Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism [1 ed.] 9781614993094, 9781614993087

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CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division.

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Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 112 ISSN 1874-6276 (print) ISSN 1879-8268 (online) Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism

Edited by

Uur Gürbüz

Copyright © 2013. IOS Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism Ankara, Turkey

Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Training Course on Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan 11-15 June, 2012

© 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-61499-308-7 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-309-4 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2013 946 724

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface NATO has committed to the mission of counterterrorism as a central role of the alliance. However, this is a fight that will require the maximum cooperation of all NATO members and partners. To this and other ends, we need to share expertise among ourselves. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme supports the work of the NATO centers of excellence in reaching out to our partner nations in order to further this goal. This book presents the proceedings of the NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism (COE-DAT) Advanced Training Course entitled “Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism,” held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from 11-15 June 2012. During these sessions of the course, presentations were by 11 expert speakers – practitioners and academics – from 8 countries to members of the Kyrgyz police and military forces as follows. The first article, “Terrorism Overview,” is by Yonah Alexander of the Potomac Institute. Here Professor Alexander sets the tone for the course and this book by describing first the history of terrorism. It is not a recent phenomenon but one that has been with us through the ages. He then goes on to talk about the various root causes for terrorism. Last he addresses the definitional problem in counterterrorism that sometimes prevents us from addressing the issue in a clear and consistent manner.

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“NATO’s Approach to Defense against Terrorism” by Josef Greipl of the COEDAT staff is the second article. Starting with an outline of NATO policy towards combating terrorism, he then shows how this integrates with other concepts. From there he discusses what this means in terms of measures taken and plans for the future. Anna-Maria Talihärm of Tartu University wrote the third article on “Terrorism and Human Rights,” where she discusses human rights treaties in the context of counterterrorism. In particular, she highlights two examples to illustrate the challenge and paying the highest possible attention to human rights while battling terrorism. Both cases underline the fact that the enforcement of the sanctions adopted to target the designated individuals and entities must be in accordance with the international human rights law and any derogations from the law must be proportional, non-discriminatory and not contravening other norms of international law. The fourth article by Ercan Çitliolu of Bahçeehir University is on “Terrorism Prejudice Perception Management.” The central premise of his article is that prejudices can lead to generalizations that can lead to negative behavioral changes. In essence, by maintain prejudices, we can create the root cause of terrorism, so if we want to eradicate terrorism, we should start to eradicate these prejudices. “Terrorist Use of the Internet” is the title of the fifth article by Francesca Bosco of the U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). In this article,

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she discusses how terrorists use the Internet for a number of purposes: to conduct attacks, to publicize themselves and their activities, to terrorize, to organize and to recruit. The inherent nature of the Internet makes it very suitable for terrorist use and presents a number of problems for counterterrorist forces to prevent that use. Next aban Ali Düzgün of Ankara University’s School of Divinity provides us with his thoughts on “Religion and the Question of Violence.” In this comprehensive article, he analyzes the role of scripture as a justification for violence. Conflicts result from interpretive contexts that are geohistorically, geoculturally and geopolitically different from one another. He describes how out-of-context quotations can easily distort the very meaning of the text, thus transforming it into a source of uproar and chaos rather than peace and serenity. Considering this historical experience, this article draws a difference between the scripture and historical phenomena it has created in order to criticize the essentialist approach that identifies the scripture with its members. The seventh article on “International Cooperation and Counterterrorism” is by Patrick Tyrrell of Vale Atlantic Associates. Here he discusses the way that international organizations, regional organizations (such as NATO), and national organizations can cooperate against the threat of terrorism. After defining a ‘threat’ as consisting of three key elements of motive, plus capability and opportunity, he discusses how these elements can be approached in a cooperative approach to counterterrorism.

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“Recruitment of Terrorists” by Noemie Bouhana of University College London is the topic of the eighth article. This summary of the presentation shows how she broke this down into a two-step process of finding the individuals to recruit and then the process of radicalizing them so they are willing to participate in terrorist group activities. In doing so, she explained the four models of recruitment and how they are used; however, how the Internet and ‘lone wolf’ terrorists play into this is still unknown. She admitted how the state of the art in this field is still reactive, not yet predictive. Vesna Markovic of the University of New Haven has contributed an article on “Financing Terrorism” where she describes the various methods by which terrorist groups obtain financing. Particularly disturbing is her linkage of terrorism financing with organized transnational crime. She concludes that only through cooperative efforts can this link between organized crime and terrorist be broken. Nations must work together to share intelligence and best practices if terrorist financing is to be stopped. “Crisis Management,” the tenth article, is another from Patrick Tyrrell where he discusses the concept of crisis management within the context of terrorism. He first outlines a five-step for crisis management. From there, he goes on to discuss dealing a crisis where there is known and unknown information. The last part of the article deals with the concept of the OODA loop – how to learn to react within the information cycle. “Energy Security and Terrorism,” from Mitat Çelikpala of Kadir Has University, addresses the concept of energy security in the face of terrorism. The reliable flow of energy to people is vital to life as well as the economy. Energy facilities present lucrative targets to terrorists who want to have a big impact. In particular, he discusses

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the attack on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline as a case study to demonstrate how terrorists could impact worldwide energy supplies. Azamat Tynybekov, of the International Scientific Center, in the penultimate article on “Environmental Security and Ecoterrorism,” discusses the impact of radiological, chemical and biological pollutants of the Kyrgyz environment and how these can be used by terrorists. In addition to the causes, he also discusses ways to mitigate the impact of the damage caused by these agents. The last article, and the second from Josef Greipl deals with “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.” He details the threat stemming from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, then discusses possible scenarios where such weapons could be used by terrorists. He finishes the article by detailing the way that NATO has approached handling this problem. Representing a significant contribution to furthering the science of counterterrorism, this book will be of interest to all whose work involves aspects of counterterrorism. I thank all who have contributed to this book.

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Uur Gürbüz Colonel, Turkish Army Course Director

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Contents Preface

v

Terrorism Overview: History, Causes, and Definitions Yonah Alexander

1

NATO’s Policy on Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) Josef Greipl

8

Human Rights and Counterterrorism Anna-Maria Talihärm

18

Terrorism Prejudice Perception Management Ercan Çitliolu

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Terrorist Use of the Internet Francesca Bosco

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Religion and the Question of Violence aban Ali Düzgün

47

International Cooperation and Counterterrorism Patrick Tyrrell

65

Recruitment of Terrorists Noémie Bouhana

70

Financing Terrorism Vesna Markovic

74

Crisis Management Patrick Tyrrell

82

Energy Security and Terrorism Mitat Çelikpala

88

Environmental Safety of the Kyrgyz Republic Azamat K. Tynybekov

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110

Subject Index

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Author Index

125

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Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Josef Greipl

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-1

Terrorism Overview: History, Causes, and Definitions 1

Yonah Alexander Potomac Institute, Washington, D.C.

Abstract. Terrorism is a phenomena as old as man itself. History is replete with examples – Sicariis and Hashashin (assassins) to modern day Palestinian and religious terrorists. Their examples have proven that terrorism can be attractive, effective, and durable even if the tools are rather primitive. It is safe to assume, therefore, that terrorism will continue by the reality that many of the causes that motivate terrorists, such as ideological and national animosities, will remain unresolved, thereby encouraging terrorists to instigate violence to achieve political, social, and economic change. The contemporary historical record indicates that many terrorist movements operate without external state help, but those groups that benefit from such support are much more viable and dangerous. Although there are definitional controversies at the national, regional, and global levels, the fact remains that the challenge requires governments and international organizations to base their strategies on the six Ps: Prevent, Punish, Pursue, Prosecute, Persuade, and Protect. Keywords. Discontent, radicalization, terrorist networks, state sponsors of terrorism

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Introduction Two major challenges face contemporary societies. One stems from natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, tsunamis, monsoons, famine, drought, floods, heat waves and wildfires. The second challenge is related to man-made threats, including crime, piracy, radicalization and extremism, terrorism, and war. Indeed, these forms of victimization are permanent fixtures of modern life. The key question for the 21st Century, then, is whether nations are willing and capable of reducing the risks and bringing them to manageable levels through programs based on a common ground of human rights, the rule of law and social/economic justice. The purpose of this article is to focus primarily on the historical context of the terrorism challenge, identify some motivations of contemporary terrorists, and deal with definitional issues confronting policy makers, scholars, and the media.

1 Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Professor Emeritus of International Studies at the University of New York This article draws on earlier lectures as well as works by the author, including in particular his latest book “Al Qaida: 10 Years after 9/11 and Beyond” (2012). E-Mail: [email protected].

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Y. Alexander / Terrorism Overview: History, Causes, and Definitions

1. A Historical Context Contemporary terrorism is the scourge of our times. In early 2013, extremists, in the name of ‘higher’ principles and ideologies, brutally struck societies in both the developed and developing world with high human, political, social, economic and strategic costs. No region or nation was immune from state and sub-state acts of radicalization and violence, including propaganda and psychological warfare, kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and destruction of lives and property. From Algeria to Afghanistan, from Mali to Nigeria, from Syria to Somalia, from Iraq to India, and from Pakistan to Turkey, homegrown and exported terrorism represented serious security and strategic concerns. Undoubtedly, the global concern is the danger that rapid developments in science and technology in the biological, chemical, nuclear, and cyber fields may challenge the very survival of civilization itself.

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And yet, terrorism did not begin on 9/11, or with the negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, or in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” in Syria, where the violence has already killed over 70,000 people, spilled over to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey and raised strategic uncertainties over the control of chemical weapons and other vital strategic systems. To be sure, terrorism is as old as history itself. From time immemorial, terrorism, one of the most common expressions of man’s inhumanity to man, has taken on the form of random, selected and systematic intimidation, coercion, repression, torture, and death. Used intentionally by individuals, groups, and state actors to create a climate of intense fear in order to obtain avowed realistic or imaginary political, social, economic, and strategic goals, terrorism has been a strategy utilized by both the strong and the weak in the struggle for power within and among communities and nations. Aggravated by nationalist fanaticism, ideological extremism, religious animosities, ethnic hatred, and racial prejudices, this form of psychological and physical force has consistently been justified and rationalized by terms such as ‘rights,’ ‘justice,’ and even ‘peace.’ More specifically, as a cost-effective tool of low-intensity conflict that projects psychological intimidation and physical force in violation of law, terrorism has ancient roots. Examples include the attacks mounted by Jewish religious extremists, known as the Zealot Sicarii, against Romans in occupied Judea, as well as the martyrdom missions of the Hashashin (assassins) that targeted the Crusaders in the Middle East. The former were active for 70 years in the first century; the latter lasted some 200 years from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Their example proved that terrorism can be attractive, effective, and durable even if the tools are rather primitive. Numerous other historical examples have been recorded, including the ritual killing and cannibalism by the religious group Binderwurs, worshipping the god Kali in India; the domestic violence utilized by Dracula against the Ottoman armies in the fifteenth century in Wallachia (present-day Romania); the cannibalism by the Aztecs of their own people in Mexico in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the Spanish Inquisition from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries in an effort to “cleanse” Catholicism; and the employment of pirates or privateers by several European maritime states between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries for the purpose of advancing foreign policy objectives.

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By the time of the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) during the French Revolution, terrorism from ‘above’ and ‘below’ was commonplace. A variety of European groups nourished by anarchistic theories (e.g., left- and right-wing ideologies) and militant nationalism, attained some tactical success. Resorting to regicide and other terrorist activities such as bombing, terrorists assassinated a considerable number of European rules and officials, including Tsar Alexander II of Russia in 1881. Clearly, many of these terrorist acts had consequences beyond the assassination at hand, as evidenced by the murder of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, which drew Europe’s powers into World War I. The interwar period also witnessed waves of attacks in different regions of the world, such as Asia and the Middle East, where nationalist groups fought for liberation from colonial rule. While the most significant impact in the twentieth century was the Soviet, Maoist, and Nazi terror, it was not until after World War II that modern societies entered the ‘age of terrorism’ with all its critical implications for national, regional and global security concerns. Perhaps the most notable dangers that are inevitably evolving from contemporary terrorist threats are related to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival or civilization itself.

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Several unique political circumstances led to this development, including the emergence of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the Six-Day War of 1967 and rise of Palestinian terrorism worldwide; the adversarial relationship and physical proximity of the United States to Cuba, leading to numerous aircraft hijackings; the Vietnam war and the universal reaction against it; and the religionization of politics, particularly the proliferation of radical groups and networks regionally and globally. Thus, despite the end of the Cold War and the initial optimism of the Arab Spring, terrorism remains as threatening as ever. Undoubtedly, conflicts emerging from ideological, theological, and national animosities will continue to make terrorism a global problem perhaps well beyond the Twenty-first Century. The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires states, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible responses to and capabilities to minimize future threats. Ensuring the safety and interests of its citizens at home and abroad will therefore continue to be every government’s paramount responsibility. Understanding the methods of operation employed by terrorists, identifying threats and specific targets, both present and future, and assessing the damage and consequences that may result from acts of terrorist violence will assist governments in responding more effectively to the reality of terrorism.

2. The Causes of Terrorism The bloody record of ideological violence underscores, once again, that terrorism mirrors the state of anarchy of modern societies that is increasingly becoming a universal nightmare. It is safe to assume, therefore, that terrorism will continue well in the Twenty-First Century and beyond. This prognosis is borne by the reality that many of the causes that motivate terrorists, such as ideological and national animosities, will

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Y. Alexander / Terrorism Overview: History, Causes, and Definitions

remain unresolved, thereby encouraging terrorists to instigate violence to achieve political, social, and economic change.

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There are basically three generic causes of modern terrorism. x

First are broad reasons that contribute to perpetuate ideological violence – these include the absence of a universal definition of terrorism; disagreement as to the root causes of terrorism; the regionalization of politics; the exploitation of the media; double standards of morality; loss of resolve by governments to take courageous actions; weak punishment of terrorists; violation of international law by nation-states; complexity of modern societies; and the high cost of security in democracies and other existing political structures.

x

Second, there are permanent motivations of individual terrorist groups that encourage radicalization and violence. These factors revolve around the human element of ‘discontent’ – specifically, political, economic, and cultural “discontent” spring to mind. The political component consists of ideological (e.g. anarchical) issues. The economic element draws from unfulfilled expectations such as securing employment. And cultural disillusionments are sustained by the reality of ethnic discrimination.

x

The third significant trigger of contemporary terrorism is the existence of an international network of groups that cooperate informally and formally with each other. This collaborative relationship operates in many ways, such as ideological and theological alliances; organizational assistance; propaganda and psychological warfare; financial help; recruitment support; intelligence sharing; supply of weapons; operational activities and availability of sanctuaries.

To be sure, in the expanding non-state category of contemporary terrorist perpetrators, included are, on the one hand, marginal antisocial elements, conspiratorial adventurers, pseudo-ideological extremists, political hallucinationists, religious fanatics and racial bigots, and, on the other hand, more institutionalized opposition movements such as banned political parties and ‘military wings’ or paramilitary underground resistance movements. To put it differently, the terrorist framework consists of individual ’free-lancer’ (e.g. mentally deranged, ‘crusaders,’ or ‘martyrs’); single-issue political desperates, ultra ‘diehard’ ethnic, tribal and religious bodies; uncompromising nationalist and separatist groups; and criminal and political mercenaries. Although these actors are nourished by various common political and social causes sustained by wide-ranging ideologies and theologies, terrorists have, nevertheless, a common disposition. Essentially, they have contempt and hostility towards the moral and legal norms of the domestic and international order. Also, terrorists glorify their violent deeds for the sake of the cause they seek to advance, regarding themselves beyond the limits of any society and system of government. They do not feel bound by any obligations and constraints, except those that they have imposed on themselves for purposes of sub-revolutionary and revolutionary successes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the sanctification and justification of violence, coupled with global networks and modern technological advantages, has raised the magnitude and intensification of modern terrorism to a level unknown in previous

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centuries. In the past, terrorists have utilized both primitive and technologically advanced tactics in their operations, from arson to facility attacks. Their arsenal has consisted not only of explosives and arms, such as guns, but more sophisticated weapons such as anti-tank rockets and ground-to-air missiles. It is highly likely, however, that in the future, these forms of conventional threats will expand even further when terrorists might also resort to unconventional or ‘superterrorism’ — chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. The use of weapons of mass destruction could inflict unprecedented devastation and affects thousands, perhaps even millions, of innocent victims. No analysis of terrorist causes is complete without a focus on the direct or indirect involvement of certain states in encouraging and directing terrorism. More specifically, a number of nations – such as the former Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea, as well as Iran, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan – have sponsored terrorist operations as a form of secret or undeclared warfare in situations where overt or declared warfare could be inconvenient and riskier. Because modern weapons and all-out wars are so expensive and destructive, these states, ideologically inclined to fight nations they perceive as enemies, may wish to restrict themselves to low-intensity conflict. In this mode, they attack their adversaries but confine their violence to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, well away from high-intensity open, organized military hostilities.

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The modus operandi of totalitarian and radical state sponsors of terrorism illustrates the complexity of the challenge and the difficulties in combating this form of violence. Traditionally, these governments have indoctrinated, funded, trained, armed, provided intelligence, and given safe haven to diverse groups of ideological, religious, and national dispositions. Many terrorist groups were directly supported or indirectly guided and encouraged by their sponsor states, thereby becoming tools of those states. The contemporary historical record indicates that many terrorist movements operate without external state help, but those groups that benefit from such support are much more viable and dangerous. The most dramatic demonstration of the threat of state involvement in terrorist activities is the role of Iran. On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants, with the encouragement of the revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini, seized the American embassy in Tehran and held some 50 diplomats in captivity for 444 days. Today, some thirty years later, Iran still sponsors terrorist operations from Bulgaria to Cyprus, supports the Assad regime in Syria, engages in cyberwarfare against the United States and its Gulf allies, and is reportedly nearing a nuclear weapons capability. Clearly, the outcome of this particular challenge will determine the future direction and viability of state-sponsorship of terrorism.

3. The Conceptual Challenge The first strategic challenge facing analysts, policymakers, practitioners and the public in general is an understanding of the nature and intensity of man-made threats to national, regional, and global security concerns. Such a task necessarily requires a definitional focus in the expanded proliferation of generic concepts (such as radicalization, extremism, violence, crime, piracy, terrorism, insurgency, asymmetric warfare, and all-out war).

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Y. Alexander / Terrorism Overview: History, Causes, and Definitions

The definitional dilemma of the meaning and implications of terrorism is a case in point. More specifically, many governments have failed to appreciate the extent and consequences of the terrorist threat to modern societies. As a result, a large number of countries have not developed strong commitments to deal with the challenge effectively. A major reason for this failure is the definitional and moral confusion over what constitutes terrorism. Every sovereign state reserves for itself the political and legal authority to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. And yet, many governments speak with a bewildering variety of voices on the subject of terrorism. Thus, the United States represents divergent national dispositions vis-à-vis terrorism. On the one hand, Congressional legislation of the Patriot Act defined terrorism as a form of violence that is intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” But when a United States Army psychiatrist, Major Nidal Hasan, inspired by alQaeda’s radical ideology, allegedly opened fire on November 3, 2009 at a recruitment center in Fort Hood, Texas murdering 13 and wounding 30 of his fellow soldiers, his act was labeled by the United States Department of Defense as a case of ‘workplace violence’ rather than a clear case of terrorism.

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Similarly, when an alleged neo-Nazi military veteran killed six worshippers at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin in August 2012, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder called the attack “an act of terrorism, an act of hatred, a hate crime that is anathema to the founding principles of our nation and to who we are as an American people.” Further confusion emerges over the use and meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ when looking at other incidents. Consider, for example, the questions that arose in connection to the case of Salim Hamadan, Osama Bin Laden’s driver in Afghanistan, who was charged with “providing material support for terrorism.” In October 2012, though, these charges were dropped by the government as Hamadan’s ‘crimes’ had been committed before the legislation, entitled the Military Commission Act of 2006, made them illegal. The issue of whether Hamadan is a ‘terrorism facilitator’ or a ‘harmless employee’ lingers, though. Indeed, what makes the American position on the definition of terrorism is the repeated use of numerous terms and concepts by government officials such as ‘asymmetric warfare,’ ’global war on terrorism,’ and ‘overseas contingency operations.’ Moreover, international organizations such as the United Nations have failed for decades to agree on a common universal definition. That is, while both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly affirmed their determination to combat terrorism in all its forms irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed, the world body remains reluctant, for political reasons, to define precisely the nature of the terrorism challenge. In short, an analysis of various governmental and intergovernmental as well as academic views on the subject indicates that there is no consensus on what terrorism is. Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement on several points, such as the nature of the act (e.g. unlawful); the perpetrators (e.g., individuals, groups, and states); objectives

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(e.g. political); intended outcomes and motivations (e.g. fear and frustration); targets (e.g. victims); and methods (e.g. hostage taking). To be sure, some of these elements have been adopted in the following terrorismrelated definitions as crafted by NATO, the world’s most established regional and global security provider: x x

x

Terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. Combating Terrorism: Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorists throughout the entire threat spectrum. Counterterrorism: All offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. Note: Such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the defense of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by the military forces of civilian organizations.

Interestingly, NATO tends to broaden its security concern in relation to illegal activities that threaten peace and security. For instance, mention should be made of NATO’s ongoing counterpiracy initiative, Operation Ocean Shield, which began in 2009. Specifically, the aims of Ocean Shield are as follows: x x

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x x

Deter, disrupt, and protect against pirate attacks, rendering assistance to ships in extremis as required. Actively seek suspected pirates and prevent their continued activity through detention, seizure of vessels and property, and the delivery of suspects and evidence to designated law enforcement officials. Facilitate and support the development of regional states’ capacity to conduct effective counter-piracy operations, in coordination with other related international efforts. Coordinate NATO operations and initiatives with coalition maritime forces, EU naval forces, and other non-NATO forces conducting counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion In sum, regardless of the definitional controversy at the national, regional, and global levels, the fact remains that the challenge requires governments and international organizations to base their strategies on the six Ps: Prevent, Punish, Pursue, Prosecute, Persuade, and Protect.

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-8

NATO’s Policy on Defence against Terrorism (DAT) Josef GREIPL COE-DAT, Ankara, Turkey

Abstract. The article explains the core of NATO’s Concept for the Defence against Terrorism (DAT), shows the relation to other NATO concepts, lists the measures taken so far in the name of fighting terrorism and shows the way ahead. The 2001 Concept for DAT and the 2010 Strategic Concept specifically have given NATO military commanders clear guidance has to how to plan for DAT. Keywords. Defence against Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, Consequence Management, Military Cooperation.

Introduction

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The article outlines NATO’s policy on Defence against Terrorism. First of all I will talk about the DAT concept itself, explaining the four different pillars of DAT and afterwards I will come to talk about some other NATO concepts which are all related to DAT. In the third part I will outline all the measures and actions taken so far by NATO in the name of DAT. In the end I will try to highlight the way ahead for NATO’s DAT Policy.

1. NATO Documents for Defence against Terrorism The basic document for NATO’s DAT is MC 472 – NATO’s Concept for DAT, which was approved on 27 September 2002, slightly more than one year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The second document, the Military Concept for the Military Contribution to DAT, was delivered to the International Military Staff (IMS) in August 2010 for approval. The Bi-SC Updates from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 are annual publications mainly focused at the tactical level, summarizing what has been achieved in the fight against terrorism related to the different NATO operations or NATO institutions, and, at the same time, giving an preview for the upcoming year. They also give some information regarding various concepts and doctrines under development. Until recently these were the only concepts or doctrines dealing exclusively with DAT on the strategic or operational level, but the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) of the International Military Staff (IMS) has developed the New Policy Guidelines for Counter Terrorism which were agreed to at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

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The Policy Guidelines summarize NATO’s main effort in DAT throughout the last years and focus for the future on firstly NATO’s main principles in DAT, namely international law, NATO’s supporting role and the policy of non-duplication. Secondly, the document emphasizes the three key areas of awareness, capabilities and engagement. Interestingly the Guidelines do not speak anymore about DAT but rather about counterterrorism (CT), so in future the terminology will change; DAT will be replaced by CT. For this article I will stay with the ‘old’ terminology. Here is neither the time nor the place to enter into a discussion whether a definition of terrorism is needed and, if so, which is the right one but for the understanding of this article and for the understanding of NATO’s DAT Policy it is necessary to know at least NATO’s definition of terrorism. In MC- 472, the NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”1 Let me underline that this definition is not approved yet but it is only the definition NATO is using.

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Before talking in detail about the four pillars of DAT, let me stress some considerations and implications: x

DAT in general is highly complex and the military contribution is only one part that needs to be coordinated with the contributions of other international organizations.

x

NATO DAT operations need to have a safe and sound legal basis in terms of international law and national Law.

x

NATO has in all four pillars of DAT mainly a supporting role, only in CT operations it may or will have the lead.

Military Cooperation in a general sense is needed to:

1

x

complement National Force Protection (FP)

x

complement national efforts in FP for forces taking part in NATO-led operations

x

act as part of the international community’s effort

x

support national authorities in consequence management

x

provide NATO assets and capabilities in supporting operations

x

establish the required planning system

x

increase intelligence sharing at all levels with all actors

NATO, Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (MC 472, 2002), Annex A, 1-A-3.

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Now the four mentioned pillars of NATO’s DAT are: Anti-Terrorism (AT), Consequence Management (CM), Counter Terrorism (CT) and Military Cooperation (MilCoop). Each will be discussed in turn. 1.1 Anti-Terrorism “Anti-Terrorism is the use of defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include limited response and containment by military forces and civilian agencies.2 The primary responsibility for AT is with the nations, mainly a civilian task to defend their populations and infrastructures, with the Alliance providing support only on request of the nation and then NATO is supposed to increase the efforts of the requesting nation by providing appropriate Alliance capabilities. The core of the requirements is to apply the respective means of deterrence, prevention, detection, neutralization, isolation and disruption in a way that a terrorist attack does not happen at all but, if this fails and the attack happens, to ease the results, ensure survivability and speed recovery. 1.2 Counter-Terrorism “Counter Terrorism is the use of offensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include counter-force activities and containment by military forces and civilian agencies.”3

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Even if it is stated that NATO normally has a supporting role, NATO may also take the lead role in CT, which means to have forces deployed with the necessary essential operational capabilities to run the respective, mainly joint, operation. Forces with the necessary operational capabilities in this respect mean flexible, interoperable, deployable, sustainable and capable forces. These operations are meant to deny the ability of terrorists to train, plan, and execute terrorist attacks. This includes offensive actions also against those who harbour terrorists as well as preventing terrorists to act with WMD. NATO in the supporting role could help

2 3

x

be the Coalition enabler and interoperability provider

x

provide the ability to backfill national requirements

x

move deploying forces forward

x

express commitment through Article 5 declarations

x

give practical support like in host nation support (HNS) or

x

offer the use of NATO’s operational planning and force generation capability.

Ibid, Annex A, 1-A-1. Ibid.

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1.3 Consequence Management “Consequence Management is the use of reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effect, or secondary effects from attacks, accidents, incidents or natural disasters. It includes those efforts that NATO may collectively make to reduce the effects of a terrorist attack on people, facilities or infrastructure.”4 Consequence Management is a national – mainly civilian – task where the nations may only ask for support through NATO. Particularly in case of CBRN incidents with mass casualties, NATO could offer crucial capabilities through the NATO Readiness Forces, the CBRN Defence Task Force or other tailored forces.

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In the field of CM, NATO has – only by national request – a supporting role for the member states. This means that the following measures and clarifications for the best possible cooperation with the requesting nation are required: x

Robust planning and force generation process, to include national capabilities likely to be used for CM tasks under NATO auspices.

x

Capabilities to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities if required, for example in the areas of CBRN Defence, engineering and the management of displaced persons.

x

A coordination center for inventory and assignment of civil support functions within the Alliance, to include development and maintenance of Statements of Requirements (SOR) for individual nations based on their declared vulnerabilities and capabilities. These SORs, integrated into advanced planning for CM, would provide an initial assessment in the event of an attack.

x

The establishment of a training and exercise coordination capability, complementing efforts of other national and international bodies, for development of NATO response capabilities.

1.4 Military Cooperation Military Cooperation: It is agreed that success in DAT operations requires enhanced coordination and interaction between NATO and non-NATO actors at all levels before and during NATO engagement. Within NATO, this exists already from the militarystrategic level to the tactical level. It needs to be expanded to the political-strategic level. The following number of challenges must be addressed to achieve effectively the desired outcome in a DAT situation in which NATO is engaged:

4

x

Achieve greater coherence of efforts and actions by various actors engaged in a DAT crisis or conflict.

x

Develop the ability to work effectively with civil organisations.

Ibid.

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x

Move, when appropriate, from ad hoc actions by interested parties to more formalized relationships regarding DAT.

x

Improve NATO’s practical cooperation with international organizations (IOs), governmental organization (GOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs): o

to collaborate in DAT planning and conducting missions and operations,

o

to enhance education and training and

o

to review, revise and amend NATO’s security policy for an extensive and effective exchange of information with non-NATO actors.

o

to optimise NATO’s structures and procedures for DAT.

This includes the allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the International Staff (IS), the IMS and the Strategic Commanders S(C) and their subordinate entities, to achieve effectiveness and consistency in managing relationships among NATO member nations, partner nations and non-NATO nations, I Os and NGOs.

