insert one’s subjectivity into the job” (Baethge 1991, 7; translation JM). 7 “Someone who assesses a job not primarily by whether it secures reproduction, but by whether it is personally meaningful [...] will not hesitate to reconsider and revise his investment and behavior in the job when his demands are not being met.” (Baethge 1991, 10; translation JM)

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

51

shift towards the monitoring of results instead of effort and process, is an essential component of new, indirect forms of managing firms and controlling labor. It allows (and requires) increased autonomy on the part of workers but also leads to excessive demands on them (cf. Kratzer and Nies 2009; Sauer 2010; Menz et al. 2011). These excesses lead to an increase in mental stress and other health hazards. Placing a higher value on the potentials of subjectivity for managing the labor process means that other dimensions of subjectivity are depreciated. In the beginning, definitions of performance were gradually broadened and diversified through the inclusion of subjective elements, but now a single standard has tended to become dominant again. “Subjectified” definitions of work performance reward those capabilities and properties which ensure that the results of achievement behavior will be profitable on the contingent markets for products and services. This all seems to confirm that artistic critique has indeed been absorbed. Attention is drawn to the fact that the critique of heteronomy and reduced autonomy have been used to justify rationalization strategies that aim to “restore as much as possible the commodification of labor power” so as to achieve “near perfect adaptation to the requirements of marketdriven flexibilization” (Dörre 2005, 251; translation JM). This is referred to as “enforced” or “non-self-determined autonomy” (cf. Dörre 2015, 158; Beck 1997, 22; Honneth 2002, 146; Honneth 2004). From this perspective, the problem is not so much that there are too many restrictions, but that there are not enough of them, which makes it absurd to demand more autonomy and self-realization. This view usually assumes that absorption or instrumentalization is successful, that the integration of critique is always in the interest of capital. Nothing remains here of the “independent demands for autonomy”, or they are seen as leading to increased selfexploitation, either through the disciplinary effects of precarization or the ideological veil of “entrepreneurial autonomy” that induces self-discipline. Our own position contradicts this “totality of absorption”. We interpret the change as a shift in the forms of domination that is neither mere façade nor a simple absorption of critique. Instead it incorporates this critique as a contradictory moment. This negative assessment of the “subjectification of work” is based on real problems, but it only considers one angle. Negative aspects must not be interpreted as side effects of the realization of freedom but as consequences of continuing oppression. We believe that the new forms of control and the subjectification that accompanies them contain a

52

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

much larger potential for independent capacities for resistance than such interpretations lead one to believe. To substantiate this argument, we will now examine the shift that has affected company structures in greater detail.

4. “Contested Autonomy”: The Transformation of Domination We assume that a profound rupture is taking place in the organization of company structures that does not just affect the forms but also the principles of organization. The hierarchic and bureaucratic system of corporate management has turned out to be an obstacle to the development of productivity. (Artistic) critique targeted this hierarchic and bureaucratic system, but the latter’s limitations affected companies in ways that were not foreseen (flexible customer demands, rigid production structures, decreasing profits, unmotivated workers, etc.). Capitalism did not merely react to new challenges to its legitimacy; it was faced with the choice of either being strangled by the limitations of the hierarchic and bureaucratic system, or abandoning it and re-establishing corporate productivity on the basis of a new organizational principle. These new forms of control in the company are manifestations of a new quality of capitalist domination that stands between hierarchy and the market. To be sure, this transformation of domination is still a form of heteronomy, but one that is mediated through its own opposite: the self-determination or autonomy of the individual. This kind of indirect control can be seen as a dialectical, borderline case of domination. Its basic idea is to use the dependence from exogenous conditions, in which the “free entrepreneur” finds himself, to control the workers. The aim is to transfer to the worker not just entrepreneurial autonomy, but also the peculiar entrepreneurial dependence that consists in being governed by depersonalized autonomous forces. It is this kind of heteronomy that is now being used to instrumentalize the worker’s own free will. The “objecttive necessity” that they are subjected to as sellers of their labor power now also characterizes their position in the immediate production process. Simply put: individuals are no longer supposed to do as they are told. Instead, they are to react autonomously to exogenous conditions which are set, on the one hand, by the uncontrollable, ever-changing conditions of the

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

53

business’ survival on the market and, on the other, by the performance targets and structures (benchmarks, indicators, business divisions) defined by management. By being confronted with entrepreneurial problems, individuals are in a situation that induces them to adopt entrepreneurial motives “voluntarily” and spontaneously (cf. Peters and Sauer 2005). These new forms of indirect control use the exogenous dynamic of unintentional or autonomous social processes—such as the external market or market proxies inside the firm—to control the productive processes. Whereas the Fordist firm tried to shield productive processes from the vagaries of the market, the new concepts attempt to make the market the driver of permanent internal restructuring. Through internalization, the contingency and dynamism of the market become the structural principles of company organization. The individual labor power is now directly confronted with the increasing dynamic of external and internal conditions. Self-organization, a focus on results, flexible hours and so on remove the previous institutional buffers between the individual and the market. On the one hand, internal marketization has shattered ossified institutional structures of domination in the firm and released labor power from its institutional and motivational limitations. On the other hand, a radicalized market economy always runs the risk of endangering and destroying these newly-created conditions of valorization (especially the “de-secured” resource labor power). This increases capital’s fundamental indifference to living labor as its own source of value, but it also makes capital acutely dependent on labor’s value-creating subjective potentials. The key condition for coping with contingent and variable demands is a new autonomy in the labor process. The projected gains in productivity and earnings can only be achieved if firms actually fulfil the classic demands for autonomy and selfdetermination. The firm really depends on a subjectivity that is legitimated and motivated by “artistic demands”, and on its subjective abilities and intrinsic motivation. It can only tap these motivational potentials by granting real autonomy, not pseudo-autonomy or by implanting neoliberal thoughts into workers’ brains. Bureaucratic structures of command have to be dismantled in reality. In this context it is important to distinguish the new work autonomy from older forms of work autonomy: while formerly they were about giving discretion and latitude to workers, the current forms are about directly confronting them with the exogenous conditions and constraints on their own actions.

54

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

The aim of the new mode of control is to get individuals to mobilize their own fully developed individuality for the purpose of valorization. This comprises all the subjective potentials and properties of living labor that can be valorized, but it also comprises the potential of developing and enhancing living labor’s capacities as such, of transforming it into work and controlling it. Individuals are put in a situation in which they adopt the way in which capital sees them and where their own powers and social relations are transformed into “resources” of entrepreneurial success. 8 The goal is to create and develop an internal relation of production of one’s own labor power as a commodity by the individual “to itself as living being”, that is, the self-objectification of the subject. At the same time, however, the appropriation of the lives of individuals by their employers is also the weakness and the Achilles’ heel of the new form of domination. When confronted directly with the market as a “new force of nature”, subjectivity becomes a contested productive resource. This struggle decides how much of that subjectivity will be used for valorization, and in what objective, temporal and social forms it will be used on the one hand, and how far the particularity of the individual can be asserted under those conditions on the other (cf. Bechtle and Sauer 2003). As an entrepreneur in the economic struggle for survival, the worker has to fight out the capital-labor contradiction in his own head. The capital relation becomes an immediately personal problem of everyday experience. His interest in developing his individuality comes into conflict with his entrepreneurial interest in being successful in a managerial sense. The worker experiences the function of the capitalist entrepreneur as fetters on the development of his individuality.

——————

8 Their own capacities therefore appear to them as their “personal capital” which they must deploy in economically rational fashion to protect their independence as “selfentrepreneurs”. “Inasmuch as their own capacities are actual capital, they function as powers of capital. As means for the quasi-natural uncontrolled process of valorization, the individuals’ productive forces are not under their own dominion and control. Therefore, the notion of an individual who sees himself as ‘self-entrepreneur’ and his capacities as ‘his capital’ can only be the illusory form in which he articulates his claim to the appropriation of his own powers.” (Stadlinger 2006, 17; translation JM)

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

55

5. Conflicting Conceptions of Work Objectives: Between Numbers and the Actual Work Content The new mode of control is highly dependent on the active participation of workers. They are put in charge of transforming their labor power into actual work—no longer mere objects, but also subjects of control themselves. At the same time, the workers’ subjective potentials and resources—their creative, problem-solving and communicative capacities, their aspiration, motivation, commitment and empathy—acquire new relevance. No longer repressed and illegalized, their subjectivity increasingly becomes a crucial productive factor. However, the firm requires more than just relatively abstract “meta-capacities”, such as creativity, initiative, commitment and organizational skills. There is also a more concrete dimension to the worker’s subjectivity that concerns the content of work, that is, an orientation towards concrete procedures and processes and desired workoutcomes in terms of quality, use and usefulness of the work product (cf. Nies 2015). This content-related orientation in particular becomes important in a market-centered mode of production. When firms are increasingly managed through abstract and dynamic targets (market strategies, indicators of competitiveness and capital marketoriented targets) that abstract from existing resources and concrete labor processes, they have to rely on their employees to cope with the contradictions between the logic of valorization and the economy of production. It is at the level of concrete labor that abstract targets derived from market indicators are confronted with concrete conditions and have to be transformed into concrete work; processes need to “function”, goods with specific physical properties have to be produced or processed, and concrete customers with their particular wishes and demands must be satisfied. The workers are the ones who have to perform this translation from the abstract to the concrete (cf. Kratzer and Nies 2009). They are the ones who have to manage the contradictions between the inherently infinite indicators of market-centered management and the finite resources of the labor process, between the requirements of customers and the company, between quality and profitability. This can only work if they, first, mobilize their subjective resources and potentials. (This has been extensively analyzed in the subjectification debate). Secondly, if employees are not exclusively guided by market indicators, but also assert their content-oriented conceptions of work objectives—even against the logic of those same

56

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

indicators. In short: work does not work when it merely follows numbers. In fact, the less the indicators take the economy of production into account, the more this rule applies. Therefore, the firm must always also draw on the intrinsic motivation and content-related identification of workers with their work. It draws on the fact that workers are guided by standards that cannot be deduced from the indicators. The workers themselves want to make and develop a good product, work with satisfied customers or create functioning organizations. Companies need these aspirations, but they instrumentalize and negate them at the same time. In sum, this is not just about expanded access to subjective resources, it is also about conflicting substantial requirements for which workers have to find solutions. In its early stages, the subjectification debate noted that the subjective demands of workers play a more important role, but empirical and theoretical analysis of performance standards remained underdeveloped or was restricted to abstract general statements. Usually, terms like “creativity”, “fun”, “increased worker discretion” and so on were used, but all these concepts refer to the form in which labor is executed. What is missing is a “grounding in content”, which is necessary to see the potential for conflict that arises when those subjective demands cannot be realized. The paradigm case for this ignorance of content is the entrepreneurial employee (Voß and Pongratz 1998; 2003). Here the worker appears as a “performance optimizer”, constantly intent on doing the best he can, whatever the task. This puts the focus squarely on the experiential aspect of work, whereas the content of those goals is being ignored. Thus, generating a high return seems to be the same as, for example, coming up with a technically sophisticated solution and its concrete usefulness. What matters is mastering a challenge, not what kind of challenge it is. In this conception, the interests of the worker and the company necessarily converge and potential contradictions are ignored. In other words, it is tacitly assumed that the “performance optimizers” identify with management targets. How workers want to do their work is certainly a relevant question. However, certain conflicts and struggles only come into view when the analysis also addresses the content of work, that is, what kind of work is being performed and how that matters to the workers (cf. Nies 2015). It will be useful to remind ourselves of Marx’ concept of the dual character of labor: as is well-known, Marx distinguishes between the use value and exchange value of commodities, that is, the usefulness of the product

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

57

and the quantitative relation which is expressed in its exchange for other commodities. Thus, the exchange value of a commodity is distinct from its qualitative dimension and refers exclusively to the quantity of labor embodied in it, which serves as common measure and basis of exchange relations. Like the commodity, which is at once use value and exchange value, labor, too, can be seen as abstract—i.e. value-creating—and as concrete (and therefore specific) labor; production can be seen as the unity of the processes of labor and valorization. A business is necessarily concerned primarily with valorization; the concrete product of labor is interesting only inasmuch as it is the condition of valorization. The identification of workers with their work, however, is also always determined by the concrete usefulness—the use-value aspect—of their labor. 9 After all, the conflict about what the business counts as performance is not exclusively determined by the parameters that define performance (effort vs. result and success), but also by the content of work. We believe that content-related parameters of performance are more important to workers’ attitudes towards paid employment than “having fun” in the workplace—and that they also hold greater potential for tensions. These “content-related orientations” conflict with the new management techniques of the market-centered mode of production. They are crucial for coping with contradictory demands, but at the same time they are called into question and endangered by the orientation towards markets and valorization. 10 When businesses are increasingly managed through abstract targets, they do not only disregard existing resources and thus the expenditure side of work or performance, but also the concrete labor processes and therefore the content of work. Performance measures are no longer derived from the concrete labor process and quantified in terms of concrete labor. Instead, they are more or less directly based on the process of valorization, the still-to-be-completed process of realizing the value that was created. Workers are now confronted much more immediately with the logic of valorization, while also having to cope with the content-related

——————

9 Cf. Heinrich 2006: “Regardless of its specific economic form, the purpose of the labor process is to produce a particular use value. From the standpoint of the labor process, all labor that creates this use value (or participates in its production) is productive labor. The purpose of the capitalist process of production is to produce surplus value. From the standpoint of the capitalist process of production only that labor is productive labor that produces surplus value.” (120, emphasis in the original; translation JM) 10 Similar Vester et al. 2007 who see this as a conflict between “professional ethos” and “valorization of capital”.

58

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

necessities of concrete labor. This constitutes a problem because the production of use values remains a necessary condition of valorization, but also often comes into conflict with it. Meeting customer demands and quality standards, mastering a technical challenge down to the last detail, doing a job thoroughly and in a way that is satisfactory to oneself and the later user is often at odds with the exigencies of the market economy, yet it remains relevant to the company. The latter needs these “excessive” content-related aspirations that cannot be derived from implementing performance measures, but it also negates them at the same time (cf. Nies 2015). In the context of “(i)mposed self-fulfillment” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 429-430) and the “work of the gurus of personal liberation” (Ehrenberg 2010, 227), work content becomes very important to the workers’ self-perception and self-definition. This is an important reason why the focus on valorization comes into conflict with content-related orientations. Under certain conditions, workers let themselves be absorbed by their jobs voluntarily because they wish to work autonomously and realize themselves in their work. This is the huge potential, the great resource that companies have gained access to. When these promises of selforganization are not kept—when there is a discrepancy between the pressure of responsibility and real discretion—or when excessive quantitative targets prohibit job satisfaction, that is, when the reconciliation of work and life is no longer experienced as a privilege but as a dilemma, subjectively experienced contradictions will emerge which workers will have to deal with (cf. Menz and Nies 2015). Usually the focus is on the negative aspects of these contradictions, i.e. the risks to physical and mental health as well as social relationships. But there is a positive side too: the desire to overcome the obstacles to individual self-realization in one’s work (cf. Sauer 2005).

6. Precarization and Subjectification: On the Connection between Social Critique and the Critique of Alienation The historical establishment of a market-centered mode of production realizes its inherent tendency to “re-commodify” labor power. The goal is to restore the commodification of labor power and to thereby roll back the advances made by the welfare state and the trade union movement. The

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

59

historical achievement of social security for workers is being reversed. Employment relations become more flexible and the reserve army mechanism takes effect again on the labor market (cf. in general Castel 2003; Bourdieu 1998; Kraemer and Speidel 2005; Dörre 2007). If labor power is to be treated like any other commodity, its specific nature is being negated. As is well known, this specificity consists in the inseparability of the commodity labor power from its owner, the concrete human being, and in the fact that it is not created for the purpose of being sold. It is living labor, that is, “the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical, the living personality of a human being” (Marx 1976, 270). At a general level this is the target of the critique of precarization: it takes the point of view of labor power as commodity and follows social critique in aiming for the “restriction of market risks to wage labor” (Dörre 2005, 250; translation JM). We share this critique, but we want to criticize the social critique for excluding and downplaying the “critique of alienation”. We believe that precarization and subjectification are essentially results of one and the same general trend. What we see here are two sides of capital’s contradictory relation towards living labor: indifference on the one hand, dependence on the other. This assumes a new quality thanks to the increasing marketization of intra-firm relations and social relations in general. On the one hand, the new independence of the workers and their subjective, life world-based resources become a “real condition of production” (Marx). At the same time, labor power is being released from its institutional moorings and safeguards. In this context, the tendencies for flexibilization and desecuritization at the levels of the firm and the state reinforce each other. This trend becomes more dynamic because the marketization of the firm is accompanied by a redefinition of “crisis”. Full order books, good revenue growth and stable earnings no longer guarantee the survival of the company or job security, either because the return on capital fails to meet international benchmarks or because entire units are outsourced due to business restructuring. The decision over the closure or continuation of a particular plant or unit no longer depends solely on “local” profitability, but also on strategic questions concerning the position of a particular production site in global chains of value creation. Plant closures or relocations are no longer the last resort for managers, but a constantly available option. For the workers, the continuous reconsideration of decisions concerning plant location makes uncertainty about employment duration, pay and job secu-

60

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

rity a permanent condition. The dominance of marketization also modifies how precarization is treated in public discourse. It is now increasingly seen as an exigency of flexibility; public discourse no longer focuses on the consequences that agency work, the flexibilization of protection against dismissal, outcontracting, etc. have on the work places and life worlds of those who are affected. Instead they are seen as opportunities for, and requirements of, corporate flexibilization. The “zone of vulnerability” (Castel 2003, 391) has expanded well into the middle of (wage labor) society and now also comprises skilled and highly skilled workers. Precarization no longer merely affects the marginal segments of the labor market that had already surrounded the Fordist core of standardized employment. The risk of precarization is now directly experienced by an increasingly broader group of employees. To be sure, different zones can still be distinguished that are characterized by increasing precariousness on the one hand, and subjectified labor on the other, but the trends increasingly intertwine. They do not just affect particular activity segments, but are manifested within one and the same segment. Precariousness used to affect mostly unskilled, strongly standardized jobs that left little room for “subjective” latitude and self-realization. Today, however, precarious employment is also increasingly found where “subjectified” forms of work with high shares of self-organization and responsibility dominate. Moreover, precarization is becoming a new element of performance control in the firm because it creates a threat that—negatively— motivates workers (cf. Holst 2009; Dörre 2007; Kratzer et al. 2008). It is, in fact, also consciously used in that way. The attempts of precarious workers to integrate or prove themselves are often used as a (new) standard for the “correct” attitude to work performance, for example when it comes to the willingness to work shifts or weekends. The opposite, however, is also true: new forms of control and subjectification are not restricted to an allegedly privileged segment of highly qualified workers. They are increasingly found also at the lower end of the hierarchy and in precarious employment relations (cf., for example, the case of call centers Kleeman and Matuschek 2003) where they overlap with the “new economy of insecurity” (Marrs and Boes 2003) in a way that is highly effective in motivating performance. Concerning interest-based politics, the expansion of precarious employment makes struggles over the conditions and content of work more difficult at all levels, whether it is the firm, collective bargaining or the state. Pressure to perform, excessive stress and other health risks are de-

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

61

emphasized in public discourse due to the existential fear of losing one’s job (which is not to say that they are any less relevant in real life). Therefore, the critique of precarization is meaningful not just in its own right, but also as a condition for criticizing other forms of endangering labor power in the labor process. At the same time, it is also clear that demands for autonomy and “good work” are not abandoned even in times of crisis. Our own empirical studies of crisis perceptions have shown that workers experience the erosion of autonomy and professional attitudes as well as increasing workloads as the most threatening—despite insecurity and loss of wages due to short-time work (cf. Detje et al. 2011, 88–9). The inner quality of labor remains a crucial area for interest-based politics as well as a condition of reflection and mobilization. Most concepts of social critique that draw on Marx only refer to one side of his concept of capital: the one that explains the “contradictory forms of existence of wealth” (Marx) and the division into rich and poor, and which is therefore suitable as the basis for criticizing the distribution of wealth. They tend to ignore what the concept of capital also entails: the connection between exploitation and alienation, the reversal between “dead” and “living” labor, between subject and object, which is the reason for the quasi-natural objectivity of the process of production as a whole. Thus they lose sight of a relation that is essential to capitalist development: capitalism as the contradictory unity of destruction and development of the social forces of production, its inherent connection between progressive and destructive tendencies. It may take on different historical forms, but both sides must always be taken equally into account. When Marx describes labor under capitalism, he also focuses on its alienated form, the “feeling outside oneself” in one’s work, the worker’s estrangement from the manifestation of his own life. As a skilled dialectician, however, Marx also noted the contradictory nature of this development when he stated that the development of “large-scale industry” makes it a question of “life and death” that “the partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one specialized social function, must be replaced by the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn” (Marx 1976, 618). Marx showed remarkable foresight by anticipating the issues of flexibilization and subjectification, transcending by far anything that the concrete empirical conditions in 19th century industry could have revealed to him. But he also always pointed out that this “development of all human powers […]

62

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying out, this universal objectification as total alienation” (Marx 1973, 425–426). If we follow this thought it comes as no surprise that, under capitalist conditions, the current trend of sublating certain aspects or manifestations of alienation through the subjectification of work takes on an inverted or alienated form. For example, under the new mode of corporate management the trend towards overcoming the distinction between labor and non-labor—which is positive in principle—is turned into the usurpation of the individuals’ entire life time by capital. The new company structure makes it possible to identify with one’s work, but this is turned against the individuals who fall from exhilaration into deep and lasting exhaustion. They treat the development of their own individuality not as an end in itself, but as a means to the external purpose of valorization. The question arises whether the individuals’ developed potentials will continue to be subjected to valorization and, as a result, become a force that turns on the individuals themselves in destructive ways; or whether they will play the opposite role by enabling individuals to liberate themselves from being means of valorization. To use Marx’ words: the point is whether and how the development of individual capabilities as productive forces can become an “explosive force” against their “limited basis” in capitalism (cf. Stadlinger and Sauer 2010).

7. The Interest of Labor 7.1 A New Articulation of Individual and Collective Interests The new forms of domination in the firm change the coordinates of power in the struggle between the conflicting interests of labor and capital, but they also change the logic of that conflict itself. Today workers are threatened by the very same things they used to demand previously—more discretion, self-organization, etc. Does that mean that the new forms of control have practically refuted the old call for a humanization of work? In our opinion, they do not refute that workers benefit from more autonomy. What is refuted is something different, namely what we now know to be the naïve assumption that more autonomy would automatically lead to better working conditions and strengthen the political position of workers. That “more pressure” is indeed created through “more freedom” (Gliß-

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

63

mann and Peters 2001) is not an argument against freedom. Instead it alerts us to the real problem, that is, the question of how this additional freedom may be used to strengthen one’s own position rather than weaken it. But how could this be done? How does one resist company policies that use objective pressures and point to market processes to worsen working conditions and boost work performance? It is obvious that the methods of defense that worked well against the old system of bureaucratic command cannot be used anymore. In a hierarchic system, the goal is to protect the workers from others, i.e. the holders or representatives of the power to command, and to assert one’s interests against others. This changes fundamentally once management goals are implemented through the worker’s own volition. If one wanted to stick to the old forms of interest-based politics, one would now have to protect the workers from themselves, but that can never work. Traditional interest politics solved problems through regulation and works councils, while trade unions protected the norms and regulations that they, as the workers’ representatives, had gained for them in their negotiations with capitalists. This does not work any longer; when management control becomes results- and market-oriented, norms and regulations will be undermined by the workers themselves. Marketization and indirect control put workers in a situation where they have to voluntarily relinquish some of their rights so that they can meet performance targets. They undercut rules they once successfully fought for—such as agreements between employers and works councils, collective agreements or legal rules—because otherwise they could not manage their work load or because they are afraid of losing their jobs. In this situation, works councils and trade unions often find themselves standing in opposition to the people whose interests they want to defend. It is currently impossible to shape and modify work without taking into account the workers’ individual interests. That may sound banal, but, if taken seriously, it amounts to a radical shift in labor policy: the end of representative politics, which has important consequences for labor policy at the firm, trade union and governmental levels. In the future, all attempts to define the interests of labor will have to take the difficult route and go through the individual’s reflection on himself and his contradictory working conditions. No one but the individual workers themselves can undertake such a reflection; no representative can do it for them. Of course, communication with others is necessary to make it politically productive, but this communication is occupied by the market-centered mode of pro-

64

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

duction. Therefore, we believe that fighting for spaces of communication is a crucial political task. Workers have to reclaim these spaces; to not just talk about what is happening in the firm, but to also talk about themselves, what is happening to them under these given conditions and what their own interests are. Today, the issue of self-determination in the form of new autonomy and independence is raised by capital as a necessary condition of expanded valorization. One may decry this as disingenuous, and it certainly does not mean the end of alienation, but it does open up new possibilities for labor policy. If interest-based politics are to be able to exploit these possibilities, a new connection between individual and collective interests has to be found in which the mobilization and assertion of individual interests can be linked to the struggle to expand the influence of firm-level labor representation as well as trade unions. The latter must adopt a new strategic perspective on regulation; the primary role of regulation can no longer be to solve workers’ problems for them and to contribute to mobilization and membership growth through demonstrable successes. Instead, regulation becomes an instrument in the mobilization and assertion of workers’ interests. 7.2 Independent Labor Policy: Between Resistance and Appropriation The transformations of management and labor control do not only undermine the efficacy of traditional interest politics. They also demand a rethinking of the content of labor policy at the firm and trade union levels. Increasing financialization of companies and the finalization of performance monitoring have reinforced the already existing marketization trend and have largely undermined the model of cooperative conflict management through consensus and compromise. This model, which was typical of West Germany in the post-war period, was based on the notion that rational economic behavior on the part of business and humane and fair working conditions fit together, that a win-win situation can be reached that benefits employers and employees alike. The room for compromises, alliances and deals that deserve this name may not have disappeared altogether, but it has shrunk considerably. Previously, compromises with employers could still be negotiated in a stable frame of reference on the basis of the technological and organizational conditions of deploying and utilizing labor power (time, standard output, etc.). Today, however, these stand-

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

65

ards of rational production, on which the negotiating logic of traditional labor policy used to be based, are becoming less relevant. When the market is the sole arbiter of what counts as performance, there are no standards left that could be invoked in negotiations. Negotiations and compromises will always result in adjusting to the market, and, since the market is inherently limitless, they will always end up in a spiral of adjustment. Currently, this can be observed wherever the competitiveness of the individual business has become the key criterion of negotiations at the company or sectoral (collective) level. The inherent absence of limitations in an increasingly competitive economy endangers labor power and its reproduction; the visible consequences are existential uncertainty and precarious labor on the one hand, and increasing workloads, mental stress and frustration on the other. Adapting working conditions and employment to the goal of competitiveness increasingly exposes the workers to market risks. It aims to commodify labor power and negates the limits that are inherent to the nature and sociability of labor, consistently forgetting that the bearer of this commodity is a natural person, a human being. As mentioned above, contemporary social critique draws new vigor from the social consequences of this negation. However, translating this into strategies for labor policy requires an additional step: in order to construct and strategically define a political defense, it is necessary not to lose sight of the causal nexus behind the dangers to the reproduction of labor power. If the frames of reference, standards and forms of cooperation of earlier, consensus-based politics are no longer available, one must create forms of resistance that take up the negation of labor power through market-centered demands and forms of control; against them one must uphold the workers’ autonomous, independent desire of controlling their work and their lives. The goal is also to combine social critique and the critique of alienation, or the perspectives of resistance and appropriation. At the level of social critique, the first goal must be to leave behind the cooperative reformist framework. An independent politics of protecting the interests of reproduction must not be derived in functionalist fashion, that is, from labor’s contribution to the economy (growth, domestic demand) or the company (competitiveness). Such a social critique would maintain its fundamentally defensive position (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 39– 40), but with a perspective of resisting the downward spiral of market-driven adjustment by limiting further losses of previously-won workers’ rights.

66

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

The goal is to set minimum standards (e.g. minimum wages) and create resistance and fall-back lines (such as limiting working hours or defending performance as defined by effort). Proposals of countering insecure employment through “de-precarization” measures (Dörre 2005), such as minimum wages or the self-organization of precarious workers, go in a similar direction. This perspective of resistance is complemented by an equally important perspective of appropriation. After all, the market-centered mode of production aims precisely at utilizing the subjective potentials of living labor, the willingness and capacity to innovate, the content-related orientations, the autonomy and the entrepreneurial behavior of individual employees. However, workers are not simply forced to deploy their subjective potentials and content-related standards in their jobs—they want to do it, too. This entails potentials and contradictions: workers’ interests that are autonomous, independent and related to the quality or content of work clash with the managerial return targets imposed on them. Nonetheless, the contradiction between self-realization and return targets has become more severe because it unfolds inside the individual workers; it is within themselves that they must fight out the conflict between profitability and workmanship. Essentially a “self-employed employee”, the worker has to confront the awkward question of what he actually wants if he could do whatever he wants; whether he merely lets himself be guided by existing conditions, or whether, and to what degree, he is capable of self-determined action against them. Making such individual reflections politically productive presupposes communication with others. An “independence” on the part of workers is revealed here that opens up possibilities for labor policy and which, in the long run, may become a politically explosive force. In the conceptualization of an independent labor policy, the perspectives of resistance and appropriation necessarily contradict each other. This is because the market-centered mode of production negates the human specificity of the commodity labor power (re-commodification), but also tries to tap the subjective potentials of living labor, the new independence and autonomy of the individual worker. Labor policy must not separate these contradictory moments and play them off against each other. Spaces and forms have to be found in which the workers themselves can reflect on these contradictions, relate them to their own interests and articulate perspectives for collective action.

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

67

Works Cited Arbeitsgruppe SubArO (2005). Ökonomie der Subjektivität. Subjektivität der Ökonomie. Berlin: edition sigma. Badura, Bernhard, Martin Litsch and Christian Vetter (eds.). (1999). FehlzeitenReport 1999: Psychische Belastungen am Arbeitsplatz. Berlin: Springer. Baethge, Martin (1991). Arbeit, Vergesellschaftung, Identität—Zur zunehmenden normativen Subjektivierung der Arbeit. Soziale Welt, 42(1), 6–19. Bahnmüller, Reinhard (2001). Stabilität und Wandel in der Leistungsentlohnung. WSI-Mitteilungen, 54(7), 426–433. Beck, Ulrich (1997). Kinder der Freiheit: Wider das Lamento über den Werteverfall. In Ulrich Beck (ed.). Kinder der Freiheit. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Beck, Ulrich (2009). Risk Society. Towards a new Modernity. London: Sage. Bechtle, Günter, and Dieter Sauer (2003). Postfordismus als Inkubationszeit einer neuen Herrschaftsform. In Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (eds.). Das neue Marktregime—Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells, 35–54. Hamburg: VSA. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2001). Die Rolle der Kritik in der Dynamik des Kapitalismus und der normative Wandel. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 11(4), 459–477. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Bourdieu, Pierre (1998). Job insecurity is Everywhere now. In Pierre Bourdieu. Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market, 81–87. New York: New Press. Bröckling, Ulrich (2015). The Entrepreneurial Self. Fabricating a New Type of Subject. London: Sage. Castel, Robert (2003). From Manual Workers to Wage Labourers. Transformation of the Social Question. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Detje, Richard, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2011). Krise ohne Konflikt? Interessen- und Handlungsorientierungen im Betrieb—die Sicht von Betroffenen. Hamburg: VSA. Deutschmann, Christoph (2001). Die Gesellschaftskritik der Industriesoziologie— ein Anachronismus?, Leviathan, 29(1), 58–69. Deutschmann, Christoph (2008). “Kapitalismus” und “Geist des Kapitalismus”— Anmerkungen zum theoretischen Ansatz von Boltanski/Chiapello. In Gabriele Wagner and Phillip Hessinger (eds.). Ein neuer Geist des Kapitalismus? Paradoxien und Ambivalenzen der Netzwerkökonomie, 127–143. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2005). Prekarität—Eine arbeitspolitische Herausforderung. WSI-Mitteilungen, 58(5), 251–258. Dörre, Klaus (2007). Die Wiederkehr der Prekarität. Subjektive Verarbeitungen, soziale Folgen und politische Konsequenzen unsicherer Beschäftigungsverhältnisse. In Frank Lorenz and Günter Schneider (eds.). Ende der Normalarbeit? Mehr

68

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

Solidarität statt weniger Sicherheit—Zukunft betrieblicher Interessenvertretung, 15–31. Hamburg: VSA. Dörre, Klaus (2015). Capitalism, Acceleration, Activation: A Criticism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa. Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 143–163. London/New York: Verso. Ehrenberg, Alain (2010). The Weariness of the Self. Diagnosing the History of Depression in the Contemporary Age. Montreal/London: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Eichler, Lutz (2009). Dialektik der flexiblen Subjektivität. Beitrag zur Sozialcharakterologie des Postfordismus. In Stefan Müller (ed.). Probleme der Dialektik heute, 85–111. Wiesbaden: VS. Gerlmaier, Anja, and Erich Latniak (eds.). (2011). Burnout in der IT-Branche. Ursachen und betriebliche Prävention. Kröning: Asanger. Glißmann, Wilfried, and Klaus Peters (2001). Mehr Druck durch mehr Freiheit—Die neue Autonomie in der Arbeit und ihre paradoxen Folgen. Hamburg: VSA. Heinrich, Michael (2006). Die Wissenschaft vom Wert. Die Marxsche Kritik der politischen Ökonomie zwischen wissenschaftlicher Revolution und klassischer Tradition. Fourth Edition. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Holst, Hajo (2009). Disziplinierung durch Leiharbeit? Neue Nutzungsstrategien von Leiharbeit und ihre arbeitspolitischen Folgen. WSI-Mitteilungen, 62(3), 143– 149. Honneth, Axel (2002). Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung. Paradoxien der Individualisierung. In Axel Honneth (ed.). Befreiung aus der Mündigkeit. Paradoxien des gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, 141–158. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Honneth, Axel (2004). Organized Self-Realization. Some Paradoxes of Individualization. European Journal of Social Theory, 7(4), 463–478. Kleemann, Frank, and Ingo Matuschek (eds.). (2003). Immer Anschluss unter dieser Nummer. Rationalisierte Dienstleistung und subjektivierte Arbeit im Call-Center. Berlin: edition sigma. Koppetsch, Cornelia (2006). Das Ethos der Kreativen. Eine Studie zum Wandel von Arbeit und Identität am Beispiel der Werbeberufe. Konstanz: UVK. Kraemer, Klaus, and Frederic Speidel (2005). Prekarisierung von Erwerbsarbeit. Zur Transformation des arbeitsweltlichen Integrationsmodus. In Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Peter Imbusch (eds.). Integrationspotenziale einer modernen Gesellschaft, 367–390. Wiesbaden: VS. Kratzer, Nick, and Sarah Nies (2009). Neue Leistungspolitik bei Angestellten. ERA, Leistungssteuerung, Leistungsentgelt, Berlin: edition sigma. Kratzer, Nick, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2008). Leistungspolitik als Feld „umkämpfter Arbeit”. Prokla, 38(150), 11–26. Matuschek, Ingo, Katrin Arnold and G. Günter Voß (2007). Subjektivierte Taylorisierung. München/Mering: R. Hampp Verlag. Marrs, Kira, and Andreas Boes (2003). Alles Spaß und Hollywood? Arbeits- und Leistungsbedingungen bei Film und Fernsehen. In Markus Pohlmann, Dieter Sauer, Gudrun Trautwein-Kalms and Alexandra Wagner (eds.). Dienstleistungsar-

WORK—MORE THAN EMPLOYMENT?

69

beit: Auf dem Boden der Tatsachen. Befunde aus Handel, Industrie, Medien und ITBranche, 187–242. Berlin: edition sigma. Marx, Karl (1973 [1857–1858]). Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Marx, Karl (1976 [1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy—Vol. I: Capitalist Production. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Marx, Karl (1981 [1894]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy—Vol. III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Menz, Wolfgang, Wolfgang Dunkel and Nick Kratzer (2011). Leistung und Leiden. Neue Steuerungsformen von Leistung und ihre Belastungswirkungen. In Nick Kratzer (ed.). Arbeit und Gesundheit im Konflikt. Analysen und Ansätze für ein partizipatives Gesundheitsmanagement, 143–198. Berlin: edition sigma. Menz, Wolfgang, and Sarah Nies (2015). Wenn allein der Erfolg zählt. Belastungen und Work-Life-Balance in den Finanzdienstleistungen. In Nick Kratzer, Wolfgang Menz and Barbara Pangert (eds.). Work-Life-Balance—Eine Frage der Leistungspolitik. Analysen und Gestaltungsansätze, 233–274. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Moldaschl, Manfred, and G. Günter Voß (eds.). (2002). Subjektivierung von Arbeit. München/Mering: R. Hampp Verlag. Nies, Sarah (2015). Nützlichkeit und Nutzung von Arbeit. Beschäftigte im Konflikt zwischen Unternehmenszielen und eigenen Ansprüchen. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Peters, Klaus, and Dieter Sauer (2005). Indirekte Steuerung—eine neue Herrschaftsform. Zur revolutionären Qualität des gegenwärtigen Umbruchprozesses. In Hilde Wagner (ed.). Rentier ich mich noch? Neue Steuerungskonzepte im Betrieb, 23–58. Hamburg: VSA. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA. Sauer, Dieter (2010). Ende der Maßlosigkeit? Leistungspolitik in der Krise. In Helga Schwitzer, Kai Ohl, Richard Rohnert and Hilde Wagner (eds.). Zeit, dass wir was drehen! Perspektiven der Arbeitszeit und Leistungspolitik, 19–39. Hamburg: VSA. Schönberger, Klaus, and Stefanie Springer (eds.). (2003). Subjektivierte Arbeit. Mensch, Organisation und Technik in einer entgrenzten Arbeitswelt. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Stadlinger, Jörg (2006). Alternativen zur indirekten Steuerung in den Sozialwissenschaften. unpublished manuscript. Stadlinger, Jörg, and Dieter Sauer (2010). Marx & Moderne: Dialektik der Befreiung oder Paradoxien der Individualisierung?. Prokla, 40(159), 195–216. Vester, Michael, Christel Teiwes-Kügler and Andrea Lange-Vester (2007). Die neuen Arbeitnehmer. Zunehmende Kompetenzen—wachsende Unsicherheit. Hamburg: VSA. Voß, G. Günter, and Hans J. Pongratz (1998). Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Eine neue Grundform der “Ware Arbeitskraft”?, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 50 (1), 131–158.

70

SARAH NIES AND DIETER SAUER

Voß, G. Günter, and Hans J. Pongratz (2003). From employee to “entreployee”: Towards a “self-entrepreneurial” work force?, Concepts and Transformation, 8(3), 239–254.

Landnahme through Tests: A Useful Concept for the Sociology of Work Klaus Dörre, Tine Haubner

In his study on the Short Dream of Everlasting Prosperity (Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität), Burkart Lutz (1984) argued that a fundamental transformation was taking place in industrialized capitalist societies. Drawing on Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of accumulation, the doyen of industrial relations in West Germany discussed the internal Landnahme of noncapitalist social environments (ibid., 57), the end of which also signaled the end of extraordinary post-war prosperity. The consequences of this “epochal rupture” (Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael 2011, 25–42) had not nearly been fully analyzed when the “Second Great Contraction” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) of 2007–09 raised the possibility of yet another historical rupture of even greater significance. We suggest that, in order to analyze the crisis-ridden social transformation since the 1980s, we should return to the discussion which had ended prematurely after the publication of Lutz’ authoritative study. We hope to develop a theory of capitalist Landnahme that once again joins the sociology of work to critical political economy. The goal is to set out a research agenda that enables us to do political economy as social theory (Streeck 2011) without ignoring the transformation of social labor processes. To this end we consciously draw on the still unexhausted wealth of ideas in Marx’ critique of political economy. However, we do so in a way that is more properly labelled “Marxian” rather than “Marxist”, and which calls for the reinterpretation of classical texts in light of contemporary knowledge in the social sciences. This “pragmatic realism” (Wright 2009, 101) in theory construction also implies a rediscovery and redefinition of concepts that Marxist orthodoxy jettisoned long ago. Landnahme is one such concept that requires reconstruction through reference to contemporary processes. It allows us to understand an expansionary social dynamic which has caused a shift in the boundaries between waged labor and unremunerated activities. Activities not yet commodified

72

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

become “land” to be occupied. More precisely: in flexible market-driven modes of production, industrial labor can only be valorized if it is continuously and increasingly supplemented by usually unpaid, self-directed work, care work and associative work. This entire range of activities therefore becomes subject to renewed Landnahme, rather than just that part of it represented by waged labor. To substantiate this hypothesis we will first outline the Landnahme concept (1) which we subsequently apply to the restructuring of work (2, 3). We conclude (4) by presenting a few ideas about possible connections between social critique and the sociology of work.

1. Landnahme and Social Labor The defining feature of theories of Landnahme is that they shift attention from the static to the dynamic aspects of capitalist societies. Capitalism is nothing when it is not in motion (Harvey 2010, 23). This is similar to social acceleration theory (Rosa 2005) and Lessenich’s (2008) activation hypothesis in that it understands capitalist dynamism as a continuous motion that aims to (temporarily) overcome the self-imposed limits to endless capital accumulation. Whatever their specific differences, the irreducible core that all theories of Landnahme agree on is that this motion can only become permanent as long as a non-capitalist “other” is available. A “pure” capitalism could probably not survive; it is, in any case, empirically non-existent. Instead, the dynamic of capitalism is characterized by a continuous exchange between social sectors that are subject to valorization and others that are not (yet) commodified. In capitalist societies, the principle of equivalent commodity exchange tends towards its universalization, but it can never become truly universal because it remains embedded in other rationalities and fields of action—towards which, however, processes of commodification (can) relate in expansive, internalizing, indeed in downright imperialist ways. Capitalist expansion occurs in time and space, within and outside of national societies and across as well as within sectors. It affects different modes of life and production, different social groups and environments as well as a broad range of (work) activities. While the sociology of work traditionally seeks to identify the most upto-date form of utilizing labor power in order to have a reference point for

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

73

expertise, critique and orientation, the concept of Landnahme, on the other hand, offers other possible interpretations. The disciplinary, destructive and exploitative potentials of a new mode of production can only be fully appreciated by starting, as it were, from the other end, that is, by including in the analysis exactly those activities that a superficial and overly optimistic view of the forces of production would (at least implicitly) dismiss as marginal or pre-modern. The focus shifts to those allegedly peripheral activities which hide behind whatever happens to be the latest form of utilizing labor power, and which frequently constitute the latter’s very conditions of possibility. 1.1 Landnahme and the Growth Imperative Rosa Luxemburg did not explicitly use the term Landnahme, but she did lay the theoretical foundations for a theory of capitalism that focuses not just on the expansive character of accumulation for its own sake, but also on the instrumentalization and occupation of work activities that are not, or not yet, fully commodified. Certain logical inconsistencies notwithstanding (Harvey 2003, 138–142; Sweezy 1964, 216–234), she correctly identified the causes of the structural growth imperative governing capitalist economies: “Capitalist methods of production do more than awaken in the capitalist this thirst for surplus value whereby he is impelled to ceaseless expansion of reproduction. Expansion becomes in truth a coercive law, an economic condition of existence for the individual capitalist” (Luxemburg 1963, 40).

In an anarchic capitalist market economy, this growth imperative can result both from competition-induced increases in labor productivity and the resulting realization problems (lack of effective demand (Schmidt 2012)) as well as from the tendency to produce disproportionalities both in physical and value terms (Lutz 1984, 58). The expanded reproduction of capital can ultimately only be successful if, at every stage in the metamorphosis of newly created surplus value, precisely those territories, raw materials, energy resources, machinery, means of transportation, labor power, consumers, reproductive activities, financial resources and so on are available that are needed to realize the surplus value which has been produced. No business or capitalist can ever be sure that this multi-stage transformation of commodities and money will be successful. Therefore, they must constantly strive to improve the

74

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

labor productivity of individual businesses. The financial sector plays a lead role in generating innovation and expanding product ranges because it advances the funds for risky operations (Deutschmann 2012; Binswanger 2009). Ultimately, most attempts to increase labor productivity result in economic growth, which—at least until recently—also meant increasing the consumption of fossil fuels and other resources. In this respect, the “continuous improvements in labor productivity” include the “unrestricted utilization of all substances and facilities afforded by nature and soil” (Luxemburg 1963, 357). The imperative of expanded reproduction is inherently expansionary not just in relation to non-human nature, but also with regard to human labor power and thus the entire range of (re-)productive activities. In the last instance, this growth imperative can never be “switched off” in capitalist societies, at least not in the export- and market-oriented industrial sector 1. Here, it will always reassert itself, despite all countervailing tendencies. Even contemporary economists who feel that they do not need to base their arguments on a theory of value (Stern 2007; Rogall 2011, 2012; Peukert 2010) agree with this view. According to environmental economist Tim Jackson, the capitalist system is not very resilient in times of stagnation and weak growth because the feedback loops of expanded reproduction turn into their opposites as soon as the drivers of growth falter; they become causes of or contributors to crisis. Thus, the dynamic of the capitalist system pushes it “towards one of two states: expansion or collapse” (Jackson 2009, 64). 1.2 Landnahme, Wage Labor and Reproductive Activity And yet, that collapse never seems to happen; in fact, the growth dynamic is always rekindled more or less successfully not despite but because of recurrent crises. When faced with problems of valorization, capitalist actors always manage to find new “land”, that is, social groups, environments and

——————

1 To be sure, a mixed economy also consists of mini-enterprises, craft producers, not-forprofit organizations, public services and certain forms of agrarian subsistence production, that are not subject to the growth imperative in the same way as capitalist enterprises. Moreover, companies that dominate a certain market can sometimes (and for a certain time) use strategies that aim less at growth and more at squeezing out the competition.

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

75

activities which can be commodified. In times of social transformation, large corporations and the state in particular are capable of actively creating an “outside” to capitalist market society (Harvey 2006). This takes place through millions of micro-social operations without there being an omniscient center that steers a course. The absence of a single master plan, however, does not exclude the possibility that contingent activities lead to the gradual consolidation of a social compromise whose institutionalization can provide the frame for relatively stable constellations of prosperity (Lutz 1984, 62; Hirsch and Roth 1986; Aglietta 1979). Each Landnahme relies on the combination of two disparate modes of socialization. It is only in a system of “internal markets” characterized by the rationality of equivalent exchange that capitalist societies manage to reproduce themselves largely on the basis of their own internal elements. Nonetheless, they remain dependent on non-commodified environments, or “external markets”, where the principle of equivalent exchange does not apply at all, or only to a limited extent. These exchange relations may be defined by arbitrariness, political discipline or even overt force. The dual nature of capitalist accumulation also structures the connection between wage labor and other forms of activity. More precisely, non-commodified activities, such as domestic labor, can become a “colony” which can be put to two different uses in the process of Landnahme. On the one hand, the reproduction of wage labor and capital remains dependent on noncapitalist activities. Expanded reproduction, which requires intensifying or expanding the utilization of labor power, could not take place without— predominantly female and unwaged—care work, nor without the influx of surplus labor power from the (semi-)peripheries. On the other hand, the systemic “outside” can also be subjected to ever-new bouts of commodification. Activities and sources of meaning which are not (yet) organized by the market are absorbed, sucked in and used up in the process of capitalist Landnahme. This incorporation, however, can never be total and can therefore never reach an absolute limit. Each Landnahme therefore redraws the boundaries between wage labor on the one hand and self-directed labor and autonomous activity on the other in new and contested ways (Land 2011, 108–9). Rosa Luxemburg’s implicit argument that internal Landnahme absorbs activities other than wage labor was taken up and developed several decades later by feminist political economy (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981, 30–50; Mies 1983). Initially, the focus was on the concept of “subsistence produc-

76

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

tion”. 2 Its central premise assumes that domestic and agricultural labor have something fundamental in common: in both cases “capital does not assume responsibility for the labor time necessary to reproduce labor power and the family” but is “unpaid labor time that enters into the valorizetion process and therefore constitutes surplus labor’ (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981, 35; translation JM; cf. Mies 1983, 116). A defining feature of subsistence labor is that it primarily produces use values, which is why its valuecreating potential contributes to accumulation only through many intermediary steps and complex processes of mediation. Treating agricultural production and household labor as equivalent, an identification which is inherent to the concept of subsistence work, has proven difficult in terms of its analytical utility. Therefore, the narrower concept of care work 3 is now used to refer to the vast majority of reproductive activities. However, in the case of care work, too, the value it produces only enters the capitalist production of exchange value through many intermediate steps. These intermediate steps provide openings for the creation of hierarchies between paid and unpaid labor which are backed by power relations. The separation of public and private spheres enables dominant capitalist actors to use economic, cultural-symbolic, or state-related and political power resources to upgrade wage labor vis-à-vis other activities, but also to create hierarchies within paid labor. This takes place through tests (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 30–32) and “classification struggle[s]” (Bourdieu 1989, 479–481), which create social stratifications between entire groups of people. 1.3 Tests, Primary and Secondary Exploitation The concept of tests—which is equivalent to “competition” or “selection”—requires some explanation. In the context of a theory of Landnahme, the notion of “competition” mostly serves to illuminate how social actors

——————

2 “Subsistence production comprises giving birth and raising children, the labor expended to make food, clothing and shelter ready for immediate consumption, the physical and mental labor of sexuality, in short: the work done by women (wives, housewives and mothers). It also comprises the work of peasants (men and women), especially in the Third World, inasmuch as it also involves the appropriation of nature through work for the purpose of consumption.” (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981, 30-1; translation JM) 3 “In the international debate, care work usually refers to all unpaid activities in the household, and to all paid and unpaid care and nursing activities.” (Madörin 2007, 142)

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

77

perceive the contested implementation of commodification at various levels of society. In our understanding, commodification means that dominant social actors create new, field-specific tests, or at least modify the formats of those systems of competitions which have already been institutionalized. Tests always comprise of two dimensions: the test of strength on the one hand, and, on the other, the test of status embedded in notions of justice (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 315–319; Boltanski 2011). Individuals or classes of individuals must qualify for tests on which access to certain social positions depends. Thus, tests act as means of capitalist Landnahme. New or newly re-formatted tests mediate in complex ways between the micro- and macro-levels. They enable transitions and interactions among heterogeneous social fields, thus acting as transfer mechanisms that convey the fundamental rule that is common to otherwise historically unique processes of Landnahme. Tests of strength and power relations can be empirically observed. However, apart from the two market systems, they also hide two systems of exploitation that are fundamentally different and whose reconstruction and critique require certain meta-theoretical considerations (Boltanski 2011, 3– 4). “Exploitation” refers to the causal connection between “the good fortune of the strong (great men) and the misery of the weak (little people)” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 360). However, even under capitalist conditions exploitation by way of production of surplus value as analyzed by Marx is only one—and often not even the dominant—form of the private appropriation of social wealth. It is in fact found in combination with another type, which applies to what Maria Mies considered the generic feature of all exploitative relationships (which is problematic): “To exploit is to plunder 4, to appropriate by force what one did not produce oneself; to take without giving an equivalent in return” (Mies 1983, 120; translation JM). By focusing on violence as the defining feature of exploitation, Mies’ definition declares as universal a mechanism that is not specific to a particular social formation, and that does not apply to the capitalist principle of equivalent exchange. Exploitation appears as fraud backed by power. Marx’ discovery—still a “first-rate theoretical achievement” (Berger 1994,

——————

4 Translator’s note: In German, “ausbeuten” (to exploit) and “Beute” (loot, booty, spoils) are etymologically related. Mies exploits—no pun intended—this relationship to drive home the point that any form of booty, however acquired, is to be understood as the result of exploitation: “Ausbeutung heißt Beute machen.”

78

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

738; translation JM)—was to explain exactly how exploitation can take place at all if the labor market is governed by the principle of equivalent exchange. In the capitalist firm, this principle can be both honored and breached at the same time because wage workers earn a wage equivalent to the value of their labor power, but not to the value of what they produce. To be sure, as Rosa Luxemburg already pointed out, class struggle (the organized action of wage laborers) is a prerequisite without which the principle of equivalent exchange could not be established. But this exchange relation can be “pacified” (Habermas 2007, 347). In advanced capitalist societies it does not need external force because, as Marx said, even wage workers have internalized “the dull compulsion of economic relations” (Marx 1954, 76) as second nature. In light of this we would like to systematically distinguish between primary relations of exploitation that are determined by specifically capitalist forms, and secondary relations of exploitation that are not specific to capitalism. Primary exploitation is embedded in formal or informal contractual relationships that codify the principle of equivalent exchange (i.e. labor power in exchange for an adequate wage). Ideally, it therefore does not rely on any extra-economic disciplinary mechanisms. Relations of secondary exploitation constitute equivalences of a different kind. In this context, “secondary” does not mean less painful, less unfair or less important. What defines secondary exploitation is that the principle of equivalent exchange that structures transactions on “internal” capitalist markets does not apply here, or at least not fully. It follows that one can speak of secondary exploitation whenever disciplinary mechanisms of a symbolic-cultural or state-sanctioned nature are deployed to maintain inside-outside distinctions with the aim of pushing the value of the labor power of certain social groups substantially beneath the general standard of wages and reproduction, for example through racist or sexist discrimination. Another possible aim for this type of strategy is to use certain activities as unpaid resources, both inside and outside the sphere of wage labor. Overall social conditions and the social balance of forces permitting, the intensification not just of primary, but also secondary exploitation is an option for capitalist businesses or economic and political elites for dealing with interruptions of the accumulation process. In this sense, mechanisms of primary and secondary exploitation are not independent of each other. The institutionally guaranteed exchange of equivalents in the production of surplus value is the standard from which

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

79

those exchange relations deviate that are subject to external discipline and partly take place outside the capitalist firm and the production of surplus value. If, for example, a society becomes more dependent for its reproduction on personal services and care activities that cannot be rationalized at all or only with considerable difficulties, it can deploy extra-economic disciplinary mechanisms to keep their price artificially low or to ensure that they are still freely available to those who demand them. The tests associated with secondary exploitation tend to resemble tests of strength. Primary exploitation, on the other hand, mostly takes place through legitimate tests and institutionalized tests of status, at least in advanced capitalist societies. 1.4 The Expansionary Nature of Capitalist Landnahme The mobilization of and expanded access to labor power as well as the shifting of boundaries between paid and unpaid work require ideological justification, even when they rely on extra-economic disciplinary mechanisms. This service is provided by intellectual systems of reference which—following Max Weber and Werner Sombart—Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello (2007, 10–11) have described as the hegemonic “capitalist spirit”. In a differentiated society, it would be very difficult for the systematic growth imperative to influence the motives of capitalist actors in the absence of adequate justification. Ideological regimes of justification, which are themselves subject to historical change, both enable and limit accumulation because they tie the process of valorization to extraeconomic sources of meaning that do not neatly fit the principle of market societalization. Usually centered around some notion of progress, each instantiation of the capitalist spirit also conveys constructions of the other. In the case of racist classifications, the origins can be traced back to the emergence of the Christian claim to superiority over the Islamic world (Miles and Brown 2003, 22–3). Marx once predicted that, as a result of capitalist globalization, “[a]ll fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify” (Marx and Engels 1976, 487). With hindsight, this assumption has not been borne out by history. To protect themselves from the juggernaut of universalized market power, groups of wage laborers tend towards a politics of closure to conserve particular

80

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

identities (Silver 2008; Polanyi 2001). However, the conservation of inequalities through sexist or racist classifications can also be in the interest of certain ruling class fractions. There are therefore, from the point of view of capitalist elites, just as many reasons to protect “venerable prejudices and opinions” about the other as there are motives to do away with them. Ideological justifications and their attendant political practices have a life of their own. Over time they tend to become autonomous from the socioeconomic causes of capital’s expansionary drive. When that happens, Landnahme takes place—for example through colonialist policies or the racist or sexist degradation of social groups and certain work activities— even when it is economically dysfunctional to do so (Arendt 1960). Classical theories of imperialism try to explain how aggressive ideologies divert the expansionary drive of capital onto territories that lie outside the borders of their respective nation states, and how they combine it with the legitimation of extra-economic force. In contrast, Burkart Lutz’ analysis of post-war prosperity demonstrates that the expansionary drive can, at least temporarily, become introverted, and that it can be tamed through the institutionalization of working class power. After 1945, this was possible because the inherent limits to growth that had caused the crises of the inter-war period were temporarily overcome by three institutional innovations: (1) the expansion of the welfare state and the transformation of proletarians into social citizens; (2) higher social appreciation of consumers who were carefully tended to by the advertising industry and influenced by artificial consumption boosters, turning them into avid buyers of positional goods; and (3) the increasing use of limited raw materials, fossil fuels and other resources that economic theory and practice treat as unlimited for as long as property rights are claimed and the ecological and social costs of industrial production can be externalized, i.e. removed from management calculations. Accordingly, the mode of integration typical of Fordist welfare capitalism was based on the notion of unlimited growth, ever-expanding social security and the gradual, but constant, growth of material wealth (Castel 2011). Economic theory “increasingly equated development with economic growth and subjected it to an abstract, mathematically inclined neoclassical logic” (Bachinger and Matis 2009, XI; translation JM). Thus, economic growth measured as gross domestic product (GDP) has today acquired a significance that is “not just economic, but also ethical” (Paqué 2010, 1, cf. 251; translation JM). To this day, it is considered the sine qua non of suc-

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

81

cessful social integration and the pacification of the class conflict (Habermas 2007, 347). However, neutralizing the “law of wages” (Lohngesetz) 5, that is the mitigation of primary and, above all, secondary mechanisms of exploitation under welfare capitalism, relied on the increasing “destruction” of the “structures, modes of production, life styles and behavioral norms” that had previously constituted the traditional craft and agricultural sector (Lutz 1984, 213–14; translation JM). This was an “internal Landnahme” that can be “compared to the ‘external Landnahme’ of imperialism” (ibid.; translation JM). If, therefore, the drivers of economic prosperity are historically limited, the same also applies to the stability of welfare institutions, internal labor markets and the socially integrative role of wage labor.

2. Landnahme in Finance Capitalism and the Flexible Mode of (Re-)production The Landnahme that started in the 1980s can thus be interpreted as a series of attempts to rekindle the dwindling forces of growth in the capitalist centers through the occupation of “new land”. But what is it that remains in thoroughly capitalized societies to be commodified or subjected to Landnahme? The answer lies in the peculiar character of Fordist societalization, and the “land abandonment” (Landpreisgabe) (Rosa 2015, 168) that accompanied the expansion of the welfare state and the embedding of wage labor in protected labor markets. 2.1 Second-order Landnahme To set the growth dynamic in motion, certain spatial and temporal “fixes” for capital that were inherent in the “functional antagonism” (Schimank 2011) of welfare state regulation had to be broken up. Government-run enterprises and public services, the not-for-profit sector, but also parts of

——————

5 According to Lutz, the law of wages states “that wages in the modern sectors of a national economy cannot significantly and consistently exceed the level of provisions that exists in the poorer sections of the traditional sector, and which is primarily defined in kind” (1984, 210; translation JM).

82

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

the household economy were now declared up for Landnahme. The same applied to institutions that restricted the market mechanism, collective bargaining and social security systems. Policies of commodification took different forms depending on the institutional divergences of national capitalisms. The catch-all phrase “neoliberalism” (Crouch 2011)—more precisely, the new hegemonic spirit of capitalism—hid (and continues to hide) very different principles and practices (Campbell 2004; Pahl 2012). The political-economic core of restructuring, however, was always the same (Cassady 2009). The goal was always to partly reinstate the “law of wages” through processes of creative destruction. The dominant elites saw the organized labor markets of the Fordist era as the central impediment to rekindling economic growth and as a limit to capitalist accumulation that had to be overcome. However, the competitive advantages of a more longterm attachment of workers to their companies and workplaces were not to be sacrificed. This is one of the reasons why commodifying Landnahme occurred in selective and field-specific ways; sometimes in a radical fashion in market-oriented capitalist economies, sometimes more moderately, as in some continental European, especially Scandinavian, countries. Political variation notwithstanding, the modus operandi of finance capitalism affected structural parameters and institutions—themselves the results of previous Landnahme—that had for a long time secured the social cohesion of advanced industrial capitalist societies. Because this was essentially an occupation of structures that had already been commodified, it can be understood as a special type of Landnahme: “second-order Landnahme”. In this case, the expansionary drive affects collective contractual relationships, regulations and compromises, all of which contribute to social cohesion (Polanyi 2001), thus constituting a Landnahme of the social. The dynamism of this kind of Landnahme results from its being combined with an extensive (that is, outwardly oriented) expansionary push, which has led to a surge in prosperity in the BRICS countries above all. This “external” Landnahme constitutes the social space of an international regime of competition, in which not only companies, but also countries and entire groups of countries are set to compete with one another, without, however, conforming to the pattern of classic imperialism. The new constellation enables some semi-peripheral countries to rapidly catch up in economic terms. It also leads to serious power shifts in the international system that tend to weaken the influence of the old centers (Arrighi 2005; Boris and Schmalz 2011).

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

83

Many a treatise describes the political-economic drivers of such change. 6 Here it will suffice to note that, since the crisis of Fordism, the factors that Burkart Lutz identified as driving the post-war expansion of the welfare state have started to turn into their opposite. The US as a world power in decline used the dollar’s status as world money to defend its hegemonic position in the world economy (Brenner 2005). Overcapacities in leading sectors of the world economy, decreasing growth rates, increasing inequalities of wealth and income, and the privatization of pension systems have turned the financial sector and its differentiated segments into the preferred and most rapidly expanding sphere of investment (Reich 2010; Huffschmid 2002). Various attempts to stimulate growth through credit expansion—whether through public loans, loans targeted at specific companies, or private credit—as well as the necessity of hedging against credit risks have further encouraged this tendency (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Jackson 2009). However, financial markets have proven that they are not the efficient “information processing machines” (Windolf 2005, 31; translation JM) whose amazing powers of innovation neoclassical economists never tire of extolling (critically: Peukert 2010). Driven by the belief that “[m]oney could finally beget money” (Arendt 1960, 137), financial market actors behave entirely rationally from their own point of view (Sorkin 2010; Kraemer 2012). But the need to reduce complexity in order to assess the risks of financial market transactions makes those assessments necessarily incomplete, especially since they are basically bets on an unpredictable future. When calculating risks, investors and their advisers must also take use value aspects into account, such as the real operating business, production processes, products, work force, etc. Normally, however, such predictions are based on a type of knowledge that extrapolates trends ex post and projects them into the future. The attempts of financial market actors to hedge the resulting risks and to use derivative financial instruments for speculative trading are the cause of the tendency for the increasing autonomization of the financial sphere from the productive economy. Such autonomization, however, can never be complete; even in the highly abstract reductions of complexity that guide financial market actors, financial transfers always remain ultimately tied to the world of work, production and nature.

——————

6 Cf. Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996; Bieling 2012; Dicken 2007; Dunning 1992; Harvey 2010; Streeck 2009.

84

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

Understanding whether and how the modus operandi of finance capitalism influences the restructuring of social labor would require a separate research program. What we know so far suggests that Landnahme under finance capitalism creates a space of possibility in which the risks and uncertainties of volatile (financial) markets are transferred into the firm and, by way of competitive processes, also onto workers. This is achieved through a reconfiguration of the relations between “internal” and “external” markets, which, in turn, is driven by the specific expansionary drive of accumulation in finance capitalism. Thus, the hypertrophic expansion of financial markets, credit and debt causes interest-bearing capital to demand returns that consistently exceed the abilities of producers and debtors (Graeber 2011). Ultimately, such demands can only be met if new assets are constantly fed into the circuit of capital, assets both real, such as territories or natural resources, and potential, such as labor power and other activities (Harvey 2010; Dörre 2011). The tendency to stabilize economy and society temporarily through the incorporation of a previously non-commodified other is the real reason why public property is sold off, social security is privatized and social property is cut back. The goal of achieving a minimum return, which has been imposed as an abstract standard onto the global economy (Paul 2012, 197), creates incentives to devise management strategies that profit from undercutting social norms. For an individual business, accepting social norms is only advantageous if their binding nature in a field of action can be guaranteed with reasonable certainty. If this does not apply, or if owners and managers have reason to assume that ignoring such norms will give them an advantage, a different rationality will kick in. In that case, individual capitalist actors tend to exploit the discrepancy between the alleged universal validity of collective norms and their limited efficacy in gaining extra profits (Streeck 2009, 241). When one front-runner takes the lead, others are likely to follow. As a result, certain corridors for labor policy decisions have again narrowed since the mid-1990s (Schumann 2003; Dörre 2002). The Fordist Landnahme was defined by the mitigation of primary and the marginalization of secondary exploitation. In finance-driven capitalism, on the other hand, ripping off workers through a variety of disciplinary mechanisms has once again become a strategic option that managers, owners and companies choose even when this seems irrational from a macro-social point of view. This expansionary and rule-defying dynamic is what stands behind the phenomena that the sociology of work describes as the “mar-

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

85

ketization”, “erosion of limits” (Entgrenzung) and “subjectification” of work (Sauer 2005). 2.2 Landnahme as the Generalisation of Competition The Landnahme concept offers a novel perspective on these transformations. Second-order Landnahme establishes a system of competition that allows for the expanded utilization of potentials and activities hitherto not at all or only partly commodified. This becomes clear when the two basic elements of market exchange are conceptually distinguished. Exchange relations and competition are equally constitutive of markets. There are multiple ways in which equivalent exchange may be socially embedded, and as such it is not necessarily a driver of growth. Competition is different; it is initiated because of, not in spite of market power. Globally oriented companies, for instance, compete in markets that are structured by power relations. It is a contest between firms which each possess the power to control (Crouch 2011, 49–70; Reich 2008), and they are therefore in a position to define conditions of market entry. This group of corporations, in which three quarters of the 150 most influential ones hail from the financial sector (Vitali et al. 2011), is capable of exploiting informational advantages against their competitors, controlling networks of firms, mobilizing exclusive expertise, and of siphoning off the products of creative labor in the small and medium enterprise sector (inventions, patents). Most importantly, however, they are skilled in the art of transforming economic into political power. This accumulation of economic, ideological and bureaucratic power, nowadays of almost symbiotic proportions, acts as a lever for policies of commodification that generalize competition, rather than market exchange as such. In this sense, “market power constitutes competition”; “market power is the mode in which competition proceeds” (Thielemann 2010, 382; translation JM). The intensification of competition within and between dominant companies distinguishes the “second-order” Landnahme from the finance capitalism of the early 20th century. Today’s process is driven by financial market actors “who also fiercely compete with each other” (Windolf 2005, 25; translation JM). Anticipating the “expectation of expectations” of institutional investors and other financial market actors, targets for returns on equity and income (operating income, defined as

86

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

EBIT 7 or similar) are set in such a way as to enable constant competition even within groups, that is between different plants, business segments and groups of employees. This expansion of competition (Verwettbewerblichung) is not tied to any one instrument in particular, such as shareholder value-oriented management (Dörre et al. 2011b). It can become just as effective by way of the market for corporate control or through management concepts that encourage spin-offs, outsourcing or outcontracting. One of the main effects of these strategies is that they deepen the secondary power divide in the labor market by drawing organized industrial relations into the commodifying system of competition (Haipeter and Dörre 2011). Eschewing membership in business associations or claiming exemption from collective agreements are among the strategies that weaken collective bargaining and further erode the institutionalized power of employees. Chief among them, however, is a specific type of rationalization: companies outsource service functions, removing them from the coverage of collectively agreed-upon norms. The affected employees are formally removed from the accumulation process, only to be reintegrated under conditions that are usually worse than the previous ones. This is a good example of how finance capitalism operates: it actively produces a non-capitalist other through its shortterm, fictitious exclusion and subsequent modified reintegration into the value chain. In this way, the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion can be radically accelerated and used to de-collectivize industrial relations. 8 No less significant is the fact that this competitive rationality is also being extended to areas of society outside the export-oriented sector. Bureaucratic instruments like budgeting, ranking, rating and target agreements are used in artificially created intra-organizational market-proxies to generalize competition. In fields as diverse as regional policy, labor markets, education, health and the social sector, constant competition is seen as the right incentive for energetic entrepreneurs whose innovative capacity will eventually benefit all economic actors through economic growth and increasing wealth. It is this generalization of competition with its inherently expansive logic that expands access to labor power and other untapped activity reserves. Competition necessarily produces winners and losers.

——————

7 Earnings before interest and taxes. 8 To illustrate: in 2008, the share of firms covered by a sectoral collective wage agreement in the business services industry was only about 14 percent in West Germany and 18 percent in the East (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011; Helfen 2011).

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

87

“Whoever does not adapt his manner of life to the conditions of capitalistic success must go under, or at least cannot rise. But these are phenomena of a time in which modern capitalism has become dominant and has become emancipated from its old supports.” (Weber 2001, 34)

Or in Hayek’s words: “it will […] be through competition” that comparatively more rational individuals “will make it […] necessary for the rest to emulate them in order to prevail” (Hayek 1993, 75). This competitive logic forces those in the labor force, whether wage workers or self-employed, to work more and become more flexible, to accept jobs outside their profession, to blur the lines between the private and the public, and, as a consequence, to become not just entrepreneurial employees, but “life entrepreneurs”.

3. Work in the System of Competition The effects of the competitive principle are felt throughout the workcentered society. 9 The dynamism of Landnahme in finance capitalism is based essentially on giving dominant capitalist actors both inside and outside the system of paid work the chance to exploit as free resources flexibilization measures as well as the activities that go with them. Frequently informal and unpaid “surplus” activities come to constitute “land” whose exploitation promises considerable flexibility gains. This is clearly demonstrated by looking at the flexible mode of production from the losers’ perspective first, that is from the perspective of the unemployed and precariously employed. There is no doubt that the new wave of Landnahme has contributed to the emergence of a highly flexible mode of work and production both in Germany and other advanced capitalist societies. As in the case of primitive accumulation, integration into this mode of production relies not only on socio-economic incentives, but centrally on extraeconomic force. However, the generalization of competition renders this

——————

9 Unless stated otherwise, the following discussion draws on results from our research project “A New Underclass in the Making?” (Entsteht eine neue Unterschicht?) that is funded by the DFG (Deutsche ForschungsGeimeinschaft – German Research Foundation). As part of the qualitative data collection, we conducted three and two waves of interviews respectively with recipients of Arbeitslosengeld II (welfare benefits) (n1 = 99, n2 = 70, n3 = 30) as well as experts from the labor administration, frontline organizations, self-help groups and associations (n1 = 53, n2 = 20) (Booth et al. 2012).

88

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

coercion an anonymous force, hiding its real character from those affected. This happens (1) through particular competitions and types of competition which (2) allow specific types of expansionary appropriation of activity potentials through other actors (whether state-related or private business) and which therefore (3) are condensed into different types of tests. 3.1 Unemployment and Employment Compulsion The effects of extra-economic force can be illustrated by the activating labor market regime, which, in Germany, was created by the Hartz labor market reforms. In this new regime, transfer payments are not connected to the principle of status preservation. Instead they are made conditional upon recipients giving something in return, namely to take measures to improve their individual employability. Following the principle that whatever gets people into work is just (Gerecht ist, was Arbeit schafft), all measures and incentives are considered legitimate that encourage the unemployed to engage in self-directed activities in ways that conform to the current labor regime. Without any guarantee of being able to maintain a given, previously achieved social status, the unemployed must qualify for upskilling programs and “client groups”. Above all, they are required to justify their receipt of transfer payments. Thus, labor market actors constitute a system of competition that is founded on state-sanctioned discipline. (1) Competition: In real-life practice, the crucial scale of activity is that of the case worker, where specific selection tests take place. It is where the long-term unemployed get classified as “clients”, where profiling takes place, benefit applications get checked, upskilling measures or job opportunities are apportioned and, if necessary, sanctions are imposed. Placement officers and case workers possess some definitional power because they decide whether to apply more or less strictly the rules that govern what kind of jobs a recipient must accept. In their struggles with benefit recipients, case workers in job centers experience the recalcitrant views and independent behaviors of their “clients”. The unemployed, on the other hand, experience the selection tests and their various formats primarily as a bureaucratic discipline. This perception arises from the tight-knit bureaucratic monitoring of their everyday lives. Strict rules concerning what can be reasonably asked of a recipient are not restricted to sanctions alone. Only a small minority of recipients are affected by sanctions anyway, al-

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

89

though there has been a significant increase in numbers. The severity of the regime is based on material scarcity (the standard benefit level is below the relative poverty line) and the sometimes strict monitoring of selfdirected activities (applying for jobs, upskilling measures, willingness to accept subsidized employment). It is the result of rules and interventions that affect the lives of benefit recipients—caps on housing expenditure or the monitoring of possessions and monetary receipts (e.g. caps on monetary birthday presents). It is also the result of constant experiences of disrespect. Regardless of how the tests pan out in individual cases, those who must submit to the format associated with the labor market reforms known as Hartz IV are assigned—both in self-perception and the perception of others—a social status that is close to charity recipients, and therefore below the threshold of social respectability. (2) Mode of appropriation: In most cases, the application of strict rules concerning what can be reasonably asked of benefit recipients is somewhat redundant, as many of them are already voluntarily active. Even so, the activating institutions achieve a symbolic and mediated, but nonetheless expansive, appropriation of the activities of the unemployed. To change their circumstances, or make them livable at least, many of the unemployed have to work hard. However, their activity is to a large degree dictated by government institutions. Working a low-wage, tax-free “mini-job” while also doing an internship imposed by the job center can easily add up to a 48-hour week. On top of that, there may also be the demands of family life and parenting. Despite their best efforts, most interviewees do not manage to advance professionally. In the seven-year period under observation, only a tiny minority managed to get into reasonably stable employment. A smaller part of benefit recipients actually exhibits downward social mobilety, in spite of the healthy economic growth at the time. Moreover, longterm unemployment and precarity cause exhaustion among many of those who are affected. Entries into and exits from jobseeker’s allowance may signal considerable fluctuation, but the data suggests that a consolidation of life situations has taken place in which social mobility is reduced to moving between precarious jobs, socially subsidized jobs and unemployment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011a, b; Scherschel and Booth 2012). The autonomous activities of benefit recipients may lead to constant shifts in their social positions and unceasing movement, but social mobility remains circular and does not deliver them from precarity. They try, they struggle, only to remain in the same spot in the end. From a macro-social

90

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

perspective this circular movement can be interpreted as a blockage of life chances. In the self-perception of benefit recipients, on the other hand, it appears as tests for small, but subjectively very significant shifts in social position. (3) Individualized test of strength: The microcosm of benefit recipients is governed by a fictitious social hierarchy; those that live under the most difficult conditions and possess the fewest power resources experience themselves as belonging to a minority group. The daily lives of this “minority” diverge considerably from the standards of “mainstream society”. Nonetheless, this special status, which is partly construed on the basis of sex, nationality and ethnic group, comes with a peculiar dynamic. Our interviewees were under the constant impression that they could, through their own efforts, get to the next level in the social hierarchy, which promised a little more social normality. Unemployment is thus individualized, even though it is heavily regulated by law, and the struggles that recipients and case workers undergo over spaces of interpretation and discretion are turned into tests of strength. Ever new tests—be they conversations with case workers, performance evaluations in upskilling programs, the assignment to this or that “client group”, even job application training courses— arise to determine whether or not the applicant can attain this social normality. In spite of low upward mobility among the unemployed, this government-imposed system of competition occupies the self-directed activities of benefit recipients. People on workfare, i.e. one-euro-an-hour jobs, make their labor power available to public or community work at low cost, while people in low wage jobs who top up their incomes through jobseeker’s allowance can be exploited as cheap labor in private business. Above all, the activities of benefit recipients can be symbolically exploited. Recipients with vastly different social backgrounds, employment histories, age, family status and social networks are indiscriminately subjected to a labor market regime that, in their self-perception, “forcibly homogenizes” the needy at the level of the earlier, undifferentiated social welfare system. 10 The collective stigma attached to this serves as a warning to

——————

10 “Forcible homogenization” refers to the reforms’ intended effect of treating all unemployed individuals equally in legal and administrative terms, regardless of their different employment careers. With the entering into force of the reforms, everyone who has been unemployed for longer than (a maximum of) 18 months is assigned the same legal status as recipient of Type II Unemployment Benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II) and receives the same Type II Unemployment Benefit transfers. The three-tier system of unemployment benefits—consisting of Arbeitslosengeld (highest level), Arbeitslosenhilfe (lower level) and

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

91

those who are (still) secure about what could happen if they fail the tests of the labor market system. 3.2 Diffuse Selection Tests in Precarious Employment The state-sanctioned formats of testing in which unemployment is enacted as a system of competition differ substantially from tests that regulate the relationship between permanent staff and those in flexible employment. This intersection differs according to labor market segment and skill levels (Pelizzari 2009). 11 (1) Competition: Despite such differentiations, the justification regime of flexible and precarious labor relies on the promise of upward mobility. Official discourse ascribes to flexible employment the role of an integration mechanism into the labor market, the so-called stickiness or bridging effect. Those who do good work and prove themselves are supposed to have a chance of improving their situation. The decision lies primarily with management. However, members of the core work force, or their organized representatives, often take part in designing test situations. These testing formats usually diverge from the requirement of unambiguousness. Like the tests in the new labor market regime, they are indeterminate and unpredictable. In most cases, it is not made clear whether and under what conditions an agency worker or temporary check-out clerk can ascend into the permanent work force. The required resources are also far from being clearly specified. In these tests, occupational skill levels are only a minimum requirement. Beyond that, extraordinary flexibility, above-average commitment and the ability to adapt quickly to new tasks, new colleagues

——————

Sozialhilfe (social welfare, the lowest level)—with its differentiated status groups of unemployed individuals is thus replaced by a two-tier system consisting of Type I Unemployment Benefit and Type II Unemployment Benefit. 11 The following discussion draw on the projects “The Changing Role of Temporary Agency Work” (Funktionswandel von Leiharbeit) (12 plant-level case studies, 72 interviews with permanent staff, temporary agency workers, superiors and labor representatives; cf. Holst et al. 2010); “Flexibility and Stability in the Value Added System ‘Automotive Industry’” (Flexibilität und Stabilität im Wertschöpfungssystem Automobil) (standardized survey of employees at a car manufacturing plant, n = 1,442, and qualitative survey of plant experts, n = 55; Hajo Holst and Ingo Matuschek); and a study of firms in the East German metal and electrical industries (including an employee survey n = 459; qualitative study of managers and works councils, n = 14; Michael Behr and Anja Häneli; all studies are documented in Dörre et al. 2012).

92

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

and line managers are also expected—often at conditions that are far worse than those offered to the core work force. (2) Mode of appropriation: Workers in precarious employment are always “on probation”. Of course, there are still formal examinations, applications, job interviews, etc., but probation never ends. Whether agency work, fixed-term contracts, mini- or midi-jobs, or outcontracting, these forms of employment are used less and less to compensate for temporary peaks in production. Insecure employment is increasingly deployed strategically at plant-level. Staff trials and externalization of risks are becoming more important as motives for businesses (Hohendanner 2010). Intra-organizational tests resemble permanent sports races precisely because the precariously employed have only slim chances of gaining permanent employment. As in professional sports, it is clear from the start that only a few will reach the finishing line. Therefore, all the resources available to the individual must be mobilized in order to make it. The goal, however, is not to deliver a top performance, but to reconnect with “normality”, that is, with standards set by permanent staff and, above all, the managerial elites in charge. In this way, selection tests in the firm motivate the precariously employed to work particularly hard by instrumentalizing their hopes, even though they rarely come true. (3) Diffuse test: The defining feature of these types of tests is their indeterminacy with regard to formats, resources and potential effects. Selection tests may be embedded into collective agreements and legal regulations, as in the case of agency work, but their institutionalization merely confirms and entrenches their distance from “normal employment”. For those who want to bridge that distance, the selection tests therefore feel indeterminate and unpredictable. These zones of uncertainty are controlled by more powerful actors and lend themselves to the use of extra-economic force (monitoring of work, intimidation, withholding fundamental rights). When the precariously employed manage, despite all obstacles, to perform successfully in the competitions, they are seen as a potential threat by permanent staff. 3.3 Competitions in Flexible Wage Work Tests inside a firm differ from the diffuse system of competition at the intersection of the core work force and the flexibly employed because their

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

93

legitimacy appears unquestionable at first. However, in the transition to flexible modes of production, the formats of these types of tests have also changed substantially. (1) Competition: Skilled workers and specialists do not normally fear for their jobs, but they do compete over good projects, interesting work, chances of minor promotions, performance bonuses, or simply maintaining the status quo with regard to their work activities and wages. Hence even permanent employment is always conditional and has to be earned time and again in constant tests. One’s status as a social citizen can only be maintained through achieving “victories in competitions”. Particularly in times of crisis, even the permanently employed have to requalify continuously for their permanent jobs, either by accepting short-time work or wage cuts, or by letting themselves be loaned out to other plants in the same group to compensate for production peaks. However, the requirement to prove oneself is ubiquitous whether or not growth falls. 77 percent of the workers we interviewed at a car manufacturing plant agreed with the statement that employees are increasingly under pressure as a result of international competition among production locations. Only 2 percent disagreed (Dörre et al. 2012). This fundamental experience is the reason why members of core work forces increasingly attempt to manage the demands of flexibility individually, and to deploy family and social networks as flexibility resources. (2) Mode of appropriation: International competition is not the only reason for changing performance parameters for skilled permanent staff; the introduction of team and project work, flexible hours and the substitution of rigid time-recording systems with trust-based working hours also play an important role. The shift from the direct monitoring of work to monitoring results frequently turns out to be a program for extending working hours, and what is technically leisure time is also occupied by work-related tasks (Kämpf 2008). Attempts to close this gap mean employees have very little downtime. Therefore, the individual freedom that the new competitive regime brings can quickly turn from blessing to curse. Constantly chasing options, workers delay having children, and work that is interesting in principle becomes a source of constant stress, leading to work addiction and an inability to relax. Vocational training becomes a permanent compulsion that workers have to deal with individually. Even consumption becomes a stressful activity when, for example, the simple act of studying the manual for a new mobile phone amounts to customer work. What

94

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

these permanent staff wish for most is leisure, quiet and free time. But in their efforts to win the next competition, to pass the next test in their projects, these workers are always willing to mobilize every last bit of energy in order to deal “productively” with the insecurity of their jobs. (3) Legitimate test of status: In those segments of the labor market where integration through creative labor is gradually taking the place of integration through stable employment, workers are particularly prone to seeing situations of competition as legitimate tests in which they can prove their “high value” for the company. In these cases, constant competition among resource-rich groups actually constitutes positive incentives for action, at least up to a point. What in the Fordist era was achieved by differentiated hierarchies, structured career paths and clearly delineated competencies is now partly left to the discretion of individuals or small groups. For members of these social groups, passing selection tests in the flexible mode of work through individual effort is seen as a strength and can become a source of social recognition. Those, on the other hand, who must resort to collective power to claim what is theirs by rights are seen as weak, and run the risk of having the successful competitors punish them through the withdrawal of social esteem. Though workers rarely question the legitimacy of the test of status, competition still contains—or maybe contains again— aspects of a test of strength and overexploitation. For example, many selfemployed workers, creative workers and specialists encounter the problem of having to do unpaid, but vitally important, relational labor (Bologna 2006, 34ff.). Relational labor refers to the maintenance of networks, customer contacts, advertisement and similar activities. Clients often take these activities for granted and exploit them as free resources. This constitutes a form of Landnahme and appropriation of activity potentials through tests that target, as it were, what is innermost to the workers, their individual temporal economies as well as their psyches. 3.4 Competitions in and around Care Work Whether precarious or still reasonably secure and protected, flexible wage labor creates challenges for social reproduction that have to be met in and through peculiar types of tests. These selection tests are embedded into the system of reproductive activities. The more flexible wage labor becomes, the higher the demands on private social networks to balance the flexibility

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

95

requirements in a way that secures reproduction. As a consequence, demands on reproductive activities also increase (on average). One of the areas thus affected is the care sector. A peculiarity of this sector, one that it shares with other (paid) personal services, is that such activities are inherently difficult to rationalize. This resistance to rationalization means that the ratio of care work to the more easily rationalized productive activities keeps rising. 12 The preparation of meals can be substituted with readymade meals or fast food to a certain degree. The same, however, does not apply to raising children or caring for family members. The flexibilization of paid employment and work activities should normally increase the dependence on care work, not just on the part of the immediate clients, but the production sector as a whole. Moreover, social appreciation of care work should increase, as should the wages of those who provide care services on a professional basis. However, such tendencies cannot be demonstrated empirically. In fact, the opposite applies, as shown by the example of the (professional) social economy. 13 (1) Competition: The central cause is the establishment of a system of competition that allocates public money through a market proxy. This competition forces care facilities to adopt managerial efficiency criteria. In addition, there is a shift in how finances are allocated; as a result, competition among the bodies that run frontline services is conducted through staff costs and thus through wages. In this way, the price of professional care work can be reduced to well below its value. In field-specific tests, care institutions are able to exploit the weak bargaining power of employees. In one of the German states examined, 38 percent of not-forprofit bodies running frontline services pay their employees on the basis of individual agreements, as do 77 percent of commercial institutions. Where collective agreements exist at all they are primarily concluded with profes-

——————

12 The social significance of care work can be illustrated by calculating expanded gross domestic product (GDP). According to that, unpaid work activities account for about 41 percent of German gross value added and unpaid female labor accounts for 30 percent. In contrast, manufacturing and the financial sector (banks/insurances) have a share of 11 percent and 9 percent respectively. In terms of working hours, the preparation of meals is the largest sector of the economy. If women reduced their unpaid care work by only 10 percent it would be equal to the closure of all facilities in the paid healthcare and social sector (Madörin 2007, 143–45). 13 The social sector comprises all facilities that provide social and healthcare services. It excludes hospitals, rehabilitation and prevention centers, rescue services, pharmacies and doctors’ surgeries, which are included in the healthcare sector.

96

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

sional associations or Christian splinter unions (Ehrlich and Hänel 2011, 30). (2) Mode of appropriation: Like the tests of strength, the tests of status, too, end up disadvantaging workers, because care work is a classic domain of female labor. Such sectors are not traditionally held in high regard. In addition, the professional ethic that pervades them finds fulfilment in the provision of high quality services, that is in socially and emotionally satisfying relationships with clients. Workers in the social sector will follow this ethic even when their conditions of work deteriorate significantly. Employers can exploit these dispositions to extract high levels of commitment from their employees despite unsatisfactory working conditions. It allows them to expand their access to the labor power of professional as well as voluntary care workers. The rate of apprenticeships is in decline even though the sector has been expanding to the point that skilled workers are becoming scarce. In fact, the entire sector is marked by an increase of fixed-term and low-wage employment as well as the intensification of work (Ehrlich and Hänel 2011, 9). Adding documentation and administrative tasks gradually expands the scope of work, and the professional ethic of relationship and care work increasingly collides with targets that “directly contradict the employees’ self-perception and vocational orientation” (ibid., 31; translation JM). (3) Hybrid test of status: In the professional care work sector, too, the testing formats become more like individualized tests of strength, as this example shows (Ehrlich and Hänel 2011). At the same time, this reduces the chance of shifting the hierarchy of value judgements in favor of these activities. Rather than upgrading care activities, we observe their social depreciation and precarization. In contrast to profit-oriented private business, the drivers of the reconversion of legitimate selection tests into hybrid tests of strength are not minimum return or profit targets, but a government-created competition over subsidies and budgeting. “Hybrid” because the legitimacy of tests in this particular sector is traditionally based on the acceptance of secondary exploitation, that is on the symbolic devaluation of female and reproductive labor. Overall, a common basic pattern emerges in all the work segments described here. Landnahme in finance capitalism rests on a modus operandi that attempts to generalize the system of competition far beyond the confines of the export-oriented sector. The expansion of competition enables governmental and/or private business actors to broaden the appropriation of

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

97

surplus activities that are not, or only partially, commodified. This appropriation of activity potentials takes place through varying combinations of intensified primary exploitation and forced secondary exploitation. This comprises more than the private, material appropriation of collectively produced goods. Under the flexible mode of (re-)production, exploitation and private appropriation can be direct or indirect, material as well as symbolic. They may largely get by without extra-economic force, or deploy it in extreme ways. Different combinations of these two market and exploitation systems constitute different types of tests, but primary and secondary exploitation pervade the entire system of competition. Their field-specific nature notwithstanding, these competitions have something fundamental in common: the victors always set the standards that others must adhere to in their work activities and work performance. The more universal the effectiveness of the principle of competition—and the sooner both the employed and unemployed consider themselves forced to individually master tests of strength and tests of status—the more the establishment of a flexible mode of life and production will at the same time entail a loss of freedom. This is because the strong and successful, with their orientation towards entrepreneurial norms, deny the less strong and successful the option of living a life that is different from that of the competitor and entrepreneur. The competitions may be institutionalized and follow strict rules, but the fuzziness of the formats and resources will always make them similar to arbitrary tests of strength. From the individual’s point of view there are only two options: either to subject themselves to a system that makes ever-expanding claims to the entire range of their (work-)activities, or to run the risk of being punished in the competitive race, which might involve social insecurity, loss of income, negative social recognition and, in the worst case, being excluded from fundamental avenues of participation.