2. Relationship to Other Concepts

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Having outlined NATO’s Concept for DAT, I would like now to present some other concepts and documents which are more or less all related to combating terrorism and which therefore show as well NATO’s policy concerning DAT. COE-DAT was involved to some extent in the process of developing most of these documents. With the New Strategic Concept being the overarching concept and giving the framework for all other concepts and conceptual work within NATO, I would like to start with that. The concept underlines that DAT, first of all, still has a prominent priority in NATO 5 and that, secondly, DAT plays an important role to counter the future threats posed by terrorism and contributing thus to a safe and stable situation in NATO countries.6 Even more, DAT has become a central concern of the Alliance and the Lisbon Declaration also suggests the enhancement of NATOs counterterrorism capabilities in the field of ‘detection’ and ‘defence’ and a stronger emphasis on ‘prevention’ and ‘partnering.’ The basis for this is a high solidarity among the partner nations and it stresses the importance of dialogue, cooperation and collaboration. When we counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), we fight terrorism; when we devise a Joint Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) concept we fight terrorism; and the same is true when we work on Counter-Proliferation, active and reactive protection concepts, sharing intelligence or countering hybrid threats.

5

NATO, Strategic Concept (2010), para. 10 (“Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citzens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. ... “). Ibid, para. 19.

6

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Countering IEDs is not a synonym for the fight against terrorism, but in terms of capability improvement and achievements in training, doctrine, standards and guidance, it is indeed to a great extent DAT. Like cooperation and comprehensiveness, intelligence and information-sharing is of critical importance in DAT. The implementation of a ‘Joint ISR’ concept provides NATO with the necessary framework to connect all ISR assets into a single concept of operations, helping to effectively counter emerging terrorist threats and risks. Of great support to NATO’s counterpiracy operations was and still is the development and promulgation of the Maritime Security Operations Concept in 2009, the Alliance Military Strategy Concept in 2010 and the Maritime Situational Awareness Concept. The update of a draft Bi-SC concept dealing with the ‘Joint Prevention of Trafficking CBRN Material in the Maritime Environment’ and the development of a ‘Joint Comprehensive CBRN Defense’ Concept to capture the awareness that this challenge presents needs to be addressed by a comprehensive political, military and civilian approach, was of great support, too. The overall goal of these two CBRN-related concepts is to deepen cooperation, facilitate information exchange and share best practices between NATO allies, partners and industry.

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Another DAT related concept approved in 2009 was the Cyber Defence Concept. Within this concept, terrorists are declared to be the second most imminent threat after nation-states. Bearing in mind what happened in Estonia in 2007, this threat might keep us busy in the future. The result of a long-term foresight analysis was to consider modern terrorism as a component of a wider hybrid threat. Therefore a concept for ‘Countering Hybrid Threats’ was developed and promulgated. The ‘Hybrid Threat’ paradigm was thought to provide an overarching understanding of the contemporary security challenges and the necessary comprehensive responses. The development of this concept ended with a big experiment in May 2011 and the interim report is now with NATO HQ in Brussels; we are waiting for further guidelines. The answer to how these hybrid threats should be countered lies with the concept of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) which is about to be developed. The aim of the CA is to include all actors like IOs, GOs, NGOs, industry and economy at one table for common planning and action-taking. SHAPE is currently making liaisons with all these actors to establish a network of international actors and dialogue partners.

3. Measures Taken In the next step we will leave the more conceptual and theoretical world to step down to the practical and very often tactical level in order to see what has been really achieved over the last years after MC 472 was approved. I am giving you a brief overview of strategies, concepts, measures and achievements that are considered under the conceptual umbrella of DAT. For a better understanding and structure, the different

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issues are collected under the respective pillar where they belong to. This list covers only the main projects. Under the AT pillar, we can subsume the following items: x

Event protection. NATO also provides assistance to protect the security of major public events in Allied countries that might attract the interest of terrorists. It does this at the request of any member country by deploying capabilities such as NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) or elements of NATO’s multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion. The Alliance has thus assisted high-visibility events such as NATO Summits and Ministerial meetings, as well as sporting events such as the Athens Olympic Games.

x

Prevention of WMD proliferation. The 2009 Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending against CBRN Threats states that NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors. As a matter of fact, since the 1994 Summit at Brussels, NATO has been following this policy concerning WMD proliferation. It specifically emphasizes the need to further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of CBRN weapons.

x

Cyber Defence. On 8 June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved a revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence – a policy that sets out a clear vision for efforts in cyber defence which brings all NATO structures under centralised protection.

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Under the pillar of CT we have currently two NATO operations: x

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is a maritime surveillance operation led by NATO’s naval forces to detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean through monitoring, patrolling, escorting and compliant boarding. Initially limited to the Eastern Mediterranean, OAE was extended to the entire Mediterranean from March 2004 onwards. Many non-NATO partner countries have also contributed to OAE in support of NATO’s operational activities against terrorism.

x

ISAF. Since August 2003, NATO has been leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority and implementing security, thereby helping to remove the conditions in which terrorism could thrive. While not a counter-terrorism operation per se, ISAF represents NATO’s determination to help the people of Afghanistan build a stable, secure and democratic state free from the threat of terrorism. In addition, many NATO Allies have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the ongoing US-led military counter-terrorism operation whose major activities are in Afghanistan.

Within the pillar of CM: x

One of the measures of Consequence Management is the NATO Crisis Management System which provides a structured array of pre-identified political, military and civilian measures to be implemented by states and NATO in response to various crisis scenarios. This system provides the

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Alliance with a comprehensive set of options and measures to manage and respond to crises appropriately. Within this system, specific Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements define the roles of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Planning Groups, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the use of civil experts during times of crisis. x

The NATO multinational CBRN Defence Task Force (which consists of a CBRN Defence Battalion and a CBRN Joint Assessment Team), which was launched at the Prague Summit in 2002, is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents both inside and beyond NATO’s area of responsibility.

x

CEPAP is a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan, adopted for the protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction. NATO’s Public Health and Food/Water Group has developed treatment protocols for casualties following a CBRN attack and, more generally, the Alliance has defined coordination mechanisms for medical evacuation capabilities and a mechanism for allocating and transporting victims to facilities in other countries.

x

In case of a CBRN incident the MOU aims to accelerate and simplify existing national border crossing procedures and customs clearance for international assistance to reach the desired location as quickly as possible.

x

Providing timely information to the public is also a key component of consequence management, NATO has developed guidelines for use by countries in this field to ensure that coordinated warnings are given. The protection of critical infrastructure against CBRN attacks is principally a national responsibility. Nonetheless, NATO is working to increase national awareness on this issue.

x

The Defence against Terrorism (DAT) Programme of Work developed in 2004, has primarily focused on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. Among the ten current areas in the programme are, e.g.: o

Large Aircraft Survivability against Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS);

o

Protection of Harbours and Ports;

o

Protection of Helicopters from Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs);

o

Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs);

o

Detection, Protection and Defeat of Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons;

o

Technology for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition (ISRTA) of Terrorists;

o

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Consequence Management;

o

Defence against Mortar Attacks (DAMA);

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Biological,

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o

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP);

o

Non-Lethal Capabilities (NLC).

Coming now to the pillar of Military Cooperation, since 11 September 2001, NATO has sought to increase consultations on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members, as well as with non-member countries. Information-sharing and, more specifically, intelligence-sharing are key aspects of this exchange. A Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was set up, working as a joint NATO body and its main task is the assessment of the terrorist challenges threats to NATO and its member nations. The TTIU developed an efficient liaison mechanism with Allied intelligence services and national terrorism coordination centres. In addition, the TTIU shared terrorism-related information with partner nations. In 2010-2011, the TTIU was replaced by the Intelligence Unit (IU), having more or less the same tasks. NATO and its partners are engaged in practical cooperation programmes within the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). This PAP-T defines partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its consequences. For instance, NATO and partner countries work together to improve the safety of air space, including through the exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the handling of possible terrorist threats.

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All Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council countries participate in the PAP-T, and it is open to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners, as well as other interested countries on a case-by-case basis. As to deepened relations, the following events have occurred: x

Combating terrorism was among the main drivers behind the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002. The common fight against terrorism remains a key aspect of NATO’s dialogue with Russia, as well as a focus of the NRC’s practical cooperation activities. In December 2004, the NRC agreed an Action Plan on Terrorism that laid out areas of cooperation and was subject to regular review. Russia has contributed to the fight against terrorism by participating in Operation Active Endeavour, in 2006 and 2007.

x

Relations with Mediterranean Dialogue partners have also deepened, including through contributions to Operation Active Endeavour.

x

Furthermore, at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to reach out to countries in the broader Middle East region, widening NATO’s network of partnership in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism.

x

NATO has also reinforced its relations with partners across the globe. These are countries that are not NATO members but they share similar security concerns and have expressed an interest in developing relations with the Alliance through individual partnership relations.

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x

17

NATO is also working to deepen its relations with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations to strengthen efforts in fighting terrorism.

Training and Education: NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities, including the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy and the 19 Centres of Excellence (COEs) that support the NATO command structure.

4. The Way Ahead Concerning the two DAT concepts, some clarifications are needed. First, we have our DAT concept MC 472 from 2002 and we have the Military Contribution to DAT. The latter was updated and handed in to IMS and since Aug 2010 it is there dormant. NATO has developed a Policy Guidelines paper which was endorsed at the Chicago Summit. In this paper NATO does not speak any more about DAT but about counter terrorism, meant as a holistic approach. Therefore these two DAT documents will be rewritten in near future. MC 472 is supposed to become a shortened military policy document and the Military Contribution to DAT will be kept as the detailed document describing how we will provide military support to CT.

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Conclusion The time since the terrorist attacks beginning in 2001 have been a busy time for counterterrorist forces. NATO has been busy as well in defining the DAT/CT role for the Alliance to give the NATO member states and their military forces the necessary guidance as to how to plan to conduct CT operations both nationally and as part of the Alliance.

Bibliography NATO, Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (MC 472, 2002). NATO, Strategic Concept (2010).

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-18

Human Rights and Counterterrorism Anna-Maria TALIHÄRM1 Tartu University, Estonia

Abstract. Balancing human rights and counterterrorism measures has long been a concern for both states and international organizations such as the United Nations. The latter has adopted a wide number of measures that, together with other instruments of international human rights law, set a priority to ensure that effective counterterrorism activities and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing. The relationship between human rights and counterterrorism must be analyzed from two standpoints. First, how do acts of terrorism impact the human rights of the victims and whole societies and, second, how do counterterrorist activities (mostly carried out by states) impact the human rights of both suspects of acts of terrorism and ordinary citizens. Furthermore, recent court cases underline the need to critically review the implementation of the sanctions targeting the fight against terrorism. Keywords. Human rights, international human rights law, terrorism, United Nations

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Introduction When we stand up for human rights, combat poverty and marginalization, when we seek to resolve conicts, support good governance and the rule of law, we do so because these activities have intrinsic value and should be pursued in their own right. But as we do, we also work to counter terrorism by addressing the very conditions that can be conducive to it.2 The issue of terrorism and human rights has long been a concern for both states and international organizations. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared in the preamble to Resolution 1456 in 2003 that “any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be unequivocally condemned, especially when they indiscriminately target or injure civilians.” In 2006, the Member States of the United Nations (UN) agreed for the first time on a common strategic approach to fighting terrorism.3 By doing this, they did not only communicate an explicit statement of condemning terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, but more importantly, resolved to take a number of practical measures individually and collectively to prevent and combat it. The annex of the resolution focuses on several specific groups of measures: addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building 1

PhD candiaite, e-mail: [email protected]. United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, Tunisia, 2007. 3 United Nations Security Council, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Resolution 288, Document A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006). 2

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States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthening the role of the UN system regarding the fight against terrorism. However, similar to other instruments regarding counterterrorism, one of the main messages of the resolution underlines that all the above-mentioned actions must be carried out while ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.4 Furthermore, the instrument has set a priority to ensure that effective counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing. This article takes a brief look at the main principles of international human rights law and the key instruments that guarantee the protection of basic rights in counterterrorism. These cornerstones of international law underline that human rights offer a set of protection for all human beings in any situation and that there are a number of absolute rights that are inalienable. Nonetheless, attention must also be paid to new developments that tackle the challenges related to the enforcement of these rights, and therefore the article continues with a discussion of a recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, and its importance to international law.

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1. International Human Rights Law Human rights instruments form an integral part of the international counterterrorism framework. In principle, together with other documents of international law, they put forward an obligation for the states to prevent terrorism and to ensure that all counterterrorist activities respect human rights. It is the conventional and positivist view that international human rights instruments govern the responsibilities of the states to respect, protect and promote the human rights of individuals within their jurisdiction and do not focus on the criminal responsibility of terrorist individuals or non-state actors. This is challenged by the perspective that these instruments create rights for the individuals and thus for non-state actors; this approach is supported by the existence of procedural rights that have been accorded to individuals in the form of, for example, the right to petition an international human rights supervisory body in case of a violation of human rights.5 Presently, however, the debate between the two views remains to be settled, even though it is commonly accepted that, under international law, breaches of international human rights law can be committed by States and not individuals or non-state actors, whereas acts of terrorism themselves are considered to be a crime and are in the majority of cases to be dealt with by national law.6

4

See ibid. Cedric Ryngaert, “Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Law,” in Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law, (Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, eds., Asgate Publishing, 2010). 6 Strictly speaking, this is the case even for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) that was established under the United Nations Security Council Mandate to prosecute persons responsible for the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and others on 14 February 2005, but is undertaking the task still under the domestic Lebanese law. See Special tribnal for Lebanon, “About the STL,” at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/ (last visited July 22, 2013). 5

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1.1. Sources of International Human Rights Law There are several sources of human rights law, including treaties, other international agreements, customary law and soft law (e.g. UN General Assembly (GA) resolutions, declarations, etc). Most of these instruments are agreed on an international or regional level – in some cases with certain reservations – and then implemented in domestic legislation. Examples of the most universal human rights instruments include the UN Charter, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and relevant optional protocols. Additionally, there are regional frameworks for human rights law that promote human rights in specific areas. Three fundamental regional human rights instruments are the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights for Africa, the American Convention on Human Rights for the Americas and the European Convention on Human Rights for Europe. Moreover, there are other mechanisms for promoting human rights such as various non-governmental organizations or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that support the work of the different UN human rights bodies. Under OHCHR’s mandate is for example the Institute of Special Rapporteurs in the UN who are appointed by the Commission on Human Rights for (usually) three years to monitor and report back on different areas of human rights through "activities undertaken by special procedures, including responding to individual complaints, conducting studies, providing advice on technical cooperation at the country level, and engaging in general promotional activities.”7 One of the special rapporteurs is specifically targeting the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.8

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1.2. Relationship with International Humanitarian Law The essence of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) may in some instances be similar, for example in protecting the human life or prohibiting torture or cruel treatment. However, in principle, they are still two separate bodies of law as IHL deals with many aspects not belonging to the direct attention of IHRL, such as status of combatants and prisoners of war or conduct of hostilities. Similarly, IHRL tackles issues that are not regulated by IHL, like the right to assembly and the right to vote. But as to proving that drawing a strict line between the two is not possible, or perhaps even necessary, there are recently adopted treaties that include provisions from both IHL and IHRL, such as Participation of Children in Armed Conflict and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.9

7 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited July 22, 2013). 8 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson” (UN General Assembly, 4 June 2012), available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/137/80/PDF/ G1213780.pdf? OpenElement (last visited July 22, 2013). 9 International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law” (Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, 2003), available at http://www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf (last visited July 22, 2013).

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2. Impact of Terrorism on Human Rights Despite the endless discussions on the definition of terrorism and the lack of an universal agreement on its wording, global organizations like the UN recognize terrorism as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, reaffirming that “acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments.”10 Thus, there is little doubt that terrorism has a profound effect on human rights as it is targeting the values protected by the UN Charter and other international instruments, in particular the rights to life, liberty and physical integrity. In addition, acts of terrorist may bring along threats to the political, social and economic development of a country.11 However, we must talk about terrorism and human rights by taking into account two perspectives. First, as discussed before, how acts of terrorism impact the human rights of the victims and whole societies; and secondly, how counterterrorist activities (mostly carried out by states) impact the human rights of both suspects of acts of terrorism and ordinary citizens. Both of these aspects are taken seriously by the UN and are manifested in the majority terrorism-related documents, notably in the already quoted UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 that invites states to take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms, in particular by implementing all GA resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism and the applicable GA resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.12

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2.1. Impact of Counterterrorism Activities on Human Rights Despite being less visible than terrorism’s direct effect on human rights, counterterrorist activities may have a considerable impact on the basic rights of every citizen. Usually, the impact of an act of terrorism is limited in time whereas restrictive counterterrorism measures may last for a longer period, such as legislation or regulation.13 These restrictive measures may be related to the arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, the absolute prohibition against torture, due process guarantees, data protection and privacy incursions, profiling and the principle of non-discrimination, restrictions on the rights of aliens, freedom of expression, and freedom of association, among others.14

10

United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism” (Fact Sheet No. 32, undated), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf (last visited July 13, 2013). 12 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 13 Peter Hostettler, “Human Rights and the ‘War’ against International Terrorism, Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses” (Presented at events organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 30 May-1 June 2002), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Album/terrorismlaw.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 14 Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32. 11

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Even though it can be argued that public tolerance of restrictive measures tend to diminish once the immediate effects of terrorism recede, 15 counterterrorist activities may still affect the everyday lives of ordinary citizens long after the acts of terrorism took place. A good example here is the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) case that involved the US authorities having access to citizens’ international bank transfer data for years without the citizens being informed about the data processing. Starting in 2001, US authorities had access to the names, addresses and account numbers of millions of EU citizens transferring money abroad; it was only in 2006 that the situation became public.16 Such measures raised serious privacy,17 proportionality and reciprocity concerns18 and were the reason for extensive negotiations between the US and EU on the conditions for the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program Agreement. However, despite finally reaching an agreement in 2010, the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) has, after its first inspection, still expressed serious concerns about compliance with data protection principles.19 There are also several non-governmental organizations that are dedicated to defending and protecting human rights. An example is one of the world’s leading independent human rights organizations, Human Rights Watch (HRW), that is among other things keeping an eye on the legality of counterterrorist activities. Interestingly, HRW has published a study on the counterterrorist legislation that has been adopted since September 2001 where it concludes that “these post-September 11 laws, when viewed as a whole, represent a broad and dangerous expansion of government powers to investigate, arrest, detain, and prosecute individuals at the expense of due process, judicial oversight, and public transparency.” 20 The report stresses that besides the possible violations of the human rights of the suspects, such regulations can and have been used to repress peaceful political dissent or to target particular religious, ethnic, or social groups.21

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2.2. Derogations from International Human Rights Law Even though it can be said that IHRL applies at all times, i.e. both in peacetime and in during armed conflict, some IHRL treaties provide options for governments to deviate 15

Hostettler, “Human Rights and the ‘War’ against International Terrorism, Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses.” 16 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, (23 June .2006), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?pagewanted=all (last visited July 13, 2013). 17 Peter Hustinx, European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion Letter (25 January 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/p10_edps/p10_edpsen.pdf (last visited July 13, 2013). 18 European Parliament, “SWIFT: European Parliament Votes Down Agreement with the US” (Justice and home affairs press release 11 February 2010, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc .do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20100209IPR68674+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last visited July 22, 2013). 19 Europol Joint Supervisory Body, “Notice” 20 March 2011, available at http://europoljsb.consilium. europa.eu/media/112160/jsb%20tftp%20inspection%20-%20website%20notice%20 march%202011.pdf (last visited July 22, 2013). 20 Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Security; Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide since September 11” (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/global0612ForUpload_1.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 21 Ibid.

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from specific rights in case of an emergency, granted of course that such derogations are proportional, non-discriminatory and not contravening other rules of international law.22 However, certain human rights are non-derogable in any situations, such as those listed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and identified in paragraph 4.2: the right to life (Art. 6), prohibition of torture, prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 7), prohibition of slavery (Art 8), retrospective criminal liability and punishment (Art. 15), recognition as a person before the law, and freedom of right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18). Dina Pokempner notes that although Article 14 of the ICCPR, which states that the fair trial guarantees is not listed in Article 4.2 as a non-derogable right, the UN Human Rights Committee has found that: Fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency. Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence. The presumption of innocence must be respected. In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.”23

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Nonetheless, Article 4 spells out that parties to the ICCPR may take measures that derogate from their obligations under the treaty “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed” but only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin” which leaves the international community to debate about the precise scope and meaning of the phrase “the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” The recent Kadi case in the ECJ sheds some light on challenges related to balancing the fight against terrorism and the protection on fundamental rights.

3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a number of resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter that put forward obligations for the Member States in the fight against terrorism. The UNSC Resolution 1267 was the first to establish the “sanctions regime” 24 and has been modified by subsequent Security Council resolutions.25 In short, these resolutions outline measures that are applied to designated individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, wherever they may be located. The 22

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Dinah Pokempner, “Terrorism and Human Rights: the Legal Framework, Terrorism and International Law: Challenges And Responses,” (Presented at events organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 30 May-1 June 2002), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Album/terrorism-law.pdf(last visited July 19, 2013); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), para. 16, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001). 24 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999). 25 United Nations, “Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities,” at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited July 22, 2013). 23

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names of the designated individuals and entities are listed in the al-Qaida Sanctions List (also known as Consolidated list).26 The summarized reasons for targeting these specific individuals and entities are published in the format of “narrative summaries.”27 Principally, there is also a procedure for removing an individual’s name from the list by using the standard form for delisting requests.28 UNSC resolutions list the obligatory measures for fighting against terrorism but the primary responsibility for implementing these sanctions lies with the Member States. The sanctions regime includes three elements:

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1) “freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of designated individuals and entities [assets freeze], 2) prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by designated individuals [travel ban], and 2) prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, spare parts, and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities, to designated individuals and entities [arms embargo].”29 However, from the beginning, the sanctions regime has been challenged on several levels. For example, it could be argued that the procedures for delisting were developed in reaction to criticism that the system of creating and maintaining the Consolidated List was too obscure and did not allow the petitioners to effectively challenge the decision of including them on the list.30 HRW has also echoed the comment that the UNSC should make sure that all resolutions involving the obligations for states involved in fighting terrorism would comply with international human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law.31 To be more precise, HRW invites the UNSC and other UN bodies to play a leading role in “helping states to reform existing counterterrorism laws; release all persons arbitrarily arrested under these laws for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, or assembly; and provide fair retrials to suspects unfairly prosecuted under such laws.”32 This shows that the UN is considered to be one of the most capable actors in guiding national legislative amendments and in the case of UNSC resolutions, to legally oblige Member States to carry out specific sanctions. However, this also means that the UN has to be 26 United Nations, “The List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with Al-Qaida” (as of 18 October 2012). 27 United Nations, Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, Narrative Summaries, at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/narrative.shtml (last visited July 13, 2013). 28 United Nations, “Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities,” at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited July 22, 2013).see also United Nations, Standard Form for the Submission of Requests to Remove a Name from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List Maintained by the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/De-listing%20form%20-%20English.pdf (last visited July 22, 2013). 29 United Nations, "Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1989.” 30 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Frequently Asked Question on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism (United Nations, 2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/ Publications/FAQ/English.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 31 Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Security.” 32 Ibid.

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especially careful in making sure that any sanctions applied by Member States to combat terrorism are in accordance with Member States’ obligations under the international human rights law. For example, only since 2011 has the UNSC Committee33 published the narrative list on their website that explains why certain entities or individuals have been included in the Consolidated List, thus making the process of listing and de-listing more transparent. In a way, this can be seen as the result of the recent ECJ Kadi case and other similar court cases that have brought the needed attention to some aspects of the targeted sanctions regime. The Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation vs Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities34 (hereafter Kadi I) is not the first (or last) of its kind, and has already been followed by other similar instances and even a continuation of the same case in a General Court of the EU with the Kadi II decision.35

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Kadi I case involved an individual from Saudi Arabia, named Kadi, who had assets in the EU and who had been identified as a person supporting terrorism by the UNSC sanctions regime. Since the UNSC resolutions oblige EU Member States to implement the adopted sanctions, Kadi had consequently been listed in the annex of the related EC Regulation. As a result, all of Kadi’s funds and financial assets in the EU were frozen. Kadi argued that he had never been involved in terrorism or in any form of support for such activities and that thus, the Regulation violated his fundamental rights to property, to a fair hearing, and to judicial redress. The case was later joined by a similar alBarakaat lawsuit, and to the appraisal of human rights advocates, ECJ decided to cancel the sanctions towards the applicant as they were spelled out in the EC Regulations. Namely, the judgment found the restrictions of Kadi’s right to be heard, the right to an effective legal remedy, and the right to property to have been unjustified.36 Despite debates about the real effect of the decision on the sanctions regime, there are voices that label the decision as “the most significant legal development to affect the regime since its inception.”37 There is some proofs of that, such as the European Commission’s proposal on 22 April 2009 for a new Council Regulation that outlines “a listing procedure ensuring that the fundamental rights of defence and in particular the right to be heard are respected” in the case of all individuals and entities included in the Consolidated List. The regulation proposes to change the current automatic listing to a manual evaluation process, so that the decisionmaking regarding individuals and 33 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. 34 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber), Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (3 September 2008), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML (last visited July 19, 2013). 35 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, Judgment, Case T-85/09 (30 September 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009A0085:EN:HTML (last visited July 13, 2013). 36 Grainne de Burca, ”The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi,” Harvard International Law Journal 51(1) (2010). 37 Devika Hovell, “A House of Kadis? Recent Challenges to the UN Sanctions Regime and the Continuing Response to the ECJ Decision in Kadi,” Blog of the European Journal of International Law” (7 July 2009), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-house-of-kadis-recent-challenges-to-the-un-sanctions-regime-and-the-continuingresponse-to-the-ecj-decision-in-kadi/ (last visited July 19, 2013).

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entities to be included in the sanctions regime would shift away from the previously full competence of the UNSC to more regional or even domestic bodies.38 It is important to underline that the ECJ did not challenge the binding UNSC resolution nor the Charter and did thus not establish a new hierarchical structure regarding the interplay between international law and European law.39 However, some scholars argue that the ECJ judgment will nevertheless threaten to expand the challenges to the Security Council sanctions, “taking decision-making further out of the hands of Security Council members and within the purview of domestic and regional courts.” This could indicate a shift from automatic compliance with UN Security Council sanctions to one of controlled compliance. 40 There are also more prudent opinions arguing that the nature and reasoning of the ECJ judgment illustrates a significant departure from the widespread understanding that the EU as an actor maintains a distinctive commitment to international law and institutions.41 However, regarding the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism this judgment emphasizes the EU’s commitment to human rights, as well as the need to review the scope and nature of the UNSC sanctions before directly applying them.

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Conclusion Several international organizations and non-profit entities are devoted to the protection and promotion of human rights; the domain becoming even more prominent in the context of the global efforts of fighting against terrorism. The UN has taken significant steps to combat terrorism, both in the form of policy documents (such as the 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy) and other types of universal instruments or binding UNSC resolutions. On top of that, there are a number of regional legal frameworks tackling both the challenges of fighting terrorism and ensuring the protection of human rights. It is commonly understood under international law that breaches of IHRL can be committed by States whereas individuals as well as non-state actors are held accountable for acts of terrorism in domestic courts. Besides acts of terrorism bringing along evident breaches of human rights, attention must also be paid to counterterrorism activities carried out by governments and their possible effect on the rights of both the suspects of terrorism and ordinary citizens. This article highlighted two examples to illustrate this challenge: the SWIFT case and the Kadi judgment in the ECJ. Both of them underline the fact that the enforcement of the sanctions adopted to target the designated individuals and entities must be in accordance with the international human rights law and any derogations from the law must be proportional, non-discriminatory and not contravening other norms of 38 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed against Certain Persons and Entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network and the Taliban” (22 April 2009), available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0187:FIN:EN:PDF (last visited July 19, 2013). 39 Albert Posch, “The Kadi Case: Rethinking the Relationship between EU Law and International Law?” Columbian Journal of European Law 15 (2009). 40 Hovell, “A House of Kadis? Recent Challenges to the UN Sanctions Regime and the Continuing Response to the ECJ Decision in Kadi,” 41 de Burca, ” The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi.”

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international law. Nevertheless, there are certain human rights that are not derogable under any circumstance. These include the right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws.

Bibliography

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de Burca, Grainne, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi,” Harvard International Law Journal 51(1) (2010). European Parliament, “SWIFT: European Parliament Votes Down Agreement with the US” (Justice and home affairs press release 11 February 2010). Hovell, Devika, “A House of Kadis? Recent Challenges to the UN Sanctions Regime and the Continuing Response to the ECJ Decision in Kadi,” Blog of the European Journal of International Law” (7 July 2009),. Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism” Ben Emmerson (UN General Assembly, 4 June 2012). Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Security; Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide since September 11” (2012). Hustinx, Peter, European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion Letter (25 January 2010). International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law” (Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, 2003). Lichtblau, Eric, and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times (23 June 2006). Pokempner, Dinah, “Terrorism and Human Rights: the Legal Framework, Terrorism and International Law: Challenges And Responses,” (Presented at events organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 30 May-1 June 2002). Posch, Albert, “The Kadi Case: Rethinking the Relationship between EU Law and International Law?,” Columbian Journal of European Law 15 (2009). United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism” (Fact Sheet No. 32, undated). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Frequently Asked Question on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism (United Nations, 2009).

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-28

Terrorism Prejudice Perception Management Ercan ÇTLOLU1 Bahçeehir University, Istanbul, Turkey

Abstract. Rigid stereotypes against the members of some ethnic groups, races and some religions reach at first a certain prejudice expressing an emotional negativity against those groups by ignoring the differences among them because it contains a generalization of their members who, in fact, differ from one another, and then to segregation with the transformation of emotivity to behaviorism. When individuals and groups who consider themselves to be the target(s) of discrimination as a result of prejudices, which are emotional, and stereotypes, recognize they are being treated unfairly and make an issue out of it, the discriminators start thinking they were completely right in the face of the problems arising, and settling on common grounds becomes more and more difficult; the doors of opportunity are opened before those who aim to achieve their goals on the basis of those problems and both the transformation of violence into a type of expression and acts of terrorism gain ground. Keywords. motives of terrorist organizations, learned helplessness, othering.

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Introduction As can be recalled, two terrorist attacks took place in Oslo on 22 July 2011, the capital city of Norway where 91 persons, most of them high school students between the ages of 14-18, lost their lives. On the majority of the TV channels broadcast and evening papers published right after the two attacks, there were news and comments mentioning the terrorist attack could have been carried out by al-Qaeda.2 The comments on the TV channels, which started broadcasting right after the explosion of the bomb that was placed in a vehicle in Oslo city center and caused 7 casualties, were concentrated on the possibility that this attack could have been carried out by al-Qaeda or by some other Islamic-linked terrorist organization, since the main attack that cost the lives of more than 80 students on Utoeya Island had not yet been discovered.3 Although it was subsequently revealed out that religious motives lay underneath the two attacks carried out in Norway by the same person (his name is Anders Breivik), this was in fact not an act of “Islamic terrorism,” which had come to the minds of most people at the first hand, but on the contrary an “Anti-Islamic” act of terrorism. 1

President of Strategic Research Center, e-mail: [email protected]. Haroon Siddique and Hannah Godfrey, “Norway Attacks Rolling Coverage,” The Guardian (22 July 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/jul/22/oslo-explosion-live-coverage?INTCMP= SRCH (last visited 17 July 2013). 3 Brian Flynn and Simon Hughes. “Norway’s 9/11,” The Sun (July 23, 2011). 2

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Even an astonishing news report was published in most circulated British evening paper, The Sun, after the perpetrator of the terrorist attack was arrested by the Norwegian police. It was written in the news that the terrorist was blonde, looked like a Norwegian, speaks Norwegian very fluently, without any accent, could have been born in Norway, was engaged by al-Qaeda and was put to sleep until he was ordered to commit the act of terrorism.4 This news was the masterpiece of the prejudice and a very clear evidence of how our perceptions can be managed. A short note has to be added that after the identity of the terrorist was revealed by the police and it was publicly known that he was Norwegian, a member of the radical anti-Islam organization and there were no links with al-Qaeda or any other Islamic terrorist organization, the newspaper did not apologize to its readers so far and from the Moslems. As a matter of fact, not only The Sun newspaper but the global media, broadcasting during the hours immediately after the attack, made comments pointing out that the attack could have been carried out by al-Qaeda or other Islamic terrorist organizations, announced in the days to follow that the attack was carried out by an anti-Islamic person but not by a Muslim. This example, a repercussion of the prejudices created as a result of the wellestablished nature of perceptions that an act of terrorism could only be carried out by Muslims or an Islamic terrorist organization, is considerable enough to be the subject of separate research in social psychology.

1. Prejudices and Human Factors

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When we consider, especially, the violence embodied at the level that the effects of prejudices on social behaviors can reach, the significance of the hot topic increases even more. The violence and demolitions in the not too distant past, which are still ongoing today due to the prejudices against some ethnic groups and races, are now more determinative, discriminative and eliminative by being based on religious identities. It should be kept in mind that there is just one reality, which is terrorism itself, which in return serves to further strengthen the segregation created by the mutual counterperceptions, where terrorism is considered to be a phenomena specific to oriental societies and Islam on the one hand, and there are the negative feelings against the west, on the other hand, without being able to throw off the residues of the heritage created by the humiliation and sufferings during the colonial period.5 Rigid stereotypes against the members of some ethnic groups, races and some religions reach at first a certain prejudice expressing an emotional negativity against 4 Duncan Gardham and Martin Evans, (2011). “Was al-Qaeda or Far-Right Group behind Attacks?,” The Sydney Morning Herald (July, 23, 2011), available at: http://www.smh.com.au/world/was-alqaeda-orfarright-group-behind-attacks-20110723-1htuc.html (last visited July, 17, 2013); Jeffrey Goldberg, “On Suspecting al Qaeda in the Norway Attacks,” The Atlantic (July 23, 2011), available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/on-suspecting-al-qaeda-in-the-norway-attacksupdated/242416/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 5 See Rafael Reuveny and William R. Thompson, Coping with Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, Counterstrategies, and Responses (SUNY Press, 2010).

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those groups by ignoring the differences among them as they contain a generalization of their members who in fact differ from one another and then to segregation with the transformation of emotivity to behaviorism. Discrimination accompanies an illusion whereby it creates an enemy and hostile groups and by searching for their own togetherness and position within the entity of the group, it could be called the ‘in-group’ and as other the ‘out-group’, the sense of ego and a kind of psychological isolations are empowered.6 Individuals and groups being subjected to discrimination face the problem of losing self-respect after a while. Also, those who, instead of calmly accepting discrimination make a problem out of it and try to guard their self-respect can then be regarded as individuals/groups causing problems through their behaviors according to the perceptions of groups othering them, so a reciprocal dilemma or vicious circle can thus start. While individuals and groups who consider themselves to be the target(s) of discrimination as a result of prejudices, which are emotional and stereotypes, recognize they are being treated unfairly and use that to make a problem out of it, the discriminators start thinking they were completely right in the face of the problems arising, and settling on common grounds becomes more and more difficult; the doors of opportunity are opened before those who aim at achieving their goals on the basis of those problems and both the transformation of violence into a type of expression and acts of terrorism gain ground.

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Besides, published scientific research has shown that groups that are affected by some sort of predefined stereotype tend to conform their behaviors to the stereotype; this conformist behavior is then used to confirm the generalization, with all the accompanying destructive effects. The most damaging, even dangerous, aspect of prejudice is its minimalist nature taking individual persons as the basis of the group to which negative judgments have been passed on, instead of their plural identities and the characteristics they possess collectively. Due attention should be paid to the fact that symbolic racism is continuously gaining more importance among the problems of our day, and those of terrorism. Prejudices and stereotypes, or classification of people according to the race, ethnicity or religion whom they belong some of the most important topics in social psychology, constitute such a large scale topic that cannot be explained within a limited perspective. By recognizing this fact, and starting especially from the example of Norway, our attention should be drawn to the discriminatory nature of prejudices against ethnic and religious groups that are widely associated with terrorism, along with the possible consequences. At this point, before proceeding with an explanation of the human factor and the related sense of mistreatment, prejudice and offensiveness, we should dwell first on radical and moderate Islam descriptions. 6 See Walter Reich, Origins Of Terrorism Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

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First it should be pointed out that all divine, monotheistic or polytheistic religions are, in principle, radical belief systems with their incontestable nature predicting the absolute obedience of their respective believers. The members of a religion do not have the opportunity to accept or reject some of the rules imposed by the holy scripture of that religion, nor change them according to their own ideas or set forth new rules. With rules based on clean acceptance and obedience, along with an imperative and incontestable identity, each religion is in fact dogmatic and radical as it sets the limits of thought. The members of a religion and denomination can transform that religion, by changing the religion to a singular and absolute belonging, into a way of life, rigid and uncompromising, to a singular and absolute guide; they can even go as much as taking their beliefs to fanaticism. Such persons can reduce the choices offered by the plurality of their identities to a sole belonging. By gathering together with those in the same position, based on the similarity principle, they can form small and narrow spiritual groups to isolate themselves from their surroundings that they call the external world and define it as the source of all sorts of lack of virtue and evil. These personal perceptions, decisions and practices can make them rise to the level of fanatics or radicals according to the values system of the rest of the society. However this positioning and localization does not go along with such definitions as radical or moderate of the religions those persons or groups adhere to.

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Therefore it is falsification of a compelling and prejudiced system of thought to reach a generalization where a religion and conjointly, all the adherents of that religion, are accused on the basis of acts of violence and terrorism carried out on an individual or groups basis, whether in reference to the religion or not. Besides, generally speaking, intense emotional relationships that could be defined as deep and strong friendship, sharing the same ‘close emotional ties and relations’ which come forth and become the dominant factor in ideological associations – tribes in feudal societies, membership in the same religious associations, especially in closed and narrow spiritual societies – do not necessarily constitute the sole and principal reason why those groups take part, absolutely and always, in acts of terrorism, but when the structural characteristics of terrorist organizations are examined thoroughly, generally this common data is revealed . That is because there are factors distinguishing the relations amongst small groups formed on the basis of ‘close emotional’ ties than those amongst randomly gathered crowds. For instance the common motive of the crowds gathered together to watch a concert is their admiration and love of the performer. The associations or togetherness created by people who do not know each other are limited to the duration of the concert. At the end of the concert those people who have met randomly will go back to their own daily lives and they will most probably never ever meet again. Yet, the specific positions of groups, that can be called the passage between individualism and collectivism, can provide individuals with attributions and codes of behavior which are impossible to compare with the general structure of the society, as for the formation and manifestation of both the individual and social identities of their members. The point where this divergence starts comes forward as one of the core elements of the tendency towards radicalism and fanaticism.

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Therefore the structural characteristics of groups with close emotional ties, which have a very different stance when it comes to solidarity, sharing, protection, commitment and obedience, compared to groups and communities formed by weak emotional ties, are in fact a set of important data that should be examined thoroughly. In the case of the transformation of groups formed by individuals with close emotional ties and similar personalities to the leader-dominant community, it becomes easier to shape them and provide them with a collective identity, as a result of an intellectual change, and transformation towards the objectives of the organization and group, isolating them from their own individualism; as a result we face people who look like one of us, but who in fact are isolated from the external world with the walls bounded in their inner worlds by different emotions, values and judgments, who enter in acts against our normative values where we find it hard to see the reasons and causality. People whose identities have become collective identities by being identified with the group identity and who have raised their sense of belonging to the group to the point of an absolute belonging by singularizing it can no longer go beyond the general behavior of the group after that point. Even though their lives used to be completely different, starting from the point where they have become an indispensable part of the group, all of their judgments, perceptions and behaviors identify with the code of behavior of the group.

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An important point here is the difference between the individual behavior and the group behavior. There are lots of examples where introverted, unresponsive, even coward, overly conformist people have demonstrated the utmost aggression, misfit, and overmotivation. Therefore people who constantly feel under pressure, who lack selfconfidence and who suffer from identity crisis, can completely change their behavior patterns, so as to evoke even dissociative identity disorder (DID) in cases where they find a group consisting of role models and a suitable environment. The true stories of transformation of the person who seems to be the most passive, the most weak-spirited member of a unit, during a war/conflict, showing up when nobody can do it with the identity of a leading person, are in fact proof of the fact that when pressure and self-control are no longer in place, there can be unforeseeable changes in the behavior patterns of human beings. So it seems possible to explain in this context those behaviors, which are demonstrated by the members of groups formed around similarity and close emotional ties, which are in fact impossible to associate individually with the members of groups. At this point it is worthwhile to explain some facts, which are somehow not considered worthy of explanation by those who always try to explain by referring to religious beliefs and especially to Islam, regarding the conversion of group identity and behavior into violence. By keeping in mind the fact that groups formed around close emotional ties and similarity are widespread in the west, especially in the United States, the observational perspective of the codes of group behavior broadens even further. For instance those who qualify ‘related to violence within the code of group behavior,’ the traditional rituals such as (hitting one’s own body with a chain until it bleeds or cutting one’s own head with a knife or sword), practiced by the Shias during the month of Moharrem (known also as the month of Ashura’), should examine cases of murders and mass

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suicides, committed by some of the members, following the orders of the gurus (spiritual groups in the United States), as these are examples of similar codes of conduct with an even further outreach and should they also try to find the common aspects of commitment to group identity. Since the members of such groups, regardless of the religion they adhere to, or whether they are organized under the ideology/philosophy of the leader above their own religious identities or belongings, consider themselves gifted and the lives of other people meaningless, the ties between them become more and more powerful. As a result, individuals that can resort to violence appear, both against themselves or against others. Hence, by identifying those groups and their behaviors with Islam, any and all attempts to reach a conclusion on the basis of this artificial identity are nothing but empirical both in terms of approach and value.7 When the group identity and behaviors are evaluated together, the causalities of the violence dominant in the executions carried out right before the cameras by the members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan and those of the tortures applied to the prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq can, although forgiving is completely out of question, become more comprehensible on the basis of the structural characteristics determinant on the behaviors of operators.

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Consequently, groups composed of people who have come together in the pursuit of finding those similar by the effect of differences from others, who raise their own beliefs, ideas, values, judgments and ideologies with the power of association after empowering on their ‘close emotional ties’ as they are on the same page on both intellectual and emotional bases, who believe that the grace on them will soar as they punish those who are not like them, can emerge in any place, at any time, where human beings live, without regard to religious or racial discrimination. The conclusion that the common ground under terrorism, in which the human factor lies at each stage and at all fronts, is in fact the perception of condemnation created by a feeling of unjust treatment, for whatsoever reason it might be and whatsoever reasons lie underneath, leads us to another question as to understanding and analyzing terrorism.

2. Who are the Terrorists? Why not all but only a minor fraction of those who have suffered during any given period or during all of their lives, that have undergone unjust treatments, whether because of their ideology, or their religious belief or ethnic identity, choose violence as a way of expression and tends towards terrorism? For example, whereas there are more than 3,000 ethnic groups all over the world, why is the number of ethnic groups who raise ethnic nationalism by taking their ethnic identities to the level of singular belonging and get involved in violent separatist movements and acts, approximately 100 at the most?

7

See Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (Harper Perennial, 2004).

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Or, if poverty, exposure to colonization, inequality and injustice, in other words, as widely pronounced in the fight against terrorism, socio-economic, socio-cultural and socio-political factors do take place among the principal factors encouraging terrorism, why are there no terrorist organizations who hijack airplanes, blow up subways, opera houses and schools, of, say, African origin, where in the not too distant past, human beings were auctioned as slaves in marketplaces, where hunger and misery reach a peak today? Why do only a minor part of those who feel themselves to be an ‘other’ in the face of the unjust treatment they are subjected to, seek the way to reach togetherness in violence, by ending their marginalization? Why do they display a culture of violence rather than reconciliation and agreement? If we turn this rhetoric, which we can continue even further, into a Socratic dialogue and try to answer the questions we pose, the very first, the easiest and for sure the most wrong answer would be that terrorists are criminals with psychological and psychiatric disorders. However, during the profile studies conducted on the members of various terrorist organizations, there have been no findings to support this perception scientifically to support a generalization.

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For example, according to data published in current psychiatric manuals, research conducted on members of terrorist organizations and on subjects who live in the same environment, under the same socio-economic conditions but who are not associated with terrorist groups, have shown that there is no difference between those individuals as to psychological values.8 As a matter of fact, believing that acts of terrorism, which require an utmost complex and professional organization and a plan (to include the designation of the target, selection of the type of the act, estimation of the psychological effects of the act, planning, logistics, intelligence support, escape plan and arrangement of safe hiding places) are carried out by ill persons with psychological disorders, shows that the threat and danger faced are not completely perceived and defined. Under this common belief or judgment lies an artificial defense and protection motive stating that people, who enjoy our subjective normative values and that we consider to be ‘normal’ by identifying with ourselves, would not resort to acts of terrorism. Therefore, according to this logic, terrorists are always criminal and persons ill with psychological disorders. It should be a precondition, for the success of the fight against terrorism, to go through a change of the collective perceptions, led by an intellectual organization that has chosen an elusive relief and that does not wish to accept it as they avoid facing being caught between their fears and the realities, to realize that terrorists are not different from us, that on the contrary, their senses of belief and commitment have reached the point that they feel justified to kill others or sacrifice their own lives voluntarily. Therefore, the preliminary condition is to understand the human being in order to respond to the topics pointed out through a set of questions and to analyze terrorism. 8

See International Terrorism and the Drug Connection (Ankara University Press, 1984).

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Condemnation is, regardless of the geographical position on earth, race, religion, age and education level, as well as social and economic stratum, a powerful emotion and impulse, causing unsettlement and reactance on every human being. And the level of unsettlement and the reaction are directly proportional to the significance and the level of effect of the external impulses and the condemnation that people are either subjected to, or feel they are being subjected to. When the condemnation felt by the people, who see themselves in this position, gains continuity, when its negative effects on their lives increase incrementally and when the perception that solving it within the system to which they belong to is not possible, the helplessness and the hopelessness revealed out as a result end up in general in either of the below two: x

x

Some people, having calmly accepted what they have been going through, lose their reactivity, by transforming into the parts of the ‘learned helplessness’ or ‘learned despair’ syndrome, and become passive, obedient individuals. In some people, on the other hand, this situation leads to a completely different reaction; the helplessness and hopelessness they have been going through turn into anger after a while, and this anger, in cases where the external impulses they are being subjected to gain continuity, turns into violence/aggression.9

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From the point of view of the theory stating that each action creates a reaction to it, among the fundamental factors of the difference of the reactions of people who were subjected to the very same actions, we could include such factors as the wellestablishment of individual rights and freedoms, different levels of education and welfare and the remembrance by the permanent memories of people (background information). The fight conducted by the people who have no hope in solving the unjust treatments they are subjected to within the national or global system to which they belong to, who perceive themselves as being mistreated by the system itself, turns after a while into a fight against the system that they consider their enemy. Those who can find no possibility to obtain remedies on legal and democratic grounds, start expressing themselves, according to the last analysis, through violence, which consequently can make violence start transforming into a relative culture. As a matter of fact, when we examine the geographical positions where terrorist organizations, their acts of terrorism and force are concentrated, it should not be possible to explain through coincidence the fact that terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism are widely seen and violence is a frequent method used in countries ruled under autocratic, totalitarian, theocratic regimes, where there is no fair distribution of revenues, justice and no equality of opportunity, where freedoms are limited and restricted, as well as in countries which face external impulses, directions and interventions because of their high importance due both to their strategic positions and their reserves in natural resources.10

9

See Neil R. Carlson, et al, Psychology: The Science of Behavior (Pearson Canada, 2010). See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1999).

10

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In acts of terrorism conducted as a result of external effects, it is seen that although there are various reasons some communities which perceive they are the subjects of unfair treatment, impositions and attacks due to several ideological, economic, cultural, psychological reasons, enter into illegal organizations with the perception that conducting their cases in an asymmetrical dimension is the sole remedy. Thus they tend towards violence at the point where they conclude that their hopes and patience have reached an end as for bringing solutions within the international system or where the real source of the injustice applied on them is the global system itself. For these reasons, conducting the relations between the rulers and the ruled ones in complete transparency within a democratic culture disallowing injustice; keeping each and every way of legal remedies wide open up to the end; bringing into full force the concept of rule of law; avoiding any and all limits and restrictions standing before the freedom of thought and the freedom of expression, could reduce the level of violence used in the expression of the reactions and marginalize those who resort to violence in time.

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Similarly, achieving with concrete examples and in a persuasive manner of convincing practices that underdeveloped or developing countries themselves are also a completely equal part of the international system and community; bringing into force regulations and sanctions supporting and proving this perception; and assuring that they are not subjected to a negative discrimination for neither the religions they adhere to nor for the ethnic identities they belong to could help eliminate, or at least decrease, the vast majority of the motives of terrorism and play a preventive role in the aforementioned parts of the world. Today, when the terrorist organizations and the acts of terrorism are scrutinized, it is seen that the basic factor is the othering/exclusion/abasement/contempt, due to a perception of being the aggrieved and unjustly treated. It is also apparent that the follower/defender organizations of the ideologies which have now become out of date quit the scene and that they are replaced largely by organizations established on the basis of an ethnic identity, a religion or a domination. And terrorism fictionalized on the sense of belonging and ethnic identity, which people earn at birth, which defines their identity and which is the basic factor impossible to change makes the threat and the danger faced nowadays gain continuity. Therefore it is a condition on a global scale in the fight against terrorism that countries with different ethnic minorities shall direct themselves towards finding, and implementing rapidly, practices and arrangements for the prevention of the emergence of micronationalist movements and the rise of racism. Further, it should be noted that in the elimination of the factors encouraging terrorism, by increasing the wish for international peace, for understanding each other and for living together, the elimination of the negative effects of the perception that the ethnic origin one belongs to is the focal point of the collective exclusion and contempt one is subjected to, creates in the peoples of some of the countries, which is known to be existent, is one of the other conditions required. For, othering effects created through associating some countries with terrorism, calling them ‘terrorist states, rogue states,’ cause large crowds to feel excluded and humiliated, who let alone being associated with terrorism, take a stand against it, and Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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can lead them appreciate and comprehend the acts of terrorism carried out against the countries which had accused them.11 It should be taken as a fact that this rhetoric, which triggers some sort of introversion, alienation to and avoidance of the international system in some countries, does not contribute; on the contrary, it disserves the fight against terrorism for all those negative effects it embodies. To give a very contemporary example, it should be kept in mind that the perception of ‘other identity and condemnation’ created, during international travels, by treating the citizens of the countries regarded as ‘terrorist’ or those of the suspected countries as potential criminals after a quick glance on their passports, or by subjecting them to negative discrimination (i.e. getting them off the plane, interning them at airports, searching them in detail, or applying humiliating practices on them) just because of the color of their skin, their clothing, contribute to the justification of terrorism, at the very least, at the level of appreciation. Therefore, another important condition in the fight against terrorism is to clear the rhetoric and jargon that are used along with any and all statements causing or evoking any sort of general accusation against a country or the people of a country.

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Consequentially, it can be affirmed that the very first and indispensable rule in the global fight against terrorism is to ensure that the efforts, understanding and cooperation intended for the creation of a world where liberal democracy becomes functional are consistent with all its institutions and legal system. The reason for this is that it is now a fact proven by prior experience that methods called security measures in the fight against terrorism are insufficient to obtain decisive results when conducted all alone. This determination does not recommend, for sure, the non-utilization of security measures in the fight against terrorist organizations, but intends, considering the measures taken are result-oriented and result-based, to draw attentions to the fact that, unless the causes leading to the consequences are eliminated and terminated, terrorist production would continue. For this reason, the main objective in the fight against terrorism should be set as the correction of the defects on the production line, rather than the elimination of the defective products. In other words, by acknowledging that a production-based fight would be more effective in getting a result than a product-based fight, the concepts and methods used in the fight should be carried out on this basis correspondingly. Another wrong method is talking about ‘modern and civilized’ communities, for its discriminator nature rather than uniting, as an alternative to the ‘combatant’ identity, imputed on some ethnic groups and leading the members of that ethnicity to demonstrate such behaviors convenient to the identity affixed on them in the course of time following external impulses.

11

See Maria R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell, A New Understanding of Terrorism, Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned (Springer, 2009).

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Conclusion In conclusion, we have difficulty in accepting that the global proliferation of terrorism is, along with various other reasons, a result of the choice to respond to imposition with imposition, to violence with violence, which in turn is the result of a somewhat possessive and minimalist intellectual perception and organization, that is in fact the expression of a process composed of weakness and helplessness. Above all, we do not see or do not choose to see that these are the reflections of the transformation of terrorism into a new method of war. However, the recent wave of terror, or the new generation of warfare, called the fourth one, but which also could be affirmed as the fifth one, has already transformed into a cheap and efficient instrument for countries and communities who see themselves as the subjects of attacks and impositions, who feel their existence and culture are under threat and danger, to whom is imposed a life free from their traditions, ways of life and habitudes, who feel that they are being forced to go through a change and transformation, strange and improper, that they do not wish to go through. An instrument which does not require a strong economy, high and developed technology, big armies, sophisticated weapons, well-established and efficient command and control systems, which is based on limited human resources with a sense of commitment to the extent that self-sacrifice is voluntary for the sake of the case, which is much more cheaper compared to ordinary and total wars, which does not cause significant loss of lives and physical damage for the ones who apply it, but is as powerful and as efficient as it is for the other party in terms of the traumatic consequences it leads to… In brief, terrorism became as a new method of war…

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Bibliography Carlson, Neil R., et al, Psychology: The Science of Behavior (Pearson Canada, 2010). Flynn, Brian, and Simon Hughes. “Norway’s 9/11,” The Sun (July 23, 2011). Gardham, Duncan, and Martin Evans, “Was al-Qaeda or Far-Right Group behind Attacks?,” The Sydney Morning Herald (July, 23, 2011). Goldberg, Jeffrey, “On Suspecting al Qaeda in the Norway Attacks,” The Atlantic (July 23, 2011). Haberfeld, Maria R., and Agostino von Hassell, A New Understanding of Terrorism, Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned (Springer, 2009). Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1999). International Terrorism and the Drug Connection (Ankara University Press, 1984). Reich, Walter, Origins Of Terrorism Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). Reuveny, Rafael, and William R. Thompson, Coping with Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, Counterstrategies, and Responses (SUNY Press, 2010). Siddique, Harron, and Hannah Godfrey, “Norway Attacks Rolling Coverage,” The Guardian (22 July 2011). Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (Harper Perennial, 2004).

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-39

Terrorist Use of the Internet Francesca BOSCO1 UNICRI, Turin, Italy

Abstract. Terrorists use the Internet for many different reasons; not all are illegal but they do have a terrorist purpose, whether it be for publicity, to commit acts of terror or just for organizational purposes. The inherently transnational nature of this phenomenon poses specific problems to traditional strategies for the prevention, detection and prosecution of terrorist activities online. Countering terrorist use of the Internet demands a collaborative and innovative approach in order to find appropriate security measures while respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression. The potential of the World Wide Web as a weapon in the fight against terrorism must be exploited in a creative and empowering way, attentive to cultural differences and in tune with the concerns, mindsets and worldviews of the specific audiences targeted by terrorist groups. Keywords. terrorist counterterrorism

use

of

the

Internet,

cyberterrorism,

cybercrime,

Introduction

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“We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”2 The 9/11 attacks prompted an intensive discussion about the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by terrorist organizations, fueled by reports that the offenders had used the Internet in preparation for their attacks. 3 Nonetheless, definitions of cyberterrorism remain controversial. Although it is tempting to adopt a definition of cyberterrorism that is broad enough to cover the disparate aspects of terrorist use of the Internet, it is also necessary to draw some boundaries in order to prevent the term from becoming meaningless. To give an example, it is highly dubious whether a terrorist booking a flight via the Internet should be regarded as an instance of cyberterrorism.4 For the purposes of this paper, we understand the term cyberterrorism to refer to a specific subset of cybercrime: illicit activities involving technological components, particularly computer systems and the Internet. Specifically, we agree that “the primary difference between a cyberattack to commit a crime and to commit terror is found in

1

Project Officer, Emerging Crimes Unit, e-mail: [email protected]. Ayman al-Zawahiri, cited in Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” The National Interest (2006), available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/al-qaedas-media-strategies-883 (last visited July 19, 2013). 3 Marco Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, (International Telecommunication Union, 2009), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/ituunderstanding-cybercrime-guide.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 4 Ibid, p. 53. 2

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the intent of the attacker, and it is possible for actions under both labels to overlap.”5 Moreover, we draw a further distinction between ‘terrorist use of the Internet’ and ‘cyberterrorism.’ By the latter, we refer to “the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents”6 – that is, terrorist activities that target computer systems and networks. By ‘terrorist use of the Internet’ we refer instead to those illicit activities that employ the Internet as a tool to produce and spread terror. This narrower definition reflects a distinction – commonly made within cybercrime studies – between those illicit activities that are made against, and those that are enabled by, computer systems and the Internet.7 To be sure, the very same terrorist organization may at once be involved in cybercrime, cyberterrorism and terrorist use of the Internet, as we have defined them here. For instance, a terrorist group may finance its activities by obtaining illegal access to online bank accounts through online fraud (cybercrime). It may also use the Internet to launch cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, perhaps by hacking an official government webpage and disseminating false information (cyberterrorism). Finally, the Internet may also be used for propaganda, information-gathering, communication etc. (terrorist use of Internet). In this paper, we concentrate on the latter category, exploring those activities enabled by the Internet which sustain and facilitate the aims of terrorist organizations.

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It is worth noting that these activities might not necessarily be illegal in a juridical sense. Legally accessible, open-data sources, for instance, can be an important source of information gathering for terrorist groups (from instructions on how to construct weapons, to architectural plans of possible targets etc.), without it constituting an offence. We focus in particular on the notion of the Internet as a medium that can be used by terrorists as an ‘information weapon’ to increase their visibility and to publicize their activities.

1. The Internet as an Attractive Arena for Terrorist Publicity Terrorist organisations face two apparently contradictory demands. On the one hand, the illegal nature of terrorist activities makes individual anonymity fundamental to conceal the identity of members from law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, terrorists need to publicize their activities to promote their messages and ideologies, as well as to intimidate their targets through psychological warfare. Given these requirements, the free and open architecture of the World Wide Web constitutes an ideal arena for terrorist propaganda.

5 Clay Wilson, “Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, RL32114, 2008), p. 4, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/ RL32114.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 6 Mark M. Pollitt, "A Cyberterrorism Fact or Fancy?" (Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, 1997), pp. 285-289. 7 Ali Alkaabi, Combating Computer Crime: an International Perspective (Unpublished Thesis, University of Southern Queensland, 2010), p.17, available at: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/43400/1/Ali_Alkaabi_Thesis.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013).