4. Perspectives for a Critical Sociology of Work In German society, the generalization of the competitive principle has proceeded at a comparatively moderate pace because it has taken the form of a transition from the Fordist full-employment society to a post-Fordist society that aims at full (or universal) participation in the labor force (Voll-

98

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

erwerbsgesellschaft 14). Labor force participation has reached record levels in Germany. For the first time, certain labor market segments are reporting a shortage of skilled labor, or even labor in general. There are segments where workers prefer fixed-term employment to permanent employment to be better able to move on to a better-paid job. However, unemployment and underemployment are decreasing without there being a concomitant increase in the number of hours of paid work (Lehndorff 2012). In contrast to Fordist wage labor societies, full participation is possible because it no longer requires full employment. After all, for a significant part of the labor force, labor market integration still implies the forced acceptance of insecure employment. Under these circumstances, maintaining the conservative German welfare model amounts to maintaining a discrimination machine that allows for an increase in labor force participation above all for Western German women only by way of expanding precarious services. A critical sociology of work must not lose sight of these connections. It should examine the divisions in the labor market as well as the interdependence between “internal” and “external” markets, between productive and reproductive activities. A comprehensive perspective is necessary to uncover the contradictory expansionism that occupies previously unused activity potentials as “new frontiers”. Flexible modes of life and production, whose guiding motives aim to generalize competition and entrepreneurialism, require extraeconomic force to appropriate social (re-)productive labor. Marginalized and precarious groups may be directly exposed to such force, but, more than anything, it spurs on the relatively secure workers not to relax their readiness to compete. In this way, the system of competition of finance capitalism also influences the thoughts and actions of those who (still) remain in a good position professionally or in relatively secure employment. There is nothing that workers in socially recognized forms of employment fear more than sliding into precarious employment or even further down into a position below the threshold of social respectability, which they equate with receiving jobseeker’s allowance. This is the real reason behind the success of the new competitive regimes: workers are increasingly willing to make concessions, to accept undervalued, precarious jobs in order to avoid being stigmatized by “mainstream society”.

——————

14 Translator’s note: The Vollerwerbsgesellschaft concept does not lend itself to direct translation, therefore a more cumbersome description of its meaning was used above. However, there are similarities to the notion of workfare society.

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

99

Those who are under constant examination quickly grow impatient with those who appear reluctant to face the competition. This is one of the sources of exclusive solidarity among the core work force in productionrelated segments who see the precariously employed as potential competitors. To be sure, the organized labor markets of the Fordist period were also based on divisions. Segmentation in intra-firm labor markets can generally not take place unless the employees themselves create segmentation barriers or accept such barriers without resisting their imposition (Lutz 1984, 14). In the system of competition of finance capitalism, however, the core work force distance themselves not just from those “outside” and “above”, but also from those “below”, that is, from the un- and precariously employed. They tend to develop bonds of solidarity among those who constantly prove their productivity to each other in daily tests. A vague suspicion that they might themselves lose their social status seems enough to trigger a desire to distinguish themselves from the precariously employed and, above all, from the alleged “shirkers” and long-term unemployed. Although Hartz IV is mostly rejected, 54 percent of the car plant workers we interviewed believed that there should be more pressure on the long-term unemployed; 51 percent believed that a society that looks after everyone could not survive in the long run (Dörre et al. 2011a). In this case, the system of competition functions as a catalyst of exclusive solidarity. What is the significance of these classification struggles for a critical sociology of work? In conclusion, we present seven thoughts for further discussion. The first hypothesis concerns the relation between social and artistic critique. Social critique takes aim at exploitation, artistic critique at alienation (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Both modes of critique are equally relevant with regard to the occupation of activity potentials. Nearly every phenomenon in the new full participation society can be the subject of both the critique of exploitation and the critique of alienation. In a representative survey of wage workers in Germany, 63 percent felt that they had to do more work in the same amount of time, 52 percent stated that they felt harried at work, and a little less than half suggested that they increasingly showed up for work even when ill (DGB-Index 2012, 3). These things are results of the expanded access to labor power we have been discussing here, and each can be criticized both as an intensification of exploitation and an expansion of alienation. It can be interpreted as an intensification of primary exploitation when nursing staff take on more and more tasks

100

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

that have nothing to do with care work while wages and hours remain the same. It is a form of secondary exploitation when extra-economic disciplines push wages in this sector, with its high share of female employment, partly below the low-wage threshold. It is alienation when actual care work increasingly diverges from the care work ethic, and when the possibilities for professional self-realization are increasingly restricted. Therefore, if critical science wants to intervene effectively, it should refrain from pitting one mode of critique against the other. Second, we feel that relations of exploitation should be at the center of analysis because they are a blind spot which the critical sociology of work has neglected for too long. As an analytical tool, the concept of “exploitation” has the advantage of drawing attention to the specific causal connection between the actors involved: exploiters and exploited, but also subaltern groups in “dominant roles” (e.g. male workers who exploit women’s “second working day”) who inhabit an intermediate position in the same social world. There is cause and effect here. The success of one group induces the other’s failure. The appropriation not just of someone else’s labor power, but of their capacity to work (cf. Negt and Kluge 1972, 36, 88ff.), is always enabled by political framing. In the case of secondary exploitation it is also repressively executed, so that exploitation is accompanied by exclusion. In the world of flexible labor, however, these mechanisms are subjected to space-time-compression. Not even the excluded, unemployed and welfare recipients inhabit a separate social world; they are far from “superfluous” (Bude and Willisch 2006). Their mere presence still has the effects which Marx described for a part of the industrial reserve army. As an active, and activated, social group, their presence has an unintended disciplinary effect that increases the exploitability even of workers in “internal”, protected markets. In this sense, the activity potentials of the allegedly superfluous are subject to secondary exploitation based on statesanctioned disciplines. Such exploitation necessarily takes place outside the firm and rests more on symbolic than material appropriation. Transforming labor power into adequate work performance always requires “external” regulation. Therefore, the sociology of work has long considered it unnecessary to distinguish systematically between primary and secondary exploitation, between the critiques of exploitation and alienation. However, we believe, third, that this conceptual fuzziness becomes problematic when the mode of controlling wage labor is predominantly described as self-economization, self-rationalization and self-control

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

101

(Pongratz and Voß 2000, 231–2). These concepts reflect the fact that the incorporation of capitalist relations in and by the subject is now the primary axis in the problem of transformation mentioned above. Bureaucratic coercion is gradually replaced by indirect control that makes rationalization and immediate control the responsibility of subjects who are capable of making autonomous decisions (Moldaschl and Sauer 2000). However appropriate such observations may be, they become problematic when they are overgeneralized and therefore lose sight of the causality and social differentiations of exploitation. In the new competitive regime, a few workaholics dictate the working conditions to the large majority who would actually prefer a different way of working. They can do this because they are presented as successful role models by elites who have the power of definition. The entrepreneurial success of resource-rich groups is based to a considerable degree on the (secondary) exploitation of migrant, sometimes academically qualified, labor for household chores. Moreover, giving symbolic jobs guarantees to members of the core work force often implies shifting market risks onto agency and other precarious workers who are thus subjected to an appropriation based on discipline. Therefore, expansion of competition (rather than “marketization”) does not as such imply an expansion of individual freedoms. There is no general weakening of hierarchic control, not even in “internal markets”. There is even less of that in “external markets” because secondary exploitation is impossible without external discipline and increasing unfreedom. Therefore we believe that, fourth, the consolidation of extra-economic force and the use of secondary exploitation are every bit as characteristic of the flexible mode of (re-)production as the expansion of zones of controlled autonomy. Apart from Landnahme (in the literal sense) by agrobusiness (FIAN international 2010), secondary exploitation is not a mere repetition of the “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2010) that characterized early capitalist development. New and previously unknown forms of exploitation were made possible by the Fordist Landnahme and the concomitant expansion of the welfare state, if not earlier. Through the welfare state, social inequalities and the basic forms of exploitation to which they are linked can be politically influenced and mitigated, but also aggravated. Welfare state regulation has structurally “politicized” (Lessenich 2015) exploitation. It has therefore become difficult to interpret distributional conflicts through a value-theoretical lens, narrowly understood. The extraordinary real wage increases of the Fordist era clearly cannot be

102

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

seen as mere oscillation around the subsistence level, even when the latter is understood as being subject to historical and moral modification (Busch and Land 2012, 11–152). Thanks to the Landnahme of finance capitalism, exchange relations have shifted again to the disadvantage of workers (Brenke 2011). In the capitalist centers, however, today’s discriminating precariousness is still defined as falling below the standards that welfare state regulation has established as the normality. Fifth, to adequately grasp the new relations of exploitation, we also have to rethink labor and, as a consequence, capital. The sociology of work must abandon its fixation on wage labor (instructive: Voß 2010) and also examine the activities that not only accompany wage labor, but in fact make it structurally possible in the first place. The absorption of activity reserves outside the narrowly defined area of professional paid work is a constitutive feature of Landnahme in finance capitalism. This expansive tendency is essentially little more than a progressive elimination of the traditional boundaries between productive and reproductive activities, between paid and unpaid labor, between employment and non-employment. Even the once rigidly defined demarcations between instrumentally rational labor and autonomous activity are becoming blurred. A narrow concept of productive, value-creating labor will not be able to capture this trend. It is therefore necessary to rethink not just the concept of labor, but with it also Marx’ theory of value and accumulation. Not that we consider it outdated; as a theory of value creation it remains indispensable (Deutschmann 2002). However, the progressive occupation of the entire range of activity potentials reveals the social and therefore value-creating character not just of natural resources, but also of activities whose immediate purpose is the production of use values (similarly: Hardt and Negri 2000, 22–41). It is also becoming increasingly obvious that capital accumulation always also comprises accumulation of organizational and definitional power. The aim is to accumulate unevenly distributed power resources which dominant capitalist actors can use to upgrade certain activities, individuals or social groups, and to downgrade others. A renewed theory of value and accumulation will systematically have to take into account this dimension of power that pervades the exchange relations between “internal” and “external” markets and between primary and secondary exploitation. 15

——————

15 Roemer 1982 is an attempt to detach the theory of exploitation from the Marxian theory of value. According to his approach, an individual or group of individuals is exploited when, within a game and its rules, there is an option that would make the exploited

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

103

We wonder, sixth, what the argument developed above implies for a contemporary critique of capitalism. The Landnahme concept draws attention to the expansive dynamic of capitalist societies, which is coming up against the limits to growth, especially in the advanced capitalist societies. As demonstrated, this concerns “external nature” 16, but also the constitution of subjectivity as well as the human capacity for work and other activities. Expanded access to this capacity increasingly violates the individual limits set by the body, biorhythm and human psyche (cf. Haubner 2010). This explains the increasing importance of health issues and the increase in mental illnesses, among which spectacular cases are merely the tip of the iceberg. If we want to challenge these developments, we have to make the systemic growth imperative the focus of critique in the social sciences. This applies both to the social and the artistic critique. The current dual, i.e. economic and ecological, crisis (Dörre 2011; 2012) marks a turning point insofar as conventional growth, the time-tested means of overcoming economic crises, will now inevitably exacerbate the ecological crises. The dual nature of this crisis affects the world of work at its core because the expanded access to the entire range of human activities gradually destroys the social preconditions that make economically rational and “entrepreneurial” (broadly understood) behavior possible in the first place. Systems of competition that ignore this by curtailing resources that provide people with a certain security and by exploiting flexibility potentials as free and unlimited resources will ultimately destroy even the capacity for creative destruction that is absolutely necessary for capitalist Landnahme. Thus, the generalization of competition leads not just to a crisis of ecological but also social reproduction. If we want to criticize this self-destructive expansionism, we have to abandon the superficial optimism with regard to modernization and the productive forces that still hamper the critical sociology of work. Not every management fashion contributes to the progress of productive forces and can therefore be seen as an—admittedly ambivalent— instrument of individual emancipation. Such reservations apply in particular to techniques of domination described by terms like “marketization” and “indirect control”. Their putative emancipatory potential can only be

——————

better off and the exploiters worse off if the exploited decide to quit the game. Legal liberation would be compatible with feudal exploitation, equal access to property with capitalist exploitation, and equalization of qualifications and skills with socialist exploitation. 16 Cf. Birgit Mahnkopf’s contribution to this volume.

104

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

assessed adequately when they are seen in connection with capitalist expansionism and the resulting growth dilemma. That said, we suggest, seventh, to embark on a sociological examination and reflection of the entire range of everyday modes of critique that exist in post-Fordist labor-centered societies. Precarious employment and informal work may seem marginal from the point of view of socially secure core work forces in global corporations, but they are often the dominant form of wage labor in transnational value chains. The uneven developments that go with this, the coexistence and overlap between “internal” and “external” markets, the intersection of different antagonisms and social conflicts have to be reflected in critical social science. That is why the weakened labor movements of the global North can no longer be the privileged, let alone the sole, reference points for critical social science. There is counter-Landnahme by social movements which, far from having “no program”, are experimenting practically with new mechanisms of social coordination at the micro-social level (Kraushaar 2012). Among them the indigenous resistance to Landnahme (in the literal sense), the protests by the Indignados in Spain or Portugal, or the Occupy New York movement. Their critique of the expansion of competition is in many ways more poignant and catches the public’s attention more effectively than the defensive struggles of the old labor and trade union movement. Nonetheless, the widespread sensation of being treated unfairly and the critique of capitalism articulated by the so-called “employment-oriented middle” (arbeitnehmerische Mitte, Vester 2001) of society ought not to be ignored. Fundamental social change would hardly be possible without them. An everyday critique of capitalism is also widespread among employees with permanent jobs. Large majorities of the production-related blue- and white-collar workers we interviewed in East and West Germany believe that they live in a society where social polarization is increasing. 67 percent of interviewees in a West German car manufacturer fully or somewhat agreed with the statement that there is now only a “top” and “bottom” section of society. In East Germany, a solid 60 percent agreed with that statement. 74 percent (West) and 79 percent (East) feel that wealth should be distributed much more fairly. The legitimacy of the capitalist economy is also eroding. Relative majorities in the West (54 percent) and the East (41 percent) agreed with the statement “The current economic system is unable to survive in the long term” (translation JM). If the undecided are included, the responses that are to some extent critical of

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

105

capitalism add up to 88 percent in the West and 74 percent in the East. The practical relevance of these responses should not be overestimated, but they provide glimpses of a critical common sense that a critical sociology of work can take up and use to create social resonance. 17 However, the examination of critical everyday thinking can no longer draw on the frame of reference provided by 20th century visions for an alternative society. Analyses that claim to go to the root of the problem must not shirk from critically questioning the systemic growth imperative that characterizes all known varieties of capitalist and state-socialist societies. The necessity of socially and ecologically sustainable investment and innovations notwithstanding: “Short-term fixes to prop up a bankrupt system aren’t good enough. Something more is needed” (Jackson 2009, 35). Undoubtedly one of the key steps towards overcoming this epochal crisis would be to reorganize the system of social labor, especially the interface between flexible productive labor on the one hand and paid and unpaid reproductive labor on the other. Use value-oriented (service) activities and organizational forms that transcend the growth imperative already contain the seeds for a resolution to the dual crisis. More concretely: placing a higher social value on personal services, care work, educational and pedagogical work and so on would constitute a big step towards an economically and socially sustainable post-growth society. In the Global North these sectors in particular still have meaningful jobs to distribute. They are also the only ones that could possibly still grow, if the chance to growth is not to be completely denied to the Global South. Therefore, the redefinition and especially the re-division of labor is a crucial field for social transformations in the future. The dimensions of this future change can be explored by looking at personal services and care work as examples. Among these dimensions are: (1) increased appreciation, professionalization and better pay for a part of these activities, (2) financing through taxes and redistributive tax policies, (3) new forms of property (cooperative service providers; foundations), (4) new ways of connecting the public and private spheres because not all kinds of care work can be organized as public services, (5) democratization of service work by granting participatory rights to producers, consumers and clients, (6) gender-balanced reductions of working hours and—above all—paid time for services to democ-

——————

17 The idea of a critical theory that is not backed by the experience of a collective, and which in some sense exists for its own sake—that is, for no one—is incoherent (Boltanski 2011, 5).

106

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

racy and the community. These are but a few important points for a transformation perspective that aims to tap the solidarity inherent in use valueoriented activities in order to restrict and gradually diminish the “competition principle” and its destructive logic of escalation. Whatever the chances of success of a transformation towards a post-capitalist post-growth society, anyone who wants to do political economy as critical social theory in the future will not be able to do this without an alternative political economy of work.

Works Cited Aglietta, Michel (1979). A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. The Us-Experience. London: Verso. Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf (1996). Grenzen der Globalisierung. Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Arendt, Hannah (1960 [1958]). The Origins of Totalitarism. New York: Meridian Books. Arrighi, Giovanni (2005). States, markets and capitalism, East and West. In Max Miller (ed.). Worlds of capitalism. Institutions, governance and economic change in the era of globalization, 109–145. London: Routledge. Bachinger, Karl, and Herbert Matis (2009). Entwicklungsdimensionen des Kapitalismus. Klassische sozioökonomische Konzeptionen und Analysen. Wien: UTB. Bennholdt-Thomsen, Veronika (1981). Subsistenzproduktion und erweiterte Reproduktion. Ein Beitrag zur Produktionsweisendiskussion. Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Marxschen Theorie, 14, 30–50. Berger, Johannes (1994). Ausbeutung. In Wolfgang Fritz Haug (ed.). HistorischKritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus, 735–743. Hamburg: Argument. Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2012). Transnationale (Krisen-)Dynamik des Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Klassenverhältnisse, Gender und Ethnizität aus politökonomischer Perspektive. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 22(1), 53–78. Binswanger, Christoph (2009). Die Wachstumsspirale. Geld, Energie und Imagination in der Dynamik des Marktprozesses. Marburg: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Bologna, Sergio (2006). Die Zerstörung der Mittelschichten. Thesen zur neuen Selbständigkeit. Graz/Wien: Nausner & Nausner. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Boltanski, Luc (2011). On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation. Cambridge: Polity Press. Booth, Melanie, Klaus Dörre, Tine Haubner, Kai Marquardsen, Karin Scherschel and Karen Schierhorn (2012). Bewährungsproben für die Unterschicht: Wir-

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

107

kungen aktivierender Arbeitsmarktpolitik. In Heinrich Best and Everhard Holtmann (eds.). Aufbruch der entsicherten Gesellschaft. Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung, 347–368. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Boris, Dieter, and Stefan Schmalz (2011). Die Krise als Katalysator. Verschiebungen in der Weltwirtschaft. In Christoph Scherrer, Thomas Dürmeier and Bernd Overwien (eds.). Perspektiven auf die Finanzkrise, 106–126. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. Bourdieu, Pierre (1989). Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge. Brenke, Karl (2011). Einkommensverteilung, Sparen, Konsum und Wirtschaftsleistung. Ein Rückblick auf die letzten zehn Jahre. In Matthias Machnig (ed.). Welchen Fortschritt wollen wir? Neue Wege zum Wachstum und sozialem Wohlstand, 84– 102. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Brenner, Robert (2005). After boom, bubble and bust: Where is the US economy going? In Max Miller (ed.). Worlds of capitalism. Institutions, governance and economic change in the era of globalization, 200–234. London: Routledge. Bude, Heinz, and Andreas Willisch (eds.). (2006). Das Problem der Exklusion. Ausgegrenzte, Entbehrliche, Überflüssige. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. Bundesagentur für Arbeit (ed.). (2011a). Der Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt in Deutschland. Monatsbericht für den Berichtsmonat März 2011. Nürnberg. Bundesagentur für Arbeit (ed.). (2011b). Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen. Erwerbstätige Arbeitslosengeld II-Bezieher Juli 2011. Nürnberg. Busch, Ulrich, and Rainer Land (2012). Teilhabekapitalismus—Fordistische Wirtschaftsentwicklung und Umbruch in Deutschland: 1950 bis 2009. In Forschungsverbund sozioökonomische Berichterstattung (ed.). Berichterstattung zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Teilhabe im Umbruch. Zweiter Bericht, 111–152. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Campbell, John L. (2004). Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cassady, John (2009). How Markets Fail. The Logic of Economic Calamities. London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Castel, Robert (2011). Die Krise der Arbeit. Neue Unsicherheiten und die Zukunft des Individuums. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. Crouch, Colin (2011). The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Deutschmann, Christoph (2002). Postindustrielle Industriesoziologie. Theoretische Grundlagen, Arbeitsverhältnisse und soziale Identitäten. Weinheim: Juventa. Deutschmann, Christoph (2012). Capitalist Dynamics—A Sociological Analysis. Working Paper 01/2012 of the DFG Research Group Post-Growth Societies Jena. DGB-Index Gute Arbeit (ed.). (2012). Arbeitshetze—Arbeitsintensivierung— Entgrenzung. So beurteilen Beschäftigte die Lage. Ergebnisse der Repräsentativumfrage 2011. Hamburg.

108

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

Dicken, Peter (2007). Global Shift. Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy. 5th edition. London: Guilford Publications. Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm, and Lutz Raphael (2011). Der Epochenbruch in den 1970er Jahren: Thesen zur Phänomenologie und den Wirkungen des Strukturwandels “nach dem Boom”. In Knud Andresen and Ursula Bitzeglo (eds.). “Nach dem Strukturbruch?” Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitsbeziehungen und Arbeitswelt(en) seit den 1970er Jahren, 25–42. Bonn: Dietz. Dörre, Klaus (2002). Kampf um Beteiligung. Arbeit, Partizipation und industrielle Beziehungen im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2011). Landnahme und die Grenzen kapitalistischer Dynamik. Eine Ideenskizze. Berliner Debatte Initial, 22(4), 56–72. Dörre, Klaus (2012). Landnahme, das Wachstumsdilemma und die “Achsen der Ungleichheit”, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 22(1), 101–128. Dörre, Klaus, Anja Hänel, Hajo Holst and Ingo Matuschek (2011a). Guter Betrieb, schlechte Gesellschaft? Arbeits- und Gesellschaftsbewusstsein im Prozess kapitalistischer Landnahme. In Cornelia Koppetsch (ed.). Nachrichten aus den Innenwelten des Kapitalismus. Zur Transformation moderner Subjektivität, 21–50. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus, Hajo Holst and Ingo Matuschek (2011b). Der Shareholder Value ist tot, es lebe die Maximalrendite! Von Management-Mimikry zu arbeitspolitischen Alternativen. In Lothar Schröder and Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). Gute Arbeit. Folgen der Krise, Arbeitsintensivierung und Restrukturierung, 80–98. Frankfurt M.: Bund-Verlag. Dörre, Klaus, Anja Hänel and Ingo Matuschek (eds.). (2012). Arbeits- und Gesellschaftsbewusstsein von Lohnabhängigen. Ergebnisse empirischer Belegschaftsbefragungen in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Working-Paper 04/2012 of the DFG Research Group Post-Growth Societies Jena. Dunning, John H. (1992). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Wokingham: Addison-Wesley. Ehrlich, Martin and Anja Hänel (2011). Sozialwirtschaftsbericht Thüringen. Kurzfassung. Jena. Ellguth, Peter, and Susanne Kohaut (2011). Tarifbindung und tarifliche Interessenvertretung: Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2010. WSI Mitteilungen, 64(5), 242–247. FIAN international secretariat (2010). Land Grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique. A report on two research missions—and a human rights analysis of land grabbing. Heidelberg. Graeber, David (2011). Debt. The first 5,000 years. Brooklyn/New York: Melville House. Habermas, Jürgen (2007 [1989]). A Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2. The Critique of functionalist Reason. Oxford: Polity Press. Haipeter, Thomas, and Klaus Dörre (eds.). (2011). Gewerkschaftliche Modernisierung. Wiesbaden: VS.

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

109

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri (2000). Empire. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. Harvey, David (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Harvey, David (2006). Limits to Capital. New and fully updated edition. London: Verso. Harvey, David (2010). The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism. London: Verso. Haubner, Tine (2010). Die Resistenz eigensinniger Alltagspraxen als Grenze der Aktivierbarkeit Langzeitarbeitsloser—Versuch einer kritischen Soziologie der Grenzziehung. Master Thesis, Jena. Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1993). Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. London: Routledge. Helfen, Markus (2011). Tarifpolitische Parallelwelten. Mitbestimmung, 58(7/8), 20– 23. Hirsch, Joachim, and Roland Roth (1986). Das neue Gesicht des Kapitalismus. Vom Fordismus zum Post-Fordismus. Hamburg: VSA. Hohendanner, Christian (2010). Unsichere Zeiten, unsichere Verträge? Befristete Arbeitsverträge zwischen Auf- und Abschwung. IAB-Kurzbericht 14/2010. Nürnberg. Holst, Hajo, Oliver Nachtwey and Klaus Dörre (2010). The Strategic Use of Temporary Agency Work—Functional Change of a Non-standard Form of Employment. International Journal of Action Research, 6(1), 108–138. Huffschmid, Jörg (2002). Politische Ökonomie der Finanzmärkte. New and fully updated edition. Hamburg: VSA. Jackson, Tim (2009). Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet. London/Sterling VA: Earthscan. Kämpf, Tobias (2008). Die neue Unsicherheit. Folgen der Globalisierung für hochqualifizierte Arbeitnehmer. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Kraemer, Klaus (2012). Ideen, Interessen und Institutionen: Welchen Beitrag kann die Soziologie zur Analyse moderner Finanzmärkte leisten?. In Klaus Kraemer and Sebastian Nessel (eds.). Entfesselte Finanzmärkte. Soziologische Analysen des modernen Kapitalismus, 25–62. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Kraushaar, Wolfgang (2012). Der Aufruhr der Ausgebildeten. Vom Arabischen Frühling zur Occupy-Bewegung. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. Land, Rainer (2011). Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. In Michael Thomas (ed.). Transformation moderner Gesellschaften und Überleben in alten Regionen. Debatten und Deutungen, 99–138. Münster: LIT. Lehndorff, Steffen (ed.). (2012). Ein Triumph gescheiterter Ideen. Warum Europa tief in der Krise steckt. Zehn-Länder-Fallstudien. Hamburg: VSA. Lessenich, Stephan (2008). Die Neuerfindung des Sozialen. Der Sozialstaat im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Bielefeld: transcript.

110

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

Lessenich, Stephan (2015). Mobility and Control: On the Dialectic of the “Active Society”. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 98–139. London/New York: Verso. Lutz, Burkart (1984). Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität. Eine Neuinterpretation der industriell-kapitalistischen Entwicklung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Luxemburg, Rosa (1963). The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge. Madörin, Mascha (2007). Neoliberalismus und die Reorganisation der CareÖkonomie. In Denknetz (ed.). Zur politischen Ökonomie der Schweiz. Analysen und Impulse zur Politik, 56–70. Zürich: edition 8. Marx, Karl (1954 [1887]). Capital. A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Volume 1. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Marx, Karl/Engels, Frederick (1976 [1848]). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Collected Works, Vol. 6: Marx and Engels 1845–1848. New York: International Publishers. 03.11.2017 http://solomon.soth.alexanderstreet.com/cgi-bin/asp/ philo/soth/getdoc.pl?S10022550-D000053. Mies, Maria (1983). Subsistenzproduktion, Hausfrauisierung, Kolonisierung. Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis, 9/10, 115–124. Miles, Robert, and Malcolm Brown (2003). Racism. London: Routledge. Moldaschl, Manfred, and Dieter Sauer (2000). Internalisierung des Marktes. Zur neuen Dialektik von Kooperation und Herrschaft. In Heiner Minssen (ed.). Begrenzte Entgrenzungen. Wandlungen von Organisation und Arbeit, 205–224. Berlin: De Gruyter. Negt, Oskar, and Alexander Kluge (1972). Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Pahl, Hanno (2012). Zentrum-Peripherie-Differenzierungen innerhalb der Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Grundriss und erste Befunde eines wissenschaftssoziologischen Forschungsprogramms. Working Paper 03/2012 of the DFG Research Group Post-Growth Societies Jena. Paqué, Karl-Heinz (2010). Wachstum! Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus. München: Hanser. Paul, Axel T. (2012). Crisis? What Crisis? Zur Logik der Spekulation oder Warum die Hypotheken-Krise lehrt, dass die nächste Krise kommt. In Klaus Kraemer and Sebastian Nessel (eds.). Entfesselte Finanzmärkte. Soziologische Analysen des modernen Kapitalismus, 181–200. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Pelizzari, Alessandro (2009). Dynamiken der Prekarisierung. Atypische Erwerbsverhältnisse und milieuspezifische Unsicherheitsbewältigung. Konstanz: UVK. Peukert, Helge (2010). Die große Finanzmarkt- und Staatsschuldenkrise. Eine kritischheterodoxe Untersuchung. 3rd and fully updated ed. Marburg: Metropolis. Polanyi, Karl (2001). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston/Massachusetts: Beacon Press. Pongratz, Hans J., and G. Günter Voß (2000). Vom Arbeitnehmer zum Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Zur Entgrenzung der Ware Arbeitskraft. In Heiner Minssen

LANDNAHME THROUGH TESTS

111

(ed.). Begrenzte Entgrenzung. Wandlungen von Organisation und Arbeit, 225–248. Berlin: De Gruyter. Reich, Robert B. (2008). Supercapitalism. The transformation of business, democracy, and everyday life. New York: Knopf. Reich, Robert B. (2010). Aftershock. The next economy and America’s future. New York: Vintage Books. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff (2009). This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press. Roemer, John E. (1982). A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rogall, Holger (2011). Grundlagen einer nachhaltigen Wirtschaftslehre. Volkswirtschaftslehre für Studierende des 21. Jahrhunderts. Marburg: Metropolis. Rogall, Holger (2012). Nachhaltige Ökonomie. Ökonomische Theorie und Praxis einer Nachhaltigen Entwicklung. 2nd new and fully updated edition. Marburg: Metropolis. Rosa, Hartmut (2005). Beschleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Rosa, Hartmut (2015). Temporary Workers and Active Citizens: What is Wrong with Late Modern Capitalism?. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 164–180. London/New York: Verso. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA. Scherschel, Karin, and Melanie Booth (2012). Aktivierung in die Prekarität: Folgen der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Deutschland. In Karin Scherschel, Peter Streckeisen and Manfred Krenn (eds.). Neue Prekarität. Die Folgen aktivierender Arbeitsmarktpolitik—europäische Länder im Vergleich, 17–46. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Schimank, Uwe (2011). Wohlfahrtsstaaten als funktionale Antagonismen von Kapitalismus und Demokratie. Ein immer labiler Mechanismus?. MPIfG Working Paper 2/11. Cologne. Schmidt, Ingo (2012). Rosa Luxemburg and the Critique of Political Economy. Ed. by Riccardo Bellofiore. Review Article. Historical Materialism, 20(1), 253–266. Schumann, Michael (2003). Metamorphosen von Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewusstsein. Kritische Industriesoziologie zwischen Taylorismusanalyse und Mitgestaltung innovativer Arbeitspolitik. Hamburg: VSA. Silver, Beverly J. (2008). Forces of labor. Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorkin, Andrew Ross (2010). Too big to fail. The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington fought to save the financial system—and themselves. London: Penguin Books. Stern, Nicholas (2007). The Economies of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

112

KLAUS DÖRRE AND TINE HAUBNER

Streeck, Wolfgang (2009). Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Streeck, Wolfgang (2011). Taking capitalism seriously: Towards an institutionalist approach to contemporary political economy. Socio-Economic Review, 9(1), 137– 167. Sweezy, Paul M. (1964 [1942]). The theory of capitalist development. Principles of Marxian political economy. New York: Monthly Review Press. Thielemann, Ulrich (2010). Wettbewerb als Gerechtigkeitskonzept. Kritik des Neoliberalismus. Marburg: Metropolis. Vitali, Stefania, James B. Glattfelder and Stefano Battiston (2011). The Network of Global Corporate Control. arXiv preprint, 19.09.2011. Voß, G. Günter (2010). Was ist Arbeit? Zum Problem eines allgemeinen Arbeitsbegriffs. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günter Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie. With the participation of Anna Hoffmann, 23–80. Wiesbaden: VS. Vester, Michael, Peter von Oertzen, Heiko Geiling, Thomas Hermann and Dagmar Müller (2001). Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel. Zwischen Integration und Ausgrenzung. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Weber, Max (2001 [1905]). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Routledge. Windolf, Paul (ed.). (2005). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen. Wiesbaden: VS. Wright, Erik Olin (2009). Understanding Class. Towards an Integrated Analytical Approach. New Left Review 60, 101–116.

II. What Do Theories of Capitalism Contribute to the Sociology of Work?

Diverging Views on Capitalism and Work: How Feminist Analyses of Capitalism Relate to the Theory of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work Brigitte Aulenbacher Feminist theories of society concern themselves with how modern society is constituted and how this shapes its development. The question is whether modern society is marked by an historically specific configuration of gender relations and gender order. Another question is to what extent modern society is characterized by its relations to other societies and what role ethnic differentiations and inequalities play in it. With regard to social transformation and reorganization, feminist approaches examine the early and pre-capitalist, Fordist capitalist and state-socialist as well as the postFordist and post-socialist capitalist formations. A recurrent theme in this context is the specifically modern tension between an economy based on inequality and the principle of civil equality (for an overview see Aulenbacher 2010a; Gottschall 2000, 140–192). Even when they do focus only on the capitalist formations of modernity, feminist theories of society will not draw, or not exclusively, on just the theory of capitalism. They may even take the opposite view. This is why I will talk here of analyses, rather than theories, of capitalism, despite what the title of the present volume suggests. In view of the occasion, I will look at feminist analyses of capitalism that focus on the issue of work. 1 This particular strand of feminist analysis of capitalism stands in the Marxist or materialist tradition. From a history of science point of view, it has had a chequered history in the German-speaking countries. From the late 1960s and the then fashionable feminist critique of Marxism to the

——————

1 Other important strands of gender studies include the feminist critique of rationality, which deals with the separation between the public and private spheres and the nature of organisations; the feminist welfare state debate, which examines work from the point of view of a critique of capitalism without, however, engaging with theories of capitalism; and pro-feminist masculinity studies that look at masculinity in the context of modernity, industrial society and capitalism.

116

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

1980s, it was a main current in gender and women’s studies as far as the theory of society and subjectivity were concerned. In the 1990s, it became marginalized by approaches that drew on post-structuralism, cultural studies as well as constructivist theories of social interaction and institutions. Nonetheless, it continued to develop by engaging with these newer approaches as well as its own tradition. Since the 2000s, these currents are in a process of reconfiguration. The rediscovery of the intersectionality concept has played an important role here and has drawn more attention to complex social differentiations and inequalities (for a chronological and history of science account of this development see Aulenbacher 2010b; Knapp 2005; Wetterer 2009). Out of this history of science I will select a few positions, insights and questions with the purpose of characterizing the feminist analysis of capitalism and its relation to the theory of capitalism. I will demonstrate the extent to which these two represent diverging views on capitalism and work that cannot easily be made compatible. 2 First, I will discuss different perspectives on the emergence and structure of the capitalist formation of modern societies (1), then I will present different views on the post-Fordist wage labor society and social divisions of labor (2).

1. Feminist Accounts of the Emergence and Structure of Capitalism The international domestic labor debate in the 1970s and 1980s was among the first key influences of the feminist analysis of capitalism. Driven by the question of the “value of domestic labor”, which it pursued for fundamental political reasons and out of an interest in the theory of society, it subjected Marxian theory to a thorough revision, which, to be sure, was not entirely free of “misunderstandings” (Gottschall 2000, 141–5). A project that was pioneered by Claudia von Werlhof (1983) and taken up by Ursula Beer (1983; 1990, 71–8) is of continuing importance to the feminist analysis of capitalism. They attempted to use the fundamental parts of the young Marx’ materialist philosophy of history, in which the “production of

——————

2 I thank Klaus Dörre and Kerstin Jürgens for their thought-provoking comments on this undertaking.

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

117

life” (Marx and Engels 2000, 10) is the condition for everything else, against the older Marx. In the latter’s work, the inquiry into the laws of motion of capitalism starts from the “analysis of commodity” (Marx 1954, 35), and the economic reproduction of “capital” becomes the center of attention. According to Ursula Beer (1983), the other conditions for the “existence of living human individuals” (Marx and Engels 2000, 3) are tacitly assumed as given; their significance for capital accumulation is therefore ignored (von Werlhof 1983; 1988). Within the limits of what is possible in the theory of capitalism, Ursula Beer’s (1990) studies in particular have “turned Marx from his head back to his feet” (Beer 1983) by systematically taking into account human existence in a re-interpretation of Marx’ theory that draws on French structuralist Marxism as well as Critical Theory (cf. Beer 1990). The author interprets the transition from a society based on estates to a capitalist society as the emergence of a “mode of economy and population” that is based on separate “economies of the market, provisioning and reproduction” (ibid., 152). For this functional separation to take place, and for the “economy of the market” to be able to disregard other life concerns and even achieve primacy under the guidance of the profit motive, a necessary condition had to be fulfilled: that the services rendered by the “economies of provisioning and reproduction” were already otherwise secured. The “polarization of gender characters” (Hausen 1976), that is, the identification of femininity and masculinity as opposites which had already started earlier, provided an appropriate ordering pattern. During the transition from an estates-based to a capitalist society, men became privileged over women with regard to access to jobs, income and property on the basis of this pattern. According to Ursula Beer (1990, 152–257), civil law secured such privilege through a number of legal complexes that are formally independent but operate in similar ways and have effects that combine and stabilize each other, including labor law, tax law, social security law and family law. They grant men the right of disposal over women’s labor power and reproductive capabilities as well as their property. According to Andrea Maihofer (1995), discourses of difference that denied women the status of full and equal subjects of civil society justified legal disadvantages, making them acceptable in spite of modernity’s equality postulate. Therefore, the hierarchical structure of gender relations and the gender order is historically constitutive for the emergence, structure and dynamic of

118

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

capitalism. It is not a mere historical condition, as theories of capitalism and inequality would have it (cf. Aulenbacher 2005, 19–56). According to the feminist view, capitalism never exists in a “pure state”. Therefore, theories of capitalism cannot explain it sufficiently, which also explains the reserve mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. With regard to gender domination, Ursula Beer (1990, 260–288) refers to capitalism as “secondary patriarchalism” (as opposed to the “primary patriarchalism” of the estates-based society). It is mediated by the legally sanctioned access to property in the means of production as well as wage income, and the “law of value” plays the role of an historically novel transmission mechanism of gender domination in it (Beer 1990, 273–4). More recently, another key intervention has been made by Cornelia Klinger (2003). It is meant as a contribution to intra-feminist debate and as a critique of the shift towards focusing on social differences due to the growing influence of cultural studies and social constructivism. It is also a plea to return to the analysis of social inequalities (ibid., 14–24). 3 What is particularly interesting in the context of the present volume is how she introduces the categories gender, ethnicity and class into the analysis of capitalism. The author approaches social reproduction from the assumption that any society must, for the sake of its survival, address three sets of unavoidable challenges or problems that are connected to birth, the process of aging and finiteness of life: natality, morbidity, mortality. Anticipating her later adoption of the intersectionality concept (cf. Klinger and Knapp 2007), she examines both the material and ideational as well as the structural and (inter-)subjective dimensions of how this takes place in capitalist society in the context of work and alienness (cf. Klinger 2003, 24–32). She argues that gender, race and class are three categories of inequality with different origins. By interlocking, they become structural determinants of the capitalist formation. With regard to the forms of domination that they give rise to, this formation therefore has to be understood as capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy (ibid., 31). Given the tension between economic inequality and civil equality, classbased divisions of labor in particular are sanctioned as meritocratic, according to Klinger, although they too are legitimated by “alienness effects [Fremdheitseffekte]” (ibid., 26) such as the separation of manual from intellec-

——————

3 See also Cornelia Klinger’s contribution to the present volume.

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

119

tual labor. She also sees divisions of labor on the basis of gender and race as part and parcel of the social organization of sexuality, generativity, the separation of production and reproduction as well as the colonial or postcolonial access to resources, but states that they collide with the values of modernity and therefore require legitimation (ibid., 31). Such legitimation is achieved through “alienness effects”: by naturalizing gender and race, they deny certain people the explicitly universal claim to equality—a claim that was, however, implicitly based on the “white, bourgeois or middle class, occidental, male subject”—because they are seen as different (ibid., 19). In the lives of individuals, differences and inequalities intersect, while in social life they cause separations that make solidarity more difficult (ibid., 34–5). Drawing on early Critical Theory, Regina Becker-Schmidt (1991, 386–394; 1998, 110) had already described this constellation of domination as privilege and coalition-building capability on the part of the powerful, which contrasts with the dissociation and social compulsion suffered by the underprivileged. Cornelia Klinger (2003) discusses the interlocking of capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy at the level of “forms of domination”, but remains vague when it comes to the overlapping of different forms of domination in the sphere of social labor because she systematically relates the “production of things” to class and race, but not also to gender. The opposite applies to the “production of life” (ibid., 31). Thus she loses sight of that connection between the capital relation and gender relations which Ursula Beer (1990) had pointed out: that the gendered organization of work and generativity is inherent to capitalist production for historical reasons and therefore underlies the separation of commodity production from other social “productions” that is necessary under capitalism. With regard to “imperialism” (Klinger 2003) we can follow Ilse Lenz (1995, 23–30) and add that colonialist and capitalist expansions have taken over and modified—in the interest of access to resources and profit seeking—the social organization of other societies as a whole, including the organization of work and generativity in gender relations, which continues even today. Cornelia Klinger (2003) and most feminist analyses of capitalism see the categories gender, ethnicity and class in their current form not as relics of the past but as genuinely modern, as they have emerged together with modernity. They are irreducible to one another and therefore autonomous, yet interwoven, determinants of social structure of equal rank, contrary to what theories of capitalism and social inequality claim (cf. Aulenbacher

120

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

2005). 4 This raises the question of how these factors affect the structure— a question that theories of capitalism do not really ask. Despite their stated intention of examining the connection between capitalist and non-capitalist relations of production as well as complex social inequalities, even regulation theory (cf. Hirsch 2005, 88–96) and the most recent version of the Landnahme approach (cf. Dörre 2010) trace social dynamics ultimately and exclusively back to the wage labor relation and capital valorization, e.g. as “structural growth imperative of capitalist economies” (ibid., 53). Forms of “secondary exploitation” (ibid.), like unpaid labor performed mostly by women, are mentioned as mere effects, for example in areas affected by Landnahme. However, in light of the above-mentioned connection between gender, ethnicity and class and the constitution of capitalism, feminist analyses of capitalism cannot be satisfied with this. They must be able to explain how gender and ethnicity, in the shape of andro- and Eurocentrism, create and co-determine social dynamics that can therefore no longer be conceived as “purely” capitalist. On the one hand, the challenge is to examine the dynamics and shifting relations of domination—from colonialism to global financial management, metaphorically speaking—with a focus on the interlocking of different claims to supremacy and attempts at hegemony. On the other hand, we must avoid personalizing domination and social dynamics—as often happens in journalism and popular science where the financial crisis, like many other historical events before, is presented as a manmade disaster. Nonetheless, we must also acknowledge that they cannot arise in the absence of “personal bearers of domination” (cf. BeckerSchmidt 1991, 386). Pro-feminist masculinity studies go in a similar direction and also take into account that we are dealing here with genuinely Eurocentric, although globally interdependent trends, which they try to

——————

4 To avoid misunderstandings let me stress that referring to gender and ethnicity as structural determinants of capitalism does not preclude that men and women as well as native and migrant parts of a population and so on may enjoy equal rights. That is what the principle of civil equality envisages. How far this is limited by its interaction with the principle of economic inequality would be a topic for another paper. The point here is that the peculiar structures and dynamics of capitalism are irredeemably bound up with its historical constituents because history cannot be undone. That is also why gender, ethnicity and class must be given equal consideration, though this does not mean that they are necessarily of equal empirical importance. How empirically important which category becomes under what kind of conditions can vary greatly.

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

121

describe by using the “trans” prefix, as for example in “economic transpatriarchies” (Hearn 2009). With regard to social dynamics, theories of capitalism and feminist analyses of capitalism can be said to hover around the same unanswered question: what is the bundle of factors that constitute and determine the trajectory of those dynamics that are specific to capitalism? Theories of capitalism see these dynamics as “purely” capitalist and can therefore not avoid certain blind spots, while feminist analyses have not yet fully grasped the andro- and Eurocentric dimension.

2. The Post-Fordist Wage Labor Society as Seen by Feminism and the Theory of Capitalism The domestic labor debate was necessary to demonstrate that society undervalues and underestimates the significance of unpaid labor, as did Marx who thus affirmed these social relations theoretically. Today however, feminism preaches to the converted when it proposes a broad concept of labor. Current debates over post-Fordism among theorists of capitalism, as well as debates in the sociology of work over how work has changed, do not deny its relevance, but there is still little research that puts this conceptual insight into practice (cf. Jürgens 2008). 5 However, rather than the well-received feminist analyses of capitalism, it is Regina BeckerSchmidt’s (1991; 2003; 2007) approach, in which she draws on early Critical Theory, that has received the greatest recognition, especially her “dual societalization” (doppelte Vergesellschaftung) hypothesis and the concept of work as “ensemble” (Ensemblecharakter der Arbeit) that later emerged from the former. The latter examines different kinds of work in relation to one another and in connection to divisions of labor on the basis of gender, ethnicity and class. However, the disagreement between feminist analyses of capitalism and theories of capitalism, which I have described above, is also apparent in the sociology of work. They disagree on where analysis should start. Should it start from paid work because it has a particularly strong influence on the connection between “work and life” (cf. Kratzer and Sauer 2007), or should it give equal weight to all the factors that under-

——————

5 See Kerstin Jürgen’s contribution to this volume.

122

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

lie the commodification and valorization of social life and therefore to all forms of paid and unpaid labor because they have to be seen in their respective differences (cf. Aulenbacher and Riegraf 2009; Becker-Schmidt 2007)? Moreover, feminist labor research has developed its own perspectives on “doing gender” and “doing ethnicity” at work. This discussion is opposed, but also connected, to materialist traditions (for an overview see Aulenbacher 2010c). In light of this history of science, and having regard for the global integration of the post-Fordist wage labor society and the divisions of labor in it, I will now compare two more recent examples for the feminist approach and the theory of capitalism respectively to examine their current relationship. As an example of a feminist and intersectional approach I choose Helma Lutz’ (2010) reconstruction of the wage labor society from the colonial and post-colonial servant society to the Fordist male breadwinner society and to the post-Fordist adult worker society. It is very similar to Lars Kohlmorgen’s (2004) regulationist analysis of the same time period. Both authors largely agree that these historical formations exhibit gender and ethnic differentiations and inequalities that have crucially determined the configuration of work—whether paid, unpaid or voluntary work—as well as social benefits. Like the male breadwinner model, the adult worker model is implicitly based on the indigenous middle classes. In the former, the unpaid labor of the housewife, who can at best contribute a “supplementary income” and enjoys only limited social security, is implicitly factored in. In the latter, we see paid housework that is usually performed by migrants, while the remaining part of the triple-c (cleaning, cooking, caring) continues to be unevenly divided between men and women. Both reduce the burden on a welfare state that has switched from a focus on sustaining families to the individual in employment (see, with somewhat diverging views, Kohlmorgen 2004, 137–158, 273–307; Lutz 2010, 26–30; also Aulenbacher and Riegraf 2009). In light of the discussion in the preceding paragraph, it comes as no surprise that Lars Kohlmorgen (2004, 104–9) interprets these developments as “gendered class formation” (ibid., 106) and that he sees capital accumulation as the structural determining factor behind it. According to him, such class formation takes place through the economically driven flexibilization and precarization of wage labor that starts in the real economy and moves on to the increasingly independent financial economy. This process interacts with the pluralization of life styles, which has completely

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

123

different causal roots, and is also manifested in the shift from the welfare to the “competition state” (cf. Kohlmorgen 2004, 199–223). Helma Lutz has a different vantage point on current trends: rather than seeing them from the “head” of “valuations and efficiency assessments that follow the norm set by financial markets” (Lutz 2010, 33), she views them from the “feet” of those care work activities that the former can only ignore because, and to the extent to which, they are performed elsewhere, or because they are not profitable growth markets (yet), for example in the sense of possible Landnahmen (cf. Dörre 2010). In her view, the postFordist formation of the wage labor society—like previous formations—is shaped by a global division of labor in which the “congenial logics” (Becker-Schmidt 1991) of capitalism, androcentrism and Eurocentrism can be seen from new global interdependencies down to the everyday lives of private households. The care work performed by migrants in Western European and North American countries of destination corresponds to the neglect of care work in their Eastern European, African, Latin American and Asian countries of origin (also see Rerrich 2006). The new regimes of gender, care and migration are essentially the institutional regulation of new divisions of labor among women that are being legitimized in and through everyday “doing gender” and “doing ethnicity”, much like Cornelia Klinger’s (2003) “alienness effects” (cf. Lutz 2007). They strengthen once more the existing androcentric nature of wage labor, despite the accelerated integration of women into the classic segments of the white, male middle classes (see already Young 1998) and a precarization of employment in those segments that also affects men (cf. Dörre 2005) who, in addition, increasingly take on paternal duties (cf. Scholz 2009). Contrary to the openly discriminatory male breadwinner model, the adult worker model completely ignores care work. It thus discriminates indirectly and in a new way against those who continue to care, still mostly women. Studies in the sociology of work show that they are forced to overstretch themselves if they want to keep up in the new forms of wage labor as “entrepreneurial employees” (Voß and Weiß 2005). The feminist analysis of capitalism uses social types like the male breadwinner or the adult worker to describe how the members of society are normatively and institutionally integrated into wage labor, housework and voluntary work as well as welfare benefits. This is then reflected—in highly individualized, yet socially structured fashion—in their biographic and everyday working arrangements that cannot be produced independently of

124

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

the existing social orders, including those of gender and ethnicity (cf. Aulenbacher and Riegraf 2011). In such a constellation, neither economic dynamics nor a (single) type of work, such as wage labor, can be seen as the sole structural determinant of individual and social life. They are causally effective only in connection with a wide range of other concerns—and with varying empirical weights. In other—and concluding—words: it is not a coincidence that the feminist analysis of capitalism does not play a leading role when sociologists of work identify new social types that, like the “entrepreneurial employee” (originally Voß and Pongratz 1998), are primarily derived from changes to wage labor in the Fordist lead sectors, and then use them as points of departure for systematically examining the mediation of “work and life” (cf. Voß 2000). Neither is it a coincidence that feminist analysis does play a leading role in the research on care work, whether private or professional, as well as studies of the welfare state. Nonetheless, I hope that I have managed to demonstrate that the feminist analysis of capitalism on the one hand and the theory of capitalism and the closely related sociology of work on the other do not simply complement each other.

Works Cited Aulenbacher, Brigitte (2005). Rationalisierung und Geschlecht in soziologischen Gegenwartsanalysen. Wiesbaden: VS. Aulenbacher, Brigitte (2010a). Gesellschaftsanalysen der Geschlechterforschung. In Brigitte Aulenbacher, Michael Meuser and Birgit Riegraf (eds.). Soziologische Geschlechterforschung. Eine Einführung, 33–58. Wiesbaden: VS. Aulenbacher, Brigitte (2010b). Intersektionalität—Die Wiederentdeckung komplexer sozialer Ungleichheiten und neue Wege in der Geschlechterforschung. In Brigitte Aulenbacher, Michael Meuser and Birgit Riegraf (eds.). Soziologische Geschlechterforschung. Eine Einführung, 211–224. Wiesbaden: VS. Aulenbacher, Brigitte (2010c). Rationalisierung und der Wandel von Erwerbsarbeit aus der Genderperspektive. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 301–328. Wiesbaden: VS. Aulenbacher, Brigitte, and Birgit Riegraf (2009). Markteffizienz und Ungleichheit—Zwei Seiten einer Medaille? Klasse/Schicht, Geschlecht und Ethnie im Übergang zur postfordistischen Arbeitsgesellschaft. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Angelika Wetterer (eds.). Arbeit. Perspektiven und Diagnosen der Geschlechterforschung, 230–248. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

125

Aulenbacher, Brigitte, and Birgit Riegraf (2011). Die Analyse alltäglicher und biografischer Arbeitsarrangements als Weg arbeits- und industriesoziologischer Sozial- und Zeitdiagnostik. Arbeits- und Industriesoziologische Studien, 4(2), 74–90. Becker-Schmidt, Regina (1991). Individuum, Klasse und Geschlecht aus der Perspektive der Kritischen Theorie. In Wolfgang Zapf (ed.). Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften, 383–394. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Becker-Schmidt, Regina (1998). Trennung, Verknüpfung, Vermittlung: Zum feministischen Umgang mit Dichotomien. In Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (ed.). Kurskorrekturen. Feminismus zwischen Kritischer Theorie und Postmoderne, 84–125. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Becker-Schmidt, Regina (2003). Umbrüche in Arbeitsbiografien von Frauen: Regionale Konstellationen und globale Entwicklungen. In Gudrun-Axeli Knapp and Angelika Wetterer (eds.). Achsen der Differenz. Gesellschaftstheorie und feministische Kritik II, 101–132. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Becker-Schmidt, Regina (2007). Geschlechter- und Arbeitsverhältnisse in Bewegung. In Brigitte Aulenbacher, Maria Funder, Heike Jacobsen and Susanne Völker (eds.). Arbeit und Geschlecht im Umbruch der modernen Gesellschaft. Forschung im Dialog, 250–268. Wiesbaden: VS. Beer, Ursula (1983). Marx auf die Füße gestellt? Zum theoretischen Entwurf von Claudia v. Werlhof. Prokla, 13(1), 22–37. Beer, Ursula (1990). Geschlecht, Struktur, Geschichte. Soziale Konstituierung des Geschlechterverhältnisses. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Dörre, Klaus (2005). Prekäre Beschäftigung—ein unterschätztes Phänomen in der Debatte um die Marktsteuerung und Subjektivierung von Arbeit. In Karin Lohr and Hildegard Maria Nickel (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit—Riskante Chancen, 180–205. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Dörre, Klaus (2010). Landnahme, sekundäre Ausbeutung und soziale Zeitregimes. Eine Ideenskizze. In Michael Frey, Andreas Heilmann, Karin Lohr, Alexandra Manske and Susanne Völker (eds.). Perspektiven auf Arbeit und Geschlecht, Transformationen, Reflexionen, Interventionen, 47–72. München/Mehring: Rainer Hampp. Gottschall, Karin (2000). Soziale Ungleichheit und Geschlecht. Kontinuitäten und Brüche, Sackgassen und Erkenntnispotentiale im deutschen soziologischen Diskurs. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Hausen, Karin (1976). Die Polarisierung der “Geschlechtscharaktere”—eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben. In Werner Conze (ed.). Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas, 363–393. Stuttgart: Klett. Hearn, Jeff (2009). Von gendered organizations zu transnationalen Patriarchien— Theorien und Fragmente. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Birgit Riegraf (eds.). Erkenntnis und Methode. Geschlechterforschung in Zeiten des Umbruchs, 267–290. Wiesbaden: VS. Hirsch, Joachim (2005). Materialistische Staatstheorie, Transformationsprozesse des kapitalistischen Staatensystems. Hamburg: VSA.

126

BRIGITTE AULENBACHER

Jürgens, Kerstin (2008). Perspektiverweiterung statt Kriseninszenierung. Ein Beitrag zum Diskurs über die Zukunft der Arbeits- und Industriesoziologie. In Norbert Huchler (ed.). Ein Fach wird vermessen. Positionen zur Zukunft der Disziplin Arbeits- und Industriesoziologie, 45–68. Berlin: edition sigma. Klinger, Cornelia (2003). Ungleichheit in den Verhältnissen von Klasse, Rasse und Geschlecht. In Gudrun-Axeli Knapp and Angelika Wetterer (eds.). Achsen der Differenz. Gesellschaftstheorie und feministische Kritik II, 14–48. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Klinger, Cornelia, and Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (2007). Achsen der Ungleichheit— Achsen der Differenz: Verhältnisbestimmungen von Klasse, Geschlecht, “Rasse”/Ethnizität. In Cornelia Klinger, Gudrun-Axeli Knapp and Birgit Sauer (eds.). Achsen der Ungleichheit. Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht und Ethnizität, 19–41. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Knapp, Gudrun-Axeli (2005). “Intersectionaliy”—ein neues Paradigma feministischer Theorie? Zur transatlantischen Reise von “Race, Class, Gender”. Feministische Studien, 23(1), 68–81. Kohlmorgen, Lars (2004). Regulation, Klasse, Geschlecht. Die Konstituierung der Sozialstruktur im Fordismus und Postfordismus. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Kratzer, Nick, and Dieter Sauer (2007). Entgrenzte Arbeit—gefährdete Reproduktion. Genderfragen in der Arbeitsforschung. In Brigitte Aulenbacher, Maria Funder, Heike Jacobsen and Susanne Völker (eds.). Arbeit und Geschlecht im Umbruch der modernen Gesellschaft. Forschung im Dialog, 235–249. Wiesbaden: VS. Lenz, Ilse (1995). Geschlecht, Herrschaft und internationale Ungleichheit. In Regina Becker-Schmidt and Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (eds.). Das Geschlechterverhältnis als Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaften, 19–46. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Lutz, Helma (2007). “Die 24-Stunden-Polin”—Eine intersektionelle Analyse transnationaler Dienstleistungen. In Cornelia Klinger, Gudrun-Axeli Knapp and Birgit Sauer (eds.). Achsen der Ungleichheit. Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht und Ethnizität, 210–234. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Lutz, Helma (2010). Unsichtbar und unproduktiv? Haushaltsarbeit und Care Work—die Rückseite der Arbeitsgesellschaft. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 35(2), 23–57. Maihofer, Andrea (1995). Geschlecht als Existenzweise. Macht, Moral, Recht und Geschlechterdifferenz. Frankfurt M.: Helmer. Marx, Karl (1954 [1887]). Capital. A critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Volume 1. Moscow. Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels (2000 [1932]). A Critique of German Ideology. Moscow. 27.10.2017 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/ger man-ideology/ch01.htm. Rerrich, Maria S. (2006). Die ganze Welt zu Hause. Cosmobile Putzfrauen in privaten Haushalten. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. Scholz, Sylka (2009). Männer und Männlichkeiten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Erwerbs- und Famlienarbeit. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Angelika Wetterer

DIVERGING VIEWS ON CAPITALISM AND WORK

127

(eds.). Arbeit. Perspektiven und Diagnosen der Geschlechterforschung, 82–99. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Voß, G. Günter (2000). Das Ende der Teilung von “Arbeit und Leben”? An der Schwelle zu einem neuen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnis von Betriebs- und Lebensführung. In Werner Kudera and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Lebensführung und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zu Konzept und Empirie alltäglicher Lebensführung. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Voß, G. Günter, and Hans J. Pongratz (1998). Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Eine neue Grundform der »Ware Arbeitskraft«?. In Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 50(1), 131–158. Voß, G. Günter, and Cornelia Weiß (2005). Ist der Arbeitskraftunternehmer weiblich?. In Karin Lohr and Hildegard Maria Nickel (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit—Riskante Chancen, 65–91. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Werlhof, Claudia von (1983). Lohn ist ein “Wert”, Leben nicht? Auseinandersetzung mit einer “linken” Frau. Eine Replik auf Ursula Beer. Prokla, 13(1), 38– 58. Werlhof, Claudia von (1988). The Proletarian is Dead! Long Live the Housewife!. In Claudia v. Werlhof, Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen (eds.). Women. The Last Colony, 168–181. London: Zed Books. Wetterer, Angelika (2009). Arbeitsteilung & Geschlechterkonstruktion—Eine theoriegeschichtliche Rekonstruktion. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Angelika Wetterer (eds.). Arbeit, Perspektiven und Diagnosen der Geschlechterforschung, 42–63. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Young, Brigitte (1998). Genderregime und Staat in der globalen NetzwerkÖkonomie. Prokla, 28(2), 175–198.

The Theory of Regulation and Labor Policy Hans-Jürgen Bieling

1. Introduction Since the late 1970s, the French regulation school has brought a breath of fresh air to critical political economy. Above all, it introduced a number of theoretical concept—such as regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, hegemonic bloc—that made it possible to conceive the connection between the economic and the political in non-economistic and nondeterminist fashion. Over time, the French regulation school has become more differentiated (for an overview see Hübner 1990; Jessop 1990; Becker 2009), and certain analytical deficits and blind spots have been identified. Despite differentiation and critique, however, a general basic structure of regulationist research remained that could also be applied to questions from adjacent sub-disciplines in the social sciences. The sociology of work was influenced by regulation theory in different ways. On the one hand, some prominent regulationists have themselves looked at issues that are related to the sociology of work (e.g. Lipietz 1997; Boyer and Durand 1997; Boyer 2006; Amable 2003). On the other hand, sociologists of work and industrial relations have also drawn inspiration from regulation theory and developed mediating concepts that have connected the regulationist analysis of capitalism and the sociology of work (cf. Lutz 1984). “Labor policy” was a particularly useful mediating concept. It was mostly developed at the Berlin Social Science Center (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB); cf. Jürgens and Naschold 1984; Hildebrandt et al. 2007), but was later also taken up and used in other research contexts (cf., among others, Lehndorff 2006; Scheele 2008). In my contribution I will argue that, despite these and similar efforts to use the regulationist analysis of capitalism in the sociology of work, the analytical and critical potential of regulation theory has not been properly exhausted. To support this hypothesis, I will first outline some fundamen-

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

129

tal arguments of regulation theory (2), before I briefly discuss the connecting concept of labor policy and its relevance for the analysis of capitalism and the sociology of work (3). Connecting the analysis of capitalism and the sociology of work is very timely because capitalism’s recent transformation, that is, the transition to a “finance-led growth regime” (Boyer 2000; Aglietta 2000) or “financial market capitalism” (Windolf 2005) and its current crisis, confirms the relevance of regulationist analyses of capitalism to the sociology of work (4). I conclude by pointing out some important implications for a research agenda that is based on this approach (5).

2. Essentials of Regulation Theory French regulation theory, or more precisely its Parisian school, has a dual origin. On the one hand, it goes back theoretically and conceptually to the debate over Marxist structuralism. As “rebel sons of Althusser” (Lipietz 1987, 19), many original regulationists saw themselves as working within the tradition of Marxist structuralism. Accordingly, they rejected a simplistic understanding of the base-superstructure model and emphasized the constitutive importance of cultural, ideological and political relations over the capitalist mode of production. The latter was understood as a social formation with a specific structure, that is, as an ensemble of different relations of production, including non-capitalist ones, that is nonetheless dominated by capitalist relations. They also assumed primacy of the relations of production over the forces of production, questioning the latter’s alleged neutrality. 1 Despite these positive references, regulation theory also distanced itself from structuralism in important regards (cf. Hübner 1990, 66–70; Lipietz 1991). Its inability to acknowledge, let alone analyze, contradictions, conflicts and the resultant social changes was seen as a particularly serious flaw. To correct it, many regulationists used a Gramscian con-

——————

1 Assuming primacy of the relations of production implies a particular sensitivity to issues related to the sociology of work because it accords more importance to relations of possession than property relations, and therefore also more importance to the labor process than the process of valorization. The focus is squarely on the (managerial) control over the organization of work and production, which corresponds to specific social hierarchies and power relations inside the firm.

130

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

cept of hegemonic struggles to open up structural Marxism by giving it an actor-centered makeover. Taking into account multiple processes of subjectification and identity formation—many of which are related to labor policy and class politics—they (re-)conceptualized capitalist accumulation as an inherently contradictory, contested and unstable process. The switch from a focus on “reproduction” to “regulation” also reflected this. Apart from the critical engagement with structural Marxism, Fordism and its crisis were another important influence on regulation theory. The general goal of understanding and analyzing the crisis-ridden path of capitalist development thus had a concrete empirical and contemporary point of reference. In the beginning, regulationists sought above all to explain why the post-war decades—primarily, but not only, in OECD countries— were characterized by a relatively long period of dynamic economic growth, which was followed by a period of crisis and stagnation that began in the 1970s and eroded the constitutive elements of Fordist capitalism. The goal was to understand the causes and trajectories of (socio-)economic ruptures and crises, but also how they were managed through specific political-institutional modes of regulation. Or in more general terms: regulation theory wanted to understand why capitalist social formations had so far proven to be surprisingly capable of stabilization and adaptation, despite their inherent contradictions and crisis tendencies. To answer these questions, two closely connected analytical concepts were developed: regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. According to Alain Lipietz (1985, 120), the regime of accumulation determines how the production and distribution of goods and services produced by a society is organized. The regime of accumulation concept already implicitly acknowledges the constitutive role played by non-economic, that is, social, institutional and political, conditions in the process of capitalist reproduction. These aspects are fundamental for the accumulation process in more than a general sense: they also constitute a specific, institutionally stabilized structure of social regulation that provides the general framework for processing the contradictions and conflicts of capital valorization. Regulation is therefore a very broad concept (cf. Lipietz 1985, 121; Hirsch 1990, 36– 7). It refers above all to the wage relation (reproduction of labor power, social security, family relations, education, lifestyles, forms and norms of consumption), the form of the enterprise (reallocation of capital, forms of competition and cooperation, forms of internal organization), the money and credit relations (importance and workings of the markets for securities,

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

131

loans and insurances), but also comprises the legal, ideological and economic dimensions of government intervention as well as international regimes. In combination, these aspects constitute a mode of regulation. Some representatives of the regulation approach add another two analytical concepts to regime of accumulation and mode of regulation (cf. Lipietz 1991). One of these, the “technological” or “industrial” paradigm, draws attention to the concrete material aspects of capitalist accumulation, especially the different forms of organizing work and production. The concept of the “production model” (Boyer and Durand 1997) points in a similar direction, but it is broader because it also comprises management concepts, specific forms of enterprise and workplace organization, cooperative or competitive inter-firm relationships, as well as patterns of the internationalization of production chains. This shows that the development and organization of work and production is seen—as in the social structures of accumulation approach (cf. Scherrer 1988; Kotz 1990; McDonough 2008)—as the result of conflicting interests, ideas, etc.; in short, the result of social conflicts and power relations. However, the different ways of organizing work and production also have structural implycations of their own for society: they play a major role in determining social structures as well as the resources that political actors have at their disposal. Therefore, the “technological” or “industrial” paradigm or production model is also relevant, albeit perhaps indirectly, to another analytical concept: the “hegemonic structure” or “hegemonic bloc”. The “hegemonic structure” concept highlights that social networks, civil society alliances and political coalitions are constituted in and through the mediation between the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation or, more generally speaking, between the economic and political-institutional dimensions of capitalist societies. Drawing on Gramsci’s thoughts in the Prison Notebooks (1992), the “hegemonic bloc” concept manages to describe different socio-political forms by emphasizing two aspects of social development: first, that political organizations and networks are determined by structures of social stratification, i.e., class, gender, ethnicity; second, the discursive, cultural and other processes of generating consensus and compromise that take place in civil society.

132

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

3. How Labor Policy Relates to the Theory of Capitalism and the Sociology of Work Its internal differentiation notwithstanding, regulation theory saw itself as a research heuristic that would help to determine more precisely the peculiarities of different capitalist social formations, both in historical and geographical comparison. This applied to the fundamental political-economic dynamics, contradictions and crisis tendencies; to the corresponding power- and domination-based political-institutional modes of regulation; to the key political-cultural and political-ideological struggles (over hegemony); and finally to the organizational patterns of labor policy that played an important mediating role in the tension-ridden relation between capitalist accumulation and political regulation. It is certainly debatable whether regulationist-inspired research has managed to live up to these multidimensional and highly ambitious goals. In principle, however, the labor policy concept enabled it to approach the sociology of work in new ways. The emergence and development of the labor policy research agenda (see Jürgens 2007), which initially was strongly influenced by the “humanization of work” discourse, already pointed towards an expansion of the sociology of work towards a social theory on the basis of political economy. At first, however, its primary point of reference was not so much regulation theory but Michael Burawoy’s (1979; 1985) advanced version of the American labor process debate. Like regulation theory or the social structures of accumulation approach, Burawoy had developed a concept of work and production that defines them as an ensemble of social relations whose manifestation and development, both at the levels of the firm and society, are contested and structured by power relations and which are therefore subject to competing strategies of political influence. His poignant conceptual distinction between and simultaneous connection of “politics in production” and “politics of production” made it possible to conceptualize labor policy not just as two mutually related fields of action, but also to identify two key topics for a critical sociology of work: on the one hand, the problem of creating an effective and, as far as possible, hegemonically stabilized organization of power and exploitation in the workplace, which constitute the core of capitalist accumulation; on the other hand, the processes at the supra-firm or public policy level through which governmental and civil society actors try to shape the regulatory and redistributive conditions of work and production.

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

133

The labor policy concept has contributed to the sociology of work by providing a political-economic foundation for empirical investigations and putting them in the context of public policy. Initially, the goal was not to “increase the complexity” of the subject area, but to make politics “endogenous” to the sociology of work (Naschold 1985, 10). The result was nonetheless to open up and broaden research, leading researchers to pay more attention to the “politics of production”. This inspired them to also pay attention to a whole range of political activities—policies of technology, industry or infrastructure, but also fiscal, health and social policies—that have consequences, at least indirectly, for the development and configuretion of work and production. The increased attention to public policy in labor policy research also broadened—at least potentially—the horizon of the sociology of work. However, certain problems and challenges for research strategy also had to be noted. They resulted from the difficulty of grasping analytically and conceptually the numerous political-economic changes: the development of capitalist accumulation dynamic, the transformation of the mode of regulation and the changes affecting the social balance of forces as well as the hegemonic bloc. It also became obvious that the labor policy concept delineated a very broad research area that was only vaguely defined (cf. Jürgens 2007, 23). This raised the issue of finding additional theoretical concepts and tools that might help to define and operationalize this very broad area more clearly. In this situation, regulation theory, which was widely read from the early to mid-1980s (cf. Naschold 1985), seemed to come in very handy. By drawing attention to the structural crises and transformations of capitalist social formations it created the possibility of making labor policy research more relevant to social theory and its analyses of contemporary issues more incisive. With hindsight, however, it is obvious that the potential of regulation theory was not fully explored. Why this happened is not quite clear, but it seems likely that the following trends are to blame: First, regulation theory was increasingly understood as a theory of regulation in the sense of steering. This contradicted the regulationist ambition of going beyond explicitly political forms of regulation and also incorporating into the analysis the various institutional, administrative and normative practices at the levels of the firm and (civil) society as constitutive elements of capitalist reproduction (cf. Hirsch 1990, 16–19). It also contradicted the original intentions of labor policy research itself (cf. Naschold 1985). How-

134

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

ever, during the 1980s this broader, socio-structural conception of regulation receded into the background in the context of the “labor policy turn” as comparative studies started to focus on how well different arrangements of work and production performed. The question of the social character of labor policy processes, that is, their determination by relations of power and dominance, was still raised occasionally, but hardly ever answered. This tendency was reinforced by the turn towards a governance perspective, which further strengthened the one-sided focus on problem-solving in empirical studies. I may have slightly exaggerated this shift in the focus of research. However, and this is the second point, it did not just affect labor policy research at the WZB, but industrial relations in general. It is not without reason that some prominent representatives of that discipline have recently asked the question whether it still makes sense to talk of a “critical sociology of industrial relations” (cf. among others Deutschmann 2001; Schumann 2002; Sauer 2007). Such reflection was apparently motivated by the realization that the enthusiastic belief that society could be actively shaped (Schumann 2002, 337), which had characterized labor policy research during the 1970s, had still been effective for some time, but that the growing influence of applied industrial relations research in the form of commissioned studies and consultancy activities gave that belief an affirmative bent, leading critique to assume a skeptical, even fatalist, position. Third, in addition to these trends that affected the sociology of work and industrial relations, regulationist research itself had reached a point where it did very little to make its potential for a theory of capitalism and social critique attractive to students of labor policy, though the latter were interested in principle. It was, for example, often quite retrograde—even sterile and mechanical—because its analytical tools remained strongly oriented towards the Fordist social formation and were of little use for investigating the ongoing crises, transformations and ruptures (cf. Röttger 2003). There were many attempts to interpret contemporary trends and problems, but they were vague and mostly unconvincing. This confusion was perfectly exemplified by the long-standing talk about “post-Fordism”. Over time, the instruments and agenda of regulation theory had also become more differentiated. Quite a few regulationists had also shifted towards a strongly formalized and model-based institutionalist theory of capitalism (see, for example, Amable 2003; Boyer 2005), which made it

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

135

very difficult to find anything in regulationist research that a critique of power and domination informed by labor policy might be able to use.

4. Capitalist Transformation and Challenges for Labor Policy The trends described above do not portend well for the critical potential of a sociology of work that is inspired by regulation theory and labor policy. But there are also counter-tendencies that show how those weaknesses could be overcome. The discussion concerning the emergence of transnational financial market capitalism (cf. Windolf 2005) is an important step in that direction. Many critical economists, including representatives of regulation theory (cf. Aglietta 2000; Boyer 2000; Chesnais 2004; Stockhammer 2007; Sablowski 2008), are involved in it both in the national and international context. The critique of capitalism may have been fairly marginal to this discussion in the early stages, that is, when the American “new economy” was still successful. Even so, the debate has made some important and innovative contributions to the questions I have dealt with here. Two of these contributions were particularly relevant. The first was conceptual and theoretical in nature: to give up the fixation on the wage relation by explicitly relating it to the capital and money relations (cf. Grahl and Teague 2000), both of which are primary from an accumulationcentered perspective. The analytical focus was not just on globalization, but, more precisely, on the specific connection that exists between politically liberalized capital markets on the one hand, and deregulated, flexible relations of work and production on the other. The second contribution concerned the analysis of contemporary developments; thanks to the concept of transnational financial market capitalism, key features and dynamics of the new capitalist formation could be more accurately described and conceptualized. The following examples illustrate this: First, the new formation is characterized by the fact that, since the 1980s, the financial system and exchange rate regime have changed globally under the influence of the “Dollar Wall Street Regime” (DWSR; Gowan 1999)—i.e. floating exchange rates, open capital markets and international competition between currencies (cf. Huffschmid 2002). The structure and role of financial markets has changed because securities markets have become more important vis-à-vis traditional credit markets. De-segmen-

136

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

tation—that is, the gradual integration of different financial markets—has also added to this. Second, the growing structural importance of the financial sector, especially capital markets, corresponds to a new configuration of political power (cf. Foster 2010). Thanks to the transformation of financial markets, certain actors have increased their economic and political influence (cf. Huffschmid 2007). These include institutional investors (insurance, investment or pension funds), rating agencies and investment banks as well as many other companies that are primarily involved in securities trading. There are now a number of political networks in which benchmarks are no longer set just by market-friendly political consultants, top executives and large consultancy groups (cf. Crouch 2005, 92–103), but also by the socalled FIRE—finance, insurance, real estate—sector (cf. Janszen 2008, 52– 3). Third, the formation of transnational financial market capitalism is characterized not just by new modes of regulation and a new balance of power, but also by a new regime of accumulation whose defining feature is the globalized capital market. It drives the modernization of society and its colonization by capital, especially through “financialization”, i.e. the penetration of different sectors of society by the logic of financial capital (cf. among others Erturk et al. 2008). Examples include the shareholder valueoriented reform of corporate governance, privatization of public infrastructures or the reform of pension systems. Focusing on accumulation, critical political economy has variously described these trends as neoliberal “penetration of the reproductive sphere” (van der Pijl 1998, 48), “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003), “global economy of dispossession” (Zeller 2004) or “new Landnahme” (Dörre 2015). These features imply that important structural elements of Fordism— such as economic stability, national coherence of accumulation and regulation, or social integration by consensus—are less relevant to the formation of transnational financial market capitalism. On the contrary, recent crises, including the global financial crisis, have shown that the accumulation regime of financial capitalism is inherently unstable, and that it can barely be controlled by the national state and usually disregards socially integrative structures of consensus or, at least, compromise (cf. Bieling 2009). If and when such structures do still emerge, it is often outside of established arenas of negotiation. Usually, however, the expectations and demands of accumulation, as organized by financial capital, systematically weaken such

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

137

structures (cf. Altvater and Mahnkopf 2002). In other words, blatant social inequality, the simultaneous growth of financial assets and material hardship, the deregulation and flexibilization of work and production, the precarisation of work and employment, and multiple new forms of social exclusion can all be seen as the constitutive flipside of the accumulation dynamic I have described here. Labor policy research has been slow to wake up to and examine the connection between finance-led accumulation and changing labor relations. The few who have engaged with this issue either do so because they are confronted with the many urgent problems of everyday labor policy (cf. Detje et al. 2005), or because they see themselves in the tradition of a critical sociology of work and industrial relations (see, for example, Dörre and Röttger 2003; Sauer 2005). Apart from these examples, however, mutual ignorance seems to be the norm. On the one hand, many critical political economists have started to examine the development of global financial markets and their crisis tendencies, but have also lost sight of the restructuring of labor policy. On the other hand, sociological research on work and industrial relations often takes a highly critical look at the deregulation and precarisation of work as well as the erosion of the work-life distinction, but fails to take into account their political-economic causes.

5. Conclusion and Outlook This disconnection between the critical theory of capitalism and the sociology of industrial relations should be the point of departure for a revitalized agenda in critical labor policy research. Such an agenda could reconnect with the original motives of labor policy research and its aim to develop a strand of labor research that is founded on a theory of capitalism. There are also some promising contributions in the recent labor policy debate. However, revitalization would have to be more than just rehashing the old agenda in a fancy new guise. After all, it seems that the wage relation is undergoing sweeping change in the context of an increasingly globalized capital relation dominated by financial markets; forms and patterns of labor policy have changed so radically that thorough revision of the existing analytical and interpretive framework is required. Apart from recalibrating and reconceptualizing the political-economic dimension of

138

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

labor policy narrowly understood, the following dual expansion might prove useful: first, systematically taking reproductive labor in the private and public spheres into consideration; second, paying attention to the various discursive struggles that take place in civil society over the priorities and instruments of labor policy. An important consequence of reconceptualizing the analytical and investigative framework of labor policy research would be to re-establish labor policy and the sociology of work as important contributors to a critical analysis of society. Putting this into practice, however, requires more than just theoretical work. The adequacy of the analytical and interpretive framework to be developed must ultimately prove itself in empirical research. Among the issues that require urgent attention are the labor policy conflicts that have become more heated—especially in the European periphery—following the transition from a global financial crisis to the sovereign debt and Euro crisis and the universal implementation of austerity policies (cf. Bieling 2011). These developments are not just politically highly relevant, they are conceptually and analytically interesting too. They demonstrate – that labor policy is now strongly influenced by the contradictions and crisis tendencies of transnational financial market capitalism; – that the political interpretation and management of financial crises, fiscal squeezes and pressures in the areas of labor and social policies is being negotiated at various interrelated levels (EU, national state, region, firm), and that it is also influenced by competing civil society discourses; – that in times of crisis the financialization of production models—for example as stronger orientation towards capital markets, corresponding corporate governance reforms or new management concepts—further adds to disciplinary pressures; – and that, in the context of a European-wide austerity agenda, labor policy conflicts increasingly shift towards the public sector, that is, towards reproductive labor in the public sphere. This list of political-economic and public policy aspects that contemporary labor policy research ought to take into account could, of course, be expanded. For example, the specific effects that crisis management in the field of labor policy has on social structures come to mind. In any case, it should have become clear that regulation theory can still make an im-

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

139

portant contribution to a critical analysis of society and capitalism that is informed by political economy and labor policy research because it looks beyond the workplace to examine the organization of power, domination and exploitation at the supra-firm level, how it is being contested in the arena of civil society, and how it is structured by the state.

Works Cited Aglietta, Michel (2000). Ein neues Akkumulationsregime. Die Regulationstheorie auf dem Prüfstand. Hamburg: VSA. Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf (2002). Globalisierung der Unsicherheit. Arbeit im Schatten, schmutziges Geld und informelle Politik. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Amable, Bruno (2003). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: University Press. Becker, Joachim (2009). Regulationstheorie. In Joachim Becker, Andrea Grisold, Gertraude Mikl-Horke, Reinhard Pirker, Hermann Rauchenschwandter, Oliver Schwank, Elisabeth Springler and Engelbert Stockhammer. Heterodoxe Ökonomie, 89–116. Marburg: Metropolis. Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2009). Wenn der Schneeball ins Rollen kommt. Überlegungen zur Dynamik und zum Charakter der Subprime-Krise. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 16(1), 107–121. Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2011). Vom Krisenmanagement zur neuen Konsolidierungsagenda der EU. Prokla, 41(2), 173–194. Boyer, Robert (2000). Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A preliminary analysis. Economy and Society, 29(1), 111–145. Boyer, Robert (2005). How and Why Capitalisms Differ. Economy and Society, 34(4), 509–557. Boyer, Robert (2006). Employment and decent work in the era of flexicurity. ParisJourdan Sciences Economiques, Working Paper No. 21. Paris. Boyer, Robert and Jean-Pierre Durand (1997). After Fordism. London: Palgrave Macillan. Burawoy, Michael (1979). Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University Press. Burawoy, Michael (1985). The Politics of Production. Factory regimes under capitalism and socialism. London: Verso. Chesnais, François (2004). Das finanzdominierte Akkumulationsregime: theoretische Begründung und Reichweite. In Christian Zeller (ed.). Die Globale Enteignungsökonomie, 217–254. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Crouch, Colin (2005). Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

140

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

Detje, Richard, Klaus Pickshaus and Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). (2005). Arbeitspolitik kontrovers. Zwischen Abwehrkämpfen und Offensivstrategien. Hamburg: VSA. Deutschmann, Christoph (2001). Die Gesellschaftskritik der Industriesoziologie— ein Anachronismus?. Leviathan, 29(1), 58–69. Dörre, Klaus (2015). The New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Market Capitalism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa. Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 11–66. London/New York: Verso. Dörre, Klaus, and Bernd Röttger (eds.). (2003). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells. Hamburg: VSA. Erturk, Ismail, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams (eds.). (2008). Financialization at Work: Key Texts and Commentary. Milton Park: Routledge. Foster, John Bellamy (2010). The Age of Monopoly-Finance Capital. Monthly Review, 61(9), 1–13. Gowan, Peter (1999). The Global Gamble. Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance. London/New York: Verso. Grahl, John, and Paul Teague (2000). The Regulation School, the employment relation and financialization. Economy and Society, 29(1), 160–178. Gramsci, Antonio, and Joseph A. Buttigieg (1992). Prison Notebooks. New York: Columbia University Press. Harvey, David (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hildebrandt, Eckart, Ulrich Jürgens, Maria Oppen and Christina Teipen (eds.). (2007). Arbeitspolitik im Wandel. Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Arbeitspolitik. Berlin: edition sigma. Hirsch, Joachim (1990). Kapitalismus ohne Alternative? Materialistische Gesellschaftstheorie und Möglichkeiten einer sozialistischen Politik heute. Hamburg: VSA. Hübner, Kurt (1990). Theorie der Regulation. Eine kritische Rekonstruktion eines neuen Ansatzes der politischen Ökonomie. 2nd edition. Berlin: edition sigma. Huffschmid, Jörg (2002). Politische Ökonomie der Finanzmärkte. 2nd edition. Hamburg: VSA. Huffschmid, Jörg (2007). Internationale Finanzmärkte: Funktionen, Entwicklung, Akteure. In Jörg Huffschmid, Margit Köppen and Wolfgang Rhode (eds.). Finanzinvestoren: Retter oder Raubritter, 10–50. Hamburg: VSA. Janszen, Eric (2008). Die Bubble-Ökonomie. Wie man die Märkte für den großen Crash von morgen präpariert. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 53(5), 49–62. Jessop, Bob (1990). Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect. Economy and Society, 19(2), 153–216. Jürgens, Ulrich (2007). Arbeitspolitik: Zur Entwicklung eines Forschungsprogramms. In Eckart Hildebrandt, Ulrich Jürgens, Maria Oppen and Christina Teipen (eds.). Arbeitspolitik im Wandel. Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Arbeitspolitik, 17–55. Berlin: edition sigma.

THE THEORY OF REGULATION AND LABOR POLICY

141

Jürgens, Ulrich, and Frieder Naschold (eds.). (1984). Arbeitspolitik. Materialien zum Zusammenhang von politischer Macht, Kontrolle und betrieblicher Organisation der Arbeit. Leviathan Sonderheft 5. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Kotz, David M. (1990). A Comparative Analysis of the Theory of Regulation and the Social Structure of Accumulation Theory. Science & Society, 54(1), 5–28. Lehndorff, Steffen (ed.). (2006). Das Politische in der Arbeitspolitik. Ansatzpunkte für eine nachhaltige Arbeits- und Arbeitszeitgestaltung. Berlin: edition sigma. Lipietz, Alain (1985). Akkumulation, Krisen und Auswege aus der Krise: Einige methodische Überlegungen zum Begriff “Regulation”. Prokla, 15(58), 109–137. Lipietz, Alain (1987). Rebel Sons: The Regulation School. Interview with Jane Jenson. French Politics and Society, 5(4), 17–25. Lipietz, Alain (1991). Demokratie nach dem Fordismus. Das Argument, 33(6), 677– 694. Lipietz, Alain (1997). Die Welt des Postfordismus. Über die strukturellen Veränderungen der entwickelten kapitalistischen Gesellschaften. Supplement of the Journal Sozialismus. Hamburg. Lutz, Burkhart (1984). Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität. Eine Neuinterpretation der industriell-kapitalistischen Entwicklung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. McDonough, Terence (2008). Social Structures of Accumulation Theory: The State of the Art. Review of Radical Political Economics, 40(2), 153–173. Naschold, Frieder (1985). Zum Zusammenhang von Arbeit, sozialer Sicherung und Politik. Einführende Anmerkungen zur Arbeitspolitik. In Frieder Naschold (ed.). Arbeit und Politik. Gesellschaftliche Regulierung der Arbeit und der sozialen Sicherung, 9–46. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Röttger, Bernd (2003). Verlassene Gräber und neue Pilger an der Grabesstätte. Eine neo-regulationistische Perspektive. In Ulrich Brand an Werne Raza (eds.). Fit für den Postfordismus? Theoretisch-politische Perspektiven des Regulationsansatzes, 18– 42. Münster: Westfäliches Dampfboot. Sablowski, Thomas (2008). Das globale, finanzdominierte Akkumulationsregime. Z.—Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung, 19(1), 23–35. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA. Sauer, Dieter (2007). Vermarktlichung und Politik—Arbeitspolitik unter den Bedingungen Indirekter Steuerung. In Gerd Peter (ed.). Grenzkonflikte der Arbeit. Die Herausbildung einer neuen europäischen Arbeitspolitik, 202–217. Hamburg: VSA. Scheele, Alexandra (2008). Arbeit als politisches Feld. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Scherrer, Christoph (1988). Der “Social Structure of Accumulation”-Ansatz: Ein Interpretationsmodell des Aufstiegs und Niedergangs der US-Ökonomie. Prokla, 18(4), 131–148. Schumann, Michael (2002). Das Ende der kritischen Industriesoziologie? Leviathan, 30(3), 325–344.