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Security and traceability were not key concerns in the design of the Internet; its creators were more interested in the possibilities for freedom of speech and the dissemination of knowledge it afforded.8 This is reflected in the basic architecture of the Internet, which is characterized by: x

easy access from anywhere in the world through public access points, IP address masks and Onion routing techniques that protect the identity of the user;

x

a decentralized structure with little or no regulation, censorship, or other form of overarching governmental or institutional control;

x

potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world;

x

anonymity and untraceability of communication, guaranteed by the use of fake names and pseudonyms, fake profiles and multiple identities;

x

fast flow of a large amount of information;

x

inexpensive development and maintenance of a web presence;

x

a multimedia environment that offers the opportunity to combine text, graphics, audio and video, allowing users to download films, songs, books, posters, etc; and

x

the ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, and particularly television broadcasting.

While these characteristics have an undoubtedly positive potential, they have also been turned to the advantage of terrorist activity, making the Internet a crucial tool for terrorist organizations. This is reflected by the fact that the number of terrorist websites has grown from 12 in 1998 to almost 7,000 in 2009.9 Besides official terrorist websites, there is also a range of unofficial blogs and forums, as well as websites of distributors, supporters, sympathisers and fans. Terrorist cyberpresence has also been seen in video sites such as Youtube and Liveleak, social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, and online video game websites.

2. Objectives of Online Terrorist Presence Taken together, cyberspace offers a fertile ground for a number of different activities related to terrorism, including: 2.1 Waging Psychological Terror Claiming responsibility for specific attacks and actions is a key aspect of terrorist strategy, as it provides indispensable visibility and publicity to the organization. 8 See Gabriel Weiman, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” (United States Institute for Peace Special Report 116, 2004), available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/wwwterrornet-how-modernterrorism-uses-Internet (last visited July 19, 2013). 9 Catherine Bott, The Internet as a Terrorist Tool for the Recruitment and Radicalization of Youth (Homeland Security Institute, 24 April 2009), available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/docs/reports/Internet_ Radicalization.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013).

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Because of its inherent potential to reach a large, worldwide audience, cyberspace offers an ideal venue to do this. This has been demonstrated by several instances, such as the video ‘Taliban Claims Responsibility for the Times Square Attack’ (May 2, 2010), purportedly released by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), that claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing in Times Square in New York City. For the same reasons, the Internet also offers new and powerful means for terrorist groups to vilify and demoralize target audiences through the spread of disinformation, the delivery of threats intended to instill fear and helplessness, and the dissemination of horrific images of recent actions. An example of this particular tactic is the case of execution videos, such as the execution of Colonel Imam released by the Pakistani Taliban in February 2011. 2.2 Publicity and Propaganda Another objective of terrorist use of the Internet is to gain sympathy and support for their cause as well as to justify their actions. The Internet has significantly increased the opportunities for terrorists to secure publicity for their ideological causes and spread propaganda, as well as provide a virtual library of terrorist material, granting easy access to everything from political, ideological and theological literature to videos of assaults and attacks, and even video games.

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Official terrorist websites use imagery and symbols of victimization and empowerment to spread their message. These displays are effective in arousing the emotions of both current and potential supporters. For example, in many Islamic extremist websites, the symbolism is of a Muslim world that is under attack from nonbelievers, where only the terrorists can resist and overcome these opponents, contributing to heroize the image of the terrorist.10 Unofficial online magazines can also be used to gain sympathy for terrorist causes, as well as for providing guides on the best ways to become a self-made terrorist. The magazines are usually PDF files of about 100-150 pages and include information ranging art – like pictures, poems, stories, and songs – to bomb-building instructions and guidance on how to use publicly available encryption systems for emails. There are also magazines that target female audiences containing articles that extol the virtues and duties entailed by being “a good wife to a Jihadist.”11 2.3 The Internet as an Organizational Tool Just like business enterprises, governments, civil society and the public, terrorists groups also increasingly use the Internet as a vital organizational tool for coordinating various activities that are distributed across decentralized networks. One particular method by which the Internet is used in the preparation of attacks is for ‘data mining,’ namely the gathering of the logistical information necessary to conduct terrorist actions, including, for instance, publicly available architectural plans 10

James Lewis, The Internet and Terrorism (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050401_internetandterrorism.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 11 Mikko Hypponen, “Terrorist Groups in the Online World” (RSA Conference, 2012) at http://privacy-pc. com/articles/terrorist-groups-in-the-online-world-mikko-hypponen-at-rsa-conference-2012.html (last visited July 19, 2013). Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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of specific objectives, high resolution satellite pictures, or ‘how-to’ instructions and tutorials on building and using weapons. Online venues (such as chat rooms, social networking sites, E-bulletin boards, and online videogames) also provide new opportunities for recruitment and training. For instance, Anders Breivik, the man responsible for the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, reportedly trained in the online game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. Indeed, many ‘shoot-’em-up’ games are suspected as being used by terrorists, as first person gaming portrays simulations of war scenarios that can easily help mask ‘real-life’ terrorist actions.

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Communication and networking among terrorist cells that are often geographically dispersed and loosely connected is also greatly facilitated by the use of Internet. Publicly available encryption tools of varying sophistication and complexity allow terrorists to make sure that only group members are able to gain access to relevant messages, thereby protecting themselves from the danger of law enforcement interception. Fundraising for terrorist organizations has also benefited from the opportunities provided by the World Wide Web. Some terrorist groups request funds directly from Web surfers who visit their sites. For example, the Ulster Loyalist Information Service – known for its affiliation with the Northern Irish terrorist group Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) – accepted funds via PayPal and invited those who were “uncomfortable with making monetary donations” to donate other items, including bulletproof vests.12 Another way in which groups raise funds is through the establishment of online stores and the sale of items such as books, audio and video tapes, flags, and t-shirts. A website linked to the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, an organization regarded as the political wing of the Real IRA, carried a link to the Internet-based book retailer Amazon.com on its top page, which asked visitors to “support our prisoners by shopping through the following link.” Commissions generated by any purchases generated through linking from the site would have been contributed from Amazon to the site owners. The link was removed in November 2000 shortly after it had gone live.13 Besides this particular phenomenon, terrorist-affiliated entities and individuals have established Internet-related front businesses as a means of raising money to support their activities. For example, in December 2002, InfoCom, a Texas-based ISP, was indicted on thirty-three counts relating to its provision of communication services, in-kind support, and funds to terrorist organizations including Hamas and its affiliate the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD).14

12

See Maura Conway, Terrorism and the Internet: New Media—New Threat? (Unpublished Paper, Dublin City University, 2005), available at http://www.cleanitproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2006Terrorism-and-the-Internet.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 13 Ibid. 14 Todd M. Hinnen, “The Cyber-front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of the Internet,” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 5 (2004), available at http://www.stlr.org/html/volume5/ hinnen.txt (last visited July 19, 2013).

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3. Countering Online Terrorist Publicity “Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.” 15

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Countering terrorist publicity online presents a multitude of difficulties. To begin with, there are disparities between different legal approaches to the issue of cyberterrorism, which in most cases are based on ad hoc applications of existing cybercrime legislation or counterterrorism legislation rather than enacting specific legislation on terrorist use of the Internet. The international dimension of cyberterrorism also poses specific difficulties, as data transfer often involves more than one country with user, hardware, host provider and audience located in different places. This entails difficulties for detection and law enforcement given the complexity of transnational collaboration and the disparity of resources and expertise available to different national agencies. Furthermore, the principle of dual criminality also hinders effective countermeasures, as different countries may not criminalize the same type of activity. Standards of proof, rules of evidence and sentencing also differ significantly across national boundaries. While international frameworks for cooperation on countering cybercrime have started to be put in place, their interpretation and application still varies widely from country to country.16 At a strategic level, a recurring question has been whether it is more effective to suppress or to engage terrorist use of the Internet, especially with regard to propaganda activities. While the instinctive reaction of governments generally tends towards shutting down terrorist-related websites, this might actually turn out to be unfeasible and counterproductive. First, suppression is often a short term solution that merely displaces terrorist-related content from one website to another, with a consequent waste of resources as analysts and investigators keep chasing a highly mobile target.17 Second, filtering and censorship sit uneasily with the democratic core principle of freedom of speech, and thus raise concerns from advocates of civil liberties and the public at large. This is reflected, for instance, by the negative media coverage sparked by the news that Google had received a significant amount of requests from various Western states demanding the removal of content related to political speech.18 In light of these difficulties, several commentators have suggested that a strategy of engagement with terrorist use of Internet for publicity and propaganda purposes might be more appropriate and effective. In other words, “our aim should be to win this battle, not by suppressing the terrorists’ ideals, but by exposing their idiocy.”19 From this perspective, the ideological narratives disseminated by terrorist organizations via the Internet should be countered and exposed as inaccurate and false.

15 Margaret Thatcher, cited in Ray Moseley, “Thatcher Urges War On Terror,” Chicago Tribune (16 July 1985), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-07-16/news/8502160228_1_terrorist-hijackingprovisional-ira (last visited July 19, 2013). 16 Gerke, Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, p.132. 17 Lewis, The Internet and Terrorism. 18 John Fahey, “Google removes terror videos from YouTube,” The Independent (18 June 2012), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-removes-terror-videos-from-youtube7857526.htm (last visited July 19, 2013). 19 See Lewis, The Internet and Terrorism.

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Various ways of doing this have been suggested, including weakening cult personalities, challenging extremist doctrines, and dispelling the glory of the ‘terrorist lifestyle.’ 20 Yet others have argued that “rather than seeking to counter [terrorist propaganda on the Internet] through rational or ideological argumentation further down the line, one approach might be for governments to provide the local victims of [terrorist] groups… with the physical means to document their own suffering” in an attempt to undermine their credibility.”21 This type of approach based on engagement has been adopted in different forms and by various actors across the world. In 2011, the International Assistance Security Force engaged in what has been defined as a “Twitter war” with the Taliban, replying to and disputing posts that were considered to be misleading or false.22 In the UK, the Radical Middle Way Programme sought to create an opportunity for young Muslims to connect with their faith and explore what it means to believe in the 21st century, promoting a moderate understanding of Islam and providing a platform for open debate, critical thinking and spiritual reflection. 23 Google has also been instrumental in implementing a project intended to combat violent extremism by supporting a digital forum in which reformed terrorists and former violent criminals can share their experiences and collaborate to devise means of countering radicalization.24 These and other activities of a similar kind underlie the inherent technological potential to counter terrorist use of the Internet, while suggesting interesting venues for collaboration between the private sector and civil society in the fight against terrorism.

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Conclusion Terrorist use of the Internet represents a complex and multifaceted issue. Terrorists use the Internet as a means to wage psychological warfare, as a powerful propaganda weapon and as an effective organizational tool for the planning, coordination and financing of their activities. The inherently transnational nature of this phenomenon poses specific problems to traditional strategies for the prevention, detection and prosecution of terrorist activities online. Moreover, the open and largely unregulated architecture of the World Wide Web offers significant advantages to terrorist groups interested in furthering their cause in the cyberspace arena. Consequently, countering terrorist use of the Internet demands a collaborative and innovative approach in order to find appropriate security measures while respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression. Indeed, the very same 20 Liat Shetret, “Use of the Internet for Counterterrorist Purposes” (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011), available at http://www.cleanitproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2011-Use-of-theInternet-for-CT-Purposes.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 21 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2(1)(2009), p. 47, available at http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf (last visited July 19, 2013). 22 Steve Bucci, “Twitter Terrorists and Turmoil” (Homeland Security Policy Institute, 25 June 2012), at http://securitydebrief.com/2012/06/25/twitter-terrorists-and-turmoil/ (last visited July 19, 2013). 23 See Radical Middle Way, “About Us,” at http://www.radicalmiddleway.org/page/about-us (last visited July 19, 2013). 24 David Gilbert, “Google Creates Online Forum for ex-Terrorists,” International Business Times (27 April 2012), available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/334204/20120427/google-against-violent-extremismforum-islamic-far.htm (last visited July 19, 2013).

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features that make cyberspace attractive to terrorist groups, such as the possibility for knowledge sharing, ease of access and the opportunity to reach wide and diverse audiences, can also be put to effective use in the fight against online terrorist activities. In particular, the Internet offers a possibility to engage with and confront the ideologies propagated by terrorist groups, as well as to challenge misleading narratives and deliberate misinformation. The potential of the World Wide Web as a weapon in the fight against terrorism must be exploited in a creative and empowering way, attentive to cultural differences and in tune with the concerns, mindsets and worldviews of the specific audiences targeted by terrorist groups. This speaks in favor of a joint approach that would enable the effective use of the particular skills and potential of the various actors involved in the fight against terrorism, including NGOs, civil society organizations and victims of terrorism, as well as governments, experts, law enforcement agencies and dedicated regional or international institutions.

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Bibliography Alkaabi, Ali, Combating Computer Crime: an International Perspective (Unpublished Thesis, University of Southern Queensland, 2010). Bott, Catherine, The Internet as a Terrorist Tool for the Recruitment and Radicalization of Youth (Homeland Security Institute, 24 April 2009). Bucci, Steve, “Twitter Terrorists and Turmoil” (Homeland Security Policy Institute, 25 June 2012). Conway, Maura, Terrorism and the Internet: New Media—New Threat? (Unpublished Paper, Dublin City University, 2005). Fahey, John, “Google removes terror videos from YouTube,” The Independent (18 June 2012). Gercke, Marco, Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, (International Telecommunication Union, 2009). Gilbert, David, “Google Creates Online Forum for ex-Terrorists,” International Business Times (27 April 2012). Hinnen, Todd M., “The Cyber-front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of the Internet,” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 5 (2004). Hypponen, Mikko, “Terrorist Groups in the Online World” (RSA Conference, 2012). Lewis, James, The Internet and Terrorism (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005). Lynch, Marc, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” The National Interest (2006). Moseley, Ray, “Thatcher Urges War On Terror,” Chicago Tribune (16 July 1985). Pollitt, Mark A., "A Cyberterrorism Fact or Fancy?" (Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, 1997). Ramsay, Gilbert, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2(1)(2009). Shetret, Liat, “Use of the Internet for Counterterrorist Purposes” (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011). Wilson, Clay, “Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, RL32114, 2008). Weiman, Gabriel, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” (United States Institute for Peace Special Report 116, 2004).

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Religion and the Question of Violence aban Ali DÜZGÜN1 Ankara University, Turkey

Abstract. Unlike Eastern religions, Western ones (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have a normative nature. Reciting the scripture does not just give its member just spiritual sense but also creates norms for daily life. They emphasize action to perform the will of God. Many ‘dos and don’ts’ of the scriptures are clear enough to see this normative character. These holy texts cannot speak; however, their interpreters must do so on their behalf. And they interpret them within an interpretive context that is geohistorically, geoculturally and geopolitically rather different from one another. This is the reason why there are conflicts, not just among those who believe and don’t, but among the members of the same holy text, as well. Through out-of-context quotations, some so-called devout members can easily distort the very meaning of the text, thus transforming it into a source of uproar and chaos rather than peace and serenity. Considering this historical experience, this paper draws a difference between the scripture and historical phenomena it has created in order to criticize the essentialist approach that identifies the scripture with its members. Key Words: The Holy Scripture, Islam of identity and Islam of truth, political Islam, jihad, suicide bombings.

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Introduction This article tries to shows how politically-minded people transform a spiritual and practical guide first into an ideology then into political capital. In this context, the following topics will be dealt with: the Islam of identity and Islam of truth; subordination of scripture to the jihadist politics; the position of Islamists and ‘ulam in contemporary Islam; para-mosque structures and transformation Islam into Islamism; neo-Orientalism, essentialism and contingencies about scripture and its relation to Muslims’ behavior; jihad and associate terms; suicide bombings and their (un)justification.

1. The Scripture and Its Contingent Interpretations: Islam versus the Historical Phenomena of Islam The history of Islam is the history of interpretations. Much of what is known as Islam is in reality nothing more than its historically and culturally construed form. There is no one-on-one overlap between Islam and its historical phenomena, including in this day and age. So, in order to figure out the current situation, three building blocks in a religious tradition (Islam in this case) are to be analyzed: First, the scripture that

 1

Prof. Dr., Theology Faculty, E-mail: [email protected].

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constructs and produces a Muslim mind; secondly, the mind that interprets the scripture and thus creates a theological tradition; and finally the actions that this mind has created throughout history, which I called historical phenomena of Islam. Without referring to the scripture, it is hardly reasonable to explain the mind and the actions or phenomena created by this mind but it is also not realistic to explain the mind and actions referring completely to the scripture. As the text is just one of the components that produces this mind and actions, beside the cultural and geographical milieu, to get an authentic evaluation, all these factors have to be scrutinized together.

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It is believed that to reveal the real character of Islam one has to read the Qur’an from beginning to the end, but this approach is not accurate. This is the case of ‘essentialists’ and ‘apologetics,’ which is totally provocative and far from being a creative solution. Through this evaluation, many go far as to compare the Qur’an to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Therefore it is necessary to consider the emotional, situational and cultural context, or ‘brackets,’ while interpreting the Qur’an. These contexts are the reason behind the occurrence of multiple meanings that traditional exegesis scholars suggested in several Qur’anic expressions. Just as it is wrong to justify one’s wrongdoing with the scripture, so is trying to find a reference from the scripture to comprehend any Islamic act. The real context of any action is economic, sociological and anthropological more than scriptural. We are at the heart of different geographical and cultural spaces where there operates not what is commonly called ‘Islam’ but Islamic fact or phenomenon. There is no unified Muslim world or Islam. Rather there have been Islam and Muslim (realities). The clash of civilization theorists grossly confuse this fact and erroneously reduce different realities or phenomena of Islam into a unified form of Islam. Considering Islam to be a monolithic entity is a mistake. Even during the ‘Golden Age of Islam’ (at the height of Abbasid period), there were rival caliphates in Cordoba and in North Africa, as well as ethnically-based Turkish and Iranian dynasties that challenged the authority of Bagdad’s Abbasid caliphate authority. This kind of unified and unequivocal Islam is an epistemic and historical absurdity. The same mistake is made by these theorists in their consideration of some other civilizations as unified, like the Indian civilization. India’s Muslim population is greater than the combined population of Britain and France; there are also Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists and the southern part of India is totally Christian. How reasonable then is it to depict Islam or other religions and civilizations as unified and cohesive?! Correspondingly, in apprehensive arguments, Islam and Islamism are being conflated into one and the same phenomenon, both seeming to embody a threat to democratic values or are seen to stand for terrorism. As long as Islam and Islamism or other forms or phenomena of Islam are not isolated from one another, a precise solution may be far from being grasped.

2. The Islam of Identity and the Islam of Truth Since the interpretive knowledge has no claim to be eternal and infallible, it is imperative to keep religion and the knowledge of religion as separate entities. However, in contemporary fundamentalism, this understanding is reversed and the difference between religion and religious knowledge is collapsed, i.e. the interpretation

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of religion is held to be religion. The profoundly heretical nature of this view emerges when one realizes that fundamentalism acts as if the ultimate and last interpretation of Islam has been (or could be) reached, which rests on the implicit postulation that theologians (‘ulama) are capable of producing sacred and thus indisputable knowledge. Thus the logocentric character of the knowledge implied in the Qur’an has been transformed into a nomothetic one. While the former focuses on the ‘truth,’ the latter underlines an ‘identity.’ Different claims of truth are possible to come together to attain a common denominator, but this is barely possible if one’s aim is to establish totally different identity. The nomothetic ingredients within the logocentric systems can create this identity. To a controllable extent, this nomothetic character is allowed, but if it dominates the logocentric side – the search for the truth and common good – then the clash of identities commences. It would be helpful to remember that the source of nomothetic elements in Islam is the sayings of the prophet Muhammad, rather than the Qu’ranic text.

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Scholarly tradition throughout the centuries – whether of a philosophical, theological, or mystical orientation – has stressed the centrality of knowledge in Islam in the strongest terms. Books by the finest scholars of Islam on the question of ‘knowledge,’ in which one finds a long list of quotations from the first centuries of Islam, all insist on the significance of the pursuit of knowledge and learning as a lifelong endeavor and as humanity's truest accomplishment. By contrast, the sole knowledge dear to Muslim fundamentalists is the knowledge of ritual and legal obligations; it is the knowledge of ‘things to be done.’ Their Islam corresponds to what Abdulkarim Soroush calls the “Islam of identity." Accordingly, what Souroush deplores most in today's Muslim world at large, not just in fundamentalism, is the loss of the "Islam of truth": I believe that the Islam of identity should yield to the Islam of truth. The latter can coexist with other truths; the former, however, is, by its very nature, belligerent and bellicose. It is the Islam of war, not the Islam of peace. Two identities would fight each other, while two truths would cooperate.2

3. Neo-Orientalism, Essentialism and Contingencies about Scripture and Muslim Behavior If we observe the social and political debate in modern-day Muslims, we can see that this has produced two schools of thought, whose members, through their reciprocal denigrating formula, have been termed ‘Neo-Orientalists’ and ‘Apologists.’ So, following such a Manichaean division, those suggesting that Islam leads to extremism have been classified as neo-Orientalists by those who deny that extremists are real Muslims; the neo-Orientalist has claimed that this latter position was nothing other than apologetic. These both are the essentialist view of Islam. This distinction is to be rejected, because it is produced by political interests dealing with the Middle East crisis and in particular, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.



2 Forough Jahanbakhsh, "Abdolkarim Soroush: New 'Revival of Religious Sciences,"' ISIM Newsletter 8 (2001), p. 21.

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It could mislead us to hold the idea that the behavior of Muslims through all centuries and countries can be explained primarily by reference solely to their belief system, which can be conceptualized as ‘essentialism.’ ‘Essentialists’ are those who argue that the Islamic world was dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meanings, to be understood through the texts of Islam and the language it generated. By contrast, as Halliday describes them, ‘contingencists’ (such as Espositio) reject any universalistic framework and prefer to focus on the ‘contingent’ realities that exist in each Islamic country or sociopolitical situation.3 Essentialism is ‘an ontology which stands outside the sphere of cultural influence and historical changes.’ To this explanation, there is something within the Islamic faith that assumes axiomatic behavior for its members. Although there are axiomatic rules, they do not interpret themselves; on the contrary, they are interpreted in different times and in different cultures. Essentialists discuss Islam but ignore Muslims and, in particular, their identities. Identity is an emotional commitment through which people experience their autobiographical selves. This could explain why those Muslims who do not practice, or even respect the basic rules of Islam (such as drinking alcohol, gambling, etc.) still define themselves as Muslim.

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Essentialism is, to some extent, correct. If the people are religious, those everyday terms will in some way be influenced by their religious convictions, for it is in the nature of faith to claim effective sovereignty over human behavior, but here the scripture with its symbols dominates believers and it is not likely to hear the voice of religion nor the believers. We must admit that Islam could have more than one interpretation. Muslims in different geographies are not pure products of their religion. If so, the best Muslim could not be other than a Muslim extremist who claims the literal structure of scripture. Gellner claims that Muslims have some ideological cards, the crucial ones of which are: scriptural faith, a completed one (the final edition, so to speak) is available, and there is no room for further accretion or for new prophets; also, there is no warrant for clergy and hence for religious differentiation; and, third, there is no need to differentiate between Church and State (between ‘what is God’s’ and ‘what is Caesar’s’) since it began as a religion of rapidly successful conquerors who soon were the state … The consequences of all this is that the trans-social standard which judges the social is a Book, and not Church.4 Gellner has presented Islam as something historically unique and overlooked the role that Muslim scholars play within the disparate Muslim traditions. It is true that Muslims do not have a centralized and hierarchical church, but it is equally true that the Qur’an cannot interpret itself. Sociopolitical and cultural dynamics mark the relationships between single Muslim believers and ‘the Book.’ This is what shows us the discrepancies among Muslim countries. ‘Neo-Orientalist’ and ‘Apologetic’ positions generate much hot air, so a third middle ground is needed – a cultural comprehension of Islam which will enable



3 Fred Halliday, “Review Article: ‘The Politics of Islam’ – A Second Look,” British Journal of Political Sciences 25(3) (1995), p. 401. 4 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 100-101.

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observers to see that different cultural milieus are not but the field in which the scripture casts its seeds and, according to this local atmosphere, it harvests its products. Hodgson has suggested that a third way may be developed, combining the essentialists’ and the contingencists’ paradigms, to conclude that the main feature of any Muslim philosophy is to achieve the Islamic ideal.

4. Subordinating Scripture to the Politics: The Position of Islamists versus ‘Ulam (Muslim Scholars)

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Contemporary fundamentalism owes much of its success to Islam’s scholarly vacuum. Whereas weakened scholarship throughout the Muslim world has allowed the rise of fundamentalism, one needs to pay attention to the eminent danger coming from leading fundamentalists who are aiming to disable entirely the Islamic scholarly tradition, realizing all too well the threat that this tradition represents to fundamentalism’s violent anti-Western ideology and generally to its attempt at controlling and manipulating Muslim societies.5 For more than a century, religion has been transformed into ideology by some Muslims, a tendency that is called Islamism: those whose agenda is politics rather than intellectualism or search for truth. This has been so because ideology provided them a symbolic framework through which social reality can be reconstructed, maintained, and manipulated. These are barely possible through religious language or within religious tradition so they first transfer religion into ideology and popularize its language to attract people. This was the case in Marxism and Islam. As Karl Marx transferred Maccabian Jewish terminology into Marxism to support the bourgeois and the proletariat, these ideologues transferred some Qur’anic terminology like ‘weak and oppressed’6 into ideology to exploit. It is not surprising that some ideologues know Marxism or other ideologies far better than Islam. As John Esposito has argued: “some people manipulate Islam as a political tool in order to change their societies or oppose ‘imperialism.’”7 In this progression, in order to prevent religion from being exploited politically, some scholars have highlighted that there must be a clear-cut division between religion and politics. For example, Ali Abdel-Rziq, an Azhar judge, accurately sparked a heated discussion in 1925, which is still alive even now, on whether Islam is a ‘religion that has a political character’ or not. In a re-interpretation style, he quoted numerous Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions to argue that Prophet Muhammad only had ‘authority as a prophet’ and not dominions as ‘king’ or ‘caliph’ and that he established ‘religious unity’ and not a ‘political state.’ Abd el-Raziq’s position is quite similar to traditional fiqh opinions that made political leadership (immah) ‘an obligation based on rationality (bi al-‘aql) rather than revealed knowledge (bi al-shar’). The hot debate after Prophet Muhammad’s death of whom to appoint as the ruler of the Madina city-

 5

Tamara Albertini, “The Seductiveness of Certainity: The Destruction of Islam’s Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists,” Philosophy East and West 53(4) (Oct. 2003), pp. 455-470. 6 Sûra Nisa 4:75, 97, 98, and 127. 7 For details, see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality? (Oxford University Press, 1999); see also John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. IX. Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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state also signifies the fact that leadership in Islam is not religiously-based matter, but rather it is left to the community itself. More than anything else, the Islamists, rather than taking religion as something individual, seek to implement Islamic law through the agency of the state. Not all are willing to resort to violent means in pursuit of this end. Many, such as Yusuf alQaradw, a highly influential Islamist and one of the most prominent ‘ulam of contemporary Islam, profess democratic commitments. However, whatever the stance toward either democracy or violence, the public implementation of the shari’a is at the heart of all Islamism, in both its Shi’i and Sunni forms. This suggests an important contrast with many among the ‘ulam. Since the first centuries of Islam, the ‘ulama have often sought to maintain a careful distance from the ruling elite, jealously guarding their institutions and practices from governmental interference. The ‘ulam generally recognized that the functioning of legal and other Islamic institutions presupposed the existence of a Muslim government but they defined a legitimate government as one that oversaw the implementation of shari’a norms. They have typically understood the government’s commitment to the sharia’ to mean that the ruler defended the borders of the polity, regulated public morality, suppressed heretics, and appointed those proficient in legal matters to implement the law.8

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In their passion to refute secularism, some writers and thinkers of the present age have gone so far as to characterize politics and government as the true objective of Islam, the reason why the prophets were sent, indeed the very reason for the creation of the human being. And they have not only given other Islamic commandments – for instance, on matters of worship – a secondary position, they have even deemed them to be mere means for political ends, just a way of training people (toward political mobilization).9 More than anything else, Islamists seek to implement Islamic law through the agency of the state, which amounts to nothing less than making religious norms subservient to political goals. In order to differentiate religious aims from those of state, Muslim methodologists like Ibn Qutayba, Qarafî and Shah Wali Ullah have underlined the two aspects of Prophet Muhammad: Muhammad as prophet and Muhammad as head of state; the former signifies his religious side and the latter his ruler side. To this scholar, these two must be differentiated from each other; while the former has a binding religious character over Muslims, the latter does not. The fact that the rhetoric of Islam is not clear enough on these topics created a gap to be bridged by some figures. Most Islamists including Hasan al-Bannâ, Sayyid Qutub, Mawdudî, and bin Laden have no formal scholarly credentials in religious matters. A deliberate blurring of distinctions is likewise evident in the statement of the Sudanese Islamist Hasan alTurab (b. 1932). Because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, and a jurist are all ‘ulama; this could be the reason why al-Turab



8 Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton University Press, 2009), p.11; Patricia Crone, God’s Rule – Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 286-314. 9 M. Taqi Uthmani,, “Hakim al-ummat ke siyasi afkar,” in Islam awr siyasat (Muhammad Ishak Multani, ed., undated), as quoted by Zaman, p. 12.

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supported the decision of the Sudanese dictatorship to execute Muslim scholar Mahmoud Muhammad Tah. They perceived Th’s ideas to be a threat to theirs, because Th emphasized the Makkan period of Muhammad, which is not political and considered it to be the very core of Islam, and not Madina, the political period of Islam.10 Mahmoud Muhammad Th is the anti-Qutb and his approach is crucial to conceive the scripture and its relationship to current issues. Th, like Qutb, was hanged by the dictatorship; he was executed in 1985 for sedition and apostasy after protesting the imposition of Sharia in Sudan by President Jaafar al-Nimeiri. In death, Th became something rare in contemporary Islam. His method of reconciling Muslim belief with Twentieth-Century values was, in its way, every bit as revolutionary as the contrary vision of Qutb. The real drama in Islam is the essential dilemma addressed by Th: how to revive ancient sacred texts in a way that allows one to live in the modern world.

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To Th, the Koran was revealed to Muhammad in two phases — first in Mecca, where for thirteen years he and his followers were a besieged minority, and then in Medina, where the Prophet established Islamic rule in a city filled with Jews and pagans. The Meccan verses are addressed, through Muhammad, to humanity in general and are saturated with a spirit of freedom and equality; according to Th, they present Islam in its perfect form, as the Prophet lived it, through exhortation rather than threat. In Th’s most important book, The Second Message of Islam (published in 1967, with the dedication “To humanity!”), he writes that the lives of the “early Muslims” in Mecca “were the supreme expression of their religion and consisted of sincere worship, kindness, and peaceful coexistence with all other people.”11 As Th puts it in The Second Message of Islam, whereas Muhammad propagated “verses of peaceful persuasion” during his Meccan period, in Medina “the verses of compulsion by the sword prevailed.”12 The Medinan verses are full of rules, coercion, and threats, including the orders for jihad, and in Th’s view they were a historical adaptation to the reality of life in a Seventh-Century Islamic city-state, in which “there was no law except the sword.” At one point, Th writes that two modest decrees of the Meccan verses – “You are only a reminder, you have no dominion over them” – were appended with a harsh Medinan edict: “Except he who shuns and disbelieves, on whom God shall inflict the greatest suffering.” In his distinctive rhetorical style, which combines dense exegesis with humanistic uplift, Th observed, “It is as if God had said: ‘We have granted you, Muhammad, dominion over anyone who shuns and disbelieves, so that God shall subject him to minor suffering at your hands through fighting, then God shall also subject him to the greatest suffering in hell.’ . . . Thus the first two verses were abrogated or repealed by the two second verses.” However, I have to add something to Th’s remarks: first, it was not jihad but qital that was ordered in Medina. Jihad was ordered in Mecca. As I will underline, jihad does not mean a military action, unlike qital which requires an organized body to attack, defend a land, or expand it. Qital is related to land, while jihad is related to the

 10

For details, see Mahmud Muhammad Th, The Second Message of Islam (Syracuse University Press, 1987). 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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individuals or the community which does not require any communal action or attack. As it was put forward by Mtürd, jihad contains all efforts before qital/war and war itself. Secondly, he is talking about the abrogation of some Meccan verses by Medinan ones. Most theologians have rejected this abrogation and claim that every single verse in the Qur’an is functional and authoritative so it is baseless to say that while in Mecca Muslims were not strong so the verses were defensive, but in Medina they became strong and accordingly offensive verses needed and all these abrogated the formers. Willingly or unwillingly, this doctrine of abrogation is nothing but eradication of many humanistic, self regarding, gentle and considerate styles the Holy Scripture has in its very nature. The Medinan verses, directed not to Muhammad alone but to the community of early believers, became the basis for sharia as it was developed by legal scholars over the next few centuries – what Th calls the “first message of Islam.” In Th’s revisionist reading, the elevation of the Madinan verses was only a historical postponement – the Meccan verses, representing the ideal religion, would be revived when humanity had reached a stage of development capable of accepting them, ushering in a renewed Islam based on freedom and equality. Th quoted a hadith, or saying of the Prophet, that declared, “Islam started as a stranger, and it shall return as a stranger in the same way it started.” This “second message of Islam” is higher and better than the first, delivered by a messenger who came to seventh-century Arabia, in a sense, from the future. And, in the Twentieth Century, the time had come for Muslims finally to receive it. Th offered a hermeneutical way out of the modern crisis of Islam, allowing Muslims to affirm their faith without having to live by an inhumane code.13

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5. How and Why Does Islamism Find Ground: Para-mosque Structures and Their Development To avoid a unilateral evaluation, one must seek out the reasons why some Muslims militarize themselves in view of internal and external circumstances. There are some events that became catalysts for the deep frustrations of Muslims. The denigrated image of the prophet, for example, has a particular emotional value for Muslims, in particular when they are of South Asian origin. The perception that there have been different treatments of the three monotheistic religions triggers their frustration. To them, European antiblasphemy laws protect Christians and Jews but not Muslims. They felt they were the children of a lesser god. Exclusionary and repressive political environments in their home country force Islamists to undergo a near universal process of radicalization, which has been witnessed by so many rebellious movements but why they transform Islam into a means of rebellion is something else to be questioned.

 13

For more detail, see George Packer, “The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam,” The New Yorker (11 September 2006), available at http://www.newyorker.com/ archive/2006/09/11/060911fa _fact1 (last visited Sep. 28, 2012).

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Although the West, and most remarkably Europe, may be less Christian today, Muslims still view it as the ‘Christian West.’ For a thousand years, from the days of Muhammad in the Seventh Century, Islam enjoyed a run of victorious conquest, interrupted only temporarily by the Christian Crusades. The time of conquest lasted until the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. After Vienna, and most dramatically under Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Western colonialism, Islam was sidelined from history – one of the main sources of the rage and resentment of today's jihadists. The events of 9/11 have increasingly convinced some non-Muslims that Islam, as a faith, is incompatible with ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization.’ On the other hand, some Muslims strongly believe that the West has rejected and attacked Islam, not only as a religion but also as an identity. The fact is that the majority of contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims tend to be mediated by stereotypes which does not help reciprocal understanding, but instead facilitates reciprocal mistrust. This has recently caused a growing number of Muslims to experience imposed or self-imposed cultural and geographical ghettoization, which has a negative effect on both sides of the issue, Muslim and non-Muslim. Although Muslims are not rejected completely, they are still perceived as ‘alien,’ ‘different’ and ‘not ordinary’ citizens; the Western institutions still perceive them to be a peculiar population that needs to be ‘placed in the new world order.’

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Kepel writes that “[i]nstead of pushing young people away from Islamist organizations, the explosions of 9/11 created a vortex into which some young European Muslims were drawn.”14 Accordingly, some Muslims living in Western countries have developed a monolithic and ideological representation of ‘the West’ and, by contrast, a self-representation of their identity as monolithically Muslim. Therefore it is not surprising that the concept of jihad has developed an independent life beyond the classical theological Islamic understanding of it.15 To answer these questions, the mass media, politicians and often academics have focused on the political issues, on the alleged ‘clash of civilizations,’ on the failure of multiculturalism, the invasion of Iraq, the alienation of Muslims, the social ghettoization of young South Asians, and the radical preachers and imams. All these factors might be the tiles of a complex mosaic, but still do not explain why the mosaic itself exists; why certain individuals, who profess themselves to be Muslim, have decided to kill themselves and innocent people in the name of jihad. Why do some Muslims understand jihad to be murder while the majority rejects such a view? In order to create an unconventional framework for the political side of Islam and to resist all these distortions, a very interesting plan has been implemented. This was the ‘para-mosque’ structure that paved the way to propagating an alternative dimension to its classical religious and spiritual dimension. An alternative to the traditional mosque structures, newly-born independent mosques could serve extremism, an example of which was seen in the contemporary Islam in Egypt and Pakistan, i.e. Hasan al-Bann’ and Abul A’l Mawdud. These two deliberately bypassed the mosque and founded their own agencies.

 14 15

Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Belknap Harvard, 2004), p. 271. Gabriele Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam (Berg Publishers, 2006), p. 9.

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Hasan al-Bann felt that “sermons of the mosque would not suffice to curb the ever-growing evil” of Cairo and, as a consequence, he began to send out teams of students to preach fundamentalist Islam in coffeehouses; these young people thus formed an embryonic para-mosque organization that later resulted in the Ikhwn alMuslimn. Mawdud felt himself forced against his will to establish this sort of institution: We have been compelled to form this organization as a last resort. For years I have been calling Muslims to turn away from the wrong paths and to concentrate their efforts on the mission entrusted to them by God. If all Muslims had accepted this call, all of whom would have constituted one single organization, an organization which would have enjoyed the status of al-Jama’ah.16

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As a matter of fact, doctrinally Islam permits people to exercise this kind of authority without assigning it ‘religious.’ The clergy-laity division is not intrinsic to Islam, so sometimes lay people assume religious authority and refer to the scripture with out-of-context quotations, which distort and degenerate the very holistic meaning of the text. Some imams are forced, especially in the United States and in Europe, to assume multiple roles besides being the imam. Demands for instruction in Islam, for ‘pastoring’ to a congregation, many of whose members may be having difficulties adjusting to a new culture, for visiting the sick and bereaved, and providing family counseling, all press the imam to enlarge the scope of his functions. Since non-Muslim countries lack the foregoing institutions and personnel, the mosque must assume functions for which it was not originally designed and the imam must fulfill roles for which he receives no training. The American masjid is a multiplex institution, combining prayer room, educational center, political forum, social hall, informal law court, and counseling clinic, all under one roof. The imam assumes the role of educator, administrator, accountant, fund-raiser, political agitator, informal lawyer, and counselor. No man can effectively perform so many functions, assuming, of course, that there is even one imam for every mosque. The transformation of the mosque into an ‘Islamic center’ has allowed it to meet certain needs but has at the same time has weakened its specifically religious character. Some Muslim institutions in America are indistinguishable from a local ‘country club’ or ‘lodge,’ along with the corresponding ethnicity, typical of most, which serves to strengthen this image. In some instances dance halls have been added.17 The dissolution of the caliphate is also used as justification for the founding of para-mosque organizations. If this institution had remained intact, it could perhaps have assumed a position analogous to that of the Roman Catholic bureaucracy and individual activist organizations could have been subjected to its authority, just as the monastic orders submitted to the authority of the papacy. Since such a possibility no longer exists, Muslims are left to their own devices.18



16 Sayyid Abul Mawdud, Witnesses unto Mankind: The Purpose and Duty of the Muslim ‘ummah’ (2nd ed., Khurrum Murad, trans., The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp. 73-74. 17 Larry Poston, Islamic Da’wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 96. 18 Ibid, p. 97.

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6. Jihad versus Qital (war) in the Contemporary Context Starting from an ancient, but still relevant, discourse which still animates the Muslim as well as non-Muslim debate: is jihad a holy war? Although the majority of Muslims emphatically reject such an axiom, we must recognize that historically a straightforward answer does not exist in Muslim mind. At some prior time in history, the Islamic states had to face a difficult decision: to interpret the Qur’anic teaching so that any imperialistic aspirations had to be renounced or to venture into philosophical and theological sophism and combine earthly desires with Allah’s injunctions. Muslim leaders in history have a privileged political interpretation of jihad over the spiritual elements of Islam. Jihad cannot be understood outside the historical contexts and events. The term jihad is derived from the Arabic root jhd, to ‘strive.’ The same jhd serves as the root for other verbs emphasizing effort and struggle to achieve perfection in difficult tasks. Unsurprisingly, ijtihad, meaning ‘to strive for understanding and interpreting the Qur’an for novel conditions,’ has the same jihad root. Jihad certainly represents a sense of totalizing effort. In the Qur’an there are many examples in which such effort (e.g. economic, psychological and physical) has been required by the new-born Muslim community.19 So jihad has a totally diverse meaning from qital or harb.

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At a purely linguistic level, we should recognize that holy war in Arabic would sound like harb al-muqaddasah rather than jihad. Neither in the Qur’an nor in the hadiths (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) can we find such an expression. The term Qur’an uses in terms of war is oital and it has its own framework to be determined. As a spiritual and practical guide for the Muslims, Qur’an has war as a theme. PreIslamic Arabic societies had developed a sophisticated military terminology, such as sira’ (combat), ma’raka (battle), harb (war) and qital (killing). In the Qur’an the specific term harb is rarely used and qital is used only thirty-four times but not always with reference in killing one’s enemies. For instance, qital is often found in verses that impose on human beings a respect for life in general. So, we can read: “Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah has been to you most Merciful.”20 “If any one slay a person –unless it be for murder or spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slay the whole people”21 and again; “Take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of justice and law.”22 In these verses, qital seems to be used in a way that rejects arbitrary killing. In terms of war, the Qur’an forbids useless violence, preserves civilians, and expressly dictates strict codes of conduct and engagement. Even in the case of war, Muslims have to restrict their aim to ‘justice.’

 19

Sûrah 2:218; 4:95; 22:78; and 25:53. Sûra Nis 4:29. 21 Sûra Mida 5:32. 22 Sûra An’m 6:151. 20

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All Muslims agree that the Qur’an allows Muslims to fight in two main circumstances: self-defense and to maintain their right to worship. In the following verse, the technical term is yuqtelne (those against whom war is made), which is passive voice. That means war can be waged only if a community is attacked: “To those against whom war is made, permission is given to right, because they are wronged; and verily God is Most Powerful for their aid.”23 And the following verse gives much more detail about the reasons for war: They are those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, for no cause except that they say “Our Lord is God”. If God did not check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure … .24 One of the most worn and misread Qur’anic verses quoted to support the violent concept of jihad is: “And wage war (slay) (qtul) them wherever you catch them”. 25 Often the second part of the verse, with its historical and timely context is omitted by both Muslim extremists and anti-Islamic rhetoricians: “and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter.” The context of the verse is war time. Here we can see much misreading, misinterpretation and ignorance on this verse.

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It is a mistake to translate ‘jihad’ constantly as ‘fighting for the cause of Allah.’ In the Qur’an it is clear that jihad is not related to fighting, rather qital is used in this regard. But the sayings of the prophet Muhammad regarding jihad have been translated as ‘fighting.’ Sahih al-Bukhari, traditionally the most trusted book after the Qur’an, is the main source of this mistranslation. In its fifty-second book e.g. chapter on ‘jihad,’ the book equated the meaning of jihad as ‘fighting’. Ali al-Qr has argued that there are two kinds of jihad: the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) and the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar). Then another sub-categorization takes place and the greater jihad is divided into the jihad of the heart (jihad al-kalb), jihad of the tongue (jihad al-kalima) and jihad of the hand (jihad bi-al-yad). ‘Jihad of the heart’ represents the struggle of the personal soul against worldly temptations in order to achieve spiritual purity. When Muslims reach this level, they may conduct ‘the jihad of the tongue’ by preaching Islam. Only when Islam is threatened and as a last resort, may Muslims conduct the jihad of hand or sword. It is important to be reminded that the Qur’an does not mention any of these categories. They are just theological products that reflect historical Muslim mind. There are some other categories or connotations of jihad like mujahada and mujadala. Mujahada and mujadala could be taken as sub-categories of jihad, for after mujahada (self-discipline) one could be ready for mujadala, which is a dialectics, discussion and diplomacy: to strive to find a solution or to create much better as it is said in the Qur’an,:

 23 24 25

Sûra Hajj 22:39. Sûra Hajj 22:40. Sûra Baqara 2:191.

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“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious…”26 “And do not dispute with the People of the Book except in a way that is better, save with such of them who are unjust…”27 As has been seen, the Holy Scripture does not equate the People of the Book. While it classifies some of them as the equivalent people who do discuss and talk to generate what is better (mujadala); on the one hand, it labels some of them as iniquitous or evil with whom any discussion seems to yield no any result. And another category which seems connected to jihad is qital (war), but they do not have any association. Because while jihad is encouraged, qital is permitted under compulsory conditions, that is on condition that the fundamental rights of any community are violated and in case of self-defense.

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While the two stages of jihad, namely mujahada and mujadala are encouraged, qital (war) is permitted, but it is not encouraged. Jihad is encouraged mostly in the Qur’anic verses revealed in Mecca where there was no organized community to attack or to be attacked militarily. So the verses regarding jihad should not be taken out of a military context. Yet war limited to self-defense was hardly the dream of any medieval king. So, the contradiction between the Eighth Century military expansion of Islam and the Islamic injunctions against unjust, unprovoked wars became visible.28 Muslim scholars were required by their rulers to resolve such a contradiction to allow expansionistic wars. Despite a famous hadith narrating how the Prophet Muhammad emphasized “The best jihad is to speak a word of truth to a tyrant,” we can easily understand how many Muslim scholars preferred to favor their rulers’ earthly desires rather than their theological beliefs. Heck is very right when he observes ‘[t]he Umayyad logic of state had profound and lasting effects on the Islamic conception of jihad: jihad as the tool of a state oriented towards expansion and became itself conceived as a tool in the service of territorial expansion, rather than a religious struggle at the level of devotion to God’s cause.’29 The term ‘jihad’ evokes differing sentiments. For some observers, it conveys the idea of the fanatical Arab horseman, galloping wildly into battle with unsheathed sword flashing in the sun, offering men and women the choice of accepting Muslim religious traditions or death. Students of Islamic history, on the other hand, have tended in recent years to follow the thinking of T.W. Arnold, who downplayed the militant ideas connected with the term and sought to portray Muslims as political liberators who were welcomed with open arms by the oppressed masses of the Middle East and North Africa.30 It goes without saying that it is not the injunction of the Qur’an that one must fight for the spreading of Islam. Bukhri records the hadith “wal-da’wah qabla al-qatl” (“the invitation to Islam is essential before declaring war”). According to Rudolph Peters, this doctrine is based

 26

Sûra Nahl 16:125. Sûra Anqabût 29:46. 28 Paul L. Heck, “Jihad Revised”, Journal of Religious Ethics 32(1) (2004), pp. 95-128. 29 Ibid, p. 108. 30 Poston, Islamic Da’wah in the West, p. 13. 27

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upon Sûras 17:15 and 16:125. “We never send our wrath until we send an apostle to give a warning.”31 The function of the summons is to inform the enemy that the Muslims do not fight them for worldly reasons, like to subject them and take their property, but that their motive is a religious one, the strengthening Islam.”32 In a similar context, Imam Mâturîdî articulates that jihad comes before declaring war and it includes all intellectual arguments, proofs and discussions which are intended to convince the rival to ensure the peace.33

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In short, the entire program of Muslim expansion may be interpreted as a measure by means of which the world may be made safe for Islamicity. Jihad in its proper meaning could mean the conditions in which people will be receptive. According to the Islamic theory of jihad, political subjugation was not an end in itself but rather a way to a greater end, whatever the motivation of particular individuals may have been. The political conquests were designed to create a milieu, an environment in which the Muslim faith could be planted, tended and harvested. Nehemia Levtzion notes that even modern Muslim historians stress “the role of temporal power in creating a total Islamic environment as a precondition of the fostering of the right attitude, a state of mind in individuals.”34 Mervin Hiskett pointed out that “military conquest cannot, of itself, force men to abandon their beliefs and ideas. But the Muslim political authorities can set up the institutions which, given time, will persuade them or pressure them into doing so.”35 Of supreme importance was the establishment of contact between the non-Muslim population and adherents of the Islamic faith. This was retarded somewhat by the early tendency to isolate the Muslim warriors in specially built towns such as Basra, Kfa, Fustat and Qayrawn. These garrison cities were built for the purpose of keeping the Muslim warriors from intermingling too quickly and too freely with the local populations, thus minimizing the risk that the new religion would be absorbed by indigenous traditions. Hodgson adds another reason for this tactic: “Centered on its mosque and kept in order by its commander, each garrison town formed a selfsufficient Muslim community, dominating and living from the district under its military control; in the process it molded its own people into an Islamic pattern.”36 Some Muslims use the notion of war to bifurcate the world into two distinct parts: that part of the world under the domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) versus the rest of the world which is referred to as the domain of perpetual war (dar al-harb). Roughly speaking, it has been accepted that the mandate of Islam is to expand the domain of Islam until there is no longer perpetual war in the world and the way in which Muslims are to perform this fundamental obligation is to wage jihad. However, this division was reasonable when the world did not have a multicultural, multireligious and multi-ethnic structure. Britain or Germany was referred as the Christendom in the past; that meant the land of Christianity. Today how can we refer these countries as Christendom while

 31

Sûra Isra 17:15 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton De Gruyter, 1979), p. 18. 33 Mâtürîdî, Ta’vîlâtu’l-Qur’an (Bekir Topalo lu, 2005-2011) p. VI:342. 34 Nehemia Levtzion, “Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization,” in Conversion to Islam (Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), p. 11. 35 Mervin Hiskett, as cited by Levtzion in ibid. 36 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. I:209. 32

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ignoring the millions of different cultural and religious groups living there? Or how can Muslims call these countries as dar al-harb (the domain of perpetual war or a candidate for a perpetual war), at least, without considering the Muslim population over there? It is unfortunate that today with regard to jihad, mostly political analysts take the podium. One reason why some Muslims have associated jihad with violence, while the great majority reject this, is its being part of any political jargon. The jargon political analysts use creates a ‘circle of panic,’ in which an increasing number of many Western Muslims are becoming trapped. This ‘circle of panic’ has developed within the Muslim community as an undefined concept which has usually been referred to when any event takes place like jihad. Overlooking the ethical dimension of this term, many identify it with war. In this case, the rumor spreading among Muslims says that an imagined monolithic ‘West’ wishes to wipe out Islam, and consequently, Muslim identities. This so-called threat may affect the emotions of certain Muslims to the degree that they feel ‘an act of identity’ to be required in order to maintain a stable experience of their self. Because of the ‘circle of panic’, a certain rhetoric of jihad could easily become the preferred ‘act of identity’.

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7. Suicide Bombers and Hot Debates about the (Un)justification of Their Acts The suicide bombers who are striking Western and non-Western cities use religious language, affirm religious identities and see the world through specific religious interpretation. Could we leave religion aside and take the matter as political, economical, or otherwise.? Or do we have to blame Islam, the religion itself, like nicknamed neo-Orientalists who claim that Islam prevented Muslims from enjoying modernization and left them in the dark times of Middle Age? To them, to understand 9/11 and recent 7/7 attacks, we need to go back to medieval interpretations and to thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya. These extreme essentialist viewpoints have facilitated odd arguments, such as the claim that Muslims are conducting jihad because they wish to transform non-Muslims into dhimmi. Although sometimes it has been observed that this rhetoric is used by militant Islam, it would be extremely naïve to believe that behind such Islamic rhetoric there could exist in medieval minds, which were quite intellectual and rational at the time. As a matter of fact, Islamists mostly do not support suicide bombings. In an "Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI," 38 distinguished Islamic religious authorities from Turkey, Egypt, Russia, Syria, Kosovo, Bosnia and Uzbekistan, delicately criticized some acts of Muslim terrorism, such as the killing of a nun in Somalia, but failed to address the relationship between religion and politics in Islam, or whether the "maintenance of sovereignty" includes, as radical jihadists claim, the violent reconquest of Western lands that were once Muslim.37 Whether out of conviction or fear of being targeted by terrorists, the 38 did not frontally reject the linkage between violence and the advance of Islam. It seems that Muslims of today still have a problem in understanding the relationship between faith and coercion. Violence is the enemy of reason. Violence has no place in the advancing of religion.

 37

“Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI,” available at http://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/ ACommonWordLetter.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2012).

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Similarly in an interview with Shaikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (2001), he says:

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As for considering these acts (suicide bombings) as possible means to be used against U.S. policy – or any other policy, for that matter – we do not support this from an Islamic point of view. The reason we do not support is not because we do not believe in applying pressure on America, but because it is not right to pressure the American administration by targeting the American people, or others who reside there or who are visitors there, like those people who were working at the World Trade Center or visiting it. The Qur’anic precepts states: No bearer of burdens should bear the burden of another.” This applies to all those victims who were not connected to the American administration or to any of its policies, not because they were Americans, but because they were Americans who were not aware of the issues of U.S. foreign policy. This is why it is not permissible, on the basis of the shari’a, or jurisprudentially, to commit such acts. This we declared immediately after the events in order to clarify that authentic Islamic values reject this and consider it terrorism, not martyrdom. Regardless of whatever good motives those who committed these acts may have had for doing what they did, these are wrong methods, in disharmony with Islamic thought. This is why it is wrong for anyone to consider this jihad, as jihad is not practiced in this manner.38 Similarly other scholars reject suicide bombings as un-Islamic. The 9/11 suicide attacks sparked significant debate in the Islamic world about the merits of suicide attacks.39 Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id al-Tantaw, head of Cairo's Al-Azhar, the most prestigious university for Sunni jurisprudence, declared that the Shari‘a rejects all attempts on taking human life, and Sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah al-Sabîl, a member of the Saudi Council of Islamic Clerics and imam at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, decried the suicide attacks on the basis that Islamic law forbids killing civilians, and suicide while protecting Jews and Christians.40

 38

Euben and Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, p. 405. Haim Malka, "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks," Middle East Quarterly X(2) (Spring 2003), pp. 19-28. 40 Closely associated with the discussion is the matter of the Muslims relationship with Christians, Jews, Hindus, Budhists and those who associate them with God, whom the Qur’an designates “People of the Book (ahl al-kitab). This subject is particularly important when the countries with high numbers of Christian and Jewish people are concerned. Due to ambiguities existing in the Qur’anic text and later traditions, Muslims have experienced difficulty in determining the exact status of these people. Traditional Muslim understanding has not required the conversion of Jews or Christians to Islam, but has rather accorded them a somewhat nebulous position as ahl al-dhimma (“protected persons”). In return for paying jizya, those people were left to themselves in religious matters. (In its classical meaning jizya means compensation. The derived meaning, which became the technical meaning, was a poll-tax levied from those who did not accept Islam, but were willing to live under the protection of Islam. There was no amount fixed for it and in any case it was merely symbolical – an acknowledgment that those whose religion was tolerated would in their turn not interfere with Islam. Imam Shafi’ suggests one dinar per year, which would be the Arabian gold dinar at the time. But to my understanding, the Qur’anic term jizya was misinterpreted as a permanent tax, it was just a war compensation paid only once. Sometimes it is discussed whether Muslims have the right to intervene in the affairs of Ahl al-Kitap. The limit of this, if at all, is that Muslims are advised to call upon Ahl al-Kitab come to the universal concept of unity of God, to live a moral life and to cooperate on the common good. This calls upon the common denomination among religions. As Sûra Al-i Imrn 3:64 mentions: “Say: “O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you that we worship none but God, that we associate no 39

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Conclusion Clearly, Muslims are genuinely appalled by the brutality of terrorist acts and some are going the extra mile to make sure their condemnation is made loud enough, and is repeated enough, so that they can be heard by the deafest of their critics. The fatwa issued by the Religious Council of North America, supported by major Muslim organizations, is the latest effort in this regard. The strong stand taken by American Muslim leaders against indiscriminate violence is a testimony of the remarkable maturity and the clarity of vision in dealing with a complex issue. The loud condemnation of terrorism is important to cut through the anti-Islam rhetoric and to reassure the public that Muslims reject indiscriminate violence and the killing of innocent civilians. Muslim leaders must continue to speak against violence, brutality, and injustice, as they reject terrorism and indiscriminate violence against civilians to demand that the Islamic respect for the sanctity of human life and the Islamic injunction against the killing of innocents be strictly observed. However, this is not enough. Muslim leaders must go beyond the condemnation of terrorism to become more active in exposing the roots of violence, hatred, and terrorism. They must reject exclusivist ideologies that privilege particular religious or ethnic communities whether it takes the form of Jewish, Christian, or Muslim exclusivism. Moreover, the religious precepts that promise people chaos and disorder about the end of the world (eschatology) must be revised and reinterpreted with common sense; a ‘theology of hope’ is to be created to assure serenity and peace on earth. The following verse from the Holy Qur’an that equates the killing of one single innocent person with the killing of a whole people while saving one is the same as saving the whole, must be a spiritual guide for all:

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If anyone killed a person – unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he killed the whole people. And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people… .41 A verse from Bible must be taken as a spiritual guide for all who desire a peace created by all through common sense and good will: “Blessed are peacemakers.”42

Bibliography Albertini, Tamara, “The Seductiveness of Certainity: The Destruction of Islam’s Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists”, Philosophy East and West 53(4) (2003). Crone, Patricia, God’s Rule – Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Columbia University Press, 2004). Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality? (Oxford Univ. Press, 1999). Esposito John L., Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).

 partners with Him, that ve erect no from among ourselves lords and patrons other than God…” And Sûra Nahl 16:125: “Invite all to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious…” The preaching must not be dogmatic, self-regarding, or offensive, but instead gentle, and considerate. The manners and arguments should not be acrimonious, but modeled on the most courteous and the most gracious example for a universal conscious. 41 Sûra Mida 5:35. 42 Mathew 5:9.