142

HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING

Stockhammer, Engelbert (2007). Charakteristika eines finanzdominierten Akkumulationsregimes in Europa. WSI-Mitteilungen, 60(12), 643–649. Van der Pijl, Kees (1998). Transnational Classes and International Relations. London/New York: Verso. Windolf, Paul (ed.). (2005). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen. KZfSS Special Issue 45. Wiesbaden: VS. Zeller, Christian (2004). Die globale Enteignungsökonomie. In Christian Zeller (ed.). Die globale Enteignungsökonomie, 9–20. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

Subalternity and the Social Division of Labor: Sociology of Work meets Materialist State Theory Stefanie Hürtgen, Jens Wissel

1. Introduction There is currently a discussion in the sociology of work about the concept of the subject and subjectivity, to which we would like to contribute by suggesting a broader perspective. The sociology of work is repeatedly and correctly admonished for its fixation on the workplace and for not paying sufficient attention, both conceptually and methodologically, to the connection between “work and life”. The (working) subjects, it is argued, have to be understood also as agents of their own biographies, as men and women with or without family, as belonging to particular social environments and/or going through particular processes of socialization. We take up this point by adding an aspect we consider crucial: that the (working) subjects are always also inherently connected to politics and the state. Taking Nicos Poulantzas’ materialist state theory, and in particular its notion of the social division of labour, we argue that (working) subjects, through their thoughts and behaviors participate in a constant social struggle over which modes of thought, forms of knowledge, notions and interpretations become universal and dominant, and which remain subaltern, private and individual. This struggle takes place inside the subjects too. Understanding the social division of labor as a social relation offers the advantage of theoretically connecting subalternity and autonomous agency. Using the current debate over the so-called subjectification of work as an example, we will demonstrate that the concepts of the (working) subject in the sociology of work (and beyond) oscillate between two poles: a kind of overestimation of the subject’s creative drive on the one hand, and its reduction to interpellation, subjection and adaptation on the other. In contrast, the concept of the social division of labor allows us to understand subalternity as a restriction that is actively produced by the subject him-/ herself, that is never stable nor pre-determined in its form, and that is

144

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

therefore constantly contested and in flux. This, we contend, is another reason why more attention should be paid to it as an analytical dimension (not just) in the sociology of work.

2. Subjectification of Work: Objectivism vs. the Subject? 2.1 From Objectivism to Subjectification The so-called subjectivity of labor continues to be a central topic of discussion in the sociology of work. Focusing on the subject of/in work is often meant as a critique of older, “objectivist” approaches in the sociology of work and industrial relations in which the workers’ consciousness was often identified with their workplace experiences (such as technological change, cf. Kern and Schumann 1977) or understood as recurring to objectively existing patterns of interpretation (e.g. Kudera et al. 1979); in other words, subjects are seen as results and bearers of their conditions, but hardly as actors who relate to their social relations in the workplace and society in an active and interpretive way (cf. Kleemann and Voß 2010, 420ff.). The new focus on the subject of/in work went hand in hand with the end of the Fordist era of prosperity and the multiple theoretical and practical challenges to the status of the (male) wage worker as the incarnation of capitalist society. Starting in the early 1980s and driven by debates over changing values and individualization, female and domestic labor and “new management concepts”, more attention started to be paid to questions of biography and reproduction but also to the “subjective perspective” on wage labor as well as the desire “to recognize oneself as subject in one’s work” (Schumann et al. 1982, 27). The West German discussions and studies on the subject of/in work exhibited an optimistic streak well into the 1990s that was inspired by the perspective of overcoming the Taylorist mode of control and domination in the workplace. The idea of the subject as an externally controlled appendage to technology and hierarchy was replaced with the subject’s creative drive and the notion that immediate working conditions could be changed. The workplace and the firm were reconceptualized as “social spaces” that employees actively relate to in order to serve their own interests better and increase their well-being, but also—as claimed in the “new concepts of production” debate—to improve the firm’s economic success.

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

145

The notion of “self-realization”—that is, the subjectively meaningful realization in and through wage labor and thus the meaningful appropriation of work and working conditions (cf., for example, Baethge and Oberbeck 1986; Paul 1989)—was at the heart of this intra-firm win-win paradigm (which was still largely based on the assumption that unfettered company growth through modernization would continue; for a critical view see Hürtgen 2008). 2.2 Subjectification without Subjects? Since roughly the mid-1990s, this optimism about the chances of selfrealization is being supplanted in the German discussion by a growing concern: first, with regard to an increasingly dominant logic of profitability that accepts or even demands meaningful work and self-realization, but only inasmuch as it contributes directly to profit maximization. A connected second concern is with the increasing erosion of the work-life distinction; it is increasingly difficult for employees to maintain both a physical and actual as well as an internal and mental “distance” from their jobs. The fear is that, instead of subjects actively appropriating and changing their work, employers will make unlimited demands on the subjectivity of workers and their desire for subjectively meaningful work, which will be structured, both during work and leisure, by the principle of optimizing valorization—the worker’s own and, by extension, that of the firm. Thus, the idea of self-realization in work is corrupted and turned into a social regime of justification for unlimited self-rationalization (Kocyba 2000). According to this discussion, autonomous and creative agency is de facto evaporating. This does not just cause serious political problems. For the subjects themselves it means broken promises of emancipation, growing social insecurity, neglect of social relationships not related to the job, exhaustion, stress, burnout—in general a subordination of the “social” to the demands of the market (marketization) (cf. Pickshaus et al. 2001). At the conceptual level, these pessimistic views are reinforced by theories of power and domination that deemphasize agency and focus more on the subjects’

146

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

far-reaching confinement by and entanglement in the dominant discourses of the market and economization. 1 2.3 Critique: the Boundary-drawing Subject This focus of the debate has now come under criticism. Gabriele Wagner insists theoretically on the necessity of “successful self-limitation” and of restricting the open space of possibilities for the emergence of subjectivity as such (cf. Wagner 2004, 177; 2005). Sabine Pfeiffer (2004) emphasizes those potentials of the active subject that go beyond “labor power”, while Kerstin Jürgens argues that even the expansion of the sphere of work still requires constant subjective agency and boundary-drawing, that is, the ability to balance constantly the various spheres of life and their demands as well as personal interests and motivations and, in so doing, also to fail other people’s expectations and reject some demands. More importantly, according to her, this activity of boundary-drawing contains an “emancipatory potential” (Jürgens 2006, 196) that should come into focus again. It contains “resistances and defiances” (ibid.) not just with regard to individual action, but also with regard to “practices of influencing the modification of structural (!) conditions” (ibid.), in which “the subject itself [proves to be] the crucial instance of the regulation of reproduction” (ibid., 228). Explicit critiques of the assumption that workers internalize control, which is current in the subjectification debate, can be found, for example, in Dörre et al. (2009, 572ff.) and Michael Frey (2009). Both criticize the “subsumptionist” focus on subjection and adaptation 2, against which they suggest the notion of “recalcitrant subjectivities” or the concept of the “appropriation” of work. (Joachim Beerhorst’s remarks, 2005, 162–3, go in

——————

1 For an example of a view that focuses more on forms of workplace domination see the concept of the “market-centered mode of control” according to which permanent insecurity is produced by reference to “objective market forces” (Boes and Bultemeier 2008). For a different approach to power and domination that is based more on theories of the subject and often draws on Foucault see, for example, Moldaschl 2002. Among the famous exceptions from the dominant focus on domination and economization are Glißmann and Peters’ (2001) agency-based arguments. 2 “This view, which very directly assumes that working subjects are subsumed under the employer’s interests, does not do justice to the complexity of individual attitudes. It overemphasizes the frictionless subjection of workers to the employer’s or managerial interests. It therefore ignores differently oriented aspects of the subjects’ consciousness as well as their deviant practices.” (Frey 2009, 198)

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

147

a similar direction.) Against the idea that the employer’s access to the subject’s capabilities has simply expanded (inevitably reducing the latter’s scope for agency), these authors put the emphasis once more on the active role that the subject plays in the production of social relations. But this also raises a theoretical problem: how does the apparent everyday drawing of boundaries relate to the simultaneous erosion of boundaries that is becoming more and more serious? There is no denying that demands of valorization and performance are still being restricted everywhere and in different ways; the figure of the footloose “(life) artist” who largely refrains from making his/her own judgements of relevance and who—as Gabriele Wagner (2004, 177) correctly remarks—becomes the “punching ball of fluctuating opportunity structures” does not (yet?) appear to be the general form in which subjectivity is manifested. How can we conceptualize the simultaneity of the existing forms of independence, defiance and boundary-drawing on the one hand and the many (self-) destructive tendencies on the other, without immediately retreating again to the structural level of domination or to “discourse”, that is, without adopting a perspective that marginalizes subjective autonomy? The theoretical problem of structure and agency—which we have discussed here in the context of the subjectification debate—requires a concept that has something to say about autonomous action (both in work and life) and puts the actors and their relationships in the larger context of social theory. We believe that it would be a step in the right direction to take on board a core argument of materialist state theory: the concept of the social division of labor and of the state as the production and the product of that division. We will argue that the notion of the state as the processualization of the social division between intellectual and manual labor is capable of grasping the limitations of everyday subjective agency without losing sight of the latter. By drawing on Nicos Poulantzas we can understand the subjects’ self-limitations as forms of (state) domination.

148

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

3. Poulantzas 3.1 Separation of Intellectual and Manual Labor Poulantzas understands the state as a social sphere in which the ruling classes and class fractions organize themselves as a power bloc through social and political struggles; the state “is the practice of condensation” of these struggles (cf. Demirović et al. 2002, 14ff.). 3 On the one hand, the state reproduces the “social totality” (Poulantzas 2000, 15), but under capitalism the latter takes on the form of a separation between the economic and political spheres. Political rule takes place as the “crystallization of intellectual labor” (ibid., 56) in the state and its apparatuses. The state is “the organic relationship between intellectual labor and political domination, knowledge and power”. This view of the capitalist state as the producer and result of the separation between intellectual and manual labor, which is based on Marx among others, was never fully elaborated by Poulantzas. In fact, he often contradicts himself. 4 In one passage, Poulantzas himself talks very modestly about merely wanting to illustrate the “investigative orientation” (ibid., 60). Nonetheless, he considers the division of labor a fundamentally important topic because the aim is to understand the state as neither a simple watchman over the competitive relationships between free commodity owners, nor as superstructure and mediating instance for economic class struggles. Instead, Poulantzas focuses on the specific kind of domination that is manifested as the separation between intellectual and manual labor. In this view, intellectual labor is the permanent and contested production of universalized, legitimate social knowledge in a broad sense. The state “monopolizes” and “organizes” forms of knowledge “in all its apparatuses” (Poulantzas 2000, 55), “army, law-courts, administration and police (not to mention the ideological apparatuses)” (ibid., 56). The state

——————

3 In accordance with the state of the art, we conceive the state also as condensation of struggles over gender relations, ethnic oppression and society-nature relations (cf. Sauer 2001, 89) 4 In one passage, Poulantzas refers to the example of writing to illustrate that “every State” represents a particular form of the separation between intellectual and manual labor (Poulantzas 2000, 59). In another passage, however, he does not just state that this separation “is realized in the most consummate manner” in the capitalist state (ibid., 56), but refers to it as specific to the capitalist mode of production (for critique see Hirsch 1994; Wissel 2007).

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

149

represents “the practical supremacy of a knowledge and discourse”, whereas the “popular masses” are “specifically and permanently” excluded from this production and implementation of knowledge (ibid., 56). Therefore, the subaltern are not just the opposite of intellectual labor by being “subjected to manual labor”. They are at the same time subjected to it “through the instrumentality of the state” (ibid.). The knowledge of the state confronts them as “power”, for example in the form of “rational scientific practice” (ibid., 55) or through “apparatuses specialized in the qualification and training of labor power (the school, the family, various occupational training structures) and through the totality of its apparatuses (bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties, the parliamentary system, cultural apparatuses, the press and media).” (ibid., 60)

Thanks to its comprehensive responsibility for producing, deploying and controlling social knowledge, the state is always present in the relations of production. The subjection of the worker in the immediate relations of exploitation (“the factory”) would not exist without it. “It is present from the beginning in the constitution of that division [between intellectual and manual labor] within the relations of production, a division incarnated in factory despotism and referring to the political relations of domination and subordination such as they exist in the relations of exploitation, and thus also to the State’s presence in the latter.” (Poulantzas 2000, 60)

3.2 Intellectual and Manual Labor as Social Relation The division between intellectual and manual labor, which is a manifestation of domination, “should not at all be conceived as an empirical or natural split between those who work with their hands and those who work with their head” (ibid., 55). It is not the case “that the ‘unfortunate’ workers stupefied by the fragmentation of labor, do not use their ‘heads’” when they work; all human activity contains some intellectual aspects (Poulantzas 1978, 254; cf. Atzmüller 2010, 139–40). 5 Poulantzas is not interested in an analytical distinction between different practices that different groups of people tend mostly to do. The important question is what status intellectual

——————

5 There is an interesting parallel here to debates in the sociology of work about wage workers under Taylorism who allegedly hardly ever think for themselves (cf. Wolf 1999; also cf. Harald Wolf’s contribution to this volume).

150

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

labor has in the overall structure, and what the function of a particular activity is in the social division of labor taken as a whole. The bourgeoisie “doubles” its rule under capitalism (Demirović 1997, 81): once as economic control over the productive apparatus and second in the bureaucratic and political staff of the state, which is formally separate from the first kind of control. In contrast, the knowledge of low-ranking employees plays no or hardly any generalizing and coordinating role, neither in the workplace and the firm, nor in society. Being “subjected to manual labor” therefore means playing only a very limited role in the organization and generalization of knowledge. The “social depth of the crystallization of a political will” in society (ibid.) is limited vis-à-vis those whose jobs put them in charge of social generalization. This reproduces a “political division of labor” (Pierre Bourdieu) that is primarily based on the fact that the “subaltern” restrict themselves with regard to the social generalization of their views. 6 Drawing on the sociology of education, Bourdieu (1984, 413–4) understands the social reproduction of domination as the reproduction of socially ascribed (in-)competence. The “more educated” face those “who ‘do not know to speak’”; those “who ‘speak well’” face the “incompetent”. An authoritarian political division of labor emerges: on the one side are those “who admit that politics is not for them” and who abdicate their formal means due to a lack of real means and “on the other [side] those who feel entitled to claim a ‘personal opinion’ or even the authoritative opinion which is the monopoly of the competent” (ibid., 414). The result is the expropriation and exclusion of those “who experience the expropriation as objective inability and who feel forced to delegate because of their incomepetence” (Demirović 1997, 84). These considerations reflect the argument from the theory of subjectivity that all domination also involves the active behavior of the subaltern subject and that “any external influence is based on the self-determination of the subject without which it would not be open to influence in the first place. All external influence is refracted by the subject’s self-constitution” (Giegel et al. 1988, 14). According to this thought, domination essentially takes place when “external restrictions are translated into internal ones” (ibid.), that is, when subjects project themselves as self-restricted.

——————

6 In passing we would like to mention that the “subaltern” are only rarely at the center of the materialist state debate. It mostly focuses on the class formations and class struggles of the ruling classes.

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

151

It is with a view towards the subjectification of labor debate in particular that we want to make the following suggestion: that the sociological understanding of the restrictive self-constitution of the subject, which we have just described, be supplemented with a theory of the hierarchical social division between intellectual and manual labor in society, i.e. beyond the workplace. The goal would be to bring together theoretically what, as shown above, the subjectification debate leaves unconnected: the descriptions of deepening erosion of boundaries on the one hand, and references to boundary-drawing on the other. 3.3 State Theory and the Subjectification Debate Following Poulantzas we can examine the limitations and difficulties of autonomy and boundary-drawing on the part of workers from a domination-centered perspective. In that view, the above-mentioned delegation of generalization to others is not solely a matter of competence. It also depends on whether or not one is “responsible” for it. Being “subjected to manual labor” does not just mean to undergo restrictive socialization. It also means that people learn that they do not have the responsibility, nor the possibility, of generalizing as socially relevant their own points of view because of their social position. In the existing social division of labor, workers in the office and on the shop floor naturally do not assume that they, too, are responsible for socially generalizing their personal motives for drawing boundaries as well as their needs and discontent. Therefore, the many different (though not always entirely conscious or present) reasons for drawing boundaries—to have some peace, to have time for other things in life, to stay reasonably healthy and rested, not least to be able to do a “good” job in accordance with one’s own standards 7, and so on— remain entirely “private” at first. Where people draw boundaries, and how they justify that (to themselves and others), appears to be their “own” private business. What about the expansion of “knowledge-based” and intellectualized labor that the debate over the subjectification of work has addressed? It also does not answer the question to what extent such knowledge influences the struggles taking place in society as a whole over notions of coopera-

——————

7 This desire is empirically demonstrated again and again, for example in Nickel et al. 2008; cf. also the contribution to this volume by Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer.

152

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

tion, division of labor, purpose of production, etc. The same question arises with regard to the workplace and the firm as well as the increasing incorporation (which is also a generalization) of the knowledge and (participatory) capabilities of workers that takes place there. If intellectual and manual labor are understood as a social, rather than merely a workplace relation, then even the subjectified knowledge workers of today seem to remain mostly subordinate because the expanded reach of their knowledge generalization serves primarily to optimize operational processes. It does not touch upon or question socially dominant ideas about the kind and purpose of economic behavior. Where domination is successful, workers construe themselves as subaltern in the “division of labor between politics and non-politics” (Demirović 1997, 84). Apart from relative exceptions like trade union activists, etc., they essentially leave to “others”—politicians, trade union bureaucrats and other representatives, or, in other words, “those up there”—the social generalization of (intellectual) boundaries. 8 With this in mind we can overcome the bipolarity between expanding erosion of boundaries on the one hand and autonomous boundarydrawing on the other and transform it into the analytical problematic of inherently limited boundary-drawing. We share the view that social domination is not to be equated simply with subjection and control of the subjects nor with “acceptance” of dominant discourses. Instead, domination consists essentially in the different functions of “knowledge” and “competence”: to be in charge of social generality in one case and one’s immediate environment in the other. Domination arises because those who do “manual labor” also understand themselves as exactly that and thus reproduce the social division between intellectual and manual labor; as not responsible for generalizing their experiences, views and knowledge. Subalternity and domination are more than simply complying with orders “from above” and accepting certain discourses and demands; they are also and at the same time a process of active self-restriction to the inherently limited role of a person that is only responsible for knowledge, judgements and standards for themselves and their immediate environment. Thus, the paradigm of state theory allows us “to understand the capitalist labor processes themselves as a political and ideological field of social struggles which, however, also

——————

8 Conversely, representative organizations and movements can be understood as transferring “purely private” matters into political space. The well-known feminist slogan “The personal is political!” is a classic example.

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

153

transcends the level of production” (Atzmüller 2010, 35) and is riddled with dynamics of restrictive self-constitution. It depends on the social balance of forces how the separation between intellectual and manual labor is shaped and how the subaltern constitute themselves in it.

4. Outlook The arguments above are only some very general remarks about the necessity of integrating materialist state theory into the sociology of work, as well as a suggestion to take into consideration the separation between intellectual and manual labor in its inherent connection to social domination. Taking our cue from Poulantzas, we should pay more attention to this form of domination, that is, to the relation between “politics and nonpolitics” and the constant changes and concrete shifts that affect it. Drawing on his investigation of authoritarian statism, materialist state theory has described the social changes of the past 30 years as post-Fordist development towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State (Jessop 2002) or a national competition state (Hirsch 1995). Transformations of domination are manifested in patterns of governmental-economic forms of knowledge and control, for example in the ubiquitous production of “objective constraints” or in permanent restructuring to remain attractive for mobile capital. They are also manifested in new forms of self-rationalization and marketized subjectivity as well as in the erosion of political participation that has received so much attention recently (Crouch 2004; Kannankulam 2008). An investigation of these political and economic changes should examine the concrete ways in which they constitute the general state- and domination-related separation between manual and intellectual labor; whether, for example, authoritarian tendencies and frequent references to “objective constraints” reinforce the subalterns’ (self-)restriction to the particular and the private, and what role organizations of political generalization, such as trade unions, play in this process. To sum up: while state theory may not be paying enough attention to relations of work and production (cf. Atzmüller 2004), the sociology of work would do well to also understand processes of subjectivation as related to the state.

154

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

Works Cited Atzmüller, Roland (2004). Arbeit an der Veränderung—Überlegungen zur Staatstheorie im Postfordismus. grundrisse, 12, 13–25. Atzmüller, Roland (2010). Krise und Transformation der Arbeitsteilung. Politische und ideologische Aspekte der Veränderung der Ware Arbeitskraft. In Alex Demirovic, Stephan Adolphs and Serhat Karakayali (eds.). Das Staatsverständnis von Nicos Poulantzas. Der Staat als gesellschaftliches Verhältnis, 133–150. BadenBaden: Nomos. Baethge, Martin, and Herbert Oberbeck (1986). Zukunft der Angestellten. Neue Technologien und berufliche Perspektiven in Büro und Verwaltung. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Beerhorst, Joachim (2005). Objekt und Subjekt—Von den Möglichkeiten und Schwierigkeiten gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitspolitik. In Ingrid Kurz-Scherf, Lena Correll and Stefanie Janczyk (eds.). In Arbeit: Zukunft. Die Zukunft der Arbeit und der Arbeitsforschung liegt in ihrem Wandel, 156–171. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Boes, Andreas, and Anja Bultemeier (2008). Informatisierung—Unsicherheit— Kontrolle. Analysen zum neuen Kontrollmodus in historischer Perspektive. In Kai Dröge, Kira Marrs and Wolfgang Menz (eds.). Rückkehr der Leistungsfrage. Leistung in Arbeit, Unternehmen und Gesellschaft, 59–90. Berlin: edition sigma. Bourdieu, Pierre (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. London u.a.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Crouch, Colin (2004). Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Demriović, Alex, Joachim Hirsch, and Bob Jessop (2002). Einleitung. In Nicos Poulantzas. Staatstheorie. Politischer Überbau, Ideologie, Autoritärer Etatismus, 7–36. Hamburg: VSA Verlag. Demriović, Alex (1997). Demokratie und Herrschaft. Aspekte kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Dörre, Klaus, Michael Behr, Dennis Eversberg, and Karen Schierhorn (2009). Krise ohne Krisenbewusstsein? Zur subjektiven Dimension kapitalistischer Landnahmen. Prokla, 39(4), 559–575. Frey, Michael (2009). Autonomie und Aneignung in der Arbeit. Eine soziologische Untersuchung zur Vermarktlichung und Subjektivierung von Arbeit. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Giegel, Hans-Joachim, Gerhard Frank, and Ulrich Billerbeck (1988). Industriearbeit und Selbstbehauptung. Berufsbiographische Orientierung und Gesundheitsverhalten in gefährdeten Lebensverhältnissen. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Glißmann, Wilfrid, and Klaus Peters (2001). Mehr Druck durch mehr Freiheit. Die neue Autonomie in der Arbeit und ihre paradoxen Folgen. Hamburg: VSA. Hirsch, Joachim (1994). Politische Form, politische Institutionen und Staat. In Josef Esser, Christoph Görg and Joachim Hirsch (eds.). Politik, Institutionen und Staat. Zur Kritik der Regulationstheorie, 157–212. Hamburg: VSA.

SUBALTERNITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

155

Hirsch, Joachim (1995). Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat. Staat, Demokratie und Politik im globalen Kapitalismus. Berlin/Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv. Hürtgen, Stefanie (2008). Globalisierung, Leistung, Co-Management. Zur konzeptionellen Neubestimmung von betrieblicher Interessenvertretung. In Kai Dröge, Kira Marrs and Wolfgang Menz (eds.). Subjekt—Leistung—Markt. Neue Koordinaten betrieblicher Leistungspolitik?, 221–237. Berlin: sigma. Jessop, Bob (2002). The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press. Jürgens, Kerstin (2006). Arbeits- und Lebenskraft. Reproduktion als eigensinnige Grenzziehung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Kannankulam, John (2008). Autoritärer Etatismus im Neoliberalismus. In Jens Wissel and Stefanie Wöhl (eds.). Staatstheorie vor neuen Herausforderungen. Analyse und Kritik, 145–165. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Kern, Horst, and Michael Schumann (1977). Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewußtsein. Eine empirische Untersuchung über den Einfluss der aktuellen technischen Entwicklung auf die industrielle Arbeit und das Arbeiterbewußtsein. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Kleemann, Frank, and G. Günter Voß (2010). Arbeit und Subjekt. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 415– 450. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Kocyba, Hermann (2000). Der Preis der Anerkennung. Von der tayloristischen Missachtung zur strategischen Instrumentalisierung der Subjektivität der Arbeitenden. In Ursula Holtgrewe, Stephan Voswinkel and Gabriele Wagner (eds.). Anerkennung und Arbeit, 127–140. Konstanz: UVK. Kudera, Werner, Werner Mangold, Konrad Ruff, Rudi Schmidt, and Theodor Wentzke (1979). Gesellschaftliches und politisches Bewußtsein von Arbeitern. Eine empirische Untersuchung. Frankfurt M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Moldaschl, Manfred (2002), Foucaults Brille. Eine Möglichkeit, die Subjektivierung von Arbeit zu verstehen?. In Manfred Moldaschl and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit, 135–176. München/Mering: Hampp. Nickel, Hildegard, Hasko Hüning, and Michael Frey (2008). Subjektivierung, Verunsicherung, Eigensinn. Auf der Suche nach Gestaltungspotenzialen für eine neue Arbeits- und Geschlechterpolitik. Berlin: Sigma. Paul, Gerd (1989). Die Bedeutung von Arbeit und Beruf für Ingenieure. Eine empirische Untersuchung. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Pfeiffer, Sabine (2004). Arbeitsvermögen. Ein Schlüssel zur Analyse (reflexiver) Informatisierung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Pickshaus, Klaus, Horst Schmitthenner and Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). (2001). Arbeiten ohne Ende. Neue Arbeitsverhältnisse und gewerkschaftliche Arbeitspolitik. Hamburg: VSA. Poulantzas, Nicos (2000). State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso. Poulantzas, Nicos (1978). Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso. Sauer, Birgit (2001). Die Asche des Souveräns. Staat und Demokratie in der Geschlechterdebatte. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus.

156

STEFANIE HÜRTGEN AND JENS WISSEL

Schumann, Michael, Edgar Einemann, Christa Siebel-Rebell, and Klaus Peter Wittemann (1982). Rationalisierung, Krise, Arbeiter. Eine empirische Untersuchung der Industrialisierung auf der Werft. Frankfurt M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Wagner, Gabriele (2004). Anerkennung und Individualisierung. Konstanz: UVK. Wagner, Gabriele (2005). Die Kunst der Grenzziehung. Subjektivität zwischen Anspruch, Norm und Anforderung. In Arbeitsgruppe SubArO (ed.). Ökonomie der Subjektivität—Subjektivität der Ökonomie, 165–182. Berlin: Sigma. Wissel, Jens (2007). Die Transnationalisierung von Herrschaftsverhältnissen. Zur Aktualität von Nicos Poulantzas’ Staatstheorie. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Wolf, Harald (1999). Arbeit und Autonomie. Ein Versuch über Widersprüche und Metamorphosen kapitalistischer Produktion. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

Work and Critical Theory: An Unfinished Project David Strecker

The sociology of work does not play an important role in the history of Critical Theory. This seems surprising given that Max Horkheimer coined the term “Critical Theory” in the 1930s as a “camouflage label” (Wiggershaus 1995, 5) for the Marxist theory of society which the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research under his leadership was supposed to revise in order for it to be adequate for contemporary society. Like Marx’ analysis which aspired to be a revelatory critique of power that would help the working class better understand its social situation, Critical Theory wanted to reveal the mechanisms that let capitalist exploitation continue and increasingly escalate into fascist barbarism, following the occurrence of a global economic crisis and the non-occurrence of socialist revolution more than six decades after the first edition of Marx’ Capital had been published. However, this task quickly led the Horkheimer circle to become aware of the autonomy of allegedly superstructural phenomena. Thus, like other varieties of “Western Marxism” (Anderson 1976) and in contrast to orthodox Comintern Marxism, the “Frankfurt School” downplayed right from the start the explanatory weight of social labor. What is specific about the Frankfurt approach is how it conceptualizes the relationship between theory and practice (cf. Strecker 2012). On the one hand, it makes use of social research to identify and uncover hidden power structures that prevent those that are affected by them from realizing what their authentic interests are. On the other hand, it stresses more clearly than Marx, and in opposition to “scientific Marxism”, that the validity of any anticipation by the social scientist of the objective interests of those who participate in a social practice is conditional upon confirmation by these actors themselves. All statements made by social theory about power relations that distort underlying interests and all claims of false consciousness are mere hypotheses until they are adopted by those persons as their own self-understanding and thereby validated. Grammatically, the

158

DAVID STRECKER

social scientist’s analysis of power proceeds in the third person and, in so doing, is oriented towards an objectifying conceptual framework of cause and effect, whereas critique is based on the language of reasons and justifications, which remains the privilege of the participant’s perspective. Hence, the differentia specifica of Critical Theory is the combination of an empirically grounded observer’s perspective which allows for the critique of power relations (by investigating social relations of cause and effect that affect actors’ interests) with the primacy of the participant’s perspective (of the members of society who, informed on the social determinants of their own interests, can only judge for themselves whether or not this amounts to distortion and therefore demands social critique and change). Accordingly, the aim of Critical Theory is to explain and dissolve selfmisunderstandings without running the risk of reinforcing the paternalism of some vanguard. This theoretically modest ambition has taken shape in some fairly complex theories. In what follows, I will outline these using the nowadays wellestablished distinction between different generations of Critical Theory. Such a classification is obviously stylized and largely ignores certain, sometimes bitter, controversies. But it is exactly for this reason that it can be used to examine the significance of social labor in Critical Theory; it makes shifts and possible gaps stand out more clearly. In order to determine where and why the dominant strands of Critical Theory refer to work and how this might contribute to the sociology of work, I proceed by examining the relevance of social labor for the observer’s and the participant’s perspective in each generation of Critical Theory. This will demonstrate that the importance of the sociology of work to the theory of society has been downplayed for good reasons and that a proper appreciation of the former’s significance to the latter remains a desideratum. A Critical Theory of society needs to be informed by a sociology of work not restricted to the analysis of labor relations but a sociology of work heeding Weber’s (2001, 20) observation that fully developed capitalism creates its own subjects, i.e. a sociology of work guided by social theory in focusing on the socializing effects of wage labor (cf., on a similar idea, Menz’ contribution to this volume): Which beliefs and attitudes relevant to social reproduction are generated and consolidated by paid labor? To what extent are socially effective notions of legitimacy produced by experiences in the sphere of work?

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

159

1. The First Generation: Empirical Social Research between Interdisciplinary Materialism and the Critique of Instrumental Reason Social labor is of key importance at both levels of Karl Marx’ theoretical endeavor. His analysis of distorting power structures is based on the conviction that the categories which shape actors’ ideas about themselves and their interests emerge from the socially institutionalized mode of production and the position actors occupy in the relations of production (observer’s perspective). However, the assumption that the proletariat’s real interest is to overcome the capitalist organization of labor, which it will realize once the veil of bourgeois categories is lifted, rests on a theoretical anticipation: the belief that this presumed objective interest can be inferred from the level of development of the productive forces as will be confirmed when the workers revolutionize the relations of production (participant’s perspective). Yet, Marx never examined the link between a crisisprone economic structure and the behavior of actors in any detail. This lacuna became apparent when the global economic crisis of 1929 did not lead to the expected revolution. Marxist theory obviously was in need of a better understanding of how motives are formed. The research agenda of interdisciplinary materialism outlined by Horkheimer (1993) in his inaugural lecture as director of the Frankfurt Institute is just such an attempt to translate Marx’ critique of social power relations into a socio-psychological critique of ideology. Convinced that the fundamental tenets of Marxian social theory were correct, the aim was to identify the power structures that kept social conflicts latent by preventing the proletariat from realizing its objective interest in overcoming capitalism. The focus was therefore on the autonomous processes of personality formation, which was introduced as a mediating variable between base and superstructure. Thus, Marx’ fundamental belief was upheld, namely that the form of the relations of production that suits the objective interest of the members of society is determined by the level of development of the productive forces. Horkheimer did, however, drop the notion that this objective interest will necessarily become empirical reality by becoming the proletariat’s subjective interest to the extent to which the contradiction between the forces and relations of production intensifies. Instead, he considered the possibility that the workers might not recognize their true interests because of their socialization. The factors that are potentially

160

DAVID STRECKER

relevant in this context were to be made the subject matter of an analysis of power that systematically took into account empirical social research to prevent itself from getting lost in speculation. In accordance with the assumption that character structure explains divergences between the other two factors—economic structure and class consciousness—the two empirical research projects the Frankfurt group was able to realize in spite of the political conditions were of a socio-psychological nature (Fromm 1983; Institut für Sozialforschung 1936). Their most important finding was that the deepening economic crisis did not produce revolutionary consciousness because paternal unemployment had destroyed the autonomy of the family and with it that context in which adolescents could have developed ego strength in the first place. Therefore the structural conditions implied that one could not count, for the time being, on a self-confident working class to put an end to capitalist exploitation. The dwindling faith in the workers’ revolutionary potential could not leave the theory unaffected. At the level of the analysis of power from an observer’s perspective, work was only indirectly taken into account as a factor that affects socialization in the family. However, from the participant’s perspective—which, to be sure, was still only implicitly assumed and never elaborated—work remained central because the entire analysis rested on the classic Marxist assumption that the decisive social interests are given by the development of the productive forces which define the level of needs satisfaction that is theoretically attainable. In the absence of confirmation through revolutionary action, the hypotheses about power and the false consciousness of the workers remained in suspense; for example, one could have claimed just as well that certain (ideological) traditions still cultivated in working class circles were the only reason why the proletariat had not yet recognized that its objective interest was best served by the national socialist community of the German people. This problem, to which Horkheimer paid increasing attention, could be dealt with in two ways: either through a more open-minded empirical examination of social groups and their interests or by vigorously insulating critique from the selfdestructive social conditions. The terror of national socialism played into the hands of the latter option, leading to a further diminution of the participant’s perspective in relation to the observer’s perspective. In this political situation, those positions in the Frankfurt group that had impeded the systematic integration of social research into the critique of power right from the start became more influential. The concept of the

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

161

totally integrated society, which was being ever more clearly developed, rested on the political-economic assumption that state capitalism had triumphed. It stated that, as a first step, the liberal competitive capitalism of the bourgeois entrepreneur had been supplanted by monopoly capitalism and the large corporation. Then, domestic competition was eliminated and the function of economic planning taken over by the policies of state capitalism (Pollock 1975). Thus economic development gives rise to an authoritarian state that assumes different forms, but whose generic feature is the bureaucratic penetration of the whole society. The state directly influences, without social or cultural mediation, the character formation of individuals whose egos are already weakened and who already exhibit an authoritarian inclination thanks to the economic crisis. Authoritarian personality and authoritarian state are mutually stabilizing (Horkheimer 1973), while individuals are no longer able to see through the context of delusion. However, this concept of the totally integrated society was not properly empirically grounded. On the contrary, some of the more marginal members of the Institute who more closely examined the relationships between power groups and legal conditions in the national socialist system had serious doubts about it and pointed to unplanned, anarchic and chaotic moments that did not fit the functionalist model and contradicted the hypothesis of comprehensive rational planning (cf. Iser and Strecker 2002). Indeed, this hypothesis was anchored not so much in empirical research but the highly speculative philosophical assumption that the entire history of humankind was characterized by the increasing dominance of instrumental reason (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Instrumental reason was thought to aim at making everything readily usable and therefore to abstract from all qualitative features that are irrelevant to this purpose. Hence the identity principle of instrumental reason was considered fundamental to social analysis, and the principle of capitalist exchange merely as its economic crystallization. Nonetheless, this approach too claims to take the participant’s perspective into consideration and even to conserve its primacy. That is why the Dialectic of Enlightenment was regarded by its authors as a “message in a bottle” (Flaschenpost) (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002), only that the working class is no longer its recipient. The subject of history has moved instead to an unknown address and its interests are therefore unclear. The only thing left to criticize is the inhumanity of existing conditions, and only the members of society are in a position to determine what a “human institution of

162

DAVID STRECKER

the world” would be like. Any critique in the name of others, however, has to anticipate their interests. This is mostly unproblematic under totalitarian conditions, but when fundamental rights and democratic participation are formally guaranteed, it is not enough for Critical Theory to pay lip service to the primacy of the participant’s perspective. Indeed, this problem was to come more into focus, but the working class no longer played an important role.

2. The Second Generation: Criticizing Communicative Relations under Late Capitalism Jürgen Habermas is at the heart of the so-called second generation of Critical Theory. When he joined the re-opened Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in 1956, the tradition of Critical Theory was no longer present there. Nonetheless, he soon focused on the same questions relating to the critique of ideology. In terms of content, he was interested in the restrictions of autonomy that were produced as side effects of the mutual penetration between bureaucratic state and capitalist economy. With regard to the architecture of theory, he focused on the theory-practice relationship, or in other words the possibility of a social critique that did not depend on the potentially distorted standards of its own culture. In contrast to the first generation of Critical Theory, this shifted the focus to the problem of justifying the standards of critique and therefore to the participant’s perspective. Habermas had rejected the classically Marxist, and fairly narrow, belief of early Critical Theory that the satisfaction of material needs is the ultimate driver of social development and that the normative problem of justifying social critique can therefore be replaced by economic analysis. Individuals are the ultimate arbiters of their own interests, and in modern pluralism they do not constitute a collective subject with a singular interest. Therefore the theory must completely refrain from trying to define the substance of their interests. What theory can do is to specify the conditions under which the members of society can form a selfconception that is undistorted by power relations and have equal access to the processes in which a collective political will is formed. Accordingly, the participant’s perspective is no longer equated with empirical practice but reconstructed theoretically. It thus plays the dual role of justifying the cri-

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

163

teria for the authenticity of interests and of explaining what practices articulate interests in undistorted fashion. To that end, Habermas first delved into the critique of ideology and philosophy of history as well as anthropological epistemology. But he only achieved a breakthrough when he discovered formal pragmatics and started to analyze the general rules of language use (cf. Iser and Strecker 2010, 56ff.). From roughly 1970 onwards, he developed the model of a critique of communicative relations that proceduralized, as it were, the critique of ideology. The principal idea is that, when they speak, human beings necessarily incur a reciprocal duty of justification from which standards for undistorted practices of collective self-reflection can be derived. Therefore, the analysis of linguistic communication can inform the design of an institutional framework that would in principle ensure the continuity of the autonomous formation of a collective political will. In Habermas’ approach the role the working class used to play for Marx and early Critical Theory is played by the plurality of citizens in democratic states under the rule of law. Moreover, the practice that matters to his version of Critical Theory is no longer the allegedly exceptional moment of revolution but the everyday business of democratic debate. In Habermas’ Critical Theory the sphere of work is also mostly irrelevant to the analysis of power from a participant’s perspective. The capitalist economy may be crucial, but, contrary to historical materialism, Habermas assumes that the relations of communication, rather than production, are central to social reproduction. Societies are reproduced in nexuses of interconnected actions that depend on the consent of those who interact (Habermas 1984; cf. Strecker 2009). Traditionally, such consent was limited by taboos and religious boundaries, but these have withered as a result of crisis-induced advances of rationalization. This could have led to the communicative mechanism becoming overburdened, but the same development also produced accomplishments like modern formal law that counteracted this trend. Through the concept of freedom of contract and the definition of formal administrative responsibilities, they facilitated the emergence of a capitalist economy and bureaucratic state apparatuses in which actions are functionally connected through the guiding media of money and administrative power and therefore relieved of the necessity of communication. From this perspective, modern society is an ensemble of two largely decoupled sectors: the systemically integrated spheres of the economy and the state on the one hand, and on the other the public and

164

DAVID STRECKER

private spheres that constitute the lifeworld and continue to rely on communication. This does not mean that economic and administrative interaction is entirely “devoid of norms”, but that interaction can take place there without agreement between those who interact. A manager, for example, can achieve obedience by giving an order if necessary. Ultimately, however, the systems remain connected to the lifeworld through law. They also depend on being considered sufficiently legitimate, but this supply of legitimacy is at risk due to the inherent crisis tendencies of capitalist accumulation. In the face of Keynesian economic policy and the pacification of class conflict through the welfare state, Habermas no longer expected the occurrence of economic crises and potentially systemchanging conflicts and therefore did not pay sufficient attention to economic developments. In contrast to the state capitalism concept espoused by the early Frankfurt school, however, he also did not believe that politics had overcome the crisis tendencies of the capitalist economy. Like Claus Offe (1972; 1973; cf. Geis and Strecker 2005) and the theory of late capitalism, he assumed that economic crises were softened by political intervention but at the cost of shifting them into the political system, which risks having its legitimacy withdrawn by individuals whose motives are not subject to administrative intervention (Habermas 1975). Habermas’ wellknown “colonization of the lifeworld” hypothesis (Habermas 1987) then explains why this did not happen. In the course of their exaggerated growth, the capitalist economy and government bureaucracy had become so strongly independent from democratic control that they had paternalistically infantilized the members of society and conditioned them in the ways of possessive individualism. Clientelist and consumerist attitudes had become deeply rooted to the detriment of social integration. They had also marginalized adequate standards of successful sociality and, in so doing, systematically distorted communicative relations. Given the chances for creating new participatory arenas on the basis of procedural law, Habermas (1996) has recently become less pessimistic about the institutional possibilities of exerting a democratic influence on the systemically integrated spheres of society, although the effectiveness of democratic participation draws on certain cultural resources that the continuing colonization of the lifeworld undermines. Today, however, this assessment lacks a theoretical foundation because the theory of late capitalism referred to an economic policy that was already out of date by the time the Theory of Communicative Action was published. The analysis of power in

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

165

Habermas’ Critical Theory needs to be updated to reflect the return of economic crises as well as the fact that these crises have still not translated into conflicts between capital and labor that threaten the system as such, but instead seem to be systematically connected to an increasingly unfettered, one-sided exploitation of cultural norms through economic and administrative imperatives which also seems to restrict the transformative potential of current protests. This would require a sociological analysis of the relationship between state and economy under globalization (Strecker 2011) as well as their internal structures, with a focus on the processes that restrict notions of legitimacy and make them more one-sided. In this context, theoretical work also needs to draw on the sociology of work—as it has always had to. On the one hand, Habermas was right to de-emphasize the role that the relations of production play for social theory and to stress that social order is also crucially dependent on notions of legitimacy that are influenced, but not determined, by material factors. The normative possesses an autonomous dynamic which early Critical Theory and its analyses of how subjective motives are formed have still failed to do justice to. On the other hand, the tendency to see capitalism and the state apparatus as unproblematic is unconvincing. According to the core argument of Habermas’ social critique, they are not problematic as such because they specialize in certain tasks related to material reproduction. They only produce social pathologies to the extent to which they reach into the private and public spheres and start to influence the reproduction of traditions, solidarities and personalities. But it is precisely these functions of symbolic reproduction for which work continues to play a crucial role in societies like ours. Focusing on the precarious conditions of symbolic reproduction should have also drawn attention to wage labor as a sphere of experiences where meaning, social relationships and dispositions are formed in ways that matter to society as a whole.

3. Third Generation and Beyond: Social Critique without a Theory of Society? Early Critical Theory focused on the analysis of social power and mostly ignored the participant’s perspective. Habermas’ reformulation corrects this bias, but his analysis of the crucial social power dynamics is not com-

166

DAVID STRECKER

plex enough and is now out of date. It has become common to talk of a third generation of Critical Theory, but its protagonists—especially Axel Honneth, but also Nancy Fraser—barely take the participant’s perspective into account. They provide sociological examinations of the power structure of contemporary society, as well as descriptions and explanations of its emergence, current condition and development trends, basically only to prove to themselves that the normative points they want to justify are adequate to the structure of contemporary societies. Thus the third generation of Critical Theory more or less dispenses with a theory of society more narrowly understood. But the participant’s perspective is also not fully unfolded. What is lacking is a theory of the practices that would enable the members of society to engage in undistorted collective communication and self-reflection; in other words, an equivalent to the concept of revolution in early Critical Theory or to Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy. Honneth and Fraser have both dealt with the theory of democracy, and the former in particular has emphasized the importance of social struggles. But they focus mostly on the normative foundation of social critique, that is, the justification and explication of standards for assessing the demands of social movements and the interests of social groups. In so doing, they eschew Habermasian proceduralism when defining the participant’s perspective and opt instead for a more substantive approach that also takes into account social labor. There are systematic reasons why Honneth shifts the emphasis to the participant’s as opposed to the observer’s perspective, and not just because even professional sociologists struggle to theoretically grasp the increased social complexity in one comprehensive concept. Like early Critical Theory, which derived social evolution from functional imperatives of dominating nature, Habermas sees systemic crises as the reason why gradually more rational patterns of justification became socially institutionalized over the course of human history. Honneth (1991, 284–5) objected to this early on, arguing that ethical progress is the result of the social struggles of collective actors and does not take place “behind the backs” of the subjects. Social conflicts in which the autonomy of the normative unfolds, rather than structural pressures, are the crucial factor for him. From Marx to Horkheimer and Habermas until Honneth, the autonomy of ethical motives as opposed to systemic factors of societal development is increasingly emphasized. Accordingly, Honneth is mostly interested in motives for expressing moral indignation. Against Habermas’ procedural definition of the partici-

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

167

pant’s perspective, Honneth manages to introduce a substantive viewpoint through his hypothesis that ethical protest results from infringements of people’s identities. According to this view, modern societies have developed three differentiated dimensions of recognition—love, law, solidarity—in which the subjects can experience disrespect in regards to their claims to identity (Honneth 1995). Damage can be done to the self-confidence, self-respect und self-esteem of the individuals in society. What matters for the relation between Critical Theory and the sociology of work is that Honneth uses the concept of achievement to define the third dimension. People experience recognition for their contribution to collaborative endeavors. In societies like ours the most important of these is the sphere of work. Following Durkheim and Parsons, Honneth (2014, 176ff.) describes this sphere as (at least in principle) a nexus of cooperation in which freedom is realized. Thus he brings work and its internal structure back into the purview of Critical Theory. Sociological studies of work are as indispensable to the search for possible conditions of realization of this undoubtedly controversial idea as they are to answering the question of the extent to which wage labor, and the wage mechanism in particular, plays a specific role for patterns of social recognition. In the context of the shift from the material to the symbolic, which the “New Left” has brought to left-wing politics, Fraser criticizes as insufficient Honneth’s re-articulation of Critical Theory on the basis of the concept of recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003). She considers social and identity politics to be equally important aspects of left-wing politics. Recognition and redistribution are two irreducible aspects of justice comprehensively understood. Such justice requires equal participation in social life and can be explicated as “participatory parity”. Despite considerable differences, there is agreement that issues of justice that touch directly on the sphere of work are crucial for Critical Theory today, but also that the true interests of the members of society cannot, as the early Critical Theory believed, be defined in purely economic terms. Of course, Critical Theory still has next to nothing to say about the organization of work—let alone the relations of production. Above all, it has become increasingly disconnected from the theory of society and sociology. There were certainly good reasons for discarding the labor-centered notion of social totality and for recognizing the autonomy of ethicalpractical struggles. Therefore, there is hardly anything in first generation

168

DAVID STRECKER

Critical Theory on which one could draw in a substantial way today. But the other generations have also so far failed to come up with a Critical Theory of society that is adequate to our present times. What the second generation needs is a thorough overhaul of its social theory, for which it has to rely on the sociology of work among other things. The third generation approaches remain fragmentary for the time being. With regard to the normative reconstruction of the participant’s perspective, they demonstrate that there are alternatives to the proceduralist conception that are not just more instructive but also take work into consideration. However, they have so far failed to clarify what a practice would look like which could meet these criteria and enable the members of society to engage in undistorted collective communication and reflection. They are also silent about its possible institutional contours. However, what is most urgently needed is an analysis of societal power relations that is formulated from the objectifying perspective of the observer. Only such an analysis can generate hypotheses about the distorted self-conception of individuals who are the core concern of the Critical Theory of society and were the reason why it started to enquire into the possibility of social critique and conceptualizing the participant’s perspective in the first place—a question that has tended to become isolated and treated separately. Given the importance of wage labor in societies like ours, it is likely that the sphere of work constitutes a place where experiences shape the subject’s self-conception in a way that is relevant to the reproduction of society as a whole. A sociology of work that examines the socialization effects of wage labor could make a vital contribution to generating hypotheses about the social power relations that distort people’s interests and that the Critical Theory of society tries to uncover and raise awareness of.

Works Cited Anderson, Perry (1976). Considerations on Western Marxism. London: New Left Books. Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth (2003). Redistribution or recognition? A politicalphilosophical exchange. London/New York: Verso. Fromm, Erich (1983). Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches. Eine sozialpsychologische Untersuchung. München: dtv.

WORK AND CITICAL THEORY: AN UNFINISHED PROJECT

169

Geis, Anna, and David Strecker (eds.). (2005). Blockaden staatlicher Politik. Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen im Anschluss an Claus Offe. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Habermas, Jürgen (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1984). Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1987). Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Honneth, Axel (1991). The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory. Translated by Kenneth Baynes. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press. Honneth, Axel (1995). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Translated by Joel Anderson. Cambridge: Polity Press. Honneth, Axel (2014). Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. Cambridge: Polity Press. Horkheimer, Max (1973). The Authoritarian State. Telos, 15, Spring 1973, 3–20. Horkheimer, Max (1993). The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research. In Max Horkheimer. Between Philosophy and Social Science. Selected Early Writings, 1–14. Cambridge. Mass: MIT Press. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno (2002 [1944]). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.). (1936). Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung. Paris: Félix Alcan. Iser, Mattias, and David Strecker (2002). Kritische Theorie der Politik. Franz L. Neumann—eine Bilanz. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Iser, Mattias, and David Strecker (2010). Jürgen Habermas zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius. Offe, Claus (1972). Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates. Aufsätze zur Politischen Soziologie. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Offe, Claus (1973). “Krise des Krisenmanagements”. Elemente einer politischen Krisentheorie. In Martin Jänicke (ed.). Herrschaft und Krise. Beiträge zur politikwissenschaftlichen Krisenforschung, 197–223. Opladen: VS. Pollock, Friedrich (1975). Stadien des Kapitalismus. München: Beck. Strecker, David (2009). Theorie der Gesellschaft. In Hauke Brunkhorst, Regina Kreide and Christina Lafont (eds.). Habermas-Handbuch, 220–233. Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler.

170

DAVID STRECKER

Strecker, David (2011). Kritische Theorie der Globalisierung. In Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink (eds.). Globalisierung ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch, 368–374. Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler. Strecker, David (2012). Logik der Macht. Zum Ort der Kritik zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Weilerswist: Velbrück. Weber, Max (2001 [1905]). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Routledge. Wiggershaus, Rolf (1995). The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Capitalist Society: A View from the Theory of Functional Differentiation Uwe Schimank

When we talk of capitalism we refer to more than the capitalist economy. If the economy and its problems were the only things at stake, we could relax and simply ask: What is going wrong? What needs repair or maybe a more fundamental reconstruction; or are these problems perhaps just the unavoidable collateral damage of an economic system whose economic superiority on the whole is beyond doubt? Such questions about how to manage economic problems remain safely within the framework of economics and economic policy. However, they become much more serious once we assume that the capitalist economy occupies a dominant position in the structure of subsystems that constitute our society. In that case, economic problems affect every last corner of society, and as a consequence we would then have to call it a capitalist society. It also means that we need a theory of society as well as policies that intentionally shape society as a whole. Theories of social differentiation are among the main strands of sociological theories of society from the classics until today (Schimank 1996). However, even if Marx, who stressed the dominance of the economy more than anyone else, is seen as a classical theorist of differentiation (Schimank 1996, 69–73), there is no denying the fact that differentiation theory mostly developed in opposition to the Marxist theory of society. Talcott Parsons (1966) regarded “single-factor theories” that, like Marxism, tried to explain societal development exclusively on the basis of the economy as a Kindergartenstufe (kindergarten stage) in the theory of society. Niklas Luhmann’s (1973, 81) assessment was not much friendlier; he spoke of “old European” relics in the self-image of modernity that an adequate theory of society needed to overcome. Accordingly, Luhmann (1979, 220) also assumed that in a functionally differentiated modern society the economic system and the system of art—or the educational system for that matter— are equally indispensable and therefore equally important.

172

UWE SCHIMANK

At first, that does not seem to suggest that the theory of differentiation can provide the key to understanding modern society as a capitalist one. But exactly this is my proposition: because the theory of differentiation does not presuppose dominance, it will be more effectively irritated by evidence to the contrary, which will induce it to look very closely so as to understand what causes economic dominance. Moreover, because its theoretical architecture does not already imply economic dominance, the theory of differentiation can speak up all the more credibly for the interests of the non-economic subsystems of modern society—if, that is, one is also interested in criticizing capitalism. 1 Due to the brevity of this chapter, I cannot do more than outline the argumentative steps that would have to be taken to substantiate the hypothesis above. I can point to some of my own preparatory theoretical work (Schimank 2005a; 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2015)—but numerous gaps remain. To avoid raising expectations too high I want to stress that I will not, for the time being, do more than describe the highly tension-prone general structure of the capitalist type of society. I will neither discuss the historical and national specificities which any empirical analysis would have to take into account. Nor will I provide an analysis of the current situation of capitalism with prospects for the future. In the remainder, I will sketch the following four argumentative steps: The establishment of a functionally differentiated society (1) entails, among other things, the differentiation of a capitalist economy (2) that possesses societal primacy and therefore constitutes a functionally differentiated capitalist society (3) whose inherent tensions are only tolerable as a welfare society (4).

1. Functionally Differentiated Society Modern society is functionally differentiated in the sense that it consists of an ensemble of about a dozen subsystems in which the interaction of ac-

——————

1 Of course, this presupposes that functional differentiation is seen as something that is worth preserving or even as something that should be constantly advanced. The theory of differentiation, however, does not oblige those who work with it to subscribe to this normative view. They can also just examine what happens to functional differentiation without making normative judgements.

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

173

tors adheres to one specific guiding value that has become absolute and an end in itself and that is exclusive to one—and only one—system. Take, for example, the search for knowledge in science, the quest for power in politics or profit seeking in the economy. 2 The subsystems—apart from the ones just mentioned there are also law, the military, art, religion, journalism, education, health, sport and intimacy—become differentiated as “value spheres” with their own respective “summum bonum”. When actors adhere to one of these guiding values as “illusio” (Bourdieu 2009, 227) the counterpart to this monomaniacal fixation is a “legitimate indifference” (Tyrell 1978, 183–4) to all other guiding values, even though we may know as individuals that in a few hours we will, for example, leave the scientific sphere and enter an entirely different subsystem this evening as, say, a local politician. The functional differentiation of modern society has gradually become established through individual processes of differentiation for each subsystem. These processes have partly taken place simultaneously, partly consecutively; sometimes they have strongly interacted and reinforced each other, and sometimes they have gone on in relative isolation. The process as a whole has taken several centuries, and its concrete shape and timing have varied considerably for different countries. There have been consciously executed policies of differentiation by certain actors, such as scientists or physicians, but the differentiation dynamics of each of the subsystems have proceeded largely transintentionally. This applies all the more to the process as a whole. The guiding value of each subsystem is constituted as a binary code. As such it is embedded into programs that are specific to each subsystem and govern the use of the code within the system-specific constellation of roles and organizations. From their own point of view, actors in their respective subsystems merely follow the guiding value as an end in itself. However, from the point of view of society as a whole they are service providers: first to a public that is specific to a particular subsystem and consists of individual members of society in their roles as, for example, patients, voters or pupils; second, they also serve the needs of the provision of services taking place in other subsystems. Thus, the subsystems coexist in a

——————

2 Misunderstandings in the past make me emphasize that my approach to social theory is based on a theory of action, not systems theory, even though certain shorthands used here and there may sound like systems theory (Schimank 2005b).

174

UWE SCHIMANK

cooperative division of labor that is, however, inherently tension-ridden and only reluctantly supported by the service providers.

2. Capitalist Economy In the 19th century people gradually realized that, within this architecture of functional differentiation, the differentiation of the economy was of a different quality than the same process in other subsystems. Like in the latter, monomaniacal fixation on its specific guiding value massively increased the effectiveness of economic action. This is vividly expressed in the variety, quality, availability and affordability of all sorts of goods and services today. No other economic system—least of all a socialist-planned economy—could surpass this “immense accumulation of commodities” (Marx 1999, 6) which nobody nowadays would want to do without. But the other side of the coin also became clear early on: as a high susceptibility to economic crises, but also as the subordination of all other subsystems to economic forces and needs. The latter creates economizing pressures that endanger the autonomy of art, science, education or politics, and ultimately functional differentiation as such. This is exactly how Pierre Bourdieu (2000, 39) interprets the “return to a kind of radical capitalism” which has been taking place since the “neo-liberal invasion” in the 1980s. This being as it is, the capitalist economy has relied right from the start on enterprises and entrepreneurs whose actions are guided by seeking and maximizing profit. It also relies on treating nature, money and, above all, labor—that is, workers as human beings—as if they were commodities, and the market as the central mechanism of governance. In their fixation on profits, enterprises and entrepreneurs are characterized first and foremost by an obstinate “unruly opportunism” (Streeck 2009, 240; emphasis omitted). Joseph Schumpeter explains the capitalist dynamic as resulting from the actions of entrepreneurs who put new ideas for products, production technologies and organization into practice to earn temporary monopoly rents. However, other practices that creative and vigorously selfinterested entrepreneurial behavior engenders are—whenever it seems opportune to do so—the formation of trusts and monopolies, exploitation of market power, unbridled speculation, insider trading, corruption, etc. When something serves profit maximization and can be done either in the

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

175

form of non-criminal circumvention or even a criminal act whose benefits outweigh the costs, then there is no holding back. No enterprise can consistently and permanently adhere to the virtues of the “honest businessman”; all that is needed to go out of business quickly is just one competitor in the market who is less scrupulous or who comes up with a new product loved by consumers. In this way, the unbridled pursuit of profit creates a constant incentive to subvert the existing economic order through ingenuity and deviance. Moreover, the market as governance mechanism has only a weak capacity for generating order and therefore does little to curb “unruly opportunism”. Even when legal rules are universally followed, the coordination of actions through the market will never guarantee more than temporary and unstable cognitive predictability. It does not provide permanent and normatively stabilized predictability. One must always be mentally prepared for the possibility that competitors will act strategically by cheating and protecting their insider knowledge. Therefore, all actors must be constantly ready to learn. They must constantly observe their counterparts to understand their intentions, opportunities and constraints and to try to anticipate, or at least comprehend, any changes. Moreover, they must be flexible enough to adjust their own decisions at any time. If everyone expects the unexpected from everyone else at each moment, there is no constant that could guarantee reliability—something that rules and responsibilities bring about in hierarchies, habitualized orientations and routines in communities, and well known veto positions in networks. In the market, social order only arises in the form of a permanent “keeping pace” with everybody else through mutual adaptation, and repeated turbulences are the inevitable result. Moreover, because the market mechanism pervades the entire economic system, local turbulences often do not remain confined but escalate quickly through simple mechanisms of “deviation amplification” (Maruyama 1963), whether as herd behavior in financial markets, spirals of inflation or deflation, or as path dependencies of technological development, management fashions or consumption trends. Of course, the expansionary unfolding of the profit motive, which the market does not curtail but encourage, presupposes a constantly growing demand for the goods that are being produced. Contrary to oncefashionable claims that the capitalist economy inevitably runs into “crises of underconsumption”, such demand has in fact been secured. Even if we disregard the vast demand for basic consumer goods in large parts of the

176

UWE SCHIMANK

world, which, to be sure, often lacks purchasing power, the seemingly saturated or even over-saturated consumers in the affluent West would still hold an inexhaustible potential demand that is equipped with very considerable, albeit not quite as inexhaustible, purchasing power. Jens Beckert (2010) has made this point thus: “Increasingly we demand goods that are interesting for us not because of their immediate usefulness, but because of their symbolic relevance. They allow us to emphasize a difference in social status or make us feel good.”

The positional, and especially the imaginative, value of goods or services hardly knows limits of saturation. After all, you can always buy an even better TV to show off or imagine that the image quality is even better. The demand side does not bring about any limits to permanent economic growth—provided that the distribution of incomes does not become so skewed that mass purchasing power decreases to the point that “underconsumption crises” may happen after all.

3. Capitalist Society The demand for goods and services that is generated by individual members of society as consumers and by other subsystems is well-provided for by the capitalist economy, but there are also—and often overwhelmingly so—the above-mentioned negative externalities: these are costs that are caused by the capitalist economy but borne by society as a whole. Examples include unemployment with all its attendant consequences, environmental destruction and the waste of scarce natural resources, as well as the commodification and commercialization of the provision of services which take place in other subsystems. These costs originate from the societal primacy of the economic system in functionally differentiated modernity. This primacy is constituted relationally; it arises from the economy’s prominent position in the structure of universal reciprocal reliance on the provision of services between the subsystems of society. The economy— and only the economy—supplies modern society with money, which is a necessary resource for the provision of services, not just in the economy but in all other subsystems too. Among the means of exerting influence which actors have at their disposal, money is also the most widely usable, both materially and socially. Legitimate power, for example, is restricted by

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

177

territory and by responsibilities that are circumscribed by their material content and the authorized representatives. Only experts can handle truth, and each truth has a specific content and can therefore only be used in the appropriate context. Love can be used for many a material end, but it is very limited socially. The loved person can demand almost anything from his or her lover—but only from them. Money, on the other hand, is universal; it can buy almost anything—except for love. Moreover, it can do so without having to define temporally today what will be bought tomorrow; it can be used by anyone vis-à-vis anyone else; and it is the most precisely quantified resource. Thanks to money’s incomparably high degree of generalization, the economy, simply by businesses earning more or less money, generates a permanent economizing pressure—in the form of an accumulating external effect—that weighs more or less heavily on all non-economic subsystems as well as individuals. This pressure compels them to take more care about economic considerations. To put it pointedly: actors in all other subsystems of society must refrain from anything that jeopardizes entrepreneurial profit seeking and the economic growth that results from it. Otherwise tax revenues that finance many activities in non-economic subsystems would decrease, as would the wages of employees, leading to mounting cost pressures on the budgets of hospitals, schools, research institutes or the welfare state as well as the household budgets of families and individuals. Businesses, on the other hand, must be granted permission to earn money wherever they want—the more so the worse they are doing—so that the providers of services in other subsystems and individual members of society may also be better off again by way of “collateral benefit”. Thus, commodification pressure is added to cost pressure, for example as in the privatization of government-run infrastructures like rail or postal services, or in the licensing of commercial broadcasters. Organizations, both within and outside the economy, compensate their employees with money that can ultimately only be earned in the economy. That is why all the actors of modernity—individuals, organizations and states (Meyer and Jepperson 2000)—all over society constantly feel the economic pulse. They know that when “less money” (Luhmann 1983, 39) becomes even less, the importance of all other societal concerns, especially the guiding values of other subsystems like truth, education, health, art, etc., declines as they are subjected to cost-saving imperatives that will endanger the autonomy of subsystems sooner rather than later. This loss of

178

UWE SCHIMANK

autonomy, that is, of the ability of service providers to stick to their particular subsystemic guiding value, is manifested in a variety of ways, from the quantitative reduction of services to the loss of service quality, as can be seen pars pro toto in the contemporary health system.

4. Welfare Society Up to this point it has become clear that capitalist society is a form of society that is inherently prone to extremely strong tensions. Among the subsystems that the functional differentiation of modernity has produced, the economy stands out through its tremendous effectiveness in functional terms, but is equally characterized by dynamic forces that constantly and endogenously generate susceptibility to crises in the economy itself and also lead to the subordination of all other subsystems. These two major dysfunctionalities raise the question of how capitalist society can endure itself. The answer is: as welfare society. The fundamental insight behind this statement is not new at all. It is still most clearly articulated in Eduard Heimann’s definition of the function of social policy: “Bit by bit it realizes the social idea within capitalism, thus ensuring its orderly continuation. […] For capitalism is always in danger of squandering its very foundation” (Heimann 1980, 190; translation JM). This can be interpreted simultaneously as social policy creating a “selfprotection of society” (Polanyi 2001, 136) against the destructive force of its own economic system and, in the other direction, as “saving capitalism from itself” (Klundt 2005), that is, as protecting the economy itself from its own destructive power. To quote Heimann once more (1980, 167–8): “Social policy is the integration of the counter-principle” into capitalism; it plays a “dual role […] as an alien element, but also as component of the capitalist system” (translation JM), a true “dialectical paradox”. In other words, we have here a functional antagonism. The countervailing principle to the capitalist pursuit of profit became established through piecemeal expansion, in the course of which it fiercely opposed this pursuit and restricted it for its own good: –

First comes social policy which was initially and primarily reactive in trying to cushion individual risks (illness, unemployment, old age) to commodified labor;

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

–

–

179

then the welfare state emerged which, after 1945, became increasingly bound up with a proactive interventionist state engaging in ancillary activities—like managing the business cycle (then deemed a possibility), or science and technology policies that aimed to create and maintain the conditions for continued economic growth; based on this, finally, the promise arose of continuously improving life chances for everyone in the form of a secure high standard of life, individual chances of social mobility and a guaranteed generous provision of health and education services.

Once basic social security had been introduced, the promise of universal wealth and welfare in the Affluent Society (Galbraith 1958) led to a welfare society, in which everyone assumed that they would be better off than their parents, and that their own children would be better off still. Until the 1980s, this promise to all members of society was the basis for social integration and political mass loyalty as output-legitimacy of government action. Who were those who fought, intentionally or transintentionally, for the concerns that ultimately became enshrined in the welfare society? A fairly intentional implementation of the counterforce to capitalist pursuit of profit did indeed take place. During the latter half of the 19th century, such an understanding existed among parts of societal elites—the most prominent example in Germany being Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire. It also existed in those factions of the labor movement that did not aim at the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, nor believed in its pre-ordained self-destruction, but who rather wanted to reform and mould it into a society that ensured security and at least modest wealth for all. The insight that “social peace” had to be made and that the working class had to be integrated into society gained traction thanks to a coalition that was never explicitly agreed upon, nor even consciously noted, by the two parties involved. These were, first, that part of the political elite that believed in the necessity of correcting the societal externalities of capitalist economies through social policy and, second, the more short-termoriented and self-centered reformist majority of the labor movement. Together they stood against the short-term-oriented and self-centered businessmen and their political representatives, as well as the revolutionary, long-term-oriented faction of the labor movement that was interested in the utopian collective well-being of the working class.

180

UWE SCHIMANK

As long as the working class had not yet been politically integrated into the state as the supreme agent of shaping society, reform-minded political elites had to point to the pressure from the streets to support their views. They could draw on massive and escalating unambiguous evidence to that end. Once democracy, that is, universal and equal suffrage, had been achieved, varying parliamentary majorities have until today decided on the expansion, conservation or reduction of the welfare state in the shadow of tax estimates and the level of public debt. Considerable national differences between welfare societies exist, for example between Germany and the USA. Nonetheless, the following applies to all developed Western countries: the functional antagonism between capitalist society and welfare society as an “ongoing contest between mutually incompatible social tendencies, or social needs” (Streeck 2009, 250) becomes, on the level of state activity, manifest in the functional antagonism between tax state and democratic state. The former is represented mostly by the ministry of finance, the latter by the other ministries. This does not mean that the tax state sets a strict limit to what can be done in terms of social benefits. When party politics or the national interest demand that mass loyalty be sustained or expanded through social benefits, empty government coffers are often ignored, even against the finance minister’s budget veto. These are therefore “soft budget constraints” (Kornai 1992), as Greece and other states have clearly demonstrated in recent years. No one can say in advance where the hard limit really lies. Ultimately it is expressed in the same way as neglect of the social minimum in welfare societies: as a revocation of political mass loyalty—see, for example, the American Tea Party movement—which can lead to an overall erosion of social integration. In such critical times, as they occur again and again in capitalist societies, government policy operates in a decision space in which pretty much the only choice left is that between a rock and a hard place. If it decides to increase public debt even more to preserve the non-economic functional requirements of society—and thus ultimately functional differentiation—it risks hyper-inflation, middle class “tax revolts”, capital flight, rising interest rates for government debt, international pressure to consolidate the budget and so on. If, on the other hand, politicians choose a strict course of austerity compatible with the capitalist pursuit of profit this brings about economizing pressures on other social subsystems and on poorer parts of the population, which results in protests by the latter as well as resistance

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

181

from service providers in the economized subsystems. In the longer term, this will also lead to dysfunctionalities that negatively affect the economy itself, such as shortages of skilled workers or innovative scientific knowledge. This concludes my very brief, very broad-brush outline of the fundamental structure of Western welfare societies. The point that I wanted to get across is that this type of society is kept together by the tension-prone opposition of principles of action—economic profit seeking on the one hand, all non-economic concerns on the other—and of actors that adhere to these principles. This basic structure already suggests that such a society will be at odds with itself again and again, to the point of breaking apart: “While the reality of capitalism is always mixed, the mix is far from stable and indeed always explosive” (Streeck 2010, 31). It would be wrong, however, to see the antagonism between capitalist economy and democratic politics as the self-destruction mechanism of functionally differentiated capitalist society. For all its explosiveness, this antagonism remains a functional one. On the one hand, the monomaniacal fixation of actors in other subsystems on their respective guiding values disregards those economic realities that art, science, education, the health system or politics cannot ignore for very long. On the other hand, the “value for its own sake” (Weber 1978, 25) of each non-economic subsystem must be defended against too hard economic “constraints”. It would be a functionalist fallacy to assume that the functional antagonism ultimately always restores the required balance. Whether a particular functional requirement is actually fulfilled or not is a strictly empirical question. The general theoretical model I have here presented, raises precisely this question when it draws the attention of detailed investigations into concrete phases in the development of functionally differentiated capitalist societies. As an action-theoretical approach it takes into account the ubiquity of conflict by also focusing on the balance of forces between actors in society as a whole. This balance of forces can sometimes lean too much towards one side, so that the functional antagonism is driven to one of either extremes—or even beyond to the point of complete destruction. What may benefit one side in the short run will be punished severely in the longer run—a punishment that both sides will normally have to suffer. We may, of course, hope that there are sufficiently influential forces, even among those who temporarily benefit from such disequilibrium, who are far-sighted enough to do something to counteract it—just like there were

182

UWE SCHIMANK

in the latter half of the 19th century. There is, however, no guarantee of that.

5. Conclusion This book claims in its title to elucidate the connection between the sociology of work and the theory of capitalism. It is therefore appropriate to conclude this chapter by discussing how the analysis of capitalism based on a theory of functional differentiation suggested here relates to the sociology of work. Unfortunately, I am the wrong person for this because I am not a student of work and industrial relations and do not know this particular field of sociology well enough. Therefore, I can only hope that I have elaborated my perspective well enough so that more qualified readers may be able to figure out how it can be connected to the sociology of work: which of the concepts, arguments and questions presented here could be used in the sociology of work? To give an example: Robert Castel’s (2003) historical analyses of the emergence and transformation of the “wage labor-centered society” support core arguments of the concept of a functionally differentiated capitalist society that I have presented here. This is indeed a useful piece of work from the sociology of work. The same applies to—certainly quite bold— hypotheses such as the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) or that of the “entrepreneurial employee” (Arbeitskraftunternehmer) (Voß and Pongratz 1998). Of course, we also have to debate further arguments from the sociology of work that reject my view of the functionally differentiated capitalist society as inadequate, for example by countering that it is the “sphere of production”, rather than, as I claim here, the “sphere of circulation”, on which the societal primacy of the capitalist economy is based. However, I do not want to parade out the stale old chestnuts of yesteryear that uncritically draw on Marx either explicitly or implicitly: the laborcentered anthropology, the labor theory of value, the law of the “tendency of the rate of profit to fall”, or the “base-superstructure” model. But, according to its own proclamations, the sociology of work has long had better things to offer anyway.

CAPITALIST SOCIETY

183

Works Cited Beckert, Jens (2010). Was unsere Güter wertvoll macht. Handelsblatt, 19./20.11.2010, 8–9. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Bourdieu, Pierre (2000). Acts of Resistance. Against the New Myths of our Time. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (2009). The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Cambridge: Polity Press. Castel, Robert (2003). From Manual Workers to Wage Labourers. Transformation of the Social Question. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers. Galbraith, John Kenneth (1958). The Affluent Society. Harmondsworth: Mariner Books. Heimann, Eduard (1980 [1929]). Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus—Theorie der Sozialpolitik. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Klundt, Michael (2005). “Saving capitalism from itself”? Entstehung und Entwicklung sozialdemokratischer Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit. In Karl Gabriel (ed.). Europäische Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit—Soziokulturelle Grundlagen und religiöse Wurzeln. Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften, 46/2005, 129–146. Kornai, Janos (1992). The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1973). Selbst-Thematisierung des Gesellschaftssystems. In Niklas Luhmann. Soziologische Aufklärung. Vol. 2, 72–102. Opladen: VS. Luhmann, Niklas (1979). Identitätsgebrauch in selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften. In Niklas Luhmann. Soziologische Aufklärung. Vol. 3, 198–227. Opladen: VS. Luhmann, Niklas (1983). Anspruchsinflation im Krankheitssystem. Eine Stellungnahme aus gesellschaftstheoretischer Sicht. In Philipp Herder-Dorneich and Alexander Schuller (eds.). Die Anspruchsspirale. Schicksal oder Systemdefekt?, 28–49. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Maruyama, Magoroh (1963). The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying in Mutual Causal Processes. American Scientist, 51, 164–179. Marx, Karl (1999 [1859]). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publisher. 03.11.2017 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ works/download/Marx_Contribution_to_the_Critique_of_Political_Economy .pdf. Meyer, John W., and Ronald L. Jepperson (2000). The “Actors” of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency. Sociological Theory, 18(1), 100–120. Parsons, Talcott (1966). Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs/ New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

184

UWE SCHIMANK

Polanyi, Karl ([1944] 2001). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Schimank, Uwe (1996). Theorien gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung. Opladen: UTB Leske+Budrich. Schimank, Uwe (2005a). Funktionale Differenzierung und gesellschaftsweiter Primat von Teilsystemen—offene Fragen bei Parsons und Luhmann. Soziale Systeme, 11(2), 395–414. Schimank, Uwe (2005b). Akteurkonstellationen und Differenzierungsdynamiken— Ein theoretischer Bezugsrahmen. In Uwe Schimank. Differenzierung und Integration der modernen Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur akteurzentrierten Differenzierungstheorie, 21–42. Wiesbaden: VS. Schimank, Uwe (2009a). Die Moderne: eine funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19(3), 327–351. Schimank, Uwe (2009b). “Vater Staat”: ein vorhersehbares Comeback. Staatsverständnis und Staatstätigkeit in der Moderne. der moderne staat, 2(2), 249–270. Schimank, Uwe (2010a). Die funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft als Organisationsgesellschaft—eine theoretische Skizze. In Martin Endress and Thomas Matys (eds.). Die Ökonomie der Organisationen—die Organisationen der Ökonomie, 33–61. Wiesbaden: VS. Schimank, Uwe (2010b). Max Webers Rationalisierungsthese—differenzierungstheoretisch und wirtschaftssoziologisch gelesen. In Andrea Maurer (ed.). Wirtschaftssoziologie nach Max Weber, 226–247. Wiesbaden: VS. Schimank, Uwe (2011). Wohlfahrtsgesellschaften als funktionaler Antagonismus von Kapitalismus und Demokratie—Ein immer labilerer Mechanismus?. MPIfG Working Paper 02/11, Cologne. Schimank, Uwe (2015). Modernity as a Functionally Differentiated Capitalist Society: A General Theoretical Model. European Journal of Social Theory, 18(4), 413–430. Streeck, Wolfgang (2009). Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Streeck, Wolfgang (2010). Taking Capitalism Seriously. Toward an Institutionalist Approach to Contemporary Political Economy. MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/10, Cologne. Tyrell, Hartmann (1978). Anfragen an die Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 7(2), 175–193. Voß, G.Günter, and Hans J. Pongratz (1998). Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Eine neue Grundform der “Ware Arbeitskraft”?. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 50(1), 131–158. Weber, Max (1978 [1922]). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Financial Market Capitalism or Financial Market Rationality? Jürgen Kädtler

Financial markets and financial market actors have gained a decisive influence on the orientation of economic action in capitalist societies since the 1990s. Less attention is paid to the real economy, the material or technological conditions of economic action, the concrete conditions in goods markets and so on. Financial market activities have freed themselves from their function as intermediaries to the real economy and have developed a highly dynamic life of their own. In times of crisis, this is revealed as merely relative, but when it happens, the repercussions for the real economy are massive. Financial markets have also become the normative point of reference for the economic behavior of non-financial corporations. Economic efficiency is defined by parameters developed by financial economists, and business models are considered viable when they conform to the models that circulate in the financial-market public sphere. Various authors (e.g. Chesnais 1997; Windolf 2005c; Dörre 2015) have interpreted these developments as the emergence of a new capitalist formation with a peculiar systemic logic (including specific contradictions) which they have called financial market capitalism. In contrast to this approach, my contribution focuses on the conditions and consequences of the emergence of financial market rationality as the dominant regime of justification for economic actors; the question whether this constitutes a new formation or not is deliberately left open here.

1. Financial Capitalism: Really the Power of the “New Owners”? Whether it is called financialization (Boyer 1999; Orléan 1999; Froud et al. 2006), financial market capitalism (Deutschmann 2005; Windolf 2005b;

186

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

Beyer 2006), or owner/fiduciary capitalism (Aglietta 1998; Lavigne 2002; Montagne 2006; 2007), what is largely uncontested is that financial markets have become the dominant point of reference for the justification of economic action. There is less agreement and more ambiguity, however, when it comes to the particular conditions of this development, especially the authority of financial markets and financial market actors, and how this plays out at the level of company behavior. 1 Protagonists of the financial market capitalism approach rarely even ask this question, preferring instead to merely postulate the existence of a systemic cause-effect nexus. When they do ask it, they focus on the concentration of formerly dispersed share ownership in the hands of “institutional investors” 2 and the power of the “new owners” that is based on it (Höpner 2003; Windolf 2005a). They also claim that, in the face of this power, other economic actors have little choice but to comply (Deutschmann 2005; Beyer 2006; Busch 2008). There is no doubt that concentration among financial investors, financial dependence or the “new owners”’ ability to combine strategies of exit and voice effectively are very important. However, the mechanisms through which these initially latent sources of power are manifested are only vaguely defined. This applies to the explanation of the political reregulation that gave financial market actors more room for maneuver (at least compared to the post-1930s period). It also applies to the effectiveness of real or alleged financial market demands at the level of (nonfinancial) corporations. Regarding the latter point, mechanisms like financial dependence, the market for corporate control, use of financial market indicators, shareholder activism, etc. are consistently developed in conceptual terms, but they are only loosely and haphazardly connected to empirical reality. Even listed companies do not rely much on equity financing, and in recent years payouts from net earnings have actually exceeded share buybacks. Where substituting debt for equity capital does increase the

——————

1 It is therefore not correct to portray these approaches simply as varieties of the theory of financial market capitalism, as claimed in a recent paper by Beyer (2009). The concept of financialization used by Folkman et al. (2007), for example, stands in explicit opposition to those that, like the theory of financial market capitalism, see it as a distinct formation. 2 It would be more appropriate here to use the term “organization”. The organized pooling of individual investors in the form of large investment funds—which is what terms like “institutionalization” or “institutional investors” refer to—does not, in my opinion, create institutions. Nonetheless, for pragmatic reasons I will follow common practice and talk of “institutional investors”.

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

187

dependence on bond markets, this is not the condition but the consequence of financial market-oriented corporate strategies. The preferred targets for hostile takeover bids in the market for corporate control are not the underperforming, badly managed companies that can be snapped up cheaply, but modern and successful ones, regardless of price. Manifest shareholder activism is very rare. Even if we assume that managers comply in advance because they anticipate the possibility of interventions, it is still the managers’ own interpretations, not those of shareholders, that are turned into strategies. There are, of course, opportunities for the representatives of financial investors to exert influence, such as analyst conferences, road shows or private conversations with top executives. Their purpose, however, is not to impose unilaterally a pre-defined investor agenda on reluctant managers, but the evaluation, justification and critique of given corporate strategies (Bébéar and Manière 2003; Faust 2011). 3 In addition, it can be empirically demonstrated that the growth of shareholder incomes since the 1990s is not the result of financial market-oriented strategies, but of a higher demand for shares not matched by a proportionate increase in supply (Froud et al. 2000; Froud et al. 2006). To summarize, financial market pressures are not unequivocal; they are ambiguous and diffuse. What financial market orientation means in practice is not determined solely by the demands of financial markets. It is the result of diverse constellations of negotiation and contestation in which financial and non-financial market actors with varying and imperfectly defined perspectives interact in ways that are not pre-ordained by some given balance of forces.

2. Financial Market Orientation as Expression of Financial Market Rationality Since the 1990s, the perspective and criteria of financial markets have become hegemonic for the justification of economic action. In this section, I

——————

3 An impressive example of just how large the room for interpretation can be is the case of General Electric under Jack Welch. In his time, the company was touted as a model of shareholder value-oriented management despite the fact that its actual (but profitable!) management strategy went directly against many of its precepts (cf. Froud et al. 2006).

188

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

will argue that this hegemony is based on the establishment of financial market rationality as a conventionally justified “guiding principle” (Leitvorstellung; Beyer 2006), “idée simple” (Lordon 2000; 2002) or “regime of justifycation” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; 2006). 4 This ties in with sociological approaches that focus on the social foundation of new standards of rationality and legitimacy for economic action. A version of the theory of social fields recently advanced by Jens Beckert (2009) is used to analyze the processes that led to this result as well as the effectiveness of the new frame of reference. Social fields, such as financial markets, are understood as arenas of social action in which actors use and invoke institutional rules, social relations and networks as well as cognitive patterns of perception and interpretation to influence situations and developments in accordance with their interests. The interrelation between these social macro-structures is marked by considerable tension. They may support and reinforce each other, but they can also induce dynamics of change in the other. The consolidation of financial market rationality as a hegemonic guiding principle is interpreted here as an example of the second possibility. 2.1 The New Academic Justification and Refoundation of Financial Market Rationality The idea that financial markets represent a superior type of rationality from which authoritative standards for economic action in completely different areas can be derived is far from self-evident. It is also fairly new. Financial market activities traditionally enjoyed a reputation for shadiness (Preda 2005), and many business models that are commonplace now, such as index trading or most financial derivatives, would have been regarded as dangerous gambling and banned as recent as the early 1970s (MacKenzie 2006, 147–8). Ethical considerations aside, the collective formation of views in the financial-market public sphere was seen above all as a source

——————

4 Translator’s note: In the German original of the present contribution the author uses the term Begründungsordnung to refer to what Boltanski and Thévenot have termed cités. In the English translation of Boltanski and Thévenot’s monograph cités is rendered as “polities”. However, to be true to the author’s intended meaning I have decided against the “official” English translation and use the term “regime of justification” instead, which is also occasionally found.

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

189

of economic risk par excellence, at least since the late 1920s. Common wisdom held that financial markets needed to have reason imposed on them through stringent regulations and restrictions if they were to behave rationally and reliably in the long run. The regulation of banks, stock exchanges and pension funds in the United States since the 1930s, as well as the Bretton Woods global exchange rate system that was introduced in 1944, aimed to safeguard the vital intermediary role of well-functioning financial markets by suppressing their autotomizing tendencies through strict regulation. Since the 1970s, these restrictions were abolished as part of a fundamental change in the regulation of financial markets, especially in the United States. This would not have happened without the academic justification and refoundation of financial market rationality by modern, mathematically oriented financial economics. It created empirically tested models that could supposedly predict the risk and return of financial investments and that worked quite well in practice. Donald McKenzie (2006) has provided a detailed analysis of this confluence of academic developments, new investment strategies and political re-regulation. Exuding a scientific aura, financial economics, which had been marginal well into the 1960s, became the principal discipline within economics, not least because it managed to expand calculi that were originally developed for the behavior of financial market investors in general and to turn them into a system of indicators that could be used to evaluate and guide economic behavior at the company level (Lordon 2000). They in turn were a necessary condition for shareholder-centered theories of corporate governance because without them the goal of complete shareholder control over executives could not have been realized. Moreover, and here we come full circle, this scientification was the precondition for the whole-sale abolition of the laws that had drastically restricted the ability of institutional investors to exercise control over individual companies. 2.2 Recalibrating the Institutional Conditions of Financial Market Behavior The academic refoundation of financial market behavior provided a powerful impetus for a new institutional framing of financial markets, which occurred first in the United States. Restrictions that had been based on the

190

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

assumption that financial markets were latently irrational were replaced with regulations that saw them as predictable. This applied to US pension funds, which were no longer restricted to investments that were officially considered safe. Instead they were now required to follow the expert opinion of financial economics and investment strategies based on it. Thus, the precepts of financial economics were effectively granted normative status (Ravikoff and Curzan 1980; Lavigne 2002, 128–131; Montagne 2003). It also applied to the abolition of legal restrictions that had rigidly curtailed institutional investors’ influence on companies, especially the possibilities for coordinated action (Davis and Thompson 1994). It also applied, finally, to the permission for index trading and the trading of other financial derivatives on stock exchanges from the early 1970s onward. In addition to these new public regulations, a range of semi-public or private regimes and interpretative authorities were also established, including standards for stock market flotation, accounting standards, rating agencies and many more. It was only in connection with this new environment that the pooling of the investing public through large pension and investment funds became practically important. These academically justified changes to the institutional framework were accompanied by other changes that had broadly similar effects. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was very important in this regard. 5 Its immediate result was an expansion of financial markets through the addition of the vast and dynamic field of foreign exchange speculation. Another consequence was the transformation of the finance function within the corporation. Once a technical bookkeeping activity, it was now elevated to a strategic function inasmuch as managing their foreign exchange exposure became crucial for businesses with international operations. As a result, CFOs and controllers moved from the margins to the center of strategic management decision making thanks to their status as embodyments of financial expertise and rationality. In the United States, complex changes in the tax code had initiated such a process already in the late 1960s (Zorn 2004).

——————

5 In contrast to Deutschmann (2005) I do not see this collapse as an expression of the power of institutional investors; at most, it contributed indirectly to their increasing influence. See Strange (1986) on the political processes leading to the end of Bretton Woods.

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

191

2.3 Social Relations and Relations of Influence as Basis of Financial Market Rationality The fact that financial market rationality could become established and radically change the institutional framework of economic action, but also the way in which this happened, depended and continues to depend on the social balance of power and influence as well as the networks and social relations underlying it. 6 In this context, institutional investors occupy the top spot. They benefit from academically justified financial market rationality in two ways. First, it directly strengthens the position from which they formulate and justify their demands. Second, it contributes to the institutional pooling of the investing public because portfolio strategies that are based on financial mathematics require large investment volumes. Thanks to their financial strength and their high concentration as representatives of both their own interests and the interests of those whose money they manage, institutional investors have the capacity to lobby, create pressure and conduct campaigns to influence political processes and decisions. The political campaign that led to the revision of corporate governance rules in the United States in the 1980s is a particularly important example (Davis and Thompson 1994). Even their sheer presence already has some effects: what happens in the real economy cannot be “derived” from investor demands, but that does not mean that they do not play a role. Apart from exercising influence through analyst conferences, direct conversations with executives, etc., there are also other, albeit rarely used, intervention channels. In sum, one can assume a kind of generalized effectiveness that is comparable to Gogol’s Government Inspector: it is unknown when, or if, he will show up and what he may want when he does, but the awareness that he might appear affects how people act. Finally, one should not underestimate the interaction between the Reagan administration and neoclassical economists, especially Milton Friedman’s Chicago School. The success of the above-mentioned 1980s campaign to change corporate governance rules in the United States was based

——————

6 This already applies to the intra-academic formation of clusters and networks without which no scientific paradigm could ever consolidate and become influential. The fate of Benoît Mandelbrot, whose fundamental critique of the calculability assumptions held by the dominant strand of financial (market) economics remained marginal for decades, is a case in point, cf. MacKenzie 2006; Taleb 2007.