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Euben, Roxanne L. and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton University Press, 2009). Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society (Cambridge University Press, 1981). Halliday, Fred, “Review Article: ‘The Politics of Islam’ – A Second Look,” British Journal of Political Sciences 25(3) (1995). Heck, Paul L., “Jihad Revised,” Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (1) (2004). Hodgson, Marshall G. S. , The Venture of Islam (University of Chicago Press, 1974). Jahanbakhsh, Forough, "Abdolkarim Soroush: New 'Revival of Religious Sciences,"' ISIM Newsletter 8 (2001). Kepel, Gilles, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Belknap Harvard, 2004). Levtzion, Nehemia, “Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization,” in Conversion to Islam (Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979). Malka, Haim "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks," Middle East Quarterly X(2) (Spring 2003). Marranci, Gabriele, Jihad Beyond Islam (Berg Publishers, 2006). Mâtürîdî, Ta’vîlâtu’l-Qur’an (Bekir Topalo lu, 2005-2011). Mawdud, Sayyid Abul, Witnesses unto Mankind: The Purpose and Duty of the Muslim ‘ummah’ (Khurranm Murad, trans., The Islamic Foundation, 1986). Packer, George, “The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam,” The New Yorker (11 September 2006). Peters, Rudolph, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton De Gruyter, 1979). Poston, Larry, Islamic Da’wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (Oxford University Press, 1992). Th, Mahmud Muhammad, The Second Message of Islam (Syracuse University Press, 1987). ‘Uthmani, M. Taqi, “Hakim al-ummat ke siyasi afkar,” in Islam awr siyasat (Muhammad Ishak Multani, ed., undated)

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International Cooperation and Counterterrorism Patrick TYRRELL1 Vale Atlantic Associates, Cornwall, England

Abstract. International cooperation can be very effective in combating terrorism. This can be done through cooperation between national organizations as well as through international organization like the United Nations and International Criminal Court or regional groups such as NATO and the EU. International collaboration at the security and emergency response level is key to spreading good practice amongst all practitioners. Keywords. Counterterrorism, international cooperation, security

Introduction

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Following the Great War, the ‘War to End All Wars,’ the Great Powers decided to provide a mechanism for international cooperation and, where necessary, reconciliation. They established the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and held its first General Assembly in 1920. Unfortunately, the United States refused to ratify the treaty and refused to join the League. This proved to be a mortal blow to the League which, over the next 15 years, succumbed to the Great Power politics of the rise of fascism and the Second World War. Following the end of the war, the United Nations was founded with the aim of not repeating the mistakes of the League. Founded by 51 nations, it now has 193 independent states as members. The top governing body is the Security Council with 15 members of whom five – the US, the UK, France, Russia (formerly USSR) and China – representing the victorious allies of the Second World War, are permanent. The UN is currently conducting 18 peacekeeping missions around the world. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established under the Rome Summit in 1998 and entered into force in 2002 after ratification by 60 member nations. It is notable that the US has not ratified the treaty.

1. Regional Organisations. There are a number of regional organisations around the globe, principally concerned with commercial activity but some incorporating an element of security and mutual

 1

Commodore, RN (Ret), e-mail: [email protected].

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defence. Foremost among such entities is NATO, arguably the most successful military alliance in modern history. It now consists of 28 nations committed to three core tasks: x x x

Collective Defence Crisis Management Mutual security through partnership

The large number of independent member nations can make consensus sometime difficult to achieve. The European Union, formed out of an iron and steel agreement in the late 1950s, has expanded to 27 nations with a further six waiting for their membership to be approved. Although it is principally an economic union, it is developing a defence and security role although it lacks the sophisticated command and control capabilities of NATO. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), based in Vienna, was set up during the latter part of the Cold War and continues to monitor crisis hot-spots and support good governance amongst European nations. On a number of occasions, none of the above organisations have been authorised by their respective members to act and so ad hoc coalitions have been put together, invariably in support of a UN Security Council resolutions, to conduct specific, targeted operations against another country. Kuwait (1991), Iraq War (2002) and Libya (2011) are examples of such activity. One disadvantage is that command and control within the coalition needs to be created from scratch.

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2. National Interests “We have no eternal allies, and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”2 Nations only tend to allow their national interests to be subsumed into other interests during the times of crises and war. So, for example, the transfer of sovereignty involved in the initial setting up of the European Union, or in the early days of NATO, reflected the strategic reality of the times with an apparent overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. So too, in the current Eurozone financial crisis, the governments of Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland are being subjected to an unprecedented level of supervision by authorities outside their respective countries in order to tackle a major financial crisis. In times of peace and prosperity, nations are less likely to agree to sacrifice their interests. This is an example of Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs” whereby security and survival invariably take precedence over every other activity.3

 2 3

Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister, 1 March 1848. Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50(4) (1943), pp. 370–96.

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Figure 1. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.

The practical implications of this are very apparent in the negotiations between independent states to develop collaboration and a key ingredient of success is to demonstrate how the proposed changes are in the interests of the individual nations.

3. The Nature of the Counterterrorism Threat It is possible to look at a threat as consisting of three key elements:

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THREAT = MOTIVE + CAPABILITY + OPPORTUNITY Each of these elements must exist before a ‘threat’ can be said to exist. Clearly if motive is lacking, there will be no requirement for terrorist action; if they have motive but no capability, the threat to the nation will be limited and, even if the terrorist group has both motive and capability, the failure to find opportunities will render them ineffectual. 3.1 Motive Motive requires an understanding of what motivates the potential perpetrator – in the words of Sun Tsu, “know your enemy” – what is, for example, the historical context of their claim – is it religious, ethnic, cultural or political; what are their political and strategic objectives (if any) and where is their support coming from – other nations, sympathetic cultural groups forming a diaspora or from elements of the local population? 3.2 Capability As a group, how much of a threat do they pose? What are their ‘military capabilities;’ upon what elements is their command and control based; how effective is it and what Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,



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have they achieved in the past? The aptitude for conducting intelligence analysis is an important element for their success; do they rely on a sympathetic civilian population who broadly support their military and political objectives or are they isolated from the local populace? Where do they obtain their weapons and their training? 3.3 Opportunity Unlike the other two prerequisites of motive and capability, opportunity is firmly in the hands of the government countering terrorism. As 9/11 showed very dramatically, however, the clever terrorist can sometimes identify opportunities that are, hitherto, unrecognised by the security authorities. Ensuring that these opportunities are not created for the terrorist to exploit easily requires good intelligence, sound policing and robust security procedures. It also demands acceptance of the inconvenience that these procedures will entail amongst the civilian population. We have grown used to long queues at airport security, bag searches in a number of disparate locations and a vigilance by the security services that impinges on our everyday lives. It is this resilience amongst the civilian population that is the key to denying terrorists the opportunities they seek to wreak havoc and panic. A vital issue, therefore, is to keep the public onside – failure so to do would severely compromise the fight against terrorism.

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4. Tackling the Threat The ability to tackle the threat of terrorism is based on a variety of actions, procedures and strategies. Essentially, we need to deny the terrorist the room in which to plan, coordinate and execute his plans. We cannot afford to just be ‘reactive,’ otherwise we hand the initiative to the terrorist. On the other hand, being too pro-active could lead us into alienating a proportion of the civilian population or failing to maintain the rule of law. There are some who feel that these are costs worth paying but we need to be sensitive to the effects our actions have on the wider community. The key capabilities we need to adopt include sophisticated intelligence collection using all available tools at our disposal including human sources, electronic intercepts, open source material – including websites and social media, academic research, and an innate understanding of the context within which the terrorists operate. These sources need to be fused together to provide a coherent threat analysis using high quality intelligence analysts. There will always be the risk of a ‘Black Swan’ moment where the totally unexpected occurs – as in 9/11 or indeed, in London on 7/7 in 2005. The critical issue in such a situation will be how quickly the emergency response teams can stabilise the situation, ensure further attacks are rendered impotent and conduct forensic analysis to allow for the swift round-up of any active terrorist cells. This element of agility by the emergency and security services needs to be developed and inculcated by frequent training and using the initiative of officers on the ground to respond rapidly and effectively. One of the natural mind-sets that develop after a traumatic event is that of assuming the next crisis will be similar to the former. Clearly we must learn the Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,



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lessons of these profound events but we must also be open to alternative scenarios and develop suitable reactions in the event that these occur. International collaboration at the security and emergency response level is key to spreading good practice amongst all practitioners.

Conclusion Denying the terrorist the ability to attack our societies and to threaten the stability of our global society will demand higher standards, greater agility and an ability to think laterally, getting into the mind-set of our adversaries.

Bibliography

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Maslow, Abraham H., “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50(4) (1943).

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Recruitment of Terrorists Noémie Bouhana1 University College London, UK

Abstract. This article looks at the recruitment of terrorists as a two-step process – first finding the individual and then radicalizing him/her to be useful to the organization. There have been a number of theories proposed for both of these steps but none are successful in being predictive; the best we can do know is understand how a terrorist was recruited. For now, until better methods are developed, the focus should be on affected individuals and limiting exposure to radicalizing elements or countering those elements. Key Words. Terrorist recruitment, radicalization, lone wolf

Introduction

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Individual involvement in terrorism is a two-sided issue. On the one hand, we need to address the issue of radicalisation, and on the other the problem of recruitment into a terrorist group or organisation. Radicalisation can be understood as the process by which an individual acquires the propensity to commit acts of terrorism when motivated (i.e. a developmental process leading to the acquisition of a terrorismsupportive morality). Recruitment is an organisational mechanism through which terrorist group acquire new members. Key aspects of recruitment will be considered first, followed by an overview of the mechanisms and factors involved in radicalisation.

1. Recruitment The recruitment process can take several guises depending on context. Notably, it can be described as either bottom-up or top-down. The nature of the process will be tied to the type of terrorist of organisation under consideration, be it hierarchical, ‘franchised’ (as in the case of Al Qaeda and its satellites) or ‘leaderless’ (as, for example, elements of the right wing militia movement in the United States). The recruitment process is dynamic and will likely adapt to the changes in the environment of the terrorist group or organisation, for example shifting from one type to another in response to counterterrorism measures taken by the authorities. Gerwehr and Daly proposed a four-fold typology of Al Qaeda-linked terrorist selection and recruitment. The four types are Net, Funnel, Infection and Seed Crystal.

 1

Ph.D., Department of Security and Crime Science, e-mail [email protected].

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x

Under the ‘Net’ approach, the whole population in a particular location is perceived as primed for recruitment and gets pitched the same story (as in the example of radical mosques or Taliban-controlled regions). This can be the beginning of a contagion pattern.

x

In the configuration of the ‘Funnel’, the recruiter identifies potential for recruitment in a population but recognises that a change of attitude is still required. This approach is incremental. Unsuitable individuals are culled along the way, until only dedicated people remain. This is related to the notion of ‘grooming’ in studies of sexual abuse. Examples are university prayer groups.

x

The ‘Infection’ approach involves the targeting of a population which is difficult to access. Here, the recruitment agent must operate from within, presenting themselves as credible sources of authority and tailoring the pitch to each individual’s circumstances. This approach is used where the majority of the population is likely to be unsympathetic to the terrorist creed.

x

The ‘Seed Crystal’ pattern characterises situations where the target population is so hard to access none of the other approaches are feasible. In this case, the best an organisation can do is try to set up the conditions for self-recruitment, in the hope that the self-recruited agent will then infect others around him. This pattern is recognisable in the phenomena of ‘homegrown’ terrorism.2

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In a 2008 report on recruitment and mobilisation in the Islamist movement in Europe, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) observes that different approaches to recruitment correspond to different cell structures. The ‘chain of command’ cell involves top-down recruitment, the ‘guided’ cell involves selfrecruitment but strong links to jihad, while the ‘self-starter’ cell is entirely self-selected and autonomous.3 Settings of recruitment can be of different types, such as places of congregation (mosques, internet cafes, gyms), which are simply places where people have the opportunity to come together, places of vulnerability (prisons, refugee centres) where recruiters can take advantage of individuals in crisis, and recruitment magnets (radical mosques, radical bookshops), where individuals come in search of recruiters. Recruitment agents can also take three forms: gateway organisations, radical imams and activists. The ICSR report suggests that the first two categories have been taking a step back in recent years in favour of activists. Cyberrecruitment has also come to the forefront, as a result of adaptation to countermeasures implemented to restrict group activities, leading organisations to lose their main bases of operations, but also learning from the success of internet recruitment. The new battlefield is described as a competition for ‘hearts and minds’ where young ‘homegrown’ jihadists are the prized recruits. There are anecdotal cases of self-recruitment and self-radicalisation happening exclusively on the Internet (eg. irhabi007), but they remain the exception instead of the

 2

Sara A. Gerwehr and Scott Daly, Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment (RAND, 2006). Peter R. Neumann and Brooke Rogers, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Movement in Europe (ICSR, 2008). 3

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norm.4 Nevertheless, the move towards ‘DIY’ or ‘open source’ jihad embodied by alQaeda’s Inspire magazine has been an area of growing concern for counterterrorism authorities; the current trend seemingly being to encourage self-recruited individuals to stay under the radar, avoid travelling to AQ-friendly parts of the world and gather what knowledge they need from open sources. There are, however, significant doubts that the Internet can deliver significant numbers of recruits. Furthermore, self-made bombs tend to fail, as self-recruits do not have sufficient technical knowledge so they are less dangerous and lethal. So-called ‘lone wolves’ have made the headlines in recent years, but are still few and far between, though they do pose a challenge in terms of detection.

2. Radicalisation Radicalisation can be formally defined as ‘the process of development through which an individual acquires the propensity to engage in acts of terrorism.’5 So-defined, it is essentially a process of moral change in a direction supportive of terrorism. Explaining radicalisation poses a prediction problem well-known of criminologists. There are many factors or characteristics linked to radicalisation at the individual level, yet no conclusive profile has emerged. The problem of specificity remains: too many individuals possess these characteristics for a profile to discriminate between them.

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In 2011, the UK Home Office commissioned a rapid evidence assessment of the factors involvement in AQ-influenced radicalisation. Its purpose was to synthesise information on individual, social and macro level factors into a single model, which would identify the key mechanisms involved in the radicalisation process. The model recognises that there is a need to tell apart factors which are merely symptoms or markers of radicalisation, from actual causes. Targeting symptoms and markers will not prevent radicalisation; only disruption of causes and causal mechanisms can achieve this objective. Three categories of causal factors were identified, individual, social ecological, and systemic, corresponding to three categories of causal processes involved in the radicalisation process: individual vulnerability, exposure and emergence (IVEE). Individual vulnerability is composed of two aspects: individual susceptibility to moral change and individual susceptibility to selection. Susceptibility to moral change is underpin by affective and cognitive processes which lead to an individual being susceptible to the influence of moral teachings and ideas. Markers of susceptibility to moral change are factors such as evidence of previous criminal involvement, youth , lack of a stable value or rule system, historical events which generate stress beyond what the individual can cope with alone, or other anxiogenic situations, lack of stable attachment to conventional sources of moral influence, and so on. Susceptibility to selection has to do with those factors which make an individual more likely to be



4 Torok, Robyn, “’Make a Bomb in Your Mums Kitchen’: Cyber Recruiting And Socialisation of ‘White Moors’ and Home Grown Jihadists (Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 30th November 2010). 5 Noémie Bouhana and Per-Oluf H. Wikström , Al-Qada-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory (Home Office RDS, 2011).

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exposed (find themselves in) radicalising settings. Markers of selection susceptibility (eg. belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group; having particular hobbies; belonging to a particular social network; residing in a particular neighborhood) are always relative to the local context, since they are determined by the places in which the radicalising settings are found. Individual vulnerability on its own is not enough for radicalisation to occur. Vulnerable individuals must be exposed to radicalising influence – exposure to radicalising settings. These settings are defined as places where radicalisation teachings are present and where individuals have the opportunity to create lasting attachments to radicalising agents in an environment where monitoring by authorities is insufficient, and therefore radicalising activity can take place without impediment. Radicalising settings can be virtual, though forming attachments virtually is more difficult.

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The two main mechanisms of exposure are social selection and self-selection. Social selection operates on the basis of a person’s membership to social groups which make their presence in one place or another more or less likely, given the organisation of society (eg. Christians are more likely to be exposed to church environments, and Muslims to mosque environments). Other factors of social selection are professional occupation, age, social networks, and so on. Self-selection operates on the basis of a person’s preferences, which have emerge over the course of that person’s history (wants and desires). For example a personal preference for drinking and dancing may increase risk of radicalising exposure if radicalisation happens in clubs where these desires can be sated. Factors or self-and social selection are therefore locally, rather than generally, relevant. Their role depends on the location of the radicalising settings. Lastly, to explain radicalisation one must explain why radicalising settings appear where and when they do. This is the most understudied aspect of radicalisation, as the focus tends to be on individual backgrounds, rather than on understanding the characteristics of environments. Markers of emergence may be systemic factors such as ethnic concentration, lack of trust in authorities which manifests in low collective efficacy, segregation, and so on.

Conclusion Although the current state of the art does not allow us to predict who will be recruited, we can be watchful for those who show that signs of recruitment and radicalization, then deal with those individuals until we can better use resources in a broader approach.

Bibliography Bouhana, Noémie, and Per-Oluf H. Wikström, Al-Qada-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory (Home Office RDS, 2011). Gerwehr, Sara A., and Scott Daly, Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment (RAND, 2006). Neumann, Peter R., and Brooke Rogers, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Movement in Europe (ICSR, 2008). Torok, Robyn, “’Make a Bomb in Your Mums Kitchen’: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of ‘White Moors’ and Home Grown Jihadists (Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 30th November 2010).

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Financing Terrorism Vesna MARKOVIC1 Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, West Haven, Connecticut

Abstract. Terrorism has changed over the past several decades, from the types of attacks they carry out to the way in which they finance these attacks. On the group level, terrorist organizations have used state sponsorship, diaspora support, charities, independent financiers, front organizations, selling their training and expertise to other groups, and have also used organized crime to finance themselves. At the cell level, carrying out operations does not cost nearly as much money. Petty crimes or even a full-time job can help cover the costs of carrying out a terrorist attack. By uncovering these networks that provide monetary and logistical support, terrorist networks can be disrupted. Keywords. Terrorist financing, organized crime-terrorism lexus,

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Introduction Terrorism has changed over the past several decades, from the types of attacks groups choose to carry out to the way in which they finance these attacks. Although there has been a decline in state-sponsored terrorism, other forms of funding have increased. The use of charities, for example, has become a prominent method of financing. Groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) used the Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) in the early 1970s and 1980s to finance their activities. The open use of charities diminished after the attacks on the U.S. on September 11th, at which point charities were scrutinized to a greater degree, forcing more groups to move their financial networks underground. This paper will focus on the issues of financing terrorism and briefly discuss ways in which terrorist groups have financed their operations at the group and cell level. It is estimated that the September 11th attacks cost between $400,000 and $500,000 to carry out, spending almost $300,000 of this total within the United States.2 This estimate includes financing all aspects in staging the attacks: flying lessons, apartments, vehicles, and all other costs associated with obtaining visas and travel costs incurred. Most of the money was directly transferred to U.S. bank accounts in the hijackers’ names, depositing money into bank accounts on a regular basis, however in varying amounts.3 The 3/11 Madrid bombings, which killed 191 people, cost approximately $15,000.4 The London transit bombings, which killed 52 civilians, cost

 1

Ph.D, Assistant Professor, University of New Haven. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report” (July 17, 2004), p. 169, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (last visited JUly 17, 2013). 3 Ibid, p. 172. 4 “Financing Terrorism: Looking in the Wrong Places,” The Economist (October 20, 2005), available at http://www.economist.com/node/5053373 (last visited July 17, 2013). 2

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less than £8,000.5 The 2009 Jakarta Marriot bombings killed nine and wounded at least 50, costing terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya less than $2,000 U.S. dollars, including renting a room in the hotel for $330 per night to gain entry to the hotel.6 Various methods were used to obtain financing for the attacks mentioned above. Terrorist groups not only use the money they raise to finance attacks, but have also used money to finance other endeavors. They have used some of this money to give back to the community in exchange for support for their actions. Groups such as Hamas have used funds raised to build orphanages and community centers. In Pakistan, groups build madrassas, or religious schools, and provide other assistance to families in poor communities that do not receive any assistance from the government. In some cases, groups use the money to pay the families of suicide bombers and in other cases have used the money to purchase suicide bombers. In 2011, for example, a top Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander sold Sher Hassan, a Pakistani national, to the Haqqani network in Afghanistan to carry out an attack against “Azizullah,” a local commander.7 Hassan spent one month training with the Haqqani network after the sale. Many of the suicide bombers were being sold for between 6-8 million PNR ($70,000 - $90,000 USD).8

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1. Types of Terrorist Financing As times have changed, terrorist groups have adapted to these changes. At the group level, terrorist organizations have used state sponsorship, diaspora support, charities, independent financiers, front organizations, selling their training and expertise to other groups, and organized crime to finance themselves. Funding large terrorist organizations takes a great deal of money. Just like any multinational corporation, there are operating costs associated with just being able to ‘keep the doors open.’ At the cell level, however, carrying out operations does not cost that much money. Petty crimes or even a full-time job can help cover costs of purchasing over-the-counter items used to make certain explosive devices. The following section will briefly detail various methods of financing at the group and cell level, as well as a look at how terrorist groups use organized crime to finance operations. 1.1 Group level State-sponsored terrorism has declined over the past several decades, although it is still occurring. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has, for example, been linked to various Pakistani terrorist groups including Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihad-



5 U.K. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (The Stat onary Office, HC 1087, May 11, 2006), p.23, available at http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.asp (last visited July 2013). 6 Adianto P. Simamora, “Bomb Funding Brought from Mideast by Couriers: Govt.,” The Jakarta Post (August 20, 2009), available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/08/20/bomb-funding-broughtmideast-couriers-govt.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 7 Reuters, “Terror Market: ‘TTP Sold Suicide Bomber to Afghan Militants,’” The Express Tribune (July 4, 2011), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/201828/insurgents-bought-suicide-bomber-from-pakistantaliban-afghan-spy-agency/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 8 Ibid.

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Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), and other groups, as well as several terrorist attacks.9 Iran has been accused in the past of sending Hamas upgraded Kassam rockets via the terrorist group Hezbollah.10 Syria has also been linked to Hezbollah as a state sponsor of terrorism, including reports that they were linked to the Hezbollah attack that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in addition to providing safe haven to various other terrorist groups including the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which sought refuge there in the 1980s and 1990s.11 Independent financiers, such as Osama bin Laden himself, who are able to front large amounts of money in support of terrorist goals and operations, are used as well. In May 2012, for example, Abdul Baqi Bari was designated by the U.S. as a Specifically Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for his use of businesses in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fund Taliban and al-Qaeda operations.12 Some groups collect funds from expatriate communities, using various methods. Large Tamil communities were a resource for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as were Kurdish communities for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In some cases donations are obtained from these communities voluntarily, in other cases support is obtained by threatening use of force, or use of force, or collateral coercion, such as threatening family members back home. Charities were another means of financing; however, they drew more scrutiny particularly in the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. Numerous charitable organizations, such as the World Tamil Movement (WTM), Holy Land Foundation, and IIRO, have all been linked to financing terrorist groups.13

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In other examples, groups sold training and knowledge in order to obtain financing. In 2001, for example, James Monaghan, Niall Connolly and Martin McCauley were arrested in Colombia after allegedly spending 18 months training Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members.14 The three were charged with training FARC members to use IRA weapons such as the truck-mounted



9 Rick Kania, “The Karachi Project: Is Pakistan Using Terror to Balance Against India’s Military Advantage?,” Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (July 25, 2011), at http://www.isvg.org/follow/blog/2011/07/25/the-karachi-project-is-pakistan-using-terror-to-balance-againstindias-military-advantage/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 10 Michele K. Esposito, Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy, Journal of Palestine Studies 33(1) (Fall 2003), pp. 116-138, available at http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/5663.pdf (last visited July 17, 2013). 11 Holly Fletcher, “State Sponsor: Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations (February 2008), at http://www.cfr.org/syria/state-sponsor-syria/p9368 (last visited July 17, 2013). 12 Bill Roggio, “US Adds Taliban Financier, Haqqani Network Operative to Terror List,” The Long War Journal (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/05/the_us_treasury _depa.php (last visited July 17, 2013). 13 Public Safety Canada, ”Currently Listed Entities” (updated November 20, 2012), at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx (last visited July 17, 2013); U.S. Department of Justice, “Holy Land Foundation, Leaders, Accused of Providing Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization,” (July 24, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_514.htm (last visited July 17, 2013); Research Directorate, Egypt: The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and Whether it is Involved in Funding Terrorist Activities (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, January 28, 2003), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3f7d4d901c (last visited July 17, 2013). 14 Shawn Pogatchnik, 3 IRA-Linked Fugitives Back in Ireland – Trained FARC in Columbia – Hid out in Venezuela/Cuba, The Boston Globe (August 6, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1458099/posts (last visited July 17, 2013).

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mortars.15 In several cases, terrorist groups have allowed other terrorist group members to attend training camps, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Not only do some groups sell knowledge, but they also transfer tactics. Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda linked group operating in Somalia, has trained members of the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, while recent reports have linked the two groups and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), alleging that they are sharing training, explosives and money.16 In addition, two Nigerian men were arrested in Abuja, Nigeria in July for allegedly receiving money from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP - Yemen) for recruiting members for AQAP from Nigeria.17 Once the money is collected for the terrorist groups, it can be moved in numerous ways. The money can be moved legally through the banking system. A terrorist group may also launder the money through the banking system. The Bank of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI) is an early example of how commercial banks were used to launder money for terrorist groups such as Abu Nidal.18 Some groups use informal money transfer systems such as Hawala, or the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Groups are also able to move money through charitable organizations or front companies. Groups have employed couriers to transfer large sums of bulk cash from country to country or from group to group. Other groups have traded in commodities such as gold, diamonds or other precious stones to transfer funds. Terrorist groups have also traded commodities such as exchanging drugs for weapons.

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1.2 Cell Level Groups that operate at the cell level do not have large overhead costs and can sustain themselves without needing such large amounts of cash. In many cases, small celllevel groups can be sustained through petty criminal activity, including theft or fraud for example. In some cases, just holding a legitimate job can provide enough money to live while preparing for a terrorist attack. A primary example of this can be seen in the London transit system bombings that took place on July 7, 2005. Because the bombs were made using over-the-counter products, the cost was not very great. A report from the House of Commons on the 7/7 bombings estimated that the bombings, which killed 52 people and injured over 770, cost less than £8,000 British pounds to plan and carry out.19 On July 7, 2005, three explosions occurred on the London transit system close to 9:00am, with a fourth bombing occurring shortly after 9:45am.20 Four men – Shehzad Tanweer, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain, and Jermaine Lindsay – were the suicide bombers that carried out these attacks.21 To carry out the operation, Khan and

 15

Ibid. David Smith, “Africa’s Islamist Militants ‘Co-ordinate Efforts in Threat to Continent’s Security,’” The Guardian (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/africa-islamistmilitants-coordinating-threat (last visited July 17, 2013). 17 BBC, “Nigerian Men Accused of Links to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” BBC News Africa (July 6, 2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18732176 (last visited July 17, 2013). 18 Sara Fritz and Joel Havemann, “Early Signs of BCCI Scandal were Ignored,” The Los Angeles Times (August 4, 1991), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-04/news/mn-268_1_bcci-scandal (last visited July, 17, 2013). 19 U.K. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 16

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Tanweer went to Pakistan and, upon their return, left their jobs to spend their time planning the attacks. Khan allegedly learned about explosives and weapons in a training camp in Malakand, Pakistan he attended in July 2003.22 The costs they incurred to plan the attacks included the trip to Pakistan, renting an apartment on 18 Alexandra Grove in Leeds, travelling within the U.K., renting a vehicle, and purchasing the bomb making equipment.23 Investigators found that bomber Jermaine Lindsay made some purchases in the weeks prior to the attacks with checks that bounced.24 It is believed, however, that Mohammad Sidique Khan financed most of the operation. He was employed full-time so he was able to obtain several credit cards and a personal bank loan.25 The bombs were made using materials that were available commercially and were therefore easy to obtain and not very costly.

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2. Organized Crime as a Method of Financing Terrorist groups have begun to diversify in order to start using methods of financing common to transnational crime groups. Although organized crime tactics have long been used to finance some groups, such as the FARC, it has become a prevalent method of financing for other groups as well. Various types of organized crime tactics such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human smuggling and human trafficking, product counterfeiting, extortion, fraud, and other types of criminal activity, such as theft, have been used by various terrorist organizations. In 2011, for example, at least 30 bank robberies across Nigeria were attributed to the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram.26 After the arrest of Boko Haram official Abu Qaqa, he disclosed that when the group lacks funding, they turn to bank robberies to be able to continue their operations.27 The movement of money for the purpose of funding terrorist organization activities can be highlighted by several case studies. These are not the only ways in which groups obtain funding but are meant to emphasize some of the various tactics used by terrorist groups. The following section will give several such examples in relation to terrorist group financing. Kidnapping is a tactic that has been used by numerous terrorist groups. In many cases, there are financial motives, while in other cases there are political motives. A primary example of a terrorist group that uses this tactic is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). As GSPC, their area of operation was confined to Algeria; however, in the past several years, their operations have expanded to many different countries in Africa. Kidnapping has become AQIM’s main source of income, with the terrorist group



22 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf (last visited July 17, 2013). 23 U.K. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 “Boko Haram, Armed Robbers Attack 100 Bank Branches,” This Day (December 10, 2011), available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-armed-robbers-attack-100-bank-branches/104715/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 27 “Boko Haram Gives Reason for Robbing Banks,” Nigeria News, (February 14, 2012), available at http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/latest-addition/139998-boko-haram-gives-reason-for-robbing-banks.html (last visited July 17, 2013).

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earning an estimated $65 million in ransom money since 2005.28 Even though it is believed that AQIM has bought hostages from other groups previously, it is estimated that they have earned approximately $130 million from kidnapping Westerners.29 On January 22, 2009, for example, four Europeans were kidnapped by Tuareg rebels near the Niger/Mali border and then were believed to have been sold to AQIM members in Mali.30 One of the hostages, Edwin Dyer, was a British national. AQIM attempted to negotiate with the British government to release him in exchange for the release of Abu Qatada, a Jordanian believed to be al-Qaeda’s European connection, being held in London, where they are attempting to deport him to Jordan for his alleged involvement in attacks in Jordan in 1998.31 After that demand was denied, the group demanded €10 million (nearly USD $12.5 million) for the return of Dyer and a Swiss hostage. On May 31, 2009 Dyer was killed in northern Mali according to a statement by AQIM.32 The group then attempted to negotiate with Britain for the return of Dyer’s body.33 In a more recent example, German engineer Edgar Fritz Raupach was kidnapped on January 26, 2012 during a raid in Kano, Nigeria, conducted by the terrorist group Boko Haram.34 It is not believed that AQIM carried out the kidnapping, but in March, 2012 they released a statement and a video which showed Raupach begging the German government to help save his life.35 The group demanded the release of Filiz Gelowicz, who was arrested and convicted for providing support to terrorists, which included a plot to kill U.S. military and citizens in Germany.36 Raupach was shot and stabbed by captors when Nigerian security forces conducted a raid in Kano in what was described as a failed rescue attempt.37

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Another example of how a terrorist group uses organized crime in financing involves a case that occurred in the United States in 2000. The case involves several operatives using cigarette smuggling as a means to obtain funding for Hezbollah. The cell, allegedly led by Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, purchased large quantities of cigarettes in North Carolina, where the tax per pack was 0.03 dollars at the time, forged



28 Horand Knaup, “Suicide Attacks in Nigeria: Islamist Terror Network Gains Strength in Africa,” Spiegel Online (January 4, 2012), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/suicide-attacks-in-nigeriaislamist-terror-network-gains-strength-in-africa-a-806749.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 29 Associated Press, “German Engineer Kidnapped in Nigeria Killed During Failed Rescue Attempt,” New York Daily News (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/german-engineerkidnapped-nigeria-killed-failed-rescue-attempt-article-1.1087360 (last visited July 17, 2013). 30 Helen Pidd, “Background: The Kidnapping of Edwin Dyer,” The Guardian (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/03/edwin-dyer-hostage-killed-al-qaida (last visited July 17, 2013). 31 Ibid; “BBC, “Abu Qatada Loses Latest Bid for Freedom,” BBC News (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19064369 (last visited July 17, 2013). 32 Duncan Gardham, British Hostage Edwin Dyer Executed by al-Qaeda in Mali, The Telegraph (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/5437960/Britishhostage-Edwin-Dyer-executed-by-al-Qaeda-in-Mali.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 33 George Gorman, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Blog, The Longwar Journal (August 5, 2010), at http://www.longwarjournal.org/today-in/2010/08/al_qaeda_in_the_islamic_59.php (last visited July 17, 2013). 34 Jon Gambrell, “Al-Qaeda Blames Germany for Hostage’s Death in Raid,” Associated Press (June 12, 2012), available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/al-qaida-blames-germany-nigeria-hostage-death (last visited July 17, 2013). 35 Associated Press, “German Engineer Kidnapped in Nigeria Killed During Failed Rescue Attempt.” 36 Ibid. 37 Gambrell, “Al-Qaeda Blames Germany for Hostage’s Death in Raid.”

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tax stamps and transported them to Michigan where the tax at the time was $1.50 per pack.38 This gave the group a profit of $1.47 per pack of cigarettes. Hammoud and his codefendants were convicted for providing material support to Hezbollah, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, racketeering, and immigration fraud.39 In 2002, Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years in prison, which was later decreased to 30 years in January 2011.40

Conclusion No matter what the terrorist group structure, it is clear that these groups are resorting to a wide range of methods to raise money for their causes. The use of organized and transnational crimes is particularly troubling. From the heroin trade in Afghanistan, south Asia and other regions, to the extortion of expatriate communities worldwide, the use of these tactics are providing funding for numerous terrorist groups. The reach of these financial networks stretches across the globe, posing a problem for many countries. It is of utmost importance to focus on the financing of terrorist activities. Cutting a terrorist group off from its finances makes the group less potent and less likely to be able to carry out large scale attacks.

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Since transnational crime is a global phenomenon, the fight against it should also be global. Bridging the gap in intelligence, meaning information gathering and most importantly information sharing, is the only way in which these issues can be identified and resolved. It is also important to target the nexus between organized crime and terrorism to cut off all means of financial and logistical support to terrorist groups. Organized criminal groups have well established networks that can assist terrorist groups in obtaining and moving explosives and other arms, as well as, movement of operatives. Targeting these activities may not only disrupt criminal activity, but also disrupt the channels used to finance terrorism. Finally, not all countries are equally equipped in fighting terrorism or transnational criminal activity. Therefore it should be a responsibility shared by all; this includes sharing best practices, helping countries strengthen their capacity to fight criminal networks, strengthen laws meant to target criminal and terrorist networks, and sharing information and intelligence more effectively to help combat this problem. Uncovering these networks that provide monetary and logistical support is a key step in the fight against global terrorism.



38 Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al, Docket 3:00CR-147-MU (United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina Charlotte Division, July 31, 2000), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorism/ushammoud32801ind.pdf (last visited July 17, 2013). 39 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, “Mohamad Youssef Hammoud Sentenced to 30 Years in Terrorism Financing Case,” (ICE Press Release, January 27, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1101/110127charlotte.htm (last visited July 17, 2013). 40 Ibid.

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Bibliography Associated Press, “German Engineer Kidnapped in Nigeria Killed During Failed Rescue Attempt,” New York Daily News (May 31, 2012). BBC, “Nigerian Men Accused of Links to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” BBC News Africa (July 6, 2012). BBC, “Abu Qatada Loses Latest Bid for Freedom,” BBC News (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19064369 (last visited July 17, 2013). “Boko Haram, Armed Robbers Attack 100 Bank Branches,” This Day (December 10, 2011). “Boko Haram Gives Reason for Robbing Banks,” Nigeria News, (February 14, 2012). Esposito, Michele K., Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy, Journal of Palestine Studies 33(1) (Fall 2003). “Financing Terrorism: Looking in the Wrong Places,” The Economist (October 20, 2005), available at http://www.economist.com/node/5053373 (last visited July 17, 2013). Fletcher, Holly, “State Sponsor: Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations (February 2008). Fritz, Sara, and Joel Havemann, “Early Signs of BCCI Scandal were Ignored,” The Los Angeles Times (August 4, 1991). Gambrell, Jon, “Al-Qaeda Blames Germany for Hostage’s Death in Raid,” Associated Press (June 12, 2012). Gardham, Duncan, British Hostage Edwin Dyer Executed by al-Qaeda in Mali, The Telegraph (June 3, 2009). Gorman, George, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” The Longwar Journal (August 5, 2010). Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al, Docket 3:00CR-147-MU (United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina Charlotte Division, July 31, 2000). Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, “Mohamad Youssef Hammoud Sentenced to 30 Years in Terrorism Financing Case,” (ICE Press Release, January 27, 2011). Kania, Rick, “The Karachi Project: Is Pakistan Using Terror to Balance against India’s Military Advantage?,” Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (July 25, 2011). Knaup, Horand, “Suicide Attacks in Nigeria: Islamist Terror Network Gains Strength in Africa,” Spiegel Online (January 4, 2012). Pidd, Helen, “Background: The Kidnapping of Edwin Dyer,” The Guardian (June 3, 2009).Pogatchnik, Shawn, “3 IRA-Linked Fugitives Back in Ireland – Trained FARC in Columbia – Hid out in Venezuela/Cuba,” The Boston Globe (August 6, 2005). Public Safety Canada, ”Currently Listed Entities” (updated November 20, 2012). Research Directorate, Egypt: The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and Whether it is Involved in Funding Terrorist Activities (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, January 28, 2003). Reuters, “Terror Market: ‘TTP Sold Suicide Bomber to Afghan Militants,’” The Express Tribune (July 4, 2011). Roggio, Bill, “US Adds Taliban Financier, Haqqani Network Operative to Terror List,” The Long War Journal (May 17, 2012). Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007). Simamora, Adianto P., “Bomb Funding Brought from Mideast by Couriers: Govt.,” The Jakarta Post (August 20, 2009). Smith, David, “Africa’s Islamist Militants ‘Co-ordinate Efforts in Threat to Continent’s Security,’” The Guardian (June 26, 2012). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report” (July 17, 2004). U.K. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (The Stat onary Office, HC 1087, May 11, 2006). U.S. Department of Justice, “Holy Land Foundation, Leaders, Accused of Providing Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization,” (July 24, 2004).

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-82

Crisis Management Patrick TYRRELL1 Vale Atlantic Associates, Cornwall, England

Abstract. Crises are sudden and, almost always unexpected, events that are very difficult to predict as to when they will occur or what their likely effect might be. However, they normally have lasting effects. Crisis management is the term that covers the way in which endeavor to mitigate the damage and deal with the fallout. This article discusses a step phase approach to understating crises and how to manage them. With proper planning, training and exercise, the effects of crises can be mitigated. Much of crisis management is ‘common sense’ – unfortunately it is not that common. Good training and instinctive responses will allow the team to be ready and primed for whatever is thrown at them next. Keywords. crisis management, phases of a crisis, managing crisis

Introduction

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We experience many crises in our lives, both personal and professional. We are able to recognise a crisis when we see it. A crisis is characterised by a catastrophic event or series of events. It might be the result of a natural disaster – like the Japanese tsunami in 2011 or a series of man-made events such as a large scale war with the associated displacement of people and considerable hardship. Often these events are sudden, cause major disruption and, inevitably, are irreversible – at least in part. Few crises leave the world in the same state as it was before the crisis broke. In science, there is a law known as Hooke’s Law which governs the extension of a spring. For most uses, the extension of a spring is directly proportional to the weight placed upon it. When the weight is released, the spring returns to its original position. If the spring is subjected to too great a weight, it will deform and fail. Removing the weight will not restore the original state. This is an extremely good analogy for the events leading to a crisis – a point after which nothing is the same again and, whatever efforts might be made, the situation will never return to its former state. Because crises are sudden and, almost always unexpected, it is very difficult to predict when they will occur or what their likely effect might be. ‘Crisis Management’ is the term that covers the way in which we endeavour to mitigate the damage and deal with the fallout. The definition used is: “The process of responding to an event, or a series of events, whose effects might threaten the national security, national integrity or very existence of a nation or its immediate allies. The aim is to minimise damage and preserve national interests.”

 1

Commodore, RN (Ret), e-mail: [email protected].

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1. Phases of a Crisis Crises can be seen to have distinct phases. A number of models have been developed but the one that I prefer is based upon a pragmatic and common-sense approach. In such a model, we can identify five key phases: 1.1. Phase 1:Trigger and Early Warning This phase may last months or even years but only recognised in hindsight. Many natural crises have extremely short early warning phases as with the Japanese Tsunami (March 2011) when the elapsed time between the earthquake and the destructive tsunami was less than one hour. Such situations are often difficult to recognise in realtime as those involved are often ‘in denial.’ 1.2. Phase 2: Escalation This is the point at which the tempo of the event speeds up – again it can be a very short in duration or last several months. As we move through this phase, more people begin to believe that they are witnessing a crisis. 1.3 Phase 3: The Crisis

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A series of catastrophic events happening in a relatively short period of time. There is little opportunity for effective action – often saving lives will be the principal priority. Information flows are usually interrupted and the centres of governance are cut off from effective decision making. The natural tendency is to panic and run for cover. Only effective training will enable a cadre to continue to function with a series of predetermined measures designed to save lives and minimise risk to the populace. Fear, disorientation, sensory overload, paralysis and an overwhelming sense of catastrophe are the principal emotions throughout the population. 1.4 Phase 4: The Recovery As events slow down and information begins to flow into the centres of governance, contingency plans can be implemented, amending, as necessary, to meet the specific conditions on the ground. Teams operating in these areas must have comprehensive training and be able to use their own initiative wherever necessary. Central government must avoid trying to ‘second guess’ leaders on the ground. 1.5 Phase 5: Post Incident Analysis This phase should be about understanding how we might tackle a future crisis; identify the early phases earlier, improve training, develop emergency stockpiles more effectively and, generally, ensure that we are better prepared. Inevitably, however, it is often about shifting blame for where things went wrong!

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2. Complicated vs. Complex

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Building a machine, even one as sophisticated as a large aircraft, is accepted to be a ‘complicated’ task: as a young boy, I well remember building model aircraft and tackling larger more complicated ones as my skills improved. Dealing with humans, however, is ‘complex’ in the biological systems context, implying that it is not always predictable as to how a system will react to change. It is my contention, therefore, that ‘crises’ are within the complex world of biological systems as they affect human beings. In looking at the human world, we need to consider the key attributes of human society: organisations and technology. Technology has changed and developed dramatically over the last two centuries; more than at any previous era of history. To take a single example, communications, which at the time of the US Civil War was represented by a simple telegraph switch, could send messages at approximately 2 bits/second. Today we are in the era of cognitive tools and terrabytes of data! Organisations have allowed a number of individuals to collect together in a very synergistic fashion. They are, by their very nature, bureaucratic as they must be to have continuity of existence. They do, however, have a tendency towards sclerotic inertia. In any crisis, we need to fight this tendency to ensure that our response can be sufficiently agile as to prove effective. The human being is highly complex: we rely on our ‘rear brain’ to survive and respond to immediate stimuli. In a crisis this might suggest flight followed by hiding somewhere safe! What distinguishes us from less well-developed mammals is the existence of the prefrontal cortex which enables us to do the ‘difficult’ tasks of tradeoffs, sophisticated decision making and abstract thought. Clearly it is these skills that are paramount in finding suitable responses to any crisis. The issue, consequently, is how do we overcome the primitive urge of the rear brain and give the front brain time to recognise how best to tackle a problem. Key to resolving this is training and an ability to take instinctive reactions to a crisis designed to limit damage and give us time to think.

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3. The “Knowns” and the “Unknowns” When we enter a crisis, we enter a situation where we have neither the information nor, in many cases, the experience to stabilise the situation and move towards a recovery phase. We bring to the task our individual expertise and knowledge: some of it will be very relevant to dealing with the crisis at hand, whereas other areas of our expertise will be of little effective utility. No one can ever claim to know everything, indeed what we as individuals know is but a small part of the total sum knowledge of human beings. If we look at the world and ‘knowledge,’ there are clearly some things that are ‘known;’ for example, it is known that the capital city of the United Kingdom is London. There are also many ‘knowns,’ ie facts available to the human race, that we, as individuals, do not know. These ‘unknown knowns’ can be revealed by research or simply asking someone who ‘knows’! There is a further category of things that we as part of the human repository of knowledge know that we do not yet know – ‘known unknowns.’ Until very recently, this included the human genome where we knew the nature of what we were looking for, but not the specifics. This is very typical in scientific research, where we are trying to push the boundaries of knowledge. There is, however, a fourth category of knowledge, the ‘unknown unknowns’ – these are things that we know not of – an example would have been nuclear physics or powered flight at the end of the Nineteenth Century. These are often revealed in a ‘Black Swan’ moment when suddenly a new area of knowledge and research becomes evident. The key issue here is that we, as individuals managing a crisis, must be very conscious that we may not have all the knowledge we need to stabilise the situation but neither may anybody else.

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4. Managing a Crisis Effective command and control, whether in times of stability or in the panic of a crisis, depends upon the ability to weld a number of disparate parts into a coherent whole. The key issue is the ability to coordinate across a wide range of disciplines and organisations. The basis for such coordination should be well established before they are going to be required – by understanding key linkages and meeting with your opposite numbers in different organisations. The key to preparation will always be training and running exercises designed to test effective coordination will be a crucial part of that training. Within the process, great emphasis needs to be placed on communications, both internally within your own team and externally with the other agencies that you must, of necessity, involve. Communications is more than just the sum total of your technology: communicating with other teams means ensuring that they can see the situation from your perspective and vice-versa. Communication is the key failure area in crisis management and a wise commander will ensure that this aspect is exercised continually. There are certain other attributes that merit our attention. It is axiomatic that we need to understand the capabilities we require. Generally speaking, we recognise a number of such capabilities within the basic force structure but each crisis is likely to demand capabilities specific to the situation and the command must be able to Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,



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recognise what new capabilities might be required at an early stage of the crisis and how those capabilities can be achieved. We also need to ensure that we have the necessary capacity to be able to undertake the tasks necessary to a resolution of the crisis – it is no good having just one fire appliance if you have multiple fires raging across a wide are! You also need the right mix of competencies amongst the people who work for you. Some leaders try to believe that they can do everything but, in our complex lives, it is increasingly the case that specialist skill sets are critical to the success of the mission; the key is to recognise what skill sets are required and which ones you might need to reinforce for specific situations. The military and security forces have learned these lessons the hard way and, generally, recognise the importance of such competencies. Good commanders find it easy to delegate responsibility to those under them: it is a recognition that they do not have all the necessary skills as well as an understanding about effective command. Delegation demands an understanding of subordinates, recognising strengths and weaknesses, a climate of trust and loyalty and a commitment to giving sound advice even when it runs contrary to that of the prevailing environment.

5. The OODA Loop

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Crises are fast moving and confusing. Training needs to be such as to allow for immediate standard responses designed to permit the manager to begin to understand what is happening. These actions should be designed to limit further damage or loss of life and, as far as possible, to stabilise the situation. These responses should have been practised and refined beforehand so that every member of the team knows, instinctively, what to do. In any crisis, planned connectivity will suffer and there needs to be a dynamic understanding as to how to communicate with other teams or even members of your own team as, and when, connection failures occur. Not all failures will be technological, working in an international environment, language, culture, and operating doctrine will all be different. Here NATO offers a good example as to how early planning and common doctrine can enable disparate national forces to operate as a coherent whole. A critical issue will always be information: getting the right data at the right time and in a format in which it can be used will continue to be an aspiration of all commanders. Significant time will be spent in collating, sifting and analysing data and, occasionally, commanders will have to take action in the absence of the level of information they might like. Borrowing a technique from that great fictional British detective, Sherlock Holmes, allows us to ask the question as to what we know and infer from it that which we don’t yet know. This allows the command to set clear, but dynamic, intelligence collection requirements. It is always the case that under great stress people perform tasks in a familiar manner – the great aphorism ‘if you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always got’ applies here and competent commanders will force themselves to look at alternative methods of meeting the overall mission!

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A young US Air Force pilot, John Boyd, flew in the Korean War and was well aware of the enormous attrition rate against US fighter aircraft. The problem seemed to be that as the aircraft passed into North Korean airspace, the situation was so complex that all the cockpit alarms were set off. In the ensuing panic, pilots failed to recognise critical alerts and concentrated on those of a lesser threat (perhaps simply because their alarms made more noise). John Boyd developed the OODA Loop – a thought process that required the user to Observe, Orient, Decide and Act – a thought process that, as a loop, goes on and on in a dynamically responsive manner.2 We can learn from this mental process, after all, the only reason we need senior officers is to bring their experience and knowledge to bear in solving complex problems.

Conclusion Managing a crisis is, inevitably a risky business! We cannot resolve the situation by doing things in the same old way! Great leaders have always been prepared to take risks and to adopt new doctrine and the best of these know the people working for them, their strengths, foibles, weaknesses, etc. We need to practise and train regularly and push our teams to the limits and beyond; we can be certain that the next crisis will not be the same as the last one. We should encourage new thinking even if we have to put up with maverick behaviour!

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Much of crisis management is ‘common sense’ – unfortunately it is not that common. Good training and instinctive responses will allow the team to be ready and primed for whatever is thrown at them next. Train your teams to be innovative and, as the commander, be prepared to condone and support ‘new thinking.’ Use the OODA Loop (or other similar tools) to ensure that your team looks at what is going on and understands the situation before deciding upon a course of action. The key component is to continue to observe the situation to see if your actions have achieved what you set out to achieve or, perhaps, made it worse! Your men and women are as vital a resource to the success of your mission as are any of the bright, shiny toys in your inventory. Use them wisely and good luck!

Bibliography Coram, Robert, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Back Bay Books, 2004).

 2

See Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Back Bay Books, 2004).

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Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism U. Gürbüz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.2333/978-1-61499-309-4-88

Energy Security and Terrorism Mitat ÇELKPALA1 Istanbul Kadir Has University, Turkey

Abstract. Energy security has emerged as an issue of great importance. As well as traditional aspects of energy security, a myriad of new aspects has emerged and continues to emerge such as tight oil and gas markets, increasing prices, alternative energy sources and their role, the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting and importing countries, geopolitical rivalries, and the increasing need for energy to the economic growth. The concept of energy security is vague. Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power. Keywords. Energy, security, terrorism.

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Introduction As Daniel Yergin has suggested, energy security became an issue on the eve of the World War I, when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill made a historic decision to shift the power source of the British Navy’s ships from coal to oil. 2 Churchill’s basic intention behind this decision was to make the British fleet faster than its German counterpart. This underlying decision was a watershed event that made the issue of energy security an important issue of national strategy and security. With this decision, British decisionmakers shifted their attention towards the Middle East because this switch meant that the Royal Navy could rely not on coal from British sources anymore but instead had to rely on oil supplies from the Middle East. This meant a new strategy for British decisionmakers and a new threat for security structures. Thus, from then on, energy security became a question of national strategy such that energy security means, in Churchill’s words, the “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” Since Churchill’s conspicuous decision, energy security has repeatedly emerged as an issue of great importance and it is so once again in today’s world. Currently, as well as the traditional aspects of energy security, a myriad of new aspects has emerged and continues to emerge: tight oil and gas markets, increasing prices, alternative energy sources and their role, the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting and importing countries, geopolitical rivalries, and the increasing need for energy to the economic growth. At present, the issue of energy security is not restricted to oil. High natural gas prices and the situation in the gas sector, the electric power blackouts in the US and power cuts in Europe, hurricanes and their negative effects on supply, nuclear energy-related issues together with alternative resources make the issue more complicated. This article aims at discussing and

 1 2

Prof., Dr., Department of International Relations. Email: [email protected]. Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006), pp. 69-70.

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analyzing basic parameters of energy security through taking different aspects into account.

1. Definition: What does Energy Security Mean?

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The concept of energy security is vague. Definitions range from uninterrupted oil supplies to the physical security of energy facilities to support for biofuels and renewable energy sources. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power. Traditionally, the concept of energy security was limited to the security of consuming countries and energy security issues focused on the possibility of disruptions to the crude oil supply from the Middle East. From this perspective, the traditional elements of energy security were classified as supply sources, demand centers, geopolitics and market structures. Especially during the energy crisis of the 1970s, the primary focus for the Western industrial countries was on oil supply sources and geopolitics.3 The current energy security system was created in the 1970s to counter the crude oil disruptions in the Middle East. As a response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the industrialized countries, most of whom were the members of OECD, established the International Energy Agency. The basic aim was to ensure coordination among those countries to counter the disruption of energy supply, encourage collaboration on energy policies, avoid bruising scrambles for supplies, and deter any future use of an oil weapon by the exporters.4 Thus the term ‘energy security’ was narrowly viewed as reduced dependence on oil consumption and imports, particularly in the OECD and other major oil importing countries. From those days on, the term ‘diversification’ then became the main or key concept in energy security. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the term diversification is still a key concept in energy security, the environment and content has changed a lot in the last couple of decades. Some issues remained the same of course but some have changed. Regional and social turmoil are still unsettled in the main producing areas but there are new aspects in the system. The potential for global terrorism focused on energy supply systems was not a consideration in the mid-1970s. Currently global or local terrorism threatens the entire system. The Iraqi war and Iran’s nuclear program have led and could lead to new oil and gas disruptions. Political turmoil in Nigeria and Venezuela could have serious consequences in energy supply chain and has significantly disrupted oil supplies. Climate change and related regulations as a new aspect of the energy security are on the agenda. Natural disasters and their consequences are new phenomena that researchers have to take into account. The hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005 showed everyone that consumers in the US or elsewhere are at stake and have to face the new risks in terms of higher and more volatile prices both at the gasoline pump and in their heating bills. As a result, the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg in July 2006 took energy security as the key concept in its agenda. The G-8 countries renewed their focus on energy security and discussed the tight oil market, high oil and gas prices, the threat of terrorism,



3 World Energy Forum, The New Energy Security Paradigm (World Economic Forum Energy Vision Update, 2006), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Energy.pdf (last visited Sep. 22, 2012). 4 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” p.75.

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instability in some exporting countries, a nationalist backlash in those regions, geopolitical rivalries and developing countries’ increasing need for energy to power their economic growth. The oil and gas crisis just before the economic crises in 2008 forced everyone to think about the energy security issue on a wider dimension. With the overall energy system stretched to its limits, the critical physical connections between gas and power, oil refineries and power, and between pipeline distribution systems and power, led everyone on the planet to think about energy security-related issues once more. Thus the term ‘energy security’ does not encompass only the flow of oil and diversification. It now extends to the entire infrastructure of energy supply that supports the global economy – off-shore platforms, long distance oil and gas pipelines, oil and gas tankers, refineries, storage and generating facilities, transmission lines and distribution systems. More narrowly, energy security is defined as the “reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices” or as “securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable and stable prices in order to sustain economic performance and growth.” Within this definition, prices and supply diversity are critical components of energy security. It should be stressed that energy security (the continuous availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices) has several aspects. It means limited vulnerability to transient or longer disruptions of imported supplies. It also means the availability of local and imported resources to meet growing demand over time and at reasonable prices. This perspective put forward of us three basic elements, essentially encapsulated in the concept of energy security: availability, accessibility and affordability. Among those three elements, availability means availability on demand. We may amplify this by saying that when a country needs or wants energy, it should be available. Accessibility means the nation should be able to access energy sources globally to ensure uninterrupted growth. Affordability means the affordability of the energy being procured to ensure that the growth engine is not negatively impacted by the prices of energy. From this perspective, it could be said that while rich countries are able to find willing sellers, the issue of energy security gains importance for developing countries which have invested huge amounts of money in infrastructure but still face issues of energy at high costs. As a result, the energy security issue is becoming related with reducing and dealing with risks.5 Reducing risks is meant to reduce the requirement of energy by increasing efficiency in the production and use of energy. Looking at global sources to stake equity and generating alternate energy supplies are other aspects. When it comes to the issue of dealing with risks, topics such as strategic storage, infrastructure, technology and having resources in place are coming to the fore. Thus the current definition of energy widens from how to handle any disruption of oil supplies from producing countries to include the protection of the entire energy supply chain and infrastructure. The challenge of energy security grows because the scale of the global trade in energy grows substantially as world markets become more integrated. In line with this perspective, Daniel Yergin defines ten key principles of energy security:



5 Hisham Khatib, “Energy Security,” Energy and the Challange of Sustainability (UNDP, 2000), pp. 112131.

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x x x x x x x x x x

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Diversification of energy supply source is the starting point for energy security. There is only one oil market. A ‘security margin’ consisting of spare capacity, emergency stocks and redundancy in critical infrastructure is important. Relying on flexible markets and avoiding the temptation to micromanage them can facilitate speedy adjustment and minimizing long-term damage. Understand the importance of mutual interdependence among companies and governments at all levels. Foster relationships between suppliers and consumers in recognition of mutual interdependence. Create a proactive physical security framework that involves both producers and consumers. Provide good quality information to the public before, during and after a problem occurs. Invest regularly in technological change within the industry. Commit to research, development and innovation for longer-term energy balance and transitions.6

As it was seen clearly from this analysis, the definition of the energy security widens to encompass different aspects of political, financial, technological, social and security agendas.

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2. Maximizing Energy Security By taking these myriad aspects of the issue, some authors suggest different dimensions of energy security for both energy-consuming and energy-producing countries in order to reach a comprehensive and clear definition of the term. Alhaji identifies six competing dimensions of the term: economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security dimensions. 7 He argued that these dimensions, reflecting the integration of energy policy into other policies and balancing all these dimensions within an energy policy, is not an easy task. Because, despite their universal and general character, each of these dimensions’ weight differs by place and time; the interaction among them also differs from country to country and from time to time. Thus, he sees the concept of energy security as “an amoebaean concept at its best.”8 It changes shape and dimensions continuously. Thus, a careful and efficient policymaker in the long run can only maximize energy security. The economic dimension of energy security is related to the strength of the relationship between energy consumption and GDP. That necessitates the use of fiscal and monetary policies. The economic dimension of energy security ensures that the scarcity of energy resources should not stall economic growth, increase inflation, raise unemployment, weaken the balance of payments or reduce the value of country’s

 6

Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security and Markets,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., Woodrow Wilson Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 7 A.F. Alhaji, “What is Energy Security,” Energy Politics IV (2008), pp. 62-82. 8 Ibid, p. 73. Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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currency. The impact of scarcity of those resources on these key macrovariables depends on the strength of the relationship between energy consumption and the GDP. The solution does not lie in the energy sector nor is it related to the policymakers in ministries of energy but requires the use of fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, fiscal and monetary policies should be integrated into any energy policy and vice versa. Policymakers can enhance the economic dimension of energy security through the implementation of a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. The environmental dimension is related to the incorporation of environmental objectives into energy policies. Pollution or increasing prices are aspects of the environmental dimension. Since the environmental impact of producing, transporting and burning fossil fuels has health and economic consequences, several countries have incorporated environmental objectives into their energy policy. Nevertheless the dichotomy of development and environmental concerns is still an issue.