192

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

on it. Davis and Thompson (1994, 158) summarize their analysis of these events as follows: “The political climate in the Reagan years, far more than any radically altered incentives for collective action, explains the rise of organized shareholder activism.” An anecdote in MacKenzie (2006, 147) points in the same direction: proponents of allowing index trading (successfully) gave the task of writing an expert opinion to Milton Friedman— not because he was regarded as an expert in the field, but because he wielded tremendous influence as chief economist of the Reagan administration. 2.4 Summary: Financial Market Rationality as Driver and Resource Financial markets and the interests based on them have gained considerable influence over the behavior of economic actors in recent years. This is the result of interconnected, mutually reinforcing changes in institutions, social networks and relations as well as patterns of perception and interpretation that structure the social field of economic action. This last dimension is crucial: without the readiness of modern financial mathematics to transform the uncertainty of financial markets into scientifically computable risk, those changes to institutions and actor constellations would not have happened, at least not in the same way. Once started, however, the various developments reinforced each other. This has led to a recalibration of economic relations of power and influence, depending on how good different actors are at utilizing the new macro-structures or how much they experience them as restrictions. Nonetheless, a stable and unambiguous configuration has not emerged. One reason is that relations between institutions, networks and patterns of perception/interpretation remain tension-ridden. Each of these structures is a potential source of change that can affect the others. Moreover, whenever actors refer to these structures, they perform an active, autonomous act. Their actions are not a perfectly determined passive result of a structural logic. Instead, by referring in an interpretative fashion to those structural resources/restrictions, they each produce a specific, unique logic of action. Finally, there is no unambiguous and compelling connection between future states of the real economy and financial mathematics. The purpose of the fundamental calculi of modern financial economics is precisely to abstract from specific companies. Therefore, nothing but a few generic de-

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

193

mands can be deduced from them for the future action of a particular business. To base management action on these demands always requires interpretation. From this perspective, financial markets can be understood as a specific public sphere in which different models and interpretations circulate and are consolidated into more or less agreed-upon and more or less long-lived business models, management fashions, etc. (see also Orléan 1999; 2005). Apart from Windolf’s “new service class of financial market capitalism” (2008) that consists of fund managers and influential knowledge intermediaries, another actor type deserves particular attention among those who populate this particular public sphere: the strategic 7 and financial management inside the companies themselves. For these actors the ability to present themselves as being at the mercy of financial markets, but also as their competent interpreters, is a power resource par excellence. In the end, however, the reach of this power also depends on aspects of reality and conditions of feasibility that cannot be interpreted at will. The material and social conditions of economic action at the level of corporations and operating firms possess a density and resilience of their own that financial market-oriented action cannot ignore for too long.

3. Financial Market Rationality: Actors and their Options Inquiring into the effects of financial market rationality means asking what options actors have and what the economic consequences are that arise on this basis. As is generally the case with economic paradigm shifts, the establishment of financial market rationality as a dominant paradigm in economics is, or was, based on the promise of efficiency. As stated above, however, there is no proof that a reliable empirical link exists between the increasing financialization of entire economies and the gains in efficiency at the company level. Among the indicators that can be influenced at that level, the remuneration of top executives is the only one that has seen consistent and significant upward movement (Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005; Froud et al. 2006, 56; Schmidt and Schwalbach 2007).

——————

7 In this context, strategic management refers to that level in the corporate hierarchy where general responsibility for corporate conduct and fundamental strategic decision making is located. It does not refer to those special functions that go by names like “Strategic Planning” or “Corporate Strategies”.

194

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

In a meta-analysis of CEO compensation conducted in 2000, Tosi et al. (2000) found that absolute company size is the determining factor in more than 40 percent of compensation amounts, while indicators of profitability or growth only account for 4 percent or less. It is worth recalling that the critique of excessive management pay that was not warranted by performance provided the initial motivation for capital market-oriented corporate governance (Davis and Thompson 1994), and that the agency theory of management control provided its conceptual foundation. It is therefore ironic that a general increase in top executive pay that is not warranted by performance indicators is among the clearest effects of financialization. The eyes of the financial-market public sphere are focused on strategies and business models rather than internal organizational details or staffing decisions. This strengthens those who are in charge of developing and presenting these strategies and business models. Top executives are replaced faster now than before (Höpner 2003, 131; Freye 2009), but this does not necessarily mean that they drop out of the intercorporate market for management positions, which has become more important. As long as they remain in business, they can earn a lot more now than in the past. Outside the company, the status gains of top managers are matched by the increasing influence and incomes of financial intermediaries. On the one hand, there are providers of financial services like consultants, auditors, financial and corporate lawyers, fund managers and stock analysts. On the other, there are investment bankers, hedge fund and private equity managers, stock traders and others who initiate and promote projects of restructuring and financial investment. Transitions from one to the other are fluent in this field. Structures, business models and incomes are a lot less transparent here than for the management of listed companies. The study of Folkman et al. (2007) contains an instructive survey of the City of London. In a total of roughly 328,000 employees in the years 2005/06, they find about 16,000 “senior intermediaries”, i.e. holders of top positions. This contrasts with only 600 top executives in FTSE100 companies, London’s lead stock index. This is a considerable group whose income is similar to that of top executives in large listed companies, although differences exist between business areas. Their income position is primarily based on the ability to keep things moving (Folkman et al. 2007; Froud et al. 2007; Froud and Williams 2007). As these incomes consist of fees and sometimes a share in the proceeds from deals that were successfully closed, what matters is the number and volume of deals rather than their long-

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

195

term economic effects for the companies. In other words, the intermediary’s income is not affected when a merger does not have the desired results. In fact, the subsequent restructuring may create new business opportunities for them. This is why AXA founder Claude Bébéar, often seen as the godfather of French financial capitalism, states that “[i]nvestment bankers tend more and more to propose deals to their customers that are useful for themselves but not the customers” (Bébéar and Manière 2003, 100). The same applies to fund and investment managers. Windolf (2008) demonstrates that their business model is based on exercising the ownership role of stockholders while shifting the risks onto customers. However, the ownership position is typically that of a middle man, which is why Folkman et al. see these and other “change agents [as] the marine corps of the intermediary groups who live by deals and novelty” (Folkman et al. 2007, 557). Those in strategic management positions or top positions in financial intermediation are the decisive actors and the most prominent beneficiaries from the financialization of contemporary capitalism. Their common power base is not the unambiguousness of financial market rationality, but the fact that it can and must be interpreted as long as the dominant social justification norm makes referring to it a necessity. But that does not create a unified perspective. The spaces for interpretation and the trade-offs that managers in the real economy have to deal with differ from those that financial intermediaries face, even where the former are strongly financial market-oriented. Moreover, the intermediaries’ interests and business models are quite heterogeneous and not necessarily compatible with each other. This constellation does not constitute a sufficiently unambiguous, consistent social logic of valorization, contrary to what regulation school authors assume when they talk of “owner capitalism” (Aglietta 1998; Montagne 2006)—an assumption that also underlies the concept of financial market capitalism. What it does lead to is a tendency for constant restructuring at various levels and, consequently, a tendency to prioritize shortterm opportunities over long-term valorization. The dominance that financial market rationality has achieved as the basis for the justification of economic action since the 1980s has come at the expense of alternative justification regimes as well as those groups that do (or have to) refer primarily to them. This is undoubtedly one of the causes of the dramatic redistribution that has taken place in all capitalist societies

196

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

in recent decades and that has favored wealth-based incomes to the disadvantage of wages and social transfers.

4. Outlook: The Financial Market Crisis and the Prospects for Financial Market Rationality The financial crisis of 2007 has undoubtedly damaged the position of financial markets and financial market actors as the unquestioned authorities of economic rationality tout court. The discursive reorientation that we have seen in the political, business and mass media public shows this clearly: the same people who, until recently, wholeheartedly endorsed or even aggressively promoted certain positions now criticize them as aberrations on the part of banks and financial actors narrowly understood. 8 With the exception of the United States and UK, demands for a levy on financial transactions that used to be the trademark of Attac and relegated to the political sidelines have now become part of the political mainstream even in the bourgeoisie. After the initial shock, however, an interpretation of the crisis prevailed that acknowledges dramatic effects for concrete financial markets but insists that these require regulatory fine-tuning, especially safeguards against the undesirable consequences of human frailty, like the “greed” of some financial professionals. The authoritative status of financial economics and of “the” financial market for the conceptual justification of economically adequate behavior remains largely untouched. Likewise, empirical financial markets have not suffered lasting damage to their role as authorities of justification and legitimation. See, for example, how the reappearance of the financial crisis in the form of the Euro crisis in 2011 has been interpreted exclusively as a debt crisis and a problem of imposing discipline on countries that have lived beyond their means. This view completely ignores the role that financial markets, financial market actors and the financial market crisis have played in causing the problem.

——————

8 A paradigmatic example is the editorial by Nils Minkmar in the German weekly Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung from 10. 02. 2010: “The Best of All Possible Futures: If only we had listened to Attac—we would have been spared the global financial crisis”. (Die beste Zukunft aller Zeiten. Hätten wir auf Attac gehört—die globale Finanzkrise wäre uns erspart geblieben.)

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

197

Leaving the financial sector to its fate is not considered a responsible thing to do, at least not since the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Irrespective of whether actors have consciously taken it into account or whether they were oblivious to it, the principle of moral hazard—incurring risks because others stand ready to pick up the pieces—has been decisively proven in the banking sector. Whether it also applies to governments is becoming ever more uncertain today. There may have been a loss of confidence in the financial markets as points of reference, but the argument presented here suggests that it is too early to tell what this will mean for economic behavior at the company level. The fact that, in the wake of the crisis, representatives from the corporate sector have become self-critical and have denounced their formerly exaggerated orientation to the financial market does not change this. Moreover, as I have demonstrated, there is only a tenuous link between financial market-oriented management strategies in the real economy and the rationality of financial investors at the level of financial markets. A particular course of action or strategy can often be justified in more than one way. It is therefore possible that the same cost cutting programs that had previously been undertaken to meet or beat the minimum rate of return required by financial markets are now justified by referring to the consequences of the financial crisis, allowing managers to claim that they have learned their lesson. Principles and methods of increasing economic efficiency that were initially introduced with a view to financial market rationality have already been (re-)interpreted in technical terms and transferred to different contexts in the past. That said, financial market rationality has been severely shaken as a regime of justification. It is therefore possible that the issue of the relative importance of different economic rationalities at the company level will be raised afresh, which will result in the curtailing of the influence which the finance function has on the basics of corporate strategy. This opens up all sorts of interesting problems for management studies and the sociology of organizations. Finding answers to them is important for answering the broader question of how to characterize the current phase of capitalist development.

198

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

Works Cited Aglietta, Michel (1998). Le capitalisme de demain. Paris : Fondation Saint-Simon. Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Yaniv Grinstein (2005). The Growth of Executive Pay. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(2), 283–303. Bébéar, Claude, and Philippe Manière (2003). Ils vont tuer le capitalisme. Paris: Plon. Beckert, Jens (2009). How Do Fields Change? The Interrelations of Institutions, Networks, and Cognition in the Dynamics of Markets. Organization Studies, 31(5), 605–627. Beyer, Jürgen (2006). Vom “kooperativen Kapitalismus” zum Finanzmarktkapitalismus—eine Ursachenanalyse. In Ulrich Brinkmann, Karoline Krenn and Sebastian Schief (eds.). Endspiel des Kooperativen Kapitalismus? Institutioneller Wandel unter den Bedingungen des marktzentrierten Paradigmas, 35–57. Wiesbaden: VS. Beyer, Jürgen (2009). Varietät verspielt? Zur Nivellierung der nationalen Differenzen des Kapitalismus durch globale Finanzmärkte. In Jens Beckert and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). Wirtschaftssoziologie, 305–325. Wiesbaden: VS. Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot (1991). De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur. Paris: NRF Essais. Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot (2006). On Justification. The Economies of Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Boyer, Robert (1999). Le politique à l’ère de la mondialisation et de la finance: Le point sur quelques recherches régulationnistes. L’année de la régulation, 3(3), 13– 76. Busch, Ulrich (2008). Finanzmarktkrise und Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Utopie kreativ, 215, 804–817. Chesnais, Francois (1997). L’ émergence d’ un régime d’ accumulation mondial à dominante financière. La pensée, 59 (309), 61–85. Davis, Gerald F., and Trcy A. Thompson (1994). A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1), 141–173. Deutschmann, Christoph (2005). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus und Wachstumskrise. In Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 58–84. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2015). The New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Market Capitalism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 11–66. London/New York: Verso. Faust, Michael (2011). The Shareholder Value Concept of the Corporation and CoDetermination in Germany: Unresolved contradictions or reconciliation of institutional logics?. In Christel Lane and Geoffrey T. Wood (eds.). Capitalist Diversity and Diversity within Capitalism, 150–188. London: Routledge. Folkman, Peter, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal and Karel Williams (2007). Working for Themselves? Capital Market Intermediaries and Present Day Capitalism. Business History 49(4), 552–572.

F INA NCIA L M A RKET C A PITA LISM OR F INA NCIA L M A RKET R A TIONA LITY ?

199

Freye, Saskia (2009). Führungswechsel. Die Wirtschaftseliten und das Ende der Deutschland AG. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Froud, Julie, Colin Haslam, Sukhdev Johal and Karel Williams (2000). Shareholder Value and Financialization: Consultancy Promises, Management moves. Economy and Society, 29(1), 80–110. Froud, Julie, Sukhdev Johal and Adam Leaver (2006). Financialisation and Strategy: Narrative and Numbers. London/New York: Routledge. Froud, Julie, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams (2007). New Actors in a Financialised Economy and the Remaking of Capitalism. New Political Economy, 12(3), 339–347. Froud, Julie, and Karel Williams (2007). Private Equity and the Culture of Value Extraction. New Political Economy, 12(3), 405–420. Höpner, Martin (2003). Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestimmung in Deutschland. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Lavigne, Stéphanie (2002). Investisseurs financiers et convention d’évaluation des firmes. PhD diss., Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse 1. Lordon, Frédéric (2000). La “création de valeur” comme rhétorique et comme pratique. Généalogie et sociologie de la “valeur actionariale”. L’Année de la régulation, 4(4), 117–168. Lordon, Frédéric (2002). La force des idées simples. Misère des comportements économiques. Unpublished manuscript. MacKenzie, Donald (2006). An Engine, Not a Camera. How Financial Models Shape Markets. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press. Montagne, Sabine (2003). Responsabilité fiduciaire et investissement financier: comment le monde financier a mobilisé le droit des trusts. In Thierry Kirat (ed.). Les mondes du droit de la responsabilité. Regards sur le droit en action, 53–66. Paris: LGDJ. Montagne, Sabine (2006). Le trust, fondement juridique du capitalisme patrimonial. Recherche & Régulation Working Papers, Grenoble. Montagne, Sabine (2007). In Trusts We Trust: Pension Funds Between Social Protection and Financial Speculation. Economic sociology the european electronic newsletter, 8(3), 26–32. Orléan, André (1999). Le pouvoir de la finance. Paris: Odile Jacob. Orléan, André (2005). Réflexions sur l’hypothèse d’objectivité de la valeur fondamentale dans la théorie financière moderne. In David Bourghelle, Olivier Brandouy, Roland Gillet and André Orléan (eds.). Croyances, représentations collectives et conventions en finance, 19–42. Paris: Recherche en Gestion. Preda, Alex (2005). The Investor as a Cultural Figure of Global Capitalism. The Sociology of Financial Markets. In Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda (eds.). The sociology of financial markets,141–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ravikoff, Ronald B., and Myron P. Curzan (1980). Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man Rule. California Law Review, 68(3), 518– 546.

200

JÜRGEN KÄDTLER

Schmidt, Reinhart, and Joachim Schwalbach (2007). Zu Höhe und Dynamik der Vorstandsvergütungen in Deutschland. In Joachim Schwalbach and Günter Fandel (eds.). Der ehrbare Kaufmann: Modernes Leitbild für Unternehmer?, 111–122. Wiesbaden: VS. Strange, Susan (1986). Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Penguin. Tosi, Henry L., Steve Werner, Jeffrey P. Katz and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia (2000). How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies. Journal of Management, 26(2), 301–339. Windolf, Paul (2005a). Die neuen Eigentümer. In Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 8–19. Wiesbaden: VS. Windolf, Paul (2005b). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, Wiesbaden: VS. Windolf, Paul (2005c). Was ist Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus?, Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 20–57. Wiesbaden: VS. Windolf, Paul (2008). Eigentümer ohne Risiko. Die Dienstklasse des Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 37(6), 516–535. Zorn, Dirk M. (2004). Here a Chief, There a Chief: The Rise of the CFO in the American Firm. American Sociological Review, 69(3), 345–364.

Re-Constructing the Future— Flexibilization and the Temporality of Capitalism Hajo Holst

1. Introduction For more than four decades, flexibility has been a key trend in the labor markets in the Global North, and sociological research has carefully analyzed the successive waves of the flexibilization of work and employment. Concepts such as the “flexible firm” (Atkinson 1984), the “segmentation of the labor market” (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Köhler and Krause 2010), the “redrawing of organizational boundaries” (Marchington et al. 2006; Sauer 2005), the “subjectification” of work (Moldaschl and Voß 2002) or the “precarization” of labor (Dörre 2015; Standing 2011) have been used to depict the changes in the organization of work and on the labor market, as well as to grasp the implications for workers and the labor movement. Moreover, research has shown that the diffusion of flexible work arrangements, flexible work roles and non-standard employment are deeply embedded in the dynamics of contemporary capitalism. Global markets mean intensified competition (Dörre and Röttger 2003); shareholders expect higher profits and push for continuous rationalization (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2003); and consumers demand customized and high-quality products at low prices. Large corporations, in particular, respond to these challenges by coupling their systems of production and the organization of work ever more tightly to the developments within product, labor and finance markets (Durand 2007). This contribution offers a novel interpretation of corporations’ seemingly unstoppable thirst for flexibility, and it does so by connecting the analysis of the flexibilization of work and employment to the current sociological debates on the temporal structures of capitalism (Adam and Groves 2007; Beckert 2016; Esposito 2011; Rosa 2013, Sewell 2008; Streeck 2017). The flexibilization of work and employment, I will argue, is part of the attempt of capitalist organizations to transform their relationship to the

202

HAJO HOLST

future. The starting point of this reinterpretation of the flexibility trend is the specific temporality of capitalism: Its basic operation—the use of money in expectation of profits—is structurally oriented towards the future. In the here and now, money is deployed in order to command more money at a future point of time (Harvey 1982). For capitalist actors, the futureorientedness of for-profit decisions and actions poses a significant epistemological challenge: In order to rationally invest money, they need reliable knowledge of the state of the world at those points of time in which today’s investments are supposed to deliver returns. As the future is open and future presents evolve over time, capitalist bets on the future cannot be based on certainty (Luhmann 1993). When investing money, actors inevitably speculate on future economic, technological, social or political developments—without ever being able to know for sure what is going to happen (Vogl 2014). The future-orientedness is an invariant of capitalist decisions and activities; but how capitalist actors handle the challenge of having to speculate on not-yet-existing developments is subject to change. This is where my contribution ties in: The flexibilization of work and employment is interpreted as a shift in the way how capitalist organizations address the future, and this shift is inextricably linked to changes in actors’ essential constructions of the future (viz. their assumptions on the relationship between past, present and future). To empirically illustrate this argument, the contribution tracks the flexibilization of work and employment in the German auto industry. 1 It demonstrates that the way large car corporations construct the link between past, present and future has been changing since the 1970s—and that these re-constructions of the future led to alterations in their organizational structures such as production planning, work organization and employment structures. Two shifts in the way large actors have re-constructed the future are empirically identified, each associated with a specific flexibilization dynamic. The first re-construction of the future took place in the aftermath of the crises of the 1970s. The unexpected economic turbulences did not only end the post-war growth path; they resulted as well in an epistemological rupture in the thinking about the future in large capitalist organizations. The vision of the future as a predictable linear continuation of the

——————

1 Empirically, the contribution is based on the rich sociological literature on changes in work organization and employment structures in the German auto industry and evidence from several recent research projects. For an exhaustive version of the argument in German language, see Holst (2018).

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

203

past, which had dominated corporate headquarters not only in the auto industry in the post-war period, abruptly lost its plausibility and was swiftly replaced by the construction of the risky future. Underlying the conception of the future as risky was the idea of multiple futures. Actors assumed that each present contained the seeds for a number of alternative futures. Although the future did not seem to be predictable any longer, modern foresight technologies promised to be able to reliably anticipate the complete range of possible futures (and organizations used flexibility to make their bets successful in the range of possible future presents anticipated by foresight). The second re-construction of the relationship between past, present and future was linked to the triumph of the lean paradigm and the effects of financialization in the 1990s and 2000s. Particularly in large corporations, the construction of the uncertain future became dominant. It shared with the notion of the risky future the idea of multiple futures. However, while the risky future was based on the conviction that all possible futures could be reliably anticipated, the construction of the future as uncertain assumes that unforeseeable events could potentially always occur (in addition to preparing for the range of futures deemed as relevant by foresight, organizations now utilize flexibility to safeguard their capitalist bets against unforeseeable events). The argument proceeds as follows. I will first discuss the specific temporality of capitalism (2); then analyze the shifts within the constructions of the future of large German car corporations including the implications for the organization of work (3); and finish with a discussion of the implications of the results for our understanding of the flexibilization of work and employment and the temporal structures of contemporary capitalism (4).

2. Betting on the Future: On the Temporality of Capitalism Capitalism’s specific temporality has attracted considerable sociological interest in recent years. The capitalist organization of the economy has been characterized as a powerful “accelerator” contributing the general trend of “social acceleration” in modern societies (Rosa 2013), the “precarization” of employment, which, over the years, has reached the core of organizations and is said to destroy workers’ futures by destabilizing the

204

HAJO HOLST

present (Bourdieu 2000; Dörre 2015), and “imaginaries” of the future have been assigned a pivotal role for the dynamics of capitalism including innovation, disruption and growth (Beckert 2016). From a temporal perspective, capitalism’s basic operation is characterized by its future-orientedness: any decision taken with the aim of making a profit or increasing one’s capital is structurally oriented towards the future. Money is invested in the present to dispose of more capital at a later point in time (Harvey 1982; Neckel 1988, 474–5)—in Luhmann’s terms (1993, 12) in a “future present”. From the viewpoint of capitalism’s future-orientedness, the merchant companies of the 17th century that specialized in the overseas trade with spices, textiles and saltpeter (Fulcher 2004, 1ff.) are no different from the automotive corporations of the 20th century or the new organizations of the emerging digital economy. Whether undertaking an expedition to a distant region, investing in new manufacturing equipment or developing new products and services, the delivery of expected returns is unknown at the very moment the decisions are made and will only be determined at a point of time when the decisions cannot be revoked. Although in the postwar period, capitalism’s specific temporality did not feature prominently on the sociological agenda, the future-orientedness of capitalist activities is by no means a discovery of today. Classic scientific observers of capitalism in the 19th and early 20th century such as Karl Marx and Joseph A. Schumpeter were well aware of the temporal attributes of an economy driven by the profit motive. Marx counted the explicit orientation towards the future among the specific characteristics of capitalist decisions and actions. While in traditional pre-capitalist economies “demand […] dominated supply, […] preceded it,” capitalism’s profit orientation turned the relation between production and consumption around: “Large-scale industry, forced by the very instruments at its disposal to produce on an ever-increasing scale, can no longer wait for demand. Production precedes consumption, supply compels demands” (Marx 1995, 73). In a similar vein, Schumpeter was aware of capitalism’s specific temporality: “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.” (Schumpeter 1947, 83)

On the societal level, capitalism’s structural future-orientedness is closely linked to the ambivalent dynamic of a profit-oriented economy—something that the two classic observers of capitalism were well aware of. Throughout his

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

205

writings, Marx praised the new economic system for its productivity and innovativeness leading to previously unknown levels of material wealth and at the same time sharply criticized the economic and social inequalities and power asymmetries accompanying capitalism. For Marx, the capitalist dynamic was “the source of so much misery, […] at the same time the source of all progress” (Marx 1995, 73). Schumpeter’s famous characterization of the capitalist dynamic as “creative destruction” focused likewise on the ambivalent consequences of the future-orientedness of capitalism: Schumpeter stressed that the profit-driven economy “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 1947, 83). On the one hand, the future-orientedness of capitalist activities is a prerequisite for innovation, growth, or profit. Capitalism is an economic system obsessively devoted to the future, and successful capitalist bets on an unknown future take the form of “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Deutschmann 2008, 142). On the other hand, the future-orientedness is also one reason for the damages and calamities that are inevitable in capitalist economies. Actors and their future plans can fail (as not all bets automatically turn into successful “selffulfilling prophecies”), and individual failure can result in crisis dynamics severely impacting wider society. The history of capitalism is full of failed projects which had more or less devastating consequences for investors, suppliers, workers and society in general (not to speak about the planet). For individual actors, the future-orientedness of capitalism poses significant epistemological challenges. In order to rationally invest money, actors require reliable knowledge on those points of time in which today’s activities are supposed to deliver the expected returns. The future, however, is open, and future presents cannot be known in advance. As a consequence, actors cannot base their capitalist bets on the future on exact and certain knowledge. Capitalist decisions and actions—to use a formulation of Luhmann—“bind time, although we cannot gain sufficient knowledge of the future; indeed, not even of the future we generate by means of our own decisions” (Luhmann 1993, 12–13, emphasis in original). The forthcoming present(s) in which today’s decisions will have to prove themselves are not abstract entities that exist outside of social practices; instead, future presents are performatively produced over time and by the actors involved. The fundamental institutions of a capitalist economy—money, commodities, markets and law—have a considerable structuring effect on economic dynamics by making certain activities more likely than others. Yet, every situation con-

206

HAJO HOLST

tains, at least potentially, the possibility that actors in their search for new profit opportunities may shake up existing market structures even where those have been stable for a long time (Streeck 2009, 240–1). The current spread of future-oriented calculative practices (Holst 2016), which reaches well beyond the narrow confines of capitalist corporations into public institutions, associations and non-profit organizations, shows that more and more actors aim at rationally calculating the medium- and long-term outcomes of present capitalist decisions. However, even for powerful actors, it is impossible to predict the behavior of competitors and buyers with certainty. Unexpected product innovations, surprise market entries of new competitors and unforeseen demand fluctuations can happen any time and influence the market in ways that elude prediction. Due to capitalism’s future-orientedness and the future’s openness, all capitalist activities aiming at profits or accumulating capital inevitably contain an element of speculation (Vogl 2014). Note that this use of the term “to speculate” deviates from its famous meaning in popular finance discourse where it is used to denote certain business models of investors as morally condemnable, namely the realization of inappropriate profits through the short-term trade of assets. Here, the term is used without moral connotetion to grasp the epistemological challenges resulting from the futureorientedness of capitalist bets on the future. The English verb “to speculate” stems from the Latin “speculari”, which means “to look into the distant from an elevated standpoint”—in this case the future. Capitalist actors continuously forestall future presents, and base their decisions and actions on the conceptions of the future created by forestalling—although they cannot know with certainty if things will evolve in the forestalled way. The only raw material which actors can use for their speculation on the future are their own experiences and expectations on activities by other actors— the speculation on the future, in other words, is based on knowledge on the past and the present. Imagining how the key parameters for economic success such as demand, markets, technology and competition will develop in the future is a permanent element of capitalist activities, whether the speculation on the future takes the form of reflective scientific foresight (Ruff 2006; Shoemaker 2002) or actors apply an experience-based rule-ofthumb approach. Speculating on a not-yet-existing future is thus an activity not limited to the trade of assets on finance markets in expectation of above-average returns; it is a regular element of capitalism—and it is, as shown above, a driving force of the ambivalent dynamic of capitalism.

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

207

In their attempt to explain the economic, technological and political dynamics of capitalism, economic sociologists have recently turned their attention to “imagined futures” and actors’ expectations towards the future (Beckert 2016; Deutschmann 2008). The study of the role of imaginations and expectations unquestionably improves our understanding of the capitalist dynamic. “Imaginations of the future” play a major role in the development and diffusion of innovations and new technologies (on the “railway manias” of the early 19th century, Hobsbawm 1962, 60ff.), and expectations are the key factors in the development of asset prices on finance markets (Windolf 2006). Yet, the following analysis takes a different approach to the study of the handling of the future in and by organizations (Koch et al. 2016). Within contemporary sociology, a consensus exists that the relationship between past, present and future is characterized by objective uncertainty (Dequech 2003; Nowotny 2016). Uncertainty means that the future is open in a way that eludes any reliable way of forestalling future presents. Neither past experiences nor actor’s expectations can tell us for sure how the world at a future point of time will look. An influential branch in economic sociology has taken objective uncertainty as a point of departure and attempts to answer the following questions: How do markets evolve under conditions of uncertainty, and how are actors dealing with uncertainty (Beckert 2009; DiMaggio 2000)? Although it seems impossible to define the objective nature of the future (uncertainty could be an epistemological problem rather than an ontological one), there are good reasons to assume that the future today is indeed uncertain. Yet, for an analysis in the spirit of the pragmatist paradigm, it is less important to know how past, present and future are objectively connected; in order to understand economic phenomena such as market interactions, corporate strategies or—in this case—the flexibilization of work and employment, it is of primary relevance to understand how capitalist actors subjectively construct the future. The following analysis of large German auto corporations’ successive waves of the flexibilization of work and employment starts from the assumption that actors’ construction of the relationship between past, present and future matter for the content and course of their capitalist bets on the future.

208

HAJO HOLST

3. Flexibilization and the Re-Construction of the Future The explicit orientation of capitalist activities towards the future entails for individual actors the risk of not meeting profit expectations in the future, and that risk belongs to the fundamental invariants of capitalist economies. The ways, however, in which organizations cope with the challenges emanating from capitalism’s particular temporality vary in time and space. Using evidence from German automotive corporations, this section demonstrates that the flexibilization trend since the 1970s manifests attempts of large capitalist organizations to transform their relationship to the future. Note that the recalibration of the constructions of the future guiding and legitimizing capitalist decisions and actions is a subjective process that takes place within the organizations; yet, this subjective redefinition of the future based on concrete experiences and expectations is situated in a specific societal context, which in turn has a structurating impact on how the organizations think about and address the future (Koch et al. 2016, 164). The following sketch of the dominant constructions of the future—i.e. auto producers’ assumptions on the relationship between past, present and future—and the organizations’ decisions and actions toward the future is therefore situated within the wider time- and space-specific capitalist context. This includes growth dynamics, institutional regulation of market dynamics and the broader development of the welfare state. 3.1 Organized Post-War Capitalism: The Linear Future, Prediction and Standardized Work and Employment In the post-war decades, those segments of the manufacturing sector that were dominated by large firms saw the proliferation of production systems for the mass manufacture of standardized goods. Although individual production systems varied (Boyer and Freyssenet 2000), the automotive sector became a stronghold of mass production. Product variety was low; Only few consumers required and were willing to pay for customized vehicles. Growing wages and decreasing inequality resulted in growing demand for standardized vehicles as large segments of the working class were able to purchase their first vehicle. The—from today’s perspective—fairly rigid production systems did not really permit short-term changes to production volumes or product features, but they did guarantee technical and organi-

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

209

zational efficiency as well as cost reductions—all of which were key factors for the success of mass production. In large automotive firms in particular, work and employment were subject to multiple standardizations. Trade union power and the decommodifying effects of labor market regulation limited the firms’ ability to use non-standardized employment relations. Up until the mid-1970s, the vast majority of the growing German auto workforces held standard employment contracts. Particularly in large organizations, work was subject to multiple standardizations including long-term planned invariant work hours. On the basis of mass production systems and the standardization of work and employment, a particular rationalization paradigm became dominant in large car corporations. In light of the evergrowing demand for standardized vehicles, Taylorist rationalization aimed at increasing output with given inputs by continuously accelerating the utilization of labor power and other factors of production. Production was managed by long-range invariant programs enabling high levels of technical efficiency; the rigidity of production systems made short-term adjustments to quantitative and qualitative demand fluctuations almost impossible. From the viewpoint of the future-orientedness of the profit motive, the decisions and actions of the vertically and horizontally integrated Fordist organizations of the postwar era had long-term—in the terminology of Luhmann: long-term timebinding—effects on future presents. Production programs defined in the past as well as yesterday’s staffing decisions determined the organizations’ output and behavior for long periods of time—and relatively independent from instantaneous market developments. Compared to the lean and financialized corporations of today, the organizations of the 1950s and 1960s were thus characterized by long-term temporal footprints. It is important to note, however, that short-term adjustments of production volume were only rarely necessary as the market for cars and other mass products grew continuously and demand fluctuations were rather rare. If demand fluctuated unexpectedly, automotive producers and manufacturing organizations in general responded primarily through reactive adaptation to changes that had already occurred. Inventories were temporarily reduced or expanded, overtime utilized to increase output, and, when this was not enough, people were laid off or newly hired (Köhler and Sengenberger 1983). As capitalist activities in general, management decisions in the 1950s and 1960s were based on a speculation on the future—a speculation which

210

HAJO HOLST

inevitably entailed the risk of not delivering the expected return. Subjectively, however, the decisions of large capitalist organizations were based on the construction of the future as a linear—and thus predictable—continuation of the past. Particularly for large powerful actors, the openness of the future did primarily constitute a horizon for economic success; the economic risks objectively associated with future-oriented decisions and actions played only a minor role in corporate decision-making as demand for standardized cars grew continuously. Large corporations as well as political elites were convinced that the capitalist dynamics were successfully tamed and channeled on a long-term growth path leading to general human progress (Koch et al. 2016, 165ff.). Forestalling of future presents in corporate planning predominantly took the form of predictive long-term forecasts which were assigned high levels of credibility. The large organizations of the automotive sector saw the future as calculable. The construction of the future as linear continuation of the past which could be predicted with the means of reliable forecasts was made possible by the specific constellation of post-war organized capitalism. On the basis of the exceptional growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s, most important markets were channeled and the social costs of the inevitable fallout from the capitalist dynamic were redistributed through collective providential systems (Shonfield 1965). Statutory labor market regulation, social security systems, numerous rules and regulations for product markets, collective bargaining agreements, the collective self-restrictions of industries through business associations, and the regulating influence of relationship banking created certain binding limitations for the development of key markets (Dörre 2015; Streeck 2009). It was not just organized labor that effected this institutional channeling of the capitalist dynamic. Individual companies and their associations also promoted its containment so as to reduce the risk of unexpected market movements. The tightly knit web of crossshareholdings and interlocking directorates that characterized “Germany Inc.” (Deutschland AG) made sure that large companies at least were rescued when they got into trouble (Streeck 2009). Let us be clear: competition was not suspended on markets in the period of post-war organized capitalism. Instead, binding institutions merely directed the capitalist dynamic into certain predetermined channels. It was the distinctive institutional channeling of the capitalist dynamic which, together with the persistent and high growth rates, forged the specific economic development characteristic for post-war organized capitalism—and which buttressed the

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

211

perception of the future as linear in corporate headquarters with empirical plausibility. 3.2 The Crises of the 1970s: Epistemological Rupture, the Risky Future and the Birth of Flexibility The economic turbulences of the 1970s turned product markets again into relevant danger zones for profits, even for those auto corporations that wielded considerable market power (Doleschal 1976). Due to relatively rigid production systems, the dramatic and unforeseen drop in demand led to rapid inventory growth, especially in internationally oriented segments of the auto industry and the manufacturing sector in general. As market recovery stayed away, many organizations resorted to the traditional instruments of adaptation: reduction of overtime, government-subsidized short-time work and layoffs. The high cost of reactive adaptation led the management of many large and powerful corporations to draw a simple, but, as we can say with hindsight, momentous conclusion: if the future movement of product markets could not (any more) be predicted reliably, organizations had to become more adaptable to markets (Posth 1975). In order to become more adaptable to short-term market swings, the auto producers began to insert flexibility in their production systems, work organization and employment structures (Köhler and Sengenberger 1983). New production systems allowed for some variation in output, both in terms of quantity and quality. Albeit at relatively low levels, product variety was increased allowing customers some choice on the specifications of the product. These initial flexibilization steps within the production systems of auto producers selfevidently had consequences for the work organization, particularly in form of working time flexibility (Jürgens et al. 1993). Although the volume of non-standardized employment remained—primarily due to German labor market regulation—for some years rather small, the turbulences of the 1970s led to the emergence of the adaptability paradigm in auto corporations and in world-market oriented manufacturing in general. In terms of the future-orientedness of capitalist activities, the birth of the flexibility trend was triggered by no less than what—in the terms of Foucault—could be called an epistemological rupture in the way large capitalist organizations construct the future. The crises of the 1970s severely undermined the plausibility of the idea of the future as a linear continuation of the past

212

HAJO HOLST

which had dominated corporate planning in the post-war period. Neither the timing nor the severity of the turbulences were forecasted; the dramatic and unexpected loss of demand came like a shock to the organizations which throughout previous decades got used to continuous and calculable growth. Even for the most powerful actors, the future did not appear to be predictable any longer. One of the clearest expressions of the epistemological rupture in the thinking about the future can be found in a small paper written in 1975 by Alfred Rappaport who later became one of the most prominent proponents of the shareholder value paradigm. Entitled “The Future is not what it used to be,” the paper contains a reflection on the implications for management of what Rappaport described as a transformation in the nature of the future: While in the past “the likelihood that tomorrow would be very much like today” was rather high, management now “must contemplate the future, or better yet the alternative futures, more systematically so that well-conceived choices can be made.” (Rappaport 1975, 1) The conviction that the future from now on had to be perceived in terms of multiple futures quickly spread in large corporations throughout the Global North—and with it scenario techniques and other foresight instruments by which actors aimed at forestalling the range of possible futures inscribed in the present (Bradfield et al. 2005). By anticipating possible futures, corporations sought to prepare themselves for the risks entailed in the indeterminateness of the future produced by rapid societal change. Note that, although the farewell to the idea of the singular future and the loss of predictability in economic development formed an epistemological rupture in the way capitalist organizations thought about the future, the scientific approach to the forestalling of the future was not abandoned. The construction of the risky future dominating large organizations in the 1970s and 1980s was fueled by the conviction that it was possible to reliably anticipate the complete range of possible future presents— and make them the point of reference for what an Audi manager called a “forward-looking human resource management” (Posth 1975). The new mode of forestalling and its key technologies identified a limited list of alternative futures which formed the base for corporations’ decisions and actions. In many organizations, planning in the 1970s and 1980s was based on two scenarios which were said to define the range of possible future presents, namely the “best-case” scenario and the “worst-case” scenario. The emergence of risk management and the birth of flexibility can be seen

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

213

as responses to the modified thinking about the future: management aimed at flexibilizing organizational structures in order to prepare the organizations for the anticipated possible futures. An influential operationalization of the construction of the risky future was the idea of the “middle line” introduced as a point of reference for production planning in Volkswagen around the mid-1970s. Production output—and therewith the size of the workforce—was planned along the mean between the potential future amplitudes of demand (which were identified by help of scenario techniques). If demand was higher than the middle line, waiting times for customers increased, if demand was lower, production went into temporary stocks. For the time being, the orientation of planning in the auto organizations towards the (with help of new foresight techniques) anticipated “middle line” allowed corporations to economize on low-variety-highefficiency Fordist mass production systems under conditions of an unpredictable future. 3.3 The “Lean Revolution” and Financialization: The Uncertain Future and the Second Wave of Flexibilization Since the 1980s, production systems in the German auto industry and in manufacturing in general continued to change. Product variability and volume flexibility grew steadily, while at the same time lead times and product cycles were reduced. Although genuine built-to-order systems (BTO) are still rare, technical development allows organizations to couple their production systems more directly to instantaneous demand. At the same time, vertical disintegration has transformed the organizational landscape of vehicle production. Car producers still account for most of the final assembly but throughout the previous decades they have intensified their cooperation with suppliers, engineering firms and service providers. Production today takes place in hierarchical and transnational networks of firms—differing remarkably from the vertically and horizontally integrated Fordist organizations of post-war organized capitalism (Deiß and Döhl 1992). One dimension of change on the car markets and in auto production needs to be mentioned particularly: the industry underwent a rapid and far-reaching process of globalization in the 1990s and 2000s. On the one hand, competition in markets intensified as car producers increasingly operated on a global scale; on the other hand, production is today orga-

214

HAJO HOLST

nized in transnational value chains and global networks. Hardly surprising, the flexibilization and fragmentation of production has impacted the organization of work as well as the employment structures of the industry. Working-time flexibility, including shift-work and short-term adjustments to market swings, is widespread through the industry; workers are regularly assigned new tasks both within locations and across sites; and nonstandardized employment, including temporary employment, temporary agency work and various forms of contract work, is growing rapidly (Holst et al. 2010; 2017). The organizations’ thirst for flexibility apparently has no limits as a leading works council of a German car producer stresses: „In that sense, management aims at infinite flexibility. If they could, they would send people home today and call them back next month, if possible from one day to the other. It is our duty to put boundaries to the demand for limitless flexibility.” (original German, translated HH)

Like its counterparts in the US and Japan, the German car industry witnessed a profound destandardization of work and employment. Intensified competition between corporations and locations put pressures on wages and the quality of work. As a consequence, workers are confronted with evergrowing flexibility demands and increased inequalities within the industry’s workforce. The modifications in production systems, work organization and employment structures reflect a transformation of the rationalization paradigm dominant in large corporations. Note that rationalization in the Fordist organizations aimed at increasing output with given inputs. Growing demand for standardized vehicles throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s enabled the dominance of the economy of production over the economy of the market (as well as the construction of the future as a linear continuation of the past). The basic ideas for the new rationalization paradigm were already born in the wake of the turbulences of the 1970s, yet they did not form a coherent paradigm before the lean revolution and the effects of financialization in the 1990s and 2000s. Characteristics of the current rationalization initiatives are—compared to the Fordist mode—a reversal of the relationship between input and output. Output is defined by market demand and thus treated as a given for rationalization initiatives which concentrate on increasing efficiency by reducing inputs including raw materials, pre-products and labor (economically unnecessary inputs are characterized as “waste”). It is the objective of the new paradigm to, at every single moment, only utilize and pay for those resources that are re-

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

215

quired to meet instantaneous demand. Besides the use of non-standard employment and other forms of externalization, the new approach to rationalization is based on Japanese principles such as just-in-sequence (JIT), Kanban or the “pull-system” (Doleschal 1989; Durand 2007). Note that the new rationalization paradigm is characterized by a change in the way organizations accelerate the utilization of resources such as labor, preproducts and raw materials. To use a metaphor, rationalization in Fordist organizations took the form of running laps at a stable high speed (i.e. continuous fast running on a pre-defined path), acceleration in the new rationalization paradigm resembles the movements of rabbits (i.e. a chain of short sprints with maximum speed, but in rapidly changing and unpredictable directions). The new rationalization paradigm does not only influence how organizations utilize labor, it changes the way corporations address the future. Coupling production directly to instantaneous demand and at the same time minimizing inputs result in a reduction of the time-binding effects of past decisions characteristic for Fordist organizations. An HR plant manager describes the function of non-standard employment for the reduction of the temporal footprint of the organizations in the following words: “In the light of its global production landscape, our company wants to avoid that single locations make decisions which foreclose something, which impede flexibility. One of these things is the growth of the workforce in Germany. German labor law is not a benefit. Its rules always produce problems when we try to enforce changes in the workforce.” (original German, translation HH)

Large capitalist actors use the flexibility of the new production systems, non-standard employment and flexible work arrangements to shorten the temporal aftermath of today’s bets on the future. The multiple standardizations of work and employment characteristic of the Fordist organizations in the post-war period blocked adjustments to instantaneous demand— and are therefore in conflict with the new approach to rationalization. Although production planning is still based on the definition of long-term production programs, the status of these programs has changed significantly since the 1970s. Short-term deviations of the programs defined in the past are possible, welcome and frequent. Flexible working-time accounts allow to swiftly align the working-time of core workforces to present demand, and the use of non-standardized employment aims at variabilizing the size of the workforce (Holst et al. 2010).

216

HAJO HOLST

In terms of the inevitable speculation on the future, capitalist decisions and actions in German auto corporations today differ strikingly from those in the period of post-war capitalism. Corporate decisions including the design of value chains, work organizations and employment structures are guided and legitimized by the classification of the future as uncertain (Shoemaker 2002). In the words of an auto manager: “We do not know how certain the future is. […] Nobody knows it in the car industry” (original German, translation HH). The characterization of the future as uncertain is in itself not a new phenomenon. However, management research has predominantly treated uncertainty as an attribute of exceptional situations characterized by technological, economic, political or social discontinuities (Kaplan/Orlikowski 2013). Yet, even in what can be called regular times not characterized by disruptive change capitalist decisions in the large auto corporations are currently based on the construction of the uncertain future. The construction of the uncertain future shares with its predecessor, the risky future, the idea that each present contains the seeds of a number of possible futures presents. Which of the possible futures materializes and turns into a present is open and will be determined over the course of time. However, there is one striking difference to the risky future. To classify the link between past, present and future as uncertain highlights the permanent and regular possibility of unexpectable events—and for management, the challenge of dealing with states of the world which were neither predicted nor anticipated in advance. According to the uncertain future, capitalist actors are able to identify a number of relevant possible futures with help of scenarios; yet, even if foresight were applied in the best possible way, something unexpected could potentially always occur. It is management’s objective to protect the organization’s profits from the negative consequences of unexpectable economic, technological, political and social developments. Note that the construction of the future as uncertain reflects both the intensifid competition on increasingly global markets and the requirements to precisley forestall the future stemming from the new rationalization paradigm and the current production systems. In order to permanently link output to instantaneous demand each single future present needs to be reliably forestalled (and not only the general long-term trend as in the Fordist period). In the words of an auto manager: “Exactly planning the future, that is not possible anymore. The world is too complex by now. But that’s no reason for saying: ‘The world is too complex; I skip planning.’ You cannot manage a large corporation without planning. You have to

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

217

map a realistic range of possibilities and in the organization create the flexibility to be able to move within this range. And in case of something going wrong, you have to have the capacity to safeguard the organization from the consequences. […] This is the reason why we work with scenarios.” (original German, translation HH)

The current flexibilization dynamic outlined above reflects the implications of the re-construction of the future. Corporations’ growing demand for flexibility on the one hand continues to focus on a range of possible futures deemed as relevant by corporate foresight (identified by scenario techniques). In this sense there is continuity to the flexibilization initiatives of the 1970s, only the extent of flexibility is growing in order to make organizations adaptable to a larger range of possible futures. On the other hand, the organizations utilize flexibility as well to increase today’s decisions’ reversibility by shortening the future horizon of the capitalist bets on an uncertain future. The modified construction of the future within car corporations (and manufacturing in general) and the altered way the organizations address the future through their profit-oriented decisions and actions also affect the general capitalist dynamic and its societal regulation. As organizations try to limit their temporal footprints by increasing the reversibility of capitalist decisions, the two main pillars of the regulation of the capitalist dynamic characteristic of post-war organized capitalism are called continuously into question: the channeling of markets and the systems of collective providence. The institutions that had funneled the market dynamic into predetermined channels were increasingly portrayed as obstacles to flexibility, severely criticized and progressively undermined or suspended. Since the mid-1980s, the labor market has been incrementally deregulated to increase the flexibility of personnel management and liberalize the use of nonstandard employment (Dörre 2015). Moreover, the self-regulation through associations and the tight network of “Germany Inc.” that had characterized German post-war capitalism has also become less binding (Streeck 2009). Collective bargaining agreements now cover fewer firms than before the 1990s, and industry-wide agreements, which have come under fire for being too rigid, are increasingly replaced by deals at the individual group or company level.

218

HAJO HOLST

4. Conclusion: The Re-construction of the Future and Flexibility With the specific temporality of capitalism in mind, this contribution has presented a new interpretation of the flexibilization of work and employment which since the 1970s has played a central role in the sphere of work in the Global North. Large capitalist organizations, it is argued, use flexibility to transform their relationship to the future. Self-evidently, the concrete design of flexible work arrangements reflects a number of local factors including traditions, culture, technological constraints and not at least power relations; yet the transformation of large corporations’ relationship towards the future represents a general trait of the dynamics of contemporary capitalism. Due to their future-orientedness, capitalist activities are inevitably bets on the future—and, as the analysis has shown, the course and content of these bets is influenced by the way actors perceive the link between past, present and future. The contribution thus reveals that not only actors’ concrete images, narratives and expectations of the future matter for the capitalist dynamic; sociology can benefit from scrutinizing as well how capitalist actors construct the links between past, present and future and address the future in their profit-oriented activities. Empirically, the analysis of the flexibilization of work and employment in the German auto industry identified two shifts in the way large car corporations construct and address the future, each associated with a distinct dynamic in the sphere of work and employment. Guided by the vision of the future as a linear continuation of the past, the Fordist organizations of the 1950s and 1960s subjectively placed their bets on singular and predictable futures, and their organizational structures were characterized by longterm time-binding effects in form of invariant production programs and the multiple standardizations of work and employment. The flexible organizations that emerged in the aftermath of the economic turbulences of the 1970s bet on risky futures, and used the flexibility to prepare their organizational structures for the alternative future presents anticipated by corporate foresight. In contrast, today’s lean and financialized organizations subjectively make their bets on uncertain futures, and the current trends in the flexibilization of work and employment reflect this reconstruction of the future. On the one hand, corporations attempt to enlarge the range of possible futures entailed in their organizational structures by increasing existing flexibility schemes; on the other hand, flexibility in

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

219

value chains and through non-standard employment is additionally used to increase the reversibility of profit-oriented decisions by shortening their future horizon. The flexibilization of work and employment is thus currently used to both safeguard the success of capitalist bets in a number of alternative futures identified by corporate planning and to protect the bets against the advent of unexpectable events. This contribution has addressed a new facet of the analysis of the temporal structures of contemporary capitalism, namely actors’ constructions of the future. The case of large capitalist organizations from the German auto industry has shown that the way actors perceive the link between past, present and future is closely linked to the course and content of their capitalist bets. However, organizations are not only observers of present futures; they participate in the performation of future presents through their decisions and actions as well. Those futures which the organizations individually forestall in order to formulate their capitalist bets are produced collectively by all actors involved. Although more research is needed on the interactions between different constructions of the future, there is good reason to believe that the re-constructions of the future within large capitalist organizations have an impact on the handling of the future by other actors both within the economic system and in other sub-systems of society. Due to the organizations’ central position in the economic system, their activities and decisions influence the view of other actors on the future, particularly organizations linked through value chains and their workforces. With a view on labor, our results are in line with precarization research which has shown that the direct coupling of work and employment to volatile markets impedes workers ability to reliably forestall and plan their own future. That corporations’ changing relationship to the future has a negative impact on those workers on non-standard employment is hardly surprising. The following quote from a long-term employee of a German car producer reveals that the organizations’ shortening the futurehorizon of their bets on the future decreases the capacities of the entire workforce to anticipate the future; in this case, the concrete working hours of the following days: “In earlier times, one could think about the future. Now, it is different… Sometimes I think, management only thinks until tomorrow. […] One day, we worked with the entire team on Saturday (which is an additional shift, HH]. But suddenly, on Monday there were only few vehicles on the program, and on Tuesday we had to stay home. I mean, I have to come in on Saturday and stay home on Tuesday? What kind of planning is that?” (original German, translation HH)

220

HAJO HOLST

Although the corporations’ attempts to align production to instantaneous demand put high flexibility pressures on workers, it is worth mentioning that we found remarkably few contestations and conflicts over the nature of the future. Management, work councils, as well as workers apparently do not question the characterization of the future as uncertain. On the contrary, the uncertain future seems be accepted as the legitimate and appropriate temporal horizon for capitalist decisions and actions. From this viewpoint, it does not only make a difference for individual organizations whether they perceive the future as linear, risky or uncertain; there is good reason to assume that the re-construction of the future analyzed above makes a difference for the future of society and of labor in particular.

Works Cited Adam, Barbara, and Chris Groves (2007). Future matters: action, knowledge, ethics. Leiden: Brill. Atkinson, John (1984). Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organisations. Personnel Management, 6(8), 28–31. Beckert, Jens (2009). The Social Order of Markets. Theory and Society, 38, 245–269. Beckert, Jens (2016). Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (2000). Die zwei Gesichter der Arbeit. Interdependenzen von Zeit- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen am Beispiel einer Ethnologie der algerischen Übergangsgesellschaft. Konstanz: UVK. Bradfield, Ron, George Wright, George Burta, George Cairns and Kees van der Heijden (2005). The origins and evolution of scenario techniques. Futures, 37(7), 795–813. Boyer, Robert, and Michel Freyssenet (2000). Les modèles productifs. Paris: La Decouverte. Deiß, Manfred, and Volker Döhl (eds.). (1992). Vernetzte Produktion. Automobilzulieferer zwischen Autonomie und Kontrolle. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Dequech, David (2003). Uncertainty and Economic Sociology. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(3), 509–532. Deutschmann, Christoph (2008). Kapitalistische Dynamik: Eine gesellschaftstheoretische Perspektive. Wiesbaden: VS. DiMaggio, Paul (2002). Endogenizing Animal Spirits: Towards a Sociology of Collective Response to Uncertainty and Risk. In Mauro F. Guillen, Randall Collins, Paula England and Marshall Meyer (eds.). The New Economic Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

221

Doeringer, Peter B., and Michael J. Piore (1971). Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington: Heath Lexington Books. Doleschal, Reinhard (1989). Just-in-time-Strategien und betriebliche Interessenvertretung in Automobil-Zulieferbetrieben. In Norbert Altmann and Dieter Sauer (eds.). Systemische Rationalisierung und Zulieferindustrie, 155–206. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Dombois, Rainer (1976). Massenentlassungen bei VW. Individualisierung der Krise. Leviathan, 4(4), 432–464. Dörre, Klaus (2015). The New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Capitalism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 11–68. London: Verso. Dörre, Klaus, and Bernd Röttger (eds.). (2003). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells. Hamburg: VSA. Durand, Jean-Pierre (2007). The Invisible Chain—Constraints and Opportunities in the New World of Employment. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Esposito, Elena (2011). The future of futures: the time of money in financing society. Cheltenham: Elgar. Fulcher, James (2004). Capitalism. A Short Introduction. Oxford: University Press. Harvey, David (1982). Limits to Capital. Oxford: Blackwell. Hobsbawm, Eric (1962). The Age of Revolution. Europe 1789–1848. London: Abacus. Holst, Hajo (2016). Von Hilfsmitteln, Symbolen und Artefakten—Finanzialisierung, rationale Investitionen und der Business Case. In Jens Maeße, Hanno Pahl and Jan Sparsam (eds.). Die Innenwelt der Ökonomie. Wissen, Macht und Performativität in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 391–424. Wiesbaden: Springer. Holst, Hajo (2018). Spekulieren auf Zukunft—Finanzialisierung und die Flexibilisierung von Arbeit. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Holst, Hajo, Oliver Nachtwey and Klaus Dörre (2010). The Strategic Use of Temporary Agency Work—Functional Change of a Non-standard Form of Employment. International Journal of Action Research, 6(1), 108–138. Holst, Hajo, Hendrik Brunsen, Steffen Niehoff and Ingo Matuschek (2017). Zwei Logiken der Externalisierung—Fragmentierte Arbeit in der Forschung & Entwicklung der Automobilindustrie. In Hajo Holst (ed.). Fragmentierte Belegschaften. Leiharbeit, Informalität und Soloselbständigkeit in globaler Perspektive, 33–68. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Jürgens, Ulrich, Thomas Malsch and Knuth Dohse (1993). Breaking from Taylorism: changing forms of work in the automobile industry. Cambridge: University Press. Kaplan, Sarah, and Wanda Orlikowski (2013). Temporal Work in Strategy Making. Organization Science, 24(2), 965–995. Knight, Frank H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Koch, Jochen, Hannes Krämer, Andreas Reckwitz and Matthias Wenzel (2016). Zum Umgang mit Zukunft in Organisationen eine praxistheoretische Perspektive. Managementforschung, 26, 161–184.

222

HAJO HOLST

Köhler, Christoph, and Werner Sengenberger (1983). Konjunktur und Personalanpassung. Betriebliche Beschäftigungspolitik in der deutschen und amerikanischen Automobilindustrie. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Köhler, Christoph, and Alexandra Krause (2010). Betriebliche Beschäftigungspolitik. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 387–412 Wiesbaden: VS. Lazonick, William, and Mary O’Sullivan (2000). Maximizing Shareholder Value. A New Ideology for Corporate Governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13–35. Luhmann, Niklas (1993). Risk: A Sociological Theory. Berlin: de Gruyter. Marchington, Mick, Damian Grimshaw and Jill Rubery (2006). Fragmenting work: blurring organizational boundaries and disordering hierarchies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marx, Karl (1995 [1847]). The Poverty of Philosophy. Amherst/New York: Prometheus Books. Moldaschl, Manfred, and G. Günter Voß (eds.). (2002). Subjektivierung von Arbeit. München. Rainer Hampp. Neckel, Sighard (1988). Entzauberung der Zukunft. Zur Geschichte und Theorie sozialer Zeitperspektiven. In Rainer Zoll (ed.). Zerstörung und Wiederaneignung von Zeit, 464–486. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Nowotny, Helga (2016). The Cunning of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. Posth, Martin (1975). Personalabbau in der Unternehmung. Personal, 8(3), 114–116. Rappaport, Alfred (1975). The future is not what it used to be: some implications for management accounting. Journal of contemporary business, 4, 1–14 Rosa, Hartmut (2013). Acceleration. A New Theory of Modernity. New York: Columbia University Press. Ruff, Frank (2006). Corporate foresight: Integrating the future business environment into innovation and strategy. International Journal of Technology Management, 34(3/4), 278–295. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. Sewell, William H. (2008). The Temporalities of Capitalism. Socio-Economic Review, 6(3), 517–537. Shoemaker, Paul J. H. (2002). Profiting from uncertainty. Strategies for succeeding no matter what the future brings. New York: Free Press. Shonfield, Andrew (1965). Modern Capitalism. London: Pickering. Streeck, Wolfgang (2009). Re-forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Streeck, Wolfgang (2017). Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso. Standing, Guy (2011). The precariat: The new dangerous class. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Vogl, Joseph (2014). The Specter of Capital. Stanford: University Press.

RE-CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE

223

Windolf, Paul (2005). Was ist Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus? In Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 20–57. Wiesbaden: VS.

III. What Does the Sociology of Work Contribute to the Critique of Capitalism?

Serfdom—(Lost) Love’s Labor—Service Industries:1 Services from Feudal Times to Late Capitalism Cornelia Klinger

1. From Personal Bodily Services under Feudalism to Labors of Love in the Bourgeois Home When God was still The Lord, service was sacred. Feudal society was founded on lordship and bondage and the reciprocal exchange of protection against servitude. The notion of service became objectionable when Western societies embarked on the path of secularization and modernization. In the absence of divine approval and a social hierarchy rooted in transcendence there seems to be nothing to justify that human beings rule over other human beings. When the scandalon of personal domination comes to the surface, so does the pudendum of the body in its randomness and decrepitude (contingency). The embarrassment of personal bodily service—Leibdienst—“rendered to a person of high social status” that one “performs in person” 2 is awkward and humiliating for both sides. In modern society, which knows ni dieu, ni maître, people are supposed to be independent and not rely on each other. The political semantic of modernity,

——————

1 Translator’s note: Klinger’s original German title—Leibdienst—Liebesdienst—Dienstleistung—cannot be adequately translated into English because it contains a substantive argument which is based on an etymological sequence that only works in German and has at its core the German word for “service”: Dienst. Leibdienst refers to personal—more precisely: bodily (“Leib” is German for “body”)—services owed to a superior in the German feudal system and seems roughly comparable to corvée and/or serjeanty in the French and English feudal systems respectively. It can mean either a service rendered unto a person, or a service that can only be performed directly in person, that is, literally with one’s hands and feet, like messenger services. Liebesdienst is literally “service performed out of love” (“Liebe” is German for “love”), which I have translated here as “labor of love”. In German it is also a euphemism for sex work. Dienstleistung, finally, refers to services and the service sector in the modern sense, whether private and for profit or public. 2 Definition taken from Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch, lemma “Leibdienst”, http://woerter buchnetz.de/DWB/?lemid=GL03732

228

CORNELIA KLINGER

with its postulates of liberty, equality and human rights, has discredited the notion of service together with its degrading side effects of coercion and violence, dependency and serfdom; in short, all the filth and misery of contingent human existence. Impersonalization, or rather de-familialization or de-patriarchalization, takes place in all sectors of the functionally differentiated society, especially the two big action systems: politics and economy. With the emergence of the modern state, kinship—the crucial dynastic principle in monarchies and aristocracies—gradually ceases to be the basis of political structures and is replaced by formal, neutral and impersonal legal and administrative procedures. The economy underwent an even more drastic transformation than politics and the state. Originally named after the house (oikos), it does not just find a new place in the factory and the firm, it also takes on a new form. Industrialization fundamentally affects the products and processes of work as well as relations between the participants; systematisation, objectification, juridification and impersonalization are complemented here by abstractification and artificialization due to the commodification of labor power and mechanization—in short, by money and machinery. The production of material goods becomes detached from the cycles of organic birth and decay; it casts off the negative aspects of the “metabolism with nature” and, in so doing, also throws off the master’s yoke. The more abstract and artificial and the less alive this kind of labor becomes, the freer it appears to be, delivered from the poverty and obscurity of contingent conditions. When politics moves out of the court and the economy out of the house, the status and character of the court and the house change fundamentally—to their advantage. Whereas state and economy come to constitute the public sphere, the house becomes the private sphere, the “domestic space” of modern society in which other, almost opposite rules apply. The rationalization, objectification and artificialization of other social subsystems stands in sharp contrast to the emotionalization and subjectification, the making-alive and naturalization, the humanization and cultivation of the domestic life-world. As work moves out of the house, the latter becomes the home, a space where the human being can flourish as a human being—or as l’homme. In contrast, in his social roles as citoyen of the state and bourgeois in the economic realm, he is free from personal bondage only to be more ruthlessly controlled by impersonal “objective pressures”. In the political and economic spheres, the modern notion of autonomy is

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

229

expressed in the principle of the self-conservation of the human being as subject. In the private sphere, however, this notion is elevated to something even higher: the principle of authenticity and individual self-realization. In the private sphere, unencumbered as it is by political and economic functions, the modern subject is more than just autonomous, they are freer than free. In this sphere, autonomy that has been elevated to authenticity determines the relations between persons. Unburdened by political and economic interests and concerns, these relations acquire positive qualities: physical intimacy and emotional warmth. Love becomes the basis for relations between the sexes in marriage as well as for inter-generational relations between parents and children. No longer are people expected to marry to form alliances between competing families or for “rational reasons”; they are expected only to do so on the basis of individual affection. Children are no longer cheap labor or heirs to their parents’ fortune and social status. Instead they are allowed a long childhood to dedicate themselves to their education so that they may later freely choose their own place in society. Stripped of traditional, hierarchical as well as modern interest-based aspects and oriented instead towards altruism and solidarity, the love-based relations between the sexes and generations appear as ends in and of themselves. Certainly, personal relationships that aspire towards the ideals of freedom, love and education still retain some aspects of the old, personal bodily service (Leibdienst) due to the immediate corporality of sexuality and generativity. However, because of their reciprocity, their voluntary nature and their being ends in themselves, these remnants are transformed into a labor of love (Liebesdienst) which is “priceless” in the fullest sense of the term. Nonetheless, the old relations of power and domination still weigh heavily on modernity. Traditional social inequalities are transformed into modern class- and gender-based domination. The freedom granted to the wage worker does not eliminate the old asymmetry between the haves and the have-nots, it merely transforms it into modern class rule. Nor does the traditional social asymmetry between the sexes vanish. The separation between the private and public spheres is personalized along the lines of gender difference, as “polarization of gender characters” (Hausen 1988)— something that is atypical given the modern trend towards functional differentiation. Whereas the features and requirements of the public sphere are inscribed into the male gender character, with its susceptibility to objective

230

CORNELIA KLINGER

constraints, the human and natural qualities of the private sphere are “projected” onto the female gender character. Motherly love in particular incorporates and symbolizes all that is new, good and beautiful about the private sphere. The selflessness and altruism, the unconditional love and care for the well-being of others are one-sidedly attributed to women who have been elevated to the moral sex. This is the ideal which would later inform the ethics of care in the 1980s. Needless to say that the normality of family life in the bourgeois-modern 19th century was much bleaker. The strict separation of public space from the private sphere and the family translates into a rigid segregation of the sexes, above all the exclusion of women from all public activities and from participation in social life. It is this legal, political and economic dependence on their husbands that consigns women’s devoted love and various care activities to the lowly status of (personal bodily) service (Leibdienst) rendered unto their husbands and children. This domestic labor of love (Liebesdienst) is more tainted, and in a qualitatively different fashion, by the stigma of the old Leibdienst than free labor in the modern workplace. The bodily functions of sexuality and generativity are not being revolutionized (at least not at this stage of technological and social development) and are not (yet) subject to rationalization and artificialization. Like some archaic, animalistic, primitive residue, they remain confined to the “obscurity of the home”—and with them the immature women and children, life in its irrationality and contingency, and the many different tasks of life care or care work. In the shadows behind the housewife-as-mistress’ labor of love (Liebesdienst) stands the maid’s service. The (well-heeled) bourgeois household of the 19th century always depended on the lowly valued and poorly paid labor of a more or less high number of—usually female—domestic servants. The shadow economy in the obscurity of the home is based on “informal” labor which—apart from the housewife’s own contribution—is performed by unpaid female relatives who have no households of their own (that is, by women of lower social status, grandmothers, aunts, unmarried “spinsters”), as well as poorly paid non-relatives, that is, rural or “underclass” women. A high share of female and child labor notwithstanding, the liberation of productive wage labor is reserved for men. This correlates with the increasing feminization of domestic and personal services (including the right of corporal punishment). The increased appreciation of femininity through the idealization and humanization of the private sphere is then opposed to the debasement and exploitation of this service relation.

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

231

The life care regime of the 19th century, which was based on the separation of life and work, casts the twilight of idealization and subordination on autonomy, humanity, freedom, love and education. The enormously increased appreciation of the private and of femininity, which is attributed to the private sphere, remains deeply ambivalent; on the one hand, they are idealized and elevated to a higher ethics and culture, to a sphere of humanity completely unburdened by base interests, but on the other hand, there is contempt for the contingency and necessities of life and the archaization of primitive nature. Under modern conditions the domestic economy becomes a “shadow economy”. From housework in the material-objective sense to the socialization and education of children and adolescents, from caring for the sick, disabled and elderly to charity for the needy, poor and weak—all these activities, which are varied but not functionally differentiated in the life world, are neither regarded nor valued as labor and are also not seen as achievements. This exterritorialization of life and life care work makes it possible to externalize the costs of human life, of birth and decay, of life’s everyday conduct and specific risks. Economy and society, market and state are relieved of responsibility here because the price of human contingency (natality, morbidity, mortality) does not have to be factored into the public budget or the cost-benefit calculations of private enterprises. This relief, however, causes severe problems. Having a male breadwinner and a female homemaker does not just imply gender inequality, it is also tied to possessions and/or income. Therefore, this particular upper-class, bourgeois life care regime is not suitable for large sections of the population for whom the man’s income is not sufficient to sustain a family and who therefore cannot do without female wage labor (often in the service of bourgeois households). The exclusion of women from participation in society, the femininization of services and the pauperization of the proletariat in the 19th century form the underbelly of the bourgeois life care model.

232

CORNELIA KLINGER

2. From Labor of Love (Liebesdienst) to Modern Services (Dienstleistung) Since roughly the beginning of the 20th century, the state has usually been the institution that people look to for solutions to the problems of the bourgeois-patriarchal life care regime. This was the time when the expansion of public systems of social security and insurance against the many different afflictions and risks of contingent life began—for example in Germany with Bismarck’s social laws (the integration of educational tasks into a system of state schools had already started earlier). Various kinds of care institutions were also created. In accordance with the idea of expanding community solidarity to the level of the national state, many care and provisioning functions that had been seen until then as belonging to the family and private sphere were taken into predominantly public administration at national, urban or municipal levels—although with differences in terms of scope and kind. 3 For the first time, provisioning, assistance and care for contingent human nature becomes a res publica, the topic and object of government policies and legal regulation, as well as a paid service (Dienstleistung) and “productive” economic contribution. For the time being, however, this did nothing to change the subordination of life or the devaluation of life care work. The many different activities that were now shifted from the bourgeois-patriarchal family to the state—which, though still connoted as “fatherly”, is actually an impersonal apparatus—are one current in the broad stream of the “tertiary sector”. Thus, life care activities moved from the obscurity of domestic privacy into a “black box”—or from the frying pan into the fire. This new sector as a whole appears as a giant, amorphous, dark continent which the social and labor sciences have mostly ignored for so long that they are unable to identify its unique features and only define it negatively, in contrast to that which it is not: everything that is not labor in the sense of producing material goods is classified as service. Services remained a residual category, even when it started to become apparent that this third sector was overtaking the “higher-ranking” secondary sector (i.e. manufacturing), just like the second sector had overtaken the primary sector (i.e. agriculture and pro-

——————

3 There was also some measure of lateral relief through charitable organizations as well as some rather modest elements of social security at company level.

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

233

duction of raw materials) only a few decades before, around the turn of the 20th century. The assumed priority of manufacturing over services was extended into the classification of services themselves; so-called “services to individuals” are ranked after so-called “production-related services”. Commercial and office work as well as services like transport, security, storage, cleaning or catering (when provided to companies) are considered primary services. Research, development, organization, management, assistance, consultancy, teaching and publication are classed as “secondary” services. 4 Those personal and social services that, with the development of the welfare state, gradually emerged from the hidden world of the private household to become third-class services are not even separately mentioned, or merely placed at the end in the “miscellaneous” category. The many different functions of life care constitute the tertiary of the tertiary sector. 5 Despite the insatiable and growing “hunger for the tertiary” (Jean Fourastié), it seems that the old contempt for services, especially personal bodily service (Leibdienst), comes more clearly to the fore again once the dark curtain of the private is lifted and the flattering cloak of love, charity and care is torn away. The primacy of manufacturing over services implies primacy of things over human beings, of productive labor over contingent life. It also implies priority of that which can be calculated and rationalized over the incalculable, of the formal over the informal. It seems that the ranking of different services depends on their greater or smaller distance from the living body, from “filth”. Such distance can be achieved either through intellectualization (as in the hierarchization of professions in the education sector) and/or by involving technology or machinery (as in medical professions).

——————

4 See http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/1999/kb1099.pdf 5 As late as 2008, the industry classification of the German Federal Statistical Office strikingly recapitulates the old sectoral classification and complete subordination of the personal and the social. Economic sectors are listed by letters A through U. The first three (A through C) comprise the primary sector (agriculture, fisheries, mining), while D through F comprise the secondary sector (manufacturing, energy supply and construction). The tertiary sector starts from G: education, “human health and social work activities”, “arts, entertainment and recreation”, “other services” and “private households with domestic personnel” occupy P through T, only followed on the last spot (U) by “activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies”. See https://www.destatis.de/DE /Methoden/Klassifikationen/GueterWirtschaftklassifikationen/klassifikationWZ08englisch.xls?__b lob=publicationFile

234

CORNELIA KLINGER

It goes without saying that “industrialism” and the overemphasis on production are apparent not just in the symbolic order of things, the lack of attention on the part of the social sciences and in more or less scholastic categorizations. They are also and above all reflected in the social devaluation of service work as expressed in relatively low(er) wages. The enormously wide range of activities makes comparison difficult, but the wage differentials that exist between jobs with a similar degree of professionalization—e.g. between manufacturing and services, between car mechanics and nurses—are consistent and striking. Apart from the fact that very little scientific attention is being paid to personal or bodily services and that their social value is poorly recognized in monetary terms, there is also insufficient understanding of the specificity of these services. When working with living people who are autonomous subjects with a will of their own, one is forced to (and should!) follow different rules and procedures than those that govern the production of dead things or passive objects. This fact, however, is mostly ignored. That the processes of rationalization, objectification, neutralization, impersonalization and artificialization that have driven the development of public administration and industrial production are not necessarily, and not to the same extent and in the same way, beneficial to life care is usually overlooked. The subordination of life under dead things corresponds to the subordination of life care activities under a concept of manufacturing labor that does not fit them—while it is generally believed that life care activities are not fit to be called “work”. The struggle to gain recognition for life care as also being work has produced ill-conceived concepts like “family work”, “relationship work”, even “work of mourning”, instead of demolishing an alienating and objectifying concept of work from the perspective of personal and life-related activities and thus to correct the perverse relation between ends and means and life and work under capitalism. The underappreciation of life care in real social relations, its under-determination in the social sciences, and its subordination under an inadequate concept of work are indicators of an inverted relation in an “absurd system” (Boltanski and Chiapello). Modern society may have abolished the service to a personal god that also legitimated personal domination of human beings over other human beings, but it has replaced it with a “dance around the golden calf”. In comparison to the bourgeois-patriarchal life care regime of the 19th century, however, the balance is still positive. There is no doubt that insur-

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

235

ance against life risks and the transfer of care and provisioning to the public sector have considerably improved the living conditions of many people. However, the full socialization of life care tasks, which would take into account really all the costs of life, has not been achieved. One probable reason is that people reject and resist the factory-like, bureaucratic organization of life care. But in contrast to certain marginal experiments in totalitarian regimes, the democratic welfare state—whether more social or Christian democratic in orientation—never aimed at abolishing the private sphere. Its primary goal was to instead support families in their life care functions. Relieving them of those functions was merely a secondary goal in case of temporary and exceptional circumstances. This concept does not supersede the ideal of the bourgeois family. On the contrary, it allows it to be extended, for the first time, to non-bourgeois sections of the population (“family wage”), while also softening the gender asymmetry by granting women access to all areas of society. Despite all these advances and advantages, the welfare state approach, in its compromise with the private life care regime of the bourgeois family, remains beset by the same inequality and injustice as the latter. The problems of social justice and inequality in the intersecting dimensions of class and gender have been modified, shifted and certainly ameliorated, but they have not been solved. The welfare state remains a class state in every single area of child care, education, health care, care for the elderly and old age insurance. The division of society into two (or more) classes is faithfully reflected in the various institutions and security systems as well as their graded tariffs. Gender equality has remained as incomplete as the abolition of class distinctions. Women may now participate in the labor market and public life, but they are still responsible for life and life care in the home. In fact, they effectively work a double shift: one in their domestic workplace, the other in an extra-domestic workplace. Income differentials in the form of unequal wages for equal work still characterize the working environment. Above all, there is an incredibly resilient pattern of assigning women and men to different sectors and types of wage labor. This reflects women’s traditional responsibility for life care tasks. The polarization of gender roles, which established the dual spheres of the public and the private during bourgeois modernity in the 19th century and which also created a hierarchy between them making it possible to externalize the costs of life care, does not disappear. It finds its consistent and uninterrupted continuation in a gender-segregated labor market. While the housewife’s labor was

236

CORNELIA KLINGER

unpaid, the same or similar types of labor are badly (or worse) paid on the labor market.

3. From Public Services to Private Service Providers Since the final quarter of the 20th century, we have started to see some movement in the Fordist family-welfare state constellation. Whether or not they refer to the real or alleged “objective constraints” of globalization, what the neoliberal attacks on the welfare state question above all is the arrangement between the private and public care regimes. At the same time, technological innovations in the fields of ICT (information and communication technologies) and life sciences—from microelectronics to microbiology—pull the carpet from under the bourgeois concept of the exterritorialization of life in the separation of the public and the private. Since the 1980s, the service sector has surpassed the primary and secondary sectors in terms of value added and number of employees. Taking these developments into account, the mainstream of social and labor sciences is correcting its one-sided focus on manufacturing work and is starting to acknowledge the shift towards a service society. At roughly the same time in the early 1980s, feminism started to develop the “care” concept, which was an important step towards the conceptualization of life care as an activity in its own right. Feminist theory may clamor for a “care revolution”, but it is in the daily practices of the market economy that it is actually taking place. While the life care regimes of the family and the welfare state are plunged into deep “crisis” at roughly the same time, market-based approaches are being developed for managing almost all life concerns. The trend towards “privatization” in the sense of marketization, production of consumer goods, and service- or customer-focus is a general tendency of our times that affects life care and the conduct of life particularly strongly. On the one hand, functions that had long been the firm prerogative of the state, like child care, education or insurance systems concerned with life care, are being exposed to competition from the market. On the other hand, the market also offers to manage sectors which are not considered very socially profitable (like care of the elderly). Apart from the emergence of welfare markets and welfare industries, we also see the beginning of a

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

237

new wave of commodification in the production of information and entertainment driven mainly by the development of new media. The privacy of individuals and their immediate everyday communication in the life world are being mediatized, virtualized and artificialized by the creative industries. The commodification of all aspects of life—not just life care narrowly understood, but also the style and conduct of life in general—increasingly influences how personal identities are shaped and transforms the nature of privacy. Everybody’s lifestyle is turned into the product of an industry that deserves to be called culture industry in the most general sense. This is accompanied by a change of perspective. (Private) life is no longer scrutinized for costs to be externalized or minimized as much as possible; instead it is now valued for the economic benefits and profit opportunities that satisfying this virtually insatiable demand might generate. This is something new. Patriarchal class society had exterritorialized life conduct and life care to the separated private life world in order to externalize the costs and exploit life and life energy as a valuable but unpaid natural resource. The democratic welfare state then tried to administer life concerns in bureaucratic fashion. That meant that life, which now appeared as a cost factor in the public “household”, was to be administered rather miserly and just above subsistence level—and yet the state was eventually overwhelmed by the tremendous cost. In contrast, the market economy now stands ready to serve all areas of life generously, even abundantly—but for a price. Life care thus switches from the principle of solidarity in the larger or smaller community of the nation or family—a principle, of course, which had always already been compromised by gender and class divisions—to valorization. This commodification of life has obvious advantages. They are more or less those that Fourastié and others had already expected from the growth of the service sector; the accumulation of knowledge, professionalization, the increased use of technology and marketization can considerably diversify and optimize the different functions related to life, from the conduct, care and maintenance of life to insurance against its risks as well as education and entertainment. Because it has come to be mediated by money, serving the endless needs and requirements of life has become economically “productive”. Standardization and efficiency gains improve the continuity and guarantee the quality and consistency of these services, creating a win-win situation. On the demand side, this means additional freedom because recipients of care services are no longer beggars or supplicants but

238

CORNELIA KLINGER

are courted as customers. They can now choose between different competing suppliers, which amounts to a gain in individual autonomy. On the supply side, training and professionalization improve the chances to be paid in accordance with one’s performance, to become financially independent, and to receive social prestige and recognition. A vastly expanded and very diverse range of (socio-)technical, educational, consultancy and therapeutic jobs is thus created in which theoretical and empirical knowledge is collected which is—or can at least be—superior to the (potentially, but not necessarily) loving, yet unprofessional management of life care in the family as well as the partly developed, but rather unloving expert knowledge of notoriously miserly bureaucratic welfare. Whereas the Fordist welfare state forced women to balance poorly paid service jobs and unpaid housework at home on a daily basis, the market economy has, for the first time, created the possibility of overcoming the asymmetric gender arrangement; the adult worker model has become a concrete policy goal. Realizing it, however, would require that the market be able in principle to take over the entire range of personal bodily services and labors of love (Leibdienst and Liebesdienst). Finally, a new and different way of dealing with the bodily nature of human existence is also emerging. The occidental tradition was based on the notion of coping with contingency through asceticism, while “classic” modernity was oriented towards the model of “a society in which no one performs and no one requires care” (Schnabl 2005). Recent advances in the field of scientific and technological contingency management make a different kind of consciousness possible: the post-modern wellness society replaces suppression and denial of mental and physical needs of all sorts with the idea of serving or even pampering them. The body ceases to be pudendum or scandalon. Apart from these significant advantages, however, there is also one drawback. The life care industry may cater to life, but it does not serve it. It is guided by the market mechanism. It offers, on an essentially limitless price scale, “products” that are distributed solely in accordance with the customers’ ability to pay—just like any other commodity. Market and technology do nothing to help address the traditionally unsolved question of financing. In fact, they exacerbate it considerably through their focus on profit. Although business and the market could in principle perform the functions of life conduct and life care better than the family and the welfare state, they cannot dispense with the latter’s (prior) financial inputs— and old tasks bring old problems. The social inequalities and injustices

SERFDOM—(LOST) LOVE’S LABOR—SERVICE INDUSTRIES

239

between the classes and sexes are reinforced once more when the gap widens between those who can afford good and expensive services and those who cannot. As long as there is still some room for the welfare state to supply families and/or individuals with the necessary financial means (in the form of allowances, vouchers or loans for care or education) to purchase private care services, and as long as the stock prices of private insurers stay up, then the weakening of national or local care institutions and public insurance systems will not yet be fully felt. However, as such options disappear and stock prices fall, having recourse to family and/or individual wealth becomes more important, making continuing wealth inequalities more important again too. The more difficult the situation becomes, the higher the pressure will be—which had never quite disappeared anyway—to reduce life care costs. This pressure towards informalization, precarization and externalization of care work affects those most who still do the lion’s share of this kind of work: women. The class- or status-based “division of labor” between the housewife and the maid, which was always a part of the bourgeois care regime, reappears here (regardless of whether the new maids work in private homes or a care service company). The 19th century exploitation of domestic servants was facilitated above all by the externalizing effect of the urban/rural divide; today this hierarchy between center and periphery assumes an international dimension. What the countryside was then, the entire globe is now; the foreign land that cost-saving externalization requires now extends worldwide. With regard to the emergence of global care work chains, ethnicity has been added as a third variable in the power game of social asymmetries alongside class and gender. But we are not just witnessing the return of old problems; there are also new ones emerging. When primacy shifted from the first to the second sector, agricultural production adapted to the laws of the newly hegemonic secondary sector and became subject to some form of industrialization. A similar process of convergence could also occur in the transition from an industrial to a service society in that certain aspects of service work, especially life and life care activities, are transferred to the production and, above all, the selling of tangible goods. In any case, the dead things are becoming surprisingly alive. On the customer-focused, post-industrial, post-material market for consumer goods, commodities are sold with the promise of not just satisfying material needs (the tea you buy does not just quench your thirst) but also of having spiritual qualities (to nurture the soul

240

CORNELIA KLINGER

or quicken the wit). The material things and purchased services are not just equipped with mind and soul, but also, and above all, a living body, sensuality and erotic appeal. Going one step further, it seems as if commodities as physical objects are becoming less important compared to human relations and emotions. The service to the customer, or “consumer care”, is becoming more important than the commodity itself. The boundaries between dead and living bodies, between things and people seem to blur. Services in relation to things are also offered as care (e.g. car care), just like the formerly private bodily services (Leibdienste) or labors of love (Liebesdienste). So while capitalism has changed tack by taking on emotional traits, all human traits conversely now become capital. In contrast to the old industrial system, the new economy requires more than just the worker’s hand and the boss’ brain. It demands the whole person, their heart and soul, emotion and commitment, beauty and love, imagination and dreams; in short, the self in all its dimensions and facets, from bodily creature to creative agent. The care-ification of everything and everyone, which correlates with the marketization of everything that was once considered contingent and irrational and therefore kept away from the rational organization of the state and the economy, makes the boundaries between the spheres and sectors of society permeable. Therefore, the question of who should serve whom has now become more urgent. Should things serve people or should people serve things? Is money a means of life or life a means of earning money? It is a—hopefully—open question whether or not we will be able to give a different direction to the (not just recently) “paradoxical system” of capitalism with its perverted relations between means and ends, people and things, money and life.

Works Cited Hausen, Karin (1988). Die Polarisierung der Geschlechtscharaktere. Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben. In Heidi Rosenbaum (ed.). Seminar: Familie und Gesellschaftsstruktur. Materialien zu den sozio-ökonomischen Bedingungen von Familienformen, 161–191. 4th edition. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Schnabl, Christa (2005). Gerecht sorgen. Grundlagen einer sozialethischen Theorie der Fürsorge. Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg/Herder Verlag.

Work and Reproduction Kerstin Jürgens

Until only a few years ago, discussing “reproduction” was a sensitive matter. Outside of academic circles, the term was considered too complicated. Although it was famously used by Marx in his Critique of Political Economy, referring to reproduction in sociological debates continued to meet with mixed reactions. 1 Despite the consensus on the exceptional importance of work to society and the fact that analyzing and conducting research into this issue was necessary, when it came to the logic and problems associated with reproduction, reactions were generally rather negative. This was not because supposedly Marxist terminology was being used, but rather because the term “reproduction” was linked to a general suspicion of a feminist intervention based on an equal-opportunities policy. Discussions about reproduction were misinterpreted as demonstrating that work and family life were “incompatible”. This led to debates that revolved around the division of labor within the family, processes of segregation in the labor market, pay gaps, and gender equality. Many of these “lifestyle” issues, which had previously received very little attention, have now become an accepted part of discussions about this issue. Debates about psychological illness and new lifestyle illnesses, such as depression or burn-outsyndrome, have only recently become a major media phenomenon. Despite the fact that research had already provided warnings about the negative consequences of demographic trends during the 1970s, when they appeared, these issues were treated as an inevitable fate. Today, the questions raised by the sociological critique of reproduction are being received far more positively. Awareness of the foreseeable

——————

1 “Reproduction” as a central category in Critique of Political Economy focused on recovering and replacing commodities and reproductive factors. However, Marx (1999, 401ff.) explicitly used the term to refer to human labor power and necessary reproductive activities, such as nutrition and recovery, as well as the procreation of the next generation of workers and their sustenance.

242

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

shortage of (highly) qualified labor has risen, and labor studies are more focused on the conditions associated with and the adversities linked to the level of spending undertaken by labor power as well as on life outside the workplace. Questions regarding sustainability are no longer being reduced to their ecological dimension: Issues such as resource-saving workforce management also form part of the debate on social sustainability. Despite this, wage labor is still the priority, and research on work action, workplaces, and capitalism is oriented towards current forms of waged labor and how it will change in the future. Research on stress and on compatibility ultimately focuses on how employees deal with requirements and how they reproduce their labor power, even in adverse conditions. From a sociological perspective, this approach is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it restricts the analysis to questions of economics since it views work and life in the context of the valorization of labor power. On the other hand (and, in this author’s opinion, more importantly), the reasons of why and how people relate to the demands placed on them at work remain unclear. In order to address this issue, people’s needs and views, both of which influence how they act and deal with the demands placed upon them, must to be taken into account more systematically. Although their needs and views are related to work, such as to income or working conditions, they also originate from contexts that are not (directly) mediated by work. Therefore, it is necessary to include phenomena that precede labor power spending, as these are also a prerequisite for production. This article begins by outlining empirical evidence suggesting that reproduction is becoming more relevant (1). After attempting to define of reproduction (2), I argue that the current debate on the dynamics and the future of capitalism should be broadened on the basis of a sociology of reproduction (3). The objective is to explain why an analysis of the economic order has to include an understanding of questions of reproduction not only as peripheral phenomena, but also as central elements of our society’s regimes of work and production.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

243

1. The Relevance of Reproduction: From Peripheral Phenomenon to Key Issue The beginnings of industrial capitalism in Europe were associated with mass pauperization. The causes of this were quite disparate and included elements such as rapid population growth, an agrarian crisis, and an end to previous modes of production. However, there was a consensus on evaluating the consequences of these changes and implementing necessary measures in order to stabilize society. Accordingly, there was recognition that the social question would have to be resolved and that state intervention was needed to regulate demographic developments and people’s working and living conditions. 2 Pauperism provided the impulse behind an institutional and collective securing of reproduction which not only resulted in increased material prosperity, but also led to a specific understanding of prosperity based on security and protection from poverty and social misery becoming more widespread. The fight for the eight-hour day, the implementation of wide-ranging social policies, and the promotion of the bourgeois family model are all examples of the restrictions placed on labor power that (even economically) proved highly important. 3 Capitalist developments were already linked to empirical knowledge (and insights) demonstrating that production and reproduction interacted and formed a highly sensitive structure that could quickly be thrown off balance. Protecting reproductive issues was not only necessary to maintain the social order; it was an existential necessity of capitalism itself. However, irrespective of the degree and reach of collective state regulation, a conflict emerged that continues to characterize our economic order: the social separation of and hierarchies in production and reproduction. This is connected to other hierarchies, particularly those in gender relations and relationships, as well as to divisions and polarizations that manifest themselves in the social structure, such as in the social order of time and space. Even if we are far from the social distortions of proto-industrialization, there are signs that the German model of reproduction is undergoing a comprehensive change. Moreover, changes are being made to the triad of

——————

2 The following analysis is based on the German situation and therefore does not include the dramatic extension of hunger and the fight for survival that still shapes the daily lives of people in many other countries. 3 For an extensive account of the creation and change of state social policy, see Lessenich 2008. For the context of social policy and the individual need for safety, cf. Castel 2005.

244

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

wage labor, welfare state, and family, which in its historic configuration led to the German economic success story. 4 The striking developments in wage labor since the 1980s can be linked to five factors. First, a decrease in real wages combined with a simultaneous increase in expenses for individual provisions (pensions, job-related incapacity, etc.) leads to financial losses. Second, a sustained labor market crisis forces people to leave their profession and places pressure on the unemployed as well as the core workforce. Third, the dissolution and subjectivization of work, which results in demands for higher levels of performance and causes stronger competition, transfers market pressures onto individual employees. Fourth, an individualization of workplace conflicts and, fifth, a new culture of self-attribution. Consequently, employees identify with the goals of the company and even accept responsibility for aspects of their work that they cannot influence. Not all sectors and groups of workers are affected in the same manner by these developments, but reports from medical insurers and results from health research indicate that the majority of the working population is becoming worn down (see, for example, DAK 2015). Workers in precarious employment situations are usually affected in multiple ways, but even in the sector representing normal or highly qualified work, the workload is increasing. Income losses and the labor market crisis fuel worries about securing a livelihood among these workers, which hinders their possibility to plan for the future. Moreover, growing levels of competition and the pressure to provide stronger performances encourage the fear of failure. The welfare state has also undergone a comparatively radical reorganization. For decades, it provided a safeguard against the effects of illness, jobrelated incapacity, and unemployment. Today, however, individuals have become responsible for these services. The guiding political image is that of “responsible citizens” taking their fate into their own hands. However, there is a huge gap of resources, not only in terms of the material, but also regarding competences to select the optimal form of social security from a wide range of choices. The reorganization of the welfare state is also char-

——————

4 I refer to this reconstruction in my paper “Deutschland in der Reproduktionskrise” (the German reproduction crisis) (Jürgens 2010) and draw on some of the central arguments here. “Model of reproduction” is understood as the institutionalized side of reproductive achievements that include the family and the welfare state as well as the interwoven organizational principles of wage labor. This “model” represents a historically formed, national-shaped division of labor based on the social hierarchy that also generates them.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

245

acterized by both withdrawal and a new level of access (cf. Lessenich 2008, 83–4) as well as new regulations that have lowered previous levels of acceptable working and housing conditions. These regulations primarily affect certain sectors of the population, but their effects are also being felt by all sections of the (employable) population. The state is currently retreating from tasks it used to undertake and is at the same time increasing the pressure it exerts on the population, which is leading to increasing levels of risk for the future, a risk that was previously taken on by the collective. Labor policy deregulation has had a strong impact and unmistakably calls into question what used to be standard employment relationships. Partner relationships and families are also changing. Although most families consist of a couple with children living together, the expansion of education and processes of individualization have contributed to a pluralization of family forms. Women are being increasingly integrated into the labor market and must now take on the role of professionals and pay into the social security system. The aim of this is to apply the adult worker model to all couples, but the professionalization of care and social work has not kept up with this trend. Today (especially in West Germany), there can be no talk of compatibility between work and family: There is a shortage of full-day care in general, particularly for children under the age of three. Care of the elderly is also at risk. Moreover, the division of labor in the private sphere is also struggling to change because men refuse to undertake domestic work, even if their partner adopts the role of “breadwinner” and earns a higher share of the household’s income (Klenner et al. 2011; OECD 2017). The current description of this situation as a “double burden” for women seriously underestimates the problem. 5 Changes have occurred in all three pillars of reproduction, and this presents a new challenge to everyday life. Previously, reproduction was structured by strong collective regulation and was embedded into institutions; this is now becoming the duty of individuals. For quite some time, a growing number of critics, even outside of the sociology of work, have been pointing out that stress is becoming widespread among the population (cf. Sennett 1998; Ehrenberg 2010; 2011). This situation is not only characterized by the return of insecurity and existential fear, both of which were assumed to have been overcome through emancipation (Castel 2005), but

——————

5 This could explain why women have a higher sickness absence rate and a higher share of sick leave due to psychological illnesses (DAK 2016).

246

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

also by individual psychological and physical destabilization. Existing support is disappearing, yet at the same time new far-reaching expectations and demands are being placed on individuals; the conflicts between different areas of life are still as acute as they were, but they are now being reinforced by new conflicts. In terms of the dynamic changes being made to society and the economic order, a perspective on reproduction promises to shed light on new features of the current form of capitalism. Reproduction demonstrates that capitalism still relies on the biological and social reproduction of labor power but that this function is increasingly being externalized and defined as existing outside of the responsibility of economics and the state. Collective and institutional regulation that previously secured the reproductive resources of society are now being called into question and replaced by individualized care and risk prevention. Society is moving towards a new and (at the same time) old phase of capitalism based on the commodification of labor power. However, employees are now not only being exposed to the adversities of a flexible market, but they also have to seek private protection once again. Although modernization and individualization liberated individuals from traditional relations of dependency, people are now expected to actively seek and develop dependencies in order to receive support in emergencies, a situation that becomes even more urgent for people who lack the necessary material resources. Gender studies have demonstrated that the structural relations between production and reproduction result in contradictory demands for action and lead to experiences of ambivalence (Becker-Schmidt and Knapp 1987). This situation characterizes life under flexible capitalism and poses a challenge for (the) critical sociology (of work); this field should provide warnings about risks and develop perspectives and instruments to analyze and clarify these issues. However, it is not enough to ask how reproduction can be reorganized socially since the old model of reproduction, despite its uses, was based on a component that generated inequality. Instead, we first need to clarify which phenomena we want to include in this debate and subsume them under the heading of reproduction.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

247

2. The Return of “Reproduction” as a Category In sociology, “reproduction” refers to the re-production and maintenance of society. It can refer to both the social structure and to subjects; consequently, it can include societal conditions, the various spheres of life, types of actions, interpretations of the social, and questions of identity. Ever since Marx’s analyses of capitalism, reproduction has become a synonym for the other side of “production” and generally refers to any factor that stabilizes the economy. Specifically, it includes restoring human labor power, producing and sustaining the next generation (biological reproduction), and ensuring that the population is fed, can recuperate, and is socially integrated (social reproduction). Generally, the family is said to perform the majority of these functions (cf. Nave-Herz 2004), and because the division of labor is characterized by gender hierarchy, women typically take on a higher workload (cf. Aulenbacher and Riegraf 2009; Becker-Schmidt 2011). Until the 1980s, reproduction was a common concept in academic debates and public political discourse. It was used to address the structural contradictions between capital and labor and the patriarchal structures embedded in capitalism (Beer 1990). However, the “reconciliation” of work-family soon became prominent in these discourses as a reaction to women’s increasing integration into the labor market, which was assumed to underline the necessity to coordinate professional and family life. However, the talk of work-family “balance” masks the hierarchical relationship between work and life. It also implies that the two spheres are indeed compatible and that “compatibility” merely needs to be achieved. At the same time, the adoption of the term also led a great deal of social theory and political analysis to be abandoned in favor of debates about the provision of infrastructure. Nevertheless, the contradictions between different areas of life and hierarchical gender relations still exist and are now being felt even more strongly than before because, as outlined above, new demands are being placed on people by the changes occurring in work and the lifeworld. Therefore, the question of how different areas of life relate to each other and how they interact remains unanswered. This points to the continued relevance of reproduction and returns the debate to questions about the conditions and requirements of restoring labor power. In contrast to “reconciliation” and concepts such as the “work-life balance”, “reproduction” is not tainted by the illusion that the inherent structural contradictions within these spheres can be resolved under capitalism. In-

248

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

stead, reproduction underscores the exchange of labor and the conditions experienced within an arrangement that continues to prioritize economics. In this respect, reproduction is an essential element in analyses of capitalism; it also strengthens understandings of the prerequisites for and the potential weaknesses of unleashed capitalism and its disintegrative effects. However, before we apply the concept of reproduction, we first need to broaden its definition. On the one hand, “reproduction” refers to a social sphere (“the private”); on the other, it includes all of the activities that are undertaken within this sphere, such as domestic, family, and care work. Although these activities are generally done for someone else, we need to remember that people also undertake these activities for themselves. As such, reproduction has to be understood as a personal individual praxis that leads to individual stabilization and maintains the whole population. When advocates of transforming the economy and the welfare state explicitly address citizens’ personal responsibilities, reproductive action gains new relevance. Moreover, when collective and institutionalized points of reference on questions of how to conduct our lives begin to erode, people’s skills and potential have to be mobilized in a new manner. Different levels of education and qualifications lead to a divergence of experiences and options; however, a new dimension of social inequality is looming due to the individual mode of reproduction, and this requires an analysis of the social structure. 6 Tunnel vision that merely focuses on economics must be avoided as reproduction does not only refer to the restoration of labor power. The main purpose of reproduction is to conserve the life force that provides subjects with the ability to maintain social relations and physical and psychological stability (Jürgens 2006, 193ff.). Although this ability is helpful in professional life, it is influenced by people’s needs and actions, which extend beyond the issue of the organization of work. Therefore, life force is an existential individual and social resource. Whereas the concept of “reproduction” demonstrates its analytical power by referring to the functional context of the mediation of economy and recovery/generativity, “life force” can claim emancipatory potential since it underscores issues that stubbornly stand outside of valorization.

——————

6 Whether it is possible to broaden the perspective of this discipline remains to be seen. The special research section 882 of the DFG (German Research Foundation), however, does state the objective of presenting a new perspective regarding the properties of heterogeneity and the mechanisms that produce inequality.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

249

3. Broadening the Sociological Perspective Research into how people maintain their own labor power has constituted a blind spot in German sociology for decades (cf. Jürgens 2006, 21ff.). Research by Asendorf-Krings, Drexel and Nuber (1976) and Brock and Vetter (1982) were prominent exceptions, but they are not included in overviews and have faded into obscurity. Today, almost 30 years later, an analysis of flexible capitalism must develop wider perspectives that include a sociology of reproduction. The transformation of the economy, management control and the organization of work, and in particular the stress and overload of employees’ capabilities (described earlier) provide crucial impulses. Moreover, these impulses foreground such aspects as the risks associated with new forms of control as well as questions about employees who are forced to cope with new demands in work and life and who need to protect themselves against permanent overload and overexploitation. Very few publications within German labor research conceptualize reproduction in terms of a creative individual effort. Individual boundary-setting is part of a wider reproductive capability that enables individuals (and debate is needed here) not only to restore their professional capabilities, but also to stabilize their entire conduct of life. Clearly, reproductive capabilities are not only linked to work; everyone is required to have these capabilities in work-based societies, and they have become even more important due to processes of individualization and the changes made to the model of reproduction. 7 This demonstrates the need to adapt approaches to the sociology of work and theories of capitalism. Moreover, it highlights the need to broaden our analyses by including an understanding that the sociology of social reproduction can also be productive. This can be substantiated by referring to the structural interrelation of reproduction stress and interpretations of waged labor. The debate about the crisis phenomenon of capitalism has not only spread because of economic and financial market turbulence and state bankruptcies, but mainly because of the new aspects emerging as part of people’s immediate experiences. The precarization of employment and other changes occurring in the world of work reveal (not only to the labor force) that our achievement-oriented society is rarely able to keep its prom-

——————

7 The structures related to time and space in our society are geared towards the professional sphere such that even the lives of non-employed people are oriented towards the logic and timing of the world of work.

250

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

ises and that the prosperity we have seen over the last few decades is unsustainable. 8 Current public discourse has a new quality, as it is becoming increasingly focused on changes to capitalism in the immediate context of reproduction, increasing psychological illness, and debility. There are, of course, at least two points that we should be clear about in this regard. First, the conduct of life has always been linked to requirements, and this is not only the case with modern societies (cf. Castel 2005). In the past, requirements resulted from having to secure one’s own existence; in contrast, individuals are now increasingly subduing themselves to their own constraints as part of their everyday lives (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Second, these requirements do not only have negative effects; dealing with them actually has positive effects for personal development, even if doing so may lead to the loss of a critical social perspective. Feelings of subjective capabilities to act have been shown to be beneficial to health (Leppin and Schwarzer 1997). Furthermore, feelings of control, expectations of selfefficacy, and optimism increase people’s abilities to cope with stressful situations (cf. Hacker 1973; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Antonovsky 1993; Schneewind et al. 1999). However, neither of these points reduces the relevance of this issue. On the one hand, modern subjects cannot escape from the influence of the dominant form of life; on the other, the permanent disappointments in terms of people’s expectations of self-efficacy make the mobilization of personal and social resources even more difficult and can negatively influence a person’s self-image. In addition, the disappointments probably have further negative effects on other areas. Requirements are not a problem in general, but they do have to be addressed when they cause illnesses. In this regard, individuals can pursue one of two possible strategies (as idealized extremes): They can either seek structural support (for example, to represent their interests; provisions on working conditions and health protection, medical services, etc.) or they have to act by themselves (e.g. by refusing to take on tasks, calling for compensation, and providing solidarity). To summarize the current research, neither of these strategies is being successfully deployed. 9

——————

8 For more information on precarization in the context of people’s lives, see the articles in WSI-Mitteilungen (8/2011). 9 New (international) patterns of divisions of labor prove to be problematic: “Reconciliation” for workers in Germany rests on the emigration of women from Eastern Europe or Latin America who have to leave their families behind (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck 2012).

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

251

What are the implications of this for analyses of flexible capitalism? The “German model” led to economic success because it was based on strong work relations and was stabilized by an institutionalized model of reproduction. It was able to exist for so long precisely because of its strong labor regulations and because it was protected against radical market forces. The characteristic feature of current (German) capitalism is that this kind of labor regulation has been abandoned in favor of the new ideal of flexible employment. This not only opens up a new field in which conflicts can take place in the workplace and during wage negotiations, but, in terms of the sociology of social reproduction, a new ideology is on the agenda: the negation of reproductive needs. Some companies avoid this problem by relocating their businesses or by claiming that personnel fluctuation is a part of their business model. However, companies’ growing indifference to the physical and/or psychological deterioration of their employees demonstrates their ignorance of the importance of reproduction. At the same time, and this has yet to be properly addressed, reproduction is becoming the new hardship. Throughout the history of industrial capitalism, (alienated) work came to be seen as a plague (cf. Jochum 2010; Voß 2010). Today, it is reproduction that has become not just an area of compensation or even emancipation, but also a new terrain with its own challenges. This was caused by dynamic transformations to the model of reproduction and by changes in the demands which people place on themselves and on others in private life. It has been exacerbated by the discourse of health and prevention; by exercising and eating properly, keeping organized, and staying relaxed, exhaustion and burn-out syndrome are said to be preventable. In this context, measures that were designed to support individuals can turn into further sources of stress. This leads to insecurities about how life should be conducted, and as such, people are now abandoning an intuitive approach to life and replacing it with planning and the search for the “right” way to conduct their lives. This arrangement blocks approaches that could be helpful; people forget to go about their lives in a relaxed manner and to avoid exposing themselves to new pressures during breaks. This situation is probably one of the most difficult challenges faced by reproductive action. Despite the consensus that work-related demands are associated with the constitution of the subject and the phenomenon of overload, the manner in which they are mediated still needs to be clarified. A sociology of reproduction broadens the view on this issue and provides for individual

252

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

processing strategies; if reproduction is regarded as a personal praxis, it is clear that subjective feelings are important influencing factors. The way a person interprets conditions and requirements is one determining factor in coping with stress (Siegrist and Dragano 2006; Wolf 2006). Stress research demonstrates the importance of focusing on the way in which people experience stress. Individual experiences of stress lead people to re-evaluate other stressful aspects of their lives, which is reflected in the changes they also make to other areas of their lives. Moreover, strong interactions between different areas of people’s lives mean that stress can lead to multiple destabilization. In the search for prerequisites of stressful experiences, we have to consider the views and the needs of individuals from a reproduction sociological perspective. Until now, labor research on needs has generally taken an indirect approach and phrased these needs as what people wish for from work and how they evaluate work-related demands. The drawback to this position is that it mostly relates to work; moreover, the importance and effects these needs have on an individual remain unclear. An understanding of this latter aspect requires an analysis of an individual’s history, experiences, and priorities. Furthermore, it is essential to consider that needs not only have a stable core, but they also possess dynamic aspects. This demonstrates that needs are influenced by social milieu and familial and peer-group socialization. Moreover, they are also influenced by an individual’s interactions as well as experiences of and continuous involvement with the environment. This of course means that needs continually change. In fact, social changes, changes to the way in which life is conducted, to location, to professional activities, and, above all, to aging lead to changes in people’s needs. 10 If labor researchers wish to analyze the demands placed on employees and the stress they experience under flexible capitalism, their needs must be included within labor research, and this means returning to the reproductive aspects of work and life (Heiden and Jürgens 2013). 11 These issues can have a strong impact on how people cope with the demands they are expected to fulfil. Moreover, these issues also influence aspects related to the representation of interests and the forms such

——————

10 Most surveys lack the economic resources with which to collect broader data—one exception to this is the studies conducted in biographical research. 11 In an empirical project at the University of Kassel we analyzed practices of reproduction and the modes of maintaining life force.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

253

representation take, as well as protest. Finally, they touch on the central questions of the mediation of the individual and society.

4. Conclusion Neglecting the assumptions and findings of the sociology of reproduction not only results in a disregard for the negative consequences of rationalization and deregulation, but it also strips analyses of the functions of flexible capitalism of their poignancy. Including reproductive concerns renders visible the enormous extent of capitalism—but also the limits of capitalism’s grip on subjects in their entirety. The view that the question of failure or success in adapting to requirements is essentially decided within the subject need not imply methodological individualism. Current research clearly demonstrates areas in which a constructive and sustainable balance of interests has been possible, as has been the case when generalized, collective standards have been implemented to define and evaluate stress. This leads to two conclusions: First, working subjects become the constitutive reference point for research in the sociology of work when the regulation of work shifts to the level of the individual. Second, only integrated perspectives can illustrate how a subject’s experience is shaped and why this occurs. Both approaches present huge challenges for labor research (Jürgens et al. 2017). Frequently, there are insufficient financial resources for such wide empirical approaches. As examples from the 1970s and 1980s show, these issues contain obstacles that present difficulties for research on interpretations and consciousness (cf. Kern and Schumann 1977; Hack 1977; Osterland 1978). The combination of research on capitalism and the sociology of reproduction here presents a new challenge and raises questions about the boundaries that have been set between disciplines. This is more than yet another critique of capitalist society; it is a core task for any sociology that aims to identify factors that (de)stabilise subjects and social integration and to estimate the possible consequences.

254

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

Works Cited Antonovsky, Aaron (1993). Gesundheitsforschung versus Krankheitsforschung. In Alexa Franke and Michael Broda (eds.). Psychosomatische Gesundheit. Versuch einer Abkehr vom Pathogenese-Konzept, 3–13. Tübingen: dgvt. Asendorf-Krings, Inge, Ingrid Drexel and Christoph Nuber (1976). Reproduktionsvermögen und die Interessen von Kapital und Arbeit. Ein Beitrag zur theoretischen Bestimmung von Qualifikation. In ISF Munich (ed.). Betrieb, Arbeitsmarkt, Qualifikation, 207–236. Frankfurt M.: aspekte. Aulenbacher, Brigitte, and Birgit Riegraf (2009). Markteffizienz und Ungleichheit—Zwei Seiten einer Medaille? Klasse/Schicht, Geschlecht und Ethnie im Übergang zur postfordistischen Arbeitsgesellschaft. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Angelika Wetterer (eds.). Arbeit. Perspektiven und Diagnosen der Geschlechterforschung, 230–248. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Becker-Schmidt, Regina, and Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (1987). Geschlechtertrennung— Geschlechterdifferenz. Suchbewegungen sozialen Lernens. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. Becker-Schmidt, Regina (2011). “Verwahrloste Fürsorge”—ein Krisenherd gesellschaftlicher Reproduktion: zivilisationskritische Anmerkungen zur ökonomischen, sozialstaatlichen und sozialkulturellen Vernachlässigung von Praxen im Feld “care work”. Gender: Zeitschrift für Geschlecht, Kultur und Gesellschaft, 3(3), 9–23. Beer, Ursula (1990). Geschlecht, Struktur, Geschichte. Soziale Konstituierung des Geschlechterverhältnisses. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Brock, Ditmar, and Hans-Rolf Vetter (1984). Reproduktion als Arbeitskraft. Grundzüge eines subjektorientierten Reproduktionskonzepts. In Ditmar Brock, Christine Preiß, Claus J. Tully, Hans-Rolf Vetter (eds.). Arbeit und Reproduktion. Umbrüche der Arbeit—Bewältigungsstrategien von Facharbeitern und Technikern, 7–80. München: DJI. Castel, Robert (2005). Die Stärkung des Sozialen. Leben im neuen Wohlfahrtsstaat. Translated by Michael Tillmann. Hamburg: Hamburger edition. DAK-Gesundheit (2015). Psychoreport 2015. Deutschland braucht Therapie. Herausforderungen für die Versorgung. Hamburg. DAK-Gesundheitsreport (2016): DAK-Gesundheitsreport 2016. Schwerpunktthema: Gender und Gesundheit. Hamburg. Ehrenberg, Alain (2010). Weariness of the Self: Diagnosing the History of Depression in the Contemporary Age. Montreal & Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s Press. Ehrenberg, Alain (2011). Das Unbehagen in der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Lutz, Helma, and Ewa Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012). Care Workers, Care Drain, and Care Chains: Reflections on Care, Migration, and Citizenship. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 19(1), 15–37.

WORK AND REPRODUCTION

255

Hack, Lothar (1977). Subjektivität im Alltagsleben. Zur Konstitution sozialer Relevanzstrukturen. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Hacker, Winfried (1973). Allgemeine Arbeits- und Ingenieurpsychologie. Psychische Struktur und Regulation von Arbeitstätigkeiten. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. Heiden, Mathias, and Kerstin Jürgens (2013). Kräftemessen. Betriebe und Beschäftigte im Reproduktionskonflikt. Berlin: edition sigma. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno (2002 [1944]). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jochum, Georg (2010). Zur historischen Entwicklung des Verständnisses von Arbeit. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 81–126. Wiesbaden: VS. Jürgens, Kerstin (2006). Arbeits- und Lebenskraft. Reproduktion als eigensinnige Grenzziehung. Wiesbaden: Spriner VS. Jürgens, Kerstin (2010). Deutschland in der Reproduktionskrise. Leviathan, 38(4), 559–587. Jürgens, Kerstin, Reiner Hoffmann, and Christina Schildmann (2017). Arbeit transformieren! Denkanstöße der Kommission “Arbeit der Zukunft”. Bielefeld: transcript. Kern, Horst, and Michael Schumann (1977). Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewußtsein. Eine empirische Untersuchung über den Einfluß der aktuellen technischen Entwicklung auf die industrielle Arbeit und das Arbeiterbewußtsein. Frankfurt M.: Shurkamp. Klenner, Christina, Katrin Menke, and Svenja Pfahl (2011). Flexible Familienernährerinnen—Prekarität im Lebenszusammenhang ostdeutscher Frauen?. Report of the WSI Düsseldorf. Lazarus, Richard S., and Susan Folkman (1984). Stress, Appraisal, and Coping. New York: Springer Publishing Company. Leppin, Anja, and Ralf Schwarzer (1997). Sozialer Rückhalt, Krankheit und Gesundheitsverhalten. In Ralf Schwarzer (ed.). Gesundheitspsychologie. Ein Lehrbuch, 349–373. Göttingen: Hogrefe. Lessenich, Stephan (2008). Die Neuerfindung des Sozialen. Der Sozialstaat im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Bielefeld: transcript. Marx, Karl (1999 [1867]). Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I: The Process of Production of Capital. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Available at: https:// www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf Nave-Herz, Rosemarie (2004). Ehe- und Familiensoziologie. Eine Einführung in Geschichte, theoretische Ansätze und empirische Befunde. Weinheim/München: Juventa Verlag. OECD (2017). Dare to Share—Deutschlands Weg zur Partnerschaftlichkeit in Familie und Beruf. Paris. Osterland, Martin (1978). Lebensbilanzen und Lebensperspektiven von Industriearbeitern. In Martin Kohli (ed.). Soziologie des Lebenslaufs, 272–290. Darmstadt/Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag.

256

KERSTIN JÜRGENS

Schneewind, Klaus A., Stefan Ruppert, Ursula Schmid, Renate Spelte, and Claudia Wendel (1999). Kontrollüberzeugungen im Kontext von Autonomie und Verbundenheit. In Hans Rudolf Leu and Lothar Krappmann (eds.). Zwischen Autonomie und Verbundenheit. Bedingungen und Formen der Behauptung von Subjektivität, 357–391. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Sennett, Richard (1998). The Corrosion of Character: The Personal. Consequences of Work in the New. Capitalism. London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Siegrist, Johannes, and Nico Dragano (2006). Berufliche Belastungen und Gesundheit. In Claus Wendt and Christof Wolf (eds.). Soziologie der Gesundheit, 109–124. Opladen/Wiesbaden: VS. Voß, G. Günter (2010). Was ist Arbeit? Zum Problem eines allgemeinen Arbeitsbegriffs. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 23–79. Wiesbaden: VS. Wolf, Christof (2006). Psychosozialer Stress und Gesundheit. Belastungen durch Erwerbsarbeit, Hausarbeit und soziale Beziehungen. In Claus Wendt and Christof Wolf (eds.). Soziologie der Gesundheit, 158–176. Opladen/Wiesbaden: VS.

Labor, Insecurity, Informality Nicole Mayer-Ahuja

For a long time, the conjunction of labor and insecurity has had a decisive influence on people’s lives. This was true especially for those who were “nothing else, and had nothing to exchange other than the force of [their] arms”. Even in the early 20th century, wage labor was still “among the most uncertain, as well as undignified and miserable, of conditions” (Castel 2003, xiii). It was only in the late 1950s and 60s, when rapid economic growth in the centers of capitalism and especially Western Europe “transformed the social question”, that wage labor became the anchor of social stability for the vast majority of the working population and—while “the short dream of never-ending prosperity” (Lutz 1984) lasted—appeared to safeguard steadily increasing prosperity. Since the mid-1970s, however, insecurity has returned to the world of work even in Western Europe and North America. New types of “informal work” and, especially since the 1990s, an increasing “informalization” of labor relations can be observed, first among women and migrants, but increasingly even among relatively stable (and male-dominated) core workforces. Attempts to measure this “new insecurity” (Kämpf 2008) are bound to fail due to the vagueness of definitions and lack of data. This is because national statistics are not standardized, because subjective insecurity is hard to trace in apparently stable employment constellations, and because informal labor is often concealed in surveys. Semi-legal or illegal employment in particular is not adequately reflected in official data. 1 However, if we aim for a critique of capitalism based on the sociology of work, the exact extent of “informal” work is only of secondary interest anyway. It is much more important to analyze the character of informal labor and to discuss the impact of informalization, which has not been done in a satisfying manner so far. Therefore, instead of presenting empiri-

——————

1 For the author’s most recent publication on these issues see Mayer-Ahuja (2017).

258

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

cal findings, I will make some conceptual suggestions that may help us understand a) what characterizes “informal labor” (in contrast to “formal labor”), b) how informalization is created and c) whether we are currently witnessing a “globalization of insecurity” (Altvater and Mahnkopf 2002).

1. What is “Informal Labor”? Approaching a Definition In 1976, when Jan Breman presented a fundamental critique of the “informal sector concept” (based on empirical research in India), he already decried the analytical vagueness of the term. It contained “a somewhat arbitrary listing of those activities which meet the eye of anyone who strolls through the streets of a city in the third world: street vendors, newspaper sellers, shoeshine boys, stall keepers, prostitutes, porters, beggars, hawkers, rickshaw drivers etc.” (Breman 1976, 1871). Since then, the concept has been extended to an even wider range of activities. Ever since informal labor in Europe and the USA has attracted attention (see Portes et al. 1991 for an early example), the Indian bootblack and the moonlighting German craftsman (who, in so doing, feeds the illegal or semi-legal “shadow economy” (Pfau-Effinger and Sakac-Magdalenic 2010)) are mentioned in the same breath, as are Latin American drug dealers and Russian prostitutes (as part of an illegal underground economy (Shapland et al. 2003)), Western European middle-class women who grow their own vegetables, their neighbors who exchange their labor power instead of selling it (in the context of a new, informal subsistence economy (Teichert 2000)), or Turkish news-agents (who represent the growing group of small and microentrepreneurs). These economic activities clearly do not have much in common, and listing them usually only serves the purpose of providing “evidence” that the world of work has become more diverse in recent decades. This approach is utterly inadequate, however, considering that informalization is shaping the working and living conditions of an ever growing number of people in different regions of the world in the early 21st century. Therefore, we need to make a serious attempt to grasp this phenomenon analytically. For a start, three considerations may prove useful: Informality and employment do not preclude each other. It is sometimes argued that informalization implies replacement of the employment relationship

LABOR, INSECURITY, INFORMALITY

259

by subsistence work or self-employment. However, this does not seem to be the most important change. On the one hand, many empirical findings on informalization refer specifically to changes that affect the contractual conditions between capital and labor—whether with regard to employment contracts (as in the case of wage labor), or to service contracts (as in the case of subcontracting or free-lance work). On the other hand, formal employment is inconceivable without the stabilizing influence of informal labor, be it reproductive labor in the household or in the subsistence economy. Therefore, informalization does not necessarily imply a disappearance of wage labor, but rather a shift between formal and informal employment, or between formalized wage labor and different kinds of informalized subsistence work or self-employment. Informality is a relational concept. Like in the case of precarious employment (cf. Mayer-Ahuja 2003), discussions about informal labor are based on implicit or explicit notions of what is “normal”. The term “informal labor” thus refers to configurations that deviate from the standards of formal labor (in a specific spatial and temporal context). However, the demarcation between formal and informal labor is anything but stable. For instance, if a law is extended to include particular types of employment, then these become formalized (as has been the case with agency work in West Germany in the 1970s)—and the boundary between informal and formal labor shifts. It is insufficient to stress the (real) dichotomy between formal and informal labor if we want to identify the “breaking points” in current developments in the world of work and thus obtain a point of departure for a politically effective critique of capitalism. Instead, we need to analyze changes in the notions of formal and informal labor (as the poles in a wide spectrum of constellations), but also their shifting relationship. In Germany, for instance, increasing insecurity is now reported even by employees in seemingly stable core workforces, and notions of “standard employment” have changed dramatically since the mid-1980s, as suggested by the fact that the formerly extensive list of criteria for what constitutes standard employment (“Normalarbeitsverhältnis”) has been gradually reduced to the sole criterion of “permanent full-time employment”, according to the official definition (Mayer-Ahuja 2011a). Such shifts in the demarcation between formal and informal labor also point to changes in the distribution of power between different groups of workers, which affect possible interest coalitions.

260

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

Informality is based on (extra-) legal regulation. Informal labor is usually defined by what it is not—it is considered “unregulated and underpaid” (Komlosy et al. 1997), “unprotected” (Swaminathan 2009), or “unorganized” (Mohanakumar and Singh 2011). A “positive” definition of informal labor, on the other hand, needs to take into account the specific mix between formal (i.e. legal) and informal (i.e. extra-legal) regulation. After all, in the current debate, the term “informal labor” seems to refer primarily to labor relations which are not so much regulated formally (through employment contracts, labor law, legal entitlement to social security, etc.)—as would be typical for “standard employment relationships”— but rather through extra-legal regulation (in the context of personal connections and dependencies). Indeed, the processes of formalization during the post-war decades, which were promoted by, among others, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in an attempt to establish general social security standards, provided some measure of legal protection to the (work) contract between capital and labor (Komlosy 2007, 209). Informalization, in contrast, means reducing such protection, and the current regulatory ideal, as propagated by the World Bank, includes systematic destandardization of legal entitlements (Breman 1995). Accordingly, informal labor is characterized by a specific type of regulation which may involve legal as well as extra-legal aspects, but the emphasis is usually on the latter.

2. The Making of Informal Labor and the Role of the State Many debates about informalization either ignore social actors entirely or focus almost exclusively on the capital-labor relationship (for instance, in the context of spatially disintegrated value chains). In contrast, the approach to informal labor suggested here explicitly points to legal regulation and thus the role of the state in the making of informality. This contradicts the commonly held view of informalization as a quasi-natural consequence of globalizing capitalism, effected not least by the retreat of the nation state, which bows to the pressure of transnational capital and retreats from the regulation of wage labor. However, informalization is not the result of “deregulation”. States have played an active role in the making of informal labor in different world regions from the 1980s onwards. After all, even the “formalization” of labor during the prosperous post-war years had

LABOR, INSECURITY, INFORMALITY

261

been a political project. This applies to formalization in a dual sense: both with respect to the universalization of wage labor and the establishment of regulatory standards which reduced, for example, the differences between blue- and white-collar workers. Based on a “liberal consensus” (DoeringManteuffel and Raphael 2010) between state, capital and labor, governments in the capitalist centers, but also in many post-colonial states of the (semi) periphery, massively expanded the public sector and turned it into an experimental ground for creating stable employment protected by labor law and social security (not least for women). Labor law and social law were extended to include new groups of employees (take, for example, the creation of a retirement fund for farmers in West Germany after the Second World War). Moreover, a specific “welfare mix” (Evers and Olk 1996) was established which enabled even workers in low-skill jobs to rely solely on employment for their retirement without having to fear old-age poverty, after the introduction of subsistence-level pensions in 1957. This expansion of wage labor, and the formalization of the jobs created in the process, was driven by the companies of the booming post-war economy, but the state supported it through regulatory measures. Similar formalization processes took place even beyond the capitalist centers. In India, for example, “formal” employment in the “organized”, state-owned sector of the economy was systematically expanded from independence in 1947 until the 1980s (cf. Subramanian 2010). In the capitalist centers and beyond, the formalization of employment was based upon a normative concept of “good work” that partly still exists today. This applies regardless of whether formal employment also happened to be the statistically dominant form (as it did in West Germany, cf. Mückenberger 1985), or whether it functioned (as in India) only as a normative ideal whose broad-based realization was not expected in the near future (given that the share of the Indian workforce employed in the formal sector has never exceeded 10 percent). If the formalization of wage labor was mostly a state-driven process, we can assume that the state has also played a central role in the making of informality since the 1980s. However, this assumption requires a thorough empirical substantiation. Future research should focus on: (a) the (standard-setting and job-creating) role of the public sector under conditions of neoliberal privatization; (b) the consequences of legal regulation (is labor law really abolished, as the “de-regulation” rhetoric suggests, and, if it still exists, does it slow down or does it accelerate informalization?); and finally

262

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

(c) the state’s contribution to the “welfare mix” that makes the reproduction of labor power possible (in how far does policy contribute to informalization by transferring the responsibility for the provision of social security from the state to the “market” or households?). The state’s role in the making of informal labor depends on the characteristics of the regulatory scenario in any specific temporal and spatial configuration (MayerAhuja 2011). Such scenarios are not determined by the structures and practices of political regulation alone, but also by economic structures and the behavior of corporations, as well as the standards of the social division of labor and the strategies of individuals and households for dealing with informalization.

3. Informal Labor goes Global? Making the Case for an Analysis of Combined and Uneven Development For many decades, discussions over “informal labor” and the “informal sector” have been closely connected with attempts to come to terms with the dynamism of “global” capitalism. The expression “informal sector” was originally coined in the early 1970s, when Hart (1973) identified an urban “informal sector” outside the “organized labor market” of Ghana and the International Labour Organisation (ILO 1972) used the same term in its “World Employment Programme” with reference to the Kenyan labor market. Since then, however, local or regional studies on informality are usually integrated into a broader perspective. Informal labor thus functions as a kind of focal point in which various tendencies of capitalist development coincide. This could first be observed in approaches inspired by modernization theory. From this perspective, informal labor in “developing countries” was seen as a “left-over of pre-capitalist formations” (Williams 2010, 21) which would disappear in the course of a quasi-natural development as soon as these countries achieved the level of modernity as represented by the capitalist centers. This argument has lost much of its persuasive power, but it seems to have been replaced by its mirror image. It is often argued today that informalization in different world regions has paved the way for a “globalization of insecurity” (Altvater and Mahnkopf 2002). According to this view informal labor is not a left-over of premodern times, but rather a product of advanced capitalism or even a pio-

LABOR, INSECURITY, INFORMALITY

263

neer on the way to a postmodern world of work (Komlosy et al. 1997, 11). In a sense, the reference to global processes of homogenization remains unchanged, only that the “global race to the top” (i.e. towards formalized labor at the height of social modernity) has now been substituted (especially in critical debates) by a “global race to the bottom” that culminates in an informalized world of work (which is sometimes, again, referred to as precapitalist). “Informality is everywhere”—this is how this discussion may be summarized, borrowing from Bourdieu (1998). However, despite its analytical shortcomings it has contributed to a broadening of perspectives by redirecting attention beyond the nation state. Thanks to the alienation effect identified by Bertolt Brecht, this raises new questions because the confrontation with the new tends to change one’s perception of seemingly selfevident phenomena. Analyzing informal labor in Europe, Asia or Africa in the context of global capitalism (as an overarching, if highly differentiated, economic system) not only provokes new questions with regard to informal labor “at home”, but also sheds light on the complex interrelations between informalization in different world regions, which point to the combined and uneven development of capitalism. An argument in favor of this integrated analysis is that formalization and informalization of labor in different regions of the world seem to be part of overarching cycles of social regulation (Ahuja 2011). In the mid-1940s (i.e. after the end of the Second World War and British colonial rule in South Asia), for instance, a veritable “formalization campaign” began in countries as diverse as Germany and India. It responded to demands by influential companies, was promoted by national governments and inspired by the ILO’s concept of standardized social protection. Around 1980, this campaign lost momentum in both countries, and in the following years informal labor began to increase. This development was spurred by a change in corporate investment strategies, but state policies also contributed to the making of informalization in both countries (with regard to public employment, labor law and welfare provision). Since informal labor still seems to be on the rise in many parts of the world, we must ask the question whether informalization really does pave the way for a homogenization of lowered standards of labor regulation. The huge differences between informal labor in different world regions do not support this assumption. Moreover, three points deserve attention, if we return once more to Germany and India.

264

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

Share of informal labor. Despite statistical measurement problems and the concomitant debates, it is widely accepted that those who do informal labor are still a minority among the working population in Germany. According to the German micro-census, 81 percent of the working population were regularly employed in the year 2000, while 11 percent were selfemployed and a total of 8 percent were employed in agency work and “mini-jobs” (i.e. below the threshold of social security coverage), which seem to come closest to the statistical category of casual employment in countries outside the capitalist centers. According to the Indian National Sample Survey of 2000, instead, 53 percent of the working population were self-employed, 33 percent in casual employment, and 14 percent in regular employment, out of which only 7 percent were employed in the formal sector and thus covered by labor law. In other words, informally regulated work arrangements (like precarious free-lance work or casual employment) are the exception in Germany, but the rule in India. Scope of state regulation. Although state actors in India and Germany have used, and continue to use, astonishingly similar policy instruments in order to achieve a formalization, and later an informalization, of labor, the reach of these instruments is different and subject to change in both countries. Labor law, for instance, in Germany applies to the overwhelming majority of employees, even though it is actively circumvented in some cases. In 2012 (when this article was published) for instance, many companies reacted to a stricter regulation of agency work (Leiharbeit) by replacing agency contracts with mostly unregulated contracts for work or services (Werkvertrag). In India, on the other hand, labor law only applies to a minority of employees in the formal sector, and its extension to new sectors (like the IT industry (Mayer-Ahuja 2011)) is highly controversial. In the Indian context, evasive strategies include the refusal of courts to punish the violation of existing law, as well as the policies of regional governments who try to attract investors by declaring certain companies in Special Economic Zones to be “Public Utility Services”, thus restricting the right to collective action, such as strikes (Singh 2009). Such “adjustments” of regulation point to an ongoing (re)calibration of informality (cf. Simeon 2006). Informal labor and regulatory scenario. According to researchers connected to the World Bank, informal labor has positive effects on society (more or less regardless of its specific context) because it is argued to constitute a safety net for those unable to obtain formal (i.e. state-regulated) work. Moreover, informal labor is seen as a growth engine because it incentivizes

LABOR, INSECURITY, INFORMALITY

265

mothers or migrants to take up wage work, and as an instrument that reduces pressure on the welfare state by creating jobs, providing self-help and saving money on unemployment benefits (Loayza and Rigolini 2011). This line of argument is not only politically dubious but thoroughly misleading in at least three ways because it ignores the importance of the specific scenario of regulation in situ. First, the character of informal labor depends on the economic context. In Germany, informal labor still mainly affects the periphery of the labor market, although it has recently made its way into core workforces (the latter applies to agency work, for example, which replaces the legal obligations of a formal labor contract with a much more flexible client-contractor relationship). In India, on the other hand, most of the economy is not formally regulated. Second, the character of informal labor depends on social security systems. Whereas informal labor in Germany is often used to circumvent regulation (such as mandatory social security contributions which can be avoided by dividing a formal job into several “mini-jobs”) or supplement social security benefits, there is no comprehensive system of social security in India. Therefore it makes no sense in the Indian context to romanticize informal labor as heroic resistance against the rigidity of social, labor or tax legislation. Third, informality has to be analyzed in the context of household strategies and the particular standards of the social division of labor in a specific setting. Even though Breman (1995) has argued convincingly that the social consequences of informal labor, even in India, are mitigated neither by any voluntary paternalism of business owners, nor by the oft-invoked solidarity of extended families (as claimed by World Bank studies), it can be assumed that the specific form of social regulation in India differs from that in Germany, with direct consequences for the social function of informal labor. We therefore face strikingly different regimes of informalization (for instance, in these two countries), simply because the characteristics of informal labor are shaped by the local scenario of economic, political and social regulation. An adequate analysis of informalization processes in different world regions and the interrelations between them thus requires us to pay attention to the tension between similarity and difference. On the one hand, the trajectories of informal labor in Germany and India are not just similar but interconnected as overarching cycles of social regulation and the use of identical policy instruments in different countries indicate. On the other hand, similar processes of (making) informalization do not necessarily re-

266

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

duce differences between world regions, but tend to reproduce them within the framework of uneven capitalist development.

4. Outlook: Informalization and Critical Labor Sociology In the preceding sections, I have argued that informalization leads to the (re)emergence of the conjunction between labor and insecurity; that it is caused by corporate investment strategies, but also actively promoted by the state; and that it shapes the sphere of work in different world regions. All this suggests a vast field of future research for labor sociology. Tilling this field implies various methodological challenges. Although we can continue to examine relations between labor and capital because informalization can and often does take place on the basis of a labor contract, the typical focus on the workplace as a seemingly stable microcosm will be difficult to maintain. Instead, we need to examine (a) the interrelations between labor within the company and beyond; (b) how state regulation influences the organization of (in)formal work on the shop floor; (c) whether there are cycles of political, economic and social regulation that transcend national borders; and (d) what interrelations exist between (in)formality at the workplace and the social division of labor within and outside the household. From this perspective, informal labor might not only constitute a focal point in which various tendencies of capitalist development coincide. It might also turn out to be an experimental ground for a longoverdue re-orientation of labor sociology.

Works Cited Ahuja, Ravi (2011). Das “Zeitalter der Arbeit”. Konturen und Elemente sozialer Regulierung im Indien des 20. Jahrhunderts. Unpublished manuscript. Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf (2002). Globalisierung der Unsicherheit. Arbeit im Schatten, schmutziges Geld und informelle Politik. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Bourdieu, Pierre (1998). Prekarität ist überall. In Pierre Bourdieu. Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion, 96–102. Konstanz: UVK.

LABOR, INSECURITY, INFORMALITY

267

Breman, Jan (1976). A Dualistic Labour System? A Critique of the Informal Sector Concept. Economic and Political Weekly, 11(48), 1870–1876/11(50), 1939–1944. Breman, Jan (1995). Labour, get lost. A late capitalist Manifesto. Economic and Political Weekly, 30(37), 2294–2300. Castel, Robert (2003). From Manual Workers to Wage Labourers: Transformation of the Social Question. London: Transaction Publishers. Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm, and Lutz Raphael (2010). Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Evers, Adalbert, and Thomas Olk (eds.). (1996). Wohlfahrtspluralismus. Vom Wohlfahrtsstaat zur Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Hart, Keith (1973). Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. In Richard Jolly Emanuel de Kadt, Hand W. Singer and Fiona Wilson (eds.). Third World Employment. Problems and Strategy, 66–70. Harmondsworth. International Labour Organization (ILO) (1972). Employment, Incomes and Equality. Geneva. Kämpf, Tobias (2008). Die neue Unsicherheit. Folgen der Globalisierung für hochqualifizierte Arbeitnehmer. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Komlosy, Andrea, Christof Parnreiter, Irene Stacher and Susan Zimmermann (eds.). (1997). Ungeregelt und unterbezahlt. Der informelle Sektor in der Weltwirtschaft. Frankfurt M.: Brandes&Apsel/Südwind. Komlosy, Andrea (2007). Arbeitsbeziehungen in der globalen Wirtschaft. Das Zusammenspiel von Formalisierung und Informalisierung. In Joachim Becker, Karin Imhof, Johannes Jäger and Cornelia Staritz (eds.). Kapitalistische Entwicklung in Nord und Süd: Handel, Geld, Arbeit und Staat, 208–226. Wien: Mandelbaum. Loayza, Norman V., and Jemale Rigolini (2011). Informal Employment: Safety Net or Growth Engine?. World Development, 39(9), 1503–1515. Lutz, Burkart (1984). Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität. Eine Neuinterpretation der industriell-kapitalistischen Entwicklung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2003). Wieder dienen lernen? Vom westdeutschen “Normalarbeitsverhältnis” zu prekärer Beschäftigung seit 1973. Berlin: edition sigma. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2011). Grenzen der Homogenisierung. IT-Arbeit zwischen ortsgebundener Regulierung und transnationaler Unternehmensstrategie. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2011a). Jenseits der “neuen Unübersichtlichkeit”. Annäherung an Konturen der gegenwärtigen Arbeitswelt. SOFI Working Papers 6/2011. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2017). Die Globalität unsicherer Arbeit als konzeptionelle Provokation: Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Informalität im Globalen Süden und Prekarität im Globalen Norden. Themenheft Arbeit und Kapitalismus, Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft, No. 2, 264–296.

268

NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA

Mohanakumar, S. and Surjit Singh (2011). Impact of the Economic Crisis on Workers in the Unorganised Sector in Rajasthan. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(22), 66–71. Mückenberger, Ulrich (1985). Die Krise des Normalarbeitsverhältnisses. Hat das Arbeitsrecht noch Zukunft? Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 31(7), 415–434, 457–475. Pfau-Effinger, Birgit, and Sladana Sakac-Madalenic (2010). Informal Employment in the work-welfare arrangement in Germany. In Enrico Marcelli, Colin C. Williams and Pascale Joassart (eds.). Informal Work in Developed Nations, Routledge Advances in Heterodox Economics, 66–81. London: Routledge. Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. Benton (eds.). (1991). The Informal Economy. Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press. Shapland, Joanna, Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Jason Ditton and Thierry Godefroy (eds.). (2003). The Informal Economy. Threat and Opportunity in the City. Freiburg: edition iuscrim. Simeon, Dilip (2005). Calibrated Indifference. Understanding the Structure of Informal Labour in India. In Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and Jan Lucassen (eds.). Workers in the Informal Sector. Studies in Labour History 1800–2000, 97–120. New Delhi: Macmillan India. Singh, Jaivir (2009). Labour Law and Special Economic Zones in India. Working Paper CSLG/WP/09/01, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi. Subramanian, Dilip (2010). Telecommunications in India: State, Business and Labour in a Global Economy. New Delhi: Social Science Press. Swaminathan, Padmini (2009). Outside the Realm of Protective Labour Regulation. Saga of Unpaid Labour in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(44), 80– 87. Teichert, Volker (2000). Die informelle Ökonomie als notwendiger Bestandteil der formellen Erwerbswirtschaft. Zu den ökonomischen, sozialen und ökologischen Wirkungen informellen Arbeitens. Paper POO-524. Querschnittsgruppe Arbeit und Ökologie, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Williams, Colin C. (2010). The changing conceptualizations of informal work in developed economies. In Enrico Marcelli, Colin C. Williams and Pascale Joassart (eds.). Informal Work in Developed Nations, Routledge Advances in Heterodox Economics, 11–33. London: Routledge.

Work and Subjectivity Stephan Voswinkel

Marx noted that the history of work in capitalism had replaced living work with dead work, and that experiences of the relative loss of meaning associated with labor were also accompanied by a subjective emptying of labor capacity. These points led Marx to conclude that workers became alienated from the product and the process of their work: “The worker,” he argued, “only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself” (Marx 2000, 30). For quite some time, this led the sociology of work to conceptualize work as the antithesis of the subjective unfolding of human nature, despite the fact that it continued to follow the notions of Taylorist rationalization. Nevertheless, it was still clear that work could not exist without a dedicated workforce, and that workers had to be able to improvise and use their initiative, but this was viewed as demonstrating that rationalization had yet to be implemented fully. However, ever since the Fordist-Taylorist paradigm lost its dominance in processes of rationalization, the sociology of work and industrial sociology have treated the exploitation of worker’s subjectivity as a productive force.

1. Subjectivity in Capitalist Modernity Treating subjectivity as a productive force also reduces subjectivity to its functionality for work. In capitalist modernity, two points are essential in any analysis of subjectivity. First, subjectivity’s role as a central social value that results in individual rights and responsibilities must be taken into account. Second, its relation to work must also be considered. The essential differences here are whether the relation between subjectivity and work is viewed as changeable and contested, and whether subjects are constructed as more than just working subjects.

270

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

(1) The origin and development of modern society has been marked by two processes: the dominance of the differentiated profit-oriented economy among the subsystems of society (Schimank 2009) and the disentanglement of the autonomous individual from social collectives as the central relation of normativity in modernity (freedom, equality and participation). In modernity, the subject is understood as a “unique, reflective, selfdetermined human individual who relates to the world” (Kleemann and Voß 2010, 415). This form of subjectivity is enforced by the dissolving bonds and certainties expressed through the form of normativity that characterizes modernity, and which also demand and encourage its development. Subjectivity is process-like: the specific form of the subject, subjectivity and their situatedness undergo historical change. Subjects are not independent of context as subjectivity is always shaped by society and develops through the interplay of demands for recognition on the one hand, and assertions of identity on the other. When Marx talked about the double freedom of wage workers (Marx 1990, 270ff.), he was addressing the double character of the working subject as free and self-determined, but also as free from protection (and subject to the forces of the labor market). In the developments associated with capitalist modernity, this double character is constantly being re-articulated as a combination of security and collectivization on the one hand, and settlements and demands for autonomy on the other. Marx tended to emphasize the ideologically obscured side of the double character of freedom and subjectivity when describing freedom as a surface phenomenon of capitalist society; although it is, this description neglects the normative and critical power of subjectivity as well as its capacity to generate demands. (2) Contrary to other periods, a further feature of modernity is the fact that work embodies human beings with subjectivity. In modernity, work is defined by two aspects: on the one hand, it provides a means of subsistence while constituting a loss of time; on the other, it provides a foundation for identity, social recognition and the appropriation of nature and society (Frey 2009, 62ff.). Subjectivity and work are related to one another at this fundamental level, and labor power and subjectivity cannot be separated, contrary to what the economic form might suggest. When workers enter a factory, they cannot leave their subjectivity behind at the gate. Yet precisely because work is supposedly meaningful, and because overcoming objective and social obstacles at work (Dejours 2007) is seen as an oppor-

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

271

tunity to prove oneself, work is also the sphere in which feelings of contempt and “alienation” are experienced. 1 Work involves both specific and abstract forms and creates use and exchange values (Marx 1976). It is in this twofold regard that subjectivity comes into play: subjects prove themselves and gain recognition by creating specific products and solutions. In an exchange society, use values are useful to others. Consequently, the subject’s relation to work is not only that of an individual to a material product, it is also a relation to others through work’s use to them and society as a whole. In this sense, the use value of work can also fulfil a socializing function, because work undertaken individually also needs to be seen in its relation to other members of society (Mead 2015, 287–8). However, work also produces exchange values and is measured abstractly in terms of time and cost. Despite this, subjectivity also comes into play here in the form of factors that are directed at and attempt to optimize economic parameters. It would therefore be an oversimplification to place subjectivity on the side of use value or to treat it as if it only existed in actual work. Instead, exchange value comes into conflict with use value because it creates a distance between itself and specific work and use value. Subjectivity in work is therefore related to the specific product of work, the profit it creates and the market. Consequently, the modes of production are separated by the manner in which this conflict-ridden relation is structured.

2. Subjectivity in Fordism In this section, I chart the common distinction between the stages of Taylorism-Fordism and post-Fordism, even if in reality they are too broad and should not be understood as a historical sequence of different modes of production, but as a historically varied dominance occurring between paradigmatic and legitimizing regimes; in others words, they should be viewed as ideal types. Subjectivity in Taylorism is generally interpreted as a disruptive force in need of control. Controlling subjectivity is aimed at optimizing a technical, functional workflow: through the de-qualification and elimination of sub-

——————

1 See also Hartmut Rosa’s article in this volume.

272

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

jectivity the independence of an organization from the qualifications and skills of the workforce should be ensured. Taylorism constantly breaks down and standardizes working procedures, and separates planning from implementation. Conveyor belts are the ultimate symbol of Taylorist production as they link workers to the speed of the belt, which makes the disregard for subjectivity almost palpable (Volmerg et al. 1986). The daily struggles over timing, expected levels of performance and the development of “predetermined motion time systems” illustrate how important ideal images of normal labor efficiency are in shaping the working environment, and the level to which individuals are expected to fulfil them (cf. Menz 2009, 179ff.). This, however, is only one side of the issue. Subjectivity is also necessary as a means of compensating for the inevitably inadequate implementation of Taylorist aims and its organization of production. 2 In reality, even a Taylorist company has a “social environment” (Volmerg et al. 1986) and a “social order” (Kotthoff 2005). Moreover, Fordism confers work with collective subjectivity. If, on the one hand, the subjectivity of individual workers is disrespected, workers can also emancipate themselves through the institutionalization of unions and other representative structures to defend their interests and take on the status of collective subjects. This shift to the collective domain is complemented by the fact that individual workers are considered subjects with needs. The age of Fordist dominance is also a period in which belonging to a company is highly valued, and workers who “sacrifice” themselves to the company may gain a certain level of appreciation and can expect to be “cared for”, at least in a paternalistic manner. This expression of respect for the needy is the other side of the disregard of the independent subject. Collective recognition and security, combined with the development of the welfare state, were essential prerequisites that enabled individualization to unfold and, through recourse to modernity’s normativity, unlock the new demands made by subjects at work. Fordism also involved the expansion of mass consumption, and this increased the importance of consumption for identity. Daniel Bell (1972) spoke of the “cultural contradictions of capitalism” due to the contradiction between the disciplined ethos of the producer following Protestant ethics (Max Weber), and the hedonist consumerism identified by Colin Campbell (1987); the latter representing the

——————

2 See also the article by Harald Wolf in this volume.

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

273

other spirit of capitalism that can be traced back to Romanticism. Both sides of this cultural contradiction can be viewed as a function of the system because they are congruous with the valorization of capital, even if they are in conflict. The development of social welfare, individualization and consumerism was accompanied by the expansion of the education system and by prolonging the length of time spent in education. These developments led to a cultural revolution, which at the time was interpreted as a “change in values” (Inglehart 1977; Klages 1985). Ultimately, of course, the increase in women’s employment and the normative transformation of the gender order enforced a change in relations between the spheres of work, family and privacy.

3. Subjectification and the Marketisation of Work This situation led Martin Baethge to speak of a new “normative subjectification of work” (1991; cf. also Langfeldt 2009, 294ff.). According to Baethge, employees and those seeking work increasingly expect to be able to utilise their subjectivity as part of their work. This assertion was made at a time when Fordism was generally viewed as being in crisis or as having already been replaced by a new form of regulation of capitalism, which, until it could be precisely named, was referred to as post-Fordism. PostFordism is based around the convergence of two developments: the increasing importance of the service sector and white-collar work as opposed to classic industrial production; and the transition from standardized mass production to a flexible, specialized form of production in a world characterized by volatile markets (Piore and Sabel 1984). Both developments were compatible, because labor in the service sector and white-collar work had already largely relied on employees’ subjectivity. This not only represents a change in the form of work undertaken and the requirements placed on work in one sector, but a shift in meaning across various fields of work (Senghaas-Knobloch 2009, 127ff.). Both processes, however, cause a combined effect, which is why we can speak of the “tertiarization” or “white-collarization” of work. This shift was also accompanied by a changing focus in the sociology of work, although it occasionally lost sight of “repetitive labor” (Kurz 1999).

274

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

Fritz Böhle (Böhle and Milkau 1988; Böhle 2002) identified specific forms of subjectivity in his analysis of manufacturing which he named “subjectifying work-related action”; these forms of subjectivity are particularly clear in service work. Böhle developed an alternative conception to instrumental and objective work-related action, defining it with recourse to factors such as sensory and physical perception, associative thinking, emotions and subjective sensations. Many types of service work also include other factors, which can be defined as inter-subjective, particularly in work with customers. This includes social and communicative skills, perspectivetaking and emotional work (Dunkel and Weihrich 2010; Voswinkel 2005; Böhle and Glaser 2006). Emotional work in particular has recently caught the attention of the sociology of work, something that should have occurred much earlier, at the very least since the publication of Arlie Hochschild’s (2003) classic analysis. On the one hand, emotional work refers to working on and with your own emotions and those of customers or clients (Dunkel 1988). Emotional work is not necessarily alienating; it can also provide a feeling of self-efficacy. At the same time, although emotional work is not only promoted through “commercialization”, it does bring a dimension of subjectivity into play. This form of subjectivity closely links personality to the psyche, but it also activates a form of psychological regulation of behavior as a specific relation of distance and closeness and of indifference and empathy. In post-Fordism, however, the markets and the modes of production associated with the manufacturing sector also undergo change, which is best described in terms of flexibility, decentralization, de-standardization and an orientation towards (capital) markets. These changes led to the assumption that people had now become flexible. This notion was popularized by Sennett (1998) and the figure of the “entrepreneurial employee” became the subject of theoretical analysis in the work of Voß and Pongratz (1998). This assumption is typical for the manner in which specific types of workers are assumed to have developed due to the specific requirements of work. This rather functional explanation of the new meaning of subjectivity was linked to theories that were inspired by Foucault’s concept of subjectification (Moldaschl 2002; Rau 2010). The debate on the subjectification of work was determined by two threads: one that focused on demands made by workers, and one that focused on demands made on workers. In fact, this development is character-

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

275

ized by both aspects as they form a conflict-ridden and in part paradoxical connection, which is why some people speak of the “double” subjectification of work (Kleemann et al. 2002; Voswinkel 2012). This refers to the fact that when organizations demand that workers apply their subjectivity at work, organizations can also appeal to the needs of workers to do exactly this. As a result, these demands are not treated as unreasonable from the outset, which leads the contradictions between demands and needs to be displaced into the inner life of the subject. This also leads to an increasing number of situations involving aspects of a “double bind”, because employees are expected to apply their subjectivity in exactly the way in which the organization requires in order for it to fulfil its aims. The subjectification of work in this sense represents a new variant of “responsible autonomy” (Friedman 1977); it acts as an “indirect form of control” (Peters and Sauer 2005) which is institutionalized within performance targets and social calculations in the form of numbers and budgets (Vormbusch 2012). If subjectification happens under the conditions of the marketization of work, the tension between concrete and abstract work takes on a specific form. This causes the perspective of exchange value to be experienced more directly and to come into conflict with the need to do concrete work and, with regard to use value, useful work. As part of the Fordist differentiation between production and the market economy, these aspects were only loosely connected; however, workers are now directly exposed to this tension. The exchange value perspective is not external to subjectivity and the conflict between these two perspectives now occurs within the subject. Service-related work is particularly prone to such a conflict, because use value demands made by customers can be directly experienced and the conflict between use value and exchange value appears as a conflict between customer and market orientation (Voswinkel 2005), which is clearly and often played out in emotional work. This conflict is also normatively controversial in other sectors where professional standards come into conflict with economic benchmarks (Vester et al. 2007, 21ff.). In the “marketization” of work and organization, subjectivity takes on a specific function. It now has to align the need for self-organization, which emerged from the retreat from Taylorist standardization and central planning, with the organization’s aims and the market situation, and it must do so “intrinsically”. Consequently, subjectivity carries with it a discourse of individual responsibility and the normative demands of workers who want to and should achieve self-fulfillment. However, this normatively legitimiz-

276

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

es the weakening of long-term reciprocal relationships, which in turn is caused by the organization’s market orientation and which furthers its flexibility. As workers experience work as fulfilling (because it no longer involves suffering), they are no longer able to demand compensation or appreciation (Voswinkel 2012). This also leads to subjectivized workers becoming (normatively) responsible for their own success or failure (Wagner 2012). This outline assumes that the functional demand on subjectivity is also fulfilled. However, it remains highly doubtful that organizations are able to “obtain the subjectivities of the workers in the way that they need them” (Holtgrewe 2005, 362). The “double subjectification” of work is therefore quite conflict-ridden and tense; and employees demand autonomy and acknowledgement of their work. This also leads organizations to attempt to channel and educate subjectivity to seal it off from autonomy. At the same time, however, subjectivity demands individual reflection and construction of the Self, and is now far less able to align itself with commonsense forms of identity and stable professional institutions.

4. Work on the Self Thus, organizations and individuals work to create and shape subjectivity. Organizations do this by selecting their employees not only by professional criteria, but also by their subjectivity and personality traits. This, of course, is not particularly new (cf. Windolf and Hohn 1984). Nevertheless, “social skills”, mental attributes (an orientation towards results, the ability to work in teams, entrepreneurial skills, etc.) and personal aptitude are being more systematically observed, tested and “objectivized” by organizations (Kleebaur 2007; Truschkat 2008) and are the focus of the “job application assessment” industry (Voswinkel 2008). The spread and normalization of assessment centers well beyond the segment of upper management serves as an example. Subjectivity in the modern market society is designed in a twofold orientation: first, as a reflexive reference to the Self and thereby as a path to autonomy and authenticity: second, as an independent orientation towards demands made by the environment and thus the demands of the market. Thus, individuals, as workers who sell labor power, develop subjectivity

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

277

due to their skills relating to meaningful forms of work and with regard to their value to the labor market. Increased marketability and subjectivity leads workers to experience both aspects more directly as tense and conflicting relations. The contradictions within capitalism thus become contradictions within the subject, and subjectivity becomes the terrain where these contradictions are played out. Therefore, the development of the Self is a prerequisite for coping with the requirements of modern work and at the same time for asserting oneself in the labor market. This struggle for subjectivity within the subject is not only played out at the cognitive level but also the emotional and identity level, and it is carried out equally by individuals, organizations and societal discourses; hence the discussion of “psycho-politics” (Rau 2010), “emotional capitalism” (Illouz 2007) and the “psychic economy” of work (Senghaas-Knobloch 2009, 118). Working on the subject involves the risk of boundless work and “voluntary self-exploitation” (Moosbrugger 2008) especially if employees are not in the position to distance themselves from and set boundaries to their work and organization (Wagner 2005), and if a subject’s performance is not linked to their resources. This leads to psychological stress and phenomena such as burn-out and “the weariness of the Self” (Ehrenberg 2010). The expectation that workers will be able to guarantee subjective performance requirements, accomplishments, or coping with work by themselves when faced with indirect management, permanent reorganization and the resulting uncertainties creates a situation of “permanent inadequacy” (Menz et al. 2011, 174) that can lead to psychological stress and suffering. The organization’s extended requirements on worker’s subjectivity and the requisite of work on the Self transform personality traits and “selfmanagement” into mechanisms of social inequality because organizations recruit their employees according to these criteria, and professional advancement depends upon them. The lack of habitual and subjective adaptation and self-reflection, in contrast, can further processes of exclusion, and the socio-psychological results of experiences of exclusion and failure quickly reinforce this exclusion.

278

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

5. The Multi-faceted Subject The preceding chapter focused on the processes associated with the close links between work and subjectivity. Subjectivity, however, encompasses more than this. As subjects, individuals attune different areas of their lives to each other; they construct meaningful biographies and define the focus of their lives. For that reason, focusing on people’s biographies can provide a sensible means of considering subjectivity, as doing so involves analyzing life in its entirety and its development. Biographical orientation enables subjects to assemble “diverse meaningful elements, such as interests, opinions, normative attachments etc. so that they provide a coherent context of meaning” (Giegel 1989, 110). Subjects are more than just labor power and performance power. For decades, demands have been made from within women’s studies that the sociology of work and industrial sociology include this understanding; their demands had relatively little effect for quite some time. Since then, however, the relation between work and life has entered mainstream debates (Jürgens 2009), 3 albeit in a narrower sense. This is reflected on the one hand, in the assumption that the difficulties of reconciling work and family life, and children and careers are treated as problems of organization. In turn, the difficulties of reconciling different areas of a subject’s life implies that they require “management” and “planning” and are therefore seen as “work”. They are seen as an effort which is demanded from the subjects, especially women, and this also provides a new source of stress and feelings of inadequacy. On the other hand, areas of life that are external to wage labor are only considered an aspect of work-life balance when they are understood as work or social duty in the forms of educational, familial or care work. This reduces subjects to a working subject—even if this status has been extended—and reproduces and expands the apparatus of work. It is undeniable that in modernity identity and recognition are essentially conveyed through work and levels of performance, but identity and recognition cannot be reduced to these aspects. Modernity’s normativity of freedom, equality and participation already bring with them the demand for diverse development of subjectivity and personality. Kerstin Jürgens argues for “reproductive agency” (Jürgens 2009) as a central category of critical social research.

——————

3 Cf. the contribution by Kerstin Jürgens in this volume.

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

279

Further reflection on this term is needed, because the functional relation of reproduction to production still resonates within it. However, as it refers to life in its entirety and in turn limits the sphere of work to one of many diverse aspects of a subject’s life, it provides a meaningful approach for a focus on the relation of work and subjectivity in light of modernity’s normativity.

Works Cited Baethge, Martin (1991). Arbeit, Vergesellschaftung, Identität. Zur zunehmenden normativen Subjektivierung der Arbeit. Soziale Welt, 42(1), 6–19. Bell, Daniel (1972). The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Journal of Aesthetic Education, 6(1/2), 11–38. Böhle, Fritz (2002). Vom Objekt zum gespaltenen Subjekt. In Manfred Moldaschl and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit, 101–133. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Böhle, Fritz, and Brigitte Milkau (1988). Vom Handrad zum Bildschirm. Eine Untersuchung zur sinnlichen Erfahrung im Arbeitsprozess. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Böhle, Fritz, and Jürgen Glaser (eds.). (2006). Arbeit in der Interaktion—Interaktion als Arbeit. Arbeitsorganisation und Interaktionsarbeit in der Dienstleistung. Wiesbaden: VS. Campbell, Colin (1987). The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. Oxford/New York: B. Blackwell. Dejours, Christophe (2007). Subjectivity, Work, and Action. In Jean-Philippe Deranty, Danielle Petherbridge, John Rundell and Robert Sinnerbrink (eds.). Recognition, Work, Politics, 71–87. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Dunkel, Wolfgang (1988). Wenn Gefühle zum Arbeitsgegenstand werden. Gefühlsarbeit im Rahmen personenbezogener Dienstleistungstätigkeiten. Soziale Welt, 39(1), 66–85. Dunkel, Wolfgang, and Margit Weihrich (2010). Arbeit als Interaktion. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günther Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 177–200. Wiesbaden: VS Ehrenberg, Alain (2010). Weariness of the Self: Diagnosing the History of Depression in the Contemporary Age. Montreal & Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s Press. Friedman, Andrew (1977). Industry and Labour. Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism. London: Palgrave. Frey, Michael (2009), Autonomie und Aneignung in der Arbeit. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Giegel, Hans-Joachim (1989). Der Lohnarbeiter als Subjekt. Von der Analyse des Arbeiterbewusstseins zur Biographieforschung. In Ditmar Brock, Hans Rudolf

280

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

Leu, Christine Preiß and Hans-Rolf Vetter (eds.). Subjektivität im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, 100–128. München: Juventa. Hochschild, Arlie Russell (2003 [1979]). The Managed Heart. Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press. Holtgrewe, Ursula (2005). Subjekte als Grenzgänger der Organisationsgesellschaft?. In Wieland Jäger and Uwe Schimank (eds.). Organisationsgesellschaft, 344–368. Wiesbaden: VS. Illouz, Eva (2007). Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press. Inglehart, Ronald (1977). The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jürgens, Kerstin (2009). Arbeits- und Lebenskraft. Reproduktion als eigensinnige Grenzziehung. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: VS. Klages, Helmut (1985). Wertorientierungen im Wandel. 2nd edition. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Kleebaur, Carolina (2007). Personalauswahl zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Kleemann, Frank, Ingo Matuschek, and G. Günter Voß (2002). Subjektivierung von Arbeit—Ein Überblick zum Stand der soziologischen Diskussion. In Manfred Moldaschl and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit, 53–100. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Kleemann, Frank, and G. Günter Voß (2010). Arbeit und Subjekt. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 416– 450. Wiesbaden: VS. Kotthoff, Hermann (2005). “Call me Barney”. Betriebliche Sozialordnung revisited. In Michael Faust, Maria Funder and Manfred Moldaschl (eds.). Die “Organisation” der Arbeit, 73–107. Müchen/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Kurz, Constanze (1999). Repetitivarbeit—unbewältigt. Betriebliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungsperspektiven eines beharrlichen Arbeitstyps. Berlin: edition sigma. Langfeldt, Bettina (2009). Subjektorientierung in der Arbeits- und Industriesoziologie. Wiesbaden: VS. Marx, Karl (1990 [1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy—Vol. I: Capitalist Production. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Marx, Karl (2000 [1932]). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts from 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers, available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf. Mead, George H. (2015 [1934]). Mind, Self, and Society. Ed. by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Menz, Wolfgang (2009). Die Legitimität des Marktregimes. Wiesbaden: VS. Menz, Wolfgang, Wolfgang Dunkel, and Nick Kratzer (2011). Leistung und Leiden. Neue Steuerungsformen von Leistung und ihre Belastungswirkungen. In Nick Kratzer, Wolfgang Dunkel, Karina Becker and Stephan Hinrichs (eds.). Arbeit und Gesundheit im Konflikt, 143–198. Berlin: edition sigma.

WORK AND SUBJECTIVITY

281

Moldaschl, Manfred (2002). Foucaults Brille—Eine Möglichkeit, die Subjektivierung von Arbeit zu verstehen?. In Manfred Moldaschl and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit, 135–176. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Moosbrugger, Jeanette (2008). Subjektivierung von Arbeit. Freiwillige Selbstausbeutung. Wiesbaden: VS. Peters, Klaus, and Dieter Sauer (2005). Indirekte Steuerung. Eine neue Herrschaftsform. Zur revolutionären Qualität des gegenwärtigen Umbruchprozesses. In Hilde Wagner (ed.). “Rentier’ ich mich noch?”—Neue Steuerungskonzepte im Betrieb, 23–58. Hamburg: VSA. Piore, Michael J., and Charles F. Sabel (1984). The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. Rau, Alexandra (2010). Psychopolitik. Macht, Subjekt und Arbeit in der neoliberalen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Schimank, Uwe (2009). Die Moderne: eine funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19(3), 327–351. Senghaas-Knobloch, Eva (2009). “Betriebliche Lebenswelt” revisited— Subjektivität in einer Ökonomie der Maßlosigkeit. In Thomas Leithäuser, Sylke Meyerhuber and Michael Schottmayer (eds.). Sozialpsychologisches Organisationsverstehen. Birgit Volmerg zum 60. Geburtstag, 117–138. Wiesbaden: VS. Sennett, Richard (1998). The Corrosion of Character: The Personal. Consequences of Work in the New. Capitalism. London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Truschkat, Inga (2008). Kompetenzdiskurs und Bewerbungsgespräche. Wiesbaden: VS. Vester, Michael, Christel Teiwes-Kügler, and Andrea Lange-Vester (2007). Die neuen Arbeitnehmer. Hamburg: VSA. Volmerg, Birgit, Eva Senghaas-Knobloch, and Thomas Leithäuser (1986). Betriebliche Lebenswelt. Eine Sozialpsychologie industrieller Arbeitsverhältnisse. Opladen: VS. Vormbusch, Uwe (2012). Die Herrschaft der Zahlen. Zur Kalkulation des Sozialen in der kapitalistischen Moderne. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Voß, G. Günter, and Hans J. Pongratz (1998). Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Eine neue Grundform der “Ware Arbeitskraft”?. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 50(1), 131–158. Voswinkel, Stephan (2005). Welche Kundenorientierung? Anerkennung in der Dienstleistungsarbeit. Berlin: edition sigma. Voswinkel, Stephan (2008). Bewerbungsratgeber: Funktionale Authentizität und Verkauf der Arbeitskraft. In Petia Genkova (ed.). Erfolg durch Schlüsselqualifikationen? “Heimliche Lehrpläne” und Basiskompetenzen im Zeichen der Globalisierung, 88–101. Lengerich: Pabst Science Publ. Voswinkel, Stephan (2012). Admiration without Appreciation? The Paradoxes of Recognition of Doubly Subjectivised Work. In Nicolas H. Smith and JeanPhilippe Deranty (eds.). New Philosophies of Labour, 273–299. Leiden-Boston: Brill.

282

STEPHAN VOSWINKEL

Wagner, Gabriele (2005). Die Kunst der Grenzziehung. In Arbeitsgruppe SubArO (ed.). Ökonomie der Subjektivität—Subjektivität der Ökonomie, 165–182. Berlin: edition sigma. Wagner, Gabriele (2012). “Exclusive Focus on Figures. Exclusive Focus on Returns.” Marketisation as a Principle of Organisation and a Problem of Recognition. In Nicolas H. Smith and Jean-Philippe Deranty (eds.). New Philosophies of Labour, 301–326. Leiden-Boston: Brill. Windolf, Paul, and Hans-Willy Hohn (1984). Arbeitsmarktchancen in der Krise. Betriebliche Rekrutierung und soziale Schließung. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus.

Informatization as Force of Production: The Informatized Mode of Production as Basis of a New Phase of Capitalism Andreas Boes, Tobias Kämpf

1

Introduction

If we want to understand contemporary capitalism and how it changes, we must above all examine the development of work in capitalist society. Until today, Marx’ analysis of “large-scale industry” continues to be the dominant conceptual framework for understanding wage labor. It has proved useful not just for the investigation of industrial labor, but also for the analysis of capitalist wage labor societies in general. The attention, however, has mostly been on the development of manual labor, ignoring that the growth and expansion of intellectual labor are also based on the principles of “large-scale industry”. After all, the latter is based on the separation of manual from intellectual labor and, through “scientification”, has also laid the foundation for the growth of intellectual labor. A thorough understanding of this “underbelly of industrialization” (Boes 2011a) requires a theory of informatization. Whereas the analysis of machinery addresses the material and physical aspects of man’s “metabolism between himself and nature” (Marx 1976, 283), the informatization concept focuses on the complementary aspect of human labor: intellectual activity. From this perspective, “large-scale industry” is a job half-done because only manual labor was industrialized. This was accompanied by an expansion of intellectual labor which, at the level of productive forces that existed at the time, was not itself subject to industrialization during a long historic phase. Today, however, we are observing a fundamental change of intellectual labor and its integration and position in the process of production on the basis of a new quality of informatisation and the rise of the “information space” (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996). In the following we will argue that informatization, a crucial aspect of the development of a society’s productive forces, can make an important contribution to a contemporary critical theory of society. Such an approach

284

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

alerts us to certain fundamental changes that affect the capitalist wage labor society. We are currently seeing the emergence of a new “informatized mode of production” (Boes and Kämpf 2010; 2011) 1 that is characterized by an internal Landnahme (cf. Dörre 2010; Harvey 2003; Luxemburg 1963) of intellectual labor which it transforms into “real” wage labor.

2. A New Quality of Informatization: A Leap in the Development of the Productive Forces Informatization has long been neglected in critical social science (though exceptions include Braverman 1974; Hack and Hack 1985; Schmiede 1992; 1996; Haug 2003), partly because of a one-sided view that only looks at the machinery and mechanical side of production, but also because informatization is often simplistically equated with information and communication technologies. From that perspective, social change can easily appear as a mere appendage to technological innovation. In contrast, we want to look at informatization from the more fundamental perspective of social theory. We understand informatization as a vital part of the development of society’s productive forces and therefore take its embeddedness and interaction with social relations into account. 2.1 Informatization as “Underbelly” of Industrialization Marx’ discussion of “large-scale industry” is a crucial point of departure for describing the significance of informatization for the development of society’s productive forces (for more detail see Boes 2011a, b). Marx develops the concept of “large-scale industry” by contrasting it with the previously dominant manufacture mode of production, which was still characterized by craftwork. The foundation for this radical transformation of the mode of production was laid by changes in work organization during the manu-

——————

1 Marx used “Produktionsweise” for the capitalist mode of production as a whole. Our concept “mode of production” (in German: “Produktionsmodus”) does not refer to this high level of society formation. We distinguish a large-scale industry mode of production and an informatized mode of production, both within the capitalist society.

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

285

facture period; it was completed by the increased use of new kinds of machinery. During the manufacture period, like in the guild workshop of the feudal era, the dexterity, power and speed of operating the tools depended on the individual craftsman, and this initially put structural limits on rationalization. For Marx, this is why the subsequent development started with the tool, not the activity: “In manufacture the transformation of the mode of production takes labor-power as its starting point. In large-scale industry, on the other hand, the instruments of labor are the starting point” (Marx 1976, 492). However, the primary reason for the dominance of the new mode of production was not the individual machine, but the system of machinery. In terms of development logic, the organization of production processes through machine systems was based on the specialization that had taken place during the manufacture period. However, this new organization of production led to a qualitative shift compared to the previous phase: “Nevertheless, an essential difference at once appears. In manufacture, it is the workers who, either singly or in groups, must carry on each particular process with their manual implements. The worker has been appropriated by the process; but the process had previously to be adapted to the worker. This subjective principle of the division of labor no longer exists in production by machinery. Here the total process is examined objectively, viewed in and for itself, and analyzed into its constitutive phases. The problem of how to execute each particular process, and to bind the different partial processes together into a whole, is solved by the aid of machines, chemistry, etc. But of course, in this case too, the theoretical conception must be perfected by accumulated experience on a large scale.” (ibid., 501–2)

Marx overestimated the true level of scientification of production, as Braverman (1974) correctly notes, but he did grasp the important qualitative change in the transition from manufacture to large-scale industry. From a “subjective” process devised by craftsmen and thus dependent on their individual capabilities and motives, the labor process is transformed into an “objective” process that has been anticipated intellectually, which has taken material shape in the machine system and therefore confronts the workers as a “condition” of the labor process. In this interpretation, the essence of industrialization consists of the transformation from a “subjective” into an “objective” process, regardless of its concrete historical shape. Industrialization means to detach a process of production from the skill and the volition of particular individuals and to use scientific methods

286

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

to turn it into an “objective” process that shapes the practical labor process. This new industrial mode of production did not just establish industrial labor as a dominant form of social labor. It also provided the foundation for the consistent separation of manual from intellectual labor and the rapid growth of various kinds of intellectual labor. It is only on the basis of intellectual labor that manual labor can become an “objective process”. On the one hand, intellectual labor is responsible for gathering information and knowledge about the labor process and appropriating the workers’ wealth of experience. This, and the use of scientific methods, enables it to design this “objective” process in the first place and constantly rationalize it. 2 On the other hand, it is intellectual labor that is primarily responsible for monitoring and controlling the process of production beyond what can be determined by immediate inspection. To that end it creates increasingly complex information systems. The history of industrialization has produced several attempts to conceptualize this “underbelly” (for a detailed account see Boes 2011b). Concepts like “scientification” (Marx), “mentalization” (Vergeistung) (Sombart 1928) or “bureaucratization” (Weber 2001), and also Braverman’s contributions (1974), are manifestations of the theoretical attempt to describe these developments and understand the expansion of intellectual labor. What they have in common is that they draw attention to the peculiar importance of the intellectual aspects of the labor process as a complement to industrialization in accordance with the level of development of the productive forces pertaining to each time. Among these approaches, Rudi Schmiede’s attempt to make the “informatization” concept useful for sociological theory and to ground it conceptually deserves particular mention (Schmiede 1992; 1996). Our understanding of informatization draws a lot on this attempt to use the informatization concept for examining the profound changes that have affected the intellectual aspects of the labor process as well as their connection to manual labor. Informatization can help us to grasp systematically the underbelly of industrialization. From this perspective, human labor is always both a physical and intellectual activity. When tools and implements are used, one can still experience this unity directly in one’s individual activity, but when machinery is introduced, intellectual and manual labor are systematically separated. A

——————

2 While Taylorization should not be confused with industrialization as such, Braverman’s discussion of “scientific management” is still particularly instructive here (1974).

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

287

core argument in Marx’ theory of the machine is that the machine always contains a “theory” and an anticipated plan of the concrete process of production. What appears as rigid, cast-iron algorithm from the point of view of manual labor is, for intellectual labor, the result of a complex labor process in which mostly mental activities are performed. The production of the algorithm on which the machine is based becomes a form of work in its own right to the extent that it can be subjected to a division of labor and has the means to give material form to ephemeral, mental processes. It is this function of materializing intellectual activity that is played by information and information systems. Informatization refers to the creation, reproduction and development of such information, especially of information systems, in general (cf. Baukrowitz et al. 2001). Informatization thus creates a structure of objects and tools of work that introduces a division of labor into intellectual processes that used to be attributable to a specific individual, turning them into supra-individual processes. Generally speaking, informatization makes intellectual activities accessible to others. It is a process of externalizing mental processes and objectifying them in different kinds of supra-individually usable media. In this sense, informatization can be seen as “materialization of the use of information” (Boes 2005a). This “materialization of the use of information”, however, requires further explanation because existing approaches have so far blocked a more ambitious use of the informatization concept by stripping it of its social nature. Irmgard and Lothar Hack (1985), for example, simply equate information with “digital” information and therefore conclude that information can only reflect dualistic regular processes. By understanding information as “pure form”, Rudi Schmiede (1992; 1996) similarly reduces information to data that machines can operate with. In contrast, the definition we would like to suggest here starts from the Latin origins of the concept. According to Rafael Cappuro (2000), the Latin term informare had a dual meaning: a real or literal one as in “to give shape to, to form or build”, and a figurative one as in “to educate by instruction, to teach”. Our understanding of information combines both these meanings and draws its particular content from their resulting relationship; information gives form to intellectual processes to make them accessible to others so as to instruct, educate or teach them. This process of forming and instructing, however, is characterized by a double contingency because the objectification of an intellectual process as information is not

288

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

the same as that intellectual process itself. The externalized information is not identical with the thought it is based on, but only its more or less incomplete reflection. Moreover, “instruction” is always the result of active appropriation by another subject. The information that is actively reconstructed by that subject is structured by the previously externalized information, but not determined by it. Therefore, informatization must always be understood as a dual social process of “objectification and appropriation” (Holzkamp 1983, 176ff.) in which form and content are inseparably reconstituted and reproduced. Informatization thus refers to a process of materialization, but information is never just “pure form” (Boes 2011b). 2.2 Informatization in Historical Perspective Informatization is the historical condition for the existence of intellectual labor as a separate form of human labor that is largely independent from manual labor and capable of being performed in rational fashion. Through informatization, intellectual processes are separated from their authors in a long, historical process. As a consequence, people’s experiences are incorporated into the construction of machines and into the organization of labor processes in a way that is more and more mediated by increasingly complex information systems. Therefore, the history of informatization started long before the first computer (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996; Schmiede 1996). It gained momentum with the emergence of “organized capitalism” in the late 19th century. Greater continuity was introduced into the use of information when it became routinely available in written form. This, and the creation of information systems, are the two key processes of informatization. “Noncodified” (Pirker 1962) types of information that can only be used “related to its meaning” (sinnbezogen) (Luhmann 1995, 83) are written down, whereas information systems can be deployed where information is “codified”, that is, where it can be presented in the form of data and can therefore be used in “regularized” (Luhmann 1995) fashion. On the one hand, this is why considerable pressure through bureaucratic methods is put on people to communicate in written form, which leads to the emergence and growth of writing as a separate task with specialized departments and to the bureaucratization of communication in the workplace (cf. Kocka 1969; Weber 2001). On the other hand, the organized use of information in the

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

289

company creates increasingly complex information systems (cf. Braverman 1974; Beninger 1986). These are based on highly formalized information that is recorded and prepared for further processing with the help of forms. A “paper apparatus” (Jeidels 1907) thus arises on the basis of bookkeeping, the basic information system of the capitalist enterprise. This apparatus can gather increasingly complex information for monitoring and controlling the company. From its inception, informatization was accompanied by the emergence of a new type of social labor, the primary task of which is to collect and process such information for the purpose of documenting, administering, managing or organizing processes of production, rather than being directly engaged in production itself (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996). This type of informatization is one of the main causes for the rapid rise in the number of white-collar workers (cf. Bahrdt 1958; Kocka 1981; Braverman 1974). Since introducing information systems at the beginning of the 20th century, companies and public bureaucracies have effected a “structural duplication” (Schmiede 1996) of the material reality of production, where the information world takes on a separate form from the material and physical world. When Alfred Sloan claimed in the 1920s that he managed General Motors solely “by the numbers”, without any direct knowledge of concrete processes of production, a milestone in the informatization of production had been reached (cf. Womack et al. 1991, 3ff.). The information system had become management’s most important tool for constructing reality as well as the dominant system of reference for monitoring and controlling the increasingly complex machinery systems and processes of production (cf. Baukrowitz and Boes 1996). Subsequently, a specific form of information use in the company emerged, in particular during the Fordist age. Now the goal was to use internal information systems to “rationally” restructure production and manage it as a “rational capitalistic organization” (Weber 2001, XXXIV). This now appears to be “essentially dependent on the calculability of the most important technical factors” (ibid., XXXVII). The particular mode of informatization that comes with this is defined by the ambition to represent internal processes as much as possible in the form of “objective” information, to refine the information thus collected through scientific procedures and to use it for the value-related and physical control of production. It is manifested in information systems whose logic is closely connected to notions of rational organization in the sense of Frederic Tay-

290

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

lor (cf. Braverman 1974), to bureaucratization (cf. Weber 2001; Kocka 1969) and the scientification of production (cf. Hack and Hack 1985). From an historical perspective, computerization replaces the growing “paper apparatus”. Computer technology has since become the leading technology for the organized use of information in the company. Initially, computers continued to be deployed like the highly formalized information systems of the Fordist era and were primarily used to speed up the processing of highly standardized mass data. At first, therefore, the nature of the information systems and their role in the company were not significantly changed by their computerization. It was only in the 1970s that the role of computer technology in the company changed significantly. It was no longer used merely for selected aspects of information processing. Entire information systems were instead transferred to and managed exclusively through computers (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996). Thus the computer took center stage in the company for the first time. Rather than being a tool used by a separate group of specialists in the data center, it has become the essential piece of equipment in the normal labor process, especially in information-intensive sectors like banking, insurance and so on (cf. Baethge and Oberbeck 1986). Specialist tasks in the office are increasingly performed with the help of computers, and production work has attained a new plane of reference thanks to numerical program control (Hirsch-Kreinsen 1993). Moreover, computer-assisted information processing now also penetrates areas that were once considered impossible to computerize. This applies especially to the wide area of word processing as well as some highly skilled, white-collar work like construction engineering or process planning. Mainframe computers were initially dominant, but the use of PCs began to expand gradually from the late 1970s. At the same time, PCs were being integrated into novel kinds of networks. The emerging computerassisted information systems that are networked in complex ways are the starting point for establishing a new type of rationalization that transcends Taylorism. As described by the concept of “systemic rationalization” (Altmann et al. 1986; Baethge and Oberbeck 1986), the process of production as such, rather than its individual segments, is now subject to rationalization, permanent change, restructuring and decomposition of its constitutive processes. The “new mode of reorganization” (cf. Sauer et al. 2005) that appears to take shape in those systemic production methods is essentially based on a new mode of informatization. Integrated information

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

291

systems (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996) that reflect the structure of the entire process of production of goods or services are the backbone of those highly differentiated and adaptable organizational structures. It is the adaptability and increasing mutual commensurability of the company’s internal information systems that ensures the flexibility of these systemic production structures (ibid.). 2.3 The “Information Space”: A Leap in the Development of the Productive Forces With regard to the current spread of global information networks, computerization and the client-server model, as well as the systemic rationalization based on them, are merely the beginning of a fundamental transformation of informatization in the company. Especially the rise of the internet and its transition from a tightly restricted information system for military use to a globally accessible open network based on non-proprietary standards represent a truly qualitative shift (Boes 2005a; cf. also Rilling 2001; Mosco 1996). Here we see the emergence of a global medium that profoundly changes the possibilities of communication and the exchange of information. Previously, information systems consisted of countless small “islands” that had been created under the control of private companies or public authorities and were therefore insufficiently connected or completely sealed off from each other. It is only with the rise of the internet that information systems that are specific to particular organizations attain a common plane of reference of international dimensions. With the internet, a global medium is established that makes information processing accessible in real-time. The crucial point is that it can process both non-codified information that is created in the act of writingdown as well as codified information. In contrast to the information systems of the 1980s that were based on mainframe computers, the internet is not restricted to highly formalized information (Baukrowitz et al. 2001). It can also be used for communication through non-codified text, images and sounds. For the first time in human history, it is now possible to connect how human beings generally use information to complex information systems through a common medium (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996). However, the most important characteristic is the range of uses to which the internet can be put. Whereas the information systems of Ford-

292

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

ism-Taylorism could only be used in accordance with fairly restrictive rules that were given by the system itself, modern information systems allow for dialogic and reflexive use (Boes 1996). From the user’s point of view, the functionality of traditional, computer-assisted information systems was almost fully prescribed. What sets the internet apart from them is that it creates a space of possibilities for the users that only takes shape through the users’ continuous, practical activity. Therefore the internet is not just another information system in the conventional sense, but the basis for an “information space” (Baukrowitz and Boes 1996) that is in principle open to all kinds of uses. The reality of this social space is not “preprogrammed”: its structure and possibilities for action are changed by the users’ practical activities. In essence it is therefore not a mere infrastructure for transmitting information, but an open space that is constituted through the social actions of its users. These features make the internet the basic infrastructure of an information space that becomes a new kind of “space for social action” (Boes 2005a). We interpret the emergence of this new, globally accessible “space for social action” as a crucial leap forward in the development of society’s productive forces.