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The social dimension is the most ignored dimension of energy security. Most energy policies do not focus on the social dimension. The energy security debate mostly focuses on external factors that are related to the security of supplies and the political situation in the producing countries. The environmental dimension of the domestic aspects has recently gained precedence but the social dimension has barely gained attention. The social dimension of energy security might require governments to intervene to reduce the energy gap between the rich and poor. The larger the proportion of the poor who are not able to get energy resources, the more energy insecurity the country experiences – a social issue. When energy prices are high, the gap between the rich and the poor became obvious. The result of such an energy gap could well be political unrest, which will reduce economic growth. The foreign policy dimension of energy security deals with the relationship between energy sources and politics. Energy and politics are intertwined with each other. The fear of shortage of energy resources may force some disadvantageous countries to ally with producing powers with whom they would not otherwise cooperate. The need for energy might force some countries to take foreign policy decisions that would compromise other important issues or principles. Accordingly, several countries have linked energy security to strategic and defense considerations, an indication that they realize the foreign policy dimension of their country’s energy security. The need for energy might force some countries to limit their foreign policy options. This dimension thus focuses on diplomatic and trade relations. The technical dimension is a government’s push to improve energy security by supporting technologies that facilitate the production of renewable energy resources. Technology is energy security’s eternal partner. The security dimension of energy security deals with the physical security of the energy infrastructure and the energy needs of the security apparatus. Threats to the physical security of the energy infrastructure include terrorist attacks, human error, natural disasters and technical malfunctions. Measures of the security dimension include the geographical location of energy resources and facilities relative to the location of the markets, the locations of various threats and the area prone to natural disaster. These measures also include frequency of terror attacks and energy consumption.

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3. Energy Security and Terrorism The potential for catastrophic terrorist attacks that affect critical energy infrastructure is increasing. Despite the fact that international terrorist incidents between 1999 and 2006 displayed very little interest in energy targets, the risk of a successful terrorist attack in the current global environment is very high, especially for energy facilities located in certain geographic regions. According to the Oklahoma City-based National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, there were at least 330 terrorist attacks on oil and gas facilities worldwide in the period from 1990 to 2005.9 Of the almost 2000 international terrorist incidents, only 23 (about 1 percent) involved utilities; the global al-Qaeda organization has conducted 25 attacks since 9/11, none of them similar to the Limburg. Other attacks on oil infrastructure include a failed attempt on an Iraqi oil terminal in 2004 and a failed suicide bombing of the Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia on 24 February 2006. The terrorists were unable to penetrate the compound. The Saudis also arrested individuals in 2006 and 2007 that purportedly were planning attacks against oil facilities.10

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There is an asymmetric relation between the critical energy infrastructure and terrorist activities; this relationship has two main dimensions: the strategic-political perspective and the operational-tactical perspective. The strategic-political perspective is closely related to a general or global political outlook and has some links to regional politics. The Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Georgia energy crises and bargains are recent examples of that level. The operational-tactical perspective is related with more practical or field issues; it concerns itself with the protection of all those infrastructure facilities, along with the questions of “How to protect?” or “What kind of an infrastructure needed?” The energy infrastructure, which requires protection from possible terrorist attack, includes pipelines, oil and LNG tankers, pumping and compressor stations, oil platforms and refineries, storage units, liquefaction plants, regasification facilities, railways and trucks. Inflicting maximum damage and social disruption is a main objective for terrorist organizations. The consequences of an attack on the critical energy infrastructure could vary widely. That makes the critical energy infrastructure a basic target for terrorists. By attacking those targets, terrorists can create striking material and psychological losses on a nation’s critical assets and deprive people of their basic needs. Such an attack would have a direct effect on daily life because of its continuing consequences on other critical systems; it would have a spillover effect into other sectors. As far as energy is concerned, continuity is sensitive, because it is hard to immediately replace any interruption. The consequences of any successful attack on critical energy infrastructure would be myriad and have effects on producers, consumers and transit countries. By means of any attack, terrorists could deprive a supplier of the market, a transporter of income, and the consumers of energy. As to the time concern, critical infrastructure facilities and systems are also an outstanding target for terrorists. Any terrorist attack could be organized during the planning, construction or operational



9 Gareth M Winrow, “Protection of Energy Infrastructure”, in Combating International Terrorism: Turkey’s Added Value (James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron, eds., RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2009), pp. 19-21. 10 Michael Mihalka and David Anderson, “Is the Sky Falling? Energy Security and Transnational Terrorism”, Strategic Insights VII(3) (July 2008), available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/ OnlineJournal/2008/Jul/mihalkaJul08.html (last visited Sep. 22, 2012).

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stage. That serves the basic aim of any terrorist organization to act at the most opportune time. As was mentioned above, there are numbers of experiences in different countries – such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and others – that have demonstrated that critical energy infrastructure facilities remain attractive targets for terrorists. The risk of a successful terrorist attack is high, especially for energy systems and facilities or installations located in certain geographic regions. An example from Turkey could help to understand the impact of single incident on the producers, consumers and the transit country.

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On 5 August 2008, an explosion occurred in the Turkish section of the BakuTiblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. 11 Pumping one million barrels per day (bpd) of Caspian crude to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea for export to Western markets, the pipeline is widely regarded as one of the most important alternative paths carrying Central Asian and Caspian gas to the international market. The blast, which occurred on a pipe gate valve near the eastern Anatolian town of Refahiye in Erzincan province, caused one percent of the international oil transportation to stop. The line remained closed for fifteen days. Officially, it was claimed that the explosion was a mechanical or technical failure, arising from a fault in the system that had been detected prior to the blast. However, the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) claimed responsibility for the blast; it is widely believed that in fact it was an act of PKK sabotage. If it was a terrorist attack, the asymmetrical nature of the incident rapidly becomes apparent. It would have cost the PKK around $500 to conduct the attack but in contrast, the material loss of the explosion to the owner is striking. Overall, it was estimated to be in the region of $1.68 billion (1 billion barrels a day at $120 a barrel spread over 14 days = $1.68 billion). When we add the other costs such as burned oil in the pipelines, firefighting and personnel costs, suspension of oil flow, repairs and so on, the overall bill was somewhere in the region of $2 billion. We can compare this amount with the 2008 budget of security organizations that are responsible for protecting the pipelines in Turkey. For instance, the 2008 budget of the Gendarmeries General Command was $2.5 billion and the 2008 budget of the General Police Forces was $4.5 billion.12 Defining and securing Turkey’s critical infrastructure (CI), including energyrelated infrastructure, is now seen as a core part of the nationwide legal, administrative and security systems. This makes both central authorities and local governmental bodies – such as municipal administrations, provincial governors and sub-governors – responsible for defining and protecting these assets.13

 11

The BTC is one of the longest oil pipelines (1.776 Km) in the world and runs through the territories of three countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The BTC pipeline is operated by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.). It is a joint venture company consisting of 11 shareholders. The pipeline’s construction phase took 12 years at a cost of more than 5 bln US$. It has a capacity of 1 million barrels per day; 1.2% of world’s daily crude oil production flows through the BTC. 12 Mitat Çelikpala, “Protecting the Key National Utilities and Energy Infrastructure,” in Combating International Terrorism: Turkey’s Added Value(James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron, eds., RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2009), pp. 16-18. 13 For a detailed analysis, see Mitat Çelikpala and M. Melih Bademir, “Türkiye’de Petrol ve Do al Gaz Boru Hatlar n n Güvenli i: Politikalar ve Öneriler,” Stratejik Aratrmalar Dergisi 8(14) (14 January 2010), pp. 97-128.

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In terms of definition, at a local level, each province, under the authority of the provincial governor, has a provincial security commission composed of local officials (either appointed by the central government or elected locally), that is responsible for defining critical infrastructure. These commissions are also responsible to take any necessary measures to protect already defined CI within their area of jurisdiction and responsibility. Naturally, this may led to very different definitions of critical infrastructure, as well as different outcomes in terms of implementing related security policies at the local level. In addition, when we take some other local bodies – such as small local municipalities, firefighting bodies, regional environmental commissions, etc. – into account, the subject becomes more complicated. Meanwhile, the main central body responsible for protecting critical infrastructure in Turkey is the Ministry of Interior. In rural areas, dams and refineries are protected by the Gendarmerie General Command (GGC). In urban areas, or within the municipality boundaries, police forces take the responsibility. The Coast Guard, national intelligence bodies, Turkish Armed Forces, special border protection units, and rarely private security companies, also play some role. In sum, there is a fragmented security structure that occasionally results in coordination problems.

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In terms of protecting pipelines, the security regime is legally regulated by the Transit Flow of Petroleum through Pipelines Act, which came into force in 2000. The act vested the “relevant security forces of government,” that is the gendarmerie and police forces, with primary responsibility for protecting the pipelines. At the same time, the Private Security Services Act (Act Number 5188 of 2004) permits the private sector, specifically the bodies that own the infrastructure in question, to establish private security institutions for the purpose of protecting their assets. In this framework, the Gendarmerie General Command (GGC) and the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTA) are responsible to protect the pipelines and related facilities in Turkey. Apart from these two statutes, there is no other legislation in Turkey relating to the security of the pipelines. Thus, in rural areas, the existing pipelines in Turkey are protected by Gendarmerie stations established in cooperation with BOTA. The essential infrastructure of these stations is provided by BOTA but the stations are managed by the GGC in accordance with a signed protocol between these two bodies. This protocol indicates that while BOTA is responsible for the protection of the pipelines and other related energy facilities – such as gate valve facilities, pumping stations, observation facilities, etc. – inside their installations, the GGC is responsible for protecting them outside of the installation enclosure. In addition to Gendarmerie forces, legally authorized village guards, who are selected from among the local settlers, also take part in the protection process by patrolling pipelines that pass through their villages and environs. Additionally, in order to enhance the physical security conditions of those facilities, necessary investments such as fortification of the buildings, increasing the thickness of the walls, monitoring by closed-circuit TV and infrared cameras are being done by BOTA. Road blockers, vehicle controls, optics, infrared cameras and facility alarming systems are monitoring these facilities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. At the moment, the GGC has 35 teams and 33 stations to protect the pipelines and other related facilities all over the country. As noted above, all those stations were built

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by BOTA and are run by the GGC. Moreover, BOTA is responsible for the cost of maintenance. The first or framework protocol was signed between the GGC and BOTA after the construction of the Kirkuk-Yumurtal k pipeline in 1986. Later on, after the construction of the BTC pipeline, a similar protocol was signed by the parties in 2003. However, because of its international character, the BTC pipeline has a special status among the pipelines running through Turkey. The protection of the BTC pipeline’s Turkish section is guaranteed by the Turkish state in accordance with Article 12 of Home Country Agreement, signed in October 2000. The security of the BTC pipeline, similar to the other pipelines in Turkey, is provided by 11 Gendarmerie stations – consisting of 22 teams exclusively charged with the protection of BTC pipeline – built in cooperation with BOTA. Meanwhile, at Ceyhan, ships of the Turkish Coast Guard Command protect BTC shipment facilities and tankers.

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It should be noted that, apart from the 2008 Erzincan-Refahiye blast, there has not been any other serious attack against the pipeline. Until then, almost 30 incidents of vandalism or attempts to steal oil had been reported, but the pipeline had essentially been successfully protected by the security forces. However, the intention to increase the number of pipelines running through Turkey makes the protection of pipelines and other related critical infrastructure a sensitive issue. Problems of cooperation, lack of efficient communication between the responsible bodies and a lack of investment in the security structure for protecting the pipelines are the main issues confronting Turkish decisionmakers. In order to address these issues, there is now greater coordination between the GGC and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Energy and Interior Affairs. Security Coordination Meetings organized by these bodies, with the participation of representatives from the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish Intelligence Service and BOTA, have been held regularly. By and large, this system works well. However, some problems continue to arise due to lack of coordination and timing. At this point, it is also worth mentioning that, although the basic mission of the appointed Gendarmerie forces is to protect the pipelines and other related facilities, these forces are also responsible for providing general public order. That makes for a rather complex state of affairs. The heavy burden on the Gendarmerie necessitates a new outlook on critical infrastructure protection that will include the participation of the private sector. Turkey is now emerging as one of the key links between the main oil and gas producing countries and the key consumer markets. Already, Turkey has emerged as the main alternative route for energy transportation to the EU. Indeed, EU sources mention that the biggest 10 gas suppliers, holding 35 per cent of global gas reserves, either are, or might potentially be, interested in using Turkey as a transit country. Thus the international community is redefining Turkey’s regional and global position. Responding to this, Turkish policymakers have made raising Turkey’s profile as a transit country a key policy priority.14 They recognize that the development of new pipelines will increase Turkey’s wealth and importance.



14 The main pipelines running through in Turkey are the BTC, Kerkuk-Yumurtal k, Samsun-Ceyhan or Blue Stream and Iranian natural gas pipelines. In addition to those main pipelines, there is a 12,000 km internal pipeline network carrying oil and natural gas for Turkey’s internal consumption. Currently 4 per cent of the

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However, in order to carry this through, Turkey needs to address the security questions that arise. In part, these are related to neighborhood developments. The BTC explosion took place just days before the start of the Russo-Georgian War of August 2009. This in turn raised awareness of the need to take into account regional issues, such as the strategic balance in the Caucasus, the construction of alternative pipelines, and political differences in the area. At the same time, as the August blast on the BTC pipeline highlighted, there is a real possibility that terrorist organizations, such as the PKK, have started to revise their policies. The BTC pipeline, along with other pipelines, is an ideal target for militants wishing to destabilize the Turkish state. Thus, when planning new pipelines, attention must now also be given to the threat posed by the PKK. Meanwhile, even though many terrorism experts argue that state-sponsored terrorism is not as common as it was during the Cold War period, in Turkey’s neighborhood, where local conflicts still have strategic significance, it is still a factor. The explosion therefore requires us to redefine the public and private critical infrastructure (CI) and develop a new common security policy to protect these structures.15 The basic questions now on the agenda are: In which ways does Turkey protects those already existing pipelines and what kind of an infrastructure is needed to protect those new pipelines? Is the existing security structure sufficient for the protection of new pipelines and how Turkey can establish an efficient security system to protect those pipelines in coordination with its partners? Turkey’s goal of becoming an energy transit country, or even a hub, is still on the table. However, if it is to emerge as a hub or as an alternative route for both producers and consumers, the potential risks, including terrorist attacks, need to be considered. Security will be a central issue when making new investments in pipeline routes running across Turkey. As the statements by various terrorist organizations have shown, they realize this. Thus, in order to become a central energy transit route, Turkey will need to take steps to tackle terrorism and minimize the perceived threat that it poses. Sufficient amounts of money and human capital should be allocated in order that security can be professionalized and coordinated with related partners. Turkey will need to cooperate with its allies – most notably the EU and the US – and will have to develop its financial, administrative, institutional and technical capacity to protect its critical infrastructure efficiently. Within this context, Turkey has to become part of the common European energy policy outlook and the EU must allocate essential sources to fight terror and terrorism together with Turkey. The PKK is not only Turkey’s problem – its elimination is a common interest.

Conclusion In sum, all indications point to a widening in the definition of energy security. There is an improvement in energy security in all parts of the world, thanks to technological

 world’s oil passes through the Bosphorus and 7 per cent via the BTC pipeline. This means that 1 in every 16 barrels of oil consumed in the world passes through Turkey. 15 It is claimed that there have been more than 170 attacks, attempted attacks or suspected attacks on energy infrastructure in Turkey since 1989. Some of them were claimed by PKK. The Iranian pipeline is the main target since the last couple of years. There has been no officially recorded attack on the BTC pipeline but there have been approximately incidents of 30 theft and vandalism. Eight of them happened during the project construction phase. Çelikpala, “Protecting the Key National Utilities and Energy Infrastructure.”

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advances, adequacy of resources, and regional cooperation. The world will continue to depend on fossil fuels for decades to come. These fuels, nevertheless, have detrimental impacts on the environment that must be dealt with to achieve sustainable development. This requires promoting clean energy technologies, pursuing energy efficiency, developing renewable forms of energy, and providing technical assistance to developing countries, where most growth in energy use will take place. Being aware of all these facts, it has to be mentioned that no energy policy is complete or successful without focusing on the energy security. A discussion of energy security is useless without understanding its meaning and measuring and assessing it. The energy market is global. Deregulation and market liberalization pose questions for energy security and for the future role of the state with respect to energy security. To improve energy security, any country needs to collect relevant, up-to-date data, measure the various dimensions and assess energy security. Only than policy makers can make an informed decision and protect their country from future crises. A market lead to innovation, reduces costs, increase trade, improves allocation of resources, and spurs technological development, all of which enhance energy security. Markets also normally pursue short-term objectives, while energy security demands long-term planning, investment and political will. The state therefore needs to continue to play a role in ensuring national long-term security of supplies and protecting consumers.

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Bibliography Alhaji, A. F., “What is Energy Security,” Energy Politics IV (2008). Khatib, Hisham, “Energy Security,” Energy and the Challange of Sustainability (UNDP, 2000). Mihalka, Michael, and David Anderson, “Is the Sky Falling? Energy Security and Transnational Terrorism,” Strategic Insights VII(3) (July 2008). Mitat Çelikpala, “Protecting the Key National Utilities and Energy Infrastructure,” in Combating International Terrorism: Turkey’s Added Value (James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron, eds., RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2009). Mitat Çelikpala and M. Melih Bademir, “Türkiye’de Petrol ve Do al Gaz Boru Hatlar n n Güvenli i: Politikalar ve Öneriler,” Stratejik Aratrmalar Dergisi 8(14) (14 January 2010). Winrow, Gareth M., “Protection of Energy Infrastructure”, in Combating International Terrorism: Turkey’s Added Value (James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron, eds., RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2009). World Energy Forum, The New Energy Security Paradigm (World Economic Forum Energy Vision Update, 2006). Yergin, Daniel, “Energy Security and Markets,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., Woodrow Wilson Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Yergin, Daniel, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006).

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Environmental Safety of the Kyrgyz Republic Azamat K. TYNYBEKOV International Scientific Center, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Abstract. This article presents information about Kyrgyz Republic in the framework of environmental issues and safety in the Central Asia region. At present, the region of the Central Asia has collided with ecological disasters of huge scales or with threats of their occurrence. Thus the centers of infringement natural ecosystems were close to crisis. Keywords. Environmental safety, remote sensing, hazardous waste

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Introduction This article deals with the common environmental issues of the Central Asia countries. Now the region of the Central Asia has collided with ecological disasters of huge scales or with threats of their occurrence. Thus the centers of infringement on natural ecosystems were close to crisis. Anthropogenic factors of influence on an environment result in its scale degradation. This position is aggravated by the fact that the geography of zones of ecological threats covers extensive territory, switching and the adjacent states. We can see on Figure 2 that the Syr-Darya river water resources forming zone has a transboundary character. The data shows a problem in the form of ecological danger that includes the region of the Tien-Shan mountains. The basic sources of environmental issues are the: 1. Aral ecological crisis and its consequences for the natural environment of Central Asia region; 2. Irrational use and water resources management, influence of artificial water basins and dams, hydroelectric power stations on an environment; 3. Influence of the mining industry (mines, quarries); 4. Natural cataclysms and man-caused character 5. Natural disasters like earthquakes, floods, fires, mudflows, etc.; 6. Storage and recycling of waste products of manufacture, toxic substances, - radioactive materials and the uncontrolled dumping in the air and waters of the region;

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Figure 1. The Kyrgyz Republic in the Central Asia

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1. Radioactive and Chemical Pollution The Kyrgyz Republic - a sovereign state – is located in a northeast part of Central Asia. The territory stretches 900 km from west to east, 410 km from north to south, for an area of 198.5 sq. km. with a population of 5.1 million people (Fig. 4). Natural radiation is with us all the time in the environment. However only relatively recently did it become known that radon is very dangerous to human health. Parameters of the death rate of the population living on the southern coast of Lake Issyk-Kul, in the area of Dzhety-Oguz (78.5 %) and to Karakol (86.2 %), exceed the data on the Issyk-Kul areas (62.9 %) and the entire Kyrgyz Republic (61.7 %). Among malignant educations in the Issyk-Kul areas, the first place in the parameter of death rates is from cancer of a stomach (10.0 %), the second – simple cancer (8,6 %), and the third - malignant tumors of a lymph node (3,9 %). This data compels research to study the reasons for these conditions. To determine the radiological conditions in the Issyk-Kul region within a two-year period (1997-1998) we had carried out research under the project entitled the “Radiological Monitoring of the Issyk-Kul Region,” financed by FAST (US). The data of the level of radiating background of the territory has been received and maps with parameters of a level of radiation in the region were made.1 1 Azamat K. Tynybekov and Vladimir E. Matychenkov, "Radiological Characteristics of Underground Waters in Quaternary Deposits of Adjoint Issyk-Kul Artesian Basin and its Mountain Frame,” in Environment and Health of the People (Bishkek, 1999), pp. 78-86; Azamat K. Tynybekov and V.M. Matorin, “Research of Natural Phytoplankton on Lake Issyk-Kul with Use of Submersible Fluorimeter,” Bulletin of the Moscow State University (Biology) 16(1) (2002), pp. 22-23; David . Hamby and zamat .

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Results of the completed job show that, in the researched territory, the common level of external radiation is within the limits of normal, but the parameters of a level of internal radiation at some times exceed the natural norm. There is a necessity to carry out detailed further research in order to find the reasons for the high contents of radon in the air of the region.

Figure 2. Radioactive, Chemical and Biological Hazards in Central Asia

Calculations show that, at full destruction of the listed storehouses, the volume of radioactive tails which can be introduced into the area of the river cone of dispersion can makes 1,2 million m3 of general radioactive nuclides of 10 thousand curies. Thus the area of pollution totals 300 sq. km. The main reasons for the pollution of water resources are imperfections in hydraulic engineering constructions of tailing dumps, their protective constructions, and emergency and catastrophic situations; in many cases, the contents of storehouses the filtration of their liquid phase takes place at the accommodation of storehouses in water-meadow and channels of the rivers inevitably results in their pollution radioactive nuclides and other toxic substances. From the centers of pollution begins

Tynybekov, “A Screening Assessment of External Radiation Levels on the Shore of Lake Issyk-Kul in the Kyrgyz Republic,” Health Physics 77(4) (1999), . 427-430. Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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the migration of the radioactive nuclides in a hydrographic network and in underground waters, so that a halo of pollution extending to tens of kilometers is formed.

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Figure 3. Radioactive Wastes and Dump Tailings

Figure 4. Indication of Radiation Level near Shop No.7 and Tailing Dumps

As an example to illustrate mistakes of the initial stage uranium mining, we shall consider a geo-ecological situation in Mailuu-Suu. Waste storage sites (radioactive wastes, dump tailings, slags) in the territory of Kyrgyz Republic are shown in Figure 9. Here in a valley of the river Mailuu-Suu, 30 km from border with Uzbekistan, radioactive waste products are stored in 23 tailing dumps and 13 slag-heaps. The total amount of radioactive tailings totalss 2 million  and total radioactivity about 50 thousand curies Research has shown that a number of tailing dumps and slag-heaps, placed in a channel of the Mailuu-Suu river and its inflows because of an imperfect design of dams, a water-saturation of tails, and the unreliability of waterproofing became sources of the regular radioactive pollution of the river waters. Since the 1990s in the seismically and tectonic active area Mailuu-Suu, the landslide process has become more active.

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2. Impact on the Environment of the Kumtor Gold Mining The Barskaun river has an average long-term discharge more than 4m3/s, and is included in the list of the major rivers of Issyk-Kul basin. It belongs to the glacial-snow feeding type of river with maximum flow in August. Under this type of feed, generally half (in the case of the Barskaun river more than 60%) of the annual flow is provided by a significant level of glaciers melting from July-September. The Barskaun river basin catchment’s area measurements on the hydrological post of Sasyk river creek, which is located 6 km above Barskaun village, total 346 sq km at an average altitude of catchment of 3480 m.2 Before the Barskaun damage on May 20, 1998 when cyanide was introduced into water that went to the village, the river and basin hydrological status was no different than other regional rivers. This damage increased the interest in this region, including the contents of river water, especially with regards to cyanide. Considering hydrochemical anomalies, the Barskaun river basin – we mean firstly substantial distinction of forming the water content of these two components – ultimately influenced the regional peculiarity of all river content. The appreciable growth of the concentration of chlorine and the common rigidity in water in the Barskaun river can be explained by the fact that in the river there is a partial dump above, leaching out easily soluble carbonate and a part of a file of an irrigation or the washed off ground. The abnormal contents in natural waters of a sulfate–ion compound, especially in a mountain landscape, is characteristic of a river basin like the Barskaun basin for two main reasons – the leaching out of plaster and other easily soluble sulfates of breeds and oxidation of sulfides, with pyrite, being the most widespread among them.3 Thus, the water content anomaly of the Barskaun river has the same relative concentration as other regional currents with sulphate-ion, the most probable source of which is the oxidation process of sulphate, more perhaps pyrite. Also a huge worldwide gold mining company - Kumtor -- is located over the watershed of the Barskaun river of the Teskei-Ala-Too range, where the ore deposit level is associated with the pyritization of rocks. We suppose that the hydrochemical anomaly of the Barskaun river is linked with the formation of this gold field, probably as reflected by the spread of the higher pyriteness beyond the studded ore area.

3. Suggestions to Address the Problems It is impossible to provide ecological well-being in one, separately taken area of a country, as well as in general in any one territory. From here follows the priority of global interests - preservation of the forming environment and the resource reproducing properties of the Earth as a whole. Collective interaction and acceptance of emergency measures can be demanded at the calculation of costs of ecological accidents whose probability of occurrence can be 2 Azamat K. Tynybekov, “Problems of Influence of Radioactive Storages on Ecology (Eco-Informa Conference, Chicago, IL, May 16-20, 2001). 3 Azamat K. Tynybekov, “Research of Ecological Risk Modeling: Influence of Uranium Storage on the Environment,” Radiation Safety Problems in the Caspian Region (Springer, 2004), pp. 79-84.

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increased by natural cataclysms (earthquakes, landslips, mudflows, flooding, droughts, huge forest fires, a stampede of cattle) or terrorist acts of sabotage. As shown, the uniform ecological politics in the region of Central Asia should be established on the basis of a interstate Agreement on Maintenance of Regional Safety. This Agreement should include all basic elements of obligations of member states on the basis of the international experience in the field of legal aspects of preservation of the environment. The interstate committee on ecology in Central Asia should include such functions as technical supervision, wildlife management, sanitary-and-hygienic supervision, arbitration supervision, and also collective structure of a fast reaction force – a kind of ‘first aid’ in case of the occurrence of an extreme ecological situation, or accident. If one of the main structures of the given interstate body should become independent, a reorganized interstate coordination water-economic commission (ICWC) should have the functions of regulation of water-distribution; the strict account and the control of consumption of water; introduction of water safety in irrigation, etc. Thus performance of the following conditions is necessary: 1. Transparency and reporting of resources used; 2. Inclusion in the structure of the commission of representative water-users and non-governmental organizations; 3. Expansion of the mandate of the commission on distribution of water for the needs of an agriculture and power; 4. Increase in the status of the commission at the expense of involving in it the representatives of the governments of countries - participants;

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5. Maintenance with powers by definition of quotas on consumption of water, to closing of objects and constructions, to removal of the international sanctions. The important factor of effective functioning of such an interstate body is the supply of information regarding the ecological safety of the region.

4. Glaciers in Tien-Shan Mountains The glaciation is one of the important elements of a spreading surface in the Ton river basin and in the greater measure the glaciers of the Tien-Shan mountains (Figure 5) which influences the quantitative characteristics of such a drain. We undertook a more detailed study of a glaciation. It was made by first defining the area of a modern glaciation. For this work, two sources of the data for the various time periods were used: x

A topographical map of scale 1:250000, executed on the basis of the data of air photography from 1963;

x

Space picture from NASA for June 2001.

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A lot of attention was given to the accuracy of the delimitation of glaciation, since on a space picture there was a small percentage of overcast that could lead to a mistake in definition of the real sizes of the objects being researched. Digitized layers of 23 glaciers have indistinct borders, because of the presence of insignificant overcast on the space picture (Figure 6) of the 23 researched glaciers.

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Figure 5. Glacier of the Tien-Shan Mountains

Figure 6. Layer of Glaciers of the Tone River Basin, Imposed on a Space Picture

Scientists have noticed the universal reduction of glaciers in the world since the 1970s and their sharp reduction since the 1980s especially. A similar process was conducted for the glaciers of the Teskei Ala- ridge. According to research carried out on one of glaciers of the Kyrgyz Ala- ridge, which forms the Sokuluk river basin, the speed of the reduction of the glaciers has practically doubled, from 0.6 % for the period

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from 1963 to 1986 to 1.3 % for the period from 1986 to 2000. On Figure7, the glaciation observable since 1963 is submitted with the diagram of changes to the area. The area of glaciers for the last 38 years has decreased more than 28 %. From 1963 to 1986, the area of glaciers has decreased 13.3%, and from 1986 to 2000 – 17.1 %. During the period from 1963 to 2008, glaciers completely disappeared.

Area, km2

Those glaciers are Class I glaciers (area