3. The “Informatized Mode of Production”: A New Phase of Capitalism This new quality of informatization has the potential to change fundamental parameters of social development, especially the structures of production and organization of work. Information and information systems are becoming the most important references for managing a firm, while complex global value chains are integrated in qualitatively new ways through information. For intellectual labor finally, the information space becomes the essential means of production and a new “production space” (Boes 2004; 2005b). This information space is accompanied by changes in the workplace that are not merely gradual but fundamental in nature, especially when it comes to intellectual labor. On the basis of this qualitative transformation of informatization, an “informatized mode of production” is currently emerging as a new phase of capitalism. This new mode of production has three core aspects (for more detail see Boes and Kämpf 2010; 2011):

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

293

– a new quality of globally integrated production that affects manual as well as intellectual labor, – a “new kind of industrialization” (Boes 2004; 2005b) that targets intellectual labor in a way that goes beyond Taylorism, – and the introduction of new forms of market-centered control over intellectual labor that replace the erstwhile “responsible autonomy” (Friedman 1977). Together with powerful logistics and transport systems, the information space provides, firstly, the foundation for the various processes of corporate and economic globalization that have been intensely debated since the 1990s and that are fundamentally changing the sphere of work (for an early account see Fröbel et al. 1977). In the course of this, computer-assisted processes become the backbone of global value chains. They connect them even across geographical and corporate boundaries and become the most important tool for monitoring and management control. It is only because of such information systems that global corporations can operate today in systemically integrated or “seamless” fashion on a world scale. Most importantly, however, the “web” makes intellectual labor itself the object of internationalization. When the objects and tools of work can be digitalized, the information space becomes a new global production space. 3 It is no longer just manual labor that can be subjected to an international division of labor, but also highly skilled work like software development or even research & development. The scope of this trend is demonstrated by the rise of India as a “new strategic place” (Boes et al. 2007) for the IT sector, or the rapid growth of engineering in China (cf. also, for example, MayerAhuja 2011; Feuerstein 2011; Hürtgen et al. 2009; Ernst 2008). For global corporations these places are increasingly interesting, and not just as potential new markets. In light of the frequently claimed skills shortage they also function as new reserves of highly skilled labor power. For the affected groups of highly skilled workers this means that fundamental aspects of their work change. Not only does working in a global context increasingly become a normality for them (Boes et al. 2012), they are also confronted now more than ever with a “world labor market” (Potts 1990). Buzzwords

——————

3 That does not mean that work becomes “footloose”, “abstract” or “virtual”, as was often argued in rather undifferentiated fashion during the “new economy” hype. We are still dealing with concrete people who sit in concrete places and use physical information systems, and that is why real-world globalization comes up against social, political and infrastructural boundaries again and again.

294

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

like “offshoring” make the possibility of shifting jobs overseas a constant threat even for highly skilled labor. New uncertainties and the downsides of globalization are now also more keenly felt in the once secure world of office workers (Kämpf 2008; Boes and Kämpf 2011). In the informatized mode of production, intellectual labor is not just affected by globalization but also subjected to new forms of industrialization. Marx’ concept of industrialization suggests that what we are witnessing here is an attempt to also organize intellectual labor in a way that is not primarily based on individual skills, but to incorporate it into an objective process. IT-assisted process systems and the information space provide the foundation for this. Rationalizing the worker’s subjective contribution through enshrining the notion of process and through the attendant informational penetration of intellectual labor is therefore the core purpose of this new type of industrialization. The IT sector is a pioneer in this regard. In real-life practice, extensive standardization efforts are the starting point. These affect the products themselves—individual solutions are replaced by standard software and accompanying services—as well as the processes, methods and tools that are used. This homogenization of procedures and processes is supported by computerized documentation systems that draw increasingly on the ideas of the Web 2.0 and the notion of community, although concepts from traditional manufacturing are also often taken up again. For example, specific forms of modularization on the basis of the classification and definition of repeated and/or typical problems (“modules”, “assembly groups”) are deployed (for more detail see Boes 2004; 2005b; Boes and Kämpf 2011). No standardized “best practice” (in the sense of Taylor’s “one best way”) has emerged with regard to the different fields of work, the demands concerning the content of work, and the contradictions that come with this. On the one hand, the ITIL model—a type of process orientation based on consistent and differentiated ticket systems as well as clearly defined workflow plans and role-based access controls—has become dominant in IT services. On the other hand, “lean production” methods (Womack et al. 1991) have become more important in software development itself where they are used, in combination with “agile methods”, as elements of industrialization (Boes 2009). Forms of selfmanagement in teams are combined with an organization of development that breaks it down into sequences of short cycles. For example, all teams have to produce and submit “usable software” in a two-to-four week

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

295

rhythm. This new rhythm has replaced the previous development cycles which often lasted several months or years. It allows for the systemic integration of an entire development organization which now moves to the same beat. The application of “lean production” concepts to intellectual labor is not at all restricted to software development. As “lean office” or “lean engineering”, they are connected to fundamental restructuring of intellectual labor in many core areas of the economy. What unites the different tentative moves towards a new type of industrialization is that companies strive to reduce their dependence on individual employees and their concrete individuality without losing access to their subjectivity in the labor process. In contrast to Taylorism, the goal is not to eliminate the employees’ subjective potential, but the systematic and repeatable utilization of their subjective capacities. The basis for company success is no longer the ingenuity of the individual “intellectual worker”, but the development of robust and stable processes that efficiently and systematically incorporate the employees’ intellectual productive forces into value creation. There is a process of differentiation that, on the one hand, conserves or creates new niches for highly innovative tasks (such as software architecture). On the other, however, the goal is to subject a growing range of tasks to strict process orientation. The “zones of uncertainty” (Crozier and Friedberg 1980) over which workers have control shrink to the extent that the actual organization of work is less and less geared towards individual skills and new forms of process orientation become dominant. As a result, the individual workers and their concrete labor power are more replaceable now than ever before. This is also the backdrop to the implementation of new forms of “market-centered control” (Boes 2002; cf. Dörre 2003) in large areas of intellectual labor. In these areas, a control regime based on “responsible autonomy” (Friedman 1977) had traditionally been the norm because employees retained strong “primary power” (Jürgens 1984) and companies strongly depended on highly skilled workers. This regime is now being replaced by a new “system of permanent probation” (Boes and Bultemeier 2010; 2008). At the heart of this mode of control is the informational penetration of labor processes through complex systems of numeric indicators, which provides the basis for the results-oriented control over employees. Market “demands” are broken down to the individual workplace and translated into appropriate targets. Without this, the market could not become the primary context and condition for what happens in the company. Unlike

296

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

the system of responsible autonomy, workers can no longer assume as given that they will continue to have a job with their current employers. This is now “optional” and conditional on meeting the targets, which makes their jobs a permanent test: every day they must prove again that they are still “worthy” of belonging to the company. From the latter’s point of view, the old securities and privileged working conditions that existed for large parts of intellectual labor are no longer functional and necessary. On the contrary, the replaceability of the workers and the attendant insecurity become the basis for new forms of control and new kinds of labor relations (Boes and Bultemeier 2008; 2010; Marrs 2008; Kämpf 2008). As a result, workers now experience wage labor in new and different ways (Boes and Kämpf 2011). 4 Intellectual labor is at the center of these transformations. On the basis of a new structure of the productive forces, the informatized mode of production incorporates subjective activities that had previously evaded capitalist control into capitalist valorization in a qualitatively new fashion. Diverging trajectories for manual and intellectual labor were constitutive of the previous capitalist formation, but now intellectual labor itself has become subject to an internal Landnahme. Informatized processes and structures allow companies to reduce their dependence on individual employees and their concrete individuality without losing access to their subjectivity. This suggests an alternative interpretation of “subjectification” (cf. Moldaschl and Voß 2003; Arbeitsgruppe SubArO 2005; Lohr and Nickel 2005); it is not just about a merely quantitative increase of the subjective element in work. What we are seeing is a more efficient and systemic use of the subjective activities of intellectual workers whose labor has so far only been formally, but not really, integrated into the capitalist production process. It is only on the basis of being incorporated into an objective process that a growing share of intellectual labor is now turned into “proper” wage labor. This also demonstrates the contribution that informatization can make to a critical theory of modern capitalism. In the context of an approach that focuses on the productive forces, it alerts us to fundamental transformations of the wage labor society that do not just affect the organization of work and production but also point to changes affecting the social structures of class and conflict that had emerged during the Fordist era.

——————

4 The hotly debated increase in mental stress symptoms (e.g. burnout) also has to be seen in the context of these changes (Kämpf et al. 2011).

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

297

The consolidation of the informatized mode of production makes new differentiations likely to appear among the previously stable “middle class” which is mainly comprised of those identified intellectual workers. Those members of the middle class who are able to protect their “zones of uncertainty” in the labor process can hope to retain their privileged conditions of work and life or even improve them, but this does not apply to those workers who are confronted, in a qualitatively new fashion, with globalization, a new type of industrialization and the system of permanent probation. The fear of status loss among large sections of the middle class is of a different kind now; it is no longer based on indirect effects or “modernized” social policies, but on fundamental transformations in the sphere of work itself.

Works Cited Altmann, Norbert, Manfred Deiß, Volker Döhl and Dieter Sauer (1986). Ein “Neuer Rationalisierungstyp”—neue Anforderungen an die Industriesoziologie. Soziale Welt, 37(2/3), 191–206. Arbeitsgruppe SubArO (2005). Ökonomie der Subjektivität—Subjektivität der Ökonomie. Berlin: edition sigma. Baethge, Martin, and Herbert Oberbeck (1986). Zukunft der Angestellten—Neue Technologien und berufliche Perspektiven in Büro und Verwaltung. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Bahrdt, Hans Paul (1958). Industriebürokratie. Versuch einer Soziologie des industrialisierten Bürobetriebes und seiner Angestellten. Stuttgart: Enke. Baukrowitz, Andrea, and Andreas Boes (1996). Arbeit in der “Informationsgesellschaft”. Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen aus einer (fast schon) ungewohnten Perspektive. In Rudi Schmiede (ed.). Virtuelle Arbeitswelten. Arbeit, Produktion und Subjekt in der »Informationsgesellschaft«, 129–158. Berlin: edition sigma. Baukrowitz, Andrea, Andreas Boes and Rudi Schmiede (2001). Die Entwicklung der Arbeit aus der Perspektive ihrer Informatisierung. In Ingo Matuschek, Annette Henninger and Frank Kleemann (eds.). Neue Medien im Arbeitsalltag, 219– 235. Wiesbaden: VS. Beninger, James R. (1986). The Control Revolution—Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press. Boes, Andreas (1996). Formierung und Emanzipation—Zur Dialektik der Arbeit in der “Informationsgesellschaft”. In Rudi Schmiede (ed.). Virtuelle Arbeitswelten—Arbeit, Produktion und Subjekt in der “Informationsgesellschaft”, 159–178. Berlin: edition sigma.

298

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

Boes, Andreas (2002). “Neue Arbeitskrafttypen” und verfasste Mitbestimmung. Auseinandersetzungen in der IT-Industrie. Das Argument, 44(248), 724–738. Boes, Andreas (2004). Offshoring in der IT-Industrie—Strategien der Internationalisierung und Auslagerung im Bereich Software und IT-Dienstleistungen. In Andreas Boes and Michael Schwemmle (eds.). Herausforderung Offshoring – Internationalisierung und Auslagerung von IT-Dienstleistungen, 9–140. Düsseldorf: Edition Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Boes, Andreas (2005a). Informatisierung. In SOFI/IAB/ISF München/INIFES (eds.). Berichterstattung zur sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Arbeit und Lebensweisen. Erster Bericht, 211–244. Wiesbaden: VS. Boes, Andreas (2005b). Auf dem Weg in die Sackgasse. Internationalisierung im Feld Software und IT-Services. In Andreas Boes and Michael Schwemmle (eds.). Bangalore statt Böblingen. Offshoring und Internationalisierung im IT-Sektor, 13– 65. Hamburg: VSA. Boes, Andreas (2009). Agile Methoden als Wegbereiter eines neuen Typs der Industrialisierung in der Softwareentwicklung. Talk given on Nov. 27, 2009 at the XP-Days 2009 at IHK Karlsruhe. Boes, Andreas (2011a). Von der “großen Industrie” zur informatisierten Produktionsweise. Überlegungen zum Verständnis des aktuellen Umbruchs in der Arbeit. Talk given on July 2, 2011 at the symposium “Arbeitswelten in Bewegung” Darmstadt. Boes, Andreas (2011b). Von der “großen Industrie” zur informatisierten Produktionsweise. Unpublished manuscript. München. Boes, Andreas, and Anja Bultemeier (2008). Informatisierung—Unsicherheit— Kontrolle. In Kai Dröge, Kira Marrs and Wolfgang Menz (eds.). Rückkehr der Leistungsfrage. Leistung in Arbeit, Unternehmen und Gesellschaft, 58–91. Berlin: edition sigma. Boes, Andreas, and Anja Bultemeier (2010). Anerkennung im System permanenter Bewährung. In Hans-Georg Soeffner (ed.). Unsichere Zeiten. Herausforderungen gesellschaftlicher Transformationen. Verhandlungen des 34. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. Wiesbaden: VS. CD-ROM. Boes, Andreas, and Tobias Kämpf (2010). Arbeit im Informationsraum. Eine neue Qualität der Informatisierung als Basis einer neuen Phase der Globalisierung. In Esther Ruiz Ben (ed.). Internationale Arbeitsräume. Unsicherheiten und Herausforderungen, 19–55. Freiburg: Centaurus. Boes, Andreas, and Tobias Kämpf (2011). Global verteilte Kopfarbeit. Offshoring und der Wandel der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Berlin: edition sigma. Boes, Andreas, Tobias Kämpf, Kira Marrs and Katrin Trinks (2007). “The World is flat”. Nachhaltige Internationalisierung als Antwort auf die Herausforderungen einer globalen Dienstleistungswirtschaft. Erste Ergebnisse einer empirischen Bestandsaufnahme. Working Paper 3 of the Project Export IT. München. Boes, Andreas, Andrea Baukrowitz, Tobias Kämpf and Kira Marrs (2012). Auf dem Weg in eine global vernetzte Ökonomie. Strategische Herausforderungen für Arbeit und Qualifikation. In Andreas Boes, Andrea Baukrowitz, Tobias

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

299

Kämpf and Kira Marrs (eds.). Qualifizieren für eine global vernetzte Ökonomie. Vorreiter IT-Branche: Analysen, Erfolgsfaktoren, Best Practices, 25–64. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Braverman, Harry (1974). Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. Capurro, Rafael (2000). Einführung in den Informationsbegriff. 12.03.2012 htt://www.capurro.de/infovorl-index.htm. Crozier, Michel, and Erhard Friedberg (1980). Actors and Systems: The Politics of Collective Action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dörre, Klaus (2003). Das flexibel-marktzentrierte Produktionsmodell—Gravitationszentrum eines “neuen Kapitalismus”?. In Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (eds.). Das neue Marktregime. Konturen eines nachfordistischen Produktionsmodells, 7–34. Hamburg: VSA. Dörre, Klaus (2010). Landnahme und soziale Klassen. Zur Relevanz sekundärer Ausbeutung. In Hans-Günter Thien (ed.). Klassen im Postfordismus, 113–151. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Ernst, Dieter (2008). A new Geography of Knowledge? Asia’s role in global innovation networks. Honolulu: East-West Center. Feuerstein, Patrick (2011). Viele Wege führen nach Indien. Reorganisation von Arbeit im Zuge der Internationalisierung der IT-Industrie. PhD diss., Georg August University Göttingen. Friedman, Andrew (1977). Responsible Autonomy versus Direct Control over the Labour Process. Capital and Class, 1(1), 43–57. Fröbel, Folker, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye (1977). Die neue internationale Arbeitsteilung. Strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit in den Industrieländern und die Industrialisierung der Entwicklungsländer. Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt. Hack, Lothar, and Irmgard Hack (1985). Die Wirklichkeit, die Wissen schafft—Zum wechselseitigen Begründungsverhältnis von “Verwissenschaftlichung der Industrie” und “Industrialisierung der Wissenschaft”. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Harvey, David (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haug, Wolfgang Fritz (2003). High-Tech-Kapitalismus. Analysen zur Produktionsweise, Arbeit, Sexualität, Krieg und Hegemonie. Hamburg: Argument. Hirsch-Kreinsen, Hartmut (1993). NC-Entwicklung als gesellschaftlicher Prozeß. Amerikanische und deutsche Innovationsmuster der Fertigungstechnik. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Holzkamp, Klaus (1983). Grundlegung der Psychologie. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Hürtgen, Stefanie, Boy Lüthje, Wilhelm Schumm and Martina Sproll (2009). Von Silicon Valley nach Shenzhen. Globale Produktion und Arbeit in der IT-Industrie. Hamburg: VSA. Jeidels, Otto (1907). Die Methoden der Arbeiterentlohnung in der rheinisch-westfälischen Eisenindustrie. Berlin.

300

ANDREAS BOES AND TOBIAS KÄMPF

Jürgens, Ulrich (1984). Die Entwicklung von Macht, Herrschaft und Kontrolle im Betrieb als politischer Prozeß—eine Problemskizze zur Arbeitspolitik. Leviathan, 12(5), 58–91. Kämpf, Tobias (2008). Die neue Unsicherheit. Folgen der Globalisierung für hochqualifizierte Arbeitnehmer. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Kämpf, Tobias, Andreas Boes and Katrin Trinks (2011). Gesundheit am seidenen Faden: Eine neue Belastungskonstellation in der IT-Industrie. In Anja Gerlmaier and Erich Latniak (eds.). Burnout in der IT-Branche. Ursachen und betriebliche Prävention, 91–152. Kröning: Asanger. Kocka, Jürgen (1969). Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847–1914. Zum Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Bürokratie in der deutschen Industrialisierung. Stuttgart: Klett. Kocka, Jürgen (ed.). (1981). Angestellte im europäischen Vergleich. Die Herausbildung angestellter Mittelschichten seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht. Lohr, Karin, and Hildegard Maria Nickel (eds.). (2005). Subjektivierung von Arbeit. Riskante Chancen. Bonn: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Luhmann, Niklas (1995). Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luxemburg, Rosa (1963 [1913]). The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge. Marrs, Kira (2008). Arbeit unter Marktdruck. Die Logik der ökonomischen Steuerung in der Dienstleistungsarbeit. Berlin: edition sigma. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2011). Grenzen der Homogenisierung. IT-Arbeit zwischen ortsgebundener Regulierung und transnationaler Unternehmensstrategie. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Marx, Karl (1976 [1867]). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy—Vol. I: Capitalist Production. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Moldaschl, Manfred, and Günter G. Voß (eds.). (2003). Subjektivierung von Arbeit. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Mosco, Vincent (1996). The political economy of communication. Rethinking and Renewal. London: SAGE Publications. Pirker, Theo (1962). Büro und Maschine. Zur Geschichte und Soziologie der Mechanisierung der Büroarbeit, der Maschinisierung des Büros und der Büroautomation. Basel/Tübingen: Kyklos. Potts, Lydia (1990). The World Labour Market: A History of Migration. London: Zed Books. Rilling, Rainer (2001). Eine Bemerkung zur Rolle des Internet im Kapitalismus. In Hans-Jürgen Bieling (ed.). Flexibler Kapitalismus. Festschrift für Frank Deppe, 84– 92. Hamburg: VSA. Sauer, Dieter, Andreas Boes and Nick Kratzer (2005). Reorganisation des Unternehmens. In SOFI/IAB/ISF München/INIFES (eds.). Berichterstattung zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung in Deutschland—Arbeit und Lebensweisen. Erster Bericht, 323–350. Wiesbaden: VS.

INFORMATIZATION AS FORCE OF PRODUCTION

301

Schmiede, Rudi (1992). Information und kapitalistische Produktionsweise— Entstehung der Informationstechnik und Wandel der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit. In Thomas Malsch and Ulrich Mill (eds.). ArBYTE. Modernisierung der Industriesoziologie?. Berlin: edition sigma. Schmiede, Rudi (1996). Informatisierung, Formalisierung und kapitalistische Produktionsweise. In Rudi Schmiede (ed.). Virtuelle Arbeitswelten. Arbeit, Produktion und Subjekt in der “Informationsgesellschaft”, 15–47. Berlin: edition sigma. Sombart, Werner (1928). Der moderne Kapitalismus. Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. München: Ducker & Humblot. Weber, Max (2001 [1905]). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. London/New York: Routledge. Womack, James P., Daniel T. Jones and Daniel Roos (1991). The Machine that Changed the World. The Story of Lean Production. New York: Harper.

Capitalist Work Organization and Self-activity Harald Wolf

“this you have to do kinda yourself” Ernst Jandl

I. There is a dark continent in the capitalist world of work that is avoided, if not ignored, in the theory of capitalism and the sociology of work and industrial sociology in Germany. Their journeys of discovery and the attempts they undertake to map the field have avoided studying worker’s self-activity. Using Freud’s metaphor of the unconscious, this sphere can be more adequately referred to as the inner foreign territory of capitalist work organizations. This understanding enables us to highlight the repression that is bound to the issue itself, to the instruments of observation that are applied in many traditional theories of society and to the sociological maneuvers aimed at evading the issue. Repression in this sphere is due to the deep-seated, silent and thereby highly effective prejudices about capitalist work organizations; these prejudices will have to be thrown overboard. Moreover, we will have to set our sails differently in both the sociology of work and the theory of capitalism if we are to approach this sphere adequately. 1 Work under capitalism can never be reduced to a form of behavior that is merely assimilated, determined and directed by others; thus, it cannot really be subsumed under capital. If this were possible, then capitalist work organizations could not exist for a second. However, the fact that they function and evolve depends on an aspect that actually endangers their existence: worker’s self-activity. Spontaneous action—in the sense in which

——————

1 For reasons of space, the focus is more on apodictic propositions than on argumentation, but extensive references are provided. I would like to thank Dimitri Mader for the important suggestions he made as this text was being revised.

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

303

it is sketched here—is always necessary in capitalist work organizations, but it is usually repressed—even in theories of capitalism. The sociological return of the repressed, as part of the residual category of the “informal”, does not properly describe what can be more precisely understood as necessary self-activity. This understanding enables us to analyze more clearly the critical and political implications raised by such findings and insights. They result, for instance, in a need to place capitalist “organization” in quite definitive quotation marks and to develop terms such as capitalist (pseudo-)rationalization and (pseudo-)organization. This should enable the insights provided by the sociology of work to enlighten and reform the theory of capitalism—but only if the sociology of work is in a position to identify its own blind spots and therefore to change. In social theory, it is generally assumed that social forms within modern capitalism are located between the poles of market and exchange on the one side, and organization and control on the other. Capitalist formation and discipline is essentially understood as emerging from these poles; they are viewed—regardless of the manner in which they are conceptualized— as the driving forces and causes of capitalist structure and growth dynamics. What (initially) cannot be resolved by this logic of exchange and control, and what cannot (yet) be subsumed under the imperatives of market and organization, is summarized in categories such as “community” and “network” (Wiesenthal 2005). In the theory of capitalism, they are underanalyzed and constitute little but oddments. The same can be said of the realm of social labor, since informal organization and informal relations within companies were relegated to similarly obscure residual categories. The “discovery” of social relations in informal work groups as part of the research into industrial companies—in the context of the legendary Hawthorne Experiments in the 1920s and 1930s—marked the beginning of the human relations movement. It also represents a cornerstone in management doctrine and ideology, and an important stage in the history of the sociology of work and industrial sociology (Kern 1999; Kieser 1999). The rational blueprint for the formal organization of work consists of the development of the abstract rules governing the structures of production, communication and command that apply to more than just one set of individuals and particular situations. However, this is now accompanied by the importance of informal work organization, which is said to result from a spontaneous interaction that is oriented to the needs, interests and experiences of the members of an organization and that takes shape within

304

HARALD WOLF

fleeting personal arrangements or more stable habits. From the perspective of formal organizations, even if the informal does have irrational traits, it has established itself as an independent social and normative sphere (Gukenbiehl 1999). Furthermore, even if the organization of action contexts through formalization—up to mechanization—is still rightly considered the central tendency and primary feature of modern society (Luhmann 1964), this view still relies on the existence of informality as a residual category, “reckoned with” and illuminated in the research on social groups, and providing an important focus for organizational teaching and practices (Friedberg 1995). However, examining this phenomenon primarily from an organizational perspective imbues it with a negative logical definition: it becomes informal, as in not-formal; therefore, it is characterized by what it is not. This leads to a strangely vacuous, and at the same time pejorative, definition; it places the informal in opposition to “real” organization. The informal becomes the Other—the “antimatter” of the well-organized. Ultimately, the informal remains a foreign body which needs to be fought against, if not annihilated, or which—in the human relations tradition, through corporate culture or concepts of group work—has to be nurtured and reprocessed as a useful “resource” for the organization and regulation (Fortado 2011). This transparent perspective of interest and domination has deeply affected the reception of informality by German sociology of work and industrial sociology—and for a long time it prevented a real discussion of the phenomenon. This discourse was essentially perceived as the work of enlightened capitalists, who, by nurturing the human factor, were trying to eliminate constraints placed on rationalization. Consequently, it was assumed to represent the continuation of Taylorist scientific management by other, essentially “psychological”, means (Popitz et al. 1957, 42). This led to the belief that it was acceptable to restrict sociological and critical research to the theoretical explanation of informal groups as being the “product and mediating entity of social antagonisms” and as “derived from the interests of employees” (Friedeburg 1963, 13). Beyond that, informal groups were entirely dismissed from analyses of capitalist work and explicitly so in the case of analyses of cooperation that were said to be focusing on “true work” (Popitz et al. 1957, 42; Kern and Schumann 1977, 72–3).

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

305

Thus, informal relations became such an anathema within the German discussion on the sociology of work and related empirical research 2 that they were only recently rediscovered as an important problem and a “new field of research” (Böhle 2010, 163; Böhle and Bolte 2002). Currently, informal relations are being particularly focused on in sociology because of the attention they have attracted in work organizations in the past due to the potential they offer for rationalization. Participative-oriented management concepts, such as small working groups, decentralization and participation, were aimed at increasing productivity; these concepts were presumed to exist as part of working people’s individual and collective experiences and their informal cooperative relations rather than as part of what were still centralized, hierarchical, formal forms of organization (Wolf 1994). The leftovers, which were as simple to explain as they were uninteresting, became an important target of rationalization. The consequence that needs to be drawn from this is “that organizational studies and studies on participation must join forces. The former must no longer merely subsume cooperation and participation under the residual category of informality, but needs to recognize it as a necessary structural feature of organizations” (Müller-Jentsch 2008, 179).

II. In order to use the theory of capitalism to critically analyze these necessary structural properties of the way in which work is organized, it is essential to avoid placing them in abstract opposition to organizational and technical structures of control; this has been done in the debate on the informal. Instead, they need to be interpreted as deeply entwined structures that are linked to one another. Labor researcher Daniellou coined the fitting metaphor of working and work as weaving and texture (Schwartz 2004, 64). In a slightly modified form, we can argue that the texture of work consists of the more or less visible “objective” warp thread of the company’s strategy, policy, formal rules, its control through others, technical processes and the properties of customers, etc. The workers have to take these threads and weave them with the more or less visible “subjective” weft threads of their

——————

2 This can be contrasted with the English and French-speaking debates; see, for example, Ackroyd and Thompson 1999 and Geoffroy 2011 for a brief overview.

306

HARALD WOLF

personal histories, their experiences of work and life, as well as that of the social groups who have transmitted the knowledge, values and rules that keep them going on a daily basis, as well as their bodies, and their understandings of their lives, desires, fears and dreams. The weaving process of working is the complex interplay of heteronomous norming and presetting on the one hand, and manifold forms of active re-norming and “redefinition of work situations” by the workers, on the other (Löffler 1991, 297ff.). This metaphor vividly evokes the “inevitability of subjectivity in the work process” (Ekardt et al. 1988, 109). 3 Work organizations depend on subjective performance because, in the context of organizational norms and presettings, non-trivial action problems constantly arise that can only be resolved through “practiced subjectivity”. These include problems of application (adequately applying rules in situations), problems of constitution (missing or incomplete action rules need to be set down or changed), problems of negotiation (of collective coordination of such application and constitution efforts), problems of contingency (unexpected effects resulting from the social or natural environment) and problems of planning (discrepancies between planning targets and performance) (ibid., 109ff.). Taking the warp thread and joining it to the subjective weft thread is an essential part of every form of work, even in the simplest Taylorised jobs. These problems are never solved merely through executing or “mechanical” actions, but as part of responsive, “answering” and creative actions (Waldenfels 2008; Joas 1997). The fundamental insight that every work activity involves the predefining and redefining of work situations and that each redefinition is responsive and creative has to be put in the context of a theory of domination. Predefinitions and redefinitions are in capitalist work organizations not only logically but socially and hierarchically separated. Predefinitions—in the shape of instructions, inspections, organizational rules, standardization, mechanization, etc.—are the objects and the result of work undertaken by particular social groups who are privileged by the domination and reward structures of the work organization; as superiors, experts, managers and capitalists. They act as specialists for “determinations for others” (Löffler 1991, 228), who should be excluded from the predefinitions of their own actions, and as such for whom these determinations represent the core of their heteronomy (hetero: the other; nomos: the norm or law). However,

——————

3 See also Stephan Voswinkel in this volume.

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

307

retroactively at least, these others must be included, as they have to be able to redefine predefinitions adequately in specific situations, and this often implies newly defining and redefining organizational rules. This can happen by way of routine, in which case it is almost invisible to the people involved, and depending on the organizational concept attempts at elimination through strategies of formalization or through incorporation into official work schedules can be made. As long as predefinitions and redefinitions remain socially separated and hierarchical, we will always be dealing with constellations of inclusion and exclusion, and with specific forms of self-activity. Even if attempts at exclusion are effective and consequential, these attempts are limited by social boundaries that exist in the form of a fundamental divide (and potential confrontation), widely graded in detail, between management and the “managed”. This divide, among other things, leads to situations in which the knowledge and informational basis of predefinitions is de facto completely insufficient (whereas, de jure specialists in determinations for Others, of course, know everything and are in charge of everything). Therefore, instructions, rules, programs, etc. become incomplete, ambivalent, contradictory or unusable and hence an action problem. In this case, people have to act in a situation where the presettings no longer help or may even hinder them. However, on the basis of ever present redefinitions and adaptions, solutions “of one’s own” and “of one’s own sense” (eigensinnige 4) have to be found. This is where necessary self-activity in its proper and strictest sense begins. Self-activity is necessary to compensate for the gaps or missing predefinitions in the face of the manifold disturbances that occur in the daily workflow. Self-activity is also needed as a means of assimilating technical innovations and adapting to diverse forms of reorganization and restructuring. Many different patterns of self-activity are possible and have been documented, ranging from active engagement against the rules (or fellow workers) to individual lists to secret organization (Wolf 1999, 77ff.; Ackroyd and Thompson 1999). They form the uncontrollable space of experience of individual and collective self-activity that rests upon predictable and enforceable “normal performances”, defining contradictory requirements in the face of which pure execution definitely fails. Necessary

——————

4 The ambiguous word Eigensinn—commonly rendered in English as “stubbornness”— has become a key concept in a certain strand of the history of everyday life (cf. Lüdtke 1995, 313–314).

308

HARALD WOLF

self-activity in capitalist work organizations therefore refers to action at the workplace that is unintended and unscheduled for by official predefinetions, predefined targets and tasks of the work role. To speak of self-activity emphasizes that the origin of these actions lies not within the organization but rather in the “Self”, i.e. in subjects. These subjects can be individuals or collectives who—together with the weft thread—are constituted de facto as subjects and act in order to solve specific action problems. The term “spontaneity”, defined as an act occurring through a subject’s own impulse that was neither forced nor determined by others, essentially refers to the same thing. This spontaneous act “of-theself” stands in opposition to forms of receptivity that are pure “receptiveness” to that which is given; spontaneity transcends the role of a subject as a recipient or the person who follows a set of instructions. Spontaneity also embodies the creative moment during which unexpected, new things occur which are part of redefinitions in work situations. This self-activity never occurs as a freely chosen act, as it is always primed and determined by the institutional heteronomy and the constraints of capitalist work organization; as such, self-activity remains something that you “have to do yourself”. From the organization’s and the subject’s perspective alike, self-activity remains highly ambivalent. The necessity for subjective appropriation and spontaneity is accompanied by permanent obstruction and challenge, and by its (perforced, temporary) acceptance and exploitation. Above all, spheres of self-activity constitute positions of power. The capacity to start and maintain a work process through self-active redefinitions and new definitions is the capacity to control organizational zones of uncertainty, and it therefore prepares the ground for primary power (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). This creates opportunities for self-regulation, for interpreting requirements and needs, for contingent, calculated efforts, for fending off impositions on behavior, and, as such, for resistance (Hodson 1991). The actual “core of the work process” (Manske 1987) is inaccessible to formalization from the outside. Permanent technical and organizational changes and the quasi-experimental character of work provide permanent renewal to this core. The workers always have a head start when it comes to knowledge, and this means that withholding self-activity, i.e. work-torule, remains an effective form of industrial action. For this reason, workers attempt to keep self-activity a secret. They push it into the “back regions” of the organization (Giddens 1984, 122); and it functions as “background cooperation” (Kumbruck 2001). Not only

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

309

is functional subjectivity involved (Schimank 2002), but also a form of subjectivity that invents unforeseen, forbidden opportunities or strives towards illicit objectives. This involves innovation (using new means) or rebellion (pursuing new objectives) described by Merton (1968, 193–210) as forms of adaptation to structural restraints: “useful illegality” (Luhmann 1964, 302), and ultimately, from the perspective of the organization, “crime as a means of fulfilling work requirements” (Bensman and Gerver 1963). These forms are opposed by strategies implemented by the organization or management aimed at securing or reinstating control. These strategies constitute an attempt to break out of the informational vicious circle that results from secrecy, false information, gaps or simply the nonexistence of specific procedures from the perspective of the organization. Organizations implement measures aimed at “informatization” in order to take control, which generally means computerizing work processes, but also in a figurative sense. It refers to informal, covered practices and forms of knowledge that are transposed and formalized into the usual format of standardized and official organizational actions. Alternatively, organizations attempt to limit such practices to certain areas or topics through selective clearance and focusing. The current strategies of “enabling” flexible bureaucratic dominance emphasize the necessary inclusion and participation of workers without disregarding primary mechanisms of exclusion, such as the option to lay workers off, decision-making hierarchies and formalization (Adler and Borys 1996; Dose 2006). The objective of this is to exploit self-activity as an implicit productive force, while maintaining traditional or renewed hierarchies and forms of domination. Self-activity is deeply ambivalent from the subjects’ perspective, too. It is a necessary activity that takes place under pressure and represents surplus work that is usually neither recognized nor rewarded by the organization. It occurs in overpowering conditions of “passivation”, and in the face of overwhelming predefined situations it even affects the most creative self-will. This leads to attempts to avoid, cover up and displace this surplus work. Workers also tend to restrict themselves to the minimum necessary, trivializing self-activity as natural routine. Incidentally, in spheres of selfactivity we find informal hierarchies and secondary managerial structures alongside moments of egalitarian cooperation (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011). This results in contradictory attitudes among workers ranging from participation and reluctance, to refusing or displacing self-activity as well as

310

HARALD WOLF

to consciously appropriating it and using it to gain power in shopfloor and company struggles. The decisive question therefore is how necessary self-activity is interpreted, framed and used by the actors. How big is the potential for resistance? What are the political implications and perspectives? Is there a path from self-activity to autonomy? If we assume that workers “cannot be considered merely as a hand, as the Taylorist model of organization assumed, or even as a hand and a heart, as the advocates of the humanrelations movement would have it”, but that they are “first and foremost a head, or, in other words, that [they] can exercise [their] freedom” and that this already means being “an autonomous agent” (Crozier and Friedberg 1980, 19), then autonomy has always existed. In this case, freedom and autonomy in work and organization are not political objectives that diverge from the status quo and therefore require realization in the future, they are simply part of the existing reality. However, if the “two fundamental laws” of collective autonomy are summarized as: “No execution [of decisions] without egalitarian participation in the making of decisions; and no law without egalitarian participation in the positing of law” (Castoriadis 1993, 321), then the situation becomes totally different. Such a project of autonomy would represent a radical objective. Besides finding references to forms of real self-activity, it would need rebellious subjectivity in Merton’s sense and open political action to become reality. The seeds of free, self-determined work, contained in the phenomenon of necessary self-activity, will remain insignificant and meaningless so long as they are not planted in the soil of political language and publicity. There is no automatic, pre-given transition from innovative to rebellious forms of self-activity aimed at autonomy that could define and institute its own goals.

III. These points enable us to draw conclusions aimed at providing an understanding of capitalist socialization and its limits. Work as a capitalist institution is, besides market and exchange forms and organization and control structures, based on another essential component: the subjective and cooperative performance associated with self-activity. This is not merely an

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

311

oddment; it keeps the machine running. Bound by a fabric of asymmetrical exchanges and harnessed by “organization”, as a cypher and expression of the control project of instrumental pseudo-rationality, self-activity forms its necessary complement and potential opposite. Capitalist work organization is the contradictory (as it relies on both the inclusion and exclusion of workers and their subjective performances) dominant form of the regulation and use of activities and cooperation. It thrives on the negation and the use of subjective performances (Böhle 1994), and as such, from the exclusion and inclusion of self-activity. As Türk has shown, this form of regulation and use is socially dominant because it fulfils a crucial mediating function in the social universe: it serves as “programmatic dominant filter or distillation flask between living co-operation and real abstract systems” (1995, 201). The functionally differentiated subsystems of economy, politics, education and science, by way of real abstraction, refer to a material environment or lifeworld as their basis. This means that the way in which these references are made is ideological, but that they are always in need of specification and operationalization through programs that still secure a link between the system and the (life)world itself. This form of programming, which orients and constrains, is precisely the modus operandi of formal organizations. The dependence of subsystems on the capitalist master program of domination and appropriation of resources from the outside is mediated by organizational program correspondence, i.e. through the specific form of organization. Work organizations thereby have a multiple mediating function within functionally differentiated capitalist society 5: the transformation of concrete performance and interactions into abstract system functions and vice-versa; the embodiment and reproduction of domination and inequality, and acting as a link between social subsystems. Capitalist work organizations are pseudo-rational and ideological because they constitute a specific form of structurally incomplete domination that is partially blind and therefore contradictory. In organization studies, “bounded rationality” is a common euphemism for the aspects of individual decision-making that correspond to this form of domination (Simon 1976). Yet the causes of the restrictions placed on rationality are social and they result from the meta-norm and meta-structure of capitalist work organizations: the vertical division of work and the social divide between

——————

5 Cf. Uwe Schimank in this volume.

312

HARALD WOLF

people who make decisions and those who receive them, between planning and execution, and between predefinitions and redefinitions of work situations. The information and planning deficiencies that result from these divisions and gaps, despite their differences in form and the fact that they also reach into psychological structures, emerge as part of normality. At the same time, however, this normality is permeated by clandestine deviations and unplanned innovations that take place through cunning executions and creative redefinitions on the part of decision receivers—and this has to occur, otherwise these aspects, which are foreign to but maintain and develop the systems of domination, would not be able to reproduce the system. Self-activity constitutes the system’s lifeblood and poison at the same time: on the one hand, self-activity provides the system with a capacity to adapt and renew itself; on the other hand, it opens up the system and makes it vulnerable to objection and resistance. Sociological organization theories can be classified between the extremes of two views of the organization: the prison and the playing field (Fleming and Spicer 2007, 4–5). The first view, in the tradition of Weber and Foucault, emphasizes control, rationalization and surveillance. The second, in contrast, emphasizes life that rages as part of organizations, deviant behavior and micro-political games (Ortmann et al. 1990). Both views of capitalist work organizations are important, but only if they are connected. By combining them we can develop an understanding in which struggles are fought not only “over work”, but, as constant, ubiquitous and informal fights, in and through work. This form of organization and its specific mode of control and rationalization, to put it more to the point, can only function if it is placed in opposition to spontaneous transgressions of norms and resistance, and the way that these are involved in the usually silent struggle over definitions of working conditions (Castoriadis 1988). This image is anything but static, and is subject to historical change. The metamorphoses of organization and management regimes, which set the historically specific conditions for these struggles and are their results (from Taylorism, human relations and systemic rationalism to corporate culture, networking and marketization), have long been the subject of productive historical and sociological research (Bendix 1956; Barley and Kunda 1993; Wolf 1994; 2008). This corresponds to a concept of work that goes beyond “instrumental rationality” and a view of work and interaction in opposition to one another; a view in which systemically distorted communicative conditions,

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

313

complaints, indignation and criticism are assumed to occur only outside of work organizations. The centrality of the subjective, interactive and political dimensions of work was clearly demonstrated during the Labor Process Debate and the discussions on labor politics and micro-politics in the sociology of work. In order to reach an understanding of these aspects that is applicable to social theory and the critique of capitalism, we will have to drop this conceptual opposition and change our perspective: we need to base our work on the assumption that demands for self-activity are always imposed and repressed. Experiences of these contradictory interpellations shape daily life in work organizations and create knowledge that is morally, practically and politically relevant. Capitalist work organizations have to be understood and explored as spaces of implicit, rudimentary and practical critique of existing social realities. In passing, let me briefly mention that this points not only to theoretical problems but also to methodological problems and the limits of traditional sociology (and the theory of capitalism) (Lefort 1979; Gabler 2009). 6 Can the cracks caused by self-activity be used to blow a political breach in the façade of work organizations and really break up heteronomous forms of organization to make way for autonomous forms? In its varying forms, self-activity represents a hidden, repressed, but instrumentalized element that characterizes dominant social reality and that brings with it the auguries of an alternative form of association. Historically, these forms of association have taken three different directions and, in some exceptional cases, have even been articulated politically. However, they have never been able to establish themselves firmly. This applies to the fragmentary counter-organization of informal groups, the development of qualitative demands with relation to working conditions and forms of organizing work, and “during the phases of social crisis”, when “workers (openly and

——————

6 The possible references and differences of the views sketched here and of “poststructuralist” discourse and power analyses or cultural studies still need to be probed more in depth. Although the former has been accused of functionalism (Honneth 1991, 105ff.), which is incompatible with the proposed perspective, we can still find affinities with the view of the organization as a fighting arena (from the perspective of sociology of work, see Moldaschl 2002). The arts and practices of everyday (Certeau 1998) that are the object of cultural studies are analyzed first and foremost in terms of the consumer’s role. Workers and consumers, however, share the active appropriation of the existing; but the worker is always in a dual role: workers are the “consumers” of predefinitions and have to produce at the same time. In this case, the skills applied are proven in more restrictive conditions, as solutions are needed directly.

314

HARALD WOLF

directly) demand the control of production [and attempt] to realize this (Russia 1917–18, Cataluña 1936–7, Hungary 1956)” (Castoriadis 1997, 80). What is occurring in this context in the current social crisis? In the wake of the last world economic and financial crisis, critique has begun to return, and it is focused on the capitalist logic of the market and exchange (Neumann 2010, 156ff.). This criticism is also directed at neoliberal discourse, which has faced considerable difficulties recently, but that is nothing less than an extremely harsh example of repressing and ignoring the problems that result from the dominance of the logic of capitalist forms of organization and control, as manifested in the domination of large international corporations (Crouch 2011, 49ff.). Concerning the critique of this logic of organization and control, subjective distancing has articulated itself rather individually and negatively, with the resulting cases of depression and suicide. At the same time, open resistance is expressed in more conformist forms, such as through acceptance of traditional representative organizations, rather than through collective, rebellious demands and the self-confident development and unfolding of self-activity and selfdetermination. It remains to be seen whether the new movements for social alternatives can put the radical question of autonomous social labor—and with it the question of democracy at work—back on the political agenda. It is not easy raising the issue of the displaced experiences of spontaneity and implicit criticism of capitalist work organization. Doing so depends on the creation of an alternative public, where the articulation of these experiences could flow into an understanding of how to exit the current social crisis (Neumann 2010, 167–8). However, this is faced by the widespread habit of focusing on the “big questions” of economy and politics. Nevertheless, the “slow formation” of an anonymous working life under the conditions of capitalist work organizations is “of equal importance to the explosion of history; for, in the anonymous life, the particles accumulate into an explosive force” (Giedion 1969, 3).

Works Cited Ackroyd, Stephen, and Paul Thompson (1999). Organizational Misbehaviour. London: Sage.

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

315

Adler, Paul S., and Bryan Borys (1996). Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 61–89. Barley, Stephen R., and Gideon Kunda (1993). Design and devotion: surges of rational and normative ideologies of control in management discourse. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 363–399. Bendix, Reinhard (1956). Work and Authority in Industry. Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization. New York: Wiley. Bensmann, Joseph and Israel Gerver (1963). Crime and Punishment in the Factory: The Function of Deviance in Maintaining the Social System. American Sociological Review, 28(4), 588–598. Böhle, Fritz (1994). Negation und Nutzung subjektivierenden Arbeitshandelns bei neuen Formen qualifizierter Produktionsarbeit. In Niels Beckenbach and Werner van Treeck (eds.). Umbrüche gesellschaftlicher Arbeit, 183–206. Göttingen: Schwartz. Böhle, Fritz (2010). Arbeit als Handeln. In Fritz Böhle, G. Günter Voß and Günther Wachtler (eds.). Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie, 151–176. Wiesbaden: VS. Böhle, Fritz, and Annegret Bolte (2002). Die Entdeckung des Informellen. Der schwierige Umgang mit Kooperation im Arbeitsalltag. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Castoriadis, Cornelius (1988). On the Content of Socialism, III: The Workers’ Struggle against the Organization of the Capitalist Enterprise. In Conrad Castoriadis. Political and Social Writings. Vol. 2 (1955–1960): From the Workers’ Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 155–192. Castoriadis, Cornelius (1993). Political and Social Writings. Vol. 3 (1961–1979): Recommencing the Revolution: From Socialism to Autonomous Society. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press. Castoriadis, Cornelius (1997). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Certeau, Michel de (1998). The practice of everyday life. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press. Crouch, Colin (2011). The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity. Crozier, Michel, and Erhard Friedberg (1980). Actors and Systems. The Politics of Collective Action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Diefenbach, Thomas, and John A. A. Sillince (2011). Formal and Informal Hierarchy in Different Types of Organization. Organization Studies, 32(11), 1515–1537. Dose, Carsten (2006). Flexible Bürokratie. Zur Logik aktueller Rationalisierungstendenzen bei Finanzdienstleistern. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag. Ekardt, Hanns-Peter, Heike Hengstenberg, and Reiner Löffler (1988). Subjektivität und die Stofflichkeit des Arbeitsprozesses. In Rudi Schmiede (ed.). Arbeit und Subjektivität. Beiträge zu einer Tagung der Sektion Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie (Kassel 21.–23.05.1987), 101–141. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften.

316

HARALD WOLF

Fleming, Peter, and André Spicer (2007). Contesting the Corporation. Struggle, Power and Resistance in Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fortado, Bruce (2011). A Field Exploration of Informal Workplace Communication. Sociology Mind, 1(4), 212–220. Friedberg, Erhard (1995). Ordnung und Macht. Dynamiken organisierten Handelns. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Friedeburg, Ludwig von (1963). Soziologie des Betriebsklimas, Studien zur Deutung empirischer Untersuchungen in industriellen Großbetrieben. Frankfurt M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Gabler, Andrea (2009). Antizipierte Autonomie. Zur Theorie und Praxis der Gruppe “Socialisme ou Barbarie” (1949–1967). Hannover: Offizin. Geoffroy, Francis (2011). Penser l’informel. Non-concept ou méta-concept pour le management?. Revue international de Psychologie, 17(43), 49–62. Giddens, Anthony (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giedion, Siegfried (1969). Mechanization takes Command. A Contribution to Anonymous History. New York/London: Norton & Company. Gukenbiehl, Hermann L. (1999). Formelle und informelle Gruppe als Grundformen sozialer Strukturbildung. In Bernhard Schäfers (ed.). Einführung in die Gruppensoziologie. Geschichte, Theorien, Analysen, 80–96. Wiesbaden: Quelle & Meyer. Hodson, Randy (1991). The Active Worker: Autonomy and Compliance at the Workplace. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 20(1), 47–78. Honneth, Axel (1991). The critique of power: reflective stages in a critical social theory. Cambridge MA/London: The MIT Press. Joas, Hans (1997). The Creativity of Action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kern, Bärbel (1999). Arbeitsgruppen im Industriebetrieb. In Bernhard Schäfers (ed.). Einführung in die Gruppensoziologie. Geschichte, Theorien, Analysen, 194–226. Wiesbaden: Quelle & Meyer. Kern, Horst, and Michael Schumann (1977). Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewußtsein. Eine empirische Untersuchung über den Einfluß der aktuellen technischen Entwicklung auf die industrielle Arbeit und das Arbeiterbewußtsein. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Kieser, Alfred (1999). Human Relations-Bewegung und Organisationspsychologie. In Alfred Kieser (ed.). Organisationstheorien, 101–131. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Kumbruck, Christel (2001). Was ist Kooperation? Kooperation im Lichte der Tätigkeitstheorie. Arbeit, 10(2), 149–166. Lefort, Claude (1979). L’expérience prolétarienne. In Claude Lefort (ed.). Éléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 71–97. Paris: Gallimard. Löffler, Rainer (1991). Die Definition von Arbeitssituationen. Plädoyer für eine neue Arbeitssoziologie. Göttingen/Augsburg: Cromm. Lüdtke, Alf (ed.). (1995). The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CAPITALIST WORK ORGANIZATION AND SELF-ACTIVITY

317

Luhmann, Niklas (1964). Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Manske, Fred (1987). Ende oder Wandel des Taylorismus?. Soziale Welt, 38(2), 166–180. Merton, Robert K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. Moldaschl, Manfred (2002). Foucaults Brille. Eine Möglichkeit, die Subjektivierung von Arbeit zu verstehen?. In Manfred Moldaschl and G. Günter Voß (eds.). Subjektivierung von Arbeit, 135–176. München: Rainer Hampp. Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2008). Industrielle Demokratie—Von der repräsentativen Mitbestimmung zur direkten Partizipation. In Walter Müller-Jentsch (ed.). Arbeit und Bürgerstatus. Studien zur sozialen und industriellen Demokratie, 173–179. Wiesbaden: VS. Neumann, Alexander (2010). Kritische Arbeitssoziologie. Ein Abriss. Stuttgart: Schmetterling. Ortmann, Günther, Arnold Windeler, Albrecht Becker, and Hans-Joachim Schulz (1990). Computer und Macht in Organisationen. Mikropolitische Analysen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Popitz, Heinrich, Hans Paul Bahrdt, Ernst August Jüres, and Hanno Kesting (1957). Technik und Industriearbeit. Soziologische Untersuchungen in der Hüttenindustrie. Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck. Schimank, Uwe (2002). Technik, Subjektivität und Kontrolle in formalen Organisationen. In Uwe Schimank. Das zwiespältige Individuum. Zum Person-GesellschaftArrangement der Moderne, 49–64. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Schwartz, Yves (2004). La conceptualisation de travail, le visible et l’invisible. L’Homme et la Société (152–153), 47–77. Simon, Herbert A. (1976). Administrative Behavior. A study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press. Türk, Klaus (1995). “Die Organisation der Welt”. Herrschaft durch Organisation in der modernen Gesellschaft. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Waldenfels, Bernhard (2008). Symbolische, kreative und responsive Aspekte des Handelns. In Bernhard Waldenfels. Grenzen der Normalisierung. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 2. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Wiesenthal, Helmut (2005). Markt, Organisation und Gemeinschaft als ‘zweitbeste’ Verfahren sozialer Koordination. In Wieland Jäger and Uwe Schimank (eds.). Organisationsgesellschaft. Facetten und Perspektiven, 223–264. Wiesbaden: VS. Wolf, Harald (1994). Rationalisierung und Partizipation. Leviathan, 22(4), 243–259. Wolf, Harald (1999). Arbeit und Autonomie. Ein Versuch über Widersprüche und Metamorphosen kapitalistischer Produktion. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Wolf, Harald (2008). Die duale Institution der Arbeit und der neue(ste) Geist des Kapitalismus. Einige Anmerkungen zu einer Anmerkung. In Philipp Hessinger and Gabriele Wagner (eds.). Ein neuer Geist des Kapitalismus?. 219–231. Wiesbaden: VS.

Work and Consumption: A New Perspective for Economic Democracy Jörn Lamla

1. Introduction What kind of society do we live in? Is it still a wage labor society? Did it become a consumer society long ago? Or is it simply wrong to think in terms of such an alternative because both concepts are right, or because neither of them are really adequate? More than anything else, it is probably the very uncertainty surrounding these categories 1 that makes them analytically useful. We are seeing social transformations that deeply affect work and employment but also change people’s private lives beyond the workplace, raising the question of how the reorganization of these spheres affects other areas of action and world-relations, especially the political public as well as the formation of a collective political will and the capacities for collective decision-making. They also raise the question of which axis has the lead role in this concert of social forces, if one can be identified at all. These questions are hardly new. I will briefly recapitulate some important interpretations before I set out my own argument for why another change of perspective is needed today. I will commence with those contributions which argue that the wage labor society has either undergone fundamental changes, has come to an end, or is beset by a structural crisis. How do those contributions relate these shifts to the changes in consumption and its social importance as well as the transformation of democracy with its necessary references to the common good and structures of political regulation (2)? I contend that the recent shifts within and between the spheres of work, consumption and politics are not yet adequately explained

——————

1 Theories of functional differentiation may be better able to deal with this uncertainty, but the price they pay for increased abstraction is a lack of historical specificity with regard to the object of their research. They are then forced to compensate for that through attempts at re-specification (see, for example, Schimank 2009).

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

319

and described by these various approaches (3). Therefore, I suggest a different interpretation: wage labor society, consumer society and democracy are affected by a comprehensive transformation that points to new structural uncertainties as well as experimental processes of societal restructuring which create chances for a transition to consumer and economic democracy (4). However, the theoretical model of democratic experimentalism, which I suggest for the analysis of this transformation, should not conceal the difficulties that arise because economic democracy continues to be confronted with a society whose economic structure is capitalist (5).

2. Wage Labor Society and/or Consumer Society? A Few Classic Tales (of Decline) For Hannah Arendt, wage labor society and consumers’ society are closely connected. She regards “A consumers’ society” (Arendt 1998, 126) as merely the sad condition of a wage labor society that has run out of labor. In her view, both belong to the “yoke of necessity” which, since the beginning of modern times, has triumphed over the sphere of public action, marginalizing those genuinely political concerns that aim at the universal, the mediation of plural standpoints, historical memory, and the creation of lasting values that transcend the limits of individual existence. Consumption, therefore, constitutes a residual form of activity in a dual sense. Firstly, it is not accorded an autonomous status, unlike work and the production of things. The increasing automatization of labor leaves opening one’s mouth to eat as the last remaining human effort (ibid., 130). But the human appetite grows to the extent to which increasing productivity leaves the animal laborans with more time at its disposal. Therefore, the residual activity of consumption expands strongly nonetheless: “That these appetites become more sophisticated, so that consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on the superfluities of life, does not change the character of this society, but harbors the grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption.” (Arendt 1998, 133)

Secondly, Arendt argues that the distance remains undiminished between the “realm of necessity”, to which consumption and work belong, and the “realm of freedom”, where the polity’s collective reflexive communication

320

JÖRN LAMLA

takes place—even though their relation has also changed as the concerns of private life had long taken over and swamped the public sphere in their hedonistic pursuit of happiness. For Arendt, the “realm of freedom” only becomes reality when people enter into conversation unburdened by the constraints of economic reproduction and when they communicate with each other and act collectively in recognition of their plurality. To reactivate these abilities it would be necessary to take a step back from life activities whose only purpose is earthly happiness or spiritual welfare and to revive practices of meaningful world appropriation which can halt and reverse the extraordinary “loss of human experience” (Arendt 1998, 321) of the modern individual. However, the colonization of the public sphere by the animal laborans, whose instrumental capacities have long been expanded to cooperative behavior and the political assembling of the collective (ibid., 324), has reached a point where there is little hope of such reactivation. Ralf Dahrendorf (1980) also shares this pessimistic view that the increasing loss of meaning is accompanied by a lack of possibilities of compensating for this “disappearance of the wage labor society”. Like others, he emphasizes the structural vacuum that the decreasing relevance of labor has left and which consumer society cannot really fill. Unlike Hannah Arendt, however, he does not treat the need for meaning as something external to life chances, which modernity has vastly expanded. Instead he considers this need as a constitutive element of modernity. Dahrendorf sees life chances as determined by options, especially rights to and offers of something, as well as ligatures, which provide orientation in the face of extensive choice and also create social bonds. The wage labor society, he argues, vastly increased the former, especially by reducing the necessary life working time, but also left a kind of generalized “teenage gap”, that is, a great need for orientation and meaning: “In the world’s developed societies, the question of the possibility of human flourishing, of greater life chances, will be a question of ligatures, and the crucial challenge is to create new ligatures without endangering the options created by the wage labor society” (ibid., 756). These bonds, however, would have to emerge from the “autonomous activity of the many” and therefore from within a new “market society” (ibid., 758), because government policies could at best improve some conditions for the emergence of ligatures, but they could not create new bonds from above or outside. This is where Dahrendorf diverges from Hannah Arendt. The realm of freedom is no longer diamet-

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

321

rically opposed to the realm of necessity; it can and must take shape within the spheres of work and leisure, although Dahrendorf continues to prioritize the wage labor over the consumer society. The joy of “free activity”, whether formerly illegal moonlighting, life-long learning or a universal social service, reveals work-centered thinking, whereas consumption is still regarded with suspicion. Claus Offe (1984) was the first to draw attention to consumption as meaningful activity by highlighting the relative loss of importance of work as a key sociological category resulting from the structural crisis of the wage labor society. 2 In order to come up with a “contemporary interpretation of the biblical Sabbath commandment”, he takes from Habermas (and therefore, in a way, also from Arendt) the analytical distinction between system and lifeworld, that is between the spheres of material reproduction and those dedicated to symbolic reproduction: “When social consciousness can no longer be reconstructed as class consciousness, when cognitive culture is no longer primarily focused on the development of the productive forces, when the political system is no longer primarily concerned with safeguarding relations of production and managing distributional conflicts, and when questions that can be answered in terms of scarcity and income are no longer at the heart of the problems that society sees itself as confronted with, the obvious need arises for a conceptual map that can chart those areas of social reality that are not fully determined by the sphere of work and production.” (Offe 1984, 36–7)

However, Offe argues that both theory and practice have a hard time making the transition to the other, still under-determined side of social reproduction, mainly because society is still predominantly organized along the lines of capitalist valorization and commodification. 3 Under these circumstances, the productive paradigm of wage labor society maintains its grip on the practices of private consumption as well as the public sphere of the political creation of meaning. Offe does focus more on the private household, but he conceives of it as a sphere of alternative forms of welfare production as if it still had to measure up to the efficiency standards of the capitalist labor market (cf. Offe and Heinze 1986). He also argues that

——————

2 There are, of course, a whole range of other theories and interpretations that have conceptually described the transition from the wage labor to the consumer society in more depth, e.g. the post-materialism hypothesis and many others. 3 Apart from the legal and institutional constraints of the labor market that rest on its power of monetary sanction, symbolic sources that derive from the capitalist reservoir of myths must also be taken into account. See the famous study of David Riesman et al. (1989, esp. 169–170) as well as Lamla (2010a) who draws on it.

322

JÖRN LAMLA

politics cannot be solely based on the consumers as organizational units of those publicly articulated interests and concerns that cut across the wage labor society as long as they stand in immediate opposition to a workforce that is unionized and organized at the plant level (cf. Offe 1981). I will get back to this issue later (5). Before that, I will continue to trace the transformation of the wage labor and consumer society until the present era, following Dahrendorf’s and, in particular, Offe’s more optimistic appraisal (compared to Hannah Arendt) of these shifting boundaries (3). I will then (4) try to describe it with the help of new theoretical concepts: today, to paraphrase Latour, the advanced hybridization of work, consumption and politics opens the possibility of a new perspective on “things”.

3. Work, Consumption and Politics Today: from Boundary Shifts to their Dissolution? The debate on the “end of the wage labor society” still focused on the shifting boundaries between activities whose empirical separateness is beyond doubt. What characterizes current trends is that these boundaries seem to become blurred in an ever-increasing number of zones (cf. Kenning/Lamla 2018). The decisive question is not so much whether or not work is becoming less relevant, whether as a result of the (currently slowing) reduction of average lifetime working hours, a diversification of acquisition motives, the growth of the service sector, or the increasing importance of new problems that transcend the productive paradigm. What we are witnessing instead is a structural transformation of capitalist societies that reshuffles and rearranges the spheres of work, consumption and the political public in many ways. This changes the conditions for all attempts to secure democratic power and influence for the “realm of freedom” in capitalist society. Some of these current changes are briefly listed here: a) The first area of change concerns the quest for meaning and need for understanding that Arendt and Dahrendorf identified as problems for a disappearing wage labor society and which belong to the area of ligatures or symbolic reproduction. These questions of meaning have become central to a marketing-driven wage labor and consumer society in which the material values of production have long taken the back seat to the symbolic

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

323

value of the product. The “weightless economy” (cf. Hutton and Giddens 2000; Castells 2009) of large transnational brand corporations is the paradigm for a society in which these cultural goods have degenerated to the point where they appear to be completely at the mercy of industrialized and mass-mediatized private capital accumulation. However, the relationship between suppliers, consumers and the public is not quite so straightforward. The consumers’ active intangible cooperation is required even in the case of commercial branding because their narratives and lifestyles play a role in generating and reproducing the symbolic capital from which corporations profit (cf. Arvidsson 2006; Lamla 2008). The “economy of signs” (cf. Lash and Urry 1994) is dependent on public communication and cannot be manipulated and used at will, which explains, for example, why certain segments of it have become infused with ethical significance (e.g. corporate social responsibility or sustainable consumption). b) It is not just in the area of symbolic reproduction that consumers are increasingly being integrated into chains of value creation. This applies to the most diverse areas of productive labor. The systematic integration of consumers into the production process, which, following Alvin Toffler (1980), is currently being discussed under the title of “prosumption”, affects many aspects of company restructuring; from crowdsourcing of simple tasks and individualized mass production to the open innovation approach, that is, the opening-up of creative departments to the suggestions of lead users and other competent or interested actors in a company’s environment (cf. Reichwald and Piller 2006; Voß and Rieder 2005). It is a highly controversial question whether these trends merely expand the boundaries of capitalist accumulation and therefore represent a new stage of capitalist Landnahme (cf. Dörre 2015), or whether they improve the chances of a far-ranging democratization of the economy, that is, of a different organization of production under public control (cf. Benkler 2006, who starts from the model of social peer-to-peer production). c) By changing the communicative infrastructure, the digital technology of new media—especially the “social web” (Ebersbach et al. 2011) and mobile internet—also changes the conditions and possibilities of reorganizing economic policy bargaining. In the first place, this concerns networking among consumers which can now assume many different formats (cf. Bieber and Lamla 2005). Of course, technological opportunities as such do not guarantee that consumers develop new avenues of participation and citizenship or develop new forms of collective representation of interests (cf.

324

JÖRN LAMLA

Baringhorst 2007; 2009). It would also be premature to infer from the existence of technological potentials and the first signs of digital networking among consumers that this will necessarily contribute to economic democracy by creating new ligatures. Instead it might also contribute to the segmentation and fragmentation of social worlds in the market society (see Lamla 2010b). Such reservations, however, do not detract from the fact that the internet is modifying the balance of forces and role identities of actors between the social worlds of production, consumption and politics, and that new possibilities and challenges are being created for rethinking this new field of forces and for coming up with new constitutional and procedural designs and provisions for appropriate arenas of negotiation. d) Government policy will have to respond to these challenges to the extent to which public attention focuses on the problems that result from the world society’s economic interdependence, especially the ecological and social side effects of capitalist growth imperatives and consumption patterns in welfare societies. Of course, no automatism should be assumed. The reactions to the current financial crisis demonstrate how the logic of economic system reproduction (restoration of the ability to pay) may ultimately manage to insulate itself and become autonomous again, despite all efforts at external (re)programming. However, the public also perceives this autonomous logic as a problem, to the point that even conservative and formerly neoliberal leaders now feel queasy when they consider the global dependencies and temporal contingencies that their polities have exposed themselves to thanks to their capitalist economic and financial constitution. Calls for a financial transaction tax and the willingness to introduce it regionally if necessary, or the fearful reactions to the verdicts of rating agencies, demonstrate how far the economic order of modernity has now turned against its own supporters, and how it is therefore threatened by a loss of legitimacy and on the verge of becoming reflexive. Therefore, political attempts to contain the markets are likely to increase again. But given the various economic, ecological and social dimensions of the problem, a policy of sustainability can no longer proceed one-dimensionally; it must integrate the different stakeholder groups and bring together consumers and workers in new (for example transnational) ways. The current tendency of work, consumption and politics to blend into one another by no means implies that the critique of capitalism must necessarily continue to remain muted, as was the case when all productive and reproductive activities were geared towards the standards of artistic cri-

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

325

tique; authenticity and autonomy, individual self-realization and independence (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). The current journalistic critique of consumerism, for example, articulates a much broader range of arguments and attacks against the capitalist economy (cf. Lamla 2013, 119–181). 4 The main difficulty lies in gathering and aggregating the various arguments and suggestions for reform in a way that makes it possible to articulate an agenda for collective action. In other words: the boundaries between work, consumption and politics are now in flux, and this subjects wage labor society, consumer society and democracy to a comprehensive transformation that causes much uncertainty, but also creates the chance of changing the balance of forces in different fields of activity. Whether or not this will be successful also depends on unevenly distributed power resources, but mostly on their more or less felicitous initial constellation. To clarify and support this point, I will now present a different theoretical perspective on the development of the wage labor and consumer society.

4. Parliaments of Things: Democratic Experimentalism as Analytical Framework The theoretical framework that I propose for reconstructing the current (and potential) restructuring of the wage labor and consumer society draws on the experimentalist models of democracy of John Dewey (1954) and Bruno Latour (2004). The fundamental pragmatist notion that collective learning takes place through experimental processes that transform a confused and unsettled situation into one that allows new habits to develop and stabilize can be applied to the current condition of the wage labor and consumer society. Analytically, this privileges the open-ended search for collective solutions over a model that explains conflicts a priori in terms of

——————

4 By publicly highlighting economic chains of interdependence through critical discussion of consumption patterns and the problems they create, the critique of consumerism offers a chance of focusing again on the connection between social and artistic critique. Above all, this draws more attention to transnational social inequalities. It also makes the economic power game of consumption-mediated aesthetic distinctions become reflexive. Therefore, a certain degree of shifting the critique of capitalism from work issues to consumption issues does not necessarily reinforce the erosion of solidarity in society. This only happens when practices of individual consumption as such are already seen as solutions to the previously identified problems.

326

JÖRN LAMLA

power differentials and the associated interests of existing groups or collectives. 5 First, I will briefly describe this perspective in its theoretical context before I apply it to the multiple processes of experimental reorganization which are taking place today between the social worlds and activity fields of work, consumption and politics within the framework of the capitalist order. Dewey’s point of departure is the growth of social interdependencies as a result of the unintended consequences of action. The global interdependencies of the modern economy with their ecological and social side effects are a prime example of his growth of the “Great Society”. Dewey’s evolutionary model of the state and democracy assumes that a public sphere emerges around these interdependent side effects of action, provided that they have a certain regularity and do not just concern private affairs but point to a general need for regulation. This public in turn is the starting point and space for reflection of an experimenting community which uses its intellectual capacities to find collective rules for the problem that has been identified and ultimately institutionalizes them in the state. In a sense, states themselves are the experiments: “By its very nature, a state is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. Almost as soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be re-made” (Dewey 1954, 31–2). The requirement that state solutions for publicly identified interdependencies and side effects of action must prove themselves in practice is far from trivial. 6 It requires the transformation of a systemic nexus of action into the shared experience of all those who are affected or participate and thus the creation or regrowth of a “Great Community” whose common interest is then administered through state regulation. Thus the theoretical model develops the connection between democracy, understood as “the idea of community life itself” (Dewey 1954, 148), and the experimental logic of collective problem solving in a community of researchers. The Logic of Inquiry (Dewey 1938), which provides the necessary methodological foundation for processes of experi-

——————

5 This is not to deny the importance of power differentials. But the deployment of power resources is seen here as secondary mechanism of closure or short-cutting strategy that is used because the experimental openness of the situation threatens to overwhelm the actors. Their problem is that they are incapable of producing new collective beliefs, certainties or ligatures (with the exception of charismatic authority) and therefore have insufficient mobilizing power. 6 One should avoid the kind of instrumentalist misinterpretations of American pragmatism that were especially typical of early Critical Theory (see, for example, Horkheimer 1947).

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

327

mental problem solving, does not constitute an expertocracy because it is itself fundamentally based on principles of publicity and adherence to rules of procedure (of problem exploration, of defining a problem by ordering the components of a situation, of developing hypothetical solutions through (thought) experiments, of recording and symbolically processing the results, and of requiring practical proof). 7 The explanatory shortcomings of this model are mainly the result of the insufficient empirical realization of such a sophisticated public. 8 It would be wrong to dismiss this model immediately because it idealizes public experimentation. To support this point I will use a second approach to determine whether its empirical relevance is not, in fact, fairly high. If we start, like Bruno Latour, from the “things”, that is, the divisive “matters of concern” which characterize our high-tech age, the analytical and diagnostic value of the experimentalist theory of democracy becomes apparent. Latour’s “parliament of things” (2004) 9 is basically just a contemporary version of pragmatist theory; modernity covertly multiplies the hybrid networks whose problematic consequences lead to the convocation of assemblies over these “things” that, in their turn, recompose the collective through the methods of science, politics, economy and ethics in (more or less) orderly procedures, and—in the long run—create the good common world of a cosmopolitan order. These processes of reassembling the collective take place as processes of experimental learning whose stages or procedural steps—from initial perplexity to renewed institutionalization—are very similar to the Logic of Inquiry. Latour’s ethnographic descriptions and ethnomethodological reconstructions of the processes of integration, relevance testing, hierarchization or selective restriction of this plurality of problemrelated propositions which are being fed into the assembly by representatives already indicate that this analytical model is also empirically useful. This

——————

7 “[…] for Democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion. [...] It will have its own consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication.” (Dewey 1954, 184) 8 It should have become clear that pragmatism develops its own answers to the questions that were raised above with reference to Hannah Arendt, Ralf Dahrendorf and others: where public freedom can be located in modern society and how new ligatures can form there. 9 Translator’s note: The author refers to the German translation of Latour’s Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie from 1999. Unlike the English translation, which follows the French and is entitled Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, the German translation is called Das Parlament der Dinge: für eine politische Ökologie (literally: The Parliament of Things: Towards a Political Ecology).

328

JÖRN LAMLA

applies to the most diverse contemporary disputes; whether it is the introduction of a new recycling bin, which can be seen as an experimental response to the global competition for scarce raw materials (“urban mining”), or the consequences of industrialized agriculture for consumers, animals, developing countries, the global climate and so on which every new crisis brings to the fore again. It makes analytical and methodological sense not simply to presuppose such social groups or entities, but to demonstrate how they are produced and related to each other in specific ways through different propositions or blueprints for order in the course of conflict bargaining (cf. Latour 2005, 27–42). 10 What remains to be seen is whether this model also proves empirically valid by adequately describing the shifts and uncertainties that affect the boundaries between work, consumption and politics, or, in other words, the erosion of the wage labor and consumer society in contemporary capitalism and its attendant opportunities for and tendencies towards a transformation to economic democracy. In concluding, I will examine this question.

5. Economic Democracy and the Theory of Capitalism Marx (1999, 115–19) already examined the multifaceted hybrid relation between production and consumption. His analysis provides a backdrop for how the perspective of experimental reassembling and institutional reconfiguration, which is rooted in this theory of democracy, can be applied to the empirically observable economic transformations of the 21st century. Marx makes a distinction between three different kinds of connections in production and consumption. At first, they are not opposed at all and should therefore be regarded as immediately identical, for every production is the consumption of something (resources, power, time, etc.) and every consumption also creates something (labor power, social ties, leisure, etc.). So why do economists insist that these categories are distinct? According

——————

10 The propositions presented in a dispute can also be used to examine what the different regimes of justification are that are opposed to each other or mediated in compromise, and how that happens (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). This shows how processes of normative renewal take place in society and the economy through multiple “parliaments of things”.

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

329

to Marx, secondly, the reason is that activities in which production and consumption appear as each other’s mediating opposite have become separate from each other. They are externally related as means and ends and refer to one another in this relation. Producing a shoe is not the same as wearing it, but the means-ends relation makes them dependent on each other. This implies that these activities must mutually re-present each other in some way. This, thirdly, raises the question of how this relation of representation is organized in society. “Production is not only simultaneously consumption, and consumption simultaneously production; nor is production only a means of consumption and consumption the purpose of production—i.e. each provides the other with its object, production supplying the external object of consumption, and consumption the conceptual object of production—in other words, each of them is not only simultaneously the other, and not merely the cause of the other, but each of them by being carried through creates the other, it creates itself as the other.” (Marx 1999, 118)

Marx’ dialectical argument describes the sublation of a practical contradiction. It addresses the question of how that which is different can form a unity without dissolving that difference. The answer, in my view, ultimately lies in the social organization of the connection between production and consumption; this organization is subject to historical change and therefore the object of continuous struggle and disputes. In this dialectical perspective, the mutual representation of production and consumption remains a persistent problem that continuously stimulates the search for new solutions through collective regulation and establishes democratic experimenttalism in the economic sphere. From this perspective, the existing institutions of the market and the wage labor contract appear as a highly deficient format for the mediation between production and consumption that largely neutralizes the social context. They only draw attention to seemingly individual program of work and consumption: either because a constantly threatened existence leaves no choice but to work in order to eat, or because marketing and advertising, as well as the practices of shopping as experience, actively promote ignorance of all the other people who play a role in creating options of consumption. In a way this was obvious to all; Fordism still represented a collective program of consumption and production, although representational deficits did exist between the sexes and with regard to ecological consequences. Today, renewed efforts are necessary to draw the public’s attention to

330

JÖRN LAMLA

the fact that economic status competition and notions of authenticity regarding the culture of consumption are far from individual affairs. However, to the extent to which the reciprocal representation of those who participate in, or are positively or negatively affected by, the networks of the wage labor and consumer society becomes a matter of public debate, experiments in economic democracy will come to the fore again which might offer better chances of articulating the different perspectives and propositions to unite them in a common order. The crucial question is now whether—as one might argue with Marx— it is a sign of the utmost naiveté or even blindness to the nature of capitalism to claim—following Latour and Dewey—that such economicdemocratic experimentalism is already taking place in the contemporary wage labor and consumer society. This question deserves careful consideration; however one chooses to answer it. Doubts are certainly warranted, and there are good reasons—especially from the perspective of a theory of capitalism—not to have very high hopes that the shifting boundaries and new communicative relations between work and consumption will, in combination with political and digital experiments that aim for reassembling the collective, lead to extensive economic democratization. It would be equally wrong, however, to downplay the potential of these changes too much. They certainly have not worsened the conditions for extensive experiments in economic democracy. I want to illustrate both these views by referencing observations that Claus Offe (1984) made more than 30 years ago about “strategic alternatives for consumer policy”. Offe opposes the differentiation of consumer policy as an independent policy field which only deals with consumption and consumer interests and favors its de-differentiation in a comprehensive “product-centered consumer policy” (Offe 1984, 234). He particularly has in mind the organizational advantages of well-established representation at the trade union and plant level, as opposed to the heterogeneous, abstractly defined and weakly organized consumers. Provided that their horizons are expanded accordingly, those advantages could be used to lend more weight to consumptionrelated concerns in the areas of labor, plant-level and product policies (such as humane working conditions, energy consumption, reducing pollution, production of use values, etc.). But why does he advocate such a reorganization of the representative relation between work and consumption? Is this another case of sociology’s mythical obsession with the wage labor society? Does the author reproduce once again the deep-seated dis-

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

331

trust of any form of “consumer democracy”? No, there is a different reason. As I understand it, the object of that distrust is capitalism as institutional order. Offe sees the position of consumers as determined by a process of differentiation whose inevitable result, in capitalist society, is to make sure that consumer interests remain structurally under-represented in the power game between corporations, organized labor and the state: “not one player alone [...] is in a position to determine outcomes unilaterally” (Offe 1984, 221–2). In capitalism, company earnings or profitability remain the overriding concern for private producers and suppliers. They only increase the benefits to consumers insofar as it serves this goal. Moreover, given the state’s structural interest in economic growth, employment and tax revenues, it can only support consumer interests in so far as it does not alienate the suppliers and scares away their capital. This insight leads Offe to conclude that “consumers can only acquire the power necessary for the realization of their interests as consumers by structurally combining their interests in consumption with productive and political functions” (1984, 230). From where we stand today, I believe we must both agree and disagree with Offe’s argument. It is still correct to draw on the theory of capitalism in warning against a naïve, but currently widespread, belief in consumer power or consumer democracy which regards the consumer as the new sovereign who, as it were, civilizes global market society from within. However, Offe’s detailed suggestions for how to integrate productive, consumption-related and political functions are less appropriate today. We are currently seeing a hybridization that bears little similarity to the organizational model of “production-centered consumer policy”. What Offe may not have been able to see at the time are the developments that increase, modify and render reflexive the interdependencies between work, consumption and politics in a way that has triggered an open-ended public search for new ways of regulating the resulting web. In the course of this, the certainties of all participants and stakeholders are shaken up, which means that the rules of the power game can also change. Where he opts for strategic integration rather than differentiation of consumer policy, his arguments dovetail completely with the theoretical model of democratic experimentalism. As he writes, “The aim of this second type of strategy is to overcome the structural differentiation between manufacturers and suppliers, the state and consumers [...]. In other words, the aim is not to strengthen or weaken actors’ positions within the ‘game’ of consumer policy but rather to reorganize or reconstitute the game and its actors” (Offe

332

JÖRN LAMLA

1984, 229). Latour could not have said it better. However, when it comes to the question of how exactly the collective should be re-congregated and reassembled, the public needs more room for experimentation than is granted by Offe who only envisions three possibilities: a state-centered planned economy that, for historical reasons, is not worthy of further elaboration; a production system that is more strongly oriented towards consumption or households; or finally the production-centered consumer policy. What gets lost here is the possibility of innovative forms of government regulation and framing which could reconnect capitalism’s complex web of action with the public deliberations of an economically democratic polity.

Works Cited Arendt, Hannah (1998). The Human Condition. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Arvidsson, Adam (2006). Brands. Meaning and value in media culture. London/New York: Routledge. Baringhorst, Sigrid (2007). Konsumenten als Netizens. Das Internet als ambivalentes Medium für ein Empowerment von Verbrauchern. In Sigrid Baringhorst, Veronika Kneip, Annegret März and Johanna Niesyto (eds.). Politik mit dem Einkaufswagen. Unternehmen und Konsumenten als Bürger in der globalen Mediengesellschaft, 81–108. Bielefeld: transkript. Baringhorst, Sigrid (2009). Politischer Konsumerismus im Netz – Chancen und Probleme demokratischer Protestpolitik. In Christoph Bieber, Martin Eifert, Thomas Groß and Jörn Lamla (eds.). Soziale Netze in der digitalen Welt. Das Internet zwischen egalitärer Teilhabe und ökonomischer Macht, 179–202. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Benkler, Yochai (2006). The Wealth of Networks. How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Bieber, Christoph, and Jörn Lamla (2005). Das Netz der Konsumenten. Innovationschancen der Verbraucherbewegung im Internet. Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, 18(4), 65–77. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot (2006). On Justification. The Economies of Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

WORK AND CONSUMPTION

333

Castells, Manuel (2009). The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture Volume I. 2nd Edition with a New Preface. Hoboken: WileyBlackwell. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1980). Im Entschwinden der Arbeitsgesellschaft. Merkur, 34(8), 749–760. Dewey, John (1954). The Public and its Problems. Chicago: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press. Dewey, John (1938). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Dörre, Klaus (2015). The New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Market Capitalism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 11–68. London/New York: Verso. Ebersbach, Anja, Markus Glaser and Richard Heigl (2011). Social Web. 2nd Edition. Konstanz: UVK. Horkheimer, Max (1947). Eclipse of Reason.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hutton, Will, and Anthony Giddens (eds.). (2000). On the Edge. Living with Global Capitalism. London: Jonathan Cape. Kenning, Peter, and Jörn Lamla (eds.). (2018). Entgrenzungen des Konsums. Dokumentation der Jahreskonferenz des Netzwerks Verbraucherforschung. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. Lamla, Jörn (2008). Markt-Vergemeinschaftung im Internet. Das Fallbeispiel einer Shopping- und Meinungsplattform. In Ronald Hitzler, Anne Honer and Michaela Pfadenhauer (eds.). Posttraditionale Gemeinschaften. Theoretische und ethnografische Erkundungen, 170–185. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. Lamla, Jörn (2010a). Authentizitätsmythos und Verbraucherautonomie. Über soziale Wertschätzung im kulturellen Kapitalismus und verbleibende Pfade in die “Nachknappheitsgesellschaft”. In Manuel Franzmann (ed.). Bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen als Antwort auf die Krise der Arbeitsgesellschaft, 392–419. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft. Lamla, Jörn (2010b). Kultureller Kapitalismus im Web 2.0. Zur Analyse von Segmentations-, Intersektions- und Aushandlungsprozessen in den sozialen Welten des Internets. Zeitschrift für Qualitative Forschung, 11(1), 11–36. Lamla, Jörn (2013). Verbraucherdemokratie: Politische Soziologie der Konsumgesellschaft. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Lash, Scott, and John Urry (1994). Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage. Latour, Bruno (2004). Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Latour, Bruno (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network Theory. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Marx, Karl (1999 [1859]). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ works/download/Marx_Contribution_to_the_Critique_of_Political_Economy .pdf.

334

JÖRN LAMLA

Offe, Claus (1981). Ausdifferenzierung oder Integration—Bemerkungen über strategische Alternativen der Verbraucherpolitik. Zeitschrift für Verbraucherpolitik/Journal of Consumer Policy, 5(1–2), 119–133. Offe, Claus (1984). Arbeit als soziologische Schlüsselkategorie? In Claus Offe. Arbeitsgesellschaft—Strukturprobleme und Zukunftsperspektiven, 13–43. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Offe, Claus, and Rolf G. Heinze (1986). Am Arbeitsmarkt vorbei. Überlegungen zur Neubestimmung “haushaltlicher” Wohlfahrtsproduktion in ihrem Verhältnis zum Markt und Staat. Leviathan, 14(4), 471–495. Reichwald, Ralf, and Frank Piller (2006). Interaktive Wertschöpfung. Open Innovation, Individualisierung und neue Formen der Arbeitsteilung. Wiesbaden: Gabler. Riesman, David, Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer (1989). The lonely crowd: a study of the changing American character. New Haven/London: Yale University Press Schimank, Uwe (2009). Die Moderne: eine funktional differenzierte kapitalistische Gesellschaft. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19, 327–351. Toffler, Alvin (1980). The third wave: The classic study of tomorrow. New York, Bantam. Voß, G. Günter, and Kerstin Rieder (2005). Der arbeitende Kunde. Wenn Konsumenten zu unbezahlten Mitarbeitern werden. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus.

Work and Sustainability Stefanie Hiß

Making work and working conditions sustainable is a traditional core concern for trade unions. Sustainable work in this sense can be understood as work that, for example, does not endanger workers’ health or that earns at least the minimum wage to secure reproduction. Generally speaking, the concept of sustainability includes the three pillars of economic, ecological and social sustainability (Grunwald and Kopfmüller 2006). This concept first appeared in the work of Hans Carl von Carlowitz, a senior mining administrator from Freiberg, a town in the German state of Saxony. Carlowitz’s 1713 treatise Sylvicultura Oeconomica called for “continuous and consistently sustainable use” (von Hauff and Kleine 2009, 2). In practice, this meant that annual logging should not exceed regrowth. The economic exploitation of timber was therefore to be capped at the level beyond which a depletion of natural resources would occur to the detriment of future generations (ibid., 3). Some 250 years later, in 1972, the sustainable development debate was again taken up by the Club of Rome in its study Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972). The Club’s warning that the global economy was approaching the earth’s absolute limits to growth and its appeal to bring ecology and economy into long-term equilibrium led to lengthy and intense debates over economic growth and lifestyles (von Hauff and Kleine 2009, 4–5). The 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission (Hauff 1987) finally enshrined the concept of sustainable development in the collective consciousness, with the conceptualization of sustainability on which the report was based garnering broad public support: “Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 43, quoted in von Hauff and Kleine 2009, 7). Five years later at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 178 countries committed themselves to sustainable development. Since then, sustainability has not just become a fixture

336

STEFANIE HISS

of political agendas but is also something present throughout mainstream society. Today, policy goals are subjected to sustainability checks, trade fairs and markets for sustainability are proliferating, and organizations have sustainability targets. Although the catch-all concept of sustainability has become strongly differentiated, most conceptualizations adopt a long-term perspective on human development. In stark contrast to this long-term view, however, work and employment have come under the pressure of short-term interests in the current world of financial market capitalism (Dörre and Brinkmann 2005; Deutschmann 2005; Windolf 2005). Looking at businesses whose behavior and rationality are oriented towards the short-term profit goals of their shareholders, questions arise about the possibilities and limits of sustainable work (Dörre and Holst 2009; Faust et al. 2011). Since the emergence of the shareholder-value movement (Jürgens 2008; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000), financial market capitalism tends to exclusively emphasize economic concerns to the detriment of ecological and social factors. As the focus shifts more and more towards short-term economic profit maximization, the inevitable negative externalities have to be absorbed by others—workers, the environment or the business’s own future. To date, financial market capitalism has exhibited a one-sided focus on economic concerns—and, even more narrowly, on short-term economic concerns with no view to economic sustainability. However, financial market capitalism has also created an infrastructure that is, at least in principle, compatible with ecological and, to a lesser degree, social concerns. There are now numerous proposed approaches for integrating ecological and social sustainability into this particular mode of control (Hiß and Kunzlmann 2011; Rikhardson et al. 2003; Schaltegger et al. 2006; Schaltegger and Wagner 2006; Unerman et al. 2007). These approaches attempt to standardize and quantify ecological and social concerns, making them compatible with the logic and rationality of financial market capitalism. Such compatibility can also be provided by sustainable investment strategies, also known as socially responsible investment or Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI). In the present paper, I will focus on SRI to link sustainability and work. SRI means basing investment decisions not only on financial markets but also on non-financial (i.e. ecological, social or ethical) concerns (Faust and Scholz 2008; Gabriel 2007; Hiß 2011). For example, a sustainable investor interested in buying shares or bonds from a particular company may factor

WORK AND SUSTAINABILITY

337

into his or her decision to invest whether the company allows trade unions, has a system for environmental resource management or supports worklife balance for its employees. In the last section of the paper, I will also discuss the trade unions’ position on SRI and the difference between ecological and social sustainability.

1. SRI and Work Sustainable investors aim to create an alternative to the short-term, profitoriented financial market logic. They employ various strategies to influence corporate governance; these strategies include being “activist shareholders” (Riedel and Schneeweiß 2008) and demanding improvements in corporate governance. These investors often base their investment decisions on social or ecological standards, and corporate sustainability reports are an important input for making these decisions. Corporations document how they assume social responsibility either through their reporting practices— that is, by producing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and sustainability reports (IÖW and future e.V. 2010)—or through accounting for CSR and sustainability—that is, by integrating social, ecological and corporate governance indicators into their annual reports. CSR or sustainability rating and research agencies like Oekom Research or imug gather, process and analyse this information and make it available to financial market actors in the form of rankings or ratings (Schäfer et al. 2004). Whether a particular corporation is included in sustainability indices like ÖkoDax or FTSE4Good (Gabriel 2005; Pauli 2007)—and can therefore be considered as a possible investment by sustainable investors—depends on their CSR or sustainability performance. Sustainable investors, which can include insurances, pension funds, foundations or religious institutions, usually do not conduct their own sustainability research, instead relying on the information provided to them by sustainability rating and research agencies; this gives these agencies a key position between sustainable investors and their investments. In Germany, the Munich-based Oekom Research is the market leader among rating and research agencies; the Hanover-based imug is another national player. In Europe, Sustainalytics, Novethics, EIRIS and Vigeo are also well known. Similar to conventional rating agencies which assess the

338

STEFANIE HISS

creditworthiness of corporations or governments, sustainability rating agencies employ a range of indicators and standards to assess and rank the sustainability performance of corporations. These standards normally include three different categories: ecological, social and (corporate) governance (ESG). The list of standards used by Oekom Research 1, for example, was selected from the over 800 assessment criteria contained in the FrankfurtHohenheim guidelines (Hoffmann 1997). These guidelines were jointly developed in 1997 by economists, philosophers, moral theorists, and theologians. Out of these 800 possible metrics, Oekom Research selected about 500 indicators, about 100 of which are used only for corporations within certain sectors. Ratings include ecological as well as social criteria; the former include environmental resource management, the attention paid to ecological concerns in the process of production, and eco-efficiency; the latter include corporate commitment to work–life balance and vocational training. As the majority of these criteria can only be described qualitatively, Oekom Research created an evaluation manual for each indicator so as to make assessments from different analysts more comparable. The rating criteria used by Oekom Research roughly fall into two categories: social and ecological. To illustrate the connection between work and sustainability, I will look at one dimension of Oekom’s social rating, “staff and suppliers”. “Suppliers” assesses to what extent subcontractors or suppliers adhere to health and safety standards in the workplace, what measures are taken to ensure compliance with these standards and whether there are any lawsuits, legal proceedings or fines pending against these actors. The “staff” sub-heading comprises a large number of individual criteria, divided into six indicators: freedom of assembly, measures for improving work–life balance, job security, health and safety, equal opportunities and vocational training. The present paper will explore work–life balance, job security and equal opportunities in greater detail. For work-life balance, what does the corporation in question do to improve this? For example, what possibilities exist for workplace flexibility or for reducing working hours? Do workers have the chance to care for family members? What are the weekly hours? For job security, have there been recent large-scale redundancies or company closures? If so, what plans and measures does the

——————

1 For further information see http://www.oekom-research.com/index.php?content=cor porate-rating (accessed 06.02.2012).

WORK AND SUSTAINABILITY

339

company have in place to deal with the consequences and soften social hardships? For equal opportunities, what are the company policies for improving equality of opportunity? What is the gender balance in the company? Are there any pending lawsuits, legal proceedings or fines related to discrimination? Of course, the reach of individual indicators and overall ratings is limited. Being in violation of or scoring poorly for a few aspects will not immediately lead to a lower rating; even companies that severely violate certain social or environmental standards will not necessarily be excluded from sustainability indices or rejected by sustainable investors. Moreover, the overall impact of these social-ecological ratings is weaker than that of binding legal rules. Although sustainability ratings have some effect in guiding the allocation of funds available for sustainable investment, these effects are limited by the small volume of these funds in comparison to those being offered by conventional financial market actors (Eurosif 2010; Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen 2011). Nonetheless, Oekom’s list of indicators makes it possible to improve corporate transparency by explicitly measuring and assessing social and ecological performance. In summer 2011, Oekom unveiled an online database that allows the sustainability performance of different companies to be compared at the level of individual indicators. Although access to this database is not free of cost, it provides sustainable investors with more transparency and comparability than annual sustainability reports.

2. Trade Unions and SRI Some of Oekom’s indicators are also relevant to trade unions, although this relevancy varies by country; for example, German trade unions are legally guaranteed the freedom of assembly, making this criterion unnecessary. Other criteria, however, touch on the enduring core concerns of trade union activities, such as severance provisions in the event of redundancies. Finally, although some criteria may not be part of unions’ core concerns, they are of interest to them; human rights in the larger value chain is one such example. To shed light on the unions’ position on SRI, I will briefly compare the Anglo-Saxon and German systems. In the former, trade unions are seen as

340

STEFANIE HISS

promoters of CSR and SRI. US trade unions, in particular, cooperate with sustainability rating agencies, using the information provided by the agencies and in turn supplying them with more information. US trade unions function as activist shareholders through their promotion of sustainabilityoriented or union-controlled pension funds, putting pressure on management through shareholder resolutions at annual meetings. The focus on action through pension investment is due, in part, to the fact that US unions have few other means to exert power; while they do have the ability to strike, they do not have the same possibilities for co-determination and collective bargaining that exist in Germany. Some commentators argue that unions and SRI also have common interests in Germany; in their view, SRI does not undermine the specificities and advantages of the German model. Rating agencies could provide additional information to unions, such as information about the costs that companies externalize in the value chain and beyond. This would open up new areas of interest, for which they also provide the necessary foundations, such as corporate equal opportunities and gender equality. The SRI information provided by the rating agencies would also create opportunities for building new coalitions, such as with civil society and nongovernmental organizations. According to those commentators, SRI can offer many advantages and few disadvantages to German trade unions. However, empirical data to date contradict these theoretical arguments. German trade unions appear to relate to SRI in a country-specific way. In Germany, unions are not drivers or promoters of SRI—in fact, it is quite the contrary. The term “SRI” is avoided on the websites of German trade unions, and no unions have made explicit statements or taken official positions on the issue. Moreover, official trade union announcements often reduce CSR to a mere Anglo-American equivalent to German codetermination. Union-controlled pension funds in Germany are also reluctant to engage in shareholder activism and invest their money in accordance with SRI principles; out of 27 such funds, the MetallRente fund is the only one to do so. “First, it is a fundamental paradigm that MetallRente’s SRI policy does not include so-called voice strategies, i.e. the exercise of voting rights. Germany has the participatory system of co-determination for involvement in the company. MetallRente shareholders rule out all attempts to exercise additional influence through their role as investors.” (Karch 2009, 189)

WORK AND SUSTAINABILITY

341

This is quite different from trade unions in the United States who consciously engage in shareholder activism: “US trade unions also began to advocate shareholder action, arguing that 15 million workers own stock in their companies through employee stock ownership plans. The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) seeks to use union-controlled pension funds to influence company annual general meetings. It has a division devoted to organizing “worker capital” for its campaigns.” (Boland 2000)

How can the German trade unions’ reticence with regard to SRI be explained? In discussions about union-controlled pension funds in Germany, the argument is sometimes made that unions should not seek to ally themselves with capital, but this is hardly a convincing explanation, as works councils do cooperate with capital in the co-management of large corporations. Explanations centered on the peculiarities of the German model of co-determination and collective bargaining therefore appear more plausible. Compared to their counterparts in other countries, German trade unions are relatively powerful in influencing corporate behavior, which could make involvement in SRI appear superfluous. Co-determination at the supervisory board level grants them meaningful access to and influence over supervisory boards and senior management; in comparison to other stakeholder groups, German trade unions have tremendous access and influence, and strengthening SRI might improve the position of those other groups at the union’s expense. The same logic applies to the fact that German trade unions almost exclusively focus their efforts on social concerns; in Germany, ecological issues have always been regarded as the sole domain of the legislature. While the legislature is also seen as the primary actor in promoting beneficial social policies, trade unions are often seen as general advocates for social concerns. More SRI could bring more ecological topics onto the agenda, which unions might not perceive as being in their best interests. By focusing on the negative aspects of financial market capitalism and defending their privileges from the era of the Deutschland AG (Germany Inc.) 2, unions forgo the opportunity of using SRI to gain control over the

——————

2 Translator’s note: In West Germany, widespread shared interests between key financial and industrial corporations created a monolithic bloc that lasted from the immediate post-war decades until the turn of the century. This arrangement—together with worker involvement in corporate governance—made for a cartel-like structure and a dense

342

STEFANIE HISS

financial markets’ leverage on labor. If company pension or unioncontrolled funds were to engage in shareholder activism, capital market pressures could lend additional weight to trade union concerns. SRI could also open up new areas for improvement that had not been among unions’ traditional core concerns, such as tracing corporate activities along the value chain and beyond or ecological issues (where unions have not historically had in-depth expertise). German trade unions could also enter into new coalitions with other stakeholder groups, increasing both their influence and legitimacy in society. While union reticence in this area will not hold back the development of SRI, it does withhold an important stakeholder who could reinforce the leverage of sustainable investors over corporations, thus contributing to a better economy, which would ultimately benefit workers and labor issues in general.

3. Social versus Ecological Sustainability Apart from the possible interest constellations outlined above, there is also a more fundamental question about the possibilities and limits of SRI with regard to work. In SRI, social sustainability takes a back seat to ecological sustainability, as ecological factors (i.e. natural resources) are easily operationalized as costs and can therefore be directly integrated into the existing framework of financial market capitalism; issues of social sustainability, such as employee satisfaction and motivation, are much harder to measure, and attempts to quantify such values frequently obstruct their integration or have unintended negative consequences. An example of such an unsuccessful attempt to quantify social sustainability is the Sustainable Value approach, which until recently was used by the German automobile group BMW (BMW Group 2009; Hahn et al. 2007; Hahn et al. 2009). This approach attempts to monetize sustainability by assigning higher scores as resources are used as efficiently as possible. While this is logical with regard to purely ecological resources like water consumption, such a metric would rate companies as most efficiently making use of human resources (i.e. staff) when they employ as few workers as possible or when individual workers work more and/or have lower wages. Intuitively, this clearly con-

——————

network of stable, informal relationships that kept outsiders out. This was dubbed Deutschland AG (Germany, Inc.).

WORK AND SUSTAINABILITY

343

tradicts the goal of sustainable employment, illustrating how when ecological standards of efficiency are transferred to social factors, sustainability easily falls by the wayside. Measuring social sustainability beyond merely counting the number of work-related accidents or hours of continuing education is a real challenge, and the question of how a good work–life balance or a supportive working climate can be meaningfully represented in numerical form is still unanswered.

4. Conclusion Although SRI is a financial market bridge with regard to work and sustainability, only certain easily quantifiable aspects can be assessed by it. However, despite these limitations, SRI is capable of inserting a sustainable perspective on work into the debate, going beyond the German codetermination system and the still-influential role of trade unions. In my opinion, this area is also terra incognita for the sociology of work: if social sustainability is not to remain confined to the purely quantitative reduction of work-related accidents or the increase of corporate-sponsored continuing education, there is still much to be done to meet the goal of transforming knowledge about work and social concerns into a concretely operationalized concept of social sustainability.

Works Cited BMW Group (2009). Sustainable Value Report 2008. Munich. Boland, Sue (2000). Can “Shareholder Activism” Change Society?. Green Left Weekly, 11.10.2000 http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/21214. Deutschmann, Christoph (2005). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus und Wachstumskrise. In Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 58–84. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Dörre, Klaus, and Ulrich Brinkmann (2005). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus: Triebkraft eines flexiblen Produktionsmodells. In Paul Windolf (ed.). FinanzmarktKapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 85–116. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus, and Hajo Holst (2009). Nach dem Shareholder Value? Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenssteuerung in der Krise. WSI-Mitteilungen, 62(12), 667– 674.

344

STEFANIE HISS

Eurosif (2010). European SRI Study 2010. Paris. Faust, Michael, Reinhard Bahnmüller and Christiane Fisecker (2011). Das kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmen. Externe Erwartungen, Unternehmenspolitik, Personalwesen und Mitbestimmung. Berlin: edition sigma. Faust, Martin, and Stefan Scholz (eds.). (2008). Nachhaltige Geldanlagen. Produkte, Strategien und Beratungskonzepte. Frankfurt M.: Frankfurt School Verlag. Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen (2011). Marktbericht Nachhaltige Geldanlagen 2011. Deutschland, Österreich und die Schweiz. Berlin. Gabriel, Klaus (2005). Indices of sustainability: the assessment of companies against social and ecological criteria and the appraisal of the market for sustainable capital investment from the viewpoint of providers of sustainability indices. Frankfurt M.: IKO. Gabriel, Klaus (2007). Nachhaltigkeit am Finanzmarkt. Mit ökologischen und sozial verantwortlichen Geldanlagen die Wirtschaft gestalten. München: oekom. Grunwald, Achim, and Jürgen Kopfmüller (2006). Nachhaltigkeit. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Hahn, Tobias, Frank Figge and Ralf Barkemeyer (2007). Nachhaltig erfolgreich Wirtschaften. Eine Untersuchung der Nachhaltigkeitsleistung deutscher Unternehmen mit dem Sustainable-Value-Ansatz. Ed. Institut für Zukunftsstudien und Technologiebewerung, Berlin/Sustainable Development Research Centre, St. Andrews. Hahn, Tobias, Frank Figge, Ralf Barkemeyer and Andrea Liesen (2009). Sustainable Value in der Automobilproduktion. Eine Analyse der nachhaltigen Performance der Automobilhersteller weltweit. Ed. Euromed Management School Marseille, Queen’s University Belfast/Institut für Zukunftsstudien und Technologiebewerung, Berlin. Hauff, Volker (1987). Unsere gemeinsame Zukunft—der Brundtland-Bericht der Weltkommission für Umwelt und Entwicklung. Greven: Eggenkamp. Hiß, Stefanie (2011). Globale Finanzmärkte und nachhaltiges Investieren. In Matthias Groß (ed.). Handbuch Umweltsoziologie, 651–670. Wiesbaden: VS. Hiß, Stefanie, and Jakob Kunzlmann (2011). Finanzialisierung von Nachhaltigkeit—am Beispiel des Nachhaltigkeitsaccountings. Paper presented at the second meeting of the DFG-Nachwuchsnetzwerk Politische Ökonomie der globalen Finanzialisierungsprozesse, May 26, Philipps-Universität Marburg. Hoffmann, Johannes (1997). Ethische Kriterien für die Bewertung von Unternehmen: Frankfurt-Hohenheimer Leitfaden. Frankfurt M.: IKO. IÖW (Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung)/future e.V.—Verantwortung Unternehmen (eds.). (2010). Das IÖW/future-Ranking der Nachhaltigkeitsberichte 2009: Ergebnisse und Trends. Berlin/Münster. Jürgens, Ulrich (2008). Corporate Governance: Eine kritische Rekonstruktion der Grundlagen, Anwendungen und Entwicklungen aus soziologischer Sicht. In Andrea Maurer and Uwe Schimank (eds.). Die Gesellschaft der Unternehmen—Die Unternehmen der Gesellschaft. Gesellschaftstheoretische Zugänge zum Wirtschaftsgeschehen, 105–123. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

WORK AND SUSTAINABILITY

345

Karch, Heribert (2009). Das Versorgungswerk MetallRente—Ziele und Strategien einer sozialpartnerschaftlichen Einrichtung. In Gotlind Ulshöfer and Gesine Bonnet (eds.). Corporate Social Responsibility auf dem Finanzmarkt. Nachhaltiges Investment—politische Strategien—ethische Grundlagen, 177–193. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Lazonick, William, and Mary O’Sullivan (2000). Maximising shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13–35. Meadows, Donella, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III (1972). The Limits to Growth—A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Pauli, Björn (2007). Nachhaltigkeitsindizes: Struktur, Komponentenauswahl und Bewertungsmethodik. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag. Riedel, Silke, and Antje Schneeweiß (2008). Chancen und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten für ein Aktives Aktionärstum in Deutschland. Eine Machbarkeitsstudie. Siegburg: imug Beratungsgesellschaft für sozial-ökologische Innovationen mbH., Hannover/ Südwind e.V.—Institut für Ökonomie und Ökumene. Rikhardsson, Pall M., Martin Bennett, Jan Jaap Bouma and Stefan Schaltegger (eds.). (2003). Implementing environmental management accounting: status and challenges. Dordrecht: Springer. Schäfer, Henry, Axel Hauser-Ditz and Elisabeth Preller (2004). Transparenzstudie zur Beschreibung ausgewählter international verbreiteter Rating-Systeme zur Erfassung von Corporate Social Responsibility. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Schaltegger, Stefan, Martin Bennett, and Roger Burritt (eds.). (2006). Sustainability accounting and reporting. Dordrecht: Springer. Schaltegger, Stefan, and Marcus Wagner (2006). Managing the business case for sustainability: the integration of social, environmental and economic performance. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing. Unerman, Jeffrey, Jan Bebbington and Brendan O’Dwyer (eds.). (2007). Sustainability accounting and accountability. London: Routledge. Von Hauff, Michael, and Alexandro Kleine (2009). Nachhaltige Entwicklung— Grundlagen und Umsetzung. München: Oldenbourg. WCED—World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our Common Future. Oxford. Windolf, Paul (2005). Was ist Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus?. In Paul Windolf (ed.). Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, 20–57. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

IV. Theory of Capitalism and Critique of Capitalism

Growth Critique as Critique of Capitalism * Birgit Mahnkopf

Talk of a “multiple crisis” is ubiquitous in analyses of the current conjuncture. The most severe financial and economic crisis in the 250-year history of industrial capitalism—also its first truly global crisis—coincides with an increasingly serious ecological crisis that is primarily perceived as a crisis of the global climate and biodiversity. There is also a food crisis, but it has so far only been felt by countries in the South. It is the consequence of the ecological crisis, of applying “scientific management” to agriculture, and, to an increasing degree, a consequence of purely speculative trading in raw materials and foodstuffs (Schumann 2011). Above all, however, “peak oil” and the foreseeable “peak everything” (Heinberg 2010) in minerals and agricultural raw materials—the indispensable biophysical conditions of fossilnuclear capitalism—will probably lead to serious conflicts over raw materials and a global energy crisis. However, times of crisis are also always times of critique. One of the core assumptions of sociological systems theory describes the ambivalence of reformism, which was already being discussed in the 1920s (by Hermann Heller among others), that the critique of capitalist modernity articulated by counter-movements and intellectuals has been turned into a driver of capitalist modernization time and time again. Social research has shown that the varied critique of capitalism—as cause of poverty, inequality, social disintegration as well as a restriction or even destruction of individual autonomy and creativity—was always quickly re-absorbed by the system or provided the impetus for politically engineered transformations that would preserve it (cf. Polanyi 2001). However, capitalism’s ability to incorporate and instrumentalize both the social critique of socio-economic structures of exploitation and the “artistic critique” of systemic alienation (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007;

——————

* I am grateful to Ulf Kadritzke for his very helpful comments and corrections referring to the German version of this article.

350

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

Dörre et al. 2015) always depends on the system’s ability to generate constant economic growth and increase (material) wealth. More and more territories and areas of human and non-human life have to be capitalized. Once something has been set in motion, it has to move ever further and faster because mediocrity and stagnation mean death in capitalism. Therefore, the crucial question for all social scientists interested in the critique of capitalism is whether capitalism can retain its historically unique capacity to absorb critique if accumulation were to come up against biophysical limits.

1. Challenges for a Critical Sociology of Work The “restless never-ending process of profit-making” (Marx 1999, 107) and the transformation of qualitative differences into quantitative monetary amounts are essential features of capitalism. The immediate purpose of capital—and thus the compulsion under which it operates—is not to generate a one-off profit, but the constant increase in the appropriation of abstract wealth in monetary form. It is the system’s inherently infinite motion, not the singular, or even repeated, generation of a profit from exploiting human labor, that sets capitalism apart from other systems of using human and non-human nature. Additional surplus value can only be generated by constant reinvestment. Therefore, markets must expand continuously beyond existing needs. This is how Marx (and, in a similar fashion, Keynes too) explained the growth imperative that is inherent to capital as “automatically active character” (Marx 1999, 107). Marx and Keynes have demonstrated that labor productivity, and thus the profitability of capital investment, is increased not only by investing in expansion, but also by more efficient combinations of fossil fuels and human labor power in the form of machinery and technology. In both cases, the consumers’ purchasing power cannot keep up with the growth of productivity and productive capacity. Investment and innovation cease to the extent to which, on the one hand, labor power is made redundant and, on the other, profits from real production decrease and interest rates exceed growth rates. In developed industrialized countries, this has been the case since the late 1970s, which means that debt service threatens to shrink the debtors’ wealth. When expanding the growth of production and consumption is only possible by expanding credit and debt, the scene is set

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

351

for a “casino capitalism” that subjects economy, society and nature to “financial repression” (Altvater 2006, 109–10). The financialization of the economy brings Keynes’ “hierarchy of markets” into particularly sharp relief. Just like exchange rates and prices for raw materials, the interest rates on globalized financial markets influence the yields on money invested in production, and these yields, together with labor productivity, then determine the scope for real wage increases. There are many reasons why yields for financial capital have improved over the last 30 years to the detriment of profits for industrial capital as well as wages, and why businesses are increasingly shifting a large part of their operations to the financial economy. There is disagreement among Marxist and Keynesian economists as to whether financialization is the cause or consequence of a weak growth dynamic. Critical political economy sees the transition from a regime of “real capitalism” to a regime of “financial capitalism” as the manifestation of a crisis of overaccumulation. Keynesians, on the other hand, believe that non-financial capitalists and workers have a common “aggregate” interest in obtaining the highest growth rates possible—despite their conflicting positions in the struggle over distribution. They see financial capitalism as a regime in which the common political interest of real and financial capital to see trade unions and the welfare state weakened is strong enough to sideline their contradictory economic interests with regard to the levels of interest and exchange rates or the stabilization and regulation of financial markets and markets for raw materials (Schulmeister 2011). From a Keynesian perspective we should therefore return to the positive-sum game that increases the “pie” as a whole, as was the case in Western Europe during the prosperity phase of the 1950s and 1960s or in contemporary China (also cf. Dullien et al. 2011). Economic growth is seen as the indispensable condition for pragmatic “alliances” between capital, labor and the state within the boundaries of capitalist property relations because serious distributional struggles can be mitigated or avoided entirely. This was the basis of the 20th century social democratic (and trade union) modernization project that managed, for a relatively short time, to reconcile capitalism, wealth for the masses and democracy, especially in European countries. Economic growth allowed unpropertied citizens, too, to receive a piece of the pie that was larger compared to earlier periods but also in comparison to the rival social system. They received this in the form of individual incomes from wage labor and increasing “social wages” as well as social transfers. Universal

352

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

and equal access to the goods and services of life care seemed to be secure in the long term—and there was no need to question the property and distributive relations of the capitalist model. This trend has now ended, and the model of “Rhenish capitalism” is showing considerable risks and drawbacks. That financialization seriously affects employment conditions, wages and social and economic security in and outside of wage labor was also noted, albeit belatedly, by critical sociologists of work. However, standing at the intersection of economy and society, they still struggle to address the paradigm of economic growth as a whole, rather than merely the exaggerated growth on financial markets. The increasing financial repression of the real economy is closely connected to the extension of private property rights to material and immaterial goods, artefacts and areas of social life that were not previously (or only to a limited extent) subjected to capitalist valorization. Thanks to the Landnahme concept (cf. Harvey 1982), such trends were also beginning to be recognized by that particular branch of the critique of capitalism that is inspired by the sociology of work (cf. Dörre et al. 2015). The sociology of work also pays a great deal of attention to the social consequences of strategies for increasing the monetary surplus, insofar as they shape new management practices. These include the geographic expansion of (not just) economic operations beyond national borders, the functional integration of globally dispersed economic activities, administrative control of production processes through lead firms 1, and the growing pressure that a shareholder-imposed focus on short-term returns on investment puts on workers and businesses. The new structures of marketisation or, more precisely, the expansion and deregulation of markets through the government’s visible hand has also become a topic for critical social science. The critical sociology (of work) also focuses with equal intensity on the consequences of liberalizing and deregulating labor mar-

——————

1 In the consumer goods sector in particular these strategies have made it possible to shift management functions, and with them the conflict-prone task of manufacturing consent (Burawoy 1979), to economically dependent but legally autonomous subcontractors that have delivery contracts, but typically no legal relation of employment, with economic actors in both the formal and informal economies. This enables companies at the top of global value chains to focus on defending their oligopolistic position—based on intangible assets like brand names or patents on key technologies—hrough strict barriers to market entry, while financial repression leads to merciless competition at the bottom end of these global value chains.

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

353

kets. The same applies to institutional, technological, commercial and financial innovations that are driven solely by the profit motive. Although it took some time to wake up to it, the sociology of work has now begun to examine the socio-economic structures of an informal economy which continues to grow on a global scale as well as its political and cultural effects and multiple functions for the formal economy. Nonetheless, sociologists of work still have not quite gotten over their usual OECD bias and have failed so far to take into account what 40 years of research into the informal economy in the field of North-South studies has contributed to the critique of capitalism. Therefore, essential causal connections of the system-specific globalization of socio-economic insecurity, which affects much more than just employment, do not receive the attention they deserve (for more details see Altvater and Mahnkopf 2002). Most strikingly, the sociology of work—like economic sociology and the Keynesian critique of mainstream economics—exhibits a peculiar blindness. Like Keynesian economists, for whom it is difficult to imagine a reconciliation of capitalism, social welfare and democracy under the conditions of a shrinking and/or permanently stagnant economy, many sociologists struggle to consider solutions to socio-economic problems that would not—like in the familiar Fordist paradigm—dramatically exacerbate ecological problems 2. As seen in financial speculation since 2007, the modern capitalist system is clearly capable of creating financial transactions and assets without a corresponding growth of real surplus. Such “growth” is possible on financial markets, but only as long as debt is not seen as risky and interest can be paid out of real incomes. Once this general trust breaks down, crises occur and monetary assets are devalued. The real economy can also grow, but in addition to an efficient combination of capital, labor power and technology, it also requires a steady influx of cheap energy and raw materials. Whether a correspondingly increasing amount of these can be made available depends on certain economic and social variables, but it mostly

——————

2 See, for example, the special edition of the renowned German sociological journal Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie edited by Jens Beckert and Christoph Deutschmann (2009). It purports to reflect the state of the art in economic sociology, but does not feature a single contribution on the connection between ecosystems and economic behavior.

354

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

depends on the physical limits of minerals and agricultural raw materials as well as the availability of sinks to absorb “waste” products. What is increasingly becoming a problem, however, is that the sociology of work is at best marginally concerned with the ecological conditions of economic transformation, that is, with the biophysical conditions of the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. Therefore, it also loses sight of the destructive tendencies of human labor which organizes the metabolism of nature and constantly reshapes it. The sociology of work largely ignores capitalism’s built-in growth imperative which constantly expands the “metabolic rift” between human social systems and the non-human natural system (cf. Foster et al. 2010). It also ignores the social and political consequences of the socio-ecological metabolism. The sociological critique of capitalism has so far failed to heed the insights from bioeconomics (cf. Georgescu-Rogen 1991) as well as eco-Marxist contributions (see especially O’Connor 1998; Benton 2001; Foster 2009; Moore 2011). The same goes for attempts to understand the destructiveness of capitalist production in thermodynamic terms and to describe the relation between the labor process and valorization as an escalating contradiction between the reversibility of the circuit of capital and the irreversibility of physical and energetic transformations (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996, chaps. 2.2 and 4). An important insight to be gained from these discussions concerns a certain unavoidable dilemma. On the one hand, the accumulation dynamic of modern industrial capitalism relies on “free inputs” from biotic systems, continuous plunder of finite mineral and agricultural resources and the availability of sinks for pollutants. On the other hand, modern capitalism turns almost the entire world into a field of valorization, which undermines these same conditions. In earlier phases of capitalism, the “promethean” capacity to go constantly beyond and ignore natural boundaries constituted the “revolutionary force” of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter), but today it has instead become a limit to capitalist accumulation. Moreover, this disregard for natural boundaries is accompanied by a disregard for social boundaries and the violation of human rights, for example when pesticides are used in the agricultural production of the agrofuels that replace fossil energy. An ecologically motivated critique of a socio-economic model that is programmed to grow infinitely and constantly increase productivity and which systematically relies on spatial expansion and temporal acceleration

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

355

is still alien to the sociology of work. There are, of course, good reasons why sociologists of work focus on social issues and the conditions of a new growth model that could base itself on existing structures of production, bargaining and distribution when they want to contribute to the critique of capitalism. However, this growth obsession is a serious weakness for at least two reasons. Capitalism treats the biophysical world as a collection of raw materials available for profitable exploitation. Anything can become a resource of capital accumulation: agricultural and mineral raw materials, human labor power, even individual subjectivity. Therefore, it is only logical that neoclassical economics talks about “natural capital” and “human capital”. In his Resources for a Journey of Hope, the British cultural theoretician Raymond Williams explained this connection as follows: “[...] this orientation to the world as raw material necessarily includes an attitude to people as raw material. It is this use and direction of actual majorities of other people as a generalized input of “labor” which alone makes possible the processes of generalized capital and technology. Thus the drive to use the earth as raw material has involved, from the beginning, the practical subordination of such majorities by a variety of means: military, political, economic, ideological.” (Williams 1983, 261–262)

Bringing social critique and the critique of alienation together to make insights from “governmentality studies” useful for contemporary social critique (cf. Lessenich 2015, 184–5) is therefore not the only challenge that a sociological critique of capitalism must address. Integrating these strands of social critique into research on the socio-ecological metabolism and an expanded critique of political ecology is more difficult, but just as necessary. If social critique started to focus on the significance of “planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al. 2009) for the interdependence of social and biophysical systems, it would have to subject Western notions of progress and development to renewed critique. This would mean addressing a question that has been widely discussed in studies of newly industrialized countries; whether “modernization without occidentalization” is possible and whether alternatives exist to the abstract-rational universalism that is at the heart of the “cultural core phenomenon of capitalist dynamism”: a lifestyle geared towards individual freedom (Deutschmann 2009, 58; cf. also Welzer 2011). This would also require a critique of the “ecological modernization” of capitalism which is based on the assumption that it is both possible and

356

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

desirable to use the creativity and dynamism of capitalism to establish a “sustainable” economy through market forces, further acceleration of technological progress and the modification of consumer behavior. Therefore, my core hypothesis in the remainder of this chapter is the following: in the face of mutually reinforcing global risks that result from the combination of economic and technological as well as social and ecological crises, a critical sociology of work can be less limited to the sociology of industrial relations than ever before. Instead, it should now pay more attention to the transformation of the existing social and international divisions of labor, to the changes that affect existing systems of conflict resolution between capital and labor, to the future of established systems of social welfare, and to how the possible disturbance or collapse of “tried and tested” distribution mechanisms between capital and labor might affect the availability of cheap staple foods and goods of everyday consumption. In Western industrialized countries in particular, “ecological imperialism” and its environmentally destructive lifestyle may not just have to face “peak everything”, but also the arrival of “natural final states” once the “tipping points” of the planetary system are reached (see, among others, WBGU 2008; Rockström et al. 2009). Among the many possible scenarios, I want to at least hint at one of them by raising the following question: what would the consequences be for labor markets and wages in Europe if industrialized and thoroughly capitalized agriculture, whose increasing yields in the EU and North America in the past three decades have led to the lowest food prices in the history of capitalism, were to reach its limit? This can be foreseen already if peak oil (and thus a dramatic rise in all fossil fuel prices), “peak phosphate” and the disappearance of the once 150 meter deep guano layer (the world’s largest reservoir of natural fertilizer in Peru) were to combine with sustained financial speculation in raw materials and food. In such a scenario, food prices would rise well beyond their current levels, which are already unbearably high for millions of people. It would also seriously affect economic and employment relations in Europe, and not just because of the large influx of environmental refugees from Africa and the Middle East who defy quasi-military fortifications. The consequences of climate change in Southern European countries, whose economies depend heavily on tourism and agricultural exports, could further fan severe conflicts over increasingly scarce water resources. At this point at the latest, it will become obvious that the climate and energy crisis creates a social crisis of

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

357

unprecedented proportions and that both undermine the systemic conditions of capitalist accumulation: the constant supply of cheap labor and the constant availability of cheap energy, cheap raw materials and cheap food (cf. Moore 2012). To prove that it can contribute to contemporary analyses, the sociological critique of capitalism must address the following key question: is capitalism capable of incorporating the ecological critique—just like it managed, within a narrowly restricted frame, to absorb essential motives of “social” and “artistic” critique and to use them for new waves of accumulation? This question includes a critical interpretation of the Landnahme concept. Given the obvious biophysical exhaustion, it seems doubtful that the limits of accumulation can be expanded further. Today, as in the past, only two strategies for achieving such expansion are conceivable. First, spatial expansion: this means further expansion of markets and integration of subsistence agriculture into a global, capitalized agricultural industry organized in accordance with “scientific management” principles, as well as exclusive appropriation of mineral and non-mineral raw materials. Second, acceleration in time: a further increase in labor productivity that would have to be accomplished through the capital-intensive combination of human labor (or human skills and knowledge condensed in technologies) with increasingly expensive raw materials and energy sources. All this creates a new task for the critical sociology of work: to think afresh about the role of technological innovation and how it relates to social innovation, and also about the concept of progress in industrialcapitalist modernity which underlies both these types of innovation. On the one hand, ecological adaptation and optimization of existing technologies and infrastructures and the acceleration of technological innovation are necessary conditions for a new, less resource-intensive model of accumulation. On the other hand, the “Jevons paradox” and the well-known rebound and backfire effects of technological innovation (cf. Herring and Sorrell 2009) explain why ecological modernization in the centers of the modern capitalist world system has until now—under conditions of market economy and welfare state regulation—neither led to an absolute reduction of resource and energy consumption, nor to the reduction of harmful emissions. Any environmental improvements gained by higher efficiency are offset by the growth effect. It is therefore doubtful that current debates about a “green growth model” can really contribute to the critique of capitalism (cf. Mahnkopf 2017).

358

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

2. Does Growth Critique Need a Critique of Capitalism? In reaction to the severe financial and economic crisis, the first decade of the 21st century has seen a remarkable discursive shift. Almost four decades after scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology first attempted to determine the “Limits to Growth” in a study commissioned by the Club of Rome (cf. Meadows et al. 2004), capitalism’s inherent growth tendency has now become the object of social critique, albeit in a strange mixture of critical and affirmative assessments. Optimistic belief in the dynamism of technological progress and the possibility of decoupling economic growth from resource consumption and harmful emissions is combined here with a moralizing critique of consumerism that only rarely discloses its assumptions regarding class as well as a barely justified confidence in the innovative and self-correcting capacities of competitive markets. This has given rise to a new, strangely hybrid model: that of a low-carbon, resource-efficient green economy. This vision is developed in exemplary fashion (1) by the United Nations Environment Programme with regard to poor countries in the South and to green growth; (2) by the OECD with regard to the growth potentials allegedly offered by ecologically transforming the economic structures and infrastructures of developed industrialized countries 3; and (3) by Keynesian-influenced social scientists who have developed a “green growth” model that they also refer to as Green New Deal. 4 Scientists and politicians as well as NGOs and civil society organizations at the levels of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union participate in the articulation and propagation of this new model, which has replaced the discourse of sustainability. In the EU, however, the discussion about growth critique is restricted to a few countries (France, Spain, Italy, UK, Germany and Austria), and there are strongly diverging goals and motives in which the critique of capitalism is sometimes more, sometimes less pronounced. Proponents of green capitalism want above all to “expand the limits of growth”, that is, to grow in a “dif-

——————

3 These projects are by no means identical, but lack of space prevents me from discussing the differences between the green economy that is recommended to developing countries and the green growth model championed by the OECD, EU and other representatives from science and politics in industrialized countries. 4 This refers to the historical New Deal, President F.D. Roosevelt’s reaction to the world economic crisis of the 1930s.

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

359

ferent”, “better”, “greener” way. A second, leftist-academic discourse calls for the intentional “shrinking of the economy” for ecological as well as social reasons (de-croissance, “de-growth”). However, Serge Latouche (2007), who was (among) the initiator(s) of this debate, considers décroissance to be impossible under capitalist conditions. Therefore, this approach has a strong tendency towards pessimistic cultural critique and focuses on changing the imaginaries and patterns of everyday life that are connected to capitalist production and accumulation. 2.1 Saving Capitalism—Through a Green New Deal? The growth critique of the Green New Deal shares the degrowth approach’s core assumption that the planet’s finite ecosystems are being overused and that this can lead to the collapse of planetary nature. However, when they criticize capitalism, most proponents of the Green New Deal—especially those who participate in internal trade union debates— merely focus on the financialization of the economy, that is, on finance-led growth. Proposals for a “green economy” are usually made in the hope that wage-led growth will correct the anemic wage rises of the last decade. As in other European countries in Germany, this has affected all kinds of workers: men and women, full-time as well as part-time workers, unskilled as well as skilled and highly skilled labor that requires a university degree. New wage increases are supposed to boost domestic demand and, in combination with different tax and fiscal policies, to engender a new, stable upswing (cf., among others, Dullien et al. 2011). This view also tends to come with a critique of the inadequacy of calculating real wealth increases, which ignores social and ecological costs, and with a critique of the role that GDP plays as an indicator of economic and social progress (cf. Mahnkopf 2016). This vision of “growing out” of the economic crisis in “intelligent” and relatively conflict-free ways is based on the hope that an acceleration of technological progress can further “expand the ecological limits to growth”. It is certainly a highly optimistic vision. Its core message is that intelligent macroeconomic policies and technological advances in the form of new products, processes and services can create “sustainable” or “qualitative” growth which, in any case, is not coupled to environmental damage and resource consumption.

360

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

Such optimism relies on the Keynesian assumption that capitalism is capable of yet another turnaround, but this time of a social and ecological nature, and that it is still able, on the basis of the profit motive and the market, to become “decent capitalism” through more government intervention and better institutions. Green capitalism is presumed to constitute a win-win situation in which investment into the energy sector, public infrastructures and environmental protection can generate additional jobs in “green industries” in the short term and, at the same time, create lowcarbon infrastructures. In the medium term, this would increase national energy security by reducing the reliance on energy imports and also create competitive advantages through technological leadership. Thus, everybody would be better off and no one would lose out. New investment opportunities would create new profits for businesses. Workers could look forward to new, possibly even high-quality jobs that would boost their incomes and consumption chances, while governments could hope to reduce their debt levels, fostering economic and political stability. The environment would be protected and future generations could look forward to a life worth living. In short: higher efficiency would reduce the costs for energy and materials and would thus allow private households to spend more on consumption and businesses to invest more in fixed capital. The crisis of overaccumulation, from which the global economy has suffered for several decades and which keeps producing new bubbles and busts, could be solved through a new regime of investment and accumulation. Of course, the necessity to increase profits and therefore consumption would remain because the crucial credit mechanism, which requires that profits be made, would stay in place. Nonetheless, the “green stimulus” clearly aims to lead the economy back onto the path of continuous consumption and rising profits—in one word: growth. There is no intention of breaking the unholy alliance of profit maximization and rising consumption. This discourse ignores many of the barriers that stand in the way of green capitalism. Even if energy supply were based exclusively on renewables—which is impossible, given increasing global energy demand—one would still have to face the physical limits that any projected “de-materialisation” of material flows eventually comes up against. No increase in the efficiency of using a particular material can ever replace that material itself. This debate also fails to consider the additive, rather than substitutive, use of technology. Moreover, the Green New Deal ignores the foreseeable dangers, unintended consequences and “normal catastrophes” that are

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

361

always part of the introduction of new technologies and processes, such as carbon storage (cf. Kadritzke 2011, who draws on Charles Perrow 1984 and refers to the Fukushima nuclear disaster). Most proponents of green capitalism also fail to consider the problem of competing uses of available land. The same piece of land simply cannot be used simultaneously for wind turbines or solar panels, as a route to “sustainable mass mobility” and to organic agriculture. The externalization of environmental costs and consequences through trade-induced emissions transfer is another issue that the Green New Deal does not, or just barely, take into account. The low-emission “service economy”, whose development is promoted at national or European levels, will probably lead to growing emissions transfers to those developing and emerging countries which already produce a growing share of the goods that are being consumed in industrialized countries 5. In light of the worsening degradation of the entire biosphere, the measures towards ecological modernization that have so far been taken in the core countries of industrial-capitalist modernity (cf. Exner et al. 2013) can be likened to the absurdity of “busily scrubbing the deck on a sinking ship and tidying the captain’s cabin. This impression is particularly strong when we look at climate change, the most urgent of the current global environmental problems” (Hausknost 2011, 72). Moreover, green capitalism would probably be as ineffective as its brown, fossil-nuclear predecessor in solving problems of global justice 6. This

——————

5 According to a study of 57 economic sectors in 113 countries by the US National Academy of Science, trade-related emissions rose annually by 4.3 percent from 1990–2008, exceeding the growth rates of the world population (1.4 percent), carbon emissions (2.0 percent) and global GDP (3.6 percent). This rise is largely explained by the quadrupling of net emissions transfers from industrialized to developing countries and far exceeds the emissions reductions that industrialized nations have committed themselves to under the Kyoto Protocol. However, if the study had not just taken bilateral trade into account but also global value chains, an even higher proportion of developing countries’ emissions could have been attributed to the industrialized countries during that time period. It is telling that 40 percent of trade-related emissions can be traced to energy-intensive sectors (like cement, steel and paper), but the less energy-intensive consumer goods industries (textile, electronics, furniture and automotive), to which only 30 percent of emissions could so far be attributed, are now responsible for 41 percent of the growth of new emissions. It is to be feared that the “greening” of capitalism will, for some industrialized countries, significantly strengthen this tendency towards spatial separation of production-related and consumption-related emissions. 6 If predictions from the 2011 World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency (2011) are correct, this “predecessor” still has a long life ahead of it.

362

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

touches on many questions concerning the extraction, processing and disposal of resources, as well as the problem of asymmetric dependence between industrialized and developing countries when it comes to access to scientific and technological know-how. However, what probably matters most in the end is that the idea of green capitalism follows in the tradition of Western notions of progress by promising that technological innovation can bridge the gap between an unlimited sense of entitlement—whether in the form of profits or consumption—and the physical finitude of resources and sinks (cf. Mahnkopf 2017). Of course, the growth paradigm could only be saved if the speed and volume in which environmentally friendly and energy-saving technologies are developed and introduced were to exceed everything that has been considered technologically possible until now. 2.2 Cultural Critique Without a Critique of Capitalism? The décroissance discourse was started by French researchers and, since the big 2010 conference in Paris, has attracted a great deal of attention from European social movements simply because of the provocative conference title. Its critical focus is more on the abstract concept of growth than the concrete reality of capitalist accumulation. The provocative idea that economic shrinking7 is necessary is connected to a comprehensive cultural critique of the dominant collective imaginaries, especially in the case of Serge Latouche (2007), who initiated this debate following in the tradition of other strands in French social critique (from André Gorz to Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello). This critique targets paradigms of social behavior, such as selfishness, competition, an obsession with work and consumption, heteronomy and labor efficiency, the hubris of the irrational ways in which humans deal with nature, as well as the exaggerated pretensions of scientific thinking. All these paradigms are to be reassessed and eventually cut down to size. Abandoning the principle of endless growth and shrinking

——————

7 Leading proponents of this discourse assume that industrialized countries must shrink their economic output by a third, but this is a pretty arbitrary number. If we base such projections instead on the reduction requirements identified by international climate scientists—more than 90 percent for emissions and 40–60 percent in the case of minerals—then the physical transformations of matter and energy that underlie the monetary increases would have to be reduced by a much larger extent.

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

363

the economy are seen as means for arriving at a steady state economy. This is a normative approach which Herman Daly has been advocating for many years. It demands, first, the stabilization of the stock of production equipment in the broadest sense; second, that flows of raw materials and energy be reduced as much as possible; and third, that population numbers be limited through active controls. The overarching goal of these measures is, fourth, to reduce the gap between rich and poor through a more egalitarian distribution and to maintain a collectively determined, sufficiently high level of production and consumption, which must not exceed the capacities of the ecological system into which the economy is embedded (Daly 1991, 17). However, neither the intentional shrinking of the economy nor a steady state economy that tends towards homeostatic equilibrium are currently on the agenda anywhere in the world. They would also not be compatible with capitalist accumulation. Therefore, Latouche ends up defining décroissance as the voluntary reduction in the extent of the economic system. The exhortation to “decolonialize our thinking”, which is particularly frequent in Latouche’s work, may envisage patterns of social interaction that go beyond the confines of the capitalist social order, but criticizing established power structures is not a core concern for the décroissance movement (cf. Foster et al. 2010). Advocates of “shrinking” therefore tend to make practical policy proposals that are not just rather sober, but downright modest: radical working time reduction and unconditional basic income! Faced with real shrinking since the 2008 economic crisis, which most people experience primarily as a social crisis, the Spanish environmental economist and degrowth promoter Juan Martinez-Alier even openly advocated a Green New Deal at least for the short term—provided that it would become the standard for continued economic growth (see MartinezAlier et al. 2010). This is not quite the case for German degrowth proponents (cf. Passadakis and Schmelzer 2011). Their concept of a “just post-growth economy” envisages a democratically negotiated reduction of production and consumption with the aim of granting social rights to everybody and decommodifying and de-monetarizing spaces of (re-)production. This discourse refers emphatically to the buen vivir concept rooted in South American indigenous traditions. This concept has recently been integrated into some national constitutions in the subcontinent (Acosta 2009) and claims

364

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

to combine solutions to social and ecological problems with alter-globalist notions of social and economic transformation. Because of its grounding in a radical critique of civilization, this particular strand of growth critique with civil society roots might prove to be as compatible with the sociology of work as the potentially more hegemonic Green New Deal discourse. The latter, however, does not show a way out of the contradictions of capitalism—if the path towards the social and ecological readjustment of the political and economic spheres were in fact taken, which seems less than likely at the moment. On the other hand, the elements of cultural critique in civil society growth critique call into question many paradigms that continue to be important normative references for social critique in the sociology of work. A third current of growth critique is desperately needed, one that questions capitalism as a socioeconomic regime. Such an approach, however, would have to start from a rather pessimistic view of the future, making it easy for detractors to dismiss it as scaremongering and prevent it from ever taking off (cf. Mahnkopf 2018).

3. Outlook The closer we get to the tipping points of ecological systems and to “peak everything”, the less we can count on the self-correcting capacity of capitalism that constantly transforms itself and absorbs critique. Instead, the biophysical finitude of resources and sinks will have to become the point of departure for a critique that is up to the challenges of our times. This focuses attention on the question of how work and production can be organized in a way that does not exceed the limits of the planetary system and that would make the economy subordinate to politics again—while always strictly adhering to the precautionary principle. In contrast to the Green New Deal, and similar to the cultural revolution envisaged by the décroissance movement, a growth critique that focuses on the socio-ecological metabolism aims at a Great Transformation which wrests control over nature, labor and money from the competitive market. In opposition to neoclassical environmental economics, which remains unwavering in its mistaken belief that markets can help to internalize the “ecological externalities” of economic behavior, we have to start from the

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

365

assumption that it is impossible to “stretch” the biophysical limits. Even the laws of capital accumulation cannot overcome the “nature of nature”, and a growth critique that heeds these limits must therefore also be a fundamental critique of capitalism. Achieving a reduction in the “ecological footprint” within the boundaries of capitalist societies would require massive regulatory intervention into property relations and a far-reaching ban on the private use of public goods. This would obviously cause fierce resistance against such measures. Once capitalism is no longer treated as sacrosanct, but as a changeable social order, questions of global ecological distributive justice can come out of the fog of philosophical thought experiments and into the broad daylight of a reality in which fierce struggles over access to highly coveted resources rage at the global level as well as within national or regional societies and between classes. One issue, for example, could be to set an upper limit on per-capita resource consumption. This approach does not put its trust in an ethically tamed capitalism. Neither can it allow the politically explosive “sufficiency” principle to be watered down and turned into some form of more or less “sustainable” consumerism that privatizes the question of ecological distributive justice by letting individuals decide how to interpret the “frugality” commandment. A growth critique that is also a critique of capitalism will probably have to question many of the normative principles on which modern capitalism is founded and which we take for granted.

Works Cited Acosta, Alberto (2009). Die Schaffung einer Utopie. Juridikum, 4/2009, 219–223. Altvater, Elmar (2006). Das Ende des Kapitalismus wie wir ihn kennen. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf (1996). Grenzen der Globalisierung— Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf (2002). Globalisierung der Unsicherheit. Arbeit im Schatten, schmutziges Geld und informelle Politik. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Beckert, Jens, and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). (2009). Wirtschaftssoziologie. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 49/2009.

366

BIRGIT MAHNKOPF

Benton, Ted (2001). Marxism and Natural Limits: A Reply to Paul Burkett. Historical Materialism, 8, 309–332. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Burawoy, Michael (1979). Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Daly, Herman E. (1991). Steady-State Economics. 2nd edition. Washington D.C./Covelo, Cal.: Island Press. Deutschmann, Christoph (2009). Soziologie kapitalistischer Dynamik. MPIfG Working Paper 5/09. Cologne. Dörre, Klaus, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism— Critique. London/New York: Verso. Dullien, Sebastian, Hansjörg Herr and Christian Kellermann (2011). Decent Capitalism—A blueprint for reforming our economies. London: Pluto Press. Exner, Andreas, Peter Feissner, Lukas Kranzl and Werner Zittel (2013). Land and resource scarcity. Capitalism, struggle and well-being in a world without fossil-fuels. New York: Routledge. Foster, John Bellamy (2009). The Ecological Revolution: Making Peace with the Planet. New York: Monthly Review Press. Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark and Richard York (2010). The Ecological Rift. Capitalism´s War on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review Press. Geogescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1991). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge (Mass.)/London: Harvard University Press. Harvey, David (1982). Limits to Capitalism. London: Basil Blackwell. Hausknost, Daniel (2011). Fortschritt in Zeiten des Klimawandels. Drei Szenarien. Editorial. Vorgänge, 3/2011, 70–78. Heinberg, Richard (2010). Peak Everything. Waking Up to the Century of Declines. Gabriola Island/BC: Ney Societies Publisher. Herring, Horace, and Steve Sorell (eds.). (2009). Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Consumption. The Rebound Effect. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kadritzke, Ulf (2011). Vorwärts und stets vergessen. Die unbelehrbare Wissensgesellschaft nach Fukushima und Finanzkrise. Le monde diplomatique, 13.05.2011. Latouche, Serge (2007). Degrowth: an electoral take?. International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, 3(1). Lessenich, Stephan (2015). Artistic or Social Critique? On the Problematisation of a False Alternative. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (eds.). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 181–197. London/New York: Verso. Mahnkopf, Birgit (2016). Greening inequality? Limitations of the “green growth” agenda. In Alexander Gallas, Hansjörg Hansjörg, Frank Hoffer, and Christoph Scherrer (eds.). Combating inequality. The Global North and South, 183–198. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Mahnkopf, Birgit (2017). Lessons from the EU: why capitalism cannot be rescued from its own contradictions. In Gareth Dale, Manu V. Mathai, and Jose A.

GROWTH CRITIQUE AS CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

367

Puppim de Oliviera (eds.). Green Growth. Ideology, Political Economy and the Alternatives, 131–149. London: Zed Books. Mahnkopf, Birgit (2018). 1968 reloaded: Die Überflussgesellschaft und ihre Gegner. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 1/2018, 81–90. Martínez-Alier, Joan, Unai Pascual, Frank-Dominique Vivien and Edwin Zaccai (2010). Sustainable de-growth: Mapping the context, criticisms and future prospects of an emergent paradigm. Ecological Economics, 69(201), 1741–1747. Marx, Karl (1999 [1867]). Capital. A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. Volume 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers. 06.11.2017 https://www.marxists.org/archive/ marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf Meadows, Donella H., Jorgen Randers and Dennis L. Meadows (2004). Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing. Moore, Jason W. (2011). Transcending the Metabolic Rift: Towards a Theory of Crisis in Capitalist World-Ecology. Journal of Peasant Studies, XXXVIII,a, 1–46. Moore, Jason W. (2012). Cheap Food & Bad Money: Food, Frontiers, and Financialization in the Rise and Demise of Neoliberalism. Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center 33(2–3). O’Connor, James (1998). Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism. New York: Guilford Press. Passadakis, Alexis, and Matthias Schmelzer (2011). Postwachstum. Krise, ökologische Grenzen und soziale Rechte. Hamburg: VSA. Perrow, Charles (1984). Normal Accidents. Living with High-Risk Technology. New York: Basic Books. Polanyi, Karl (2001 [1944]). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. Rockström, Johan et al. (2009). Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity. Ecology and Society, 14(2). 06.11.2017 http://www. ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/. Schulmeister, Stefan (2011). Mitten in der großen Krise. Ein “New Deal” für Europa. Wien: Picus. Schumann, Harald (2011). Die Hungermacher. Wie Deutsche Bank, Goldmann Sachs & Co. auf Kosten der Ärmsten mit Lebensmitteln spekulieren. Food-Watch Report 2011. Berlin. WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2008). Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel. Heidelberg/New York: Springer. Welzer, Harald (2011). Mentale Infrastrukturen – Wie das Wachstum in die Welt und in die Seelen kam. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Williams, Raymond (1983). The Year 2000 A Radical Look at the Future – And What We Can Do to Change It. New York: Pantheon Books.

Work and Alienation Hartmut Rosa

In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Karl Marx made alienation, a concept which had until then been used only in legal or philosophictheological contexts, useful for the critique of existing social, or more precisely capitalist, relations. This he did with an explicit, even exclusive focus on the conditions of work. He identified five forms of alienation suffered by the modern human being—alienation from nature, from one’s fellow human beings, from oneself, from the process of labor and from its product—all of which result from a misguided or distorted labor process. Further still, alienated labor as the cause of social suffering was seen by Marx not as the consequence of capitalist private property, but as its cause (although he conceded that an interdependent relation had emerged between private property and alienation over the course of history): “Through estranged, alienated labor, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labor of a man alien to labor and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labor creates the relationship to it of the capitalist [...]. Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labor, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labor, of estranged life, of estranged man.” (Marx 2000, 33)

If this passage is taken seriously, it suggests that capitalism is itself the consequence of a wrong or problematic “world relation” which is mediated and unfolded in and through the form of labor. It is sad that Marx himself discarded this idea in his later works and with it the concept of alienation or estrangement. In the Communist Manifesto he even denounced it as “philosophical nonsense” (Marx and Engels 1976, 511; cf. Kaufmann 1970, XVIII). Moreover, whereas the concept of alienation became crucial to critical contemporary analyses in the philosophical tradition of Critical Theory in the 1960s and 1970s—from Lukács,

WORK AND ALIENATION

369

Horkheimer and Adorno to Marcuse and especially Erich Fromm or Karen Horney, not least following the rediscovery of Marx’ early manuscripts that were only published in 1932 (by Erich Fromm)—it was mostly rejected by the more orthodox and materialist theory of capitalism and the sociology of work (Schacht 1970; 1994; Jaeggi 2005). This rejection was predominantly based on two connected reasons which explain why even social philosophers now largely ignore alienation. The first reason why the alienation concept has fallen into disrepute is its vagueness. To measure alienation in terms of a distance from something, you need an idea of a “true” or “right” way of living and working that alienated conditions fall short of, but such an idea cannot be plausibly defined. The alienation discourse has clearly never managed to determine precisely what would constitute a non-alienated condition, or, in other words, how the counter-concept to alienation is to be defined. In fact, this was already the reason for the later Marx’ skepticism; to possess analytical rigor, the alienation concept seems to require a notion of “true human nature” or the “correct” life, which implies making essentialist assumptions about human nature—assumptions that cannot be substantiated and that seem a priori implausible given human beings’ historical plasticity. Attempts to solve this problem by particularizing or individualizing the question and shifting the point of reference away from “human nature”, the identity or authenticity (or Eigentlichkeit) of a community or individual way of life are equally insufficient. Even the idea that an individual (or a community) can become removed from their (or its) “inner core” or their (its) “true identity” due to certain actions or conditions still rests on the substantialist belief in an identity core that is unchangeable or that at least provides normative standards. However, there is no basis in either social philosophy nor social psychology for identifying such a core and imbuing it with normative authority. Alienation has therefore remained a concept that lacks a clear difference, which explains why it became increasingly fuzzy in social theory as well as attempts at empirical operationalization. Over time, almost any kind of dissatisfaction with all sorts of existing conditions was described as a manifestation of alienation. It was not just the workers anymore who were alienated, but the young (who are alienated from society), voters (alienated from politics), believers (alienated from the established churches), consumers and media users (alienated from what is on offer) and many others (Schacht 1970, 161–204).

370

HARTMUT ROSA

The progressive hollowing-out of the alienation concept also explains why the rejection of “artistic critique”, which was oriented towards an idea of the good or successful life, and the embrace of “social critique” based on clearly identifiable standards and measurable dimensions of (in-)equality and distributive justice was not restricted to the sociology of work and the critique of capitalism, but also took place in social philosophy and political theory more generally. 1 Even proponents and defenders of Critical Theory have changed course in this way. This is the second reason behind the declining importance of the alienation concept since the 1970s. The sociology of work and the theory of capitalism began to focus once more on questions of income, wealth distribution and social insurance, the distribution of risk and (un-)certainty, temporal and contractual spaces of autonomy as well as work-related stress. This provided numerous opportunities for incisively criticizing capitalist social relations as contradictory and unfair, unequal and illegitimate. Nonetheless, in this contribution I want to make a passionate appeal for the reintroduction of the alienation concept and for a reorientation of not just the critique of capitalism, but also the sociology of work. I believe that the first of the two aforementioned problems can be solved by reconceptualizing alienation (in a way that I will now elaborate), and that restricting our normative standards and our critique of capitalism to social critique is a fatal mistake in a dual sense. First, it ignores the possibility of “pathological” social grievances that also cause suffering but cannot be reduced to distributive issues. This applies in particular to the modern, capitalist “escalation pathologies” that are the consequence of growth and acceleration imperatives. These pressures cause ecological and psychological damage and lead to structural experiences of powerlessness and heteronomy even where they do not clash with norms of equality or distributive justice. On the whole, they are manifestations of a distortion in the modern world relation. This was expressed with remarkable clarity in Marx’ Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: “An enforced increase of wages [...] would therefore be nothing but better payment for the slave, and would not win either for the worker or for labor their human status and dignity. Indeed, even the equality of wages [...] only transforms the relationship of

——————

1 On the distinction between artistic and social critique and the dominance of the latter since the 1970s see Boltanski and Chiapello (2007). For the subsequent debate see also Dörre et al. (2015).

WORK AND ALIENATION

371

the present-day worker to his labor into the relationship of all men to labor. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist.” (Marx 2000, 34, emphasis in original)

Therefore, the alienation concept focuses on experiences of suffering that cannot be reduced to distributive questions, although they may imply them. A logic of infinite increase pervades capitalist societies. These require unceasing growth, acceleration and condensation of innovations even in the absence of substantive goals, simply to reproduce their own fundamental structures and maintain the status quo. If we accept that this state of affairs should be criticized and that it constitutes a problem and pathology (one that did not yet play an important role for Marx), then this suggests that, second, social critique has itself become an (involuntary) driver of this escalatory spiral and a functional moment of cultural system stabilization due to its one-sided focus on inequality. By declaring that some in the system—the few—are the winners who successfully defend their position, and by inducing in the many the (legitimate) desire to have a bigger piece of the pie, it supplies both sides with the motivational energy to keep the game of increases going—and to ignore the pathological side effects. If the self-referential, escalatory spiral is to be stopped and this kind of dynamic stabilization, which has taken on pathological aspects since the 21st century, is to be overcome, the critique of capitalism must not shy away from developing a standard for the irrationality of the system as a whole, rather than merely its inherent distributive relations and cleavages. I want to show now that the concept of alienation can provide this standard, provided that it is understood as the indicator of the distorted nature of the modern world relation as such—much like the young Marx understood it. However, it is first necessary to solve the fundamental problem of developing an adequate concept of what alienation is not. As I explained above, neither the concept of “human nature” nor the idea of “authentic” life and/or action are suitable as “counter-concepts” to alienation and as the standard for a non-alienated condition. Those social philosophers who have not entirely abandoned alienation have therefore come up with two other possible definitions. The most promising and most developed approach is certainly that of Rahel Jaeggi, whose monograph Alienation (2014, first published in German in 2005 as Entfremdung. Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems) represents a milestone in the development of a non-essentialist and non-substantialist concept of alienation. She does not contrast alienation with some notion of authenticity (or

372

HARTMUT ROSA

Eigentlichkeit), but merely with the idea of autonomy or self-determination. 2 The counter-concept to alienation is therefore the notion of successful, self-determined world appropriation or identificatory reference to the world. In so doing, Jaeggi manages to define alienation (in accordance with the early Marx) as a kind of distorted world relation, as a “relation of unrelatedness [Beziehung der Beziehungslosigkeit]”. As legitimate and important as this step may be, I do not agree with Jaeggi’s restrictive and autonomy-centered way of defining the counterconcept as “identificatory self-determination” (although, unfortunately, this is nowhere fully spelled out). First, I have my doubts whether all forms of life that do not make a claim to self-determination can really be called “alienated”. Second, I believe that the structurally inscribed escalatory logic of capitalist modernity I have described above is inherently connected to the demand that the possibilities for and dimensions of self-determination be constantly expanded—a demand that is immensely powerful both at the cultural and the individual level. In fact, autonomy, growth and acceleration may prove to be intrinsically connected and therefore constitute a “nexus of alienation”. Third, there is also a clear tension between the concept of autonomy on the one hand and those approaches on the other that try a different way of arriving at a non-essentialist definition of alienation by basing it on the concept of recognition. These approaches argue that experiences of alienation result from situations or conditions in which the subject experiences feelings of inferiority, disrespect or worthlessness. Recognition (in the form of love, respect, appreciation or solidarity) thus becomes the counter-concept to alienation. 3 Therefore, I would instead propose contrasting the condition or experience of alienation with the concept of resonance, rather than autonomy and authenticity, or recognition and appreciation, and defining an intact world relation in terms of resonance. Successful world relations are those in which the acting subject experiences the world as a responsive, breathing, supportive, sometimes even benevolent or accommodating “system of resonance”. Recognition is doubtlessly an (important) enabling condition of resonance, but subjects can also experience resonance outside of social interaction. In modern society, the spheres of aesthetic experience and (experiencing) nature have

——————

2 A similar conception is also developed by Seel (1993). On the following see also Rosa 2012, 7–16. 3 Axel Honneth’s work has broken new ground in this respect. Apart from the Struggle for Recognition (1996), see also his books on Unsichtbarkeit (2003) and Reification (2008).

WORK AND ALIENATION

373

become spheres of resonance in their own right (while religion has partly maintained itself as another sphere of resonance). If you are deeply affected, moved or shaken by music—whether at the Wagner Festival in Bayreuth or a rock festival on some muddy patch—and therefore experience moments of “harmony” or “profound resonance” between yourself and an acoustic world (in whatever shape) “outside”, then you experience resonance. So do those who “hear” the world “breathe” when they sit on a beach underneath a starry sky or on a mountain top at dawn. 4 The fascination of a crowded football stadium, a church congress or a summer camp of young trade unionists can also be explained by the promise of chances and experiences of resonance—a promise that is at least occasionally and momentarily fulfilled. Through such experiences, subjects try to assure themselves of being in unison or harmony with the “world”. The concept of resonance therefore goes beyond recognition in more than one regard: it does not just allow us to integrate this particular kind of successful or distorted world relation into our theoretical architecture, it also seems useful for re-interpreting relations of social interaction. It can be used to reconstruct in interesting ways the notion that subjectivity is constituted on the basis of intersubjectivity, something that sociologists have been discussing ever since G.H. Mead’s influential work. It can also explain why being ignored or treated with indifference by other people usually has more severe consequences for a person than experiencing disrespect in the form of explicit disapproval or negative appreciation. In this light, experiences of alienation can be interpreted as the consequences of “silent”, nonresonating relationships; they can emerge despite, and sometimes even as a result of, successful instrumental relations towards things, people, spaces, etc. This suggests that human lives are (at least momentarily) successful where and insofar as subjects have constitutive experiences of resonance. On the other hand, alienation exists where spheres of resonance are sys-

——————

4 Religious experience can be interpreted as a continuously effective, additional sphere of resonance. In prayer, hymns or the Eucharist, for example, (Christian) believers experience a responsive “you”, a relationship between the subject and a (transcendent) world that goes beyond an instrumental or causal relationship. The fact that the experience of resonance cannot be fixed or reliably produced through manipulation in any of these three spheres (aesthetic, nature, religion)—the same piece of music, scenery or ritual that may touch an individual’s innermost today may leave them entirely unaffected tomorrow—demonstrates that this is an aspect of the subject-to-world relation that goes beyond instrumental, causal and/or epistemic relations.

374

HARTMUT ROSA

tematically replaced by “silent”—that is, purely causal or instrumental— relationship patterns. The conditions that foster resonance no longer depend on the essence of human nature nor on the substance of individual identity. They instead hinge on context-dependent “relations of correspondence” between institutions and individuals that can be changed by both sides and which can be structurally defined. Resonance can only emerge when the appropriation or adaptation of sections of the world is successful. Therefore, the absence of autonomy and/or social recognition can still be seen as the crucial cause of alienation experiences, especially in modernity. My proposal can be summarized as follows: alienation should no longer be conceptualized as the failure to comply with human nature, understood in a substantialist or even essentialist sense, or the demands of “authentic life”. It is to be understood as a disturbance in the appropriation or adaptation of things, activities and people and/or as a disturbance in the relationship to space, time, society and one’s own body (Rosa 2009, 32–54). This can be contrasted with a “resonance-based concept” of successful world relations. It starts from the (admittedly still vague) idea that subjects have relationships of response and exchange to the spaces in which they move, the activities they pursue, the tools and things they use, to space, time and the people they interact with—and that these relations cannot be reduced to causal or instrumental interdependencies, but that they have constitutive significance for the entirety of the subjects’ relations to themselves and the world. The task of sociology is then to identify those structural conditions and requirements that lead to the emergence and maintenance of relations of resonance or alienation. Applying our new-found contrastive pair of relations of resonance and alienation to the structural examination of labor processes and conditions opens up a perspective for research that I consider both promising and multilayered. I cannot (or more precisely: not yet) fully elaborate this here, but I at least want to sketch some broad outlines. There is no doubt that (wage) labor is a crucial axis of meaning and resonance for modern subjects in their relation to the world. It is, by the way, irrelevant here whether this is a constitutive feature of “human beings as natural beings” or merely a contingent fact of capitalist society. Resonances tend to emerge wherever workers “recognize” themselves in what they do so that they feel “at home” or “at one with themselves”, e.g. when using their tools and implements, in their relationships with colleagues, at

WORK AND ALIENATION

375

their workplaces, in the labor process itself or in the realization of work objectives. Two conclusions follow from this. First, losing one’s job (or knowing that one might lose it) is a disaster not only and not primarily because it endangers material reproduction and the availability of resources, but because it implies the loss of a comprehensive and crucially important “space of resonance”. Those who suffer such a loss are at risk of experiencing the world as harsh, silent, hostile and/or indifferent. They lose interaction partners, resonating spaces of tasks and activities and potentially also meaning and position in the world, unless they have the possibility of compensating for that loss in other social spheres. Losing one’s job is a paradigmatic case of “resonance destruction” with regard to the subject’s world relation in capitalist societies. Second, alienation in the sense of a gradual erosion of resonance can also happen in the workplace, where it assumes many different forms. It happens whenever the “adaptation” of sections of the world, the creation of relations of resonance, is not successful. Time plays an important role here. Creating and nurturing relations of resonance is time-consuming and “adaptation” is not instantaneous but normally the result of exchanges that require a lot of work. Those who are forced to interact with “clients” (in a hospital, care services, school or job center) on a minute-by-minute basis are not just unable to take the time to build resonances with them, they will even see it as interfering with their professional work. Those who can assume that they will use a particular tool or implement (such as a computer or particular software) throughout their entire working lives will try to appropriate and become familiar with it; in short, to develop a relationship with it. If, on the other hand, they know that a particular technology will be replaced by a new one in a few months, if not weeks, they will (of necessity) restrict themselves to an instrumental relationship—one that remains alien and external. This list could be endlessly continued; those who move to a new place of work in the assumption that they will stay there for many years or even the rest of their lives will try to appropriate their new environment in comprehensive fashion (as empirical geographical studies on the appropriation of spaces have shown). If, on the other hand, they only see it as a temporary place of residence, they will restrict themselves to a strategic-instrumental exploration of space that merely includes the identification of functionally important spots (like the supermarket, petrol station or the office). Those who assume that they will work with their colleagues for a long time will try to get to know them as “entire

376

HARTMUT ROSA

persons”, whereas they will want to avoid this if they assume that cooperation will only last for the duration of one particular project. To be sure, this does not mean that the conditions of structural alienation were suspended during the slower Fordist work regime. Loss of resonance can also be the consequence of long-term, heteronomous and possibly dull routines, consistently unequal social relations, unhealthy working environments, etc. It only means that temporal relations have become problematic in a specific way in late modernity because they now also undermine the “microspheres” of (everyday) resonance. It is safe to say that acceleration-inducing pressures and the neoliberal, post-Fordist transformation of the last few decades have shifted employment relations towards an increasing instrumentalization of world relations for which resonance is just a time-consuming and efficiency-reducing problem. Interestingly, there is also much to suggest that the resulting pathological conditions of alienation are increasing at an alarming rate. The management of France Télécom, which was privatized in 1998, almost turned resonance avoidance into an agenda. Under the explicit slogan “Time to Move”, for example, it involuntarily transferred 7,000 executive staff every three years. This was supposed to keep them open to new things, flexible, innovative and creative and to avoid attachments to staff, routines, social spaces, etc. The result is well-known: in the space of two years—from March 2008 to March 2010—at least 41 employees committed and many more attempted suicide, until finally the French labor inspectorate and judiciary initiated criminal investigations against senior management for negligent homicide (cf. Veiel 2009; Wüpper 2010). Even if we disregard spectacular cases such as this, it could nevertheless be a promising strategy to explain cases of stress- or burnout-related illnesses among workers—which, according to every known indicator and statistic, are on the rise—as not just being the result of heavy workloads, and also to examine what role contexts of alienation may play. It seems that burnout symptoms appear when tasks and methods of working are not properly “appropriated” and social relations of resonance cannot emerge, when pressure increases without any goal in sight, and when, finally, workers’ contributions are neither honored nor recognized and are therefore unable to provide the satisfaction of success. As a depressive, indifferent relation to the world, this represents the epitome and pathological climax of a non-resonant, alienated relation to one’s world and work.

WORK AND ALIENATION

377

Works Cited Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Dörre, Klaus, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism— Critique. London: Verso. Honneth, Axel (1996). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: MIT Press. Honneth, Axel (2003). Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der lntersubjektivität. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Honneth, Axel (2008). Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaeggi, Rahel (2014), Alienation. New York: Columbia University Press. Kaufmann, Walter (1970). Introductory Essay. In Richard Schacht. Alienation, XV– LVIII. Garden City/NY: Doubleday. Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels ([1848] 1976). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Collected Works. Vol. 6. 1845–1848. New York: International Publishers. Marx, Karl ([1932] 2000). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts from 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 03.11.2017 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf. Rosa, Hartmut (2009). Kritik der Zeitverhältnisse. Beschleunigung und Entfremdung als Schlüsselbegriffe der Sozialkritik. In Rahel Jaeggi and Tilo Wesche (eds.). Was ist Kritik?, 23–54. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Rosa, Hartmut (2012). Weltbeziehungen im Zeitalter der Beschleunigung. Umrisse einer neuen Gesellschaftskritik. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Schacht, Richard (1970). Alienation. Garden City/NY: Doubleday. Schacht, Richard (1994). The Future of Alienation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Seel, Martin (1993). Ethik und Lebensformen. In Micha Brumlik and Hauke Brunkhorst (eds.). Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit, 244–259. Frankfurt M.: Fischer. Veiel, Axel (2009). Suizidwelle bei France Télécom. Berliner Zeitung 30.09.2009. Wüpper, Gesche (2010). France Telecom: Ermittlungen gegen Chefs nach Selbstmord-Serie. Welt Online, published 23.03.2010. 16.11.2017 https://www.welt. de/wirtschaft/article6894578/Ermittlungen-gegen-Chefs-nach-SelbstmordSerie.html.

Social Critique and Trade Unions— Outlines of a Troubled Relationship Hans-Jürgen Urban

1. Introduction: The Return of the Critique of Capitalism “Wherever you look these days, the critique of capitalism has all of a sudden become quite fashionable.” Thus begins a 2009 book by sociologists Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015, 1) on the return (or retrieval) of capitalism and the critique of it into German sociology. But has the critique of capitalism really become that ubiquitous? Indeed, elites and media are not shy in heaping blame on financial market capitalism, and there is no shortage of evidence for that. Take, for example, reports on the 2012 Davos meeting of the political and financial elite that talk of a deep “discontent with capitalism” (Piper 2012) and argue that global capitalism suffers from burn-out syndrome (Schwab 2012). This diagnosis stands in contrast to the assumption that the hegemony of neoliberalism continues, or that it is now even “more politically powerful than ever” (Crouch 2011, vii), despite the evident functional crisis of financial capitalism. The conviction “that free markets in which individuals maximize their material interests provide the best means for satisfying human aspirations” (Crouch 2011, vii) seems unchallenged. Even German sociology has been affected by market dogmatism. Under the dominance of neoclassical academic economics, mainstream sociology has changed into a “scientific accessory to an era in which flagrantly displayed subjection to the market became hegemonic in just about every sphere of life. A political agenda of enabling, or rather educating people with regard to Marktlichkeit [marketability] had increasingly become an unquestioned and convincing sign of ‘modernity’” (Dörre et al. 2015, 2). From the perspective of critical social science, the “precipitous increase in public critique of capitalism” is no reason to relax. Until now, sociology “has to this day failed as an academic discipline equipped to treat the recent, clearly crisis-

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

379

prone transformations of capitalist society in a manner that meets the standard of a critical-progressive self-understanding” (ibid., 2). In contrast, Dörre et al. propose an initiative for a scientific-political counterposition which—in the tradition of Marxist-inspired Critical Theory—assumes “that in ‘modern’ society—including in its present, ‘late modern’ formation— sociological diagnostics of society and social critique must first and foremost target capitalism as a form of private profit accumulation, and the social conditions and consequences that it engenders.” (ibid., 4)

At the heart of the project is the attempt to develop “analytical and diagnostically reliable (and thereby potentially politically viable) standards of measurement for the critique of capitalism”. At the same time it distances itself “from all those trite varieties of critique of capitalism and their representatives, who exhaust themselves in polemics against single actors within the system […]; or who consider a diluted critical attitude to be a temporary concession to the zeitgeist necessary to enhance their own careers.” (ibid., 6)

This project of revitalizing a sociologically grounded critique of capitalism needs to address questions that match the problems. These are in no way obvious; they have to be found in a collective process of search and discussion among the potential bearers of critique. This paper aims to contribute to this process by addressing the interaction between a social critique and the strategic capacities of labor unions. To this end I will refer to the debate on a “sociology of critique” (Boltanski 2011) and the role of critique for the dynamic of capitalism as developed by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello. The following thoughts draw on this dialectic between criticizing and civilizing capitalism. I will discuss the hypothesis that the weakening of German labor unions went hand in hand with their strategic deradicalization, which in turn diminished the relevance of social critique and abetted the relatively unregulated transformation of welfare capitalism into financial capitalism. I will also examine whether the reform concept of a “new eco-social economic democracy” could give new impetus to an updated social critique and revitalize the trade unions’ political power. The argument is structured as follows: First (2) I trace the interaction between social critique and the development of the unions’ political power. Then I ask how the work done by social scientists and union strategists on the

380

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

concept of “new economic democracy” can give new impulses to social critique and union policy (3). This is followed by considerations on the role of labor unions in implementing economic democracy (4). I conclude by making suggestions for union policy and research (5).

2. The Muting of Social Critique and De-radicalization of Unions? To argue that capitalism needs critique for its own survival is a paradox only at first sight. It becomes more plausible if we follow Boltanski and Chiapello (2005; 2007) and take the function of critique for the dynamic of capitalism into account. 2.1 Critique of Capitalism as Lifeblood of Capitalism One of their key arguments is that capitalism needs critique as a driver of its own development and a corrective for its deformations. In itself it is “remarkably lacking in justification” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005, 241) and mostly incapable of moral self-justification and political selfcorrection. According to them, it is only through partially internalizing critique that capitalism is able to correct its internal moral and functional deficits. In other words, it is from capitalism’s opponents, whose interests it systematically infringes upon and whose outrage it repeatedly causes, that it learns about its shortcomings as well as new solutions, which explain its ability to survive. “In fact, it is probably capitalism’s amazing ability to survive by endogenizing some of the critiques it faces that has helped in recent times to disarm the forces of anti-capitalism, giving way to a triumphant version of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005, 242). From this interaction between capitalism and its critique emerges the phenomenon that Boltanski and Chiapello call the “spirit of capitalism”. It provides those sources of legitimation without which capitalism could not close its inherent justification gap. “It is impossible for capitalism to avoid being at least somewhat oriented towards the attainment of the common good, as it is this striving which motivates people to become committed to its process. Yet capitalism’s amorality means that the spirit

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

381

of capitalism cannot be solely predicated on what capitalism alone is able to offer, that is, only the capacity for accumulation. So capitalism needs its enemies, people who have a strong dislike of it and who want to wage war against it. These are people who provide it with the moral foundations that it lacks, and who enable it to incorporate justice-enhancing mechanisms whose relevance it would not otherwise have to acknowledge.” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005, 242)

Boltanski and Chiapello distinguish between two types of critique that are based on different sources of indignation and normative references (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 36–40). They call the first type “social critique”. It is directed primarily at inequality, poverty and exploitation as well as the social mechanisms that prioritize unrestrained individualism over social solidarity. The second type is called “artistic critique”. It mainly targets phenomena like oppression through market imperatives, capitalist dominance in the workplace or the commercialization of society, and defends the autonomy and authenticity of individuals and social collectives (see Lessenich 2015 for a critical view). Both social critique and artistic critique can be articulated as either “corrective critique” or “radical critique”. The former aims to correct social wrongs by revealing injustices and morally challenging capitalism; the other intends to transform, and is aimed not at correcting deficits, but overcoming the capitalist order. 1 2.2 Loss of Importance of Labor Unions in Financial Market Capitalism So far, so good. But the media’s scolding of capitalism obviously fails to affect the political and financial elites who proceed undeterred with their policies—all of this despite the fact that the justification gap of financial market capitalism could not be any bigger and despite the countless leverage points for ideological resistance. Colin Crouch’s analysis of neoliberalism gives us a hint of an explanation. For Crouch, Keynesianism perished because the working class, whose interests it represented, had entered into historical decline and lost its social power, whereas the social agents of

——————

1 It is worth mentioning that separating social from artistic critique is dangerous for an adequate analysis of capitalism. It runs the risk of analytically separating the cultural objects of critique from their social context while at the same time depriving the critique of social distortion of its cultural dimension. It would thereby conceptually separate what in an analysis of capitalism belongs together. Nevertheless, it should be possible to understand the conceptual differentiation of a general critique of capitalism as analytical distinction and use it productively in a heuristic manner.

382

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

neoliberalism, especially financial corporations, were not weakened by the crisis of capitalism but came out of it stronger (Crouch 2011, 1). According to this view, the success of an ideology is correlated mainly with the power of the class whose interests it represents. The same should apply to the critique of a hegemonic ideology. It needs an actor who is willing and capable of taking action and who will not waste an opportunity for critique. Currently this is where the problem lies. What role could labor unions have in this configuration? Could they, as representatives of the interests of the victims of the financial market crisis, be the agents of a new critique of capitalism? Attempts to answer this question lead to a renewed skepticism because unions, once the prime agents of social critique, 2 appear to be in bad shape (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 273ff.). German labor unions, too, were unable (or unwilling?) to make a significant contribution to stabilizing or even renewing a resolute critique of capitalism. One might even say that labor unions and social critique were not passive victims of the transition to financial market capitalism. Instead, the disappearance of social critique and the unions’ organizational power both reinforced each other, while their reluctance to articulate an incisive critique of capitalism made it easier for financial market capitalism to become dominant. Any attempt to verify these assumptions would run into various methodological difficulties and would be beyond the scope of this paper. The history of labor unions in Germany since the second World War is too complex to be described here. But there may be a parallel evolution of labor unions and the social-democratic wing of the political labor movement. During the crisis of welfare capitalism, social democracy underwent a programmatic and strategic transformation which political science has described as a “steady process of political de-radicalization”: “This process starts from the radical refusal of the bourgeois-capitalist order and the goal of a classless socialist society in which private property and the economic and political domination of humans over other humans is a thing of the past; it passes through the stage of acceptance of the market economy, and eventually leads to recognizing social inequality as a legitimate and economically functional pattern of stratification in highly-developed market societies under conditions of global economic transactions.” (Merkel 2000, 264)

——————

2 At the same time, the unions’ more political aims and demands for more humane work and more workplace participation always also contain elements of artistic critique.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

383

This programmatic revision at the end of the 20th century, which was begun in the UK by New Labour under the title of “Third Way” and was also accepted by German Social Democrats, was seen as a strategic answer to the new context of global financial market capitalism. In this view, the new context created new opportunity structures and new paths of action for social-democratic actors in electoral and political decision-making arenas, which necessitated a new political strategy. Regarding its strategic substance, this programmatic de-radicalization can be read as the continuing depletion of social democracy’s political will and ability to resist the tightening constraints of a globalized market system. Through deregulation and globalization, this system had freed itself from the fetters of Fordist regulation and redefined the rules of society and politics. In this reading, the “Third Way” is a concept of political damage control that attempted—and failed—to limit the fallout from an unstoppable globalization, while at the same time hoping to extract political gains from the productive potential of unbound markets (Urban 2004; Lessenich 2008). The implications of this strategy for social democracy and the welfare state are not my concern here. Instead I want to ask whether German labor unions have developed in similar fashion. It is, after all, sometimes stated that they derived “their long-term goals and political orientation from the social democratic workers’ party” (Müller-Jentsch 2011, 51) and that they too are faced with new action contexts in financial market capitalism. 2.3 Crisis, Corporatism and the Disappearance of the Critique of Capitalism It is, of course, vital to avoid analytically conflating the history of labor unions and social democracy. At the height of “New Labour” and the implementation of the “Agenda 2010”, 3 the historical alliance between labor unions and social democracy fell apart, and unions acted more as a barrier than as a resource in the execution of the “Agenda” policies

——————

3 Translator’s note: The “Agenda 2010” is a series of reforms carried out by the German Government under the social democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder which began in 2003. The reforms changed the welfare system and labor relations. Its most well-known part is “Hartz IV”, which abolished the traditional distinction between social welfare payments (Sozialhilfe) and unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe).

384

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

(Merkel et al. 2006). The “decoupling” between labor unions and parties, which was noted by international research (Piazza 2001), was to a large degree the result of diverging strategies for how to respond to the new action context. Nevertheless, with regard to their more general political positioning within and towards capitalism, the unions successively departed from an unflinching critique of the system, although they did not scale down their ambitions with regard to matters of distributive, labor and social policy. The DGB’s 4 basic program, passed during its 5th Extraordinary National Conference in November 1996 in Dresden, can be interpreted as a recent step in this departure from critique and as a step towards the model of social market economy (for a critique see Forum Gewerkschaften 1996). This happened at a time when the implosion of bureaucratic state socialism had generally discredited systemic alternatives to capitalism and when the unions were discussing their corporatist politics in the wake of the unions’ initiative for an employment alliance between themselves, the business associations and the German federal government. This initiative had been proposed by then IG Metall 5 chairman Klaus Zwickel under the slogan “Alliance for work” (Bündnis für Arbeit). The DGB’s platform somewhat downplayed the importance of the model of the social market economy by opposing the concept of the “socially regulated market economy” to a negative image of “unregulated capitalism” (DGB Bundesvorstand 1996, 19), but the platform contains no elements of an elaborated critique of capitalism. This marked the endpoint of a development that had started in the early years of the West German republic. The Düsseldorf Program, decided in 1963 after intense internal debate, was a milestone on the path that led the DGB and its member unions to embrace an agenda and a self-conception that differed from their original ideas for a new social order (Bergmann et al. 1976, 15ff; Deppe 1989, 513ff.). This reconciliation of labor unions with social market economy in no way signified a general departure from a critique of the market, nor from demands for a redistribution of income, wealth and social rights. But it signaled their departure from the fundamental critique of the capitalist logic of accumu-

——————

4 Translator’s note: The Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Confederation of German Trade Unions) is the umbrella association for eight German trade unions with six million members. 5 Translator’s note: The Industriegewerkschaft Metall (Industrial Union of Metalworkers) is the German metalworkers’ union. It is one of the largest trade unions worldwide and a member of the DGB.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

385

lation and of “anti-capitalist interpretations of situations” (Bergmann et al. 1976, 43), and their turn towards a self-conception that is compatible with capitalism. Underlying this programmatic change was a functional change of labor unions in post-war capitalism that has been described as a process of incorporation (e.g. Müller-Jentsch 2008; Dörre 2011). In the context of the economic prosperity of post-war capitalism and the Keynesian welfare regulation of class relations, labor organizations that used to be critical of the system became functional to it and were given the important task of mediating between the interests of their members and those of the system. This “factual abandonment of system-transcending goals” was followed by an historically unprecedented accrual of “social property for ensuring subsistence and status”, “expressed in guaranteed pension claims, employment protection and workplace safety, co-determination and binding norms agreed upon in collective bargaining” (Dörre 2011, 270). This functional integration of labor unions into the political economy of German capitalism, based on their considerable negotiating and organizational power, did not preclude fiercely fought conflicts with capitalist associations and government over social policy and redistributive issues. However, the unions’ interest-driven policy came to rely less and less on justifications that were based on the critique of capitalism. Their claims to actively shaping society were reduced to representing the interests of wage laborers within the structures of the corresponding capitalist formation and restricted to the space given by productivity increases and competitive position. When compared to other European countries, this policy can be regarded as successful, but reducing social critique to demands that accepted the functional logic and leeway of the accumulation model lead to the fading of the critical profile of labor unions and reduced the reform pressure that challenges capitalism to adjust the system regarding social and justice policies. This was not a story of complete success. Generally speaking, international research on labor unions notes that the transition to financial market capitalism created a very difficult situation for the unions (Brinkmann et al. 2008; Streeck 2009; Peters 2011). Decline in membership numbers, financial means, rates of unionization, the erosion of the unions’ workplace ties and negotiating and distributive power in determining wages and company policies, and last, but not least, the erosion of their lobbying power are seen as indicators of a structural defensive. Regarding the consequences that the Great Crisis of financial market capitalism has for the organizing

386

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

capacity and power of unions, the assessments have also been rather pessimistic. 6 According to these views, the unions did not succeed in using the obvious failure of neoliberalism and the belief in the market to their strategic advantage. There were some defensive successes with regard to shielding certain sectors (the case of the automobile scrappage scheme) and employment (short-time work and internal flexibilization of working hours) that could not have been taken for granted and that contributed considerably to the German employment “miracle” (Möller 2010). As a result, the unions’ self-confidence increased as did their prestige as crisis managers among political and media elites. However, there was also a rapid reduction in the number of jobs in precarious segments and considerable concessions with regard to wages and work and performance standards. International research indicates that, despite some strengthening of labor unions, the crisis did not represent a positive “turning point for labor” (Baccaro 2010). Instead it can be shown “that the unions are in dire straits, and that […] the global financial crisis has done nothing to improve their plight and has possibly even worsened it” (ibid., 347). Apparently the erosion of their power resources was too profound for labor unions to be able to strengthen their organizational power through proactive interventions and to influence the course of the crisis. One point that we should take into account is that the change that the labor unions underwent during the crisis took place in the context of institutional change. In crisis-ridden Europe, this led to the development of a new form of the tripartite coalition between the state, labor unions and associations of capital in some countries (Hassel 2009; Glassner and Keune 2010). The German context also included a discussion of the term “crisis corporatism” (Urban 2012). This refers to the concessions that were made on employment and wage security (or at least reducing income losses) in exchange for the abandonment of resistance to the system, and social and political militancy. There are also pertinent differences between German crisis corporatism and social corporatism or previous forms of competitive corporatism. The crisis of financial market capitalism created a specific macroeconomic context that fundamentally differed from phases of prosperity; it also changed the corporatist actors’ interests and the power resources available to them. Under pressure from the shock of 2008/2009, the state,

——————

6 Cf. the contributions by Colin Crouch, Lucio Baccaro, Mario Regini, Paul Marginson, Richard Hyman and Rebecca Bumbell-McCormick as well as Ruth Milkman in: SocioEconomic Review, 8(2), 2010, 341–376 and Lehndorff 2012.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

387

unions and the companies that formed part of the real economy went on the defensive. They began wielding political power against the mechanisms of the financial market and the lobbying power of its key actors. In this context, crisis corporatism represented an alliance of the weak, and the social agreements between companies and political actors can be understood as emergency associations and acute responses to the crisis. In other words, although incorporating labor unions into government crisis policy turned out to be a relatively successful means of protecting the interests of the core workforce, it was unable to prevent asymmetrical political results and continued expropriation of social property at the expense of wage dependent labor (Dörre 2015). In the context discussed here, there can be no denying that the logic of corporatist negotiation acts more like a brake on anti-capitalist social critique than as a force for social change. Anticapitalist social critique remained muted even during the acute functional and hegemonic crises of financial market capitalism, thanks also to the crisis policies enacted by the unions.

3. New Economic Democracy as Fountain of Youth? The idea that the unions withdrew from a steadfast critique of capitalism at the same time that they were on the defensive (and that reciprocal causalities were at work), need not imply the reverse. There is no proof that more radical positions would have made financial market capitalism more humane or that radical positions could have prevented labor unions from adopting a defensive position. In fact, labor unions throughout the world—and this includes organizations with different strategies and policies—are all on the defensive; as such, it is unlikely that more radical positions would have produced a different outcome. Moreover, sometimes the radical positions of weaker unions are linked to defensive claims that meet with relatively little success, whereas social dialogue that is more aimed at compromise can bring about far-reaching achievements (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010a; Artus 2010). Nevertheless, and this is crucial here, reconciliation with the imperatives of capitalist functional logic has not changed the defensive position of the unions.

388

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

3.1 Economic Democracy and the Revitalization of Labor Unions This leads to the question of what would need to happen in order to revitalize the political power of the unions. This question is being explored in a new approach to the international study of unions: the strategic unionism approach. This approach does not merely spell out the dimensions of the crisis currently faced by the unions, but it increasingly focuses on the options for and the prerequisites of labor union revitalization. Gradually, the German debate is catching up with this discussion, and its literature is currently being consolidated into a separate research field known as “labor revitalization studies” (Voss and Sherman 2000; Frege and Kelly 2004; Huzzard et al. 2004; Haipeter and Dörre 2011). The strategic unionism approach views labor unions—even within financial market capitalism—as faced with an open, undetermined situation. The current economic, social, political and cultural context has produced a space that provides diverse opportunities (including an array of strategic choices) that labor unions can use to revitalize themselves with varying levels of success. In other words: “Hard times can often result in strategic paralysis, but can also be a stimulus for the framing of new objectives, levels of intervention and forms of action” (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010b, 327). The success of unions in selecting the most appropriate “strategic choice” and their capacities for innovative praxes depend on their ability to develop realistic analyses of the context, select adequate strategies and wield sufficient power to implement these strategies. Numerous prerequisites need to be fulfilled to ensure that labor unions can be revitalized. The mobilization of structural, institutional and communicational power not only presupposes strategic will but also, above all, strategic ability. Strategic ability essentially consists of the capacity to adequately analyze a problem and situation, explore and select adequate options, develop corresponding strategies for implementation and not least activate organizational and negotiating power in order to push through the chosen approach despite resistance and if necessary in the face of conflict. 7 The on-going debate about “new economic democracy” is certainly relevant in this context. 8 In this view, new economic democracy could provide

——————

7 On the development of strategies in political organisations see, for example, Raschke and Tils 2007; for the prerequisites for strategic ability in unions, see, for example, Hyman 2007. 8 Cf. Meine, Schumann and Urban 2011 and the literature they review.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

389

impulses for the rejuvenation of anti-capitalist social critique, while at the same time strengthening labor unions’ political power. The debate about new economic democracy is based on the assumption that neither the model of the social market economy nor that of traditional Keynesianism is capable of tackling the current situation. Moreover, economic democracy represents a fundamental change in power relations between the state, (finance) capital and labor, and aims to secure systematic influence over economic decisions and property rights for democratic politics. This has sparked a backlash from the state and capital, which has rapidly converted discourses of economic democracy into social power struggles. 3.2 Elements of Economic Democracy in the Crisis Policy of Labor Unions Any discussion of economic democracy will probably remain an intellectual pastime if it is not embedded within strategies aimed at revitalizing labor unions; moreover, such debate must include an analysis of potential obstacles to union revitalization. There are factors that could link attempts to revive debates about economic policy to the crisis policy of the unions. In Germany, IG Metall suggested overcoming the crisis through strategic intervention. The union’s critique of neoliberal policies and the blatant failure of the markets led IG Metall to view the crisis as demonstrative of a “systemic collapse of the world economy”. Accordingly, the union developed a crisis strategy that went beyond the mechanisms of the market. “Those who leave the solution of the crisis to the markets will be punished by massive losses in prosperity, mass unemployment and a long depression. Overcoming the crisis requires determined political action that must be prepared to fundamentally change existing structures. This applies equally to nation states, the European Union and the G20.” (IG Metall 2009)

The labor union’s main demand was a public equity fund of at least 100 billion Euros that was to be used for state investment in struggling companies. The fund was to be financed by a mandatory bond of 2 percent on private money assets over 750,000 Euros. IG Metall also wanted to attach conditions to the provision of public equity to secure public influence over company policy. These conditions included the rejection of redundancies for operational reasons, the rejection of the shareholder-value paradigm, ensuring company policy secured sustainable company development, the

390

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

ecological modernization of products and production, compliance with agreed wage levels and workers’ and participation rights, as well as a new model for management remuneration. Decisions involving the provision of public equity were to take social and macroeconomic aspects into consideration and be undertaken by a committee consisting of employers, labor unions and the public sector in accordance with the German law on codetermination. This intervention, which aimed at the foundations of industrial value creation, was inspired by economic democracy and aimed at preventing bankruptcies and redundancies, while strategically reorienting companies. These measures were to be embedded within a form of economic and financial policy that included proposals to regulate financial markets, modernize societal infrastructure within a European investment program, expand workplace participation and codetermination, and implement tax measures aimed at broad income redistribution. This union offensive was aimed at overcoming the crisis and implementing an alternative model of social economic development that linked the interests of labor in social reproduction to society’s general interest in development and ecological sustainability. 3.3 Economic Democracy in the 21st Century: Points for Debate The final implementation of these economic democratic policies, however, remained far behind the union’s ideals, mainly because of the diverging interests of the actors involved. When it comes to economic democracy, there is very little overlap between the interests of labor, capital and the state, which of course is a prerequisite for political compromise. This considerably diminishes the chances of implementing economic democracy within a corporatist regime. In this particular case, economic democracy would have had to develop its aims and proposals very quickly, as these were still in an embryonic state. Traditional models are not applicable here; instead, the main features of economic democracy need to be questioned, corrected and further developed with regard to the context of globalized financial market capitalism (see Urban 2011). This first applies to the traditional model’s socialist perspective. At the beginning of the 21st century, this perspective does not provide any common ground for strategy. However, an alternative that offered eco-social

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

391

reform could lead to a minimal, medium-range, political-economic consensus. This consensus would be based on a vision of capitalist development that was fundamentally different from the current model of financial market capitalism; it would reinstate the primacy of politics over economics by enabling democratic economic decisions to be made and by disempowering the financial capitalist elites (see Dörre 2015). Second, it is essential that the traditional critique of capitalism is expanded to include a critique of “fossil-fuel capitalism” (Altvater 2010). This would require integrating material-energetic aspects and ecological conversion strategies into the concept of economic democracy. Doing so would increase the importance of the democratization of social decisions about production, distribution and consumption as a means of developing a strategy of ecological conversion. Third, the problem of statism in classical economic democracy needs to be solved. Since at least the left-wing critique of welfare-statism, we need to accept that although the welfare state, through its means of intervention (law and money) produces social security, solidarity and individual freedom, it can also lead to bureaucracy, repression and the economization of social relations. This increases the importance of aspects that are outside of state control in developing an emancipated and free way of life. At the same time, the extension of economic and political relations beyond the nation-state and the restrictions this places on the capacities of nationstates also have consequences for new forms of economic democracy. In globalized capitalism, economic democracy has to be conceptualized as a multi-level concept, in which reforms and regulations at the European, nation-state, regional and workplace levels are intertwined. Existing practical experience also needs to be evaluated as part of a new debate on economic democracy. If economic democracy is to be provided with stable foundations, scientific and political focus must be placed on the particularly difficult points. The first point of contention that must be dealt with is the tense relationship between individual participation in designing economy and society and the indispensable social coordination and regulation of both spheres. This concerns the tension between individual interests and the decisions that are prepared or made at a different level in the social planning process. Democratic participation and self-determination must form the core “democratic work”, and this in turn could act as a nucleus for a multi-level conception of economic democracy (Urban 2011, 57ff.). A second point of contention consists in overcoming the focus placed on the “good of the

392

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

company” in the institutions and practices of workplace codetermination. The increasingly aggressive conditions of capitalist competition provide very little room to implement measures in individual companies that would permanently reduce the return on capital; doing so could actually put the company’s survival at risk. This does not mean that unions or company representatives lack ecological consciousness or need to adopt more situation-appropriate business-related thinking; instead, it merely underscores the objective logic of the situation. Without regulating capitalist competition at a level that is above that of the individual company, companies will never have enough space to act democratically. Third, there must be a debate about “resource allocation”. From an economic perspective, resource allocation is about optimally using market efficiency and the democratic potential of political regulation. It is precisely here that it is necessary to draw on experience from failed models of state bureaucratic planned economies; these economies regularly suffocated economic dynamics through their centralist and imperative system of directives. This, understandably, strengthened the view that “the market has to be used, in order to enable individual needs to be satisfied within an adequate period and with the necessary flexibility”. This is also reflected in economic democratic models of development, in which planning has to rely on indicative planning—in other words, through incentives instead of orders—through which decentralized economic actors reach agreements by way of democratic communication (Altvater 2010, 243–4). This points to the following conclusion: a new conceptualization of eco-social economic democracy bundles together several lines of argumentation and captures diverse areas of social and artistic critique. As a means of overcoming a crisis and restabilizing the economy and the welfare state, it acts as social critique and aims to produce change. However, the effects of placing restrictions on the property rights of private capital through expansive participation, elements of political control over the economy and securing the primacy of social problem-solving over private profit reach beyond the rules of a capitalist economy; radical critical transformative forces are at work here. By democratizing decisions about production and distribution, producers are freed from their role of acting as (more or less) passive objects of capitalist accumulation; this strengthens them against market imperatives and shareholder-value thinking, while turning them into subjects of economic control. As such, economic democratic reform contains elements of social artistic critique. These reforms could initially

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

393

result in a strong increase in the value of non-private property and lead to a market system guided by social needs. In addition, an active and intervening civil society could reverse the colonization of society and politics by economics and set in motion a process of the “colonization of economics” by implementing social and political objectives. New economic democracy, organized in cooperation with labor unions, politicians, critical scientists and others, could lead to new impulses in the social sciences and in labor union policy. 3.4 Labor Unions as Actors in Economic Democracy Implementing economic democracy would require cooperation between a variety of actors with different competences and interests. One possibility would be to build a cooperative association in which diverse actors, organizations and individuals are able to apply their specific potential as part of a single political project, but without giving up their own identities. The requirements placed on political actors within such configurations are expressed by the idea of the left-wing mosaic (Urban 2009; 2010). On the one hand, participating in the mosaic would require participants to engage in profound internal debates; and this includes the labor unions. They would have to reach an understanding on perspectives, including the limits of crisis corporatism. In contrast to developing compromises on distribution and employment policies, combined steps towards a transformation to economic democracy could not be taken within arrangements between capital associations and pro-capitalist governments, since the interests of these actors are too divergent. By questioning property rights and putting the control of the economy above private profit, economic democracy touches on the core of capitalism and therefore becomes discredited in terms of corporatism. Knowing this does not make things easier, because the democratization of economic decision-making is not an undertaking that would spark political mobilization; it remains in the shadows of the political arena. The same applies to the rhetoric of the unionist and political left, and even more so to these groups’ political practices. Due to the distributive rollback that was occurring before the crisis and that continued after it, a need for correction has piled up that focuses on questions about the future distribution of profits at the expense of democracy. The conflicts over Stuttgart’s central station (Stuttgart 21) have shown that the

394

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

anger and potential for mobilization among the middle classes due to the post-democratic arrogance of the political class is ignited most strongly over issues in their immediate environment. This is not the case with issues such as the desire for participation in the economy. Accordingly, new economic democracy could become superseded by neo-materialist and postmaterialist issues and remain in the shadows of the political arena. Whether labor unions want to and can help prevent this from happening will depend on the willingness of the union leadership to engage in debates on an adequate strategy. In addition, it is essential that policy concepts and paths toward implementation are defined more precisely in order to mobilize the union membership. At the same time, the union membership must be involved in the active development of relevant strategies. The decisive point will not only be whether union members, the workforce and union activists adopt these issues, but the importance these groups place on developing a new eco-social economic democratic project. Faced by the power relations in the workplace and society, will these issues be rejected as luxurious or utopian and relegated to the distant future? Alternatively, will they be understood as a necessary means of stemming the tide of the financial elites’ undemocratic presumptuousness and of keeping open the path towards an economy and society based on solidarity?

4. Outlook: Suggestions for Labor Union Policy and Research This analysis suggests distinguishing between two aspects of labor union strategy. Until now, revitalization efforts by labor unions have been oriented towards conflicts of distribution and power at the level of the nationstate; even these have been more sporadic than systematic. However, this narrow strategy does not do justice to an initiative aimed at implementing economic democracy; instead, debates on labor union strategy must include the multi-level perspective developed in research on Europe. This would require realigning labor union policy towards European politics; which would represent a new paradigm for the unions (Urban 2009). The Europeanisation of labor union policy would have to be linked to a broadening of union interests and extended political alliances. A European movement, a heterogeneous collective actor, consisting of diverse initiatives, organizations and characters, could provide a strong point of refer-

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

395

ence, for which the term “left-wing mosaic” has been coined (Urban 2009; 2011). Working as part of a cooperative transnational actor would enable the unions to complement their own (insufficient) power resources by aligning themselves with other powerful movements (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010b). This, however, would require labor unions to conduct an intensified strategy debate which would necessarily include their understanding of politics and their conceptions of their own roles. Rephrasing labor unions’ conception of autonomy would inevitably lead to this. Traditionally, the core of autonomous labor union policy has consisted in conflict-oriented representation of interests; a form of policy that asserted labor’s reproductive interests against the economic imperatives of accumulation and the imperatives of political integration. This was political and economic class politics, which directed its criticism of capitalism towards the state and capital (Deppe 1979). A more modern concept of autonomy in the context of the left-wing mosaic would not simply replace this view; it would extend it. This would require a broader definition of “interest”. Without doubt, financial market capitalism is making class-oriented interest representation by wage labor even more important. However, in the context of a left-wing mosaic, broader issues and political objectives would have to be debated— and not only class-oriented political projects in the strictest sense of the term. Consequently, unions would need to include interests and preferences that arise from outside of the direct context of wage labor. In any case, this would strengthen the political mandate of labor unions and that of union-based interest representation in general (Urban 2005). This presents a challenge not only for labor union strategy but also for labor union research. Crisis corporatism is a wide field. First, the suitability of crisis corporatism as a concept would have to be analyzed and further developed. The goal should be an analytical terminology that captures the specifics of the macro-economic context and the actors along with their interests and the specific power configuration within German financial market capitalism. These efforts should be linked to the debate on the capacities of nation states to act. If, during the crisis, skepticism of the return of nation-states as powerful actors were to increase (see Mayntz 2010), this would have consequences for the reliability of commitments made by states and the likelihood that corporatist alliances formed during the crisis would be successful. It would be useful to trace the implications, which are certainly not trivial, that embedding labor unions in corporatism

396

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

has had for the internal decision-making process. Here, research from an artistic critique informed by organization sociology is needed. Crisis corporatism is kept under tension by the conflict between the logic of political influence and the opposing logic of membership (Streeck 1999, 223ff.). Being too deeply embedded in social pacts that unequally distribute the costs and benefits of the crisis could become a risk to labor unions’ democratic internal structures. The more labor unions are embedded within corporatist arrangements and the higher the cost of gaining influence, the stronger the leaderships’ tendencies could be to try and influence internal discussion and decision-making. Furthermore, they would also attempt to minimize conflict between internal opinion formation and demands made from within corporatist alliances, and to demonstrate unions’ capabilities to make commitments. This type of internal formation could lead to restrictions on the genuine articulation of member interests and damage internal democracy (see Milona 2008). It is unclear whether these risks could be resolved by implementing decentralized decision-making structures and increasing member participation, or whether such measures would block the tripartite model of politics. However, it is clear that central issues need to be analyzed through a form of research that remains strongly linked to praxis. If internal democracy in labor unions is damaged, a form of artistic critique that is sensitive to democracy will not be long in coming. Nevertheless, if a powerful actor with critical intentions were to develop during the current crisis, and if the reactivation of anti-capitalist social and artistic critique were successful, this would not necessarily threaten the foundations of capitalism. Capitalism could once again succeed in transforming critique into resources of adaptation and stabilization. This, its turn, would confirm the dialectics of social critique and social dynamics discussed above, and with it one of the basic premises of this argument. Yet, at the same time, it would also discourage ambitious anti-capitalist critique. In fact, it is unclear whether the hope for only a “better” form of capitalism than its finance-driven form will be fulfilled. Studying the manner in which the critique of capitalism could free itself from this trap, therefore, would be a rewarding area of research for reflexive sociology.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

397

Works Cited Artus, Ingrid (2010). Die französischen Gewerkschaften in der Wirtschaftskrise: Zwischen Dialogue Social und Basismilitanz. WSI-Mitteilungen, 63(9), 465–471. Altvater, Elmar (2010). Der große Krach. Oder die Jahrhundertkrise von Wirtschaft und Finanzen, von Politik und Natur. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Baccaro, Lucio (2010). Does the Global Financial Crisis Mark a Turning Point for Labour?. Socio-Economic Review, 8(2), 341–348. Bergmann, Joachim, Otto Jacobi and Walther Müller-Jentsch (1976). Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt M.: EVA. Boltanski, Luc (2011). On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation. Cambridge: Polity. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2005). The Role of Critique in the Dynamics of Capitalism: Social Critique versus Artistic Critique. In Max Miller (ed.). Worlds of Capitalism. Institutions, Governance and economic change in the era of globalization, 237–267. London/New York: Routledge. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Brinkmann, Ulrich, Hae-Lin Choi, Richard Detje, Klaus Dörre, Hajo Holst, Serhat Karakayali and Catharina Schmalstieg (2008). Strategic Unionism: Aus der Krise zur Erneuerung? Umrisse eines Forschungsprogramms. Wiesbaden: VS. Crouch, Colin (2011). The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press. Deppe, Frank (1979). Autonomie und Integration. Materialien zur Gewerkschaftsanalyse. Marburg: Verlag Arbeiterbewegung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft. Deppe, Frank (1989). Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 1949–1965. In Frank Deppe, Georg Fülberth and Jürgen Harrer (eds.). Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung, 471–575. Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein. DGB-Bundesvorstand (1996). Grundsatzprogramm des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes. Berlin. Dörre, Klaus (2011). Funktionswandel der Gewerkschaften. Von der intermediären zur fraktalen Organisation. In Thomas Haipeter and Klaus Dörre (eds.). Gewerkschaftliche Modernisierung, 267–301. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2015). The New Landnahme: Dynamics and Limits of Financial Market Capitalism. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 11–66. London: Verso. Dörre, Klaus, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology, Capitalism, Critique—Towards the Revitalisation of an Elective Affinity. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 1– 8. London: Verso. Forum Gewerkschaften (1996). Soziale Marktwirtschaft—das Ende der Geschichte? Zur Kritik des Entwurfs für ein neues DGB-Grundsatzprogramm. Supplement der Zeitschrift Sozialismus, 23(6), 6–96.

398

HANS-JÜRGEN URBAN

Frege, Carola, and John Kelly (eds.). (2004). Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalisation in a Globalizing Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Glassner, Vera, and Maarten Keune (2010). Negotiating the Crisis? Collective Bargaining in Europe during the Economic Downturn. ILO-Working Paper 10, Geneva. Haipeter, Thomas, and Klaus Dörre (eds.). (2011). Gewerkschaftliche Modernisierung. Wiesbaden: VS. Hassel, Anke (2009). Policies and Politics in Social Pacts in Europe. European Journal of Industrial Relation, 15(1), 7–26. Huzzard, Tony, Denis Gregory and Regan Scott (eds.). (2004). Strategic Unionism and Partnership, Boxing or Dancing?. London: Macmillan. Hyman, Richard (2007). How can Trade Unions act strategically?. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 13(2), 193–210. Hyman, Richard, and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (2010a). Trade Unions and the Crisis: A Lost Opportunity?. Socio-Economic Review, 8(2), 364–372. Hyman, Richard, and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick (2010b). Trade Unions, Politics and Parties: Is a New Configuration Possible?. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 16(3), 315–331. IG-Metall Vorstand (2009). Aktiv aus der Krise. Gemeinsam für ein gutes Leben. Aktionsplan der IG-Metall. Frankfurt am Main. Lehndorff, Steffen (ed.). (2012). A Triumph of Failed Ideas. European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis. Brussels: ETUI. Lessenich, Stephan (2008). Die Neuerfindung des Sozialen. Der Sozialstaat im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Bielefeld: transcript. Lessenich, Stephan (2015). Artistic or Social Critique? On the Problematisation of a False Alternative. In Klaus Dörre, Stephan Lessenich and Hartmut Rosa (2015). Sociology—Capitalism—Critique, 181–197. London: Verso. Mayntz, Renate (2010). Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Nationalstaats bei der Regulierung der Finanzmärkte. Leviathan, 38(2), 175–187. Meine, Hartmut, Michael Schumann, Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). (2011). Mehr Wirtschaftsdemokratie wagen!. Hamburg: VSA. Merkel, Wolfgang (2000). Der “Dritte Weg” und der Revisionismusstreit der Sozialdemokratie am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. In Karl Hinrichs, Herbert Kitschelt and Helmut Wiesenthal (eds.). Institutionenpolitik in kapitalistischen und postsozialistischen Gesellschaften, 263–290. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Merkel, Wolfgang, Christoph Egle, Christian Henkes, Tobias Ostheim and Alexander Petring (2006). Die Reformfähigkeit der Sozialdemokratie. Herausforderungen und Bilanz der Regierungspolitik in Westeuropa. Wiesbaden: VS. Milona, Oscar (2008). Social Pacts, Collective Bargaining and Trade Union Articulation Strategies, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp. 399–418. Möller, Joachim (2010). The German Labor Market Response in the World Recession—De-mystifying a Miracle. Journal for Labour Market Research, 42(4), 325– 336.

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND TRADE UNIONS

399

Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2008). Arbeit und Bürgerstatus. Studien zur sozialen und industriellen Demokratie. Wiesbaden: VS. Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2011). Gewerkschaften und Soziale Marktwirtschaft seit 1945. Stuttgart: Reclam. Peters, John (2011). The Rise of Finance and the Decline of Organised Labour in the Advanced Capitalist Countries. New Political Economy, 16(1), 73–99. Piazza, James (2001). De-Linked Labor. Labor Unions and Social Democratic Parties under Globalization. Party Politics, 7(4), 413–435. Piper, Nikolaus (2012). Das Unbehagen am Kapitalismus. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25.01.2012, 35. Raschke, Joachim, and Ralf Tils (2007). Politische Strategie. Eine Grundlegung. Wiesbaden: VS. Schwab, Klaus (2012). Wege aus der Burn-out-Falle. Handelsblatt-Beilage, 25.01.2012, 7. Streeck, Wolfgang (1999). Korporatismus in Deutschland. Zwischen Nationalstaat und Europäischer Integration, Frankfurt M.: Campus. Streeck, Wolfgang (2009). Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2004). Aktivierung und Eigenverantwortung. Stützpfeiler einer neuen Wohlfahrtsarchitektur?. WSI-Mitteilungen, 57(9), 467–473. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2005). Gewerkschaften als konstruktive Vetospieler. Kontexte und Probleme gewerkschaftlicher Strategiebildung. Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, 18(2), 44–60. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2009). Die Mosaik-Linke. Vom Aufbruch der Gewerkschaften zur Erneuerung der Bewegung. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 54(5), 71–78. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2010). Lob der Kapitalismuskritik. Warum der Kapitalismus eine starke Mosaik-Linke braucht. Luxemburg. Gesellschaftsanalyse und linke Praxis, 2(1), 18–29. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2011). Wirtschaftsdemokratie des 21. Jahrhunderts. Konturen und Realisierungsbedingungen eines gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprojektes. In Hartmut Meine, Michael Schuman and Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). Mehr Wirtschaftsdemokratie wagen!, 42–67. Hamburg: VSA. Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2012). Crisis Corporatism and Trade Union Revitalisation in Europe. In Steffen Lehndorff (ed.). A Triumph of Failed Ideas. European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis,199–222. Brussels: ETUI. Voss, Kim, and Rachel Sherman (2000). Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement. American Journal of Sociology, 106(2), 303–349.

Work and Societal Legitimation: What a Normative Sociology of Work and Industrial Relations Can Contribute to the Theory of Capitalism Wolfgang Menz More than 40 years ago, Jürgen Habermas (1975) raised the question of a “legitimation crisis” of capitalist societies. Even though his diagnosis was made in a different historical context (today we would probably talk about legitimation crises of neoliberal capitalism or late Fordism rather than late capitalism), there are still interesting parallels to the recent financial and currency crisis. Can rising state activities in stabilizing the economic system, i.e. an increasing social subsidisation of capitalism, be justified in the public sphere? Habermas’ answer, of course, was no. Simultaneously with the legitimation crisis, a “motivational crisis” would occur: social conformist orientation towards performance—the performance-oriented professional ethos of the middle class as well as the conventional work morale of the lower class—would begin to erode. From today’s perspective, Habermas’ late capitalism thesis is neither theoretically nor empirically convincing, but I still agree with its premise: capitalist societies (and more generally, social orders), if they are to be stable for at least a certain period, rely on binding notions of what is obligatory or exemplary (Weber 1978, 31) to generate motivation for compliance among those who are subject to capitalist domination. The lack of general belief in such a justification leads to reproduction crises either of capitalism as such or at least of a specific historic formation of capitalism. Crises, in general, are not crises of pure economic functioning, but crises of legitimation that stem from the separation of economic-politic justification demands and the conceptions of legitimation of the members of society. However, legitimation does not emerge from an abstract, distanced assessment of plans for how to build a society (which one could then examine as if on a drawing board), but through the individuals’ daily experiences and interpretations of the things around them. As long as wage labor re-

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

401

mains an essential area of everyday life, it is also a central production location of ideas of legitimation—and such notions then point beyond the specific work context. If the sociology of work and industrial relations wants to be of broader social and theoretical use, it must inquire into the conditions of the production of notions of adequacy and propriety in work and their relevance for social theory. In my view, the usual approaches in critical social theory fail to adequately conceptualize legitimation (or, in the words of other theoretical traditions, hegemony or ideology) regarding “work”. On the other hand, the current sociology of work seems unable to demonstrate the relevance of its findings for social theory, for instance by explaining the relevance of the normative dimension of work to the stability as well as crisis tendencies of society. By going very quickly through the theory of capitalism and sociology of work and industrial relations, I will first identify deficiencies and points of connection. Then I will briefly outline what the sociology of work and industrial relations can contribute to explaining crises in capitalist legitimation. I will then illustrate this with a specific question—that of the importance of an orientation towards achievement for legitimizing domination in the workplace and wider society. Finally, I will return to the initial question of legitimation problems of the economic occupation of the state in managing the current financial crisis.

1. Ideology without Work: Work Norms without Social Reference In critical approaches to capitalism, there are two dominant models of legitimation. First, the externality model, where motivation to participate and notions of adequateness ultimately originate in a pre-capitalist sphere or one that is external to capitalism (Habermas, Boltanski and Chiapello); or, in cases where the origin of meaning is traced back to fundamental capitalist structures, the production of legitimation in work is generally neglected (theory of ideology or hegemony). Finally, governmentality studies—if we want to count them as a theory of capitalism—avoid the question of legitimation altogether; the subjects simply appear the way management theory and literature want them to be.

402

WOLFGANG MENZ

Marx himself did not develop a systematic theory of ideology in the labor process. The theorem of commodity fetishism (which is in my view the core of Marx’ concept of ideology) presupposes a specific relation of (private) production and social exchange, but essentially restricts it to the sphere of circulation. There are indications that Marx regarded work primarily as coercion—“the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men” (Marx 1954, 356); a coercion that needs no further legitimation. Nevertheless, Marx later stated that the development of—mostly illusory—ideas of “individuality, and with it the sense of liberty, independence, and self-control” (Marx 1954, 555) acts as a mechanism to align the actions of the worker with the valorization of capital. Therefore, the work process does not function wholly without ideology. Another possible interpretation focuses on the legitimation effects of the equivalence principle. The standards of justice in exchange, which initially are relevant only in the sale of labor power, can also be normatively effective in the subsequent expenditure of labor power. Work is done “voluntarily” and in line with the employer’s demands which are seen as legitimate—occasionally based on meritocratic ideals. These provisional trails set out by Marx were not pursued further. Those Marxists who focused on the critique of ideology—in the form of the older Critical Theory—were more interested in the integration mechanisms of the culture industry than in the experience of work. The tradition of hegemony theory, which emphasized agency and conflict, was focused primarily on the struggles over intellectual leadership in civil society and the state apparatus. Gramsci’s famous statement that hegemony originates in the factory (Gramsci 1975, 2146) has largely remained neither precisely defined nor updated. Habermas’ theory of late capitalism prominently raises the question of legitimation, but suffers from a fundamental lack of understanding of the normative dimension of work. Economy and work in general appear as not requiring legitimation because they are systemically self-sufficient to a certain extent or sometimes automatically legitimised through the equivalence principle. They are ignored as places of social meaning-making, which is exclusively assigned to the socio-cultural system (cf. Honneth’s critical remarks 1980). In Habermas’ theory, legitimation problems arise either from the shortage of non-capitalist resources of meaning (“crises of motivation”), or from new kinds of state intervention in the economy that require legitimation (“crises of legitimation”). That the capitalist economy

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

403

itself needs meaning, or that meaning is produced in work, seems out of the question. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) also deny that the capitalist economy itself is able to produce legitimation. Capitalism for them is an “absurd system” that needs meaning “from outside”, for instance by drawing on normative resources provided by a critique of capitalism based in the life world to justify managerial control. Here, too, the origin of meaning remains essentially external, even if it is addressed in management discourse. Capitalism can exploit and integrate such meaning resources, but it cannot produce them. Recently, popular Foucauldian approaches have suffered from a different kind of deficit (e.g. Bröckling 2007). Contrary to Habermas as well as Boltanski and Chiapello, they do not use an externality model but directly explore the economic interpellation of working subjects as developed in management or self-help literature. They sometimes produce brilliant analyses of post-Fordist subjectivities, but the mediation between these interpellations and the real empirical attitudes remains hidden. Ultimately, they are unable to ask the question of legitimation—i.e. the question of the relation between the necessary economic justifications and subjective attitudes and orientations. The sociology of work and industrial relations exhibits deficiencies which correspond to these gaps in the theory of capitalism. Normative orientations and interpretations—the “subjective side” of legitimation— initially played a minor role in older versions of critical industrial sociology in Germany. This applies equally to the Frankfurt subsumption studies (e.g. Brandt et al. 1978; Schmiede and Schudlich 1976) and the approach of the Munich Institute for Social Research (e.g. Brechtle 1980; Altmann et al. 1978)—two of the main strains of critical German sociology of work. Studies on workers’ consciousness from the same time take the questions of employees’ attitudes and perceptions empirically seriously (even if they would often disqualify them as “ideological”). They also sketched the connections between workers’ experiences and their attitudes towards social issues (e.g. Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Kern and Schumann 1977; Kudera et al. 1979). However, these were often rather linear and sketchy, which led to demands that the sociology of work and industrial relations should turn its focus instead on agency and the subject. Subsequent studies since the 1980s have produced a more differentiated account of interpretation pat-

404

WOLFGANG MENZ

terns and behavioral orientations in the workplace. The emphasis was no longer on large social units (classes, strata), but on differentiated groups of actors with specific strategies and attitudinal patterns. However, this came at the expense of restricting oneself to work and the workplace. The issue of the relevance of workers’ orientation for the normative integration of society was almost never raised—which continues until today. The sociology of work and industrial relations has become—against its own original intentions—just another specialized field of sociology whose subject area is well-defined but disconnected from society.

2. Legitimation as a Challenge for the Theory of Capitalism and Sociology of Work What is the conceptual point of departure if the sociology of work is to contribute to the question of societal legitimation? First, we should study what type of meaning capitalism itself claims to produce. Capitalism is not simply a systemic functional mechanism that is, as it were, “embedded” in a non-capitalist “social” environment. Rather, it is capitalism itself that produces certain principles of justification, requirements for action and concepts of subjectivity. The first step has to be to reconstruct these. With regard to work, this means that certain historically important rationalization principles inherently contain certain concepts of subjectivity that define certain models of agency, of rights and duties, of principles of adequate behavior, etc. They address workers as working subjects in a specific way. These concepts of the subject and the patterns of justification, which give meaning to the demands on the subjects and justify the dominant order, have to be differentiated from the subjects’ self-image (concepts of the Self) and their notions of validity and adequacy regarding external expectations. Only by looking at the relation between these dimensions—the concepts of subject and the justification patterns on the one side, and the self-concept and notions of validity of the subjects on the other side—can the question of legitimation and motivation be determined. Legitimacy, in short, means correspondence between both dimensions. Crises of legitimation arise when they become decoupled.

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

405

Both dimensions do not develop automatically at the same rate, but also not independently of each other. Rather, specific historical capitalist formations make various offers of meaning. They also define fields of what can be thought and said, within which subjects have to position themselves. Therefore, the more or less successful relations of correspondence, as they emerge in certain phases of development, are more than just historical contingencies. If we take the thesis of the internal production of legitimacy seriously, possible crises of legitimation must be understood on the basis of how capitalist concepts of the subject and justification patterns have changed historically. These new requirements can come into conflict with existing notions of validity and adequacy—being products of previous stages of development. Crises of legitimation arise not only from the depletion of non-capitalist normative resources or from changing attitudes in the socio-cultural system. They may also arise because new requirements collide with (previously) produced meaning contexts.

3. Legitimation Problems in the Meritocratic Society and the Market Regime The connection between workplace experience and patterns of social justification can be seen very clearly in one field: that of “achievement” or “performance”. Performance—in whatever historically concrete form—is at the same time something that firms demand from their workers, an important element in the self-image of the working subjects, and a fundamental justification norm for social inequality in capitalist societies. If the meaning produced in work is relevant for societal legitimation, and if crises of legitimation arise out of possible conflicts between new requirements of meaning and pre-existing relations of legitimacy, then it is worth taking a look at the principles of legitimation of the (former) Fordist performance regime.

406

WOLFGANG MENZ

3.1 Legitimation in Taylorism Under the classic justification principle of Taylorism, performance requirements and remuneration are justified meritocratically on the basis of individual performance. The standard is defined by an anthropocentric natural parameter—paradigmatically expressed in, for instance, the REFA standard performance. 1 It is based on a kind of physical-aesthetic ideal that sees performance as the harmonic motion of the working human being. According to REFA, work rate and performance intensity have to follow the “natural motion rhythm of the body, its natural frequency so to speak” (REFA 1961, 16). What is natural and what kind of performance can legitimately be expected is then determined by the experts in industrial engineering. The idea of performance as a natural parameter is combined with the scientification and standardization of the methods by which this parameter is defined. Prices and market conditions are disregarded, and performance is calculated only in terms of time units (target time, piece rate, etc.). The core of the Taylorist concept of performance is its reference to labor power: what is “humanly possible” can legitimately be demanded of the worker, a standard that defines performance in terms of the physical properties of abstract labor power. It is also what the corresponding principles of meritocracy refer to: measurability and labor science promise objectivity. Standardization and normalization mean equal treatment for all employees. Disregarding specific circumstances—not only of the concrete activity and the features of individual “achievers” but also the market situation— promises neutrality. The official justification principle should not be confused with employee attitudes. Employees in Taylorism certainly did not generally consider their wages and performance conditions fair. However, within this “justification order” it was possible to refer to the principle of labor power-related meritocracy. If such a norm is discursively available, reality may often appear unjust. Indeed, basic elements of this concept were used by many relevant actors (employers’ associations as well as unions) to justify as well as to ward off demands. Studies on workers’ consciousness often showed that, while workers were discontented with their performance situation and

——————

1 Translator’s note: In Germany, REFA (Association for Work Configuration, Management and Company Development) sets an industry standard of performance called REFA-normal that is based on Scientific Management.

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

407

wages, an overwhelming majority of them still agreed with the meritocratic principle—often to the barely concealed amazement of the researchers. What was disputed was not the norm, but its specific implementation (Siegel 1995). 3.2 Legitimation in the Market Regime In the current market-centered production model, the principle of labor power-related meritocracy is called into question—not by an “external”, life world-based critique of the rigidity of the meritocratic principle, but because of internal structural changes in how companies control performance. 2 In so doing, the post-Fordist economy attacks—this is the initial assumption—its own fundamental legitimation that was supposed to justify domination in the workplace, activate the workers’ motivational resources and justify social inequality. Success-oriented systems of performance control and remuneration do not only define performance as the contribution of living labor to a company’s production of material commodities. Work only counts as (remunerable) performance if the value of its result can be realized in the market. Performance and success are decoupled—albeit unilaterally. There is uncertainty about whether a rendered performance leads to revenue; on the other side, increased pressure to succeed requires increasingly greater efforts. Economic uncertainties are not absorbed by the organization, but passed on to the workers in the form of changing performance requirements (Sauer 2005). Market orientation reverses the principle that performance is related to the expenditure of labor power. It also reverses the decoupling between the temporal economy of the firm and the external market economy. What counts is not effort in relation to what is “humanly possible”, but the work result in relation to what is externally necessary. The definition of performance is thus “finalized” (Bahnmüller 2001). Though the authority of labor science is abandoned, market-oriented performance justification also aims for objectivity. Performance requirements, it is suggested, arise neither from the superior’s claim to dominance

——————

2 Cf. the contribution by Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer in this volume.

408

WOLFGANG MENZ

nor from the profit-seeking of the capital owner. They appear as externally defined objective parameters. The market regime in the workplace tries to justify itself by producing “exterritoriality”: the “market” stands for a non-negotiable reference point. The naturalization of human labor power is replaced by naturalizing the laws of the economic process. With regard to this oft-described radical change in performance principles, we can ask two questions: 1. Is the post-Fordist market regime successful in tapping into new sources of justification? Do the new justification patterns also correspond to new ideas of validity on the workers’ side? Or does this collide with established meritocratic ideas? 2. Are new, stable “self-concepts” emerging, in which workers define themselves as market subjects? Is the post-Fordist concept of subjectivity being realized? 1. What future does meritocracy have as the central Taylorist justification principle (and possibly a new principle for critique)? Sighard Neckel once predicted that, with the transformation of “capitalist wage labor societies” into “performance-oriented market societies”, meritocratic norms would start to disappear from the “moral horizon” of society (Neckel 1999). Ultimately this would mean that workers’ attitudes would adapt flexibly to the justification patterns of the new capitalist phase. Meritocratic ideas would also be undermined in the individuals’ consciousnesses. But the opposite scenario is equally possible: that employees critically use the existing justice norms against the new principles of performance management. This could result in a legitimation crisis of market-oriented performance policy. I now want to answer this question empirically (more details in Menz 2009). In our study of attitudes towards norms of justice and performance in market-oriented performance policy, we found no general erosion of standards of justice. Meritocratic ideas still play a prominent role as a normative standard for workers. Their practical application, however, is very specific: they primarily concern the distribution of gains and workloads within one’s own immediate environment, e.g. the team or department. Standards of justice that draw on a labor power-related definition of performance are used above all to evaluate the behavior and attitudes of one’s colleagues. Thus the most important field for the application of standards of justice is the assessment of observable actions by specific people in

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

409

one’s immediate environment. Here, they serve primarily to provide ethical support to performance requirements at the horizontal level. At this point there are no signs that “meritocracy” is losing importance as a normative standard. But performance requirements do erode—as our study showed—when they can serve to bolster employees’ demands against the company or to criticize unreasonable performance demands. The company as the target of demands for justice disappears from sight, and “the market” escapes those demands anyway. Justice demands are strong where they can be used for collegial control through mutual disciplining “among equals”. Whatever remains of standards of justice thus assumes a more repressive function, rather than supporting the critique of domination. Collective performance requirements, which are perceived as objective and remain outside the purview of standards of justice thanks to their effective market justification, are extended into the group where they are normatively secured and managed by the employees themselves. That demands for justice are suspended in the market regime also means that it does not have a solid normative foundation. Its acceptance is primarily derived from notions of necessity. The market regime is sustained not by a “moral” but only by a “pragmatic legitimacy” (Suchman 1995). To perform what the market and the customers demand is deemed “adequate” and “justified”, because it appears necessary and reasonable, even unavoidable, in light of external economic circumstances—not because it results in a just distribution of performance and gains, but because social inequality appears justified. 2. I now turn to the second element of the subjective dimension. Can employees succeed in developing a stable self-understanding as performance subjects if the “anarchy of the market” legitimately determines the work rhythm? 3 In their study of the entrepreneurial employee, Günter Voß and Hans Pongratz describe a new type of employee with a specific performance orientation. The so-called “performance optimizer” draws a “positive performance experience” with a specific emotionalized quality from flexibly adapting to chaotic work environments. He enjoys his success even—and especially—in extreme conditions (Pongratz and Voß 2003). This work

——————

3 Empirically I refer to our current research at the ISF on performance and work load (see Menz et al. 2011, Menz and Nies 2015).

410

WOLFGANG MENZ

identity as a successful market subject is typical for those workers who succeed in developing almost rush-like sensations in unusually stressful situations, or who even have “borderline experiences” created by pushing one’s own performance limits. Getting a “kick” is a recurring catchphrase in our interviews. Coping with uncontrollable uncertainty can serve as a relevant selfaffirmation, but said “kick” can only be generated—systematically—when there is a permanent threat of failure. Successful self-affirmation, and sometimes bare economic survival, is proof of success. But this also means that recognition remains permanently precarious and that the “performance identity” of the workplace market subject remains fundamentally fragile because its possible failure needs to be constantly considered. Deflecting changing market conditions does not equal pride in one’s own performance, as would be the case with meeting professional standards or achieving stable quantitative targets. According to our study, the ability to see survival under precarious conditions as a positive performance experience remains a privilege of more highly-skilled workers. The majority experiences “the market” as an instance of coercion and intimidation and as quasi-natural source of permanent insecurity, not as a chance for selfaffirmation or an extended world of experience. The typical target spirals in new forms of control illustrate the excessive nature of the market regime that causes a precarization of the performance identity. Earnings targets that had only barely been achieved in the previous year are regularly increased by a few percent. What was considered a success yesterday is a failure today, and yesterday’s achievements are now merely the starting point for new growth. Past performances do not add up over the long term to establish a secured status (as in plateaus that can be reached through work). Instead there is “permanent reservation”: the worker’s performance can be devalued any time. Even when earnings targets are somehow achieved—often to the astonishment of the workers themselves—this leads to experiences of inadequateness, to a feeling of insufficient personal performance. A stable “sense of accomplishment” is no longer achieved (Dunkel et al. 2010; Menz et al. 2011). This renders the reproduction of the post-Fordist market regime fundamentally insecure. It undermines those resources that its predecessor could still count on, at least partly. The scope for justifying inequality on the basis of notions of justice disappears. This makes developing a stable self-conception as a successful performer more difficult. Moreover, the

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

411

“success-oriented culture of the market society” (Neckel 2008) does not provide much in terms of meaning. Nevertheless, we are not (yet?) dealing with open crisis. The legitimation of the market regime is, as it were, cut in half: it lacks a stable foundation of standards of justice (moral legitimacy), but it has been able until now to successfully use justification by objective constraints (pragmatic legitimacy). Whether it can permanently produce sufficiently motivated “successful” market subjects is currently an open question.

4. The Financial Market Crisis as Crisis of Legitimation? New Consciousness Studies Are Needed Let us go back once more to Habermas. He argued that, in the transition from liberal to organized capitalism, the state was forced to close the growing functional gaps in the market that resulted from the process of capital concentration. The state, according to Habermas, no longer only ensured a general framework for market exchange with as few crises as possible, but tended to complement and substitute for the market mechanism. What used to appear as natural was now becoming the object of political action and therefore became accountable to the public. With the “introduction of legitimate power into the reproduction process”, the basic contradiction between social production and private appropriation erupted into the realm of the political; it was no longer possible to shield the state from demands for redistribution (Habermas 1975, 69). In the wake of the crisis since 2008, however, it seems that we are seeing a legitimate economization of the political rather than a politicization of the relations of production. Whether government attempts to revive the economy will run into similar justification problems as they did 40 years ago depends on whether government action can successfully be portrayed as expanded (quasi-)nature. Currently it seems that this might work. Crisisridden post-Fordism must do without visions of a “democratic” or a “just” society. Arguments of this kind are no longer used in public discourse. “Systemically relevant” was the magic word that saved Commerzbank or Hypo Real Estate. No one ever claimed that this had anything to do with justice, and nobody seriously demanded it either. This is precisely the source of the at least temporary stability of the neoliberal policy regime:

412

WOLFGANG MENZ

that it has managed to liberate itself from comprehensive legitimacy demands like the notion of justice. In the workplace, submission to objective constraints and the suspension of demands for justice has been successfully practiced for years. The parallel between workplace legitimacy and societal legitimacy (both of which are “cut in half”) is obvious. Nevertheless, this is where the work starts for a sociology of work and industrial relations that aims to inform social theory. It would be wrong to assume that justification order and norms in the workplace are directly translated into principles of justification or expectations of legitimacy with regard to politics and society as a whole. Social philosophy in particular points to the existence of different normative principles in different subsystems of society (Honneth 2014; Walzer 1983). 4 This would mean shedding light on the connections and contradictions between experiences of work on the one hand and the normative requirements and political and social relations of legitimation on the other. This would mean reviving the comprehensive questions of “workers’ consciousness” with regard to work, society and politics, 5 but to ask them in a more open way to avoid determinism and faulty conclusions.

——————

4 However, it tends to ignore that principles of justification in different spheres do tend to resemble each other over time. Generic market-based justifications are now deployed in very different areas. Just think of the occasionally grotesque attempts to switch public administration—previously thought of as an area with a logic of its own that must, by necessity, follow different principles than private business—to a market terminology that calls citizens “clients” and public services to which people are entitled by law “products”. 5 We had a first initial stab at this in our short study Krise ohne Konflikt? ([Crisis without Conflict?], Detje et al. 2011a, b). It suggests that the submission to market constraints and crisis-induced cutbacks that happens in the workplace and that is seen as inescapable does not cause workplace domination to lose its legitimacy. However, we also found that experiences of powerlessness in the workplace add up to an “diffuse rage” that lacks a discernible target and is shifted from the workplace onto the political field. There it manifests in the form of diverse protest fantasies—without being first channeled through notions of justice.

WORK AND SOCIETAL LEGITIMATION

413

Works Cited Altman, Norbert, Günter Bechtle and Burkart Lutz (1978). Betrieb—Technik— Arbeit. Elemente einer soziologischen Analytik technisch-organisatorischer Veränderungen. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Bahnmüller, Reinhard (2001). Stabilität und Wandel der Entlohnungsformen— Entgeltsysteme und Entgeltpolitik in der Metallindustrie, in der Textil- und Bekleidungsindustrie und im Bankgewerbe. München/Mering: Rainer Hampp. Brandt, Gerhard, Bernhard Kündig, Zissis Papadimitriou and Jutta Thomae (1978). Computer und Arbeitsprozess. Eine arbeitssoziologische Untersuchung der Auswirkungen des Computereinsatzes in ausgewählten Betriebsabteilungen der Stahlindustrie und des Bankgewerbes. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Brechtle, Günter (1980). Betrieb als Strategie. Theoretische Vorarbeiten zu einem industriesoziologischen Konzept. Frankfurt M.: Campus. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York: Verso. Bröckling, Ulrich (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform. Frankfurt M: Suhrkamp. Detje, Richard, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2011a). Krise ohne Konflikt? Interessen- und Handlungsorientierungen im Betrieb—die Sicht von Betroffenen. Hamburg: VSA. Detje, Richard, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2011b). The German Miracle? Interests and Orientations for Action During the Crisis - the Perspectives of Those Affected. transform! european journal for alternative thinking and political dialogue, (8), 158–169. Dunkel, Wolfgang, Nick Kratzer and Wolfgang Menz (2010). “Permanentes Ungenügen” und “Veränderung in Permanenz”—Belastungen durch neue Steuerungsformen. WSI-Mitteilungen, 63(7), 357–364. Goldthorpe, John H., David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer and Jennifer Platt (1969). The affluent worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gramsci, Antonio (1975 [1934]). Quarderni del carcere. 4 vols. Edizione critica dell’ Istituto Gramsci. Ed. Valentino Gerratana. Turin: Einaudi. Habermas, Jürgen (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. Honneth, Axel (1980). Arbeit und instrumentales Handeln. Kategoriale Probleme einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie. In Axel Honneth and Urs Jaeggi (eds.). Arbeit, Handlung, Normativität. Theorien des Historischen Materialismus 2, 185–233. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Honneth, Axel (2014). Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. New York: Columbia University Press. Kern, Horst, and Michael Schumann (1977). Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewußtsein. Eine empirische Untersuchung über den Einfluß der aktuellen technischen Entwicklung auf die industrielle Arbeit und das Arbeiterbewußtsein. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp.

414

WOLFGANG MENZ

Kudera, Werner, Werner Mangold, Konrad Ruff, Rudi Schmidt, Rudi and Theodor Wentzke (1979). Gesellschaftliches und politisches Bewusstsein von Arbeitern. Eine empirische Untersuchung. Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp. Marx, Karl (1954 [1887]). Capital. Volume I. A Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Menz, Wolfgang (2009). Die Legitimität der Marktregimes. Leistungs- und Gerechtigkeitsorientierungen in neuen Formen betrieblicher Leistungspolitik. Wiesbaden: VS. Menz, Wolfgang, Wolfgang Dunkel and Nick Kratzer (2011). Leistung und Leiden. Neue Steuerungsformen von Leistung und ihre Belastungswirkungen. In Nick Kratzer, Wolfgang Dunkel, Karina Becker and Stephan Hinrichs (eds.). Arbeit und Gesundheit im Konflikt, 143–198. Berlin: edition sigma. Menz, Wolfgang, and Sarah Nies (2015). Wenn allein der Erfolg zählt. Belastungen und Work-Life-Balance in den Finanzdienstleistungen. In Nick Kratzer, Wolfgang Menz and Barbara Pangert (eds.). Work-Life-Balance—Eine Frage der Leistungspolitik. Analysen und Gestaltungsansätze, 233–274. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Neckel, Sighard (1999). Blanker Neid, blinde Wut? Sozialstruktur und kollektive Gefühle. Leviathan, 27(2), 145–165. Neckel, Sighard (2008). Flucht nach vorn. Die Erfolgskultur der Marktgesellschaft. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Pongratz, Hans J., and G. Günter Voß (2003). Arbeitskraftunternehmer. Erwerbsorientierung in entgrenzten Arbeitsformen. Berlin: edition sigma. REFA (1961). Das REFA-Buch. Band 1: Arbeitsgestaltung. München: Hanser. Sauer, Dieter (2005). Arbeit im Übergang. Zeitdiagnosen. Hamburg: VSA. Schmiede, Rudi, and Edwin Schudlich (1976). Die Entwicklung der Leistungsentlohnung in Deutschland. Eine historisch-theoretische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Lohn und Leistung unter kapitalistischen Produktionsbedingungen. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Siegel, Tilla (1995). Schlank und flexibel in die Zukunft. Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von industrieller Rationalisierung und gesellschaftlichem Umbruch. In Brigitte Aulenbacher and Tilla Siegel (eds.). Diese Welt wird völlig anders sein— Denkmuster der Rationalisierung, 175–195. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus. Suchman, Mark C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. Walzer, Michael (1983). Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books. Weber, Max (1978 [1921]). An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Towards Critical Perspectives Klaus Dörre, Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dieter Sauer

Given the force and complexity of the current economic, ecological, political, and social crisis outlined in the introduction to this volume, it is no wonder that capitalism has lost much of the nimbus it had been ascribed in the years around 1990, when the “end of history” seemed to have arrived and capitalism was commonly regarded as the only surviving system after many decades of confrontation between the East and the West. Today, the future of capitalism is discussed remarkably critically, even at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In the editorials of established journals and newspapers, this socioeconomic system is called into question, as well-known conservative commentators ask whether the Left’s anticapitalist stance might have been justified after all. But how about (labor) sociology?

1. Capitalism and Labor Sociology Although German sociology considers itself an “academic expert for crisis” (Krisenwissenschaft), it is currently far from coming to terms with the multiple aspects of crisis we are facing today. Many sociologists stay clear of questions which reach beyond purely academic concerns in a selfimposed quest for academic “neutrality”. Even if they address such phenomena at all, sociologists these days can no longer assume that their voice will be heard in the polyphonic concert of contemporary opinion. Much the same applies to labor sociology. When this academic discipline expanded massively around 1970 as part of the “opening up” of higher education in Western Germany, many scholars with a pronouncedly Marxist profile entered the universities as well as the newly-founded research institutes (like ISF in Munich and SOFI in Göttingen). Labor soci-

416

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

ology was in high demand at this point, since the humanization of the world of work (Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt) was among the central aims of the Federal government in close cooperation with employers’ associations and trade unions—and academic expertise was urgently required, whether or not the scholars concerned were in favor of capitalism. Only a few years later, however, the situation changed. Although the return of economic crises after 1973, mass unemployment, the downsizing of social security provisions, employer-friendly reforms of labor law and the consequential increase of social insecurity and precarious employment (Mayer-Ahuja 2003), as well as the intensified rationalization especially in the industrial sectors would ask for (and actually received) a profound sociological analysis, the focus of academic and popular attention shifted. What concerned sociologists, particularly in Germany, most during the 1980s were new lines of conflict with regard to ecology, to social inequalities between men and women rather than between capital and labor, and the new social movements that developed along these cleavages. Under these conditions, capitalism and labor lost their status as key categories of sociological analysis. Instead of analyzing the crisis of capitalism, discussions focused on the crisis (Offe 1984, 7) or even the end (Gorz 1985, 32) of the work-centered society (Arbeitsgesellschaft). The “problems of the fat bellies” seemed to overshadow those of the “empty stomachs” (Beck 1992, 19–20), and when Habermas emphasized the “colonization of the world of life” (Habermas 1984, 331), the massive changes underway in the colonizing “world of the system” (i.e. in the economic sphere, in companies, etc.) were increasingly neglected. One result of the anti-productivist turn of the majority of German sociologists during that time was that critical notions of “capitalism”, with their emphasis on inequality and exploitation, were replaced by the much more optimistic concept of “modernity”, which implied a steady progress into a better future. Accordingly, the most influential sociological theories in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s, like Habermas’ theory of communicative action or Ulrich Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity, were no longer concerned with analyzing the dynamism of capitalism or its socioeconomic structures. If the term “capitalism” was used at all, it was done in a way that deprived it of all analytical vigor (cf. Ulrich Beck’s references to “capitalism without classes”, Beck 1992, 88; or “capitalism without work”, Beck 2000, 38). The term “capitalism” thus turned into an empty formula with merely associative effect, lacking theoretical substance and analytical clarity.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

417

For labor sociology, this development was obviously fatal. Pushed to the fringes of sociological debates and pitied as experts of an increasingly irrelevant part of social reality, labor sociologists withdrew into their own circles, turned defensive or insisted, rather stubbornly, on empirical evidence proving the unabated relevance of wage labor (Schmidt 1999). This persistence may have earned labor sociology the accusation of clinging to antiquated concepts (like Marxist notions of capital and labor) and therefore losing academic relevance. Kühl (2004), for instance, has identified labor sociology’s cardinal error in that it keeps on equating capitalism with society as a whole, just like Marx had suggested, instead of paying attention to its differentiation into sub-systems with their own inherent logic (Kühl 2004). If this critique was right and if labor sociology could and would actually draw upon a sound theoretical basis for analyzing the multiple crises we are confronted with today, this would be wonderful news indeed. As a matter of fact, however, what Deutschmann calls “post-industrial industrial sociology” tends to abstain from capitalism as a theoretical concept altogether. If it occurs as an analytical category at all, it is for the most part used—fully in line with institutionalist approaches (Hall and Soskice 2001)—in the plural. As a result, the formative forces of capitalism are regarded as mere context variables, its dynamism is analytically confined to rather static notions of “path dependency”, and the complex interrelations between different varieties of capitalism are more often than not ignored. When capitalism as a “social formation” slowly returned to the focus of the social sciences, this was based on a new reception of Polanyi rather than Marx (Streeck 2009, 230). In the field of labor sociology itself, (rather vague) notions of capitalism still constitute the analytical basis of many studies, and Marx’s question of how abstract labor is transformed into concrete labor, and of how exactly labor power is utilized in the process of production or service provision, continues to inform research. However, the existence of capitalism as such is largely presupposed, and it has long ceased to be analyzed by labor sociologists as a “dynamic socioeconomic formation”. This takes its toll at times when labor has forcefully returned into the very center of academic and political debates (not only) in Germany, given the increase and all-time high of employment rates, activation policies assuming that “any job is better than none”, the omnipresence of work-inflicted illnesses (like burnout), the (partly hysterical) debates about the future of work and society in the face of digitization, and a marked increase in labor conflicts. Under

418

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

these conditions, the notion of “thinking big” is returning—or should return—to the social sciences and especially to labor sociology.

2. Criticizing Capitalism and Labor As argued in the introduction to this volume, the multiple crises of capitalism are omnipresent today. In how far then can the endeavor to revive critical perspectives on capitalism and labor build upon sentiments and attitudes that call into question capitalism as a specific form of organizing economy, politics, and society, or the ways in which labor is utilized under these conditions? First of all, it is worth noting that a remarkable part of the population in Germany is critical of capitalism as we know it. According to opinion polls from the German Allensbach Institute, 48 percent of all respondents agree that capitalism in its current form is no longer suitable for our times. Whereas 48 percent associated capitalism with freedom in 1992, only 27 percent did so two decades later. The share of respondents who associated capitalism with progress had decreased from 69 to 38 percent during the same period, while 77 (instead of 66 percent) associated it with exploitation in 2012 (Köcher 2012). This “discontent” with capitalism is certainly influenced by how the questions are phrased: if asked about “social market economy”, responses tend to be considerably less critical. In any case, two thirds of all respondents in this poll were convinced that the German economic system is indeed capitalist. If this critique aims at capitalism as a socioeconomic system, how does this relate to popular attitudes towards labor? Obviously, any claim that everyday social critique is fueled primarily or even exclusively by experiences with waged labor in the workplace would come close to a relapse into discussions of the 1980s. Like labor itself, the suffering in and from society has become increasingly differentiated (Bourdieu 2000). Still, many of the men and women we have approached for our own studies at their workplace have expressed anti-capitalist sentiments. We have encountered a rage that is not addressed at anyone in particular (Adressatenlose Wut) (Detje et al. 2011), a widespread feeling of social injustice, and serious doubts about the future viability of capitalism (Dörre et al. 2011). As such, “anti-capitalism with no place to go” says little about the behavior of indi-

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

419

viduals. The microcosm of the workplace may well blunt the everyday critique of society and capitalism. It can take the form of an exclusive, competitive solidarity, more or less aggressively distinguishing oneself from the “others” and “those below”. It can also bring chauvinist, right-wing parties into parliament, as has just happened in Germany. At the individual level, being critical of capitalism can translate into very different strategies as well. The more hermetic one perceives the capitalist system to be, the more refuge will be sought in individualist strategies, which in fact reduce the scope for effective action, for instance, on a collective basis. If trade unions do not base their politics on an adequate analysis and informed critique of capitalism, they may well reinforce the widespread notion of capitalism as a system which follows “objective” necessities, has no alternatives, and can be tackled only individually, if at all. What results is a negative competitive individualism, whose only goal is to successfully master ever new “tests” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 30), and which poses a serious challenge to any collective organization (Dörre et al. 2012). What role can, or rather should, labor sociology play under these conditions? As an academic discipline specialized in solid, in-depth empirical research, often with a strong focus on labor at the site of production or service provision, it will have to analyze changes in this sphere, which fuel discontent among working men and women, and which may link up to the rather abstract anti-capitalist sentiments described above. If Kratzer et al. (2015) describe “fragile legitimations” among workforces in a wide range of economic sectors, and across qualification levels, they provide a first glimpse at how anti-capitalism might manifest itself on the shop floor. If economic rationalities collide with professional ethos or with the technical necessities or requirements of serving the customer; if recognition is denied and planning undermined through strategies of permanent restructuring, but a long-term access to skilled labor power remains essential for economic success, all this points to internal contradictions which need to be scrutinized relentlessly in order to formulate an adequate critique of labor under capitalism. Labor sociology has always based its critique on the rich empirical analysis and the detailed description of the contradictions, paradoxes and pathologies which confront labor at the workplace, in a company and society. There are good reasons for keeping up these high standards. Empirical research must analyze the status quo as objectively and deeply as possible, but it does not have to refrain from a critical perspective. If

420

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

empirical findings serve to confront society with the manifold divergences between its own expectations and self-descriptions on the one hand and empirical realities on the other, they may well turn into a very effective means of critique. This would be impossible, of course, without the observations, experiences, and critical sentiments of those who actually work in the constellations under review. Labor sociologists should not equate such expressions of everyday discontent with “the truth” too easily, but they may well lead us towards (often contradictory) notions of justice, which are crucial for any assessment of capitalism today. As Erik Olin Wright argues in his book Envisioning Real Utopias (2010, 110–149), an approach like this is necessary in order to develop a “compass” for the potentials of social transformation. A sociological critique of capitalism can be formulated in mainly three different ways. First of all, an immanent critique starts from everyday experiences with working and living in a world in which the boundaries of paid labor are constantly reconfigured and capitalist logics pervade an everincreasing part of human life. This type of critique aims at encouraging individuals (or groups of individuals) to deal independently, autonomously and creatively with the erosion of social security. To that end, it can draw on that excessive individuality which defies the abstract levelling force of an universalized production of exchange value that ignores “the individuality of things and of people” (Eagleton 2011, 103). Paradoxically, competitive forms of control reinforce this individuality while restricting it at the same time. Since this mode of critique starts from the everyday activities of individuals, it is mainly focused on the micro-level of analyzing capitalism, as outlined in the introduction. The potential for collective action is thus typically beyond its scope. Pragmatic critique, instead, can be argued to be effective at the meso-level of workplace, company or economic sector. Drawing upon the experiences of individuals as well as of collectives of working people, pragmatic critique aims at confronting managerial strategies that result in the undermining of standards and in a dissolution of boundaries that restrict capital’s access to labor. In many cases, in order to support social, ecological, and democratic reforms, the proponents of this kind of critique must appeal to “stronger” segments of society, or of the workforce under review, to protect the interests of the “weak”, who are, for instance, those in precarious employment or in the reproductive sector. It remains to be seen whether this approach will succeed in overcoming the limitations of competitive solidarity among groups of workers who are

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

421

still relatively protected. In any case, pragmatic critique focuses on the redistribution of resources within a given organization or social system but does not challenge this system as such. The latter is the preserve of a radical critique which directs its focus at the macro-level of socioeconomic development and questions capitalism as a specific mode of organizing economy, politics, and society. Currently, radical critique is mostly found in seemingly peripheral groups, among “irresponsible” parts of society, whose actions may often appear nihilistic and “take the form of impulse” (Boltanski 2011, 153, 158). Their main discursive achievement is to draw attention to institutions that forcefully preserve a social reality which no longer exists. Whether it draws on theories of alienation or exploitation, radical critique adheres to a maxim formulated by environmental economist Tim Jackson (2009, 35): “Short-term fixes to keep a bankrupt system alive aren’t good enough. We need something completely different.” Each of these approaches is legitimate in its own right, but, in order to formulate a comprehensive critique of capitalism, they need to be integrated, at least to some extent. This has not happened so far, either in the social sciences or beyond. Moreover, any “compass” supposed to guide critical interventions will have to rely on very clear and unambiguous criteria in order to distinguish between social movements and protests that promote new ideas of social progress (Dath and Kirchner 2012) from a critique of capitalism, which would ultimately lead to regression and authoritarian solutions. Erik Olin Wright has suggested considering the democratization of all social relations, explicitly including labor, as this core criterion (Wright 2010). Scholars not only from Göttingen (Meine et al. 2011), Munich (Detje and Sauer 2012, 55–86) and Jena (Dörre 2010, 18– 23) have come to similar conclusions and have started to explore the potentials for a “new economic democracy” (Neue Wirtschaftsdemokratie). The notion that all men and women are equal and should have equal rights to decide about their lives, whether in the economy, in politics, or in society, may sound rather basic. Under current conditions, however, “equality and democratization” may well serve as a rallying cry not only against the political right with its firm belief in human inequality but also against the polarizing effects of today’s capitalism.

422

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

3. Towards a New Research Agenda In any case, political action requires a solid critique, and the latter must be based on a detailed analysis of the state of things. This calls for an ambitious research agenda, which can be outlined by way of drawing upon the contributions to this volume. Let us summarize its main components very briefly. Ever since the advance of capitalism, one of the most important effects of its expansionist character is the continuous division and re-composition of labor. The peculiarity of this expansionist dynamic—or Landnahme—can only be accounted for if “labor” is defined in a broad sense, encompassing both wage labor and other activities, which are connected, for instance, to the reproduction of labor power. We need to return to an understanding of “work activities” as part of a wide range of “life activities” in order to grasp the current changes in capitalist societies. If the focus of attention is re-directed towards productive as well as reproductive labor, however, traditional ways of analyzing the transformation of abstract labor into concrete labor (as the main concern of labor sociology) may no longer suffice. After all, it has become impossible to presuppose (as we used to do for a long time) that the transformation of life activity into (surplus) value necessarily happens within the confines of a company. Modes of controlling labor increasingly reach far into the spheres of reproduction, and household constellations (including their specific material and cultural resources) shape the chances of working men and women to set limits to the alienating and exploitative effects of labor under capitalism. In short: the basic categories of labor sociology (labor, control, organization, etc.) need to be re-adjusted in order to tackle the tremendous changes the world of work has gone through during recent years. In this endeavor, labor sociology cannot draw upon any elaborate, “ready-made” theory of capitalism. Instead, the review of our analytical grasp on labor needs to be accompanied by an (equally complex) reconfiguration of our understanding of capitalism in the 21st century. In order to reach this aim, a multi-level analysis 1 of the functioning of today’s capitalism is required, which has to include the macro-level of

——————

1 Drawing upon Hartmut Esser (1999), Christoph Deutschmann has pointed out that macro-social phenomena cannot simply be explained by other macro-social phenomena, but have to be subjected to multi-level analysis (Deutschmann 2010, 50–4). Neil Fligstein’s (2001) idea of following Bourdieu in treating markets as social fields (of

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

423

socioeconomic development, the meso-level of workplace and company, as well as the micro-level of working men and women. We suggest that we can no longer regard the company or a specific workplace as a stable microcosm in which the “transformation problem” is solved simply because employment has become considerably less stable and the reproduction of labor power is much more closely interlinked with the process of production or service provision. If this is correct, the complex interrelations between labor utilization on the shop-floor on the one hand and the wider (economic, political, and social) regulatory scenario (MayerAhuja 2014) on the other hand deserve much more analytical attention than they have received during the last decades, despite the early and inspiring work of Michael Burawoy (1983) and others. A multi-level approach to labor under capitalism would, moreover, enable labor sociology to leave the confines of the company and of the nation state and move towards transnational perspectives. It is no coincidence that many of the contributions to this volume, which have been provided by predominantly German-speaking scholars, tend to focus implicitly or explicitly on one specific country (often Germany). After all, those who study labor at the site of production (as labor sociologists tended to do in the past) typically operate within one company, and even the system of labor regulation is still largely bound to the nation state. If we analyze labor under capitalism on the three levels outlined above, however, this picture changes profoundly. On the one hand, capitalism can be studied as a global phenomenon, which is translated into different, but equally capitalist, ways of organizing economy, politics, and society, in the early 21st century. Transnational perspectives imply, then, directing the focus of attention towards the interrelations between different national settings, which result from the adaptation of neoliberal policies in different parts of the world or from the transnational activities of companies that promote competition between locations. On the other hand, an approach which situates labor at the site of production within its broader capitalist context can not only “follow” working men and women as they move between companies or across borders. It also enables labor sociologists to view specific phenomena (like precarious or informal labor) from a transnational perspective (Mayer-Ahuja 2017), thus rendering it easier to discern the peculiarities of interrelations between the utilization of labor on the shop-

——————

power) may be useful in order to approach this “micro-macro” model, and much the same applies to Boltanski’s (2011) concept of “tests” and “tests of truth”.

424

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

floor and the surrounding socioeconomic system in the country under review. Moreover, transnational perspectives might help to judge dimensions correctly, if informal labor, which is regarded as a minority problem in Germany, for instance, turns out to affect the vast majority of the working population in other parts of the world. In short, we would like to argue that transnational perspectives exceed classical international comparison and go far beyond the observation of institutional divergences. Transnational value chains, transnational modes of regulation, and transnational migration constitute new transnational social spaces (Pries 2010), in which heterogeneous modes of production and reproduction and a wide range of labor relations may be integrated and hierarchically arranged. Labor sociology must take this into account. As Erik Olin Wright has persuasively argued, it is high time to analyze pathways of transformation and the scope for social action. As labor sociologists, it is our task to provide analyses of the functioning of capitalism, within the company and beyond, by way of drawing on immanent, pragmatic, and radical ways of criticizing capitalism. One major aim of this endeavor should be to identify spaces of possibility which enable actors to make strategic choices (cf. Hans Jürgen Urban’s contribution to this volume) in their private lives, at the workplace, and with regard to the socioeconomic system they live in. Klaus Schwab, founder of the Davos World Economic Forum, believes “that the capitalist system in its current form is no longer fit for the world of today” (Knop 2011; translation JM). Critical (labor) sociologists should not fall back behind this insight.

Works Cited Beck, Ulrich (1992). Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Beck, Ulrich (2000). The Brave New World of Work. London: Polity. Boltanski, Luc, and Ève Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. London/New York, Verso. Boltanski, Luc (2011). On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (2000). Die zwei Gesichter der Arbeit. Interdependenzen von Zeit- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen am Beispiel einer Ethnologie der algerischen Übergangsgesellschaft. Translated by Franz Schultheis. Konstanz: UVK.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

425

Burawoy, Michael (1983). Between the Labor Process and the State. The Changing Face of Factory Regimes under advanced Capitalism. American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, October, 587–605. Dath, Dietmar, and Barbara Kirchner (2012). Der Implex. Sozialer Fortschritt. Geschichte und Idee. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Detje, Richard, Wolfgang Menz, Sarah Nies and Dieter Sauer (2011). Krise ohne Konflikt? Interessen- und Handlungsorientierungen im Betrieb—die Sicht von Betroffenen. Hamburg: VSA. Detje, Richard, and Dieter Sauer (2012). Vom Kopf auf die Füße stellen. Für eine arbeitspolitische Fundierung wirtschaftsdemokratischer Perspektiven. In Werner Pricke and Hilde Wagner (eds.). Demokratisierung der Arbeit. Neuansätze für Humanisierung und Wirtschaftsdemokratie, 55–86. Hamburg: VSA Deutschmann, Christoph (2010). Soziologische Erklärungen kapitalistischer Dynamik. In Jens Beckert and Christoph Deutschmann (eds.). Wirtschaftssoziologie, 43–66. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus (2010). Wirtschaftsdemokratie—eine Bedingung individueller Partizipation. spw, 180, 18–23. Dörre, Klaus, Anja Hänel, Hajo Holst and Ingo Matuschek (2011). Guter Betrieb, schlechte Gesellschaft? Arbeits- und Gesellschaftsbewusstsein im Prozess kapitalistischer Landnahme. In Cornelia Koppetsch (ed.). Nachrichten aus den Innenwelten des Kapitalismus. Zur Transformation moderner Subjektivität, 21–50. Wiesbaden: VS. Dörre, Klaus, Anja Hänel and Ingo Matuschek (eds.). (2012). Arbeits- und Gesellschaftsbewusstsein von Lohnabhängigen. Ergebnisse empirischer Belegschaftsbefragungen in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Working-Paper 04/2012 der DFG-Kollegforscherinnengruppe Postwachstumsgesellschaften, Jena. Eagleton, Terry (2011). Why Marx was right. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Esser, Hartmut (1999). Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Band 1: Situationslogik und Handeln. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Fligstein, Neil (2001). The Architecture of Markets. An Economy Sociology of Twenty-FirstCentury Capitalist Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gorz, Andre (1985). Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work. Boston: South End Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1984). Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press. Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Tim (2009). Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet. London/Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Knop, Karin (2011). Von der frühen Etablierung zur Omnipräsenz moderner Wirtschaftswerbung—Hundert Jahre Werbegeschichte. In Werner Faulstich

426

KLAUS DÖRRE, NICOLE MAYER-AHUJA AND DIETER SAUER

(ed.). Die Kultur des 20. Jahrhunderts im Überblick, 173–187. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Köcher, Renate (2012). Allensbach-Umfrage: Das Unbehagen im Kapitalismus. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.02.2012. Kratzer, Nick, Wolfgang Menz, Knut Tullius and Harald Wolf (2015). Legitimationsprobleme in der Erwerbsarbeit: Gerechtigkeitsansprüche und Handlungsorientierungen in Arbeit und Betrieb. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Kühl, Stefan (2004). Arbeits- und Industriesoziologie. Soziologische Themen. Bielefeld: transcript. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2003). Wieder dienen lernen? Vom westdeutschen “Normalarbeitsverhältnis” zu prekärer Beschäftigung seit 1973. Berlin: edition sigma. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2014). “Everywhere is becoming the same?” Regulating IT-work between India and Germany. New Delhi: Social Science Press. Mayer-Ahuja, Nicole (2017). Die Globalität unsicherer Arbeit als konzeptionelle Provokation: Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Informalität im Globalen Süden und Prekarität im Globalen Norden. Themenheft Arbeit und Kapitalismus, Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft, 2, 264– 296. Meine, Hartmut, Michael Schumann and Hans-Jürgen Urban (eds.). (2011). Mehr Wirtschaftsdemokratie wagen!. Hamburg: VSA. Offe, Claus (1984). Arbeitsgesellschaft: Strukturprobleme und Zukunftsperspektiven. Frankfurt M./New York: Campus. Pries, Ludger (2010). Transnationalisierung. Theorie und Empirie grenzüberschreitender Vergesellschaftung. Wiesbaden: VS. Schmidt, Gert (ed.) (1999). Kein Ende der Arbeitsgesellschaft. Arbeit, Gesellschaft und Subjekt im Globalisierungsprozess. Berlin: edition sigma. Streeck, Wolfgang (2009). Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, Erik Olin (2010). Envisioning Real Utopias. London: Verso.

Authors

Brigitte Aulenbacher, Dr., is Professor in the Department for the Theory of Society and Social Analyses at the Johannes Kepler University, Linz. Her fields of research include sociological theory, gender and intersectionality, sociology of work and care with empirical studies on 24h care, digital care and marketization of the universities. Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Dr., is Professor for Political Economy and Economic Education in the Department of Political Science at the Eberhard Karls University in Tübingen. His fields of research include international political economy and European integration. He is also interested in issues concerning the theory of society, state and politics. Andreas Boes, Dr., is a member of the board at the Institute for Social Science Research (ISF München) and professor at the TU Darmstadt. His fields of research are the informatization of society and the future of work. Christoph Deutschmann, Dr., is a retired professor at the Institute of Sociology at the Eberhard Karls University in Tübingen. His fields of research include industrial relations, management sociology and economic sociology. Klaus Dörre, Dr., is Professor for the Sociology of Work as well as Industrial and Economic Sociology at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. His fields of research include theories of capitalism and finance capitalism, flexible and precarious employment, industrial relations and strategic unionism as well as right-wing populism. Tine Haubner, Dr., is a researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. Her research interests include the margins of working society such as informal and unpaid work, care work,

428

AUTHORS

unemployment, and also welfare, social inequality, exploitation as well as social theory. Stefanie Hiß, Dr., is Professor for Sociology of Markets, Organizations and Governance at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. Her fields of research include economic sociology, sociology of financial markets and socially responsible investment, sociology of organizations, environmental sociology and sustainability, social movements, and international political economy. Hajo Holst, Dr., is Professor for Economic Sociology at the University of Osnabrück. His fields of research include the transformation and organization of work, financialization, sustainability transitions and the temporal structures of capitalism. Stefanie Hürtgen, Dr., is an assistant professor at the University of Salzburg and associate member of the Institute for Social Research (IfS) in Frankfurt, Germany. Her fields of research include European transformation, sociology of work and industry and labor geography. Kerstin Jürgens, Dr., is Professor of Microsociology at the University of Kassel. Her fields of research include work, occupation, digitalization, work and life, health and empirical social research. Jürgen Kädtler, Dr., is Professor of Sociology and Executive Director at the Sociological Research Institute (SOFI) at the Georg August University, Göttingen. His research interests include financial market orientation and participation, development of qualifications and labor market segmentation, innovations and wage policy. Tobias Kämpf, Dr., is a researcher at the Institute for Social Science Research (ISF München) and lecturer at the Friedrich-AlexanderUniversity Erlangen-Nürnberg. His fields of research range from globalization and new forms of international divisions of labor to the digital transformation and the development of white-collar work. Cornelia Klinger, Dr., is Professor for Philosophy at the Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen. Her fields of research include aesthetic theory, political philosophy, feminist theory and gender studies.

AUTHORS

429

Jörn Lamla, Dr., is Professor for Sociological Theory at the University of Kassel. His fields of research include sociological theory, political and economic sociology, consumerism, digital studies and methodology and methods of hermeneutic social research. Birgit Mahnkopf, Dr., is Professor em. of European Politics at the Berlin School of Economics and Law. Her fields of research include economic, social and political dimensions of globalization, political economy of the European integration, environmental and energy policy in the EU, sociology of work and industrial relations. Nicole Mayer-Ahuja, Dr., is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Sociological Research Institute (SOFI) at Georg August University, Göttingen. Her research interests include the precarization and informalization of labor and its regulation on the shop-floor and beyond, from a historical and transnational perspective. Recent projects have focused on professional cleaning, Indo-German IT-work, and the interrelations between labor utilization and migration. Wolfgang Menz, Dr., is Professor of Sociology at the University of Hamburg. His fields of research include health policy, performance policy, work and subject, and work and society. Sarah Nies, Dr., is a senior researcher at the Institute for Social Science Research (ISF München). Her fields of research include reorganization and labor process rationalization, digitalization, workers’ interest, conflict and consent, and workers’ subjectivity. Hartmut Rosa, Dr., is Professor of General and Theoretical Sociology at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena and Director of the Max-Weber-Kolleg at the University of Erfurt. His research interests include sociology of time and theory of acceleration, sociology of world relations and the foundations of social critique. Dieter Sauer, Dr., is a senior researcher at the Institute for Social Science Research (ISF München). His fields of research include reorganization, innovation and globalization, industrial relations, and workers’ subjectivity.

430

AUTHORS

Uwe Schimank, Dr., is Professor for Social Theory at the University of Bremen. His research interests include social theory, theory of society, organizational sociology, economic sociology, science studies and higher education studies. David Strecker, Dr., is a researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the TU Berlin. His fields of research include critical theory, power and violence, and slavery in the past and the present. Hans-Jürgen Urban, Dr., is a member of the Executive Committee of IG Metall, the German metalworkers’ union and lecturer at the University of Jena. His research interests include the welfare state, health policies, union research, and labor policies. Stephan Voswinkel, Dr., is a researcher at the Institute for Social Research (IfS) at the Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main. His fields of research include the sociology of work, the services industry, and industrial relations. Jens Wissel, Dr., is Professor of Social Policy at the Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences. His fields of research include materialist state theory, European integration, international political economy and social policies. Harald Wolf, Dr., is a researcher at the Sociological Research Institute in Göttingen (SOFI) at the Georg August University. His research interests include claims of justice within wage work, innovation und participation.

Index

acceleration 40, 72, 203, 215, 354– 357, 359, 370–372, 376 accumulation 13, 25, 46, 72–88, 101–102, 117, 122, 130–137, 323, 350–351, 354–360, 384, 395 alienation 45–47, 58–62, 64–65, 99– 100, 349, 355, 368–376 artistic critique 46, 47–49, 51, 99, 103, 324, 349, 370, 381, 392, 396 autonomy 46–53, 147, 151, 162, 228–229, 270, 275–276, 295– 296, 310, 370, 372, 395 biography 144, 278 Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Eve 46–48, 79, 379–381, 403 Brundtland Commission 335 capitalism financial market capitalism/finance capitalism 81, 82, 84–87, 96, 98, 336, 378, 381–383, 385–388, 390–391, 395 fossil-fuel capitalism 74, 80 future-orientedness of capitalism 205, see also future capitalist economy 16, 46, 104, 162–164, 171–172, 174–176, 181– 182, 205, 325, 392, 402–403

capitalist society 117–118, 144, 171–172, 178, 180–182, 253, 270, 283, 311, 322, 331, 374, 379 Carlowitz, Hans Carl von 335 class 15–16, 20, 35, 80–81, 118– 122, 130, 148, 157, 160–164, 179–180, 233, 235, 237, 239, 258, 296–297, 358 Club of Rome 335, 358 combined and uneven development 262–263 conflict between use value and exchange value 275 class conflict 61, 164 conflict management 64 in the workplace 56–58, 220, 244, 251, 394–396 social conflict 129, 104, 131, 159, 166 consumption 16, 74, 80, 130, 175, 204, 272, 318–325, 328–331, 342, 354–360, 362, 363 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 323, 337 corporatism crisis corporatism 386, 387, 395, 396 competitive corporatism 386

432 social corporatism 386 Critical Political Economy 136, 351 critical sociology of work 49, 97, 98, 99,100, 103, 105, 132, 137, 350, 356, 357 ecology ecological crisis 16, 327, 335, 349, 355, 367, 416 ecological modernization see modernization economization pressure 174 employment standard employment relationship 245, 260 unemployment 17, 36, 40, 88– 91, 98 ethnicity 120-124, 131, 239 exploitation 45, 50, 76–79, 81, 87, 96–97, 99–102, 120, 149, 157, 230, 239, 416, 418 feminist theory 116, 118, 236 marxism and feminism 115–117 financialization/financial capital/financial repression 37, 41–45, 64, 136, 138, 140, 185, 186, 193–195, 203, 213, 214, 351, 352, 359, 367 flexibility 60, 87, 91, 93, 94, 103, 201–203, 211–220, 274, 276, 291, 338, 392 Fordism/Post-Fordism 25–26, 53, 80–85, 94–104, 121-124, 130, 144, 153, 213–215, 238, 272, 275, 289, 290, 376, 383, 407– 408, 410 functional antagonism 81, 178, 180–181

INDEX

functional differentiation 171–174, 178, 180, 182, 229 future 202–223 gender 115, 117–124, 229, 235, 238, 243, 246, 273, 340 globalization 79, 165, 213, 236, 262, 293–294, 353, 383 Green New Deal 358–364 growth/growth critique 349–367 health 60, 103, 244, 250–251 hegemony 132, 188, 378, 401–402 indirect control 52, 53, 63, 101, 103 industrialization 228, 239, 283–288, 294–295 information space 283, 291–294 information systems/ICT technologies 237, 286–293 informatization 283–296 internet 291–292 labor informal labor 258–266, 424 intellectual labor 148–151, 283, 286, 288, 292–296 labor process 22, 35, 45, 49, 5558, 132, 152, 285–288, 295, 313, 368, 374–375, 402 state regulation of labor 243, 264, 266, 357 Landnahme 71–76, 79–85, 87, 96, 101-104, 120, 296, 323, 352, 357 lean production 294–295 life sciences 236 logic of influence and logic of membership 396 market-centered mode of production 26, 48, 55, 57–58, 66

INDEX

marketization 45, 53, 59-60, 64, 84, 103, 145, 240, 275 Marx, Karl 13, 15, 19-20, 35–37, 39, 56, 61, 77–79, 117, 157, 159, 171, 204–205, 241, 269–271, 284–287, 328-329, 350, 368– 372, 402, 417 metabolism/metabolic shift 228, 354–355, 364 modernity 117, 119, 176, 178, 227, 235, 238, 262–263, 269–270, 278, 320, 324, 257, 372, 376, 416 modernization 103, 136, 145, 246, 262, 349, 351, 355, 357, 361 money 13, 44, 83, 130, 135, 176– 177, 202, 240 mosaic left 393, 395 multi-level approach 394, 422–423 multi-level concept 391 neoliberalism 82, 381–382, 386 New Economic Democracy 387– 394, 421 overaccumulation see accumulation Poulantzas, Nicos 148–149 precarity/precarious employment/precarization 26, 45, 58–62, 66, 91–92, 98–99, 137, 244, 249, 386, 410 profit motive 117, 175, 204, 209, 353, 360 rationalization 35, 50, 86, 95, 101, 145, 153, 163, 209, 214–215, 230, 253, 269, 285, 290, 303– 305, 312, 416 recognition 94, 97, 167, 234, 270– 272, 278, 372–374, 410, 419 reconciliation of work and family see work-life balance

433 self 49–50, 58, 100, 145–147, 167– 168, 273–279, 308 social critique 45–49, 58–62, 65, 99, 162–168, 355, 370–371, 380– 387 Social Democracy 382–383 social policy 178, 243, 384 Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 336 societal primacy 176, 182 strategic ability 388 subjectification of work 49, 51, 62, 144–147, 151–153, 273–376 subjectivity 51, 53, 33, 145–147, 269–279, 295, 306, 309, 373, 404 sustainability social sustainability 242, 335337, 342–343 sustainability reports 337 Sustainable and Responsible Investments (SRI) 336 sustainable development 335 sustainable investors 337, 339 sustainable rating and research agencies 337 sustainable work 336 Taylorism 35, 49, 209, 269–272, 290–293, 295, 306, 310, 406, 408 temporality 203–207 tertiary sector 232–233 Third Way 383 trade unions 63, 339-342, 381–390, 393–396 uncertainty 65, 92, 207, 295, 297, 308, 410 use value 20, 56–58, 76, 102, 105– 106, 271, 275

434 welfare society/welfare state 16–17, 80–81, 101, 122–124, 178–182, 233, 235–239, 244–245, 248, 261–262, 265, 351, 357, 379, 391 work care work 74-76, 94–97, 100, 123, 230–240 domestic work 20, 75-76, 116, 121, 235, 245 emotional work 274, 275 meaningful work 145

INDEX

organization of work 36, 119, 131, 292, 214–215, 295, 303 paid and unpaid work 72–76, 79, 87, 102, 120, 121–124, 230, 233–236, 238 short-time work 61, 93, 211, 386 work content 55–58 work-life balance/work-life distinction 22, 137, 145, 247, 278, 338 workers’ interests 64, 66